

AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

VOL. I

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VOLUME
ONE



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
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This work, the only complete history of the Russian revolution, appeared first in German during the summer and autumn of 1927. It was published in fortnightly parts by the Neuer Deutscher Verlag of Berlin, whom we have to thank for the originals of most of the photographs contained in it.

The present volume carries the story of the revolution from the beginning of the century to the summer months of 1917 when the struggle for power was growing more and more acute. A second volume will contain the history of the seizure of power by the Soviets in October, 1917, the civil war, the "New Economic Policy," and the first steps taken towards socialist reconstruction; we hope to publish this during 1928.

Material on the work and writings of Lenin was provided by the Lenin Institute in Moscow, which is at present preparing a definitive edition of his works. Material for almost all the chapters was provided by leading participants in the revolution, including Bukharin, Krupskaya, Lunacharski, Olminski, Pokrovski, Rykov, Stalin, Stepanov-Skvorzov, Tomski and Yaroslavski. Several chapters have also been drafted, written or revised by one or more of these leaders of the revolutionary movement; and their help has made it possible for this History to be published as an authoritative account of events the importance of which has not yet been fully recognised.

M. L.



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THEORY OF THE EARTH

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One—THE ECONOMIC ANTECEDENTS OF THE REVOLUTION

THE revolution of 1917 did not come like a flash of lightning in a clear sky. It was prepared for by the past history of Russia; for many years the waves of revolution had been lapping round the foundations of the Tsar's throne; for many years the masses by their struggle not only against Tsarism but against the bourgeoisie had been prepared for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

There is no space here to consider the first stages in the growth of the Russian revolutionary movement—nor is it necessary for this book. Nevertheless even in this short sketch some attention must be paid to the first Russian revolution, since, as Lenin truly remarked, it was a sort of general rehearsal for the 1917 revolution.

When the workers and peasants began the class war in 1917 they were armed by the experiences gained in the first Russian revolution of 1905, and it was this fact above all which enabled them to achieve their victory.

That is why, although no historical analysis is made here of the revolutionary movement from the 17th to the 19th century, it has been considered essential to deal in detail with the 1905 to 1907 revolution, and to make a comparative examination of the tactics of the revolutionary (Bolshevik) and the opportunist (Menshevik) wings of the Social Democrats in this rehearsal for the year 1917.

The revolution of 1905-1907 was a bourgeois revolution against a background of world imperialism—then growing and increasing in strength—and intensified by the inner struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. In this first revolution the outline of a truly revolutionary alliance of workers and peasants could be seen, under the leadership of the proletariat, as against the counter-revolutionary alliance of the great landowners and bourgeoisie. The origins of this grouping lie in the peculiarities of the pre-revolutionary social and economic development of Russia.

In order to understand the causes and motives of the first Russian revolution one must first of all investigate the conditions in which Russian agriculture developed. Up to the revolution, the great landlords were the dominant element in the countryside. Side by side with peasant holdings of about 8 or 9 acres, there were great estates with scores of thousands of acres.

Lenin came to the following conclusions in his work on agriculture in the pre-revolutionary period: 700 landowners on an average disposed of 80,000 acres of land each. These 700 persons possessed three times as much land as the 600,000 smallholders.

How did these landowners manage their estates? An investigation made by a bourgeois economist at the end of the 19th century—an investigation following on a year of bad harvest—showed that the great landlords who concentrated in their hands about three-quarters of the total cultivable soil only cultivated themselves about one-fifth of their lands.

As the result of an examination of 12,000 estates it was found that on about 50 per cent. of the farms of the black soil region (the most fertile in Russia) there were no cattle and that about half the farms had no equipment of their own. On many farms no farm buildings existed. In the black soil region such unequipped lands formed more than a third of all the farms examined; outside the black soil region a little less than one-fifth.

This means that most of the great landlords undertook no farming on a large scale. The landlord used his right of possession of the land to exploit the peasants in a semi-feudal manner. It was found that at the end of the 19th century the landowners of the black soil zone leased about 50 per cent. of their possessions, outside the black soil zone from 30 per cent. to 45 per cent., and that for this leased land the peasants had to pay an extraordinarily high rent. Sometimes the landlord compelled the peasant to give up to him half of what was produced on the landlord's soil with the peasant's own equipment. In some places the leases made the peasants complete serfs. The peasant who held a strip of land from the landlord had to furnish in return a considerable amount of labour, even providing his own equipment, for the cultivation of the landlord's estate. The landlords brought in no new machinery, in no wise modernised the management of their estates, inaugurated no new methods of production, or only did so to an inconsiderable extent. The only purpose for which they made use of their right of possession of so much land was the feudal exploitation of the peasantry.

Of course, there were already certain indications of progress in the management of the large estates, certain first steps in the direction of capitalistic development, some transition to capitalistic methods of management, but all this was not characteristic of the type of agriculture prevailing among the landowners. The landowner was usually predominantly a feudal lord of the soil and not a capitalist producer.

It is clear that in such circumstances methods of agriculture could not develop quickly among the peasantry, nor production reach an economically higher level. Anyhow, one can never speak of the peasantry as a whole, since amongst them there was a considerable differentiation. They were being drawn more and more to the exchange of goods in the market, and were delivering more and more grain on to the market, and all of this was breaking up the old peasant community. Some of the most energetic, enterprising and able peasants became a village bourgeoisie, which in its turn exploited the poor of the village.

But these differences within the ranks of the peasantry and this inequality of wealth were not the decisive and characteristic features of the period. Much greater and much sharper was the contrast between the landlord class and the peasantry as a whole. The peasantry, even the most prosperous of them, could not materially improve their methods of cultivation under the existing conditions of land tenure. For this reason, the whole village, the prosperous peasant and the village bourgeois no less than the poor peasantry, strove for the overthrow of the landlords and for the destruction of the feudal system of land tenure. The pressure of the peasantry on the landlords and the first foundations for a revolutionary movement amongst the peasants will become clear by taking a few figures into account. For instance, the number of horses owned by the peasants in the 50 provinces of European Russia diminished during the 10 years from 1888 to 1898 from 19.6 million to 17 million, and the number of cattle from 34.6 million to 24.5 million.

During the same period (1888 to 1898) in the Central Russian provinces, where the landowner exploited the peasant in a particularly cruel and pitiless manner, the number of peasant farms which had either no horses or from one to six horses each, changed rapidly. The position in 1898, taking 1888 as 100 per cent., was as follows:

	Without horses	With 1 horse	2 horses	3 horses	4 horses	5 horses	6 horses
Farms	122%	125%	96%	65%	57%	41%	41%

The number of farms without horses or with only one horse had considerably increased,



NICHOLAS THE BLOODY.

while on the other hand, the number of farms which had more than one horse had decreased.

In several provinces of Central Russia, a decrease in the amount of cultivated land is also to be found, the decrease being about 18 per cent. during the second half of the 19th century. Peasant agriculture in the process of development came up against the great landowners who, by means of exploitation and by the feudal chains which they imposed upon the peasants, prevented them from freeing themselves from poverty and plunged them into the deepest misery. The great majority of peasant households at the beginning of the 20th century were almost destitute.

This fundamental contrast between the great landlords and the peasants whom they exploited was at the root of the struggle which took place from 1905 to 1907.

After the freeing of the serfs by the "Peasants' Reform" of 1861, Russia became not only a country of great estates and of feudal exploitation, but also a country of capitalist industry. Russia became a capitalist country in the last thirty years of the 19th century. A network of large capitalist

enterprises, factories and works—some of which gave employment to more than 10,000 workers—spread over the land. In these years the rapidity of Russia's capitalist development was greater than that of many of the old capitalist countries of Western Europe.

In the following figures a comparison is made between the growth of various branches of production in Russia and in Western Europe and America:

The production of pig iron between 1890 and 1899 increased in England by 18 per cent., in the U.S.A. by 50 per cent., in Germany by 72 per cent., in France by 31 per cent., in Belgium by 32 per cent., and in Russia by 108 per cent. The total production of the Russian pig iron industry was larger during this period than that of Austria-Hungary, Belgium and France, and at the beginning of the 20th century it occupied fourth place in the production of the world.

The increase in the production of iron and steel during the same period, 1890 to 1899, was as follows: England 80 per cent., U.S.A. 63 per cent., Germany 78 per cent., France 67 per cent., Belgium 48 per cent., and Russia 116 per cent.

Changes in the production of coal for the same period are as follows: in England an increase of 22 per cent., in America of 61 per cent., in Germany of 52 per cent., in France of 26 per cent., in Austria-Hungary of 26 per cent., in Belgium of 8 per cent., in Russia of 131 per cent.

In the production of oil Russia had only one competitor, the United States. In the years 1890 to 1899, the production of the United States increased by 9 per cent., that of Russia by 132 per cent. Russia made a tremendous advance, and in so doing changed places with the United States. Whereas at the beginning of the decade Russia accounted for only 37.7 per cent. of the total product of the two countries, at the end of the same decade the position was reversed: the United States had 42.7 per cent. against Russia's 57.3 per cent.

The Russian cotton industry at the beginning of the 20th century was only second to that of England and America. In four years, from 1893 to 1897, the value of Russia's total product had increased to 1,104 million roubles* and the number of workers employed to 515,000. The political economist Flinn-Yenotajevski says of Russia's capitalist transformation:

"It could be said that the oil-bearing regions were connected up with the mining industry of the South Russian region by means of the Grosni and Vladikavkas railway running close to Rostov, these mining regions being in their turn connected up with the sugar industry district which had Kiev as its centre. Further west Polish capitalism was advancing with rapid strides, and in the Baltic provinces large scale industry was developing at the same speed. The industries of the central regions were growing generally, particularly the capitalist textile industry; the mining and metallurgical industry of the Urals was growing, and so also was capitalist industry in the Petersburg district, and everywhere it showed its peculiar social characteristics. Further to the north, Finnish capitalism—whose fate in the history of the last few years has been closely bound up with that of Russia—was developing."

The growth dealt with here is that of large scale industry. As always in the history of capitalism large undertakings became of ever greater importance with the progressive development of production. The enterprises which are best organised technically, are best equipped and have plenty of capital and high productive capacity, will always compete successfully against small enterprises. Therefore, in Russia at the end of the 19th century, large scale undertakings grew and flourished at the expense of small and middle-sized ones. These facts can be illustrated by a few examples. Lenin gives the following:

In the year 1866, of the total number of workers employed in large scale industry (enterprises employing over 100 workers), 27 per cent. were in factories employing over 1,000 workers; in 1879 these employed 40 per cent. and in 1890, 46 per cent. This means that almost half the workers engaged in the large scale enterprises were working in the factories employing over 1,000 workers each. In 1894 the 68 larger enterprises in the cotton industry employed nearly three times as many people as the remaining 156. Therefore, when we speak of the development of Russian capitalism in the 19th century, we refer to the development of large scale production employing thousands of workers and organised in accordance with the latest technical discoveries. In this respect Russia is similar to capitalist Western Europe, and can be considered as a country of large scale capitalism.

What led to such a rapid, one might say an enormous, growth of industry in Russia

* A rouble is approximately two shillings in value.

in the 19th century? First of all the development of her railways. The Russian landowner was year by year drawn further into the sphere of influence of the world grain market. He exported continually increasing quantities of grain to Western Europe. In order to bring this grain quickly to the Western European markets, the autocratic State of the landowners had to build railways to connect the agricultural lands with the Black Sea and Baltic ports. This is the explanation of the construction of the Russian railways at the end of the 19th century. In addition the railways had to connect the agrarian provinces with the industrial ones in order to make possible an exchange of goods within the country and to enable the inhabitants of the villages to make use, to a considerable extent, of the products of the towns; also to help on the increasing exchange of goods and to draw the peasant's husbandry into general trade.

At the beginning of the sixties there were in Russia 1,488 versts* of railway lines; at the beginning of the seventies, 10,202 versts; at the beginning of the eighties, 21,155; at the beginning of the nineties, 27,229, and at the beginning of the year 1900, 41,714 versts. This extraordinary activity in railway construction naturally had its effect on the general industrial development of the country. The normal progress of railway construction required a corresponding organisation of the branches of industry connected with it.

Locomotives were required for the railways, and these had to be manufactured. Rolling stock was required; great quantities of sleepers were required. In order to build railway stations, an increasing quantity of iron and building materials had first to be produced. Then the construction of the railways brought in enormous numbers of workmen, and the larger their number the greater was their demand for articles of consumption. These articles of consumption again had to be produced by the various branches of industry concerned. The workers needed clothing, shoes and other articles of daily use. It is clear that the construction of the Russian railways, undertaken in the interest of the landowners, gave a tremendous impetus to the industrial development of the country.

Another circumstance which favoured this industrial development was the cheapness of labour in Russia and the high profits which could accordingly be made in industry.

The "Reform" of the sixties, and above all the whole policy of the "feudal state," set the pace for the emigration of impoverished peasants from village to town. These peasants swelled the ranks of the tremendous army of free unemployed cheap labour. Wages in Russia were much lower than in the capitalist States of Western Europe and it is obvious that this fact encouraged the flow of capital into industry.

A third and especially important circumstance which favoured industrial development was the influx of foreign capital and its investment in Russian industry. 600 million roubles is an approximate valuation of the total capital which came into Russia from abroad at the beginning of the 20th century, attracted by the possibilities of favourable investment. This capital was mainly French and German. The capitalist penetration of the Donetz Basin was undoubtedly to a large extent due to the importation of foreign capital. The leaven of West European capital raised the metallurgical industry to a high level at the end of the nineteenth century; foreign capital set the coal industry going; such giants of industry as the Alexander works and others, which employed tens of thousands of workers, were created with the help of foreign capital.

These three conditions: the gigantic strides made in railway construction, the cheapness of labour and consequent high profits, and finally the influx of foreign capital, explain the

* A verst is about two-thirds of an English mile.

rapid development of industry which took place in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century. But the very ease with which capitalism developed at the end of the 19th century resulted in a severe slump at the beginning of the 20th century. Industry experienced a set-back in the decade 1900-1910. Until the 1905 revolution the industrial crisis was general. Production diminished and there was hardly any improvement from 1905 to 1910. Even when there was some sign of growth in one or another branch of industry it was only of minor importance and could not possibly be compared with the rapid progress at the end of the previous century. On the contrary it can be observed that there was a definite decrease in production in many other branches of industry.

Whilst the amount of cotton consumed in Russia had increased by more than 200 per cent. between the years 1890 and 1900, the co-efficient of increase sank to 30 per cent. in the next ten years (1900-1910). The textile industry between 1900 and 1910 also increased at one-seventh the rate of its former progress; this is usual in the crises of capitalist industry, when industrial development gets ahead of the purchasing power of the market. In heavy industry it is impossible to slow down the rate of production at short notice, because of the large amount of capital invested in its machinery and equipment. Whilst the production of pig iron, iron, steel, and goods manufactured from them, shows an increase of 300 per cent. between the years 1890 and 1900, there is no increase at all, and even a small diminution of output, during the first ten years of the twentieth century.

How is the position in which industrial capital found itself, after such a brilliant period of expansion, to be understood?

In a land of advanced capitalist development such a crisis would usually be surmounted within a year or two—so long as capitalism were not in its declining stage. But in Russia even ten years did not suffice to surmount the crisis which occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The reason for this phenomenon lies in the condition of Russia's agricultural development, since it is quite clear that the development of industry is closely related to that of agriculture, and that the production of consumable goods is linked up with the production of capital goods. It has already been noted that the impoverishment of the peasantry became especially noticeable at the beginning of the twentieth century. The increasing exploitation of the peasants by the landlord, the shrinking of the cultivated area, the decrease in the numbers of cattle on the peasant holdings, all this naturally made any thought of continuous industrial progress illusory. And since the defeat of the revolution left the agrarian question unsolved and brought no freedom to the peasant, the necessary conditions for the rapid development of capitalism did not exist even afterwards. The relics of feudalism kept the productive forces of the country enchained.



SCHLUSSELBURG PRISON—A Tsarist castle in Petersburg in which political prisoners were confined.

Two—FROM 9th JANUARY, 1905, TO THE OCTOBER STRIKE

IN view of the growing political movement of the working class, the autocracy tried in various ways to obtain control of the Labour movement by turning it aside into "peaceful" patriotic channels. The so-called "Subatov" legal unions, which owed their existence to the initiative of Subatov, chief of the secret police, were made to serve this purpose.

In Moscow, in Odessa, in the West and even in Petersburg just before the revolution, these police unions had local groups in the working class districts of the towns. They organised their own clubs, which the working people could enter free of charge; these enjoyed the friendly protection of the secret police, and even received funds from the latter for furnishing and maintenance.

In these clubs lectures were given to the workmen on harmless subjects; they could have dances and entertainments, and they were sometimes even allowed (with the approval of the police) to hear a lecture delivered by some Liberal professor on the condition of the working class in Western Europe. But as soon as the Subatov union had obtained some influence, these Liberal professors were driven off the speakers' platforms by priests, jingoes, etc.

As the workers who were members of the Subatov unions took part in strikes, these unions often had to join in strike movements. According to Subatov's plan, the leaders of the organisation were to do their best to bring the workers into a peaceful frame of mind, to relieve the tension; but at the same time, as agents of the police, to exercise pressure on the employer in the sense of forcing him to make unimportant, though perceptible, concessions. This circumstance did much to obscure the class consciousness of the worker and enhanced the authority of Subatov's organisations in his eyes. Sometimes the police, in supporting the strike movement, came into appreciable opposition with the employers, who complained to the government about the Subatov people. A struggle was waged on this issue in the nineties between the Minister for Home Affairs, as the representative of the police, who supported Subatov's policy, and the Finance Minister, who looked after the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie.

The feudal State, which generally supported the bourgeoisie, thought it might be possible, at this aggressive stage of the working class movement, to turn aside on to the bourgeoisie the main force of the blow which the working class was directing against both aristocracy and bourgeoisie.

At the same time Subatov's organisations tried by every means to increase their authority among the workers, and to inculcate sentiments of patriotism and loyalty towards the autocracy. In some places these efforts even had a temporary success.

Thus, on the 19th February, 1902 (the anniversary of the "freeing" of the peasantry) the Subatov organisations of Moscow organised a demonstration at the statue of Alexander II. in which more than ten thousand workers took part.

The results were extraordinarily short-lived.

The revolution tore asunder the net in which the secret police had bound the working class movement, and swept away the obstacles which had grown up as the result of these

police organisations. It tore down the dam which the Subatovs and their allies were trying with great skill to throw across the mounting flood. In Moscow, for instance, revolutionary tendencies penetrated with such force into the minds of the workers organised in the Subatov "Union of Engineers," that the secret police were compelled to tolerate them, even in their own organisation. In the west the "Subatovs" had no luck amongst the industrial workers and could only touch the unimportant elements of the population who were engaged in handicrafts.

They met with even less success in the south.

The workers who entered the Subatov organisations there drew them into the strike movement and obtained control over them in the famous strike movement of 1903, so that the organisations intended for strangling the working class movement came to be used as means for its further expansion.

A certain Shayevitch, who was Subatov's agent in the south, had to go into exile as the result of this failure, and even Subatov himself fell into disfavour.

The attempt of the autocracy to obtain control of the working class movement through the machinations of the police was even more disastrous in Petersburg than in the south.

It can thus be seen that the attempt of the autocratic State to obtain control of the revolutionary working class movement ended in disastrous failure.

The last big attempt made by the secret police to control the working class movement was in Petersburg, in the heart of working class Russia. This attempt ended tragically.

The priest, Gapon, was the agent of the secret police in Petersburg. It can now be held as conclusively proved that Gapon received support from the secret police. This not only appears from the fact that the police permitted meetings of Gapon's followers, but also from



WORK OF A PUNITIVE EXPEDITION—These expeditions were sent by the Tsarist Government into provinces where the peasants were discontented during the Russo-Japanese war. A photo taken in 1904 in Northern Manchuria.



WAR AGAINST WAR!

An illegal Socialist poster against the Russo-Japanese War.

the fact that evidence found in the archives of the police departments shows that the local groups of Gapon's organisation received important sums from the secret police for the furnishing and maintenance of their halls. The Social-Revolutionary, Rutenburg, who took part in the killing of the provocateur, Gapon, affirms that the latter also received large sums from the secret police for his personal use.

Gapon's "Union of Factory Workers" commenced its activities in the spring of 1903, although it was not officially established until the 11th of April, 1904. Like the Subatov people in Moscow, the Gapon people in Petersburg spread the net of their organisation over the large working class districts. In November, 1904, this organisation had groups in the following districts: Vyborg, the island of Vassilyevitch, Nevsky, Kolmosk, the ports, Narva, the environs of Petersburg, Roshestvensk, Moscow, Kulpinov, Sestroretzk. Some of these groups had a considerable number of members,

(for instance, that of Vyborg had about 2,000). In November, 1904, this organisation had 9,000 working class members. The groups had libraries, in their clubs Liberal lecturers delivered addresses on natural science (geology), history and economic questions. Political speeches against the autocratic regime were not allowed. The outlook of the members of Gapon's organisation was patriotic.

But at the beginning of the year 1905 the air was already ominous with anticipation of great events. The defeats sustained in the Russo-Japanese war intensified the political unrest in the country. The workers were more and more influenced by the Social-Democrats, and Gapon's organisation found itself between the hammer and the anvil. A new wave of revolution was rising amongst the masses; Tsarism prepared to provoke the working class, wanting bloodshed, whilst the workers were still insufficiently organised.

In the middle of December, 1904, four men at the Putilov works who belonged to Gapon's "union" were dismissed without sufficient reason. The "union" sent a deputation to the director and begged that those dismissed should be reinstated. The request was not complied with. Gapon repeated his pleading several times to the director of the factory and also to Fulon, the Chief of Police. The "union" and its petition were, however, each time rejected. Then a resolve matured amongst the masses locked up in Gapon's union to reply to the dismissals by a strike.

On the 1st January, the union decided to bring about a strike in the Putilov works. On 2nd January, this decision was ratified and on the 3rd January the men at the Putilov works downed tools. The demands which they laid before the management had been worked out by the local group of Gapon's organisation, and included the following points:

(1) Introduction of an eight-hour day; (2) division of work into three shifts; (3) a 66 per cent. increase of wages for men, and nearly 100 per cent. for women; (4) improvement of the sanitary arrangements in the works, etc.

The strike was not long confined to the Putilov works. On the 4th January, the Putilov workers brought about a strike in the Franco-Russian works, whose employees put forward the demand for an eight-hour day. In the next few days tools were downed in a metal factory, the Semjanikov and Obuchov Works, and also in a series of other big enterprises. Soon almost the whole working class of Petersburg, at least 150,000 men, stood fast together in the strike. The printers went on strike, and Petersburg was without newspapers. For this reason the Social-Democratic broadsheets were widely read.

Gapon tried in every way possible to obtain the leadership of the expanding movement, and what at first enabled him to attain his purpose was the fact that the Social-Democrats had not got a strong organisation at this time, so that the Gapon union stood as the only mass organisation of workers.

Gapon succeeded in winning over the workers to the idea of a "procession of the Cross" to the Tsar. On January 4th, at a meeting of one of his local groups, he had inspired the workers with the idea of approaching the Tsar with a petition. The proposal was taken up with enthusiasm. Lively discussions went on in all the districts from the 4th to the 9th of January. Feeling amongst the workers was very strained. "Gapon went round himself from group to group,"—writes an eye-witness of the 9th January (22nd January according to the new calendar)—"his speeches grew more and more excited and impassioned, and roused ever greater enthusiasm among the masses. In some quarters he spoke quietly and induced his hearers to believe in the success of the venture; in other quarters he spoke of the possibility of failure, of the danger which confronted them, of the possibility that the Tsar might refuse to receive and listen to his people. When he spoke like this, he always ended with the words, 'Then we will have no Tsar.' 'Then we will have no Tsar,' repeated the crowd as one man. 'We swear that we will stand by one another!' 'If needs be, we will all die.' 'Little Father, lead us on to the great deed, we bless you!'" Eye-witnesses recount that all of them were exalted. "Many wept, stamped their feet, struck the walls with their clenched hands, threw up their arms to heaven, and swore to endure to the end."

This was the feeling amongst the workers before January the 9th. But although they took up the idea of a petition to the Tsar with exaltation and passion, this does not mean they meant to repeat on January 9th the patriotic demonstration of February 19th, 1902.

Under the shadow of the Church banners, with ikons and pictures of the Tsar carried as a protection, the workers brought a petition to the Tsar, a petition of which the purely economic demands contained a demand for the removal of Tsardom itself. This explains the whole paradox of January 9th.

Only a Gapon who was half an ignorant youngster, half a priest, could have had this idea of approaching the Tsar in order to obtain his support for the demand for a Constituent Assembly, and for the grant of political freedom, and only a long-suffering and deluded people could have followed him.

The working class was already sufficiently ripe to appreciate how necessary was the realisation of the minimum program of the Social-Democrats. This program had been made clear to the workers by the Social-Democrats who came to speak at their local meetings. Although the idea of a petition to the Tsar seemed by itself to be absolutely innocent, it appeared in the eyes of the autocracy that the presentation of such a petition on the 9th




ON STRIKE—Workers of the Putilov Factory discussing the proclamation of the strike.

January made it a day of revolution. For this reason the idea of a little blood-letting was quickly put into operation.

It is quite clear that the Government had decided before the 9th January to let the petitioners be shot down. An English newspaper correspondent who had close connections with the Court, relates that on the night before the 9th January, the Tsar appointed the Grand Duke Vladimir as Dictator for the coming day, and gave him unlimited powers, so that he might "calm the rebellious temper of the crowd even if in order to do so he should be forced to use all the troops under his command against the people." So many troops were assembled in Petersburg that they filled the whole town; the sentries were doubled everywhere, staffs were organised in all the districts, and officers in field uniform held inspections—in fact, the government prepared for the 9th January as for a battle.

It is quite clear from the obstinacy displayed by the management of the Putilov works that "Bloody Sunday" was brought about deliberately by the government. The dismissal of the four workmen was an obvious provocation and the consistent refusal to reinstate the men, in spite of the unheard-of excitement among the whole working population of Petersburg, must have been dictated from above. The heavy hand of the autocratic police regime could be felt in all that happened. This is also proved by the hesitation shown by the Prime Minister, Count Witte, when speaking to a delegation of Liberal intellectuals, who wished him to interfere with the policy of the Petersburg administration.

On the 9th January, many thousands of workers led by Gapon marched in procession from Narva. There were neither red flags nor revolutionary placards, and as each wave of the procession neared the troops stationed along the road, everyone thought that there would be no shooting. We quote from the account of Doctor Dyatshkov, who was



GAPON with the Tsar's Chief of Police,
Colonel Fulon.

an extreme reactionary and convinced monarchist: "The picture I saw was such that it appeared to me—a true-believing Christian, absolutely devoted to our Lord the Tsar, and adhering to the old patriotic traditional belief in the unity of the absolute Tsar and his devoted people—it appeared to me quite certain that there would be no shooting, that no one would dare to shoot."

At the Narva Tower the troops allowed the column led by Gapon to come within 300 paces of them, then the cavalry charged, striking the crowd with their sabres, so that when they had ridden right through the demonstration there was room for the infantry to fire a round. Then the cavalry charged again, and cut at those who were fleeing and killed the wounded. Gapon succeeded in saving himself. The massacre of the defenceless went on for some time. In the district of Schlüsselburg, the infantry shot at the workers, who tore their shirts away from their breasts and shouted: "We shall die, comrades, but we shall not yield an inch!"

It was even worse at the Troitzky bridge. Here the commander of the troops let the crowd come up within two to three hundred paces and then gave the word of command "Fire!" Then the cavalry rode over the workmen, women, children and old men lying on the ground.

On the island of Vassilyevsky, the demonstrators tried to defend themselves. Under the leadership of Social-Democrats the workers plundered a munition stores, improvised barricades out of telegraph poles, kiosks and boards, and met the cavalry with shots, stones, and logs. But even here "order" was restored. It is difficult to calculate the number of victims, but the number of those who fell cannot have been less than a thousand, and among these were 200 killed. So ended the 9th January in Petersburg.

The whole working class of Russia answered the 9th January by a strike of protest. It is known from official records that ten days after the 9th January a quarter of the

workers in the city had been drawn into the movement, and this official figure is quite certainly an underestimate. Almost all the industrial centres of Russia were convulsed by great strikes, and these were in many places accompanied by armed conflicts between the workers, the police and the troops. This happened in Warsaw, Lodz, Riga, etc. The 9th January gave an impetus to the revolutionary movement of the Russian working class.

As a day on which the working class was massacred, the 9th January is one of mourning, but from the historical point of view it is the great day which freed men's minds from a crippling belief in the Tsar, a belief which hindered them on their way to great revolutionary struggles. The masses who had begun life as peasants, and had come into the cities to labour, had brought with them from their villages a deeply-rooted and ancient belief in the Tsar. Even in the 17th and 18th centuries, the peasant insurrections tried to sanctify and justify their fight by declaring that they wished to re-establish the Tsar who had been driven from his throne.

In Western Europe, when the peasants revolted, they—in order to justify themselves—gave their economic demands a religious appearance. The Russian peasants substituted a monarchist for a religious appearance. The "Vice-regent of God on earth," the Tsar, was to lead the peasant movement. If he had not existed he would have had to be invented. Pugachev, a peasant rebel leader, was hailed as Peter III. When as the result of the "Reform" of 1861, the landlords plundered the peasants, the rumour spread among them that "the landlords had concealed from the people the real freedom given by the Tsar."

Even after the revolution of 1905, the peasants had not quite lost this belief in the Tsar. Even in the first Duma of 1906, the peasant deputies of the "Trudoviki" (or "Labour") Party viewed all the evils of the autocratic government as the result of the misdeeds of the officials, of the bureaucracy; the Tsar himself was supposed to know nothing about their criminal policy. Kukanov of the Trudoviki, for example, in his speech against the Second Chamber, cried out: "No! Enough of the barriers between the Tsar and his people! Would that the Tsar himself knew what goes on in the country, what it needs, what it suffers!"

It was this good and kindly Tsar of the peasantry who knew nothing of his subjects' suffering, that existed until the 9th January in the imagination of the working class. On that day this image was destroyed and the working class was shown that the only real way to socialism lay in the overthrow of the autocracy.

Rosa Luxemburg was right when she said that the spirit of Karl Marx hovered over this demonstration, with its ikons and its Church banners.

The 9th January set the proletariat at the head of the revolutionary movement. By coming forward the proletariat opened the way to the revolution of 1905. Theirs were the first victims in the developing class struggle, and after the January days they became the leaders of the expanding political mass movement.

It is difficult to describe the many-sidedness and wealth of the movement which laid its imprint on the period between January and October, 1905. It was during these months that the movement grew extremely rapidly. Each month, each week, each day, brought in fresh numbers. News of the revolution, and of what the workers were doing in the great industrial centres, reached the smaller places and caused an echo there. It can be said that in the middle of 1905, all the workers of Russia took a more or less active part in the revolution.

It is certainly true that the masses did not at the outset make clear, definite and un-

equivocal demands. In many places the movement began with demands of an economic nature, or on economic grounds, but very soon political declarations were mixed with the other demands. It became a political mass movement.

This is not to be wondered at. The proletariat went out in 1905 to fight against the autocracy, but it was, at the same time, fighting against the bourgeoisie to improve its conditions, for increase of wages, for improvement in its standard of living, and to put an end to the barbaric conditions imposed by capitalism in its development; for in no other country had the capitalists exploited the workers so ruthlessly and shamelessly as in Russia.

Of all the demands and slogans which the workers put forward at this time, the two following are most characteristic: in the struggle against capitalism the demand for an eight-hour day, and in the struggle against the autocracy the demand for the calling of a Constituent Assembly.

In various districts, but especially in Poland and in the Baltic provinces, the working class movement became a more or less armed insurrection against Tsarism. Tsarism was still strong enough to achieve a temporary victory. Still the defeated efforts of the workers were in a certain sense victories. From this point of view the summer strike in Ivanov-Vosnessensk is typical. 50,000 workers took part in this strike, and it lasted a week. The workers, who at the outset had only put forward economic demands, were compelled by the logic of the struggle to supplement them by political slogans because the police and the troops, in face of the growing obstinacy of the workers, came more and more frequently to use force against them. Since meetings of workers were forbidden in the town itself, a crowd numbering some tens of thousands assembled outside on the banks of the river Talka, and here listened to the speeches of the Social-Democrats, who were leading the movement politically.

The capitalists wanted to make some concessions, but not to comply with the main demands of the workers. Finally, the exhausted workers, who had large families and no means of subsistence, and some of whom had been compelled to go back to their villages, were forced to give in; but when they came back to their weaving stools after the week's strike they made it clear to the capitalists that: "We give in; but we do not feel that we have been defeated."

Under pressure from the working class movement the Tsar made some concessions, but the poverty of these concessions was such that the workers' movement passed them by, and demanded the complete destruction of the old regime. Such concessions were: (1) the appointment of Senator Shidlovski's commission in the spring of 1905; this commission was told to find out the reasons for working class discontent; (2) the appointment of the Home Minister Bulygin's commission, whose task was to prepare a draft for the calling of a State Duma—this Duma to have the right of discussion but *not* of legislation. This commission went on functioning all through the summer of 1905 and "gave birth to a dead child" in the form of a draft which provided for the election of such a Duma, but a Duma in which the working class, the intellectuals and about nine-tenths of the peasantry were to have no vote.

These concessions were received with interest by the Liberal bourgeoisie and by the Mensheviks, but were repudiated by the working class. During the spring and summer of 1905, the attention of the latter was more and more directed towards the developing revolutionary movement among the peasants. The first signs of this movement were visible in January, but it was only in February and March that it became a mass movement, under the

influence of the military defeats sustained by the Government and of the workers' revolution.


During these two months Central Russia, Poland, the Western Provinces, the Baltic lands and the Caucasus were all drawn into the revolutionary agrarian movement. In Poland and in the Baltic lands, as also in some of the Western provinces, it was not of a purely peasant character, for here it also swept along the agricultural labourers who were fairly numerous in these parts. Precisely for this reason the strike movement was to the fore in these places, whilst in Central Russia, on the contrary, a spontaneous movement among the peasantry was characteristic, a movement which often found expression in the destruction of the houses and property of the landlords. In the spring and summer of 1905, sixty-two districts of Inner Russia, that is to say, 14 per cent. of all the country districts, were drawn into the agrarian movement.

Almost all classes among the peasantry, the rich included, took part in the movement. From month to month new groups of peasants joined in and their desire to organise themselves became noticeable. It is characteristic that even in this early phase the split-up and disunited peasantry created a kind of central organisation. On the 31st July, there met in Moscow the first secret inauguration congress of the All-Russian Union of Peasants, an organisation which was firmly established in several districts. Naturally the main subject of discussion at this congress was the land question, the question of the division of the landlords' fields. But beneath the demands put forward by the congress was the further demand for the calling of a Constituent Assembly. Forty-five of the delegates to this congress were peasants. Naturally one cannot consider this Peasants' Union as an organisation representing the large masses of the peasantry. It was rather a consolidation of the leading, class-conscious heads of the peasantry's political representatives. But even the organisation of these highest class-conscious elements among the peasantry had great political significance.

It would be wrong to assert that the peasant movement had a purely political character. At a time when political slogans had a quite definite meaning for the working class movement, and were becoming hourly the most burning questions, that is to say, at a time when political objects had become of paramount importance to the working class, the same cannot be affirmed about the peasantry. The movement amongst them was of an economic nature, was spontaneous and had not yet any recognised political form.

The peasants who had been in the army were the most ready to enter the political struggle, and understood most about it. This can be asserted of all the troops who had been on the Japanese front, and had returned to their villages from the defeated army. It is even more true of the fleet. In the summer of 1905 occurred the insurrection in the Black Sea fleet. On the 14th June, the crew of the armed cruiser "Kniaz Potemkin Tavritshesky" mutinied on purely economic grounds (dissatisfaction with the rations, etc.). The sailors, who were undoubtedly under the influence of the Social-Democrats, arrested their officers, put forward political demands, and declared their solidarity with the workers on strike in Odessa. The "Potemkin" steamed into the harbour, and the revolutionary crew landed in order to bury one of the sailors who had been murdered by an officer. Great crowds attended the funeral. After this the cruiser put out to sea again, and on the 17th June met the fleet sent out to put down the mutiny. The "Potemkin" steamed straight towards the fleet and called upon the sailors in the other ships to join the insurrection.

One of the largest fighting units in the fleet, the armoured ship "Georgi Pobedonosetz," joined the "Potemkin." But this union did not last long, there was no Social-Democratic influence on the "Georgi Pobedonosetz" and it soon abandoned the insurrection. In a few




POTEMKIN—A cartoon from a Russian paper of 1905.

days' time, the mutineers on the now isolated "Potemkin" were also disorganised. On 25th June, the cruiser entered the Roumanian harbour of Constanza, and the crew gave it up to the Roumanian authorities. Some of the sailors were arrested and handed over to Russia, others disappeared abroad.

The first important movement in the fleet, the mutiny on the "Potemkin," was thus a failure. Nevertheless, it was of great political importance. It was a defeat which prepared the way for victory. It shook the belief of the masses in the absolute power of the Government, it created revolutionary traditions in the forces, and prepared the ground for the armed rising of the masses. It is for this reason that Lenin in several articles called the attention of the class-conscious workers to the sailors' revolutionary acts. From the social point of view, this movement was also very important since it gave a revolutionary impetus to the ranks of the disciplined and organised peasants, that is to say to those who were in sailors' uniform. These peasants were drawn spontaneously into revolutionary union with the working class.

Three—THE OCTOBER STRIKE OF 1905

AFTER the events of January, 1905, the revolutionary movement expanded further. It drew in more and more workers, it spread from place to place and took up one new position after another. Generally speaking, though the movement was split up after January, other incidents, strikes and so forth, occurred locally. Then again in September, 1905, there was a new wave of political agitation with the working class at its head. This agitation culminated in October. The most important event at this time was the political general strike which spread all over Russia.



N. LENIN in 1903.

The workers of Moscow took the first steps in the October General Strike. At the end of September a mass strike of the printers occurred in Moscow, which up to now had reacted but feebly to the revolutionary deeds of the Petersburg workmen. Some 6,000 workers employed in 50 establishments struck work on that date. Their demands were of an economic nature, but they were ready to take up political agitation against Tsarism, and there now occurred in close connection with them a movement among the State workers

and employees. The strike of the bakers, which was begun on September 25, was specially important, for those employed at the Philippov bakery came to blows with the soldiers. These strikers, hemmed in by police and soldiers, took refuge in a granary. A small group of them defended themselves there like heroes, gun in hand.

At the end of September, the strike spread beyond the big industrial centres and affected the Brester railway junction, where the men in the railway workshops joined the movement. On the 3rd October, the Petersburg printers declared their solidarity with their fellow workers in Moscow. During the next few days the workmen in the State printing establishments and those in the Neva dockyards joined the strike, whereupon those in the various works and factories of Petersburg all stood in with the movement. This strike movement in the principal towns soon found an echo in the neighbouring industrial centres, but as yet it had no central organisation and no concerted aims. The new revolutionary movement crystallised round the railway strike. On the 20th September, the congress of the State railway employees met in Petersburg. This organisation bore the instructive name of "Conference for the Revision of the Regulations for the Contributory Pensions Fund." But the general tone was so revolutionary that day by day it came to deal more with burning political questions, and its sphere of discussion shifted more and more on to political lines.

The "Conference for the Revision of the Regulations for the Contributory Pensions Fund," after a few days of orientation to the left, called itself "The First Delegate Congress of Railway Workers' Representatives." The Government viewed the work of the congress with the greatest anxiety, whilst sympathy for the congress and the expectations and demands it was putting forward grew continually stronger among the rank and file workers. It is, therefore, not astonishing that when it became known in Moscow on the 6th October that the delegates of the congress had been arrested, it was the sign for revolt and strike among the railway workers.

On the 7th October, communication was stopped on the Kazan railway, and during the next few days communication and working came to a standstill on all the Moscow railway lines. When the post and telegraph employees joined the strike movement it assumed a really serious aspect. What wonder that the railway strike, spreading immediately to Petersburg and other great junctions, gave the impetus, became as it were the carrier of the October general strike, this general strike with its soviets of workers' deputies, its mass inspiration, its demonstrations, its conflicts with the soldiers and police. In this way the railway strike became the support of the whole Russian proletariat.

There was no single industrial centre in all Russia, no large works, no large factory, whose workers did not join in the political general strike of October. Railway communication was at a standstill, the telegraph services did not function, the newspapers did not appear, there was no light, no more stocks were produced daily and flung upon the market. Everyone having been called on to the streets by the revolutionary general strike, the day-to-day work in Government institutions and private concerns could not be carried on. The universities, to which autonomy had been granted by the Government even before the strike, were filled to overflowing with masses of noisy, enthusiastic, revolutionary-minded people.

In the squares of the towns the soldiers and police were forced to give way by the crowds. Demonstrations of thousands were held every day. It was truly a people's revolution. Economic demands were pushed into the background and the eight-hour day, the vote and the convoking of a Constituent Assembly were the chief demands of the strikers. The meetings and demonstrations often ended with armed encounters between the crowds

and the police or the soldiers. Barricades were erected in the streets in many places.

On October 10th, there were street battles over the barricades in Kharkov, on the 11th in Yekaterinoslav, on the 16th in Odessa. The October strikes affected sections of the population hitherto undisturbed. It was not only workers, students, salaried employees, and intellectuals who struck, the movement even affected the Liberal bourgeoisie, the Liberal landowners, merchants, professors and even higher officials. But although the people who took part in the movement comprised very mixed elements, the working class was without doubt the leader of the strike and standard-bearer of the movement. It was also the working class which created a central organisation for it.

On the 13th October the Soviet of Workers' Deputies met for the first time in Petersburg; by the third day this council had already 226 members, representing 100 works. This Soviet of Workers' Deputies soon became the leader of the revolution not only in Petersburg, but in the whole of Russia. Similar councils of workers were formed on its model in Moscow and in a number of other towns.

On the 17th October, the movement reached its highest point, and on the same day the Government decided to make concessions: the Tsar proclaimed his Manifesto of October 17th, and promised to grant real political freedom and to convoke a people's legislative assembly, the State Duma. Great enthusiasm prevailed among the people at this weakening of the counter-revolutionary front; nevertheless the vanguard of the revolution, the working class, understood very well that this first success would not be secure unless the revolution really were to achieve more important successes by conflict, by a new offensive and by all possible activities following on the revolution.



DEMONSTRATION in Petersburg on October 31, 1905.

The strike was not broken by the proclamation of the Manifesto. We read in the leading article of the third issue of the "Workers' Deputies' Soviet News" of the 20th October: "So we have been given a Constitution! We have constitutional freedom—but the Assembly will be surrounded by soldiers. We have freedom of speech—but the censor remains untouched. We have freedom of instruction—but there are still soldiers in the universities. We have personal freedom—but the prisons are overflowing with arrested persons. We have a Constitution—but we have also kept the autocracy. Everything has been granted us—and nothing."

The leaders of the revolution meant that the revolution must expand, that the battle had only begun, that new decisive conflicts must be prepared for. Lenin wrote as follows after he heard the news of the proclamation of the Manifesto: "Even the Liberal bourgeoisie must realise that the Manifesto only contains words and promises, but who now believes in mere promises? Who will make good the Tsar's promises? The Minister Witte will never be a Minister of the Liberal bourgeoisie, but only a Minister of the Liberal bureaucracy. Have the people shed their blood in battle for freedom in order to trust themselves to the Liberal bureaucracy, to be put off with mere words, mere promises? No, Tsarism is still far from capitulation, the autocracy is still far from being shaken, many hard battles have still to be fought by the revolutionary workers; their first victory will consolidate their strength and enlist new comrades in the fight."

Influenced by such considerations, the workers continued striking after October 17th. But the storms of the October days had wearied the insurrectionists. Preparation is necessary for an armed uprising, and a new offensive could only be successful if well prepared. For this reason the council of Petersburg workers decided on October 21st to bring the strike to an end. Within five days of this decision the strike was altogether broken off.

These, in outline, are the events of the second main stage of the 1905 revolution; the political general strike of October. The October strike marks a quite definite period in the revolutionary movement. In extent it was the most widespread phase up to that time. The demands of the strikers did not only bring the workers together, they were even taken up—with avowed sympathy, if not with sufficient decision—by the Liberal bourgeoisie. These latter were neither the instigators nor the leaders of the strike, but for all that they entered the lists for the political demands of this movement. After the proclamation of the Manifesto of October 17th, when the Tsar had promised to convoke the Duma, the Liberal bourgeoisie went over to the side of Tsarism. The revolutionary phrases soon disappeared from the resolutions of the bourgeois assemblies and conferences, and in their place appeared threats against the obstinate workers who were continuing the revolutionary fight.

During the October strike, the revolutionary workers' organisations in many places applied to the bourgeois municipal and zemstvo organisations for help for the strikers, or with the proposal to organise a general militia, etc. Such proposals were either refused by the Liberal bourgeoisie or answered by half-hearted promises; no real help was to be expected from them.

After the October strike, the influential representatives of the bourgeois political parties sounded the retreat. Tsarism had made concessions, the Tsar himself had promised a State Duma, the enticing prospect of Parliamentary activity opened up before the leaders of the bourgeois party. One could scent a "European" atmosphere; furthermore the moneybags of the bourgeoisie were hit by the strike. Henceforth the working class found the attitude of the Liberal bourgeoisie openly hostile.

Whilst the Liberal bourgeoisie took an unmistakable turn to the right, as the Bolsheviks had long foreseen, the conditions now clearly existed for a new revolutionary alliance, that between proletariat and peasantry. Just as the January and February rising had given an impetus to the forward movement of the peasantry in the spring of 1905, so the October strike found an echo in the agrarian movement. In the autumn of 1905, from the middle of October, the disturbances among the peasantry assumed the proportions of a mass movement. The discontent was manifested over a district three times as large as in the spring; the movement shook the villages of Central Russia, of the Baltic lands, of Poland and the



UNDER THE COSSACK LASH—The peasants who showed signs of revolt were forced to till the fields of the great landowners under a Cossack guard.

Caucasus. The estates of the landowners were plundered and destroyed; they fled from the villages in panic, because they no longer felt safe in their ancestral domains. The abodes of the nobility were abandoned by their old owners. Something like 2,000 aristocratic residences were destroyed.

In the Caucasus the peasant movement had an openly political aspect and was under the influence of the Social-Democrats. In the Baltic lands, and also in parts of Poland, the farm labourers played a leading part in the agrarian revolutionary movement, and the peasantry was in close alliance with the workers of the towns.

The peasantry went on to consolidate their strength by organisation. On the 7th November, 1907, the All-Russian Peasants' Union met for its second congress. At this congress, the fundamental economic problem, that of the land and soil, was put forward in revolutionary form as at the first congress; political demands were expressed more vigorously and definitely.

In this atmosphere there was also revolutionary unrest in the army. In the middle of November, disturbances broke out among many detachments in Petersburg, especially amongst the technical corps. In the middle of January, the Black Sea fleet was responsible for a shining deed in revolutionary annals.

The revolutionary unrest in the fleet found expression on the 15th November in the revolt of the armoured cruiser "Otschakov." Naval-Lieutenant Schmidt was the leader of the movement. The revolting sailors ran up the red flag. The "Potemkin," the "Dniestr" and other ships followed the "Otschakov's" example. Schmidt, the leader of the revolt, appealed to all the ships of the flotilla to be more in earnest than in the summer. On the same day he sent a telegram to the Tsar with a demand for the convoking of a Constituent Assembly. The first half of the day passed in great anxiety. Feeling was somewhat weakening. In the second part of the day, all available forces from among the officers not yet arrested by the sailors were mobilised to suppress the revolt.

The "Otschakov" was shelled, and answered fire; then fire broke out on board; disagreement was rife on the other ships, and by evening the movement was suppressed. Disturbances of greater or less moment broke out among the troops in Kiev, Kharkov, Samara and many other towns.

Meanwhile, the peasantry, the allies of the working class, were entering into the revolutionary struggle. In the villages they destroyed the residences of the nobles, and in the army in the uniform of soldiers or sailors, they refused obedience, broke through the Tsarist discipline, and allied themselves to the revolutionary workers. In spite of this, one cannot, on the strength of isolated instances, speak of the existence of an organised political movement of the peasantry. It was only that the first step towards revolution had been taken.

On the other hand, the working class movement was marked not only by the increased number of its demands and the strengthening of its political consciousness, but also by successes in organisation. November, Workers' Soviets were formed in many towns. The first assembly of the Moscow Workers' Soviet, which met on November 22nd, numbered 180 deputies representing 80,000 workers. At the beginning of November, Workers' Soviets were formed in Ivanov-Vosnessensk, Rostov-on-Don and Kiev. The working class of Odessa, Kostroma, Samara and many other towns acted in the same way. But the Petersburg Workers' Soviet played the most important part of them all. It already had important revolutionary experience and enjoyed undisputed authority throughout the whole country; in the 1905 revolution, Petersburg and its Soviet was at the head of the whole working class move-

ment. The events occurring in the capital were followed with breathless interest by the whole of working-class Russia.

Petersburg was, so to speak, the piper of the revolution—a piper it must be noted who could not always make people dance to his tune. Until the end of January, the workers of Petersburg bore the main brunt of the revolutionary battle. No specially important deeds were performed by the workers of most other districts. The Petersburg workers spent October and November in uninterrupted battle against capitalists and Tsar. Their most important actions during this time were the struggle for the eight-hour day, and the second political general strike.

Immediately after October 17th, the workers in the Petersburg factories and works put forward more and more decisively and intently their demand for the introduction of the eight-hour day. In many factories they attempted to get their way by revolutionary means. The Soviet received stacks of correspondence insisting that it should organise and lead this struggle.


On October 31st the Soviet decided to begin the battle for the eight-hour day, and for this purpose to adopt revolutionary means. During the next two weeks, the workers put their demands before the capitalists; they left work after eight hours; where they met with opposition they went on strike, and fought with unswerving determination in unbroken masses. The capitalists answered with lock-outs and mass discharges, shutting down their works and refusing wages.

The exhausted workers, who had already lost their wages in the many strikes throughout the year, started in some places to give in and to go back to their work. For this reason the Soviet decided temporarily to abandon the struggle, since the slogan of the eight-hour working day had not carried along with it the great mass of the Russian working class, and the struggle had been almost entirely confined to the workers of Petersburg.

Another important act of the Petersburg Workers' Soviet was the second general strike, which lasted from the 1st to the 7th of November. The strike broke out on two political grounds. On October 26th a mutiny broke out among the troops stationed at Kronstadt. The leaders of the movement, some hundreds of sailors and soldiers, were brought before a court-martial. In Poland the government proclaimed martial law on October 29th. There followed in reply the second political general strike, which was carried through with extraordinary solidarity, and in which even on the last day, November 7th, more than a hundred thousand workers were taking part.

On the 5th November, the Soviet brought about the post and telegraph strike, which also was very complete and very well organised.

Meanwhile Tsarism was growing stronger, and it decided to aim a destructive blow



LIEUTENANT SCHMIDT

A leader of the 1905 mutiny of the Black Sea Fleet.



SEARCHING PASSERS-BY in the streets for revolutionary literature.

at the Soviet. The Government saw in this organ, not without reason, the embryo of a revolutionary government. In actual fact, the State railways during the strike had obeyed the orders, not of the Tsarist administration, but of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The printing works, in which all newspapers, including official publications, were printed, only worked on the orders of the Soviet. The factories and workers stopped work at the bidding of the Soviet. The water supply was cut off, the trams stood still, the life of the capital was petrified, when the Soviet held it necessary for their aims. The troops rebelled more and more against the Government, and sympathised more and more with the Soviet. Was not the Soviet, therefore, about to become the embryo of a new government?

Tsarism, sure of the support of the bourgeoisie and of the comparatively wide circles of intellectuals, got to grips with this organ

of revolution which, insufficiently powerful as it still was, yet threatened the existence of all the old order. In November, the forces of reaction were sufficiently prepared: meetings were broken up, revolutionary leaders arrested and police abuses were rife. In reply to the offensive of the reactionary forces, the Petersburg Soviet decided on November 22nd to organise a financial boycott. According to this decision, the Soviet told the workers immediately to withdraw their savings from the banks and to demand payment of their wages in gold. The Government replied to this assault on the rouble by arresting the chairman of the Soviet, Chrustalev-Nosar, who was actually in no way a real revolutionary leader, but had been carried along in these days of revolution and was popular among the workers. On November 27th, the Soviet passed a resolution to prepare for an armed rising.

The Government had employed various measures to suppress the revolution; the council decided on December 2nd to publish its "financial manifesto." On December 3rd all the members of the Soviet present at its sitting were arrested. A decisive encounter could no longer be avoided. The Workers' Soviets of the capitals considered a new political general strike to be unavoidable; the Petersburg Soviet began it on December 8th, the Moscow Soviet on December 7th. During long months of trying conflict the Petersburg workers had marched at the head of the revolution. In the December strike they could no longer act as confidently, as obstinately and firmly as heretofore. These fighters in the vanguard were exhausted. Although on the 9th December, the second day of the strike, the number of workers taking part amounted to a hundred thousand, the ranks of the strikers were thinned during the next few days and the strike soon petered out. Then Moscow began to play her part. On 6th December, the strike there had affected 150,000 workers, the movement grew without interruption, and the political general strike led on with relentless logic to the armed uprising.

Four—THE RISING AND THE DEFEAT

ON the decision of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, the political general strike was begun in Moscow on December 7th, and soon spread to almost the entire working population. There was more in this than the usual sort of political demonstration, and of this General Dubasov, the military governor of the town, was well aware. There were hardly any troops in Moscow at the time, and as disturbances broke out even amongst these they could not be considered as reliable. It was therefore decided to take immediate and energetic measures to suppress the movement before it should have assumed formidable proportions. As early as the evening of December 8th, troops surrounded meetings of workmen in the Aquarium and Olympus, and the Fiedler Industrial Secondary School. At the last-mentioned a large assembly of revolutionary organisations was in session; the police and military raided them, and ordered the premises to be cleared forthwith. The delegates at this meeting, being given three-quarters of an hour to consider their decision, after consultation declared to Rachmaninov, the police commander, that they refused to obey. Captain Rachmaninov then gave them ten minutes to reconsider and threatened to open fire on the building after the expiration of time. This second period of grace was also allowed to pass, and the occupants of the Fiedler building still refused to leave it. One of the gendarmes who was present gives the following description of what next occurred:

"Hardly had the echoes of the last trumpet call died away than the order was given in measured tones: 'Company, attention! Aim at the second-floor windows'—a moment of terrible suspense—'Fire!' A volley was the response, the crashing of glass and an answering rain of bullets from the windows. Though I had not been at the war, I realised that my chance had now come to take part in a battle. Bullets were whistling around me. Rachmaninov gave the order to the artillery. Words fail to describe the effect upon us of the artillery fire in the confined space between the high buildings. The terrible pressure in the air sent a physical convulsion all through one's being. The police staggered away in horror, their hands pressed tightly against their ears. A hail of bullets from the buildings, groans of wounded soldiers and police, blood flowing everywhere, the soldiers in terrible anger at sight of their wounded comrades!

"Suddenly a window was lit up and a rocket flew out. Everyone cried out 'A bomb, a bomb!' An accurately aimed shell, I heard afterwards made the bold bomb-thrower pay for his daring with his life. The shell which killed him tore open his body, and it was probably this which caused those in the building to waver. Soon afterwards someone from inside called out 'We surrender.' I was not able to count the rifle volleys, but twelve shells were fired, seven of which were high explosive and five shrapnel. Shooting then ceased and the besieged left the building."

These first shots fired after the Manifesto of October 17th, on peaceful citizens, met to discuss political questions, were the beginning of the armed contest which ended in the defeat of the revolution, after the sacrifice of their lives by the heroic insurgents. On December 10th began the bombardment of the streets of Moscow, which is described as follows by a revolutionary who was an eye-witness of what occurred:

"The first cannon shot was fired at 2.30 p.m. from the Strastnaya Square along the Tverskaya towards the Triumphal Arch. Peaceful meetings were scattered by rifle fire, machine guns rained bullets, and the artillery fired in volley. Even the house-porters, who were usually faithful allies of the police and accomplices of the Okhrana (secret police) were roused by the artillery fire to assist in the erection of barricades. The sound of the curfew bells rung in all the churches at evening mingled with the noise of cannon firing and created a most repelling impression of the unity between the autocracy and the orthodox Church."



BARRICADES in Moscow, 1905

This was the first armed rising of the masses. Their fighting methods were admittedly primitive, since they lacked experience and since arms were only available in small and ever-decreasing quantities. Only a few hundred irregulars can really be counted among the forces of the movement, and these were armed with an infinite variety of weapons, some only with sporting guns. A large part of the population helped to throw up the barricades, for their sympathies were entirely with the insurgents. Thus although the latter were few in numbers, their many sympathisers helped, directly or indirectly, to disorganise the police and military. For several days the streets of Moscow were the scene of obstinate battles, advances and retreats: before the assault of superior military forces, half-destroyed barricades would be abandoned and new ones constructed elsewhere in feverish haste.

Appeals made by the revolutionaries to the troops engaged in suppressing them were sometimes successful. The troops therefore could be but little depended upon by the authorities—a fact specially noted by Lenin in one of his works as a sign of the development of revolutionary class-consciousness among the soldiers.

"In the December days," he writes, "the Moscow working class gave us a wonderful example of how best to influence the army. On the 8th the populace surrounded the Cossacks in the Strastnaya Square, penetrated into their ranks, fraternised with them and persuaded them to retire. On the 10th of December, two working girls carrying the red flag rushed to meet the Cossacks before a crowd of seven thousand, crying: 'Kill us, for living

we shall not abandon the flag!' The Cossacks were shamed and turned their horses, the people cheering them. These examples of working class heroism should for all time remain imprinted on the consciousness of the workers."



A BARRICADE in Moscow

Even General Dubasov, the chief executioner and hero of the pogrom, whose cruelty during these days of bloodshed was outrageous, had to admit that only about 5,000 of the 15,000 soldiers composing the Moscow garrison could be relied on. But since they were disciplined, well-armed and experienced, the anti-revolutionaries gradually got the upper hand.

The most obstinate stand was made in the Presnia district of Moscow, where the workers in the Prahorov factories formed the core of the revolutionary army. Since there was only a small military force there, these Workers' Councils soon took command of the political situation and became the central organisation of the armed rising. The gendarme, quoted above, gives the following description of the situation: "The military forces soon proved inadequate and the rebels obtained unchallenged mastery of the two districts of Presnia and Shchuka. No proclamation of the Governor-General could be communicated to the inhabitants of these districts, where the 'Ivestia'—'News of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies'—was published. In the absence of news to the contrary, the population believed that a new government had been formed, and it was adapting itself to the new situation in the hope that the new government might not be worse than the old. The edicts issued by the rebels were everywhere obeyed."

Even in the Presnia district the actual fighting forces on the side of the revolution were very small, numbering at the outside 200 irregulars. On December 16th a cordon of troops was drawn round the district, laying merciless siege to the whole quarter. It had to surrender on December 18th, and on December 19th the Moscow Workers' Soviet decided to discontinue the strike.

The armed rising was not confined to Moscow. Similar events occurred in many other towns, and the rising in Rostov-on-Don was in particular very much like that in Moscow. Here the centre of the insurrection was in the suburb of Temernik. As soon as the news of the political general strike arrived from Moscow (that is on December 7th) the Rostov

workers declared a sympathetic strike. A body of several hundred irregulars was formed which soon received reinforcements from the nearby towns of Taganrog, Ticharetz, etc.

"From December 15th to the 20th," writes one who participated in the movement, "a continuous bombardment of Temernik was maintained. Several attempts were also made to take the district by assault but the insurgents bravely held their own. An administration was formed as in a beleaguered town and workshops, stores of food, materials, etc., were established. It may be mentioned as a curiosity that it immediately became necessary to set up a prison in which to lock up police spies and other suspicious characters."

The insurgents made sallies into the town and it was not till the numbers of the Cossacks became overwhelming that the leaders dismissed their irregulars. The latter were disbanded without breach of discipline, and quietly leaving Temernik, disappeared in all directions. There were armed risings in several other industrial centres such as Sormov, Khar'kov, Matomiliy and the Urals. There were even some temporary successes, as for instance in Novorossisk where the Soviet of Workers' Deputies managed to disaffect the troops composing the garrison, to take possession of the town and to maintain their control for a few days until the arrival of strong military forces. The events in Nikolaiev and Piatigorsk were similar.

The December rising marks the climax of revolutionary tension, and its defeat the retreat of the proletariat. But the very occurrence of such armed risings, the collaboration of thousands of workers and of citizens who sympathised with them, the trembling and tottering of the forces of absolutism in those fateful days, the shaken allegiance of the military when faced with revolution, the fact that so many workers understood the necessity of the armed rising as a weapon in the war against autocracy—all these things were deeply impressed on the understanding of the people and they mark an important phase in the historical development of Russia.

A few months before the rising the advisability of transforming the general strike into an armed rising had been discussed in Social-Democratic circles, the Bolsheviks considering the change necessary and inevitable. Their leaders impressed upon the party the duty of preparing for such a rising, not only theoretically, but by measures of organisation. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, were still behindhand in the spring of 1905, and only voted for propaganda of a rising, being unwilling to undertake any organisation or technical preparation of the masses—in fact, to prepare for any active realisation of the rising.

The echoes of firing had not yet died away in the streets of Moscow, the autocracy had not yet completed its bloody task of destroying the organisations which took part in the rising, the masses of embittered workers were becoming more and more convinced that no liberation was possible by peaceful means, and yet, in these pregnant days, George Plehanov, the mouthpiece of Menshevik ideals, could write: "Recourse should not have been had to arms." The rising suppressed, the experience gained in it should now have been used to prepare for a fresh, victorious revolt. The masses should now have been convinced of the inevitability of armed insurrection and of the need for better preparation than in December. Yet instead of this the Mensheviks were using every argument to prove that the revolution had been carried too far, that the working class movement had advanced beyond the bounds of discretion and that the Bolsheviks had led the masses into a bloody massacre without aim or reason.

"Nothing could be more shortsighted," writes Lenin, "than Plehanov's declaration, welcomed as it was by all the opportunists, that the strike was untimely and should not have

been declared, and that violence should not have been used . . . But to keep from the masses the knowledge that a desperate war of extermination is necessary as a preliminary to our eventual program, that would be self-deception and false leadership of the people." Lenin claims that one of the main causes of the failure of the December rising was the inadequate revolutionary work done in the army, and that one of the chief errors lay in the uncertainty of the leaders as to their military and strategical policy.


"The December rising," he writes, "has confirmed yet another profound saying of Karl Marx which has been forgotten by the opportunists. Marx says that insurrection is an art, whose chief quality is a desperate daring and a resolute offensive. This truth is not sufficiently impressed upon our minds. We must not preach passivity or wait inactively for the troops to come over to our side.

"No, we must advocate from the house-tops the need for daring attack, for an armed uprising, for the extermination of all the masters, and for a most active fight to win over the allegiance of the irresolute soldiery. We must apply all the newest discoveries of science: our Workers' battalions must be trained for mass production of bombs, they must be helped to provide themselves and the irregulars with explosives, fuses and automatics."

The above is Lenin's conception of the lessons of the Moscow insurrection.

Although we have become accustomed to name the First Russian Revolution that of 1905-07 this chronological combination is, strictly speaking, rather unsuitable. The insurrection in December, 1905, marks the climax of revolutionary tension and its defeat heralds the retreat of the working class. In 1906 the latter fought rearguard actions against the attacking forces of reaction. In the October days, the more Liberal bourgeoisie were still inclined to support the proletariat. The events of December intimidated them, for they were aiming at concessions from the autocracy rather than at revolution, which indeed they feared.

The events of December wiped out the last trace of radicalism in the minds of the bourgeoisie, who were henceforth revealed as the bitter enemies of the working class. The revolutionary movement still continued to grow and gather strength among the peasantry; there were still some bright episodes in the class war, but it is not possible to point out any situation, any fighting moment of considerable importance or marked by a concerted effort or mass offensive of all the revolutionary forces. The close of 1905 marks the end of the offensive period, so that at the outside, only 1905 to 1906 can be designated as the First Russian Revolution; 1907 was a year not of revolution, but of the triumph and increasing power, insolence and oppressiveness of the forces of reaction.



THE TSARIST EMPIRE—Showing “spheres of influence” and the direction of efforts at imperialist expansion.

Five — SOCIAL - DEMOCRACY AND THE REVOLUTION

THE Russian revolution of 1905-07 was in its nature a bourgeois revolution. Since the great civilised nations of the west had already passed through their bourgeois revolutions there had developed amongst them a socialist movement of the proletariat, and signs were not wanting of the approach of a period of socialist revolution. There arose the question of the relationship between Russia's bourgeois revolution and the international socialist revolution.

The Mensheviks were willing to admit the possible influence of the international socialist revolution on the Russian revolution, but saw no likelihood of a reaction in the opposite direction.

At their Conference in the spring of 1905, the Mensheviks declared their policy on the question of the participation of working class representatives in the revolutionary government in the following resolution: "The only hypothesis on which social democracy should use its forces on its own initiative for conquest of power and for its maintenance as long as possible is that the revolution should spread amongst the advanced countries of Western Europe in which the primary conditions for realising socialism have already reached a certain development." This Menshevik thesis was thus criticised by Lenin: "First it must be asked whether it is not permissible to direct our forces on our own initiative to a definite object? Secondly could this sentence not be inverted to read: 'Only in one circumstance will revolution spread among the advanced countries of Western Europe, namely if the Russian Social-Democratic Party shall succeed in gaining and maintaining power for a long period'... If we are tabling hypotheses, why not this one? An excess of energy can do no harm."

Bolshevism here declared through Lenin that the Party of the Russian working class, which led the bourgeois-democratic revolution in its own country, considered it to be its duty to strive with all its might that the revolution might spread to the advanced countries of Western Europe and that the Russian movement should thus merge in the international socialist revolution. The Bolshevik conception was to pursue a policy which would make Russia a supporter and fire-giver for the world socialist revolution.

Trotsky's supporters insistently emphasised the necessity of joining on to the world socialist revolution and the initial encouragement which the latter would derive from the Russian revolution, but they failed to appreciate the fact that such encouragement could only be given by a complete revolution, which would only be possible if the working class party had rightly understood that the revolution was bourgeois-peasant in character.

We should not be carried off our feet by phrases about a union with a world revolution: first of all a practical—not indefinitely hypothetical—line of policy must be found in consonance with the conditions prevailing in our own country, a policy which should enable the working class to stir large sections of the population and which should raise them to such heights on the wings of the revolutionary movement that the strength given by their victory would enable them effectively to assist the working class of other countries.

Many years later, in 1917, the Bolsheviks attained power through the medium of this same bourgeois-democratic revolution, because they alone understood its character and were able to utilise its forces. It is only through this understanding and the practical use made of it that Russia has become the centre of the world socialist revolution.



GEORGE PLEHANOV (1856-1918)
One of the founders of the Russian Social
Democratic Party.

The different opinions which prevailed as to how the driving force of the revolution should be utilised also helped to split the Social-Democratic Party. The divergence of policy among Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was already apparent before the revolution. As early as 1904, in the so-called Zemstvo Campaign, the Mensheviks had given expression to their conception of the bourgeois opposition as the leader, spearpoint and support of the expanding movement.

According to their idea, the bourgeois revolution must be led by the bourgeoisie, and their tactics were accordingly confined to subordinating the workers' movement to that of the Liberal bourgeoisie, whom they considered to be entitled to the leadership of the revolution by the divine right of history.

This lifeless unreal theory was put forward by the Mensheviks without reference to actual social relationships. The Russian bourgeoisie did indeed want a Constitution, but they wanted to obtain it by petition, they fawned on the Tsarist Government for concessions, vowing that nothing was further from their thoughts than revolution. It was this bourgeoisie with its anti-revolutionary temper which the Mensheviks cast for the part of leader of the revolution! According to the Menshevik "plan" the working class were to be allowed to spur on and revolutionise the bourgeoisie (but without employing "intimidation") to induce in them a more determined and logical procedure, but without "undue insistence" which might "repel" them. The peasantry was conceived as merely an appendage to the Liberal movement, showing that the Mensheviks had failed to realise the important part played historically by the peasantry in the bourgeois-peasant revolution. In their opinion, the cultured Liberal bourgeoisie must inevitably be driven to take action against the autocracy, whilst the peasantry, their faith in the Tsar not as yet dimmed, were much

more likely to side with the militarist Government in defence of the monarchy. Such were the arguments of the Menshevik politicians, who, sitting as it were in hermetic seclusion, could only repeat old truisms, without the appreciation of how conditions had changed, and without insight into the real roots of the revolution.


Lenin pointed out to the Mensheviks that they did not realise the bourgeois character of the revolution and that the revolution had got to be made. With amazing vigour and impressiveness Lenin championed this simple, easily understood and (one would have thought) logically natural theory against the Mensheviks. The essence of the problem was that the revolution had got to be made. Circumstances were such that the civil revolution had to develop and advance without a revolutionary bourgeoisie, indeed even against their will and in spite of their opportunism.

Even before the revolution the opportunist trimming of the bourgeois leaders was apparent, and every day of revolt made clearer the fact that although they talked incessantly of revolution they clung with every fibre of their being to the hope of compromise with the autocracy. In order to wipe the old régime out of existence battle had to be given not only to Tsarism, but also to the anti-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

Russia had made considerable progress on the path of industrial capitalist development. The feudal aristocratic regime placed obstacles in the way of the economic, political and cultural growth of the country, but among the smallholders who formed the majority of the Russian population it was not the capitalists but the semi-bourgeois peasant farmers who were driven by economic and political circumstances to fight the revolutionary battle against the landowning class and its government.

The Liberal bourgeoisie admittedly had to suffer many disabilities from the autocratic regime, but it had already won access to the bureaucratic flesh-pots and was on the way to a compromise with Tsarism. The peasants on the other hand were inevitably involved in the revolution by the logic of war, and were forced to go ever further towards the forcible removal of the economic and political oppression of the landowners. But the peasants are not able to play an independent or leading role in revolution by reason of their dispersion, dissensions and lack of organisation.

The weight of the revolution, the leadership of the bourgeois-peasant revolution falls upon the working class which alone is capable of maintaining a logical unremitting fight against aristocracy and Tsarism. Only the working class can march at the head of a revolution whose object is to force a "plebeian" reckoning with Tsarism. Only under such leadership can the masses overthrow the autocracy. It must, none the less, be emphasised that the working class would sacrifice nothing of its own class interest in taking the lead over the peasants: the bourgeois-democratic



CAUTION—DON'T BLOW!

(A Russian cartoon of 1905 on Witte's "Manifesto of October 17th" in which the Tsar promised political liberty and the summoning of a Duma.)

revolution promised them many advantages. Lenin wrote as follows in this connection: "In countries like Russia the working class suffers not so much from the existence of capitalism as from its insufficient development. . . Removal of all the remnants of tradition which clog the free and speedy development of capitalism is undoubtedly advantageous to the working class. The bourgeois revolution is an overthrow which makes a clean sweep of all the relics of serfdom (these relics include not only autocracy but any sort of monarchy) and gives the best guarantee of a free and speedy development of capitalism. The bourgeois revolution is, for this reason, of the greatest benefit to the working class and is indeed an absolute necessity. The greater the force and resolution and consistency of the bourgeois revolution, the surer is the outcome of the battle for socialism now being waged between proletariat and bourgeoisie."

Although Trotsky was in alliance with the Mensheviks at the time of the Zemstvo Campaign, he diverged from them in 1905. He correctly estimated the unrevolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie but did not comprehend the true role of the peasantry.

Trotsky emphasised the inevitable socialist character of the revolution, and asserted at the same time that the lower middle class would just as inevitably turn against the socialist proletariat in the course of the revolution. He ridiculed the Bolshevik conviction that an alliance with the poorer peasantry would "guarantee" the victory of the socialist revolution. So Trotsky left the peasantry out of the list of forces making for the success of the revolution. He showed a lack of understanding of the character of the revolution and of its cumulative forces.



A. N. RYKOV

Madame
ZEMPLACHKA

A. A. BOGDANOV



M. N. LIADOV



S. GUSSEV



N. N. RUMIANTSEV



M. M. LITVINOV

THE BOLSHEVIK EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, set up after the Second Conference of the Social Democratic Party in 1903 to prepare for the Third Conference, at which the differences between the Bolsheviks (the majority) and the Mensheviks (minority) within the Party were to be argued out.

In the light of the above explanation of the differences of opinion between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks it is easy to understand their lack of agreement concerning tactics and weapons. The Bolshevik plan of destroying the autocracy by "plebeian" methods made it a bounden duty to prepare by all possible means for an armed uprising. Further the Bolshevik attitude towards the problem of participation in the revolutionary government was closely connected with their recognition of an armed rising as the only method of revolutionary conflict.

They thought that the revolutionary struggles ought to be developed and intensified on the following lines: the political general strike should be transformed into an armed insurrection. This would immediately bring home to the masses the necessity of organising a dictatorial revolutionary government of workers and peasants, *i.e.*, a democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry.

In spite of the bourgeois character of the revolution the working class party cannot avoid participating in the revolutionary government and struggling for preponderance in its councils. It must indeed actually strive to organise such a government itself in order to make sure that its influence upon it will be felt. Lenin lays down the following as the aims to be achieved by participation in such a government: (1) merciless warfare against all counter-revolutionary attempts; (2) representation of the independent interest of the working class. The Bolsheviks assert that the intensification of the class war forces the working class to act not only "from below" (mass strikes and armed insurrection) but also "from above" (democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry).

In proving the necessity of participating in the revolutionary government Lenin writes: "The great questions of political freedom and class war will in the last resort only be decided by force. We must therefore see to the preparation and organisation of such force and for its active, not merely defensive, but rather offensive, application. The long uninterrupted period of reaction which has dominated European politics since the Paris Commune has over much accustomed us to think only of action 'from below' and has taught us too well to fight only a defensive battle. We have now undoubtedly entered upon a new era, an era of political upheavals and revolutions. In such an epoch as that which Russia is now going through we must not limit ourselves to old conceptions. We must propagate the idea of action 'from above,' preparations must be made for an energetic offensive and the conditions and forms of such action must be studied."

The Mensheviks could not approve of the Bolshevik methods of revolutionary warfare, since these conflicted with their conception of the character and driving force of the revolution.

They attached great importance to the general strike but were against its transformation into an armed insurrection. When in the spring of 1905 the workers' and peasants' movement already showed the clearest signs of the possibility of revolution and the question of an armed rising was being mooted, the Mensheviks at their conference thought it feasible to favour propaganda of the idea of an armed rising whilst opposing any preparations for it.

After the defeat of the December insurrection, the Mensheviks condemned this inevitable revolutionary step though it had been dictated by the whole trend of the intensified class war. They fought against the democratic dictatorship of peasants and proletariat and the methods of revolutionary action "from above" with extraordinary vehemence and cried out "conspiracy," "anarchy," etc.

The revolution of 1905-7 did not develop far enough to make discussion of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry feasible. Nevertheless the seeds of such

a dictatorship existed in the form of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. One can judge of the respective attitude of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks towards this question by their behaviour towards the Petersburg Soviet—that historically most important pattern. This Soviet was founded on the initiative of the Mensheviks. For the first few days it acted as a sort of strike committee. The Mensheviks had no objection to its functioning in this manner but they strenuously opposed its transformation into an organ of armed insurrection not to mention its becoming an organ of the democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasants.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, in accordance with their tactics did everything they could to transform it into an organ of armed insurrection and of the democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry.

During the short period of its existence the Petersburg Soviet followed the Bolshevik policy. For a few historic days it was in political control of the capital, and a few days before its members were arrested it changed from a Soviet of Workers' Deputies to a Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies.

On the question of the functions of the Soviet, Trotsky was nearer to the Bolsheviks than to the Mensheviks but he none the less failed to understand the organs of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. He did not realise that as things stood in 1905 the Soviets were the embryo of the democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry. His own saying "Without Tsars and with a workers' government" is evidence of his false appreciation of the character and driving forces of the revolution.

The different conceptions outlined above found expression at the conferences of the Social-Democratic Party: in 1905 at its third conference, held in London, all problems were solved on the Bolshevik theory because the Mensheviks sent no delegates. The fourth conference held in Stockholm in 1906 and the fifth in London in 1907 were general conferences of both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks: at the fourth the Bolsheviks were in a minority, at the fifth their influence prevailed, and from then onwards they consolidated their majority.



AN OPPONENT OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.—From a painting.

Six—THE PERIOD OF REACTION (1907-1910)

THE after-effects of the revolutionary movement were felt in the years 1906 and 1907. In 1907 the forces of revolution were smashed and disrupted, whilst the forces supporting Tsarism were gaining in strength and consolidating their position. The aristocracy was moving further and further to the right, towards unbridled reaction. Immediately after 1905 the organisations of the united nobles were very active. It was these organisations which decided the policy of the Government. The landowners of extreme monarchist views, together with the representatives of the priesthood, organised the notorious "Union of the Russian People" (the so-called "Black Hundred") whose guiding spirits were Purishkevitch and Markov, both deputies in the Duma. Besides landowners and priests, the "Union of the Russian People" included police agents, pro-Tsarist bureaucrats, merchants and rich peasants, and some of the dregs of the proletariat who were ready for a "consideration" to stage either patriotic demonstrations or pogroms against the Jews or to provoke fights at workers' meetings and revolutionary demonstrations in order to make possible "justifiable" "punitive" interference by the police.

Demonstrations of revolutionary elements were dispersed by police and Cossacks; demonstrators were belaboured with sword and "nagaika" (riding whip), and even shot down on several occasions. Wholesale arrests filled the prisons with thousands of class-conscious workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals. Many of them were tried and condemned to exile either for lifelong settlement or imprisonment in the most distant parts of Siberia. Death sentences, pronounced on workmen by court martial, became more and more numerous. The "Social-Democrat" (No. 11, 1910) published the following figures showing the death sentences passed during the years of reaction :

Year	Death Sentences							Executions announced in the Press	
1907	1692	748
1908	1959	782
1909	1435	543

"This table can only be properly understood" they wrote, "if one realises that the figures exclude the countless victims of the year of punitive expeditions (1905) and the year of court martials (1906). The 3,000 corpses, which cast a red glow of horror round the Terror of the Great French Revolution were easily outnumbered by the Terror of the Tsarist counter-revolution." It is to be noted that four-fifths of those condemned to death belonged to the so-called "lower strata of the population" *i.e.*, were workers, peasants, artisans, etc.

Throughout the whole country the Tsarist police régime celebrated its triumph over the revolution. The Liberalism of the bourgeoisie and of some of the nobility became more and more lukewarm and was replaced by complete submission to the will of the autocracy and support of its fight against the revolutionary movement.

The landowning autocracy on many occasions was able to rely on the support of the bourgeoisie. The leading political spirit of the period of reaction was Stolypin, nicknamed "Hangman Cravatte." The dominant policy was named the Stolypin policy, and the hangman's noose was called Stolypin's cravat; at the same time as he ruthlessly suppressed the movement, he tried to create a faction of "doughty farmers," as a strong bulwark of Tsarism in each village.

The destruction of the workers' movement had also meant the suppression of the agrarian revolution; but the instigators of the Government policy, as well as many of the landowners, were well aware of the fact that the village had outgrown its old patriarchal and feudal conservatism; that, thanks to the development of capitalist relationships, it had been emancipated from tradition and from the poisonous influences of feudal ideology.

Tsarism naturally could not solve the land question by revolutionary means, for this would have meant the suicide of the great landowning class. Yet to leave the position unchanged, and to institute no reforms, was to drop a match into a powder magazine. Many landowners declared that it was dangerous to carry on cultivation on the plains, and that it would perhaps be better to sell the land to the peasants—naturally at a "fair price." The statistics of changes in the ownership of land in the years following on the revolution show the transfer of large tracts from the hands of the great landowners to those of the peasants. Round figures are given below to show the transactions of the Agricultural Bank:

	1906	1907	1908	1909
	in 1,000 dessiatines (1 dessiatine = 2.8 acres)			
Land offered to the Agricultural Bank by the great proprietors	7,665	2,981	1,536	420
Bought by the Agricultural Bank or through its agency by the peasants	1,224	1,812	997	668

In the above four years the great proprietors sold more than 10 per cent. of their land through the Agricultural Bank at rather high prices. The land was bought in increasing quantities *by individual wealthy farmers and not by co-operative bodies*, as had previously been



BLACK REACTION—A demonstration of the "Union of the Russian People" (organisers of pogroms) in 1907.

the case. The expert on agriculture in post-revolutionary Russia, Professor Tiumenev, draws the following conclusions: "In the years 1906-1907 not more than 2 per cent. or 3 per cent. of all the land sold by the banks came into the possession of individual purchasers. In the years 1910-13, on the other hand, the percentage purchased by individuals increased to 90 per cent. which means almost the whole of the land was bought by the peasants from the Bank. The average size of the holdings increased from 10 dessiatines per purchaser in 1907 to nearly 18 in 1913. The great mass of the peasantry accordingly almost ceased to buy land from the Bank, while there was at the same time an increase, at their expense, in the number of peasant landowners."

Increased sales of land to the peasants, forced upon the landowners, was therefore the first safety valve. The landowners hoped in this way to clear the atmosphere of the village, which had been agitated by the Social-Democratic revolution. But the bankers sold the land to the peasants at inflated prices, thus forcing the radical village bourgeoisie to pay a heavy tribute to the landlords.

Other measures were required to buy the sympathy of the village bourgeoisie. Stolypin's agrarian reforms, which first found expression in the law of November 9th, 1906, followed the line of alliance with the village bourgeoisie; these "reforms" allowed the latter to withdraw from the village *mir*.*

Until 1905 about four-fifths of the co-operative tillings had been in the hands of the village *mirs* and only the remaining fifth consisted of individual holdings; 75 per cent. of the village *mirs* still followed the practice of periodically redistributing the land among the peasants.

For a long time the Tsarist Government had encouraged and supported the village *mirs* as the community of ownership made it possible to transfer arrears of taxes from peasants who could not pay on to the shoulders of the village commune. The landowners also regarded the village *mir* as a convenient instrument for exploitation of the whole village.

The development of capitalist economy naturally went on within the framework of the communal system: this process was analysed by G. Plehanov at the end of the nineteenth century in his book "Our Differences of Opinion," but is treated in far more detail in Lenin's book "The Development of Capitalism in Russia." There is no doubt that communal ownership of land among the peasants hampered to a considerable extent the natural growth of a middle class in the village by making it difficult to convert land and property into goods.

The conditions under which a member might leave his village *mir*, as laid down in the law of November 9th, and as interpreted by the various government executives after it had become operative, had the effect of making withdrawal from the village commune attractive to only a small class of wealthy peasants, who consolidated their economic position at the expense of the mass of poor members.

The effect of Stolypin's agrarian reforms was to hasten the decay of the village *mir*. In forty governments of European Russia, individual land ownership by peasants at the outbreak of war amounted to 60 per cent. of the total lands owned by the peasantry.

The social import of Stolypin's agrarian reforms will only be appreciated when it is known that, shortly after their enactment, approximately 900,000 peasants, or 40 per cent. of all those who had withdrawn from the village *mirs* and established their land as private property, had to sell their land.

* There is no English equivalent for this word, which means a village organised for the cultivation of the land in common.


This shows that Stolypin's reform aided the proletarianisation of masses of peasants who were compelled by sheer necessity to sell their farms.

The lands withdrawn from communal ownership were, of course, not only sold but also bought. Research into the process in different governments showed that the aggregate of purchases was many times as great as the aggregate of sales. This means that the increasing facilities for the sale of peasant lands resulted in the concentration of the poor peasants' land in the hands of the village bourgeoisie, the poor peasants becoming members of the proletariat.

Thus Tsarism and feudalism were adapting themselves to bourgeois development and had built a bridge for the transference of landownership between the nobility and the peasant bourgeoisie.

"The changed agrarian policy of Tsardom," writes Lenin referring to Stolypin's reform "is of extreme importance in a country of peasants such as Russia. The change is not accidental, represents no mere swing of the pendulum due to ministerial changes, no mere whim of the bureaucratic mind—no, it is a fundamental change of policy in the direction of a Bonapartist agrarian policy and towards a Liberal policy (Liberal in the economic, that is in the bourgeois sense of the word) towards peasant landownership. This Bonapartism is a manoeuvre on the part of the monarchy, bereft of its former support in the old patriarchal or simple feudal system, and forced to struggle for balance lest it should fall, to canvass for friends in order to govern; to bribe in order to please; to enlist the support of the dregs of society, of thieves and scoundrels, so as not to have to rely solely on bayonets for the maintenance of its authority. Bonapartism is an objectively inevitable development of monarchy, diagnosed by Marx and Engels from a whole series of symptoms traceable in the recent history of every bourgeois country. The agrarian Bonapartism of Stolypin which received the conscious and unshakable support of the reactionary landowning class as well as of the bourgeoisie of October fame, could never even have been conceived, much less maintained for two years, had not the village *mir* on its own initiative reached a certain degree of capitalist development and produced in its midst elements for whose support Tsarism was able to intrigue, to whom it could say: 'Get rich, rob the community, but support me.'

"It is therefore quite erroneous to consider Stolypin's agrarian policy without taking into account both its Bonapartist methods and its bourgeois Liberal character. Lastly it was no



SIBERIA—A village to which political prisoners were exiled.



EXILED TO SIBERIA—A group including G. I. Petrovski (now President of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic) marked with a cross.

accident that approval of the Stolypin reforms was expressed by the Cadets,* the party of the Liberal bourgeoisie."

The rapid "proletarianisation" of the peasantry consequent on the growth of capitalist economy in the village assured the capitalists of a supply of cheap labour in industry and agriculture. Historians estimate that in the years after the first revolution and preceding the war, about 2½ million peasants joined the ranks of the proletariat as industrial workers. In addition capitalist development in the villages involved an extension of the home markets. Nevertheless it is easily discernible, from a diagram showing the fluctuations in production in the most important branches, that the condition of industry was extraordinarily bad during the years following on the revolution.

The production of pig-iron from 1904 to 1909 was continually decreasing. A corresponding fall was maintained in the production of finished metal goods from 1904 to 1908; there being a slight improvement in 1909. In other industries the position was as follows: railway construction shows a great decrease from 1904 to 1908, and a rise about 1909; wrought iron, a big drop from 1904 to 1909; naphtha a big drop down to 1910. During the period examined the only increase of production was a slight one in textiles (not quite 9 per cent.).

The Stolypin policy, promising an extension of the market among the masses, brought Tsarism and bourgeoisie more closely together. Aristocracy, capitalists and village bourgeoisie—these were the forces which combined under the banner of Tsarism against the workers' and peasants' revolution; these were the social forces on which the feudal autocracy based its reactionary policy after the revolution.

The working class had to bear unaided the whole brunt of the reaction during these years. The peasantry, disrupted and for the most part under the influence of constitutional illusions ("The Revolution has availed us nought; perhaps the Duma will help us!") ceased for several years to be an active revolutionary force. Every year the strike movement amongst

* Cadets or members of the C.D.—the Constitutional Democratic Party also called the "Party of popular freedom." Was formed in October, 1905. The cardinal points in its program were: (1) government by Parliament; (2) freeing of a part of the big proprietors' lands at a "fair price"; (3) improvement of the workers' lot. In foreign politics they supported the jingoism and aggressive aims of the Tsarist government.

the workers weakened. The official figures, given below, show (in round numbers) the official statistics of strikes and strikers:

Year	Strikes	Strikers
1905	14,000	2,900,000
1906	6,100	2,100,000
1907	3,600	740,000
1908	less than 900	176,000

The number of strikes and strikers in 1909 was even smaller than in 1908. It can easily be appreciated how greatly the power of the proletariat in the class war had been weakened, from the fact that whilst only 29.4 per cent. of all the strikes had terminated in favour of the employers in 1905, this percentage had risen to 68.8 in 1908 and to 80 in 1909. Responsibility for the weakening of the working class can in large part be attributed to the disorganisation of its vanguard, the Social-Democratic Party.


The years of reaction were years of ruin for the Social-Democratic organisations; the leaders were arrested and exiled, the illegal printing presses were destroyed and the Party's close connection with the masses ceased. At the same time there was a quantitative decrease in membership of these organisations, especially in the number of intellectuals. The latter were unable to hold out against the severe hardships of the struggle during the period of reaction and lost themselves in mysticism and religious searchings after "God"; the literary intellectuals gave prominence to sex problems which were dealt with more and more on pornographic lines.

The membership of the Social-Democratic Party, which had stood at 150,000 at the end of the first revolution, decreased during the years of reaction to a mere fraction of that figure. Defections were particularly numerous among the Mensheviks who had never been remarkable for ideological solidarity or organised steadfastness, and had raised decentralisation and organic confusion to a principle ("Live and let live").

This fact must now be admitted even by those who for long asserted that the Menshevik principles of organisation offered scope for the building up of a vital party. We quote here a passage from T. Dan's appendix to Martov's "History of Russian Social-Democracy" ("The History of Russian Social-Democracy" by J. Martov, with an Appendix "Social-democracy in Russia after 1908"; published in Berlin 1926 by J. H. W. Dietz's successors.)

"Whilst the Bolshevik section of the Party transformed itself into a battle-phalanx, held together by iron discipline and cohesive guiding resolution, the ranks of the Menshevik section were ever more seriously disorganised by dissension and apathy."

The process of disruption among the Mensheviks was most forcibly expressed in the appearance of the so-called "liquidation policy" a tendency directed towards the liquidation of the illegal Party.



THE DEATH WAGON
in which dead "criminals" left their prison.



CORRIDOR OF CELLS in the Peter-Paul Fortress of Petersburg.

At a time when the Social-Democratic organisations were being constantly interfered with, when it had become terribly difficult to keep going the illegal rallying centres and when no organisation could remain within the law unless it was avowedly monarchist or at least semi-monarchist, the "Liquidators" whose most prominent representatives were Potresov, Tsherevanni, Dan, Axelrod and Maslov, supported by Martov, spoke about fruitless expenditure of strength on conspiracy and about the necessity of concentrating attention on legal work.

By reason of the overwhelming majority of the Mensheviks at this time, the policy took firm hold. Its ideology was extremely simple. On the one hand the "Liquidators" tended more and more to the conclusion that illegal conspiratory work was futile and that the gains were not worth the sacrifices involved. On the other hand they looked upon the State Duma as an almost fully-fledged Parliament and saw in the concessions made by the autocracy, in the pitiful possibilities of action possessed by the Labour organisations, a fundamental change in the autocratic policy, a complete transformation of Tsarism into a bourgeois monarchy, its decisive transition to the methods of West European parliamentarianism.


Starting on this entirely incorrect assumption, the "Liquidators" called upon the workers not to let themselves be influenced by the romance of revolution but to occupy themselves with sober work within the legal organisations and to keep within the bounds which enabled these organisations to retain a legal existence. They were referring to the State Duma, the trade unions, workers' clubs, the legal press and so on. The "Liquidators" in fact made efforts to limit themselves completely to legal work, taking up their stand against conspiracy. T. Dan, in the work referred to above, states that the Mensheviks were in favour of concentrating their efforts on legal work, but he conceals the fact that they were essentially opposed to revolutionary conspiracy.

"But all these Social-Democratic assumptions and projects"—concludes T. Dan—"were at the mercy of the forces of counter-revolution."

The "Liquidators" intended to do away with the illegal supports of the working class movement. They succeeded in damaging the workers' cause in many ways. They tried to create a broad legal working class movement, which, as Dan records, they failed to do. In the State Duma the Menshevik liquidatory policy was supported by an alliance with the Cadet Party, which was founded on belief in a constitutional monarchy. The Mensheviks pursued a policy of co-operation with the Cadets so zealously that they even eradicated all the more radical planks in the program of their party. For instance, in order to preserve a united front with the Cadets, the Mensheviks in their Duma speeches even shelved the demand for the expropriation of the landowners.

The cowardly move against revolutionary conspiracy was so revolting, and so crudely contradicted the revolutionary traditions of the vanguard of the proletariat, that protests were raised even amongst the Mensheviks. A small group of "Mensheviks true to the Party" broke away under the leadership of G. Plehanov and these edited the "Social-Democratic Diary" (the organ of the "Liquidators" was called the "Social-Democratic Voice"). Plehanov pointed out to the "Liquidators" that the history of the Russian Social-Democratic Party had already known an opportunist phase which bore the mark of legality (the so-called "Legal Marxists" of the nineties).

"It suffices to mention"—Plehanov wrote in 1910 in the "Social-Democrat"—"that these 'critics' of Marx who had leaned towards legalism soon transformed themselves to a greater or lesser degree—rather greater than less—into champions of progressive bourgeois ideas whereas the non-legal 'orthodox' spokesmen became the champions of the revolutionary proletariat. . . . Revolutionary conspiracy is now frequently attacked precisely by those who are unfit for any revolutionary action. They are tired, they want to rest, the heavy ceaseless martyrdom of the self-sacrificing rank and file workers is beyond their strength, they escape



TSAR NICHOLAS II.—the Dream of the Gallows.

from their circles and try to make themselves and others believe that their flight is no treachery to the cause but merely its passing over on to a wider basis."

Though he defended revolutionary conspiracy Plehanov still remained a Menshevik in tactics. Hence his criticism of the policy of liquidation could not be consistent, although it undoubtedly served a good purpose in the fight against the organised policy of liquidation, whereas Trotsky's group, which then edited the popular paper "Pravda" in Vienna and tried to unite all the forces of Menshevism including the "Liquidators," only assisted the latter's policy. Only the Bolsheviks submitted the policy of liquidation to a consistent revolutionary criticism. This they did in their organ "Proletariat."

The Bolsheviks asserted quite correctly that under the Tsarist regime it was impossible to speak of the likelihood of a wide mass movement of workers within the bounds of legality. They emphasised the fact that Tsarism was essentially a reactionary machine for exercising the power wielded by the feudal aristocracy, that the evolution of autocracy was proceeding towards a bourgeois monarchy at a very slow pace; that only illegal revolutionary activity could provide the workers' movement with a true socialist ideology, and that only it could appear as the revolutionary soul of the Labour organisations. The illegal rallying points of the movement, according to the Bolshevik view, should be the struggle of the working class to realise the three irrevocable slogans (the so-called "three fundamentals"): a democratic republic, expropriation of the Junker landowners, and the 8-hour day.

The Bolsheviks carried on their revolutionary work with the idea that the individual acts of the workers should be subordinated to the struggle for these three fundamental demands. During these difficult years the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, had to struggle not only against the Mensheviks' policy of liquidation but against those within their own ranks who favoured a policy of "liquidation from the left."

Just as the Menshevik liquidators adopted a policy of only acting within the law and opposing revolutionary conspiracy, so the "Left liquidators" took the view that only illegal methods of fighting should be used and refused to use legal means for revolutionary ends. (The "Left liquidators" organised themselves into a group in 1909, this group called "Vperiod" [Forward] had A. A. Bogdanov, Lunacharski and Alexinski at its head and was also joined by Gorki).

The difference between the points of view of these three Social-Democratic policies in the years of reaction can most clearly be seen in the position taken up by each group on the State Duma question.

In place of the first State Duma dissolved by the Government (April-July, 1906) in which the Social-Democrats and their sympathisers had occupied 18 seats, came the second Duma (February to June, 1907) in which they had about 60. But this Duma was also dissolved and the leading Social-Democratic representatives were imprisoned or sent to Siberia. The third Duma, which met on 1st November, 1907, was elected according to the reactionary election law of 3rd July, 1907, and, accordingly had a counter-revolutionary complexion. (The Social-Democrats only occupied 15 seats).

In spite of their small numbers the political role of the Social-Democratic faction in the State Duma was of great importance. In these circumstances the Mensheviks adopted the standpoint which had always been regarded by the representatives of the revolutionary proletariat as "Parliamentary cretinism." They looked upon even this "Chatter parliament" as a panacea for all ills. Instead of using the lawful opportunities afforded by Parliament for the extension and intensification of the extra-parliamentary revolutionary movement the

Mensheviks entered the slippery downward path of parliamentary wire-pulling, adopted the bourgeois methods of parliamentary bargaining and began to compromise with the non-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The Bolsheviks declared on the contrary that one ought indeed to enter the Duma, but not for the purpose of making compromises, not in order to capitulate to the representatives of the bourgeoisie.

The Bolsheviks entered the Duma in order to unmask Tsarism and the bourgeoisie, they went in to make propaganda for revolutionary ideas and slogans, to prepare an ideology for the next revolution.


The "Boycottists" who assured the proletariat of their support of the revolutionary cause, in fact wanted to deprive the working class of the extremely important legal means of preparing for a new revolution—important because it was during a period of reaction. Beneath their "left" phraseology lay a reactionary tactic. They adopted a policy which would have transformed the party into an isolated sectarian organisation.

Whilst they retained and consolidated the illegal skeleton organisation of the party and fused together the illegal centres of the revolutionary movement, the Bolsheviks intended to make use of all legal means for keeping in touch with the masses in order to bring them over to the cause of revolution.

"Now that we can look back upon a complete historical period, whose connection with the periods following is already absolutely clear, it becomes obvious that the Bolsheviks could not have formed the solid nucleus of the revolutionary working class party between 1908 and 1914, nor could they have consolidated, strengthened and developed it, if they had not striven hard for the adoption of both legal and illegal methods of fighting, and had not insisted upon participation in the most reactionary of parliaments and in the series of other institutions controlled by reactionary legislation (Social Insurance, etc.)."—(Lenin, "Left Wing Communism; An Infantile Disorder.")

The Bolsheviks understood in every Congress, Conference and Plenary sitting of the Central Committee that, following Lenin's teachings, they must emphasise the necessity of utilising both legal and illegal methods. (The London Congress of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1907, which ended in a victory for the Bolsheviks; the Paris Conference called by the Central Committee in 1908; the January Plenary sitting of the Central Committee in 1910).

This was the pledge of the success of the revolutionary movement in the years (1911-1914) when the working class movement was being revived after the years of reaction.



RASPUTIN—Ruler of the Tsar.

Seven—THE RISE OF THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT BEFORE THE WAR

IN the year 1910, or in 1909 if the first symptoms are taken into consideration, there began an improvement in various industries, and this partial improvement transformed itself in 1911 into a general industrial revival which lasted without interruption up to the beginning of the world war.

The agrarian reform of Stolypin was undoubtedly the main factor in this industrial boom, since it liberated the village from the chains of communal ownership and feudal enslavement, and helped on the development of bourgeois relationships in the village. As a result of Stolypin's reform and the consequent transformation of relations within the village, ever greater masses of landless peasants were forced into industry as cheap labour power. According to some estimates 2½ million peasants are supposed to have become wage-earners between 1900 and 1914.

This was not, however, the most important antecedent of the industrial boom. Cheap labour power had before this been at the disposal of Russian industrial capital. The greatest difficulty which had to be faced was not this, but the problem of markets.

The reform of Stolypin facilitated the solution of this problem. We have already pointed out that the Stolypin agrarian laws gave a powerful impetus towards social differentiation in the village and this, as always, resulted in an extension of the home industrial market. In these years industry developed at an increasingly rapid pace, not as the result of government orders, but through the increased demands of the home market and particularly through the increased purchasing power of the villages.

Statistics show, amongst other things, a special rise in the demand for articles specifically required in the countryside. Thus the extension of the home market was undoubtedly an important factor in the industrial boom, a factor which was yet more important than the colossal development of industry at the end of the 19th century. We give below figures dealing with the percentage increase in production from 1909 to 1913 in the most important heavy industries, on whose development that of other industries always depends:

Pig iron	+ 65.5 per cent.	Wrought iron	+ 61.3 per cent.
Metal manufactures	+ 51.3 per cent.	Sheet iron	+ 20.4 per cent.
Rails	+ 23.9 per cent.	Beams and sleepers	+ 87.9 per cent.

This industrial boom, due to the favourable conjunction of markets, had an invigorating influence on the workers' movement. The enormous profits of the native capitalists were dependent upon the continuous development of industry and this they intended to secure by small concessions to the workers.

The revival of the strike movement began in 1910. From 1910 to 1914 the number of strikers grew twentyfold, and in 1912 a wave of strikes affected more than a million workers; in 1913 about 1½ million went on strike, and in the first half of 1914 about 2 million. It is important to note here that strikes with political objects became increasingly important. It is characteristic that the struggle about the so-called "Lena Bloodbath" of April, 1912, gave a strong new impetus to the revival of the general strike movement. On the Lena goldfields in Siberia, away from railways and large towns, where capitalist exploitation assumed a particularly brutal form and where force and tyranny supplemented economic

pressure, a demonstration of strikers making very modest economic demands was dispersed by shots fired by the infantry. The victims numbered several hundreds.

The Russian working class replied to this "bloodbath" by protest strikes, and emphasis was put on the political complexion of the strikes of the following period. Every year showed increased political activity among the working class, a conscious grasp of revolutionary political slogans by the masses, a strengthening of the movement and greater attendance on historic days (22nd January, May Day, etc.). On the First of May, 1914, more than a million workers struck.

The struggle for the leadership of the masses was waged by two groups: the Bolsheviks and the "Liquidators." The latter reduced their program to a struggle for liberty of association and concentrated their efforts principally on petitions. In opposition to this cowardly program the Bolsheviks put forward the three fundamental aims already mentioned: the struggle for a democratic republic, expropriation of the feudal landowners, the 8-hour day.

T. Dan, the Menshevik, in his book on the history of Russian social-democracy is compelled to admit that the Bolsheviks had more success than the "Liquidators" among the masses: "The Bolshevik point of view in regard to the struggle for the right of association found an echo among the masses who, since they had no experience of organisation, did not know how to value the right of association. On the one hand the campaign for the right of association was ruined by the efforts of the Bolsheviks, who intimidated the Duma group by their demagoguery and agitation among the masses—the Duma group desiring to preserve its neutrality—and on the other hand the adherents of the association campaign were drawn aside from direct agitation among the masses and compelled to dissociate themselves from the demagogic Bolsheviks."

Dan cannot clearly understand why the workers, living under an autocratic police régime, when any revolutionary act involved severe persecution and sacrifice, should decline the reformist proposals of the "Liquidators" and follow the Bolshevik lead which appealed for a revolutionary struggle to obtain a democratic republic. He cannot conceive why the workers had sufficient "experience" for this struggle and yet not sufficient for the campaign for the right of association. "As a result"—he says—"the 'Liquidators,' who had up to now been of the opinion that their obvious task in the years of preparation would create a position of advantage for them when the workers' movement revived, noted, much to their surprise, that their monopoly position was shaken by that illegal Bolshevik Party which they had looked upon as a 'living corpse.'"

The root of the matter lay in the fact that the working class had not forgotten the lessons of the 1905-07 revolution. The Bolsheviks appeared to them more and more clearly as the real revolutionaries. The working class movement of the first revolution marched on, armed with the slogans of Bolshevism. The new vigour apparent in the movement restored the ties between the proletariat and its vanguard, ties which had been weakened during the period of reaction but which were now restored on a revolutionary basis.

The years 1911-1914 were the years of the "Bolshevisation" of the working class. No single important event took place during these years which was not predominantly influenced by the Bolsheviks, whether it was a strike against the poisoning of working women in a gum factory or the heroic hundred day fight of the Baku workers, shortly before the war, or the Social Insurance campaign.

On the eve of the war the political mass struggle of the working class created an atmosphere strongly reminiscent of the 1905 revolution. Just before the war the streets



STRIKERS SHOT—Corpses of strikers shot at the Lena mines, Siberia, in 1912.

of Petersburg were barricaded and were the scene of armed conflicts. In its "Manifesto on the War,"* the Bolshevik Central Committee says: "The revolutionary movement against Tsarism during the last few years has again assumed immense proportions. Throughout this period the Russian working class has marched at the head of the movement. The political strikes of recent years, affecting millions, have been governed by the slogans of the overthrow of Tsardom and the demand for a democratic republic. On the eve of the war Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, on a visit to Tsar Nicholas II. saw barricades erected by Russian workers in the streets of Petrograd."

The working class did not in any sense follow the leadership of the "Liquidators." They streamed in increasing numbers under the banners of Bolshevism.

The "Liquidators," who were against "strike passion" were cast aside by the powerful torrent of the workers' movement. They stood aside from the rising flood of revolution, they clung to a few little groups of aristocrats of labour who set their group interests above those of the whole class.

The revolutionary advance was interrupted by the war, but this pause did not destroy the class consciousness of the proletariat. The experience of the first revolution, supplemented by the experience gained in the movement immediately preceding the war, assured the continuity of the revolutionary traditions of the working class and prepared the way for the battle against imperialism, for socialism, and for victory in the fight for Soviet power. The revolutionary movement in the period of pre-war expansion showed several new aspects not apparent in the movement at the time of the first revolution. The fact that the work-

* *Social-Democrat*, No. 33, 1st November, 1914.



EXILED—A group of Bolshevik propagandists in exile in Siberia: third, fourth and seventh from the left, back row, are Stalin, Kamenev and Sverdlov.

ing class put itself under the direct leadership of the Bolshevik Party, which by dissociating itself from the opportunists had formed a separate organisation, was one important new development.

The day-to-day political struggle forced the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks to make an ever clearer differentiation of their attitudes. The line of demarcation became clearer and clearer in all the forms of party organisation; separate committees and separate organisations were established. In 1912 at the conference of revolutionary Social-Democrats in Prague a Bolshevik Central Committee was elected and was demonstrated to be the leading organ of Social-Democracy. Thus there arose a distinct Bolshevik Party leadership which could not but influence the Social-Democratic group in the State Duma. In 1913 there was a split among the Social-Democratic representatives in the State Duma. On one side stood seven adherents of opportunism under the leadership of Tscheidze. They had been elected by seven non-proletarian districts having 214,000 workers. On the other side were six deputies all representing labour assemblies, elected by the industrial centres of Russia whose workers numbered 1,008,000.

The main difference of opinion was on the subject of revolutionary Marxist or opportunist reformist tactics. Practical deviations of policy were manifested, especially in the sphere of extra-parliamentary work among the masses. Such work was bound to be illegal in Russia if the leaders intended to act on revolutionary principles. Tscheidze's group continued to be most loyal allies of the "Liquidators," who repudiated illegal work, and supported the latter in all discussions among the workers.

This resulted in a split. The six deputies formed the group known as the Russian

Social-Democratic Workers' Party. A year's work proved conclusively that an overwhelming majority of the Russian workers supported this group (see Lenin and Zinoviev's pamphlet "Socialism and the War"). The Bolsheviks were able to do effective revolutionary work in the Duma because they had broken with the Mensheviks. They could approach the working masses from the platform of the Duma over the heads of the deputies with an unmodified revolutionary program, because they had taken the definite step of separating themselves from the Mensheviks. The Mensheviks created a furore on account of the split which the Bolsheviks had caused in the labour organisations. This split was, however, really caused by those who had drawn the workers into a policy of compromise, into a petty day-to-day struggle, into a policy of liquidation. The split also occurred in the Party press. As against the organ of the Liquidators, "Nasha Zaria," the Bolsheviks started the legal papers "Isvestia" and "Pravda," around which there gathered an important group of active revolutionary-minded workers. In two and a half years, from early in 1912 till the autumn of 1914, four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia rallied round "Pravda," and the Duma deputies of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party acted in full harmony with them. (See Lenin's article "What is Shown by the Proceedings of the Russian Social-Democratic Duma Group?" in No. 40 of the "Social-Democrat," 1915).

The split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was also reflected in the legal non-party organisations of the workers. In this connection the struggle of Bolshevism against the Liquidators in the Social Insurance campaign is characteristic. The social insurance law of 1912 completely subordinated the workers to employers and bureaucrats even in this sphere. The Menshevik Liquidators, who already in 1912 had their own organ "Workers' Insurance," tried to bring the movement on to legal lines, that is to keep it within the limits of the Tsarist constitution. The Bolsheviks for their part also issued their paper "Insurance Questions," from 1913, and dealt therein with the insurance movement, together with the general political movement of the proletariat.

The *Pravda* ("Truth") which owing to the censorship had been renamed *Za Pravdu* ("For the Truth") wrote: "The workers must put through their own workers' policy on questions of social insurance, they must weigh every action of their insurance policy. Only thus can they gain anything out of it." (22-10-13.) It is very characteristic that the Bolsheviks achieved a victory over the Menshevik Liquidators even in this matter. By an overwhelming majority the workers voted at the Health Insurance elections for the Bolshevik program. The organised establishment of the Bolsheviks as an independent party was of extraordinary importance for the future development of the workers' movement.

At the beginning of the revolution the workers who had passed through the melting-pot of the imperialist war discovered in the Bolshevik Party a tested revolutionary fighting organisation which contained no compromising elements, and which possessed not only its own ideological and political traditions hostile to reformism, but also its own fundamental principles of organisation. It was, moreover, a thoroughly disciplined body.

The West European proletariat, which in several countries entered after the world war into a revolutionary period, did not possess a separate and closely-knit Bolshevik party. The results of this are well known. The period of the rapid advance of the workers' movement immediately preceding the war, constitutes a specially important chapter in the history of Bolshevism, because it was then that its organised establishment as an independent party occurred.

This was the final result of the ten years' struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism.

Eight — THE IMPERIALIST WAR AND THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE REVOLUTION

RUSSIA took part in the world war as one of the Entente Powers. This is explained by the nature of capitalist development in Russia after the 1905-07 revolution. At the outbreak of the war the Russian Empire was a land in which patriarchal agricultural methods of production and the most modern forms of capitalist production existed side by side. Industrial capitalism in pre-war Russia had already definitely passed into the stage of imperialism, the stage of finance capital.

To elucidate this statement a quotation is here given from the work of the Russian investigator, N. Vanag ("Finance Capital in Russia on the Eve of the War," Moscow, 1925). His proof of the fact that towards the end of the war three-quarters of the total Russian banking system was controlled by European banking capital, is specially significant. The capital of the Entente Powers, particularly that of France, played the most important role in this control over Russian industry. German capital was only of importance in the electrical industry and the manufacture of rolling stock. In the most important branches of Russian heavy industry the financial monopoly was in the hands of the banking capitalists of the Entente.

"The bank capital of the Entente, led by France, was at the head of the monopoly of Russian heavy industry," writes N. Vanag, "represented by a well-known Paris banking concern which was under the control of the *Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas*. On the eve of the war the French banks had an almost complete monopoly of the Russian metallurgical industry. They controlled a series of companies, whose stock amounted to 67.5 per cent. of the total capital of all enterprises which were under the influence of the banks. They stood at the head of the metallurgical trusts and of the *Prodamet* syndicate. The Paris banks completely dominated the Russian coal industry; they controlled companies with stocks which constituted 75 per cent. of all the enterprises under the control of the banks; they stood at the head of the *Produgol* syndicate. As regards the oil industry, the French banks co-operated with the English in the *Russian General Corporation*, and in 1913 monopolised about 40 per cent. of the total oil production of Baku.

"The monopoly of British bank capital extended to the Russian oil industry (the oil production of both the Standard and the Shell Companies accounted for 40 per cent. of the total Russian oil production) and to the copper industry; here British financiers controlled companies whose stock formed 51 per cent. of all capital invested in this industry up to the year 1913."

These data make it quite clear why Russia entered the world war. The Entente banking capital was of decisive importance in the economic, and therefore in the diplomatic, life of the Russian bourgeoisie. Russia entered the world war chiefly because it was the will of the financial magnates of France and England who controlled Russian capitalism. Besides this, Russian capitalism had for long thrown yearning glances at the Balkans, that conveniently placed market for Russian industrial products. France and England promised to satisfy this "yearning for the Dardanelles." Behind this "yearning" was the imperialist wish to transform the Balkan States into colonies or the equivalent. Russian Tsarism fully agreed with the program of the imperialist bourgeoisie not only because of the economic

influence of the bourgeoisie in the autocratic State was very strong, not only because the capital of the Entente, especially that of France, had repeatedly helped Tsarism out of its financial difficulties, but also because the landowning class had for long expressed a similar desire for robbery. The Dardanelles, the key to the Mediterranean, would secure a position of advantage in the cereal trade of that sea for Russian agrarian interests. It would enable them to defeat their most important competitors, the Hungarian grain merchants.



LENIN in 1914.

The annexation of Persia, Galicia and Armenia, and a general "rounding off" of Russian possessions, was as attractive to the Russian bourgeoisie. As long as the Entente was willing to support these Russian plans the Entente slogan against Germany and Austria "To the glorious end!" became also the slogan of aristocracy and bourgeoisie. The Russian autocracy was in this respect the representative of the united interests of the landed aristocracy and of

finance capital, just as the German monarchy represented German finance capital and the German Junkers. In this connection the growing competition between Russian and German agrarian interests should also be mentioned, a competition which had induced the German State to impose a high protective tariff on Russian grain.*

Russia's war aims so far are in no doubt: Tsarism came out with an imperialist program and one of territorial annexation in the agrarian interests. If the war program of a country comparatively backward in capitalist development such as Russia bears the stamp of imperialism how is it possible to doubt the imperialist motives of such highly-developed countries as England, France and Germany? Could one deny that the Entente on one side and Germany on the other had entered the war with imperialist aims—and still remain a Marxist?†

Could one assume that all the other smaller countries which joined one or other group of Great Powers were not tools of imperialist policy? And is the question "Who began it?" really of great importance since all were, in fact, ready to shoot? And yet the socialists of the Second International, who but shortly before had voted at International Congresses in favour of resolutions worded: "War against imperialist war," on the day that war was declared supported their own imperialist governments and were anxious to prove that *their* government was engaged in a "just war of defence."

In spite of the vigorous resolutions of the Congresses of the Second International, the socialists of Germany, France and England voted for "*their*" war credits.

Thus was the Second International broken up. The most out-and-out jingoes gave the lead to the socialists. The same arguments were repeated with suitable variations in the different countries. It is interesting to compare the attitude taken up by the Russian and the German Social-Democrats.

With both of these the main line taken was that of the open jingoism of the war apologists—"To a glorious end." The German Südekums and Scheidemanns proved that the war was a "just war" and "a war of liberation," because one of the chief enemies of Germany was Tsarist Russia, the bulwark of world reaction. A victory for Tsarist Russia, they said, means a victory for reaction in Europe, an enslavement of Germany, its economic and social retrogression, the weakening of the German working class, and a defeat for socialism.

But the "Russian Südekums" (Plehanov, Maslov, Potressov, Leartzki, etc.) employed exactly the same sort of arguments to prove the rightness of their attitude and yet reached a diametrically opposite conclusion. Plehanov proved to the Russian workers that a German victory meant a victory for the reactionary militarism of William II., that in case of a German victory the economic life of Russia would suffer, the strength of the working class would disappear, and the prospects of socialism would be worse. Therefore they supported the "just war" of Nicolas II. This socialist way of proving things resulted in two "truths." One "truth" proved the justice of the Entente Powers and of Nicolas II., the other "truth" was on the side of William II.

This theory which suited the jingoes of the Entente just as well as the jingoes of Germany was put forward by the "Centrists" whose most important representative in Germany was Kautsky. The latter proved in the columns of the "Neue Zeit" that modern capitalism, though it *might* carry on an imperialist policy, *need not necessarily do so*, that an imperialist

* This aspect of the matter is clearly shown in an interesting manner by the Russian Marxist historian, M. Pokrovski.

† We leave out of consideration here the competition—sufficiently discussed in German literature—between England and France on one side, and Germany on the other.

policy was not a necessary corollary of modern capitalism; finally, that the capitalists of our time might carry on a war of defence. It was also he who spoke of the impossibility of revolution in time of war. It was he who sought to allay the confused yet growing revolt of the masses against imperialism by the pious theory of ultra-imperialism. This theory stated that as a result of the war there would supervene a pacifist epoch of imperialism affecting the whole world. [That is to say "you should fight for the present and salvation will come to you later."] Whilst he dissociated himself from the cruder forms of socialist jingoism Kautsky himself nurtured and justified it by his theoretical sophisms, and it was just because of this ideological relationship that he was against a split and in favour of unity of organisation with the socialist jingoes.

The Russian "Centrist Menshevik Internationalists" (Martov, Dan, etc.) were the counterpart to Kautsky in the Russian Social-Democratic Party; they came out with a phraseology even more "left" than Kautsky's, but they occupied the same ideological position.

Whilst criticising the socialist jingoes of Plehanov's type, the Russian Centrists, like their German confrères, remained always within the bounds of socialist pacifism. They stuck to such phrases as "Fight above all for peace," and "Preparation for Peace," and to the preparation of "peace conferences," etc. At the same time they defended the socialist jingoes against Bolshevik criticism and stood with them for unity of organisation.

"The International Mensheviks"—writes T. Dan—"who within the International vigorously opposed defence of country and the policy of internal peace, never demanded that these tendencies should be excluded from the Labour International."

The distribution of forces was as follows: the autocratic State carried on a war with a program of imperialism and feudal annexations. The socialist jingoes of Plehanov's type designated this war as a "just war of defence," they persuaded the workers to "self-denial," to abstention from strikes, to a truce in the class war, during the critical times through which the Fatherland was passing.

The Internationalists of Martov's type, though criticising the crude jingoes, were nevertheless in favour of unity with them and thereby supported and protected them.

Trotsky at that time had his own group which, though it did not go hand in hand with that of the Bolsheviks led by Lenin, yet dissociated itself sharply from the socialist jingoes. In the course of time Trotsky's group approached even more closely to Lenin's point of view and abandoned several pacifist illusions. Only those Bolsheviks led by Lenin and Zinoviev condemned and fought against the war with proletarian consistency.

The Bolsheviks gave a Marxian interpretation to the war, they declared that in this war there was no defensive party, that all countries had entered it with an imperialist program, that the roots of the war were to be found in the imperialist phase of capitalism which led inevitably to war in the struggle for raw materials and markets and for outlets for finance capital.

The Bolsheviks vigorously and uncompromisingly condemned all renegades who had betrayed the cause of socialism and deserted into the imperialist camp. They appealed for war against their native bourgeoisie, they demanded that the weapons of war should be directed against their own national imperialism, they advocated civil war and the overthrow of bourgeois domination, for only thus could the victory of the proletariat and the elimination of the causes which had led to the imperialist war be assured.

Against the cry "Save your Country!" the Bolsheviks set the slogan of "Welcome Defeat!" and also "Change the imperialist war into a civil war!"

"Revolution in war time is civil war, and the transformation of the war of States into a civil war is facilitated by military failures (defeat) on the part of the governments of the States; it is in fact impossible to bring about such a transformation without encouraging defeat."

So shortly, but with amazing clarity, did Lenin formulate the slogan, "Defeat," in his article "Concerning the Defeat of our Government in the Imperialist War."

"The transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war," "Defeatism" in relation to one's own imperialist "fatherland," the creation of a Third International—these were the aims for the realisation of which the Bolsheviks strove during the imperialist war.



WAR—2½ million Russian soldiers fell in the War, and 5 million were wounded.

In Russia the Bolshevik deputies in the State Duma voted against war credits in contrast to the socialist jingoes of all countries.*

Five Bolshevik deputies to the State Duma, the workers Petrovski, Muranov, Samilov, Badajev and Shagov, were sent, together with Kamenev and other comrades, to lifelong exile in Siberia on a charge of high treason.

Month after month, year after year of the war, the Bolsheviks prepared for the overthrow of Tsarism. They carried on revolutionary anti-war propaganda among the workers and in the army. They called upon the masses to attack Tsarism and to repudiate any kind of patriotic co-operation between proletariat and bourgeoisie.

The struggle concerning the "War Industry Committee" is of special interest in this connection. The bourgeois parliamentarians led by Gutshkov and Kononov, men who were later ministers in the Provisional Government, organised a workers' group within this committee consisting of their elected representatives. The purpose of this workers' group was the realisation of effective co-operation between bourgeoisie and proletariat in the prosecution of the imperialist war. The imperialist bourgeoisie reckoned—not without justification—on the transformation of this "workers' group" into an organisation through which imperialist influence could be exerted on the working class and by means of which a campaign against the strike movement could be carried on.

The socialist jingoes were for participation in the "War Industry Committee." The Centrists were at first somewhat critical. "In spite of this, however"—admits T. Dan—"the majority of Internationalist Mensheviks who were active in Russia, were in favour of participation in this Committee." The Bolsheviks carried on an energetic agitation among the masses against participation in the War Industry Committee.

At an assembly of Petrograd workers, specially summoned to vote upon this question, the majority expressed its opposition to co-operation with the bourgeoisie in the War Industry Committee. It was only by means of police pressure and the efforts of Gutshkov and other bourgeois politicians that it was possible to obtain amenable "representatives."

* The Menshevik deputies, whose most typical representative was Tscheidze, voted likewise against war credits, but soon afterwards took up a socialist jingo position.



FALSE NEWS OF VICTORY—in Moscow, 1915.

The Bolsheviks adopted, both practically and theoretically, the idea of changing the imperialist war into a civil war, and did not adopt the principle of co-operation with imperialism. Their work in this respect was diametrically opposed to the activities of the Mensheviks of all countries. Through the propaganda efforts of the latter the Labour organisations became an integral part of the imperialist system. The socialist jingoes of all countries pursued the line of welding the Labour organisations into their own country's imperialism, and even to-day they are still proud of this "socialist" activity of the compromising Labour bureaucracy.

The Bolsheviks for their part emphasised the fact that only the establishment of the Third International, which was not to include the socialist jingoes, but was to consist of real proletarian revolutionaries who would destroy capitalism and not attempt to bolster it up—that only such an International could bring about unity in the ranks of the international proletariat. This aim was pursued by the "Left" Internationalist group led by Lenin at Zimmerwald (1915), and at the Kienthal Socialist Conference (1916). Bolshevism took up a revolutionary political line in both its home and foreign policy.

The Spartacus group, whose glorious and heroic leaders were Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, adopted the same line in Germany.

The war brought an intensification of the class contradictions whose roots lay in the disintegration of the national economy.

War against a country so highly developed economically as Germany demanded of Russia an immense straining of her forces, which were insufficient in spite of the support given by the Entente. This was due both to her economic backwardness and to the corrup-

tion of the ruling autocracy, and also to the growing resistance to war among the masses who had no interest in the victory of Tsarism.

At first sight it seemed that the war had brought an intense economic revival, but this revival was unhealthy and temporary.

Parallel with the growth of capital investment in industry and the increasing number of workers employed in it, parallel with the growing profits of the capitalists and the mounting interest on shares, there was a diminution in the productivity of labour and in the totality of production. This phenomenon is most clearly seen in those heavy industries most essential for military purposes. The weakness of industry meant an insufficiency of supplies for the army, both as regards munitions and as regards equipment for the soldiers. It was particularly the lack of munitions which caused the unfavourable outcome of the war. Below we give some characteristic examples concerning the totality of Russian production :

Product	Production in poods (60 poods=1 ton.)					
	1914			1916		
Gold	4,000	1,858
Copper	1,888,000	1,270,000
Pig iron	264,033,000	231,865,000
Iron and steel	240,033,000	205,862,000
Coal	2,200,052,000	1,954,680,000

In his "Sketches of the History of the Revolutionary Movement in Russia in the 19th and 20th Centuries" (Moscow, 1924), M. Pokrovsky writes: "Already at the end of August our batteries had exhausted their third reserve (of shells). Indeed by the end of August, 1914, there appears anxiety on account of lack of ammunition in the correspondence of the then chief of the General Staff, Janushkevitch, with the Minister for War, Sukhomlinov. Our artillery was forced to reduce its firing, a fact which had a most demoralising effect on the army. When in May, 1915, the Mackensen offensive began, when Mackensen threw his famous artillery phalanx into the scales, it could no longer be concealed, and became common knowledge that to every 3,000 German rounds we could reply with a bare 100."

In such circumstances it was not only impossible to attack, it was also impossible to hold the line. The retreat of the Russian army from Galicia entailed the loss of millions as prisoners, and the surrender of fortresses, etc. It was a debacle, an absolute defeat, and any battle of Mukden during the Russo-Japanese War was a mere bagatelle compared to what occurred at the Russian front in the summer of 1915.

The catastrophic breakdown in the supply of munitions to the army was accompanied by the collapse of the transport system. The war placed a very heavy burden on transport, the means of transport were used up, whilst construction and repair of railway material were very much behindhand. The total production of the largest Russian locomotive factory was 117 locos in 1913, 107 in 1914, and only 64 in 1916. Even the food supply of the army and of the towns deteriorated seriously. In 1915 and 1916 the amount of grain transported on the railways was 60 per cent. below the pre-war figure, i.e., that of 1913.

In the villages half the working hands were missing, and the best ones at that. The peasant farms were falling to pieces, cattle were sold at ridiculous prices to satisfy the demands of the army, the area under cultivation shrank and the cost of living rose continuously.

The workers who received nominal bonuses with their wages felt all too soon the undoubted and continuous fall of their real wages. (Thus in the first 1½ years of the war there was in Moscow an increase in the prices of the most important articles of consump-

tion amounting to 50 per cent., while wages had only increased 19 per cent.)

The revolutionary anti-militarist agitation of the Bolsheviks found an ever-growing support among the workers, particularly in industrial centres such as Petrograd, where the number of those engaged in large-scale enterprises (more than 500 workers) had increased to an extraordinary extent (from 1914 to 1917 the number of these workers had almost doubled).

In 1917 the workers of Petrograd headed the anti-imperialist mass movement.

"The political strikes in February, 1917"—writes Kritzmann in his work "Russian Industry Before the War"—"affected a larger number of workers than the October strike of 1905. Over 250,000 strikers, that is two-thirds of the total number, came from Petrograd, and of this number about half were metal workers."

This movement of the workers depended upon the support of the army. At the

conference of chief commanding officers from all fronts, which took place on the 17th and 18th December, 1916, all the generals were compelled to bear witness at General Headquarters to the moral disintegration of the army. General Russki, commander-in-chief of the Northern army, declares amongst others: "Riga and Dvinsk, but particularly Riga, are the weak spots on the northern front; they are two nests of insurrection." General Brusilov (western front) mentions a characteristic detail: "The 7th Siberian Army Corps as a matter of fact came out of Riga in a perfectly miserable condition, the men refusing to advance to the attack. Even mutinies occurred. A company commander was killed. Strong measures had to be taken, several men were shot and the commanders were removed."

General Ebert admits that the lack of supplies and munitions had a disastrous effect on the spirit and discipline of the army.



FOOD QUEUE—in Moscow, 1916.



TSARISM—A French cartoon of 1905.

Revolutionary feeling became more and more widespread when stories began to circulate among the people about the corruption at the Tsar's court and the inefficiency of the Government in dealing with difficulties due to the war and to their own policy, about bribery and espionage (Myazaredov), and about the infamous doings of Rasputin, (the favourite of the Tsar's family), whose assassination was arranged by patriotic men of conservative views (even the Grand Duke Dimitri Pavlovitch was a party to the deed).

On the one side inefficiency, bribery and corruption, carelessness and luxury among a nobility alive but decaying, and with high war profits for the capitalists, high profits which intensified their patriotism and filled them with enthusiasm for holding out till the "victorious finish"; on the other side hungry workers and destitute peasants, soldiers barefooted, unarmed and hungry, cannon-fodder massacred in hundreds of thousands.

The time was ripening for revolution and for a revolution which would not be stopped half-way. The vanguard of the proletariat, the Bolshevik Party, called upon the masses to turn the imperialist war into a civil war. This call meant not only the overthrow of the aristocracy, but also a struggle against bourgeois domination. In the Fourth State Duma, the bourgeoisie, through its two most important parties (the Cadets and Octobrists), had formed an alliance with the Nationalist Party, which was mainly agrarian.

This alliance gave rise to the so-called "Progressive Bloc" which criticised the autocracy from the Duma platform (in the Liberal manner) and which was prepared, as an exceptional measure, to allow a "palace revolution" in favour of continuing the war to a victorious end. This was how the proletariat was called to make a revolution—a revolution which was to become a socialist one.

It is true that Russia, as compared with England, France or Germany, was a backward country from the point of view of capitalist development. Yet in the first place it was a country where capitalism had already assumed the highly organised form of finance capitalism, and where the conquest of positions of commanding economic importance could and should give a decisive control of the whole national economy to the proletariat which was now on the way to the conquest of power.

Secondly, the Bolsheviks regarded the Russian revolution only as part of the International Socialist Revolution. The time for the latter was postponed, the process of socialist world revolution proved to take much longer than was expected, but this did not alter the fact that the Russian proletariat was able with the help of the European working class firmly to establish its victory as that of the vanguard of the world proletariat. Nor did it alter the fact that the world had entered upon a period of the breakdown of capitalism, an epoch of socialist revolutions. Thirdly, the socialist proletariat of Russia did not only represent its own interests, but also those of the non-proletarian working masses coming under its influence and supporting its State power. The Mensheviks talk a great deal nowadays about the peasant character of the Russian revolution. The Russian proletariat did, in fact, bring to completion the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and it also understood how to solve the peasant question in the most radical manner. This was also clear to the Mensheviks.

But what these latter never could, nor would, understand is this: that the successful carrying through of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the solution of the peasant question, was not feasible in the Russian revolution without converting the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one, and without the establishment of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the outbreak of the February revolution large masses of the peasantry demanded a solution of three great problems: the revolutionary "plebeian" abolition of feudalism; an ending to the "kulakisation" of the village; the conclusion of the imperialist war.

Could a bourgeois government supported by Mensheviks have performed these tasks?

The bourgeoisie were against a revolutionary solution of the agricultural problem since the lands of the aristocracy were mortgaged to the banks and the bourgeoisie had thus become part owners of them. (In this connection it is worth remembering the policy of the Cadets towards Stolypin's reform.) The solution of the problem necessitated the fall of the bourgeois government and its lackeys. The bourgeoisie from their very nature were bound to oppose the abolition of "kulakisation."

The solution of this problem of the revolution necessitated the fall of the government of capitalists and socialist traitors, who were carrying on a capitalist policy.

The bourgeoisie and the Mensheviks—and this point is of great importance—were against the revolutionary termination of the imperialist war, and therefore inevitably became a force hostile to the mass of the peasantry.

Only the socialist proletariat, who had taken power into their own hands, could fulfil the revolutionary demands of the peasants, *and only they did fulfil them.*

Under the conditions of the Russian revolution the peasant revolution had inevitably to be led by the socialist proletariat and had to be completed by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Bit by bit the peasantry realised more and more clearly the "class truth" of the proletariat as expressed in the Bolshevik intention of converting the imperialist war into a civil war.

The development of this interacting class relationship and of the class war up to February, 1917, formed the antecedent conditions not only of the February revolution, but also of the October overthrow. The motive power of the October revolution was already operating in February. It is only with this conception of the antecedents of the revolution that the further progress of the revolutionary campaign and the victory of the Russian proletariat can be fully appreciated.



GENERALS UNDER ARREST—Tsarist generals arrested by order of the Soldiers' Committees.

Nine—THE UPWARD BEAT

THE workers of Petrograd marched at the head of the February revolution. The strike movement had persisted all through the war. From December, 1916, to January, 1917, there was a sudden and continuous rise of the working class movement which now assumed an openly revolutionary aspect. The confidential reports of the police and the "Okhrana" furnish convincing evidence of the political nature of the unrest in the capital. A secret police report dated 18th January, 1917, states: "There is an exceptional feeling of unrest in the capital. The wildest rumours are circulating about the reactionary measures which the Government intend to introduce, and about possible and probable revolutionary measures instigated by groups and sections of the people hostile to the Government. Occurrences and actions of an exceptional kind are everywhere expected from either side."

The political situation was strongly reminiscent of the period immediately preceding the year 1905. "It seems very probable that there will be students' riots which will attract the workers and will culminate in acts of terrorism." This report refers to a time about two months before the February revolt. One and a half weeks later, on February 1st, Globatshev, the chief of the secret police stated in a "strictly confidential" report that "the people are openly criticising the measures taken by the Government (in streets, trams, theatres, shops) so sharply that their utterances are hardly permissible."

Five days later the secret police reported that as a result of the acuteness of the food question, the people openly insulted all those who were even remotely connected with its supply, and that their insults were such that it was impossible to repeat them. By reason of a fresh rise in prices and the disappearance from the market of much-needed articles, there was a fresh wave of indignation which even spread to conservative officials. "The absence up to now of hunger riots does not necessarily mean that there will be none. The spirit of rebellion is growing and no one can see where it may carry the people."

The secret police and the Tsarist potentates were thus aware of the threatening revolution. What they failed to realise was the tremendous force behind the popular movement. On the day before the traditional day of strikes, the chief of the Petrograd secret police, after bearing witness to "the secret incitement of the proletariat," came to the following conclusions: some recent arrests have considerably weakened the hidden power; according to reports received, we need only expect solitary isolated strikes on the 22nd, or attempts at bringing off strikes; none of them will be organised.

This was written on January 21st. On the 22nd there were 300,000 strikers in Petrograd. There were meetings in all the factories. In Moscow, a third of the working population went on strike, two demonstrations were arranged and thousands joined in them. In Kharkov, there were strikes, and meetings even took place inside the factories; in Baku and Nijni Novgorod, Bolshevik leaflets were distributed among the workers. On 23rd January, the following Petrograd bourgeois papers could not appear: "Ryetsch," "Sovremenoye Slovo," "Dyeni," etc.

A political strike went on at Baku from January 31st to February 5th.

Owing to the continuous unrest the Government postponed the re-opening of the Duma from January 25th to February 27th.

It is obvious that the Duma could not be regarded as a centre of the revolutionary movement, either politically or from the point of view of organisation. Its absence was of no consequence to the development of the mass movement. Still the postponement of its reopening was looked upon as a repressive measure and served to throw oil upon the flames of unrest in factories and in the streets.

Eleven members of the workers' group in the War Industries Committee were arrested on February 12th. In a Government report issued on February 12th, the group was charged with having become a "central organisation for the expansion and accomplishment of the designs of the workers' movement," and of having as its aim the "transformation of Russia into a Social-Democratic Republic."

This in no way corresponded to the facts. The workers' group was never in any respect, nor ever became, the centre of the working class movement. It had completely compromised itself in the eyes of the masses by its support of Tsarism during the war.

The arrest of the workers' group did not in the least weaken the working class movement. Tsarism had, on the contrary, wrongly estimated the revolutionary forces; it had failed to recognise its own allies both in the Duma and in the opportunist elements within the Labour movement.

Meetings were held almost every day in the Petrograd factories. The Government prepared for a fight. It armed the police with machine-guns taken from the army. On February 27th there were some tens of thousands of strikers; 60 factories were on strike. The workers paraded the streets carrying revolutionary banners and singing revolutionary songs. On the Nevsky Prospekt, Petrograd's main street, workers and students held a demonstration demanding bread and "Down with the War." The State Duma met on the same day, the 27th February. The Mensheviks called upon the workers to march to the Tauride Palace which was the meeting place of the Duma.

The Bolsheviks opposed this, being unwilling to associate the Duma in any way with the development of the revolutionary movement. The march was a failure. Only about 500 people gathered before the Tauride Palace. As regards the street demonstrations the cry "Down with the war" voiced by so many workers from different factories was not of Menshevik origin. On the 4th March there were more street riots, especially near the food stores. The people demanded bread. Many women could be seen in the streets. On March 6th the bakers' shops and grocery stores in the working class districts were looted by the crowd.



COSSACKS who sympathised with the revolution in February, 1917, helped the workers against the special police.

Ten—THE FIGHT

THE large factories of Petrograd played a very important part in the whole revolutionary movement. The men in the Putilov works (one of the largest factories in Russia, for machine and locomotive construction, but during the war converted to the manufacture of supplies for the artillery) for instance, ceased from the beginning of February to confine themselves to strikes and meetings, and openly attacked the police. They paraded the streets with red flags and banners, like those of the Lessner factory workers, bearing the motto: "Down with the War." An encounter with the police occurred in which several workers were arrested. On March 3rd there were meetings in all the workshops. General political demands were added to economic ones.

The management threatened dismissals and lockouts; on the 6th March there were again meetings in all the workshops; on 7th March the management put their lockout into effect for an indefinite period. The revolutionary Putilov workers now gave all their energy to street fighting.

The 8th March (23rd February, old calendar) was the women's day. It can be looked back upon as the first day of the revolution. The movement could no longer be contained. The whole of Petrograd was in ferment. About 50 factories employing 90,000 people were on strike. The fighting spirit was expressed in demonstrations and encounters with the police. A dense crowd of factory women and wives of working men marched to the Town Hall and demanded bread. At different points in the town appeared banners declaring "Down with autocracy," "Down with the War." Towards 4 o'clock in the afternoon the workers held up the trams in Engineer Street, Sadovaya Street and the Nevsky Prospekt. The streets were filled with police, mounted and on foot; the former rode on the pavement and belaboured the crowd with whips. On the Nevsky Prospekt Cossacks armed with pikes rode up and down. On this day the streets were not empty till about ten at night. The town went to rest only to wake next day to more fighting. On the 9th March 200,000 workers struck work in Petrograd. There was firing in the streets, and the crowd drove away the police. The first signs of unrest were shown among the troops; the Cossacks, who sympathised with the people, were greeted with cheers by the crowd. The authorities, gathered together in the house of Khabalov, the district defence commander, were compelled "to strengthen with a cavalry unit the Cossacks of the first Don regiment, since the latter are not opposing the masses energetically enough," so writes V. Kajurov, a worker in the Erikson factory in his memoirs describing the exciting days of the revolt.

"On the morning of the 9th March, the workers of the Erikson factory (together with all the other workers of the Vyborg suburb, numbering approximately 70,000), refused to start work. They took part in a factory meeting, and then streamed out, a crowd of 2,500 men, into the Sampsonievsky Prospekt, in order to parade the streets of Petrograd with the slogan 'Give us bread!' The Prospekt is very narrow at this point and was literally blocked by the mass of the Erikson workers. With difficulty a procession was formed which moved towards the Liteinaya bridge. The line of the procession was held up by Cossacks at a distance of 100 metres. . .

"The situation was uncanny. . . In the event of an attack by the Cossacks there could be no escape. All eyes were fixed on one spot. New processions of workmen from the

factories in the surrounding district were continually arriving. Then the officer's word of command rang out; the Cossacks flung themselves with drawn swords on our defenceless, unarmed procession.

"With hearts contracted and horror-stricken eyes, our brains worked feverishly; no hope of defence nor of escape—what will become of us? The officers were the first to fling themselves on the crowd; they forced their way through with their horses, their eyes blood-shot; behind them we could see the Cossacks charging along the whole length of the Prospekt. . . . But what joy! The Cossacks wormed their way through the passage just made by the officers, some smiled and some winked openly at the workers. Joy was unbounded. Shouts of applause greeted the Cossacks from thousands of throats. There was indeed good cause for rejoicing: the first attempt had been successful without sacrifices on our side. The street was literally overflowing: in front the workers from the Nobel and the Parviain factories, behind them a gap which the Cossacks had made, and then the workers from the new Lessner factory, the Aivas factory and others.

"But now the second word of command was given, and there followed a second attack on our procession which by now was bigger than before. The same thing happened as previously.

"And the third and fourth time the same story was repeated. The officers began to be afraid for their skins. The Cossacks seemed in earnest, a gleam of joy in their eyes.

"No further attacks were attempted, since the officers realised their futility. . . .

"The Cossacks stood before us again; the first row of demonstrators approached them and began to talk in friendly fashion about the day's events. They pointed out the peaceful character of our demands. More and more belated workers were streaming in from the side streets. The officers, seeing the peaceful intercourse between Cossacks and workers, made another attempt to block the way of the procession. The Cossacks, however, did not move, and allowed the workers to slip through under the bodies of their horses. Thus we reached Liteinaya Bridge, where we were joined by the workers from Polyustrov and Great-Ochta. The whole crowd could not pass the bridge, because both police and Cossacks were blocking the way.

"An old, grey-haired police officer was in charge of the police. With him we negotiated about clearing a way across the bridge. He tried at first to argue with us, but when he noticed that by means of slipping under the horses about 500 demonstrators had broken through the chain, he gave the command: 'Charge with the *nagaiķas*!' (whips). The police immediately charged those who had managed to slip through, beating them with their *nagaiķas*. The victims argued with the police and drew their attention to the neutrality of the Cossacks. There was obvious confusion among the police, probably not because of their consciences, but because they were afraid of the Cossacks.

"Taking advantage of this confusion I managed to get several comrades to pull down from his horse a fellow who seemed to be using his *nagaiķa* in a particularly vigorous manner. Several people jumped at him and got hold of him, but some police running to his aid were successful in liberating him.

"The wide Nishgorod Street—as far as it could be seen from the bridge—was literally packed with workers; the shops were closed and the shop assistants were on the streets. An attack by the unarmed demonstrators upon the armed police and Cossacks, who moreover occupied a very advantageous position, was hardly possible. We therefore waited to see what would happen to the leading group who were standing immediately behind the police

and the Cossacks. All the demonstrators were consumed by one desire only: to demonstrate in large masses in the bourgeois quarters of Petrograd. The obstacle which hindered this design made the crowd very irritable. At the same time we saw the comrades who had managed to slip through before, running towards us from the other end of the bridge; they told us that they had been fired at from somewhere or other, and that some of them had been killed and others wounded. We could not decide whether or not to go on alone, when someone exclaimed: 'Comrades, over the ice!' In a moment the ice on both sides of the bridge was black with people running into one another like ants. Of the further happenings on the bridge I know nothing because I too continued to run across the ice to the Nevsky Prospekt.

"The Nevsky was pretty crowded. The workers formed a procession and moved along the street singing revolutionary songs. The police had completely vanished. The appearance of the crowd of demonstrators changed a little later on. The dark blue hats of the students could be seen. The people in the streets sympathised with us. From some hospitals soldiers greeted us. The Cossacks made continuous attacks upon us; their horses were covered with foam; since, however, the superior officers became convinced of the futility of the attacks they were stopped and the Cossacks were ordered to take up their position by the Kazan Cathedral. Then some semi-intoxicated dragoons suddenly appeared, cursing coarsely, and charging the crowd with their lances. The revolutionary temper of the masses became so intense that they remained still and did not disperse.

"The following episode shows clearly the feeling of the people. Several dragoons cursing loudly, were charging a small group of people standing on the bridge of the Catherine Canal, who had been separated from the rest of the demonstrators. A young dragoon jumped at a very old man, who as far as I could see had not at all the appearance of a worker, and screamed: 'What do you want here, you old devil?' The old man was so taken by surprise that he at first became speechless. Then he began to reproach the dragoon, pointed at the Cossacks who were standing near by and drew attention to their exemplary behaviour; he concluded by tearing open his clothes, and pointing to his chest said: 'You baby face, if you are in need of the blood of a hungry man, take it.' The soldier ashamed and confused turned round and rode away hurriedly.

"Towards evening the demonstrators became still more numerous. Workers from other districts arrived. The Znamensky Square, in which speakers were addressing the crowd from the Alexander Memorial, could no longer contain the crowd.

"I was unable either on the 9th or on the 10th of March to speak with any member of the Petrograd Committee or even with a member of the District Committee. I could not, therefore, discuss our behaviour with any body. One felt sure that the moment for action had arrived.

"Without having taken counsel with anybody, I called a meeting of part of the Erikson Party Fraction and proposed that red cloth should be bought. We prepared two banners with inscriptions 'Down with autocracy!' and 'Down with the War!' The first flag I gave to Michael Polyakov, the second to my son Alexander. I impressed upon them that the flags were only to be shown when a large crowd had assembled. Then I went to the Nevsky Prospekt where an enormous crowd had gathered and where speakers were addressing the crowd from the Memorial.

"At last the banners arrived. The story of the Cossack attack was again repeated. For a short while the flags were rolled up, but as soon as the Cossacks and dragoons had

passed through the masses, they were again flying over the heads of the crowd. Suddenly a Cossack tore the flag away from my son, rode away several yards, held it high, tore it from the pole and put it in his pocket. The flag-bearer ran after the Cossack and asked him to return the flag. This he did, letting it fall unperceived from his pocket on to the street, probably out of regard for his superior officer.

"The crowd on the Znamensky Square crowded in ever greater masses in front of the Memorial. The speakers addressed them. I listened to them with a comrade from the Lessner factory. Several of them called for support for the Duma, and its demand for a responsible government. Only now I became conscious of the Duma. Only now I realised that somewhere some kind of people's representatives were in conference, were waiting for our support and probably believed in it. Then suddenly the mounted police charged the crowd and beat at them. Everyone ran into the side streets. Only some remained to offer resistance. The comrade from the Lessner and I did not run away. We took off our caps and approached the Cossacks saying: 'Brother Cossacks, give your support to the workers in their struggle for peaceful objects. Can you not see how they treat us hungry workers? Will you not help us?'

"I noticed what strange glances the Cossacks were throwing at each other. We had hardly moved away when they threw themselves upon the small crowd. At first I thought they were running to aid the police, but when the latter saw the Cossacks they began to flee, the Cossacks pursuing them. What happened later I could not see. I ran to the station and saw that there the crowd was carrying a Cossack on their shoulders. I learned afterwards that he had beaten down a police officer with his sword, and that the latter had then been killed with a shovel.

"The encounter between Cossacks and police had a remarkable effect upon the temper of the masses: 'The Cossacks are on our side!' was the way in which their actions were interpreted. But the Cossacks again occupied their old places as if nothing had happened. Their officers were grouped some distance away and were obviously conferring about something. The police had totally disappeared, but soldiers appeared instead with rifles, ready for firing. To my question, 'Comrades are you really going to help the police?' the soldiers replied: 'Get out of the way!' My second attempt to start a conversation resulted likewise. I walked round the Znamensky Square, caught up the procession at the Nevsky Prospekt, and walked along with it to the Kazan Cathedral. Here mounted police appeared from somewhere and threw themselves upon the mass. Confusion arose, there was a confused sound of shouting, of breaking glass, shots were heard—the soldiers of the Pavlovsky Regiment were firing at the police who were fleeing from the demonstrators. The procession then again made its way towards the Znamensky Square. At the same time cordons of armed soldiers were formed who closed all the streets. The lines of soldiers were particularly dense across Sadovaya Street, and round about the big store on the Nevsky.

"The crowd observed these preparations with feverish excitement, but in their enthusiasm they did not believe that the soldiers would fire upon them. The demonstration here assumed gigantic proportions. The first ranks, pushed forward by the masses behind, approached nearer and nearer to the soldiers till finally the points of the bayonets were touching the breasts of the first row of demonstrators. Behind could be heard the singing of revolutionary songs, in front there was confusion. Women cried out to the soldiers with tears in their eyes: 'Comrades, take away your bayonets—join us.' The soldiers were moved. They threw swift glances at their own comrades. The next moment one bayonet

is slowly raised, is slowly lifted above the shoulders of the approaching demonstrators. There is thunderous applause. The triumphant crowd greeted their brothers clothed in the grey cloaks of the soldiery. The soldiers mixed freely with the demonstrators.

"In place of the vanished troops there appeared two groups of well-armed soldiers from a military school. One part blocked up the Nevsky Prospekt in the neighbourhood of the Town Hall, while another took up a position on the bridge of the Catherine Canal. The demonstrators were still in front. I went to these soldiers to find out their feelings. About 15 workers and myself began an agitation among them. The commanding officer tried several times to drive us away. We took no notice of his command. In spite of this we were unable to find out the feeling of these soldiers. Meanwhile the procession was drawing



VICTIMS OF THE FIGHT in Petrograd, February, 1917.

nearer, and it was high time to make a swift decision. Several comrades tried to get hold of the bayonets and continued to persuade the soldiers not to shoot. But we were told: 'Get out, you!' amidst curses. We had to retreat and call to our comrades from the distance: 'Comrades, you are not doing the right thing.' Then at last a whisper from the man on the left flank reached us: 'Get the officer away.' Immediately the officer was surrounded by ten men, but he, for some unknown reason, turned round; obviously realising our intention, he raised his small riding whip, and with a friendly smile observed: 'Don't be afraid; don't be afraid.' Thus we assumed that there would be no firing, and we went on.

The procession was already only 50 paces away. Already I could see the banner, borne by comrade Shugurin, with his shirt open at his chest, and the face of my son walking beside him. Then came the sound of rifle shots. The trumpeter blew his trumpet, the first salvo was fired. . . . the second. . . . the third. . . . I stood in a line with the soldiers and so could observe the direction of the rifle fire. They were firing in the air. But perhaps I had been mistaken. I glanced at the crowd, which when the first salvo was fired had thrown itself upon the snow, but found that they were all unharmed and were soon standing up again. A thousand voices once more rang out their thundering applause. Then again shots, screams and groans. In a panic of terror the crowd quickly dispersed; only a few brave ones remained behind, in order to remove the dead and wounded.

"The demonstration was over, but the pavements were crowded with people, discussing the events of the day.

"The fact that the soldiers had fired on the multitude created a very strong impression. The excitement was so great that in spite of the late hour I went to the barracks of the Cossacks in order to find out whether new orders had been given; I also wanted to get to know the feeling of the Cossacks.

"At the entrance to the barracks I met a wounded Cossack of whom I enquired what had happened. It appeared that someone in a moment of terror had given a blow to his horse, which had thereupon thrown him off and so he had been wounded. He told me to tell the workers in no case to touch the Cossacks; should the Cossacks be provoked to action it would be very bad for the workers. I naturally promised to let the workers know this and added that they certainly felt no hostility towards the Cossacks. If anything were to happen, it would be the work of *agents-provocateurs*, and the workers would certainly deal sternly with such people.

"The following day we went to the Nevsky Prospekt, and on our way discussed the events of the previous day near the Town Hall. What would happen to-day? Was it possible that the soldiers would not join us? Suddenly shots were heard, machine guns rattled and people with terrified faces came running towards us. On the Nevsky Prospekt was a terrible sight. People were pushing one another on the pavements in the direction of Sadovaya Street leading to the Kazan Cathedral. From here as far as the Znamensky Square, police were standing and stray people armed with rifles who were firing in all directions. The procession was unarmed and could not take any effective measures to meet those being taken by the Government. The ambulance carriages were swarming on the Nevsky Square and taking away the dead and wounded. With great difficulty we managed to get to Ligovka and to the Nicolai Station. Workers were assembled in large crowds.

"It was impossible to cross the street because the way was blocked by a double cordon of soldiers. There were some who asked the soldiers to let them pass, whereupon the answer was given that the police were shooting over there. In the same place, quite near the cordons of soldiers, a meeting was going on. A little further away the demonstrations moved on, singing revolutionary songs. Confusion arose. The mass seethed. The rolling and rattling of an armoured car could be heard. Now it came into view. Its appearance and the terrible noise it made let loose a horrible panic. There was indeed good reason for fear. Behind the cordon the workers in the Nevsky were pitilessly mown down. But one still felt the pulse of revolution and the tremendous motive power behind the demonstrations; one heard the singing of revolutionary songs.

"A speaker was addressing the crowd. For a short space the accursed reality vanished. One could breathe and think freely. We were rudely awakened from our dreaming by the ominous thunder of the armoured car. The bright colours of our vision vanished, and the dark reality confronted us once more. The appearance of the armoured car seemed to destroy all hope of a revolution. We stood helpless, and could expect no aid.

"By about 8 o'clock the Nevsky Prospekt was empty. I went home. On my way I looked in at the Cossack barracks but could learn nothing new. When I got home they told me that I had been called to a meeting of the District Committee.

"Sceptical remarks were heard. It was asked whether the time had not come to call upon the workers to stop the strike. The District Committee of the Vyborg suburb had to confer about tactical questions concerning the whole Petrograd organisation, since the Petrograd Committee had been arrested in Kukhlin's house; they had been betrayed—as we thought—by the spy, Mulyin. . . .

"During the meeting, I noticed a new face in a soldier's coat. When I asked who it was, I was told he was a comrade from the armoured car detachment. I protested against his presence on the ground that we were here discussing very important questions, and that only proved comrades should be admitted to such a meeting. I said the same to the man himself and requested him to leave. Whilst he was taking leave of us I asked him: 'Why don't you help us?' 'But we are helping you,' the comrade answered in confusion.

"It turned out that the armoured car which had appeared on the Nevsky Square, belonged to his detachment and that it was only because of lack of ammunition that they had not fired on the police.

"Then why did you go on the streets unarmed? By your appearance you encouraged the police and created unnecessary confusion in the ranks of the workers. And now what do you intend to do to-morrow?' The comrade replied that they were preparing to fight on the morrow, for everything was now ready.

"Terrible fatigue and the hard frost made it impossible for us to finish our meeting. It was decided to continue it at my house next morning at 8 o'clock. About 40 people came, representing the various factories.

"The majority were in favour of carrying on. There was hardly any opposition. Towards the end of the meeting comrade Shvedtchikov rushed in radiating joy and told us what was going on in the town. He was followed by several comrades who had been released from the Kresty prison. Our joy was unbounded. We rapidly dispersed. I made my way to the Moscow barracks, which were besieged on all sides by workers. The soldiers offered no resistance, they jumped over the fence, some with their rifles and some empty-handed, and mingled with the workers.

"Perceiving their perplexity I decided to make use of them. I asked very curtly why they were standing about and not joining in the revolution. Then I commanded: 'Attention!' This magic word had an immediate effect. They stood still. But alas, I knew no other words of command. The soldiers realised this at once, they began to whisper among themselves and to laugh at me. Fortunately a young cadet who was dashing along relieved me from this awkward situation. He found the right words of command, the ranks formed themselves, and they marched to Lessnoye in order to fetch the machine gun and motor-cycle detachment out of the barracks. I remained, feeling confused on account of my failure.

"On the 12th March, round about mid-day, Petrograd resembled a besieged town. Everywhere could be heard the firing of rifles and the rattling of machine guns. The noises

all mingled in one confused roar and the columns of smoke rising from the burning Courts of Justice and police stations rose high in the sky. I went to the Sampsonievsky Prospekt and approached the barracks occupied by motor-cyclists. At the entrance stood several soldiers; I asked them: 'Why do you stand there, comrades?' The soldiers smiled rather unpleasantly and remained silent. The officers harshly ordered me away. I went up to a group of workers and soldiers, and pointed out to them that they should somehow or other fetch out the motor-cyclists. A comrade calmed me by saying that everything necessary had already been done and an armoured car sent for. Nothing more could be done for the present, since the motor-cyclists had shut themselves in and had put up machine-guns. But the waiting crowd grew impatient and prepared to besiege the barracks. Shots could be



FEBRUARY, 1917—The house of a Tsarist Minister stormed and destroyed by the workers.

heard on either side, but it seemed impossible to advance. It was, therefore, decided to pull down the fence meanwhile, and this was done. One part of the fence was pulled down and the rest set on fire. The motor-cyclists could not hold all the barracks (there were about twenty) so they rapidly congregated in two or three of them and firmly entrenched themselves there.

"Part of the empty barracks was set on fire by the besiegers. The flaming barracks, the broken fence, the machine gun and rifle fire, the excited faces of the besiegers, the motor lorry hurrying towards us filled with armed revolutionaries, the long-awaited armoured car—all these made an unforgettable picture. The armoured car fired two or three light shells at the officers and motor-cyclists inside the barracks, and at the same time directed heavy machine-gun fire upon them. After a short but sharp exchange of shots, the besieged gave themselves up.



AFTER THE STORM—A Petrograd prison set on fire by the workers during February, 1917.

"The commander of the garrison was dead. The remaining officers removed their epaulettes, and fled through the kitchen gardens adjoining the barracks.

"There was now not a single counter-revolutionary group on the Vyborg side, and only the police who had taken up their position in the attics of the houses were still hindering the triumph of the rebel crowd.

"During the revolutionary fight which lasted three days, I, as one of the demonstrators, noticed only students and workers taking an active part; it was in fact quite clear that the banner bearing the inscription: 'Down with the War!' found no sympathy with the Men-

shevik and Social Revolutionary leaders who were walking along the Nevsky Prospekt.

"During these days I was particularly afraid of those talkers who call themselves 'Friends of the Workers.' Would the workers realise what a danger these 'friends' are to them? It was this that worried me as I went to the Sampsonievsky Prospekt in the morning.

"Facing Landrin's factory two companies of older soldiers, pioneers, had taken up their position. The commander and several officers approached. The commander saluted the rank and file and addressed them somewhat as follows: 'I congratulate you, brothers, on our great fortune. The Government, which was universally detested, has been overthrown. A provisional government has been formed, headed by Prince Lvov, a man respected by all his colleagues in the Duma. Only one thing now remains to be done—to vanquish the external enemy. The Provisional Government requests you to be calm, to return to your barracks, and to render obedience to your superiors, your officers, as in the past. I now ask you to return to your places in the barracks.' Some called out, 'At your command!' Others simply looked perplexed. The sweet speech of this emissary of the 'friends' of the people affected me like an electric shock. I called out: 'May I just say a word, Commander?' He gave me permission to speak. 'Comrade soldiers,' I began, 'You have just heard your commander's advice to return to the barracks, to put yourselves under your officers and calmly to await the decisions of the newly-formed Provisional Government and of the Committee of Public Safety, led by the landowners, Lvov and Rodzianko. Comrades, has the workers' blood been shed for three days in order that one landowner should replace another? Is this the object for which thousands of proletarian fighters have lost their lives? No! The proletariat of Petrograd will stay away from the factories until it has won the right to expropriate the landowners. We can only be calm when the place of these "benefactors" of the people has been taken by the workers and the peasants themselves. And now permit me, gentlemen, to say this to you. If you really desire the welfare of the people, then join us. Yes or no?' There was silence.

"'Comrade Soldiers! Your officers remain silent; this means that they have other aims. I propose that the officers be arrested, and in their stead other commanders be elected by yourselves!' Loud applause greeted this proposal. Company commanders were at once elected. The soldiers fell into military formation and singing revolutionary songs, led their officers away. But where? To the Duma. . . . To Rodzianko. The procession was joined by at least as many workers, among whom was a member of the Petrograd Committee, comrade Schutke, who addressed us. I marched along up to the Duma and forced my way to the Catherine Hall, where Rodzianko took great pains with the soldiers. He praised their long-proved military efficiency and their bravery. The whole was such a drawl that I soon realised there was little danger here to the revolution, so I returned to my own district. In the meantime elections for the Soviet were being held in the factories."

Such is a revolutionary eye-witness's description of the events of February.

On the 10th March when the crowds were demonstrating in the streets, the representatives of the Mensheviks and the Trudoviks, Skobelev, the Menshevik Duma representative, a supporter of the defence of the country during the war and a socialist-patriot, and Kerensky, a lawyer and another socialist-patriot, delivered speeches in which, instead of appealing for revolution, they urged the necessity for a responsible government.*

* The Duma fraction of the Trudoviks (group of the "workers") were in a coalition with the National Socialists and several more or less revolutionary deputies of the peasantry. The leader of the fraction was Kerensky. The Trudoviks represented the radical petty bourgeoisie and the middle peasants.

A number of bourgeois liberal speakers (Shingariov and others) willingly agreed to this proposal. The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) issued the following appeal on March 10th:

"Proletarians of all countries, Unite!

"Life has become impossible. No food! No warmth! No clothes!

"On the frontier—Blood, Maiming, Death. Call follows call. Troops are transported to the front one after another. Like cattle our brothers are carried to the human shambles.

"Silence is no longer possible!

"To allow brothers and sons to be led to the slaughterhouse, and yourselves to be destroyed by cold and hunger, and yet to remain silent—that would be cowardice, unthinkable, criminal and vile.

"In vain you try to save yourselves. If not prison—then shrapnel—then disease or death by famine. It is unworthy of you, to hide your face in the sand and not look forward. The country is deserted. There is no bread. Famine approaches. Worse is to come. There is the likelihood of deadly epidemics, of cholera. . . .

"When we ask for bread, we are answered with lead!

"Who is to blame? The blame rests on the Tsarist régime and the bourgeoisie. They rob the people at the front as well as at home. The landowners and the capitalists are profiting by the war. They are hardly able to count their profits. They draw out the war indefinitely. For the sake of the war profits and the conquest of Constantinople, Armenia and Poland they are driving the people to the shambles. Their bestial greed has no bounds.

"They will not willingly give up their profits and make an end to the war. It is high time to tame the reactionary bourgeois beast.

"Liberals and reactionaries, Government and Duma, the nobility and the zemstvo administration—all have united during the war into a bloodthirsty gang.

"The court of the Tsar, the bankers and the priests snatch up the gold. A lazy robber gang is gnawing at the bones of the people, is drinking their blood. And we must suffer. We must kill ourselves working. We must die in the trenches. We can no longer remain silent.

"All for the fight! On the streets! For yourselves, for your children, for your brothers.

"In Germany, in Austria, in Bulgaria, the working class is lifting up its head. It is fighting against its bloodthirsty bourgeoisie for peace and freedom. Let us help them by fighting against our own oppressors. Arise! Organise for the fight! Form Committees of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party inside the factories, in the workshops, in the districts, in the towns, in the barracks, in the whole of Russia. These will be committees of fighting, committees of freedom. Tell the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the soldiers, that their salvation will only come through the victory of the Social-Democrats.

"The time for open battle has arrived. Strikes, meetings, demonstrations do not weaken organisations, but strengthen them. Do not miss any opportunity, any suitable day! Always and everywhere with the masses and with your own revolutionary slogans.

"Let the accomplices of the capitalists call our action 'a hazardous game with the strike,' or 'Putschism.' Salvation lies in an immediate and steady fight and not putting off the fight indefinitely.

"Call everyone to the fight! Better to die in the glorious fight for the worker's cause, than be killed at the front for the profits of capitalists, or to die of hunger or overwork.

"Sporadic actions can grow into revolution over the whole of Russia, which in its turn

may give an impetus to revolution in other countries.

"A hard struggle is confronting us, but a real victory will come.

"Everyone under the red banner of the revolution!

"Down with Tsarist Monarchy!

"Long live the democratic Republic!

"Long live the eight-hour day!

"All the land of the aristocracy for the People!

"Down with the War!

"Long live the fraternal union of the workers of the whole world!

"Long live the Socialist International!"

On the night of the 11th March about 100 persons were arrested—as if such measures could have stopped the elementary movement of the masses.

On March 11th factories and workshops were closed and the workers came from all the suburbs to the centre of the town. The town was like an armed camp. There was intermittent firing from cover.

The Government now had recourse to machine-guns. To reinforce the police it put the soldiers into police uniform. This caused great indignation among the soldiers and induced them to go over to the side of the people.

About 4 o'clock Khabalov received the report that the 4th Company of the Pavlovsky Reserve Regiment had left the barracks and were demanding that there should no more firing on the crowd, further that they were firing on a battalion of mounted police in the neighbourhood.

Even on the preceding day (the 10th March) the Tsar had sent a wire to Khabalov from General Headquarters: "I command that an end be put to-morrow to the unrest in the capital which is inadmissible in these difficult times of war against Germany and Austria. —Nicolai." On the 11th Khabalov reported to the Tsar that disorder continued and that he was unable to carry out his order.

On the same day the president of the State Duma, Rodzianko (a landowner) wired to the Tsar as follows: "Situation serious. In the capital anarchy. Government impotent. Supply of food and light entirely disorganised. Social discontent growing. In the streets firing. Different groups of soldiers shooting at one another. Someone in whom the people have

* The following is a translation of the text of the poster:

NOTICE.

In the last few days there have been disturbances in Petrograd in which attempts have been made on the lives of the soldiers and police. I forbid any meetings in the streets. I warn the people of Petrograd that the military have instructions from me to use their rifles and ruthlessly to take any measures necessary to restore order in the capital.

25th February, 1917.

The Commander of the Petrograd Defence Committee,
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL KHALALOV.

ОБЪЯВЛЕНИЕ

Командующаго войсками Петроградскаго
военнаго Округа.

Последніе дни въ Петроградѣ произошли безпорядки, сопровождавшіеся насиліями и посягательствами на жизнь воинскихъ и полицейскихъ чиновъ.

Воспреещаю всякое скопленіе на улицахъ.

Предваряю населеніе Петрограда, что мною подтверждено войскамъ употребить въ дѣло оружіе, не останавливаясь ни передъ чѣмъ для водворенія порядка въ столицѣ.

Командующій войсками Петроградскаго военнаго Округа,
Генералъ-Лейтенантъ **Хабаловъ.**

25 февраля 1917 года.

confidence must be given power to form a new government. No hesitation. Delay greatest danger. I pray to God that in this hour the responsibility may not fall upon the Monarch. —Rodzianko.”

The day which followed, the 12th March (27th February—old style) is the day on which victory was clearly won for the revolution.

In the morning Rodzianko sent the Tsar a second telegram: “Situation worse. Measures must be adopted at once. To-morrow too late. Last moment arrived to decide for country and dynasty.”

The Minister of the Imperial House, Frederick, tells how the Tsar after receipt of this telegram said to him: “This silly fellow Rodzianko sends me some more nonsense, which I shall not even bother to answer.”

In the meantime the Petrograd garrison had decisively passed over to the side of the people and had thus definitely sealed the doom of the autocracy. The first rebel regiments to join the people were the Preobrazhensky, the Litovsky, the Volinsky, and the Pavlovsky. They went along to the other barracks and brought out the soldiers from these as well. Part of the officers also came over. The Cossacks remained neutral from the beginning, dispersed the masses now and again but did not proceed to attack them; isolated detachments even came over to the side of the workers. The rebel soldiers in common with the workers occupied the arsenal and the Peter-Paul fortress, situated in the centre of the town, and liberated the political prisoners.

W. N. Saleshtsky, a member of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolsheviks in 1915, describes his liberation from prison during the February days in the following manner:

“In December, 1915, our Petrograd Committee, which had carried so worthily the banner of Bolshevism during the eventful autumn and winter of 1915, was gradually liquidated by the Okhrana.

“Personally, I had been under observation for a long time, and for some time had been without a passport, and without abode . . . Every day I changed my locality and noticed with regret the progress of casualties, and of isolation in the work of the districts. Now from one, now from another district came the news that ‘Initiative Groups’ unknown to the Petrograd Committee had been formed which were trying to build up an organisational machine, and were issuing appeals. Daily reports arrived about the ‘ambition’ of these dilettante groups. The leadership was weak and it was therefore natural that the districts were in a topsy-turvy condition.

“I made an attempt to organise the work. Together with the remaining comrades I organised a ‘Place for reports to the Petrograd Committee,’ on the Vassiliev Island. There the secretaries brought daily reports on the life and work in the districts. We tried sending out instructions from there in order to direct the work according to plan. The provocateur Limonini (Shurkanov), whose reports to the police came into the hands of the Petrograd Committee in the February days, writes as follows about these days: ‘The well known Vladimir is carrying on energetic work. He has formed a staff of young girls, who carry on the duties of secretaries. In such a way he can direct the activities in the districts without showing himself in the streets.’

“Then at last ‘Vladimir’s’ turn came. I was arrested on the Vassilievsky-Ostrov not far from the office for reports to the Petrograd Committee, just as I was descending from a tram car.

"I was very disturbed when I was put into prison, because it seemed to me that no one remained at liberty. Try as I might, I could not conceive who was to continue the work of the Petrograd Committee. This was, however, an illusion not uncommon to old professional revolutionaries. How often did we think during an arrest that behind us there would remain a gap, at least for the time being. With what pleasure did one learn afterwards that the work had not only been continued but had also been extended. People seemed to come from nowhere and successfully filled the posts rendered vacant by the arrests. . . . This is just how it happened in this case. After one or two months I learned from a neighbour in the cage of the prison chapel that the Petrograd Committee was still actively functioning.

"The February days came to me entirely unexpectedly. I was psychologically quite unprepared for them, and had no idea about the position of the social forces in February, 1917.

"On Sunday, March 10th someone knocked through the stovepipe: 'My neighbour went to court and only returned to-day.'

" 'Why?' I interrupted with surprise.

" 'In town the workers are striking, the streets are full of people, and the escort was afraid to bring him over during the evening.'

"This news affected me like lightning in a clear sky. Unfortunately this was all my neighbour could tell me.

"On Monday the 11th March, I got up very calm. I gave up my books in the library and impatiently waited for dinner, because we always received new books after the meal. Dinner was over and my impatience grew. Nervously I walked up and down the cell, occasionally listening to the approaching sound of the opening of the peepholes. A sign that the books were being distributed.

"Suddenly an indistinct roar came from the streets. I ran to the window, opened the ventilator and heard a chaotic noise, in which, however, these words could be clearly distinguished: 'Batter down the doors, comrades! Hurrah!'

"A feeling of coldness passed over me. I felt my skin become 'goosefleshy' as it were. Holding my breath I listened intently. Through my mind there passed a rapid picture of the attack on the same prison in October, 1905, in which I myself had taken part.

"Then there is a strike in the town! Obviously, as at this moment an excited crowd is storming the prison, I said to myself. How were they allowed to get here? A terrible knocking interrupted my thoughts. The walls seemed to tremble. The noise grew into an inarticulate roar.

"The crowd seems to have lost control of itself, so run my thoughts, it is storming the prison. This is obviously a provocation; otherwise they would not have let them come so near. Very soon they will be fired at. These scoundrels. . . .

"I shut my teeth tightly in my terror, awaiting at any moment the firing of the shots, took my tin drinking cup and began to hammer the door with it like mad. With my cup, my fists, my feet, I belaboured the door. The chaotic noise is growing. I feel as if everything is tottering round me. I, too, lose control and almost unconsciously I hammer on the door. Only one painful, clear thought passes through my mind: 'Soon they will shoot.' I don't want to think it. I don't want to listen to the shooting. I drum against the door, instinctively trying to drown the noise of the shooting. I feel that I cannot bear the noise. . . .

"Then suddenly complete silence. Nonplussed I lie in waiting. What is the meaning of it? Faint, distant sounds of doors being unlocked reach me, the sounds come nearer and nearer. 'I see, they are dragging those who have been hammering at the doors into the

punishment cells. I won't leave, even if they try to get me out by force; no, not even if they beat me.'

"I rush towards my bed, tear off the linen, and wind it round my chest to protect my ribs from possible injury. (Experience had made me familiar with prison beatings; two men seize one's hands and hold them up while several others belabour one's body below the shoulders). Over the linen I drew my chest protector. Thus prepared I wait. . . . How strange! I hear no sounds of resistance, no cries from those being beaten; only the quiet click of doors being unlocked. It comes nearer and nearer. My neighbour's door is being opened. . . . Now the click of my own lock. The warder opens the door of my cell and walks on.

"My mind, that of an old prison habitué who has often been confronted by strange happenings—miraculous happenings—begins to interpret this phenomenon on the basis of old experience.

"A provocation, of course. They allowed the crowd in, in order to stage an attack on the prison. They are opening the cells in order to prepare a massacre inside the prison.'

"It seems senseless to remain in the cell. I dive into the corridor and there see the stupefied faces of my fellow prisoners appearing at the half-opened doors of their cells. Far and wide no one else is in sight. I turn round the corner—my cell is at the corner—and at the bend of the corridor on the fifth floor I run into a superintendent, a decent fellow.

"What's up?' I call out to him.

"I don't know. Revolution. They have disarmed us,' he throws at me wildly, and

runs on. I notice his terrified expression and see that a small remnant of his revolver belt is dangling from his waist, the rest having been torn from him.

"But still I don't believe that the revolution has come! It is all so unexpected.


"The crowd has broken into the prison; soon they will be surrounded and everyone here will be shot. Still it is better to die a free man.' I quickly slip on my overcoat and rush headlong down the gangway. On the fourth floor I see crowds of soldiers and workmen armed with



REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS in the Reading Room of the Tsarist Duma.

rifles. One of them with his rifle is calmly breaking in a door which has remained locked for some unknown reason. The further I descend the more armed workers I find in the corridors. They almost obscure the soldiers from view. In the prison office there is absolute silence. The floor is covered with masses of torn documents. In one corner a pile of snaps and papers has been set fire to; a crowd of "criminals" is hastily changing into ordinary clothes. At last I reach the outer prison yard. The gates leading on to the street are opened wide. A dense mass of armed people fills up the yard—workmen, soldiers, women. . . .

"A woman sees me and screams: 'For God's sake look how they have ill-treated him..



FEBRUARY, 1917—"Mopping up" one of the little groups of armed special police who resisted the revolution for a few days.

Then comrade 'Fyodor' (Komanov) puts his arm round me, standing there with his bundle in his hand and looking round about him. We kiss each other. 'What has happened?' 'Where shall we go now?' I ask. 'To us, of course, to Lessnoye, where we shall find out all about things.'

"We have hardly gone two steps when a detachment of soldiers led by two young officers appears round the corner. The soldiers have small red flags fixed on their bayonets, the officers and their horses are also decorated in red.

" 'Hurrah for the soldiers!' shouts the crowd. The detachment marches in splendid order down Spalernaya Street. 'They are marching to the Duma,' people in the crowd tell each other. Wild joy fills my whole being. Armed workers, soldiers carrying red flags—this is the revolution. Fyodor and I almost run towards the workers' districts.

"Near the Liteinaya Bridge we meet another company of soldiers. But we are not afraid; they are sure to be on our side. We would like to call out greetings, we would like to talk to them. . . . Fyodor can no longer contain himself.

" 'Are these revolutionary troops?' he asks the officer.

" 'Yes,' he proudly answers, stopping his horse.

" 'Can one get to Lessnoye?'

" 'You won't be able to pass by the Finland Railway Station; there are government troops there; go round by the quay.'

"We run along the quay. We meet Broide and Gvosdev, the leaders of the War Industry Committee workers' group.

"Where have you come from?" they ask.

"From the prison for those awaiting trial."

"And we're out of the Kresty prison."

"Where are you off to?"

"To the State Duma."

"Good, and we to the workers' districts," we answered and went on.

"This incident has often recurred to me. It is in a way symbolical that we should have met on the first day of our release. The Bolsheviks and the Liquidators—both freed by the insurrectionary workers—already separated at the very beginning. The former went their way to the workers' quarters, to the masses; the latter went to the Duma, which by the next day was already trying to recall the workers to 'Peace and order.'"

On the evening of March 12th, news came that Kronstadt, the most important naval port, had joined the people. The Government were left without any support in the capital and the surrounding districts. It is symbolic that the Preobrazhensky regiment was one of the first to mutiny. It was this "most reliable" regiment which had been sent by Tsarism from Petersburg to Moscow in 1905 to suppress the December insurrection of the Moscow workers. The soldiers of this regiment did in fact do this at the time.

On the 12th and 13th March, the police and the authorities still held their positions in some districts; but this was only the death-rattle of the old régime.



REVOLUTIONARIES—A group who fought in 1905.

Eleven—THE STATE DUMA AND THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

THE deputies of the State Duma, who commenced their session on the 12th March, learned from Rodzianko that the sittings of the State Duma and the State Council had been interrupted. The deputies left the House and adjourned to a neighbouring room where they held a conference. This conference was opened by Rodzianko at 3.30. He pointed out the necessity of coming to some kind of decision, and remarked at the same time: "We cannot make any definite statement at present because the exact position of the various forces cannot yet be gauged."

The Cadet Nekrassov then spoke. He said: "There is now no governing authority, and it is therefore imperative that one should be formed. I think that it would be best to entrust it to a man enjoying universal confidence, together with several representatives of the State Duma." In his opinion General Manikovsky would be a suitable man. The Progressive, Rshovsky pointed out that "there should be no hesitation, the people are waiting, the district Court of Justice is occupied, immediate action is absolutely necessary." He proposed that a committee should be established which should be in close and continuous contact with the people and with the army. The Trudovik Dzhubinsky proposed that the power should be handed over to the Council of Elders of the Duma. Kerensky asked the assembly to authorise him and Tscheidze (leader of the Duma fraction of the Mensheviks) to explain to the rebellious army that the Duma was solidly with them and was prepared to support them. Tscheidze supported Kerensky's proposal and emphasised the need for destroying the old power and establishing a new. The Cadet Shingariov replied to Tscheidze and remarked that "there was uncertainty whether the people would recognise the new power." Miliukov (a professor and leader of the Russian Liberal bourgeoisie, representative of the annexationist plan of the Great Powers during the war, supporter of a war "to a glorious end") then addressed the assembly. His speech is recorded in the minutes as follows:

"Three proposals on the question of a governing authority have been put forward:

"(1) A committee of 10. For my part I could not agree that such a committee should have dictatorial powers over all, including ourselves.

"(2) Nekrassov's proposal I also consider unsuitable.

"(3) The proposal of Tscheidze and Dzhubinsky, *i.e.*, the establishment of a new power, cannot be put into effect, since the moment for it has not yet arrived.

"Personally I have no concrete proposals to make. What remains to be done? To go to the troops and calm them as Kerensky proposes? That would hardly placate the troops. Something real must be found."

But what? At the meeting this party leader suggested nothing, as can be seen from the minutes.

Forty minutes passed. The sitting continued with small interruptions. Dzhubinsky proposed that they should declare the Duma to be a Constituent Assembly. The Octobrist, Savitch (Octobrists were the members of the "Society of the 17th October," the party of the reactionary upper bourgeoisie and the right wing of the zemstvo representatives) opposed this. "The streets cannot give us power. The Duma is the last refuge of the people, and when it commits an illegal act it ceases to be a law-giving organ and is a Duma no longer." Shulgin

emphasised that "We could not be in agreement on everything with the rebellious part of the population. Supposing the rebels should want to end the war? We could never agree to that. . . ." Rodzianko urged speed, believing that delay meant danger. The conference closed after a decision had been reached that the members of the State Duma should not leave Petrograd. The Council of Elders was authorised to form a Provisional Committee and to decide upon the future role of the State Duma.

The Council of Elders carried out the request of the Duma, and appointed a Provisional Committee consisting of the following members: Rodzianko, Shulgin (Nationalist) V. Lvov (Centre), Dmitriukov (Octobrist), Shidlovsky (Progressive bloc), Karaulov (non-Party), Konovalov (Progressive), Kerensky (Trudovik), Rshvsky (Progressive), Miliukov (Cadet), Nekrassov (Cadet), Tschaidze (Social-Democratic Menshevik).

All this time events outside the Tauride Palace were moving very rapidly. The first rebel regiments joined the revolutionary populace. The rebellious soldiers visited the barracks and fetched the soldiers out of them. Some of the officers also joined. The Cossacks remained neutral; from time to time they dispersed the masses, but otherwise left them alone. Several detachments even joined the workers. The rebellious soldiers together with the rebel workers stormed the Arsenal, occupied the Peter-Paul fortress and betook themselves to the prisons, where they liberated many arrested socialists, among whom were also the workers' group of the Central War Industries Committee. The leaders of this group, accompanied by soldiers and workers, immediately made their way from the prison to the Tauride Palace where, with the help of the representatives of the Trade Unions and the Co-operatives and the Left members of the Duma, they formed a "Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies," whose members were: Gvosdev, Bogdanov, Kapelinsky, Grynevitch, Tschaidze, Skobolev and Frankorussky. The immediate task of this committee was the summoning of the Petrograd Soviet, which was immediately done, by issuing an appeal to the workers in the town asking them to appear at the Tauride Palace at 7 p.m. the same day. The committee did not confine itself to summoning the Soviet, but took strenuous measures to ensure supplies of food for the rebels. For this purpose a provisional Food Commission was appointed and the population was asked to contribute to the maintenance of the soldiers. In addition measures for the defence of the revolution were adopted by organising military headquarters in the Tauride Palace, in order to ensure an effective defensive in the event of an attack by loyal Tsarist troops. This military headquarters was formed by several officers, among whom was the well-known Social-Revolutionary Mstislavsky.

Exactly at 9 p.m. the sitting of the Workers' Soviet was opened in the Tauride Palace.

ВОЗЗВАНИЕ.

Исполнительного Комитета представителей рабочих и солдат.

Граждане! Засидающие въ Государственной Думѣ представители рабочихъ солдатъ и населения Петрограда объявляютъ, что

Первое заседание этихъ представителей состоится сегодня 27 февраля вечеромъ въ помѣщеніи Гос. Думы.

Всѣмъ перешедшимъ на сторону народа войскамъ, немедленно избрать своихъ представителей по одному на каждую роту.

Заводамъ избрать своихъ депутатовъ по одному на каждую тысячу.

Заводы нѣмѣющие менѣе тысячи рабочихъ избираютъ по одному.

27 февраля 1917 г.

Временный Исполнительный Комитетъ Советъ Рабочихъ Депутатовъ.

THE FIRST MANIFESTO
of the Provisional Executive Committee of
the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

At the beginning of the sitting different soldiers' representatives brought greetings from their regiments. After the reports a resolution was unanimously adopted to amalgamate the revolutionary army and the revolutionary proletariat into one organisation to be called the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It was reported that Kronstadt had also joined the revolution. The member of the provisional Food Committee, Frankorussky, then addressed the meeting. He gave a short account of the food position in Petrograd and proposed that a Food Commission be elected, endowed with the necessary power and that this commission should be instructed to begin its work at once. The commission was elected, and Groman became its chairman. The newly-elected commission then left in order to begin its work.

Then followed the question of the defence of the town. Braunstein and Sukhanov proposed that all deputies present should immediately instruct their districts to organise a militia (100 men per thousand) in every factory, to form district committees and to appoint fully authorised Commissars in all districts, who were to attend to the restoration of order and to the fight against anarchy and pogroms.

In regard to the question of defending the town, a resolution to appeal to the populace in the name of the Soviet was also proposed and carried. A literary commission was elected to compose this appeal. Its members were Sokolov, Peschekhonov, Steklov, Grynevitch and Sukhanov. The appeal was written the same evening, sanctioned by the Council of Workers, and published the following morning in the first issue of "Isvestia."

The following decision was made by the Soviet on the recommendation of the Finance Commission :

(1) All the financial resources of the State must immediately be confiscated from the old State power. For this purpose the State bank, the financial houses, the Mint and the printing press for banknotes must be occupied by revolutionary guards.

(2) The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies instructs the Provisional Committee of the State Duma to carry out the above decision immediately.

(3) Until the new Minister of Finance of the Provisional Government is elected all confiscated funds shall remain in the hands of the present officials, but they shall be watched by revolutionary guards.

(4) The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Provisional Committee of the State Duma shall jointly elect a Finance Committee which shall have the following duties: (a) the adoption of measures for preventing financial confusion in the country; (b) supervision and control over the normal process of all money and credit operations in all credit institutions.

(5) The Finance Committee shall have the power to satisfy the needs of existing or future revolutionary organs by cash notes on the State financial offices.

(6) The Finance Committee is empowered in case of need to stop the credits opened by the old government.

(7) All Executive Committees of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies must present their budgets. It is the function of the Finance Commission to collate all these budgets into one collective budget and to decide upon the total credit needed by the Soviet.

(8) All revenues reaching the Soviet are to be handed over to the Finance Commission.

On the evening of the 12th March the Executive Committee of the State Duma issued two appeals, and an order to the Petrograd garrison. One of the appeals was as follows :

"The Provisional Committee of the State Duma has found it necessary to take into its hands the restoration of constitutional and social order during the difficult period of break-

down caused by the measures of the old government. While the Committee is fully conscious of the responsibility which falls upon it by this decision, it hopes that the people and the army will assist it in its difficult task of establishing a new government according to the wishes of the people, and one which will enjoy their confidence.—M. RODZIANKO, President of the State Duma.”

In the second appeal the Committee asks the inhabitants of Petrograd: “to preserve the institutions of State and society, and to allow no attacks on the life, health or property of private citizens.” The order to the troops stated that first, all the ranks and all detachments should at once return to their barracks; second, all officers should return to their formations and should adopt measures for the restoration of order; third, all commanders of detachments should report at 11 a.m. on the 13th March at the State Duma to receive their orders.

On the evening of March 12th the one-time Minister Shtsheglovitov was arrested and sent to the Tauride Palace under a strong escort. He was the first Tsarist Minister to be arrested. Rodzianko, the President of the Duma, would have liked to let him go free, but any such attempt was impossible. On the same day, at 6 p.m., the “Council of Ministers” sent a telegram to the Tsar asking for the Cabinet to be dissolved, and for a person “enjoying universal confidence” to be entrusted with the formation of a Cabinet. The Tsar replied: “I cannot allow a change in the constitution of the Cabinet in the present circumstances.—NICOLAI.”

The Grand Duke Michael, the Tsar’s brother, together with Rodzianko and others, sent a telegram to the Tsar that evening proposing that Michael should be appointed Regent, and that Prince Lvov (later President of the Provisional Government) should be appointed Prime Minister.

On March the 12th, the Moscow workers went on strike. During the night a Provisional Revolutionary Committee was elected to represent their organisations. At 2 o’clock in the morning many soldiers from various regiments who had joined the revolutionary movement assembled in the Town Hall.

On March 13th Tsarist headquarters made its big attempt to suppress the revolution.


From both the northern and western frontiers, two infantry and two cavalry regiments with machine-gun detachments were sent to Petrograd in the early morning of this day. They were under the command of the Chief of the General Staff, Ivanov, who was invested with extensive powers as military commander of Petrograd, and to him even the Ministers were to subordinate themselves entirely. Ivanov left Moghilev at 1 p.m. On the same day, the Tsar wired to his wife in English: “Left this morning at 5. My thoughts always with you. Wonderful weather. Hope you are well and calm. Many troops sent from the front. With kind love.—NIKOLAI.”

In Petrograd, the Tsarist ministers were arrested one after another; amongst them were the ex-War Minister Sukhomlinov, and the leader of the “Society of the Russian People” (the Black Hundred), Dr. Dubrovin; the ex-Minister for Home Affairs, Protopopov, one of the most hated figures of the Tsarist régime, went voluntarily to the Tauride Palace and asked to be arrested.

In front of the Tauride Palace soldiers and workers thronged all day. Rodzianko and Miliukov delivered speeches and requested the soldiers to return to their barracks, to preserve obedience to their officers, and to take heed only of the decisions of the Duma Committee.

The order given on the previous day by the Provisional Government, and the speeches of Rodzianko and Miliukov, caused anxiety among the soldiers. During the sitting of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, a group of soldiers appeared and reported on the excitement prevailing among the soldiers as a result of this order and of the speeches of Rodzianko. The Executive Committee promised to clear up the matter.

On March 13th shooting was still going on in the streets of Petrograd. Police, gendarmerie and commissionaires (who in Tsarist Russia were always in the service of the police) fired from the roofs upon the demonstrators. The workers and soldiers replied by storming the police courts.



ON GUARD over the arrested Tsarist Ministers, in the Tauride Palace, February, 1917.

In the city Ward Defence Corps were formed. House Committees and various self-aid organisations were set up, in particular those for ensuring the maintenance of the soldiers.

In Moscow, the strike and demonstration movement became more intense on March 13th. Regiments placed themselves at the disposal of the revolution, the police were disarmed and the trams prevented from running. The Provisional Revolutionary Committee issued a proclamation in which the soldiers were called upon to occupy the Arsenal and arm the people. The workers and soldiers were also asked to elect representatives to the Soviet.

The overthrow was accomplished in both capitals. Most of the Tsarist ministers were already arrested by the 14th March, the most important buildings had been occupied by the revolutionaries, and an order had been given to arrest all the uniformed police, secret police and all gendarmes. General Ivanov, sent for to put down the disturbance in Petrograd, reached Tsarskoye-Selo, about 12 miles from Petrograd, on the evening of this day with a battalion known as "The Knights of the Order of St. George." Here he learnt of the arrests of Khabalov and the Ministers, and received news that in Petrograd "not a single detachment was at the disposal of the lawful authorities." On the same night he turned his course towards Vyryza. After his departure, revolutionary troops with machine-guns appeared at the station and in the places round it.

On the same day the Provisional Committee of the Duma sat in conference to form a new government. The Committee was in favour of a Monarchy. And the question as to what was to happen to Nicolai II. was solved in this way: Nicolai was to abdicate in favour of his son Alexei, and was to appoint his brother Michael as Regent. To bring about this solution the Committee decided to send a delegation to the Tsar, consisting of two persons: the Octobrist, Gutshkov, and the Nationalist, Shulgin.

Tscheidze was to get the post of Minister of Labour, and Kerensky that of Minister of Justice in the new government. The Executive Committee of the Soviet also considered the question of a new government. It was unwilling as yet to take the government into its own hands, though it would certainly have had the power and the means to do so. The authority of the Soviet among the workers was incomparably greater than that of the Duma, which was out of touch with the masses. The leaders of the Soviet were however Mensheviks, who voluntarily kept the road to power clear for the bourgeois Duma.

There arose the question: "Should a coalition be formed? Should the Soviet send its representatives to a government formed by the Duma?" Eight members of the Executive Committee (Mensheviks, Defenders of the Fatherland, Members of the Jewish Social-Democratic "Bund," Narodniks*) voted for coalition, thirteen members against. Formal participation in the government was thus declined; the whole future policy of the Soviet was, nevertheless, actually a policy of coalition.

The Plenary session of the Soviet sanctioned the preliminary conditions attached to the handing over of power to the Provisional Government. The representatives of the Executive Committee, led by Tscheidze and Skobolev, went to the Duma to settle the business. After lengthy debates, the representatives of the Soviet, contrary to the decisions of the Plenary session, gave two far-reaching concessions to the Duma. First, they conceded the non-election of officers, although the plenum of the Soviet had as one of their demands that officers should be elected; second—and this is particularly characteristic—they cut out the demand passed by the Plenum, that the Provisional Government should refrain from all acts which might prejudice the determination of the future type of government in Russia. The representatives of

* Populists.

the Soviet thereby gave the Provisional Government the fullest powers for its monarchist intrigues.

On the evening of the 14th March, the first session of the United Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies took place. It sanctioned the above-mentioned conditions for the support of the Provisional Government by the Soviet. The whole session stood as a symbol of the revolt. The soldiers demanded that the Duma committee should be dismissed, because of Rodzianko's speech at the meeting on the 13th March, and because of the attempt of the military commission of the Duma to disarm the soldiers. It was decided that arms should be surrendered to no one, and that they were to remain in the charge of the company and battalion committees. Furthermore, it was decided that the soldiers should submit themselves in all political actions to the council only, and to the Duma Commission only so long as their decisions were not contrary to the decisions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. An order was to be given to the troops embodying this decision, and the commission entrusted with its issue drew up on the same day the so-called "Order No. 1," which we quote here verbatim, as well as "Order No. 2," which must be looked upon as supplementary to the previous order.

ORDER No. 1.

March 1st (14th new style), 1917.

To the Garrisons of the Petrograd Army Corps.

To all soldiers of the Guards, of the Army, of the Artillery and of the Fleet for immediate and exact execution.

For the information of the workers of Petrograd.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has decided:

(1) Committees must be elected immediately by all companies, battalions, regiments, batteries, brigades, squadrons, and in all offices of the different military administrations, as well as on all ships of the Navy, from among the elected representatives of the rank and file of the here-mentioned formations.

(2) From all troops who have so far failed to elect their representatives to the Soviet, one representative per company must be elected. These representatives, furnished with their necessary permits, must appear at 10 a.m. on the 2nd March in the House of the State Duma.

(3) The troops are subordinated to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and to their own Committees in all political matters.

(4) The orders of the Commission of the State Duma must only be obeyed if they are not contrary to those of the Soviet.

(5) All arms such as rifles, machine-guns, armoured cars, etc., must be put at the disposal

Приказъ № 1.

1 марта 1917 года.

Во гарнизонъ Петроградскаго Округа: всѣмъ солдатамъ пехоты, кавалеріи, артиллеріи и флота для немедленнаго и точнаго исполненія, а рабочимъ Петрограда для свѣдѣнія.

Советъ Рабочихъ и Солдатскихъ Депутатовъ постановилъ:

1) Во всѣхъ ротныхъ, батальонныхъ, полковыхъ, парковыхъ, батарежныхъ, эскадронныхъ и отдельныхъ службахъ разнаго рода военныхъ управленій и на судахъ военнаго флота немедленно выбрать комитеты изъ выборныхъ представителей отъ нижнихъ чиновъ вышеуказанныхъ воинскихъ частей.

2) Во всѣхъ воинскихъ частяхъ, которыя еще не выбрали своихъ представителей въ Советъ Рабочихъ Депутатовъ, избрать по одному представителю отъ роты, которыми и вѣстись съ писменными удостовѣреніями въ записи Государственной Думы въ 10 часовъ утра, 2-го сего марта.

3) Во всѣхъ своихъ политическихъ выступленіяхъ воинская часть подчиняется Совету Рабочихъ и Солдатскихъ Депутатовъ и своимъ комитетамъ.

4) Приказы военной комиссіи Государственной Думы слѣдуетъ исполнять только въ тѣхъ случаяхъ, когда они не противоречатъ приказамъ и постановленіямъ Совета Рабочихъ и Солдат. Депутатовъ.

5) Всякаго рода оружіе, какъ то винтовки, пулеметы, бронированные автомобили и прочее должны находиться въ распоряженіи и подѣ контролю ротныхъ и батальонныхъ комитетовъ, и въ военныя случаи не выдаваться офицерамъ, даже по тѣхъ требованіяхъ.

6) Въ строю и при отправленіи служебныхъ обязанностей солдаты должны соблюдать строжайшую воинскую дисциплину, но въ тѣхъ случаяхъ, когда солдаты на ихъ чинъ не могутъ быть умалены въ тѣхъ правахъ, которыя пользуются всѣ граждане.

Въ частности, вставаніе во фронтъ и обязательное отдаваніе чести при службѣ отменяется.

7) Разнымъ образомъ отменяются титулованіе офицеровъ: вице-превосходительство, баргоровале и т. п., и замѣняется обращеніемъ: господинъ генералъ, господинъ полковникъ и т. д.

Грубое обращеніе съ солдатами всѣхъ воинскихъ чиновъ и, въ частности, обращеніе къ нимъ на ты, воспрещается и о всякомъ нарушеніи сего, равно какъ и о всѣхъ недоразумѣніяхъ между офицерами и солдатами, послѣдніе обязаны доводить до свѣдѣнія ротныхъ комитетовъ.

Настоящій приказъ прочесть во всѣхъ ротныхъ, батальонныхъ, полковыхъ, эскадронныхъ и прочихъ строевыхъ и нестроевыхъ командахъ.

Председатель Советъ Рабочихъ и Солдатскихъ Депутатовъ.

ORDER No. 1.

of the company and battalion committees, and must on no account be delivered to the officers, even at the latter's direct command.

(6) When in the ranks or while carrying out their duties, soldiers must preserve strict military discipline. When off duty soldiers may enjoy their lives in political activity and as citizens and private individuals, exercising all rights as members of the State without prejudice of any kind. In particular there is to be an end to standing at attention and to the compulsory salute when off duty.

(7) Simultaneously the practice of addressing officers as "Your Excellency," "Noble Sir," etc. is abolished, and is to be replaced by such forms of address as "General," "Colonel."

The Executive Staff are forbidden to use a bullying tone in addressing the soldiers and in particular are forbidden to use the familiar "thou." Soldiers are instructed to report all infringements of this prohibition as well as any disputes between officers and soldiers to the company committees.

This order is to be read out to all companies, battalions, regiments, batteries and other front-line and auxiliary units.

*The Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers' and
Workers' Deputies.*

ORDER No. 2.

March 5th (18th new style), 1917.

To the troops in the Petrograd defence area.

To all soldiers of the Guard, of the Army, of the Artillery and of the Fleet for their most strict observance.

For the information of the Petrograd workers.

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has made the following decisions in amplification and explanation of Order No. 1:

(1) In Order No. 1, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies commands all companies, battalions and other units to elect company, battalion and like committees for each of their respective units. It was not, however, laid down in Order No. 1 that these committees were to choose the officers for each unit. The reason for the election of the committees is to enable the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison to be organised, through their representatives, to take part in the political life of the country, and especially to enable them to report to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies their views regarding the advisability of any proposed measures. It is furthermore the duty of the committees to pay attention to the social needs of each company or other unit.

(2) The problem as to how far the interests of military efficiency can be reconciled with the soldiers' right to choose their own officers, has been entrusted to a special commission for investigation and elaboration.

All elections of officers which have been confirmed by the Executive Staff, or submitted to it for confirmation, are to be recognised as valid.

Until the problem of the possibility of electing officers has been definitely settled the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies authorises the committee of each unit to protest against the appointment of any definite officer. Such protests are to be made to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which will transmit them to the Military Commission, composed of representatives of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of the functional organisations.

(3) The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is designated in Order No. 1 as an

organisation in charge of the conduct of all the political activities of the soldiers in Petrograd. All soldiers must give allegiance in their social and political activities to this, their elected organ. So far as the various military units are concerned, soldiers must obey the commands of their respective units in all matters concerning military service.

(4) In order to remove the danger of an armed counter-revolution, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has demanded that the garrison of Petrograd, which won freedom for Russia, shall not be disarmed. The Provisional Government has undertaken not to allow the disarmament of these troops, and has made this promise public in its "Proclamation."

In accordance with this proclamation, the committees of companies and batteries are under the obligation, already mentioned in Order No. 1, of taking care that the soldiers should not be deprived of their arms.

(5) In confirmation of paragraphs 6 and 7 of Order No. 1, containing certain demands, the Executive Committee wishes to say that several of these demands have already been met by the Provisional Government.

This order is to be read out to all companies, battalions, regiments, columns, batteries, and other front-line and auxiliary units.

*Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.*

Witness to the true and correct copy:—*The Chairman of the Military Commission of
the Provisional Government.*

On the ground that the victory of the revolution was as yet inadequately secured, a meeting of the Workers' Deputies in Moscow rejected the proposal that the strike should be called off in the factories where war supplies were made. On the same day, all the political prisoners in the Butyrka prison were liberated, and possession was taken of the post and telegraph offices, the offices of the secret police, the police stations and the military headquarters of the city.

The revolution now began to be felt in the provinces: in Tver, Nijni-Novgorod, Saratov and other towns, the workers fraternised with the troops, whilst behind their backs the bourgeoisie stealthily took possession of the most powerful positions.

In the evening, the Tsar sent a telegram to the effect that "for the salvation of the country and the happiness of his people," he would agree to the formation of a new Cabinet with Rodzianko as Prime Minister but reserved to himself the appointment of the Ministers of Marine and of the Interior.

The 15th of March is the date of the Tsar's abdication; two delegates were sent to the Tsar (Gutshkov and Shulgin) to persuade him to abdicate in favour of his son Alexei, who was to govern under a Regency.

Shulgin's memoirs, which were published in the "Russkaya Muze" (Vol. I., 1923) give an interesting account of what occurred; he writes:

"It was 4 p.m., I think, when Gutshkov returned for the second time. He was very excited, as Prince Viasemski, who had sat next to him in the car, had just been killed by a shot fired from some military barracks at the passing 'officer' . . .

"We were not at the time assembled in full force: except for Rodzianko, Miliukov and myself, I cannot recall who else was there, but I am certain that neither Kerensky nor Tscheidze was present. As we were all friends Gutshkov spoke quite frankly, his words being to the following effect: 'Some decision really must be taken. The situation is getting

worse every minute. Viasemski was killed for no other reason but that he was an officer. The same sort of thing must be going on in other places. . . . if not to-day, then it will come to it to-morrow. On my way here I noticed officers in various rooms of the State Duma building: they have simply gone there to hide—they are afraid for their lives. They are praying to be saved. Some decision *must* be taken—some grand impressive action by which a way can be found out of this terrible position with the minimum of losses. In this chaos we must, whatever we do, ensure the safety of the monarch. Russia cannot live without a monarchy. But it is clear that the present Tsar can no longer rule: a supreme edict of the Cabinet is no longer effective, is not executed. This being the state of affairs, are we going to wait inactive and apathetic until the full tide of revolutionary confusion sets in, finds its own way out and makes its own reckoning with the monarchy?—for that is what is bound to happen if we leave the initiative to others.

“Rodzianko spoke: ‘I should have gone to the Tsar to-day but I was not allowed to—I was told the train would not be allowed to pass, and that I had better travel with Tscheidze and a battalion of soldiers.’



THE EAGLES OF THE TSARS are hacked down during the February revolution.

"‘I know,’ said Gutshkov, ‘that is why other means must be found. We must act promptly and secretly without asking anyone, without taking anyone into our confidence. If we act in concert with “them” it will be of the least possible benefit to ourselves. “They” must be confronted with a *fait accompli*. Russia must be given a new Tsar. All forces that can be rallied for defence, must be gathered under this new standard. Prompt and resolute action is essential.’

“‘Be a little less vague! What are your concrete proposals?’

“‘I propose that we should take the train immediately and go to His Majesty to bring about his abdication in favour of the Heir Apparent.’

“Rodzianko said: ‘I have had a telegram from General Russky saying that he has already spoken to His Majesty on the subject. Alexeiev has also sent a questionnaire to all the Generals in command of the armies and their replies are pending.’ ‘I think we must go,’ said Gutshkov; ‘if we are all agreed and if you depute me, I am willing to go, but I should prefer someone would go with me.’

“‘We looked at each other: there was an appreciable pause, then I said: ‘I will go with you.’”

The leading members of the General Staff also urged this step as the last means of saving the monarchy. The Tsar finally signed the deed of abdication, not, however, in favour of his son, but, for the moment, in favour of his brother, Michael. The deed was brought to Petrograd by the Duma delegates.

DEED OF ABDICATION OF NICOLAI ROMANOV

“In the days of Our great struggle with the external enemy, who, for the last three years, has been striving to subjugate Our beloved country, it has pleased God to afflict Russia with yet another heavy ordeal.

“Incipient internal disturbances threaten to have a calamitous effect on the determined continuation of the war. The fate of Russia, the honour of Our heroic army, the welfare of the Nation and the future of Our beloved country, all require the continuation of the war, at all costs, to a victorious end.

“Our merciless enemy is rallying his last forces and the hour is not far off when Our brave army, together with Our glorious allies, will succeed in finally breaking the enemy’s power. In this critical hour in the life of Russia We have felt it to be a duty laid upon Our conscience to make easy for Our people the most prompt summoning of its energies in the battles for victory, and We have deemed it right, in agreement with the Duma of State, to abdicate the Throne of the Russian State and to give up Our power.

“As We do not wish to be separated from Our dear Son, We transmit the succession to Our dear Brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, and give him Our blessing at his ascension to the Throne.

“We recommend Our Brother to carry on the affairs of State in full agreement with the popular representatives of the legislative bodies on the basis which these shall determine, and to swear an inviolable oath to this effect in the name of Our deeply beloved country.

“We call upon true sons of the Fatherland to fulfil their most sacred duty of submission to the will of the Tsar in this critical moment of national calamity and to assist him in co-operating with the representatives of the people in leading Russia along the path of victory, prosperity and glory. May the Lord God help Russia.

“(Signed) NICOLAI.”



PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE DUMA.

Standing: Shulgin, Dmitriukov, Engelhart, Kerensky, Karaulov.
Sitting: Prince Lvov, Shidlovsky, Rshesky, Rodzianko.

On the same day the final composition of the Government was decided upon. The Octobrists, Nationalists and Cadets occupied the most important ministries. Prince G. E. Lvov was chosen to be President of the Cabinet and Minister of the Interior (he had till then been chairman of the Pan-Russian Zemstvo Union), Miliukov became Minister for Foreign Affairs; Manuilov (Professor, Cadet Party) Minister of Education; Tereshchenko (Non-Party, Vice-Chairman of the Munitions Committee) Finance Minister; Konovalov (Progressive) Minister of Trade; Nekrassov (Left Cadet, Vice-Chairman of the Duma) Minister of Transport; Gutshkov (Octobrist, Chairman of the Munitions Committee) Minister of War; Shingariov (Cadet, member of the Duma) Minister of Agriculture; Kerensky (officially Trudovik, actually a Social-Revolutionary) Minister of Justice, while Godnev (member of the Duma Progressive bloc) became Controller-General and V. N. Lvov (Centrist member of the Duma) Procurator of the Synod.

On the 15th March Steklov reported to the Petrograd Soviet the result of the negotiations between the representatives of the Executive Committee and the Provisional Committee of the Duma, for the formation of a Provisional Government.

The Executive Committee proposed that the draft-manifesto, or proclamation, of the newly-formed Government should be acknowledged and that an appeal to the people should then be made pleading for the consolidation of forces, the cessation of excesses and support for the Provisional Government, so long as the latter carried out the policy and dealt with the problems which it had promised to tackle. After the report of the Executive Committee, Kerensky claimed a hearing and begged the Soviet to sanction his decision to take up the duties of Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government while retaining the position of Vice-Chairman of the Soviet. Thunderous applause greeted Kerensky's speech and, relying on the ovation he had received, he left the platform and the place of assembly without waiting for the Soviet to make a formal decision. After his departure there was a discussion on

the report, during which there was evidence of a current of thought which rejected the possibility of co-operating in any way with the Duma committee and strongly demanded the formation of a Provisional Government by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Another divergent faction demanded that representatives of the Soviet should be sent to the Provisional Government.

Both these proved to be minority opinions, and, after a lively debate, all the suggestions contained in the Report of the Executive Committee were adopted with the following additions:

(1) In spite of the state of war the Provisional Government must lay special emphasis on the carrying out of the measures detailed.

(2) The manifesto of the Provisional Government is to be signed simultaneously by Rodzianko and by the Provisional Government.

(3) A paragraph dealing with the national and cultural self-determination of all peoples must be inserted in the manifesto of the Provisional Government.


(4) A Committee must be formed from among the members of the Soviet of workers' and soldiers' deputies to supervise the conduct of the Provisional Government.

All the proposals of the Executive Committee were almost unanimously adopted (by several hundred votes against fifteen).

That same evening the delegates of the Soviet resumed negotiations with the Provisional Committee of the Duma. The delegates insisted on the inclusion of the following concluding paragraph in the proclamation of the Provisional Government: "The Provisional Government has no intention of taking advantage of the continuance of a state of war in order to delay the execution of the reforms and regulations set forth herein."

The paragraph about national and cultural self-determination was not included in the proclamation, but in spite of this the text of the appeal by the Executive Committee to the people was finally agreed upon. Among other things the appeal declared:

"In order to ensure the victory of the revolutionary struggle, patience must be exercised and indulgence shown towards the trifling offences against democracy on the part of those officers who joined your ranks in the last decisive fight against the old regime."



THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, March, 1917.
Kerensky is the centre figure; next to him is Prince Lvov.

Kerensky's entry into the Provisional Government was approved by the conference of the Social-Revolutionaries on the same day. After a review of the political situation the meeting passed, among others, the following resolution: "This conference recognises that some control over the activities of the Provisional Government must be exercised by the masses, and welcomes A. F. Kerensky's entry into the Provisional Government as champion of the interests and liberty of the people. It expresses its complete satisfaction with his behaviour during the days of revolution and considers it to have been guided by a correct understanding of the situation at the moment."

On March 15th Miliukov, Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government, delivered a speech at a meeting in the Catherine Room of the Tauride Palace, in which he declared that the throne had passed from Nicolai to Michael. This announcement was received with noisy shouts of acclamation by the meeting. Late at night a group of excited officers appeared at the Tauride Palace and declared that they could not return to their units unless Miliukov withdrew his statements. Miliukov prevaricated, telling them that his words were only intended as a "personal conception" (although the definite resolution to preserve the monarchy had been unanimously adopted by the whole Duma Committee and by the Provisional Government).

The revolution continued to spread more and more widely in the provinces—Kiev, Pskov, Orel, Rybinsk, Ekaterinoslav, Penza, Kazan, etc., followed the example of the capital.



FUNERAL of those who fell in the revolutionary fighting, Petrograd, February, 1917.

Twelve—THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

ON March 16th the following proclamation of the Provisional Government appeared, together with the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies for support for the Provisional Government:

DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

"Citizens!

"The Provisional Committee composed of members of the Duma has succeeded, with the assistance of the troops and population of the metropolis, in gaining such victories over the sinister powers of the old regime that it is now in a position to proceed to a more permanent reconstruction of the executive power.

"For this purpose the Provisional Committee of the Duma appoints the following persons as Ministers, persons who by their social and political activities in the past have won for themselves the confidence of the whole country:—President of the Cabinet Council and Minister of the Interior, Prince G. E. Lvov; Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. N. Miliukov; Minister of War and Marine, A. I. Gutshkov; Minister of Transport, N. V. Nekrassov; Minister of Commerce, A. J. Konovalov; Minister of Finance, M. I. Terestchenko; Minister for Education, A. A. Manuilov; Holy Synod, V. Lvov; Minister of Agriculture, A. J. Shingariov; Minister of Justice, A. F. Kerensky.

"The Cabinet will be guided by the following principles:—

1. An immediate and complete amnesty for all who have been sentenced for political and religious crimes, including terrorist outrages, military mutinies, agrarian revolts, etc.
2. Liberty of speech, liberty of the Press, freedom to combine in unions, to hold meetings, and to strike; as well as extension of political freedom to members of the military forces so far as technical military considerations permit.
3. Abolition of all disabilities of caste, creed and nationality.
4. Immediate preparations for summoning a Constituent Assembly to be elected by universal suffrage and secret ballot, and which shall determine the constitution of the State and define its form.
5. Substitution for the police of a State militia with elected officers, this militia to be under the orders of the self-governing municipalities.
6. Municipal elections by universal suffrage and secret ballot.
7. All troops which took part in the revolutionary movement will be kept in Petrograd and will not be disarmed.
8. The abolition of all disabilities affecting the civil rights of soldiers, subject to the maintenance of strict military discipline while on duty.

"The Provisional Government considers it its duty to add that it will not in any way make use of the continuance of a state of war as a pretext for delaying the realisation of any of the reforms and legislation detailed above.

"Signed *President of the Duma*: N. Rodzianko.

President of the Cabinet Council: Prince Lvov.

Ministers: Miliukov, Nekrassov, Manuilov, Konovalov, Gutshkov, Terestchenko, V. Lvov, Shingariov, Kerensky."

PROCLAMATION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

"Comrades! Citizens!

"A proclamation has to-day been issued by the new Government, composed of members from the moderate elements in the community, setting forth all the reforms which it undertakes to put through, either during its struggle with the old regime or after the termination of that struggle. Some of these reforms can be welcomed by a wide circle of democratic partisans: the political amnesty, the promise to prepare the way for a Constituent Assembly, the realisation of civil liberties and the abolition of legal disabilities of nationality. So long as the Government in process of formation acts in a manner calculated to realise these reforms, and so long as it continues to carry on a merciless war against the old regime, we consider that it should have the support of the people.

"Comrades! Citizens!

"The complete victory of the Russian people over the old regime is at hand, but another mighty effort and great steadfastness and endurance are required for its attainment. Dissension and anarchy must not be allowed to spread. All excesses, plundering, unlawful intrusion into private houses, pilfering or destruction of private property must cease at once. Anarchy and indiscipline might be ruinous to the cause of the revolution and to the liberty of the nation.

"The danger of military intervention against the revolution still exists, and in order to ward it off it is of the utmost importance to secure harmonious co-operation between soldiers and officers. Those officers who have at heart the interests of liberty and the progressive development of our country must make every effort to bring about smooth collaboration with the soldiers. They must respect the dignity of the soldiers as men and citizens, and avoid wounding their self-respect. For their part, the soldiers must not forget that an army's strength depends on the unity existing between soldiers and officers, and that no stigma must be attached to the whole corps of officers, because of the wrong bearing of a few of them. In the cause of victory in the revolutionary struggle patience must be exercised, and minor transgressions against democracy made by those officers who took part in the last fight against the old regime must be forgotten.

"Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies."

The same day, the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) issued a proclamation calling on the masses "to fight pitilessly against any attempt to restore a monarchic form of government in any guise whatever."



CITIZEN ROMANOV
under guard at Tsarskoye Selo, near Petrograd.

That morning Gutshkov tried to deliver a speech in favour of the new Tsar Michael before a meeting of railway workers, but he only succeeded in being roughly thrown out; it was only with difficulty and by good luck that he managed to escape both arrest and injury. A meeting of the members of the Provisional Government and of the leading spirits of the Duma held at noon in Michael's palace to consider the future of the dynasty was, with the exception of Gutshkov and Miliukov, unanimously in favour of abdication. Miliukov urged against abdication that "a powerful government, which was indispensable to the firm establishment of the new regime, must have a symbol of power to which the masses were habituated, and that a Provisional Government without a monarch was like a leaky boat which might easily founder in the ocean of popular commotion."

Michael however "deemed it advisable" to abdicate, as he felt that monarchy had become an anachronism. His deed of abdication ran thus:

"Through the will of my brother, who transferred the throne of Tsardom to me in a year of unexampled warfare and great popular disturbances, a heavy burden has been cast upon my shoulders. I agree with the whole nation in thinking that the welfare of our country must take precedence over all other things, and I have firmly decided not to assume the supreme power unless that be the wish of our great nation, whose function it is to decide through its representatives in the Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage, upon the future form of government and the new constitution of the Russian Empire.

"I therefore beg all citizens of Russia, invoking on them the blessings of God, to subordinate themselves to the Provisional Government, which has been formed on the initiative of the Duma and provided with plenary powers, until the day when a Constituent Assembly chosen by universal suffrage through secret ballot shall, in the near future, meet and reveal the people's will by a resolution on the form of government.

(Signed) MICHAEL."

The Provisional Government despatched a telegram abroad, worded as follows:

"A serious situation has arisen owing to the excited state of public opinion and the great



CELLS IN THE SCHLUSSELBURG PRISON
after the explosion in February, 1917.

energy displayed by the political organisations of the Left. The Provisional Committee has nevertheless succeeded in coming to an agreement with the most powerful of these organisations, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." The message proceeds: "The representatives of the people and the national government are firmly determined to use all their strength and to make every sacrifice necessary to secure victory over the enemy (i.e., Germany)."

Meanwhile, at many workers' meetings resolutions were passed urging the strictest watch over the activities of the Provisional Government.

In Moscow a provisional organisation committee was formed by the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies. During a demonstration, some of those present carried the slogan "Stop the War!"

At Kronstadt there was a mutiny among the sailors and soldiers of the garrison. Their officers, who were particularly harsh, were beaten and some were killed. The first victim was the Fleet Commander, Wierew. The soldiers and sailors elected new officers and also deputies. Peace was not restored until March 17th or 18th, after the arrival at Kronstadt of delegates of the Petrograd Bolshevik Committee. Similar events occurred in Sveaborg and Helsingfors, where Admiral Nepeshin was killed. In the days which followed, revolution spread to all parts of the country and to all the fronts, encountering scarcely any resistance. The February revolution was an established fact, and a new chapter in history, which can be called "The Eight Months of Coalition Government," had begun.

Thirteen—RETROSPECT

THE events of the February upheaval having been presented to the reader, let us survey them in order truly to appreciate the attitudes of the various classes in Russia and of their representatives while the overthrow was proceeding. The feudal-agrarian autocracy was itself wholly responsible for the isolation into which its previous policy had brought it by February, 1917.

The stupid conduct of the war and the tendency among the ruling class to make a separate peace with Germany had isolated them from their allies, the Entente Powers. For this reason British and French diplomacy was not opposed to the substitution for a government of men like Sukhomlinov, Shtsheglovitov and Protopopov by one composed of Lvov, Gutshkov, Miliukov and their like. In 1905-07 French loans helped Tsarism to conquer the revolution; in 1917 the Allies left the Romanov dynasty to its fate. Internally the autocracy showed such a lack of understanding of its own interests and those of the class it represented, that even during the war no steps were taken to win over public opinion amongst the bourgeoisie. Although Tsarism was carrying on a war which, objectively, was not only in the interests of the Russian landowners and of Entente capital, but also in those of the Russian bourgeoisie, a contemptuous disregard was shown for the public spirit of the latter; Tsarism even saw in it a "danger of revolution," although this same bourgeoisie had given indubitable proof of its readiness to participate vigorously in the organisation of economic and political life "in the cause of victory." In the eyes of the most obstinate and pure-blooded representatives of the Tsarist regime, the Duma and even the various middle class organisations (the Confederation of Towns, the Industrial Munitions Committee), were veritable hotbeds of revolution. The result of this state of mind, when the revolution was approaching fruition, was the adjournment and then the dissolution of the Duma as a defensive gesture on the part of the autocracy. It also accounted for the dour resistance of the Tsarist bureaucracy to every attempt made by the "public-spirited" middle class to co-operate in organising the commissariat—that Achilles heel of the Tsarist Government during the war.

All endeavours on the part of the organs of the self-governing communes (municipal bodies) to re-organise and improve the provisioning of the towns and the distribution of necessities, resulted, without exception, in failure. As military collapse and victory for the revolution became ever more imminent, the Tsarist administration became more and more unbridled in its despotism; the last opponents of the policy of naked repression were set aside and free rein was given to the policy named after Rasputin. This is the logic of the downfall of a thoroughly rotten and oppressive class. The state of affairs at the Imperial Court, where matters of high policy were decided upon at the whim of various adventurers, caused such a flood of indignation among all ranks of the community that even persons of importance near the throne were forced to decide on the murder of Rasputin by reason of their anxiety for the future of the dynasty. The deed was accomplished in the middle of December, 1916, with the complicity of the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovitch Romanov and of Purishkevitch, the well-known Duma deputy of the Radical Right.

Tsarism placed blind reliance on its own powers and imagined that it was still possible to dominate the country by sheer force and bureaucratic despotism. The Tsar himself, a fool but "faithful to the traditions of his great ancestors," persisted in his obstinate opposition

to all reforms and concessions even after his advisers had counselled him to give way. On the very day of the overthrow, March 12th, he would not listen to any proposals for a Constitution and even expressed the opinion that any change in the composition of the Government was inadmissible "in the circumstances." The only language which the Tsar was disposed to use to his insurgent people was the language of machine-guns. The Tsarist police went on firing from the housetops on to the streets of Petrograd for several days after March 12th. "Have sent many troops there from the front," wired the Tsar to his wife about the same date (March 13th), and the only reason for his abdication on March 15th was that the police were completely conquered by that time and there were no pro-Tsarist troops left.

The rule of the Romanov dynasty came to an end in March, 1917. Into whose hands did control over the Russian State pass? *Into the hands of the capitalists and of the Junkers who had passed over into the middle class.* In spite of the intolerance of the autocracy, in spite of its jealous retention of all the privileges of power, the capitalists had before this attained to certain positions of power, if not to the highest, at least to the financial posts and other State offices. No other state of affairs was imaginable since the capitalists as a class had concentrated many of the means of production in their own hands. Nevertheless this access to the lesser administrative posts was only a sort of backdoor entry. The capitalists had no influence, no deciding voice in the constitution, and no means of exercising power in the State. Even when, in the critical days of the 1905 revolution, the autocracy showed itself much more adaptable than in 1917 and Witte, the Liberal bureaucrat who was coquetting with the middle class, was allowed for a short time to occupy the post of Prime Minister, the landowners only made an ostensible sacrifice of their power. The whole affair was but a tactical manœuvre on the part of the landowning class, who were forced by the pressure of the masses to gain a breathing space in order to gather up their forces and then to restore once more the shaken domination of their class. This they did by means of the Manifesto of October 17th without surrendering either the army or any other part of the State machine.

Absolutism was government by the aristocracy which ruled by means of a compromise with the middle class. The aim of the capitalists as a class was to reverse the relative strength of the partners within the ruling bloc. They wanted a middle class government ruling by means of compromise with the aristocracy, but nothing more.

The assumption of power by the capitalists was inconceivable for the capitalists without such a pact with the agrarians. The whole course of the development of Russian capitalism had prepared the way for such a coalition and had indissolubly merged these two exploiting classes into each other. In politics the capitalists were forced into the arms of the landowners by the fear of a proletarian revolution, a fear which had immensely increased in intensity by the beginning of 1917. The capitalists recognised in the street riots the beginning of the end. From the Tauride Palace their leaders watched with horror the movement in the streets of Petrograd. Hence they took all measures possible for the preservation of the monarchy as the most convenient form for setting up a ruling bloc of capitalists and aristocracy; the most convenient form for the exercise of power by the two exploiting classes.

The leading members of the Duma tried to persuade the Tsar and his Ministers to extinguish the flames of revolution by concessions. They asked for "the responsibility of the Cabinet," for an extension of the rights of "popular representation" (meaning the Duma), for an extension of the rights of the organs of local self-government, and so on. This process of persuasion was carried on from the platform of the Duma as well as behind the

scenes. The following words of Rodzi-anko are a pretty fair sample of their oratory; they were used by him in a report at an audience with the Tsar: "Under the unbearable pressure of hard times and the tortures of an oppressive administration, the nation might conceivably take the defence of its legal rights into its own hands. This must on no account be allowed to happen and must be hindered in all eventualities."

When it became obvious that Nicholas II. could no longer retain his throne, the hopes of the Duma party were transferred to the "Regent Michael." The unanimity of the Progressive bloc in defence of the monarchy was so organically sound that even the former differences between its Left and Right wings vanished. When, in view of the impossibility of saving the monarchy, the abdication of Michael also was approved by a majority of these "public-spirited men" so extreme a Left Radical as the Cadet Miliukov still defended the monarchy ("for a flock must have its shepherd") and demanded that Michael should accept the crown. Gutshkov was with Miliukov, and these two are the central figures in the first Provisional Government.

It is not difficult to understand from these facts that the "Republicanism" of the Russian capitalists, which originated in the spring of 1917 (the first declaration of the Cadets was made at their Conference in May), was of a doubtful nature. Their Republicanism was merely a signboard under the protection of which Gutshkov and Miliukov were able to go on working for the restoration of the monarchy.

The Provisional Government in its whole policy carefully observed the compact with the landowners and saw in the aspirations of the peasants to acquire the land of the big proprietors a fatal precedent for the workers in regard to capitalist private property.

Although in February Miliukov and Gutshkov had not succeeded in obtaining the desired form of government, the composition of the new government was beyond criticism in respect of its class aspect. It was a middle class government, ruling in alliance with the aristocracy.

Historical events, however, completely upset these calculations. Capitalist government when it appeared in Russia was already out of date, as the working class was by then the dominant force in society and had the manifest support of the lower middle class on many questions. The existence of the Provisional Government was consequently dependent on the tolerance, or rather on the lack of class consciousness and organisation, of the masses, as well as on their credulity. All things considered the hours of the Provisional Government



IN MOSCOW: a demonstration near the Kremlin in February, 1917.

were numbered. Even at the outset of the revolution a rival to the Provisional Government arose in the shape of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, which prevented the concentration of all power in the hands of the capitalists and created a peculiar situation of dual government.

The Provisional Government assured the Allies of its readiness to carry on the war to a decisive victory, but sent a wireless telegram abroad on March 16th telling of serious complications introduced into this question by Left political organisations, even though the Government had succeeded in coming to an agreement with the most influential of these organisations, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

Serious complications had indeed arisen from the fact that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, which had the actual power to assume governmental control, nevertheless allowed it to pass to a body whose very leaders declared its absolute impotence.

Miliukov for instance writes: "About that time, on March 12th, only its President could speak of the Duma as a factor in politics." Later, he says: "The Duma, whose name appeared in the forefront of the revolution, did not as an institution participate in the revolution, nay, was not capable of doing so." Such facts as these are naturally not set down on paper till years afterwards: at the time these gentlemen trumpeted forth that the Duma was a great factor in the revolution.

It is in any case a fact that the Duma was absolutely powerless. If its creature, the Provisional Government, was able to hold the reins of power, it was only because the leaders of the first Soviet of Workers' and Soldier's Deputies voluntarily assumed the role of servants, thus betraying the confidence of the masses which, in the first period of the revolution, could not but be theirs.

From the outset the leaders of the Soviet were Mensheviks, the only reason being that the Bolshevik organisations had suffered far more heavily during the war than the



WAITING FOR NEWS outside the Duma Buildings, on the first day of the February revolution, 1917.

Mensheviks from the persecution of the police. This can be seen as regards both the legal and illegal organisations. Whilst the Menshevik fraction in the Duma under the leadership of Tscheidze and Tseretelli was able to appear more in the public eye, the Bolshevik fraction had been in exile since 1914.*

The Mensheviks had in addition another lawful organisation, the workers' group of the War Industries' Committee. It was only after repeated faked elections that the Mensheviks were able to get into this group, after a meeting of the Petrograd Workers' Delegates had, in 1915, categorically refused to appoint representatives to an organisation which was hand-in-glove with Tsarism and the capitalists. The opportunist and anti-revolutionary nature of this group was unmistakable; in order to convey an idea of its functions before the revolution we quote the opinions of several representatives of the capitalists on the activities of the group.

V. Talin, a writer belonging to the Cadet Party, describes in his memoirs the atmosphere in which the activities of the workers' group were carried on: "They (the workers from the factories) came to the workers' group in such excitement and so noisily that the more experienced workers found it extremely difficult to discover the real nature of their demands or the causes of the strike. What was obvious was the fact that they were people worn out and indescribably tortured by unaccustomed heavy labour. They just laid down their tools although they had neither formulated grievances nor chosen leaders, and were without the rudiments of organisation. . . . They had no confidence in the small body of experienced workmen, on the contrary they hated them if only because they seemed to work more regularly and quietly as if they were in league with the employers. The fire of their rage was usually damped by persuasive words spoken to them on the premises of the workers' group and they would depart with confused minds, only to be fired once more by the speeches of the Bolshevik demagogues."

This enemy of Bolshevism, this Cadet, was forced in spite of his sympathy with the Mensheviks in the workers' group, to admit that the workers looked upon this group as an organisation run by the employers and that they were spontaneously drawn to Bolshevism.

The employers themselves afford the best evidence of the actual co-operation between the workers' group and themselves. For instance, there are the well-known so-called "Explanations" drawn up and submitted to the Government by the bureaucratic and industrial members of the War Industries' Committee. The document bears the signature of the Central Office of the War Industries' Committee and contains the following passage: "In so far as their political opinions are concerned, the members of the workers' group resemble most closely the so-called Mensheviks, *i.e.*, the more moderate elements in the Russian Labour movement. The activities of the workers' group, being open and above-board, do not in any way resemble the usual fighting tactics employed by the revolutionary parties to obtain their objects. The Central Office of the War Industries' Committee greatly values this participation of working class elements in its work. The normal political development of the country and the preservation of internal peace, so necessary for the carrying on of war against the foreign enemy, are certainly both placed in serious jeopardy by the absolute political isolation of the workers and their resolute abstention from any contact with the

* The Bolshevik fraction in the Duma consisted of Petrovski, Badayev, Muranov, Shagov and Samoilov. At the outbreak of the imperialist war they, together with the rest of the Bolshevik Party, remained loyal to the principles of revolutionary socialism; they were betrayed in November, 1914, by an *agent provocateur* and arrested while holding an illegal debate on a subject relating to the war. They were banished to Siberia.

so-called capitalist elements. For this reason the Central Office of the War Industries' Committee registers the gravest protest against the dissolution of the workers' group, which would grievously injure the cause of national defence and is bound to destroy the last shreds of belief among the workers in the advantages to themselves of participating in the social work of national defence."

Similar views concerning the workers' group were expressed at different times by the most eminent political leaders of the capitalists. Miliukov notes its moderation with great satisfaction. The Nationalist, Shulgin, later a member of the "Black Hundred," said: "The delegates to the workers' group are no underground agitators who create discord and confusion. All their strength is devoted to the cause of national defence and there are no sacrifices which they would not have made for the happiness of our country." Rodzianko pointed out that the group deserved the credit for keeping down disturbances among the workers in the ammunition factories. The arrest of this workers' group in February was yet another proof of Tsarism's suicidal policy of isolation.

Released from prison on March 12th the members of the workers' group tried to secure for themselves the leadership of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It was they who, in collaboration with the Menshevik deputies in the Duma, issued the appeal which called upon the workers to send delegates from the factories to the Tauride Palace.

It would however not be correct to take the first acts of the Soviet as being the exact realisation of the Menshevik political plans. True the Mensheviks tried to master it, but the elemental forces of revolution were constantly becoming less controlled by Menshevik



BARRICADE in the Liteinaya Pereulok, Petrograd, February, 1917.

guidance. Signs of divided leadership can be perceived in the first steps taken by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. On one side were the masses of workers and peasants who looked with instinctive distrust upon the Duma and its creation, the Provisional Government; conscious of their own superior power they gave a revolutionary imprint to the first acts of the Soviet and even gave to the Soviet half the nature of a genuine instrument of government. On the other side the "leaders" of these spontaneously revolutionary masses spared no pains to neutralise the Soviet and to turn it into a mere appendage of the middle class Provisional Government.



THERE CAME A DAY

The Petrograd County Court, stormed and burnt out in February, 1917.

One of the acts which sprang from the depths of the mass revolutionary movement was the issue of the famous Order No. 1, which roused a wave of implacable hatred against the Soviet among the ranks of the middle classes. The order was directed formally only to the garrison of the Petrograd defence area, but in actual fact it was taken as an instruction by the whole army. Order No. 1 discovered a sore point not only in the Tsarist regime but also in the whole Russian capitalist order. It struck at the fighting efficiency of the old imperial army. Direct attack was made on the corps of officers: "All available arms, such as rifles, machine-guns, armoured cars, etc. must be put at the disposal and under the control of the company and battalion committees, and must on no account be delivered to the

officers even at their command." Besides such an open expression of political distrust towards the officers the words about strictest military discipline in the same order could obviously only prove entirely unconvincing and ineffective.

The decisions of the Soviet regarding the basis for army reorganisation were far from being fully expressed in Order No. 1. The plenary sitting of March 14th not only appointed a Commission to work out the Order, but showed itself in favour of the election of all holding command in the army. These demands came from the masses themselves, and had of necessity to be expressed by the delegates of workers and soldiers at their first joint meeting.

The sole blame for the omission from Order No. 1 of this demand, which had been unanimously adopted by the plenary sitting, rests on the leaders who betrayed their social trust. Behind the backs of the rank and file these "leaders," in their negotiations with the Duma Committee, struck out the election of officers from among the conditions laid down by the Soviet as their terms for supporting the Provisional Government. A bourgeoisie determined to continue the war to a victorious end could not possibly agree to the election of the officers of the imperial army, and it was the strange guiding principle of the Mensheviks not to make a single move without the sanction of the bourgeoisie.

In spite of the modifications introduced by the leaders, Order No. 1 was the outcome of the direct resistance of the masses to the attempt of the Military Commission of the Duma Committee to disarm the soldiers; it bluntly opposed the order to the soldiers to return to their barracks which had been hurriedly issued on March 12th by the Provisional Government in the first hours of its existence; lastly it was a flat contradiction of Rodzianko's speech on March 13th. At the sittings of the Soviet acute dissatisfaction was manifested at the above act of the Provisional Government. Order No. 1 shows this very clearly, as for instance: "The commands of the Military Commission of the Duma Committee are only to be obeyed in so far as they do not contravene the orders and decisions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies."

Immediately after the issue of Order No. 1, Major Engelhardt, the Chairman of the Military Commission of the Duma, had to give the order not to deprive the soldiers of their arms.

Order No. 1 is a particularly interesting and characteristic example of the workings of the dual government which came into being in February. In many places the election of officers at once took place, although no mention had been made of it in the Order. As early as March 18th the issue of another Order (Order No. 2) in explanation of Order No. 1 was deemed necessary by the Executive Committee of the Soviet. Order No. 2 decrees the validity of elections of officers already held, but explains for future guidance that company, battalion and other unit committees should indeed be elected, but not the officers, though these committees are to have the right of vetoing the appointment of this or that officer.

The representatives of the Soviet submitted Order No. 2 to Gutshkov, the Minister for War, for signature but he refused to sign. Eventually Order No. 2 was cancelled before its publication, thus naturally implying the simultaneous annulment of Order No. 1. General Potapov gives the following description of the Soviet delegates' visit to Gutshkov on March 12th: "The meeting was very stormy. Gutshkov declared that the demands of the delegation were such as he could not agree to and left the room several times with the pronouncement that he would resign his office. After his departure, I took the chair and a

compromise was worked out: Gutshkov was then recalled and the result of the meeting was a proclamation signed by Skobelev for the Soviet delegates, by myself for the Duma Committee, and by Gutshkov for the Government. The proclamation cancelled Orders No. 1 and No. 2, but the Minister for War promised to introduce a more workable system in the army in the form of new regulations defining the relations between officers and men."

Messrs. Skobelev, Gvosdev, and Tscheidze could take part in stormy meetings, they could raise objections and even advance demands, but the representative of the capitalist Government had only to threaten resignation for the courage of the leaders of democracy to sink into their boots and for themselves to be reduced to speechlessness. Nothing more was required than for the capitalist Minister to gild the pill with a flimsy promise and the



THE RED FLAG AT THE FRONT.
Arrival of the first news of the revolution.

leaders of democracy were ready only five days after its publication to annul such an achievement of the masses as Order No. 1.

The proclamation making it known that Orders No. 1 and 2 were not valid for the army in the field or for any other forces outside the Petrograd defence area appeared in the Soviet's *communiqué* of the 21st March. Immediately afterwards the Provisional Government set to work to restore the authority of the anti-revolutionary corps of officers in the army and to regain control over the "fellows in the grey overcoats." "Do not take heed of those who sow discord," was the tenor of a proclamation issued to the people and the army on March 22nd by Gutshkov. "Disguised in the soldier's grey overcoat many German spies have crept into your midst and are bringing trouble and confusion into your ranks."

Thenceforth official sanction was given to the Government's fiction of the military overcoat as the disguise of German spies and it was bandied about by all the capitalist, yellow and counter-revolutionary Press.

In this connection an extract may well be given from the report of the Duma members, Janushkevitch and Filomenko, who made a tour of the front line. It is from a speech by Janushkevitch at a meeting of the Provisional Committee of the Duma on March 26th. It presents a vivid picture of the army's condition after the February revolution:

Janushkevitch: "On receiving the order to visit the front we were afraid that we should see many things which would make the blackest possible impression on us, that a depressing spectacle would greet us there. But at the very outset of our journey the very opposite impressions were evoked by what we saw as we drew nearer to the front. Scarcely had we left Petrograd than we found every station packed with people, including many soldiers, who had heard of our coming and wished to welcome us. Having left our compartment at every station to respond to our welcome, by the time we got to the firing line we were already hoarse. At Reshiza we were welcomed by a particularly lively ovation and we were asked to attend a meeting in the town. Troops were lined up, military bands played, and a great crowd was assembled. We were given an address of welcome, we made speeches and spent some time there. In the same town a meeting of the Soviet soldiers and officers was held in the cinema. Several unpleasant incidents occurred. The Commandant of the Sumsky Regiment and several others were killed. When they began to disarm the police and to proceed to a meeting, there appeared a special group of armed men whose behaviour gave promise of a disturbance. As no one knew why they had come, the Sumsky Regiment was ordered to proceed to the spot. Meanwhile the rumour had spread that this regiment was intended to suppress the movement. Threats to move up the heavy artillery unless the regiment made its intentions clear were uttered. The soldiers joined the movement but a misunderstanding arose with the officers owing to their expressions of severe disapproval of the soldiers and their red rosettes. In this mêlée the regimental commander was killed. Some said that he had shot himself. The various accounts were confused and the whole affair was very mysterious. The president of the zemstvo* was also arrested; he was a most unpopular man who had acquired an evil reputation in connection with the food supply and his arrest was a settlement of old scores.

"Many questions were discussed at the meeting of officers and soldiers, among them Gutshkov's order about polite methods of address in the army; this order was in our hands. Having indicated the importance of all these questions to the entire soldiery and having read out the order, we were overwhelmed with questions put by the soldiers about corporal punishment, saluting, etc. What was the attitude of the Provisional Government to these matters and what was being done about them? We replied that the Provisional Government would probably settle everything by means of suitable orders. Thunderous cheers greeted our reading of Gutshkov's order, but the soldiers asked why there was no mention of saluting. I must not omit to mention that the Town Commandant of Reshiza had already abolished saluting on his own initiative, declaring that it was not compulsory within the garrison command. We answered all these questions. The president of the nobility was also examined about the arrests but he was not allowed to speak; quiet was however restored when we called for order. We proposed that no arbitrary arrests should be permitted; such arrests would, we said, be taking justice into private hands; those arrested must be released.

* A rural district governing body.

"Arrived at the front, we joined the troops in the front firing line. Everywhere we were received ceremoniously and with music, and this made us feel very embarrassed. It appeared that a certain amount of disorganisation had resulted from Order No. 1, and a cloud of rumours accompanied it among the 'green' units, *i.e.*, those composed of peasants. No such phenomena had occurred among the other more revolutionary-minded regiments. In these there was a good working agreement between officers and men. We noticed one remarkable thing: although a Provisional Government is in existence, although the overthrow of the old regime is an accomplished fact, several of the superior officers behave with extraordinary tactlessness. Everywhere we heard complaints that red rosettes would soon get torn off again, and some declared further that they would not remove the Tsar's portrait. The soldiers come and see the portrait hanging on the wall and are filled with indignation. In some places we received definite information that the removal of the Tsar's portrait had been forbidden under threats of shooting. This lack of tact was creating an unbearable atmosphere. Elsewhere we were asked to take measures to remove the Tsar's portrait, as the troops were very excited and murder might be done. It must be admitted that the soldiers showed a certain restraint, they were awaiting developments and evidenced intense interest in all that was going on. Questions were put to us on the most varied subjects. We first had speeches of welcome and then we explained that all fundamental problems would be decided upon by the Constituent Assembly, the purpose of the Provisional Government being only to deal with certain specified questions. We were also approached by officers but we asked them to leave us. We talked with the men in every unit, complaints and petitions were brought to us, and we tried to make everything clear and to pacify the soldiers.

"Desires were also expressed about the courts martial. It was not disputed that strong measures were indispensable at the front, but there was a wish that rankers should also sit as members of the courts; in that case all sentences would be submitted to without a murmur. As matters stood courts martial were the sole business of the officers and no confidence could be placed in such tribunals. We were asked to make it possible for a representative of the units to be sent to Petrograd to obtain a clear idea of what was happening.

"The question of leave is a burning one. All leave had been stopped after the latest events and although passes had again been issued in some units, the soldiers in general were deeply stirred over this question. They distrusted their officers, although there were also detachments where the Commanders had the confidence of their men; many, indeed, must have become convinced that there could be no return to the old regime. From our conversations with individual soldiers, with several groups and with various representatives of the soldiers there emerged the fact that the Ministry of War would have to reckon, one way or



AT THE FRONT.

The Bolshevik slogan: "Peace, Bread, Liberty and Land" fell on fertile soil.

another, with the temper of the troops, with their distrust of their commanders. Not only the soldiers but also the officers said to us: 'We have no confidence in these people, we are afraid to go into an attack with them, they would let us down.' Some do everything they can, as if intentionally, to provoke the soldiers against themselves. We visited almost all the divisions of the First Army, talked with the soldiers of each unit for one or two hours, and although we got very hoarse, we to some extent pacified the greater number, for which we may take credit. Our round began at 8 a.m. and ended at 1 a.m. the next morning. The general feeling is not so bad, only some old soldiers begged to be allowed to return to their families. On the whole there is a fighting spirit; this impressed us favourably as we had expected the opposite. There is discipline but it must be organised on new lines. At some meetings we also spoke to the officers, some of whom have a good understanding of their present task. Others will not realise that an epoch-making break has taken place, and that they too must change their conduct accordingly. These latter feel deeply outraged and indignant at the Orders, particularly at Gutshkov's Order about polite forms of address. They assert that such orders destroy the spirit of an army and are the inventions of armchair soldiers who are absolutely out of touch with the army. We held a meeting at which we decided that such an attitude was anti-revolutionary and opposed to the established fact of the overthrow. Prominent among the speakers were 'green' officers, second-lieutenants and, if I may use the expression, greenhorns. One so far forgot himself as to say: 'You are a civilian and have no understanding of the spirit of the army.' When we stated definitely that these measures were necessary if everything were not to go to pieces, they were convinced and stated that, as disciplined men, they were willing to render blind obedience if the orders came, as they should prefer it, from a central authority, but they could not have orders issued from another unqualified source, since in that case the highest commands must inevitably lose their authority, so that the soldiers could not be led to the attack. We explained to the soldiers that there was now a new government which would carry out all useful measures, but since the whole framework still remained unaltered, ordinary duties should be performed as usual. They would therefore continue to receive instructions from their commanders. A further point to be noted is the exaggerated expectations cherished by both officers and men about events behind the lines. They said that the food ought to be improved, everyone was tired of the lentils, and relief was expected from behind the lines. If none came it was said that something was wrong behind the lines. The soldiers blamed everything on their commanders, and it took us a great deal of trouble to make them understand that great deficiencies were the fault of the old regime and not of any individual commander.

"General conclusions. Feeling is not pessimistic, discipline still prevails, but the soldiers are still waiting for something. They implored us, for Heaven's sake, to come, or to send someone to remove all misunderstandings; not only the soldiers but the officers also begged us to visit their units. Some units refused to take the new oath to the colours, and when we asked the reason they said: 'When our officers are administering the oath we don't know whether it isn't perhaps the oath to the old regime.' We said, 'No, it is to the new Government, you can believe us.' Then again, 'Why must we give our signatures?' The question of the signature is very important. 'We did not have to sign in the old days.' We explained: 'Now you are citizens of the State, and every enlightened citizen must sign a declaration that he is ready to serve.' Many similar questions were put to us. The request came from some units that we should get into touch with some authority with a view to purifying the corps of officers. Among these petitioners there were also citizens who said: 'We no longer trust

our commanders; they have made themselves so hated amongst the soldiers by their past conduct that the soldiers no longer believe them now after the revolution. But this means disorganisation and also the likelihood of excesses.'

"We cannot guarantee that the troops, led by such commanders, will go confidently into battle. We noticed that where the officers had tried to make the revolution comprehensible to the soldiers their previous sins would be forgiven them. Such officers at once gained credit in the eyes of the masses; special mistrust was occasioned when there was silence, when no meeting was arranged, no explanation or account given of what had happened. In such formations there was endless mistrust. The soldiers' old mistrust of their officers has somehow weakened, but the new mistrust, risen since the revolution, is terrible. In the formations where there have been meetings in which recent events were discussed in a manner to give confidence, confidence was at once engendered even amongst those troops where formerly there was none. Such troops would go through fire and water.

"The participation or non-participation in the elections for the Constituent Assembly is a very serious question for the soldiers. 'No one can make decisions for us.' We were asked: 'Will the soldiers be able to take part?' We replied on our own responsibility: 'You will, of course, be able to express your opinion in some form or other.' They also wanted to know whether there was going to be a republic or a monarchy. We said that this question would be solved by the Constituent Assembly. I must say frankly that so far as I could judge the prevalent opinion is republican. They also asked whether Nicolai Romanov and his whole family had been imprisoned. When we answered 'Yes,' they cheered, lifted us on to their shoulders, and so forth. Special attention must be drawn to the fact that several commanders behaved very tactfully. As the revolution, the abdication, etc. took place they (unofficially) removed all pictures of the Tsar, whereas in other units they allowed them to hang in full view. When the soldiers demanded the removal of these pictures the commanders refused, not because they thought that they ought to remain hanging for the sake of the old regime, but because in their view discipline could not allow that soldiers should demand and officers obey. A situation was thus created which threatened to bring about serious consequences. Some soldiers said quite frankly to us: 'Our commander is this, that and the other; we shall kill him; everything is already arranged.' To such as this we said: 'Be calm, don't do anything foolish. The Provisional Government will solve these problems; it will take measures to give you the officers you require. But there must not be any talk of your taking matters into your own hands. Strict justice must be maintained.'

"The soldiers were also interested in the right to make complaints. 'Formerly, it was wretched; they ill-treated us, and when we complained to the authorities they didn't take any notice. What will happen now? Are we once more to complain to the authorities? But if the magistrates are the same as before, how are we to make those who now rule us hear, those who have power and look after our interests?' It was hard to answer this question.

"We talked with many officers and also with the higher commanders. Many were absolutely at sea about the situation and asked us why the army hadn't been consulted before the revolution was made? We replied that it had just happened so. They themselves, on waking up one day, wouldn't have recognised Petrograd. These officers can't imagine how everything has happened; they are unhappy because they weren't consulted beforehand, because everything has been done in a hurry by civilians, whom they think of little account. Sometimes such officers refuse to do anything, even to carry out the orders

which come through. Then the soldiers say: 'Here is an enemy of the new regime.' A divisional commander gave vent to some remarks which gave me the impression that if he were not an enemy of the new regime, at all events he was very sceptical about it. It was lucky that our conversation was interrupted, otherwise I should have had to have him arrested. Amongst other things he said: 'I have thrashed this rabble in spite of everything, and shall go on thrashing them in spite of everything. If anyone grumbles he will have fifty strokes counted out.' A soldiers' meeting had taken place just beforehand and I noticed that the men did not disperse at the end of it. I enquired the reason for this and was told: 'Well, just because we're not going to disperse.' Later on they told me they thought the General might arrest me, as he was an adherent of the old regime. 'Yesterday he threatened to shoot because the Tsar's portrait had been taken away. A squadron of Cossacks was standing ready, we should just have...'

"In one division of the army where we came to speak, the unpopular General said to the soldiers: 'Leave your rifles behind.' This order roused much misgiving and each man came to the meeting with his rifle. Later they asked us: 'Why without rifles?' We said they would be more at their ease without rifles, and they were appeased. Even though everything is quiet at the moment it is quite possible that unless measures are taken many undesirable things may happen. The officers in particular understand very imperfectly what has occurred. They do not appreciate the nature of the event; they believe that the whole army is destroyed, that its spirit is annihilated, and that the foundations on which it was built have disappeared."

So runs the report of the delegate, Janushkevitch.

The people who had placed themselves at the heads of the Soviets in the first days of revolution were unable to lead it further. On the contrary, they put the brake on its natural course. How little the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries understood what was passing can be seen from the fact that on the 10th March, Skobelev (Menshevik) and Kerensky (Trudovik), with the approval of the liberal deputies, still advocated the policy of the Cadets about responsible government, and in doing so made known that they had not yet abandoned the premise of constitutional monarchic demands.

When these miserable leaders worked out terms of agreement with the Provisional Government did they include in these terms the demand for the proclamation of a democratic republic or indeed for any republic? By no means. This demand was omitted. The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries compromised with the most blatant monarchists and were careful to make no demands which might separate them from these monarchists.

Something even better was to come. When the attempts of the Provisional Government to maintain the monarchy and the dynasty produced irritation and indignation among the masses, when the plenary session of the Soviets in considering this burning question (even more burning a question than the relationship between officers and men, since the question of the form of government affected the interests of the entire population) decided to forbid the Provisional Government to take any action which should predetermine the future form of government—what did leaders like Skobelev and Tscheidze do? When they heard from the representatives of the Duma Committee that it was definitely decided to retain the monarchy and to force an abdication in favour of Alexei, Messrs. Skobelev and Tscheidze erased from the Soviet decisions the one point which would not be pleasing to the gentlemen of the Duma! In so doing they gave the monarchists a free hand, in fact, they even opened up to them the prospect of the Soviets' support.

Here again the leaders of the masses swindled them. They betrayed their interests in intimate discussions and negotiations with the capitalist representatives and acted against the instructions given by the Soviets. This was the manner of the inner working of the dual government. The contradictions were so glaring that it was only in the first days of the intoxication of victory that the workers and soldiers could be reconciled to them.

Obviously the domination of the Soviets by the Mensheviks, and later also the Social Revolutionaries, would not have been possible had not the lower middle class and even the workers been imbued, during the first months of the revolution, with the illusions of jingo patriotism. This is shown by the popularity among the workers of the proclamation issued on March 27th by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It was addressed to "All the Peoples of the World" and ran as follows:

"Comrades, Proletarians, Workers of all Lands!

"The Russian Workers and Soldiers united in the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies send you a fiery greeting and inform you of events of the first importance.

"Russian Democracy has thrown the ancient tyranny of the Tsars into the dust and comes among you as an equal and as a menacing force in the fight for our common liberation. Our victory is a great victory for world freedom and world democracy. The chief support of reaction, the 'Gendarme of Europe,' is no more. May the earth lie heavy as granite on his grave. Long live freedom! Long live the international solidarity of the Proletariat and its fight for complete victory!

"Our work is not yet finished. The shadow of the old regime is not yet dispelled. Many enemies are rallying their forces against the Russian revolution. But still our achievements are extraordinarily great. The people of Russia will express their will through a Constituent Assembly which will very shortly meet elected by universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage. Already it can be positively asserted that the democratic republic is triumphing in Russia. The Russian people have full political freedom, they can now have the deciding voice in the internal self-determination of the country and in its foreign policy. In that we speak to all the nations ruined and decimated by this terrible war, we declare that the time has come for a decisive battle against the rapacious appetites of the governments of all countries; that the time has come for the nations to take the questions of war and peace into their own hands.

"Conscious of their revolutionary strength, the Russian Democracy declares that it will struggle with all its might against the rapacious policy of its own ruling class, and it summons the nations of Europe to take joint and determined action in the cause of freedom.

"We address ourselves to our proletarian brothers in the German-Austrian alliance and especially do we address ourselves to the German proletariat. From the first day of the war till now they have tried to make you believe that when you took up arms against Russia you were defending European culture against Russian despotism. Many of you see in this your justification for the support you have given to the war. Even this justification no longer exists: democratic Russia can no longer threaten freedom or civilisation.

"We shall know how to defend our liberty against all reactionary interference from outside and from inside. The Russian revolution will not yield before the bayonets of the conquerors, nor let itself be crushed by any military force.

"We challenge you to overthrow your semi-autocratic government as the Russian people have thrown off the tyranny of their Tsars. Refuse to serve as the instruments of robbery

and violence in the hands of kings, landowners and bankers, and with united forces we will put an end to the terrible massacre that violates humanity and darkens the great day of the birth of Russian freedom.

"Workers of all lands! We hold out our brotherly hand to you over a mountain of our brothers' corpses, over a river of innocent blood and tears, over the smoking ruins of towns and villages, over the destroyed treasures of civilisation, and we call upon you to restore and fortify international unity, for therein lies the pledge of future victory and the complete liberation of mankind.

"Workers of the world, unite!

Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies."

All these meanderings appeared to the masses at the time as extremely revolutionary, for as yet they had no idea of *how* "an end of the terrible massacre" could or should be made. The downfall of autocracy was interpreted as a visible "refusal" of the people any longer "to serve imperialist ends." The fact that the capitalists had stepped into the shoes of Tsarism with the firm intention not only of carrying on the armed struggle for the old imperialist aims but even of intensifying it, had not yet penetrated into the consciousness of the trustfully happy masses who were being cheated by the capitalists and their Social Democratic accomplices. Therefore the idea of a second revolution to overthrow the capitalist regime and to snatch power from the bourgeoisie had not yet taken firm root, although in the first days of February the masses already felt a spontaneous distrust of the capitalists. It was not till several months afterwards that this distrust ripened into a class-conscious movement.

The masses took no account of the fact that the freedom which had come to them also meant a surrender of power to the capitalists. Therefore they accepted the summons of the Council "to defend the revolution against the bayonets of the conquerors" as genuine. Some time elapsed before the masses understood that behind the slogan "Defence of the Revolution" there was concealed an attempt to restore life to the old annexationist policy of the Russian imperialists.

The Russian people, who had not yet overcome the capitalists and who had not yet made sure of the anti-imperialist policy of their own country, addressed themselves "to the nations of the world," as the proclamation of the Soviet runs, and called upon the other nations not to overthrow capitalism but only to overthrow the "semi-autocratic" regime: all this again offering no security to the other nations against the waging of imperialist wars.

It is true that even this inconsistent summons was of revolutionary importance for foreign countries, since it was the first call to fight against war and was issued in the name of the first revolution to occur during the war.

Naturally its revolutionary importance cannot compare with the revolutionary influence of the later "Decree of Peace," just as generally the February revolution could not in any way attain to the international importance of the October revolution which followed it.

Only the Bolshevik Party stayed the course until the completion of this second proletarian revolution; only they represented accurately and consistently the interests of the working class and of the masses of the peasantry. Nevertheless the Bolshevik Party, which became extremely active at the outbreak of the revolution, was numerically weak as a result of its illegality and the police persecution from which it had suffered. Shelavin gives the following figures in his book "The Working Classes and the R.C.P. (Bolsheviks) in the

February Revolution": At the end of 1916 the following were organised in the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks): in Petrograd 1,500 to 2,000 Party members among 450,000 workers; in Moscow 300 to 500 Party members, in the Moscow province 60 to 80 amongst 400,000 workers; in Ivano-Vosnesensk 150 to 160 among 50,000 workers; in Nijni-Novgorod 150 to 200; in Samara 80 to 100; in Saratov 70 to 80; in Kharkov 120; in Kiev 200; in Ekaterinslav 400; in Lugansk 100; in Makayevka 80 to 100; in the Urals 900; in Irkutsk 1,000; in Krasnojarsk 50 to 60.

Until the February revolution the Bolsheviks designated the imminent revolution as a capitalist one. In opposition to the Mensheviks they did not regard the transference of power to the capitalists as the only possible outcome of the capitalist revolution in Russia. Admitting the possibility of this outcome they also thought that a result more favourable to the proletariat was a possibility: the acquisition of power by the proletariat and the peasantry during the course of the capitalist revolution. Hence the Bolsheviks fought for this second result, for the "revolutionary democratic dictatorship" which should open up a freer way for the development of the socialist movement and prepare the way for the transformation of the capitalist revolution into a socialist one. The February revolution was a capitalist revolution. The Bolsheviks did not succeed in influencing events in February in such a way that power should at once fall to the workers and peasants. Simultaneously a peculiar situation arose: side by side with the Provisional Government there emerged, as yet in an immature form, a second government in the form of the Workers' and Peasants' Soviets (the soldiers were mostly peasants). This second rudimentary "government" was indeed far from being a socialist one; it was rather a bourgeois-democratic one and it voluntarily surrendered power to the capitalists.

This resignation of power was in accord with the dogmatic opportunist theory of the Mensheviks, according to which the capitalists possessed an unquestionable claim to power in the capitalist revolution. This hindered the Mensheviks not only from being socialists, but also from being consistent democrats. It bound them to the chariot of the Provisional Government and forced upon them their treason to the cause of the proletariat even when there was no question of socialism but merely the advocacy of purely democratic demands. In February the Mensheviks proved themselves incapable even of fighting honestly and consistently for the republic: on March 10th their leader in the Duma only stipulated for a "responsible government." In the terms put before the Provisional Government, the demand for the proclamation of a republic was missing: thus the efforts of the monarchists to preserve the dynasty were legalised by the Soviet. All decisive reforms were deferred to the Constituent Assembly. The terms contained no word about the confiscation of the land for the peasants, no mention of the eight-hour working day. Thus did the Mensheviks in February betray all the essentially democratic demands which were written in the program of the R.S.D.L.P.

It was the Bolsheviks alone who fought for a consistent democratic program during the February days. Their "Manifesto" of the 12th March ran as follows:

"Workers of all lands, unite!

"To all citizens of Russia!

"Fellow citizens! The bulwarks of Russian Tsarism have fallen. The wealth of the Tsarist gang, founded on the blood of the people, has collapsed. The capital is in the

* Published in Russian by Priboi, Leningrad, 1927.

hands of the rebellious people; revolutionary divisions of the army place themselves on the side of the rebels. The revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary army must rescue the country from the ruin and breakdown prepared by the Tsarist Government.

"By prodigious efforts, by the sacrifice of their blood and their lives, the Russian people have thrown off their ancient yoke.

"The task of the workers and of the revolutionary army is to create a provisional revolutionary government which will place in the forefront of its program a comprehensive republican order.

"The provisional revolutionary government must enact provisional laws which shall protect all the rights and liberties of the people, which shall confiscate and transfer to the people all the estates of the monasteries, the landowners and the Tsar, introduce the eight-hour day and summon a Constituent Assembly elected by universal, secret, direct and equal suffrage.

"The provisional government must immediately undertake the task of supplying provisions to the people and the army, and to this end it must confiscate the stores collected by the former government and the municipalities.

"The hydra of reaction can still raise its heads. The task of the people and their revolutionary government is to crush all counter-revolutionary machinations inimical to the people.

"The provisional government must at once join with the proletariat of the belligerent countries to further the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the people of all lands against their oppressors, against the Tsarist governments and capitalist cliques, and in order that the bloody human carnage forced upon the enslaved peoples may be suspended at once.

"The workers in the factories and workshops and also the insurrectionary troops must immediately elect their representatives in the provisional revolutionary government which will be formed under the protection of the revolutionary people and the revolutionary army.

"Fellow citizens! Soldiers! Wives and Mothers! All to the fight! To the open fight against the might of Tsardom and its abettors!

"The red banner of revolt is raised all over Russia. In all Russia take up the cause of liberty, overthrow the servants of the Tsar, call the soldiers to the fight!

"Workers all over Russia, in town and village, forward to set up a government of the revolutionary people!

"Fellow citizens! By fraternal, determined effort we will make fast upon the ruins of arbitrary government an order rooted in freedom.

"Forward! There is no retreat! Fight without quarter!

"Forward! under the red banner of the revolution!

"Long live the democratic republic!

"Long live the revolutionary working class!

"Long live the revolutionary people and the rebellious army!

*Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Labour
Party of Russia (Bolsheviks). 12 March, 1917."*

The formation of the Provisional Government through the Soviet and not through the Duma and the realisation of the main demands of the Social-Democratic program by means of this Government—this is the essence of the internal political program presented here. This is the basis of a program of the "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of prole-

ariat and peasantry." The Central Committee of the Bolsheviks immediately responded to the monarchist intrigues by a call to "pitiless battle" against such tendencies.

However, the events of February rapidly outpaced this consistent democratic program of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry which the Bolsheviks had fought for since 1905. The situation already required farther-reaching slogans.

Under the guidance of Lenin, who arrived in Petrograd from Switzerland on April 3rd (new style April 16th), the Party found the policy required by the new conditions. This was the policy of immediately transforming the democratic revolution into a socialist one.

Lenin's arrival in Petrograd, which was of decisive importance for the revolution and for the Party, is graphically described by F. Raskolnikov:

"Do you know that Lenin arrives in Petrograd this evening?" said Leonid Nikolaievitch Stark to me on the 3rd April, 1917.

"Immediately I rang up L. W. W. Kamenev. The news turned out to be true and at the appointed time we went to the Finnish Station with Kamenev, Madame Kamenev and comrade Teodorovitch. There, as usual, was a noisy crowd.

"On the way Kamenev spoke of Lenin and laughed about the reception which the Petrograd workers would prepare for him. 'One must know Lenin, he hates all festivity.' The time passed rapidly in lively conversation, and the lights of the frontier station, Belostrov, were soon seen shining in the twilight. A good many people had come into the station restaurant, amongst others Maria Ulianova, Lenin's sister, Alexander Shliapnikov, Alexandra Kollontai, all in all about twenty responsible Party workers. All were in an excited, elevated mood. For most of them Lenin's arrival came quite as a surprise. Since we knew what unheard-of difficulties would be placed by the Entente Governments in the way of the return to Russia of the exiled "extremists" we were much alarmed about the fate of our leader, and although we realised daily the acute and urgent need for his return, we were reconciled to the idea that we were hardly likely to see him amongst us very soon. The ingenious idea of a journey through Germany had not occurred to us, we had become too accustomed to the thought of the impenetrable barriers which the war had erected between the hostile States. And suddenly it appeared that a real possibility had been offered to our comrades to return to revolutionary Russia where they were so much needed and where their places stood empty.

"However, not all Party comrades were sympathetic towards the idea of a journey through Germany. Voices were heard on this day which condemned the decision for



ZURICH

The house in which Lenin lived during his exile in Zurich.

tactical reasons—these comrades foresaw the monstrous campaign of lies which was soon to be actually launched against our Party.

“All the same, if our enemies had not had this incident they would certainly have found plenty of others.

“Lenin’s decision at any price to return to Russia as soon as possible was doubtless right and corresponded with the feeling of the majority of the Party, who sorely missed their appointed leader. The difficult situation which had arisen through the unfinished and still developing revolution required an unflinching, firm and consistent line of action, and of this our Party unfortunately could not boast at the moment.

“The first signal rang to announce the arrival of the train. We all went on to the platform. . . . Here the workers from the Sestroretzker munition factory were impatiently waiting, talking excitedly and holding up a large red flag. They had come several versts on foot to greet their leader. At last the train came in. First the blinding glare of the three headlights on the engine, next the lighted windows of the passenger carriages as the train slowed down. The train stopped, and at once we recognised Lenin’s form in the midst of the throng of workers. The people from Sestroretzker lifted him on their shoulders and carried him into the station waiting room. Here all the comrades out of Petrograd pressed towards him one after the other and congratulated him heartily on his return to Russia. All of us, who saw Lenin for the first time, embraced and kissed him just like his old Party friends and relations, as if we had known him for a long time. He was serenely happy, the smile did not leave his face for a moment. One could see that this return to his country in the throes of revolution caused him inexpressible joy. We had hardly had time to greet him when the excited Kamenev, quite upset by the joy of meeting him again, came into the waiting room leading the equally excited comrade Zinoviev by the hand. Kamenev introduced us to the latter and after vigorous handshaking we all surrounded Lenin and went with him to his carriage.

“Hardly had Lenin entered his compartment and sat down than he hurled himself on comrade Kamenev.

“‘What sort of rubbish is this in your “Pravda”? We saw several numbers and abused you roundly,’ boomed the fatherly, censoring voice of Lenin, which could never cause offence. Next the comrades from Sestroretzker begged comrade Lenin to say a few words, but he was absorbed in conversation with Kamenev. There was so much for both to tell each other and to talk over.

“‘Shall Zinoviev speak? You must invite him to, comrades,’ said Lenin, and went on with his political analysis with Kamenev.

“Zinoviev went on to the platform and delivered a short, impassioned speech, the first he had made on the revolutionary soil of Russia. He was joyfully disposed and told how the Swiss Socialist, Platten, had arranged their journey, how they had come through Germany and how the German Social-Democrats had tried to get into communication with Lenin but had been categorically refused.

“‘We travelled in a prison; we prepared for immediate arrest on crossing the frontier,’ he said, and went on to describe his impressions of the journey.

“The train soon arrived at Petrograd. Our carriage was already in the station. Along the platform were ranged the sailors of the 2nd Baltic Naval Division, but a wide passage was left clear in the middle of the platform. The commander of the sailors’ detachment, Maximov, a young naval cadet who was energetically ‘making a revolutionary career for

himself,' stepped forward, barred comrade Lenin's way and delivered an address of welcome which he concluded with the strange wish that Lenin might enter the Provisional Government. At this we could not help smiling. 'Well,' thought I, 'Lenin will soon make such an entry into the Provisional Government for you that you will be struck deaf and dumb; only wait.' When on the following day Lenin openly explained his program, this Maximov, a malapert and a child politically, published a letter in the capitalist press in which he excused himself for having taken part in Lenin's reception and actually on the ground that he had known nothing of the journey through Germany.

"The ordinary sailors had no cause for repentance. Already then they saw in Lenin their appointed leader.

"In response to the wish that he should enter the Provisional Government, comrade Lenin hurled at the crowd the slogan of the fight: 'Long live the socialist revolution!'

"There were a lot of people at the station, mainly workers. Comrade Lenin went to the State Room of the Finnish station where he was greeted by the representatives of the Petrograd Soviet. He answered briefly and again ended with the cry 'Long live the social revolution!'

"Finally he gave the same slogan to the crowded thousands who had assembled on the Station Square to meet the old leader of the Russian working class.

"Lenin delivered his speech here standing on an armoured car. A whole squadron of armoured cars had come to the Finnish station. The bright beams from their lamps cut through the evening darkness and threw long quivering streams of light along the streets of the Vyborg quarter. Lenin then entered the palace that formerly belonged to the dancer, Kschesinskaya, but which, since the revolution had become the citadel of our Party. Before it stood a huge multitude which listened attentively to a passionate speech delivered by Lenin from the balcony on the second floor. He spoke of the development and perspective of the world revolution.

"Many Party members were assembled in the house and amongst them one met members of the Petrograd organisation, and various responsible comrades arrived from the provinces. Lively conversations were being carried on in every corner of the spacious room. Soon Lenin was again called out, for the Kronstadt comrades had come to greet him. Comrade Roshall, who had been in Kronstadt on that day, had assembled all the comrades who wished to greet Lenin and had brought them over the ice to Petrograd. The thaw which had set in was the cause of their involuntary delay.

"Lenin made a short speech. The slogan of the socialist revolution came to the Kronstadters from his very heart and was received with enthusiastic cheers and a storm of applause.

"Everyone then returned to the room, where more happy scenes of reunion continually took place between old friends parted through prison and exile and now once more brought together. The veterans of the revolution and of Bolshevism learnt to know the new generation of Party workers who had grown up in the epoch of 'Zvesda' and 'Pravda.' I recall how the late Arcadi Alexandrovitch Samuilov walked up to comrade Zinoviev, gave his name and made himself known as a contributor to the pre-revolution 'Pravda' under the pseudonym of Juriev.

"Zinoviev shook him heartily by the hand. Soon all present went downstairs to a large room, which had been used as a drawing room by the dancer Kschesinskaya and which now served as a place for meetings of workers. Here the celebration of Lenin's return took place.



"LONG LIVE THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOCIALIST REPUBLIC."

Mass demonstration in front of the Tauride Palace (State Duma) in Petrograd, March, 1917, with this slogan.

One after the other the speakers got up and expressed their deep joy at the return to Russia of the tried leader of the Party.

"Lenin sat listening to the speeches with a half-smile, waiting impatiently for them to end. When the list of speakers was exhausted, Lenin at once came to himself, stood up and immediately came to the point. He severely attacked the tactics which had been employed by the leading groups of the Party and by individual comrades. He bitingly derided the notorious formula 'to support the Provisional Government in so far as . . . ' and formulated the policy 'No support at all for the Provisional Government.' He called upon the Party to fight for the surrender of power to the Soviets, for the social revolution.

"Citing some obvious instances, Lenin demonstrated brilliantly the absolute falsity of the policy of the Provisional Government, the shrieking contradictions between its promises and actions, words and facts; he emphasised our duty as being that of relentlessly unmasking the tendencies and acts of this essentially anti-revolutionary and anti-democratic Government. His speech lasted about an hour. The listeners grew stiff in their intense unfaltering attention. Those present were the responsible leaders of the Party, yet even for them Lenin's speech came as a real revelation. It set an indelible line of division between the tactics of yesterday and the tactics of to-day.

"Lenin clearly and distinctly brought up the question 'What is to be done?' He demanded that we should turn from semi-recognition and semi-support of the Government to open non-recognition and merciless hostility.

"He transposed to the sphere of practical and immediate achievement the victory of the power of the Soviets, which in the eyes of many hovered in the hazy distance of a more or less indefinite future.

"This speech was in the truest sense of the word an historical act. In it Lenin for the first time explained his political program, afterwards formulated in his world-renowned thesis. This speech accomplished an October revolution in the consciousness of the leaders of the Party and laid the foundations of all the subsequent work of the Bolsheviks.

"When Lenin had finished his speech, which left an indelible impression on everyone present, he received a long and loud ovation. Kamenev summarised the general feeling in a few words:

" 'We can agree or disagree with the opinions of comrade Lenin; we can differ from him in his judgment of one situation or another; but in any case, the highly-gifted and acknowledged leader of our Party has returned to Russia in the person of comrade Lenin, with whom we shall go forward towards socialism.' "


"Kamenev found a comprehensive formula and one which was acceptable to those still vacillating and unable to find their way in the current of new ideas. Those present identified themselves with what he had said by loud applause. At any rate, in spite of this or that difference of opinion, the unity of the Party was preserved under the guidance of its clear-sighted leader through victories and unavoidable defeats to final victory in the heroic struggle for power of the workers and peasants."

In his so-called April thesis (laid before a Party meeting on April 5th) Lenin clearly and distinctly formulated the problem of the transition of the revolution into "its second stage, in which power is to be placed in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest of the peasants." The form of this power is the Soviets. The problem: no immediate "introduction" of socialism, but rather transition steps towards it, and next the solution of the democratic problems which remained unsolved in February (above all the confiscation of estates and their transference to the peasants). Moreover the Soviet Power was to lead the country out of the fiery orbit of the imperialist war by revolutionary means and must destroy all community of interest with capitalism.

The Bolshevik Party concentrated all its efforts on the "patient, systematic, tenacious clearing-up of the errors of the masses" (accommodating itself to the practical needs of the masses), on the ideological conflict, on the propagation of the sole correct, Bolshevik program of action.

Lenin's April thesis took account of the nature of the whole dynamics of the developing revolution. For this reason his theory worked out in practice in a way never known before in history, worked out to the triumphant first proletarian victory, to the first proletarian dictatorship known in the world, which began to build up socialism.

We give here two works of Lenin's on the February revolution and the problem of the proletariat: "The First Stage of the First Revolution," out of "Letters from Afar," written under the impressions made on him in Switzerland by the first news of the February revolution and published on March 21-22, 1917 in "Pravda"; and the afore-mentioned April thesis on "The Task of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," published in "Pravda" on April 7th, 1917. Following these we give N. Bukharin's "Analysis of the February Revolution."



A MEETING OF OFFICERS during the period of political compromise, 1917. The banner reads "Officer and soldier are one."

Fourteen—THE FIRST STAGE OF THE FIRST REVOLUTION

A "Letter from Afar" by N. Lenin

THE first revolution, the product of the imperialist world-war, has broken out. This first revolution will certainly not be the last. The first stage of this first revolution, namely the Russian revolution of 1st March, 1917, is over, according to the scanty news with which the writer of these lines in Switzerland is provided. This first stage will certainly not be the last stage in our revolution.

"How can this miracle have come to pass, that in scarcely eight days—a space of time to which Miliukov calls special attention in his ostentatious telegram to all Russia's representatives in foreign countries—the monarchy got out of joint, the monarchy which had held out for centuries and which also held its ground against all attacks in the three years of the sharpest struggle of classes, that is from 1905 to 1907?

"There are no miracles in nature or in history, only sudden turns of the wheel of history. Every revolution furnishes such a wealth of meaning, displays such unexpected peculiar combinations of forms of conflict and of division of strength amongst those fighting, that to the uninformed much must appear as a miracle.

"A combination of a whole series of conditions was necessary to bring about the collapse of the Tsarist monarchy in a few days. We will name the most important of them.

"Without the three years of most intense class conflict and without the revolutionary energy displayed by the Russian proletariat in the years 1905 to 1907 such a rapid—rapid in the sense of the completion of its first steps in a few days—second revolution would have been impossible. The first (1905) had forcefully loosened the ground, had cleared away century-old prejudices, had awakened millions of workers and millions of peasants to political conflict, had shown to themselves and to the whole world entire classes (and all important parties) of Russian society in their true colours, in the true reciprocal relations of their interests, their powers, their methods of working, their immediate and ultimate destinations. The first revolution and the subsequent anti-revolutionary period (1907 to 1914) revealed the whole nature of the Tsarist monarchy, carried it to its ultimate limits and disclosed its complete rottenness and baseness. It revealed the whole cynicism and depravity of the Tsarist gang with the monstrous Rasputin at its head, the whole brutality of the Romanov family—these pogrom heroes who have drowned Russia in the blood of the Jews, the workers and the revolutionaries—these 'first among equal' landowners, who possess millions of dessiatines of land and who are prepared to commit any brutality, any excesses, any crimes, any plundering and the strangulation of any number of citizens only in order to preserve their own and their class's 'holy private property.'

"Without the revolution of 1905 to 1907, without the counter-revolution of 1907 to 1914, such an exact 'self-determination' of all classes of the Russian nation and of the people inhabiting Russia would have been impossible, the determination of the reciprocal relation of these classes to one another and to the Tsarist monarchy witnessed in the eight days of the February-March revolution of 1917. This eight-day revolution was, to use a figurative expression, 'played' as if after ten dress and ordinary rehearsals; the 'actors' knew one an-

other, knew their roles, their places, their milieu through and through, from top to bottom, to the last but still important shade of political direction and methods of acting.

"But if the first great revolution of 1905, which was condemned by Messrs. Gutshkov and Miliukov and their followers as the 'great riot,' led after twelve years to the 'splendid' glorious revolution of the year 1917, which Gutshkov and Miliukov praised as 'glorious' because it (in the meantime) had given them power, so did it need a great, all-powerful 'stage-manager' who was able on the one hand in great measure to accelerate the course of world history and on the other hand to produce world crises of unheard-of force—economic, political, national and international crises. Besides the unusual acceleration of world history, sudden turnings of the wheel of history were particularly necessary in order that in one of these turns the chariot of the blood-stained and mire-bespattered Romanov monarchy might be tilted over at one blow.

"This all-powerful 'stage-manager,' this mighty accelerator, was the imperialist world war.

"Now there is no doubt about it that the war is a world war, for the United States and China are to-day already half involved and to-morrow will be completely involved in it.

"It is now indubitable that the war is imperialist on both sides. Only the capitalists and their train-bearers, the socialist-patriots and socialist-jingoes, can deny or suppress the fact that the German (like the English-French) bourgeoisie wages war for the purpose of plundering foreign countries, for the strangulation of small nations, for financial dominion over the world, for the division and re-division of the colonies and for the rescue of the sinking capitalist regime by the befooling and separation from each other of the workers of the different countries.

"The imperialist war must, with objective inevitability, greatly accelerate the class war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and intensify it in an unprecedented fashion; it must transform itself into a civil war between the enemy classes.

"This transformation has begun through the February-March revolution of 1917, the first stage of which has shown us the joint blow against Tsarism on the part of two Powers: the whole of capitalist and landowning Russia with all its unconscious adherents and all its conscious pilots among the English-French ambassadors and capitalists on the one hand, and the Soviets of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on the other.

"These three political divisions, the three fundamental political forces: (i) the Tsarist monarchy, the head of the feudal nobility, the bureaucracy and the old body of generals; (ii) the bourgeois-landowning-Octobrist-Cadet Russia and behind them the petty-bourgeoisie; (iii) the Soviet of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies which seeks for allies amongst the whole proletariat and in the whole mass of the poorest of the population—these three fundamental political forces have already in the eight days of the 'first stage' revealed themselves with absolute clearness, even to a distant observer, forced like the writer of these lines to limit himself to the scanty telegrams in the foreign press.

"Yet before I deal with this in detail I must revert to that part of my letter which is devoted to a factor of foremost importance, namely, the imperialist war.

"The war has bound together with iron chains the belligerent powers, the belligerent groups of capitalists, the 'masters' of the capitalist regimes, the slave-keepers of capitalism. Social-political life at the present historical moment is bound together in one single bloody skein.

"The socialists who at the beginning of the war sided with the capitalists—the Davids

and Scheidemanns in Germany, Plehanov, Potressov, Gvosdev and company in Russia—bellowed long and loud against the ‘illusions’ of the revolutionaries, against the ‘illusions’ of the Basle manifesto, against the ‘farce’ of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war. In every key they extolled the strength alleged to be revealed by capitalism, its vitality and adaptability, *they*, who help the capitalists to ‘adapt’ the working class of different countries, to tame them, to make fools of them, to divide them.

“But ‘he laughs best who laughs last.’ The bourgeoisie was not able long to postpone the revolutionary crisis produced by the war.

“It grew with irresistible force in all countries, beginning with Germany, which, according to the expression of an observer who was recently there, is passing through a ‘highly organised famine’ and passed to England and France, where hunger likewise approaches and where the organisation is much less excellent.

“It is natural that in Tsarist Russia, where disorganisation was most extreme and where the proletariat is the most revolutionary (thanks not to its peculiar qualities but in consequence of the living traditions of the year 1905), the revolutionary crisis should have broken out earliest.

“This crisis was accelerated by a series of very severe defeats which Russia and her allies have experienced. The defeats caused all the old mechanism of government and the whole of the old regime to totter, embittered all classes of the population against them, stirred up the army, largely destroyed the old commanding personnel with its ossifying noble and peculiarly rotten bureaucratic character, and replaced it with young, fresh, mainly civilian elements from the middle-class.

“But if the defeats of the war played a negative role, which accelerated the outbreak, the union of English and French finance capital, of English and French imperialism, with the Octobrist-Cadet capital of Russia constituted the positive factor which accelerated this crisis.

“This extraordinarily important aspect of the matter was for obvious reasons concealed by the English and French press and maliciously underlined by the German press. We Marxists must calmly face the truth without allowing ourselves to be confused by lies—by the official, sugared diplomatic lies of diplomats and ministers of the first belligerent group of imperialists, or by the insinuations and evasions of the financial and militarist competitors of the other belligerent group. The whole course of events of the February-March revolution shows clearly that the English and French embassies with their agents and associates for a long time made the most desperate efforts to hinder the ‘separate’ settlements and the separate peace of Nicholas the Second (we will however hope and take care that he is the last) with William the Second, and finally struggled directly for Nicholas Romanov’s deposition.

“We will not delude ourselves.

“The revolution has triumphed quickly and radically, but this is only because of an exceedingly peculiar historical situation, because entirely different currents, entirely heterogeneous class interests, entirely antagonistic, political social efforts coincided, and indeed blended remarkably harmoniously. On the one hand the conspiracy of the English-French imperialists, who incited Miliukov, Gutshkov and their consorts to the conquest of power in order to prolong the war, in order to ensure a still fiercer and more persevering conduct of the war, in order to have new millions of Russian workers and peasants slaughtered so that Gutshkov might get Constantinople, so that the French capitalists might get Syria, so that the English capitalists might get Mesopotamia, and so on. This on the one hand. On the other

a deeply rooted proletarian movement (a movement of the very poorest sections of the population in town and country) of a revolutionary nature, a movement for bread, peace and true liberty.

"The revolutionary workers and soldiers have completely destroyed the abject Tsarist monarchy, and they have been able to accomplish this in a short space of time through the conjunction of rare historical circumstances in that help came through the efforts of Buchanan,* Miliukov and Co. to substitute one monarchy for another.

"Thus and only thus did it occur. Thus and only thus can a politician see it who is not afraid of the truth, who soberly weighs the reciprocal relations of social forces in the revolution, who does not judge each specific situation only from the point of view of its immediate specific cause but sees it as the expression of deeper motives and of more profound relationships between the interests of the proletariat and those of the capitalists both in Russia and in the whole world.

"The Russian workers and soldiers have fought selflessly against the Tsarist monarchy, for freedom, for the land of the peasants, for peace. English-French imperialism intrigued at Court in order to lengthen and intensify the massacre, staged a conspiracy, incited and encouraged the Gutshkovs and Miliukovs and prepared a stable government, which, after the first blow of the proletariat in the fight against Tsarism, did indeed conquer power.

"This Government is no accidental collection of people.

"It represents the new class which has risen to political power in Russia, the class of the capitalist landowners and the bourgeoisie who for a long time have governed our land economically and who in the revolution of 1905 to 1907, during the counter-revolution of 1907 to 1914, and finally in the war of 1914 to 1917 have very rapidly organised themselves politically and have taken into their hands local government, popular education, the congresses of different kinds, the Duma, the War Industries Committees, etc. Even before 1917 this new class had considerable political influence; therefore the first blow against Tsarism sufficed to bring about the collapse of the latter and left the way free for the bourgeoisie. The imperialist war, which required an enormous expenditure of energy, so accelerated the course of development of backward Russia that at one bound (in reality only apparently at one bound) we have overtaken Italy, England, even almost overtaken France, and have obtained a 'Coalition Government,' a national parliamentary Government, i.e., one prepared to carry on the imperialist slaughter and the duping of the people.

"By the side of this Government, which in point of fact, is simply the tool of the millionaire trusts of England and France, arose a new, unofficial, still undeveloped, comparatively weak Workers' Government which represented the interests of the proletariat and the whole of the poorest sections of the town and country population. This is the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd.

"This is the real political situation which we must first and foremost establish with the greatest possible objective exactitude in order to work out a Marxist tactic on the one firm foundation on which it must be based, namely on the foundation of fact.

"The Tsarist monarchy has been struck down but not smashed to pieces.

"The Octobrist-Cadet capitalist Government which will conduct the war 'to the end' is in reality a tool of the financial trusts of England and France, and is compelled to promise the people a maximum of liberty and charity, so arranged as to enable this Government to retain dominion over the people and to have the opportunity to prolong the war.

* English ambassador in Russia.

"The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the germ of the Workers' Government, represents the interests of the whole of the poorest mass of the population, i.e., the interests of the nine-tenths of the population striving for peace, bread and liberty.

"The conflict of these three powers determines the situation which has now been produced and forms the transition period from the first to the second stage of the revolution.

"In order really to fight against the Tsarist monarchy for the real attainment of liberty not merely in words, not merely in the promises of liberal braggarts, the workers must not support the new Government but this Government must support the workers! For the only guarantee of liberty and the total destruction of Tsarism is the arming of the proletariat, the solidifying, extension and expansion of the role, the significance and the power of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

"Everything else is falsehood and deceit, the self-deception of politicians from the liberal and radical camps.

"Help the workers to arm, or at least do not hinder them, and freedom in Russia will be invincible; it will be impossible to restore the monarchy and the republic will be secure.

"Otherwise the people will be swindled. Promises are cheap, promises cost nothing. With promises all bourgeois politicians in all bourgeois revolutions have put off and made fools of the people.

"This is a bourgeois revolution, therefore the workers must support the bourgeoisie—so say the worthless politicians from the camp of the liquidators.

"This is a bourgeois revolution, we Marxists say, therefore the workers must open the eyes of the people to the deception of the bourgeois politicians, must teach them not to trust to words, but to rely only on their own strength, on their own organisation, on their own solidarity, on their own arms.

"The Government of the Octobrists and Cadets, the Gutshkovs and Miliukovs, can give neither peace, nor bread, nor liberty, even if they sincerely want to do so.

"Not peace—because it is a war government, a government for the prolongation of the imperialist massacre, an annexationist government, which has not yet by so much as a word renounced the Tsarist policy of the annexation of Armenia, Galicia, Turkey, the conquest of Constantinople, the re-conquest of Poland, Courland, Lithuania, etc.

"This Government is bound hand and foot by English and French imperialist capital.

"Russian capital is merely a branch of the world trust which disposes of hundreds of milliards of roubles and bears the name of 'England and France.'

"Not bread—because it is a capitalist government. At the best they will give the people a 'highly organised famine,' as Germany has done. But the people will not tolerate the famine. The people will learn, and probably learn soon, that there is bread and that it is to be had, but not otherwise than by measures which will not halt before the sacredness of capital and landed property.

"Not liberty—because this is a landowning capitalist government which is afraid of the people.

"We will speak in another article on the practical problem of our next actions in relation to this Government. There we will show in what consists the peculiarity of the present moment, the moment of transition from the first to the second stage of the revolution, why the slogan must at this moment be: *Workers, you have accomplished wonders of proletarian heroism in the civil war against Tsarism, you must accomplish wonders of proletarian organisation in order to prepare your victory in the second stage of the revolution.*

We limit ourselves now to an analysis of the class-war and the inter-relations of class forces in this stage of the revolution; here we must again raise the question: Who are the *allies* of the proletariat in this revolution?

"It has two allies: first the broad millions of the great mass of the population, the mass of the semi-proletarian and in part small peasant population of Russia. This mass needs peace, bread, freedom, land. Under the influence of the bourgeoisie, particularly the petty bourgeoisie, with which according to the conditions of its life it is most closely in harmony, the mass will remain unresisting, it will fluctuate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The hard lessons of the war, which will become all the harder the more energetically the Gutshkovs, Miliukovs and their friends conduct the war, must inevitably thrust this mass over to the side of the proletariat and compel it to follow the latter. We must now seek first and foremost generally to enlighten and organise this mass, making full use of the liberty afforded by the new regime and of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The formation of soviets of peasant deputies, soviets of land-workers, is one of the most urgent tasks of the moment. We must strive not only for the formation of landworkers' soviets, but also for the organisation of the propertyless and poorest peasants separately. . . .

"Secondly the proletariat of all belligerent and in general of all countries is the ally of the Russian proletariat. For the moment it is to a large extent held under by the war, the words of the socialist jingoes are too often made use of in its name, those socialist jingoes who, like Plehanov, Gvosdev and Potressov in Russia, have in Europe taken the side of the capitalists. But with the passing of each month of the imperialist war the proletariat becomes freer and freer from their influence. The Russian revolution will inevitably enormously accelerate this process.

"With these two allies the proletariat of Russia, making full use of the peculiarities of the present transition period, can and will proceed to the conquest first of the Democratic Republic and the complete victory of the peasantry over the landowners, and then to socialism which alone can bring peace, bread and freedom to the war-tormented peoples."



THE REVOLUTION ON THE COAST OF THE WHITE SEA.

Mass meeting of workers, soldiers and peasants, in Murmansk on receiving the news of the February revolution, 1917.

Fifteen—ON THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT IN THE PRESENT REVOLUTION

By N. Lenin

“ARRIVING in Petrograd on the night of April 3, it was naturally only in my own name and with express reference to my comparatively insufficient preparation that I could publicly at the meeting on April 4th make a report on the task of the proletariat. The one thing that I could do in order to make the matter easier for myself—and for conscientious opponents—was to compose written formulated theses. I have read them aloud and given the text to comrade Tseretelli. I have read them aloud very slowly twice, first at the meeting of the Bolsheviks, then at the joint meeting of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.

“I now publish these my personal theses, furnished only with the shortest explanatory notes; these notes were fully developed in my report.

THESES

“1. In the position we take up in relation to the war not the smallest concession must be made to ‘Revolutionary National Defence,’ for under the new Government of Lvov and Co. the war on Russia’s side is as rapacious and imperialist as before, owing to the capitalist nature of the new Government. The class-conscious proletariat can only give its consent to a revolutionary war which would justify a revolutionary national defence on the conditions: (a) that power be transferred into the hands of the proletariat and that they be joined by the poorest ranks of the peasantry; (b) that all annexations be renounced in fact and not merely in words; (c) that an absolute and real break be made with everything which serves the interests of capitalism.

“In consideration of the no doubt sincere conviction of large numbers of the advocates of revolutionary national defence, of those people who suffered the war only on compulsion and not from love of conquest, in their case, seeing that they have been fooled by the capitalists, they must be thoroughly enlightened and made to realise their mistake; it must be consistently and perseveringly made clear to them that there is an inseparable connection between capital and the imperialist war; it must be demonstrated to them that the war cannot be ended by a true democratic peace—not a peace of compulsion—unless capitalism is overthrown.

“Organisation of the most widespread propaganda of this opinion amongst the soldiers on service.

“Fraternisation.

“2. The peculiarity of the present situation in Russia lies in the transition from the first stage of the revolution—which as a result of insufficient class-consciousness and the defective organisation of the proletariat has juggled power into the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the second stage which is to place power in the hands of the proletariat and of the poorest peasants.

“This transition is characterised on the one hand by a maximum of legality (Russia represents momentarily the freest country amongst all the belligerent countries), on the other

hand by the non-existence of any power over the masses and finally by their trustful attitude towards the Government of the capitalists—the arch-foe of peace and of socialism.

“This peculiarity necessitates on our side the capacity to fit the special conditions of the Party work into the milieu of the masses of the proletariat who are powerful but only now awakened to political life.

“3. No sort of support of the Provisional Government, the unmasking of the whole falseness of all their promises, particularly that about the renunciation of annexations. Unmasking of the Government, instead of the inadmissible, futile demand that this Government, the Government of capitalists, shall cease to be imperialist.

“4. Recognition of the fact that in most Soviets of Workers’ Deputies our Party is in the minority, at present even in a weak minority, against the bloc of all petty bourgeois, opportunist elements (which lying under the influence of the capitalists bring the proletariat under that influence) from the National Socialists and Social-Revolutionaries to the Organisation Committee (Tscheidze, Tseretelli, Steklov and others).

“Enlightening the masses to the fact that the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies represent the only possible form of revolutionary government, and therefore as long as that Government lies under the influence of the capitalists our task can only be a persevering, systematic, obstinate explanation to the masses of their mistakes and tactics in a manner suitable to their particular practical needs.

“So long as we are in the minority we perform the work of criticism and clearing up in order that the masses may correct their mistakes through their own experience, but we can at the same time advocate the transfer of the whole executive power into the hands of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies.

“5. Not a parliamentary republic—a return to this from the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies would be a step backwards—but rather a republic of Soviets of Workers’, Landworkers’ and Peasants’ Deputies embracing the whole country and all strata of the workers.

“Abolition of State forces and bureaucracy.*

“Payment of all state officials, however efficient and responsible, at a rate not exceeding that paid to a good workman.

“6. As to the agrarian program, the transference of this very weighty matter to the Soviets of Landworkers’ Deputies.

“Expropriation of all large landed properties. Nationalisation of the whole landed property in the empire, transfer of the right of disposal of it to the local Soviets of Landworkers’ and Peasants’ Deputies. Separate Soviets of Deputies for the poorest peasants. Formation of model farms on all big estates (those 100 to 300 dessiatines in extent, taking into consideration the local and other conditions and according to the estimate of the local institutions) under the superintendence of the Landworkers’ Deputies, and at the public cost.

“7. Immediate amalgamation of all banks in the country into one universal National Bank and the transfer of its control to the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies.

“8. Not the introduction of socialism as our first task, but only the immediate taking over of the control of social production and distribution of all produce by the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies.

“9. Tasks of the Party:

(a) Immediate calling of a General Party meeting.

(b) Alteration of the Party program

* That is, the replacement of the standing army by the universal arming of the people.

- (i) Concerning imperialism and the imperialist war.
- (ii) Concerning the relations with the State and our demand for a 'Commune State.'
- (iii) Amendment of the out-of-date Minimum Program.
- (c) Alteration of the name of the Party.²

"10. Renewal of the International. Initiative for the creation of a revolutionary International, an International against the socialist jingoes and the 'Centrists.'"

"In order that the reader may understand why I was obliged to call special attention to the rare exception of the case of conscientious opponents, I ask him to compare the above theses with the following objection of Herr Goldenberg:

" 'Lenin has set up the flag of civil war in the midst of revolutionary democracy')
(quoted by Plehanov in 'Yedinstvo,' No. 5).

"Is not this priceless?

"I write: In consideration of the no doubt sincere conviction of large numbers of the advocates of revolutionary national-defence . . . in their case seeing that they have been made fools of by the capitalists they must be thoroughly enlightened and made to realise their mistakes.

"But the capitalist gentlemen who call themselves Social Democrats, who however are not counted amongst the wide masses nor amongst the advocates of national defence, have the impudence to represent my views by the words 'has set up (!) the flag (!) of civil war' (of that there is no word in the theses, any more than in my report!) 'in the midst (!!) of revolutionary democracy.'

"What have we here? What distinguishes this from a pogrom agitation, from the *Russkaya Volya*?

"I write: The Soviets of Workers' Deputies represent the only possible form of revolutionary government, hence our task can only be persevering, systematic, obstinate explanation of their mistakes and tactics to the masses, in manner suited to their particular practical needs.

"As against this a certain type of opponent represents my view as a call to 'civil war in the midst of revolutionary democracy'(!!) and says that I have given no concessions but only vague promises. I had proved to them that the summoning of the Constituent Assembly and the success of its working were impossible without the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

"An opinion is falsely attributed to me adverse to the speedy summoning of the Constituent Assembly! This I should feel inclined to treat as raving, had not decades of political warfare taught me that honesty is a rare exception among my opponents.

"G. Plehanov in his paper described my speech as 'delirious'. Very well, Mr. Plehanov! but how clumsy, how embarrassed and short-sighted is your method of attack! If I had delivered a delirious speech of two hours duration, how is it that hundreds of listeners bore

¹ That is, a State whose prototype is offered by the Paris Commune.

² Instead of "The Social Democratic Party," whose official leaders by going over to the capitalists (the "Fatherland-defenders" and the vacillating Kautsky crowd) have betrayed socialism over the whole world, we must call ourselves "The Communist Party."

³ In international Social Democracy "Centrists" are those who swing to and fro between the Jingoes (followers of the "Fatherland-defenders") and the Left such as: Kautsky and Co., in Germany; Longuet and Co. in France; Tschaidze and Co. in Russia; Turati and Co. in Italy, MacDonald and Co. in England, etc.

with my ravings? Further, why is a whole column of your paper devoted to reporting this 'delirium'? Truly, you seem to have succeeded in over-reaching yourself!

"Naturally, it is much easier to vituperate and wail than to make an effort to explain and recall what conclusions Marx and Engels arrived at in the years 1871, 1872 and 1875, concerning the experiences of the Paris Commune and concerning the sort of government required by the proletariat.

"For a former Marxist, Mr. Plehanov is strangely unwilling to be reminded of Marxism.

"I quote Rosa Luxemburg, who on August 4th, 1914, called German Social-Democracy a putrid corpse. Messrs. Plehanov, Goldenberg and Co., feel insulted—and on whose behalf? On behalf of the German jingoes, whom I have just called jingoes.

"What a tangle these poor Russian socialist jingoes have got themselves into! They are socialists in words and jingoes in deed."



THE MOSCOW SOVIET: The first session of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Moscow, February, 1917.

Sixteen—THE FEBRUARY OVERTHROW

By N. Bukharin

“THE catastrophic speed of the fall of the autocratic government came as a surprise even to the fighting classes. The whole course of events, the enormous superiority of the social forces ranked against Tsarism, all made this rapid débâcle inevitable. Not only those whose fall was brought about, but also those who caused it were filled with astonishment. Surprised at its success, the revolutionary element paused for a moment.

“The proletariat, which had marched in the van of the movement with boundless heroism and had been forced to create its organisations in secrecy, now came into the open. Although it was the best organised and disciplined force, it had yet no mass organisations.

“With still less justice could any organisation of the lower middle classes, particularly of the peasantry, be said to exist. Nor had the Army, which rose almost unanimously against its High Command and its ‘idolised leaders,’ to destroy Tsarist discipline and organisation, managed to create a revolutionary organisation.

“The only force which was organised from the beginning turned out to be the Liberal-imperialist middle class, which least deserved to be called a driving force of the revolution. On the contrary, its leader, Miliukov, contemptuously spoke of the banner of revolution as a ‘red rag.’ He, indeed, was the author of the famous slogan ‘Better defeat than revolution!’ The Liberal bourgeoisie had already learned from the experience of 1905 that revolution in Russia meant danger not only to Tsardom, but also to ‘Culture and Property.’ Hence they had become ‘His Majesty’s responsible Opposition.’

“It had now become a critical question whether they should openly side with Nicholas’ Government or not. There was no ambiguity about the collapse of Tsarism, and nothing remained for the Liberal bourgeoisie but to ‘go over to the side of the people’ and to mobilise all their old organisations—the party of the ‘Progressive Bloc’ above all, the party of ‘People’s Liberty,’ all possible ‘non-political organisations,’ and finally the rump of the National Duma.

“Outwardly, there was a complete conciliation. Diehard monarchists swiftly took the colour of republicans; house-proprietors took down the Tsarist tricolour and hoisted the red flag of the revolution in its place; the rosettes of State officials were replaced by red emblems, and even former police officials strutted about with a red ribbon in the buttonhole of their hastily adapted overcoats.

“‘Revolution’ suddenly became a magic word, worshipped even by those who only yesterday had exhausted their vocabulary of abuse in condemnation of this same revolution. Rodzianko, the President of the ultra-reactionary Octobrist Duma, admitted that he was so filled with sentimental ‘brotherly feeling for the people’ that ‘on his honour and conscience’ he could raise no opposition to the claims of the people. That notorious organiser of the blackest reactionaries, Shulgin, a declared monarchist and a suppressor of that same ‘vital force’ which was now being acclaimed with unstinted enthusiasm—this Shulgin made the following statement with reference to the election of the Constituent Assembly: ‘Had I been told two days ago that I should hear this demand without opposing it, and that I should have to admit that it was the only way out; that this same hand would draft the abdication of Nicholas II.; I should have called the speaker mad and myself, too. But to-day, I can

raise no opposition. Yes, there must be a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage on a direct equal vote by secret ballot.' All these gentlemen from the Nationalists up to and including the Left Party of the Cadets (who really desired, at the most, a trifling *change* at Court, and a few miserable 'constitutional guarantees') though they ground their teeth inwardly, were in public bowing before that 'red rag,' which terrified them more than the toreador's cloak terrifies the bull. There was therefore absolutely no agreement between the idyllic externals and the real truth, and 'pan-national' phrases could not minimise, much less annihilate, the existence of class warfare.

"The superiority in organisation of the bourgeoisie brought forth the Provisional Committee of the Duma, which acted as its central organ. The same evening, almost at the same hour, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies was born in Petrograd, and took a corresponding leading position among the proletariat and the lower middle-class masses.

"Prominence must be given to two circumstances in order to explain why the power, conquered by the people, passed into the hands of the Provisional Government, i.e., the imperialist bourgeoisie. In the first place, a most powerful factor was the relative strength in the organisation of that bourgeoisie; secondly, the responsibility must be put on the opportunism of the leaders of the working class or rather on the faction which was then in power. Those same leaders, who afterwards entered a semi-imperialist Cabinet, did indeed play the role of implacable revolutionaries, but they were afraid to seize power. The revolution, to them, was above all a revolution of the Russian bourgeoisie and any unnecessary departure from the dominance of the bourgeoisie was to their cowardly philistine minds a violation of the sacrosanct prerogatives of the 'middle-class' revolution. They conceived it to be the undoubted duty of a revolutionary to browbeat the workers with the bogey of the downtrodden bourgeoisie—tactics which were a sad legacy of the Russian revolution from lower middle class 'socialism.'

"Thus was born the first Provisional Government out of the womb of the Provisional Committee of the Duma. The Executive Committee of the Soviet even refused posts in the Cabinet, and only Kerensky the 'disciple of Order,' for the second time acted against his colleagues in his struggle for power (on the first occasion, this 'Social Revolutionary' entered the Duma, against a decision of his Party). The Cabinet was, therefore, almost exclusively an organisation of the financial and capitalist bourgeoisie of the time. It included Alexander Ivanovitch Gutshkov, leader of the Octobrists, representative of the Moscow merchants, a 'warrior in mufti' as he described himself; the same Gutshkov who, at the time of the Moscow rising, organised the militia to help Admiral Dubassov to shoot workmen; Paul Nikolaievitch Miliukov, leader of the Party of National Liberty, mouthpiece of Russian imperialism, supporter of international robbery under the guise of the 'liberty of small nations,' a devoted friend and tool of the English capitalists, cunning, unscrupulous, strong-willed, a man of encyclopædic learning in baseness; A. J. Konovalov, the greatest of factory owners and speculators, a hall-marked representative of the employers' organisations; Tereshtshenko, an offspring of the shareholders of the sugar syndicate. Such were the most prominent members of the 'Revolutionary' Government, led by Prince Lvov, the representative of the landowning nobility; with him were Nekrassov, Godnev and the Citizen Kerensky described above.

"However cowardly the tactics of lower middle class socialism showed themselves to be, in its leadership and organisation of the Petrograd proletariat, the basis of power could be nothing else but compromise, i.e., the actual predominance of the workers and the lower middle classes must needs be seen in operation. The Provisional Government was composed

of unadulterated capitalists, but beside it stood the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' (later also of Soldiers') Deputies.

"Petrograd governed Russia, and Petrograd was governed by the workers and soldiers. The ruling organ of the Petrograd workers and soldiers thus became, next to the Provisional Government, the centre of all power in Russia. This twofold concentration of power reflected the division between the capitalist voters and the landowners, on the one hand, and the lower middle class, the peasantry and the proletariat on the other. The famous formula of co-operation with the government was only conditionally ratified by the Soviet: 'so far as it works to consolidate the conquests of the revolution and to extend these conquests in steadfast agreement with the Soviet.' Thus, a firm foundation was laid for the policy of compromise.

"The first act of the Provisional Government should have been the proclamation of a democratic Republic. But to proclaim a democratic Republic meant an immediate and irrecoverable breach with the past. Can one 'foolishly and senselessly' break with 'historical traditions' and still remain a 'respectable man'? Is not a monarchy 'modified by a constitution' the best protection against the 'frenzied elements,' against 'fanaticism' and 'anarchy'? Here the discord between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the revolutionary democracy found full expression. During the joint session of the Executive Committee and the Provisional Committee of the Duma, the timid representatives of the workers and soldiers moved to abstain from any acts which might 'predetermine the form of government.' The representatives of the Party of National Liberty proposed (perhaps out of immense respect for National Liberty) that the Romanov monarchy should be allowed to go on. Steklov, a member of the Executive Committee, referred to this subject at a discussion in the Soviet in the following terms: 'I categorically affirm that the Cadets' representatives contested this point to the very end; not only did they refuse to agree to the proclamation of a democratic Republic, a step which we did not wish to urge on them too insistently, but they would not even consent to our wording. . . . We knew they wanted to impose on us—the victorious Russian democracy—not merely a monarchy, but the Romanov monarchy. Miliukov especially insisted that Alexei, the heir to the throne, must be proclaimed Tsar and the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch Regent. It was useless for us to protest that no political group was entitled to anticipate the opinion of the whole Russian people; in vain for us to explain that our political prudence (!) went so far that, in spite of the physical might at our disposal, we would not use it to compel them to declare a democratic republic, but would only beg (!) them not to proclaim a monarchy. . . . In spite of all these arguments no agreement was achieved on these points.'

"The 'prudent' leaders of the working class and the lower middle class, in spite of their powers of 'physical compulsion,' nevertheless lacked the courage to demand the decreeing of a republic! On the very day following the victorious insurrection the hypocritical champions of National Liberty had the impudence to demand the re-establishment of the Romanov monarchy. A member of the Provisional Government, the Octobrist Gutshkov, and a member of the Duma Committee, the ultra reactionary Shulgin, were already preparing with Miliukov's blessing, to visit General Headquarters in order to 'preserve our country from anarchy,' i.e., to betray the people and the revolution and to conclude a treaty with the bandits of Tsarism. Michael Romanov's courage, however, was not equal to Paul Miliukov's; the former had apparently some respect for the 'physical force' at the disposal of the Soviet, and the bargain of the bourgeois vote-mongers with the dwellers in the Romanov wasps'-nest did not materialise.

"Besides the paragraph about the form of government, which was actually erased, the following additional eight points were contained in the agreement between the Soviet and the Provisional Government: Concerning an amnesty; concerning the liberty of speech, of the press, of meetings and of strikes; concerning immediate steps for the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, the replacement of the police by an elected militia, local self-government by universal vote; concerning the abolition of all disabilities of class, nationality and creed, the veto on disarmament and transfer of the revolutionary troops from Petrograd; and, lastly, concerning the internal administration of the army.

"A proclamation in this sense was issued by the Provisional Government. But even at that period, its members began those tactics which only reached their full flower later—the tactics of sabotage. The Executive Committee soon realised that the respective Ministers were in no hurry to put the program into effect. Two demands were then made: the immediate publication of the decree granting an amnesty and of that against the reactionary Generals, who were visibly preparing for a reactionary overthrow.

"The publication of the amnesty decree soon took place. Even Mr. Miliukov would not have dared merely to file it, for the demand had already been put forward by the First Duma, the offspring of the Cadets!

"Not in a moment can one become a perpetuator of Attorney-General Parlov's policy, he who was greeted even by Liberals of the First Duma with the unanimous cry: 'Down with the hangman!'

"The political 'criminals' received an amnesty. Exiles were to be repatriated at the expense of the State. International imperialism, however, showed a baseness exceeding by far that of Russian imperialism.

"Lloyd George and the members of the English Okhrana (secret police) amended the ordinances (or at least the public ordinances) of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Russian revolution threatened not only a blow at Tsarism, but threatened also to fan the fire of international revolution and destroy the concord of the workers with the exploiters and the imperialist robber States. Although Russian imperialism was itself as yet ashamed and afraid to seize the representatives of the revolutionary international by the collar and fight them by methods worthy of Abdul Hamid's myrmidons, the agency of its Anglo-French colleagues and of the bloodhounds of the old Tsarist consulates was invoked to carry out this policy. Several persons were practically forbidden to leave Switzerland, France, England and America. Many Russian citizens were arrested by 'Allied' policemen, who justified their arbitrary conduct by base calumnies of which only a bourgeoisie insane with rage is capable.

"On the subject of his arrest by the English authorities, Trotsky wrote: 'English diplomacy cannot on the whole be said to lack either caution or superficial, purely decorative 'gentlemanliness': but these qualities are obviously absent from the declaration of the English Ambassador concerning the German subsidies which we are alleged to have received; the charge is just as vile as it is stupid. The explanation is that the politicians and diplomats of Great Britain have two sets of manners—one for 'civilised' countries, and one for colonies. Sir G. Buchanan (the English Ambassador in Petrograd), who was the Tsarist monarchy's best friend and is now numbered among the friends of the republic, feels the same in Russia as in India or in Egypt, and therefore sees no reason to be scrupulous in his conduct.'

"The attitude of the Allied Powers is thus most accurately described. So far as Russia was concerned, it turned out that neither the English nor the French Government con-

sidered the famous right of self-determination of nations to which the imperialists of all countries had paid lip service with such pompous publicity to be applicable here. Apparently, the military riding whip, with which England governed her colonies, was to be swung also over the 'independent' citizens of Russia! While German imperialism was only just stretching out its mailed fist towards Russia, English imperialism already considered Russia as a conquered country! Long live 'Peaceful Penetration!'

"Pressure from the organs of revolutionary democracy procured the release of those who had been arrested. Others were refused transit visas by the Allies who, on the contrary, prepared warrants for their arrest; this situation compelled some individuals to travel via Germany.

"The treatment of the amnestied exiles in their return to Russia revealed a clear line of sympathy between the imperialist governments and the as yet furtive tendencies of the Provisional Government, which, although scarcely out of its swaddling clothes, was already turning towards imperialism. Its attitude towards the demands of the Executive Committee that the reactionary generals should be outlawed, revealed in a still cruder light the imperialistic nature of this Government.

"Information arrived from every side that G.H.Q. was the centre from which a counter-revolution was being organised. The soldiers were filled with indignation at the reactionary spirit of their officers. As early as March 6th, General Ewart published Army Orders in the name of Nicholas Nicholaievitch, containing an appeal to support the Romanovs. General Alexeiev (whom Citizen Kerensky kissed later on) threatened the 'bands of revolutionaries' arriving from Petrograd with courts martial. General Ivanov who had brought up troops for the pacification of the Petrograd insurgents in the critical days, developed his activities in Kiev, after the Petrograd affair.

"The Provisional Government nevertheless kept on putting off any definite action in the matter, under the pretext of trying to find the relevant paragraph in the Criminal Code, and the decree actually never reached publication. Measures which were more or less decisive, in so far as any of the steps taken by the opportunist Mensheviks can be called decisive, were eventually taken by the Executive Committee of the Soviets.

"The era of spontaneous organisation among the revolutionary masses now set in, among the proletariat, the soldiers and the peasants. An organised force was already at the disposal of the Petrograd Soviet, and from now on the power of the Soviets, and of the Petrograd Soviet in particular, grew to formidable dimensions. But in equal measure there developed a dull resistance to the Soviet on the part of the imperialist middle-class and its organ, the Provisional Government; Gutshkov, the Minister of War, was especially unyielding. The Commissaries of the Executive Committee encountered active opposition from the new 'authorities.' The capitalist class clearly realised a threat to the whole basis of its existence in the growing power of the Soviets. One fine day, these plebeians might well take everything into their own hands. What guarantees have we that they will be satisfied with a mere change in the political constitution?

"As Mr. Miliukov had not succeeded in putting Alexei on the throne immediately, in place of Nicholas, he had to provide for the future possibility of his accession. Negotiations were begun by the Provisional Government with Nicholas' ruling relatives in England, with a view to sending the ex-Tsar to that country. The Executive Committee, however, on learn-

* "Peaceful Penetration"—the name given by the imperialists to their intrusion into weak countries in preparation for enslaving these countries and conquering them by military force.

ing from the railway officials that two trains, carrying the Tsar's family, were already on the way to the frontier, mobilised the Petrograd garrison, occupied all the stations and broadcast in all directions the telegraphic order: 'Stop and arrest!' The attempt to save the 'holy family' failed.

"The attitude of the people towards the imperialist war made the capitalists more uneasy than the problem of the nature of the new constitution. However fiercely the capitalists (mainly through the Party of National Liberty) fought against the political enunciation of national liberty, i.e., against a democratic republic, this question was for them of secondary importance. A republican constitution still leaves room for a policy of spoliation, as can be learnt from 'free America' and 'glorious France.' Through the clearance of the Tsarist Augean stables, there were even some economies in prospect in the conduct of the war.

"That the Allies understood this fact is seen from a speech by Lloyd George, in which, in direct allusion to a defeat of Tsarist troops, he said that the German artillery were bursting the chains which hindered the Russian people from carrying on the war. Just as the imperialists of Russia had no objection to a 'trifling change,' and would even have accepted a republic, though with a gnashing of teeth, so this policy would have been 'recognised' by the English and French imperialists.

"Quite another position was created, when the continuation of the war became the critical issue. The war was the essential core of capitalist finance. To have designs against the



IN THE VILLAGES—A revolutionary meeting in the depths of the countryside, March, 1917.

war meant to plot against capitalism's excess profits, its right to exploit the world. What can be more sacred than this right? He is a traitor who dares to protest against it!

"Around the banner 'War to the End!' all sections of the ruling classes joined with the imperialist bourgeoisie. The Right Wing disappeared from the scene, as though physically wiped out of existence; and all its numerous organisations with their various names, its papers subsidised by Tsarism, its 'functionaries,' all lost their glaringly flaunted character of blackest reaction. All this machinery, which outwardly was almost dissolved, in fact transferred its services to the united middle class alliance, represented most typically in politics by the Party of National Liberty. Just as in Tsarist times the capitalist imperialists played second fiddle to the upholders of serfdom, in their common interest, so the upholders of serfdom now followed the lead of the capitalist imperialists. The alliance of the 'Landowners of the old school' and 'progressives' arose like a phoenix from the ashes scattered by the world slaughter. But the leadership passed to capitalist finance with its 'European' methods of exploiting the world.

"The lower middle class, the peasantry and the army (composed mainly of peasants), were far from aiming at imperialist conquests. The Russian peasantry had not yet attained development on the line of the German type of large farmers, whose organisations are really agricultural cartels, hostile to the proletariat by reason of their high monopolist prices. Instead of a combination with the landowners, we here find them fighting the landlord for his land. To the peasant war offers no such guarantee of profitmaking as it does to capitalist finance. It harms agriculture by depriving it of its human labour and animals. The peasant knows that the land—his landlord's land—is within his reach, and it is impossible to create enthusiasm among the peasantry by promising them some unknown territories. In this sense, they are shortsighted empiricists, and all their thoughts are intently focussed on a nearer, more attainable goal, the land of the landlord. The peasant has bedewed it with his sweat, has cultivated it with his miserable plough; he has even starved in order to pay so much money for it to the landlord. Justice demands that it shall become his own.

"Somewhat different is the position of the lower middle class in the towns. A portion of them, allied to capitalist finance by the bond of co-operation, and really forming a reinforcement of capitalism, echoes all the slogans of unadulterated imperialism. To this class there are annexed to a great extent all the so-called intellectuals (doctors, lawyers, teachers, in short all the 'free' professions). In contrast to these, there are the semi-proletarian strata, which suffer directly from the war and are thus ready to cry out against the 'damnable slaughter.'

"A crushing majority of the lower middle class in the towns therefore was opposed to the imperialist war: the viewpoint of the revolutionary international was however beyond their grasp. While the peasantry is dependent on its own land or on the land which it desires to make its own, it must defend that land against an 'external enemy'; in so far as it is concerned about the annexation of foreign owned territory, it has no care that its *defensive war* might be combined with imperialist aims of the Allied bankers and might actually be transformed into a war of annexation by the whole coalition. Thus the lower middle class is partly an opponent and partly a supporter of imperialism. It hates the capitalists, the usurers, trafficking in men as in horses, the speculators, bankers, manufacturers, employers, all these large scale thieves, who assemble like crows round a carcass. On the other hand it negotiates a truce with them, in consideration of the 'national emergency.' The 'oppression of capitalism' compels it to dream of the 'reign of freedom,' but 'the chains

of property' drag it down from its ideal; its policy can therefore only be contemptible and sometimes even treacherous. Its mentality is made up of a philistine socialism, above all of socialist verbiage. Revolution, but not too radical; fight the counter revolution—but no intimidation of the bourgeoisie; socialism—200 years hence; fraternisation of the nations—but don't offend the Allied bankers! Such lower middle class vacillation expresses itself in the socialism of the Social Revolutionaries.

"The proletariat is freed by its social position from the bonds involved in the ownership of property. Workers have, when all is said and done, no patriotism; they have the chains of wage slavery which their country has forged for them. The national organisation of capitalism which masquerades under the name of patriotism only inspires respect in the workers in so far as they are mentally enslaved by the lower middle class or by high finance. Very frequently the workers of a country are held in such a slavery of ideas, but the working class is the only one which can step out of this cage. None but they can raise themselves to a viewpoint which values the interest of the international revolution above those of 'their' country, meaning the capitalist organisation of the nationalist State. They, alone, can form a revolutionary class, mercilessly critical and steadfastly international. Vacillation is inherent in the character of the lower middle class, whilst for the proletariat it is a disease. The lower middle class is incapable of a logical policy; among the proletariat there is almost invariably an inflexible revolutionary core.

"Both lines of thought may be traced in the Russian workers' movement: the socialist-patriotic Mensheviks had lower middle class mentality. The coalition of the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, which immediately became visible, is the expression of their loyalty to lower middle class ideas. 'Opposed to annexations, but loyal to our obligations to our Allies and to the defence of our country' was the inevitable slogan of the middle class and a section of the workers. Equally firm was the revolutionary proletariat's policy: 'Opposed to all treaties with capitalists of any kind, opposed to the war, which is conducted in alliance with them.'

"Socially, the Provisional Government was supported by the imperialist bourgeoisie; it also received assistance from France and from British capitalism, which found an energetic intermediary in the person of Sir George Buchanan and a faithful keeper of bargains in Paul Miliukov. The Provisional Government's real policy was that of Allied imperialism.

"The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies had the support not only of the working class but also to a large extent of the lower middle class (peasants and soldiers). The lower middle class faction of the Soviet, and some of the workers who still belonged to the lower middle class, composed the majority of the Soviet, whose political ideas were expressed by the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

"On March 14th there was published the famous proclamation 'To the Peoples of all the World.'

"This proclamation was the first official document, enlightening the masses in all the combatant countries as to the true situation and the mind of the proletariat and peasant masses of Russia. Till then, all news had been obviously counterfeit.

"Capitalist circles in Allied countries at first rejoiced at the overthrow of Tsarism which had rescued Russia from the pro-German tendencies of George V.'s nearest relative. At the creation of the Soviet, however, the 'Times,' the organ of a financial oligarchy, began to be uneasy. Thereupon the world was made happy by the fulsome messages of the Provisional Government, messages of a pronounced slavish subservience, so that the excitement in the

fatty hearts of the gentlemen in the city of London might be assuaged. This servile tone was the more comical since it emanated from the authorised representatives of the conception of Russia as a 'Great Power.' The Cadet letter-writers controlled by Mr. Miliukov's department nevertheless danced like lap-dogs before their mistress, and wriggled reverently at the feet of the English imperialists, cravenly depicting the Russian revolution as a peaceful metamorphosis, the entire legality of which was undisturbed but for the existence of a few paragraphs of the Tsarist Criminal Code which had obviously crept in by an oversight. Although the Soviet's summons succeeded in evading the blockade of Russian imperialism, it met with pitiless obstruction from the Allied 'lovers of liberty.' The French Government, which still lives on interest drawn from the political capital of France's great revolution, and makes a rallying cry of this revolution on every opportune and inopportune occasion, proscribed the manifesto; it reached the French nation as an illegal pamphlet, published by the socialist opposition.

"The actual issue of the proclamation is an imposing fact. That the revolutionary governing body of the workers and soldiers should during a state of war address all peoples, among them even the 'external foe'—is not that a collapse of militarist barbarism? One deep internal contradiction, however, caused a grave defect in the manifesto; on the one hand, it called for the cessation of warfare, for a struggle for a democratic peace; on the other the war was made a duty as a defensive war in spite of the continued existence of the secret treaties with the Allies, treaties of a pronounced annexationist character. On the one hand, it summoned the peoples—particularly those of the Central Powers—to revolt against their governments; on the other it tacitly assumed internal peace with its own capitalists, a peace which was glaringly expressed in the support given to the imperialist Provisional Government. In a word, there was incorporated the ambiguity and half-heartedness which is peculiar to the 'socialism' of the petty bourgeoisie. It contained in embryo the possibility that democracy might give way to the annexationist aims of the imperialist sharks.

"Stress was nevertheless laid on a peace without annexations or indemnities, for which an unmistakable desire was expressed. Taken as a whole it was against imperialist warfare, and appealed to the socialist proletariat; this was sufficient to assure the Soviet of the furious hatred of the capitalists—a hate which was, however, concealed until the opportune moment.

"The 'Front Congresses' in Minsk, Pskov, and elsewhere, took place under the direct influence of the 'summons'. Here representatives of the Army, of the active fighting force, unanimously declared themselves against a policy of annexations. It seemed that an enormous mass of supporters was enlisted in the cause of international brotherhood. Even a blind man could have felt the thirst for peace. The fraternising in the front line trenches was sufficiently clear evidence of its existence."

Seventeen—WAR AIMS

UNDER cover of the superficial unity of classes, the inner contradictions of the February revolution were growing. These contradictions became more prominent each day in the four months immediately following the overthrow, and culminated in open conflict between the classes.

The first and most important question, which brought this conflict to maturity, was the attitude towards the imperialist war.

The Soviet had set out its policy in the Manifesto of March 27th, which, being essentially a compromise, could satisfy neither the proletariat nor the bourgeoisie. At first, however, the workers allowed themselves to be led by revolutionary phraseology, while the bourgeoisie, inarticulate officially, i.e., through its government, began a campaign against the Manifesto in its journals.

A declaration concerning war aims was issued by the Government on April 11th, over Prince Lvov's signature. It ran as follows: "Having taken stock of the military position of the Russian State, the Provisional Government has resolved to do its duty to the People by a frank and open statement of the truth. National defence was left in a state of grave disorder by the government which has been overthrown. Criminal neglect and misguided administration have brought confusion into our finances, our commissariat and transport system, and into the supply of munitions to the troops. Our excellent economic system has been brought to the verge of collapse. With the energetic support of the whole Nation, the Provisional Government will use every effort to eradicate these consequences of the old regime; but time presses; thousands of the sons of our country have generously poured out their blood in these thirty long months of warfare. Yet our country still confronts our mighty enemy, who has occupied entire provinces of our land and is even now, in the days of the birth of Russian Freedom, preparing a new offensive against us.

"The defence of our country at any cost and the freeing of our land from the enemy forces, this is the vital and most important duty of our warriors who defend the liberty of the People. All questions regarding the World War and its termination are left by the Provisional Government to the decision of the People's will in close collaboration with those allied to us, but it considers it to be both a right and a duty to declare at this stage that free Russia's aim is not to rule over other peoples, to deprive them of their national heritage or to occupy foreign territory by force. On the contrary, it wishes to bring about a lasting peace on the basis of the right of each nation to be the arbiter of its own fate. The Russian People has no desire to extend its external rule at the expense of other peoples nor to enslave or humiliate any other nation.

"In the cause of equality, the chains which bound the Polish people have been removed. But the Russian People will not suffer their own land to emerge from the Great Struggle humiliated or with its means of existence weakened.

"These basic principles will guide the foreign policy of the Provisional Government; the Popular Will will assuredly be brought to realisation and the rights of our country will be safeguarded while, at the same time, the obligations into which we have entered with our Allies shall be carried out.

"The Provisional Government of liberated Russia has not the right to withhold the

true facts from the People. Our country is in danger. Every effort must be exerted to save it. May the nation react to this truth, not by being uselessly cast down, nor in a spirit of despair, but by feeling an urge to create a united national will. Thus shall we acquire new energy for the battle and win salvation. May this hour of heavy trial find the whole land vigorous enough to preserve the freedom we have won and to devote itself to untiring travail for the welfare of liberated Russia. The Provisional Government has taken a solemn oath to preserve the People and firmly believes that unprecedented support from each and all will enable it to carry out its duty."

The All-Russian Conference of Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets, which opened on April 11th, attached very great importance to the Government's proclamation, seeing in it an important step towards the realisation of the principles of democracy in the field of foreign politics. Thus were more compromising illusions about the capitalist government spread by the socialist patriots.

Hardly had a few weeks elapsed when Miliukov, Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed the following note to the Entente Powers through diplomatic channels:

"A Manifesto was published on April 11th of this year by the Provisional Government to the citizens of liberated Russia in which the Government set out its war aims. I am directed by the Foreign Minister to acquaint you with the said document and to append the following commentary: Attempts have recently been made by our enemies to sow dissension between our Allies and ourselves by spreading the senseless assertion that Russia is ready to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers. I enclose the text of the above document as the best confutation of such inventions. From it you will see that the general principles enunciated by the Provisional Government are in complete accord with the high ideals which have up to now animated so many of the speeches of most of the prominent statesmen of the Allied Powers and which have been particularly clearly expressed in the speeches of the President of the great transatlantic republic, our latest Ally. It was admittedly impossible for the government of the old regime to share and assimilate these ideas of a war for liberation and for the creation of solid bases for a peaceful co-existence of nations, the self-determination of oppressed peoples, etc. A liberated Russia, however, may speak in a language comprehensible to the progressive democracy of modern mankind, and hastens to add its voice to the voice of the Allies. There cannot, of course, in the proclamation of the Provisional Government, permeated as it is with this new spirit of a liberated democracy, be the slightest grounds for the supposition that the revolution which has occurred involves a weakening of Russia's role in the united battlefront of the Allies. The resultant consciousness of common responsibility has, on the contrary, intensified the efforts of the entire Nation to continue the War to a decisive victory. This striving has become the more effective as it is now concentrated on a task within the understanding and grasp of all, that of driving back the enemy who has invaded the boundaries of our country. As stated in the aforementioned document, the Provisional Government, while defending the rights of our country, will observe in their entirety the obligations subsisting between us and our Allies. Fully convinced that, with complete agreement between the Allies, this War will end victoriously, the Provisional Government believes that the problems raised by the War will be best solved in the spirit of creating the basis for an enduring peace and that the progressive democracies who are of like mind will find means of providing the guarantees and sanctions indispensable to the prevention of future bloody conflicts."

This was the first violent shock of disillusion for the credulous defenders of their country. On the day this note was published the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) adopted at an extraordinary meeting the following resolution on the crisis caused by the Provisional Government's note:

"The Provisional Government's note has completely justified our Party's attitude as defined in the resolution of the Petrograd Town Conference under the following heads:

"(1) The Provisional Government is a completely imperialist government, tied hand and foot by Franco-British and Russian capitalism.

"(2) None of the promises which this Government has given, or may give (with reference to expressing the popular desire for peace), can be anything but fraudulent.

"(3) Quite independently of the persons composing it the Provisional Government can never renounce annexations, since the capitalist class, in this war and particularly at the present time, is a tool of banking capital.

"(4) This note once more unmasks the petty policy followed by the Narodniks, Mensheviks and by the majority of the leaders of the present Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, a policy which cherishes the illusive hope of reforming the capitalists (i.e., the Provisional Government) by 'suitable representations.'

"Faced by this state of affairs the Central Committee has declared:

"(i) Any change in the composition of the present Government (such as Miliukov's resignation, Kerensky's recall, etc.) would only be an imitation of the worst practices of capitalist democratic republicanism, which substitutes rivalries among cliques and personal intrigues for class warfare.

"(ii) The only salvation for the petty bourgeois masses, which vacillate between the capitalist and working classes, is their unconditional adherence to the proletarian cause which alone is capable of bursting the chains of capital and of the policy of annexation. Only the assumption of governmental power by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on behalf of the revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary soldiers and supported by the majority of the people can create a government which will have the confidence of the workers of all countries and which will put an end to the war by a genuinely democratic peace."

Eighteen—THE CRISIS IN THE GOVERNMENT

IN the afternoon of that day soldiers of the 180th Finnish Regiment and the Moscow Regiment, as well as sundry complete field companies and detachments of Marines, appeared before the Maria Palace with placards inscribed "Away with Miliukov," "Down with Miliukov!" In the evening placards were seen declaring "Down with the Provisional Government!" The soldiers refused to disperse except on being assured of the resignation of the Provisional Government, and broke up only after holding a meeting addressed by speakers of different parties. There were demonstrations attended by large crowds between 7 and 10 that evening in the Palace Square. Placards bearing the inscriptions, "Down with Miliukov!" and "Stop the War!" were carried by the demonstrators. These demonstrations went off in perfect quiet and order: the members of the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet were listened to without interruption and the crowds dispersed quietly. On the Palace Square there was also a crowded demonstration whose placards read "Confidence in the Provisional Government!" and where the cry was "Down with Lenin!" Advantage was taken of the absence of crowds of workers to arrest a few workmen. On the Nevsky Prospekt a collision took place between two processions of demonstrators; one consisting of workers, soldiers and sailors bearing placards inscribed "Down with Miliukov!" "Away with Miliukov!" "Peace without Annexations and Indemnities!"; the other of members of the middle class with white placards inscribed "Long live Miliukov!" In the skirmish which ensued the white placards were torn, whereon the petty bourgeois crowd gradually melted away. This was the first blood shed in the streets since the February days. In this manner the deceptive cloudlessness of the revolutionary sky was broken.

Manifestations, meetings and demonstrations took place in Petrograd during the whole of the next day, resulting in several armed encounters. The supporters of the Provisional Government began with a demonstration at which banners were borne with the inscription "Long live the Provisional Government!" "Long live Miliukov!" "Arrest Lenin!" Circulars published by the "Party of National Liberty" and calling for manifestations of confidence in the Provisional Government were posted up and distributed.

The demonstrations against the Provisional Government began about mid-day. A large crowd assembled at about 3 p.m. at the corner of the Nevsky Prospekt and the Catherine Canal to discuss current events. Collisions soon occurred, shots were fired, and people killed and wounded. At about 4 p.m. there was a bloody encounter in Kazan Street between two hostile processions of demonstrators, and two soldiers and one woman were seriously wounded. Towards eight o'clock a crowd of workers 15,000 strong started out from the Admiralty Office, where the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was sitting; battle songs were sung and banners carried, among the inscriptions being "Long live the Third International!" "Long live Socialism!" "Down with the Provisional Government!" "Long live the power of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies!" The greater part of the demonstration had already turned into the Sadovaya Road, when shots were fired into the crowd from a house at the corner of the Sadovaya and the Nevsky Prospekt. The crowd began to fire back, and a number of dead and wounded fell. The Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd Defence Area, General Korniloff, telephoned an order to the Artillery School that its two cannon should be moved out on the Palace Square. On receipt of this



A MASS MEETING in Petrograd: voting (by show of hands) for a Bolshevik resolution.

telephone message, a meeting of the officers and soldiers of the School decided not to obey General Korniloff's order and to refuse to give up the cannon. It was further decided to send a delegation to ascertain whether General Korniloff had acted with the sanction of the Petrograd Soviet. It was discovered that the order had been given without the consent of the Executive Committee. Two hours later there came a second order from General Korniloff, this time in writing, countermanding the first.

The Cabinet had deliberated on the text of the commentary to Miliukov's note up to 5 p.m., when it had been submitted to Tseretelli and approved by him. The wording of the commentary was such that doubts had arisen as to the interpretation of the Foreign Minister's Note which had been handed to the Allied Powers on April 11th together with the declaration on war aims. In view of these doubts the Provisional Government deemed it necessary to state that the Foreign Minister's Note had been the subject of careful and thorough deliberation among the Cabinet and that the text of the following commentary had been adopted unanimously: "It goes without saying that when this Note speaks of decisive victory it means the attainment of the aims contained in the declaration of April 11th. By the sanctions and guarantees of a lasting peace the Provisional Government means the limitation of armaments, establishment of international tribunals, etc. The commentary will be communicated by the Foreign Minister to the Allied Powers."

After examining the text of this commentary to Miliukov's Note the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies adopted the following resolution by 34 votes to 19: "The incident concerning the Note is to be regarded as closed: decisive steps should at once be taken to reinforce control over the activities of the Provisional Government, particularly of the Foreign Minister, and especially to insist that no important document should be sent out without the previous sanction of the Executive Com-

mittee and that a radical alteration must be made in Russia's diplomatic personnel abroad."

This resolution put to the plenary session of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies by the Executive Committee was adopted with 13 dissentients; it was the message of the Petrograd revolutionary democracy, whose meetings, demonstrations and resolutions had fully proved the interest with which it followed the problems of foreign politics and its fear of a relapse in this department towards the old policy of annexationist imperialism. Among the other contents of the resolution were the statements that the new commentary, published for all to see by the Provisional Government and handed to the Allied Powers by the Foreign Minister, made it impossible to interpret the Note in a manner contrary to the interests and demands of revolutionary democracy, that it should be considered as an important victory for democracy, and that the first step had been taken to bring up the question of renouncing forcible annexations for international discussion. Finally the resolution called for revolutionary Russia to rally more closely round its Soviets. The firm confidence was expressed that the peoples of the states at war would break down the resistance of their governments and compel them to enter into peace negotiations on the basis of renouncing annexations and indemnities.

Parallel to the events in Petrograd, Moscow also had its demonstrations. The workers marched out of the factories singing revolutionary songs, proceeded to the centre of the town and there held meetings where orators urged battle against the Provisional Government. The banners of the demonstrators bore the words, "Down with the Provisional Government!" "Down with Gutshkov and Miliukov!" "Down with the capitalist Government!" There was a particularly large number of placards bearing "Down with Miliukov!" The procession of demonstrators, singing the Marseillaise, moved to the building of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. From the window of this house the members of the Executive Committee exhorted the workers to remain quiet and to hold themselves prepared for organised action in case of need.

As a result of these events, came the first crisis in the Government. The Government decided to form a coalition with the socialists. On May 13th Gutshkov handed in his resignation from the War Ministry. Miliukov categorically refused to entertain the suggestion that he should exchange the portfolio of Foreign Affairs for that of Education and resigned ("I was made to go," as he said afterwards). After the retirement of Gutshkov and Miliukov, Kerensky was appointed Minister for War and Marine. The following ministerial posts were given to socialists: Agriculture (Tchernov, Social Revolutionary); Justice (Pereversev, Social Revolutionary); Food (Peschekhnov,



TSCHEIDZE, a Menshevik leader, at a meeting of sailors, March, 1917.

Populist); Labour (Skobolev, Social Democrat); Posts and Telegraphs (Tseretelli, Social Democrat). This second Government which issued its opening declaration on May 6th, is known as the "First Coalition Government." The socialists were in a minority in its Cabinet.*

The division of the ruling power and the coming struggle for the upper hand were clearly shown in the events of April. In an essay in *Pravda* of May 15th Lenin wrote: "All Russia still remembers the days from April 19th to 21st, when civil war threatened to break out in the streets of Petrograd.

"On April 21st the Provisional Government issued another placatory letter, in which it tried to explain its imperialist note of April 18th.

"Thereupon a majority of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies declared 'the incident to be closed.'

"A few days passed and the question of the coalition government arose. The Executive Committee was virtually split equally on this point: 23 voted against the Coalition Government and 22 for. The incident had only been 'settled' on paper. Once more a few days passed and we were faced by yet another 'incident.' War Minister Gutshkov, one of the leading members of the Provisional Government, announced his resignation. Rumours declare that the whole Provisional Government has retired (at the time of writing these lines we have no definite news of the retirement of the Government). Yet another 'incident' eclipsing its predecessors by its magnitude.

"Whence spring all these 'incidents'? Is there some basic cause which brings about an inevitable sequence of 'incidents'? Such a cause actually exists in the dual distribution of power, in the absence of equilibrium, which has resulted from the compromise between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

"The Provisional Government represents the rule of the capitalists and is not in a position to renounce annexations or to end the war of spoliation by a democratic peace. It must protect the interests of its class (i.e., the capitalist class) and the landed property of the landowners.

"The Soviet of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies represents quite different classes. Most of the workers and soldiers in the Soviet are against the war of spoliation; they are not interested in the profits of the capitalists, or in the property of the landowners. At the same time the confidence of the Soviet is offered to the Provisional Government. It desires an understanding and the maintenance of close contact with the Government.

"The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies contains the seed of power. In equal measure with the Provisional Government, the Soviet seeks for concrete manifestation of its powers in the various current problems. The result is a sharing of power, or more clearly what is now called the crisis of the struggle for power. Such a situation cannot drag on for long, as the circumstances are bound to produce a new 'incident' and new complications every day. One can write down on paper that 'the incident is settled,' for the simple reason that there are no 'incidents,' no trifling occurrences. They are merely the outer manifestations of a serious internal crisis. This is the consequence of the fact that the whole of humanity has been driven into a blind alley. The only possible way out of this war of spoliation is to take measures such as the Internationalists suggest.

* The extraordinary session of the Executive Committee on May 14th revised the hostile decision previously taken against the Coalition Government, and, by 44 votes against 19, with two abstentions, resolved to send representatives into the Government. The Mensheviks and the majority of the Social Revolutionaries were in favour of this resolution; the Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries were against it.

"Three courses are before the Russian People for ending the governmental crisis. Some say: Leave things as they have been and repose still more confidence in the Provisional Government. Perhaps the latter is only threatening to resign in order to force from the Soviet the declaration: 'We are willing to trust you still further.' The Provisional Government is fighting for the invitation: 'Come and rule, for without you the situation is impossible.' Another choice is that of a Coalition Government. Let us but share the Ministerial posts with Miliukov and his friends, let us but send a few of our men into the Government and you will see how the wind will change.

"The third course is the one we propose, a reversal of the whole policy of the Soviet. No confidence in the capitalists; the transfer of the whole power into the hands of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Juggling with individual changes is useless; it is policy which must be changed. A necessity exists for power to be taken by a different class. The Government of the Workers and Soldiers will have the confidence of the whole world, for everyone knows that workers and poor farmers desire no conquests. That is the only way to bring nearer the end of the war and to facilitate the victory over our economic decay.

"All power to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies! No confidence in the Government of the Capitalists!"

"Each successive 'incident' each day and hour will help to justify this war-cry of ours."

In an article in *Pravda* (No. 28, April 9th) about the sharing of power, Lenin thus



WAR TO THE END!—A demonstration of "Junkers" (cadets of the Officers' Training Schools) in Petrograd, March, 1917. The banner reads: "War for Liberty to the glorious end!"

analysed the relative strength and mutual attitude of the two parties who divided the power between them:

"The question at the root of every revolution is who shall govern. No responsible participation in a revolution, not to speak of leadership, can be said to exist without a clear conception on this point.

"An exceedingly curious peculiarity of our revolution is the fact that it has produced a partition of power. One must, first of all, enlighten oneself on this point, or else any progress is out of the question. The old 'formula' of Bolshevism must be revised and supplemented; as results have shown, they were on the whole sound, but their concrete realisation proved to be different in form. No one had ever before thought of this sharing of power, nor could have thought of it.

"Of what does this division of authority consist? It means that by the side of the Provisional Government, the rule of the capitalists, there has developed yet another power, which is as yet weak and present only in embryonic form, namely that of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

"Of what classes does this new power consist? The proletariat and the peasantry (dressed in the soldiers' uniforms). What is the political nature of their government? It is a revolutionary dictatorship; i.e., it is a power founded not upon laws formerly dictated by a central State authority, but on conquest by revolution and on the direct action of the masses of the people from below. It is a power quite different from the usual power in the parliamentary type of capitalist democratic republic, such as we have met up to now in the progressive countries of Europe and America. This circumstance is often forgotten and at times the nature of its composition is simply not thought of. This power is of the same type as the Paris Commune of 1871. The basic characteristics of this type are: (1) not laws, debated and passed by parliament, are the source of its power, but direct action by the mass of the people from below and in the State, the 'direct conquest of power' to use a current phrase; (2) the displacement of the police and army as institutions apart from and opposed to the people, the framework of the State being protected by the workers and peasants themselves, by the armed people; (3) the direct rule of the people is substituted for that of officials and bureaucrats, or at least a special control is established over the latter—they become bodies not only elective but removable by the single will of the people—in a word, from being a privileged class with high posts and good salaries they become just workers in a particular branch of labour with no salaries higher than the wage of a good worker.

"In this and this only consisted the special character of the Paris Commune as a particular type of government. This is its peculiarity which has been forgotten and distorted by men like Plehanov (unadulterated jingoes who betray Marxism) and Kautsky (the 'Centre' Party, i.e., vacillators between jingoism and Marxism) and generally all Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, etc., who have held power for awhile. People mouth phrases, keep silence, make evasions, congratulate each other over and over again upon the revolution; everything is done to avoid reflection on the nature of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. People will not see the obvious truth that in so far as these Soviets endure, in so far as they are the government, thus far there is in Russia a State of the type of the Paris Commune. I emphasise 'in so far as' for we have here a government only in embryo, a government which has delivered up and is still betraying its strongholds by direct compromises with the Provisional Government and by a series of actual concessions.

"What is the reason? Is it only because Tscheidze, Tseretelli, Steklov and their like

are making a mistake? Nonsense! A philistine can think like this, but not a Marxist. The reason is to be sought in the undeveloped political consciousness and the insufficient organisation of the workers and peasants. The 'mistake' of the above leaders lies in their bourgeois attitude, in that they obscure instead of enlighten the political consciousness of the workers, in that they strengthen the hold of the capitalists on the masses instead of liberating the masses.

"This will explain the many mistakes also made by those of our comrades who ask: 'Should the Provisional Government be overthrown at once?'

"My answer is: (1) being an externally imposed capitalist government it must be overthrown, as it is incapable of bringing peace, food and liberty; (2) to overthrow it at once is impossible as it maintains itself by an agreement, both direct and indirect in form and substance, with the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and especially with the most important one, the Petrograd Soviet; (3) it is absolutely impossible to overthrow it in the usual manner because it is supported by the capitalists and by the only alternative government, the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. This government is the only possible government which directly expresses the will of the majority of workers and peasants. A higher and better type of government than a Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies humanity has never created, and has hitherto not known.

"To become a government the class-conscious workers must win over the majority for themselves; as long as there is no power over the masses the way to dominion will be closed. We are not Blanquists, not adherents to the conquest of power by a minority. We are Marxists, adherents to the proletarian class-war against petty-bourgeois mania, against the jingoism of defence of country and against dependence on the bourgeoisie.


"We desire to create a proletarian Communist Party; its elements have already been created by the best supporters of Bolshevism. We want to unite ourselves for proletarian class co-operation, and from among the proletarians and poorest peasants an ever greater number will join us. For life will gradually destroy the petty-bourgeois illusions of the Social-Democrats, Tscheidze, Tseretelli, Steklov, etc., of the Social Revolutionaries and of the still "purer" petty-bourgeoisie, etc.

"The capitalists are for absolute dominion by the capitalists.

"The class-conscious workers are for the absolute dominion of the Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, for an absolute dominion to be obtained by clarifying the proletarian consciousness, by destroying capitalist influence, but not by the methods of an adventurer.

"The petty-bourgeoisie—'Social Democracy,' the Social Revolutionaries, etc., etc.—vacillates and is preventing this process of clarification, this destruction of capitalist influence.

"This is the actual class relation of forces which will determine our tasks."



TYPICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BOURGEOISIE, Russia, 1917. Second from the left, front row, is Riabushinski, the multi-millionaire.

Nineteen—THE ALL-RUSSIAN APRIL CONFERENCE OF THE BOLSHEVIKS

As early as the 21st April, immediately after the February revolution, Lenin wrote in the Central Organ of the Party, *Pravda*, that in the course of 20 years only the basis for a Communist mass party could be established from the best elements of Bolshevism. The April All-Russian Conference of the Bolsheviks, which was in session from 24 to 29 April (7 to 12 May new style) in Petrograd, was of particular importance for the establishment and consolidation of such a party.

During the first month of the revolution Bolshevik organisations grew particularly rapidly. The All-Russian Conference gave the Party above all the opportunity to survey its forces and to estimate its influence on the masses as well as to sum up the results of its work up to that moment. The growth of the membership of the Party was remarkable; 79,204 Party members were represented at the Conference (76,577 with voting rights, 2,627 with advisory rights). The distribution of organised Party members in some of the towns and districts was as follows: Petrograd about 14,600; Kronstadt about 3,000; Helsingfors about 3,000; Vyborg about 560; Peterhof about 50; Moscow area about 7,000; Ivano-Vosnesensk over 3,500; Tula over 300; Kostroma over 400; Sormovo over 2,000; Kanavino over 500; Samara over 2,700; Saratov about 1,000; Kazan about 400; Ekaterinoslav about 1,500; Lugansk about 1,500; Makejevka about 1,500 Ural District 16,000; Tiflis about 500, Ekaterinodar about 200. If this membership is compared with that in war time, it is found that in Petrograd the party increased its membership fifteen to sixteen-fold during the two revolutionary months, and in Ivano-Vosnesensk thirtyfold, etc.

In spite of these great preliminary successes in the conquest of the working class the majority of the workers were not yet with the Bolsheviks. The work of the Party in the Army was in some places very good (in Petrograd the military organisation of the Bolsheviks had about 6,000 members) but on the western front and on the Roumanian front the position was very bad. Though the Party gradually began to conquer the most progressive elements of the peasantry, namely the soldiers, the work in the villages was extremely weak.

On the 8th May Lenin in *Pravda*, set forth for the Bolsheviks their task of establishing an organisation which should be able to act "like a single individual," and in which there should be direct and continuous contact between the central committee and the districts, factories and troops; saying that this contact was to be of such a nature, "so strong, consolidated and authoritative as to render impossible any attack on the part of the enemy which could take it unawares." One can only speak in a very limited sense of a centralised leadership of the Party before the April Conference.

In Moscow the district administration was regarded as an "executive organ" (and not a directing organ) of the district members' general meeting. At the Petrograd town conference ideas were voiced according to which the Petrograd committee was to co-ordinate its functions with the central committee, but even this co-ordination was progressing badly. In the April days of 1917, for instance, the secretary of the Petrograd committee and the Petrograd committee itself called the workers on to the streets, in contravention of the decision of the central committee.

The organisational structure of the Party at that time was still so confused that in

several places there were still joint organisations of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks; the organisation from Tula, for example, refused to accept Lenin's Theses and sent no representative to the conference. Though Lenin's Theses of April, 1917 very rapidly won over a large number of Party organisations, there were among the Party members many differences of opinion and these were expressed at the conference.

The April Conference united the Party organisationally as well as ideologically on the basis of Lenin's principles.

The decisions reached by the All-Russian Party Conference show clearly that, in spite of a number of differences, in spite of Kamenev's opposition to Lenin, the conference reached a rare unanimity on the basic questions. The most important decisions, the resolutions on the war, on the agrarian question and on the Provisional Government were unanimously agreed upon, 7 to 11 members abstaining from voting among more than 140 delegates. The greatest differences of opinion existed on the question of nationality, where the resolution of the central committee showed 56 in favour and 16 against with 18 abstentions. The mistakes made by comrade Kamenev in his speech and in some of his *Pravda* articles arose, above all, from his misconception of Lenin's theory concerning the merging of the democratic revolution into a socialist one. In Kamenev's opinion the capitalist revolution must first be complete and only then begins the socialist revolution. At the same time his belief that the socialist revolution was to be accomplished by the proletariat alone, in opposition to the remaining part of the population, became clearly evident. Lenin's point of view led the proletariat to victory because it made it conditional upon the working class winning over the majority of the working population, while according to Kamenev the proletariat was in opposition to the enormous petty-bourgeois masses of the towns and villages, there being no hope that the proletariat would retain its role as the leading element during the course of the socialist revolution. This "left" standpoint on the question of the second (future) stage of the revolution went hand in hand with opportunist views in the estimation of class forces during the present phase of the revolution. Thus there was talk about the capacity of the petty-bourgeoisie to create a dictatorship independent of the capitalists, also about the inevitability of encounters between the petty-bourgeoisie (and consequently their parties, the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries) and the imperialist bourgeoisie, etc. In reality the months following April, 1917, proved just the contrary. The April theses of Kamenev helped only to obscure the consciousness of the proletariat and portrayed the role of the petty-bourgeoisie from quite a wrong angle.

Comrade Kamenev's standpoint only found support among a few people at the conference. This was also the case with several other incorrect views, as for instance comrade Rykov's statement that "The slogan of the proletarian revolution could not be issued in the most backward, petty-bourgeois country," and that "the attack for the social revolution must come from the West."

The "left" standpoint during the discussions on the question of nationalities (represented at the conference by comrade Piatakov) suffered from the basic error of all ultra-left doctrines: it falsely estimated the tasks of the proletariat in the conquest of the majority of the workers, and in its practical policy it slid into petty-bourgeois ways. Comrade Piatakov made an energetic stand against the correct attitude that "all the nations included in Russia must be given the right of self-determination and the right of forming independent States." To contest this right would have resulted in an actual weakening of the influence of the Russian working class on the working masses of Poland, the Ukraine, etc. The

Russian working class had to show its attitude towards the right of self-determination of nations by deeds, in order thus to ensure that the nations previously oppressed by Tsarism should voluntarily join the new Soviet State. Actually the "left" project of comrade Piatakov worked out at the same as that of the opportunists who were already beginning to defend the "Rights" of the Russian State as a "great Power."

Even the Menshevik "Chronicle of the Revolution" (Petrograd, 1924, Byloye, page 272) states that at the conference "Lenin's ideological influence was indisputable" and that "Lenin's statement on the war found unanimous approval." The resolution on the war is the most important decision of the conference. It is here quoted in full.

RESOLUTION ON THE WAR.

(Unanimously adopted with 7 abstentions.)

I.

"The present war is an imperialist war for both opposing groups of belligerents. That is to say, the capitalists are engaged in it for the sake of the apportionment of the profits resulting from a domination of the world, for the sake of markets, for finance (bank) capital, and for the sake of the oppression of weaker people, etc. Every day of the war serves still further to enrich the financial and industrial capitalists; more and more exhausts and destroys the power of the proletariat and the peasantry of all belligerent and even neutral States. In Russia the extension of the war also endangers the achievements of the revolution and its further development.

"The transference of State power into the hands of the Provisional Government—a government of landowners and capitalists—could not alter the character and the significance of the war for Russia.

"This fact became specially obvious when the Provisional Government not only did not publish the secret treaties made between ex-Tsar Nicholas II. and the capitalist governments of England, France, etc., but formally confirmed the free plundering of China, Persia, Turkey, Austria, etc. promised in these treaties, without the sanction of the people of Russia. The concealment of these treaties makes it possible to deceive the Russian people as to the real character of the war.

"Therefore a proletarian party cannot give support either to the present war or to the present government; nor can it support their loans, without completely breaking with internationalism; that is, with the fraternal solidarity of the workers of all countries in their struggles against the capitalist yoke.

"The promise of the present government to renounce all annexations, that is, to renounce the conquest of foreign territory or the forcible retention of any nationality in the Russian Union of States, is not worthy of the least confidence. For, firstly, the capitalists who are connected by a thousand threads with bank capital cannot renounce annexations without at the same time renouncing their milliards of profits invested in loans, concessions, war industrial concerns, etc.; secondly, the new government, which in order to deceive the people renounced any form of annexation, stated through its mouthpiece Miliukov, on the 9th April, 1917, at Moscow, that it would not renounce annexations. The note of 18th April and the explanatory note of the 22nd April confirmed this annexationist policy of the government.

"The Conference warns the people of the empty promises of the capitalists and declares that renunciation on paper must be carefully distinguished from renunciation in fact, which

would occur if the robber-like secret treaties were immediately published and annulled, and if the right were granted to all nations to decide by a free vote whether they desired to be independent States or whether they wished to be attached to an already existing State of their own choice.

II.

"The so-called 'revolutionary system of defence,' which is holding its sway in Russia over the parties of the Narodniki (National Socialists, Trudoviki, Social Revolutionaries), the opportunist Menshevik parties (Tscheidze, Tseretelli, etc.), and the majority of non-party revolutionaries, represents, from the class standpoint, the interests and attitude of the rich peasants and partly also of the middle peasants. These, just like the capitalists, secure their profits by overpowering weaker people. On the other hand, this revolutionary defence has resulted from the swindle which the capitalists have practised on the proletarians and semi-proletarians of the town, although these latter, corresponding to their class position, have no interest in the profits of capitalists and hence no interest in the imperialist war.

"The Conference deems it absolutely inadmissible to allow any concession to the conception of 'revolutionary defence.' Such a concession would, in its belief, amount to a break with internationalism and with socialism. The party will fight any such 'defensive' mood which may affect the vast masses of the people, by a continuous repetition of the axiom that any confidence in the capitalist Government, any non-class-conscious attitude towards it, is, at the moment, the greatest obstacle to a speedy termination of the war.

"With reference to the most important question of how this war of the capitalists can be ended most rapidly and at the same time not by force but by a truly democratic peace, this conference has come to the following decision :

"This war cannot be ended by the soldiers of one belligerent group refusing to continue the war, nor by one of the belligerent parties simply suspending military operations.

"The conference makes repeated protests against the mean slander disseminated by the capitalists against our Party, namely, that we are in favour of a separate peace with Germany. We regard German capitalists as just the same kind of robbers as the Russian, English, French, etc., and Kaiser William as just as much a crowned robber as Nicholas II. and the English, Roumanian, Italian and all other monarchs.

"Our party will patiently, yet obstinately, always put before the people the truth that wars are waged by governments, that wars are inseparably connected with the policies of definite classes and that the present war can only be terminated by a democratic peace when all power in the State, in at least a few belligerent countries, shall have been transferred into the hands of that class of proletarians and semi-proletarians who are in fact able to break the yoke of capital.

"In the event of the revolutionary class seizing power in Russia it would adopt such measures for the destruction of the economic power of the capitalists that they would be rendered absolutely harmless. An open offer would at once be made to all peoples for a democratic peace, and all annexations and indemnities would be renounced. Such a measure and such an open peace offer would restore full mutual confidence between the workers of the belligerent States and would lead inevitably to revolts of the proletariat against those imperialist governments which are opposed to such a peace offer.

"As long, however, as the revolutionary class in Russia does not take power into its hands, so long will our Party support with all its strength those foreign proletarian parties and groups who already during the war—not by words, but by deeds—have carried on a

revolutionary campaign against their own imperialist governments and against their own bourgeoisie. The Party will give particular support to the mass fraternisation at the front of the soldiers of all belligerents and will try to transform this spontaneous expression of the solidarity of the oppressed into a conscious and, if possible, organised movement, whose aim will be the transference of the whole State power in all the belligerent countries into the hands of the revolutionary proletariat."

An equally important resolution was the one about the agrarian question; for this was just the point on which the basic question of the revolution was to be decided: the question of the entry of the peasantry as allies of the proletariat and under the leadership of the latter.

RESOLUTION ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

(Adopted unanimously; 11 abstentions.)

"The existence of the landlord system of landownership in Russia forms the material basis for the power of the feudal nobility and a guarantee for the eventual return to a monarchy. Such a system of landownership inevitably condemns the vast majority of Russia's people—the peasants—to misery, enslavement and dire despair and leads to a general backwardness of the whole country in every sphere of life.

"Peasant ownership of land in Russia, i.e., allotments (communal land and individually owned land) as well as land privately acquired (mortgaged and purchased land), is in every way influenced by customs and usages and by an existing relationship handed down from the times of slavery. Thus we find peasants classified according to ranks, we have the scattered lands, etc.

"The underlying reason for all the efforts of the peasants to nationalise the land of the State is the need for eliminating all such obsolete and harmful relics of the past; the need for 'unhedging' the land and for re-establishing a connection between landownership and agriculture.

"However petty bourgeois are the utopias with which all Narodniks clothe the peasant's fight against feudal ownership and against the fetters of slavery in landownership and land revenue, this fight nevertheless amounts to nothing less than a bourgeois democratic, entirely progressive and economically determined effort to break all these barriers.

"The nationalisation of the land, considered as a bourgeois measure, represents the highest possible phase of the class war in capitalist society and the liberation of land exploitation from bourgeois appendages. Besides, the act of land nationalisation, the elimination of private ownership in land, would in actual practice deal such a heavy blow at private property, which extends to all means of production, that the party of the proletariat must always render aid to any such transformation.

"On the other hand, from the peasant owners of Russia there has already long arisen a peasant bourgeoisie, and Stolypin's agrarian reform has certainly strengthened, multiplied and consolidated these elements. At the opposite pole of the peasant population the agricultural labourers, the proletarians and their nearly related semi-proletarian peasants have been strengthened and multiplied.

"The more decisive and consequential the defeat and elimination of landlordism (the bourgeois-democratic transformation of agrarian conditions) in Russia, the quicker and more powerful will be the development of the class war between land proletariat and peasant owners (peasant bourgeoisie).

"In the event that the proletarian revolution in Europe, just beginning, does not exert an immediate and powerful influence on our country, the fate and the issue of the Russian revolution will depend upon the question whether the town proletariat will succeed in carrying along with it the peasant proletarians and semi-proletarians or whether these will follow the peasant bourgeoisie who tend towards an alliance with Gutshkov, Miliukov, the capitalists, the landowners and the counter-revolution in general.

"This conference, basing itself upon the class situation and the existing distribution of forces resolves:

"(1) That the proletarian party fights with all its might for the immediate and complete confiscation of all landed property in Russia (including domains, appanages, monastery and church lands, etc.).

"(2) The party is resolved in favour of an immediate transference of all lands to the peasantry organised in the soviets of peasant deputies or in other bodies of local self-government, elected in an absolutely democratic manner and independent of landowners and officials.

"(3) The party demands the nationalisation of all lands in the State. Nationalisation means the transference of all property rights to the State. Thus it entails the right of land distribution by the democratic local bodies.

"(4) The party must lead a decisive campaign against the Provisional Government, which, through Shingariov and by collective proclamations, tries to force the peasants into a 'voluntary understanding' with the landowners—a reform for the benefit of landowners—and which threatens the peasants with punishment in case of their 'helping themselves'—the forcible suppression of the majority of the population by the minority (the landowners and the capitalists). The party must also lead a campaign against the petty-bourgeois vacillations of the majority of the Narodniks and the Mensheviks, who advise the peasants against the confiscation of land before the calling of the Constituent Assembly.

"(5) The party advises the peasants to seize the whole land systematically, without permitting any compensation and to see to it that an increase of production shall result.

"(6) All agrarian changes can only be successful and permanent if the State is made completely democratic, i.e., on the one hand after the dismissal of the police, the standing army and the privileged bureaucracy, and on the other hand after the introduction of the most far-reaching local self-government, which must be entirely independent from control and patronage from above.

"(7) Immediate steps must be taken to create separate organisations of the land proletariat in the form of soviets of agricultural labourers' deputies (also soviets of deputies of the semi-proletarian peasantry) as well as an organisation of proletarian groups or fractions in joint soviets of peasant deputies independent of all the bodies of local and urban government, etc.

"(8) The party must support the initial growth of those peasant committees which in many districts of Russia put into the hands of the peasants organised in these committees the inventories of the live and dead stock of the landlords, for the purpose of a joint regularised general agricultural development.

"The party of the proletariat must advise all proletarians and semi-proletarians to promote the establishment of extensive model farms on every estate. The costs of management must be provided by the soviets of landworkers' deputies, directed by agronomists, and the best technical means must be adopted."

Lenin's famous Theses of the 4th April were fully adopted on the fundamental questions. The task of obtaining power by the winning over of the majority of the workers and of establishing a democratic, proletarian, peasant, non-bourgeois republic was clearly put before the Party. This, in conjunction with the methods of transition to socialism, with the organising and arming of the proletariat, showed the need for establishing a new type of State.

With reference to international co-operation the Party decided at the April conference to take the initiative in creating a third International which would make a final break with the opportunists and would also carry on an energetic campaign against the bastard policy of the Centrists (the thing in mind at the time was the existing state of the parties represented at the conferences in Zimmerwald and Kienthal). The conference also decided to revise the Party program, carefully outlined its relations to the Mensheviks (i.e., decreed the imperative need for the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the joint organisations) and elected the first central committee of the Party. The April conference completed the period of the re-orientation of the Party (March-April, 1917); the Party left the conference united on the basis of Lenin's Theses. The conference was an essential stage in the process of the birth and growth and strengthening of a real communist mass party.



JULY—The demonstration described in Chapter 22, when the workers of Petrograd protested against the offensive on the South-Western Front.

Twenty—THE ARMY, AND THE JUNE-JULY OFFENSIVE

THE capitalists dealt a heavy blow at the working class when the Russian army attacked the German lines, an attack which resulted in failure and retreat. Our description of the March overthrow contained an official report made by the Duma deputy Janushkevitch on the position at the front (see page 112). Before quoting a connected description of the June-July offensive written by A. Shliapnikov, a quotation is given from N. Krylenko about the army at the front.

"Our sketch is confined to an analysis of the first revolutionary period (February-July) because this period exhibits clearly the problem of the class character of the peasant army. Already in this period the army displayed the characteristics of a revolutionary mass force, potential rather than real, and one round which the already formed and crystalised political groups had arranged themselves in active conflict. The social conduct of the army was thus more distinctly expressed in this period than in the period July to October, when it had already appeared as a completely developed political force subject to definite political influences, or during October to March, when in fact it had undergone disintegration and was politically disabled.

"This army, rural in character, constitution and ideology, can here be regarded as a mass of armed, organised peasants, left entirely to its own resources; in other words, a peasantry combined in one organisation which has made its appearance in the political arena. Such a combination of peasants in one mass organisation is a phenomenon of very rare, nay, even unique, occurrence. In our political analysis of the army's attitude during the February revolution we shall proceed from this point of view. We are concerned only with the army on active service, the soldiers who were at the front and in the trenches. The army at home does not really represent an army in the fullest sense of the word: it included the partly revolutionised, politically conscious regiments of the garrisons stationed in the capitals—these could in no way be regarded as displaying the political feeling of the army as a whole—and the so-called Reserve, containing the 'Detachment of Convalescents' and the 'Last Reserve of the 2nd category,' the 'Forty-Year Olds' (that is older peasants) as they were called. These manifested in particular the specific ideology and psychology of the village at home but were not representative of the army as such. The army on active service was a political unit, because it was free from those peculiar factors of disintegration and disorganisation characteristic of the village, and therefore of the Reserve force, although its political ideology contained all the characteristics evidenced by the peasant masses as a whole.

"What, then, was the nature of the army as a whole in the period immediately preceding the February revolution? To give some idea of the feelings shown in this period I should like to describe two incidents of which I was an eye-witness and which have fixed themselves in my memory. The first incident occurred at a parade held in December, 1916, by a regiment stationed on the south-west front in occupied Austrian territory. It happened, therefore, on foreign territory, in the midst of a foreign people, where Russian officers certainly looked upon themselves as victors. The second episode occurred immediately afterwards when the regiment had taken its position just behind the firing line.

"The regimental commander delivered an address to the regiment drawn up in battalion formation. He spoke with much resentment about Germany's separate peace offer to Russia and told them enthusiastically about the Tsar's refusal of negotiations. The war would be continued to a glorious end. He completed his speech with the customary cheers for the Tsar and the Army. But, contrary to expectations, very few of the rank and file responded. There was no thundering 'Hurrah!' such as had followed any similar invitation in the past—an enthusiastic cheer probably resulting from a respect for orders or perhaps simply from habit. The general impression created by this incident greatly disheartened even the officers. In the rear lines, whither the rank and file had dispersed during the cold, and where the knowledge was spreading that they would soon return to the front line, one feeling prevailed, there was only one subject of discussion: a deep indignation against the Tsar, a unanimous protest against the continuance of the war. So unanimous was this protest that the soldiers displayed a complete absence of restraint in their manner of referring to the Tsar and to the officers.

"The second episode, as already stated, happened in the front line. We had then taken up our position on the Stochod, that accursed rivulet, which everyone who had to spend the autumn and winter of 1916 there probably remembers.

"An order had come to us from Headquarters to get prisoners at any price because it was necessary to determine the composition and distribution of the hostile troops. According to the peculiar tariff obtaining in the old army a prisoner from a Polish detachment was valued at 5 roubles, while a German was valued at 20 roubles. As I was making my rounds in the foremost trenches while on duty, I noticed a patrol, which had just returned with two Austrian prisoners, reporting to a company commander. The company commander was highly pleased and promised these 'splendid fellows' the Cross of St. George, and at once, seated in front of his fire, wrote out a report of the affair. In his despatch he stated that 'these splendid fellows' had come upon an enemy patrol between the trenches and the barbed wire, had taken the Austrians prisoners with their naked hands, as it were, and had driven them into our positions without firing a single shot. When the report was completed the company commander handed it over to the patrol and sent them to headquarters with the prisoners.

"Our road was the same and I joined them. On the way the patrol told me something which differed entirely from the report. Actually, when they had met the Austrians the patrol had no intention of attacking them or of shooting at them, the question was simply and clearly put in this way: 'Shall we come to you, or will you come to us?' After careful consideration it was decided that it was better 'with us,' and so the Austrians together with their 'conquerors' made their way to the Russian lines. Such conditions were to be found everywhere. The officers often wondered why, in spite of the nearness of hostile forces, there was no firing between the trenches. The officers puzzled about the reason for the apparent absence of the enemy. The solution of the riddle was very simple. The cessation of the firing was, as a rule, due to a joint agreement between the soldiers of both armies. The patrols on both sides served a useful purpose. This occurred most often when we were confronted by Poles or Austrians.

"These two events are significant because they reflect clearly and exactly the political mood of the army on the eve of the February revolution. The army on the whole had but one desire and but one thought: Peace. It was tired of war, it was hostile to the officers apart from the question of its political transformation. On the whole it was a passive peas-

ant mass, which regarded its part in the war as a heavy cross, which, though it must be carried, was to be thrown down at the first opportunity.

"The main characteristic of the army at this time was its passivity.

"I recollect a scene which I myself often witnessed during the so-called 'night operations.'

"From time to time separate companies of men were sent to the advance lines in order to repair barbed wire entanglements and construct new trenches, etc. It was necessary to do the work at night—the enemy prevented it during the day—although rockets and searchlights lit up the space between the opposing lines of trenches and though the wandering bullets hummed their long-drawn lamentations. As a rule the company had to march along in Indian file, carrying pegs, beams, wire and other materials as well as tools on their shoulders. After having reached the front line the men had to step into the open field entirely unprotected or work right underneath the barbed wire entanglements. I could not, in the beginning, grasp why the soldiers displayed such calmness while exposed to the rifle fire, why they never tried to evade the bullets which were whizzing past them; how they could face the bullets with indifference, though entirely unprotected, as if a still, peaceful, undisturbing darkness was enveloping them. When I asked them about it they replied: 'The bullets can't hit everyone' or 'If I am wounded I shall get home all the sooner.' The last answer gives an insight into their attitude.

"Such was the feeling in the trenches before the revolution. Already a muffled dissatisfaction prevailed but it had not as yet become an articulate protest. The mere thought of making actual demands had not yet occurred to the masses. The putting forward of political questions was impossible, largely because the newspapers never came anywhere near the front and those that managed to get there were disregarded by the soldiers. Revolutionary organisations were not at hand. Among the officers, even those second lieutenants and lieutenants who had sprung from liberal minded intellectual circles occupied themselves on the days of rest in nothing but eternal card playing, dreams of leave and talks about military distinctions. This section consisted principally either of military officials or of ex-telegraphists, ex-postal officials and similar elements who had had the luck to pass through an officer's school at home. These were, in any case, not those intellectuals who had entered the army in the first years of the war as second lieutenants of the Reserve and who had either been killed already or had been promoted.

"Notwithstanding this the army represented potentially an enormous dissatisfied mass which was only waiting for something to happen but was not yet conscious of the way in which this dissatisfaction could express itself. Its demand was 'Peace, peace at any price!'

"The February revolution found the army in this mood. We learned about it fairly late in the day (18th March). On the 13th March (28th February), the very same day that the workers of Leningrad were standing on the barricades of the capital side by side with the soldiers, our regiment had to fight an unseen enemy, who bombarded us with poison shells as we were taking up new positions. The battalion which I led lost about 60 men as it crossed an open track which was subjected to the enemy's fire. The next few days passed in reinforcing the broken ranks and restoring the lines. But on the 16th March one could already feel that something had happened. First the battalion commanders vanished from the trenches. They were called to regimental headquarters and did not return for some considerable time. From the train all sorts of rumours oozed through together with the provisions. Our officer's orderly circulated the rumour in our company and all over our section

of trenches which it occupied. It was contained in the following sentence: 'The Tsar has run away and so has his little son.' The soldiers whispered in corners. The first definite news came to us from a German aeroplane, which flew over us at a low altitude and threw leaflets into the trenches. These leaflets contained the following Russian text: 'Petrograd is in the grip of revolution. All ministers are imprisoned. The garrison of 30,000 men is on the side of the rebels.'

"The Germans brought us the first news about the revolution. From the Germans the Russian army learned of the revolution and the fall of the old regime. The leaflet was naturally handed over at once to the superior officers, but the temper of the men became more turbulent and more threatening until the arrival from regimental headquarters of the official order which was to be read to all companies and which contained the abdication of Nicholas, the appointment of Michael as his successor and Michael's refusal to mount the throne before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. This official *communiqué* loosened all tongues and, for the first time, open political discussions were heard in the trenches.

"The first result of the revolution was totally unexpected by the officers. This was an unspoken agreement among the soldiers, along the whole length of the front of about 1,000 versts, 'to make no offensive under any circumstances.'

"This passive silent sabotage of the war was the first response of the peasant army to the revolution. The army did not reply with the slogan of revolutionary action, nor with the slogan of the overthrow of the new government, nor even with an effort to get at an understanding of these recent events, but with the typical, specific, rural formula of passive protest: 'Hold the Front! No offensive!' with the emphasis naturally on the second phrase.

"From this moment onward the discipline of the old army absolutely ceased to be a force controlled by the conductor's baton of the officers. From this moment onward the old Tsarist army terminated its existence and converted itself into a peasant mass gradually becoming conscious of its own power, a mass which knew but one thing: that it desired no more war and was not going to be used for any offensive.

"In this manner the first fateful change in the army occurred.

"During the period immediately following the news of the revolution, I was sent behind the lines to a chemical school which stood about 10 versts distant from the trenches. I was there to obtain 'chemical proficiency.'

"Thus I was placed in a position where I could observe events with greater freedom and where I could begin an extensive agitation among the surrounding troops. Only once did I address a large meeting, and then it was to the chemical corps. I described the most recent happenings. The knowledge of this meeting spread rapidly and from all detachments delegates approached me with the request that I should address them on the same theme. The political situation was by no means clear to me. I was out of touch with the central party organs and was thus forced to depend entirely upon myself. So it went on until May, when for the first time I was able to leave the front for Petrograd. One thing, however, was clear from the first. The political feeling of the peasant army had already assumed a definite form and the form was the one of which I have already spoken. No effort of the officers could persuade the soldiers to believe in the need for an offensive and the continuance of the war to a victorious end. Nor could it alter their obstinate, definite attitude. The army was ready to wait patiently a little longer and hold the front. But that was all.

"On the question of its attitude to the Provisional Government the army was completely at a loss. The dominant formula here, just as at home, was 'Support the

Provisional Government in so far as it does not betray the interests of the working masses.'

"Meanwhile, it was not possible at the front to call attention to the fact that such a government could in no way further the interests of the working masses. An attempt of such a kind on my part had more of a negative than a positive result.

"It seemed that I predicted new difficulties in place of the hoped-for relief. Although I received an address (some kind of illuminated address as far as I remember) wherein it was written that the troops shared my view that the political horizon was very clouded, that the most difficult fight was still to come, and that they found themselves in duty bound to fight in the forefront of the battles of the revolutionary people, the impression was yet disheartening and these promises did not inspire me with much confidence.

"In this first period of the revolution only the question of the relation between rank and file and officers was seriously considered in the army.

"The period March-May can be designated as the period of the gradual separation of the army from the officers. The old discipline, the old fear of the superior vanished more and more completely; cases of expressly hostile stands taken by the soldiers against the emissaries of the Provisional Government accumulated, while revolutionary fraternising with the enemy affected an ever wider circle of soldiers in the trenches.

"This latter phenomenon was the second form of expression of the political independence of the peasant army. Fraternisation was spontaneous and unorganised practically everywhere. In this connection the night of the 27th April was typical (i.e., Easter eve), when the soldiers informed me that there was no cause for worry, that though the Germans would allow the minethrowers to play no one would be hurt, that after midnight these too would stop and complete silence would reign. All this actually happened. On the following morning one could see in the space between our trenches and those of the Austrians a typical scene of good tempered conversations, laughter, discussions on political themes and on the way in which to end the war. I went over to the Germans with the soldiers and was there received in just as friendly a manner until a German officer arrived, dispersed his men and threatened to have me shot if I didn't get out.

"The only concession he made was not to shoot until I reached our barbed wire. When I returned to my company I was immediately summoned to regimental headquarters, where I was severely reprimanded. The soldiers thereupon sent a deputation to the regimental commander threatening to do away with the whole staff if repressive measures were taken against me. That was indeed a plain threat, a direct transition to revolutionary procedure.

"From this time onward our Officers' Corps ceased to be an organ of power. The army began creating all their own organisations, which sprung up spontaneously and independently in the most varied forms and on the basis of manifold election standards. Only in rare cases did these recognise a general right of voting.

"As a rule the most intelligent of the officers, or those in nearest contact with the masses, were elected, who in most cases were Liberal, Menshevik or right-socialist revolutionary intellectuals. In no instance were active officers elected. Here, too, the social composition and the psychological traits of the peasant made themselves felt. This was only a peculiar reflection of what took place at the same time at home, where, in the soviets, the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary Labour deputies were the real rulers. In the army these tendencies also predominated. The Bolsheviks were only strong on the west front, where the comrades Miasnikov and Skliansky, since dead, were at work. On the north front they were weaker, in the south-west they were spread out in small groups and on the Roumanian

front only individuals could be found, while on the Caucasian front they were apparently entirely lacking.

"Gradually, however, the political horizon of the army cleared up. The peasant masses came over to the Bolsheviks and fought not only against Gutshkov, but also against the Right Social Revolutionary-Menshevik bloc.

"In this connection it is important to notice the first army congress of the 11th Army with a Social Revolutionary Menshevik majority. I myself attended this congress and, in consequence of the lack of clarity in the general political outlook of the delegates, was even elected chairman of the army committee. On the other hand it was characteristic that the temper which already prevailed among the masses could only be given vent to after the army congress. At the conference of my division on the 1st of May, where I represented the army committee, all regiments appeared with white banners. Only my own regiment came with a red flag bearing an inscription: 'Long live the International! Long live the class war and the social revolution!' From the practical standpoint the conference did not deal with the slogan of the social revolution but with the slogan of a separate peace.

"The actual and intelligible policy at home of a campaign against the Provisional Government was here in no sense existent.

"The question of world revolution was merely academic at the front. For the vast masses of the peasants the slogan of a separate peace was the only intelligible one on political grounds. It was, however, not as yet possible to formulate this cry since it had not yet been authorised by the Bolshevik Party. In such circumstances no unequivocal and exact answer could be given to the soldiers on the question as to whether a separate peace should or should not be made. The masses in the meantime desired a concrete answer to this question. The demand that the revolutionary government should immediately approach all governments with a general peace offer was perfectly intelligible to the masses, while the slogan: 'Away with the capitalist ministers of the Government!' did not satisfy them in the least. The army wanted but one slogan: 'Peace at any price; even though it means a separate peace.'

"On the one hand were the concrete demands of the masses and on the other hand the political necessity of a policy of waiting, which crippled the revolutionary bodies and led to a crisis in the army committees, where I and a small group of supporters were forced to go into opposition. The first 11th Army Congress held in June already showed two lots of delegates—a majority bloc of Social Revolutionary Mensheviks, and a minority of Bolshevik elements.

"Such was the feeling of the army from May to June. At the congress of the delegations from the field army held in May, the soldiers from the front came forward openly in the Tauride Palace demanding a separate peace.

"The only slogan which could be appreciated at this time by the peasants as a class, as a social group, as an independent force, was thus the slogan of peace, which, however, was unacceptable to the bourgeoisie and was bound to result in a conflict between the bourgeoisie and the army. It was only the working class, under Bolshevik leadership, which could become a real ally of the peasantry in the solution of this question. Thus grew the social force whose mission was to realise the objects of the revolution. Although the Bolsheviks were represented by a minority of hardly a hundred during the First Soviet Congress in June their aims even at that time were those of the majority, not only in Petrograd, but also amongst the whole population and in the army. It was the confidence Lenin felt

in this not quite crystallised majority which made him dare to hurl his reply at Kerensky when the latter asked whether any political party had at that moment the courage to take power into its hands. 'Yes, there is such a party, our party of the Bolsheviks.'

"Here our short description of the army during the first period of the revolution might end. None the less another characteristic passage concerning life in the army is quoted here. I have in mind the movement of the so-called 'Forty-Year Olds,' of those older peasants who were the last to be mobilised by Tsarism. When they were sent to the front they put forward only one demand as a rule, namely, 'That they might be given new foot rags'; under this condition they promised to go to the front. Naturally they would not have gone to the trenches even had this demand been fulfilled, the foot rags were here only a variety of that sabotage of the war which was practised by the whole army.

"As is well known this fact became more evident during the days following the July rebellion, when the incompetence of the peasants to carry on an independent policy found expression in the well known 1st July (18th June) offensive. The army undertook this offensive at Kerensky's request, only to disperse immediately after the first failure and to flee in a terror of panic."

This ends the account of N. Krylenko, who was an eye-witness of the events at the front and an active participant in the revolutionising work in the army. We now give an account of the July offensive written by A. Shliapnikov from materials found in the archives:

"The general reports of headquarters on the situation in the army between the 23rd and 30th June give the following picture of the army's attitude towards the offensive.

"*North Front*: the attitude to the coming offensive is a very passive one. In several units opposition is expressed against the offensive. In consequence of this the redistribution of the troops is not everywhere accomplished without friction, since not only regiments, but also divisions must first be convinced of the need for action and for the occupation of new positions. The most excited mood is prevalent in the First Corps, so that the commander of the 5th Army has made a request for the appointment of a commissar and for the sending of delegates from the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies for the whole duration of the operations which are being prepared.

"*West Front*. In the units where feeling is changeable one cannot assume with certainty that the troops will obey the orders for the offensive. In Regiment No. 700 of the 175th Division the offensive was expressly opposed and it was said that no obligation rested on them to obey the orders of the Government. Threats were also made that in case of a failure they would revenge themselves on the officers. According to information coming from the chairman of the divisional committee a small, insufficiently enlightened group was active in this regiment, among whom were also several deserters recently arrived in the regiment.

"*South-West Front*. In many units at the front there is a demand among the soldiers for an early offensive. In the meantime, however, this readiness must be viewed with caution. The new reserves contain many people who do not want the war to continue and hinder the creation of an efficient army. An outstanding protest against the offensive is nowhere to be found. The army committees and the officers must however make an effort to retain a fighting spirit and must persuade their commands of the necessity for an offensive.

"*Roumanian Front*. No desire for an offensive can be observed in most units. Requests for an offensive are taken up with reserve. In the 2nd and 36th Army Corps the attitude taken up on the subject of an offensive is a rather critical one. They demand big reserves



ALBERT THOMAS, a Labour leader, the French Minister for Munitions during the war, and now Director of the International Labour Office, Geneva, urges "war to the glorious end" in the name of Socialism.

and strong preparations by the heavy artillery. The majority of the soldiers want to stay behind the lines. There is no guarantee whatever that an order for attack will be obeyed.'

"On the 1st of July there began the offensive prepared by the 7th and 11th Armies and eagerly awaited by capitalist Russia. The change in the feeling of the soldiers and their altered attitude towards the offensive can be judged by the report issued by headquarters between the 1st and 8th July at the height of the success of the offensive operations.

"In the armies on the North front the attitude towards the offensive is still unfavourable, particularly in certain units. In the 1st and 12th Armies a certain improvement is noticeable in this connection. Individual units of the army in the field have congratulated the chief commander for the successes on the South-West front and have expressed a desire to be included in the Death Battalions. With few exceptions there were no excesses and incidents in the 22nd Division. On the 5th July five hundred men and one officer from one regiment of this division appeared at a meeting of the Petrovsky regiment. They carried a poster bearing an inscription "Down with the offensive!" and beat two speakers who had called for the carrying out of the order for an offensive. The incident is now being exam-

ined. The position of the officers is unavoidably difficult, their work is often hindered in an insulting manner. The work of the unit committees does not as yet show the desired results, on account of the unsettled condition of their organisation.'

"On the West Front the commanders found that, as a result of the success in the south, the demand for an offensive had undoubtedly grown; how long, however, this change of mood would last, it was difficult to predict.

"The troops often express the desire to engage in action, but at the same time refuse to execute the order to occupy the front positions. (Siberian Regiments Nos. 1 and 8, Regiment No. 218 of the 55th Division, the whole of the 2nd Caucasian Grenadier Division and the whole 169th Division, the 16th Siberian Guards, the Regiment No. 203 of the 51st Division and 246 of the 62nd Division, the Siberian Guard Regiments 51, 62 and 63). The reasons for refusal vary greatly; it generally follows the putting forward of various demands which are often absolutely nonsensical. In Regiment No. 675 the regimental conference passed a resolution in which an allowance settlement was demanded (25 roubles for a 2nd lieutenant and 5 roubles bonus for each higher man; in addition the return of the former divisional commander and his assignment to service in the reserve company of the regiment).

"Often there is a refusal to occupy the trenches on the grounds that these are in too bad a condition or that there is not enough artillery.

"In the Siberian Regiment No. 63 the soldiers categorically refused to work in the trenches and at the same time decided not to occupy that part of the front assigned to them—because of the bad state of the trenches. The meeting which had passed this resolution ran to a place of refuge at the mere sight of a German aeroplane. The company and regimental committees did not show any understanding of the importance of their tasks and instead of calming the soldiers, passed resolutions in which the offensive was declined (Siberian Guard Regiments No. 61 and 368, etc.). In many regiments no duty at all has been performed recently. The troops have hardly familiarised themselves with the technique of an offensive; the newly-arrived batch is badly trained and, finally, the planning of the positions of infantry and artillery is carried out either not at all or only very insufficiently.

"When an estimate is made as to the possibility of an offensive the greatest care must be exercised as to the place for it, since it is uncertain whether an effective unit of to-day will still be effective to-morrow. The work of Bolshevik agitators is rapidly bearing fruit, while the authority of officers and even of company committees is insufficient.'

"On the Roumanian front the cause of the offensive was in a very bad way. From headquarters it was reported:

"There is no complete guarantee for the execution of the order for an offensive. The agitation of the Bolsheviks has affected individual companies. Everyone is principally concerned with the safety of his own skin. In the 78th Division the soldiers say that if an order for an offensive comes they will do away with their superior officers. The authority of the officers is altogether weak and the activities of the committees do not, by a long way, lead in the desired direction. Particular excesses have not been observed. The position of the officers is unavoidably difficult in several units, only the call to duty keeps them at their posts.

"It is to be hoped that the success on the South-west front will improve the mood of the troops and will react favourably on their fighting efficiency.'

"The plan for the spring offensive of 1917 was already sketched in December, 1916. After a war council at General Headquarters from the 17th to 30th December, Nicholas II.,

as Commander-in-Chief, ordered the spring offensive, the main attack to be carried out in the section of the 11th and 7th Armies in the direction of Lemberg and further attacks to be made on the remaining fronts. The offensive was timed to synchronise with the commencement of offensive operations on the English-French front or rather it was to be subordinated to the latter. The revolutionary events in March frustrated the plans of the Russian and French Headquarters' Staff.

"After the Provisional Government had come to an agreement with the socialists about the offensive and had defeated the resistance of the workers and soldiers, the plan of the offensive sketched in December again emerged. For the execution of the attack of the advance troops in the section of the 11th and 7th Armies, 31 divisions were concentrated on this frontier line between Swischin and Tepelich (65 versts), i.e., 312 battalions, 270,000 bayonets, about 800 light guns, 158 medium and 370 heavy guns.

"At the council of commanders held from the 1st to 14th May at General Headquarters and later in Petrograd at a joint council with the Provisional Government, an offensive was only regarded as possible after the passing of the food crisis and after the health of the army had been attended to. 'Our obligations to our allies compelled us not entirely to refuse an active offensive,' states a report of General Headquarters. The same report continues: 'The greater strength of our forces in the previously mentioned section, which is in general one in a ratio of 4 to 1, and the preponderance of our artillery, including the heavy, over the enemy forces gave us a certain hope of success even in the case of a short attack.' This was the position as regards the technical side of the preparations for the offensive.

"For the moral preparations there was zealously formed a united front which included the socialist opportunists, the Cadets and other capitalist parties. The army committees, the commissars, the delegates and the representatives of the Petrograd Soviet and the Central Executive Committee all took part in an agitation in favour of the offensive. Besides this, all the socialist parties, with the sole exception of the Bolsheviks, agitated in favour of the offensive.

"The Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks resolved to make use of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was to start its session on the 16th July, for the purpose of gaining support for the offensive. This intention was already obvious on the 13th June at a special interfractional council of all Social Democratic delegates to the congress. Lenin, representing the Bolsheviks, addressed the meeting and dealt with the importance of fraternisation as a means of revolutionary propaganda against war and against the imperialist bourgeoisie. At this council there were few supporters of our Party present, and the resolution in favour of supporting the war and the offensive was therefore carried.

"During the session of the congress our comrades repeatedly tried to begin a discussion on the question of the offensive. Every time this attempt was frustrated by the majority.

"According to the original intention of General Headquarters the troops were to be ready for the offensive on the 23rd of July; the final decision was, however, to be made by the Provisional Government. The Provisional Government was, on this question, in unison with the socialist jingoes, who intended to allow the All-Russian Congress to decide upon the question. General Brussilov urged Kerensky to make a journey to the front; he, however, replied that, in view of the necessity of his presence at the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies until after the adoption of the resolution on the war, he could not begin his journey before the 12th.

"The work of the congress proceeded successfully. There were few at this congress who

held our views, but among the workers and soldiers outside the congress the influence of our party increased from day to day. Even the opportunists knew this. They were enraged against us, against our proposals and our slogans. The feeling against us at the congress was one of great hostility.

"The debate proceeded and almost frustrated the offensive prepared by General Brusilov. On the 24th June Kerensky informed General Brussilov that he 'intended to travel to the front personally.' 'For moral support, and in order to lend weight to the order for attack, I consider it absolutely inadmissible that the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies should express itself as clearly opposed to war and the offensive. Judging by its tone I do not doubt that the congress resolution will be a favourable one. I can only go, then, after the resolution is in my hand. I ask, therefore, that in the last resort the resolution on the war may be held back. I believe that the particular resolution will be passed within the next few days.'

"To this proposal General Headquarters replied: 'It is only possible to postpone for two days. Further hesitation would considerably hamper the success of the operations. The enemy is already aware of our preparations and to disturb these he is already beginning firing attacks. In that section of the front where one of the armies intended as an advanced attacking troop is stationed the enemy is himself trying to engage an attack by artillery preparations. Probably the reserves are also being called in. I, therefore, appoint the 16th June as the final date for the commencement of artillery preparations and urgently request that you appear at the front on this day.—(Signed) BRUSILOV.'

"The expectations of the capitalists were fulfilled. The congress adopted all the opportunist proposals and Kerensky went away to the front with the resolutions of the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in his pocket. These resolutions he needed only as spurs in order to urge the soldiers to an offensive. The 'revolutionary democracy' embodied in the All-Russian Congress approached the army with a proclamation of greeting worded as follows:

" 'Soldiers! Officers! The Provisional Government of revolutionary Russia calls you to battle. Hardened in the fire of the revolution and organised on a democratic basis, you have gone bravely into the fight.

" 'Your strength shown in this offensive will lend weight to the voice of revolutionary Russia when it is heard by the belligerent, neutral and allied countries, and bring nearer the end of the war.

" 'All our thoughts are with you, the sons of the revolutionary army.

" 'Soldiers and officers at home! At your first order go to the front in companies and regiments.

" 'Citizens, all think of your duty. No one shall dare in these days to withdraw from his duty to his country.

" 'The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies hold watch over Russia's freedom.

" 'Soldiers and officers. Let your hearts not be doubtful. You fight for freedom and for Russia's happiness.

" 'You fight for an immediate universal peace. Brothers, we greet you!

" 'Long live the Revolution! Long live the revolutionary Army!

" '(Signed) *All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.*

" '*Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Peasant Deputies.*'

"The Provisional Government issued a special appeal to the citizens in which it called upon them to strain all their resources and all their will, and to thrust aside anything which might lead to disunion.

"The Provisional Government and the whole bourgeoisie tensely awaited news of the offensive. On the first of July the Prime Minister, Prince Lvov, telephoned to General Brusilov to try to learn the result of the offensive. General Headquarters, however, was itself without any comprehensive news as yet. It was only known that it had been possible to throw those troops who were on the spot into the offensive. This success was trumpeted telegraphically all over Russia.

"To-day is a day of triumph for the revolution. On the 1st July the Russian Revolutionary Army began the attack with tremendous enthusiasm, and so proved to Russia and to the rest of the world its absolute devotion to the cause of the revolution and its love for liberty and for the fatherland.

"Contemptuously leaving behind them at home the unimportant group of cowards, the free Russian warriors prove by their offensive the existence of a new discipline resting on their sense of duty as citizens. Whatever may happen now, this day has made an end of the malicious and slanderous attacks on the organisations of the Russian army built upon a democratic basis. I urgently request permission to hand over to the regiments who took part in the battles of the 18th June (1st July) the red flags of the revolution in the name of the liberated people, the red flags which even now, during the battle, are being waved by the attacking regiments on their own initiative. I also ask that all regiments who opened the offensive be styled "Regiment of the 18th June."

(Signed) KERENSKY.

"But a few days after the news of victory, among the lists of prisoners and trophies came other reports from General Headquarters. On the 19th July Kerensky telegraphed as follows to the Provisional Government:

"The military operations are much less successful than one was led to hope from the intensity of the artillery preparations and the large number of troops concentrated. I ascribe the following reasons for this slow progress of operations:

"1. The most important points of attack are occupied by Germans, not by Austrians. Moreover the Germans are taking over the defence of those sections where we were successful in routing the Austrians.

"2. The enemy is sending troops from the West front to ours. It is known that three divisions from the French front have been brought to the East.

"3. The plan of operation of one of our armies was found to be incorrectly worked out. (The army commander has been dismissed.)

"4. The technical preparation for the offensive was insufficient on our side, principally because the soldiers refused to carry out the preparatory work. The troops were insufficiently trained in the technique of an attack, since a regular training of the soldiers was out of the question. Apart from all these circumstances there was also the general state of our army, which is not yet fully organised and consolidated on the new basis. By an enormous strain of moral influences it was possible to lead the army to battle and to create a jolly and enthusiastic atmosphere in the first days. In many cases this atmosphere showed itself to be very transient, so that after the first days (here and there even after the first hours) of the battle there supervened a mood of depression. Instead of continuing their first successes, the troops participating in the offensive passed resolutions demanding to be withdrawn be-

hind the lines. Thus it was hardly possible to retain the soldiers at their posts, much less to get them to advance further. Apart from the general war-weariness this change of mood is determined by the lack of understanding of the sense and purpose of the war and by the lack of unity between the soldiers in action and those behind the lines. The soldiers complain frequently about the unreasonable attitude of the reserve units, who are sending no reinforcements and dare with impunity to refuse to go to the front. Such a mass refusal can become a great danger, since it often clothes itself with the ideas of Bolshevism. Thus a whole Grenadier regiment, a battalion of the Pavlovsky Regiment and a part of the Finland Regiment withdrew behind the lines without permission. They were led by a Bolshevik officer. This happened at a time when the whole First Corps of Guards was making ready for an attack. The confusion and unrest following this desertion made the whole corps ineffective, so that to its shame it was unable to fulfil its assigned task. In general the army shows healthy symptoms alternately with dangerous symptoms of further disintegration, so that it is difficult to say what lies in the future. The necessity for an armed battle on two fronts (e.g., the case of the Grenadier regiment) destroys all hopes of any more important successful operations.

"The state of the officers' corps is also giving rise to great difficulties. The great majority of the officers cannot adapt themselves to the new conditions. They look upon the democratisation of the army as a personal insult. The elimination of the authority of command and the lack of responsibility in the higher command seldom brings about the possibility of a happy coupling of military talents and love for the emancipated fatherland. Often I could see how failure in an attack was accepted with glee—not well concealed—or gave rise to strong and bitter criticism against the new conditions in the army. Everything possible is being done to change the temper of the army. But the low mentality of the soldiers, the splendid opportunity they have for hiding their cowardice and their lower instincts behind a mask of perverse Bolshevik slogans, the possibility of agitating with impunity for the refusal to take orders (such agitation going under the name of idealism), the lack of preparedness and of organisation of the bodies of soldiers and the low power of adaptation of the officers makes work in the army increasingly difficult."

"During the offensive, which had lasted three weeks, the Russian troops took 36,000 prisoners, over 90 guns and 400 machine guns. In the first days it was already evident that the troops would not go right through with it.

"The report of General Headquarters contains the following words concerning the offensive:

"On the 29th June artillery preparation on the south-west front commenced; this lasted two days. On the third day, after a short drumfire, we attacked and occupied varying depths of different sections of the enemy positions.

"After this first success the unreliability of the troops made itself felt. They were no longer disciplined and had got out of the habit of obeying their superior officers. In the sector of the 7th Army we were confronting Germans mainly; our troops drew back to their old positions because of heavy artillery fire and after the first counter-attempt of the enemy. And this although the attack could not be repeated at any later period.

"In the 11th Army sector many units fought very bravely and occupied enemy positions. But for several reasons no use was made of these successes. The attacking troops became quickly tired and could be of no further use for the continuance of the operations, while the relief troops, who were to make use of the newly-occupied positions as points of

departure, behaved in a thoroughly unsoldierly manner. Instead of executing their orders rapidly, exactly and unquestioningly, they started discussions on how the orders were to be executed. Valuable time passed, during which the enemy had ample opportunity of altering the distribution of his forces and strengthening his positions.

“On the 18th July the 8th Army attacked the enemy successfully. After taking Halitsch and the line of the Lomnitza, however, they also stopped. Without reinforcements they were unable to continue their advance.

“The inefficiency of the 8th Army was now clearly evident. Yet the 8th Army sector on the other hand, had a remarkable success to put to its credit. A redistribution and a strengthening of the 8th Army at the expense of the 7th was therefore decided upon, and an attack was to be made by the 11th and 8th Armies, the 11th Army proceeding in the direction of Zlokzev and the 8th in the direction of Rogatin. Such a redistribution was, however, delayed, the delay being caused in the same way as before. That is, the troops refused to enter new positions and so the daily-postponed operation finally had to be given up, since the Germans made their counter-attack on the 19th July.

“The 11th, 7th and 8th Armies suffered heavy losses in this offensive—1,222 officers, 37,500 men, i.e., 14 per cent. of the total strength—and these losses contained the best elements.’

“The Germans made their counter-offensive as early as July 1st. They broke through the front and forced the Russian troops to withdraw. The offensive, carried out after great flourishes against the will of the workers and soldiers, put the troops into a very awkward state. After the failure of the June-July offensive the Provisional Government and their War Minister, Kerensky, made an assault upon the disobedient soldiers and, together with all the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, against the workers and the Bolshevik Party. During this fight the hero of the 18th June suffered his political death.

“The July offensive demonstrated clearly to the masses what it was that the capitalists were striving for; the continuance of the war, the fulfilment of the treaties of alliance with the Entente and the infamous ‘Final Victory.’ Miliukov was deposed only because of the sincerity of his words, only in order to give the bourgeoisie a chance of effecting its policy whilst voicing democratic sentiments. The appointment of Kerensky as War and Naval Minister represented the height of his popularity among the credulous and patriotically-minded masses. The July offensive and its resulting failure seriously undermined his authority in the army.

“Revolutionary Petrograd soon replied with a wave of open indignation against the military adventure of the government of capitalists and social-traitors. This wave reached formidable proportions in July and broke decisively in the days July 16-18.”

Twenty-One—THE 1st CONGRESS OF SOVIETS, AND THE 1st PETROGRAD FACTORY CONFERENCE

On the 16th June the First All-Russian Congress of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies met. According to the report of the credentials' committee there were 1,090 delegates, of whom 822 had voting rights. Of these, 777 delegates gave their party membership as follows: 285 Social Revolutionaries, 248 Mensheviks, 105 Bolsheviks, 32 Internationalists, 73 Independent Socialists. The Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had an absolute majority, and small political groups attached themselves to these. For the Sunday was planned a demonstration of workers and soldiers, which was supplied by the Bolsheviks with the following slogans: "Down with the counter-revolution! Down with the 4th State Duma and the State Council! Down with the ten capitalist ministers! Down with the Allied imperialists who are behind the counter-revolution! Down with the capitalists, with the sabotage of production and with the camouflaged lock-outs! All power to the soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies; long live the control of the workers over the production and distribution of commodities! Down with the anti-democratic clauses in the declaration of the rights of soldiers! Oppose the disbandment of the revolutionary regiments! Oppose the disarmament of the workers! Long live the army of all the people and above all the workers! No separate peace with William, no secret treaties with the English and French capitalists! Immediate publication by the Soviet of really just peace conditions! Away with the policy of an offensive! Bread! Peace! Freedom!"

The Congress, terrified by the possibilities of such a demonstration, decided to prohibit it.

The central committee of the Bolsheviks submitted to this decision and called off the demonstration, though it was very difficult to keep the workers and soldiers back. In all factories and barracks meetings were held, in which the Bolsheviks were greatly applauded while congress speakers were greeted with interruptions of "Traitor!" and "Compromiser!"

The Congress of Soviets now itself organised a large, general demonstration in Petrograd which was attended by about half a million people. The preponderance of Bolshevik slogans was striking. Not one factory, not one regiment, carried slogans which supported the Provisional Coalition Government. Several banners bearing such inscriptions had to be rolled up owing to the hostile calls of the crowd. A banner of this kind brought by a Cossack group was torn by the crowd. The compromising *Isvestia* was forced to sound the alarm, on account of the large number of Leninist slogans at the demonstration.

At this powerful demonstration of the Petrograd proletariat the following slogans predominated: "All Power to the Soviets!" "Away with the ten capitalist Ministers!" "Neither a separate peace with the Germans, nor general agreements with the English and French capitalists!" Lenin called it "a demonstration of the forces and the policy of the revolutionary working class which pointed out its course to the revolution, which showed the way out of the blind alley."

The first All-Russian Congress of Soviets lasted till the 7th July. It had to consider the question formulated by Lenin: either dissolution of the soviets or all power to the soviets. The Congress with its majority of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries declared itself against the revolutionary proletariat. On days of mass demonstrations the Congress and

the Petrograd proletariat found themselves in opposition. The Congress, which declared that these demonstrations were manifestations of counter-revolution and sanctioned the disarming of the working class, was compelled to allow a new demonstration which took place under Bolshevik slogans. The First Soviet Congress declared for an alliance with the bourgeoisie and for continued prosecution of the war. The majority of the Congress turned against the Bolsheviks, against the proletariat. The petty bourgeoisie aligned itself against the proletariat.

Lenin made a speech at this First Congress of Soviets in which he outlined a program :

"Comrades! In the short time at my disposal I can only deal with the most important questions of principle (which I also consider most essential to my purpose) brought forward by the spokesman of the Executive Committee and by the speakers who followed him. The first and most important question which confronts us is: Where do we stand? What actually are these soviets here gathered together in an All-Russian Congress? What actually is this revolutionary democracy, of which so much has here been said—only to mask a lack of understanding and to hide your complete abandonment of it? For it is indeed strange to speak of revolutionary democracy to the All-Russian Soviet Congress, and at the same time to efface the true nature of that institution, its class composition and its role in the revolution, to make no mention of all this and yet at the same time to claim for yourselves the name of 'democrats.'

"We have here had put before us the program of a bourgeois parliamentary republic such as exists in Western Europe; we are here shown the program of reforms which have already been recognised by all bourgeois governments—amongst them by our own—and on top of this they speak of revolutionary democracy. And to whom do they speak? To the soviets. Now I ask you: Is there a country in Europe, a bourgeois, democratic, republican country, where there is anything at all like these soviets? Your answer must be 'No.' No such institution exists elsewhere, nor can exist elsewhere; for there can be only one of two alternatives. Either a bourgeois government with a program of reform such as has been expounded to us, a program which has already been propounded a hundred times in every country and still only exists on paper, or that institution now being appealed to, that new type of government which the revolution has created, and whose originators are only to be found in times of intense revolutionary advance, in the years 1792 and 1871 in France, and in 1905 in Russia.

"The soviets are an institution which cannot customarily be found in any bourgeois parliamentary State; they cannot, indeed, exist side by side with a bourgeois government. The soviets are the new democratic form of State which we in the resolutions of our party called a peasant-proletarian democratic republic, and in which power can only belong to the soviets of soldiers' and workers' deputies.

"It would be wrong to think that this is a theoretical question; it is vain to treat the question as one which can be got round in this way; it is also vain to imagine that this or that institution can exist side by side with the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies. Yes, they *do* exist side by side. But it is just this fact which occasions such endless misunderstandings, conflicts and friction. It is this fact which causes the transition of the Russian revolution from its first swing forward, to that state of stagnation, to that retrogression which we see now in our coalition government with its 'continuity of policy' in home and foreign affairs, continuity with the previous imperialist offensive.

"Of two things, one; either we have the usual bourgeois government, in which case the

peasants', workers', soldiers' and other soviets will be superfluous and will be hacked asunder by all those counter-revolutionary generals who have control of the army and who care not a jot for the eloquence of Kerensky's Ministers—or that government will die an inglorious death. There is no other way out for these institutions, which cannot go backwards or stand still, but must go forward if they are to exist at all. Such is this form of State, which the Russians did not think out themselves, but the revolution itself engendered, since in no other way can a revolution triumph.

"It is inevitable that there should be friction inside the All-Russian Soviets, that there should be a struggle for power between the parties, but such a State would be a triumph over all possible mistakes and illusions, a triumph which could be effected by the political experience of the masses themselves (applause) and not by the speeches made by the Ministers here, in which they appeal to what they said yesterday, what they will write to-morrow and promise the day after.

"Viewed from the standpoint of that institution which has been created by the Russian revolution, and is now faced with the question of existence or non-existence, this whole question, comrades, is absurd. The soviets can no longer exist as they have done in the past. Grown-up persons, workers and peasants, are required to meet together here, to listen to speeches and to pass resolutions which cannot be carried out in any practical manner!

"The soviets are the transitional form to a Republic which will establish its firmly-rooted Government without a police force, without standing army, not in words, but in reality; a Government which could not exist in Western Europe, a Government without which there can be no victory for the Russian revolution in the sense of a victory over imperialism.

"Without such a form of power we cannot win this victory, and the more closely we examine the program recommended to us here, and the facts before us, the more clearly appear its fundamental contradictions. We have been told now that the first Provisional Government was a bad one. But those dreadful Bolsheviks said, 'Do not support, do not trust this Government!'—and how we were overwhelmed with accusations because of it, how they cried out that we stood for anarchy! Now everybody says that the former Government was a bad one. But in what way does the present Coalition Government with its 'almost-socialist' ministers differ from the previous one? Has there not been enough prating about programs and plans? Have we not had enough—is it not time to get down to it? A month has already passed since May 6th, since the Coalition Government came to an end. Consider the facts, consider the disorder which prevails in Russia, and in all the countries which were drawn into the imperialist war. What is the cause of this disorder? The rapacity of the capitalists! That is true anarchy.

"Here we have it: according to reports published—not in our paper, nor, God forbid! in any Bolshevik paper—in the ministerial *Rabotchaya Gazeta* (Labour Gazette) the prices for coal delivery have been *raised* by the 'revolutionary Government.' In this respect, too, nothing was changed under the Coalition Government. We are asked whether Socialism is to be introduced into Russia, whether in general it is possible to change the country thoroughly. That is all empty words, comrades! The teaching of Marx and Engels, as they themselves always said, consisted in the following: Our doctrine is not a dogma, but a direction for activity.

"We are not concerned here with any promises of reform—they are merely empty words. We are concerned here with those steps which are necessary and which must be

taken. If you want to appeal to the 'revolutionary' democracy, that idea is quite different from the *reformist* democracy with its capitalist ministers, because we have at last come to the point when we must turn from speaking about the 'revolutionary democracy,' from the mutual congratulations on the occasion of the 'revolutionary democracy,' to the class characteristics of this phenomenon, as Marxism and scientific socialism generally has taught us to do. What has been proposed here is a transition to reformist democracy with a capitalist ministry. From the standpoint of the customary Western European example, that may be very fine, but now many countries are on the brink of ruin.

"The practical measures which are necessary (measures which, it is claimed, are so complicated that they can only be introduced with great difficulty, that they must be specially worked out, as the speaker before me, Monsieur, the Minister of the Post Office said) these measures are very clear. That minister said that there was no political party in Russia ready to take power completely. I answer, there is such a Party; no single party should decline to take over power, and our party does not decline. It is ready to take over power entirely at any moment (applause and laughter). You may laugh as much as you please. But put this question to the minister of one of the parties of the Right, and he will give the right answer. No party should decline, and so long as freedom prevails, so long as the threats of imprisonment and banishment (threats made by the counter-revolutionaries in a body in which they sit together with our almost-socialist ministers) only remain threats, one of those parties says: 'Give us your trust, and we shall fulfil for you our program.'

"On April 29th our conference put forward such a program. Unfortunately this program is not being considered, and is not accepted as a guiding rule; it still requires popular explanation. I shall try to give the citizen Minister for Posts a popular explanation of our resolutions and our program.

"Our program deals with the economic crisis as follows: The profits of the capitalists reaching the unheard-of figure of 500 to 800 per cent. shall at once be publicly distributed, not as in the open market of 'pure' capitalism, but in supplies for the army. That can be done now without any delay. Here is one point where the workers' control is indispensable and possible. If you claim the title of 'revolutionary democrats' you must carry out these measures in the name of the soviets. It can be done by to-morrow. This is not socialism; you will only thereby open the eyes of the people and show them the real anarchy, the real game with imperialism, the real game with the people's property and with the lives of hundreds of thousands who must die to-morrow, because we want to crush Galicia still further. Publish the profits of the capitalists: arrest 50 or 100 millionaires. It is only necessary to keep them away for a few weeks—even under the same favourable conditions as Nicholas Romanov—and you will expose all the connections and the swindling manœuvres, all the filth and selfishness which is daily costing our country thousands or millions, even under the new Government. The real cause of the anarchy and disorder lies in that, and therefore we say that the old state of affairs still exists, that the Coalition Ministry has altered nothing, it has only added a mass of superfluous declarations.

"The members of this Government are so sincere, they have the welfare of the working classes so close to their hearts that they have altered nothing; *the same class* remains in power. The policy which has been conducted is not a democratic policy. Mention has been made here of 'a democratisation of central and local administration.' Do you not then realise that these words mean something new only for Russia? That in other countries dozens of 'almost socialist' ministers have made similar promises?

"What do such words signify, when we have before us a living, concrete fact? The people elects an administration, but immediately the very elements of democracy are violated by the central power claiming for itself the right to nominate or ratify these local administrations. The plundering of the people's property by the capitalists will be continued. The imperialist war will be continued, while we are promised reforms, reforms and further reforms—which it is impossible to realise under such conditions, because the war determines everything and crushes everything.

"Why are you not at one with those who maintain that the war did not occur because of capitalist profits? Where is our criterion? It exists, above all, in this—what class has power, what class will govern in the future, what class is earning hundreds of milliards in banking and financial operations? It is still the same capitalist class. That is also why the imperialist war will be continued. Neither the first Provisional Government, nor the government of the 'almost-socialist' ministers has changed anything in that respect. The secret treaties remain secret treaties. Russia is fighting for the Straits, for the continuation of the Liachov policy in Persia, etc.

"I know that this is not your wish, that the majority among you do not wish it, that even the ministers do not wish it, because one does not desire something that means the murder of hundreds of thousands of men. But consider for one moment the offensive of which Miliukov and Maklakov speak so much. You know well enough what is in the balance. You know that this question is bound up with the question of power, with the question of the revolution. We are told that we must keep political and strategic questions separate. It is ridiculous to put the question like that. The Cadets understand well enough that the question is a political one.

"The first step that we should take, if we had power, would be to arrest the leading capitalists and tear up all the threads of their intrigues. Without such measures all talk of 'peace without annexations or indemnities' is merely empty phrases. Our second step would be to tell the people, over the heads of their Government, that we consider all capitalists to be bandits—including Terestchenko (who is not one whit better than Miliukov, only slightly more stupid) and the French, English, and all other capitalists.

"Your own *Isvestia* has gone the wrong way; instead of demanding 'Peace without annexations or indemnities,' they propose to leave the *status quo* untouched. No! That is not our idea of peace without annexations. Even the congress of peasants came nearer the truth when it spoke of a federative republic, and thereby gave expression to the thought that the Russian republic will not oppress any people, either in the old, or in any new way; that it will not live together with our peoples, with Finland, with the Ukraine (which so greatly annoyed the Minister for War and with which shameful conflicts are being provoked) on a basis of force. We want a united, indivisible Russian republic with its power firmly established, but this firmly established power must originate in the free consent of the people. 'Revolutionary Democracy'—these are great words, but they are used by a Government which will aggravate the Ukrainian and Finnish problem by contemptible chicanery, although these peoples do not in the least wish to separate themselves, but only demand that the institution of the basic principles of democracy shall not be put off till the Constituent Assembly.

"It is impossible to conclude a peace without annexations or indemnities before giving up our own projects of annexation. Every worker in Europe grins at this ridiculous game. He says: You can make fine speeches, and appeal to the people to clear out the bankers; but you send your own bankers into the Government. Arrest them, unmask the swindle,

disclose their connections! You don't do that, although you have powerful, irresistible organisations. You have lived through 1905 and 1917, you know that revolutions are not made to order, that the revolution in other countries must be realised by the difficult and bloody path of revolt; but in Russia there is no group, no class which can stand against the power of the Soviets. In Russia the revolution is possible only by the road of peace, and if this revolution, to-day or to-morrow, proposes peace to all peoples by a complete break with all capitalist classes, in a very short time both France and Germany will consent through the voice of their people, because these countries are threatened with annihilation, because the position of Germany is hopeless, because it cannot save itself and because France"

The President: "Your time for speaking is up."

Lenin: "I shall finish in half a minute. . . ."

(Noise, calls of "Go on!" protests, applause.)

The President: "I have to tell the Congress that the Presidium proposes to prolong the time allowed for speaking. Who is against? The majority is for the prolongation of time allowed for speaking."

Lenin: "I have said that if the revolutionary democracy in Russia were a democracy of deeds and not words, it would strive to push the revolution forward, and not to compromise with the bourgeoisie: it would not speak of peace without annexations or contributions, but would give up what Russia has annexed and frankly declare that they consider any annexation to be a crime and a robbery. Then the imperialist offensive could also be avoided which threatens thousands, millions with ruin, for the sake of the division of Persia or the Balkans. Then the road to peace would be open.

"It is not an easy road—we do not maintain that—and it is a road which does not exclude the possibility of a revolutionary war. We do not put the question as Basarov puts it in the *Novaya Zhizn*. We only say that Russia, at the end of the imperialist war, is in a position where her tasks are easier than one might suppose. The geographical position of Russia is of such a nature that the powers who, relying on the rapacious interests of capital, would dare to go forth against the Russian working class and their allies, the semi-proletariat, i.e., the poorest class of peasant—if they dared do this, they would find themselves up against an extremely difficult task.

"Germany is on the brink of an abyss, and since America has come into the war, America that wants to swallow up Mexico and to-morrow will probably begin a war against Japan—after the entry of America, Germany's position is quite hopeless, it will be annihilated. France, which in consequence of its geographical position has suffered the most, has reached the limits of endurance. Although France has suffered less from hunger than Germany, she has lost incomparably more men.

"If you had from the very beginning cut into the profits of the Russian capitalists; if you had taken from them any possibility of accumulating millions in profits; if you had offered to *all* peoples a peace directed against the capitalists of *all* countries and frankly declared that you would engage in no negotiations or relations with the German capitalists or with their direct or indirect partisans, but neither would you have anything to do with the French or English capitalists—if you had done this, then you could accuse them before the workers. Then you would not have celebrated the issue of a passport to MacDonald as a victory, because this MacDonald has never waged a revolutionary struggle against capitalism; he should travel, for he has never given expression to the ideas, the principles, the practice or the experience of that struggle against the English capitalists, in whose cause

our comrade John MacLean and hundreds of other English socialists are now sitting in gaol, in whose cause our comrade Liebknecht is in prison, because he said: 'German soldiers, turn your weapons against your Kaiser!' Would it not be better to throw the capitalists, the imperialists, into those prisons? This has been promised us every mortal day and prepared for by the majority in the Provisional Government, and by the third Duma—or is it the fourth? I don't know—which was expressly called for this purpose. New legislative measures have already been prepared in the Ministry of Justice for this very end. . . .

"MacLean and Liebknecht, they are the socialists who are translating the ideas of the revolutionary struggle against imperialism into fact. That must be said to all Governments. To conduct a struggle for peace must be the test question of a Government. By such a method you would put any imperialist government into a difficult position. But now you yourselves are in a difficult position. On March 14th you issued an appeal for peace to the people and said: 'Clear out your kings and bankers!' while we, who have an organisation strong in numbers and rich in experience, as the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is, form a united front with our own bankers, form an 'almost-socialist' Coalition Government and make plans of reform, which have been made in Europe for many decades!

"In Europe they smile at this sort of 'struggle for peace.' They will only understand the struggle if the Soviets seize power and go forward in a true revolutionary fashion. One single country in the world is at this moment in a position to take steps to end the imperialist war, to proceed against the capitalists on a class scale and without the shedding of blood. That country is Russia, and Russia will remain that country so long as the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies exists. But it cannot exist for long, next to a Provisional Government of the usual type, and it will remain in its present form only so long as this offensive does not become a reality. The change to an offensive is a turning point in the entire policy of the Russian revolution; it is a change from waiting, from preparing for peace by a revolutionary uprising, to a renewal of the war. And at the same time it will mean a change from fraternising on one front to fraternising on all fronts; from spontaneous fraternisation, where one exchanges a piece of bread with a hungry German worker for a pocket knife, thereby risking imprisonment—to conscious fraternisation. That is the way which is opening before us. If we seize power, we shall curb the capitalists, and then the war will be conducted in a different fashion from now, then the character of the war will be determined by the class which is conducting it, and not by what is written in documents. One can write what one likes in documents. But so long as the capitalist class is represented by a majority in the Government, you may write what you please, you may devise beautiful phrases, you may combine in the election of an 'almost-socialist' ministry, the war remains an imperialist war. Everybody knows that and everybody sees it. The example of Albania, Greece, Persia, proves it so clearly and distinctly that it puzzles me why everybody is directing such bitter attacks against our written declaration concerning the offensive, while nobody says a word about these concrete examples. It is not difficult to make plans, but the concrete measures are continually postponed. It is easy to write a declaration on peace without annexations, but the examples of Albania, Greece, Persia, came after the entry into office of the Coalition Government.

"The *Dielo Naroda*—not an organ of our Party, but an official organ, an organ of the ministry—did indeed write that Russian democracy will be mocked at if Greece is strangled. The same Miliukov, whom you wish to depict here as God only knows what—he is a simple member of his party—this Miliukov wrote that the diplomacy of the Entente is crush-

ing Greece. The war remains an imperialist war, and you may long for peace, you may sympathise with the workers ever so sincerely, you may desire peace ever so sincerely—I am quite convinced that this desire must be sincere among the masses—you will still be powerless, because the war can only be ended by the further development of the revolution. As the revolution began in Russia, so will the revolutionary struggle for peace also begin from below. Had you seized power, had power passed into the hands of the revolutionary organisations for the struggle against Russian capitalists, the workers of other countries would have believed you: then you could have asked for peace. Then our peace would have been assured on at least two sides, by at least two nations who are bleeding to death and whose cause is hopeless, Germany and France.

“If the conditions of a revolutionary war had compelled us—one cannot tell, we do not deny the possibility—we should say, ‘we are not pacifists, we do not oppose the war, if the revolutionary class is in power, if it has really thrown off any influence of the capitalists on the course of events, on the intensification of that disorder which gave them the opportunity to earn millions.’ The revolutionary Government would make it clear to all peoples without exception, that all nations should be free, that just as Germany should not carry on the war because of Alsace-Lorraine, so the French people should not carry on the war because of their colonies. For if Germany is fighting for its colonies, Russia also has Khiva and Bokhara, they are also none other than colonies, and if the division of colonies once begins, what is the basis on which the division will take place? According to power? But the relations of power are changing. The position of the capitalists admits of no other solution than war.

“If, however, you seize revolutionary power, a revolutionary road to peace will be open to you. You can go to the people with a revolutionary appeal and demonstrate the tactics to be pursued with the same example. Then a way to the world will be opened, and in all probability you will avoid the death and ruin of hundreds of thousands. Then you may be sure that the German and French people will place themselves on your side. And if the English, American and Japanese capitalists should wish to wage war against the revolutionary working class, they would not—the probability is about 99 per cent.—be able to do so. The forces of the working class will, however, be increased tenfold if the capitalists are curbed and cast aside and control passes into the hands of the working class. It would be enough if you were to say that you are not pacifists, that you will defend your republic against all the German, French and other capitalists—and peace would be assured.

“These are the reasons why we attach so much importance to the offensive in our declaration. We have arrived at a turning point in the history of the Russian revolution. The Russian revolution began with the help of the imperialist bourgeoisie of England, who imagined that Russia was somewhat similar to India or China. Instead of that there arose—next to a Government in which the majority is composed of large landowners and capitalists—the Soviets: these popular assemblies, of a strength never before seen, which you by your participation in the Coalition Government of the bourgeoisie are ruining. The Russian revolution has succeeded in gaining doubled and trebled sympathy in other countries for their revolutionary struggle from below against the capitalist government. The question now is: to go forward or to draw back? In revolutionary times it is impossible to remain standing in one place. Therefore the offensive is a turning point in the development of the Russian revolution, not in a strategical, but in a political and economic sense.

“The offensive means the continuation of the imperialist mass murder, the death of



IN MOSCOW—Fighting in the snow, February, 1917.

hundreds, thousands, millions; and even objectively—i.e., independently of the will or consciousness of any minister—the strangulation of Persia and other small nations. The transference of power into the hands of the revolutionary proletariat, supported by the poor peasants, means a change to the revolutionary struggle for peace in the surest, most painless form—the confirmation of the victory and the power of the revolutionary workers in Russia and in the whole world.”

The First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees, which was opened in the Tauride Palace on June 12, 1917 (May 30th old style) was one of the most important stages in the struggle of the Petrograd workers which led to the October victory. The conference, with its 568 delegates—three-quarters of them Bolsheviks—had even in May a small advantage over the Soviet of

Workers’ Delegates as well as over the trade unions, which, even in August and September, did not have a Bolshevik majority. The particular radicalism of the first conference of the Factory Committees can only be explained by the fact that in the first days of the February revolution the rising organisation of factory committees had organically drawn into their ranks the whole of the working masses of Petrograd. The conference was according to its composition almost a hundred per cent. a workers’ conference (setting aside a few speakers and representatives of party organisations and of the press). Here the worker, who had just broken away from the bench in order to work in the factory committee, or who had left the bench only for the time of the conference, with his own mind, with his own will, created his revolutionary economic organisation.

The extraordinary significance of this conference lies not only in the fact that it created a union of all the factory committees of Petrograd, in the central committee elected by the conference; the fundamental principle brought out in the conference was the clear and precisely formulated Bolshevik slogan of workers’ control over production and distribution. This slogan was first put forward by Lenin in his April Theses, when he wrote: “Not the ‘introduction’ of socialism as our immediate task, but at the moment the change over to the control by the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies of the production and distribution of goods.” This slogan was loudly echoed among the workers, and the realisation of this slogan was begun in the very first stages of the revolution.

But it was not the Soviets of the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries who were called upon to put this slogan into practice. Before the Soviets themselves were Bolshevikised, another organisation was required to carry through the revolutionary workers’ control, to form the necessary connection between the Party and the workers for the realisation of this

slogan. Nor could the trade unions be such an organisation at that time; the unions still clung to the traditions of the guild system and of the working class aristocracy. The organisation was engendered spontaneously in the revolution itself—and it was an organisation of the factory committees. Conferences and discussions between the factory committees of the Navy and Artillery factories had already taken place in March, and later in April and May. It was in those factories that the committees first originated. They were elected by the general meetings of the workers, immediately after these State concerns were freed from their hated military managers and left without any management.

In the committees of the Navy factories and their unions the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries maintained the upper hand for a long while, while the Bolsheviks immediately gained the upper hand in the Artillery factory committees and their unions. It was also they who took the initiative in calling a conference and setting up an Organisation Bureau.

Lenin immediately recognised the importance of the factory committees and of the part they were to play. He supported the calling of the first conference in the most active manner and took his part in it as speaker for Zinoviev's Report on the control of production and the distribution of goods. Unfortunately no report of his speech was taken. We only possess the notes scribbled down by one of the secretaries, which we reproduce here.

"N. Lenin spoke against the speech and the resolution of comrade Avilov. He says: This resolution completely overlooks the class point of view. In his resolution B. W. Avilov has as it were attempted to collect and concentrate all the defects which are obvious in the resolutions of the petty-bourgeois parties.

"First of all, Avilov puts forward in his resolution a thesis which no socialist will to-day dispute; namely, that the predatory economy of capitalist Russia has led to a complete economic and industrial breakdown: but he also proposes a long-winded formula of control by the 'State power' with participation by the broad masses of the democracy.

"At the present moment a great deal is being said about control everywhere: even those who once at the word 'control' were ready to call for help, now realise that control is necessary.

"By means of this general word 'control' they want to make it in fact illusory.

"The Coalition Government, to which 'socialists' belong, has done nothing to realise this control, and we can quite understand therefore that the factory committees want real workers' control and not control on paper.

"In explaining this idea of control, as to when and through whom it will be realised, we must not for one moment lose sight of the class character of the modern State, which is entirely an organisation of class supremacy. The same class analysis must be employed with the idea of 'revolutionary democracy.' And the point of departure in such an analysis must be the real relations of social forces.

"Avilov's resolution, which begins with a promise to give everything, ends by proposing to leave everything untouched. In the whole resolution there is not one suggestion of revolutionary spirit.

"In times of revolution the question of the State system must be generally analysed, as for example—whose interests it protects, and how it must be built up so that it may really protect the interests of the workers. And that is just what Avilov's resolution does not do.

"Why has our new Coalition Government, which includes 'socialists,' done nothing during three months to make this control a reality: and not only done nothing, but in the

dispute between the mineowners of South Russia and the workers, taken the side of the capitalist party?

"If control over industry is to be effective, it must be a workers' control; so there should be a workers' majority in all responsible institutions, and the administration of the industry should account for all its dealings to the authoritative workers' organisations.

"Comrade workers! Fight for a real control and not a fictitious one, and turn down all resolutions and proposals for such a fictitious, nominal control in the most decisive manner."

Lenin's speech gave a sharply defined *tone* and a definite *direction* to the work of the whole conference. It found a most lively echo among those present. Through the delegates, numbering more than 500 at this conference, Lenin carried one of the most important of the October slogans among the masses, which later bore a rich harvest. In that lies one of the greatest achievements of the Bolshevik Party at any period.

Workers' control received its constitution, its organisation, its real embodiment in the resolution passed on Zinoviev's Report. The chief points of this *historic* resolution, which was passed by 297 votes against 21, 44 delegates refraining from voting, are as follows:

"(3) To save the country from catastrophe it is necessary that the working and peasant population should place into the hands of the people the largest part of the profits, income and property of the banks, of the financial, commercial and industrial magnates of capitalist economy; not only in words, but in deeds thus inspiring complete and unconditional confidence, so that neither local nor central directing and decisive institutions should recoil from it.

"(4) The way of escape from destruction leads through creating a real workers' control of production and distribution of goods. To realise this control it is necessary (i) that in all central institutions which have to be considered for this purpose, there should be assured a majority of at least two-thirds, composed of workers' organisations, of trade unions, of Soviets of workers' deputies, of factory committee centres—with the unconditional co-operation of the business men still left in the factories—as well as of the economically educated and technical personnel; (ii) that factory committees as well as trade unions have the right to share in the control of each undertaking and to demand inspection of all trading and bank books, as well as an explanation of all statements.

"(5) Workers' control must be extended with the same rights to all financial and banking operations, so that the financial position of every undertaking may be made quite clear.

"(6) Workers' control, already recognised in a number of cases of dispute by the capitalists, must be immediately converted into a complete regulation by the workers of the production and distribution of goods; this to be carried out by a series of carefully considered measures which must not however be postponed. . . .

"(10) A systematic and successful execution of all the measures proposed is only possible by the transference of the entire power of the State into the hands of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers and Peasants' Deputies."

Twenty-Two—THE EVENTS OF JULY

THE spontaneous movement of the masses burst forth after the tragic events at the front. The masses, against the advice of the Bolshevik Party, endeavoured to seize power with weapons in their hands. Since the Bolshevik Party could not support the movement, it decided to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and to mitigate the rigour of the defeat (which was in the circumstances unavoidable), by giving it an organised and peaceful character. Petrograd stood almost alone; it had not yet obtained the support of the army; nor were the villages or the provinces aroused.

At the 6th Congress of the Bolsheviks in August, 1917, Stalin reported as follows on the events of July: "At the end of June and the beginning of July there were signs of an offensive policy. Rumours were afloat concerning the reintroduction of the death penalty, of the demobilisation of many regiments, of mismanagement at the front. Delegates from the front brought in reports of arrests and mismanagement. Similar news came from the grenadier and machine-gun regiments. All this prepared the way for a new line.

"I will now deal with the events of the 3rd to the 5th July (old style) which have the greatest interest for us.

"The 3rd July. It was 3 o'clock in the afternoon of that day. The city conference was then discussing communal questions at our headquarters, Kschesinskaya's villa. Suddenly two delegates from the machine-gun regiment burst in and, although the subject was not on the agenda, declared: 'They want to dissolve our regiment; they are playing with us; we can wait no longer and we have decided to take action! We have already sent delegates to the factories and to other regiments.'

"It was clear to the Central Committee that the bourgeoisie as well as the monarchists would gladly have provoked us to action in order to place on us the responsibility for trying to take the offensive. We had decided to postpone the offensive, to allow time for them to compromise themselves completely in the eyes of the masses, and further, on no account to be provoked. Our idea was to wait and to allow time for the Provisional Government to get to the end of its resources.

"Comrade Volodarsky, President of the City Conference, replied to the delegates that the Party had decided against action, and that Party members must convey this decision to their regiments, and the machine-gunners' delegates withdrew under protest. At 4 o'clock there was a meeting of the Central Committee in the Tauride Palace at which it was decided to take no action. On the instructions of the Central Committee I reported at the meeting of the bureau of the Central Executive Committee that our Party had decided not to take any action. I recounted all the facts, not forgetting to mention that the delegates of the machine-gun regiment had sent delegates to the works and factories. I proposed that the bureau might find means to prevent action being taken. At our request this proposal was put as a protocol. Messrs. the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who now place on us the responsibility for preparing this action, have forgotten this fact. Those present went out into the districts and to the factories to restrain the masses. At 7 o'clock in the evening two regiments with banners and bearing the slogan, 'All Power to the Soviets!' appeared before the Villa Kschesinskaya. Two comrades, Lashevitch and Kurayev, spoke to the soldiers and tried to convince them that they should refrain from action and return to their barracks.

They were received with cries of derision, a thing which had never happened before.

"At the same time there appeared a demonstration of workers bearing the slogan, 'All Power to the Soviets!' It was now clear to everyone that action could no longer be prevented. A meeting of a few members of the Petrograd Committee decided to mix with the demonstrators and persuade the soldiers and workers to proceed in an organised fashion, to make their way peacefully to the Tauride Palace, and to elect delegates through whom to make their demands known.

"The soldiers received this decision with applause and the singing of the Marseillaise. At 10 o'clock the members of the Central Committee, those who had taken part in the City Conference, and the representatives of the regiments and factories met together in the villa. It was found necessary to revise the previous decision, to join the movement which had already begun to take action, and to strengthen it. It would have been a crime for the Party to stand aside at this juncture. After this decision the Central Committee went back to the Tauride Palace, where the soldiers and workers were congregated. A meeting of the workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet was going on. Zinoviev spoke and stated the problem caused by the movement which had begun.

"Under the pressure of circumstances the workers' section decided to join the movement and to give it an organised character, since without leadership the masses might easily give way to provocation. The section was divided on this question. The minority (one-third) left the meeting, while the majority remained and elected a Provisional Committee of 15 persons, recommending it to take vigorous measures. About 11 o'clock there was a continual

stream of agitators and delegates returning from the factories. They deliberated whether or not to have a demonstration on July 4th. The proposal to organise a demonstration was turned down by an overwhelming majority as purely utopian. It was clear to everybody that in any case something would be done. The Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee proposed to hold a peaceful demonstration on July 4th. The notice sent to *Pravda* on July the 3rd to the effect that the idea of taking action should be abandoned, was withdrawn; it was found impossible to set up another notice, and so *Pravda* appeared on the 4th with a blank space on the front page. A leaflet was published whose contents are probably known to all. It is quite certain that no mass seizure of power, no splitting of the soviets was intended. It would be absurd and illogical to accuse us, who wanted to give up all power to the soviets, of trying to seize power by force of arms. It is characteristic that all representatives of the so-called revolutionary democracy, admit that our Party had no part



LENIN

This is the photograph that was circulated by the police when the order went out for Lenin's arrest after the July rising, 1917.

in the uprising. Voytinski, the official representative of the Executive Committee openly declared this (the reporter misread an extract from out of the *Isvestia* of July 4th.) The same was stated in the call of the All-Russian Soviet Congress to the soldiers and workers.

"Touching on Lenin's connection with the matter, it is to be noted that he was absent. He went away on June 29th and only came back to Petrograd on July 4th after the decision to take part in the movement had been made. The decision was approved of by Lenin.

"*The 4th July.* At least 500,000 people came out into the streets. The rumours, according to which the demonstration aimed at arresting the Ministers or administering a drubbing to them, are false. There was not a single attempt made to surround any institution whatsoever; we are not responsible for the clamour of hooligans and thieves. On July 4th, as the demonstration was peacefully marching by, it was fired on at the corner of the Nevsky Prospekt and the Sadovaya. A number of delegates declared that the only way out of the existing situation was the taking over of power through the Soviets. The Central Executive Committee answered by declining, whereupon part of the soldiers considered their duty as accomplished and went away, whilst others remained.

"The turning-point came with the publication of the 'document' concerning 'Lenin's treachery.' It appeared that this 'material' had for long been at the disposal of the staff. It is clear that the soldiers were to have been incensed against the Bolsheviks by the publication of this 'document.' They had clearly speculated on the deep psychological effect which the news that Lenin was a German spy would be certain to have on the soldiers. The Minister, Tseretelli, telephoned and tried to arrange for the newspapers not to publish uncontrolled news, but in spite of this *Shivoye Slovo* printed this 'document.'

"A second factor was the rumour coming through from the front concerning the beginning of the offensive, about which only the leaders of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies knew anything. These facts made a profound impression on the leaders. The attitude of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries towards us underwent a change. People who until now had spoken to us as comrades suddenly called troops up to defend the Tauride Palace, declared that we had called for an armed uprising and pointed to us as betrayers of the revolution. In a word, a complete change of front, although we had already decided to put off the demonstration to the next day, since we were of opinion that the demonstrators had given sufficient vent to their feelings.

"*The 6th July.* No demonstration. In the streets troops fresh from the front filed by. Cadets from the training schools arrived in the suburbs of Petrograd. The streets were full of agents of the counter-espionage; passes were controlled and haphazard arrests took place. On the night of the 5th to the 6th July, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries decided to proclaim a dictatorship and to disarm the workers and soldiers. The spiritual father of this resolution was Tseretelli. He had wanted to do this as early as the 10th June, but was prevented by the refusal of Martov, who said that any idiot could rule by force.

"On 6th July our comrades Kamenev and Zinoviev deliberated with Liber concerning the protection of Party members and of the Party organisation against the attacks of hooligans, concerning the readjustment of the editorship of *Pravda*, etc. The deliberation ended in an agreement to the following effect: that the armoured cars should be called away from the Villa Kschesinskaya, that the swing bridges should be shut, that the sailors who had stayed behind should go back to Kronstadt, that the troops who had remained at the Peter and Paul Fortress should be diverted without hindrance and be placed as a guard outside the Villa Kschesinskaya. This agreement was not put into operation because behind the

backs of the Central Executive Committee, which had called for a dictatorship, the military clique had taken action. This was soon clear to everyone.

"The order came to us from Kusmin, the commanding officer of the Petrograd district, to evacuate the Villa Kschesinskaya immediately. I went to the Central Executive Committee and suggested that we could settle the matter without bloodshed. To my question: 'What do you want, then? To shoot at us? But we aren't against the Soviets,' Bogdanov replied that they wished to avoid bloodshed. We went to the staff. The officers received us badly saying that the order was on the point of being given. I had the impression that these gentlemen wanted to begin some blood-letting at any price.

"This is the part which our Party played in those days. The Party did not want any action to be taken; the Party wanted to wait until the policy of an offensive at the front had been discredited. In spite of this there arose a spontaneous movement, evolved by the ruin in the country and by Kerensky's order on the sending of troops to the front. The Party held it to be its duty to help in this movement and not to remain mere spectators.

"What kind of a party of the masses should we have been if we had stood aside without taking part in such a mass movement? Our Party has always gone with the masses. Tsere-telli and the rest, who blamed us for taking part in the movement, have signed their own political death-warrants. Much has been said about bloodshed, but even this would have been much more terrible and dangerous if our Party had not participated in the engagement. The Party acted as a regulator.

"That is all that I wished to say about the political action of the Central Committee. Ours was the only Party which remained with the masses in their fight against the counter-revolution. We did all we could to find an honourable way out of the existing circumstances."

We supplement Stalin's account by an extract from the *Memoirs* of A. Lunacharsky:

"The entry of the workers' delegation at the sitting of the Central Executive Committee made a very great impression. Although we stood so close to the workers' movement most of the people whom the world of workers had thrown up from the depths were new to us. The depths of the whole mass of workers, hardly known to us, stirred and played a scene before us like to that enacted when the Paris departments appeared before the bar of the Convention.

"I remember an old man, who came (unless I am mistaken) from the Putilov Works, with a deeply-lined face, white-haired, wearing glasses and bent with age, who made a threatening speech full of revolutionary energy in a gloomy bass voice which could be heard in every corner of the room. I remember a youthful worker of about seventeen wearing a workers' blouse, who actually wanted to mount the tribunal armed, and could scarcely be persuaded by Tscheidze to lay down his weapon whilst he spoke.

"Comrade Trotsky, who sat next to me, pointed upwards with his hand where working-class youths were sitting high up on some railings, their feet hanging down, listening eagerly in a pose which betokened complete self-forgetfulness. 'Look,' said Trotsky, 'doesn't it remind you of an old engraving of the time of the great French revolution?' It did remind one of that exactly.

"The crowd round the Palace was extraordinarily agitated. Two incidents brought matters to a climax: the attempt of the Kronstadt sailors (anarchists) to arrest Chernov and the angry cry of the Putilov workers: 'Hand out Tseretelli to us that he may speak and give answer!' The Communists had to damp down this outbreak of popular distress. The

masses had already adopted the slogan which became logically right in October; but they were demonstrating for the seizure of power by these same Chernovs and Tseretellis!

"When the Menshevik Dan, not without posing, but certainly quite rightly, declared that his comrades would rather fall beneath the bullets of the insurrectionaries than adopt the slogan of the July demonstration, it was in the true sense of the word tragic-comical. There was a certain tragedy in this, there was also real courage; I do not doubt that Dan and some of his comrades were really ready at this moment to die as heroes. Their heroism consisted in the fact that they were ready to die for their convictions (herein it can be seen that these men had passed through a revolutionary school, they who so short a time before had been our comrades in underground activity); but there was comedy in the fact that they wanted to die this martyr's death because of their anxiety in face of the revolutionary power which the masses of the people had placed in their hands. They were ready to die at their posts to defend the Coalition with the bourgeoisie, to fight with their last breath against the slogan 'Down with the capitalist Ministers!'

"The revolutionary energy of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries produced a cross-current. Behind their sure protection the capitalist Ministers laughed up their sleeves, not quite without anxiety, but still with the certain expectation that the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries would somehow or other save them and would sooner or later afford them the opportunity of tasting vengeance on the determined revolutionaries.

"But fate decreed otherwise. The July flood, loosed by the inner discontent of the working masses and by the Petrograd garrison, did not subside, but spread further, and its Left elements assimilated the timid more and more rapidly. When we left the prisons in which the Kerensky regime had held us fast, we obtained a far greater influence on political and social affairs than we had ever had before the events of July. After the crisis of the Kornilov affair we immediately grew stronger, so that on the eve of the 'Pre-parliament' we could resolve firmly and decide clearly: certain that during the last twenty days of October if we were to tell the Kerensky Government to leave, we would throw them out if they did not do so. And this in fact is what we did.

"That same Dan who struck his breast and declared he would rather die than take power lay, early on the morning on October 26 (old style), in a half-fainting condition on one of the couches of the Tauride Palace and said to me: 'So you have gained your object; you have ended the Russian revolution! I am not so much indignant against you as pitying you. For in a few weeks you will collapse ingloriously.' Dan was even then just as bad a prophet as he has remained ever since."

In essentials the Bolshevik Party succeeded in performing the task which it had set itself in July. Nevertheless there was naturally some bloodshed in many places. The capitalists' and compromisers' press and the Government held the Party responsible for this bloodshed, since it had led the movement; an amazingly wild hatred was unchained against the Bolsheviks. Their leaders were tracked down and arrested, their newspapers (*Pravda*, etc.) were suppressed, their editorial offices destroyed. With the connivance of the Social Revolutionary Minister, Pereversev, an evil stream of slanderous abuse poured out of the Ministry of Justice into the Boulevard newspapers. It was asserted that the Bolsheviks were in alliance with the German Government; there were cries of treachery, of espionage, and this evil, mean, preconcerted game was played in all countries in the hope that it would serve to keep in check the revolutionary excitement of the masses.

The death penalty was re-introduced at the front. Reaction triumphed all along the line. At the same time—such is the irony of history—the formal influence of the socialists in the Government was growing.

Just as in April the pressure of the working class had destroyed the Government, had brought about the first governmental crisis of the months of revolution and the formation of the "First Coalition," so now in July the pressure of the masses brought on another crisis and led to the formation of the "Second Coalition" with a socialist majority.

But this second, July, crisis betokened a different, more acute and significant turn of events than that of April.

A continuous differentiation of the different class camps had been going on, during the period from March to July. The bourgeoisie, still too weak to overcome the existing dual dominion in a way favourable to themselves, strenuously organised their forces. During the first months of the revolution there was a whole series of all possible kinds of bourgeois Congresses: a Congress of Cadets, a Congress of Trade and Industry, a Congress of Officers, etc. At the same time the old State Duma went on existing and gave some sign of life. The old State Council, which consisted of Tsarist officials, was still alive. All this went on as an inseparable ingredient in the new "democratic" publicity.

At the other end of the scale the class organisation of the proletariat grew stronger and firmer day by day. The Bolshevik Party, which at the time when it ceased to be an illegal organisation numbered all in all only 10,000 members had already got 80,000 members at the time of the April Conference (1917), and at the July (August) Congress it had 150,000 members. As early as the month of June the Party had a majority in the workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet.

The masses were withdrawing themselves more and more from the influence of the petty bourgeois revolutionary "defenders of the fatherland," the Mensheviks and Social



ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!—A demonstration in Petrograd, July, 1917, when this slogan was first raised, together with "Down with the capitalist Ministers."

Revolutionaries, and coming under the influence of the proletarian party which had taken up a firm, logical stand against the imperialist war.

The "defenders" spread the illusion that the capitalist or Coalition Government could renounce the carrying out of an imperialist policy. The Bolsheviks asserted that such an abandonment of imperialist aims could only be carried through by the power of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' soviets. Facts showed the rightness of the Bolshevik point of view.

Coalition with capitalists or power to the Soviets?—that was the question.

When it came to the question of the 8-hour day the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries pronounced their aim of making the Government work out and issue a law concerning this 8-hour day. The Bolsheviks said to the workers, from the first day of the revolution: "Don't wait for any legislation; you yourselves make the 8-hour day an actual fact!" Up to the time of its overthrow the Provisional Government had passed no law for an 8-hour day, and wherever it had been introduced it had been accomplished from below by the action of the workers themselves.

The question of control of the means of production was specially acute in view of the approaching economic catastrophe and the sabotage of those employers who closed down their works; the Mensheviks put forward the demand for State Control. As against this the Bolsheviks said: "No control by the present capitalist State; control by the workers is necessary and must be embarked on when power is transferred to the Soviets!"

The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries wanted the peasants to wait patiently until such time as the Constituent Assembly should have solved the land question. The Bolsheviks called upon the peasantry to take possession of the landlords' estates and place them in the power of the Peasants' Soviets.

The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries supported the "Liberty Loan" floated by the Government in April by means of which the capitalist Government hoped to obtain from the people the necessary means for carrying on the war. The Bolsheviks worked energetically against this loan and called for a boycott and similar measures to be taken against it.

Thus did the Bolsheviks mobilise the workers and peasants all along the line for the overthrow of the capitalists and the landowners, for the destruction of their State apparatus and for the seizure of power by the Soviets.

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