THE TURN TO THE RIGHT: THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM, 1919-1929

ALEXANDER J. MOTYL
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<tr>
<td>AUNR</td>
<td>Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic</td>
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<td>CP(b)U</td>
<td>Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine</td>
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<td>DOPS</td>
<td>Action Union of Progressive Students</td>
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<td>HUNM</td>
<td>Group of Ukrainian National Youth</td>
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<td>KPSH</td>
<td>Communist Party of Eastern Galicia</td>
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<td>KPZU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Western Ukraine</td>
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<td>LUN</td>
<td>League of Ukrainian Nationalists</td>
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<td>OUN</td>
<td>Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists</td>
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<td>PUN</td>
<td>Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists</td>
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<td>RUP</td>
<td>Revolutionary Ukrainian Party</td>
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<td>SUNM</td>
<td>Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth</td>
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<td>SVU</td>
<td>Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine</td>
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<td>TseSUS</td>
<td>Central Union of Ukrainian Students</td>
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<td>TUP</td>
<td>Society of Ukrainian Progressives</td>
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<td>UDKhP</td>
<td>Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party</td>
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<td>UHA</td>
<td>Ukrainian Galician Army</td>
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<td>UKhSP</td>
<td>Ukrainian Christian-Social Party</td>
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<td>UKP</td>
<td>Ukrainian Communist Party</td>
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<td>UkSSR</td>
<td>Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>UNDO</td>
<td>Ukrainian National Democratic Union</td>
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<td>UNP</td>
<td>Ukrainian People’s Party</td>
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<td>UNR</td>
<td>Ukrainian People’s Republic</td>
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<td>UNTP</td>
<td>Ukrainian People’s Labor Party</td>
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<td>UPSR</td>
<td>Ukrainian Party of Social-Revolutionaries</td>
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<td>UPSS</td>
<td>Ukrainian Party of Independists-Socialists</td>
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<td>USDP</td>
<td>Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDRP</td>
<td>Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party</td>
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<td>USKhD</td>
<td>Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists</td>
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<td>USS</td>
<td>Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters</td>
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<td>UVO</td>
<td>Ukrainian Military Organization</td>
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<td>UVU</td>
<td>Ukrainian Free University</td>
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<td>ZADVOR</td>
<td>Foreign Delegation of the Military Organization</td>
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<td>ZUNR</td>
<td>Western Ukrainian People’s Republic</td>
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<td>ZUNRO</td>
<td>Western Ukrainian National Revolutionary</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
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I

INTRODUCTION

A qualitatively new Ukrainian political movement arose in the decade following the First World War. Specifically labelled “Nationalist” by its adherents, the new movement represented a radical rejection of the pre-war “nationalism” current among the Ukrainian revolutionary intelligentsia. Whereas the earlier “nationalism” had had no difficulty reconciling Ukrainian national aspirations with democratic and generally human values, post-war Ukrainian “Nationalism” regarded the claims of the nation and the claims of humanity to be mutually exclusive. In order to differentiate between the two, John Armstrong’s example will be followed throughout this study and post-war “Nationalism” will be spelled with a capital ‘N’, while pre-war “nationalism” will be spelled with a small ‘n’.

Ukrainian Nationalism arose in the atmosphere of political chaos that followed the Ukrainians’ unsuccessful attempt at building a national state in 1917-1920. Several competing Ukrainian governments-in-exile, innumerable political parties and organizations, and a large mass of increasingly radicalized soldiers and students faced a bitter reminder of their nation’s failure in the existence of the Soviet Ukraine and in the division of the remaining ethnically Ukrainian territories among three (not even formally Ukrainian) states — Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.
The Ukrainian Nationalists saw their movement as a reaction to this chaotic and desperate state of affairs. In diagnosing the fiasco of 1917-1920, the Nationalists came to the conclusion that democracy, socialism, and lack of will were to blame. In their place, they emphasized organization, authority, solidarity, and faith as essential to the successful mobilization of the Ukrainian nation and the attainment of the Nationalist goal — an Independent and United Ukrainian State (Ukrains’ka Samostiïna Soborna Derzhava).

Although clearly a native product of the post-war Ukrainian reality, Ukrainian Nationalism shared many similarities with a variety of non-Ukrainian as well as Ukrainian ideologies, ranging from French integral nationalism and Italian Fascism to Ukrainian conservatism. Was Ukrainian Nationalism, therefore, “integral nationalist” or “fascist” or neither of the two? The question, of course, is critical, not only for Ukrainian Nationalism but also for students of the Right. The question is also difficult and made no easier by the fact that scholars themselves are not in agreement over the meanings of the two terms. Carlton J. H. Hayes, for example, considers Hitler and Mussolini to have been — “integral” or “totalitarian” nationalists. Eugen Weber writes that Maurras’ “integral nationalism was royalism.” Ernst Nolte, on the other hand, believes that the Action Française was a form of Fascism.¹ Who is right? The best way to answer this question, which ultimately muddles the issue, is to sidestep it. Instead, this study will refer to the definitions given these terms by Maurras and Mussolini themselves and then compare them with the ideology and politics of Ukrainian Nationalism. Although this method may not definitively resolve the question concerning Ukrainian Nationalism’s “true” nature, it does have the very substantial merit of confronting the issue of ideological origins in the simplest possible manner and in this way avoids confusing arguments of classification. After all, it should not be enough that a movement or regime be authoritarian, prone to violence, and nationalist to make it fascist, unless of course the term fascist is to be employed as a loose and virtually meaningless description of “style.”
Likewise, if the terms "integral nationalist" and "fascist" are interchangeable, as Hayes and Nolte suggest, then all discussion of the two as separate ideologies becomes purposeless. Thus, although the two ideologies doubtless shared many features, the most important question — even if it is of largely theoretical value — is whether they were also identical in their "essence." What, if anything, stood at the center of integral nationalism, Fascism, and Ukrainian Nationalism? After arriving at this answer with the help of Barrès, Maurras, Mussolini, and the Ukrainian Nationalists, it will then be possible to determine Ukrainian Nationalism's fundamental relationship to both.

While clearly a question of vital importance to contemporary Eastern European history, Ukrainian Nationalism remains a mystery to most Western students of nationalist and right-wing movements, with the notable exception of John A. Armstrong, who devoted a whole book to the subject. For example, Peter Sugar's two collections on nationalism and "native fascism" in Eastern Europe completely disregard the Ukrainian dimension. The same is true of the works on fascism and the European Right edited, respectively, by Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, and Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber. Western European scholars fare no better in this regard. Even Nolte, perhaps the foremost student of fascism, finds a fascist movement in every country of Europe, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Russia, but manages to overlook the immediate neighbor of the four — the Ukraine.

Ukrainian emigres have produced a rich body of memoirs as well as several semi-scholarly attempts at describing the Nationalist phenomenon. With the exception of Michael Sosnowsky's (Mykhailo Sosnovs'kyi) study of Dmytro Dontsov, however, none of the emigre works provides an adequate historical analysis of Ukrainian Nationalism. Soviet Ukrainian scholars, on the other hand, tend to avoid so politically complex a field of study as Ukrainian Nationalism and instead leave the job to pamphleteers whose diatribes against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" are of no value to the researcher. Of Eastern European scholars, only the Poles...
have seriously examined Ukrainian Nationalism as a crucial aspect of inter-war Polish history. The works of Ryszard Torzecki, Krzysztof Lewandowski, Antoni B. Szczęśniak, and Wiesław Z. Szota stand out in this regard.⁵

This study will deal with Ukrainian Nationalism as an ideological and political phenomenon. Although the social and economic dimensions will not be ignored, they will occupy a position of secondary importance to the ideological and political processes that led to the formation in 1929 of an organized movement of Ukrainian Nationalists — the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Furthermore, this study will deal only with the origins and development of the Ukrainian Nationalist movement — a period that began approximately in 1919 and ended in 1929, and attempt to explain how and why the transition was made from pre-war nationalism to post-war Nationalism.

Note on terminology:

All place names in the Ukraine in general and in Eastern Galicia in particular have been rendered in transliterations from the Ukrainian for two reasons. First, because it is incongruous to use non-Ukrainian place names when writing about so radically nationalist a phenomenon as Ukrainian Nationalism; and second, because this eliminates the confusion that would result were the place name corresponding to the period in question to be used: for example, depending on the year, L'viv could have been referred to as Lwów, L'vov, or Lemberg. Certainly, the use of “L'viv” alone is much simpler.
CHAPTER I

THE PRE-WAR BACKGROUND AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The First World War, the revolutionary turmoil in Russia, and the social and political changes they unleashed in Europe were the events that transformed the politically immature and, for the most part, incoherent Ukrainian national aspirations of the pre-war period into the nationally conscious but wildly divergent political currents of the 1920s. The war years created a distinctly Ukrainian political question which became the cornerstone of post-war Ukrainian politics. In particular, the various interpretations of the period from 1917 to 1920 served as the basis of the political rivalries of the post-war decade.

Crucial to the dimensions that the Ukrainian problem assumed during and after the war was the distribution of the pre-war ethnically Ukrainian population between two empires, Austria-Hungary and Russia. Some four million “Ruthenians” lived in the former, while just under 24 million “Little Russians” lived in the latter. Although the term “Ukrainian” did not come into broad use until the beginning of the 20th century, it will be used here in place of “Ruthenian” and “Little Russian” for the sake of clarity and convenience.

Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary populated Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia, all of which comprised an area later known as the “Western Ukraine” (Zakhidna Ukraina). Ukrainians in Russia primarily inhabited the gubernias of Chernihiv, Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kiev, Podillia, Poltava, Tavria, and Volyn’, together referred to as the
"Eastern Ukraine" (*Skhidna Ukraina*). In dealing with the Ukrainian movement in the Western Ukraine, this study will focus only on where it was strongest — Eastern Galicia.

The Ukrainian populations of both empires had similar social structures. Peasants formed the vast majority, the working class was small in relative as well as absolute terms, and a nationally conscious intelligentsia was as yet only in the process of formation. The ethnic cleavage paralleled the urban-rural cleavage, with Ukrainians dominating the countryside and non-Ukrainians (Russians and Jews in the Eastern Ukraine, Poles and Jews in Eastern Galicia) dominating the cities.

Existing under radically different political conditions, the Ukrainian movements in Austria and Russia developed along very different lines. The Habsburgs supported Ukrainian aspirations in Eastern Galicia, the so-called "Ukrainian Piedmont", as a counterweight to those of the Poles, the dominant nationality in the whole province. As a result, Galician Ukrainians (hereafter also referred to as Galicians) regarded Austria with a fair degree of loyalty and reverence. More important, the Ukrainian movement in Galicia assumed many of the characteristics of the conservative and evolutionary politics practiced in Vienna. Eastern Ukrainians, on the other hand, had continually to deal with the opposition of the Russian state in advancing national goals. Severe limitations on the uses of the Ukrainian language, for example, were contained in two ukases issued in 1863 and 1876. As a result, Eastern Ukrainians came to practice an illegal and conspiratorial form of politics which led to the development of ideological similarities and close ties to the Russian revolutionary underground.

The early Galician nationalists espoused Populist ideas and in this spirit founded the *Prosuita* (Enlightenment) Society in 1868 and the *Ridna Shkola* (Native School) Society in 1881. They followed with the first Ukrainian-language daily, *Dilo* (The Deed), in 1888 and with the *Sokil*, the Ukrainian counterpart to the patriotic Czech gymnastic organization, *Sokol*, in 1889. The Populists finally organized in the liberal-democratic Ukrainian National Democratic Party (*Ukrains’ka Natsional’no-Demokratychna Partiia*) in 1899.
They faced a powerful opposition in the Russophiles (or "Muscophiles", as they were literally called), who considered the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia to be a branch of the Russian nation and advocated Galicia's annexation to Russia. Both groups fought for the allegiance of the nationally uncommitted population, which regarded itself as Ruthenian. By the end of the 19th century, when the national movement had already broadened its horizons to include the Eastern Ukraine (in 1848, the Supreme Ruthenian Council had become the first Galician organization to declare the Galicians a part of the Ukrainian nation) and political goals supplemented cultural-educational ones, the term "Ruthenian" was progressively replaced by "Ukrainian". With the politicization of Ukrainian aspirations, however, the national movement came into conflict with the Poles and eventually assumed an anti-Polish character.

The late 19th century also saw the growth in Eastern Galicia of a Ukrainian socialist movement which drew its strength from the increasingly large number of Ukrainian workers employed in the recently discovered oil fields in the Carpathian foothills. A large role in its development belonged to the poet Ivan Franko, one of the founders in 1890 of the Ukrainian Radical Party (Ukrains'ka Radykal'na Partiia). Not to be outdone by the National Democrats, the Radicals founded their own version of the Sokil, the Sich, in 1900. A member of the Radical Party, Iulian Bachyns'kyi, published a landmark brochure in 1895, entitled Ukraina Irredenta, which for the first time articulated pan-Ukrainian aspirations to an independent state. Ukrainian students assimilated many of Bachyns'kyi's irredentist and socialist views in their journal Moloda Ukraina (The Young Ukraine) in 1900-1903.

Students dominated the national movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by loudly agitating for the creation of a Ukrainian university. In 1901-1902, several hundred of them went so far as to organize a "secession" from the University of L'viv, leaving it to study in Prague, Cracow, and Vienna in protest against the Polish character of the institution. Large anti-Polish student demonstrations took place at the same university in 1906, 1907, and 1910. A student, Adam Kotsko,
was killed in the latter disturbances, thereby providing the Ukrainians with their first national martyr. In 1909, another student, Myroslav Sichyns'kyi, created a sensation by assassinating the Polish governor of Galicia, Count Andrzej Potocki.

Between 1909 and 1914 the Ukrainian movement in Galicia assumed many of the features of the militarism then current in Europe. In particular, the Bosnian Crisis and the First Balkan War led many Ukrainians to believe that a wider conflict was inevitable and that they should not be unprepared for it. Students again took the initiative, organizing secret military groups throughout the province. They also played the leading role in founding the Ukrainian counterpart to Baden-Powell’s Scouts, the paramilitary organization Plast, in 1912.

The exploits of Józef Piłsudski, in Galicia since 1908, provided additional inspiration for the young Ukrainian militarists. Most enticing was Piłsudski’s success in persuading the Austrian government to allow the Poles to form organizations of Strzelcy (Sharpshooters). The Ukrainians followed suit with both the Sich and the Sokil founding their own sharpshooter societies in 1913-1914. The high point of the Ukrainians’ militarist fever occurred on June 28, 1914, the day of Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination, when the Sich and Sokil organizations staged a monumental show of strength in L’viv.

As war broke out, the Poles received permission to organize two national legions. The Ukrainians once again followed in their footsteps and began lobbying for Ukrainian units. Finally, in August 1914, permission was given for the formation of a legion of Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters (Ukrains’ki Sichovi Stril’tsi—USS). The USS served in the Austrian army until Austria’s collapse in late 1918, whereupon the legion was integrated into the Ukrainian Galician Army.

Two figures dominated the Eastern Ukraine in the 19th century — the poet Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) and the scholar Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841-1895). The former proved with his impassioned verse that Ukrainian was a literary
language and that the Ukrainians were indeed a separate nation. The latter provided the Ukrainian question with European dimensions and in the process popularized socialist ideas among the intellectuals of the Eastern Ukraine and Galicia. In general, political currents in the Eastern Ukraine paralleled those in Russia, with the Populism of the 19th century eventually giving way to the revolutionary socialism of the twentieth. Ukrainian national aspirations, meanwhile, increased with the growing intensification of the nationality problem in Russia. As in Eastern Galicia, intellectuals and students played a crucial role in these developments.

A short-lived Taras Brotherhood (Bratstvo Tarasiivtsiv) was founded in Kaniv in Kiev gubernia in 1891. Named after Shevchenko, it espoused a mildly nationalist and vaguely socialist program. There followed in 1900 the Kharkiv-based Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (Revoliutsiina Ukrains'ka Partiia — RUP), whose program, based on Mykola Mikhnovs'kyi's pamphlet Samostiina Ukraina (Independent Ukraine), first raised the slogans “Ukraine for the Ukrainians” and “One, United, Indivisible, Free, Independent Ukraine from the Caucasus to the Carpathians” that were to be adopted by the post-war Nationalists.

Mikhnovs'kyi, a young lawyer from Kharkiv, soon left the RUP and founded the small and outwardly nationalist Ukrainian People's Party (Ukrains'ka Narodna Partiia — UNP). Although it supported socialism out of political expedience, the UNP regarded the nationality question to be the most important aspect of the Ukrainian problem. According to its program, “All the evils which the Ukrainian people have suffered up to now derive from the fact that until recently they did not view their cause nationally, but only socially, and that they did not have the ideal of an independent Ukraine.”

In the meantime, the original RUP underwent a schism in 1904 over the nationality question. Those party members who downplayed the issue founded the Ukrainian Social-Democratic League (Ukrains'ka Sotsial-Demokratychna Spilka) and thereafter joined the Russian Social-Democratic Workers'
Party. The national wing of the former RUP renamed itself the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (Ukrains’ka Sotsial-Demokratychna Robitnycha Partiia — USDRP). Among the USDRP’s more prominent members were Symon Petliura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and Dmytro Dontsov. Several years later, Ukrainian moderates, consisting for the most part of scholars, writers, and other intellectuals, joined in the Society of Ukrainian Progressives (Tovarystvo Ukrains’kykh Postupivtsiv — TUP).

Nationally conscious Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia and in the Eastern Ukraine, whether revolutionaries, writers, or scholars, maintained close ties to one another since as early as 1867, when the journal Prawda, which came to serve as a forum for Ukrainians on both sides of the Austro-Russian border, was founded in L’viv. Of particular importance in fostering this vital exchange of ideas were the Eastern Ukrainian emigres living in L’viv, thanks to whose efforts the Shevchenko Society, a literary and cultural association, was established in 1873, and then expanded to include scholarly functions and renamed the Shevchenko Scientific Society in 1893. Most prominent of the Eastern Ukrainians was Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, a prodigious scholar of Eastern European history and author of the 10-volume History of the Ukraine-Rus’, who became editor of the Scientific Society’s periodical publication, the Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk (Literary-Scientific Herald). Dmytro Dontsov, meanwhile, the up-and-coming young Social-Democrat whose anti-Russian tendencies caused numerous conflicts within the party, played an influential role in politicizing the student movement in L’viv.

On August 4, 1914, Dontsov, together with Volodymyr Doroshenko, Vsevolod Kozlovs’kyi, Marian Melenevs’kyi, Oleksander Skoropys-Ioltukhovs’kyi, Mykola Zalizniak, and Andrii Zhuk — all emigres from the Eastern Ukraine, formed the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy — SVU) in L’viv. In late 1914, the members of the SVU moved their organization to Vienna in reaction to the Russian advance on Galicia. Skoropys-Ioltukhovs’kyi then founded a branch of the SVU in Berlin in April 1915. Enjoying the
financial and administrative support of Germany and Austria, the SVU was allowed to conduct its propaganda among the Ukrainians interned in the POW camps of both countries on the condition that its agitation have no anti-German or anti-Austrian content. The SVU published newspapers and brochures, organized cultural events, and conducted educational work aimed at reducing the high rate of illiteracy among the Ukrainian soldiers. Above all, the SVU tried to instill them with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity and of the need to oppose Russian political and cultural domination. The SVU's platform foresaw an "independent Ukrainian state" with a "constitutional monarchy", a "democratic internal political order", and the status of an "autonomous territory within Austria."

The Union dissolved itself after the establishment of a Ukrainian state allied to the Central Powers in the spring of 1918.

The first two years of the war saw no particularly important changes in the pre-war status of the Ukrainian movements in Austria and Russia. The Ukrainians for the most part continued to see their problems within the context of their respective empires. It was only the collapse of first the Russian and then the Austrian Empire that provoked them into taking radical measures leading to political independence.

The February Revolution offered the various political groups in the Eastern Ukraine the opportunity to put their ideas into practice. The Society of Ukrainian Progressives (TUP) took the initiative and on March 17 formed a representative and constituent body in Kiev, the Central Rada (Tsentral'na Rada rada is the Ukrainian word for soviet), and delegated Professor Hrushevskyi to head it. Given legitimization by an All-Ukrainian National Congress held on April 17-21, the Rada proceeded to take hesitant steps towards its goal of an autonomous Ukraine within a federal Russia. In the following months, Ukrainian units of the Russian army were "Ukrainianized" — given a specifically Ukrainian character, and measures were taken to introduce progressive social legislation.
The growing political and social ferment led to a proliferation of political parties and military organizations. The TUP reorganized itself as the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists (Ukrains'ka Partiia Sotsialistiv-Federalistiv — UPSF), while the Ukrainian Party of Social-Revolutionaries (Ukrains'ka Partiia Sotsial-Revoliutsioneriv — UPSR) and the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party (Ukrains'ka Demokratychno-Khliborobs'ka Partiia — UDKhP) were the most important of the many that came into existence. The Socialists-Federalists, socialist only by name, espoused moderate political and social goals within a federal Russia. The Social-Revolutionaries, the largest of all Ukrainian parties, represented the socialistically-inclined Ukrainian peasantry. The conservative Democratic-Agrarians, founded by Serhii Shemet and Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, stood for the interests of the middle-peasant stratum and supported Ukrainian statehood.

Most Ukrainian parties either did not desire more than autonomy or were committed to some form of anti-militarism and therefore saw no need for a Ukrainian army. Opposed to them were such groups as the Hetman Pavlo Polubotok Military Club and the Ukrainian Party of Independists-Socialists (Ukrains'ka Partiia Samostiïnykiv-Sotsialistiv — UPSS), whose members were for the most part soldiers. Predictably, Mikhnovs'kyi played a large role in both organizations. In spite of the soldiers' persistent pressure, however, Ukrainian government circles did not treat the matter of a standing army seriously and continued to think in terms of popular militias. The result was that the Central Rada was left virtually defenseless before the Bolshevik invasion at the end of 1917.

Reflecting the growing strength of the military movement was the spontaneous formation in the second half of 1917 of local peasant militia units called the Free Cossacks (Vil'ne Kozatstvo). First organized in Kiev gubernia, the Free Cossack movement then spread to Poltava gubernia, and soon came to occupy a large part of the Left-Bank Ukraine. Although intended to maintain law and order and prevent "counter-
revolutionary incidents”, the Free Cossacks consisted of many middle and rich peasants and frequently assumed an overtly anti-socialist character. On October 10-16, delegates representing some 60 thousand Free Cossacks gathered in Chyhyryn and chose General Pavlo Skoropads’kyi, the Ukrainian nobleman and landowner whose 34th Corps had the distinction of being the first large army unit to be “Ukrainianized”, as their Hetman.8

At approximately the same time that the Free Cossacks were mobilizing, several Galician officers interned in a Russian POW camp near Tsaritsyn were planning to escape to Kiev and there organize the large number of Galician soldiers in the Ukrainian capital into a military unit loyal to the Central Rada and committed to Ukrainian statehood. Radicalized by the revolutionary changes in Russia and the Ukraine, these officers were among the first Galicians to perceive the Galician problem within the context of the overall Ukrainian issue. Together with the Galician—Bukovinian Committee for Aid to Casualties of the War, the Galician officers organized a Galician-Bukovinian Battalion of Sich Sharpshooters in November 1917. At first based on a system of soldiers’ councils, the Sharpshooters were reorganized along regular military lines in January 1918, when Ievhen Konovalets’, Mykhailo Matchak, Andrii Mel’nyk, Volodymyr Kuchabs’kyi, and others purged the unit of its communist sympathizers and took control of its decision-making body, the Sharpshooters’ Council. At the same time, the unit was renamed the First Battalion of Sich Sharpshooters in order to emphasize its all-Ukrainian character and placed under Konovalets’s command. Although highly politicized, Colonel Konovalets’s Sharpshooters (who are not be be confused with the Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters of Galicia, the USS) were to be unswerving supporters of Ukrainian independence and of the several Ukrainian national governments existing in 1917-1919.

Events of an overall Russian nature soon pushed problems of an internal Ukrainian character into the background. The Bolshevik coup, the creation of a rival Soviet Ukrainian
government in Kharkiv, and the Red Army's invasion of the Ukraine exposed the weakness of the Central Rada government. Pushed by the tide of events to ever more extreme measures, the Rada issued the last of its famous four Proclamations on January 25, 1918 — two weeks after Woodrow Wilson's presentation of his Fourteen Points, and declared a Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublika — UNR). The steady Soviet advance forced the Rada to evacuate Kiev on February 7 and then sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk two days later. Soon thereafter, the Central Powers occupied the Ukraine and the Rada returned to Kiev.

However, the Rada proved incapable of governing the Ukraine effectively and providing the land with the law and order demanded by the occupying generals, Hermann von Eichhorn and Wilhelm Groener. At the same time, it faced growing opposition from the Democratic-Agrarians and Ukrainian and Russian circles representing landowner and business interests — the All-Ukrainian Union of Landowners, the Union of Landowners, and the Union of Industry, Commerce, Finance, and Agriculture. This opposition culminated in the Union of Landowners' Congress at which General Skoropads'kyi was proclaimed Hetman of the Ukraine on April 29. Skoropads'kyi's coup was over by the next day, when he ceremoniously announced the replacement of the UNR with the Ukrainian State (Ukrains'ka Derzhava). Colonel Konovalets's Sharpshooters, who refused to recognize the legitimacy of Skoropads'kyi's takeover, were promptly disarmed and disbanded.

As the German and Austrian occupying troops intensified requisitions of foodstuffs and other natural resources, the Hetman's repressive measures against the Ukrainian peasantry and inability or unwillingness to give his government a Ukrainian profile brought him into ever greater disrepute with the Ukrainian population in general and with the already hostile Ukrainian parties in particular. Most of the parties thereupon joined forces in the Ukrainian National Union (Ukrains'kyi Natsional'nyi Soiuz), an anti-Hetman coalition which demanded that Skoropads'kyi rid his government of
excessive Russian influence and increase its commitment to Ukrainian national ideals. The National Union also encouraged Konovalets’ to petition the Hetman for renewal of the Sich Sharpshooters. Skoropads’kyi gave his approval and on August 18 Konovalets’ began reorganizing the force in Bila Tserkva, south of Kiev.

Skoropadskyi’s reactionary policies provoked significant changes within the Ukrainian political spectrum. The Social-Revolutionaries crystallized into a right (Mykola Kovalevs’kyi), center (Mykyta Shapoval), and left (the Borot’bisty) factions. The Social-Democrats divided into a left wing led by Vynnychenko, formerly general secretary of internal affairs in the Rada government, and a right wing led by Petliura, the former secretary of military affairs. At the same time, the left wings of both parties drew closer to each other in increasingly favoring a Soviet socialist Ukraine in alliance with a Soviet Russia.

With the war clearly coming to a close, the precariousness of the Hetman’s unpopular government became dangerously obvious. At their Congress held on October 26-28, even the Democratic-Agrarians criticized the Hetman’s national policies and pro-Russian leanings. The Union of Landowners was also divided over Skoropads’kyi. The Russian wing supported his federalist tendencies, while the Ukrainian wing, organized in the All-Ukrainian Union of Landowners, favored a Ukrainian orientation. As to the Ukrainian National Union, it began plotting an uprising.

On November 13, ten days after the armistice with Austria and two days after that with Germany, the National Union formed the Directory, a five-man executive body headed by Vynnychenko and Petliura, and empowered it to lead the revolutionary anti-Hetman forces. One day later, Skoropads’kyi, at least partly motivated by the desire to win favor with the Entente, proclaimed the Ukraine’s federation with an anti-Bolshevik Russian government. Responding to Skoropads’kyi’s act of desperation, the Directory began its uprising on November 16. Within a month, its forces, spearheaded by Konovalets’s Sharpshooters, were in control of Kiev and reestablished the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Several days later on December 14, Skoropads’kyi abdicated.
Events of equal importance were also taking place in Eastern Galicia. There, on November 1, 1918 in L'viv, the Ukrainians overthrew the local Austrian administration and proclaimed a Western Ukrainian People's Republic (Zakhidno-Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublika — ZUNR) with Ievhen Petrushevych, a National Democrat, as President. The coup’s organizers were the Ukrainian National Council, a representative body formed in October out of members of the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to Vienna, and a group of army officers who laid the groundwork for the takeover by establishing an underground network of Ukrainian soldiers throughout the province.

Eastern Galicia’s Poles immediately rose in armed opposition to the Ukrainians. In sore need of reinforcements, Petrushevych then sent Osyp Nazaruk, a Radical, to Kiev to request that the Hetman transfer Konovalets's Sharpshooters to the Polish front. Although Skoropads'kyi was not averse to ridding himself of the troublesome force, the Sharpshooters' Council turned Nazaruk down, considering the Eastern Ukraine, and not Galicia, to be crucial to the success of the Ukrainian Revolution.

The Directory, meanwhile, was proving just as incapable of holding on to power as Skoropads'kyi. At first enjoying the wholehearted support of the revolutionized peasant masses, who hoped that they would be given back the land that the Hetman had taken away, the Directory suffered a progressive reduction in its popular base as a result of its inability to assert itself and introduce much needed social reforms. Its weakness stemmed in large part from the crippling power struggle between Vynnychenko, who favored adoption of pro-Soviet policies at the cost of Ukrainian nationalist goals, and Petliura, who called for armed struggle against the Bolsheviks. Petliura's supporters, among them the Sich Sharpshooters, proved the stronger and on January 16, 1919 the Directory declared war on Soviet Russia. In reaction to these events, the Social-Democrats followed in the Social-Revolutionaries' footsteps and formally split into pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet factions in mid-January.

The Directory's last important act before its flight from Kiev in early February was the proclamation of Ukrainian
sobornist' (a religious term denoting unity) on January 22, 1919. Although the UNR and the ZUNR agreed on principle to unite in one Ukrainian People's Republic, formal unification was to be implemented by a future Ukrainian constituent assembly. Till that time, the ZUNR, although renamed the Western Oblast of the Ukrainian People's Republic, was to remain under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian National Council in L'viv.

As the Directory steadily retreated westward before the advancing Red Army, the Galician government still continued to hold on to most of Eastern Galicia. This favorable state of affairs lasted only until spring, however, when General Józef Haller's well-trained army arrived in Poland from France. Although ostensibly mobilized to counteract the Bolshevik threat, Haller's forces were sent to the Galician front and in mid-May began an offensive that resulted in a rout of the Ukrainian Galician Army (Ukrains'ka Halyts'ka Armii — UHA) within two months. As the ZUNR's position became desperate, Petrushevych was given dictatorial powers and appointed Dictator.

By this time, the Soviet drive had pushed the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (Armiia Ukrains'koi Narodnoi Respubliky — AUNR) to the Zbruch River, the boundary line between Eastern Galicia and the Eastern Ukraine. Still further to the west — in Hungary, Bela Kun was busy establishing a Soviet republic. Fearing this two-pronged Communist threat, the Allied Supreme Council authorized the Poles to occupy all of Galicia. On July 16, meanwhile, the UHA crossed the Zbruch and joined Petliura's beleaguered forces in Kamianets' Podil's'kyi.

Events were no less chaotic east of the so-called "Triangle of Death." The Bolsheviks faced armed opposition from Otaman Grigoriev, the anarchist bands of Nestor Makhno, and the peasantry. The French, who had arrived in Odessa in late 1918 and on whose support the Directory had counted, left the seaport in early April, while the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces began organizing a Volunteer Army in the south.

Petliura, now a virtual dictator, also faced serious difficulties. The Borot'bisty and left Social-Democrats were in open opposition to the Directory, while pro-Bolshevik sympathies were gaining ever greater currency in the army
and among the peasantry. What is more, Petliura, although nominally the Supreme Otaman, was proving incapable of or unwilling to maintain order in even the small strip of territory that he still controlled, with the result that Ukrainian soldiers and peasants engaged almost unopposed in anti-Jewish pogroms of terrifying proportions. The atrocities committed by Petliura’s forces, together with the no less numerous ones of the Bolsheviks and the Whites, not only decimated the Jewish population of the Ukraine, but also poisoned Ukrainian-Jewish relations for many years to come.

Equally debilitating to the Directory were an anti-Petliura, anti-socialist opposition led by Opanas Andriievs'kyi, an Independist-Socialist, and the growing strains with the Galicians. The UNR government viewed Petrushevych’s appointment as Dictator as running counter to the democratic ideals of the Ukrainian Revolution. The ZUNR government, on the other hand, became increasingly alarmed at the growth of radical socialist tendencies in the UNR. To make matters still worse for Petliura, the internal UNR opposition joined forces with the Galicians in an alliance that survived into the post-war years.

Reinforced by the battle-heardened Galician Army, however, Petliura was able to launch a combined UNR-ZUNR offensive in late July. Aided by Denikin’s drive from the south, the Ukrainian forces occupied Kiev on August 30, only to lose it to the Russian general the day after. The question of Denikin became another point of disagreement between the Galicians and the Eastern Ukrainians. The former saw him as a potential ally against the Bolsheviks, while the latter regarded him as a counterrevolutionary who had to be resisted at all costs.

Further complicating the situation was the Red Army’s successful counteroffensive against the Ukrainians and Denikin in the fall. In order to secure his rear, Petliura agreed to a 30-day armistice with the Poles on September 1, 1919. As the Ukrainian front continued to crumble, the head of the UNR’s diplomatic mission to Poland, Andrii Livyts'kyi, opened further negotiations in Warsaw. Both moves were severely condemned by the Galicians, who began fearing the worst from their Eastern Ukrainian allies.

The Galician Army (UHA), meanwhile, pressed hard by both the Bolsheviks and Denikin and decimated by typhus and a
lack of supplies, began negotiations with the White general and on November 17 agreed to join his army. The outraged Eastern Ukrainians promptly decried the move as treason. Considering its relations with the ZUNR to be abrogated, the UNR concluded a pact with Poland on December 2, whereby Petliura granted Eastern Galicia and the western half of Volyn’ *gubernia* to Poland in exchange for its political and military support against Russia. It was now the Galicians' turn to charge the Eastern Ukrainians with betraying *sobornist*. In spite of this formal exchange of accusations, the de facto break between the Eastern and the Western Ukrainians had already taken place in November, when Petrushevych fled to Rumania and the Western Ukrainian members of the joint UNR-ZUNR delegation to the Paris Peace Conference formed a separate Western Ukrainian delegation.

While the Army of the UNR was engaged in its First Winter Campaign, the UHA, once again caught in a desperate situation after Denikin's collapse, joined the Red Army on February 10, 1920. Just as indicative of the extent of the Bolshevik victory was the decision of the *Borot'bisty*, who had reconstituted themselves as the Ukrainian Communist Party (*Borot'bisty*) in August 1919, to join the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine (*CP(b)U*) in March 1920 after several unsuccessful attempts to gain recognition from the Comintern. The left Social-Democrats also founded their own Ukrainian Communist Party in January 1920 and were thereafter known as the *Ukapisty*.

On April 21, 1920, Petliura's government concluded a political treaty with Poland reiterating the conditions of the earlier pact and three days later followed with a military convention that resulted in the combined Piłsudski-Petliura offensive on Kiev. Two of the three brigades of the now Red Ukrainian Galician Army (*Chervona UHA*) once again changed sides, only to be quickly disarmed by the Poles. Supported by General Wrangel's offensive in the south, the Polish-Ukrainian armies captured Kiev on May 7, only to lose it to the Red Army six weeks later. The Soviet counter-offensive, which was to reach as far as the Vistula River, drove the Polish-Ukrainian forces out of the Ukraine in July. Although AUNR partisans continued their struggle until late 1921, the summer of 1920 marked the end of large-scale Ukrainian resistance. The Poles, in the meantime, abandoned
their Ukrainian allies and signed a peace treaty with Soviet
Russia at Riga on March 8, 1921.

A radically different political reality now faced the
Ukrainians. The Austrian and Russian Empires had collapsed; 
Ukrainian ethnic territories, however, continued to be divided 
among foreign states. Eastern Galicia and part of Volyn’
gubernia had gone to Poland, Transcarpathia to Czecho-
slovakia, and most of Bukovina to Rumania. East of the
Zbruch River, meanwhile, there existed a new state entity most
Ukrainian nationalists considered to be a puppet of Soviet
Russia — the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR).

As the state-building efforts of the Eastern and Western
Ukrainian governments drew near collapse in 1919-1920, the
focus of Ukrainian politics began slowly to shift to the emigres.
Although, as the example of the Union for the Liberation of the
Ukraine shows, Ukrainian emigres also played an important
political role in the national movement during the war, the
collapse of first the ZUNR and then of the UNR resulted in so
large a flood of emigres, that the Ukrainian emigration became
the center of the national movement in the post-war decade.
The followers of Petliura found refuge in Poland and France,
those of Petrushevych fled to Czechoslovakia and Austria,
while Skoropads’kyi’s cohorts settled in Berlin and Vienna.

Political emigres tend usually to be forgotten or ignored.
Denied the opportunity to play a direct role in the political life
of the country they left, emigres often turn their energies
against one another, preoccupying themselves with petty
questions of ideology as a result of their inability to deal in
practical politics. And as they increasingly withdraw into their
private world, their irrelevance to the political processes in
their native country correspondingly grows larger.

An emigre group can maintain its relevance, however, as
long as it represents a sizable political current unable to
express its aspirations in the home country. By this means, the
emigres acquire the essential political base at home, while the
base acquires a mouthpiece, albeit removed, for its interests.
The resulting relationship may be termed symbiotic. The
Eastern Ukrainian emigres in pre-war Austria, for example,
served such a function in relation to the Ukrainian movement
in Russia. Significantly, the emigres are essential to the natives only as long as the two groups' interests coincide or the latter remain incapable of assuming the emigres' role as mouthpiece.

The many Ukrainian political emigres who left the Ukraine during and after the war all tried desperately to maintain or establish vital contact with the homeland. However, some became politically irrelevant as soon as they set foot out of the Ukraine; others maintained their relevance at first, only to lose it with time; still others were able to adapt themselves to conditions in the Ukraine and thereby attain the desired relevance. Nevertheless, whatever their ultimate fate, the emigres played a crucial role in inter-war Ukrainian political and cultural life.

The post-war emigration had already been preceded by several waves of Ukrainian emigrants. The pre-war emigrants consisted almost exclusively of impoverished Galician and Bukovinian peasants in search of work in Europe. Although most of the war-time emigrants were also Galicians, these had usually either fled from their homes before the Russians or been forcibly evacuated in the course of the war. They were supplemented by the thousands of Ukrainians held as prisoners of war in Austria and Germany, if soldiers in the Russian army, or in Russia and Italy, if soldiers in the Austrian army.

The first large-scale, strictly political emigration took place in 1919. It consisted of UNR supporters who had fled before the Bolshevik advance early that year and of ZUNR supporters who had escaped to the West after Haller's offensive and the UHA's crossover to Denikin spelled the end of the ZUNR's active involvement in events in the Ukraine. The second wave took place in the winter of 1919-1920, when Petliura's pact with Poland resulted in the internment in Polish camps of large numbers of AUNR soldiers, among them the Sich Sharpshooters of Col. Konovalets'. The final and largest emigration took place in the second half of 1920 with the collapse of the Ukrainians' military efforts. This wave consisted of Petliura's remaining troops and of the soldiers of the peripatetic Galician Army.
Although having been decisively defeated by their political and military opponents, the various Ukrainian emigre groups resolved to continue their struggle to the extent possible in emigre conditions. In so doing, however, the emigres fought one another as much as their national enemies. In particular, three competing governments-in exile — Skoropads'kyi's, Petrushevych's, and Petliura's — offered obvious evidence as to why the Ukrainian Revolution had failed.
SKOROPADS'KYI AND THE CONSERVATIVES

Following the Directory's successful uprising in late 1918, Hetman Skoropads'kyi and his entourage became the first of the Ukrainian governments to go into exile. After spending some time in Vienna, the Hetman eventually made his way to Germany and established residence near Berlin. Although he received a yearly stipend from German government circles associated with General Groener, Skoropads'kyi's benefactors refrained from openly supporting the Hetman. The Germans recognized that the kind of Ukraine envisioned by the Hetman would be in Germany's interests, yet at the same time realized that the dictates of realistic politics, which demanded that Germany break out of its isolation by establishing diplomatic relations with the UkSSR in 1921, by signing the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, and by entering into economic and military cooperation with Soviet Russia, made the Skoropads'kyi connection of secondary importance.9

With General Paul von Hindenburg's election to the presidency in 1925, however, Skoropads'kyi's fortunes turned for the better. First, because conservative military-Junker circles favorably disposed to the Hetman acquired a greater voice in the von Hindenburg government; second, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw that the "Ukrainianization" process and the NEP had created a strong national and middle-peasant stratum and believed that the resulting tensions could
make the Ukraine into a trouble-spot demanding the requisite German attention — all the more so, since England was also beginning to reveal an interest in the UkSSR; and third, because after Petliura’s assassination in 1926, Skoropads’kyi became the central personality among Ukrainian emigre politicians.\textsuperscript{10}

Aside from the increase in Skoropads’kyi’s personal stipend, the greater German interest in the Hetmanite movement primarily manifested itself in the creation in November 1926 of a Ukrainian Scientific Institute (\textit{Ukrains’kyi Naukovyi Instytut}) in Berlin. Although formally underwritten by the Society for the Support of Ukrainian Science and Culture, which was headed by General Groener, the Institute was actually funded by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Education. Groener, a close friend of Skoropads’kyi, also served as the Institute’s curator, while Professor Ivan Mirchuk was designated Director. The Institute had five departments dealing with various aspects of Ukrainian studies, published several scholarly periodicals, and came to occupy a special place in the Ukrainian emigre world as a serious scholarly and political institution.\textsuperscript{11}

Lacking mass support among Ukrainians, Skoropads’kyi devoted himself mostly to behind-the-scenes contacts with influential (as well as not-so-influential) conservative and right-wing circles in the West. Besides Groener, his German contacts included von Hindenburg, General Max Hoffmann, General Rüdiger von der Goltz, and the publicist Paul Rohrbach. The Hetman also met with representatives of the Orgesch in 1920 and with Alfred Rosenberg in 1921.\textsuperscript{12} At the same time, the Hetman enjoyed the financial support of English circles closely affiliated with the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{13} Most of Skoropads’kyi’s remaining contacts were to Russian monarchists and restorationists, including General Wrangel. Individual Hetmanites, meanwhile, actively agitated among the Ukrainians held in the internment camps for Wrangel’s troops in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.\textsuperscript{14}

The Hetman’s supporters, among whom was a sizable number of non-Ukrainians, organized themselves in political
groupings usually bearing the name Agrarian (*Khiborob*). The ideological offspring of the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party, they were found in Austria, Germany, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, with the strongest Agrarian organizations in Berlin and Vienna. The Berlin Hetmanites controlled the *Ukrains'ka Hromada* (Ukrainian Community), an ostensibly non-political organization for Ukrainians in Germany, ran a publishing house, and put out a newspaper of the same name—*Ukrains'ke Slovo* (The Ukrainian Word). The ideological center of the Agrarian movement, however, lay in Vienna, where the pro-Hetman wing of the Democratic-Agrarian Party, united under V. Lypyns'kyi, Dmytro Doroshenko, and S. Shemet, founded the Union of Ukrainian Statehood (*Soiuz Ukrains'koi Derzhavnosty*) in February 1920. The Union was soon renamed the Initiative Group of the Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists and formalized as the Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists (*Ukrains'kyi Soiuz Khliborobiu-Derzhavnkyiu*—USKhD) by late 1920. The Agrarian Statists published a non-periodical journal, entitled *Khliborobs'ka Ukraina* (The Agrarian Ukraine), which appeared five times between 1920 and 1925 and which reflected the high intellectual level of Skoropads'kyi's supporters.

Although the number of Ukrainian Hetmanites was relatively small, their social position, intellectual capabilities, and broad contacts gave them an enormous advantage over other Ukrainian political groupings. The Hetman's minister of foreign affairs, D. Doroshenko, his envoy to Vienna, V. Lypyns'kyi, and I. Mirchuk, for example, were all eminent historians and publicists.

Lypyns'kyi, however, was also the Hetmanite ideologue. A Ukrainianized nobleman of Polish descent, Lypyns'kyi had already supported Ukrainian independence before the war, believing that the local aristocracy would have to play the key role in attaining this goal. After the war, he remained in Austria, where he wrote his monumental *Lysty do bratiu-khliborobiv* (Letters to Brethren-Agrarians), an important political work which attempted to describe the "idea and organization of Ukrainian Monarchism."
According to Lypyns'kyi, the essential principles of the “conservative” ideology were contained in the following propositions:

—“No one will build us a state, if we do not build it ourselves and no one will make of us a nation, unless we ourselves will want to become a nation.”17

—“Only the Ukrainian agrarian class is capable with its own strength and with its own authority of organizing politically and uniting nationally our ethnic mass, that is, of creating a Ukrainian State and a Ukrainian Nation.”18

—“The unification and organization of the whole Ukrainian Nation depends on the unification and organization of the Ukrainian agrarian class.”19

—“Without the remnants of the Russified and Polonized Ukrainian nobility that are morally healthy and capable of community work, a new agrarian-peasant, state-minded leading stratum cannot be created, the agrarian class cannot be unified by it, and that means that the Ukrainian Nation cannot be unified and the Ukrainian State organized.”20

—“Without a Ukrainian Monarchy — in the form of an hereditary and not elective Hetmanate, the politically honest and state-mindedly creative part of the Russified and Polonized noble upper strata of the agrarian class cannot return to the Ukrainian Nation; a new, healthy, and strong peasant-agrarian aristocracy, [built] with their participation, cannot be formed; the Ukrainian agrarian class cannot be unified by the authority of this new peasant aristocracy. This means that only with a Hetmanite-monarchical form of Ukrainian statehood can the Ukrainian agrarian class unite, organize, and acquire that inner strength, without which it cannot unify the Ukrainian Nation and cannot build the Ukrainian State.”21

—“Without the rebirth and restoration of the traditional state-national Ukrainian Hetmanate in the person of an ancestral and hereditary Hetman, declared the Head of the State, those conditions cannot be created in the Ukraine under which the agrarian class, the strongest in the Ukraine, will be able to act with its greater real strength in the name of
the ideological and all-national interests of the State and Nation, gain for itself the necessary moral authority in the eyes of the other classes, and thus use its greater strength for building a Ukrainian State and for unifying the Ukrainian Nation.”

—“Without morally worthy, politically honest, disciplined and organized Hetmanites, who are devoted with all their soul to their ideal for which they are prepared to make sacrifices and who are capable of creative community work, the traditional and national Ukrainian Hetmanate cannot be restored and the period of reconstruction and creativity, that will come to the Ukraine after the present period of democratic destruction, will not be able to acquire Ukrainian national forms. Because without a Hetmanate there cannot arise a new, authoritative state-creative nationally Ukrainian stratum, the agrarian part of this stratum will not be able to unify and organize its agrarian class, and the Ukrainian Nation will not be able to be unified and the Ukrainian State will not be able to be organized on the basis of this strongest Ukrainian class.”

Lypyns’kyi’s proposed “organization of the nation” was a “classocracy” (klasokratiia), a harmonious, cultured society, divided into “productive classes.” The alternatives to “classocracy” were democracy, which was characterized by the “disintegration of classes, lack of a common faith, and complete communal amorality” and was equivalent to the “material and moral ruin of the nation”; and “mobocracy” (okhlokratiia; from the Greek word okhlos, meaning “mob”), the rule of “nomadic barbarians united by some kind of primitive, fanatical faith, and primitive morality and organization,” equivalent to the “rule of the fist” and the “authority of fear.”

Because the only feasible Ukraine was a Hetmanite Ukraine, the Hetmanite ideology had to become the ideology of the “mind of the nation”, the intelligentsia. But the existing intelligentsia was democratic, socialist, and revolutionary and incapable of infusing the people with the desire for statehood so necessary to achieving it. The “healthy” conservatives, therefore, had to “isolate” themselves from the “sick”
intelligentsia, organize their forces, and respond to the “despicable invective” of their “sick brethren” with “love and quiet”, as does a “doctor to the ravings of a sick man, whom he loves and wants to cure.” In this manner, the conservatives would attract to their side the “healthier” intellectuals, “less afflicted with the sickness of non-statehood”, eventually cure them of their illness, and thereby provide the “ideological impulse, which makes of stateless nations — nations with states.”

Although probably the most profound Ukrainian political theorist of the 20th century, Lypyns’kyi — not surprisingly — was relatively uninfluential among Ukrainians, who, while adopting many of his ideas, generally rejected his class-based aristocratic schemes. Ironically, Lypyns’kyi’s influence was strongest where it was least expected — among the Nationalists.

Not all Ukrainian conservatives, however, supported the Hetman. The leading figures in the anti-Hetman camp were Mykola Chudinov, an Eastern Ukrainian and one-time member of the RUP and the USDRP, the Archduke Wilhelm von Habsburg, and Viktor Andriievs’kyi, a Free Cossack activist from Poltava gubernia. Chudinov, also known by the more Ukrainian-sounding and patriotically evocative name “Bohun,” led the Ukrainian People’s Party (Ukrains’ka Narodna Partiia — UNP), the Archduke, who went under the assumed name, Vasyl’ Vyshyvanyi, established his stronghold among the emigre Free Cossacks, while Andriievs’kyi worked with both.

The Ukrainian People’s Party was founded on May 15, 1919 in Stanyslaviv by the former All-Ukrainian Union of Landowners and discontented elements in the Democratic-Agrarian Party. Although claiming to represent the Ukrainian middle peasantry, the UNP differed from the Hetmanites by not rejecting democracy and the parliamentary system. Moreover, the UNP adopted a distinctly nationalist line. It called for “safeguarding the nationality of the Ukrainian people”, the “independence of the Ukrainian church”, the “defense of small and middle land-ownership”,

...
and an alliance of the middle peasantry with the urban Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie. Most important, all of these goals were to be achieved with “our own forces” (ulasni syly). Opposed to the Hetman, because of his rejection of parliamentarianism and reliance on Germans and Russians, and to Petliura, because of his socialism and orientation on the Poles, the UNP came strongly to sympathize with the anti-socialist, nationalist emigre camp led by Petrushevych.26

Vasyl’ Vyshyvanyi’s involvement in Ukrainian affairs dated back to the war, when he joined the Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters, learned the Ukrainian language, and later became colonel of the legion. While stationed in the Ukraine in 1918, the Archduke became the focus of a controversy revolving about his pretensions to Skoropads’kyi’s throne. After finally settling in Vienna in 1919-1920, Vyshyvanyi, who managed to publish a collection of mediocre Ukrainian poems in 1921, plunged into Ukrainian politics in spite of serious difficulties with his father, the Archduke Karl Stephan, who strongly disapproved of his active involvement in Ukrainian emigre life. Although a supporter of Petrushevych and an advocate of a constitutional monarchy, the Austrian nobleman maintained close ties to such Hetmanites as Doroshenko and Lypyns’kyi throughout 1920, apparently in connection with Petrushevych’s temporary rapprochement with Skoropads’kyi at the time of Wrangel’s offensive in the Ukraine. It is also likely that Vyshyvanyi first came into contact with the UNP in 1920.27

An event of some importance for the Archduke took place in November 1920 in Berlin, where two former Free Cossacks, P. Romanovs’kyi and K. Novokhats’kyi, the latter a member of Chudinov’s party, founded the Initiative Committee for the Renewal of the Free Cossacks.28 That the move was probably an attempt by conservative anti-Skoropads’kyi forces to mobilize the conservative Ukrainian emigration seems clear from the appearance one month later of an open letter from the Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists to the “Officers and Cossacks of the Ukrainian Army” imploring the Ukrainian soldiers to join the USKhD in “one, broad, straight road” to Ukrainian independence.29
As the Free Cossack movement broadened in scope, Vyshyvanyi became the logical candidate for leader of this strongly nationalist, conservative, and anti-Hetman political force. Already possessing the support of the UNP and of Petrushevych, Vyshyvanyi also acquired the valuable services of Viktor Andriievs'kyi in March 1921, when Andriievs'kyi, together with the Galician wing of the Hetmanites, left the USKhD and joined Chudinov's UNP. 30

Andriievs'kyi was already well-known for his brochure, entitled Do kharakterystyky ukraïns'kykh pravykh partii (Towards a Characterization of Ukrainian Right-Wing Parties). "By right-wing Ukrainian parties and organizations," wrote Andriievs'kyi, "I mean those who do not consider themselves socialist, who do not take the socialist doctrine as the basis of their worldview, and who do not have as an imperative goal the achievement, to a greater or lesser degree and either now or in the future, of a socialist order. Not one of these Ukrainian right-wing parties ever . . . took part in governing the Ukraine . . . and can therefore not take upon itself any responsibility whatsoever for the state-building in the Ukraine." 31

Andriievs'kyi's analysis of the Ukrainians' unsuccessful revolution was typical of the thinking current among his ideological comrades. Foremost was the conviction that the socialists had betrayed the Ukrainian cause:

"The role of Ukrainian socialist democracy in creating a state was . . . destructive. But having destroyed its own state, it was incapable of building anything else; so as not to allow its right-wing competitors — the real Ukrainian, the agrarian — to come to power, it made use of an alliance with foreigners on the outside, and of demagogy . . . on the inside. True, Ukrainian socialist democracy succeeded in drawing away the poor, unenlightened Ukrainian proletarian and the landless or small-landholding Ukrainian muzhik from right-wing Ukrainian democracy, . . . but Ukrainian socialist democracy was not capable of attracting them to itself and instead threw them into the hands of the Muscovite Bolshevik centralists . . . ." 32
In October 1921, Andriievs'kyi began publishing the newspaper Soborna Ukraina (The United Ukraine) in Vienna. Billed as the “Organ of the Free Cossacks”, Andriievs'kyi’s venture enjoyed Vyshyvanyi’s political and financial support. Anti-socialist, unremittingly nationalist in its hatred of Russians and Poles, and resolutely opposed to Skoropads’kyi, Andriievs'kyi’s newspaper advocated the primacy of national over class or party interests, the establishment of a national Church, an “aristocratic democracy” which would reconcile a monarchical order with the democratic strivings of the agrarian class, and an absolute reliance on “our own forces”. Significantly, Soborna Ukraina adopted a neutral attitude towards Petrushevych. The Hetmanites, as was to be expected, regarded Andriievs'kyi with barely-concealed hostility.

In the meantime, Vyshyvanyi’s fortunes continued to rise. In April 1921, Ievhen Chykalenko, a former Eastern Ukrainian landowner and an active supporter of the pre-war national movement, argued in a prominent emigre journal that only by summoning a “Varangian, before whom all our intellectual forces would bow,” as monarch of the Ukraine could a Ukrainian state be built and maintained in the face of the threat from a restored Russian tsar, the inevitable outcome, according to Chykalenko, of the “centralist-autocratic communist rule.” Even a White Russian newspaper in Prague reflected the Ukrainian mood, claiming in late 1921 that a “Habsburg would never want to become the vassal of a Romanov.” Several years later, Lypyns’kyi still considered Chykalenko’s ideas to be of sufficient danger to the Hetman to warrant writing a lengthy article on “The Summoning of ‘Varangians’ or an Organization of Agrarians” in Khliborobs’ka Ukraina.

Vyshyvanyi appears to have lost Andriievs’kyi’s support sometime in early 1922, when Soborna Ukraina dropped the Free Cossack sub-heading and became the private political organ of Andriievs'kyi. At the same time, the newspaper replaced its former ideal of an “aristocratic democracy” with that of a “peasant national democracy” bearing no trace of a
monarch. By May 1922, Soborna Ukraina ceased publication, probably from a lack of funds. Although Vyshyvanyi's alleged flirtations with Russian monarchists may have contributed to his quarrel with Andriievs'kyi, more likely was the latter's own evolution towards an extreme form of nationalism, in many respects an ideological sibling of Dontsov's Nationalism.

Vyshyvanyi receded into the background of Ukrainian emigre politics in 1922-1923. Galicia was granted to Poland, Petrushevych turned to the Soviets, and the Soviet Ukraine refused to collapse. His Free Cossack supporters turned further rightwards, while Ukrainian emigres in general either moved en masse to Prague, the new Ukrainian emigre capital, or adapted to the new situation by returning to Galicia or to the UkSSR. Clearly, there was little room for the Austrian Archduke in such an environment.

As emigre politics were increasingly shown to be fruitless, Ukrainians began turning to radical solutions to what they perceived as a national crisis. Reflecting the political disarray and social dislocation that were particularly characteristic of the Free Cossacks, this rightward trend found its most extreme representative in Ivan Poltavets'-Ostrianytsia, a political adventurer who served as Skoropads'kyi's secretary in 1918. After emigrating to Munich, Poltavets' established contacts to Ernst Roehm, Hermann Goering, and Alfred Rosenberg in 1921, and soon thereafter began organizing the openly reactionary "Cossack Movement" from former Ukrainian soldiers in Denikin's and Wrangel's armies interned in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. He also published Ukrains'kyi Kozak (The Ukrainian Cossack) in 1923-1924, a newspaper adorned with swastikas and called a "terribly stupid thing" by D. Doroshenko. In July 1926, Poltavets' was proclaimed "Hetman and national vozhd' of all the Ukraine" by the "All-Ukrainian National Insurgent Cossack Council." Although the second hetman continued to consort with Nazis and even expanded his right-wing connections to include the Czech fascist, General Rudolf Gajda, his political significance remained quite minimal.
CHAPTER 3

PETRUSHEVYCH AND THE GALICIANS

The second of the Ukrainian governments to go into exile was that of Ievhen Petrushevych, who escaped to Vienna in late 1919. Intent on exploiting Eastern Galicia’s uncertain international status, the Galician Dictator began a massive lobbying effort aimed at convincing the Entente powers that an independent and neutral Eastern Galician state was in their interests. Fundamental to this strategy was to dissociate Galicia from the overall Ukrainian issue and thereby make of it a question that could legally be settled by the Allies.

In particular, Petrushevych placed his hopes on Article 89 of the Treaty of Saint Germain: “Austria hereby recognizes and accepts the frontiers of Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the Czecho-Slovak State as those frontiers may be determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”43 The Dictator not unreasonably interpreted this article to mean that the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia, sanctioned by the Allied Supreme Council on June 25, 1919, was only a temporary solution to the Galician question. With allies in Lloyd George and Sir Lewis Namier, who regarded the Galician question as a way of curbing France’s political ambitions and of maintaining a balance of power in Europe, Petrushevych was able to make some headway in advancing Galician independence in 1920-1921 by playing on England’s great-power interests.44
The Dictator offered the Allied Powers, and particularly the British, powerful incentives for regarding Galician independence favorably. Foremost among them were the province’s large oil fields, long since an area of competition between French and British petroleum companies. Second, argued Petrushevych, a neutral Galicia could serve as a convenient link for Western Europe’s trade with Russia. And finally, an independent but neutral Galician state, established and guaranteed by the Allies, would stabilize Eastern Europe by removing a much disputed territory from the field of contention.

The ZUNR’s relations with Czechoslovakia occupied a special place in Petrushevych’s international politics. Already at odds with the Poles over the question of Teschen, the Czechs saw the Galician issue as a means of checking their neighbor’s power in the region. Besides wanting Galicia’s oil, they also believed that an independent Galician state, with close political and economic ties to Czechoslovakia, could serve as the trade corridor to Russia they so desired. Petrushevych, for his part, assured them that “Czechoslovakia’s only possible window to the whole of Eastern Europe and to neighboring Asia is an independent Galicia. It was not, is not, and will not be so industrialized as ever to be able to compete with Czechoslovakia in Eastern Europe.”

Much to Petrushevych’s chagrin, however, Poland was treating Eastern Galicia as an integral part of its territory. Although lacking legal jurisdiction over the Ukrainian province, the Polish government progressively integrated Eastern Galicia into the overall Polish state structure. In March 1920, Eastern Galicia was officially renamed Wschodnia Małopolska. In December, the province was divided into L’viv, Ternopil’, and Stanyslaviv województwa. A census was conducted in September 1921 and elections to the lower house of the Polish Sejm were held in November 1922 — events that the Ukrainians boycotted at Petrushevych’s instigation. At the same time, Polish colonists streamed into the land-hungry province and the Polish authorities introduced repressive measures aimed at limiting Ukrainian political and cultural life. Thousands of Ukrainians were imprisoned, political
parties and cultural organizations were severely circum-
scribed, and Ukrainian students were denied admission to the 
University of L'viv.

As conditions in Poland and the Soviet Ukraine stabilized in 
spite of the Dictator's dire warnings to the contrary, the case 
for an independent Galician state began seriously to weaken. 
The harshest blows to the ZUNR government occurred in late 
1922, when Lloyd George left office and the Polish Sejm passed 
a law (never put into effect) granting autonomy to the 
Ukrainian województwa. Likewise, Czech foreign policy had 
taken a turn for the worse with regard to Galicia. Seeking a 
political and economic rapprochement with the Poles, the 
Czechs expressed a willingness to support Polish policy in the 
Ukrainian province in exchange for Polish disinterest in 
Ukraine. At the same time, Czechoslovakia began establish-
ing political and economic ties to the Soviet Ukraine, thereby 
proving that an independent Galicia was not necessary to 
trade with the East.

When the Council of Ambassadors met in March 1923, 
therefore, many Ukrainians in Galicia and in the emigration 
already knew that its verdict would be unfavorable. Satisfied 
that the minority question had been adequately handled by the 
Poles, the Council agreed on the incorporation of Eastern 
Galicia and Vilnius into Poland on March 15 — a decision 
which proved disastrous for the ZUNR government-in-exile 
and left bitter feelings of betrayal in the Ukrainians and the 
Lithuanians. One pro-Soviet journal captured the resulting 
mood in the following manner: “When you meet a non-socialist 
Ukrainian acquaintance in L'viv and ask him what’s up, you 
immediately get a short and concise answer — chaos! After 
meeting a socialist comrade on another street and asking him 
the same question with regard to the non-socialist camp, you 
hear an even shorter reply — a swamp!”

Petrushevych's government soon collapsed after the March 
catastrophe. Although Petrushevych continued to address 
statements to the “Ukrainian People of the Galician Land” in 
which he condemned the “Entente's betrayal,” his government 
had obviously lost its reason for continuing to exist. Poland, in
the meantime, declared a political amnesty allowing Ukrainian
eemigres previously involved in anti-Polish activities to return
to Galicia. Many Galicians took advantage of this opportunity,
thereby further depleting the ranks of the Dictator’s emigre
supporters. Petrushevych, however, was not discouraged and
resolved to follow a different course in pursuit of his end. He
moved the remnants of his government to Berlin and there
established ties to the Soviet plenipotentiary to Germany,
Nikolai Krestinskii. As a result of his talks with the Soviet
diplomat, Petrushevych shifted his “orientation” from the
Entente to the Soviets, coming to regard annexation to the
Soviet Ukraine as the only possible salvation for Eastern
Galicia.

Petrushevych’s change of allies was not too surprising in
view of the Russophile and Sovietophile sentiments occasion-
ally voiced by his followers during and after the war. In 1919,
for example, the ZUNR organ, Ukrains’kyi Prapor, had editorial-
ized: “Our basic position on the Ukrainian statutory-state
question . . . is the complete state independence of the
Ukrainian People’s Republic, the union of all Ukrainian lands
in one state whole, the attempt to create a close state union with
neighboring states, and in the first place with a renewed
Muscovite democratic state and with a Czecho-Slovak
republic . . . .”47 That same year, Petrushevych’s right-hand
man, Kost’ Levyts’kyi, advocated peace with Denikin and a
confederation of the Ukraine with a democratic Russia.48 And
in 1922, Vasyl’ Paneiko, the head of the ZUNR’s delegation to
the Paris Peace Conference, published a brochure, entitled The
United States of Eastern Europe, where he argued against
Ukrainian independence as an “organically harmful con-
cept.”49

The clearest indications of Petrushevych’s pro-Soviet
tendencies occurred at the height of the Soviet counter-
offensive against Piłsudski and Petliura. After the Comintern
recognized the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia’s
proclamation of Galician independence, Ukrains’kyi Prapor
pointed out with satisfaction that the Soviet occupation of the
province did, after all, result in driving the Poles out.50
Somewhat earlier, the newspaper had also written: "... although we do not conceal the opinion that we do not believe in the Bolshevik ideology of our people, we nevertheless stand on the position that were the people to reveal it [the Bolshevik ideology] in a truly free and unmistakable way — we will follow them. We will follow them and a Ukrainian government." 51

The ZUNR exile government had diplomatic representatives in Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Paris, Belgrade, Berlin, the Vatican, Rio de Janeiro, and Winnipeg. Although it received some technical and material assistance from Germany during the war, the ZUNR's exile activities appear to have been largely funded with monies brought to Vienna from Galicia. 52 In 1921, however, the ZUNR began to experience a severe financial crisis and thereupon turned to the Galician emigration in the United States and in Canada for help. By issuing bonds, Petrushevych's representatives in the USA succeeded in raising several hundred thousand dollars for the Galician government. Osyp Nazaruk, Petrushevych's minister of press and propaganda, was dispatched to Canada in 1922 for similar reasons. 53

Emigre members of the Ukrainian People's Labor Party (Ukrains'ka Narodno-Trudova Partiia — UNTP), known as the Ukrainian National Democratic Party before 1919, and of the Ukrainian Radical Party occupied the most important positions in the government-in-exile. Most prominent of them were the Laborites Kost' Levyts'kyi, Dmytro Levyts'kyi, and Pavlo Lysiak and the Radical, Nazaruk. Petrushevych also maintained close ties to the Ukrainian parties in Galicia — the Labor and Radical parties, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party (Ukrains'ka Sotsial-Demokratychna Partiia — USDP), and the Ukrainian Christian-Social Party (Ukrains'ka Khryshtyians'ko-suspil'na Partiia — UKhSP). United in an Inter-party Council (Mizhpartiina Rada), a broad anti-Polish national front, since late 1919, the Galician parties recognized the continued legitimacy of the exile government and subordinated themselves to Petrushevych's authority.

Not surprisingly, Petrushevych and his supporters attempted to assert ZUNR hegemony over as broad as possible a section
of the Ukrainian emigration. Alongside of the usual emigre politicking, Petrushevych concentrated heavily on propaganda aimed at discrediting Petliura and the UNR and at defending the concept of an Eastern Galician state against charges of “particularism” and “provincialism”.

The ZUNR’s principal political opponents naturally belonged to the UNR camp. Even before Petrushevych’s break with Petliura, one pro-UNR emigre journal had mercilessly attacked the Galicians for their “separatism”, “particularism”, and “provincialism”, and for thinking that “they can exist as the Ukraine, as an independent republic, even if the Eastern Ukraine falls into slavery.”

L’viv, one UNR publicist wrote, could “vanish from the face of the earth and there would be no great harm.”

The Galician Army’s negotiations with and crossover to Denikin led a prominent journalist to comment: “Compared to the overall Ukrainian problem, the Galician question is only partial and particularist . . . . They [the Galicians] are ready even to allow the Ukraine to be ruled by the Muscovites, if only Galicia not be under Poland . . . .”

As if to confirm the validity of the Eastern Ukrainians’ criticism, Osyp Nazaruk once went so far as to claim that Galicians were a nation separate from the Eastern Ukrainians.

The Dictator’s followers, meanwhile, had made their first coordinated attempt at consolidating the ZUNR’s political position vis-a-vis the UNR in March 1920 in Kamianets’ Podil’s’kyi, where they founded the Ukrainian National Council (Ukrains’ka Natsional’na Rada) together with other anti-socialist parties, including Mykola Chudinov’s UNP. At the same time, several Eastern and Western Ukrainian anti-socialist parties, among them the Ukrainian Party of Independists-Socialist, the Ukrainian People’s Labor Party, and the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party, founded the Ukrainian National State Union (Ukrains’kyi Natsional’no-Derzhavnyi Soiuz) in Vienna. Claiming that the Directory had violated the principle of sobornist’ on which the Ukrainian National Union, the body that called the Directory into being in November 1918, had been founded, both organizations declared that they, and not the Directory, were the true holders
of the National Union’s authority. With Petliura’s final retreat to Poland and the de facto decomposition of the Directory, however, the two organizations lost their rationale for existing and quickly fell apart.

Another attempt to organize the anti-socialist emigres into an anti-Petliura coalition was made in January 1921 in Vienna. Accompanied by the usual fanfare and overblown expectations, ten groupings came together to form the All-Ukrainian National Council (Vse-Ukrains’ka Natsional’nna Rada). These included, among others, the Independists-Socialists, the right-wing faction of the Social-Revolutionaries (Mykola Zalizniak, Mykola Kovalevs’kyi), the Ukrainian People’s Party (M. Chudinov, V. Andriievs’kyi), the Labor Party (P. Lysiak), the Radical Party (O. Nazaruk), and the League for the Restoration of the Ukraine (General Oleksander Hrekiv, Col. Ie. Konovalets’). The Council collapsed in April, however, after Gen. Hrekiv and three Independists-Socialists delivered a declaration to Warsaw in which they expressed support of the Supreme Otaman’s Polish policy. The Galician parties promptly called this move treason and left the Council, thereby causing its dissolution.

At first, Petrushevych enjoyed broad support in most centers of emigre life outside UNR-dominated Poland. However, as the Dictator increasingly dissociated his actions from the overall Ukrainian problem, opposition to his “separatist” politics also arose within the ZUNR camp in 1921. The arrival of Konovalets’ onto the emigre political scene in 1920 was crucial to the crystallization of this opposition. Uncompromisingly committed to sobornist’, the Sharpshooters’ colonel quickly came into conflict with Petrushevych over the latter’s handling of the Galician issue.

Siding with Konovalets’ and the Sich Sharpshooters were a number of prominent Galicians living in Vienna. Foremost among them was Pavlo Lysiak, the former editor of the ZUNR organ, Ukrains’kyi Prapor (The Ukrainian Flag), and at one time a staunch supporter of the Galician regime. At Konovalets’s initiative, these like-minded Galicians joined in a loosely organized group, called Young Galicia (Moloda
Halychyna), in mid-1921. Besides Konovalets’ and Lysiak, the group included two other Sich Sharpshooter officers, Andrii Mel’nyk and Ivan Chmola, the Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooter officer, Kost’ Voievidka, the Labor Party member, Dmytro Levyts’kyi, the journalist, Ivan Kedryn-Rudnyts’kyi, and the latter’s sister, Milena Rudnyts’ka, later to become a prominent politician in Galicia.59

According to Konovalets’, Young Galicia set itself the following goals: “to counteract the spread of the ideology of territorial separatism, taking into account that such an ideology would throw all the Eastern Ukrainians into the embrace of the Poles, and the Galicians into the embrace of the Muscovites. Raising the slogans of pure nationalism: to struggle against all manifestations of Russophilism and Polonophilism in Galicia; to caution against excessive optimism about the success of the Galician government’s diplomatic action; to be prepared for a prolonged period of Polish occupation; to stimulate the organization of all the vital forces of the people in all areas of their life, and, most important, to concentrate on youth, women, the peasantry, and the workers, that is, on those groups and classes that most quickly succumb to the demagogic slogans that are hostile to the all-Ukrainian national ideology.”60

What is immediately striking about Young Galicia’s ideas is that they reflect a very pronounced political realism. Although, as Konovalets’ wrote, Young Galicia “was far from the thought of interfering in the diplomatic actions taken by the Galician government,” it believed that the most important battle would have to be fought in Galicia itself: Galicians had to be made to think differently so as to be able to accept the “all-Ukrainian national ideology” and reject Russophilism and Polonophilism.61 Most important, the Galicians themselves had to get involved in the national struggle, one that would be long and hard given the “prolonged period of Polish occupation”. And finally, the “organization” of the masses had to be “stimulated” by such nationally-conscious groups as Young Galicia. Statehood, Young Galicia believed, ultimately depended on the nation.
Although Konovalets' left Vienna for L'viv in mid-1921, Lysiak continued the ideological struggle against Petrushevych. In a landmark article written in November, Lysiak argued: "I am certain that real liberation can come to us in Galicia only either directly from the East... or indirectly from within the land, but also under the influence of the above-mentioned revolutionary maelstrom. On the other hand, I believe that Western European diplomacy can, with respect to us, only sanction that final order which will come upon our lands..." Osyp Nazaruk immediately replied with an article heavily laden with innuendoes, claiming that Lysiak had personal and not political motives for attacking ZUNR policy. The damage, however, had been done and ever greater numbers of Galicians began leaving the ZUNR camp. Ironically, even Nazaruk left Petrushevych for the Hetmanites after returning from Canada.

Discontent was also growing in Galicia, which for the most part still continued to represent a solid front of support for Petrushevych. The first outward manifestation of this dissatisfaction occurred in July 1921 at a congress of Ukrainian students in L'viv, "accidentally" attended by several Sich Sharpshooters. Resembling Young Galicia's ideas, the resolutions passed at the congress called for an "Independent and United Ukrainian State" and exhorted "all the political parties of Galicia, who stand on the basis of all—Ukrainian national statehood, to mutually agree to create a provisional Galician-Ukrainian Government with its seat in Galicia." Sensing an obvious threat to the ZUNR, Nazaruk again reacted violently. Branding the resolutions the work of "secret provocateurs", he reiterated a claim that more and more Galicians were regarding with scepticism: "... the existing Government of the Galician land has indisputable facts that Poland will never get the Galician land and that the Polish invader will soon retreat from it."

Of even greater significance than the actions of the students, however, was the fact that the Ukrainian parties in Galicia were forced by the very flow of events in Poland to deal with concrete problems of everyday political and cultural life in the
province and therefore felt themselves ever more estranged from the Dictator's international machinations. Although outwardly loyal to the ZUNR government, the Galician parties increasingly looked askance at what they considered the exaggerated optimism of the emigres. What is more, the emigres themselves were viewed with some animosity as people who had left the scene of battle, but still continued to have pretensions to its manner of conduct. The rift was perhaps inevitable: as Petrushevych shifted his attention wholly to the international plane, the local parties became preoccupied with local problems whose solution did not require the existence of an exile government. The fragility of the Dictator's relations with Galicia became evident after March 1923, when the Interparty Council fell apart and Petrushevych's own party, the Ukrainian People's Labor Party, suffered a serious schism.

At its Congress held in L'viv in May 1923, the Labor Party (UNTP) broke with its practice of refusing to work within the structure of Polish politics and adopted a program with maximal and minimal demands. While acknowledging that its ideal remained an independent Ukrainian state, the UNTP also expressed its readiness to cooperate with the Polish government on the basis of Galician autonomy. Two oppositional currents developed within the party in reaction to the autonomists led by Volodymyr Bachyns'kyi. The first, and by far the larger, current, known as the Independent Group (Nezalezhna Hrupa), was led by Viacheslav Budzynovs'kyi and advocated the pro-Soviet line of Petrushevych. A far smaller group led by Samiilo Pidhirs'kyi and Dmytro Paliiv rejected both the autonomist and the pro-Soviet tendencies and instead advocated an independent, Nationalist course. That same year, the pro-Petrushevych wing seized control of the Party's leadership, while the autonomists grouped themselves about the L'viv daily, Dilo, and were thereafter known as the Dilo Group (hrupa Dila). The Nationalists, meanwhile, left the UNTP and eventually founded the Ukrainian Party of National Work (Ukrains'ka Partiia Natsional'noi Roboty) in April 1924. On July 11, 1925, however, the three groups
overcame their differences and merged in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukrains’ke Natsional’no-Demokratychne Obiednannia — UNDO), the dominant Galician party of the inter-war period. The UNDO willingly participated in the political system, eventually took part in elections, and even sent delegates to the Polish Sejm. At the same time, it “recognized the Soviet Ukraine as a serious and farreaching stage in the statehood of the Ukrainian people.”  

Both attitudes, and especially the first, were to be condemned as “conciliationism” (uhodovstvo) by militant Ukrainians in general and the Nationalists in particular.

The politically centrist and mildly nationalist UNDO continued to maintain close ties to Petrushevych until November 1926, when it condemned his exaggerated reliance on the Soviet Ukraine and rejected his call to boycott the forthcoming Polish elections. It broke off its remaining ties to Petrushevych in early 1927 by substituting a loyal UNDO cadre for the former dictator as the UNDO’s contact to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.68 As a result, the pro-Petrushevych faction, by now a small minority, left the UNDO in May and founded the uninfluential Ukrainian Party of Work (Ukrains’ka Partiia Pratsi).

The UNDO’s official plunge into Polish electoral politics took place in March 1928 when it succeeded in sending 23 members to the Sejm and eight to the Senate. The Ukrainian Socialist-Radical Party, which arose from a merger of the Ukrainian Radical Party and of the Ukrainian Party of Social-Revolutionaries of Volyn’, won eight seats in the Sejm and one in the Senate. These elections, which marked the first time that Galician parties formally acknowledged the status quo, marked a crucial point in the polarization of Galician society into mutually hostile “legalistic” and “revolutionary” camps.
CHAPTER 4

PETLIURA AND THE SOCIALISTS

After settling in Tarnów in the south-east of Poland in the fall of 1920, Petliura and the remnants of his UNR government soon discovered that their dependence on Poland had led them into a political impasse. Poland’s peace with Soviet Russia and the internal triumph of the centralists (as best represented by Roman Dmowski) over the federalists (Piłsudski) made of the UNR’s political centerpiece — the anti-Russian alliance of Poland with an independent Ukraine — a category of little relevance to Polish policy. In spite of substantial reductions in Poland’s financial and political support, however, the UNR had no alternative but to maintain its “orientation” on its ally. As one UNR spokesman argued: “For us, Russia, whether Bolshevik or any other kind, is the most terrible of enemies threatening the independent existence of the Ukrainian people, and that is the major reason for our readiness to maintain and strengthen the friendship between the Ukrainian and Polish peoples.” Only with Piłsudski’s return to power in May 1926 did the federalists gain the upper hand and support for the UNR somewhat increase.

The UNR’s political supporters came almost exclusively from the pro-Petliura wing of the Social-Democrats, from the Prague-based Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party (Ukrains’ka Radykal’no-Demokratychna Partiia — the former Socialists-Federalists), as well as from various Social-Revolutionary, Nationalist, and student groups. Also associated with the
UNR camp was the journal *Volia* (Liberty), which appeared in Vienna in 1919-1921 under the editorship of Viktor Pisinachevs’kyi, an Eastern Ukrainian journalist. In late 1919, several of *Volia’s* more socialistically-inclined editors, headed by the Eastern Ukrainian poet Oleksander Oles’ and the Galician writer Antin Krushel’nyts’kyi, formerly UNR minister of education, left the journal to found their own, *Na Perelomi* (At the Turning Point). The new journal adopted a moderately left-wing position, with Krushel’nyts’kyi, who was later to join the pro-Soviet camp and eventually emigrate to the UkSSR, articulating its most radical tendencies.

The vast majority of Petliura’s followers, however, were AUNR veterans, living in Poland, France, and to a far smaller degree, Czechoslovakia. The UNR, as a result, devoted a great deal of its attention to the military sphere and persistently toyed with interventionist schemes all throughout the 1920s. Thirty-eight Ukrainian officers, for example, served in the Polish army so as to maintain a Ukrainian officer corps in constant readiness. In UNR military circles also conducted intelligence work and readily shared their information with the Poles. In spite of all these plans, however, the UNR’s last armed engagement with the Soviets took place in November 1921, when several hundred AUNR soldiers attempted the Second Winter Campaign, a short-lived foray into the UkSSR that ended with the almost complete destruction of the raiding force.

Petliura moved from Tarnów to Warsaw in 1922, where he remained until late 1923, when he left the Polish capital for Paris via Budapest and Switzerland. He appears to have left Poland in the hope of revitalizing the UNR by reducing its dependence on the moribund Polish-Ukrainian alliance. Following his resettlement in France, the Supreme Otaman began publishing a bi-monthly journal, entitled *Tryzub* (The Trident). His colleague, Viacheslav Prokopovych, the head of the UNR Council of Ministers, was appointed editor of the periodical, whose first issue appeared on October 15, 1925. Revealing the degree to which the “Petliurites” (*Petliuriutsi*) had abandoned their commitment to socialism, the opening
editorial proclaimed the UNR's "commandments" as "the state above the party, the nation above the class." The shift to the right was perhaps inevitable in view of the constraints placed upon the UNR's political maneuverability by its Polish connection. Apparently, the only way out from this seeming dead-end was to turn one's energies inward and seek political salvation in the one area which remained fully accessible to the UNR camp — the nation.

By 1927, this rightward trend had become so apparent that a certain Mykola Koval's'kyi could write in a manner of which the Nationalists would surely have approved: "To believe and to be certain are, one would think, two different concepts, but for us they are long since synonyms. We believe in the realization of our national ideals because we are certain of the correctness of the paths to their realization, and we are certain of the realization of these ideals in the near future because we believe in them . . . ." Koval's'kyi's remarks were not surprising, considering that there was little else that the UNR could politically do but have faith in its eventual triumph.

In March 1929, meanwhile, an anonymous author once again echoed typically Nationalist sentiments by praising war as a "factor in the development of culture." "When war is destructive," he wrote, "then it ruins that which is already incapable of life, because it is a law of nature that that which cannot survive the struggle dies."

By far the best indication of the UNR's progressive assimilation of Nationalist ideas is found in the writings of Dmytro Andriievs'kyi, an Eastern Ukrainian living in Brussels. Andriievs'kyi, unrelated to his namesake from Soborna Ukraina, was a well-polished and urbane engineer who eventually became a leading activist and theoretician of the organized Nationalist movement. Accepting the basic UNR principle of the irreconcilability of Ukrainian and Russian interests, Andriievs'kyi believed that the only solution to this problem was for the Ukraine to ally itself politically and spiritually with Europe — a concept to which he assigned well-nigh mystical significance and which manifested its inner spirit and character in what Andriievs'kyi
termed “Europeanism” (Europeizm). This Europeanism, according to Andriievs’kyi, embodied the souls of Greece, Rome, and Catholicism, and was characterized by “clarity, exactness of outlines, certainty, and equilibrium.” Because the person as the “alpha and omega of the universe” stands at the center of the Europeanist “philosophy of life”, Europe was able to enjoy a “great blossoming of human nature” which manifested itself in a well-developed “mind, consciousness, and gift for abstraction”, qualities, which “first gained control over themselves so as to be able to influence that which lies beyond them: the unconscious and the mechanism of life.” In other words, continued Andriievs’kyi, “although the mind, the intellect, played and continues to play a tremendous role, having raised the person above the level of other living beings, it is an irrational force that moves it [the mind], breathes life into it, gives sense and taste to all our existence, and constitutes the starting point and nerve of our actions . . . .” The genius of the well-balanced European lies in his ability to unite these two forces in “fruitful cooperation.” As a result, the “spirit of the European” is characterized by “that striving and endless searching for new shores and heretofore unknown values, which are primarily tempting and fundamentally desirable in and of themselves.” The European strives to do something “for the sake of the process of doing.” The “physical struggle, the rivalry of ideas and characters, economic competition, competition over wealth, power, and authority, the desire to force one’s will upon another and inculcate one’s faith, one’s way of feeling” so typical of the European have led to the development of different “roles” and “forms of organization”, which, in turn, result in a “certain hierarchy of values, both material and moral” and in the rise of elites. The final proof of the European’s genius was imperialism, the “flooding by the European race and civilization of all the continents” as a result of the “overpopulation of its own continent and still more of the overflowing of the moral organism with vital forces and with the taste for fighting, for struggle.”76
All these European qualities Andriievs’kyi purported to see — although in a less developed form — in the Ukrainian character. The European’s ability to balance the “conscious and unconscious” reminded Andriievs’kyi of Ukrainian humor, the “result of analysis and . . . lyrical feelings.” The European imperialist drive brought to the author’s mind the Cossacks and, less plausibly, the Ukrainian peasants who had emigrated to Canada and Brazil in order to “conquer nature.”

Although there was no doubt that the Ukraine was spiritually related to Europe, it lagged far behind its western cousin because its European traditions had been interrupted in the past. But without tradition, without a past, that “regulating, unifying, synthesizing factor,” “national energy” is and will continue to be wasted. In other words, statehood could not be attained. The answer to this problem, according to Andriievs’kyi, was similar to that proposed by Dontsov: “The task of our generation . . . is to transform our potential tradition, which remains in the depths of our national soul, into one that is kinetic, consolidated, and crystallized in certain formulas; to create a certain system of moral and intellectual categories . . . . A powerful factor, the enzyme that quickens this process, is the closest possible contact to, the most frequent relations with, and our participation in the life of Europe . . . . It will not be difficult to repair the torn thread of our European tradition, because the basis of our national soul is composed to a significant degree of those very [same] elements and develops for the most part under those very same influences as the all-European character.”

Certainly no profound thinker, Dmytro Andriievs’kyi was typical of the many emigre Ukrainians searching for a way out of the impasse to which their political convictions had led. Seeing that “orientations” brought no results, they sought “allies” not in countries, but in ideological, moral, and spiritual values that could guarantee their nation victory in the struggle for statehood. That Andriievs’kyi saw these essentially Nationalist values in “Europe” is not surprising. There, too, the ideologies and movements that radiated the most vitality and promised the best results were authoritarian and nationalist.
The relative uneventfulness characteristic of the UNR camp was violently interrupted on May 25, 1926, when Petliura was assassinated on a side street off the Boulevard Saint Michel by Samuel Schwartzbard, a Jew who claimed to be avenging the pogroms perpetrated by Petliurite soldiers in the first half of 1919. Ironically, Petliura underwent an immediate transformation from one of the most reviled of Ukrainian statesmen to a national martyr and hero — a symbol of the suffering Ukraine and of national unity. Even many Galicians forgave the dead Otaman, although Petrushevych and his supporters in Berlin remained true to their hostility and refused to attend a requiem for Petliura.79

In an unusual manifestation of unanimity, 53 Ukrainian organizations in Czechoslovakia joined in the “Committee to Honor the Memory of the Head of the Directory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Supreme Otaman of the Ukrainian Armies, Symon Petliura” and declared: “Unbreakable is our commitment before the grave of the Great Patriot and Indefatigable fighter to realize the Ideal of Ukrainian Statehood . . . . The killing . . . was directed against the whole Ukrainian People. The Enemies of the Ukrainian People, the occupiers of their Country, the violators of its will, and not an avenger of the Jewish nationality in the Ukraine, directed the hand of the killer onto Symon Petliura.”80

At the same time, Petliura’s death was assigned mystical overtones and the Ukrainian cause transformed into a well-nigh religious matter. Volodymyr Sal’s’kyi, a general in the AUNR, wrote that the dead Otaman “will continue to be our Vozhd’ up to the attainment of independent Ukrainian statehood. Dead — he will be even more terrible for our enemies than alive.”81 According to the young Nationalist poet and former AUNR soldier, Ievhen Malaniuk, “The cause of the Ukrainian national state struggle has been covered with the sacrificial blood of its Leader. The greatest sacrifice has been brought before the God of the Nation. The bread and wine of our national efforts have been transubstantiated into Body and Blood.” Petliura’s assassination, wrote Malaniuk, was a “clever Muscovite-Jewish business.”82 One Ukrainian student saw Petliura’s death as being necessary “so that the National
Ideal of the Resurrection of the Ukrainian People become a religious impulse."83 Another drew the following lesson from the assassination: "There is something mystical in this last act of the great tragedy of the Ukrainian People. . . . Yes, I believe—You will resurrect, O my Ukraine. We will overcome."84

For Ukrainians, however, the full tragedy of Petliura's assassination took place a year later during Schwartzbard's sensational trial in Paris on October 18-26, 1927. Under the skillful handling of Schwartzbard's astute defense counsel, Henri Torres, the trial was turned into a tribunal against Petliura, who was charged with tolerating and encouraging the pogroms which swept the Ukraine in 1919. According to the defense, the Ukrainian head of state was a war criminal, whose assassination could only be welcomed. The prosecutor, on the other hand, referred to Petliura's democratic, socialist, and pro-Jewish convictions, argued that the chaotic state of the Ukraine had prevented any effective control over the Ukrainian army, pointed to the Jewish ministers in Petliura's cabinet, and charged that the circumstances of the assassination as well as Schwartzbard's background, recent activity, and ideological beliefs suggested a conspiracy, probably directed by the USSR.

Jews and Ukrainians the world over, meanwhile, mobilized their forces for this critical judicial battle. For the former, it was vital that Schwartzbard be acquitted as the avenger of his people; for the latter, it was critical that Petliura—as a symbol of the Ukrainian movement for independence and statehood—not be branded a pogromchik and the Ukrainian cause thereby be discredited as anti-Semitic. The trial, as many Jews did not realize, struck at the very heart of the Ukrainian national movement. Schwartzbard's eventual acquittal not only made Petliura a criminal, whose only consistent policy was said to be the systematic slaughter of Jews, but it also transformed the Ukrainian revolution, where thousands of Ukrainians had lost their lives, into a minor chapter in the history of pogroms.

Predictably, the Ukrainians immediately reacted to the verdict with outrage. Believing that the world had treated them unjustly once again, they agreed with Dontsov "that only
traitors or idiots can speak of an understanding with the Jews" and sought refuge in national introversion and isolation.\textsuperscript{85} Significantly, hostility to Jews had been absent from most Ukrainian publications prior to Petliura's assassination. In general, the tone was conciliatory, probably reflecting the realization that Ukrainian-Jewish relations simply had to be raised from the low point they had reached during the war. Following Schwartzbard's acquittal, however, a marked shift became evident in the Ukrainians' attitude toward Jews.

The moderate Galician newspaper, \textit{Dilo}, for example, wrote: "It is not a matter of Schwartzbard, but of something far greater and far deeper — Ukrainian-Jewish relations. It must be said clearly and explicitly. The Jews blackened the Ukrainians' name before the world groundlessly and without reason."\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ukrains'kyi Holos} (The Ukrainian Voice), a Hetmanite newspaper published in Peremyshl', put the matter more bluntly: "With their tactic the Jews have dug a canyon between the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples. The Jews must also consider why they are everywhere not just not loved, but actually hated."\textsuperscript{87} According to the Petliurite \textit{Tryzub}, the Schwartzbard trial was "sadistic-cynical" and "clearly and unequivocally showed the greatest idealists that we have no friends among the Jews. The Ukrainian nation does not forget and will not forget such lessons."\textsuperscript{88} Even so pro-Jewish a Ukrainian as \textit{Tryzub}'s correspondent in Bucharest, a certain Dmytro Herodot, wrote: "Rejecting with indignation . . . the accusation that the Ukrainian nation or its leaders are anti-Semitic, Ukrainian public opinion has unanimously ascertained that the conduct of all Jewry during Schwartzbard's trial and the way the defense of the murderer was organized were a graphic and indubitable manifestation of the Ukrainophobia of the Jewish nation . . . . We will be very glad if the leaders of the Jews show us the error of our conclusions. But until they do, we will consider all talks with Jewish representatives to be unnecessary and even harmful from the point of view of Ukrainian statehood and shameful and inadmissible from the point of view of our feelings of national dignity."\textsuperscript{89}
The events surrounding Petliura's death were crucial to the development of Ukrainian Nationalism. A leader of the Ukrainian Revolution had been killed, his name had been besmirched, and the Ukrainian cause had been vilified. Clearly, the world was hostile to Ukrainian national aspirations. "Orientations" did not work, the loudly proclaimed principle of self-determination seemed not to apply to the Ukrainians, and the democracies of Europe had ignored them in drawing up the post-war map of the continent. The only solution, concluded many Ukrainians, was to withdraw into the nation, close ranks, mobilize all available forces, and ruthlessly pursue Ukrainian interests with no regard for other nations.

The UNR's most serious socialist opposition came from Mykyta Shapoval's Social-Revolutionaries. Shapoval, who represented the SRs' centrist faction while still in the Ukraine, emigrated to Czechoslovakia in February 1919 and there established himself as a powerful rival to Petliura.

The developments undergone by the Social-Revolutionary emigres were even more chaotic than the norm for the Ukrainian emigration. Originally organized in the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Social-Revolutionaries (Zakordonna Delehatiiia UPSR), the SRs suffered their first internal crisis in June 1920 when the faction led by M. Kovalevs'kyi and M. Zalizniak was purged from the party because of its right-wing tendencies. This group then founded a rival UPSR which closely cooperated with Ukrainian anti-socialist parties in Vienna. In 1921, however, the Foreign Delegation underwent another, more debilitating, split. This time, the SRs divided over the issue of the Soviet Ukraine. Mykyta Shapoval and his supporters believed that the emigration should continue its struggle against the UkSSR; Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi and Pavlo Khrystiuk, on the other hand, believed that the emigres should return to their homeland and help build a Ukrainian state. Shapoval thereupon left the Foreign Delegation and founded the Foreign Committee (Zakordonnyi Komitet) of the UPSR. Most of Hrushevs'kyi's
followers were eventually to return to the Soviet Ukraine, with Hrushevskyi himself making the move to Kiev in 1924. There he continued his historical studies and became a leading member of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

Hrushevskyi's stronghold was in Vienna, where he published a journal, entitled Boritesia-poborete (Struggle and You Will Overcome), and ran a research and publishing organization, the Ukrainian Sociological Institute (Ukrains'kyi Sotsiolohichnyi Instytut). Shapoval's power-base was in Prague, where he founded and headed a whole series of organizations until his death in 1932.

Most important of Shapoval's many creations were the Ukrainian Public Committee (Ukrains'kyi Hromads'kyi Komitet), founded on July 7, 1921 and intended to provide Ukrainian "refugees, emigrants, internees, prisoners, and others" with "various kinds of assistance," the Ukrainian Community Publishing Fund, and the Ukrainian Institute of Sociology (Ukrains'kyi Instytut Hromadoznavstva). All three organizations enjoyed the Czech government's monetary and political support; Shapoval himself maintained close ties to President Thomas Masaryk, Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš, and particularly to the latter's vice-minister, Václav Girsa. By 1925-1926, however, Czech interest in and support of the Ukrainian emigres, including the SRs, had substantially declined. At the same time, Shapoval faced growing opposition in both the Foreign Committee of the UPSR and the Ukrainian Public Committee. As the internal and external pressures mounted, Shapoval left the Foreign Committee and founded his own Foreign Organization (Zakordonna Orhanizatsiia) of the UPSR in early 1925, while the Public Committee collapsed on September 3 of that same year.

Undaunted, the tireless Shapoval founded a Ukrainian Committee on February 13, 1926, and a Union of Ukrainian Organizations in the Czecho-Slovak Republic (Soiuz Ukrains'kykh Orhanizatsii v ČSR) on April 17, 1926 in an attempt to regain lost ground. Although enjoying some Czech support, neither of the organizations proved to be of
significance, so that in late 1926 Shapoval found himself turning for allies to left-wing Russian and Belorussian SRs and joined them in the Socialist League of the East of Europe (Sotsialistychna Liga Skhodu Evropy). And in a move that occurred as often as its opposite among the emigres, Shapoval's Foreign Organization became reconciled with the Foreign Committee in late 1928 and the two formed a joint political body, the Supreme Political Committee.\(^93\)

Far more important than his feverish organizational activity, however, was a journal Shapoval began publishing in March 1922, following his break with Hrushevs'kyi. Entitled Nova Ukraina (The New Ukraine), the journal was anti-Petliura, anti-Soviet, and socialist in spite of its claim to be a "non-party bi-weekly of community, cultural, and economic life."\(^94\) After V. Vynnychenko joined the editorial board in January 1923, the journal, now billed as the organ of "Ukrainian democracy and in the first place of socialist democracy", declared as its guiding principles the "national-state independence and the all-round free development of our people; the liberation of the person from all forms of exploitation, violence, and oppression."\(^95\)

The fiery Vynnychenko had undergone a remarkable political evolution since his resignation from the Directory in early 1919 and subsequent emigration to Vienna. By April of that same year, the former chairman of the Directory had come completely to reject what he regarded as the counterrevolutionary policies of Petliura in favor of a Soviet socialist Ukraine, and then entered into negotiations with Bela Kun in the hope of establishing a military alliance of Soviet republics including Russia, the Ukraine, and Hungary. Although his plans failed, Vynnychenko continued his drift leftwards and founded the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Zakordonna Hrupa UKP) and its political organ, Nova Doba (The New Era), in early 1920. After having written his three-volume Vidrodzennia Natsii (Rebirth of a Nation), his highly opinionated memoirs which portrayed Petliura as a dark villian and blamed him for the Ukraine's ills, Vynnychenko departed for Moscow and Kharkiv in May 1920,
hoping to reach an accord with the UKSSR government. Disillusioned with what he saw and the way he was treated, Vynnychenko returned to Vienna in October, convinced that "there is no dictatorship of the proletariat" in the Ukraine and that the "commissar is everything." The Foreign Group continued to publish Nova Doba until October 1921, when both were dissolved. Soon thereafter, Vynnychenko found a new ally in Shapoval.

The first issue of Nova Ukraina under their joint editorial guidance contained a landmark article by Vynnychenko, entitled "A United Revolutionary-Democratic National Front." The ideas expressed by the talented playwright, although bearing the stamp of his communist convictions, accurately reflected the thought processes at work in the entire Ukrainian emigre community. According to Vynnychenko:

"Playing the nationalist chords of the Russian political parties... Bolshevism willingly enters into a united Russian national front, presenting itself as its assiduous executive organ... The task of Ukrainian socialists and democrats is extremely difficult: to oppose the united Russian national front... with a force capable of halting the advance of Russian imperialism... Obviously, none of the socialist currents can take such a task upon itself. A united front of the Ukrainian toiling democracy, that is, of almost the entire Ukrainian nation, should stand in opposition to the united front of Russian nationalism... All anti-democratic, conservative, and reactionary groupings (monarchists, communists of the Muscovite conception, Petliurites) should be kept out of such a union... Every supporter of Muscovite 'communism' is ipso facto an enemy of democracy... The united front requires one will, one mind, one plan of action, that is, a certain limitation on individualities. But without a united front, without a systematic, organized, unanimous exertion of the strength of a large part of the Ukrainian nation its liberation is impossible." Significantly, Vynnychenko's conclusions were almost identical to those that many Nationalists unequivocally opposed to socialism had also reached — that the core of the Ukrainian
problem was national and not social in character, that patriotic Ukrainians had to unite against the internal as well as external enemy, and that organization and the subordination of decentralizing tendencies to a center were necessary to win the struggle.

By 1924, Vynnychenko’s vision had begun to assume concrete form. United in the Democratic National Front (Demokratychno-Natsional’nyi Front) were Vynnychenko’s Communists, Shapoval’s SRs, the anti-Petliura wing of the Social-Democrats, and several Galician Radicals. Although having pretensions to all Ukrainians, the Front shared the fate of similar emigre attempts at consolidation and never left the realm of coffee-house politics in Prague.⁹⁸
CHAPTER 5

THE SOVIETOPHILES

According to the post-war political vocabulary of Ukrainians opposed to the Soviet Ukraine, Communists and Soviet sympathizers were termed “Sovietophiles”. Although “Sovietophilism” generally made few inroads into the staunchly anti-Soviet political groups, its overall influence was sufficiently large to have significantly accelerated the political polarization that gave impetus to the rightward drift of the Nationalists.

The earliest of the non-Bolshevik Ukrainian Sovietophiles had been the left Social-Revolutionaries (Borot’bisty) and the left Social-Democrats (the later Ukapisty). After abandoning Petliura in 1919-1920 and reorganizing themselves as Ukrainian Communist parties, both groups eventually merged with the CP(b)U and came to play a significant role in the political, cultural, and economic life of the UkSSR in the 1920s. Thanks largely to their pressure, for example, the policy of Ukrainianization was officially proclaimed at the 7th Conference of the CP(b)U in April 1923 and actively put into effect at the April 1925 Plenum of the Central Committee.

Galician Sovietophiles were found in the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (Komunistychna Partiia Skhidnoi Halychyny — KPSH), established in 1919. Too weak to play a major role in the disturbances that rocked the province that same year, the KPSH had to wait until the Red Army’s invasion of Eastern
Galicia in the summer of 1920 before it could proclaim a Galician Socialist Soviet Republic (*Halyts'ka Sotsialistychna Radians'ka Respublika*), a cardboard entity which collapsed immediately after the Red Army's retreat. Despite the fact that the Galician peasantry radicalized nationally and socially after the Polish occupation of the province, the KPSH proved far less capable than the legal Ukrainian parties supporting the ZUNR in harnessing this social force.

The KPSH lasted until 1923, when it was renamed the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine (*Komunistychna Partiiia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy* — KPZU) and placed under the jurisdiction of the Communist Party of Poland in view of Eastern Galicia's new status. The KPZU differed significantly from its predecessor in addressing itself not only to the Ukrainian proletariat but also to the peasantry, by far the largest Ukrainian class. As a result, Communist influence increased substantially in the countryside and came to pose a serious threat to the non-Communist Ukrainian parties in the 1920s. The various factions of the KPZU's front organization, the Ukrainian Peasants' and Workers' Socialist Union (*Ukrains'ke Selians'ko-Robitnyche Sotsialistychnye Ob'iednannia*), for example, managed to garner 18 out of a total of 48 Ukrainian mandates to the Polish Sejm in the elections of 1928. The Communists, however, proved no less fractious than their "bourgeois" opponents, and in 1927-1928 both the KPZU and the Socialist Union underwent damaging schisms over serious differences regarding the nationality question in the Western Ukraine and the Ukrainianization process in the Soviet Ukraine.

General Sovietophile tendencies began to manifest themselves among large numbers of emigres and Galicians in 1923-1924. Originally opposed to the Soviet Ukraine because of its allegedly non-Ukrainian character, more and more Ukrainians, even those with no socialist proclivities such as Petrushevych, came to regard the UkSSR as a truly Ukrainian state deserving the support of all patriotic Ukrainians. The immediate reasons for this change in attitude were twofold: Ukrainians, on the one hand, became increasingly aware of
the ever more apparent political impotence of the various exile governments and parties and, on the other, witnessed political and literary-artistic developments in the UkSSR that seemed to be leading to an undeniably Ukrainian state. Most impressive were the peasant revival accompanying the NEP and the national progress made as a result of the Ukrainianizing policies of the people's commissars of education, the Borot' bist Oleksander Shums'kyi and the Old Bolshevik Mykola Skrypnyk. Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, Pavlo Tychyna, Mykola Kulish, and scores of other writers and poets, meanwhile, were proving that Ukrainian culture was vital and growing.

Not surprisingly, many Ukrainians, for the most part veterans and peasants joined by numerous intellectuals such as Hrushevs'kyi and A. Krushel'nyts'kyi, decided to "re-emigrate" to the Soviet Ukraine. The question of "re-emigration", meanwhile, became a controversial issue among the Ukrainians who stayed behind, polarizing them into two mutually exclusive camps. Those who rejected the Sovietophile alternative gradually turned to Nationalist positions, branding the Sovietophile phenomenon as zminovikhovshchyna, a highly derogatory term considered equivalent to "turncoat". (The term was derived from the title of the Russian emigre journal Smena Vekh (Changing of Landmarks), which considered the NEP to be the first step in the USSR's ultimate transformation into a Russian national state.)

Most prominent of the groups that abandoned their early hostility to the UkSSR and adopted Sovietophilism was the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party (USDP) of Galicia. A member of the Interparty Council, the coordinating body of all pro-ZUNR Ukrainian parties in the province, the USDP adopted a pro-Soviet platform in early 1923 and thereupon left the Council. It cooperated closely with Galician Communists until its liquidation in 1924.

The Social-Democrats' most articulate emigre spokesman was Semen Vityk. In Vienna since 1919, Vityk established his power base in the Ukrainian workers' organization Jednist' (Unity) and published Borot'ba (The Struggle), in which he
attacked both the ZUNR and the UNR for betraying the Ukrainian working people's interests. Although a socialist, Vityk did not immediately become a supporter of the UkSSR. This transformation came about in several years time and culminated in 1923-1924, when Vityk published a “socio-political journal”, entitled Nova Hromada (The New Community), in Vienna. Assisted by Antin Krushel'nyts'kyi, Vityk advanced a pro-Soviet and pro-Communist line with heavy nationalist overtones. Uncompromising in its demand for Ukrainian sobornist, Nova Hromada upheld the principle of reliance on “our own forces”, defended Ukrainian national aspirations as an indisputable good, and proposed that the Ukrainian state be based on its ethnic frontiers.99

Together with Ukrainian emigre Communists, Vityk's group worked closely with emigre Galician veterans who had formerly belonged to the Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters (USS). In the course of their stay in the Ukraine, first as members of the occupying Austrian army and later of the Red Galician Army, many of the USS became supporters of a Soviet Ukraine. Heavily influenced by Hrushevs'kyi's Social-Revolutionary group, the USS emigres formally made a turn to the left in 1921. Two years later, following the March 1923 Ambassadors' decision, the USS's coordinating body issued a communique in which it strongly condemned the autonomist line of the Ukrainian People's Labor Party and the rise of "fascism" among Ukrainians. Singled out in particular were Ukrains'kyi Kozak and Zahrava (The Glow), published, respectively, by Poltavets'-Ostrianytsia and Dmytro Dontsov.100
CHAPTER 6

DMYTRO DONTSOV

Dmytro Dontsov occupies a special place in the development of a Ukrainian Nationalist ideology. A complex historical personality, the controversial Dontsov has all too often been subjected to oversimplification by friends and enemies alike. The former generally regard only his contributions to the formation of a Ukrainian national identity, while the latter all too happily focus on his totalitarian tendencies. The “real” Dontsov, however, escapes both sides. Non-systemic and frequently erratic, his thinking was based on a wide range of personal experiences and intellectual influences and cannot easily be compartmentalized into convenient categories. Instead, all of Dontsov’s ideas at any given period must be considered as a logical whole in order to be understood. The complexity of this undertaking will become evident in this chapter, which will deal only with the “early” Dontsov, with the period from 1919 to 1929 when he developed the essential ideas of his brand of Nationalism.¹⁰¹

Dontsov was born in 1883 in a heavily Russian-populated border district of the Eastern Ukraine. While a university student in St. Petersburg, he joined the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party and wholeheartedly accepted its ideological tenets. Unlike his comrades, however, Dontsov persistently maintained a strong attitude of distrust towards Russia and regarded the Russian threat as a mortal peril for
the Ukraine. After breaking with the USDRP over this question prior to the war, Dontsov progressively replaced his socialism with the belief that national independence was the most important aspect of the Ukrainian issue. His paper at a 1913 student congress in L'viv, recommending the "political separation" of the Eastern Ukraine and its annexation to Austria, marked a watershed in his intellectual development.\textsuperscript{102} There followed Dontsov's short-lived involvement in the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine in 1914 and several years of publicistic activity in Vienna, Berlin, and Bern, where he gained a reputation as the "apostle of Ukrainian separatism."\textsuperscript{103} He returned to the Ukraine in 1917, and in 1918 joined both the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party and Skoropads'kyi's government apparatus as head of the Ukrainian Press and Telegraph Agency. It was at this time that Dontsov seems to have undergone a profound shift in his political thinking. Although he was to leave the Democratic-Agrarians and turn against Skoropads'kyi, Dontsov accepted the fundamental principles of Lypyns'kyi's party and of the Hetman's type of rule. He recognized the importance of the peasantry and of decisive, strong-willed leadership to the success of a Ukrainian revolution. These convictions were further reinforced in 1919, when he witnessed the collapse of Petliura's socialist and democratic regime as a result of the Supreme Otaman's inability to maintain the support of the revolutionized Ukrainian peasant masses and to control his own army. Like many other Ukrainians, Dontsov concluded that the Ukrainian leadership's constant vacillation had prevented it from taking the bold steps that were necessary to attaining statehood.

These three fundamental elements of Dontsov's maturing worldview — Russia, as the Ukraine's foremost enemy; the peasantry, as the backbone of the nation and of the state; the necessity of a strong sense of purpose and of will — found more coherent expression in a work which attempted to outline the principles on which the Ukrainian state-building effort should be based. The result was \textit{Pidstavy nashoi polityky} (The Foundations of Our Politics), published in Vienna in 1921. A
remarkably sober and stimulating book, *Pidstavy* is usually ignored by students of Dontsov, although it contained most of the ideas on which the publicist built his ideology in the 1920s.

The fundamental dynamic of European politics, according to Dontsov, was the "great conflict of two civilizations, of two political, social, and cultural religious ideals, the conflict Europe-Russia." This conflict of two spiritually contrary principles explained both tsarism and Bolshevism: "... both the ideology of Russian communism and of tsarism are only different forms of one and the same essence, of one and the same phenomenon of a more general character, which is nothing other than Russian messianism struggling against the West." "Why is Russia fundamentally hostile to Europe and why must she fight it?" asks Dontsov. The answer is simple: "the amorphous Russian mass can be led only by absolutism, while the independently-minded European society only by self-action. Therefore, Russia must, on the one hand, defend itself against the European principle and not allow European bacilli to itself, because once latched on to Russia, [this principle] can lead only to debauch and to the decomposition of the state mechanism. On the other hand, she must strive to destroy this Europe and to destroy its ideas... because these ideas are the only defense against the all-inclusive Muscovite absolutism which wants to rule the continent. To destroy this spiritual compound which in the West joins individuals into groups, into strata, into classes and unions, and make of them an amorphous mass, incapable of any kind of opposition." 

The Ukraine, according to Dontsov, with its highly developed sense of peasant individualism and "self-action", was the first bastion of the West to experience the Russian onslaught. Most recently, the Russian desire to subjugate the independent Ukrainian spirit had taken the form of the campaign against the kulaks, a "new peasant class, which has awakened to conscious political life, and, imbued with the ideals of democratism, is the greatest obstacle to Russian despotism in the Ukraine." 

The Ukraine's fate, therefore, clearly lay with Europe, with
European "imperialism." Yet Dontsov was astute enough to realize that power-political realities complicated the issue. Foreseeing a German-Russian "union", he suggested that a "strong Rumania, Hungary, and Poland" and the support of the Entente powers, and especially Britian, were critical to Ukrainian national interests. Aware that any suggestion of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation would outrage the Galicians, Dontsov appealed to Realpolitik as justifying his proposal: "... the great and old conflict between Europe and Russia throws us, whether we like it or not, together with Poland, on this side of the line of demarcation, on this side of the barricade." The choice facing the Ukraine was clear-cut: "... either to seek support from all of the former 'western Russia' (the new borderland states), something that would be impossible without Poland (and without Rumania), to make the appropriate, but in the last analysis temporary and almost necessary sacrifices, and to strive for the sovereignty of the Ukraine. Or again, through an anti-Polish or anti-Rumanian policy, to break up the bloc of western borderland states, to attempt to take back the Ukrainian provinces of Poland and Rumania, at the price of uniting them all under Russia, at the price of losing [our] national sovereignty. To sacrifice a part for the whole or the whole for the part is [the difference between] a national policy and a provincial policy." 106

The social group on which Dontsov's national policy had to be based was the peasantry, which not only constituted the vast majority of the Ukrainian nation, but was also the only Ukrainian class with the vitality, strength, and vision necessary to attaining and maintaining a state in the face of the opposition of the urban-based non-Ukrainian minorities in the Ukraine. In this respect, however, the Ukraine was not alone: "The socialist sympathies of the few barely conscious and wholly unorganized urban workers in the Ukraine and the Bolshevismomania of the still less numerous Russian and Jewish parties in the Ukraine do not change anything about the nature of the revolution, which took place in the Ukraine in the years after the fall of the tsar. This upheaval is now taking place in all of Eastern and Central Europe. Hungary,
Rumania, Croatia, Poland, and the Balkan States, just like the Ukraine, stand under the sign of the great peasant-bourgeois revolution . . . . The result of the war — the decomposition of three great states, Russia, Austria, and Hungary, and a revolution in Germany — was the end of the political influence of the landed aristocracy in these countries . . . [where] the weak development of urban life and of an urban bourgeoisie had led to the fact that political influence in the state remained in the hands of the landed aristocracy . . . To divest this class, which in the most obvious manner lost its former political elan, of political influence became the goal of the revolutionary movements. In place of it there came a new class — peasant democracy . . . Such an evaluation of the revolution also delineates the major outlines of the internal and external policy of the Ukraine. Together with the revolution, the war transferred the center of gravity of economic and social life to the villages . . .”

Dontsov’s “ideal”, therefore, was a “peasant, petty-bourgeois republic.” This alone could save the Ukraine from “Muscovite socialism”, which “operates only with slaves” and wants to “rule over a mass that understands nothing besides its own intestinal interests and demagogic slogans.” In practice, this ideal demanded rejecting all foreign political ideals and subordinating the “purely cultural, or purely economic, or purely social, or purely tribal . . . needs of the national collective” and all “cosmopolitan goals (world revolution, international socialism, pacifism)” to political sovereignty and to a “national ideal.” But, “only a clear awareness of this ideal will save the life of the nation . . . . Only a clearly formulated national ideal makes a certain national idea into a crystallizing center for individual and group wills within the nation, which otherwise search for other centers of gravity.”

Giving this ideal a clear profile was the task of the “independence-minded intelligentsia”, which understands that “only the peasantry and the ideology that corresponds to its interests and manner of thinking” can save the Ukraine. The 19th century Ukrainian intelligentsia, as best typified by
Mykhailo Drahomanov, “who considered the Ukraine’s political interests to be identical with the interests of Russian imperialism”, had failed to provide such an ideal. The “bankrupt social-demagogues” of the revolutionary period, who had ignored the peasantry and thereby subordinated Ukrainian national goals to their own social and class ideals, had proven equally harmful to Ukrainian interests. And just as the monarchists, whose lack of peasant support would inevitably lead to “agitation for the benefit of the Russian monarchy”, harm the “cause of Ukrainian independence”, so too the socialists, “who have nothing in common either with the ideology or the manner of thinking of the peasantry,” and instead “know no regulator in society other than the lowly materialistic instincts of the masses or the arbitrariness of a lord over a flock of equal slaves” cannot possibly serve Ukrainian interests.109

Dontsov’s solution was peasant democracy, which, however, was not a democracy of “pacifism, egalitarianism, anti-militarism, mobocracy [okhlokratiia], intestinal socialism, and class struggle... of general levelling, of the deification of numbers, of sentimental-anemic popular sovereignty [narodopravstvo]” but a democracy of “work, hierarchy, social solidarity, responsibility, and the strong fist.” Dontsov’s democracy was one of “self-discipline and of higher ideals,” of “production”, of “freedom and of independent action.” It “recognizes equality in the competitive struggle of life, but equality with regard to the starting point and not to the finish line of the race.” Somewhat surprisingly, Dontsov considered the qualities of the peasant democracy he advocated to be best exemplified in “northern America”, revealing an infatuation with the United States that was to persist throughout the 1920s. In fact, one may go so far as to say that America served as a model for Dontsov. That Dontsov’s perceptions of the United States may or may not have corresponded to the reality is not important. What is important is that Dontsov, who made no secret of his admiration for the Fascists, chose America and not Italy as his ideal form of society.110

Furthermore, argued Dontsov, accepting the peasantry as the foundation of Ukrainian statehood could ultimately lead to
a reconciliation between the hostile national minorities and the Ukrainians. Once the former realized that the "true physiognomy of militant Ukrainianism" was "peasant, private-property-minded, and nationalist", their fears of "socialism" and "national Bolshevism" would go away. In a remarkably hopeful tone, Dontsov then concluded that such a rapprochement could result in the "ultimate crystallization of the collective ideal of the nation as a group of people of various classes and nationalities, living on a common territory and joined with common historical traditions." \[111\]

In the last analysis, however, the crucial role lay with the intelligentsia, with "our generation", which had to find the "formula of the great popular movement in the Ukraine and clearly define its goal." Without this, the Ukrainian struggle would become an easy prey for "foreign national demagogues", remain mired in chaos, and never rise above the level of a "struggle for expropriated cattle or for confiscated grain." The "Muscophiles of the right and of the left" had to "disappear", and their place had to be taken by those "who understand that our national ideal can be realized only in uncompromising struggle with Russia." \[112\]

Dontsov's writings since his arrival in L'viv in early 1922 revealed a thematic continuity with the ideas expounded in *Pidstavy nashoi polityki*. A certain shift in emphasis and direction, however, had already become evident as early as 1922-1923 in his articles in *Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk* and *Zahrava*, both of which he edited. Dontsov now began developing the ideas of ideological purity, faith, irrationality, and will which were to dominate his later thinking. His infatuation with the peasantry and hatred of Russia remained, but a significant radicalization took place in his view of how Ukrainian statehood was to be achieved.

In discussing Dontsov's intellectual development, it is important not to place undue emphasis on ideas themselves as the source of his inspiration. Without doubt, the well-read Dontsov surely borrowed and learned from whatever intellectual source that appeared to him to be of significance. This intellectual inspiration, however, far more affirmed rather than formed Dontsov's own ideas, which he developed
on the basis of a very astute and penetrating perception of ongoing events. The revolution of 1917-1920 had taught Dontsov the importance of the peasantry, strong leadership, and ideological clarity — ideas he developed in *Pidstav*. The Fascists, meanwhile, opened his eyes to the importance of "initiative-minorities", a fact which seems to have escaped him until then, primarily because of his absolute rejection of Bolshevism as a purely Russian phenomenon of no relevance to the Ukrainian situation.

By late 1922 and early 1923, Dontsov was openly declaring his admiration for the Fascists and the Bolsheviks. The first indication came in the November 1922 issue of the *Vistnyk*, when Dontsov used a quotation from the "catechism of the Fascists" as a lead-in to an article on the zminovikhovshchyna. In January 1923, there followed a long article which compared Fascism to Bolshevism and analyzed the reasons for their success. Dontsov found four points of identity between the two movements. They were both "anti-democratic", "populist", "uncompromising", and were led by an "initiative-minority."

"Thus," wrote the Ukrainian journalist, "the reasons for the success of both movements were: their populism [*narodnist*], their ability to touch the deepest instincts of the masses, their irreconcilability, and their militancy. With regard to the anti-democratism of their program (antiparlimentarianism) and of their tactics (not coalitions, but coups d'état), at the least they did not harm their success and, at closer view, perhaps even helped it; after all, their opponents found themselves not on the wagon, but under the wagon, in spite of the democratism of their program and tactics . . . ."

Whether Dontsov had hereby abandoned his former endorsement of "peasant democracy" or whether he considered it reconcilable with Fascist and Bolshevik "anti-democratism" was left unclear in the article. What was made explicit, however, was Dontsov's new conviction that not only new political "foundations", but also "new people" were necessary. The implication that Ukrainians should draw their inspiration from the Fascist and Bolshevik examples was
obvious, if not clearly articulated: “Our [country] needs new characters, who know what they want and who would have nothing of that sentimental-pacifist, internationalist-slavish psychology of the ‘former people’ . . . . The conflict over ‘programs’, ‘coalitions’, ‘concentrations’, and ‘orientations’ being conducted by these people will lead to nothing. They are living corpses, who forgot to die . . . . Theirs is no longer to conceive of an idea, for which people would go to kill other people . . . .”

Dontsov’s unconcealed admiration for the Fascists and newly acquired appreciation for the Bolsheviks by no means meant a blind acceptance of their ideological tenets. Rather, as a man of not inconsiderable political perspicacity, Dontsov borrowed only that which he believed applicable to the Ukrainian struggle for the ultimate ideal — statehood. Naturally, Dontsov underwent ideological shifts in the process. But for a pragmatist, whose only goal was Ukrainian independence, such shifts posed few problems. In fact, he considered them indicative of a capacity to think creatively and remain in vital contact with the world. Dontsov’s pragmatism, for example, was most evident in his attitude towards the question troubling all Ukrainians — the question of “our own forces” or of “orientations.” For Dontsov, “there was no such dilemma: We say, always and in the first place — ‘our own forces’, and then — ‘orientations’.”

In one respect, however, Dontsov was uncompromising, even rigid. Whereas he revealed a pragmatism in most political questions that few Ukrainians could match, his dedication to purity of ideology and clarity of purpose was immune to all changes in the political climate. His concern with these two notions, which he had only fleetingly discussed in Pidstavuy, was given precise formulation in the first issue (May 1922) of the revived Vistnyk. According to Dontsov, the task of the journal was to “extricate our national idea from the chaos within which it threatens to die, to purify it of garbage and mud, to give it bright and clear content, to make of it a banner about which the whole nation would rally.”

The point of ideological purity was very practical. It would
determine the success or failure of the Ukrainian revolution: "... only clear, simple, and unconfused slogans, coupled with an unshakeable faith in their sanctity and with an unbending will to realize them, attract the masses to themselves... the masses will never follow unclear slogans or those, who do not know what they want.... Only he who does not hesitate at the appropriate time to say yes or no will impose his will upon the mob. This is precisely what has been lacking in Ukrainian nationalism until now: this irrational faith in the historical vocation of one's people...."

Although his comments seem to dilute his earlier belief in the peasantry's ability to act on its own and to lead the Ukrainian revolution, Dontsov himself apparently differentiated between the peasantry (an active force) and the masses or mob (a passive force). In Dontsov's eyes, therefore, the peasantry continued to embody all the qualities he advocated. In particular, the peasantry had "revealed ... a remarkable courage in the defense of its interests, an extraordinary activism, and an enormous readiness to make sacrifices... It knew what it wanted, and that which it wanted, it wanted very much."

It naturally followed that the Ukraine's social "ideal" had to be that which the "peasantry developed in hard struggle" — private property, labor discipline, productivity, organized collectivism, hierarchy, cooperation, social self-action, personal initiative, and the sanctity of the family and of the church. But "most significant" for attaining these goals was to "maintain the purity of one's own ideology, clear in content and active of will, as well as a faith that knows no doubts. If we lose this ideology, then the most heroic efforts of the nation will be branded as banditism. If we maintain it, then we will attain everything."

The quintessence of Dontsov's evolving Nationalist worldview found expression in the first (April 1923) issue of Zahrava. As editor-in-chief, Dontsov outlined "our goals" as "wanting at least for ourselves to finish once and for all with the dominance of phrases, which inhibit the political creativity of right, left, and center and which destroy the people's resistance. We want
to remove these phrases from ourselves.... And replace them with a pure national egoism and the uncompromising interests of the class on which it [the nation] is based and which constitutes the vast majority of us. We want to bring about the formation of a group, even if small in number, but stubborn in its convictions, which knows what it wants, and that which it wants, it wants very much. That would detest compromises; that would pursue its goal with firmness and clarity, which attracts the masses, and that would affirm its ideal with pure religious fervour, without which no movement and no idea have yet triumphed."

Dontsov elaborated on "national egoism" in the third issue (May 1, 1923) of Zahrava. A profound shift towards an extreme form of Nationalism, approaching racism, became evident in his "formula" for "putting in motion the mob's potential energy", which, if uncontrolled by the intelligentsia, could manifest itself, as it did in the war years, in pogroms. This formula had to "tie their [the masses'] everyday hurts and expectations to one general idea" and "synthesize their scattered energy and give it a goal." The "idea", meanwhile, had to emphasize the "racial allegiance of the peasant majority of the nation" and its "ethnic individuality," and "deepen this feeling of racial individuality with all the consequences flowing therefrom...."123

The fourth issue (May 15, 1923) of Zahrava, meanwhile, revealed the degree to which Dontsov had moved in the direction of elitism: "Only a group, which knows what it wants, which needs the masses for its actions and for educating them, and not for decoration, which sees in them and not in paragraphs the beginning and end of everything, and which can awaken the sleeping energy of the nation, is capable of organizing the masses."124

As his hatred for the "doctrine of liberalism" and for "snail-like democratism" grew, as he even ventured to call Ukrainian Nationalism "Ukrainian 'fascism'", and as he proclaimed that the "worldview of contemporary nationalism" approximated the "theological worldview of the Church" and named Maurice Barrès its "apostle", Dontsov finally took his elitism
to its logical end. Obviously impressed by Mussolini's consolidation of power and Piłsudski's growing influence, Dontsov devoted an article to "Napoleonic" where he preached the virtues of such great leaders as Bonaparte, Cromwell, Mussolini, Piłsudski, and Khmel'nyts'kyi, who carried out revolutions by appealing "first to the 'rabble' and not to feelings of legitimism, which revolutions destroy" and who were concerned with "controlling the revolutionized mass and not with principles." Where the peasantry fit into this scheme was unclear. Certainly, its revolutionary role, already limited by the existence of an "initiative-minority", could not but have been further circumscribed by a Napoleon. Although Dontsov may have denied it, the peasantry had been deprived of its earlier initiative and transformed into a tool of the elite in his ideology.

The July-August 1925 issue of Vistnyk summarized the basic tenets of the ideology Dontsov had been propounding in the journal for the past three years: "This was a worldview that... proclaimed the right to life of the stronger and not the weaker; to the old question... intellect or will, it gave first place to the latter; it saw the meaning of life in its [the will's] struggle with others, and it [regarded] the virtues necessary for this struggle as the ideal of the modern 'kalokagathia'. . . . This was the worldview of... Bergson and Sorel in philosophy and sociology, of Kipling in literature, and of Roosevelt and Kitchener in politics." Crucial to the further radicalization of Dontsov's Nationalist ideas was Schwartzbard's assassination of Petliura. The Otaman's death was proof to Dontsov of the correctness of his social Darwinian belief that life was a struggle and that only the strongest survived: "We do not approach this problem [pogroms] from the viewpoint of bourgeois morality. For us the victory of the Ukrainian idea is more important than the lives of thousands of Ukrainians, not to mention the lives of thousands of Schwartzbards and Bronsteins. And if the liberation of the Ukraine demanded these thousands, then, I believe, no Ukrainian patriot would hesitate before them . . . . But such Jewish hecatombs were not necessary for us and
Petliura is not guilty of them. They were not a mistake of his policies.... His mistake lay elsewhere: in that he unnecessarily called Jews into his cabinet and gave them autonomy... He wanted to win the support of a cowardly and slavish race with concessions, when all that Ukrainian politics should have done with regard to them was to break their power in the Ukraine and force them to uncompromising loyalty to the Ukrainian idea.... The point is that Jews are fundamentally hostile to Ukrainian statehood.... The Jews are guilty, terribly guilty, as those who helped to consolidate the Russian rule in the Ukraine, but — the ‘Jew is not guilty of everything'. Russian imperialism is guilty of everything.”

Following Schwartzbard’s acquittal, Dontsov again took to his pen, essentially repeating his earlier beliefs but with a noticeably greater impatience and intolerance: “What’s the matter? Whence these shrieks? What are the hyenas concerned about? About pogroms... What pogroms? There were no pogroms in the Ukraine. There was a civil war in which masses of Jews, Muscovites, and Ukrainians died...” What, according to Dontsov, was the Jews' real concern? — “... the awakening of the millionfold masses of the Ukrainian people and especially of the peasantry to economic and political independence is a pogrom! This cannot be allowed because it would mean the end of the blissful times.” And as to the “lesson” Ukrainians should draw from the trial — “Let us master several rules for the future: never give ‘minorities’ cultural-national autonomies which end in Schwartzbards.”

Significantly, although Dontsov was clearly no friend of the Jews, neither of the above two comments sees the Ukraine’s problems in exclusively Jewish terms. The first statement makes Russia “guilty of everything”; the second puts the blame on “minorities”, that is, on other nationalities. Both are consistent with the nature of Dontsov’s Nationalism, which saw the Ukraine caught in a struggle with all nations in general and with Russia in particular. Ukrainian-Jewish relations, therefore, were secondary and even incidental to what Dontsov, and many Ukrainians with him, perceived as the whole world’s hostility to their nation.
In spite of the great number of changes he had undergone since 1921, Dontsov's "perfect" society in April 1929 remained what it had been at the time he wrote Pidstavy. "The Spirit of Americanism" was the title of the article in Vistnyk which clearly articulated what Dontsov found so compelling about the United States. Very simply, Dontsov believed that Americans embodied that one quality Ukrainians lacked and which he considered essential to all great achievements. To use an earlier phrase, Americans "knew what they wanted, and that which they wanted, they wanted very much."

According to Dontsov's article, Americans were always "driven forward" by the "idea of the new, always joined together with the idea of the better. The Yankee does not know the impossible. The impossible is only that which has not yet been tried." True to these ideals, America had declared war on the "Utopians of reaction and of socialism, both of which deny the law of private initiative and place obstacles before the free, human 'I.'" Every American "is far too preoccupied with the thought of conquest to pity the conquered and far too in a hurry to get ahead in order to stop by those who are left behind.""130

But American individualism was a "social individualism", an "individualism of voluntary self-discipline", which "exists only in the group and cannot find expression outside of the group." The result was that "there is freedom, but also regimentation and discipline, there is no anarchy. But the freedom which the individual enjoys by no means implies tolerance for an individual who goes outside of the law. Every time that the ideal of the nation or its vital interests enter into play, the law immediately directs the unrestrained individual to his place. Those, who in this singular democracy do not accept the general faith, are not always treated very gently." The reason for this intolerance was the "moral tyranny of the majority.""131

The model American, for Dontsov, was William Jennings Bryan, the renowned lawyer who steadfastly held to his belief "in the word of the Bible" during the so-called Monkey Trial. "We may laugh at Bryan," wrote Dontsov, "but when his opponents came to be involved with this person, who firmly
believed in his truth, the smiles quickly vanished from their faces . . . . And when I consider some countrymen, who are very progressive and, obviously, supporters of Darwin's theory, but for whom no dogmas exist, who freely go — without being punished by public opinion — from Ukrainianism to Muscophilism and to Communism, who, like some at Schwartzbard's trial, served foreigners against their own people, then I regret that we have no dogmas, which would forbid doubt, that we have no tyranny of the majority as in America. I begin to think that it is better to believe in an out-of-date Bible, in Jonah, in the whale — and in one's own nation, than to be progressive, accept the monkey theory, but in practice jump monkey-like from one faith to another . . . .”

Like so many others written by Dontsov, the above article does not easily fit into all-too-casually formed preconceptions of Dontsov's political and ideological convictions. Surprisingly sad, even despairing, in tone, Dontsov's article offers convincing evidence that his intellectual horizons extended far beyond Fascist Italy and Bolshevik Russia. The "singular democracy" Dontsov so admired (and as he described it) can hardly be termed totalitarian and is even arguably authoritarian. Dontsov's "majority" was tyrannical, but it was nevertheless a majority. Likewise, the individual remained "free" in Dontsov's ideal world. In fact, the ideal individual, the Yankee, was the greatest of individualists, ever driven, self-reliant, creative, free-thinking, and forceful. The nation, the society, however, set the limits on the Yankee's individualism. Moreover, he accepted these limitations voluntarily out of a sense of responsibility to the nation. In this respect, Dontsov was echoing a motto he had coined in 1923: "Ukrainians for the Ukraine" instead of the more usual "The Ukraine for Ukrainians".

The most systematic expression of Dontsov's Nationalism appeared in 1926 as a book, entitled, simply enough, Natsionalizm (Nationalism). As with other Nationalists, Dontsov's point of departure was the reality of the war. "Only one law emerged unscathed from the catastrophe. That was the law of struggle . . . ." Nations struggled for survival; the
the stronger ones won, the weaker ones lost. The Ukrainian nation had been on the losing side in 1917-1920. Who was responsible for the defeat? How could the Ukrainians win? Responsibility for defeat lay with “our nationalism of the 19th century, the nationalism of collapse, or Provençalism.” The way out was to adopt Dontsov’s proposed Nationalism, which was “fundamentally hostile” to the views typified by the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, Mykhailo Drahomanov, Ivan Franko, and Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi. Dontsov’s Nationalism took the “will” as its starting point; their worldview began with the “intellect”. As a result of this infatuation with the intellect, the 19th century Provençals overlooked the most basic aspect of life — will — and thereby created an ideology that could not but not respond to the inner strivings of the will of the Ukrainian nation. The Provençals had committed many sins: “Narrow and stupid intellectualism, faith in the mechanical nature of social ‘progress’ . . . , the rejection of the national affect as a ‘causa sui’, making human and national will dependent on countless sanctions, primitive objectification of will, raising the individual over the general and the national, emphasizing the passive aspect of the nation (the ‘number’, the ‘people’) over the active (the initiative-minority) — all of this led not only to the degradation of the entire nation, to its being pushed into the role of an apolitical tribe . . . , but also to the gradual atomization of the concept of a nation; to its negation, to the complete exclusion of the element of struggle, of the role of the willful factor in history, and finally to the negation of the very instinct to life . . . .” This “decline of the will”, this “lack of faith and lack of will”, could be cured only by a worldview that stressed just the opposite. “It is not important,” wrote Dontsov, “whether a nation is aggressive or not, or whether an idea is aggressive or not. It is important whether an idea is connected to the appropriate feeling, to the abstract will to life and to growth, or whether an idea is an intellectual abstraction that wants to kill the affect (as Drahomanov and the Drahomanovites did) . . . .”

The point, therefore, was to find the kind of “idea”, that would speak to the “heart” of the nation, to its will, and thereby
move the “masses to give up their lives” for it.  

"But such an ideal can only be that ideal, which is a faithful translation of the subconscious will to self-rule of precisely that nation, and which draws its content not from the slogans of an isolated doctrine, but only from the whole of the needs of the people, from their geographic location in the world, from their past, from their traditions, history, and psychology . . . . Every nation has its own law and its own truth and should submit only to them . . . . The national idea can only then become a powerful factor in life, when it happily consists of two parts: the affective and the intellectual, when the intellect is tightly bound to the popular instinct and conscience. But this is possible only when the content of the idea, when the national ideal is not foreign, abstractly deduced and imposed . . . ."  

But who was to create this new idea? — “. . . never the people!” replied Dontsov. “The people are a passive factor with regard to any idea . . . . The active factor which carries the idea and within which the idea arises is the active or initiative-minority . . . . This is the group that formulates the idea, which is unclear for the ‘not-conscious’ mass, makes it accessible to this mass, and finally mobilizes the ‘people’ for the struggle for this idea.”  

For this idea to be realized, however, it was first necessary to break with Provençalism and adopt Dontsov’s “active nationalism” (chynnyi natsionalizm), a voluntarist ideology which alone understood human nature and the means by which ideas were made triumphant. Sosnowsky provides an excellent synthesis of the kernel ideas of “active nationalism”:

“The answer to the lack of the ‘will impulse’ was to be . . . the inculcation of the ‘will to life’ and the ‘will to power’. In place of the exaggerated importance of the weight of the intellect and knowledge and of rationalism in general in the life of a person and of peoples — irrationalism, romanticism, illusionism as the fundamental motive factors. In place of pacifism and the lack of desire to ‘encroach upon another’s freedom’ — the idea of struggle, expansion, violence or simply ‘imperialism’. In place of scepticism, lack of faith, lack of character — a fanatical faith in ‘one’s own truth’,
dogmatism, exclusiveness, toughness. In place of particularism, anarchism, and demo-liberalism — the interests of the nation above everything, a hierarchy of values in political, community, and social life, and the subordination of the individual to the national, to the collective. In place of the morality of the ‘bourger-bourgeois’ — the ‘amorality of the person of action’ who recognizes as moral and ethical only that which increases the strength of the nation and guarantees its growth. In place of indulging in various ideologies which decompose the nation and the society — ideological exclusiveness, intolerance. In place of the provincial conception of the political symbiosis of two nations, Russia and the Ukraine — the self-rule of a sovereign and independent nation . . . . In place of democracy — the principle of the initiative-minority and of creative violence.”

All these qualities were best exemplified in the “strong man” (syl’na liudyna), the ideal “active nationalist” whom Dontsov transparently patterned on Nietzsche’s Übermensch. Dontsov’s “strong man”, however, was very much a “beast who lusts for gain and for victory” over the “masses”, who “desires struggle for the sake of struggle,” and who knows “how to bite him, who bit us, and to hit him, who hit us”, and in this respect was precisely what the Übermensch was not. Curiously, Dontsov did not specify the “strong man’s” relationship to the initiative-minority and to creative violence. Would the initiative-minority consist of strong men, and if so, how could they possibly overcome their “joy to kill” instinct and lead the masses? And were the strong men not to be in the initiative-minority, then how would it cope with such “beasts”? Likewise, was the strong man’s proclivity to violence “creative” or simply destructive? Dontsov left these questions unanswered. Moreover, he left the very concepts of initiative-minority and creative violence (the latter obviously borrowed from Georges Sorel) so undeveloped as to cause great confusion with regard to the who and how of implementing the Ukrainian idea.

But what, then, was the Ukrainian idea? Dontsov’s answer was again vague and those Nationalists who awaited a
proposal for an explicit course of action were sorely disappointed. The Ukrainian idea was based on the “Western European concepts of family, community, property . . . the organicity of our culture, personal initiative, social distinctness and clarity, form-ness, hierarchy and not numbers, personal activism and not its enslavement, production and not distribution, organization and not anarchy, idealism and not materialism.” More specifically, when “transferred to the sphere of concrete relations, this ideal would be sovereignty and imperialism in politics, a church that is independent of the state in religion, occidentalism in culture, and private initiative and growth in economic life.”

For Dontsov, there could be no question of not accepting his proposed “active nationalism”. “The struggle for existence is the law of life,” he wrote at the very end of Natsionalizm, “There is no universal truth . . . Life makes him [right], who proves himself morally and physically stronger. We can acquire this strength only if we become filled with a new spirit, a new ideology. Every nation faces a dilemma: either to triumph or to die.”

In general, what Natsionalizm had to offer was either not particularly new (struggle, faith, the Ukrainian idea, initiative-minorities) or not sufficiently developed (the strong man, creative violence). Where Dontsov did contribute something significantly new, however, was in his elaboration on an old theme, will. Taking his cue from Schopenhauer, Dontsov accepted the “will to life” as the irrational motive force of all life. He then arbitrarily reinterpreted Nietzsche’s “will to power” as the “craving for power” over others and proclaimed the two wills equal — a step of more than doubtful logic. Thus, the “will to life” implied the “will to power”, which “lives in almost all of us to a smaller or greater degree.” Both wills, therefore, were unchanging constants possessed by all individuals and could be neither increased nor decreased. For the nation to manifest these wills in the proper form — in the struggle for statehood, however, an idea, the “Ukrainian idea”, was necessary in order to channel these latent energies in the proper direction. The “Provençals” had not provided this idea; the Nationalists, on the other hand, would. It was not
a question, therefore, of "reeducating the person", of inculcating a "new will", as Sosnowsky concludes by taking Dontsov's sloppy use of terminology too literally. This would have been logically impossible, given the unchanging nature of will. Rather, as Dontsov repeatedly pointed out, the question was to find the right idea that would reflect the strivings of the will. This combination of idea and will would then guarantee the nation's survival in a hostile world.146

Where Dontsov is inconsistent, however, was in blaming the Provençals for espousing the ideas they had. For, as one critic of Dontsov correctly pointed out, if will is the motive force of all life, then it — and not the individual — must be responsible for ideas as well.147 By the same token, Dontsov's "active nationalism" was not his own creation, but the creation of his will. Its "appearance" in the 1920s was certainly fortuitous given the sad state of the Ukrainian nation, but by no means necessary or even in any way related to the intellectual and socio-political reality of the time. In this respect, Dontsov's ideology was ultimately pessimistic. After all, if the fate of the Ukrainian nation depended on the whims of will, what basis was there for thinking that Ukrainians would ever achieve statehood? Granted that they were now fortunate enough to have the answer in Dontsov's ideas, but who could guarantee that the nation's will would not eventually "revert" to a 19th century Provençalism? Were that to be the case (as it clearly could), the Ukrainian cause would obviously be lost. Ironically, therefore, Dontsov's "active nationalism" contained a passive, even fatalistic, and ultimately fatal streak. As an ideology of change, it was simply much too dependent on forces outside of its domain to be of practical value.

Although generally considered the high point of Dontsov's Nationalist thinking, Natsionalizm lacked the coherence of style and clarity of thought so much more evident in Pidstavy nashoi polityky and in his articles. This fact, together with a large dose of pseudo-philosophical meandering, made the book unreadable for a sizable part of the young Galician generation that otherwise tried to practice all that Dontsov preached. The book also laid bare Dontsov's philosophical weakness and
inability to think systemically. Of course, Dontsov was not trying to create a complete ideological system, but only a "worldview", and in this respect he cannot be unduly faulted for not having achieved what he had never set out to do. His aim, as his articles very clearly convey, was primarily to describe what Ukrainians had to be like in order to achieve independence. What they were to do and how were questions that would answer themselves once Ukrainians were sufficiently capable of asking such questions. As he repeatedly stated, the most important thing was to "know what one wants, and that which one wants, one wants very much." What it was that one wanted would be decided once the wanting was there: "when there is [faith], a formula will find itself."

Furthermore, Dontsov was too much a pragmatist, even an opportunist, to be able to construct a complete ideological system. His willingness to sacrifice thousands of Ukrainian lives for a free Ukraine is a good example of his political and ideological readiness to take any step to attain his goal. For Dontsov, the end very much justified the means. His frequently criticized political zig-zagging and his apparent inability to maintain the "line" were, in Dontsov's view, consistent with his belief that everything was allowed in the struggle for Ukrainian independence. In this respect, Dontsov's infatuation with the peasantry, for example, sprang not from an innate love for this particular social stratum, but from the perception that this class alone could provide the foundations for a Ukrainian state. Likewise, Dontsov's support of the "singular" kind of democracy he believed to exist in the United States stemmed not from a personal conviction that democracy was the greatest political good there can be, but from the very practical observation that American democracy appeared to have made America into a great power. In other words, only a "democracy" could channel the nation's energies in the proper direction and mobilize it for the Ukrainian revolution. Thus, his argument with the Hetmanites, for example, had less to do with an aversion for monarchies as with the belief that a monarchy would have no social support in the Ukrainian population and could therefore not survive.
It is therefore incorrect to label Dontsov a fascist for the ideas he professed in the 1920s (but only in the 1920s!), if only because one could just as easily and logically brand him a Yankee or Bolshevik. In spite of his open admiration for all three “types”, Dontsov admired not so much what the Fascist, the Yankee, and the Bolshevik had done, as the manner in which they did it. What bound Fascist Italy, the United States, and Soviet Russia together in Dontsov’s eyes was obviously not a particular social system or organization of the state, but the fact that they were all ruled by ruthless, vigorous, and willful men. In fact, if Dontsov has to be typecast politically, then the term that describes him most accurately is not “fascist”, but “laissez-faire capitalist”. Of course, Dontsov did have very pronounced fascist tendencies with regard to political “style” (a question already touched upon in the introduction). But “style” alone surely cannot be the substance of fascism, which, if anything, is a way of organizing a state. Questions of state organization, however, were largely immaterial for the Dontsov of the 1920s, who considered the attainment of that state as the first and only priority.

On the other hand, Dontsov was without doubt an “integral nationalist” of the Maurice Barrès/Charles Maurras variety. For him, as for the two Frenchmen, the nation was the criterion by which everything was to be judged. Still, as even a quick look at the footnotes to Natsionalizm reveals, there is no basis to speak of his “main intellectual inspiration” from Barrès and Maurras. As this chapter has tried to show, Dontsov formulated his most basic ideas primarily in response to concrete political events. What he drew from the writings of Barrès, Maurras, Pareto, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Sorel, Simmel, Le Bon, Hegel, Sombart, and many others was confirmation of the correctness of ideas, at which he had for the most part arrived independently. The very style in which Natsionalizm was written, for example, supports this conclusion. After stating an idea, Dontsov would endlessly reinforce it with quotations from the above authors. Significantly, these quotations did not so much prove his points as illustrate them. Were one to seek a “main intellectual
inspiration”, however, this would have to be Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi, who himself accused Dontsov of stealing his ideas. As the following passage from Lysty do bratiu-khliborobiv indicates, Lypyns’kyi’s charges may not have been unfounded:

“... there can be no state without the conquest of power. Power cannot be won without idealistic passions, which morally support the warriors in their struggle for power, give them the satisfying feeling of creating a great and noble deed, and morally justify their struggle for power in the eyes of the popular masses, among whom this conquest and this attainment of a state are taking place. There can be no idealistic passions when there is no strong, organized, and highly worthy intelligentsia among the local population. Because only such an intelligentsia can create an ideology, can morally support those who are fighting for the realization of this ideology with the material strength of the sword and of production, and can with its influence on the popular masses call forth from them love and respect for those warriors-producers, who are realizing the given ideology... and building... a state.”

Disregarding differences in terminology and emphasis, there is no reason why Dontsov could not have agreed with the above sentiments. The point, of course, is that Dontsov and Lypyns’kyi did share more or less identical views on the how of achieving statehood. Where they differed fundamentally was on the practical question of who: the nation and the Nationalists (or “mobocrats”, as Lypyns’kyi called them) or the agrarians and the conservatives (the “classocrats”)? Related to this was the equally important fact of the irreconcilability of Dontsov’s absolute hostility to Russia with Lypyns’kyi’s and the USKhD’s belief that Ukrainian cooperation with Russia was not only necessary for historical and geographic reasons but also desirable.

Whether Dontsov actually borrowed ideas directly from Lysty do bratiu-khliborobiv is debatable, however, primarily because Lypyns’kyi wrote his opus in installments published in Khliborobs’ka Ukraina at the same time that Dontsov was
busy at work formulating the basic concepts of *Natsionalizm* in *Pidstavy nashoi polityky* and in his articles. Nevertheless, there is no denying that Lypyns’kyi’s theories were “in the air” and significantly influenced the intellectual and social climate in which Dontsov developed his ideas. In this respect, Dontsov may very well have “adapted” (and in the process transformed) some of Lypyns’kyi’s thoughts to his own already existing, but continually changing, views of the world.

Two examples of ideas which Dontsov may have adapted in this manner involve Lypyns’kyi’s concepts of will and of elites. According to the Hetmanite, will was indispensable to attaining a desired goal, while an “active minority with an elemental inclination to power, to leadership, and to organization” could be found in every nation and in every “human collective.”

Although Lypyns’kyi’s will was a conscious striving and therefore an essentially rational force and his “active minority” was to consist of the vanguard of the agrarian class, so that both ideas had substantially different content from that which Dontsov gave them, it is nevertheless likely that both concepts serve as the basis on which Dontsov developed his own versions of the irrational will and of the initiative-minority. Thus, Dontsov probably accepted Lypyns’kyi’s ideas as starting points, but then arrived at his own conclusions. In any case, relations between Dontsov and Lypyns’kyi could not have been worse for personal as well as ideological reasons. Alluding to the other’s supposed non-Ukrainian origins, the two publicly referred to each other as “Wacław Lipinski” and “Mit’ka Shchelkoperov.”

Although Dontsov exerted an enormous influence on all Galicians, he enjoyed an unchallenged and unquestioned popularity with the young in general and students in particular. Dontsov realized that a reaction to the Ukrainian defeat was inevitable and that this reaction would be violent in rejecting past forms of Ukrainian politics. He also understood that the generation of the 1920s would perforce take the lead in turning against the Ukrainian past. As a result, Dontsov preached primarily to the young. In so doing, however, he did little else but try to persuade the young to be young. “What
usually characterizes the young? — a terrific thirst for knowledge . . . and a firm faith in oneself, because theirs is the future.” Youth, according to Dontsov, was supposed to be daring, bold, and certain of its convictions. Most important, youth meant change, action, and vitality — precisely those qualities the Ukrainian nation needed. “But who, if not the young, is called . . . to proclaim judgement, . . . set new guidelines, and destroy the old? Let this be done with an unskilled hand, but with the never-failing instinct of a creator, with a faith that upends mountains. Because when that is there, a formula will find itself.”

Galician and emigre youth took Dontsov literally. They accepted him as a prophet and passionately tried to live what he taught. In this respect, Dontsov actually molded the entire inter-war generation of Galicians and determined the intellectual categories with which they defined their reality. It was perhaps an indication of the poverty of inter-war Ukrainian political thought that a fiery journalist with a keen political sense should have so dominated Ukrainian ideological and philosophical thinking.
CHAPTER 7

THE STUDENTS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS

Youth in general and students in particular played a disproportionately large role in Ukrainian political life since the late 19th century. In fact, this dependence on youth was so great that Ukrainian politics frequently experienced radical directional changes with the political activization of a new generation of students. The generational nature of Ukrainian political life, particularly evident among the inter-war emigres and in Galicia, made Ukrainian politics inherently unstable and often concealed serious ideological and political differences behind the facade of generational conflict.

Eugen Weber provides an excellent explanation of this phenomenon by relating the political importance of students to the level of their country’s socio-economic development. According to Weber:

"Where representative institutions do not exist or, existing, do not really function, schools and universities provide almost the only and certainly the most convenient platform for public discussion of national and international issues, and students are bound to form the vanguard of all radical movements. The more backward the country, the greater the part that students play in its political life, if only because, in the absence of other agencies of human concentration such as factories, schools will take their place, gathering a similarly uprooted and concentrated public, facilitating the
formation of groups and the preparation of action, creating a student self-consciousness and solidarity before the appearance of other politically significant class solidarities.”  

Weber’s description of a “backward country” applies directly to inter-war Eastern Galicia and is also not without relevance to the Ukrainian emigration. The latter, if considered abstractly as a socio-political whole, was also characterized by an absence of “representative institutions” and “agencies of human concentration” other than the schools. Eastern Galicia, meanwhile, was neither industrialized nor urban, with the Ukrainians, in any case, living primarily in the countryside.

Ukrainian emigre students were for the most part demobilized UHA or AUNR soldiers, who had interrupted their studies to take up arms and who had little else to do as emigres but to resume their student life. Their numbers were supplemented by Galician students who had left the province after a law was passed in 1919 which allowed only veterans of the Polish armed forces to study at Polish universities, including L’viv. The greatest incentive for studying as an emigre, however, was the financial support that the Czech government gave Ukrainian educational institutions and students as part of its anti-Polish foreign policy.

The most important of the emigre educational institutions in Czechoslovakia was the Ukrainian Free University (Ukraїns’kyi Vil’nyi Universytet — UVU). Founded in Vienna by the Union of Ukrainian Journalists and Writers in January 1921, the University was moved to Prague later that year and officially opened on October 23. The institution at first received 100 thousand crowns monthly from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, this figure was steadily reduced as Czech interest in the Ukrainian question diminished and by 1928, when the UVU was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, the yearly budget stood at 500 thousand crowns. Students, of whom there was an average of 385 per semester, also received government stipends.  

Equally prominent was the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy
(Ukrains'ka Hospodars'ka Akademiia), which had been founded in Podebrady in the spring of 1922. Although under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, it too received its funding from the Foreign Ministry. In the second half of the 1920s, however, the Czechs progressively reduced their financial support and in 1928 the Ministry of Agriculture called for the institution's eventual dissolution. With ever smaller numbers of students, the Academy was finally dissolved in 1935.\textsuperscript{156}

In July 1923, Mykyta Shapoval's Ukrainian Public Committee founded the Ukrainian M. Drahomanov High Pedagogical Institute (Ukrains'kyi Vysokyi Pedahohichnyi Instytut im. M. Drahomanova) in Prague. At first supported by the Foreign Ministry, it shared a fate similar to that of the Agricultural Academy, ending its existence in 1933. Prague was also the site of a Ukrainian Gymnasium, founded in 1925 and also funded by the Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{157}

Although the largest number of students, some two thousand, was in Czechoslovakia, several hundred Ukrainian students also studied in Germany, Austria, Poland, and Danzig. In general, student life closely paralleled Ukrainian emigre life. Just as divided as their elders over questions of ideology, students proved equally incapable of transcending coffee-house politics. They outdid their elders, however, in regarding political questions with even greater passion and intolerance.\textsuperscript{158}

The two major points of disunity before and particularly after the Ambassadors' decision were the questions of socialism and the Soviet Ukraine. According to the students' own categorizations, socialists, communists, and Sovietophiles were considered "leftists", while Nationalists and all those who gave the national priority over the social question were called "rightists". Many of the latter were veterans, usually officers, who had been given the opportunity to leave their internment camps to study. The numerous battles between Left and Right frequently overstepped the bounds of heated discussion and developed into brawls, with the rightists in particular finding this an expedient method of advancing their viewpoints.
Unlike their elders, however, Ukrainian students were at least temporarily successful in uniting in one, all-encompassing, “professional” organization in July 1922 at an All-Ukrainian Congress of Youth in Prague, which called the Central Union of Ukrainian Students (Tsentral'nyi Soiuz Ukrains'koho Studentstva — TseSUS) into existence. The TseSUS immediately became a battleground of the Left and Right. At its 2nd Ordinary Congress, held in Podebrady in July 1924, the ideological and political differences over the question of the Soviet Ukraine finally came to a boil. Overpowered by an alliance of the rightists and the Shapoval socialists, the Communists and Sovietophiles left the student union and founded a rival student organization, the Action Union of Progressive Students (Dilove Ob'iednannia Prohresyvnoho Studentstva — DOPS). The DOPS began a powerful counterattack soon thereafter, challenging the TseSUS’s legitimacy at international student gatherings and agitating among Galician students.

In 1922, the TseSUS began publishing a monthly journal, entitled Students'kyi Vistnyk (The Student Herald). Aside from carrying news concerning various student activities, Students'kyi Vistnyk also featured numerous ideological and political discussions of which one deserves particular attention. Initiated in late 1924 by the later Nationalist activist, Volodymyr Martynets’, it concerned what Martynets’ saw as the existing conflict between “parents” and “children.” The parents, so claimed Martynets’, regarded the question of the Ukraine’s independence with “deviations and compromises.” Their children, on the other hand, knew what they wanted and knew how to get it. More important, Martynets’ associated each generation with a particular ideology. The parents, who failed to build a Ukrainian state, were socialists; their children were Nationalists. By means of this simplified formula, socialism was made responsible for the unsuccessful national revolution and Nationalism hailed as the wave of the future. Although criticized for being simplminded, Martynets’s theory clearly reflected the muddled thinking of a large segment of Ukrainian youth, which increasingly came to see itself as embodying the modern
Ukrainian nation and as best understanding its hopes and aspirations.

The more radical half of the Ukrainian student movement was found in the krai (country), in Galicia. There, directly affected by the Polish government's repressive policies and faced with radicalizing experiences in their everyday life, students turned to extremist solutions, whether communist or Nationalist, with far greater intensity than their frequently demoralized emigre comrades. Of particular importance in radicalizing the students was the government's policy of Polonizing Ukrainian primary and secondary schools.

The Galician students were organized in the province-wide Ukrainian Student Union (Ukrains'kyi Students'kyi Soiuz), a nationalist organization that went underground after being banned in the spring of 1921. It was replaced in November of that same year by the equally illegal Ukrainian Regional Student Organization (Ukrains'ka Kraiova Students'ka Orhanizatsiia), which published an underground periodical called Nash Shliakh (Our Path) and which was eventually renamed the Professional Organization of Ukrainian Students (Profesiina Orhanizatsiia Ukrains'koho Studentstva).

In July 1921, the Ukrainian Student Union organized a secret Congress which called for the creation of a Galician-Ukrainian Government that would mobilize the population of Galicia into "mass movements" and prepare the way for the "violent liberation of the Ukrainian lands from under Polish occupation." Petrushevych was exhorted to subordinate the ZUNR exile government to the proposed entity, while his advocacy of Galician neutrality was condemned for separating Galicia from the larger Ukrainian issue. At the same time, the student congress resolved to continue the struggle for a Ukrainian univeristy, urged its emigre comrades to return to study in the province, and called upon all Ukrainians to boycott those Ukrainian students attending Polish schools.160

Just as before the war, the demand for a Ukrainian university became the battle-cry of Galician students. The immediate reasons for resurrecting the issue were the abolition of the Ukrainian chairs at the University of L'viv and, more
important, the official exclusion of all those who did not serve in the Polish army — in other words, of all Ukrainians — from studying at Polish universities. Several open attempts were made to found a center of higher Ukrainian studies, but after continued police repression the decision was made to go underground. Informal underground courses lasted from 1920 to 1921, when they were given greater organizational structure and remodelled along the lines of a Western European university. The resulting “underground” Ukrainian University consisted of the departments of philosophy, law, medicine, and technology, with the latter soon breaking away to form the Ukrainian Technical High School (Ukrains’ka Vysoka Tekhnichna Shkola). In its first year of existence, the University had 1,408 students, for the most part former soldiers, attending 66 courses. Student fund drives, along with the voluntary contributions of individuals and organizations in Galicia, Europe, and particularly North America, provided the financing. The head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Dr. Vasył’ Shchurat, became the University’s first rector.161

In spite of continual police harassment, the underground university managed to thrive by living off the patriotic sentiments of students and faculty, who regarded support for the institution as a national duty. After the March 1923 Ambassadors’ decision, however, the rationale for an underground university disappeared for most of its supporters. The way to Polish schools was now open, police harassment was intentionally curtailed, and the battle had obviously been lost. The last point in particular resulted in a wave of disillusionment and apathy and a desire to adapt as best as possible to the existing conditions. Ukrainian interest in maintaining what appeared to be an anachronistic institution waned and the University fell apart in 1923-1924.

The effect of the March decision on the emigre students was just as devastating. One young Ukrainian in Prague complained in 1923: “Almost all of us sense a breakdown in our public and intimate-personal lives. Speaking honestly and to the point, if we have not yet ceased, then we are now ceasing profoundly to understand one another, to feel, and what is most
important, we are ceasing to believe.” The situation had apparently little improved in 1925, when most students “refrained from joining any kind of organization, because this includes assuming certain obligations” and were indifferent “to everything that extends beyond the boundaries of their own ego.”

The major beneficiary of the disillusionment rampant among emigre and Galician students was the left-wing Union of Progressive Students (DOPS). The tactics of the Right appeared to have been discredited, and the DOPS, with its “orientation” on the Soviet Ukraine, offered the only existing alternative to students interested in national politics. Left-wing attitudes grew in popularity among Galician students, providing the background for the formation in 1924-1926 of overtly Nationalist student groups and organizations. The Nationalists supplanted the left-wing students in several years time and eventually came to dominate the entire Galician student movement.
Although Ukrainian soldiers played a particularly prominent role in post-war Ukrainian politics, they had already been an influential political force in 1917-1920. Konovalets’s Sharpshooters, for example, never hid their preference for a nationalist Ukrainian government and often played a key, if hidden, role in determining government policy as the mainstay of the army. Moreover, as the successive Ukrainian governments revealed their inability to govern effectively, the military often proved to be the only body capable of not fully succumbing to the destructive centripetal forces at work in the Ukraine. In this manner, Ukrainian soldiers established themselves as an element indispensable to the vitality of Ukrainian political life.

There were at least two cases of soldiers actively involved in underground military organizations with political goals during the war. The first such group was founded in Vienna in the spring of 1917 by Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooter officers, who conducted propaganda among the Ukrainian soldiers in the USS and in the Austrian army aimed at “breaking the Ukrainian lands away from Austria and annexing them to the Great Ukraine.” The second such underground military organization arose in October 1918 in Galicia in conjunction...
with the Ukrainians’ plans to seize political power in the province. Led by Colonel Dmytro Vitovs’kyi and consisting mostly of Ukrainian officers in the Austrian army, the military organization agitated for the planned coup among the rank-and-file Ukrainian soldiers. Working through strictly conspiratorial methods, the organization was open for membership only to those soldiers considered “nationally conscious and reliable.” Although neither of the above two organizations survived very long, they set a significant precedent for soldiers wishing to continue their struggle with political and military means after the war.

As the war ended for the Ukrainians, some 20-25,000 AUNR soldiers found themselves in Poland in internment camps in Wadowice, Kalisz, Szczepiórno, Tuchola, Piotrków, Aleksander Kujawski, Łańcut, and Strzałkowo, while approximately half that number of UHA veterans were interned in Deutsche Gabel, Liberec, and Josefov in Czechoslovakia. In both groups of camps, the soldiers took part in educational, cultural, and political activities in many respects resembling those organized by the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine during the war. Many of the soldiers, and particularly the officers, were given the opportunity to attend schools in Czechoslovakia and Poland and thereby served as a link between the interned veterans and the students. As a result, the veterans instilled the students with many of their own values. This pattern was especially evident in Galicia, where former soldiers played major roles at the 1921 student congress and in the underground university.

In both Galicia, where many UHA veterans stayed behind, and in the countries of emigration, soldiers found themselves facing a reality whose emergence they had fought for several years. Imbued with military values, embittered by the war, and wishing to continue their struggle in whatever way possible, the Ukrainian veterans became very receptive, to the radicalization that often follows the frustration of defeat. What is more, the aftermath of the war placed the soldiers in a position of social as well as psychological dislocation. Unable to adjust to the new conditions, the
Ukrainian veterans became all the more set on changing the post-war reality in the only way they knew how—by force. Although hardly comparable to the German Freikorps or Horthy's officers, most Ukrainian soldiers also espoused conservative political values and believed that the demands of the nation superseded social reform.

The bulk of the Army of the UNR and of the Galician Army left the Ukraine in late 1920. Parts of both armies, however, had already been interned much earlier. Konovalets's Sharpshooters, for example, were disarmed and interned by the Poles in late 1919. An UHA brigade, meanwhile, had crossed the Carpathians into Czechoslovakia in May 1919 after being cut off from the body of the army during Haller's offensive. After assisting the Czechs in fighting Bela Kun's forces, the Galicians were placed in a camp at Deutsche Gabel, where they were reorganized as the Ukrainian Brigade (Ukrains'ka Bryhada). The Brigade was later supplemented with other Galician soldiers. Some, such as General Anton Kraus's UHA unit crossed into Czechoslovakia after separating from the combined Polish-Ukrainian army as it retreated before the Soviets in the summer of 1920. Many others were former soldiers in the Austrian army who had been demobilized in Austria or released from POW camps in Italy. To meet this growing number of veterans, the Czechs built a second internment camp at Liberec in July 1920. In April 1921, both camps were liquidated and the soldiers transferred to Josefov.

The Ukrainian Brigade in Josefov recognized the ZUNR exile government and filled the role of Petrushevych's exile army. The Brigade's existence as an organized force, however, was clearly dependent on the goodwill of the Czech government. Engaged at the time in their territorial disputes with Poland, the Czechs willingly financed and trained the Brigade to keep the Poles off balance on the question of Galicia. The Poles, in turn, supported emigre Slovak nationalists and demanded the Brigade's dissolution as the price for better relations. After Polish-Czech relations gradually improved and the Galician question had been settled internationally, the internment camps were indeed liquidated, albeit slowly, and the Brigade eventually dissolved.
The Ambassadors’ decision affected the Brigade just as it did all other Ukrainians. Disillusionment and demoralization followed the first spurt of defiance. The desertion rate rose rapidly and many soldiers took advantage of the Polish amnesty for Ukrainians and applied for permission to return to Galicia. Although the March defeat demoralized the Galician soldiers, it also contributed to their radicalization and swing rightwards. The journal *Ukrains’kyi Skytalets* (The Homeless Ukrainian), the “organ of the military emigration of the ZUNR lands,” captured the mood of bitterness and hatred in an editorial on the Ambassadors’ decision:

“The Ukrainian Galician Sharpshooter never placed much hope on the ‘fairness’ of the Entente and regards its decision with indifference. Drawing his strength from faith in his own people and basing the future of the nation upon the one real law — unremitting struggle against all enemies of the Ukrainian people up to liberation, the Ukrainian Galician Sharpshooter considers the Entente’s decision to be a scrap of paper, which binds him to nothing and which will be torn sooner or later by the combined forces of the entire Ukrainian nation and by the blood of its Army.”

The above passage succinctly reveals the conclusions that many Ukrainians, and not only soldiers, were reaching. The Entente, so went the thought process, had turned its back on the Ukrainian cause. Only by withdrawing into one’s own nation, insisting on a revision of the incurred injustice, and applying force could the damage be undone. In other words, nationalism, revisionism, and militarism could along guarantee Ukrainian victory.

Understandably, officers were the most politically active of all Ukrainian soldiers. Generally more conservative and military-minded in their thinking than the regulars, the officers represented a significant political force of no small nuisance to the various governments-in-exile. Most important of the officers were Colonel Ievhen Konovalets’ and his Sich Sharpshooters. Unconditionally committed to an “independent and united Ukrainian State”, the Sharpshooters represented the most nationalist wing of the anti-Soviet camp and as such
played a crucial role in the development of the Nationalist movement.

Following the Sharpshooters’ Council’s decision to demobilize the force in late 1919, those Sharpshooters who did not join the AUNR in its First Winter Campaign were disarmed by the Polish army and forcibly placed in a camp near Luts’k, where they remained for the duration of the winter. There, Konovalets’ and his officers, opposed on principle to Petliura’s April pact with Piłsudski, began hatching farreaching plans of continuing the “organized active struggle” on their own terms. Resolved to “create a new center of the regular Ukrainian army” and “acquire a new operational base” in the Ukraine, the officers turned their eyes to the Ukrainian Brigade in Czechoslovakia.¹⁶⁸

The officers hoped to supplement the Brigade with the large number of Galician and Eastern Ukrainian soldiers already in emigration and thereby create a force sufficiently large to have an impact on the fighting in the Ukraine. The new unit, according to the officers’ plans, would cross into the Ukraine through Rumania, march south towards Odessa, and there await the outcome of the Piłsudski-Petliura offensive. Should the Poles win, the unit would serve as a Ukrainian counterweight. In case of a Bolshevik victory, it would resume the Ukrainian struggle.¹⁶⁹

After providing Petliura with a censored version of their plans, the officers gained the Otaman’s approval and soon thereafter were released from the internment camp. The leading members of the Sharpshooters’ Council, Konovalets’ included, then went to Prague to win Galician support for their project. Much to their surprise, however, both Petrushevych and the UHA veterans reacted with violent opposition to their proposal that the Galicians lend military aid to Petliura. The ZUNR press went so far as to attack the Sharpshooters as “Polish mercenaries.”¹⁷⁰ Petliura, in the meanwhile, perhaps having learned of the Sharpshooters’ real intentions, came to regard their plans as detrimental to the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement. Isolated and attacked from all sides, the officers abandoned their project.¹⁷¹
The Sharpshooters, however, were not alone in their belief that the military emigres had a large role to play in the struggle for Ukrainian statehood. A Ukrainian Union of Officers (Ukrains'kyi Soiuz Starshyn), founded on April 18, 1920 in Vienna and consisting mostly of Galician Army officers, provided an additional impulse to the soldiers’ growing political importance. Although claiming to be “non-party and apolitical”, the Union apparently supported the Petrushevych government. Nevertheless, its ideological leanings closely approximated those of the Sharpshooters. Its stated task was to “eliminate all possible disunifying elements” by “fighting narrow provincial differences.” Its ultimate goal was to “guard the honor of the Ukrainian Army and of the Ukrainian Nation” and to preserve the “ideology of the One United and Independent Ukraine, for which it would be no shame to die on the field of glory.” Although the Sharpshooters neither founded nor dominated the Union (despite rumors to the contrary), they do appear to have exerted considerable influence within its ranks. Evidence for this is the Union’s official participation at a Congress of the Representatives of Ukrainian Military Organizations Abroad (Z'izd vidporuchny-kiv ukraïns'kykh viïs'kouykh orhanizatsii zakordonom), organized by the Sharpshooter officers and held in early August 1920 in Prague.

Present at the congress were representatives of the Sharpshooters, the Vienna officers’ union, the Ukrainian Brigade, and of other UHA soldiers in Czechoslovakia (but not of the AUNR!). Not surprisingly, the resolutions issued by the gathering bore the stamp of Konovalets’s thinking: “The Congress supports the complete sobornist’ and independence of the Ukraine without regard to the social or political forms in which this independence appears; The Congress asserts that the Ukraine’s present catastrophic position is the result of an unwillingness to work, unsteadiness, vacillation, and contrariety with the slogans listed in the first point as well as of the very fact of the existence of up to three Ukrainian governments and their organs; The congress considers it correct not to offer military resistance to the unification of the Ukrainian lands
that is currently taking place as a result of the Bolshevik advance and simultaneously calls upon all officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Army to further steadfast struggle for the independence of the Ukraine; The Congress considers it necessary to maintain in organized form the military units existing outside of the territory of the Ukraine and to unite them ideologically with one another.” The Congress also suggested that the various military organizations be placed under a “central ideological leadership” and called on all Ukrainian soldiers to return to the Ukraine and there continue their activity.175

The above resolutions, just like those later adopted by the Young Galicia group, are remarkably level-headed and realistic in their approach to the Ukrainian problem. Without in any way being sympathetic to Bolshevism, the soldiers believed that a step-by-step approach to the problem was the best course to follow and therefore supported Soviet occupation of all Ukrainian ethnic territories as a means of furthering sobornist’. In this manner, at least one part of the “Independent and United Ukraine” would be achieved. The next step would then be to attain independence, a difficult task made substantially easier by the simple fact that now all Ukrainians would have common interests and fight on the same side of the barricade. It would no longer be a question of Kiev vs. L’viv, but of liberating the whole Ukraine. The soldiers, meanwhile, organized in units and united in ideology, would be in the vanguard of this all-Ukrainian movement.

Immediately after, and apparently with the approval of, the Congress, one of the Sharpshooter officers left for Warsaw with a plan for organizing a combined ZUNR-UNR military force. The officer proposed to Petliura and to the Polish General Staff that Petliura’s army withdraw into the Carpathians and there join up with the Galicians interned in Czechoslovakia. The Bolsheviks, it was hoped, would then overrun Poland and begin threatening the Entente powers, who, in turn, would organize a broad anti-Soviet front, including the Ukrainian army in the Carpathians, and thereby give the Ukrainian problem international dimensions. Both the Poles and Petliura, however, rejected the proposals.176
As was to have been expected, the ZUNR saw the Congress as a threat to the Dictator's authority. According to a surprisingly restrained commentary in the August 28 issue of Ukrains'kyi Prapor, "...insofar as this military congress was to have been the beginning of political agitation in our army, we consider this action of some irresponsible officers as a very dangerous experiment for the army itself and for our state cause." In view of the extent of the ZUNR's past criticism of Konovalets', there is little doubt that the ZUNR newspaper considered him to be one of the "irresponsible officers." In fact, it is logical to assume, as Ukrains'kyi Prapor no doubt did, that Konovalets' was the driving force behind the military congress.

Colonel Ievhen Konovalets' played a crucial role in the Ukrainians' war-time and post-war efforts at independence. As the dominant figure among Ukrainian soldiers and in the later organized Nationalist movement, Konovalets' undoubtedly exerted great influence on the direction that both these currents took. Perhaps more than any other factor, his oftentimes baffling political and ideological personality provides the key to many of the events associated with the rise of Ukrainian Nationalism.

Konovalets' was born on June 14, 1891 in Zashkiv, a small village just north of L'viv. His grandfather had been a Uniate priest, while his father was a teacher at the local grade school. The Konovalets', moderately rich and occupying positions of importance within the village, were Zashkiv's leading and probably most nationally conscious family. As was customary for a young man of his social standing, Konovalets' attended Eastern Galicia's most prestigious Ukrainian secondary school, the Academic Gymnasium in L'viv. There, under the influence of Professor Ivan Bobers'kyi, then the head of the Sokil, Konovalets' became an active member of the gymnastic society. After graduating, Konovalets' took to studying law at the University of L'viv and wholeheartedly devoted himself to extracurricular work in the Prosvita. His student activism was also limited to cultural-educational matters, specifically, to the struggle for a Ukrainian university. At the July 1913 student
congress, where Dontsov created a sensation by advocating the annexation of the Eastern Ukraine to Austria, Konovalets' delivered a paper on a more prosaic topic, "The Cause of an Independent Ukrainian University of L'viv."

Konovalets's political views slowly crystallized during his stay at the university, when he joined the liberal, moderately nationalist, and anti-socialist Ukrainian National Democratic Party, generally regarded as the party of Galician intellectuals, officials, and priests. As a member of the party's executive body, the Inner People's Committee, Konovalets' had all the makings of an up-and-coming young politician. Through his work in the party, moreover, he doubtless came to meet Galicia's leading Ukrainian politicians, a fact that worked very much to his advantage in the 1920s.

With the outbreak of the war, Konovalets' was inducted into the Austrian army. His actual service time was short, however, ending in June 1915, when he was captured by the Russians and interned in a POW camp near Tsaritsyn. The rest of the story has already been related. After escaping to Kiev and becoming commander of the Sharpshooters, Konovalets' remained an active participant in the Ukrainian war effort until late 1919, when the Sharpshooter force was interned by the Poles. Although having only an incidental relationship to military matters before 1917, Konovalets' proved himself an outstanding commander. The Colonel, however, always remained what he originally was, a politician, and as such was the vital link connecting the Ukrainian military and political worlds. This fact also explains the Colonel's ability to become so politically influential after the war.

Konovalets' pre-war, essentially cultural, nationalism underwent a profound transformation during the war. Perhaps because of his continual efforts to defend the fledgling Ukrainian governments, the notion of statehood became dominant in his nationalism. But, as Konovalets' learned from the destructive strife between the ZUNR and the UNR, sobornist' was a prerequisite to Ukrainian statehood. For Konovalets', however, sobornist' was just as much a manner of thinking as a political goal. Sobornist' meant understanding
that each Ukrainian, regardless of his regional affiliations, owed his primary loyalty to the Ukrainian state and was obligated to work for the good of that state. Furthermore, sobornist', just like Konovalets's conception of Ukrainian statehood, transcended all, and particularly political, boundaries. As a result, a Ukrainian state need not consist of all Ukrainian ethnic territories in order to be consistent with sobornist'. Most important was that a Ukrainian state, in whichever part of the Ukraine that it arise, consider itself the representative of all Ukrainians and aspire to the eventual unification of all Ukrainian territories. Herein lay the basis of Konovalets's disagreement with Petliura and Petrushevych. The former had formally renounced the Western, while the latter the Eastern, Ukraine. Both, as a result, were guilty of identifying Ukrainian state interests with the interests of their particular region only. Nevertheless, the existence of the two governments-in-exile was an established fact which demanded recognition. Konovalets', as a result, realized that he had to be willing to cooperate with both, without aligning himself with either. Otherwise, he would consign himself to isolation and certain ineffectiveness.

Konovalets's views of sobornist', therefore, may be considered a blend of lofty idealism and common-sense realism. Although the Colonel would not compromise his nationalist ideal, he was crafty enough a politician to realize that only a politics of realism could attain that ideal. And realism primarily meant taking advantage of every available opportunity to advance the Ukrainian cause. The ability to be realistic, however, required sobriety, subtlety, and, above all, sobornist'.

After analyzing the Ukrainian problem in all its dimensions as it appeared in early 1921, Konovalets' reached conclusions similar to those of Petrushevych: "It is necessary to differentiate between the situations of the Eastern Ukraine and of Galicia. The first is par excellence a question of the East, whose final solution depends on the solution of a whole complex of other questions of the East. The second is a question of the liquidation of the old Austria; the Entente States,
however, would like to resolve it completely at the same time that the matter of the East is settled. It is therefore necessary to treat these two problems completely separately.”  

Although appearing to contradict his commitment to sobornist’ by supporting the ZUNR’s international efforts on Galicia’s behalf, Konovalets’ considered cooperation with the ZUNR to be justified as a means of furthering the liberation of at least one part of the soborna Ukraina. An independent Galicia did, after all, appear a distinct possibility and Konovalets’ himself wrote in February 1921 that “Galicia will not be Polish.” Practical cooperation, however, did not mean ideological agreement. As Petrushevych came ever more to emphasize the purely Galician nature of the Galician problem, Konovalets’ replied by intensifying his pan-Ukrainian agitation and founded the Young Galicia group in Vienna. Although “our realistic Ukrainian politics” demanded treating Galicia separately from the Eastern Ukraine, “this does not exclude a rapprochement between wide circles of the public of both sides.”

After the failure of the Piłsudski-Petliura offensive, Konovalets’ shaped his attitude towards the UNR government according to the same criterion he applied to the ZUNR: could it be helpful in furthering the Ukrainian cause? With Poland weak and the Entente showing a desire to stabilize its relations with Russia, Konovalets’ realized that an “orientation on Poland, any kind of hopes for its help in our liberation struggle, is absurd.” On its own, however, the UNR could do virtually nothing to influence events in the Ukraine. As a result, Konovalets’ condemned schemes of military intervention in general and the AUNR’s Second Winter Campaign of late 1921 in particular, because they “not only exposed the active participants to terrible dangers, but also brought no real benefits to the Ukrainian population, and, moreover, evoked savage persecution from the Bolsheviks.” In view of the UNR’s (and ZUNR’s) limited political usefulness, therefore, the only solution to the Ukrainian problem — whether in the Eastern Ukraine or in Galicia — ultimately had to lie in the
Ukraine itself, in the Ukrainian masses. Thus, Konovalets' concluded, it was necessary to go to the nation, as the soldiers at the Prague military congress were exhorted to do, mobilize it, and eventually lead it to victory.

Konovalets's fellow Sharpshooter officers also believed that the struggle for Ukrainian statehood was impossible in the emigration and had to take place in the Ukraine, if only because the emigres stubbornly resisted all their efforts to unite them. What is more, conditions in the Soviet Ukraine were highly unstable and could perhaps be exploited. Even more encouraging was Galicia, where opposition to the Poles was acquiring mass proportions as a result of unconcealed Polish chauvinism and the unemployment, land hunger, and overall socio-economic dislocation exacerbated and produced by the war. The peasantry was especially active, staging numerous local uprisings just as often for national as for social reasons. More important, however, was the destabilizing presence in the province of thousands of demobilized soldiers — generally Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooter or Galician Army veterans loyal to Petrushevych but with an enormous esteem for Konovalets's heroics, who continued their struggle against the hated Poles by means of individual acts of resistance. Realizing that the soldiers were of potentially great significance to the outcome of the Galician question, Konovalets' and his fellow officers resolved to organize them into a coherent force that would exert military and political pressure on the occupying Poles, involve the masses in the revolutionary struggle, and in this manner instill them with the sense of sobornist' and the desire for national independence so necessary to final victory. In short, the intended military organization would continue the armed struggle and revolutionize the nation.
CHAPTER 9

THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The following account of the birth and growth of the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrains'ka Viis'kova Orhanizatsiia — UVO) is necessarily fragmentary and to some degree conjectural. Although individual facts are known, their interrelationships are not immediately visible and have to be adduced by analyzing the given data in relation to the overall Galician and emigre reality and then drawing what appear to be the most likely conclusions. What follows, therefore, is a history of the UVO that is logical, likely, and coherent, but which cannot pretend to describe completely "how it really was."

"In July 1920," wrote Konovalets' in an article in 1929, "we held the last meeting of the Sharpshooters' Council in Prague, at which, after ascertaining the uselessness and aimlessness of further remaining abroad, we decided to exhort all Sich Sharpshooters to return to Galicia. After this meeting of the Sharpshooters' Council, the Sich Sharpshooter Organization in fact ceased to exist. The Sich Sharpshooter officers who were abroad for the most part parted ways — some to the Eastern Ukraine, others to Galicia. There they became the same kind of citizens as all others. Each of them joined that group or party, which best corresponded to his personal convictions."183

Although the above quotation is generally thought to imply that the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) was founded
at this meeting, Konovalets' himself clearly provides no evidence to support this contention. In fact, the Colonel does not even say that the Sharpshooter organization was officially dissolved, but only that it "in fact ceased to exist" — a statement that could easily have been made with the benefit of hindsight. Likewise, the occasionally aired hypothesis that Konovalets' declined to mention the UVO's founding out of reasons of conspiracy does not hold in view of the year (1929) when this passage was written. Far more plausible, and painfully obvious, is the simple conclusion that the UVO was not founded at this meeting. At the most, the creation of such an organization might have been discussed by the Sharpshooter officers. This discussion was apparently continued and expanded to include other emigre soldiers at the Prague military congress in early August, which also called on Ukrainian soldiers to return to the Ukraine and proposed that a "central ideological leadership" of all military organizations be created. It was probably only after the congress that the Sharpshooter officers parted ways: Ivan Andrukh left for the Eastern Ukraine, while Iaroslav Chyzh, Mykhailo Matchak, Vasyl' Kuchabs'kyi, and others returned to Galicia. Konovalets', meanwhile, went to Vienna, where Andrii Mel'nyk was serving as the UNR's military attaché.

Before parting, and obviously in conjunction with the above two meetings, the officers apparently decided that a military organization coordinating the activities of Galician veterans was desirable. They must have realized, however, that their efforts to organize the soldiers without Petrushevych's approval would be as fruitless as their misadventure with the Ukrainian Brigade. Konovalets' reason for travelling to Vienna, therefore, probably was to discuss the matter with Petrushevych. But in order to gain the Dictator's support for his plans, the Colonel had to overcome the Galicians' mistrust of the Sharpshooters. Consequently, Konovalets' must have promised Petrushevych that the military organization would neither be under predominantly Sharpshooter control, nor aspire to an independent military or political role that could undermine the ZUNR's authority. In any case, these presumed
talks appear to have resulted in a "certain rapprochement between the two sides." 184

In early September, meanwhile, Chyzh and Matchak took to forming an executive body for the military organization and persuaded the former Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooter and member of the Radical Party, Osyp Navrots'kyi, the Galician Army veteran and member of the People's Labor Party, Iurii Polians'kyi, and the judge and member of the Labor Party, Volodymyr Tselevych, to join them in the Supreme Collegium (Nachal'na Kolehiia) of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO). Significantly, not only were the Sharpshooters Chyzh and Matchak a minority in the Collegium, but the non-Sharpshooter Navrots'kyi became its head. What is more, the choice (certainly not accidental) of three highly respected members of precisely those Galician parties that supported Petrushevych reveals the degree to which the UVO was bound to the ZUNR and to the Galician parties. And indeed, not only did the UVO maintain close ties to all the parties, the ZUNR Delegation in L'viv, and the Interparty Council, but the latter body also provided it with funds. 185

The initiative for a military organization, however, did not come exclusively from the Sharpshooters. Sometime in 1920 in Czechoslovakia, several officers from the 6th UHA Brigade, among them Omelian Senyk and Iulian Holovins'kyi, met a number of times to discuss plans for continuing the "underground struggle." 186 Whether they actually formed an organization is unknown, although it is probable, in view of Senyk's and Holovins'kyi's later active involvement in the UVO, that their group was absorbed into the UVO after Konovalets's rapprochement with Petrushevych in late 1920. A similar initiative came from UHA officers interned in the camp at Josefov, who founded the Fighting Organization of Galicia (Boioua Orhanizatsiia Halychyny) in the fall of 1920. Soon thereafter, its headquarters were moved to Prague and several months later the entire organization was transformed into the UVO Representation in Czechoslovakia (Ekspozytura UVO v ČSR). The ZUNR's military attaché in Prague, Lieutenant Ivan Rudnyts'kyi, held the dominant position in the Representation. 187
In general, UHA veterans in Czechoslovakia provided the Galician UVO with many vital services. Guns and explosives, for example, were smuggled into the krai by means of the Carpathians. The Josefov camp served as a convenient hiding place for UVO cadres, as a training site for new members, and as a repository for military materiel. The UVO Representation in Prague, meanwhile, had close contacts to Czech government officials, looked after the legal needs of UVO activists who had fled from Galicia, and maintained an illegal crossing point to Poland at Teschen.¹⁸⁸

Konovalets's role in the new organization was that of its foreign representative. Although it is usually claimed that he was from the very first intended as the head of the UVO (but being in emigration did not immediately occupy the position), this seems highly unlikely in view of what would have been Petrushevych's strong opposition to seeing so powerful a rival in charge of the organization.¹⁸⁹ In any case, Konovalets' remained in close contact with the krai organization. However, in so doing, he appears to have bypassed Navrots'kyi, Polians'kyi, and Tselevych and instead corresponded primarily with his Sharpshooter colleagues, whom he addressed in his letters as "members of the Sharpshooters' Council."¹⁹⁰ What emerges is a picture which suggests that Konovalets' and his colleagues still thought of themselves as Sharpshooters, as an organization within an organization, and that a Konovalets'-Petrushevych power struggle had been brewing since the UVO's founding.

Not too surprisingly, the Colonel's Sharpshooter supporters in the UVO were encountering considerable difficulties in gaining acceptance from the mistrustful Galicians. Kuchab's'kyi and Chyzh complained that "after returning to the krai, we disappeared from the horizon and fell to the bottom of public life. Relying only on our own abilities and experience, having neither funds nor friends, finding in Galicia a negative attitude towards us that was imported from the emigration, we began our public work, at times fighting great material poverty."¹⁹¹ Some Sharpshooters were even beginning to voice doubts about the need for the UVO's continued existence. In February
1921, Konovalets' himself noted the "ever greater decline of our organization," the "ever more visible loss . . . of the awareness of belonging to our organization," and the "non-execution of tasks and duties." Even the Colonel was having second thoughts about taking upon himself the "role of leader of such an organization" or about remaining its representative.\textsuperscript{192}

In addition, serious strains had also appeared in Konovalets's as it is tenuous relations with Petrushevych. Their growing difference of opinion regarding Galician "particularism" and the subsequent formation of the Young Galicia group touched off another anti-Sharpshooter campaign. Probably feeling himself at a disadvantage in Vienna anyway, the Colonel decided to return to L'viv in order to revive the ailing organization and use it as a base for the advancement of Young Galicia's ideas of independence, sobornist', and mass involvement. Although Konovalets' was politically constricted from turning his back completely on Petrushevych, he was determined to pursue his own plans to the extent possible. This meant paying lip service to the ZUNR on the one hand, while giving the UVO a more independent political role to play in Galicia on the other.

His colleagues, Matchak, Chyzh, and Kuchabs'kyi, had already taken some steps in this direction, playing a particularly prominent role in the Galician student movement. Chyzh was head of the Ukrainian Student Union, while Matchak headed the Academic Aid organization (\textit{Akademichna Pomich}). All three attended the July 1921 student congress, where Kuchabs'kyi delivered a speech in which he argued that a "national state is absolutely essential to the healthy development of the nation." After all, continued Kuchabs'kyi, Woodrow Wilson's right to self-determination had been shown to have little practical worth, because the "question of life is a question of force and only force." Instead, Wilson's theory made self-determination into an "exactly defined fact", when it was really a process. As a result, "struggle and only struggle" is the "method of every process of self-determination." This process, however, as an expression of national energy and will, had to involve the entire nation. Therefore, mass struggle,
when the "whole population without exception applies all its strength, all its energy to attaining victory," was necessary. In time, when the nation had proven its readiness, mass struggle would turn into armed struggle, the "organic conclusion of the whole complex of national work, of the whole process of national self-determination." At the head of this process were to be individuals who "feel an insuperable striving for a national state." They were to "break the passivity of the public" by "transferring national work from the path of occasional explosions of enthusiasm onto the path of steadfast struggle." But before this could be done, the masses had to stop "hoping for outside help", rely only on their own forces, and comprehend the "goals of their own statehood" and the counterproductivity of individual outbursts of opposition.

Kuchabs'kyi's emphasis on the importance of the masses to the national-liberation struggle flew directly in the face of Petrushevych's efforts to gain Galician statehood by means of government action alone. His theory not only was theoretically dangerous to the ZUNR, but also threatened to undermine the exile government's authority in Galicia — precisely what Petrushevych feared most from Konovalets' — by isolating the ZUNR from the Ukrainian population.

Upon arriving in Galicia on July 20, 1921, Konovalets' immediately took charge of the organization and began an intensive drive to expand its network beyond L'viv. The Supreme Collegium was replaced with a Supreme Command (Nachal'na Komanda) and Konovalets' became Supreme Commander. Apparently feeling itself strong enough to play a more active role in Galician affairs, the UVO finally terminated its year of inactivity in late 1921. On September 25, Stepan Fedak, the Colonel's future brother-in-law, committed the UVO's first act of terror, when he attempted to shoot the visiting Piłsudski but instead wounded the L'viv wojewoda, Stanisław Grabowski; and in November, the UVO joined the Galician parties in organizing a boycott of the Polish census.

Several months later, in the late spring of 1922, the UVO launched a province-wide "sabotage action" of arson against the property of Polish landowners and colonists. The action
had the twofold goal of serving as a protest against the Polish colonization (and more generally, occupation) of Galicia and as a prelude to the intended boycott of the Polish parliamentary elections of November 1922. Seeing active opposition to the Poles, the Ukrainian masses were supposed to radicalize and break out of their passivity. The “sabotage action” succeeded too well, however, eventually went out of control, and soon approached the scale of an uprising. The Polish authorities thereupon increased their repressive measures and the situation turned clearly counterproductive for the Ukrainian side. The head of the ZUNR Delegation in L'viv, who also represented the established Ukrainian economic interests, persuaded Konovalets' to call a halt to the campaign. The Colonel readily agreed, being aware that an uprising would end disastrously for the Ukrainians.194

Another act of protest against the elections was registered on October 15, when three UVO cadres assassinated the Ukrainian writer Sydir Tverdokhlib for actively advocating Ukrainian-Polish cooperation through his tiny, government-subsidized Ukrainian Agrarian Party (Ukrains'ka Khliborobs'ka Partiiia). Tverdokhlib, derisively labeled a khrun', was the first Ukrainian “collaborator” to fall victim to the UVO. His assassination was also a sign of the radicalization that the UVO was undergoing. In their turn to Nationalism, many UVO cadres came to divide Ukrainians into friends and enemies of their movement and, by extension, of the Ukrainian people.

The aftermath of the Tverdokhlib affair proved disastrous for the overextended UVO. Already weakened by the arrests that followed Fedak's assassination attempt one year earlier, the UVO now received an almost lethal blow from the police. Although most of the members of the Supreme Command managed to avoid arrest, many of the organization's middle- and lower-level cadres did not. In order to rebuild the shattered organization, the Command went underground, while Konovalets' left the province with the probable intention of clarifying his relations with Petrushevych.

Although the UVO enjoyed the ZUNR's support and was
formally subject to the exile government's authority, relations between Petrushevych and Konovalets' steadily worsened from the time of their initial rapprochement and reached their nadir during the Colonel's stay in Galicia. The reasons were twofold: not only did Konovalets' appear to be molding the UVO into his private army, but — worse still — he also began acting like the politician that he was. Using the greatly expanded krai UVO as his power base, the Colonel reestablished old political acquaintances in Galicia and plunged headlong into the province's political life, even joining the Publishing League of Dilo and a nationalist (probably anti-Petrushevych) student grouping called Young Ukraine (Moloda Ukraina). Most upsetting for Petrushevych, Konovalets' was using the UVO to propagate Young Galicia's ideology as well as the idea, first advanced by the 1921 student congress "accidentally" attended by Chyzh, Matchak, and Kuchabs'kyi, of a secret Ukrainian-Galician government (with the UVO as its underground army, of course).

Particularly illustrative of Konovalets's independent behavior was his close association with Dmytro Dontsov. Although it is unclear whether the Colonel shared Dontsov's feelings about Galicia, he realized that the journalist's ideological and political convictions made him a valuable ally who could do much to help set Galicia on the path of sobornist' and Nationalism. Konovalets' and his UVO friends thereupon collected enough capital and revived the Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk (Literary-Scientific Herald) in May 1922, insisting that Dontsov become editor-in-chief. Interestingly, the first issues of the Vistnyk disappointed Konovalets', who complained that they lacked a "clear profile" and propagated khlopomanstvo (a reference to the mid-19th century "peasant lover" movement in the Right-Bank Ukraine). Why Konovalets' should have criticized Dontsov's infatuation with the peasantry is not clear. Conceivably, he may have found fault with the fact that it was only an infatuation and did not offer any suggestions for concrete political actions. In any case, their ideological differences were apparently still small enough to allow Konovalets' and Dontsov to meet with Dmytro Paliiv
and Ostap Luts'kyi to discuss the idea of forming a distinctly Nationalist party.¹⁹⁹

Konovalets' again made use of Dontsov's talents in early 1923, when the two joined forces and began publishing the journal Zahraua (The Glow). The UVO supplied the financial backing, while Dontsov assumed the position of editor-in-chief.²⁰⁰ Although the first issue may have been intentionally timed to appear on April 1, two weeks after the Ambassadors' decision, Zahraua more likely represented the culmination of several months' cooperation between Konovalets' and Dontsov, being intended as the mouthpiece of the Nationalist forces in the UVO and as part of Konovalets's strategy of popularizing the political positions which he believed the UVO in particular and the Ukrainian liberation movement in general had to represent. A certain Teodor Martynets' was appointed managing editor. Iurii Tiutiunnyk, who had led the UNR's Second Winter Campaign and who emigrated to the UkSSR in late 1923, a mysterious "O.V.", Dmytro Paliiv, and Volodymyr Kuz'movych were frequent contributors and probably members of the editorial board (Volodymyr Kuchabs'kyi and Mykhailo Matchak are said to have been on the board as well).²⁰¹ Other prominent UVO members, among them Iurii Polians'kyi, Ievhen Zyblikevych, and Volodymyr Bemko, were among the small number of Ukrainians (including Viktor Andriievs'kyi of Soborna Ukraina) contributing to the Zahraua Press Fund.²⁰² To what extent did Zahraua simply reflect the UVO's (and Konovalets's) positions and to what extent was it an organ of, and perhaps even controlled by, the military organization cannot be determined, although the first possibility appears more likely in view of Dontsov's intractable personality. Clear enough, however, is the UVO's heavy involvement in the journal.

Understandably, the journal bore the stamp of Dontsov's ideas. Even more than Dontsov himself was wont to do, however, Zahraua placed the Ukrainian peasantry at the very center of its ideology. In an article appearing in July 1923 which almost rhetorically asked the question "Are We Fascists?", Zahraua's editors underlined their absolute commitment to
peasant politics: "Our state must be peasant. When we place political above social liberation, then it is precisely because this state cannot be other than peasant.... It is not true that we reject the principles of democracy. These principles are "All for the people" and that means for its vast majority — the peasantry."203 Dontsov, meanwhile, even recommended that the Ukrainian peasantry form its own party and "strive to acquire political power."204

The above article on Fascism had appeared in response to charges that the Zahrava group (hrupa Zahravy) advocated a Ukrainian fascism. True, the Zahravites, admitted, they were indeed different from other Ukrainian parties because of "this activism, this desire to impose one's own thoughts, ideals, and methods on the broad masses, and this class and national egoism we want to introduce to peasant politics... and to our relationships with other nations as well as with our own masses and the existing status quo."205 But, the journal claimed, "because we stand not on an international but on a national platform, just like fascism, we cannot be fascists." Probably aware that this logic was not too convincing, the author of the article conceded that if the ideas propagated by Zahrava were the "program of fascism, then, according to me, we are fascists!"206 In another article, meanwhile, O.V. — a particularly virulent, but always nameless, Nationalist, who admired Maurice Barrès, contributed to the Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, and who may very well have been Dmytro Dontsov writing anonymously, wrote: "The political program is nothing, action is everything.... the 'mob' instinctively senses the path that is shown it and the resolute will leading it down this path, about which it has long since dreamed. To infect one's audience with this will is all that is necessary."207 Nevertheless, in spite of the Zahrava group's flirtations with Fascism, its overwhelming concern for the peasantry places it — as later events were convincingly to bear out — more in the tradition of Eastern European nationalist peasant parties and less in that of fascist movements.

Hoping to win the support of the Ukrainian peasant masses, the Zahrava group expanded its horizons and began
publishing an “illustrated political-economic newspaper”, *Novyi Chas* (The New Times), on October 15, 1923. The UVO activist, Dmytro Paliiv, was appointed editor of the new UVO-funded publication. As with *Zahrava*, Konovalets’ probably hoped that the newspaper would strengthen his position in Galicia vis-a-vis Petrushevych.*

The *Zahrava* group’s own plans for political action began to crystallize in 1924 and assumed concrete form on April 4 at a congress which brought to life the Ukrainian Party of National Work (*Ukrains’ka Partiia Natsional’noi Roboty* — UPNR). The reasons given for creating this new political formation were the split in the Ukrainian People’s Labor Party, the “shaky ideological base of the Radicals”, and the Communists’ dependence on a “force that is hostile to the nation.” In other words, the Zahravites perceived a political vacuum which they thought could best be filled by a new party. The executive committee of the UPNR Central Committee consisted of Ostap Luts’kyi, Dmytro Paliiv, Samiilo Pidhirs’kyi, Kyrylo Troian, and Iulian Sheparovych. Plans for eleven district executive committees with seats in L’viv, Peremyshl’, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Kolomyia, Dubno, Luts’k, Kovel’, Berest’, Pins’k, and Ternopil’ revealed the scope of the UPNR’s ambitions.*

Most important, the new party drew up a program, which reaffirmed the group’s peasant-oriented and Nationalist worldview:

1) The party’s goal is to group together and organize people from various strata of the nation who would be a) conscious of the political and social aspirations of the Ukrainian nation and b) united by discipline, and who realize them [the aspirations] with common means. . . .

5) The party’s socio-economic goal is to bring about the elimination of that abnormal state, whereby the nation is reduced to the level of one (the agrarian) stratum economically dependent on the foreign city and capital. That is why the party strives for the domination of the economy by the Ukrainian element, and with this goal in mind desires that: a) the entire land fund of the country be at the legal and actual disposal of the Ukrainian peasant masses and that all
trade and industrial capital of the Ukraine pass into national hands; b) [the party] will especially aspire to create conditions for intensification of the peasant economy and its production.

6) In its economic policy the party stands on the position of private initiative and responsibility, insofar as they do not come in conflict with the general good of the nation. The interests of each economic group must be subordinated to the interests of the nation and of economic progress. In stating the fact that the Ukrainian nation is primarily a peasant nation, the party stands on the position that the interests of the Nation are in the first place the interests of the Ukrainian peasantry.

7) Considering nationally conscious workers to be a valuable socio-economic stratum and an active factor in the building of a state, the party will defend the workers from economic, social, and political exploitation by capital. That is why we acknowledge the workers’ right to free coalitions and to group in corporations for the defense of their economic and social gains within the bounds of broad, work-protective legislation, that contributes creatively to the state.

8) With respect to culture, the party considers it imperative to raise the cultural level of the broad popular [illegible]... of the family, of national traditions, [and] the personal and corporative dignity and the free self-activity of individual strata and groups in the nation. With respect to church-religious matters, the party stands for complete freedom of conscience and religion.

9) Considering that all cosmopolitan slogans contradict the eternal law of international struggle and are either a utopia or a cover-up for the imperialistic plans of temporarily stronger nations, the party rejects all international doctrines.²¹⁰

Significantly, the UPNR program was the first “programmatic” statement of Ukrainian Nationalist intentions and as such marked an important watershed in the development of Ukrainian Nationalism. As will shortly become evident, all its tenets were to be expressed in more developed form in “mature” Nationalist writings. Unlike the later Nationalists, however, the UPNR had a very vague
notion of the role of the state in the future society. In fact, except for two minor references in Point 7, the state completely escaped the UPNR’s attention. The later Nationalists, on the other hand, gave the state an extremely important active role to play in their socio-economic, political, and ideological schemes. In this respect, the UPNR, like Dontsov, was “purer” in its Nationalism than the organized Nationalists. By the same token, the UPNR, again like Dontsov, was specific in its principles but very vague in its practical suggestions.

Although Zahraava appears to have ceased publication in 1924, the Party of National Work continued in existence until July 11, 1925, when it joined the Budzynovs’kyi and Dilo factions of the former Ukrainian People’s Labor Party in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO). The UPNR’s offer of cooperation, made in the summer of 1924, was severely criticized by the former Zahravite, O.V., who chided the party for not taking the road of “party exclusiveness and self-sufficiency” (Dontsov’s favorite themes). 211

Dontsov, in the meantime, had progressively loosened his ties to the Zahravites to the point where he actually left or, as he later put it, “betrayed” the group. 212 He remained editor until June 1923, when he was replaced by an “editorial collegium.” His articles continued to appear until December 1923 (and those of O.V. until January 1924), after which time Dontsov’s name is inexplicably absent from the pages of the journal. His leaving the journal clearly took place between then and — at the latest — the UPNR’s announcement of its readiness to cooperate with other political groups. In any case, that Dontsov was neither on the party’s executive committee, nor a member implies that his decision to leave Zahraava was related to the Zahraava group’s plans to found a party and therefore probably occurred at the time he stopped contributing to the journal. Why Dontsov, who had earlier proposed that the peasantry found its own party, should have been opposed to the Zahravites’ intentions is not immediately clear. Considering the degree to which the party’s program reflected Dontsov’s own ideas, his reasons to leave Zahraava and not join the UPNR probably had to do with the belief that
the Zahrava group was not being true to the principles of "pure national egoism", hatred for compromise, firmness, and clarity which he had expressed in the journal's first editorial.\textsuperscript{213} Perhaps the very fact of wanting to found a party of Nationalists (and not simply of peasants) was a contradiction in terms in Dontsov's eyes — a not inconceivable conjecture, given his conviction that not "phrases" or programs, but people "who knew what they wanted" were necessary. Or, as O.V. put it, "the political program is nothing, action is everything."

Whatever the publicist's precise reasons for leaving Zahrava, his move meant a break with Konovalets'. While the Colonel searched for and found allies among Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians of almost all political persuasions, Dontsov was evolving towards positions of ever greater ideological and political purity. Their basis for cooperation was clearly eroding, leaving Dontsov no alternative but to retreat into his stronghold, the Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, and there proclaim himself the ideologue of Ukrainian Nationalism.

Unfortunately, Konovalets's attitude towards the UPNR can be guessed at only. Zahrava's discontinuation suggests that it (or the UPNR) fell into disfavor with the Colonel, who may then have decided to cut off its funding. Perhaps Konovalets' considered the UPNR's declared willingness to cooperate with the legal parties to be a form of uhodovstvo which was incompatible with the UVO's revolutionary aims. On the other hand, why should the level-headed Konovalets', who was not averse to working with almost all political groups, including the ZUNR and the UNDO, have turned his back on a journal and party, whose ideology and personal composition could not but have appealed to him? Were the latter case to be true, Zahrava may have ceased coming out from a simple lack of funds — a not unlikely possibility given the severe crisis in the UVO in 1923-1924 and its perpetual financial difficulties. And as to the UPNR, the Colonel may very well have supported its merger in the UNDO as a way of infiltrating the legal sector with his own allies.
In early 1923, an important UVO conference, held near Danzig, temporarily resolved the Petrushevych-Konovalets' power struggle in the Colonel's favor. Konovalets' was reaffirmed in his position as Supreme Commander, the Supreme Command was officially transferred to the emigration, and a Krai Command, with Andrii Mel'nyk as krai commander, was formally established in Galicia. Both commands were instructed to rebuild the shattered military organization in their respective sectors. Mel'nyk thereupon drove the organization underground and proceeded slowly to rebuild its base through strictly conspiratorial methods. Konovalets', meanwhile, expanded the UVO's contacts abroad and promoted its international standing. Related to both was the enlargement and activization of the intelligence sector. Intelligence gathering, logically, best suited the weak capabilities of the krai organization; at the same time, it could prove useful in establishing ties to foreign centers.

The Ambassadors' decision of March 15 soon followed the Danzig conference. Petrushevych's politics were proven bankrupt, the Galicians became demoralized and gave up their resistance, the Interparty Council (and with it a source of the UVO's funds) collapsed, and the UVO was again plunged into a serious crisis. Seeing continued armed resistance as useless in the face of the harsh reality, many veterans left the UVO, thereby reducing the organization to a highly conspiratorial group of Konovalets's and Petrushevych's most loyal followers. Moreover, with the collapse of its political base, the UVO suddenly found itself adrift and with no clear idea of where it stood in relation to the new political reality. As a result, a Political Collegium (Politychna Kolehiia), consisting of the krai commander and of several chosen advisors, was created so as to increase and define the UVO's political range — a move which clearly worked to Konovalets's and not to Petrushevych's favor.

Petrushevych, in the meantime, almost immediately turned to the Soviets. In negotiations held in Copenhagen, the Soviet plenipotentiary to Germany, Krestinskii, agreed to Pet-
rushevych's offer of cooperation on the condition that Konovalets' be removed from his position as Supreme Commander and the UVO be placed at the Soviets' disposal. Petrushevych agreed to the terms and began to rally the anti-Konovalets' forces in the UVO. His efforts to gain the upper hand were indeed successful and in the fall of 1923 Konovalets' left his post.215

Petrushevych had already tried to have Konovalets' removed from the UVO one year earlier, in mid-1922. After two officers sent to organize a putsch went over to his rival's side, the Dictator resolved to have Konovalets' killed. Ironically, Iulian Holovins'kyi, later one of the Colonel's most devoted supporters, was chosen as the assassin. After meeting the persuasive Colonel, however, he too changed sides.216

In view of the importance assigned by Konovalets' to the UVO, it is highly unlikely that he left the Supreme Command with the intention of permanently abandoning the organization. Isolated in the emigration, confronted with a powerful pro-Petrushevych emigre opposition, and lacking an equally large power base in Galicia, Konovalets' probably decided to leave the scene of battle and quietly reorganize his forces. While his friend, Mel'nyk, worked on rebuilding the aparat in Galicia, Konovalets' sought support for "his" UVO among Poland's enemies, in particular, Germany and Lithuania.

The krai UVO, meanwhile, lacking funds and cadres, seemed to have disappeared from the public eye. What its relationship to Konovalets' and Petrushevych was is unclear, although it is very likely that Mel'nyk kept in close contact and coordinated his activity with the Colonel. Only the low-profile and inexpensive intelligence-gathering sector, headed by the former Sharpshooter Osyp Dumin, testified to the UVO's existence. Its military intelligence figured prominently in Konovalets's contacts with the Reichswehr and the Abwehr and was usually exchanged for German financial and political support.217

In early 1924, however, the intelligence sector and with it the whole krai UVO were dealt a shattering blow. In a series of arrests spanning February to April, a large number of leading
UVO cadres, among them Mel'nyk, were arrested on charges of spying. Setting off the wave was the arrest of Ol'ha Basarab, an UVO courier with close organizational ties to Dumin, whose suspicious death in mid-February made her a national martyr and further inflamed Ukrainian hatred of Poles.

Soon thereafter, Iaroslav Indyshevs'kyi, a Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooter as yet unknown to the police, came to L'viv from Prague and assumed the position of krai commander, while Konovalets' somehow reestablished himself as supreme commander in June. Indyshevs'kyi, who envisioned a greater political role for the UVO and who eventually appears to have been willing to enlist Soviet support for the organization, from the very first faced the opposition of Iulian Holovins'kyi and Omelian Senyk, who believed in activating the UVO's military/terroristic capabilities. In mid-1926, the two finally succeeded in forcing Indyshevs'kyi to leave his post and return to Prague, whereupon Holovins'kyi became commander. It was perhaps at the time of Indyshevs'kyi's stay in power that the Soviets made several unsuccessful offers of cooperation to the UVO.218

With the organization somewhat stabilized after Konovalets's return to power and Indyshevs'kyi's appointment as krai commander, Holovins'kyi and Senyk renewed the UVO's terrorist activity and on September 5, 1924 organized an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Polish President, Stanisław Wojciechowski. Interestingly, after a Galician Jew was falsely arrested and his trial developed into a Polish version of the Dreyfus affair, the UVO released the following communique: "... we are sorry that the UVO action unintentionally brought serious harm to a completely innocent person of Jewish nationality and became a reason for a renewed attack by the Polish side on the Zionist party and the Jewish community."219

As a result of the UVO's almost perpetual state of crisis, however, its ranks had thinned out to such an extent that the application of Konovalets's and Kuchabs'kyi's "mass involvement" theories had become a practical impossibility. Holovins'kyi, who, ironically, was the owner of a bus company,
therefore changed tactics and created the Flying Brigade (*Letiucha bryhada*), a small, mobile group of reliable cadres assigned with committing acts of terror throughout Galicia. That such a group was at all considered necessary testifies to the virtual extinction of the UVO at the middle and lower organizational levels and is an indication of the UVO's weakness and not of its strength. The Brigade's primary targets were mail trucks and post offices, which not only were symbols of the Polish occupation but also served as a source of sorely-needed funds. (The UVO, of course, was familiar with Piłsudski's exploits.) Moreover, the Brigade's raids were intended as spectacular reminders to the Ukrainian population and perhaps also, as Dumin claims, to the Germans, that the UVO, although invisible, was still busy at work.\(^{220}\)

Although frequently decimated by arrests — thereby revealing the same kind of conspiratorial amateurism that plagued the entire UVO, the Brigade managed to last until October 1926, when Holovins'kyi himself was arrested after the UVO's assassination of the L'viv school superintendent, Stanisław Sobinski.

Konovalets's major problem, however, remained the still incompletely resolved conflict with Petrushevych. A conference, held in January 1925 in Uzhhorod in Transcarpathia, resulted in the final parting of ways. Petrushevych's followers were forced to leave the UVO and soon thereafter founded a rival organization, the Western Ukrainian National Revolutionary Organization (*Zakhidno-Ukrains'ka Natsional'no-Revoliutsiina Orhanizatsiia* — ZUNRO).\(^{221}\) Although quite strong in the Kolomyia and Sniatyn powiaty of Stanyslaviv województwo, the ZUNRO was incapable of offering the UVO serious competition and survived only until 1928-1929, thanks to the increasing unpopularity of its Soviet orientation. The ZUNRO's underground organ, *Ukrains'kyi Revoliutsioner* (The Ukrainian Revolutionary), first appeared in 1926 and advocated the unification of the "Ukrainian people of the Western Ukrainian lands" with the "whole Ukrainian people in one, great, United Ukrainian State from the Carpathians to the Caucasus."\(^{222}\)
The Colonel’s troubles with Petrushevych’s followers, however, were not yet ended. Osyp Dumin, who had left Galicia for Berlin after the arrests of 1924, organized another pro-Petrushevych opposition among the emigres in 1924-1925. Although personal rivalries may have also played some role, Dumin’s loyalty to Petrushevych appears to have led him to plot Konovalets’s overthrow. His plans failed, however, as most of the UVO’s leading cadres rallied to the Colonel. Dumin was then purged from the military organization in March 1926.223

Following his ejection from the UVO, Dumin wrote a lengthy denunciation of Konovalets’ for the German Abwehr. Possessing close ties to German intelligence circles through his involvement in the UVO’s own intelligence sector, Dumin probably wrote the denunciation in the hope of ruining what he knew was a very important connection for Konovalets’ and his UVO. Although unreliable as a source of information about the infighting within the UVO, the document does point out the degree to which the Konovalets’ faction was dependent on the Germans.224

Berlin and Danzig had become major centers of UVO activity by the mid-1920s. The Foreign Delegation of the Military Organization (Zakordonna Delehatssia Viis’kovoi Orhanizatsii — ZADVOR), in Berlin since the early 1920s, and the Union of Ukrainian Officers in Germany, founded in 1921, promoted the UVO’s interests in German military circles.225 Riko Jary, one of the Colonel’s most trusted lieutenants, had established ties to the Reichswehr as well as to A. Rosenberg, H. Goering, and E. Roehm in 1921.226 Born to well-established German colonists in Galicia, Jary served as a cavalry officer in the UHA, took sides with the Konovalets’ faction in the UVO, and later became chief of the UVO’s intelligence sector and its Berlin representative to the Germans. Perhaps most indicative of Germany’s importance to the UVO, Konovalets’ himself established residence in the Berlin area after leaving Galicia.

Danzig, meanwhile, thanks to its position as a bridge between Poland and Germany, served as a transit point for weapons and couriers and as a meeting place for the UVO’s
leaders since 1921. The UVO Representation in the city developed close ties to anti-Polish German circles, including the head of the paramilitary Heimatdienst, the Danzig chief of police, and the city president.\textsuperscript{227}

In 1924, several Berlin-based Ukrainians, Germans, and Lithuanians joined efforts to publish a journal with an obviously anti-Polish slant, innocently entitled Osteuropaische Korrespondenz (Eastern European Correspondence). Although controlled by the UVO, the journal also enjoyed the support of prominent Galician politicians, Lithuanian government leaders, and German individuals (including Paul Rohrbach and Axel Schmidt) and organizations with revisionist pretensions to Poland's western boundary. The editors-in-chief were first Vasyl' Kuchabs'kyi and then Zenon Kuzelia, a Ukrainian scholar who sympathized with the UVO. Funds for the journal were supplied by the UVO and the press section of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{228}

The UVO also used Germany as a convenient site for training \textit{krai} UVO cadres. At least four such training courses concerned with military and intelligence matters took place with the cooperation of German military and intelligence circles: in Munich in 1922-1923, in Preusisch-Holland in 1924-1925, in Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1926, and near Berlin in 1927. The UVO also ran an officers' school in Danzig in 1925-26 and a training course in eastern Slovakia in 1927, probably with the knowledge of the respective authorities.\textsuperscript{229}

The high point in the UVO's relations with the Germans occurred in 1926 when the Supreme Command set up headquarters in Berlin and began publishing the official UVO organ, \textit{Surma} (The Trumpet), in January 1927 in response to the pro-Petrushevych Ukrains'kyi Revoliutsioner. Possibly, the UVO's increased contacts to the Germans were stimulated by the Locarno Conference's unwitting confirmation of the identity of German and Ukrainian interests with regard to Poland. In 1928, however, \textit{Surma} was moved to Kaunas in order to downplay the UVO's close ties to Berlin. The move appeared necessary in view of the fact that the UVO's many enemies, and particularly Poland, were exploiting its German
connection as proof that the organization was on Germany’s payroll and little more than an instrument of German foreign policy. A sensational trial, held in Cracow in late 1927, at which a certain Volodymyra Pipchyns’ka and 30 other UVO members were convicted for spying, lent credence to these accusations.230

Not surprisingly, the UVO also had ties to Lithuania since 1925, when its intelligence was first traded for Lithuanian funds.231 As both sides came to realize the mutual benefits of close cooperation, the contacts between the two greatly expanded. Relations became particularly warm after Augustinas Voldemaras and Antanas Smetona overthrew the democratic government with the help of the Nationalist Union and the military. An UVO representative was thereupon sent to Kaunas, an UVO front, the Ukrainian-Lithuanian Society (Ukrains‘ko-Lytovs’ke Tovarystvo), was established, and the UVO itself entered into close relations with the Union for the Liberation of Vilnius. The Lithuanians, in turn, not only increased their financial subsidies, but also granted UVO cadres Lithuanian passports and political asylum. In May 1928, Konovalets’ and Volodymyr Martynets’ even travelled to Kaunas as the official guests of the Lithuanian government in order to take part in the festivities surrounding the 10th anniversary of Lithuania’s independence.232

Surma explained the UVO’s foreign policy alliances in the following manner: “The UVO is an organization for which only the interests of the Ukrainian nation are and will be decisive in its activity . . . . The UVO does not consider serving the interests of foreign peoples. At the same time, however, the UVO is aware that it has not only the task but also the responsibility to look for allies and to carry on propaganda among the peoples of the world in order to prepare the proper grounds and sympathy in the world for the general liberation of the Ukrainian people.”233

Although Konovalets’ had succeeded in winning undisputed control over the UVO by 1926, he soon realized that his victory was largely a hollow one. The UVO had been so greatly weakened as a result of the conflict with Petrushevych and the
constant arrests of its cadres, that the very survival of the organization and of the ideas it represented was in danger unless a new political and ideological ally could be found. Moreover, the fact that all Ukrainian parties in Galicia had followed in the UNDO's footsteps and were now participating (and thereby legitimating) the existing political system isolated the UVO from the Ukrainian political world. According to Konovalets', the stabilization of Galicia and its progressive integration into Poland meant that the UVO could no longer simply engage in "loud underground combat actions", but had to adapt itself to the new political reality and employ political methods as well. The solution to the above two problems lay in allying the UVO to the growing Nationalist movement. After all, the UVO had already had close contacts with the Nationalists and in fact shared many of their ideological beliefs. Moreover, young Galician Nationalists were joining the UVO in increasing numbers and replacing the original cadres, many of whom had either reentered civilian life after the March 1923 decision, or had left the organization in the course of the struggle with Petrushevych, or had been arrested. By allying the UVO with the Nationalists, therefore, the Colonel hoped to provide the military organization with a political base, which would not only supply it with recruits and assist it in its actions, but, more important, give it a distinct political profile and thereby define its relationship to the Ukrainian political reality. At the same time, Konovalets' believed that it was necessary to reach some understanding with the various Nationalist groups in order to coordinate their increasingly prominent activity with that of the UVO so as to avoid potential friction. In particular, the young Nationalists in Galicia were revealing a restlessness and dynamism which could be made to work to the UVO's advantage if harnessed and applied wisely.

But the prerequisite to an alliance with the Nationalists was that the Nationalists represent an organized and coherent political force. Some steps had already been taken in the direction of organizational unity, but, by and large, the Nationalists still remained grouped in several separate
organizations and lacked a common set of concrete political goals. What they did have in common, however, were ties to the UVO. Together with other leading UVO cadres, therefore, Konovalets' set out to try to join the various Nationalists and Nationalist groupings into one Nationalist organization. As he visualized it, the future Nationalist organization would be a "purely political organization ... which works conspiratorially or even legally depending on the situation and the conditions and which cannot openly and gloriously have relations with a terrorist organization [the UVO]." The Nationalist organization would propagandize Nationalism among the masses, prepare them for the national revolution, and serve as a base of support for the revolutionary, elite UVO. What is more, Konovalets' hoped to use the future Nationalist organization as a base for his own foreign policy work in Europe. The Colonel believed that his (and the emigres') propagandistic and diplomatic effectiveness would greatly increase were he the representative of a political organization with a mass following and not simply of the underground, terrorist UVO. As a political organization, however, the Nationalist organization would infiltrate various Ukrainian economic, sport, cultural-educational, student and other institutions, but not take part in the political work of the legalistically-inclined Galician parties. The latter course (which, in Konovalets's view, did not exclude contacts with individual politicians) was unacceptable in that it would compromise the UVO's commitment to Ukrainian independence and statehood. Typically, the Colonel's attitude towards the legal parties reflected the combination of idealism and realism that characterized all of his dealings with other political groups.

Surma had alluded to the need for such a division of labor in its August-September 1928 issue. After first stating that "it is clear that only the UVO can properly exploit, strengthen, and direct in the proper channel the elemental movement of the popular masses to build their own state and can train these popular masses at the proper moment to cast off the yoke of the invader and become masters of their own land," the journal pointed out that "this preparation must go in two directions.
First, the organization cannot allow that, on the one hand, the Ukrainian public, which currently finds itself under the fist of the Polish invader, get used to this fist and accomodate itself to the existing regime, and that, on the other hand, the ruling Polish occupier not even for one moment feel secure on our lands . . . . The second direction is positive work, which involves raising new cadres of the Ukrainian public, who in full awareness and steadfastness, with unshakeable energy, and in an organized manner would strive to attain our goal — the building of a Ukrainian state.” Konovalets’ probably envisioned the UVO as continuing with the first “direction”, and the Nationalist organization as carrying out the second.

Opposed to Konovalets’ were Volodymyr Kuchabs’kyi and the leading krai UVO cadres, Dmytro Paliiv, Liubomyr Makarushka, and Volodymyr Tselevych, all of whom argued that individual UVO members should actively participate in the legal parties and thereby advance the UVO’s goals. What their proposals ultimately meant, of course, was that the UVO cease being a revolutionary organization and place itself at the disposal of the legal sector. Kuchabs’kyi himself joined the Hetmanites, while the others primarily became members of the UNDO. With regard to the envisioned Nationalist organization, the Colonel’s internal opponents believed that it too should work within the legal Ukrainian parties.

The conflict between these two conceptions, which were soon to be joined by a radically different one — that of the young Galician Nationalists, is at the center of the developments described in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 10

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS: THEIR ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR IDEOLOGIES

The oldest existing emigre Nationalist organization was the Group of Ukrainian National Youth (Hrupa Ukrains'koi Natsional'noi Molodi — HUNM), which was founded in 1922 by Galician Army officers and soldiers in the internment camps at Liberec and Josefov. Soon thereafter, branches of the organization were also established in most Ukrainian student centers in Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Germany. Its members, for the most part Galicians, were at first united on little other than the belief that Ukrainian national interests should take precedence over social questions, that the socialist menace had somehow to be resisted, and that Ukrainians should rely only on their own forces. The tasks which it initially set itself were to “unite Ukrainian students on the basis of the state independence of the Ukraine, to study the national development of other peoples, in particular agrarian ones, and to learn the means and methods by which these peoples attained and continue to attain their national-state goals.”

In order to further its ends, the HUNM organized rallies, lectures, discussions, and concerts and actively took part in student organizations, and particularly the TseSUS. Naturally, it belonged to the “rightist” student camp.

In the same year of its founding, however, the HUNM was already expressing characteristically Nationalist viewpoints.
At a festivity honoring Galicia's independence, for example, a certain Iliarii Ol'khovyi prophesized that:

"... in the future there will come people who will understand that the independence of the Ukrainian state must in the first place come out of L'viv and Kiev and not out of Paris, that only the Ukrainian people can decide the fate of their state, and that independence must be founded not on Wilson's self-determination of peoples, but on our own Ukrainian, unyielding 'I want'. The law is the weapon of the weak, while the strong Ukrainian people (and such will they be) should only demand and take. There will come people who, knowing the past, will remember that state independence is attained with weapons, while international conflicts are resolved not by feelings or sentiments, but by force, that the factor which is ultimately decisive is war, and that the argument which best speaks to the conscience of a hostile neighbor is a sharp knife." 

A commitment to sobornist', a reliance on "our own forces", a rejection of abstract rights in favor of ruthless action, an acceptance of struggle as the basic law of life, and a vision of a future elite — all these elements can also be found in the thinking of Dontsov and Kuchabs'kyi.

In January 1924, the individual HUNM branches held a congress in Prague, where they elected a central executive and resolved to publish a periodical called Natsional'na Dumka (National Thought). The journal appeared from April 1924 to December 1927 and was partially financed by the UVO Representation in Czechoslovakia since 1926. Its many editors included, among others, Myron Konovalets' (the Colonel's brother), I. Ol'khovyi, Stepan Nyzhankivs'kyi, Osyp Boidunyk, Oles' Babii, and Volodymyr Martynets'. Dmytro Andriievs'kyi was a frequent contributor.

According to an editorial in the journal, the HUNM's ideology was based on the following propositions: an Independent Western Ukraine as a step towards a United Ukrainian State; the reliance on "our own forces"; a "strong, holy faith in ourselves"; the inviolable national principle "I am supposed to live, I want to live, I must live"; eternal struggle as
the means of attaining the right to life, because "life lives off life"; the acknowledgement of no rights or "limitations" in waging the struggle for life; force as the ultimate arbiter of all conflicts; and the principle of the survival of the fittest.²⁴⁴

Having established that the "weaker one dies", the HUNM concluded that everything that "poisons the national organism" and makes it vulnerable to defeat must be eliminated. This meant replacing love of one's enemies with hate, mercy with "destroying the enemy at every step... and with every means", "international altruism" with the "holiest national egoism", and "humanity" with "national pride." As for the practical attainment of its ends, the HUNM suggested monolithic national unity: "... the nation is a collective. If every one of its members is not filled with the same goal, if he does not merge his own 'ego' with the 'ego' of the nation, subordinating the first in every respect to the second, if he does not enter the struggle side by side with the others, then all our efforts will be useless, then the outcome of the battle is beforehand decided."²⁴⁵ Interestingly, this last passage brings to mind Volodymyr Vynnychenko's very similar arguments concerning his United Revolutionary Democratic National Front and reveals the degree to which such thinking was common to all anti-Soviet Ukrainians, regardless of their political persuasions.

The Group had undergone a significant ideological transformation in the first two years of its existence. As a comparison of the above two passages shows, by 1924 the HUNM considered the Ukraine's enemies to include not only other nations or states, but also "dangerous" elements within the nation itself. In granting the nation the right to purge these elements, the HUNM took a decisive step towards affirming the prerogative which the later organized Nationalists were to grant themselves: to decide, as the nation's foremost representatives, who was a true Ukrainian and who was not. At the same time, the HUNM supplemented its earlier inclinations to external agressiveness with muted advocacy of internal repression and social control.

By 1927, however, the HUNM was already expounding
distinctly Nationalist positions: "In place of internationalism we must foster the idea of national unity, in place of fratricidal class slaughter — the idea of cooperation, positivism, realism, and patriotism. And this excludes synthesis and compromise because synthesis and compromise always harm the weaker one. The national-state principle and the class-international communist one are fire and water. And if someone wants to create a synthesis of these two antitheses, then he wants to reconcile fire with water. We do not believe in this synthesis. And that is why in place of internationalist phrases we bring to the people the slogan: Ukraine above everything."

That same year Natsional'na Dumka published an article by D. Andriievs'kyi, entitled "The Building of the Nation", which articulated the essential ideas of the Nationalist movement and proved of lasting significance for the development of a Nationalist organization. According to Andriievs'kyi:

"Until now our Nation was an amorphous ethnic mass, that is, it was really not a nation, that vital, organized cell of society which is creative and active. Now it is one [a nation] psychologically, in the souls, in the ideas of its more sensitive elements, but it is still not a final, living fact. The spirit of a nation moves within this mass, which, however, lacks a physically real organization in order to be a living organism. In and of itself the spirit has neither form nor direction. It moves in all directions and when it faces an obstacle or boundaries that are too small it roars, destroys, and breaks. Then it is a destructive force. Only by giving it proper form, by channeling it in the proper direction can one extract useful work from it . . . . Thus for a nation to be a vital and creative category, a subject and not an object of history, it must have a real, material organization, one that is intrinsic to it, organic, and derived from it and not imposed from outside . . . . The building of the Nation in its present stage requires the wholeness, cohesiveness, and the monolithic nature of our national body . . . . Iron discipline, order, the
subordination of the secondary to the basic, of the personal to the general, and of the particular to the fundamental must be the law."

Significantly, Andriievs'kyi saw the key to victory in organization and not, like Dontsov, in inspiration. This very simple, but critically important difference, was to lie at the basis of the Nationalists' inability to draw the publicist into their movement.

Following an unsuccessful attempt at unifying Ukrainian organizations and parties in an "organ for the defense of the Ukrainian emigration in the CSR" in the late spring of 1926, the HUNM executive and several branches initiated steps towards organizational unification with other Nationalist groups. Negotiations were thereupon undertaken with the League of Ukrainian Nationalists (Liga Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv — LUN), an organization of Eastern Ukrainians, mostly AUNR veterans, that was founded on November 12, 1925 in Podebrady. Three like-minded organizations had merged to form the League: the Ukrainian National Union (Ukrains'ke Natsional'ne Ob'iednannia) headed by Mykola Stsibors'kyi and Dmytro Demchuk, the Union of Ukrainian Fascists (Soiuz Ukrains'kykh Fashystiv) headed by Leonid Kostariv and Petro Kozhevnykiv, and the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy — unrelated to the pre-war SVU) headed by Iurii Kollard and a certain Hryhorovych. As its motto the LUN adopted the rather banal statement "Thoughts are thoughts, but swords are swords" (Dumka dumkoiu, mech mechem).

The question of the League's attitude to Italian Fascism proved to be a major divisive point within the young organization. The minority faction led by Kostariv, later to be a prominent activist in the organized Nationalist movement, proposed patterning the LUN's Nationalism directly on Italian Fascism. Stsibors'kyi's majority and ultimately victorious faction opposed this "orientation" on foreign models and instead suggested that Ukrainian Nationalism seeks its inspiration in Ukrainian history, culture, and tradition.
Significantly, the disagreement concerned not the authoritarian organization of the state and society, but the imitation of non-Ukrainian examples. The League, in other words, reaffirmed its commitment to Nationalism, but by no means rejected what the Italian Fascists preached.249

Despite the League’s public support of the UNR, its ideological leanings were clearly far to the right of the Petliura camp. Besides Mussolini, Maurice Barrès and Dmytro Dontsov exerted a particularly strong influence on the thinking of the LUN. The extremism to which its members tended was already evident in an article written by one of its future cadres, a certain V. Voin, several months before the League’s founding. Writing in the TseSUS journal, Students'kyi Vistnyk, Voin proposed 13 theses concerning the “state-minded youth”:

1) The clearest feature of a person in the universe is his ability to master his living and non-living environment, even in time and space. Indivisible in their essence, ideas and actions, when systematically executed, are means to [this] mastery. Beyond them there is only chaos. The eternal struggle with chaos is the basic task of the person. The ideal is the eventual subjugation of chaos by the person.

2) The greatest imperative for Ukrainians, the struggle for the Ukrainian perfect nation, is simultaneously a struggle against chaos in the familial and societal spheres, as well as in material and non-material culture. This struggle is possible only with the training of leaders, who will systematically rule over these spheres, without any compunctions to destroy everything hostile within themselves and in their environment. The creation of such leaders is the basic task of the Nation. The ideal is a Nation, where every individual exists only for the Nation in the name of its perfection . . . .

4) The creation of such leaders, the preparation for the foundations of the luxuriant blossoming of the nation, is under present conditions possible only within the Ukrainian intelligentsia . . . .

5) Primarily in view of its great task, the Ukrainian intelligentsia must preserve its moral and physical health . . .
10) Where there is no will, everything will appear to be very complicated.... On the other hand, organization is the expression of will. Of all intellectuals, Ukrainian youth is most suited for this [organization].

11) The character of the organization of Ukrainian youth must correspond to the character of the Ukrainian nation. The most fundamental and most famous organization, instinctively accepted by everybody in the Ukraine, is that of the military, praised in songs and ballads....

12) The organization must know and appropriately guide the entire personal life of its members.... In the sexual sphere, everyone should remember that he is supposed to create a family, the basis of the Nation. People, who give much weight to transient sexual relations, should stand on the lowest rung of the organization's hierarchy.250

Voin's almost pathological obsession with chaos, order, and organization represented a qualitatively new element in Ukrainian Nationalism. His goal was not so much statehood, the traditional Nationalist objective, as the "perfect nation." The organization he proposed was unabashedly totalitarian, implying, therefore, that the nation, whose character the organization had to reflect, was also totalitarian. Pseudo-philosophical and conceptually primitive, Voin's theses were an expression of the kind of fanaticism prevalent in the extreme right wing of the Nationalist movement. Not surprisingly, the Nationalist extremists, like Voin, were usually students.

That Voin's extremism was probably not untypical for the League is suggested by a public statement released by the LUN in the late summer of 1926: "...the only possible form of state rule, at the beginning and under present conditions, can be a dictatorship of groups of organized Ukrainian patriots-nationalists, who have state-minded tendencies, [a dictatorship] which should be realized in the person of that national vozhd' who will organize and complete the liberation of the Ukrainian People."251 Reacting to these comments, one Tryzub publicist asked: "Is this an inability to express one's thoughts
in Ukrainian, or simply an inability to express one’s thoughts, or finally the complete inability to think?”

In spite of all these inabilities, the League managed to publish two issues of an ideological journal, Derzhavna Natsiia (The State Nation), in 1927. According to the Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, the first issue contained a “nationalist platform”, “much popularization of Maurice Barrès’ ideas”, and “argumentation against doctrinaires of a certain type of government”, while the second issue, published in collaboration with the HUNM, offered little that was new and was essentially a continuation of the HUNM’s Natsional’na Dumka.

Although avowed Nationalists, the League’s members did not immediately regard themselves as an independent political force and, in fact, supported the UNR. Consistent with this viewpoint, the LUN considered its mission to be to promote the integration and unification of the various Ukrainian political currents under the national banner. Thus, immediately after its founding, the LUN took part in the formation of the Committee of Unified Ukrainian National-Political Organizations, whose platform demanded “sovereignty, complete sobornist’, and independence”, a “democratic state order”, the “nation above the class and the state above the party.” Other members of the Committee included the outwardly pro-UNR Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party, the HUNM, the Union of Ukrainian Agrarians in the ČSR (which eventually merged with the LUN), the Union of Former Ukrainian Soldiers, and the Group of Kuban Ukrainians. And following Petliura’s death, it was the LUN which prompted representatives of over 50 Ukrainian organizations in Czechoslovakia to join the already-mentioned committee to honor Petliura’s memory.

Despite the fact that the two committees did not last very long, the LUN’s integrational ambitions were still strong enough to prompt it to initiate the founding of the Union of the Ukrainian Emigration in the Czech Lands on June 10, 1926. After renaming itself the Ukrainian National-Political Union Abroad on September 1, the organization drew up a platform where it pledged itself to stand on the “basis of the
independence and sobornist' of the Ukrainian State”, to recognize “only the people as a whole as the source of state power”, and to pursue the “goal of organized assistance to the Ukrainian people in their struggle for state, national, cultural, and social liberation and for the renewal of the state sovereignty of the Ukrainian people in the form of an independent democratic republic.” Along with the LUN, factions of the SRs and of the SDs, the Radical Democratic Party, and the TseSUS joined the organization. “Party egoism and elements of competition”, however, led to the Union’s rapid demise.

As the LUN’s involvement in the above organizations shows, its members clearly had a very vague sense of their own ideological convictions. On the one hand, the League signed statements demanding democratic republics, while, on the other, it proclaimed the need for a dictatorship. Although at least two of its members were avowed fascists (Kozhevnykiv, Kostariv) and one was a totalitarian fanatic (Voin), the League appears to have regarded its integrational efforts as being entirely consistent with its ideology. In this respect, the LUN’s superficiality, ideological imprecision, and lack of self-identity placed it at the opposite end from Dontsov, who always knew what he wanted and who insisted that all Nationalists be like him. Nevertheless, extreme as it was, the LUN was typical of the early Nationalists in its groping attempts to divorce itself from its ideological heritage and develop an independent Nationalist worldview. Unlike most of the other emigre Nationalists, however, the League made this transition in a particularly simple-minded manner that clearly reflected its disdain for “thoughts” and infatuation with “swords.”

Following its unsuccessful efforts at unifying the Ukrainian emigres, the LUN turned to consolidating its forces with those of like-minded Nationalists and, in particular, with the HUNM. In the summer of 1927, after several months of negotiations, the two organizations agreed on the formation of a coordinating center, the Union of Organizations of Ukrainian Nationalists (Soiuz Orhanizatsii Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv), with M. Stsibors'kyi as head. The Union's
stated goal was to "struggle for the renewal as soon as possible of an Independent National United Ukrainian State, which would guarantee the well-being of all strata of the Ukrainian people . . . ." The means towards this end included "fostering a consciousness of the unconditional primacy of Ukrainian national-state interests over all other interests, be they of foreign peoples or of our own political, social, religious, military or other groupings or of individual persons" and "maintaining a clearly hostile attitude towards the occupying regimes on the Ukrainian lands as well as towards those Ukrainian political groups who in their activity find support in any one of the occupying regimes." The Union also resolved to take steps towards the "final formulation of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology" and the "creation of a new Ukrainian nationalist organization, which would unite all like-minded nationalist elements abroad as well as in the Krai on the basis of one organizational scheme." Further steps towards ideological and organizational unity were taken on January 28, 1928 and June 25, 1928, when, respectively, the Brno and the Berlin branches of the LUN and the HUNM officially dissolved and merged in Unions of Ukrainian Nationalists (Soiuzy Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv).

The growth of a Nationalist movement among the emigres was paralleled by a similar development in Galicia. A difference of crucial importance, however, characterized the krai Nationalists. Whereas their emigre comrades lived through and took an active part in the revolutions of 1917-1920 and considered that period as the major inspiration for their Nationalism, the Galician Nationalists were generally young students, who did not directly experience the Ukrainian Revolution and who therefore formed their worldview on the basis of romanticized interpretations of that time and on the basis of the ideological and political realities of the 1920s. As a result, although the emigres were also inclined to extremism and authoritarianism and were heavily influenced by the Fascist example, the young, impetuous, romantic, and revolutionary Galicians rejected all forms of coffee-house politics and became active exponents of a radical Nationalism which made no
secret of its admiration for the Italian dictator and glorified
direct and immediate action as the only solution to the
oppressiveness of the Galician reality. Impressed by deeds
alone, the inter-war generations of Nationalists became
incapable of dispassionately regarding a phenomenon and
delving beneath its surface appearance. The result was often
an uncritical admiration for all that radiated vitality as well as
an uncritical rejection of all that smacked of excessive thought.

True to the dictum that generational change was a major
determinant of Galician politics, upper gymnasium and
university student youth dominated the Nationalist movement
in Galicia. Confronted with overt discrimination against
Ukrainians and the progressive deterioration of the already
unsatisfactory economic conditions of the Ukrainian popula-
tion as well as frustrated by the Polonization of Ukrainian
schools and the inability to advance in a society whose all but
lowest tiers were largely closed to them, the embittered
students immediately joined the ranks of Poland's implacable
enemies and sought radical solutions to their problems, which
they identified with the problems of the Ukrainian nation. The
experience of the underground university and of the UVO's
"sabotage action", where students had a first-hand opportu-
nity to make a contribution to the national cause, helped
transform nationally-conscious youths into Nationalists. The
Ambassadors' decision, Petliura's assassination, Schwartz-
bard's trial, and the communist challenge, as represented by
the Soviet Ukraine and the powerful local communist student
movement, drove the young Nationalists further rightwards, a
direction that Mussolini's success in Italy seemed to suggest
was the wave of the future. The students' extremism received a
powerful impulse from the rioting that rocked L'viv in the early
days of November 1928. Sparked by a massive Ukrainian
demonstration in honor of the 10th anniversary of the
founding of the ZUNR, the ensuing city-wide disturbances
resulted in enormous damage to Ukrainian cultural and
economic institutions and in violent confrontations between
Ukrainian and Polish students. Not surprisingly, the fighting
only served to increase the students' determination to
overthrow the hated Poles.
The first semi-Nationalist groups in Galicia were organized in 1923-1924. Consisting of small numbers of trusted friends, the groups possessed no clear ideological and political orientation aside from their agreement on the necessity of Ukrainian statehood and their hatred of socialism and the Soviet Ukraine. The groups were usually found in student circles and in the scouting organization Plast, with the latter in particular often serving as a training ground for future UVO and Nationalist cadres. Not surprisingly, many young “rightists” had ties to the UVO.

In 1924-1925, several formal organizations with Nationalist leanings came into existence. One was the L'viv-based Organization of Upperclassmen of the Ukrainian Gymnasia (Orhanizatsiia Vysokykh Klaiser Ukrain's'kykh Gimnazii), which put out an underground journal called Meteor. Far more important was the Group of Ukrainian State Youth (Hrupa Ukrain's'koi Derzhaunyts'koi Molodi), founded in 1925. Significantly, not only were many of its members Hetmanites, but the choice of the adjective derzhaunyts'ka was inspired by Lypyns'kyi's Lysty. The Hetmanites left the Group during the Lypyns'kyi-Dontsov feud, while the remaining Nationalists renamed the organization the Group of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth. Riding on the crest of Nationalism’s growing popularity with the young (thanks in large part to the appearance of Dontsov’s Natsionalizm in 1926), the original L’viv-based Group managed to establish branches throughout Galicia as well as among young artisans and workers.258

In need of some central coordinating body, the individual groups of Ukrainian Nationalist youth established a Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (Soiuz Ukrain's'koi Natsionalystychnoi Molodi — SUNM) in 1926. The Union was centered in L'viv, which had the largest concentration of Ukrainian university and gymnasium students, and established its headquarters in the Academic House (Akademichnyi Dym), the Ukrainian university student dormitory. Naturally, close ties were maintained with Dontsov, whose Vistnyk served as a forum for the more talented young Nationalist writers and poets in the SUNM. Although itself illegal, the SUNM
managed to put out a legal publication, *Smoloskypy* (Torches), which advocated a softened version of its hard-line Nationalism. SUNM cadres were also active in legal Ukrainian educational, cultural, and sports organizations such as the *Prosvita* and the *Sokil*.

Two rival camps existed within the student organization. The smaller one, led by Osyp Bodnarovych, the *Smoloskypy* editor and an avowed fascist, supported close cooperation with the legal Ukrainian political sector in general and with the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO) in particular — to the point of campaigning together with the UNDO in the March 1928 elections. The second and larger camp, led by Ivan Gabrusevych, a fanatical Nationalist and driving force behind the SUNM's radicalization, believed that the SUNM should stand on Dontsov's principles of radical exclusiveness and unconditional non-cooperation with the existing Ukrainian parties. According to the stronger faction, the very willingness to participate in Polish politics was tantamount to a betrayal of the Ukrainian cause.259 Outnumbered by the Gabrusevych radicals, Bodnarovych and his followers left the SUNM prior to the elections.

Although greatly influenced by Dontsov, the SUNM Nationalists made several more or less original contributions to the Nationalist worldview. Foremost among them was the creation of a Ukrainian "mythology" whose centerpiece was the "cult of heroes" (*kul't heroiv*). Soldiers and UVO cadres who had died for the Ukrainian cause were idealized, honored, and set up as examples to be followed and their graves made the objects of veneration. The Kruty battle, for example, where several hundred students died on January 30, 1918 while defending the Central Rada from the Bolshevik invasion, was assigned well-nigh religious significance. Besides motivating Ukrainians to heroic action, the cult of heroes was also intended to serve as a reminder that statehood could be achieved only by means of arms. In this respect, the SUNM was in agreement with the emigre and UVO Nationalists. The Galicians, however, drove this, as they did many other notions, to its logical end and developed a theory of "permanent
revolution” (*permanentna revoliutsiia*). Somewhat similar to certain ideas expressed by V. Kuchabs’kyi and Konovalets’ in 1921, the theory of permanent revolution also envisioned the liberation struggle as a process which would culminate in the national revolution after much preparatory work. Kuchabs’kyi and Konovalets’, however, had emphasized mass involvement in “certain concrete matters” such as the struggle for a university or against conscription, rejecting mass involvement in “armed actions.” The SUNM, on the other hand, considered that the masses had to and could be “permanently” involved in direct revolutionary action. In this respect, the SUNM envisioned a far broader mobilization of the population and demanded the active as well as the passive support of every Ukrainian, whose position within the nation, therefore, was to be that of a soldier in an army (an idea also articulated by V. Voin of the LUN).

Not surprisingly, ideology played a small role in the SUNM’s action-oriented world. Reflecting this intellectual paucity and concern with deeds was the Decalogue (*Dekaloh*), a list of ten commandments intended as a set of guidelines for SUNM members:

1) Attain a Ukrainian State or die in battle for It.
2) Do not allow anyone to defame the glory or the honor of Your Nation.
3) Remember the Great Days of our efforts.
4) Be proud of the fact that you are an heir of the struggle for the glory of Volodymyr’s Trident.
5) Avenge the death of Great Knights.
6) Do not speak of the cause with whomever possible, but only with whomever necessary.
7) Do not hesitate to commit the greatest crime, if the good of the Cause demands it.
8) Regard the enemies of Your Nation with hate and perfidy.
9) Neither requests, nor threats, nor torture, nor death can compel You to betray a secret.
10) Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners.
Resembling the esoteric instructions of a mystical sect, the Decalogue is striking for its advocacy of the total subordination of the individual as well as of all moral and political principles to the concept of the Nation — a cardinal tenet of Dontsov and of the French integral nationalists. The analogy with religion is not accidental. Nationalism was conceived by the SUNM as an all-encompassing system with the capacity to create its own traditions, construct a meaningful present, and assure a glorious future. The individual person, meanwhile, would be safely enclosed within the structure, guaranteed a preordained position that would enable him to transcend his petty self and merge with a far greater being, the Nation. Not surprisingly, a strong current of inferiority is evident in many of the commandments. Equally important is the appeal the Decalogue makes to the irrational, to the elemental. Life is reduced to the primeval struggle of good vs. evil and the person to a participant overwhelmed by the awe-inspiring simplicity of it all. The world of reason, logic, and doubt is abandoned for a well-nigh religious one where Dontsov reigns and natural laws, human passions, and mighty forces decide the outcome of everything. Such a world cannot be understood, it must simply be accepted. In these respects, the young Galician Nationalists, although indifferent to religion themselves, bear some resemblance to Codreanu’s Iron Guard. There, in particular, extreme nationalism fused with a fanatical religiosity to produce a simple but potent ideology that made of Codreanu’s a mass movement.

Their many drawbacks notwithstanding, Konovalets’ believed that this wide array of Nationalists was best suited to carry on the struggle for an Independent and United Ukrainian State which the Sharpshooters and the UVO had begun. The Colonel was aware of the generational nature of Ukrainian politics, however, and realized that he and the emigres could only provide the initiative and set a general direction and that the extremist Galicians would soon come to dominate the movement. Although Konovalets’ had serious doubts about many of the young Nationalists’ radical views, he understood that the demands of “realistic politics” required
allying his beleaguered forces with the up-and-coming Galicians.\textsuperscript{264}

The most important of the early Nationalist contacts that Konovalets' established was to Volodymyr Martynets', a leading student activist and editor of the HUNM's ideological organ, \textit{Natsional'na Dumka}. The well-read and incisive Martynets' was offered the editorship of \textit{Surma} in 1927 and given the responsibility of spearheading the unification process by organizing a conference of Ukrainian Nationalists. Martynets' had already written about the need for a Nationalist organization which would "direct the national energy into the proper channel, which would give the appropriate forms to the content of our life, and which would give a unique spirit to the national matter." The Ukrainian nation, Martynets' claimed, had already proven its vitality, but the Ukrainian national struggle had collapsed because of the "uncoordination of the released energy . . . [and] the lack of leadership." The Nationalist organization would, of course, occupy this position of leadership and, as such, it had to be "supra-class". Class struggle, therefore, was to be replaced with class cooperation on the basis of the central organization's "synthesizing" policies. In order to achieve these goals, the central Nationalist organization had to "force its way into all areas of national life, into all its recesses, into all its institutions, societies, and groups, into every city and village, into every family." The process by means of which the Nationalist organization would gain control of the society was, however, evolutionary, demanding "long and creative work," and "stamina and stubbornness." Although Martynets' differed fundamentally from the Galician Nationalists in this respect, his blueprint for a Nationalist organization and society resembled theirs and that of the LUN in being essentially totalitarian.\textsuperscript{265}

The First Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists was finally held on November 3-7, 1927 in Berlin. Of the fifteen unofficial delegates who arrived, close to half were from the UVO, with the rest more or less evenly divided among the HUNM, LUN, and SUNM. Although the delegates were united on the need for
a Nationalist organization, they disagreed over the question of its relationship to legality in general and to the UVO in particular. Resembling the Bodnarovych line, the pro-legality faction led by the UVO member L. Makarushka argued that the future organization would be most effective if it maintained no open ties to the UVO and to Konovalets'. The pro-illegality faction, led by V. Martynets', insisted that a legal Nationalist organization was by definition an impossibility in Galicia and that the new organization should waste no time and immediately go underground. Konovalets' was the focus of the argument: should he, as head of the UVO, be chosen head of the Nationalist organization or not? The Colonel himself was unsure. In the end, although the delegates agreed that the existing Nationalist organizations should dissolve upon merging in the future organization and that a Provid (Leadership) of Ukrainian Nationalists (Provid Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv — PUN) be elected and empowered to take the necessary steps towards founding the Nationalist organization, the questions of legality and of the UVO were left unresolved. Nevertheless, Konovalets' was chosen head of the Provid, while Martynets', Mykola Stsibors'kyi, and Dmytro Andriiivs'kyi were appointed its members. The PUN was also authorized to publish a journal, Rozbudova Natsii (The Building of the Nation), as the official organ of the Nationalist movement. The prolific Martynets' was appointed editor.266

In its official proclamation, the Conference traced the origins of the “movement of Ukrainian nationalists” to the failure of the national revolution of 1917-1920 and to the party strife that followed. “Strong in faith”, “burning with shame”, and “conscious of their mission”, the Nationalists had realized that the “secondary” had to be “subordinated to the eternal and elemental in the being of a Nation.” Having arisen spontaneously, the Nationalists were now organizing in order to “take into their hands the helm of Ukrainian national-political life and strive to renew and defend the Independent, Free, United Ukrainian National State.” By its very nature, the Nationalist ideology strove to “dominate all of our national reality.”267
As the Nationalist movement and ideology began increasingly to crystallize, the unresolved problem of the Nationalists' relationship to the legal Ukrainian parties and, of course, to legality in general assumed ever greater urgency. Of particular importance was the fact that many of the UVO's leading cadres in Galicia supported Bodnarovych in believing that the Nationalists should be active in the political life of the individual parties. The emigres and young Galicians, meanwhile, were for the most part in agreement that affiliation with the legal parties would condemn the future organization to ineffectiveness. What added particular urgency to the issue was the question of whether the SUNM should declare its support for the UNDO in the 1928 parliamentary elections.

The question of affiliation was the major topic of the Second Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists, held on April 8-9, 1928 in Prague. Attended by the four Provid members and representatives of the LUN, HUNM, SUNM, and UVO, the Conference took a decisive step towards establishing the Nationalist movement as an independent political force. The PUN was authorized to act as the representative body of all the Nationalist organizations and as such it resolved to "distance itself from all Ukrainian political parties and groups and not to enter into cooperation with them." All the Nationalist organizations were enjoined to do the same.²⁸⁸

The Second Conference marked an important watershed in the Nationalist movement. The Nationalists had taken another step towards consolidating their forces; more important, they proclaimed themselves an elite group whose unwillingness even to associate with other parties clearly revealed their conviction that they alone, by being "supra-party", were suited to lead the Ukrainian liberation struggle. As the vanguard of the Ukrainian nation, the Nationalists conferred upon themselves the right to decide the entire nation's fate along with the more elementary question of who was a true son of the nation and who was not. The decision to break all ties to legal parties provoked the eventual departure of the above-mentioned UVO cadres and, with the SUNM Bodnarovych group already gone, resulted in the emigres'
virtually complete reliance on the young radicals in the Academic House. Significantly, the Nationalists who decided to leave the organized Nationalist movement and participate in the legal parties did not for the most part represent a democratic current any the less committed to the authoritarian tendencies so evident among their comrades. Paliiv and Bodnarovych, for example, were convinced Nationalists. Their decision to join the legal sector was a tactical move founded on the anti-Dontsovian belief that exclusiveness would be harmful to the advancement of Nationalist goals.

Although the exclusivist position advocated most passionately by Martynets', Stsibors'kyi, and the Galicians had become the official line, Konovalets' himself continued to maintain very extensive working relationships with Ukrainian politicians and parties and, in particular, with the UNDO. True to his moderate character, the Colonel appears to have believed that public pronouncements had little in common with private politics and that the Nationalists could not afford to isolate themselves completely from the Ukrainian political world. Typically, Konovalets' occupied the position of middleman between those Nationalists advocating total withdrawal into exclusiveness and those who regarded that the best results could be achieved by infiltrating the existing political structure.

The Nationalists' relations with the legal Ukrainian parties were in any case very strained — perhaps an additional reason for the Nationalists' resolve not to have anything to do with them. Besides viewing the rising Nationalist movement as a possible threat to their own positions, most emigre and Galician parties also accused them of being ideologically demagogic and politically irresponsible. The Nationalists, on the other hand, had many charges to make against their opponents. The UNDO and the UNR were "collaborating" with Poland, Shapoval was consorting with Russian socialists, Petrushevych with Moscow, and the Hetmanites with Russian monarchists. In all cases, so claimed the Nationalists, an independent Ukrainian policy, with the Ukraine as the starting- and end-point of everything, was lacking. And this they intended to supply.
The Nationalists' exclusiveness, however, also flowed from their conviction that there existed a fundamental incompatibility between the new type of Ukrainian, the Nationalist, and the old, the party politician. Martynets' elaborated on this belief immediately after the Second Conference:

"The crisis of our political life has its source not so much in the programs and ideologies of the parties as in the people themselves who make up these parties, in their psychology, in their moral categories, and in their actions. And if we evaluate the parties and their members from this point of view, then we see that . . . these are all people of one type, of one structure. And it is in the existence of this type that there lies the crisis of our political life. And however that one may repaint their signboards and correct their party programs, the people who comprise these parties will not change. And not this, but a completely new type of Ukrainian can free the nation from its age-old slavery. Cadres of such new Ukrainians have now to be created — by cultivating them from among the youngest generation, which is still not endangered by the lack of ideals and amorality of our political life. It is completely certain that they will not be cultivated by the existing political parties. This young element must be completely isolated from party influence."

In spite of the fact that in this as in many other respects the Nationalists clearly drew their inspiration from Dontsov, their relations with the journalist were poor. Although the young Galicians were Dontsov's devoted followers, the emigres generally regarded him critically. According to Martynets', the emigres faulted Dontsov with having no practical suggestions for making Nationalism into an organized political force and, more specifically, with ignoring the Ukrainian problem in Poland. Nevertheless, they did make a number of attempts to draw him into their movement. But Dontsov refused their offers, probably feeling that the Nationalists in general and Konovalets' in particular were far too "impure" ideologically and politically to justify his cooperation. Writing in 1928, Dontsov tried to persuade the "nationalist youth" that "self-organization, group exclusiveness, a concern for the complete
ideological homogeneity of one’s group are the slogans with which nationalism will triumph.” Although Dontsov’s comments were certainly directed at Bodnarovych, they were probably also intended as a general criticism of the Nationalist movement. The Nationalists, in any case, understood his criticism in this manner and assigned D. Andriievs’kyi to write a rebuttal in Rozbudova Natsii. The task the Nationalists set themselves, according to Andriievs’kyi, was to transform Nationalism from an “ideological category into a political factor.” Referring to the Petliura camp, Lypyns’kyi, and Dontsov, Andriievs’kyi wrote that “our parents have not been able to do this because they were ashamed by it or repudiated it as a heresy or narrowed its ideological base.” The last sin on the list — narrowing the ideological base — clearly belonged to Dontsov. Only by broadening the base and thereby necessarily allowing some degree of ideological impurity could Nationalism be made into a “political factor.” Konovalets’ himself reportedly considered Dontsov to be a “fanatic and egocentric”, whom one must accept as he is if he is not “immediately to become a fanatical opponent.”

Interestingly, Dontsov for his part believed that the Nationalists were insufficiently aware of the Russian menace. In a review (November 1928) of an English-language publication of the PUN’s Propaganda Section, entitled The Ukrainian Question. A Peace Problem (sic), Dontsov strongly took the Nationalists to task for beginning the brochure with an UNDO declaration in the Polish Sejm and for devoting no space to the Ukrainian lands under Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Above all, Dontsov wrote, “One is struck on the basis of the book’s overall tone by the calm, almost sympathetic, tone with regard to Russian ‘work’ in the Soviet Ukraine. Cui podest?” Although it is certain that the Nationalists were not “sympathetic” to the Soviets, their concern with the immediate Galician situation along with their flirtations with Germany and Lithuania and the political limitations resulting therefrom probably combined to divert most of their attention from Russia to Poland. In Dontsov’s eyes, however, anything but a complete and all-consuming hostility to Russia was a political sin of the greatest order.
Although the difficulties with Paliiv and Bodnarovych delayed the Nationalists’ efforts at consolidation, the process continued undeterred and culminated in the founding of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Оханізатсія Українських Нашоналістів — OUN) at the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, held from January 28 to February 3, 1929 in Vienna. Thirty delegates, evenly divided between Eastern and Western Ukrainians as testimony to the Nationalists’ devotion to sobornist’, attended the primarily emigre gathering. Of that number, at least 12 had been either officers or soldiers in the First World War. Ten were engineers, nine were teachers, journalists, or poets, and three were students (the occupations of the remainder are unknown). As these figures show, the OUN was largely the creation of middle class intellectuals strongly influenced by military thinking. Although the intellectual component alone makes the OUN little different from most other radical — whether on the left or on the right — political movements, the large military presence underlines the degree to which the socially dislocated veterans contributed to the formation of Ukrainian Nationalism.

The Congress appointed special committees to formulate the OUN’s policy positions on a whole range of ideological, socio-economic, military, political, cultural-educational, and organizational questions. Two opposing ideological currents — one represented by Dmytro Demchuk and the other by Iulian Vassyian and the two Galicians, Stepan Lenkavs’kyi and Stepan Okhrymovych — became evident in the discussions of the ideological committee. The former and weaker current was apparently somewhat “utilitarian” in its worldview and supported a more or less “democratic” Nationalism of the UNR variety (a not very surprising fact, given Demchuk’s AUNR and LUN origins). The latter and ultimately victorious current stood for the kind of idealist and voluntarist worldview propagated by Dontsov and fully accepted by the young Galician radicals.

Although the emigres were finally able to resolve most of their differences, the long-brewing emigre-krai conflict came
into the open and revealed radically different conceptions of the nature of the Nationalist movement. Arguing from the perspective of "permanent revolution", the two SUNM delegates proposed that the OUN be a mass revolutionary, terrorist organization — an extended version of the UVO, but with a clearly delineated Nationalist profile. Consequently, they wished to structure the Nationalist organization along the lines of a military dictatorship, with Konovalets' as dictator. Konovalets' and the emigres, on the other hand, saw the OUN as a mass political organization that would serve as a base for the elite, revolutionary UVO. According to the emigres, the OUN should propagate the Nationalist ideology and organize the masses into loyal cadres, whose relationship to revolutionary actions would be indirect and supportive. In essence, the conflict was a question of the OUN's relationship to the UVO: should the two be merged into one as the Galicians demanded, or should they remain separate as the emigres desired. The question was finally resolved in the emigres' favor so that the formally accepted "Structure of the OUN" even foresaw children's (8-15 years) and youth (15-21 years) sections in addition to the full OUN members, who had to be over 21 years old. Moreover, the duties of the members were to "obey the instructions of the Structure and of the codes and [to obey] the resolutions and directives of all the leading organs of the OUN, to spread the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, to attract new members, and pay membership dues on time."277

The Galician radicals could not but have been strongly disappointed with so obviously non-revolutionary an organization.

A new Provid, consisting of Konovalets' as Head (Holova) and of M. Stsibors'kyi, V. Martynets', P. Kozhevnykiv, D. Andriievs'kyi, Ih. Vassyian, General Mykola Kapustians'kyi, D. Demchuk, and L. Kostariv was "summoned" and given full powers over the organized Nationalist movement. The inclusion in the Provid of Martynets', Andriievs'kyi, and Vassyian testified to the great weight placed on theory and ideology by the Congress, which adopted a lengthy set of resolutions that outlined the official principles of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Ironically, the resolutions were as much a party program as those the Nationalists so opposed.

In the months following the Congress, the individual Nationalist organizations were dissolved and their members officially joined the OUN. The UVO’s continued existence, however, meant that the krai OUN came to be dominated by the young radicals in the SUNM who began transforming it into the mass revolutionary organization they envisioned without the approval and occasionally even without the knowledge of the emigre leadership. This development led to serious disagreements with the Provid and the UVO, which continued to see the OUN as a purely political organization that should not meddle in the UVO’s sphere of activity. In the end, however, not only did the UVO have to merge with the OUN in 1932, but the krai-emigre differences deepened and finally ended in a debilitating schism in 1939-1940.
CHAPTER 11

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

In its essence, Ukrainian Nationalism was simply an attempt to explain why Ukrainian statehood had been lost and how it could be regained. What had been done wrong in 1917-1920? Who was responsible for the defeat? Which forces and events were positive and which were negative from the viewpoint of Ukrainian statehood? The Nationalists, like most other post-war Ukrainian political groups, tried to give specific answers to these troubling questions.

Responsibility for defeat, concluded the Nationalists, lay with the political leaders. Very simply, they had proven incapable of leading the Ukrainian nation. Why? Because as socialists, who believed in class struggle, and as anarchic democrats, who lacked all sense of purpose, direction, and organization and who instead had an absolute devotion to parties, programs, and parliamentarianism, they had been incapable of seeing that statehood could be attained only by mobilizing the entire nation, by relying on all of "our own forces." This, of course, required seeing the nation as a whole, something that the socialists, who perceived it as a ragtag mixture of warring classes, inherently could not do.

How, therefore, could a Ukrainian state be constructed? The answers appeared clear to the Nationalists — rejection of the "socialist and democratic psychosis" of the former political leaders and mobilization of the Ukrainian masses, of the
nation. This entailed replacing words with action, discarding parties, programs, and an excessive commitment to democratic and parliamentary procedures as elements that contribute negatively to determined leadership, rejecting socialism with its emphasis on class divisiveness as a nefarious ideology which created artificial conflicts and weakened the strength of the nation, and placing one's faith completely in the masses, in the Ukrainian nation, as that force which would ultimately decide whether Ukrainian statehood would be attained or not.

Mobilizing the nation, however, first required understanding its true nature. "The Nation," D. Andriievs'kyi wrote, "is a living organism, that is, a hierarchical whole. It is not the sum of equal and equivalent individuals, but the coordination, the organic interconnection of individual and collective (classes, estates) persons of different weight and character." What is more, the "most fundamentally essential characteristic" of Ukrainian Nationalism was, according to Iu. Vassyian, the "understanding of the nation as a whole." Getting the nation to function as whole, therefore, was the goal of Nationalism, because the "attainment of statehood is possible only...[by means of] the harmonization of the actions of all the component organs of the national body."

Here, as in several other respects, the organized Nationalists differed fundamentally from Dontsov. For him, simple harmonization or integration or organization was not enough to mobilize the nation and lead it to statehood. Instead, his first priority was to find the idea that would mobilize the nation's will. (A consequence of this belief, incidentally, was that Dontsov, although a Nationalist, paradoxically lacked a developed theory of the nation in the 1920s.) It is not surprising, therefore, that Dontsov and the Nationalists found it impossible to cooperate. For Dontsov, the problem was essentially ideological; for the Nationalists, it was essentially organizational.

That nations were living organisms, however, was a statement that led to several important conclusions. First, as Andriievs'kyi pointed out, that they were "hierarchical
wholes”. Thus, some individuals — clearly the Nationalists — were innately more qualified than others to lead the nation and, by implication, the state. And second, as a living organism, the nation obviously lived. But life, as Darwin had pointed out and as the First World War had very clearly shown, was a struggle for existence. Those who were stronger triumphed, while those who were weaker perished. Consequently, in order to live, nations struggled and inevitably came into conflict with one another. Wars, as Andriievs’kyi argued, were unavoidable.282 Imperialism, wrote Vassyian, also followed naturally because nations grew physically and spiritually and therefore had to expand.283

The nation’s continual involvement in struggle, however, meant that it had to be organized along goal-oriented lines that channeled its energies in the direction of national victory. Only a state could offer the nation the needed organization and assure it continued prosperity. The state, therefore, was necessary to a nation’s spiritual and physical growth and was the form within which the nation found its self-fulfillment and creative self-expression and without which the nation was incapable of assuming its intended place in the world of nations and states.284

But a state was the organic expression of the internal alignment of forces within the nation. As such, it had to represent all social groups and act as the harmonizing factor regulating their interrelationships. In this sense, according to Vassyian, the Nationalist state was both democratic and dictatorial. Democratic — because it guaranteed the active involvement of all members of the nation in the national process. Dictatorial — because it alone determined the means and ends of this process.285 As Martynets’ wrote, “the state will have the final decisive say in all matters. This refers not only to relations among the various social groups, but also to all other matters that in some way relate to the interests of the nation.”286

Several ideas expressed by Martynets’ in 1926 before he became active in the Nationalist movement may help throw some additional light on the OUN’s conception of democracy.
It goes without saying that many, if not most, Nationalists understood democracy simply as anarchy and disorder, as a "psychosis." Martynets', however, possessed far more sophisticated views. Democracy and capitalism, he claimed, were inextricably related. As capitalism takes the place of feudalism, democracy takes the place of theocracy and aristocracy. But just as the basis of feudalism is the aristocracy, so the basis of capitalism is the classes which it brings into being. Democracy, therefore, as the political manifestation of capitalism, cannot exist without classes and is, in fact, the government of all classes. Many young democracies, however, are not fully capable of discarding their feudal roots and, as a result, find themselves in states of crisis. The way out is to summon a "democratic dictator" who will guide the fledgling state to complete democracy. According to Martynets', an example of such a democratic dictator was Mussolini.287 Interestingly, the OUN's resolutions make no mention of democracy, whether in a good or in a bad light. Perhaps the Nationalists considered democracy to be, as Vassyian wrote, inherent in the very concept of a Nationalist state and therefore in no need of elaboration. After all, the Zahrova group also believed that its peasant state could not but be democratic.

The place of the individual in the Nationalist state flowed automatically from the Nationalist understanding of the nation and of the state. Although an individual lived and died, the nation as a whole, in other words, the idea of the nation, existed independently of him and was eternal. As an expression of the nation, therefore, the state had the right to demand the absolute loyalty of the citizen. The individual, however, secure in the knowledge that he was as necessary to the nation and state as they were to him and seeing therein a "relationship of mutually complementing creative advance" continued to retain his individuality and his liberty.288 Elaborating on this idea, Vassyian wrote that Ukrainian Nationalism aspires to the "solidification of the various by means of completion and synthesis and not its simplification by means of exclusion and negation. With regard to this it may
be called integral nationalism . . . . its goal is the greatest synthetic achievements with the smallest loss of the forms of the variety of life and with the smallest limitations on individual liberty."289

That nations were living organisms had another very important consequence for the Nationalists: they were all fundamentally different. The manifestations of a nation's physical and spiritual vitality were peculiar to it alone and could not be transplanted to other national organisms. The socialists had tried to do this in 1917-1920, but their attempt at grafting the foreign socialist ideology onto the body of the Ukrainian nation had ended in a temporary sickness that led to the artificial breakdown of Ukrainian unity. The only ideology that could accurately reflect the true needs and aspirations of the Ukrainian nation, therefore, was clearly a Ukrainian ideology, one that grew out of the nation itself. And Ukrainian Nationalism, as an ideology which based itself exclusively on the past, present, and future of the Ukrainian nation, was clearly the ideology of the Ukrainian nation.

Neither the Ukrainian state nor the Ukrainian ideology, however, could be expected to come into being automatically. The prerequisite was the existence of Ukrainian Nationalists, determined, strong-willed individuals with a fanatical faith in the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian state. On the basis of their unconditional commitment to "all-Ukrainianism, supra-partymindedness, and monocracy", the Nationalists best understood what the Ukrainian nation needed and how the Ukrainian state should be constructed.290 They were therefore the "leading stratum" within the nation.291 Their position of leadership, however, did not flow from their social or economic position within the nation, but from their moral qualities as Nationalists who knew no greater good than the Ukrainian nation and who were willing to sacrifice everything for it. In order to further their goals, Ukrainian Nationalists joined forces in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, by its very nature the only political grouping that could carry out the ideas of Ukrainian Nationalism. As such, only the OUN could administer the future Ukrainian state. Moreover, the OUN had
to aspire to "dominate the Ukrainian national reality in all Ukrainian lands and in foreign lands settled by Ukrainians" in order to ensure that the Nationalist ideology take root in every member of the Ukrainian nation. In so doing, it would oppose "all party and class groupings with their methods of political work," because the "notion of taking different paths to one goal is a stereotypical untruth since different means produce different results." But how did the Nationalists intend to attain Ukrainian statehood? Unlike Dontsov, who gave no answer to this question, the Nationalists had a fairly specific idea of how the "national revolution" was to be brought about. First, a special military "nucleus" would "prepare the Ukrainian popular masses for armed struggle" and train "organizers and schooled leaders." Then, "only a military force, supported by the armed people, which is ready to fight for its rights obstinately and bravely, can free the Ukraine from its occupiers and make possible the organization of the Ukrainian State." A "national dictatorship" would develop in the course of the revolution and would "guarantee the internal strength of the Ukrainian nation and the greatest [possible] resistance to the outside." And finally, "only after the renewal of statehood will the national dictatorship ... go over to the creation of legislative organs on the basis of the representation of all organized social strata with consideration for the differences of the individual lands that will enter into the Ukrainian State." The "monolithic state body" would be ruled by a "head of state summoned by the legislative organ" and by an executive branch appointed by him. The state would be administered on the basis of "local self-government", with each krai having its own "representative legislative organ, summoned by the local organized social strata, and its own executive authority." In the meantime, a "regular, supra-party national army and fleet" would replace the military force of the national revolution. Committed to Nationalist principles, the Nationalist state would conduct socio-economic policies aimed at the "nation's self-sufficiency, the augmentation of the people's wealth, and
the safeguarding of the material well-being of the population by means of the development of all branches of the national economy.” The economic system would be based on the “cooperation of the state, cooperatives, and private capital” and would be so geared as to reflect and best utilize the distribution of social forces within the nation. As the Nationalists often claimed, their policies would be based not on preconceived notions of what the society should look like, but on the direct observation of life itself. Since the Ukrainian nation was primarily a peasant nation, agriculture was and had to remain the lifeblood of the national economy. The middle peasant stratum, as the Revolution had shown, was the most nationally conscious and nationally constructive social class and would therefore have to serve as the major pillar of support of the Ukrainian state. Unlike the peasantry, wrote the Nationalist poet Oles’ Babii, “other strata are either foreign or hostile to our statehood or still too weak to create the life of the nation on their own.” The state, therefore, would “expropriate landowner holdings” and “guarantee the well-being of the peasantry by means of supporting middle peasant farms,” while the peasantry could either own land in the limits set by the state or join cooperatives.

Industry, however, would not be ignored by the future Ukrainian state. In order to assure the independence and “all-round development” of the national economy, to satisfy the “needs of state defense,” and to “give a living to the surplus village population,” the state would “promote the industrialization of the country.” Those industrial enterprises considered “important to the existence and defense of the country will be nationalized”, while all other branches of industry would be left to the “private capital of individual persons and associations on the basis of free competition and private initiative.”

Trade would be in the hands of private capital, cooperatives, and the state. “Defensive, supportive, and protectionist measures” would be employed by the state to “guarantee Ukrainian products and wares the most advantageous sales conditions on the world markets.” The state’s finances would
be assured by a “single, uniform, progressive, and direct tax” and by several indirect taxes.\textsuperscript{304}

In its social policy, the state would regulate the “inter-relationships among social groups” and possess the right to “final arbitration” in all social conflicts. “Members of all social groups” would have the “right to coalitions, according to which they will unite in professional organizations with the right to form syndicates along territorial lines and along branches of production, and will have their representatives in the organs of state authority.” Relations between employers and workers would be based on the “right to free personal and collective agreements”, although labor conflicts would be resolved by courts of arbitration with the final say belonging to the state. In addition, strikes and lockouts would be allowed and the eight-hour working day introduced.\textsuperscript{305}

Production councils of “representatives of the owners, managers, and workers with the right to supervise and control the technology of production” would exist at the factory level. Workers’ councils would also exist in all “agricultural, industrial and trade enterprises” in order to represent the workers before the “trade unions, employers, and state.” The workers’ councils would participate in the production councils as well as conclude “collective agreements.” All workers would be assured unemployment benefits and be subject to a “general life-insurance” plan. All citizens over 60 years and “lacking their own means of sustenance” would receive assistance from the state.\textsuperscript{306}

The Nationalists’ foreign policy envisioned the Ukraine as occupying its intended place of glory in the world. The Ukrainian state would “aspire to attain the most defensible boundaries which will include all Ukrainian ethnic territories and guarantee the necessary economic self-sufficiency.” A cornerstone of Ukrainian foreign policy would be a system of alliances with those “peoples with hostile relations with the occupiers of the Ukraine.”\textsuperscript{307}

The state would also guide the inner life of the nation towards Nationalist goals. The “cultural process”, although “based on freedom of cultural creativity”, would be brought in
line with the “spiritual nature of the Ukrainian people.” However, the Nationalists also made very clear that “only the development of that cultural creativity and those artistic currents which are tied to healthy manifestations in the past of the Ukrainian Nation and to the cult of knighthood and the voluntarist-creative relationship to life will be able to awaken the healthy drive of the nation to strength and power.”

A system of universal and free public schooling would “educate the popular masses in a national-state spirit.” Religion would be the “internal matter” of the individual, although the church, while officially separate from the state, would enjoy the state’s support in “matters of the moral education of the nation.” Only religions with no “denationalizing tendencies” would be allowed to be taught in schools, “religious cults active in the Ukraine” would be Ukrainianized, and active state support would be given to the “development of the Ukrainian national Church.” Interestingly, no mention was made of the Jews.

Considering the above sentiments, it was not surprising that all other Ukrainian political groups — whether in the emigration, in Galicia, or in the Soviet Ukraine and ranging from the Petliurites to the UNDO to the Communists — greeted the OUN’s founding negatively. The threat was clear. The Nationalists had declared their intentions: the envisioned Nationalist state would have no room for non-Nationalists. Tryzub called the Nationalists “our future dictators.” Dilo pointed out that “if the Nationalists are against parties, then they must take into account that by organizing they have become nothing other than a new Ukrainian party, and a fascist-type party at that.” Bil’shovyk Ukrainy (The Bolshevik of the Ukraine), as was to be expected, labelled the OUN a “young Ukrainian fascism.”
CHAPTER 12

THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

A comparison of the ideology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists with French integral nationalism, Italian Fascism, and Ukrainian conservatism is warranted because all four ideologies flourished in the same historical period; because the Ukrainian Nationalists were acquainted with, sometimes admiring of, and perhaps even directly influenced by the other three; and because the core elements of Ukrainian Nationalism — the organic nation, the all-powerful corporate state, and the indispensable peasantry — first appeared in the other ideologies, thereby suggesting that Ukrainian Nationalism may perhaps be viewed as a synthesis of the three. Should this be true, it does not at all mean that the Nationalists consciously borrowed ideas from the other ideologies. Rather, it is only to say that the core ideas made use of by the Nationalists had their origins elsewhere.

The question of the OUN’s relationship to French integral nationalism presents the fewest difficulties. If one considers Charles Maurras’ own definitions of an integral nationalist as a person who “places his country above everything” and who “conceives, treats, and resolves all questions in their relation to the national interest”\textsuperscript{311} and of integral nationalism as the “exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity, and the steady increase of national power,”\textsuperscript{312} then it is immediately and indubitably
clear that the OUN was integral nationalist. Maurras' royalism is not at issue here, because it represented the form in which his "placing the country above everything" could best be manifested. After all, what distinguished Maurras from traditional French royalists was precisely his integral nationalism.

Moreover, Ukrainian Nationalism can also be fruitfully compared to Maurice Barrès' nationalism. Using the "foundations" outlined by E.R. Curtius as the basis for comparison, Ukrainian Nationalism, like Barrès' nationalism, was: 1) collectivist, in that it subordinated the individual to the whole; 2) determinist, in that the individual's fate was determined by his belonging to the nation; 3) anti-intellectual; 4) relativist, in that each nation had its own truth; 5) empiricist, in that the national truth was to be derived not from theory but from reality itself; 6) traditionalist; 7) anti-parliamentarian; 8) militarist; and 9) federalist (the OUN's "local self-government" and the administrative division of the state into krais). Curtius' tenth Grundlage, religiously, was also common to both nationalisms, if defined broadly enough. For Barrès this meant Catholicism, for the Ukrainians the virtually religious passion of their ideology. Of course, the most important and decisive point of identity is the fact that both integral nationalism and Ukrainian Nationalism placed the nation at the very center of their ideology. This was true not only of the OUN, but also, obviously, of Dontołow.

Ukrainian Nationalism's relationship to Fascism is substantially more problematic. Obviously, there is no denying the many similarities. Even a superficial observer can immediately see that the two ideologies shared the following elements: the glorification of the nation and the state, eternal conflict as the essence of life, the exaltation of militarism and imperialism, will and faith as the motive forces of history, action as the solution to all problems, the nation as a living organism, the individual person and the social class as organic parts of the nation, the absolute rejection of Marxism and communism, the commitment to state-regulated capitalism, the subordination of social conflict to national unity and the
regulation of class struggle, an authoritarian, hierarchical, and corporatist state and social structure, a totalitarian national ideology, and a totalitarian political elite. The list could be continued. Nevertheless, do these points of identity make Ukrainian Nationalism "fascist"?

Benito Mussolini suggests an answer to this difficult question: "... for the Fascist everything is in the State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the State . . . . It is not the nation that generates the State . . . Rather the nation is created by the State, which gives to the people, conscious of its own moral unity, a will and therefore an effective existence." Fascism, therefore, took the state as its starting point and the nation as its end-point. The state gives the nation a "will" and "therefore an effective existence." In other words, no state — no nation. The ideological premises of Ukrainian Nationalism, on the other hand, were just the opposite. "The nation," claimed the OUN, "is the highest form of organic human community . . . ." Moreover, "the Ukrainian Nation is the starting point of every action and the end goal of every striving of Ukrainian nationalism." The "sovereign state", meanwhile, was only the "condition which guarantees the nation a lasting active participation in the world." In other words, a nation could very well exist without a state, and all the more so since it already possessed a will by the very nature of its being a nation. The advantage of having a state, however, was that a nation thereby "becomes a full member of world history, because only in the state form of its life does it possess all the internal and external marks of an historical subject." For the Nationalists, therefore, no nation — no state.

This difference of emphasis on the state-nation relationship is vital and lies at the core of the problem of establishing the difference between Ukrainian Nationalism and Fascism. To point out that both movements shared similar worldviews and political goals and methods ignores the fact that the philosophical premises of the two were radically different. Naturally, if one ignores these premises as unimportant and concentrates only on the fact that both movements
were anti-Marxist and authoritarian (as Ernst Nolte might have done), then one could perhaps conclude that Ukrainian Nationalism was indeed a form of fascism. However, if the latter term is to have any precise meaning and not simply be considered a synonym for authoritarianism or totalitarianism (whether of the Marxist or anti-Marxist variety), then the fundamental philosophical difference concerning the nation-state relationship primarily defines the relationship between the OUN’s Nationalism and Fascism.

In order to be consistent with this viewpoint, therefore, the Ukrainian Nationalists should have cared only about the nation and the means by which it could be mobilized to attain statehood and not about the form and role of the desired state. After all, as the Nationalists pointed out, overemphasizing this question of form had caused the downfall of Ukrainian statehood in 1917-1920. Dontsov, of course, was largely faithful to this theoretical distinction by means of his uncompromising commitment to ideological purity. He could and did avoid the question of state form (at least in the 1920s), simply because his concern was theoretical: to create a new worldview, Ukrainian Nationalism, which would create a new type of Ukrainian, the Ukrainian Nationalist. As Dontsov repeatedly wrote, once these were on hand, the “formula would find itself.” For the action-oriented and politically-involved OUN, however, concerned as it was with organizing the nation and attaining statehood, this theoretical distinction was not so easily maintained. Where was it to draw the boundary line between theory and practice? How could it realistically avoid the question of state form when it was actively seeking a state? Did not the methods by means of which the nation was to achieve statehood to some extent determine the kind of state that would result? And most important, could a Nationalist afford to ignore the question of state form when it so obviously affected the nation? Would this not be irresponsible and an abdication of his duties and ideals? Dontsov answered these questions in abstractions or not at all, for which the organized Nationalists criticized him severely. Seen in this light, it is not surprising that the OUN devoted the greater part of its resolutions to the
future Ukrainian state, its form and its policies. Just as Mussolini could not in practice pretend that the Italian nation did not yet exist, so too the Ukrainian Nationalists had to take a stand on the form of statehood they desired. Politically, they simply could not do otherwise without limiting their own effectiveness through ideological purity or "narrowness." In so doing, the Ukrainian Nationalists adopted a position (nation ≠ state) which closely resembled that of the Fascists (state ≠ nation). Although the starting and end points of the two formulae are different, the dynamic relationship between the nation and state is essentially the same for both.

The Nationalists themselves approached the problem of Ukrainian Nationalism's relationship to Fascism from the point of view of the state-nation question. The difference between Ukrainian Nationalism and Italian Fascism, wrote Ievhen Onats'kyi, a Nationalist journalist living in Rome, was of "tremendous principled importance." Both had in common that they were "vividly expressed nationalisms." Fascism, however, was the "nationalism of a state nation, opposed to all irredentisms, and ready to sacrifice everything and everybody before the cult of its already created state." Ukrainian Nationalism, on the other hand, was the "nationalism of a stateless nation that lives only by irredentism and is ready to sacrifice everything and everybody for the destruction of the cult of those states that do not allow it to live." Onats'kyi had indeed touched upon an interesting difference between the two ideologies: Fascism was a way of organizing a state, while Ukrainian Nationalism was a way of attaining a state. The Ukrainians, therefore, could not be fascists, because they had not even reached that point — a state — which made fascism possible. Thus, even in practical terms, the Nationalists' end point was the Fascists' starting point. In other words, Ukrainian Nationalism was in its essence a national-liberation movement. As Konovalets' remarked in his closing speech at the OUN Congress, "... the renewal of a Unified Ukrainian State is in and of itself equivalent to the liquidation of the Muscovite empire as well as of Polish historical imperialism."
How both of these imperialisms were to be “liquidated” was the problem confronting the OUN. One way to learn how to conduct one’s own national-liberation struggle was to study the experience of other nations. Thus, in prefacing an article by the Fascist publicist Giacinto Trevisonno on the virtues and universality of Fascism, Rozbudova Natsii pointed out that “Ukrainian nationalists, who vigilantly follow all manifestations of national activism in the various countries of the world, dare not overlook the movement of the Italian nationalists with their amazingly great achievements.” And indeed, the journal also contained articles on the United States, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Korea, Latvia, and Lithuania. Revolutionary movements, such as Zemlia i Volia, Piłsudski’s anti-Russian underground, and the Irish Sinn Fein, were also of inordinate interest to the Nationalists.

Not surprisingly, the Fascists, as nationalists who had succeeded in making “amazingly great achievements,” most fascinated the Ukrainian Nationalists, who made no effort to hide their obvious admiration for Mussolini and openly considered the ideology and practice of Fascism to have relevance to the Ukrainian situation. As early as the second issue of Rozbudova Natsii, the normally staid Dmytro Andriievs'kyi revealed the awe with which the Nationalists viewed the events in Italy:

“After almost a thousand years of slavery and disunity, Italy is only now coming to its national life. Rejuvenated with a barbarian injection, revitalized during the time of her great historical interlude, the heiress of ancient Rome turns a new page of her existence. The post-war international agreements did not take into account either the ancient traditions, or the youthful freshness, or the material difficulties of the Italian nation, cramped on a small peninsula. In the soul of the nation — raging, spurred on to action by a brilliant dictator — there awakens today an awareness of its difficulties, the rapaciousness of the ancient conqueror, the sense of the great, and the invincible desire for daring and dangerous actions.”
The parallel with the Ukraine was too obvious to be missed. It too had once had a brilliant past (Kiev Rus’), experienced a “thousand years of slavery and disunity”, and was now on the verge of asserting its “youthful freshness” and “desire for daring and dangerous actions.”

Onats’kyi expressed the analogy with Italy openly. “The old and young Italy,” he wrote, “[are] almost like the former Little Russia and the present Ukraine.” But whereas the “extraordinary organizer and leader Mussolini” along with his “group of young, energetic people, armed at first only with their passionate love and indefatigable energy,” had raised Italy from its passivity, the Ukrainian national effort had ended in “bankruptcy.” “The fascist Italian movement,” continued Onats’kyi, “evoked a completely understandable interest” among Ukrainians, particularly because it “immediately had to wage armed struggle against Italian communists, who received money and instructions from Moscow.” As a result, “many Ukrainian nationalists began calling themselves Ukrainian fascists and seeking support in the Italian fascists.” Although this support did not materialize because of a divergence in foreign policy interests with many Nationalists therefore becoming deeply disenchanted, the “young Ukrainian nationalism adopted some things from Italian fascism and, first of all, the recognition of the need for an iron hierarchical organization and the subordination of all private, party, and class interests to the interests of the fatherland . . . . Furthermore, the recognition of the superiority of the strength of the spirit over the strength of matter.”

Interestingly, Onats’kyi concedes that there actually were Ukrainian Nationalists who called themselves Ukrainian fascists. His remark, together with Dontsov’s reference to “Ukrainian ‘fascism’” in 1924, Zahrava’s answer to the question “Are We Fascists?”, and the absorption into the League of Ukrainian Nationalists of the Union of Ukrainian Fascists, gives incontrovertable evidence that Ukrainian fascists, at least of the self-styled variety, did in fact exist. Not
accidentally, many of them found a home in the organized Ukrainian Nationalist movement in general and in the OUN in particular. Clearly, the ideological and philosophical subtleties differentiating Ukrainian Nationalism from Fascism did not in practice mean much to the Ukrainian fascists.

Although Ukrainian Nationalism’s similarities with French integral nationalism and Italian Fascism are undeniably large, the historical and ideological origins of the Nationalist ideology are to be found first and foremost in the Ukrainian conservative parties and ideologies characterised as “right-wing” by Viktor Andriievs’kyi.

The ideas advocated by the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party, the Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists, Mykola Chudinov’s Ukrainian People’s Party, V. Andriievs’kyi’s Soborna Ukraina, and even by Vasyl’ Vyshyvanyi’s Free Cossacks were all forerunners of Ukrainian Nationalism. These “right-wing” groups’ high regard for the peasantry and for military action, their endorsement of national unity, organization, hierarchy, and strong government, their unanimous opposition to socialism, their disdain for democracy and parliamentarianism (with the exception of Chudinov’s party), and their general unwillingness (excepting the Democratic Agrarians and the Agrarian Statists) to collaborate with non-Ukrainians all found a place in the later Nationalist ideology. Dontsov’s involvement in the Democratic Agrarians and in Skoropads’kyi’s government, the absorption into the LUN of the Union of Ukrainian Agrarians in the ČSR, the prominent Hetmanite presence in the Group of Ukrainian State Youth, and the very simple fact that all the Nationalist and conservative groups under consideration were Ukrainian and therefore shared a common tradition imply that an actual transmission of ideas must have taken place and indeed did take place.

Crucially, the central feature of “right-wing” thinking — the indispensability of the peasantry to Ukrainian statehood — assumed an equally central role in Ukrainian Nationalism. The writings of Dontsov, D. Andriievs’kyi, O. Babii, and M.
Stsibors'kyi, the program of the Ukrainian Party of National Work, the editorial policy of Zahrava, and the resolutions of the OUN all reveal the degree to which the Nationalists built their ideology around the agrarian class. Unlike many of the conservatives, however, the Nationalists regarded the peasantry as the strongest social class and as the core of the nation, thereby giving their brand of integral nationalism a social content quite different from that of Maurras. In this as in many other respects, the Nationalists infused essentially "right-wing" Ukrainian ideas with their own content.

The Hetmanites, in particular, provided the Nationalists with many of the starting points of their ideological development. The Hetmanite state itself, for example, Skoropads'kyi's flabby rule and the preponderant influence of Russians aside, closely approximated the Nationalist ideal. The most convincing evidence of their ideological kinship with the Nationalists, however, is found in the 1920 statute of the Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists (USKhD), which in many parts reads like the OUN's resolutions:

"The Ukrainian Nation cannot exist without its own independent and sovereign State . . . . That is why the USKhD takes upon itself the task of organizing those forces who want to build an independent and sovereign Ukrainian State on all the lands inhabited by the Ukrainian ethnic mass . . . . the USKhD takes upon itself the task of . . . basing Ukrainian state-creative political work exclusively on the permanent forces of the Ukrainian Nation and not on accidental and changeable outside foreign aid . . . . the USKhD wants to create the kind of State a) that would rely on the support of the natural and permanent groupings of people within the Nation — on the materially productive toiling classes, b) that would guarantee each class the maximum of its cultural and economic development as well as participation in the governing of the State . . . . A higher and lasting form of statehood . . . can be built under the following conditions: a) the self-organization
of each class and each Land in one solid and healthy political-economic organism, b) the unification of all classes and all Lands by means of the permanent and sole principle of national and state unity as personified in the person of the unchangeable and unelected Head of the National State. Such a form of statehood is a Toilers’ Monarchy. Standing above all classes and not being a dictatorship of one party or caste, it is interested in guaranteeing each class the possibility of self-organization and the broadest development of all its productive abilities . . . . the USKhD . . . rejects the principles of partymindedness, voting, elections, and so on, because this leads to the development of careerism, demagogy, irresponsibility, antagonism, disunity, and weakness within the very organization. Instead, the USKhD builds its organization on the basis of selectivity, length of service, assortment, solidarity, and discipline.”321

The Hetmanite vocabulary was, of course, different from that of the Nationalists. The essential Hetmanite ideological beliefs, however, clearly found their way into Ukrainian Nationalism. These included, among others, the absolute priority of statehood, the necessity of sobornist’, the principle of “our own forces”, the integrality of the nation, class cooperation and administrative “federalism”, an all-powerful executive embodying the nation’s will, the rejection of parties and of parliamentarianism, and the necessity of a new, non-party type of cadre. Most important, both the Hetmanites and the OUN, unlike Dontsov, recognized the importance of organization and believed that without it Ukrainian efforts to attain statehood would remain unsuccessful. Unlike the Hetmanites, however, the Nationalists believed that their support of the peasantry entailed rejecting the primacy of the landowners. As Mykola Stsibors’kyi wrote in 1928:

“A policy supporting the interests of the peasantry is a directly expedient and necessary demand. Even disregarding the economic significance of the peasantry
in the Ukraine . . ., we must admit that a total defense of its interests is imperative because the Ukrainian peasantry is the most important carrier of organic national forces, of power, and of creativity and is that well from which the nation-state draws its strength and striving for development. The strength, wealth, and development of our nation in the future will be directly proportional to the well-being and strength of the peasantry. If for all these reasons we correctly evaluate the politico-social, economic, and state importance of the two actors (the peasantry and the landowners) who are fighting over the land, then the practical nationalist policy must clearly and decisively defend the interests of the peasantry.”

Ukrainian Nationalism’s historical and ideological origins in “right-wing” Ukrainian conservatism point to the fact that, in spite of its ideological affinity with non-Ukrainian right-wing movements, the Nationalist ideology was primarily (and obviously) a product of the post-war Ukrainian intellectual and socio-political climate. The political chaos, social dislocation, intellectual self-searching, and moral disillusionment virtually demanded that a movement considering itself a negation of the existing reality arise. Equally important was the fact that many of the canons of the Nationalist faith already existed in either partially or fully developed form among politically active Ukrainians. The principle of “our own forces” is a good example of how a generally accepted post-war belief was appropriated by the Nationalists and made into a central tenet of their ideology. A xenophobic hatred of the Ukraine’s national enemies, in particular the Russians and Poles, a tendency to think in exclusively national terms, the desire for all-Ukrainian political and social unity and for the abolishment of unnecessary party and class strife, and the recognition of the need for strong leadership and some degree of coordination were notions which also figured prominently in the post-war political thought of virtually the entire Ukrainian emigration, including the UNR, ZUNR, V. Vynnychenko, M. Shapoval, S.
Vityk, and many others. In this respect, Ukrainian Nationalism was as organically Ukrainian a phenomenon as any other Ukrainian political current of the 1920s. As a result, there can, for the most part, be no question of Ukrainian Nationalism’s having “borrowed” from or “imitated” foreign examples or of its having been “artificially transplanted” to Ukrainian soil. The Nationalists, therefore, were not incorrect when they said that “Ukrainian Nationalism is a spiritual and political movement, which arose from the inner nature of the Ukrainian Nation at the time of its violent struggle for the foundations and goals of creative existence.”

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The founding congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was the watershed dividing the period under discussion, which comprised the origins and development of Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1920s, from the period of the 1930s, when the organized Nationalist movement came as close as it ever would to becoming a form of fascism. This second period ended with the assassination of Ievhen Konovalets’ in 1938 and the subsequent division of the OUN into two hostile camps.

Most significant of the trends which the OUN underwent in the 1930s were its increasing “orientation” on foreign models in general and on Nazi Germany in particular and the intensification of the krai-emigre conflict. Both trends, as this study has shown, had their roots in the 1920s and were built into the Nationalist movement from the very outset.

Ironically, the organized Nationalists of the 1930s thereby undermined the very principles which the individual Nationalists of the 1920s had regarded as essential to the very notion of Nationalism. First, the Nationalist dependence on Germany went far beyond wanting to “learn” from the Nazis and, in fact, constituted a classic case of the “orientations” the early Nationalists so despised. Dontsov, incidentally, also
increasingly oriented himself on the Nazi model. And second, the division of the OUN into two warring factions revealed the degree to which the Nationalists had forgotten their own belief that party interests should be subordinated to national interests. In both respects, the Nationalists betrayed their original resolve to be different from the other parties and in fact joined the "party" camp.

In this manner, the Nationalists eventually completed a full circle and reached the point where their own ideology and politics became the objects of internal reevaluation and criticism. What followed then was the third and final period of the Nationalist movement, which ended with the elimination of the krai OUN in the mid-1950s. Ironically, this third period saw the Nationalists turn against the ideological tenets of the 1920s and 1930s and adopt generally social democratic positions similar to those they had rejected in the 1920s. 

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3. Although valuable to the researcher, most of the following works must be approached with some caution: Roman Ilnytzykij, Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934-1945 (München: Osteuropa-Institut, 1958); Ievhen Konovalets’ ta ioho doba (Munich: Fundatsiia im. Ievhen Konoval’tsia, 1974); Volodymyr Martynets’, Ukrains’ke pidpillia vid UVO do OUN (West Germany, 1949); Petro Mirchuk, Narys istorii Orhanizatsiia Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv 1920-1939 (Munich: Ukrains’ke Vydavnytstvo, 1968); Orhanizatsiia Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv 1929-1954 (Paris: Persha Ukrains’ka Drukarnia u Frantsii, 1955); OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot’by 1929-1955 rr. (Munich, 1955); Mykhailo Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov: Politychnyi portret (New York: Trident International, 1974); the memoirs of Zynovii Knysh, too numerous to mention, are all of great interest and considerable value.

4. One of the exceptions to this rule is Iu. I. Rymarenko, Burzhuaznyi Natsionalizm ta ioho ‘teoriia’ natsii (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1974).


6. Martynets’, p. 120.

7. “Nasha pliatorma,” Vistnyk Soiuza vyzvoennia Ukrainy, 1, No. 1 (1914), 1.


10. Ibid., p. 859.
11. Ibid., p. 859; Torzecki, pp. 112-14.
12. Lewandowski, p. 173; Torzecki, p. 112.
17. Ibid., p. 67.
18. Ibid., p. 72.
19. Ibid., p. 72.
20. Ibid., p. 76.
21. Ibid., p. 80.
22. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
23. Ibid., p. 110.
27. Lewandowski, p. 170.
28. Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 2, No. 60 (1920), 4.
30. Volia, 2, No. 6-7 (1921), 281.
32. Ibid., p. 23.
33. "Partiia chy narod?", Soborna Ukraina, 1, No. 2 (1921), 1; "Lysty vid ukraïns'kykh khliborobiv do ukraïns'koi intellihtsii," Soborna Ukraina, 1, No. 9 (1921), 1-3.
34. Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi, p. 55.
35. Ievhen Chykalenko, “De vykhid?”, Volia, 2, No. 3-4 (1921), 102-04.
36. Volia, 2, No. 9-10 (1921), 369-70.
40. Torzecki, p. 114.
41. Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi, p. 55.
42. Ukrains’ki visti, 3, No. 62 (1928), 2.
46. “Rozval i bahno,” Nova Hromada, 1, No. 3-4 (1923).
47. “V spravi skhid’n’oi Halychyny,” Ukrains’kyi Prapor, 1, No. 3 (1919), 1.
49. Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 1, No. 1 (1922), 92-95.
50. Ukrains’kyi Prapor, 2, No. 44 (1920).
53. Triembits'kyi, p. 57.
54. Volia, 1, No. 4 (1919), 6.
55. Ibid., p. 5.
58. Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 3, No. 2 (1921).
61. Ibid., p. 45.
64. Konovalets', p. 45.
65. Martynets', p. 34.
68. Kamenets'kyi, p. 856.
69. Torzecki, p. 61.
70. Tryzub, 2, No. 16 (1926), pp. 25-26; 2, No. 45 (1926), pp. 20-22.
71. Torzecki, p. 61.
72. Ibid., p. 61.
73. Tryzub, 1, No. 1 (1925), 2.
76. Dmytro Andriievs'kyi, “Ievropeizm”, Tryzub, 2, No. 32 (1926), 8-12; 2, No. 33 (1926), 12-20.
77. Ibid., pp. 10, 12-13.
78. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
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81. V. Sal’s’kyi, “Vozhd’ z lasky Bozhoi,” Tryzub, 2, No. 35-36 (1926), 17.
86. Ibid., pp. 18-20.
87. Ibid., pp. 18-20.
88. Ibid., p. 20.
90. Nova Ukraina, 1, No. 1 (1922).
93. Ibid., pp. 35-46, 79.
98. Nova Hromada, 2, No. 2-4 (1924).
99. Nova Hromada, 2, No. 5-6 (1924).
101. Dontsov, of course, did not stop writing in 1929.
This admittedly artificial cut-off point was chosen for the very simple and obvious reason of examining only those of his ideas which were accessible to Ukrainians in the period under discussion in this study.

126. An Aristotelian term denoting perfect character.
131. Ibid., pp. 362-64.
132. Ibid., pp. 364-65.
135. Ibid., p. 13. By Provençalism Dontsov meant “looking at the world from the point of view of ‘numbers’, of the plebs, the province, of one’s native Provençe, as a part of some greater whole.” Ibid., p. 186.
136. Ibid., p. 205.
137. Ibid., p. 262.
138. Ibid., p. 273.
139. Ibid., pp. 333-34.
140. Ibid., pp. 285-86.
141. Sosnovs’kyi, p. 233.
142. Ibid., pp. 267-68.
144. Ibid., pp. 341-42.
145. Ibid., pp. 228, 232.
146. Sosnovs’kyi, p. 271.
147. Ibid., pp. 252-53.
166. Lewandowski, p. 239.
167. *Ukrains'kyi Skytalets',* 4, No. 6 (1923), 1.
174. "Viis'kovyi zizd v Prazi," *Ukrains'kyi Prapor*, 2, No. 46 (1920), 3. This article appeared on August 28. According to Konovalets' (p. 42), the military congress took place on August 31 — obviously, Konovalets' made a mistake. Curiously, this glaring discrepancy has gone unnoticed in the literature on this period.
175. Konovalets', p. 42.
177. “Viis’kovyi zizd . . .,” Ukrains’kyi Prapor, p. 3.
179. Ibid., p. 254.
180. Ibid., p. 254.
181. Ibid., p. 251.
183. Ibid., p. 42.
188. Mel’nykovych, pp. 328-40; Martynets’, pp. 54-58.
191. Martynets’, p. 35.
195. Mirchuk, p. 33.
196. Kedryn, p. 106; Martynets’, p. 36.
199. Sosnovs’kyi, p. 172.
200. Ibid., p. 171.
201. Ibid. p. 171.
202. Zahrava, 1, No. 2 (1923), 32; No. 3 (1923), 48; No. 9 (1925), 144.
203. “Chy my fashysty?,” Zahrava, 1, No. 7 (1923), 99.
204. “Na dva fronty,” Zahrava, 1, No. 9 (1923), 133.
206. Ibid., p. 98.
219. “Pislia atentatu,” Natsional’na Dumka, 1, No. 4-6 (1924), 23-25; see also Zynovii Knysh, Dva protsesy iak naslidok diial’nosti UVO v 1924 rotsi (Toronto: Sribna Surma).
221. Torzecki, p. 56; Mirchuk, pp. 40-41.
224. It is logical to assume, however, that Dumin’s remarks concerning the UVO’s relations with the Germans are accurate insofar as these were facts which the Germans themselves would know about and could therefore verify.
225. Torzecki, p. 117.
229. Mel’nykovych, p. 335; Dumin, pp. 113, 118-19; Martynets’, pp. 175-76; Mirchuk, p. 34; Ievhen Vrets’ona, “Moi zustrich z polkovnykom,” in *Ievhen Konovalets’ ta ioho doba*, pp. 466-72.
241. Narizhnyi, p. 82.
242. *Ukrains’kyi Skytalets’,* 3, No. 21 (1922), 43.
243. Mel’nykovych, p. 333.
244. “Nasha ideolohiia,” *Natsional’na Dumka*, 1, No. 3 (1924), 3-7.
246. Mirchuk, p. 66.
250. V. Voin, “Derzhavnyts’ka molod’,” *Students’kyi vistnyk*, 3, No. 5 (1925), 13-16.
257. Mirchuk, p. 72.
258. Knysh, *Pry dzherelakh* . . . , pp. 66-74; Mirchuk, pp. 54-56; Lenkavs’kyi, p. 400.
259. B.K., an early SUNM activist, testifies to Bodnaryvych’s fascist tendencies.
261. According to B.K.
262. Volodymyr the Great was a prince of the Kievan Rus’. His symbol, the trident, is considered the emblem of the Ukrainian national state by non-Soviet Ukrainians.
263. According to B.K., the “enslavement of foreigners” referred to non-Ukrainians living in the Ukraine. Mirchuk (p. 127) writes: “This was the result of discussions of whether the Ukrainian State should give complete freedom to foreigners even when they act against it as in 1917-18 . . . or should it, on the other hand, ‘enslave’ them, if this is what the security and growth of the Ukrainian State requires.”
266. Mirchuk, pp. 76-78; Martynets’, pp. 201-04.
267. Mirchuk, pp. 79-80.
271. Martynets', pp. 225-30; D. Dontsov, “Problema pokolin’,” 
_Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk_, 7, no. 7-8 (1928), 328.
274. Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 7, No. 11 (1928), 285-86.
he and Okhrymovych were to see how little the emigres 
abided by the rules of conspiracy at the congress, to the point of 
making a group photograph and sending postcards with the 
signatures of all the participants. These two incidents, of 
course, affirm the fact that, unlike the krai Nationalists, the 
emigres perceived the OUN as a semi-legal political 
organization in no great need of conspiracy. According to B.K., 
the differences between the emigres and the krai Nationalists 
were so great that the latter even censored copies of _Rozbudova Natsii_ 
before disseminating them among the young. Moreover, 
the young Galicians also believed the OUN resolutions to have 
placed far too much emphasis on socio-economic problems; the 
OUN Structure can be found in Mirchuk, pp. 100-01.
281. Ibid., p. 41.
284. _OUN v svitli postanov_, pp. 4-5.
289. Ibid., p. 40.
290. OUN v svitli postanov, p. 6.
292. OUN v svitli postanov, p. 15.
293. OUN v svitli postanov, p. 15; Vassyian, “Do holovnykh zasad . . .”, p. 38.
295. Ibid., p. 95.
296. Ibid., p. 93.
297. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
298. Ibid., p. 96.
299. Ibid., p. 99.
300. Ibid., p. 96.
301. Oles’ Babii, “Revoliutsiia chy kontrrevoliutsiia,” Rozbudova Natsii, 1, No. 3 (1928), 78.
302. Mirchuk, p. 96.
303. Mirchuk, p. 97.
304. Ibid., p. 304.
305. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
306. Ibid., p. 98.
307. Ibid., p. 98.
308. Ibid., p. 99.
309. Ibid., p. 99.
310. Ibid., pp. 108-11.
315. Mirchuk, pp. 94-95.
316. Ievhen Onats'kyi, “Lysty z Italii,” Rozbudova Natsii, 1, No. 3 (1928), 95.
317. Mirchuk, p. 92.
323. Mirchuk, p. 94.
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