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The fight of the PLA against the Khrushchevite revisionists at the 1960 Bucharest and Moscow Meetings



ENVER HOXHA

This issue of the «Albania Today» is dedicated to the 19th Volume of the Works of Comrade Enver Hoxha which was distributed throughout Albania on November 8th 1975. This volume includes speeches, reports, letters and radiograms of the period June-December 1960 which throw light on the determined struggle waged by the Party of Labour of Albania and Comrade Enver Hoxha against Khrushchevite revisionism.

- Real Unity
 Is Achieved and Strengthened Only on the Basis
 of Marxist-Leninist Principles
- We Shall Go to Moscow not with Ten Banners, but with Only One, with the Banner of Marxism-Leninism
- Whether Albania Is a Socialist Country or not,
 This Does not Depend on Khrushchev,
 but it Has Been Decided by the Albanian People through
 the Wars They Have fought and the Blood
 They Have Shed
- We Shall Ardently Defend Marxism-Leninism and the Interests of the People
- We Have Fought Empty-bellied and Bare-footed, but Have Never Kotowed to Anybody
- Other Reports, Speeches, Letters, and Radiograms

A WORK OF GREAT POLITIC

On November 8, 1975, the 34th anniversary of the founding of the Party, the 19th volume of the Works by comrade Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PLA, leader of the Party and of the Albanian people, was distributed throughout Albania,

In the series of the Works by comrade Enver Hoxha the materials of this volume are of great political and ideological importance. They belong to the period June-December 1960, a very complicated period when deep ideological and political disagreements had arisen in the relations between a number of parties. In this period the PLA had to take decisions of special responsibility and openly rise before the entire international communist movement, to defend Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism from the new and dangerous revisionist trend, which had been crystalized in its ranks by Khrushchevite revisionism.

In this volume a clear picture is given of the consistent struggle carried out by the Party of Labour of Albania at the Bucharest Meeting and the Moscow Meeting. At Bucharest the PLA did not accept that the alleged mistakes of the Communist Party of China should be judged and the latter condemned on the basis of a document full of slanderous accusations fabricated by the Soviet leadership, without giving the Communist Party of China time and the possibility to read the material and present its own view. At the Moscow Meeting the PLA had its say with revolutionary courage and, before international communism, openly criticised the wrong line of the Soviet leadership concerning a series of major questions of principle. The Party of Labour of Albania never made concessions over principles and refused to follow the revisionist course of the Khrushchev group.

The editors of the review "Albania Today" are publishing some materials from this volume in this issue, hoping that in this way they will fulfill the desire of the readers.

AL AND IDEOLOGICAL VALUE

LETTER ADDRESSED TO ALL THE BASIC ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PARTY ABOUT THE HOLDING OF THE BUCHAREST MEETING AND ABOUT THE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

August 9, 1960

Some important ideological and political disagreements have arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. Word about these disagreements is beginning to appear both in the Chinese and Soviet press as well as in the speeches of the leaders of these two countries, of course, without mentioning one-another by name, but making allusions, which anybody can easily understand. These questions also have been spoken about and discussed openly at the meeting in Bucharest of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties who were delegates of their parties to the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party.

The Central Committee of the Party considers it necessary to inform all the Party organizations of our stand towards this problem by means of this letter.

On June 2,1960 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sent a letter to the Central Committee of our Party, in which it proposed the holding, at the end of June, of a meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the countries of the socialist camp "to exchange opinions about the problems of the present international situation and to determine our further common line». The Central Committee of our Party immediately replied to this letter, stressing that it was in full agreement with holding the proposed meeting at the end of June, and that the delegation of our Party for this purpose would be headed by comrade Enver Hoxha. However, on June 7 our Central Committee received another letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In this letter the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union informed us that, all the parties had agreed in principle to the holding of the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp, but some of them had proposed that the meeting should be postponed to a later date. Concerning this, the June 7 letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said: "We could have a preliminary discussion with the representatives of your Party about the time for convening the meeting at the time of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, on June 20, after which, in agreement with the central committees of the sister parties, we shall fix the definite date of the meeting. The Central Committee of our Party replied to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that it agreed that the meeting should be postponed, and that agreement should be reached in Bucharest about the fixing of the date when it should be held. For this purpose, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee authorized comrade Hysni Kapo1, who headed the delegation of our Party to the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, to exchange opinions with the representatives of the sister parties who were at the Congress, about the fixing of the date of the meeting which was proposed in the letters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

But in fact, our delegation, which went to participate in the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party and discuss the fixing of the date of the meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp found itself in Bucharest faced with an international meeting already prepared. This meeting was contrary to what had been decided, it was contrary to the content of the letters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of which we spoke above. The agenda, too, was quite different: instead of exchanging opinions about fixing the date of the meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, as stated in the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, accustations were made there against the Communist Party of China. To this end only 10 hours before the meeting a 45 page document prepared by the Soviet comrades was distributed to all the foreign delegates (the majority of whom were only members of the central committees), in which the views of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were expressed concerning the disagreements they have with the Chinese comrades. And on this very important and delicate question it was demanded that the representatives of more than 50 communist and workers' parties of various countries, who had come to Bucharest for another purpose, should adopt a stand, after 10 hours, and accuse the Communist Party of China.

It is quite clear that this meeting had been organized in haste and in opposition to the most elementary Leninist organizational rules. As you know very well, dear comrades, even when the question of a rank and file member is to be put forward for discussion in the Party branch, the Party teaches us to be careful, cautious, just, and never hasty. Implementing this Leninist principle of the Party, the branch may hold one, two and frequently even three meetings, the members are informed at least three days before of the agenda and its content, commissions are appointed to prepare the necessary materials, etc. And this, and this alone, is the right way of the Party, the organizational way Marxism-Leninism teaches us. But if we act in this way over one party member, is it in order that a whole party, which has several million party members in its ranks, which leads a people of almost 700 million, should be accused in such a hasty way and in violation of every organizational rule?

In these circumstances, considering the way in which the Bucharest Meeting was prepared and held, the Political Bureau of our Party adopted a correct stand, the only correct, principled and Marxist-Leninist stand that could be adopted. What is this stand?

It can be summed up in a few words: first, the said disagreements are disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China; second, the Bucharest meeting was premature and held in contravention of the Leninist organizational rules; third, our Party will have its say about these disagreements at the coming meeting, which must be prepared according to the rules and the practice existing among the communist and workers' parties.

Our Party of Labour thinks that the meeting organized in Bucharest was out of order. It was contrary to the agreement reached through the correspondence between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other sister parties, according to which, only the date of the coming meeting would be set at Bucharest, it was premature and in contravention of the organizational rules which the communist and workers' parties implement. Thus, on the one hand, taking the above facts into account, and on the other hand, since only 10 hours before the meeting we received a document in which only the view of the Soviet comrades was expressed, our Party could make no pronouncement in Bucharest about the disagreements existing between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. Our Party will have its say, will express its view about the said disagreements at the coming meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, which will take place later, after having studied the materials of both sides carefully, cautiously and with the Marxist-Leninist justice. Our Party, which has always fought, and has loyally defended the principles of Marxism-Leninism, is of the opinion that only at a meeting organized according to the Leninist organizational rules, after having heard the arguments of the two sides, with patience and without heat, in a comradely spirit, can the conclusion as to who is right and who is wrong, how we should work jointly in the future for the good of socialism and communism, for the good of the unity of our socialist camp, be reached.

This wise, principled, and Leninist stand was maintained by comrade Hysni Kapo at the Bucharest Meeting on the instructions of the Political Bureau. As you know from the communique published in the press, this stand was fully and unanimously approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party which was held on July 11-12, 1960. The Central Committee is convinced that this correct and principled stand will be unanimously approved by every member of our heroic Party. Only those who do not want to respect the Leninist norms can fail to approve our correct stand.

The disagreements existing between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China concern the two biggest countries and parties of the socialist camp. Our Party cannot remain indifferent towards them... In the future our Party will work, as before, to strengthen our great love and friendship with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet peoples, with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, for there is no stronger and more sincere love than that which is based on the triumphant precepts of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. But at the same time it is undeniable and indisputable that great China, its people and party are dear to us, too, just as to all the countries of the socialist camp.

Therefore, our Party, just as all the other parties, is concerned that this important question should be solved correctly, on the basis of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Our Party is confident that this question will be resolved at the coming meeting, which will be held in 2-3 months time and the preparation of which has been charged to a commission of representatives of many sister parties, including our Party. We have this firm confidence, for we have confidence in Marxism-Leninism, which has withstood many storms and has always emerged victorious.

Our Party of Labour has always worked and fought for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, for its application in life, for the preservation of the purity of its principles. For this reason, during its entire glorious history, our Party has always had an entirely correct line, a line which responds to the teachings of Lenin, which responds to the interests of the Albanian people, the interests of socialism and communism. Our Party will pursue its line, based on these principles, without any wavering whatever, in the future, too. We shall fight and work for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, for the implementation of the principles of the Moscow Declaration of 1957, and of the Bucharest Communique, which, as announced in the press, was unanimously approved by the Central Committee of our Party.

Our Party will enhance and strengthen its revolutionary vigilance, which must always be at the proper level, as befits our heroic Party, because the enemies of the Party and the people, the weak, opportunist, and cowardly elements will strive, as always, in various ways to attack the Party and its correct line, to arouse doubts about, and slander, our friendship with the great Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, to spread various slogans and views with a view to causing ideological confusion in our ranks. Being vigilant, all the members of our glorious Party must fight with cour

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age and determination against any effort of the enemies to attain these base aims.

Our Party must strengthen even more the steel-like unity of its ranks, the unity of the entire Party round the Leninist Central Committee of our Party, the unity of the Party with our heroic people. Our unbreakable unity has always been the decisive condition for successfully overcoming any obstacle, for advance towards new successes. Now, too, it is the decisive condition for the triumph of the line of the Party, to crush any activity of our enemies, to defeat the opportunists, the weak and cowardly elements.

The Central Committee of the Party is firmly confident that all the party branches, all the party members, who the Party has educated as the loyal sons of our Party and our people, faithful to the death to Marxism-Leninism, in judging this important question, will show themselves cautious, just, courageous, and principled as always, and will close their ranks still more tightly round the Central Committee of our Party.

The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania

ENVER HOXHA

1. Member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CC of the PLA.

ALWAYS FOLLOW A CORRECT LINE

From the contribution to the discussion at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA

June 22, 1960

The question we are going to discuss today has to do with the Bucharest Meeting. As decided, we sent to Rumania a party delegation, headed by comrade Hysni Kapo, to participate in the proceedings of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party. We had foreseen that on this occasion the first secretaries, or some of them, would go at the head of the delegations of the parties, but for many reasons, which we know, we judged that I should not go. Our delegation was also authorized, in addition to its participation in the proceedings of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, to participate in the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp, according to the agreement reached, in order to fix the place and date of a meeting of all the parties, at which they will discuss, among other things, the disagreements existing between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China.

There is no doubt that these disagreements must be solved as quickly as possible and in the Marxist-Leninist way, in the first place between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and, in case they are not solved between them, then the theses should be provided for a discussion among the parties where the representatives of the communist and workers' parties will have their say, and the disagreements be solved in a correct way.

However, the Soviet leaders in Bucharest are making efforts to talk about these disagreements right now. In the radiogram he sent us, comrade Hysni says that, as the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties has been postponed, they propose to hold a meeting with the representatives of all the parties who are there, at which to raise the disagreements the Soviet Union has with China, of course in the direction the Soviet Union thinks. According to Khrushchev, at this meeting decisions could be taken, too, and all the parties should express their views, express their solidarity with the Soviet Union and with the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of 1957, of which Khrushchev says, "the Chinese comrades are not upholding"! All this is being done

by talking with and working on the delegations one after another, with the end in view that the delegation of the Communist Party of China will be told whether it will remain in the socialist camp or not. They say that this meeting is not to isolate China, but is being held in order to "inform ourselves, to adopt a common stand".

I think that the decision we have taken¹ is correct. We must listen not only to what the Soviet comrades say, but also to what the Chinese say, and then have our say in the discussion. Therefore the question arises: What stand will our delegation maintain at this meeting jacked up by the Soviet representatives headed by Khrushchev?

We have been subject to a number of provocations there, against which Hysni has stood firm, but he needs further assistance and instruction, for he finds himself faced with a series of difficulties, and the most diverse pressures and provocations.

As always, we must pursue a correct line, for we have a great responsibility to our people. We are a Marxist-Leninist party, and it is up to us to maintain a Marxist-Leninist stand, whatever may occur. Life has shown that we have never wavered, therefore not even a cannon can shift us now from the correct line our Party is pursuing. Life has shown that we were not mistaken in our opinions and attitudes towards the Yugoslav revisionists, they have been correct. If Khrushchev and company have adopted a different stand, not fighting the Yugoslav revisionists, that is their affair. That is the way they see it, but we, too, have the right to tell them our opinion. We have supported the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of 1957, not only on the Yugoslav question, but also on other questions, such as: the unity of the socialist camp, peaceful coexistence, etc. But, on the other hand, concerning many questions included in it, we have had our reservations which we have expressed to the Soviet comrades, or we have adopted a stand in the press and propaganda of the Party. We are for peaceful coexistence, but in the way Lenin conceived it, not to extend it to the field of ideology, for this is extremely dangerous. As far as disarmament is concerned, life has confirmed that imperialism is not disarming, on the contrary it is arming more and more. Then how can we disarm? On the contrary, we must be vigilant. And so we are, and we have done well. On the basis of the line our Party has pursued, the people and all the communists are ready to rise against any danger of aggression. There are some things which we can tell the Soviet comrades that are not in order. We can tell them, for example, that we do not agree with them when they do not expose the Yugoslav revisionists through to the end. Likewise, if we have any criticism of the others, we shall tell them openly and in a comradely spirit, in a Marxist way. Therefore, we must prepare ourselves for these things and go to the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties to have our say. In these matters everybody should take a clear and firm Marxist-Leninist stand and provocations by anyone must not be permitted.

Now, if you like, we may read the radiogram by comrade Hysni.

After reading the radiogram sent by comrade Hysni Kapo, comrade Enver Hoxha again took the floor.

As soon as comrade Gogo [Nushi]² arrived in Moscow, he was summoned by Brezhnev. After asking him, "How are you" and "How are you getting on", he told him about their theses concerning the Chinese. Likewise when comrade Mehmet [Shehu]³ went to Moscow, Kosygin saw him and spoke to him for an hour and a half about these questions. Comrade Mehmet replied: "If these things are so, why have they been left to get worse, since it has been possible to solve them in a Marxist-Leninist way between the two parties first of all, and then, if necessary, they could have been raised with the other parties". Mehmet told him, "Our Party will maintain a correct, principled, Marxist-Leninist stand, and will not fall into sentimental and opportunist positions"

In his letter comrade Hysni tells us that Teodor Zhivkov tried a provocation. He said to him, "What is Albania up to? Only Albania does not agree!" Comrade Hysni retorted: "What do you imply by this?" Then Zhivkov said: "I was joking". Hysni pointed out to him that he must have something

in his head to say that, "Only Albania does not agree", He again answered, "I was joking".

The Bulgarians have published in an illustrated brochure a map of the Balkans in which Albania is presented as a part of Yugoslavia. Concerning this question I told Behar⁴ to summon the Bulgarian ambassador and ask him what was that they were doing, and demand that this brochure be immediately withdrawn from circulation.

With regard to the questions we discussed here I think we should guide comrade Hysni. I have prepared the letter, which I am going to read slowly because it is important.

After the reading and approval of the letter⁵, comrade Enver Hoxha continued:

I want to stress that our strength consists in the unity of thought and deed of our leadership and the entire Party, which is of exceptional importance. Our unity is based on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, therefore we must make it ever stronger. We have advanced consistently on this road, striving for the strict implementation to the letter of the decisions we adopt here jointly, in the Political Bureau, and when the need arises we consult one-another again. But on those occasions when one of us finds himself in difficulty and alone and having no possibility to consult anyone, he ought to act, as we did in the time of war, when, without comrades, one had to decide for oneself whether or not all the forces should be thrown into the attack, or to defend and implement himself the line of the Party.

LETTER ADDRESSED TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO IN BUCHAREST

June 22, 1960

Dear comrade Hysni,

We received your telegrams and letter and studied them in the Political Bureau. We are unanimously of the opinion that the situation is very grave and is not developing in a proper party way. The development of events, the fanning and extension of the conflict between the Soviet Union and China, in the way it is being done, our Political Bureau considers very wrong, very harmful and very dangerous, therefore it can by no means reconcile itself to the methods and forms which are being used to resolve this conflict which is costing our socialist camp and international communism dear. Our Political Bureau stands firm, as always, on the

Marxist-Leninist line that the disagreements between the Soviet Union and China should never have been left to get worse, that the conflict must not be allowed to deepen, but must be solved in a Marxist-Leninist way and with Marxist-Leninist methods.

The Political Bureau thinks that the disagreements which exist between the Soviet Union and China have been made known to the communist and workers' parties not according to the Leninist rules, but in a fortuitous way, through open and indirect polemics in the press and by word of mouth. This is not the right method of solving such a conflict if it is

^{1.} Concerning the participation in the Meeting of the parties of the socialist camp in Bucharest to fix the place and date for a future broader meeting of the communist and workers' parties.

^{2.} At that time Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA and President of the Trade Unions of Albania, stopped at Moscow on his way back home from Peking where he had gone to participate in the meeting of the Council of the World Trade Union Federation.

^{3.} Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PRA.

^{4.} Behar Shtylla, at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRA.

^{5.} See the letter addressed to comrade Hysni Kapo in Bucharest on June 22, 1960.

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desired, as Marxism-Leninism requires, that the other parties, too, should intervene and assist with their experience and weight. This assistance has not been sought until recently. However, according to the telegrams you sent us, even now the Soviet side is aiming to avoid this correct manner of solution. We come to the conclusion that all efforts to clear up these questions between the two biggest parties of the socialist camp in a proper and objective manner, in the Marxist-Leninist way, have not been made. And it seems to us that the solution of the question by a meeting, in which the other communist and workers' parties of our camp should participate, is not being taken as seriously as it should be, since the two parties that have disagreements have not presented their theses and views on these disagreements officially to the other sister parties.

The Political Bureau considers that our Party has just as great a responsability as all the other parties, both for the strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp in the Marxist-Leninist way, and for the preservation of the purity of the Party and Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union is dear to our Party, but China, too, is dear to us. Therefore, we must make no mistakes, we must not get the Party into an impasse and into ideological and political confusion. We have not done this, and we shall never do it. When it is a question of defending our principles, we take no account of whether this one or that one may like it. Our Party has always been guided by the correct Marxist-Leninist stand, and it will always be characterized by principled Marxist-Leninist courage.

Now what stand should be maintained towards the events taking place there? You are clear about the line of the Party and there is no need to dwell on it. But since passions have burst out not in proper party forms, you must be very careful. Your response must be cautious and carefully weighed up. Always think of the interests of the Party and Marxism-Leninism. But this does not mean that you should not give the due reply there and then to whowever it may be. For example, is it not ridiculous and impermissible that a certain Magyarosil should come to convince us, Albanians, of the correctness of the line of the Soviet Union and the "faults" of China?! Let Magyarosi go elsewhere to peddle his wares, and not to us. We do not need Magyarosi to come and "enlighten" us about those principles and truths for which our Party has fought and is ready to fight always. Or, for example, make sure that Andropov2 thoroughly understands that we do not accept that the Soviet representatives should approach our comrades, members of the delegation to the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, and say to them in tones of amazement: "What, has your leadership not informed you of these things?» Remind Andropov that Mikoyan wanted to talk about these questions3 only to comrade Enver, and it was he (Enver), who on his own initiative, took along comrade Mehmet. Mikoyan begged comrade Enver to keep all he told him absolutely secret, and when this is the case, our leadership keeps its word, for it is not in the habit of gossiping about such things. But tell Andropov that we see two dangerous tendencies in the Soviet comrades who talked with the comrades of our delegation: First, they underrate the danger of revisionism, a thing with which we can never agree, and, second, the tendency to present the leadership of our Party as guilty in the eyes of our comrades, for allegedly not informing them. Tell Andropov that they must stop these anti-Marxist tactics immediately, and that they should know that the unity of our leadership is like steel, just as the unity of our leadership with the entire Party of Labour is also like steel, and whoever tries, in one way or another, to make such attempts, may be sure that he will receive blows from us. Tell Andropov also that it is neither proper nor necessary for the Soviet comrades to inform our comrades, because our leadership, which knows how to defend Marxism-Leninism, also knows when and about what it should inform its members.

Say these things to Andropov without heat, but you well understand why they must be said. They are acting in an irregular way and not in a party way, and it is the occasion to bar the way to these actions. Also say to Andropov, "I am very sorry that you brought Magyarosi with you, not as the host, but to convince me of the correctness of the line of the Soviet Union and the wrong way of China. Only good manners, since I was his guest, prevented me from being as blunt with him as he deserved.

Or, when the opportunity presents itself, as when Andropov said to you that, "... thinking that you are firmly against the Yugoslavs, the Communist Party of China wanted to win you over, but it was wrong....", etc., say that, "The times are gone when our Party of Labour and its leadership could be misled by anyone and become a partisan of wrong lines. Our Party has been tempered in struggle and does not step on rotten planks. It has stood and will always stand on the road of the Marxist-Leninist principles".

Before we come to the essence of the problem, there are also some other questions you should bear in mind, because they might help you. There are some crooked developments taking place, as you wrote in your letter to us. Provocations and behind-the-scenes manoeuvres are being hatched up there. Therefore, stand firm, and show them that there is unity, determination, and courage in our leadership.

On the basis of the decisions of the Political Bureau you will act as follows:

I. - Call Andropov and tell him, on behalf of the leadership of the Party (always on behalf of the Party, on behalf of the leadership): «I communicated to my leadership what you told me. Our leadership has had knowledge in a general way about these disagreements and has considered them very grave, very harmful to our common cause, and again expressed its opinion that they must be resolved, and resolved in a correct way, according to the Marxist-Leninist organizational rules. Our leadership has expressed the opinion that these ideological and political disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China should be solved in a Marxist-Leninist way through joint discussions between the two parties. If they cannot be solved in this way, then the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the camp of socialism should be called on to discuss the issues and express their views. The stands maintained at this meeting could be put before a broader meeting of the communist and workers' parties like that of Moscow in 1957.

Now it has been decided to hold this meeting. The leadership of our Party considers this a correct decision. It is in agreement, is preparing to express its opinion on the issues, and is awaiting the fixing of the date. Tell them that, "I [Hysni] am authorized to discuss the setting of the date. Our leadership has appointed and has communicated, also, that our delegation to the coming meeting will be headed by comrade Enver Hoxha.

The meeting which is proposed to be held now in Bucharest with all the representatives of the sister communist and workers' parties, who have come to the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, over the disagreements between the CP of the SU and the CP of China, is considered by our leadership as premature and very harmful. Our Party also considers very harmful a camouflaged or open campaign in the press, about these very delicate questions. Let the coming meeting judge who is right or who is wrong. Our Party will exert all its strength and that modest experience it has, to resolve these grave disagreements in the principled Marxist-Leninist way. Our Party assumes all its responsibilities; it will fight honestly and courageously, as always, to defend its correct Marxist-Leninist line, to defend Marxism-Leninism, to defend the camp of socialism and its unity. The Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party have been, are, and will remain very dear to our Party. But it is undeniable and indisputable that, both to you, and also to us and to our whole camp, great China is very dear, too. Therefore, our leadership thinks and reaffirms that the mistakes, wherever they may be, should be considered in a realistic way at a meeting, and that every effort, everything possible, must be done through Marxist-Leninist ways and methods, to correct them for the good of socialism and communism. This was the official opinion of our leadership when they sent me to Bucharest, and it remains so now after I have informed them of what you communicated to me».

Also tell Andropov: "I [Hysni] am authorized only to represent the Party of Labour of Albania at the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party and talk with the representatives of the other parties of the camp of socialism about the fixing of the date for the forthcoming meeting. In case the meeting proposed by you and the Rumanian Workers' Party is to be held now immediately in Bucharest, as I pointed out previously, our leadership considers it premature, nevertheless I am authorized to take part in it.

I have been officially authorized to communicate these things to you so that you will transmit them to your leadership. Our Party says everything it has to say openly and without hesitation, in a Leninist way.

II. At the meeting that may be held keep cool. Measure your words. About the disagreements which exist between

the Soviet Union and China make no pronouncement. Your statement should be brief and concise.

In essence you will declare on behalf of our Party:

- 1. Our Party of Labour has approved and implemented the decisions of the Moscow Conference [1957].
- 2. Emphasize the correct, consistent, and principled policy of our Party, its boundless loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, the great love of our Party and people for the parties and peoples of the countries of the socialist camp, for all the other sister communist and workers' parties of the world, for the unity of our camp which must in no way be endangered, but must be strengthened and tempered in the Marxist-Leninist way.
- 3. Express the regret of our Party over these disagreements that have arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and express the conviction that these will be solved in the Marxist-Leninist way at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties which will be held later.
- 4. Express the determination of our Party that it will fight shoulder to shoulder with the parties of the socialist countries, always being vigilant and mercilessly exposing imperialism and its agents, the revisionists, through to the end.

These things should be the essence of your statement.

We believe that everything will go well. We are on the right road, therefore follow the situations with the coolness and revolutionary courage which characterize you.

Keep us informed about everything. Splendid news: Yesterday good rain fell everywhere. All the comrades send you their best regards.

I embrace you,

P.S.

To any attempt or suggestion on the part of the Soviet comrades about my coming to Bucharest you must answer, "He is not coming".

1. A. Magyarosi, at that time Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the Rumanian Workers' Party.

2. At that time Head of Department of the CC of the CP of the Soviet Union.

3. At the beginning of February 1960, comrade Enver Hoxha, who was in Moscow at the head of the delegation of the PLA to take part in the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries of Europe on the questions of the development of agriculture, met A. Mikoyan on the latter's request. Mikoyan spoke at this meeting for nearly 5 hours about the ideological and political disagreements which existed between the CP of the SU and the CP of China.

LETTER ADDRESSED TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO IN BUCHAREST

June 25, 1960

Dear Hysni,

We received the radiograms of the evening and I am writing this piece of letter to you now in the morning¹, to say only that you have given a good reply to the "fellow". Don't trouble yourself at all when someone may provoke you, but answer, and indeed strongly, however with coolness. Base things are being done, but right always wins. If they

continue to make provocations, leave nothing on our back, but leave it on their back.

I embrace you,

ENVER

^{1.} Sent by the plane which would bring comrade Hysni back home.

^{2.} Nikita Khrushchev.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY WHICH ALWAYS JUDGES FAIRLY, WISELY, CALMLY AND, WHEN NECESSARY, SEVERELY, TOO

From the conversation with Koço Tashko¹

August 3, 1960

COMRADE-ENVER HOXHA: I received your letter in which you asked to meet me. I authorized comrade Hysni Kapo to talk with you, but you were not satisfied, because you wanted to speak with me or with nobody. Of course, anybody may ask to talk with the First Secretary of the Central Committee, but it may happen that the First Secretary is very busy or absent from Tirana. In such cases I authorize somebody else, as I did in your case. In the evening, as soon as I received your letter, I sent it immediately to Hysni through an officer. The officer was instructed to inform you to come and meet Hysni at the Central Committee. This was not to your liking, and you used bad language towards one of our officers. When a secretary of the Central Committee asks you to come to meet him, you should go there at once, at the fixed time, and not when it pleases you. Otherwise how can a man call himself a communist, if he does not show himself to be correct and disciplined when invited by a comrade whom the Party has elected to the leadership2? Besides, you know that our officers are our comrades, they are communists, they are not "policemen", as you call them. You are wrong to speak like this, because you are a party member. The Party has charged our officers with important tasks.

We have invited you3 today to talk over the problems which you raised in your letter, and what you discussed with Hysni. Therefore, you must speak openly, clearly, in detail, like a party member. We have time at our disposal, and the patience to hear you out. Tell us about your problems one by one. In what are you opposed to the Central Committee and where does it stem from? Tell us about the talks you have had with the functionaries of the Soviet Embassy, what they said to you and what you said to them.

Koço Tashko began speaking in an irresponsible and insolent manner. Patiently, comrade Enver Hoxha tried to help him, from time to time breaking in to ask a question.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You are trying to jump from one thing to another, by telling us what was said at the Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party, as if I were not present at the meeting. Why don't you tell us about the other matters we want to know? You told us nothing about what you said to Hysni. I say you should judge things better. Many things you raise here are the offspring of your imagination.

You are not in order when you say that the criticisms we levelled at Khrushchev were not fair. In your opinion, over what problems has Khrushchev been wrong? Or is he not wrong at all? As you said yourself, your opinion is that "Khrushchev was unjustly attacked by those who spoke at the Plenum, and no measures were taken against them".

This is astonishing. Instead of condemning the attitude of Khrushchev, you seek to condemn the comrades of the Plenum who quite rightly spoke against him.

A little while ago, you said: "Perhaps by travelling so much in the capitalist countries, Khrushchev might bring back other ideas. I want to say that there is the possibility that some circumstances might influence him. But if Khrushchev is making mistakes, Stalin made mistakes, too". No, Koço, don't mix Khrushchev with Stalin. Do not speak in general, but tell us concretely, has Khrushchev made mistakes or not?

KOÇO TASHKO: I say that he has not made mistakes.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But you say that Khrushchev might make mistakes just as Stalin?!

 \dot{KOCO} TASHKO: Even if he is wrong, I believe that he will be corrected.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You said that you were not in agreement when I did not go to the Bucharest Meeting, that allegedly I did not reply to the invitation of the Soviet comrades. It is not as you say. I had no such invitation. You fabricate non-existent things.

The norms of the Marxist-Leninist parties are known by all. If you do not know these norms, then, I shall tell you: It has not happened and does not happen that the Central Committee of our Party may say to the First Secretary, "don't go", when he is invited to a meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp or of the world. Just at the last Plenum it was decided that at the coming meeting to be held in November in Moscow, the First Secretary of the Central Committee would go at the head of the delegation of our Party. We were invited to Bucharest by the Rumanian Workers' Party only to take part in its Congress, and we sent our delegation there. As regards the meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties which was held in Bucharest, according to the agreement reached beforehand, it was aimed only at fixing the time and place of the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the world, therefore our Central Committee did not consider it necessary to send me to Bucharest, but authorized comrade Hysni Kapo to take part in that meeting. Now, as for whence you deduce these things you are saying, other than what they are in reality, and what your starting point is, we do not understand, therefore explain this to us yourself.

You are a party member, how can it be explained that you think that all the things that were said at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party were not put forward correctly and are without foundation? What is well-founded then? These things that you tell us?

KOÇO TASHKO: You should have more confidence in Khrushchev!

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: When, according to the Marxist-Leninist organizational norms and the rules of the proletarian internationalism, one party criticizes another party, or when a leader criticizes a leader of another party, because he has committed mistakes, this is a correct stand.

You are of the opinion that the Moscow Meeting should not be held in November, but as soon as possible. But this is a proposal made by you. The essence of the matter is that we shall go to the Moscow Meeting, and there we shall express our viewpoint. What have you to say on this?

KOÇO TASHKO: I do not agree that you should go into details.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: What do you agree? Tell us. KOÇO TASHKO: I told you. I have nothing to add, I am a sick man.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: No, Koço Tashko, you are not as physically sick as you pretend. You are sick in the head. But the Party is healthy. The Party can cure those who are sick in the head if they so desire. It is the Party's duty to help people have their say, to correct themselves, to march on the right road, but, in order to receive this aid, their hearts must be open before the Party. Do you know these principles?

KOÇO TASHKO: I know them, that is why I asked to talk with you because I could not speak at the Plenum as I can here. Who would let you to speak like this there? They would have me by the throat.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: What is this you are saying? Explain yourself a little. Who does not allow you to speak at the Plenum of the Central Committee? According to you, when you cannot speak at the Plenum, this means that the situation there is unhealthy. You said that you have great faith in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, then why don't you have the same faith in our Party as well, of which you yourself are a member?

KOÇO TASHKO: I said this because, if they interrupted me when I spoke, I am nervous and..., one interjection, one remark against me, throws me off balance.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: As to what you feel, I do not know. I only know the Leninist norms of our Party. The Central Committee is the leadership of the Party which always judges things correctly, wisely, calmly, but, when necessary, severely, too. Then, how can you speak like this about the Central Committee, about the leadership of the Party? The members of the Central Committee are not children, who, as you say, would not judge you well but would hurl themselves at your throat! What do you mean by saying that you are nervous?

 $\it KOCO\ TASHKO:$ That I cannot speak there. It is a question of temperament.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But can such a stand before the Central Committee of our Party be called Marxist? Last night you said to Hysni that if you had spoken at the Plenum, you would have caused a split, while here you are telling me that, if you had spoken, "they would have had you by the throath: Which statement do you stand by? If you explain this with "health reasons", you do not convince us. It is your duty to give the explanations that the Central Committee demands from you, because you are a party member. There-

fore, tell us why you think that the members of the Plenum would not judge you fairly.

The communist speaks openly at the meetings of the Party. When he considers that he is expressing a correct view, this is in the interests of the Party, therefore he defends his opinion to the end, even if all the others are opposed to his view. That is what Lenin teaches us. The interests of the Party should be put above everything else, and not personal interests. The communist might even die, he might collapse unconscious at the meeting, but the Party must know his viewpoint now or after 50 years, therefore he should express this viewpoint, just as it is. That is how the party members think, but not you, who are afraid to speak at the Plenum, and you tell us here: "My heart might stop beating if I speak"! I ask you again, tell us, what is this idea you expressed to Hysni that your speech would cause a split?

KOÇO TASHKO: I said that the comrades of the Central Committee must not think that I was criticizing you.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: This is what you think, and not the comrades of the Plenum, who understand criticism correctly. And why shouldn't you criticize me? Tell us, what is the Central Committee and what am I? I am a party member, a soldier of the Party. Above me is the Political Bureau, above the Political Bureau is the Central Committee, above which is the Congress of the Party. Then, why do you prefer to have a tête-à-tête talk alone with me and not with the Central Committee, which is the leading forum of the Party, while I am a member of the Central Committee? Tomorrow you will come to the Central Committee again and give explanations for these viewpoints.

KOÇO TASHKO: But there are some things which one should discuss rather more in confidence.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It seems to me you do not have a correct understanding of the Central Committee. What is there in all this to be discussed in confidence? Why should you discuss these things more in confidence, for what reasons? How can it be explained that you want to avoid saying these things in the Central Committee? Why are you worried that by speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee you would cause a split among its rank? You did not explain this.

You admitted here that if you had spoken at the Plenum it might have been thought that, "Koço waited and said these things at a meeting where there were a whole of people!" How can you speak in such a way about the Central Committee? Are you in your senses or not? What is the Central Committee, a "mob", a random gathering? Better to have raised these matters at the Plenum, as there would have been no split at all, only the authority the Party has given you would have declined. Think it over, speak out as you should speak in the Party, you poor man! What are these things? You have been nursing these thoughts for 20 days without saying a word to us.

You have said that you agree only on the question of our going to Moscow and that, "If we do have any opinions about Khrushchev, we should say them to him". But you know very well, because you were at the Central Committee and heard it there, that we have continually told Khrushchev what we think. Therefore the things we have to say to Khrushchev are not new to him, we have told him to his face, and have not

kept them to ourselves. Did you hear this at the Plenum, or not?

As the facts show, you do not agree with the decisions of the Plenum, except on one thing, that we must go to Moscow.

These are not family problems, neither are they friendly ones. You come out with views contrary to the Central Committee. Then why raise such worrying problems about which the Central Committee has decided what stand should be adopted, today, and not at the proper time? On such party problems why wait and think "to meet comrade Enver when he goes on holiday"? For all these problems that you have and which are in opposition to the Party, you should have come to us the very next day. Why did you leave this problem for 20 days? This is not a party stand. How will you explain this stand to your branch?

 ${\it KOÇO~TASHKO}$: I did not come because I thought you are busy with Thorez4.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I stayed only two hours with Thorez. You should have asked for a meeting, it was your duty to tell the Party everything, and not to think that, "now comrade Enver is with Thorez", "I shall go to meet him when he goes to Korça on holiday", etc. If I had not gone to Korça, what would you have done? I suppose you would have kept these things to yourself still, especially as you didn't want to tell them to any other secretary of the Central Committee.

KOÇO TASHKO: As I said to the Soviet comrades, I hoped that you would talk with Thorez about these problems, and that through his mediation, a way to solve them would be found.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: So this is what you think! And it seems to me that this is what kept you from meeting me at once. Why do you have hopes in Thorez and yourself, and not in Enver, who is your First Secretary? However, in your opinion, is it correct, that now Thorez has come, things will be put right? Tell us what things will be put right, have you thought about it or not?

You thought that now that Thorez had come attempts would be made to improve relations with Khrushchev. What are these attempts? What mediation should we have sought from Thorez, in your opinion? Explain yourself!

KOÇO TASHKO: This is very simple: Thorez is General Secretary of a glorious party, and I thought that comrade Enver would tell him that the Moscow Meeting should be held earlier than November.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It is still stuck in your mind that the November Meeting should be held earlier. I told you that this does not depend on us. We have been and still are of the opinion that this meeting should be held, and we have declared this before the representatives of more than 50 parties. It was decided at Bucharest that this meeting would be held in Moscow, on the occasion of the celebrations of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It has also been decided that before the meeting the proceedings of the commission comprised of the representatives of the 12 parties of the socialist countries and the representatives of the 14 other parties of the capitalist states should take place. These problems will be discussed first at the commission and then the materials will be sent to every party, hence to our Party, too.

When they come, we shall study these materials very carefully and act as was decided at the Plenum of the Central Committee, which you know. Therefore you had no need to demand from our Party that the meeting should be held as early as possible. If the meeting is held earlier, we are ready to go.

You want the meeting to be held very soon, but you do not come, according to the party rules, and tell the First Secretary your great anxiety. Then what are the reasons that you think that "now that Thorez has come the problems will be set on the right path and put in order"? What problems are you talking about?

KOÇO TASHKO: Good grief -about the known problems! All those things that were said at the Plenum and what we are talking about here!

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: That is to say that we should tell Thorez everything, and he should put them forward in the place you have in mind! But how was it decided at the Central Committee? At the Plenum we decided to put forward these problems at the Moscow Meeting. If we were to solve these problems through Thorez, this would mean we would be acting outside the decision of the Central Committee. How does it come about that you think in such a way?

KOÇO TASHKO: I think it is correct to make use of Thorez for any disagreement you have with Brezhnev, Kozlov, and others:

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: What is this Brezhnev, why do you try to frighten us with these names? We have nothing to do with the president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Don't try to provoke us here. I have told Kozlov to his face what's wrong with him, and I shall do so again.

Now tell us about the meetings you have had with the Soviet representatives. We are interested to know what you talked about. Tell us the important things.

KOÇO TASHKO: On the 29th of July Bespalov⁵ phoned me and asked me to come and talk to him. I met him at the Soviet Club. We saw a film and afterwards went to Dajti Hotel. Bespalov told me that the relations between us had become cool.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Didn't they say why they had become cool?

KOÇO TASHKO: He did not say, nor did I ask. We talked about many things. I told him that the Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party had charged Comrade Enver with the solution of the problems. I said that perhaps something might be done through the talks that would be held with Thorez.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But what was your opinion?

KOÇO TASHKO: My opinion was that these problems should be solved at the November Meeting or at any other meeting that might be held. I do not exclude some other meeting, apart from that of November.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Thus, you do not exclude another meeting. Go on.

KOÇO TASHKO: I told Bespalov that with the coming of Thorez to our country, there would be something positive, because that day I had read in the newspaper "Zëri i Popullit" the speech Thorez made in Korça, and I was impressed by the fact that he spoke very well of our Party, the Central Committee, and comrade Enver.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: That is to say that you came to the conclusion that we had talked, that we had discussed these problems, too, and were of one mind with Thorez. Thus, you judge from outside, formulate in your imagination ideas that Thorez has not come here for a vacation but to talk. And you say this even to Bespalov. You think that the comrades of the Bureau must have come to agreement with Thorez, and proceeding from the estimation Thorez made of our Party in the speech he delivered in Korça, you judge that even the leadership of our Party has given way. Thus, according to your thinking, all the things decided by the Plenum have been discarded and Enver has come to the same opinions as Koço. Have you met Novikov6?

KOÇO TASHKO: I have met him. Bespalov asked me to dinner at Novikov's. Ivanov7 was to be there, too. After dinner we had a long talk. Near the end, I don't remember how it arose, we talked about Thorez.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Try to remember how this conversation developed.

KOÇO TASHKO: We just talked about Thorez.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It was all about Thorez?

KOÇO TASHKO: Yes, that Thorez would save the day.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But Ivanov, what did he say?

KOÇO TASHKO: I don't know, he spoke in general.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We know Ivanov very well. He

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We know Ivanov very well. He is not the one to speak in general.

KOÇO TASHKO: Ivanov has never talked with me about the problems we are speaking about. Neither has Zolotov8, or Bespalov – they are close friends of mine.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I find it surprising that they have not talked with you, when you are close friends, at a time when they are approaching cadres whom they scarcely know, and saying, "Come and talk with us".

KOÇO TASHKO: They have not talked with me, not only now, but even in 1957, when I was in the Soviet Union. From all they did for me at that time, I understood something. They did me all those great honours, they said, «If you like, you may stay in the villa where comrade Enver stays with the government delegation»; they even invited me to the reception that was given in the Kremlin. Hence, they have uvazhenie9 for me and behave well. But recently, when Ivanov shakes hands with me, he does so very briefly, in order to avoid compromising me in the eyes of somebody who does not like me.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But why could be compromise you? Who doesn't like you? Is this true?

KOÇO TASHKO: I don't know, I cannot explain.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But later, why did Ivanov become closer to you again?

 $KOCO\ TASHKO:$ This is one of the questions that I have in the back of my mind, too.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You said that, "all the talk with the Soviet representatives was about Thorez, that this was a very important question". But when you consider the question of Thorez as important, why do you talk with Novikov and Ivanov, and do not come to me? You had all these talks with them before sending me your letter.

KOÇO TASHKO: I went to them by chance.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: The party comrades will laugh at you, when this question is discussed. Since you accept the

thesis that comrade Enver might have talked with Thorez, why do you discuss these questions with the Soviet representatives? KOÇO TASHKO: I don't see anything wrong with that.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We are in the offices of the Central Committee, here, therefore speak in the proper manner. I am not a prosecutor, but the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, therefore discuss the problems, as they are discussed in the Party. What you are telling us doesn't add up. On the one hand, you say that you can talk only with comrade Enver, because he is the First Secretary of the Central Committee, and on the other hand, the idea you have about our Party, you do not tell him, but you go and tell it to Bespalov, whom you consider a close friend, as you yourself said. What are you saying? Bespalov has his place, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of our Party has his.

Why didn't you respect the organizational rules of the Party, and talk with me? If you had disagreements with the Central Committee and wanted to speak to the First Secretary about them, you should have done it at the proper time, immediately after the Plenum. Whether you should have gone to the Soviet representatives or not, is another matter. In my opinion you had no business to go there, while you not only went and talked with them, but went without saying a word to us and had three meetings with the Soviet representatives.

KOÇO TASHKO: No, I had only two.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: This is stated in writing in your letter. Even if you had not met them at all, even the idea of going to them for talks before coming to your Party is impermissible and contrary to the organizational rules of the Party.

I do not accept you wrote your letter to me before you talked with the Soviet representatives: the very content of it refutes such acceptance.

According to you, it seems that Thorez has come from Paris just to talk with us about these questions, and then go on to Moscow. When Ivanov told you that, besides Thorez, there were also some others who would go to Moscow on the 8th of August, were you not curious to ask who were these others? Then, who asked you to say to Ivanov that an invitation to this meeting should go to comrade Enver? Who authorized you to speak in the name of the First Secretary of the Central Committee? Now you come and say to me that you are of the opinion that the problems should not be left to be discussed in November, "since they will get worse". We know this, but we know the other side, too, that our Party is not making matters worse. It is your actions that are doing this, therefore do not accuse our Party.

For 4-5 years we have not uttered a word about the unjust actions of certain Soviet leaders. Some Soviet leaders attack us, but we have been patient, while now you come and say that we should not leave these things to get worse. Isn't this an accusation? I told you, and I repeat, that it does not depend on our Party to decide the time of the meeting. Why are you so insistent that this meeting should be held as soon as possible? You tell Ivanov that an invitation should go to comrade Enver, then you come here and tell me to go and talk with Ivanov myself. Have you thought about what course you are on? Why do you act like this? What wrong has our Party done you? It has brought you up, it has helped you, it is helping and will help you, but what you have done is very grave.

You say that you love the Party, why then do you not tell the Party the things that are worrying you?

KOÇO TASHKO: I told you that I am a phlegmatic type, therefore you should also keep in mind the human aspect and types of people. And what is more, after I met the Soviet representatives, they put me in a difficult position.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: How did they put you in a difficult position? Explain yourself!

KOÇO TASHKO: I intended to meet you, but I postponed it from day to day. As soon as I talked with Bespalov I understood that this problem could not be put off any longer.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Explain to us a little, why did you go and talk with him, since you condemn this talk?

KOÇO TASHKO: No, I do not condemn it, but I had something to say to you also.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You tell them everything while you tell the First Secretary of your Party only "something". But who is to blame for what you have done? If you realize your mistake, then make a little self-criticism. Didn't the Soviet representatives with whom you talked ask how the Plenum went?

KOÇO TASHKO (hesitates, then says): They may have asked

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Tell us frankly, did you say anything about the Plenum? Didn't Ivanov ask how these problems were discussed at the Plenum? I ask you again, did Ivanov ask you how these matters were discussed at the Plenum? Did he ask you such a question?

What was that you said to Hysni, you who pose as allegedly knowing the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when you put our leadership in the position of the Mensheviks and Trotskyites, and said that what is happening here with us sis like the time of Kronstadts in the Soviet Union? Is this what you think about your Party? Then what are we - belogardists? Do you know the history of our Party? It was not you who inculcated the great love of our people for the peoples of the Soviet Union, but our Party, during the war, with blood and sweat, while now you come and make such accusations against us! These things that you said have their roots elsewhere, therefore think and reflect only in the party way, otherwise you will not correct yourself. Come down to earth. The Party has respected you more than you deserved. Your imagination is sick, and this is not a recent illness - you have had this sickness for some time.

To tell the truth, from no one else in my life have I heard such a discussion and presentation of the matter, without start, without finish, without any connection between one thing and another, like this I heard from you. Many comrades have come and have opened their hearts to me when they have made some mistake, but they have emerged from the discussion feeling better. While now you speak to me about "humanism", about the phlegmatic type! I have been humane with people, with the comrades. What do you want when you tell me now "to see the human side, too"? Do you want me to fail to defend the line of the Party, its interests? Please! I put the interests of the Party and of the people above everything else, and I will defend them as long as I live. If anybody has facts with which to criticize me and the Central Committee, we shall welcome his just criticism gladly, and this is how we have always received it.

But if anybody criticizes us for the stand we maintain towards the Yugoslav revisionists, we say "stop", whoever he might be, even to Khrushchev, because we call a spade a spade. He himself has said that the Yugoslav leadership is an agency of imperialism. Then why should our Party be attacked for its just stand against the Yugoslav revisionists? For what reasons? How can we keep our mouths shut over these things? When we say that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the mother Party, this does not mean that we should keep silent about the mistakes of some one in its leadership.

After the talks we held in Moscow in 1957, out of respect for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for a time we did not write against Yugoslav revisionism in our press. However, it was not long and the Yugoslav revisionists held their notorious 7th Congress, with regard to which the correctness of the line of our Party was once again obvious. By taking a revolutionary stand, we are defending the Soviet Union itself and its Communist Party, while those who violate the principles of Marxism-Leninism in one way or another, we shall criticize in a Marxist-Leninist way, whoever they may be. Don't we have the right to criticize some one when the cup is full? When mistakes are made, we cannot sit in silence. We shall criticize in a Marxist-Leninist way, because this is the way to defend the freedom and the independence of our Homeland and of the Soviet Union itself, because so much blood has been shed to win these things. This is the way to defend Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, Koço Tashko, not your way. You mix up things in your imagination. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has the right to act as it likes, but we have the right to have our say about the complaints made against our Party. Our Party fights to the end to defend the interests of the people and of Marxism-Leninism from the enemies, but your sick imagination says otherwise. Criticism is criticism, therefore, when you are faced with mistakes, it is opportunism not to criticize. However you have suffered to some degree from this disease. I have followed the life of the Party very carefully from the very beginning. There are occasions when little should be said, but there are also occasions when you should grit your teeth, and, when it is a matter of principles, they must be defended, we must not violate them.

Have you seen our writings where we criticize the Yugoslav revisionists? In them we have constantly spoken about the experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Then why come and point out to me one by one the articles published by the Soviet comrades? I know them, but there are also differences in our attitudes, which are not just tactical differences. We have made our criticism known to Khrushchev, too. We do not speak about them in secret. We have told him openly to his face, and he has spoken to us the same way. But these differences have not led us to a split. You know the viewpoint of our Party, that the disagreements that have emerged are between two parties, between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and we have said at the proper time that the examination of these questions in Bucharest was premature, hasty, that they should be solved carefully and by strictly applying the Leninist organizational rules on the relations between parties. What then impels you to adopt this stand against the Central Committee? Therefore, as a comrade, I say to you to reflect upon these

questions. During these next 2 or 3 days, according to the party rules, you have the possibility to write to the Central Committee about these questions.

KOÇO TASHKO: I have nothing more to say.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: That means that you will not act like a party member, to whom the Party lends a hand to think over his mistakes. Then don't come out tomorrow and say that comrade Enver did not give you the possibility to reflect more deeply over your mistakes.

 $KOCO\ TASHKO:$ I have nothing to say. What I had to say I said here.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: In short, this is your stand. Are you not going to re-examine your position? I advise you once again to reflect today, tomorrow, till the day after tomorrow, and hand us your views in writing, then we shall judge your case in the Central Committee, because it is a problem of import-

ance which the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party must discuss and decide.

KOCO TASHKO: I shall not write. I said what I had to say.

REAL UNITY IS ACHIEVED AND STRENGTHENED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES

Letter to the CC of the CPSU and the CC of the CP of China¹

August 27, 1960

Dear comrades,

As is known, at the Bucharest Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, which was held in June this year, concerning the disagreements arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, the delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania, in conformity with the directives of the Central Committee of our Party, maintained a different stand from that of the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the delegations of the majority of the parties participating in the meeting.

The Party of Labour of Albania nurtures the most profound respect for all the communist and workers' parties of the world and expresses its great regret that, for the first time in its revolutionary history, it was obliged to take such a stand as it took at the Bucharest Meeting, which is in opposition to the stand of the majority of the delegations of the communist and workers' parties. Our Party, like any other Marxist party, has the right to express its opinion according to its conscience and to adopt the stand which it judges is correct.

At the Bucharest Meeting the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union distributed to the delegations of other parties a written document in which it was stated that the Communist Party of China has violated the 1957 Moscow Declaration. At that meeting... we found ourselves faced with a truly international conference specially organized to criticize the Communist Party of China for *violation* of the Moscow Declaration, on the basis of the material presented by the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was handed to the delegation of our Party only 10 hours before the meeting.

As is known, Marxism-Leninism teaches us that not only when the mistakes of a Marxist party such as the Communist Party of China, which has millions of members in its ranks and has proved itself over a long period of consistent revolutionary activity, are being examined, but even when the mistakes of a single communist are examined, we must be very careful, very cautious, must thoroughly analyse all the causes of the mistakes this communist has made, must strive to convince him of his mistakes, take his case to the basic organization or to the appropriate forum of the Party, where the case should be examined with the greatest objectivity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, aiming at the attainment of a single end: the improvement of this communist and putting him on the right road. If we make such great efforts in order to analyse the mistakes of one communist and save him from these mistakes, then it is self-evident what great efforts should have been made before "exchanging opinions about the mistakes of a party, at an international communist meeting, such as the Bucharest Meeting. But this, unfortunately, was not done.

The Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania proceeds from the Marxist-Leninist principle that, in order to express its opinion about the ideological and political mistakes of another Marxist party, first it must be convinced with facts about the existence of these mistakes, and this conviction must be created by analysing, in the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, without passion and on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist method, all the relevant arguments concerning this question, that is, both the arguments presented by the side making the criticism and the arguments presented by the side which is criticized. After

At that time Chairman of the Auditing Commission of the PLA.

^{2. -} Even for his meeting with comrade Enver Hoxha, Koço Tashko was three hours late, for which he was severely criticized.

^{3. –} Comrade Rita Marko, Member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the PLA, was also present at this meeting.

^{4. -} At that time General Secretary of the CP of France.

^{5. –} At that time first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana.

^{6. -} At that time adviser of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana.

^{7. –} At that time ambassador of the Soviet Union in Tirana.

^{8. -} Soviet employee in Tirana.

^{9. -} Respect (Russ.)

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this Marxist-Leninist analysis has been made by the Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party, then and only then, shall we be in a position to express our opinion objectively about the mistakes of another party. We think that this is the fairest method in examining the ideological mistakes of a sister party. The Central Committee of our Party will use this method to reach its final conclusions about the "mistakes" which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union attributes to the Communist Party of China, and will express its own opinion on this at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties, in November this year. We think that to act otherwise, to act as was done at the Bucharest Meeting would mean to condemn a sister party without thorough and dispassionate analysis of all the facts in order to arrive at a conclusion whether the said party has made mistakes or not. In these cases haste is harmful.

For these reasons, at the Bucharest Meeting, the delegation of our Party declared that these disagreements had arisen between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and that efforts for their solution should have been made through discussions between these two parties and, if no solution were achieved, then the case should have been raised before all the other sister parties to express their opinions; that the Bucharest Meeting was premature and not in conformity with the Leninist norms; that, in regard to the disagreements arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, the Party of Labour of Albania would express its view at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties in the month of November.

Of course, the disagreements arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China are of great principled, ideological and political importance, and the solution of these disagreements is of vital importance to the unity of the camp of socialism and the international communist movement. Not only are all the Marxist parties, including the Party of Labour of Albania, interested today in the solution of these disagreements, but, indeed, all the Marxist parties are duty-bound to make their contribution to the solution of these disagreements, in as much as these disagreements have now gone beyond the bounds of relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China and have assumed an international character.

After the Bucharest Meeting, some communist and workers' parties of the countries of the socialist camp, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have sent the Central Committee of our Party copies of the letters which they have addressed to the Communist Party of China. In these letters the conclusion is reached that the Communist Party of China "has deviated from the Marxist-Leninist theory and practice"... Assertions are made which convince us even more strongly that our stand at the Bucharest Meeting was completely correct, Marxist-Leninist. In our view, these assertions prove that the Bucharest Meeting was not confined simply to the "exchange" of opinions about "the mistakes of the Communist Party of China", and that the Communist Party of China has been condemned de facto by the parties which have sent us these letters.

Besides this, it is stressed in these letters that at the Bucharest Meeting the "complete unity of all the communist and workers' parties, in the criticism they made of the "mistakes," of the Communist Party of China was confirmed. Such an assertion implies that the Party of Labour of Albania, too, has aligned itself with the majority of the other communist and workers' parties in regard to the "mistakes" attributed to the Communist Party of China. If we are speaking of the approval of the communique of the Bucharest Meeting, we agree that there was unity of all the parties, for the communique was approved by our Party, too. But, if we are speaking of "unity of all the parties* concerning the disagreements arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, this does not correspond to the truth, at least as far as our Party is concerned, because the Party of Labour of Albania did not associate itself with the majority of the other parties, and it will express its view about these disagreements at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties, in November this year, as it has many times declared. To affirm that there was "complete unity of all the parties" at the Bucharest Meeting in the criticism made of the "mistakes" of the Communist Party of China, means to distort the facts and

Today, the Central Committee of our Party is more convinced than it was at the Bucharest Meeting that not only has that meeting not eliminated the disagreements arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, but it has made these disagreements even deeper, to reach disquieting proportions.

The solution of the disagreements arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, as we said, is of vital importance to the unity of the camp of socialism and to the unity of the international communist movement. Therefore, we think that every effort must be made to solve these disagreements on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. It is a fact that the enemies of Marxism-Leninism, imperialism and revisionism, have already begun to exploit the existence of these disagreements to attack Marxism-Leninism, to discredit and split the camp of socialism and the international communist movement.

The Central Committee of our Party thinks that there is nothing more important to the life of all the communist and workers' parties of the world today, to the preservation and strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement, than the solution of these disagreements on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism...

Our Party will always be vigilant against the war-mongering plans and actions of imperialism and against modern revisionism, which, as defined in the Moscow Declaration, is the main danger to the international communist movement.

Fraternal greetings
For the Central Committee
of the Party of Labour of Albania
ENVER HOXHA

^{1.} A copy of this letter was sent also to the parties of the other socialist countries,

WE SHALL GO TO MOSCOW NOT WITH TEN BANNERS, BUT WITH ONLY ONE, WITH THE BANNER-OF MARXISM-LENINISM

Speech at the 18th Plenum of the CC of the PLA concerning Liri Belishova's grave mistakes in line

September 6, 1960

Before we speak of Liri Belishova I shall inform the Plenum of some decisions taken by the Political Bureau.

In recent weeks we have had correspondence with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

We have been informed by the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rumania and Czechoslovakia about a letter which each of them has addressed to the Communist Party of China. In essence these letters make serious accusations against the Communist Party of China of deviation from Marxism-Leninism, of dogmatism, sectarianism, and great state chauvinism, and other charges like these. At the same time, these letters defend N.S. Khrushchev against what is said in a document which was distributed to the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp by the delegation of the CP of China at the end of the Bucharest Meeting.

The material of the Chinese comrades said, among other things, that the Bucharest Meeting was not held in accord with the proper forms, that N.S.Khrushchev's interjections and actions during the meeting were not Marxist-Leninist, and that these questions which were raised are of great importance to the further development of the international communist movement.

Later we received a letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in which, after stating that the ties between our two parties have been exceptionally close, they say that at the Bucharest Meeting a "spark of misunderstanding" arose between our parties, which must not be allowed to catch fire. Therefore, they proposed to us the holding of a meeting, of whatever level we would like and when we would like, to discuss these misunderstandings together, so that "the Party of Labour of Albania and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will go with complete unity of views" to the coming November meeting in Moscow.

We have sent three letters to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the first letter we have pointed out to it, in a comradely way, the disruptive, sabotaging activity of the Soviet ambassador V.I.Ivanov, of the counsellor Novikov, and the first secretary Bespalov, against our Party and its leadership. Since the Bucharest Meeting these three senior functionaries of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, have carried out hostile work against our Party and leadership, breaching every rule of friendship and Party behaviour. Their aim has been to disrupt the leadership. They have made efforts to this end, using every form and method, about some of which you know. They strove to find a crack in the leadership of our Party and, first of all, to learn what was discussed at the July Plenum, what stands were adopted and, if possible, to learn what each speaker had said.

We have been exceptionally patient with regard to these actions in this situation, for we were guided by the principle

of preserving our friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union. But our Party and our people have been extremely vigilant towards these actions which have an unfriendly and un-Marxist swell. It is a fact that all our comrades whom they have provoked, have stood up to them very well and have given them the reply they deserved. There was only Koço Tashko with whom they managed to succeed, and they undid him in a most despicable way, as we shall see. He alone told them about everything that was discussed at the July Plenum of the CC of the PLA.

Considering that they had gone too far, the Political Bureau sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the first letter pointing out this activity and stressing that these were unfriendy, anti-Marxist actions against our Party, and we asked the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to take measures for the sake of the sincere friendship and collaboration between our two countries and parties, so that there would be no more actions like these. Following this letter Ivanov was called to Moscow. Whether he will return or not, we do not know.

We want to be sincere friends with the ambassador and with all the Soviet personnel, within the bounds of friendship and Marxist-Leninist norms. The other functionaries of the Soviet Embassy are here and we notice that they, too, are undertaking impermissible actions.

The second letter that we sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was sent at the same time to the Communist Party of China, too. After the Bucharest Meeting, particularly in the letters which the leaderships of the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania addressed to the CC of the Communist Party of China, it is alleged that all the communist and workers' parties were in complete solidarity at the Bucharest Meeting on their stand towards the CP of China, a thing which is not true. Therefore, in this letter we dot the i's. We express our opinion about the stand we adopted in Bucharest, and we say that as to the allegations of mistakes by the CC of China, our Party did not support these at the Bucharest Meeting.

In the letter we express the view that a great revolutionary party such as the Communist Party of China, cannot be condemned hastily and in those forms and ways as was done at Bucharest. Even with regard to a rank and file communist who has committed a grave fault, things cannot proceed in this way but only on the basis of the Leninist organizational rules, and in this case, only after every effort has been made to save him, then a final decision is taken. Hence we do not consider it in order for a great revolutionary party to be unfairly accused and condemned outside the organizational rules, especially by the leadership of those parties that have addressed those letters to the Communist Party of China.

In the letter the idea is expressed that these problems, which have been made the property of the international communist movement, concern all parties, just as they do ours. Therefore we shall express our opinion about these questions at the meeting which it has been decided to hold in November, where we shall speak our mind in a revolutionary and Marxist-Leninist way. The contradictions that have arisen constitute a very big issue for the international communist movement, therefore, before we go to the Moscow Meeting, after we have received the necessary material and studied it, we shall put it before the Plenum of the Central Committee for discussion and decision, and we shall put forward the view of the Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party at that meeting. This, we think, is the Marxist-Leninist way for the solution of a question of an international character. We think that there is no other way, and to pursue any other course would be incorrect.

Another question, which we raised in our letters addressed to the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and China, and which is of importance, is that not only must the problems which have arisen, developed, and assumed a very serious character, be solved between the two parties, in the first place, but we think and propose that, till it is not too late, the two great parties, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China should hold a top-level meeting prior to the meeting of the commission, which will be held at the end of September, to discuss the main questions around which their disagreements have arisen. We say in the letter that this would be of great help to the work of the commission, or the plenary meeting in Moscow. We make this proposal proceeding from the interests of international communism. Now we have been informed that our idea is considered reasonable, and the meeting of the representatives of the two parties will be held about September 15-17, but at what level, we do not know.

The third letter concerns the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for a meeting with the representatives of our Party. We reply in our letter that it is proper that, when disagreements arise between two parties, the questions should be discussed and sorted out as correctly as possible, in the Marxist-Leninist way. But there are no disagreements between our two parties, because these disagreements exist between them and another party. Therefore, for us to go to Moscow and discuss the "mistakes" of another party without its representatives being present, too, is not at all Marxist, and we cannot do such a thing. Such a method of work does not assist the solution of the existing disagreements, on the contrary it may render the situation more difficult. In a word, we tell them that we do not talk behind anyone's back.

As to what the Soviet leadership say that a "spark of misunderstanding" has arisen between our two parties, we have replied that our Party has kindled neither spark nor fire.

Thus, the Political Bureau has sent these three letters to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

For the best preparation of the Plenum in regard to the questions we shall discuss, I recommend that the Chinese articles "Long Live Leninism!", the material distributed by the Soviet representatives at the Bucharest Meeting, the 1957 Moscow Declaration, the copies of the letters we have recently

addressed to the CC of the CP of the SU, of which I spoke above, as well as the materials that have been recommended and not read as yet, should be put at the disposal of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee. All these should be studied carefully so that, when we discuss them at the Plenum, the comrades will be prepared. If we have other materials from the Communist Party of China about its views, these too, will be made available for study.

Let us now get down concretely to the question of Liri Belishova.

You know that at the July Plenum, apart from other things, Liri was criticized for the major serious mistakes she made during her stay in China and the Soviet Union. But at that meeting of the Plenum these mistakes were only touched upon in passing, in the course of the discussion. However, after these questions, which several comrades mentioned, were raised, Liri did not appear before the Plenum with a self-criticism, although she knew that the Political Bureau had arrived at the conclusion that her self-criticism before the Bureau was incomplete, that there were many gaps in it. Precisely for these reasons I said at the Plenum that, after being re-examined once more in the Political Bureau, her case should be presented to the Plenum. In fact we did examine the question of Liri².

We gave her the possibility to reflect deeply, to ponder over the grave mistakes she has made in such complicated and difficult situations, to come out with correct conclusions and reveal the causes which impelled her to make these mistakes.

At the meeting of the Political Bureau she showed some signs of irritation in connection with the comrades' questions, which served to uncover and make clearer Liri's wavering on the political and ideological line of our Party. Later, I too summoned her separately, to help her reflect on these questions, indeed I reminded her of the non-Marxist methods the Soviet leaders had used for the disruption of the leaderships of a number of communist and workers' parties, therefore I advised her to think over these questions.

I want to say that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, which is always guided by the principle that things must be explained to the comrades to save them from the wrong road and mistakes, had tried to help Liri patiently and calmly. Her mistakes are not small and trivial, but are profound mistakes, in which, if she does not understand them, there is the danger that they will become even more grave and harmful, both to the Party and to her position in the Party.

On the other hand, by criticizing the one who makes mistakes, the Party helps him to arm himself, to make efforts to understand the reasons for his mistakes, so that he no longer falls into such mistakes. This has been the road of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and mine, for the correction of those who make mistakes.

The Political Bureau thinks that Liri Belishova's mistakes are very great and serious. They show that in fact she is in opposition to the line of our Party, she is not in agreement, not in unity of thought and action on a number of ideological and political questions with the Central Committee of the Party, with our entire Party. She does not understand the vital importance to our Party, as to any Marxist party, of the question of the ideological and political unity in the Party and, the more so, the question of the unity of the Central Committee and the

Political Bureau itself. This question is of vital importance particularly in the existing situation, when the imperialist enemies and the modern revisionists are striving to split the leadership of our Party at all costs, even if they can cause some small cracks, to weaken it and then attack the Party. Therefore, those who damage this steel-like unity, which the Party has forged with struggle and bloodshed through all sorts of storms, must be severely punished, as they deserve, as the great interests of the Party and the people require.

What are the mistakes of Liri Belishova?

As you know, Liri went to China. This trip had an official character, and the delegation of which she was a member did not include all sorts of people, but party people. Thus, the delegation was not comprised of apolitical people, but of known personalities of our Party and State.

Before leaving for China, she knew of the disagreements that existed between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, not to the full extent to which they developed later, but she knew many things. When is was recommended to her, as far as possible, to avoid expresing opinions on these still unresolved problems, this means that she had knowledge of the object of the disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. However, Liri Belishova went to China and did not act as recommended.

During her stay in China, Liri Belishova showed a surprising fear and avoided any discussion with the Chinese comrades, when it was question of expressing the opinion of our Party about modern revisionism, about our friendship with the CP of China and its Government and about the correct meaning of the ties with the Soviet Union. Indeed, in various forms she asked them, as far as possible, to refrain from discussing party questions because, allegedly, "she was not authorized", etc.

Why she did this, we shall see later, but the fact is that the Chinese comrades wanted to discuss party questions with us. We cannot prevent them from talking, but we have our own stand, and this stand must be expressed on every occasion. It is not so simple to seek to avoid talking about party questions. Although Liri strove at all costs to avoid dealing with party problems in the talks with the Chinese comrades, they considered it reasonable to talk to us about so great and delicate a question. Of course, they did this because they had great trust in, and deep respect for, our Party. As it seems, this is not how Liri Belishova evaluated this question. Instead of maintaining the stand that should have been maintained in these talks with the Chinese comrades, without any instructions to do such a thing, she opposed their views on some questions and gave them to understand that we were leaning towards the Soviet leaders. Not only had our Party not expressed itself in favour of such a stand, but all the comrades of the Political Bureau were in disagreement with many stands of the Soviet leaders about political and ideological problems which were apparent both in their practical activity and in their press. Therefore, our Party had never pronounced itself against China, With her attitude, Liri Belishova implied to the Chinese comrades that our Party did not agree with their views.

The other mistake of Liri Belishova's was that she went and made contact with the counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, and told him about the things the Chinese comrades had said to her. From this her aim emerges very clearly. The

Soviet leaders, from Khrushchev down to Polyansky, understood how Liri was thinking, that they were her personal opinions, that she was against the Chinese views and for the Soviet position on these questions.

Liri Belishova was considered by them the "heroine" of the situation. The Soviet leaders utilized her actions to create a difficult situation in our Party, in our leadership and among our cadres. After the Bucharest Meeting they got hold of all the comrades who were in the USSR to expound their views and to get their opinion, in one way or another, to see if they were with the Central Committee of the PLA. One of these views was that in China Liri Belishova took an "heroic" stand, that "she gave the Chinese comrades the proper reply and did not allow them to issue a communique on the talks they held with her". This is what the Soviet leaders are saying.

Not only was Liri Belishova predisposed to adopt such a stand, but she made another organizational mistake, she violated the discipline of the Party. She did nothing at all to seek the opinion of the Political Bureau. She did not understand that this was a harmful action to fan the flames in this situation of disagreements which existed between these two parties. She knew that disagreements existed between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and not between the Communist Party of China and the whole of international communism, as this matter was put forward at the Bucharest Meeting.

We have had sincere relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on everything. But in the way the events developed and when it is a matter of a third party being accused, we should not pour petrol on the fire. Before she left for China, I talked with Liri about what Mikoyan had told us of the Communist Party of China. I instructed her, also, not to talk about this question with anyone, as long as we had still not informed even the CC of the Party of these disagreements. Liri should have understood that, since we had not informed our Party, it was not up to us to inform the Communist Party of China of what Mikoyan had said about them. Not only was Liri instructed, but even if she had no instruction at all, as a member of the Political Bureau, she should have realized that the questions raised with her by the Chinese comrades could not be discussed with a third party without obtaining the approval of the Central Committee.

Why did Liri not seek the opinion of the leadership of the Party? Because she did not have a correct concept of the leadership, of the Political Bureau. She has been conceited and overrated her own abilities and intelligence, otherwise, like any other member of the Central Committee, when difficulties are encountered about an important problem, she should consult the leadership of the Party, and not act without receiving its advice. Liri did not do this, because she liked the position she held.

At the Political Bureau she tried hard to justify herself concerning her mistakes in Peking. She clung to such arguments as that she was alone and had nobody to consult. But the fact is that she continued to make mistakes in Moscow, too, indeed up to the meeting of the Political Bureau after she returned. She does not want to understand her grave mistakes, and she does not admit them.

When Liri was in Peking I sent her a radiogram. What was its content? When the holding of the Bucharest Meeting

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in June was proposed to us we had received a radiogram from our embassy in Peking, by which we were briefly informed of what had happened at the meeting of the Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, of the major differences of principle between the delegations of the Soviet Union and China. We knew that Liri would have meetings with the Chinese comrades, therefore we sent a radiogram concerning the meeting of the communist and workers' parties which it was thought would be held in June. We told her that Chinese comrades had proposed the postponement of the June meeting, but, if the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other parties agreed with their proposal, we had no objection. If it was to be held in June, we said in the radiogram, the Chinese comrades should be informed, if they would allow us to express our modest opinion, that the participation of the great Communist Party of China in this meeting was essential.

During this time we received another letter, from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which we were informed of the postponement of the meeting which was to have been held in June. Then we sent another radiogram to Liri, in which we said that it was not necessary to transmit to the Chinese comrades the content of the first radiogram, because our fear that the Chinese comrades would not come to the meeting they had proposed should be postponed, had disappeared. Liri read and interpreted the radiogram in the way she wanted and according to the plan she was turning over in her mind.

Likewise, we instructed her to find the opportunity to inform the Chinese comrades that we had read and liked the articles published by them on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth.

Liri did not carry out this instruction from the Political Bureau, because she had her own views. But irrespective of the fact that these articles were not to her liking, she should have transmitted the view of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of our Party to the Chinese comrades. When she returned she could have expressed her personal view to the Political Bureau. This shows that Liri Belishova had gone to China with definite opinions which were at variance with those of the comrades of the Political Bureau, who, those days, held frequent discussions on the political and ideological stands of the CP of the SU and the CP of China.

When she reached Moscow, Liri was more completely armed. You know that we sent Liri two simple, but very clear letters, fully sufficient weapons for her to avoid making mistakes⁴. Taking into account her attitude in China, and especially the shortcomings in Liri's character, such as conceit and ambition, plus the flattery of her by the Soviet leadership who had called her a "heroine", we feared for what she might do and we took this measure so that she could not fall into errors again. Thus, we sent these two letters in order to save Liri. However, she did not carry out the instructions sent to her.

In the first letter, which she received as soon as she arrived in Ulan-Bator, the Political Bureau pointed out to her that she had made grave mistakes in China, and for this reason she should take care not to let the flattery and high-sounding praise that she might receive from the Soviet leaders go to her head. In the second letter, which she received as soon as she landed in Moscow, she was informed of the holding of the Bucharest Meeting, the stand adopted there by our Party, and it was

stressed to her that this stand did not please the Soviet leaders, therefore she should be careful to defend the line of the Party, to stress that she fully agreed with the stand of the Central Committee of the Party, expressed in Bucharest by comrade Hysni. This stand would have been correct and would have barred the way to all efforts by anyone who might try to split our leadership.

Thus, Liri Belishova had been prepared so as to avoid any mistakes, had she agreed with the line of the Central Committee. But the fact is that this is not what happened.

We know the tactics pursued by the Soviet leaders. They invited Liri to lunch, but there she did not maintain the stand on which she had been instructed by the Political Bureau. Liri used there the tactics of jokes. "We must make jokes," she thought, "to get out of this situation", but in fact jokes did not help her, and a situation was created which was favourable to the Soviet leaders, unfavourable and in opposition to the stand of the Central Committee of our Party, and compatible, in the final analysis, with the views of Liri Belishova.

During the lunch the Soviet leaders began with praises and toasts to Liri, and with attacks on our Party, but Liri dodged the touchy issues, the blows and venom against our Party, directed particularly by Kozlov. Kozlov expressed his dissatisfaction over the stand of comrade Hysni [Kapo] in Bucharest, and she did not knock him back immediately. She pretends not to be clear about this question, but she allegedly told Kozlov that, "Enver Hoxha has no skeleton in the cupboard like Gomulka" about whom they said that he had adopted a "pravilno", "yasno" 5 stand. She should have intervened immediately to say that at Bucharest our Party adopted a correct and clear stand, and that she agreed with that stand.

Then Kozlov said that, "We want friendship, but without zigzags". But who is developing friendship with zigzags? Liri did not give the proper reply to this, either. In the letter we said to Liri that Khrushchev did not like the stand of our Party at the Bucharest Meeting, therefore she should have understood that when there was talk of zigzags it was our Party which was being attacked, and she should have replied that our Party does not make zigazags.

Thus such a stand of Liri Belishova's is deliberate.

During the lunch other insinuations were made such as: "Whom are you Albanians with, with the 200 or the 600 millions?" But this, too, went without the proper reply from Liri. At the meeting I had with Ivanov, I told him that what Kozlov said was anti-Marxist. And what did he mean by with the 200 or the 600 millions?" Our Party was on a Marxist road, therefore it was with all the countries of our socialist camp. However, at the Plenum Liri told us that she did not hear this question properly, or did not understand it. But it is impossible that this escaped her ears, for he said it at lunch, sitting near her, and we do not agree with such a justification. They might even have said these things in a confusing, indirect way, but at the end of the lunch she should have risen and said: "Comrades, there are no zigzags in our line. We are for the unity of all the countries of our camp, therefore let us drink this toast to the triumph of Marxism-Leninism!" But in fact this was not the way she acted, the lunch and these venom-filled remarks of the Soviet leaders were passed off with a laugh.

But why with a laugh? Because Liri Belishova did not agree with the line of our Party on these questions, she had

a different view and she thought that her view was correct and, in the final account, in her opinion, the views of the leadership of our Party were not correct, and that in this situation we were making mistakes.

Thus, even when she came back, Liri showed some signs and took some actions which confirm this. She began especially to say to the comrades: "Comrade Enver should be sidetracked, we should not draw him into this situation so that he will not compromise himself over these questions". In plain language this means, "Nobody knows how the conflict between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will end. Therefore, we should leave comrade Enver out of it, not let him meddle in it, and when this problem is over, then we shall see who is right, you or I, that's the time for comrade Enver to come out, and give the others who were wrong stick, and in this way we are in order", according to her view.

That is, even after her return to Tirana, in spite of the advice given her at the meeting of the Political Bureau, Liri Belishova continued to maintain the same stand and to concoct intrigues to disrupt the leadership of the Party.

Linked with this is also Liri's other saying that, "We must prepare several variants for the Moscow Meeting" and, after we see which way the "wind" is blowing, make use of the one which seems to us the most advantageous. This is a very wrong, opportunist view, entirely unacceptable to our Party of Labour. We must go to the Moscow Meeting not with "several variants", but with a clear-cut stand, not with ten banners, but with one, with the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

Another view of Liri was that the comrades of the Plenum or the alternate members of the Political Bureau should not be given the documents exchanged between the Political Bureau and comrade Hysni Kapo in Bucharest, who was instructed through them about the stand he should adopt there. What does this mean? This is connected with the fact that, "These documents bear Enver's signature, therefore we should not expose him." Why should we not inform the Central Committee of the practice followed by the Political Bureau, and let the Plenum judge of its work? What is wrong with this?

But in reality there are and there should have been second thoughts in Liri Belishova's head. The explanations she has given have not convinced the Political Bureau that she has thoroughly and profoundly understood her mistakes. She should bring out the reasons why she acted as she did and who impelled her, from what bases did these thoughts arise in her, that is, she should make a profound analysis of her mistakes. That is why we analysed this question again in the Political Bureau.

The aim of this discussion in the Political Bureau was to help Liri. The contributions to the discussion were fiery, severe, for they concerned the defense of the interests of the Party, its line, its life. We must stand firm before the interests of the Party. To tell the truth, Liri was given plenty of help by the comrades, and she should have made a frank self-criticism, with the gloves off. But her self-criticism in the Political Bureau was not satisfactory. Liri said nothing, indeed, through her contributions, she indirectly expressed dissatisfaction and doubts about the stand adopted in her regard.

Liri presented her mistakes in a very simple way. She did not make a Marxist-Leninist analysis of these mistakes, of their sources, something which was expected from her. She

did not proceed from the principle of telling the Party the real causes that impelled her to make mistakes, but she clung to such arguments as "she was alone and had nobody to consult". This tactic of Liri's is not healthy. She should have told the Political Bureau frankly why these mistakes were made and where they had their source.

The comrades of the Political Bureau analysed Liri Belishova's mistakes and arrived at the conclusion that such mistakes were not made easily, had she not had some distorted views about the others and overestimation of herself.

Liri Belishova should have had it clear that revisionism does not exist only in Yugoslavia, that revisionist views also exist in parties of other countries, which are deviating from the correct Marxist-Leninist road.

Many times we have discussed with Liri that many actions of the Soviet leaders are not on the right road, but on an opportunist road, which is to the advantage of the revisionists, particularly of the Yugoslav revisionists.

And this has not been a matter only of tactical stands on their part. We observe that the Soviet leaders have allowed the struggle against the Yugoslav revisionists to die down. From time to time they write theoretical articles against the Yugoslav revisionists, but even those with many gaps in them, while as to the concrete struggle against them, this they have outright out. Indeed there are parties, such as the Communist Party of Bulgaria, which have even taken decisions not to say anything against the Yugoslav revisionists.

We cannot say that these matters were a bolt from the blue to Liri Belishova, and therefore she has no right to say: "How could I imagine that in the line of the Soviet leaders there are such revisionist views?". We talk about such problems every day, but Liri Belishova's eyes have been blinded by the flattery and great praise of the Soviet leaders, and she has reconciled herself with them. She has forgotten that on such an important question as that of the disagreements between the CP of the SU and the CP of China no Marxist party whatever can be hindered from expressing its viewpoint, just as it cannot be hindered from expressing it also on the actions of Khrushchev or Kozlov, which we think are not correct at all.

When we speak of love for the USSR we must not include here those who make mistakes, whoever they may be, Soviets, Czechs, Bulgarians or Albanians. Every Marxist and leader must have it clear that we do not love the USSR for the beautiful eyes of Ivanov. He does not love the Soviet Union, or our friendship with the Soviet Union, as long as he acts in a hostile way against a people and a party who nurture a sincere love for the Soviet people, which he has seen with his own eyes during his three year stay in our country. And why should we keep Ivanov happy to avoid ruining our friendship? The same goes for Kozlov, Khrushchev, and others.

We have our own views which we have expressed and will express. But Liri Belishova was not reconciled to this stand, for she has wavered in the Party line. She has been led to these positions by her conceit, she has become very swell-headed, she overrates her own capacities and underrates others'. For this she has been criticized several times.

In spite of the advice given her, she adopts a very arrogant attitude towards the cadres, she has offended them and continues to do so, she has attacked them so severely that even in the apparatus of the Central Committee there are

comrades who have asked to leave for this reason. Despite the criticism made of her, she demonstrated her arrogance towards the cadres even at the last meeting of the Central Committee of the ALYU. She acted in the same way also at the Teachers' Conference. To act in this way after all the criticism made of you, means that you fail to reflect on your mistakes.

These manifestations show that when you have such scorn for the cadres subordinate to you, you will have a similar concept also of those with whom you are on a par. As a matter of fact, even with regard to comrades of the Political Bureau, Liri Belishova often has not taken a correct and healthy stand. To underrate the comrades of the leadership, and display this on many occasions even in public, is impermissible. The criticism made of the cadres before the masses is one thing, we have done this and shall continue to do it, but despising and discrediting the cadres is another thing.

There are many facts of this nature about Liri Belishova. Therefore, when you have such a concept of the cadres, in complicated situations you make mistakes, as she did, even making mistakes in regard to the line. When you have such views about the cadres up to the leadership, of course you will not have sound views about the decisions this leadership adopts, either, which are a many-sided concretization of the political line of the Party.

Therefore, if you go on with such rubbish in your head, if you live with this overestimation of yourself, you are sure to make mistakes in the political line, too.

Thus, Liri Belishova has been wrong on these questions, and still has not understood her grave mistakes. The Political Bureau came to the conclusion that Liri should reflect further on her mistakes. We remained dissatisfied with her self-criticism, she promised us that she would think it over, and she must have done so. Now it depends on the self-criticism she will make before the Plenum, and on how much she has benefited from the help of the Political Bureau.

Her case now depends on the evaluation she will make of these problems before the Plenum of the Central Committee. We advise her to look straight and deeply into her mistakes from sound Marxist-Leninist bases, for there is no comrade who holds any ill-will, not only towards Liri, but towards anybody whatever who has made mistakes. We only wish her well, that is why we are trying to correct her. But with these views she cannot be in the Political Bureau, for it is a very

serious thing to be in disagreement with the line of the Central Committee. The Political Bureau has decided to propose to the Plenum that Liri Belishova be discharged from her function as a member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee for propaganda, because these high forums of the Party must not include comrades who run counter to the views and ideological and political line of the Central Committee. In the Political Bureau and Central Committee there must be complete unity of thought and action, and in the first place on the main questions, such as the current question, which is of exceptional importance to the building of socialism in our country and international communism.

1. At that time member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CC of the PLA.

2. On September 3 the Political Bureau distributed a document to all the members of the Plenum dealing with Liri Belishova's mistakes and with the stand she had adopted in the Political Bureau.

3. This was a talse justification of Liri Belishova's. Not only did she have the necessary instructions from the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA concerning the stand she should adopt in the PR of China, but also through a special radiogram of June 4, 1960, comrade Enver Hoxha drew her attention and instructioned her: "We are reading your greetings in newspapers, and they astonish us. They are extremely dry and contain mistakes.

First of all you must speak longer and exceptionally warmly of China; sternly expose the imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists... It is entirely impermissible to speak of a certain modern revisionism. The successes of our country and the correct policy of the Party in every field must be pointed out well and at length everywhere. The speeches must be politically and ideologically elevated, and not with banal phrases... Tear up the hackneyed greetings and speeches you have prepared, and formulate entirely new ones.

While the other radiogram of June 6 said: "Talks with the Chinese comrades on the ideological questions under discussion may be held only by you". (Taken from the copies of the originals of the radiograms which are in the Central Archives of the Party).

4. When she returned to Albania, Liri Belishova was asked by the Political Bureau and the basic organization of which she was a member to hand these letters in. She said that she had allegedly destroyed them. In fact she ought to have handed them over to the Soviet leaders during the meetings she had with them.

5. "Correct", "clear" (Russ.).

RADIOGRAM TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU' IN NEW YORK

September 29, 1960

Dear Mehmet,

1) We are carefully following the speeches of everybody and can describe them with Shakespeare's words «much ado about nothing». In fact the ado is great, especially when the «self-ado», if we may adopt this term, is deafening. Long live the echoes and the variety shows, because that is all that will come out of it, and we are of the same mind as you, that it turned out as we had predicted. Of course, in the end, as a conclusion, it will be said that the meeting was positive and,

as "Rrapo Lelo" 2 has already expressed it at lunch, "we did well to have come".

2) These close negotiations with the Belgrade arch-revisionist are shameful. Their continuous and open talks are certainly cooking up new actions disastrous to us...

The influence of the Soviet Union, China and of all our countries is being undermined. Here we should see, in particular, the undermining of the Chinese influence in the emerging

states of the socalled "third world". With his great manoeuvre "Rrapo Lelo" aims to deal China a blow ideologically and undermine it politically. With these actions he assists the development of capitalism, strengthens imperialism, weakens our camp and our positions in the UNO...

"Rrapo Lelo's" admirers and lick-spittles consider this terrible capitulation a great success. I think that with those who you think are worried about this situation but who haven't the courage to speak up about it, you should tactfully let them know our views on these manoeuvres. Why should we keep our correct views so much to ourselves? Maybe one of them will tell "Rrapo Lelo" our views, but so what! "Rrapo" will understand that we do not talk with him about these questions, so let him jump up and down if he likes.

3) In regard to Gomulka's speech, we have arrived at the same conclusions as you. In no way can we accept it. The status quo in favour of the imperialists can never be accepted. You stick to the stand we decided, while as to Gomulka's proposals, not only do not accept them, but tell them that we shall denounce them at the plenary meeting of the communist and workers' parties in Moscow if they are included in the resolution.

4)...

5)...

6) Last night, I was with your family. I gave Figret your radiograms to read and she found them amusing. Your mother and children are well. Don't worry about them. Your little son's sword is broken, so when you come bring him a sword, I think you will find one there, because not all the swords will have been turned into ploughshares.

My regards to Behar. His boy is well. Tell him to look after Lukanov³ well lest the breeze carries him away.

I embrace you SHPATI4

- 1. Comrade Mehmet Shehu was at that time in New York at the head of the delegation of the People's Republic of Albania to the 15th Session of the UNO General Assembly.
- 2. Implies Khrushchev. Rrapo Lelo, a kulak from the region of Mallakastra, was an enemy of the people.
 - 3. At that time Foreign Minister of the PR of Bulgaria.
- 4. One of comrade Enver Hoxha's pseudonyms during the National Liberation War.

LETTER ADDRESSED TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO' IN MOSCOW

October 1, 1960

Dear comrade Hysni,

I received the letter and the material you sent me, yesterday, at the time when we were holding the meeting of the Political Bureau to examine the draft-directives of the 4th Congress of the Party about the 3rd Five-year Plan, as well as the report on the reorganization of the school. I had just received the material when your radiogram arrived, too, in which you told us that this material must be returned to you, therefore we handed it over to be printed. I am telling you all this so that you will understand that, at the moment of writing, I have not started the reading of the material you sent me, therefore I have nothing to say about it at the moment. I shall give you an opinion by radiogram or a longer letter, which I shall send you by air.

Associating myself with your view, I, too, think that the Soviet comrades are up to a dirty manoeuvre for definite aims.

The material they have provided may be acceptable up to a point, likewise it is drafted and predisposed so that it could be corrected and made even stronger. They are not much concerned about this!! "If you like", they may say, "we can even make it much stronger, only there must not be any polemics, everything should go quietly and smoothly. As to carrying out what we put on paper, let us not worry about that, in a word we shall carry on as before, we shall violate this Declaration, too, like that of Moscow [1957], and if you accuse us again, we shall convene a second Bucharest meeting and really fix you.

If the Soviet leaders have made some concessions or are prepared to see the Declaration made even stronger, this is not because they have changed their views, not because they recognise their mistakes, but because they make these alleged concessions to us in order to stop the discussion going any further. They think that what we are wanting is declarations. But we have Marxism-Leninism. What we need and insist on is that the Soviet leaders must correct their opportunist mistakes. The Declaration must be the conclusion of these discussions. This is precisely what frightens the Soviet leaders and does not frighten us.

The Soviet leaders are afraid of the discussions not only because of the shocks that ran through other parties after Bucharest, but because these upheavals will become ever stronger after November. So, to stave this off, they hand out this declaration: "And we can make it even stronger if you like", and thus, all their admirers shout and cheer: "Eureka! This is, has been, and will remain our line. We have never made mistakes. China reflected, reconsidered its mistakes and came back on the right road! Thus, Bucharest was very "poljezno"2. In our parties we condemned China and Albania as dogmatic, etc. With one stone we killed two birds: we exposed them, and we cured them, and we opened the way to say to the parties again tomorrow that the patients were not completely cured because they have had a relapse of the disease of dogmatism. Finally, we triumphed in both scenes and carry on in our old way". This, I think, is more or less the reasoning of the Soviet leaders and their admirers. Nikita found the medicine for Zhivko3 and company.

We must not fall for the tricky manoeuvres of the Soviet revisionists. We must give the Soviet leaders and others to understand that we agree to work on this material, to remove ALBANIA TODAY

from, or add to, it, but this material will be as a conclusion of all-sided discussions in November and will show how the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of the Moscow Meeting [1957] have been carried out, who has departed from, and who has implemented, them consistently. A reassessment of Bucharest will be made on the basis of facts, and not only Soviet ones, but also on the basis of facts that the other parties, too, will bring up on this question.

The coming Moscow Meeting must not be a formal meeting, nor an unproductive polemical meeting, but a meeting of great constructive importance on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the Leninist norms. It will not be only a "pacifist", conciliatory meeting to gloss over grave mistakes, but a meeting to make a radical exposure of, and cure, the mistakes. There is no other way, and they should not expect any other way of solution from us. If these mistakes are not looked squarely in the eye, we are sure that the revisionists will go rapidly on with their destructive work. Therefore, there is only one road for us, struggle in defence of Marxism-Leninism, and not reconciliation with the opportunist and revisionist mistakes in ideology and politics, such as Khrushchev and his group are making. I think that the struggle should be commenced in the commission, where the other parties, except that of China, have sent fourthrate people, because, naturally, the Soviet leaders have reached

agreement with them, have adopted the one set of tactics, and are seeking to get easily over the ditch they themselves have dug by accusing China and us of a thousand things. But this does not go down with us.

There is no need to write any more, for your know the issues yourself. When I send you the remarks about the material, I may write at greater length.

Regards to Ramiz4 and the comrades.

I embrace you, ENVER

P. S. I am writing to you in haste because the plane is about to leave, therefore you will find it difficult to read. Yesterday we were at the Chinese comrades and in my speech I fired the first "warning shots".

2. "Useful", (Russ.).

3. Ironical abbreviation for T. Zhivkov.

RADIOGRAM TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU IN NEW YORK

October 1, 1960

Dear Mehmet,

- 1) The Moscow Meeting opens today. The delegations are very colourless, apart from the Chinese and ours, 50 people all told. We hear that the Bulgarian delegation will do what the Soviets tell them and avoid stirring up polemics. This is the general watchword issued by the "friend" you have there.
- 2) The Soviets handed out a document in the form of a 36 page declaration, which is to be discussed in regard to adding to it or removing some bits. We have just translated and typed it, since it came only yesterday, and I have just given it a first quick reading. The real working meeting will start this Tuesday, October 4th, in Moscow.
- 3) The first impression of the material: A dirty manocuvre by the revisionists, not in a polemical tone, but some devious and base insinuations, a lot of big gaps, smoothing over some angles dangerous to them, some tactical retreats to throw dust in people's eyes, some approaches to our theses, to the effect: "Look, we are making concessions to your stubbornness, and this in the face of a savage enemy, therefore take this Declaration, be content with it, worship it if you like". But it should be read again carefully, and I will make suggestions to Hysni about its essence.
- 4) What is the manoeuvre of the revisionists? In my opinion, they want to draw a veil over all their mistakes; and the veil is this Declaration. They think we are desperately concerned about declarations, as if we did not have our ideology, Marxism-Leninism. Hence, according to them, they are "fulfilling our desire" with a declaration in which room is left for

amendments, indeed, they are ready to make it much stronger. I believe, they will make a few concessions and then say: "You see, this has been our line, you made some additions, we agreed to them, and now there is nothing to divide us, hurrah! But who has deviated from Marxism-Leninism, who is revisionist or dogmatic, what occurred in Bucharest and how things went on later, and so on and so forth, all these matters have been decided, and decided correctly and unanimously; you slipped into dogmatism, we condemned you and we were right; we exposed you in our parties, this was useful to you; you reflected upon your mistakes and came here; we held a discussion and reached agreement, and even produced a declaration. Go home now, make self-criticism in your parties, and henceforth do not commit the mistake of criticizing us, because we shall bring you to a second Bucharest, and this time you will be «recidivists». This is approximately «Rrapo Lelo's» aim. This reasoning and tactic of "Rrapo's" is certainly extremely gratifying to Zhivkov and company, since, sooner or later, they will certainly have an earthquake under their feet, but with this manoeuvre they think may avert the danger. This, of course, is their course, but not ours. Our course is that which we have decided on and which is correct.

5) I warned Hysni to begin the fight right in the commission and let them understand clearly that we can discuss the Declaration, removing or adding something, but that the Declaration should be the conclusion of a Marxist-Leninist debate about the problems under discussion: who has applied Marx-

^{1.} Member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CC of the PLA, headed the delegation of the PLA at the Meeting of the 26 parties which were to draw up the Moscow Declaration.

^{4.} Ramiz Alia, Member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CC of the PLA, was a member of the delegation of the PLA at the Meeting of the 26 parties which were to draw up the Moscow Declaration.

ism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration [1957] correctly and who has betrayed it; who are the revisionists and who is not dogmatic; who organized Bucharest and for what purpose; who created this split and why. All the problems will be laid on the table and examined, not on the basis of the false facts of the Soviets, but on the basis of the arguments of the Chinese, ours, and anybody's else. We do not accept peace for peace's sake in the communist movement; we do not permit faults to be covered up. We cannot allow the Moscow Meeting to be a "meeting of revisionists" and of Right-wing pacifists: we shall

fight to make it a militant, constructive, Marxist meeting. There is no other way. In this manner any illusion of the Khrushchevites will vanish, all their manoeuvres will fail, and things will be carried through to the end. I believe that the Chinese will act as we do.

So much for now. Write to us if you have any comment or suggestion.

Affectionately, SHPATI

THE MOSCOW DECLARATION SHOULD BE MADE AS STRONG AS POSSIBLE, WITH GUNPOWDER AND NOT COTTON WOOL

Letter addressed to comrade Hysni Kapo in Moscow

October 4, 1960

Dear comrade Hysni,

I received your letter this morning and I understood your views. I agree with these views and the proposals you make, which, in general, conform with that I have written you.

Thus, I am stressing once more, as we discussed when you left Tirana, you will press for the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting to be as strong as possible, with gunpowder and not cotton wool, and to contain questions formulated correctly, according to our view, and not equivocal, unclear views, such as the Soviet delegation, the ideas of which are opportunist and revisionist, will try to put in.

There is one thing you must bear in mind, that, by means of the Declaration, not only must we express the correct Marxist-Leninist views of our Party about the problems, but, when reading this document, every communist in the world should at once understand that in the "ideological conflict" which the Khrushchev group trumpeted inside and outside the camp, this group lost and their revisionist course was condemned. In the first place, the members of those parties where the questions were put forward in a distorted way, slandering the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania, which were condemned unjustly and thrown mud at, must understand this fact, when they read the Declaration. This is very important, for the slanderers have no intention of going back to their parties and making selfcriticism. Therefore, much depends on your contribution to the discussion there, much depends on the formulation which you will propose. Pay great attention to the formulations of the main issues. In these formulations, bear in mind not to stay within the limits of the Soviet text and the form they have given to the presentation of the problem. By this I want to say don't try to adjust the question on the phrasing put up by the Soviets or to avoid damaging the general or partial "framework" of the structure of the Soviet text. Such a manner of construction will hinder you from formulating the ideas as we conceive them, because the Soviets have built that text in conformity with their views, they have extended themselves in some places in order to introduce a bit of poison or they have spread the poison in a whole "tirade" over which they have also sprinkled a coating of sugar. Therefore, don't worry about the Soviet structure, concern yourself about the key problems, cut out all the tittle-tattle and non-sense, then leave it to the Secretariat to correct the structure of the Declaration.

In my opinion, the Declaration stinks on the main questions, and is just what you think it is. I read it through carefully once and made notes alongside the text. Time did not permit me to sum up all these remarks and elaborate them. Thus, I decided to send you the text with the notes I have made. Don't think that every note on this text is a jewel. There are some unnecessary, hasty things, written in anger. Therefore have a look at them yourself, the aim is mostly to draw your attention to something which may not have struck your eye while it has struck mine, and vice versa. I am sure that you have gone over the Soviet material with a fine-tooth comb and have seen all the delicate questions, therefore my mind is at ease on that score. Anyway, although you will find it somehow difficult to read my notes, for I have scribbled them, I shall be satisfied if they are of any help to you.

If you have anything particular to consult me about, send a radiogram. As to the speech you will have to deliver, it will be best if you send us a copy, because, as you yourself say, we may be able to help you with some comments either by radiogram or by returning the text with our remarks, if we have any, and if the time of the return of the plane permits.

...The Khrushchev group has lined up on its side a large number of parties, which it caught on the hop, and is taking advantage of their trust in and love for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It will be difficult for these parties and these communists to have the courage to adopt a clear-cut stand immediately. This is true. But it becomes very dangerous to leave this matter to drag out, because revisionism will do its own dreadful work, will compromise people and parties, will carry on large-scale demagogy with propaganda and with large material funds. Within ten years the Tito clique completely disintegrated the party, and the genuine communists and patriots

were thrown into jails or killed. Therefore, the most correct stand is that at this meeting we should carry the matter through to the end, as Marxists. It must come out nakedly who is on an anti-Marxist road, who is betraying Marxism-Leninism and violating the 1957 Moscow Declaration. This is the Khrushchev group. Therefore the meeting should dot the i's. The i's must be dotted about Bucharest, and those who have made mistakes must admit them at the meeting like Marxists and go back to their parties to correct them. The Khrushchev group does not want to admit its mistakes, it is responsible for splitting the ideological unity of the international communist movement. We are on a correct Marxist-Leninist road. The Khrushchev group has deviated into revisionism, therefore our struggle and time will expose them. But there is one other thing, the threat of a split and the split itself will speed up the process of the bankruptcy of the Khrushchev group and its isolation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other parties, which will be shocked and reflect on the matter better and sooner. Otherwise, these parties pretend to be outside the conflict, indeed they consider a success that it did not come to a split, and leave it to time to prove whether the Soviet line or ours is correct. The slogan: "Let time verify the line", as some advocate... is to the liking of Khrushchev, and is an opportunist, revisionist and anti-Marxist slogan. It contains in itself the fear of taking things through to the end and radically curing the mistakes. This idea serves to preserve the Khrushchevite status quo with a bit of patching up which Khrushchev has not, does not and will not have any notice of at all. This slogan helps the revisionists to go further, to spread revisionism. In a word, if this slogan is adopted, we can be sure that there are great dangers.

Revisionism is the main danger, it must be attacked, however big the "heads" that have this purulence within them. To

clear up the abscess the scalpel must be used. All those who say, *Let us leave it to time*, understand the situation, but lack the revolutionary courage to put the finger on the sore spot and to use the effective means to clean it.

On the other hand we should realize that the Khrushchev group is terrified of the situation, terrified of a split. They see that their policy is suffering failures, that it has created a grave situation, that is far from correct, that ideologically they are quite deliberately and hopelessly on the road to disaster. Thus, in this situation, is it permissible for us to allow this revisionist group to regain its breath, to get over this great chasm which it created? It seems to me that we must not allow this. If we do not expose the Khrushchev group, we shall be making a great mistake, for they will take advantage of this to do more harm to the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and international communism. Khrushchev is an exhibitionist clown. Look what he is doing at the UNO. This is why I sent you that long radiogram the evening before last.

But, anyway, dear Hysni, carry on as you are doing, you are doing fine.

Everyday I receive "amusing" radiograms from Mehmet. Matters continue as before. No concrete results whatever. No disarmament, no reorganization of the UNO Secretariat, no meeting, not a damned thing, The only "success" has been the creation of the third force with Tito at the head and the blessing of "dyadya". Khrushchev...

Best regards to Ramiz and the comrades. The comrades here send there greetings.

I embrace you ENVER

1. "Uncle" (Russ.)

RADIOGRAM TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU IN NEW YORK

October 4, 1960

Comrade Mehmet,

- I have received all the radiograms. We are following the UNO «fiasco».
- 1) The meeting in Moscow began on Saturday. Only the opening. Suslovkat opened it. Kozlovka, Andropovka, Muhitdinovka and Pospyelovka and others were present. Cold as ice. Time was allowed to study the material and today, Tuesday, at 14 hours, the meeting will open again. Teng Hsiao-ping will speak before Hysni, who is expected to speak on Thursday or Friday.
- 2) I carefully studied the draft-Declaration and sent all my comments to Hysni, together with the tactics he must pursue in the commission. The Declaration stinks. It is revisionist, hackneyed, repetitious, stringing out the issues in order to dilute the poison so we might swallow it and in the process it has been sprinkled with icing sugar to sweeten the taste to us. It makes some *feints*, alleged retreats, but which do not satisfy us at all, therefore I put Hysni on his guard and instructed him how the questions must be formulated.
- 3) Hysni writes that he will send me the opening speech to have a look at. Hysni is completely competent and well armed as to the stands which must be maintained.
- ...At the meeting there are some who have the fear, which we do not share, of what might happen if the Khrushchev group does not come to its senses. We do not agree with them on this, but we must discuss and convince them, for we see it more correctly, more radically, and the Khrushchev group ought to fear what we think, while we have no need to fear them. We have our positions correct and strong. Theirs are revisionist and weak. Therefore we must strike the iron while it is hot, for, if the acrobat gets away with this, he will be up to a thousand and one tricks, let alone within 10-15 years in which he will do terrible things. Anyway, this in the final stage; you will come back and we shall talk here, before we go to Moscow.
- 4) Hysni wrote that Kozlovka invited him to lunch yesterday, but Hysni thanked him and did not go. Considering what

he has done to us, this suited us fine, so that he will understand with whom he is dealing.

- 5) We hear from reliable sources that the Bucharest Meeting had been pre-arranged behind the backs of our Party and the Communist Party of China. Khrushchev had informed, discussed, and received the approval of all his boys about how the issues would be raised in Bucharest, what would be discussed and what should be decided. This is blatant not a faction, but a plot. This was the whole aim of the struggle of Ivanov and Koço Tashko to get me to go on a vaction: to compromise me and drag me into the dirt. But they missed out.
- 6) The Plenum on education will open on October 7. In the Bureau we definitely decided on the questions under discussion concerning the reorganization of the school. The only thing we did not decide, because opinions were divided, was whether the school should be 11 or 12 years. We shall examine what the Plenum has to say, too. I was inclined

towards 12 years, I believe you, too, are for 12 years. But I thought of a variant which does not upset the reorganization of the school and the preparation of the new curricula. We do not have to decide right now for years ahead. We have 3-4 years to carry out the experiment with those classes in which we have decided to include work this year, and during this period, the teachers should study the new programs and thus this question will be defined more correctly. The truth is that it is not easy to turn down the variant of the 12-year school, but the 11 year variant, too, has its own advantages and disadvantages. Anyway, we shall decide for the best.

Figret and the children are well.

I embrace you and we are eagerly awaiting your return.

SHPATI

1. Diminutives used in an ironical sense.

RADIOGRAM TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU IN NEW YORK

October 6, 1960

Comrade Mehmet,

- 1) You gave Vinogradov¹ a good reply on the question of disarmament. "Rrapo Lelo" wants to cover up his failure at the United Nations Organization, to confuse the masses, and to mobilize the press to declare that there will be new "festivals" in the coming year. It is a good thing for public opinion to exert pressure on the Americans, since it means increased indignation and vigilance, but he wants to be the "big man" himself, to take the initiative himself, to go himself, to be everything himself. Therefore, you acted correctly in not refusing him in principle. But we have plenty of time to declare ourselves. He will declare himself because he disregards our opinion. And this because he is up to some mischief.
- 2) The commission met yesterday in Moscow, five people or so spoke, obedient delegates, who had adopted the watchword: "No word about the contradictions", as if nothing had happened. They mentioned neither the Soviet Union nor China. General

expressions and approval of the Soviet draft-Declaration. The Fin, the Hungarian, the West German, the Mongolian, and the Italian spoke. The Chinese will speak today.

3)...

4) There is nothing new on the internal front. The ploughing is under way; the sugar-beet is being lifted but it is very poor. A small earthquake shook the Kardhiq area, but nobody was injured, only some houses were wrecked. The situation is not alarming. The census of the population was taken properly. Spiro [Koleka]² has shut himself up and is working on the report.

Yours SHPATI

2. Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA.

LETTER TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO IN MOSCOW

October 7, 1960, 24∞ h.

Dear comrade Hysni,

Today we opened the Plenum, things are going well, the discussions about the school reform are continuing. The contributions to the discussion are good. We shall discuss this problem tomorrow, too, and then we shall examine the draft-directives of the Five-year Plan.

Today at noon I received the parcel with the material you sent me. You will understand that I have very little time, but I

have glanced rapidly through your letter, your speech, and the re-formulations and amendments of the draft-Declaration you are going to make...

1) In regard to your speech, I liked it. The problems were dealt with well and its tone was correct. If the opportunity presents itself, either to you in the plenary meeting, or to Ramiz in the commission, you should defend the Communist

^{1.} Member of the Soviet delegation to the 15th Session of the General Assembly of the UNO.

Party of China more strongly; since the main assault is against it, the main batteries are aimed at it. They hate us just as much as the Chinese, and there is no doubt that they will attack us, but the main attack will be concentrated on the Communist Party of China, since they think, and with reason, that the greatest potential danger to them is the Communist Party of China, and they think: "It we can deteat them, the Albanians will be no problems.

Therefore, for the time being, our positions are not being attacked, but we will be attacked, especially when we hit Khrushchev with some hard facts; they will accuse us, too, of being "dogmatic", because we take the side of China. We must show the Soviet representatives and their supporters that ours is a Marxist-Leninist line, that we defend the Communist Party of China only because it upholds a correct Marxist-Leninist line, that we are fighting the revisionist and Right opportunist viewpoints as well as the slanderers and falsifiers.

From these positions we attack all those who dare to attack us, either openly or in an underhand way.

Apart from those parties that we know have taken wrong positions, don't attack those that hesitate, that lack the courage to say what they think, those that say nothing about our Party or only something of no consequence. Don't push them into open conflict with us, manoeuvre. The attack should be concentrated on the main enemy, on those who have caused the opportunist deviation and who attack our correct line. Apart from the Soviets, Bulgarians, Poles and some others, if these parties make some half-hearted attack on the Communist Party of China, because they cannot do otherwise, don't put the pressure on them, leave it to the Chinese to judge the best tactic to follow.

2)...

In my opinion, the Soviet leaders want to close the matter, to cover up their rottenness, because for the time being, it is not in their interests to deepen the contradictions. They are ready to make some concessions simply to get over the river without wetting their feet; to make the amendments demanded, in one way or another, and then tell us: "There is no reason to hold a discussion or debaten. "We agreen. "Go home"!

I may be mistaken in my assessment at what the Soviets are up to. I told you at the start that I had had only a quick glance through. Your speech deprives the Soviets of this possibility, because it comes out clearly that "we have accounts to settle". Initially, our speeches may be like a "prelude" but later they must burst out like Beethoven's symphonies; we are not for "serenades and nocturnes".

3) I also read the formulations of the amendments to the draft-Declaration. They seem good. Consult and collaborates with the Chinese comrades. Why should the Soviets and others coordinate their activities, and not we?

I want you to re-examine the formulation about the "transition to socialism" once again so that the spirit of our point of view comes out better. I remind you once again of the question of the "cult", which should be formulated in another way, because in November we are going to take it up in connection with Stalin and the attitude of Khrushchev. There is a passage about "factions"; have another look at it to see whether it has been put there as a trap. One last remark; on page 27, in the 2nd paragraph of the draf-Declaration typed in Tirana, or on page 14 of your text, Lenin's idea should be brought out

more clearly "...as long as the bourgeoisie does not impede the workers' movement and its vanguard in its ideological, political, and economic struggle..." (this is a quotation from Lenin), but the idea that the Soviets have introduced subsequently should be made more precise, because there they mean Nehru and others, in order to justify the aid they give them.

4) It is difficult to say what you should slap back in their faces, and what you should not. It depends on the circumstances. You must go by the principle, defend the Party and its line fearlessly, without hesitating, "Should I say this or hold back?". As you judge it. You should expose your opponent by means of fair arguments and crush him. A single fact used at the right time and place can be enough to make your opponent fall flat on his face in the mud. Therefore don't tie yourself down and don't worry too much about making some mistake.

The question is simply that we should keep some things for the Moscow Meeting instead of throwing them in at the commission, because, if the Soviets were to learn of them they would work out their tactics for a counter-attack.

As long as they hesitate, the French should be told in various forms: "Which way are you going? We have a feeling that you understand where the mistakes lie and you should help to avoid even more serious mistakes, etc.". Make an effort in this direction.

A diplomat of a country of people's democracy told one of our comrades in Rome that the leaders of the communist and workers' parties of our camp, with the exception of the Communist Party of Albania and the Communist Party of China, knew what was to be put forward at Bucharest, because Khrushchev had consulted them previously. Hence, the Bucharest Meeting was organized beforehand behind the scenes as an international faction (we shall use this argument at the Moscow Meeting).

I have nothing else to add but to wish you success. I know that you are working hard and suffering from the "icy" atmosphere, but we can do nothing about it, the struggle for justice is no bed of roses. When you fight for the Party, for the people and communism, there is neither tiredness nor boredom.

The comrades went to the reception given by the Germans: I did not, as I wanted to write you this letter and send it tomorrow by plane. I did not go to the Germans' reception also for the reason that I wanted to make them realize that we did not take it kindly that their delegation did not return our official visit, although they had decided the date and the composition of the delegation. The reasons they gave for not coming were unconvincing, but the real ones are those we know and over which you are fighting there.

"Fiasco" in the UNO! With a capital 'F'. Mehmet leaves New-York on the 11th of October and arrives at Tirana on the 20-21st.

On the 25th of October we are convening the People's Assembly, and on this occasion Mehmet will speak on the "triumph" of disarmament and "Rrapo Lelo's" coexistence in the UNO. My best regards to Ramiz.

Yours affectionately ENVER

WHETHER ALBANIA IS A SOCIALIST COUNTRY OR NOT, THIS DOES NOT DEPEND ON KHRUSHCHEV, BUT IT HAS BEEN DECIDED BY THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE THROUGH THE WARS THEY HAVE FOUGHT AND THE BLOOD THEY HAVE SHED

From a conversation with Y. Andropov in Moscow

November 8, 1960

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I was informed today that Khrushchev had expressed the wish to meet me tomorrow at 11 a.m. I read the Soviet document in which Albania does not figure as a socialist country.

Y. ANDROPOV: What document is this, I do not understand you, tell me concretely what material you mean, where this has been said?!

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: This is the material of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed to the Communist Party of China1.

- Y. ANDROPOV: But why should you be concerned about it, this is a letter to China, what has China to do with Albania? COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: And this made my meeting with Khrushchev definitely impossible.
- Y. ANDROPOV: I do not understand you, what is said about you in that material?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Read it and you will see.

Y. ANDROPOV: I have read it and am very familiar with its content, since I myself participated in drawing it up. But your statement, comrade Enver, is a very serious one.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Yes, it is serious. Tell Khrushchev that whether Albania is a socialist country, or not, this does not depend on Khrushchev, but has been decided by the Albanian people themselves through the wars they have fought and the blood they have shed. This has been decided by the Party of Labour of Albania, which has marched and will always march on the Marxist-Leninist road.

Y. ANDROPOV: I do not understand you, comrade Enver, that material is meant for China, what has it to do with Albania?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I speak on behalf of my homeland, my people, my country.

Y. ANDROPOV: This is a very serious statement, and I can only express my regret over it.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We shall have the meeting of the parties, and there our Party will express its opinion. That's all! Goodbye!

1. — A letter of 125 pages addressed by CC of the CPSU to the CC of the CP of China on November 5th, 1960, in which besides the accusations levelled against the CP of China, the CC of the CPSU ignored the existence of the PR of Albania as a socialist country and maligned the Party of Labour of Albania.

WE SHALL ARDENTLY DEFEND MARXISM-LENINISM AND THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE

From the conversation of the delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania with the representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A. Mikoyan, F. Kozlov, M. Suslov, P. Pospyelov, Y. Andropov, in Moscow¹

November 10, 1960

A. Mikoyan is the first to speak. Expressing his "regret" over the disagreements that have arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Party of Labour of Albania, he accuses our Party of allegedly being the cause of these disagreements, of "not having the same trust as before..." in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he complains of our officers' having allegedly completely changed their attitude towards the Soviet officers at the naval base of Vlora, and asks: "Do you want to leave the Warsaw Treaty?...", etc. He claims that the Soviet leadership allegedly stands for the clearing up of these "misunderstandings" in the best way. "Tell us," he went on, "where our mistakes are, we shall not get angry. We get angry only when you talk behind our backs".

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Tell us when and where we have said anything against you behind your backs. With us Albanians, it is not the custom to talk behind someone's back.

What you said concerning the military base of Vlora is not true. There is a close friendship between the Albanian and Soviet officers and men there. This was the case until the Bucharest Meeting, and it will continue to be so as far as we are concerned. The Central Committee of the Party has instructed our men at the base to maintain a correct attitude towards the Soviet personnel. But some of your sailors have attacked ours. The Ministry of Defence of the PRA has issued instructions that these matters should be settled through the party branches. An incident took place between an officer of our navy and a Soviet rear-admiral who came from Se-

vastopol on an inspection and who was addicted to drink. Quite improperly he got hold of one of our oficers, a good comrade who had studied in the Soviet Union, and demanded that he tell him what was decided at the Plenum of the Central Committee, because, he said, "he would be giving lectures on this matter in Sevastopol, and would be asked about it." Our officer replied that the communique on the Plenum of the Central Committee had been published in the newspaper², so what more did he want? He took his hat and left and reported the matter to his commander. Your comrades had the rear-admiral on the mat, he begged our pardon and the incident was closed.

Concerning the delivery of the submarines: Our seamen were trained for two and a half years in Sevastopol, they had distinguished themselves in firing practice. Our Staff and our seamen had prepared themselves to receive the submarines in a solemn manner. There is a Soviet rear-admiral in our Staff. We do not know exactly what he is, but a rear-admiral he certainly is not. He said, "The submarines cannot be handed over to you, because you are not trained". The comrades of our Ministry of Defence questioned the validity of this statement. Were it necessary for our military men to study for some months longer they should have been informed about it. But the Soviet Staff itself had said that the Albanian crews had completed their training.

Then they told us that winter had come, that seas were stormy. Our comrades came here, to your admiralty, stated their case and received the reply that "the submarines would be handed over to them". But again came the order from your people not to give them to us. When we were in Tirana, our Ministry of Defence sent a letter to Gorshkov, explained the matter in comradely terms, just as I put it to you. The letter said that, if several more months were needed to train our seamen, you could tell us so. But the reason does not lie here.

A. MIKOYAN: And where does it lie?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It is up to you to tell us this. But this is not the main problem... Let us come now to the question of our leaving the Warsaw Treaty, since you mentioned this at the start...

A. MIKOYAN: We did not, but such was the impression created.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: How can such an impression be created — on the basis of what a certain rear-admiral says? Let us consider this question, for there are more serious things in it.

A. MIKOYAN: Really? We know nothing of them.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: How is it that you know nothing of them? If this is the case, it is not right that your Central Committee does not know about them. Do you know that we have been threatened with expulsion from the Warsaw Treaty? Grechko has made such a threat.

A. MIKOYAN: We know nothing about it. Tell us.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We shall tell you all right, for it is a matter of principle. Two of your marshals, Malinovsky and Grechko, have said such a thing. You must know this.

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO: On October 22nd, I informed Polyansky of this.

A. MIKOYAN: You may not believe me, but I do not know. COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Since you put the matter in this way, that you know nothing about it, we must remind you that four months ago we wrote you a letter concerning your ambas-

sador. Why did you not follow the Leninist practice of your Party, and reply to us?

F. KOZLOV: We shall send you another ambassador.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You say so now, but why have you not written to us? We wrote to you four months ago but have received no answer.

A. MIKOYAN: We did well not to answer you. And this is why: for 15 years now our ambassadors have been going to the party committees to ask for information. This has been so in Albania, too. Is it interference on the part of our ambassador to ask the Chairman of the Auditing Commission³ about what went on at the Plenum?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Yes, it is interference and entirely impermissible. I can say that in our country nothing has been hidden from the Soviet personnel. For 16 years we have followed the practice of informing you about all important documents and decisions of the Central Committee of our Party and Government. Why have we done this? Because we have been sincere and frank with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. You have no right to accuse our Party of bad behaviour towards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have been very closely linked with the Soviet comrades, ranging from the ambassador to the ordinary specialist. All doors have been open to them.

A. MIKOYAN, M. SUSLOV: Precisely, that is so.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We think that perhaps no other Party has behaved in this way towards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Why have we done this? Because we have considered the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the Party which, under Lenin's leadership, carried out the Great Socialist Revolution and was the first to open the way to socialism and communism.

We have had disagreements prior to the Bucharest Meeting, and we shall tell you them. For example, on the question of Yugoslav revisionism. But we have gone about it in such a way that nothing has leaked out. Why have our relations deteriorated after Bucharest? What did we say at Bucharest? We expressed our attitude, stressing that the disagreements which were presented by Khrushchev at the Bucharest Meeting were over matters concerning the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and that the Party of Labour of Albania reserved the right to voice its opinion about them at the Moscow Meeting. Why then was our Party attacked?

We do not agree with the Bucharest Meeting, but we did nothing to make you change your attitude towards us one hundred per cent. First of all, your ambassador behaved in a despicable manner towards us. We liked him. After the Bucharest Meeting, and especially after his return from Moscow, he began to attack us and behave contemptuously towards us.

A. MIKOYAN: I have never thought he would go as far as that.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: That means you do not believe us. Do not forget that I am the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour. I have been and am a friend of the Soviet Union. You can fail to believe me, but you believe your "chinovniks". What interest has the Party of Labour of Albania in creating disagreements and saying false things about the ambassador of the Soviet Union?!

A. MIKOYAN: I believe that you are not interested in this. The ambassador has spoken no ill of you. Personally, he is a good man.

M. SUSLOV: But not very bright, especially politically.

A. MIKOYAN: Tell us, what should we do to improve our relations? We shall replace the ambassador.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Things are not as simple as that. We do not maintain only diplomatic relations but also interparty links, and these must be on a Marxist-Leninist basis. For example, ambassador Ivanov had contact with me. Why should he meet the Chairman of the Auditing Commission?

I am the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. Have I asked you why you expelled Zhukov? Up to now I know nothing. The Soviet ambassador has always come to ask me about the Plenums of our Party, and I have informed him about them. He came and asked me about the proceedings of this Plenum4. I told him what was to be told. Since the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party told him that much, he should have gone home to bed. Otherwise, if your ambassador is going to get hold of one and the other, he and his friends are not diplomats and representatives of a socialist country, but intelligence agents. The staff of the embassy, through Bespalov, got hold of the Chairman of the Auditing Commission and "worked" on him in two sessions, then, for the third session, he was invited to dinner in the name of the ambassador, at the residence of the first secretary of the embassy. There were three of them, the ambassador, the counsellor and the secretary. And there our comrade, who 15 days before had agreed with the decision of the Plenum, with the line of our Central Committee, was opposed to the line of the Party. Now I ask you: can an ambassador be allowed to act in this manner and on his own responsibility?

We think that all these actions were aimed at creating disruption in our Party. Your ambassador went even further. At the airport, alluding to the Bucharest events, he asked our generals, "With whom will the army side?"

A. MIKOYAN, F. KOZLOV: He is a fool.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I respect you, but we cannot swallow such "excuses", although we lack your experience.

The question of the invitation Khrushchev sent me is very important. First I decided to accept it. But when I read your material, the letter addressed to the Chinese comrades on November 5th,I saw that Albania was not included in the socialist camp. All the countries of people's democracy of Europe are mentioned there with the exception of Albania.

M. SUSLOV: Neither is the Soviet Union mentioned there. COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: What are you trying to tell us!? Were I in your place I would admit that it is wrong. Ivanov has acted in this way, Grechko likewise, such things are written in the document, Khrushchev has told Teng Hsiao-ping disgraceful things about Albania, but you admit nothing, whereas we have always been sincere with you. Kosygin did not behave well towards me in a conversation we had, either. He behaved as if he were an overlord. He said: «In your Party there are enemies that want to split us.»

This year, because of very unfavourable natural conditions, we were badly in need of bread grain. We had bread for only 15 days. We asked you for 50 thousand tons of wheat. We waited for 45 days but received no reply. Then we bought

it in France with convertible currency. The French merchant came immediately to Albania to size up the situation. He asked, "How is such a thing possible? Albania has never bought grain from the Western countries, the Soviet Union is selling grain everywhere." In order to dispel his doubts we told him, "The Soviet Union has given us grain, has given us maize, but we use it to feed pigs." We know where you sell your grain, where the Rumanians, the Germans sell theirs: in England and elsewhere. You put conditions on us, and we were obliged to offer you gold to buy the grain we needed.

A. MIKOYAN: We have not refused to supply you with grain. I know that grain has been shipped to you every month. You proposed to our people to pay in gold, and they accepted. Why should we want your currency?!

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Comrade Pospyelov, when you were in Albania you have seen what love our people nurture for the Soviet Union. But now you seek this love from Koço Tashko and Liri Belishova, and not from us.

The tactic you are following is completely wrong. You should have talked with me before you wrote those things in the letter I mentioned. But when you accuse our Party and its leadership of being anti-Soviet, of being criminals, and as you say, of resorting to "Stalinist methods", and after you have made all these public accusations, you want to talk with me, this I can never accept.

A. MIKOYAN: We invited you to talk earlier but you refused.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Things are not as you say. I had taken some days off. It was only partly a vacation, because I was working on the report for the Party Congress⁵. Comrade Hysni told me that Ivanov had informed him that, if he wished, Comrade Enver could go to rest in the Soviet Union. But he did not tell me anything about the meeting with Khrushchev.

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO: In regard to your letter in which you invited us to hold talks, it was quite clear what we were going to talk about.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: The letter said that we should meet to discuss the question of China.

A. MIKOYAN: Not the question of China. The word «China» is not even mentioned there⁶. You refused to meet us.

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU: How can such a thing be denied! How can you behave in such a way towards our country! Shame on you, comrade Kozlov that you allow yourself to present small Albania with an ultimatum: "Either with us or with China"!

F. KOZLOV: When your delegation passed through here, I said only that I was surprised at Comrade Kapo's position. Your stand was different from that of other parties. We have treated you so very well. When Comrade Enver spoke in Leningrad, he said that the Albanian people feel that they are not one million but 201 million.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I still say it, too, but not if you do not think of China. Both you and we should be for the unity of our camp, for a billion strong camp. We love the Soviet Union but we have a great love for the Chinese people and the Communist Party of China, too. Why is it, comrade Kozlov, that since Bucharest you speak of "zigzags" by our Party and ask with whom we will side, "with the 200 or the 600

millions»? At a meeting at which the ambassadors of other countries were present, you said that a single bomb would be enough to turn Albania into dust and ashes...

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO: You said that we allegedly talk behind your backs. But on October 22nd, Khrushchev told comrade Teng Hsiao-ping, that from then on he would maintain the same stand towards Albania as towards Yugo-slavia.

Y. ANDROPOV: That is how things stood: in a conversation we had with the Chinese comrades, comrade Khrushchev said that some Albanian leaders are dissatisfied because the question of Berlin is not yet settled.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: And I am the one who has said it. After Khrushchev returned from Paris, Ivanov asked me about the Berlin question. I answered: In my personal opinion, imperialism is badly shaken, our positions are strong, in America there is a favourable political situation which could be utilized for the settlement of the Berlin question. This was my personal opinion.

A. MIKOYAN: There is nothing wrong with that, but not as some one who offended us put it, saying to our officers:
... Berlin scared you, you did not keep your word, etc...

Y. ANDROPOV: It is in connection with these words that Khrushchev said that we have had good relations with the Albanians, but now, as things stand, we cannot trust them. We lost Albania....

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Even in these terms, this is not in the least comradely. What has the Bolshevik Party taught us? All these things have a source. Marxism-Leninism does not recognize that events can develop spontaneously. Hence you should go thoroughly into these matters. What are the reasons things came to this state after the Bucharest Meeting? We think that it is up to you to tell us.

A. MIKOYAN: We may be wicked, but we are not fools. Why should we want our relations with you to become worse?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We have asked this question, too. Apart from the fact that we have not been wrong, but even if we had, why did the Communist Party of Soviet Union, which has seen many things, not show a little patience with us Albanians, and its leadership not say: well, the Albanians have made a mistake, but let us see what they have to say tomorrow, after they have thought things over.

You should know, comrades, that we are grieved when we see all these things which are occurring in the attitude of the leaders and other Soviet officials towards Albania and our Party of Labour. We say to you that the unhealthy spirit, which exists among your people in Albania should be completely changed. Since the Bucharest Meeting, seeing what Ivanov and Co. are doing, I have not met and will not meet your people in Tirana.

A. MIKOYAN: Your cadres have changed their attitude towards us. The Central Committee of our Party is not mentioned, Khrushchev is mentioned only as a blunderer.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I must tell you in a comradely way that Khrushchev often accused us of being "hot-headed". But Khrushchev himself should keep his tongue in check, because every state, every person has his dignity. He has said that you will treat Albania the same as Yugoslavia. You should not write such things in a document.

P. POSPYELOV: With his sharp replies at the Bucharest Meeting, comrade Kapo was not in order, either.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Even now we do not agree with the Bucharest Meeting, as you organized it.

A. MIKOYAN: The Bucharest Meeting is another issue. Now the question is whether our relations should be improved or not. Comrade Khrushchev said today, in his speech, that we shall maintain friendship even with those parties with which we have differences. We must meet and talk things over.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We are not against meetings. But we ask the comrades of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to be more careful, because to distribute among 80 and more parties a document, in which Albania is excluded from the socialist countries, and then invite us to "come and talk", is completely unacceptable.

M. SUSLOV, A. MIKOYAN: Let's meet and talk about how we can improve our relations.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We, too, seek to improve our relations.

M. SUSLOV: But not in that tone.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I want to give you a piece of advice: put out of your mind that we are hot-headed. When Marxism-Leninism and the interests of our people are at stake, we shall defend them ardently.

^{1.} This meeting with the delegation of the PLA, which was in Moscow, was demanded by the Soviet leaders with a view to "persuading" our delegation not to raise at the Meeting of the 81 parties the questions about which the PLA did not agree with them, and particularly their anti-Marxist and hostile actions towards our country after the Bucharest Meeting.

^{2.} The communique of the 18th Plenum of the CC of the PLA, published in the newspaper "Zëri i Popullit" of September 9th 1960.

^{3.} Koço Tashko.

^{4.} The 17th Plenum of the CC of the PLA, which was held from 11-12 of July 1960 and approved the activity of the delegation of the PLA to the Bucharest Meeting.

^{5.} The 4th Congress of the Party, which it had been decided to hold in November 1960. Later, due to the Meeting of the 81 communist and workers' parties in Moscow, it was postponed until February 1961.

^{6.} A downright lie on the part of A. Mikoyan. The letter of August 13th that the CC of the CPSU sent to the CC of the PLA said expressly: "The Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties held in Bucharest showed that between the Communist Party of China and the other sister parties there is a different understanding of a series of important problems of the international situation and the tactics of the communist parties...".

WE HAVE FOUGHT EMPTY-BELLIED AND BARE-FOOTED, BUT HAVE NEVER KOTOWED TO ANYBODY

Conversation of the delegation of the PLA headed by comrade Enver Hoxha, at a meeting with N. S. Khrushchev in the Kremlin, Moscow¹

November 12, 1960

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: You have the floor, we are listening. COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You have invited us. The host should speak first.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: We accept the Albanians' terms. I do not understand what has happened since my visit to Albania in 1959! Had you been dissatisfied with us even then, I must have been a blockhead and very naive not to have realized this. At that time we had nothing but nice words to say apart from some jokes such as that I made with comrade Mehmet Shehu about the poplars?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: If this is intended to open up conversation, it is another matter. The joke about the poplars is out of place here.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: What other reason could be there, then, why you have changed your attitude towards us?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It is not us who have changed our attitude, but you. We have had disagreements on previous occasions, as for example, over the stand to be taken towards the Yugoslav revisionists. But this change of attitude occurred after the Bucharest Meeting, and precisely on your part.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: I want to get one thing clear. I thought that we had no disagreements over Yugoslavia. You have spoken more than we have about this problem. We, too, have written about it, but dispassionately. We have stressed that the more said against them, the more their value would be increased. And that is what happened.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: In our opinion, that is not so.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: I speak for us. But I want to ask you: in what tone shall we speak? If you do not want our friendship, then tell us so.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We want to be friends always, we want to talk in a friendly way. But this does not mean that we should see eye to eye with you over all matters.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: Three times we have invited you to talks. Do you want to break off relations with us?!

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It is you who caused the deterioration of our relations after the Bucharest Meeting. We have pointed out many facts to your comrades, they should have told you.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: I do not quite understand this. I had no conflict with comrade Hysni Kapo at the Bucharest Meeting. He said that he was not authorized by the CC of the PLA to take a definite stand towards the questions under discussion.

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO: At Bucharest I expressed our Party's opinion that the Bucharest Meeting was premature and held in contravention of the Leninist organizational norms; that the disagreements discussed there were disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and that the Party of Labour of

Albania would express its opinion at a future meeting. Thereupon you said that you were amazed at the stand taken by the Party of Labour of Albania. You said this both at the meeting of the 12 parties of the socialist countries and at the broader meeting of 50 and more parties. In reality, we had told you our stand before we spoke at the meeting of the 12 parties. I had spoken with Andropov about this. After he informed you of our talk, you told him to tell the Albanians that they must think things over and change their stand.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: The Central Committee of our Party has never accepted the Bucharest Meeting. From the very beginning, I was in the current of all that was going on at Bucharest.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: This is of no great importance. The point is that even before the Bucharest Meeting you were not in agreement with us but you said nothing about this to us. And we considered you as friends. I am to blame for having trusted you so much.

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU: I ask comrade Khrushchev to recall our talks of 1957. We spoke to you with open hearts about all the problems, including that of the activity of the Yugoslav revisionists. You listened to us, then after a telling reply to you by comrade Enver, you rose to your feet and said, "Do you want to put us back on Stalin's road?" That means that you knew long ago that we thought about the Yugoslav revisionists differently from you. You knew this at least as early as April 1957. But you should also remember that in 1955, when you were about to go to Yugoslavia, we replied to your letter in which you suggested changing the attitude that should be maintained towards the Yugoslav revisionists, that the problem should first be analysed by the Information Bureau which should take the decision.

- A. MIKOYAN: Yes, that is what happened.
- N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: You say that new people with little experience have come to power in the Soviet Union. Do you want to teach us?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: No, there is no need. This is an internal question of yours. But do you know what your ambassador has said? Other things apart, I shall tell you only one fact that has to do with the army. He has asked to whom the Albanian Army will be loyal. This question he addressed to our generals at the airport, in the presence of one of your generals. Our officers replied that our army would be loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the Party of Labour and socialism.

 $\it N.~S.~KHRUSHCHEV:$ If our ambassador has said such a thing he has been foolish.

 ${\it COMRADE}$ ${\it ENVER}$ ${\it HOXHA:}$ Yes, but this is political foolishness.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: This is every sort of foolishness.

A. MIKOYAN: Do you think that such behaviour by our ambassador expresses our line?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: A fool's foolishness, even of a political character, may be excused once, but, when it is repeated many times over, then this is a line.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: Yes, that is true.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Your ambassador has been a friend of our Party, and ours personally. He was no fool. He committed this "foolishness" following the Bucharest Meeting. Why did he not display such "foolishness" prior to the Bucharest Meeting, during the three consecutive years he stayed in Albania? That is astonishing.

A. MIKOYAN: It is not astonishing, but previously he used to receive information from you regularly and had not noticed such behaviour on your part.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It seems to me that you said that he did not know that there were disagreements between us...

A. MIKOYAN: Comrade Enver told us that previously he used to tell Ivanov everything, but later he did not. Hence the change in the behaviour of the ambassador. We have discussed these things.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: If we have discussed these things, as Mikoyan says, then why are we sitting here? If, after discussing matters, we say that we do not agree with you, you can then say to us, "We have discussed these things".

A. MIKOYAN: But we recalled our ambassador. Why do you harp on this question?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: All right, we will leave the ambassador aside, but what you have written about Albania and the Party of Labour in your letter to the Chinese comrades is monstruous.

A. MIKOYAN: We have expressed our opinion.

COMRADE RAMIZ ALIA: You publicly accuse us of anti-Sovietism.

(He reads page 46 of the letter.).

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: This is our opinion. You must not get angry.

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU: You attack us, and we should not get angry.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: We are sorry about what happened with these people³. You do not agree. I have not known Koço Tashko, I may perhaps have seen him, but, even if you were to show me his photo, I would not remember him.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: If you want his photo, we may send it to you.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: I know Belishova less than you do. I know that she was a member of the Bureau. She told us about the talk she had in China. Kosygin told comrade Mehmet this when Mehmet was in Moscow, and when he heard it he went white with rage. She is a courageous woman, she told us openly what she felt. This is a tragedy; you expelled her, because she stood for friendship with us! That is why we wrote about this in the document.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: That is to say, you consider what has been written here, in your material, to be correct?

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: Yes, we do.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: There are two points here. First, you say that we expelled a member of the Bureau in

an undemocratic way. Who told you that this was done not according to democratic rules and Leninist norms, but according to "Stalinist methods", as you call them?! Second, you say that we expelled her for pro-Sovietism, and that implies that we are anti-Soviet. Can you explain this to us?

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: If you have come here intending to disagree with us and break off relations, say so openly and we won't waste time.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You did not answer our question. And you have distributed this material to all the parties.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: To those parties to which the Chinese have distributed their material.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: And we have our point of view which does not coincide with yours. Two or three times you have raised the question of whether we are for friendship or for breaking off relations. We came here to strengthen our friendship. But you admit none of your mistakes. You have made criticism of us, and so have we of you. You have criticized on the quiet and publicly, before all. You may have other criticisms. Tell us, and we shall tell you ours, so that our central committees may know them. The Central Committee of our Party has sent us here to strengthen our friendship.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: One of your comrades told our armymen that Khrushchev was not a Marxist.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: In connection with the question of the militarymen we have talked with your comrades. How could it be in our interest to have our militarymen quarrel at the Vlora base?! While you produce "documents" to the effect that one of our comrades has allegedly said this and that. Have a good look at your military men. I told Mikoyan that your rear-admiral at the Vlora naval base is not a rear-admiral.

 $N. S. \ KHRUSHCHEV:$ We can dismantle the base if you like.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Then what Malinovsky and Grechko have said turns out to be true. Are you trying to threaten us? If the Soviet people hear that you want to dismantle the Vlora base, at a time when it is serving the defence of Albania and the other socialist countries of Europe, they will not forgive you for this...

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: Comrade Enver, don't raise the voice! COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: If you dismantle the base you will be making a big mistake. We have fought empty-bellied and bare-footed, but have never kotowed to anybody.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: The submarines are ours.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Yours and ours, we are fighting for socialism. The territory of the base is ours. About the submarines we have signed agreements which recognize the rights of the Albanian State. I defend the interests of my country.

A. MIKOYAN: Your tone is such as if Khrushchev has given you nothing. We have talked among ourselves about the base. Khrushchev was not for dismantling it. I said to him, if our officers go on quarrelling with the Albanians, why should we keep the base?

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU: You have treated us as enemies. Even here in Moscow you have carried out intelligence activities against us. You know this very well4.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: As the question was put here, we might just as well discuss it at the Warsaw Treaty. I want to say that while such a thing has occurred to you, it has never crossed our minds. And then, to say, "We shall dismantle it if you like"! Relations between the Albanians and the Soviet personnel at the Vlora base have always been good. Only since the Bucharest Meeting have some incidents taken place, and they were caused by your officers who were not in order. If you insist, we can call together the Warsaw Treaty. But the Vlora base is ours and will remain ours.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: You flare up in anger. You spat on me; no one can talk to you.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You always say that we are hot-headed.

 $\it N.~S.~KHRUSHCHEV:$ You distort my words. Does your interpreter know Russian?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Don't carp at the interpreter, he knows Russian very well. I respect you and you should respect me.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: That is just how MacMillan wanted to talk to me.

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU AND HYSNI KAPO: Comrade Enver is not MacMillan, so take that back!

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: But where shall I put it?

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU: Put it in your pocket.

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO (addressing the comrades of our delegation): I do not agree that the talks should be conducted like this.

Comrade Enver Hoxha and the other comrades rise and leave the room.

3. Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko.

FROM THE REPORT AT THE 21st PLENUM OF THE CC OF THE PLA «ON THE MEETING OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES WHICH WAS HELD IN MOSCOW IN NOVEMBER 1960»*

December 19, 1960

In the first chapter comrade Enver Hoxha makes a scientific analysis of the fundamental disagreements that existed at that time in the ranks of the international communist and workers' movement concerning the definition of the character of our epoch, the questions of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, the questions of the roads of transition to socialism, the questions of revisionism and dogmatism and the question of the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

* * *

These questions of such great importance, comrade Enver Hoxha says, became the subject of a major struggle over principle, first in Bucharest, where, as is known, the Soviet leaders and those of some other parties wanted to make an accomplished fact of the "condemnation" of Marxism, the condemnation of the correct views which were defended by the Communist Party of China, by labelling it "dogmatic" and "sectarian". Our Party did not associate itself with this anti-Marxist conspiracy, because, in principle, it did not agree either with the methods adopted by the organizers of the Bucharest Meeting, or with the content of the issues they put forward. An even greater struggle was waged on the above-mentioned matters of principle at the meeting of the commission in Moscow during October, and, finally, a determined struggle was waged at the Meeting of

the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, in November, in Moscow, over the correct Marxist meaning of these questions, for the defence of Leninism in the explanation, comprehension, and interpretation of them.

In the course of this struggle, through this long process, the positions of various parties towards these questions were also defined. Thus, from the time of the November Meeting it was clear that the disagreements on these problems were not just beween the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and even less, between the Communist Party of China and the whole of international communism, as the Soviet leaders claimed in Bucharest, but these disagreements included many parties, and became disagreements between Marxists and opportunists, between parties which defended the purity of Marxism-Leninism and parties which were distorting a number of its theses and interpreting them in a one-sided manner. If it was only the Communist Party of China and our Party of Labour which rose openly in defence of the Marxist principles at Bucharest, against the trend which was distorting the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration [1957], in the October commission seven out of the twenty-six parties represented took correct positions...

At the Moscow Meeting this ratio of forces underwent a change. Besides the former seven parties, another 4-5 parties adopted the correct stand regarding all the questions under

^{1.} On November 12, 1960 the delegation of the PLA agreed to meet the representatives of the CPSU once more. Also present from the Soviet side at this meeting were A. Mikoyan, F. Kozlov, Y. Andropov.

^{2.} The sole criticism N. Khrushchev found it possible to make during his stay in Albania in May 1959 was that the poplars along our roads should be replaced with figures and plums!...

^{4.} The reference is to the listening devices installed secretly by the Soviet revisionists both at the residence of the delegation of the PLA in Zarechye of Moscow and in the offices of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Albania in Moscow.

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discussion... But there were a considerable number of parties, which on particular questions such as the problem of the road of transition to socialism, the aggressive nature of imperialism, the necessity of the struggle against revisionism and especially against Yugoslav revisionism, and other questions, supported our theses. Such positions were adopted by almost all the parties of Latin America...

The change in the ratio of forces speaks of the determined struggle waged at the Meeting by the Chinese delegation, the delegation of our Party, and others, which, through convincing arguments, refuted the distorted views and made clear to all their principled position on the issues under discussion. The fact that a considerable number of parties, completely or partially, adopted the correct positions indicates that Marxist-Leninist right is on our side, that it is being rapidly adopted by others, that right will triumph over wrong, that Marxism-Leninism will always triumph over opportunism and revisionism. Absolutely convinced of this, our Party will continue to fight with determination, as it has done up till now, for the purity of our Marxist-Leninist ideology, for the triumph of socialism and communism.

II. – THE STAND OF THE PARTY OF LABOUR OF ALBANIA TOWARDS THE DISAGREEMENTS WHICH AROSE IN THE RANKS OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Our Party of Labour has always pursued a correct Marxist-Leninist line and has upheld the principles of the Moscow Declaration [1957]. On all the fundamental matters which we mentioned above, that is, in connection with the definition of the epoch, the question of the struggle against imperialism, the problem of war and peace, etc., our Party has defended and implemented the correct Marxist-Leninist view. Our Party has never accepted or said that Leninism has become "out-dated" On the contrary it has fought incessantly and with determination against the Yugoslav revisionists, who, in order to cover up their betrayal, declare Marxism "out-dated". Our Party has never had any illusions about the character of US imperialism and its leaders, but has constantly educated the masses of the people to hate it and be vigilant against it; we have never thought that peace will be donated to us, that without first liquidating imperialism it is possible to create a world without weapons, without armies, and without wars. On the contrary, having a correct view of the problem of war and peace, the danger threatening mankind from imperialism and reaction, our Party has mobilized the people under the slogan, "The pick in one hand and the rifle in the other". Our Party has fought consistently to unmask imperialism and its lackeys, the Yugoslav revisionists, and has never approved the "soft" policy, the "big" policy of the Soviet leaders or even that of the Bulgarian leaders, either towards US imperialism or towards Yugoslav revisionism. Our Party has never thought that for the sake of coexistence the class struggle in the capitalist countries should be extinguished or the political and ideological struggle against imperialism and the bourgeoisie liquidated. On the contrary, our Party has always opposed any such opportunist concept of peaceful coexistence.

Thus, the position of our Party on these matters of principle has been in complete accord with the teachings of

Marxism-Leninism, and it has long been in opposition to the position of the Soviet leaders. However, our Party has been in opposition of principle to the views and actions of the present Soviet leaders also on a series of other questions of principle, about which our Central Committee has been informed.

For instance, we have not been in agreement with the Soviet leaders in connection with their stand towards Yugoslav revisionism. This dates back to May 1955, at the time when Khrushchev and Bulganin went to Belgrade and, in a unilateral manner, overriding the Information Bureau, decided to rehabilitate the Tito clique, a thing which, as is known, brought about many evils in the international communist and workers' movement later. At that time, our Party expressed its opposition to this rehabilitation, and since then it has never approved the tactics and the stand of the Soviet leadership towards Tito and his clique, a clique which was coddled, considered as socialist, and with which they should consult about everything, etc.

Our Party did not agree with the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, especially with the criticism against Stalin and the explanation of the peaceful road of transition to socialism. On the first issue we were not and are not in agreement, first, because the criticism against the "cult of Stalin" was made without prior consultation with the other fraternal parties, although Stalin was not only the leader of the Soviet Union but also of the international proletariat, and second, because only the mistakes of Stalin were mentioned without saying a single word about the positive aspects of his activity. On the second issue, in fact the 20th Congress gave the opportunists ideological weapons to propagate only the peaceful road of taking power.

At the 20th Congress, Khrushchev presented the issue of the transition to socialism in a distorted way. He put special stress on taking power in a peaceful way and through the parliamentary road, a thing which is contrary to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the experience of history so far.

Apart from these questions, our Party did not agree with the Soviet leaders also in regard to the events in Hungary, with their assessment of them, with the hesitation they showed over the liquidation of the counter-revolution there, and over the complete exposure of the Yugoslav revisionists on this issue. The Central Committee has been informed about this matter, therefore it is not necessary to dwell on it at length.

Finally, our Party was not in agreement with the Soviet leaders and has been opposed to them also over many other issues which have to do with the correct Leninist concept of relations among fraternal parties, which are equal and independent from one another. In connection with this, the Central Committee is also informed on the improper interference of the Soviet leaders in the internal affairs of our Party, such as in the case of the enemies of our Party, Liri Gega, Tuk Jakova, Panajot Plaku, and others.

Hence, it is evident that on the fundamental questions of the foreign policy, of the tactics and strategy of the communist movement, our Party has always maintained a correct Marxist-Leninist line, a line which has run counter to that pursued by the Soviet leadership. But, while consistently pursuing the abovementioned line, while resolutely defending the correct Marxist-Leninist principles, without making concessions on them, despite the many pressures exerted on it by the Soviet leaders, the Central Committee of our Party did not express its opposition publicly. Why did the Central Committee do this?

First, because after the 20th Congress, all the attacks of the imperialist and revisionist enemies were concentrated on splitting the unity of our communist movement. Therefore, for the sake of this unity, we had to contain ourselves and consistently apply the Marxist-Leninist line, while avoiding open criticism addressed to the Soviet leadership.

Second, because, as is known, as a result of the criticism of Stalin, when reaction and the revisionists began to cast doubts on the entire Soviet system, and in particular, as a result of the events in Poland and in Hungary, the efforts of the whole world reaction to lower the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the prestige of the Soviet Union itself were very great. In these circumstances, it was an internationalist duty to defend the Soviet Union and its Communist Party, to give reaction not a single weapon and to defend the Soviet leadership and, by means of comradely criticism, to put it on the right road. This was what our Party did. We publicly defended the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Sovie Union itself, but from 1957 on, as the opportunity presented itself, we have also pointed out to the Soviet leaders a number of matters on which we had criticism, especially in connection with their stand towards Yugoslav revisionism, towards the events in Hungary, towards the interference in the internal affairs of our Party.

This stand of our Party is correct, internationalist, Marxist-Leninist. At that time to act differently meant to play into the hands of the enemy, to damage the general cause of socialism and the international working class.

But the Soviet leaders plunged more deeply into their errors. Matters went so far that they were not only coddling Tito and his clique, but they were also showering flattery on Eisenhower, thus demonstrating that they were distorting the Marxist-Leninist concept on imperialism and the class struggle. The Chinese comrades, absolutely correctly, considered reasonable to dot the i's on the fundamental questions of the international situation and the strategy and tactics of the communist movement, by means of some articles, which explained these things on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist teachings. But the Soviet leaders did not pause to reflect. On the contrary, they organized the anti-Marxist behind-the-scenes plot of Bucharest in order to settle accounts with the Communist Party of China and with any other party which had become an obstacle to their erroneous course.

We shall not dwell on the proceeding of the Bucharest Meeting, because the Plenum of the Central Committee is already informed on this, but I shall briefly mention our stand at this meeting.

As we said before, our Party did not agree with the organizers of the Bucharest Meeting, the Soviet leaders, not only on the anti-Marxist methods which were used there, but in essence it did not agree, also, with the accusation brought against the Communist Party of China. Therefore, it maintained the correct and principled stand which is known.

How did it come to pass that our Party maintained that stand? Was it accidental? The stand of our Party in Bucharest was not accidental. It was in keeping with the consistent line always pursued by our Party, with the principled positions always defended by our Party on the fundamental questions

under discussion. In Bucharest we defended Marxism-Leninism, we defended the line of the Party and, while waging this principled and courageous struggle, on the one hand, we found ourselves on the same side as the Chinese comrades who defended their glorious Party, which, like our Party, was fighting in defence of the purity of Marxism-Leninism, and, on the other hand, we ran counter to the Soviet leaders and all the representatives of the other parties who organized the Bucharest Meeting, who defended a wrong cause in opposition to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Here lies the principled importance of our stand in Bucharest, a stand which was the logical and consistent outcome of the entire Marxist-Leninist line pursued by our Party, a stand which has enhanced the authority and prestige of our Party in the eyes of the international communist movement.

Our Party condemned the Bucharest Meeting and described it correctly as a blot on the communist movement. The correctness of our stand in Bucharest and our assessment of the anti-Marxist behind-the-scenes plot hatched up there, was demonstrated at the Moscow Meeting and by the documents approved there. Not a single representative of any of the parties there had the courage to defend the Bucharest Meeting, to answer our criticisms and those of the Chinese comrades of the factional work which went on there. Not only this, but none dared to propose that a single good word should be put in about the Bucharest Meeting in the Declaration published which comprised 52 pages. Not the slightest trace remained of the Bucharest Meeting.

On the other hand, however, the Bucharest Meeting marks the beginning of the overt aggravation of relations between our Party and the Soviet leaders, a thing which soon began to express itself in the political and economic relations between our two countries and states. The blame for the situation rests completely on the Soviet side which was not pleased with the principled stand of our Party in Bucharest. It began to express this displeasure in many wrong actions which began to cause serious harm to the friendship and fraternal ties between our two parties and countries. This is how the anti-Marxist interference in the internal affairs of our Party by some Soviet persons began. It had the aim of splitting our Party, of arousing discontentment with its leadership, of casting doubt on the correctness of the line of our Party, of attacking the leadership of our Party, with the final aim of liquidating it. The staff of the Soviet embassy to Tirana, headed by the ambassador, worked in this direction; Kozlov in Moscow worked in this direction on our comrades who passed through there; this was the aim of the words of Marshal Malinovsky at the dinner for the chiefs of staffs of the Warsaw Treaty; this was the objective of the economic pressures which began in regard to bread and the reduction of economic aid; the threats by Marshal Grechko to throw our country out of the Warsaw Treaty, and the provocations at the military base of Vlora, etc., are linked with this.

The objective of these wrong and anti-Marxist actions is clear: the Soviet leadership aimed either to make us change our stand, that is to abandon the correct Marxist-Leninist course, the principled stand maintained by our Party, or, as a result of the difficulties which would be created, in the opinion of the Soviet leaders, some division must take place in the Party, dissatisfaction must be increased in its ranks and among the

people, and, as a way-out, the leadership of the Party must be liquidated to bring to the head of it the "saviours", who would be loyal to the anti-Marxist line of the Soviet leadership.

But, as is known, in reckoning their accounts they had forgotten the host, and all these intentions were foiled. They did not succeed thanks to the loyalty of our Party to Marxism-Leninism, thanks to its staunch and principled stand, thanks to its steel-like Marxist-Leninist unity with the masses of the people, the unity of the Party with its Central Committee, the unity of the Central Committee with the Political Bureau. This unbreakable unity has been and is the guarantee of all the victories of our people and Party, therefore our primary duty is to make this unity ever stronger and defend it like the apple of our eye.

The source of the wrong actions of the Soviet leadership towards our Party should be sought in its non-Marxist views on fundamental issues and in the disagreements over matters of principle which exist between our Party and the Soviet leaders on the questions of principle of the international communist and workers' movement. The incorrect actions of the Soviet leaders against our Party also express the anti-Marxist concept they have about the relations between fraternal parties and countries, the concept they have about criticism and the Marxist-Leninist unity of the communist movement and the socialist camp. In Bucharest we expressed our opposition to the stand of the Soviet leaders, we criticized their crooked actions in a correct and principled way.

For Marxists, fair and principled criticism is not contrary to unity. On the contrary, criticism aids the consolidation of unity, it is a motive force, a law of development. The Soviet leaders do not see the problem in this way. They are not used to listening to criticisms, but only to making criticisms. In words they accept the principle of equal rights in the relations among parties, but in fact they recognize only their right to say the final word, while the rest must obey blindly. Therefore, according to them, if some party or other dares to criticize them, that party is in an anti-Soviet position, is factional, against the unity of the communist movement, and so on. This distorted concept impels them to incorrect actions, like those mentioned above. In these concepts and acts Marxist dialectics has been replaced with metaphysics, with idealism.

The acts we mentioned and the erroneous stand maintained by the Soviet leaders towards our Party and our country following the Bucharest Meeting, made us more then ever convinced that our Party was in a correct Marxist-Leninist position, that its position on all the fundamental issues was principled, therefore those positions had to be defended with determination, standing firm against any pressure.

The delegation of our Party in Moscow, in October, at the meeting of the commission which worked out the draft of the Declaration approved later at the November meeting, maintained this correct and principled stand. At this meeting, our delegation presented the correct viewpoint of our Party openly on all matters of principle under discussion, and together with the Chinese comrades and the comrades of those other parties which also took a correct stand, resolutely defended the Marxist-Leninist teachings with sound arguments. A great struggle for principle went on in the commission on every issue, over every paragraph, and every word. This work went on for nearly 25 days.

To give you an idea of the correct struggle waged by our delegation there, as well as by the other delegations which stood in sound positions, suffice it to mention these facts: in compiling the draft-Declaration, the draft presented by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was taken as the basis. This draft of 36 pages contained many erroneous views, and in many parts there were hidden attacks against the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania. For instance, it accused us of "national communism", of being opponents of the policy of peaceful coexistence, compared us with Yugoslavia, accused us of being "factionalists", and so on. Apart from this, the draft did not properly stress the necessity of the struggle against imperialism and had a soft and, frequently, opportunist spirit, putting great stress on the peaceful road of transition to socialism; the national bourgeoisie was presented almost as a supporter of socialism, it failed to mention Yugoslav revisionism, dogmatism was presented as more dangerous than revisionism, even though it said that revisionism was the main danger, and so on. 175 pages comments on this draft were presented, of which our delegation presented 20 pages, and the Chinese delegation 40. It must be stressed that none of our comments was refuted by argument as incorrect; but those which were not included in the Declaration were rejected on the pretext of tactics or by the majority of votes. Nevertheless, the basic draft was almost completely changed. It was extended from 36 pages to 52. The hidden attacks against us were thrown out, the section on imperialism was strengthened, the paragraph on Yugoslav revisionism was added, the question of the struggle against revisionism and dogmatism was put in order, and so on. However, some questions remained, such as that of the importance of the 20th and 21st Congresses, that of factions, of the cult of the individual, etc., to which our delegation, the Chinese delegation and the delegations of some other parties did not agree, but which should be taken up again for discussion at the November meeting.

In the meeting of the commission it was very clear how correct and principled were our positions and how distorted were the positions of the Soviet leaders and the parties supporting them. The opportunist spirit which has gripped some parties, such as the Communist Party of Italy, Syria, Britain, the United States of America and others showed itself plainly, and this emerged even more clearly at the November meeting. The Soviet leaders tried hard to manoeuvre, resorting to all kinds of methods, ranging from working on individuals among the various delegations to the procedural machinations. Here is a typical fact: the commission agreed that a phrase which Maurice Thorez had used in a speech during those days should be put in the Declaration. It was: "There will be an absolute guarantee of the liquidation of all kinds of war only when socialism has triumphed in all countries or in the main capitalist countries». This thesis was put in on the proposal of the French delegation, and was supported by our delegation and the Chinese. But before two days had passed the Soviets proposed that it should be re-examined, presumably because their Presidium had not approved it. Despite our resistance, the majority of the meeting decided to omit it, but at the November meeting they were forced to put it back again in another form.

The proceedings at the preparatory meeting and the views expressed there indicated clearly that the Moscow Meeting in

November would become an arena of the struggle between the correct Marxist-Leninist view and the tendency to deviate from the revolutionary positions of our ideology.

Our Party and the delegation appointed by the Central Committee of the Party were prepared for this struggle. The Central Committee of our Party instructed its delegation that at the Moscow Meeting it should put forward the principled view of our Party on all questions under discussion, frankly and sincerely and with Marxist-Leninist courage, that it should inform the meeting of the erroneous acts of the Soviet leaders against our Party following the Bucharest Meeting, and criticize them severely with the aim of preventing any repetition of such acts in the future. We report to the Central Committee of our Party that the delegation carried out this directive and, as was decided by the Central Committee of the Party, all the matters were put before the meeting of the representatives of the 81 communist and workers' parties which was convened in November this year in Moscow.

Did the Central Committee of the Party act correctly when it decided that all matters should be put forward openly at the November meeting? We answer: Yes, the Central Committee acted correctly, for the following reasons:

- 1. Because, as a Marxist-Leninist Party, we were duty-bound to defend the principled positions of the Moscow Declaration [1957], which were being violated. If we were to remain silent in face of the distortions of Marxism-Leninism, in face of actions contrary to the fundamental principles of our ideology, irrespective of the fact that the violators and deviators were the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we could not call ourselves communists. In order to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism, to defend the cause of socialism and communism, we must always be principled, never sentimental or one-sided.
- 2.— Because, in its violation of the Moscow Declaration [1957], and the principles of Marxism-Leninism, as well as in its concrete actions, the Soviet leadership had gone so far that to have remained silent about these grave errors and offences would have been suicide, a crime against our common cause. The Bucharest Meeting and the anti-Marxist behind-the-scenes plot which was organized there by the Soviet leaders, the pressures and damaging actions against our Party, on the one hand, and against the Communist Party of China, on the other (I mean the withdrawal of the specialists, the cancelling of orders for various machinery, etc.) were the first signs of a very dangerous action which, if not unmasked, would have had even more serious consequences for the communist movement and the socialist camp.
- 3. Because our sincere and principled criticism had a good purpose: by condemning the wrong views and actions, it aimed at liquidating them, at closing the door to them so that they would never be repeated, at clearing the air of the negative manifestations, and on this basis, at helping to strengthen our communist movement, to reinforce our unity which was endangered. This aim, and this aim alone, was what impelled the Central Committee of the Party to express its view openly, and it was absolutely correct to do so.
- 4. Finally, we say with absolute conviction that there is another reason why the Central Committee was right when it decided to put forward these questions at the Moscow Meeting. We saw for ourselves, both before the meeting and during its

proceedings, that the Soviet leaders, on their part, were determined to continue on the course on which they had embarked against our Party, because if we had remained silent, they had prepared themselves to cast the blame on us for everything, and for this reason they brought extreme pressure to bear on our delegation in order to make us shut our mouths.

It is clear that if we had remained silent at the meeting about the wrong actions of the Soviet leaders, this would not only have meant abandoning our whole principled line, but it would also have been fatal to our Party and to the future of socialism in Albania.

III. — ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET LEADERS TOWARDS OUR DELEGATION AND OUR TALKS WITH THEM

As is known, our delegation went to the Soviet Union as an official delegation, invited by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the celebrations of the 43rd anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution. This being the case, from the formal angle they did us all the honours of the occasion. But their attitude towards us was cold and the talks unfriendly. Thus, we talked with Kozlov on our arrival in Moscow, with Kosygin and Polyansky at the dinner of the 7th of November, and their position became clear: in everything they sought to cast the blame on our Party. The next day, that is on the 8th of November, everything became even more clear.

On the 8th of November we were handed a copy of the letter which the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in reply to the September letter from the Communist Party of China. This fact in itself did not please us, because it was a bad prelude to the holding of the meeting, but we shall speak of this later. What made an impression on us were the following facts: In one paragraph of the letter speaking of the socialist countries of Europe, they were all listed by name, with the exception of Albania. This meant that the leadership of the Soviet Union had wiped Albania from the books as a socialist country. Further down, although the letter was addressed to the Communist Party of China, there was an open and tendentious attack against our Party. While claiming that following the criticism of "the cult of the individual", all problems were solved in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union allegedly according to the rules of democratic centralism, the letter said:

"Unfortunately, there are other examples. We can bring up such a fresh example as the settlement of such matters by the Albanian comrades. In September this year they expelled comrade Liri Belishova from the Central Committee and discharged her from the post of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, while comrade Koço Tashko was discharged from the post of the Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission of the Party of Labour of Albania and expelled from the Party. And for what? Simply because these comrades expressed their beliefs that it is impermissible to slander the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

We express our suspicions that there is a bad end in store for all those people whose only "sin" is that they are friends of the Soviet Union, have a correct understanding of the siALBANIA TODAY 6 (25), 1975 • 39

tuation, and express their sympathy for the Soviet people and for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

From this presentation of things it emerges: First, that allegedly the Central Committee of our Party did not carry out the rules of the internal democracy of the Party when it expelled Liri Belishova from its ranks and Koço Tashko from the Central Auditing Commission. It seems to me unnecessary to prove here, in the Central Committee of the Party, that this is deliberate slander. Second, it emerges that in our Party the friends of the Soviet Union are being condemned and persecuted, that is, the Central Committee of our Party is allegedly in an anti-Soviet position, etc. There is no need to prove that this, too, is another slander. But in these tendentious accusations the aim of the Soviet leadership is clear: to discredit our Party, to present it as though it has gone off the rails of Leninism, as though it has taken the road of Yugoslavia (therefore, in the same document Albania is not mentioned as a socialist country).

This shows that the Soviet leaders were not interested in resolving the disagreements which had arisen between us. On the contrary, they wanted to deepen them, indeed to use them to discredit our Party. On the other hand, in order to have complete success in their actions against our Party they resorted to all means to make us shut our mouths.

The first method was that of threats. To this end, Nikita Khrushchev himself twice spoke to the Chinese comrades about Albania. First, on October 25 [1960], he told comrade Teng Hsiao-ping, "We shall treat Albania like Yugoslavia", and the second time, he told another representative of the CP of China, "The Albanians behave towards us just like Tito used to do", "We lost an Albania and you Chinese won an Albania", "The Party of Labour of Albania is our weak link."

What was their aim?

First, the Soviet leaders intended to intimidate us, to make us review our position and to desist from raising all the questions we had in mind. It should be borne in mind that the Soviets were more or less aware of what we would raise at the Moscow Meeting. Koço Tashko had kept them informed about our views.

Second, while speaking against our Party and threatening us, in fact, they were also warning the Chinese, that is, they intended to kill two birds with one stone.

Third, by presenting the case as though we were following the road of Yugoslavia, the Soviet leaders sought to discredit our Party, to distort our stand, to divert the discussion away from the basis of principles to slanders, etc.

Together with the method of indirect threats the Soviet leaders also used the method of direct pressure, through meetings and talks with our delegation.

Before speaking of the meetings we had in Moscow, it is necessary to say a few words concerning our view on the method of talks, meetings, and consultations. This is essential, because the Soviet leaders tried many times to present the question as though we were against talks, and to illustrate this they brought up these examples: our refusal to meet the Soviet leaders on the basis that they proposed in the well-known letter of August 13 [1960]; the fact that comrade Enver did not go to spend his summer holiday in the Soviet Union, allegedly as if we wanted to avoid any meeting with them, and, finally,

our refusal of Khrushchev's invitation to meet him on November 9, of which I will speak later.

The Party and its Central Committee have been and are of the opinion that the method of meetings, talks, and consultations among the leaders of fraternal parties, the exchange of views on various problems of mutual interest, the more so when differences have arisen between two parties or socialist countries, is the most correct and advisable Marxist-Leninist method. Therefore, in the past our Party and its Central Committee have not refused any meeting and will not do so in the future, especially, when the aim of these meetings is to strengthen and consolidate the Marxist-Leninist unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

But, at the same time, proceeding from these principled positions, our Party is of the opinion that in these meetings certain other principles of Marxism-Leninism must be respected, among which: First, it is impermissible and contrary to the Leninist norms that a third party should become a subject of conversation at a meeting of two other parties, that the general line of the former should be talked about in the absence of this party; and second, any discussion or meeting between two parties, whichever they be, should be held on an equal footing, on the basis of consultations and mutual respect, avoiding any manifestation of imposing the will of one side upon the other side, or of any privileged position of one side over the other side, etc. Our Party has respected and will respect these principles. This is the principled position of our Party concerning the question of meetings, talks and consultations; we have maintained such a position in the past, and we shall maintain it in the future too.

Now let us see in concrete terms, whether the Soviet leaders are right when they accuse us of being against meetings, by bringing up the above-mentioned cases. It is true we refused the meeting proposed in the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated August 13, 1960. But we refused to meet them, not because we were against meetings in principle or because we wanted to avoid meeting the Soviet leaders, but because such a meeting would have been contrary to the Leninist norms, because, as is known, in their letter the Soviet leaders proposed that we should hold discussions in order to put out "the spark of misunderstanding", which had flared up between us in Bucharest, "in time", so that our two parties "could go" to the meeting next November "with a complete unity of opinion." Why did misunderstandings arise at Bucharest? What was the fundamental problem of the Bucharest Meeting? It was the criticism of the Communist Party of China. Therefore, we were supposed to discuss China, to formulate a common view on this issue, and all this was to be done behind the back of the Communist Party of China. Is this principled? Isn't this the same as factionalism? We explained this to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in our reply, back in August, stressing that a meeting between us for that purpose was not in order. Again we think we acted very correctly.

Let's take the question of our refusal to meet Nikita Khrushchev on November 9, 1960. We think that our delegation acted correctly when it refused that meeting, and we explained this to the Soviet leaders. The thing is that, on the one hand, on November 8, 1960 the Soviet leadership handed us a letter addressed to the Communist Party of China, in which, as we

said above, Albania was not ranked among the socialist countries, and our Party was accused of anti-Sovietism, of having allegedly violated the principles of democratic centralism, and so on, and this material was distributed to the representatives of 81 parties, while, on the other hand, on the very same day they were inviting us to talks to examine the misunderstandings which had arisen between us! On the one hand, they tell the Chinese comrades, "We shall treat Albania like Yugoslavia», and, on the other hand, they want to meet us! Is this talking on equal footing? Has the basis been created for the comradely spirit indispensable for fruitful talks? Is not this a clear expression of the tendecy of the Soviet leaders to have a privileged position in talks? It is clear that we could not possibly hold talks under such conditions, because this is contrary to the principles of mutual equality and respect, especially so when we had not whispered a single word to the international communist and workers' movement about the concrete disagreements between us and the Soviet leaders up till that time. This is why we refused that meeting. It is up to the Central Committee of the Party to judge whether our delegation acted correctly or not.

As for the question of "comrade Enver's failure to go to the Soviet Union for his holiday this year", this is not worth speaking about, because there is nothing political in it. I did not go to the Soviet Union for my vacation last year, either, and no scandal was made of it. The matter is that this year the Soviet leaders "had thought" that when comrade Enver came there they would talk to him! But neither I nor the Political Bureau had been informed of this. We were supposed to find this out by divination.

In fact, it is not our Party, but the Soviet leaders who have been against talks, against the solution of disagreements through consultations. As is known, at the beginning of August we sent the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union a letter informing it of the anti-Marxist acts of some members of the staff of the Soviet embassy headed by ambassador Ivanov. Why is it that the Soviet leaders, who tell us they are determined that the problems should be solved through discussions, have still not replied to this letter to this day? In Moscow, they told us that they had not replied because they did not want to worsen relations, because their answer might be offensive to us. This clearly shows that it had never crossed their minds that the disagreements should be resolved, that it was necessary to discuss them, but they had decided their attitude: to deny everything. Then, why talk at all? Hence, who is against talks in fact? It is clearly not us, not the Party of Labour of Albania, but the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that is against talks.

Regardless of all this, in spite of the unequal conditions for talks, which, as we said above, were created by the Soviet leaders themselves, and despite their uncomradely attitude towards our delegation, an attitude which went so far as to resort to such anti-Marxist and police methods as eavesdropping on our conversations by means of various bugging devices both in our residence and in our embassy, our delegation, seeing their insistance on meeting us and upholding our Party's principle on the necessity for talks, consultations, and exchanges of opinion before the meeting began and during it, consented to, and held, three meetings with the Soviet leaders.

Our delegation understood the real aim of the Soviet leaders from its talks, on November 9, 1960, with Maurice Thorez, who, as the conversation showed clearly, had been charged by them to meet us. Thorez tried to "convince" us of the correctness of the line pursued by the Soviet Union in all directions, on the question of war and peace, on the policy of peaceful coexistence calling Khrushchev the "Lenin of our time", and so on. On the other hand, he spoke against China, presenting the Communist Party of China as "dogmatic, factionalist and Trotskyite, as a great danger to the communist movement, a partisan of war, which seeks to discredit the Soviet Union", and so on. Finally, he told us of the love which the Soviet Union has for Albania, of the aid it has given Albania, as well as that we ought to be grateful to it, and in the end he said that all of us must follow in the wake of the Soviet Union.

We told him of our views, stressing that we had disagreements with the Soviet leaders, which we would put forward at the meeting (we were aware that everything we said would be eavesdropped by the Soviet leaders or would be transmitted to them by Thorez). Thorez tried to "dissuade" us from raising these matters at the meeting, otherwise the whole meeting would be against us, and would call us provocateurs, that we should resolve these things by sitting down to talk with the Soviet leaders, and here he mentioned that we had been wrong not to meet Khrushchev, The meeting with Thorez lasted three hours, and in the end we parted with each side maintaining its own viewpoint. This was the first direct pressure to stop us from speaking openly at the meeting, and the first effort to learn what we would put forward there.

Following this meeting, we held two meetings with the Soviet leaders, on November 10-11 and 12.

At the first meeting the views of each side were put forward and, as you might say, the ground was prepared for the next meeting, which, in fact, was the official meeting. On the first day of this meeting, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Suslov, Pospyelov and Andropov participated from the Soviet side, while on the second day only Kozlov and Mikoyan. From our side, the whole delegation took part in the meeting.

Right from the beginning of the meeting, the Soviet leaders adopted the pose that nothing had occured from their side, as though the Party of Labour of Albania was to blame for everything, moreover that we ought to state frankly why we were aggravating our relations with the Soviet Union, what had happened, and what we were demanding from the Soviet leaders. In fact, this was their stand in the later meetings, too. Of course, our delegation rebutted any such claim, and with concrete facts proved that it was not us, but the Soviet leaders who, with their erroneous attitudes and actions against our Party and country, had caused the aggravation of our relations. We mentioned the question of the ambassador and of the staff of their embassy, the question of bread, the words of Malinovsky and Grechko, the anti-parti work of Kozlov with our delegation on its return from China, the crooked actions of some Soviet officers at the Vlora base, and so on. All these, we stressed, were not isolated facts but closely connected. All these things have happened since the Bucharest Meeting and have a political character. Their aim has been to force our Party to change the attitude which it maintained in Bucharest, to undermine the unity of the Party, to divide it and overthrow its leadership. In order to improve the relations between our two parties and countries,

which is the desire of our Party, and in order to strengthen our friendship, we sought from the Soviet leaders that they should condemn these acts and take measures to avoid repetition of them in the future.

The Soviet leaders did not admit anything sincerely and frankly, but sought to dodge everything. They repeated the thesis that allegedly our Party was to blame for the aggravation of the situation, that allegedly it was not for talks, as we stressed above over and over again. They tried to deny the actions of the Soviet diplomats in Tirana, but in the end they were forced to admit that "some slight mistake" might have been made through the "foolishness" of the ambassador. They said that now they would send another ambassador, and the matter would be closed. They presented the question of bread as though we were not so badly off because they had sent shiploads of grain to Albania, whereas on the question of buying grain with gold they said that this was the proposal of the Albanian side, which was accepted by the Soviet Foreign Trade people. They sought to excuse the attitudes of Marshal Malinovsky and Marshal Grechko in the same way, while admitting that even if something excessive had been said, this would have been unintentional and quite accidental. Thus, according to them, there was nothing political in all those actions. Our Party was trying in vain to give them that colour, they were trifling things, and so on!

It was evident that they did not want to admit anything at all, and even when they did admit something, it was only a partial admission for the sake of appearances, so that we would not raise the issue at the meeting. Later developments proved this to the hilt. In its reply to our speech, which it distributed on December 1, 1960 to the delegates at the meeting, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not admit anything. On the contrary, it tried to refute our speech and defended both the ambassador as well as Malinovsky, Grechko, and others.

During the talks, they went to great lengths to accuse our men over the grave situation which allegedly had been created at the Vlora base. They used this, as well as the measures which the Plenum of the Central Committee took against Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko, as evidence of a certain anti-Soviet spirit which had allegedly emerged in Albania. They had a great deal to say about the naval base in particular. Now we learn that all that fuss which was made in Moscow about the Vlora base had been carefully coordinated with acts of provocation and very dangerous behaviour by some bad elements among the Soviet personnel at the Vlora base during those days. Evidently, everything was done to a plan. Provocations here, these things there, were employed as arguments to prove that we had changed our stand, that we were aggravating the relations, etc. But neither the provocations here, nor threats and false accusations there, succeeded. Our men here, educated by the Party, knew how to avoid scandals, never falling into the trap of planned provocations, and this, in the end, forced the provocateurs to give up their plans; whereas our delegation, convinced that our commanders and officers carry out the directives of the Party to the letter, refuted any threats and false accusations, stressing to the Soviet leaders that the Central Committee of our Party had given special instructions concerning the Vlora base, and that we were convinced that nothing had happened or would happen there through the fault of our men, and we told them to have a good look at what their people were doing. And in fact this was how things stood.

As a result of the first talks, in which voices were raised from time to time, each side was acquainted with the other's views, but stuck to its own positions. The only agreement reached was that we would hold another meeting the following day, at which the Soviet delegation would be led by Khrushchev. We stressed to the Soviet leaders that we were willing to hold this meeting also, but they, on their part, should think things over better, should see matters from the political angle, and not reduce them to trifles or to accidental and technical mistakes, as they tried to explain them.

On November 12 the official meeting took place, at which the Soviet side was represented by Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Kozlov, and Andropov, while our side by the entire delegation.

This meeting, too, went the same way as the first. Khrushchev maintained the same stand, presenting the case as though they had done nothing, indeed he could not even imagine what might have aroused the indignation of the Albanian comrades, except the criticism which he had made when he was in Albania concerning the question of poplars(!). After we put forward the question of the ambassador, as well as the question of what had been written in the letter addressed to the Chinese comrades against our Party, Khrushchev, for the sake of appearances, admitted that it was foolish of the ambassador to have behaved in such a manner towards our armymen, but he defended and described as correct what had been written against our Party in the letter of November 5 addressed to the Chinese comrades. The main item of the talks was the problem of the Vlora naval base. Now it became clear why this question was raised so strongly, and what was the meaning of the military blackmail and provocations which were organized here during those days. Khrushchev raised the question that a grave situation had been created at the base, that our officers were quarrelling with the Soviet officers, that our men were allegedly speaking against Khrushchev, and so on. And, in the end, he raised the issue that the Soviets might dismantle their base.

This was an open threat, which, on the other hand, proved that everything which had been said earlier against our Party had not been accidental; thus, neither what Marshal Grechko said, "Albania is in the Warsaw Treaty for the time being", nor what Khrushchev told the Chinese comrades, "We shall treat Albania like Yugoslavia", or what Gomulka told the Chinese, "As long as Albania is a member of the Warsaw Treaty we shall not allow it to do as it thinks fit, otherwise we shall convene the Warsaw Treaty and examine the question of Albania".

In his proposal to dismantle the Vlora base, Khrushchev let out the entire plan that he, obviously, had worked out together with his associates. He wanted to threaten our Party with this, but without success. We rejected his distorted idea, and described it as a fatal mistake, which nobody among the Soviet people would accept. We told him that threats did not go down with us and that, if they wished to raise the question of the liquidation of the base, this must be done by the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty. But we declared officially that the Party of Labour of Albania would never agree to such a decision, that we were for the preservation of the base, because it responded to the interests of the defence of our country. We posed

the question to the Soviet leaders whether, by giving up the Vlora base, perhaps they wanted to leave the US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean a free field of action and avoid being committed to war with them in case of imperialist aggression against our country?

Of course, the discussion of this vital question made the going very much rougher in the talks, but what made it impossible to continue them was Khrushchev's unfriendly and despicable comparison when he said our talks were like his talks with MacMillan. At that, our delegation broke off the talks and left the room in protest.

As a conclusion, it can be said that the Soviet leaders did not want to talk, or to reach agreement with us on anything. They had made up their minds on their plan and point of view. They had even started to talk with others about this, with the sole aim of discrediting our Party. If they asked us to talks, they did this not because they wanted to resolve the disagreements, but to threaten us, to force us to give up the idea of our speech at the meeting. After these meetings it was clear once again who was for talks and who was not. They also showed that the Soviet leaders had no intention of making self-criticism over anything they had done against our Party and against our country. On the contrary, as their threat about the Vlora base indicated, they were determined to go further.

Therefore, we can repeat once more that in those conditions the Central Committee of the Party acted very correctly. It did well when it decided to raise, and when it actually did raise, all our contradictions with the Soviet leaders at the Meeting of the representatives of the 81 communist and workers' parties of the world in Moscow.

IV. - ON THE DEVELOPMENTS AT THE MOSCOW MEETING

The Moscow Meeting was organized to discuss the current problems of the international situation and the questions of the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement. The basis for the proceedings of the meeting was the draft-Declaration prepared by the commission of 26 parties, which, as we said, was convened in Moscow in October. In discussing these questions, the meeting, in fact, had to pronounce on the disagreements which had appeared in the ranks of the international communist and workers' movement, to condemn the erroneous views and to fix the correct Marxist-Leninist view, the united view of the whole communist movement on these questions, in the Declaration which it would approve.

But from the very beginning of the meeting, even prior to it, it was evident that the Soviet leaders and those of some other communist parties of the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe thought differently. The distribution of the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the eve of the proceedings of the meeting, and the working on all the delegations with this letter made the plan of the Soviet leaders even more clear. The tendency was to organize a new Bucharest, to gain approval outside the meeting for all those things that were said in Bucharest against China, to create the opinion among all the parties that the Communist Party of China *is dogmatic and factionalist*, that *it has

violated the Moscow Declaration and acts in opposition to the entire communist movement, that together with the Communist Party of China, the Party of Labour of Albania, too, is following the same course», opposition to which is expressed in the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In order to create this opinion, the Soviet leaders organized intensive preparatory work among the various delegations in the first days before the beginning of the meeting. Working especially actively to this end were the delegation of the Communist Party of France (with the delegations of the capitalist countries of Europe), the delegation of the Communist Party of Spain and the People's Party of Cuba (with the delegations of Latin America), the delegation of Syria (with the delegations of the Arab and African countries). On top of this organized work, in which the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated November 5 addressed to the Communist Party of China was read and commented on, many bilateral meetings and talks were held with the Soviet delegation and the delegations of the socialist countries of Europe. Of course, such work cannot be considered normal, on the contrary it is incorrect and anti-Marxist. On the other hand, it indicates how weak are the positions of the Soviet leaders, because he who is on the correct course and who abides by the teachings of Marx and Lenin has no need to win allies through improper methods, pressure and working on people in this way.

By doing this preparatory work outside the meeting, the Soviet leaders intended to impart a demonstrative character to the very holding of the meeting, in which the speeches made would be in general terms, with eulogies for the successes achieved, without diclosing the existing contradictions, but casting veiled allusions against the correct Marxist-Leninist positions of the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania on the fundamental issues. Such a development of the meeting would have been to the advantage of the Soviet leadership and the parties supporting its view, because, on the one hand, they did their work outside the meeting, creating the opinion that the Communist Party of China had allegedly made mistakes, indeed that it was in favour of war, of adventures, against peaceful coexistence, and so on, and on the other hand, by not uncovering the contradictions at the meeting, the Soviet leaders presented themselves as allegedly staunch partisans of the defence of the unity of the communist movement and the socialist camp, hence, they displayed their «magnanimity, and avoided discussion of their line, of their mistakes, of their deviations from the Moscow Declaration [1957] and from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

The Soviet leaders saw clearly that an open discussion of the contradictions at the meeting would discredit them before the movement in many respects: First, because they have trampled on the Moscow Declaration and have adopted a conciliatory policy in the struggle against imperialism and revisionism; second, because they have breached the Leninist norms regulating the relations among socialist states and communist and workers' parties, as is the case with China and Albania; third, because in the eyes of the entire communist movement, of the representatives of 81 communist and workers' parties of the world, the existing opinion of the infallibility of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leaders would vanish,

together with the opinion that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leaders are beyond criticism, that everything they say "is law, is correct, is the last word in Marxism, and, therefore must be implemented by all", etc., etc.

In keeping with this tactic Nikita Khrushchev spoke on behalf of the Soviet delegation on the first day of the Moscow Meeting. In fact, his speech was an attempt to set the tone in which matters should be discussed at this meeting.

Khrushchev's speech was cunningly prepared and differed greatly from the letter which the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on November 5, which was distributed to all the delegations prior to the meeting, in which the Chinese comrades were openly accused of having violated the Moscow Declaration and the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The speech delivered to the meeting was written in such a tone as though no disagreements whatsoever existed between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, moreover, throughout that speech of 80 pages the Communist Party of China was never mentioned by name. Khrushchev's speech gave the main «arguments» in defence of the theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning the main question about which there are disagreements, such as the question of war and peace, the theoretical problems of the 20th Congress, the question of the struggle against "factionalism" in the international communist movement, etc. The speakers who followed in support of Khrushchev, such as Zhivkov and others, described Khrushchev's speech as a «creative development of Marxism», and repeated his arguments in other forms.

Although efforts were made to avoid mentioning the disagreements in Khrushchev's speech, to maintain a moderate tone, nevertheless, in a hidden manner, it contained venomous allusions, which were directed first of all against the Chinese comrades, on a series of important problems.

Khrushchev strongly insisted on condemnation of the so-called factionalist activity in the international communist and workers' movement, hypocritically declaring that this thesis was not directed against any party in particular, and he put great stress on the fact that the decisive condition for the achievement of unity in the international communist movement was allegedly respect for, and the implementation of, the decisions taken by the majority on the part of the minority. With this he set the line for all his supporters at the meeting on the key problem and his main aim: the condemnation and subjugation of the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania.

Immediately after Khrushchev's speech the meeting began its "tranquil" course, as the tactic and purpose of the Soviet leaders required, according to the principle, "Roast your meat but don't burn the spit." Thus, during the first three days of the meeting, 18 representatives of various parties took the floor, among them the representatives of the parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Canada, Greece, Argentine, Irak, the Union of South Africa, and others, which, while supporting the stand of the Soviet delegation on all matters raised in Khrushchev's speech and eulogizing him, levelled masked criticism against the correct views of the Communist Party of China. All of them, on Khrushchev's example insisted that the Declaration which had been prepared should remain un-

changed on the questions about which the delegation of China, our delegation, and those of some other parties had expressed opposition since the meeting of the October commission. As is known, these questions had to do with the evaluation of the 20th and 21st Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the question of the "cult of the individual", the question of "factions", and that of "national communism".

This is how the meeting began, and this is the "tranquil" appearance it had in the first stage of its proceedings. But if, formally, its appearance was tranquil, in essence the atmosphere was tense, because they all had an uneasy feeling, all had something in their chests from which they could not get away unless they brought it out. They were all worried about the question of unity, but the course the meeting had taken was not leading towards unity. It covered up the contradictions without eliminating them, therefore, sooner or later, they were bound to burst out, would come to the surface, and the later this happened the worse it would be for the fate of our movement. Marxism-Leninism teaches us to look the truth straight in the eye and not to be afraid of it, no matter how unpleasant it may be. The contradictions existed, therefore they had to be discussed courageously, who was right and who was wrong had to be found out through criticism and self-criticism, through a frank and comradely consultation and discussion, and then, purged of the filth, united in genuine Marxist-Leninist unity, we had to march ahead towards fresh victories. This is how we and the Chinese comrades conceived the proceedings of the Moscow Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties.

Therefore, it was essential to change the spirit of the proceedings and the discussions at the meeting; it was necessary to put an end to the stage of relative "tranquility" which was in the interests of the Soviet leaders, but did not serve the genuine strengthening of our unity.

The spirit of the proceedings of the meeting changed after the speech by the Chinese delegate, comrade Teng Hsiao-ping, and the speech I delivered on behalf of the delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania. The meeting entered its second phase which is characterized by the open discussion of the disagreements existing in the international communist and workers' movement over fundamental questions. This discussion forced the representatives of every party to take a stand towards these major issues, and thus the real views of every party came out more clearly.

The speech of the delegation of the Communist Party of China was a speech of a high ideological content, a principled, very well argumented speech, which unmasked the erroneous views and the distortions and deviations of the Soviet leaders concerning the fundamental questions of the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement. Right from the start of his speech the delegate of the Communist Party of China exposed the method and aim of the Soviet leaders in not opening up the problems at the meeting. He described the November 5 letter of 125 pages, which was full of savage attacks against the Communist Party of China and its leader, comrade Mao Tsetung, as in fact, the main speech of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The difference, he stressed, consists only in the fact that, taking advantage of the favourable conditions created for them, because the meeting was being held in Moscow,

the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had distributed that speech outside the meeting, while delivering another speech in the meeting.

The Chinese delegation rebutted the distortion made of the position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concerning the principal content of the present epoch. He said that the Communist Party of China has never characterized the present epoch as the epoch of imperialism, of war and revolution, but as the epoch of revolutions, of the overthrow of imperialism, of the triumph of socialism and communism. This slander was first uttered at the Bucharest Meeting by the head of the Soviet delegation, and was accompanied by other distortions that allegedly the Chinese overestimate the strength of imperialism while underestimating our strength. Speaking of the content of the present epoch, the Chinese delegation expressed its opposition to replacing the activity of the masses in the struggle for peace with the activity of state leaders, explained the meaning of the expressions "the East wind prevails over the West wind", and "imperialism is a paper tiger, and stressed the need to educate the masses in the spirit of determination to fight the class enemy.

Speaking of the problems of war and peace, of peaceful coexistence, the delegate of the Communist Party of China pointed out the sources of wars, refuting the charge brought against the Communist Party of China that it allegedly wants war, that allegedly it is in favour of the cold war and that allegedly it seeks to establish socialism throughout the world by means of war. This, he said, amounts to saying that the threat of war comes from China and not from imperialism. Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping said that we must speak of both possibilities, that of the prevention of war and that of the outbreak of war, and that we must carefully prepare ourselves for both possibilities. "Overestimation of the strength of the people and underestimation of the strength of the enemies», he said, «is one tendency. If this tendency is not combated, it might lead to adventurist Leftist and sectarian errors. Overestimation of the strength of the enemies and underestimation of the strength of the people is another tendency. If this tendency is not combated, it might lead to revisionist and Right opportunist errors. It is important to combat both these tendencies. We think," he said, "that in the present conditions the main danger in the ranks of the international communist movement is the second tendency, not the first.

He demanded the inclusion of the following phrase in the draft-Declaration: "We can be sure that there will be no war only when socialism has triumphed in at least the principal countries of the world". He explained the difference between the possibility of avoiding world war and the possibility of excluding any kind of war. The oppressed peoples will inevitably rise in war against their reactionary governments, and we must support these wars. The representative of the Communist Party of China pointed out that the policy of the Soviet Union on talks has been supported by the People's Republic of China. But we must not base all our hopes or our main hopes on talks. Everything depends on the active struggle of the masses all over the world for peace.

Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping said that the main danger in the international communist movement is revisionism. It has

never happened, he said, that revisionism has developed because there has been so much struggle against it, as the Soviet leaders claim. He demanded that the chapter of the draft-Declaration speaking of this question should be more complete and said that there were also dogmatic tendencies, which, under particular conditions, might become the main danger. But dogmatism was not manifested in the Communist Party of China and even less on the questions over which it was being slandered.

He devoted a special place to the relations among the fraternal communist and workers' parties. He laid special stress on the principle of equality and independence of the various parties and on proletarian internationalism. He attached particular importance to the principle of consultations among parties and the achievement of unanimity. He said that criticism among parties is a sound basis for unity among them. The Chinese delegation refuted the charge that allegedly the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China intended to reject everything the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had done. It was wrong to think that criticism harmed unity. If criticism had been in a harsh tone, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was not to be blamed for that. The principle of the majority and minority in the relations among parties should not and could not be applied. This is a principle applied within the parties themselves, and not at international meetings, at which each party preserves its own independence. The delegate of the Communist Party of China criticized the Bucharest Meeting at which the Marxist-Leninist principles were breached, pointed out the positive and negative aspects of the 20th and 21st Congresses of the CPSU, criticized the stand of the Central Committee of the CPSU towards the Party of Labour of Albania and rejected the proposal that "factionalist activity" should be condemned in the Declaration, a move which was directed against the Communist Party of China.

Finally, he dwelt in detail on the disagreements between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After an outline of the history of the disagreements and showing how the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was extending them to state relations, Teng Hsiao-ping said that these disagreements had been aggravated as a result of the violation of the principle of equality among parties on the part of the Soviet leadership and that the Moscow Declaration had not been respected.

The Central Committee knows the content of the speech of our delegation, therefore it is unnecessary to dwell on it here. However, we can say that it was listened to with great attention by the participants at the meeting, and despite the attacks heaped upon us later, of which we shall have more to say below, no one, not even the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its written declaration of December 1, could produce convincing arguments to refute a single one of our theses. On the contrary, its principled character, its correct analysis of the questions and its courageous criticism addressed to the Soviet leaders were welcomed by many delegations of fraternal parties.

As I said above, following our speeches, the meeting took another course. This stage of the meeting also can be divided into two parts: the first 2-3 days after our speeches

were dominated by the contributions of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties who defended the thesis of the Soviet leaders and consequently attacked the Communist Party of China and our Party of Labour. Whereas, during the last 2-3 days of the meeting there was a predominance of speeches of the delegations of the communist and workers' parties who defended the correct Marxist-Leninist positions, that is, the parties which were of the same opinion as the Chinese comrades and us. Why did this happen? Because even in this direction the Soviet leaders pursued an incorrect procedure: wanting to create the impression that the entire movement was against us, they gave the floor, one after another, to those delegations which they were sure would defend the view of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while refusing it to others. Thus, for example, they postponed the right of the Indonesian delegation to take the floor for three days on end. But, in this manner, by putting off the demands of all those delegations, it came about that the last speeches delivered were by the parties maintaining a correct Marxist-Leninist stand.

What is characteristic of the speeches of the second stage of the meeting?

First, the attacks against the Communist Party of China and against our Party in particular were organized (to such an extent that they were even furnished with quotations from the documents of our Party which were only at the disposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and another characteristic is their lack of arguments, the replacement of arguments with offensive language.

Second, at first, following the speech of the Chinese delegate, the attacks were spearheaded only against the Communist Party of China, after our speech the attacks were directed mainly against our Party, and by the end of the meeting, especially during the second contributions, criticism was concentrated against our two parties at the same time, against the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania.

Third, their discussions were tendentious; they condemned everything Chinese or Albanian, passing over in silence, that means supporting, even the most extreme manifestations of Right opportunism, which tried to take advantage of this situation in order to spread its ideas. For example, in his speech, which gave the impression of being more of a speech of a social-democrat than of a communist, the representative of the Communist Party of Sweden, Hagberg, raised these opportunist theses:

- 1) He said that in the framework of its collaboration with the social-democratic party, the Communist Party of Sweden had achieved successes precisely thanks to the fact that it was in favour of a broad collaboration with all the social-democrats, that they spoke of what united them and not of what divided them. He declared that the leadership of the Communist Party of Sweden was against the creation of a Left wing within the social-democratic party, because the communists should collaborate with all the detachments of the working class.
- 2) He defended the Yugoslav revisionists and criticized those who spoke in harsh language against them. He declared that the main thing for us was to isolate the principal

enemy and not the Yugoslav League of Communists, that we should not maintain a sterner stand towards the Yugoslav leaders than towards the heads of social-democrats, because this hurted the feelings of the Yugoslav people. We should not aggravate our relations with the Yugoslav leadership, so that we could have it as fellow-traveller, be it even temporary and not very reliable, in our common struggle for peace,

3) He declared that the terms "dictatorship of the proletariat", which might cause only harm, should not figure in the Declaration which the meeting would adopt. The term "dictatorship of the proletariat" was an old term of the 19th century, which had become outdated and frightened the masses. Although we communists understood the content of this term, we didn't use it, because from both the logical and the philological aspects "dictatorship" meant the opposite of democracy, its negation. The Swedish workers took offence if you spoke to them about the "dictatorship of the proletariat". This term was not included in the program of the Communist Party of Sweden and when we spoke to the workers about the socialist state, we stressed that this was the most democratic state", etc.

Likewise, the representatives of the Communist Party of the United States of America and of the Communist Party of Great Britain, under various pretexts, also demanded that the formulation on the dictatorship of the proletariat should be omitted from the draft-Declaration.

The representative of the Communist Party of the United States of America also demanded the omission from the draft-Declaration of the phrase which said: "If the crazy imperialists launch their war, the peoples will wipe out and bury capitalism". Whereas the delegate of the Communist Party of Italy declared in his speech that not a single Italian worker would consent to pay for the victory of socialism in blood, that is, they were for "peace at any price". The representative of the Communist Party of Italy proposed a new formulation of that part of the draft-Declaration which speaks about Yugoslav revisionism. This new formulation left out the thesis that the Yugoslav revisionists have betrayed Marxism-Leninism and have engaged in undermining activity against the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

However, none of the delegates to the meeting, including even the Soviet delegation, stood up to oppose these anti-Marxist and blatantly revisionist theses. Only the delegation of the Communist Party of China and our delegation, as well as those of some other parties which stand on Marxist-Leninist positions, fought against and refuted these incorrect and oportunist views in the editing commission.

On the Stand of some Delegations Towards the Speech of our Delegation

Immediately after the speech delivered by our delegation at the meeting, the representatives of a number of communist and workers' parties launched heavy attacks full of offensive epithets against the Party of Labour of Albania. Regardless of the facts, or without knowing them at all, they labelled as slanders all criticisms contained in our speech in the ad-

dress of the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet

The attack was opened by Dolores Ibarruri, who said among other things, "This morning I heard the most disgraceful speech I have ever heard in my many years in the communist movement; we have not heard such a speech since the time of Trotsky. It was a provocative speech. How can anyone speak such falsehoods against the Soviet Union... We protest against the slanders addressed to Khrushchev. We believe that the entire movement will condemn your speech...", etc.

Most offensive adjectives were employed by Gomulka against our speech and our Party. He called our speech "an irresponsible attack against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, an act of hooliganism, which no one, who has any sense of responsibility, could permit himself." Further on Gomulka said: "If anyone does not believe that the Chinese are factionalists, let him look at their factionalism with the Albanians..."

Attacking the speech of our delegation, Longo and the representatives of some other parties declared that "it sounds like an insult and vilification, not only of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but also of the entire international communist movement."

The representative of the Communist Party of Morocco, Ali Yata, also made base attacks against the leadership of our Party.

Georgiu Dej pronounced himself in this manner against our spech: "We listened with indignation to the speech by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania. We controlled ourselves, put our patience to the test, for it seemed as if "The Voice of America" or "Free Europe" was speaking from this tribune. No difference whatever from the Yugoslav revisionists. With their adventurist policy, the Albanians are creating a difficult situation in the Balkans... Our meeting should resolutely condemn the disruptive speech and action of the Albanian delegate".

The delegations of some parties which had not yet pronounced themselves before my speech hurried to issue written declarations to condemn the speech of the delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania and its leadership. This is what the delegations of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, the Communist Party of France, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and others did.

The declaration distributed by the delegation of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, among other things, says: «...What the representatives of the Party of Labour of Albania did was an expression of the blackest ingratitude and cynicism. In return for fraternal help they have brought up the basest falsification and slanders against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Belgrade revisionists have no reason to be dissatisfied with the struggle waged by the leaders of the Party of Labour of Albania against them. Through this "struggle" they have simply become more valuable on the US market, receive more generous aid and loans from the United States of America."

The declaration of the delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in connection with the speech by the delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania, says among other things, "What are the aims of the

monstrous slanders of the Albanian delegation which dared to describe the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as almost to blame for the Hungarian counter-revolution? The present words of the Albanian delegation, which makes against the Soviet Union the grave accusation of resorting to almost colonial methods and great power chauvinism, arouse even greater indignation. These insults can only be grist to the mill of the bourgeois and revisionist propaganda about the socalled Soviet "colonialism" and Soviet 'hegemonism's.

A large number of the delegations that spoke against us in connection with our speech expressed themselves only with some phrases, such as "this was not the place to open these discussions", or "the speeches by the Chinese and Albanian comrades were inappropriate and harmful, and contained slanders against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", or "we agree with the assessment of the speech of the Albanian delegate made by the preceding speakers", etc.

Generally speaking according to their stand towards the views expressed in our speech, the various delegations may be divided into three groups:

a) The first group includes those parties that defended us openly or supported our theses, without mentioning us at all, or saying the odd word simply for the sake of appearances against our speech.

In this group mention should be made first of all of the Chinese delegation that resolutely defended our Party.

Besides the Chinese delegation, many delegations of the communist and workers' parties of Asia came out openly in defence of our Party, some of them, such as those of Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia, criticized the un-communist methods and the offensive language used against those parties that speak openly and courageously, whereas some other delegations did not declare themselves openly but told us aside that they agreed with us.

- b) The second group is made up of the delegations which spoke against us, but, as said above, in very mild terms, such as "improper speech", etc. Most of the delegations from Latin America, the Scandinavian countries, some delegations from Africa and others may be included in this group.
- c) The third group is made up of the delegations that rose against us with great heat and unreservedly defended the position of the Soviet leaders. But even among them there are some shades of difference:
- The most aggressive were: Gomulka, Ibarruri, Ali Yata of Morocco, Zhivkov and the Czechs (the latter two came out with written declarations), Dej, Longo of Italy, and others who used the most abusive language against us.
- -- The less aggressive were: the French who issued written declarations, the Tunisians and others who spoke against us, not in the above-mentioned terms, but such as "disgraceful speech", "impermissible and unacceptable speech" aimed at discrediting the Soviet Union", etc.
- Lastly, the moderates, among whom the Hungarians may be included, for they were very measured in their written declaration.

The fierce attacks against the Chinese delegation and ours came as no surprise. They were an organized outburst of unprincipled passions, an unsuccessful attempt to stifle our principled views and criticism through base attacks and

offensive language, to divert the discussion, by means of sentimental phrases, away from the questions of principle on the agenda, etc. But they did not achieve their aims. In fact most delegations began to waver, and the more passions cooled down and logic prevailed, the more objectively the correct and principled Marxist-Leninist views upheld by the Chinese delegation, our delegation and some other delegations, were assessed by a series of delegations.

This is clearly expressed in the shift of the ratio of forces and in the conclusion of the proceedings of the meeting.

As we said at the start of this report, apart from the Chinese delegation and our delegation, the representatives of many other parties, too, took a resolute Marxist-Leninist stand at the November meeting. All stood for the unity of the communist movement, and frankly admitted that without China and its Communist Party there could be no talk of unity either in the communist movement or in the socialist camp. This stand was in open opposition to the proposals and theses of the Soviets and their ardent supporters who wanted to condemn the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania as factionalists, etc.

At the end of the plenary session of the meeting, after 79 representatives of the various parties had made their contributions to the discussion, N. S. Khrushchev took the floor for the second time, and so did Teng Hsiao-ping and 23 other persons. A characteristic of the last speeches of Khrushchev and his supporters was that they showed themselves more moderate, their expressions were more controlled, they were more engaged in defending their viewpoints than in attacking those of others.

Nikita Khrushchev's second speech was a reflection of the situation created up to then at the meeting: on one hand, the speech of the Chinese delegation and that of our delegation had dealt heavy blows at the arguments of the Soviet leaders concerning the accusations against the Communist Party of China, and on the other hand, it was a fact that besides the parties openly supporting the stand taken by the Soviet delegation against the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania, although without convincing arguments, there was also another group of parties, and not a small one, that supported our viewpoints, and another in the centre that were against the split.

In conformity with this, Khrushchev's second speech had two characteristic aspects:

a) Although in its external form it was fiercer than his first speech and directly attacked both the Chinese comrades and us, in essence it was a speech from defensive positions. Defending himself against the criticisms by the Chinese comrades and us, Khrushchev tried to justify the viewpoints of the Soviet leadership on a series of questions: war and peace, the stand to be taken towards imperialism, the thesis of the 20th Congress on the roads of transition to socialism, the attitude towards the national liberation movements, the criticism of "Stalin's cult of the individual", etc. Concerning all these questions he did not dare to enter into an analysis of facts but said only that all "the slanders and attacks against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would be answered by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in a special letter. Apart from this, in Khrushchev's second speech the first signs of a retreat were apparent when he declared that, facing the enemy, the meeting must, without fail, be concluded with a joint document and the elimination of disagreements.

b) Relying on the support of the majority, in his second speech Khrushchev continued his pressure on the Communist Party of China to have it condemned and force it to its knees. In this respect he was very insistent that allegedly the disagreements were between the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania, on the one hand, and all the communist and workers' parties, on the other; that the minority should submit to the majority and respect its opinion; that "factional activity" in the international communist movement should be condemned, etc. He went on with his attacks against the Chinese comrades, accusing them of being unwilling to acknowledge their mistakes simply for the reason that they put their pride above the interests of the international communist movement, etc. Without any arguments, and on false evidence, he also attacked the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania.

Khrushchev's second speech showed that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with Khrushchev at the head had not renounced its erroneous views and methods in its relations with the fraternal parties.

After Khrushchev's speech and in reply to it, comrade Teng Hsiao-ping took the floor for the second time.

His speech was centered on two main questions: First, did the leadership of the Communist Party of China defend the Moscow Declaration of 1957, or did it violate it? Second, was the stand taken by the Communist Party of China aimed at defending the solidarity of the international communist movement, or had it endangered it?

Concerning the first question, the Chinese delegate pointed out that the leadership of the Communist Party of China had consistently stood on the positions of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and had defended it with determination. He once more refuted the accusations brought by many preceding speakers to the effect that the Chinese comrades, especially in the articles included in the pamphlet "Long Live Leninism!", had allegedly departed from the Declaration of 1957, that they allegedly negated the importance of the world socialist system in the international arena, negated the principle of peaceful coexistence, were Left adventurers, dogmaticians, etc. He proved that, on the contrary, it was the Soviet leaders and the leaders of some other fraternal parties who began to declare that some important theses of Leninism were obsolete, to act according to the supposition that imperialism had allegedly changed its nature, to spread harmful illusions about the summit meetings, etc. The articles included in the pamphlet "Long Live Leninism!" were directed against imperialism, against revisionism and the harmful illusions fostered by the Soviet leaders in connection with imperialism. So, it was they who had departed from the positions of the Moscow Declaration of 1957, and not the Chinese comrades; as a result, they should have consulted the other parties about their viewpoints which they changed from those of the Moscow Declaration, and not the Chinese comrades about their articles which had defended the theses of the Declaration in question.

Concerning the second question, the delegate of the Communist Party of China rejected the accusation brought

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by many speakers to the effect that the first speech of the delegation of the Communist Party of China allegedly endangered the solidarity of the international communist movement. On the contrary, that speech was meant as an answer to the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated November 5th, which in fact had deepened the contradictions. The delegate of the Communist Party of China also resolutely rejected the accusations that many speakers during the meeting brought against the Communist Party of China, as well as the accusation brought by Khrushchev in his second speech, to the effect that the Chinese comrades allegedly put their pride above the interests of the international communist movement.

He clearly showed that an unhealthy and impermissible situation had been created in which any criticism in the address of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was labelled as "factionalist activity", whereas the Soviet comrades were permitted to decide everything on their own, without asking the others, and the other parties had only to follow them. This violated the principle of equality and consultation in the relations among the fraternal parties. In this respect, the Chinese delegate exposed the manoeuvre of Khrushchev who, intending to justify his arbitrary actions, in his second speech said that the question of the condemnation of "Stalin's cult of the individual" could not have been made an object of discussion among the fraternal parties before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union without previously soliciting the opinion of the Party, while after the decision of the congress, this decision could not be violated. (In this way, in fact, the possibility of consultation among the fraternal parties is totally de-

The Chinese delegate emphasized that the principle of consultation did not mean in the least the imposition of the will of the minority on that of the majority, that the unity of the communist movement was not threatened by the principle of equality and consultation, but on the contrary by the fact that this principle was being violated. He expressed himself resolutely against the inclusion in the draft-Declaration of such theses as that on the socalled "factional activity" in the international communist movement, on "national communism», etc., which were directed against the Communist Party of China, and he stressed that no unity could be reached on this basis. He also expressed his opposition to the thesis on the importance of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the inclusion of which in the draft-Declaration would be considered as an imposition of the views of one party on the other parties. He said that the common struggle of all the communist and workers' parties constituted a broad basis for the overcoming of all the existing divergencies.

The speech by the delegate of the Communist Party of China showed that the Communist Party of China stood firm on its correct Marxist-Leninist positions, that this was the only right road for the achievement of unity.

Our delegation decided not to contribute to the discussion for the second time, therefore it did not ask for the floor, but we issued a brief written declaration which was distributed to all the delegations. In this declaration we emphasized that we stood firm on the positions expressed in our speech and pointed out that the insulting criticism levelled at us was hasty and did not serve the strengthening of the unity in our movement. In this connection we stressed:

"Typical in this respect was the speech of the delegate of the United Workers' Party of Poland, Vladislav Gomulka, who went so far in his unworthy attemps to distort the truth about the Party of Labour of Albania as to use against it epithets, descriptions and insinuations which are altogether impermissible in the relations among the Marxist parties and which only the imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists repeatedly fling at us each passing day. From the content and tone of the Polish delegate's speech it is clear that he is not in the least interested in the elimination of disagreements among parties and the strengthening of the unity of the communist and workers' movement, but on the contrary is striving with great zeal to deepen them, which is only to the benefit of our enemies. His intention was to lead our meeting into a blind alley and to discredit the Party of Labour of Albania in the eyes of the international communist and workers' movement. However, this attempt to isolate the Party of Labour of Albania ended in failure and disgrace, as it was bound to do.

We reject all the slanders and provocations made at this meeting against our delegation, against our Party and people.

The Party of Labour of Albania regrets that a number of delegates of some other fraternal parties hastened to use an incorrect and un-comradely language towards the Party of Labour of Albania in their speeches or written declarations distributed at this meeting, without going thoroughly into the real facts and without being aware of the truth. However, the Party of Labour of Albania hopes that those comrades will reflect more deeply and will understand the truth about the content of the speech made by the delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania.

As you see, apart from Gomulka, we did not name anyone else, and did not respond to the personal attacks so that we would not deviate from our principled position. Our brief written declaration was well received by the delegations, and none of the 23 second-time speakers, even including Gomulka, said anything against it.

In this manner the first and more important part of the Moscow Meeting came to an end, and the commission for the final editing of the Declaration started its work. The commission met 5 days in succession. The Chinese delegation, our delegation, and other delegations with the same viewpoints as ours, waged a stern and determined struggle there. The change in the situation was clearly apparent in the commission. Not only the shift in the ratio of forces, but also the result of the resolute struggle and the courageous and unflinching stand taken, particularly, by the Chinese delegation and ours at the plenary session, was even more evident there. Many delegations of parties in a centrist position behaved with respect towards the proposals made by our delegations.

In conclusion, some amendments were made for the improvement of the draft-Declaration, whereas all the proposals intended to weaken the Declaration, to give it an opportunist character, like those of the Italians who wanted to water

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down the paragraph on Yugoslav revisionism, or the proposals of the Swedes, etc., were rejected. The Commission also rejected the thesis about "national communism", but, at the end, 4 questions remained unresolved: the assessment of the 20th and 21st Congresses, the question of the cult of the individual, the question of factions, and the inclusion in the Declaration of the principle of consultation for the achievement of unity, as proposed by the Chinese delegation.

A break of one day was taken for consultation with the heads of delegations about finding a way out. However, our delegations expressed their determination not to accept the inclusion in the Declaration of the first three of the above-mentioned four questions. Indeed, through some delegations that had taken a centrist position we had let it be understood that, if the above-mentioned questions remained in the Declaration, we would not put our signature to it.

Only at midday of the last day, as a result of our struggle and clear-cut stand, was complete unanimity reached, after the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was obliged to back down. In fact the questions under discussion were resolved as follows: the question of factions was removed from the text altogether; the Chinese proposal about consultations was included; the assessment of the 21st Congress was removed completely and only the characterization of the 20th Congress according to the 1957 Declaration remained, with the addition of a phrase on the contribution made by other parties to the enrichment of Marxism-Leninism; the formula about the cult of the individual remained, but no longer as a phenomenon connected with the whole international communist movement. After these amendments the Declaration was unanimously approved by all the delegations.

The fundamental questions about which there were different opinions are presented correctly and interpreted from the Marxist point of view. The characterization of the epoch, the problems of war and peace, the question of peaceful coexistence, the problems of the national liberation movement, of the communist movement in the capitalist countries, of the unity of the socialist camp and of the communist parties, find their correct reflection in the Declaration. The only fundamental question about which we disagreed, but on which, for the sake of unity, were obliged to make a concession, was the mentioning of the 20th Congress.

But one thing should be kept always in mind. There exists the possibility that each will try to give his own interpretation to the theses of the Declaration. The Moscow Declaration of 1957, too, was, correct, but many disagreements arose concerning its interpretation. Distortions could be made, not by revising the theses of the Declaration and replacing them with new theses, but by stressing its theses in an one-sided manner, by mentioning only one side of the question and leaving out the other. For, example, there exists the danger that in the characterization of our epoch only our forces may be emphasized or overestimated; there is the danger that, in connection with the problem of the war, the danger of war may not be properly stressed, and imperialism not exposed; there is the danger that only the policy

of the alliance with the social-democrats and the national bourgeoisie may be emphasized, and the struggle against, and criticism of, their reactionary viewpoints and actions may be left aside; there is the danger that the peaceful road of transition to socialism will be the most stressed, and the non-peaceful way not mentioned as it should be; there is the danger that revisionism may be acknowledged as the main danger only in words, and more stress laid on the struggle against dogmatism and sectarianism. Similar distortions can be made over the other problems taken up in the Declaration, too.

Hence the question arises: how will this Declaration be implemented? Will it be honoured by everyone?

We can answer this question with certainty only as far as our Party is concerned. Not only will our Party of Labour fight with might and main to implement the Declaration approved, but at the same time we feel ourselves duty-bound to fight against any one who may violate it, who may attempt to distort its content.

As far as the other parties are concerned, we hope that for the sake of unity, of the common struggle against imperialism and revisionism, for the sake of the camp of socialism and communism, they all will implement the Declaration approved. The implementation of this Declaration to the letter will mark a decisive step towards the liquidation of all disagreements in the ranks of the communist movement, will make a valuable contribution to the tempering of the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement, which is indispensable for the victory over the enemy. The Declaration itself and its content represent a real basis on which this unity can be built.

But we cannot fail to inform the Central Committee of the Party about some reservations, that are even now becoming apparent in the attitude of the Soviet leaders towards the implementation of the Declaration.

The reservations they have expressed, which in our opinion are unjustified, are these: In a speech he delivered in October, at a banquet in honour of the participants in the editing commission of the Declaration, Nikita Khrushchev himself called the Declaration a "compromise document". «As you know,» he went on, «such documents are not long-lived". Later, at the farewell banquet given in honour of the participants of the Moscow Meeting on December 2nd, that is to say, after the Declaration was signed, speaking about Yugoslavia, Nikita Khrushchev stressed that it is not a socialist country, but that its economy is developing along socialist lines(!), and that "we (the Russians) would not fight Yugoslav revisionism as the Albanians are doing, for we keep in mind that, in case of war, Yugoslavia could muster a number of divisions, and we do not want them lined up against us.»

On what is hidden behind these declarations, what is their purpose, we shall not attempt to comment. Let us wait and see. We only observed these facts, and now we are informing the Central Committee of the Party about them. Of course, in our opinion, such statements cannot give rise to optimism. They make you think that the Soviet leadership will not fight as every party should to implement the pledges

stemming from the unanimous approval of the Declaration which was signed.

V. - THE TASKS OF THE PARTY IN THE FUTURE

The activity of our delegation, its determined and principled stand, the courageous speech and all the work carried out at the Moscow Meeting, have been very good and, as we said, have given good results. We must emphasize that, as a result, the individuality of our Party has been raised, admiration and respect for its courage, its principled stand, its determination to defend Marxism-Leninism have increased immeasurably. This rejoices us, but it should not go to our heads and make us boastful. We did nothing but our duty to Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, to our Party and our people.

But, at the same time, there are a number of new problems facing us which we must solve with the wisdom characterizing our Party, with coolheadedness and intelligence.

We should be aware that our courageous and principled stand was not to the liking either of the Soviet leadership or of the representatives of some parties of the socialist and capitalist countries, and this is evident from the attacks they directed against our Party. On the other hand, as a result of the work done by the Soviet leaders with the various delegations, especially after our speech, and the slanderous lies they told the meeting against us, among many delegations there is the impression that we attacked the Soviet Union and its Communist Party.

After having spoken of the attitude towards the Soviet Union, Comrade Enver Hoxha continued:

On Relations with the Communist Party of China

In recent times our ties and relations with the Chinese comrades have become still closer. And this is explained by the fact that our two parties are following the same course, the same aim, because the principled struggle for the defence of Marxism-Leninism united the two of us and linked us closely. Some representatives of various parties in Moscow, like Zhivkov and others, tried to present the matter as if the Party of Labour of Albania acted and acts according to the instructions of the Communist Party of China. It is not necessary to stress here that our Party has its own opinion, its own view, its own individuality. It has fought for many years resolutely in defence 'of Marxism-Leninism and it continues to do so. In this struggle we found ourselves shoulder to shoulder with the Chinese comrades, who are fighting, too, with courage and determination in defence of our triumphant ideas. And on this basis, on the basis of the struggle for Marxism-Leninism, our two parties became united and firmly linked together.

It must be said that at the Bucharest Meeting we defended the Chinese comrades proceeding from the positions of Marxism-Leninism. Likewise, from these same positions we defended them also at the Moscow Meeting. But, for their part, the Chinese comrades, too, at the Moscow Meeting resolutely defended our Party and its principled positions. Allow me to put forward here what the delegate of the CP of China said in his two speeches with regard to our Party.

In the first speech he said, among other things, that the position adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in these recent times towards the Party of Labour of Albania had caused them great concern. The Soviet Union had given aid to Albania, and nobody denied that. «But,» he stressed, «can one consider as entirely insignificant the internationalist aid which the heroic and industrious Albanian people give the Soviet Union, the whole socialist camp, the international communist movement, the cause of peace throughout the world and the revolution of the peoples of various countries? In any case, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union cannot, because it has given aid to Albania, consider it permissible to use this as a privilege to interfere in the internal affairs of Albania, and neither have the Albanian comrades have in any way lost the right to solve their internal questions independently for this reason.

In these recent times the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have more than once made attacks on the Party of Labour of Albania before the Chinese comrades, stating that they will adopt towards the Marxist-Leninist Party of Labour of Albania and towards the People's Republic of Albania the same stand they adopted towards Yugoslavia, that they want to condemn the Party of Labour of Albania, cutting off any kind of aid to it, simply because the Albanian comrades defend their own views on a series of questions, and, especially at the Bucharest Meeting and after this Meeting, they did not follow the Soviet comrades in their actions directed against the Communist Party of China. In its letter of November 5, addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union even expressed its open support for anti-Party elements in Albania, calling them friends of the Soviet Union. We hope that the Soviet comrades will quietly ponder over whether, by adopting such a stand towards the Party of Labour of Albania, they are guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism or by patriarchal principles which are impermissible in the ranks of the communists. If things reach the point that all the sister parties and all the fraternal countries interfere in one another's internal affairs and provoke disruption of oneanother, without hesitating to use any means whatever, then the question arises: What will become of our great communist family? There is no doubt that such acts are absolutely incompatible with the interests of the socialist camp and of the international communist movement...».

And in the second speech he stressed:

"The delegation of the Communist Party of China is of the opinion that the questions presented by comrade Enver Hoxha in connection with the relations between the parties and states of the Soviet Union and Albania are serious and deserve serious attention and study on the part of the comrades. The comrades may not agree with this or that point of his critical remarks, but meanwhile they must base themselves only on facts and they must not, without having examined the facts, describe as calumny everything which has been said, as though the serious disagreements that have arisen between the sister parties and fraternal countries can be solved in this way. The Communist Party of China sincerely desires that the disagreements between the parties and states of the Soviet Union and Albania should be solved by means of friendly

consultations, and that the good fraternal relations that have been created between them in the course of many years will be maintained in the future, too. The interests of the socialist camp and the international communist movement require this. Some comrades insulted the delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania, a thing which is contrary to the spirit of equality between sister parties. We were astonished by the fact that even comrade Gomulka allowed himself to use offensive terms, saying that the speech of the Albanian comrades was a "dirty attack by hooligans.» Can it be said that Albania is not a socialist country, and the Party of Labour of Albania not an internationalist and communist Party? Are the Albanian comrades not waging a determined struggle against imperialism and Yugoslav revisionism? If we reflect calmly that Albania is a small country in our socialist camp and is surrounded by enemies, it will be difficult to believe that the Albanian comrades treat others with contempt. Offensive words addressed to the Albanian comrades are no contribution either to the solidarity of the international communist movement or to the improvement of the relations between the Soviet Union and Alba-

Some comrades allowed themselves to declare that the speech of the Albanian comrades is allegedly a result of the factional activity the Chinese comrades are carrying out, indeed they declared that this was a "distribution of roles" between the Albanian and Chinese comrades. It is very difficult for us to understand how these comrades could invent such tales. If the fact that the Albanian and Chinese comrades expressed identical views on a series of questions is to be called factional activity or the result of factional activity, the question arises: How can we call the expression of identical views by the comrades of the other sister parties? Comrades, in our ranks, in the ranks of the sister parties, such an atmosphere of irresponsibility and injustice has been manifested. This cannot fail to cause us serious concern..."

Our Party of Labour is grateful to the sister Party of China for its internationalist and Marxist-Leninist support.

In the future our Party will strengthen its ties and friendship with the Communist Party of China and the great Chinese people, always upholding the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the correct line always pursued by the Central Committee of our Party.

On the discussion of these questions in the Party and at the Congress

Sofar, the Central Committee of the Party has informed the Party, through a special letter, only about the Bucharest Meeting. We think that now, with another letter, we must inform the party organizations of the Moscow Meeting and the contradictions which exist between our Party and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We think this letter of the Central Committee should be analysed and discussed at district party conferences (or in actives), and then in the party branches. It would be good if all this work can be completed before the Congress, so that the delegates, who come to the Congress, will be aware of these problems beforehand.

The party organizations must see to it that our people, in the first place the communists, further enhance their revolutionary political vigilance and devote more attention to the problems of production, the realization of economic plans, in industry, construction, the mines, trade, agriculture, etc. In the present conditions total mobilization is needed, indeed a ten-fold increase of the enthusiasm and the determination of the masses, to cope with the difficulties and obstacles ahead of us, so that both the Party and the people emerge successful.

As to the Party Congress, we think that it is better to postpone it, hold it towards the beginning of February, so that we shall have time to put the questions, of which we spoke, before the Party and also to prepare ourselves better for the Congress.

Comrades,

These were the questions we wanted to report to the Plenum. Our Party, as always, will march forward towards new victories under the banner of Marxism-Leninism. We shall achieve ever greater successes, for we are on a correct road, we are fighting for a noble cause, and there is and will be no obstacle, or difficulty that can stop our triumphant advance.

^{*)} The abridgements are made by the editor on the full text of the original published in the 19th Volume of the Works of Comrade Enver Hoxha.

THE ROAD OF STRU OVER KHRUSHCHEV

by RAMIZ ALIA

Comrade Enver Hoxha's historic speech at the Moscow Meeting, as well as all the documents of the 19th volume of his Works,

Meeting, as well arouse, in the Albanian communists and all the working masses, a legitimate pride towards their heroic Party, towards its revolutionary line, its unwavering loyalty to Marxism_Leninism and proletarian internationalism

FIFTEEN YEARS HAVE GONE BY SINCE COMRADE ENVER HOXHA DELIVERED HIS HISTORICAL SPEECH AT THE MEETING OF 81 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES IN MOSCOW. UPHOLDING COMMUNIST PRINCIPLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY DETERMINATION, COMRADE ENVER HOXHA DEMOLISHED THE ANTI-MARXIST THESES OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV AND HIS FOLLOWERS, EXPOSED THE POLITICAL PLATFORM OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, BROUGHT OUT INTO THE LIGHT OF DAY ITS MURKY, BEHIND-THE-SCENES MANOEUVRES, ITS INTRIGUES AND PLOTS AGAINST THE C. P. OF CHINA AND THE PARTY OF LABOUR OF ALBANIA, AGAINST THE REVOLUTION AND SOCIALISM.

THE MATERIALS OF THE 19TH VOLUME OF THE WORKS OF COMRADE ENVER HOXHA, WHICH WAS PUT INTO CIRCULATION RECENTLY, INCLUDE THE SPEECHES, REPORTS, LETTERS, AND RADIOGRAMS HE WROTE DURING THE PERIOD JUNE TO DECEMBER, 1960. THEY THROW A POWERFUL LIGHT ON THAT RESOLUTE STRUGGLE WHICH OUR PARTY AND COMRADE ENVER HOXHA WAGED AGAINST KHRUSHCHEVITE REVISIONISM AND ARE A GREAT ASSISTANCE TO GAINING A THOROUGH AND ALL-ROUND UNDERSTANDING OF THE HISTORICAL WORLD IMPORTANCE OF THIS STRUGGLE, TO SEEING IN ALL ITS CLARITY, THE CORRECTNESS OF THE LINE OF THE PARTY OF LABOUR OF ALBANIA.

Comrade Enver Hoxha's writings in this volume reflect the direct confrontation of our Party with the Khrushchev group and the beginning of the open struggle on a broad front against Soviet revisionism. This volume contains mainly writings and materials unpublished until now, which show at length and in detail the stand and struggle of the Party and Comrade Enver Hoxha in the complicated situations in which the Bucharest Meeting, the preparations for, and the meeting of, the 81 parties took place. They reflect the determined, sharp, and stern struggle the Party has waged against the pressure, interference, and sabotage of the Soviet leaders against our country after Bucharest. The historic speech Comrade Enver Hoxha delivered at the

Moscow Meeting, his reports and contributions to the discussions in the Central Committee and the Political Bureau which deal with questions in connection with the struggle and stand of our Party against Khrushchevite revisionism, the correspondence with our delegation in Bucharest, at the preparatory commission for the Moscow Meeting, at the U.N.O., etc., are published in this volume.

Nineteen sixty was a time when, as a consequence of the betrayal by the Soviet leading group headed by Khrushchev, a regressive revisionist trend was spreading rapidly. The international communist and workers' movement was faced with a fierce counter-revolutionary attack. Against the strategy and tactics of the movement, against the theory and practice of the

RAMIZ ALIA – Member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CC of the PLA. Article published in "Zëri i Popullit", organ of the Central Committee of the PLA, on November 16, 1975.

GGLE AND VICTORY ITE REVISIONISM

revolution, all reaction, together with the Khrushchevites, had drawn the sword.

The communists and revolutionaries found themselves facing a great test and responsibility. The problem was acute. What side would they take at this moment so critical for the international communist movement and socialism? With Marxism-Leninism and the revolution, or with revisionism and counter-revolution, with the Soviet leadership which was betraying socialism, or against it?

Today, when the Soviet Union has been turned into an imperialist superpower, when the revisionist parties have degenerated into a counter-revolutionary force, this choice may seem simple. But at that time it was not so. The Soviet Union was still considered by the majority of the communists and broad sections of the international working class and public opinion, who knew nothing about the facts, as the centre of the world revolution. There were many people who identified the Soviet leadership with the heroic past of the Soviet Union of the time of Lenin and Stalin. On the other hand, the problems were not as clear as they are today. Because of the revisionist propaganda, which made great play with the names of Marx and Lenin, many phenomena were presented in a distorted way, while the development of many others was in the embryonic stage. ideological deviations, in many cases, were confounded with errors of a practical character, and so on.

Thus, to come out openly and publicly denounce the ideological platform and political line of the Khrushchevites required, first and foremost, sound Marxist-Leninist convictions, profound knowledge of the situation, great ideo-theoretical abilities to analyse the events and phenomena of the time in a scientific way and to see the perspective clearly. On the other hand, great political and ideological courage and determination were needed, because, to come out against the Khrushchevites meant to swim against the tide, to rise against the "authorities" and the "law-makers" of Marxism, to accept a battle with very great dangers. It was not just the "anathemas" of the revisionists that would descend upon us. but the consequences of the Khrushchevite vengeance, the blockades and sabotage, perhaps even military aggression.

The writings of the 19th volume explain and make it possible to understand precisely why the Party of Labour of Albania, a party of a small country and relatively new, rose against the revisionist line of the Khrushchevite leadership, why it was able to maintain such a principled and revolutionary stand and take such a great responsibility before its own people and international communism.

The Party of Labour of Albania was born in the fury of the National Liberation War and grew up in the revolution for the liberation of the country, in the struggle for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the construction of socialism. It had learned Marxism, not from books and conferences, but in the heat of a stern class struggle, in battles and clashes with enemies of all kinds and descriptions. The Albanian communists had waged a protracted, consistent, and principled struggle against Yugoslav revisionism, against its anti-Marxist theories and practices.

The steel-like unity of the Party around its leadership with Comrade Enver Hoxha at the head, as well as the unbreakable unity of the people around the Party, had been tempered in war and revolution. It was a Marxist-Leninist unity, based on a correct line tested in daily revolutionary practice.

In the principled and unyielding Marxist-Leninist stand adopted by our Party against revisionism, a special merit belongs to its founder and leader, Comrade Enver Hoxha. It is he who hammered out the correct line of the Party at all the stages of the development of the revolution, who forged the steel-like Marxist-Leninist unity of its ranks, the unity of thought and action, the revolutionary courage and determination of the Albanian communists.

The writings of the 19th volume are a brilliant example of unwavering loyalty to, and defence of, Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism. They testify to the wise, principled, and resolute stand which Comrade Enver Hoxha maintains at the most com-

plicated and delicate moments, to the astute and skilful tactics he adopts to cope with the revisionist attacks, the correct road he chooses to fight the enemies and carry the Party to victory.

The documents of the 19th volume reflected that special care which Comrade Enver Hoxha always takes to consult the comrades of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee on all problems, the great strength he finds in the opinion and stands of the Party. They reflect his faith in his comrades and fellow fighters, the great courage with which he arms them. Addressing the comrades at the 17th Plenum of the CC in July, 1960, Comrade Enver Hoxha said: "You cannot imagine what great strength we have gained here, from this Plenum of the Central Committee, what great lessons we have learned from you about the courage we must display in the future... The way the CC has armed us, if we have not wavered in ten encounters, now we shall not waver in a thousand encounters.1,

At the most critical moment for the cause of communism, the Party of Labour of Albania chose the only correct road, that of direct, open struggle with Khrush-chevite revisionism. This choice expressed the opinion, will and desire of all the communists and all the Albanian people. The CC of the Party did a colossal amount of intensive work to cope with the situations created, to work out its attitudes and prepare the Party for the new battle against Soviet revisionism. Five Plenums of the Central Committee were held from July to December 1960.

The exposure by the Party of Labour of Albania and the Communist Party of China of the Soviet leadership at the Moscow Meeting marks a decisive turning point in the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. At the Moscow Meeting a clearcut demarcation line was drawn between Marxism-Leninism and Khrushchevite pseudo-Marxism. There the way of the fighters for socialism parted from that of the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, the way of the Marxist-Leninists from that of the revisionists.

The Moscow Meeting was turned into an arena of fierce ideological struggle between the revolutionary proletarian line, represented by the CP of China and the PLA, and the opportunist line, represented by the Soviet leadership that had abandoned the priciples of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and had taken the road of open betrayal.

The Soviet leadership aimed to impose the course of the 20th Congress on the whole communist movement. This course, disguised with demagogic slogans of "creative Marxism", was an expression of the wide-ranging plot of the Khrush-chevites to liquidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, to side-track the communist parties from Marxism-Leninism, to replace class struggle with class conciliation and the revolution with bourgeois reforms, to subject all the parties to the dictate of Moscow.

In order to achieve these aims, the Soviet revisionist leaders clamorously trumpeted Khrushchevite peaceful coexistence, a world without arms and without wars, the peaceful parliamentary road, and preached that imperialism and its chieftains had become reasonable, and changed their aggressive nature, and so on. They attacked Stalin, his work and his teachings linked up with Yugoslav revisionism, and intensified their sabotage and attacks against the revolutionary forces that defended Marxism-Leninism.

The Party of Labour of Albania and Comrade Enver Hoxha rose resolutely and opened fire against this line of betrayal and very dangerous plan of the Khrushchevite revisionists.

Our Party had never been reconciled to the essence of the theses of the 20th Congress or the actions of N. Khrushchev. Through party channels, our Party had told the Soviet leaders of these objections. Nevertheless, while upholding its own views, which were not in accord with the Khrushchevite theses, in its propaganda and concrete activity, for tactical reasons, as well as because of the fact that the Soviet leaders themselves, especially Khrushchev, were saying one thing today and something different tomorrow,

until 1960 our Party had not come out in open public polemics.

But then came Bucharest. Khrushchev launched an open attack against the Communist Party of China and all those who were defending Marxism-Leninism and hindering the realization of the diabolical plans of the revisionists. Our Party and Comrade Enver Hoxha judged that now the cup was full. A clearcut and resolute stand had to be adopted against Khrushchev and his followers. Khrushchev's arrogance and brutality, his behaviour as an overlord and a boss had to be attacked. The opportunism of the Soviet leaders had to be unmasked.

At Bucharest, our Party, in a lofty internationalist spirit, came out in defence of the CP of China. Regardless of the consequences, it resolutely opposed the Khrushchevite plot. In the 19th volume, especially in the radiograms sent to Comrade Hysni Kapo in Bucharest, there are very interesting materials which speak of the great importance the Party and Comrade Enver Hoxha attached to the exposure of the anti-Chinese campaign of the Khrushchevites and the defence of the CP of China with Comrade Mao Tsetung at the head, as well as of the skilful tactics and clear stand which our Party adopted.

Bucharest represents the first open clash with Khrushchevite revisionism, but our Party decided to wage the decisive battle in Moscow, before the broad forum of 81 parties. Its aim was to expose Krushchevite revisionism ideologically and politically, to appeal for unity of the revolutionary forces, to raise high the banner of Leninism which the revisionists had trampled in the mud.

Comrade Enver Hoxha stressed that we were not suffering from any lack of declarations, that "our task is not just to add to the collection of declarations", that the Moscow meeting must not be a conciliatory, pacifist meeting to gloss over the grave mistakes. "We cannot allow the Moscow Meeting to be a meeting of revisionists and Right pacifists", he stressed. "We shall struggle to make it a militant, constructive, Marxist meeting. There is no other ways".

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Comrade Enver Hoxha's speech at the Meeting of 81 parties, which will always retain great contemporary value, reflects the line of the struggle of our Party against Khrushchevite revisionism. A devastating criticism is made in it of the opportunist views of the Soviet leaders in all their essential manifestations, and the attitude of the Party of Labour of Albania is presented on the most important problems of world development, strategy and tactics, and relations among the communist parties and socialist countries.

In Moscow Comrade Enver Hoxha hit right on the mark. He showed that the origin of the evil which had appeared in the communist movement should be sought in the 20th Congress and its decisions. That was the source of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the events in Poland, of the great upheavals in a number of parties, and the upsurge of anticommunist hysteria. With incontestable arguments, Comrade Enver Hoxha refuted the revisionist theses and anti-Marxist acts of the Soviet leaders one by one, and revealed their reactionary aims.

He dwelt at length on the analysis of imperialism and the problems of war and peace, and, in opposition to the Khrushchevite view, emphasized the opinion of our Party that, "imperialism, and in the first place US imperialism, has changed neither its hide, its hair, nor its nature"; that "imperialism is aggressive and will remain aggressive, as long as it has a single tooth left in its mouth".

Comrade Enver Hoxha exposed and dealt a telling blow to Khrushhev's so-called peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev's coexistence reflected the strategic plan of the Soviet leadership to achieve a rapprochement and close collaboration with imperialism, with the aim that these two together would liquidate the revolution, stamp out the liberation wars, and preserve and extend their spheres of influence. This was a major diversion to disarm the masses ideologically and politically, to leave them defenceless in the face of the coming attacks of imperialism and social-imperialism.

Life has fully confirmed the correctness of the views of the Party of Labour of Albania. Even today, 15 years later, US imperialism, along with the new Soviet imperialism, constitute the greatest danger to the peoples, to their freedom, and to the revolution. The historic experience, the protracted and allround struggle of the revolutionary forces in defence of the anti-imperialist line and the mobilization of the masses around this line, have taught peoples not to harbour any illusion whatever about imperialism, old or new, and not to permit any underestimation of them.

In his speech at the Moscow Meeting, Comrade Enver Hoxha made a powerful exposure of the opportunist thesis of the peaceful road as a revision of the fundamental question of Marxism, as an effort to persuade the workers to give up the revolutionary class struggle. He emphasized that "no people, no proletariat, no communist or workers' party, has taken power without bloodshed and violence". Again time has fully confirmed the views of our Party. The revisionists' peaceful road to socialism brought about the tragedies in Indonesia and Chile.

In his speech to the representatives of the 81 parties, Comrade Enver Hoxha revealed the hostile aims of the revisionist campaign against Stalin, and strongly defended Stalin's name and work. The Khrushchevites slandered and attacked Stalin because, without the elimination of Stalin, they could not have opened the gates to revisionism and the bourgeois ideology, to the counter-revolutionary transformations in the Soviet Union, they could not have negated the historic experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat and "dethroned" Leninism. They invented the so-called struggle against the «cult of the individual» and against "Stalinism", in order to interfere brutally in the internal affairs of other parties, to change their leaderships and bring to power opportunist and revisionist elements wherever they could.

In defending Stalin, our Party defended Leninism, defended the socialist victories the Soviet Union had achieved, defended the revolutionary line of the communist movement, in which the historic role and great contribution of Stalin remain immortal. "The Party of Labour of Albania," declared Comrade Enver Hoxha, "thinks that it is not right, normal, or Marxist, for the great name and work of Stalin to be erased from this whole epoch as is being done. All of us should defend the splendid and immortal work of Stalin. He who does not defend it is an opportunist and a coward."

Concerning Yugoslav revisionism, in sternly condemning the stand of the Soviet leadership towards it, Comrade Enver Hoxha made a profound analysis and criticism of the opportunist ideological content and the hostile activity of Yugoslav revisionism. He emphasized that the struggle against modern revisionism had not ended, as the Soviet leadership claimed, that modern revisionism always remained the main danger for the international communist movement. Revisionism must be combatted wherever it is practiced, in all the forms and aspects in which it manifests itself. If revisionism is conceived and treated as a passing phenomenon, as something localized, then, in practice, it will not be fought, the roads through which it spreads will not be closed.

The stand of the Party of Labour of Albania in Bucharest, and Moscow derived from its profound concern for the fate of the revolution and socialism, for the Marxist-Leninist unity of the international communist movement.

With the aim of establishing their hegemony and rule in the relations with the communist parties and socialist countries, the Soviet revisionist leaders brutally trampled under foot all norms and principles. Against these anti-Marxist methods and actions, behind which stood great state chauvinism, our Party and Comrade Enver Hoxha rose in powerful struggle. By courageously, criticising the Khrushchevite plot against the CP of China in Bucharest, as well as Khrushchev's attempts to subjugate all the communist parties and direct them according to his desire. Comrade Enver Hoxha defended the Leninist principles of independence and equality that should exist

in the relations between the communist parties and socialist states.

At the Moscow Meeting, Comrade Enver Hoxha, expressing the will of the Party of Labour and the whole Albanian people, denounced the chauvinist line and actions of the Khrushchevites towards the People's Republic of Albania, particularly their hostile actions following the Bucharest Meeting, rejected the revisionist accusations and slanders, and resolutely defended the Party of Labour and the PR of Albania.

Fifteen years have gone by since the Moscow Meeting. At that time, while denouncing the revisionist course of the Soviet leadership, our Party, worried about the future of the Soviet Union, called on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to change its course before it was too late, to return to the Leninist road. However, the Khrushchevite leadership stood on its anti-Marxist positions and went rapidly down the road of betrayal. Today, everybody can see the consequences of this catastrophic course.

The Khrushchevite betrayal liquidated the dictatorship of the proletariat that had emerged from the October Revolution. Its place has been taken by the dictatorship of the revisionist bourgeoisie, represented by the strata of the bureaucrats, the technocrats, the top-ranking military men, and the intelligentsia.

The new economic reforms destroyed the entire socialist structure. The ideology, culture, morality, way of life, have assumed bourgeois content and forms and have led to the degeneration of spiritual life. The Soviet Union has been transformed into the extinguisher of the revolution and a social-imperialist superpower.

Embracing revisionism has brought painful consequences in the former socialist countries that followed the Khrushchevite road. They are now under a double oppression – under the oppression of the local revisionist cliques and the yoke of Soviet social-imperialism. The political, economic, and military integration of these countries into the central Soviet state system is gradually eliminating even that formal independence they once had. As Comrade Enver Hoxha warned in

Moscow, the Warsaw Treaty, COMECON, and the other joint organizations, have been transformed into instruments of Soviet domination.

The communist parties which followed the Soviet leadership have degenerated completely. Now there is nothing Leninist about them. They have erased any class boundary with the bourgeoisie. Their latest orientation for the achievement of an alliance and close collaboration with the big bourgeois parties, as the Togliatti revisionists are doing, also marks the public capitulation of the revisionist parties to the bourgeoisie.

The entire revisionist camp is characterized by contradictions, disintegration, and fragmentation into different trends and groupings. The Soviet revisionist leaders are failing to organize a new meeting of the revisionists, that has long been planned. They are failing to keep control of the different detachments of modern revisionism, which are less and less obeying Moscow's desires.

By contrast, an excellent situation characterizes socialist Albania. When we contemplate this situation, we can understand more clearly just how life-saving and opportune was that principled and resolute stand of our Party, just how correct and revolutionary was the line of its irreconcilable and uncompromising struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism.

When our Party began the open struggle against the Soviet revisionists, when it exposed their anti-Marxist activity, the Khrushchevites were infuriated and did everything they could against socialist Albania. But the Party did not waver, nor was it intimidated. It had long since taken its decision. "Even if we Albanians have to go without bread," declared Comrade Enver Hoxha at the meeting of the Political Bureau on the eve of the Moscow Meeting, "we will not violate our principles; we will not betray Marxism-Leninism. Let all our friends and enemies be clear on this."

The enemies expected Albania to capitulate. But they made a bad mistake. Albania did not capitulate, it was not deceived and it was not subjugated, neither

by the blockade, nor by the savage pressure of the revisionists. Socialist Albania always stands loyal to Marxism-Leninism and is advancing triumphantly on the road of socialist construction. The depressions, disorders, and crises which prevail today in the revisionist countries and the entire capitalist world are unknown in Albania.

Socialist Albania is linked in a sincere and fraternal friendship with the Great China of Mao Tsetung. This friendship and this fraternal cooperation is founded on loyalty to the principles, correct and consistent implementation of Marxism Leninism and proletarian internationalism, determination to defend and serve the cause of the revolution and the liberation of the peoples to the end. The struggle of the Communist Party of China, with Comrade Mao Tsetung at the head, against Khrushchevite revisionism, its contribution to the defence of Marxism-Leninism, its support for the revolutionary and liberation forces, will always be valued and respected, as an outstanding example of revolutionary determination and devotion to the cause of communism.

A great success of Marxism-Leninism over revisionism is the creation of new Marxist-Leninist organizations and parties. Today, these parties are correctly solving a series of important ideological, political and organizational problems which crop up in life and in the revolutionary struggle, and more and more consolidating their Marxist-Leninist unity, extending their links with the masses and taking an active part in the big class battles against capitalism and imperialism.

The open struggle and polemics which the Party of Labour of Albania, the Communist Party of China, and the other Marxist-Leninist forces began in 1960 against Khrushchevite revisionism, have not finished. They must continue and be intensified uninterruptedly. This is vital, because the present-day Soviet leadership, headed by Brezhnev, who is the direct heir and successor of Khrushchev, has deepened the counter-revolutionary anti-Marxist line of revisionism even further, he has come out openly with the banner of hegemonism and

imperialist expansionism. The other revisionist parties in different countries are carrying on poisonous and disorientating activity among the working class and the working masses, and together with the social democrats and the bourgeoisie, are fighting against the sound revolutionary forces and sabotaging the revolution and the liberation struggles of the peoples.

* * *

While waging a fierce struggle, in all fields, against Khrushchevite revisionism, the Party of Labour of Albania has known how it should profit from this struggle and draw useful lessons from the negative experience of the revisionist degeneration in the Soviet Union and other countries

The Party of Labour of Albania, in the historic struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism, while relentlessly exposing the revisionist line and program of bourgeois degeneration and the re-establishment of capitalism, has simultaneously worked out a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line and program on how to carry forward the revolution and the construction of socialism uninterruptedly, how to block the road to the danger of revisionism and turning back to capitalism. This program, which constitutes a new contribution to the theory and practice of scientific socialism, has found and is finding its implementation in Albania, day by day. It has confirmed that the spread of revisionism in the socialist countries is not inevitable, as the bourgeois ideologists claim, because the advance of socialism is unceasing when a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line is consistently implemented.

Our Party has waged the class struggle in a correct way, it has ceaselessly strengthened and perfected the leading role of the Party in every field, has continuously strengthened the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, by deepening the struggle against bureaucracy and liberalism, has implemented the line of the masses and the direct control of the working class and the Marxist-Leninist principle of self-reliance in the construc-

tion of socialism. Our Party and people's state power have strengthened the defence of the country through arming the whole people and giving them military training, they have resolutely combatted the foreign ideological aggression and have successfully stood up to the imperialist-revisionist blockades and encirclement. Experience has taught our Party and people to be always vigilant against the external and internal enemies. It has shown them that, in the protracted process of socialist construction, particularly at the moments when the class struggle assumes an even greater fierceness, or when the pressure of the imperialist-revisionist encirclement increases, the hidden enemies raise their heads, and, in collaboration with international revisionism and reaction, try to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat, to create premises and situations for the overthrow of socialism and the restoration of capitalism. The new materials which are published in 19th volume in regard to the enemies of the Party, Koço Tashko, Liri Belishova, and others as well as all the past and present experience of the struggle of the Party and the masses against hostile and traitor elements, show that there is a direct link between the foreign and internal enemies, and especially with the revisionists, a coordination of action to attack the Party, the people's state power, the unity and security of our Homeland.

Degenerate people such as these, at the service of the enemies, will never find a crack in the ranks of our Party or in the Party-people unity, they will never find fertile ground for their diabolical undermining work. "The class struggle," says Comrade Enver Hoxha, "which our Party and people are carrying out with so much success, determination and vigilance, exposes and mercilessly crushes these corrupted elements of our society."

Comrade Enver Hoxha's historic speech at the Moscow Meeting, as well as all the documents of the 19th volume of his Works, arouse in the Albanian communists, and in all the working masses, a legitimate pride towards their heroic Party, towards its revolutionary line, its

unwavering loyalty to Marxism Leninism and proletarian internationalism. They are enthused by its unyielding struggle, are filled with new courage and strength to stand unflinching and emerge victorious in the battles in which the Party leads us. From the materials of the 19th Volume of Comrade Enver Hoxha's Works, the communists understand even better that the only correct policy is the principled policy, and that the basis, the foundation of all our victories is the correct line of the Party.

It is the duty of the communists and our entire people to engage even more persistently in the study of Marxism-Leninism, the documents of our Party, and the Works of Comrade Enver Hoxha. Particular care should be devoted to the assimilation of all the materials contained in the 19th Volume. They give as an important theoretical basis and rich experience to fight and win in the struggle against modern revisionism and all the enemies of socialism, to understand the various situations which are created in the world, to courageously defend the correct line of our Party, always and in all circumstances, to defend the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. These materials educate and inspire us to carry forward the cause of the Party and socialism.

The heroic struggle of our Party, fills us with that great and unwavering faith and conviction, that there is no force in the world which can conquer a genuine communist Party and a revolutionary and patriotic people, such as the Party of Labour and the Albanian people, there is no force which can conquer Marxism-Leninism. On our road and in our struggle, we are not alone. Hundreds of millions of people on all continents are fighting and thinking, just as we Albanians fight and think. The revolution is advancing everywhere. The future belongs to Marxism-Leninism, socialism, and the freedom and independence of the peoples.

^{1.} E. Hoxha, Works, vol. 19, p. 67, (Alb. ed.).

^{2.} Ibid., p. 290.

^{3.} Ibid., p. 457.

^{4.} Ibid., p. 338.

FROM THE LIFE OF THE COUNTRY

The November 7 and 8 Holidays Celebrated with Joy

This year the Albanian people celebrated November 7 and 8, the 58th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the 34th aniversary of the Founding of the Party of Labour of Albania with the customary dignity. On this occasion, numerous activities were organized throughout the entire country. In the Capital, thousands of people made organized visits to the «Lenin-Stalin» Museum and the museum-house where the Albanian Communist Party was created in 1941. During the preceding days, many talks and discussion evenings were organized in work and production centres, agricultural cooperatives and city quarters, in schools and cultural institutions, devoted to the historic importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution and to the great role played by the Albanian Communist Party, today the Party of Labour of Albania, founded in 1941 by comrade Enver Hoxha.

In the main cities of the country, commemorative meetings were organized on November 7 and 8, which were addressed by representatives of the Party Committees and leading cadres. The addresses were followed by artistic programmes dedicated to the two important events.

The entire press of the country, central and local, devoted editorial articles to the two memorable events. These articles and other materials pointed out the historic importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which opened a new era in the history of mankind, the era of the destruction of capitalism and the triumph of socialism, as well as the decisive role which the Party of Labour of Albania has played in the majestic successes attained by Albania, once the most backward country in Europe and today a beacon-light of socialism.

In its article dedicated to the 58th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "Zëri i Popullit", organ of the CC of the PLA, writes among other things:

"The Great October Socialist Revolution was the glorious deed of the Russian proletariat, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks of Lenin and Stalin. It triumphed because the Communist Party (b), with Lenin and Stalin at the head, faithfully, and farsightedly, implemented the teachings of Marx and Engels on the arm-

ed uprising, for the overthrow of the oppressive and exploiting feudo-bourgeois state power by revolutionary violence. It triumphed because it had as a leading force such a tried and tested party, as the Party of the Bolsheviks of that time, a strong party, with revolutionary experience, with steel-like discipline, with extensive and close ties with the toiling masses.

The Great October Socialist Revolution proved in practice the real possibility of the victory of socialism in a single country. It shook the capitalist world to its very foundations and inflicted a mortal wound on the international bourgeoisie. Under the influence of this revolution the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples assumed an unprecedented upsurge.

The emergence of modern revisionism on the arena of history, particularly the usurpation of the state power by the Khrushchev clique in the homeland of the October Revolution, marked the great regressive turning-point in the Soviet Union. The revisionist counterrevolutionary traitors launched a furious attack on the glorious period of the historic victories achieved under the leadership of the genius of this revolution, V. I. Lenin, and later of J.V.Stalin. They struck at Leninism and trampled the ideals of the October Revolution in the mud, they attacked and liquidated the dictatorship of the proletariat, rehabilitated the enemies alive and dead, of the Soviet state power, and restored capitalism.

The renegade Khrushchev clique turned the Soviet Union, from the support of the revolutionary peoples of the world, into their savage enemy.

The ideas of great October, which the revisionist usurpers have sullied, are a powerful force in the minds of the international proletariat, of the exploited working masses and peoples, of all the genuine revolutionaries. The Khrushchevite modern revisionists can never bury them. The ideas of the October Socialist Revolution were born and matured in the ranks of the Russian proletariat and became part of the life and struggle of the international proletariat and the revolutionary peoples. They are immortal and call for courage, sacrifice, the rebirth of the revolutionary

spirit and traditions of the times of Lenin and Stalin, so that the revolutionary masses come out again on the battle-field, to smash the traitor cliques, to carry out the proletarian revolution once more, to destroy the bourgeois-revisionist dictatorship and restore the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Party of Labour of Albania, should-der to shoulder with the Communist Party of China, with all the Marxist-Leninist parties and forces in the world, is carrying the banner of Marxism-Leninism and the October Revolution.

In its article dedicated to the 34th anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Communist Party (today the PLA), "Zēri i Popullit" writes:

"In those difficult times, 34 years ago, when the fascist darkness, terror and death hung over our country and the whole of Europe, the creation of the Communist Party of Albania by the Albanian

communists with comrade Enver Hoxha at the head, was a brilliant ray of light for our much-suffering people, the great hope for the realization of their age-old aspirations, the beginning of the era which opened the road to true freedom and socialism in our country, an era of heroic struggles and titanic transforming work which our people significantly call the Era of the Party.

The Party of Labour of Albania, which consistently follows the Leninist precepts on the Party, is a strong and organized party, tested in battles, an ideologically and politically pure party, determined and capable of successfully carrying forward the cause of the working class. Precisely because our Party is such, the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country stands and will remain invincible, steel-like; that regressive phenomenon which occurred in the Soviet Union and in some other countries, where the birth of revisionism and

the restoration of capitalism began with the degeneration of the Party, did not and will never occur. Our Party never forgets that the class struggle continues both within and outside the country, that the pressure of the bourgeois and revisionist ideology is strong. Therefore, the continuous strengthening and tempering of the Party itself, its unceasing revolutionization, its fighting leading role in the socialist society, has been and always remains at the centre of attention of our Party.

The 30 year history of the PLA clearly speaks of that great truth of which comrade Enver Hoxha has said: "As it was born, as it continued, so our Party will go on its way: as a Party of the revolution, as a Party of the struggle for the freedom, independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of our people and Homeland, for socialism and comunism, as a Marxist-Leninist Party".

Important Centre of Education of the Cadres with the Teachings of Marxism-Leninism

November 8 this year, saw 30 years completed since the day of the opening in Tirana of the «V.I.Lenin» Higher Party School. This is the most important centre in Albania for the education of the cadres with the Marxis-Leninist theory and the teachings of the Party.

To commemorate this important event a meeting was organized at the school, attended, in addition to the students and teaching staff, by many invited guests, including the Members and Alternate Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PLA, Hekuran Isai, Hysni Kapo, Manush Myftiu, Mehmet Shehu, Ramiz Alia, Rita Marko, Llambi Gegprifti, Qiriako Mihali, and Khafer Spahiu.

The main address was delivered by the Vice-director Jorgji Sota, who said, among other things, that during the 30 years 11.000 Party cadres have sat at the desks in this school, 65 per cent of whom during the last five years alone.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the PLA and comrade Enver Hoxha personally, those present at the meeting were greeted by the Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mehmet Shehu.

"Comrade Enver Hoxha", he said among other things, "teaches us that communist education is the basis of communist action, that the education of our cadres must be firmly based on the theory of Marxism-Leninism, on the precepts of our great classical teachers — Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin — and on the teachings of our Party. The 34 years of the Party are a revolutionary school, they are filled with vivid lessons in the correct, revolutionary, creative application of the Marxist-Leninist theory in the concrete conditions of Albania".

Then comrade Mehmet Shehu spoke of the lessons we must draw from the bitter experience of what has occurred in the Soviet Union which has been turned by the modern revisionists, from the first socialist country in the world, into a social-imperialist state. *Not only must we never forget the teachings of the Party and comrade Enver Hoxha, their profound

analyses of the causes which led the Soviet Union to catastrophe, and the harm which this has done to the world revolution, he said, but we must continually deepen our understanding at them.

*Among the factors that caused the loss of the achievements of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union and in many former socialist countries», comrade Mehmet Shehu went on, *were the lack of a really revolutionary Marxist-Leninist education, which led to the degeneration of the cadres, their separation from the masses, the running after individual interest and placing it above collective interest, the flourishing of bureaucracy and liberalism, which led to the creation of a stratum of privileged people of the new bourgeoisie, with revisionist views and ideology.

In its day to day struggle for the consolidation of the positions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its further strengthening, for the consistent implementation of its line our Party has always borne these teachings in mind, but it will never cease emphasizing the necessity that each one of us, without exception, should strive every day to gain a deeper understanding in these great issues.

In conclusion comrade Mehmet Shehu said:

"We should be proud of the great victories attained by our Party. Our historic duty as militants of the Party and the revolution, is to carry these victories forward,

consolidate them, strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, improve and deepen the communist education of people, strengthen our vigilance and readiness for the defence of the homeland, work tirelessly and with lofty consciousness, constantly deepen the class struggle, always in the interest of the proletariat. Experience has shown that the nearer the enemy approaches his grave, the more he strives with tooth and nail, multiplies his efforts to restore, to regain his lost para-

dise, as Lenin says. Therefore, we should wage the class struggle consistently under the leadership of the Party. Then the perpetuation of the revolution in Albania is ensured also for the generations that will come after us».

The 3rd Session of the 8th Legislature of the People's Assembly

The 3rd session of the 8th Legislature of the People's Assembly was held on November 17, in a revolutionary atmosphere, when the Albanian people, under the leadership of the Party, are fighting heroically to fulfill the tasks of the last year of the 5th Five-year Plan ahead of schedule.

At this session the Member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Hysni Kapo, deputy of the Vlora district, on behalf of the CC of the PLA delivered the report •On drawing up the new Draft Consti-

tution of the People's Republic of Alba-

The deputies unanimously approved the report presented by comrade Hysni Kapo, and the People's Assembly adopted the decision on the drafting of the new Constitution of the PRA, as well as the decision on the creation of a special commission for the drawing up of the new draft-Constitution with comrade Enver Hoxha as chairman.

On November 17, likewise, the conmission for the drawing up of the new draft-Constitution of the PRA, held its

first meeting under the chairmanship of comrade Enver Hoxha. At this meeting comrade Enver Hoxha pointed out that the duty with which the commission is charged by the People's Assembly is of great responsibility, but also a great honour.

"We shall work to fulfill this to the best of our ability, loyally, upholding the teachings of the Party, the guidelines laid down at the 3rd Session of the 8th Legislature of the People's Assembly for the drawing up of the new draft-Constitution, pointed out comrade Enver Hoxha.

The commission outlined the plan of work of drawing up the new draft-Constitution of the PRA and for the organization in the future of wide-ranging discussion of it among the people.

November 28 and 29 Celebrated with Joy

The working class, the cooperativist peasantry, the people's intelligentsia, the entire Albanian people and their armed forces celebrated with joy and revolutionary enthusiasm the 63rd anniversary of the proclamation of national independence and the 31st anniversary of the liberation of the Homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution.

On this occasion, numerous and allround political, cultural, artistic and physical culture and sports activities were organized throughout the country.

The working people honoured the memory of the martyrs, paying homage and placing wreaths on their graves.

On the occasion of November 28-29, on November 28, in the afternoon, the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania, the General Council of the Democratic Front of Albania and the Tirana District Party Committee organized a solemn meeting in Tirana.

The meeting was attended by working people from work and production centres,

central government departments, and cultural, artistic and scientific institutions of the capital, servicemen, members of martyrs' families, veterans of the National Liberation War and other invited quests.

The President of the Presidium of the People's Assembly Haxhi Lleshi, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Mehmet Shehu and other Party and State leaders were also present. The speech on the occasion was delivered by the Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Party Qirjako Mihali.

From the solemn meeting a message of greetings was sent to the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania.

Solemn meetings were organized also in other regions of the country.

On November 29, on the occasion of the 31st anniversary of the liberation of the Homeland and the triumph of the People's Revolution, the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, the Presidium of the People's Assembly and the Council of Ministers of the People's

Republic of Albania, gave a reception in the Palace of Brigades.

Participating in the reception were the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party Enver Hoxha, the President of the Presidium of the People's Assembly Haxhi Lleshi, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Mehmet Shehu and other Party and State leaders, representatives of mass organizations, distinguished working people and cooperativists, Heroes of the People and of Socialist Labour, veterans of the National Liberation war, members of martyrs' families, servicemen, workers in culture, science, art and the press, as well as other invited guests.

Present were also E.F. Hill, Chairman of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist), and his wife who are on a visit in Albania.

Present were also heads and functionaries of the diplomatic representations accredited to the People's Republic of Albania.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, the Presidium of the People's Assembly and the Council of Ministers, those present were greeted, by the Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party Pilo Peristeri.

"THE DAWN OF FREEDOM", this is how the painter Shaban Hysa
has entitled his painting (oil) dedicated to the victory of the partisan unit over the enemies
and traitors. After fierce battles the partisan forces raise the banner of freedom on all the highest peaks of the country.

Albania today

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