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[Note: The author of this article, Li Tso-p'eng, was later deeply involved in
the attempted coup and murder of Mao which was led by Lin Biao (Lin Piao) in
1971. While this does not show that this article is itself necessarily
erroneous, it is doubtful that it would have been published in AWTW of
this had been known to its editors. BannedThought.net editor.]
Excerpts:
Strategy: One
Against Ten Tactics: Ten Against One
An Exposition
of Comrade Mao Tsetung's Thinking on the Strategy and Tactics of
the People's War
By Li Tso-peng
The following article originally appeared in Hongqi (Red Flag) nos.
23-24, 1964. An English language translation was published after
some changes by the author in 1966 by Foreign Languages Press, Peking,
from which these excerpts were made AWTW.
...The Chinese revolution took armed struggle as its main form of
struggle; by destroying the counter-revolutionary armed forces one
after another and smashing the reactionary state machinery in one
area after another, it finally captured state power throughout the
country and ended the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism
and bureaucrat-capitalism. The historical experience of the Chinese
revolution in winning this great victory provides striking proof
of the wisdom, greatness and correctness of Comrade Mao Tsetung's
thinking....
I. The Method
of Concentrating a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One
by One Is the Embodiment in Military Struggles of the Great Strategic
and Tactical Thinking of Comrade Mao Tsetung
...Comrade Mao Tsetung has pointed out again and again that although
imperialism and all reactionaries are seemingly powerful, they represent
the reactionary, decaying and declining classes. The law of historical
development determines their inevitable doom. The revolutionary
people must, therefore, see the essence of their nature, look at
them from a long-term point of view and regard them for what they
are paper tigers; they must despise them strategically, dare
to struggle against them and dare to seize victory. On this they
should build their strategic thinking. At the same time, Comrade
Mao Tsetung has also pointed out repeatedly that just as there is
not a single thing in the world without a dual nature, so imperialism
and all reactionaries have a dual nature. Before they are finally
destroyed, they may still be powerful for a certain period, may
still enjoy a temporary military advantage, and will continue to
devour people. From this point of view, they are living tigers made
of iron. Tactically, therefore, with regard to each specific struggle,
the revolutionary people must take the enemy seriously, be prudent,
carefully study and perfect the art of struggle. On this they should
build their tactical thinking. Only by combining a fearless revolutionary
spirit with an art of struggle which is flexible and inventive will
they be able to seize victory in every specific encounter and finally
defeat the enemy....
The method of concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy
forces one by one is a concentrated expression in a military struggle
of the concept of tactically taking the enemy seriously, it is a
concrete expression of the concept of tactically "pitting ten against
one" and "using the many to defeat the few"....
The method of concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy
forces one by one also embodies the idea of despising the enemy
strategically. For only by strategically despising the enemy and
displaying a revolutionary and militant spirit of "pitting one against
ten" can we remain cool-headed in face of a powerful enemy and not
be overawed by his truculence or confused by a complex situation;
only in this way will we dare to concentrate our forces and deal
the enemy blows. On the other hand, victories won in a succession
of campaigns and battles by the use of this method will further
educate the people and their army and enable them to see clearly
through their own experience that the enemy can be defeated and
that it is entirely correct to despise him strategically. This will
inevitably increase the confidence of the people and their army
in their struggle against the enemy and encourage them to fight
and win still greater victories....
II. Concentrating
a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One is the Most
Effective Method of Fighting to Change the Situation in which the
Enemy is Strong while We are Weak
At the outset and even over a fairly long period of time, the people's
revolutionary armed forces are always relatively weak and small
in numbers and subject to continuous attacks and "encirclement and
suppression" by their powerful enemies. This is usually the objective
situation in regard to the balance of forces. In the eyes of Marxist-Leninists,
such a situation can be changed. War is a contest of strength. The
objective basis for initiative or passivity is to be found in the
superiority or inferiority of the forces of war but neither in itself
constitutes initiative or passivity. In the course of war we must
know how to change the balance of forces and make it possible for
the small and weak revolutionary forces to seize the initiative
and shake off passivity in the face of the enemy's superiority so
that instead of being pinned down by the enemy we will be able to
gain the upper hand and defeat him. The decisive factor here is
the subjective effort. That is to say, we must use the correct method
of fighting, win more victories, commit less errors, and continuously
eliminate the enemy forces and enlarge our own forces through protracted,
hard and complex struggle and thus turn our strategic inferiority
and passivity into superiority and initiative. Comrade Mao Tsetung
has pointed out:
"...it is possible to escape from our position of relative strategic
inferiority and passivity, and the method is to create local superiority
and initiative in many places, so depriving the enemy of local superiority
and initiative and plunging him into inferiority and passivity.
These local successes will add up to strategic superiority and initiative
for us and strategic inferiority and passivity for the enemy. Such
a change depends upon correct subjective direction."1
This correct direction refers, first and foremost, to implementing
the method of fighting characterised by concentrating a superior
force to destroy the enemy forces one by one.
This method of fighting was widely employed at various periods in
China's revolutionary war. It played a most important role in changing
the situation in relation to advance and retreat, the offensive
and defensive, and fighting on interior and exterior lines as well
as in enabling our army to change from being weak to being strong
and from inferiority to superiority. It has undergone all manner
of tests in the prolonged practice of revolutionary war and has
been proved correct.
During the Second Revolutionary Civil War period, Comrade Mao Tsetung
applied the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to make a penetrating
analysis of the situation in which the enemy was strong while the
Red Army was weak. He pointed out that China's revolutionary war
had both favourable and unfavourable conditions, that is, the Red
Army could grow and defeat the enemy, but that it could not do this
quickly. Such was the fundamental law governing China's revolutionary
war. In the light of this law, Comrade Mao Tsetung put forward a
whole series of principles and methods of operation, such as "divide
our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal
with the enemy", "the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps,
we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue",
"extend stable base areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves;
when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling
around", "lure the enemy in deep", and "concentrate superior forces,
pick the enemy's weak spots, and fight when you are sure of wiping
out part, or the greater part, of the enemy in mobile warfare so
as to crush the enemy forces one by one". Thus he solved the most
difficult problem of how the weak and small Red Army could defeat
a powerful enemy....
III. The War
of Annihilation is the Fundamental Idea of Concentrating a Superior
Force to Destroy the Enemy ForcesOne by One
...No matter whether the balance of forces is in our favour or the
enemy's, operations must be carried out by concentrating our forces.
It is only by concentrating a superior force especially when
the enemy is strong and we are weak that we can muster sufficient
strength to fight a battle of annihilation and gain a quick decision.
When offensive operations are carried out in this way, we can quickly
break through the enemy's defence, smash his reinforcements and
counter-assaults, mass enough troops to outflank, encircle, and
cut up his forces, fight one engagement after another, and swiftly
exploit the victory. And when defensive operations are carried out,
we can weaken and inflict great losses on the attacking enemy, win
time for our side, and even shift from the defensive to the offensive.
If we do not concentrate a superior force, we cannot achieve the
aim of annihilating the enemy, nor can we fight quick engagements
and gain a quick decision. Moreover, a situation of stalemate may
arise in campaigns and battles; they may become battles in which
there is more loss than gain, and the danger of being crushed piecemeal
by the enemy may even arise....
Comrade Mao Tsetung pointed out:
"In the first and second stages of the war, which are marked by
the enemy's strength and our weakness, the enemy's objective is
to have us concentrate our main forces for a decisive engagement.
Our objective is exactly the opposite. We want to choose conditions
favourable to us, concentrate superior forces and fight decisive
campaigns or battles only when sure of victory ... we want to avoid
decisive engagements under unfavourable conditions when we are not
sure of victory...."2
This means that whenever we use the method because of the enemy's
strength and our weakness of destroying the enemy forces one
by one we must necessarily begin with "tidbits" by gathering together
small victories into a big one. Then we must eat the enemy up with
big mouthfuls. This method of gradually destroying the enemy forces
requires many decisive engagements with the enemy in campaigns and
battles. This is the objective process by which the enemy is wiped
out despite his strength and our weakness. As the situation in which
the enemy was strong and we were weak had not basically changed
during the initial stage of the Third Revolutionary Civil War, we
had to proceed from destroying in one battle an enemy battalion,
or a regiment, or a brigade. Following the change in the balance
of forces, we were gradually able to wipe out an enemy division
or a corps until we could finally destroy one to several powerful
enemy armies at one time and fight battles of annihilation on a
much bigger scale.
By concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one
by one, we can also deal dialectically with the relation between
annihilation of the enemy's effective strength and the holding or
seizing of cities. That is to say, the outcome of a war does not
depend on the seizure or loss of a city or place but on the decrease
or increase of effective strength of the belligerents. Comrade Mao
Tsetung has said: "The principle of concentrating our forces to
wipe out the enemy forces one by one is aimed chiefly at annihilating
the enemy's effective strength, not at holding or seizing a place."3
To concentrate our troops to annihilate powerful attacking enemy
forces, we must adopt the policy of luring them in deep and abandon
some cities and districts of our own accord in a planned way, so
as to let them in. It is only after letting the enemy in that the
people can take part in the war in various ways and that the power
of a people's war can be fully exerted. It is only after letting
the enemy in that he can be compelled to divide up his forces, take
on heavy burdens and commit mistakes. In other words, we must let
the enemy become elated, stretch out all his ten fingers and become
hopelessly bogged down. Thus, we can concentrate superior forces
to destroy the enemy forces one by one, to eat them up mouthful
by mouthful. Only by wiping out the enemy's effective strength can
cities and localities be finally held or seized. We are firmly against
dividing up our forces to defend all positions and putting up resistance
at every place for fear that our territory might be lost and our
"pots and pans" smashed, since this can neither wipe out the enemy
forces nor hold cities or localities. In order to concentrate its
troops for flexible operations and lure the enemy forces in deep
so as to annihilate them one by one on the move, our army in
the first year of the Third Revolutionary Civil War abandoned
on its own initiative 105 major cities such as Yenan, Changchiakou,
Chengteh, Shenyang and Antung (now Tantung). This placed burdens
on the enemy and greatly reduced his striking force. Meanwhile,
our army evaded the enemy's main offensive force, shifted its troops
to the enemy's flanks and rear to seek favourable chances for battles
and thus annihilated his forces in large numbers while they were
on the move. As a result, not only were the lost cities recovered,
but new cities were liberated.
Of course, not making the holding of cities and places our chief
aim does not in any way mean arbitrarily abandoning them and letting
the enemy occupy large parts and cities of the base areas easily
without fighting. Comrade Mao Tsetung has said: "... we must hold
or seize territory wherever the balance of forces makes it possible
to do so or wherever such territory is significant for our campaigns
or battles...."4 Our army firmly adhered to Comrade Mao Tsetung's
directive. Thus, at the stage of strategic defence, our army, while
annihilating the enemy's effective strength, resolutely held those
cities and places which had to be held as positions for launching
strategic counter-offensives and offensives. At the stage of strategic
offence, our army closely linked the annihilation of the enemy's
effective strength with the seizing of cities and places, thus simultaneously
attaining the goal of destroying the enemy and fulfilling the task
of holding or seizing cities and places.
The basic principle of our army's operations is to fight a war of
annihilation, but this does not imply total negation of the war
of attrition. When the enemy is strong and we are weak, we advocate
a war of attrition strategically but battles of annihilation in
campaigns and engagements, and achieve strategic attrition through
the latter. As Comrade Mao Tsetung has said: "...campaigns of annihilation
are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition."5
Therefore, wherever circumstances are favourable, we must concentrate
a superior force, employ encircling and outflanking tactics and
fight battles of annihilation. Under special circumstances, we may
also adopt the method of dealing blows of annihilation at the enemy
so as to wipe out one part of his forces while routing another.
The battle of annihilation takes the primary place in campaigns
and engagements. There is also the battle of attrition which is
supplementary to the battle of annihilation though this is not a
"contest in attrition". For instance, when the main force of our
army is used to annihilate certain enemy forces, it is sometimes
necessary to fight a battle of attrition in other directions in
order to intercept and pin down the enemy forces....
V. This Method
of Fighting Can only Be Used Effectively by a People's Army
In spite of the fact that military experts in all times and in all
countries have been familiar with these ideas of the "concentrated
employment of troops" and "smashing the enemy forces one by one"
and that a great deal of military literature has repeatedly discussed
and stressed them, no one hitherto has ever viewed them as parts
of an integral whole and used them dialectically. It was none other
than Comrade Mao Tsetung who comprehensively put forward the strategic
and tactical principle of "concentrating a superior force to destroy
the enemy forces one by one" and dialectically applied it with great
success to the practice of China's revolutionary war. This is because
the war we waged was a people's war, our army was a people's army
and its military operations were guided by dialectical materialism.
Comrade Mao Tsetung has pointed out: "The richest source of power
to wage war lies in the masses of the people." He has also added;
"The army must become one with the people so that they see it as
their own army. Such an army will be invincible...."6 This is the
fundamental condition for the victory of the people's revolutionary
war.
Comrade Mao Tsetung has provided a masterly summary of the strategy
and tactics of a people's war: You fight in your way and we fight
in ours; we fight when we can win and move away when we cannot.
In other words, you rely on modern weapons and we rely on highly
conscious revolutionary people; you give full play to your superiority
and we give full play to ours; you have your way of fighting and
we have ours. When you want to fight us, we do not let you and you
cannot even find us. But when we want to fight you, we make sure
that you cannot get away and we hit you squarely on the chin and
wipe you out. When we are able to wipe you out, we do so with a
vengeance; when we cannot, we see to it that you do not wipe us
out. It is opportunism if one will not fight when one can win. It
is adventurism if one insists on fighting when one cannot win. Fighting
is the pivot of all our strategy and tactics. It is because of the
necessity of fighting that we admit the necessity of moving away.
The sole purpose of moving away is to fight and bring about the
final and complete destruction of the enemy. Such strategy and tactics
can be successfully applied only in a people's war, by the people's
army, guided by dialectical materialism.
The war waged by us was a people's war in which the principle of
combining main with local forces, regular army with local armed
units and people's militia, and armed with unarmed masses was put
into practice. The local armed units, militia and the masses of
the people took part in the war on an extensive scale; they actively
supported the front and consolidated the rear, and in direct co-ordination
with the operations of the main forces, destroyed communications
and transport in the enemy's rear, contained and dispersed the enemy
troops and harassed and threatened their rear. This made it possible
for the main forces of our army to concentrate their troops to a
high degree and carry out operations with great flexibility. Meanwhile,
participation of the militia and masses in such activities as standing
sentry, conducting reconnaissance, preventing the leakage of news
and acting as guides also created favourable conditions for our
army to concentrate its troops in time and in secret so as to surprise,
encircle and annihilate the enemy. Take, for instance, the Pinghsingkuan
Campaign fought at the beginning of the War of Resistance Against
Japan. Our troops were assembled for as long as one week at places
15 to 30 kilometres away from the route of the enemy's advance,
but the enemy completely failed to discover them because of the
active cooperation of the masses who hid the news and thus thwarted
the enemy's special agents and traitors. With the help of the masses,
our army was promptly informed of the state of the enemy and disposed
its forces correctly, thus taking him by surprise and putting him
out of action with lightning speed.
On the contrary, the enemy fought in isolation without the support
and cooperation of the people because the war waged by them was
of an anti-popular nature. Wherever the enemy occupied one of our
places, they were opposed by the people and had to send in troops
for defence. All this inevitably affected the concentration of their
troops. Even if they succeeded in concentrating their troops in
a certain area, they were always in a passive position and found
it hard to carry out their plans because they failed to win the
people's support, could not find out what the conditions were or
locate the objectives of their attacks. At the same time their own
actions were always exposed.
Our army was founded on Comrade Mao Tsetung's theory of army building;
it is a new-type army wholeheartedly serving the interests of the
people under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
Its nature determines its ability to give the fullest play to the
power of the method of concentrating a superior force to destroy
the enemy forces one by one. Strategy and tactics are carried out
by men. The qualities of an army play an important role in deciding
whether the correct strategy and tactics can be carried through
so as to produce the greatest effect in practice. Our army has the
steadfast leadership of the Communist Party and most loyally carries
out the Party's Marxist-Leninist line and policies. It has a high
degree of conscious discipline and is heroically inspired to destroy
all enemies and conquer all difficulties. Internally there is full
unity between cadres and fighters, between those in higher and those
in lower positions of responsibility, between the different departments
and between the various fraternal army units. With the establishment
of firm revolutionary political work, the masses of our commanders
and fighters are highly class conscious and clearly aware that they
are fighting for the interests of the people. Thus, when using this
method of fighting, they display a vigorous fighting will and courageous
spirit. When concentrating, they move quickly and have no fear of
fatigue or difficulties; while on the offensive, they advance courageously
and persistently and dare to outflank and cut up the enemy and fight
single-handedly; on the defensive, they can resist the successive
attacks of a powerful enemy, stand firm on their positions and fight
doggedly. Army units are able to cooperate on their own initiative
and coordinate their activities closely with each other. They are
not afraid of sacrificing themselves for the interests of the whole.
In addition, commanders and fighters can give full play to their
own judgement in working out various methods of defeating the enemy.
All this fully ensures that this method of fighting can be used
to the best advantage and have great effect in defeating the enemy
and winning victory.
The enemy's army is an anti-popular force. The great majority of
the soldiers are coerced or cheated into joining. Their fundamental
interests are diametrically opposed to those of the reactionary
ruling classes. Deep contradictions exist between officers and men
and between superiors and subordinates. Although the reactionary
ruling classes do their utmost to carry out deceptive propaganda
and reactionary education among the soldiers, the troops have a
low morale and lack a vigorous fighting will. Such troops are afraid
of fighting at close quarters, night engagements and casualties.
Moreover, mutual distrust and strife among different corps and factions
of the army stop them from coordinating activities on their own
initiative. The enemy forces subjectively attempt to deal with us
by employing the method of concentrating superior forces. But, in
practice, they often fail to realise their aim especially when
conditions are difficult or critical because of the inherent
weaknesses in their forces.
We study, analyse and direct war by using the principles of dialectical
materialism. We can correctly employ the method of concentrating
a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one and get
the greatest results from this, precisely because of the fact that
we are able to assess the subjective and objective situation correctly,
analyse comprehensively the balance of forces as between the enemy
and ourselves, make good use of the contradictions within the enemy
ranks and then proceed from reality. It is also because we can correctly
handle the various relations confronting us in the course of using
this method of fighting, such as those between the whole and the
part, concentration and dispersal, main and secondary directions,
annihilating the enemy and holding cities and places, advance and
retreat, offence and defence. Consequently, even when engaging a
powerful enemy, we are invincible and able to attain the objective
of both wiping out the enemy and preserving and strengthening ourselves.
Our enemies are idealists and their method of thinking is metaphysical.
They are unable to analyse the objective situation correctly and
comprehensively and proceed from reality. They always overestimate
their own strength and underestimate the revolutionary forces; they
judge the situation subjectively and thus make light of their opponents
and advance recklessly. They always look at problems from a one-sided
point of view and cannot correctly handle the various relations
encountered in military activities. For instance, in order to cope
with our method of concentrating a superior force to destroy the
enemy forces one by one, the Kuomintang reactionaries put forward
at one time during the Third Revolutionary Civil War the so-called
"tactics of massing troops and advancing abreast" "the employment
of troops must be conventional rather than tricky, the stationing
of troops must be concentrated rather than dispersed and the manoeuvreing
of troops must be slow rather than swift". These tactics were used
when their troops were asked to carry heavy weapons. At another
time they formulated the so-called "tactics of making use of loop-holes"
when they switched to the idea that their troops should carry light
weapons and rations and use mountain paths instead of highways.
They used now this and now that tactic without a definite principle.
In short their strategic intentions and specific actions were always
in contradiction because of the anti-popular nature of the war they
waged. At the beginning of the Third Revolutionary Civil War, Chiang
Kai-shek laid down a principle of "concentrated and flexible employment
of troops". But, on the other hand, he wanted to occupy a great
many places including the Liberated Areas on the borders of Honan
and Hupeh, north Kiangsu, Chengteh, Shenyang and Antung (now Tantung).
With his objectives so scattered and his forces limited, he put
a burden on his back whenever he occupied a city because he had
to send troops to defend it. The more places he occupied, the heavier
his burden and the fewer the troops for further flexible employment.
That is why the principle he formulated could only remain empty
words. Even if he temporarily succeeded in concentrating a relatively
superior force in one particular area and making some gains, lots
of loop-holes were exposed in other areas. Such contradictions were
insurmountable for our enemy.
In a word, the method of concentrating a superior force to destroy
the enemy forces one by one is based on the waging of a people's
war by a people's army and on dialectical materialism; it can be
employed effectively only by a people's army. No antipopular army
can fruitfully use or cope with this method. As Comrade Mao Tsetung
has said:
"The Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang and the U.S. imperialist military
personnel in China are very well acquainted with these military
methods of ours. Seeking ways to counter them, Chiang Kai-shek has
often assembled his generals and field officers for training and
distributed our military literature and the documents captured in
the war for them to study. The U.S. military personnel have recommended
to Chiang Kai-shek one kind of strategy and tactics after another
for destroying the People's Liberation Army; they have trained Chiang
Kai-shek's troops and supplied them with military equipment. But
none of these efforts can save the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang from
defeat."7
* * *
Concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by
one is the materialisation in military affairs of Comrade Mao Tsetung's
strategic and tactical thinking of strategically "pitting one against
ten" and tactically "pitting ten against one". Comrade Mao Tsetung
has also made a great contribution to Marxist-Leninist military
science by applying the Marxist-Leninist stand, views and methods
to the concrete practice of China's revolutionary war. It is the
crystallisation of the experience gained by the Chinese people in
their prolonged armed struggle against their enemies, both internal
and external. This principle is not only one for operations in campaigns
and battles, but also one of guidance in strategy. It fits in with
a war fought both under the condition in which the enemy is strong
and we are weak and vice versa. It is a principle of offence, but
as a guiding concept of operations, it holds good in defence too.
Apart from the glorious role it played in the Chinese people's revolutionary
wars and its great historic significance in those wars, this principle
is of enormous practical significance in strengthening our national
defence and making preparations to smash imperialist aggression
now. As a method of thinking and work, concentrating forces to fight
a war of annihilation applies not only to military struggles, but
also to political and economic struggles. It is of significance
in guiding all activities of our socialist construction.
Although this method of fighting took shape and developed in the
practice of the Chinese revolutionary wars, it has a general significance
for all revolutionary wars. This is because all revolutionary wars,
including those in China, have the common characteristics of a big
and strong enemy and a weak and small revolutionary force which
can achieve victory only through arduous and hard struggles. Of
course, this method of fighting, like the use of other methods for
directing war, must be developed according to the progress of history
and war. It must be flexibly used according to different adversaries
and places. Only in this way can it fulfil its role the role
of defeating the enemy and wining victory. n
Footnotes
1. Mao Tsetung,
"On Protracted War", Selected Military Writings (SMW), Eng. ed.,
Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1963, p. 234.
2. Ibid.,
p. 254-55.
3. Mao Tsetung,
"Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by
One", SMW, pp. 315-316.
4. Ibid.,
p. 316.
5. Mao Tsetung,
"On Protracted War", SMW, p. 249.
6. Mao Tsetung,
"On Protracted War", SMW, p. 260.
7. Mao Tsetung,
"The Present Situation and Our Tasks (excerpts)", SMW, p. 348.
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