

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A MONTHLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS

THE POLICY OF PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING PEACE

THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY TODAY

ANTI-SOVIETISM IN PEKING'S STRATEGY

THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

REVIEWS * FACTS AND FIGURES

7

1973



A MONTHLY JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FOUNDED
IN RUSSIAN: 1954—IN ENGLISH: 1955

CONTENTS

The Policy of Preserving and Strengthening Peace	3
Socialist Countries Consolidate Their Political Foundations B. Strashun	8
Defence of Peace: The Peoples' Cause A. Khomenko	15
Anti-Sovietism in Peking's Strategy I. Alexeyev	21
Middle East: Dangerous Tension Must Go E. Dmitriyev	27
Soviet-Italian Contacts Expand L. Yugov	33
The Future of Ecuador's Oil D. Lozinov	40
The Present-Day Capitalist Economy: Processes and Tendencies A. Pokrovsky, G. Sokolnikov	45
The Mass Media and International Law Y. Kolosov	53

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

OAU: Ten Years of Existence Y. Alimov	59
--	----

COMMENT ON FACTS

International Financial Organisations: Their Role in Neocolonialist Policy V. Panov	65
---	----


FROM THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Preparation of the Munich Deal V. Sipols, M. Pankrashova	70
---	----

SCANNING THE FOREIGN PRESS

Reminiscences of the Past, a Peek into the Future V. Ryzhikov	80
--	----

(Continued on page 2)



JULY
MOSCOW • 1973

REMINISCENCES

The Soviet General Staff at War (1941-1945) . . . S. Shtemenko 84

REVIEWS

General de Gaulle: His Life and Policy (N. Molchanov, General de Gaulle) G. Filatov 90

Incurable Disease (Victor Perlo, The Unstable Economy. Booms and Recessions in the United States Since 1945) . . . S. Losev 92

Problems of Socialist Economic Integration (Y. Kormnov, Specialisation and Cooperation of Production in the CMEA Countries Under Socialist Economic Integration) I. Dudinsky 94

Uhuru! Freedom! (L. Vladimirov, Forged in the Fires of Struggle. Kenya's Path to Independence) N. Lebedev 97

Tories' "European Stake" (Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion. How Britain Joined the Common Market) . . . I. Kovalyova 100

The Mechanism of US Foreign Policy (The USA: Foreign Policy Mechanism. Organisation, Functions, Administration) I. Usachyov 102

Myths of Bourgeois Political Economy (E. Bregel, Critique of Bourgeois Doctrines on the Economic System of Modern Capitalism) V. Mikheyev 104

FACTS AND FIGURES

Soviet-Swedish Trade Ties ★ Algeria's Agrarian Reform ★
★ ECLA ★ New International Scientific Centre ★ US Military
Expenditure ★ Dahomey ★ UN Forces 106

This journal is published by the
ALL-UNION SOCIETY "ZNANIYE"
in Russian, English and French

English Editor
I. L. MELAMED
Editorial Office

14 Gorokhovskiy Pereulok, Moscow K-64
Printed at the Chekhov Printing Works
Chekhov, Moscow Region

Any articles and other materials in the journal may
be reproduced with due acknowledgement

© Общество «Знание», 1973 г.
© Translated into the English.
Progress Publishers, 1973.

THE POLICY OF PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING PEACE

SOCIALISM and peace are indivisible concepts. Every passing year and even day bring the peoples of the world fresh irrefutable proof of the profound truth of these words. This is forcefully demonstrated by developments in Europe in recent years. Now that the first half of 1973 is over, important favourable changes are keenly felt in Europe. Thanks to the consistent constructive policy of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving, realistically-minded forces, an historic turn is being made on the continent—from cold war and dangerous tensions to rational joint effort for consolidating peace and developing mutually advantageous economic cooperation.

It is impossible to overestimate the tremendous impact the April Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU has had on the cause of peace and security in Europe. The Plenary Meeting fully approved the work done by the Political Bureau in safeguarding a lasting peace throughout the world and in providing reliable security for the Soviet people who are building communism. It noted the great personal contribution toward achieving these aims, made by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The decisions of the Plenary Meeting have been acclaimed by all Soviet people, the peoples of other socialist countries and the peace-loving forces the world over.

The constructive foreign policy of the CPSU helps establish the principles of peaceful coexistence as a generally recognised rule governing relations between states with differing social systems. It is the main driving force in the present shift from the cold war to a détente in Europe. Leonid Brezhnev stated in his speech at the May Day Meeting in Moscow: "We call for eliminating the blood-soaked past of Europe not to forget it, but so that it should never return. Today, when socialism has become a mighty, irrepressible force in the life of Europe, this has become a fully realistic task."

The main direction of the CPSU's foreign policy activity is toward consolidating the posi-

tions of world socialism, promoting allround cooperation with other fraternal socialist countries. Their coordinated peaceful foreign policy is playing a paramount role in bringing about the positive changes in Europe and in normalising the entire international atmosphere.

The successes of peace "conclusively demonstrate the correctness and effectiveness of the policy pursued by the socialist states. The principles of peaceful coexistence formulated by Lenin and consistently applied for decades by the Soviet Union and then by the entire socialist community determine ever more resolutely the trend of international relations," Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, stated in Bydgoszcz in early April. The enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in April noted that the "influence of the socialist countries, the Soviet Union in the first place, is increasingly felt in the positive development of international events".

Elimination of the diplomatic blockade of the German Democratic Republic and recognition of the GDR by most states of the world constitute a substantial achievement of the coordinated policy of the countries of the socialist community.

Consolidation of the positions of world socialism is the number one task of the CPSU and fraternal parties. The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU stressed once again that our Party is doing and will continue to do everything necessary to consolidate the unity of the socialist countries and to promote allround relations with them. The recent visits to the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, serve this historic task.

Close cooperation of socialist countries united in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance constitutes an important and constant factor for European security. "We have never considered our community as an exclusive bloc opposing its in-

terests to the interests of other countries," Leonid Brezhnev said in Warsaw on May 11, 1973. "On the contrary, the strength of our joint policy lies in the fact that it meets the aspirations of all progressive movements, the hopes and expectations of all peoples. We firmly stand on class positions. We stand for securing to all peoples the right to a life of freedom and dignity. We stand for political settlement of all outstanding issues, for businesslike and equal cooperation."

The rising might and international prestige of the USSR and other fraternal socialist countries, and their intensified initiatives in peaceful policy, as well as the increasing impact of other factors determining the general progressive development of international relations today, have led capitalist states to increasingly recognise the need for peaceful coexistence as the only rational basis for relations with socialist countries.

This applies in particular to France whose President, Georges Pompidou, and the Government have proclaimed a policy of détente, concord and mutual cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The meeting of Leonid Brezhnev and Georges Pompidou, held in Zaslavl in early January 1973, made an important contribution to promoting stable cooperation between the USSR and France. The participants in the meeting noted that the efforts of both countries were aimed at facilitating the convocation of an all-European conference. They reaffirmed their determination to do everything in their power for the successful preparation of the conference on security and cooperation and its holding in the next several months.

The visit to the FRG by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, constituted a new major landmark in the postwar period in the life of the European peoples and in the transition of Europe to a new historical stage when peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation of countries with differing social systems are becoming the law-governing international relations of European states. The visit was a concrete embodiment of the foreign policy mapped out by the 24th CPSU Congress. It was a forceful example of the implementation of the decisions of the April Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which stressed the great significance of direct contacts between our Party and State leaders and leaders of other states, for consolidating favourable changes in the international climate.

The successful completion of the summit talks between the Soviet Union and the FRG in

Bonn was preceded by extensive work of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU following the signing and ratification of the treaty with the FRG and discussions between Leonid Brezhnev and Willy Brandt in Moscow and Oreanda. Such positive shifts in Europe as the signing of the treaties of the USSR and the Polish People's Republic with the FRG, the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, the Treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—the international acts which recognise the paramount importance of the principle of the inviolability of frontiers as a basis for preserving peace and security in Europe—have created the necessary groundwork for the Bonn negotiations between the leaders of the USSR and the FRG. Thereby prerequisites were created for the development of mutually advantageous many-sided relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and the FRG, including in the sphere of the economy, science and technology, and cultural exchanges.

Emphasising the particular moral and political significance of the 1970 Moscow Treaty which marked the turning point in relations between the USSR and the FRG, Leonid Brezhnev stated on May 13 in his interview to H. Nannen, Editor-in-Chief of *Stern*, that the Treaty had created a solid basis for allround ties between the Soviet Union and the FRG, specifically in the areas of economy, commerce, science and technology. "The development of these ties," Leonid Brezhnev said, "is part of the general process of improving relations between our countries. Moreover, the active character of the ties and their scale forcefully indicate the stability of relations now being established between the Soviet Union and West Germany."

The establishment of peaceful cooperation between the USSR and the FRG meets the interests of the peoples of both countries, the interests of peace and security in Europe. "The ordinary people of our country stand for good-neighbourly relations with the socialist world. This conforms to their vital interests, among which first place is held by the striving to ensure a lasting peace," stated Kurt Bachmann, Chairman of the German Communist Party. Indeed, the people of the FRG cannot fail to see the direct benefit resulting from the relaxation of international tensions, which creates the most favourable conditions for their struggle for social progress, for their vital economic needs and democratic rights and freedoms. The broadest sections of the West German population are interested in the development of trade and economic rela-

tions between the FRG and socialist countries. During the visit Leonid Brezhnev met with leading members of the German Communist Party, West German trade-union leaders and the Premier of North Rhine Westphalia, the majority of whose population are workers of the Rhine-Ruhr industrial region.

Today a new, constructive page is opening in the history of relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG. This is the result of the expanding process of détente in Europe, which is linked to a decisive degree with the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, with the constructive positions of other interested countries, and the persistent efforts of peace-loving forces. The establishment of cooperation between the USSR and the FRG, as an essential component of the peaceful development in Europe, at the same time is indissolubly linked with the worldwide process of normalising the political climate, in particular with an improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA.

This is also the result of the will of the people of the FRG to consolidate peace and cooperation, which was so conclusively demonstrated in the Bundestag elections last autumn when the majority of West German voters cast their ballot for the policy of the Brandt-Scheel Government. This is the result of the realistic policy pursued by the FRG Government, including the personal efforts of Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt. Recognition of their share of responsibility for the destiny of Europe, beyond doubt, underlies the constructive foreign policy actions taken by the present leaders of the FRG. Assessing the treaties of the FRG with the USSR, Poland and the GDR, Federal Chancellor Brandt stated that an "historic attempt to banish war from our continent forever" was being made in Europe.

The visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the FRG is an important contribution toward resolving the cardinal issue of our epoch — saving mankind from the threat of a world war, eliminating war and force in the relations among all countries. Let us review in our mind's eye the recent past when war psychosis was artificially fanned in Europe and belligerent calls were sounded "to roll back communism" and "to win the cold war". In those years many feared the outbreak of a third world war because of the reckless demands made by the West German revanchists. Today these apprehensions are becoming a thing of the past. In his speech over the West German TV Leonid Brezhnev stated that "the Europe which more than once was the hotbed of aggressive wars that brought colossal destruction and claimed millions of lives must be relegated to the past for all

times. We want its place to be taken by a new continent, a continent of peace, mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation among all states".

It is not by chance that failure besets the attempts of the most reactionary circles of the FRG to cling to the long discredited cold-war concepts and to resist the development of allround USSR-FRG cooperation. Under the onslaught of life itself and, most of all, with the growing pressure of the broadest sections of the people of the FRG, these forces are now compelled to adapt themselves to the changing conditions.

During Leonid Brezhnev's visit the following agreements designed to promote the further extension and deepening of bilateral relations were signed: Agreement on the Development of Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation; Agreement on Cultural Cooperation; Supplementary Protocol to the Air Travel Agreement of November 11, 1971. This long-term programme of mutually beneficial cooperation opens up wide prospects for the two countries. It takes into consideration the fact that the economic potentials of both countries beneficially supplement each other and that long-standing traditional ties exist in trade between the USSR and the FRG. As a result of the talks in Bonn and the agreements signed there, cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany will undoubtedly reach new dimensions.

The present development of peaceful relations and mutually advantageous cooperation between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries convincingly demonstrates the vitality of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence. Evaluating the prospects for peace, Lenin emphasised that the Soviet Republic through its programme of peace and long-term plans of economic cooperation upholds not only peaceful interests of the absolute majority of the world population, but also attracts the business circles of capitalist states. "With our plan we shall most certainly attract the sympathy not only of all the workers but of sensible capitalists as well..."¹

The meetings and talks in the FRG facilitate rapprochement and mutual understanding between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the FRG in transforming Europe into a continent of permanent peace and friendship among all the European nations. Their results constitute a major step in accomplishing this task. In his speech on leaving Bonn Leonid Brezhnev emphasised: "Our talks, the agreements signed during our visit and the Joint Statement we signed yesterday with

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 451.

Chancellor Brandt—all this represents new considerable steps in spreading cooperation between the peoples of our two countries."

An important place in the Bonn talks was taken by questions pertaining to the concluding stage of the preparations for the all-European conference. In the Joint Statement signed upon the completion of the visit the USSR and the FRG voiced the hope that "the multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki will soon be completed, that the conference will be convened in the immediate future and held at a level corresponding to the international importance of this undertaking. Both sides are fully resolved to contribute to the success of the conference for the purpose of laying a solid foundation for peace, security and cooperation in Europe".

The USSR, striving for the speediest convocation of the all-European conference on security and cooperation, at the same time considers the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe of great significance. The talks in Vienna, begun on January 31, 1973, are the result of the consistent and steadfast efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to achieve a military détente in Europe. The Soviet Union stands for serious preparations for and the effective handling of these negotiations. It believes that fully observing the principle of equal security the negotiations can achieve success. And this, beyond any doubt, would be a substantial contribution toward safeguarding peace in Europe, and far beyond Europe. In the Joint Statement the sides declared "their readiness to facilitate the concerting at the multilateral talks of an approach to the solution of these problems acceptable to all the participants. Both sides welcome the multilateral consultations being conducted in Vienna in a constructive spirit on the preparation of such negotiations and express the hope that these consultations will soon be successfully completed".

Of great importance are the talks between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the FRG in respect to normalising relations between them. The Federal Chancellor informed Leonid Brezhnev about the course of these negotiations and the efforts of the Federal Government to finally close the question of the Munich agreement. It is noted in the Joint Statement that the successful consummation of the talks between the FRG and Czechoslovakia "would be of great significance for a further détente in Europe". Normalisation of relations between the FRG and other socialist countries would be in the interests of European peace.

The April Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, basing itself on the estimate

that "prerequisites have emerged in Europe for creating a solid system of security and cooperation which would be a living and attractive example of peaceful coexistence", declared that it attached fundamental importance to the successful holding of the all-European conference.

What are the 34 participants of the conference, that is, practically all European countries, plus the USA and Canada, bringing to the first forum of this kind in the postwar history of Europe? What are the results of their joint preparatory work which in the main was concentrated at the multilateral consultations in Helsinki? It is fully understandable that the coming all-European conference continued to remain a subject of discussion during the numerous bilateral talks and negotiations, including summit meetings between representatives of European and other interested states. That is why the coordinated practical decisions and recommendations adopted in the Finnish capital are the outcome of intricate and multifaceted foreign policy activity and, first of all, of the efforts of the diplomacy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

As a result of consultations in Dipoli which lasted for more than half a year, it has become possible to determine areas of contacts and to find a general approach to a number of important questions at the forthcoming conference.

There are no doubts any longer on the point that the conference should open in Helsinki, and a number of countries also favour the holding of all the three stages of the conference in the Finnish capital. It should be recalled that the participants in the forthcoming conference have agreed on organising its work in three stages: first a meeting of Foreign Ministers, then the final drafting of the conference decisions at meetings of the commissions and, lastly, the adoption of these decisions at the final, culminating stage. Socialist countries have always acted on the principle that holding the third stage with the participation of representatives of states at the Summit would conform to the historic significance of the all-European conference. It appears that many other states now also tend to favour this point of view.

But the main thing is that the position taken from the very outset by the socialist countries which firmly insisted on focusing the conference's attention on the most urgent problems of consolidating European peace and cooperation, won wide support.

Specifically, there is common agreement that the main item on the agenda should be safeguarding European security and the principles of relations between states in Europe, including some measures for ensuring stability and confidence.

It should be recalled that these principles are: inviolability of state frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, independence, equality, and renunciation of the threat or use of force. In the decisions of the forthcoming conference a special part undoubtedly must be played by such a fundamental principle of European security as the inviolability of frontiers.

The second item on the agenda will deal with expansion of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties on the basis of equality, and protection of the environment. This concerns cooperation in trade and industry, the carrying out of large all-European projects, in particular, pooling efforts in respect to the supply of energy sources, trans-continental transportation, and the like. It will largely be a matter of drawing up a broad European programme of economic cooperation, eliminating discrimination and giving full scope for establishing mutually beneficial ties which for a long time were artificially obstructed by the cold warriors.

Coordination of questions relating to extension of cultural cooperation, establishing contacts between organisations and persons, and the spread of information, did not proceed so smoothly in Helsinki. Some NATO member countries clearly tried to exploit this question in order to leave some loopholes for interfering in the internal affairs of socialist countries. Underlying these attempts undoubtedly were hopes, still not abandoned by some Western circles, of "softening" the socialist community and eroding its ideological positions. Ultimately, however, a sober approach prevailed. Cultural ties and contacts between countries and peoples, whose utmost development, notwithstanding dishonest claims of bourgeois and reformist propaganda, have been consistently advocated by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, must promote mutual spiritual enrichment of the peoples, the growth of confidence between them

and the propagation of peace and good-neighbourly relations.

The proposal of the socialist countries to discuss, under the fourth item on the agenda, the question of creating a consultative committee on security and cooperation in Europe was at first met with considerable restraint by the Western states. But, judging by everything, the need to ensure the uninterrupted continuity of effort to reinforce the foundations of European security, will in one or another form be reflected in the conference decisions. It is this position that is advocated by the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the USSR, what is needed is to elaborate, by joint effort, a generally recognised reliable system of principles which would help create a really tranquil atmosphere in our continent that would enable Europeans to look ahead with confidence not only for years but for an entire historical epoch.

It goes without saying that the struggle for safeguarding peace and security in Europe, and the convocation and successful holding of the all-European conference does not end with this. It is entering a new phase possessing new content.

The Leninist policy of defending and strengthening peace provides for the development of mutually useful relations with countries of differing social systems, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. This policy which stems from the historical necessity to make a radical turn toward a détente and peace on the European continent meets the aspirations of the Soviet people, the interests and expectations of all mankind. A dependable way to achieve this cardinal task would be to establish on our continent an effective system of equitable and good-neighbourly relations, in other words, to create a strong system of collective security and cooperation in Europe. Thereby, the peoples of the countries of Europe would make a valuable contribution toward safeguarding world peace and social progress.

Socialist Countries Consolidate Their Political Foundations

IN THE 1960s and early 1970s, the development of the world socialist system was marked by the completion in some countries of the construction of the foundations of socialism and the transition to the building of a full-scale socialist society. The character of this society was fundamentally transformed by the nationalisation of industry, banks, transport and trade, collectivisation of agriculture, establishment of a comprehensive and coherent socialist economic system, elimination of relations of man's exploitation by man and successes in socialist industrialisation. The new social structure, free from class antagonisms, provides the conditions for a gradual transformation of the entire society into a united social and political collective of working people.

The economic system of the socialist countries is now characterised by the complete domination of socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production. Thus, in Bulgaria it accounts for 99.9 per cent of the basic production assets; 98.4 per cent of those employed in the sphere of material production work in the socialist sector, and in agriculture the figure reaches 99 per cent.¹ In Hungary, 97 per cent of the office and industrial workers are employed in the socialist sector, which yields 98 per cent of the national income.²

These basic changes in the economy and in the social structure of society have gone hand in hand with transformations in the political and juridical superstructure. These changes are reflected above all in the Constitution, the fundamental law, which not only records what has been achieved, but also promotes the further progressive development of the state and the whole of society.

¹ *Rabotnichesko Delo*, May 8, 1971.

² See *The 10th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party*. Budapest, November 23-28, 1970, Political Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp. 84-85.

By now, most of the countries which have entered the stage of construction of full-scale socialist society have carried out constitutional reforms. In the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic, new Constitutions were adopted back in 1960, that is, soon after the main tasks in building the foundations of socialism had been fulfilled. Economic and political changes are formalised in constitutional terms only after experience has been gained in the operation of the political system under the new conditions. Thus, in the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the new Constitution was adopted in 1965, in the German Democratic Republic in 1968, in the People's Republic of Bulgaria in 1971, in the Hungarian People's Republic (a new edition of the 1949 Constitution) and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, in 1972. Constitutional reforms are scheduled in the Polish People's Republic, which is now entering the stage of building full-scale socialism.

The new constitutions record the triumph of socialist relations of production and also the achievements in developing the democratic political system which is an integral part of the system of social relations under socialism in general. The political system of socialist society, as is known, includes both state and non-state institutions by means of which the working people, led by the working class, exercise political power.

At the present stage of development, socialist society is still uneven in structure, for it includes social and national groups with their own specific interests. This heightens the role of the entire political system of socialism in respect to uniting these groups for the achievement of the common aim, the construction of a socialist and then of a communist society. The Central Committee Report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU stated: "The Party's policy yields required results only when it

fully takes into account both the interests of the entire people and the interests of various classes and social groups, and directs them into a single common channel."³

The role of the various elements of the political system in the stage of building full-scale socialism has been reflected and established in the new constitutions of the socialist countries.

THE LEADING role of the working-class party, the conscious, ideologically and organisationally united vanguard of all the working people, which has mastered Marxism-Leninism, the advanced theory of social development, is a necessary prerequisite for the successful construction of socialism and communism. The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "The 70th Anniversary of the Second Congress of the RSDLP" noted that "the most important objective regularity in the development of socialist society is the expansion of the Communist Party's leading role".⁴

Historical experience reveals that each new stage in socialist construction brings forth problems whose solution requires the purposeful use of all the resources of society and the country and their concentration along key lines. Under the impact of the scientific and technical revolution, social processes develop at a faster pace and their direction becomes more complex. At the same time, the creative initiative of the masses is enhanced as they are increasingly and more widely involved in all types of social administration. In the sphere of foreign policy of the socialist countries there are ever more diverse tasks in consolidating world socialism, preventing wars, developing international cooperation, and ensuring social progress.

All this requires that the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries deepen the scientific character of social administration and constantly develop Marxist-Leninist science. In exercising their leading role in the system of social administration, they lay down the basic lines in building full-scale socialist society. Formulation of the political line requires consideration of the most diverse factors, both domestic and international. Consolidation of internationalist ties among the

communist parties helps them to work out its own political line which best combines the interests of that country and the interests of the entire socialist community and the world communist movement.

But the communist and workers' parties have not confined themselves to working out the political line. They have ensured its most effective implementation. For example, on the basis of decisions on constitutional questions by the 10th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the 10th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, new constitutional legislation was adopted in these countries and important laws ensuring realisation of constitutional principles are being formulated and enacted in these countries under the leadership of the Central Committees of the Parties.

A key area in exercising the leading role of communist and workers' parties in the political system is the selection, appointment and education of personnel in state agencies and mass organisations. The parties pursue their political line through the communists, who are elected because of their prestige to government and public bodies. Communists are widely represented in organs of state power. Thus, in Poland's Sejm, the Polish United Workers' Party has 255 seats out of 460, and in the People's Assembly of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Communist Party has 268 seats out of 400.

The working people's participation in managing the national economy, whose various forms are being ever more widely utilised at the present stage of socialist construction, is also being guided by the communist parties. Party Committee representation is frequently directly provided for when organs are set up through which such participation is exercised (workers' self-government conferences in Poland, production committees in the GDR, and so on). Prominent leaders of the Communist Parties are also appointed to leading positions of mass public bodies. For example, the central trade union bodies are usually headed by members of the Politburo of the Parties' Central Committees. In Czechoslovakia and Rumania, the General Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Rumanian Communist Party, respectively, head the central bodies of the People's Fronts; in Hungary, such a body is led by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

There is steady improvement in the style, forms and methods of Party leadership.

³ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 87.

⁴ *Правда*, April 13, 1973.

Hence the understandable emphasis contained in the new Constitutions of socialist countries on the leading role of the communist and workers' parties. Where the old Constitutions in these countries dealt with the Communist Party and its role only in connection with the right of citizens to association, almost all the new Constitutions establish the leading role of the Party in the first sections, which define the principles of socio-political structure.

ONE OF THE MOST important characteristics of socialist and communist construction is the consolidation of the socialist state as the political organisation of the working people. The key to a correct understanding of the essence of this process is provided by Lenin's well-known statement that the state derives its strength from the consciousness of the masses.⁵ The development of socialist statehood takes place, on the one hand, through ever increasing involvement of masses of working people in administration, and on the other, through the improvement of the state apparatus, of its structure, composition, and forms and methods of its activity with the aim of ensuring satisfaction of the interests of all society.

Under the present conditions the state in the socialist countries fulfils many tasks which no other political organisation of working people is capable of fulfilling. This relates above all to providing reliable protection of the working people's socialist achievements against any encroachments by external and in some countries also by internal enemies of socialism. The state acts as the full-fledged representative of the people in international relations. Of exceptional importance are the economic tasks of the socialist state, which directly administers the property of the entire people and exerts an influence on the development of other forms of socialist property.

It should also be stressed that in conditions of the current scientific and technological revolution, the state alone is capable of accumulating and making the most purposeful use of social resources to satisfy society's constantly growing requirements. At the present stage, the socialist state has a very important ideological and educational role to play, as it promotes in every way the development of the

new, socialist morality and the Marxist-Leninist world outlook.

The socialist state's fulfilment of its role is now being facilitated by the existence of the world socialist system, whose consolidation is an internationalist task of each socialist state. Within the framework of this system, relations are governed by friendship, cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance.

At the stage of building full-scale socialism, the consolidation of the socialist state is expressed in the growing role of representative institutions constituting the basis of the entire state apparatus, bodies through which the people exercise their power. The new Constitutions have extended the powers of representative bodies, invested them with more efficient means of control over the activity of the whole state apparatus, and improved the system of relations between these bodies and mass organisations as well as the internal structure and procedures governing the functioning of representative institutions and their formation.

In the process, the legal standards and their practical application have given striking expression to such an important principle in the organisation and functioning of representative bodies as socialist democracy. For example, in Bulgaria, the People's Assembly was defined by the 1947 Constitution only as the supreme organ of state power. Under the 1971 Constitution it is characterised as the supreme body expressing the will and sovereignty of the people, so that it now has the task of combining legislative and executive powers and exercising supreme control. By so extending the competence of the People's Assembly, the new Constitution has vested it with new powers, such as the supreme direction of the state's domestic and foreign policy, adoption of measures for the fulfilment of laws and other legislation, ratification and denunciation of international treaties, definition of the tasks of state organs, and so on. Whereas in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the legislative activity of the People's Assembly was relatively limited while important social relations were frequently regulated by decrees of the Presidium of the People's Assembly and even by decrees of the Government, since the second half of the 1950s the situation has changed. The People's Assembly has considerably expanded its legislative activity and decrees have been issued only on particular matters requiring legislative regulation.⁶

⁶ See *Socialist Constitutional Questions*, Sofia, 1969, pp. 273-274.

⁵ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 256.

Today, the State Council, which has replaced the old Presidium, may amend or add to individual provisions of the law only in urgent cases.

The new Constitutions and laws in respect to organs of power are also characterised by the extension of the rights of deputies and the improvement of legislative procedures themselves. In Bulgaria, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland there is provision for two and even more readings (votings) of bills which are, as a rule, passed at different sessions of the supreme representative institution. This creates conditions for the more thorough preparation of laws. In some instances, the number of agencies and organisations enjoying the right of legislative initiative, has been expanded. For example, the 1949 Constitution of the GDR extended this right only to the Government and to the deputies (until 1958 also to the Chamber of Lands which then existed). Now, under the 1968 Constitution this right is vested in the deputies representing political parties and mass organisations, the committees of the People's Chamber, the State Council, the Council of Ministers and the Association of Free German Trade Unions. In addition, the Constitution provides that nationwide discussion of the key bills is compulsory. In the GDR and Bulgaria the Constitutions themselves were approved in nation-wide referendums.

Enhancement of the role of representative institutions within the machinery of the socialist state is also expressed in the more vigorous functioning of standing deputy commissions, whose number is increasing. Through their initiatives and control they now exert an influence on many areas of government, so that more and more deputies on these commissions are being actively involved in formulating government decisions. In 1952, for example, the Polish Sejm set up 7 standing commissions involving 130 deputies. Today there are 22 standing commissions involving the overwhelming majority of deputies. The People's Assembly in Bulgaria at first had 4 standing commissions. Now it has 13, in which 370 out of the 400 deputies work. In local representative bodies in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, standing deputy commissions have also been vested with some executive powers, in particular, the right in some cases to issue mandatory instructions to organs of state administration.

The growing control by representative institutions over the entire course of state administration and economic management is

expressed in the regular reports to them by organs of state administration and the growing number of interpolations made by deputies.

The electoral system based on socialist democracy ensures the truly representative composition of the organs of state power. Among the deputies are men and women from all walks of life, various branches of the national economy, science and culture, while the percentage of career politicians and administrative officials is relatively small. For instance, of the 400 deputies in the People's Assembly of Bulgaria elected in 1971, 101 work in material production, 48 are scientists, artists and cultural workers, 118 are government officials, and 57 Party functionaries. Almost two-thirds of the deputies have a higher education, which enables them to play a competent role in resolving the most intricate problems of social administration; 15 deputies are members of national minorities, 75 are women, and 43 are young people under 30 years of age.⁷ This composition of representative bodies makes it possible to correctly combine the interests of society as a whole with the interests of individual groups of working people.

THE STAGE of construction of full-scale socialism places higher demands on the organisation and functioning of the state apparatus. The resolution of the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia declares: "The further development of the socialist state also requires the further raising of the level of leadership in all the state bodies, wide use of the scientific knowledge and experience gained by fraternal socialist states, giving the work of the central state agencies an increasingly planned character, effectively utilising rational methods in state administration, and defining the criteria of responsibility and efficiency more clearly in the activity of each state agency. In the functioning of the state apparatus it is necessary to consistently observe the Leninist method and style of work, to seek to secure a high level of political and professional training and to root out bureaucratic practices and neglectful attitudes to the needs of the people."⁸

⁷ See *Rabotnichesko Delo*, Dec. 15, 1971; B. Spasov, *Constitution and Democracy*, Sofia, 1972, pp. 37-39.

⁸ *The 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*, Prague, May 25-29, 1971, Political Literature Publishers, Moscow, pp. 252-253.

The communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries, seeking to improve the structure and methods of work in the state apparatus, have devoted special attention to developing the democratic principles underlying its organisation and activity. In particular, broad participation by the working people in exercising popular control helps to raise its efficiency. For example, in Hungary 30,000-36,000 people's inspectors every year check up on the work of various institutions.⁹

There is a steady development in the socialist countries of the working people's participation in the administration of justice, specifically the work of the social courts. In the GDR, these involve more than 250,000 volunteers from the ranks of the working people. This is besides almost 50,000 men and women who act as assessors in the administration of justice by the state courts.¹⁰ Working people's societies help state agencies in maintaining law and order.

As has been noted, in improving the machinery of state power the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries also devote considerable attention to provide protection of their socialist gains from any encroachment. The resolution of the 10th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party on the Report of the Party's Central Committee states: "The Party will continue to display constant concern for improving the country's defence capability, maintaining the combat might and armaments of the Bulgarian people's army at the modern level and for strengthening the state security organs, and it will show concern in providing them with highly skilled personnel so as to enable them to be a true and reliable guard of the people's socialist gains and peaceful labours."¹¹ Similar provisions are contained in documents adopted by other communist and workers' parties in the socialist countries. In some of these, the new Constitutions and laws set up special organs to direct defence: the National Defence Council in the GDR, the State Defence Council, the republican and local defence councils in Czechoslovakia, Defence Councils in Rumania and Hungary, and the State Defence Committee in Bulgaria. As a rule, these are standing bodies which in

practice (in Rumania in accordance with the law) are headed by the General (First) Secretaries of the communist and workers' parties. In Hungary, the Defence Council is set up by the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic only in extraordinary circumstances.

IN SOME socialist countries non-communist democratic parties and mass organisations also play an active role in involving the masses of working people in the administration of society and the state. At the stage of construction of full-scale socialism, these parties and organisations continue to operate under the leadership of the working-class Party, promoting the political unity of all the working people round the working class and the successful building of a new society.

The policy of extending cooperation with the non-communist democratic parties is reflected in many of the key documents of the recent period. The resolution of the 10th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party on the Report of the Central Committee declares: "In the fulfilment of important tasks in building full-scale socialist society, our Party will continue to enrich and expand its joint activity with the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union, and to intensify the ties between the two fraternal organisations."¹² This is also emphasised in Article 1 of Bulgaria's new Constitution, which states: "The Bulgarian Communist Party shall exercise leadership in building full-scale socialist society in close fraternal cooperation with the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union." The Central Committee's Report to the 8th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany says: "Our Party will continue to pursue the time-tested policy of comradely cooperation with the allied parties: the Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany, the Christian Democratic Union, the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany and the National Democratic Party of Germany, and also with mass organisations of the Democratic Bloc and the National Front."¹³ At the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the 6th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party the role of the non-communist democratic parties was dealt with in connection with the

role of the National Front and the People's Unity Front respectively.¹⁴

Thus, life itself has refuted the slanderous assertions by bourgeois propagandists that non-communist democratic parties within the political system of the socialist states allegedly have no substantial importance because of the Communist Party's leading role. Actually, however, their participation in political life helps to strengthen the alliance between the working class and all the other sections of the working people.

The non-communist democratic parties are represented in state bodies in accordance with their influence. Thus, the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union has 100 seats in Bulgaria's People's Assembly; it is represented by the First Deputy Chairman and four members on the State Council, and the First Deputy Chairman and three ministers on the Council of Ministers; the Union has 863 seats on the District People's Councils and 8,350 seats on the Communal Councils.¹⁵ In the GDR, all four non-communist democratic parties have their own groups in the representative bodies. In the People's Chamber each has 52 deputies. In Poland's Sejm, the United Peasants' Party has 117 seats, and the Democratic Party—39 seats out of 460; a representative of the United Peasants' Party is traditionally elected as Marshal of the Sejm, and a representative of the Democratic Party as one of the vice-Marshals.¹⁶ In Czechoslovakia, representatives of the non-communist democratic parties have been elected Deputies of the Chairman of the Federal Assembly.¹⁷

Documents of the communist and workers' parties and the new Constitutions devote special attention to the importance of mass political organisations and movements—the popular fronts. Bulgaria's Constitution defines the Fatherland Front as the embodiment of the alliance between the working class, the toiling peasants and the people's intelligentsia, as the social mainstay of the people's power, and a mass school for educating the people in the spirit of patriotism and communism and in-

volving them in the administration of the country. The 6th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party declared that the increased prestige and activation of the People's Unity Front constitute an important achievement for the Party. The Front "has now become a forum for the exchange of opinion on the most important problems of national and social life, which helps to provide fuller considerations of questions on which the state authorities make their decisions".¹⁸

In Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front is now developing as the broadest mass political organisation, as a nationwide movement, which enables all citizens to take part in social life through the organisations of the Front.¹⁹ In Rumania, the People's Democracy Front in 1968 was transformed into the Socialist Unity Front, a standing organisation, which includes the Rumanian Communist Party, the main mass organisations and the councils of the working people of the national minorities. It is the task of the Front to further strengthen cooperation and alliance between the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, and involve them ever more widely in discussing political, economic, social and cultural questions and mobilise the working people to implement the Party's policy.²⁰

Mass organisations, as vehicles of the social interests of various groups of working people, play an increasingly greater role in the political system of the socialist countries. Among these a special role is played by the trade unions, because the working class not only exercises a leading role in society, but also constitutes the majority of the population in some countries. Thus, it is quite natural that the tasks of the trade unions are embodied in Hungary's Constitution while the GDR Constitution devotes an entire chapter to a detailed definition of the legal basis of their status and provides guarantees for their effective functioning. It is the trade unions which, as a rule, ensure the working people's participation in the management of the national economy.

The transfer of some state functions to mass organisations also reflects their growing importance in the socio-political life of the socialist state. This has been taking place to varying degrees in all socialist countries and is reflected in the new Constitutions of

⁹ See *The 10th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party*, p. 44.

¹⁰ *Statistisches Taschenbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1972*, Berlin, 1972, p. 20.

¹¹ *The 10th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Sofia, April 20-25, 1971, Political Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 319.

¹² *The 10th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, p. 320.

¹³ *The 8th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany* (Berlin, June 15-19, 1971), Political Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1972, pp. 54-55.

¹⁴ See *The 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*, p. 73; *The 6th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party*, (Dec. 6-11, 1971, Main Materials and Documents), Political Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1972, pp. 249-250.

¹⁵ See G. Traikov, "Alliance with the Communists. Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union and Some Lessons of History", *World Marxist Review*, No. 8, 1972, p. 15.

¹⁶ See *Trybuna Ludu*, March 29, 1972; *Rada Narodowa*, No. 16, 1972, p. 2.

¹⁷ See *Rudé Právo*, Dec. 10, 1971.

¹⁸ *The 6th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party*, p. 52.

¹⁹ See *The 10th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, pp. 283, 319; *Patriotic Front Is a Nation-Wide Organization and Movement*, *Novo Vreme*, No. 6, 1972.

²⁰ See *World Marxist Review*, No. 2, 1969, p. 45.

Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The trade unions also play a greater role in respect to labour relations and social security. It should be noted this does not deprive this function of its state character, since the decisions adopted by the mass organisations in this case are fully backed up by power and authority of the state.

BASED on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the foreign policy of the socialist state is designed to create the most favourable external conditions for the construction of socialism and communism at home and for the successful development of the world socialist system as a whole. In the recent period, in view of the gradual expansion and development of external relations, their influence on the entire political, economic and cultural life of each socialist country has been immensely increased. That is why the Constitutions of the socialist countries adopted at the stage of building full-scale socialism, devote much more attention to foreign policy than their Constitutions of earlier stages of development. Without confining themselves to proclaiming the sovereign rights of the state as a subject of international relations and establishing the foreign policy competence of state agencies, the new Constitutions establish to varying degrees the aims and principles of socialist foreign policy.

The new Constitutions proclaim as the aim of foreign policy the development of fraternal relations with other socialist countries, a striving for peace, mutual understanding and cooperation with all states, support for the peoples struggling for their independence and social progress. The Constitutions of Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Bulgaria and Hungary note specifically the countries' membership of the world socialist system.

The Preamble of Bulgaria's Constitution declares that the Bulgarian people are firmly determined "to strengthen and extend the inviolable alliance, friendship and allround cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other fraternal socialist countries; support the peoples' just struggle for independence and social progress; and to promote the strengthening of world peace, and mutual understanding among the nations of the world". In accordance with these aims, the Constitution sets before the state the task of organising the defence of the national independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country; developing and strengthening

friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with the USSR and other socialist countries; and pursuing a policy of peace and mutual understanding with all countries and peoples. Article 12 stresses that Bulgaria belongs to the world socialist community, "which is one of the main conditions of her independence and allround development".

The Constitutions of some socialist countries also lay down the principles of socialist foreign policy. Thus, the Constitutions of the GDR, Mongolia, Rumania and the Korean People's Democratic Republic establish the principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism as the principle governing relations with socialist countries. In addition, some Constitutions contain a list of the general principles governing relations with other countries: respect for sovereignty and national independence, equality, and so on.

The constitutional establishment of aims and principles of foreign policy gives legal form to the policy guiding the conduct of state agencies and economic and mass organisations participating in the country's external relations.

SUCH are the basic characteristic features in the development of the political system of some socialist countries. It is difficult in the space of one article to consider the experiences of all socialist countries. This explains why the author confined himself to giving examples from the practical activity of the European countries, which have entered or are entering the stage of building full-scale socialist society. Their experiences forcefully demonstrate that for all the diversity in political forms and approaches to various problems, general processes in the development of the basic political institutions are evident in these countries. This is due to their common social system, identical fundamental interests and aims of the peoples of the socialist countries, and the policies pursued by the Marxist-Leninist parties, which, basing themselves on these processes, seek to achieve the correct combination between the international and specific national features of social development.

The further improvement and strengthening of the political system in the countries building full-scale socialist society is an earnest of new achievements by these states. They also ensure successes for the entire world socialist system in achieving its common aim, the building of a classless, communist society.

A. KHOMENKO

Defence of Peace: the Peoples' Cause

WAR AND PEACE have always constituted one of the most important and acute problems in the history of mankind. They continue to be such even today. While imperialism may have lost some of its old positions on the international political scene and in world economy, it continues to be the source of aggressive, plunderous wars. But the characteristic feature of the situation in the modern world is that, despite its great military-industrial arsenal, imperialism is no longer able to do as it likes with the destinies of nations.

Mankind now has real possibilities for keeping imperialism in check, for averting and eliminating armed conflicts and fully getting rid of the threat to world peace and to the security of nations. The emergence, growth and strengthening of the might of the world socialist system constitutes the main factor that has helped to create these possibilities and which has been exerting a progressive influence on the course of historical development. In present times, it is socialism that plays the primary role in determining the trend of world affairs. The socialist countries, the international working class, the national liberation movement, and other peaceloving forces basing themselves on anti-imperialist positions now constitute an exceptionally powerful anti-war front.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the homeland of socialism, is a well-tested and reliable bastion of peace and security for the nations of the world. The Peace Programme, formulated by the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the basis of a profound scientific analysis of the relationship of class forces, the existing world situation and the international perspective, has opened up new avenues for relaxing tensions, and for creating sound foundations for the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems. The successes of the foreign policy activity of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries over the past two years pro-

vide convincing evidence of the vitality of this Programme.

The April Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU firmly approved the activity of the Soviet Union in implementing the Leninist policy of peace and friendship between the peoples. The Plenary Meeting noted with satisfaction the solidarity of Marxist-Leninist parties and mass organisations with the CPSU and the Soviet Government in carrying out the Peace Programme.

The Soviet people and the people of goodwill all over the world fully approve the decision of the April Plenary Meeting "On the International Activity of the CC CPSU in Implementing the Decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress". The awarding of the International Lenin Peace Prize to Leonid Brezhnev signified the worldwide recognition of the outstanding services of the CPSU and Leonid Brezhnev personally in the struggle for ensuring peace and security of nations.

There is now ever increasing recognition that any conflicts and issues arising between states must be resolved not on the field of battle, but round the conference table. Experience has shown that with good-will and honest intentions on the part of all sides negotiations result in positive resolutions of complex problems of exceptional importance.

Many examples today can illustrate this point. Through negotiations the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was reached; treaties were concluded between the USSR and the FRG, and Poland and the FRG, as well as the Treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG and a set of agreements on West Berlin; there are the well-known agreements between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, on the one hand, and France, the USA, Canada and other countries, on the other. All of this opens up prospects for resolving problems of ensuring security and cooperation in Europe and other parts of the world.

An important contribution to the cause of peace and friendship of nations is also made by the expanding cooperation between the socialist countries and many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The positive changes in international relations are inseparable from the successes achieved in consolidating unity and fraternal cooperation between the countries of the socialist community. In his Report, *The 50th Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Leonid Brezhnev noted: "Together with our friends and allies we have made great efforts to settle problems inherited from the Second World War, and to create a healthier political climate in the world."

ANALYSING current world developments one cannot fail to note that much of what had appeared impossible only a short time ago is now becoming reality. At the same time, the peoples of the world realise that far from all the obstacles left by the Second World War and the ice packs accumulated during the cold war period have been removed.

Relaxation of tensions and the establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations are being achieved in complicated and stubborn struggle between the forces of progress and the reactionary forces of imperialism which resist relaxation of tensions, try to discredit the peace policy of the socialist countries and to revive and sustain the cold war spirit in relations between the socialist and the capitalist states.

Today, peaceloving public opinion, including the peace movement, which has become a truly massive and powerful force, has an especially significant role to play in the struggle for progress in international relations.

We must help the peoples to intervene in questions of war and peace. Lenin declared just at the time when the Soviet Government adopted its Decree on Peace. The Soviet Republic, exposing the system of imperialist secret treaties, and pursuing an open policy that was clear to all, for the first time in the history of mankind provided the peoples with truly realistic possibilities for intervening in questions of war and peace. In the interwar period, the progressive forces took steps to establish a broad antiwar popular front. At that time, the ruling circles of the capitalist countries employed all the means at their disposal to prevent this.

Many historians analysing the causes of the Second World War particularly state that the absence of a massive and solid international antiwar front at the time made it possible to deceive the masses of the working people in the capitalist countries, to blunt their vigilance and to prepare for war. But the Second World War, the most destructive and most costly of all wars in human history, has taught the peoples a great deal.

Soon after the defeat of nazi Germany and militaristic Japan, aggressive circles in the Western countries, ignoring the desire of the peoples for peace, which they had won at such a high price, launched preparations for another war. They mounted a monstrous arms drive, and established the aggressive NATO bloc and other military blocs and alliances. The imperialist propaganda machine raised a hullabaloo about an alleged communist threat to the "free world".

The USSR, which had suffered unprecedented losses during the Second World War, united with other socialist countries in doing everything possible to defend peace and to prevent another world war. The resolute response by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the aggressive moves of bellicose imperialist circles was a source of strength and inspiration for all people of good-will who joined in the struggle against a new war. The peace movement emerged in the tense and acute postwar situation. In a brief period it became a powerful movement and exerted a potent influence on world affairs and international relations. As Lenin had anticipated, the peoples resolutely intervened in the questions of war and peace.

The first World Peace Congress which inaugurated the mass movement against war in the postwar period, was held April 20-25, 1949. It took place simultaneously in Paris and Prague, and was attended by 2,065 delegates of differing views representing broad sections of world public opinion and people of good-will from 72 countries. Addressing the opening session of the Congress, Frédéric Joliot Curie, the great French scientist and the first President of the World Peace Council, declared: "We have gathered here not for the purpose of begging for peace from the advocates of war, but to make them accept it." Indeed, the essence of the task facing the peace movement was and is to compel the imperialists to abandon the use of force in settling disputes arising between states of differing socio-economic systems, and on that basis to permanently

eliminate war from the life of mankind. A distinctive feature of the movement is its massive character and truly humanistic aims.

The struggle against aggression and the danger of atomic war, and for general and complete disarmament, for peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, resolute support of national liberation movements, struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism, apartheid, racism and fascism—those constitute the basic principles on which the peace movement emerged and is developing.

The support this movement enjoys among broad public circles and progressive people of the world, invests the activity of the peace fighters with a political force that exerts a substantial influence on the solution of many international problems.

The demands expressed in resolutions adopted by peace fighters, such as the famous Ban the Bomb Appeal, which was signed by 500 million people, have been reflected in a number of major international agreements, like the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, mankind's first agreement on the elimination of some types of mass destruction weapons—bacteriological and toxin weapons, the recent resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. All of this convincingly demonstrates that the efforts in the peace fighters' struggle against war have not been futile.

A World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace was held in Moscow in the summer of 1962. It was the most representative peace forum, being attended by 2,484 delegates from 121 countries and 20 international bodies. It formulated a programme of action for general disarmament.

Implementing this programme, national organisations of peace fighters and the World Peace Council have been carrying on a persistent struggle for a solution of the problem of general disarmament. The important thing to note is that many campaigns and the steps taken by peace fighters to achieve this most important goal have been exerting a definite influence on governments, and on their policy. The UN General Assembly decision, adopted on the proposal of the USSR, to call a world disarmament conference may also be justly credited to the fighters for peace and security of nations.

There has been general approval by the peace forces of the Soviet-US Treaty on the Limitation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The peace forces of European countries, whose voice resounded at the Brussels Assembly, have made a substantial contribution to creating a climate favouring the convocation and success of a conference of European states, the USA and Canada on problems of security and cooperation in Europe.

It should be recalled that until recently the war in Vietnam and in other countries of Indochina presented grave dangers to the cause of peace. Israel's aggression in the Middle East remains a threat to international security.

The World Peace Council and national peace organisations, reflecting the aspirations of all people of good-will, united with other progressive forces, mounted a struggle to end the war in Indochina and to bring about a just peace settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. The movement to end the war in Vietnam and to extend moral and material support for the heroic Vietnamese people spread to all countries and continents. A broad anti-war movement developed in the USA itself, and the US Government was compelled to reckon with it. Never before in history had there been such a massive, powerful and effective world anti-war movement as the movement of solidarity with the people of Vietnam.

The struggle to end the war in Vietnam helped to produce a platform which served as a basis for steadily uniting the struggles of peace forces, irrespective of their political views.

In France, for example, the struggle to end the war in Vietnam brought together more than 50 organisations, including the Communist and the Socialist parties, and the country's major trade unions. This form of joint action was also characteristic of the struggles in Italy, Sweden, the FRG and some other countries. The struggle to end the war in Vietnam was a material factor in producing a broad coalition for peace and justice in the USA, which brought together numerous organisations and groups of men and women of different political orientation. In Britain the campaign for peace in Vietnam and the activity of the British Committee for European Security united many of the country's influential trade unions, MPs and peace organisations.

Similar coalitions for joint action to maintain and ensure peace were formed in India,

Japan, Bangladesh, Canada, Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Egypt, and many countries of Latin America.

The international campaign of solidarity with the peoples subjected to aggression helps to enhance the prestige of the World Peace Council and to strengthen the peace movement organisationally and politically. The attempts by reactionary imperialist circles during the past few years to discredit the peace movement, as allegedly "serving the interests of the communists", did not produce the desired results for the enemies of peace. Today, the organisations of peace fighters are becoming ever more efficient instruments for exerting public influence on the policies of governments and international governmental organisations in respect to war and peace.

New forces are joining the ranks of the fighters for peace because the aims and goals of the movement can be understood and appreciated by everyone. In their ranks are workers and farmers, cultural workers and teachers, MPs and political leaders, old and young of every race and nationality, millions upon millions of fighters dedicated for the cause of peace who are struggling against war, and for peace, national independence, freedom and happiness, friendship and cooperation of the present and future generations of mankind.

In the peace movement, the international working class, the most consistent fighter against the threat of another war, has a decisive role to play. Marx pointed out that the working class enters the arena of history as an independent force conscious of its own responsibility and capable of dictating peace wherever the so-called masters clamour for war.¹

The struggle for peace is indissolubly linked with defence of the working class's economic and political rights. The expansion and strengthening of the ranks of peace fighters, consolidation and unity of all the peace forces can only rest on the sound basis of the active and broad participation by the working class and the toiling peasantry. This is demonstrated by the unity of will and action of the peoples in the socialist countries, the most impassioned opponents of war and the most consistent fighters for peace.

¹ See K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 157.

The new atmosphere in international affairs and international relations, which has emerged as a result of implementation of the Peace Programme, has opened up new favourable conditions and opportunities for making the peace movement more effective. A rapid process of uniting the struggles of all peace forces is now under way. It is a worldwide process which has crossed national and regional borders.

Influential and authoritative inter-governmental organisations, like the United Nations, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of African Unity, have begun to establish contacts and cooperate with the World Peace Council on issues of common interest on which there can be useful joint actions for peace. In the recent period many prominent leaders in diverse international and national organisations willingly took part in various meetings, conferences and other actions organised by peace fighters. They participated, for example, at the major international meetings of 1972: the Conference on Indochina at Versailles, the Assembly of Representatives of Public Opinion for European Security and Cooperation in Brussels, the Conference on Namibia, and other peace forums. Representatives of the peace movement participated in the international conference of non-governmental organisations on questions of disarmament. A delegation of the World Peace Council visited the UN headquarters in New York in September and also in late October and early November 1972, and had meetings and discussions in UN committees and commissions and also with the UN Secretary-General and the President of the 27th UN General Assembly.

The meetings and talks showed that contacts and cooperation between the World Peace Council and the United Nations and its specialised agencies could be fruitful and useful for the cause of peace and the security of nations. In the present situation, governments acting through the United Nations and its specialised bodies, as well as through interstate and regional organisations, cannot act successfully for peace, security and cooperation without the active support from world public opinion, without enlisting peoples' support for their steps for peace. Equally, peace forces and broad sections of the public are incapable of achieving their aims unless they link their actions even more closely with the constructive activity and programs of the United Nations, with governments, political parties and other movements for peace, security and progress.

IN THIS new situation, there has arisen the need for a World Congress which could be attended by representatives of all the peace forces of the globe. This should be a forum reflecting the will of the peoples of the whole world, which would define new steps for consolidating and achieving détente and the victory of the principles of peaceful coexistence. This is the first time such a congress is to be called. In composition, form and in the character of its work, it is to be like none of the previous public forums.

The Appeal issued by the World Peace Council to international and national mass organisations, peace movements, political parties and all those prepared to work to ensure peace, security and independence of peoples, to join together in calling a World Congress of Peace Forces in the autumn of 1973, was adopted at the meeting of the WPC Presidium held at Santiago, the capital of Chile, last October. It has met with wide support everywhere.

The International Consultative Meeting in Moscow, March 16-18, 1973, for preparing a World Congress of Peace Forces revealed profound interest among many political and mass organisations and movements for united action against the aggressive policy of imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, against hunger and poverty, against hot and cold war, and for disarmament and protection of man's environment.

The Meeting confirmed the timeliness and necessity of a World Congress to achieve greater unity of action of all the peace forces and to enhance their influence on international affairs and international relations.

The International Meeting in Moscow was perhaps the first major forum for constructive cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organisations. At the meeting, which was of a strictly preliminary character, 40 international and 81 national organisations were represented, among them, Communists, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, representatives of bourgeois liberal ruling parties and of some inter-governmental and interstate organisations, including the United Nations. Among the speakers were representatives of a number of departments of the UN Secretariat and UN committees, the League of Arab States, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation, the World Federation of United Nations Associations, a number of international trade union organisations and women's and youth movements, international religious bodies,

2*

various world pacifist associations and their coordinating agencies, international institutes and peace funds.

Representatives of diverse movements, of different and occasionally diametrically opposite ideological positions, voiced general agreement that it was time to unite and work together to preserve and strengthen peace. The meeting adopted the Appeal which declared: "The participants address an urgent appeal to all those who wish to contribute to the preparation and work of this Congress which will be held in Moscow in October 1973.... We are convinced that despite all the differences in outlook and ideological approach, an open dialogue ... will be extremely useful for the cause of peace and international détente and will reinforce confidence and cooperation among the peoples.... We express the hope that other organisations, movements, parties and personalities will respond to our appeal. Peace is a matter of concern for each and everyone."

The proposal for a World Congress of Peace Forces was supported in the United Nations. Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary-General, in an exchange of opinions with a WPC delegation last November on the problems of cooperation between mass and governmental organisations, highly evaluated the prospects for the mass movement for peace. He said: "For us, at the United Nations, cooperation between large massive non-governmental movements and organisations is of great importance, it is essential, it is a prerequisite of success in our work".

It should be recalled that not so long ago the heads of many inter-governmental organisations would not even hear of cooperation with international non-governmental organisations and movements fighting for peace. In his speech at the International Consultative Meeting, Romesh Chandra, General Secretary of the World Peace Council, recalled the difficult times of the past when he said that there had been a time when the situation arising in relations between non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations was assessed as something of a cold war. But that period passed. Curtis Roosevelt, head of the UN Secretariat department for relations with non-governmental organisations, stated at the Consultative Meeting in Moscow that he agreed with WPC General Secretary Romesh Chandra's assessment when he spoke about the end of what he described as cold war between governmental and non-governmental organisations. He further noted that from the standpoint of his depart-

ment of the United Nations he saw a possibility of a new era of cooperation.

Preparations for the Congress have now begun on every continent. In the various countries, committees and groups for promoting the Congress are being set up on the basis of a coalition of various peace forces. Hundreds of thousands of men and women are taking part in the activity of these committees and groups. On the initiative of mass organisations—trade unions, peace fighters, journalists, women's and young people's organisations, and also writers' and artists' associations, scientific and technical, cultural and educational, and co-operative societies and associations, and the parliamentary group of the USSR—a Soviet Committee for the Promotion of the Congress has been set up. Mikhail Zimyanin, Editor-in-Chief of *Pravda*, a Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a Member of the CPSU Central Committee, has been elected Chairman.

The Soviet people met with gratitude the proposal to hold the World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow. Soviet people regard this as an expression of the confidence the peoples of the world have in our country and in the peaceful policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government. The attitude of the Soviet public to this proposal was expressed by Leonid Brezhnev in his Report, *The 50th Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, when he stated: "Ever new opportunities of promoting peace arise for public organisations and mass movements. And the Soviet public will continue to take an active part in their useful work. We are convinced that the forthcoming World Congress of Peace Forces will play a prominent part in the peoples' struggle for peace."

The Soviet Committee for the Promotion of

the Congress, basing itself on the assistance and support of the public, will do everything in its power to ensure the necessary conditions for the fruitful work of the Congress.

The great and noble goals pursued by the peace forces in connection with the forthcoming Congress have caused confusion in certain circles and aroused concern and alarm, to put it mildly. Realising that it is impossible to prevent the convocation of the Congress, the opponents of détente and peaceful coexistence will naturally try to obstruct participation in the Congress by organisations and movements which still display doubt and hesitation with respect to the Congress. The reactionaries, and Leftist and Trotskyite elements of every stripe, who are helping them, will try to prevent a useful discussion and the establishment of an atmosphere at the Congress which would promote unity of action by the world's peace forces. The Second International Consultative Meeting for the convocation of the Congress is to be held in early July 1973. The expectations are it will be also attended by representatives of organisations and movements which were not present at the First Meeting and will help to clarify the stand of many of such organisations.

The Soviet people are aware that despite the positive results achieved in international relations much remains to be done to overcome the many obstacles and to secure a lasting world peace. There is still a danger of nuclear conflict, hotbeds of war remain, above all in the Middle East; the peace settlement in Indochina is not yet complete; the arms race continues; survivals of colonialism, racial discrimination and neocolonialism are still a sad reality. The struggle for peace and life goes on. As in the past, the peace forces of the world have an important role to play in this fight.

I. ALEXEYEV

Anti-Sovietism in Peking's Strategy

ANTI-SOVIETISM has with increasing sharpness and bluntness been revealed as the most characteristic feature in the foreign policy of the Maoist leadership. An analysis of Peking's position and activity in international affairs—from whatever angle it is considered—whether in respect to the various groups of countries (the socialist community, the capitalist world and the developing states) or to various issues (the struggle for peace and international security, disarmament, the national liberation movement and the world communist movement) shows that the Maoists' entire policy is ultimately in one way or another connected with anti-Soviet objectives. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, stated in his Report *The 50th Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*: "In substance, the purpose of doing the greatest possible harm to the USSR, of impairing the interests of the socialist community, is now the sole criterion determining the Chinese leaders' approach to any major international problem."

Opposing virtually all Soviet initiatives in the international arena, the Peking strategists have been trying to fit their "theoretical" concepts to this line, including their "theory" of so-called "intermediate zones" which has nothing in common with the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the present epoch. At first, its authors placed between the USSR, on the one hand, and the USA, on the other, an "intermediate zone" including all the other countries. Today, even this kind of an "arrangement of forces" no longer suits the Peking leaders, whose whole policy is permeated with a striving for world hegemony. Accordingly, *Hung Chi*, organ of the CC CPC, recently announced a new version of the notorious concept, which provides for the existence of two world poles: at one of these there are the two "superpowers", the USSR and the USA, and at the other, China and some socialist countries. Between them lie two intermediate zones:

one includes the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the other, the "main capitalist countries of the West and the East".¹ The line of reasoning invented by the authors of this artificial and anti-Marxist scheme is designed to prove that China is a "natural" leader of the countries within the two zones.

The "theory of China's chief enemies" has also undergone a characteristic evolution. In the early 1960s, these enemies were three: US imperialism, "modern revisionism" (as the Maoists then primarily labelled the USSR) and the "reactionaries of various countries". At the 9th Congress of the CPC in 1969, US imperialism and "Soviet social-imperialism" were designated as the chief enemies. Finally, in the last few months, the Maoists have openly been calling the Soviet Union "the most dangerous enemy". Inside China this was preceded by an "explanatory" campaign which stressed the need to make a distinction between the "chief and secondary" enemies of China, so as to unite with one enemy at a given stage in order to "isolate the chief enemy and to drive him into a corner."²

Peking, notes the Polish newspaper *Sztandar Młodych*, "no longer bothers to camouflage its policy with the two-enemy theory. There is only one enemy for the Maoist leaders today—the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries—as well as the communist parties opposing Peking's anti-socialist line".

Such is the "theoretical" basis for the present anti-Soviet line of the Peking leaders in the world affairs. Apart from the total struggle against the Soviet Union and the socialist community, re-orientation of China's relations on the capitalist countries and a struggle for leadership of the "Third World" constitute most important components of this line.

In order to conceal the nationalistic and Great-Power character of its plans, Peking's

¹ *Hung Chi*, No. 11, 1972.

² *Hung Chi*, No. 9, 1971.

diplomacy has been manoeuvring, making adjustments here and there and on the whole employing more extensive arsenal of tactical tricks than it did a few years ago. Some of the odious extremist slogans (ever sharpening struggle, pushing one and all to armed struggle and revolution, the cult of violence, attacks on the principles of peaceful coexistence, and so on) have been withdrawn or toned down, and no opportunity is lost to demonstrate China's "peaceful character" and her desire to maintain relations with other countries on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

But as Peking's international activity demonstrates the Chinese leaders do not really want a true détente or a stable world situation. Even the Western bourgeois press has said as much. Soon after the 27th UN General Assembly opened, *Le Figaro* declared that the constructive Soviet proposals should "in theory be unanimously adopted by the Assembly" unless "China, Albania or some other 'eccentric' country sets out to demonstrate its originality to the extent of voting against them".³ The proceedings of the Session revealed that Peking's representatives took a negative position on all the key questions relating to the renunciation of force in international relations, prohibition of nuclear weapons and the consolidation of international security. They did not even take part in the debate on implementing the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and together with Albania's representatives walked out during the voting on the resolution on this question, which was co-sponsored by 55 socialist and "Third World" countries. Most participants in the Session gave no support to the Maoists' raucous and hostile line toward the Soviet Union.

Characteristically, China has refused to participate in any of the existing international agreements on disarmament. In order to shed responsibility for the sabotage of measures in this area, Peking's diplomacy has tried to divert world public opinion from disarmament problems, to minimise their significance, and to drive home the idea that the most important thing in the present international situation is "resolute struggle" by all peoples against the "hegemony of the two superpowers". Peking insists "now there can be no question of disarmament", let alone "international peace and security".⁴

Peking has tried to meddle in the Soviet-US

negotiations on strategic arms limitation and has, in effect, backed up the US military-industrial complex, advising US ruling circles to continue building up nuclear weapons stockpiles, so as "not to lag behind the Soviet Union". The Soviet-US agreements on limitation of strategic armaments, like the earlier signed international treaties on specific aspects of disarmament, were labelled by the Maoists as a "great fraud", a "behind-the-scenes deal by the superpowers" and "pseudo-disarmament". In this way, the Peking leadership has placed itself in opposition to the overwhelming majority of governments and countries of the world, which have welcomed the first real steps toward disarmament.

There is one general aim behind the Chinese leaders' approach to international problems such as European security, the situation in the Middle East, and the settlement in Hindustan, namely to obstruct any détente, to aggravate existing contradictions, and to find a common platform with the anti-Soviet forces. A stream of charges against the Soviet Union has come from Peking, claiming that the Soviet Union intends to establish its own "domination" and "hegemony" in these areas, engages in "gun-boat diplomacy", and so on. *L'Unità* notes in this respect: "What is incomprehensible and deplorable is that just when even conservative-minded governments have abandoned the old and worn out charge of the USSR's imaginary expansionism, and when the Soviet Government's policy of peace and détente has been given recognition, this charge is being revived by the Chinese and is being formulated in intolerable terms which go to the extent of converting the USSR into the 'chief enemy'."⁵

The Maoists have been trying very hard to cast doubt on the Soviet Union's high prestige among the developing countries, to denigrate Soviet assistance to these states and to suggest that the USSR has been taking part in all manner of "plots" against the "small and medium-size" countries. Sharply criticising these anti-Soviet concoctions, the Lebanese newspaper, *An-Nida*, stated in March 1973: "Who on earth will believe Peking's notorious allegations that the Soviet Union 'failed' to help the peoples, including the Chinese people, in their liberation struggle?... The Arab countries' experience is visual evidence of the falsehood of such charges. Selfless assistance, mutual benefit and constant support to newly-free countries—this is the basis of Soviet

foreign policy. And what have the Chinese themselves done in this sphere?"

Peking has been stubbornly pursuing a splitting line with respect to the socialist community. The Maoist leadership's main aim has been to pit the socialist countries against each other, to pry apart the unity of the socialist community and to undermine its international positions. With that objective in mind, it has employed flirtation, flattery and blackmail. Not long ago, the Chinese leadership "graciously" decided to rank a few more countries as socialist (up to then China and Albania were alone designated as socialist).

Even the ending of the war in Vietnam was utilised by the Maoists as a pretext for attacking the USSR. Thus, recent reports in the Japanese central press about the talks between T. Kimura, a member of the Japanese House of Representatives, and Chinese leaders, noted that the latter tried to cast doubt on the purposes of Soviet policy in Vietnam and charged the Soviet Union with "standing in the way" of a détente in Asia.

Thus, pursuing its nationalistic, anti-Soviet line, Peking's ruling group has in effect been folding up China's struggle against imperialism, increasingly orienting its international activity upon a confrontation with the socialist countries and a link-up with imperialism, their class enemy.

The organ of the German Communist Party, *Unsere Zeit*, exposing Peking's efforts to push the peoples of the capitalist and developing countries along the path of anti-Sovietism, stressed: "Those who are guided in their activity in international affairs by anti-Sovietism and nationalism abandon the class struggle, do harm to the struggle of the peoples for peace, democracy and socialism, and are in tune with the world strategy of imperialism."⁶

However, even at home, the Chinese leadership has been unable to secure complete understanding and support for its political line of hostility to the Soviet Union. Broad masses of the people, party members and party cadres in China have been unable to understand the logic of the Maoist leadership's frequent and sharp zigzags in policy. *Hung Chi* was recently forced to admit that the "struggle of lines" is a theory that is widely regarded in the country as being "incomprehensible".⁷ This has compelled the Maoists to stage periodical propaganda shake-ups so as to inflame anti-Soviet-

ism and try to convince the man-in-the-street that there is no reason to expect any change in the political line. Those who express disagreement with the official Maoist line are instantly accused of "national betrayal" and of leaning toward "surrender" and "sell out" to the Soviet Union.

In China, all the mass media are geared for brainwashing the population in the spirit of anti-Sovietism. In 1972, two central newspapers alone—*Jenmin Jihpao* and *Kuang-ming Jihpao*—carried 505 articles containing attacks on the Soviet Union, while the 12 issues of *Hung Chi* carried 31 similar articles. The three publications contained more than 100 anti-Soviet articles from January to March of this year. Bookshops in China constantly offer for sale and widely advertise books and pamphlets—a total of about 100 titles—which are hostile to the USSR. Their authors keep drumming into the heads of readers absurd ideas about "degeneration" of the Soviet system.⁸

Facts reveal that efforts are being made in China to raise the coming generation in the spirit of anti-Sovietism and militarism. It permeates the entire system of education, including primary and nursery schools, where things have come to such a state that children are taught to count imaginary numbers of dead and wounded soldiers of "Soviet revisionism". Even the *Grammar of the Modern Chinese Language*, published last year, contains exercises with sentences attacking the USSR. There are mass editions of collections of stories, of verses and songs hastily composed to meet the demands of anti-Sovietism.

Here is a typical example of how anti-Soviet attitudes are being fostered among the Chinese young people today. The character in one story, an old worker of the Peking petrochemical combine, instructing a young colleague, tells him that the Soviet Union, while extending assistance to China, allegedly cheated the Chinese by delivering substandard equipment which he calls "rubbish" and "scrap metal". For this, the worker exclaims, "they got out of us much pork, flour and rice".⁹

Peking propaganda has tried to portray Russia as China's worst and inveterate enemy, inflaming nationalistic passions and trying to create a sort of medium for cultivating anti-

³ *Le Figaro*, Sept. 28, 1972.

⁴ *Jenmin Jihpao*, July 18, 1972.

⁵ *L'Unità*, April 7, 1973.

⁶ *Unsere Zeit*, March 9, 1973.

⁷ *Hung Chi*, No. 1, 1973.

⁸ See *Struggle for Implementation of the Party's Basic Programme and Ultimate Goal*, Shanghai, 1972, pp. 19, 45-49 (in Chinese).

⁹ *Spring Has Come to Fenghuangling*, Collection of Stories, Peking, 1972, p. 31 (in Chinese).

Sovietism. Abandoning the class approach, deliberately ignoring the Great October Socialist Revolution, the formation of the world's first workers' and peasants' state and its policy in respect to oppressed peoples and nations, the Peking social-chauvinists suggest that tsarist Russia was the Chinese nation's enemy before the October Revolution and that the Soviet Union is its enemy today.

Geographical and historical "studies" contain provocative statements claiming that Russia had "seized Chinese territories with an area of over one million square kilometres north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River", ¹⁰ that the Soviet Union is engaged in "military expansion", ¹¹ and that it has "plundered the Chinese people". ¹² The Chinese authors broadly hint that the "plundered" descendants will eventually live to see the "day of great upheavals". ¹³

Shuffling historical facts like a pack of cards, ¹⁴ the Maoists have tried to fabricate a "territorial question" between China and the Soviet Union, to cast doubt on the borders existing between the two countries and to lay claim to territories which are a part of the USSR and where Soviet people live and work.

Just recently, on March 7, 1973, *Jenmin Jihpao* attempted to grossly meddle in the USSR's domestic affairs, trying to tell the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation which names of cities in the Soviet Far East it should change. On that occasion, the Maoists in effect reaffirmed their claims to Soviet territory north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River. Together with conjuring up the mythical "menace from the north", the so-called territorial issue is being clearly exploited by top Maoist leaders to stifle the good-will of the Chinese people toward the Soviet Union and to foster in them the spirit of anti-Sovietism.

Statements by the Soviet Government and Soviet leaders have convincingly exposed the absurdity of the efforts of the Chinese side to "substantiate" their claims to Soviet territory. There is no "territorial issue" between the two countries. It should be noted that while making groundless territorial claims on the USSR, the Chinese leaders have also tried to intensify revanchist moods in other countries.

In order to fan the militaristic psychosis at home, the Chinese leadership has actively utilised the "prepare for war" slogan, gradually inducing the population to believe that this will be a war against the Soviet Union. Tens of millions of people have been mobilised to build military installations, dig bomb shelters and trenches. Foreigners who have visited China say that there is now "another China" which is underground. *Svenska Dagbladet* carried a report describing a visit by a group of Scandinavian journalists to inspect such installations in November 1972. It stated that "a demonstration of bomb shelters in Peking is a compulsory element in the campaign of anti-Sovietism being fanned in China". The paper added that in China one would hardly ever now hear any criticism of US imperialism, but the attacks against the Soviet Union had become a constant feature.

In order to justify this turn about in relations with the USSR (which Peking has carried out over the past 10 years or so) from a policy of friendship and cooperation to confrontation all along the line, Maoist propaganda has tried to mislead the people by slanderously asserting that China's line with respect to the Soviet Union has always been "consistent and unwavering", and that it is Soviet policy that has changed, because the USSR has allegedly "restored capitalism" and now yearns for "world domination", ¹⁵ "openly meddling in the domestic affairs of other countries", ¹⁶ and so on.

However, these unsubstantiated charges will not serve to cover up the fact that the real source of China's present relations with the Soviet Union is to be found in Peking. Long before 1949, when the people's revolution was victorious in China, Mao Tse-tung and his entourage revealed anti-Soviet tendencies. They regarded the USSR not so much as the world's first socialist state, but as a source of material and political support. In the early 1940s, slanderous anti-Soviet propaganda was being systematically carried on in Yenan, the centre of the Liberated Areas. Mao and his followers blocked every attempt to reach an understanding on possible joint action by the armed forces of the CPC and the Soviet Union against the Japanese imperialists. ¹⁷

It is worth recalling that history is replete with examples where those who staked themselves on anti-Sovietism went down in ignominious defeat. Some of these examples come from the history of China. One need merely recall the hostile statements against the USSR which filled the pages of the Kuomintang press during the period of the unbridled anti-Soviet campaign of 1946-1948 to realise that the present Peking leaders and the Chiang Kai-shek clique have much in common in terms of method and content in their propaganda against the USSR.

Chiukuo Jihpao, one of the most reactionary of Chiang's newspapers, wrote in 1946, that "red imperialism... surpasses the old-style imperialism". Another paper asserted that the USSR was "driving for world domination". ¹⁸ The Kuomintang press was most vociferous about the Soviet Union's "aggressiveness". *Takengpao*, mouthpiece of fascist-minded CC-clique, noted in particular, that the "Soviet Union has extended its boundaries since the Second World War." ¹⁹ An editorial in *Chungkuo Shipao* proclaimed that the USSR was "our chief enemy". ²⁰

Right-wing bourgeois elements made roughly similar hostile attacks against the USSR at meetings, and in the central and especially the local Chinese press in 1957. They tried to characterise Soviet foreign policy as "red imperialism", urging a "settlement of scores with the Soviet Union", and "a fight to the last breath" to "restore the lost lands". They placed responsibility on the USSR for the "aggressive acts by monarchist Russia against China", etc. ²¹ At that time, the CPC leadership found it necessary to refute this slander. Addressing the 4th Session of the National People's Congress of the first convocation on July 11, 1957 Lu Din-yi, chief of the propaganda department of the CPC Central Committee, said: "They [the Right-wing elements] use the reactionary ideology of nationalism to incite the masses, in an effort to provoke dissent between China and the Soviet Union. Their statements are essentially a variation of the tunes of the imperialists and the Chiang Kai-shek clique [my italics—I. A.], that is they seek to present the Soviet Union as 'red imperialism', and not as state treating us as an equal." ²²

One has to recall all this today because the statements about "social-imperialism" and other unseemly methods employed by the Maoist propaganda machine against the Soviet Union express essentially one and the same rabid nationalistic line, although in one case it is voiced by diehard reactionary Kuomintang men, on whom the people turned their backs with disdain, and in the other, by those styling themselves Communists. For all the differences in the historical conditions in which the anti-Soviet campaigns have been inspired—one in Kuomintang China in the late 1940s, and the other in the People's Republic of China in the 1970s—there is much in common between the two campaigns. In their anti-Soviet hysteria, the Chiang Kai-shek clique sought to find a means of saving its disastrously plummeting prestige in the country, to justify before the Chinese people its policy of dealing with US imperialism, to whitewash its aggressive actions and its interference in China's domestic affairs. The sad results of this policy are well known.

There is every indication that the present Chinese leaders have failed to draw any lessons from the experience of their predecessors. In the atmosphere of internal political struggle, they want to arouse hostile feelings toward the USSR in order to divert the people from the grave consequences of their fatal line in domestic affairs and to justify their shift toward a rapprochement with imperialist circles.

There must be good reason for recent reports in the Hong Kong press to the effect that Peking intends to seek a rapprochement with Taiwan clique precisely on their common anti-Soviet platform. The Hong Kong newspapers noted that Chinese officials have been studying the anti-Soviet theses in Chiang Kai-shek's book *Soviet Russia in China*. In this respect it was explained to them that just as cooperation between the CPC and the Kuomintang was possible in the 1930s in face of the Japanese aggression, so today cooperation between them is possible in face of the "threat" coming from the USSR.

It should be noted that lip service is being paid in Peking to the possibility of normalising relations with the USSR on the state level. In so many words this was the gist of a statement issued by the PRC Government on October 7, 1969, but in reality the Chinese side has displayed no interest in normalisation. In the past few years it has not undertaken a single initiative aimed at improving relations with

¹⁰ *Sino-French War*, Peking, 1972. (in Chinese).

¹¹ *Jenmin Jihpao*, May 22, 1972.

¹² *Kuangming Jihpao*, March 21, 1972.

¹³ *Wen wu*, No. 2, 1972.

¹⁴ See, for instance, the pamphlet, *Let Us Read Some World History*, Peking, 1973 (in Chinese).

¹⁵ *Jenmin Jihpao*, Nov. 7, 1972.

¹⁶ Chiang Yu-lun, *The Second International*, Peking, 1972 (in Chinese).

¹⁷ See O. E. Владимиров, В. И. Рязанцев, *Страницы политической биографии Мао Цзе-дуна*, Moscow, Political Literature Publishers, 1969, pp. 53-58.

¹⁸ *Shenpao*, Aug. 3, 1947.

¹⁹ *Takengpao*, March 8, 1948.

²⁰ *Chungkuo Shipao*, June 23, 1947.

²¹ *Heilungkiang Jihpao*, June 25, 1957.

²² *Дружба* (Peking), July 14, 1957.

the Soviet Union. What is more, as China's leaders have rejected one constructive Soviet proposal after another, they have stressed existing differences, the "need for prolonged struggle", and have erected new obstacles to a possible improvement of relations.

When the ruling group in Peking began its campaign against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the late 1950s, regarding them as the main obstacle to its hegemonistic, Great-Power chauvinistic aspirations, the Maoists initially referred to ideological and inter-party contradictions. Subsequently, step by step, they extended the sphere of contradictions and have by now concentrated their efforts on inciting conflict between the Soviet Union and China on the state level. In Peking today, it is being declared the USSR is "China's enemy", an "even more dangerous one than the old-type imperialism".²³ Maoist policy now bases itself on the assumption that Soviet-Chinese contradictions are "antagonistic and are the chief contradictions in relations with the external world".

Quite clearly, this kind of line is no substitute for a positive programme for China's national development, and it increasingly runs counter to China's long-term interests and objective needs, placing the Chinese leadership in the same camp with the most rabid forces of anti-communism and discrediting it in the eyes of world public opinion. The anti-Sovietism of the Chinese leaders has evoked resolute rebuffs from the socialist countries and the international communist and working-class

movement. There is also growing distrust of Maoist policy among "Third World" countries which have not displayed any desire to establish relations with China on an anti-Soviet basis. Anti-Sovietism is bound to collapse, and the sooner this is realised in Peking, the better from the standpoint of the fundamental and long-term interests of the Chinese people. The entire history of modern times shows, states *Rabotnichesko Delo*, organ of the Bulgarian Communists, that anti-Sovietism is a dead end, and that in international relations a policy based on hostility for the Soviet Union will not endure.

The April Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU stressed that "stubborn struggle by the PRC leaders against the unity of the socialist countries and the world communist movement, against the efforts of peace-loving states and peoples to relax international tensions, as well as the anti-Soviet line pursued by Peking, is harming the cause of peace and international socialism". The Plenary Meeting reaffirmed the determination of the Party to continue following the line in respect to relations with China, mapped out by the 24th Congress of the CPSU.

The Soviet people are certain that because the objective interests of the two countries are identical, Soviet-Chinese friendship will ultimately be restored. Expressing this idea, Leonid Brezhnev told a ceremonial meeting on December 21, 1972, marking the 50th anniversary of the USSR: "We want to see China a flourishing socialist power, and to work shoulder to shoulder with her for peace, against imperialism. But when this will come about depends on China herself."

E. DMITRIYEV

Middle East: Dangerous Tension Must Go

AGAINST the background of the considerable achievements scored by the peace-loving forces, peoples and states in the recent period in relaxing international tensions, the unresolved situation in the Middle East stands out as being increasingly abnormal. There is the continued illegal occupation by the Israeli armed forces of the Arab territories seized in 1967, the extremely aggravated relations and the persisting state of war between Israel and the Arab countries. The situation in the Middle East is a serious cause for very grave concern. After all, there is no guarantee at all that developments in the area may not at some moment get out of control and that an armed conflict may not flare up with fresh force.

Of course, the crisis in the Middle East did not develop overnight. The sharp deterioration in relations between the Arabs and the Jews who had lived in the area for a long time in peace and harmony began in the late 19th century, when Zionists proclaimed their policy of setting up a Jewish "law-protected sanctuary" in Palestine and took steps to intensify massive Jewish immigration into the region. The Zionists were impelled by a determination to colonise Palestine, a drive which was accompanied with buying up fertile lands from the Arabs at give-away prices, or their forcible expulsion. Characteristically, in 1882 (the year marking the beginning of Jewish immigration) there were only about 34,000 Jews in Palestine. By 1947 their number had increased to 608,000.

The idea of the Austrian journalist T. Herzl, the "father of Zionism", of establishing a special and purely Jewish state in Palestine at the turn of the century appealed to the imperialists, who saw this as an opportunity for using the Zionists to entrench their positions in the Middle East. These were the motives behind the actions of the British Government. In 1917, shortly before the end of the First World War, Britain announced her intention to set up a "Jewish national home" in Palestine (the

Balfour Declaration). In his book, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, Lloyd George pointed out that the declaration indicated the intention of the British and their allies, who supported them, to lay the foundation of a future Jewish state in Palestine. In revealing the motive behind the British Government's decision to adopt the Balfour Declaration, Lloyd George wrote: "The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a National Home for Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally to the Allied cause Jewish sentiments and support throughout the world."

Although the Balfour Declaration spoke of Britain's support for the establishment of a "Jewish national home" (the word "state" was not mentioned to avoid aggravating relations with the Arabs, whom the British had also promised, in the course of the First World War, to set up independent states on the territory of the former Ottoman Empire), the Zionist leaders had actually projected the policy of setting up a purely Jewish state in Palestine ever since the Basel Zionist Congress in 1897.

President Nasser was quite right when he told the Editor-in-Chief of the French journal *Evenements* in November 1967 the following: "The Jews are our cousins. We have coexisted over the ages. Zionism has put forward a problem and everything has become impossible between Jews, Arabs and Christians. We can all live together in one house, but none of us can take over the whole house and drive out all the others."

However, it was the takeover of the Arab "house" that the Balfour Declaration in effect called for. As a result of its adoption, the Cairo *Al-Ahram* observed, "a base for aggression, sabotage and conspiratorial activity against the revolutionary forces in the Arab world was created". The taking away of land from the Arab peasants, as the Jewish Agency bought up land for subsequent resale to Jewish immigrants, the efforts by Jewish settlers to turn

²³ *Jenmin Jihpao*, Oct. 1, 1972.

the Arabs into "second-class citizens", the attempts by the Zionist political organisation "Vaad Leumi" (National Council) to assume the functions of an organ of state administration in the period of the British mandate in Palestine, and the fanning of hostility between the Jews and the Arabs by the British colonialists—all this had produced by the end of the Second World War a complex and tangled net of contradictions. The extremely aggravated relations between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine provided the British with a convenient pretext for continuing their mandate.

In 1945 the most reactionary Zionists unleashed open violence against the Arabs, setting up for that purpose, besides the Hagana armed detachments, other combat terroristic organisations like the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Group. Even representatives of the British mandate administration were forced to admit in 1947 that beginning with 1945 these Zionist organisations, "lending support to an organised campaign of lawlessness, murder and sabotage, are trying to prove that whatever the interests of the other groups of the population, nothing must stand in the way of the formation of a Jewish state and free immigration into Palestine".

By the end of the Second World War, the USA advanced an unconcealed claim to hegemony in Palestine. This eagerness on the part of the USA to establish itself in the area coincided with the Zionists' desire to "switch masters", and to substitute American for British patrons. US action in the period before the end of the British mandate in Palestine was dictated, in the first place, by oil and military-strategic interests. Some very influential circles in the USA sought to convert Palestine into a US military-strategic base. These US intentions were also borne out by its increased investments in the economy of Palestine. In 1937, these investments came to \$39 million, and by 1947—reached almost \$150 million.

The 2nd UN General Assembly adopted a decision on November 29, 1947, to partition Palestine into two independent states: an Arab state with an area of 11,100 sq. km., which was to have a population of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews, and a Jewish state—with an area of 14,100 sq. km., with a population of 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs. Jerusalem, with its adjacent areas, was set up as an independent administrative unit with a population of 205,000 (105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews). The two states were divided into 7 regions.

Following this General Assembly decision,

Zionist terrorist bands started to systematically drive the Arabs from their native soil and to kill innocent people. For instance, on April 9, 1948, Jewish terrorists massacred most of the inhabitants, including women and children, of the Arab village of Deir-Jassin.

It is, in fact, during the period extending from the time of the General Assembly decision to the proclamation of the state of Israel (May 14, 1948) that the first wave of Arab (Palestinian) refugees fled from their homes in fear of their lives. The Palestine War, which broke out on May 15, 1948, led to heavy material losses and casualties on both sides. In the course of military operations, the Israeli troops drove out masses of Arabs and seized their property. The US writer Edgar O'Ballance noted: "It was the Jewish policy to encourage the Arabs to quit their homes. Later as the war wore on, they ejected those Arabs who clung to their villages." The one-time commander of the Arab Legion, British General Glubb, wrote in his memoirs that in Jerusalem the Jews warned the Arabs through loudspeakers: "The Jericho road is still open. Fly from Jerusalem before you are all killed!" Testimonies of this kind can be easily multiplied.

In the course of the Palestine War, the Israeli troops destroyed a large part of the Arab dwellings so as to prevent their owners from returning. Thus, in the city of Jaffa entire streets of Arab houses were blown up. In the coastal plain lying between Tel Aviv and Haifa all the Arab villages were destroyed, with the exception of Fouradis which was left standing exclusively for propaganda purposes. The result of the Palestine War was that the Arab state, proclaimed by the UN decision, was never set up at all, and a large part of it was integrated with Israel.

As a result of the military operations, many Arabs left their homes and fled into neighbouring countries, particularly to Jordan. They continued to leave Israel even after the end of the Palestine War. According to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the number of Arab refugees on May 31, 1967 totalled 1,344,576 persons. In addition, the same Agency has estimated, the 1967 Israeli aggression produced more than 350,000 refugees.

The tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956 and the Israeli aggression in 1967 resulted in a further aggravation of Arab-Israeli relations and produced additional obstacles to a just settlement of the Middle East issue.

Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflict arose as a

result of the policy pursued by the imperialist powers in the Arab East, utilising the Zionists as their tool in the fight against the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples. This conflict was aggravated as Israel's rulers, encouraged by the imperialist circles, particularly of the US, pursued their expansionist policy which repeatedly took the form of overt aggression against their Arab neighbours. Within just the period of a quarter-century, Israel's rulers started three wars in the Middle East.

Past experience has shown that Tel Aviv relies on force in dealing with neighbours. It has done everything possible to avoid a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, sabotaging all efforts by peace-loving countries and forces to settle it. To this day, the Israeli rulers have issued virtually no adequately clear-cut statement proclaiming their outlook on future relations between their country and its Arab neighbours. The repeated assertions that Israel "will not return to the 1967 borders", and that it "will not once again perform an act of political suicide" (which is how the possible return to the 1967 borders is being dramatised in Israel)—a similar statement was made by the Israeli Prime Minister during her recent visit to the United States—merely indicate that the real aim of Tel Aviv's Middle East policy is to establish an "Israeli peace". This means in effect a peace that would legitimise the territorial seizures of June 1967 (Golda Meir and her colleagues characterise this as recognising "a policy of *faits accomplis*").

In fact, US monopoly bourgeoisie encourages Israel's expansionist policy. The fact that the USA has no serious intention of settling the Middle East conflict on a just basis is due not only to a broad identity of interests between the Israeli extremists and the US imperialist circles. It is also due to the activity of "Israeli lobby", which has been exerting a marked influence on US public opinion. This activity has helped to establish a "special relationship" between the USA and Israel. This is expressed, for example, in the fact that in the USA, as the one time US chargé d'affaires in Cairo, David Nes, noted, there is almost no criticism of Israel. "Only history," he added, "can render a total explanation for this very special US-Israel relationship."

A *New York Times* columnist states this is due to the general rule that any criticism of Israel's policy would draw charges of anti-Semitism. David Nes observed that the "special relationship" between Israel and the USA "has reached a point where Israel's security and

welfare is not only considered vital to our own, but where our reaction to its possible compromise is more intense than would be evident with any of our NATO or SEATO allies."

At the same time, attempts are being made in the USA, which has been subjected to criticism for its blatant support for the Israeli extremists, to portray Israel as having allegedly escaped from US control and as failing to co-ordinate its actions with US policy in the Middle East, and so on. Such statements have a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, they are designed to clear the US Government of responsibility for the present state of crisis in the Middle East and to prove that the USA has nothing to do with Israel's policy of aggression and expansion, and on the other, to encourage the Israeli leaders to adopt an openly obstructionist stand on any initiatives linked with the search for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this respect, one should recall the statement by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to a group of *Jerusalem Post* correspondents upon his return from the 27th UN General Assembly late last October. Eban declared: "The US Administration shares the view that no new Israeli initiative [incidentally, there has never been any "new" or any other constructive initiative on Israel's part—E. D.] is required at the moment. The Americans are satisfied with the present state of affairs. They feel things have gone well for them. I found in the US no signs of malaise or discomfort at the consequences of their Middle East policy." What could be clearer than that?

The pro-Israeli character of Washington's policy is expressed, in particular, by the fact that the USA has stubbornly sought to pressure the Arab countries toward direct negotiations with Israel, which, the Israeli leadership declare, is the only way to resolve the conflict. The idea here is that direct negotiations with the Arab states under continued Israeli occupation of the Arab territories seized in 1967 would enable the Israelis to put pressure on the Arabs, to conduct negotiations from a "position of strength", and to eventually secure additional territory.

Those who advocate direct Arab-Israeli negotiations sometimes claim the necessity of elaborating "universally recognised" principles which will allegedly serve as the basis of the Middle East settlement.

This is an odd standpoint, to say the least. After all, there is the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, containing principles

which could and should be made the basis for a just settlement in the Middle East. The main principle is that it is inadmissible to acquire territory by means of war. This means the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. It is this principle, whose implementation would pave the way for a Middle East settlement, that the advocates of the Israeli aggressors seek to revise.

The point is that there can be no doubt on this score. That the aggressor has no right to the Arab territories he seized during the "six-day war", that he has no right to any territorial "reward" for his aggression, is a generally recognised principle of modern international law, which is of tremendous importance not only for the Middle East. This was forcefully stated by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Alexei Kosygin, in his speech at the 5th Extraordinary UN General Assembly in June 1967. The head of the Soviet Government declared: "There are many areas in the world where you will find those who are eager to seize the territory of others, and where the principles of territorial integrity and respect for the sovereignty of states are still far from being honoured. Unless a rebuff is given today to Israel's claims, tomorrow more aggressors, big and small, may try to take over the territory of other peaceloving countries."

To this very day, the Israeli "hawks" base their relations with the Arabs on superiority of military strength. But Nahum Goldman, a well-known leader of international Zionism, noted in 1970 in *Le Monde*: "No one can say how long it will take the Arabs to overtake Israel in technical terms, specifically in the sphere of armaments. However, the time will come when the balance of strength will change in their favour".

Life goes on, and "the mole of history", as Marx put it, has been digging in the right direction. With each passing day it is becoming clearer that the imperialists and their accomplices are no longer able, with impunity, to do, as they once did, whatever they wish with the destinies of states and peoples and impose their will on all. This is so because they have been increasingly compelled to reckon with reality and with the changing relationship of forces in favour of socialism, democracy and peace.

Israeli rulers have been doing their utmost to sustain tensions in international relations. They seriously fear an improvement of Soviet-US relations.

In Israel apprehension has been aroused by the statements by US officials to the effect that any settlement in the Middle East should provide for an active participation in it of the Soviet Union, because without Soviet participation any "peace models" in the area would be doomed to failure in advance. President Nixon stated at the 25th UN General Assembly: "It is essential that we and the Soviet Union join in the efforts toward avoiding war in the Middle East and also toward developing a climate in which the nations of the Middle East will learn to live and let live. It is essential not only in the interest of the peoples in the Middle East themselves, but also because the alternative could be a confrontation with disastrous consequences for the Middle East, for our nations, and for the whole world."

Israeli rulers and the imperialist forces backing them have been trying to undermine Soviet-Arab friendship.

It is well known that the Soviet Union has always consistently supported the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples, their anti-imperialist struggle, and the resolute measures undertaken by leaders of the Arab countries to consolidate their political and economic independence.

The Soviet Union's steadfast stand was most authoritatively expressed in the resolution of the April 1973 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It reaffirmed "the CPSU line of supporting the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples in the struggle against Israeli aggression, and for a settlement of the Middle East conflict in accordance with the well known resolution of the UN Security Council".

The USSR's support constitutes a powerful stimulus to all progressive developments and tendencies in the Arab world and helps to strengthen its positions in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries in the political, economic and other spheres is becoming an ever more important factor in present-day international relations. This is all the more remarkable, considering that the history of Soviet-Arab cooperation does not extend over so many years. The late Gamal Abdel Nasser noted: "Arab-Soviet friendship has become a constant factor whose influence extends to the struggle for freedom and peace. It is reinforced by mutual confidence, which springs from a profound understanding of the problems of the struggle being conducted by both sides." The important

internal processes which led to the establishment in the Arab East, after the Second World War, of a number of politically independent states, some of which have taken a progressive path of development, were objective prerequisites for the successful development of Soviet-Arab cooperation. It is quite natural that the more consistently progressive the line of the Arab states, the sounder, deeper and more comprehensive the Soviet Union's relations with them.

Today, important socio-political developments are taking place in the Arab East, where diverse forces interact and contend with each other, and where there is a stubborn struggle between the supporters of the new and the progressive, and those who represent "forces of the past" and desperately cling to their old privileges. Sometimes this class conflict acquires highly acute forms. It is not easy for the new elements to make headway. Some of the inconsistent and contradictory measures adopted today in some Arab countries from time to time are due to the struggle between various socio-political forces, the tenacious character of the old views and conceptions, the intensified activity of reactionary circles, and to external pressures from the forces of international imperialism. These factors also explain the outbursts of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, which occur from time to time with the direct and active support of the forces of domestic and external reaction.

One should bear in mind that in the Arab world there is growing class consciousness among the working people, and increased political activity by broad masses of people (something that the Right-wing bourgeois circles fear so much). This process is being spurred on by the sharpening of the class struggle in some Arab countries, the continued Israeli aggression, and the open support to Israel's expansionist policy by the imperialist circles.

Many in the Arab world realise that the imperialist circles have openly staked themselves on Israel in the hope of using it to set back the national liberation movement in the Middle East and to overthrow progressive Arab regimes.

In this respect, the Egyptian journal, *Rosel Youssef*, noted last December: "The enemies of the country, the enemies of progress and freedom want the situation to remain as it is: Israel occupying the Arab territories, the USA helping it, the negative sides of life being aggravated, negligence becoming natural, hostile propaganda breeding despair, persistently trying

to convince us that we are impotent, and to isolate us..., and then?... Then surrender and subjugation to US peace projects are inevitable.... We must remember that the aggressive circles in America and Israel have been skilfully and subtly preparing for the plot, and that the Israeli militarists have declared, through some of their leaders, that the occupation troops will continue to stay on the other bank of the Canal, waiting until Egypt explodes from inside." This statement (one of many similar statements) is an unequivocal response to those Arab circles which naively believe or maliciously assert that the Arabs can obtain a just settlement of the Middle East conflict only by looking to the West.

An understanding of the dangers posed by the subversive activity conducted by international imperialism and domestic reaction places before the Arab countries these primary tasks: strengthening the "domestic front", uniting all truly national and patriotic forces, consolidating the front of Arab states ranged against Israeli aggression, and expanding close, fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community.

More solid Soviet-Arab relations help to invigorate the foreign policy of Arab states. To eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression and to normalise the situation in the Middle East is the unwavering goal of the Arab countries' foreign policy activity.

A new initiative has recently come from the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt. An important element of this initiative was the trip to Moscow, London, Washington and Bonn by H. Ismail, ARE President's Adviser on National Security Affairs. In the course of his talks in the four capitals, H. Ismail reaffirmed the Egyptian leaders' well-known position that no plans for any "partial" or "intermediate" settlement are acceptable to the ARE.

The Egyptian Government justly regards such plans as expressing the desire of their authors to divert world and Arab public opinion from the need to withdraw Israeli troops from the Arab territories, and to try to impose on the Arabs some sort of "partial" settlement from which only the aggressors and their patrons stand to gain. Plans for a "partial" or "intermediate" settlement are also unacceptable because essentially they tacitly envisage separate agreements between individual Arab countries involved in the conflict, and Israel, outside the framework of a general, interconnected "package" solution for all the

aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict and elimination of the consequences of Israel's aggression.

The efforts of Israeli extremists to block a just peace settlement of the conflict and their ceaseless armed provocations against their neighbours in the recent period have served to inflame the atmosphere in the Middle East.

The provocative sallies by Israeli militarists against the Lebanon, the ceaseless terroristic acts by Israeli agents against the Palestine resistance movement, the threats against Egypt and Syria, issued at regular intervals by high-ranking spokesmen of the Israeli Government aggravate the dangerous tensions in the Middle East and tend to push the area to the brink of another and very grave armed conflict.

Unfortunately, the Security Council's discussion in mid-April of the Lebanese complaint against Israel's acts of piracy and aggression was largely wrecked by the attempts to put the aggressor and his victim on the same footing.

There was good reason why the Soviet delegate abstained in the voting on the "smoothed down" draft resolution. It is the Security Council's duty to compel Israel, at long last, to abandon its adventurist and obstructionist policy on a Middle East settlement, considering that its spokesmen once solemnly pledged to respect the provisions of the UN Charter.

The need for the speediest elimination of the serious hotbed of war in the Middle East is now becoming particularly clear. Moreover the special significance of the situation in this area is such that what happens here largely affects the overall situation in the world. The profound developments taking place in the Arab countries, which are basically anti-imperialist in character, and the steadily growing role of the Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist community in the international arena warrant an optimistic assessment of the prospects in the Middle East.

L. YUGOV

Soviet-Italian Contacts Expand

TODAY the trend toward détente and cooperation is becoming a determining factor in relations between European states with differing socio-political systems. Recently this was primarily demonstrated in bilateral relations. Now this trend is being increasingly revealed in the area of Europe's common problems. Efforts are being made to resolve problems on a multilateral and a European-wide basis. In respect to Europe's bilateral relations, too, more attention is being steadily devoted to questions extending beyond the bounds of mutual contacts between countries. This also characterises the ties between the Soviet Union and Italy.

Indeed, in recent years Soviet-Italian relations have been consistently expanding. In this connection, the more advanced level of political ties between the two countries, which formerly lagged behind the trade, economic and other contacts, is most significant. Meanwhile, the political dialogue between the USSR and Italy gradually expanded, thereby acquiring an increasingly more profound content, as well as manifesting itself in new forms prompted by life itself.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the expansion of its relations with Italy is but another illustration of the consistent line followed by the CPSU and the Soviet Government, which is aimed at an allround improvement and normalisation of the international situation, and the development of relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation with capitalist countries. The significant favourable changes in relations of the USSR with the USA and also with the Federal Republic of Germany, and the further development in Soviet-French relations forcefully demonstrate the great achievements gained by the Soviet Union along this line.

Thus, Italy, too, confronts an urgent need to keep in step with world developments. In October 1972, on the eve of his visit to the USSR, Giulio Andreotti, Chairman of the Italian Council of Ministers, stated: "Today the entire

world is in motion. Russia is concluding unusual agreements with the USA and other countries.... Everyone is in motion and is seeking to consolidate economic ties. We, too, must make up for lost time."

The Italian Premier's visit to the Soviet Union evoked a positive international response and clearly revealed the great opportunities for mutually advantageous and allround cooperation with the USSR, available to capitalist countries genuinely interested in such cooperation. In highly estimating the results of Soviet-Italian talks in Moscow, *Il Popolo*, newspaper of Christian Democrats, the leading party of the government coalition, noted: "Of fundamental importance is the fact that—with strict and loyal observance of international and political framework in which they act, as well as the responsibility of each country—relations between Italy and the USSR took a 'qualitative leap' as was correctly assessed: prospects for cooperation expanded, the possibilities for 'mutual understanding' emphasised by the two sides and reflected in various agreements, increased. We regard this as a most positive development not only for the bilateral but also for the European and international relations within which all this must be viewed."¹

The majority of Italian and other Western publications noted the important shift in the political relations between the two countries that followed in the wake of the visit. Many commentators noted that the Soviet-Italian documents signed in Moscow reaffirmed the Soviet Union's consistent foreign policy with respect to Western countries. An Italian journal on international relations pointed out: "The Protocol on regular consultations was a new fact in the political sphere... True, Moscow has signed similar agreements with a number of other non-communist countries, including some Atlantic states—France and Canada. It is justly noted, however, that now the USSR signed

¹ *Il Popolo*, Oct. 30, 1972.

an agreement with a country which has never found fault with NATO as was the case with France, and which has neither special grounds nor enough armed forces to emphasise its independence as, for example, Canada does in face of her too powerful neighbour."²

The joint Soviet-Italian documents signed in Moscow demonstrate that the zone of political accord between the two countries, given mutual readiness, may extend further, despite differences in social structure and ideology. Thus, today, following France, the FRG, and the USA, Italy has come to realise that a summit political dialogue with the USSR is necessary and useful. This is revealed, in particular, by the agreement on the exchange of visits by the leaders of the two countries.

The Soviet Union gives a positive assessment to the state and prospects of Soviet-Italian cooperation in various spheres, and expresses its readiness to promote the development of Soviet-Italian relations in future. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, stressed in his report on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the USSR, that the Soviet Union is ready "to develop all that is positive, that has become or is becoming part of the practice of our relations with countries like Finland, our good neighbour, Italy..."³

Needless to say, different approaches in respect to some key questions of today cannot but affect the degree of accord between the partners of political negotiations. For example, during the talks, the Soviet Union noted in connection with the Italian Government's granting a submarine base to the US 6th Fleet on the Maddalena Island that, at present, when the trend toward peace and a détente is gaining headway in Europe, it is particularly important that nothing should be done in Europe to counter this trend nor should any action reflect the former policy of intensifying military preparations by setting up foreign bases and aggravating tensions.

At the same time, we have been emphasising those measures which meet the real interests of the Soviet Union and Italy, and which promote peace, détente, and good-neighbourly cooperation in Europe. That is why the problems of European security and cooperation occupy an increasingly important place in the contacts between Soviet and Italian re-

presentatives. It is indicative that in Italy, Soviet-Italian contacts in this respect are meeting with growing public understanding. True, (and this is acknowledged by the Italian press) Italy often lags behind her Western partners in maintaining such contacts. She leaves the initiative to others.

In positively assessing the Moscow meeting of heads of the Soviet and Italian governments, the Turin *La Stampa*, closely linked with FIAT, did not fail to note: "What would have created a sensation several years ago, today seems almost an ordinary phenomenon."⁴ Quite recently many in the West, particularly in Italy, expressed scepticism with respect to the convocation of an all-European conference. Today, the representatives of the Italian Government take part in the multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki, while the problems of an all-European conference, together with other urgent questions pertaining to Italy's foreign and domestic affairs, are discussed with keen interest in the country. Such is the logic of developments in international situation today.

The basic changes which took place in the position of the Italian Government with respect to the problems of European cooperation should be particularly noted. They are characterised by a shift from somewhat restrained attitude toward the Ostpolitik of the Brandt Government to the approval of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, from support to the Hallstein Doctrine—to establishment of diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic, and from trade relations—to a political dialogue with European socialist countries.

The further expansion of the political dialogue between the USSR and Italy is an important component of the present-day favourable changes in Europe. Naturally, fruitful results will accrue as the zone of accord between the two countries expands. The Soviet-Italian Protocol on Consultations, signed October 26, 1972, may serve as an important lever in this field. Given the readiness of the Italian side, it is possible, within the framework of the Protocol, to find additional opportunities for developing cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of international politics, in the pursuit of a détente, in consolidating European security, and in furthering mutually advantageous bilateral relations between the USSR and Italy. In pursuance of the Soviet-Italian Protocol, the first consultations were held in Rome last November to examine ques-

tions linked with preparations for an all-European conference. The next round of consultations took place in Moscow in May 1973.

TODAY the all-European conference occupies a central spot in statements by the architects of Italian foreign policy. The all-European conference is an event in diplomacy which has no equal in the past decades or even centuries. Many Italian statesmen and political leaders, as well as experts in, and observers of, international affairs, share this viewpoint.

The solution of problems in respect to European security and cooperation on an all-European basis is being increasingly regarded in Italy as an efficient way to ensure the independent development of West European countries. *Relazioni Internazionali* declared: "The preliminary talks in Vienna on the reduction of forces in Central Europe and the talks on European security in Helsinki could promote the restoration of Europe's independence [from the USA—L. Y.] without which neither the protection of one's own interests, nor the ensuring of European contribution to the solution of the problems facing the world, are possible."⁵ Such an approach to European affairs is rapidly gaining ground in the Apennines.

It appears that some Western countries, including Italy, are more clearly realising the direct link between the necessity for a more independent course and parting company with the policy pursued by US imperialism during the postwar period. In noting particularly the huge deficit in the US balance of payments (accumulated for many years), which explains present US monetary problems, many in Western Europe, including Italy, openly state that "the US policy of strength in its various manifestations, including in Vietnam, underlies the chain of reasons which have engendered this deficit".⁶

In view of the serious trade, economic and political differences between the USA and its West European partners, there are rather frequent calls in Italy for the expedient adjustment of inter-European relations throughout the continent in all major spheres—from political to scientific and technological. It is not by chance that the questions linked with the all-European conference occupy a prominent place in Italian negotiations not only with the USSR and other socialist countries but also in rela-

tions with her partners in the Common Market, NATO, Western European Union, etc.

As for the Soviet-Italian understanding on convening an all-European conference, the most important thing here is the jointly expressed desire for the conference to be convened "not later than the first half of 1973", as well as the agreement on the principles which should serve as the basis for relations in Europe. It should be noted that the Soviet-Italian Communiqué of October 30, 1972, stated the necessity to observe "the principles of the inviolability of borders, non-interference in domestic affairs, equality, independence, non-use or threat of force".

Italy is taking an active part in the multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki. It should also be noted, however, that the call for a common NATO approach or an approach, agreed upon by members of the enlarged Common Market, to the preparations and convocation of the conference, sometimes resounds even louder than Italy's own voice. It appears that certain inconsistency in positions of Italy in the course of the preparations for an all-European conference did not help her to fully use her ability to advance the preparations. On the contrary, consistent implementation of existing agreements would undoubtedly consolidate Italy's international positions and her prestige both in Europe and elsewhere.

In approaching European problems, Italy often and quite justly stresses that she is not only a European but also a Mediterranean power. It is only natural, therefore, that Italy is concerned with European problems and also with the situation in the Mediterranean. During the preparations for the all-European conference, Italy linked the questions of European security with the problems of the Mediterranean.

Of course, a definite interconnection between various problems in contemporary world politics does exist. It is no less obvious, however, that a truly realistic and constructive policy selects out of the maze of problems those issues which are ripe for mutually acceptable solutions without tying them to other problems which cannot be quickly resolved.

It should be noted that the approach which stressed the need to consider Mediterranean problems at the all-European conference failed to secure support even from many NATO countries. In view of the situation existing on the eve of the conference, this approach could be regarded as an artificial obstacle to the con-

² *Relazioni Internazionali*, Nov. 4, 1972.

³ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1972, p. 54.

⁴ *La Stampa*, Oct. 30, 1972.

⁵ *Relazioni Internazionali*, Feb. 24, 1973.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

ference. The cause of peace in Europe will stand to gain if such obstacles are eliminated.

Moreover, during Giulio Andreotti's visit to Moscow, the Mediterranean problem was also raised. Subsequently both countries arrived at the common conclusion that the solution of the Middle East problem (like the process of a further détente in Europe) would "promote the establishment of peace and friendly cooperation in the Mediterranean". It was not by chance that then the Mediterranean problem was not tied up to the questions of the all-European conference. It seems today, too, such an approach corresponds best to the interests of all European and Mediterranean countries.

SOVIET-ITALIAN cooperation could also play a useful role in respect to such an important question as the consolidation in international relations of the principle of non-use or threat of force, and the permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons. The two sides reached an understanding on this issue. In addition, the Italian Government, as is known, expressed its satisfaction that, as a result of Soviet-US agreements, measures curtailing the nuclear arms race are taken. Such an approach embodied in the Soviet-Italian Communiqué is all the more indicative because quite recently the Italian opponents of a détente were raising a hue and cry about the Soviet Union's alleged agreement with the USA at the expense of third parties. The principled stand taken by the USSR demolished all such "theories". Moreover, as the present position of the Italian Government shows, Soviet policy has been correctly understood in Italy, as well as in the majority of other countries.

The question of disarmament has for several years constituted an important point in the Soviet-Italian dialogue and in the consultations on different levels. The point in the Soviet-Italian Protocol dealing with "progress in disarmament" actually consolidates the existing practice of mutual consultations and sets new tasks before the participants in the talks. One of these tasks is active struggle for the banning of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction. Of great importance here is the fact that the two countries admitting the importance of all its propositions urge an immediate accession of all states to the non-proliferation treaty.

An understanding between the USSR and Italy on cooperation for achieving an international agreement on banning chemical weapons

could enhance the fruitfulness of the work of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. Italy supports the Soviet proposal to convene a world disarmament conference. Thus if the two countries jointly work for such conference, it would undoubtedly constitute a worthy contribution to the solution of the entire complex of urgent disarmament problems.

Of considerable practical significance also is Italy's position on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. That Italy, following the Soviet-US Summit Talks, favoured the consideration of these questions "at a special forum and independently of the all-European conference"⁷ and took a positive view of the preliminary talks in Vienna, is unquestionably an important development. At the same time, some Western circles, above all those directly linked with NATO, are urging Italy to take a position which would at the very least obstruct the talks in Vienna. Of course, much depends on whether Italian representatives take a realistic approach to the problem or still cling to obsolete concepts in respect to military détente in Europe.

The understanding jointly expressed by the USSR and Italy, as a result of Moscow talks, that "general normalisation of relations between the GDR and the FRG and their admission to the UN would create new opportunities for a détente and the strengthening of international security", has already played its essential role in improving the situation in Europe. Early this year negotiations with the representatives of the GDR were held in Rome and on January 18 the establishment of diplomatic relations between Italy and the GDR was announced. This not only constitutes an impressive success scored by the foreign policy of the GDR and the concerted constructive policy of the entire socialist community, but also provides a graphic example of how détente in Europe is being consolidated. It also demonstrates realism on the part of the Italian political leaders who took pains not to be among those Western states which are the last to recognise the German Democratic Republic.

Like the Soviet Union, Italy positively assessed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. In approving the decisions of the Paris Conference, Italy took an important political and practical step in March 1973, toward establishing diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is revealing that the adoption of an appropriate

⁷ *Pravda*, Oct. 30, 1972.

resolution in the Italian Parliament was accompanied by stormy applause on the part of the absolute majority of the deputies.

TRADE and economic cooperation between the two countries constitutes one of the spheres of allround development in relations between the USSR and Italy. Business contacts successfully developing on the firm basis of equality and mutual benefit are yielding good results for the two countries. For Italy, one of the first Western countries which developed trade with the USSR, her economic ties with the Soviet Union are of particular importance in present conditions when the competitive struggle in the capitalist world has been sharply aggravated, particularly in the enlarged Common Market, and crises are gripping the monetary and financial relations in the West. It is no accident that *L'Espresso*, a weekly, commenting on the Soviet-Italian trade negotiations, wrote: "The negotiations on contracts worth many billions are coming to a close, and they will be like a breath of air for our economy."⁸ In respect to her trade turnover with the Soviet Union, Italy ranks fifth, after the FRG, Finland, Britain and France. In 1972, her trade turnover with the USSR amounted to 466 million rubles.

During the last decade, Soviet-Italian trade increased 150 per cent. The deep-going quantitative shifts resulted in qualitative changes: the pattern of mutual exports and imports has been considerably altered, new forms and means of mutual settlements have emerged, and the number of participants in Soviet-Italian trade—firms, organisations and state agencies—has been expanded. Today consideration of questions linked with long-term planning of trade and economic cooperation is being placed on a realistic basis.

Italian businessmen are particularly interested in these mutually advantageous exchanges. This is true not only for the state sector of Italian industry (ENI, IRI and others) or such industrial giants as FIAT, Pirelli, Olivetti, Montedison but also of small and medium-size companies, members of Confindustria, the Italian confederation of industrialists. The statement made by a businessman in an interview with the *Panorama* magazine is indicative in this connection: "The two big deals we made earlier (the agreement signed by FIAT and

the agreement with ENI on the construction of one of the longest gas mains in the world) should not remain isolated episodes. It is necessary to act fast since the Soviet market is an attraction to everyone and a fierce competitive struggle is under way."⁹ *L'Espresso* points out that, while proposing to look for new methods to expand trade with the Soviet Union, Italian businessmen fear that "unless new credits for fresh initiatives are granted, we may find ourselves far away from big deals which make Kissinger and foreign ministers of the entire capitalist world come to Moscow and discuss bargains.... We must realise that the period when Italian industrialists were pioneers is coming to an end, maybe, for ever".¹⁰

With the intensification of trade and economic contradictions between Italy and the United States, which sometimes develop into political differences, the anxiety of the Italian businessmen is quite understandable. Of late, the differences between Italy and the other EEC members have been noticeably aggravated to such an extent that there is even talk in Italy that the country is increasingly drifting away from the Common Market. Of course, these are words but not facts. However, they apparently contain covert threats both against the USA and the Common Market, and the Italian working people who are waging a stubborn struggle for their socio-economic rights. In this connection, *Il Corriere della Sera* stated: "There are two ways opened up for Italy with respect to the Community [the EEC—L. Y.]: either to weaken her ties with Europe and get involved in purely Italian problems or to demand that Europe accept us as we are.... Either Europe discards the smokescreen of 'harmonisation' and 'coordination' and takes care of our misfortunes or ties of kinship will inevitably slacken."¹¹

However that may be, Italy's membership in the Common Market still remains one of the foundations of her foreign policy. When the complications, which led to the deterioration in the relations between Italy and the other EEC members were in full swing, the Prime Minister of Italy thought it necessary to note: "Europeanism constitutes the basic element of our political concept, and we are anxious about the obstacles in the path toward the creation of Europe, caused by the monetary crisis."¹² At the same time, these difficulties have force-

⁹ *Panorama*, Oct. 19, 1972.

¹⁰ *L'Espresso*, Nov. 5, 1972.

¹¹ *Corriere della Sera*, March 14, 1973.

¹² *La Stampa*, March 15, 1973.

⁸ *L'Espresso*, Nov. 5, 1972.

fully demonstrated that an excessive orientation toward such groupings as the EEC entails considerable economic and political risks for Italy. It is not by chance that the action of her Government aimed at developing ties with the countries outside the Common Market was approved by Italian democratic forces, businessmen, and all sober-minded Italians. Hence, it is quite understandable that the questions concerning further expansion of economic cooperation with the USSR rightly occupy a central place in Italian policy with respect to the USSR. Of course, such an approach meets with full understanding and support in the Soviet Union.

The Joint Communiqué signed as a result of Giulio Andreotti's visit to the USSR stressed the readiness of the two sides "to impart a greater scope to the existing economic ties", as well as their desire to expand "economic and industrial cooperation between the two countries with consideration to the high level of industrial development that has been reached". It was decided, in particular, to intensify the activities of the joint commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation. A regular session of the commission was held in February-March of this year. The Chairman of the Italian part of the commission, Mario Pedini, Deputy Foreign Minister, pointed out in one of his interviews that the commission served as a "useful means of gradual mutual adaptation of the markets of the two countries, thereby making it possible, as science and technology develop, to utilise everything that may facilitate the expansion of exchanges between them".

Indicative in this connection is the range of problems considered at the session: long-term planning of trade and scientific and technological cooperation, new forms of settlements between the two countries, specific aspects of industrial cooperation, and a number of other practical matters. According to Mario Pedini, "successes have been scored in the very philosophy of Soviet-Italian exchange.... Commodities are naturally paid for by commodities, while the enterprises—mainly, by financial means. Formerly a big part of these means was received through the credit we granted, and now the USSR offers us not only raw materials and fuel but also other goods we are interested in".¹³

Another revealing feature is worthy of note. The experience of the Italian engineers, designers and workers is growing in the course of cooperation with Soviet industry. Giovanni

Agnelli, FIAT President, said in an interview with a Hong Kong magazine: "The construction of such scope [the Volzhsky Automobile Works—L. Y.] ensured a great demand for our technical specialists. About 800 highly-skilled specialists, the cream of FIAT took part in it. They gained wonderful experience.... Our young people came back full of enthusiasm and resolve."¹⁴

Scientific exchanges between the Soviet Union and Italy are steadily expanding. This form of cooperation is of substantial practical importance since it includes not only fundamental research in a number of leading branches of modern science but also exchanges in important applied sciences. The agreement of the two countries to examine the problem of cooperation in respect to the protection of the environment is a qualitatively new feature at the present stage. The already existing agreements between the Soviet and the Italian governments on scientific cooperation in agriculture, medicine and public health received a fresh impetus.

The cultural ties which are successfully developing both in traditional fields of arts and culture and in comparatively new spheres such as cinematography, modern linguistics, are playing a growing role in Soviet-Italian relations. An increase in such exchanges is naturally being accompanied by the emergence of new forms and characteristic features of cooperation. In particular, a joint decision has been adopted to promote the teaching of the Russian language in Italy and the Italian language in the USSR. According to Italian press reports, this decision received a most hearty welcome in Italy. Last December, on the initiative of some public organisations, a conference was held in Rome, with the participation of the Italian Ministry of Public Education, on the study of the Russian language in Italian secondary schools. The exchange of tours by the Bolshoi Theatre and La Scala, as well as of the expositions of Russian paintings of the 19th century in Rome and Italian paintings of the 18th century in Moscow, will be an important event in the cultural life of the two nations.

Fruitful Soviet-Italian cultural relations serve as a graphic illustration of the great potentialities Europe possesses in developing spiritual intercourse among nations. It is clear that the indispensable conditions for this cooperation are the respect for the sovereignty, laws and customs of each country, the orienta-

tion and character of these contacts which are designated to facilitate mutual spiritual enrichment of the peoples, and the promotion of peace and good-neighbour relations.

IN GENERAL, the present stage of Soviet-Italian relations is characterised by a consolidation of the tendencies toward their further intensification, and by the emergence of qualitatively new forms. The exchanges are expanding in both directions with the two countries taking practical steps to steadily implement all mutually useful agreements that have been signed. When necessary, some operating Soviet-Italian agreements are either being replaced by others more fully meeting present-day require-

ments, or are being supplemented by new clauses. A case in point, in particular, is the treaty of October 26, 1972 on maritime navigation, whose conclusion was determined by the growing role played by the two countries as big sea and trading powers and by the constant increase of sea shipping and charter agreements between them. Similar reasons brought about the objective necessity to raise consular relations onto a higher level. Hence, a decision was made to set up general consulates of the USSR in Milan and of Italy in Leningrad.

The expansion of Soviet-Italian contacts, undoubtedly, meets the interests of the two countries and the interests of promoting peace and businesslike cooperation in Europe.

¹³ *Il Sole-Ventiquattrore*, March 15, 1973.

¹⁴ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 7, 1972.

The Future of Ecuador's Oil

IN 1972, Ecuador became one of the major exporters of oil in Latin America. Today, with oil acquiring ever increasing importance in the world economy, several million tons of oil that Ecuador extracted and exported last year may not, perhaps, have had a substantial impact on the world oil market. But that is only the beginning and there is every indication that in the future Ecuador will export tens of millions of tons of the "black gold".

Of interest, I believe, are not only the statistics of Ecuador's oil deposits and extraction, but recent events in the country which directly bear on the struggle of the people of Ecuador for their oil, waged against foreign monopolies and the forces backing them up. These events are of cardinal importance both for Ecuador and, in a sense, for all Latin America. They are linked with the struggle of the Latin American peoples for the right to control their own natural resources.

UNTIL recently, Ecuador was mainly known as a major producer and exporter of farm crops, such as bananas, coffee and cocoa. Indeed, bananas still appear to be the basis of the Ecuadorean economy: banana plantations occupy an area of 110,000 hectares, and raising, processing and preparing them for export (Ecuador is the world's main exporter of bananas) involves nearly 1,300 million people, that is, almost one-fifth of the population.¹ In 1971, bananas accounted for 44.42 per cent of Ecuador's exports, coffee—16.81 per cent and cocoa—11.69 per cent. Thus, these three items make up nearly 73 per cent of her total exports. The rest consist of sugar, fish, light industry and handicraft products.²

An event that occurred in March 1967, Ecuadoreans believe, could effect a radical change in the pattern of the country's foreign trade.

Rich oil deposits were discovered in Oriente, the eastern part of the country. Sober-minded political leaders and statesmen do not expect the discovery of oil deposits to automatically change the economic situation in the country. The important thing is in whose interests will Ecuador's oil be exploited. And in this respect Ecuador has had some unfortunate experience.

The fact is that oil was first discovered in Ecuador on the St. Helena Peninsula back in 1912, but it was at once seized by the notorious International Petroleum Company which is controlled by US capital (Standard Oil Company of New Jersey). It was followed by the Anglo-Ecuadorean Oil Fields, which in 1917 began to develop oil fields in the St. Helena area, and shortly after another British company, Sociedad Comercial Anglo-Ecuadoriana, likewise established itself in the country. The first of these two British companies turned out to be more enterprising and already in 1925 began to export crude oil and in 1927 bought up all the fields of the latter.

This company's operations in Ecuador led to unfortunate consequences. In 1971, for example, the 696 wells in the country yielded only 150,000 tons of oil, placing Ecuador last in Latin America in respect to oil extraction. This was due to plunderous exploitation of the oil fields.

The other foreign companies, still hoping to find oil in other parts of Ecuador, behaved just as brazenly. According to an official report by the Central Bank, from 1923 to October 1972, 16 foreign oil companies received concessions totalling 48.3 million hectares in the Oriente area alone. From 1961 to 1968, eight companies received 10.3 million hectares of land, one-half of which is still at their disposal.³

One can therefore readily understand why most people in Ecuador met joyfully but, at the same time, with restraint and alarm the news that an exploratory well, Lago Agrio No. 1, yielded its first oil on March 29, 1967. (Incidentally, it is still gushing to this day.) The oil was discovered on the territory of the conces-

sion of Texaco-Gulf, a US consortium nominally established in Ecuador in 1961. Taking over vast areas, it began extensive prospecting for oil only a few years later.

As soon as it obtained its first oil and made sure that the oil fields were promising, Texaco-Gulf extended its exploratory drilling for purely strategic reasons. The United States' researcher, Raimond F. Mikesell, notes that the United States is interested in oil deposits of the Western Hemisphere to avoid a world oil crisis which may arise in case the Middle East or North Africa stop their oil supplies.⁴

Ecuador's oil deposits whetted the appetites of many foreign oil companies and Ecuador soon became a kind of an oil Klondike. By September 1, 1968, the end of the presidential term of Otto Arosemena Gómez, who particularly patronised foreign oil monopolies, nearly 5 million hectares of land in Oriente area were handed over as concessions. A special issue of the Ecuadorean journal, *Nueva*, pointed out that on January 1, 1973, there were 31 foreign oil companies operating in the country.

The haste to acquire concessions incidentally was due to the fact that José María Velasco Ibarra, a presidential candidate in the 1968 elections, had made a change of the country's oil policy in the national interest a plank in his election programme. He won the elections largely because of this plank. Ibarra sensed the growing alarm in the country over the activities of oil monopolies and the rising patriotic sentiment in many sections of the population.

However, in 1968 the situation was quite different from the early days when Ecuador's oil deposits were first discovered and the British oil companies began to exploit them. Although in 1967 oil was discovered by the US Texaco-Gulf consortium, the oil monopolies had to operate in totally different conditions.

Revolutionary developments in Latin America, socialist Cuba's example, and the struggle of Ecuador's progressive forces for a democratic economic policy in the national interests were radically transforming the atmosphere in Ecuador.

An important fact should be borne in mind that life itself confronted Ecuador with the need to normalise and develop relations with the socialist countries, including the USSR. This question was soon resolved: Ecuador soon restored or established diplomatic relations with

a number of socialist countries in Europe. In November 1969, relations were normalised with the Soviet Union and an understanding was reached on an exchange of embassies and implemented the following spring.

All these domestic and external factors necessarily affected the situation in which the struggle for Ecuadorean oil developed following the discovery of new deposits in Oriente. The Texaco-Gulf consortium was forced to restrain its appetites. In 1969, it was compelled to review the 1964 concession contract. As a result the Ecuadorean Government secured more advantageous terms and also re-established control of 935,000 hectares, formerly a part of the Texaco-Gulf concession. And although the foreign companies which pounced upon Ecuador managed to obtain nearly 5 million hectares of concessions within a few months in 1968, they were no longer free of control.

Here it should be noted that despite the oil boom, Ecuador's oil reserves have not yet been fully estimated. According to the *Oil and Gas Journal* and the *Petroleum Press Service*, Ecuador's proved oil reserves in early 1972 were 758.2 million tons. This means that Ecuador is second in Latin America. Venezuela, with 1,984.9 million tons, is first. However, other estimates are cited. Thus, Rodrigo Cabezas in his book *Oil Is Ours* says that representatives of Texaco-Gulf place oil reserves on their concessions at 160 million tons. The Bureau of Oil Economy of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum in Venezuela believes that Ecuador has reserves of oil totalling 1,000 million tons.⁵

In view of these differences in assessments and in view of earlier unfortunate experiences over the St. Helena concessions, Ecuadorean specialists have urged a careful estimate of the oil reserves and determination of the level of extraction in accordance with a reasonable exploitation of the newly discovered oil fields. However, it was only in 1972 that the Government adopted an appropriate decision on this matter, and on March 7, 1973, the Ministry of Mineral and Power Resources signed a contract with the US Terramar Consultants Company to estimate the oil reserves in Oriente. This will be done in 1973.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the oil reserves in Oriente are vast, as otherwise Texaco-Gulf would not have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in that deserted and unsettled area (Oriente is located on the outskirts

¹ See Alfredo Vera Arrata, *Historia de un triste banano*, Guayaquil, 1972, p. 8.

² See *Boletín del Banco Central del Ecuador*, Nos. 537-539, April-June 1972, p. 172.

³ See *El Universo*, Dec. 14, 1972.

⁴ Raimond F. Mikesell, *Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries*, Baltimore and London, 1972, p. 76.

⁵ Rodrigo Cabezas, *El petróleo es nuestro*, Quito, 1972, p. 135.

of the Amazon jungle on the territory of Ecuador and has almost no populated localities or roads, to say nothing of industry). As soon as oil deposits were discovered, Texaco-Gulf offered the Government to build an oil pipeline from the Lago Agrio area to one of the country's ports on the Pacific. This was accepted, and, following exploratory work, construction of the oil pipeline was started at the end of 1970 from Lago Agrio to the port of Esmeraldas. It was completed by the summer of 1972 and on June 26, 1972, the first oil reached the port of Balao, which was built close to Esmeraldas.

The vast oil resources discovered in Ecuador, their proximity to the major oil refineries in the Caribbean and the west coast of the USA, and the high quality of the oil (it contains little sulphur) attracted the oil monopolies which literally rushed into the Ecuadorean jungle. Another attraction, apparently, had much to do with Ecuador's long reputation (until recently) as the USA's reliable and pliant "partner".

But as was already noted, it became clear in 1968 that things were beginning to change. Not only the foreign oil monopolies but the Ecuadorean people, including a section of the nationalistic-minded bourgeoisie, recognised the importance of the wealth discovered in Oriente. That is why during the 1968 presidential election Velasco Ibarra promised to pursue an oil policy in the national interests. However, that election promise was mostly forgotten and the foreign monopolies continued to operate in the country almost without control.

THE SITUATION changed only with the installation on February 15, 1972 of a military government headed by General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara. The new Ecuadorean Government, declaring itself to be "revolutionary and nationalistic", stood up in defence of the country's national interests, above all, its oil resources.

Its policy-making statement, The Philosophy and Plan of Action of the Revolutionary and Nationalistic Government of Ecuador, announced to the country by General Lara on March 10, 1972, contained a special section, "Policy on Oil". It stressed that "the oil policy will be pursued in the interests of the state. It will be based on a rational exploitation of the oil fields, preservation of oil reserves for future generations, and also with an eye to the real profitability of investments by the oil companies".

The Government promised to legislate changes and to review "the contracts with the companies so as to guarantee national sovereignty". It set itself the task of correctly fixing posted prices for oil, controlling foreign oil exchange revenues, declaring a new law on a State Oil Corporation of Ecuador (SEPE), building a national tanker fleet and so on.⁶

The new Government's actions, in respect to its oil programme, are being fairly consistently implemented. Once in office, it decided to place the oil port of Balao under Navy control. In March it announced an international contest for building an oil refinery at Balao (capable of refining up to 8,000 tons of oil a day). It cancelled an earlier decision by the Velasco Ibarra Government awarding a contract to a Japanese company for building the refinery, because, it said, the decision had been taken "without serious study".⁷

This was followed by more resolute measures. A decree of June 14, 1972, declared that the oil companies were to return to the state 60 per cent of their concessions in excess of the maximum provided for by the oil law and to pay an additional amount for any excess territory by December 31, 1972. On June 23, 1972, it passed a law setting up the State Oil Corporation of Ecuador charged with the task of exploring, extracting, transporting and marketing oil and oil products, and also gas independently or in cooperation with foreign companies.⁸

At the end of July 1972, after thoroughly assessing the situation in the world oil market and conditions in Ecuador, the Government established a new posted price for oil. According to estimates by Ecuadorean economists made on the basis of the average posted price of \$2.50 per barrel, the state is to receive \$1.412, and the companies—\$0.428 per barrel, that is, 75 per cent and 25 per cent of the profit.

Last year, Ecuador established her own tanker fleet, which makes her something of a pioneer among oil producing countries. She created a national tanker fleet as soon as she began to work her oil fields, despite the fact that considerable attempts are still being made in Ecuador and elsewhere to prove that this is economically unprofitable and that Ecuador should abandon any ideas of a tanker fleet.

On August 16, 1972, the first trial shipment of oil was carried out at Balao, and regular oil

⁶ See *Filosofia y plan de acción del Gobierno revolucionario y nacionalista del Ecuador*, Quito, 1972, pp. 26-27.

⁷ *El Comercio*, March 1972.

⁸ See *Registro oficial*, No. 88, June 26, 1972.

exports were started on August 27, 1972, reaching roughly 4.1 million tons by January 1, 1973. Thus, within four months of last year, Ecuador's oil extraction totalled more than 4 million tons. Consequently, at present oil extraction will be at least 12-13 million tons annually.

Although oil extraction in the eastern areas last year was carried on for only a few months, Ecuador at once became Latin America's second oil exporter after Venezuela. Incidentally, the Oriente oil will also be used for domestic purposes. A Government's decision of January 30, 1973, binds the companies operating in Oriente to transfer definite quantities of oil for refining at Libertad plants.

Oil exports immediately led to an important change in the pattern of Ecuador's foreign trade. According to official data, the three traditional export items (bananas, coffee, and cocoa) accounted for 58 per cent of last year's exports, and oil, for 20 per cent.

This picture is bound to continue to change in the years ahead, because under Ecuador's Five-Year Development Plan (approved by the Government and made effective on January 1, 1973), oil exports will increase to 14 million tons in 1974, 14.5 million tons in 1975, 16 million in 1976, and 23 million in 1977. In the five-year period, \$350 million is to be invested in the oil industry.

The Rodriguez Lara Government is now pursuing its policy of restricting operations by foreign oil companies. In the last few months of 1972, it forced them to return to the state another 737,000 hectares of concession territory. Texaco-Gulf, alone, returned 504,000 hectares of oil-bearing lands. All these lands are being handed over to SEPE.

By the end of 1972, the Government placed duties on the foreign oil companies in the country which would yield \$10 million in additional taxes on concession areas under the new oil laws. In February 1973, the Ministry for Mineral and Power Resources declared invalid the contract with the Minas y Petroleos del Ecuador C. A. and Compania Petrolera y Yasuny C. A., both of which refused to pay the above-mentioned taxes. Their concession territory together with all the equipment was handed over to SEPE.

Of course, all these Government's measures have met with resistance from the oil companies and their supporters in the country. Thus, UPI reported on January 8, 1973, that the Texaco-Gulf consortium announced in New York that it had demanded compensation for the returned concession areas from the Ecuadorean

Government. On January 10, the Ministry for Mineral and Power Resources issued a statement firmly rejecting the claims of the US consortium. The latter had no way out but to deny the UPI report. The report had quite obviously been an attempt on the part of Texaco-Gulf to probe the Ecuadorean Government's firmness on the issue.

PURSUING the policy of protecting her natural resources against encroachments by foreign monopolies, Ecuador seeks to act jointly with other oil-producing countries both in Latin America and on the international scene, and to make use of their experience.

In 1972, Ecuadorean oil specialists extended contacts at various levels with their colleagues in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Chile. Last August, the Latin American Organisation of Mutual Assistance in Developing State Oil Companies held its first meeting in Quito, which, among other questions, discussed the type of contracts concluded with foreign oil companies. Last September, Ecuador was an active participant in the first conference of Ministers for Oil and Power Industries of Latin American countries, which met in Caracas.

Early last April, the second consultative meeting of Latin American Ministers for Oil and Power Industries was held in the capital of Ecuador. The meeting adopted the Quito Declaration in which the 21 participating Latin American countries declared their determination to act jointly in defence of the continent's natural resources, particularly oil and other power resources.

Oil policy was high on the agenda discussed by the Presidents of Ecuador and Venezuela during President Caldera's visit to Quito in February 1973. Both Presidents reached an understanding on coordinating the policy of the two states within the framework of international oil organisations and on regularly exchanging information on oil.

An important indication of Ecuador's growing ties with the oil producing countries was the International Oil Symposium held at Quito in October 1972. It was attended by 22 countries, including the Soviet Union.

Soviet-Ecuadorean contacts in the sphere of oil are just being started: a number of Ecuadorean students are studying in the USSR to become oil specialists, and for the 1973/74 academic year the Soviet Union has offered another

10 scholarships for study of oil extraction and petrochemistry. In 1971, the Soviet Union, free of charge, made a comprehensive analysis of Ecuadorean oil from the Oriente fields. This was highly appreciated by government officials and the Ecuadorean public. These initial contacts can be expected further to develop in the interests of both countries.

At present, Ecuador is just starting to work oil, one of her main riches. Much is still unclear and indefinite, but one thing is quite obvious: in the future, Ecuador will become a major oil producer not only in Latin America, but on a world scale.

However, the beginnings of extraction and export of Ecuadorean oil and the expected growing foreign exchange revenues have confronted Ecuador not only with questions of relations with foreign oil monopolies but also with the problem of utilising oil revenues to develop the national economy.

Ecuador's patriotic circles and progressive forces believe that it would be wrong and dangerous to expect the oil revenues to help solve all of the country's economic and social problems. It has been quite correctly pointed out that, first, a large section of the population will

continue, as before, to live off farming, which must not be neglected in the expectation of oil revenues. Second, these revenues, if used incorrectly, will result in higher prices and inflation, and this will complicate the difficulties of the working people. Third, in order to overcome these negative consequences, apart from oil exports there is need to set up a petrochemical industry and other industries to take up the surplus manpower in the country.

Ecuadoreans have before them the example of Venezuela, whose economy has been largely distorted under the domination of foreign oil monopolies. Venezuela's "oil Eldorado" has yet to bring prosperity to her people.

OIL IS ONE of the few natural resources which could have a substantial effect on a country's economic development, especially of such a small state as Ecuador. That is why the struggle of her people to maintain control of their oil and revenues from it, is essentially a struggle for their own future. Success in this fight depends on the unity of the Ecuadorean people and on their determination to advance along the path of economic and social changes.

A. POKROVSKY,
G. SOKOLNIKOV

The Present-Day Capitalist Economy: Processes and Tendencies

INSTABILITY, crises of overproduction, economic recessions and rampant inflation combined with monetary crises, which are exerting an increasingly adverse influence on the functioning of the economic mechanism, are characteristic features of most of developed capitalist countries in the initial years of the 1970s. The capitalist state and the monopolies, as always, are trying to eliminate all these difficulties at the expense of the working people. The result is an intensification of the class struggle between labour and capital and an exacerbation of social conflicts.

At the same time, the early 1970s witnessed capitalism's further adaptation to the new world situation. Monopoly capital, with considerable assistance from the bourgeois state, is bending every effort to ease economic difficulties to a certain extent and to mitigate class antagonisms.

A precise evaluation of the development of contemporary capitalism was given by the 24th CPSU Congress. The Congress Resolution noted: "The attempts of capitalism to adapt itself to the new conditions do not lead to its stabilisation as a social system. The general crisis of capitalism continues to deepen. State-monopoly development results in an aggravation of all the contradictions of capitalism, and in a rise of the anti-monopoly struggle." These fundamental, profound propositions enable us to properly understand the laws governing contemporary capitalism.

CONTRADICTIONS AND INSTABILITY

WHAT are the main trends in the economic development of the leading capitalist states in recent years? Facts furnish an answer to this question. The economic situation of every country is reflected above all in such a basic indicator as the gross national product (GNP). Whereas in the second half of the 1960s

the average annual growth of the GNP of all capitalist countries was 5.5 per cent, in 1970 it decreased to 2.7 per cent and subsequently rose again. In 1972, according to available estimates, it reached 5 per cent. But these general figures conceal substantial differences in the growth rates of individual states.

Growth Rate of the GNP in Individual
Capitalist Countries¹

	1970	1971	1972
United States	- 0.6	2.7	6.2
Japan	10.2	6.7	8.5
Federal Republic of Germany	5.5	2.8	3.0
Britain	2.2	1.4	3.2
France	5.8	5.1	5.5
Italy	5.0	1.1	3.0
Canada	5.3	5.5	6.0

During the first two years of the present decade (1970-1971) there was a recession of business activity in most Western countries. A regular crisis of overproduction flared up in the United States, the leading capitalist country, as a result of which the GNP declined in 1970. A similar situation developed in 1971 in Italy, whose economy entered the deepest postwar crisis. In other Western countries crisis phenomena and a sharp decline in economic growth rates were registered in many sectors. In this respect, the low growth rates of the GNP in Britain should be specially noted. Rates of growth slowed down noticeably in the Federal Republic of Germany. Only in France and Canada did economic development remain relatively stable.

¹ *Economic Outlook*, No. 12, 1972.

It should be emphasised that crisis phenomena in the economy of the majority of industrially developed capitalist states were observed simultaneously. In other words, there was a definite synchronisation in the movement of the world economic cycle, a feature which on the whole was not characteristic of recent years.

A decline in business activity affected to the greatest extent the leading sector of the economy, industry. In 1971, industrial output of developed capitalist countries increased 2 per cent. In 1970 industrial production in the USA decreased 4 per cent, and in the following year it continued to remain at the same level. A decline in industrial production was registered in Italy in 1971. In general, low industrial growth rates were characteristic of most West European states in the first two years of the 1970s. Only in France, Holland and Austria did they exceed the average level.

Investment activity noticeably slackened in all Western countries. While in 1970 investments in the EEC countries rose 8.4 per cent, in 1971 only a 3-per cent increase was recorded. In Italy gross investments declined 4.9 per cent and in Belgium 3.1 per cent.

The situation somewhat changed in the world capitalist economy in 1972—an upward tendency began to make its appearance. Economic growth rates as a whole and particularly of industrial production rose somewhat. But the economy maintained its differentiated development in various countries.

In the USA, for example, industrial output increased 7 per cent in 1972. In respect to this indicator it surpassed many other developed capitalist countries. Capital investments in the US economy rose 11 per cent as compared with 1971. The economy of Italy began to emerge from the crisis. Her GNP increased 3.1 per cent but investment activity as a whole remained sluggish and the utilisation of productive capacity was not high. In Britain, industrial output scored a 3-per cent gain but the situation in many branches remained tense. No essential changes occurred in the economy of the FRG.

If we analyse the sources of the somewhat livening up of general economic activity in Western countries last year, we arrive at the conclusion that it was perhaps stimulated chiefly by a rise in the investment activity of private companies. Economic growth in a number of Western states was facilitated by an increase in consumer demand. At the same time the factors determining economic activity, it

may be noted, did not operate in full force. It was this that determined the contradictory, unstable character of the general livening up of the economy in the capitalist world.

ACCELERATED CONCENTRATION AND EXPANSION

A GAINST this background the process of further extending the power of the biggest monopolies continued and the struggle between groups of finance capital for spheres of influence grew in intensity. One of the most interesting phenomena in this process is the accelerated concentration and centralisation of production and capital both within the borders of individual states and on an international level.

By stepping up concentration, the monopolies seek to promote the competitiveness of their goods in the world market—this arena of constant fierce inter-imperialist struggle. The forms and methods of concentration are quite diverse. But perhaps it proceeds chiefly through mergers and absorptions, integration and diversification of production and cartelisation. Cooperation between companies has become widespread in recent years. Formally this signifies the conclusion of agreements between independent partners on economic, technical and scientific cooperation. In reality, however, such agreements should be regarded as a prelude to the final absorption of the financially and economically less powerful corporations by the monopoly Leviathans. The higher level of concentration in individual states is accompanied by the wholesale ruin of middle and small enterprises unable to withstand the onslaught of the powerful competitors.

In France, for example, where in the non-distant past some 200 families exercised economic and political domination, full control over the economy is now wielded by about 10 industrial-financial monopoly groups which are closely intertwined with each other. Concentration in French industry is assuming ever increasing proportions. While in 1959, 900 mergers of enterprises and companies were registered, in 1969 the number exceeded 2,500.

In 1971 the big British monopolies absorbed 884 companies with total assets of £1,165 million. In Britain, 1972 was a record year for the number of mergers and absorptions: in the first six months alone 604 companies with a total capital of £887 million were swallowed up.

The wave of concentration has also swept the West German economy. While in 1966, there were 43 absorptions of weaker competitors

by monopoly associations, in 1971 the number rose to 220 and in 1972 reached 269.² The beginning of 1973 was marked by a truly sensational event in this respect. The Thyssen corporation, the giant of the West German steel industry which holds seventh place among the FRG companies (joint stock capital of DM1,000 million), launched a determined drive to swallow up (by buying up 51 per cent of the shares) one of the largest metalworking companies, Rheinestahl A. G. (27th place, with a capital of DM470 million). The enterprises of the newly-created monopoly group will employ more than 150,000 people and their annual sales will reach DM16,000 million³. In this respect, Thyssen will occupy second place in the FRG, being exceeded only by the Volkswagenwerk.

One factor which plays a considerable role in intensifying the process of concentration should be noted. The point is that the intensity and scale of struggle between monopolies of imperialist states have been so heightened that only the most powerful industrial complexes can hope to succeed in their particular spheres. It is in this connection that, alongside increased concentration within the borders of individual countries, this process is developing on an ever wider international scale.

The main centres of imperialist rivalry emerged distinctly at the beginning of the 1970s, namely, the United States, Western Europe (above all the Common Market) and Japan. A sharp economic and political struggle is developing among them.

As is known, the United States because of historical conditions succeeded in outstripping its competitors and building up its economic bridgeheads in other countries, and first of all in Western Europe. At the beginning of 1972, US direct private investments abroad amounted to \$86,000 million, of which more than \$27,000 million were in Western Europe. Actually this means that in many West European industries, particularly in the most dynamic and promising in light of the scientific and technological revolution, key positions are held either by subsidiaries of US corporations or international concerns controlled by US capital.

The main groups of the West European monopoly bourgeoisie for a long time had no adequate possibilities for large-scale international operations. That is why the corporations and trusts of the FRG, France, the Benelux countries, Italy and other West European states,

confined themselves chiefly to their national borders. But a turn in this respect emerged at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s. As the economic might of the West European monopolies grew, a marked tendency to form international monopoly associations increased in this region. Recent developments reflect, on the one hand, the expansionist aspirations of the most powerful financial and economic groups of West European countries which find themselves cramped by national boundaries, and, on the other, signify intensified joint construction of bastions for defensive and offensive struggle against US businessmen and also against Japanese rivals which are steadily gaining in strength.

According to published data, within the framework of the EEC, 257 international mergers of industrial enterprises were effected and more than 1,000 cooperation agreements concluded between 1961 and 1969. In recent years powerful international monopoly complexes were created in some branches of industry. An agreement on the merger of the West German Hoesch and the Dutch Hoogovens steel companies entered into force January 1, 1972. The joint new company produces 11 million tons of steel and now holds third place in Western Europe (after the British Steel Corporation and the Thyssen concern). A powerful association was set up in the electronic computers industry; its participants are Siemens (FRG), CII (France), and Philips (Holland). The members of this group, by undertaking the manufacture of computers meeting the latest scientific and technological standards, seek to unitedly resist the onslaught of the US monopolies.

Joint monopoly groups are being set up in the atomic, automobile, chemical, aerospace and other industries.

Inter-imperialist rivalry and confrontation between monopolies are revealed in the most diverse spheres. Mention should also be made of some tendencies in respect to world trade, which emerged in recent years.

The slackening of economic activity in the main capitalist countries early in the 1970s led to a certain slowing down of the growth rates of world trade, although on the whole they remained somewhat higher than those in the economy of each country. In other words, the deterioration in the economic situation in the Western world and the consequent exacerbation of the marketing problem, at first glance, appeared to only slightly affect world capitalist trade. But closer examination of characteristic

² See *Wirtschaftswoche*, No. 6, 1973, p. 96.

³ See *Handelsblatt*, Feb. 21, 1973.

current tendencies in world commerce leads us to a different conclusion: the rivalry between Western states on these fronts is becoming more sharp.

What is above all noticeable is the obvious weakening of the positions of the United States in the world market. The dollar crisis and the consequent lowering of the competitive position of US products slowed down the growth of US exports and created favourable prerequisites for the influx of foreign goods into the US home market. This sharply worsened the US balance of trade. In 1972 alone, the unfavourable balance of trade exceeded \$6,000 million including \$1,300 million in US commerce with the FRG.

But the greatest anxiety in the United States is aroused by the character of the trade with Japan: with this partner the unfavourable trade balance amounted to \$4,000 million. Trade with Canada is no better: there is an adverse balance of \$2,000 million.

Recently US monopoly capital has begun to energetically apply measures for resisting the pressure of its competitors, seeking through the introduction of various import restrictions to set up a kind of barrier to the influx of foreign goods. At the same time, in accordance with the demands of its industrial tycoons, the US Government is trying to compel its partners to create favourable conditions for the penetration of US exports into the West European and Japanese markets. Paradoxically as it may seem, the US monopolies themselves are creating obstacles for the expansion of national exports. The point is that many of the biggest US monopoly associations, in pursuit of additional superprofits, have transferred a considerable part of their production resources to other regions, chiefly to Western Europe. As a result, the sales of US subsidiaries and of multinational companies controlled by US capital in the EEC member states are approximately 2.5 times greater than US exports of goods to these countries.

And so, a situation has arisen where the products of European branches of trans-Atlantic corporations are competing with "purely" US goods. Moreover, goods reaching the US market, which are manufactured in US-controlled enterprises in Western Europe at lower production costs, undermine the positions of local producers.

The increasing resistance offered by the United States to Japan's expanded exports has prompted the Japanese monopolies to undertake a kind of regrouping of forces and to devote

special attention to the large West European market. Last year, EEC countries absorbed about 7 per cent of all Japanese exports, but the growth rates are high. Between 1958 and 1970, Japan's exports to Common Market countries increased ten-fold and in 1971 they rose another 26 per cent. In 1967, the Common Market countries had a favourable balance of trade with Japan amounting to \$46 million, while in 1972 the six EEC states accounted for \$1,000 million of Japan's total \$9,000 million favourable trade balance.

In recent years, Japanese goods have literally flooded the markets of Western Europe. Suffice it to say that Japanese enterprises produce 99 per cent of all the transistor sets, 57 per cent of the tape recorders and 34 per cent of the portable TV sets sold in the Federal Republic of Germany. Many companies, including large ones, cannot withstand Japanese competition. For example, Philips, a major Dutch corporation, recently announced that it had discontinued the manufacture of table computers because of Japan's competitive pressure.

The expansion of trade with Japan, which is unfavourable for West European countries, is largely explained by the high competitiveness of Japanese goods. Moreover, Japanese monopolies are displaying great flexibility in penetrating West European markets, for example, by making investments in various sectors of the economy and setting up mixed enterprises and companies. West European industrial circles are exerting ever increasing pressure on their governments to take effective measures for limiting or stopping Japanese imports in situations when they disorganise the local market.

The acute situation in trade relations between the United States and its West European partner-rivals and the sharpening of competition between the EEC and Japan, as well as the trade contradictions between Japan and the USA, have been the object of numerous negotiations at various levels. They have also led to painful explorations for compromises. But thus far, this has produced no tangible results.

THE MONETARY CRISIS AS A FACTOR OF GROWING CONTRADICTIONS

THE EARLY 1970s abounded in monetary upheavals on a scale without precedent in the capitalist world. Discontinuation of the exchange of the dollar for gold and its two devaluations, the frequent revisions in the

parities of basic currencies, the introduction of floating rates, the fiercest assaults of the "gold rush", the migration of huge amounts of "hot money" in search of a profitable refuge—all this reveals that the crisis in the capitalist monetary system has reached quite a high pitch.

Most Western experts regard the more frequent waves of the monetary crisis as the result of disturbances within the mechanism of international settlements in view of the loss of the dollar's regulating power. For example, J. Rueff, an eminent French economist, told a France Presse correspondent in May 1971, that the present international monetary system represented merely a caricature of the system adopted in Bretton Woods July 22, 1944, because it was no longer based on the United States commitment to freely sell gold to its partners upon the latter's request. In Rueff's opinion, development of international trade is a precondition for the prosperity of the West, and this requires the preservation of stable currency parities. This, in turn, is possible only by restoring the convertibility of the dollar into gold in the way it was introduced at Bretton Woods.

The course of events has demonstrated the utter futility of efforts to achieve at least relative stability in international settlements: the United States, far from restoring the Bretton Woods rule concerning dollar convertibility into gold, even renounced the remaining mini-commitments to exchange for gold the US currency held in central banks of other countries.

The sensational events in the international monetary sphere began in mid-1971 and practically continue unabated up to the present. The Italian weekly *L'Espresso* wittily and justly compared the Western monetary and financial system with a pyramid standing on its apex. "How long can this edifice balancing on its own edge maintain its equilibrium?" the journal asked. The reply to the question was furnished by President Nixon, August 16, 1971, who announced an emergency programme for saving the dollar, which finally blasted illusions concerning the possibilities of normalising international settlements.

In accordance with the President's programme, a 10-per cent import surcharge was introduced in the United States and the convertibility into gold of foreign dollar holdings was abolished.

In effect, the capitalist countries had to decide whether to maintain the rate of the dollar and keep on accumulating the wobbly US

currency, or to introduce a floating rate and thereby try to contain the tidal wave of speculative dollars flooding the markets of the most stable currencies. The mounting prospects of a devaluation of United States currency drew into speculative circulation huge dollar resources held by foreigners (\$60,000-70,000 million). Most of the West European banks, in pursuit of a way out of an extremely delicate situation, were forced temporarily to suspend the exchange of currencies.

The monetary and financial catastrophe which struck the capitalist world did not surprise anyone. The "dethroning" of the dollar had long been predicted by economists, and therefore caused no sensation. An unerring diagnosis of the chronic illness of the US currency was also made long ago: sharp dystrophy caused by the exhausting burden of militarisation and the maintenance of military bases and armed forces abroad. The clinical picture of this disease was characterised by a balance-of-payments deficit running into many thousand million dollars and leading to ever new "elephantine" injections of dollars into international money circulation, as well as by the rising scale of inflation within the USA. The deficit in the US balance of payments in recent years was maintained at an annual level of about \$10,000 million.

The monetary crisis in 1971 reached its culminating point at the meeting of the Group of Ten held in Washington, December 17-18. It ended in a compromise decision, according to which the United States undertook to devalue the dollar by 7.89 per cent and in response to this a number of countries revalued their currencies. This understanding among the principal capitalist countries, which is known as the Smithsonian agreement on levelling parities, was characterised by the US President as an historic event. But the hope of ensuing fair weather in the monetary sphere proved to be illusory. After a brief dead calm, a storm again broke loose in the ocean of international settlements.

The United States failed to restore confidence in the new parity of its currency and the year 1972 was marked by a mounting "flight" from the dollar toward more stable currencies—the Japanese yen, the West German mark and the Swiss franc. Mistrust of the dollar was displayed in a fever of speculation in the main markets of Western Europe and Japan. The exchange of dollars for stable currencies assumed fantastic proportions. The malaise of capitalism's monetary system was

also revealed in the more frequent assaults of the "gold rush". But the most dramatic events were enacted in the first months of 1973: Distrust of the dollar became especially pronounced early in February, with the price of gold in the free market reaching \$90 per troy ounce.

In this situation, the US Government again devalued the dollar by 10 per cent, and Japan simultaneously introduced a floating rate of the yen. Washington's decision to reduce the parity of its currency evoked contradictory comments. On the one hand, this step was appraised as a prudent measure designed to eliminate the crisis. At the same time many commentators noted that it was not a case of the US Government taking a wise step, but of promoting US external economic expansion. The French *Les Echos*, on February 15 noted that "two devaluations in 14 months not only undermine confidence in American currency but also compel one to ponder over the policy of a country which affected them and its strategy". The newspaper emphasised that "devaluation, decided by the United States, is an aggressive measure with regard to Europe. This decision is dictated by the desire to preserve dollar dominance over European and Japanese vassals by compelling them to pay for American expansion".

The Italian business world received news of the dollar devaluation without much enthusiasm. From the viewpoint of Italian-American trade, this signified the practical revaluation of the Italian lira. The higher cost of the lira in relation to the dollar reduces the competitiveness of Italian goods exported to the United States, creating additional difficulties for their sale in the US market. If we add to this the prospect of higher customs duties, hinted at quite transparently by Washington, the anxiety of Italian business circles is fully understandable and justified.

The Italian press, even that section which usually in most questions takes a pro-US stand, this time criticised Washington's financial policy, emphasising its intention to regulate economic difficulties at the expense of West European partners and Japan. For example, *Corriere della Sera*, Italy's largest bourgeois newspaper, declared that the United States was exporting its own crisis, placing its "allies" in a difficult position.

E. Scalfari, well-known Italian journalist, wrote in the weekly *L'Espresso* that "the little that was built up by the 'historical' agreement in Washington collapsed like a house of cards.

Nothing remained intact: the dollar was devalued, the yen, pound sterling, Swiss franc and lira are 'floating' without any upper and lower limits; in France, Italy and Belgium foreign currencies are quoted simultaneously in two different markets—one for current operations, another for the movement of capital; the EEC agricultural market practically no longer exists; the present crisis struck the existing shaky structures with the fury of an earthquake..." Scalfari pointed to the adverse consequences of the monetary hurricane for the home markets of West European countries. In Italy, for example, it led to a rise in the cost of living, moreover, the prices of foodstuffs are especially increasing.

In contrast to these statements about the adverse consequences of dollar devaluation, official circles of most West European countries approved the action of the United States. This position of governmental circles of a number of West European countries was the result of an understanding between the United States and the respective countries to portray the devaluation of the dollar as an important concession by Washington and a means of stabilising the international monetary situation.

But within two weeks after the devaluation a critical situation again arose in the monetary market. Representatives of six Common Market countries (France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Denmark) who met in Brussels on March 11, decided to renounce the commitment to maintain the rate of the dollar. The FRG, in addition, revalued the mark by 3 per cent. The West German business world assessed the measures agreed upon in Brussels and especially the revaluation of the mark as a strong blow at export-oriented industries. Minister of Finance H. Schmidt and Minister of Economics H. Friderichs admitted that the coal, automobile and ship-building industries would inevitably face difficulties. "Our exports will have to make sacrifices," Friderichs said discussing the Brussels decisions. He called them not a step forward, but merely the preservation of the existing situation in the monetary and financial sphere. He emphasised the point that the US dollar had ceased to be the leading currency.

The final step in the winter-spring monetary crisis of 1973 was the Paris meeting of 14 countries organised on the initiative of Giscard d'Estaing. It was attended by representatives of the United States, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Britain and nine other countries with weighty currencies. In the

final communique, the ministers and governors of the central banks confirmed their resolve to jointly ensure a normalised system of exchange rates. They arrived at agreement in principle on facilitating the preservation of normal conditions in the monetary market, taking into account the desirability of reducing the movement of speculative capital.

In accordance with the Paris agreement, there is no longer firm parity between the US dollar and individual currencies. Instead, leading currencies will have a freely floating rate in relation to the dollar; moreover, some of them will fluctuate in unison ("float jointly"), while others will do so individually. Six of the nine currencies of Common Market countries will preserve firmly fixed parities among themselves, while their rates will freely float in relation to the dollar. The other EEC currencies, the British pound, the Irish pound, and the Italian lira, will continue to float independently, just as the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc and the Canadian dollar.

Most of those who commented on the results of the Paris meeting noted that the "concessions" made by the Americans were more seeming than real. The United States clearly demonstrated that it did not intend to assume obligations which would require radical changes in home policy or seriously influence the country's balance of payments. Judging by statements of political leaders and experts, the reliability of the Paris agreements is of a limited character: the acute monetary crisis has been settled but the disintegration of the international monetary system had not been halted. As the Belgian journal *Pourquoi Pas?* pointed out at the very inception of the monetary crisis in the 1970s, "monetarily the West remains in a state of mortal sin, and without any hope of redemption".

The monetary crisis and the aggravation of trade contradictions are deeply rooted in the world capitalist economy. Constantly operating factors upset the stability of international settlements and undermine the mainstays of imperialism's world monetary system.

Some of these factors have their source in the law of uneven political and economic development of imperialist countries. Since the sphere of international monetary settlements mediates external economic relations among states, changes in the correlation of their economic potentials and the consequent exacerbation of inter-imperialist contradictions in the world market are displayed first of all in this sphere. For example, the correlation of

economic potentials of the United States, on the one hand, and Western Europe and Japan, on the other, changed in the last 20 years not in favour of the Americans. This was also reflected in international trade: the share of the United States in total exports of the capitalist world dropped from 32 per cent in 1947 to 15.5 per cent in 1970. In the 1960s the growth rates of US exports were lower than those of all capitalist exports. Realising that it was losing ground in the world market, the United States decided to exploit the mechanism of international settlements and devalued the dollar twice, thus giving US exporters a considerable reserve of competitive power. It should be noted that while the first devaluation of the dollar (December 18, 1971) was made on the basis of an international agreement on evening out exchange parities, the 10-per cent devaluation in February 1973 came as a unilateral decision on the part of the United States specifically directed at stimulating the expansion of foreign trade. *L'Humanité* pointed out that the devaluation of the dollar was a weapon in the commencing struggle between the United States and other imperialist countries.

It should be recalled that for a long time Americans regarded the devaluation of their currency as an undesirable blow at national prestige and preserved an inflated parity of the dollar. But when the economies of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, developing at a faster pace, began to squeeze the Americans in foreign markets, the United States discarded prestigious considerations and utilised the devaluation mechanism.

The uneven, leap-like development of individual links in the world capitalist economy leads to stronger currencies being transformed into instruments for external economic expansion of the respective countries. This, to a certain extent, disorganises the functioning of the mechanism of international settlements. In recent years the West German mark and the Japanese yen have repeatedly been the objectives of large-scale money speculation and the source of acute inter-imperialist contradictions.

Another group of factors which erode the foundation of international monetary relations is connected with state-monopoly intervention in the social reproduction process smoothing over the impact of economic crises as well as mitigating the numerous social contradictions.

INFLATION, EXACERBATION OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS

ALL THIS, however, does not mean that the contradictions in the capitalist mode of

production are being eliminated; they are inherent in it and will disappear only with the elimination of bourgeois social system. The point is that the factors which help to minimise the crisis simultaneously create conditions for new, economic and social ills. In concentrated form they are embodied in the inflationary process which is a manifestation of capitalism's incurable disease penetrating more deeply into the system with the help of state-monopoly regulation.

Inflation specifically reflects the cyclical development of the monopoly economy which makes it imperative to finance anti-crisis measures; it exposes the greed of the bourgeoisie which ignores social needs and collective interests and utilises the created resources for further self-enrichment.

In an effort to preserve and increase its profits in conditions of inflation, economic instability and monetary crisis, monopoly capital has launched a large-scale offensive on the vital rights and interests of the mass of people.

The working people are saddled with the heavy burden of military spending, rise in prices and taxes and unemployment. In 1972 alone, domestic prices in industrially developed capitalist countries rose 4.5 per cent. In Britain, prices of various groups of goods increased on the average 7 per cent, and in Italy and France, 8 and 6 per cent respectively.

Unemployment continues to remain a scourge of the capitalist system. In his message to Congress, last March President Nixon pointed out that while in 1970 the United States had on the average 4,088,000 unemployed, in 1972 the figure rose to 4,840,000. The level of unemployment was respectively 4.9 and 5.6 per cent of the total labour force. A similar picture is also characteristic of other capitalist countries.

The working people react to the worsening of their socio-economic conditions by militant struggles against monopoly capital. This is demonstrated by the mass scale of the strike

movement, the most massive form of the proletariat's class struggle. While in 1965 there were 20 million strikers in developed capitalist countries, in 1971 their number reached 48 million. In 1972 new class battles raged in Britain, France, Japan, Italy, the United States and other countries. In 1972, up to 60 million working people took part in mass actions in the capitalist world, including over 40 million in industrially developed countries.

In Britain, 2,470 strikes involving 1.7 million were recorded last year. A total of 24 million man-days was lost during strikes, 76 per cent more than in 1971. In Japan 8 million workers struck in the spring of 1972 alone. More than 5,000 strikes involving 2 million workers were recorded in the United States.

Such forms of action as Days of Struggle, Days of Joint Action, Days of National Action are increasingly spreading, making it possible to draw into class battles broad contingents of workers of hand and brain. They are organised at factories, in entire industries, and on a nation-wide scale as combined with strikes, demonstrations, meetings and protest marches.

The class struggle spread in such forms, for example, in Italy last autumn. It was directed against the high cost of living, and unemployment, for wage increases, social security and trade union rights. About 5 million people of the most diverse occupations took part in these actions.

The joint action of the working masses for common demands helps to eliminate the influence of splitters in the working-class movement, to expose and halt their manoeuvres against proletarian solidarity. The expansion of the strike movement, alongside other forms of the proletariat's anti-monopoly struggle, attests to the rising class consciousness of the working people in the capitalist countries, their readiness to fight to the end for their inalienable social rights, for an improvement in their living conditions, and for the abolition of the omnipotence of the financial oligarchy.

Y. KOLOSOV

The Mass Media and International Law

A CHARACTERISTIC feature of present-day international relations is the ever increasing use of the mass media (the press, the cinema, radio, television) for foreign policy propaganda. There are objective reasons for this trend: the sharpening ideological struggle on the world arena, the increasing role played by public opinion in the solution of international problems, the expanding economic, political and cultural ties between nations. To this should be added, the development as a result of scientific and technological progress of vastly more powerful and more perfected mass communications media, which are utilised not only within the national framework but for the population of foreign states. Some idea of the scale of this development can be gathered from the following data: by the early 1970s, there were over 18,000 radio stations and 600 million radio sets throughout the world. The number of TV centres increased from 3,000 in 1962 to 10,000 in 1969, and the number of TV sets from 140 million to 200 million. Satellites now make it possible to beam TV programmes to any foreign country, ignoring, like radio waves, obstacles such as state borders and tariff barriers. Experts point out that in the course of the next few years it will be possible to beam TV programmes directly into the home, bypassing ground receiving and relay stations.

The press—newspapers, magazines and books (over 100 US magazines have foreign editions)—films, expositions, fairs, advertisements, and so on, are being widely utilised to disseminate information across national frontiers.

The expansion of international mass information can promote the growth of mutual understanding, social progress and cooperation among nations, and the mutual enrichment of national cultures. But one cannot ignore the fact that the mass media can also be used for other, directly opposite purposes: to incite hostility among nations, to combat progressive views, to mislead people and to spread reactionary ideas.

The vastly expanded role played by mass information today lends especial urgency to the need to regulate by international law the activity of states in respect to this sphere of international relations.

ONE OF THE MOST acute issues in this area is "freedom of information". Some Western students of law deny the necessity for any regulation or restrictions on the spread of information. In particular, they refer to the draft convention adopted at an international conference in Geneva in 1948, which held information to be the right of collecting, transmitting and publishing information everywhere without any restriction.

Those who advocate "unlimited" freedom of information also refer to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which speaks of the right of all to freely "impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers". However, one can readily see that this refers only to personal freedom and the right to express an individual opinion on one or another question, but not to the spreading of any mass information which could sometimes harm relations between countries and peoples.

In practice, in relations among countries (also among capitalist states) the possibility of individuals to use the international mass media is explicitly denied. In the last few years, a number of Western nations in view of its great importance have concluded bilateral agreements prohibiting radio amateurs from engaging in public broadcasting and enjoining them to limit their broadcasts to technical and personal matters.¹

Eurovision, the international West European organisation for the exchange of TV programmes, daily provides its members via teletype

¹ For instance, the agreement between the USA and Brazil on this matter of June 1, 1965 (See *UN Treaty Series*, Vol. 546, 1967, No. 7946).

with the programmes for the following day so as to enable states not wishing to relay any particular item to substitute for it programmes of their own choosing. In coordinating a three-hour TV programme, "Our World", the members of Eurovision agreed that it would not be of a political nature.²

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966, provides for the limitation by a country of the individual's right to freely express his opinion when that is necessary to guarantee "respect of the rights and reputation of others" and "the protection of national security, or of public order..., or of public health".

The discussion at the 27th UN General Assembly of the Soviet Government's proposal for an international convention on the principles governing the use by states of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting, revealed that a majority of countries consider it necessary to base activity in this field on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, equality, cooperation and mutual benefit. UN members declared they intended to ensure "the free flow of communications on a basis of strict respect for the sovereign rights of states".³

The practice of international relations reflects the principle in accordance with which every state possesses sovereign rights in respect to the dissemination of mass information on its territory. However, there are different interpretations in the theory of international law of the concrete rights of states in the field of radio broadcasting.

Some students of law give top priority to the sovereign right of states to *control on their territory* the reception of foreign radio transmissions, while others believe the essence of sovereignty in this field lies in the right of countries to *carry on from their own territory* any radio transmissions. Thus, the US lawyer, Ch. Hyde, wrote in 1922 on "the right of a state to control the passage of Hertzian waves through the air space over its territory".⁴ The English lawyers, Lauterpacht and Oppenheim, take the view that each country has the right to prevent the entry into its territory of radio waves from abroad. They refer to the principle

of state sovereignty of air space.⁵ The French lawyer Debbasch holds that today there is need for international regulation in the use of radio waves.⁶ The Italian lawyer Ambrosini also stated that countries could not be regarded as being independent in the exercise of radio broadcasting.⁷

Advocates of the opposite view refer to the physical impossibility of controlling the passage of radio waves over air space and substantiate the theory of "freedom of the air". They draw a line of distinction between sovereignty of air space and the sovereign right to use the air for purposes of broadcasting.⁸ L. Martin of the USA argues that these sovereign rights are mutually exclusive and that the principle of sovereignty with respect to the passage of radio waves across a state's air space has been superseded by the principle of sovereignty in exercising radio broadcasting.⁹

However, the essence of the matter appears to lie not in whether radio waves cross the border or not, but in the kind of information they convey. Countries possess sovereignty in the sphere of domestic broadcasts, but they may not disseminate any mass radio information abroad. Hence, a country's right to resist the spread on its territory of communications whose content has not been agreed upon.

The draft convention on freedom of information, elaborated as far back as 1948, has yet to be fully considered by the United Nations. It would apparently be right to introduce amendments—to define the principles of the use by states of international mass media, with the main emphasis on the content, and not on "freedom of information".

●
THERE is no consensus of opinion among Western lawyers concerning what is admissible and inadmissible in international mass information. They differ on whether it is lawful or unlawful to conduct propaganda among the population of foreign states. Some hold that any information has a propaganda effect, while

⁵ See J. B. Whitton and A. Larson, *Propaganda Towards Disarmament in the War of Words*, New York, 1964, p. 213.

⁶ See Ch. Debbasch, *Le droit de la radio et de la télévision*, Paris, 1969, p. 111.

⁷ С. Б. Крылов, *Международно-правовое регулирование радиосвязи и радиовещания*, Moscow, 1950, p. 352.

⁸ See J. B. Whitton and A. Larson, *Op. cit.*, p. 214.

⁹ See L. J. Martin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 78—79.

others feel that only information indicating an effort to convince people should be classified as propaganda. R. Rowson, a senior official in the US propaganda apparatus, characterising international political communications in 1966, said that in general they were equivalent to propaganda and defined them as "public communication directed to a mass audience whose use is planned to affect the minds and emotions of groups and not just single individuals for a specific public purpose".¹⁰

Some Western ideologists insist on the right to carry on any international political propaganda and deny the possibility of any regulation in this sphere. W. O'Brien of the USA states that the main obstacle to achieving an understanding on the international regulation of propaganda is the philosophical and ideological contradictions dividing the world.¹¹ R. Falk discounts the possibility of eliminating force in international relations and insists that the approach to propaganda should be a similar one.¹²

However, such views have been refuted by experience. The content of mass information has already become the subject of a number of international agreements.

Under the 1919 peace treaties, radio stations in Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary were prohibited from broadcasting radio telegrams of a political, military and naval nature, while commercial dispatches could be transmitted only under the control of the Entente. In 1936, a number of Latin American countries agreed on control over news broadcasts and political reports so as to guarantee their authenticity. Radio programmes insulting to other states or offensive to the national feelings of their peoples were prohibited. The same year, the International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace was worked out at Geneva. It particularly stated that radio broadcasting must not be used to "harm good international understanding".

After the Second World War, as a result of the growing political and social importance of mass information, bilateral agreements between states on cooperation and use of radio, TV and other mass media become customary. Under these treaties, a country is provided opportunities to control the contents of com-

munications received by its population from the territory of the other state.

The importance of ideological influence via the mass media became so obvious that the 7th UN General Assembly in 1952 opened for signing the Convention on the International Right of Correction, which entered into force in 1962. The Convention places responsibility on signatory states to pass on to their correspondents and news agencies a correction coming from another state to disseminated distorted reports capable of damaging its prestige or relations with other countries.

With the initiation in the West of commercial advertising broadcasts by pirate radio stations in 1958, the members of the Council of Europe were forced in 1965 to sign a special multilateral agreement on preventing broadcasts from stations outside the boundaries of national territories.

The prospect of television programmes being beamed directly into homes led in 1968 to the establishment of a group within the framework of the UN Space Committee to study the possible political, social, cultural, legal and other consequences of the use of this new mass media. At the 3rd session of the working group in 1970, the Soviet Union and France introduced draft documents presenting a number of principles governing the use of satellites for direct TV broadcasts.

In 1972, the Soviet Government placed before the 27th UN General Assembly a draft convention on the principles governing a country's use of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasts. USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko explained that the purpose in raising this question was to guarantee that the new space techniques would from the very beginning be used for the noble aims of strengthening peace and friendship between nations.¹³

The Soviet Union's initiative, aimed at resolving a number of problems arising from TV broadcasts via satellites, does not in any sense constitute an attempt to ban direct television broadcasts, as some Western periodicals claimed. TV broadcasts may promote cultural progress and bring the peoples of the globe closer together. However, it is not right to permit the new mass media to be used for spreading distrust and hostility between nations and to aggravate the international situation. Such a possibility is not at all ruled out. If some radio stations have been abusing radio

¹⁰ *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Duke University, 1966, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, p. 462.

¹¹ See *Ibid.*, p. 595.

¹² See *Ibid.*, pp. 622, 632.

¹³ See *Правда*, Sept. 27, 1972.

² See *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, Vol. V, California, June 1970, p. 220.

³ UN General Assembly Resolution 2916 (XXVII) of November 9, 1972.

⁴ L. J. Martin, *International Propaganda. Its Legal and Diplomatic Control*, Minneapolis, 1958, p. 78.

broadcasting, there is no guarantee at all that TV broadcasting would not be used for similar purposes. The Soviet proposal is not in any sense unusual or unexpected. One can justifiably state today there are some established principles, recognised by countries in respect to the contents of international mass information.

For one thing, the international community recognises that ideological preparation for and propaganda of war is unlawful. The UN General Assembly Resolution 110 (II) of November 3, 1947, condemns propaganda which has the aim or is capable of creating a threat to peace.

On the contrary, there is encouragement for the spreading of progressive ideas. In accordance with the UN Declaration on the Promotion Among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding Between Peoples, adopted in 1965, the mass media directed toward young people, is obligated to help bring nations closer together. The Programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, provides that all states and the United Nations will support the ideas of decolonisation, through the press, radio and television.¹⁴

According to the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, all forms of interference and any threats directed against the lawful rights of a country as a subject of law or against its political, economic and cultural principles, constitute breaches of international law.¹⁵

An analysis of contractual practice reveals that the principle of reciprocity in cultural exchanges has been established in international relations.

Like any other activity extending beyond the borders of one state and affecting the interests of other countries, the use of international mass media should undoubtedly also accord with certain general universal principles of international law, among which are the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as reflected in Article I of its Charter. They also include provisions written into the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the

United Nations: states shall refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force both against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and in any other manner incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations; they shall settle their international disputes by pacific means in such a way as not to jeopardise international peace, security and justice; they shall not interfere in affairs falling within the domestic competence of any state; they shall cooperate with each other in accordance with the UN Charter; to observe the principles of the equality and self-determination of nations.

THE REGULATION of the contents of international mass information is inseparable from the resolution of certain technical questions which are regulated by international law.

As far back as 1906, the International Radio and Telegraph Union was established in accordance with the Berlin Convention. The signatory states undertook to abide by a number of rules in operating coastal and ship-based radio and telegraph stations transmitting public information. The Washington radio and telegraph convention of 1927 extended the regulation by international law of radio communications to all stations without exception.

The Madrid conference in 1932 set up the International Telecommunication Union which is now one of the specialised UN institutions. It has a membership of nearly 130 countries. It is mainly engaged in coordinating technical matters in respect to telecommunications, specifically, the allocation of radio frequencies among radio stations.

In 1959, with the advent of space communications, the Union allotted several radio frequency bands for this purpose. Their range was greatly expanded in 1971 by the World Administrative Radio Conference.

Among the technical aspects of international mass information is the procedure governing the holding of international expositions, which was agreed upon by states in the Convention Relating to International Exhibitions signed in Paris in 1928 (some amendments were introduced to the Convention in 1948 and 1966).

In 1949, the Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, was worked out under the jurisdiction of UNESCO. In 1950, UNESCO members adopted an agreement on the importa-

tion of materials of an educational, scientific and cultural nature.

In order to coordinate the international exchange of television programmes, the West European countries established their Eurovision organisation. In 1960, broadcasting agencies of the socialist countries set up their Intervision organisation. Mondovision operates on the American continent. These organisations have arranged an exchange of programmes which is being steadily extended.

The possibility of using satellites for television broadcasting has also required coordination in respect to dealing with a number of technical problems. Some of these have already been resolved in the agreement setting up Intersputnik, an international system and space communications organisation, which was signed in 1971 by a number of socialist countries, and also in the Washington agreements setting up INTELSAT, an international organisation for satellite telecommunications.

Against this background, the arguments put forward by some Western lawyers, urging abandonment of the regulation of matters pertaining to technical aspects of the use of the mass media, are not very convincing. The US lawyer W. Hinchman states, for example, that UHF broadcasts and laser techniques make possible the reduction of mutual interference, thus making international regulation of the use of frequencies unnecessary.¹⁶ It is difficult to accept this view because the distribution of definite frequencies among broadcasting stations is designed to guarantee not only the avoidance of interference but also the beaming of broadcasts to a foreign state on a given frequency only with the consent of the latter. Canadian and Swedish experts rightly noted in documents submitted to the United Nations, that political and ideological interests may turn out to be more important than economic, technical and other matters with the introduction of direct television broadcasting.¹⁷ The Brazilian lawyer, H. Valladao, also believes that freedom of the use of telecommunications must be restricted when it tends to jeopardise the security of a country or conflicts with its laws, security and moral principles.¹⁸

The most convenient method of orbiting

satellites for direct television broadcasting purposes is considered to be the fixed earth orbit (when the satellite appears to be fixed over a given point on the surface of the Earth). The US lawyer, E. Valters, gives preference to the principle of a free "appropriation" of places by states on this orbit.¹⁹ At the 2nd session of the working group on direct broadcasting satellites, the French delegation quite justly said that such an arbitrary orbiting of fixed earth satellites would mean "appropriation" by states of sections of this orbit.²⁰ The point is that under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the entire expanse of outer space is not subject to national appropriation in any form whatsoever. Consequently, the use of the fixed earth orbit must be subject to regulation by international law.

It is not right to assume that few Western lawyers advocate the need for regulating the use of the mass media in international law. But most of them do not base themselves on the effective principles of state sovereignty and cooperation, but rather attempt to resort to some "reconstruction" of existing international law.

One of the most widespread proposals would refer all matters concerning international mass information to the competence of a supranational organisation. It has been proposed that the right to produce international programmes should be turned over to the United Nations or any of its specialised institutions like the International Telecommunication Union and UNESCO. Some suggest INTELSAT, sponsored by COMSAT, a private US corporation, should act as such an organisation.²¹

The real meaning of such proposals is clear. For many years some UNESCO spokesmen have claimed the need for a "free flow of information" among countries.²² The capitalist powers frequently seek to use the mechanisms of international organisations for purposes of ideological penetration into developing countries. Thus, in October 1970, a working conference of the World Publishers' Association in London adopted a resolution urging the establishment, with UNESCO's assistance, of agencies for the dissemination of information

¹⁹ See *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, pp. 53, 57.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

²¹ See *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, pp. 17-19, 42-50; *The International Law of Communications*, p. 68.

²² See, for instance, UNESCO, Doc. 13C/res. f. 2123, and also J. B. Whittton and A. Larson, *Op. cit.*, p. 196.

¹⁴ See UN General Assembly Resolution 2621 (XXV) of October 12, 1970.

¹⁵ See UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of October 24, 1970.

¹⁶ See *The International Law of Communications*, Leyden, 1971, pp. 24-25.

¹⁷ See UN Document A/AC.105/59, pp. 19-21.

¹⁸ See *The International Law of Communications*, p. 143.

from the developed to the developing countries.²³

However, it is quite obvious that mass information is so closely interrelated to the ideological and political struggle on the international scene that the various problems related to this question can be resolved only through the free expression of the will of each state. It is quite arbitrary and intolerable to impose on countries any decisions adopted by international organisations without their participation.

Some Western students of law say that the resolution of problems in respect to mass information should be determined on a non-governmental level. In this way, the exporting of official state ideology can be concealed through the establishment of "private" information agencies, including international bodies. J. Whitton and A. Larson note that the non-governmental character of US radio stations gives them considerable flexibility and freedom.²⁴

The nature of so-called "private" mass information organisations is well-known. The Italian lawyer, A. Zanicchi, states, for example, that "theoretically, full freedom of expression of ideas and, consequently of propaganda, exists under democratic [meaning, bourgeois.—Y. K.] regimes. But actually... freedom of expression is restricted and in reality the newspapers, radio, TV and film studios always represent the central propaganda authorities".²⁵ The Dutch lawyer, F. Hondius, says that governments are

ultimately responsible for the content of broadcasting abroad.²⁶

References to the private character of mass information agencies and claims that they are not subject to control by their governments are frequently used to cover up the unwillingness of certain Western circles to regulate various matters concerning dissemination of information among peoples outside their countries. They refer to the constitutional freedoms of speech and the press. However, the French lawyer, Ch. Debbasch, declares that the monopoly of the state in the sphere of radio broadcasting does not contradict democratic principles. He writes as follows: "It is quite lawful to have the whole of radio broadcasting within the competence of a single state agency, provided the law guarantees the use of radio broadcasting means to the main social sections of society."²⁷

But even granting that some problems relating to mass information can be tackled on the non-governmental level, this does not at all signify a totally "free hand" in international mass information. For international legal agreements of a private character must be based on the same generally recognised rules and principles which are characteristic for the entire body of contemporary international law.

It is to be hoped that as the peaceful co-existence of states with differing socio-political systems continues to develop a sober policy promoting the use of the international mass media in the interests of peace and social progress will gain the upper hand.

²³ See Report of the Director-General on the activity of the Organization in 1970, UNESCO, 1971, p. 137.

²⁴ See J. B. Whitton and A. Larson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

²⁵ A. Zanicchi, *Potenza e prepotenza della comunicazione sociale*, Rome, 1969, p. 274.

²⁶ See *The International Law of Communications*, pp. 69-70.

²⁷ Ch. Debbasch, *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

OAU: TEN YEARS OF EXISTENCE

Y. ALIMOV

MAY 25, 1973 was the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which now includes 41 independent countries on the continent.¹ The emergence of the OAU was not accidental: it was prepared by the entire course of the struggle of the African peoples against colonialism, and for freedom and independence. The long experience of anti-colonial struggle and the lessons of the early years of independence of the young states impressed African leaders with the realisation that acting alone the newly-free countries of Africa could not adequately resist imperialism and could easily fall victim to neocolonialism.

The OAU is thus based on the community of interests of its member states in such questions as the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism. At the same time, in order to correctly assess the OAU's activity and to realise its potentialities, one must recognise that it has rallied all the independent African countries, with the exception of South Africa. Among its members are republics and monarchies, countries oriented toward socialism and capitalism, English-speaking and French-speaking countries. Under these conditions it is quite natural that African countries have not only common interests, but also specific interests and positions.

One must also bear in mind that on the continent there exist growing social and political differentiations among states and rise of so-called local nationalism, or "micronationalism" in some countries. This undoubtedly breeds centrifugal tendencies and serves as the basic cause for the internal contradictory character of the tendencies toward unification

in Africa and within the OAU. Besides, imperialism, which has not abandoned its efforts to run the OAU and utilise it for its own purposes, also seeks to spread dissent in the Organisation.

As a result of these and various other factors, two main lines coexist and contend with each other within the African unity movement: the anti-imperialist line, and the line of conciliation and compromise.

The determining role is played, however, by the anti-imperialist forces, and the tendency toward consolidating the continent-wide unity on an anti-imperialist basis is predominant.

The following main lines may be noted in the activities of the OAU: struggle for total eradication of colonialism on the continent; beating back the moves by neocolonialism; peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts; development of allround cooperation between African states; strengthening of independent Africa's international positions; struggle for peace and international security.

In the past decade, the OAU has employed various methods to accelerate the liberation of the colonial peoples on the continent. Working for the speediest elimination of the survivals of colonialism, the OAU has linked this issue not only with the liberation of over 30 million Africans from colonial slavery, but also with ensuring the security of the countries already liberated. African leaders believe that the security of their countries will be threatened as long as racist-colonial regimes exist. The OAU has given consistent political support and material assistance to national liberation organisations.

Independently and through the United Nations, the OAU has been bringing political and economic pressure (boycott and sanctions) to bear on colonial and racist regimes. Finally, the OAU has sought, on various oc-

¹ The OAU was established at a conference of heads of state and government of independent African countries at Addis Ababa in 1963.

casions with the help of world progressive forces, to influence the policy of their patrons and allies—the imperialist NATO countries—subjecting them to criticism and public condemnation.

In the past few years, the OAU has sought opportunities to extend assistance to the national liberation movements. It has adopted decisions to increase contributions by African countries to the Liberation Fund and to vitalise the activity of the Liberation Committee, the main agency within the OAU system whose responsibility is to coordinate the aid given by African countries to the national liberation movements. In 1972 and 1973, the OAU succeeded in achieving the first results in its years of trying to bring about joint action by rival national liberation organisations. This is in reference to Angola and Zimbabwe.

Organisations providing leadership in the struggle of the peoples in the colonies were granted observer status at the OAU. The OAU's Rabat Assembly (June 1972) considered the question of recognising national liberation organisations in the Portuguese colonies as legitimate representatives of their countries and peoples. It urged the international community to discuss problems concerning these countries and peoples only with the representatives of the appropriate liberation movements.

However, the OAU's decolonising efforts on the continent meet with great difficulties. The colonialists are constantly changing their tactics, making them more flexible and sophisticated. Thus, for example, Portugal has not only expanded her armed operations against the fighters for freedom, but has also taken other steps to obstruct the struggle of the patriots. Together with other imperialist countries, Portugal has begun construction of hydropower complexes at Kabora Bassa and Kunene, in Mozambique and Angola respectively. The objective is, first, to attract hundreds of thousands of Europeans from the metropolitan area (to provide a social basis for the colonial regimes) and, second, to directly cause international monopolies and other imperialist powers to take interest in preserving Portugal's colonial possessions.

In its efforts to split the ranks of the national liberation movements and to spread illusions among the indigenous population, Lisbon last spring organised "elections" to local legislative assemblies in its colonies which are officially ranked as Portuguese overseas provinces. However, only a small section of the African population, those who know

how to read and write in Portuguese, were able to take part in these elections. The Portuguese secret police has been organising assassinations of prominent leaders of the national liberation movement. Thus, early this year a hired assassin killed Amílcar Cabral, leader of the African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC).

Nor have the racists of South Africa and Rhodesia lagged behind the Portuguese colonialists. The rulers of Pretoria, Lisbon and Salisbury have been consistently consolidating their unofficial military and political alliance which Africans call the "devil's alliance". For their part, the imperialist powers have been active in arming the colonial-racist regimes and giving them political and material support.

A factor hampering the OAU's further intensification of activity is, to some extent, the position taken by some African states. The meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee in Accra last January noted the slowing down of the process of decolonisation on the continent. Its resolution declared that unfortunately the assistance of the African states to the national liberation movements was so insignificant that it could not be compared with the volume of assistance being received by these movements from non-African countries.

A serious test for the OAU was the "dialogue" with South Africa and the concept of a peaceful path of struggle against colonial-racist regimes. In 1969, the OAU Assembly adopted the Lusaka Manifesto which stated that it was desirable for all African peoples to achieve independence without the use of force or with a minimum of force and even through some compromise on the question of the timetable for achieving change. Some African leaders then proposed that the African states should abandon their boycott of the Republic of South Africa and should start establishing contacts and initiating negotiations with it.

The national liberation movements and progressive forces in the OAU had to exert much effort to prove that it was impossible to make colonial-racist regimes "see the light". They were "aided" in this by the colonialists and racists themselves, who continued to suppress any action by the Africans and to stage provocations on the borders of Guinea, Zambia and other states.

At the subsequent assemblies in 1970 and 1971, substantial corrections were made in the programme outlined by the Lusaka Manifesto. In June 1971, a majority at the OAU Assembly

rejected the idea of a "dialogue" with South Africa and adopted a special declaration characterising it as a move by the racist minority of South Africa and its allies, the move designed to divide the African states. In this way, the OAU gave a rebuff also to the "peace-makers" in the imperialist countries, the true initiators of the idea of "dialogue".

At present, the OAU is discussing the question of armed assistance to liberation movements and of the organisation of joint military resistance to the aggressive actions by the colonial-racist regimes along the borders of African countries. Thus, in June 1972 the Rabat Assembly of the OAU considered the proposal by President Nguabi of the People's Republic of the Congo to set up African volunteer brigades to take part in armed struggles under the command of leaders of liberation movements. Similar ideas have also been expressed by Nigeria and several other African countries.

The OAU Liberation Committee meeting in Accra in January 1973 adopted a declaration on a new strategy for Africa's liberation. It was decided to concentrate on the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and on providing assistance to the fighters for freedom in Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique, because that was the weakest link in the "devil's alliance" between the colonialists and racists. Moreover, the liberation struggle has scored there its greatest successes and has the best prospects for victory.

Despite its limited potentialities, the objective difficulties and the differences within it, the OAU has been making an important contribution to the struggle to eliminate the survivals of colonialism in Africa. This contribution consists in giving material assistance to the struggling peoples, securing their rear, and rendering diplomatic support to them in Africa and on the world scene. Since the establishment of the OAU, nine new states have appeared in Africa. Armed struggle was started in Mozambique, Namibia and Rhodesia, and it was intensified in Angola and Guinea (Bissau). The movement against apartheid is gradually gathering momentum in South Africa.

In view of the OAU's anticolonialist stand (together with other facts, of course) the Western powers, who are interested in maintaining their relations with the independent countries of Africa, have been forced to cover up their real aims. They have been compelled to pursue a policy of manoeuvring and even to some extent to participate in UN sanctions against colonial-racist regimes. Thus, no im-

perialist power has risked official recognition of the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

The OAU Liberation Committee has voiced its determination to make the second decade of armed struggle a decade of substantial and decisive victories in the fight for the complete liberation of Africa.

In this respect it should be noted that the Vietnamese people's victory has registered a profound impact on Africa and the OAU. The OAU Council of Ministers Session in February 1973 adopted a resolution stressing that Vietnam's example was a source of inspiration for all fighters for freedom, just as the principles and methods of warfare it demonstrated and the self-sacrificing struggle of the Vietnamese people.

THE AFRICAN peoples' struggle against neo-colonialism is perhaps as difficult as that against colonialism. Back in 1963, the OAU put forward a demand for a withdrawal of foreign troops from Africa, dismantling of foreign military bases, and release of African countries from the military agreements imposed on them by foreign powers. Gradually, step by step, imperialism was forced to retreat in one country after another, to agree to dismantle its military bases and to pull out its troops. There are now only a handful of imperialist military strong points on the continent. But the struggle for a review of the military agreements, which assumed its most vigorous form in Africa in 1972 and 1973, is aimed today at depriving the imperialists of their last military bases on the continent.

The OAU is seeking to find approaches toward collective defence of the economic interests of the young African states. In 1971, the OAU Assembly adopted a resolution on the permanent sovereignty of the African countries over their natural resources. In it the OAU was supporting the steps taken by the African countries producing oil and other minerals, and also any steps that could be taken by the states on the continent to effectively exercise sovereignty over their natural resources.

The 1972 OAU Assembly passed a resolution on environmental control, raising the question of Africa's right to reparations from all countries whose development is partially based or continues to be based on the harmful and wasteful exploitation of Africa's natural resources. These OAU decisions are of funda-

mental importance. They promote more active joint effort by the OAU countries to do away with the economic domination of the imperialist powers in Africa. In opposing interference by neocolonialists in the internal affairs of African countries, the OAU exerts influence on the policy of imperialist powers. Despite the fact that the OAU does not thus far utilise its full resources in the struggle against neocolonialism, the anti-imperialist character of its activity is gradually becoming more pronounced.

The whole experience of Africa's postcolonial development shows that the OAU cannot confine its activity to purely African problems. Africa's problems are closely connected with world problems. This is borne out by the ever more overt ties between the colonial-racist regimes and the aggressive NATO bloc, and by Israel's aggression against the Arab countries, including the ARE, member of the OAU, the aggression backed up by international imperialism, and so on.

It should be recalled that initially the OAU was unable to take an active stand in support of Egypt. Moreover, in the voting at the Extraordinary Special Session of the UN General Assembly in June 1967 some of the countries of Tropical Africa refused to condemn Israel as the aggressor. Their attitude was subsequently assessed by Israel's Foreign Minister Eban as having rescued Israel from political defeat.

Gradually, however, the views of the Arab and the non-Arab countries of Africa on the Middle East crisis drew closer together. This was largely due to the self-exposure of Israeli aggressive plans against Arab territories. Besides, it has become clear that the Israeli aggressors are completely dependent on international imperialism. Likewise their socio-political objective—to overthrow progressive regimes in Egypt and Syria—has also become more apparent. Israel's attempts to present the Middle East conflict as a "non-African problem" were doomed to failure.

During the past few years, every OAU Assembly has firmly supported the Arab Republic of Egypt and has condemned Israel as the aggressor. As before, the OAU favours a peaceful settlement of the conflict but demands an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories. It is indicative that OAU resolutions on Israel's aggression against the Arab countries are now passed either unanimously or by an overwhelming majority.

The OAU has devoted increasing attention

to world problems. At its session in February 1973, Council of Ministers adopted an important programme document, the Declaration on current political questions, in which the OAU countries note with satisfaction the achievements in relaxing international tensions and consider the incipient tendencies toward a more stable security in Europe as a sound foundation for international relations. For their part, the OAU countries reaffirmed their determination to continue working, both on an African and on an international level, for the consolidation of peace and justice, for promoting genuine cooperation.

Of course, it would be an exaggeration to assume that all the OAU countries are resolutely opposed to imperialist aggression, wherever it may occur, or to the use of force, wherever the imperialists may try to apply it. On this question, perhaps, more than on any other, the political and economic pressures of the West also have their effect. Past experience shows that the OAU has taken its most active stand on those international problems which directly or indirectly affect Africa. This, above all, applies to the problem of eliminating colonial racist regimes.

THERE has been general recognition of the OAU's role as a stabilising factor in inter-African relations. The OAU has actively promoted the settlement of a number of territorial and other political conflicts between African states. It has helped, in particular, to stop armed conflicts on the borders of Algeria and Morocco, Somalia and Ethiopia; to relax tensions on the borders of Somalia and Kenya, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon; and to normalise relations between all these countries. To maintain peace, the OAU countries are known to have agreed to observe the status quo on the territorial issue. The OAU has established as fundamental principles the inviolability of the existing frontiers and the peaceful settlement of any disputes arising between African states.

It is interesting to note that in 1972, Algeria and Morocco signed two conventions which establish mutual recognition of the frontiers existing between the two states as being final, and which also provide for joint development of iron ore deposits in the once contested area of Tindouf in the west of Algeria. This kind of compromised settlement of border disputes may be regarded as an important historical precedent for other countries on the continent.

A special resolution adopted by the OAU Rabat Assembly fully approved both conventions.

The task of strengthening Africa's political unity and making it more effective is inseparable from the task of developing continental economic, trade, cultural and other relations between OAU states. Whereas the political ties between African countries and peoples have been prepared by the entire course of the national liberation revolution, there has been virtually no economic cooperation between them or it was of no significance at all. In this matter, the OAU in effect has had to start from scratch.

What has been achieved in this area in the recent period? Important steps have been taken to arrange economic cooperation within the framework of various regions. Several regional economic organisations are already functioning, although they face some difficulties in their work. There was, for example, the First All-Africa Trade Fair in Nairobi (1972), the First All-Africa Festival of Culture in Algiers (1969) and the Organisation of African Labour Unity was set up last April.

It should also be stressed that the OAU renders economic assistance to some African countries which are subjected to aggression or subversive action by colonial-racist regimes or colonialists. Such assistance, for example, was given to Equatorial Guinea, Guinea and Zambia. The OAU's activity in the economic sphere has already led to the establishment of all-Africa ties and contacts, which until recently were non-existent. The OAU also has a positive role to play in developing international economic relations.

A few years ago a Western bourgeois journal thus expressed the sentiments of certain circles: the ideal Africa was an Africa of nations united not "against" but "for". The point is that by placing reliance on Africa's conservative forces, the neocolonialists seek to have the OAU cease being anti-imperialist and anti-colonial and engage in the activity presenting no danger to imperialism, that is only in adjusting economic ties and regulating inter-African disputes. The advocates of imperialism would like to see the OAU countries isolated from the world anti-imperialist movement and the OAU remaining on the sidelines of the struggle for peace and world security.

The attempts to separate the building of a new life from the African peoples' struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism have not brought imperialism any success. OAU's experience has repeatedly demonstrated that

actually the solution of any concrete question in the interests of Africa's full decolonisation, economic progress in the newly-free countries, and the strengthening of Africa's unity clash with the aims of imperialism and undermine its positions on the continent. That is why the advance of African countries along the path of independence, economic and social progress inevitably comes up against resistance from neocolonialism. That is why the OAU's activity, aimed at achieving its proclaimed goals, cannot objectively be anything but anti-imperialist.

The OAU's first decade undoubtedly confirms that the African unity movement has much in common with the world anti-imperialist movement which unites the progressive forces of all continents, representatives of different races, nationalities and creeds. The attempts to divert the African unity movement to the shaky ground of racial or geographical isolation have proved to be futile. The OAU has been and remains an anti-imperialist organisation making a contribution to the cause of strengthening the worldwide anti-imperialist front.

THE OAU is a collective agency and its effectiveness depends on the efforts of all its members. The OAU has established itself as an influential and authoritative organisation. The comment made by the South African Foreign Minister when the OAU was just established that the explosion in Addis Ababa was not worthy noticing, now sounds no more than an oddity. The racist-colonial regimes are now forced to reckon with the OAU in every respect in formulating their own strategy. The former metropolitan countries now consider the OAU an important political factor in Africa. Finally, the African peoples themselves have come to realise that their joint collective action constitutes a real force. President Moktarould Daddah of Mauritania declared: "Of course, the OAU has not performed any miracles, but we no longer see any skeptical smiles. The OAU has acquainted Africans with each other and has helped them to resolve a number of extremely important problems."

The past decade has not been an easy one for the OAU. Independent Africa has had to repeatedly face subversive activity by imperialism and aggressive action by racist-colonial regimes. In this period, old governments have been overthrown and new ones established in

many African countries; several subregional organisations of neighbouring states have been established and have broken up; here and there conflicts broke out between some countries; and now and again some African leaders have boycotted some OAU sessions.

From time to time, situations arose in Africa and in the OAU when a sense of concern and even pessimism for the OAU future spread among many African leaders, including the most ardent advocates of African unity. This is what happened, for example, during the Congolese crisis of 1964-1965, when the OAU was split on whether it should support the Central Government or the Congolese in the eastern part of the country opposing the Government. That is what occurred again, following the declaration of "independence" by the Smith clique of Rhodesia in 1965, when only a quarter of the independent African states complied with the OAU decision on breaking diplomatic relations with Britain which was conniving at Salisbury. Doubt was also cast on Africa's unity and the OAU future during the civil war in Nigeria (1967-1970), when 4 African states recognised "Biafra" and there was much talk about OAU's impotence in bringing about a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

During such periods, the Western bourgeois press repeatedly predicted the early demise of the OAU. However, what above all must be noted is that the OAU emerged from each crisis a more united and more active force. It was as if the leaders of African countries had taken a fresh look at the OAU's role. Recognising it as the vehicle and champion of the common interests of the African peoples and realising the grave consequences of growing centrifugal tendencies, they arrived at compromised solutions and threw themselves with renewed energy into working for a more stable African unity. What is very important is that the anti-imperialist tenor of the OAU activity, far from being blunted, was on the contrary, sharpened.

All these years the OAU has essentially

functioned without interruption, whatever the differences between its members. From year to year, the OAU has improved its organisational structure, making the network of its standing and ad hoc commissions and committees increasingly more ramified and diverse. After each upheaval the OAU continued to exist and to act as a factor for stabilising the situation in Africa, for multiplying the forces of the African peoples in their struggle for the full elimination of colonialism on the continent, in resisting the offensive of neocolonialism, in striving for friendly ties and cooperation with all the countries of the world.

As for the Soviet Union, it has taken a consistently friendly attitude to the African unity movement. The USSR welcomed the convocation of the Addis Ababa conference in May 1963 and the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity.

The African peoples have repeatedly been able to see for themselves that the Soviet Union supports the OAU anti-imperialist activity in deeds as well as words. The Soviet Union has actively participated in the political boycott and international sanctions against the colonial-racist regimes of Vorster in South Africa and Smith in Rhodesia, and against the Portuguese colonialists. The USSR has extended moral and material support to the major national liberation organisations carrying on an active struggle for the liberation of their countries. Soviet mass organisations have made substantial contributions to the OAU fund to aid the struggle against colonialism and apartheid.

Steadily extending allround cooperation with the young African states, the Soviet Union has been helping them to overcome the burden of their colonial legacy as soon as possible. It has actively supported their struggle against neocolonialism. It has also backed the OAU in its efforts to establish inter-African cooperation, to peacefully settle all disputes arising between African countries and to work for a more stable world peace and security.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANISATIONS: THEIR ROLE IN NEOCOLONIALIST POLICY

V. PANOY

THE DISINTEGRATION of imperialism's colonial system has brought about a change not only in the methods of colonial expansion but also in the organisational forms in which it takes place. International state-monopoly associations constitute one of the new forms of imperialist penetration of "Third World" countries.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), established immediately after the war, proclaimed as its official aim promotion of the postwar economic recovery of countries, above all in Western Europe. In the mid-1960s, however, first place in respect to receiving IBRD funds was held not by Europe (27 per cent) but by Asia (31 per cent). In the 1959/60 fiscal year European countries received only 10.5 per cent of the total sum of loans as compared with 41.5 per cent poured into Asian states and 20 per cent—into Latin American countries.

Other international credit institutions, which at first served only the developed capitalist states, have also extended their activity to developing countries. In 1958, for example, members of the Common Market set up the European Investment Bank for the purpose of financing the development of backward regions of countries belonging to the EEC. However, for the past several years the Bank's sphere of activity has been extended to include countries of the "Third World".

Beginning with the mid-1950s, new international state-monopoly financial organisations sprung up one after another. Their functioning from the very outset was designed expressly for Asian, African and Latin American countries. In 1956, the International Finance Corporation

was established; in 1958, the European Development Fund designated for African states associated with the EEC; in 1960, the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Development Association; in 1966, the Asian Development Bank. Most of these organisations are quite representative. In mid-1972, 117 countries participated in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 108—in the International Development Association and more than 90—in the International Finance Corporation.¹ The European Development Fund is financing economic projects in 18 states of the Afro-Malagasy group and the European Investment Bank engages in operations also with other states associated with the Common Market outside the Yaoundé Convention (Turkey, Greece, Tunisia, and others). Dozens of countries participate in the Inter-American Development Bank and Asian Development Bank.

If we take the aims proclaimed in the charters of international financial organisations of capitalist countries at their face value, their establishment was dictated by recognition of the economic and social difficulties faced by young independent states and by a desire to help them. The aim of the First Yaoundé Convention concerning the association of the Afro-Malagasy Common Organisation with the European Common Market (its financial basis was provided by the Second European Development Fund) runs as follows: consolidation of the economic independence of the African partners

¹ See *World Bank, International Development Association, Annual Report 1972*, Washington, p. 3; *Problèmes économiques*, No. 1139, Paris, 1969, p. 25.

and the creation of conditions promoting successful international trade.²

The Second Yaoundé Convention which became effective since January 1971, (the Third European Development Fund operates within its framework) is officially called upon "to facilitate cooperation between the contracting countries for the purpose of promoting the economic and social development of the associated states through an increase of trade, financial assistance and technical cooperation".³

The main objective in organising the International Development Association, according to its founders, was to promote the economic advance of the least developed regions of the world in order to raise the living standards of the peoples inhabiting them.⁴ But is it possible, knowing the nature of imperialism, to believe in such altruism?

Neocolonialism is characterised by its efforts to penetrate the economy of "Third World" countries, and, exploiting their objective difficulties, to enslave them economically and subordinate politically. In this respect, what opportunities do international financial organisations offer neocolonialists? Before replying to this question we want to emphasise the complete dependence of these organisations on the imperialist powers.

It should be recalled that the influence of each country belonging to these organisations depends on the share of participation in the joint capital. The bigger the share, the more votes a given state commands in the administrative bodies of an organisation. Thus, 27 Asian (excluding Japan) and 40 African (minus the Republic of South Africa) countries have 20.43 per cent of the total vote in the directorate and in the board of governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, while the United States has 23.24 per cent. The entire "Third World", including 22 Latin American countries, possess 28.67 per cent of the votes as against 32.81 per cent of the votes controlled by the United States and Great Britain, which, moreover, can also count on the support of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Canada, Japan, Italy, Holland and Australia, small capitalist countries of Europe, New Zealand and the Republic of South Africa.⁵

² See *Moniteur du commerce international*, No. 358, Paris, 1964, p. 2781.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 1020, 1971, p. 203.

⁴ See *Problèmes économiques*, No. 738, 1962, p. 10.

⁵ See *World Bank. International Development Association. Annual Report 1972*, pp. 100-101.

In the International Development Association, which in effect is a subsidiary of the IBRD, the positions of the United States and Great Britain are even stronger. They have respectively 25.09 and 10.39 per cent of the total vote, whereas all the developed capitalist states have 62.09 per cent.⁶ In the Inter-American Development Bank the United States controls 42.47 per cent of the votes, while the other 19 members have 57.53 per cent.⁷ As for the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank, which function under the Common Market, representatives of European states enjoy a monopoly in formulating their policies and in determining the expediency of financing a project in the associated countries, as well as the terms of credits and loans.

Utilising the administrative apparatus, a handful of imperialist powers thus fully make use of international financial organisations in their own interests. On the one hand, a semblance of democracy is created (decisions are adopted by a majority vote), but, on the other, it depends solely on the imperialist states which have a majority of the votes as to who will receive loans, credits, or subsidies and on what terms.

The neocolonialists are able, through the international financial organisations, to exert economic and political pressure on countries which have broken off diplomatic relations with them.

The neocolonialists are deriving great advantages from their monopoly position in international financial organisations. To begin with, this is quite a safe form for imperialist exportation of private and state capital to Asian, African and Latin American countries. International associations, as a rule, guarantee capital investments against risks linked with possible political and economic upheavals or obligate the governments of countries to which capital is exported to provide such guarantees. Such a condition is specifically recorded in the Charter of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁸ It is also included in the charters of other financial organisations. That is why West European, North American and Japanese monopolies readily and widely participate in financing projects carried out by these organisations.

⁶ See *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁷ See К. Я. Чижов, *Международные валютно-финансовые организации капитализма*, Finansy Publishers, Moscow, 1968, p. 164.

⁸ See *United States Congress. House Committee of Banking and Currency*, Washington, May 30, 1945, p. 27.

A case in point is the financing of the construction of a petrochemical factory in Brazil. In addition to the International Finance Corporation which invested in it \$6 million, a group of French banks which provided a loan of \$10 million participate in financing the project. We can cite another example. In Indonesia, the same corporation is financing the construction of a textile mill jointly with three Japanese firms, of which the Daiwa Spinning Company is the biggest. It is indicative that the Japanese group will own 60 per cent of the shares, the International Finance Corporation—13.3 and the Indonesian company—26 per cent.⁹

The link between international financial organisations and private monopoly capital is revealed most vividly in the activity of the International Finance Corporation. Officially, one of its main functions is to promote the influx of private investments into economically backward countries. The corporation not only enlists foreign companies in the financing of projects but it also sells them its shares in the capital of enterprises built in developing countries. In the 1968/69 fiscal year alone, this corporation ceded to private foreign investors nearly \$41 million in shares it owned. Altogether during the period of its activities it handed over to monopolies shares valued at \$123.5 million, that is one-third of its total liabilities.¹⁰

A private international investment company, the Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America, operates regularly at the Inter-American Development Bank. Its direct aim is to stimulate foreign investments in that region. The company enjoys the support of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The ties between other international financial organisations and private monopoly capital are less conspicuous. But they also play an important role in stimulating the export of private capital. This has been reflected in a number of official documents. In the Second Yaoundé Convention, the section dealing with regulating the activity of the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank provides (Article 26) that any juridical body or person of Common Market member countries has the right to participate on equal terms with representatives of associated states in developing projects financed by these organisations.¹¹

⁹ See *International Finance Corporation. Press Release*, Paris, April 15, 1971, pp. 1-2; June 15, 1971, p. 2.

¹⁰ See *Problèmes économiques*, No. 1139, 1969, p. 24.

¹¹ See *Moniteur du commerce international*, No. 1020, 1971, p. 206.

The results of such "equality" can be judged by the experience of implementing the First Yaoundé Convention. At the beginning of 1968, only 14 per cent of the projects financed by the European Development Fund were being implemented by state and private companies of the 18 associated African states, and the others, predominantly by European monopolies.¹²

Since it is to the obvious advantage of the monopolies to cooperate with international financial organisations, they not only readily take part in their operations but also enlist them in their own activities. They do this because the very fact of participating of such an organisation already offers a certain guarantee against the nationalisation of their property in "Third World" countries. Thus, the International Finance Corporation participates in the *Société internationale financière pour les investissements et le développement en Afrique* (SIFIDA). In this case the required effect is attained at a very small price: the International Finance Corporation subscribed only to 4 per cent of the company's capital.¹³

International organisations resort extensively to loans because they are greatly in need of additional resources. The monopolies readily furnish such loans because this brings them substantial profits. For example, in 1971 a syndicate of the largest Swiss banks offered a credit of 75 million Swiss francs to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of 15 years at an annual interest rate of 6.5 per cent.¹⁴

The monopolies utilise international financial organisations also as a source of economic information. The point is that, participating in financing projects in "Third World" countries, these organisations (particularly the IBRD), on the pretext that they have to be convinced of the solvency of the borrower, as a rule, demand information concerning the general state of the economy. Moreover, they often reserve the right to collect additional information on the spot (as is done by the Commission of the European Economic Community), and to establish control over the home market (characteristic of the International Finance Corporation).

Indicative in this respect is the activity of consortia and consultative groups functioning under the aegis of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Officially they

¹² See *Ibid.*, No. 723, 1968, p. 10.

¹³ See *International Finance Corporation. Press Release*, June 2, 1971, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴ See *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Press Release*, June 1, 1971, p. 1.

are called upon to coordinate the aid programmes of various capitalist states to one or another developing country (at the end of 1971 there were 16 consortia and consultative groups under the International Bank, including those for India, Pakistan, Nigeria, the Philippines and Thailand). Moreover, they seek the right to "critically analyse" the development programmes and economic policies of the countries concerned. It is characteristic that representatives of the countries receiving aid are not even invited to major meetings of consortia and consultative groups when questions of the scale and terms of aid are decided.

The interests of foreign capital also determine the trend of activity of international financial associations. They, as a rule, undertake to finance projects of the infrastructure: the building of a network of roads, electric power stations, port and warehouse facilities, and so on. In mid-1967, the construction of infrastructure projects accounted for 75.5 per cent of all IBRD loans to African countries; 66 per cent—to Asian states; and 86.7 per cent—to Latin American countries.¹⁵

In recent years, the sectoral structure of aid by international financial organisations has been changed somewhat under the pressure of developing member countries which are striving to accelerate the growth rates of their national industry and agriculture. If we compare the composition of allocations under the first (1958-1963) and the second (1964-1968) European Development Funds, one can readily note that the share of appropriations for the infrastructure decreased from 44 to 37.7 per cent, while there was an increase in the share of allotments for the development of agriculture from 24.8 to 44.9 per cent.¹⁶

It was noted in one of the annual reports of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which coordinates imperialist aid, that in future the Bank (IBRD) "intends to give preference to financing not big infrastructure projects... but agriculture and education, and to allot bigger funds for birth control, industrialisation and tourist travel".¹⁷

But no serious shift along these lines has thus far occurred. In the 1971/72 fiscal year the IBRD allocated 52.6 per cent of all loan com-

mitments for the construction of infrastructure projects, as against 17.4 per cent for industry and 6.2 per cent for agriculture in "Third World" countries.¹⁸ The European Investment Bank also devotes considerable attention to infrastructure projects: 44 per cent of the loans from the special operations resources utilised only by associated countries were issued for these purposes.

An important strategic objective pursued by international financial organisations is to strengthen the positions of local private capital in the former colonies. This is reflected both in the charters of the organisations and in their activities. The International Finance Corporation, for example, usually finances private firms of developing countries or mixed companies in which the state has a small share. In 19 countries the corporation set up 23 finance companies which act as vehicles of its policy. A case in point is the Private Development Corporation of the Philippines, established in 1963, which finances private enterprises by issuing loans and subscribing to their capital. Among its shareholders are 18 finance companies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

An annual report of the IBRD emphasised that the Bank's investments represented an important requisite for the development of private enterprise and that the Bank had repeatedly taken steps designed to create a more favourable climate for private capital both national and foreign. An example of aid to national private capital is the \$40-million loan given to the Türkiye Sinai Kalkınma Bankası, a Turkish firm which finances the country's private enterprises.¹⁹ Cases of direct crediting of private capital by the Bank are also quite frequent.

Last but not least, the international financial organisations play a big part in economically enslaving "Third World" countries through the credit mechanism itself. Most international organisations render aid to developing countries on extremely rigid, in fact, usurious terms.

The huge and swiftly mounting foreign debt is a heavy burden for "Third World" countries. In 1962, it amounted to \$22,000 million, and at the beginning of 1971 reached \$66,700 million, growing 12-14 per cent annually on the average. In 1970, foreign debt

and interest payments by these countries totalled \$6,000 million.²⁰

At the end of the first half of the 1960s, pressed by developing countries, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development set a 5.5 per cent annual interest on loans for states unable to receive them from other sources. However, since February 1966, these terms have rapidly become more stringent. In 1971-1972, Guatemala, Colombia, Jamaica, Uruguay, Turkey, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Thailand and a number of other Asian, African and Latin American countries received loans at an annual interest of 7.25 per cent. And this rate was by no means dictated by the condition of the Bank. In 1972, its net profit amounted to \$183 million, 3 times greater than in 1961.²¹

The European Investment Bank charged 7 per cent interest on credits and loans to African countries in 1967. The Bank's loan terms have grown harsher since August 1969. The Inter-American Development Bank raised the interest rate to 7.75 per cent since 1968, and the Asian Development Bank issued many loans at 6.875 per cent in 1968 and 1969. For a number of years the average interest on loans of the International Finance Corporation has been 7.3 per cent.²² Such a financial policy promotes the economic enslavement of "Third

World" countries and opens up to imperialism many avenues for exerting political pressure on young states, in other words, fully meets the spirit and aims of neocolonialism.

INTERNATIONAL financial organisations constitute an instrument for penetrating Asian, African and Latin American countries, convenient for the neocolonialists. It is not by chance that new organisations are being established and the scale of their operations is increasing. For example, in 1962 credits and loans issued by all international financial organisations totalled \$194 million, and in 1969—\$850 million. In the 1971/72 fiscal year, just the leading group of international financial organisations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association, made financial commitments, valued at \$1,966 million and \$1,000 million respectively.²³

The activity of international financial organisations is one of the most characteristic manifestations of collective colonialism. The growing imperialist expansion through these organisations is based on utilising the objective interests of developing countries in external sources for financing their national economies. At the same time Asian, African and Latin American countries are increasingly realising that the "aid" through international associations of Western countries serves first and foremost the interests of the imperialists.

²⁰ See *Aide au développement... Examen 1970*, pp. 56-57; *Aide au développement... Examen 1971*, p. 117; *World Bank. International Development Association. Annual Report 1972*, p. 81.

²¹ See *World Bank. International Development Association. Annual Report 1970*, p. 3; *World Bank. International Development Association. Annual Report 1972*, p. 3.

²² See *Aide au développement... Examen 1969*, pp. 93-94.

²³ See *Aide au développement... Examen 1970*, p. 58; *World Bank. International Development Association. Annual Report 1972*, p. 3.

¹⁵ See *Al-Moudjahid*, Oct. 22-23, 1967.

¹⁶ See *Внешняя торговля*, No. 8, 1970, p. 22.

¹⁷ OCDE. *Aide au développement, Efforts et politique poursuivis par les membres du Comité d'aide au développement. Examen 1969*, Paris, 1969, p. 60.

¹⁸ See *World Bank. International Development Association. Annual Report 1972*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁹ See *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*, Dec. 26, 1972, p. 1.

PREPARATION OF THE MUNICH DEAL

Britain's Road to Munich

AFTER THE AUSTRIAN Anschluss in the spring of 1938 the nazi Reich began preparations for aggression against Czechoslovakia. This further sharpened the situation in Europe. Nevertheless, the British Government continued to base its foreign policy on hopes for an agreement with Germany.

Britain's ruling circles hoped such an agreement would become possible once nazi Germany's claims to the Sudeten region had been met. That is why they entertained no intentions of preventing the nazi Reich from seizing the Sudeten, and actually even helped Hitler to realise his plans. But they wanted this to be achieved without force, because military action could unleash war in Europe and would mean the collapse of all the plans and calculations of Britain's ruling élite.

Employing the "big stick" without compunction, the British Government urged Czechoslovakia to surrender to nazi claims. At the same time, in an effort to hamstring France, which had a treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia, it wanted the French Government to obligate itself not to act without London's permission. London realised that if France came out in defence of Czechoslovakia, Britain would also be involved in a war against Germany. In accordance with the 1935 Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty on mutual assistance against aggression, the Soviet Union would also side with Czechoslovakia. As a result, Britain would find herself in a state of armed conflict with Germany and in alliance with the USSR, and that would mean the failure of the British Government's entire foreign policy line, for its political calculations were based on collaboration with Germany and on pushing it into war against the Soviet Union.

Britain's ruling élite eagerly began to help

the German aggressors to scrap the treaties on mutual assistance which Czechoslovakia had with France and the USSR. This would leave Czechoslovakia defenceless and simultaneously constitute a step toward international isolation of the Soviet Union.

BRITAIN'S OPPOSITION TO HELPING CZECHOSLOVAKIA

ON MARCH 14, 1938, the British Parliament was the scene of a stormy debate. Many deputies demanded an end to the notorious policy of "appeasing" the aggressors. However, Chamberlain was fully determined to continue his line of reaching agreement with the nazi Reich. The minutes of a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Policy on March 15 noted: "He [Chamberlain] did not think that anything that had happened should cause the Government to alter their present policy, on the contrary, recent events had confirmed him in his opinion that that policy was a right one and he only regretted that it had not been adopted earlier" [*Public Record Office* (further referred to as *PRO*), Cab. 27/623, p. 139].

At a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Policy three days later, Chamberlain expressed confidence that Hitler was seeking to reach an understanding with Britain. He said: "It should be noted that throughout the Austrian adventure Herr Hitler had studiously refrained from saying or doing anything to provoke us.... All this did not look as if Germany wished to antagonise us; on the contrary it indicated a desire to keep on good terms with us" (*Ibid.*, p. 169.).

Halifax was of the same opinion. In a conversation with Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak envoy in London, he declared: "I do not want altogether to abandon the hope that an understanding can after all be reached with Germany some time" (Historico-Diplomatic Archives).

On March 18, the Foreign Office placed before the Committee on Foreign Policy a Memorandum on the Czechoslovak question. It said that "the German Government will, by fair means or foul, continue to work for the eventual incorporation within the Reich of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, passing perhaps by way of some kind of intermediate autonomous regime. They will also aim at breaking Czechoslovakia's connection with France and the Soviet Union, with both of whom she has treaties of mutual assistance, and at reducing her to a status of neutrality" (*PRO*, Cab. 27/623, p. 181).

Under these circumstances, the Memorandum declared, three courses were in the main open to the British Government:

1. Conclusion of a "grand alliance" with the participation of France and other countries against aggression (Churchill's proposal in the House of Commons on March 14).

2. A new commitment to France, that is, a declaration that Britain would assist France if her territory were attacked by Germany as a result of France's fulfilling her treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. However, considering that such an undertaking, being unconditional, could become a direct commitment with respect to Czechoslovakia, a reservation should be added that the French Government should seek "our approval before going to the assistance of Czechoslovakia".

3. No new commitments to France.

The latter line, the Memorandum admitted, entailed some risk. Germany's superiority in arms could well be greater within a year or two. Unless a firm stand is taken, "Germany will march uninterruptedly to hegemony in Europe, which will be but a first step toward a deliberate challenge to the British Empire" (*Ibid.*, pp. 187-192).

In the Memorandum, Halifax came out firmly in favour of the third line, proposing an effort to make the Czechoslovak Government meet Germany's demands without having to resort to military operations (*Ibid.*, pp. 193-194).

The British Government possessed a powerful instrument for putting pressure on France to prevent her coming to the defence of Czechoslovakia: it was the question of British assistance in the event of war, and this question acquired the utmost importance both for Czechoslovakia's future and the subsequent disposition of forces in Europe.

In the discussion on the Memorandum by

the Committee on Foreign Policy on March 18, the tone was set by Chamberlain, Halifax and Inskip, Minister for Coordination of Defence, who advocated the third of the courses open to Britain, that is, no new commitments to France. Halifax declared that he believed unsubstantiated the assumption that "when Germany secured the hegemony over Central Europe she would then pick a quarrel with France and ourselves" (*Ibid.*, p. 164).

Chamberlain argued that Hitler had no intention of taking over the whole of Czechoslovakia, and assumed that the nazis would demand the integration of the Sudeten region with Germany and that this would ultimately take place. The Prime Minister opposed British assistance to Czechoslovakia. He believed it to be desirable that the Sudeten problem should be settled through negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Germany and argued that if Germany could attain her *desiderata* by peaceable methods there was no reason to suppose that she would reject such a procedure in favour of one based on violence (*Ibid.*, pp. 168-169). The British Prime Minister also came out against any commitment to France or additional guarantees in the event she came out in defence of Czechoslovakia. He said that he would not like to leave to the discretion of French ministers the power to decide whether Great Britain was to be involved in war or not. A declaration of Britain's intention to assist France in the event she sided with Czechoslovakia and would in consequence be attacked by Germany, he said, "might cause Germany to fear that France would be more ready and willing to implement her Treaty undertakings to Czechoslovakia" (*Ibid.*, pp. 162, 173).

Supporting the Prime Minister, MacDonald, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, asserted that "the attitude of France and of Czechoslovakia would tend to harden, and they might indeed take up an obstinate and unreasonable position, if they know in advance that in certain events we would go directly to the assistance of France and in this way indirectly to the assistance of Czechoslovakia" (*Ibid.*, p. 174). Viscount Hailsham, Lord President of the Council, referred to one "danger" connected with French assistance to Czechoslovakia. He pointed out that "Soviet Russia's commitment to Czechoslovakia was to come to her assistance if France came to her assistance" (*Ibid.*, p. 174).

Halifax also stressed that "the more closely we associated ourselves with France and Russia... the more difficult would it be to make

any real settlement with Germany" (*Ibid.*, p. 164).¹

Summing up the results of the debate, Halifax declared: "We must decline to undertake any fresh commitment in regard to Czechoslovakia and ... we must try and persuade Dr. Beneš and also the French Government that the best course would be for Czechoslovakia to make the best terms she could with Germany" (*Ibid.*, p. 172).

Thus, acting on the assumption that Germany would take over the Sudeten region anyway, the British Government decided to abandon Czechoslovakia to her fate leaving her to resolve the questions of relations with Germany herself. The main problem before the British Government in this respect was to guarantee that in the event of Germany's armed action against Czechoslovakia the Franco-Czechoslovak and the Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance pacts would not enter into force. That is why, Halifax said, "we could vigorously impress upon Germany our view that there should be an orderly settlement of the Sudeten question" (*Ibid.*, p. 172).²

This meeting worked out the key principles which guided the British Government throughout the Czechoslovak crisis. Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Foreign Under Secretary, made the following entry about this meeting in his diaries: "F.P.C. [is] unanimous that Czechoslovakia is not worth the bones of a single British Grenadier" (*The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, London, 1971, p. 63).

In accordance with established practice, Chamberlain mustered the military to back up his thesis that it was "impossible" to fight against Germany. At its following meeting March 21, the Committee considered a report by the Chiefs of Staff, "Military Implications

of German Aggression Against Czechoslovakia" (*PRO*, Cab. 27/627, pp. 35-43).

In assessing this report, one must emphasise three points.

First, Chamberlain had instructed the Chiefs of Staff to consider the case of Germany attacking Czechoslovakia and Britain coming to her assistance in cooperation with France, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, Turkey and Greece or some of these countries (*Ibid.*, p. 35). Chamberlain did not even mention the USSR among the countries with whom Britain could or wanted to cooperate in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia.³

Second, the report of the Chiefs of Staff stated that "the French have based military doctrine on defence", which is why the French troops would not leave their fortified zone and would not undertake any big-scale offensive (*Ibid.*, p. 38). Ignoring the Soviet Union and assuming a passive French stand as being inevitable, the Chiefs of Staff left the impression that in the event of a conflict Britain would have no serious allies. On the other hand, they said, Britain's involvement in a war with Germany would also trigger off an attack on the British Empire by Italy and Japan.

Third, Britain herself, the Chiefs of Staff said, was capable of exerting only economic pressure on Germany, which takes a very considerable time to take effect (*Ibid.*, p. 42).

In this way, the Chiefs of Staff suggested the conclusion that Britain should not come out in support of Czechoslovakia.

Following consideration of the report by the Committee on Foreign Policy, Halifax drew the conclusion that there was need to exert every effort to "dissuade France from going to the aid of Czechoslovakia" (*PRO*, Cab. 27/623, p. 218, Protocol of the Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Policy of the Cabinet, March 21, 1938).

The Committee on Foreign Policy also considered the Draft Memorandum for the French Government which stated, in effect, that the British Government had no intention of undertaking any additional commitment to France in connection with possible assistance by her to Czechoslovakia. Contrary to the actual state of affairs, the Memorandum asserted that neither France herself, nor the Soviet Union were capable of giving Czechoslovakia effective assistance (*Ibid.*, p. 232).

³ The Protocol of the Government meeting on March 22, 1938, said that "the Chiefs of Staff, however, had been instructed to leave Russia out of the calculation" (*PRO*, Cab. 23/93, p. 38).

The British Ministers admitted that the Memorandum would be a "terrible blow to France" (MacDonald) and that its effect would be "catastrophic" (Oliver Stanley). President of the Board of Trade Stanley stressed that Britain's position could make Germany's policy "more adventurous". Even Halifax was forced to admit that "France would be shocked". However, he declared that he saw no way of avoiding this. It was ultimately agreed that more was to be done to polish up the text and to try to give it an outwardly more friendly character (*Ibid.*, pp. 211, 218, 221).

The question of Britain's attitude to the danger of German aggression against Czechoslovakia was finally considered at a Cabinet meeting on March 22. Halifax proposed:

1) that no new commitments entailing a risk of Britain's involvement in a war should be undertaken, and 2) the Czechoslovak Government should be induced to settle its relations with the Sudeten Germans (*PRO*, Cab. 23/93, p. 34).

Some members of the Government expressed apprehension that such a policy "would be tantamount to an invitation to Germany to take the next step in her programme". It was also noted that if Germany established her domination over the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Britain's positions within a few years could become much worse because the balance of strength would have changed in Germany's favour. That is why Britain's intervention in the future would turn out to be much more difficult (*Ibid.*, pp. 37, 38).

However, Chamberlain supported Halifax's proposals. France would be glad, he asserted, to be rid of her commitments to Czechoslovakia. Halifax's proposals were adopted by the Cabinet. Britain was to confine herself, according to the Ministers, to keeping the "Germans guessing" (*Ibid.*, pp. 36, 39, 44).

That same day a Memorandum was sent to the French Government stating that the British Government found it impossible to "assume any further commitments in Europe beyond those embodied in the Treaty of Locarno and the Covenant of the League". The Memorandum ended by declaring that the Governments of Britain and France should offer "their good offices with the Government of Czechoslovakia to bring about a settlement of questions affecting the position of the German minority" [*Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series (further referred to as *DBFP*), Vol. I, pp. 83-86].

A Memorandum to the Czechoslovak Govern-

ment couched in the same terms was sent out on March 23, 1938. It said that Britain was "unable to take any further direct and definite commitment in respect of Czechoslovakia" (*Ibid.*, p. 91).

On March 24, 1938, Chamberlain made a statement in the House of Commons whose text had been prepared by the Foreign Office and approved by the British Government (*PRO*, Cab. 23/93, p. 52).

Chamberlain declared that the British Government had decided not to undertake any new commitments in Europe. It had simultaneously deemed it necessary to inform Germany that in the event she resorted to open armed aggression in her expansion in Central Europe, Britain may find herself involved in war against her will. Chamberlain said: "Where peace and war are concerned, legal obligations are not alone involved, and, if war broke out, it would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations. It would be quite impossible to say where it might end and what Governments might become involved. The inexorable pressure of facts might well prove more powerful than formal pronouncements, and in that event it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries, besides those which were parties to the original dispute, would almost immediately be involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven" (*DBFP*, Vol. I, pp. 96-97).

In this way, the British Government made it clear that it had no intention of resisting German aggression against Czechoslovakia "by peaceful means", but that this did not imply that in the event of Germany's armed aggression against Czechoslovakia Britain, following France, would not be involved in the conflict.

Characterising British policy at the time, the Soviet Embassy in London reported: "Britain had never intended to give anything like active support to Czechoslovakia against Germany. But she feared that because France was linked to Czechoslovakia by a military treaty, Britain could be involved in a war through France, if Czechoslovakia's fate should one unfortunate day become the starting point of European conflagration. Hence, the systematic British influence on France, which now and again took the form of direct pressure, in a spirit of freezing French obligations with respect to Czechoslovakia, and also with

¹ Oliver Harvey, Assistant Foreign Secretary, said in his diplomatic diaries that when Halifax set out his stand in less official surroundings in that period, he declared that he fully understood the German action with respect to Austria. He also said that he had no objections to Germany's establishing her economic domination in Central Europe. He was all the more reluctant to have anything in common with the USSR (*The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937-1940*, London, 1970).

² At a Cabinet meeting on March 18, 1938, Halifax stressed that Britain was in an exceptionally favourable position because "we had entered into no kind of definite and automatic commitment. We still, in theory at least, retained full liberty of action, and we could in any particular case say whether or not we would or would not come to France's assistance. This had the great advantage that we were able to keep both France and Germany guessing as to what our attitude in any particular crisis would be..." (*PRO*, Cab. 27/623, p. 161).

respect to the USSR on the 1935 mutual assistance pact" [USSR Foreign Policy Archives (further referred to as USSR FPA)].

USSR URGES REBUFF TO FASCIST AGGRESSORS

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, as is known, considered it necessary to take collective action to prevent the further spread of German aggression. It was prepared to make an effective contribution to the fight against the fascist aggressors, including fulfilment of its commitments under the 1935 Treaty with Czechoslovakia.

A Soviet Government statement March 17, 1938, declared that the Soviet Government was "still prepared to take part in collective action which would be decided together with it and which would be aimed to stop the further development of aggression and to eliminate the growing danger of another world war". The Soviet Government expressed readiness to immediately start discussions with other powers in respect to practical measures, dictated by the circumstances, both in the League of Nations and elsewhere (*Izvestia*, March 18, 1938).

The statement was sent to the Governments of Britain, France, the USA, as well as Czechoslovakia and a number of other European countries.

On March 19, 1938, the British Ambassador to Moscow Chilton was forced to admit in a conversation with Maxim Litvinov that the Soviet Government's statement had "caused much animation in Britain among the members of Parliament". The People's Commissar declared that the statement should be seen as an invitation to begin negotiations and that "depending on the response of the great powers, the question of the time and place of such a discussion could be raised". There was need to clarify beforehand the view of the countries concerned, after which "invitations to a conference could be sent out" (USSR FPA).

Replying to a question from the Soviet Embassy in Britain as to how the Soviet proposal was to be implemented, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said on March 20 that "it was necessary Britain and France, at any rate, should express readiness for joint discussion of pressing European problems" after which it would be possible to discuss with them through diplomatic channels the form and place of a conference. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs believed it possible to call a conference "with the participation of states taking an unequivocal stand with respect

to collective security". The possibility of calling the League of Nations Council for this purpose was not ruled out either (USSR FPA).

As British documents now reveal, Chamberlain and Halifax did not even consider it necessary to put the Soviet proposal before the Committee on Foreign Policy and the Government. They rejected it without any discussion, because it contradicted their entire foreign policy line. The Soviet Embassy in Britain wrote to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on March 18, 1938: "There is no doubt that Chamberlain takes an extremely negative attitude to our initiative, and if he manages to continue his present line, the British Government will do its utmost to shelve the Soviet proposal" (USSR FPA).

In a note to the Soviet Embassy in London on March 24, 1938, the British Foreign Office wrote that "a conference only attended by some of the European Powers, and designed less to secure the settlement of outstanding problems than to organise concerted action against aggression, would not necessarily... have such a favourable effect upon the prospects of European peace". That is why "His Majesty's Government cannot accept in their entirety the suggestions" of the Soviet Government (*DBFP*, Vol. 1, p. 101).

Addressing the House of Commons that day, Chamberlain declared that adoption of the Soviet proposal "would appear to involve less a consultation with a view to settlement than a concerting of action against an eventuality that has not yet arisen. Its object would appear to be to negotiate such mutual undertaking in advance to resist aggression as... His Majesty's Government for their part are unwilling to accept" (*Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, March 24, 1938, Col. 1406).

MIDDLEMAN WITH A BIG STICK

ON APRIL 28-29, 1938, Anglo-French negotiations were held in London on the policy of Britain and France with respect to Czechoslovakia.

Z. Fierlinger, Czechoslovakia's envoy to Moscow, noted in a talk with Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. P. Potyomkin, that if Daladier and Bonnet obtained assurances in London that Britain would support France in the event the latter found it necessary to assist Czechoslovakia against the German aggressor, Hitler would not dare to attack Czechoslovakia. The situation would be different if Chamberlain started to convince

France not to irritate Germany in any way, as Britain was hoping to reach an understanding with the latter (*New Documents from the History of Munich*, Moscow, Political Literature Publishers, 1958, p. 30).

The Anglo-French talks showed that the British Government had no intentions of promising support to France in the event she went to Czechoslovakia's assistance.

On the eve of the talks the British Government met to decide on the stand to take in the discussions with the French.

On the Czechoslovak issue, Halifax proposed it should be made clear to the French that "we could not assume any military commitment". He also proposed to declare that Britain was "anxious to pursue the interrupted negotiations" with Germany⁴ (*PRO*, Cab. 23/93, pp. 193, 195, Protocol of the Cabinet Meeting, April 27, 1938).

Referring to military commitments to France, Halifax declared that in accordance with the consensus of opinion among members of the Cabinet, Britain could not undertake any commitment to send troops to the continent. Considering that it was necessary to keep France under control, he observed that the French should not, after all, be told that Britain would not send troops under any circumstances. It was also decided that if the need arose to send British troops to France, their numerical strength at the start of the war would not be more than two divisions (*Ibid.*, pp. 196-197).

During the negotiations, the British representatives declared that Britain would not undertake any commitments to give military assistance to France in addition to those she had already assumed under the 1925 Treaty of Locarno. Besides, under the Treaty Britain could give only naval and air assistance but did not agree to send troops, as Daladier was insisting. Chamberlain said that Britain was able to send to France only two divisions but the British Government "had no desire to commit themselves to sending two British divisions to France on the outbreak of war. The most he could definitely say was that this possibility was not excluded" (*DBFP*, Vol. 1, p. 198).

⁴ On April 22, Parliamentary Under Secretary in the Foreign Office Butler told Woermann, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain, that from his close association with Chamberlain and Lord Halifax he could say that "both, now as in the past, held fast to the idea of a real understanding with Germany and that the events in Austria had not altered this in any way" [*Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D. (further referred to as *DGFP*), Vol. 1, pp. 1092-1093].

Chamberlain also declared that Britain had no intention of giving assistance to Czechoslovakia and that "it should be made very clear to the Czechoslovak Government" that it should do its utmost to reach a settlement with Germany (*Ibid.*, pp. 214-215).

According to this decision, the British Government, acting as mediator, was to inform Germany that "they were doing their best to bring about a peaceful solution" of the Sudeten problem, and to ask the Czechoslovak Government to make its own contribution. At the same time it was agreed that "a démarche would be made at Prague by both the French and the British Governments to secure the maximum concessions from Dr. Beneš"⁵ (*Ibid.*, p. 230).

If no peaceful settlement was reached in this way, Britain would tell the German Government that it "could not guarantee" that she would not intervene in the event of Germany's resort to force. In so doing it would refer to the appropriate part of Chamberlain's speech of March 24 (*Ibid.*, pp. 231-232).

On May 9, the British Embassy informed the Foreign Ministry in Germany that if it were confidentially informed of the solution Germany was seeking, the "British Government would bring such pressure to bear in Prague that the Czechoslovak Government would be compelled to accede to the German wishes" (*DGFP*, Vol. 11, p. 265).

Although the British Government, having no intention to cooperate with the USSR, did not pass on any official information to it about its policy, Moscow did receive some information concerning its foreign policy line.

Thus, on May 10, an unofficial conversation was held between the Soviet Ambassador in London and Horace Wilson, a close associate of Chamberlain. Reporting to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador stated that Horace Wilson was "in effect the architect of the foreign policy now being pursued by the Prime Minister". Chamberlain set himself the task, Wilson said, of concluding an agreement with Italy and Germany. "It is now Germany's turn. Britain's mediation on the Czechoslovak issue is a test. The outcome will show whether one can expect a probable

⁵ The German diplomats also learned that in the course of the negotiations "the British have suggested to the French that they become more aloof from the Russians" (*DGFP*, Vol. 1, pp. 1103-1104). According to another report Chamberlain suggested that the French should do away with the Franco-Soviet pact (*DGFP*, Vol. 11, pp. 248-249).

general agreement with Berlin in the near future. Chamberlain fully reckons with the possibility of German expansion in Central and Southeast Europe and even with the possibility of Germany's swallowing up a number of small central European and Balkan states. But he believes that this is a lesser evil than war with Germany in the immediate future. The Prime Minister expects the process of swallowing up to take a relatively long time, and in the meantime Britain would well arm herself.... The problem of Anglo-Soviet relations did not appear urgent or practically important to Chamberlain at the given moment. That is why he takes little interest in it... although the Prime Minister is sure that the USSR is well armed" (USSR FPA).

For its part, the Soviet Government continued to believe that there was need to do the utmost to prevent the Nazi Reich from taking over Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government was informed that the USSR, if requested, was prepared to join France and Czechoslovakia to take all measures to ensure Czechoslovakia's security and that it had all the necessary means to do so (*New Documents from the History of Munich*, pp. 26, 29).

During a conversation with the British military attaché in Moscow, Colonel Firebrace, on May 2, the People's Commissar for Defence Kliment Voroshilov also declared that the Soviet Union would loyally honour all its commitments under the treaty with Czechoslovakia (*PRO, FO 371/22299*).

Moreover, the Soviet Government was prepared to go beyond its treaty obligations with respect to Czechoslovakia. This question came up in a conversation between Joseph Stalin and Klement Gottwald in mid-May 1938. Gottwald subsequently wrote: "Stalin told me clearly that the Soviet Union was prepared to give military assistance to Czechoslovakia even if this was not done by France, as Soviet assistance had been stipulated.... Of course, Stalin stressed, the Soviet Union could extend assistance to Czechoslovakia on one condition: if Czechoslovakia would defend herself and would request Soviet assistance." Gottwald remarked that he passed on the statement to President Beneš of Czechoslovakia⁶ (*Pravda*, Dec. 28, 1949).

⁶ It should be noted, however, that the Czechoslovak Government did not raise the question of Soviet assistance regardless of the French position. On May 17, 1938, Beneš said in a conversation with the British envoy in Prague Newton: "Czechoslovakia's relations with Russia had always been and would remain a secondary consideration, dependent on the attitude of France and Great Britain.

On May 13, 1938, the French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet asked the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, who was then at Geneva, what the USSR intended to do in the event of a crisis in German-Czechoslovak relations. The People's Commissar replied that the question would have to be discussed together with representatives of the French, Soviet and Czechoslovak General Staffs (*New Documents from the History of Munich*, pp. 41-42). The People's Commissar reported to Moscow that Bonnet put the question in such a way that one felt a desire to obtain an answer that would be tantamount to the USSR's refusal of assistance to Czechoslovakia so as to use the reply to make it easier for France to evade her own commitments with respect to Czechoslovakia (USSR FPA). Earlier, on March 26, 1938, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs remarked in a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Czechoslovakia on "the strange behaviour of France, which in the recent period has not once addressed us about Czechoslovakia" (*Ibidem*).

On May 14, 1938, the People's Commissar met Halifax. He recalled the Soviet proposal of March 17 and criticised Britain's policy with respect to the Nazi Reich, stressing that Britain was making a big mistake by accepting Hitler's motivations both on the Spanish and the Czechoslovak questions at face value. In fact this meant Germany's forceful acquisition of territory and securing of strategic and economic positions in Europe. The People's Commissar pointed to the danger which would, after some time, threaten Great Britain (*New Documents from the History of Munich*, p. 43).

Toward the latter part of May 1938, the Czechoslovak Government, having received information that Germany was concentrating her troops along Czechoslovakia's borders, ordered a partial mobilisation. The danger of an armed conflict arose.

Following a discussion with Halifax on Britain's position in the new situation, Cadogan summed up the situation as follows on May 21: "Decided, we must not go to war!" (*The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, p. 79).

On May 21, 1938, the Foreign Office instructed Henderson, the British Ambassador in

Czechoslovakia's present connection with Russia was purely contingent on the Franco-Russian treaty but if Western Europe disinterested herself in Russia, Czechoslovakia would also be disinterested." "His country", he repeated, "would always follow and be bound to Western Europe and never to Eastern Europe. Any connection with Russia would only be through Western Europe" (*DBFP*, Vol. I, pp. 314-315).

Berlin, to inform the German Government (in accordance with an understanding reached during the Anglo-French talks on April 28-29, 1938) that the British Government was doing its utmost to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue and was exerting all its influence on the Czechoslovak Government. However, should a conflict nevertheless take place, the German Government should be well aware of the dangers such a course of events would entail. France had commitments to Czechoslovakia and by virtue of these commitments would be compelled to intervene in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia. "In such circumstances, His Majesty's Government could not guarantee that they would not be forced by circumstances to become involved also. This point was quite clearly expressed by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on March 24" (*DBFP*, Vol. I, pp. 331-332).

The British démarche was in no sense an indication of the British Government's intention to actually resist the German aggression. The Czechoslovak Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow informed V. P. Potyomkin that according to information received by the Czechoslovak mission in London, after the démarche Halifax requested Lord Lothian to inform Hitler through his German friends that "Britain would not defend Czechoslovakia arms in hand" (USSR FPA).

Cadogan remarked in his diaries that the following morning when the Foreign Office was again considering the matter, Simon resolutely backed up the stand when he said: "We can't go to war." After this Cadogan drafted a telegram to the French "warning them not to count too much on us" (*The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, p. 79).

On May 22, the Foreign Office said in a directive to Phipps, the British Ambassador in Paris, that it might be highly dangerous if the French Government were to read more into the British statement in Berlin than is justified by its terms. If, however, the French Government were to assume that His Majesty's Government would at once take joint military action with them to defend Czechoslovakia from German aggression, it is only fair to warn them that "our statements do not warrant any such assumption". Phipps was to tell the French that Britain was not going beyond Chamberlain's statement of March 24. In conclusion, the Foreign Office stressed that France should not take any actions which could lead to war without concerting these with Britain.

That same day, French Foreign Minister Bonnet assured Phipps that "the French Government would not dream of taking any action... under reference without ample consultation with His Majesty's Government". If Czechoslovakia "were really unreasonable the French Government might well declare that France considered herself released from her bond. That all that the French Government desired was not to be placed before the dreadful alternative of breaking their pledge or of beginning another world war" (*DBFP*, Vol. I, p. 357).

The British Government only met 5.00 p. m., May 22 to discuss the existing situation. Halifax informed the members of the Government of the measures he had taken (*PRO*, Cab. 23/93, pp. 321-324).

Still a dangerous crisis was averted. Of course, a considerable factor here was the fact that the Czechoslovak people were determined to rebuff the aggressor and that the USSR expressed its readiness to fulfil the commitments it had undertaken.

Immediately after the crisis, the British Government began to put increasing pressure on Czechoslovak ruling circles demanding that they demobilise the Czechoslovak army and make fresh concessions in talks with Henlein, spokesman for the Sudeten Germans.

The Soviet Embassy in London reported to Moscow: "The British Government was putting pressure on Czechoslovakia in every way, recommending that she should make maximum concessions to the Sudeten Germans. Almost every week, Halifax summoned Masaryk, advising him, drawing his attention, pointing out, warning and even threatening, demanding more and more concessions to Henlein.... Almost every fortnight, Masaryk flew to Prague and conveyed to the Czechoslovak Government this or that demand made by London. Simultaneously, Chamberlain put pressure on Paris, and... sought similar démarches in Prague from the French Government" (USSR FPA).

Summing up the meeting at the Foreign Office at the time, Cadogan wrote that a decision was taken to adopt a "big-stick" approach toward Czechoslovakia (*The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, p. 81).

BRITAIN'S LINE OF SCRAPPING CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S TREATIES WITH FRANCE AND THE USSR

○ N MAY 25, Halifax placed before the Cabinet the question of Britain's future political line. Noting that the first crisis was

over, he considered it necessary to prepare for the next. "He recalled that the French Government were constantly talking of the dilemma in which they were placed between the risk of war and dishonour.... It was desirable therefore, if possible, to obtain a release for the French from their obligation and its contingent consequences" (*PRO*, Cab. 23/93, p. 347).

Referring to Czechoslovakia, Halifax said that the situation would perhaps have changed for the better had Britain taken a firm stand. But this, he stressed, could have involved her in dangerous developments. He was opposed to supporting any concrete proposal on settling the Sudeten problem, because that would "bring us very near to a military commitment". Halifax believed that it was also impossible to offer resistance "if at some point in the negotiations a strong demand should be made for a plebiscite". Moreover he raised the question of whether the Czechoslovak Government should be given "good advice" to make the most far-reaching proposals to the Sudeten Germans and in addition to ask them whether they preferred those proposals "or the Anschluss with Germany" (*Ibid.*, pp. 347-348).

Halifax then raised the question of ways and means of doing away with Czechoslovakia's mutual assistance treaties with France and the Soviet Union. The Protocol of the meeting state: "The Foreign Secretary said that he did not feel that we could ask the French, the Czechoslovak or the Russian Governments to denounce their Alliances: he would, however, like to see the Czechoslovak State move into a position of neutrality which, like the neutrality of Switzerland, would be witnessed by the big nations concerned. Under such a system the Alliances would automatically disappear" (*Ibidem*).

Members of the British Government, Chamberlain above all, supported Halifax's proposals. "In the course of a short discussion the plan of Czechoslovak neutrality... was commended" (*Ibidem*).

At the same meeting of the Government, without any special discussion, it was decided to adopt the line of dismembering Czechoslovakia and scrapping her mutual assistance treaties with France and the USSR.⁷

⁷ As far back as 1935, Britain put up stubborn resistance to the conclusion of the Soviet-French and the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties on mutual defence against aggression, and then tried to scrap them. For example, on July 7, 1937, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. P. Potyomkin, wrote to the Soviet

The British Government put out feelers in Prague in respect to plans to "neutralise" Czechoslovakia. On May 30, 1938, the Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: "Before my arrival, Krofta [the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs] had had a visit from the Italian envoy who allegedly on his own initiative had probed the Czechoslovak Government's attitude toward Czechoslovakia's neutralisation.... The day before, the British envoy carried out an absolutely similar probe. Krofta expressed his view that the move was designed to detach Czechoslovakia from the USSR" (USSR FPA). In reply, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wrote, June 11, to the Ambassador in Prague: "You would do well to point out the dangers of the proposal for Czechoslovakia's neutralisation" (USSR FPA).

On June 14, Halifax put before the Committee on Foreign Policy a Memorandum entitled "The Possibility of Modifying Czechoslovakia's Treaties of Mutual Assistance with France and Russia".

His Memorandum stressed that sooner or later the German Government would raise the question of modifying Czechoslovakia's treaties with France and the USSR. Halifax wrote: "I also have the impression that the French Government would be glad if they could without loss of prestige be relieved of the fear of having to fulfil an obligation in regard to Czechoslovakia." That is why there should be a discussion of whether the British Government could make the relevant proposals (*PRO*, Cab. 27/627, p. 74).

The Memorandum said: "The problem created by Czechoslovakia's present treaty system might be solved if it were replaced by a system of guaranteed neutralisation.... Neutralisation requires that a neutralised country shall undertake not to enter into any political engagements with other states to defend their territory.... In return for this limitation of sovereignty the independence and integrity of the neutralised

Embassy in London: "The last few conversations of [Soviet Ambassador] Alexandrovsky with a number of persons, including Krofta, established that British diplomatic efforts were being undoubtedly intensified in favour of Germany and against the USSR in the countries of Central and Southeast Europe. In particular, through its envoy in Prague, the British Government resumed its influence on the Czechoslovaks, inducing them to make concessions to Henlein.... There was also confirmation of reports about British attempts to discredit the Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet pacts" (USSR FPA).

State is guaranteed by other States concerned in the maintenance of its neutralisation."⁸

The Memorandum admitted the difficulties of pushing through the entire plan. It said that Czechoslovakia "will not wish to be neutralised.... It is also doubtful whether it would be possible to devise any system of neutralisation which would satisfy Germany, who, in any case, must be expected to object to France and particularly Russia acting as guarantors".

The Foreign Office proposed that implementation of the plan should be started with a study of the question whether it was possible to modify Czechoslovakia's treaties in such a way that Czechoslovakia herself would not be bound to come to the assistance of the Soviet Union and France. The first thing that was proposed was to hold consultations on the question with the French Government (*Ibid.*, pp. 74-75).

To the Memorandum was annexed a draft telegram to E. Phipps, the British Ambassador in Paris, containing instructions for talks with the French Foreign Minister Bonnet. Halifax wrote to Phipps: "It is my impression, as I think it is yours also, that M. Bonnet would be glad if the French Government could be relieved of the fear of having to fulfil an obligation" with respect to Czechoslovakia. "I have, as you know, never been able to discover from French Ministers what precise action France would in present circumstances take in order to fulfil her obligation to Czechoslovakia if the case arose."

Phipps was instructed to raise before the French Government a question of how Czechoslovakia's treaty system was to be modified so as to release her from commitments in respect to assisting France and the USSR. "If France

⁸ The Memorandum considered in detail the question of the distinction between guarantees issued individually by each country concerned and a joint guarantee of these countries. The Memorandum said: "His Majesty's Government have always held the view that the difference between a several guarantee and a joint guarantee is that, whereas in the former each guarantor is pledged to carry out its undertakings even if the other guarantors fail, in the case of a joint guarantee the guarantee only holds good so long as all the guarantors are ready to give effect to it" (*PRO*, Cab. 27/627, p. 74).

would prefer in present circumstances some less direct and onerous obligation it might be found possible to devise a more generalised and less explicit form of security arrangement for Czechoslovakia, in which the obligation would be assumed jointly by a number of states, including Germany and the Soviet Union" (*Ibid.*, p. 75).

While the Memorandum merely implied that the British Government intended to offer joint instead of individual guarantees by the states concerned, the draft telegram to Phipps said as much in concrete terms. This meant that by participating in such "joint guarantees", Germany could always make their implementation impossible.

On June 17, Phipps was instructed to raise this question with the French Government. However, France did not consider it possible at the time to support the British proposals. The German Government was informed of the British position on this question. On July 14, the German Ambassador in London von Dirksen reported to Berlin that the British Government's attitude toward the Franco-Soviet pact "is today more critical than before.... The British gave the French clearly to understand how desirable it would be from the point of view of the whole situation in Europe to allow French ties with Soviet Russia to fade more and more into the background. This tendency gained further ground during the Czech crisis". In conclusion, Dirksen reported that the British were willing "to exclude Soviet Russia from any discussion on a European settlement" (*DGFP*, Vol. II, p. 486).

Britain's attitude was no secret for the Soviet Government either. The Soviet Embassy in Paris reported to Moscow on July 24, 1938, that the British had put forward the idea of "neutralising" Czechoslovakia. The Embassy wrote that this was a suggestion for guarantees on the part of the USSR, France and Germany to Czechoslovakia so as to have the USSR's pacts with Czechoslovakia and France annulled (USSR FPA).

V. SIPOLS,
Dr. Sc. (Hist.),
M. PANKRASHOVA,
Cand. Sc. (Hist.)

(To be continued)

REMINISCENCES OF THE PAST, A PEEK INTO THE FUTURE

IN THE PAST TWO or three years some prominent statesmen and politicians in Britain published their memoirs and other books. Harold Wilson, George Brown, and Harold Macmillan describe their years in office and, like Edward Heath in his book, present their views on key issues in Britain's foreign and home policy and international affairs. The authors give their own interpretation of the facts, designed to present their activity in the best light. This, naturally, should be borne in mind. At the same time, their works contain many facts which help one to gain a better understanding of the functioning of the two-party political system, under which the alternation of Conservative and Labour governments does not signify any change in the basic content of the domestic and foreign policy line.

However, there is also another interesting aspect to these books. They do much to explain the present position of the Conservatives and the Labourites on urgent international problems, like the Common Market issue. Britain entered the EEC at the beginning of the year, and has been trying to utilise her membership to transform the Community into a new military-political alliance. The fact is that hints at this line may be found in the books written by the Conservative leader Heath as well as by Labour leaders. It is also interesting, in the light of the present day, to learn of their views on Britain's role in Europe and her place in the NATO bloc. Today, as in the past, these views are being backed up by actions that hardly constitute efforts to relax tensions.

Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labour Party and former Prime Minister, called his reminiscences *The Labour Government 1964-1970* with the subtitle *A Personal Record*.¹ A reading of the memoirs shows that the subtitle was in no sense a casual one: the form of

¹ H. Wilson, *The Labour Government 1964-1970. A Personal Record*, London, 1971.

"personal record" aids the author to portray the Labour Party in office in the 1960s in the most favourable light while ignoring everything unfavourable to the Labourites. Wilson appears to be making an effort to divest himself and his immediate colleagues of the responsibility for the failure of the widely proclaimed plan for Britain's "socialist reconstruction", and for the grave economic difficulties the British working people had to suffer under the Labour Government.

Contrary to the facts, Wilson insists that it was under the Labour Party that Britain finally overcame the "balance-of-payments problem". "The sneers abroad about Britain's sickness had given place to admiration". He says that the Labour Government scored achievements, unprecedented for Britain, in social service, housing construction, education, public health and social security, achievements which the Labour Government itself did not expect (pp. XVII-XVIII). Actually, the Wilson Government's economic and social policies did not in any way help to fulfil the loudly heralded election promises with which the Labour Party was assuming office in 1964. Under the Labour Party, industrial production growth rate declined, inflation was intensified and taxes increased (from 1964 to 1970, taxes introduced by Labour totalled £3,000 million), while the balance-of-payments deficit grew steadily and military spending reached a record high (£2,200 million in 1969). In November 1967, the Labour Government was forced to devalue the pound.

Wilson frequently recalls that his Government had many good and correct plans, among them Labour's National Plan which was geared to Britain's "socialist development". It should be remembered, however, that as early as 1966, that is, within a year of its adoption, the Labour Government had to admit that the National Plan was impractical. Wilson says that this was due to lack of time (p. 138). Actually, the

curtailed reforms, portrayed with fanfare as "socialist development", turned out to be unfeasible under the continued domination of the monopolies, the sustained arms drive and—last but not least—the Labour leaders' own policies.

In 1969, the Labour Government made a futile attempt to impose on the British Trade Unions an anti-labour bill which banned or materially restricted the right to strike. In this way, Wilson states, the Government sought to solve the "strike problem". The powerful protest movement discarded Labour's anti-labour legislation, and it was the Tories, the avowed enemies of the working class, who pushed through Parliament the anti-labour bill. This however in no way signifies that the British working class has been hog tied. It is employing the strike weapon with considerable success today.

Much of Wilson's memoirs deals with foreign policy activities, providing detailed descriptions of Wilson's official and unofficial visits to the USA, the FRG and other countries, reports on meetings with the Rhodesian racist leader Ian Smith (couched in a spirit of "tolerance and understanding") and praise of NATO's militaristic policy in Europe. Wilson deals considerably with the war in Vietnam and the role of mediator which he and his Government allegedly tried to play in reaching a peace settlement in Indochina. It is hard to give the author the benefit of the doubt here especially in view of the well-known facts which indicate the contrary, namely, that the Labour Government had an "understanding" attitude toward US aggression in Vietnam and gave it moral and political support. What is much more important is that Wilson's reminiscences most clearly reveal that the Prime Minister of a country claiming to have a "special relationship" with the USA and to be its closest and truest ally, did not dare to justify fully and unconditionally the dirty war of US imperialism.

Wilson very briefly refers to Britain's participation in the Common Market, the problem which still most strongly agitates his countrymen. It is true, that he reiterates his postulate: "Europe [Western] needs us just as much, and many would say more, than we need Europe" (p. 705). But that is as far as he goes. Wilson's restraint can be traced to the complicated position of the Labourites who have not rejected Britain's membership of the Common Market in principle, but would prefer to have it on their own terms. Besides, who better than the leaders of the Labour Party, whose

mass base is made up of trade unionists, should be aware of the unpopularity of the Common Market among rank-and-file Britons, for whom the "leap into Europe" entails higher prices, growing unemployment and greater oppression by the monopolies. Hence Wilson's desire to gloss over this "unfavourable" aspect of his Government's activities.

By contrast, almost the entire book of reminiscences by George Brown, a former leader of the Labour Party, titled *In My Way*, constitutes, in effect, a theoretical and political substantiation of British "Europeanism" and praise for the superior qualities of West European integration.²

Presenting his political credo, Brown writes that he wants, most definitely, to state his firm belief that the political future of Europe and Great Britain depends on Britain's successful entry into the Common Market. Britain, he continues, will be able to change the situation in the whole world if she becomes an organic part of Europe (p. 14). What kind of changes does Brown mean? It follows from his book that the EEC should be converted into a close military-political grouping, an "integrated Europe" with its own "integrated armed forces" and even a "European Defence Minister". Brown argues that the sooner this happens, the better (p. 215). It can be easily seen that these dreams of the "socialist" Brown do not differ from those the British Conservatives now seek to impose on Western Europe.

Here one should recall Brown's own "evolution". In 1964, he held the posts of Deputy Premier and Secretary for Economic Affairs. It was he who implemented the notorious "prices and incomes policy", which in practice meant a "freeze" of the working people's wages while prices continued to rise. It was a policy that for all practical purposes constituted a component part of the offensive by monopoly capital on the rights of the working people of Britain. After that, for nearly two years, Brown was Foreign Secretary. It was at that time that Britain connived at the USA's military venture in Indochina, pursued a line of building up the NATO war machine to the maximum, gave support to the Israeli aggressors and pampered the racists in South Africa. It is futile for Brown to try (as his book shows him to be doing) to divest himself of the responsibility for the reactionary foreign policy line. Brown was not returned to Parliament in the 1970 election, and subsequently lost his post of

² George Brown, *In My Way*, London, 1971.

Deputy Leader of the Party. For his anti-labour policy, he was expelled from the Transport and General Workers' Union. But almost at once—and this is highly indicative of the evolution of extreme Right-wing Labourism in Britain—he started out on a fresh career. The management of Courtauld's, a big textile and chemical monopoly, offered Brown a highly paid position as consultant to the company. A place also was found for him in the House of Lords.

In concept and content, the biography of Denis Healey, one-time Labour Secretary of State for Defence, is close to the memoirs of Wilson and Brown.³

Healey, his biographers stress, rejected the very ideas of a "socialist foreign policy". During preparations for the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to his own admission, he became an open advocate of Atlantic solidarity (p. 71). He worked to build up the aggressive NATO bloc and to maintain US military presence on the European continent. That constituted the essence of his activity as Secretary for Defence despite his "Left-wing phrases". Paying lip-service to the recognition of Britain's unbearable burden of expenditures resulting from the arms drive, Healey steadily helped to increase the military budget. It was he who formulated the new defence policy which was more in line with the country's strategic position (p. 263). And that was the very period when Britain began to look toward Europe.

It was natural to expect that the memoirs of Conservative leaders would be in contrast to the reminiscences of Labour leaders. However it is very hard to say this. One can hardly find anything that reveals a fundamental distinction between the positions taken by Labour and Conservative leaders. Some of the nuances on domestic and foreign policy questions which may be found in the books of Conservative leaders are due perhaps not so much to fundamental differences but to tactical considerations dictated by the scramble for ministerial office or different emphasis in determining Britain's foreign policy objectives. However, there is much evidence to show the similarities in the policies pursued by Labour and Conservative leaders. This applies above all to the domestic-policy section of Volume 5 in the memoirs of one-time Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, which was published last year.⁴

³ R. Bruce and J. Williams, *Denis Healey and Policies of Power*, London, 1972.

⁴ H. Macmillan, *Pointing the Way, 1959-1961*, London, 1972.

There is, in particular, a description of the election campaign in 1959, which shows that the two main parties in Britain have pursued a largely similar course.

The memoirs devote relatively little space to the problem of Britain's entry into the Common Market. That is understandable, since Macmillan headed the Government from 1957 to 1963, when Britain tried unsuccessfully to pry apart the West European grouping by setting up the rival European Free Trade Association. Of course, it would be wrong to assume that Macmillan was in some sense a principled opponent of West European integration in general and entry into the Common Market in particular. Britain's long efforts to undermine the EEC and her obvious desire to dissolve the EEC in some kind of broader West European economic association were largely determined by the resolute opposition to Britain's "European claims" on the part of her main imperialist rivals on the continent—France and the FRG. Aside from all else, they feared that once inside the Common Market, Britain would act as a Trojan horse for the USA. That there was a justifiable basis for such apprehensions can be seen from Macmillan's memoirs. He states, for example, that it was the USA, specifically President Kennedy (p. 348), who was most insistent on getting Britain into the EEC. This is an interesting admission, especially in the light of the position taken by present Britain's rulers, who are now trying to assume the role of the EEC's chief representative in its relations with the USA.

By contrast, the present Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath has openly proclaimed himself to be a confirmed "European". The concept of the "historical necessity" for Britain's orientation upon Europe runs all through his book.⁵

Heath says: "I firmly believe it [Britain's entry into the EEC.—V. R.] to be in the interests of Europe as well as of Britain. Moreover, it is in the interests of establishing a better balance in the Atlantic Community" (p. 34). Some tens of pages later, Heath explains what these interests are: the countries of the "free world" should prevent the spread of communism (p. 79).

Heath's book helps one to gain a better understanding of the main lines of the present Tory Cabinet's domestic and foreign policy. What the Conservative leader said three years

⁵ E. Heath, *Old World, New Horizons. Britain, the Common Market and the Atlantic Alliance*, London, 1970.

ago is now reflected in Britain's stubborn attempts to slow down Europe's advance toward peace and mutually advantageous cooperation and to utilise Britain's membership in the EEC to split the continent.

●
A READING of the books by the Labour and Conservative leaders clearly reveals that actually none of them succeeded in opening

any "new horizons" for Britain. Their programmes on foreign and domestic policy are dictated by monopoly capital. They propose a "resurgence" of Britain's power chiefly through running rough-shod over the vital interests and the rights of the working people, continuing the arms race, strengthening the "Atlantic solidarity" and opposing all steps toward détente.

V. RYZHIKOV

The Soviet General Staff at War (1941-1945)

S. SHTEMENKO

Sergei Shtemenko was born in 1907 in the Cossack village of Uryupinskaya (now the town of Uryupinsk) on the River Khopyor, a tributary of the Don. His nationality is Russian. On finishing secondary school in 1926, he entered an artillery training establishment, which launched him on his long career in the Army.

After finishing the Red Army Mechanisation and Motorisation Academy in 1937 Shtemenko completed the General Staff Academy, and in 1940 he began his many years of service on the General Staff. During the war, as Chief of the Operations Department and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, he was directly involved in planning operations and campaigns and frequently visited the front to supervise their execution.

From 1948 to 1952 Shtemenko served as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Between 1953 to 1962 he held leading posts in a number of military districts and was Chief of Staff of Land Forces. He is now Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Countries of the Warsaw Pact. He holds the rank of General of the Army and has been awarded many Soviet and foreign decorations.

We reprint here a chapter from General Shtemenko's book which we hope will be of interest to our readers. The book was put out by Progress Publishers, Moscow.

A TRIP TO TEHRAN

A new assignment. From train to plane. We reach the capital of Iran. Additions to the Overlord plan. Roosevelt supports Stalin. Our commitments to the Allies. Churchill's map of Yugoslavia. Teheran contrasts. Planning the campaigns for the first half of 1944. From offensive along the whole front to the system of alternating blows.

IN THE AFTERNOON on November 24th, 1943, Antonov said to me: "I want you to be ready for a journey. Have maps of all the fronts with you and take a cypher-officer. You'll find out where and when you're going later."

We were used not to asking questions. Obviously, this was to be an important mission.

A messenger from the Kremlin called for me at two in the morning. I reported to Antonov, picked up my case with the maps in it and left.

The streets of Moscow, carpeted with snow and still blacked out because of the war, were deserted. Only occasionally did we pass a patrol, marching along in sheepskins and felt boots.

We drove fast. I had not been told the route. I was sitting in the back of the car and tried to get my bearings by peering at the roads and side-streets through the imperfectly curtained side-window. At last I realised that we were heading for Kiev station, but soon that, too, was behind us.

On the Mozhaish Road, where in those days the towering grey shapes of new buildings kept

company with squat two-storey houses of the last century, the car put on speed. The Jewish cemetery flashed by. We were out of Moscow.

Having made a few intricate turns after Kuntsevo, we eventually drove up to the platform of some unfamiliar military railway depot. I made out the dark shape of a train on the tracks. My escort led me to one of the carriages.

"This is yours," he said briefly.

There were no other passengers in the carriage. The attendant showed me my compartment. I began wondering if I was to accompany someone from GHQ to the front.

Presently I heard the crunch of footsteps in the snow outside the window. Voroshilov and two other officers entered the carriage. Voroshilov greeted me and said:

"The train commandant will report to you soon. Tell him where and for how long he must stop the train, so that by eleven o'clock we can collect information on the situation on all fronts and report it to Comrade Stalin. After that you will report three times a day, as in Moscow."

The train started. I was alone again in the carriage. Presently the commandant appeared and said we were on our way to Stalingrad. We soon settled the question of where to stop. At 9.40 we should reach Michurinsk. We should stop there for half an hour and immediately plug in to the HF telephone.

"Everything will be done," the commandant assured me and withdrew.

I sat for a while with the light out. Telegraph poles flashed by with dark woods and snow-covered slopes rising and falling in the background. Now and then the dim outlines of a village emerged.

I began to ask myself questions: "Why are we going to Stalingrad? What shall we do there, when the war's on the other side of the Dnieper? Stalingrad can't be our real destination...."

Obedient an old habit, I climbed into the upper berth and got into bed. The upper berth was an old and well-tried friend. It had saved me from many of the troubles that befell those who travelled below and I was always sincerely sorry for people who because of age or for some other reason could not climb on top.

In those days I used to fall asleep instantly. When I awoke, a gloomy day was breaking through the window. My watch showed eight. I went for a walk along the corridor. The guard at the end of it and the attendant were awake.

Taking my briefcase with me, I moved to the lounge, where there was an HF telephone. I spread the maps out on the table, and, as soon as we

reached Michurinsk, got in touch with Gryzlov. He was alert and ready as usual. He gave me the information I needed and I entered the situation on the maps.

Voroshilov came into the lounge at about ten. Apparently I had woken him by talking on the phone.

"You do shout loud," he complained. "How's the war going?"

I gave him a brief report without referring to the maps. The troops of the Second and First Baltic fronts were engaged in hard offensive fighting in the Idritsa, Gorodok and Vitebsk areas and were not making any substantial progress. The Western Front, having broken through to Vitebsk and the approaches to Mogilev, was also at a standstill. Things were going much better for the Byelorussian Front. Here Rokossovsky's troops had enveloped Gomel, which would be liberated at any time now, and were exploiting their success in the direction of Zhlobin and Polesye.

The position of the First Ukrainian Front was complex. After capturing Kiev, its troops had seized a vast area stretching as far as the line through Malin, Zhitomir, Fastov and Tripolye. Korosten had been liberated on November 17th. But at this point the enemy had succeeded in containing our advance. Having regrouped, he had thrown in fresh reserves and counter-attacked in the direction of Kiev, striking right at the root of our attacking force. The German panzers were pressing us very hard in the Zhitomir and Fastov areas. On November 19th they had taken Zhitomir and by the 25th had succeeded in encircling Korosten, where the 226th Infantry Division of the 60th Army was holding out heroically.

The Second and Third Ukrainian fronts were pushing forward with great difficulty in the Kirovograd and Krivorozhye directions and west of Zaporozhye.

At eleven o'clock the commander of Stalin's bodyguard, Lieutenant-General Vlasik, invited Voroshilov to the Supreme Commander's lounge. I told Vlasik I was ready to report on the situation and stayed in my compartment. About five minutes later I was sent for.

Besides Stalin and Voroshilov, Molotov was also in the lounge. The Supreme Commander asked whether anything new had occurred at the fronts. There was very little that was new and I was soon allowed to go.

In the evening, when we reached Stalingrad, I again collected information on the situation. After that I prepared to "detrain", packing my maps and waiting for orders. But no order came and half an hour later the train moved on.

When I was sent for again, I found Stalin in the same company. They were all sitting at a table set for dinner.

I reported the situation from the 1:1,000,000 map, then passed on several requests and suggestions from the fronts which I had received through Antonov. Stalin granted all the requests, approved the suggestions and invited me to dine.

The meal lasted about an hour and a half. The talk was all about some forthcoming conference in which Roosevelt and Churchill would be taking part, and of which I knew nothing.

The night passed. A new day came. The established routine remained unchanged. I went in three times to report to Stalin. We passed through Kizlyar and Makhachkala. By evening we arrived in Baku. Here everyone except me got into cars and drove off somewhere. I spent the night in the train. At seven in the morning someone came for me and we drove to the aerodrome.

There were several Si-47 aircraft standing on the airfield. A. A. Novikov, commander of Air Forces, and A. Y. Golovanov, commander of Long-Range Aircraft, were strolling up and down beside one of them. Near one of the other planes I noticed a pilot I knew, V. G. Grachov. Stalin arrived at eight o'clock. Novikov reported to him that two aircraft were ready for immediate take-off. One would be piloted by Colonel-General Golovanov, the other by Colonel Grachov. Half an hour later two more aircraft would take off with a group of officials from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Novikov invited the Supreme Commander to fly in Golovanov's plane. Stalin appeared, at first, to accept the invitation but, after taking a few paces, suddenly stopped.

"Colonel-Generals don't do much flying," he said. "We had better go with the colonel."

He turned in Grachov's direction. Molotov and Voroshilov followed him.

"Shtemenko will fly with us, too, and keep us informed about the situation on the way," Stalin said as he mounted the ramp.

I did not keep him waiting. Vyshinsky, several officials from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the guard flew in the other plane.

I had not been told until reaching the aerodrome that our destination was Teheran. We were escorted by three flights of nine fighters each—one on each side, the third ahead and higher.

I reported the position at the fronts. The situation at Korosten had become even more critical. Our troops were just about to pull out. Everything indicated that the enemy intended smashing his way through to Kiev and sweeping our troops off the bridgehead they had secured there....

Teheran appeared after about three hours. We were met by Colonel-General Apollonov, who had been sent ahead to organise the guarding of the Soviet delegation. There were some plainclothesmen with him whom I had never seen before; five or six of them altogether. A car drove right up to our plane. Stalin and the other members of the Government stepped into it and it swept away, accelerating rapidly. The first of the escort cars dashed after it. I went in the second.

We were soon at our Embassy.

The Soviet Embassy was housed in several buildings that stood in a pleasant park surrounded by a reliable wall. Not far away was the British Mission, guarded by a mixed brigade of Anglo-Indian troops. The American Embassy was a considerable distance from us.

The cypher-officer and I were given a room on the ground floor of the house where Stalin and the other members of the delegation lived. It was a small room with one window. The telegraph was next door. That evening, before taking a walk in the park, Stalin came in to see what conditions we had for work. He did not like our room.

"Where can they spread out their maps in here? And why is it so dark? Can't something better be found for them?"

His visit had an immediate effect. We were at once given a light, roomy verandah, three tables were brought in and the direct telephone was also moved to suit us.

The conference of leaders of the three Great Powers opened on November 28th, at sundown. It took place in a separate building in the grounds of the Soviet Embassy. I was given a pass of admission and made good use of it. The building was guarded internationally; at each post there were three sentries, one from the USSR, one from the United States and one from Britain. Each was changed by his own relief commander. It was a remarkable and rather amusing ceremony.

Quite soon, on Stalin's invitation, Roosevelt moved permanently to the Soviet Embassy. This was for security reasons; there had been rumours of a plot to assassinate the President.

The Soviet delegation behaved at the conference with great assurance. From the talk I had heard in the train I realised that our people intended taking a firm stand over the question of the Second Front, which the Allies were obviously delaying. More than once Stalin made me check up on the number of enemy and satellite divisions on the Soviet-German front and the Germans' front against the Allies.

These figures were used on the very first day of the conference. They were the Soviet delegation's trump-card when the discussion turned to the

subject of shortening the war, immediate opening of the Second Front or, as the Allies put it, execution of the Overlord plan. These figures showing the overall relation of forces were a very effective argument against Churchill and exposed all his attempts to substitute secondary operations for a Second Front. With these figures to back him up Stalin showed that in 1943 because of the Allies' passivity the German Command had been able to concentrate fresh assault forces against our army. This he followed up with the news of the deterioration in the situation on the Soviet-German front, including what was happening at Korosten and, in general, the position round Kiev.

One of the key questions at the conference was what should be considered a Second Front and where it should be opened. The Soviet delegation literally cornered the British delegation into admitting that Operation Overlord should be the Allies' main effort, that it should begin not later than May of the following year, and that it must definitely be carried out on the territory of Northern France. In order to defend this quite correct point of view, Stalin had to give a brief but exhaustive analysis of the Allies' possibilities of attacking Germany from other directions. Closest attention was focused on the alternative of the operations in the Mediterranean and on the Apennine Peninsula, where the Allied armies were approaching Rome.

The operations in the Mediterranean were regarded by the Soviet Supreme Command as secondary, since the enemy was using relatively few forces there and this theatre was a long way from Germany. As for the Italian theatre, the Soviet delegation considered it very important for securing free passage of Allied shipping in the Mediterranean but quite unsuitable for striking directly at Hitler Germany, whose borders on this side were guarded by the formidable barrier of the Alps.

Nor were the Balkans, on which Churchill had his most eager gaze, suitable for an invasion of Germany.

The Soviet representatives offered their Western Allies a militarily well founded plan for carrying out three interconnected operations that fully accorded in scale and substance with a real Second Front: the main forces should carry out the Overlord plan in Northern France, an auxiliary blow should be struck in Southern France with a subsequent advance northward to link up with the main forces, and, finally the operation in Italy should be used to create a diversion. We also gave in some detail what seemed to us the best timetable for these operations.

Special attention was paid to an Allied landing in the south of France. Considerable difficulties could be foreseen in this area but the operation

would improve the chances of the main forces. When summing up the Soviet point of view on Southern France, Stalin declared:

"I, personally, would go to that extreme."

Stalin, as we know, was supported by Roosevelt and the Soviet proposal on the timing of Overlord and also on the auxiliary operation in the south of France was accepted. This decision undoubtedly strengthened the anti-Hitler coalition of the three Great Powers and signified the triumph of the ideas that inspired their joint struggle.

I was kept busy with my own work throughout the conference. Regularly, three times a day I would gather information on the situation at the fronts by telephone and telegraph and report it to Stalin. As a rule he heard my reports in the morning and after the Heads of Government had been in session.

Nearly every day Antonov transmitted to me draft instructions requiring the Supreme Commander's signature. After Stalin had signed them I would inform Moscow and put the original documents away in a metal box, which was kept by the cypher-officer.

Once or twice Stalin himself spoke with Antonov. On one occasion he got in touch personally with Vatutin and Rokossovsky and asked them about the possibilities of liquidating the enemy's counter-offensive against Kiev. He was particularly interested in the opinion of Rokossovsky, whose Front was assisting Vatutin's Front on the Mozyr Sector.

As chief of the Operations Department, I naturally had a keen interest in coordinated action by the Soviet and Allied armies in future operations. This question was raised by Stalin in a conversation with Churchill on November 30th, and on the same day, at the third session of the Heads of Government, it was formulated as an undertaking on the part of the USSR. In the Head of the Soviet Government's statement on this subject the possibility was not ruled out that the Allied troops might incur the greatest danger not at the beginning of Operation Overlord, but when the operation was under way and the Germans tried to switch some of their troops from the Eastern to the Western front. I must say in advance, however, that in 1944 the Soviet Army, true to its commitments to the Allies, took such resolute action that, far from being allowed to withdraw troops from the Eastern front for transfer to the west, Hitler was actually forced to withdraw divisions from the west and send them east.

There was some friction over the question of appointing a Supreme Commander for the Allied forces in the west. The person nominated for this

post would have to shoulder the full responsibility for preparing and carrying out Operation Overlord. Serious hitches, if not complete failure, would be inevitable unless someone was made personally responsible for this vitally important project. All who took part in the conference realised this perfectly and in the end they agreed to appoint the American General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander.

The Teheran Conference concluded its work by solving some other very important aspects of the problem of the Second Front, namely, the strength of the Allied forces to be landed on the continent. Churchill fixed the strength of the invasion force at a million men or thereabouts.

At Teheran our Allies obtained Soviet agreement in principle to declare war on imperialist Japan after the defeat of Hitler Germany.

I remember how much trouble I had over the map of Yugoslavia which Churchill had given Stalin. This storm in a tea-cup arose because the British Prime Minister's data on Yugoslavia did not agree with the data the head of the Soviet delegation had brought to the conference.

At noon on November 30th the map reached me with a categorical order written across it: "To be checked". I had no information on Yugoslavia ready to hand, so an urgent call had to be put through to Gryzlov. He dictated to me the latest information on the state of affairs in Yugoslavia. It turned out that Churchill's map was less accurate than ours. But, as far as I know, Stalin never returned to this subject in his further talks with Churchill.

I also remember the ceremony of presentation of the Sword of Honour which the King of England had sent as a gift to Stalingrad. On the King's behalf Churchill presented the sword to Stalin in November 29th. Roosevelt was also present at the ceremony. Members of all three delegations, officials of our Embassy, Soviet officers and soldiers were invited, too. Churchill made a short speech. Stalin took the sword and kissed it.

During the conference Churchill celebrated his 69th birthday. A great banquet was held in the British Mission to mark the occasion. The hero of the day sat at table with Roosevelt on his right and Stalin on his left, still keeping the traditional cigar between his lips. There was an enormous birthday cake in front of him with enough burning candles to match his age. A good number of toasts were proposed in Churchill's honour, including one by Stalin.

During the ordinary conference working days the Heads of Government and members of the delegations would dine in turn at Stalin's, Roosevelt's or Churchill's. These dinners took place very late

(at nearly 20.00 hours, Moscow Time), when we had already had supper. Roosevelt did not always stay on after dinner. More often than not he would withdraw immediately to his rooms, but Stalin and Churchill would spend a long time in what were known as "unofficial talks". On the other hand, Roosevelt liked to meet Stalin at noon, before the conference sessions began, and these meetings helped substantially to ensure the success of the conference.

One day Stalin went out to pay an official visit to the Shah of Iran. A reception was held in the palace. The Shah in his turn paid a visit to Stalin. This was the first time I had seen the well-built, rather handsome young man the Shah was at that time. He presented Stalin with a large, exquisitely embroidered carpet, the warp of which was said to be of silver threads.

Naturally I was very eager to see Teheran. One day I had the chance. The Embassy people warned me that I should not appear in the streets in Soviet uniform. Someone brought me a slouch hat and a raincoat. I put them on over my uniform. It was a long raincoat. The hat did not fit properly either, but I did what I could with it and, looking like a real plainclothes detective, set out by car for an evening of sight-seeing in Teheran. I was not used to brightly-lit main streets and multi-coloured neon signs. I was struck by the contrast, the magnificent palaces of the nobility with their rich parks and gardens with so many flowers, and the horrifying poverty on the outskirts of the city, where veiled women drew water straight from the roadside ditches.

My trip lasted about an hour and a half and, of course, I had only a glimpse of Teheran.

After the conference we returned to Moscow by the same route; in Grachov's plane to Baku, and from there by train to Moscow. I gathered information and reported on the situation as usual. The talk, of course, was about the conference.

A few days later, from the autumnal warmth of peaceful Iran we arrived back in our own Moscow war-time winter.

The General Staff received no special instructions after the Teheran Conference. All assignments from GHQ, however, were obviously designed to make sure that our obligations to our Allies in connection with the prospects of a Second Front were fulfilled to the better. The destruction of the Nazi war machine naturally took priority among these assignments, while a more modest place was allotted to preparations for war with Japan.

We did not forget, of course, that the nature of the anti-Hitler coalition was contradictory and might produce all kinds of surprises. The actual date for the opening of the Second Front was

particularly in doubt. Even at Teheran it had been hedged about with all kinds of provisos by our Allies. The watchword of both GHQ and the General Staff was, therefore, rely on the Allies but don't be caught napping yourself.

One of the many questions related to the practical work of the General Staff at this time was whether the plan for the winter campaign that had been worked out in September 1943 needed modifying.

The primary political aim of the Soviet Army's forthcoming operations was to liberate our country completely from the Nazi invaders. Only one-third of previously occupied Soviet territory still remained in their clutches. In the coming year the Soviet Army would have to be ready to fulfil the great international mission of lending a helping hand to the peoples of other countries. Operations on an even grander scale than the previous year were required to achieve this and the old and well-tryed rule of hitting the enemy all the time, giving him no let-up, remained in force.

On the other hand, the extraordinary long offensive was having its effect on our troops; they were tired and needed replacements of men and matériel. During the autumn and winter fighting of 1943 the enemy had thrown in strong reserves and had succeeded in creating a temporary threat to our position in the Ukraine, slowing down our advance in Byelorussia and warding off our thrusts into the Baltic area. The German High Command was desperately trying to stabilise the front. This meant that the situation had basically changed and the old decisions were no longer valid.

GHQ and the General Staff clearly realised that under no circumstances could we afford to lose the strategic initiative and allow the enemy to put the war on a positional basis. Fresh and fundamental regroupings were needed, particularly in the Ukraine. The simultaneous offensives by the Soviet Armed Forces along the whole front from the Baltic to the Black Sea which had been characteristic of the autumn 1943 plan were now unfeasible. The realities of the war compelled us to abandon simultaneous offensives in favour of powerful consecutive operations or, as we used to say and write in those days, strategic blows, which would be more suited to the new situation.

When deciding upon the target for such a blow, its timing and coordination with other similar operations, the number and nature of the forces required, the General Staff was guided mainly by the nature of the enemy forces that had to be defeated. By the beginning of 1944 the enemy had clearly definable concentrations of forces in the Leningrad area, in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, in the Crimea and in Byelorussia. To de-

feat such groupings one would have to tear gaps in the enemy's defences that, since he was short of strategic reserves, he would have to close mainly by moving forces from other sectors. The German Command did not, as a rule, keep operational formations in its reserves; it operated mainly with corps and divisions of various types, mainly panzer.

In order to pierce the enemy front, break it up on a wide sector and prevent its restoration, Soviet strategists had to plan with a view to creating more powerful groupings than the enemy's. The role of tanks, artillery and aircraft must be enhanced to make each of these groupings a predominantly attacking force. There would have to be massive reserves that would allow us to build up a decisive superiority of forces on the chosen sector rapidly enough to take the enemy by surprise. His reserves, on the other hand, could best be dispersed by alternating our blows and delivering them in areas far apart from one another.

All this was envisaged in the plans of campaign for the first half of 1944. In addition, they took into account the obligation assumed at the Teheran Conference "to organise by May a large-scale offensive against the Germans in several places".

The time when these operations would begin depended mainly on the readiness of our forces for action. There were other considerations that applied to the various fighting areas: the need to lift the siege of Leningrad, for instance, the undermining of Germany's political positions in Finland and Rumania. This was all taken into account in our planning.

According to the plan of campaign, the earliest offensive (January 12th) was to be launched by the Second Baltic Front. On January 14th it would be joined by the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. This joint operation of the three fronts was known as the "1st blow". Ten days later (on January 24th) the main offensive, in the Ukraine, was to begin. Our operations here were designated the "2nd blow". The "3rd blow" was to be delivered in March-April, when Odessa would be liberated by the Third Ukrainian Front, after which the enemy forces in the Crimea would be crushed by the onslaught of the Fourth Ukrainian Front. After this the plan envisaged an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and in Southern Karelia.

This system of alternating blows at widely separated targets fully justified itself. The enemy was forced to swing his forces from one sector to another, including the distant flanks, and thus lost them bit by bit.

General de Gaulle: His Life and Policy

Н. Молчанов, *Генерал де Голль*, М., изд-во «Международные отношения», 1972, 496 стр.

N. Molchanov, *General de Gaulle*, International Relations Publishers, Moscow, 1972, 496 pp.

THE GENRE of a political biography enables an author, by narrating the life and activity of a statesman or political leader, to paint a vivid picture of the history of a country in a definite epoch. Works of this kind naturally occupy a conspicuous place in Soviet scientific literature. Molchanov's book, as it were, continues the series of biographies of noted political leaders in the recent past, in particular, monographs about Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt published somewhat earlier.

Molchanov casts aside the sediments of the "Gaullist myths", created by bourgeois historians and publicists concerning the nature of de Gaulle's policy which supposedly stood above classes and parties. On the basis of vast documentary material he recreates, from positions of Marxist-Leninist historical science, a real, objective picture of the main stages of his political biography.

As distinct from the other two Heads of countries (members of the anti-Hitler coalition) who were the recognised leaders of Britain and the United States, de Gaulle, a regular officer of the French Army, was only beginning his political career when the Second World War broke out. A resolute and purposeful man, he already at that time claimed to speak "as an equal" with the British Prime Minister and the US President.

De Gaulle employed his uncommon talent as a political leader and statesman to defend the positions of France's ruling class whether in respect to domestic or foreign affairs.

In describing de Gaulle's youth and the first years of his adult life, Molchanov reveals the influence exerted by social environment and family education on moulding the personality of the future politician and statesman. The worship of France's grandeur which prevailed in the de Gaulle

family of devoted Catholics and descendants of the ancient French nobility, the interest in French history and Bergson's philosophy largely explained both de Gaulle's decision to become a military man and his keen sense of national pride and belief in the dominant role of the nation.

Two periods in his life occupy the central place in the book. The first covers the years of the Second World War when he organised in London the Free France Movement (later renamed Fighting France) and then headed the French Committee of National Liberation in Algeria and subsequently the Provisional Government of the French Republic. The second period covers the ten years of his stay in office as President of the Fifth Republic (1958-1969).

In June 1940, during those tragic days for the French people, de Gaulle, a little-known Brigadier-General at that time, vigorously denounced the capitulation of the Government and refused to reconcile himself to France's defeat. According to the author, de Gaulle who left France at the moment of her surrender tried to solve three cardinal problems: to rally the largest possible number of Frenchmen ready to fight arms in hand against the fascist invaders; to acquire a territorial base in the colonies; and to regain for France the "rank" of a great power she had lost as a result of her defeat.

The successful accomplishment of these tasks and ultimately France's participation in completing the defeat of Hitler Germany was guaranteed by the mass Resistance movement which united all the progressive forces of the French nation and also by the diplomatic and military cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The sense of political realism, inherent in de Gaulle, a man of conservative views, suggested to him the need for establishing close

contact with the internal Resistance forces, including the French Communist Party which made the largest contribution to the armed struggle of the French people against the Nazi invaders.

Of special interest are the pages in the book which deal with the relations of Free France and the Soviet Union. After Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR, de Gaulle at once took steps for rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Molchanov points out that de Gaulle was convinced that it was the Soviet Union that was destined to make the decisive contribution to the defeat of the fascist invaders.

Already at that time, Charles de Gaulle considered it vitally necessary for the national interests of France to lay the foundations for Franco-Soviet cooperation in the postwar period. The Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded on December 10, 1944 was of tremendous significance for restoring France to the rank of a great power. The Soviet Union's support frustrated the efforts of the leaders of the United States and Britain to reduce France to the status of a second-rate country and to bar her from participation in the resolution of major questions of European policy and postwar settlement.

De Gaulle returned to office in 1958, at the moment when the short-sighted colonial policy of the Governments of the Fourth Republic had led the country into a blind alley. Earlier he recognised the inevitable collapse of the old system of colonialism under the powerful offensive of national liberation movement, and the need to grant independence to Algeria, displaying far-sightedness and a sense of political realism.

Following the ending of the Algerian war which greatly curtailed France's foreign policy activity, de Gaulle initiated measures to release the country from commitments which unconditionally subordinated France to NATO's military integration system. These steps undoubtedly expressed the tendency to strengthen France's sovereignty and her independent line in foreign policy. Notwithstanding the outspoken dissatisfaction of influential pro-US "Atlantic" circles with such an orientation, de Gaulle vigorously opposed the hegemony of the United States in the Western camp. He offered stubborn resistance to Washington's schemes to organise the vaunted Multilateral Nuclear Force. He also opposed attempts of the United States to include or, to be more exact, to dissolve the Common Market in some kind of an Atlantic community.

De Gaulle also categorically objected to the introduction of the "supra-nationality" principle in the Common Market, rightly perceiving in this a threat to France's independence. From the very outset he roundly denounced US aggression in

Indochina. Molchanov recalls that as early as 1961, during his meeting with John F. Kennedy, General de Gaulle predicted the inevitable fiasco of the US military venture in Vietnam. De Gaulle even more strongly condemned the aggression of Israel against Arab countries and Washington's support of Israel.

Molchanov notes that with the growth in France of a tendency toward an independent line in foreign policy, de Gaulle saw the increasing significance of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Without actively taking part in détente, "there could be no question of a world policy by a great world power, which was de Gaulle's cardinal aim" (p. 453).

The author points out that, in de Gaulle's opinion, a détente was "in the first place a European problem"; it was in Europe that major steps in that direction had to be taken. He quotes de Gaulle's words that for this purpose "the Soviet Union and France were chosen by history, by their very nature and the will of their peoples" (p. 453). These and some other considerations underlay de Gaulle's decision to steer a course toward rapprochement with the USSR and the development of allround Franco-Soviet cooperation.

An important stage in pursuance of this course was de Gaulle's visit to the USSR in June 1966 and his talks with the Soviet leaders. These talks were followed by intensive development of Franco-Soviet cooperation in the national interests of both European states. During his official visit to France, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, stated that his trip to that country was a logical continuation of the line "initiated during the talks of General de Gaulle in Moscow in 1966 remembered by all of us".

Speaking about de Gaulle's home policy, Molchanov notes that, using his great personal influence, de Gaulle rendered considerable services to the French big capitalists. The economic policy pursued under the slogan of efficiency of production, profitability and competitiveness, the author stresses, had an adverse effect on workers, office employees and small farmers. For some time, de Gaulle managed to contain the dissatisfaction of the working masses with the state-monopoly's reactionary policy. However the stormy events of May-June 1968 exposed the gap between the scope and boldness of his foreign policy and the narrow-mindedness of his domestic policy, especially his policy in social affairs. These events, the author notes, marked the beginning of the downfall of de Gaulle's political career (pp. 461-465).

In conclusion, Molchanov states that he does not regard his evaluations of different phases in the many-sided and contradictory life of Charles de

Gaulle as final in character. Nevertheless the main facts of General de Gaulle's biography, in our opinion, have been sufficiently covered in the book. It goes without saying that in a monograph written on such an intricate subject one can find certain shortcomings, inaccuracies, some disputable assertions, and so on. On the whole, however, the author has succeeded in drawing a real, life-like portrait of an important statesman advanced to the foreground of our times by the French ruling classes.

Molchanov, an author of a number of books dealing with political leaders and the history of France, wrote this book in a special form. It is

somewhere in between scientific research and fiction. It is a very interesting work.

Publication of this book shows once again that the contribution made by General de Gaulle to the development of Franco-Soviet cooperation and the strengthening of peace in Europe is highly valued in the Soviet Union. His memorable visit to the USSR in 1966 initiated a new, fruitful stage in the development of friendship and cooperation between the two countries which are called upon to play such an important role in safeguarding European and international security.

G. FILATOV

Incurable Disease

Victor Perlo, *The Unstable Economy. Booms and Recessions in the United States Since 1945*, New York, International Publishers, 1973, 238 pp.

IN HIS LATEST BOOK Victor Perlo, well-known US economist, analyses the causes of the economic and financial crisis which struck the United States in 1970 and examines from a Marxist viewpoint contemporary bourgeois economic theories and attempts at state-monopoly regulation of the economy in the USA, the main citadel of imperialism. Considerable attention is given to the militarisation of the United States and its impact on the country's economy and business activity.

Crisis phenomena in the economy and inflation, sharply exacerbated in the USA in recent years, have given rise to considerable differences in the evaluation by bourgeois theoreticians of the Government's economic policy and have led to quite a fierce struggle between the main schools of US bourgeois political economy. Among the most noted exponents of these schools mention should particularly be made of two. They are Professor Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago, who during the 1968 election campaign was Nixon's chief economic adviser and now is a consultant to Robert McNamara (President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and Professor Walter Heller of the University of Minnesota, who under the Kennedy Administration was Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors.

While M. Friedman is known as the head of the so-called monetary trend, W. Heller is a proponent of the theories of the British economist Keynes, and proposed such remedies as regulation of taxes and Federal spending to stimulate economic activity and to "smooth out" the cycle, M. Friedman and his supporters, on the contrary, maintain that regulation of the money supply is the most effective and most swiftly acting economic instrument the Government has at its disposal.

One merit of the book is that Victor Perlo does not confine himself to a general critique of these theories but basing himself on an analysis of the facts, particularly of the 1970 crisis, reveals the bankruptcy of both schools.

According to data supplied by the National Bureau of Economic Research, the US economy went through 30 cyclical recessions between 1834 and 1961. The four cyclical fluctuations after the end of the Second World War, however, were comparatively "mild" and of short duration. And no postwar recession, naturally, could be compared with the 1929-1932 crisis.

The period of upturn in business activity which began in February 1961 continued almost uninterrupted for more than 100 months—up to mid-

1969 (prior to this the record period of economic advance during the Second World War was 80 months). The recession began in the summer of 1969 and in 1970 developed into the biggest and longest cyclical crisis of overproduction in the last 40 years, accompanied by a stock exchange and credit crisis. A real panic flared up on the stock exchange where quotations dropped precipitously followed by a wave of bankruptcies which even such large corporations as the Penn Central Railroad could not escape. Lockheed, a mammoth corporation specialising in arms production, succeeded in keeping afloat only thanks to massive government subsidies (p. 8). In the long run, just as after the Great Depression, the Government was forced to resort to such an extreme measure as the devaluation of the dollar.

Every economic crisis has its particular features. The 1970 crisis, as the author points out, "was the first real economic decline in wartime not caused by the physical damages of war. It was the first real crisis accompanied for over a year by a continuous, rapid increase in prices" (the history of the United States shows that usually prices went up during the periods of booms and dropped during periods of crises and depressions). "And for the most of its duration," Victor Perlo notes, "it was limited to the United States" (p. 8).

New troubles began to harass the United States precisely at the moment when the Administration was prepared to proclaim an era of "permanent prosperity". The 1969 Annual Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisors emphasised: "The vigorous and unbroken expansion of the last eight years is in dramatic contrast to the 30-month average duration of previous expansions. No longer is the performance of the American economy generally interpreted in terms of stages of the business cycle.... The forces making for economic fluctuations have been contained through the active use of monetary and fiscal policies" (p. 11).

On assuming office at the very beginning of 1969 the Republican Administration, Victor Perlo recalled, made an attempt to deliberately slow down the boom. The main aim of the Government, in the author's opinion, was to raise the profits of the monopolies, preventing at the same time an increase in wages. It hoped by an "insignificant" slowing down of economic activity to arouse fear of unemployment among the workers. Government contracts were curtailed, credits became less accessible and more costly.

The "planned recession", however, went much further than the Government expected. It did not succeed in "smoothing out the cycle" and paving the way for business activity at a normal, stable level. To combat the crisis which assumed menacing

proportions, the Government had to reduce the cost of credit and increase its contracts. These measures further boosted the budget deficit (\$23,200 million in 1972), accelerated the rate of inflation and raised the public debt to \$450,000 million in 1972. Thereby the basis for a new recession was laid. "Every administration," Victor Perlo notes, "has reacted to recessions and crises with substantial and often massive injections of government deficit spending as a means of stimulating a new upturn. And always this has been reinforced with easier money policies" (p. 137).

The Eisenhower Administration during its first years in office relied on the "traditional" concepts of a balanced budget and monetary "responsibility". But it responded to the 1958 crisis with record peacetime budget deficit. The Nixon Administration also began with talk about a balanced budget. Prominence was given to the theory of economic stabilisation, advocated by M. Friedman, through a gradual, four-per cent annual increase in the money supply.

Like the Eisenhower Administration in 1957, the Nixon Government in 1969 followed the policy of credit restriction and a rigid budget. But in 1970 Nixon changed his course even more sharply than Eisenhower did in 1958. By the second quarter of 1970, the deficit had reached an annual level of \$14,000 million, recalling the alarming 1958 deficit and the even greater deficit in 1967 under the Johnson Administration. The increase of the money supply exceeded almost twice the 4-per cent norm recommended by M. Friedman. Government officials asserted that the financial and budget policy would be the main factor in the planned economic advance during the second half of 1970. But the expected upturn did not materialise either at the end of 1970 or in 1971 which passed, without a substantial recovery in the level of business activity. These results compelled the Government to draw up the budget for the 1972 fiscal year with a record postwar deficit—\$39,000 million (p. 138).

During recession periods the US ruling circles have invariably resorted to an increase in military spending as a means of stimulating the economy. Victor Perlo notes that militarisation was the dominant factor in the US economy in the last 30 years. Appropriations for armaments were sharply cut immediately after the end of the Korean war. But a year later there began a decade of uninterrupted increase in the military expenditure and appropriations for related space research. Beginning with 1965, military contracts sharply rose because of the Vietnamese war (from \$27,100 million in 1964 to \$39,700 million in 1966 and \$42,300 million in 1967). This helped prolong the "tired boom" (p. 166).

The author believes, however, the stimulating effect of rising military spending will ultimately be reduced to naught as the result of mounting taxes, price increases and the general decline in the purchasing power of the people. These last factors are particularly felt at a time when the stimulating influence of military contracts on the economy is drawing to an end. As a result the cyclical economic recession is not smoothed over but deepened. "The longer a war drags on," Victor Perlo writes, "the less its stimulating effect becomes, and the more its deterrent effect comes to the fore. In World War II, production reached a peak in 1943 and remained thereafter at a high plateau until the end of the war, when there was a sharp reconversion recession. Economic activity during the Korean War reached a similar plateau in 1952 and was followed by a final surge in the last months of the War. This sequence was repeated during the Vietnam War with the 'mini-recession' of 1967 and the final surge of activity in 1968. But Vietnam has lasted longer than any previous US war... And it was the first war in which the negative factors became so dominant that an economic crisis of overproduction erupted while the war continued" (p. 165).

In August 1971, the Nixon Government was compelled to resort to the so-called new economic policy aimed at livening up economic activity and restraining galloping inflation. True enough, since the spring of 1972 there has been a certain upturn in business, but the cardinal problems of the US economy have remained unsolved. Inflation has not been checked because its causes have been preserved: the chronic deficit of the Federal budget and the trade balance, the huge public debt and colossal military expenditures which in the 1973 fiscal year, notwithstanding the end of the war

in Vietnam, amounted to \$76,400 million. In applying the "new economic policy" which has now entered its third phase, considerable differences have been revealed in government agencies themselves. This shows that the White House has no definite and clearcut programme for a way out of the blind alley. Secretary of the Treasury Schultz, for example, insists on restraining the increase in the amount of money in circulation, while the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Arthur Burns, on the contrary, urges reducing the cost of credit and increasing the money supply. Victor Perlo conclusively demonstrates that the "new economic policy" in all its three phases bears a strikingly pronounced class character, serves the interests of the monopolies and is directed against the working people. **The Unstable Economy** contains much statistical data which demonstrate the inability of the US Government to resolve the basic contradictions of the capitalist economy through state-monopoly regulation. Even now when most of the forecasts rule out the outbreak of a serious recession during 1973, the **US News & World Report** states that evident signs of inflation compel economists to ponder whether these factors are not fraught with danger. At some time the swift growth of business activity has to stop.

The continued international monetary and financial crisis and the further decline of the dollar, despite its new devaluation announced on February 12, 1973, deal crushing blows at the concepts of "planned capitalism", blast the myths of bourgeois propaganda about the omnipotence of the imperialist state and its ability to eliminate the anarchy of capitalist production and economic crises.

S. LOSEV

Problems of Socialist Economic Integration

Ю. Ф. Кормнов, Специализация и кооперация производства стран СЭВ в условиях социалистической экономической интеграции, М., изд-во «Экономика», 1972, 335 стр.

Y. F. Kormnov, Specialisation and Cooperation of Production in the CMEA Countries Under Socialist Economic Integration, Moscow, Ekonomika Publishers, 1972, 335 pp.

THEORETICAL elaboration of the various problems of integration is an important prerequisite for the realisation of many practical meas-

ures in the further implementation of the Comprehensive Programme for the economic integration of the CMEA countries. One of the major areas of

research embraces problems linked with the promotion and deepening of international specialisation and cooperation of production. The success of integration depends as a whole on progress in international specialisation.

Many important aspects of international specialisation and cooperation of production and the problems that have to be resolved in order to speed up this process, are dealt with by Y. F. Kormnov. In this work he examines a wide range of economic problems relating to international specialisation and cooperation in the light of the tasks that have been set by the Comprehensive Programme and by the congresses of the fraternal communist and workers' parties. He analyses the substance of these problems, the interconnection between economic and scientific and technological cooperation, the efficacy of economic incentives and, lastly, the various methods and means of managing socialist international cooperation.

The author's principal methodological point of departure is that he considers all the basic problems of international specialisation primarily from the standpoint of economic effectiveness. This enabled him to demonstrate the dialectical combination of the CMEA countries' national and international interests in their mutual economic cooperation. The author points out that in the solution of major practical questions of production and trade relations it is important to take into account the actual, specific interests of each country and, at the same time, the common interests of the community as a whole. He has succeeded in showing that in economic integration a key precondition for correctly combining the national and international interests of the CMEA countries is that there must be an organic link between the planning and coordinating, commodity and monetary, and institutional instruments for directing the process of advancing international cooperation and specialisation.

Kormnov insists that a higher level of efficiency of social production must be the criterion in the approach to the choice of the variants of cooperation, for this is consistent with the common, international interests of the socialist community and with the cost accounting interests of each of the fraternal countries.

Operating in the world socialist market, the economic organisations of the CMEA countries are sellers and buyers of a special kind. "They are the owners of socialist property, which, as distinct from capitalist property, does not divide but on the contrary objectively unites its owners. Objectively inherent in the socialist countries, therefore, is the striving to find variants of international specialisation of production that would conform with the common interests of the community and yield the

maximum total benefit for all the countries in it" (p. 38).

A feature of the present phase of the CMEA countries' development is not only their immense industrial potential but also the fact that during the years of socialist construction the economic levels of all the European CMEA countries have been brought considerably closer together. Moreover, judging by indices such as per capita industrial output and national income, it may now be said that all these countries have reached a similar level of economic development. Under these conditions, Kormnov writes, "the approach to the promotion of international specialisation from the standpoint of common interests and the internationalist duty must not be reduced to unilateral actions by one country or another that agrees to satisfy the requirements of other countries by a non-equivalent exchange and by disadvantage to itself. This would be a manifestation of only one aspect of internationalism—disinterested assistance. The present phase of the cooperation between the fraternal countries, i. e., the period of socialist economic integration, is characterised by mutual assistance and reciprocal benefit, by mutual and not unilateral material advantages, by the working out and implementation of a division of labour that ensures the maximum saving for all countries under the principles of cost accounting in foreign economic relations. This is evidence that in assessing these factors, each socialist country must accord the interests of its socialist partners the same attention as it gives its own interests" (pp. 38-39).

In elaborating on various problems raised in the Comprehensive Programme, the author closely scrutinises the place occupied by international specialisation and cooperation in the system of means for gradually drawing together and levelling up the economic development of the socialist countries.

He is correct in giving prominence to cooperation and specialisation of production among the other forms of economic cooperation, for it provides the less developed countries with a steadily growing, stable market thereby ensuring a high level of effectiveness for their national industry and for their exports and imports. Moreover, this form accords with the interests of the industrialised countries provided the products they receive in exchange are of good quality and of a high technical standard (p. 76). The author quite rightly stresses that quality and technical standards are an international requirement. The intensified productivity of labour and the outcome of the economic competition between socialism and capitalism ultimately depend on the fulfilment of this requirement.

Chapter II is of particular interest in this con-

nection, for in it the author sums up the experiences gained in promoting socialist production cooperation and examines existing difficulties and the ways of overcoming them. He shows that today production cooperation is inseparable from cooperation in scientific and technical research.

In order to keep abreast of technological progress, producers of specialised products must not only constantly improve production technologies but also see to it that their products have not become morally obsolete. This is, so to speak, one side of the coin. The other side is that production cooperation takes shape on the basis of the joint scientific and technical research by the CMEA countries. Progress in this sphere constitutes a major guarantee of successful socialist integration in the main branches of production.

The author points out that under the resulting comprehensive form of cooperation, which embraces science, technology, production and foreign trade, "complete clarity would be achieved for all the member countries on questions of cost, on the competitiveness and efficacy of production and of the export and import of a given product... The countries involved would become more interested in coordinating investments and utilising production capacities; begin to show more understanding for the economic interests of their partners, find the ways of extending necessary financial and other assistance to each other and strive to develop and deepen specialisation in the joint production of parts and units". (p. 138). This would lead to the establishment of new, efficiently operating joint economic organisations and to the enlargement of agreement-based forms of cooperation as envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme.

From the standpoint of national state interests, the author analyses the changes that have taken place in economic forms of scientific and technological cooperation among the CMEA countries. He shows that under present-day conditions exchanges of scientific and technological documentation (gratuitous in some cases, and paid in others) and, especially, the development of international scientific and technological cooperation, are objectively necessary and expedient.

Socialist property bounded by national state frontiers not only requires the use of the instruments of coordination and planning but also of commodity and monetary instruments and of the principles of cost accounting in the sphere of mutual economic relations. The author reviews the entire range of these problems in international specialisation and cooperation of production.

He deals at length with the question of the interdependence of the integrating countries and with the need to take the interests of partners into

account and establish complete clarity on the prospects for mutual economic relations.

In international economic relations non-financing by the state calls for account and control, but the objects and methods of such control differ essentially from the domestic practice of the socialist countries. The principle aim of cost accounting in foreign economic relations, for the attainment of which the communist and workers' parties of the fraternal countries improve the mechanism of mutual economic cooperation, "is to prevent or limit cases where decisions in the sphere of economic cooperation are inimical to the common international interests of the socialist community or to the interests of individual countries of that community" (p. 193).

From this standpoint the author examines the problem of improving the system of foreign trade prices for specialised products. Prices, he writes, must be fixed in such a way as to ensure mutual benefit to the partners. This benefit is mandatory but by no means always equal, because for each country the actual effect of this benefit depends on the national level of labour productivity, which differs in all countries.

This does not in any way signify that there has been a violation of the principle of equivalence in foreign trade exchanges of specialised products. "The very nature of the economic relations between the socialist countries," the author writes, "presupposes the complete and actual economic equality of the partners in specialisation and comradely mutual assistance, reciprocal interest and a desire to ensure benefits to each of the partners" (p. 215).

The concluding section of the book is devoted to the problem of improving the CMEA economic mechanism for the planning of international specialisation and cooperation of production. Here the author analyses the question of the maximum involvement of each country in international specialisation, the reciprocal voluntary adaptation of the innerstate economic mechanisms of the CMEA countries with the aim of improving the conditions for the development of integration. Finally, he examines the problems of improving the international mechanism of economic cooperation between the integrating countries, that is, all the instruments of this mechanism—planning and coordination, commodity and monetary, and organisational and institutional. The relations of specialisation between the CMEA countries, the author points out, have not administrative but contractual and economic regulators.

Kormnov's book, which covers a wide range of problems and reflects the search for the solution of the most complex of these, contains a number of debatable points and omissions. While

correctly noting the priority of prices over the compensation funds providing economic incentives for specialisation, he does not examine the role played by these funds in coordinating the production of units and parts. It is possible that here these funds could yield a positive effect much more quickly. Further, the author ignores currency problems, on whose solution the rate and scale of specialisation depends to a large extent. He has, in effect, by-passed the question of the CMEA countries' participation in all-European economic coo-

peration, a factor that must be considered in any examination of the problems dealt with in this book.

These comments do not belittle the merits of this book, which contains a wealth of material on the present state of important processes in the world socialist economy and is a useful reference for readers interested in questions linked with the economic integration of the countries of the socialist community.

Professor I. DUDINSKY

Uhuru! Freedom!

Л. Владимиров, *Рожденная в огне (Путь Кении к независимости)*, М., Политиздат, 1972, 288 стр.

L. Vladimirov, *Forged in the Fires of Struggle. Kenya's Path to Independence*, Political Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1972, 288 pp.

THE FORMER colonial peoples have achieved their freedom along different paths. But one thing is indisputable: without the Soviet Union's decisive contribution to the crushing of German fascism and Japanese militarism, without the emergence and consolidation of the world socialist system, colonialism would not have disintegrated so rapidly and so irretrievably.

Kenya was, apparently, the first of the countries in Tropical Africa to rise in armed struggle against the British colonialists in the early 1950s. This had a powerful impact on the liberation struggle on the African continent, particularly in East Africa. Developments in Kenya have widely been commented on by the world and Soviet press.¹

Vladimirov's book, issued recently by the Political Literature Publishers, is based on numerous documents, special research material and other literature. Moreover, the author had an opportunity to talk with witnesses of the events he describes. He analyses the political and economic history of Kenya and the distinctive features of the Kenyan

people's liberation struggle against imperialism.

The author draws on diverse historical material, including ethnographical, and informs the reader about the rich culture of the peoples of East Africa and the civilisation of the Swahili in Africa during the Middle Ages. He exposes the slanderous assertions of Reginald Coupland, the apologist of British imperialism, to the effect that until the mid-19th century, i. e., British penetration into the valley of Zambezi, most of Africa "had had no history" of its own, that it had "sunk in barbarism" and that the "heart of Africa was scarcely beating".²

British historians and officials depict the nearly 70-year domination by Great Britain as the "golden age" of Kenya, and portray the actions of the British colonial administration, as nothing else but a mission of "civilisation". Suffice it to refer, in this respect, to a document of the British colonial administration, which, among other things, states that British colonial policy in East Africa was, as elsewhere, determined to civilise large masses of human

¹ See A. M. Глухов, *Кения: ультиматум колониализму*, Moscow, International Relations Publishers, 1964; A. M. Перушев, *Кения. Очерк политической истории (1959-1969)*, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1972.

² Basil Davidson, *The African Past. Chronicles from Antiquity to Modern Times*, Penguin Books, 1966, p. 18.

beings who were extremely primitive in moral and social terms.³

The facts cited in the book convincingly demonstrate that British rule in Kenya virtually constituted a period of rapacious exploitation of the country's wealth. The author notes: "After proclaiming the protectorate over Kenya, the colonialists intensified the seizure of African lands, particularly the fertile lands of the Kikuyu people. At the beginning of the 20th century the possessions of the British Imperial East-African Company already totalled more than 320 thousand acres of land" (p. 36). The British colonialists pursued a consistent policy directed at transforming Kenya into a "country of Whites".

The peoples of Kenya never reconciled themselves to their oppressed position and waged a ceaseless struggle against British imperialism. The national liberation struggle of African countries was greatly influenced by the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. "The echo of the revolutionary tide generated by the Great October Revolution," the author points out, "also reached the coasts of remote Africa. The news of the establishment in Russia of the world's first workers' and peasants' government, headed by Lenin, and of the first decrees of Soviet power on peace, land and the right of nations to self-determination, penetrated into the African continent, awakening the political consciousness of the African peoples. A movement for the liberation of lands, seized by the European settlers, arose in Kenya, which was in essence an anti-colonial movement" (p. 40).

An important stage in the anti-colonial movement was the strike in Nairobi in March 1922, the first in Kenya and one of the earliest strikes on the African continent (p. 47). A prominent role in advancing the national liberation movement was played by Jomo Kenyatta, President of the Kenya African National Union.

After the Second World War, Kenya became an arena of still more acute social and economic conflicts, and this found its expression in mass resistance to the agrarian policy of colonial authorities, as well as in strikes and political demonstrations in towns.

Of great importance for national liberation was the struggle of the peasants for land, so-called Mau Mau Movement. Representatives of the colonial authorities spread numerous slanderous fables to discredit the national patriotic forces in the eyes of the people and the world progressive forces. A well-known Kenyan leader Oginga Odinga noted:

"Without the forest fighters in the so-called 'Mau Mau' period, Kenya's independence would still be a dream in the minds of a few visionary politicians, for the rising in Kenya brought independence nearer not only for Kenya but... for the whole of East Africa."⁴

The efforts of the Kenyan people to regain the African lands seized by white colonialists developed into an armed struggle for independence. Representatives of numerous nationalities of the country took part in this struggle, but the main burden in the struggle against British colonialism was borne by the Kikuyu people.

The author points out that it was the actions of the "young Kenyan proletariat that imparted a militant spirit, purposefulness and staunchness to the movement of African peasants for land" (p. 60). In 1952, there were 438 thousand wage workers in Kenya out of the total African population of 5.5 million in the country (p. 70).

A special section of the book, titled "The Creation of a Secret Organisation", deals with the preparation for the armed uprising and the formation of guerrilla detachments which consequently united into the Land Liberation Army. It was a difficult and dangerous business, for it required the organisation of the disunited sections of the African population, "divided by tribal prejudices and special interests. Moreover, the people had no concept of modern warfare, or arms" (p. 90). The author traces the history of the Kenyan people's liberation struggle, describes combat operations of guerrillas, their ties with the population, etc.

The book exposes insinuations and slanders spread by British bourgeois propagandists and historiographers in respect to the armed struggle conducted by the Kenyan people. At the same time, the author points out that this area has been far from fully studied. In particular, the question of who prepared the armed struggle and how this was done, has yet to be adequately clarified.

The British imperialists utilised their entire arsenal of instruments and methods in order to suppress the national liberation movement of the Kenyan people. They employed modern weapons, tanks and aircraft. They tried to split the patriotic forces and incite the inter-tribal discord, etc. According to incomplete official British data, 11,500 guerrillas were killed and some 30 thousand were taken prisoner in the period ending 1956 (p. 134).

But colonialism in Kenya could not be rescued. The struggle of the Kenyan people ended in victory for it was supported by the anti-imperialist forces throughout the world. In particular, the So-

viet Union and other socialist countries rendered the just struggle of the Kenyan people all possible political and other support.

Kenya became independent on December 12, 1963, and in 1964 she was proclaimed a republic. But this did not signify that she had gained economic independence. Key positions in the Kenyan economy were still in the hands of foreign capital, and this obstructed her advance toward progress. All this is convincingly revealed in Odinga's book **Not Yet Uhuru**, which was favourably received by Kenya's progressive forces, and by Africa as a whole.

Kenyan progressive leaders maintained that the complex problems facing the country could be solved along lines of non-capitalist development. These views were expressed in the Programme of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and in its 1963 electoral manifesto which called for creating "independent democratic socialist Kenya".

The struggle between the supporters of the non-capitalist path of development and the forces of internal and external reaction who were implanting capitalism in the country, permeated the entire political life of independent Kenya. This struggle was also clearly reflected in foreign policy. The national patriotic forces sought to develop ties with all countries, including socialist states, since this promotes their independence, economic and cultural progress, and the expansion of the state economic sector.

The experience of many young independent countries demonstrates that when they draw on the support of the USSR and the world socialist system as a whole, they can more successfully overcome the resistance of imperialist forces and domestic reactionaries and move toward fundamental social, economic and political transformations. Such a course of action best serves the interest of the people.

The author says: "Successes achieved by the country in its first year of independence were possible as a result of the unity and cohesion of the

national patriotic forces and the pursuance of a progressive policy aimed at abolishing the remnants of colonialism, strengthening the political and economic independence of the country and moving the country along the path of progress. The subsequent offensive of the foreign imperialist forces and domestic reaction, and, as a consequence, the intensified tribal discord and the increased activities of foreign monopolies and private capital have damaged the interests of the Kenyan people" (pp. 275-276).

Kenya's national patriotic forces are firmly convinced that difficulties linked with problems of consolidating the country can be overcome through the consistent struggle against neocolonialism and imperialism, through the implementation of progressive social and economic measures in the interests of the people and the strengthening of ties and cooperation with African countries and socialist states. There is no doubt such a policy would be welcomed by all real friends of the Republic of Kenya.

On the whole, Vladimirov's book makes a definite contribution to Soviet studies of Africa. It will draw the attention of specialists, as well as the reader at large who are interested in problems of the developing countries. Having analysed the developments that had taken place in Kenya, the author tackled a number of questions relating to Kenya's history and her people's struggle for freedom and independence.

A merit of the book is undoubtedly its exposure of the imperialist policy of Britain and the USA in respect to independent Kenya. The author shows that the policy of the Peking leaders plays into the hands of the enemies of the Kenyan people who have won their political independence at the price of steadfast and bloody struggle, and are now energetically working to develop their country along the path of social and economic progress.

Professor N. LEBEDEV

³ See *The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau. An Historical Survey*, Sessional Paper No. 5, London, 1959, p. 262.

⁴ Oginga Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru*, London, 1967, pp. 254-255.

Tories' "European Stake"

Uwe Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion. How Britain Joined the Common Market*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1973, 432 pp.

B RITAIN'S ATTEMPTS to join the EEC, which lasted more than a decade, had been completed, thereby ushering in a new stage: existence and struggle inside the Community.

Britain's long and contradictory path to Europe is described in this book by the well-known British political analyst, Uwe Kitzinger, who is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Common Market Studies* and the author of a number of books on West European integration. The author is an advocate of the Common Market and this has naturally influenced his treatment of various problems. As his subtitle indicates, he deals with an event that has already become a part of history. However, much of what he says has an immediate bearing on the present, since a sharp struggle over her membership in the EEC is still in progress in Britain. The fact is that Britain's entry into the Common Market has intensified the struggle for leadership among members of the Community. Moreover, contradictions among the members have entered a new phase.

Uwe Kitzinger begins by recapitulating the origin of the concept of West European integration in the late 1940s and early 1950s and recalls the initially negative attitude toward it by Britain's ruling circles. He demonstrates that with the decline of Britain's world influence and the deterioration of her economic condition, membership in the Common Market became the main objective of London's foreign policy in the 1960s. There was a growing feeling that economic and political union with a group of West European countries would provide greater opportunities than the leading but highly vulnerable position within the Commonwealth of Nations or the role of the USA's junior partner. Without abandoning the advantages of the "special relationship" with the USA, Britain's Conservative rulers placed their reliance on achieving leadership within the Common Market.

It should be stressed that their expectations were based above all on the class solidarity of the imperialists and a desire to fortify the positions of capitalism. They feared that the economic division of Western Europe could lead to a political split and a weakening, if not a disintegration, of the NATO military bloc. That is why the Tory Govern-

ment stressed the political aspect in its position for EEC membership. They emphasised the necessity to unite in face of the "common danger" (implying, of course, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries), and the need to avert a split in Western Europe and NATO.

Britain was also pushed into the Common Market by powerful monopoly capitalist forces who anticipate reaping economic advantages from EEC membership in the long run. The costs of entry—higher prices as Britain's lower prices are raised to the Common Market level, large contributions to the EEC budget (about £ 150 million in 1973), and a reduction of customs tariffs on industrial imports from the EEC area—were all to be shifted to the working people.

Quite naturally, Uwe Kitzinger concentrates on Britain's last attempt, under Conservative leadership, to "swim the Channel". The installation of a Conservative Government in place of the Labour Government in June 1970, shortly before the opening of the talks with the EEC, introduced some adjustments in London's European policy. One of the Conservatives' main foreign policy aims—entry into the EEC—was now being backed up by the aspirations of the new Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who was prepared to pay any price for Britain's admission into "Little Europe".

Uwe Kitzinger says: "Whether it fully realised it or not—and the latter is probably the case—the Conservative Party took its most decisive step toward British entry into the EEC eight years before 1973. It was on July 1965 that, in the first election it had ever held for a party leader, it replaced Sir Alec Douglas-Home not by Reginald Maudling, but by Edward Heath.... He [Heath] sees in British entry into the European Communities the main theme and justification of his whole political career" (p. 147).

It should be recalled that in 1961, during the Conservatives' first attempt to join the Common Market, the Macmillan Government intended to stand up for the interests of the Commonwealth countries and also of Britain's partners in the European Free Trade Association. This time there was virtually no talk of any solidarity with them. Casting off every doubt and sacrificing the interests of

her allies and of her people, Britain under the Tories executed her famous "leap into Europe".

No other problem in the entire postwar period has aroused such wide public discussion in the press, radio and television as the question of entry into the Common Market which virtually split the country along the class line: the big monopoly bourgeoisie being in favour, while the working people and most of the trade unions were opposed. All public opinion polls in Britain—and there have been a great many—invariably revealed that most people in Britain were against the country's entry. They believed with good reason that this would result in further increases in prices and unemployment, additional taxes and lower living standards.

Once in office, the Conservatives mounted an unprecedented campaign for entry, a campaign which, the author says, was probably one of the most massive and costly in the postwar period.

It is interesting to read what the author has to say about the activity of the Confederation of British Industry, which maintained almost daily contact with the British delegation negotiating in Brussels, and with the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade. This headquarters of the British monopolies established simultaneous contacts with the Common Market countries' embassies and the EEC Permanent Representative in London, and encouraged EEC officials to visit Britain. In Brussels, the Confederation even set up a special office for unofficial but influential contacts (p. 262).

Uwe Kitzinger considers the attitudes of that section of the bourgeoisie which is threatened with growing competition and ruin as a result of Britain's entry. This includes the paper, shipbuilding, sugar and several other industries. One of the best organised was the so-called sugar lobby, which tried to influence the course of the negotiations in Brussels. Defending the sugar manufacturers, it made a pretence of demonstrating concern for the sugar producing countries of the Commonwealth.

In assessing Labour's resistance to Britain's entry into the Common Market, Uwe Kitzinger reveals no illusions. Out of power and in opposition, the Labour Party was forced to reckon with the opinion of its rank-and-file members and had to review its policy on EEC: the old stand in favour of EEC gave way to a position against it, but only against the terms on which the Conservatives were prepared to join.

The Communist Party of Great Britain proved to be the most consistent opponent to the Common Market. The British Communists explained to the people that "going in also means strengthening the giant international firms and their power to exploit the workers.... It would help those who want to keep Europe divided and perpetuate the cold war

and the arms race".

The author is compelled to admit that the enlargement of the Common Market produces new problems for the Community and equally for each of its new members. In practical terms, the establishment of an economic and monetary union has turned out to be much more difficult than had been anticipated by the EEC Heads of State and Government meeting at The Hague in 1969, where the decision to expand the Common Market was adopted. The crisis of the capitalist monetary system has kept the EEC in a constant feverish state, causing tense relations among its members. That is why, the author notes, the most serious trials still lie ahead, and "battles to be fought compared to which British entry was simple.... The act of accession on 1 January 1973 is not an end. It is a means, and it is a beginning" (p. 399).

Indeed, the enlargement of the EEC marks the formation of one of the three "principal centres of imperialist rivalry", which, as the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Party's 24th Congress pointed out, are locked in a growing economic and political competitive struggle. The expansion of the Europe of the Six into the Europe of the Nine extends the basis of inter-imperialist struggle in Western Europe itself. The Tory Government's claims to a leading role in the EEC have already become pronounced. It expects to achieve this goal by concentrating attention on foreign policy problems and laying down a "common line" for the EEC countries on the most important international issues. Prime Minister Edward Heath has tried, contrary to the stand taken by the other members, to interpret the results of the Common Market's Paris Summit in October 1972 as constituting a decision that the Nine should insistently work to formulate a European foreign policy. This effort was continued by Britain Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home when the enlarged Council of Ministers of the EEC met in January 1973. He urged the members not to discuss economic problems, but to concentrate on the most important strategic issues. However, a rejoinder at once came from the French Foreign Minister who stressed that important foreign policy matters should be decided by the national governments. Nor were the other EEC members eager to follow in Britain's wake. In particular, Denmark has come out against the EEC foreign policy integration.

There is every indication that Uwe Kitzinger comes very close to the truth in his conclusion that Britain's entry into the Common Market is not so much an end as a beginning, the beginning of a new round of inter-imperialist struggle on an enlarged scale.

I. KOVALYOVA

The Mechanism of US Foreign Policy

США: внешнеполитический механизм. Организация, функции, управление, М., изд-во «Наука», 1972, 368 стр.

The USA: Foreign Policy Mechanism. Organisation, Functions, Administration, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1972, 368 pp.

PREPARED by a team of authors of the Institute of the USA at the USSR Academy of Sciences, this is an analysis of the organisational structure and basic practical orientation of the US foreign policy apparatus.

As the book's subtitle indicates, the US foreign policy mechanism is considered chiefly not from the angle of state law or history but from the standpoint of the means and methods of administration. The authors make a probing study of the functions of this leading imperialist power's complex foreign policy mechanism and the interaction of its various elements.

When the USA emerged on the world scene as an independent state, its foreign policy was directed by only two departments. The present apparatus charting and implementing foreign policy is a huge machine embracing more than 40 ministries and autonomous departments operating in such extensive and diverse spheres as diplomacy, military preparations and intelligence, economic relations, external and domestic propaganda, and so forth.

The agencies and departments connected directly or indirectly with the US foreign policy apparatus have an aggregate of more than half a million employees. The expenditures for the maintenance of these services and employees are likewise impressive. According to Charles Schultze, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget, annual expenditures on foreign policy programmes, excluding the cost of intelligence operations and the upkeep of US forces overseas, total \$5,600 million. In addition, about \$5,000 million are spent by the US intelligence agencies (p. 21).

The authors justifiably stress that the expansion of the US foreign policy mechanism was the direct result of US imperialism's brazen aggressiveness on the world scene. This accounts for the growing weight and influence of the departments and subdivisions discharging repressive military, espionage, subversive, ideological, and sabotage

functions. Among these are, particularly, the agencies of the Department of Defence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in charge of the operations of "special force", the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence services, and the United States Information Agency.

The swelling of the foreign policy mechanism was accompanied by centralisation of the planning and making of foreign policy decisions. Currently, the coordinating body of the US foreign policy mechanism is the National Security Council that was set up in 1947 under the Truman Administration, when the US ruling circles openly adopted the policy of employing military and economic might to establish US "leadership of the world". The authors provide a comprehensive picture of the shifts in the National Security Council caused by changes in White House leadership. The present Republican Administration tends toward reviving the National Security Council's network of agencies (p. 59).

The analysis group headed by Henry Kissinger, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, is the NSC's main agency in charge of working out, assessing and preparing recommendations on foreign policy. With policy-making placed in the hands of the NSC, it is not surprising that the influence of the State Department has been weakened.

The reorganisation of the higher agencies responsible for foreign policy has considerably influenced the status of some of the leading government departments linked with the implementation of foreign policy. However, the authors are quite correct in noting that all changes in the organisation and functions of the leading foreign policy agencies have not and could not affect their loyalty to the interests of the leading monopoly capital groups that in the final analysis exercise supreme economic and political power in the USA.

The Defence Department is the largest and most expensive branch of the apparatus linked

with execution of foreign policy. The scope of the overseas operations of military agencies is substantially larger than the scale of analogous activity by other state agencies.

In mid-1970, US embassies and missions abroad comprised 3,100 State Department officials and 8,264 military staff (p. 135). The Defence Department possesses the most sophisticated equipment for communications, information processing and administrative organisation. This partially explains why the White House lends a more attentive ear to the Pentagon's advice than to the counsel of purely foreign policy agencies, particularly during crisis situations (p. 135).

For the same reason, as many Americans themselves assert, it was the Secretary of Defence rather than the Secretary of State who exerted the greatest influence on major foreign policy decisions under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson (p. 139).

A similarly large role in the planning and implementing US foreign policy is played by intelligence agencies. The authors cite many facts demonstrating the position occupied by these agencies in US foreign policy activity. Lately, the authors note, the US Government relies more and more on the information it receives from the intelligence agencies in its planning policy. The figures, quoted in the book, indicate the activities of the US intelligence apparatus and its role in the foreign policy mechanism. In addition to the operatives these agencies employ at home and in foreign countries, they maintain a staff of nearly 200,000. The maintenance of this apparatus costs US tax-payers from \$5,000 to \$6,000 million annually (p. 158).

Overseas propaganda and activity of all state civilian propaganda bodies are coordinated by the US Information Agency. However, as a result of recent intensification of the ideological struggle on the international scene, a larger role has been assigned to the State Department which has been set the task of moulding public opinion on foreign policy issues in the United States and conducting ideological work abroad throughout its embassies and missions as well as through cultural and education exchange programmes.

US ruling circles have long regarded economic relations with foreign countries as an effective means for implementing foreign policy. The importance of this means has grown immensely in recent years because of the obvious failure of the military and political methods employed in US foreign policy. In particular, this explains the establishment of the Council on International Economic Policy in early 1971.

Some of the chapters deal with the theoretical foundations of US foreign policy and with the utilisation of scientific achievements to promote this policy. An analysis of the theories underlying US foreign policy helps to lay bare the main reasons for that policy's innumerable failures.

The authors show the efforts made in the USA to plan foreign policy. Initially, a planning agency was set up at the State Department, but more recently the principal planning effort has been concentrated in agencies working directly under the President, notably in the National Security Council.

The US Government has lately introduced organisational novelties and up-to-date methods of administration in an effort to make its foreign policy more effective and thereby restore the world positions it lost. But experience shows that the efforts of the US ruling circles to escape from their difficulties solely by improving the mechanism of decision-making, while retaining the general orientation of their foreign policy, are not yielding the desired results.

US foreign policy setbacks are impressing upon the ruling circles the need for a more sober approach to international problems. The Soviet-US talks in Moscow, May 1972, demonstrated that US statesmen are capable of adopting such an approach toward the question on the basis of which to build relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the USA, signed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, and the US President, Richard M. Nixon, declare the USSR and the USA will "proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence".

In conclusion it must be stated that while correctly assessing the real reasons for the setbacks suffered by the foreign policy of US imperialism, the authors have, in some cases, given a simplified or formalistic interpretation of the US Government's actions (pp. 18, 19). For example, one can take issue with the argument that US policy is formed spontaneously. There are some vexing shortcomings, notably repetitions and also inaccuracies and lack of uniformity in names.

But by and large this is a useful study of how US foreign policy is organised and implemented.

Myths of Bourgeois Political Economy

Э. Я. Брегель, Критика буржуазных учений об экономической системе современного капитализма, М., «Мысль», 1972, 295 стр.

E. Y. Bregel, Critique of Bourgeois Doctrines on the Economic System of Modern Capitalism, Moscow, Mysl Publishers, 1972, 295 pp.

THE BOOK under review considers the concepts of bourgeois economic science now being widely employed in the West in the ideological struggle against socialism. Most of these concepts are based on the idea that modern capitalism has been "transformed" into a different, "non-capitalist" system and has rid itself of all its contradictions.

One of the earlier theories on the "transformation of capitalism" came from the bourgeois economist, Professor I. Schumpeter of Harvard University in the USA. In his book, **Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy**, which he had written before the war, and published in 1942, he claimed that capitalism was destroying itself by virtue of its own laws, as the economy was being "depersonalised" and the "institutional structure" of capitalism was disintegrating, gradually giving place to a socialist system.

Bregel criticises these views and provides a reminder that Marxist-Leninist theory long ago refuted the reformist conception that capitalism was able to evolve into socialism. The history and experience of social development have borne out the Marxist theory on the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. Schumpeter took a critical attitude to some aspects of capitalism, recognising that it was historically doomed and anticipating its inevitable downfall. But, basing himself on anti-Marxist positions, he reached profoundly erroneous and harmful conclusions concerning the spontaneous disintegration of capitalism and its transformation into another socio-economic system. These conclusions were subsequently used by many apologists of imperialism to "refute" the necessity for a socialist revolution.

The idea of the "transformation" of capitalism, says Bregel, is most clearly expressed in the theories of "people's" and also "collective", "planned" and "organised" capitalism.

Some time ago, the theory of "people's capitalism" was widely circulated and adopted as the official propaganda line by a number of bourgeois governments. It was discussed by prominent

bourgeois leaders like Dwight Eisenhower, Ludwig Erhard, and others. It is true that "people's capitalism" fairly soon worked out its propaganda possibilities. Today it is being less spoken and written about. However, it continues to play a considerable role in the bourgeois system of ideological influence on the masses.

Bregel criticises the "people's capitalism" theory, consistently exposing its basic propositions: the invention about the supposed "diffusion of property", the "managerial revolution" and the "incomes revolution". He stresses the corporations in no sense became the "property of millions of people in every walk of life", as bourgeois scientists assert. Far from there being a "diffusion", there is in fact a concentration of private property. Thus, in the USA the bulk of the equity is held by 0.2-0.3 per cent of the adult population. In the FRG, the workers own about 5-7 per cent of the "people's shares". Naturally, the acquisition of a few shares is a far cry from obtaining a share in the ownership of the capital. The capitalists' practice of selling small shareholdings helps to accumulate capital from the working people's savings, to increase the power of the financial oligarchy and to centralise capital.

It should be noted that the myth about private property being "democratised" is a component part of many modern bourgeois economic theories and is the cornerstone of various systems designed to demonstrate the "transformation" of capitalist society. That is why exposure of this myth is of such great importance today.

Of considerable interest is the chapter dealing with the theories of "regulated" and "planned" capitalism, centring on an analysis and critique of Keynesian theories, which are prominent in Western political economy.

The author observes that the appearance of John Maynard Keynes' theory marked a new stage in the evolution of bourgeois political economy because it took a critical attitude to pre-monopoly capitalism. Bregel says: "Instead of unqualified praise for the spontaneous market

mechanism (something that was typical of bourgeois economic thinkers before Keynes) a leading bourgeois ideologist admitted for the first time in so many words that this mechanism was not efficient and that it was incapable of ensuring the full use of society's productive resources" (p. 116). Keynes wanted to "repair" the capitalist economy by creating a mechanism to regulate its circulation processes. He believed adjustment of the interest rate was the basic element of such a mechanism: lower interest rates were to boost business activity, reduce unemployment, etc. In the 1950s and 1960s, bourgeois economists widely adopted the view that a "regulated economy" had developed in the industrialised capitalist countries in place of the old capitalism, and that a government mechanism had appeared for actively tackling the problem of economic growth and stability.

Refuting these views, the author shows that the bourgeois state is limited in its ability to influence economic processes. The basic problems of capitalism cannot be eliminated by any kind of "stabilisers".

That the theory and practice of "regulated capitalism" are untenable is well demonstrated by the cyclical development of the capitalist economy. Since the war, the US economy has gone into crisis recessions of production in 1948-1949, 1953-1954, 1957-1958 and 1969-1970. The growth of production in the USA since the Second World War has fluctuated from plus 17 per cent (1960) to minus 7 per cent (1958). In Britain, the national product increased in 1965 2.2 per cent, in 1966—1.8 per cent, in 1967—2 per cent, in 1968—3.1 per cent and in 1969—2 per cent.

The author exposes "planned capitalism" as still another bourgeois propaganda myth designed to retard the development of class consciousness among the working people in the capitalist countries.

The same aims are served by the bourgeois economic doctrines of "mixed economy", "social market economy", "formed society" and "industrial (technological) society", all of which are pivoted on the theory that capitalism has been "transformed" into a "non-capitalist society". Bregel shows all these theories to be superficial, and not in any sense original, but rather endless variations of the same ideas.

At the same time, while these concepts are similar, they do differ considerably in form. There are variants of the "mixed economy" theory and the "industrial society" theory, the "stages of growth" and "socialisation" of the market economy, etc. The author reveals the specific characteristics of these doctrines. He

proves the various bourgeois concepts to be erroneous and analyses the substance of the objective phenomena in capitalism which they falsify.

Thus, criticising the "formed society" theory, which claims that modern capitalist society is "homogeneous", Bregel presents striking data about the crying inequality in the distribution of social wealth, the sharply differentiated social structure in the capitalist countries, notably the FRG, where about 440 families with fortunes of over DM10 million each are at the top of the social scale.

Bregel's aim was to analyse and criticise the general bourgeois doctrines of capitalism, primarily those which are fundamentally and openly directed against Marxism. But the important thing to note is that modern bourgeois political economy includes not only "global" concepts, ranging over the processes of capitalist production as a whole. Of increasing importance are the veiled "technical" forms of capitalist apologetics. Thus, the general theory of capitalist production has been virtually dropped from university curricula in the capitalist countries, while compulsory subjects include marketing problems, organisation of production, company economic policies, etc. The theories of concrete economic processes, analysing individual aspects of the policy of state-monopoly capitalism, are being used not only to tackle the practical tasks in the development of bourgeois economy, but also in the ideological struggle and propagating the idea that the capitalist system is here to stay.

While Bregel's book is comprehensive, it does not, regrettably, deal with some very important modern bourgeois economic concepts which now play an important role in the ideological struggle, such as the theory of the "post-industrial society" and the "technotronic society". It would also be highly interesting to have a Marxist critique of the theory of "neoclassical synthesis", and the whole complex of ideas connected with the concept of the "three-fold revolution", and also with the theories of "institutionalism", social engineering, and many others.

The author does not deal at all with problems connected with bourgeois views of the processes taking place in the developing countries, the questions of neocolonialism.

Despite these omissions, Bregel's book helps to expose the false concepts and myths which bourgeois economic science and propaganda have been spreading to justify and defend the capitalist system, which has historically outlived itself.

SOVIET-SWEDISH TRADE TIES ● ALGERIA'S AGRARIAN REFORM ●
ECLA ● NEW INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CENTRE ● US MILITARY
EXPENDITURE ● DAHOMEY ● UN FORCES

Soviet-Swedish Trade Ties

THE SOVIET UNION and Sweden are natural partners as far as economic relations are concerned. There are a number of factors conducive to the promotion of such ties, including the geographical position of the two countries and their traditional trade with each other. Soviet-Swedish trade relations were established in May 1920, when a consortium of Swedish firms and Soviet organisations signed the first contract providing for the delivery of large consignments of machinery and equipment to our country. A Soviet-Swedish trade agreement was signed in March 1924.

Trade between our two countries has been developing with particular success in the last few years. In the five-year period ending 1970, it increased 130 per cent. In the same period, Soviet exports rose 50 per cent and imports over 220 per cent. In 1970, Soviet-Swedish trade set a record—it reached 235 million rubles, with exports accounting for 105 million and imports for 130 million (the figures in 1966 were 63.7 million and 39.9 million, respectively).

Soviet-Swedish trade is growing faster than Swedish foreign trade in general. Swedish Minister of Commerce K.-O. Feldt informed Parliament in March 1973 that the Soviet Union was "traditionally Sweden's main trading partner in Eastern Europe" and stressed that it was time they traded in new kinds of goods.

In 1968 and 1969, Sweden and the Soviet Union set up special committees to facilitate trade and scientific and technical cooperation between them. In January 1970, they concluded

an agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The mixed inter-governmental commission established in accordance with this agreement deals with all questions directed at improving cooperation and seeks to conclude new contracts.

If Soviet-Swedish trade is to develop still more successfully, it is important to bring the pattern of exports of the two countries in greater conformity with their overall economic structure. Between 50 and 60 per cent of Sweden's exports to the Soviet Union consist of machinery and equipment. At the same time, the greater part of Soviet exports is made up of liquid fuel, coal, coke, chrome and manganese ores, scrap ferrous metal, apatites. The share of machinery and equipment in exports is as yet insignificant, though Soviet engineering products have well recommended themselves on the Swedish market. The Soviet Union is one of the leading suppliers of universal lathes to Sweden and is increasing its sale of milling and drilling machines. There are over 1,200 Soviet automatic and semi-automatic lathes operating at more than 250 Swedish enterprises. They are sold in Sweden by AB Profila, a branch of the Alfa-Laval Company. In the past few years the Soviet Union has sold a number of ore carriers and other products to the Wallenius Company.

"We, no doubt, could jointly draw up a common plan for Soviet-Swedish economic cooperation for many years ahead so that our two countries supplement each other more fully," Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Minist-

ers, stated in Stockholm on April 4. "Swedish businessmen will obviously be interested to know what role the Soviet Union could assume in meeting Sweden's long-term requirements in electrical energy, various equipment, and raw materials. Soviet economic organisations could take into consideration the potentialities of Swedish industry in drawing up current and long-term economic plans."

Kosygin's statement evoked a positive reaction in Sweden. Premier Olof Palme stated Sweden was extremely interested in long-term trade and economic cooperation. The Swedish press noted that the Government was taking concrete steps to expand trade with the Soviet Union.

D. MISHIN

Algeria's Agrarian Reform

MORE THAN A YEAR and a half ago the Revolutionary Council, the supreme organ of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic, adopted the law on agrarian reform. The socio-economic transformations now being successfully effected in the countryside were outlined in the Agrarian Revolution Charter which came into force in November 1971.

There are two production sectors in Algerian agriculture: self-managing and private. Together they account for all of the country's 7 million hectares of cultivated land. The self-managing sector came into existence shortly after Algeria had gained independence. On the initiative of the people, the estates abandoned by the colonialists were turned into self-managing farms and war veterans' cooperatives. The self-managing sector, embracing 2.3 million hectares, is distinguished by its high productivity, extensive use of farm machinery and well-ramified supply, credit, service and sales systems. Though accounting for only one-third of the arable land, it yields 60 per cent of the total farm produce.

The overwhelming majority of the fellaheen, however, belong to the private sector, which is divided into modern and traditional subsectors. The modern subsector consists of large farms employing advanced tilling methods, selected seeds, etc. It has about a million hectares of land at its disposal. The traditional subsector, accounting for the bulk of the peasant population (6 million) and land (some 4 million hectares), consists of small farms which possess almost no machines and on which share-cropping prevails to this day. This subsector accounts for less than 40 per cent of the value of the farm produce.

The backwardness of the traditional subsector

lies in the antiquated structure of land tenure, primarily in the uneven distribution of land. The big landowners, who make up 2.8 per cent of all private owners, have 25 per cent of the arable land, while hundreds of thousands of fellaheen together own only 10 per cent.

The agrarian reform provides mainly for the elimination of the unjust system of land distribution, for its redistribution among those who themselves till the soil.

The first stage of the agrarian reform, which ended in 1972, included stock-taking of public and waste land, and measurement and registration of the estates of those who voluntarily turned land over to the agrarian revolution fund. One million hectares were distributed among more than 60,000 fellaheen.

The new stage of the agrarian reform, recently announced by the Algerian Government, will extend over a period of about one year. It provides for the registration of the land in the private sector—about five million hectares, approximately one million of which belong to big landowners. According to the agrarian reform law, these holdings will be reduced and large estates nationalised.

One of the main aims of the agrarian reform is the organisation of an extensive network of cooperatives. That is why recipients of plots of land are required to join cooperatives.

It is planned to establish seven types of cooperatives. There will be three types of machine, supply and marketing cooperatives, two kinds of service cooperatives, and the rest will grow and harvest crops. Algerian newspapers report the completion of the organisation of cooperatives in one of the country's fifteen provinces—Greater

Algiers—where 200 cooperatives have been set up on lands from the national agrarian revolution fund.

The cooperatives are considerably aided by the Government. In the first stage of the agrarian revolution the Government spent 170 million dinars on their equipment.

The abolition of large landed estates and of

exploitation in the countryside is rightly regarded in Algeria as a major socio-economic achievement. The task of the agrarian revolution does not consist merely in redistributing land but in fulfilling a whole number of measures designed to create new production and social relationships in the rural areas.

A. RUSAKOV

ECLA

THE UN ECONOMIC Commission for Latin America (ECLA), set up by the UN Economic and Social Council and functioning under its guidance, is observing its 25th anniversary this year. The permanent members of this regional economic organisation are the Latin American and Caribbean countries, the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Canada. It also has an associated member—British Honduras.

ECLA deals with the problems of economic development facing Latin American countries, draws up appropriate recommendations on the basis of analysis of their economic situation, and advises the governments of the member countries on questions within its competence. It collects, systematises and processes economic, statistical and other data, compiles surveys and distributes them.

Day-to-day activity is conducted by the Secretariat headed by the Executive Secretary. He is appointed by the UN Secretary-General (since March of the last year the post is held by Enrique Iglesias of Uruguay). The Commission's supreme body is the plenary session, held annually from 1948 to 1951 and since then once every two years. Each session establishes several working committees which consider some specific agenda items.

In its practical activity, ECLA devotes considerable attention to the problem of economic integration of Latin America. It has played an active role in establishing a number of subregional organisations. Also operating under ECLA's aegis since 1962 is the Latin American Institute of Economic and Social Development.

The Soviet Union (since May 1957) and a number of other socialist countries attend ECLA sessions as observers. They support the organisa-

tion's increased activity in solving the key socio-economic problems confronting the continent.

The 15th Session of the Economic Commission for Latin America was held on March 23-30 in Quito, the capital of Ecuador. The Latin American representatives firmly supported their countries' independent economic advancement and stressed the need to take effective measures to promote their socio-economic development.

This is an extremely urgent problem, as the present economic situation in this region reveals. According to the report submitted to the Session by UN experts, foreign monopolies and the local oligarchy, who account for only 5 per cent of the population, pocket as much as 43 per cent of the national income while the poorest stratum of the population—20 per cent of the total—have to be content with only 3 per cent of the national income.

R. Esguerra, Director of the regional branch of the UN Children's Fund, told the Session that "half the population of Latin America still goes undernourished. One million children die every year from undernourishment." A. Orwitz, Director of the American regional bureau of the World Health Organisation said that 100 million people on the continent still had no access to the most elementary medical services. According to ECLA specialists, there is an acute shortage of housing in Latin America, with the result that 45 per cent of the population of the cities and 50 per cent of the countryside live in houses unfit for habitation. This situation deteriorates with each passing year because the population increases by 3-3.5 per cent per annum.

The report submitted to the Session stressed that Latin American countries were forced to borrow to meet their needs in foreign exchange and

that the loans were being granted to them on extremely onerous terms. For example, out of every dollar loaned them by the United States, Latin American countries actually get only 17 cents. Chilean representative, Hernan Sanja Cruz, declared that while major changes had taken place in the world in the last quarter-century, the problems which confronted Latin America in 1945 are unsolved to this day.

The US representatives at the Session claimed that the basic provisions of the report were not objective. However, when cornered by irrefutable facts, they were compelled to admit that US policy toward the countries in the region seriously hampered them in carrying out their plans for development and that the terms on which they were granted loans were becoming increasingly difficult.

A number of draft resolutions were submitted to the Session. The Chilean, Cuban, Peruvian and Ecuadorean delegations offered a joint draft resolution providing for the right of Latin American countries to freely exploit their natural resources. Also submitted to the Session was a report on the activity of the multinational companies which are interfering in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries. As a concrete example, the report cited the subversive activity conducted by the US ITT and Kennecott monopolies against the Popular Unity Government in Chile.

The Soviet observer declared in his speech that major changes had taken place in Latin

America in the twenty-five years since the establishment of ECLA: Cuba became the first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere and is progressing successfully; Chile chose the path of anti-imperialist policy and social progress; and more and more countries are recognising the need to carry out far-reaching socio-economic reforms, to defend their national sovereignty and to oppose the policies of the imperialist monopolies. The main task before the Latin American countries, the Soviet representative stressed, was to achieve genuine economic independence, promote social progress and to utilise the natural resources in the interests of the nation.

The session ended after adopting a number of important resolutions. Among other things, these resolutions condemned economic, political and other activities aimed at infringing on the sovereignty of the Latin American countries, denounced interference of the multinational corporations in their internal affairs, and stressed the need for the Latin American countries to more closely unite in defence of their lawful rights and to end exploitation by the imperialist monopolies. All this shows that ECLA is becoming a major factor in Latin American affairs. The determination of the countries of the continent to jointly solve their social and economic problems and to check the expansionist aspirations of the US monopolies is making itself increasingly felt in the activity of this organisation.

V. MIKHAILOV

New International Scientific Centre

THE NEWLY-ESTABLISHED International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is located in Vienna. The decision to found it was adopted, after several years of consultations, at a conference held last October by scientific organisations from twelve countries: the USSR Academy of Sciences, the US National Academy of Sciences, the French Association for the Development of Systems Analysis, the National Italian Research Council, the British Royal Society, the Max Planck Society of West Germany, the Polish Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Sciences of the GDR, the Bulgarian National Centre for

Cybernetics and Computer Techniques, and the Czechoslovak, Canadian and Japanese Committees for the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

The establishment of the Institute is closely linked with problems resulting from scientific and technological progress, the expansion of industrial production, research, utilisation of natural resources, rising needs of big cities. The methods employed to solve the problems arising from these diverse activities often prove to be inadequate because of the multitude of factors and the great quantity of information involved. The Insti-

tute's task is to work out with the aid of the applied systems analysis, based on the wide use of computer techniques, cybernetics, dynamic modelling, the theory of information and a number of other modern disciplines, effective methods for solving those problems. Based on this, it can help to make possible better solutions to these problems.

The systems analysis, which is a complex scientific method, helps solve global tasks connected with environmental pollution, the use of the resources of the World Ocean, defence against natural calamities, space exploration and space communications, epidemiology, etc. Moreover, it aids in resolving national problems related to improving cooperation among scientists and specialists of many countries (public health, urban development, municipal services and road-building, improvement of conditions in areas with poor climate, etc.).

With the establishment of the Institute, major research institutions of socialist and capitalist countries have for the first time joined forces on a permanent basis to solve problems of vast importance for the well-being and progress of mankind.

The leading body of the Institute is its Council, consisting of representatives of all member organisations. The President is a representative of the Soviet Union—Djermen Gvishiani, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences—and the Vice-Presidents are Professor H. Koziolk of the German Democratic Republic and Professor M. Lévy of France. The US scientist, Dr. Howard Raiffa of Harvard University, was appointed Director of the Institute, and Alexander Letov, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Assistant Director.

The Institute is a multinational organisation. It consists chiefly of leading scientists and specialists in systems analysis and in a wide range of

branches of science and technology in which systems analysis may be employed. The Institute will also include young researchers, for whom it will no doubt be a good school. The Statute states the Institute is open to scientists from countries whose organisations are not associated with it.

The Institute will cooperate with national member organisations, exchange experience and information with them, and inform them of the results of its research. It will maintain ties with various other international and national scientific and technical organisations.

The second session of the Council was held in January. It considered a number of proposals in future areas of research. These include modern methods and means of systems analysis, the principles of organisational systems, guidance of the development and implementation of large-scale economic, scientific and technological projects and programmes, automated control of industrial production, and the relations between man and nature and between man and the machine. The latter area includes such lines of research as power resources, urban and regional planning and management of urban systems, environmental control, systems methods in biology and medicine, modelling of systems of thought processes, designing of robots, and computer systems. Most of these lines of research were suggested by the Soviet delegation.

The Council adopted a decision to establish working groups within the Institute on various themes and to organise international working groups or symposiums in which Institute scientists would play a leading role.

The establishment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis graphically testifies to the growing economic, scientific and technical cooperation among countries.

V. ROZEN

US Military Expenditure

FROM 1946 to 1972 the United States spent about \$1,500,000 million on military purposes. About 10 per cent of all working people are engaged in war production. The value of the Pentagon's property, equipment and other assets

has topped \$200,000 million. Eighty per cent of the funds appropriated for scientific and technological research in the postwar period (they totalled about \$200,000 million) are spent for military purposes.

US Military Expenditure in the Federal Budget (in million dollars)

1949/50 — 13,100	1969/70 — 80,300
1954/55 — 40,200	1972/73 — 76,400
1959/60 — 45,900	(estimate)
1964/65 — 49,600	1973/74 — 81,100
	(estimate)

The budget for the 1973/74 fiscal year did not justify the hopes nurtured by the American people that there would be a reduction in military expenditures. On the contrary, it turned out to be directed toward intensifying the arms drive. Former Defence Secretary E. Richardson told Congress that military expenditures in the 1974/75 fiscal year would total \$85,500 million.

The *Washington Post* wrote on April 14 that the Administration was doing everything possible to persuade public opinion that military expenditures would be drastically cut while appropriations for social needs would be sharply increased. The Government attempted to prove that the US budget for defense purposes had been reduced from 41 per cent in the 1968/69 fiscal year to 30 per cent in the 1973/74 fiscal year. But there was a catch in this juggling of figures: the Government included in these figures social insurance and other insurance funds (about

\$80,000 million) which have nothing to do with the government budget and are not controlled by the White House. If one were to add to the \$81,100 million requested for military purposes the \$11,500 million paid out to former servicemen and the \$24,700 million paid as interest on war debts, total military expenditures would come to \$117,300 million. And that would make it 59 per cent of the budget.

Particular stress in the military budget for the 1973/74 fiscal year is placed on four strategic arms programmes: further development of Trident, the new submarine missile system designed to replace Polaris and Poseidon; designing of the new B-1 strategic bomber; continued replacement of obsolete ballistic missiles with the more powerful Minuteman-3 missiles and Poseidon with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle; and the designing of new strategic winged missiles for submarines. Moreover, part of the appropriations is to be spent for the completion of the Safeguard anti-missile system near the Grand Forks air base in North Dakota.

Characterising new military budget a US business executive cynically declared that when one did not have to spend money on helmets and boots, there was more of it left for modern matériel, i. e., mass destruction weapons.

Y. GAVRILOV

Dahomey

DAHOMEY is a small republic in West Africa. It is 112,600 square kilometres in area and has a population of 2.7 million (the main ethnic groups are the Fons, Yorubas and Adjias). The capital, Porto-Novo, has a population of 85,000. The trade, economic and political centre is Cotonou, the country's largest port (population: 120,000). It is here that the presidential palace, the Government and many state institutions are located. Administratively, Dahomey is divided into six departments.

History tells us that the Dahoman people waged many battles against alien invaders from the 15th century: first against the Portuguese, and then against the British and the Dutch. It was on the seaboard of the Gulf of Guinea that the big-

gest slave trade centre in Africa—the Slave Coast—was established.

Despite courageous resistance, by the 17th century the states which were formed on the territory of present-day Dahomey were unable to withstand invasions. In 1892, after a two-year war, Dahomey became a French colony.

The upsurge of the national liberation movement in Africa forced France in 1958 to grant Dahomey autonomy within the French Community. On August 1, 1960, the country became independent.

Dahomey is an economically underdeveloped country. In per capita national income (\$61 in 1969) it is one of the poorest of the independent African countries. About 90 per cent of the popu-

UN Forces

lation are engaged in farming. Besides cultivating food crops for local consumption (manioc, sweet potatoes, millet), the Dahoman people specialise in the production of palm oil, groundnuts and cotton which go mainly for export (in 1972 Dahomey exported 48,000 tons of palm oil, 33,000 tons of groundnuts, and 47,000 tons of cotton).

Industry, which accounts for only about 9 per cent of the gross national product, is just being built up. It is largely based on processing of farm produce. There are small food and light industry factories and enterprises assembling radio sets, automobiles and motorcycles from imported parts. The country's economy is much dependent upon foreign, chiefly French, monopolies. The natural resources have been only slightly explored. Dahomey trades mainly with France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and Italy.

For a long time after gaining independence the situation in Dahomey was complicated and unstable. Dahomey has experienced five military coups, ten different civilian and military governments, the establishment and disintegration of parties and various political blocs. In the Western press, Dahomey enjoyed the reputation as the most unstable country in Africa. The reason for all this lies in the pernicious economic and social legacy bequeathed the young state by the colonialists, and the tribal strife instigated by neocolonialists. The former Dahoman political leaders were less concerned about solving urgent national problems than taking care of the interests of the well-to-do sections of the tribes they represented. In these conditions, the measures aimed at developing the national economy (establishment of national companies and agricultural co-operatives) were ineffective, the economy suffered from stagnation, the foreign monopolies strengthened their dominant position, corruption was rife, bloody clashes were provoked between ethnic groups, and living standards declined.

The Dahoman workers rose repeatedly in defence of their rights. They demanded an end to the anti-popular policy pursued by the ruling

top circles but failed to achieve any tangible results because the trade union movement was badly fragmented (there are dozens of unions functioning in little Dahomey).

In 1970 the main regional groups arrived at a compromise and set up the so-called Presidential Council consisting of three political leaders—H. Maga, S. M. Apithy and G. Ahomadegbe—who were to take turns as head of state. This, however, failed to eliminate tribal contradictions and eventually further aggravated the situation.

As a result of the military coup of October 26, 1972, power was taken over by a military revolutionary government made up of young army officers led by Major Mathien Kerekou, who was proclaimed President. The new Government announced a programme for national development which was drawn up by specialists with the help of representatives of trade unions and youth and other public organisations. Among other things, the programme calls for an end to tribalism and foreign domination which are regarded as the main causes of the country's backwardness. The Government plans to achieve this goal by reorganising the Dahoman economic and social structure, relying on the creative initiative of the people, strengthening the public sector of the economy, establishing national industrial enterprises, and instituting strict control over foreign capital and foreign trade.

In foreign affairs, the Government has declared it will follow a policy of non-alignment, struggle against imperialism and for cooperation with all countries respecting Dahomey's sovereignty.

The Soviet Union, which was one of the first states to recognise Dahomey, maintains friendly relations with it. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1962. In 1963, they signed a trade agreement and an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation. Trade between the Soviet Union and Dahomey is developing to their mutual benefit. A number of Dahomans study in Soviet educational institutions.

V. ANATOLIN

UNDER ARTICLE 43 of the UN Charter all members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council, at its call, armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary to maintain international peace and security. This commitment is governed by special agreements concluded between the Security Council and UN member states. The decision to use armed forces of member countries is adopted by the Security Council (Art. 44). The responsibility for the strategic direction of the armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council rests with the Military Staff Committee consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives (Art. 47). The Charter does not authorise any other UN agency, including the General Assembly, to deal with these questions. It should also be pointed out that the Charter does not provide for the establishment of any permanent UN armed forces but proceeds from the fact that the member states are placing military contingents at the disposal of the Security Council in each particular case when it decides to apply enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace.

The UN Charter thus contains clearcut provisions stating the decisions to use armed force on behalf of the United Nations can be taken only by the Security Council in accordance with the concurring votes of the permanent members. The need to strictly abide by these Charter provisions is obvious, for the application of such an extreme measure as the use of foreign troops, including UN armed forces, to settle conflicts and their very presence on foreign soil may, as the developments have shown, lead to utterly different results—to interference in countries' internal affairs and serious international complications.

A number of attempts to implement the Charter provisions concerning the employment of armed forces on behalf of the UN and the conclusion of agreements in accordance with Article 43 were made in the early years of the United Nations' existence. They all came to naught, however, because the United States and its allies sought to secure dominant positions in the UN armed forces, it was planned to form, and to subordinate these forces to their selfish interests.

Later there appeared in the West all sorts of schemes to establish, in contravention of the Charter, a permanent "UN police force" which

could be used by the Western powers to suppress national liberation movements and promote other imperialist aims. One attempt to carry out such plans was made in 1948 by UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, who proposed the establishment of a UN Field Service, designed to form the nucleus of the future armed forces and to be used without the sanction of the Security Council. Although this Service was established, its functions were reduced to that of ensuring technical services to various UN missions.

Armed forces were established under the UN flag several times, and each time the provisions of the UN Charter were violated to one degree or another.

On July 7, 1950, in the absence of the Soviet delegate, the United States railroaded through the Security Council a resolution recommending the UN member countries help South Korea with armed forces or give her other assistance. Under this resolution, the armed forces and assistance were "available to a unified command under the United States of America". The unified command was authorised to use the UN flag at its discretion. Actually, the United Nations had nothing to do either with the direction or the financing of the armed forces of the United States and its close allies which invaded Korea. However, using the UN flag, US troops continue to occupy South Korea to this day and are thus preventing the peaceful reunification of the country.

The UN Emergency Force in the Middle East was set up in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 4 and 5, 1956, with the objective of securing (in cooperation with the Egyptian Government) a ceasefire in the Anglo-Franco-Israeli war against Egypt, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from her territory and the observance of the armistice agreements. The Soviet delegation then declared that this armed force was being established in contradiction to the UN Charter, inasmuch as the Security Council was alone empowered to do this. However, it stated, bearing in mind the fact that the victim of aggression in this particular case was compelled to agree to the introduction of an international armed force and with the hope that this would prevent the further expansion of aggression, the Soviet delegation would not vote against but would abstain when these resolutions were put to a vote. The Soviet delegation stres-

sed, moreover, that the financial responsibility for the maintenance of the UN force should be borne by the countries which had started the war against Egypt.

After the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt the contingents of the UN Emergency Force were stationed in the Gaza Strip, along the eastern border of the Sinai Peninsula and in the Sharm el Sheikh area, where they remained until May 19, 1967, when they were withdrawn at the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic and disbanded. The strength of this force never exceeded 6,000 officers and men (1957) and was reduced to 3,400 at the time of its withdrawal.

The UN Operation in the Congo was undertaken at the Congolese Government's request for immediate military assistance against aggression on the part of Belgium. On July 14, 1960, the Security Council adopted by eight votes a resolution authorising the UN Secretary-General to "take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance which may be necessary". The Soviet Union voted for this resolution.

The Western powers, however, succeeded in securing control over this operation, removed it from the competence of the Security Council and concentrated it in the hands of the Secretary-General and a group of US officials in the UN Secretariat. The UN Command in the Congo acted contrary to the spirit of the Security Council resolutions, in the interests of foreign monopolies, and in fact connived at the murder of Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba who had appealed to the UN for assistance.

There were 20,000 officers and men in the UN force in the Congo in June 1961. Their stage-by-stage withdrawal was begun in February 1963 and completed by June 30, 1964.

On March 4, 1964, the Security Council adopted a resolution which recommends "the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus" to prevent clashes between the Greek and Turkish communities. The Soviet delegation abstained from voting on Article 4 of this resolution, which authorised the Secretary-General to decide on all questions relating to the composition, strength and command structure of the UN force. But taking into account the wishes of the Cyprus Government, which considered this resolution useful, and the fact that the financing of these troops was optional and that they were to be sent to Cyprus for only three months, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness not to hinder the adoption of the resolution in general, and voted for it.

The UN force is still in Cyprus, its presence there being periodically prolonged by the Security Council for three or six months. This enables the Security Council members, including the Soviet Union, to exercise definite control over its activity. At the end of 1972 there were 3,200 UN troops in Cyprus.

The 33-nation UN Special Committee set up for peacekeeping operations is now working on measures to coordinate the principles governing such operations with the UN Charter. The Soviet Union insists that all UN actions in the maintenance of international peace and security be decided and controlled by the Security Council.

V. LOGHIN

"INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS"

MAY BE OBTAINED FROM

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT — **Modern Age Establishment**, 20A Adly Pasha Street, Cairo.

HONG KONG — **Apollo Book Co.**, PO Box 5710, Kowloon, Hong Kong; **Great Eastern Book Co.**, PO Box 3427, Hong Kong.

AUSTRALIA — **New World Booksellers**, 425 Pitt Street, Sydney, NSW; **International Bookshop, Pty. Ltd.**, 2nd Floor, 17 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne, Victoria; **CBD. Library and Subscription Service**, Box 4886, GPO, Sydney, NSW 2000; **Socialist World Bookshop**, 61 Liverpool Street, Sydney, NSW, 2000; **Spring Bookshop**, 7 Collins Street, Melbourne, Victoria; **Peoples Bookshop**, 205 Brunswick Street, Valley, Brisbane, Queensland; **Peoples Bookshop**, 180 Hindley Street, Adelaide, South Australia; **Pioneer Bookshop**, 75 Bulwar Street, Perth WA; **International Bookshop**, 514 Finders Street, Melbourne, Victoria.

BANGLADESH — **Standard Publishers, Ltd.** 3/10 Liaquat Avenue, Dacca-1; **Abdul Moyez Khan Majlish** 146 Govt., New Market, Dacca-2.

BURMA — **Trade Corporation No. 9**, 550/552 Merchant Street, Rangoon.

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS — **Sputnik Ltd.**, Tillirias Square No. 1, Nicosia; **People's Agency**, Tricoupi Str. 53c, Nicosia.

DENMARK — **Akademisk Boghandel**, Universitetsparken, Aarhus-C; **Munksgaard Ltd.**, Subscription Dept., Nørregade, 6. København K; **Rosenkilde og Bagger Kronprinsensgade 3**, København K.

ETHIOPIA — **Cosmos Bookshop**, Haile Selassie Ist Avenue, 89, Po Box 3393, Addis-Ababa.

GREECE — **Librairie Kauffman**, 28 Rue de Stade, Athens 132.

HOLLAND — **"Pegasus" Boekhandel**, Leidsestraat 25, Amsterdam; **Swets & Zeitlinger**, Keizersgracht 471 & 487, Amsterdam; **W. P. van Stockum Ltd. Booksellers**, 36 Buitenhof, Den Haag; **Martinus Huijoff N. V.**, Lange Voorhout 9, Den Haag; **Ster-boek Visserstraat**, 23 Groningen.

ICELAND — **MIR**, Pingholtistraeti 27, Reykjavik.

INDIA — DELHI, **People's Publishing House [P] Ltd.**, Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi-55, Phone 568745-Grams 'Qaumikitab'; **Magazine Centre**, F-82, 1st Floor, Ghaffar Market, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-5, Phone 568798; **People's Literary Centre**, 9895, Nawab Ganj, Pulbangesh, Delhi-6. MAHARASHTRA, **PPH Book Stall**, 190-B, Khetwadi Main Road, Bombay-4, Phone 351324-Grams 'Loksahitya'; Branch: **People's Book House**, Piramshah Manzil, Relief Road, Ahmedabad; **Vijay Stores**, Commisariat Bldg. 1st floor, 231, DN Road; Bombay-1. MYSORE, **Navakarnataka Publications [P] Ltd.**, Sarabhushana Mutt Compound, Kempedowda Circle, Bangalore-9, Grams 'Bookcentre'; **Magazine Centre**, N 7, S. Vitoba Market (Behind Khaleel Bldg.), Chickpet, Bangalore-2A. BIHAR, **People's Book House**, Opp. Patna College, Asok Raj Path, Patna-4, Phone 23628—Grams 'Literature'; Branch: **Hazaribagh Road**, Ranchi. WEST BENGAL, **Manisha Granthalaya [P] Ltd.**, 1/1A, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Calcutta-12, Phone 348645-Grams 'Mangrantha'; **National Book Agency [P] Ltd.**, 12 Bankim Chatterjee Street, Calcutta-12, Phone 341677-Grams 'Marxistlit'; Branch: **Nachan Road**, Benachiti, Durgapur-4, Phone 495463; **Bingsha Shatabdi**, 22/A, Arabinda Sarani, Calcutta-5. ANDHRA, **Visalaandhra Publishing House**, Eluru Road, Vijayawada-2, Phone 4949-Grams, 'Visalaandhra'; Branch: **Visalaandhra Book House**, 4-2-237, Sultan Bazar, Hyderabad, Visalaandhra Book House, Visakhapatnam. TAMILNADU, **New Century Book House [P] Ltd.**, 6 Nallathambi Chetty Street, Madras-2, Phone 88563-Grams 'Newlit'; Branches: 80 West Tower Street, Madurai-1, 19/43, Big Bazar Street, Coimbatore-1, Singarathope, Tiruchirapalli-8, Bus Stand, Tanjore, Cherry Road, Salem 123, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Pondicherry. KERALA, **Prabhath Book House**, Head Office: Prabhath Bldg., TC 22/306, Vanchiyoar Trivandrum-1, Grams 'Prabhath'; Branches: **Prabhath Book House**, Trivandrum-1, Cannonshed Road, Ernakulam-1, Mullakkal Road, Alleppey Near Pauls Corner, Cannanore Udyogmandal, Quilon. GUJARAT, **Vijay Stores**, 62 Kalyan Bhuvan Ahmedabad-1; **Vijay Stores**, Station Road, Anand, (W. Rly.);

Vijay Stores, Rajni, 1st Floor, Bhupendra Road, Rajkot-1.
ORISSA, **Nabajuga Granthalaya**, Bajrakabati Road, Cuttack-1.

IRAN — **Bookstore Sako Hovsepian**, 48 Avenue Marshal Stalin, Teheran.

IRAQ — **DAR Al-Jamaheer**, House for Press, Baghdad.

KENYA — **Equatorial Publishers Ltd.**, PO Box 7973, Nairobi.

KUWAIT — **Farajall Press Agency**, PO Box 4541, Kuwait, Arabia.

LEBANON — **Maison d'Édition Dar el Farabi**, BP 3181, Beyrouth; **Librerie des Amis-Machdotz**, Rue des Cupucins-1 mm, Sahnauoi 2 éme Etage, No. 11, Beyrouth.

MALTA — **Polcar**, 7 Market Street, Floriana.

NEPAL — **Baje Ko Pasal**, Bank Road, Biratnagar, PBI, Biratnagar; **International Book House**, 6/194 Pako-Pokhal-dyang, Post Box 32, Kathmandu.

NEW ZEALAND — **Progressive Books**, 14-16 Darby Str. Auckland CI; **Technical Books Ltd.**, 262 Lambton Quay, Wellington; **New Zealand Tribune**, PO Box 19-114, Auckland.

NIGERIA — **The Nigerian News Vendors Co. Ltd.**, 6 Williams Street, Lagos.

NORWAY — **A/S Narvesens Litteraturtjeneste**, Bertrand Narvesens vei 2, Postbooks 6140, Oslo 6; **Tanum-Cammeyer (Subscription-Centre)**, Karl Johansgt, 43, Oslo 1; **Norsk-Sovjetrussisk Samband**, Radhusgt, 8-V, Oslo; **A/S Norsk Forlag NY DAG**, Books 3634 GB, Oslo; **A/S Oslo Bok-og Papirhandel**, Schweigaardsgt 56, Oslo; **Universitetsforlaget**, Box 307, Blindern, Oslo 3.

PAKISTAN — **People's Publishing House**, 26, The Mall, Lahore.

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC — **Dar Dimachq Editeurs-Distributeurs**, Adib Tounbakji, Share Port Said, Damas; **Dar-Al-Fajr Edition et Distribution**, Rue Al-Kouafly, En

Face du Cercle des Officiers, Alep; **General Press Company Nizam Bros and Kayyali**, 29, Ayyaz Street, PO, Box 2366, Damas.

SOMALIA — **Samater's Book Sellers, Stationeries Commission Agents & Government Contractors**, PO Box 936, Mogadiscio.

REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA — **People's Publishing House**, 124 Kumaran Rathman Road, Colombo-2.

SUDAN — **"National Culture Library"**, PO Box 10, Khartoum; **Gamahier Bookshop**, PO Box 151, Khartoum Central; **"El-Fajr Bookshop"**, PO Box 351, Wadmedani.

SWEDEN — **Wennergren-Williams AB**, Fack S-104 25 Stockholm 30; **AB C. E. Fritz Kungl. Hovbokhandel**, Fredsgatan 2, Stockholm, 16; **AB Sandbergs Bokhandel**, Box 5702, S-114 87 Stockholm; **Förlags AB Arbetarkultur**, Kungsgatan, 84, 112 27 Stockholm; **Gumperts Bokhandel AB**, Södra Hamngatan 35, Göteborg; **Almqvist & Wiksell**, 26, Gamla Brogatan, Box 62, S-101 20 Stockholm; **Gleerupska Universitetsbokhandel**, Lund; **Förbundet Sverige-Sovjetunionen**, Katarinavägen 20, 1 tr., 116 45 Stockholm.

TANZANIA — **Dar Es Salaam Bookshop**, PO Box 9030, Dar Es Salaam; **African Bookshop**, PO Box 20837, Dar Es Salaam.

UGANDA — **Popular Book Supply Ltd.**, 81 Kampala Road, PO Box 769, Kampala.

USA — **Stechert-Hafner, Inc.**, 31 East 10th Street, New York 3, NY; **Moore-Cottrell Subscription Agencies, Inc.**, North Cohocton, NY; **Four Continent Book Corporation**, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, 10, NY; **Universal Distributors Co.**, 52-54 West 13th Street, New York 11, NY; **Imported Publications & Products**, Room 809, l'Union Square, New York 3, NY; **Eastern News Distributors, Inc.**, 155 West, 15 Street, New York, NY 10011; **Schoenhof's Slavic Books, Inc.**, 1280 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge 38, Mass.; **Imported Publications Inc.**, 1730 Arcade Place, Chicago, Illinois 60612.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC — **Andulus Bookshop**, 26 Sep. Street, PO Box 559, Sanaa.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN — **National Distribution Company at the 14th October Corporation**, PO Box 304, Crater, Aden.

70531