



J. STALIN

WORKS

12





WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao



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OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION
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И полета рии всех ст ран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ



О Г И З

ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ

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J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

TO MAO

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PREFACE

The twelfth volume of J. V. Stalin's *Works* contains writings and speeches of the period from April 1929 to June 1930.

This was a time when the Bolshevik Party was developing a general offensive of socialism along the whole front, mobilising the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the fight to reconstruct the entire national economy on a socialist basis, and to fulfil the first five-year plan. The Bolshevik Party was effecting a decisive turn in policy—the transition from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation. The Party was accomplishing a historic task of the proletarian revolution—the most difficult since the conquest of power—the switching of millions of individual peasant farms to the path of collective farming, the path of socialism.

In his speech at the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) in April 1929 on “The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B),” published in full for the first time in this volume, J. V. Stalin analyses the class changes which had taken place in the U.S.S.R. and in the capitalist countries, and points to the increasing

socialist offensive in our country against the capitalist elements of town and country and the consequent sharpening of the class struggle. J. V. Stalin shows that the partial stabilisation of capitalism was being shattered and that the elements of a revolutionary upsurge in the capitalist countries were accumulating, and he substantiates the need for intensifying the struggle against the Right elements in the Communist Parties.

J. V. Stalin denounces the anti-Party factional activities of Bukharin's group, their double-dealing and their secret negotiations with the Trotskyists for the organisation of a bloc against the Party.

J. V. Stalin stresses that the Right deviation and conciliation towards it were the chief danger at that period, exposes the Right capitulators as enemies of Leninism and agents of the kulaks, and lays bare the bourgeois-liberal, anti-revolutionary nature of the Right-opportunist "theory" that the kulaks would grow peacefully into socialism. In the struggle against the Bukharin opposition, J. V. Stalin develops Lenin's thesis that the exploiting classes must be eliminated by means of a fierce class struggle of the proletariat. He shows that the Right capitulators' opportunist line on questions of class struggle was linked with Bukharin's anti-Leninist errors concerning the theory of the state.

In the struggle against the Right opportunists, J. V. Stalin upholds and develops the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state and of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the article "Emulation and Labour Enthusiasm of the Masses," J. V. Stalin defines socialist emulation as the communist method of building socialism, as the

lever with which the working people are destined to transform the entire economic and cultural life of the country on the basis of socialism.

In "A Year of Great Change," J. V. Stalin assesses the year 1929 as one of great achievements on all fronts of socialist construction: in the sphere of labour productivity, and in the development of industry and agriculture. Noting the success of the collective-farm movement, he shows that the main mass of the peasantry—the middle peasants—were joining the collective farms, and that, as a result of the individual peasant farming taking the path of socialism, the last sources for the restoration of capitalism in the country were being eliminated.

Proceeding from V. I. Lenin's co-operative plan, J. V. Stalin elaborates the theory of collectivisation of agriculture and indicates the practical ways and means of putting it into practice.

In his speech "Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R.," J. V. Stalin exposes the bourgeois and Right-opportunist theories of "equilibrium," of "spontaneity" in socialist construction, and of the "stability" of small-peasant farming, and demonstrates the advantages of large-scale collective economy in agriculture. He defines the nature of collective farming as a socialist form of economy, and substantiates the change from the policy of restricting and ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation.

In "Dizzy With Success," "Reply to Collective-Farm Comrades" and other works, J. V. Stalin denounces

“Leftist” distortions of the Party line in the development of collective farms, indicates the ways and means of correcting these distortions, and shows that the chief and basic link in the collective-farm movement at the given stage was the agricultural artel.

This volume, contains the “Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.),” in which J. V. Stalin gives a profound analysis of the crisis of world capitalism and reveals the sharpening of the contradictions of the capitalist system. Describing the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist states, he defines the foreign policy of the Soviet state as a consistent policy of peace. He shows the growing economic progress of the U.S.S.R. and the superiority of the socialist economic system over the capitalist system, and defines the nature and tasks of the sweeping socialist offensive along the whole front. Mobilising the Party to combat deviations in the national question he shows that the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is one of the development of national cultures, socialist in content and national in form.

The volume contains hitherto unpublished letters of J. V. Stalin to Felix Kon, A. M. Gorky and Comrades Bezymensky and Rafail.

*Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)*

APRIL 1929 - JUNE 1930



THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)*

*Speech Delivered at the Plenum of
the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in April 1929¹*

(Verbatim Report)

Comrades, I shall not touch on the personal factor, although it played a rather conspicuous part in the speeches of some of the comrades of Bukharin's group. I shall not touch on it because it is a trivial matter, and it is not worth while dwelling on trivial matters. Bukharin spoke of his private correspondence with me. He read some letters and it can be seen from them that although we were still on terms of personal friendship quite recently, now we differ politically. The same note could be detected in the speeches of Uglanov and Tomsky. How does it happen, they say, we are old Bolsheviks, and suddenly we are at odds and unable to respect one another.

I think that all these moans and lamentations are not worth a brass farthing. Our organisation is not a family circle, nor an association of personal friends; it is the political party of the working class. We cannot allow interests of personal friendship to be placed above the interests of our cause.

* The present text of this speech contains over 30 pages which were not published in the press at the time.—*Ed.*

Things have come to a sorry pass, comrades, if the only reason why we are called old Bolsheviks is that we are *old*. Old Bolsheviks are respected not because they are *old*, but because they are at the same time eternally fresh, never-aging revolutionaries. If an old Bolshevik swerves from the path of the revolution, or degenerates and fails politically, then, even if he is a hundred years old, he has no right to call himself an old Bolshevik; he has no right to demand that the Party should respect him.

Further, questions of personal friendship cannot be put on a par with political questions, for, as the saying goes, friendship is all very well, but duty comes first. We all serve the working class, and if the interests of personal friendship clash with the interests of the revolution, then personal friendship must come second. As Bolsheviks we cannot have any other attitude.

I shall not touch either on the insinuations and veiled accusations of a personal nature that were contained in the speeches of comrades of the Bukharin opposition. Evidently these comrades are attempting to cover up the underlying political basis of our disagreements with insinuations and equivocations. They want to substitute petty political scheming for politics. Tomsky's speech is especially noteworthy in this respect. His was the typical speech of a trade-unionist politician who attempts to substitute petty political scheming for politics. However, that trick of theirs won't work.

Let us get down to business.

I

ONE LINE OR TWO LINES?

Have we a single, common, general line or have we two lines? That, comrades, is the basic question.

In his speech here, Rykov said that we have a single general line and that if we do have some "insignificant" disagreements, it is because there are "shades of difference" in the interpretation of the general line.

Is that correct? Unfortunately, it is not. And it is not merely incorrect, but it is absolutely contrary to the truth. If we really have only one line, and there are only shades of difference between us, then why did Bukharin run off to yesterday's Trotskyites led by Kamenev, in an effort to set up with them a factional bloc directed against the Central Committee and its Political Bureau? Is it not a fact that Bukharin spoke there of a "fatal" line of the Central Committee, of Bukharin's, Tomsky's and Rykov's disagreements in principle with the Central Committee of the Party, of the need for a drastic change in the composition of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee?

If there is only one line, why did Bukharin conspire with yesterday's Trotskyites against the Central Committee, and why did Rykov and Tomsky aid him in this undertaking?

If there is only one general line, how can one part of the Political Bureau, which supports the single, common, general line, be allowed to undermine the other part, which supports the same general line?

Can a policy of such shifts be allowed if we have a single, common, general line?

If there is only one line, how are we to account for Bukharin's declaration of January 30, which was wholly and solely aimed against the Central Committee and its general line?

If there is only one line, how are we to account for the declaration of the trio (Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky) of February 9, in which, in a brazen and grossly slanderous manner, they accuse the Party: a) of a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, b) of a policy of fostering bureaucracy, and c) of a policy of disintegrating the Comintern?

Perhaps these declarations are just ancient history? Perhaps it is now considered that these declarations were a mistake? Perhaps Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky are prepared to take back these undoubtedly mistaken and anti-Party declarations? If that is the case, let them say so frankly and honestly. Then everyone will understand that we have only one line and that there are only shades of difference between us. But, as is evident from the speeches of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, they would not do that. And not only would they not do that, but they have no intention of repudiating these declarations of theirs in the future, and they state that they adhere to their views as set forth in the declarations.

Where then is the single, common, general line?

If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of Bukharin's group, the Party line consists in pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, then do Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky really wish to join us in pursuing this fatal policy, instead of combating it? That is indeed absurd.

If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in fostering bureaucracy, then do Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky really wish to join us in fostering bureaucracy within the Party, instead of combating it? That is indeed nonsense.

If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in disintegrating the Comintern, then do Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky really wish to join us in disintegrating the Comintern, instead of combating this policy? How are we to believe such nonsense?

No, comrades, there must be something wrong with Rykov's assertion that we have a single, common line. Whichever way you look at it, if we bear in mind the facts just set forth regarding the declarations and conduct of Bukharin's group, there is something amiss with the business of one, common line.

If there is only one line, then how are we to account for the policy of resigning adopted by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky? Is it conceivable that where there is a common general line, one part of the Political Bureau would systematically refuse to implement the repeated decisions of the Central Committee of the Party and continue to sabotage Party work for six months? If we really have a single, common, general line, how are we to account for this disruptive policy of resigning that is being methodically pursued by one part of the Political Bureau?

From the history of our Party we know of examples of the policy of resigning. We know, for instance, that on the day after the October Revolution some comrades,

led by Kamenev and Zinoviev, refused the posts assigned to them and demanded that the policy of the Party should be changed. We know that at that time they sought to justify the policy of resigning by demanding the creation of a coalition government that would include the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in opposition to the Central Committee of our Party whose policy was to form a purely Bolshevik government. But at that time there was some sense in the policy of resigning, because it was based on the existence of two different lines, one of which was for forming a purely Bolshevik government, and the other for forming a coalition government jointly with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. That was clear and comprehensible. But we see no logic, no logic whatsoever, when the Bukharin opposition, on the one hand, proclaims the unity of the general line, and, on the other hand, pursues a policy of resigning, adopted from that of Zinoviev and Kamenev in the period of the October Revolution.

One thing or the other—either there is only one line, in which case Bukharin and his friends' policy of resigning is incomprehensible and inexplicable; or we have two lines, in which case the policy of resigning is perfectly comprehensible and explicable.

If there is only one line, how are we to explain the fact that the trio of the Political Bureau—Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky—deemed it possible, during the voting in the Political Bureau, to *abstain* when the main theses on the five-year plan and on the peasant question were being adopted? Does it ever happen that there is a single general line but that one section of the comrades abstains from voting on the main questions

of our economic policy? No, comrades, such wonders do not occur.

Finally, if there is only one line, and there are only shades of difference between us, why did the comrades of the Bukharin opposition—Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy—reject the compromise proposed by a commission of the Political Bureau on February 7 of this year? Is it not a fact that this compromise gave Bukharin's group a perfectly acceptable way out of the impasse in which it had landed itself?

Here is the text of this compromise proposed by the majority of the Central Committee on *February 7* of this year:

“After an exchange of views in the commission it was ascertained that:

“1) Bukharin admits that his negotiations with Kamenev were a political error;

“2) Bukharin admits that the assertions contained in his ‘declaration’ of January 30, 1929, alleging that the Central Committee is in fact pursuing a policy of ‘military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry,’ that the Central Committee is disintegrating the Comintern and is fostering bureaucracy within the Party—that all these assertions were made in the heat of the moment, during passionate polemics, that he does not maintain these assertions any longer, and considers that there are no differences between him and the Central Committee on these questions;

“3) Bukharin recognises, therefore, that harmonious work in the Political Bureau is possible and necessary;

“4) Bukharin withdraws his resignation both as regards *Pravda* and as regards the Comintern;

“5) consequently, Bukharin withdraws his declaration of January 30.

“On the basis of the above, the commission considers it possible not to submit its draft resolution containing a political

appraisal of Bukharin's errors to the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, and suggests that the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission withdraw from circulation all existing documents (verbatim reports of speeches, etc.).

"The commission requests the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the C.C.C. to provide Bukharin with all the conditions necessary for his normal work as editor-in-chief of *Pravda* and Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern."

Why did Bukharin and his friends reject this compromise if we really have only one line, and if there are only shades of difference between us? Is it not perfectly obvious that Bukharin and his friends should have been extremely eager to accept the compromise proposed by the Political Bureau, so as to put an end to the tension existing within the Party and create an atmosphere conducive to unanimity and harmony in the work of the Political Bureau?

There is talk of the unity of the Party, of collective work in the Political Bureau. But is it not obvious that anyone who wants genuine unity and values the collective principle in work should have accepted the compromise? Why then did Bukharin and his friends reject this compromise?

Is it not obvious that if we had only one line, then there would never have been either the trio's declaration of February 9 or Bukharin and his friends' refusal to accept the compromise proposed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee?

No, comrades, if we bear in mind the facts set forth above, there must be something amiss with the business of your one, common line.

It turns out that in reality we have not one line, but two lines; one of them being the line of the Central Committee and the other the line of Bukharin's group.

In his speech, Rykov did not tell the truth when he declared that we have only one general line. He sought thereby to disguise his own line, which differs from the Party line, for the purpose of stealthily undermining the Party line. The policy of opportunism consists precisely in attempting to slur over disagreements, to gloss over the actual situation within the Party, to disguise one's own position and to make it impossible for the Party to attain complete clarity.

Why does opportunism need such a policy? Because it enables opportunists to carry out in effect their own line, which differs from the Party line, behind a smoke screen of talk about the unity of the line. In his speech at the present plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission Rykov adopted this opportunist standpoint.

Would you care to hear a characterisation of the opportunist in general, as given by Comrade Lenin in one of his articles? This characterisation is important for us not only because of its general significance, but also because it fits Rykov perfectly.

Here is what Lenin says about the specific features of opportunism and of opportunists:

“When we speak of fighting opportunism, we must never forget the feature characteristic of the whole of present-day opportunism in every sphere, namely, its indefiniteness, diffuseness, elusiveness. An opportunist, by his very nature, always evades formulating an issue definitely and decisively, he seeks a

middle course, he wriggles like a snake between two mutually exclusive points of view, trying to 'agree' with both and to reduce his differences of opinion to petty amendments, doubts, righteous and innocent suggestions, and so on and so forth" (Vol. VI, p. 320).

There you have a portrait of the opportunist, who dreads clearness and definiteness and who strives to gloss over the actual state of affairs, to slur over the actual disagreements in the Party.

Yes, comrades, one must be able to face the facts no matter how unpleasant they may be. God forbid that we should become infected with the disease of fear of the truth. Bolsheviks, incidentally, are different from all other parties because they do not fear the truth and are not afraid of facing the truth no matter how bitter it may be. And in the present case the truth is that in fact we have not got a single, common line. There is one line, the Party line, the revolutionary, Leninist line. But side by side with it there is another line, the line of Bukharin's group, which is combating the Party line by means of anti-Party declarations, by means of resignations, by means of slander and camouflaged undermining activities against the Party, by means of backstairs negotiations with yesterday's Trotskyites for the purpose of setting up an anti-Party bloc. This second line is the opportunist line.

There you have a fact that no amount of diplomatic verbiage or artful statements about the existence of a single line, etc., etc., can disguise.

II

CLASS CHANGES AND OUR DISAGREEMENTS

What are our disagreements? What are they connected with?

They are connected, first of all, with the class changes that have been taking place recently in our country and in capitalist countries. Some comrades think that the disagreements in our Party are of an accidental nature. That is wrong, comrades. That is quite wrong. The disagreements in our Party have their roots in the class changes, in the intensification of the class struggle which has been taking place lately and which marks a turning point in development.

The chief mistake of Bukharin's group is that it fails to see these changes and this turning point; it does not see them, and does not want to notice them. That, in fact, explains the failure to understand the new tasks of the Party and of the Comintern, which is the characteristic feature of the Bukharin opposition.

Have you noticed, comrades, that the leaders of the Bukharin opposition, in their speeches at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, completely evaded the question of the class changes in our country, that they did not say a single word about the intensification of the class struggle and did not even remotely hint at the fact that our disagreements are connected with this very intensification of the class struggle? They talked about everything, about philosophy and about theory, but they did not say a single word about the class changes which

determine the orientation and the practical activity of our Party at the present moment.

How is this strange fact to be explained? Is it forgetfulness, perhaps? Of course not! Political leaders cannot forget the chief thing. The explanation is that they neither see nor understand the new revolutionary processes now going on both here, in our country, and in the capitalist countries. The explanation is that they have overlooked the chief thing, they have overlooked those class changes, which a political leader has no right to overlook. This is the real explanation for the confusion and unpreparedness displayed by the Bukharin opposition in face of the new tasks of our Party.

Recall the recent events in our Party. Recall the slogans our Party has issued lately in connection with the new class changes in our country. I refer to such slogans as the slogan of *self-criticism*, the slogan of intensifying *the fight against bureaucracy and of purging the Soviet apparatus*, the slogan of *training new economic cadres and Red experts*, the slogan of strengthening *the collective-farm and state-farm movement*, the slogan of *an offensive against the kulaks*, the slogan of *reducing production costs and radically improving the methods of trade-union work*, the slogan of *purging the Party*, etc. To some comrades these slogans seemed staggering and dizzying. Yet it is obvious that these slogans are the most necessary and urgent slogans of the Party at the present moment.

The whole thing began when, as a result of the Shakhty affair,² we raised in a new way the question of new economic cadres, of training Red experts from the ranks of the working class to take the place of the old experts.

What did the Shakhty affair reveal? It revealed that the bourgeoisie was still far from being crushed; that it was organising and would continue to organise wrecking activities to hamper our work of economic construction; that our economic, trade-union and, to a certain extent, Party organisations had failed to notice the undermining operations of our class enemies, and that it was therefore necessary to exert all efforts and employ all resources to reinforce and improve our organisations, to develop and heighten their class vigilance.

In this connection the slogan of *self-criticism* became sharply stressed. Why? Because we cannot improve our economic, trade-union and Party organisations, we cannot advance the cause of building socialism and of curbing the wrecking activities of the bourgeoisie, unless we develop criticism and self-criticism to the utmost, unless we place the work of our organisations under the control of the masses. It is indeed a fact that wrecking has been and is going on not only in the coal-fields, but also in the metallurgical industries, in the war industries, in the People's Commissariat of Transport, in the gold and platinum industries, etc., etc. Hence the slogan of self-criticism.

Further, in connection with the grain-procurement difficulties, in connection with the opposition of the kulaks to the Soviet price policy, we stressed the question of developing collective farms and state farms to the utmost, of launching an offensive against the kulaks, of organising grain procurements by means of pressure on the kulak and well-to-do elements.

What did the grain-procurement difficulties reveal? They revealed that the kulak was not asleep, that the

kulak was growing, that he was busy undermining the policy of the Soviet government, while our Party, Soviet and co-operative organisations—at all events, some of them—either failed to see the enemy, or adapted themselves to him instead of fighting him.

Hence the new stress laid on the slogan of self-criticism, on the slogan of checking and improving our Party, co-operative and procurement organisations generally.

Further, in connection with the new tasks of reconstructing industry and agriculture on the basis of socialism, there arose the slogan of systematically reducing production costs, of strengthening labour discipline, of developing socialist emulation, etc. These tasks called for a revision of the entire activities of the trade unions and Soviet apparatus, for radical measures to put new life into these organisations and for purging them of bureaucratic elements.

Hence the stress laid on the slogan of fighting bureaucracy in the trade unions and in the Soviet apparatus.

Finally, the slogan of purging the Party. It would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to strengthen our Soviet, economic, trade-union and co-operative organisations, that it is possible to purge them of the dross of bureaucracy, without giving a sharp edge to the Party itself. There can be no doubt that bureaucratic elements exist not only in the economic and co-operative, trade-union and Soviet organisations, but in the organisations of the Party itself. Since the Party is the guiding force of all these organisations, it is obvious that purging the Party is the essential condition

for thoroughly revitalising and improving all the other organisations of the working class. Hence the slogan of purging the Party.

Are these slogans a matter of accident? No, they are not. You see yourselves that they are not accidental. *They are necessary links in the single continuous chain which is called the offensive of socialism against the elements of capitalism.*

They are connected, primarily, with the period of the reconstruction of our industry and agriculture on the basis of socialism. And what is the reconstruction of the national economy on the basis of socialism? It is the offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements of the national economy along the whole front. It is a most important advance of the working class of our country towards the complete building of socialism. But in order to carry out this reconstruction we must first of all improve and strengthen the cadres of socialist construction—the economic, Soviet and trade-union cadres and also Party and co-operative cadres; we must give a sharp edge to all our organisations, purge them of dross; we must stimulate the activity of the vast masses of the working class and peasantry.

Further, these slogans are connected with the fact of the resistance of the capitalist elements of the national economy to the offensive of socialism. The so-called Shakhty affair cannot be regarded as something accidental. “Shakhtyists” are at present entrenched in every branch of our industry. Many of them have been caught, but by no means all of them. The wrecking activities of the bourgeois intelligentsia are one of the most dangerous forms of resistance to developing socialism.

The wrecking activities are all the more dangerous because they are connected with international capital. Bourgeois wrecking is undoubtedly an indication of the fact that the capitalist elements have by no means laid down their arms, that they are gathering strength for fresh attacks on the Soviet regime.

As for the capitalist elements in the countryside, there is still less reason to regard as accidental the opposition of the kulaks to the Soviet price policy, which has been going on for over a year already. Many people are still unable to understand why it is that until 1927 the kulak gave his grain of his own accord, whereas since 1927 he has ceased to do so. But there is nothing surprising in it. Formerly the kulak was still relatively weak; he was unable to organise his farming properly; he lacked sufficient capital to improve his farm and so he was obliged to bring all, or nearly all, his surplus grain to the market. Now, however, after a number of good harvests, since he has been able to build up his farm, since he has succeeded in accumulating the necessary capital, he is in a position to manoeuvre on the market, he is able to set aside grain, this currency of currencies, as a reserve for himself, and prefers to bring to the market meat, oats, barley and other secondary crops. It would be ridiculous now to hope that the kulak can be made to part with his grain voluntarily.

There you have the root of the resistance which the kulak is now offering to the policy of the Soviet regime.

And what does the resistance offered by the capitalist elements of town and country to the socialist offensive represent? It represents a regrouping of the forces of

the class enemies of the proletariat for the purpose of defending the old against the new. It is not difficult to understand that these circumstances cannot but lead to an intensification of the class struggle. But if we are to break the resistance of the class enemies and clear the way for the advance of socialism, we must, besides everything else, give a sharp edge to all our organisations, purge them of bureaucracy, improve their cadres and mobilise the vast masses of the working class and labouring strata of the countryside against the capitalist elements of town and country.

It was on the basis of these class changes that our Party's present slogans arose.

The same must be said about the class changes in capitalist countries. It would be ridiculous to think that the stabilisation of capitalism has remained unchanged. Still more ridiculous would it be to assert that the stabilisation is gaining in strength, that it is becoming secure. As a matter of fact, capitalist stabilisation is being undermined and shaken month by month and day by day. The intensification of the struggle for foreign markets and raw materials, the growth of armaments, the growing antagonism between America and Britain, the growth of socialism in the U.S.S.R., the swing to the Left of the working class in the capitalist countries, the wave of strikes and class conflicts in the European countries, the growing revolutionary movement in the colonies, including India, the growth of communism in all countries of the world—all these are facts which indicate beyond a doubt that the elements of a new revolutionary upsurge are accumulating in the capitalist countries.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight against Social-Democracy, and, above all, against its "Left" wing, as being the social buttress of capitalism.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight in the Communist Parties against the Right elements, as being the agents of Social-Democratic influence.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight against conciliation towards the Right deviation, as being the refuge of opportunism in the Communist Parties.

Hence the slogan of purging the Communist Parties of Social-Democratic traditions.

Hence the so-called new tactics of communism in the trade unions.

Some comrades do not understand the significance and importance of these slogans. But a Marxist will always understand that, unless these slogans are put into effect, the preparation of the proletarian masses for new class battles is unthinkable, victory over Social-Democracy is unthinkable, and the selection of real leaders of the communist movement, capable of leading the working class into the fight against capitalism, is impossible.

Such, comrades, are the class changes in our country and in the capitalist countries, on the basis of which the present slogans of our Party both in its internal policy and in relation to the Comintern have arisen.

Our Party sees these class changes. It understands the significance of the new tasks and it mobilises forces for their fulfilment. That is why it is facing events fully armed. That is why it does not fear the difficulties confronting it, for it is prepared to overcome them.

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it does not see these class changes and does not understand the

new tasks of the Party. And it is precisely because it does not understand them that it is in a state of complete bewilderment, is ready to flee from difficulties, to retreat in the face of difficulties, to surrender the positions.

Have you ever seen fishermen when a storm is brewing on a big river—such as the Yenisei? I have seen them many a time. In the face of a storm one group of fishermen will muster all their forces, encourage their fellows and boldly guide the boat to meet the storm: “Cheer up, lads, keep a tight hold of the tiller, cut the waves, we’ll win through!”

But there is another type of fishermen—those who, on sensing a storm, lose heart, begin to snivel and demoralise their own ranks: “It’s terrible, a storm is brewing: lie down, lads, in the bottom of the boat, shut your eyes, let’s hope she’ll make the shore somehow.” (*General laughter.*)

Does it still need proof that the line and conduct of Bukharin’s group exactly resembles the line and conduct of the second group of fishermen, who retreat in panic in the face of difficulties?

We say that in Europe the conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, that this circumstance dictates to us new tasks along the line of intensifying the fight against the Right deviation in the Communist Parties and of driving the Right deviators out of the Party, of intensifying the fight against conciliation, which screens the Right deviation, of intensifying the fight against Social-Democratic traditions in the Communist Parties, etc., etc. But Bukharin answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us,

that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee wants to “haul” him, i.e., Bukharin, “over the coals.”

We say that the class changes in our country dictate to us new tasks which call for a systematic reduction of costs of production and improvement of labour discipline in industry, that these tasks cannot be carried out without radical change in the practices of work of the trade unions. But Tomsky answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee wants to “haul” him, i.e., Tomsky, “over the coals.”

We say that the reconstruction of the national economy dictates to us new tasks along the line of intensifying the fight against bureaucracy in the Soviet and economic apparatus, of purging this apparatus of rotten and alien elements, wreckers, etc., etc. But Rykov answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee wants to “haul” him, i.e., Rykov, “over the coals.”

Now, is this not ridiculous, comrades? Is it not obvious that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky see nothing but their own navels?

The misfortune of Bukharin’s group is that it does not see the new class changes and does not understand the new tasks of the Party. And it is precisely because it does not understand them that it is compelled to drag in the wake of events and to yield to difficulties.

There you have the root of our disagreements.

III

DISAGREEMENTS IN REGARD TO THE COMINTERN

I have already said that Bukharin does not see and does not understand the new tasks of the Comintern along the line of driving the Rights out of the Communist Parties, of curbing conciliation, and of purging the Communist Parties of Social Democratic traditions—tasks which are dictated by the maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge. This thesis is fully confirmed by our disagreements on Comintern questions.

How did the disagreements in this sphere begin?

They began with Bukharin's theses at the Sixth Congress³ on the international situation. As a rule, theses are first examined by the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.). In this case, however, that condition was not observed. What happened was that the theses, signed by Bukharin, were sent to the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) at the same time as they were distributed to the foreign delegations at the Sixth Congress. But the theses proved to be unsatisfactory on a number of points. The delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was obliged to introduce about twenty amendments into the theses.

This created a rather awkward situation for Bukharin. But who was to blame for that? Why was it necessary for Bukharin to distribute the theses to the foreign delegations before they had been examined by the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.)? Could the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) refrain from introducing amendments if the theses proved to be unsatisfactory? And so it came about that the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) issued

what were practically new theses on the international situation, which the foreign delegations began to counterpose to the old theses signed by Bukharin. Obviously, this awkward situation would not have arisen if Bukharin had not been in a hurry to distribute his theses to the foreign delegations.

I should like to draw attention to four principal amendments which the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced into Bukharin's theses. I should like to draw attention to these principal amendments in order to illustrate more clearly the character of the disagreements on Comintern questions.

The first question is that of the character of the stabilisation of capitalism. According to Bukharin's theses it appeared that nothing new is taking place at the present time to shake capitalist stabilisation, but that, on the contrary, capitalism is *reconstructing itself* and that, on the whole, it is maintaining itself more or less *securely*. Obviously, the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) could not agree with such a characterisation of what is called the third period, i.e., the period through which we are now passing. The delegation could not agree with it because to retain such a characterisation of the third period might give our critics grounds for saying that we have adopted the point of view of so-called capitalist "recovery," i.e., the point of view of Hilferding, a point of view which we Communists cannot adopt. Owing to this, the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced an amendment which makes it evident that capitalist stabilisation is not and cannot be secure, that it is being shaken and will continue to be shaken by the march of events, owing to the aggravation of the crisis of world capitalism.

This question, comrades, is of decisive importance for the Sections of the Comintern. Is capitalist stabilisation being shaken or is it becoming more secure? It is on this that the whole line of the Communist Parties in their day-to-day political work depends. Are we passing through a period of decline of the revolutionary movement, a period of the mere gathering of forces, or are we passing through a period when the conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, a period of preparation of the working class for future class battles? It is on this that the tactical line of the Communist Parties depends. The amendment of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.), subsequently adopted by the congress, is a good one for the very reason that it gives a clear line based on the latter prospect, the prospect of maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge.

The second question is that of the fight against Social-Democracy. In Bukharin's theses it was stated that the fight against Social-Democracy is one of the fundamental tasks of the Sections of the Comintern. That, of course, is true. But it is not enough. In order that the fight against Social-Democracy may be waged successfully, stress must be laid on the fight against the so-called "Left" wing of Social-Democracy, that "Left" wing which, by playing with "Left" phrases and thus adroitly deceiving the workers, is retarding their mass defection from Social-Democracy. It is obvious that unless the "Left" Social-Democrats are routed it will be impossible to overcome Social-Democracy in general. Yet in Bukharin's theses the question of "Left" Social-Democracy was entirely ignored. That, of course, was a great defect. The delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was

therefore obliged to introduce into Bukharin's theses an appropriate amendment, which was subsequently adopted by the congress.

The third question is that of the conciliatory tendency in the Sections of the Comintern. Bukharin's theses spoke of the necessity of fighting the Right deviation, but not a word was said there about fighting conciliation towards the Right deviation. That, of course, was a great defect. The point is that when war is declared on the Right deviation, the Right deviators usually disguise themselves as conciliators and place the Party in an awkward position. To forestall this manoeuvre of the Right deviators we must insist on a determined fight against conciliation. That is why the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) considered it necessary to introduce into Bukharin's theses an appropriate amendment, which was subsequently adopted by the congress.

The fourth question is that of Party discipline. In Bukharin's theses no mention was made of the necessity of maintaining iron discipline in the Communist Parties. That also was a defect of no little importance. Why? Because in a period when the fight against the Right deviation is being intensified, in a period when the slogan of purging the Communist Parties of opportunist elements is being put into effect, the Right deviators usually organise themselves as a faction, set up their own factional discipline and disrupt and destroy the discipline of the Party. To protect the Party from the factional sorties of the Right deviators we must insist on iron discipline in the Party and on the unconditional subordination of Party members to this discipline. Without that there can be no question of waging a serious fight against

the Right deviation. That is why the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced into Bukharin's theses an appropriate amendment, which was subsequently adopted by the Sixth Congress.

Could we refrain from introducing these amendments into Bukharin's theses? Of course not. In olden times it was said about the philosopher Plato: We love Plato, but we love truth even more. The same must be said about Bukharin: We love Bukharin, but we love truth, the Party and the Comintern even more. That is why the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) found itself obliged to introduce these amendments into Bukharin's theses.

That, so to speak, was *the first stage of our disagreements* on Comintern questions.

The second stage of our disagreements is connected with what is known as the Wittorf and Thälmann case. Wittorf was formerly secretary of the Hamburg organisation, and was accused of embezzling Party funds. For this he was expelled from the Party. The conciliators in the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, taking advantage of the fact that Wittorf had been close to Comrade Thälmann, although Comrade Thälmann was in no way implicated in Wittorf's crime, converted the Wittorf case into a Thälmann case, and set out to overthrow the leadership of the German Communist Party. No doubt you know from the press that at that time the conciliators Ewert and Gerhart succeeded temporarily in winning over a majority of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party against Comrade Thälmann. And what followed? They removed Thälmann from the leadership, began to accuse him of corruption and published a "corresponding" resolution

without the knowledge and sanction of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Thus, instead of the directive of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern about fighting conciliation being carried out, instead of a fight against the Right deviation and against conciliation, there was, in fact, a most gross violation of this directive, there was a fight against the revolutionary leadership of the German Communist Party, a fight against Comrade Thälmann, with the object of *covering up* the Right deviation and of *consolidating* the conciliatory tendency in the ranks of the German Communists.

And so, instead of swinging the tiller over and correcting the situation, instead of restoring the validity of the violated directive of the Sixth Congress and calling the conciliators to order, Bukharin proposed in his well-known letter *to sanction* the conciliators' coup, to hand over the German Communist Party to the conciliators, and to revile Comrade Thälmann in the press again by issuing another statement declaring him to be guilty. And this is supposed to be a "leader" of the Comintern! Can there really be such "leaders"?

The Central Committee discussed Bukharin's proposal and rejected it. Bukharin, of course, did not like that. But who is to blame? The decisions of the Sixth Congress were adopted not in order that they should be violated but in order that they should be carried out. If the Sixth Congress decided to declare war on the Right deviation and conciliation towards it, keeping the leadership in the hands of the main core of the German Communist Party, headed by Comrade Thälmann, and if it occurred to the conciliators Ewert and Gerhart to upset that

decision, it was Bukharin's duty to call the conciliators to order and not to leave in their hands the leadership of the German Communist Party. It is Bukharin, who "forgot" the decisions of the Sixth Congress, who is to blame.

The third stage of our disagreements is connected with the question of the fight against the Rights in the German Communist Party, with the question of routing the Brandler and Thalheimer faction, and of expelling the leaders of that faction from the German Communist Party. The "position" taken up by Bukharin and his friends on that cardinal question was that they persistently avoided taking part in settling it. At bottom, it was the fate of the German Communist Party that was being decided. Yet Bukharin and his friends, knowing this, nevertheless continually hindered matters by systematically keeping away from the meetings of the bodies which had the question under consideration. For the sake of what? Presumably, for the sake of remaining "clean" in the eyes of both the Comintern and the Rights in the German Communist Party. For the sake of being able subsequently to say: "It was not we, the Bukharinites, who carried out the expulsion of Brandler and Thalheimer from the Communist Party, but they, the majority in the Central Committee." And that is what is called fighting the Right danger!

Finally, *the fourth stage of our disagreements*. It is connected with Bukharin's demand prior to the November plenum of the Central Committee⁴ that Neumann be recalled from Germany and that Comrade Thälmann, who, it was alleged, had criticised in one of his speeches Bukharin's report at the Sixth Congress, be called to order. We, of course, could not agree with Bukharin,

since there was not a single document in our possession supporting his demand. Bukharin promised to submit documents against Neumann and Thälmann but never submitted a single one. Instead of documents, he distributed to the members of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) copies of the speech delivered by Humbert-Droz at the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., the very speech which was subsequently qualified by the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. as an opportunist speech. By distributing Humbert-Droz's speech to the members of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and by recommending it as material against Thälmann, Bukharin wanted to prove the justice of his demand for the recall of Neumann and for calling Comrade Thälmann to order. In fact, however, he thereby showed that he identified himself with the position taken up by Humbert-Droz, a position which the E.C.C.I. regards as opportunist.

Those, comrades, are the main points of our disagreements on Comintern questions.

Bukharin thinks that by conducting a struggle against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it in the Sections of the Comintern, by purging the German and Czechoslovak Communist Parties of Social-Democratic elements and traditions, and by expelling the Brandlers and the Thalheimers from the Communist Parties, we are "disintegrating" the Comintern, "ruining" the Comintern. We, on the contrary, think that by carrying out such a policy and by laying stress on the fight against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it, we are strengthening the Comintern, purging it of opportunists, bolshevizing its Sections and helping the Communist Parties to prepare the working class for

the future revolutionary battles, for the Party is strengthened by purging itself of dross.

You see that these are not merely shades of difference in the ranks of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), but quite serious disagreements on fundamental questions of Comintern policy.

IV DISAGREEMENTS IN REGARD TO INTERNAL POLICY

I have spoken above on the class changes and the class struggle in our country. I said that Bukharin's group is afflicted with blindness and does not see these changes, does not understand the new tasks of the Party. I said that this has caused bewilderment among the Bukharin opposition, has made it fearful of difficulties and ready to yield to them.

It cannot be said that these mistakes of the Bukharinites are purely accidental. On the contrary, they are connected with the stage of development we have already passed through and which is known as the period of *restoration* of the national economy, a period during which construction proceeded peace fully, automatically, so to speak; during which the class changes now taking place did not yet exist; and during which the intensification of the class struggle that we now observe was not yet in evidence.

But we are now at a new stage of development, distinct from the old period, from the period of restoration. We are now in a new period of construction, the period of the *reconstruction* of the whole national economy on the

basis of socialism. This new period is giving rise to new class changes, to an intensification of the class struggle. It demands new methods of struggle, the regrouping of our forces, the improvement and strengthening of all our organisations.

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it is living in the past, that it fails to see the specific features of this new period and does not understand the need for new methods of struggle. Hence its blindness, its bewilderment, its panic in the face of difficulties.

a) THE CLASS STRUGGLE

What is the theoretical basis of this blindness and bewilderment of Bukharin's group?

I think that the theoretical basis of this blindness and bewilderment is Bukharin's incorrect, non-Marxist approach to the question of the class struggle in our country. I have in mind Bukharin's non-Marxist theory of the kulaks growing into socialism, his failure to understand the mechanics of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The passage from Bukharin's book, *The Path to Socialism*, on the kulaks growing into socialism has been quoted several times here. But it has been quoted here with some omissions. Permit me to quote it in full. This is necessary, comrades, in order to demonstrate the full extent of Bukharin's departure from the Marxist theory of the class struggle.

Listen:

"The main network of our co-operative peasant organisations will consist of co-operative units, not of a kulak, but of a

‘toiler’ type, units that grow into the system of our general state organs and thus become *links in the single chain of socialist economy*. On the other hand, *the kulak co-operative nests will, similarly, through the banks, etc., grow into the same system*; but they will be *to a certain extent an alien body, similar, for instance, to the concession enterprises.*”*

In quoting this passage from Bukharin’s pamphlet, some comrades, for some reason or other, omitted the last phrase about the concessionaires. Rosit, apparently desiring to help Bukharin, took advantage of this and shouted here from his seat that Bukharin was being misquoted. And yet, the crux of this whole passage lies precisely in the last phrase about the concessionaires. For if concessionaires are put on a par with the kulaks, and the kulaks are growing into socialism—what follows from that? The only thing that follows is that the concessionaires are also growing into socialism; that not only the kulaks, but the concessionaires, too, are growing into socialism. (*General laughter.*)

That is what follows.

Rosit. Bukharin says, “an alien body.”

Stalin. Bukharin says not “an alien body,” but “to a certain extent an alien body.” Consequently, the kulaks and concessionaires are “to a certain extent” an alien body in the system of socialism. But Bukharin’s mistake is precisely that, according to him, kulaks and concessionaires, while being “to a certain extent” an alien body, nevertheless grow into socialism.

Such is the nonsense to which Bukharin’s theory leads.

* My italics.—*J. St.*

Capitalists in town and country, kulaks and concessionaires, growing into socialism—such is the absurdity Bukharin has arrived at.

No, comrades, that is not the kind of “socialism” we want. Let Bukharin keep it for himself.

Until now, we Marxist-Leninists were of the opinion that between the capitalists of town and country, on the one hand, and the working class, on the other hand, there is an *irreconcilable* antagonism of interests. That is what the Marxist theory of the class struggle rests on. But now, according to Bukharin’s theory of the capitalists’ *peaceful growth* into socialism, all this is turned upside down, the irreconcilable antagonism of class interests between the exploiters and the exploited disappears, the exploiters grow into socialism.

Rosit. That is not true, the dictatorship of the proletariat is presumed.

Stalin. But the dictatorship of the proletariat is the sharpest form of the class struggle.

Rosit. Yes, that is the whole point.

Stalin. But, according to Bukharin, the capitalists grow into this very dictatorship of the proletariat. How is it that you cannot understand this, *Rosit*? Against whom must we fight, against whom must we wage the sharpest form of the class struggle, if the capitalists of town and country grow into the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against the capitalist elements, for the purpose of suppressing the bourgeoisie and of uprooting capitalism. But if the capitalists of town and country, if the kulak and the concession-

aire are growing into socialism, is the dictatorship of the proletariat needed at all? If it is, then for the suppression of what class is it needed?

Rosit. The whole point is that, according to Bukharin, the growing into presumes the class struggle.

Stalin. I see that Rosit has sworn to be of service to Bukharin. But his service is really like that of the bear in the fable; for in his eagerness to save Bukharin he is actually hugging him to death. It is not without reason that it is said, "An obliging fool is more dangerous than an enemy." (*General laughter.*)

One thing or the other: either there is an irreconcilable antagonism of interests between the capitalist class and the class of the workers who have come to power and have organised their dictatorship, or there is no such antagonism of interests, in which case only one thing remains—namely, to proclaim the harmony of class interests.

One thing or the other:

either Marx's theory of the class struggle, *or* the theory of the capitalists growing into socialism;

either an irreconcilable antagonism of class interests, *or* the theory of harmony of class interests.

We can understand "socialists" of the type of Brentano or Sydney Webb preaching about socialism growing into capitalism and capitalism into socialism, for these "socialists" are really anti-socialists, bourgeois liberals. But one cannot understand a man who wishes to be a Marxist, and who at the same time preaches the theory of the capitalist class growing into socialism.

In his speech Bukharin tried to reinforce the theory of the kulaks growing into socialism by referring to a

well-known passage from Lenin. He asserted that Lenin says the *same thing* as Bukharin.

That is not true, comrades. It is a gross and unpardonable slander against Lenin.

Here is the text of this passage from Lenin:

“Of course, in our Soviet Republic the social order is based on the collaboration of two classes: the workers and peasants, in which the ‘Nepmen,’ i.e., the bourgeoisie, are now permitted to participate on certain conditions” (Vol. XXVII, p. 405).

You see that there is not a word here about the capitalist class growing into socialism. All that is said is that we have “permitted” the Nepmen, i.e., the bourgeoisie, “on certain conditions” to participate in the collaboration between the workers and the peasants.

What does that mean? Does it mean that we have thereby admitted the possibility of the Nepmen growing into socialism? Of course not. Only people who have lost all sense of shame can interpret the quotation from Lenin in that way. All that it means is that *at present* we do not destroy the bourgeoisie, that *at present* we do not confiscate their property, but permit them to exist on certain conditions, i.e., provided they unconditionally submit to the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which lead to increasingly restricting the capitalists and gradually ousting them from national-economic life.

Can the capitalists be ousted and the roots of capitalism destroyed without a fierce class struggle? No, they cannot.

Can classes be abolished if the theory and practice of the capitalists growing into socialism prevails? No,

they cannot. Such theory and practice can only cultivate and perpetuate classes, for this theory contradicts the Marxist theory of the class struggle.

But the passage from Lenin is wholly and entirely based on the Marxist theory of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What can there be in common between Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism and Lenin's theory of the dictatorship as a fierce class struggle? Obviously, there is not, and cannot be, anything in common between them.

Bukharin thinks that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the class struggle must *die down* and *come to an end* so that the abolition of classes may be brought about. Lenin, on the contrary, teaches us that classes can be abolished only by means of a stubborn class struggle, which under the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes *even fiercer* than it was before the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"The abolition of classes," says Lenin, "requires a long, difficult and stubborn *class struggle*, which, *after* the overthrow of the power of capital, *after* the destruction of the bourgeois state, *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *does not disappear* (as the vulgar representatives of the old socialism and the old Social-Democracy imagine), but merely changes its forms and in many respects becomes even fiercer" (Vol. XXIV, p. 315).

That is what Lenin says about the abolition of classes.

The abolition of classes *by means of the fierce class struggle of the proletariat*—such is Lenin's formula.

The abolition of classes *by means of the extinction of the class struggle and by the capitalists growing into socialism*—such is Bukharin's formula.

What can there be in common between these two formulas?

Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism is therefore a departure from the Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle. It comes close to the theory propounded by Katheder-Socialism.⁵

That is the basis of all the errors committed by Bukharin and his friends.

It may be said that it is not worth while dwelling at length on Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism, since it itself speaks, and not only speaks, but cries out, against Bukharin. That is wrong, comrades! As long as that theory was kept hidden it was possible not to pay attention to it—there are plenty of such stupid things in what various comrades write! Such has been our attitude until quite lately. But recently the situation has changed. The petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which have been breaking out in recent years, have begun to encourage this anti-Marxist theory and made it topical. Now it cannot be said that it is being kept hidden. Now this strange theory of Bukharin's is aspiring to become the banner of the Right deviation in our Party, the banner of opportunism. That is why we cannot now ignore this theory. That is why we must demolish it as a wrong and harmful theory, so as to help our Party comrades to fight the Right deviation.

b) THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Bukharin's second mistake, which follows from his first one, consists in a wrong, non-Marxist approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle, of the increasing resistance of the capitalist elements to the socialist policy of the Soviet government.

What is the point at issue here? Is it that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector of our economy, and that, because of this, they are increasing their resistance, undermining socialist construction? No, that is not the point. Moreover, it is not true that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector. If that were true, socialist construction would already be on the verge of collapse.

The point is that socialism is successfully attacking the capitalist elements, socialism is growing *faster* than the capitalist elements; as a result the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining*, and for the very reason that the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining* the capitalist elements realise that they are in mortal danger and are increasing their resistance.

And they are still able to increase their resistance not only because world capitalism is supporting them, but also because, in spite of the decline in their relative importance, in spite of the decline in their relative growth as compared with the growth of socialism, there is still taking place an absolute growth of the capitalist elements, and this, to a certain extent, enables them to accumulate forces to resist the growth of socialism.

It is on this basis that, *at the present stage of development and under the present conditions* of the relation of forces, the intensification of the class struggle and the increase in the resistance of the capitalist elements of town and country are taking place.

The mistake of Bukharin and his friends lies in failing to understand this simple and obvious truth. Their mistake lies in approaching the matter not in a Marxist, but in a philistine way, and trying to explain the intensification of the class struggle by all kinds of accidental causes: the “incompetence” of the Soviet apparatus, the “imprudent” policy of local comrades, the “absence” of flexibility, “excesses,” etc., etc.

Here, for instance, is a quotation from Bukharin’s pamphlet, *The Path to Socialism*, which demonstrates an absolutely non-Marxist approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle:

“Here and there the class struggle in the countryside breaks out in its former manifestations, and, as a rule, this intensification is provoked by the kulak elements. When, for instance, kulaks, or people who are growing rich at the expense of others and have wormed their way into the organs of Soviet power, begin to shoot village correspondents, that is a manifestation of the class struggle in its most acute form. (This is not true, for the most acute form of the struggle is rebellion.—*J. Stalin*) However, such incidents, as a rule, occur in those places where the local Soviet apparatus is weak. *As this apparatus improves*, as all the lower units of Soviet power become stronger, as the local, village, Party and Young Communist League organisations improve and become stronger, *such phenomena*, it is perfectly obvious, will become more and more rare and will finally *disappear without a trace.*”*

* My italics.—*J. St.*

It follows, therefore, that the intensification of the class struggle is to be explained by causes connected with the character of the apparatus, the competence or incompetence, the strength or weakness of our lower organisations.

It follows, for instance, that the wrecking activities of the bourgeois intellectuals in Shakhty, which are a form of resistance of the bourgeois elements to the Soviet government and a form of intensification of the class struggle, are to be explained, not by the relation of class forces, not by the growth of socialism, but by the incompetence of our apparatus.

It follows that before the wholesale wrecking occurred in the Shakhty area, our apparatus was a good one, but that later, the moment wholesale wrecking occurred, the apparatus, for some unspecified reason, suddenly became utterly incompetent.

It follows that until last year, when grain procurements proceeded automatically and there was no particular intensification of the class struggle, our local organisations were good, even ideal; but that from last year, when the resistance of the kulaks assumed particularly acute forms, our organisations have suddenly become bad and utterly incompetent.

That is not an explanation, but a mockery of an explanation. That is not science, but quackery.

What then is the actual reason for this intensification of the class struggle?

There are two reasons.

Firstly, our advance, our offensive, the growth of socialist forms of economy both in industry and in agriculture, a growth which is accompanied by a

corresponding ousting of certain sections of capitalists in town and country. The fact is that we are living according to Lenin's formula: "Who will beat whom?" Will we overpower them, the capitalists—engage them, as Lenin put it, in the last and decisive fight—or will they overpower us?

Secondly, the fact that the capitalist elements have no desire to depart from the scene voluntarily; they are resisting, and will continue to resist socialism, for they realise that their last days are approaching. And they are still able to resist because, in spite of the decline of their relative importance, they are nevertheless growing in absolute numbers; the petty bourgeoisie in town and country, as Lenin said, daily and hourly produces from its midst capitalists, big and small, and these capitalist elements go to all lengths to preserve their existence.

There have been no cases in history where dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence. Whether our lower Soviet apparatus is good or bad, our advance, our offensive will diminish the capitalist elements and oust them, and they, the dying classes, will carry on their resistance at all costs.

That is the basis for the intensification of the class struggle in our country.

The mistake of Bukharin and his friends is that they identify the growing resistance of the capitalists with the growth of the latter's relative importance. But there are absolutely no grounds for this identification. There are no grounds because the fact that the

capitalists are resisting by no means implies that they have become stronger than we are. The very opposite is the case. The dying classes are resisting, not because they have become stronger than we are, but because socialism is growing faster than they are, and they are becoming weaker than we are. And precisely because they are becoming weaker, they feel that their last days are approaching and are compelled to resist with all the forces and all the means in their power.

Such is the mechanics of the intensification of the class struggle and of the resistance of the capitalists at the present moment of history.

What should be the policy of the Party in view of this state of affairs?

The policy should be to arouse the working class and the exploited masses of the countryside, to increase their fighting capacity and develop their mobilised preparedness for the fight against the capitalist elements in town and country, for the fight against the resisting class enemies.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle is valuable, among other reasons, because it facilitates the mobilisation of the working class against the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Wherein lies the harm of the Bukharin theory of the capitalists growing into socialism and of the Bukharin conception of the intensification of the class struggle?

It lies in the fact that it lulls the working class to sleep, undermines the mobilised preparedness of the revolutionary forces of our country, demobilises the working class and facilitates the attack of the capitalist elements against the Soviet regime.

c) THE PEASANTRY

Bukharin's third mistake is on the question of the peasantry. As you know, this question is one of the most important questions of our policy. In the conditions prevailing in our country, the peasantry consists of various social groups, namely, the poor peasants, the middle peasants and the kulaks. It is obvious that our attitude to these various groups cannot be the same. The poor peasant as the *support* of the working class, the middle peasant as the *ally*, the kulak as the *class enemy*—such is our attitude to these social groups. All this is clear and generally known.

Bukharin, however, regards the matter somewhat differently. In his description of the peasantry this differentiation is omitted, the existence of social groups disappears, and there remains but a single drab patch, called the countryside. According to him, the kulak is not a kulak, and the middle peasant is not a middle peasant, but there is a sort of uniform poverty in the countryside. That is what he said in his speech here: Can our kulak really be called a kulak? he said. Why, he is a pauper! And our middle peasant, is he really like a middle peasant? Why, he is a pauper, living on the verge of starvation. Obviously, such a view of the peasantry is a radically wrong view, incompatible with Leninism.

Lenin said that the individual peasantry is *the last capitalist class*. Is that thesis correct? Yes, it is absolutely correct. Why is the individual peasantry defined as the last capitalist class? Because, of the two main classes of which our society is composed, the peas-

antry is the class whose economy is based on private property and small commodity production. Because the peasantry, as long as it remains an individual peasantry carrying on small commodity production, produces capitalists from its midst, and cannot help producing them, constantly and continuously.

This fact is of decisive importance for us in the question of our Marxist attitude to the problem of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. This means that we need, not *just any kind* of alliance with the peasantry, but only *such an alliance* as is based on the struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry.

As you see, Lenin's thesis about the peasantry being the last capitalist class not only does not contradict the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, but, on the contrary, supplies the basis for this alliance as an alliance between the working class and the majority of the peasantry directed against the capitalist elements in general and against the capitalist elements of the peasantry in the countryside in particular.

Lenin advanced this thesis in order to show that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry can be stable only if it is based on the struggle against those capitalist elements which the peasantry produces from its midst.

Bukharin's mistake is that he does not understand and does not accept this simple thing, he forgets about the social groups in the countryside, he loses sight of the kulaks and the poor peasants, and all that remains is one uniform mass of middle peasants.

This is undoubtedly a deviation to the Right on the part of Bukharin, in contradistinction to the "Left," Trotskyite, deviation, which sees no other social groups in the countryside than the poor peasants and the kulaks, and which loses sight of the middle peasants.

Wherein lies the difference between Trotskyism and Bukharin's group on the question of the alliance with the peasantry? It lies in the fact that Trotskyism is *opposed* to the policy of a *stable* alliance with the middle-peasant masses, while Bukharin's group is in favour of *any kind* of alliance with the peasantry in general. There is no need to prove that both these positions are wrong and that they are equally worthless.

Leninism unquestionably stands for a stable alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, for an alliance with the middle peasants; but not just any kind of alliance, however, but such an alliance with the middle peasants as ensures the *leading role* of the working class, *consolidates* the dictatorship of the proletariat and *facilitates the abolition of classes*.

"Agreement between the working class and the peasantry," says Lenin, "may be taken to mean anything. If we do not bear in mind that, from the point of view of the working class, agreement is permissible, correct and possible in principle only if it supports the dictatorship of the working class and is one of the measures aimed at the abolition of classes, then the formula of agreement between the working class and the peasantry remains, of course, a formula to which all the enemies of the Soviet regime and all the enemies of the dictatorship subscribe" (Vol. XXVI, p. 387).

And further:

"At present," says Lenin, "the proletariat holds power and guides the state. It guides the peasantry. What does guiding the

peasantry mean? It means, in the first place, pursuing a course towards the abolition of classes, and not towards the small producer. If we wandered away from this radical and main course we should cease to be socialists and should find ourselves in the camp of the petty bourgeoisie, in the camp of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are now the most bitter enemies of the proletariat" (*ibid.*, pp. 399-400).

There you have Lenin's point of view on the question of the alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, of the alliance with the middle peasants.

The mistake of Bukharin's group on the question of the middle peasant is that it does not see the dual nature, the dual position of the middle peasant between the working class and the capitalists. "The middle peasantry is a vacillating class," said Lenin. Why? Because, on the one hand, the middle peasant is a toiler, which brings him close to the working class, but, on the other hand, he is a property owner, which brings him close to the kulak. Hence the vacillations of the middle peasant. And this is true not only theoretically. These vacillations manifest themselves also in practice, daily and hourly.

"As a toiler," says Lenin, "the peasant gravitates towards socialism, preferring the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. As a seller of grain, the peasant gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, towards freedom of trade, i.e., back to the 'habitual,' old, 'time-hallowed' capitalism" (Vol. XXIV, p. 314).

That is why the alliance with the middle peasant can be stable only if it is directed against the capitalist elements, against capitalism in general, if it guarantees

the leading role of the working class in this alliance, if it facilitates the abolition of classes.

Bukharin's group forgets these simple and obvious things.

d) NEP AND MARKET RELATIONS

Bukharin's fourth mistake is on the question of NEP (the New Economic Policy). Bukharin's mistake is that he fails to see the two-fold character of NEP, he sees only one aspect of NEP. When we introduced NEP in 1921, we directed its spearhead against War Communism, against a regime and system which excluded *any and every form* of freedom for private trade. We considered, and still consider, that NEP implies a *certain* freedom for private trade. Bukharin remembers this aspect of the matter. That is very good.

But Bukharin is mistaken in supposing that this is the only aspect of NEP. Bukharin forgets that NEP has also another aspect. The point is that NEP by no means implies *complete* freedom for private trade, the *free* play of prices in the market. NEP is freedom for private trade within *certain* limits, within *certain* boundaries, *with the proviso that the role of the state as the regulator of the market is guaranteed*. That, precisely, is the second aspect of NEP. Moreover, this aspect of NEP is more important for us than the first. In our country there is no free play of prices in the market, such as is usually the case in capitalist countries. We, in the main, determine the price of grain. We determine the price of manufactured goods. We try to carry out a policy of reducing production costs and reducing prices of man-

ufactured goods, while striving to stabilise the prices of agricultural produce. Is it not obvious that such special and specific market conditions do not exist in capitalist countries?

From this it follows that as long as NEP exists, both its aspects must be retained: the first aspect, which is directed against the regime of War Communism and aims at ensuring a *certain* freedom for private trade, and the second aspect, which is directed against *complete* freedom for private trade, and aims at ensuring the role of the state as the regulator of the market. Destroy one of these aspects, and the New Economic Policy disappears.

Bukharin thinks that danger can threaten NEP only "from the Left," from people who want to abolish *all* freedom of trade. That is not true. It is a gross error. Moreover, such a danger is the least real at the present moment, since there is nobody, or hardly anybody, in our local and central organisations now who does not understand the necessity and expediency of preserving a *certain measure* of freedom of trade.

The danger from the Right, from those who want to abolish the role of the state as regulator of the market, who want to "emancipate" the market and thereby open up an era of complete freedom for private trade, is much more real. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the danger of disrupting NEP from the Right is much more real at the present time.

It should not be forgotten that the petty-bourgeois elemental forces are working precisely in this direction, in the direction of disrupting NEP from the Right. It should also be borne in mind that the outcries of the

kulaks and the well-to-do elements, the outcries of the speculators and profiteers, to which many of our comrades often yield, bombard NEP from precisely this quarter. The fact that Bukharin does not see this second, and very real, danger of NEP being disrupted undoubtedly shows that he has yielded to the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces.

Bukharin proposes to "normalise" the market and to "manoeuvre" with grain-procurement prices according to areas, i.e., to raise the price of grain. What does this mean? It means that he is not satisfied with Soviet market conditions, he wants to put a brake on the role of the state as the regulator of the market and proposes that concessions be made to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which are disrupting NEP from the Right.

Let us assume for a moment that we followed Bukharin's advice. What would be the result? We raise the price of grain in the autumn, let us say, at the beginning of the grain-purchasing period. But since there are always people on the market, all sorts of speculators and profiteers, who can pay three times as much for grain, and since we cannot keep up with the speculators, for they buy some ten million poods in all while we have to buy hundreds of millions of poods, those who hold grain will all the same continue to hold it in expectation of a further rise in price. Consequently, towards the spring, when the state's real need for grain mainly begins, we should again have to raise the price of grain. But what would raising the price of grain in the spring mean? It would mean ruining the poor and economically weaker strata of the rural population, who

are themselves obliged to buy grain in the spring, partly for seed and partly for food—the very grain which they sold in the autumn at a lower price. Can we by such operations obtain any really useful results in the way of securing a sufficient quantity of grain? Most probably not, for there will always be speculators and profiteers able to pay twice and three times as much for the same grain. Consequently, we would have to be prepared to raise the price of grain once again in a vain effort to catch up with the speculators and profiteers.

From this, however, it follows that once having started on the path of raising grain prices we should have to continue down the slippery slope without any guarantee of securing a sufficient quantity of grain.

But the matter does not end there.

Firstly, having raised grain-*procurement* prices, we should next have to raise the prices of agricultural raw materials as well, in order to maintain a certain proportion in the prices of agricultural produce.

Secondly, having raised grain-*procurement* prices, we should not be able to maintain low retail prices of bread in the towns—consequently, we should have to raise the *selling* price of bread. And since we cannot and must not injure the workers, we should have to increase wages at an accelerated pace. But this is bound to lead to a rise in the prices of manufactured goods, for, otherwise, there could be a diversion of resources from the towns into the countryside to the detriment of industrialisation.

As a result, we should have to adjust the prices of manufactured goods and of agricultural produce not on the basis of *falling* or, at any rate, stabilised prices, but

on the basis of *rising* prices, both of grain and of manufactured goods.

In other words, we should have to pursue a policy of *raising the prices* of manufactured goods and agricultural produce.

It is not difficult to understand that such “manoeuvring” with prices can only lead to the complete nullification of the Soviet price policy, to the nullification of the role of the state as the regulator of the market, and to giving a free rein to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces.

Who would profit by this?

Only the well-to-do strata of the urban and rural population, for expensive manufactured goods and agricultural produce would necessarily become out of the reach both of the working class and of the poor and economically weaker strata of the rural population. It would profit the kulaks and the well-to-do, the Nepmen and other prosperous classes.

That, too, would be a bond, but a peculiar one, a bond with the wealthy strata of the rural and urban population. The workers and the economically weaker strata of the rural population would have every right to ask us: Whose government are you, a workers’ and peasants’ government or a kulak and Nepmen’s government?

A rupture with the working class and the economically weaker strata of the rural population, and a bond with the wealthy strata of the urban and rural population—that is what Bukharin’s “normalisation” of the market and “manoeuvring” with grain prices according to areas must lead to.

Obviously, the Party cannot take this fatal path.

The extent to which all conceptions of NEP in Bukharin's mind have become muddled and the extent to which he is firmly held captive by the petty-bourgeois elemental forces is shown, among other things, by the more than negative attitude he displays to the question of the new forms of trade turnover between town and country, between the state and the peasantry. He is indignant and cries out against the fact that the state has become the supplier of goods for the peasantry and that the peasantry is becoming the supplier of grain for the state. He regards this as a violation of all the rules of NEP, as almost the disruption of NEP. Why? On what grounds?

What can there be objectionable in the fact that the state, state industry, is the supplier, without middlemen, of goods for the peasantry, and that the peasantry is the supplier of grain for industry, for the state, also without middlemen?

What can there be objectionable, from the point of view of Marxism and a Marxist policy, in the fact that the peasantry *has already become* the supplier of cotton, beet and flax for the needs of state industry, and that state industry has become the supplier of urban goods, seed and instruments of production for these branches of agriculture?

The contract system is here the principal method of establishing these new forms of trade turnover between town and country. But is the contract system contrary to the principles of NEP?

What can there be objectionable in the fact that, thanks to this contract system, the peasantry *is becoming*

the state's supplier not only of cotton, beet and flax, but also of grain?

If trade in small consignments, petty trade, can be termed trade turnover, why cannot trade in large consignments, conducted by means of agreements concluded in advance (contracts) as to price and quality of goods be regarded as trade turnover?

Is it difficult to understand that it is on the basis of NEP that these new, mass forms of trade turnover between town and country based on the contract system have arisen, that they mark a very big step forward on the part of our organisations as regards strengthening the planned, socialist direction of our national economy?

Bukharin has lost the capacity to understand these simple and obvious things.

e) THE SO-CALLED "TRIBUTE"

Bukharin's fifth mistake (I am speaking of his principal mistakes) is his opportunist distortion of the Party line on the question of the "scissors" between town and country, on the question of the so-called "tribute."

What is the point dealt with in the well-known resolution of the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (February 1929) on the question of the "scissors"? What is said there is that, in addition to the usual taxes, direct and indirect, which the peasantry pays to the state, the peasantry also pays a certain supertax in the form of an over-payment for manufactured goods, and in the form of an under-payment received for agricultural produce.

Is it true that this supertax paid by the peasantry actually exists? Yes, it is. What other name have we for this supertax? We also call it the “scissors,” the “diversion” of resources from agriculture into industry for the purpose of speeding up our industrial development.

Is this “diversion” necessary? We all agree that, as a temporary measure, it is necessary if we really wish to maintain a speedy rate of industrial development. Indeed, we must at all costs maintain a rapid growth of our industry, for this growth is necessary not only for industry itself, but primarily for agriculture, for the peasantry, which at the present time needs most of all tractors, agricultural machinery and fertilisers.

Can we abolish this supertax at the present time? Unfortunately, we cannot. We must abolish it at the first opportunity, in the next few years. But we cannot abolish it at the present moment.

Now, as you see, this supertax obtained as a result of the “scissors” does constitute “something in the nature of a tribute.” Not a tribute, but “something in the nature of a tribute.” It is “something in the nature of a tribute” on account of our backwardness. We need this supertax to stimulate the development of our industry and to do away with our backwardness.

But does this mean that by levying this additional tax we are thereby exploiting the peasantry? No, it does not. The very nature of the Soviet regime precludes any sort of exploitation of the peasantry by the state. It was plainly stated in the speeches of our comrades at the July plenum⁶ that under the Soviet regime exploitation of the peasantry by the socialist state is *ruled*

out; for a constant rise in the well-being of the labouring peasantry is a law of development of Soviet society, and this rules out any possibility of exploiting the peasantry.

Is the peasantry capable of paying this additional tax? Yes, it is. Why?

Firstly, because the levying of this additional tax is effected under conditions of a constant improvement of the material position of the peasantry.

Secondly, because the peasants have their own private husbandry, the income from which enables them to meet the additional tax, and in this they differ from the industrial workers, who have no private husbandry, but who nonetheless devote all their energies to the cause of industrialisation.

Thirdly, because the amount of this additional tax is being reduced year by year.

Are we right in calling this additional tax “something in the nature of a tribute”? Unquestionably, we are. By our choice of words we are pointing out to our comrades that this additional tax is detestable and undesirable, and that its continuance for any considerable period is impermissible. By giving this name to the additional tax on the peasantry we intend to convey that we are levying it not because we want to, but because we are forced to, and that we, Bolsheviki, must take all measures to abolish this additional tax at the first opportunity, as soon as possible.

Such is the essence of the question of the “scissors,” the “diversion,” the “supertax,” of what the above-mentioned documents designate as “something in the nature of a tribute.”

At first, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy tried to wrangle over the word "tribute," and accused the Party of pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry. But now even the blind can see that this was just an unscrupulous attempt of the Bukharinites at gross slander against our Party. Now, even they themselves are compelled tacitly to acknowledge that their chatter about military-feudal exploitation was a resounding failure.

One thing or the other:

either the Bukharinites recognise the inevitability, at the present time, of the "scissors" and "diversion" of resources from agriculture into industry—in which case they are forced to admit that their accusations are of a slanderous nature, and that the Party is entirely right;

or they deny the inevitability, at the present time, of the "scissors" and "diversion," but in that case let them say it frankly, so that the Party may class them as opponents of the industrialisation of our country.

I could, incidentally, refer to a number of speeches of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy, in which they recognise without any reservations the inevitability, at the present time, of the "scissors" and "diversion" of resources from agriculture into industry. And this, indeed, is equivalent to an acceptance of the formula "something in the nature of a tribute."

Well then, do they continue to uphold the point of view with regard to the "diversion," and the preservation of the "scissors" at the present time, or not? Let them say it frankly.

Bukharin. The diversion is necessary, but "tribute" is an unfortunate word. (*General laughter.*)

Stalin. Consequently, we do not differ on the essence of the question; consequently, the “diversion” of resources from agriculture into industry, the so-called “scissors,” the additional tax, “something in the nature of a tribute”—is a necessary though temporary means for industrialising our country at the present time.

Very well. Then what is the point at issue? Why all the tumult? They do not like the word “tribute” or the words “something in the nature of a tribute,” because they believe that this expression is not commonly used in Marxist literature?

Well then, let us discuss the word “tribute.”

I assert, comrades, that this word has long been in use in our Marxist literature, in Comrade Lenin’s writings, for example. This may surprise some people who do not read Lenin’s works, but it is a fact, comrades. Bukharin vehemently asserted here that “tribute” is an unfitting word to use in Marxist literature. He was indignant and surprised at the fact that the Central Committee of the Party, and Marxists in general, take the liberty of using the word “tribute.” But what is surprising in this, if there is proof that this word has long been in use in the writings of such a Marxist as Comrade Lenin. Or perhaps, from Bukharin’s viewpoint, Lenin does not qualify as a Marxist? Well, you should be straightforward about it, dear comrades.

Take for example the article “‘Left-Wing’ Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality” (May 1918), which was written by no less a Marxist than Lenin, and read the following passage:

“The petty bourgeois who hoards his thousands is an enemy of state capitalism; he wants to employ these thousands just for

himself, against the poor, in opposition to any kind of state control; yet the sum total of these thousands amounts to many thousands of millions that supply a base for speculation, which undermines our socialist construction. Let us assume that a certain number of workers produce in a few days values equal to 1,000. Let us then assume that 200 out of this total vanishes owing to petty speculation, all kinds of pilfering and of "dodging" Soviet decrees and regulations by small property owners. Every class-conscious worker would say: If I could give up 300 out of the 1,000 for the sake of achieving better order and organisation, I would willingly give up 300 instead of 200, because to reduce this "tribute" later on, to, say, 100 or 50, will be quite an easy matter under the Soviet regime, once we have achieved order and organisation and once we have completely overcome the disruption of all state monopoly by small property owners" (Vol. XXII, p. 515).

That is clear, I think. Should Lenin on this account be declared an advocate of the policy of military-feudal exploitation of the working class? Just try, dear comrades!

A voice. Nevertheless the term "tribute" has never been used in relation to the middle peasant.

Stalin. Do you believe by any chance that the middle peasant is closer to the Party than the working class? You are some Marxist! (*General laughter.*) If we, the Party of the working class, can speak of "tribute" when it concerns the working class, why cannot we do so when it concerns the middle peasantry, which is only our ally?

Some of the faultfinding people may imagine that the word "tribute" in Lenin's article "'Left-Wing' Childishness" is just a slip of the pen, an accidental slip. A check-up on this point, however, will show that the suspicions of those fault-finding people are entirely groundless. Take another article, or rather a pamphlet,

written by Lenin: *The Tax in Kind* (April 1921) and read page 324 (Vol. XXVI, p. 324). You will see that the above-quoted passage regarding "tribute" is repeated by Lenin word for word. Finally, take Lenin's article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power" (Vol. XXII, p. 448, March-April 1918), and you will see that in it, too, Lenin speaks of the "tribute (without quotation marks) which we are paying for our backwardness in the matter of organising accounting and control from below on a nationwide scale."

It turns out that the *word* "tribute" is very far from being a fortuitous element in Lenin's writings. Comrade Lenin uses this *word* to stress the temporary nature of the "tribute," to stimulate the energy of the Bolsheviks and to direct it so as at the first opportunity, to abolish this "tribute," the price the working class has to pay for our backwardness and our "muddling."

It turns out that when I use the expression "something in the nature of a tribute" I find myself in quite good Marxist company, that of Comrade Lenin.

Bukharin said here that Marxists should not tolerate the word "tribute" in their writings. What kind of Marxists was he speaking about? If he had in mind such Marxists, if they may be so called, as Slepkov, Maretsky, Petrovsky, Rosit, etc., who are more like liberals than Marxists, then his indignation is perfectly justified. If, on the other hand, he has in mind real Marxists, Comrade Lenin, for example, then it must be admitted that among them the word "tribute" has been in use for a long time, while Bukharin, who is not well acquainted with Lenin's writings, is wide of the mark.

But this does not fully dispose of the question of the "tribute." The point is that it was no accident that Bukharin and his friends took exception to the word "tribute" and began to speak of a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry. Their outcry about military-feudal exploitation was undoubtedly meant to express their extreme dissatisfaction with the Party policy towards the kulaks that is being applied by our organisations. Dissatisfaction with the Leninist policy of the Party in its leadership of the peasantry, dissatisfaction with our grain-procurement policy, with our policy of developing collective farms and state farms to the utmost, and lastly, the desire to "emancipate" the market and to establish complete freedom for private trade—that is what was expressed in Bukharin's howling about a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry.

In the history of our Party I cannot recall any other instance of the Party being accused of pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation. That weapon against the Party was not borrowed from the arsenal of Marxists. Where, then, was it borrowed from? From the arsenal of Milyukov, the leader of the Cadets. When the Cadets wish to sow dissension between the working class and the peasantry, they usually say: You, Messieurs the Bolsheviks, are building socialism on the corpses of the peasants. When Bukharin raises an outcry about the "tribute," he is singing to the tune of Messieurs the Milyukovs, and is following in the wake of the enemies of the people.

f) THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY AND THE NEW FORMS OF THE BOND

Finally, the question of the rate of development of industry and of the new forms of the bond between town and country. This is one of the most important questions of our disagreements. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the converging point of all the threads of our *practical* disagreements about the economic policy of the Party.

What are the new forms of the bond, what do they signify from the point of view of our economic policy?

They signify, first of all, that besides the old forms of the bond between town and country, whereby industry chiefly satisfied the *personal* requirements of the peasant (cotton fabrics, footwear, and textiles in general, etc.), we now need new forms of the bond, whereby industry will satisfy the *productive* requirements of peasant economy (agricultural machinery, tractors, improved seed, fertilisers, etc.).

Whereas formerly we satisfied *mainly* the personal requirements of the peasant, hardly touching the productive requirements of his economy, now, while continuing to satisfy the personal requirements of the peasant, we must do our utmost to supply agricultural machinery, tractors, fertilisers, etc., which have a direct bearing on the reconstruction of agricultural production on a new technical basis.

As long as it was a question of *restoring* agriculture and of the peasants putting into use the land formerly belonging to the landlords and kulaks, we could be content with the old forms of the bond. But now, when it is

a question of *reconstructing* agriculture, that is not enough. Now we must go further and help the peasantry to reorganise agricultural production on the basis of new technique and collective labour.

Secondly, they signify that simultaneously with the re-equipment of our industry, we must begin seriously re-equipping agriculture too. We are re-equipping, and have already partly re-equipped our industry, placing it on a new technical basis, supplying it with new, improved machinery and new, improved cadres. We are building new mills and factories and are reconstructing and extending the old ones; we are developing the metallurgical, chemical and machine-building industries. On this basis new towns are springing up, new industrial centres are multiplying and the old ones are expanding. On this basis the demand for food products and for raw materials for industry is growing. But agriculture continues to employ the old equipment, the old methods of tillage practised by our fore-fathers, the old, primitive, now useless, or nearly useless technique, the old, small-peasant, individual forms of farming and labour.

Consider, for example, the fact that before the Revolution we had nearly 16,000,000 peasant households, while now there are no less than 25,000,000. What does this indicate if not that agriculture is becoming more and more scattered and disunited. And the characteristic feature of scattered small farms is that they are unable properly to employ technique, machines, tractors and scientific agronomic knowledge, that they are farms with a small marketable surplus.

Hence the insufficient output of agricultural produce for the market.

Hence the danger of a rift between town and country, between industry and agriculture.

Hence the necessity for increasing the rate of development of agriculture, bringing it up to that of our industry.

And so, in order to eliminate this danger of a rift, we must begin seriously re-equipping agriculture on the basis of new technique. But in order to re-equip it we must gradually unite the scattered individual peasant farms into large farms, into collective farms; we must build up agriculture on the basis of collective labour, we must enlarge the collectives, we must develop the old and new state farms, we must systematically employ the contract system on a mass scale in all the principal branches of agriculture, we must develop the system of machine and tractor stations which help the peasantry to master the new technique and to collectivise labour—in a word, we must gradually transfer the small individual peasant farms to the basis of large-scale collective production, for only large-scale production of a socially-conducted type is capable of making full use of scientific knowledge and modern technique, and of advancing the development of our agriculture with giant strides.

This, of course, does not mean that we must neglect poor and middle individual peasant farming. Not at all. Poor and middle individual peasant farming plays a predominant part in supplying industry with food and raw materials, and will continue to do so in the immediate future. For that very reason we must continue to assist poor and middle individual peasant farms which have not yet united into collective farms.

But this does mean that individual peasant farming alone is *no longer* adequate. That is shown by our grain-procurement difficulties. That is why the development of poor and middle individual peasant farming must be *supplemented* by the widest possible development of collective forms of farming and of state farms.

That is why we must make a bridge between individual poor- and middle-peasant farming and collective, socially-conducted forms of farming by means of the contract system on a mass scale, by means of machine and tractor stations and by the fullest development of a co-operative communal life in order to help the peasants to transfer their small, individual farming on to the lines of collective labour.

Failing this it will be impossible to develop agriculture to any extent. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem. Failing this it will be impossible to save the economically weaker strata of the peasantry from poverty and ruin.

Finally, this signifies that we must develop our industry to the utmost as the principal source from which agriculture will be supplied with the means required for its reconstruction: we must develop our iron and steel, chemical and machine-building industries; we must build tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc.

There is no need to prove that it is impossible to develop collective farms, that it is impossible to develop machine and tractor stations, without drawing the main mass of the peasantry into collective forms of farming, with the aid of the contract system on a mass scale, without supplying agriculture with a fairly large quantity of tractors, agricultural machinery, etc.

But it will be impossible to supply the countryside with machines and tractors unless we accelerate the development of our industry. Hence, rapid development of our industry is the key to the reconstruction of agriculture on the basis of collectivism.

Such is the significance and importance of the new forms of the bond.

Bukharin's group is obliged to admit, in words, the necessity of the new forms of the bond. But it is an admission only *in words*, with the intention, under cover of a verbal recognition of the new forms of the bond, of smuggling in something which is the very *opposite*. Actually, Bukharin is opposed to the new forms of the bond. Bukharin's starting point is not a rapid rate of development of industry as the lever for the reconstruction of agriculture, but the development of individual peasant farming. He puts in the foreground the "normalisation" of the market and permission for the free play of prices on the agricultural produce market, complete freedom for private trade. Hence his distrustful attitude to the collective farms which manifested itself in his speech at the July plenum of the Central Committee and in his theses prior to that July plenum. Hence his disapproval of any form of emergency measures against the kulaks during grain procurement.

We know that Bukharin shuns emergency measures as the devil shuns holy water.

We know that Bukharin is still unable to understand that under present conditions the kulak will not supply a sufficient quantity of grain voluntarily, of his own accord.

That has been proved by our two years' experience of grain-procurement work.

But what if, in spite of everything, there is not enough marketable grain? To this Bukharin replies: Do not worry the kulaks with emergency measures; import grain from abroad. Not long ago he proposed that we import about 50,000,000 poods of grain, i.e., to the value of about 100,000,000 rubles in foreign currency. But what if foreign currency is required to import equipment for industry? To this Bukharin replies: Preference must be given to grain imports—thus, evidently, relegating imports of equipment for industry to the background.

It follows, therefore, that the basis for the solution of the grain problem and for the reconstruction of agriculture is not a rapid rate of development of industry, but the development of individual peasant farming, including kulak farming, on the basis of a free market and the free play of prices in the market.

Thus we have two different plans of economic policy.

The Party's plan:

1. We are re-equipping industry (reconstruction).
2. We are beginning seriously to re-equip agriculture (reconstruction).
3. For this we must expand the development of collective farms and state farms, employ on a mass scale the contract system and machine and tractor stations as means of establishing a *bond* between industry and agriculture *in the sphere of production*.
4. As for the present grain-procurement difficulties, we must admit the permissibility of temporary emergency measures that are backed by the popular support of the middle- and poor-peasant masses, as one of the means of breaking the resistance of the kulaks and of obtaining from them the maximum grain surpluses necessary for

dispensing with imported grain and saving foreign currency for the development of industry.

5. Individual poor- and middle-peasant farming plays, and will continue to play, a predominant part in supplying the country with food and raw materials; but alone it is no longer adequate—the development of individual poor- and middle-peasant farming must therefore be *supplemented* by the development of collective farms and state farms, by the contract system on a mass scale, by accelerating the development of machine and tractor stations, in order to facilitate the ousting of the capitalist elements from agriculture and the gradual transfer of the individual peasant farms on to the lines of large-scale collective farming, on to the lines of collective labour.

6. But in order to achieve all this, it is necessary first of all to accelerate the development of industry, of the metallurgical chemical and machine-building industries, tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem just as it will be impossible to reconstruct agriculture.

Conclusion: *the key to the reconstruction of agriculture is a rapid rate of development of our industry.*

Bukharin's plan:

1. "Normalise" the market; permit the free play of prices on the market and a rise in the price of grain, undeterred by the fact that this may lead to a rise in the prices of manufactured goods, raw materials and bread.

2. The utmost development of individual peasant farming accompanied by a certain reduction of the rate of development of collective farms and state farms (Bu-

kharin's theses in July and his speech at the July plenum).

3. Grain procurements to proceed automatically, excluding at any time or under any circumstances even a partial use of emergency measures against the kulaks, even though such measures are supported by the middle- and poor-peasant masses.

4. In the event of shortage of grain, to import about 100 million rubles' worth of grain.

5. And if there is not enough foreign currency to pay for grain imports and imports of equipment for industry, to reduce imports of equipment and, consequently, the rate of development of our industry—otherwise our agriculture will simply “mark time,” or even “directly decline.”

Conclusion: *the key to the reconstruction of agriculture is the development of individual peasant farming.*

That is how it works out, comrades!

Bukharin's plan is a plan to *reduce* the rate of development of industry and to *undermine* the new forms of the bond.

Such are our disagreements.

Sometimes the question is asked: Have we not been late in developing the new forms of the bond, in developing collective farms, state farms, etc.?

Some people assert that the Party was at least about two years late in starting with this work. That is wrong, comrades. It is absolutely wrong. Only noisy “Lefts,” who have no conception of the economy of the U.S.S.R., can talk like that.

What is meant by being late in this matter? If it is a question of foreseeing the need for collective farms

and state farms, then we can say that we began that at the time of the October Revolution. There cannot be the slightest doubt that already then—at the time of the October Revolution—the Party foresaw the need for collective farms and state farms. Lastly, one can take our programme, adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Party (March 1919). The need for collective farms and state farms is recognised there quite clearly.

But the mere fact that the top leadership of our Party fore saw the need for collective farms and state farms was not enough for carrying into effect and organising a *mass movement* for collective farms and state farms. Consequently, it is not a matter of foreseeing, but of *carrying out* a plan of collective-farm and state-farm development. But in order to carry out such a plan a number of conditions are required which did not exist before, and which came into existence only recently.

That is the point, comrades.

In order to carry out the plan for a mass movement in favour of collective farms and state farms, it is necessary, first of all, that the Party's top leadership should be supported in this matter by the *mass* of the Party membership. As you know, ours is a Party of a million members. It was therefore necessary to convince the mass of the Party membership of the correctness of the policy of the top leadership. That is the first point.

Further, it is necessary that a mass movement in favour of collective should arise within the peasantry, that the peasants—far from fearing the collective farms—should themselves join the collective farms

and become convinced by experience of the advantage of collective farming over individual farming. This is a serious matter, requiring a certain amount of time. That is the second point.

Further, it is necessary that the state should possess the material resources required to finance collective-farm development, to finance the collective farms and state farms. And this, dear comrades, is a matter that requires many hundreds of millions of rubles. That is the third point.

Finally, it is necessary that industry should be fairly adequately developed so as to be able to supply agriculture with machinery, tractors, fertilisers, etc. That is the fourth point.

Can it be asserted that all these conditions existed here two or three years ago? No, it cannot.

It must not be forgotten that we are a party *in power*, not *in opposition*. An opposition party can issue slogans—I am speaking of fundamental practical slogans of the movement—in order to carry them into effect after coming into power. Nobody can accuse an opposition party of not carrying out its fundamental slogans immediately, for everybody knows that it is not the opposition party which is at the helm, but other parties.

In the case of a party in power, however, such as our Bolshevik Party is, the matter is entirely different. The slogans of such a party are not mere agitational slogans, but something much more than that, for they have the force of *practical decision*, the *force of law*, and must be carried out immediately. Our Party cannot issue a practical slogan and then defer its implementation. That would be deceiving the masses. For a practical

slogan to be issued, especially so serious a slogan as transferring the vast masses of the peasantry on to the lines of collectivism, the conditions must exist that will enable the slogan to be carried out directly; finally, these conditions must be created, organised. That is why it is not enough for the Party's top leadership merely to foresee the need for collective farms and state farms. That is why we also need the conditions to enable us *to realise, to carry out*, our slogans immediately.

Was the mass of our Party membership ready for the utmost development of collective farms and state farms, say, some two or three years ago? No, it was not ready. The serious turn of the mass of the Party membership towards the new forms of the bond began only with the first serious grain-procurement difficulties. It required those difficulties for the mass of the Party membership to become conscious of the full necessity of accelerating the adoption of the new forms of the bond, and primarily, of the collective farms and state farms, and resolutely to support its Central Committee in this matter. This is one condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Was there any serious movement among the vast masses of the peasantry in favour of collective farms or state farms some two or three years ago? No, there was not. Everybody knows that two or three years ago the peasantry was hostilely disposed to the state farms, while they contemptuously called the collective farms the "kommunia," regarding them as something utterly useless. And now? Now, the situation is different. Now we have whole strata of the peasantry who regard the state farms and collective farms as a source of assist-

ance to peasant farming in the way of seed, pedigree cattle, machines and tractors. Now we have only to supply machines and tractors, and collective farms will develop at an accelerated pace.

What was the cause of this change of attitude among certain, fairly considerable, strata of the peasantry? What helped to bring it about?

In the first place, the development of the co-operatives and a co-operative communal life. There can be no doubt that without the powerful development of the co-operatives, particularly the agricultural co-operatives, which produced among the peasantry a psychological background in favour of the collective farms, we would not have that urge towards the collective farms which is now displayed by whole strata of the peasantry.

An important part in this was also played by the existence of well-organised collective farms, which set the peasants good examples of how agriculture can be improved by uniting small peasant farms into large, collective, farms.

The existence of well-organised state farms, which helped the peasants to improve their methods of farming, also played its part here. I need not mention other facts with which you are all familiar. There you have another condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Further, can it be asserted that we were able some two or three years ago to give substantial financial aid to the collective farms and state farms, to assign hundreds of millions of rubles for this purpose? No, it cannot be asserted. You know very well that we even lacked sufficient means for developing that minimum of

industry without which no industrialisation at all is possible, let alone the reconstruction of agriculture. Could we take those means from industry, which is the basis for the industrialisation of the country, and transfer them to the collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not. But now? Now we have the means for developing the collective farms and state farms.

Finally, can it be asserted that some two or three years ago our industry was an adequate basis for supplying agriculture with large quantities of machines, tractors, etc.? No, it cannot be asserted. At that time our task was to create the *minimum industrial basis* required for supplying machines and tractors to agriculture *in the future*. It was on the creation of such a basis that our scanty financial resources were then spent. And now? Now we have this industrial basis for agriculture. At all events, this industrial basis is being created at a very rapid rate.

It follows that the conditions required for the mass development of the collective farms and state farms were created only recently.

That is how matters stand, comrades.

That is why it cannot be said that we were late in developing the new forms of the bond.

g) BUKHARIN AS A THEORETICIAN

Such, in the main, are the principal mistakes committed by the theoretician of the Right opposition, Bukharin, on the fundamental questions of our policy.

It is said that Bukharin is one of the theoreticians of our Party. This is true, of course. But the point is

that not all is well with his theorising. This is evident if only from the fact that on questions of Party theory and policy he has piled up the heap of mistakes which I have just described. These mistakes, mistakes on Comintern questions, mistakes on questions of the class struggle, the intensification of the class struggle, the peasantry, NEP, the new forms of the bond—these mistakes could not possibly have occurred accidentally. No, these mistakes are not accidental. These mistakes of Bukharin's followed from his wrong theoretical line, from the defects in his theories. Yes, Bukharin is a theoretician, but he is not altogether a Marxist theoretician; he is a theoretician who has much to learn before he can become a Marxist theoretician.

Reference has been made to the letter in which Comrade Lenin speaks of Bukharin as a theoretician. Let us read this letter:

“Of the younger members of the Central Committee,” says Lenin, “I should like to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. In my opinion, they are the most outstanding forces (of the youngest ones), and regarding them the following should be borne in mind: Bukharin is not only a very valuable and important theoretician in our Party, he is also legitimately regarded as the favourite of the whole Party, *but it is very doubtful whether his theoretical views can be classed as fully Marxist, for there is something scholastic in him (he has never studied and, I think, has never fully understood dialectics)*”* (Verbatim report of the July plenum, 1926, Part IV, p. 66).

Thus, he is a theoretician without dialectics. A scholastic theoretician. A theoretician about whom it

* My italics.—*J. St.*

was said: "It is very doubtful whether his theoretical views can be classed as fully Marxist." That is how Lenin characterised Bukharin's theoretical complexion.

You can well understand, comrades, that such a theoretician has still much to learn. And if Bukharin understood that he is not yet a full-fledged theoretician, that he still has much to learn, that he is a theoretician who has not yet mastered dialectics—and dialectics is the soul of Marxism—if he understood that, he would be more modest, and the Party would only benefit thereby. But the trouble is that Bukharin is wanting in modesty. The trouble is that not only is he wanting in modesty, but he even presumes to teach our teacher Lenin on a number of questions and, above all, on the question of the state. And that is Bukharin's misfortune.

Allow me in this connection to refer to the well-known theoretical controversy which flared up in 1916 between Lenin and Bukharin on the question of the state. This is important for us in order to expose both Bukharin's inordinate pretensions to teach Lenin and the roots of his theoretical weaknesses on such important questions as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle, etc.

As you know, an article by Bukharin appeared in 1916 in the magazine *Internatsional Molodyozhy*,⁷ signed Nota Bene; this article was in point of fact directed against Comrade Lenin. In this article Bukharin wrote:

“. . . It is quite a mistake to seek the difference between the Socialists and the Anarchists in the fact that the former are in favour of the state while the latter are against it. The real difference is that revolutionary Social-Democracy desires to

organise the new social production as centralised production, i.e., technically the most advanced production; whereas decentralised anarchist production would mean only retrogression to old technique, to the old form of enterprises. . . .”

“. . . Social-Democracy, which is, or at least should be, the educator of the masses, must now more than ever emphasise its hostility in principle to the state. . . . The present war has shown how deeply the roots of the state idea have penetrated the souls of the workers.”

Criticising these views of Bukharin’s, Lenin says in a well known article published in 1916:

“This is wrong. The author raises the question of the difference in the attitude of Socialists and Anarchists *towards the state*. But he replies *not* to this question, but to *another*, namely, the difference in the attitude of Socialists and Anarchists towards the economic foundation of future society. That, of course, is a very important and necessary question. But it does not follow that the *main* point of difference in the attitude of the Socialists and Anarchists towards the state can be ignored. The Socialists are in favour of utilising the modern state and its institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, and they also urge the necessity of utilising the state for the peculiar transitional form from capitalism to socialism. This transitional form, which is *also* a state, is the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Anarchists want to ‘abolish’ the state, to ‘blow it up’ (“sprengen”), as Comrade Nota Bene expresses it in one place, erroneously ascribing this view to the Socialists. The Socialists—unfortunately the author quotes the words of Engels relevant to this subject rather incompletely—hold that the state will ‘wither away,’ will gradually ‘fall asleep’ *after* the bourgeoisie has been expropriated.” . . .

“In order to ‘emphasise’ out ‘hostility in principle’ to the state, we must indeed understand it ‘clearly.’ This clarity, however, our author lacks. His phrase about the ‘roots of the state idea’ is entirely muddled, non-Marxist and non-socialist. It is not ‘the state idea’ that has clashed with the repudiation of the

idea of the state, but opportunist policy (i.e., an opportunist, reformist, bourgeois attitude towards the state) that has clashed with revolutionary Social-Democratic policy (i.e., with the revolutionary Social-Democratic attitude to the bourgeois state and towards utilising the state against the bourgeoisie in order to overthrow it). These are entirely different things” (Vol. XIX, p. 296).

I think it is clear what the point at issue is, and what a semi-anarchist mess Bukharin has got into!

Sten. At that time Lenin had not yet fully formulated the necessity for “blowing up” the state. Bukharin, while committing anarchist mistakes, was approaching a formulation of the question.

Stalin. No, that is not what we are concerned with at present. What we are concerned with is the attitude towards the state in general. The point is that in Bukharin’s opinion the working class should be hostile *in principle to any kind of state*, including the working-class state.

Sten. Lenin then only spoke about utilising the state; he said nothing in his criticism of Bukharin regarding the “blowing up” of the state.

Stalin. You are mistaken, the “blowing up” of the state is not a Marxist formula, it is an anarchist formula. Let me assure you that the point here is that, in the opinion of Bukharin (and of the Anarchists), the workers should emphasise their hostility in principle to any kind of state, and, therefore, also to the state of the transition period, to the working-class state.

Just try to explain to our workers that the working class must become imbued with hostility in principle to the proletarian dictatorship, which, of course, is also a state.

Bukharin's position, as set forth in his article in *Internatsional Molodyozhy*, is one of repudiating the state in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Bukharin overlooked a "trifle" here, namely, the whole transition period, during which the working class cannot do without its own state if it really wants to suppress the bourgeoisie and build socialism. That is the first point.

Secondly, it is not true that at the time Comrade Lenin in his criticism did not deal with the theory of "blowing up," of "abolishing" the state in general. Lenin not only dealt with this theory, as is evident from the passages I have quoted, but he criticised and demolished it as an anarchist theory, and counterposed to it the theory of *forming* and *utilising* a new state after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, namely, the state of the proletarian dictatorship.

Finally, the anarchist theory of "blowing up" and "abolishing" the state must not be confused with the Marxist theory of the "withering away" of the *proletarian* state or the "breaking up," the "smashing" of the *bourgeois* state machine. There are persons who are inclined to confuse these two different concepts in the belief that they express one and the same idea. But that is wrong. Lenin proceeded precisely from the Marxist theory of "smashing" the *bourgeois* state machine and the "withering away" of the *proletarian* state when he criticised the anarchist theory of "blowing up" and "abolishing" the state in general.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous if, for the sake of greater clarity, I quote here one of Comrade Lenin's manuscripts on the state, apparently written at the end

of 1916, or the beginning of 1917 (before the February Revolution of 1917). From this manuscript it is easily seen that:

a) in criticising Bukharin's semi-anarchist errors on the question of the state, Lenin proceeded from the Marxist theory of the "withering away" of the proletarian state and the "smashing" of the bourgeois state machine;

b) although Bukharin, as Lenin expressed it, "is nearer to the truth than Kautsky," nevertheless, "instead of exposing the Kautskyites, he helps them with his mistakes."

Here is the text of this manuscript:

"Of *extremely* great importance on the question of the state is the letter of *Engels to Bebel* dated March 18-28, 1875.

"Here is the most important passage in full:

". . . 'The free people's state is transformed into the free state. Taken in its grammatical sense, a free state is one where the state is free in relation to its citizens, hence a state with a despotic government. *The whole talk about the state should be dropped, especially since the Commune, which was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word.* The "people's state" has been thrown in our faces by the Anarchists to the point of disgust, although already Marx's book against Proudhon and later the *Communist Manifesto* directly declare that *with the introduction of the socialist order of society the state will dissolve of itself* (sich auflöst) *and disappear*. As, therefore, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, in order to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is pure nonsense to talk of a free people's state: so long as the proletariat still *uses* (Engels' italics) the state, it does *not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist*. We would therefore propose to replace the word state (Engels' italics) everywhere by the word "community" (Gemein-

wesen), a good old German word which can very well represent the French word "*commune*."

"This is, perhaps, the most remarkable, and certainly, the most pronounced passage, so to speak, in the works of Marx and Engels '*against* the state.'

"(1) 'The whole talk about the state should be dropped.'

"(2) 'The Commune was *no longer* a state in the proper sense of the word.' (What was it, then? A transitional form from the state to no state, obviously!)

"(3) The 'people's state' has been 'thrown in our faces' (in die Zähne geworfen, literally—thrown in our teeth) by the Anarchists too long (that is, Marx and Engels were ashamed of the obvious mistake made by their German friends; but they regarded it, and of course, *in the circumstances* that then existed, correctly regarded it as a far less serious mistake than that made by the Anarchists. This NB!!).

"(4) The state will 'disintegrate ("dissolve") (Nota Bene) of itself and disappear' . . . (compare later "will wither away") 'with the introduction of the socialist order of society'. . . .

"(5) The state is a 'temporary institution' which is used 'in the struggle, in the revolution' . . . (used by the *proletariat*, of course). . . .

"(6) The state is needed *not for freedom*, but for *holding down* (Niederhaltung is not suppression in the proper sense of the word, but preventing restoration, keeping in submission) the *adversaries of the proletariat*.

"(7) When there will be freedom, there will be no state.

"(8) 'We' (i.e., Engels and Marx) would propose to replace the word 'state' '*everywhere*' (in the programme) by the word 'community' (Gemeinwesen), 'commune'!!!

"This shows how Marx and Engels were vulgarised and defiled not only by the opportunists, but also by Kautsky.

"The opportunists *have not* understood a single one of these *eight* rich ideas!!

"They have taken *only* what is practically necessary for the present time: to utilise the political struggle, to utilise the *present* state to educate, to train the proletariat, to 'wrest concessions.' That is correct (as against the Anarchists), but that is

only $\frac{1}{100}$ part of Marxism, if one can thus express it arithmetically.

“In his propagandist works, and publications generally, Kautsky has completely slurred over (or forgotten? or not understood?) points 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, and the ‘Zerbrechen’ of Marx (in his controversy with Pannekoek in 1912 or 1913, Kautsky (see below, pp. 45-47) completely dropped into opportunism on this question.)

“What distinguishes us from the Anarchists is (α) the use of the state *now* and (β) during the proletarian *revolution* (the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’)—points of very great importance in practice at this moment. (But it is these very points that Bukharin *forgot!*)

“What distinguishes us from the opportunists is the more profound, ‘more permanent’ truths regarding ($\alpha\alpha$) the ‘temporary’ nature of the state, ($\beta\beta$) the *harm* of ‘chatter’ about it now, ($\gamma\gamma$) the not entirely state character of the dictatorship of the proletariat, ($\delta\delta$) the contradiction between the state and freedom, ($\epsilon\epsilon$) the more correct idea (concept, programmatic term) ‘community’ instead of state, ($\zeta\zeta$) ‘smashing’ (Zerbrechen) of the bureaucratic-military machine.

“It must not be forgotten also that the avowed opportunists in Germany (Bernstein, Kolb, etc.) directly repudiate the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, while the official programme and Kautsky *indirectly* repudiate it, by not saying anything about it in their day-to-day agitation and *tolerating* the renegacy of Kolb and Co.

“In August 1916, Bukharin was written to: ‘Allow your ideas about the state *to mature.*’ *Without*, however, allowing them to mature, he broke into print, as ‘Nota Bene,’ and did it in such a way that, instead of exposing the Kautskyites, he *helped them* with his mistakes!! Yet, as a matter of fact, Bukharin is nearer to the truth than Kautsky.”⁸

Such is the brief history of the theoretical controversy on the question of the state.

It would seem that the matter is clear: Bukharin made semi-anarchist mistakes—it is time to correct

those mistakes and proceed further in the footsteps of Lenin. But only Leninists can think like that. Bukharin, it appears, does not agree. On the contrary, he asserts that it was not he who was mistaken, but Lenin; that it was not he who followed, or ought to have followed, in the footsteps of Lenin, but, on the contrary, that it was Lenin who found himself compelled to follow in the footsteps of Bukharin.

You do not believe this, comrades? In that case, listen further. After the controversy in 1916, nine years later, during which interval Bukharin maintained silence, and *a year after the death of Lenin*—namely, in 1925—Bukharin published an article in the symposium *Revolutsia Prava*, entitled “Concerning the Theory of the Imperialist State,” which previously had been rejected by the editors of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*⁹ (i.e., by Lenin). In a *footnote* to this article Bukharin bluntly declares that it was not Lenin but he, Bukharin, who was right in this controversy. That may seem incredible, comrades, but it is a fact.

Listen to the text of this footnote:

“V. I. (i.e., Lenin) wrote a short article containing criticism of the article in *Internatsional Molodyozhy*. The reader will easily see that I had not made the mistake attributed to me, for I clearly saw the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat; on the other hand, from Ilyich’s article it will be seen that at that time he was wrong about the thesis on ‘*blowing up*’ the state (bourgeois state, of course), and confused that question with the question of the withering away of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* Perhaps I should have enlarged on the subject of the dictatorship at that time. But in justification I may say that *at that time* there was

* My italics.—*J. St.*

such a wholesale exaltation of the bourgeois state by the Social-Democrats that it was natural to concentrate all attention on the question of *blowing up* that machine.

“When I arrived in Russia from America and saw Nadezhda Konstantinovna* (that was at our illegal Sixth Congress and at that time V. I. was in hiding) her first words were: ‘V. I. asked me to tell you that he has no disagreements with you now over the question of the state.’ Studying this question, *Ilyich came to the same conclusions*** regarding ‘blowing up,’ but he developed this theme, and later the theory of the dictatorship, to such an extent as to create a whole epoch in the development of theoretical thought in this field.”

That is how Bukharin writes about Lenin *a year after* Lenin’s death.

There you have a pretty example of the hypertrophied pretentiousness of a half-educated theoretician!

Quite possibly, Nadezhda Konstantinovna did tell Bukharin what he writes here. But what conclusions can be drawn from this fact? The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Lenin had certain grounds for believing that Bukharin had renounced or was ready to renounce his mistakes. That is all. But Bukharin thought differently. He decided that henceforth, not Lenin, but he, i.e., Bukharin, must be regarded as the creator, or, at least, the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the state.

Hitherto we have regarded ourselves as Leninists, and we continue to do so. But it now appears that both Lenin and we, his disciples, are Bukharinites. Rather funny, comrades. But that’s what happens when one has to deal with Bukharin’s puffed-up pretentiousness.

* Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, Lenin's wife.—*Tr.*

** My italics.—*J. St.*

It might be thought that Bukharin's footnote to the above-mentioned article was a slip of the pen, that he wrote something silly, and then forgot about it. But it turns out that that is not the case. Bukharin, it turns out, spoke in all seriousness. That is evident, for example, from the fact that the statement he made in this footnote regarding Lenin's *mistakes* and Bukharin's *correctness* was republished recently, namely, in 1927, i.e., two years after Bukharin's first attack on Lenin, in a biographical sketch of Bukharin written by Maretsky, and it never occurred to Bukharin to protest against this . . . boldness of Maretsky. Obviously Bukharin's attack on Lenin cannot be regarded as accidental.

It appears, therefore, that Bukharin is right, and not Lenin, that the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the state is not Lenin, but Bukharin.

Such, comrades, is the picture of the theoretical distortions and the theoretical pretensions of Bukharin.

And this man, after all this, has the presumption to say in his speech here that there is "something rotten" in the theoretical line of our Party, that there is a deviation towards Trotskyism in the theoretical line of our Party!

And this is said by that same Bukharin who is making (and has made in the past) a number of gross theoretical and practical mistakes, who only recently was a pupil of Trotsky's, and who only the other day was seeking to form a bloc with the Trotskyites against the Leninists and was paying them visits by the backdoor.

Is that not funny, comrades?

h) A FIVE-YEAR PLAN OR A TWO-YEAR PLAN

Permit me now to pass to Rykov's speech. While Bukharin tried to provide a theoretical basis for the Right deviation, Rykov attempted in his speech to provide it with a basis of practical proposals and to frighten us with "horrors" drawn from our difficulties in the sphere of agriculture. That does not mean that Rykov did not touch upon theoretical questions. He did touch upon them. But in doing so he made at least two serious mistakes.

In his draft resolution on the five-year plan, which was rejected by the commission of the Political Bureau, Rykov says that "the central idea of the five-year plan is to increase the productivity of labour of the people." In spite of the fact that the commission of the Political Bureau rejected this absolutely false line, Rykov defended it here in his speech.

Is it true that the central idea of the five-year plan in the *Soviet country* is to increase the productivity of labour? No, it is not true. It is not *just any kind* of increase in the productivity of labour of the people that we need. What we need is a *specific* increase in the productivity of labour of the people, namely, an increase that will guarantee the *systematic supremacy of the socialist sector of the national economy over the capitalist sector*. A five-year plan which overlooks this central idea is not a five-year plan, but five-year rubbish.

Every society, capitalist and pre-capitalist society included, is interested in increasing the productivity of labour in general. The difference between *Soviet* society and every other society lies in the very fact that it

is interested not in just any kind of increase of the productivity of labour, but in such an increase as will ensure the supremacy of socialist forms of economy over other forms, and primarily over capitalist forms of economy, and will thus ensure that the capitalist forms of economy are overcome and ousted. But Rykov forgot this really central idea of the five-year plan of development of *Soviet* society. That is his first theoretical mistake.

His second mistake is that he does not distinguish, or does not want to understand the distinction—from the point of view of trade turnover—between, let us say, a collective farm and all kinds of individual enterprises, including individual capitalist enterprises. Rykov assures us that from the point of view of trade turnover on the grain market, from the point of view of obtaining grain, he does not see any difference between a collective farm and a private holder of grain; to him, therefore, it is a matter of indifference whether we buy grain from a collective farm, a private holder, or an Argentinian grain merchant. That is absolutely wrong. It is a repetition of the statement of Frumkin, who at one time used to assure us that it was a matter of indifference to him where and from whom we bought grain, whether from a private dealer or from a collective farm.

That is a masked form of defence, of rehabilitation, of justification of the kulak's machinations on the grain market. That this defence is conducted from the point of view of trade turnover does not alter the fact that it is, nevertheless, a justification of the kulak's machinations on the grain market. If from the viewpoint of trade turnover there is no difference between

collective and non-collective forms of economy, is it worth while developing collective farms, granting them privileges and devoting ourselves to the difficult task of overcoming the capitalist elements in agriculture? It is obvious that Rykov has taken a wrong line. That is his second theoretical mistake.

But this is by the way. Let us pass to the practical questions raised in Rykov's speech.

Rykov said here that in addition to the five-year plan we need another, a parallel plan, namely, a two-year plan for the development of agriculture. He justified this proposal for a parallel two-year plan on the grounds of the difficulties experienced in agriculture. He said: the five-year plan was a good thing and he was in favour of it; but if at the same time we drew up a two-year plan for agriculture it would be still better—otherwise agriculture would get into a fix.

On the face of it there appears to be nothing wrong with this proposal. But upon closer scrutiny we find that the two-year plan for agriculture was invented in order to emphasise that the five-year plan is unreal, a plan merely on paper. Could we agree to that? No, we could not. We said to Rykov: If you are dissatisfied with the five-year plan with regard to agriculture, if you think that the funds we are assigning in the five-year plan for developing agriculture are inadequate, then tell us plainly what your supplementary proposals are, what additional investments you propose—we are ready to include these additional investments in agriculture in the five-year plan. And what happened? We found that Rykov had no supplementary proposals to make about additional investments in agriculture. The

question arises: Why then a parallel two-year plan for agriculture?

We said to him further: In addition to the five-year plan there are yearly plans which are part of the five-year plan. Let us include in the first two of the yearly plans the concrete additional proposals for developing agriculture that you have, that is, if you have any at all. And what happened? We found that Rykov had no such concrete plans for additional assignments to propose.

We then realised that Rykov's proposal for a two-year plan was not made for the purpose of developing agriculture, but arose from a desire to emphasise that the five-year plan was unreal, a plan merely on paper, from a desire to discredit the five-year plan. For "conscience" sake, for appearance sake, a five-year plan; but for work, for practical purposes, a two-year plan—that was Rykov's strategy. Rykov brought the two-year plan on the scene in order subsequently, during the practical work of carrying out the five-year plan, to counterpose it to the five-year plan, reconstruct the five-year plan and adapt it to the two-year plan by paring down and curtailing the assignments for industry.

It was on these grounds that we rejected Rykov's proposal for a parallel two-year plan.

i) THE QUESTION OF THE CROP AREA

Rykov tried here to frighten the Party by asserting that the crop area throughout the U.S.S.R. is showing a steady tendency to diminish. Moreover, he threw out the hint that the policy of the Party was to blame for

the diminution of the crop area. He did not say outright that we are faced with a retrogression of agriculture, but the impression left by his speech is that something like retrogression is taking place.

Is it true that the crop area is showing a steady tendency to diminish? No, it is not true. Rykov made use of average figures of the crop area throughout the country. But the method of average figures, if it is not corrected by data for individual districts, cannot be regarded as a scientific method.

Rykov has, perhaps, read Lenin's *Development of Capitalism in Russia*. If he has read it he ought to remember how Lenin inveighed against the bourgeois economists for using the method of average figures showing the expansion of the crop area and ignoring the data for individual districts. It is strange that Rykov should now repeat the mistakes of the bourgeois economists. Now, if we examine the changes in the crop area according to districts, i.e., if we approach the matter scientifically, it will be seen that in certain districts the crop area is expanding *steadily*, while in others it *sometimes* diminishes, depending chiefly on meteorological conditions; moreover, there are no facts to indicate that there is a *steady* diminution of the crop area anywhere, even in a single important grain growing district.

Indeed, there has recently been a decrease in the crop area in districts which have been affected by frost or drought, in certain regions of the Ukraine, for instance. . . .

A voice. Not the whole Ukraine.

Schlichter. In the Ukraine the crop area has increased by 2.7 per cent.

Stalin. I am referring to the steppe regions of the Ukraine. In other districts, for instance in Siberia, the Volga region, Kazakhstan, and Bashkiria, which were not affected by un favourable weather conditions, the crop area has been steadily expanding.

How is it that in certain districts the crop area is steadily expanding, while in others it sometimes diminishes? It cannot really be asserted that the Party has one policy in the Ukraine and another in the east or in the central area of the U.S.S.R. That would be absurd, comrades. Obviously weather conditions are of no little importance here.

It is true that the kulaks are reducing their crop areas irrespective of weather conditions. For that, if you like, the policy of the Party, which is to support the poor- and middle-peasant masses *against* the kulaks, is "to blame." But what if it is? Did we ever pledge ourselves to pursue a policy which would satisfy all social groups in the countryside, including the kulaks? And, moreover, how can we pursue a policy which would satisfy both the exploiters and the exploited—if we desire at all to pursue a Marxist policy? What is there strange in the fact that, as a result of our Leninist policy, which is intended to restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in the countryside, the kulaks begin partly to reduce the area of their crops? What else would you expect?

Perhaps this policy is wrong? Then let them tell us so plainly. Is it not strange that people who call themselves Marxists are so frightened as to try to make out that the partial reduction of crop areas by the kulaks is a decrease of the crop area *as a whole*, forgetting that

besides the kulaks there are also the poor and middle peasants, whose crop area is expanding, that there are the collective farms and state farms, whose crop area is growing at an increasing rate?

Finally, one more error in Rykov's speech regarding the crop area. Rykov complained here that in certain places, namely, where there has been the greatest development of collective farms, the tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants is beginning to diminish. That is true. But what is wrong with that? How could it be otherwise? If the poor- and middle-peasant farms are beginning to abandon individual tillage and are going over to collective farming, is it not obvious that the growth in size and numbers of the collective farms is bound to result in a decrease of the tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants? But what would you expect?

The collective farms now have something over two million hectares of land. At the end of the five-year plan period, the collective farms will have more than 25,000,000 hectares. At whose expense does the tillage of the collective farms expand? At the expense of the tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants. But what would you expect? How else is the individual farming of the poor and middle peasants to be transferred on to the lines of collective farming? Is it not obvious that in a large number of areas the tillage of the collective farms will expand at the expense of individual tillage?

It is strange that people refuse to understand these elementary things.

j) GRAIN PROCUREMENTS

A lot of fairy-tales have been told here about our grain difficulties. But the main features of our current grain difficulties have been overlooked.

First of all, it has been forgotten that this year we harvested about 500-600 million poods of rye and wheat—I refer to the gross harvest—less than last year. Could this fail to affect our grain procurements? Of course it was bound to affect them.

Perhaps the policy of the Central Committee is responsible for this? No, the policy of the Central Committee has nothing to do with it. The explanation lies in the serious crop failure in the steppe regions of the Ukraine (frost and drought), and the partial crop failure in the North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth region, and the North-Western region.

That is the principal reason why our grain procurements (rye and wheat) in the Ukraine by April 1 last year totalled 200,000,000 poods, while this year the total barely reached 26-27 million poods.

That also explains the drop in wheat and rye procurements in the Central Black Earth region to about one-eighth and in the North Caucasus to about one-fourth.

In certain regions in the East, grain procurements this year almost doubled. But this could not compensate, and, of course, did not compensate, for our grain deficit in the Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Central Black Earth region.

It must not be forgotten that in normal harvest years the Ukraine and the North Caucasus provide about one half of the total grain procurements in the U.S.S.R.

It is strange that Rykov lost sight of this fact.

Finally, the second circumstance, which constitutes the chief feature of our current grain-procurement difficulties. I refer to the resistance of the kulak elements in the countryside to the grain-procurement policy of the Soviet government. Rykov ignored this circumstance. But to ignore it means to ignore the chief factor in grain procurements. What does the experience of the past two years as regard grain procurements show? It shows that the well-to-do strata of the countryside, who hold considerable grain surpluses and play an important role in the grain market, refuse to deliver voluntarily the necessary quantity of grain at the prices fixed by the Soviet government. In order to provide bread for the towns and industrial centres, for the Red Army and the regions growing industrial crops, we require about 500,000,000 poods of grain annually. We are able to procure 300-350 million poods coming in automatically. The remaining 150,000,000 poods have to be secured through organised pressure on the kulaks and the well-to-do strata of the rural population. That is what our experience of grain procurements during the past two years shows.

What has happened during these two years? Why these changes? Why were automatic deliveries adequate before, and why are they inadequate now? What has happened is that during these years the kulak and well-to-do elements have grown, the series of good harvests has not been without benefit to them, they have become stronger economically; they have accumulated a little capital and now are in a position to manoeuvre in the market; they hold back their grain surpluses in expectation of high prices, and get a living from other crops.

Grain should not be regarded as an ordinary commodity. Grain is not like cotton, which cannot be eaten and which cannot be sold to everybody. Unlike cotton, grain, under our present conditions, is a commodity which everybody will take and without which it is impossible to exist. The kulak takes this into account and holds back his grain, infecting the grain holders in general by his example. The kulak knows that grain is the currency of currencies. The kulak knows that a surplus of grain is not only a means of self-enrichment, but also a means of enslaving the poor peasant. Under present conditions, grain surpluses in the hands of the kulak is a means of economically and politically strengthening the kulak elements. Therefore, by taking these grain surpluses from the kulaks, we not only facilitate the supply of grain to the towns and the Red Army, but we also destroy a means of strengthening the kulaks economically and politically.

What must be done to obtain these grain surpluses? We must, first of all, abolish the harmful and dangerous mentality of letting matters take their own course. Grain procurements must be *organised*. The poor- and middle-peasant masses must be mobilised against the kulaks, and their public support organised for the measures of the Soviet government to increase grain procurements. The significance of the Urals-Siberian method of grain procurement, which is based on the principle of self-imposed obligations, lies precisely in the fact that it makes it possible to mobilise the labouring strata of the rural population against the kulaks for the purpose of increasing grain procurements. Experience has shown that this method gives us good results. Experience has

shown that these good results are obtained in two directions: firstly, we extract the grain surpluses from the well-to-do strata of the rural population and thereby help to supply the country; secondly, we mobilise on this basis the poor- and middle-peasant masses against the kulaks, educate them politically and organise them into a vast, powerful, political army supporting us in the countryside. Certain comrades fail to realise the importance of this latter factor. Yet it is one of the important results, if not the most important result, of the Urals-Siberian method of grain procurement.

It is true that this method is sometimes coupled with the employment of emergency measures against the kulaks, which evokes comical howls from Bukharin and Rykov. But what is wrong with it? Why should we not, sometimes, under certain conditions, employ emergency measures against our class enemy, against the kulaks? Why is it regarded as permissible to arrest speculators in the towns by hundreds and exile them to the Turukhansk region, but not permissible to take the grain surpluses from the kulaks—who are speculating in grain and trying to seize the Soviet government by the throat and to enslave the poor peasants—by methods of public compulsion and at prices at which the poor and middle peasants sell their grain to our procurement organisations? Where is the logic in this? Has our Party ever declared that it is opposed *in principle* to the employment of emergency measures against speculators and kulaks? Have we no laws against speculators?

Evidently, Rykov and Bukharin are opposed *in principle* to any employment of emergency measures

against the kulaks. But that is bourgeois-liberal policy, not Marxist policy. Surely you know that, after the introduction of the New Economic Policy, Lenin even expressed himself in favour of a return to the policy of Poor Peasants' Committees, under certain conditions of course. And what indeed is the partial employment of emergency measures against the kulaks? Not even a drop in the ocean compared with the policy of Poor Peasants' Committees.

The adherents of Bukharin's group hope to persuade the class enemy voluntarily to forego his interests and voluntarily to deliver his grain surpluses to us. They hope that the kulak, who has grown stronger, who is speculating, who is able to hold out by selling other products and who conceals his grain surpluses—they hope that this kulak will give us his grain surpluses voluntarily at our procurement prices. Have they lost their senses? Is it not obvious that they do not understand the mechanics of the class struggle, that they do not know what classes are?

Do they know how the kulaks jeer at our officials and the Soviet government at village meetings called to promote grain procurements? Have they heard of such facts as, for instance, what happened in Kazakhstan, when one of our agitators tried for two hours to persuade the holders of grain to deliver grain for supplying the country, and a kulak stepped forward with a pipe in his mouth and said: "Do us a little dance, young fellow, and I will let you have a couple of poods of grain."

Voices. The swine!

Stalin. Try to persuade people like that.

Class is class, comrades. You cannot get away from that truth. The Urals-Siberian method is a good one for the very reason that it helps to rouse the poor- and middle-peasant strata against the kulaks, it helps to smash the resistance of the kulaks and compels them to deliver the grain surpluses to the Soviet government bodies.

The most fashionable word just now among Bukharin's group is the word "excesses" in grain procurements. That word is the most current commodity among them, since it helps them to mask their opportunist line. When they want to mask their own line they usually say: We, of course, are not opposed to pressure being brought to bear upon the kulak, but we are opposed to the excesses which are being committed in this sphere and which hurt the middle peasant. They then go on to relate stories of the "horrors" of these excesses; they read letters from "peasants," panic-stricken letters from comrades, such as Markov, and then draw the conclusion: the policy of bringing pressure to bear upon the kulaks must be abandoned.

How do you like that? *Because* excesses are committed in carrying out a correct policy, *that correct policy*, it seems, *must be abandoned*. That is the usual trick of the opportunists: on the pretext that excesses are committed in carrying out a correct line, abolish that line and replace it by an opportunist line. Moreover, the supporters of Bukharin's group very carefully hush up the fact that there is another kind of excesses, more dangerous and more harmful,—namely, excesses in the direction of merging with the kulak, in the direction of adaptation to the well-to-do strata of the rural population, in

the direction of abandoning the revolutionary policy of the Party for the opportunist policy of the Right deviators.

Of course, we are all opposed to those excesses. None of us wants the blows directed against the kulaks to hurt the middle peasants. That is obvious, and there can be no doubt about it. But we are most emphatically opposed to the chatter about excesses, in which Bukharin's group so zealously indulges, being used to scuttle the revolutionary policy of our Party and replace it by the opportunist policy of Bukharin's group. No, that trick of theirs won't work.

Point out at least one political measure taken by the Party that has not been accompanied by excesses of one kind or another. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that we must combat excesses. But can one *on these grounds* decry the line itself, which is the only correct line?

Take a measure like the introduction of the seven-hour day. There can be no doubt that this is one of the most revolutionary measures carried out by our Party in the recent period. Who does not know that this measure, which by its nature is a profoundly revolutionary one, is frequently accompanied by excesses, sometimes of a most objectionable kind? Does that mean that we ought to abandon the policy of introducing the seven-hour day?

Do the supporters of the Bukharin opposition understand what a mess they are getting into in playing up the excesses committed during the grain-procurement campaign?

k) FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES AND GRAIN IMPORTS

Lastly, a few words about grain imports and our reserves of foreign currency. I have already mentioned the fact that Rykov and his close friends several times raised the question of importing grain from abroad. At first Rykov spoke of the need to import some 80-100 million poods of grain. This would require about 200 million rubles' worth of foreign currency. Later, he raised the question of importing 50,000,000 poods, that is, for 100 million rubles' worth of foreign currency. We rejected this suggestion, as we had come to the conclusion that it was preferable to bring pressure to bear upon the kulaks and wring out of them their quite substantial grain surpluses, rather than expend foreign currency earmarked for imports of equipment for our industry.

Now Rykov makes a change of front. Now he asserts that the capitalists are offering us grain on credit, but that we refuse to take it. He said that several telegrams had passed through his hands, telegrams showing that the capitalists are willing to let us have grain on credit. Moreover, he tried to make it appear that there are people in our ranks who refuse to accept grain on credit either owing to a whim or for some other inexplicable reasons.

That is all nonsense, comrades. It would be absurd to imagine that the capitalists in the West have suddenly begun to take pity on us, that they are willing to give us some tens of millions of poods of grain practically free of charge or on long-term credit. That is nonsense, comrades.

What is the point then? The point is that for the past six months various capitalist groups have been prob-

ing us, probing our financial possibilities, our financial standing, our endurance. They approach our trade representatives in Paris, Czechoslovakia, America and the Argentine with offers of grain on very short-term credit, not exceeding three, or, at the most, six months. Their object is not so much to sell us grain on credit, as to find out whether our position is really very difficult, whether our financial possibilities are really exhausted, or, whether our financial position is strong, and whether we will snatch at the bait that they have thrown out.

There are big disputes going on now in the capitalist world on the subject of our financial possibilities. Some say that we are already bankrupt, and that the fall of Soviet power is a matter of a few months, if not weeks. Others say that this is not true, that Soviet power is firmly rooted, has financial possibilities and sufficient grain.

At the present time our task is to display the requisite firmness and stamina, not to succumb to mendacious promises of grain on credit, and to show the capitalist world that we shall manage without importing grain. That is not just my personal opinion. That is the opinion of the majority of the Political Bureau.

For this reason we decided to decline the offer of philanthropists of the Nansen type to import into the U.S.S.R. a million dollars' worth of grain on credit.

For the same reason we gave a negative answer to all those intelligence agents of the capitalist world in Paris, America and Czechoslovakia, who were offering us a small quantity of grain on credit.

For the same reason we decided to exercise the utmost economy in grain consumption, and the maximum degree of organising efficiency in grain procurement.

By doing so, we sought to achieve two aims: on the one hand to do without importing grain and thus keep our foreign currency for importing equipment, and, on the other hand, to show all our enemies that we stand on firm ground and have no intention of succumbing to promises of alms.

Was this policy correct? I believe that it was the only correct policy. It was correct not only because we found here, within our own country, new possibilities of obtaining grain. It was correct, too, because by managing without grain imports and by sweeping aside the intelligence agents of the capitalist world, we have strengthened our international position, improved our financial standing and exploded all idle chatter about "the impending collapse" of Soviet power.

The other day we held certain preliminary talks with representatives of German capitalists. They are promising us a 500,000,000 credit, and it looks as though they in fact consider it necessary to grant us this credit so as to ensure Soviet orders for their industry.

A few days ago we had the visit of a delegation of British Conservatives, who also consider it necessary to recognise the stability of Soviet power and the expediency of granting us credits so as to ensure Soviet orders for their industry.

I believe that we would not have had these new possibilities of obtaining credits, in the first place from the Germans, and then from one group of British capitalists, if we had not displayed the necessary firmness that I spoke of earlier.

Consequently, the point is not that we are refusing some imaginary grain on imaginary long-term credit

because of an alleged whim. The point is that we must be able to size up our enemies, to discern their real desires, and to display the stamina necessary for consolidating our international position.

That, comrades, is the reason why we have refused to import grain.

As you see, the question of grain imports is far from being as simple as Rykov would have us believe. The question of grain imports is one that concerns our international position.

V

QUESTIONS OF PARTY LEADERSHIP

Thus we have reviewed all the principal questions relating to our disagreements in the sphere of theory as well as in the sphere of the policy of the Comintern and the internal policy of our Party. From what has been said it is apparent that Rykov's statement about the existence of a *single* line does not correspond to the real state of affairs. From what has been said it is apparent that we have in fact *two* lines. One line is the general line of the Party, the revolutionary Leninist line of our Party. The other line is the line of Bukharin's group. This second line has not quite crystallised yet, partly because of the incredible confusion of views within the ranks of Bukharin's group, and partly because this second line, being of little importance in the Party, tries to disguise itself in one way or another. Nevertheless, as you have seen, this line exists, and it exists as a line which is *distinct* from the Party line, as a line

opposed to the general Party line on almost all questions of our policy. This second line is that of the *Right* deviation.

Let us pass now to questions of Party leadership.

a) THE FACTIONALISM OF BUKHARIN'S GROUP

Bukharin said that there is no opposition within our Party, that Bukharin's group is not an opposition. That is not true, comrades. The discussion at the plenum showed quite clearly that Bukharin's group constitutes a new opposition. The oppositional work of this group consists in attempts to revise the Party line; it seeks to revise the Party line and is preparing the ground for replacing the Party line by another line, the line of the opposition, which can be nothing but the line of the Right deviation.

Bukharin said that the group of three does not constitute a factional group. That is not true, comrades. Bukharin's group has all the characteristics of a faction. There is the platform the factional secrecy, the policy of resigning, the organised struggle against the Central Committee. What more is required? Why hide the truth about the factionalism of Bukharin's group, when it is self-evident? The very reason why the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission has met is to tell all the truth here about our disagreements. And the truth is that Bukharin's group is a factional group. And it is not merely a factional group, but—I would say—the most repulsive and the pettiest of all the factional groups that ever existed in our Party.

This is evident if only from the fact that it is now attempting to use for its factional aims such an insig-

nificant and petty affair as the disturbances in Adjaria. In point of fact, what does the so-called "revolt" in Adjaria amount to in comparison with such revolts as the Kronstadt revolt? I believe that in comparison with this the so-called "revolt" in Adjaria is not even a drop in the ocean. Were there any instances of Trotskyites or Zinovievites attempting to make use of the serious revolt which occurred in Kronstadt to combat the Central Committee, the Party? It must be admitted, comrades, that there were no such instances. On the contrary, the opposition groups which existed in our Party at the time of that serious revolt helped the Party in suppressing it, and they did not dare to make use of it against the Party.

Well, and how is Bukharin's group acting now? You have already had evidence that it is attempting in the pettiest and most offensive way to utilise against the Party the microscopic "revolt" in Adjaria. What is this if not an extreme degree of factional blindness and factional degeneration?

Apparently, it is being demanded of us that no disturbances should occur in our border regions which have common frontiers with capitalist countries. Apparently, it is being demanded of us that we should carry out a policy which would satisfy all classes of our society, the rich and the poor, the workers and the capitalists. Apparently, it is being demanded of us that there should be no discontented elements. Have not these comrades from Bukharin's group gone out of their minds?

How can anybody demand of us, people of the proletarian dictatorship who are waging a struggle against the capitalist world, both inside and outside our country,

that there should be no discontented elements in our country, and that disturbances should not sometimes occur in certain border regions which have common frontiers with hostile countries? For what purpose then does the capitalist encirclement exist, if not to enable international capital to apply all its efforts to organise actions by discontented elements in our border regions against the Soviet regime? Who, except empty-headed liberals, would raise such demands? Is it not obvious that factional pettiness can sometimes produce in people a typically liberal blindness and narrow-mindedness?

b) LOYALTY AND COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

Rykov assured us here that Bukharin is one of the most “irreproachable” and “loyal” Party members in his attitude towards the Central Committee of our Party.

I am inclined to doubt it. We cannot take Rykov’s word for it. We demand facts. And Rykov is unable to supply facts.

Take, for example, such a fact as the negotiations Bukharin conducted behind the scenes with Kamenev’s group, which is connected with the Trotskyites; the negotiations about setting up a factional bloc, about changing the policy of the Central Committee, about changing the composition of the Political Bureau, about using the grain-procurement crisis for attacking the Central Committee. The question arises: Where is Bukharin’s “loyal” and “irreproachable” attitude towards his Central Committee?

Is not such behaviour, on the contrary, a violation of *any kind of* loyalty to his Central Committee, to his Party, on the part of a member of the Political Bureau?

If this is called loyalty to the Central Committee, then what is the word for betrayal of one's Central Committee?

Bukharin likes to talk about loyalty and honesty, but why does he not try to examine his own conscience and ask himself whether he is not violating in the most dishonest manner the elementary requirements of loyalty to his Central Committee when he conducts secret negotiations with Trotskyites against his Central Committee and thereby betrays his Central Committee?

Bukharin spoke here about the lack of collective leadership in the Central Committee of the Party, and assured us that the requirements of collective leadership were being violated by the majority of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

Our plenum, of course, has put up with everything. It can even tolerate this shameless and hypocritical assertion of Bukharin's. But one must have really lost all sense of shame to make so bold as to speak in this way at the plenum against the majority of the Central Committee.

In truth, how can we speak of collective leadership if the majority of the Central Committee, having harnessed itself to the chariot of state, is straining all its forces to move it forward and is urging Bukharin's group to give a helping hand in this arduous task, while Bukharin's group is not only not helping its Central Committee but, on the contrary, is hampering it in every way, is putting a spoke in its wheels, is threatening to resign, and comes to terms with enemies of the Party, with Trotskyites, against the Central Committee of our Party?

Who, indeed, but hypocrites can deny that Bukharin, who is setting up a bloc with the Trotskyites

against the Party, and is betraying his Central Committee, does not want to and will not implement collective leadership in the Central Committee of our Party?

Who, indeed, but the blind can fail to see that if Bukharin nevertheless chatters about collective leadership in the Central Committee, putting the blame on the majority of the Central Committee, he is doing so with the object of disguising his treacherous conduct?

It should be noted that this is not the first time that Bukharin has violated the elementary requirements of loyalty and collective leadership in relation to the Central Committee of the Party. The history of our Party knows of instances when, in Lenin's lifetime, in the period of the Brest Peace, Bukharin, being in the minority on the question of peace, rushed to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were the enemies of our Party, conducted backstairs negotiations with them, and attempted to set up a bloc with them against Lenin and the Central Committee. What agreement he was trying to reach at the time with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries—we, unfortunately, do not yet know.¹⁰ But we do know that at the time the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were planning to arrest Lenin and carry out an anti-Soviet coup d'état. . . . But the most amazing thing is that, while rushing to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and conspiring with them against the Central Committee, Bukharin continued, just as he is doing now, to clamour about the necessity of collective leadership.

The history of our Party knows, too, of instances when, in Lenin's lifetime, Bukharin, who had a majority in the Moscow Regional Bureau of our Party and the sup-

port of a group of "Left" Communists, called on all Party members to express lack of confidence in the Central Committee of the Party, to refuse to submit to its decisions and to raise the question of splitting our Party. That was during the period of the Brest Peace, after the Central Committee had already decided that it was necessary to accept the conditions of the Brest Peace.

Such is the character of Bukharin's loyalty and collective leadership.

Rykov spoke here about the necessity of collective work. At the same time he pointed an accusing finger at the majority of the Political Bureau, asserting that he and his close friends were in favour of collective work, while the majority of the Political Bureau, consequently, were against it. However, Rykov was unable to cite a single fact in support of his assertion.

In order to expose this fable of Rykov's, let me cite a few facts, a few examples which will show you how Rykov carries out collective work.

First example. You have heard the story about the export of gold to America. Many of you may believe that the gold was shipped to America by decision of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Committee, or with the consent of the Central Committee, or with its knowledge. But that is not true, comrades. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have had nothing to do with this matter. There is a ruling which prohibits the export of gold without the approval of the Central Committee. But this ruling was violated. Who was it that authorised the export? It turns out that the shipment of gold was authorised by one of Rykov's deputies with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is that collective work?

Second example. This concerns negotiations with one of the big private banks in America, whose property was nationalised after the October Revolution, and which is now demanding compensation for its losses. The Central Committee has learned that a representative of our State Bank has been discussing terms of compensation with that bank.

Settlement of private claim is, as you are aware, a very important question inseparably connected with our foreign policy. One might think that these negotiations were conducted with the approval of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Committee. However, that is not the case, comrades. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have had nothing to do with this matter. Subsequently, upon learning about these negotiations, the Central Committee decided to stop them. But the question arises: Who authorised these negotiations? It turns out that they were authorised by one of Rykov's deputies with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is that collective work?

Third example. This concerns the supplying of agricultural machinery to kulaks and middle peasants. The point is that the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R.,¹¹ which is presided over by one of Rykov's deputies for matters concerning the R.S.F.S.R., decided to *reduce* the supply of agricultural machines to the middle peasants and *increase* the supply of machines to the upper strata of the peasantry, i.e., to the kulaks. Here is the text of this anti-Party, anti-Soviet ruling of the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R.:

“In the Kazakh and Bashkir A.S.S.R., the Siberian and Lower Volga territories, the Middle Volga and Urals regions, the proportion of sales of farm machines and implements set forth in this paragraph shall be *increased* to 20 per cent for the upper strata of the peasantry and *decreased* to 30 per cent for the middle strata.”

How do you like that? At a time when the Party is intensifying the offensive against the kulaks and is organising the masses of the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks, the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R. adopts a decision to *reduce* the level of deliveries of farm machinery to the middle peasants and *increase* the level of deliveries to the upper strata of the peasantry.

And it is suggested that this is a Leninist, communist policy.

Subsequently, when the Central Committee learned about this incident, it annulled the decision of the EKOSO. But who was it that authorised this anti-Soviet ruling? It was authorised by one of Rykov's deputies, with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is that collective work?

I believe that these examples are sufficient to show how Rykov and his deputies practise collective work.

c) THE FIGHT AGAINST THE RIGHT DEVIATION

Bukharin spoke here of the “civil execution” of three members of the Political Bureau, who, he says, “were being hauled over the coals” by the organisations of our Party. He said that the Party had subjected these three members of the Political Bureau—Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky—to “civil execution” by criticising their errors

in the press and at meetings, while they, the three members of the Political Bureau, were “compelled” to keep silent.

All that is nonsense, comrades. Those are the false words of a Communist gone liberal who is trying to weaken the Party in its fight against the Right deviation. According to Bukharin, if he and his friends have become entangled in Right deviationist mistakes, the Party has no right to expose those mistakes, the Party must stop fighting the Right deviation and wait until it shall please Bukharin and his friends to renounce their mistakes.

Is not Bukharin asking too much from us? Is he not under the impression that the Party exists for him, and not he for the Party? Who is compelling him to keep silent, to remain in a state of inaction when the whole Party is mobilised against the Right deviation and is conducting determined attacks against difficulties? Why should not he, Bukharin, and his close friends come forward now and engage in a determined fight against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it? Can anyone doubt that the Party would welcome Bukharin and his close friends if they decided to take this not so difficult step? Why do they not decide to take this step, which, after all, is their duty? Is it not because they place the interests of their group above the interests of the Party and its general line? Whose fault is it that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky are missing in the fight against the Right deviation? Is it not obvious that talk about the “civil execution” of the three members of the Political Bureau is a poorly camouflaged attempt on the part of the three members of the Political Bureau to compel

the Party to keep silent and to stop fighting against the Right deviation?

The fight against the Right deviation must not be regarded as a secondary task of our Party. The fight against the Right deviation is one of the most decisive tasks of our Party. If we, in our own ranks, in our own Party, in the political General Staff of the proletariat, which is directing the movement and is leading the proletariat forward—if we in this General Staff should allow the free existence and the free functioning of the Right deviators, who are trying to demobilise the Party, demoralise the working class, adapt our policy to the tastes of the “Soviet” bourgeoisie, and thus yield to the difficulties of our socialist construction—if we should allow all this, what would it mean? Would it not mean that we are ready to put a brake on the revolution, disrupt our socialist construction, flee from difficulties, and surrender our positions to the capitalist elements?

Does Bukharin’s group understand that to refuse to fight the Right deviation is to betray the working class, to betray the revolution?

Does Bukharin’s group understand that unless we overcome the Right deviation and conciliation towards it, it will be impossible to overcome the difficulties facing us, and that unless we overcome these difficulties it will be impossible to achieve decisive successes in socialist construction?

In view of this, what is the worth of this pitiful talk about the “civil execution” of three members of the Political Bureau?

No, comrades, the Bukharinites will not frighten the Party with liberal chatter about “civil execution.” The

Party demands that they should wage a determined fight against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it side by side with all the members of the Central Committee of our Party. It demands this of Bukharin's group in order to help to mobilise the working class, to break down the resistance of the class enemies and to organise decisive victory over the difficulties of our socialist construction.

Either the Bukharinites will fulfil this demand of the Party, in which case the Party will welcome them, or they will not do so, in which case they will have only themselves to blame.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

I pass to the conclusions.

I submit the following proposals:

1) We must first of all condemn the views of Bukharin's group. We must condemn the views of this group as set forth in its declarations and in the speeches of its representatives, and state that these views are incompatible with the Party line and fully coincide with the position of the Right deviation.

2) We must condemn Bukharin's secret negotiations with Kamenev's group as the most flagrant expression of the disloyalty and factionalism of Bukharin's group.

3) We must condemn the policy of resigning that was being practised by Bukharin and Tomsky, as a gross violation of the elementary requirements of Party discipline.

4) Bukharin and Tomsky must be removed from their posts and warned that in the event of the slightest

attempt at insubordination to the decisions of the Central Committee, the latter will be forced to exclude both of them from the Political Bureau.

5) We must take appropriate measures forbidding members and candidate members of the Political Bureau, when speaking publicly, to deviate in any way from the line of the Party and the decisions of the Central Committee or of its bodies.

6) We must take appropriate measures so that press organs, both Party and Soviet, newspapers as well as periodicals, should fully conform to the line of the Party and the decisions of its leading bodies.

7) We must adopt special provisions, including even expulsion from the Central Committee and from the Party, for persons who attempt to violate the confidential nature of the decisions of the Party, its Central Committee and Political Bureau.

8) We must distribute the text of the resolution of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on inner-Party questions to all the local Party organisations and to the delegates to the Sixteenth Party Conference,¹² without publishing it in the press for the time being.

That, in my opinion, is the way out of this situation.

Some comrades insist that Bukharin and Tomsky should be immediately expelled from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. I do not agree with these comrades. In my opinion, for the time being we can do without resorting to such an extreme measure.

EMULATION AND LABOUR ENTHUSIASM OF THE MASSES

*Forward to E. Mikulina's Pamphlet
"Emulation of the Masses"*

It is hardly open to doubt that one of the most important features—if not the most important—of our constructive work at the present moment is the wide development of emulation among the vast masses of the workers. Emulation between whole mills and factories in the most diverse corners of our boundless country; emulation between workers and peasants; emulation between collective farms and state farms; registration of these mass-scale production challenges in specific agreements of the working people—all these are facts which leave no doubt whatever that socialist emulation among the masses has already become a reality.

A mighty upsurge of production enthusiasm among the masses of the working people has begun.

Now even the most confirmed sceptics are forced to admit this.

“Far from extinguishing emulation,” Lenin says, “socialism for the first time creates the opportunity for employing it on a really *wide* and on a really *mass* scale, for really drawing the majority of the working people into the arena of such work as enables them to display their abilities, develop their capacities, reveal their talents, of which there is an untapped spring among the people, and which capitalism crushed, suppressed and strangled among thousands and millions.” . . .

. . .“Only now is the opportunity created on a wide scale for a truly mass display of enterprise, emulation and bold initiative” . . . because “for the first time after centuries of working for others, of working under compulsion for the exploiters, it has become possible to *work for oneself*.” . . .

. . .“Now that a socialist Government is in power, our task is to organise emulation.”¹³

It was from these propositions of Lenin that the Sixteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) proceeded when it issued the special appeal for emulation to the workers and all labouring people.

Certain “comrades” of the bureaucratic type think that emulation is just the latest Bolshevik fashion, and that, as such, it is bound to die out when the “season” passes. These bureaucratic “comrades” are, of course, mistaken. In point of fact, emulation is *the communist method of building socialism*, on the basis of the maximum *activity* of the vast masses of the working people. In point of fact, emulation is the *lever* with which the working class is destined to transform the entire economic and cultural life of the country on the basis of socialism.

Other “comrades” of the bureaucratic type, frightened by the powerful tide of emulation, are trying to compress it within artificial bounds and canalise it, to “centralise” the emulation movement, to narrow its scope and thus deprive it of its most important feature—the *initiative* of the masses. It goes without saying that the hopes of the bureaucrats will not be realised. At any rate, the Party will make every effort to shatter them.

Socialist emulation must not be regarded as a bureaucratic undertaking. Socialist emulation is a manifestation

of practical revolutionary *self-criticism* by the masses, springing from the creative *initiative* of the vast masses of the working people. All who, wittingly or unwittingly, restrict this self-criticism and creative initiative of the masses must be brushed aside as an impediment to our great cause.

The bureaucratic danger manifests itself concretely above all in the fact that it shackles the energy, initiative and independent activity of the masses, keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system, deep down in the working class and peasantry, and prevents these reserves from being utilised in the struggle against our class enemies. It is the task of socialist emulation to smash these bureaucratic shackles, to afford broad scope for the unfolding of the energy and creative initiative of the masses, to bring to light the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system, and to throw them into the scale in the struggle against our class enemies both inside and outside our country.

Socialist emulation is sometimes confused with competition. That is a great mistake. Socialist emulation and competition exhibit two entirely different principles.

The principle of competition is: *defeat and death for some* and victory and domination for others.

The principle of socialist emulation is: comradely *assistance* by the foremost to the laggards, so as to achieve an advance *of all*.

Competition says: *Destroy the laggards* so as to establish your own domination.

Socialist emulation says: Some work badly, others I work well, yet others best of all—*catch up with the best* and secure the *advance of all*.

That, in fact, explains the unprecedented production enthusiasm which has gripped the vast masses of the working people as a result of socialist emulation. It goes without saying that competition can never call forth anything resembling this enthusiasm of the masses.

Of late, articles and comments on emulation have been more frequent in our press. They discuss the philosophy of emulation, the roots of emulation, the possible results of emulation and so on. But one rarely finds an article which gives any coherent description of *how* emulation is put into effect by the *masses themselves*, *what* the vast masses of the workers *experience* when practising emulation and signing agreements, a description showing that the masses of the workers regard emulation as *their own cause, near and dear* to them. Yet this side of emulation is of the highest importance for us.

I think that Comrade E. Mikulina's pamphlet is the first attempt to give a coherent exposition of data from the *practice* of emulation, showing it as an undertaking of the masses of the working people themselves. The merit of this pamphlet is that it gives a simple and truthful account of those deep-lying processes of the great upsurge of labour enthusiasm that constitute the inner driving force of socialist emulation.

May 11, 1929

Pravda, No. 114,
May 22, 1929

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TO COMRADE FELIX KON

*Copy to Comrade Kolotilov, Secretary, Regional Bureau
of the Central Committee, Ivanovo-Voznesensk Region*

Comrade Kon,

I have received Comrade Russova's article on Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet (*Emulation of the Masses*). Here are my observations:

1) Comrade Russova's review gives the impression of being too one-sided and biased. I am prepared to grant that there is no such person as the spinner Bardina, and that there is no spinning shed in Zaryadye. I am also prepared to grant that the Zaryadye mills are "cleaned once a week." It can be admitted that Comrade Mikulina was perhaps misled by one of her informants and was guilty of a number of gross inaccuracies, which, of course, is blameworthy and unpardonable. But is that the point? Is the value of the pamphlet determined by individual details, and not by its general trend? A famous author of our time, Comrade Sholokhov, commits a number of very gross errors in his *Quiet Flows the Don* and says things which are positively untrue about Syrtsov, Podtyolkov, Krivosshlykov and others; but does it follow from this that *Quiet Flows the Don* is no good at all and deserves to be withdrawn from sale?

What is the merit of Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet? It is that it *popularises* the idea of emulation and in-

fects the reader with the spirit of emulation. That is what matters, and not a few individual mistakes.

2) It is possible that, because of my foreword to Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet, the critics expected too much of it and thought it must be something out of the ordinary, and being disappointed in their expectations they decided to punish its author. But that is wrong and unfair. Of course, Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet is not a scientific work. It is an *account* of the emulation deeds of the masses, of the practice of emulation. Nothing more. Comrade Mikulina is not to blame if my foreword gave rise to an exaggerated opinion about her—actually very modest—pamphlet. That is no reason for punishing the author or the readers of the pamphlet on that account, by withdrawing it from sale. Only works of a non-Soviet trend, only anti-Party and anti-proletarian works may be withdrawn from sale. There is nothing anti-Party or anti-Soviet in Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet.

3) Comrade Russova is particularly incensed with Comrade Mikulina for having "misled Comrade Stalin." One cannot but appreciate the concern shown by Comrade Russova for Comrade Stalin. But it does not seem to me that there is any call for it.

In the first place, it is not so easy to "mislead Comrade Stalin."

Secondly, I do not in the least repent having furnished a foreword to an *inconsiderable* pamphlet by a person *unknown* in the literary world, because I think that, notwithstanding its individual and, perhaps, gross mistakes, Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet will be of great value to the masses of the workers.

Thirdly, I am emphatically opposed to supplying forewords only to pamphlets and books by the “bigwigs” of the literary world, by literary “lights,” “coryphees” and so on. I think it is high time for us to abandon this *aristocratic* habit of giving prominence to literary “bigwigs,” who are prominent enough as it is, and from whose “greatness” young literary forces have to suffer, writers who are known to none and ignored by all.

We have hundreds and thousands of young and capable people who are striving with might and main to rise to the surface and contribute their mite to the common treasury of our work of construction. But their efforts are often unavailing, because they are very often kept down by the vanity of the literary “lights,” by the bureaucracy and callousness of some of our organisations, and, lastly, by the envy (which has not yet evolved into emulation) of men and women of their own generation. One of our tasks is to break down this blank wall and to give scope to the young forces, whose name is legion. My foreword to an *inconsiderable* pamphlet by an author *unknown* in the literary world is an attempt to take a step towards-accomplishing this task. I shall in the future, too, provide forewords only to simple and unassuming pamphlets by simple and unknown authors belonging to the younger forces. It is possible that this procedure may not be to the liking of some of the snobs. But what do I care? I have no fondness for snobs anyhow. . . .

4) I think that the Ivanovo-Voznesensk comrades would do well to call Comrade Mikulina to Ivanovo-Voznesensk and give her a “rap on the knuckles” for the errors she has committed. I am by no means opposed

to having Comrade Mikulina properly taken to task in the press for her errors. But I am decidedly opposed to having this undeniably capable authoress done to death and buried.

As to withdrawing Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet from sale, in my opinion that wild idea should be left "without sequel."

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

July 9, 1929

Published for the first time

**TO THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE
OF THE UKRAINE ON ITS TENTH
ANNIVERSARY**

Ardent greetings on its tenth anniversary to the Leninist Young Communist League of the Ukraine, which was tried and tested in the battles of the Civil War, which is successfully promoting socialist emulation and is actively participating in building Ukrainian socialist culture.

J. Stalin

Moscow, July 10, 1929

Pravda, No. 157
July 12, 1929

ENTRY IN THE LOG-BOOK OF THE CRUISER “CHERVONA UKRAINA”

Have been on board the Cruiser “Chervona Ukraina.” Have attended a concert of amateur talent given by the crew.

General impression: splendid men, courageous and cultured comrades who are ready for everything in behalf of our common cause.

It is a pleasure to work with such comrades. It is a pleasure to fight our enemies alongside such warriors. With such comrades, the whole world of exploiters and oppressors can be vanquished.

I wish you success, friends aboard the “Chervona Ukraina”!

J. Stalin

July 25, 1929

The newspaper *Krasny Chernomoretz*
(Sevastopol), No. 260,
November 7, 1929

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE

*On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary
of the October Revolution*

The past year was a year of great *change* on all the fronts of socialist construction. The keynote of this change has been, and continues to be, a determined *offensive* of socialism against the capitalist elements in town and country. The characteristic feature of this offensive is that it has already brought us a number of decisive *successes* in the principal spheres of the socialist reconstruction of our national economy.

We may, therefore, conclude that our Party succeeded in making good use of our retreat during the first stages of the New Economic Policy in order, in the subsequent stages, to organise the *change* and to launch a *successful offensive* against the capitalist elements.

When NEP was introduced Lenin said:

“We are now retreating, going back as it were; but we are doing this in order, by retreating first, afterwards to take a run and make a more powerful leap forward. It was on this condition alone that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy . . . in order to start a most persistent advance after our retreat” (Vol. XXVII, pp. 361-62).

The results of the past year show beyond a doubt that in its work the Party is successfully carrying out this decisive directive of Lenin's.

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If we take the results of the past year in the sphere of economic construction, which is of decisive importance for us, we shall find that the *successes* of our offensive on this front, our *achievements* during the past year, can be summed up under three main heads.

I

IN THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR

There can scarcely be any doubt that one of the most important facts in our work of construction during the past year is that we have succeeded in bringing about a *decisive change* in the sphere of productivity of labour. This change has found expression in a growth of the *creative initiative* and intense *labour enthusiasm* of the vast masses of the working class on the front of socialist construction. This is our first fundamental *achievement* during the past year.

The growth of the creative initiative and labour enthusiasm of the masses has been stimulated in three main directions:

a) the fight—by means of *self-criticism*—against bureaucracy, which shackles the labour initiative and labour activity of the masses;

b) the fight—by means of *socialist emulation*—against labour shirkers and disrupters of proletarian labour discipline;

c) the fight—by the introduction of the *uninterrupted working-week*—against routine and inertia in industry.

As a result we have a tremendous achievement on the labour front in the form of labour enthusiasm and emulation among the vast masses of the working class in all parts of our boundless country. The significance of this achievement is truly inestimable; for only the labour enthusiasm and zeal of the vast masses can guarantee that progressive increase of labour productivity without which the final victory of socialism over capitalism in our country is inconceivable.

“In the last analysis,” says Lenin, “productivity of labour is the most important, the principal thing for the victory of a new social system. Capitalism created a productivity of labour unknown under serfdom. Capitalism can be utterly vanquished, and will be utterly vanquished, by the fact that socialism creates a new and much higher productivity of labour” (Vol. XXIV, p. 342).

Proceeding from this, Lenin considered that:

“We must become imbued with the labour enthusiasm, the will to work and the persistence upon which the speedy salvation of the workers and peasants, the salvation of the national economy now depends” (Vol. XXV, p. 477).

That is the task Lenin set our Party.

The past year has shown that the Party is successfully carrying out this task and is resolutely overcoming the obstacles that stand in its path.

Such is the position regarding the Party’s first important achievement during the past year.

II

IN THE SPHERE OF INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION

Inseparably connected with the first achievement of the Party is its second achievement. This second achievement of the Party consists in the fact that during the past year we have in the main successfully solved the *problem of accumulation* for capital construction in heavy industry, we have *accelerated* the development of the production of means of production and created the prerequisites for transforming our country into a *metal* country.

That is our second fundamental *achievement* during the past year.

The problem of light industry presents no special difficulties. We solved that problem several years ago. The problem of heavy industry is more difficult and more important.

It is *more difficult* because its solution demands colossal investments, and, as the history of industrially backward countries has shown, heavy industry cannot manage without huge long-term loans.

It is *more important* because, unless we develop heavy industry, we cannot build any industry at all, we cannot carry out any industrialisation.

And as we have not received, and are not receiving, either long-term loans or credits of any long-term character, the acuteness of the problem for us becomes more than obvious.

It is precisely for this reason that the capitalists of all countries refuse us loans and credits, for they

sume that we cannot by our own efforts cope with the problem of accumulation, that we shall suffer shipwreck in the task of reconstructing our heavy industry, and be compelled to come to them cap in hand, for enslavement.

But what do the results of our work during the past year show in this connection? The significance of the results of the past year is that they shatter to bits the anticipations of Messieurs the capitalists.

The past year has shown that, in spite of the overt and covert financial blockade of the U.S.S.R., we did not sell ourselves into bondage to the capitalists, that by our own efforts we have successfully solved the problem of accumulation and laid the foundation for heavy industry. Even the most inveterate enemies of the working class cannot deny this now.

Indeed, since, in the first place, capital investments in large-scale industry last year amounted to over 1,600,000,000 rubles, of which about 1,300,000,000 rubles were invested in heavy industry, while capital investments in large-scale industry this year will amount to over 3,400,000,000 rubles, of which over 2,500,000,000 rubles will be invested in heavy industry; and since, in the second place, the gross output of large-scale industry last year showed an increase of 23 per cent, including a 30 per cent increase in the output of heavy industry, while the increase in the gross output of large-scale industry this year should be 32 per cent, including a 46 per cent increase in the output of heavy industry—is it not clear that the problem of accumulation for the building up of heavy industry no longer presents insuperable difficulties for us?

How can anyone doubt that we are advancing at an accelerated pace in the direction of developing our heavy industry, exceeding our former speed and leaving behind our “age-old” backwardness?

Is it surprising after this that the targets of the five-year plan were exceeded during the past year, and that the *optimum* variant of the five-year plan, which the bourgeois scribes regard as “wild fantasy,” and which horrifies our Right opportunists (Bukharin’s group), has actually turned out to be a *minimum* variant?

“The salvation of Russia,” says Lenin, “lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—that, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry. . . . Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without it we shall be doomed altogether as an independent country. . . . Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we do not provide them, then we are doomed as a civilised state—let alone as a socialist state” (Vol. XXVII, p. 349).

That is how sharply Lenin formulated the problem of accumulation and the task of the Party in building up heavy industry.

The past year has shown that our Party is successfully coping with this task, resolutely overcoming all obstacles in its path.

This does not mean, of course, that industry will not encounter any more serious difficulties. The task of building up heavy industry involves not only the problem of accumulation. It also involves the problem of cadres, the problem:

a) of *enlisting* tens of thousands of Soviet-minded technicians and experts for the work of socialist construction, and

b) of *training* new Red technicians and Red experts from among the working class.

While the problem of accumulation may in the main be regarded as solved, the problem of cadres still awaits solution. And the problem of cadres is now—when we are engaged in the technical reconstruction of industry—the key problem of socialist construction.

“The chief thing we lack,” says Lenin, “is culture, ability to administer. . . . Economically and politically, *N E P* fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. It is ‘only’ a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard” (Vol. XXVII, p. 207).

It is obvious that Lenin refers here primarily to the problem of “cultural forces,” the problem of the cadres for economic construction in general, and for building and managing industry in particular.

But from this it follows that, in spite of important achievements in the sphere of accumulation, which are of vital significance for heavy industry, the problem of building heavy industry cannot be regarded as fully solved until we have solved the problem of cadres.

Hence the task of the Party is to tackle the problem of cadres in all seriousness and to conquer this fortress at all costs.

Such is the position regarding our Party’s second achievement during the past year.

III

IN THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Finally, about the Party's third achievement during the past year, an achievement organically connected with the two previous ones. I am referring to the *radical change* in the development of our agriculture from small, backward, *individual* farming to large-scale, advanced *collective* agriculture, to joint cultivation of the land, to machine and tractor stations, to artels, collective farms, based on modern technique, and, finally, to giant state farms, equipped with hundreds of tractors and harvester combines.

The Party's achievement here consists in the fact that in a whole number of areas we have succeeded in *turning* the main mass of the peasantry away from the old, *capitalist* path of development—which benefits only a small group of the rich, the capitalists, while the vast majority of the peasants are doomed to ruin and utter poverty—to the new, *socialist* path of development, which ousts the rich, the capitalists, and re-equips the middle and poor peasants along new lines, equipping them with modern implements, with tractors and agricultural machinery, so as to enable them to climb out of poverty and enslavement to the kulaks on to the high road of co-operative, collective cultivation of the land.

The achievement of the Party consists in the fact that we have succeeded in bringing about this *radical change* deep down in the peasantry itself, and in securing the following of the broad masses of the poor and middle

peasants in spite of incredible difficulties, in spite of the desperate resistance of retrograde forces of every kind, from kulaks and priests to philistines and Right opportunists.

Here are some figures.

In 1928, the crop area of the state farms amounted to 1,425,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of more than 6,000,000 centners (over 36,000,000 poods), and the crop area of the collective farms amounted to 1,390,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of about 3,500,000 centners (over 20,000,000 poods).

In 1929, the crop area of the state farms amounted to 1,816,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of about 8,000,000 centners (nearly 47,000,000 poods), and the crop area of the collective farms amounted to 4,262,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of about 13,000,000 centners (nearly 78,000,000 poods).

In the coming year, 1930, the crop area of the state farms, according to the plan, will probably amount to 3,280,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of 18,000,000 centners (approximately 110,000,000 poods), and the crop area of the collective farms will certainly amount to 15,000,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of about 49,000,000 centners (approximately 300,000,000 poods)

In other words, in the coming year, 1930, the marketable grain output of the state farms and collective farms will amount to over 400,000,000 poods or more than 50 per cent of the marketable grain output of the *whole* of agriculture (grain sold outside the rural districts).

It must be admitted that such an impetuous speed of development is *unequalled* even by our socialised,

large-scale industry, which in general is marked by the outstanding speed of its development.

It is clear that our young large-scale socialist agriculture (the collective farms and state farms) has a great future before it and that its development will be truly miraculous.

This unprecedented success in the development of collective farming is due to a variety of causes, of which the following at least should be mentioned.

It is due, *first of all*, to the fact that the Party carried out Lenin's policy of educating the masses by consistently leading the masses of the peasantry to collective farming through implanting a co-operative communal life. It is due to the fact that the Party waged a successful struggle against those who tried to run ahead of the movement and force the development of collective farming by means of decrees (the "Left" phrasemongers)- as well as against those who tried to drag the Party back and remain in the wake of the movement (the Right blockheads). Had it not pursued such a policy the Party would not have been able to transform the collective-farm movement into a real mass movement of the peasants themselves.

"When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison took power," says Lenin, "they fully realised that our constructive work in the countryside would encounter great difficulties; that there it was necessary to proceed more gradually; that to attempt to introduce collective cultivation of the land by decrees, by legislation, would be the height of folly; that an insignificant number of enlightened peasants might agree to this, but that the vast majority of the peasants had no such object in view. We, therefore, confined ourselves to what was absolutely essential in the interests of the development of the

revolution: in no case to run ahead of the development of the masses, but to wait until, as a result of their own experience and their own struggle, a progressive movement grew up" (Vol. XXIII, p. 252).

The reason why the Party achieved a great victory on the front of collective-farm development is that it exactly carried out this tactical directive of Lenin's.

Secondly, this unprecedented success in agricultural development is due to the fact that the Soviet government correctly recognised the growing needs of the peasants for new implements, for modern technique; it correctly recognised that the old forms of cultivation leave the peasantry in a hopeless position and, taking all this into account, it came to their aid in good time by organising machine-hiring stations, tractor columns and machine and tractor stations; by organising collective cultivation of the land, by establishing collective farms, and finally, by having the state farms give every assistance to peasant farming.

For the first time in the history of mankind there has appeared a government, that of the Soviets, which has proved by deeds its readiness and ability to give the labouring masses of the peasantry systematic and lasting assistance in the sphere of *production*.

Is it not obvious that the labouring masses of the peasantry, suffering from age-long lack of agricultural equipment, were bound to reach out eagerly for this assistance and join the collective-farm movement?

And can one be surprised if henceforth the old slogan of the workers, "face to the countryside," is supplemented, as seems likely, by the new slogan of the collective-farm peasants, "face to the town"?

Lastly, this unprecedented success in collective-farm development is due to the fact that the matter was taken in hand by the advanced workers of our country. I am referring to the workers' brigades, tens and hundreds of which are scattered in the principal regions of our country. It must be acknowledged that of all existing and potential propagandists of the collective-farm movement among the peasant masses, the worker propagandists are the best. What can there be surprising in the fact that the workers have succeeded in convincing the peasants of the advantages of large-scale collective farming over individual small farming, the more so as the existing collective farms and state farms are striking examples of these advantages?

Such was the basis for our achievement in collective-farm development, an achievement which, in my opinion, is the most important and decisive of all our achievements in recent years.

All the objections raised by "science" against the possibility and expediency of organising large grain factories of 40,000 to 50,000 hectares each have collapsed and crumbled to dust. Practice has refuted the objections of "science," and has once again shown that not only has practice to learn from "science" but "science" also would do well to learn from practice.

Large grain factories do not take root in capitalist countries. But ours is a socialist country. This "slight" difference must not be overlooked.

In capitalist countries large grain factories cannot be organised without previously buying a number of plots of land or without the payment of absolute ground rent, which cannot fail to burden production with

colossal expenses, for private ownership of land exists there. In our country, on the other hand, neither absolute ground rent, nor the sale and purchase of land exist, which cannot fail to create favourable conditions for the development of large grain farms, for in our country there is no private ownership of land.

In capitalist countries the large grain farms aim at obtaining the maximum profit, or, at all events, a profit equal to the so-called average rate of profit, failing which, generally speaking, there would be no incentive to invest capital in grain production. In our country, on the contrary, the large grain farms, being state undertakings, need neither the maximum profit, nor the average rate of profit for their development; they can limit themselves to a minimum profit, and sometimes even manage without any profit, which again creates favourable conditions for the development of large grain farms.

Finally, under capitalism large grain farms do not enjoy special credit privileges or special tax privileges, whereas under the Soviet system, which is designed to support the socialist sector, such privileges exist and will continue to exist.

Esteemed "science" forgot all this.

There have collapsed and crumbled to dust the assertions of the Right opportunists (Bukharin's group) that:

a) the peasants would not join the collective farms,
b) the accelerated development of collective farms could only cause mass discontent and estrangement between the peasantry and the working class,

c) the "high road" of socialist development in the countryside is *not* the collective farms, *but* the co-operatives,

d) the development of collective farms and the offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside might deprive the country of grain altogether.

All that has collapsed and crumbled to dust as old bourgeois-liberal rubbish.

Firstly, the peasants are joining the collective farms; they are joining by whole villages, volosts, and districts.

Secondly, the mass collective-farm movement is not weakening the bond, but strengthening it, by putting it on a new, production basis. Now even the blind can see that if there is any serious dissatisfaction among the main mass of the peasantry it is not because of the collective-farm policy of the Soviet government, but because the Soviet government is unable to keep pace with the growth of the collective-farm movement as regards supplying the peasants with machines and tractors.

Thirdly, the controversy about the “high road” of socialist development in the countryside is a scholastic controversy, worthy of young petty-bourgeois liberals of the type of Eichenwald and Slepko. It is obvious that, as long as there was no mass collective-farm movement, the “high road” was the lower forms of the co-operative movement—supply and marketing co-operatives; but when the higher form of the co-operative movement—the collective farm—appeared, the latter became the “high road” of development.

The high road (without quotation marks) of socialist development in the countryside is Lenin’s co-operative plan, which embraces all forms of agricultural co-operation, from the lowest (supply and marketing co-operatives) to the highest (producers’ and collective-

farm co-operatives). To *counterpose* collective farms to co-operatives is to make a mockery of Leninism and to acknowledge one's own ignorance.

Fourthly, now even the blind can see that without the offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside, and without the development of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we would not have achieved the decisive successes of this year in the matter of grain procurements, nor could the state have accumulated, as it has already done, an emergency reserve of grain totalling tens of millions of poods.

More than that, it can now be confidently asserted that, thanks to the growth of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we are definitely emerging, or have already emerged, from the grain crisis. And if the development of the collective farms and state farms is accelerated, there is no reason to doubt that in about three years' time our country will be one of the world's largest grain producers, if not the largest.

What is the new feature of the present collective-farm movement? The new and decisive feature of the present collective farm movement is that the peasants are joining the collective farms not in separate groups, as was formerly the case, but by whole villages, volosts, districts, and even okrugs.

And what does that mean? It means that *the middle peasant is joining the collective farm*. And that is the basis of that radical change in the development of agriculture that constitutes the most important achievement of the Soviet government during the past year.

Trotskyism's Menshevik "conception" that the working class is incapable of securing the following of the

main mass of the peasantry in the work of socialist construction is collapsing and being smashed to smithereens. Now even the blind can see that the middle peasant has turned towards the collective farm. Now it is obvious to all that the five-year plan of industry and agriculture is a five-year plan of building a socialist society, that those who do not believe in the possibility of completely building socialism in our country have no right to greet our five-year plan.

The last hope of the capitalists of all countries, who are dreaming of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.—“the sacred principle of private property”—is collapsing and crumbling to dust. The peasants, whom they regarded as material that fertilises the soil for capitalism, are abandoning en masse the lauded banner of “private property” and are going over to the lines of collectivism, of socialism. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism is collapsing.

This, by the way, explains the desperate efforts of the capitalist elements in our country to rouse all the forces of the old world against advancing socialism—efforts which are leading to an intensification of the class struggle. Capital does not want “to grow into” socialism.

This also explains the furious howl against Bolshevism which has been raised recently by the watchdogs of capital, by the Struves and Hessens, the Milyukovs and Kerenskys, the Dans and Abramoviches and their like. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism is disappearing—that is no joke for them.

What other explanation for the violent rage of our class enemies and this frenzied howling of the lackeys

of capital can there be except the fact that our Party has actually achieved a decisive victory on the most difficult front of socialist construction?

“Only if we succeed,” says Lenin, “in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry” (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

That is how Lenin put the question of the ways of winning the vast masses of the peasantry to the side of the working class, of the ways of transferring the peasants on to the lines of collective-farm development.

The past year has shown that our Party is successfully coping with this task and is resolutely overcoming every obstacle standing in its path.

“In a communist society,” says Lenin, “the middle peasants will be on our side only when we alleviate and improve their economic conditions. If tomorrow we could supply 100,000 first-class tractors, provide them with fuel, provide them with drivers (you know very well that at present this is fantasy), the middle peasant would say: ‘I am for the kommunia’ (i.e., for communism). But in order to do that we must first defeat the international bourgeoisie, we must compel it to give us these tractors, or we must so develop our productivity as to be able to provide them ourselves. That is the only correct way to pose this question” (Vol. XXIV, p. 170).

That is how Lenin put the question of the ways of technically re-equipping the middle peasant, of the ways of winning him to the side of communism.

The past year has shown that the Party is successfully coping with this task too. We know that by the spring of the coming year, 1930, we shall have over 60,000 tractors in the fields, a year later we shall have over 100,000 tractors, and two years after that, over 250,000 tractors. We are now able to accomplish and even to exceed what was considered “fantasy” several years ago.

And that is why the middle peasant has turned towards the “kommunia.”

Such is the position regarding our Party’s third achievement.

Such are the fundamental achievements of our Party during the past year.

CONCLUSIONS

We are advancing full steam ahead along the path of industrialisation—to socialism, leaving behind the aged “Russian” backwardness.

We are becoming a country of metal, a country of automobiles, a country of tractors.

And when we have put the U.S.S.R. on an automobile, and the muzhik on a tractor, let the worthy capitalists, who boast so much of their “civilisation,” try to overtake us! We shall yet see which countries may then be “classified” as backward and which as advanced.

November 3, 1929

Pravda, No. 259,
November 7, 1929

Signed: *J. Stalin*

**TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD
OF THE NEWSPAPER *TREVOGA*, ORGAN
OF THE SPECIAL FAR EASTERN ARMY¹⁴**

Fraternal greetings to the men and commanders of the Special Far Eastern Army, who are upholding the rights and interests of the October Revolution against the encroachments of the Chinese landlords and capitalists!

Keep a keen watch on every movement of the Chinese counter-revolutionaries, answer every blow with a crushing blow, and thus help our brothers in China, the Chinese workers and peasants, to smash the landlord and capitalist yoke.

Remember that on this festive day the vast masses of the working people of the U.S.S.R. are thinking of you with affection, and together with you are celebrating the great anniversary and sharing your rejoicing over the successes of the Special Far Eastern Army.

Long Live the October Revolution!

Long Live the Special Far Eastern Army!

Long Live the workers and peasants of China!

J. Stalin

A NECESSARY CORRECTION

Pravda, in its issue of December 16 (No. 296), printed (in its “Party Affairs” section) an unsigned article entitled “*Must There Be Confusion?*” criticising one of the statements of an article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*,¹⁵ “*Introductory Essay on Leninism*,” which discussed the question of the most favourable conditions for a revolutionary breach of the world imperialist front.

The author quotes the following passage from the criticised article: “Leninism teaches that the revolution begins where the imperialist chain has its *weakest link*.” He further *equates* this passage with the following passage from Bukharin’s *Economics of the Transition Period*: “The collapse of the capitalist world system began with the *weakest national-economic systems*.” The author then quotes Lenin’s critical observations directed against this passage from Bukharin’s book and draws the conclusion that the article “*Introductory Essay on Leninism*” in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* is guilty of an error similar to that of Bukharin’s.

It seems to me that the author of the article “*Must There Be Confusion?*” is mistaken. Under no circumstances can the thesis—“the imperialist chain breaks

where it is weakest”—be *equated* with Bukharin’s thesis: “the imperialist chain breaks where the national-economic system is weakest.” Why? Because the former speaks of the weakness of the imperialist chain *which has to be breached*, that is, it speaks of the weakness of the imperialist forces, whereas Bukharin speaks of the weakness of the national-economic system of the country *which (the country) has to breach* the imperialist chain, that is, of the weakness of the *anti-imperialist* forces. That is by no means one and the same thing. More than that, these are two opposite theses.

According to Bukharin, the imperialist front breaks where the national-economic system is weakest. That, of course, is untrue. If it were true, the proletarian revolution would have begun not in Russia, but somewhere in Central Africa. The “*Introductory Essay on Leninism*,” however, says something that is the *very opposite* of Bukharin’s thesis, namely, that the imperialist chain breaks where it (the chain) is weakest. And that is quite true. The chain of world imperialism breaks in a particular country precisely because it is in that country that it (the chain) is *weakest* at the particular moment. Otherwise, it would not break. Otherwise, the Mensheviks would be right in their fight against Leninism.

And what determines the weakness of the imperialist chain in a particular country? The existence of a certain minimum of industrial development and cultural level in that country. The existence in that country of a certain minimum of an industrial proletariat. The revolutionary spirit of the proletariat and of the proletarian vanguard in that country. The existence in

that country of a substantial ally of the proletariat (the peasantry, for example), an ally capable of following the proletariat in a determined struggle against imperialism. Hence, a combination of conditions which render the isolation and overthrow of imperialism in that country inevitable.

The author of the article "*Must There Be Confusion?*" has obviously confused two *entirely different things*.

Indeed—must there be confusion?

Pravda, No. 298,
December 18, 1929

Signed: *J. St.*

**TO ALL ORGANISATIONS AND COMRADES
WHO SENT GREETINGS ON THE OCCASION
OF COMRADE STALIN'S FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY**

Your congratulations and greetings I place to the credit of the great Party of the working class which bore me and reared me in its own image and likeness. And just because I place them to the credit of our glorious Leninist Party, I make bold to tender you my Bolsheviki thanks.

You need have no doubt, comrades, that I am prepared in the future, too, to devote to the cause of the working class, to the cause of the proletarian revolution and world communism, all my strength, all my ability and, if need be, all my blood, drop by drop.

With deep respect,

J. Stalin

December 21, 1929

Pravda, No. 302
December 22, 1929

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R.

*Speech Delivered at a Conference
of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions
December 27, 1929*¹⁶

Comrades, the main fact of our social and economic life at the present time, a fact which is attracting universal attention, is the tremendous growth of the collective-farm movement.

The characteristic feature of the present collective-farm movement is that not only are the collective-farms being joined by individual groups of poor peasants, as has been the case hitherto, but that they are being joined by the mass of the middle peasants as well. This means that the collective-farm movement has been transformed from a movement of individual groups and sections of the labouring peasants into a movement of millions and millions of the main mass of the peasantry. This, by the way, explains the tremendously important fact that the collective-farm movement, which has assumed the character of a mighty and growing *anti-kulak* avalanche, is sweeping the resistance of the kulak from its path, is shattering the kulak class and paving the way for extensive socialist construction in the countryside.

But while we have reason to be proud of the *practical* successes achieved in socialist construction, the same cannot be said with regard to our *theoretical* work

in the economic field in general, and in that of agriculture in particular. More than that, it must be admitted that theoretical thought is not keeping pace with our practical successes, that there is a certain gap between our practical successes and the development of theoretical thought. Yet it is essential that theoretical work should not only keep pace with practical work but should keep ahead of it and equip our practical workers in their fight for the victory of socialism.

I shall not dwell at length here on the importance of theory. You are quite well aware of its importance. You know that theory, if it is genuine theory, gives practical workers the power of orientation, clarity of perspective, confidence in their work, faith in the victory of our cause. All this is, and necessarily must be, immensely important in our work of socialist construction. The unfortunate thing is that precisely in this sphere, in the sphere of the theoretical treatment of questions of our economy, we are beginning to lag behind.

How else can we explain the fact that in our country, in our social and political life, various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories on questions of our economy are still current? How can we explain the fact that these theories and would-be theories are not yet meeting with a proper rebuff? How can we explain the fact that a number of fundamental theses of Marxist-Leninist political economy, which are the most effective antidote to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories, are beginning to be forgotten, are not popularised in our press, are for some reason not placed in the foreground? Is it difficult to understand that unless a relentless fight against bourgeois theories is waged on the basis of

Marxist-Leninist theory, it will be impossible to achieve complete victory over our class enemies?

New practical experience is giving rise to a new approach to the problems of the economy of the transition period. Questions of NEP, of classes, of the rate of construction, of the bond with the peasantry, of the Party's policy, are now presented in a new way. If we are not to lag behind practice we must immediately begin to work on all these problems in the light of the new situation. Unless we do this it will be impossible to overcome the bourgeois theories which are stuffing the heads of our practical workers with rubbish. Unless we do this it will be impossible to eradicate these theories which are acquiring the tenacity of prejudices. For only by combating bourgeois prejudices in the field of theory is it possible to consolidate the position of Marxism-Leninism.

Permit me now to characterise at least a few of these bourgeois prejudices which are called theories, and to demonstrate their unsoundness in the light of certain key problems of our work of construction.

I

THE THEORY OF "EQUILIBRIUM"

You know, of course, that the so-called theory of "equilibrium" between the sectors of our national economy is still current among Communists. This theory, of course, has nothing in common with Marxism. Nevertheless, it is a theory that is being spread by a number of people in the camp of the Right deviators.

This theory assumes that we have, in the first place, a socialist sector—which is one compartment, as it were—and that in addition we have a non-socialist or, if you like, capitalist sector—which is another compartment. These two “compartments” are on different rails and glide peacefully forward, without touching each other. Geometry teaches that parallel lines do not meet. But the authors of this remarkable theory believe that these parallel lines will meet eventually, and that when they do, we shall have socialism. This theory overlooks the fact that behind these so-called “compartments” there are classes, and that the movement of these compartments takes place by way of a fierce class struggle, a life-and-death struggle, a struggle on the principle of “who will beat whom?”

It is not difficult to realise that this theory has nothing in common with Leninism. It is not difficult to realise that, objectively, the purpose of this theory is to defend the position of individual peasant farming, to arm the kulak elements with a “new” theoretical weapon in their struggle against the collective farms, and to discredit the collective farms.

Nevertheless, this theory is still current in our press. And it cannot be said that it has met with a serious rebuff, let alone a crushing rebuff, from our theoreticians. How can this incongruity be explained except by the backwardness of our theoretical thought?

And yet, all that is needed is to take from the treasury of Marxism the theory of reproduction and set it up against the theory of equilibrium of the sectors for the latter theory to be wiped out without leaving a trace. Indeed, the Marxist theory of reproduction teaches

that modern society cannot develop without accumulating from year to year, and accumulation is impossible unless there is expanded reproduction from year to year. This is clear and comprehensible. Our large-scale, centralised, socialist industry is developing according to the Marxist theory of expanded reproduction; for it is growing in volume from year to year, it has its accumulations and is advancing with giant strides.

But our large-scale industry does not constitute the whole of the national economy. On the contrary, small-peasant economy still predominates in it. Can we say that our small peasant economy is developing according to the principle of expanded reproduction? No, we cannot. Not only is there no annual expanded reproduction in the bulk of our small-peasant economy, but, on the contrary, it is seldom able to achieve even simple reproduction. Can we advance our socialised industry at an accelerated rate while we have such an agricultural basis as small-peasant economy, which is incapable of expanded reproduction, and which, in addition, is the predominant force in our national economy? No, we cannot. Can Soviet power and the work of socialist construction rest for any length of time on two *different* foundations: on the most large-scale and concentrated socialist industry, and the most disunited and backward, small-commodity peasant economy? No, they cannot. Sooner or later this would be bound to end in the complete collapse of the whole national economy.

What, then, is the way out? The way out lies in making agriculture large-scale, in making it capable of accumulation, of expanded reproduction, and in thus transforming the agricultural basis of the national economy.

But how is it to be made large-scale?

There are two ways of doing this. There is the *capitalist* way, which is to make agriculture large-scale by implanting capitalism in agriculture—a way which leads to the impoverishment of the peasantry and to the development of capitalist enterprises in agriculture. We reject this way as incompatible with Soviet economy.

There is another way: the *socialist* way, which is to introduce collective farms and state farms into agriculture, the way which leads to uniting the small-peasant farms into large collective farms, employing machinery and scientific methods of farming, and capable of developing further, for such farms can achieve expanded reproduction.

And so, the question stands as follows: either one way or the other, either *back*—to capitalism, or *forward*—to socialism. There is not, and cannot be, any third way.

The theory of “equilibrium” is an attempt to indicate a third way. And precisely because it is based on a third (non-existent) way, it is utopian and anti-Marxist.

You see, therefore, that all that was needed was to counterpose Marx’s theory of reproduction to this theory of “equilibrium” of the sectors for the latter theory to be wiped out without leaving a trace.

Why, then, do our Marxist students of agrarian questions not do this? In whose interest is it that the ridiculous theory of “equilibrium” should have currency in our press while the Marxist theory of reproduction is kept hidden?

II

THE THEORY OF "SPONTANEITY" IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Let us now take the second prejudice in political economy, the second bourgeois type of theory. I have in mind the theory of "spontaneity" in socialist construction—a theory which has nothing in common with Marxism, but which is being zealously advocated by our comrades of the Right camp.

The authors of this theory assert approximately the following. There was a time when capitalism existed in our country, industry developed on a capitalist basis, and the countryside followed the capitalist town spontaneously, automatically, becoming transformed in the image of the capitalist town. Since *that* is what happened under capitalism, why should not the same thing happen under the Soviet economic system as well? Why should not the countryside, small-peasant farming, automatically follow the socialist town, becoming transformed spontaneously in the image of the socialist town? On these grounds the authors of this theory assert that the countryside can follow the socialist town automatically. Hence, the question arises: Is it worth our while bothering about organising state farms and collective farms; is it worth while breaking lances over this if the countryside may in any case follow the socialist town?

Here you have another theory which, objectively, seeks to supply the capitalist elements in the countryside with a new weapon for their struggle against the collective farms.

The anti-Marxist nature of this theory is beyond all doubt.

Is it not strange that our theoreticians have not yet taken the trouble to explode this queer theory which is stuffing the heads of our practical collective-farm workers with rubbish?

There is no doubt that the leading role of the socialist town in relation to the small-peasant, individualist countryside is a great one and of inestimable value. It is indeed upon this that the role of industry in transforming agriculture is based. But is this factor sufficient to cause the small-peasant countryside automatically to follow the town in the work of socialist construction? No, it is not sufficient.

Under capitalism the countryside automatically followed the town because the capitalist economy of the town and the individual small-commodity economy of the peasant are, basically, economies of *the same type*. Of course, small-peasant commodity economy is not yet capitalist economy. But it is, basically, the same type of economy as capitalist economy since it rests on private ownership of the means of production. Lenin was a thousand times right when, in his notes on Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*, he referred to the "commodity-capitalist tendency of the peasantry" in contrast to the "*socialist* tendency of the proletariat."^{*17} It is this that explains why "small production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale"¹⁸ (*Lenin*).

Is it possible to say that basically small-commodity

* Lenin's italics.—*J. St.*

peasant economy is the same type of economy as socialist production in the towns? Obviously, it is impossible to say so without breaking with Marxism. Otherwise Lenin would not have said that “as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism.”¹⁹

Consequently, the theory of “spontaneity” in socialist construction is a rotten, anti-Leninist theory.

Consequently, in order that the small-peasant countryside should follow the socialist town, it is necessary, apart from everything else, to *introduce* in the countryside large socialist farms in the form of state farms and collective farms, as bases of socialism, which—headed by the socialist town—will be able *to take the lead* of the main mass of the peasantry.

Consequently, the theory of “spontaneity” in socialist construction is an anti-Marxist theory. The socialist town can *lead* the small-peasant countryside, only by *introducing* collective farms and state farms and by transforming the countryside after a new, socialist pattern.

It is strange that the anti-Marxist theory of “spontaneity” in socialist construction has hitherto not met with a proper rebuff from our agrarian theoreticians.

III

THE THEORY OF THE “STABILITY” OF SMALL-PEASANT FARMING

Let us now take the third prejudice in political economy, the theory of the “stability” of small-peasant farming. Everybody is familiar with the argument of bourgeois political economy that the well-known Marxist

thesis about the advantages of large-scale production over small production applies only to industry, and does not apply to agriculture. Social-Democratic theoreticians like David and Hertz, who advocate this theory, have tried to “base themselves” on the fact that the small peasant is enduring and patient, that he is ready to bear any privation if only he can hold on to his little plot of land, and that, as a consequence, small-peasant economy displays stability in the struggle against large-scale economy in agriculture.

It is not difficult to understand that such “stability” is worse than any instability. It is not difficult to understand that this anti-Marxist theory has only one aim: to eulogise and strengthen the capitalist system, which ruins the vast masses of small peasants. And it is precisely because this theory pursues this aim that it has been so easy for Marxists to shatter it.

But that is not the point just now. The point is that our practice, our reality, is providing new arguments against this theory, yet our theoreticians, strangely enough, either will not, or cannot, make use of this new weapon against the enemies of the working class. I have in mind our practice in abolishing private ownership of land, our practice in nationalising the land, our practice which liberates the small peasant from his slavish attachment to his little plot of land and thereby helps the change from *small-scale* peasant farming to *large-scale* collective farming.

Indeed, what is it that has tied, is still tying and will continue to tie the small peasant of Western Europe to his small-commodity farming? Primarily, and mainly, the fact that he owns his little plot of land, the ex-

istence of private ownership of land. For years he saved up money in order to buy a little plot of land; he bought it, and of course he does not want to part with it, preferring to endure any privation, preferring to sink into barbarism and abject poverty, if only he can hold on to his little plot of land, the basis of his individual economy.

Can it be said that this factor, in this form, continues to operate in our country, under the Soviet system? No, it cannot be said. It cannot be said because there is no private ownership of land in our country. And precisely because there is no private ownership of land in our country, our peasants do not display that slavish attachment to a plot of land which is seen in the West. And this circumstance cannot but facilitate the change from small-peasant farming to collective farming.

That is one of the reasons why the *large* farms, the collective farms of our countryside, are able in our country, where the land is nationalised, to demonstrate so easily their *superiority* over the *small* peasant farms.

That is the great revolutionary significance of the Soviet agrarian laws which abolished absolute rent, abolished the private ownership of land and carried out the nationalisation of the land.

But it follows from this that we now have at our command a new argument against the bourgeois economists who proclaim the stability of small-peasant farming in its struggle against large-scale farming.

Why then is this new argument not sufficiently utilised by our agrarian theoreticians in their struggle against all the various bourgeois theories?

When we nationalised the land our point of departure was, among other things, the theoretical premises

laid down in the third volume of *Capital*, in Marx's well-known book *Theories of Surplus-Value*, and in Lenin's works on agrarian questions, which represent an extremely rich treasury of theoretical thought. I am referring to the theory of ground rent in general, and the theory of absolute ground rent in particular. It is now clear that the theoretical principles laid down in these works have been brilliantly confirmed by the practical experience of our work of socialist construction in town and country.

The only incomprehensible thing is why the anti-scientific theories of "Soviet" economists like Chayanov should be freely current in our press, while Marx's, Engels' and Lenin's works of genius dealing with the theory of ground rent and absolute ground rent are not popularised and brought into the foreground, but are kept hidden.

You, no doubt, remember Engels' well-known pamphlet *The Peasant Question*. You, of course, remember with what circumspection Engels approaches the question of the transition of the small peasants to the path of co-operative farming, to the path of collective farming. Permit me to quote the passage in question from Engels:

"We are decidedly on the side of the small peasant; we shall do everything at all permissible to make his lot more bearable, to facilitate his transition to the co-operative should he decide to do so, and even to make it possible for him to remain *on his little plot of land for a protracted length of time* to think the matter over, should he still be unable to bring himself to this decision."^{*20}

* My italics.—*J. St.*

You see with what circumspection Engels approaches the question of the transition of individual peasant farming to collectivist lines. How are we to explain this circumspection displayed by Engels, which at first sight seems exaggerated? What did he proceed from? Obviously, he proceeded from the existence of private ownership of land, from the fact that the peasant has "his little plot of land" which he will find it hard to part with. Such is the peasantry in the West. Such is the peasantry in capitalist countries, where private ownership of land exists. Naturally, great circumspection is needed there.

Can it be said that such a situation exists in our country, in the U.S.S.R.? No, it cannot. It cannot be said because here we have no private ownership of land chaining the peasant to his individual farm. It cannot be said because in our country the land is nationalised, and this facilitates the transition of the individual peasant to collectivist lines.

That is one of the reasons for the comparative ease and rapidity with which the collective-farm movement has of late been developing in our country.

It is to be regretted that our agrarian theoreticians have not yet attempted to bring out with the proper clarity this difference between the situation of the peasantry in our country and in the West. And yet this would be of the utmost value not only for us, working in the Soviet Union, but for Communists in all countries. For it is not a matter of indifference to the proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries whether, from the first day of the seizure of power by the proletariat, socialism will have to be built there on the

basis of the nationalisation of the land or without this basis.

In my recent article (“A Year of Great Change”*), I advanced certain arguments to prove the superiority of large-scale farming over small farming; in this I had in mind large state farms. It is self-evident that all these arguments fully and entirely apply also to collective farms as large economic units. I am speaking not only of developed collective farms, which have machines and tractors at their disposal, but also of collective farms in their primary stage, which represent, as it were, the manufacture period of collective-farm development and are based on peasant farm implements. I am referring to the collective farms in their primary stage which are now being formed in the areas of complete collectivisation, and which are based upon the simple pooling of the peasants’ implements of production.

Take, for instance, the collective farms of the Khover area in the former Don region. Outwardly, from the point of view of technical equipment, these collective farms scarcely differ from small-peasant farms (few machines, few tractors). And yet the simple pooling of the peasants’ implements of production within the collective farms has produced results of which our practical workers have never dreamt. What are these results? The fact that the transition to collective farming has brought about an increase of the crop area by 30, 40 and 50 per cent. How are these “dizzying” results to be explained? By the fact that the peasants, who

* See this volume, pp. 124-141. —*Ed.*

were powerless under the conditions of individual labour, have been transformed into a mighty force once they have pooled their implements and have united in collective farms. By the fact that it has become possible for the peasants to till neglected land and virgin soil, which is difficult to cultivate by individual labour. By the fact that the peasants have been enabled to avail themselves of virgin soil. By the fact that wasteland, isolated plots, field boundaries, etc., etc., could now be cultivated.

The question of cultivating neglected land and virgin soil is of tremendous importance for our agriculture. You know that the pivot of the revolutionary movement in Russia in the old days was the agrarian question. You know that one of the aims of the agrarian movement was to do away with the shortage of land. At that time there were many who thought that this shortage of land was absolute, i.e., that there was in Russia no more free land suitable for cultivation. And what has actually proved to be the situation? Now it is quite clear that scores of millions of hectares of free land were and still are available in the U.S.S.R. But the peasants were quite unable to till this land with their wretched implements. And precisely because they were unable to till neglected land and virgin soil, they longed for "soft soil," for the soil which belonged to the landlords, for soil which could be tilled with the aid of peasant implements by individual labour. That was at the bottom of the "land shortage." It is not surprising, therefore, that our Grain Trust, which is equipped with tractors, is now able to place under cultivation some twenty million hectares of free land, land unoccupied

by peasants and unfit for cultivation by individual labour with the aid of small-peasant implements.

The significance of the collective-farm movement in all its phases—both in its primary and in its more developed phase when it is equipped with tractors—lies, for one thing, in the fact that it is now possible for the peasants to place under cultivation neglected land and virgin soil. That is the secret of the tremendous expansion of the crop area attending the transition of the peasants to collective labour. That is one of the reasons for the superiority of the collective farms over individual peasant farms.

It goes without saying that the superiority of the collective farms over the individual peasant farms will become even more incontestable when our machine and tractor stations and tractor columns come to the aid of the primary-stage collective farms in the areas of complete collectivisation, and when the collective farms will be in a position to own tractors and harvester combines.

IV

TOWN AND COUNTRY

In regard to the so-called “scissors,” there is a prejudice, fostered by bourgeois economists, against which a merciless war must be declared, as against all the other bourgeois theories that, unfortunately, are circulated in the Soviet press. I have in mind the theory which alleges that the October Revolution brought the peasantry fewer benefits than the February Revolution, that, in fact, the October Revolution brought no benefits to the peasantry.

At one time this prejudice was boosted in our press by a "Soviet" economist. This "Soviet" economist, it is true, later renounced his theory. (*A voice*: "Who was it?") It was Groman. But this theory was seized upon by the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition and used against the Party. Moreover, there are no grounds for claiming that it is not current even now in "Soviet" public circles.

This is a very important question, comrades. It touches upon the problem of the relations between town and country. It touches upon the problem of eliminating the antithesis between town and country. It touches upon the very urgent question of the "scissors." I think, therefore, that it is worth while examining this strange theory.

Is it true that the October Revolution brought no benefits to the peasants? Let us turn to the facts.

I have before me the table drawn up by Comrade Nemchinov, the well-known statistician, which was published in my article "On the Grain Front."²¹ From this table it is seen that in pre-revolutionary times the landlords "produced" not less than 600,000,000 poods of grain. Hence, the *landlords* were then the holders of 600,000,000 poods of grain.

The *kulaks*, as shown in this table, at that time "produced" 1,900,000,000 poods of grain. That represents the very great power which the kulaks wielded at that time.

The *poor* and *middle* peasants, as shown in the same table, produced 2,500,000,000 poods of grain.

That was the situation in the old countryside, prior to the October Revolution.

What changes have taken place in the countryside since October? I quote the figures from the same table.

Take, for instance, the year 1927. How much did the *landlords* produce in that year? Obviously, they produced nothing and could not produce anything because they had been abolished by the October Revolution. You will realise that that must have been a great relief to the peasantry; for the peasants were liberated from the yoke of the landlords. That, of course, was a great gain for the peasantry, obtained as a result of the October Revolution.

How much did the *kulaks* produce in 1927? Six hundred million poods of grain instead of 1,900,000,000. Thus, during the period following the October Revolution the kulaks had lost more than two-thirds of their power. You will realise that this was bound to ease the situation of the poor and middle peasants.

And how much did the *poor* and *middle* peasants produce in 1927? Four thousand million poods, instead of 2,500,000,000 poods. Thus, after the October Revolution the poor and middle peasants began to produce 1,500,000,000 poods more grain than in pre-revolutionary times.

There you have facts which show that the October Revolution brought colossal gains to the poor and middle peasants.

That is what the October Revolution brought to the poor and middle peasants.

How, after this, can it be asserted that the October Revolution brought no benefits to the peasants?

But that is not all, comrades. The October Revolution abolished private ownership of land, did away with the purchase and sale of land, carried out the nationalisation of the land. What does this mean? It means that

now the peasant has no need to buy land in order to produce grain. Formerly he was saving up for years in order to acquire land; he got into debt, went into bondage, if only he could buy a piece of land. The expense which the purchase of land involved naturally increased the cost of production of grain. Now, the peasant does not have to do that. He can produce grain now without buying land. Consequently, the hundreds of millions of rubles that formerly were spent by the peasants for the purchase of land now remain in their pockets. Does this ease the situation of the peasants or not? Obviously, it does.

Further. Until recently, the peasant was compelled to dig the soil with old-fashioned implements by individual labour. Everyone knows that individual labour, equipped with old-fashioned, now unsuitable, instruments of production, does not bring the gains required to enable one to lead a tolerable existence, systematically improve one's material position, develop one's culture and emerge on to the high road of socialist construction. Today, after the accelerated development of the collective-farm movement, the peasants are able to combine their labour with that of their neighbours, to unite in collective farms, to plough virgin soil, to utilise neglected land, to obtain machines and tractors and thereby double or even treble the productivity of labour. And what does this mean? It means that today the peasant, by joining the collective farm, is able to produce much more than formerly with the same expenditure of labour. It means, therefore, that grain will be produced much more cheaply than was the case until quite recently. It means, finally, that,

with stable prices, the peasant can obtain much more for his grain than he has obtained up to now.

How, after all this, can it be asserted that the October Revolution brought no gains to the peasantry?

Is it not clear that those who utter such fictions obviously slander the Party and the Soviet power?

But what follows from all this?

It follows that the question of the "scissors," the question of doing away with the "scissors," must now be approached in a new way. It follows that if the collective-farm movement grows at the present rate, the "scissors" will be abolished in the near future. It follows that the question of the relations between town and country is now put on a new basis, that the antithesis between town and country will disappear at an accelerated pace.

This circumstance, comrades, is of very great importance for our whole work of construction. It transforms the mentality of the peasant and turns him towards the town. It creates the basis for eliminating the antithesis between town and country. It creates the basis for the slogan of the Party—"face to the countryside"—to be supplemented by the slogan of the peasant collective-farmers: "face to the town."

Nor is there anything surprising in this, for the peasant is now receiving from the town machines, tractors, agronomists, organisers and, finally, direct assistance in fighting and overcoming the kulaks. The old type of peasant, with his savage distrust of the town, which he regarded as a plunderer, is passing into the background. His place is being taken by the new peasant, by the collective-farm peasant, who looks to the

town with the hope of receiving real assistance *in production*. The place of the old type of peasant who was afraid of sinking to the level of the poor peasants and only stealthily (for he could be deprived of the franchise!) rose to the position of a kulak, is being taken by the new peasant, with a new prospect before him—that of joining a collective farm and emerging from poverty and ignorance on to the high road of economic and cultural progress.

That is the turn things are taking, comrades.

It is all the more regrettable, comrades, that our agrarian theoreticians have not taken all measures to explode and eradicate all bourgeois theories which seek to discredit the gains of the October Revolution and the growing collective-farm movement.

V

THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE FARMS

The collective farm, as a *type* of economy, is one of the forms of socialist economy. There can be no doubt whatever about that.

One of the speakers here tried to discredit the collective farms. He asserted that the collective farms, as economic organisations, have nothing in common with the socialist form of economy. I must say, comrades, that such a characterisation of the collective farms is absolutely wrong. There can be no doubt that it has nothing in common with the true state of affairs.

What determines the type of an economy? Obviously, the relations between people in the process of production. How else can the type of an economy be determined?

But is there in the collective farms a class of people who own the means of production and a class of people who are deprived of these means of production? Is there an exploiting class and an exploited class in the collective farms? Does not the collective farm represent the socialisation of the principal instruments of production on land belonging to the state? What grounds are there for asserting that the collective farms, as a type of economy, do not represent one of the forms of socialist economy?

Of course, there are contradictions in the collective farms. Of course, there are individualistic and even kulak survivals in the collective farms, which have not yet disappeared, but which are bound to disappear in the course of time as the collective farms become stronger, as they are provided with more machines. But can it be denied that the collective farms as a whole, with all their contradictions and shortcomings, the collective farms as an *economic* fact, represent, in the main, a new path of development of the countryside, the path of *socialist* development of the countryside in *contradistinction* to the kulak, *capitalist* path of development? Can it be denied that the collective farms (I am speaking of real, not sham collective farms) represent, under our conditions, a base and centre of socialist construction in the countryside—a base and centre which have grown up in desperate clashes with the capitalist elements?

Is it not clear that the attempts of some comrades to discredit the collective farms and declare them a bourgeois form of economy are devoid of all foundation?

In 1923 we did not yet have a mass collective-farm movement. Lenin, in his pamphlet *On Co-operation*, had

in mind all forms of co-operation, both its lower forms (supply and marketing co-operatives) and its higher forms (collective farms). What did he say at that time about co-operation, about co-operative enterprises? Here is a quotation from Lenin's pamphlet *On Co-operation*:

"Under our present system, co-operative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but they *do not differ** from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working class" (Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

Hence, Lenin takes the co-operative enterprises not by themselves, but in connection with our present system, in connection with the fact that they function on land belonging to the state, in a country where the means of production belong to the state; and, regarding them in this light, Lenin declares that co-operative enterprises do not differ from socialist enterprises.

That is what Lenin says about co-operative enterprises in general.

Is it not clear that there is all the more ground for saying the same about the collective farms in our period?

This, by the way, explains why Lenin regarded the "mere growth of co-operation" under our conditions as "identical with the growth of socialism."

As you see, the speaker I referred to above, in trying to discredit the collective farms, committed a grave mistake against Leninism.

This mistake led him to another mistake—about the class struggle in the collective farms. The speaker

* My italics.—*J. St.*

portrayed the class struggle in the collective farms in such vivid colours that one might think that the class struggle in the collective farms *does not differ* from the class struggle in the absence of collective farms. Indeed, one might think that in the collective farms it becomes even fiercer. Incidentally, the speaker mentioned is not the only one who has erred in this matter. Idle talk about the class struggle, squealing and shrieking about the class struggle in the collective farms, is now characteristic of all our noisy "Lefts." The most comical thing about this squealing is that the squealers "see" the class struggle where it does not exist, or hardly exists, but fail to see it where it does exist and is glaringly manifest.

Are there elements of the class struggle in the collective farms? Yes, there are. There are bound to be elements of the class struggle in the collective farms as long as there still remain survivals of individualistic or even kulak mentality, as long as there still exists a certain degree of material inequality. Can it be said that the class struggle in the collective farms is equivalent to the class struggle in the absence of collective farms? No, it cannot. The mistake our "Left" phrasemongers make lies precisely in not seeing the difference.

What does the class struggle imply *in the absence of* collective farms, *prior to* the establishment of collective farms? It implies a fight against the kulak who *owns* the instruments and means of production and who keeps the poor peasants *in bondage* with the aid of those instruments and means of production. It is a life-and-death struggle.

But what does the class struggle imply with the collective farms *in existence*? It implies, firstly, that the

kulak has been defeated and deprived of the instruments and means of production. It implies, secondly, that the poor and middle peasants are united in collective farms on the basis of the socialisation of the principal instruments and means of production. It implies, finally, that it is a struggle between members of collective farms, some of whom have not yet rid themselves of individualistic and kulak survivals and are striving to turn the inequality that exists to some extent in the collective farms to their own advantage, while the others want to eliminate these survivals and this inequality. Is it not clear that only the blind can fail to see the difference between the class struggle with the collective farms in existence and the class struggle in the absence of collective farms?

It would be a mistake to believe that once collective farms exist we have all that is necessary for building socialism. It would be all the more a mistake to believe that the members of the collective farms have already become socialists. No, a great deal of work has still to be done to remould the peasant collective farmer, to set right his individualistic mentality and to transform him into a real working member of a socialist society. And the more rapidly the collective farms are provided with machines, the more rapidly they are supplied with tractors, the more rapidly will this be achieved. But this does not in the least belittle the very great importance of the collective farms as a lever for the socialist transformation of the countryside. The great importance of the collective farms lies precisely in that they represent the principal base for the employment of machinery and tractors in agriculture, that

they constitute the principal base for remoulding the peasant, for changing his mentality in the spirit of socialism. Lenin was right when he said:

“The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale” (Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

Who can deny that the collective farms are indeed that form of socialist economy which alone can draw the vast masses of the small individual peasants into large-scale farming, with its machines and tractors as the levers of economic progress, the levers of the socialist development of agriculture?

Our “Left” phrasemongers have forgotten all that.
And our speaker has forgotten about it, too.

VI

THE CLASS CHANGES AND THE TURN IN THE PARTY'S POLICY

Finally, the question of the class changes in our country and the offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements in the countryside.

The characteristic feature in the work of our Party during the past year is that we, as a Party, as the Soviet power:

a) have developed an offensive along the whole front against the capitalist elements in the countryside;

b) that this offensive, as you know, has yielded and continues to yield very appreciable, *positive* results.

What does this mean? It means that we have passed from the policy of *restricting* the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class. It means that we have carried out, and are continuing to carry out, one of the decisive turns in our whole policy.

Until recently the Party adhered to the policy of *restricting* the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks. As you know, this policy was proclaimed as far back as the Eighth Party Congress. It was again announced at the time of the introduction of NEP and at the Eleventh Congress of our Party. We all remember Lenin's well-known letter about Preobrazhensky's theses²² (1922), in which Lenin once again returned to the need for pursuing this policy. Finally, this policy was confirmed by the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. And it was this policy that we were pursuing until recently.

Was this policy correct? Yes, it was absolutely correct at the time. Could we have undertaken such an offensive against the kulaks some five years or three years ago? Could we then have counted on success in such an offensive? No, we could not. That would have been the most dangerous adventurism. It would have been a very dangerous playing at an offensive. For we should certainly have failed, and our failure would have strengthened the position of the kulaks. Why? Because we did not yet have in the countryside strongpoints in the form of a wide network of state farms and collective farms which could be the basis for a determined offensive against the kulaks. Because at that time we were not yet able to

replace the capitalist production of the kulaks by the socialist production of the collective farms and state farms.

In 1926-27, the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition did its utmost to impose upon the Party the policy of an immediate offensive against the kulaks. The Party did not embark on that dangerous adventure, for it knew that serious people cannot afford to play at an offensive. An offensive against the kulaks is a serious matter. It should not be confused with declamations against the kulaks. Nor should it be confused with a policy of pinpricks against the kulaks, which the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition did its utmost to impose upon the Party. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must smash the kulaks, eliminate them as a class. Unless we set ourselves these aims, an offensive would be mere declamation, pinpricks, phrase-mongering, anything but a real Bolshevik offensive. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must prepare for it and then strike at the kulaks, strike so hard as to prevent them from rising to their feet again. That is what we Bolsheviks call a real offensive. Could we have undertaken such an offensive some five years or three years ago with any prospect of success? No, we could not.

Indeed, in 1927 the kulaks produced over 600,000,000 poods of grain, about 130,000,000 poods of which they marketed outside the rural districts. That was a rather serious power, which had to be reckoned with. How much did our collective farms and state farms produce at that time? About 80,000,000 poods, of which about 35,000,000 poods were sent to the market (marketable grain). Judge for yourselves, could we at that time have *replaced* the kulak output and kulak marketable grain by the out-

put and marketable grain of our collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not.

What would it have meant to launch a determined offensive against the kulaks under such conditions? It would have meant certain failure, strengthening the position of the kulaks and being left without grain. That is why we could not and should not have undertaken a determined offensive against the kulaks at that time, in spite of the adventurist declamations of the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition.

But today? What is the position now? Today, we have an adequate material base for us to strike at the kulaks, to break their resistance, to eliminate them as a class, and to *replace* their output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. You know that in 1929 the grain produced on the collective farms and state farms amounts to not less than 400,000,000 poods (200,000,000 poods below the gross output of the kulak farms in 1927). You also know that in 1929 the collective farms and state farms have supplied more than 130,000,000 poods of marketable grain (i.e., more than the kulaks in 1927). Lastly, you know that in 1930 the gross grain output of the collective farms and state farms will amount to not less than 900,000,000 poods of grain (i.e., more than the gross output of the kulaks in 1927), and their output of marketable grain will be not less than 400,000,000 poods (i.e., incomparably more than the kulaks supplied in 1927).

That is how matters stand with us now, comrades.

There you have the change that has taken place in the economy of our country.

Now, as you see, we have the material base which

enables us to *replace* the kulak output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. It is for this very reason that our determined offensive against the kulaks is now meeting with undeniable success.

That is how an offensive against the kulaks must be carried on, if we mean a genuine and determined offensive and not mere futile declamations against the kulaks.

That is why we have recently passed from the policy of *restricting* the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of *eliminating the kulaks as a class*.

Well, and what about the policy of dekulakisation? Can we permit dekulakisation in the areas of complete collectivisation? This question is asked in various quarters. A ridiculous question! We could not permit dekulakisation as long as we were pursuing the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, as long as we were unable to go over to a determined offensive against the kulaks, as long as we were unable to replace the kulak output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. At that time the policy of not permitting dekulakisation was necessary and correct. But now? Now things are different. Now we are able to carry on a determined offensive against the kulaks, break their resistance, eliminate them as a class and replace their output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. Now, dekulakisation is being carried out by the masses of poor and middle peasants themselves, who are putting complete collectivisation into practice. Now, dekulakisation in the areas of complete collectivisation is no longer just an administrative measure. Now, it is an integral part of the formation and development of the collective farms. Consequently it is now ridiculous

and foolish to discourse at length on dekulakisation. When the head is off, one does not mourn for the hair.

There is another question which seems no less ridiculous: whether the kulaks should be permitted to join the collective farms. Of course not, for they are sworn enemies of the collective-farm movement.

VII CONCLUSIONS

The above, comrades, are six key questions which the theoretical work of our Marxist students of agrarian questions cannot ignore.

The importance of these questions lies, above all, in the fact that a Marxist analysis of them makes it possible to eradicate all the various bourgeois theories which sometimes—to our shame—are circulated by our own comrades, by Communists, and which stuff the heads of our practical workers with rubbish. And these theories should have been eradicated and discarded long ago. For only in a relentless fight against these and similar theories can theoretical thought among Marxist students of agrarian questions develop and grow strong.

The importance of these questions lies, lastly, in the fact that they give a new aspect to the old problems of the economy of the transition period.

Questions of NEP, of classes, of the collective farms, of the economy of the transition period, are now presented in a new way.

The mistake of those who interpret NEP as a retreat, and only as a retreat, must be exposed. As a matter of fact, even when the New Economic Policy was being

introduced, Lenin said that it was not only a retreat, but also the preparation for a new, determined offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country.

The mistake of those who think that NEP is necessary only as a link between town and country must be exposed. It is not just any kind of link between town and country that we need. What we need is a link that will ensure the victory of socialism. And if we adhere to NEP it is because it serves the cause of socialism. When it ceases to serve the cause of socialism we shall get rid of it. Lenin said that NEP had been introduced in earnest and for a long time. But he never said it had been introduced for all time.

We must also raise the question of popularising the Marxist theory of reproduction. We must examine the question of the structure of the balance sheet of our national economy. What the Central Statistical Board published in 1926 as the balance sheet of the national economy is not a balance sheet, but a juggling with figures. Nor is the manner in which Bazarov and Groman treat the problem of the balance sheet of the national economy suitable. The structure of the balance sheet of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. must be worked out by the revolutionary Marxists if they desire at all to devote themselves to the questions of the economy of the transition period.

It would be a good thing if our Marxist economists were to appoint a special group to examine the problems of the economy of the transition period in the new way in which they are presented at the present stage of development.

LETTER TO A. M. GORKY

Dear Alexei Maximovich,

Heaps of apologies, and please don't be down on me for my tardy (too tardy!) reply. I am dreadfully overworked. What is more, I have not been altogether well. That, of course, is no excuse. But it may serve as a sort of explanation.

1) We cannot do without self-criticism. We simply cannot, Alexei Maximovich. Without it, stagnation, corruption of the apparatus, growth of bureaucracy, sapping of the creative initiative of the working class, are inevitable. Of course, self-criticism provides material for our enemies. You are quite right about that. But it also provides material (and a stimulus) for our advancement, for unleashing the constructive energies of the working people, for the development of emulation, for shock brigades, and so on. The negative aspect is counterbalanced and *outweighed* by the positive aspect.

It is possible that our press gives too much prominence to our shortcomings, and sometimes even (involuntarily) advertises them. That is possible and even probable. And, of course, it is bad. You demand, therefore, that our shortcomings should be counterbalanced (I would say: *outweighed*) by our achievements. You are,

of course, right about that too. We shall most certainly repair this defect, and without delay. You need have no doubt of that.

2) Our youth are of various kinds. There are the grumblers, the tired and the despairing (like Zenin). There are those who are cheerful, high-spirited, of strong will and indomitably determined to achieve victory. It cannot be the case that now, when we are breaking the old relations in life and building new ones, when the customary roads and paths are being torn up and new, uncustomary ones laid, when whole sections of the population who used to live in plenty are being thrown out of their rut and are falling out of the ranks, making way for millions of people who were formerly oppressed and downtrodden—it cannot be the case that the youth should represent a homogeneous mass of people who sympathise with us, that there should be no differentiation and division among them. Firstly, among the youth there are sons of wealthy parents. Secondly, even if we take the youth who are our own (in social status), not all of them have the hardiness, the strength, the character and the understanding to appreciate the picture of the tremendous break-up of the old and the feverish building of the new as a picture of something which *has to be* and which is therefore *desirable*, something, moreover, which has little resemblance to a heavenly idyll of “universal bliss” that is to afford everyone the opportunity of “taking his ease” and “basking in happiness.” Naturally, in such a “racking turmoil,” we are bound to have people who are weary, overwrought, worn-out, despairing, dropping out of the ranks and, lastly, deserting to the camp of the enemy.

These are the unavoidable "overhead costs" of revolution.

The main thing now is that the tone among the youth is set not by the grumblers, but by our militant Young Communist Leaguers, the nucleus of a new and numerous generation of Bolshevik destroyers of capitalism, of Bolshevik builders of socialism, of Bolshevik deliverers of all who are oppressed and enslaved. Therein lies our strength. And therein lies the pledge of our victory.

3) That, of course, does not mean that we should not try to diminish the number of grumblers, whiners, doubters, and so on, by bringing organised ideological (and all other) influence to bear on them. On the contrary, one of the chief tasks of our Party, our cultural organisations, our press and our Soviets is to organise this influence and to secure substantial results. We (our friends) therefore, wholeheartedly accept your suggestions:

a) to start a magazine, *Za Rubezhom*,²³ and

b) to publish a series of popular symposia on *The Civil War*, inviting the participation of A. Tolstoy and other literary artists.

It is only necessary to add that neither of these undertakings can be placed under the direction of Radek or any of his friends. It is not a question of Radek's good intentions or good faith. It is a question of the logic of the factional struggle, which (i.e., the struggle) he and his friends have not fully renounced (certain important disagreements have remained and these will impel them to fight). The history of our Party (and not only the history of our Party) teaches that the logic

of things is stronger than the logic of human intentions. It will be safer to entrust the direction of these undertakings to politically staunch comrades, and to invite Radek and his friends as collaborators. That will be safer.

4) After thoroughly discussing the question of starting a special magazine, *O Voine (On War)*, we came to the conclusion that there are no grounds at the present time for publishing such a magazine. We think that it is more expedient to deal with questions of war (I am referring to *imperialist* war) in the existing *political* journals. The more so as questions of *war* cannot be severed from questions of *politics*, of which war is an expression.

As to war stories, they will have to be published with great discrimination. The book market is filled with a mass of literary tales describing the "horrors" of war and inculcating a revulsion against *all* war (not only *imperialist* but *every other kind* of war). These are bourgeois-pacifist stories, and not of much value. We need stories which will lead the reader from the horrors of *imperialist* war to the necessity of getting rid of the *imperialist* governments which organise such wars. Besides, we are not against *all* wars. We are *a g a i n s t* imperialist wars, as being counter-revolutionary wars. But we are *f o r* liberating, anti-imperialist, revolutionary wars, despite the fact that such wars, as we know, are not only not exempt from the "horrors of bloodshed" but even abound in them.

It seems to me that Voronsky's line in wanting to launch a campaign against the "horrors" of war differs very little from the line of the bourgeois pacifists.

5) You are quite right in saying that here, in our press, great confusion prevails on the subject of anti-

religious propaganda. Extraordinary stupidities are sometimes committed, which bring grist to the mill of our enemies. There is a great deal of work before us in this field. But I have not yet had the opportunity of discussing your suggestions with our comrades engaged in anti-religious work. I shall write to you about this next time.

6) I cannot do what Kamegulov asks. No time! Besides, what sort of a critic am I, the devil take it!

That's all.

I warmly clasp your hand and wish you good health.
Thanks for your greetings.

J. Stalin

I am told you need a physician from Russia. Is that so? Whom do you want? Let us know and we shall send him.

J. St.

January 17, 1930

Published for the first time

CONCERNING THE POLICY OF ELIMINATING THE KULAKS AS A CLASS

The article, "The Elimination of the Kulaks as a Class," in No. 16 of *Krasnaya Zvezda*²⁴ is undeniably correct in the main, but it contains two inaccuracies of formulation. It seems to me that these inaccuracies must be corrected.

1. The article says:

"In the restoration period, we conducted a policy of restricting the capitalist elements of town and country. With the inauguration of the reconstruction period, we passed from the policy of restricting to the policy of ousting them."

This statement is incorrect. The policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of ousting them are not two different policies. They are one and the same policy. Ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside is an inevitable result and *component* part of the policy of restricting the capitalist elements, the policy of restricting the kulaks' exploiting tendencies. Ousting the capitalist *elements* in the countryside must not be regarded as equivalent to ousting the kulaks as a *class*. Ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside means ousting and overcoming *individual sections* of the kulaks, those unable to bear the burden of taxation and the Soviet government's system of restrictive measures.

Naturally, the policy of restricting the kulaks' exploiting tendencies, the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the countryside, cannot but lead to the ousting of individual sections of the kulaks. Consequently, ousting individual sections of the kulaks cannot be regarded otherwise than as an inevitable result and a component part of the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the countryside.

We pursued this policy not only in the restoration period, but also in the period of reconstruction, and in the period following the Fifteenth Congress (December 1927), and in the period of the Sixteenth Conference of our Party (April 1929), as well as after that conference right down to the summer of 1929, when the phase of complete collectivisation set in, and when the *change* to the policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a *class* began.

If one examines the most important documents of our Party from, say, the Fourteenth Congress in December 1925 (see the resolution on the report of the Central Committee²⁵) to the Sixteenth Conference in April 1929 (see the resolution on "Ways and Means of Promoting Agriculture"²⁶), one cannot fail to notice that the thesis about "restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks," or about "restricting the growth of capitalism in the countryside" always goes *side by side* with the thesis about "ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside," about "overcoming the capitalist elements in the countryside."

What does that mean?

It means that the Party *does not separate* the ousting of the capitalist elements in the countryside from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the

kulaks, from the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the countryside.

Both the Fifteenth Party Congress and the Sixteenth Conference stood whole-heartedly for the policy of “restricting the exploiting proclivities of the agricultural bourgeoisie” (Fifteenth Congress resolution on “Work in the Countryside”²⁷), for the policy of “adopting new measures to restrict the development of capitalism in the countryside” (*ibid.*), for the policy of “resolutely restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks” (see Fifteenth Congress resolution on the five-year plan²⁸), for the policy of “an offensive against the kulaks” in the sense of “passing to further, more systematic and persistent restriction of the kulak and private trader” (*ibid.*), for the policy of “still more resolute economic ousting” of the “elements of private-capitalist economy” in town and country (see Fifteenth Congress resolution on the report of the Central Committee²⁹).

Consequently, a) the author of the above-mentioned article is wrong in depicting the policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of ousting them as two different policies. The facts show that what we have here is one general policy of restricting capitalism, a component part and result of which is the ousting of individual sections of the kulaks.

Consequently, b) the author of the above-mentioned article is wrong in asserting, that the ousting of the capitalist elements in the countryside began only in the period of reconstruction in the period of the Fifteenth Congress. In point of fact, the ousting took place both before the Fifteenth Congress, in the restoration period, and after the Fifteenth Congress, in the reconstruction

period. In the period of the Fifteenth Congress the policy of restricting the kulaks' exploiting tendencies was only intensified by new and additional measures, as a result of which the ousting of individual sections of the kulaks was also bound to be intensified.

2. The article says:

"The policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class entirely follows from the policy of ousting the capitalist elements, being a continuation of this policy in a new stage."

This statement is inaccurate and, therefore, untrue. Naturally, the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class could not have fallen from the skies. The way for it was prepared by the entire preceding period of restricting, and hence of ousting, the capitalist elements in the countryside. But this does not mean that it does not differ *radically* from the policy of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside, that it is a *continuation* of the restriction policy. To say what our author says is to deny that there has been a *change* in the development of the countryside since the summer of 1929. To say what he does is to deny that during this period we have executed a *turn* in our Party's policy in the countryside. To say what he does is to create a certain ideological refuge for the Right elements in our Party, who are now clinging to the Fifteenth Congress decisions in opposition to the Party's *new* policy, just as at one time Frumkin clung to the Fourteenth Congress decisions in opposition to the policy of promoting collective farms and state farms.

What was the point of departure of the Fifteenth Congress in proclaiming an intensification of the policy

of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside? Its point of departure was that, despite this restricting of the kulaks, they, *as a class*, nevertheless were *bound to remain* for the time being. *On those grounds*, the Fifteenth Congress left in force the law on renting land, although it knew very well that it was mostly kulaks who rented land. *On those grounds*, the Fifteenth Congress left in force the law on hiring labour in the countryside, and demanded that it should be strictly observed. *On those grounds*, it was again proclaimed that dekulakisation was impermissible. Do these laws and decisions contradict the policy of *restricting* (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside? Certainly *not*. Do these laws and decisions contradict the policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class? Certainly, *they do!* Consequently, these laws and decisions must now be set aside in the areas of complete collectivisation, which is spreading by leaps and bounds. Incidentally, they have already been set aside by the very progress of the collective-farm movement in the areas of complete collectivisation.

Can it, then, be affirmed that the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class is a *continuation* of the policy of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside? Obviously, it cannot.

The author of the above-mentioned article forgets that the kulak class, as a class, cannot be ousted by taxation measures or any other restrictions, if this class is *allowed to retain* instruments of production and the right to free use of land, and if in our practical activity we *preserve* in the countryside the law on hiring labour, the law on renting land, and the ban on dekulakisation. The

author forgets that the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks enables us to count only on ousting individual sections of the kulaks, which does not contradict, but, on the contrary, presumes the *preservation* for the time being of the kulaks as a class. As a means of ousting the kulaks as a class, the policy of restricting and ousting individual sections of the kulaks is inadequate. In order to oust the kulaks as a class, the resistance of this class must be *smashed* in open battle and it must be *deprived* of the productive sources of its existence and development (free use of land, instruments of production, land-renting, right to hire labour, etc.).

That is a *turn* towards the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. Without it, talk about ousting the kulaks as a class is empty prattle, acceptable and profitable only to the Right deviators. Without it, no substantial, let alone complete, collectivisation of the countryside is conceivable. That is well understood by our poor and middle peasants, who are smashing the kulaks and introducing complete collectivisation. That, evidently, is not yet understood by some of our comrades.

Hence, the Party's present policy in the countryside is not a *continuation* of the old policy, but a *turn* away from the old policy of *restricting* (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside towards the new policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class.

Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 18,
January 21, 1930

Signed: *J. Stalin*

REPLY TO THE SVERDLOV COMRADES³⁰

I

THE SVERDLOV STUDENTS' QUESTIONS

1. In the theses on the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.), adopted by the Third Congress of the Comintern,³¹ Lenin spoke of the existence of two main classes in Soviet Russia.

We now speak of eliminating the kulaks and the new bourgeoisie as a class.

Does this mean that in the NEP period a third class has taken shape in our country?

2. In your address to the conference of Marxist students of agrarian questions, you said: "If we adhere to NEP it is because it serves the cause of socialism. When it ceases to serve the cause of socialism we shall get rid of it." How is this "getting rid of" to be understood, and what form will it take?

3. What amendments will the Party, as decisive successes in collectivisation and in eliminating the kulaks as a class are achieved, have to make in the slogan which now determines the relations between the proletariat and the various strata of the peasantry: "To come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while never for a moment renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly relying solely on the poor peasant" (*Lenin*)?³²

4. By what methods should the elimination of the kulaks as a class be brought about?

5. Will not the simultaneous application of two slogans: one for the areas of complete collectivisation—elimination of the kulaks as a class, and the other for the areas of incomplete collectivisation—restriction and ousting of the kulaks, lead in the latter areas to the self-elimination of the kulaks (dissipation of their property, means of production)?

6. What influence may the elimination of the kulaks as a class and the sharpening of the class struggle in our country, and the economic crisis and the rise of the tide of revolution in the capitalist countries, have on the duration of the “respite”?

7. What is your opinion of the possibility of the present revolutionary upsurge in the capitalist countries passing into a direct revolutionary situation?

8. How should the new advances among the working class, characterised by the decision of entire factory shops to join the Party, be assessed from the standpoint of the further relations between the Party and the working class?

9. In connection with the tremendous scope of the collective-farm movement, the extension of the Party organisation in the countryside becomes a practical question. What should be our policy in relation to the limits of such extension, and in relation to admission of the various groups of collective farmers into the Party?

10. What is your attitude towards the disputes that are taking place among the economists on cardinal problems of political economy?

II

COMRADE STALIN'S REPLY

First question. Lenin spoke of two *main* classes. But he knew, of course, that there was a third, the capitalist class (the kulaks, the urban capitalist bourgeoisie). The kulaks and the urban capitalist bourgeoisie did not, of course, "take shape" as a class only after the introduction of NEP. They existed also before NEP, but as a *secondary* class. NEP, in its first stages, to some extent facilitated the growth of this class. But it assisted the growth of the socialist sector to an even greater extent. With the launching by the Party of an offensive along the whole front, matters have taken a sharp turn towards the undermining and abolition of the class of rural, and partly of urban, capitalists.

For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that the Party has not given instructions to extend the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class to the new, urban bourgeoisie. It is necessary to distinguish between the Nepmen, who were in the main deprived of their *production* base long ago, and therefore play no substantial part in our economic life, and the kulaks, who until very recently possessed enormous economic weight in the countryside, and whom we are *only now* depriving of their *production* base.

It seems to me that some of our organisations forget this difference and commit the error of trying to "supplement" the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class with the slogan of eliminating the urban bourgeoisie.

Second question. The sentence in my speech at the conference of Marxist students of agrarian questions

should be understood as meaning that we shall “get rid of NEP” when we are no longer under the necessity of permitting a certain freedom for private trade, when permitting it would yield only adverse results, and when we are in a position to establish economic relations between town and country through our own trading organisations, without private trade with its private turnover and tolerance of a certain revival of capitalism.

Third question. It is clear that as the collectives come to embrace the majority of the areas of the U.S.S.R., the kulaks will be eliminated—hence this part of Ilyich’s formula will lapse. As regards the middle and poor peasants in the collective farms, they will, as the latter become equipped with machines and tractors, merge into a single category of working members of the collectivised countryside. Correspondingly, the concepts “middle peasant” and “poor peasant” should in the future disappear from our slogans.

Fourth question. The principal method of bringing about the elimination of the kulaks as a class is that of mass collectivisation. All other measures must be adapted to this principal method. Everything that runs counter to this method or detracts from its effectiveness must be rejected.

Fifth question. The slogans, “elimination of the kulaks as a class” and “restriction of the kulaks” must not be conceived as two *independent* and *equal* slogans. From the moment we passed to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, this slogan became the *chief* slogan; and in the areas of incomplete collectivisation the slogan of restricting the kulaks changed from an independent slogan into a *subsidiary* slogan, an *auxiliary* of

the chief slogan, into a slogan which facilitates the creation in these areas of the conditions for a transition to the chief slogan. As you see, in the new conditions of today, the status of the slogan "restriction of the kulaks" is radically different from what it was a year ago and earlier.

It is to be noted that, unfortunately, some of our press organs do not appreciate this specific feature.

It is possible and probable that in the areas of incomplete collectivisation a section of the kulaks, in anticipation of dekulakisation, will resort to "self-elimination" and "dissipate their property and means of production." Measures, of course, must be taken to prevent this. But it does not at all follow that we should permit dekulakisation, not as part of collectivisation, but as something independent, undertaken before and without collectivisation. To permit that would be to replace the policy of *socialising* confiscated kulak property in the collective farms by a policy of *sharing out* this property for the personal enrichment of individual peasants. Such replacement would be a step backward, not forward. There is only one way of preventing "dissipation" of kulak property, and that is to work harder for collectivisation in the areas where it is incomplete.

Sixth question. The means and conditions you enumerate *may* considerably shorten the duration of the "respite." But they are certainly *bound* to strengthen and multiply our means of defence. Very much will depend on the international situation, on the growth of the contradictions within the camp of international capitalism, on the further development of the international economic crisis. But that is another question.

Seventh question. No hard and fast line can be drawn between a "revolutionary upsurge" and a "direct revolutionary situation." One cannot say: "Up to this point we have a revolutionary upsurge; beyond it, we have a leap to a direct revolutionary situation." Only scholastics can put the question in that way. The first usually passes "imperceptibly" into the second. The task is to prepare the proletariat *at once* for decisive revolutionary battles, *without waiting* for the "onset" of what is called a direct revolutionary situation.

Eighth question. The desire of entire factory shops and even of whole factories to join the Party is a sign of the tremendous revolutionary upsurge of the vast masses of the working class, a sign of the correctness of the Party's policy, a sign of publicly expressed approval of this policy by the broad mass of the working class. But it does not at all follow from this that we must admit into the Party all who desire to join it. In the shops and factories there are all sorts of people, even saboteurs. The Party must therefore continue to apply its tried and tested method of *individual* approach to each applicant for membership, and of *individual* admission to the Party. We need not only quantity, but quality.

Ninth question. It goes without saying that numerically the Party in the collective farms will grow at a more or less rapid rate. It is desirable that all the elements of the collective-farm movement who have been most steeled in fighting against the kulaks, especially farm labourers and poor peasants, should find application for their energies in the ranks of the Party. Naturally, individual approach and individual admission into the Party must be applied here with especial persistence.

Tenth question. It seems to me that in the disputes among the economists there is much that is scholastic and far-fetched. Setting aside the external aspect of the disputes, the main errors of the contending sides are the following:

a) neither side has proved capable of properly applying the method of fighting on two fronts: both against “Rubinism” and against “mechanism”;³³

b) both sides have been diverted from the basic questions of Soviet economy and world imperialism into the realm of talmudic abstractions, thus wasting two years of effort on abstract themes—to the satisfaction and advantage, of course, of our enemies.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

February 9, 1930

Pravda, No. 40,
February 10, 1930

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement

The Soviet government's successes in the sphere of the collective-farm movement are now being spoken of by every one. Even our enemies are forced to admit that the successes are substantial. And they really are very great.

It is a fact that by February 20 of this year 50 per cent of the peasant farms throughout the U.S.S.R. had been collectivised. That means that by February 20, 1930, we had *overfulfilled* the five-year plan of collectivisation by more than 100 per cent.

It is a fact that on February 28 of this year the collective farms had *already succeeded* in stocking upwards of 36,000,000 centners, i.e., about 220,000,000 poods, of seed for the spring sowing, which is more than 90 per cent of the plan. It must be admitted that the accumulation of 220,000,000 poods of seed by the collective farms alone—after the successful fulfilment of the grain-procurement plan—is a tremendous achievement.

What does all this show?

That a *radical turn of the countryside towards socialism may be considered as already achieved*.

There is no need to prove that these successes are of supreme importance for the fate of our country, for the whole working class, which is the leading force of our

country, and, lastly, for the Party itself. To say nothing of the direct practical results, these successes are of immense value for the internal life of the Party itself, for the education of our Party. They imbue our Party with a spirit of cheerfulness and confidence in its strength. They arm the working class with confidence in the victory of our cause. They bring forward additional millions of reserves for our Party.

Hence the Party's task is: to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilise* them systematically for our further advancement.

But successes have their seamy side, especially when they are attained with comparative "ease"—"unexpectedly," so to speak. Such successes sometimes induce a spirit of vanity and conceit: "We can achieve anything!", "There's nothing we can't do!" People not infrequently become intoxicated by such successes; they become dizzy with success, lose all sense of proportion and the capacity to understand realities; they show a tendency to overrate their own strength and to underrate the strength of the enemy; adventurist attempts are made to solve all questions of socialist construction "in a trice." In such a case, there is no room for concern to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilise* them systematically for further advancement. Why should we consolidate the successes achieved when, as it is, we can dash to the full victory of socialism "in a trice": "We can achieve anything!", "There's nothing we can't do!"

Hence the Party's task is: to wage a determined struggle against these sentiments, which are dangerous and harmful to our cause, and to drive them out of the Party.

It cannot be said that these dangerous and harmful sentiments are at all widespread in the ranks of our Party. But they do exist in our Party, and there are no grounds for asserting that they will not become stronger. And if they should be allowed free scope, then there can be no doubt that the collective-farm movement will be considerably weakened and the danger of its breaking down may become a reality.

Hence the task of our press is: systematically to denounce these and similar anti-Leninist sentiments.

A few facts.

1. The successes of our collective-farm policy are due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on the *voluntary character* of the collective-farm movement and on *taking into account the diversity of conditions* in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry. Examples of the formation of collective farms in the developed areas must not be mechanically transplanted to underdeveloped areas. That would be foolish and reactionary. Such a "policy" would discredit the collectivisation idea at one stroke. In determining the speed and methods of collective-farm development, careful consideration must be given to the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R.

Our grain-growing areas are ahead of all others in the collective-farm movement. Why is this?

Firstly, because in these areas we have the largest number of already firmly-established state farms and collective farms, thanks to which the peasants have had the

opportunity to convince themselves of the power and importance of the new technical equipment, of the power and importance of the new, collective organisation of farming.

Secondly, because these areas have had two years' schooling in the fight against the kulaks during the grain-procurement campaigns, and this could not but facilitate the development of the collective-farm movement.

Lastly, because these areas in recent years have been extensively supplied with the best cadres from the industrial centres.

Can it be said that these especially favourable conditions also exist in other areas, the consuming areas, for example, such as our northern regions, or in areas where there are still backward nationalities, such as Turkestan, say?

No, it cannot be said.

Clearly, the principle of taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. is, together with the voluntary principle, one of the most important prerequisites for a sound collective-farm movement.

But what actually happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of taking local peculiarities into account are not violated in a number of areas? No, that cannot be said, unfortunately. We know, for example, that in a number of the northern areas of the consuming zone, where conditions for the immediate organisation of collective farms are comparatively less favourable than in the grain-growing areas, attempts are not infrequently made to *replace* preparatory

work for the organisation of collective farms by bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, paper resolutions on the growth of collective farms, organisation of collective farms on paper—collective farms which have as yet no reality, but whose “existence” is proclaimed in a heap of boastful resolutions.

Or take certain areas of Turkestan, where conditions for the immediate organisation of collective farms are even less favourable than in the northern regions of the consuming zone. We know that in a number of areas of Turkestan there have already been attempts to “overtake and outstrip” the advanced areas of the U.S.S.R. by threatening to use armed force, by threatening that peasants who are not yet ready to join the collective farms will be deprived of irrigation water and manufactured goods.

What can there be in common between this Sergeant Prishibeyev “policy” and the Party’s policy of relying on the voluntary principle and of taking local peculiarities into account in collective-farm development? Clearly, there is not and cannot be anything in common between them.

Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, these unworthy threats against the peasants? Nobody, except our enemies!

What may these distortions lead to? To strengthening our enemies and to discrediting the idea of the collective-farm movement.

Is it not clear that the authors of these distortions, who imagine themselves to be “Lefts,” are in reality bringing grist to the mill of Right opportunism?

2. One of the greatest merits of our Party's political strategy is that it is able at any given moment to pick out the *main link* in the movement, by grasping which the Party draws the whole chain towards one common goal in order to achieve the solution of the problem. Can it be said that the Party has already picked out the main link of the collective-farm movement in the system of collective-farm development? Yes, this can and should be said.

What is this chief link?

Is it, perhaps, *association for joint cultivation* of the land? No, it is not that. Associations for joint cultivation of the land, in which the means of production are not yet socialised, are already a past stage of the collective-farm movement.

Is it, perhaps, the *agricultural commune*? No, it is not that. Communes are still of isolated occurrence in the collective farm movement. The conditions are not yet ripe for agricultural communes—in which not only production, but also distribution is socialised—to be the *predominant* form.

The main link of the collective-farm movement, its *predominant* form at the present moment, the link which has to be grasped now, is the *agricultural artel*.

In the *agricultural artel*, the basic means of production, primarily for grain-farming—labour, use of the land, machines and other implements, draught animals and farm buildings—are socialised. In the artel, the household plots (small vegetable gardens, small orchards), the dwelling houses, a part of the dairy cattle, small livestock, poultry, etc., are *not socialised*.

The artel is the *main link of the collective-farm movement* because it is the form best adapted for solving

the grain problem. And the grain problem is the *main link in the whole system of agriculture* because, if it is not solved, it will be impossible to solve either the problem of stock-breeding (small and large), or the problem of the industrial and special crops that provide the principal raw materials for industry. That is why the agricultural artel is the main link in the system of the collective-farm movement at the present moment.

That is the point of departure of the "Model Rules" for collective farms, the final text of which is published today.*

And that should be the point of departure of our Party and Soviet workers, one of whose duties it is to make a thorough study of these Rules and to carry them out down to the last detail.

Such is the line of the Party at the present moment.

Can it be said that this line of the Party is being carried out without violation or distortion? No, it cannot, unfortunately. We know that in a number of areas of the U.S.S.R., where the struggle for the existence of the collective farms is still far from over, and where artels are not yet consolidated, attempts are being made to skip the artel framework and to leap straight away into the agricultural commune. The artel is still not consolidated, but they are already "socialising" dwelling houses, small livestock and poultry; moreover, this "socialisation" is degenerating into bureaucratic decreeing on paper, because the conditions which would make such socialisation necessary do not yet exist. One might

* *Pravda*, March 2, 1930.

think that the grain problem has already been solved in the collective farms, that it is already a past stage, that the principal task at the present moment is not solution of the grain problem, but solution of the problem of livestock and poultry-breeding. Who, we may ask, benefits from this blockheaded “work” of lumping together different forms of the collective-farm movement? Who benefits from this running too far ahead, which is stupid and harmful to our cause? Irritating the collective-farm peasant by “socialising” dwelling houses, all dairy cattle, all small livestock and poultry, when the grain problem is still *unsolved*, when the artel form of collective farming is *not yet consolidated*—is it not obvious that such a “policy” can be to the satisfaction and advantage only of our sworn enemies?

One such overzealous “socialiser” even goes so far as to issue an order to an artel containing the following instructions: “Within three days, register all the poultry of every household”; establish posts of special “commanders” for registration and supervision; “occupy the key positions in the artel”; “command the socialist battle without quitting your posts” and—of course—get a tight grip on the whole life of the artel.

What is this—a policy of directing the collective farms, or a policy of *disrupting* and *discrediting* them?

I say nothing of those “revolutionaries”—save the mark!—who *begin* the work of organising artels by removing the bells from the churches. Just imagine, removing the church bells—how r-r-revolutionary!

How could there have arisen in our midst such block-headed exercises in “socialisation,” such ludicrous attempts to over-leap oneself, attempts which aim at by-

passing, classes and the class struggle, and which in fact bring grist to the mill of our class enemies?

They could have arisen only in the atmosphere of our “easy” and “unexpected” successes on the front of collective-farm development.

They could have arisen only as a result of the block-headed belief of a section of our Party: “We can achieve anything!”, “There’s nothing we can’t do!”

They could have arisen only because some of our comrades have become dizzy with success and for the moment have lost clearness of mind and sobriety of vision.

To correct the line of our work in the sphere of collective-farm development, *we must put an end to these sentiments.*

That is now one of the immediate tasks of the Party.

The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must not lag behind the movement, because to do so is to lose contact with the masses. But neither must one run too far ahead, because to run too far ahead is to lose the masses and to isolate oneself. He who wants to lead a movement and at the same time keep in touch with the vast masses must wage a fight on two fronts—against those who lag behind and against those who run too far ahead.

Our Party is strong and invincible because, when leading a movement, it is able to preserve and multiply its contacts with the vast masses of the workers and peasants.

Pravda, No. 60,
March 2, 1930

Signed: *J. Stalin*

LETTER TO COMRADE BEZYMENSKY

Comrade Bezymensky,

I am somewhat late in replying.

I am not an expert on literature, and certainly not a critic. Nevertheless, since you insist, I can give you my personal opinion.

I have read both *The Shot* and *A Day In Our Life*. There is nothing “petty-bourgeois” or “anti-Party” in these works. Both, and especially *The Shot*, may, for our time, be considered models of revolutionary proletarian art.

True, they contain certain vestiges of Young Communist vanguardism. Reading these works, the unsophisticated reader might even get the impression that it is not the Party that corrects the mistakes of the youth, but the other way round. But this defect is not the main feature of these works, nor the message they convey. Their message lies in the concentration on the shortcomings of our apparatus and in their profound belief that these shortcomings can be corrected. That is the chief thing in both *The Shot* and *A Day In Our Life*. That is also their principal merit. And this merit more than compensates for and altogether overshadows what, it seems to me, are minor defects dating back to the past.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

March 19, 1930

Published for the first time

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES

It is evident from the press that Stalin's article, "Dizzy with Success,"* and the decision adopted by the Central Committee on "The Fight Against Distortions of the Party Line in the Collective-Farm Movement"³⁴ have evoked numerous comments among practical workers in the collective-farm movement. In this connection, I have received lately a number of letters from collective-farm comrades asking for replies to questions raised in them. It was my duty to reply to these letters in private correspondence. But this proved impossible, because more than half the letters contained no indication of the addresses of their writers (they had forgotten to give them). Yet the questions touched upon in the letters are of immense political interest for all our comrades. Moreover, I could not, of course, leave unanswered those comrades who forgot to give their addresses. I am therefore obliged to reply to the letters of the collective-farm comrades publicly, that is, through the press, extracting from them all the questions requiring to be dealt with. I do this all the more readily as I have a direct decision of the Central Committee on this subject.

First question. What is the *root* of the errors in the peasant question?

* See pp. 197-205 in this volume.—*Ed.*

Reply. A wrong approach to the middle peasant. Resort to coercion in economic relations with the middle peasant. Forgetfulness of the fact that the economic bond with the masses of the middle peasants must be built not on the basis of coercive measures, but on the basis of agreement with the middle peasant, of alliance with him. Forgetfulness of the fact that the basis of the collective-farm movement at the present moment is an alliance of the working class and poor peasantry with the middle peasant against capitalism in general, against the kulak in particular.

As long as the offensive against the kulak was waged in a united front with the middle peasant, all went well. But when some of our comrades became intoxicated with success and began imperceptibly to slip from the path of an offensive against the kulak on to the path of a struggle against the middle peasant, when, in pursuit of high collectivisation percentages, they began to apply coercion to the middle peasant, depriving him of the suffrage, “dekulakising” and expropriating him, the offensive began to assume a distorted form and the united front with the middle peasant to be undermined, and, naturally, the kulak obtained an opportunity of trying to rise to his feet again.

It has been forgotten that coercion, which is necessary and useful in the fight against our class enemies, is impermissible and disastrous when applied to the middle peasant, who is our ally.

It has been forgotten that cavalry charges, which are necessary and useful for accomplishing tasks of a military character, are unsuitable and disastrous for accomplishing the tasks of collective-farm development, which,

moreover, is being organised in alliance with the middle peasant.

That is the root of the errors in the peasant question.

Here is what Lenin says about economic relations with the middle peasant:

“Most of all, we must take as our basis the truth that here, by the very nature of the case, nothing can be achieved by methods of coercion. Here the economic task is an entirely different one. Here there is not that top section which can be cut away, while leaving the whole foundation and the whole building intact. That top section, which in the town was represented by the capitalists, does not exist here. *To apply coercion here would ruin the whole matter. . . . Nothing could be more stupid than the very idea of coercion in the sphere of the economic relations of the middle peasant*” (Vol. XXIV, p. 168).

Further:

“*The use of coercion against the middle peasantry would do very great harm.* This stratum is a numerous one, many millions strong. Even in Europe—where it nowhere attains to such strength, where technology and culture, urban life, railways, are immensely developed, and where it would be easiest of all to contemplate its use—nobody, not a single one of the most revolutionary Socialists, has ever proposed the use of coercive measures against the middle peasantry” (Vol. XXIV, p. 167).

That is clear, I think.

Second question. What are the chief errors in the collective-farm movement?

Reply. There are, at least, three such errors.

1) In building collective farms, Lenin’s voluntary principle has been violated. The basic directives of the Party and the Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel

about the voluntary character of collective-farm development have been violated.

Leninism teaches that the peasants must be brought to adopt collective farming voluntarily, by convincing them of the advantages of socially-conducted, collective farming over individual farming. Leninism teaches that the peasants can be convinced of the advantages of collective farming only if it is *demonstrated* and *proved* to them in actual fact and by experience that collective farming is better than individual farming, that it is more profitable than individual farming and that it offers both poor and middle peasants a way out of poverty and want. Leninism teaches that, without these conditions, collective farms cannot be stable. Leninism teaches that any attempt to impose collective farming by force, any attempt to establish collective farms by compulsion can only have adverse results, can only repel the peasants from the collective-farm movement.

And, indeed, as long as this basic rule was observed, the collective-farm movement registered success after success. But some of our comrades, intoxicated with success, began to neglect this rule, began to display excessive haste and, in their pursuit of high collectivisation percentages, began to establish collective farms by means of compulsion. It is not surprising that the adverse results of such a "policy" soon showed themselves. The collective farms which had sprung up so rapidly began to melt away just as rapidly, and a section of the peasantry, who only yesterday had had the greatest confidence in the collective farms, began to turn away from them.

That is the first and chief error in the collective-farm movement.

Here is what Lenin says concerning the voluntary principle of building collective farms:

“Our task now is to pass to *socially-conducted* cultivation of the land to *large-scale* farming in common. But there can be no compulsion by the Soviet government; there is no law that makes it compulsory. The agricultural *commune* is founded *voluntarily*, the passing to *socially-conducted cultivation* of the land can only be *voluntary*; there cannot be the slightest compulsion by the workers’ and peasants’ government in this respect, nor does the law allow it. If any of you has observed such compulsion, you must know that it is an abuse, a violation of the law, which we are doing our utmost to correct, and shall correct”* (Vol. XXIV, p. 43).

Further:

“Only if we succeed in practice in *showing* the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry. Hence the importance of every kind of measure to promote co-operative, artel agriculture can hardly be overestimated. We have millions of individual farms in our country, scattered and dispersed in the depths of the countryside. Only when it is *proved in practice, by experience* easily understood by the peasants, that the transition to the co-operative, artel form of agriculture is essential and possible, only then shall we be entitled to say that in this vast peasant country, Russia, an important step towards socialist agriculture has been taken” (Vol. XXIV, pp. 579-80).

* My italics.—*J. St.*

Lastly, one more passage from the works of Lenin:

“While encouraging co-operative associations of all kinds, and equally agricultural communes of middle peasants, the representatives of the Soviet government must not allow their formation to involve *the slightest compulsion*. Only such associations are valuable as are constituted by the peasants themselves on their free initiative, and the advantages of which have been verified by them in practice. *Excessive haste in this matter is harmful*, because it is only capable of strengthening the middle peasants’ prejudice against innovations. Representatives of the Soviet government who take the liberty of resorting even to indirect, to say nothing of direct, compulsion with a view to uniting the peasants in communes must be called to the strictest account and removed from work in the countryside”* (Vol. XXIV, p. 174).

That is clear, I think.

It scarcely needs proof that the Party will carry out these injunctions of Lenin’s with the utmost stringency.

2) In building collective farms, Lenin’s principle of taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. has been violated. It has been forgotten that in the U.S.S.R. there are the most diverse regions, with differing forms of economy and levels of culture. It has been forgotten that among them there are advanced regions, average regions and backward regions. It has been forgotten that rates of progress of the collective-farm movement and the methods of collective-farm development *cannot be uniform* in these far from uniform regions.

“It would be a mistake,” Lenin says, “if we were simply to write stereotyped decrees for all parts of Russia, if the Bolshe-

* My italics.—*J. St.*

vik-Communists, Soviet officials in the Ukraine and the Don region, began extending them wholesale and without discrimination to other regions” . . . for “under no circumstances do we bind ourselves to a single stereotyped pattern, or decide once and for all that our experience, the experience of Central Russia, can be transplanted in its entirety to all the border regions” (Vol. XXIV, pp. 125-26).

Lenin further says:

“To stereotype Central Russia, the Ukraine and Siberia, to make them conform to a particular stereotyped pattern, would be the greatest folly” (Vol. XXVI, p. 243).

Lastly, Lenin makes it obligatory for the Caucasian Communists

“to understand *the specific character of their position, of the position of their republics, as distinct from the position and conditions of the R.S.F.S.R.*; to understand *the necessity of not copying our tactics, but of thoughtfully modifying them in accordance with the difference in the concrete conditions*” (Vol. XXVI, p. 191).

That is clear, I think.

On the basis of these injunctions of Lenin, the Central Committee of our Party, in its decision on “The Rate of Collectivisation” (see *Pravda*, January 6, 1930),³⁵ divided the regions of the U.S.S.R., as regards the rate of collectivisation, into three groups, of which the North Caucasus, the Middle Volga and the Lower Volga may in the main complete collectivisation by the spring of 1931, other grain-growing regions (the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth region, Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan, etc.) by the spring of 1932, while the remaining regions may extend collectivisation to the end of the five-year plan period, that is, until 1933.

But what actually happened? It turned out that some of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes of the collective-farm movement, cheerfully forgot both Lenin's in junctions and the Central Committee's decision. The Moscow Region, in its feverish pursuit of inflated collectivisation figures, began to orientate its officials towards completing collectivisation in the spring of 1930, although it had no less than three years at its disposal (to the end of 1932). The Central Black Earth region, not desiring to "lag behind the others," began to orientate its officials towards completing collectivisation by the first half of 1930, although it had no less than two years at its disposal (to the end of 1931). And the Transcaucasians and Turkestanians, in their eagerness to "overtake and outstrip" the advanced regions, began to orientate themselves on completing collectivisation "at the earliest," although they had fully four years at their disposal (to the end of 1933).

Naturally, with such a quick-fire "tempo" of collectivisation, the areas less prepared for the collective-farm movement, in their eagerness to "outstrip" the better prepared areas, found themselves obliged to resort to strong administrative pressure, endeavouring to compensate the missing factors needed for a rapid rate of progress of the collective-farm movement by their own administrative ardour. The consequences are known. Everyone knows of the muddle which resulted in these areas, and which had to be straightened out by the interference of the Central Committee.

That is the second error in the collective-farm movement.

3) In building collective farms, Lenin's principle that it is impermissible to skip over an uncompleted form of movement was violated. Also violated was Lenin's principle of not running ahead of the development of the masses, of not decreeing the movement of the masses, of not becoming divorced from the masses, but of moving together with the masses and impelling them forward, bringing them to our slogans and helping them to convince themselves of the correctness of our slogans through their own experience.

"When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison took power," says Lenin, "they fully realised that our constructive work in the countryside would encounter great difficulties; that there it was necessary to proceed more gradually; that to *attempt to introduce collective cultivation of the land by decrees*, by legislation, would be the *height of folly*; that an insignificant number of enlightened peasants might agree to this, but that the vast majority of the peasants had no such object in view. We, therefore, confined ourselves to what was absolutely essential in the interests of the development of the revolution: in no case *to run ahead of the development of the masses*, but to wait until, as a result of their own experience and their own struggle, a progressive movement grew up"* (Vol. XXIII, p. 252).

Proceeding from these injunctions of Lenin, the Central Committee, in its decision on "The Rate of Collectivisation" (see *Pravda*, January 6, 1930), laid down that:

a) the chief form of the collective-farm movement at the present moment is the agricultural artel,

* My italics.—*J. St.*

b) in view of this, it is necessary to draw up model rules for the agricultural artel, as the chief form of the collective-farm movement,

c) “decreeing” the collective-farm movement from above and “playing at collectivisation” must not be allowed in our practical work.

That means that at the present time we must steer our course not towards the commune, but towards the agricultural artel, as the chief form of collective-farm development; that we must not allow skipping over the agricultural artel to the commune; that “decreeing” of collective farms and “playing at collective farms” must not be substituted for the mass movement of the peasants in favour of collective farms.

That is clear, I think.

But what actually happened? It turned out that some of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes of the collective-farm movement, cheerfully forgot both Lenin’s injunctions and the C.C.’s decision. Instead of organising a mass movement in favour of the agricultural artel, these comrades began to “transfer” the individual peasants straight to the rules of the commune. Instead of consolidating the artel form of the movement, they began compulsorily “socialising” small livestock, poultry, non-commercial dairy cattle and dwelling houses.

The results of this haste, which is impermissible for a Leninist, are now known to all. As a rule, of course, they failed to create stable communes. But, on the other hand, they lost control of a number of agricultural artels. True, “good” resolutions remained. But what is the use of them?

That is the third error in the collective-farm movement.

Third question. How could these errors have arisen, and how must the Party correct them?

Reply. They arose because of our rapid successes in the collective-farm movement. Success sometimes turns people's heads. It not infrequently gives rise to extreme vanity and conceit. That may very easily happen to representatives of a party which is in power, especially in the case of a party like ours, whose strength and prestige are almost immeasurable. Here, instances of communist vainglory, which Lenin combated so vehemently, are quite possible. Here, belief in the omnipotence of decrees, resolutions and orders is quite possible. Here, there is a real danger of the Party's revolutionary measures being converted into empty bureaucratic decreeing by individual representatives of the Party in one corner or another of our boundless country. I have in mind not only local officials, but also individual regional officials, and even individual members of the Central Committee.

"Communist vainglory," says Lenin, "means that a man, who is a member of the Communist Party, and has not yet been purged from it, imagines that he can solve all his problems by issuing Communist decrees" (Vol. XXVII, pp. 50-51).

That is the soil from which sprang the errors in the collective-farm movement, the distortions of the Party line in collective-farm development.

Wherein lies the danger of these errors and distortions, if they are persisted in, if they are not eliminated rapidly and completely?

The danger here lies in the fact that these errors lead us straight to the discrediting of the collective-farm movement, to dissension in our relations with the middle peasants, to the disorganisation of the poor peasants, to confusion in our ranks, to the weakening of all our work of socialist construction, to the revival of the kulaks.

In short, these errors have a tendency to push us from the path of strengthening the alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, of strengthening the proletarian dictatorship, on to the path of a rupture with these masses, on to the path of undermining the proletarian dictatorship.

This danger was already in evidence in the latter half of February, at the time when a section of our comrades, dazzled by the earlier successes, went off at a gallop from the Leninist path. The Central Committee of the Party was alive to this danger and intervened without delay, instructing Stalin to issue a warning to the over-presumptuous comrades in a special article on the collective-farm movement. There are some who think that the article, "Dizzy with Success," was the result of Stalin's personal initiative. That, of course, is nonsense. It is not in order that personal initiative in a matter like this may be taken by anyone, whoever he might be, that we have a Central Committee. It was a reconnaissance-in-depth by the C.C. And when the depth and extent of the errors were ascertained, the C.C. lost no time in striking at these errors with all the strength of its authority, by publishing its well-known resolution of March 15, 1930.

It is with difficulty that people who in their frantic course are dashing headlong towards the abyss can be

halted and turned back to the right path. But our C.C. is called the Central Committee of the Leninist party precisely because it is able to overcome difficulties even greater than these. And, in the main, it has already overcome these difficulties.

It is difficult in cases like this for whole detachments of the Party to stop in their course, to turn back in time to the right path and to re-form their ranks on the march. But our Party is called Lenin's party precisely because it is sufficiently flexible to overcome such difficulties. And, in the main, it has already overcome these difficulties.

The chief thing here is to have the courage to acknowledge one's errors and the moral strength to eliminate them as quickly as possible. Fear of acknowledging one's errors after being intoxicated by recent successes, fear of self-criticism, reluctance to correct one's errors rapidly and resolutely—that is the chief difficulty. One has only to overcome this difficulty, one has only to cast aside inflated numerical targets and bureaucratic maximalism, one has only to transfer one's attention to the tasks of building the collective farms organisationally and economically, and not a trace of the errors will remain. There is no reason to doubt that, in the main, the Party has already overcome this dangerous difficulty.

“All revolutionary parties which have hitherto perished,” Lenin says, “did so because they *grew conceited*, failed to see where their strength lay *and feared to speak of their weaknesses*. But we shall not perish, for we do not fear to speak of our weaknesses and shall learn to overcome them”* (Vol. XXVII, pp. 260-61).

* My italics.—*J. St.*

These words of Lenin must not be forgotten.

Fourth question. Is not the fight against distortions of the Party line a step backward, a retreat?

Reply. Of course not! This can be said to be a retreat only by people who consider persistence in errors and distortions an advance, and the fight against errors, a retreat. Advancing by piling up errors and distortions!—a fine “advance,” there’s no gainsaying. . . .

We have put forward the agricultural artel as the principal form of the collective-farm movement at the present moment and have provided appropriate model rules to serve as a guide in the work of collective-farm development. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

We have put forward consolidation of the production bond of the working class and the poor peasants with the middle peasants as the basis of the collective-farm movement at the present moment. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

We have put forward the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class as the chief slogan of our practical work in the countryside at the present moment. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

Already in January 1930 we adopted a definite rate of collectivisation of agriculture in the U.S.S.R., dividing the regions of the U.S.S.R. into a number of groups, and fixing its own special rate for each group. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

How, then, can it be said that the Party is “retreating”?

We want people who have committed errors and distortions to retreat from their errors. We want blockheads to retreat from their blockheadedness to the position of

Leninism. We want this, because only then will it be possible to continue the *real* offensive against our class enemies. Does this mean that we are taking a step backwards? Of course not! It only means that we want to carry out a *proper* offensive, and not blockheaded playing at an offensive.

Is it not obvious that only cranks and “Left” distorters can consider this stand of the Party a retreat?

People who talk about a retreat fail to understand at least two things.

a) They do not know the laws of an offensive. They do not understand that an offensive *without consolidating* captured positions is an offensive that is doomed to failure.

When may an offensive—in the military sphere, say—be successful? When you do not confine yourself to advancing headlong, but endeavour at the same time to *consolidate* the positions captured, *regroup* your forces in conformity with changing conditions, *move up* the rear services, and *bring up* the reserves. Why is all this necessary? In order to guarantee yourself against surprises, to liquidate any break-throughs, against which no offensive is guaranteed, and thus pave the way for the complete rout of the enemy. The mistake made by the Polish army in 1920, if we consider only the military side of the matter, was that it ignored this rule. That, incidentally, explains why, after having dashed headlong to Kiev it was then forced to make just as headlong a retreat to Warsaw. The mistake made by the Soviet army in 1920, if again we consider only the military side of the matter, was that it duplicated the mistake of the Poles in its advance on Warsaw.

The same must be said about the laws of an offensive on the front of the class struggle. It is impossible to conduct a successful offensive with the object of annihilating the class enemies, *without consolidating* captured positions, *without regrouping* forces, without providing *reserves* for the front, without moving up *rear services*, and so on.

The whole point is that the blockheads do not understand the laws of an offensive. The whole point is that the Party does understand them and puts them into effect.

b) They do not understand the class nature of the offensive. They shout about an offensive. But an offensive against *which* class, and in alliance with *which* class? We are conducting an offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside in alliance with the middle peasant, because only such an offensive can bring us victory. But what is to be done if, owing to the misguided ardour of individual sections of the Party, the offensive begins to slide from the proper path and its sharp edge is turned against our ally, the middle peasant? Is it just *any kind* of an offensive that we need, and not an offensive against a definite class, and in alliance with a definite class? Don Quixote also imagined he was conducting an offensive against his enemies when he attacked a windmill. But we know that he got his head broken in this offensive, if one can call it that.

Apparently, our “Left” distorters are envious of the laurels of Don Quixote.

Fifth question. Which is our chief danger, the Right or the “Left”?

Reply. Our chief danger at the present time is the Right danger. The Right danger has been, and still is, the chief danger.

Does not this thesis contradict that in the Central Committee's decision of March 15, 1930, to the effect that the errors and distortions of the "Left" distorters are now the chief hindrance to the collective-farm movement? No, it does not. The fact of the matter is that the errors of the "Left" distorters in regard to the collective-farm movement are such as create a favourable situation for the strengthening and consolidation of the Right deviation in the Party. Why? Because these errors present the Party's line in a false light—consequently, they make it easier to discredit the Party, and therefore they facilitate the struggle of the Right elements against the Party's leadership. Discrediting the Party leadership is just that elementary ground on which alone the struggle of the Right deviators against the Party can be waged. This ground is provided for the Right deviators by the "Left" distorters, by their errors and distortions. Therefore, if we are to fight successfully against Right opportunism, we must overcome the errors of the "Left" opportunists. Objectively, the "Left" distorters are allies of the Right deviators.

Such is the peculiar connection between "Left" opportunism and Right deviationism.

It is this connection that explains the fact that some of the "Lefts" so often suggest a bloc with the Rights. This, too, explains the peculiar phenomenon that a section of the "Lefts," who only yesterday were "executing" a dashing offensive and trying to collectivise the U.S.S.R. in a matter of two or three weeks, are

today lapsing into passivity, losing heart and effectively surrendering the field to the Right deviators, thus pursuing a line of real retreat (without quotation marks!) in face of the kulaks.

The specific feature of the present moment is that a fight against the errors of the "Left" distorters is a pre-condition for a successful fight against Right opportunism and a distinctive form of this fight.

Sixth question. How is the exodus of a section of the peasants from the collective farms to be assessed?

Reply. The exodus of a section of the peasants signifies that of late a certain number of unsound collective farms were formed which are now being cleansed of their unstable elements. That means that sham collective farms will disappear while the sound ones will remain and grow stronger. I consider this a perfectly normal thing. Some comrades are driven to despair by it, give way to panic, and convulsively clutch at inflated collectivisation percentages. Others gloat over it and prophesy the "collapse" of the collective-farm movement. Both are cruelly mistaken. Both are far removed from a Marxist understanding of the nature of the collective-farm movement.

Primarily, it is so-called dead souls that are withdrawing from the collective farms. It is not even a withdrawal but rather the revelation of a vacuum. Do we need dead souls? Of course not. I think that the North Caucasians and the Ukrainians are acting quite rightly in dissolving collective farms with dead souls and in organising really live and really stable collective farms. The collective-farm movement will only benefit from this.

Secondly, it is alien elements, which are definitely hostile to our cause, that are withdrawing. It is obvious

that the sooner such elements are ejected, the better it will be for the collective-farm movement.

Lastly, it is vacillating elements, which cannot be called either alien elements or dead souls, that are withdrawing. These are peasants whom *today* we have not yet succeeded in convincing of the rightness of our cause, but whom we shall certainly convince *tomorrow*. The withdrawal of such peasants is a serious, although temporary, loss to the collective-farm movement. Consequently, one of the most urgent tasks of the collective-farm movement now is to fight for the vacillating elements in the collective farms.

It follows that the exodus of a section of the peasants from the collective farms is not entirely a bad thing. It follows that, inasmuch as this exodus relieves the collective farms of dead souls and definitely alien elements, it is the sign of a beneficent process making the collective farms healthier and stronger.

A month ago it was estimated that collectivisation in the grain-growing regions amounted to over 60 per cent. It is now clear that, as regards genuine and more or less stable collective farms, that figure was definitely exaggerated. If, after the exodus of a section of the peasants, the collective-farm movement is consolidated at 40 per cent collectivisation in the grain-growing regions—and that is certainly feasible—it will be a very great achievement for the collective-farm movement at the present moment. I take an average figure for the grain-growing regions, although I am well aware that we have individual areas of complete collectivisation where the figure is 80-90 per cent. Forty per cent collectivisation in the grain growing regions means that by the spring of

1930 we shall have succeeded in fulfilling the original five-year plan of collectivisation *twice over*.

Who will venture to deny the *decisive* character of this *historic* achievement in the socialist development of the U.S.S.R.?

Seventh question. Are the vacillating peasants acting rightly in withdrawing from the collective farms?

Reply. No, they are acting wrongly. In withdrawing from the collective farms they are going against their own interests, for only the collective farms offer the peasants a way out of poverty and ignorance. In withdrawing from the collective farms, they make their position worse, because they deprive themselves of those privileges and advantages which the Soviet government accords the collective farms. Errors and distortions in the collective farms are no reason for withdrawing from them. Errors must be corrected by joint effort, while remaining in the collective farms. They can be corrected the more easily as the Soviet government will fight them with might and main.

Lenin says:

“The small-farming system under commodity production *cannot* save mankind from the poverty and oppression of the masses” (Vol. XX, p. 122).

Lenin says:

“Small-scale farming provides no escape from poverty” (Vol. XXIV, p. 540).

Lenin says:

“If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin” (Vol. XX, p. 417).

Lenin says:

“Only with the help of common, artel, co-operative labour can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war has landed us” (Vol. XXIV, p. 537).

Lenin says:

“We must pass to common cultivation in large model farms,” for “otherwise there will be no escaping from the dislocation, from the truly desperate situation in which Russia finds itself” (Vol. XX, p. 418).

What does all that signify?

It signifies that collective farms are the sole means that offer the peasants a way out of poverty and ignorance.

Clearly, peasants who withdraw from the collective farms are acting wrongly.

Lenin says:

“You all know, of course, from all the activity of the Soviet government what *immense importance* we attach to communes, artels and all organisations generally which aim at the transformation, at gradually assisting this transformation, of small, individual peasant farming into socially conducted, co-operative or artel farming”* (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

Lenin says:

“The Soviet government gave direct *preference* to communes and co-operatives by putting them *in the forefront*”* (Vol. XXIII, p. 399).

What does that mean?

It means that the Soviet government will accord privileges and preferences to the collective farms as

* My italics.—*J. St.*

compared with the individual farms. It means that it will accord privileges to the collective farms as regards provision of land, as regards supply of machines, tractors, seed grain, etc., as regards tax relief, and as regards provision of credits.

Why does the Soviet government accord privileges and preferences to the collective farms?

Because the collective farms are the only means by which the peasants can rid themselves of poverty.

Because preferential assistance to the collective farms is the most effective form of assistance to the poor and middle peasants.

A few days ago the Soviet government decided to *exempt* from taxation *for two years* all socially-owned draught animals in the collective farms (horses, oxen, etc.), and all cows, pigs, sheep and poultry, both those collectively owned by the collective farms and those individually owned by the collective farmers.

The Soviet government has decided, in addition, to *postpone* to the end of the year repayment of arrears on credits granted to collective farmers and to *cancel* all fines and court penalties levied prior to April 1 on peasants who have joined collective farms.

It has decided, lastly, to carry out without fail the granting of credits to collective farms in the present year to the amount of 500,000,000 rubles.

These privileges will aid the peasant collective farmers. They will aid those peasant collective farmers who have stood firm against the exodus, who have become steeled in the fight against the enemies of the collective farms, who have defended the collective farms and have held aloft the great banner of the collective-farm move-

ment. They will aid the poor- and middle-peasant collective farmers, who now constitute the main core of our collective farms, who will strengthen and give shape to our collective farms, and who will win millions upon millions of peasants for socialism. They will aid those peasant collective farmers who now constitute the principal cadres of the collective farms, and who fully deserve to be called heroes of the collective-farm movement.

These privileges the peasants who have left the collective farms *will not receive*.

Is it not clear that peasants who withdraw from the collective farms are making a mistake?

Is it not clear that only by returning to the collective farms can they ensure receiving these privileges?

Eighth question. What is to be done with the communes? Should they not be dissolved?

Reply. No, they should not be dissolved and there is no reason for doing so. I am referring to real communes, not those existing on paper. In the grain-growing regions of the U.S.S.R. there are a number of splendid communes which deserve to be encouraged and supported. I have in mind the old communes which have withstood years of ordeal, which have become steeled in the struggle and have fully justified their existence. They should not be dissolved, but should be converted into artels.

The formation and management of communes is a complicated and difficult matter. Large and stable communes can exist and develop only if they have experienced cadres and tried and tested leaders. A hasty replacement of the rules of the artel by the rules of the commune can only repel the peasants from the collective-farm

movement. Hence this matter must be approached with the utmost care and without any sort of haste. The artel is a simpler affair and more easily understood by the broad masses of the peasants. That is why at the present time the artel is the most widespread form of the collective-farm movement. Only as the agricultural artels become stronger and more firmly established can the basis be created for a mass movement of the peasants towards communes. But that will not be soon. Hence the commune, which constitutes a higher form, can become the chief link in the collective-farm movement only in the future.

Ninth question. What is to be done with the kulaks?

Reply. So far we have spoken of the middle peasant. The middle peasant is an ally of the working class, and our policy towards him must be a friendly one. As for the kulak, that is another matter. The kulak is an enemy of the Soviet regime. There is not and cannot be peace between him and us. Our policy towards the kulaks is to eliminate them as a class. That does not mean, of course, that we can eliminate them at one stroke. But it does mean that we shall work to surround them and to eliminate them.

Here is what Lenin says about the kulaks:

“The kulaks are most bestial, brutal and savage exploiters, who in the history of other countries have time and again restored the power of the landlords, tsars, priests and capitalists. The kulaks are more numerous than the landlords and capitalists. Nevertheless, the kulaks are a minority of the people. . . . These bloodsuckers have grown rich on the want suffered by the people during the war; they have raked in thousands and hundreds of thousands of rubles by raising the prices of grain and other products. These spiders have grown fat at the expense of the peas-

ants who have been ruined by the war, and at the expense of the hungry workers. These leeches have sucked the blood of the toilers and have grown the richer, the more the workers in the cities and factories have suffered hunger. These vampires have been gathering and are gathering the landed estates into their hands; they keep on enslaving the poor peasants" (Vol. XXIII, pp. 206-07).

We tolerated these bloodsuckers, spiders and vampires, while pursuing a policy of restricting their exploiting tendencies. We tolerated them, because we had nothing with which to replace kulak farming, kulak production. Now we are in a position to replace, and more than replace, their farming by our collective farms and state farms. There is no reason to tolerate these spiders and bloodsuckers any longer. To tolerate any longer these spiders and bloodsuckers, who set fire to collective farms, murder collective farms leaders and try to disrupt crop-sowing, would be going against the interests of the workers and peasants.

Hence the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class must be pursued with all the persistence and consistency of which Bolsheviks are capable.

Tenth question. What is the immediate practical task of the collective farms?

Reply. The immediate practical task of the collective farms lies in the fight for crop-sowing, for the maximum enlargement of crop areas, for proper organisation of crop-sowing.

All other tasks of the collective farms must now be adapted to the task of sowing the crops.

All other work in the collective farms must be subordinated to the work of organising the sowing of the crops.

That means that the stamina of the collective farms and of their non-Party active, the ability of the leaders and Bolshevik core of the collective farms will be tested not by resounding resolutions and high-flown greetings, but by practical performance in properly organising the crop-sowing.

But to fulfil this practical task with honour, the attention of collective-farm officials must be turned to the *economic* questions of collective-farm development, to the questions of the *internal* development of the collective farms.

Until recently, the attention of collective-farm officials was focused on the chase for high collectivisation figures; moreover, people refused to see the difference between real collectivisation and collectivisation on paper. This infatuation for figures must now be discarded. The attention of the officials must now be concentrated on *consolidating* the collective farms, on giving them organisational *shape*, on *organising* their practical work.

Until recently, the attention of collective-farm officials was concentrated on organising large collective-farm units, so called "giants," which not infrequently degenerated into cumbrous bureaucratic headquarters, devoid of economic roots in the villages. Consequently, real work was swamped by window-dressing. This infatuation for display must now be discarded. The attention of officials must now be concentrated on the organisational and economic work of the collective farms in the villages. When this work achieves proper success, "giants" will make their appearance of themselves.

Until recently, little attention was paid to drawing middle peasants into the work of managing the collective

farms. Yet there are some remarkably fine farmers among the middle peasants, who could become excellent collective-farm executives. This defect in our work must now be eliminated. The task now is to draw the finest elements among the middle peasants into the work of managing the collective farms and to give them the opportunity to develop their abilities in this sphere.

Until recently, insufficient attention was paid to work among peasant women. The past period has shown that work among peasant women is the weakest part of our work. This defect must now be eliminated resolutely, once and for all.

Until recently, the Communists in a number of areas assumed that they could solve all the problems of collective-farm development by their own efforts. Because of this assumption, they did not pay sufficient attention to drawing non-Party people into responsible work in the collective farms, to promoting non-Party people to managerial work in the collective farms, to organising a large group of non-Party activists in the collective farms. The history of our Party has proved, and the past period in collective-farm development has once more demonstrated, it, that this line is radically wrong. If Communists were to shut themselves up in their shells and wall themselves off from non-Party people, they would ruin the entire work. If the Communists have succeeded in covering themselves with glory in the battles for socialism, while the enemies of communism have been beaten, it is due, among other things, to the fact that the Communists knew how to enlist the co-operation of the finest elements among the non-Party people, that they knew how to draw forces from the broad non-Party strata, how

to surround their Party with large numbers of non-Party activists. This defect in our work among the non-Party people must now be eliminated resolutely, once and for all.

Correcting these defects in our work, eliminating them completely, means precisely putting the *economic* work of the collective farms on sound lines.

And so:

1) Proper organisation of the crop-sowing—that is the task.

2) Concentration of attention on the economic questions of the collective-farm movement—that is the means necessary for accomplishing this task.

Pravda, No. 92,
April 3, 1930

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TO THE FIRST GRADUATES OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACADEMY

The training of new cadres for socialist industry from the ranks of the working class and the labouring people generally, cadres capable of providing social and political, as well as production and technical, leadership for our enterprises, is a cardinal task of the moment.

Unless this task is fulfilled, it will be impossible to convert the U.S.S.R. from a backward into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country, into a country of electricity and metal, of machines and tractors.

The Industrial Academy is one of the most important workshops for training such cadres in our country.

The first contingent of graduates of the Industrial Academy is its first arrow launched into the camp of our enemies, into the camp of production routine and technical backwardness.

Let us hope that the new leaders of industry who are today quitting the walls of the Academy will display in practice exemplary labour enthusiasm and genuinely revolutionary activity in promoting a Bolshevik tempo of constructive work.

Greetings to the first graduates of the Industrial Academy, which is providing the country with a new Bolshevik detachment of leaders of our socialist industry, leaders fortified with technical knowledge.

J. Stalin

April 25, 1930

Pravda, No. 115,
April 26, 1930

REPLY TO COMRADE M. RAFAIL

(Regional Trade-Union Council, Leningrad)

Copy to Comrade Kirov, Secretary,

Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)

Comrade Rafail,

Owing to lack of time, I shall answer briefly:

1) There is, and can be, *no* analogy between the C.C.'s action in March of this year against excesses in the collective-farm movement and the Brest period or the period of the introduction of NEP. In the latter cases it was a matter of a turn in policy. In the first case, in March 1930, there was no turn in policy. All we did was to put a check on the comrades who had got out of hand. Consequently, all the arguments you base upon analogy, even though an incomplete one, fall to the ground.

2) There really was a turn in policy in the affairs of the collective-farm movement (as a result of the turn towards the collective farms on the part of the mass of the middle peasants) but it was not in March 1930, but in the latter half of 1929. The beginning of this turn in policy was already made at the Fifteenth Congress of our Party (see the resolution on "Work in the Country-side").

This turn, as I have already said, assumed a purely practical character at the close of 1929. You undoubtedly

know that the C.C. gave precise shape to the new policy and laid down rates of development of the collective-farm movement for the various regions of the U.S.S.R. in its decision of January 5, 1930. The facts bear out that this decision of the C.C. was fully and entirely correct on all points.

Was there any lag on the part of the C.C. behind the progress of the movement? I think that, as far as theoretical prevision and elaboration of an appropriate political line are concerned, there was no lag whatever.

Was there a lag on the part of any considerable sections of the Party or of individual members of the C.C. in their practical policy? There certainly was. Otherwise, there would have been no fight for the general line and against deviations either in the Party or in the C.C. itself.

3) Is it possible for a ruling party instantaneously to grasp the coming into being of new processes, and also instantaneously to reflect them in its practical policy? I think it is not possible. It is not possible, because the facts occur first of all, then their reflection in the consciousness of the most advanced elements of the Party, and only after that does the moment come when the new processes are perceived by the minds of the mass of Party members. Do you remember what Hegel said: "The owl of Minerva makes its flight only at night"? In other words, consciousness lags somewhat behind the facts.

The difference in this respect between the turn in our policy in the latter half of 1929 and the turns at the time of Brest and the introduction of NEP is that in the latter half of 1929 the Party became con-

scious of the new processes in objective reality sooner than it did in the case of the turns at the time of Brest and the introduction of NEP. The explanation of this is that in the interval the Party had succeeded in perfecting itself, and its cadres had become more perceptive.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

May 31, 1930

Published for the first time

AGRICULTURE MACHINERY WORKS, ROSTOV

I congratulate the workers, technical personnel and entire executive staff of the Agricultural Machinery Works on their victory. Your victory is a great one, if only because the Agricultural Machinery Works alone is to produce, in accordance with its full programme, farm machinery to the value of 115,000,000 rubles annually, whereas all the 900 agricultural machinery works that existed before the war together produced farm machinery to the value of only 70,000,000 rubles annually.

My best wishes for the successful fulfilment of this programme.

Stalin

June 16, 1930

Pravda, No. 165,
June 17, 1930

TRACTOR WORKS, STALINGRAD

Greetings and congratulations on their victory to the workers and executive personnel of the giant Red Banner Tractor Works, the first in the U.S.S.R. The 50,000 tractors which you are to produce for our country every year will be 50,000 projectiles shattering the old bourgeois world and clearing the way for the new, socialist order in the countryside.

My best wishes for the successful fulfilment of your programme.

J. Stalin

June 17, 1930

Pravda, No. 166,
June 18, 1930

**POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)³⁶**

June 27, 1930

I

**THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM
AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R.**

Comrades, since the Fifteenth Congress two and a half years have passed. Not a very long period one would think. Nevertheless, during this period most important changes have taken place in the life of peoples and states. If one were to characterise the past period in two words, it could be called a *turning point* period. It marked a turning point not only for us, for the U.S.S.R., but also for the capitalist countries all over the world. Between these two turning points, however, there is a fundamental difference. Whereas for the U.S.S.R. this turning point meant a turn in the direction of a new and bigger economic *upswing*, for the capitalist countries it meant a turn towards economic *decline*. Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is a *growing upswing* of socialist development both in industry and in agriculture. There, among the capitalists, there is *growing economic crisis* both in industry and in agriculture.

Such is the picture of the present situation in a few words.

Recall the state of affairs in the capitalist countries two and a half years ago. Growth of industrial

production and trade in nearly all the capitalist countries. Growth of production of raw materials and food in nearly all the agrarian countries. A halo around the United States as the land of the most full-blooded capitalism. Triumphant hymns of "prosperity." Grovelling to the dollar. Panegyrics in honour of the new technology, in honour of capitalist rationalisation. Proclamation of an era of the, "recovery" of capitalism and of the unshakable firmness of capitalist stabilisation. "Universal" noise and clamour about the "inevitable doom" of the Land of Soviets, about the "inevitable collapse" of the U.S.S.R.

That was the state of affairs yesterday.

And what is the picture today?

Today there is an economic crisis in nearly all the industrial countries of capitalism. Today there is an agricultural crisis in all the agrarian countries. Instead of "prosperity" there is mass poverty and a colossal growth of unemployment. Instead of an upswing in agriculture there is the ruin of the vast masses of the peasants. The illusions about the omnipotence of capitalism in general, and about the omnipotence of North American capitalism in particular, are collapsing. The triumphant hymns in honour of the dollar and of capitalist rationalisation are becoming fainter and fainter. Pessimistic wailing about the "mistakes" of capitalism is growing louder and louder. And the "universal" clamour about the "inevitable doom" of the U.S.S.R. is giving way to "universal" venomous hissing about the necessity of punishing "that country" that dares to develop its economy when crisis is reigning all around.

Such is the picture today.

Things have turned out exactly as the Bolsheviks said they would two or three years ago.

The Bolsheviks said that in view of the restricted limits of the standard of living of the vast masses of the workers and peasants, the further development of technology in the capitalist countries, the growth of productive forces and of capitalist rationalisation, must inevitably lead to a severe economic crisis. The bourgeois press jeered at the “queer prophesies” of the Bolsheviks. The Right deviators dissociated themselves from this Bolshevik forecast and for the Marxist analysis substituted liberal chatter about “organised capitalism.” But how did things actually turn out? They turned out exactly as the Bolsheviks said they would.

Such are the facts.

Let us now examine the data on the economic crisis in the capitalist countries.

1. THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS

a) In studying the crisis, the following facts, above all, strike the eye:

1. The present economic crisis is a crisis of *over-production*. This means that more goods have been produced than the market can absorb. It means that more textiles, fuel, manufactured goods and food have been produced than can be purchased for cash by the bulk of the consumers, i.e., the masses of the people, whose incomes remain on a low level. Since, however, under capitalism, the purchasing power of the masses of the people remains at a minimum level, the capitalists keep their “superfluous” goods, textiles, grain, etc., in

their warehouses or even destroy them in order to bolster up prices; they cut down production and discharge their workers, and the masses of the people are compelled to suffer hardship because too many goods have been produced.

2. The present crisis is the first post-war *world* economic crisis. It is a world crisis not only in the sense that it embraces all, or nearly all, the *industrial* countries in the world; even France, which is systematically injecting into her organism the billions of marks received as reparations payments from Germany, has been unable to avoid a certain depression, which, as all the data indicate, is bound to develop into a crisis. It is a world crisis also in the sense that the *industrial* crisis has coincided with an *agricultural* crisis that affects the production of all forms of raw materials and food in the chief *agrarian* countries of the world.

3. The present world crisis is developing *unevenly*, notwithstanding its *universal* character; it affects different countries at different times and in different degrees. The industrial crisis began first of all in Poland, Rumania and the Balkans. It developed there throughout the whole of last year. Obvious symptoms of an incipient agricultural crisis were already visible at the end of 1928 in Canada, the United States, the Argentine, Brazil and Australia. During the whole of this period United States industry showed an upward trend. By the middle of 1929 industrial production in the United States had reached an almost record level. A break began only in the latter half of 1929, and then a crisis in industrial production swiftly developed, which threw the United States back to the level of 1927. This

was followed by an industrial crisis in Canada and Japan. Then came bankruptcies and crisis in China and in the colonial countries, where the crisis was aggravated by the drop in the price of silver, and where the crisis of overproduction was combined with the ruination of the peasant farms, which were reduced to utter exhaustion by feudal exploitation and unbearable taxation. As regards Western Europe, there the crisis began to gain force only at the beginning of this year, but not everywhere to the same degree, and even in that period France still showed an increase in industrial production.

I do not think there is any need to dwell particularly on the statistics that demonstrate the existence of the crisis. Nobody now disputes the existence of the crisis. I shall therefore confine myself to quoting one small but characteristic table recently published by the German Institute of Economic Research. This table depicts the development of the mining industry and the chief branches of large-scale manufacturing industry in the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Poland and the U.S.S.R. since 1927; the 1928 level of production is taken as 100.

Here is the table:

Year	U.S.S.R	U.S.A.	Britain	Germany	France	Poland
1927	82.4	95.5	105.5	100.1	86.6	88.5
1928	100	100	100	100	100	100
1929	123.5	106.3	107.9	101.8	109.4	99.8
1930 (first quarter)	171.4	95.5	107.4	93.4	113.1	84.6

What does this table show?

It shows, first of all, that the United States, Germany and Poland are experiencing a *sharply expressed crisis* in large-scale industrial production; in the first quarter of 1930, in the *United States*, after the *boom* in the first half of 1929, the level of production dropped 10.8 per cent compared with 1929 and sank to the level of 1927; in *Germany*, after three years of *stagnation*, the level of production dropped 8.4 per cent compared with last year and sank to 6.7 per cent below the level of 1927; in *Poland*, after last year's *crisis*, the level of production dropped 15.2 per cent compared with last year and sank to 3.9 per cent below the level of 1927.

Secondly, the table shows that *Britain* has been marking time for three years, round about the 1927 level, and is experiencing severe economic *stagnation*; in the first quarter of 1930 she even suffered a drop in production of 0.5 per cent compared with the previous year, thus entering the first phase of a crisis.

Thirdly, the table shows that of the big capitalist countries only in France is there a certain *growth* of large-scale industry; but whereas the increase in 1928 amounted to 13.4 per cent and that in 1929 to 9.4 per cent, the increase in the first quarter of 1930 is only 3.7 per cent above that in 1929, thus presenting from year to year a picture of a *descending* curve of growth.

Lastly, the table shows that of all the countries in the world, the U.S.S.R. is the only one in which a *powerful upswing* of large-scale industry has taken place; the level of production in the first quarter of 1930 was more than *twice* as high as that in 1927, and the increase rose from 17.6 per cent in 1928 to 23.5 per cent in 1929

and to 32 per cent in the first quarter of 1930, thus presenting from year to year a picture of an *ascending* curve of growth.

It may be said that although such was the state of affairs up to the end of the first quarter of this year, it is not precluded that a turn for the better may have taken place in the second quarter of this year. The returns for the second quarter, however, emphatically refute such an assumption. They show, on the contrary, that the situation has become still worse in the second quarter. These returns show: a further *drop in share prices* on the New York Stock Exchange and a new *wave of bankruptcies* in the United States; a further *decline* in production, a *reduction of wages* of the workers, and *growth of unemployment* in the United States, Germany, Britain, Italy, Japan, South America, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.; the entry of a number of branches of industry in France into a state of *stagnation*, which, in the present international economic situation, is a symptom of incipient crisis. The number of unemployed in the United States is now over 6,000,000, in Germany about 5,000,000, in Britain over 2,000,000, in Italy, South America and Japan a million each, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria half a million each. This is apart from the further intensification of the agricultural crisis, which is ruining millions of farmers and labouring peasants. The crisis of overproduction in agriculture has reached such a pitch that in Brazil, in order to keep up prices and the profits of the bourgeoisie, 2,000,000 bags of coffee have been thrown into the sea; in America maize has begun to be used for fuel instead of coal; in Germany, millions of poods of rye are

being converted into pig food; and as regards cotton and wheat, every measure is being taken to reduce the crop area by 10-15 per cent.

Such is the general picture of the developing world economic crisis.

b) Now, when the destructive effects of the world economic crisis are spreading, sending to the bottom whole strata of medium and small capitalists, ruining entire groups of the labour aristocracy and farmers, and dooming vast masses of workers to starvation, everybody is asking: what is the cause of the crisis, what is at the bottom of it, how can it be combated, how can it be abolished? The most diverse "theories" about crises are being invented. Whole schemes are being proposed for "mitigating," "preventing," and "eliminating" crises. The bourgeois oppositions are blaming the bourgeois governments because "they failed to take all measures" to prevent the crisis. The "Democrats" blame the "Republicans" and the "Republicans" blame the "Democrats," and all of them together blame the Hoover group with its "Federal Reserve System,"³⁷ which failed to "curb" the crisis. There are even wiseacres who ascribe the world economic crisis to the "machinations of the Bolsheviki." I have in mind the well-known "industrialist" Rechberg who, properly speaking, little resembles an industrialist, but reminds one more than anything of an "industrialist" among literary men and a "literary man" among industrialists. (*Laughter.*)

It goes without saying that none of these "theories" and schemes has anything in common with science. It must be admitted that the bourgeois economists

have proved to be utter bankrupts in face of the crisis. More than that, they have been found to be devoid even of that little sense of reality which their predecessors could not always be said to lack. These gentlemen forget that crises cannot be regarded as something fortuitous under the capitalist system of economy. These gentlemen forget that economic crises are the inevitable result of capitalism. These gentlemen forget that crises were born with the birth of the rule of capitalism. There have been periodical crises during more than a hundred years, recurring every 12, 10, 8 or less years. During this period bourgeois governments of all ranks and colours, bourgeois leaders of all levels and abilities, all without exception tried their strength at the task of "preventing" and "abolishing" crises. But they all suffered defeat. They suffered defeat because economic crises cannot be prevented or abolished within the framework of capitalism. Is it surprising that the present-day bourgeois leaders are also suffering defeat? Is it surprising that far from mitigating the crisis, far from easing the situation of the vast masses of the working people, the measures taken by the bourgeois governments actually lead to new outbreaks of bankruptcy, to new waves of unemployment, to the swallowing up of the less powerful capitalist combines by the more powerful capitalist combines?

The basis, the cause, of economic crises of overproduction lies in the capitalist system of economy itself. The basis of the crisis lies in the contradiction between the social character of production and the capitalist form of appropriation of the results of production. An expression of this fundamental contradiction of cap-

italism is the contradiction between the colossal *growth* of capitalism's potentialities of production, calculated to yield the *maximum* of capitalist profit, and the relative *reduction* of the effective demand of the vast masses of the working people, whose standard of living the capitalists always try to keep at the *minimum* level. To be successful in competition and to squeeze out the utmost profit, the capitalists are compelled to develop their technical equipment, to introduce rationalisation, to intensify the exploitation of the workers and to increase the production potentialities of their enterprises to the utmost limits. So as not to lag behind one another, all the capitalists are compelled, in one way or another, to take this path of furiously developing production potentialities. The home market and the foreign market, however, the purchasing power of the vast masses of workers and peasants who, in the last analysis, constitute the bulk of the purchasers, remain on a low level. Hence overproduction crises. Hence the well-known results, recurring more or less periodically, as a consequence of which goods remain unsold, production is reduced, unemployment grows and wages are cut, and all this still further intensifies the contradiction between the level of production and the level of effective demand. Overproduction crises are a manifestation of this contradiction in turbulent and destructive forms.

If capitalism could adapt production not to the obtaining of the utmost profit, but to the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the masses of the people, and if it could turn profits not to the satisfaction of the whims of the parasitic classes, not to perfecting the methods of exploitation, not to the export

of capital, but to the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the workers and peasants, then there would be no crises. But then capitalism would not be capitalism. To abolish crises it is necessary to abolish capitalism.

Such is the basis of economic crises of overproduction in general.

We cannot, however, confine ourselves to this in characterising the *present* crisis. The present crisis cannot be regarded as a mere recurrence of the old crises. It is occurring and developing under certain new conditions, which must be brought out if we are to obtain a complete picture of the crisis. It is complicated and deepened by a number of special circumstances which must be understood if we are to obtain a clear idea of the present economic crisis.

What are these special circumstances?

These special circumstances can be reduced to the following characteristic facts:

1. The crisis has most severely affected the *principal country* of capitalism, its citadel, the United States, in which is concentrated not less than half the total production and consumption of all the countries in the world. Obviously, this circumstance cannot but lead to a colossal expansion of the sphere of influence of the crisis, to the intensification of the crisis and to the accumulation of extra difficulties for world capitalism.

2. In the course of development of the economic crisis, the industrial crisis in the chief capitalist countries did not merely coincide but became *interwoven* with the agricultural crisis in the agrarian countries, thereby aggravating the difficulties and predetermining

the inevitability of a general decline in economic activity. Needless to say, the industrial crisis will intensify the agricultural crisis, and the agricultural crisis will prolong the industrial crisis, which cannot but lead to the intensification of the economic crisis as a whole.

3. Present-day capitalism, unlike the old capitalism, is *monopoly* capitalism, and this predetermines the inevitability of the capitalist combines fighting to keep up the high monopolist prices of goods, in spite of overproduction. Naturally, this circumstance, which makes the crisis particularly painful and ruinous for the masses of the people who constitute the main consumers of goods, cannot but lead to prolonging the crisis, cannot but be an obstacle to resolving it.

4. The present economic crisis is developing on the basis of the *general crisis* of capitalism, which came into being already in the period of the imperialist war, and is sapping the foundations of capitalism and has facilitated the advent of the economic crisis.

What does that mean?

It means, first of all, that the imperialist war and its aftermath intensified the decay of capitalism and upset its equilibrium, that we are now living in an epoch of wars and revolutions, that capitalism has already ceased to be the *sole* and *all-embracing* system of world economy, that side by side with the *capitalist* system of economy there is the *socialist* system, which is growing, thriving, stands opposed to the capitalist system and by its very existence demonstrates the decaying state of capitalism, shakes its foundations.

It means, further, that the imperialist war and the victory of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. have shaken

the foundations of imperialism *in the colonial and dependent countries*, that the prestige of imperialism has already been undermined in those countries, that it is no longer able to lord it in those countries in the old way.

It means, further, that during the war and after it, a young native capitalism appeared and grew up in the colonial and dependent countries, which is successfully competing in the markets with the old capitalist countries, intensifying and complicating the struggle for markets.

It means, lastly, that the war left the majority of capitalist countries a burdensome heritage in the shape of *enterprises chronically working under capacity* and of *an army of unemployed numbering millions*, which has been transformed from a reserve into a *permanent army of unemployed*; this created for capitalism a mass of difficulties even before the present economic crisis, and must complicate matters still more during the crisis.

Such are the circumstances which intensify and aggravate the world economic crisis.

It must be admitted that the present economic crisis is the gravest and most profound world economic crisis that has ever occurred.

2. THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM

A most important result of the world economic crisis is that it is laying bare and intensifying the contradictions inherent in world capitalism.

a) It is laying bare and intensifying the *contradictions between the major imperialist countries*, the struggle for markets, the struggle for raw materials, the struggle

for the export of capital. None of the capitalist states is now satisfied with the old distribution of spheres of influence and colonies. They see that the relation of forces has changed and that it is necessary in accordance with it to redivide markets, sources of raw materials, spheres of influence, and so forth. The chief contradiction here is that between the United States and Britain. Both in the sphere of the export of manufactured goods and in the sphere of the export of capital, the struggle is raging chiefly between the United States and Britain. It is enough to read any journal dealing with economics, any document concerning exports of goods and capital, to be convinced of this. The principal arena of the struggle is South America, China, the colonies and dominions of the old imperialist states. Superiority of forces in this struggle—and a definite superiority—is on the side of the United States.

After the chief contradiction come contradictions which, while not the chief ones, are, however, fairly important: between America and Japan, between Germany and France, between France and Italy, between Britain and France, and so forth.

There can be no doubt whatever that owing to the developing crisis, the struggle for markets, for raw materials and for the export of capital will grow more intense month by month and day by day.

Means of struggle: tariff policy, cheap goods, cheap credits, regrouping of forces and new military-political alliances, growth of armaments and preparation for new imperialist wars, and finally—war.

I have spoken about the crisis embracing all branches of production. There is one branch, however, that

has not been affected by the crisis. That branch is the armament industry. It is growing continuously, notwithstanding the crisis. The bourgeois states are furiously arming and rearming. What for? Not for friendly chats, of course, but for war. And the imperialists need war, for it is the only means by which to redivide the world, to redivide markets, sources of raw materials and spheres for the investment of capital.

It is quite understandable that in this situation so-called pacifism is living its last days, that the League of Nations is rotting alive, that "disarmament schemes" come to nothing, while conferences for the reduction of naval armaments become transformed into conferences for renewing and enlarging navies.

This means that the danger of war will grow at an accelerated pace.

Let the Social-Democrats chatter about pacifism, peace, the peaceful development of capitalism, and so forth. The experience of Social-Democrats being in power in Germany and Britain shows that for them pacifism is only a screen needed to conceal the preparation for new wars.

b) It is laying bare and will intensify the *contradictions between the victor countries and the vanquished countries*. Among the latter I have in mind chiefly Germany. Undoubtedly, in view of the crisis and the aggravation of the problem of markets, increased pressure will be brought to bear upon Germany, which is not only a debtor, but also a very big exporting country. The peculiar relations that have developed between the victor countries and Germany could be depicted in the form of a pyramid at the apex of which America, France,

Britain and the others are seated in lordly fashion, holding in their hands the Young Plan³⁸ with the inscription: "Pay up!"; while underneath lies Germany, flattened out, exhausting herself and compelled to exert all her efforts to obey the order to pay thousands of millions in indemnities. You wish to know what this is? It is "the spirit of Locarno."³⁹ To think that such a situation will have no effect upon world capitalism means not to understand anything in life. To think that the German bourgeoisie will be able to pay 20,000 million marks within the next ten years and that the German proletariat, which is living under the double yoke of "its own" and the "foreign" bourgeoisie, will allow the German bourgeoisie to squeeze these 20,000 million marks out of it without serious battles and convulsions, means to go out of one's mind. Let the German and French politicians pretend that they believe in this miracle. We Bolsheviki do not believe in miracles.

c) It is laying bare and intensifying *the contradictions between the imperialist states and the colonial and dependent countries*. The growing economic crisis cannot but increase the pressure of the imperialists upon the colonies and dependent countries, which are the chief markets for goods and sources of raw materials. Indeed, this pressure is increasing to the utmost degree. It is a fact that the European bourgeoisie is now in a state of war with "its" colonies in India, Indo-China, Indonesia and North Africa. It is a fact that "independent" China is already virtually partitioned into spheres of influence, while the cliques of counter-revolutionary Kuomintang generals, warring among

themselves and ruining the Chinese people, are obeying the will of their masters in the imperialist camp.

The mendacious story that officials of the Russian embassies in China are to blame for the disturbance of "peace and order" in China must now be regarded as having been utterly exposed. There have been no Russian embassies for a long time in either South or Central China. On the other hand, there are British, Japanese, German, American and all sorts of other embassies there. There have been no Russian embassies for a long time in either South or Central China. On the other hand, there are German, British and Japanese military advisers with the warring Chinese generals. There have been no Russian embassies there for a long time. On the other hand, there are British, American, German, Czechoslovak and all sorts of other guns, rifles, aircraft, tanks and poison gases. Well? Instead of "peace and order" a most unrestrained and most devastating war of the generals, financed and instructed by the "civilised" states of Europe and America, is now raging in South and Central China. We get a rather piquant picture of the "civilising" activities of the capitalist states. What we do not understand is merely: what have the Russian Bolsheviks to do with it?

It would be ridiculous to think that these outrages will be without consequences for the imperialists. The Chinese workers and peasants have already retaliated to them by forming Soviets and a Red Army. It is said that a Soviet government has already been set up there. I think that if this is true, there is nothing surprising about it. There can be no doubt that only

Soviets can save China from utter collapse and pauperisation.

As regards India, Indo-China, Indonesia, Africa, etc., the growth of the revolutionary movement in those countries, which at times assumes the form of a national war for liberation, leaves no room for doubt. Messieurs the bourgeois count on flooding those countries with blood and on relying on police bayonets, calling people like Gandhi to their assistance. There can be no doubt that police bayonets make a poor prop. Tsarism, in its day, also tried to rely on police bayonets, but everybody knows what kind of a prop they turned out to be. As regards assistants of the Gandhi type, tsarism had a whole herd of them in the shape of liberal compromisers of every kind, but nothing came of this except discomfiture.

d) It is laying bare and intensifying *the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat* in the capitalist countries. The crisis has already increased the pressure exerted by the capitalists on the working class. The crisis has already given rise to another wave of capitalist rationalisation, to a further deterioration of the conditions of the working class, to increased unemployment, to an enlargement of the permanent army of unemployed, to a reduction of wages. It is not surprising that these circumstances are revolutionising the situation, intensifying the class struggle and pushing the workers towards new class battles.

As a result of this, Social-Democratic illusions among the masses of workers are being shattered and dispelled. After the experience of Social-Democrats being in power, when they broke strikes, organised

lockouts and shot down workers, the false promises of “industrial democracy,” “peace in industry,” and “peaceful methods” of struggle sound like cruel mockery to the workers. Will many workers be found today capable of believing the false doctrines of the social-fascists? The well-known workers’ demonstrations of August 1, 1929 (against the war danger) and of March 6, 1930 (against unemployment)⁴⁰ show that the best members of the working class have already turned away from the social-fascists. The economic crisis will strike a fresh blow at Social-Democratic illusions among the workers. Not many workers will be found now, after the bankruptcies and ruination caused by the crisis, who believe that it is possible for “every worker” to become rich by holding shares in “democratised” joint-stock companies. Needless to say, the crisis will strike a crushing blow at all these and similar illusions.

The desertion of the masses of the workers from the Social-Democrats, however, signifies a turn on their part towards communism. That is what is actually taking place. The growth of the trade-union movement that is associated with the Communist Party, the electoral successes of the Communist Parties, the wave of strikes in which the Communists are taking a leading part, the development of economic strikes into political protests organised by the Communists, the mass demonstrations of workers who sympathise with communism, which are meeting a lively response in the working class—all this shows that the masses of the workers regard the Communist Party as the only party capable of fighting capitalism, the only party worthy of the workers’ confidence, the only party under whose lead-

ership it is possible to enter, and worth while entering, the struggle for emancipation from capitalism. This means that the masses are turning towards communism. It is the guarantee that our fraternal Communist Parties will become big mass parties of the working class. All that is necessary is that the Communists should be capable of appraising the situation and making proper use of it. By developing an uncompromising struggle against Social-Democracy, which is capital's agency in the working class, and by reducing to dust all and sundry deviations from Leninism, which bring grist to the mill of Social-Democracy, the Communist Parties have shown that they are on the right road. They must definitely fortify themselves on this road; for only if they do that can they count on winning over the majority of the working class and successfully prepare the proletariat for the coming class battles. Only if they do that can we count on a further increase in the influence and prestige of the Communist International.

Such is the state of the principal contradictions of world capitalism, which have become intensified to the utmost by the world economic crisis.

What do all these facts show?

That the stabilisation of capitalism is coming to an end.

That the upsurge of the mass revolutionary movement will increase with fresh vigour.

That in a number of countries the world economic crisis will grow into a political crisis.

This means, firstly, that the bourgeoisie will seek a way out of the situation through further fascisation in the sphere of domestic policy, and will utilise all

the reactionary forces, including Social-Democracy, for this purpose.

It means, secondly, that in the sphere of foreign policy the bourgeoisie will seek a way out through a new imperialist war.

It means, lastly, that the proletariat, in fighting capitalist exploitation and the war danger, will seek a way out through revolution.

3. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CAPITALIST STATES

a) I have spoken above about the contradictions of world capitalism. In addition to these, however, there is one other contradiction. I am referring to the contradiction between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R. True, this contradiction must not be regarded as being of the same order as the contradiction *within capitalism*. It is a contradiction between capitalism as a whole and the country that is building socialism. This, however, does not prevent it from corroding and shaking the very foundations of capitalism. More than that, it lays bare all the contradictions of capitalism to the roots and gathers them into a single knot, transforming them into an issue of the life and death of the capitalist order itself. That is why, every time the contradictions of capitalism become acute, the bourgeoisie turns its gaze towards the U.S.S.R., wondering whether it would not be possible to solve this or that contradiction of capitalism, or all the contradictions together, at the expense of the U.S.S.R., of that Land of Soviets, that citadel of revolution which, by its very existence,

is revolutionising the working class and the colonies, which is hindering the organisation of a new war, hindering a new redivision of the world, hindering the capitalists from lording it in its extensive home market which they need so much, especially now, in view of the economic crisis.

Hence the tendency towards adventurist attacks on the U.S.S.R. and towards intervention, a tendency which will certainly grow owing to the development of the economic crisis.

The most striking expression of this tendency at the present time is present-day bourgeois France, the birthplace of the philanthropic "Pan-Europe" scheme,⁴¹ the "cradle" of the Kellogg Pact,⁴² the most aggressive and militarist of all the aggressive and militarist countries in the world.

But intervention is a two-edged sword. The bourgeoisie knows this perfectly well. It will be all right, it thinks, if intervention goes off smoothly and ends in the defeat of the U.S.S.R. But what if it ends in the defeat of the capitalists? There was intervention once and it ended in failure. If the first intervention, when the Bolsheviks were weak, ended in failure, what guarantee is there that the second will not end in failure too? Everybody sees that the Bolsheviks are far stronger now, both economically and politically, and as regards preparedness for the country's defence. And what about the workers in the capitalist countries, who will not permit intervention in the U.S.S.R., who will fight intervention and, if anything happens, may attack the capitalists in the rear? Would it not be better to proceed along the line of increasing trade

connections with the U.S.S.R., to which the Bolsheviki do not object?

Hence the tendency towards continuing peaceful relations with the U.S.S.R.

Thus, we have two sets of factors, and two different tendencies operating in opposite directions:

1. The policy of disrupting economic connections between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries; provocative attacks upon the U.S.S.R.; open and secret activities in preparation for intervention against the U.S.S.R. These are the factors that menace the U.S.S.R.'s international position. It is the operation of these factors that explains such facts as the rupture of relations with the U.S.S.R. by the British Conservative Cabinet; the seizure of the Chinese-Eastern Railway by the Chinese militarists; the financial blockade of the U.S.S.R.; the clerical "crusade," headed by the Pope, against the U.S.S.R.; the organisation by agents of foreign states of wrecking activities on the part of our specialists; the organisation of explosions and incendiarism, such as were carried out by certain employees of "Lena Gold-Fields"⁴³; attempts on the lives of representatives of the U.S.S.R. (Poland); finding fault with our exports (United States, Poland), and so forth.

2. Sympathy towards and support of the U.S.S.R. on the part of the workers in capitalist countries; growth of the economic and political might of the U.S.S.R.; increase in the U.S.S.R.'s defence capacity; the peace policy undeviatingly pursued by the Soviet government. These are the factors that strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s international position. It is the operation of these factors that explains such facts as the success-

ful settlement of the dispute over the Chinese-Eastern Railway, the restoration of relations with Britain, the growth of economic connections with capitalist countries, and so forth.

It is the conflict between these factors that determines the U.S.S.R.'s external situation.

b) It is said that the stumbling block to the improvement of economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the bourgeois states is the question of the debts. I think that this is not an argument in favour of paying the debts, but a pretext advanced by the aggressive elements for interventionist propaganda. Our policy in this field is clear and well-grounded. On condition that we are granted credits, we are willing to pay a small part of the pre-war debts, regarding them as additional interest on the credits. Without this condition we cannot and must not pay. Is more demanded of us? On what grounds? Is it not well-known that these debts were contracted by the tsarist government, which was overthrown by the Revolution, and for whose obligations the Soviet Government can take no responsibility? There is talk about international law, about international obligations. But on the grounds of what international law did Messieurs the "Allies" sever Bessarabia from the U.S.S.R. and hand it over to enslavement under the Rumanian boyars? On the grounds of what international obligations did the capitalists and governments of France, Britain, America and Japan attack the U.S.S.R., invade it, and for three whole years plunder it and ruin its inhabitants? If this is what is called international law and international obligations, then what will you call robbery? (*Laughter.*

Applause.) Is it not obvious that by committing these predatory acts Messieurs the "Allies" have deprived themselves of the right to appeal to international law, to international obligations?

It is said, further, that the establishment of "normal" relations is hindered by the propaganda conducted by the Russian Bolsheviki. With the object of preventing the pernicious effects of propaganda, Messieurs the bourgeois every now and again fence themselves off with "cordons" and "barbed-wire fences" and graciously bestow the honour of guarding these "fences" upon Poland, Rumania, Finland and others. It is said that Germany is burning with envy because she is not being permitted to guard the "cordons" and "barbed-wire fences." Does it need to be proved that the chatter about propaganda is no argument against establishing "normal relations," but a pretext for interventionist propaganda? How can people who do not want to appear ridiculous "fence themselves off" from the ideas of Bolshevism if in their own country there exists favourable soil for these ideas? Tsarism in its time also "fenced itself off" from Bolshevism, but, as is well known, the "fence" proved to be useless. It proved to be useless because Bolshevism everywhere does not penetrate from outside, but grows within the country. There are no countries, one would think, more "fenced-off" from the Russian Bolsheviki than China, India and Indo-China. But what do we find? Bolshevism is growing in those countries, and will continue to grow, in spite of all "cordons," because, evidently, there are conditions there that are favourable for Bolshevism. What has the propaganda of the Russian Bolsheviki to do with it?

If Messieurs the capitalists could somehow “fence themselves off” from the economic crisis, from mass poverty, from unemployment, from low wages and from the exploitation of labour, it would be another matter; then there would be no Bolshevik movement in their countries. But the whole point is that every rascal tries to justify his weakness or impotence by pleading Russian Bolshevik propaganda.

It is said, further, that another stumbling block is our Soviet system, collectivisation, the fight against the kulaks, anti-religious propaganda, the fight against wreckers and counter-revolutionaries among “men of science,” the banishment of the Besedovskys, Solomons, Dmitrievskys, and other lackeys of capital. But this is becoming quite amusing. It appears that they don’t like the Soviet system. But we don’t like the capitalist system. (*Laughter. Applause.*) We don’t like the fact that in their countries tens of millions of unemployed are compelled to suffer poverty and starvation, while a small group of capitalists own wealth amounting to billions. Since, however, we have agreed not to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, is it not obvious that it is not worth while reverting to this question? Collectivisation, the fight against the kulaks, the fight against wreckers, anti-religious propaganda, and so forth, are the inalienable right of the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R., sealed by our Constitution. We must and shall implement the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. with complete consistency. Naturally, therefore, whoever refuses to reckon with our Constitution can pass on, can go wherever he pleases. As for the Besedovskys, Solomons, Dmitrievskys

and so forth, we shall continue to throw out such people like defective goods that are useless and harmful for the Revolution. Let them be made heroes of by those who have a special predilection for offal. (*Laughter.*) The millstones of our Revolution grind exceedingly well. They take all that is useful and give it to the Soviets and cast aside the offal. It is said that in France, among the Parisian bourgeois, there is a big demand for these defective goods. Well, let them import them to their heart's content. True, this will overburden somewhat the import side of France's balance of trade, against which Messieurs the bourgeois always protest, but that is their business. Let us not intervene in the internal affairs of France. (*Laughter. Applause.*)

That is how the matter stands with the "obstacles" that hinder the establishment of "normal" relations between the U.S.S.R. and other countries.

It turns out that these "obstacles" are fictitious "obstacles" raised as a pretext for anti-Soviet propaganda.

Our policy is a policy of peace and of increasing trade connections with all countries. A result of this policy is an improvement in our relations with a number of countries and the conclusion of a number of agreements for trade, technical assistance, and so forth. Another result is the U.S.S.R.'s adherence to the Kellogg Pact, the signing of the well-known protocol along the lines of the Kellogg Pact with Poland, Rumania, Lithuania, and other countries, the signing of the protocol on the prolongation of the treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey. And lastly, a result of this policy is the fact that we have succeeded in main-

taining peace, in not allowing our enemies to draw us into conflicts, in spite of a number of provocative acts and adventurist attacks on the part of the warmongers. We shall continue to pursue this policy of peace with all our might and with all the means at our disposal. We do not want a single foot of foreign territory; but of our territory we shall not surrender a single inch to anyone. (*Applause.*)

Such is our foreign policy.

The task is to continue this policy with all the perseverance characteristic of Bolsheviks.

II

THE INCREASING ADVANCE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Let us pass to the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

In contrast to the capitalist countries, where an economic *crisis* and *growing unemployment* reign, the internal situation in our country presents a picture of *increasing advance* of the national economy and of *progressive diminution* of unemployment. Large-scale industry has grown up, and the rate of its development has increased. Heavy industry has become firmly established. The socialist sector of industry has made great headway. A new force has arisen in agriculture—the state farms and collective farms. Whereas a year or two ago we had a crisis in grain production, and in our grain-procurement operations we depended mainly on individual farming, now the centre of gravity has shifted to the collective farms and state farms, and the grain crisis can be regarded

as having been, in the main, solved. The main mass of the peasantry has definitely turned towards the collective farms. The resistance of the kulaks has been broken. The internal situation in the U.S.S.R. has been still further consolidated.

Such is the general picture of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. at the present time.

Let us examine the concrete facts.

1. THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AS A WHOLE

a) In 1926-27, i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, the gross output of *agriculture as a whole*, including forestry, fishing, etc., amounted in pre-war rubles to 12,370,000,000 rubles, i.e., 106.6 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, however, i.e., in 1927-28, it was 107.2 per cent, in 1928-29 it was 109.1 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, judging by the course of development of agriculture, it will be not less than 113-114 per cent of the pre-war level.

Thus we have a steady, although relatively slow, increase in agricultural production as a whole.

In 1926-27, i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, the gross output of *industry as a whole*, both small and large scale, including flour milling, amounted in pre-war rubles to 8,641,000,000 rubles, i.e., 102.5 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, however, i.e., in 1927-28, it was 122 per cent, in 1928-29 it was 142.5 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, judging by the course of industrial development, it will be not less than 180 per cent of the pre-war level.

Thus we have an unprecedentedly rapid growth of industry as a whole.

b) In 1926-27, i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, *freight turnover* on our entire *railway system* amounted to 81,700,000,000 ton-kilometres, i.e., 127 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, however, i.e., in 1927-28, it was 134.2 per cent, in 1928-29 it was 162.4 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, it, by all accounts, will be not less than 193 per cent of the pre-war level. As regards new railway construction, in the period under review, i.e., counting from 1927-28, the railway system has grown from 76,000 kilometres to 80,000 kilometres, which is 136.7 per cent of the pre-war level.

c) If we take the *trade turnover (wholesale and retail)* in the country in 1926-27 as 100 (31,000,000,000 rubles), then the volume of trade in 1927-28 shows an increase to 124.6 per cent, that in 1928-29 to 160.4 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, the volume of trade will, by all accounts, reach 202 per cent, i.e., double that of 1926-27.

d) If we take the *combined balances* of all our *credit institutions* on October 1, 1927 as 100 (9,173,000,000 rubles), then on October 1, 1928, there was an increase to 141 per cent, and on October 1, 1929, an increase to 201.1 per cent, i.e., an amount double that of 1927.

e) If the *combined state budget* for 1926-27 is taken as 100 (6,371,000,000 rubles) that for 1927-28 shows an increase to 125.5 per cent, that for 1928-29 an increase to 146.7 per cent, and that for 1929-30 to 204.4 per cent, i.e., double the budget for 1926-27 (12,605,000,000 rubles).

f) In 1926-27, our *foreign trade turnover* (exports and imports) was 47.9 per cent of the pre-war level. In 1927-28, however, our foreign trade turnover rose to 56.8 per cent, in 1928-29 to 67.9 per cent, and in 1929-30 it, by all accounts, will be not less than 80 per cent of the pre-war level.

g) As a result, we have the following picture of the growth of the total *national income* during the period under review (in 1926-27 prices): in 1926-27, the national income, according to the data of the State Planning Commission, amounted to 23,127,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28 it amounted to 25,396,000,000 rubles—an increase of 9.8 per cent; in 1928-29 it amounted to 28,596,000,000 rubles—an increase of 12.6 per cent; in 1929-30 the national income ought, by all accounts, to amount to not less than 34,000,000,000 rubles, thus showing an increase for the year of 20 per cent. The average annual increase during the three years under review is, therefore, over 15 per cent.

Bearing in mind that the average annual increase in the national income in countries like the United States, Britain and Germany amounts to no more than 3-8 per cent, it must be admitted that the rate of increase of the national income of the U.S.S.R. is truly a *record* one.

2. SUCCESSES IN INDUSTRIALISATION

Our national economy is growing not spontaneously, but in a definite direction, namely, in the direction of industrialisation; its keynote is: industrialisation, growth of the relative importance of industry in the general system of the national economy, transforma-

tion of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country.

a) The dynamics of the relation between industry as a whole and agriculture as a whole from the point of view of the relative importance of industry in the *gross* output of the entire national economy during the period under review takes the following form: in pre-war times, industry's share of the gross output of the national economy was 42.1 per cent and that of agriculture 57.9 per cent; in 1927-28 industry's share was 45.2 per cent and that of agriculture 54.8 per cent; in 1928-29, industry's share was 48.7 per cent and that of agriculture 51.3 per cent; in 1929-30 industry's share ought to, by all accounts, be not less than 53 per cent and that of agriculture not more than 47 per cent.

This means that the relative importance of industry is already beginning to surpass the relative importance of agriculture in the general system of national economy, and that we are on the eve of the transformation of our country from an *agrarian* into an *industrial* country. (*Applause.*)

b) There is a still more marked preponderance in favour of industry when regarded from the viewpoint of its relative importance in the *commodity* output of the national economy. In 1926-27, industry's share of the total commodity output of the national economy was 68.8 per cent and that of agriculture 31.2 per cent. In 1927-28, however, industry's share was 71.2 per cent and that of agriculture 28.8 per cent; in 1928-29 industry's share was 72.4 per cent and that of agriculture 27.6 per cent, and in 1929-30, industry's share will, by all accounts, be 76 per cent and that of agriculture 24 per cent.

This particularly unfavourable position of agriculture is due, among other things, to its character as small-peasant and small-commodity agriculture. Naturally, this situation should change to a certain extent as large-scale agriculture develops through the state farms and collective farms and produces more for the market.

c) The development of industry in general, however, does not give a complete picture of the rate of industrialisation. To obtain a complete picture we must also ascertain the dynamics of the relation between heavy industry and light industry. Hence, the most striking index of the growth of industrialisation must be considered to be the progressive growth of the relative importance of the output of *instruments and means of production* (heavy industry) in the total industrial output. In 1927-28, the share of output of instruments and means of production in the total output of *all* industry amounted to 27.2 per cent while that of the output of consumer goods was 72.8 per cent. In 1928-29, however, the share of the output of instruments and means of production amounted to 28.7 per cent as against 71.3 per cent, and in 1929-30, the share of the output of instruments and means of production, will, by all accounts, already amount to 32.7 per cent as against 67.3 per cent.

If, however, we take not all industry, but *only* that part which is planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy, and which embraces all the main branches of industry, the relation between the output of instruments and means of production and the output of consumer goods will present a still more favourable picture, namely: in 1927-28, the share of the output of instruments and means of production amounted to 42.7 per

cent as against 57.3 per cent; in 1928-29—44.6 per cent as against 55.4 per cent, and in 1929-30, it will, by all accounts, amount to not less than 48 per cent as against 52 per cent for the output of consumer goods.

The keynote of the development of our national economy is industrialisation, the strengthening and development of our own heavy industry.

This means that we have already established and are further developing our heavy industry, the basis of our economic independence

3. THE KEY POSITION OF SOCIALIST INDUSTRY AND ITS RATE OF GROWTH

The keynote of the development of our national economy is industrialisation. But we do not need just any kind of industrialisation. We need the kind of industrialisation that will ensure the growing preponderance of the *socialist forms of industry* over the *small-commodity* and, still more, over the *capitalist* forms of industry. The characteristic feature of our industrialisation is that it is *socialist* industrialisation, an industrialisation which guarantees the victory of the *socialised* sector of industry over the *private* sector, over the small-commodity and capitalist sector.

Here are some data on the growth of capital investments and of gross output according to sectors:

a) Taking the growth of *capital investments* in industry according to sectors, we get the following picture. *Socialised sector*: in 1926-27—1,270,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28—1,614,000,000 rubles; in 1928-29—2,046,000,000 rubles; in 1929-30—4,275,000,000 rubles. *Private and*

capitalist sector: in 1926-27—63,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28—64,000,000 rubles; in 1928-29—56,000,000 rubles; in 1929-30—51,000,000 rubles.

This means, firstly, that during this period capital investments in the socialised sector of industry have more than *trebled* (335 per cent).

It means, secondly, that during this period capital investments in the private and capitalist sector have been *reduced by one-fifth* (81 per cent).

The private and capitalist sector is living on its old capital and is moving towards its doom.

b) Taking the growth of *gross output* of industry according to sectors we get the following picture. *Socialised sector*: in 1926-27—11,999,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28—15,389,000,000 rubles, in 1928-29—18,903,000,000 rubles; in 1929-30—24,740,000,000 rubles. *Private and capitalist sector*: in 1926-27—4,043,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28—3,704,000,000 rubles; in 1928-29—3,389,000,000 rubles; in 1929-30—3,310,000,000 rubles.

This means, firstly, that during the three years, the gross output of the socialised sector of industry more than *doubled* (206.2 per cent).

It means, secondly, that in the same period the gross industrial output of the private and capitalist sector was *reduced by nearly one-fifth* (81.9 per cent).

If, however, we take the output not of all industry, but only of *large-scale* (statistically registered) industry and examine it according to sectors, we get the following picture of the relation between the socialised and private sectors. Relative importance of the socialised sector in the output of the country's large-scale industry: 1926-27 97.7 per cent; 1927-28—98.6 per cent; 1928-29—99.1

per cent; 1929-30—99.3 per cent. Relative importance of the private sector in the output of the country's large-scale industry: 1926-27—2.3 per cent; 1927-28—1.4 per cent; 1928-29—0.9 per cent; 1929-30—0.7 per cent.

As you see, the capitalist elements in large-scale industry have already gone to the bottom.

Clearly, the question "who will beat whom," the question whether socialism will defeat the capitalist elements in industry, or whether the latter will defeat socialism, has already been settled in favour of the socialist forms of industry. Settled finally and irrevocably. (*Applause.*)

c) Particularly interesting are the data on the *rate of development* during the period under review of *state* industry that is planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy. If the 1926-27 gross output of socialist industry planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy is taken as 100, the 1927-28 gross output of that industry shows a rise to 127.4 per cent, that of 1928-29 to 158.6 per cent and that of 1929-30 will show a rise to 209.8 per cent.

This means that socialist industry planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy, comprising all the main branches of industry and the whole of heavy industry, has *more than doubled* during the three years.

It cannot but be admitted that no other country in the world can show such a terrific rate of development of its large-scale industry.

This circumstance gives us grounds for speaking of the five-year plan in four years.

d) Some comrades are sceptical about the slogan "*the five-year plan in four years.*" Only very recently one

section of comrades regarded our five-year plan, which was endorsed by the Fifth Congress of Soviets,⁴⁴ as fantastic; not to mention the bourgeois writers whose eyes pop out of their heads at the very words "five-year plan." But what is the actual situation if we consider the fulfilment of the five-year plan during the first two years? What does checking the fulfilment of the optimal variant of the five-year plan tell us? It tells us not only that we can carry out the five-year plan in four years, it also tells us that in a number of branches of industry we can carry it out in three and even in two-and-a-half years. This may sound incredible to the sceptics in the opportunist camp, but it is a fact which it would be foolish and ridiculous to deny.

Judge for yourselves.

According to the five-year plan, the output of the *oil industry* in 1932-33 was to amount to 977,000,000 rubles. Actually, its output already in 1929-30 amounts to 809,000,000 rubles, i.e., 83 per cent of the amount fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the oil industry in a matter of two-and-a-half years.

The output of the *peat industry* in 1932-33, according to the five-year plan, was to amount to 122,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already its output amounts to over 115,000,000 rubles, i.e., 96 per cent of the output fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the peat industry in two-and-a-half years, if not sooner.

According to the five-year plan, the output of the *general machine-building industry* in 1932-33 was to amount to 2,058,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already

its output amounts to 1,458,000,000 rubles, i.e., 70 per cent of the output fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the general machine-building industry in two-and-a-half to three years.

According to the five-year plan, the output of the *agricultural machine-building industry* in 1932-33 was to amount to 610,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already its output amounts to 400,000,000 rubles, i.e., over 60 per cent of the amount fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the agricultural machine-building industry in three years, if not sooner.

According to the five-year plan, the output of the *electro-technical industry* in 1932-33 was to amount to 896,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already it amounts to 503,000,000 rubles, i.e., over 56 per cent of the amount fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the electro-technical industry in three years.

Such are the unprecedented rates of development of our socialist industries.

We are going forward at an accelerated pace, technically and economically overtaking the advanced capitalist countries.

e) This does not mean, of course, that we have already overtaken them as regards size of output, that our industry has already reached the *level* of the development of industry in the advanced capitalist countries. No, this is far from being the case. The *rate* of industrial development must not be confused with the *level* of industrial development. Many people in our

country confuse the two and believe that since we have achieved an unprecedented rate of industrial development we have thereby reached the level of industrial development of the advanced capitalist countries. But that is radically wrong.

Take, for example, the production of electricity, in regard to which our rate of development is very high. From 1924 to 1929 we achieved an increase in the output of electricity to nearly 600 per cent of the 1924 figure, whereas in the same period the output of electricity in the United States increased only to 181 per cent, in Canada to 218 per cent, in Germany to 241 per cent and in Italy to 222 per cent. As you see, our rate is truly unprecedented and exceeds that of all other states. But if we take the level of development of electricity production in those countries, in 1929, for example, and compare it with the level of development in the U.S.S.R., we shall get a picture that is far from comforting for the U.S.S.R. Notwithstanding the unprecedented rate of development of electricity production in the U.S.S.R., in 1929 output amounted to only 6,465,000,000 kilowatt-hours, whereas that of the United States amounted to 126,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours, Canada 17,628,000,000 kilowatt-hours, Germany 33,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours, and Italy 10,850,000,000 kilowatt-hours.

The difference, as you see, is colossal.

It follows, then, that as regards level of development we are behind all these states.

Or take, for example, our output of pig-iron. If our output of pig-iron for 1926-27 is taken as 100 (2,900,000 tons), the output for the three years from 1927-28 to 1929-30 shows an increase to almost *double*, to 190 per

cent (5,500,000 tons). The rate of development, as you see, is fairly high. But if we look at it from the point of view of the level of development of pig-iron production in our country and compare the size of the output in the U.S.S.R. with that in the advanced capitalist countries, the result is not very comforting. To begin with, we are reaching and shall exceed the pre-war level of pig-iron production only this year, 1929-30. This alone drives us to the inexorable conclusion that unless we still further accelerate the development of our metallurgical industry we run the risk of jeopardising our entire industrial production. As regards the level of development of the pig-iron industry in our country and in the West, we have the following picture: the output of pig-iron in 1929 in the United States amounted to 42,300,000 tons; in Germany—13,400,000 tons; in France—10,450,000 tons; in Great Britain—7,700,000 tons; but in the U.S.S.R. the output of pig-iron at the end of 1929-30 will amount to only 5,500,000 tons.

No small difference, as you see.

It follows, therefore, that as regards level of development of pig-iron production we are behind all these countries.

What does all this show?

It shows that:

1) the rate of development of industry *must not be confused* with its level of development;

2) we are damnably *behind* the advanced capitalist countries as regards level of development of industry;

3) only the *further acceleration* of the development of our industry will enable us to overtake and outstrip

the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically;

4) people who talk about the necessity of *reducing* the rate of development of our industry are enemies of socialism, agents of our class enemies. (*Applause.*)

4. AGRICULTURE AND THE GRAIN PROBLEM

Above I spoke about the state of agriculture as a whole, including forestry, fishing, etc., without dividing agriculture into its main branches. If we separate agriculture as a whole into its main branches, such as, for example, grain production, livestock farming and the production of industrial crops, the situation, according to the data of the State Planning Commission and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. is seen to be as follows:

a) If the *grain crop* area in 1913 is taken as 100, we get the following picture of the change of the grain crop area from year to year: 1926-27—96.9 per cent; 1927-28—94.7 per cent; 1928-29—98.2 per cent; and this year, 1929-30, the crop area will, by all accounts, be 105.1 per cent of the pre-war level.

Noticeable is the drop in the grain crop area in 1927-28. This drop is to be explained not by a retrogression of grain farming such as the ignoramuses in the Right opportunist camp have been chattering about, but by the failure of the winter crop on an area of 7,700,000 hectares (20 per cent of the winter crop area in the U.S.S.R.).

If, further, the *gross* output of grain in 1913 is taken as 100, we get the following picture: 1927—91.9 per cent; 1928—90.8 per cent; 1929—94.4 per cent, and in 1930

we shall, by all accounts, reach 110 per cent of the pre-war standard.

Noticeable here, too, is the drop in the gross output of grain in 1928 due to the failure of the winter crop in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus.

As regards the *marketable* part of the gross output of grain (grain sold outside the rural districts), we have a still more instructive picture. If the marketable part of the grain output of 1913 is taken as 100, then the marketable output in 1927 is found to be 37 per cent; in 1928—36.8 per cent, in 1929—58 per cent, and this year, 1930, it will, by all accounts, amount to not less than 73 per cent of the pre-war level.

Thus, it follows that, as regards grain crop area and gross grain output, we are reaching the pre-war level and slightly exceeding it only this year, 1930.

It follows, further, that, as regards the *marketable* part of the grain output, we are still far from having reached the pre-war standard and shall remain below it this year too by about 25 per cent.

That is the basis of our grain difficulties, which became particularly acute in 1928.

That, too, is the basis of the grain problem.

b) The picture is approximately the same, but with more alarming figures, in the sphere of *livestock farming*.

If the number of head of livestock of all kinds in 1916 is taken as 100, we get the following picture for the respective years. In 1927 the number of horses amounted to 88.9 per cent of the pre-war level; large horned cattle—114.3 per cent; sheep and goats—119.3 per cent; pigs—111.3 per cent. In 1928, horses—94.6 per cent;

large horned cattle—118.5 per cent; sheep and goats—126 per cent; pigs—126.1 per cent. In 1929, horses—96.9 per cent; large horned cattle—115.6 per cent; sheep and goats—127.8 per cent; pigs—103 per cent. In 1930, horses—88.6 per cent; large horned cattle—89.1 per cent; sheep and goats—87.1 per cent; pigs—60.1 per cent of the 1916 standard.

As you see, if we take the figures for the last year into consideration, we have obvious signs of the beginning of a decline in livestock farming.

The picture is still less comforting from the standpoint of the *marketable output* of livestock farming, particularly as regards meat and pork fat. If we take the gross output of meat and pork fat for each year as 100 the marketable output of these two items will be: in 1926—33.4 per cent; in 1927—32.9 per cent; in 1928—30.4 per cent; in 1929—29.2 per cent.

Thus, we have obvious signs of the instability and economic unreliability of small livestock farming which produces little for the market.

It follows that instead of exceeding the 1916 standard in livestock farming we have in the past year obvious signs of a drop below this standard.

Thus, after the grain problem, which we are already solving in the main successfully, we are faced with the meat problem, the acuteness of which is already making itself felt, and which is still awaiting solution.

c) A different picture is revealed by the development of *industrial* crops, which provide the raw materials for our light industry. If the industrial *crop area* in 1913 is taken as 100, we have the following: *cotton*, in 1927—107.1 per cent; in 1928—131.4 per cent; in 1929—151.4

per cent; in 1930—217 per cent of the pre-war level. *Flax*, in 1927—86.6 per cent; in 1928—95.7 per cent; in 1929—112.9 per cent; in 1930—125 per cent of the pre-war level. *Sugar-beet*, in 1927—106.6 per cent; in 1928—124.2 per cent; in 1929—125.8 per cent; in 1930—169 per cent of the pre-war level. *Oil crops*, in 1927—179.4 per cent; in 1928—230.9 per cent; in 1929—219.7 per cent; in 1930—no less than 260 per cent of the pre-war level.

The same, in the main, favourable picture is presented by the *gross output* of industrial crops. If the gross output in 1913 is taken as 100, we get the following: *cotton*, in 1928—110.5 per cent; in 1929—119 per cent; in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 182.8 per cent of the pre-war level. *Flax*, in 1928—71.6 per cent; in 1929—81.5 per cent; in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 101.3 per cent of the pre-war level. *Sugar-beet*, in 1928—93 per cent; in 1929—58 per cent, in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 139:4 per cent of the pre-war level. *Oil crops*, in 1928—161.9 per cent; in 1929—149.8 per cent; in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 220 per cent of the pre-war level.

As regards industrial crops, we thus have a more favourable picture, if we leave out of account the 1929 beet crop, which was damaged by moths.

Incidentally, here too, in the sphere of industrial crops, serious fluctuations and signs of instability are possible and probable in the future in view of the predominance of small farming, similar to the fluctuations and signs of instability that are demonstrated by the figures for flax and oil crops, which come least under the influence of the collective farms and state farms.

We are thus faced with the following problems in agriculture:

1) the problem of strengthening the position of industrial crops by supplying the districts concerned with sufficient quantities of cheap grain produce;

2) the problem of raising the level of livestock farming and of solving the meat question by supplying the districts concerned with sufficient quantities of cheap grain produce and fodder;

3) the problem of finally solving the question of grain farming as the chief question in agriculture at the present moment.

It follows that the grain problem is the main link in the system of agriculture and the key to the solution of all the other problems in agriculture.

It follows that the solution of the grain problem is the first in order of a number of problems in agriculture.

But solving the grain problem, and so putting agriculture on the road to really big progress, means completely doing away with the backwardness of agriculture; it means equipping it with tractors and agricultural machines, supplying it with new cadres of scientific workers, raising the productivity of labour, and increasing the output for the market. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, it is impossible even to dream of solving the grain problem.

Is it possible to fulfil all these conditions on the basis of small, individual peasant farming? No, it is impossible. It is impossible because small-peasant farming is unable to accept and master new technical equipment, it is unable to raise productivity of labour to a suf-

ficient degree, it is unable to increase the marketable output of agriculture to a sufficient degree. There is only one way to do this, namely, by developing *large-scale* agriculture, by establishing large farms with modern technical equipment.

The Soviet country cannot, however, take the line of organising large *capitalist* farms. It can and must take only the line of organising large farms of a *socialist* type, equipped with modern machines. Our *state farms* and *collective farms* are precisely farms of this type.

Hence the task of establishing state farms and uniting the small, individual peasant farms into large collective farms, as being the *only* way to solve the problem of agriculture in general, and the grain problem in particular.

That is the line the Party took in its everyday practical work after the Fifteenth Congress, especially after the serious grain difficulties that arose in the beginning of 1928.

It should be noted that our Party raised this fundamental problem as a practical task already at the Fifteenth Congress, when we were not yet experiencing serious grain difficulties. In the resolution of the Fifteenth Congress on "Work in the Countryside" it is plainly said:

"In the present period, the task of uniting and transforming the small, individual peasant farms into large collective farms must be made the Party's *principal task* in the countryside."⁴⁵

Perhaps it will not be superfluous also to quote the relevant passage from the Central Committee's report to the Fifteenth Congress in which the problem of doing

away with the backwardness of agriculture on the basis of collectivisation was just as sharply and definitely raised. Here is what was stated there:

“What is the way out? The way out is to turn the small and scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on cultivation of the land in common, to go over to collective cultivation of the land on the basis of a new and higher technique.

“The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms gradually but surely, *not by pressure, but by example and persuasion*, into large farms based on common, co-operative, collective cultivation of the land with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture.

*“There is no other way out.”*⁴⁶

5. THE TURN OF THE PEASANTRY TOWARDS SOCIALISM AND THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF STATE FARMS AND COLLECTIVE FARMS

The turn of the peasantry towards collectivisation did not begin all at once. Moreover, it could not begin all at once. True, the Party proclaimed the slogan of collectivisation already at the Fifteenth Congress; but the proclamation of a slogan is not enough to cause the peasantry to turn en masse towards socialism. At least one more circumstance is needed for this, namely, that the masses of the peasantry themselves should be convinced that the slogan proclaimed is a correct one and that they should accept it as their own. Therefore, this turn was prepared gradually.

It was prepared by the whole course of our development, by the whole course of development of our industry, and above all by the development of the industry that supplies machines and tractors for agriculture. It was prepared by the policy of resolutely fighting the kulaks

and by the course of our grain procurements in the new forms that they assumed in 1928 and 1929, which placed kulak farming under the control of the poor- and middle-peasant masses. It was prepared by the development of the agricultural co-operatives, which train the individual peasant in collective methods. It was prepared by the network of collective farms, in which the peasantry verified the advantages of collective forms of farming over individual farming. Lastly, it was prepared by the network of state farms, spread over the whole of the U.S.S.R. and equipped with modern machines, which enabled the peasants to convince themselves of the potency and superiority of modern machines.

It would be a mistake to regard our state farms only as sources of grain supplies. Actually, the state farms, with their modern machines, with the assistance they render the peasants in their vicinity, and the unprecedented scope of their farming were the leading force that facilitated the turn of the peasant masses and brought them on to the path of collectivisation.

There you have the basis on which arose that mass collective-farm movement of millions of poor and middle peasants which began in the latter half of 1929, and which ushered in a period of great change in the life of our country.

What measures did the Central Committee take so as to meet this movement fully equipped and to lead it?

The measures taken by the Central Committee were along three lines: the line of organising and financing state farms; the line of organising and financing collective farms; and lastly, the line of organising the manufacture of tractors and agricultural machinery and of

supplying the countryside with them through machine and tractor stations, through tractor columns, and so forth.

a) As early as 1928, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee adopted a decision to organise *new state farms* in the course of three or four years, calculating that by the end of this period these state farms could provide not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain. Later, this decision was endorsed by a plenum of the Central Committee. The Grain Trust was organised and entrusted with the task of carrying out this decision. Parallel with this, a decision was adopted to strengthen the *old state farms* and to enlarge their crop area. The State Farm Centre was organised and entrusted with the task of carrying out this decision.

I cannot help mentioning that these decisions met with a hostile reception from the opportunist section of our Party. There was talk about the money invested in the state farms being money “thrown away.” There was also criticism from men of “science,” supported by the opportunist elements in the Party, to the effect that it was impossible and senseless to organise large state farms. The Central Committee, however, continued to pursue its line and pursued it to the end in spite of everything.

In 1927-28, the sum of 65,700,000 rubles (not counting short-term credits for working capital) was assigned for financing the state farms. In 1928-29, the sum of 185,800,000 rubles was assigned. Lastly, this year 856,200,000 rubles have been assigned. During the period under review, 18,000 tractors with a total of 350,000 h.p. were placed at the disposal of the state farms.

What are the results of these measures?

In 1928-29, the *crop area* of the *Grain Trust* amounted to 150,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 1,060,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 4,500,000 hectares, in 1931-32 to 9,000,000 hectares, and in 1932-33, i.e., towards the end of the five-year plan period, to 14,000,000 hectares. In 1928-29 the crop area of the *State Farm Centre* amounted to 430,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 860,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 1,800,000 hectares, in 1931-32 to 2,000,000 hectares, and in 1932-33 to 2,500,000 hectares. In 1928-29, the crop area of the *Association of Ukrainian State Farms* amounted to 170,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 280,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 500,000 hectares and in 1932-33 to 720,000 hectares. In 1928-29, the crop area of the *Sugar Union* (grain crop) amounted to 780,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 820,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 860,000 hectares, in 1931-32 to 980,000 hectares, and in 1932-33 to 990,000 hectares.

This means, firstly, that at the end of the five-year plan period the grain crop area of the Grain Trust alone will be *as large* as that of the whole of the Argentine today. (*Applause.*)

It means, secondly, that at the end of the five-year plan period, the grain crop area of all the state farms together will be 1,000,000 hectares *larger* than that of the whole of Canada today. (*Applause.*)

As regards the *gross* and *marketable* grain output of the state farms, we have the following picture of the change year by year: in 1927-28, the gross output of all the state farms amounted to 9,500,000 centners, of which marketable grain amounted to 6,400,000 centners; in

1928-29—12,800,000 centners, of which marketable grain amounted to 7,900,000 centners; in 1929-30, we shall have, according to all accounts, 28,200,000 centners, of which marketable grain will amount to 18,000,000 centners (108,000,000 poods); in 1930-31 we shall have 71,700,000 centners, of which marketable grain will amount to 61,000,000 centners (370,000,000 poods), and so on and so forth.

Such are the existing and anticipated results of our Party's state-farm policy.

According to the decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of April 1928 on the organisation of new state farms, we ought to receive from the new state farms not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain in 1931-32. Actually, it turns out that in 1931-32 we shall already have from the new state farms alone more than 200,000,000 poods. That means the programme will have been fulfilled twice over.

It follows that the people who ridiculed the decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee fiercely ridiculed themselves.

According to the five-year plan endorsed by the Congress of Soviets, by the end of the five-year plan period the state farms controlled by all organisations were to have a total crop area of 5,000,000 hectares. Actually, this year the crop area of the state farms already amounts to 3,800,000 hectares, and next year, i.e., in the third year of the five-year period, their crop area will amount to 8,000,000 hectares.

This means that we shall fulfil and overfulfil the five-year programme of state-farm development in three years.

According to the five-year plan, by the end of the five-year period the gross grain output of the state farms was to amount to 54,300,000 centners. Actually, this year the gross grain output of the state farms already amounts to 28,200,000 centners, and next year it will amount to 71,700,000 centners.

This means that as regards gross grain output we shall fulfil and overfulfil the five-year plan in three years.

The five-year plan in three years!

Let the bourgeois scribes and their opportunist echoers chatter now about it being impossible to fulfil and overfulfil the five-year plan of state-farm development in three years.

b) As regards *collective-farm* development, we have an even more favourable picture.

As early as July 1928, a plenum of the Central Committee adopted the following decision on collective-farm development:

“Undeviatingly to carry out the task set by the Fifteenth Congress ‘to unite and transform the small, individual peasant farms into large collective farms,’ as *voluntary associations* organised on the basis of modern technology and representing a higher form of grain farming both as regards the socialist transformation of agriculture and as regards ensuring a radical increase in its productivity and marketable output” (see resolution of the July plenum of the Central committee on “Grain-Procurement Policy in Connection With the General Economic Situation,” 1928).⁴⁷

Later, this decision was endorsed in the resolutions of the Sixteenth Conference of the Party and in the special resolution of the November plenum of the Central

Committee, 1929, on the collective-farm movement.⁴⁸ In the latter half of 1929, when the radical turn of the peasants towards the collective farms had become evident and when the mass of the middle peasants were joining the collective farms, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee adopted the special decision of January 5, 1930 on "The Rate of Collectivisation and State Measures to Assist Collective-Farm Development."

In this resolution, the Central Committee:

1) placed on record the existence of a *mass turn of the peasantry* towards the collective farms and the possibility of overfulfilling the five-year plan of collective-farm development in the spring of 1930;

2) placed on record the existence of the material and other conditions necessary *for replacing kulak production by collective-farm production* and, in view of this, proclaimed the necessity of passing from the policy of restricting the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class;

3) laid down the prospect that already in the spring of 1930 the crop area cultivated on a socialised basis *would considerably exceed 30,000,000 hectares*;

4) divided the U.S.S.R. into three groups of districts and fixed *for each of them approximate dates* for the completion, in the main, of collectivisation;

5) *revised the land settlement method* in favour of the collective farms and the forms of financing agriculture, assigning for the collective farms in 1929-30 credits amounting to not less than 500,000,000 rubles;

6) defined the *artel form* of the collective-farm movement as the *main link in the collective-farm system* at the present time;

7) rebuffed the opportunist elements in the Party who were trying to retard the collective-farm movement on the plea of a shortage of machines and tractors;

8) lastly, warned Party workers against possible excesses in the collective-farm movement, and against the danger of decreeing collective-farm development from above, a danger that would involve the threat of playing at collectivisation taking the place of a genuine and mass collective-farm movement.

It must be observed that this decision of the Central Committee met with a more than unfriendly reception from the opportunist elements in our Party. There was talk and whispering about the Central Committee indulging in fantasies, about it "squandering" the people's money on "non-existent" collective farms. The Right-wing elements rubbed their hands in gleeful anticipation of "certain" failure. The Central Committee, however, steadfastly pursued its line and pursued it to the end in spite of everything, in spite of the philistine sniggering of the Rights, and in spite of the excesses and dizziness of the "Lefts."

In 1927-28, the sum of 76,000,000 rubles was assigned for financing the collective farms, in 1928-29—170,000,000 rubles, and, lastly, this year 473,000,000 rubles have been assigned. In addition, 65,000,000 rubles have been assigned for the collectivisation fund. Privileges have been accorded the collective farms which have increased their financial resources by 200,000,000 rubles. The collective farms have been supplied with confiscated kulak farm property to the value of over 400,000,000 rubles. There has been supplied for use on collective-farm fields not less than 30,000 tractors of a total of

400,000 h.p., not counting the 7,000 tractors of the Tractor Centre which serve the collective farms and the assistance in the way of tractors rendered the collective farms by the state farms. This year the collective farms have been granted seed loans and seed assistance amounting to 10,000,000 centners of grain (61,000,000 poods). Lastly, direct organisational assistance has been rendered the collective farms in the setting up of machine and horse stations to a number exceeding 7,000, in which the total number of horses available for use is not less than 1,300,000.

What are the results of these measures?

The crop area of the collective farms in 1927 amounted to 800,000 hectares, in 1928—1,400,000 hectares, in 1929—4,300,000 hectares, in 1930—not less than 36,000,000 hectares, counting both spring and winter crops.

This means, firstly, that in three years the crop area of the collective farms has grown more than forty-fold. (*Applause.*)

It means, secondly, that our collective farms now have a crop area *as large* as that of France and Italy put together. (*Applause.*)

As regards *gross* grain output and the part available for *the market*, we have the following picture. In 1927 we had from the collective farms 4,900,000 centners, of which marketable grain amounted to 2,000,000 centners; in 1928—8,400,000 centners, of which 3,600,000 centners was marketable grain; in 1929—29,100,000 centners, of which 12,700,000 centners was marketable grain; in 1930 we shall have, according to all accounts, 256,000,000 centners (1,550,000,000 poods), of which marketable grain

will amount to not less than 82,000,000 centners (over 500,000,000 poods).

It must be admitted that not a single branch of our industry, which, in general, is developing at quite a rapid rate, has shown such an unprecedented rate of progress as our collective-farm development.

What do all these figures show?

They show, first of all, that during three years the gross grain output of the collective farms has increased more than fifty-fold, and its marketable part more than forty-fold.

They show, secondly, that the possibility exists of our receiving from the collective farms this year *more than half* of the total marketable grain output of the country.

They show, thirdly, that henceforth, the fate of our agriculture and of its main problems will be determined not by the individual peasant farms, but by the collective farms and state farms.

They show, fourthly, that the process of eliminating the kulaks as a class in our country is going full steam ahead.

They show, lastly, that such economic changes have already taken place in the country as give us full grounds for asserting that we have succeeded in turning the countryside to the new path, to the path of collectivisation, thereby ensuring the successful building of socialism not only in the towns, but also in the countryside.

In its decision of January 5, 1930, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee laid down for the spring of 1930 a programme of 30,000,000 hectares of collective-farm crop area cultivated on a socialised basis.

Actually, we already have 36,000,000 hectares. Thus the Central Committee's programme has been overfulfilled.

It follows that the people who ridiculed the Central Committee's decision fiercely ridiculed themselves. Nor have the opportunist chatterboxes in our Party derived any benefit either from the petty-bourgeois elemental forces or from the excesses in the collective-farm movement.

According to the five-year plan, by the end of the five-year period we were to have a collective-farm crop area of 20,600,000 hectares. Actually, we have already this year a collective-farm crop area of 36,000,000 hectares.

This means that already in two years we shall have overfulfilled the five-year plan of collective-farm development by over fifty per cent. (*Applause.*)

According to the five-year plan, by the end of the five-year period we were to have a gross grain output from the collective farms amounting to 190,500,000 centners. Actually, already this year we shall have a gross grain output from the collective farms amounting to 256,000,000 centners.

This means that already in two years we shall have overfulfilled the five-year programme of collective-farm grain output by over 30 per cent.

The five-year plan in two years! (Applause.)

Let the opportunist gossips chatter now about it being impossible to fulfil and overfulfil the five-year plan of collective-farm development in two years.

6. THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS

It follows, therefore, that the progressive growth of the socialist sector in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture is a fact about which there cannot be the slightest doubt.

What can this signify from the point of view of the material conditions of the working people?

It signifies that, thereby, the foundations have already been laid for a radical improvement in the material and cultural conditions of the workers and peasants.

Why? How?

Because, firstly, the growth of the socialist sector signifies, above all, a diminution of the exploiting elements in town and country, a decline in their relative importance in the national economy. And this means that the workers' and peasants' share of the national income must inevitably increase owing to the reduction of the share of the exploiting classes.

Because, secondly, with the growth of the socialised (socialist) sector, the share of the national income that has hitherto gone to feed the exploiting classes and their hangers-on, is bound henceforth to remain in production, to be used for the expansion of production, for building new factories and mills, for improving the conditions of life of the working people. And this means that the working class is bound to grow in numbers and strength, and unemployment to diminish and disappear.

Because, lastly, the growth of the socialised sector, inasmuch as it leads to an improvement in the material conditions of the working class, signifies a progressive

increase in the capacity of the home market, an increase in the demand for manufactured goods on the part of the workers and peasants. And this means that the growth of the home market will outstrip the growth of industry and push it forward towards continuous expansion.

All these and similar circumstances are leading to a steady improvement in the material and cultural conditions of the workers and peasants.

a) Let us begin with the *numerical growth* of the working class and the *diminution of unemployment*.

In 1926-27, the number of wage-workers (not including unemployed) was 10,990,000. In 1927-28, however, we had 11,456,000, in 1928-29—11,997,000 and in 1929-30, we shall, by all accounts, have not less than 13,129,000. Of these, manual workers (including agricultural labourers and seasonal workers) numbered in 1926-27—7,069,000, in 1927-28—7,404,000, in 1928-29—7,758,000, in 1929-30—8,533,000. Of these, workers employed in large-scale industry (not including office employees) numbered in 1926-27—2,439,000, in 1927-28—2,632,000, in 1928-29—2,858,000, in 1929-30—3,029,000.

Thus, we have a picture of the progressive numerical growth of the working class; and whereas the number of wage-workers has increased 19.5 per cent during the three years and the number of manual workers 20.7 per cent, the number of industrial workers has increased 24.2 per cent.

Let us pass to the question of *unemployment*. It must be said that in this sphere considerable confusion reigns both at the People's Commissariat of Labour and at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

On the one hand, according to the data of these institutions we have about a million unemployed, of whom, those to any degree skilled constitute only 14.3 per cent, while about 73 per cent are those engaged in so-called intellectual labour and unskilled workers; the vast majority of the latter are women and young persons not connected with industrial production.

On the other hand, according to the same data, we are suffering from a frightful shortage of skilled labour, the labour exchanges are unable to meet about 80 per cent of the demands for labour by our factories and thus we are obliged hurriedly, literally as we go along, to train absolutely unskilled people and make skilled workers out of them in order to satisfy at least the minimum requirements of our factories.

Just try to find your way out of this confusion. It is clear, at all events, that these unemployed do not constitute a *reserve* and still less a *permanent* army of unemployed workers of our industry. Well? Even according to the data of the People's Commissariat of Labour it appears that in the recent period the number of unemployed has *diminished* compared with last year by over 700,000. This means that by May 1, this year, the number of unemployed had dropped by over 42 per cent.

There you have another result of the growth of the socialist sector of our national economy.

b) We get a still more striking result when we examine the matter from the point of view of the distribution of the national income according to classes. The question of the distribution of the national income according to classes is a fundamental one from the point of view of the material and cultural conditions of the

workers and peasants. It is not for nothing that the bourgeois economists of Germany, Britain and the United States try to confuse this question for the benefit of the bourgeoisie by publishing, every now and again, their "absolutely objective" investigations on this subject.

According to data of the German Statistical Board, in 1929 the share of wages in Germany's national income was 70 per cent, and the share of the bourgeoisie was 30 per cent. According to data of the Federal Trade Commission and the National Bureau of Economic Research, the workers' share of the national income of the United States in 1923 amounted to over 54 per cent and the capitalists' share to over 45 per cent. Lastly, according to data of the economists Bowley and Stamp, the share of the working class in Britain's national income in 1924 amounted to a little less than 50 per cent and the capitalists' share to a little over 50 per cent.

Naturally, the results of these investigations cannot be taken on trust. This is because, apart from faults of a purely economic order, these investigations have also another kind of fault, the object of which is partly to conceal the incomes of the capitalists and to minimise them, and partly to inflate and exaggerate the incomes of the working class by including in it officials who receive huge salaries. And this is apart from the fact that these investigations often do not take into account the incomes of farmers and of rural capitalists in general.

Comrade Varga has subjected these statistics to a critical analysis. Here is the result that he obtained. It appears that the share of the workers and of the working people generally in town and country, who do not ex-

exploit the labour of others, was in Germany 55 per cent of the national income, in the United States—54 per cent, in Britain—45 per cent; whereas the capitalists' share in Germany was 45 per cent, in the United States—46 per cent, and in Britain—55 per cent.

That is how the matter stands in the biggest capitalist countries.

How does it stand in the U.S.S.R.?

Here are the data of the State Planning Commission. It appears that:

a) The share of the *workers and working peasants, who do not exploit the labour of others*, constituted in our country, in 1927-28, 75.2 per cent of the total national income (including the share of urban and rural wage-workers—33.3 per cent); in 1928-29 it was 76.5 per cent (including the share of urban and rural wage-workers—33.2 per cent); in 1929-30 it was 77.1 per cent (including the share of urban and rural wage-workers—33.5 per cent).

b) The share of the *kulaks and urban capitalists* was in 1927-28—8.1 per cent; in 1928-29—6.5 per cent; in 1929-30—1.8 per cent.

c) The share of *handicraftsmen*, the majority of whom are working people, was in 1927-28—6.5 per cent; in 1928-29—5.4 per cent; in 1929-30—4.4 per cent.

d) The share of the *state sector*, the income of which is the income of the working class and of the working people generally, was in 1927-28—8.4 per cent; in 1928-29—10 per cent; in 1929-30—15.2 per cent.

e) Lastly, the share of the so-called *miscellaneous* (meaning pensions) was in 1927-28—1.8 per cent; in 1928-29—1.6 per cent; in 1929-30—1.5 per cent.

Thus, it follows that, whereas *in the advanced capitalist countries the share of the exploiting classes in the national income is about 50 per cent and even more, here, in the U.S.S.R., the share of the exploiting classes in the national income is not more than 2 per cent.*

This, properly speaking, explains the striking fact that in the United States in 1922, according to the American bourgeois writer *Denny* “one per cent of estate holders owned 59 per cent of the total wealth,” and in Britain, in 1920-21, according to the same *Denny*, “less than two per cent of the owners held 64 per cent of the total wealth” (see *Denny’s book America Conquers Britain*).

Can such things happen in our country, in the U.S.S.R., in the Land of Soviets? Obviously, they cannot. There have long been no “owners” of this kind in the U.S.S.R., nor can there be any.

But if in the U.S.S.R., in 1929-30, only about two per cent of the national income falls to the share of the exploiting classes, what happens to the rest, the bulk of the national income?

Obviously, it remains in the hands of the workers and working peasants.

There you have the source of the strength and prestige of the Soviet regime among the vast masses of the working class and peasantry.

There you have the basis of the systematic improvement in the material welfare of the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R.

f) In the light of these decisive facts, one can quite understand the systematic increase in the real wages of the workers, the increase in the workers’ social insurance budget, the increased assistance to poor- and middle-

peasant farms, the increased assignments for workers' housing, for the improvement of the workers' living conditions and for mother and child care, and, as a consequence, the progressive growth of the population of the U.S.S.R. and the decline in mortality, particularly in infant mortality.

It is known, for example, that the *real wages* of the workers, including social insurance and allocations from profits to the fund for improvement of the workers' living conditions, have risen to 167 per cent of the pre-war level. During the past three years, the workers' social insurance budget alone has grown from 980,000,000 rubles in 1927-28 to 1,400,000,000 rubles in 1929-30. The amount spent on mother and child care during the past three years (1927-28—1929-30) was 494,000,000 rubles. The amount spent on pre-school education (kindergartens, playgrounds, etc.) during the same period was 204,000,000 rubles. The amount spent on workers' housing was 1,880,000,000 rubles.

This does not mean, of course, that everything necessary for an important increase in real wages has already been done, that real wages could not have been raised to a higher level. If this has not been done, it is because of the bureaucracy in our supply organisations in general, and primarily and particularly because of the bureaucracy in the consumers' co-operatives. According to the data of the State Planning Commission, in 1929-30 the socialised sector of internal trade embraced over 99 per cent of wholesale trade and over 89 per cent of retail trade. This means that the co-operatives are systematically ousting the private sector and are becoming the monopolists in the sphere of trade. That, of course, is

good. What is bad, however, is that in a number of cases this monopoly operates to the detriment of the consumers. It appears, that in spite of the almost monopolist position they occupy in trade, the co-operatives prefer to supply the workers with more "paying" goods, which yield bigger profits (haberdashery, etc.), and avoid supplying them with less "paying," although more essential, goods for the workers (agricultural produce). As a result, the workers are obliged to satisfy about 25 per cent of their requirements for agricultural produce in the private market, paying higher prices. That is apart from the fact that the co-operative apparatus is concerned most of all with its balance and is therefore reluctant to reduce retail prices in spite of the categorical instructions of the leading centres. It follows, therefore, that in this case the co-operatives function not as a socialist sector, but as a peculiar sector that is infected with a sort of Nepman spirit. The question is, does anyone need co-operatives of this sort, and what benefit do the workers derive from their monopoly if they do not carry out the function of seriously raising the workers' real wages?

If, in spite of this, real wages in our country are steadily rising from year to year, it means that our social system, our system of distribution of the national income, and our entire wages policy, are such that they are able to neutralise and make up for all defects arising from the co-operatives.

If to this circumstance we add a number of other factors, such as the increase in the role of public catering, lower rents for workers, the vast number of stipends paid to workers and workers' children, cultural services, and so forth, we may boldly say that the percent-

age increase of workers' wages is much greater than is indicated in the statistics of some of our institutions.

All this taken together, plus the introduction of the seven-hour day for over 830,000 industrial workers (33.5 per cent), plus the introduction of the five-day week for over a million and a half industrial workers (63.4 per cent), plus the extensive network of rest homes, sanatoria and health resorts for workers, to which more than 1,700,000 workers have gone during the past three years—all this creates conditions of work and life for the working class that enable us to rear a new generation of workers who are healthy and vigorous, who are capable of raising the might of the Soviet country to the proper level and of protecting it with their lives from attacks by its enemies. (*Applause.*)

As regards assistance to the peasants, both individual and collective-farm peasants, and bearing in mind also assistance to poor peasants, this in the past three years (1927-28—1929-30) has amounted to a sum of not less than 4,000,000,000 rubles, provided in the shape of credits and assignments from the state budget. As is known, assistance in the shape of seeds alone has been granted the peasants during the past three years to the amount of not less than 154,000,000 poods.

It is not surprising that the workers and peasants in our country are living fairly well on the whole, that general mortality has dropped 36 per cent, and infant mortality 42.5 per cent, below the pre-war level, while the *annual increase* in population in our country is about three million. (*Applause.*)

As regards the cultural conditions of the workers and peasants, in this sphere too we have some achievements,

which, however, cannot under any circumstances satisfy us, as they are still small. Leaving out of account workers' clubs of all kinds, village reading rooms, libraries and abolition of illiteracy classes, which this year are being attended by 10,500,000 persons, the situation as regards cultural and educational matters is as follows. This year elementary schools are being attended by 11,638,000 pupils; secondary schools—1,945,000; industrial and technical, transport and agricultural schools and classes for training workers of ordinary skill—333,100; secondary technical and equivalent trade schools—238,700; colleges, general and technical—190,400. All this has enabled us to raise literacy in the U.S.S.R. to 62.6 per cent of the population, compared with 33 per cent in pre-war times.

The chief thing now is to pass to universal, compulsory elementary education. I say the "chief" thing, because this would be a decisive step in the cultural revolution. And it is high time we took this step, for we now possess all that is needed to organise compulsory, universal elementary education in all areas of the U.S.S.R.

Until now we have been obliged to "exercise economy in all things, even in schools" in order to "save, to restore heavy industry" (*Lenin*). During the recent period, however, we have already restored heavy industry and are developing it further. Hence, the time has arrived when we must set about fully achieving universal, compulsory elementary education.

I think that the congress will do the right thing if it adopts a definite and absolutely categorical decision on this matter. (*Applause.*)

7. DIFFICULTIES OF GROWTH, THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE OFFENSIVE OF SOCIALISM ALONG THE WHOLE FRONT

I have spoken about our achievements in developing our national economy. I have spoken about our achievements in industry, in agriculture, in reconstructing the whole of our national economy on the basis of socialism. Lastly, I have spoken about our achievements in improving the material conditions of the workers and peasants.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that we achieved all this “easily and quietly,” automatically, so to speak, without exceptional effort and exertion of willpower, without struggle and turmoil. Such achievements do not come about automatically. In fact, we achieved all this in a resolute struggle against difficulties, in a serious and prolonged struggle to surmount difficulties.

Everybody among us talks about difficulties, but not everybody realises the character of these difficulties. And yet the problem of difficulties is of serious importance for us.

What are the characteristic features of our difficulties, what hostile forces are hidden behind them, and how are we surmounting them?

a) When characterising our difficulties we must bear in mind at least the following circumstances.

First of all, we must take into account the circumstance that our present difficulties are difficulties of the *reconstruction* period. What does this mean? It means that they differ fundamentally from the difficulties of the *restoration* period of our economy. Whereas in the restoration period it was a matter of keeping the old

factories running and assisting agriculture on its old basis, today it is a matter of fundamentally rebuilding, reconstructing both industry and agriculture, altering their technical basis and providing them with modern technical equipment. It means that we are faced with the task of reconstructing the entire technical basis of our national economy. And this calls for new, more substantial investments in the national economy, for new and more experienced cadres, capable of mastering the new technology and of developing it further.

Secondly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that in our country the reconstruction of the national economy is not limited to rebuilding its technical basis, but that, on the contrary, parallel with this, it calls for the reconstruction of social-economic relationships. Here I have in mind, mainly, agriculture. In industry, which is already united and socialised, technical reconstruction already has, in the main, a ready-made social-economic basis. Here, the task of reconstruction is to accelerate the process of ousting the capitalist elements from industry. The matter is not so simple in agriculture. The reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture pursues, of course, the same aims. The specific feature of agriculture in our country, however, is that small-peasant farming still predominates in it, that small farming is unable to master the new technology and that, in view of this, the reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture is *impossible* without simultaneously reconstructing the old social-economic order, without uniting the small individual farms into large, collective farms, without tearing out the roots of capitalism in agriculture.

Naturally, these circumstances cannot but complicate our difficulties, cannot but complicate our work in surmounting these difficulties.

Thirdly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that our work for the socialist reconstruction of the national economy, since it breaks up the economic connections of capitalism and turns all the forces of the old world upside down, cannot but rouse the desperate resistance of these forces. Such is the case, as you know. The malicious wrecking activities of the top stratum of the *bourgeois intelligentsia* in all branches of our industry, the brutal struggle of the *kulaks* against collective forms of farming in the countryside, the sabotage of the Soviet government's measures by *bureaucratic elements* in the state apparatus, who are agents of our class enemy—such, so far, are the chief forms of the resistance of the moribund classes in our country. Obviously, these circumstances cannot facilitate our work of reconstructing the national economy.

Fourthly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that the resistance of the moribund classes in our country is not taking place in isolation from the outside world, but is receiving the support of the capitalist encirclement. Capitalist encirclement must not be regarded simply as a geographical concept. Capitalist encirclement means that the U.S.S.R. is surrounded by hostile class forces, which are ready to support our class enemies within the U.S.S.R. morally, materially, by means of a financial blockade and, if the opportunity offers, by military intervention. It has been proved that the wrecking activities of our specialists, the anti-Soviet activities of the *kulaks*, and the incendiarism and explosions at our

factories and installations are subsidised and inspired from abroad. The imperialist world is not interested in the U.S.S.R. standing up firmly and becoming able to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. Hence, the assistance it renders the forces of the old world in the U.S.S.R. Naturally, this circumstance, too, cannot serve to facilitate our work of reconstruction.

The characterisation of our difficulties will not be complete, however, if we fail to bear in mind one other circumstance. I am referring to the special character of our difficulties. I am referring to the fact that our difficulties are not difficulties of *decline*, or of *stagnation*, but difficulties of *growth*, difficulties of *ascent*, difficulties of *progress*. This means that our difficulties differ fundamentally from those encountered by the capitalist countries. When people in the United States talk about difficulties they have in mind difficulties due to *decline*, for America is now going through a crisis, i.e., economic decline. When people in Britain talk about difficulties they have in mind difficulties due to *stagnation*, for Britain, for a number of years already, has been experiencing stagnation, i.e., cessation of progress. When we speak about our difficulties, however, we have in mind not decline and not stagnation in development, but the *growth* of our forces, the *upswing* of our forces, the *progress* of our economy. How many points shall we *move further forward* by a given date? What per cent *more* goods shall we produce? How many million *more* hectares shall we sow? How many months *earlier* shall we erect a factory, a mill, a railway?—such are the questions that we have in mind when we speak of difficulties. Conse-

quently, our difficulties, unlike those encountered by, say, America or Britain, are difficulties of *growth*, difficulties of *progress*.

What does this signify? It signifies that our difficulties are such as *contain within themselves the possibility of surmounting them*. It signifies that the distinguishing feature of our difficulties is that *they themselves give us the basis for surmounting them*.

What follows from all this?

It follows from this, first of all, that our difficulties are not difficulties due to minor and accidental "derangements," but difficulties arising from the class struggle.

It follows from this, secondly, that behind our difficulties are hidden our class enemies, that these difficulties are complicated by the desperate resistance of the moribund classes in our country, by the support that these classes receive from abroad, by the existence of bureaucratic elements in our own institutions, by the existence of unsureness and conservatism among certain sections of our Party.

It follows from this, thirdly, that to surmount the difficulties it is necessary, first of all, to repulse the attacks of the capitalist elements, to crush their resistance and thereby clear the way for rapid progress.

It follows from this, lastly, that the very character of our difficulties, being difficulties of *growth*, creates the *possibilities* that we need for crushing our class enemies.

There is only one means, however, of taking advantage of these *possibilities* and of converting them into *reality*, of crushing the resistance of our class enemies and surmounting the difficulties, and that is to organise

an *offensive* against the capitalist elements *along the whole front* and to isolate the opportunist elements in our own ranks, who are hindering the offensive, who are rushing in panic from one side to another and sowing doubt in the Party about the possibility of victory. (*Applause.*)

There are no other means.

Only people who have lost their heads can seek a way out in Bukharin's childish formula about the capitalist elements peacefully growing into socialism. In our country development has not proceeded and is not proceeding according to Bukharin's formula. Development has proceeded, and is proceeding, according to Lenin's formula "who will beat whom." Either we vanquish and crush them, the exploiters, or they will vanquish and crush us, the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R.—that is how the question stands, comrades.

Thus, *the organisation of the offensive of socialism along the whole front*—that is the task that arose before us in developing our work of reconstructing the *entire* national economy.

That is precisely how the Party interpreted its mission in organising the offensive against the capitalist elements in our country.

b) But is an offensive, and an offensive along the whole front at that, permissible at all under the conditions of NEP?

Some think that an offensive is incompatible with NEP, that NEP is essentially a retreat, that, since the retreat has ended, NEP must be abolished. That is nonsense, of course. It is nonsense that emanates either from the Trotskyists, who have never understood anything

about Leninism and who think of “abolishing” NEP “in a trice,” or from the Right opportunists, who have also never understood anything about Leninism and think that by chattering about “the threat to abolish NEP” they can manage to secure the abandonment of the offensive. If NEP was nothing but a retreat, Lenin would not have said at the Eleventh Congress of the Party, when we were implementing NEP with the utmost consistency, that “the retreat has ended.” When Lenin said that the retreat had ended, did he not also say that we were thinking of carrying out NEP “in earnest and for a long time”? It is sufficient to put this question to understand the utter absurdity of the talk about NEP being incompatible with an offensive. In point of fact, NEP does not merely presuppose a *retreat* and permission for the revival of private trade, permission for the revival of capitalism while ensuring the regulating role of the state (the initial stage of NEP). In point of fact, NEP also presupposes, at a certain stage of development, the *offensive* of socialism against the capitalist elements, the *restriction* of the field of activity of private trade, the relative and absolute *diminution* of capitalism, the increasing *preponderance* of the socialised sector over the non-socialised sector, the victory of socialism over capitalism (the present stage of NEP). NEP was introduced to ensure the victory of socialism over the capitalist elements. In passing to the offensive along the whole front, we do not yet abolish NEP, for private trade and the capitalist elements still remain, “free” trade still remains—but we are certainly abolishing the initial stage of NEP, while developing its next stage, the present stage, which is the last stage of NEP.

Here is what Lenin said in 1922, a year after NEP was introduced:

“We are now retreating, going back as it were; but we are doing this in order, by retreating first, afterwards to take a run and make a more powerful leap forward. It was on this condition alone that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy. We do not yet know where and how we must now regroup, adapt and reorganise our forces in order to start a most persistent advance after our retreat. In order to carry out all these operations in proper order we must, as the says, measure not ten times, but a hundred times before we decide” (Vol. XXVII, pp. 361-62).

Clear, one would think.

But the question is: has the time already arrived to pass to the offensive, is the moment ripe for an offensive?

Lenin said in another passage in the same year, 1922, that it was necessary to:

“Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file toiling peasants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely, more slowly than we imagined, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually move forward with us” . . . that “if we do that we shall in time get such an acceleration of progress as we cannot dream of now” (Vol. XXVII, pp. 231-32).

And so the same question arises: has the time already arrived for such an acceleration of progress, for speeding up the rate of our development? Did we choose the right moment in passing to the decisive offensive along the whole front in the latter half of 1929?

To this question the Party has already given a clear and definite answer.

Yes, that moment had already arrived.

Yes, the Party chose the right moment to pass to the offensive along the whole front.

This is proved by the growing activity of the working class and by the unprecedented growth of the Party's prestige among the vast masses of the working people.

It is proved by the growing activity of the masses of the poor and middle peasants, and by the radical turn of these masses towards collective-farm development.

It is proved by our achievements both in the development of industry and in the development of state farms and collective farms.

It is proved by the fact that we are now in a position not only to replace kulak production by collective-farm and state-farm production, but to exceed the former several times over.

It is proved by the fact that we have already succeeded, in the main, in solving the grain problem and in accumulating definite grain reserves, by shifting the centre of the production of marketable grain from the sphere of individual production to that of collective-farm and state-farm production.

There you have the proof that the Party chose the right moment to pass to the offensive along the whole front and to proclaim the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class.

What would have happened had we heeded the Right opportunists of Bukharin's group, had we refrained from launching the offensive, had we slowed down the rate of development of industry, had we retarded the development of collective farms and state farms and had we based ourselves on individual peasant farming?

We should certainly have wrecked our industry, we should have ruined the socialist reconstruction of agriculture, we should have been left without bread and have

cleared the way for the predominance of the kulaks. We should have been as badly off as before.

What would have happened had we heeded the "Left" opportunists of the Trotsky-Zinoviev group and launched the offensive in 1926-27, when we had no possibility of replacing kulak production by collective-farm and state-farm production?

We should certainly have met with failure in this matter, we should have demonstrated our weakness, we should have strengthened the position of the kulaks and of the capitalist elements generally, we should have pushed the middle peasants into the embrace of the kulaks, we should have disrupted our socialist development and have been left without bread. We should have been as badly off as before.

The results would have been the same.

It is not for nothing that our workers say: "When you go to the 'left' you arrive on the right." (*Applause.*)

Some comrades think that the chief thing in the offensive of socialism is measures of repression, that if there is no increase of measures of repression there is no offensive.

Is that true? Of course, it is not true.

Measures of repression in the sphere of socialist construction are a necessary element of the offensive, but they are an auxiliary, not the chief element. The chief thing in the offensive of socialism under our present conditions is to speed up the rate of development of our industry, to speed up the rate of state-farm and collective-farm development, to speed up the rate of the economic ousting of the capitalist elements in town and country, to mobilise the masses around socialist construction, to

mobilise the masses against capitalism. You may arrest and deport tens and hundreds of thousands of kulaks, but if you do not at the same time do all that is necessary to speed up the development of the new forms of farming, to replace the old, capitalist forms of farming by the new forms, to undermine and abolish the production sources of the economic existence and development of the capitalist elements in the countryside—the kulaks will, nevertheless, revive and grow.

Others think that the offensive of socialism means advancing headlong, without proper preparation, without regrouping forces in the course of the offensive, without consolidating captured positions, without utilising reserves to develop successes, and that if signs have appeared of, say, an exodus of a section of the peasants from the collective farms it means that there is already the “ebb of the revolution,” the decline of the movement, the cessation of the offensive.

Is that true? Of course, it is not true.

Firstly, no offensive, even the most successful, can proceed without some breaches or incursions on individual sectors of the front. To argue, on these grounds, that the offensive has stopped, or has failed, means not to understand the essence of an offensive.

Secondly, there has never been, nor can there be, a *successful* offensive without regrouping forces in the course of the offensive itself, without consolidating captured positions, without utilising reserves for developing success and for carrying the offensive through to the end. Where there is a headlong advance, i.e., without observing these conditions, the offensive must inevitably peter out and fail. A headlong advance means

death to the offensive. This is proved by the wealth of experience of our Civil War.

Thirdly, how can an analogy be drawn between the "ebb of the revolution," which usually takes place on the basis of a *decline* of the movement, and the withdrawal of a section of the peasantry from the collective farms, which took place against a background of the continuing *upswing* of the movement, against a background of the continuing *upswing* of the whole of our socialist development, both industrial and collective-farm, against a background of the continuing *upswing* of our revolution? What can there be in common between these two totally different phenomena?

c) What is the essence of the Bolshevik offensive under our present conditions?

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, first and foremost, in mobilising the class vigilance and revolutionary activity of the masses against the capitalist elements in our country; in mobilising the creative initiative and independent activity of the masses against bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, which keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system and prevents them from being used; in organising emulation and labour enthusiasm among the masses for raising the productivity of labour, for developing socialist construction.

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, secondly, in organising the reconstruction of the entire practical work of the trade-union, co-operative, Soviet and all other mass organisations to fit the requirements of the reconstruction period; in creating in them a core of the most active and revolutionary functionaries, pushing aside

and isolating the opportunist, trade-unionist, bureaucratic elements; in expelling from them the alien and degenerate elements and promoting new cadres from the rank and file.

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, further, in mobilising the maximum funds for financing our industry, for financing our state farms and collective farms, in appointing the best people in our Party for developing all this work.

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, lastly, in mobilising the Party itself for organising the whole offensive; in strengthening and giving a sharp edge to the Party organisations, expelling elements of bureaucracy and degeneration from them; in isolating and thrusting aside those that express Right or "Left" deviations from the Leninist line and bringing to the fore genuine, staunch Leninists.

Such are the principles of the Bolshevik offensive at the present time.

How has the Party carried out this plan of the offensive?

You know that the Party has carried out this plan with the utmost consistency.

Matters started by the Party developing wide *self-criticism*, concentrating the attention of the masses upon shortcomings in our work of construction, upon shortcomings in our organisations and institutions. The need for intensifying self-criticism was proclaimed already at the Fifteenth Congress. The Shakhty affair and the wrecking activities in various branches of industry, which revealed the absence of revolutionary vigilance in some of the Party organisations, on the one hand, and the

struggle against the kulaks and the defects revealed in our rural organisations, on the other hand, gave a further impetus to self-criticism. In its appeal of June 2, 1928,⁴⁹ the Central Committee gave final shape to the campaign for self-criticism, calling upon all the forces of the Party and the working class to develop self-criticism “from top to bottom and from the bottom up,” “irrespective of persons.” Dissociating itself from the Trotskyist “criticism” emanating from the other side of the barricade and aiming at discrediting and weakening the Soviet regime, the Party proclaimed the task of self-criticism to be the ruthless exposure of shortcomings in our work for the purpose of *improving* our work of construction and *strengthening* the Soviet regime. As is known, the Party’s appeal met with a most lively response among the masses of the working class and peasantry.

Further, the Party organised a wide campaign for the struggle against *bureaucracy* and issued the slogan of *purging* the Party, trade-union, co-operative and Soviet organisations of alien and bureaucratised elements. A sequel to this campaign was the well-known decision of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of March 16, 1930, concerning the promotion of workers to posts in the state apparatus and the organisation of mass workers’ control of the Soviet apparatus (patronage by factories).⁵⁰ As is known, this campaign evoked tremendous enthusiasm and activity among the masses of the workers. The result of this campaign has been an immense increase in the Party’s prestige among the masses of the working people, an increase in the confidence of the working class in the Party, the influx into the Party of further hundreds of thousands of workers, and the

resolutions passed by workers expressing the desire to join the Party in whole shops and factories. Lastly, a result of this campaign has been that our organisations have got rid of a number of conservative and bureaucratic elements, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions has got rid of the old, opportunist leadership.

Further, the Party organised wide socialist *emulation* and mass *labour enthusiasm* in the factories and mills. The appeal of the Sixteenth Party Conference concerning emulation started the ball rolling. The shock brigades are pushing it on further. The Leninist Young Communist League and the working-class youth which it guides are crowning the cause of emulation and shock-brigade work with decisive successes. It must be admitted that our revolutionary youth have played an exceptional role in this matter. There can be no doubt now that one of the most important, if not the most important, factor in our work of construction at the present time is socialist emulation among factories and mills, the interchange of challenges of hundreds of thousands of workers on the results achieved in emulation, the wide development of *shock-brigade work*.

Only the blind fail to see that a tremendous change has taken place in the mentality of the masses and in their attitude to work, a change which has radically altered the appearance of our mills and factories. Not so long ago voices were still heard among us saying that emulation and shock-brigade work were "artificial inventions," and "unsound." Today, these "sages" do not even provoke ridicule, they are regarded simply as "sages" who have outlived their time. The cause of emulation and shock-brigade work is now a cause that has been won

and consolidated. It is a fact that over two million of our workers are engaged in emulation, and that not less than a million workers belong to shock brigades.

The most remarkable feature of emulation is the radical revolution it brings about in people's views of labour, for it transforms labour from a degrading and heavy burden, as it was considered before, into a matter of *honour*, a matter of *glory*, a matter of *valour* and *heroism*. There is not, nor can there be, anything of the sort in capitalist countries. There, among the capitalists, the most desirable thing, deserving of public approval, is to be a bondholder, to live on interest, not to have to work, which is regarded as a contemptible occupation. Here, in the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, what is becoming the most desirable thing, deserving of public approval, is the possibility of being a hero of labour, the possibility of being a hero in shock-brigade work, surrounded with an aureole of esteem among millions of working people.

A no less remarkable feature of emulation is the fact that it is beginning to spread also in the countryside, having already spread to our state farms and collective farms. Everybody is aware of the numerous cases of genuine labour enthusiasm being displayed by the vast masses of state-farm workers and collective farmers.

Who could have dreamed of such successes in emulation and shock-brigade work a couple of years ago?

Further, the Party mobilised the country's financial resources for the purpose of developing state farms and collective farms, supplied the state farms with the best organisers, sent 25,000 front-rank workers to assist the collective farms, promoted the best people among the

collective-farm peasants to leading posts in the collective farms and organised a network of training classes for collective farmers, thereby laying the foundation for the training of staunch and tried cadres for the collective-farm movement

Lastly, the Party re-formed its own ranks in battle order, re-equipped the press, organised the struggle on two fronts, routed the remnants of Trotskyism, utterly defeated the Right deviators, isolated the conciliators, and thereby ensured the unity of its ranks on the basis of the Leninist line, which is essential for a successful offensive, and properly led this offensive, pulling up and putting in their place both the gradualists of the camp of the Rights and the "Left" distorters in regard to the collective-farm movement.

Such are the principal measures that the Party carried out in conducting the offensive along the whole front.

Everybody knows that this offensive has been crowned with success in all spheres of our work.

That is why we have succeeded in surmounting a whole number of difficulties of the period of reconstruction of our national economy.

That is why we are succeeding in surmounting the greatest difficulty in our development, the difficulty of turning the main mass of the peasantry towards socialism.

Foreigners sometimes ask about the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. But can there be any doubt that the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. is firm and unshakable? Look at the capitalist countries, at the growing crisis and unemployment in those countries, at the

strikes and lockouts, at the anti-government demonstrations—what comparison can there be between the internal situation in those countries and the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.?

It must be admitted that the Soviet regime is now the most stable of all the regimes in the world. (*Applause.*)

8. THE CAPITALIST OR THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM OF ECONOMY

Thus, we have the picture of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

We also have the picture of the internal situation in the chief capitalist countries.

The question involuntarily arises: What is the result if we place the two pictures side by side and compare them?

This question is all the more interesting for the reason that the bourgeois leaders in all countries and the bourgeois press of all degrees and ranks, from the arrant capitalist to the Menshevik-Trotskyist, are all shouting with one accord about the “prosperity” of the capitalist countries, about the “doom” of the U.S.S.R., about the “financial and economic bankruptcy” of the U.S.S.R., and so forth.

And so, what is the result of the analysis of the situation in our country, the U.S.S.R., and over there, in the capitalist countries?

Let us note the main, generally known facts.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is economic *crisis* and a *decline* in production, both in industry and in agriculture.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is an economic *upswing* and *rising* production in all spheres of the national economy.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is *deterioration* of the material conditions of the working people, *reduction* of wages and *increasing* unemployment.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is *improvement* in the material conditions of the working people, *rising* wages and *diminishing* unemployment.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there are *increasing* strikes and demonstrations, which lead to the *loss* of millions of work-days.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there are no strikes, but *rising* labour enthusiasm among the workers and peasants, by which our social system *gains* millions of additional work-days.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is *increasing tension* in the internal situation and *growth* of the revolutionary working-class movement against the capitalist regime.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is *consolidation* of the internal situation and the vast masses of the working class are *united* around the Soviet regime.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is *growing acuteness* of the national question and *growth* of the national-liberation movement in India, Indo-China, Indonesia, in the Philippines, etc., developing into *national war*.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., the foundations of national fraternity have been *strengthened*, *peace* among the nations is ensured and the vast masses of the people in the U.S.S.R. are *united* around the Soviet regime.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is *confusion* and the prospect of further *deterioration* of the situation.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is *confidence in our strength* and the prospect of further *improvement* in the situation.

They chatter about the “doom” of the U.S.S.R., about the “prosperity” of the capitalist countries, and so forth. Would it not be more correct to speak about the inevitable doom of those who have so “unexpectedly” fallen into the maelstrom of economic crisis and to this day are unable to extricate themselves from the slough of despond?

What are the causes of such a grave *collapse* over there, in the capitalist countries, and of the important *successes* here, in the U.S.S.R.?

It is said that the state of the national economy depends in a large measure upon the abundance or dearth of capital. That, of course, is true! But can the crisis in the capitalist countries and the upswing in the U.S.S.R. be explained by abundance of capital here and a dearth of capital over there? No, of course not. Everybody knows that there is much less capital in the U.S.S.R. than there is in the capitalist countries. If matters were *decided* in the present instance by the state of accumulation, there would be a crisis here and a boom in the capitalist countries.

It is said that the state of economy depends in a large measure on the technical and organising experience of the economic cadres. That, of course, is true. But can the crisis in the capitalist countries and the upswing in the U.S.S.R. be explained by the dearth of technical

cadres over there and to an abundance of them here? No, of course not! Everybody knows that there are far more technically experienced cadres in the capitalist countries than there are here, in the U.S.S.R. We have never concealed, and do not intend to conceal, that in the sphere of technology we are the pupils of the Germans, the British, the French, the Italians, and, first and foremost, of the Americans. No, matters are not decided by the abundance or dearth of technically experienced cadres, although the problem of cadres is of great importance for the development of the national economy.

Perhaps the answer to the riddle is that the cultural level is higher in our country than in the capitalist countries? Again, no. Everybody knows that the general cultural level of the masses is lower in our country than in the United States, Britain or Germany. No, it is not a matter of the cultural level of the masses, although this is of enormous importance for the development of the national economy.

Perhaps the cause lies in the personal qualities of the leaders of the capitalist countries? Again, no. Crises were born together with the advent of the rule of capitalism. For over a hundred years already there have been periodical economic crises of capitalism, recurring every 12, 10, 8 or fewer years. All the capitalist parties, all the more or less prominent capitalist leaders, from the greatest "genuises" to the greatest mediocrities, have tried their hand at "preventing" or "abolishing" crises. But they have all suffered defeat. Is it surprising that Hoover and his group have also suffered defeat? No, it is not a matter of the capitalist leaders

or parties, although both the capitalist leaders and parties are of no little importance in this matter.

What is the cause, then?

What is the cause of the fact that the U.S.S.R., despite its cultural backwardness, despite the dearth of capital, despite the dearth of technically experienced economic cadres, is in a state of increasing economic *upswing* and has achieved decisive *successes* on the front of economic construction, whereas the advanced capitalist countries, despite their abundance of capital, their abundance of technical cadres and their higher cultural level, are in a state of growing economic *crisis* and in the sphere of economic development are suffering *defeat after defeat*?

The cause lies in the *difference* in the economic *systems* here and in the capitalist countries.

The cause lies in the *bankruptcy* of the capitalist system of economy.

The cause lies in the *advantages* of the Soviet system of economy over the capitalist system.

What is the Soviet system of economy?

The Soviet system of economy means that:

1) the power of the class of capitalists and landlords has been overthrown and replaced by the power of the working class and labouring peasantry;

2) the instruments and means of production, the land, factories, mills, etc., have been taken from the capitalists and transferred to the ownership of the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry;

3) the development of production is subordinated not to the principle of competition and of ensuring capitalist profit, but to the principle of planned guidance and

of systematically raising the material and cultural level of the working people;

4) the distribution of the national income takes place not with a view to enriching the exploiting classes and their numerous parasitical hangers-on, but with a view to ensuring the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the workers and peasants and the expansion of socialist production in town and country;

5) the systematic improvement in the material conditions of the working people and the continuous increase in their requirements (purchasing power), being a constantly increasing source of the expansion of production, guarantees the working people against crises of overproduction, growth of unemployment and poverty;

6) the working class and the labouring peasantry are the masters of the country, working not for the benefit of capitalists, but for their own benefit, the benefit of the working people.

What is the capitalist system of economy?

The capitalist system of economy means that:

1) power in the country is in the hands of the capitalists;

2) the instruments and means of production are concentrated in the hands of the exploiters;

3) production is subordinated not to the principle of improving the material conditions of the masses of the working people, but to the principle of ensuring high capitalist profit;

4) the distribution of the national income takes place not with a view to improving the material conditions of the working people, but with a view to ensuring the maximum profits for the exploiters;

5) capitalist rationalisation and the rapid *growth* of production, the object of which is to ensure high profits for the capitalists, encounters an obstacle in the shape of the poverty-stricken conditions and the *decline* in the material security of the vast masses of the working people, who are not always able to satisfy their needs even within the limits of the extreme minimum, which inevitably creates the basis for unavoidable crises of overproduction, growth of unemployment, mass poverty;

6) the working class and the labouring peasantry are exploited, they work not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of an alien class, the exploiting class.

Such are the advantages of the *Soviet* system of economy over the *capitalist* system.

Such are the advantages of the *socialist* organisation of economy over the *capitalist* organisation.

That is why here, in the U.S.S.R., we have an increasing economic upswing, whereas in the capitalist countries there is growing economic crisis.

That is why here, in the U.S.S.R., the increase of mass consumption (purchasing power) continuously outstrips the growth of production and pushes it forward, whereas over there, in the capitalist countries, on the contrary, the increase of mass consumption (purchasing power) never keeps pace with the growth of production and continuously lags behind it, thus dooming industry to crises from time to time.

That is why over there, in the capitalist countries, it is considered quite a normal thing during crises to destroy "superfluous" goods and to burn "superfluous" agricultural produce in order to bolster up prices and

ensure high profits, whereas here, in the U.S.S.R., anybody guilty of such crimes would be sent to a lunatic asylum. (*Applause.*)

That is why over there, in the capitalist countries, the workers go on strike and demonstrate, organising a revolutionary struggle against the existing capitalist regime, whereas here, in the U.S.S.R., we have the picture of great labour emulation among millions of workers and peasants who are ready to defend the Soviet regime with their lives.

That is the cause of the stability and security of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. and of the instability and insecurity of the internal situation in the capitalist countries.

It must be admitted that a system of economy that does not know what to do with its "superfluous" goods and is obliged to burn them at a time when want and unemployment, hunger and ruin reign among the masses—such a system of economy pronounces its own death sentence.

The recent years have been a period of practical test, an examination period of the two opposite systems of economy, the Soviet and capitalist. During these years we have heard more than enough prophesies of the "doom," of the "downfall" of the Soviet system. There has been even more talk and singing about the "prosperity" of capitalism. And what has happened? These years have proved once again that the capitalist system of economy is a *bankrupt* system, and that the Soviet system of economy possesses *advantages* of which not a single bourgeois state, even the most "democratic," most "popular," etc., dares to dream.

In his speech at the conference of the R.C.P.(B.) in May 1921, Lenin said:

“At the present time we are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers in all countries of the world without exception and without exaggeration. This we have achieved. The capitalists cannot hush up, conceal, anything, that is why they most of all seize upon our economic mistakes and our weakness. That is the field to which the struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we solve this problem, we shall have won on an international scale surely and finally” (Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11).

It must be admitted that our Party is successfully carrying out the task set by Lenin.

9. THE NEXT TASKS

a) General

1) First of all there is the problem *of the proper distribution of industry throughout the U.S.S.R.* However much we may develop our national economy, we cannot avoid the question of how properly to distribute industry, which is the leading branch of the national economy. The situation at present is that our industry, like the whole of our national economy, rests, in the main, on the coal and metallurgical base in the Ukraine. Naturally, without such a base, the industrialisation of the country is inconceivable. Well, the Ukraine fuel and metallurgical base serves us as such a base.

But can this one base satisfy in future the south, the central part of the U.S.S.R., the north, the north-east, the Far East and Turkestan? All the facts go to

show that it cannot. The new feature of the development of our national economy is, among other things, that this base has already become inadequate for us. The new feature is that, while continuing to develop this base to the utmost, we must begin immediately to create a second coal and metallurgical base. This base must be the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, the combination of Kuznetsk coking coal with the ore of the Urals. (*Applause.*) The construction of the automobile works in Nizhni-Novgorod, the tractor works in Chelyabinsk, the machine-building works in Sverdlovsk, the harvester-combine works in Saratov and Novosibirsk; the existence of the growing non-ferrous metal industry in Siberia and Kazakhstan, which calls for the creation of a network of repair shops and a number of major metallurgical factories in the east; and, lastly, the decision to erect textile mills in Novosibirsk and Turkestan—all this imperatively demands that we should proceed immediately to create a second coal and metallurgical base in the Urals.

You know that the Central Committee of our Party expressed itself precisely in this spirit in its resolution on the Urals Metal Trust.⁵¹

2) Further, there is the problem of *the proper distribution of the basic branches of agriculture throughout the U.S.S.R., the problem of our regions specialising in particular agricultural crops and branches of agriculture.* Naturally, with small-peasant farming real specialisation is impossible. It is impossible because small farming being unstable and lacking the necessary reserves, each farm is obliged to grow all kinds of crops so that in the event of one crop failing it can keep going with the others. Naturally, too, it is impossible to organise

specialisation unless the state possesses certain reserves of grain. Now that we have passed over to large-scale farming and ensured that the state possesses reserves of grain, we can and must set ourselves the task of properly organising specialisation according to crops and branches of agriculture. The starting point for this is the complete solution of the grain problem. I say "starting point," because unless the grain problem is solved, unless a large network of granaries is set up in the livestock, cotton, sugar-beet, flax and tobacco districts, it will be impossible to promote livestock farming and industrial crop cultivation, it will be impossible to organise the specialisation of our regions according to crops and branches of agriculture.

The task is to take advantage of the possibilities that have opened up and to push this matter forward.

3) Next comes the problem of *cadres* both for industry and for agriculture. Everybody is aware of the lack of technical experience of our economic cadres, of our specialists, technicians and business executives. The matter is complicated by the fact that a section of the specialists, having connections with former owners and prompted from abroad, was found to be at the head of the wrecking activities. The matter is still more complicated by the fact that a number of our communist business executives failed to display revolutionary vigilance and in many cases proved to be under the ideological influence of the wrecker elements. Yet, we are faced with the colossal task of reconstructing the whole of our national economy, for which a large number of new cadres capable of mastering the new technology is needed.

In view of this, the problem of cadres has become a truly vital problem for us.

This problem is being solved by measures along the following lines:

- 1) resolute struggle against wreckers;
- 2) maximum care and consideration for the vast majority of specialists and technicians who have dissociated themselves from the wreckers (I have in mind not windbags and poseurs of the Ustryalov type, but the genuine scientific workers who are working honestly, hand in hand with the working class);
- 3) the organisation of technical aid from abroad;
- 4) sending our business executives abroad to study and generally to acquire technical experience;
- 5) transferring technical colleges to the respective economic organisations with a view to training quickly a sufficient number of technicians and specialists from people of working-class and peasant origin.

The task is to develop work for the realisation of these measures.

4) The problem of *combating bureaucracy*. The danger of bureaucracy lies, first of all, in that it keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system and prevents them from being utilised, in that it strives to nullify the creative initiative of the masses, ties it hand and foot with red tape and reduces every new undertaking by the Party to petty and useless trivialities. The danger of bureaucracy lies, secondly, in that it does not tolerate *the checking of fulfilment* and strives to convert the basic directives of the leading organisations into mere sheets of paper divorced from life. It is not only, and not so much, the old bureaucrats stranded

in our institutions who constitute this danger; it is also, and particularly, the new bureaucrats, the Soviet bureaucrats; and the "Communist" bureaucrats are by no means the least among them. I have in mind those "Communists" who try to substitute bureaucratic orders and "decrees," in the potency of which they believe as in a fetish, for the creative initiative and independent activity of the vast masses of the working class and peasantry.

The task is to smash bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, to get rid of bureaucratic "habits" and "customs" and to clear the way for utilising the reserves of our social system, for developing the creative initiative and independent activity of the masses.

That is not an easy task. It cannot be carried out "in a trice." But it must be carried out at all costs if we really want to transform our country on the basis of socialism.

In the struggle against bureaucracy, the Party is working along four lines: that of developing *self-criticism*, that of organising the *checking of fulfilment*, that of *purging* the apparatus and, lastly, that of *promoting* from below to posts in the apparatus devoted workers from those of working-class origin.

The task is to exert every effort to carry out all these measures.

5) The problem of increasing the *productivity of labour*. If there is not a systematic increase in the productivity of labour both in industry and agriculture we shall not be able to carry out the tasks of reconstruction, we shall not only fail to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries, but we shall not even be able to

maintain our independent existence. Hence, the problem of increasing the productivity of labour is of prime importance for us.

The Party's measures for solving this problem are along three lines: that of systematically *improving the material conditions* of the working people, that of implanting *comradely labour discipline* in industrial and agricultural enterprises, and lastly, that of organising *socialist emulation* and *shock-brigade work*. All this is based on improved technology and the rational organisation of labour.

The task is to further develop the mass campaign for carrying out these measures.

6) The problem of *supplies*. This includes the questions of *adequate supplies* of necessary produce for the working people in town and country, of adapting the *co-operative apparatus* to the needs of the workers and peasants, of systematically raising the *real wages* of the workers, of *reducing prices* of manufactured goods and agricultural produce. I have already spoken about the shortcomings of the consumers' co-operatives. These shortcomings must be eliminated and we must see to it that the *policy of reducing prices* is carried out. As regards the inadequate supply of goods (the "goods shortage"), we are now in a position to enlarge the raw materials base of light industry and increase the output of urban consumer goods. The bread supply can be regarded as already assured. The situation is more difficult as regards the supply of meat, dairy produce and vegetables. Unfortunately, this difficulty cannot be removed within a few months. To overcome it will require at least a year. In a year's time, thanks primarily to the

organisation of state farms and collective farms for this purpose, we shall be in a position to ensure full supplies of meat, dairy produce and vegetables. And what does controlling the supply of these products mean when we already have grain reserves, textiles, increased housing construction for workers and cheap municipal services? It means controlling all the principal factors that determine the worker's budget and his real wages. It means guaranteeing the rapid rise of workers' real wages surely and finally.

The task is to develop the work of all our organisations in this direction.

7) The problem of *credits* and *currency*. The rational organisation of credit and correct manoeuvring with our financial reserves are of great importance for the development of the national economy. The Party's measures for solving this problem are along two lines: that of concentrating all short-term credit operations in the State Bank, and that of organising non-cash settlement of accounts in the socialised sector. This, firstly, transforms the State Bank into a nation-wide apparatus for keeping account of the production and distribution of goods; and, secondly, it withdraws a large amount of currency from circulation. There cannot be the slightest doubt that these measures will introduce (are already introducing) order in the entire credit system and strengthen our chervonets.

8) The problem of *reserves*. It has already been stated several times, and there is no need to repeat it, that a state in general, and our state in particular, cannot do without reserves. We have some reserves of grain, goods and foreign currency. During this period our comrades

have been able to feel the beneficial effects of these reserves. But "some" reserves is not enough. We need bigger reserves in every direction.

Hence, the task is to accumulate reserves.

b) Industry

1) The chief problem is to force the development of the *iron and steel industry*. You must bear in mind that we have reached and are exceeding the pre-war level of pig-iron output only this year, in 1929-30. This is a serious threat to the whole of our national economy. To remove this threat we must force the development of the iron and steel industry. By the end of the five-year period we must reach an output not of 10,000,000 tons as is laid down in the five-year plan, but of 15-17 million tons. We must achieve this aim at all costs if we want really to develop the work of industrialising our country.

Bolsheviks must show that they are able to cope with this task.

That does not mean, of course, that we must abandon *light* industry. No, it does not mean that. Until now we have been economising in all things, including light industry, in order to restore heavy industry. But we have already restored heavy industry. Now it only needs to be developed further. Now we can turn to light industry and push it forward at an accelerated pace. One of the new features in the development of our industry is that we are now in a position to develop both heavy and light industry at an accelerated pace. The overfulfilment of the cotton, flax and sugar-beet crop plans this

year, and the solution of the problem of kendyr and artificial silk, all this shows that we are in a position really to push forward light industry.

2) The problem of *rationalisation, reducing production costs and improving the quality* of production. We can no longer tolerate defects in the sphere of rationalisation, non-fulfilment of the plan to reduce production costs and the outrageous quality of the goods turned out by a number of our enterprises. These gaps and defects are harmfully affecting the whole of our national economy and hindering it from making further progress. It is time, high time, that this disgraceful stain was removed.

Bolsheviks must show that they are able to cope with this task.

3) The problem of *one-man management*. Infringements in the sphere of introducing one-man management in the factories are also becoming intolerable. Time and again the workers complain: "There is nobody in control in the factory," "confusion reigns at work." We can no longer allow our factories to be converted from organisms of production into parliaments. Our Party and trade-union organisations must at last understand that unless we ensure one-man management and establish strict responsibility for the way the work proceeds we shall not be able to cope with the task of reconstructing industry.

c) Agriculture

1) The problem of *livestock farming and industrial crops*. Now that we have, in the main, solved the grain problem, we can set about solving simultaneously both the livestock farming problem, which is a vital one at

the present time, and the industrial crops problem. In solving these problems we must proceed along the same lines as we did in solving the grain problem. That is to say, by organising state farms and collective farms, which are the strong points for our policy, we must gradually transform the technical and economic basis of present-day small-peasant livestock farming and industrial crops growing. The Livestock Trust, the Sheep Trust, the Pig Trust and the Dairy Trust, plus livestock collective farms, and the existing state farms and collective farms which grow industrial crops—such are our points of departure for solving the problems that face us.

2) The problem of *further promoting the development of state farms and collective farms*. It is scarcely necessary to dwell at length on the point that for us this is the *primary* problem of the whole of our development in the countryside. Now, even the blind can see that the peasants have made a tremendous, a radical turn from the old to the new, from kulak bondage to free collective-farm life. There is no going back to the old. The kulaks are doomed and will be eliminated. Only one path remains, the collective-farm path. And the collective-farm path is no longer for us an unknown and unexplored path. It has been explored and tried in a thousand ways by the peasant masses themselves. It has been explored and appraised as a new path that leads the peasants to emancipation from kulak bondage, from want and ignorance. That is the basis of our achievements.

How will the new movement in the countryside develop further? In the forefront will be the state farms as the backbone of the reorganisation of the old way of

life in the countryside. They will be followed by the numerous collective farms, as the strong points of the new movement in the countryside. The combined work of these two systems will create the conditions for the complete collectivisation of all the regions in the U.S.S.R.

One of the most remarkable achievements of the collective-farm movement is that it has already brought to the forefront thousands of *organisers* and tens of thousands of *agitators* in favour of collective farms from among *the peasants themselves*. Not we alone, the skilled Bolsheviks, but the collective-farm peasants themselves, tens of thousands of peasant organisers of collective farms and agitators in favour of them will now carry forward the banner of collectivisation. And the peasant agitators are splendid agitators for the collective-farm movement, for they will find arguments in favour of collective farms, intelligible and acceptable to the rest of the peasant masses, of which we skilled Bolsheviks cannot even dream.

Here and there voices are heard saying that we must abandon the policy of complete collectivisation. We have information that there are advocates of this "idea" even in our Party. That can be said, however, only by people who, voluntarily or involuntarily, have joined forces with the enemies of communism. The method of complete collectivisation is that essential method without which it will be impossible to carry out the five-year plan for the collectivisation of all the regions of the U.S.S.R. How can it be abandoned without betraying communism, without betraying the interests of the working class and peasantry?

This does not mean, of course, that everything will go “smoothly” and “normally” for us in the collective-farm movement. There will still be vacillation within the collective farms. There will still be flows and ebbs. But this cannot and must not daunt the builders of the collective-farm movement. Still less can it serve as a serious obstacle to the powerful development of the collective-farm movement. A sound movement, such as our collective-farm movement undoubtedly is, will achieve its goal in spite of everything, in spite of individual obstacles and difficulties.

The task is to train the forces and to arrange for the further development of the collective-farm movement.

3) The problem of *bringing the apparatus as close as possible to the districts and villages*. There can be no doubt that we would have been unable to cope with the enormous task of reconstructing agriculture and of developing the collective-farm movement had we not carried out *redelimitation of administrative areas*. The enlargement of the volosts and their transformation into districts, the abolition of gubernias and their transformation into smaller units (okrugs), and lastly, the formation of regions as direct strong points of the Central Committee—such are the general features of this redelimitation. Its object is to bring the Party and Soviet and the economic and co-operative apparatus closer to the districts and villages in order to make possible the timely solution of the vexed questions of agriculture, of its upswing, of its reconstruction. In this sense, I repeat, the redelimitation of administrative areas has been of immense benefit to the whole of our development.

But has everything been done to bring the apparatus really and effectively closer to the districts and villages? No, not everything. The centre of gravity of collective-farm development has now shifted to the district organisations. They are the centres on which converge all the threads of collective-farm development and of all other economic work in the countryside, as regards both co-operatives and Soviets, credits and procurements. Are the district organisations adequately supplied with the workers they need, and must have, to cope with all these diverse tasks? There can be no doubt that they are extremely inadequately staffed. What is the way out? What must be done to correct this defect and to supply the district organisations with a sufficient number of the workers required for all branches of our work? At least two things must be done:

- 1) abolish the okrugs (*applause*), which are becoming an unnecessary barrier between the region and the districts, and use the released okrug personnel to strengthen the district organisations;

- 2) link the district organisations directly with the region (Territorial Committee, national Central Committee).

That will complete the redelimitation of administrative areas, complete the process of bringing the apparatus closer to the districts and villages.

There was applause here at the prospect of abolishing the okrugs. Of course, the okrugs must be abolished. It would be a mistake, however, to think that this gives us the right to decry the okrugs, as some comrades do in the columns of *Pravda*. It must not be forgotten that the okrugs have shouldered the burden of tremendous

work, and in their time played a great historical role. (*Applause.*)

I also think that it would be a mistake to display too much haste in abolishing the okrugs. The Central Committee has adopted a decision to abolish the okrugs.⁵² It is not at all of the opinion, however, that this must be done immediately. Obviously, the necessary preparatory work must be carried out before the okrugs are abolished.

d) Transport

Lastly, the *transport* problem. There is no need to dwell at length on the enormous importance of transport for the whole of the national economy. And not only for the national economy. As you know, transport is of the utmost importance also for the defence of the country. In spite of the enormous importance of transport, however, the transport system, the reconstruction of this system, still lags behind the general rate of development. Does it need to be proved that in such a situation we run the risk of transport becoming a “bottle-neck” in the national economy, capable of retarding our progress? Is it not time to put an end to this situation?

Matters are particularly bad as regards river transport. It is a fact that the Volga steamship service has barely reached 60 per cent, and the Dnieper steamship service 40 per cent, of the pre-war level. Sixty and forty per cent of the pre-war level—this is all that river transport can enter in its record of “achievements.” A big “achievement” to be sure! Is it not time to put an end to this disgrace? (*Voices:* “It is.”)

The task is to tackle the transport problem, at last, in the Bolshevik manner and to get ahead with it

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Such are the Party's next tasks.

What is needed to carry out these tasks?

Primarily and chiefly, what is needed is to *continue* the sweeping offensive against the capitalist elements along the whole front and *to carry it through to the end*.

That is the centre and basis of our policy at the present time. (*Applause.*)

III

THE PARTY

I pass to the question of the Party.

I have spoken about the advantages of the Soviet system of economy over the capitalist system. I have spoken about the colossal possibilities that our social system affords us in fighting for the complete victory of socialism. I said that without these possibilities, without utilising them, we could not have achieved the successes gained by us in the past period.

But the question arises: has the Party been able to make proper use of the possibilities afforded us by the Soviet system; has it not kept these possibilities concealed, thereby preventing the working class from fully developing its revolutionary might; has it been able to squeeze out of these possibilities all that could be squeezed out of them for the purpose of promoting socialist construction along the whole front?

The Soviet system provides colossal *possibilities* for the complete victory of socialism. But *possibility* is not *actuality*. To transform possibility into actuality a number of conditions are needed, among which the Party's line and the correct carrying out of this line play by no means the least role.

Some examples.

The Right opportunists assert that NEP guarantees us the victory of socialism; therefore, there is no need to worry about the rate of industrialisation, about developing state farms and collective farms, and so forth, because the arrival of victory is assured in any case, automatically, so to speak. That, of course, is wrong and absurd. To speak like that means denying the Party's role in the building of socialism, denying the Party's responsibility for the-work of building socialism. Lenin by no means said that NEP guarantees us the victory of socialism. Lenin merely said that "economically and politically, NEP fully ensures us the *possibility* of laying the foundation of a socialist economy."⁵³ But possibility is not yet *actuality*. To convert possibility into actuality we must first of all cast aside the opportunist theory of things going of their own accord, we must rebuild (reconstruct) our national economy and conduct a determined offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country.

The Right opportunists assert, further, that there are no grounds inherent in our social system for a split between the working class and the peasantry—consequently we need not worry about establishing a correct policy in regard to the social groups in the countryside, because the kulaks will grow into socialism in any case,

and the alliance of the workers and peasants will be guaranteed automatically, so to speak. That, too, is wrong and absurd. Such a thing can be said only by people who fail to understand that the policy of the Party, and especially because it is a party that is in power, is the chief factor that determines the fate of the alliance of the workers and peasants. Lenin by no means considered that the danger of a split between the working class and the peasantry was out of the question. Lenin said that “the grounds for such a split *are not necessarily inherent* in our social system,” but “*if* serious class disagreements *arise* between these classes, a split *will be inevitable*.”

In view of this, Lenin considered that:

“The chief task of our Central Committee and Central Control Commission, as well as of our Party as a whole, is to watch very closely for the circumstances that may cause a split and to *forestall* them; for, in the last resort, the fate of our Republic will depend on whether the masses of the peasants march with the working class and keep true to the alliance with it, or whether they permit the ‘Nepmen,’ i.e., the new bourgeoisie, to drive a wedge between them and the workers, to split them off from the workers.”⁵⁴

Consequently, a split between the working class and the peasantry is not precluded, but it is not at all inevitable, for inherent in our social system is the *possibility* of preventing such a split and of strengthening the alliance of the working class and peasantry. What is needed to convert this possibility into actuality? To convert the possibility of *preventing* a split into actuality we must first of all bury the opportunist theory of things going of their own accord, tear out the roots

of capitalism by organising collective farms and state farms, and pass from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class.

It follows, therefore, that a strict distinction must be drawn between the *possibilities* inherent in our social system and the *utilisation* of these possibilities, the conversion of these possibilities into *actuality*.

It follows that cases are quite conceivable when the possibilities of victory exist, but the Party does not see them, or is incapable of utilising them properly, with the result that instead of victory there may come defeat.

And so the same question arises: Has the Party been able to make proper use of the *possibilities* and *advantages* afforded us by the Soviet system? Has it done everything to *convert these possibilities into actuality* and thus guarantee the maximum success for our work of construction?

In other words: Has the Party and its Central Committee correctly guided the building of socialism in the past period?

What is needed for correct leadership by the Party under our present conditions?

For correct leadership by the Party it is necessary, apart from everything else, that the Party should have a correct line; that the masses should understand that the Party's line is correct and should actively support it; that the Party should not confine itself to drawing up a general line, but should day by day guide the carrying out of this line; that the Party should wage a determined struggle against deviations from the general

line and against conciliation towards such deviations; that in the struggle against deviations the Party should forge the unity of its ranks and iron discipline.

What has the Party and its Central Committee done to fulfil these conditions?

1. QUESTIONS OF THE GUIDANCE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

a) The Party's principal line at the present moment is *transition* from the offensive of socialism on *separate sectors* of the economic front to an offensive *along the whole front* both in industry and in agriculture.

The Fourteenth Congress was mainly the congress of *industrialisation*.

The Fifteenth Congress was mainly the congress of *collectivisation*.

This was the preparation for the *general* offensive.

As distinct from the past stages, the period before the Sixteenth Congress was a period of the *general* offensive of socialism *along the whole front*, a period of intensified socialist construction both in industry and in agriculture.

The Sixteenth Congress of the Party is the congress of the *sweeping offensive* of socialism *along the whole front*, of the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and of the realisation of complete collectivisation.

There you have in a few words the essence of our Party's general line.

Is this line correct?

Yes, it is correct. The facts show that our Party's general line is the only correct line. (*Applause.*)

This is proved by our successes and achievements on the front of socialist construction. It was not and cannot

be the case that the decisive victory won by the Party on the front of socialist construction in town and country during the past period was the result of an incorrect policy. Only a correct general line could give us such a victory.

It is proved by the frenzied howl against our Party's policy raised lately by our class enemies, the capitalists and their press, the Pope and bishops of all kinds, the Social-Democrats and the "Russian" Mensheviks of the Abramovich and Dan type. The capitalists and their lackeys are abusing our Party—that is a sign that our Party's general line is correct. (*Applause.*)

It is proved by the fate of Trotskyism, with which everybody is now familiar. The gentlemen in the Trotsky camp chattered about the "degeneration" of the Soviet regime, about "Thermidor," about the "inevitable victory" of Trotskyism, and so forth. But, actually, what happened? What happened was the collapse, the end of Trotskyism. One section of the Trotskyists, as is known, broke away from Trotskyism and in numerous declarations of its representatives admitted that the Party was right, and acknowledged the counter-revolutionary character of Trotskyism. Another section of the Trotskyists really degenerated into typical petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, and actually became an information bureau of the capitalist press on matters concerning the C.P.S.U.(B.). But the Soviet regime, which was to have "degenerated" (or "had already degenerated"), continues to thrive and to build socialism, successfully breaking the backbone of the capitalist elements in our country and their petty-bourgeois yes-men.

It is proved by the fate of the Right deviators, with which everybody is now familiar. They chattered and

howled about the Party line being “fatal,” about the “probable catastrophe” in the U.S.S.R., about the necessity of “saving” the country from the Party and its leadership, and so forth. But what actually happened? What actually happened was that the Party achieved gigantic successes on all the fronts of socialist construction, whereas the group of Right deviators, who wanted to “save” the country but who later admitted that they were wrong, are now left high and dry.

It is proved by the growing revolutionary activity of the working class and peasantry, by the active support for the Party’s policy by the vast masses of the working people, and lastly, by that unprecedented labour enthusiasm of the workers and peasant collective farmers, the immensity of which astonishes both the friends and the enemies of our country. That is apart from such signs of the growth of confidence in the Party as the applications from workers to join the Party in whole shops and factories, the growth of the Party membership between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Congresses by over 600,000, and the 200,000 new members who joined the Party in the first quarter of this year alone. What does all this show if not that the vast masses of the working people realise that our Party’s policy is correct and are ready to support it?

It must be admitted that these facts would not have existed if our Party’s general line had not been the only correct one.

b) But the Party cannot confine itself to drawing up a general line. It must also, from day to day, keep check on how the general line is being carried out in practice. It must guide the carrying out of the general

line, improving and perfecting the adopted plans of economic development in the course of the work, and correcting and preventing mistakes.

How has the Central Committee of our Party performed this work?

The Central Committee's work in this sphere has proceeded mainly along the line of amending and giving precision to the five-year plan by accelerating tempo and shortening time schedules, along the line of checking the economic organisations' fulfilment of the assignments laid down.

Here are a few of the principal decisions adopted by the Central Committee amending the five-year plan in the direction of speeding up the rate of development and shortening time schedules of fulfilment.

In the iron and steel industry: the five-year plan provides for the output of pig-iron to be brought up to 10,000,000 tons in the last year of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision, however, found that this level is not sufficient, and laid it down that in the last year of the five-year period the output of pig-iron must be brought up to 17,000,000 tons.

Tractor construction: the five-year plan provides for the output of tractors to be brought up to 55,000 in the last year of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision, however, found that this target is not sufficient, and laid it down that the output of tractors in the last year of the five-year period must be brought up to 170,000.

The same must be said about *automobile construction*, where, instead of an output of 100,000 cars (lorries and passenger cars) in the last year of the five-year

period as provided for in the five-year plan, it was decided to bring it up to 200,000.

The same applies to *non-ferrous metallurgy*, where the five-year plan estimates were raised by more than 100 per cent; and to *agricultural machine-building*, where the five-year plan estimates were also raised by over 100 per cent.

That is apart from *harvester-combine* building, for which no provision at all was made in the five-year plan, and the output of which must be brought up to at least 40,000 in the last year of the five-year period.

State-farm development: the five-year plan provides for the expansion of the crop area to be brought up to 5,000,000 hectares by the end of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision, however, found that this level was not sufficient and laid it down that by the end of the five-year period the state-farm crop area must be brought up to 18,000,000 hectares.

Collective-farm development: the five-year plan provides for the expansion of the crop area to be brought up to 20,000,000 hectares by the end of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision, however, found that this level was obviously not sufficient (it has already been exceeded this year) and laid it down that by the end of the five-year period the collectivisation of the U.S.S.R. should, in the main, be completed, and by that time the collective-farm crop area should cover nine-tenths of the crop area of the U.S.S.R. now cultivated by individual farmers. (*Applause.*)

And so on and so forth.

Such, in general, is the picture of the way the Central Committee is guiding the carrying out of the Par-

ty's general line, the planning of socialist construction.

It may be said that in altering the estimates of the five-year plan so radically the Central Committee is violating the principle of planning and is discrediting the planning organisations. But only hopeless bureaucrats can talk like that. For us Bolsheviki, the five-year plan is not something fixed once and for all. For us the five-year plan, like every other, is merely a plan adopted as a first approximation, which has to be made more precise, altered and perfected in conformity with the experience gained in the localities, with the experience gained in carrying out the plan. No five-year plan can take into account all the possibilities latent in the depths of our system and which reveal themselves only in the course of the work, in the course of carrying out the plan in the factory and mill, in the collective farm and state farm, in the district, and so forth. Only bureaucrats can think that the work of planning ends with the drafting of a plan. The drafting of a plan is only the *beginning of planning*. Real guidance in planning develops only after the plan has been drafted, after it has been tested in the localities, in the course of carrying it out, correcting it and making it more precise.

That is why the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, jointly with the planning bodies of the Republic, deemed it necessary to correct and improve the five-year plan on the basis of experience, in the direction of speeding up the rate of development and shortening time schedules of fulfilment.

Here is what Lenin said about the principle of planning and guidance in planning at the Eighth Congress

of Soviets, when the ten-year plan of the GOELRO⁵⁵ was being discussed:

“Our Party programme cannot remain merely a Party programme. It must become the programme of our economic work of construction, otherwise it is useless even as a Party programme. It must be supplemented by a second Party programme, by a plan for the restoration of our entire national economy and for raising it to the level of modern technology. . . . We must come to the point of adopting a certain plan; of course, this will be a plan adopted only as a first approximation. This Party programme will not be as unalterable as our actual Party programme, which can be altered only at Party congresses. No, this programme will be improved, worked out, perfected and altered every day, in every workshop, in every volost. . . . Watching the experience of science and practice, the people of the localities must undeviatingly strive to get the plan carried out earlier than had been provided for, in order that the masses may see that the long period that separates us from the complete restoration of industry can be shortened by experience. This depends upon us. Let us in every workshop, in every railway depot, in every sphere, improve our economy, and then we shall reduce the period. And we are already reducing it” (Vol. XXVI, pp. 45, 46, 43).

As you see, the Central Committee has followed the path indicated by Lenin, altering and improving the five-year plan, shortening time schedules and speeding up the rate of development.

On what possibilities did the Central Committee rely when speeding up the rate of development and shortening the time schedules for carrying out the five-year plan? On the reserves latent in the depths of our system and revealed only in the course of the work, on the possibilities afforded us by the reconstruction period. The Central Committee is of the opinion that the reconstruction of the technical basis of industry and agriculture

under the socialist organisation of production creates such possibilities of accelerating tempo as no capitalist country can dream of.

These circumstances alone can explain the fact that during the past three years our socialist industry has more than doubled its output and that the output of this industry in 1930-31 should be 47 per cent above that of the current year, while the volume of *this increase alone* will be equal to the volume of output of the *entire* pre-war large-scale industry.

These circumstances alone can explain the fact that the five-year plan of state-farm development is being overfulfilled in three years, while that of collective-farm development has already been overfulfilled in two years.

There is a theory according to which high rates of development are possible only in the restoration period and that with the transition to the reconstruction period the rate of development must diminish sharply year by year. This theory is called the theory of the "descending curve." It is a theory for justifying our backwardness. It has nothing in common with Marxism, with Leninism. It is a bourgeois theory, designed to perpetuate the backwardness of our country. Of the people who have had, or have, connection with our Party, only the Trotskyists and Right deviators uphold and preach this theory.

There exists an opinion that the Trotskyists are superindustrialists. But this opinion is only partly correct. It is correct only insofar as it applies to the end of the *restoration* period, when the Trotskyists did, indeed, develop superindustrialist fantasies. As regards

the *reconstruction* period, however, the Trotskyists, on the question of tempo, are the most extreme minimalists and the most wretched capitulators. (Laughter. Applause.)

In their platforms and declarations the Trotskyists gave no figures concerning tempo, they confined themselves to general chatter about tempo. But there is one document in which the Trotskyists did depict in figures their understanding of the rate of development of state industry. I am referring to the memorandum of the "Special Conference on the Restoration of Fixed Capital" of state industry (OSVOK) drawn up on the principles of Trotskyism. It will be interesting briefly to analyse this document, which dates back to 1925-26. It will be interesting to do so, because it fully reflects the Trotskyist scheme of the descending curve.

According to this document, it was proposed to invest in state industry 1,543,000,000 rubles in 1926-27; 1,490,000,000 rubles in 1927-28; 1,320,000,000 rubles in 1928-29; 1,060,000,000 rubles in 1929-30 (at 1926-27 prices).

Such is the picture of the *descending* Trotskyist curve.

But how much did we actually invest? Actually we invested in state industry 1,065,000,000 rubles in 1926-27; 1,304,000,000 rubles in 1927-28, 1,819,000,000 rubles in 1928-29; 4,775,000,000 rubles in 1929-30 (at 1926-27 prices).

Such is the picture of the *ascending* Bolshevik curve.

According to this document, the *output* of state industry was to increase by 31.6 per cent in 1926-27, by 22.9 per cent in 1927-28; by 15.5 per cent in 1928-29; by 15 per cent in 1929-30.

Such is the picture of the *descending* Trotskyist curve.

But what actually happened? Actually, the increase in the output of state industry was 19.7 per cent in 1926-27; 26.3 per cent in 1927-28; 24.3 per cent in 1928-29; 32 per cent in 1929-30, and in 1930-31 the increase will amount to 47 per cent.

Such is the picture of the *ascending* Bolshevik curve.

As you know, Trotsky specially advocates this defeatist theory of the descending curve in his pamphlet *Towards Socialism or Capitalism?* He plainly says there that since "before the war, the expansion of industry consisted, in the main, in the construction of new factories," whereas "in our times expansion, to a much larger degree, consists in utilising the old factories and in keeping the old equipment running," therefore, it "naturally follows that *with the completion of the restoration process* the coefficient of growth must *considerably diminish*," and so he proposes that "during the next few years the coefficient of industrial growth be raised not only to twice, but to three times the pre-war 6 per cent, and perhaps even higher."

Thus, three times six per cent annual increase of industry. How much does that amount to? Only to an increase of 18 per cent per annum. Hence, 18 per cent annual increase in the output of state industry is, in the opinion of the Trotskyists, the highest limit that can be reached in planning to accelerate development in the *reconstruction period*, to be striven for as the ideal. Compare this pettifogging sagacity of the Trotskyists with the actual increase in output that we have had during the last three years (1927-28—26.3 per cent, 1928-29—24.3 per cent, 1929-30—32 per cent); compare this defeatist philosophy of the Trotskyists with the

estimates in the control figures of the State Planning Commission for 1930-31 of a 47 per cent increase, which exceeds the *highest* rate of increase of output in the *restoration* period, and you will realise how utterly reactionary is the Trotskyist theory of the "descending curve," the utter lack of faith of the Trotskyists in the possibilities of the *reconstruction* period.

That is why the Trotskyists are now singing about the "excessive" Bolshevnik rates of industrial and collective-farm development.

That is why *the Trotskyists cannot now be distinguished from our Right deviators.*

Naturally, if we had not shattered the Trotskyist-Right-deviation theory of the "descending curve," we should not have been able either to develop real planning or to accelerate tempo and shorten time schedules of development. In order to guide the carrying out of the Party's general line, to correct and improve the five-year plan of development, to accelerate tempo and to prevent mistakes in the work of construction, it was necessary first of all to shatter and liquidate the reactionary theory of the "descending curve."

That is what the Central Committee did, as I have already said.

2. QUESTIONS OF THE GUIDANCE OF INNER-PARTY AFFAIRS

It may be thought that the work of guiding socialist construction, the work of carrying out the Party's general line, has proceeded in our Party calmly and smoothly, without struggle or tense effort of will. But that is

not so, comrades. Actually, this work has proceeded amid a struggle against inner-Party difficulties, amid a struggle against all sorts of deviations from Leninism both as regards general policy and as regards the national question. Our Party does not live and operate in a vacuum. It lives and operates in the thick of life and is subjected to the influence of the surrounding environment. And our environment, as you know, consists of different classes and social groups. We have launched a sweeping offensive against the capitalist elements, we have pushed our socialist industry far forward, we have widely developed the formation of state farms and collective farms. Events like these, however, cannot but affect the exploiting classes. These events are usually accompanied by the ruin of the moribund classes, by the ruin of the kulaks in the countryside, by the restriction of the field of activity of the petty-bourgeois strata in the towns. Naturally, all this cannot but intensify the class struggle, the resistance of the moribund classes to the Soviet government's policy. It would be ridiculous to think that the resistance of these classes will not find reflection in some way or other in the ranks of our Party. And it does indeed find reflection in the Party. All the various deviations from the Leninist line in the ranks of our Party are a reflection of the resistance of the moribund classes.

Is it possible to wage a successful struggle against class enemies without at the same time combating deviations in our Party, without overcoming these deviations? No, it is not. That is because it is impossible to develop a real struggle against class enemies while having their agents in our rear, while leaving in our

rear people who have no faith in our cause, and who strive in every way to hinder our progress.

Hence an uncompromising struggle against deviations from the Leninist line is an immediate task of the Party.

Why is the Right deviation the chief danger in the Party at the present time? Because it reflects the kulak danger; and at the present moment, the moment of the sweeping offensive and the tearing out of the roots of capitalism, the kulak danger is the chief danger in the country.

What did the Central Committee have to do to overcome the Right deviation, to deliver the finishing stroke to the "Left" deviation and clear the way for rallying the Party to the utmost around the Leninist line?

a) It had, first of all, to put an end to the remnants of Trotskyism in the Party, to the survivals of the Trotskyist theory. We had long ago routed the Trotskyist group as an opposition, and had expelled it. The Trotskyist group is now an anti-proletarian and anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary group, which is zealously informing the bourgeoisie about the affairs of our Party. But the remnants of the Trotskyist theory, the survivals of Trotskyism, have not yet been completely swept out of the Party. Hence, the first thing to be done was to put an end to these survivals.

That is the essence of Trotskyism?

The essence of Trotskyism is, first of all, denial of the possibility of completely building socialism in the U.S.S.R. by the efforts of the working class and peasantry of our country. What does this mean? It means that if a victorious world revolution does not come to our aid in the near future, we shall have to sur-

render to the bourgeoisie and clear the way for a bourgeois-democratic republic. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois denial of the possibility of completely building socialism in our country, disguised by "revolutionary" phrases about the victory of the world revolution.

Is it possible, while holding such views, to rouse the labour enthusiasm of the vast masses of the working class, to rouse them for socialist emulation, for mass shock-brigade work, for a sweeping offensive against the capitalist elements? Obviously not. It would be foolish to think that our working class, which has made three revolutions, will display labour enthusiasm and engage in mass shock-brigade work in order to manure the soil for capitalism. Our working class is displaying labour enthusiasm not for the sake of capitalism, but in order to bury capitalism once and for all and to build socialism in the U.S.S.R. Take from it its confidence in the possibility of building socialism, and you will completely destroy the basis for emulation, for labour enthusiasm, for shock-brigade work.

Hence the conclusion: in order to rouse labour enthusiasm and emulation among the working class and to organise a sweeping offensive, it was necessary, first of all, to bury the bourgeois theory of Trotskyism that it is impossible to build socialism in our country.

The essence of Trotskyism is, secondly, denial of the possibility of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction in the countryside. What does this mean? It means that the working class is incapable of leading the peasantry in the work of transferring the individual peasant farms to collectivist lines, that if the victory of the world revolution

does not come to the aid of the working class in the near future, the peasantry will restore the old bourgeois order. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois denial of the capacity or possibility of the proletarian dictatorship to lead the peasantry to socialism, disguised by a mask of "revolutionary" phrases about the victory of the world revolution.

Is it possible, while holding such views, to rouse the peasant masses for the collective-farm movement, to organise a mass collective-farm movement, to organise the elimination of the kulaks as a class? Obviously not.

Hence the conclusion: in order to organise a mass collective-farm movement of the peasantry and to eliminate the kulaks, it was necessary, first of all, to bury the bourgeois theory of Trotskyism that it is impossible to bring the labouring masses of the peasantry to socialism.

The essence of Trotskyism is, lastly, denial of the necessity for iron discipline in the Party, recognition of freedom for factional groupings in the Party, recognition of the need to form a Trotskyist party. According to Trotskyism, the C.P.S.U.(B.) must be not a single, united militant party, but a collection of groups and factions, each with its own centre, its own discipline, its own press, and so forth. What does this mean? It means proclaiming freedom for political factions in the Party. It means that freedom for political groupings in the Party must be followed by freedom for political parties in the country, i.e., bourgeois democracy. Consequently, we have here recognition of freedom for factional groupings in the Party right up to permitting political parties in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, disguised

by phrases about “inner-party democracy,” about “improving the regime” in the Party. That freedom for factional squabbling of groups of intellectuals is not inner-party democracy, that the widely-developed self-criticism conducted by the Party and the colossal activity of the mass of the Party membership is real and genuine inner-party democracy—Trotskyism cannot understand.

Is it possible, while holding such views about the Party, to ensure iron discipline in the Party, to ensure the iron unity of the Party that is essential for waging a successful struggle against class enemies? Obviously not.

Hence the conclusion: in order to guarantee the iron unity of the Party and proletarian discipline in it, it was necessary, first of all, to bury the Trotskyist theory of organisation.

Capitulation in practice as the *content*, “Left” phrases and “revolutionary” adventurist postures, as the *form* disguising and advertising the defeatist content—such is the essence of Trotskyism.

This duality of Trotskyism reflects the duality of the position of the urban petty bourgeoisie, which is being ruined, cannot tolerate the “regime” of the dictatorship of the proletariat and is striving either to jump into socialism “at one go” in order to avoid being ruined (hence *adventurism* and *hysterics* in policy), or, if this is impossible, to make every conceivable concession to capitalism (hence *capitulation* in policy).

This duality of Trotskyism explains why it usually crowns its supposedly “furious” attacks on the Right deviators by a *bloc* with them, as undisguised capitulators.

And what are the “Left” excesses that have occurred in the Party in connection with the collective-farm

movement? They represent a certain attempt, true an unconscious one, to revive among us the traditions of Trotskyism in practice, to revive the Trotskyist attitude towards the middle peasantry. They are the result of that mistake in policy which Lenin called "over-administration." This means that some of our comrades, infatuated by the successes of the collective-farm movement, began to approach the problem of collective-farm development not as builders, but mainly as administrators and, as a result, committed a number of very gross mistakes.

There are people in our Party who think that the "Left" distorters should not have been pulled up. They think that our officials should not have been taken to task and their infatuation should not have been counteracted even though it led to mistakes. That is nonsense, comrades. Only people who are determined to swim with the stream, can talk like that. These are the very same people who can never understand the Leninist policy of going against the stream when the situation demands it, when the interests of the Party demand it. They are khvostists, not Leninists. The reason why the Party succeeded in turning whole detachments of our comrades on to the right road, the reason why the Party succeeded in rectifying mistakes and achieving successes is just because it resolutely went against the stream in order to carry out the Party's general line. That is Leninism in practice, Leninism in leadership.

That is why I think that if we had not overcome the "Left" excesses we could not have achieved the successes in the collective-farm movement that we have now achieved.

That is how matters stand as regards the struggle against the survivals of Trotskyism and against the recurrence of them in practice.

Matters are somewhat different as regards Right opportunism, which was, or is, headed by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy.

It cannot be said that the Right deviators do not admit the possibility of completely building socialism in the U.S.S.R. No, they do admit it, and that is what distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. But the misfortune of the Right deviators is that, while formally admitting that it is possible to build socialism in one country, they refuse to recognise the ways and means of struggle without which it is impossible to build socialism. They refuse to admit that the utmost development of industry is the key to the transformation of the entire national economy on the basis of socialism. They refuse to admit the uncompromising class struggle against the capitalist elements and the sweeping offensive of socialism against capitalism. They fail to understand that all these ways and means constitute the system of measures without which it is impossible to retain the dictatorship of the proletariat and to build socialism in our country. They think that socialism can be built on the quiet, automatically, without class struggle, without an offensive against the capitalist elements. They think that the capitalist elements will either die out imperceptibly or grow into socialism. As, however, such miracles do not happen in history, it follows that *the Right deviators are in fact slipping into the viewpoint of denying the possibility of completely building socialism in our country.*

Nor can it be said that the Right deviators deny that it is possible to draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of building socialism in the countryside. No, they admit that it is possible, and that is what distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. But while admitting it formally, they will not accept the ways and means without which it is impossible to draw the peasantry into the work of building socialism. They refuse to admit that state farms and collective farms are the principal means and the "high road" for drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of building socialism. They refuse to admit that unless the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class is carried out it will be impossible to transform the countryside on the basis of socialism. They think that the countryside can be transferred to socialist lines on the quiet, automatically, without class struggle, merely with the aid of supply and marketing co-operatives, for they are convinced that the kulaks themselves will grow into socialism. They think that the chief thing now is not a high rate of industrial development, and not collective farms and state farms, but to "release" the elemental forces of the market, to "emancipate" the market and to "remove the shackles" from the individual farms, up to and including those of the capitalist elements in the countryside. As, however, the kulaks cannot grow into socialism, and "emancipating" the market means arming the kulaks and disarming the working class, it follows that *the Right deviators are in fact slipping into the viewpoint of denying that it is possible to draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of building socialism.*

It is this, really, that explains why the Right deviators usually crown their sparring with the Trotskyists by backstairs negotiations with them on the subject of a *bloc* with them.

The chief evil of Right opportunism is that it *breaks* with the Leninist conception of the class struggle and slips into the viewpoint of *petty-bourgeois liberalism*.

There can be no doubt that the victory of the Right deviation in our Party would have meant completely disarming the working class, arming the capitalist elements in the countryside and increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

The Right deviators do not take the stand of forming another party, and that is another thing that distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. The leaders of the Right deviators have openly admitted their mistakes and have surrendered to the Party. But it would be foolish to think, on these grounds, that the Right deviation is already buried. The strength of Right opportunism is not measured by this circumstance. The strength of Right opportunism lies in the strength of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, in the strength of the pressure on the Party exercised by the capitalist elements in general, and by the kulaks in particular. And it is precisely because the Right deviation reflects the resistance of the chief elements of the moribund classes that the Right deviation is the principal danger in the Party at the present time.

That is why the Party considered it necessary to wage a determined and uncompromising struggle against the Right deviation.

There can be no doubt that if we had not waged a determined struggle against the Right deviation, if we had not isolated its leading elements, we would not have succeeded in mobilising the forces of the Party and of the working class, in mobilising the forces of the poor- and middle-peasant masses, for the sweeping offensive of socialism, for the organisation of state farms and collective farms, for the restoration of our heavy industry, for the elimination of the kulaks as a class.

That is how matters stand as regards the "Left" and Right deviations in the Party.

The task is to continue the uncompromising struggle *on two fronts*, against the "Lefts," who represent *petty-bourgeois radicalism*, and against the Rights, who represent *petty-bourgeois liberalism*.

The task is to continue the *uncompromising* struggle against those *conciliatory* elements in the Party who fail to understand, or pretend they do not understand, the necessity of a determined struggle on two fronts.

b) The picture of the struggle against deviations in the Party will not be complete if we do not touch upon the deviations that exist in the Party on the *national question*. I have in mind, firstly, the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism, and secondly, the deviation towards local nationalism. These deviations are not so conspicuous and assertive as the "Left" or the Right deviation. They could be called creeping deviations. But this does not mean that they do not exist. They do exist, and what is most important—they are growing. There can be no doubt whatever about that. There can be no doubt about it, because the general atmosphere of more acute class struggle cannot fail to

cause some intensification of national friction, which finds reflection in the Party. Therefore, the features of these deviations should be exposed and dragged into the light of day.

What is the essence of the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism under our present conditions?

The essence of the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism lies in the striving to ignore national differences in language, culture and way of life; in the striving to prepare for the liquidation of the national republics and regions; in the striving to undermine the principle of national equality and to discredit the Party's policy of nationalising the administrative apparatus, the press, the schools and other state and public organisations.

In this connection, the deviators of this type proceed from the view that since, with the victory of socialism, the nations must merge into one and their national languages must be transformed into a single common language, the time has come to abolish national differences and to abandon the policy of promoting the development of the national cultures of the formerly oppressed peoples.

In this connection, they refer to Lenin, misquoting him and sometimes deliberately distorting and slandering him.

Lenin said that under socialism the interests of the nationalities will merge into a single whole—does it not follow from this that it is time to put an end to the national republics and regions in the interests of . . . internationalism? Lenin said in 1913, in his controversy with the Bundists, that the slogan of national culture is a bourgeois slogan—does it not follow from this that

it is time to put an end to the national cultures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in the interests of . . . internationalism?

Lenin said that national oppression and national barriers are destroyed under socialism—does it not follow from this that it is time to put a stop to the policy of taking into account the specific national features of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and to go over to the policy of assimilation in the interests of . . . internationalism?

And so on and so forth.

There can be no doubt that this deviation on the national question, disguised, moreover, by a mask of internationalism and by the name of Lenin, is the most subtle and therefore the most dangerous species of Great-Russian nationalism.

Firstly, Lenin never said that national differences must disappear and that national languages must merge into one common language within the borders of *a single state before the victory of socialism on a world scale*. On the contrary, Lenin said something that was the very opposite of this, namely, that “national and state *differences* among peoples and countries . . . will continue to exist *for a very, very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale*”* (Vol. XXV, p. 227).

How can anyone refer to Lenin and forget about this fundamental statement of his?

True, Mr. Kautsky, an ex-Marxist and now a renegade and reformist, asserts something that is the

* My italics.—*J. St.*

very opposite of what Lenin teaches us. Despite Lenin, he asserts that the victory of the proletarian revolution in the Austro-German federal state in the middle of the last century would have led to the formation of a *single, common* German language and to the *Germanisation* of the Czechs, because “the mere force of unshackled intercourse, the mere force of modern culture of which the Germans were the vehicles, without any forcible Germanisation, *would have converted into Germans the backward Czech petty bourgeois, peasants and proletarians who had nothing to gain from their decayed nationality*” (see Preface to the German edition of *Revolution and Counter-revolution*).

It goes without saying that such a “conception” is in full accord with Kautsky’s social-chauvinism. It was these views of Kautsky’s that I combated in 1925 in my speech at the University of the Peoples of the East.⁵⁶ But can this anti-Marxist chatter of an arrogant German social-chauvinist have any positive significance for us Marxists, who want to remain consistent internationalists?

Who is right, Kautsky or Lenin?

If Kautsky is right, then how are we to explain the fact that relatively backward nationalities like the Byelorussians and Ukrainians, who are closer to the Great-Russians than the Czechs are to the Germans, have not become Russified as a result of the victory of the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R., but, on the contrary, have been regenerated and have developed as independent nations? How are we to explain the fact that nations like the Turkmenians, Kirghizians, Uzbeks, Tajiks (not to speak of the Georgians, Armenians,

Azerbaijanians, and others), in spite of their backwardness, far from becoming Russified as a result of the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., have, on the contrary, been regenerated and have developed into independent nations? Is it not evident that our worthy deviators, in their hunt after a sham internationalism, have fallen into the clutches of Kautskyan social-chauvinism? Is it not evident that in advocating a single, common language within the borders of *a single* state, within the borders of the U.S.S.R., they are, in essence, striving to restore the *privileges* of the formerly predominant language, namely, the *Great-Russian* language?

What has this to do with internationalism?

Secondly, Lenin never said that the abolition of national oppression and the merging of the interests of nationalities into one whole is tantamount to the abolition of national differences. We have abolished national oppression. We have abolished national privileges and have established national equality of rights. We have abolished state frontiers in the old sense of the term, frontier posts and customs barriers between the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. We have established the unity of the economic and political interests of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. But does this mean that we have thereby abolished national differences, national languages, culture, manner of life, etc.? Obviously it does not mean this. But if national differences, languages, culture, manner of life, etc., have remained, is it not evident that the demand for the abolition of the national republics and regions in the present historical period is a reactionary demand directed against the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Do our de-

viators understand that to abolish the national republics and regions at the present time means depriving the vast masses of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. of the possibility of receiving education in their *native* languages, depriving them of the possibility of having schools, courts, administration, public and other organisations and institutions in their *native* languages, depriving them of the possibility of being drawn into the work of socialist construction? Is it not evident that in their hunt after a sham internationalism our deviators have fallen into the clutches of the reactionary Great-Russian chauvinists and have forgotten, completely forgotten, the slogan of the cultural revolution in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which applies equally to *all* the peoples of the U.S.S.R., both Great-Russian and non-Great-Russian?

Thirdly, Lenin never said that the slogan of developing national culture *under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat* is a reactionary slogan. On the contrary, Lenin always stood for *helping* the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to develop their national cultures. It was under the guidance of none other than Lenin that at the Tenth Congress of the Party, the resolution on the national question was drafted and adopted, in which it is plainly stated that:

“The Party’s task is to *help* the labouring masses of the non-Great-Russian peoples to catch up with Central Russia, which has gone in front, to *help* them: a) to develop and strengthen Soviet statehood among them in forms corresponding to the national conditions and manner of life of these peoples; b) to develop and strengthen among them courts, administrations, economic and government bodies functioning in their native languages and

staffed with local people familiar with the manner of life and mentality of the local inhabitants; c) to develop among them press, schools, theatres, clubs, and cultural and educational institutions in general, functioning in the native languages; d) to set up and develop a wide network of general-educational and trade and technical courses and schools, functioning in the native languages.”⁵⁷

Is it not obvious that Lenin stood wholly and entirely for the slogan of developing national culture *under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat*?

Is it not obvious that to deny the slogan of national culture under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat means denying the necessity of raising the cultural level of the non-Great-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R., denying the necessity of compulsory universal education for these peoples, means putting these peoples into spiritual bondage to the reactionary nationalists?

Lenin did indeed qualify the slogan of national culture *under the rule of the bourgeoisie* as a reactionary slogan. But could it be otherwise?

What is national culture under the rule of the national bourgeoisie? It is culture that is *bourgeois* in content and national in form, having the object of doping the masses with the poison of nationalism and of strengthening the rule of the bourgeoisie.

What is national culture under the dictatorship of the proletariat? It is culture that is *socialist* in content and national in form, having the object of educating the masses in the spirit of socialism and internationalism.

How is it possible to confuse these two fundamentally different things without breaking with Marxism?

Is it not obvious that in combating the slogan of national culture under the bourgeois order, Lenin was striking at the bourgeois *content* of national culture and not at its national form?

It would be foolish to suppose that Lenin regarded socialist culture as *non-national*, as not having a particular national form. The Bundists did at one time actually ascribe this nonsense to Lenin. But it is known from the works of Lenin that he protested sharply against this slander, and emphatically dissociated himself from this nonsense. Have our worthy deviators really followed in the footsteps of the Bundists?

After all that has been said, what is left of the arguments of our deviators?

Nothing, except juggling with the flag of internationalism and slander against Lenin.

Those who are deviating towards Great-Russian chauvinism are profoundly mistaken in believing that the period of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. is the period of the collapse and abolition of national cultures. The very opposite is the case. In point of fact, the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is a period of the *flowering* of national cultures that are *socialist* in content and national in form; for, under the Soviet system, the nations themselves are not the ordinary "modern" nations, but *socialist* nations, just as in content their national cultures are not the ordinary bourgeois cultures, but *socialist* cultures.

They apparently fail to understand that national cultures are bound to develop *with new strength* with the introduction and firm establishment of compulsory

universal elementary education in the native languages. They fail to understand that only if the national cultures are developed will it be possible really to draw the backward nationalities into the work of socialist construction.

They fail to understand that it is just this that is the basis of the Leninist policy of *helping* and *promoting* the development of the national cultures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

It may seem strange that we who stand for the future *merging* of national cultures into one common (both in form and content) culture, with one common language, should at the same time stand for the *flowering* of national cultures at the present moment, in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But there is nothing strange about it. The national cultures must be allowed to develop and unfold, to reveal all their potentialities, in order to create the conditions for merging them into one common culture with one common language in the period of the victory of socialism all over the world. The flowering of cultures that are national in form and socialist in content under the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country *for the purpose* of merging them into one common socialist (both in form and content) culture, with one common language, when the proletariat is victorious all over the world and when socialism becomes the way of life—it is just this that constitutes the dialectics of the Leninist presentation of the question of national culture.

It may be said that such a presentation of the question is “contradictory.” But is there not the same “contradictoriness” in our presentation of the question

of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions *for* the withering away of state power—such is the Marxist formula. Is this “contradictory”? Yes, it is “contradictory.” But this contradiction is bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx’s dialectics.

Or, for example, Lenin’s presentation of the question of the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secession. Lenin sometimes depicted the thesis on national self-determination in the guise of the simple formula: “disunion for union.” Think of it—disunion for union. It even sounds like a paradox. And yet, this “contradictory” formula reflects that living truth of Marx’s dialectics which enables the Bolsheviki to capture the most impregnable fortresses in the sphere of the national question.

The same may be said about the formula relating to national culture: the flowering of national cultures (and languages) in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country with the object of preparing the conditions for their withering away and merging into one common socialist culture (and into one common language) in the period of the victory of socialism all over the world.

Anyone who fails to understand this peculiar feature and “contradiction” of our transition period, anyone who fails to understand these dialectics of the historical processes, is dead as far as Marxism is concerned.

The misfortune of our deviators is that they do not understand, and do not wish to understand, Marx's dialectics.

That is how matters stand as regards the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism.

It is not difficult to understand that this deviation reflects the striving of the moribund classes of the formerly dominant Great-Russian nation to recover their lost privileges.

Hence the danger of Great-Russian chauvinism as the chief danger in the Party in the sphere of the national question.

What is the essence of the deviation towards local nationalism?

The essence of the deviation towards local nationalism is the endeavour to isolate and segregate oneself within the shell of one's own nation, the endeavour to slur over class contradictions within one's own nation, the endeavour to protect oneself from Great-Russian chauvinism by withdrawing from the general stream of socialist construction, the endeavour not to see what draws together and unites the labouring masses of the nations of the U.S.S.R. and to see only what can draw them apart from one another.

The deviation towards local nationalism reflects the discontent of the moribund classes of the formerly oppressed nations with the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, their striving to isolate themselves in their national bourgeois state and to establish their class rule there.

The danger of this deviation is that it cultivates bourgeois nationalism, weakens the unity of the work-

ing people of the different nations of the U.S.S.R. and plays into the hands of the interventionists.

Such is the essence of the deviation towards local nationalism.

The Party's task is to wage a determined struggle against this deviation and to ensure the conditions necessary for the education of the labouring masses of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in the spirit of internationalism.

That is how matters stand with the deviations in our Party, with the "Left" and Right deviations in the sphere of general policy, and with the deviations in the sphere of the national question.

Such is our inner-Party situation.

Now that the Party has emerged victoriously from the struggle for the general line, now that our Party's Leninist line is triumphant along the whole front, many are inclined to forget the difficulties that were created for us in our work by all kinds of deviators. More than that, to this day some philistine-minded comrades still think that we could have managed without a struggle against the deviators. Needless to say, those comrades are profoundly mistaken. It is enough to look back and recall the handiwork of the Trotskyists and Right deviators, it is enough to recall the history of the struggle against deviations during the past period, to understand the utter vacuity and futility of this party philistinism. There can be no doubt that if we had not curbed the deviators and routed them in open struggle, we could not have achieved the successes of which our Party is now justly proud.

In the struggle against deviations from the Leninist line our Party grew and gained strength. In the struggle against deviations it forged the *Leninist unity* of its ranks. Nobody now denies the indisputable fact that the Party has never been so united around its Central Committee as it is now. Everybody is now obliged to admit that the Party is now more *united* and *solid* than ever before, that the Sixteenth Congress is one of the few congresses of our Party at which there is no longer a definitely formed and united opposition capable of counterposing its separate line to the Party's general line.

To what is the Party indebted for this decisive achievement?

It is indebted for this achievement to the circumstance that in its struggle against deviations it always pursued a policy *based on principle*, that it never sank to backstairs combinations or diplomatic huckstering.

Lenin said that a policy based on principle is the sole correct policy. We emerged victoriously from the struggle against deviations because we honestly and consistently carried out this behest of Lenin's. (*Applause.*)

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* *

I shall now conclude, comrades.

What is the general conclusion?

During the past period we have achieved a number of decisive successes on all the fronts of socialist construction. We achieved these successes because we were able to hold aloft the great banner of Lenin. If we want

to be victorious we must continue to hold aloft the banner of Lenin and keep it pure and unstained. (*Applause.*)

Such is the general conclusion.

With the banner of Lenin we triumphed in the battles for the October Revolution.

With the banner of Lenin we have achieved decisive successes in the struggle for the victory of socialist construction.

With this banner we shall triumph in the proletarian revolution all over the world.

Long live Leninism! (*Loud and prolonged applause. An ovation from the entire hall.*)

Pravda, No. 177,
June 29, 1930

NOTES

- ¹ The plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, C.P.S.U.(B.) held April 16-23, 1929, discussed: 1) inner-Party affairs; 2) questions concerning the Sixteenth All-Union Party Conference; and 3) the purging of the Party. The plenum approved the resolution on inner-Party affairs which had been adopted by a joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and the Presidium of the C.C.C. on February 9, 1929, and in a special resolution condemned the Right-opportunist activities of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. The plenum approved and resolved to submit to the Sixteenth All-Union Party Conference the theses presented by the Political Bureau on a five-year plan for the development of the national economy, on ways and means of promoting agriculture and tax relief for the middle peasants, and on the results and immediate tasks of the fight against bureaucracy. It also decided to submit to the Sixteenth Party Conference theses, which it had approved in principle, on a purge of members and candidate members of the C.P.S.U.(B.). J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.);" at the meeting of the plenum on April 22. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the C.C. and the C.C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 429-47).

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- ² This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary organisation of bourgeois experts which had operated in Shakhty and other Donbas areas in 1923-28. p. 12
- ³ The Sixth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, July 17-September 1, 1928. It discussed a report on the activities of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and reports of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International and of the International Control Commission, measures for combating the danger of imperialist wars, the programme of the Communist International, the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, the economic situation in the U.S.S.R. and the situation in the C.P.S.U.(B.), and endorsed the Rules of the Comintern. In its resolutions, the congress drew attention to the growth of the internal contradictions of capitalism, which were inevitably leading to a further shaking of the capitalist stabilisation and to a sharp accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism. The congress defined the tasks of the Communist International springing from the new conditions of the working-class struggle, and mobilised the Communist Parties to intensify the fight against the Right deviation, as the chief danger, and against conciliation towards it. The congress took note of the achievements of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and their importance in strengthening the revolutionary positions of the international proletariat, and called upon the working people of the whole world to defend the Soviet Union. J. V. Stalin took a leading part in the work of the congress. He was elected to the Presidium of the congress, to the Programme Commission and to the Political Commission set up to draft the theses on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist International. p. 21
- ⁴ This refers to the plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), together with members of the Central Control Commission and Central Auditing Commission, which was held November 16-24, 1928. p. 27

- ⁵ Katheder-Socialism—a trend in bourgeois ideology, chiefly in bourgeois political economy, which arose in Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century and later became widespread in Britain, America and France. Its representatives were bourgeois-liberal professors who used their university chairs (*Katheders* means university chair) to combat Marxism and the developing revolutionary working-class movement, to slur over the contradictions of capitalism, and to preach class conciliation. The Katheder-Socialists denied the class, exploiting character of the bourgeois state and alleged that the latter was capable of perfecting capitalism by means of social reforms. Referring to the German representatives of this trend, Engels wrote: “Our Katheder-Socialists have never been much more, theoretically, than slightly philanthropic vulgar economists, and now they have sunk to the level of simple apologists of Bismarck’s state socialism” (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. XXVII, p. 499). In Russia, the bourgeois-liberal reformist ideas of the Katheder-Socialists were preached by the legal Marxists. The Russian Mensheviks, the opportunist parties of the Second International and the modern Right-wing Socialists also went over to the position of Katheder-Socialism, striving to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie and preaching that capitalism would grow gradually and peacefully into socialism. p. 36
- ⁶ This refers to the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) held July 4-12, 1928. p. 53
- ⁷ *Youth International (Jugend Internationale)*—a magazine, the organ of the International Union of Socialist Youth Organisations, published in Zurich from September 1915 to May 1918. From 1919 to 1941 it was the organ of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International. (In 1925-28, it appeared under the title *Communist Youth International*.) p. 74
- ⁸ See *Lenin Miscellany* XIV, pp. 250-59. p. 80

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- ⁹ *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata (Symposium of Sotsial Demokrat)* was published by the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in 1916 under the personal direction of V. I. Lenin. Two numbers were issued: in October and December 1916. p. 81
- ¹⁰ At the time of the Brest Peace (1918), Bukharin and the group of "Left" Communists he headed joined with Trotsky in waging a fierce struggle within the Party against Lenin, demanding the continuation of the war with the aim of exposing the young Soviet Republic, which still had no army, to the blows of German imperialism. At the trial of the anti-Soviet "Right-Trotskyist bloc" in 1938, it was established that Bukharin and the group of "Left" Communists headed by him had joined with Trotsky and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in a secret counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the Soviet Government with the object of torpedoing the Brest Peace Treaty, arresting and assassinating V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov, and establishing a government of Bukharinites, Trotskyists and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 106
- ¹¹ EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R.—Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. p. 108
- ¹² The Sixteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which took place in Moscow, April 23-29, 1929, discussed a five-year plan of development of the national economy, ways and means of promoting agriculture and tax relief for the middle peasants, results and immediate tasks of the fight against bureaucracy, and the purge and verification of members and candidate members of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The first five-year plan was the chief question discussed by the conference. It rejected the "minimum" variant of the five-year plan advocated by the Right capitulators and adopted an "optimal" variant, to be obligatory under all circumstances. The conference condemned the Right deviation as representing a complete rejection of the Party's Leninist policy and an outright adoption of the position of the kulaks, and it called upon the Party to deliver a crushing blow to the Right deviation, as the chief danger at that

period, and also to conciliatory attitudes towards deviations from the Leninist line. V. M. Molotov reported to the conference on the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and on the speech delivered at that meeting by J. V. Stalin on "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.);" (see pp. 1-113 in this volume). The conference unanimously passed a resolution on "Inner-Party Affairs" and adopted an appeal to all workers and labouring peasants of the Soviet Union for full development of socialist emulation. (For the resolutions of the Sixteenth Conference, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 448-99.) p. 113

- 13 V. I. Lenin, "How to Organise Emulation?" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 367, 368). p. 115
- 14 The Special Far Eastern Army was formed in August 1929, during the conflict on the Chinese-Eastern Railway provoked by the Chinese counter-revolutionary generals and Japanese imperialists. *Trevoga (Alarm)*—the organ of the Political Department, Special Far Eastern Army; it was published from 1929. p. 142
- 15 *Komsomolskaya Pravda (Y.C.L. Truth)*—a daily newspaper, organ of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, which began publication on May 24, 1925. The article, "Introductory Essay on Leninism," was published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 282, December 7, 1929. p. 143
- 16 The All-Union Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions, convened by the Communist Academy of the C.E.C., U.S.S.R., was held December 20-27, 1929. The 302 delegates who attended it represented scientific research institutions, agricultural and economic colleges, and newspapers and magazines. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech "Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R." at the concluding plenary meeting on December 27. p. 147

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- ¹⁷ See *Lenin Miscellany* XI, p. 368. p. 154
- ¹⁸ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 7-8. p. 154
- ¹⁹ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, p. 483. p. 155
- ²⁰ F. Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany*, 1922, p. 66 (see also K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1955, p. 435). p. 158
- ²¹ See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 85-101. p. 163
- ²² See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 211-15. p. 173
- ²³ *Za Rubezhom (Abroad)*—a magazine founded in 1930 by Maxim Gorky. From 1932 to 1938 it appeared as a magazine-news-paper. p. 181
- ²⁴ *Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)*—a military and political daily newspaper founded in January 1924. In March 1953 it became the central organ of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defence. p. 184
- ²⁵ See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-82. p. 185
- ²⁶ For the Sixteenth Party Conference resolution on “Ways and Means of Promoting Agriculture and Tax Relief for the Middle Peasant,” see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 455-69. p. 185
- ²⁷ See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 350-68. p. 186
- ²⁸ For the Fifteenth Party Congress resolution on “Directives for the Compilation of a Five-Year Economic Plan,” see

- Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 330-49.* p. 186
- ²⁹ See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-21.* p. 186
- ³⁰ Students of the Y. M. Sverdlov Communist University. p. 190
- ³¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 431. p. 190
- ³² V. I. Lenin, "Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, p. 171). p. 190
- ³³ "Rubinism" and "mechanism"—anti-Marxist revisionist trends in political economy. Rubin, a Menshevik, revised Marx's teaching from an idealist bourgeois standpoint, emasculated its revolutionary content and criminally diverted the attention of economists from the study of questions of Soviet economy and led them into the realm of scholastic disputes and abstractions. "Mechanism" distorted Marxism in philosophy and political economy from the vulgar mechanistic standpoint, and was equivalent to denying materialist dialectics and replacing it by the bourgeois theory of equilibrium. One of the chief exponents of mechanism was Bukharin, ideologist of the Right deviators. In the sphere of political economy, the mechanists denied the internal contradictions of capitalist society and the historically transient character of its laws of development, and extended the laws of capitalism to Soviet socialist society. p. 196
- ³⁴ This resolution of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) was published in *Pravda*, No. 73, March 15, 1930. (See also *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 548-51.*) p. 207
- ³⁵ For the resolution of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) of January 5, 1930, on "The Rate of Collectivisation and State Meas-

ures to Assist Collective-Farm Development” see also *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 544-47. p. 213

- ³⁶ The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in Moscow, June 26-July 13, 1930, discussed the political and organisational reports of the Party's Central Committee; the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, the Central Control Commission, and the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Executive Committee of the Comintern; and reports on fulfilment of the five-year plan in industry, on the collective-farm movement and the promotion of agriculture, and on the tasks of the trade unions in the reconstruction period. The congress unanimously approved the political line and activities of the Central Committee and instructed it to continue to ensure Bolshevik rates of socialist construction, to achieve fulfilment of the five-year plan in four years, and to carry out unswervingly the sweeping socialist offensive along the whole front and the elimination of the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation. The congress noted the momentous importance of the crucial change in the development of agriculture, thanks to which the collective-farm peasantry had become a real and stable support of the Soviet regime. The congress instructed the Party's Central Committee to continue to pursue a firm policy of peace and to strengthen the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R. The congress issued directives: that heavy industry should be developed to the utmost and a new, powerful coal and metallurgical base created in the eastern part of the country; that the work of all the mass organisations should be reconstructed and the role of the trade unions in socialist construction increased; that all workers and the masses of the working people should be drawn into the socialist emulation movement. The congress completely exposed the Right opportunists as agents of the kulaks within the Party, and declared that the views of the Right opposition were incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The congress instructed the Party organisations to intensify the fight against deviations on the national question

—against dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism—and to firmly carry out the Leninist national policy, which ensures the broad development of the cultures—national in form and socialist in content—of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Sixteenth Congress is known in the history of the Party as the congress of the sweeping offensive of socialism along the whole front, of the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and of the realisation of complete collectivisation. J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on June 27, and replied to the discussion on the report on July 2. (For the Sixteenth Congress, of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 481-84. For the decisions of the Congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 553-616.) p. 242

37 The Federal Reserve System was instituted in the U.S.A. in 1913. Twelve Federal Reserve Banks in the major centres of the country co-ordinate and control all the activities of the American banks and are an instrument of monopoly capital. The System is headed by a Federal Reserve Board (re-named in 1933 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), the members of which are appointed by the U.S. President, and which is completely under the thumb of the financial magnates. The American bourgeois economists—apologists of American capitalism—and financial and government circles in the U.S.A. considered that the Federal Reserve System would safeguard the country's economy against crises. The attempts of President Hoover to cope with the crisis that broke out in 1929 with the help of the Federal Reserve System proved a complete failure. p. 249

38 The Young Plan—named after its author, the American banker Young—was a plan for exacting reparations from Germany. It was adopted on June 7, 1929, by a committee of French, British, Italian, Japanese, Belgian, American and German experts, and was finally endorsed at the Hague Conference on January 20, 1930. The plan fixed total German

reparations at 113,900 million marks (in foreign currency), to be paid over a period of 59 years. All reparations receipts and payments were to be handled by the Bank for International Settlements, in which the U.S.A. occupied a dominant position. The establishment of this bank was one of the cardinal points of the Young Plan and was a means by which American monopoly capital could control the trade and currencies of the European countries. The plan relieved German industry of contributions to reparations, the whole burden of which was laid upon the working people. The Young Plan made it possible to speed up the rebuilding of Germany's industrial war potential, which the U.S. imperialists were seeking to achieve with a view to launching aggression against the U.S.S.R. p. 257

- 39 This refers to the treaties and agreements concluded by the imperialist states at a conference in Locarno, Switzerland, held October 5-16, 1925. The Locarno agreements were designed to strengthen the post-war system established in Europe by the Treaty of Versailles, but their effect was to sharpen still more the contradictions between the chief imperialist countries and to stimulate preparation for new wars. (For the Locarno Conference, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 277-83.) p. 257
- 40 Anti-war demonstrations and strikes on August 1, 1929 (the fifteenth anniversary of the outbreak of the imperialist first world war) and protest demonstrations on March 6, 1930, against the rapid growth of unemployment (as a result of the world economic crisis of 1929) took place in many cities and industrial centres of France, Germany, Britain, the U.S.A., Poland and other European and American countries. The protest movement took place wholly under the leadership of the Communist Parties and the Communist International. p. 260
- 41 "Pan-Europe"—a projected bloc of European states against the Soviet Union suggested by the French Foreign Minister Briand in May 1930. Europe, united in a "Federal Union," was to constitute a single anti-Soviet front, and the executive

body of the "Federal Union," the "European Committee," was to be a general staff for preparing an attack on the U.S.S.R. Briand's plan was also designed to establish French hegemony on the European continent, and therefore encountered the opposition of Britain, Italy and the U.S.A. Nothing came of the "Pan-Europe" scheme owing to the contradictions between the imperialist powers. p. 263

- 42 This refers to the pact renouncing war signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, by the U.S.A., France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and the British Dominions. The U.S.S.R. was not invited to take part in the negotiations for the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact, in order that the U.S.S.R. should not be included among the countries to which the proposed pact for renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should apply. Under cover of demagogic talk about "universal peace," the sponsors of the pact (France, U.S.A., Britain) intended to use it as a means of isolating and combating the U.S.S.R. The true purposes of the pact were exposed by the Government of the U.S.S.R. in its statement of August 5, 1928. Under the pressure of public opinion, the American, British and French Governments were compelled to invite the U.S.S.R. to adhere to the pact. The Soviet Government did so and was one of the first to ratify the Kellogg Pact, inviting neighbouring states to conclude an agreement giving immediate effect to its provisions. Such an agreement was signed by the U.S.S.R., Poland, Rumania, Estonia and Latvia in Moscow on February 9, 1929, Turkey and Lithuania adhering to it later. p. 263

- 43 Lena Gold-Fields—a British company which in 1925-30 held a concession in the U.S.S.R. for the exploitation of gold, copper, iron and other deposits in Siberia. By the terms of the concession agreement the Lena Gold-Fields company was obliged to construct new mining enterprises and to reconstruct the plants and mines it had received on lease. In view of the fact that the company did not carry out its obligations and caused the plants, mines and other installations it had received

to fall into decay, the Soviet Government terminated the concession and committed to trial Lena Gold-Fields employees who had engaged in espionage and wrecking activities in the U.S.S.R. p. 264

- 44 The Fifth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., which was held in Moscow, May 20-28, 1929, discussed the following questions: the report of the Government of the U.S.S.R.; the five-year plan of development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R.; the promotion of agriculture and the development of co-operation in the countryside. The central question at the congress was the discussion and adoption of the First Stalin Five-Year Plan. The congress approved the report of the Government of the U.S.S.R., endorsed the five-year plan of development of the national economy, outlined ways and means of promoting agriculture and the development of co-operatives in the countryside, and elected a new Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. p. 278
- 45 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 355 p. 287
- 46 J. V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) (see *Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 312-13). p. 288
- 47 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 393. p. 293
- 48 The plenum of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.) held November 10-17, 1929, discussed the following questions: the control figures for the national economy in 1929-30; results and further tasks of collective-farm development; agriculture in the Ukraine and work in the countryside; the formation of a Union People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.; the fulfilment of the decisions of the July plenum of the C.C.

(1928) on the training of technical cadres. The plenum decided that propaganda of the views of Right opportunism and of conciliation towards it was incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and resolved to expel Bukharin, as the chief exponent and leader of the Right capitulators, from the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). The plenum noted that the Soviet Union had entered a phase of extensive socialist reconstruction of the countryside and development of large-scale socialist agriculture, and outlined a series of concrete measures for strengthening the collective farms and widely developing the collective-farm movement. (For the resolutions of the plenum see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 500-43.) p. 294

- 49 This refers to an appeal of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) "To All Party Members and to All Workers" on developing self-criticism, which was published in *Pravda*, No. 128, June 3, 1928. p. 322
- 50 The decision of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on "Promotion of Workers to Posts in the State Apparatus, and Mass Workers' Control from Below of the Soviet Apparatus (Patronage by Factories)" was published in *Pravda*, No. 74, March 16, 1930. p. 322
- 51 This refers to the decision of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) of May 15, 1930, on "The Work of Uralmet" (a trust embracing the iron and steel industry of the Urals). It was published in *Pravda*, No. 135, May 18, 1930. p. 335
- 52 The decision of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on "The Abolition of Okrugs" was published in *Pravda*, No. 194, July 16, 1930. p. 347
- 53 V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan for the Political Report to the Eleventh Party Congress (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24.) p. 349

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- 54 V. I. Lenin, "How to Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 444). p. 350
- 55 The Eighth Congress of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R. was held December 22-29, 1920. One of the principal questions at the congress was the plan for the electrification of the country, prepared by the State Commission on the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO). In its decision, the congress assessed the electrification plan "as the first step of a great economic undertaking." In a letter to V. I. Lenin in March 1921, J. V. Stalin wrote about the plan for the electrification of Russia: "During the last three days I have had the opportunity to read the symposium: '*A Plan for the Electrification of Russia.*'. . . An excellent, well-compiled book. A masterly draft of a really single and really state economic plan, not in quotation marks. The only Marxist attempt in our time to place the Soviet superstructure of economically backward Russia on a really practical technical and production basis, the only possible one under present conditions" (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 5, p. 50). p. 358
- 56 This refers to the address delivered at a meeting of students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, May 18, 1925 (see J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East," *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 141-42). p. 375
- 57 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, p. 559. p. 378

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*April 1 9 2 9 -June 1 9 3 0*)

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- April 16-23* J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- April 22* At the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)."
- April 23-29* J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Sixteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- April 27* At the Sixteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission for drafting the resolution on ways and means of promoting agriculture and tax relief for the middle peasant.
- April 29* J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- May 1* J. V. Stalin attends the May Day parade of the troops of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital on the Red Square.

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- May 4* J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of Donbas miners.
- May 6* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech in the American Commission of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the Right factionalists in the American Communist Party.
- May 11* J. V. Stalin writes the article, "Emulation and Labour Enthusiasm of the Masses," a foreword to Mikulina's pamphlet, *Emulation of the Masses*. The article is published in *Pravda*, No. 114, May 22.
- May 14* J. V. Stalin delivers speeches on the situation in the American Communist Party at a meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
- May 20-28* J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fifth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
- May 28* At the Fifth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the Union Soviet of the C.E.C., U.S.S.R.
- June 18* J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov have a talk with a delegation of representatives of the timber industry.
- July 9* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade Felix Kon.
- July 10* J. V. Stalin sends a congratulatory message to the Ukrainian Young Communist League on its tenth anniversary. The message is published in *Pravda*, No. 157, July 12.

- July 2* J. V. Stalin is present at exercises of a squadron of the Black Sea Fleet.
- July 25* J. V. Stalin pays a visit to the Cruiser "Chervona Ukraina," attends an amateur concert given by the crew, and makes an entry in the log-book of the cruiser.
- October 30* J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the Special Far Eastern Army on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The message is published in *Trevoga*, No. 52, and *Pravda*, No. 259, November 7.
- November 3* J. V. Stalin writes the article "A Year of Great Change," published in *Pravda*, No 259, November 7.
- November 7* J. V. Stalin attends the parade of the troops of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital on the Red Square on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
- November 10-17* J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- November 13* At a meeting of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech denouncing the factional activities of the leaders of the Bukharin opposition.
- The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to a commission set up for the final draft of the resolution on the control figures for the national economy in 1929-30, and for drafting a resolution on Bukharin's group of Right deviators.

- November 15* The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to a commission set up to draft the final text of a resolution on the results and further tasks of collective-farm development.
- November 29* J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Second Session of the C.E.C., U.S.S.R., fifth convocation.
- December 18* J. V. Stalin's article, "A Necessary Correction," is published in *Pravda*, No. 298.
- December 21* J. V. Stalin writes a reply to all organisations and comrades who sent him congratulations on his fiftieth birthday. The reply is published in *Pravda*, No. 302, December 22.
- December 27* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech to an All-Union Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions "Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R." The speech was published in *Pravda*, No. 309, December 29.

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- January 2* J. V. Stalin's message of greetings to the workers of Stalingrad on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the liberation of the city from the whiteguards is published in *Pravda*, No. 2.
- January 5* On the motion of J. V. Stalin, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) adopts a decision on "The Rate of Collectivisation and State Measures to Assist Collective-Farm Development." The decision was published in *Pravda*, No 6, January 6.

- January 17* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to A. M. Gorky.
- January 19* J. V. Stalin writes the article, "Concerning the Policy of Eliminating the Kulaks as a Class." The article was published in *Pravda*, No. 21, and *Krasnaya Zvezda*, No. 18, January 21.
- January 21* J. V. Stalin attends a memorial meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
- February 9* J. V. Stalin writes the "Reply to the Sverdlov Comrades." It was published in *Pravda*, No. 40, February 10.
- February 13* In response to the request of numerous organizations and general meetings of workers, peasants and Red Army men, J. V. Stalin is awarded a second Order of the Red Banner for his outstanding services on the front of socialist construction. The resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. making the award was published in *Pravda*, No. 53, February 23.
- February 22* J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the First Cavalry Army on the occasion of its tenth anniversary. The message was published in *Pravda*, No. 53, February 23.
- J. V. Stalin writes a reply to a letter from the workers of the Izhevsk factory wishing them success in the fulfilment of their plan of production of munitions for the Red Army. The reply was published in *Izhevskaya Pravda*, No. 51, March 2.

J. V. Stalin attends a celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Red Army and the tenth anniversary of the First Cavalry Army.

- March 2* J. V. Stalin's article, "Dizzy With Success" is published in *Pravda*, No. 60.
- Not later than
March 14* J. V. Stalin works on drafting a decision of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on "The Fight Against Distortions of the Party Line in the Collective-Farm Movement." The decision was published in *Pravda*, No. 73, March 15.
- March 19* J. V. Stalin replies to a letter of Comrade Bezymensky.
- April 3* J. V. Stalin's article, "Reply to Collective-Farm Comrades" is published in *Pravda*, No. 92.
- April 21* J. V. Stalin writes a message to the workers of the Stalin Metal Works, Leningrad, congratulating them on completing ahead of schedule the first powerful turbine to be produced in the U.S.S.R. The message was published in *Leningradskaya Pravda*, No. 112, April 23.
- April 25* J. V. Stalin writes a message of congratulation to the first graduates of the Industrial Academy. The message was published in *Pravda*, No. 115, April 26.
- April 26* J. V. Stalin's message of greetings to the builders of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway on the occasion of the completion of the construction and the opening of through traffic is published in *Pravda*, No. 115.

- May 1* J. V. Stalin attends the May Day military parade and demonstration of the working people of the capital on the Red Square.
- May 10* J. V. Stalin's message of greetings to the Special Cavalry Brigade on the occasion of its tenth anniversary is published in *Pravda*, No. 127.
- May 27* The Krasnaya Presnya and Bauman District Party Conferences elect J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Moscow Regional Party Conference and to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- May 31* J. V. Stalin replies to a letter of Comrade M. Rafail.
- June 16* J. V. Stalin sends a message of greetings to the personnel of the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Works congratulating them on the completion of the building of the works ahead of programme. The message is published in *Pravda*, No. 165, June 17.
- J. V. Stalin writes a reply to a letter of greetings from collective farmers of the Kanevskaya District, Krasnodar territory. The reply is published in *Krasnoye Znamya* (Krasnodar), No. 137, June 18, and in *Pravda*, No. 167, June 19.
- June 17* J. V. Stalin sends a message of greetings to the workers of the Stalingrad Tractor Works congratulating them on the completion and starting ahead of schedule of the first tractor works in the U.S.S.R. The message is published in *Pravda*, No. 166, June 18.

- June 25* J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). The plenum approves the theses prepared by the Political Bureau for the Sixteenth Party Congress and appoints J. V. Stalin to make the report at the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on the first item of the agenda (political report of the Central Committee).
- June 27* J. V. Stalin delivers the political report of the Central Committee at the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

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