

# China Policy Study Group

# BROADSHEET

Sponsors: Dr Joseph Needham FRS, Prof Cyril Offord FRS, Prof Joan Robinson, Prof George Thomson

## DYNAMISM OF NON-ALIGNMENT

Before the end of the last world war the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America had been isolated from one another, but since the Asian Relations Conference was held in New Delhi in 1947, representatives of governments or of political movements and organisations leading the fight against colonialism and imperialism have met together on various occasions. The Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955 is the best known of these early meetings. The recent conference in Algiers of heads of state of non-aligned nations must be viewed against the background of attempts by the subject peoples during the last twenty-five years to achieve unity and solidarity in the face of emerging post-war policies aimed at carving up the tri-continent and even dividing individual countries into new systems of big power domination—spheres of influence, military alliances, economic and ideological blocks, etc. In these systems it was clear that 'lesser' countries would be allowed only to be dependent and subordinate, and that their resources and territory would be exploited for the benefit of, or would be vulnerable to aggression by, one or another of the superpowers. There was at first great uncertainty and confusion among the rulers of many 'independent' countries, as is clear from the Bandung Conference, or the conferences convened by the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, or the series of meetings of what were termed the non-aligned. But in the last few years the struggle waged by the developing countries has been raised to a much higher level than ever before, as the Algiers conference showed.

### KINDS OF NON-ALIGNMENT

The refusal to be camp-followers in either of the major power blocs could, in a world order in which nation-states still existed, mean very different and even contradictory things. On the one hand it could mean the serious refusal (however high the cost) to be dictated to, interfered with or obstructed by others—to assume an equal right with all others to independence and self-determination and to an equal voice in world affairs. It could mean, in other words, a determination to challenge the prevailing world order, with its powers and superpowers, and to transform it into its opposite; not to preserve the privileges and security of the ruling classes but to attack and eradicate the root causes of worldwide poverty, oppression and backwardness.

On the other hand, a refusal to be aligned with either bloc could mean a policy of keeping on good terms with both of the competitors for superpower hegemony, and in fact of pressing in the so-called cold war for consensus and detente, and a 'peace' which stabilised the existing situation of dependence and oppression. This would be a policy of blurring political issues and of isolating revolutionary forces in the Third World. Friendliness to all meant friendliness towards imperialists.

Those who called for non-alignment between oppressors and oppressed, between nations seeking liberation and those seeking world monopoly, did not approve of the altogether different

non-alignment of the Chinese, Korean and Indochinese revolutionaries when they ignored the deals made among the super-powers.

China was never thought of as non-aligned in the early days and most of those influenced by Chinese attitudes were highly critical of the concept of non-alignment.

The first non-aligned conference at Belgrade in 1961 was followed in 1964 by Cairo and in 1970 by Lusaka, and all the time pressures, both economic and military, were increasing on the non-aligned to induce them to abandon their non-alignment. To those unwilling to surrender their independence as the price of aid or investment it gradually became clear, from the end of the 50's, that there was nothing to choose between the private enterprise giant of the U.S.A. and the state power giant of the U.S.S.R. Both were centres of ambitious power systems, both were striving to extend their hegemony, both disposed of great economic and military strength. However much the systems might appear to differ, from the point of view of the Third World their aims and methods were essentially the same.

Nothing contributed more than the experience of China to convincing the Third World that the Soviet embrace was as dangerous as the American. The lessons of the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in 1960 and the thinly-camouflaged attempts to bring China under Soviet military tutelage were not lost on a score of other countries on the periphery of the Russian sphere of influence. Soviet accusations that China had departed from scientific socialism and Leninism carried little weight against the mounting evidence that these phrases had become a formula for Russian control. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 confirmed the fears.

### DIVERSITY OF THE NON-ALIGNED

By the time preparations began for the fourth non-aligned conference at Algiers, non-alignment was directed equally against the Soviet Union and the U.S. Not all the participants were equally non-aligned, however. India has a security treaty with the Soviet Union, and Cuba is virtually a Soviet client state. Still others have Western bases on their soil.

There are contradictions in the non-aligned movement as in everything else. At one time they appeared formidable enough to tear it apart. In the days of the Cold War the movement seemed to be founded on a contradiction, for it professed to have similar relations with the Western colonialists and the Eastern denouncers of colonialism, asking for aid from both.

### SOVIET INTERVENTION

Whatever may be forgotten about the Algiers conference, it will always be remembered for the almost unbelievably clumsy message addressed to it by Brezhnev. When he declared that the non-aligned states must not allow themselves to be divided from the socialist states and thereby 'deprived of their natural and most trustworthy allies', the warning was immediately and almost universally seen as an extension to the Third World of the doctrine of 'limited sovereignty', as applied in Eastern

Europe. Independent struggle by the oppressed nations will not do. You must be aligned with one superpower, according to Brezhnev, and non-aligned with the other.

### CHINESE NON-INTERVENTION

China, true to her policy of strict non-intervention in the diplomacy of the non-aligned nations, confined herself to sending a message wishing the Algiers summit success in achieving 'positive results in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and big-power hegemonism'. The common purpose that brings the non-aligned nations together is independence and development, and here Chinese experience teaches only one approach, that of self-reliance. China has undoubtedly found one way in which a country can turn backwardness into development. Above all, the majority of the Algiers nations desire to remain non-aligned. China is the outstanding example of successful non-alignment in relation to both superpower blocs. The possibilities for common action are immense.

Denunciations of U.S. and Soviet policy at the 10th Congress of the C.P.C. and at the United Nations Assembly have been widely publicised. If the Chinese charges struck a responding chord in Europe, they sounded even more clearly in the Third World, which suffers more directly from superpower hegemony. At the U.N., Chiao Kuan-hua's most withering fire was directed at the Soviet Union's proposed 'collective security' system for Asia. The present attempt to breathe new life into the scheme made it seem, he said, as if the ghost of John Foster Dulles had taken up quarters in the Kremlin. Merely to mention such proposals underlined the similarity between the two superpowers. Both in Asia and in the Middle East their striving for domination over others transcended their differences. They were like two clay figurines which had been kneaded together and then remoulded, so that there is something of each in the other. When they called for disarmament and limitation it was others they wished to disarm and limit, not themselves.

This is a theme certain to unite the nations who have been the victims of exploitation and extortion and now find new devices being used to perpetuate their dependence. The older imperialists of Europe still see the power structures of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as indispensable underpinning for their own system of plunder. The current attitudes of West Germany (refusal to let liberal qualms slow down rapprochement with the U.S.S.R.) and even of France (Pompidou's studious avoidance of any public statement implying acceptance of Chinese criticism of Soviet power-politics) give few grounds for confidence that the E.E.C. will take up an independent position. They will do nothing to offend the Soviet Union, and at the same time they go out of their way to reassure the other superpower that there will be no conflict between E.E.C. and U.S. policy. That situation, however, is likely to be only temporary.

### A NEW STAGE

The European Community may perhaps be a potential ally of China, but China and the non-aligned countries, however they may be seen by others or see themselves, are natural allies. China's development has benefited from a wealth of negative example. She can see where becoming a great power has led, and is determined to follow a different path. All the countries of the Third World know this, and though some may not immediately understand when she measures her support with her eyes on a wider horizon, the voices which denounce China sound a false note.

The Algiers conference of September 1973 marks a new stage in the struggle against imperialism. It has tilted the balance, not against one superpower or the other but against both superpowers together. The developing countries now have no intention of sliding into either camp to escape the pull of the other. Non-commitment equally to the free-economy camp of the

U.S. and the state-monopoly bloc of the U.S.S.R. is no longer an unstable or transitory position. It is the pivot of a positive alternative accepting neither encroachment nor dependence. Translated into economic forms, it sets off a train of questions on other levels. But on the crucial issue of where the power and initiative lie it is categorical: freedom does not mean the 'freedom' of the 'free world' and socialism does not mean the 'socialism' of the Soviet bloc.

The Third World is not merely clarifying its own politics but helping to clarify those of the developed countries. The way was prepared for this by France, who gave the death-blow to the axiom that the U.S. is custodian of all the interests of the 'free' countries, and by China, who exposed the politics of superpower as being imperialism with either a socialist or a free-enterprise facade.

It will be ironical if the only political leadership offering hope to the world comes from those who until recently were virtually outcasts. But the truth shunned by the affluent is seen very clearly by the Third World: the superpowers, while feared militarily, are discredited politically and morally, as are those who merely vacillate between them. Their eloquently proclaimed ideologies are no more than a screen for domination or acquiescence in domination. Only those who start by shedding the illusion that the Western way is the only way of development, and dismissing the idea that the wealthy will come to their aid, and resolve to rely on their own exertions, will set foot on the upward slope. Countries that want to develop will not do so by receiving aid. Countries that want to command respect will not do so by receiving patronage. Countries anxious to preserve the gains of liberation will reject alliance with superpowers or with governments under their control.

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## TO FRIENDS OF BROADSHEET

We thank those readers who sent us £30 in donations during the quarter July-September. Summer is always a time when donations fall off and we hope that our friends will make up for it at Christmas and when renewing subscriptions. May we remind you that the books mentioned below would make excellent Christmas presents. We still have in stock some bound volumes containing our 1970 and 1971 issues, price £3.00 by post, for the two years.

We have just had an inspiring letter from a friend in one of the many detention camps in the Far East. Eight detainees are placing subscriptions and several want copies of George Thomson's books.

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Supplies of Prof. Thomson's new book, **CAPITALISM AND AFTER: the Rise and Fall of Commodity Production**, were delivered to us in the middle of October and orders are being filled as rapidly as possible.

We ask that all orders for this book, and for the previous one, **FROM MARX TO MAO TSE-TUNG**, be sent to C.P.S.G. Books, 41 Great Russell Street, London W.C.1. Both books are the same price, 60p by post. Cheques should be made out to China Policy Study Group.

Payments for BROADSHEET should continue to be sent to Parliament Hill. Please do not combine subscriptions for BROADSHEET with payments for books; it will make difficulties for us.

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A proposed Editorial on the Middle East crisis has been crowded out of this issue. We intend to publish a longer article next month.

THE CHINA POLICY STUDY GROUP

# THE 'TEN MAJOR STRUGGLES'

In his Report to the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Chou En-lai said that in the past fifty years the Party had gone through ten major struggles between two lines. In fact, the whole history of the Chinese Party has illustrated the truth of Mao Tse-tung's statement in *On Contradiction* that differences are universal:

'The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.'

Inner-Party struggles have been continuous in the past, and, as Chou En-lai put it, 'comrades in our Party must be fully prepared for the struggles in the long years to come', for contradictions would continue in society and two-line struggles would reflect them.

Moreover, struggles within the Party would reflect contradictions without, for 'enemies at home and abroad all understand that the easiest way to capture a fortress is from within', and 'capitalist-roaders' within the Party were in the best position to subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat. He was then referring specifically to Lin Piao, but others, both before and after seizure of power by the proletariat, had opposed the interests of the working people.

This article offers a very brief outline of the ten struggles referred to by Chou En-lai. Clearly it cannot cover all their ramifications and complexities, but it does indicate the main trends and the main errors. The fact that each one is identified by the name of an individual does not mean he alone was responsible for the deviation in question, nor that he alone carried it out. Nor does it mean that these were the only contradictions and struggles within the Party. Already at the First Party Congress in 1921 there were two wrong viewpoints: the 'right' held by the 'Legal Marxists' who only wanted to publish journals, run political schools, and take part in 'parliamentary' action; the 'left' which stood for immediate proletarian dictatorship, rejecting participation in bourgeois-democratic movements, and advocating adventurist action.

(1) **Chen Tu-hsiu.** He was elected leader of the Party Central Committee in 1921. He at first took the 'left' line that socialist revolution must start at once, omitting the stage of democratic revolution against feudalism and imperialism. He then opposed alliance with the Kuomintang and wanted an independent Communist Party. Later, under the influence of the Comintern, he led the Party into a united front with the K.M.T., but in which the Party was in a subordinate position. This was a line of 'all unity and no struggle', and it ended in the 1927 disaster when Chiang Kai-shek massacred thousands of communists and other militants.

(2) **Chu Chiu-pai.** A member of the Party Central Committee, he led the 'first left line' (1927-28). He denied that revolution should proceed by stages and that the democratic revolution was necessary. He and other Party leaders ordered city uprisings, ignoring the fact that revolution had suffered a severe setback, that workers and peasants had not been organised, that the Party had not set up bases and built an army. He was an ultra-leftist who did not understand the role of the several intermediate classes and who sought to leap over the stage of democratic revolution.

(3) **Li Li-san.** Replacing Chu Chiu-pai, he nevertheless led the 'second left line', believing that the workers formed the only revolutionary class. He attacked the 'peasant mentality' of Mao and others, urging postponement of land reform and opposing the setting up of red bases in rural areas. At the same time he

took the 'right' line of alliance with the rich peasants, in opposition to those who were seeking to organise the poor peasants. He caused the Party great losses by launching risings in the cities before preparations had been made.

(4) **Wang Ming.** As leader of a group of students returning from the Soviet Union, he was responsible for the 'third left line', which dominated the Party for the four disastrous years (1930-34), during which Chiang Kai-shek launched a series of encirclement campaigns to wipe out the red bases in Southeast China. Although Wang Ming scorned the Li Li-san line as 'right opportunism under the disguise of "leftist" talk', he himself was at first a leftist, advocating 'all struggle and no unity' except with workers. He despised what he called 'peasant mentality' and simultaneously attacked all rich peasants, landlords and capitalists. His military tactics were to throw the Red Army, then still inexperienced, into conventional attacks on big cities. Later, he had swung right, and in 1937 thought that the C.P.C. was too weak to lead the anti-Japanese war. He labelled Mao a 'chauvinist' for believing that victory over Japan and winning national independence were essential steps to revolutionary victory. He ultimately defected to the Soviet Union, where he carries on bitter anti-China propaganda.

(5) **Lo Chang-lung.** Before 1921 he was a student member of a Marxist study circle in Peking and was a member of leading Party organisations in the 1920's. He strongly disagreed with Li Li-san and later with Wang Ming, opposing their 'left' lines, even to the extent of attempting to form a rival Central Committee in the C.P.C. He was a rightist who would have split the Party and was expelled in 1932.

(6) **Chang Kuo-tao.** He was a sectarian who veered from 'left' to 'right'. In 1923-27 he thought the working class the only revolutionary force and, like Chen Tu-hsiu, ignored the peasantry. His 'left' line was expressed by opposing the first united front with the Kuomintang, but early in the Long March he became an ultra-rightist, urging the merging of Party administration and armed forces with those of the K.M.T., to which in 1938 he defected.

(7) **Kao Kang.** Both before and after 1949 he held leading Party positions in the Northeast. He tried to reproduce a Soviet model in his area, holding that the Soviet Union must be imitated in every way. In practice he attempted to set up 'independent kingdoms' under his own control. In 1954 and 1955 he was exposed as a member of an anti-Party bloc.

(8) **Peng Teh-huai.** Formerly a Kuomintang officer, he joined the C.P.C. in 1928 and played an important part in the revolutionary war. At the same time, he was fundamentally a rightist who sought to strengthen 'professionalism' in military organisation and action, ignoring politics. In the 1930's he had sided with Wang Ming and others in saying that 'guerillism' was outmoded, that conventional warfare was essential. For a few years soldiers' conferences and committees were dropped and political education declined, while Soviet-style ranks, codes of behaviour, and uniforms were adopted. The traditions of the P.L.A. were in danger of being lost. He seriously underrated the role of the militia and considered modern weaponry more important than politically-conscious soldiers. As a corollary, he opposed the mass movements of the Great Leap Forward and the formation of the people's communes. He was dismissed as Minister of Defence in 1959.

(9) **Liu Shao-chi.** Basically he was a rightist, but veered from right to 'left' and back again. At one time he pressed for the merging of the C.P.C. with the Kuomintang, then in 1938 he backed Mao's struggle for 'independence and initiative' within the united front. Later he talked of 'peace and democracy' as the main form of struggle. In 1948 he passed on Soviet advice *not* to cross the Yangtse, but to leave South China to Chiang Kai-shek. After 1949 he tried to slow down socialist construction; Tientsin businessmen were told that 'production comes first'. In 1958 he claimed that the commune movement was premature. In 1966 he made use of the 'work teams' sent into universities to repress student rebellion.

(10) **Lin Piao.** His training at Whampoa Military Academy under senior Russian and other foreign advisers tended to imbue him with professional military concepts of organisation, protocol, and tactics. He was suspicious of guerilla warfare, reliance on the masses, and especially on the peasant. However, he played a successful part in the campaigns of the Civil War and the Anti-Japanese War. He is thought to have been responsible, during the Cultural Revolution, for much of the extravagant praise of Mao, now considered to be a deliberate attempt to ridicule him. After his draft report for the 1969 Ninth Party Congress had been turned down, he was constrained to accept the draft which he delivered. As Chou En-Lai said, 'On his part there was a process of development and self-exposure, and on our part there was also a process of getting to know him.' When his counter-revolutionary schemes failed he tried to flee to the Soviet Union, but died in a plane crash in Mongolia. Details of his conspiracies have been discussed by the Chinese people and in due course are likely to be made known outside.

#### LESSONS FROM HISTORY

Wrong policies within the Chinese Communist Party have caused heavy losses and every one of the struggles against those policies appeared, to some, to provide evidence of fundamental disunity in the Party. But those who realised that contradictions are a part of life were not discouraged. The struggles against deviations actually *helped* to confirm and strengthen the correct line. No other Party has made such efforts to learn from mistakes. Is not one of the reasons for Chinese success the fact that, recognising the inevitability of contradictions, they expose them, they analyse them and learn from them, rather than trying to sweep them under the carpet?

It is noteworthy, too, that erring members are given every opportunity to correct and learn from their mistakes. They are *not* executed; usually they are given other work. Both Li Li-san and Wang Ming were members of the Central Committee until the Cultural Revolution. Wang Ming has been living in Moscow for many years.

Can one really say that other Communist parties have made fewer mistakes than the Chinese? It would appear, for example, that the C.P.S.U. believe they have made no errors since the death of Stalin. Khrushchev was indiscreet and his bluster offended people, but after his removal it was stated officially that his policies would continue. When we consider the lesser parties of the West we find a curious paradox: the fewer the avowed mistakes, the less the success; the more mistakes acknowledged, the greater the success.

Further information about most of those referred to above may be found in: *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (especially the notes) and *A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution* (now out of print), published by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking; *The Morning Deluge*, by Han Suyin; *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*, by Jerome Chen.

## NOTE FROM WUHAN

*An English subscriber working in Peking writes:*

I saw something in Wuhan that might fill an odd space in BROADSHEET. I whipped around the big department store — one of the eight biggest in China — in an odd half-hour, and noticed a corner of the textile floor given over to about 10 treadle sewing machines, where two women were busy sewing. I had just passed the tailoring and repair section so knew it wasn't that, and asked if the women were learning to use the machines before buying them. I was told they were hiring the use of the machines — 5 fen (about 1p) an hour. A wonderful service; I have not seen it provided in any other department store in China.

Further on, in the textile department, was a section crowded with people. On display were children's clothes, jackets (for men and women), and women's blouses. Each was numbered and there was a large box with numbered slots; I think 97 garments in all were shown. They were the latest designs from local factories, on show to gather opinions from customers. Although I know factories producing consumer goods gather opinions of the masses, I had never seen such a display in a shop before.

## CAUSE OF HOSTILITY

Certainly there is an absolutely fundamental hostility between American imperialism and China, stemming from the different nature of the two societies, so that accommodations between them are relative, conditional and temporary, reflecting their tactical positions in the overall international situation at a given time. But between the Soviet Union and China there is not merely this same hostility but *something added*. America is avowedly a capitalist country, so that any agreements it makes with China are openly between countries which have different systems and which are making agreements based on their calculations of practical interests at a given time. The Soviet Union, however, avows itself to be what it is not, a socialist country, with the whole position of its ruling class resting on asserting this untruth. Chinese exposures of this sham are not merely a challenge to the Soviet state from another state — if this were all, Soviet-Chinese relations would be subject to the same kind of calculations as those which apply to Soviet-American relations — but a challenge to the whole existence of the Soviet regime. That is what Brezhnev meant when he spoke of Chinese 'rabid anti-Sovietism'. This is the element in Soviet-Chinese relations which does not exist in American-Chinese or Soviet-American relations, and which gives rise to fixed Soviet hostility to China.

The above words are quoted from the July-September issue of *Politics & Money*, a periodical published in London ten times a year. The July-September issue is on the international situation and deals almost exclusively with the Soviet Union. The next issue will consider other countries. A postcard to *Politics & Money*, 14 South Hill Park Gardens, London, N.W.3 will bring a sample copy. Subscription for a year is £1.90 to the British Isles, £2.70 to Europe (airmail), and £3.50 to the rest of the world (airmail).

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