



1971:

Writings and speeches

Mao Zedong

Introduction

In 2013, a private collector of Mao Zedong's works and related memorabilia, published 52 volumes of the Collected Works of Mao Zedong.

Zhang Dijie, from Luoyang City in Henan province was born in December 1959, and joined the PLA in 1976, the year of Mao's death. He began collecting everything he could related to the writings of Chairman Mao, and his 52 volumes, each often comprising 500 or so pages, spans the first poem written by Mao in 1901 at the age of 8 years old, to the final message attributed to Mao before his death, the message on the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea.

According to Zhang Dijie, over 36 years of painstaking effort he had accumulated 102,000 copies and 15,000 editions of Mao's works from over 130 countries. The content of the published collection, by a Hong Kong publishing house, comprises 30% that is widely known, 50% that has only been released to a limited audience, and 20% published for the first time.

This is a translation of those parts of Volume 51 that span the year 1970. The five volumes of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong published in various languages by the Foreign Language Press, Beijing, have made Chairman Mao's writings on protracted people's war, the New Democratic Revolution, literature and art, and a host of other topics prior to the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution available to the international communist movement.

I am not fluent in Chinese. I know enough to get by on a daily basis in China, but for the sake of getting the job done quickly, I use the online translators Google Translate and DeepL. As good as they are, they invariably contain errors or contain references that need to be explained for non-Chinese readers. I can at least recognise and correct the errors, and search the internet in Chinese to find the information that will help readers.

There are two types of footnotes in this collection of Mao's speeches and writings. Those enclosed in [] brackets at the end of each writing or speech by Mao are by Zhang Dijie, those at the bottom of a page are my own. There are not many of the latter. Those by Zhang Dijie are translated as they appear in his collection. Some are simply matters of fact ("XXX was at that time director of such and such an institution") while others reflect the revisionist reappraisal of events and people connected with the GPCR. Comrades will no doubt be able to use their own bullshit detectors in relation to the latter.

I have not been able to contact Comrade Zhang Dijie to thank him for his great effort in collecting and publishing the 52 volumes of Mao's Collected Works, so I use this opportunity to acknowledge his great contribution to our knowledge of Mao's thinking across the years, and particularly during the tumultuous year that saw the launching of the GPCR.

Nick G. (Contents pages at rear)

Comments on Jiang Qing's speech [1] at the North China Conference [2]

(January 1971).

1

Please do so. Please send me the transcript of Jiang Qing's recording before you decide whether to play it.

2

Do not play it or print it out; it can be kept as internal material.

[1] Jiang Qing (then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the Central Organization and Propaganda Group) made two speeches at the North China Conference, criticizing others without discussion by the Central Committee. On January 7, 1971, Zhou Enlai made six specific arrangements in his report to Mao Zedong and others on the North China Conference to implement Mao Zedong's policy and instructions on holding a good conference and uniting the entire army. The sixth item was to focus everyone's attention on the two instructions and related reports issued by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin on December 16 and 19, as well as relevant documents of the Central Committee, and to compile and print seven materials of the North China Conference. "It is also planned to delete the recordings of Comrade Jiang Qing's two speeches) and play them for the comrades in the region. After reading them, Mao Zedong wrote a comment, which is the content of this article. On January 11, when Zhou Enlai submitted the edited manuscript of Jiang Qing's two speeches to Mao Zedong, he wrote, "I received the Chairman's instructions on the evening of July 7 and informed Comrade Jiang Qing the next day." Last night we agreed to "send the edited manuscript with the parts we intend to delete to the Chairman for review. I am sending it here now. Please approve whether it should be played at the meeting. After reading it, Mao Zedong wrote another comment, which is the second part of this article.

[2] The meeting was held in Beijing from December 22, 1970 to January 24, 1971. A total of 449 people attended the meeting, including leaders of the Beijing Military Region, military regions of various provinces in North China, Beijing Garrison District, Tianjin Garrison District and relevant units in North China. From January 9, 1971, 143 people who attended the Central Military Commission symposium also attended the meeting. This meeting exposed and criticized Chen Boda's anti-party crimes, but also said that Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan "participated" in Chen Boda's anti-party activities. On December 6, 1979, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a "Notice on Rehabilitating the So-called "North China Mountaintopism"" to rehabilitate Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan.

Comments on the Jinan Military Region Political Department's Report on the Study and Implementation of Mao Zedong's Directive "The Army Must Be Cautious" [1]

(January 8, 1971)

1

Comrades Lin, Zhou, and Kang [2]:

This document is excellent. It explains the problem clearly from the perspective of combining theory with practice. Please review it and see if it can be circulated to the entire army. If approved, please have the Premier read it out, discuss it, and approve it at a Politburo meeting. Add a few instructions from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Military Commission, and the General Political Department of the Military Commission, and it can be issued [3]. In addition to the army, central government agencies and local party and government agencies should also issue it. Our army and local governments have not rectified this erroneous ideology for many years. Now is an excellent time to conduct a self-education campaign.

Mao Zedong

January 8

2

It is better to change it to abundant energy, because human energy is not unlimited.

[1] On January 5, 1971, the Political Department of the Jinan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army wrote a report to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and the General Political Department, stating that in studying and implementing Chairman Mao's directive on "the army's caution," we have focused on the following issues: First, we have dismantled the "theory of consistent correctness" and established a dialectical worldview. We must make some comrades who believe they are "consistently correct" realize that "consistent correctness" itself is incorrect and fundamentally violates dialectical materialism. They dress themselves up as "consistently correct" for the sake of vying for credit, which manifests as arrogance, but is essentially bureaucratic, and rooted in selfishness. Secondly, we must dispel the notion that "leaders are superior" and establish the concept that the masses are the true heroes. We must address the problem of some comrades who always feel they are "superior to the masses," who are prone to putting on airs, who are prone to criticizing and reprimanding, and who demand the final say on matters big and small. We must equip cadres with Chairman Mao's directives: "Be both 'officials' and ordinary people" and "Absolutely no airs." We must guide everyone to begin by discussing the lessons learned from the Cultural Revolution and to

understand the harm of bureaucratic arrogance. Thirdly, we must dispel the notion that pride is "capital" and establish the idea that new contributions must be made for the people. By studying Chairman Mao's teaching that "veteran cadres may have made contributions in the past, but they cannot rest on their laurels... they must establish new contributions and new labor," we carried out a minor rectification campaign, engaged in ideological confrontation, and engaged in struggle, criticism, and reform at the depths of our souls, consciously shedding the burdens of both "war merits" and "new achievements." "Many comrades criticized the half-baked revolutionary thinking of 'the ship has reached the dock, the train has arrived at the station,' and resolved to use their unlimited energy to redouble their efforts to make new contributions to the people within their limited years." After "unlimited energy," Mao Zedong wrote a note in brackets, which is the second part of this article.

[2] Lin refers to Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Zhou refers to Premier Zhou Enlai. Kang refers to Kang Sheng, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Organization and Propaganda Group.

[3] A notice issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Military Commission, and the General Political Department of the Military Commission on January 11, 1971, regarding the implementation of Chairman Mao's important directive of January 8th stated: "This directive plays an extremely important role in strengthening the ideological and work style of our Party and our army, implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, and persisting in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. For many years, the army, local governments, and central government agencies have failed to carry out rectification campaigns focused on combating complacency and arrogance. Some cadres have exhibited unhealthy tendencies such as complacency, arrogance, warlordism, self-righteousness, dictatorialness, lies, and a refusal to follow the right path. These unhealthy tendencies, along with great-power chauvinism, both internally and externally, have greatly hindered the implementation of Chairman Mao's directive and line." "Our army, local governments, and central government agencies must all take Mao's directive as their guiding principle and seize the current excellent opportunity to launch a self-education campaign opposing complacency and advocating modesty and prudence." Before this notice was issued, it was sent to Mao Zedong for review, who then wrote: "Issue as is."

Comments on Zhou Enlai's speech outline [1] at the North China Conference [2]

(January 1971)

1

I have read it once and it is generally acceptable. I may discuss it again tomorrow.

2

Agree.

3

Completely agree.

[1] This first part is a comment on the first draft of Zhou Enlai's speech outline submitted for review on January 22, 1971. On January 23, Mao Zedong met with Zhou Enlai and others to discuss Zhou Enlai's speech outline. After revising the outline according to Mao Zedong's opinions, Zhou Enlai sent it to Mao Zedong for review that night. After reading it, Mao Zedong wrote a comment on the report submitted for review, which is the second part of this part; and wrote a comment on the envelope, which is the third part of this part. On January 24, Zhou Enlai made a summary speech on behalf of the CPC Central Committee at the plenary meeting of the North China Conference based on the outline. This speech outline was later issued as the sixth document of the CPC Central Committee in 1971.

[2] The North China Conference was held in Beijing from December 22, 1970 to January 24, 1971. A total of 449 people attended the meeting, including leaders of the Beijing Military Region, military regions of various provinces in North China, Beijing Garrison District, Tianjin Garrison District and relevant units in North China. From January 9, 1971, 143 people who attended the Central Military Commission symposium also participated in the meeting. This meeting exposed and criticized Chen Boda's anti-party crimes, but also said that Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan "participated" in Chen Boda's anti-party activities. On December 6, 1979, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a "Notice on Rehabilitating the So-called "North China Mountaintopism"" to rehabilitate Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan.

Comments on Zhang Xiulong's Letter [1]

(January 1971)

Please ask Lin [2] to submit this to the Military Commission for consideration.

[1] This comment was written on a letter dated November 17, 1970, from Zhang Xiulong, former commander of the Zhejiang Provincial Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, to Mao Zedong and others. The letter stated that during your inspection tour of Zhejiang in September 1967, you stated that Zhang Xiulong had made mistakes and should be helped to correct them. However, I have been sidelined for several years and have been training at a military farm in Hubei Province for over a year. I believe that my mistakes during the Cultural Revolution were due to many subjective and objective factors, primarily my inability to keep up with your thinking, my lack of awareness of the line, my poorly shaped worldview, and my selfish thoughts. I bear all responsibility. However, I believe I am a good person whose mistakes are a contradiction among the people. Yet, I have been sidelined for so long, barred from political involvement, and prohibited from visiting my wife (my wife is ill, and I am not allowed leave to visit her). I cannot understand this, so I am writing to ask the Military Commission's office group to review my training here, provide guidance on where I can strive, and allow me to visit my family at regular intervals. On January 12, 1971, Li Desheng, a member of the Central Military Commission's working group and director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army, presented Zhang Xiulong's letter to Mao Zedong for review. After Mao's approval, the working group offered a favorable opinion on Zhang Xiulong's case: he should be hospitalized for treatment, allowed to reunite with his family, resume his organizational activities, and await work assignment. Zhang Xiulong later returned to military service as deputy commander of the Hubei Provincial Military Region. After 1975, he held various positions, including commander of the Hubei Provincial Military Region and deputy commander of the Wuhan Military Region.

[2] Lin refers to Lin Biao, who was then Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission

Regarding the Criticism of Chen [1] and the Rectification Movement The emphasis is on the criticism of Chen [2]

(February 19, 1971)

I agree. Please inform comrades in all regions that when carrying out the Criticism of Chen and the Rectification Movement, the emphasis should be on criticizing Chen, and only then on the rectification. Don't follow the example of the Military Commission symposium [3] which lasted a month but did not criticize Chen at all. Even more, don't follow the example of the early days in North China, when the criticism of Chen was neither severe nor itchy, as was the case during the period when Li and Zheng [4] presided over the movement.

[1] Chen refers to Chen Boda.

[2] This comment was written on Zhou Enlai's report to Mao Zedong on February 19, 1971, regarding the situation of the National Planning Work Conference. The report stated that in order to listen to opinions in a broad and in-depth manner, a Politburo meeting would be held tonight to invite the main leaders of the regions and provinces, cities, and districts to meet and solicit their opinions on this year's plan and various tasks. At the same time, "we also plan to discuss the issue of dissemination of the 'Criticize Chen and Rectify the Work Style' campaign. Currently, the various military regions in North China are disseminating the campaign within the scope recommended by the Beijing Military Region Party Committee approved by the Chairman, and the results are very good. The whole country also plans to follow the North China dissemination scope after they return tomorrow and the day after tomorrow." Zhou Enlai also mentioned several other issues to be discussed at the Central Politburo meeting in his report.

[3] Refers to the symposium held by the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China on January 9, 1971. From the 9th, all participants in the symposium participated in the North China Conference.

[4] Li refers to Li Xuefeng, the former first political commissar of the Beijing Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Zheng refers to Zheng Weishan, the former commander of the Beijing Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. They co-chaired the early stages of the North China Conference. On the last day of the conference, January 24, 1971, they were announced to be "transferred from their original positions and continue to undergo self-examination and study." On December 6, 1979, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Notice on Rehabilitation of the So-called 'North China Mountaintopism'" to rehabilitate them.

Comments on the Military Commission Office's Report on the Study and Discussion of Chairman Mao's Instruction on "Focus on Criticizing Chen" [1]

(February 1971)

1

Why are you comrades always so passive in criticizing Chen? You won't move unless you are given a push. You should give this matter some thought and take steps to turn passivity into initiative.

2

Why do you always lack understanding? The 38th Army's morale is vastly different from yours. What's the reason? We should look into it.

3

These are good words.

4

After Zhou and Kang [2] have read it, return it to the Military Commission.

[1] On February 20, 1971, the Central Military Commission's Office Group wrote a report to Mao Zedong, stating: "On the evening of February 19, Premier Zhou conveyed Chairman Mao's directive that 'the focus of launching the Criticize Chen and Rectify Work Style Movement should be on criticizing Chen, and only then on rectifying the work style. Don't emulate the Military Commission symposium, which lasted a month and still didn't criticize Chen at all.' We held a special meeting today to study and discuss this matter. We unanimously agree that the Chairman's important criticism of us is completely correct. This is the Chairman's kind care and education for us. We firmly support and sincerely accept it." This section contains Mao Zedong's comments on this report. The Military Commission Office Group's report stated: "Due to our insufficient understanding of the importance of 'criticizing Chen' at this Military Commission symposium, we did not prioritize 'criticizing Chen' during the 'Criticize Chen and Rectify Work Style' campaign. This was a serious mistake." Mao Zedong underlined the phrase "due to our insufficient understanding of the importance of 'criticizing Chen'" and wrote a comment, which is Section 2 of this section. The Military Commission's working group's report stated: "We resolutely implement the Chairman's instructions and carry out the 'Criticize Chen and Rectify the Work Style' campaign throughout the army." We have conveyed the Chairman's important instruction that "the emphasis in launching the campaign to criticize Chen and rectify the style of work should be on criticizing Chen, and only then on rectifying the style of work" to all the

headquarters and military branches currently in session. We demanded that they first earnestly carry out the campaign to criticize Chen, resolutely criticize and discredit the anti-Party element Chen Boda politically, ideologically, in terms of line, and theory, thoroughly eradicate his harmful influence, and raise the consciousness of the entire army in class struggle and line struggle. Next to this passage, Mao Zedong drew a line and wrote a comment, which is the third part of this article. The fourth part of this article was written on the envelope containing the report submitted by the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China to the Military Commission's Working Group. At that time, the head of the Central Military Commission's Working Group was Huang Yongsheng, the deputy head was Wu Faxian, and Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo were members. During the Cultural Revolution, they, along with Chen Boda, actively participated in the conspiracy of the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary group to seize supreme power in the Party and the state, and were the main culprits in this counter-revolutionary group.

[2] Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. Kang refers to Kang Sheng, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Organization and Propaganda Group.

Comments on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Report on the Issue of Americans Visiting China [1]

(February 1971)

Generally speaking, it's acceptable. Those who haven't actively requested to visit China will not be invited.

[1] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' "Request for Implementation of the Great Leader Chairman Mao's Important Instructions on the Visit of Americans to China" dated February 17, 1971, stated that in the two years since Nixon came to power in 1969, approximately 830 Americans had applied to visit China through various channels (in addition, Nixon had privately expressed to me through several channels his willingness to send representatives to Beijing for talks). In view of the growing calls for a change in US policy toward China, the intensified competition between the US and the Soviet Union while continuing to collude, and the new international situation in which the Nixon administration was in a more serious internal and external predicament than when it came to power, Chairman Mao, with foresight, issued the important instruction "Let Americans come, left, center, and right", changing the previous practice of not allowing Americans to come to China. This was an important decision with strategic significance. To implement this important directive, we intend to follow the following principles in handling the issue of American visits to China: We will prioritize China, selectively, systematically, and systematically approve visits by some Americans. In addition to friendly individuals and reputable and influential centrists, we may also approve visits by certain influential right-wing figures, depending on circumstances. In 1971, we initially envision approving several visits by Americans (approximately 30 individuals). This will generally be based on requests from the other side, with China providing support when necessary. The report also proposes specific recipients and a reception plan based on these principles.

A Correct Interpretation of the Nanchang Uprising and the Joining of the Zhu-Mao Armies

[1]

(February 1971)

Article 4 is correct in stating that a correct interpretation of the Nanchang Uprising and the joining of the two armies should be given.

[1] This is a comment written by Mao Zedong on the 29th issue of the Diplomatic Activities Bulletin in February 1971.

[2] This refers to the fourth article of "Some Reflections from Foreign Countries on the Visit of Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in China, Garcia," published in the 29th issue of the Diplomatic Activities Bulletin. The content is: When Garcia visited Jinggangshan, he criticized the tour guide for not mentioning the Nanchang Uprising and Zhu De's visit to Jinggangshan. He said that these two historical events should be mentioned. If they are not mentioned, it will be easier for Chinese people to understand, but it will be difficult for foreigners to understand.

Comments on the Military Commission Working Group's report on Mao Zedong's criticism of Chen [1] and the rectification movement [2]

(March 1, 1971)

I've read it. It's excellent. With the initiative, we will strive to implement it.

March 1, 1971

[1] This report, submitted to Mao Zedong and others by the Central Military Commission's Working Group on February 28, 1971, reported on the evening of February 22nd, when it convened a meeting of key leaders from various headquarters, military services, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission, military academies directly under the Military Commission, and the Beijing Garrison Command to convey and discuss Mao Zedong's directive to "focus on criticizing Chen" during the rectification movement. The report stated that, since the Military Commission symposium began on January 9th, we had failed to grasp the key point of criticizing Chen. As a result, the meeting lasted a month without criticizing Chen at all. This was a serious political mistake, a significant loss to the political and ideological development of the entire army, and a painful lesson. Several comrades in our Military Commission Working Group made errors in direction and line at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee. They should have reflected on these errors at the Military Commission symposium, engaged in self-education and ideological clarification through criticizing Chen, but they failed to do so, resulting in a passive position and repeated mistakes. At this briefing, these comrades self-criticized their past serious mistakes, such as blindly believing in the anti-Party element Chen Boda, being deceived by him, and quoting his quotations. They also vowed to seriously examine themselves during the 'Criticize Chen and Rectify Work Style' movement. At the time, the Central Military Commission's working group was headed by Huang Yongsheng, with Wu Faxian as deputy head. Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo were members. During the Cultural Revolution, they actively participated with Chen Boda in the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique's conspiracy to seize supreme power in the Party and the state, and were the main culprits in this counter-revolutionary group's case.

[2] Chen refers to Chen Boda.

Comments on the two draft documents submitted for review by the Chinese Party and Government Delegation to Vietnam [1]

(March 1971)

It is possible to ask the Vietnamese side for their opinions. They may think that this is a good way to put it, or they may think that a more obscure way is better. I cannot yet tell what their intentions are.

[1] On March 3, 1971, Zhou Enlai sent Mao Zedong his draft of a speech to be delivered at a mass rally in Hanoi, Vietnam, and the Joint Communiqué of the Parties and Governments of China and Vietnam (Chinese draft) for review, and proposed that the red-lined parts of the two documents were new formulations, which should be considered. The red-lined passage in Zhou Enlai's speech at the mass rally in Hanoi reads: "Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are close neighbours of China. We will never allow U.S. imperialism to do whatever it wants there. If U.S. imperialism insists on following the path of expanding its war of aggression in Indochina, the Chinese people will take all necessary measures, even at the cost of the greatest national sacrifice, to fully support the Vietnamese people's war to resist the U.S. and save the country, and to fully support the people of the three Indochinese countries' war to resist the U.S. and save the country, until the U.S. invaders are completely defeated." The red-lined passage in the Joint Communiqué of the Parties and Governments of China and Vietnam (Chinese draft) reads: "The Chinese people will never allow U.S. imperialism to act recklessly and do whatever it wants in Indochina." If U.S. imperialism continues along the path of expanding its war of aggression in Indochina, the Chinese people will take all necessary measures, even at the cost of the greatest national sacrifice, to fully support the Vietnamese people and the peoples of the Indochinese countries and thoroughly defeat the U.S. invaders. Zhou Enlai's speech and the joint communiqué were published in the People's Daily on March 10 and 11, 1971, respectively.

Comments on the draft of the article "Long Live the Victory of the Proletarian Dictatorship" [1] by the editorial departments of two newspapers and one magazine

(March 15, 1971)

I have read it and found it acceptable.

Only one word [2] was removed from page 18 to emphasize Marxism-Leninism. It was already on page 17 [3], so that was enough. For many years, our Party did not study Marx and Lenin, and did not emphasize them. As a result, some swindlers deceived us for many years, causing many people to not even know what materialism and idealism are. The big joke [4] made at Lushan was a very serious lesson. In the next few years, we should pay special attention to promoting Marxism-Leninism.

March 15, 9:00 AM

[1] This article, written by the editorial boards of the People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily, was written to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Paris Commune. It is divided into six main parts: 1. The principles of the Paris Commune are eternal; 2. The extreme importance of the revolutionary people holding the gun; 3. The revolution is the cause of the masses; 4. There must be a genuine Marxist-Leninist party; 5. Modern revisionism is a traitor to the revolutionary principles of the Paris Commune; 6. Persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and strive for greater victory. This article was published in the People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily on March 18, 1971, and in the fourth issue of Red Flag on April 1.

[2] On page 18 of the draft for this article, it was written: "We must ensure that Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought, the sharpest of all teachings, are mastered by Party members, cadres, and the masses." When Mao Zedong reviewed it, he deleted the phrase "Mao Zedong Thought."

[3] On page 17 of the draft for this article, it was written: "During the course of China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong Thought and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line have been increasingly integrated with the revolutionary practice of hundreds of millions of people, becoming the greatest force for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat."

[4] This refers to the incident during the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Lushan in 1970, when Chen Boda and others compiled and collated "Several Quotations from Engels, Lenin, and Chairman Mao on Genius" and "Instructions by Vice Chairman Lin," which deceived many people.

Comments on the press release regarding the successful launch of the "Shijian-1" scientific experimental satellite [1]

(March 16, 1971)

Do this.

[1] This comment was written on Zhou Enlai's report on March 16, 1971, requesting the publication of a new report on China's successful launch of the "Shijian-1" scientific experimental satellite. The press release stated that on March 3, 1971, China launched a scientific experimental artificial earth satellite. During its operation from March 3 to 15, the satellite successfully sent back various scientific experimental data to Earth and is currently continuing its scheduled scientific experiments. When Mao Zedong reviewed the press release, he deleted the following paragraph from the press release: "This is a great victory for Mao Zedong Thought, a great victory for Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, and another fruitful achievement of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." This press release was published in the People's Daily on March 17, 1971.

Comments on the Letters of Self-Criticism by Huang Yongsheng, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Zuopeng [1]

(March 24, 1971)

I have read the self-criticisms of Comrades Huang Yongsheng, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Zuopeng. I think they are all well written. From now on, it will be a question of putting these statements into practice.

Mao Zedong

March 24, 1971

[1] Huang Yongsheng, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, head of the Central Military Commission's office group, and chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army. Qiu Huizuo, then a member of the CPC Central Committee, a member of the Central Military Commission's office group, deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army and director of the General Logistics Department. Li Zuopeng, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, a member of the Central Military Commission's office group, deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army and political commissar of the Navy. During the Cultural Revolution, they actively participated in the conspiracy of the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary group to usurp the party and launch a coup. In August 1978, the CPC Central Committee decided to expel them from the party forever and cancel all their duties inside and outside the party. In January 1991, the Special Tribunal of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China confirmed them as the main culprits of the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary group case and sentenced them to 18, 16 and 17 years in prison respectively, and deprived them of their political rights for 5 years.

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating the Peoples of the Three Indochinese Countries on Their Great Victory in the War of Resistance Against U.S. Aggression and National Salvation

(March 29, 1971)

Prince Souphanouvong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Lao Patriotic Front;

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia and Chairman of the National United Front of Cambodia;

Prince Ben Nou, Chairman of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the National United Front of Cambodia and Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity of the Kingdom of Cambodia;

His Excellency Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and Chairman of the Advisory Council of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam;

His Excellency Hoang Tan Phat, Chairman of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam;

Comrade Ton Duc Thang, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

Comrade Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam;

Comrade Truong Chinh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

Comrade Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

In recent times, the people of the three Indochinese countries have fought brilliantly on various fronts. In particular, the Battle of Highway 9 was a brilliant battle of annihilation, effectively wiping out large numbers of enemy forces in an organized manner, achieving a magnificent and inspiring victory. On behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people, we extend our warmest congratulations to you and to the fraternal peoples of the three Indochinese countries.

This victory is of great strategic significance. You have unleashed the unparalleled might of people's war, achieved new heights, and gained new experience. You have dealt a heavy blow to the U.S. invaders, defeated their aggressive plans, and made the Nixon [1] administration's situation even more difficult and its life even more arduous. Your victory fully demonstrates that the united strength of the three Indochinese peoples is formidable and invincible.

The situation in Indochina is now unprecedentedly favourable. We firmly believe that the heroic peoples of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, united under the banner of the Supreme People's Conference of Indochina, and continuing to persevere in people's war, will overcome any difficulties and achieve complete victory in the war against the U.S. and for national salvation.

Mao Zedong Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing, March 29, 1971

[1] Nixon, then President of the United States.

Comments on the Meeting to Criticize Chen [1] and Report on the Rectification Movement [2]

(April 1971)

1

Approved for distribution. (The time is tentatively set at seven days, but it may be extended in practice.)

2

Agreed. The meeting time (originally scheduled for seven days) is insufficient and should be extended.

3

Agreed.

20:00 on the 19th

4

This is good. If it is not enough, extend the time.

[1] Chen refers to Chen Boda.

[2] This first part was written on the draft notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on April 4, 1971, submitted by Zhou Enlai for review, regarding the convening of a meeting to report on the campaign to criticize Chen Boda and rectify his style of work. The draft outlined the progress of the campaign to criticize Chen Boda and rectify his style of work in various regions, military units, and central government agencies since the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth CPC Central Committee. It proposed that, in order to summarize and exchange experiences, facilitate the in-depth and forward-looking development of the campaign, and further understand the nature of Chen Boda's reactionary crimes, "the Central Committee has decided to convene a nationwide meeting to report on the campaign to criticize Chen Boda and rectify his style of work starting on April 15th," with the duration tentatively set at five days. During Mao's review, the "five days" was changed to "seven days." The meeting began on April 15, 1971, and concluded on April 29th. This second part was written on Zhou Enlai's report to Mao Zedong on the evening of April 18, 1971. The report stated that at the "Criticize Chen and Rectify Work Style Report Conference," in addition to expressing their views, most of the group meetings related their own mistakes of being deceived and deceived at the Lushan Conference. "As long as these speeches serve the purpose of 'learning from past mistakes to avoid ones in the future,

curing the illness and saving the patient,' they will all be published in the bulletin, achieving unity through criticism and self-criticism. If there are any ulterior motives, they will be exposed; if there are errors of recognition, education should still be provided. Please comment on whether this approach is appropriate, Chairman." Parts 3 and 4 of this report were written in Zhou Enlai's report to Mao Zedong on April 19, 1971. The report stated: "The second draft of the crimes of the anti-Party element Chen Boda has been revised several times. It is now being printed and sent to the Politburo comrades for review." "I am submitting a copy to the Chairman and Vice Chairman Lin for your personal review. Please read it and see if it is acceptable. It will be printed and distributed to the meeting on the evening of the 20th for future use." (Next to this sentence in quotation marks, Mao Zedong wrote a comment, which is Part 3 of this report.) "For the next two days (the 19th and 20th), we will continue to focus on exposing and discussing the Lushan Conference and the issues surrounding it, in order to deepen our understanding and reflection, and to promote unity. Please approve whether it is appropriate." Next to this paragraph, Mao Zedong wrote a comment, which is Part 4 of this report.

Comments on the Self-Criticisms of Huang, Wu, Ye, Li, and Qiu [1]

(April 11, 1971)

Comrade Enlai [2]:

I have read the rewritten self-criticisms of Comrades Wu Faxian and Ye Qun. They are acceptable.

Please report this, along with the self-criticisms of Comrades Huang, Li, and Qiu, to the Politburo meeting for appropriate action.

Mao Zedong

April 11, 1971

[1] Huang refers to Huang Yongsheng, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, head of the Central Military Commission's office group, and chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army. Wu refers to Wu Faxian, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, deputy head of the Central Military Commission's office group, deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, and commander of the Air Force. Ye refers to Ye Qun, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the Central Military Commission's office group. Li refers to Li Zuopeng, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, a member of the Central Military Commission's office group, deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, and political commissar of the Navy. Qiu refers to Qiu Huizuo, then a member of the CPC Central Committee, a member of the Central Military Commission's office group, deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, and director of the General Logistics Department. On September 29, 1971, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a notice stating: "In view of the factional activities of the Lin Biao-Chen anti-Party clique, Comrades Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo, who have been deeply involved and unable to continue their current work, have been ordered to resign, reflect, and make a thorough confession." "The Central Committee has decided that the daily work of the Military Commission will be presided over by Vice Chairman Ye Jianying, and that an office meeting of the Military Commission will be organized to provide collective leadership." Later investigations revealed that during the Cultural Revolution, Huang, Wu, Ye, Li, and Qiu actively participated in the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique's conspiracy to seize supreme power in the Party and the state. In September 1971, Ye Qun was killed while defecting with Lin Biao. In August 1973, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to permanently expel them from the Party and remove them from all positions within and outside the Party. In January 1981, a special tribunal of the Supreme

People's Court of the People's Republic of China confirmed them as the main culprits in the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique case and sentenced Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu to 18, 17, 17, and 16 years in prison, respectively, and deprived them of their political rights for five years.

[2] Enlai refers to Zhou Enlai.

Comments on Li Desheng's report [1]

(April 24, 1971)

1

That's good. This is a matter of great importance, so we should act impartially and not shy away from suspicion. I have always believed that when comrades have disagreements or problems, they should be discussed patiently and with more heart-to-heart talks. We shouldn't be impatient or procrastinate. If things aren't going smoothly, with the Central Committee's help, they will eventually be resolved.

Mao Zedong

April 24th

2

After reading it, Lin, Zhou, and Kang [2] should return it to Comrade Li Desheng for safekeeping (it may be forwarded to Comrade Xu Shiyu and others for their review).

[1] This first part was written in a report submitted to Mao Zedong on April 23, 1971, by Li Desheng, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Central Military Commission, and Director of the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The report stated, "In accordance with your instructions, on the morning of April 20, I conveyed to Comrade Xu Shiyu the Chairman's instructions requesting that he address the Zhoushan issue in Zhejiang and the issue of unity within the military." He was delighted and expressed his firm commitment to complying with the Chairman's instructions. He also discussed his previous failure to address these two issues, primarily to avoid suspicion. Firstly, he feared being accused of being a culprit, and secondly, of attempting to seize power in East China. Therefore, he was reluctant to intervene and unwilling to speak further on the subject. He requested further discussions with comrades in Zhejiang. I have already spoken with Comrades Nan Ping and Xiong Yingtang, and they stated that they had long expressed this desire. They immediately expressed their hope that Comrade Xu Shiyu would address these issues in accordance with the Chairman's instructions. This second part was written in the envelope containing Li Shensheng's report. Xu Shiyu was then Commander of the Nanjing Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and Director of the Jiangchi Provincial Revolutionary Committee. Nan Ping was then First Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, Director of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and Political Commissar of the Zhejiang Provincial Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Xiong Yingtang was then Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China,

Deputy Director of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and Commander of the Zhejiang Provincial Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[2] Lin refers to Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. Kang refers to Kang Sheng, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Organization and Propaganda Group.

Comments on Zhou Enlai's Report on the Meeting [1] on Criticizing Chen and Rectifying the Work Style [2]

(April 1971)

1

I have read it. I basically agree.

2

It seems that there is no need to convey this to grassroots party members for the time being.

3

I don't go out these days.

4

Let's not talk about it anymore.

[1] This meeting was held in Beijing from April 15 to 29, 1971. A total of 99 leaders from the central government, local governments, and military units attended, along with 143 people currently attending the Military Commission symposium. The meeting was held to exchange experiences from various regions regarding the "Criticize Chen" and "Rectify the Work Style" campaigns. Chen refers to Chen Boda.

[2] This article was written in Zhou Enlai's report to Mao Zedong and others on April 24, 1971. The report said that the meeting to criticize Chen and rectify the style of work had been held for nine days. Comrades from each group had spoken many times, made criticisms and self-criticisms, and expressed their desire to strengthen unity on the basis of the principles of Mao Zedong Thought. The five comrades of the Military Commission's office group all made self-criticisms. In general, the meeting deepened understanding and self-criticism. Starting from today, each group will enter into an exchange of experiences in criticizing Chen and rectifying the style of work and self-education, and discuss how to convey this to the grassroots level in all regions and aspects. At the closing meeting, the Political Bureau will speak out about the gains of this meeting and summarize several issues so that they can be conveyed to the Standing Committee members of the Party Committees of the major military regions, the Standing Committee members of the Party Committees of the provinces, cities and districts or the Party Core Groups, and the corresponding party, government and military organizations directly under the Central Committee, especially to the members and alternate members of the Central Committee in all regions and directly affiliated units. At the same time, we need to discuss how to convey the "Criticism of Chen

and the Rectification Movement" to grassroots Party members. Mao Zedong drew a horizontal line under the quotation marks and wrote a comment, which is now part two of this article. "The meeting hopes that the Chairman and Vice Chairman Lin will meet with everyone. It would be even better if they could say a few words to everyone. However, everyone also said that this request should not interfere with the Chairman and Vice Chairman Lin's attendance at the May Day commemoration and viewing the fireworks at Tiananmen Square." Next to this sentence, Mao Zedong drew a vertical line and wrote a comment, which is now part three of this article. "Whether the above ideas are appropriate or not, please approve them. If the Chairman has any new ideas, please also approve them. If you can invite us to a meal, it would be greatly appreciated." Next to this sentence, Mao Zedong drew a vertical line and wrote a comment, which is now part four of this article.

Comments [1] on the Outline of Zhou Enlai's Speech at the Meeting [2] on Criticizing Chen and Rectifying the Work Style

(April 1971)

I have read it once and think it is acceptable. I will first discuss it with the six-member group [3], then with the comrades of the Politburo (including the leaders of the major groups and the five comrades who made mistakes [4]), and then discuss it with them. If they agree, I may make some revisions before you give your speech.

[1] This comment was written on the report submitted by Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong for review on April 28, 1971. The report said that it took two days to draft the outline of the speech on behalf of the Political Bureau. "If the Chairman can review it this morning and tell me that the degree of criticism is generally acceptable, I will put forward the speech for discussion at the six-member group meeting; if the wording is too strong and not suitable for presentation, please also tell me so that I can rewrite it; if it is still not enough, I will emphasize it in the discussion after I get your advice." On April 29, Zhou Enlai made a summary speech on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at the plenary meeting of the meeting to criticize Chen and rectify the style of work.

[2] The meeting to criticize Chen and rectify the style of work was held in Beijing from April 15 to 29, 1971. A total of 99 people from the central government, local governments and the military attended the meeting. 143 people who were attending the Military Commission symposium also attended the meeting. The meeting exchanged experiences of criticizing Chen and rectifying the style of work in various places.

[3] On April 22, 1971, at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee chaired by Zhou Enlai, it was decided that Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Huang Yongsheng, Yao Wenyuan, and Ji Dengkui would draft the outline of the speech to be delivered at the end of the meeting to criticize Chen and rectify the style of work. The six-member group referred to here refers to the group composed of the above six people to draft the outline of the meeting summary.

[4] Refers to Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo.

Comments on Zhou Enlai's Letter and Submission [1]

(May 1971)

1

This is good.

2

I have read it carefully.

[1] On May 27, 1971, Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao Zedong, reporting on the meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on the evening of the 26th to discuss the Sino-US talks. The letter said, "The Political Bureau meeting was held on the evening of the 26th, and everyone expressed some opinions. I will write a report with a plan, and after everyone's deliberation, I will send it to the Chairman and Vice Chairman Lin for consideration." Mao Zedong underlined the words "after everyone's deliberation" in the text and wrote a comment, which is the first part of this article. On May 29, Zhou Enlai wrote the "Report of the Central Political Bureau on the Sino-US Talks," based on the discussions at the Politburo meeting. Mao Zedong reviewed it and wrote, "Agree." On May 27, Zhou Enlai also sent Mao Zedong the following documents along with his letter: 1. Volume 3 of the "Brief Report on the Visit of the South Korean Workers' Party Delegation to China," compiled and published by the Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 10, 1971, which contained a message from Soviet CPSU Secretary-General Brezhnev on page 2 expressing his desire to come to China for talks; 2. The minutes of Zhou Enlai's meeting on May 11 with the Vietnamese Workers' Party delegation led by First Secretary Le Duan; and 3. Zhou Enlai's report on his talks with Le Duan to Mao Zedong and others on May 12. This second part contains Mao Zedong's comments after reviewing these documents submitted by Zhou Enlai.

Report of the meeting with the Romanian Party and Government delegation led by Nicolae Ceausescu [1]

(June 3, 1971)

Chairman Mao said happily to the Romanian comrades: "Comrades, hello, I wish you very well! Unite and overthrow imperialism and all reactionaries."

[1] Nicolae Ceausescu, then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of State.

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating the 10th Anniversary of the Signing of the Sino-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

(July 10, 1971)

Pyongyang

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Prime Minister of the Cabinet of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Choi Yong-kun

Comrade:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Sino-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people, we extend warm congratulations to the Workers' Party of Korea, the DPRK government, and the fraternal Korean people.

The Sino-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. It fully embodies the great friendship and fighting solidarity forged between our two peoples in the long struggle against imperialist aggression. This treaty plays an extremely important role in comprehensively developing the friendly and cooperative relations between our two countries, opposing the aggression of U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism, and safeguarding peace in Asia and the world.

Over the past decade, the international situation has developed increasingly in favor of the peoples of all countries and unfavourably of U.S. imperialism and reactionaries in various countries. Unwilling to accept defeat, U.S. imperialism is using ever more insidious and cunning tactics to continue pursuing its policies of aggression and war. Japanese militarism, revived under the aegis of U.S. imperialism, is ambitious and accelerating its military expansion, having become a dangerous force of aggression in Asia. The aggressive plots and activities of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries are being strongly condemned and resolutely opposed by the Chinese people, the Korean people, and the people of all Asian countries.

The great friendship and fighting unity between the Chinese and Korean peoples, forged with blood, are time-tested and unbreakable. If the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries dare to impose a war of aggression on the Chinese and Korean peoples, the Chinese people will, as always, resolutely unite with the Korean people and fight shoulder to shoulder to completely defeat the invaders.

Long live the great friendship and fighting unity between the Chinese and Korean peoples!

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing, July 10, 1971

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating Romania on the 27th Anniversary of its Liberation

(August 22, 1971)

Bucharest

General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu,

Chairman of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania,

Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania,

Dear Comrades:

As the fraternal Romanian people celebrate the 27th anniversary of their country's liberation, we, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the government of the People's Republic of China, and the Chinese people, extend our warmest congratulations to you, to the Communist Party of Romania, the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and the entire Romanian people.

The Romanian people, a people with a glorious revolutionary tradition, waged a protracted and heroic struggle for national independence and liberation. Their armed uprising on August 23, 1944, ushered in a new era in Romanian history. For the past 27 years since liberation, the fraternal Romanian people, under the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party, have adhered to the path of independence and self-reliance, working tirelessly and resolutely to strengthen their country. They have overcome numerous difficulties, transformed the face of their homeland, and achieved significant success in socialist construction. Currently, the Romanian people are striving with full confidence to successfully complete the new Five-Year Plan and implement the various measures recently proposed by the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party to improve political and ideological work. We sincerely wish you continued success.

The Romanian people have consistently upheld the equality of all nations, big or small, resolutely opposed imperialist power politics and threats of aggression, and courageously defended national independence and sovereignty. We express our support and praise for the righteous stance and courageous spirit of the fraternal Romanian people.

The revolutionary friendship between the Chinese and Romanian peoples, established on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, has seen new developments in recent years. The recent visit of a Romanian Party and government delegation headed by Comrade Ceausescu to China further strengthened the friendly and cooperative relations between our two parties, two countries, and two peoples. We are confident that in the struggle to build our respective countries and oppose imperialism, the

Chinese and Romanian peoples will, as always, sympathize with, help, and support each other.

Long live the unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Romanian peoples!

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing, August 22, 1971

Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Directive on Classification of Class Composition in Ethnic Minority Areas of Xinjiang and Yunnan [1]

(August 24, 1971)

Agreed to implement it on a trial basis.

[1] The draft directive submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on August 24, 1971, reads: The Central Committee has received the request reports from Yunnan and Xinjiang on the issue of class classification in ethnic minority areas and pastoral areas. In principle, we agree that in ethnic minority areas where class classification has not been done or has been done but not clearly, you should fully mobilize the masses and classify them in light of the actual class struggle. Regarding the policy on class classification, you can refer to the spirit of the "Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Socialist Transformation of Tibet" of December 8, 1970, and the principles set forth in the attached request reports of the Party Core Group of the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Party Core Group of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. We must strictly control the scope of the crackdown. The number of households classified as landlords, herders, rich peasants, and rich herders should not be rigidly applied to the proportions in the interior. We should follow Chairman Mao's teaching on the small scope of the crackdown, combine the actual conditions of ethnic minority areas, seek truth from facts, and follow the Party's policy on class classification. We should classify as many households as possible, but not more than 8% of the total number of households. Given the complex class situation in minority areas and our limited understanding of the situation, we suggest that you conduct a pilot program in one or two, or even three, counties. After gaining experience and making necessary revisions to the specific provisions for class classification, you can then expand the program. We hope you will report the results of the pilot program to the Central Committee. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this directive that same day.

Inspection

to the tune of Music for Peace

(August 1971)

A Southern Tour¹ of Ten Thousand *li*,

I cannot help but recall the ancient emperors.

Their might and influence remain throughout the land:

Qin Shi Huang², Sui Yang³, Kangxi⁴.

They pursued their own achievements,

while I now work for the country,

breaking the bureaucratic machine,

and denouncing the bourgeoisie.

¹ During August and September 1971, Mao Zedong toured southern China and held numerous conversations with local Party, government, and military leaders along the way, pointing out Lin Biao's ambitions. Mao refers here to his southern tour of inspection as *Nánxún* 南巡, a term almost exclusively applied to imperial tours, especially those of the early Qing emperors, who used these journeys to gather information and promote imperial authority. Not to be outdone, Deng Xiaoping conducted a *Nánxún* in 1992, following a November 1989 resolution by the CCP Central Committee stating that the pace of reforms was too fast, and deciding to review the changes. Although no longer General-Secretary of the CCP, Deng used the tour to launch a counter-attack, urging that "[the Shenzhen government] should be bolder in carrying out the Reforms and Opening-up, dare to make experiments and should not act as women with bound feet". Immediately after he took office in December 2012, Xi Jinping conducted his own *Nánxún*, repeatedly emphasising "pushing forward reforms and insisting on opening up."

² Qin Shi Huang was the first emperor of China. He reunified China by conquering the other 6 warring states in 10 years and then establishing the Qin Dynasty (221–206 BC). He gave himself the title "Huangdi" or "Emperor", which remained in use for the next 2,000 years. He standardised weights, measurements and coinage. Mao Zedong approved of his suppression of Confucianism in favour of a new doctrine of Legalism. His tomb outside Xi'an is the site of the famous Terra-Cotta Army

³ Emperor Yang of Sui (569-618) was the second emperor of the Sui dynasty (reigned 604-618). During his reign, he rebuilt the Sui Grand Canal, built Luoyang (the eastern capital), moved the capital to Luoyang, and changed the state to a county; he changed the weights and measures to the ancient style; he waged frequent wars, which, together with the abuse of the people's power and extravagance, led to a massive peasant uprising.

⁴ The Kangxi Emperor (1654 –1722) was the longest-reigning emperor in Chinese history and one of the longest-reigning rulers in history. He is considered one of China's greatest emperors. His reign brought about long-term stability and relative wealth after years of war and chaos. His court also accomplished such literary feats as the compilation of the Kangxi Dictionary, the Complete Tang Poems poetry anthology, and the Complete Classics Collection of Ancient China.

Comments on the Central Committee's forwarding of the Minutes of the National Conference on Education Work [1]

(August 1971)

Agree.

[1] From April 15 to July 31, 1971, the National Education Work Conference, convened with the approval of Mao Zedong, was held in Beijing. On July 27, the Minutes of the National Education Work Conference, drafted by Chi Qun (then a member of the State Council's Science and Education Leading Group) and finalized by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan (both then members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee), put forward "two basic assessments" on the situation on China's education front: 17 years after liberation, "Chairman Mao's proletarian education line has basically not been implemented, and the education system, teaching principles and methods are almost all the old ones"; and among the original teaching staff, "most of them support socialism and are willing to serve the people, but their world outlook is basically bourgeois". The minutes also proposed that to further implement Chairman Mao's proletarian educational line, principles, and policies, ten key issues must be addressed: 1. The proletarian educational revolution must be led by the working class; 2. Adherence to the path of the "May 7 Directive"; 3. Criticism of the bourgeoisie; 4. Issues of educational reform, primarily the issue of teachers; 5. Worker-peasant-soldier students are the main force of the educational revolution; 6. Textbooks must be thoroughly reformed; 7. The adjustment and management system of higher education institutions; 8. Several issues in the educational revolution in primary and secondary schools; 9. The effective operation of secondary vocational schools and technical schools; and 10. The educational revolution in military academies. On August 13, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China approved and circulated the minutes. On March 19, 1979, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China approved and circulated the Ministry of Education's report, revoking the 1971 "Minutes of the National Education Work Conference" and repudiating the "two basic assessments."

Comments on the Central Committee's forwarding of the "Minutes of the Guangzhou Military Region's Three Supports and Two Militaries⁵ Political and Ideological Work Symposium" [1]

(August 1971)

Distribute this.

[1] In its report submitted to the Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and the General Political Department on August 5, 1971, the Guangzhou Military Region Committee of the Communist Party of China stated: "Recently, we held a symposium on political and ideological work for the three supports and two militaries. The meeting examined and discussed the issues of deepening the line education among the personnel of the three supports and two militaries, continuing to oppose arrogance, complacency, privilege, and bourgeois ideology, as well as improving the organizational leadership and management of the personnel of the three supports and two militaries in accordance with the new situation of the establishment of local party committees at all levels. A summary of the meeting was drafted. Please review and determine whether this document is appropriate." The symposium was held from July 15 to 31, 1971, and was attended by relevant leading comrades from the Guangzhou Military Region's divisional and military sub-district units and above, as well as the South China Sea Fleet and the Guangzhou Air Force. The CCP Central Committee's comments on this memorandum, forwarded on August 20, 1971, stated: "The issues identified in this memorandum accord with the current realities of the three supports and two militaries, and the improvement measures are quite good. I hope you will study them carefully and implement them as a reference." The four words "study carefully" in the Central Committee's comments were added by Mao Zedong during his review.

⁵ The "three supports and two militaries" were policies adopted by the PLA during the Cultural Revolution, namely supporting the left, supporting workers, supporting agriculture, and military management and military training.

Minutes of Conversations with Officials During Field Inspections and Along the Way (1)

(August to September 1971)

I hope you will practice Marxism and not revisionism; unite and not divide; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire.

The correctness of the ideological and political line determines everything. If the Party's line is correct, everything is yours: if you have no people, you can have people; if you have no guns, you can have guns; and if you have no power, you can get power. If the line is incorrect, even if you have it, you can discard it. The line is the guiding principle, and if the line is not correct, even what it has it may lose. The line is a net rope. When it is pulled, the whole net opens out.

Our Party has a history of fifty years, and there have been ten major struggles over the line. During these ten struggles, some people wanted to split our Party, but they failed. This issue deserves study. With such a large country and so many people, we can only talk about the will of the people and the will of the Party. The will of the Party members does not support splitting. Historically, our Party has hope.

It started with Chen Duxiu's right-wing opportunism. After the August 7th Conference in 1927 [2], he, along with Liu Renjing and Peng Shuzhi [3], organized the "Left Opposition of Leninists" of 81 people to issue a statement to split our party. However, this failed, and they went over to Trotsky's faction.

Then Qu Qiubai made a line error. They got a pamphlet in Hunan that contained my words, "Political power comes from the barrel of a gun." They were furious, saying, "How can political power come from the barrel of a gun?" So they removed me from the Politburo as an alternate member. [4] Later, Qu Qiubai was captured by the Kuomintang, wrote "Superfluous Words," and surrendered himself to the Kuomintang [5].

After the Sixth Party Congress in 1928, Li Lisan became arrogant. From June to September 1938, he implemented the Li Lisan line for over three months. He advocated attacking the big cities and achieving victory in one or more provinces first. I disagreed with his approach. By the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Li Lisan had fallen from power.

From 1930 to 1931, Luo Zhanglong [6] was a rightist who set up a new central committee and tried to create a split, but he was unsuccessful.

Wang Ming's line lasted the longest. He formed a faction in Moscow, organizing the "Twenty-Eight and a Half Bolsheviks." Leveraging the power of the Third International, they seized power throughout the Party for four years. Wang Ming convened the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in Shanghai and published the pamphlet "Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the CCP," criticizing Li Lisan for not being sufficiently "leftist" and

insisting on destroying all the base areas, which he essentially did. From 1931 to 1934, I had no say in the Central Committee. The Zunyi Conference in January 1935 corrected Wang Ming's errors in his line, leading to his downfall.

During the Long March, after the First and Fourth Front Armies merged, Zhang Guotao attempted to split the Red Army and establish a separate Central Committee, but this failed. Before the Long March, the Red Army numbered 300,000, but by the time they reached northern Shaanxi, only 25,000 remained. The Central Soviet Area had 80,000 men, but by the time they reached northern Shaanxi, only 8,000 remained. Zhang Guotao was trying to split the Red Army and was unwilling to go to northern Shaanxi. At that time, if he didn't go to northern Shaanxi, there was no way out. This was a question of political line. Our line at that time was correct. If he hadn't gone to northern Shaanxi, how could he have reached North China, East China, Central China, and Northeast China? How could he have established so many bases during the War of Resistance Against Japan? After arriving in northern Shaanxi, Zhang Guotao fled.

After the national victory, Gao Gang and Rao Shushi formed an anti-Party alliance [7] and tried to seize power, but failed.

At the 1959 Lushan Conference, Peng Dehuai colluded with foreign powers and attempted to seize power. Huang Kecheng, Zhang Wentian, and Zhou Xiaozhou also jumped out to oppose the Party. They set up military clubs, but didn't focus on military matters. Instead, they talked about things like "People's Communes were established too early" and "The gains don't outweigh the losses." Peng Dehuai even wrote a letter openly challenging the Party, attempting to seize power, but failed.

Liu Shaoqi and his group also attempted to split the Party, but they also failed.

Then there was the struggle at the 1970 Lushan Conference [8].

At the 1970 Lushan Conference, they launched a surprise attack, engaging in underground activities. Why didn't they dare to disclose it? Clearly, they had something to hide. They concealed the truth first, then launched a surprise attack. They kept it a secret from three of the five Standing Committee members, and also from the majority of the Politburo comrades, with the exception of those senior generals. Those generals, including Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo [9], Li Xuefeng, and Zheng Weishan [10], cursed them for not letting them breathe a word, launching a surprise attack.. Their attack lasted not just a day and a half, but two and a half days, from August 23rd and 24th to noon on the 25th. They must have had a purpose for doing this! Peng Dehuai set up a military club and issued a declaration of war. They were even worse than Peng Dehuai, demonstrating the low character of these people.

I believe their sudden attacks and underground activities were planned, organized, and based on a program. This program was about establishing a presidency, about "genius,"

about opposing the line of the Ninth National Congress and overturning the three agenda items of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee [11]. Some were eager to become president, split the Party, and seize power. The question of genius is a theoretical one; they engage in idealistic a priori theory. Saying opposing genius is opposing me. I'm not a genius. I spent six years reading Confucius and seven years studying capitalism, and only started reading Marxism-Leninism in 1918. How can I be a genius? Those adverbs [12] have been used several times in our country. The Party Constitution for the Ninth National Congress has already been finalized; why not take a look? "My Opinions" was written after interviewing some people and conducting some research. It specifically criticizes the theory of genius. This doesn't mean I don't want to say that genius is simply being smarter. Genius doesn't depend on one or a few people; it depends on the Party. The Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. Genius relies on the mass line and collective wisdom.

Comrade Lin Biao's speech [13] was not discussed with me, nor was it shown to me. They had something to say, but they didn't show it beforehand, probably because they thought they had some confidence and that it would succeed. But when they were told it wouldn't work, they panicked. At first, they were so brave, as if they were ready to blow up Mount Lushan and stop the earth from turning. But after a few days, they quickly withdrew the record. [14] If it was reasonable, why did they withdraw it? It shows that they were empty and panicked.

The struggle against Peng Dehuai at the 1959 Lushan Conference was a struggle between two headquarters. The struggle against Liu Shaoqi was also a struggle between two headquarters. This Lushan Conference is again a struggle between two headquarters.

The Lushan struggle this time is different from the previous nine. All nine resulted in conclusions, but this time, Vice Chairman Lin was protected, and no personal conclusion was drawn. He certainly bears some responsibility. What should be done with these people? The principle of education remains, which is "learning from past mistakes to prevent future ones, and curing the illness and saving the patient." Lin must still be protected. Regardless of who has made mistakes, it's always bad to not uphold unity and adhere to the party's policy. After returning to Beijing, I'll talk to them again. If they don't come to me, I'll go to them. Some may be salvaged, others may not. It all depends on practice. There are two possible outcomes: one is the possibility of change, the other is the possibility of no change. Major mistakes of principle, mistakes of line, and errors of direction, even for the leaders, are difficult to change. Historically, did Chen Duxiu change? Did Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Luo Zhanglong, Wang Ming, Zhang Guotao, Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Peng Dehuai, and Liu Shaoqi change? No, they didn't.

I've spoken with Comrade Lin Biao, and some of his remarks are inappropriate. For example, he said that a genius appears only once every few hundred years in the rest of the world, while in China it's only once every few thousand. That's not true! Marx and Engels were contemporaries, and Lenin and Stalin were less than a hundred years apart. How can we say

that a genius only appears once every few hundred years? China had Chen Sheng, Wu Guang, Hong Xiuquan, and Sun Yat-sen. How can we say that a genius only appears once every few thousand years? What about the "pinnacle" and "one sentence is worth ten thousand sentences"? You're exaggerating. One sentence is just one sentence; how can it be worth ten thousand sentences? Don't establish a state President, I won't be President. I've spoken six times, and even if I only spoke one sentence each time, that's sixty thousand sentences, but they didn't listen. Not a single word counted for anything; it was equivalent to nothing. It was Chen Boda's words that were worth ten thousand sentences to them. What's with the phrase "a great tree, a special tree"? It's called "raising me." I don't know who they're raising. To be frank, they're raising themselves. And what about the phrase "I founded and led the People's Liberation Army, and Lin personally commanded it?" But if you founded it, you can't command it! It wasn't just me who founded it, after all.

I held fast to issues of line and principle. I wouldn't compromise on major issues of principle. After the Lushan Conference, I adopted three approaches: throwing stones, adding sand, and digging out the corner of the wall. I criticized the material Chen Boda had produced, which had deceived many people. I also criticized the 38th Army's report and the Jinan Military Region's report on combating arrogance and complacency. The Military Commission held a lengthy symposium, but didn't criticize Chen at all. I added comments to a document. My approach was to take these stones, add comments, and let everyone discuss them. This was throwing stones. Soil that's too compacted doesn't breathe; adding a little sand will make it breathable. The Military Commission's working group wasn't staffed enough, and they needed to add more people. This was adding sand. Reorganizing the Beijing Military Region was digging out the corner of the wall.

What are your thoughts on the Lushan Conference? For example, was North China Group Briefing No. 6 [15] revolutionary, semi-revolutionary, or counter-revolutionary? Personally, I think it was a counter-revolutionary briefing. You all attended the 99-person meeting [16]. The Premier delivered a summary speech, issued self-criticisms from five generals [17], and also from Generals Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan. Everyone believed the issue was resolved. In fact, the Lushan incident is not over, it's not resolved. They're trying to keep it secret, even preventing officials at the level of the director of the Second Department of the General Staff from knowing about it. How can this be allowed?

I've said this as my personal opinion, just to share with you. Don't jump to conclusions now; that's for the Central Committee to make.

We must be cautious. First, the military must be cautious, and second, local authorities must be cautious as well. We must not be complacent; complacency leads to mistakes. The military must be unified and rectified. I simply do not believe our army will rebel, and I simply do not believe you, Huang Yongsheng, can command the People's Liberation Army to rebel! Under the army are divisions, regiments, and even headquarters, political affairs, and logistics agencies. If you mobilize the army to commit mischief, who will listen to you?

You should be involved in military affairs, not just as civilian officials, but also as military officers. To manage military affairs, it is nothing more than studying the line, correcting unhealthy tendencies, avoiding factionalism and sectarianism, and emphasizing unity. The military has always advocated a vigorous and resolute style, and I agree with this. However, resoluteness is not enough to solve ideological problems. We must present facts and reason.

I approved the document on the three supports and two militaries written by the Guangzhou Military Region [18]. In the central government's comments, I added the words "carefully study" to draw everyone's attention. The local party committee has been established, and it should exercise unified leadership. If the local party committee takes matters already decided to the military party committee for discussion, isn't this turning things upside down?

In the past, our army had standardized drills during military training. From individual soldier training to battalion training, it took about five or six months. Now, we focus on the cultural aspects, not the military. Our army has become a cultural army.

One good thing can lead three good things. Your one good thing may or may not be the right one. The effectiveness of those activist representative conferences is worth studying. Some were successful, while many were not. The main issue is the line. If the line is wrong, then the activist representative conferences will not be successful.

Industry should learn from Daqing, agriculture should learn from Dazhai, and the whole country should learn from the People's Liberation Army. This is not the complete story; we should also add that the PLA should learn from the people of the whole country.

We should study Lenin's article [19] commemorating the 25th anniversary of Eugene Pottier's [20] death and learn to sing "The Internationale" and "The Three Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention." We should not only sing it, but also explain it and put it into practice. The lyrics to "The Internationale" and Lenin's article are all Marxist standpoints and viewpoints. They talk about slaves rising up to fight for truth, saying there has never been a saviour, nor do we rely on gods or emperors; we must save ourselves. Who created the human world? It was us, the working people. At the Lushan Conference, I wrote a 700-word document [21] that raised the question of whether heroes or slaves make history. The Internationale embodies the principle of unity, for tomorrow, communism will surely be realized. Studying Marxism emphasizes unity, not division! We've been singing the Internationale for fifty years, and yet some in our Party have caused splits ten times. I suspect it could happen ten, twenty, or even thirty more times. Do you believe it? You may not, but I do. Will there be no struggle in communism? I don't believe that either. Even in communism, there will still be struggle, but it will be between the new and the old, between right and wrong. Even after tens of thousands of years, wrong will not stand, and will not survive.

The Three Major Disciplines and the Eight Points for Attention require "every clause to be clearly remembered" and are "supported and welcomed by the people throughout the country." A few of them are not quite remembered now, especially the first of the Three Major Disciplines and the first and fifth of the Eight Points for Attention. It would be wonderful if we could remember them all and act accordingly. The first of the Three Major Disciplines requires that all actions be carried out in unison, and victory can be achieved. Without unity, victory is impossible. Furthermore, the first and fifth of the Eight Points for Attention require that we be polite to the people, soldiers, and subordinates, avoid arrogance, and resolutely overcome warlordism. This is the key point. Without a key point, there can be no policy. I hope to use the Three Major Disciplines and the Eight Points for Attention to educate soldiers, cadres, the masses, Party members, and the people.

The Lushan Conference emphasized the importance of reading the works of Marx and Lenin. I hope you will read more in the future. How can senior cadres not even understand what materialism and idealism are? What if it's difficult to understand Marx and Lenin's works? You can ask the teacher for help. You are all secretaries, and you still need to be students. I am a student every day, reading two volumes of *Reference Materials* every day, so I have some understanding of international knowledge.

I've always disapproved of one's wife being the office director at one's workplace. Under Lin Biao, Ye Qun was the office director, and the four of them [22] had to go through her whenever they asked Lin Biao for instructions. You should do your work yourself, personally review and approve it. Don't rely on secretaries, and don't give secretaries so much power. My secretary only handles receiving and sending documents. I select and review the documents myself, and write the required documents myself to avoid mistakes.

The Cultural Revolution brought out Liu Shaoqi, Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang [23], which was a great gain. There were also some losses. Some good cadres are still unable to stand out. Most of our cadres are good, and the bad ones are always a minority. No more than 1% were purged, and less than 3% were suspended. The bad ones should be appropriately criticized, and the good ones should be praised, but without flattery. Praising people in their twenties as "super geniuses" [24] is of no benefit. At this Lushan Conference, some comrades were deceived and misled. The problem is not you, but Beijing. It doesn't matter if there are mistakes. Our party has such a rule: if you make a mistake, you should review it and allow it to be corrected.

We must focus on ideological and political education. The policy remains to learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and cure the disease to save the patient, unite, and strive for greater victory.

[1] On March 16, 1972, Premier Zhou Enlai sent a draft of this conversation summary, along with a draft of the CPC Central Committee's notice forwarding it, to Mao Zedong for review.

Mao wrote, "I agree. Minor revisions." On March 17, the CPC Central Committee issued a notice stating that from mid-August to September 12, 1971, Chairman Mao toured the country and held numerous important conversations with leading officials along the way. Many units requested that Chairman Mao's conversations be compiled and distributed. Based on Chairman Mao's various conversations, the CPC Central Committee has compiled a summary, which it now prints and distributes to you. Please disseminate it immediately to the entire Party, the entire army, and the people of the country.

[2] Refers to the emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Hankou on August 7, 1927.

[3] Peng Shuzhi joined the Communist Party of China in 1921. In 1925, at the Fourth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, he was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee and a member of the Central Bureau. He also served as Director of the Central Propaganda Department and Editor-in-Chief of the journal "Guide." In the later years of the First Civil Revolutionary War, he implemented Chen Duxiu's right-leaning opportunist line. In May 1927, he was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. He was expelled from the Party in November 1929 for forming a "Left Opposition" with Chen Duxiu and others and engaging in anti-Party activities. He later became a Trotskyist.

[4] On August 7, 1927, Mao Zedong stated at the August 7th Conference, chaired by Qu Qiubai and others, "We must understand that political power is obtained from the barrel of a gun." On November 9th and 10th, under the guidance of Comintern representative Rominazzi, Qu Qiubai presided over an enlarged meeting of the Provisional Politburo of the CPC Central Committee in Shanghai, which adopted the "Resolution on the Current Situation in China and the Tasks of the Communist Party." The meeting emphasized that the situation of the Chinese revolution was "continuously rising" and that the nature of the Chinese revolution was "continuous revolution." Consequently, a "left" blind activism took hold within the central leadership. The "Resolution on Political Discipline," issued on the 14th, criticized the Hunan Provincial Committee for "completely violating the central government's strategy" in its guidance of the Autumn Harvest Uprising. The resolution stated that the Hunan uprising should have been primarily based on the peasant masses, but that the Hunan Provincial Committee had "turned it into a mere failure of military speculation." Mao Zedong was held seriously responsible for the Hunan Provincial Committee's mistakes and it was decided to remove him from his positions as alternate member of the 7th Central Political Bureau and member of the Hunan Provincial Committee.

[5] On October 19, 1980, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee forwarded the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's "Re-examination Report on the Arrest of Comrade Qu Qiubai," stating that the historical evaluation of Comrade Qu Qiubai made by the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party in 1945 was correct. The slander of Comrade Qu Qiubai as a "traitor" during the Cultural Revolution was

completely wrong, and Comrade Qu Qiubai should be thoroughly rehabilitated and his reputation restored.

[6] Luo Zhanglong joined the Communist Party of China in 1921. He was elected a member and alternate member of the Central Committee. After the Sixth Plenary Session of the CPC in January 1931, he organized the "Central Extraordinary Committee" and engaged in activities aimed at splitting the Party, for which he was expelled from the Party.

[7] Gao Gang, former member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the State Planning Commission. Rao Shushi, former member of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of the Organization Department. In 1953, they formed an anti-Party alliance, plotting to split the Party and seize supreme power in the Party and the state. In February 1954, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee exposed and criticized them. In March 1955, the National Congress of the Communist Party of China passed a resolution expelling them from the Party.

[8] The Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in Lushan from August 23 to September 6, 1970, exposed and criticized Chen Boda. Wu Faxian and others were also criticized at the meeting, thus thwarting Lin Biao's planned and premeditated plot to seize power.

[9] Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo. See the notes to "Comments on the Self-Criticisms of Huang, Wu, Ye, Li, and Qiu."

[10] Li Xuefeng, formerly the First Political Commissar of the Beijing Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Zheng Weishan, formerly the Commander of the Beijing Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. They co-chaired the early stages of the North China Conference. On the final day of the conference, January 24, 1971, they were announced to be "transferred from their original positions to continue their self-examination and study." On December 6, 1971, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Notice on Rehabilitating the So-called 'North China Mountaintopism'," rehabilitating them.

[11] On March 23, 1970, at the opening of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhou Enlai announced the three items on the agenda: 1. Discussion on constitutional issues; 2. National economic planning; and 3. War preparedness.

[12] Refers to three adverbs: "geniusly, comprehensively, and creatively".

[13] Refers to Lin Biao's speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 23, 1970.

[14] It refers to Ye Qun secretly taking back the record of her speech at the Central-South Group meeting of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

[15] This refers to Briefing No. 6 of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, also known as Briefing No. 2 of the North China Group. This briefing reported on the discussion of Lin Biao's speech by the North China Group of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the afternoon of August 24, 1970. In his speech to the North China Group, Chen Boda recited "Several Quotations from Engels, Lenin, and Chairman Mao on Genius," which had been approved by Lin Biao. The briefing described Lin Biao's speech as "very important and excellent," "representing the aspirations of the entire Party and the people of the entire country," and expressed sincere support for the proposals to "add Article 2 to the Constitution stating that Chairman Mao is the President and Vice Chairman Lin is the Vice President" and "restore the chapter on the President of the State in the Constitution." On the afternoon of August 25, Mao Zedong presided over an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, attended by the heads of various groups. The meeting decided to immediately halt the discussion of Lin Biao's speech in the subgroup meetings of the Central Plenary Session, retract Briefing No. 2 of the North China Group, and order Chen Boda to review the speech.

[16] This refers to the meeting held by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China from April 15 to 29, 1971, to criticize Chen and report on the rectification movement. Ninety-nine leaders from the central government, local governments, and military units attended the meeting, along with 143 people currently attending the Military Commission symposium.

[17] Refers to Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo.

[18] Refers to the "Minutes of the Guangzhou Military Region's Symposium on Political Ideology for the Three Supports and Two Militaries," issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 20, 1971.

[19] Refers to Lenin's article "Eugène Pottier" written in January 1913.

[20] Eugene Pottier, a French proletarian poet, activist of the Paris Commune, and composer of the lyrics of The Internationale. He died in November 1887.

[21] Refers to "My Opinion".

[22] Refers to Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo.

[23] Peng refers to Peng Zhen, formerly a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Secretary of the Central Secretariat, First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, and Mayor of Beijing. Luo refers to Luo Ruiqing, formerly Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat, Vice Premier of the State Council and Deputy Minister of National Defense, and Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army. Lu refers to Lu Dingyi, formerly Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Secretary of the Central Secretariat, Minister of the Central Propaganda Department, Vice

Premier of the State Council and Minister of Culture. Yang refers to Yang Shangkun, formerly Alternate Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat and Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee. During the Cultural Revolution, they were wrongly labeled as members of the so-called "Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun anti-Party clique." On February 17, 1978, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a document completely rehabilitating Peng Zhen, refusing all charges and false accusations leveled against him during the Cultural Revolution. On May 20, 1980, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Notice on Rehabilitating Comrade Luo Ruiqing," revoking the May 16, 1966, "Central Committee Approving the Report of the Central Working Group on the Errors of Comrade Luo Ruiqing," thus completely rehabilitating Luo Ruiqing. On June 8, 1979, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded the Organization Department's "Reexamination Report on the Issue of Comrade Lu Dingyi," thus rehabilitating Lu Dingyi. In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China reviewed and corrected the erroneous conclusions previously drawn about Yang Shangkun, recognizing his contributions to the Party and the people.

[24] Refers to Lin Biao's son Lin Ligu.

Conversation with Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing in Wuhan

(August 25, 1971)

I see that you are thinking about agriculture, while I am thinking about the struggle of lines. Of course, the struggle of lines in agriculture you mentioned also involves struggle of lines, but there is a bigger line. Agriculture alone is not enough. We must also consider the east, west, south, north, and centre, the party, government, military, civilians, and schools. We must focus on industry and agriculture, but at present we should focus mainly on the struggle of lines. Agriculture also has line issues.

China is also strange in that the Chinese party has not split. Chen Duxiu organized the "Leninist Left Opposition" with 81 people and later turned to Trotskyism. There was a Liu Renjing who had met Trotsky⁶. He was younger than me and now lives in Beijing. Luo Zhanglong set up a new central committee but failed. He is now a professor in Hubei. He is from Liuyang and his current name is Luo Aojie. Qu Qiubai and Li Lisan were not considered splits, but they made mistakes in the line. Wang Ming organized 28 and a half Bolsheviks and seized power in the whole party for four years. He held two plenary sessions of the Central Committee, namely the Fourth and Fifth Plenary Sessions. The Zunyi Conference was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau, which overthrew Wang Ming's leadership. Zhang Wentian was in charge. In fact, Zhang Wentian was the convener and I was in charge. I was officially in charge ten years after the Zunyi Conference. I was elected chairman at the "Seventh National Congress" in May 1945. I published two books, "The Struggle between Two Lines" and "Since the Sixth National Congress". They disarmed. Zhu Guotao was on the Long March and set up his own central committee, but it did not come to anything.

Gao and Rao wanted to seize power, but failed. Some people said that I was responsible for the three-year disaster, but the officials did not agree with the measures I wanted to take. Later, the Beidaihe meeting discussed the situation and class contradictions, and then things got better.

⁶ Liu Renjing (1902 –1987), was one of the early leaders of the Communist Party of China, and a Trotskyite. In September 1922, he went with Chen Duxiu and Qu Qiubai to the Soviet Union to attend the Fourth Congress of the Comintern held in Petrograd and spoke on behalf of the CCP. In the autumn of 1926, Liu Renjing went to study at the Lenin Institute in Moscow, and later attended the seventh enlarged meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. In 1929, Liu Renjing left the Soviet Union and went to Turkey to meet Trotsky, hoping to get his confirmation to become the leader of the Chinese Trotskyites, but Trotsky refused. After returning to China, Liu was expelled from the CCP. In October 1949, the People's Republic of China was founded, and the following year, Liu Renjing travelled from Shanghai to Beijing to admit his mistake to the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee. On December 21, 1950, the People's Daily published Liu Renjing's review of his mistakes, but believed that he did not fully repent. Liu was later assigned to teach at Beijing Normal University, but due to opposition from students, he had to be transferred to work at the People's Publishing House. He died after being hit by a bus in Beijing in 1987.

I published the minutes of the Guangzhou Military Region's three supports and two militaries symposium, and added the words "seriously study" in the central government's comments, without fearing that the major military regions would be careless.

The Lushan Conference was a struggle between the two headquarters. The surprise attack at Lushan was planned, organized, and had a program. The attack did not last for a day and a half, but for three days, the 23rd, 24th, and 25th. It was to negate the line of the "Ninth National Congress" and the three agenda items of the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee, and to change it to a discussion of genius and the establishment of a state President. They were against Zhang Chunqiao in name only, but in fact they were against me. It was me who crossed out genius and proposed not to establish a state President. I am not a genius. I read Confucius' books for six years, went to the First Middle School and the First Normal School, read capitalist books for seven years, and only read Marxism-Leninism in 1918.

This briefing (Briefing No. 6 issued at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee) is a counter-revolutionary briefing. This is my personal opinion, and the Party Central Committee will have to discuss it in the future.

There is a purpose in saying that there is a great potential to blow up Lushan Mountain. Only the Air Force can blow it up. They distributed the quotations called geniuses, but not to Comrade Li Desheng. Several of them were from the First Front Army on the Jinggang Mountain. Once in front of them, I said to Li Desheng, "You are so stupid. We are not from the same mountain top. How can I give you the treasure?" The quotations extolling genius that were read aloud at meetings were never discussed beforehand; no one knew which book or page they came from. It was all falsehood.

I am Cheng Yaojin's three axes⁷, throwing stones, undermining the corner of the wall, and adding sand. I was very happy to see the report of the 38th Army, and I approved it at that time. The 24th Army, the 21st Army, and the 38th Army were severely punished, especially the 38th Army. I also approved the documents of the Jinan Military Region on fighting against arrogance and Liu Zihou's self-criticism, which was throwing stones. Reorganizing the Beijing Military Region was digging out the corner of the wall. They did not insert the Central Guard Corps and the Beijing Garrison. They added sand, including Li Desheng and Ji Dengkui. It was still too little, so I asked Li Xiannian to join the Military Commission's working group. You can't ignore the military. You don't have to attend the meeting. People in Central and South China also need to attend. You are concurrently the political commissar and party secretary of the Guangzhou Military Region. You don't have to attend the meeting. You have

⁷ Cheng Yaojin (589 –665), was a native of Shandong Province, and a general of the Tang Dynasty. He was reputed to have a three-bladed axe shaped so as to perfect the vertical head-splitting, horizontal head swiping and sudden turn-around movements. The reference to Cheng Yaojin's three axes became a metaphor for good luck in battle. Mao refers here to political movements, not military ones.

to be involved in military affairs. You can't just be a civilian official, you have to be a military officer.

We must correct the line, unite to strive for greater victory, "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones" and "cure the sickness and save the patient". Some can be saved, some may not be saved, it depends on practice. Comrade Wang Dongxing was in charge of the General Office of the Central Committee and the Guard Corps, which had more than 7,000 people. He spoke about his mistakes several times to more than 1,000 people. It's good to be willing to correct mistakes.

Don't engage in mountain topism, factionalism kills people. The whole country must unite, but there are still a few principles. Three methods, throwing stones, digging the wall, and adding sand. Some words cannot be listened to. One word is worth ten thousand words. Can you believe it? Some words are not worth even half a word. It's worth nothing. In fact, some don't count, such as the issue of genius and the president of the country. I have said it many times, but I don't say a word. Chen Boda's words are worth ten thousand words.

Conversations with Hua Guofeng, Bu Zhanya⁸, and Wang Dongxing in Changsha (Excerpt)

(August 27, 1971)

You should study the issue of the democratic parties and decide whether they should still exist. One issue is understanding, and the other is the issue of the national bourgeoisie. Some say they should no longer exist and no interest will be paid. I say no. Some small capitalists don't want interest, but the big capitalists are unwilling to accept it. They should receive some interest.

Democratic parties must exist. Some places say they don't need them anymore, but there's no need to rush. There's a famous person in Hunan named Zhou Shizhao, an old classmate of mine. Zhou Shizhao came to Tiananmen Square on May Day. I asked him if the democratic parties still existed. He was quite an honest man, and he said there were active counter-revolutionaries within the democratic parties, and some had a history of counter-revolutionary behaviour. This was speaking of individuals. As for the democratic parties, they haven't tried to overturn verdicts, nor have they issued directives. As democratic parties, they can still exist. But as for individuals within the democratic parties, some have problems, and a few have very serious ones. There are leftists, centrists, and rightists among them. Don't generalise and say that all democratic figures are good or bad.

Some democratic figures have been subjected to struggle and criticism, and some have been dragged out for a year or two, and their problems haven't been resolved. Not only have the problems of the democratic figures remained unresolved, but the problems of things like the "May 16th" incident haven't been resolved either. Some have even been suspended. None of the democratic parties should be suspended. During our nation's Cultural Revolution, certain irregularities occurred where democratic parties were dissolved. What benefit did that serve? The word 'delay' does not resolve the issue. The existing problems can be further understood, investigated, and addressed after the suspensions have been lifted.

⁸ Bu Zhanya (1918 –1999) was a founding colonel of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, having joined the Communist Party of China in May 1938. In September 1952, he went to North Korea to participate in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. In March 1955, he was appointed political commissar of the 135th Division. In 1956, he entered the Political Academy of the People's Liberation Army. In 1957, he was appointed political commissar of the 134th Division. In April 1970, he served as deputy director of the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee, deputy political commissar of the Guangzhou Military Region and first political commissar of the Hunan Provincial Military Region, and secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China in November 1970. In October 1972, he was suspended from his position as secretary of the provincial party committee by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on suspicion of involvement in the September 13, 1971 Incident, i.e. Lin Biao's attempted coup. In March 1973, he was transferred as the deputy political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region (term of office from July 1973 to February 1979). The Hunan Provincial Party Committee issued Document No. 23 in 1982, believing that Bu Zhanya had made mistakes during his work in Hunan, but it was not a matter of participating in counter-revolutionary conspiracy activities. In August 1983, he resigned to recuperate.

Not only should you sing the "Three Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention," you should also explain them and act in accordance with their requirements. Find a few copies of "The Internationale"; it has everything. Tomorrow, recite the "Internationale," discuss them, and have a conversation. Don't compare every line to every phrase; focus on the most pressing requirements for the day and act accordingly. We've sung "The Internationale" for fifty years, yet some within our Party have engaged in splitting activities ten times. Even if we don't draw conclusions this time, it's still a splitting action. I think there could be ten, twenty, or even thirty more. Do you believe it? You may not, but I do. Will there be no struggle in communism? I don't believe it. In communism, there will still be struggle, but it will be a struggle between the new and the old, between right and wrong. The nature of the struggle may change in communism, but even ten or even tens of thousands of years from now, mistakes will still exist. But by then, cultural levels will be higher, and those who make mistakes will be more aware and able to recognise and correct them in a timely manner. No matter what happens to people who make mistakes, don't kill them. When carrying out struggle, criticism, and reform, do it in a gentle manner.

Conversation with Liu Xingyuan, Ding Sheng, Wei Guoqing, and Wang Dongxing in Changsha

(August 28, 1971)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): (To Liu Xingyuan and Ding Sheng) Comrade Wei Guoqing, I'm relatively familiar with him. You two, I'm not so familiar with.

Mao: (To Wei Guoqing) Wei Baqun and you both have the surname Wei. Are you from the same family?

Wei Guoqing (hereinafter referred to as Wei): We're outside the five degrees of mourning⁹, not within. Wei Baqun studied at the Guangdong Peasant Movement Training Institute and received instruction from the Chairman.

Mao: You can't say he learned anything from me. In name, I was the teacher and he was the student; in reality, he was the teacher and I was the student. To be a teacher, one must first be a student. He knew much more about Guangxi than I did. It's a pity this comrade has passed away. I miss him dearly.

Mao: Peng Pai was from Haifeng County, Guangdong Province. His family was a large landowner. While he was working in Haifeng, tens of thousands of people once worshipped Guanyin Bodhisattva. Someone asked him if he would join them, and he said yes. He was right to do so. After the worship, he told the peasants that Guanyin Bodhisattva was unreliable and that they had to rely on themselves. So, he took up sticks and clubs to start a revolution. He was good at agitation, but not good at organizational work. His mass work was not very solid, and he did not do it well, and he later died. When he mobilized the masses, he even used his own money to give to the peasants to quell the mass movement.

(Mao Zedong turned the topic to the historical struggle between lines.)

Mao: Do you understand the Party's past struggles over different lines? Our Party has a fifty-year history. China is so vast, with so many factions, yet there has never been a split. Isn't that strange? Counting back fifty years, there have been ten struggles over different lines.

(Mao Zedong discussing the struggles during the Jinggangshan period)

Mao: At that time, Qu Qiubai and his group in Hunan obtained a pamphlet containing my words, "Political power comes from the barrel of a gun." They were furious, asking how could political power come from the barrel of a gun? So they removed my alternate Politburo membership. Later, they said my Central Committee membership had also been

⁹ The five degrees of mourning refers to the rules of etiquette and personal relations to be observed according to the Confucian patrilineal clan structure and patriarchal laws. They were widely observed in feudal China and other East Asian countries. Being "within" or "outside" the structure determined such things as the wearing of particular mourning clothes and patterns of obedience and authority.

removed. Somehow, word got to Jinggangshan, where they said I was expelled from the Party. Some people were dissatisfied and wanted to write a report to the Central Committee. I said no, expulsion was no big deal. Since I had been expelled from the Party, I couldn't serve as a representative. But they said I could be a division commander. Later, they said I could be a Party representative. At that time, we only had two regiments: the 31st Regiment, formed from the Autumn Harvest Uprising Army, and the 32nd Regiment, led by Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo. Later, the Fourth Army was formed, with Comrade Zhu De as commander, Comrade Chen Yi as director of the Political Department, and me as a Party representative. At a meeting in western Fujian, I was told to step down. Later, someone called me back, and I took over. Then there was Li Lisan's brief period. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Wang Ming seized power and held it for four years. At the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee, I was a member of the Politburo, but they said I wasn't allowed to attend. In January 1935, an enlarged Politburo meeting was held, chaired by Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and me. This was the Zunyi Conference, and Zhang Wentian delivered a report. I was like a bodhisattva placed in a urinal, sinking for a few seconds and becoming extremely stinking. After this meeting, I took charge. In the five instances mentioned above, I was powerless; they didn't listen to me.

Mao: Later, Zhang Guotao emerged and created a split. Comrade Ye Jianying performed a significant role in this matter. Zhang Guotao sent a telegram to Chen Changhao, saying, "Take advantage of the situation and march south to thoroughly initiate intra-Party struggle." Comrade Ye Jianying was the Chief of Staff at the front at the time. He showed me this telegram, which is why we left. Otherwise, we would have been captured. Ye Jianying made a significant contribution at this crucial moment, so you should respect him.

Our strategy at that time was correct. If the army hadn't reached the northwest, how could it have established a base? How could we have established bases in North China and Northeast China later? After arriving in northern Shaanxi, Zhang Guotao fled again. He was very afraid of Hu Zongnan and subsequently fled to Xi'an to seek refuge with Hu Zongnan. If Zhang Guotao hadn't fled, he would have been made a member of the Politburo. Do you believe it?

Then came Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, who attempted to seize power. Then there was last year's Lushan Conference. The things that came out of that conference, I think, were underground activities, surprise attacks, organized, planned, and based on a program. That program was "genius", establishing a Presidency and overturning the agenda of the Second Plenum and the line of the Ninth National Congress. That was their program. They were organized, doing it in secret. They hid it from three of the five Standing Committee members, and also from most of the Politburo comrades, with the exception of those senior generals. The first part of the Second Plenum wasn't going well, but the second part was good, raising everyone's awareness of reading and learning.

Mao: In recent times, my principles have been threefold: to practice Marxism-Leninism, not revisionism; to unite, not split; and to learning from past mistakes to avoid ones in the future, and curing the sickness and saving the patient. I also have three methods, like Cheng Yaojin's three axes. The first is hurling stones. The first stone is criticising the quotations compiled by Chen Boda. The second stone is criticising the report on the 38th Army. Their persecution of the 38th Army is truly atrocious. How could they persecute their own troops in such a way? They persecuted the 24th Army, the 31st Army, the 69th Army, and the 38th Army. Why? The third is to criticize the report of the Jinan Military Region, add comments, and let everyone discuss it. The second method is to add sand. The third method is to undermine the foundation.

Mao: (To Liu Xingyuan, Ding Sheng, and Wei Guoqing) What do you think of the Lushan Conference?

Mao: If you make a mistake, you should self-criticize. Your mistake was supporting a genius like me and wanting me to be Chairman. How could I be a genius? I read Confucius for six years and Capital for seven. In 1918, I became a librarian at Peking University. It wasn't easy! The monthly salary was eight yuan. But the dormitory was small and very cold in the winter. There was no coal to heat the kang. Eight of us squeezed onto one kang. We couldn't sleep flat, so we had to sleep on our sides because there wasn't enough space. The seven of us were going abroad to study, working part-time in France. The library had heating at the time, so I would sleep there at night, warming myself and reading. I started reading Marxist-Leninist books. It was during this time that I began to read Marxist-Leninist works.

Mao: (To Wei Guoqing) I think you're a bit too polite. During the Dien Bien Phu campaign, you were adamant about fighting. At first, they wouldn't listen, but you were so powerful that they finally listened.

Wei: I was acting according to the Chairman's instructions.

Mao: (To Wei Guoqing) Has the population of your ethnic group (the Zhuang) increased? It should be around 40 to 50 million people. You could probably organize dozens of divisions. Among the southern provinces capable of fighting, Guangxi is first, Guangdong second, and Hunan third. Your province (Jiangxi) (referring to Wang Dongxing) is fourth.

(After Liu Xingyuan finished his work report)

Mao: I listened to you for ten minutes today. Chen Duxiu couldn't do it; he wouldn't listen. He initially disagreed with setting up a peasant movement training institute, but later agreed. I said, "Then please announce the enrolment." He said the proportion of peasants was too large, while the proportion of workers was too small. It wouldn't work. Actually, at the time, there were 400 million peasants and only 2 million workers, so we should train more cadres for the peasant movement. But Chen Duxiu did have one strength: he wasn't greedy for money. His clothes were spotless, and his desk was neatly arranged.

(Speaking of the Yan'an Rectification Movement)

Mao: During the Yan'an Rectification Movement, the idea of compiling a book was proposed. Wang Shoudao was later put in charge, but his work proved unsuccessful. Hu Qiaomu was then appointed. He possessed considerable knowledge and collected and studied numerous documents, compiling two large volumes that were then printed for discussion. Through study, the issues became more clearly understood.

(Speaking of the Battle of Jinzhou)

Mao: We were in the apple orchard, and our troops were not picking apples to eat. I said, "Our troops have hope."

Mao: When we arrived in Beijing, someone proposed increasing military pay, saying, "The capitalists eat rice and steamed buns, while our troops eat pickled cabbage. Life is too hard." "Only by increasing military pay can we compete with the capitalists." I said, "Our troops only eat pickled cabbage and can still fight. This shows great hope." Why should military pay be increased? The person who proposed this was speaking for the pickled cabbage-eating class.

Mao: The army must be cautious and not arrogant. Arrogance leads to mistakes. I haven't been in charge of military work for a long time, but now I must. Governing the army simply means studying the line, correcting unhealthy tendencies, avoiding factionalism, and emphasizing unity. After entering the city, Nie Rongzhen was initially in charge of military work, followed by Peng Dehuai, who had won battles. Then came Lin Biao, who couldn't handle so much. In reality, He Long and Luo Ruiqing handled more. Then came Yang Chengwu, and then Huang Yongsheng, who became Chief of Staff and head of the Military Commission's working group. Some people in the working group caused a lot of trouble at the Lushan Conference. I don't think Huang Yongsheng is very strong politically. First, the army must be cautious, and second, the local governments must also be cautious. The army must be cautious, and first, avoid factionalism. Comrade Li Desheng had objections to the quotations they produced at the Lushan Conference. I said, "Li Desheng is such a fool! You're not from their mountain top¹⁰. How can someone else give you their faction? How can they give you their precious treasures?"

(Mao Zedong pondered for a moment, then turned the conversation to "Theory of Genius")

Mao: The Internationale encompasses the entire Marxist standpoint and viewpoint. You see, it talks about slaves rising up to fight for truth. There has never been a savior, nor do we rely on gods or emperors; we must save ourselves. Who created the human world? It was us, the working people. At the Lushan Conference, I wrote a 700-word document that raised the question of whether heroes create history or slaves. Have you discussed this? The

¹⁰ "Mountain-topism" was a term used during the revolutionary years to refer to acting on one's own, not accepting Party discipline, and practising factionalism.

Internationale embodies the principle of unity toward tomorrow, and communism must be realized. Studying Marxism emphasizes unity, not division. Regarding the song "Three Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention," you should pay attention to the first of the Three Disciplines and the first and fifth of the Eight Points for Attention. These are the key points. Without a focus, there can be no policy.

Mao: You must study seriously. When Luo Ruiqing served as Chief of the General Staff, he was instructed to consult with Chen Boda on compiling a reading list, which resulted in a selection of thirty books. I thought it was a good idea. Later, they said it would hinder the study of the Quotations from Chairman Mao and put a halt to the study of theory. How can senior cadres not even understand what materialism and idealism are? What can we do if we have difficulty understanding the works of Marx and Lenin? There is a way. You can ask a tutor for help.

I've reviewed the documents you (referring to the Guangzhou Military Region) wrote regarding the three supports and two militaries. While some issues haven't been completely addressed, they're still acceptable. I added four words to the Central Committee's comments: "Study carefully." This means we must draw everyone's attention. Most of our cadres are good, and the bad are always a minority. The bad should be appropriately criticized, and the good should be praised, but not excessively. We shouldn't praise them too highly. For example, some people say, "Super genius!" Praising someone in their twenties with such high praise doesn't do them any good; it actually harms them. The local Party committee has already been established. Shouldn't the decisions made by the local Party committee be brought to the military Party committee for discussion? Isn't that perverse? This was permitted before the local Party committee was established, but it's no longer permitted now that the local Party committee is in place.

Mao: I have always disapproved of wives serving as secretaries and office managers. What do you ladies think? You should do your work yourself, personally review and approve it, to avoid mistakes. That's all for today.

Conversation in Changsha with Liu Xingyuan, Ding Sheng, Wei Guoqing, Hua Guofeng, Bu Zhanya, and Wang Dongxing

(August 30, 1971)

(When discussing the issue of Lin Biao and his gang)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): Let's not draw conclusions now; that should be done by the Central Committee. You all attended the meeting of 99 people. The Premier delivered a summary speech. Self-criticisms by five generals, as well as those by Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan, were published. Everyone believed the issue was resolved and a summary had been made. In fact, the Lushan incident is not over, not resolved. Everyone also believes Chen Boda was wrong to create a collection of quotations calling him a "genius." What theory? The Second Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee reached a considerable conclusion. "My Opinion" specifically criticizes the "genius" theory. I'm not saying we shouldn't talk about genius. Genius is simply a bit smarter. Isn't genius dependent on one person or a few people? Genius relies on one person, isn't it? Genius relies on the Party, and the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat.

(On the Party's situation)

Mao: Our Party has over 20 million members, and only 1 percent are bad. This one percent, called "getting rid of the old and welcoming in the new," will need to be suspended a little, but not by much. Those purged and suspended will account for three percent. There are still backward elements within the Party, or relatively speaking. These issues can only be resolved in years, or even decades. Because there's no war now, there's no Chen Duxiu. Back then, there were daily battles, a whirlwind of revolutionary activity, and the situation quickly became apparent. Chen Duxiu and his 81 companions escaped and issued a statement. Before the August 7th Conference, the policy of the Nanchang Uprising was correct. The Nanchang Uprising was fundamentally correct. Later, there were mistakes in the policy, but the experience gained was also good. The cities are no longer that developed. Relying on external aid is unreliable; we have to rely on ourselves. What can we do without soldiers? We rely on mobilizing the masses. We also have captured soldiers. They're also members of the masses, having been conscripted by the Kuomintang. By capturing them, we're splitting them from the enemy.

Mao: I heard that the education on the Three Disciplines and the Eight Points of Attention has been neglected. Article 1 of the Three Disciplines, and Articles 1 and 5 of the Eight Points of Attention are all very important. They are the key points. Without a key point, there is no policy. Without a policy, how can we do our work? We must grasp the key points, study, and discuss them. How can we do this without drawing on history and policy?

Of course, you can't talk to the soldiers about the Lushan Conference yet. We don't understand why they held this meeting, and why it ended so quickly. Comrade Liu Jianxun said it took a day and a half, I say three days. They were already working on it from the very beginning.

If you have a point, you can insist. Why did that evil wind die down after three days? Why did it retreat so quickly? The heads of all the major groups participated in the discussion at the Politburo Standing Committee and announced the withdrawal of the briefing.

In short, we will distribute the briefing to everyone. Let everyone comment: Is it revolutionary, semi-revolutionary, or counter-revolutionary? Don't be influenced by the backward opinions of the masses. You are among those who are backward. Otherwise, why would you be swept up in the sudden typhoon?

Mao: The military has always emphasized a resolute and decisive style, and I agree with that. However, when resolving ideological issues, resoluteness isn't enough. We must present facts and reason, and we'll listen to whoever has the right opinion. I've never had any opinions. My opinions all come from the lower levels, from the supply stations. Chen Boda gave me a few quotations, the 38th Army gave me a report, Wang Dongxing's self-examination, the Jinan Military Region's report on combating arrogance and complacency, and Liu Zihou also gave me some materials. What do I have? I learned from them, and then I just throw stones.

I think you should do the same in the future. What kind of knowledge do you have? I don't know. It's nothing more than holding a couple of meetings with workers and peasants and then summarizing things. Some people, once summarizing things, start talking about how wise and great they are! A wise leader! Actually, how can I be considered a wise leader? The mere mention of a wise leader fills me with dread. I'm not a wise leader. I simply write a few words or a few sentences on the reports from below, and they provide material for my brain to process.

You all talk about wise leadership, right? Of course, without it, we can't do anything. Without wise leadership, how could you possibly manage Guangdong Province? The Guangzhou Military Region encompasses three provinces with a population of over 100 million. Can you manage them? But you should keep an eye on the numbers; don't just publish them in the newspapers. I'll go around and talk to you guys, but don't bring too many people. At the Lushan Conference, we talked about reading. I hope you'll read more in the future.

You are all secretaries, and you still have to be students. I'm a student every day now, reading two copies of Reference Materials: one in the morning and one in the afternoon, so I have some international knowledge. Some people are too busy and only read one copy of Reference News, which is too little. If you don't have time, you can give it to the secretaries or secretarial section chiefs. After they read it, they can whisper it in your ears. I think we

should print more copies of Reference Materials so that more people can read it. If some people don't read it, let them be.

(On the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee)

Mao: This Lushan fight is different from the previous nine. All the previous nine resulted in conclusions, but this time, to protect Vice Chairman Lin, no personal conclusion was reached. He certainly bears some responsibility. I think those people did him a disservice. They didn't even keep me informed. It would be good if you could keep me informed more often.

I'm just trying to give you some peace of mind this time! Speak out what's on your mind, both right and wrong. That'll make you feel better. Like Wang Dongxing, he was involved, but he made several self-criticisms at meetings of 1,300 people, and he didn't fall. You can't fall if you speak your mind. Of course, there are a few who gloat over your misfortune.

What I've said goes beyond the Premier's summary of the meeting of ninety-nine people. It's my personal opinion. For example, was the North China Group's briefing revolutionary or counter-revolutionary? That's still up for debate. In short, it's not very good. Otherwise, why would they have to retract it? It wasn't entirely appropriate for a few generals to leak information to the various groups. Then, when they were told it wasn't working, they panicked. Initially, they were so bold, ready to blow up Mount Lushan and stop the Earth. But after a few days, they quickly retracted the records. Look, it's only been a few days, and they've been going back and forth. If they have a point, why retract it?

Our senior cadres are immature. That Lushan Conference only had about two hundred people, and I was one of them, along with some other senior cadres. This time, I'm trying to get some fresh air out to our senior cadres. I've spoken to Central Committee members, including Bu Zhanya, who isn't a member. I've also spoken to him. Is it okay to try to get some fresh air out to the political commissar of a military region? Comrade Hua Guofeng, you're obsessed with agriculture. Of course, you've also discussed the agricultural policy, but agriculture alone isn't enough. We also need to consider the Party, government, military, civilians, and academics in all directions. Go back and get some fresh air out there. Those who can, do so. Those who can't, just abide by the rules. Let's give it a try. I can't make the decision alone. Don't do this universally; you should try to get some fresh air out there individually.

(Speaking of the conferences of representatives of activists studying Chairman Mao's works held in various regions)

Mao: Mao: How effective were these past collective meetings? It warrants investigation. The one held in Beijing had shortcomings.

Firstly, at that collective meeting convened by the General Staff Department, he insisted on singling out one person for special praise while forbidding anyone else to speak. I heard that

a nurse there voiced a dissenting opinion and they didn't let her off. 'The "Great Tree Special Tree" campaign is ill-conceived. While ostensibly promoting me, it's unclear whom it truly elevates—in reality, it elevates only him. Do I need him to elevate me? I've already achieved remarkable prominence.'

Later, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission's congresses weren't good either. Some people even sent telegrams of congratulations when the commission held its congresses. In reality, this was just a publicity stunt, a way to gather support. Mao: (To Liu Xingyuan and Ding Sheng) You have such a close relationship with Huang Yongsheng. What would happen if Huang Yongsheng fell? He was the only son of the Jinggangshan clan in the working group.

Huang Yongsheng, a native of Xianning, Hubei, joined the army at the age of seventeen. He was originally a soldier in the guard regiment of Ye Ting's army. This regiment did not participate in the Nanchang Uprising, but participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Xiushui, Jiangxi, and then went to Jinggangshan.

Cadres in the south are relatively rare now. They are too high up in the hierarchy and sparse. I'm happy that cadres are increasing in the north, but don't get cocky. Overall, we are Bolsheviks with our flaws, and that's okay.

Mao: Don't talk about the Lushan Conference publicly, because the Central Committee hasn't reached a conclusion yet. You can just talk about the nine struggles between the two lines. Just say that there are still some problems with the current struggle between the two lines. Don't tell me what I'm saying. However, our army should be educated. All senior cadres should understand what I've been bragging about. There are so many commanders and political commissars, I'm afraid it's too late. Actually, everyone knows about it. What about the "ordinary people"? Who are these "ordinary people"? Everyone in Hebei knows. In short, it's a question of line, factionalism, and unity. I'm Cheng Yaojin's three axes. I talk about it everywhere. No matter who makes a mistake, if they don't uphold unity and the line, it's not good. After returning to Beijing, I'll talk to them one by one, or three or four at a time. If they don't talk to me, I'll go to them.

The method is threefold: throwing rocks, undermining the foundations, and adding sand. Chen Boda, this "little common man," is trying to sow discord, and he never finishes his words. We are now at the grassroots level, and we don't criticize him openly. We still call the criticism of Chen and the rectification movement "criticism of revisionism and rectification movement." Our Party has discipline. During the Lushan struggle, we didn't hear what the foreigners said. Meetings were held in North China for over a month, and later generations held meetings for another three months, but we didn't hear anything from the foreigners. In short, there are over 20 million Party members nationwide, both cadres and soldiers. Isn't 3% a bit too much? Now I hope you will try to use the Three Disciplines and Eight Points of

Attention to educate the soldiers, cadres, the masses, the Party members, and the people. This issue is very simple; there's no need for such lengthy reports.

(Mao Zedong checked his watch)

Mao: I'm leaving today, and I'll continue my conversations along the way.

Wei: The Chairman's speech was very instructive for us.

Mao: That's brilliant again, isn't it? I've never heard of it before. A meeting of ninety-nine people... I just spoke about it. Marx often said, don't judge people by their statements, judge them by their actions. Statements are merely spoken or written; that's easier. Truly implementing them is harder. This issue hasn't been resolved; it may take several years, ten years, or even twenty years. People say, "The final judgment will be made after the final coffin." I say that some people can't be judged after the final coffin. Wasn't Stalin judged after the final coffin? No, he wasn't.

Stalin's Yalta Agreement aimed to carve up the world. Mongolia was removed from China, Xinjiang and Northeast China were assigned to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, with no other countries allowed in. Japan was assigned to the United States' sphere of influence. Did you know this?

(Discussing Sino-Soviet relations)

Mao: During the Korean War, relations between the two countries were relatively good. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance and the Yalta Agreement are two different issues. During the internal debate surrounding the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, they said that third-country nationals were not allowed to enter Northeast China and Xinjiang. We said there were still 200,000 Koreans in Northeast China, some of whom had not yet obtained Chinese citizenship. How could this be? They couldn't answer. Furthermore, they wouldn't allow us to seize power. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was always opposed to this. The telegrams still exist.

After the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, Stalin sent our Party a telegram saying that civil war was unacceptable. If a civil war were to break out, the Chinese nation would be in danger of extinction.

If the country was in danger of extinction, that was fine, but how could a nation perish? The word "nation" refers to its people. How could a nation with hundreds of millions of people perish? I disagreed with them. At the time, there were also quite a few within our party who did not want to seize power, nor did they talk about seizing power.

Mao: I've discussed the Party's ten struggles between different lines. Not once did the Party split. This question is worth studying. With such a large country and so many people, the only reason for not splitting is the people's hearts and the Party's will. The Party members

themselves did not support a split. The Bolsheviks and Mensheviks formed in the Soviet Union. There was a basis for a split in our Party, especially during Wang Ming's time.

(Someone in the audience asked Chairman Mao: Did the Soviet Union give Gao Gang and Rao Shushi a hand?)

Mao: We did pull them back a bit. From a historical perspective, our party has hope. In the past, Zhang Guotao attempted to split the party and pitted the Communist Party's armed forces against each other, but that didn't work.

Mao: There's great hope. We must continue to implement the policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the illness and saving the patient" and unite.

Conversation with Xu Shiyu, Han Xianchu, Cheng Shiqing, and Wang Dongxing in Nanchang

(August 31, 1971)

(Mao Zedong spoke directly about the Party's history and the struggle between different lines.)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): The Chinese Communist Party's ten errors of line were intended to split the Party, but they failed to do so.

Mao: (To Xu Shiyu) During the Long March, Zhang Guotao was trying to split the Party, and they established a pseudo-Central Committee. You are well aware of this.

Chen Duxiu was trying to split the Party, and eighty-one people formed the "Leninist Left Opposition." Chen Duxiu was the first, Peng Shuzhi the second, and Liu Renjing the third. They also issued a statement.

Chairman Mao: Wang Dongxing has conveyed to you the content of the Wuhan and Changsha talks, and discussed the issues of the Lushan Conference. Those who founded the People's Liberation Army and led our army—if they could build and lead, could they not command? They separate building from command. Does that mean the founders can't command? Furthermore, was our army created by just one person? Or was it created by a few individuals? I don't think so. There were so many people involved. Zhu De, Enlai, He Long, Liu Bocheng, and Ye Ting—so many people initiated the Nanchang Uprising. Couldn't they have commanded it?

After the Nanchang Uprising, due to errors in command and policy, the rebel army marched south to the Chaoshan region of Guangdong to fight the enemy, resulting in heavy losses. The remaining troops were eventually forced to return to Jiangxi and Hunan.

After the Nanchang Uprising, due to errors in command and policy, the rebels sought to rely on foreigners. Comrade Zhu De, who had arrived in the Guidong region, had a classmate and friend named Fan Shisheng, with whom he had a good relationship. Fan Shisheng gave him some guns, money, and clothing.

It's wrong to say that the founders and leaders of the army can't command it. Founders and leaders aren't just a few people; they're not just me, Mao Zedong, or you, Lin Biao. There are many comrades in our Party who led military conflicts and led the army.

Zhang Guotao staged a coup during the Long March, and he was the initiator and commander. However, he commanded the army to cause division, using the army as leverage for this, which was not good. During the Long March, the Right Column with us included the 4th and 30th Armies. These two armies crossed the grasslands with us. They threw their guns to the students in the Cadre Corps, but I still asked them to take their guns.

If they wanted to go back, they could go back. Zhang Guotao had given the order. If they didn't want to go back, we welcomed them. We couldn't help at the time. The army couldn't help because they were all holding guns. Zhang Guotao sent a telegram! Let them go back. If they wanted to go back, then let them go! Li Xiannian and Xu Shiyu also crossed the grasslands with us, but they eventually returned.

Mao: (To Xu Shiyu and others) You and Zhang Guotao were in the same unit. You must learn this lesson. Didn't you later reunite with us?

Conversation with Nan Ping, Xiong Yingtang, Chen Liyun, and Wang Dongxing in Hangzhou

(September 3, 1971)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): That briefing [1] had the greatest impact; it was a counter-revolutionary briefing. I don't understand why they did that. They had something to say, but they didn't disclose it beforehand. They probably thought they had some sort of guarantee, that it would succeed. But when they were told it wouldn't work, they panicked again. I think they were afraid.

Mao: The Lushan riot lasted three days, actually a day and a half. Then we stopped and toured the mountain. It's been a year now. Comrade Lin Biao's speech was not discussed with me, nor was it shown to me. Lin Biao's two attempts to call and write were both blocked by them.

The Lushan issue wasn't so good, but without the Lushan Conference, the current situation wouldn't exist. The Lushan incident isn't over, it's not thorough, and it hasn't been concluded. A meeting of fewer than 100 people isn't enough. The military should expand the participation to include army commanders and political commissars, and local comrades at a similar level should also participate.

(On the issue of Lin Biao and Chen Boda at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee)

Mao: The Lushan Conference focused on two main issues: the presidency and genius. Anyone who speaks of "anti-genius" is opposing me. I've circled those adverbs several times.

Mao: We must practice Marxism-Leninism, not revisionism; we must unite, not split, and avoid forming factions; we must be open and aboveboard, not engage in intrigue and conspiracy.

Mao: I haven't discussed the line with you. In our past meetings, we only talked about trivial matters, nothing more than relations with Nanjing. Who knew there would be the Lushan Conference? I've said before that one major tendency obscures another, but who knew the three supports and two militaries obscured the main tendency of the Lushan Conference!

Listen to what you hear and analyse it. Don't listen to rumours. Don't just listen to what others say. You'll be misled and fail to understand the situation. Therefore, we must investigate and study, and listen to what we hear and analyse it.

(When discussing his attitude toward the terms "genius" and "greatness")

Mao: Three adverbs were mentioned at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee. It was a time of chaos and war, so they were still needed. Things are different after the Ninth National Congress. We must unite and strive for greater victory. Now the

temperature must cool down. Pictures are hung everywhere, exposed to the sun and rain. It's pitiful. And then there's that "great" thing. I have four "great," but you don't have one! A great mentor is just a teacher. Of course, a mentor is more capable than a teacher. I circled those three adverbs in the draft Party Constitution for the Ninth National Congress. The Ninth National Congress Party Constitution has been finalized. Why don't you take a look?

(On the issue of cadres studying Marxism-Leninism)

Chairman Mao: At this Lushan Conference, many people didn't even understand what materialism and idealism were. They couldn't even make sense of it. You should study the works of Marx and Lenin. Now study six books. Those with higher education may make breakthroughs. Study a few more books next year.

(Finally, the topic turned to the military.)

Chairman Mao: When we entered the city, I was in charge of both the fighting and the army. Since they won the Korean War, I stopped being in charge. I left that to others. Rongzhen initially managed the army, then Peng Dehuai, and later Lin Biao. But he was in poor health and couldn't handle much. Luo Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu wouldn't listen to him, and my help wasn't enough. I'm not familiar with the current generals, and I don't understand them well. I haven't had many conversations with them individually or in groups. I'm also unclear about Huang Yongsheng's current ideological state. I didn't manage it before, but now I'm in charge of the army. I don't believe the army will rebel. The army must be unified and rectified.

(Speaking about the situation in the Beijing Military Region)

Mao: Besides them, the main perpetrators were the Beijing Military Region, which first reorganized the 24th Army, then the 31st, 69th, and finally the 38th Army. Some of them implemented organizational adjustments. When the 21st Army was transferred to Shaanxi, Hu Wei remarked, "This is great! We're no longer under their command." They were all happy to leave the Beijing Military Region. They were dissatisfied with the 66th Army, and their former commander resisted, refusing to allow them to join the Tianjin Municipal Revolutionary Committee. They couldn't get involved in the Beijing Garrison District because of Xie Fuzhi, Wu De, and Wu Zhong, who wouldn't listen to their rhetoric.

Mao: Lin must be protected. (At the same time, he criticized Lin's speech.)

Mao: What do you mean by "one sentence is worth ten thousand"? One sentence is worth ten thousand. How can it be worth ten thousand? What do you mean by "the People's Liberation Army was founded and led by me, and Lin Biao personally commanded it?" If you founded it, you can't command it! (Towards the end of the conversation)

Mao: Industry should learn from Daqing, agriculture should learn from Dazhai, and the people of the whole country should learn from the People's Liberation Army. That's not enough. We must also add that the PLA should learn from the people of the whole country.

[1] Refers to Briefing No. 6 of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee.

Conversation with Li Desheng, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Wu Zhong, and Wang Dongxing in Fengtai

(September 12, 1971)

(Mao Zedong first asked Li Desheng about his visit to Albania and Romania. Li talked about the Albanian Party's attitude and opinions on inviting Nixon to visit China)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): They are leftists, and we are rightists. They are afraid that the withdrawal of the US imperialists from Asia will increase pressure on them, so they want us to hold the US imperialists back. They [1] have only 200 million people and cannot afford casualties, so they want to withdraw their troops. Withdrawal of troops will not necessarily increase pressure on them.

(Then Mao talked about the party's previous struggles on the line)

Mao: Our principle is that the line determines everything. Having more people and more guns cannot replace the correct line. If the party's line is correct, everything will be there. If the line is not correct, even if you have people and guns, you may lose them. The line is a guideline, and the guideline is clear and detailed. What is the guideline? Do you know how to fish? The guideline is the rope that goes through the fishing net, and the mesh is the mesh on the fishing net. You can't finish talking about the mesh in three days. Today I am talking about the guideline. Our party has a history of 50 years, and there have been 10 major line struggles. The first one was Chen Duxiu. After the "August 7" meeting, he and Liu Renjing, Peng Shuzhi and other people signed a "Leninist Left Opposition" with 81 people.

They said we were bad people and the Red Army was saboteurs, and then they turned to Trotsky's faction. Later, it was Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Luo Zhanglong, Wang Ming, and Zhang Guozhu. The Sixth Party Congress was held in Moscow in 1928. Li Lisan was arrogant and did it for three months. At that time, the Premier had not returned. Li Lisan advocated attacking big cities and winning one or several provinces first.

I did not agree with what Li Lisan did. Li fell at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee. Wang Ming fell at the Zunyi Conference. Wang Ming's line had the longest lifespan. They used the power of the Third International to label the Premier a conciliator and published a pamphlet "Struggle for the Further Bolshevikization of the Communist Party of China", criticizing Li Lisan for not being "left" enough and not being satisfied until all the bases were destroyed. In the end, they basically destroyed them all.

From 1931 to 1934, I had no say in the Central Committee. Our party has had fifty years of experience. Chinese people do not like divisions. In the ten struggles over different lines in our party, none of them split the party.

(Mao talked about the many times in history when people tried to split the party, but all failed.)

Mao: Then there was the surprise attack at the Lushan Conference last year, which was as if it would blow up Lushan and stop the rotation of the earth. They concealed things first, then launched a surprise attack. The five Standing Committee members concealed three of them. There was no communication at all. They launched a surprise attack and issued briefings to fan the flames. There must be a purpose for doing this! This shows how low these people's style is. I talked to some people about my article and did some investigation and research. I wrote it on the fifth day. The issue of genius is a theoretical issue. They engage in idealism. I am not saying that genius is not good. Genius is just a little smarter. Genius does not rely on one person or a few people. Genius relies on a party. The party is the vanguard of the proletariat. Genius relies on the mass line and collective wisdom.

I have had a disagreement with Lin Biao. You said that it takes hundreds of years in Europe and thousands of years in China for a genius to appear. This is not true! Marx and Engels were contemporaries, and it was less than a hundred years before Lenin and Stalin. How can you say that it takes hundreds of years for a genius to appear? China had Chen Sheng, Wu Guang, Hong Xiuquan, and Sun Yat-sen. How can you say that it takes thousands of years for a genius to appear? What is the "peak"? One sentence is worth ten thousand sentences. You are exaggerating! One sentence is one sentence. How can it be worth ten thousand sentences? If there is no president, I will not be the president. I have spoken six times. Even if I speak one sentence each time, that is 60,000 sentences. They did not listen. Not even a single sentence counts. It is equal to zero.

Most of our cadres are good. If they make mistakes, they should be criticized. If they do a good job, they should be praised, but they should not be praised. It is no good to praise people in their twenties as "super geniuses". People who make mistakes are allowed to correct their mistakes. But it is easy to issue a statement. It is nothing more than speaking or writing it on paper. The problem is whether they practice their statement and correct their mistakes. These people are the most courageous and ended so quickly. Comrade Liu Jianxun said that it took a day and a half, I said it was three days. Why did the evil wind only blow for three days and then stop? Why did you withdraw your reason? It shows that they are empty. I hit stones wherever I can. The material that Chen Boda made in Lushan that deceived many people was a stone, the report of the Jinan Military Region on the three destructions and three establishments was also a stone, and the report of the 38th Army was a big stone. Later, there was Liu Zihou's self-criticism, and the Military Commission held such a long meeting but did not criticize Chen at all. I added comments, which was also throwing stones.

Mao: (To Li Desheng) If you ask them for the materials they collected in Lushan, they will say three times in a row: "Why don't you give me your treasure?" See what they say. After entering the city, I rarely took charge of military work. The people in charge of military work were Nie Rongzhen at first, then Peng Dehuai, and then Lin Biao. In fact, He Long and Luo Ruiqing were in charge of it more. Luo Ruiqing, the three chiefs of the general staff, didn't listen to him much. Later, it was Yang Chengwu and Huang Yongsheng. I think Huang

Yongsheng is not very politically strong. He has a head but no brain. He has the least courage to self-criticise. He is scared to death. He has to tell others what is in his mind. He feels comfortable when he tells others what is right and wrong.

Mao: (To Wang Dongxing) He was a little involved and made several self-criticisms at meetings of more than a thousand people.

Wang Dongxing: I made formal self-criticisms three times.

(Mao was talking about Wang Dongxing's self-criticisms in the General Office of the Central Committee and the Central Guard Corps)

Mao: There were only 7,000 soldiers, including wives and children, and he did not fall. Speak your mind, he will not fall. Of course, there are a few people who gloat over the misfortune and say that Wang Dongxing will not be able to step down this time, but most people still say that he made a good self-criticism. The five people's self-criticisms at the report meeting on criticizing Chen and rectifying the style of work admitted that they were wrong in direction and line in politics and sectarian in organization. But they were hesitant in their self-criticisms, which made people doubt whether they could change for the better.

The soil is too hard and it is not breathable. Sand must be mixed in. Comrade Li Xiannian used to be involved in the army's wars. He can join the Military Commission's working group. In the future, some people will be selected from major military regions to join the work of the Military Commission's working group. The Beijing Military Region will also transfer some people from the Fu Army to smash the nest of factionalism. The North China Conference sent Comrades Li Desheng and Ji Dengkui to the Beijing Military Region, which is called poaching. My method is to throw stones, mix sand, and poach.

Mao: Does Chen Boda count as a line?

Ji Dengkui: Yes!

Mao: We have to wait and see. Chen Boda is not the only black hand. There are other black hands. I have never approved of my wife being my secretary or office director. Are you a wife dictatorship? Lin Biao wanted to call me and write to me, saying that he was stopped by people around him. If they had reported it, they would not have succeeded! We should practice Marxism-Leninism, not revisionism; we should unite, not split, not sectarianism or mountain-topism; we should be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire.

Mao: We should focus on line education, and the policy is still "learning from past mistakes to avoid future mistakes, and curing the disease to save the patient". Unite and strive for greater victory.

[1] Referring to the United States.

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on its 26th Anniversary

(September 1, 1971)

Comrade Sun Duc Thang, Chairman of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

Comrade Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam;

Comrade Truong Chinh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

Comrade Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

On the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people, we extend our warmest congratulations to the Workers' Party of Vietnam, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Vietnamese people.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is the first socialist state established in Southeast Asia after World War II. For 26 years, imperialist aggressors have continuously launched wars of aggression against Vietnam. Under the wise leadership of their great leader, President Ho Chi Minh [1], and the Workers' Party of Vietnam, the heroic Vietnamese people have waged a protracted and unyielding struggle, first achieving glorious victories in the War of Resistance Against French Aggression. Over the past decade or so, the Vietnamese people, with fearless heroism, have resisted the most brutal aggression launched by U.S. imperialism and achieved great victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression and save the nation. The people of northern and southern Vietnam, fighting and producing simultaneously, with unwavering perseverance and a spirit of self-reliance, have achieved tremendous successes in socialist economic and national defense construction. The great victory of the Vietnamese people has strongly supported the people of all countries engaged in the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle and set a shining example for the struggles of oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world for liberation.

At present, the heroic peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, holding high the battle banner of the Supreme Conference of the Indochinese People, are valiantly fighting for complete victory in the war against the US and for national salvation. The situation in Indochina is unprecedentedly favourable. The US invaders' so-called "Nixon Doctrine" [2] and their scheme to "Vietnamize" the war have failed. Contradictions and chaos are rife within the puppet clique. Although US imperialism is still struggling mightily, its defeat is a foregone conclusion, unalterable by any force. Victory will undoubtedly belong to the peoples of the three Indochinese countries.

The peoples of China and Vietnam are time-tested comrades and allies. The friendship and solidarity between us is unbreakable. The Chinese people will, as always, resolutely fulfill their internationalist obligations and fully support the Vietnamese people and the peoples of Indochina in their war to resist the United States and save their country until complete victory is achieved.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing, September 1, 1971

[1] Ho Chi Minh, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Died in 1969.

[2] Nixon was then the President of the United States. The foreign policy he proposed and implemented during his tenure became known as the "Nixon Doctrine." Its main elements included: "burden and responsibility sharing" with partnership as the core; building a "realistic deterrent" based on vitality; and promoting a "balance of power diplomacy" within the "triangle" of the "five powers," using negotiation as a key tool.

Message of Condolence from Mao Zedong and Others to Northern Vietnam for the Severe Flooding

(September 2, 1971)

Hanoi

2Comrade Ton Duc Thang, Chairman of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

Comrade Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam;

Comrade Truong Chinh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

Comrade Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

We are deeply concerned to learn of the severe flooding in northern Vietnam. On behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people, we express our deepest condolences to the Workers' Party of Vietnam, the Vietnamese government, and the fraternal Vietnamese people.

In this flood-fighting struggle, the heroic Vietnamese people, under the strong leadership of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, fought bravely and tenaciously day and night, demonstrating unparalleled revolutionary spirit. The Chinese people deeply admire this.

China and Vietnam are close neighbours, and the peoples of China and Vietnam are comrades-in-arms and brothers. The Chinese people have always considered the difficulties of the Vietnamese people their own and will do everything possible to strongly support the brotherly Vietnamese people in overcoming this flood.

We firmly believe that the heroic Vietnamese people, who have already achieved great victory in the war against the United States and for national salvation, will surely overcome the temporary difficulties caused by natural disasters and achieve victory in the fight against floods.

Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Mao Zedong

Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Lin Biao

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China: Zhou Enlai

Beijing, September 2, 1971

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating the 23rd Anniversary of the Founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(September 8, 1971)

Pyongyang

Comrade Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea
Prime Minister of the Cabinet of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Comrade Choi Yong-kun, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Comrades:

On the occasion of the 23rd anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people, we extend our warmest congratulations to the Workers' Party of Korea, the Korean government, and the brotherly Korean people.

For 23 years, under the wise leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea headed by Comrade Kim Il Sung, the Korean people have held high the banner of anti-imperialist revolution and trodden a glorious path. The heroic Korean people resisted the war of aggression launched by U.S. imperialism, defeated the American invaders, and achieved great victory. In the cause of socialist revolution and socialist construction, the Korean people, through self-reliance and arduous struggle, have achieved brilliant successes. Now, the Korean people are forging ahead courageously to fulfill the various combat tasks set forth by the Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. The Chinese people are delighted and encouraged by the tremendous achievements of the Korean people and sincerely wish the brotherly people of Ming Dynasty new and greater victories in their future revolutionary struggles.

The current international situation is developing increasingly in favour of the people of all countries and unfavourable to U.S. imperialism and all its running dogs. To escape its internal and external predicament, U.S. imperialism is intensifying its collusion with Japanese militarism and directing its spearhead of aggression against the peoples of Asia. However, in the face of the united strength of the Korean, Chinese, and Indochinese peoples, as well as the peoples of all Asian countries, all the aggressive plots of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries are bound to fail.

U.S. imperialism still occupies South Korea and, in collusion with Japanese militarism, continually launches military provocations and war threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Korean people have waged a relentless struggle to oppose the aggression of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries and achieve the peaceful reunification of their homeland. The Chinese people firmly support the just struggle of the Korean people

and firmly believe that the national aspiration of the 40 million Korean people to unify their homeland will surely be realized.

The Chinese and Korean peoples share a profound fighting friendship. This friendship, founded on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, was forged with blood in the protracted struggle against our common enemy and cannot be destroyed by any force. In the common struggle against U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism, the Chinese people will forever stand united with the fraternal Korean people and fight shoulder to shoulder until complete victory is achieved.

Long live the fighting friendship and great unity between the Chinese and Korean peoples!

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing, September 8, 1971

Comments on Zhou Enlai's Report on the Convening of the Third Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee [1]

(September 1971)

I agree with everything. By-elections for the Standing Committee are also required.

[1] On September 10, 1971, Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao Zedong, saying that before the Fourth National People's Congress was held, there were several matters that needed his approval so that preparations could begin: 1. Should the Third Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Party be held before National Day? 2. Should the Third Plenary Session be used to announce the permanent expulsion of Chen Boda from the Party? 3. Should several additional members of the Central Committee be elected at the Third Plenary Session? The Third Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which was scheduled to be held at the time, was not held due to Lin Biao's treason and escape on September 13.

Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Notice on Lin Biao's [1] Treason, Escape, and Self-Destruction [2]

(September 1971)

Distribute as it is.

[1] Lin Biao, formerly Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, formed a counter-revolutionary group during the Cultural Revolution, colluding with Chen Boda and others. He then colluded with and competed with the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary group in a plot to seize supreme leadership of the Party and the state. After his plot was exposed, he fled on September 13, 1971, and died in a plane crash in Wulankhan, Mongolia. In August 1973, the CPC Central Committee passed a resolution expelling Lin Biao from the Party. In 1981, a special tribunal of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China confirmed him as the principal offender in the counter-revolutionary group case.

[2] The main contents of the draft notice submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on September 17, 1971 were: 1. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China officially notifies that Lin Biao fled in panic on September 13, 1971, surrendered to the enemy, betrayed the Party and the country, and brought about his own destruction. 2. Lin Biao's betrayal of the Party and the country was a continuation of the class struggle and the two-line struggle that had been going on for a long time, especially since the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Party. It was the total exposure and bankruptcy of Lin Biao, a bourgeois individual careerist and conspirator. 3. Our Party grew and became stronger through the class struggle and the two-line struggle. 4. At present, the entire Party must heighten its revolutionary vigilance, prevent enemy sabotage, and continue to strengthen its war preparedness. 5. In accordance with the principle of differentiating internal and external communication and disseminating information in a step-by-step manner, the issue of Lin Biao's betrayal of the Party and the country has only been communicated to Party organizations at or above the Standing Committee level of the provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional Party committees. Later, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee, the scope of this notice was gradually expanded.

Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Notice Regarding Huang Yongsheng and Others' Resignation and Reflection [1]

(September 1971)

Agree.

[1] This notice issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 29, 1971, stated that, in view of the deep involvement of Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo in the sectarian activities of the Lin Biao-Chen anti-Party clique, making it difficult for them to continue their current work, the Central Committee had ordered them to resign, reflect, and make a thorough confession.

Comments on the Draft Notice on the Establishment of the Central Special Task Force [1]
(October 1971)

Agree.

[1] The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a notice on October 3, 1971, stating that in order to thoroughly investigate and clarify the history of the anti-Party clique of Lin Biao and Chen Boda, the Central Committee decided to establish a special case team to handle the relevant issues. The special case team consisted of 10 people, including Zhou Enlai, and had a working group under it, with Ji Dengkui and Wang Dongxing in charge of daily work. In the future, all localities and units reporting to the Central Committee about the Lin Biao and Chen Boda anti-Party clique should submit them to the special case team for unified handling.

Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Notice on the Dissolution of the Military Commission's Working Group [1]

(October 1971)

Agree.

[1] This notice issued by the CPC Central Committee on October 3, 1971, stated that the CPC Central Committee had decided to abolish the CMC Working Group and establish a CMC Working Meeting. The Meeting was chaired by CMC Vice Chairman Ye Jianying and was responsible for the CMC's daily work under the leadership of the CPC Central Military Commission.

Conversations after the restoration of the United Nations seat (1)

(October 26 and November 8, 1971)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): Little Tang, (2) Miss Nancy Tang, your country has failed, what are you going to do?

Zhou Enlai (hereinafter referred to as Zhou): The Chairman originally instructed... (3)

Mao: That is old news, it doesn't count.

Zhou: We just had a meeting and we all thought that the UN General Assembly resolved the issue cleanly and thoroughly without any sequelae. It was just that we were unprepared, especially since the Security Council was more troublesome. If we participated now, it would not be in line with the Chairman's teaching of "not fighting a battle without preparation." I came up with an idea on the spur of the moment and asked Xiong Xianghui (4) to take a few people to the United Nations as advance personnel to understand the situation on the spot and make preparations.

Mao: That is not necessary. Didn't the Secretary-General of the United Nations send a telegram? We will send a delegation. Let Mr. Qiao (5) be the head of the delegation and Xiong Xianghui be the representative. They will come back after the meeting. We also need to receive Nixon (5). You can study who to send to the Security Council.

Zhou: Let Huang Hua be the deputy head of the delegation and stay in the United Nations as the permanent representative to the Security Council.

Mao: Huang Hua has been the ambassador to Canada for less than four months. If he is transferred now, they may not be happy.

Zhou: Do some work and the Canadian government will understand.

Mao: Okay, let's do it.

Mao: This year, there were two major victories, one was Lin Biao and the other was the United Nations. I did not expect these two major victories. I was aware that Lin Biao was playing tricks, but I did not expect him to go abroad, and I did not expect that the "Trident" plane he was riding would crash in Outer Mongolia and "sink into the sand". My head nurse (8) is an expert on the United Nations. She has studied the proposals of countries like Albania. These days, she often tells me: The United Nations can pass it; I say: It cannot pass; she says: It can; I say: It cannot. You see, she is right after all. I still have so much superstition about the baton of the United States.

Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, and Italy all became "Red Guards" and rebelled against the United States, voting for us in the United Nations. Portugal also became a "Red Guard". Among European countries, only Malta voted against, while Greece, Luxembourg, and Franco's Spain (9) abstained. Except for these four countries, all voted in

favor. Nineteen Asian countries and twenty-six African countries voted in favor. Latin America is the "backyard" of the United States, and only Cuba and Chile have established diplomatic relations with us. This time, seven countries voted for us. The fire in the "backyard" of the United States is a big deal. Among the 131 member states, there were 76 votes in favor, 17 abstentions, and only 35 votes against. When the voting results were announced, there was singing, cheering, and some people slammed the table. What does slamming the table mean? (Zhou Enlai explained: slamming the table in the meeting hall expresses extreme happiness.) So many countries welcome us, it would be unreasonable not to send a delegation. There are also people who are unhappy, and "Chairman Chiang" is the first one. The US State Department said it would issue a statement, but I haven't seen it yet. It's just a "condolence letter".

What should we do if we are totally unprepared? I have said that we should not fight a war without preparation. I have also said that we should learn war in war. Now please let the Prime Minister take charge and make preparations as soon as possible. The most important thing is to prepare for the first speech at the United Nations General Assembly. (10)

In 1950, we were still in the "Huaguo Mountain era". At that time, you (11) and Wu Xiuquan (12) went to the United Nations. Wu Xiuquan gave a speech at the Security Council entitled "Accusing the United States of Armed Invasion of China's Territory Taiwan". Accusing means filing a complaint, accusing the "Jade Emperor". At that time, the "Jade Emperor" was very arrogant and did not take us seriously. Now it is different. The "Jade Emperor" will also visit Huaguo Mountain. This time you are not going to file a complaint, but to uphold justice, to boost the morale of the people of the world, and to destroy the prestige of the superpower. Shout out support for countries that oppose foreign interference, aggression, and control.

The first speech should show this spirit.

First, we need to settle accounts. For so many years, we have not been allowed to join the United Nations. The Chinese people and the people of the world are angry. The main reason is the United States, followed by Japan. We must name them. We must list the sponsors one by one.

Second, we need to talk about the changes in the world situation since the establishment of the United Nations. It is what I said in the "Communiqué" (13) with Kissinger this time, "Countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want revolution. This has become an irresistible historical trend." We need to talk about some history. The American War of Independence in 1776, the French Revolution in 1789, and the October Revolution in 1917 in Russia are all great. But none of them have been as large as those since 1945. We should talk about China, self-reliance, hard work, overthrowing the three mountains, achieving national independence, national liberation, and victory in the new democratic revolution. This is not bragging, but a fact. The purpose is to encourage the

people of the world. The United States must withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan. No matter who wants to separate Taiwan from China, it is wishful thinking.

Third, we need to talk about our basic attitude towards international issues. Many of the words we said in our discussion with Kissinger on the communiqué can be used. We oppose the imperialist war and aggression policies, oppose the hegemonism of the superpowers, and support the just struggles of all oppressed peoples and oppressed nations. The struggles of the people of all countries support each other. We need to publicize the Five Principles: all countries, big or small, are equal; China belongs to the Third World and will never be a superpower; we oppose big countries bullying small countries and strong countries bullying weak countries; and we do not allow any country to manipulate the United Nations.

What else do I want to say? Please consider it. In short, we must have a clear-cut banner, "a high-profile leadership", and "unstoppable force". "Unstoppable force" was said by Du Yu, the "chief of the three armies" of Sima Yan, the emperor of the Jin Dynasty. He was known as "Zuo Zhuan Ci". He led his troops to occupy Wuchang and prepared to attack Jianye, the capital of the Eastern Wu. A "second-rate" staff officer suggested to him that the Yangtze River was flooded now, so he should wait until next year to fight. Du Yu said: "Now the army is powerful, like a bamboo breaking momentum, after a few sections, all problems will be solved easily, and there will be no more opportunities." As expected, it was a success, and "the three-part world was unified". When writing an article, you must use "unstoppable force" to convince people.

Cao Cao was a great military strategist. Zhuge Liang praised him in "The Second Expedition to the Emperor": "Cao Cao's wisdom and strategy are unique, and his use of troops is like Sun Wu's." At the same time, he also criticized him for losing battles. How did he criticize him? Please tell me.

(Ye Jianying: trapped in Jianyang, in danger in Wuchao, forced in Liyang, almost defeated in Beishan, and almost died in Tongguan.)

The "almost defeated in Beishan" refers to Cao Cao's fight for Hanzhong after Xiahou Yuan died in battle. "The Second Expedition to the Emperor" mentions Xiahou Yuan three times, and the other two are "Xiahou was defeated" and "Xiahou was beheaded".

Xiahou Yuan was one of Cao Cao's generals. Cao Cao appointed him as the General of the Western Expedition and the "Security Commander" of Hanzhong. When Liu Bei attacked Hanzhong, Xiahou Yuan deployed the main force at Dingjun Mountain and ordered Zhang He to defend the East Encirclement. Liu Bei "lured the snake out of its hole" and attacked Zhang He first. Xiahou Yuan divided half of his troops to personally assist Zhang He, but was beheaded by Huang Zhong. There is a Peking opera called "Dingjun Mountain", which is the specialty of Tan Xinpei and Tan Fuying. (14) You can take a look at the biography of Xiahou Yuan in "Book of Wei". At the beginning, Xiahou Yuan won several battles. Cao Cao wrote a letter to remind him: "When you are a general, you should be timid and not just rely on

courage. A general should take courage as the basis and act with wisdom; if you only know how to rely on courage, you will be no match for a common man." "When you are timid" means that you should think about your weaknesses and shortcomings, and there is a possibility of defeat. Xiahou Yuan did not take Cao Cao's warning seriously, and the whole army was annihilated. You will face many difficulties when you go to the United Nations. You must be brave and pay attention to the fact that you may be timid. The head of the delegation is the general. Don't be blinded by victory. I will give you two sentences. One is "No investigation, no right to speak" and the other is "Humility makes people progress, pride makes people fall behind."

Our policy in the United Nations is to "unite the majority and isolate the minority". The 23 proposing countries are our friends in need, and we must unite with them. We must also unite with the other 54 countries that voted in favour of us. We must treat the 17 countries that abstained correctly. Under such great pressure from the United States, they did not support the United States and expressed their sympathy for us by abstaining from voting. We should thank them. The 35 countries that voted against are not a monolithic entity, and we must also work on them. Unity is principled unity, and principles are our basic position on international issues. Our current slogan is: safeguard the independence and sovereignty of all countries, safeguard international peace, and promote human progress. Use this slogan to unite the majority.

2

Mao: "Without investigation, there is no right to speak." This was said to dogmatists. I still think this sentence is correct. Don't be biased in your understanding of this sentence. Objective things are constantly developing and changing, and people's understanding can never keep up with this change. Understanding always lags behind reality. If you require that everything be investigated before speaking or doing things, then you will never be able to speak or do anything. Once you understand the main situation and the essential situation, you can make a judgment and make up your mind. I have always opposed people who talk a lot when they get off the train. Such people are not good enough to do things, but they are more likely to cause trouble. They think they are great and only want to be teachers, not students. Some people have fought in the war and have some merits, or they think they have some merits. They keep thinking about their merits when they eat, shit, sleep, and dream. If you say that he has no merits, he will say that even if he has no merits, he has worked hard; even if he has no hard work, he has also been tired. This is low taste. In recent years, the thinking of some people in the army has been messed up by Lin Biao. The Jinan Military Region proposed "Anti-arrogance and undermining the fullness of the people" which is a good idea. I will let the whole army learn from it. I have often said recently that the army should be cautious. This is a targeted move. This year we won a great victory at the United Nations. This victory was mainly won by our foreign friends. We have no reason to be proud of ourselves. Now we are "not living up to our reputation". So I say "a general should

be timid sometimes". Or "three cobblers are better than one Zhuge Liang". We should discuss things and make more plans and make good decisions. Don't be like Yuan Shao who "made many plans but made few decisions" and even more so, "made no plans but made decisions". Being cautious does not mean being overly cautious. When you see something, say it when you should and do it when you should.

We must establish a united front in the United Nations. This is an international united front, which is similar to and different from the domestic united front. The fundamental difference is that the domestic united front is a united front of different classes, and the proletariat must take the lead; the international united front is a united front of different countries, and there is no question of who leads whom. All countries, big or small, are equal, and no one should lead anyone, and no one should listen to anyone else's leadership. In the past, we said that the Soviet Union should be the leader because it is the big brother. In order to deal with imperialism, we let it take the lead when necessary and let it be the chairman during meetings. But it wants to take the lead and establish a father-son party and a father-son country, which is completely wrong. The United States always wants other countries to listen to it, which is hegemony. Hegemony should be overthrown. Therefore, in establishing an international united front, we must negotiate on an equal footing. We must never regard ourselves as a big country and act arrogantly, and we must never interfere in other people's internal affairs, and we must never have the idea of leading others.

You can rest assured when you go to the United Nations this time. My "close comrade-in-arms" is gone. Do the comrades present know this?

Zhou: We haven't told them yet. After the Chairman finished speaking, we went to the Great Hall to read the document (15) to them and introduce the relevant situation. "May 7th" is a homonym of "armed uprising". This is the program of the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary group to plot to assassinate the Chairman and launch a counter-revolutionary coup.

Mao: Read this to them later. Print and distribute the full text to all Party branches across the country as soon as possible.

Zhou: It is full of malicious slander against the Chairman. How can it be printed? Mao: Why not? Do not change a single word. Distribute it verbatim so that all Party members and the masses know it.

Mao: Security is very important. Everyone should live together when they go there.

Mao: (To Zhou Enlai) Immediately send a telegram to Huang Zhenchuan's assistant and ask him to tell Kissinger that the US government must guarantee the safety of our delegation while it is in the United States. If there is any problem, only the US government will be held responsible.

(1) This is Mao Zedong's conversation with relevant comrades after China resumed its seat in the United Nations. The first part of this article is the conversation between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, Tang Wensheng, Ji Pengfei, Qiao Guanhua, Xiong Xianghui, Zhang Wenjin, and Wang Hairong on October 26, 1971; the second part of this article is the conversation between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Ji Pengfei, Qiao Guanhua, Fu Hao, Xiong Xianghui, Chen Chu, Tang Mingzhao, An Zhiyuan, Wang Hairong, Tang Wensheng, Zhang Wenjin, and Ambassador to France Huang Zhen and Ambassador to the Soviet Union Liu Xinquan who returned to China to report on their work at 8 pm on November 8, 1971.

(2) Xiao Tang refers to Tang Wensheng, who was born in Brooklyn, New York, USA. Tang Wensheng and Wang Hairong were important translators of Mao Zedong in his later years.

(3) From July 9 to 11, 1971, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was on a secret visit to China, told Zhou Enlai that President Nixon had decided that the United States would support the People's Republic of China in obtaining seats in the United Nations and the Security Council (UNSC) this year, but would not agree to expel Taiwan from the United Nations. When Zhou Enlai reported this to Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong said: We will never board the "pirate ship" of "two Chinas". China will survive and develop as usual without joining the United Nations. We are determined not to join the United Nations this year, no matter if it is a magpie or a crow.

(4) Xiong Xianghui, then Zhou Enlai's assistant. A famous ace spy in the history of our party, originally named Xiong Huiquan, was born in Ye County, Shandong Province (now Laizhou City) with his ancestral home in Fengyang, Anhui Province. He graduated from the Chinese Department of Tsinghua University. In 1937, he was instructed by Zhou Enlai to infiltrate the Kuomintang Hu Zongnan's army. From March 1939 to May 1947, he served as Hu Zongnan's aide-de-camp and confidential secretary, becoming Hu Zongnan's confidant, responsible for handling confidential documents and daily affairs, and drafting speeches: Mao Zedong praised Xiong Xianghui, saying that he could replace several divisions. After the founding of New China, he engaged in diplomatic work.

(5) Master Qiao refers to Gu Guanhua, who was then the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. The name "Master Qiao" originated from the 1960s comedy film "Master Qiao Goes to the Sedan".

(6) Nixon, then President of the United States.

(7) Huang Hua was then China's ambassador to Canada.

(8) Refers to Wu Xujun, Mao Zedong's head nurse, who worked with Mao Zedong for 21 years from 1953 to 1974, fulfilling her duties conscientiously and dedicatedly, staying on the front line of caring for Mao Zedong day and night, and also doing some work as a secretary for international affairs.

(9) Francisco Franco (1892-1975) was a Spanish politician, military strategist, fascist dictator, Spanish Marshal, and leader of the Spanish Falange Party. On March 21, 1939, Franco's army occupied Madrid, overthrew the Republican government, and ruled Spain for 36 years.

(10) Refers to the speech made by Qiao Guanhua, the head of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the plenary meeting of the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly on November 15.

(11) Refers to Qiao Guanhua.

(12) Wu Xiuquan, in November 1950, the United Nations Security Council reviewed the "US armed invasion of Taiwan" case raised by China. Wu Xiuquan attended the meeting as a special representative of the Chinese government. He made an impassioned speech on the UN podium, severely refuting the various slanders and defamations against China by the United States and its accomplices, denounced the United States' invasion and threat to our territory Taiwan, and safeguarded our sovereignty and dignity.

(13) The Communiqué refers to the Sino-US Joint Communiqué issued in Shanghai on February 27, 1972 when Nixon visited China, also known as the Shanghai Communiqué.

(14) Tan Lingpei and Tan Fuying. The Tan family is a famous Peking Opera family. Tan Xinpei is Tan Fuying's grandfather and the founder of the first old male school in Peking Opera history. Tan Fuying is one of the four great male actors in the 1930s and 1940s.

(15) This document refers to the "Minutes of the 'May 71 Project'". On March 21, 1971, Lin Biao's son Lin Liguo, together with Zhou Yuchi, Yu Xinye, and Li Weixin, conspired in Shanghai. They analyzed the situation and believed that Lin Biao's power and influence in the whole country currently had an absolute advantage, but it might gradually weaken. The "literary power" (Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyan, etc.) was developing, and the development trend was that Zhang Chunqiao was the most likely to replace Lin Biao. They studied the issue of Lin Biao's "succession" and believed that there were three possibilities: one was that Lin Biao "peacefully took over", the second was that Lin Biao "was taken over by someone else", and the third was that Lin Biao "took over the position in advance". They proposed two methods: get rid of Zhang Chunqiao and his gang, keep the "leader" status unchanged, and then make a peaceful transition; or directly get rid of Mao Zedong, but Mao Zedong had a great influence and high prestige, and it would be difficult to deal with him politically in the future, so they tried not to do this. They agreed to strive for a "peaceful transition" and prepare for an "armed uprising". Two things to do first: write a plan and let the Fourth Air Force form a "teaching team". Lin Liguo decided to name the plan "Project 571". From March 23 to 24, 1971, Yu Xinye drafted the "Minutes of the 'Project 571'". The manuscript was seized. It is divided into nine parts: 1. Possibility; 2. Necessity; 3. Basic conditions; 4. Timing; 5. Strength; 6. Slogans and Program; 7. Implementation Points; 8. Policies and Strategies; 9. Confidentiality and Discipline. The minutes were later printed and distributed to cadres at the county and regiment level and above.

Excerpts from a Conversation with Participants at the Chengdu Regional Symposium

(November 14, 1971)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): I've been talking all along, all along. I've only shared a few bits of information. Guangzhou was the worst offended, and they're doing better now. Wuhan is next.

Zhou Enlai (hereinafter referred to as Zhou): The Wuhan self-criticism hasn't been written yet.

(At this point, Ye Jianying enters)

Mao: Stop talking about the "February Countercurrent." What was the nature of the "February Countercurrent"? It was their response to Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Wang, Guan, and Qi. Wang, Guan, and Qi, on May 16, 2016, wanted to overthrow everything, including the Premier and the veteran marshals. The veteran marshals were angry and complained. They did it openly at a Party meeting, causing a scene in the Huairan Hall! There were shortcomings. It's all right for you to have a little argument. Just talk to me. We didn't understand it clearly at that time. Wang, Guan, and Qi hadn't been exposed yet. Some issues took years to clarify.

Zhou: Later, Yang Chengwu vigorously promoted absolute authority. He was promoting his own.

Zhou: It was also Lin Biao's fault. Li Zuopeng made a powerful speech, which was simply outrageous.

Mao: The issue is clear: it was Lin who supported it. He launched the "May 16th" movement, calling for an overthrow of everything. He made it so difficult for these people to reach their destination and raise their heads. At the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, Chen Yi threw all the dirty laundry at himself. I told him to stop talking.

Zhou: There was a mass rally to denounce Chen Yi, and some foreign experts from the Foreign Affairs Department also attended. I didn't understand what was going on at the time. After the denunciation, they wanted to arrest Chen Yi, but the attendant at the Great Hall wouldn't let them. He said, "The Chairman ordered us to protect him, so he should be protected."

Mao: During the denunciation, he bowed three times, then back and forth. But after getting in the car, he overturned his gesture and denied it again, saying, "You forced me to speak."

Mao: What about Yang Yong¹¹?

Ye Jianying (hereinafter referred to as Ye): I didn't understand it at the time either.

Mao: Why was Liao Hansheng arrested¹²?

Zhou: Liao Hansheng had connections with He Long¹³. Even He Long, the Chairman, didn't approve of this move at the time.

¹¹ Yang Yong (1913 –1983), was founding general of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and a former deputy state-level leader. He served as deputy chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and commander of the Beijing Military Region, member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and member of the 10th to 12th Central Committee. He joined the Communist Youth League in 1927, and the Party in 1930. He took part in the Long March and fought many battles for the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. He commanded numerous battles during the Second Guomindang-Communist Civil War. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, in January 1950, Yang Yong was appointed commander of the Guizhou Provincial Military Region and chairman of the Guizhou Provincial People's Government. On April 18, 1953, he was appointed commander of the 20th Corps of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and arrived in North Korea on May 11. He organized his troops to participate in the counterattack in the summer of 1953 and commanded the Battle of Jincheng. In February 1954, Yang Yong was appointed deputy commander and chief of staff of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and after the end of fighting in Korea was appointed head of the Beijing Military Region. He was criticised early in the Cultural Revolution, but was appointed deputy commander of the Shenyang Military Region in July 1972, assisting Chen Xilian in charge of combat and border defence tasks. In June 1973, he was appointed commander of the Xinjiang Military Region.

¹² Liao Hansheng (1911 –2006), a former deputy state-level leader, and senior general of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. At the age of 13, He Long funded him to study at the Affiliated Primary School of Hunan Provincial Second Normal School in Changde. Later, because He Long participated in the Northern Expedition and left Hunan, he lost his funding and dropped out of school to return to his hometown. In 1926, he graduated from high school in the county and participated in the peasant movement and the workers' armed struggle. Later, he married Xiao Genggeng, the daughter of He Long's second sister He Wugu. During the Anti-Japanese War, he mistakenly thought that Xiao Genggeng was dead in his hometown, and Liao married Yang Bailin as his wife. Yang Bailin is Yang Shangkun's sister, formerly known as Yang Shangpu. In 1954, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense. In 1955, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. In 1960, he was appointed political commissar of the Beijing Military Region. He was accused by Lin Biao and others of being one of He Long's "cronies" and jailed for five and half years. In 1973, he was appointed political commissar of the Academy of Military Sciences. In 1975, he was appointed political commissar and first political commissar of the Nanjing Military Region. In August 1977, he was elected as a member of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. He followed Deng Xiaoping's revisionist policies and in 1980, he was appointed first political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region.

¹³ He Long (1896 –1969), was one of the main founders of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. He joined the Chinese Revolutionary Party after it was founded by Sun Yat-sen in Tokyo in 1914 and attacked the guards of the Cili County Chief's Guard with two kitchen knives, known in history as "two kitchen knives to make a revolution". On August 1, 1927, he served as the commander-in-chief of the Nanchang Uprising, and then returned to western Hunan to form the Second Red Army, served as the commander of the corps, and opened up the Honghu Soviet Area. He commanded Communist armies during the War of Resistance against Japan and the Second Guomindang-Communist Civil War. In 1954, he became vice premier of the State Council and vice chairman of the National Defence Commission of the People's Republic of China. In 1955, he was awarded the rank of Marshal of the People's Republic of China. He was persecuted by Lin Biao as an organiser of the "February Counter-Current" and died in 1969. In 1974, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China announced the rehabilitation of He Long.

Mao: The Yang Yong incident was orchestrated with the support of Lin Biao. Lin told me this, but later denied it.

Mao: If you have time, there's a book by Lu Xun that's worth reading. In the postscript to "Zhun Fengyue Tan," there's an article by Cao Juren, "A Remote Record of a Literary and Art Symposium." There was a literary and art symposium planned, and Cao Juren was invited, but he didn't attend. The newspaper reported him as the initiator. Cao then asked Long Yusheng how the meeting went. Long replied, "Just some snacks and tea." Cao Juren replied, "If you drink someone's tea, you become their person!" This incident illustrates the complexity of the struggle at the time. Now, if you drink someone's tea, you become their person? I don't think so. If you drink my tea today, do you become my person? Not necessarily. The Premier and Kang Lao¹⁴ both drank their tea! If you drink their tea, you become their person. Do you abandon the Party and the Central Committee?

The morning after "My Opinions" was completed, the Premier and Kang Lao went to see Lin Biao. After reading it, he agreed. "My Opinions" didn't have a title at the time. Setting aside some issues, the central question was the Presidency, which I left aside. The headquarters' desire for me to be President was fake; Lin Biao's desire to be chairman and successor was real. There were also some who genuinely wanted me to be President, and they disagreed with Lin Biao. Some said the people wouldn't accept my not being chairman. I said, "I haven't been President for over a decade." I can boast to you about this, but wanting me to be President, to greet foreign guests every day, to send off foreigners, and to send letters of credence—all that sort of thing—is nothing more than a call for me to see God.

Ye: The Chairman is very busy, and there's still a lot of stuff to be written.

Mao: I'm just bragging to everyone.

Mao: I've read all the negative material those people used to target Ye Jianying. They escalated the situation step by step, first bombarding him, then overthrowing him. Later, when they saw the situation was no longer favourable, they stopped. The "Red Creation" wasn't all about the "May 16th Group." Among the negative material compiled, there was a report in a Kuomintang newspaper claiming that the Red Army had embarked on the Long March and that Ye surrendered to the enemy in Jiangxi. He did join the Long March, and all of you veteran comrades were there. How could that be true?

Mao: The Red Army's tradition has always been not to attack one's own troops. You (referring to Zhang Guohua) were a soldier in Wang Zuo's unit¹⁵.

¹⁴ Kang Lao refers to Kang Sheng. "Lao" means old and is commonly placed before a person's surname to show respect for them as an elder. Placing "Lao" after the surname is even more respectful.

¹⁵ Wang Zuo (1898–1930), was a former bandit chieftain who operated in the Jinggang Mountains of Jiangxi, from 1923, and then joined the Chinese Communist Party, becoming a protégé of Mao Zedong during their formative period in the Jiangxi Soviet. However, he lost his life in the 1930 power struggle within the Chinese

Zhou: Later, you were the bugler.

Mao: Wang Zuo certainly made contributions, and he even joined the Party. He just couldn't bear to leave his position and couldn't endure hardship. It's not good that Wang Zuo was killed by Peng Dehuai!¹⁶ How could Communist troops fight Communist troops? Ji Zhentong of the Fifth Corps shouldn't have been killed either¹⁷. It's better to kill fewer people. We don't kill counter-revolutionaries; keeping them alive is beneficial to the Party because they serve as living evidence. Why would you kill someone like Jie Fang?

Zhou: Wang Shiwei¹⁸ could have been spared, too.

Mao: It's much better now. The Kuomintang officials who arrested and tried Liu Shaoqi and Chen Boda are still alive; they serve as living evidence.

Communist Party. As early as October of that year, Mao Zedong criticised the officials in power of the Jiangxi Soviet for the assassination of his old ally.

¹⁶ In the late night of February 23, 1930, Peng Dehuai was awakened from his bed by Xiang Zhongfa's and Li Lisan's two lieutenants, the local CCP committee secretaries Zhu Changxie and Wang Huai, who told Peng that they had just received intelligence claiming Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai had defected to Kuomintang, and thus they needed Peng's signature to deploy troops to exterminate the traitors. Peng initially refused and argued with them to defend Wang and Yuan. The lieutenants then changed their story by claiming that the intelligence indeed appeared to be a rumour, and they were to be invited to a meeting to clear things up, and some force would be deployed just in case. After leaving Peng Dehuai's camp, the lieutenants faked Mao Zedong's order to lure both Yuan and Wang to the supposed meeting to discuss the military situation. But once Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai reached the meeting, they were shot in obscure circumstances, allegedly ambushed while trying to rebel. Because Peng Dehuai had signed the order for the meeting at which they were ambushed, Mao and others held him responsible. The murder of Wang Zuo resurfaced as an accusation against Peng Dehuai during struggle sessions of the Cultural Revolution.

¹⁷ Ji Zhentong (1901 –1934), was a military figure in the Republic of China. He was a senior general of the Guomindang's National Revolutionary Army and the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In 1931, and led his troops to Jiangxi to participate in the encirclement and suppression of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. However, he recognised the danger to China of Japanese aggression after the Japanese attacked Shenyang on September 18, 1931 and subsequently refused to participate in the encirclement and suppression of the Communists, demanding instead to take his troops north to fight the Japanese. When Chiang Kaishek refused to allow this, he and his men took part in the Ningdu Uprising of December 14 and were reorganized into the Fifth Red Army. Ji Zhentong was appointed commander of the corps and joined the Communist Party of China in January of the following year. In 1932, he expressed his desire to leave his combat leadership position and go to the Soviet Union to recuperate. This led to a struggle with elements of the Communist leadership. In August 1932, Ji Zhentong was sentenced to death by the Provisional Supreme Court of the Chinese Soviet Republic, and later changed to 10 years in prison under the mediation of Mao Zedong and others. In October 1934, on the eve of the Red Army's Long March, Ji Zhentong was ordered by Zhou Enlai to be executed in Ruijin Yeping Village.

¹⁸ Wang Shiwei (1906 – 1947) joined the Communist Party of China in 1926. He was a writer, and influenced by Lu Xun to write for the Left. In September 1937, he went to Yan'an. In March 1942, the Liberation Army Daily published a series of his essays under the name Wild Lilies. In May, his writings, and those of others like Ding Ling and Ai Qing were criticised by Mao as part of the rectification movement and the definition of the role of literature and art. Criticisms of Wang Shiwei intensified, and he was expelled from the Party in October. The Guomindang sought to split the Communists by publishing Wild Lilies, and Wang Shiwei was subsequently denounced as a counter-revolutionary and arrested. On June 12, 1947, a Guomindang plane blew up the detention centre where Wang Shiwei was held. In the scramble to evacuate, his jailers secretly killed him. In the spring of 1948, Mao Zedong led the Central Front Committee from northern Shaanxi to Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei via Sanjiao Town, Linxian County, and for the first time heard that Wang Shiwei had been executed. He expressed dissatisfaction with this.

Comments on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Report on the Farewell Plan for the Delegation to the 26th UN General Assembly [1]

(November 1971)

The standards should be higher. We can discuss this tonight.

[1] This Ministry of Foreign Affairs report, dated November 6, 1971, stated: The Chinese delegation to the 26th UN General Assembly, headed by Qiao Guanhua and deputy headed by Huang Hua, is expected to depart Beijing for New York via Shanghai and Paris on November 9. First, upon the delegation's departure from Beijing, it is recommended that Ji Pengfei, Li Yaowen, Ma Wenbo, other comrades of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Party Core Group, heads of relevant departments, and heads of other diplomatic-related departments be invited to see them off. Second, upon the delegation's arrival and departure from Shanghai, it is recommended that a deputy director, a standing committee member, and the head of the Foreign Affairs Group of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee be invited to greet and see them off. Third, since many diplomatic envoys stationed in China have volunteered to see the delegation off, it is recommended that the foreign ambassadors and Soviet border officials be notified, and that foreign journalists stationed in Beijing be informed. Fourth, a comprehensive announcement will be issued regarding the delegation's departure from Beijing and its transit through Shanghai. On November 13, Mao Zedong personally met with all members of the Chinese delegation to the 26th UN General Assembly. On November 9, Premier Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and other party and government leaders saw the delegation off at the airport.

Comments on the Chinese delegation's written speech [1] upon arrival at New York Airport
(November 1971)

Agreed.

[1] Qiao Guanhua, head of the delegation of the People's Republic of China to the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly, delivered a written speech upon his arrival at New York International Airport on November 1, 1971, stating that the Chinese government has consistently advocated establishing and developing normal relations with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; and has consistently supported the just struggle of oppressed peoples and ethnic minorities for freedom and liberation, against foreign interference, and to take control of their own destiny. Our delegation will follow the established policy of our government and work together with representatives of all peace-loving and justice-loving countries in the United Nations to safeguard international peace and promote the cause of human progress. This speech was published in the People's Daily on November 12, 1971.

Comments on the Speech by the Head of the Chinese Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly [1]

(November 1971)

Agreed.

[1] Speech by Qiao Guanhua, head of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the 26th United Nations General Assembly on November 15, 1971: On October 25, 1971, the current United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution by an overwhelming majority, deciding to restore all the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and to immediately expel the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from the United Nations and all its affiliated agencies. This is the bankruptcy of the policy of hostility, isolation and blockade against the Chinese people, the failure of the US government's conspiracy with the Sato government of Japan to create "two Chinas" in the United Nations, the victory of Chairman Mao Zedong's diplomatic line, and the common victory of the people of the world. On behalf of the government of the People's Republic of China, I reiterate here: Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory. We firmly oppose any conspiracy to separate Taiwan from the motherland. The Chinese people must liberate Taiwan, and no force can stop this. We have always advocated that all countries, regardless of size, should be equal, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should become the norm for relations between countries. The people of all countries have the right to choose their own social systems according to their own will and to safeguard their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. No country has the right to invade, subvert, control, interfere in, or bully another. We oppose the imperialist and colonialist theories that hold that big countries are superior to small ones and that small countries are dependent on big ones. We oppose power politics and hegemonism that bully small countries and strong countries bully weak ones. We advocate that the affairs of any country should be managed by its own people; that world affairs should be managed by all countries in the world; and that the affairs of the United Nations should be managed jointly by all countries participating in the United Nations. Superpower manipulation and monopoly are not permitted. China does not seek to be a superpower now and will never seek to be one. This statement was published in the People's Daily on November 17, 1971.

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating the 27th Anniversary of the Liberation of Albania

(November 28, 1971)

Tirana

Comrade Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania;

Comrade Haci Rehi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania;

Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania;

Dear Comrades:

On the 27th anniversary of Albania's liberation, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Chinese people, we extend our warmest festive greetings to you, to the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Workers, to the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, and to the Albanian people.

Twenty-seven years ago, the heroic Albanian people, under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, led by Comrade Enver Hoxha, took up arms, defeated fascism, established a red people's regime, and ushered in a new era in Albanian history. Since liberation, the Albanian people have adhered to the principle of independence and self-reliance, achieving brilliant achievements in socialist revolution and socialist construction, making Albania an indestructible revolutionary bastion.

The Albanian Party of Labor and the Albanian people have always despised the seemingly powerful US imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, resolutely opposed the superpowers' power politics and hegemonism, and made important contributions in the struggle to defend Marxism-Leninism, oppose modern revisionism, and support the revolutionary cause of the peoples of all countries. You uphold truth and principles, and voice justice on the international stage. Your proletarian internationalist spirit has won the admiration and praise of genuine Communists and revolutionary people in all countries.

The Communist Party of China and the Chinese people regard all the achievements of the glorious Albanian Party of Labor and the fraternal Albanian people as their own, and are delighted and encouraged by them. We sincerely wish the Albanian people, under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, headed by the great Marxist-Leninist Comrade Enver Hoxha, to continue their revolutionary journey and achieve new and greater victories in fulfilling the various combat tasks set forth at your Party's Sixth Congress!

Long live the great friendship and fighting unity between the Chinese and Albanian parties, countries, and peoples!

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Dong Biwu, Vice Chairman of the People's Republic of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

November 28, 1971

Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Notice on the Dissemination and Discussion of "The Struggle to Smash the Counter-Revolutionary Coup of the Lin [1] and Chen Anti-Party Group (Material 1)" [2]

(December 1971)

To be distributed.

[1] Lin refers to Lin Biao, formerly Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. During the Cultural Revolution, he formed a counter-revolutionary group with Chen Boda and others, and colluded with and competed with the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary group to seize the supreme leadership of the Party and the state. After his conspiracy was exposed, he fled by plane on September 13, 1971, and died in a plane crash in Wulankhan, Mongolia. In August 1973, the CPC Central Committee passed a resolution to expel Lin Biao from the Party. In 1981, the Special Tribunal of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China confirmed him as the main culprit in the counter-revolutionary group case.

[2] This notice of the CPC Central Committee was issued on December 11, 1971. On January 13 and July 2, 1972, the CPC Central Committee forwarded the documents compiled by the Central Special Case Group, "The Struggle to Smash the Counter-Revolutionary Coup of the Lin Biao-Chen Anti-Party Group (Material 2)" and "The Struggle to Smash the Counter-Revolutionary Coup of the Lin Biao-Chen Anti-Party Group (Material 3)". These two documents were approved for forwarding by Mao Zedong.

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on its 11th Anniversary

(December 19, 1971)

South Vietnam

Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam,

Huang Tan Phat, Chairman of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam:

On the eleventh anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, on behalf of the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China, and the Chinese government, we extend our warmest congratulations with sincere brotherly feelings to the heroic people of South Vietnam fighting on the anti-US front.

Since its founding, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam has held high the banner of resisting US aggression and saving the nation, leading the people of South Vietnam in a heroic, tenacious, and arduous struggle against the US invaders and their running dogs, winning countless glorious victories and writing a magnificent chapter in the history of people's war. Your struggle has greatly inspired and supported all oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world, accumulated rich experience in the fight against imperialism, and set a shining example.

Today, the Vietnamese people have achieved tremendous victories on all fronts, military, political, and diplomatic. The U.S. invaders and their minions have fallen into deep contradictions and a profound crisis. The "Nixon Doctrine" [1] and "Vietnamization" plans promoted by U.S. imperialism are failing and will inevitably fail completely. The Vietnamese people, in strengthening unity with the brotherly peoples of Laos and Cambodia, and fighting shoulder to shoulder, will surely achieve the great goal of "expelling U.S. imperialism, overthrowing the puppet regime, and achieving the liberation of the South, the defence of the North, and ultimately the peaceful reunification of the motherland."

The Chinese people have always regarded the struggle of the Vietnamese people and the peoples of Indochina as their own struggle, and have considered supporting the Vietnamese and Indochina peoples in their war to resist the United States and save the nation as their internationalist duty. As long as U.S. imperialism continues its aggression, and as long as the national aspirations of the Vietnamese and Indochina peoples remain unfulfilled, the Chinese people will fully support your struggle until complete victory.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Dong Biwu, Vice Chairman of the People's Republic of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing, December 19, 1971

Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Directive on the Distribution of Rural People's Communes [1]

(December 1971)

Distribute this.

[1] This directive issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on January 26, 1971, pointed out that in order to further improve the distribution work of rural people's communes, the following issues must be effectively resolved: 1. Correctly handle the relationship between collective accumulation and member distribution; 2. Carefully manage grain distribution; 3. Adhere to the socialist principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work"; 4. Carefully implement the principle of running the commune frugally and promote the spirit of self-reliance and hard work; 5. Effectively solve the problem of households with overspending; 6. Implement the principle of "taking grain as the key link and pursuing all-round development."

Inscription on a Folding Fan [1]

Four-Character Poem¹⁹

(1971)

Each pursues his own aspirations [2]

Each takes his own path.

Separate from the mundane and the sage,

Separate from cause and effect.

[1] In 1971, on the eve of the Lin Biao group's defection, Zhou Enlai reported to Mao Zedong in writing about the unusual situation of Lin Biao's group preparing to defect. After reading the materials, Mao Zedong pondered for a long time and wrote a four-character poem on a white silk folding fan.

[2] Each pursues his own ambition. "The Biography of Boyi" in "Records of the Grand Historian" says: "Those with different paths cannot make plans together, but each follows his own ambition."

¹⁹ The poem was written in four lines, with four characters per line.

A Playful Adaptation of Li Panlong's [1] "Thinking of Ming Qing"

To the tune of Seven Character Jue Ju

(1971)

From Yuzhang, I gaze westwards at the colourful clouds of Ba [2].

The Yangtze River flows ninefold, the mountains stretch long [3].

Lying high, I need not peer into the stone mirror²⁰, [4].

The autumn wind rages on the traitor's face [5].

[1] Li Panlong (1514-1570) was a native of Licheng, Shandong (now Jinan City). His courtesy name was Yulin and his pseudonym was Cangming. He was a Jinshi in the 23rd year of Jiajing (1544). He inherited the legacy of the "Seven Masters" such as Li Mengyang and He Jingming, and advocated the restoration of the past. Together with Xie Zhen, Liang Youyu, Zong Chen, Wang Shizhen, Xu Zhongxing, and Wu Guolun, he was called the leader of the "Seven Masters". He wrote "Cangming Collection".

[2] Yuzhang is an ancient place name. It is located at the boundary between Huainan and Jiangbei. In the Han Dynasty, the name was moved to Jiangnan and a county was established, which was under the jurisdiction of Yangzhou. The jurisdiction was equivalent to the present Jiangxi Province. After the Sui Dynasty conquered the Chen Dynasty, it was changed to a county and belonged to Hongzhou. The jurisdiction gradually shrank, so the seat of government was in the present Nanchang City. Therefore, it is used to refer to Jiangxi or Nanchang. "Among the Colourful Clouds" is a poem by Li Bai of the Tang Dynasty, "Early Departure from Baidi City": "I left Baidi in the morning among the colourful clouds."

[3] "Ninefold" refers to a section of the Yangtze River north of Jiujiang City, Jiangxi Province. The river here has nine tributaries, hence the reference. Jiudie ("Ninefold") Mountain, one of the scenic spots in Lushan, Jiangxi Province, is also known as Jiudieping, and here refers to Lushan Mountain. Li Panlong's poem "Nine branches Yangtze River Nine folds Mountain" means looking far into the direction of Jiangxi, imagining the nine branches of the Yangtze

²⁰ The year after the "September 13" incident, Mao Zedong met with Zhou Shizhao, an old classmate of Hunan First Normal School, in Zhongnanhai. In their last conversation, the two talked about poetry again, especially when talking about Lin Biao, Mao Zedong immediately read the Ming Dynasty poet Li Panlong's poem. The three characters "peering into the stone mirror" are from Li Bai's "Lushan Ballad Sends Lu Shiyu Xuzhou" sentence "Idle peeking at the stone mirror to clear my heart". Mao Zedong still had a glimmer of hope for Lin Biao about what happened at Lushan, hoping that Lin Biao could review his errors, but Lin Biao was stubborn and did not follow Mao Zedong's intentions, so he was out of control. The When Mao Zedong read the last sentence of Li Bai's poem, he casually changed "attendant" to "traitor", and said that it was most appropriate to give this poem to Lin Biao.

River and the nine folds of Lushan Mountain, expressing his nostalgia for Wu Guolun. Mao Zedong here refers to Lushan Mountain in Jiangxi Province.

[4] Lying with a high pillow and a righteous heart, refers to a secluded life without official duties. Shijing, a bright and clear rock that can reflect one's reflection.

[5] Mao Zedong was saying that Lin Biao should just lie down and sleep soundly, not looking in the mirror, because his plot to usurp the leadership of the Party and the state at the Lushan Conference had been exposed. In the bleak autumn wind, his face, filled with rage and shame, must have been unsightly, a sharp satire on Lin Biao's traitorous face.

A Parody of Du Fu's "Reminiscence of Ancient Sites" No. 3 [1]

Seven-Character Poem²¹

(1971)

Numerous mountains and valleys converge at Jingmen [2],

Lin Biao grew up in a village long ago [3].

Once he left the Purple Palace, he was even more distant [4].

Only the green tomb remains, facing the twilight for a long time [5].

[1] Du Fu (712-770), a great realist poet of the Tang Dynasty, was known by his courtesy name Zimei and styled himself Shaoling Ye Lao. He was a native of Gong County. He was later revered as the "Poet Sage". His poems show the historical process of the Tang Dynasty's rise and fall and reflect the vast social life, and are known as "Poetic History". "Ode to Ancient Relics" (No. 3) is one of his famous works. Mao Zedong changed the "Ming Fei" in Du Fu's poem to "Lin Biao".

[2] Jingmen is the name of a mountain. It is located northwest of Yidu County, Hubei Province.

[3] Lin Biao (1907-1971), a native of Huanggang, Hubei. On September 13, 1971, he fled in a plane and died in a plane crash in the Wulankhan region of Mongolia.

[4] Purple Palace, the residence of the emperor. In the poem "Hate Fu" by Jiang Yan of the Southern Liang Dynasty, it is written: "When the Ming Fei left, I looked up to the sky and sighed. The Purple Palace was a little far away, and the mountains and rivers were endless." In the "Book of the Later Han Dynasty: Biography of Yuan An", it is written: "Now that the northern desert has been pacified, it is appropriate to order the Southern Chanyu to return to the northern court and lead the surrendered people."

[5] Qingzhong, also known as the green tomb of Zhaojun, is located on the alluvial plain on the south bank of the Dahei River, 9 kilometres south of Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. From a distance, the tomb's surface appears dark and murky, leading to its identification as a Qingzhong tomb.

²¹ The poem is four lines long; each line comprises seven characters.

Reading "A Dream of Red Mansions"

Seven-Character Verse

(1971)

The masterpiece, "A Dream of Red Mansions", has been passed down through the ages, reflecting feudalism and denouncing princes.

Since ancient times, loyal ministers have often been followed by rebellious sons, but only Baoyu and Daiyu²² have found their place in the divine land²³.

²² Mao Zedong regarded the 18th Century novel "A Dream of Red Mansions" as a realistic portrayal of the decline of a feudal aristocratic family. He regarded Jia Baoyu, the son of a wealthy family as a representative of the crumbling feudal elite, a youth disillusioned with his class and its values. Arrangements are made for him to marry a cousin, Xue Baochai, but he really loves another cousin, Li Daiyu, who shares his love of music and poetry. She is presented as tragic figure crushed by feudal oppression.

²³ In ancient times, the central regions of what came to be called the Middle Kingdom, was known as Shenzhou, or the Divine Land.

1971: Writings and Speeches

Mao Zedong

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