

Kurdish National Question

"The Call of the Century": Solution or Dissolution?



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[Note: This brochure is an evaluation of the ‘Call for Peace and Democratic Society’ announced by PKK leader A.Öcalan on 27 February 2025.]

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First, a brief reminder is necessary. Following the "Al-Aqsa Flood Operation" carried out by the Palestinian National Resistance on October 7, 2023, the Middle East witnessed developments of historical significance. Israel launched military operations first against Gaza and then against Lebanon. Meanwhile, in Syria, the Ba'ath regime collapsed, and power was handed over to the Salafi- jihadist HTS gang.

Contradictions among capitalist-imperialist powers on the international stage escalated into open war with Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing wars and conflicts in the Middle East. This situation is reshaping alliances and realignments among the imperialist-capitalist powers based on these contradictions. All sides are preparing for a new war of redivision (the Third Imperialist War of Division).

In the words of Chairman Mao, *"there is chaos under the heavens."*

It is unthinkable that these developments would not affect the Turkish state and the ruling Turkish classes. Since its founding, Turkey has been a semi-colonial market for imperialism, and due to its geopolitical position, it has served as a "regional gendarme" for the imperialist powers, making this situation all the more inevitable.

While Turkey's goals and objectives in Syria are well known, the emergence of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria—led by the Kurdish national movement and encompassing various nationalities and faiths, particularly the Arab nation—has become a critical factor. As this "autonomy" has increasingly gained the prospect of achieving an official status, the ruling Turkish classes have been compelled to develop a new policy on the Kurdish national question.

The Turkish state once again turned to Abdullah Öcalan, whom it has kept under severe isolation on İmralı Island for 26 years. Reports emerged that a process, which was not officially called a "solution process," had been underway following meetings that apparently began about a year ago. As a result of this process, on February 27, the "İmralı Delegation" announced a call titled "Peace and Democratic Society," personally written by Öcalan. After the written statement was read in both Kurdish and Turkish, delegation member Sırrı Süreyya Önder shared a note from Öcalan: *"While presenting this perspective, it undoubtedly requires the abandonment of arms, the dissolution of the PKK, and the recognition of the legal and political framework for democratic politics."*

These developments have once again brought discussions centered on the Kurdish national question to the forefront. Naturally, the approaches of the "parties" to the process differ drastically. The Kurdish national movement embraced Abdullah Öcalan's call and announced that guerrilla forces would lay down their arms. It was stated that the Kurdish national movement had no conditions regarding the process. As Sırrı Süreyya Önder from the "İmralı Delegation" put it: "There are no conditions for this. There is neither a precondition nor a condition afterward." (March 3, 2025)

The stance of the Turkish state's spokespeople on the process is well known, making it unnecessary to reiterate.

This is not the first time that the Turkish state and the Kurdish national movement have engaged in direct or indirect negotiations on the Kurdish national question. For instance, in 1993, under the initiatives of President Turgut Özal, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan declared a unilateral ceasefire for the first time on March 20, 1993.

Following Öcalan's capture on February 15, 1999, as a result of an international conspiracy, he called for another ceasefire, which the PKK declared in September 1999. Along with this, orders were given for the withdrawal of guerrilla forces from

Turkish borders. The PKK largely complied with this call, initiating a period of "unilateral inaction" that lasted until 2004.

When the Turkish state failed to take any steps toward a "solution," the PKK ended its unilateral ceasefire and resumed armed struggle on June 1, 2004. The AKP government launched the so-called "Democratic Initiative" process in 2009 under the name "National Unity and Brotherhood Project." Talks with Abdullah Öcalan resumed on İmralı Island, and officials from the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and some AKP representatives held secret meetings with PKK representatives (KCK executives) in Oslo, Europe. These meetings, known as the Oslo Talks, took place between 2009 and 2011.

In December 2012, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly announced that negotiations were taking place with Öcalan on İmralı. Following this statement, in early 2013, government representatives, led by the Undersecretary of MİT, held discussions with the "İmralı Delegation." This period, which lasted from 2013 to 2015 and became known as the "solution process" in public discourse, saw the AKP government take legal steps to institutionalize the process. In 2014, a law was passed, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) established a "Solution Commission," and the "Wise People Committee" was formed. On March 21, 2013, during the Newroz celebrations in Amed, Öcalan's letter was read to the public. On February 28,

2015, the İmralı Delegation and representatives of the AKP government held a joint press conference at Dolmabahçe Palace. During this conference, Öcalan's 10-point negotiation framework was read, and it was announced that Öcalan was calling on the PKK to convene an extraordinary congress in the spring to decide on disarmament. However, in March 2015, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan opposed the Dolmabahçe Agreement, stating that he had not given his approval and declaring, *"I do not recognize the agreement."*

Toward the end of 2024, reports surfaced that a new "negotiation" process had taken place between the Turkish state

and Abdullah Öcalan. This process was distinct from previous ones in that it was not officially labeled as a "process" and that the details of the meetings were not disclosed to the public. While the Kurdish national movement was reportedly not given any conditions or demands, the Turkish state, on the other hand, made no commitments or concessions. As a result, the nature of this process remains unknown. However, it must be emphasized that the Turkish state's renewed engagement with Abdullah Öcalan regarding the Kurdish national question is significant. The primary reason for this is the developments unfolding in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the Turkish state's new policy in this context.

Fortifying the "Internal Front"

It is understood that Israel's aggression, the ongoing process in Syria, and overall developments in the Middle East have pushed the Turkish state toward developing a new policy. The signs of this policy began to appear a year ago. The first indication came when President and AKP Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated, "When we look at the events we are experiencing today, we can see much more clearly how crucial the internal front is for a nation." (August 30, 2024). Later, in New York for the 79th United Nations General Assembly, Erdoğan reiterated this emphasis, declaring, "Our internal front objectives are our 'Kızıl Elma' (Red Apple)." (September 27, 2024).

Following Erdoğan, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli also emphasized the "internal front," stating, "Our primary duty is to fortify our national and spiritual front against a chaotic world. Our internal front, which is being shaken, and our unity and solidarity, which are being threatened with dissolution, cannot be ignored, and we will not allow it." (October 2, 2024).

As a product of this new political strategy, the process began when MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli shook hands with the DEM Party Group in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 1, 2024. On the same day, Bahçeli stated, "We are

entering a new era. While calling for peace in the world, we must also ensure peace within our own country."

That same day, President and AKP Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in his speech at the General Assembly, said, "It is now more than a necessity—it is an obligation—to realize that, in the face of Israeli aggression, it is not areas of conflict but areas of reconciliation that must come to the forefront both domestically and internationally." As a further indication of this new political strategy, on October 22, 2024, Bahçeli declared at an MHP Group Meeting in Parliament, "If the isolation of the leader of the terrorists is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party Group Meeting in Parliament. Let him declare that terrorism has ended completely, and that the organization has been dissolved." Erdoğan also followed up with a statement: "We hope that the historic window of opportunity opened by the People's Alliance will not be sacrificed for personal interests." (October 22, 2024). Following these statements, the "İmralı Delegation" published Abdullah Öcalan's statement, titled "Peace and Democratic Society," marking the 26th year of his imprisonment by the Turkish state. As indicated above, although this call was written by Öcalan himself, it appears to be essentially a product of negotiations conducted over the past year between Turkish state officials and Öcalan, ultimately resulting in a certain agreement. Since no official explanation has been provided to the public regarding the nature of these talks or the "agreement" reached, making a concrete assessment is difficult. However, it is understood that in return for the PKK laying down arms and dissolving itself, certain measures have been taken by the Turkish state.

According to publicly available information, negotiations and discussions between the Turkish state and Abdullah Öcalan have been ongoing for the past year. It appears that the Turkish state has conducted this process with Öcalan, whom it has held captive—an inherently problematic and fundamentally unjust situation. Under these conditions, it is necessary to speak of

"secret diplomacy." This, in turn, limits the ability to make an objective assessment of the matter.

Is Öcalan's Call a Surrender?

First and foremost, it should be noted that it is not unusual for warring parties to engage in negotiations with their enemies, go through "peace processes," or enter into mutual or unilateral ceasefires. Throughout history, communists and leaders of various national and social liberation movements have taken similar practical steps. These steps must be considered tactical maneuvers serving the goal of revolution and liberation, as long as that goal is not abandoned.

Although Öcalan's call on February 27, which includes the dissolution of the PKK, signifies a significant political break, it should not be forgotten that this is not the first time he has made such a call. Indeed, Öcalan has previously stated in various declarations and writings that, due to the setbacks experienced in socialism and the collapse of modern revisionist regimes (what Öcalan calls the "collapse of real socialism"), a change in line (which he refers to as a "paradigm shift") was necessary and that new organizational methods and models should be adopted.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) initially emerged as a national movement influenced by Marxism, waging a revolutionary war against the Turkish ruling classes' policies of national denial and extermination. However, in his statements and defenses following his imprisonment, Öcalan renounced the "Right to Freely Secede" meaning the demand to establish a separate state. Instead, he led the Kurdish National Movement toward what he conceptualized as "Democratic Modernity," characterized by an "Ecological, Women's Liberationist, and Democratic Nation Paradigm."

Öcalan, in his statements and defenses, defined his ideological shift as a "break from real socialism" and distanced himself from the revolutionary-socialist ideas that influenced the founding of the PKK. Instead, he introduced various alternative

models, including ecological theories, “post-Marxist” currents, and anarchist tendencies, as a “new organizational model” for the Kurdish National Movement. In this sense, there is nothing truly “new” in Öcalan’s latest declaration.

However, as seen in the recent statement, it appears that even this “paradigm” has now been abandoned. Notably, Öcalan explicitly described the PKK, the organization he led in its foundation, as suffering from “lack of meaning and excessive repetition.” While this remark signifies an important political rupture, it should also be understood as a call to the practical leadership of the Kurdish National Movement to “update its meaning.” In this sense, it would be inaccurate to interpret Öcalan’s position as one of “surrender.” Given his ideological stance, political maneuvering, and pragmatism as a representative of a national movement, this becomes even more significant. Therefore, reducing the issue merely to “liquidationism,” “surrender,” or even “betrayal” would be misleading. It must not be forgotten that the Kurdish nation had rebelled even before the PKK and, with the PKK, sustained its rebellion through a long-term guerrilla war. A national struggle that has endured oppression, bans on its existence and language, and massacres cannot simply be summed up as “surrender” at this stage. Moreover, the Kurdish national question is not confined to Turkey’s Kurdistan alone; it continues to exist in various forms across different parts of Kurdistan.

At this point, the Kurdish national question has surpassed Öcalan’s “paradigm” time and again. The reactions to his statement have further placed the Kurdish nation and the reality of Kurdistan on the global agenda. The primary figure responsible for this situation is none other than Öcalan himself, who has been held in severe isolation on an island for 26 years. Despite all its weaknesses and shortcomings, the uninterrupted struggle of the Kurdish nation, and above all, its armed resistance, has been the determining factor. Even in its current state, the Kurdish National Movement, which began in Turkey’s Kurdistan and later

expanded to Iraq, Syria, and Iran's Kurdistan, has become a subject of not only the Middle East but also global political discourse. This has undoubtedly been shaped by the PKK's practical leadership and the Kurdish people's elevation of Öcalan to a symbolic position of "national leadership," even if not in direct practice.

For this reason, it is problematic to assess the situation based on the premise that, under Öcalan's leadership, the Kurdish National Movement has surrendered through negotiation and is set to be dissolved, thereby imposing liquidation on the revolutionary movement as a whole. Evaluating the matter solely through this possibility is fundamentally an ideological and political line issue. The Kurdish national question remains one of the primary contradictions in our region. Its resolution, whether through this or that means, or the reduction of its intensity and urgency does not necessarily mean that other contradictions in our region, or indeed the principal contradiction, will also be resolved.

Those who base their entire analysis and critique purely on "surrender" and "liquidation" expose their own ideological and political insecurity. More importantly, they reveal their tendency to link the entire revolutionary process exclusively to the struggle of the oppressed nation, disregarding the broader class struggle.

Like any national movement, the Kurdish National Movement can, of course, reach agreements and compromises with the enemy it fights against. This possibility has existed since the moment the national movement emerged, and at certain stages of the war, it is understandable for the movement to acknowledge and highlight this possibility as a tactical consideration. However, continuously focusing on this possibility as the primary issue reflects a problematic approach. **What must remain uncompromising are not possibilities but principles.** It is essential to be unwavering in principles while maintaining flexibility in formulating policies according to concrete conditions.

Principle: The Right to Freely Secede

First and foremost, it is problematic that a fundamental right such as the Right to Freely Secede, which arises from the very existence of an oppressed nation, is being renounced, especially when this renunciation is expressed by a single individual (Öcalan) under conditions of captivity. Furthermore, criminalizing the legitimate and just foundation upon which the struggle of the oppressed nation stands, while proposing a compromise (or agreement) with the ruling- class bourgeoisie of the oppressor nation, does not change the reality that the Kurdish nation in Turkey remains an oppressed nation.

Another problematic aspect of Öcalan's statement is his emphasis on the so- called "shared destiny of Turks and Kurds." This rhetoric is frequently used by the representatives of the oppressor nation. Phrases like "brotherhood" and "we are like flesh and bone" serve only to obscure and legitimize the oppression exerted by the dominant nation over the oppressed one. True fraternity between nations can only be discussed once full national equality is recognized. Therefore, the real issue is not about renewing and strengthening a so-called "Turkish-Kurdish alliance" but rather about putting an end to the historical injustices imposed on the Kurdish nation.

The Kurds in Turkey exist as a nation and are subjected to national oppression by the dominant nation. Changes in the form or methods of this oppression— whether its intensity increases or decreases—do not negate the fact that the Kurds are a nation. Nor does it invalidate their legitimate and just democratic demands, above all, their Right to Freely Secede, which stems from their status as a nation.

In general, the national question, and specifically the Kurdish national question, is ultimately a matter of rights and status. As the term itself suggests, it is not solely a problem to be resolved on a class basis. While its ultimate resolution is tied to class struggle, this does not prevent it from producing various

intermediate “solutions” along the way. In the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, some national questions have, in one way or another, been “resolved” through imperialist intervention.

The demand for statehood, which is at the core of the national question in terms of securing national rights and establishing an independent economic space, can take different forms. It may evolve into arrangements such as autonomy or federation, as seen in various historical examples. Indeed, the establishment of collective cultural rights, political status, and organizational structures, particularly concerning language, constitutes an advanced stage from the perspective of national criteria. In this sense, it represents a shift in status. Furthermore, these demands are the democratic demands of the oppressed national bourgeoisie against the ruling-class bourgeoisie of the oppressor nation. **The possibility that these demands may be instrumentalized by imperialism or co-opted for other interests does not invalidate their democratic content.** In our specific case, the solution to the Kurdish national question lies in the fulfillment of the Kurdish nation’s national-collective rights, including the right to secede, federation, autonomy, and cultural rights. **Renouncing or refusing to demand these national-collective rights does not mean that the Kurdish national question has been resolved, nor does it indicate that the contradiction between the oppressor and oppressed nations has disappeared.**

For this reason, in Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society,” he states that *“the inevitable consequence of an excessively nationalist drift, such as the creation of a separate nation-state, federation, administrative autonomy, and culturalist solutions, fails to provide an answer to the sociology of historical society.”* While this statement points to a deadlock in solving the national question, it also implicitly accepts the Turkish nation’s privilege of statehood while rejecting, even in the bourgeois-democratic sense, the Kurdish nation’s right to establish an

independent state, which stems from its status as a nation. Such a view is, of course, unacceptable to communists.

In Turkey, the Kurdish national question remains unresolved. It continues with all its intensity. Contrary to Öcalan's claims, the issue of the Kurdish nation's national rights in Turkey persists.

Has the Era of Armed Struggle Ended?

On the other hand, it is necessary to point out the following reality: when it comes to resolving the Kurdish national question, caution is needed against narratives that can be formulated as "laying down arms and opening the political channel" narratives that have also found resonance within the ranks of the Kurdish movement. While it is understandable for those on the side of the oppressor nation to promote such narratives, they hold no real value for the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the world. After all, *"if a people have no army, they have nothing!"* This is another principle.

Of course, "democratic political struggle instead of armed struggle" is a choice. However, whether the conditions exist for such a choice is decisive. Under current circumstances in Turkey, leaving aside the well-known obstacles to "democratic political struggle," even the slightest crumbs of bourgeois democracy are no longer tolerated. In Turkey, the conditions for "democratic politics" have always existed on paper, but in practice, they have no real foundation. Fascism is not simply a form of government; it is the very mode of governance and the essence of politics itself. For this reason, even the slightest demand for rights or any democratic and revolutionary struggle is met with fascist terror. In the recent period, under the so-called "Presidential System," the AKP-MHP fascism has imposed a policy of fascist repression against all democratic demands, including freedom of expression. One of those who have experienced this reality most acutely is the Kurdish national.

It must not be forgotten that the Kurdish National Movement resorted to armed struggle because there was no path for democratic struggle, as denial and annihilation were imposed upon it. This was not merely a choice but a necessity under the conditions of Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan. There have been Kurdish national movements that did not take up arms, yet they too could not escape the heavy repression of fascism. This reality, just as it was in the past, remains valid today. The presence of certain changes does not mean that fascism has been eliminated or that contradictions, particularly the Kurdish national question, have been resolved.

On the other hand, the propaganda that equates armed struggle with a lack of political strategy under the guise of "solution" and "peace" is fundamentally flawed. Armed struggle is, in itself, a form of politics. For years, those who have made political arguments under the pretense of criticizing armed struggle, despite acknowledging the justified assertion of "the role of force in Kurdistan," cannot erase the fact that armed struggle is also a political struggle.

The search for reconciliation with fascism leads to unfounded theories such as "armed struggle is not political struggle" and even that "armed struggle hinders democratic struggle." As practice has consistently demonstrated, "War is the continuation of politics by other means." The rejection of this reality by its practitioner's points to their ideological stance and their current decision to conduct politics through different means.

Moreover, the assertion that "the era of armed struggle has ended" can only be a dream in today's conditions, where preparations for a new imperialist war of division are underway, especially in the Middle East. Furthermore, the process has repeatedly invalidated Öcalan's statement that "the era of armed struggle has ended." For instance, while Öcalan made this declaration in 2013, at the same time, the Kurdish nation was achieving successes through a life-and-death armed struggle against ISIS in Rojava. Additionally, it is evident that currently, in

Rojava, there is no other option but to respond with armed resistance to the direct attacks of Turkey and its proxy groups. As these realities have consistently proven, not only has "the era of armed struggle" not ended, but especially under Middle Eastern conditions, it is clear that it remains a necessity. Truths are revolutionary, and the era of armed struggle has not ended. In the current situation of the imperialist capitalist system, with signs of a new war of division emerging, and in today's reality where the world is increasingly arming itself under the guise of "defense," theories suggesting that the era of armed struggle has ended for the proletariat, oppressed peoples, and nations of the world are, in the broadest sense, equivalent to disarming the oppressed and are, of course, unacceptable.

Is a "Democratic Society" Possible Under Conditions of Fascism?

In his statement, Abdullah Öcalan discusses Turkish-Kurdish relations, speaks of a "spirit of brotherhood," and proposes "democratic society" and "democratic reconciliation" as the fundamental methods for a solution. However, under capitalism, there is no democracy that is independent of or above class structures. Every class has its own understanding of democracy and implements it accordingly. Therefore, a "democratic society" or "democracy" cannot truly

be realized within a capitalist system dominated by the bourgeoisie. Real people's democracy and a democratic society can only exist under a people's state, where the people hold power.

Expecting a "democratic society" from the Turkish state is an illusion. The fundamental approach is flawed from the outset. Even as the call for a "democratic society" is made, the reality remains that the process is being carried out behind closed doors. Without a comprehensive public explanation of what is happening, even the possibility of a "democratic discussion" is out of the question. Moreover, one of the parties involved is under

severe isolation. Before anything else, the heavy isolation imposed on Öcalan must be lifted, and he must be freed. If the goal is truly a democratic society, then at the very least, Öcalan must be provided with the conditions to work freely and be allowed unrestricted communication with his organization.

Öcalan justifies his call for the dissolution of the PKK and the laying down of arms by arguing that in Turkey, "the denial of identity has been resolved" and "progress has been made in freedom of expression." However, it is evident to all that no fundamental progress has actually been made in these areas. The so-called "recognition" of the existence of Kurds is, at best, a superficial acknowledgment. Even this limited recognition was only achieved through a struggle that cost countless lives. Therefore, it is clear that this does not correspond to any concrete status in terms of resolving the national question. Moreover, at this stage, the situation regarding freedom of expression is so stark that it leaves no room for debate.

The point that A. Öcalan overlooks or rather misjudges because he fails to approach the issue from a class perspective — is the root of the national question in general, and the Kurdish national question in particular. The Kurdish national question cannot be reduced to issues of identity denial and freedom of expression, nor is the Kurdish nation itself the source of this

problem. The problem lies in the national oppression imposed on the Kurdish nation. This oppression is not only directed at the Kurdish people in general but affects the entire Kurdish nation—except for a handful of large feudal landlords and a few big bourgeois figures who have fully integrated with the Turkish ruling classes. Kurdish workers, peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and small landowners all continue to suffer from national oppression. As a result of the Kurdish nation's struggle, certain concessions have been made in the national oppression policy of the dominant nation, yet the policy of national oppression continues uninterrupted. The Kurdish national question remains unresolved. In our region, resolving the Kurdish

national question remains one of the tasks of the People's Democratic Revolution. Under conditions of fascism, it is impossible to achieve a revolutionary resolution of the Kurdish national question. However, as a result of revolutionary-democratic struggle, certain steps may be taken. Supporting progressive steps that contribute to resolving the Kurdish national question and other major contradictions in Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan, while integrating these reforms into the revolutionary struggle, is not incorrect.

However, propagating reforms as a solution, and even more so, claiming that under current conditions the Kurdish nation has exercised its right to self-determination, is entirely misleading. Öcalan, in his statement, argues that "there is no non-democratic path for system-building and implementation. There cannot be. Democratic reconciliation is the fundamental method." In today's world, within the reality of class society, this view is fundamentally flawed. Within the reality of class divisions, the concept of democracy is also class-based. The imperialist capitalist world order, which is built upon the system of private property, and the reality of the state in Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan, prove that the state is nothing more than *"an instrument of one class's oppression over another."* Even bourgeois democracies have become increasingly questionable under current conditions.

From its very foundation, bourgeois democracy in Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan has had a fascist character. *"Our country has never truly experienced real bourgeois democracy; it has only tasted some of its crumbs."* (İK, Collected Works, Nisan Yayıncılık).

Thus, setting aside other contradictions, the emergence of the Kurdish national question and the policy of national oppression imposed on the Kurdish nation have been carried out under the guise of "democracy."

The emancipation, freedom, and independence of the Turkish working class, the laboring people, and the Kurdish

nation cannot be achieved within the system or through its so-called democracy. The struggle for liberation of the peoples from the Turkish and Kurdish nations, as well as various other nationalities and faiths, does not depend on "democratic reconciliation" but rather necessitates methods and tools of struggle outside the system. This is not a matter of choice but a historical necessity.

TC (Turkish Republic) Fascism Must Be Targeted!

At this stage, the Turkish state, which once labeled Öcalan as a "terrorist leader," now presents him as a figure advocating peace and seeking a solution. Although the state's media propaganda will frame this process as the "elimination of terrorism," at the same time, discussions will emerge both domestically and internationally about the obligations of the Turkish state, democratization, and the steps it must take.

Indeed, in the note conveyed to the public by Sırrı Süreyya Önder—though absent from Öcalan's official statement (likely because the Turkish state did not permit it to be included), Öcalan outlines what the Turkish state must do in return for the "agreement" reached. He points to legal and constitutional changes that would secure the political rights of the Kurdish nation, emphasizing that the process of disarmament and the dissolution of the PKK should be synchronized with democratic legal reforms within the country. These demands, within the conditions of fascism, are undeniably "progressive" and "democratic." Whether they will be implemented is another matter entirely.

Regardless of the calculations of Turkish fascism, these demands must be supported and defended.

In general, regarding the national question, and specifically the Kurdish national question, the class-conscious proletariat holds a clear stance. It is worth reiterating:

"..Regardless of nationality, the class-conscious Turkish proletariat will unconditionally and unequivocally support the general democratic content of

the Kurdish national movement that targets the oppression, tyranny, and privileges of the Turkish ruling classes, seeks to abolish all forms of national oppression, and aims for the equality of nations. It will likewise unconditionally and unequivocally support the movements of other oppressed nationalities in the same direction.

...Regardless of nationality, the class-conscious Turkish proletariat will remain entirely neutral in the struggles waged by the bourgeoisie and landlords of various nationalities for their own superiority and privileges. The class-conscious Turkish proletariat will never support tendencies within the Kurdish national movement that seek to strengthen Kurdish nationalism; it will never assist bourgeois nationalism; it will never support the struggles of Kurdish bourgeoisie and landlords to secure their own privileges and superiority. That is to say, it will support only the general democratic content within the Kurdish national movement and will not go beyond that." (İbrahim Kaypakkaya, Collected Works, p.194)

In conclusion, a new process has begun in the context of the Kurdish national question with Abdullah Öcalan's call. The distinguishing factor of this process compared to previous ones is the new political orientation implemented by the Turkish comprador bourgeoisie under the discourse of "consolidating the internal front."

For this reason, it must be recognized that this process carries risks not only for the Kurdish National Movement but also for TC fascism. The equation of solution or dissolution is not solely an issue for the Kurdish National Movement but is also a matter of concern for the Turkish state itself.

The fundamental issue here is that the "sharp edge of the arrow" must not be directed at the Kurdish National Movement or Abdullah Öcalan, but at Turkish fascism. The

creator and cause of the Kurdish national question is TC fascism, the fascist dictatorship of the Turkish comprador bourgeoisie.

The TC fascism is in a state of crisis. As a result of this crisis, it is seeking "reconciliation" with the Kurdish National Movement. Under these conditions, it is necessary to stand in solidarity with the Kurdish National Movement.

Criticism, of course, is possible and even necessary. However, the primary enemy must not be overlooked, the focus must remain on the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Turkey, including the Turkish and Kurdish nations, as well as various nationalities and religious communities.

Whether the "Call of the Century" will lead to a solution or dissolution will ultimately be determined by the unfolding process and the struggle itself. This necessitates that the revolutionary democratic opposition does not remain indifferent but actively intervenes in the process.

Referring the solution of the Kurdish national question to revolution under the guise of a "real solution", invoking the Right to Freely Secede while overlooking the current dynamics of the issue means falling out of touch with the political reality of the present moment. Such an approach is unacceptable from the perspective of the interests of the People's Democratic Revolution in Turkey. The issue must not be reduced merely to a question of power but must be grasped with ideological clarity.