

China Policy Study Group

BROADSHEET

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EDITORIAL

President Nixon's 'New Strategy for Peace' has been hailed in some quarters as marking U.S. recognition that its role of world policeman has come to an end. In fact it is an attempt, while maintaining the old objectives, to induce other people to do more of the dying and paying.

In arguing that because of 'the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation,' the U.S. can now afford to reduce the scale of its armaments, he is simply making a virtue of necessity. The reduction in arms spending is not the result of any sudden shift in international relations; it is dictated by domestic political and economic pressures. And the mounting scale of U.S. aggression in Laos shows that the imperialist policeman does not easily abandon his role.

U.S.-Soviet talks on arms limitation are based not only on economic necessity and the 'balance of terror' but on the fact that the U.S. has long ceased to regard the U.S.S.R. as its real enemy. What Walter Lippmann said in his eulogy of President Kennedy remains fundamentally true: the Soviet leaders have acquiesced in a balance of power decided in favour of the U.S.

What then of American overtures to China? These are not new either. The U.S. has for years been trying to escape from the intolerable contradictions involved in trying to 'contain' the nation which it sees as the largest potential market in the world—a market that it badly needs. But it still occupies the Chinese territory of Taiwan. And neither U.S. leaders nor their Soviet counterparts can escape from the fact that revolutionary and socialist China threatens, by the force of its example, imperialism and revisionism alike, and is a solid base of support for all peoples struggling for freedom.

In arguing that 'the Soviet Union shares with other countries the overwhelming temptation to continue to base its policies at home and abroad on old and familiar concepts', Nixon is on sure ground. But, so far as China is concerned, ordinary people everywhere may be sceptical of his claim that the U.S. 'will deal with communist countries on the basis of a precise understanding of what they are about in the world': capitalist politicians are inherently incapable of understanding the real driving force behind the genuine socialism of China.

TWO CONTENDING LINES

in the history of the C.P.C.

There are always divergent lines within political parties, crystallising into factions and periodically causing splits. Lenin's Communist Party (Bolshevik) was formed through such a split; after its formation new internal policy differences appeared. Basic issues after the October Revolution were whether to build an independent socialist nation; whether, considering the urgency of economic and military independence, to give priority to consumer industry or to basic industry; whether to develop large-scale agriculture and industry at once upon socialised lines, etc. A series of inner-party struggles against both right and 'left' ensued. They were carried out in a form influenced by Russian political traditions, by European radicalism and by the current international and domestic situation. China's criticism of Stalin has been that during the struggle he failed to distinguish contradictions between the enemy and the people from contradictions among the people themselves.

Having acted on the theory that every contradiction was antagonistic, Stalin concluded that the internal enemy had been eliminated and class struggle within the country was on the way out. This was accepted by Western Communists, who carried on their own struggle under much the same thinking.

In this period China's radical traditions were still in formation. Imperialist predations after the Opium war of 1840 had given rise to a demand among high officials for constitutional monarchy and modernisation. Thanks to the radical influence of the sons of the middle class studying in Japan and the West, a bourgeois revolution led by Sun Yat-sen resulted in 1911. Economic modernisation and a combination of ancient Confucian and modern Western humanism—'Science and Democracy'—were major aspects of the new thought. The guns of the October Revolution brought Marxism-Leninism to China, the May 4th Movement of 1919 introduced political demands, the proletariat entered the scene and the Chinese revolution took on a new character. Some years later Mao Tse-tung found the way to mobilise the oppressed peasants, who became the mainstay of the revolution.

Among those who founded the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 two tendencies were already apparent. One adopted

lock, stock and barrel Western radical thinking and methods. The other, of which Mao became the chief exponent, accepted the humanist tradition and the historical experience of the proletariat, striving to develop them according to specific national conditions.

The Western faction was first dominated by national secretary Chen Tu-hsiu, who argued that the democratic revolution should be led by the bourgeoisie, and that after victory the Communists could wage a legal struggle for a socialist revolution. A 'left' line under Chang Kuo-tao (who later became a spy and now lives in Canada), opposed any form of alliance with bourgeois forces or the peasant movement. Only in 1923 was Mao's policy of a united front with the Kuomintang—the Communist Party retaining autonomy—agreed upon. In 1925, as Mao had long urged, the Fourth Party Congress called upon workers and peasants to organise and oppose imperialist and warlord oppression. At the Fifth Congress, held in 1927, shortly after Chiang Kai-shek's coup in Shanghai and massacre of revolutionary forces in the cities, Mao urged the strengthening of the rural revolution by arming the peasants to seize the land and set up rural revolutionary governments. Under Chen Tu-hsiu's control, the Congress refused to discuss this resolution, removed Mao from the leading body and stripped him of voting rights. Chen directed Liu Shao-chi, then a union official in Hankow, to have the workers turn in their arms.

The Left was bust. It painfully regrouped itself in the mountains, where Mao and his followers were already building rural soviet power. The Sixth Party Congress, held in Moscow in 1928, repudiated Chen Tu-hsiu's line, and elected a new Central Committee under Li Li-san. Clinging to the western tradition of urban struggle, Li instituted a 'Left' programme of strikes and demonstrations. In the face of formidable repression, this was quickly given up, but the successive leaderships of Chu Chiu-pai and Wang Ming continued the urban line, regarding the development of guerrilla forces merely as preparation for taking the towns. Several such attempts ended in disaster.

The urban movement having been decimated as a result of these adventurous policies, Wang Ming retreated

in 1932 with the Central Committee from the Shanghai underground to the rural bases. There they ordered the ill-armed guerrillas to oppose with conventional military tactics Chiang's fifth attack on the revolutionary bases — which had successfully withstood the previous four by using 'people's war'. In consequence they were virtually routed. This was the inauspicious start of the Long March. At Tsunyi in January 1935 the March was halted and a conference held; it removed Wang Ming from office, elected Mao the new chairman of the Communist Party and began a disciplined march to a northwestern base from which Japanese invasion could be resisted.

'Left'-ists become capitulationists

With the formation of the anti-Japanese united front at the end of 1936, Wang Ming and his urbanist faction became capitulationists. Liu Shao-chi, already becoming known as a theorist in 1939, was ready, in return for official posts, to turn over leadership to the Kuomintang. In the region under his party control his methods of work led to the decimation of revolutionaries. In 1942, the New Fourth Army, based south of the Yangtse, blindly accepting Kuomintang orders rather than advice from Yen-an, fell into a K.M.T. trap and were massacred. In Shanghai intellectuals for years conducted a party organisation independently of Yen-an.

It was in an attempt to solve these contradictions that Mao initiated the 1942 rectification. The movement, which lasted three years, was an essential preliminary to the successful Liberation War. By 1945 Wang Ming was quite discredited, and lived much of the time out of the country, misadvising Stalin on the Chinese situation. It was only Mao Tse-tung's personal intervention that kept him on the Central Committee. At the Seventh Congress in 1945, Liu Shao-chi was spokesman for the conservative faction. In his report on revision of the Party constitution, he promoted class conciliation and 'peaceful transition', decried armed struggle, and opposed Mao's party-building line.

Differences after liberation

After liberation fundamental differences continued to be reflected in two distinct lines. Liu proposed letting the capitalists build a large, modern industry, which the socialist state would then nationalise, the former owners staying on as managers. One such person fled to Hongkong a few years later, taking all his liquid assets with him. Liu also advocated private farming until industry could produce modern agricultural equipment in quantity. Soon after land reform, a process of class polarisation started again, with successful peasants investing their surpluses in traditional ways—usury, rackrents or commercial speculation—but not in capital improvement.

To combat this trend the Central Committee in 1955 called for a million 'higher' agricultural co-operatives, to supersede the 'lower' form, and permanently take over land, animals and tools, compensating their owners. The peasants, fully ready for the move, answered the call for one million with seven.

People's Communes

Out of these there developed the Communes which, after his 1958 tour of agricultural regions, Mao praised as the right form for the next stage. In spite of every attempt after 1960 to discredit them and to reinstate the individual farmer, they endured. At the same time, the Big Leap in agriculture had its counterparts in the growth of new and modernised industries.

Ultra-'left' policies have neither social nor economic base, and usually serve to sabotage realistic radical policies. This is what is meant by 'left in form but right in essence' and 'waving

the red flag to attack the red flag'. This tactic has been much used in China to disguise conservatives as ultra-revolutionaries. It can confuse cadres, who may sometimes accept it as a continuation of Party policies. William Hinton's *Fanshen* presents such a case (see his BROADSHEET pamphlet, *China's Continuing Revolution*).

The 'Party line', announced in policy speeches and resolutions agreed on at the highest levels, may be distorted in practice by ministerial and provincial directives. In 1958 Mao Tse-tung's line that education must be combined with proletarian politics and productive labour was set forth in a policy speech by Lu Ting-yi, Minister of Education. But after 1960, on the excuse of raising standards, Lu used the temporary economic setbacks as the occasion to cut secondary schools and to introduce streaming and competitive entrance examinations, overloading scholastic curricula and eliminating politics and productive labour. Primary school leavers too young for jobs stayed idle at home.

Methods of struggle

Mao Tse-tung writes:

In the history of our Party there were great struggles against the erroneous lines of Chen Tu-hsiu and of Li Li-san, and they were absolutely necessary. But there were defects in the methods employed. For one thing, the cadres were not brought to a full ideological understanding of the causes of these errors, the circumstances in which they were committed and the detailed ways and means of correcting them, so that errors of a similar nature came to be repeated; and for another, too much stress was placed on the responsibility of individuals, so that we failed to unite as many people as we could have done for our common endeavour.

(*Our Study and the Current Situation*, 1944)

Of the rectification movement of 1942, he wrote:

The 'Left' dogmatists had resorted to the method of 'ruthless struggle and merciless blows' in inner-Party struggle. This method was incorrect. In criticising 'Left' dogmatism, we discarded this old method and adopted a new one, that is, one of starting from the desire for unity, distinguishing between right and wrong through criticism or struggle and arriving at a new unity on a new basis.

(*On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, 1957)

The 16 May, 1966 *Circular* (on Peng Chen) quoted Mao:

Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchov, for example, who are still nestling beside us.

Objects of struggle

In this situation, Mao sees among those he criticises men who have devoted a lifetime to fighting for a more rational society, through hardship and war; some have made significant contributions. But because they grew up in a semi-mediaeval society, many feel themselves revolutionary even though their politics are more middle-class than proletarian, their 'rational society' a kind of welfare state under a 'beneficent' bureaucracy/elite, and their ideas of economic development outdated (e.g. Liu Shao-chi in 1950, 'What we need more of is the farmer with three horses and a plough'). Mao's policies have often been carried, despite the reluctance of the majority, because of his long-term correct leadership and because these policies were already being put into effect by the people throughout the country.

Mao's stress is on the great debate, the 'struggle-criticism-change' (*dou-pi-gai*). He emphasises that at lower levels—where

there is a strong tendency to remove capitalist-roaders from office without the critical analysis necessary to keep revolutionary cadres from taking the same road—criticism should be of the line, not of the individual.

Still less to be held responsible are the 'deceived masses' and those ordinary Party members who thought they were following the Party line but in fact were being mobilised by the bureaucratic machine to attack critics in the name of 'defending the Party'. Cadres under criticism are not as a rule publicly named outside their own organisations. The concentration of criticism on those in positions of authority protects those at a lower level, and centres attention on issues rather than personalities. Liu Shao-chi, one of the 'persons like Khrushchov', was officially named only by the enlarged Central Committee in October 1968, while the other keeps the official anonymity of 'top Party person in authority taking the capitalist road'. This practice facilitates rehabilitation and preserves unity with those still subject to the influence of the criticised.

Party instructions on 'cleansing the ranks' are precise. Only if there is thoroughly documented evidence of desertion or betrayal (any use of third-degree methods to extort confessions is prohibited, and such evidence would be unacceptable) or of his being a 'diehard capitalist-roader', is anyone expelled. Evidence of workers and activists, already published, had established Liu Shao-chi as guilty; and further evidence presented to the Ninth Congress resulted in his expulsion.

Only his actions will show whether or not a person is a 'diehard capitalist-roader'. Chen Tu-hsiu, after being repudiated in 1928, left to form a disruptive second Party. Li Li-san stayed with the revolution, a secondary fighter, and is still there, although dropped from the Central Committee at the Ninth Congress. Wang Ming has long been in voluntary exile, writing stale slanders which few read, calling Mao Tse-tung a usurper and revolutionary China a failure; the Ninth Congress wrote him off. Peng Teh-huai—implicated in the 1953 attempt by

Kao Kang to carve an 'independent kingdom' out of the north-eastern provinces—tried a Party coup in 1959. He remained on the Central Committee, on probation, without a vote; some details of his case were made public in 1967.

Some who still have seats on the Ninth Central Committee have often opposed revolutionary policies in the past. One elder statesman with an outstanding revolutionary record was invited by the masses to be criticised, but when Mao said he would be there to support him, the organisers had second thoughts and the meeting was called off. The 'woman with bound feet' (Mao's description of a leading cadre who in 1954 dissolved 200,000 co-operatives) is still on the Committee, with another chance to take off his bindings.

The area of attack should be limited, and the area of education broad. . . . Toward good men who have erred, we must do more educational work, and when they reach understanding, we must liberate them promptly.

(Mao Tse-tung, quoted in *Hongqi* editorial, January 1969)

Mao sees China's Cultural Revolution not as a power struggle between factions, but as a struggle to 'unify understanding, unify policy, unify planning, unify direction and unify action' on a revolutionary line for a new great upsurge.

SHIRLEY WOOD

CHINA'S CONTINUING REVOLUTION

by William Hinton, author of 'Fanshen'

The two contending lines — from Land
Reform in 1948 to the Cultural
Revolution

CHINA POLICY STUDY GROUP

JAPAN'S ROLE

in an anti-China axis

The recent Tokyo-Washington agreement on Okinawa by no means heralds a new U.S. policy in Asia; on the contrary, it emphasises its continuity. From the Opium War of 1840 to the final victory of the People's Liberation Army in 1949, American policy in Asia was dominated by the vision of China as an integral part of its economic and political system. As far back as 1900 Senator Beveridge (Indiana) stated:

The Philippines are ours forever and just beyond the Philippines are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either, will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustees under God of the civilisation of the world. The power that rules the Pacific is the power that rules the world. That power will forever be the American Republic.

Japan's defeat of China in 1895, and her more significant victory over Russia a decade later, won her a role as junior partner in the American scheme of things in China and the Pacific. The U.S., like Britain, sympathised with Japan's desire to carve out for herself a sphere of influence in Manchuria and Korea. Her success in blocking Russian designs there met with approval from the West and admiration in Asia. The American view of Japan's special role in China was re-emphasised during World War I, when Japanese militarism, its appetite whetted, forced weak Chinese rulers to accept the notorious Twenty-One Demands. While Woodrow Wilson talked of 'open covenants openly arrived at', his Secretary of State Lansing was busy making a secret agreement with his Japanese counterpart Ishii, under which Washington conceded to Tokyo the substance of its claims on China. Throughout the 1920's, and particularly in the 1930's, when Japanese militarism took Manchuria into its empire, American industry continued to act as Japan's most important supplier of arms and essential raw materials. On the

eve of World War II, John Foster Dulles poured scorn on those who warned the world of the dangers from Japanese militarism in the East and Nazism in the West.

Japan's attempts to seduce the peoples of Asia through such slogans as 'co-prosperity' and 'Asia for Asians' were exposed by the savagery of the Japanese military in the countries they occupied. 'The United States,' as Noam Chomsky remarks, 'fought the Second World War, in the Pacific theatre, primarily in order to prevent Japan from constructing its own independent, integrated imperial system which would be closed to America. That was the basic issue which lay behind the Japanese-American War.' Today the U.S. is putting the finishing touches to a system which would allow Japan to function effectively as a junior partner. This had become an urgent necessity, for America's political equation in the Pacific had been badly upset by the emergence of People's China as a great power, and by the increasing influence of its revolutionary ideology. With China 'lost' the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, formed a committee to reassess American policy in Asia. It was instructed to take as its basic premise 'that it is a fundamental decision of American policy that the U.S. does not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the continent of Asia. . . .'

Dulles' brain-child, the 'Japanese Peace Treaty', was rushed through in 1951, without the signatures of either the Soviet Union or People's China, and Japan was henceforth firmly in the American orbit.

Japan became a base for U.S. military operations on the Asian mainland, e.g. Korea and Vietnam, while the creation of a belt of U.S. satellites, from South Korea and Taiwan to the

Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, assured Japan a market and access to raw materials. In this period Japan also greatly increased her stake in the Australian economy.

In Eisenhower's words:

One of Japan's greatest opportunities for increased trade lies in a free and developing south-east Asia. . . . The great need in one country is for raw materials, in the other country for manufactured goods. The two regions complement each other markedly. By strengthening of Vietnam and helping to ensure the safety of the South Pacific and south-east Asia, we gradually develop the great potential between this region . . . and highly industrialised Japan to the benefit of both. In this way freedom in the western Pacific will be greatly strengthened.

Failure to ensure such a sphere of influence for Japan might bring about a crisis in that country's capitalist system and force it to turn to China, with the danger that once again a great industrial power would be carving out for itself an economic empire outside the American world system.

The crippling cost to the U.S. of its Asian policy, above all the endless drain of men and money in Vietnam, now makes it imperative for Washington to shift some of the burden to industrialised Japan. Eisaku Sato on 22 November 1969 proclaimed a 'new Pacific age', saying that 'a new order will be created by Japan and the United States'. According to the *Times* (London), 5 January 1970:

The question of more immediate concern to Japan's neighbours is whether there is to be an expansion of her military role.

The signs are that the Sato Government will continue, possibly at a faster pace, the discreet build-up of the nation's military capability that has been going on over the years in spite of a pacifist constitution which declares that 'land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained'.

The Japanese Defence Agency released some information this weekend about the next five year defence programme starting in 1972, the fourth in a series which began in 1957. Officials said that the programme would create 'a system capable of effectively dealing with all (armed) aggression involving localised or inner warfare and the use of conventional weapons'.

'Localised' is not clearly defined. Does it, for example, mean that Japanese forces would intervene to help repel a conventional Communist attack on Formosa, or South Korea, both of which, to judge by the Okinawa communique, are now considered to be within Japan's security perimeter?

The stepping-up of the 'defence programme' may also be another step in the creation of an inter-Asian army designed to protect reactionary and autocratic governments from their own people, much as the Brazilians were called in to confirm and legitimise America's Dominican intervention.

And the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union too has a major role for Japan in its 'collective security' scheme for Asia. Like Washington, Moscow is primarily interested in stabilising the status quo and in containing China. The attempt to use for this purpose the tottering Indian Government and other semi-bankrupt regimes in south-east Asia is a measure of Moscow's political bankruptcy, but the addition of Japan to this rickety anti-revolutionary, anti-China coalition might succeed in buying for it a longer lease of life. To this end the Soviet rulers are trying to lure the Sato Government with offers of joint economic exploitation of eastern Siberia, hoping that a favourable response will be forthcoming from Japanese monopolists searching for new sources of raw material.

The real question is whether Japan in the years ahead will be content with the junior position assigned to it by the two super-powers. If it maintains its present rate of growth, Japan's production will surpass the U.S.S.R.'s within fifteen years. And if the past is a reliable guide, Japan's rulers may yet have some unpleasant surprises in store for their friends in the White House and the Kremlin.

A NOTE ON FOREIGN TRADE

Figures for China's 1969 trade, now available from various countries, illustrate her policy of making trade serve her political objectives, not dominate them. They are evidence of her determination to remain self-reliant, to build her economy in her own way, and to be prepared for whatever may come.

Trade with the United Kingdom, both export and import, was the highest since the founding of the People's Republic, with China buying considerably more of such raw materials as diamonds, platinum, copper and lead. This does not necessarily mean that China lacks these minerals, but rather that present development is concentrated in other fields or that stockpiles are being formed.

Increased imports of machine tools (more recent and bigger orders for which are not reflected in the 1969 figures) show a willingness to make use of individual items from abroad, when they are suitable, in factories of Chinese design.

For a number of years much wheat has been imported from Canada and Australia—a trade which these countries would now be reluctant to lose. The wheat is not essential for China's current consumption, but useful foreign exchange is earned by buying wheat and selling rice, at the same time creating reserves. More dairy farming in China and increased consumption of bread are to some extent changing her food habits.

By comparison with the great trading nations China's international trade is small. She does not depend on it. At the same time her freedom from external and internal debt makes it possible for her to take quick advantage of favourable market possibilities and she has shown notable skill in doing so.

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