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FOREWORD

Since eager enquiries have already been made about the nature of The Stalin Question, it might not be amiss to give the reader an idea of what this book is about and what it is not.

This is not a biography of Stalin, though it contains a lot of biographical material. Neither is it a history of the Stalin era, though there is a great deal of history in it. Those hoping to find just a chain of eulogies on Stalin will be disappointed since more than a half of this compilation is filled with attacks on Stalin—not only from his known adversaries like Trotsky, Kamenev and Khrushchev but also from his mentor and preceptor Lenin. This by no means implies that the book aims at an overall rejection of Stalin and his works. Considerable parts of it will be found to contain warm positive appraisal of Stalin’s contribution to the development of the Soviet Union and of the communist movement in general.

While roving over vast rural and urban tracts of India I had the privilege of having discussions on Stalin, on the future of the Soviet Union and China and on Socialist revolution in general with all sorts of people, ranging from the raw village youth to the seasoned university scholar. The present compilation may be said to have grown out of these discussions. To avoid too much intricacy, however, I have confined myself to the questions raised about Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and since. Instead of trying to answer the questions myself, I have brought before the reader a selection of documents—speeches, articles, letters and memoirs—from a close study of which he may find his own answer. These documents will often be found to juxtapose
diametrically opposite views, and they have been chosen and set with utmost care so that they do not inadvertently impose the compiler’s views on the reader. Efforts have been made to arrange the materials (with introductory notes where necessary) in such a way as to enable the reader to judge every issue through comparative study and to make his own evaluation of Stalin.

Although I have tried to be impartial, I must admit that I hold a definite political opinion in the matter. The reader who wishes to know my personal evaluation of Stalin may turn to the last editorial article, though I should advise him to do so only after he has gone through the whole book.

Doubtless, many readers will find this compilation incomplete and wanting in many respects. I shall, however, consider my labours rewarded if this compilation helps to rouse in my readers a deeper spirit of enquiry and an urge to take part in the great movement not only to interpret the world aright but also to change it.

Banbehari Chakrabarty

CONTENTS

I  N. S. Khrushchev’s Speech Concerning the ‘Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences’, 1956... 1

II  N. S. Khrushchev on Stalin, 1949

Stalinist Friendship of Peoples : Guarantee of Our Motherland’s Invincibility ... 76

III  Lenin’s ‘Testament’

Letter to the Congress ... 82

IV  Kamenev on Stalin at the 14th Congress of the CPSU(B) ... 90

V  Stalin’s Reply to Kamenev ... 93

VI  Lenin with Trotsky against Stalin

After Lenin’s illness—L. Trotsky ... 100

With Lenin against Stalin—L. Trotsky ... 105

Lenin Broke Conclusively With Stalin—L. Trotsky ... 111

VII  Stalin Speaks on Lenin’s ‘Testament’

The Trotskyist Opposition Before And Now—J. V. Stalin ... 113

VIII  Dispute between Lenin and Stalin over the National Question

The Question of Nationalities or ‘Autonomisation’—V. I. Lenin ... 121

Reply to the Discussion on the Central Committee’s Organisational Report (Excerpt)—J. V. Stalin ... 128

Report on National Factors in Party and State Affairs (Excerpt)—J. V. Stalin ... 134

Reply to the Discussion on the Report on National Factors in Party and State Affairs (Excerpt)—J. V. Stalin ... 145
IX On Bureaucracy in the Soviet Administration and the Party

- My Last Talk with Lenin—L. Trotsky ... 152
- The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky's mistakes—V. I. Lenin ... 154
- Speech Closing the Discussion Delivered at the Meeting of the Communist Group of the Second All-Russia Congress of Miners (Excerpt)—V. I. Lenin ... 157
- The Tax in Kind—V. I. Lenin ... 158
- Letter to M. F. Sokolov—V. I. Lenin ... 166
- The Organisational Report of the Central Committee—J. V. Stalin ... 168
- Reply to the Discussion on the Central Committee's Organisational Report—J. V. Stalin ... 173
- Organise Mass Criticism From Below—J. V. Stalin ... 176
- Report to the 17th Party Congress (Excerpt)—J. V. Stalin ... 180

X A Pupil of Lenin

- Reply to the Greetings of the Workers of the Chief Railway Workshops in Tiflis—J. V. Stalin ... 183
- Letter to Ksenofontov (Excerpt)—J. V. Stalin ... 185
- Stalin's talk with the German author Emil Ludwig (Excerpt) ... 185
- Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Brigades (Excerpts)—J. V. Stalin ... 196
- Other Remarks (Excerpt) ... 197

XI Stalin's Military Activities During the October Insurrection and the Civil War Period

- To the People's Commissariat for War—V. I. Lenin ... 199

XII Stalin's Military Leadership During the Great Patriotic War

- A Commander of Genius of the Great Patriotic War—K. Voroshilov ... 205
- On Miscalculation about the Nazi Attack—Marshal Zhukov ... 222
- Stalin as Supreme Commander-in-Chief—Marshal Zhukov ... 231
- Speech at the Reception in the Kremlin in Honour of the Commanders of the Red Army (Excerpt)—J. V. Stalin ... 237

XIII The State Treason Trials 1936-1937-1938

- Last Pleas of Kamenev and Zinoviev Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR ... 241
- Statement of Mr. Dudley Collard ... 243
- The Moscow Correspondent of the News Chronicle Reports ... 244
- Fifth Columnists in Russia: A Study in Hindsight—1941—Joseph E. Davies ... 244

XIV Trotsky on the Significance of Kirov Murder and on the task of the Fourth International

- The Inevitability of a New Revolution—L. Trotsky ... 252

XV The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute

- Letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of CPY ... 257
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH CONCERNING THE
"CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES", FEBRUARY 25, 1956

[On February 24-25, 1956, at midnight, Nikita S. Khrushchev, as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered a report on Stalin and the “cult of the individual”, to a closed session of the Party's Twentieth Congress. Fraternal delegates from foreign communist parties were barred from this session. This special session was so secret that it was never mentioned in the columns of Pravda even.]

The original Russian text of Khrushchev's “personality cult” report has never been officially published. But the information concerning this speech could not be suppressed for long. Different versions of the speech began to be reported by foreign journalists immediately after. Though certain stringent measures were taken to suppress this information inside Russia, there is reason to believe that the authors of this speech intended its widest circulation in the Western countries.

On June 4, 1956, the United States Department of State released an English translation of the text of the Khrushchev speech with the following introduction:

"The Department of State has recently obtained from a confidential source a copy of a document which purports to be a version of the speech of Party First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev at a session of the Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956. The session was limited in attendance to the delegates from the U.S.S.R."
The document is being released in response to many inquiries. This version is understood to have been prepared for the guidance of the party leadership of a Communist Party outside of the U.S.S.R. The Department of State does not vouch for the authenticity of the document and in releasing it intends that the document speak for itself."

Some "Marxists", who prefer to maintain a policy of "equidistance" in the ideological debate on international communist movement, still pretend to doubt the authenticity of Khrushchev's "secret speech". But, the contemporary accounts of the speech obtained from Eastern European sources by Reuter's News Service and the Yugoslav Communist Party newspaper Borba, Resolution of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. dated June 30, 1956 published in Pravda dated July 2, 1956 in response to the critical remarks made in the Western Communist Party press, and finally, Khrushchev's speech in the Twenty-second Congress (1961) of the C.P.S.U. attacking the Albanian Party's stand on Stalin, prove the authenticity of the "secret speech" beyond doubt. It is quite possible, however, that in the present version, intended as it was for foreign consumption, certain details of the speech as originally delivered might have been omitted.

As Khrushchev's "secret speech" is a document of major importance for the study of the different currents in the world communist movement, we reproduce below the whole speech and as text we follow the U. S. State Department version.

Comrades! In the report of the Central Committee of the party at the Twentieth Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenary CC/CPSU (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) sessions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences.

After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the party began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behaviour.¹

Such a belief about a man, and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated among us for many years.

The objective of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin's life and activity. Concerning Stalin's merits, an entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had already been written in his lifetime. The role of Stalin in the preparation and execution of the Socialist Revolution, in the Civil War, and in the fight for the construction of socialism in our country is universally known. Everyone knows this well. At present we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the party now and for the future —[we are concerned] with how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of party principles, of party democracy, of revolutionary legality.

Because of the fact that not all as yet realize fully the practical consequences resulting from the cult of the individual, the great harm caused by the violation of the principle of collective leadership of the party and because of the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of one person—the Central Committee of the party considers it absolutely necessary to make the material pertaining to this matter available to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual. In a letter to the German poli-
tical worker, Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated: “From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my merits and which annoyed me. I did not even reply to them, except sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute. Lassalle subsequently did quite the opposite.”

Some time later Engels wrote: “Both Marx and I have always been against any public manifestation with regard to individuals, with the exception of cases when it had an important purpose; and we most strongly opposed such manifestations which during our lifetime concerned us personally.”

The great modesty of the genius of the Revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin had always stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing and organizational role of the party as a living and creative organism, and also the role of the Central Committee.

Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the working class in directing the revolutionary liberation movement.

While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly condemned every manifestation of the cult of the individual, inexorably combated the views alien to Marxism, about the “hero” and the “crowd” and countered all efforts to oppose a “hero” to the masses and to the people.

Lenin taught that the party’s strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact that behind the party follow the people—workers, peasants and intelligentsia. “Only he will win and retain power,” said Lenin, “who believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the living creativeness of the people.”

Lenin spoke with pride about the Bolshevik Communist Party as the leader and teacher of the people; he called for the presentation of all the most important questions before the opinion of the conscious workers, before the opinion of their party. He said [of the party], “We believe in it, we see in it the wisdom, the honour, and the conscience of our epoch.”

Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at belittling or weakening the directing role of the party in the structure of the Soviet state. He worked out Bolshevik principles of party leadership and norms of party life, stressing that the guiding principle of party leadership is its collegiality [leadership by a group]. Already during the pre-revolutionary years Lenin called the Central Committee of the party a collective of leaders and the guardian and interpreter of party principles. “During the period between congresses,” pointed out Lenin, “the Central Committee guards and interprets the principles of the party.”

Underlining the role of the Central Committee of the party and its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out: “Our Central Committee constituted itself as a closely centralized and highly authoritative group...”

During Lenin’s life the Central Committee of the party was a real expression of collective leadership of the party and of the nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views on his co-workers. He tried to convince; he patiently explained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently observed that the norms of party life were realized, that the party congresses and the plenary sessions of the Central Committee took place at the proper intervals.

In addition to the great accomplishments of V. I. Lenin for the victory of the working class and of the working peasants, for the victory of our party and for the application of the ideas of scientific communism to life, his acute mind expressed itself also in this—that he detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave-
consequences. Fearing the future fate of the party and of the Soviet nation, V. I. Lenin made a completely correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of the Secretary General because of the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a proper attitude towards his comrades, that he is capricious and abuses his power.

In December 1922, in a letter to the Party Congress, Vladimir Ilyich wrote: "After taking over the position of Secretary General, Comrade Stalin accumulated in his hands immeasurable power and I am not certain whether he will be always able to use this power with the required care."

This letter—a political document of tremendous importance known in the party history as Lenin's "testament"—was distributed among the delegates to the Twentieth Party Congress. You have read it and will undoubtedly read it again more than once. You might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expression is given to Vladimir Ilyich's anxiety concerning the party, the people, the state, and the future direction of the party policy.

Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us communists, becomes a defect which can not be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man who, above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness and a more considerate attitude towards the comrades, a less capricious temper etc..." 4

This document of Lenin's was made known to the delegates at the Thirteenth Party Congress, who discussed the question of transferring Stalin from the position of Secretary General. The delegates declared themselves in favour of retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he would heed the critical remarks of Vladimir Ilyich and would be able to overcome the defects which caused Lenin serious anxiety.

Comrades! The Party Congress should become acquainted with two new documents, which confirm Stalin's character as already outlined by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in his "testament". These documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya to Kamenev, who was at that time head of the Political Bureau, and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin.

I will now read these documents:

Lev Borisovich!

Because of a short letter which I had written in words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by permission of doctors, Stalin allowed himself yesterday an unusually rude outburst directed at me. This is not my first day in the party. During all these 30 years I have never heard from any comrade one word of rudeness. The business of the party and of Ilyich are not less dear to me than to Stalin. I need at present the maximum of self-control. What one can and what one cannot discuss with Ilyich—I know better than any doctor, because I know what makes him nervous and what does not, in any case I know better than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigory [Zinoviev], as much closer comrades of V. I., and I beg you to protect me from rude interference with my private life and from vile invectives and threats. I have no doubt as to what will be the unanimous decision of the Control Commission, with which Stalin sees fit to threaten me; however, I have neither the strength nor the time to waste on this foolish quarrel. And I am a living person and my nerves are strained to the utmost.

N. Krupskaya

Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on December 23, 1922. After two and a half months, in March 1923, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin sent Stalin the following letter:
To Comrade Stalin:
Copies for Kamenev and Zinoviev.
Dear Comrade Stalin!
You permitted yourself, a rude summons of my wife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her. Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget what was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev heard about it from her. I have no intention to forget so easily that which is being done against me, and I need not stress here that I consider as directed against me that which is being done against my wife. I ask you, therefore, that you weigh carefully whether you are agreeable to retracting your words and apologizing or whether you prefer the severance of relations between us.

Sincerely:
Lenin
March 5, 1923

(Commotion in the hall)

Comrades! I will not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in this manner during Lenin's life, could behave thus towards Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya—whom the party knows well and values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and as an active fighter for the cause of the party since its creation—we can easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negative characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last years acquired an absolutely insufferable character.

As later events have proven, Lenin's anxiety was justified: in the first period after Lenin's death Stalin still paid attention to his [i.e., Lenin's] advice, but later he began to disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.

When we analyze the practice of Stalin in regard to the direction of the party and of the country, when we pause to consider everything which Stalin perpetrated, we must be convinced that Lenin's fears were justified. The negative characteristics of Stalin, which in Lenin's time, were only incipient, transformed themselves during the last years into a grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party.

We have to consider seriously and analyze correctly this matter in order that we may preclude any possibility of a repetition in any form whatever of what took place during the life of Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate collegiality in leadership and in work, and who practised brutal violence, not only toward everything which opposed him, but also toward that which seemed, to his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his concepts.

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient co-operation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint and the correctness of his position, was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This was especially true during the period following the Seventeenth Party Congress, when many prominent party leaders and rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism.

We must affirm that the party fought a serious fight against the Trotskyites, the Rightists, and Bourgeois Nationalists, and that it disarmed ideologically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological fight was carried on successfully, as a result of which the party became strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a positive role.

The party led a great political-ideological struggle against those in its own ranks who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who represented a political line hostile to the party and to the cause of socialism. This was a stubborn and difficult fight but a necessary one, because the political line of both the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinistes led actually toward the restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world...
bourgeoisie. Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in 1928-1929 the political line of right deviation had prevailed among us, or orientation toward “cotton-dress industrialization”, or toward the kulak, etc. We would not now have a powerful heavy industry, we would not have the kolkhozes, we would find ourselves disarmed and weak in a capitalist encirclement.

It was for this reason that the party led an inexorable ideological fight and explained to all party members and to non-party masses the harm and the danger of the anti-Leninist proposals of the Trotskyite opposition and the rightist opportunists. And this great work of explaining the party line bore fruit; both the Trotskyites and the rightist opportunists were politically isolated; the overwhelming party majority supported the Leninist line and the party was able to awaken and organize the working masses to apply the Leninist party line and to build socialism.

Worth noting is the fact that, even during the progress of the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites, the Bukharinites and others, extreme repressive measures were not used against them. The fight was on ideological grounds. But some years later, when socialism in our country was fundamentally constructed, when the exploiting classes were generally liquidated, when the Soviet social structure had radically changed, when the social basis for political movements and groups hostile to the party had violently contracted, when the ideological opponents of the party had long since been defeated politically—then the repression directed against them began.

It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repression through the Government apparatus was born, first against the enemies of Leninism—Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, long since politically defeated by the party—and subsequently also against many honest communists, against those party cadres who had borne the heavy load of the Civil War and the first and most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization, who actively fought against the Trotskyites and the rightists for the Leninist party line.⁷

Stalin originated the concept “enemy of the people”. This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations. This concept “enemy of the people” actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one’s views known on this or that issue, even those of a practical character. In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the “confession” of the accused himself; and as subsequent investigation proved, “confessions” were secured through physical pressures against the accused. This laid to glaring violations of revolutionary legality and to the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the past had defended the party line, became victims.

We must assert that, in regard to those persons who in time had opposed the party line, there were often no sufficiently serious reasons for their physical annihilation. The formula “enemy of the people” was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals.

It is a sad fact that many persons who were later annihilated as enemies of the party and people had worked with Lenin during his life. Some of these persons had made errors during Lenin’s life, but despite this, Lenin benefited by their work; he corrected them and he did everything possible to retain them in the ranks of the party; he induced them to follow him.

In this connection the delegates to the Party Congress should familiarize themselves with an unpublished note by V. I. Lenin directed to the Central Committee’s Political
Bureau in October 1920. Outlining the duties of the Control Commission, Lenin wrote that the Commission should be transformed into a real "organ of party and proletarian conscience."

"As a special duty of the Control Commission there is recommended a deep individualized relationship with and sometimes even a type of therapy for, the representatives of the so-called opposition—those who have experienced a psychological crisis because of failure in their Soviet or party career. An effort should be made to quiet them, to explain the matter to them in a way used among comrades, to find for them (avoiding the method of issuing orders) a task for which they are psychologically fitted. Advice and rules relating to this matter are to be formulated by the Central Committee's Organizational Bureau, etc."

Everyone knows how irreconcilable Lenin was with the ideological enemies of Marxism, with those who deviated from the correct party line. At the same time, however, Lenin, as is evident from the given document, in his practice in leading the party demanded the most intimate party contact with people who had shown indecision or temporary non-conformity with the party line, but whom it was possible to return to the party path. Lenin advised that such people should be patiently educated without the application of extreme methods.

Lenin's wisdom in dealing with people was evident in his work with cadres.

An entirely different relationship with people characterized Stalin. Lenin's traits—patient work with people, stubborn and painstaking education of them, the ability to induce people to follow him without using compulsion, but rather through the ideological influence on them of the whole collective—were entirely foreign to Stalin. He discarded the Leninist method of convincing and educating, he abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repression and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time often violating all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws.

Arbitrary behaviour by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even despair.

This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the party ranks and of all strata of working people, but, on the contrary, brought about annihilation and the expulsion from the party of workers who were loyal but inconvenient to Stalin.

Our party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for the construction of socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this fight, had the party's devotion to principles been skilfully combined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted but rather drawn to our side, we certainly would not have ad such a brutal violation of revolutionary legality and many thousands of people would not have fallen victim to the method of terror. Extraordinary methods would then have been resorted to only against those people who had in fact committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.

Let us recall some historical facts.

In the days before the October Revolution, two members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party—Kamenev and Zinoviev—declared themselves against Lenin's plan for an armed uprising. In addition, on October 18, they published in the Menshevik newspaper, Novaya Zhizn, a statement declaring that the Bolsheviks were making preparations for an uprising and that they consider it adventuristic. Kamenev and Zinoviev thus disclosed to the enemy the decision of the Central Committee to stage the uprising, and that the uprising had been organised to take place within the very near future.

This was treason against the party and against the Revolution. In this connection, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Kamenev
and Zinoviev revealed the decision of the Central Committee of their party on the armed uprising to Rodzyanko and Kerensky..." He put before the Central Committee the question of Zinoviev's and Kamenev's expulsion from the party.

However, after the Great Socialist October Revolution, as is known, Zinoviev and Kamenev were given leading positions. Lenin put them in positions in which they carried out most responsible party tasks and participated actively in the work of the leading party and Soviet organs. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev committed a number of other serious errors during Lenin's life. In his "testament" Lenin warned that "Zinoviev's and Kamenev's October episode was of course not an accident." But Lenin did not pose the question of their arrest and certainly not their shooting. 8

Or, let us take the example of the Trotskyites. At present after a sufficiently long historical period, we can speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyze this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois society. Part of them belonged to the party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers. We can name many individuals who, in their time, joined the Trotskyites; however, these same individuals took an active part in the workers’ movement before the Revolution, during the Socialist October Revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people? We are deeply convinced that, had Lenin lived, such an extreme method would not have been used against any of them.

Such are only a few historical facts. But can it be said that Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means against enemies of the Revolution when this was actually necessary? No; no one can say this. Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the Revolution and of the working class and when necessary resorted ruthlessly to such methods. You will recall only V. I. Lenin's fight with the Social Revolutionary organizers of the anti-Soviet uprising, with the counter-revolutionary kulaks in 1918 and with others, when Lenin without hesitation used the most extreme methods against the enemies. Lenin used such methods, however, only against actual class enemies and not against those who blunder, who err, and whom it was possible to lead through ideological influence and even retain in the leadership. 9 Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes were still in existence and were vigorously opposing the Revolution, when the struggle for survival was decidedly assuming the sharpest forms, even including a civil war.

Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the Revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated and socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically.

It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the Soviet Government. Here we see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once so alarmed V. I. Lenin.

Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Beria gang, 10 the Central Committee looked into a series of matters fabricated by this gang. This revealed a very ugly picture of brutal willfulness connected with the incorrect behaviour of Stalin. As facts prove, Stalin, using his unlimited power, allowed him—
self many abuses, acting in the name of the Central Committee, not asking for the opinion of the Committee members nor even of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau; often he did not inform them about his personal decisions concerning very important party and governmental matters.

Considering the question of the cult of an individual, we must first of all show everyone what harm this caused to the interests of our party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the party's role and significance in the direction of the Socialist government of workers and peasants; he saw in this the chief pre-condition for a successful building of socialism in our country. Pointing to the great responsibility of the Bolshevik party, as the ruling party of the Soviet state, Lenin called for the most meticulous observance of all norms of party life; he called for the realization of the principles of collegiality in the direction of the party and the state.

Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of our party, a party built on the principles of democratic centralism. "This means," said Lenin, "that all party matters are accomplished by all party members—directly or through representatives—who, without any exceptions, are subject to the same rules; in addition, all administrative members, all directing collegia, all holders of party positions are elective, they must account for their activities and are recallable."

It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the most careful observance of these principles. There was no matter so important that Lenin himself decided it without asking for the advice and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members or of Central Committee's Political Bureau. In the most difficult period for our party and our country, Lenin considered it necessary regularly to convene congresses, party conferences and plenary sessions of the Central Committee at which all the most important questions were discussed and where resolutions, carefully worked out by the collective of leaders, were approved.

We can recall, for an example, the year 1918 when the country was threatened by the attack of the imperialistic interventionists. In this situation the Seventh Party Congress was convened in order to discuss a vitally important matter which could not be postponed—the matter of peace. In 1919, while the Civil War was raging, the Eighth Party Congress convened, which adopted a new party programme, decided such important matters as the relationship with the peasant masses, the organization of the Red Army, the leading role of the party in the work of the Soviets, the correction of the social composition of the party, and other matters. In 1920, the Ninth Party Congress was convened, which laid down guiding principles pertaining to the party's work in the sphere of economic construction. In 1921, the Tenth Party Congress accepted Lenin's New Economic Policy and the historical resolution called About Party Unity.

During Lenin's life, party congresses were convened regularly; always when a radical turn in the development of the party and the country took place, Lenin considered it absolutely necessary that the party discuss at length all the basic matters pertaining to internal and foreign policy and to questions bearing on the development of party and government.

It is very characteristic that Lenin addressed to the Party Congress as the highest party organ his last articles, letters and remarks. During the period between congresses, the Central Committee of the party, acting as the most authoritative leading collective, meticulously observed the principles of the party and carried out its policy.

So it was during Lenin's life. Were our party's holy Leninist principles observed after the death of Vladimir Ilyich?

Whereas, during the first few years after Lenin's death, party congresses and Central Committee plenum took place more or less regularly, later when Stalin began increasingly to abuse his power, these principles were brutally violated. This was especially evident during the last 15 years of his life. Was
it a normal situation when over 13 years elapsed between the Eighteenth and the Nineteenth Party Congresses, years during which our party and our country had experienced so many important events? These events demanded categorically that the party should have passed resolutions pertaining to the country's defence during the Patriotic War [World War II] and to peacetime construction after the war. Even after the end of the war a congress was not convened for over seven years. Central Committee plenums were hardly ever called. It should be sufficient to mention that during all the years of the Patriotic War not a single Central Committee plenum took place. It is true that there was an attempt to call a Central Committee plenum in October 1941, when Central Committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited two days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and talk to the Central Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and how hautishly and disdainfully he treated the Central Committee members.

In practice, Stalin ignored the norms of party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective party leadership.

Stalin’s wilfulness vis-a-vis the party and its Central Committee became fully evident after the Seventeenth Party Congress which took place in 1934.

Having at its disposal numerous data showing brutal arbitrariness toward party cadres, the Central Committee has created a party Commission under the control of the Central Committee Presidium; it was charged with investigating what made possible the mass repressions against the majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

The Commission has become acquainted with a large quantity of materials in the NKVD archives and with other documents and has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against communists, to false accusations, to glaring abuses of socialist legality, which resulted in the death of innocent people. It became apparent that many party, Soviet and economic activists, who were branded in 1937-38 as "enemies", were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest communists; they were only so stigmatized and, often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves (at the order of the investigative judges—falsifiers) with all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes.

The Commission has presented to the Central Committee Presidium lengthy and documented materials pertaining to mass repressions against the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress and against members of the Central Committee elected at that Congress. These materials have been studied by the Presidium of the Central Committee.

It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates of the party's Central Committee who were elected at the Seventeenth Congress, 98 persons i.e. 70 percent, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-38). (Indignation in the hall)

What was the composition of the delegates to the Seventeenth Congress? It is known that 80 percent of the voting participants of the Seventeenth Congress joined the party during the years of conspiracy before the Revolution and during the Civil War; this means before 1921. By social origin the basic mass of the delegates to the Congress were workers (60 percent of the voting members).

For this reason, it was inconceivable that a congress so composed would have elected a Central Committee a majority of whom would prove to be enemies of the party. The only reason why 70 percent of Central Committee members and candidates elected at the Seventeenth Congress were branded as enemies of the party and of the people was because honest communists were slandered, accusations against them were fabricated, and revolutionary legality was gravely undermined.

The same fate met not only the Central Committee members but also the majority of the delegates to the Seventeenth
Party Congress. Of 1,966 delegates with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108 persons were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority. This very fact shows how absurd, wild and contrary to commonsense were the charges of counter-revolutionary crimes made out, as we now see, against a majority of participants at the Seventeenth Party Congress. 11 (Indignation in the hall)

We should recall that the Seventeenth Party Congress is historically known as the Congress of Victors. Delegates to the congress were active participants in the building of our socialist state; many of them suffered and fought for party interests during the pre-Revolutionary years in the conspiracy and at the Civil War fronts; they fought their enemies valiantly and often nervelessly looked into the face of death.

How, then, can we believe that such people could prove to be “two-faced” and had joined the camps of the enemies of socialism during the era after the political liquidation of Zinovievites, Trotskyites and Rightists and after the great accomplishments of socialist construction? This was the result of the abuse of power by Stalin, who began to use mass terror against the party cadres.

What is the reason that mass repressions against activists increased more and more after the Seventeenth Party Congress? It was because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself above the party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the party.

While he still reckoned with the opinion of the collective before the Seventeenth Congress, after the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Bukharinites, when as a result of that fight and socialist victories the party achieved unity, Stalin ceased to an ever greater degree to consider the party’s Central Committee and even the members of the Political Bureau. Stalin thought that now he could decide all things alone and all he needed were people to fill the stage; he treated all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise him.

After the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov, 12 mass repressions and brutal acts of violation of socialist legality began. On the evening of December 1, 1934, on Stalin’s initiative (without the approval of the Political Bureau—which approved it two days later, casually) the Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, Yenukidze, signed the following directive:

“1. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or execution of acts of terror.

“II. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of death sentences pertaining to crimes of this category in order to consider the possibility of pardon, because the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, U.S.S.R. does not consider as possible the receiving of petitions of this sort.

“III. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs are directed to execute the death sentences against criminals of the above-mentioned category immediately after the passage of sentences.”

This directive became the basis for mass acts of abuse against socialist legality. During many of the fabricated court cases the accused were charged with “the preparation” of terroristic acts; this deprived them of any possibility that their cases might be re-examined, even when they stated before the court that their “confessions” were secured by force, and when, in a convincing manner, they disproved the accusations against them.

It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov’s murder 13 hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of Kirov.

A month and a half before the killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious behaviour but he was
released and not even searched. It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an interrogation, on December 2, 1934, he was killed in a car “accident” in which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organizers of Kirov’s killing. *(Movement in the hall)*

Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov, dated from Sochi on September 25, 1936, was addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov and other members of the Political Bureau. The content of the telegram was as follows:

“We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU [*secret police*] is four years behind in this matter. This is noted by all party workers and by the majority of the representatives of the NKVD.”

Strictly speaking, we should stress that Stalin did not meet with and, therefore, could not know the opinion of party workers.

This Stalinist formulation that the “NKVD [*term used interchangeably with OGPU*] is four years behind” in applying mass repression and that there is a necessity for “catching up” with the neglected work directly pushed the NKVD workers on the path of mass arrests and executions.

We should state that this formulation was also forced on the February-March plenary session of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1937. The plenary resolution approved it on the basis of Yezhov’s report, “Lessons Flowing from the Harmful Activity, Diversification and Espionage of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite Agents”, stating:

“The plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that all facts revealed during the investigation into the matter of an anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre and of its followers in the provinces show that the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs has fallen behind at least four years in the attempt to unmask these most inexorable enemies of the people."

The mass repressions at this time were made under the slogan of a fight against the Trotskyites. Did the Trotskyites at this time actually constitute such a danger to our party and to the Soviet state? We should recall that in 1927, on the eve of the Fifteenth Party Congress, only some 4,000 votes were cast for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition while there were 724,000 for the party line. During the ten years which passed between the Fifteenth Party Congress and the February-March Central Committee plenum, Trotskyism was completely disarmed; many former Trotskyites had changed their former views and worked in the various sectors building socialism. It is clear that in the situation of socialist victory there was no basis for mass terror in the country.14

Stalin’s report at the February-March Central Committee plenum in 1937, *Deficiencies of Party Work and Methods for the Liquidation of the Trotskyites and of Other Two-Facers*, contained an attempt at theoretical justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that as we march forward toward socialism class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this.

Actually Lenin taught that the application of revolutionary violence is necessitated by the resistance of the exploiting classes, and this referred to the era when the exploiting classes existed and were powerful. As soon as the nation’s political situation had improved, when in January 1920, the Red Army took Rostov and thus won a most important victory over Denikin, Lenin instructed Dzerzhinsky to stop mass terror
and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin justified this important political move of the Soviet state in the following manner in his report at the session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee on February 2, 1920:

“We were forced to use terror because of the terror practised by the Entente, when strong world powers threw their hordes against us, not avoiding any type of conduct. We would not have lasted two days had we not answered these attempts of officers and White Guardists in a merciless fashion; this meant the use of terror but this was forced upon us by the terrorist method of the Entente.

“But as soon as we attained a decisive victory, even before the end of the war, immediately after taking Rostov, we gave up the use of the death penalty and thus proved that we intend to execute our own programme in the manner that we promised. We say that the application of violence flows out of the decision to crush the capitalists; as soon as this was accomplished we gave up the use of all extraordinary methods. We have proved this in practice.”

Stalin deviated from these clear and plain precepts of Lenin. Stalin put the party and the NKVD up to the use or mass terror when the exploiting classes had been liquidated in our country and when there were no serious reasons for the use of extraordinary mass terror.

This terror was actually directed not at the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes but against the honest workers of the party and of the Soviet state; against them were made lying, slanderous and absurd accusations concerning: “two-facedness,” “espionage,” “sabotage,” preparation of fictitious “plots,” etc.

At the February-March Central Committee plenum in 1937 many members actually questioned the rightness of the established course regarding mass repressions under the pretext of combating “two-facedness”.

Comrade Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts. He said:

“I have philosophized that the severe years of fighting have passed. Party members who have lost their backbones have broken down or have joined the camp of the enemy; healthy elements have fought for the party. These were the years of industrialization and collectivization. I never thought it possible that after this severe era had passed Karpov and people like him would find themselves in the camp of the enemy. (Karpov was a worker in the Ukrainian Central Committee whom Postyshev knew well.) And now, according to the testimony, it appears that Karpov was recruited in 1934 by the Trotskyites. I personally do not believe that in 1934 an honest party member who had trod the long road of unrelenting fight against enemies for the party and for socialism, would now be in the camp of the enemies. I do not believe it...I cannot imagine how it would be possible to travel with the party during the difficult years and then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites. It is an odd thing...”

Movement in the hall

Using Stalin's formulation, namely, that the closer we are to socialism the more enemies we will have, and using the resolution of the February-March Central Committee plenum passed on the basis of Yezhov's report—the provocateurs who had infiltrated the organs of state security, together with conscienceless careerists began to cover with the party name the mass terror against party cadres, cadres of the Soviet state and ordinary Soviet citizens. It should suffice to say that the number of arrests based on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes grew ten times between 1936 and 1937.

It is known that brutal wilfulness was practised against leading party workers. The Party Statutes, approved at the Seventeenth Party Congress, were based on Leninist principles—expressed at the Tenth Party Congress. They stated that in order to apply an extreme method such as exclusion from the party against a Central Committee member, against a Central Committee candidate and against a member of the Party Control Commission, “it is necessary to call a Central Com-
mittee plenum and to invite to the plenum all Central Committee candidate members and all members of the Party Control Commission'; only if two-thirds of the members of such a general assembly of responsible party leaders find it necessary, only then can a Central Committee member or candidate be expelled.16

The majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the Seventeenth Congress and arrested in 1937-1938 were expelled from the party illegally through the brutal abuse of the Party Statutes, because the question of their expulsion was never studied at the Central Committee plenum.

Now, when the cases of some of these so-called "spies" and "saboteurs" were examined, it was found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures.

At the same time, Stalin, as we have been informed by members of the Political Bureau of that time, did not show them the statements of many accused political activists when they retracted their confessions before the military tribunal and asked for an objective examination of their cases. There were many such declarations, and Stalin without doubt knew of them.

The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to inform the Congress of many such fabricated "cases" against the members of the party's Central Committee elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress.

An example of vile provocation, of odious falsification and of criminal violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate member of the Central Committee's Political Bureau, one of the most eminent workers of the party and of the Soviet Government, Comrade Eikhe, who was a party member since 1905.

(Commotion in the hall)

Comrade Eikhe was arrested on April 29, 1938 on the basis of slanderous materials, without the sanction of the Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., which was finally received 15 months after the arrest.

Investigation of Eikhe's case was made in a manner which most brutally violated Soviet legality and was accompanied by wilfulness and falsification.

Eikhe was forced under torture to sign ahead of time a protocol of his confession prepared by the investigative judges, in which he and several other eminent party workers were accused of anti-Soviet activity.

On October 1, 1939, Eikhe sent his declaration to Stalin in which he categorically denied his guilt and asked for an examination of his case. In his declaration he wrote:

"There is no more bitter misery than to sit in jail of a government for which I have always fought."

A second declaration of Eikhe has been preserved which he sent to Stalin on October 27, 1939; in it he cited facts very convincingly and countered the slanderous accusation made against him, arguing that this provocatory accusation was on the one hand the work of real Trotskyites whose arrests he had sanctioned as First Secretary of the West Siberian Krai [Territory] Party Committee and who conspired in order to take revenge on him, and, on the other hand, the result of the base falsification of materials by the investigative judges.

Eikhe wrote in his declaration:

"...On October 25, of this year I was informed that the investigation in my case has been concluded and I was given access to the materials of this investigation. Had I been guilty of only one-hundredth of the crimes with which I am charged, I would not have dared to send you this pre-execution declaration; however, I have not been guilty of even one of the things with which I am charged and my heart is clean of even the shadow of baseness. I have never in my life told you a word of falsehood and now, finding my two feet in the grave, I am also not lying. My whole case is a typical example of provocation, slander and violation of the elementary basis of revolutionary legality..."
"...The confession which were made part of my file are not only absurd but contain some slander of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars because correct resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and of the Council of People's Commissars which were made not on my initiative and without my participation are presented as hostile acts of counter-revolutionary organizations made at my suggestion...

"I am now alluding to the most disgraceful part of my life and to my really grave guilt against the party and against you. This is my confession of counter-revolutionary activity.... The case is as follows: Not being able to suffer the tortures to which I was submitted by Ushakov and Nikolayev—and especially by the first one—who utilized the knowledge that my broken ribs have not properly mended and have caused me great pain, I have been forced to accuse myself and others.

"The majority of my confession has been suggested or dictated by Ushakov, and the remainder is my reconstruction of NKVD materials from Western Siberia for which I assumed all responsibility. If some part of the story which Ushakov fabricated and which I signed did not properly hang together, I was forced to sign another variation. The same thing was also done to Rukhimovich, who was at first designated as a member of the reserve net and whose name later was removed without telling me anything about it; the same was also done with the leader of the reserve net, supposedly created by Bukharin in 1935. At first I wrote my name in, and then I was instructed to insert Mezhlauk. There were other similar incidents.

"...I am asking and begging you that you again examine my case, and this not for the purpose of sparing me but in order to unmask the vile provocation which, like a snake, wound itself around many persons in a great degree due to my meanness and criminal slander. I have never betrayed you.

"...The only plea which he places before the Court is that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) be informed that there is in the NKVD an as yet not liquidated centre which is craftily manufacturing cases, which forces innocent persons to confess; there is no oppor-
in one's nonparticipation in crimes to which the confessions of various persons testify. The investigative methods are such that they force people to lie and to slander entirely innocent persons in addition to those who already stand accused. He asks the Court that he be allowed to inform the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) about all this in writing. He assures the Court that he personally never had any evil design in regard to the policy of our party because he had always agreed with the party policy pertaining to all spheres of economic and cultural activity."

This declaration of Rudzutak was ignored, despite the fact that Rudzutak was in his time the chief of the Central Control Commission which was called into being in accordance with Lenin's concept for the purpose of fighting for party unity. In this manner fell the chief of this highly authoritative party organ, a victim of brutal wilfulness; he was not even called before the Central Committee's Political Bureau because Stalin, did not want to talk to him. Sentence was pronounced on him in 20 minutes and he was shot.

(Indignation in the hall)

After careful examination of the case in 1955, it was established that the accusation against Rudzutak was false and that it was based on slanderous materials. Rudzutak has been rehabilitated posthumously.

The way in which the former NKVD workers manufactured various fictitious "anti-Soviet centres" and "bloc" with the help of provocative methods is seen from the confession of Comrade Rozenblum, party member since 1906, who was arrested in 1937 by Leningrad NKVD.

During the examination in 1955 of the Komarov case Rozenblum revealed the following fact: When Rozenblum was arrested in 1937, he was subjected to terrible torture during which he was ordered to confess false information concerning himself and other persons. He was then brought to the office of Zakovsky, who offered him freedom on condition that he make before the court a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the NKVD concerning "sabotage, espionage and diversion in a terroristic centre in Leningrad."

(Movement in the hall)

With unbelievable cynicism, Zakovsky told about the vile "mechanism" for the crafty creation of fabricated "anti-Soviet plots."

"In order to illustrate it to me", stated Rozenblum, "Zakovsky gave me several possible variants of the organization of this centre and its branches. After he detailed the organization to me, Zakovsky told me that the NKVD would prepare the case of this centre, remarking that the trial would be public. Before the court were to be brought 4 or 5 members of this centre: Chudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, Shaposhnikova (Chudov's wife) and others together with 2 or 3 members from the branches of this centre...

"...The case of the Leningrad centre has to be built solidly, and for this reason witnesses are needed. Social origin ( of course, in the past ) and the party standing of the witness will play more than a small role.

"'You, yourself,' said Zakovsky, 'will not need to invent anything. The NKVD will prepare for you a ready outline for every branch of the centre; you will have to study it carefully and to rememner well all questions and answers which the court might ask. This case will be ready in four-five months, or perhaps a half year. During all this time you will be preparing yourself so that you will not compromise the investigation and yourself. Your future will depend on how the trial goes and on its results. If you begin to lie and testify falsely, blame yourself. If you manage to endure it, you will save your head and we will feed and clothe you at the Government's cost until your death.'"

These are the kind of vile things which were then practised.

(Movement in the hall)

Even more widely was the falsification of cases practised in...
the provinces. The NKVD headquarters of the Sverdlov Oblast "discovered" the so-called "Ural Uprising Staff"—an organ of the bloc of rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, church leaders—whose chief, supposedly, was the Secretary of the Sverdlov Oblast Party Committee and member of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Kabakov, who had been a party member since 1914. The investigative materials of that time show that in almost all krais, oblasts (provinces) and republics there, supposedly, existed "rightist Trotskyite, espionage-terror and diversionary-sabotage organizations and centres" and that the heads of such organizations as a rule—for no known reasons—were first secretaries of oblast or republic Communist Party committees or central committees.

(Movement in the hall)

Many thousands of honest and innocent communists have died as a result of this monstrous falsification of such "cases" as a result of the fact that all kinds of slanderous "confessions" were accepted and as a result of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and others. In the same manner were fabricated the "cases" against eminent party and state workers—Kossior, Chubar, Postyshev, Kosaryev and others.

In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied which were based on nothing tangible and which resulted in heavy cadre losses to the party.

The vicious practice was condoned of having the NKVD prepare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction of the Military Collegium and whose sentences were prepared in advance. Yezhov would send these lists to Stalin personally for his approval of the proposed punishment. In 1937-1938, 383 such lists containing the names of many thousands of party, Soviet, Komsomol, Army and economic workers were sent to Stalin. He approved these lists.

A large part of these cases are being reviewed now and a great part of them are being voided because they were baseless and falsified. Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present time the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom were rehabilitated posthumously.

Mass arrests of party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of socialist advancement.

Mass repression had a negative influence on the moral-political condition of the party, created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion, and sowed distrust among communists. All sorts of slanderers and careerists were active.

Resolution of the January plenum of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in 1938 brought some measure of improvement to the party organizations. However, widespread repression also existed in 1938. Only because our party had at its disposal such great moral-political strength was it possible for it to survive the difficult events in 1937-1938 and to educate new cadres. There is, however, no doubt that our march forward toward socialism and toward the preparation for the country's defence would have been much more successful were it not for the tremendous loss in the cadres suffered as a result of the baseless and false mass repression in 1937-1938.

We are justly accusing Yezhov for the degenerate practice of 1937. But we have to answer these questions:

Could Yezhov have arrested Kossior, for instance, without the knowledge of Stalin? Was there an exchange of opinions or a Political Bureau decision concerning this?

No, there was not, as there was none regarding other cases of this type.

Could Yezhov have decided such important matters as the fate of such eminent party figures?

No, it would be a display of naivety to consider this the work of Yezhov alone. It is clear that these matters were decided by Stalin, and that without his orders and his sanction.

T. S. Q.—3
Yezhov could not have done this.

We have examined the cases and have rehabilitated Kossior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosaryev and others. For what causes were they arrested and sentenced? The review of evidence shows that there was no reason for this. They, like many others, were arrested without the prosecutor's knowledge.

In such a situation, there is no need for any approval, for what sort of an approval could there be when Stalin decided everything? He was the chief prosecutor in these cases. Stalin not only agreed to but on his own initiative issued arrest orders. We must say this so that the delegates to the Congress can clearly undertake and themselves assess this and draw the proper conclusions.

Facts prove that many abuses were made on Stalin's orders without reckoning with any norms of party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very distrustful man, morbidly suspicious; we knew this from our work with him. He could look at a man and say, "Why are your eyes so shifty today?" or "Why are you turning so much today and why do you avoid looking directly into my eyes?"

The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even toward eminent party workers whom he had known for years. Everywhere and in everything he saw "enemies", "two-facers" and "spies".

Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in great wilfulness and choked a person morally and physically. A situation was created where one could not express one's own will.

When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it was necessary to accept on faith that he was an "enemy of the people". Meanwhile, Beria's gang, which ran the organs of State security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested and the truth of materials which it falsified. And what proofs were offered? The confessions of the arrested. And the investigative judges accepted these "confessions".

And how is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed? Only in one way—because of application of physical methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away of his human dignity. In this manner were "confessions" secured.10

When the wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939, and the leaders of territorial party organizations began to accuse the NKVD workers of using methods of physical pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded telegram on January 20, 1939, to the committee secretaries of oblasts and krais, to the Central Committees of republic Communist parties, to the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of NKVD organizations. The telegram stated:

"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) explains that the application of methods of physical pressure in NKVD practice is permissible from 1937 on in accordance with permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)...It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use methods of physical influence against representatives of the socialist proletariat and that they use them in their most scandalous forms.

"The question arises as to why the socialist intelligence service should be more humanitarian against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against the deadly enemies of the working class and of the kolkhoz workers. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that physical pressure should still be used obligatorily, as an exception applicable to known and obstinate enemies of the people, as a method both justifiable and appropriate."

Thus Stalin sanctioned in the name of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the most brutal violation of socialist legality, torture and oppression, which led as we have seen to the slandering and self-accusation of innocent people.

Not long ago—only several days before the present Congress—we called to the Central Committee Presidium session and interrogated the investigative judge, Rodos, who in
his time investigated and interrogated Kossior, Chubar and Kosaryev. He is a vile person, with the brain of a bird, and morally completely degenerate. And it was this man who was deciding the fate of prominent party workers; he was making judgments also concerning the politics in these matters, because, having established their "crime," he provided there-with materials from which important political implications could be drawn.

The question arises whether a man with such an intellect could alone make the investigation in a manner to prove the guilt of people such as Kossior and others. No, he could not have done it without proper directives. At the Central Committee Presidium session, he told us: "I was told that Kossior and Chubar were people's enemies and for this reason, I, as an investigative judge, had to make them confess that they are enemies."

*Indignation in the hall*

He could do this only through long tortures, which he did, receiving detailed instructions from Beria. We must say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared: "I thought that I was executing the orders of the party."

In this manner, Stalin's orders concerning the use of methods of physical pressure against the arrested were in practice executed.

These and many other facts show that all norms of correct party solution of problems were invalidated and everything was dependent upon the wilfulness of one man.

The power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin, led to serious consequences during the Great Patriotic War.

When we look at many of our novels, films and historical "scientific studies," the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely improbable. Stalin has foreseen everything. The Soviet Army, on the basis of strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called "active defence," i.e. tactics which, as we know allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such tactics, the Soviet Army, supposedly, thanks only to Stalin's genius, turned the offensive and subdued the enemy. The epic victory gained through the armed might of the land of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and "scientific study" as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.

We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance not only from the historical but especially from the political, educational and practical point of view.

What are the facts of this matter?

Before the war, our press and all our political-educational work was characterized by its bragging tone: When an enemy violates the holy Soviet soil, then for every blow of the enemy we will answer three blows, and we will battle the enemy on his soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves. But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts, which would actually guarantee the immunity of our borders.

During the war and after the war, Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy which our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of the "unexpected" attack of the Germans against the Soviet Union. But, comrades, this is completely untrue. As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany he assigned to himself the task of liquidating Communism. The fascists were saying this openly; they did not hide their plans.

In order to attain this aggressive end, all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Many facts from the pre-war period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet state, and that he had concentrated large armed forces, including armoured units, near the Soviet borders.

Documents which have now been published show that by April 3, 1941, Churchill, through his Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans...
had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union.

It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation. He had in this his own imperialistic goals—to bring Germany and the U.S.S.R. into a bloody war and thereby to strengthen the position of British Empire.

Just the same Churchill affirmed in his writings that he sought to “warn Stalin and call his attention to the danger which threatened him.” Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of April 18, and in the following days.21

However, Stalin took no heed of these writings. What is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given to information of this sort, in order not to provoke the initiation of military operations.

We must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources; however, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation.

Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin on May 6, 1941, by the Soviet military attaché, Captain Vorontsov, stated: “Soviet citizen...Bozer communicated to the deputy naval attaché that according to a statement of a certain German officer from Hitler’s headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the U.S.S.R. on May 14, through Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia. At the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and paratroopers landed in border cities....”

In his report of May 22, 1941, the deputy military attaché in Berlin, Khlopov, communicated that “…the attack of the German Army is reportedly scheduled for June 15, but it is possible that it may begin in the first days of June....”

A cable from our London Embassy dated June 18, 1941, stated:

“As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of armed conflict between Germany and the U.S.S.R. which will begin not later than the middle of June. According to Cripps, the Germans have presently concentrated 147 divisions (including air force and service units) along the Soviet borders...”

Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for defence and to prevent it from being caught unawares.

Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes, we had the time and capabilities. Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet Army with everything that it needed. This is proven by the fact that although during the war we lost almost half of our industry and important industrial and food-production areas as the result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and other western parts of the country, the Soviet nation was still able to organize the production of military equipment in the eastern parts of the country, install there equipment taken from the western industrial areas, and supply our armed forces with everything which was necessary to destroy the enemy.

Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the Army with necessary material, our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobilization had not been, however, started in time. And already in the first days of the war it became evident that our Army was badly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the enemy back.

Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of tanks and artillery pieces before the war. But mass production of all this was not organized, and, as a matter of fact, we started to modernize our military equipment only on the eve of the war.

As a result, at the time of the enemy’s invasion of the Soviet land, we did not have sufficient quantities either of old
machinery which was no longer used for armament production or of new machinery which we had planned to introduce into armament production.

The situation with anti-aircraft artillery was especially bad; we did not organize the production of anti-tank ammunition. Many fortified regions proved to be indefensible as soon as they were attacked, because the old arms had been withdrawn and new ones were not yet available there.

This pertained also, not only to tanks, artillery and planes. At the outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient numbers of rifles to arm the mobilized manpower. I recall that in those days I telephoned to Comrade Malenkov from Kiev and told him, "People have volunteered for the new Army and demand arms. You must send us arms."

Malenkov answered me, "We cannot send you arms. We are sending all our rifles to Leningrad and you have to arm yourselves."

(Movement in the hall)

Such was the armament situation.

In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following fact: Shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite Army, Kirponos, who was chief of the Kiev Special Military District (he was later killed at the front) wrote to Stalin that the German armies were at the Bug River, were preparing for an attack and in the very near future would probably start an offensive. In this connection, Kirponos proposed that a strong defence be organized, that 300,000 people be evacuated from the border areas and that several strong points be organized there: antitank ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc.

Moscow answered this proposition with the assertion that this would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken at the borders, that the Germans were not to be given any pretext for the initiation of military action against us. Thus, our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the enemy.

When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operation had begun, Moscow issued the order that the German fire was not to be returned. Why? It was because Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German Army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.

The following fact is also known: On the eve of the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite Army, a certain German citizen crossed our border and stated that the German armies had received orders to start the offensive against the Soviet Union on the night of June 22, at 3 o'clock. Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warning was ignored.

As you see, everything was ignored: warnings of certain Army commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy army, and even the open hostility of the enemy. Is this an example of the alertness of the chief of the party and of the state at this particularly significant historical moment?

And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this disregard of clear facts? The result was that in the first hours and days the enemy destroyed in our border regions a large part of our Air Force, artillery and other military equipment; he annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and disorganized our military leadership; consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.

Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war followed Stalin's annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations. During these years repressions were instituted against certain parts of military cadres beginning literally at the company and battalion commander level and extending to the higher military centres; during this time the cadre of leaders...
who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated.

The policy of large-scale repression against the military cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because, for several years, officers of all ranks and even soldiers in the party and Komsomol cells were taught to "unmask" their superiors as hidden enemies.²²

(Movement in the hall)

It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the first war period.

And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the party and to the Fatherland. Suffice it to say that those of them who managed to survive despite severe tortures to which they were subjected in the prisons have from the first war days shown themselves real patriots and heroically fought for the glory of our Fatherland; I have here in mind such comrades as Rokossovsky (who, as you know, had been jailed), Gorbatov, Maretskov (who is a delegate at the present Congress), Podlas (he was an excellent commander who perished at the front), and many, many others. However, many such commanders perished in camps and jails and the Army saw them no more.

All this brought about the situation which existed at the beginning of the war and which was the greatest threat to our Fatherland.

It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe disaster and defeats at the front, Stalin thought that this was the end. In one of his speeches in those days, he said: "All that which Lenin created we have lost forever."

After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary to take certain steps immediately in order to improve the situation at the front.

Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our

Fatherland in the first period of the war was largely due to the faulty methods of directing the nation and the party by Stalin himself.

However, we speak not only about the moment when the war began, which led to serious disorganization of our Army and brought us severe losses. Even after the war began, the nervousness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated, interfering with actual military operation, caused our Army serious damage.

Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situation which was developing at the front. This was natural because, during the whole Patriotic War, he never visited any section of the front or any liberated city except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk highway during a stabilized situation at the front. To this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts and so many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin was interfering with operations and issuing orders which did not take into consideration the real situation at a given section of the front and which could not help but result in huge personnel losses.

I will allow myself in this connection to bring out one characteristic fact which illustrates how Stalin directed operations at the fronts. There is present at this Congress Marshall Bagramyan who was once the Chief of Operations in the headquarters of the southwestern front and who can corroborate what I will tell you.

When there developed an exceptionally serious situation for our Army in 1942 in the Kharkov region, we had correctly decided to drop an operation whose objective was to encircle Kharkov, because the real situation at that time would have threatened our Army with fatal consequences if this operation were continued.

We communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation demanded changes in operational plans so that the enemy would be prevented from liquidating a sizable concentration of our Army.
Contrary to commonsense, Stalin rejected our suggestion and issued the order to continue the operation aimed at the encirclement of Kharkov, despite the fact that at this time many Army concentrations were themselves actually threatened with encirclement and liquidation.

I telephoned to Vasilevsky and begged him:
"Alexander Mikhailovich, take a map"—Vasilevsky is present here—"and show Comrade Stalin the situation which has developed." We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. 2 3

(Animation in the hall)
Yes, comrades, he used to take the globe and trace the front line on it. I said to Comrade Vasilevsky: "Show him the situation on a map; in the present situation we cannot continue the operation which was planned. The old decision must be changed for the good of the cause."

Vasilevsky replied, saying that Stalin had already studied this problem and that he, Vasilevsky, would not see Stalin further concerning this matter, because the latter did not want to hear any arguments on the subject of this operation.

After my talk with Vasilevsky, I telephoned to Stalin at his villa. But Stalin did not answer the telephone and Malenkov was at the receiver. I told Comrade Malenkov that I was calling from the front and that I wanted to speak personally to Stalin. Stalin informed through Malenkov that I should speak with Malenkov. I stated for the second time that I wished to inform Stalin personally about the grave situation which had arisen for us at the front. But Stalin did not consider it convenient to raise the phone and again stated that I should speak to him through Malenkov although he was only a few steps from the telephone.

After "listening" in this manner to our plea, Stalin said: "Let everything remain as it is!" 2 4

And what was the result of this? The worst that we had expected. The Germans surrounded our Army concentrations and consequently we lost hundreds of thousands of our soldiers.

This is Stalin's military "genius"; this is what it cost us. (Movement in the hall)
On one occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with members of the Political Bureau, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning the Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted.

You should have seen Stalin's fury! How could it be admitted that he, Stalin, had not been right! He is after all a "genius", and a genius cannot help but be right! Everyone can err, but Stalin considered that he never erred, that he was always right. He never acknowledged to anyone that he had made any mistake, large or small, despite the fact that he had made not a few mistakes in the matter of theory and in his practical activity. After the Party Congress we shall probably have to re-evaluate many wartime military operations and to present them in their true light.

The tactics on which Stalin insisted without knowing the essence of the conduct of battle operations cost us much blood until we succeeded in stopping the opponent and going over to the offensive.

The military know that already by the end of 1941, instead of great operational manoeuvres flanking the opponent and penetrating behind his back, Stalin demanded incessant frontal attacks and the capture of one village after another. Because of this we paid with great losses until our generals on whose shoulders rested the whole weight of conducting the war, succeeded in changing the situation and shifting to flexible-manoeuvre operations, which immediately brought serious changes at the front favourable to us.

All the more shameful was the fact, that after our great victory over the enemy which cost us so much, Stalin began to downgrade many of the commanders who contributed so much to victory over the enemy, because Stalin excluded every possibility that services rendered at the front should be credited to anyone but himself.
Stalin was very much interested in the assessment of Comrade Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often for my opinion of Zhukov. I told him then, "I have known Zhukov for a long time; he is a good general and a good military leader."

After the war Stalin began to tell all kinds of nonsense about Zhukov, among other things the following, "You praised Zhukov, but he does not deserve it. It is said that before each operation at the front Zhukov used to behave as follows: He used to take a handful of earth, smell it and say, 'We can begin the attack,' or the opposite, 'The planned operation can not be carried out.'" I stated at the time, "Comrade Stalin, I do not know who invented this, but it is not true."

It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for the purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of Marshal Zhukov.25

In this connection, Stalin very energetically popularized himself as a great leader; in various ways he tried to inculcate in the people the version that all victories gained by the Soviet nation during the Great Patriotic War were due to courage, daring and genius of Stalin and of no one else.26 Exactly like Kuzma Kryuchkov [a famous Cossack who performed heroic feats against the Germans], he put one dress on seven people at the same time.

(Animation in the hall)

In the same vein, let us take, for instance, our historical and military films and some literary creations; they make us feel sick. Their true objective is the propagation of the theme of praising Stalin as a military genius. Let us recall the film, 'The Fall of Berlin.' Here only Stalin acts; he issues orders in the hall in which there are many empty chairs and only one man approaches him and reports something to him—that is Poskrebeshev, his loyal shield-bearer.

(Laughter in the hall)

And where is the military command? Where is the Political Bureau? Where is the Government? What are they doing and with what are they engaged? There is nothing about them in the film. Stalin acts for everybody; he does not reckon with anyone; he asks no one for advice. Everything is shown to the nation in this false light. Why? In order to surround Stalin with glory, contrary to the facts and contrary to historical truth.

The question arises: And where are the military, on whose shoulders rested the burden of the war? They are not in the film; with Stalin in, no room was left for them.

Not Stalin, but the party as a whole, the Soviet Government, our heroic Army, its talented leaders and brave soldiers, the whole Soviet nation—these are the ones who assured the victory in the Great Patriotic War.

(Tempestuous and prolonged applause)

The Central Committee members, ministers, our economic leaders, leaders of Soviet culture, directors of territorial party and Soviet organizations, engineers and technicians—everyone of them in his own place of work generously gave of his strength and knowledge toward ensuring victory over the enemy.

Exceptional heroism was shown by our hard core—surrounded by glory is our whole working class, our kolkhoz peasantry. The Soviet intelligentsia, who under the leadership of party organization overcame untold hardship and bearing the hardship of war, devoted all their strength to the cause of the defence of the Fatherland.

Great and brave deeds during the war were accomplished by our Soviet women who bore on their backs the heavy load of production work in the factories, on the kolkhozes, and in various economic and cultural sectors; many women participated directly in the Great Patriotic War at the fronts; our brave youth contributed immeasurably at the front and at home to the defence of the Soviet Fatherland and to the annihilation of the enemy.

Immortal are the services of the Soviet soldiers, of our:
commanders and political workers of all ranks; after the loss of a considerable part of the Army in the first war months they did not lose their heads and were able to reorganize during the progress of combat; they created and toughened during the progress of the war a strong and heroic Army, and not only stood off pressures of the strong and cunning enemy but also smashed him.

The magnificent and heroic deeds of hundreds of millions of people of the East and of the West during the fight against the threat of fascist subjugation which loomed before us will live centuries and millennia in the memory of thankful humanity.27

(Thunderous applause)

The main role and the main credit for the victorious ending of the war belongs to our Communist Party, to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and to the tens of millions of Soviet people raised by the party.

(Thunderous and prolonged applause)

Comrades, let us reach for some other facts. The Soviet Union is justly considered as a model of a multinational state because we have in practice assured the equality and friendship of all nations which live in our great Fatherland.

All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state. We refer to the mass deportation from their native places of whole nations, together with all Communists and Komsomols without any exception; this deportation action was not dictated by any military consideration.

Thus, already at the end of 1943, when there occurred a permanent breakthrough at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War benefiting the Soviet Union, a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on which they lived.

In the same period, at the end of December 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic. In March 1944, all the Chechen and Ingush peoples were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were deported to far away places from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic and the Republic itself was renamed the Autonomous Kabardian Republic. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, he would have deported them also.28

(Laughter and animation in the hall)

Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common-sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old people, Communists and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.

After the conclusion of the Patriotic War, the Soviet nation stressed with pride the magnificent victories gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts. The country experienced a period of political enthusiasm. The party came out of the war even more united; in the fire of the war, party cadres were tempered and hardened. Under such conditions nobody could have even thought of the possibility of some plot in the party.

And it was precisely at this time that the so-called “Leningrad affair” was born. As we have now proven, this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives includes Comrades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others.29

As is known, Voznesensky and Kuznetsov were talented and eminent leaders. Once they stood very close to Stalin. It is sufficient to mention that Stalin made Voznesensky first deputy to the chairman of the Council of Ministers and Kuznetsov was elected secretary of the Central Committee. The very fact that Stalin entrusted Kuznetsov with the supervision of the state-security organs shows the trust which he enjoyed.
How did it happen that these persons were branded as enemies of the people and liquidated?

Facts prove that the "Leningrad affair" is also the result of wilfulness which Stalin exercised against party cadres.

Had a normal situation existed in the party’s Central Committee and in the Central Committee Political Bureau, affairs of this nature would have been examined there in accordance with party practice, and all pertinent facts assessed; as a result, such an affair as well as others would not have happened.

We must state that, after the war, the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies before his very eyes. After the war, Stalin separated himself from the collective even more. Everything was decided by him alone without any consideration for anyone or anything.

This unbelievable suspicion was cleverly taken advantage of by the abject provocateur and vile enemy, Beria, who had murdered thousands of communists and loyal Soviet people. The elevation of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beria. As we have now proven, it had been precisely Beria who had "suggested" to Stalin the fabrication by him and by his confidants of materials in the form of declarations and anonymous letters, and in the form of various rumours and talks.

The party’s Central Committee has examined this so-called "Leningrad affair"; persons who innocently suffered are now rehabilitated and honour has been restored to the glorious Leningrad party organization. Abakumov and others who fabricated this affair were brought before a court; their trial took place in Leningrad and they received what they deserved.

The question arises: Why is it that we see the truth of this affair only now, and why did we not do something earlier, during Stalin’s life, in order to prevent the loss of innocent lives? It was because Stalin personally supervised the "Leningrad affair", and the majority of the Political Bureau members did not, at that time, know all of the circumstances in these matters, and could not therefore intervene.

When Stalin received certain materials from Beria and Abakumov, without examining these slanderous materials, he ordered an investigation of the "affair" of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. With this, their fate was sealed.

Instructive in the same way is the case of Mingrelian nationalist organization which supposedly existed in Georgia. As is known, resolutions by the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were adopted concerning this case in November 1951, and in March 1952. These resolutions were adopted without prior discussion with the Political Bureau. Stalin had personally dictated them. They made serious accusations against many loyal communists. On the basis of falsified documents, it was proved that there existed in Georgia a supposedly nationalistic organization whose objective was the liquidation of the Soviet power in that republic with the help of imperialistic powers.

In this connection, a number of responsible party and Soviet workers were arrested in Georgia. As was later proved, this was a slander directed against the Georgian party organization.

We know that there have been at times manifestations of local bourgeois nationalism in Georgia as in several other republics. The question arises: Could it be possible that in the period during which the resolutions referred to above were adopted, nationalist tendencies grew so much that there was a danger of Georgia’s leaving the Soviet Union and joining Turkey?

(Animation in the hall, laughter)

This is, of course, nonsense. It is impossible to imagine how such assumptions could enter anyone’s mind. Everyone knows how Georgia has developed economically and culturally under Soviet rule.

Industrial production of the Georgian Republic is 27 times
greater than it was before the Revolution. Many new industries have arisen in Georgia which did not exist there before the Revolution: iron smelting, an oil industry, a machine-construction industry, etc. Illiteracy has long since been liquidated which, in pre-revolutionary Georgia, included 78 percent of the population.

Could the Georgians, comparing the situation in their republic with the hard situation of the working masses in Turkey, be aspiring to join Turkey? In 1955, Georgia produced 18 times as much steel per person as Turkey. Georgia produces 9 times as much electrical energy per person as Turkey. According to the available 1950 census, 65 percent of Turkey's total population are illiterate, and of the women 80 percent are illiterate. Georgia has 19 institutions of higher learning which have about 39,000 students; this is 8 times more than in Turkey (for each 1,000 inhabitants). The prosperity of the working people has grown tremendously in Georgia under Soviet rule.

It is clear that, as the economy and culture develop, and as the socialist consciousness of the working masses in Georgia grows, the source from which bourgeois nationalism draws its strength evaporates.

As it developed, there was no nationalistic organization in Georgia. Thousands of innocent people fell victim to wilfulness and lawlessness. All of this happened under the "genial" leadership of Stalin, "the great son of the Georgian nation," as Georgians like to refer to Stalin.32

(Animation in the hall)

The wilfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in decisions concerning the internal life of the country but also in the international relations of the Soviet Union.

The July plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslavia affair" contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions among comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of the "affair"; it was completely possible to have prevented the rupture of relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations with a friendly country.33

I recall the first days when the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began artificially to be blown up. Once, when I came from Kiev to Moscow, I was invited to visit Stalin, who pointing to the copy of a letter lately sent to Tito, asked me, "Have you read this?"

Not waiting for my reply he answered, "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."

We have dearly paid for this "shaking of little finger". This statement reflected Stalin's delusions of grandeur, but he acted just that way: "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no Kossior"; "I will shake my little finger once more Postyshev and Chubar will be no more"; "I will shake my little finger again—and Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and many others will disappear."

But this did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how little Stalin shook, not only his little finger but everything else that he could shake, Tito did not fall. Why? The reason was that, in this case of disagreement with the Yugoslav comrades, Tito had behind him a state and a people who had gone through a severe school of fighting for liberty and independence, a people which gave support to its leaders.

You see to what Stalin's delusions of grandeur led. He had completely lost consciousness of reality; he demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness not only in relation to individuals in U.S.S.R., but in relation to whole parties and nations.

We have carefully examined the case of Yugoslavia and have found a proper solution which is approved by the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia as well as by the working masses of all the people's democracies and by all pro-
gressive humanity. The liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole camp of socialism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the whole world.

Let us also recall the "affair of the doctor-plotters".

(Animation in the hall)
Actually there was no "affair" outside the declaration of the woman doctor Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator of the organs of state security) to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.

Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion that there are doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally issued advice on the conduct of the investigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said that Academician Vinogradov should be put in chains, another one should be beaten. Present at the Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly, "If you do not obtain confession from the doctors we will shorten you by a head."

(Tumult in the hall)
Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him instructions, advised him on which investigative methods should be used; these methods were simple—beat, beat and, once again, beat.

Shortly after the doctors were arrested, we, members of the Political Bureau, received protocols containing the doctors' confession of guilt. After distributing these protocols, Stalin told us, "You are blind like young kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognize enemies."

The case was so presented that no one could verify the facts on which the investigation was based. There was no possibility of trying to verify facts by contacting those who had made the confessions of guilt.

We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was questionable. We knew some of these people personally because they had once treated us. When we examined this "case" after Stalin's death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end.

This ignominous "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not, however, have the time in which to bring it to an end (as he conceived that end), and for this reason the doctors are still alive. Now all have been rehabilitated; they are working in the same place they were working before; they treat top individuals, not excluding members of the Government; they have our full confidence; and they execute their duties honestly, as they did before.

In organizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very base role was played by the rabid enemy of our party, an agent of a foreign intelligence service—Beria, who had stolen into Stalin's confidence. In what way could this provocateur gain such a position in the party and in the state, so as to become the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee's Political Bureau? It has now been established that this villain had climbed up the Government ladder over an untold number of corpses.

Were there any sign that Beria was an enemy of the party? Yes, there were. Already in 1937, at a Central Committee plenum, former People's Commissar of Health Protection, Kaminsky, said that Beria had worked for the Mussavat Intelligence Service. But the Central Committee plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Had Stalin examined Kaminsky's statement? No, because Stalin believed in Beria, and that was enough for him. And when Stalin believed in anyone or anything, then no one could say anything which was contrary to his opinion; anyone who would dare to express opposition would have met the same fate as Kaminsky.
There were other signs also. The declaration which Comrade Snegov made at the party's Central Committee is interesting. (Parenthetically speaking, he was also rehabilitated not long ago, after 17 years in prison camps.) In this declaration, Snegov writes:

"In connection with the proposed rehabilitation of the former Central Committee member, Kartvelishvili-Lavrentiev, I have entrusted to the hands of the representative of the Committee of state security a detailed deposition concerning Beria's role in the disposition of the Kartvelishvili case and concerning the criminal motives by which Beria was guided.

"In my opinion, it is indispensable to recall an important fact pertaining to this case and to communicate it to the Central Committee, because I did not consider it as proper to include in the investigation documents.

"On October 30, 1931, at the session of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Kartvelishvili, secretary of the Transcaucasian krai committee, made a report. All members of the executive of the krai committee were present; of them I alone am alive.

"During this session, J.V. Stalin made a motion at the end of his speech concerning the organization of the secretariat of the Transcaucasian krai committee composed of the following: first secretary, Kartvelishvili; second secretary, Beria (it was then, for the first time in the party's history, that Beria's name was mentioned as a candidate for a party position). Kartvelishvili answered that he knew Beria well and for that reason refused categorically to work together with him. Stalin proposed then that this matter be left open and that it be solved in the process of the work itself. Two days later a decision was arrived at that Beria would receive the party post and that Kartvelishvili would be deported from the Transcaucasus."

This fact can be confirmed by Comrades Mikoyan and Kaganovich, who were present at that session.

The long unfriendly relations between Kartvelishvili and Beria were widely known; they date back to the time when Comrade Sergo [Orjonikidze] was active in the Transcaucasus; Kartvelishvili was the closest assistant of Sergo. The unfriendly relationship impelled Beria to fabricate a "case" against Kartvelishvili.

It is a characteristic thing that in this "case" Kartvelishvili was charged with a terroristic act against Beria.

The indictment in the Beria case contains a discussion of his crimes. Some things should, however, be recalled, especially since it is possible that not all delegates to the Congress have read this document. I wish to recall Beria's bestial disposition of the cases of Kedrov, Golubiev and Golubiev's adopted mother, Baturina—persons who wished to inform the Central Committee concerning Beria's treacherous activity. They were shot without any trial and the sentence was passed ex-post facto, after the execution.

Here is what the old communist, Comrade Kedrov, wrote to the Central Committee through Comrade Andreyev (Comrade Andreyev was then a Central Committee secretary):

"I am calling to you for help from a gloomy cell of the Lefortovsky prison. Let my cry of horror reach your ears; do not remain deaf; take me under your protection; please, help remove the nightmare of interrogations and show that this is all a mistake.

"I suffer innocently. Please believe me. Time will testify to the truth. I am not an agent provocateur of the Tsarist Okhrana [secret police]; I am not a spy; I am not a member of an anti-Soviet organization of which I am being accused on the basis of denunciations. I am also not guilty of any other crimes against the party and the Government. I am an old Bolshevik, free of any stain; I have honestly fought for almost 40 years in the ranks of the party for the good and the prosperity of the nation...

"...Today I, a 62-year-old man, am being threatened by the investigative judges with more severe, cruel and degrading..."
methods of physical pressure. They (the judges) are no longer capable of becoming aware of their error and of recognizing that their handling of my case is illegal and impermissible. They try to justify their actions by picturing me as a hardened and raving enemy and are demanding increased repressions. But let the party know that I am innocent and that there is nothing which can turn a loyal son of the party into an enemy, even right up to his last dying breath.

"But I have no way out. I cannot divert from myself the hastily approaching new and powerful blows.

"Everything, however, has its limits. My torture has reached the extreme. My health is broken, my strength and my energy are waning, the end is drawing near. To die in Soviet prison, branded as a vile traitor to the Fatherland—what can be more monstrous for an honest man? And how monstrous all this is! Unsurpassed bitterness and pain grips my heart. No! No! This will not happen; this cannot be, I cry. Neither the party, nor the Soviet Government, nor the People's Commissar, L. P. Beria, will permit this cruel, irreparable injustice. I am firmly certain that, given a quiet, objective examination, without any foul rantings, without any anger and without the fearful tortures, it would be easy to prove the baselessness of the charges. I believe deeply that truth and justice will triumph. I believe. I believe."

The old Bolshevik, Comrade Kedrov, was found innocent by the Military Collegium. But, despite this, he was shot at Beria's order. (Indignation in the hall)

Beria also handled cruelly the family of Comrade Orjonikidze. Why? Because Orjonikidze had tried to prevent Beria from realizing his shameful plans. Beria had cleared from his way all persons who could possibly interfere with him. Orjonikidze was always an opponent of Beria, which he told to Stalin. Instead of examining this affair and taking appropriate steps, Stalin allowed the liquidation of Orjonikidze's brother and brought Orjonikidze himself to such a state that he was forced to shoot himself. 5 7

(Indignation in the hall)

Such was Beria.

Beria was unmasked by the party’s Central Committee shortly after Stalin's death. As a result of the particularly detailed legal proceedings, it was established that Beria had committed monstrous crimes and Beria was shot. 5 8

The question arises why Beria, who had liquidated tens of thousands of party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked during Stalin's life. He was not unmasked earlier because he had utilized very skilfully Stalin's weaknesses; feeding him with suspicions, he assisted Stalin in everything and acted with his support.

Comrades! The cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person. This is supported by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-glorification and of his lack of even elementary modesty is the edition of his Short Biography, which was published in 1948.

This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery, an example of making a man into a godhead, of transforming him into an infallible sage, "the greatest leader, sublime strategist of all times and nations." Finally, no other words could be found with which to lift Stalin up to the heavens.

We need not give here examples of the loathesome adulation filling this book. All we need to add is that they all were approved and edited by Stalin personally and some of them were added in his own handwriting to the draft text of the book.

What did Stalin consider essential to write into this book? Did he want to cool the ardour of his flatterers who were composing his Short Biography? No! He marked the very places where he thought that the praise of his services was insufficient. Here are some examples characterizing Stalin's activity, added in Stalin's own hand:

"In this fight against the sceptics and capitulators, the
Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinistes and Kamenevites, there was definitely welded together, after Lenin's death, that leading core of the party... that upheld the great banner of Lenin, rallied the party behind Lenin's behests, and brought the Soviet people into the broad road of industrializing the country and collectivizing the rural economy. The leader of this core and the guiding force of the party and the state was Comrade Stalin." 

Thus writes Stalin himself! Then he adds:

"Although he performed his task as leader of the party and the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin never allowed his work to be marred by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit or self-adulation."

Where and when could a leader so praise himself? Is this worthy of a leader of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. Precisely against this did Marx and Engels take such a strong position. This also was always sharply condemned by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. 

In the draft text of his book appeared the following sentence: "Stalin is the Lenin of today." This sentence appeared to Stalin to be too weak, so, in his own handwriting, he changed it to read: "Stalin is the worthy continuer of Lenin's work, or as it is said in our party, Stalin is the Lenin of today." You see how well it is said, not by the people but by Stalin himself.

It is possible to give many such self-praising appraisals written into the draft text of that book in Stalin's hand. Especially generously, does he endow himself with praises pertaining to his military genius, to his talent for strategy.

I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin concerning the theme of the Stalinist military genius.

"The advanced Soviet science of war received further development", he writes, "at Comrade Stalin's hands. Comrade Stalin elaborated the theory of the permanently operating factors that decide the issue of wars, of active defence and the

laws of counter-offensive and offensive, of the co-operation of all services and arms in modern warfare, of the role of big tank masses and air forces in modern war, and of the artillery as the most formidable of the armed services. At the various stages of the war Stalin's genius found the correct solutions that took account of all the circumstances of the situation." 

(Movement in the hall)

And, further, writes Stalin:

"Stalin's military mastership was displayed both in defence and offence. Comrade Stalin's genius enabled him to divine the enemy's plans and defeat them. The battles in which Comrade Stalin directed the Soviet armies are brilliant examples of operational military skill."

In this manner was Stalin praised as a strategist. Who did this? Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist but in the role of an author-editor, one of the main creators of his self-adulatory biography. Such, comrades, are the facts. We should rather say, shameful facts.

And one additional fact from the same Short Biography of Stalin. As is known, The Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was written by a commission of the party Central Committee.

This book, parenthetically, was also permeated with the cult of the individual and was written by a designated group of authors. This fact was reflected in the following formulation on the proof copy of the Short Biography of Stalin:

"A commission of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), under the direction of Comrade Stalin and with his most active personal participation, has prepared a Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)."

But even this phrase did not satisfy Stalin. The following sentence replaced it in the final version of the Short Biography:

"In 1938 appeared the book, History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Short Course, written by
THE STALIN QUESTION

Comrade Stalin and approved by a commission of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Can one add anything more?

(Animation in the hall)

As you see, a surprising metamorphosis changed the work created by a group into a book written by Stalin. It is not necessary to state how and why this metamorphosis took place.

A pertinent question comes to our mind: If Stalin is the author of this book, why did he need to praise the person of Stalin so much and to transform the whole post-October historical period of our glorious Communist Party into an action of “the Stalin genius”?

Did this book properly reflect the efforts of the party in the socialist transformation of the country, in the construction of socialist society, in the industrialization and collectivization of the country, and also other steps taken by the party which undeviatingly travelled the path outlined by Lenin? This book speaks principally about Stalin, about his speeches, about his reports. Everything without the smallest exception is tied to his name.

And when Stalin himself asserts that he himself wrote the Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) this calls at least for amazement. Can a Marxist-Leninist thus write about himself, praising his own person to the heavens?

Or let us take the matter of the Stalin Prizes.

(Movement in the hall)

Not even the Tsars created prizes which they named after themselves.

Stalin recognized as the best a text of the national anthem of the Soviet Union which contains not a word about the Communist Party; it contains, however, the following unprecedented praise of Stalin:

“Stalin brought us up in loyalty to the people. He inspired us to great toil and acts.”

In these lines of the anthem the whole educational and directional and inspirational activity of the great Leninist party is ascribed to Stalin. This is, of course, a clear deviation from Marxism-Leninism, a clear debasing and belittling of the role of the party. We should add for your information that the Presidium of the Central Committee has already passed a resolution concerning the composition of a new text of the anthem, which will reflect the role of the people and the role of the party. (Loud, prolonged applause)

And was it without Stalin’s knowledge that many of the largest enterprises and towns were named after him? Was it without his knowledge that Stalin monuments were erected in the whole country—these “memorials to the living”? It is a fact that Stalin himself had signed on July 2, 1951 a resolution of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers concerning the erection on the Volga-Don Canal of an impressive monument to Stalin; on September 4, of the same year he issued an order making 33 tons of copper available for the construction of this impressive monument.

Anyone who has visited Stalingrad area must have seen the huge statue which is being built there, and that on a site which hardly any people frequent. Huge sums were spent to build it at a time when people of this area had lived since the war in huts. Consider, yourself, was Stalin right when he wrote in his biography that “…he did not allow in himself…even a shadow of conceit, pride, or self-adulation”?

At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect for Lenin’s memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite the decision taken over 30 years ago to build a Palace of Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich, this Palace was not built, its construction was always postponed and the project allowed to lapse.

We cannot forget to recall the Soviet Government resolution of August 14, 1925, concerning “the founding of Lenin prizes for educational work”. This resolution was published in the press, but until this day there are no Lenin prizes. This, too, should be corrected. (Tumultuous, prolonged applause)
During Stalin's life—thanks to known methods which I have mentioned, and quoting facts, for instance, from the Short Biography of Stalin—all events were explained as if Lenin played only a secondary role, even during the October Socialist Revolution. In many films and in many literary works the figure of Lenin was incorrectly presented and inadmissibly depreciated.

Stalin loved to see the film, "The Unforgettable Year 1919", in which he was shown on the steps of an armoured train and where he was practically vanquishing the foe with his own sabre. Let Klimenti Yefremovich [Voroshilov], our dear friend, find the necessary courage and write the truth about Stalin; after all, he knows how Stalin had fought. It will be difficult for Comrade Voroshilov to undertake this, but it would be good if he did. Everyone will approve of it, both the people and the party. Even his grandsons will thank him. 

(Prolonged applause)

In speaking about the events of the October Revolution and about the Civil War, the impression was created that Stalin always played the main role, as if everywhere and always Stalin had suggested to Lenin what to do and how to do it. However, this is slander of Lenin.

(Prolonged applause)

I will probably not sin against the truth when I say that 99 percent of the persons present here heard and knew very little about Stalin before the year 1924, while Lenin was known to all; he was known to the whole party, to the whole nation, from the children up to the graybeards.

(Tumultuous, prolonged applause)

All this has to be thoroughly revised so that history, literature and the fine arts properly reflect V. I. Lenin's role and the great deeds of our Communist Party and of the Soviet people—the creative people.

(Applause)

Comrades! The cult of the individual has caused the employment of faulty principles in party work and in economic activity; it brought about rude violation of internal party and Soviet democracy, sterile administration, deviations of all sorts, covering up of shortcomings and varnishing of reality.

Our nation gave birth to many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit.

We should also not forget that, due to the numerous arrests of party, Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to work uncertainly, showed overcautiousness, feared all that was new, feared their own shadows and began to show less initiative in their work.

Take, for instance, party and Soviet resolutions. They were prepared in routine manner, often without considering the concrete situation. This went so far that party workers, even during the smallest sessions, read their speeches. All this produced the danger of formalizing party and Soviet work and of bureaucratizing the whole apparatus.

Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities and the fact that he was not aware of the real state of affairs in the provinces can be illustrated by his direction of agriculture.

All those who interested themselves even a little in the national situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but Stalin never even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes, we told him, but he did not support us. Why? Because Stalin never travelled anywhere, did not meet city and kolkhoz workers; he did not know the actual situation in the provinces.

He knew the country and agriculture only from films. And these films had dressed up and beautified the existing situation in agriculture.

Many films so pictured kolkhoz life that the tables were bending from the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently, Stalin thought that it was actually so.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin looked at life differently; he was always close to the people; he used to receive peasant delegates and often spoke at the factory gatherings; he used to visit villages and talk with the peasants.

T. S. Q.—5
Stalin separated himself from the people and never went anywhere. This lasted ten years. The last time he visited a village was in January 1928, when he visited Siberia in connection with grain deliveries. How then could he have known the situation in the provinces?

And when he was once told during a discussion that our situation on the land was a difficult one and that the situation of cattle breeding and meat production was especially bad, a commission was formed which was charged with the preparation of a resolution called, Means toward Further Development of Animal Breeding in Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes. We worked out this project.

Of course, our propositions of that time did not contain all possibilities, but we did chart ways in which animal breeding on kolkhozes and sovkhozes would be raised. We had proposed then to raise the prices of such products in order to create material incentives for the kolkhoz, MTS [machine-tractor-station] and sovkhoz workers in the development of cattle breeding. But our project was not accepted and in February 1953, was laid aside entirely.

What is more, while reviewing this project, Stalin proposed that the taxes paid by the kolkhozes and by the kolkhoz workers should be raised by 40 billion rubles; according to him the peasants are well off and the kolkhoz worker would need to sell only one more chicken to pay his tax in full.

Imagine what this meant. Certainly, 40 billion rubles is a sum which the kolkhoz workers did not realize for all the products which they sold to the Government. In 1952, for instance, the kolkhozes and the kolkhoz workers received 26,280 million rubles for all their products delivered and sold to the Government.

Did Stalin’s position, then, rest on data of any sort whatever? Of course not.

In such cases facts and figures did not interest him. If Stalin said anything, it meant it was so—after all, he was a “genius”, and a genius does not need to calculate, he only needs to look and can immediately tell how it should be. When he expresses his opinion, everyone has to repeat it and to admire his wisdom.

But how much wisdom was contained in the proposal to raise the agricultural tax by 40 billion rubles? None, absolutely none, because the proposal was not based on an actual assessment of the situation but on the fantastic ideas of a person divorced from reality.

We are currently beginning slowly to work our way out of a difficult agricultural situation. The speeches of the delegates to the Twentieth Congress please us all; we are glad that many delegates deliver speeches to the effect that there are conditions for the fulfilment of the sixth Five-Year Plan for animal husbandry, not during the period of five years, but within two to three years. We are certain that the commitments of the new Five-Year plan will be accomplished successfully. (Prolonged applause)

Comrades!

If we sharply criticize today the cult of the individual which was so widespread during Stalin’s life and if we speak about the so many negative phenomena generated by this cult which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the party and the country for 30 years and many victories were gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of the individual, only by those who do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet state, only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist manner, the role of the party and of the people in the development of Soviet society.

The Socialist Revolution was attained by the working class and by the poor peasantry with the partial support of middle-class peasants. It was attained by the people under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin’s great service consisted in the fact that he created a militant party of the working class,
but he was armed with Marxist understanding of the laws of social development with the science of proletarian victory in the fight with capitalism, and he steeled this party in the crucible of revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people.

During this fight the party consistently defended the interests of the people, became its experienced leader, and led the working masses to power, to the creation of the first socialist state.

You remember well the wise words of Lenin that the Soviet state is strong because of the awareness of the masses that history is created by the millions and tens of millions of people.45

Our historical victories were attained thanks to the organizational work of the party, to the many provincial organizations, and to the self-sacrificing work of our great nation. These victories are the result of the great drive and activity of the nation and of the party as a whole; they are not at all the fruit of the leadership of Stalin, as the situation was pictured during the period of the cult of the individual.

If we are to consider this matter as Marxists and as Leninists, then we have to state unequivocally that the leadership practice which came into being during the last years of Stalin's life became a serious obstacle in the path of Soviet social development. Stalin often failed for months to take up some unusually important problems, concerning the life of the party and of the state, whose solution could not be postponed. During Stalin's leadership our peaceful relations with other nations were often threatened, because one-man decisions could cause and often did cause, great complications.46

In recent years, when we managed to free ourselves of the harmful practice of the cult of the individual and took several proper steps in the sphere of internal and external policies, everyone saw how activity grew before their very eyes, how the creative activity of the broad working masses developed, how favourably all this acted upon the development of the economy and of culture. (Applause)

Some comrades may ask us: Where were the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee? Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And why is this being done only now?

First of all, we have to consider the fact that the members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times. Initially, many of them backed Stalin actively because Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and party work.47

It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially during the first years, actively fought for Leninism against the enemies of Leninist theory and against those who deviated. Beginning with Leninist theory, the party, with its Central Committee at the head, started on a great scale the work of socialist industrialization of the country, agricultural collectivization and the cultural revolution.

At that time Stalin gained great popularity, sympathy and support. The party had to fight those who attempted to lead the country away from the correct Leninist path; it had to fight Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and Rightists, and Bourgeois Nationalists. This fight was indispensable.

Later, however, Stalin, abusing his power more and more, began to fight eminent party and Government leaders and to use terroristic methods against honest Soviet people. As we have already shown, Stalin thus handled such eminent party and Government leaders as Kossior, Rudzutak, Eikhe, Postyshev and many others.

Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. This characterized the fall of Comrade Postyshev.

In one of his speeches Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?"

Postyshev answered clearly, "I am a Bolshevik, Comrade Stalin, a Bolshevik."

This assertion was at first considered to show a lack of respect for Stalin; later it was considered a harmful act and
consequently resulted in Postyshev's annihilation and branding without any reason as a "people's enemy".

In the situation which then prevailed I talked often with Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin; once when we two were travelling in a car, he said, "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And, when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next—home or to jail."

It is clear that such conditions put every member of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. And, when we also consider the fact that in the last years Central Committee plenary sessions were not convened and that sessions of the Political Bureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time, then we will understand how difficult it was for any member of the Political Bureau, to take a stand against one or another unjust or improper procedure, against serious errors and shortcomings in the practices of leadership.

As we have already shown, many decisions were taken either by one person or in a roundabout way, without collective discussion.

The sad fate of Political Bureau member, Comrade Voznesensky, who fell victim to Stalin's repressions, is known to all. It is a characteristic thing that the decision to remove him from the Political Bureau was never discussed but was reached in a devious fashion. In the same way came the decision concerning the removal of Kuznetsov and Rodionov from their posts.

The importance of the Central Committee's Political Bureau was reduced and its work disorganized by the creation within the Political Bureau of various commissions—the so-called "quintets", "sextets", "septets" and "novenaries"—was against the principle of collective leadership. The result of this was that some members of the Political Bureau were in this way kept away from participation in the decision of the most important state matters.

One of the oldest members of our party, Klimenti Yefremovich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he was actually deprived of the right of participation in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents. When the Political Bureau was in sessions and Comrade Voroshilov heard about it, he telephoned each time, and asked whether he would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction.

Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed also with the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was an English agent. (Laughter in the hall)

It's true—an English agent. A special tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there. (Indignation in the hall)

By unilateral decision, Stalin also separated one other man from the work of the Political Bureau—Andrey Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled acts of wilfulness.

Let us consider the first Central Committee plenum after the Nineteenth Party Congress, when Stalin, in his talk at the plenum, characterized Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old
workers of our party were guilty of some baseless charges. It is not excluded that, had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably not have delivered any speeches at this Congress.

Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau. He often stated that Political Bureau members should be replaced by new ones.

His proposal, after the Nineteenth Congress, concerning the selection of 25 persons to the Central Committee Presidium, was aimed at the removal of the old Political Bureau members and the bringing in of less experienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways.

We can assume that this was also a design for the future annihilation of the old Political Bureau members and, in this way, a cover for all the shameful acts of Stalin, acts which we are now considering.

Comrades! In order not to repeat the errors of the past, the Central Committee has declared itself resolutely against the cult of the individual.

We consider that Stalin was excessively extolled. However, in the past, Stalin doubtlessly performed great services to the party, to the working class and to the international workers' movement.

The question is complicated by the fact that all this which we have just discussed was done during Stalin's life under his leadership and with his concurrence; here Stalin was convinced that this was necessary for the defence of the interests of the working classes against the plotting of enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp.

He saw this from the position of the interest of the working class, of the interest of the labouring people, of the interest of the victory of Socialism and Communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interest of the party, of the working masses, in the name of the defence of the revolution's gains. In this lies the whole tragedy!
The Stalin Question

We cannot let this matter get out of the party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemies; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes. I think that the delegates to the Congress will understand and assess properly all these proposals.

(Tumultuous applause)

Comrades! We must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work.

It is necessary for this purpose:

First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another.

To return to and actually practise in all our ideological work the most important theses of Marxist-Leninist science about the people as the creator of history and as the creator of all material and spiritual good of humanity, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary fight for the transformation of society, about the victory of Communism.

In this connection we will be forced to do much work in order to examine critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widely spread erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual in the sphere of history, philosophy, economy and of other sciences, as well as in literature and the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in the immediate future we compile a serious text-book of the history of our party which will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism, a text book of the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War.

Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the party's Central Committee during the last years, a work characterized by minute observation in all party organizations, from the bottom to the top, of the Leninist principles of party leadership, characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, characterized by the observance of the norms of party life described in the Statutes of our party, and finally, characterized by the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism.

Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet socialist democracy, expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight the arbitrariness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected.

Comrades! The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has manifested with a new strength the unshakable unity of our party, its cohesiveness around the Central Committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building communism. (Tumultuous applause)

And the fact that we present in all their ramifications the basic problems of overcoming the cult of the individual which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is an evidence of the great moral and political strength of our party.

(Prolonged applause)

We are absolutely certain that our party, armed with the historical resolutions of the Twentieth Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories.

(Tumultuous, prolonged applause)

Long live the victorious banner of our party—Leninism!

(Tumultuous prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise.)
KHRUSHCHEV ON STALIN, 1949

STALINIST FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES: GUARANTEE OF OUR MOTHERLAND'S INVINCIBILITY

(DECEMBER 21, 1949)

[Just six years two months before the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., an article entitled Stalinist Friendship of Peoples: Guarantee of our Motherland's Invincibility was published in PRAVDA, Dec. 21, 1949, over the signature of N. S. Khrushchev. The occasion was Stalin's seventieth Birthday. We reproduce the article, almost in full. It would bring out the contrast between the two evaluations of Stalin by the same person.]

All peoples of the Soviet Union and progressive mankind throughout the world are observing a precious date—the seventieth birthday of our inspired leader and teacher, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Millions of persons turn to Comrade Stalin with the most profound feelings of love and devotion because he, together with Lenin, formed the great party of the Bolsheviks and our socialist state, because he enriched Marxist-Leninist theory and raised it to new, higher level. Comrade Stalin, the brilliant leader and teacher of our party, defended and developed the Leninist theory of the victory of socialism in one country. Armed with this theory, the Bolshevik party, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, rallied the peoples of our country and led them to the triumph of socialism. The victory of socialism found its expression in the new Constitution, which has justly been called by the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the Stalinist Constitution.

The despised enemies of our people have more than once attempted to shatter the unity of the Bolshevik party, to ruin Soviet rule. A great service of Comrade Stalin is that he, in mortal combat with the enemies of the people—Mensheviks, S. Rs., Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists—upheld the purity of Lenin's teaching, the unity and iron solidarity of our party's ranks. Led by great Stalin, the party of Bolsheviks guided with confidence the peoples of our country along the Leninist-Stalinist path to Communism.

Soviet citizens link all their achievements in the struggle for Communism, in rebuilding a multi-national socialist state, with the name of the immortal Lenin, with the name of the great continuer of Lenin's cause—Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin's name is the banner of all victories of the Soviet people, the banner of struggle for the workers of the entire world against capitalist slavery and national oppression, for peace and socialism.

Prepared for and executed under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, the Great October Socialist Revolution shattered and destroyed for ever the chains of the social slavery and national oppression. Relying on Lenin's and Stalin's teaching, our party has in fact effected a proletarian solution of the national question, has established equal rights for all peoples and nations of our country and has created the great friendship of peoples which is a source of our motherland's strength and might. Herein lies Comrade Stalin's tremendous and invaluable service. He is the true friend and comrade-in-arms of the great Lenin.

From the very first days after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Comrade Stalin, as the outstanding leader of the national policy of the party and the Soviet state, did much to rally all nationalities of former Tsarist Russia in the formation of national Soviet republics and regions and in the creation of friendship among peoples.

The first All-Soviet Congress of Soviets, Dec. 30, 1922,
adopted, on Comrade Stalin's report, the historic resolution on forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The USSR guaranteed the sovereignty and equality of all national republics, their collaboration and mutual aid in military, economic and cultural respects.

"Where the military union of the Soviet republics during the Civil War years enabled us to beat off armed interference by our enemies", said Comrade Stalin, "and the diplomatic union of these republics during the period of Genoa and The Hague alleviated our struggle against the Entente's diplomatic pressure, so the unification of the Soviet republics in a single allied state will without doubt create such a form of universal military-economic collaboration as will basically abet the economic success of the Soviet republics. It will convert them into a citadel against attempts by international capitalism."


The formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a major victory of our party's Leninist-Stalinist national policy and had a decisive influence on the further strengthening of the Soviet state and of its defence capacity. The creation of the USSR was a classical solution indeed of the national question and an establishment of genuine friendship of peoples on the basis of Soviet power and socialism and opened broad perspectives for the development of statehood, economies and culture of every Soviet republic.

Lenin and Stalin stood by the cradle of every Soviet republic, defended it against threatening dangers, helped in a fatherly way its growth and strengthening. If today all the republics of the Soviet Union stand before the world in the flowering of their material and spiritual forces, for these they are obliged to the brilliant teaching of Lenin-Stalin, to the wise leadership of Comrade Stalin. That is why all the peoples of our country with unusual warmth and feeling of filial love call the great Stalin their dear father, our great leader, and their brilliant teacher.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution a national revival of all the formerly oppressed nations of our country began. New socialist nations arose and developed on the ruins of the old order. On the basis of the historical experiment of completing the first multi-national socialist state in the world, Comrade Stalin developed and enriched Marxist-Leninist thought on the national question.

The new socialist nations, Comrade Stalin teaches, were developed and formed on the basis of the old bourgeois nations, by means of a radical transformation, in the spirit of socialism, after capitalism had been overthrown in Russia and the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties had been eliminated and the Soviet order established...

All the fraternal peoples of our country see with a feeling of national pride the great transformation they have brought about in the composition of the USSR, under leadership of the party of Lenin and Stalin and relying on Stalinist friendship of peoples.

This is clearly seen in the example of the Soviet Ukraine and in any other republic of the Soviet Union. On the eve of the war, the socialist industry of Ukraine produced almost twice as much as did the industry of all pre-revolutionary Russia, and eleven times as much as the industry of the Ukraine in 1913...

Thanks to successful carrying out of the Stalin period of industrialization, our country has become a first class industrial power.

Basic changes also took place in agriculture. On the basis of the triumph of the Stalinist policy of collectivising agriculture, the most numerous exploiting class, the kulaks, was eliminated. Bondage to kulaks and village poverty disappeared. The widespread use of machinery and agrotechnics in collective farm production have considerably lessened the labour of the peasants and have increased harvests.

Collective farms of the Ukraine and other fraternal republics are increasing their total harvest of wheat and other...
crops from year to year and are fulfilling their obligations to the state ahead of schedule. The incomes of collective farms and their workers are steadily growing. The path of a prosperous, cultured and joyful life has opened up before collective farm peasantry.

The Bolshevist party has trained an army of 700,000 Soviet intellectuals, Party members, Soviet officials, engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors and other specialists in the Ukraine, as in all other fraternal republics, is proof of the depth and scope of the cultural revolution which has taken place in our country under Comrade Stalin's leadership.

Like a careful gardener, Comrade Stalin cultivates and trains this personnel in a spirit of ardent Soviet patriotism. He has taught and is teaching them the Bolshevist mode of work and sharp implacability toward the slightest manifestation of alien bourgeois ideology, toward the ideology of bourgeois nationalism, rootless cosmopolitanism and servility before decadent bourgeois culture...

For all these successes, the Ukrainian people, like all peoples of the Soviet Union, are indebted to the Bolshevist party and to the leader of the party and the people, the great Stalin. Carrying out the brilliant programme outlined by the great Stalin for the gradual transformation from Socialism to Communism, the peoples of our multi-national motherland are incessantly strengthening their fraternal cooperation and mutual aid. In our Stalinist economic plans there are combined the interests of further strengthening of the power of our great motherland as a whole and the interests of each republic individually.

One can never forget how Comrade Stalin prepared reconstruction projects, unprecedented in their scope, for Soviet land liberated from the enemy. Our advancing troops were still far from this or that district of Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia or the Smolensk area when Comrade Stalin had already worked out plans for reconstruction work in these areas. He daily interested himself in, and verified what was being done in order to develop more quickly the reconstruction of cities destroyed by the enemy, of enterprises, collective farms, and demanded the speeding up of the dispatching to liberated areas of industrial equipment, tractors, and agricultural equipment and seed for collective farms. Comrade Stalin is the organizer of the aid shown by fraternal peoples of the USSR and the country as a whole to republics which suffered from the occupation....

Thanks to the Soviet Union and thanks to Comrade Stalin, the peoples of Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Albania stand on the path of construction of socialism. Under the leadership of fraternal Communist and Workers' parties and relying on the Leninist-Stalinist principle of proletarian internationalism, they have succeeded in strengthening their freedom and independence.

Loyalty to the great cause of Lenin and Stalin, to the cause of internationalism, is determined and verified by the attitude towards the Soviet Union, which stands at the head of all forces of democracy and socialism. Treachery towards the Soviet Union and treachery towards proletarian internationalism inevitably lead into the camp of nationalism, fascism and imperialist reaction. An example of this is the Tito-Rankovic band of murderers and spies, which completed the transition from nationalism to fascism and converted itself into the direct agent of imperialism, became its weapon in the struggle against socialism and democracy.

The freedom-loving peoples of the world and all progressive mankind brand with shame these betrayers and traitors. They rally still more closely around the great invincible banner of Lenin and Stalin, for the decisive struggle against the enemies of the Soviet Union, the enemies of proletarian internationalism.

On the day of the seventieth birthday of Comrade Stalin, all the Soviet peoples give to their dear teacher and leader an oath—incessantly to strengthen the Lenin-Stalin friendship of the peoples as the indestructible basis for happiness and pros-
perity of our country, as the powerful guarantee of its national
independence and statehood, the guarantee of the further
prosperity of the Soviet Union and of every Soviet republic
entering into its composition.

Today the peoples of the great Soviet Union and all advanced progressive mankind greet our own Comrade Stalin,
inspirer of the indissoluble friendship of peoples whole-heartedly. *Glory to our dear father, our wise teacher, to the\nbrilliant leader of the party of the Soviet people and of the\nworkers of the entire world, Comrade Stalin.*

[All italics ours]

III

*LENIN'S "TESTAMENT"

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS

[Lenin had his first attack of illness on May 26, 1922.
After recovery he resumed work on October 2, 1922. He
had a second stroke on December 16, 1922, which paralysed
his right side. Lenin had his third stroke on March 9,
1923. During the three months between the second and
the third stroke, though confined to his apartment, Lenin
wrote articles, personal notes on party and governmental
affairs. It was at this time that he first recognized that his
days were numbered, and he was filled with anxiety for
the future. His greatest anxiety was about the probable
instability in the Central Committee of the party. On
December 23, 1922, only seven days after the second
stroke, he began to dictate a letter to the Congress dealing
with the problem of instability in the Central Committee
and suggesting several measures to prevent any split in the
immediate future. The letter dictated from December 23
to December 26, 1922 along with the postscript dated
January 4, 1923 added to the letter of December 24, 1922,
is known as Lenin's "Testament".

Lenin intended this letter to be made known to the Party
Congress after his death. Accordingly, it was read out to
the delegates of the Thirteenth Congress of the Party which
was held from May 23 to May 31, 1924. The Congress
unanimously decided not to publish the letter, because it
was addressed to the Congress and had not been intended
for the Press. Though it was not published, the content of
Lenin's "Testament" was widely known to the general body
of members of the Party after the Thirteenth Congress.
Most probably through Trotsky's manipulations, the con-
tent of Lenin's "Testament" was smuggled out to the West-
ern Press. A summary of the "Testament" first appeared
in Germany in *Sotsialistisches Vestnik* on July 24, 1924
(Berlin). Max Eastman, an American admirer of Trotsky,
gave citations from the "Testament" in his book *Since Lenin
Died*, in 1925. This same Eastman, published an English
translation of the "Testament" in *New York Times* of Octo-
ber 18, 1926. In the words of Eastman: "On October 18,
1926—at the height of a militant effort of the Opposition
to carry out the will of Lenin in regard to the General
Secretary—I published the following translation of the
Testament in the *New York Times*, using the money
received in the further propagation of Bolshevik ideas."
(*The Real Situation in Russia* by Trotsky. Translator's
note by Max Eastman, Page-319). Eastman's confession is
revealing. Eastman accused the Central Committee of the
Russian Party of suppression of Lenin's Testament. But,
Trotsky publicly said in a statement that Lenin's Testament
was not suppressed by the Central Committee. Trotsky
himself published the full content of the Testament in 1928
in his book, *The Real Situation in Russia*. ]
THE STALIN QUESTION


I would urge strongly that at this Congress a number of changes be made in our political structure.

I want to tell you of the considerations to which I attach most importance.

At the head of the list I set an increase in the number of Central Committee members to a few dozen or even a hundred. It is my opinion that without this reform our Central Committee would be in great danger if the course of events were not quite favourable for us (and that is something we cannot count on).

Then, I intend to propose that the Congress should on certain conditions invest the decisions of the State Planning Commission with legislative force, meeting, in this respect, the wishes of Comrade Trotsky—to a certain extent and on certain conditions.

As for the first point, i.e., increasing the number of C.C. members, I think it must be done in order to raise the prestige of the Central Committee, to do a thorough job of improving our administrative machinery and to prevent conflicts between small sections of the C.C. from acquiring excessive importance for the future of the Party.

It seems to me that our Party has every right to demand from the working class 50 to 100 C.C. members, and that it could get them from it without unduly taxing the resources of that class.

Such a reform would considerably increase the stability of our Party and ease its struggle in the encirclement of hostile states, which, in my opinion, is likely to, and must, become much more acute in the next few years. I think that the stability of our Party would gain a thousandfold by such a measure.

December 23, 1922.
Lenin.

Taken down by M. V.*

[*M. V.—initials of Lenin’s secretary, M. Volidicheva]
Party does not take steps to avert this, the split may come unexpectedly.

I shall not give any further appraisals of the personal qualities of other members of the C.C., I shall just recall that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of course, no accident, but neither can the blame for it be laid upon them personally, any more than non-Bolshevism can upon Trotsky.

Speaking of the young C.C. members, I wish to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. They are, in my opinion, the most outstanding figures (among the youngest ones), and the following must be borne in mind about them: Bukharin is not only a most valuable and major theorist of the Party; he is also rightly considered the favourite of the whole Party, but his theoretical views can be classified as fully Marxist only with great reserve, for there is something scholastic about him (he has never made a study of dialectics, and, I think, never fully understood it).

December 25.

As for Pyatakov, he is unquestionably a man of outstanding will and outstanding ability, but shows too much zeal for administrating and the administrative side of the work to be relied upon in a serious political matter.

Both of these remarks, of course, are made only for the present, on the assumption that both these outstanding and devoted Party workers fail to find an occasion to enhance their knowledge and amend their one-sidedness.

December 25, 1922.

The increase in the number of C.C. members to 50 or even 100 must, in my opinion, serve a double or even a treble purpose: the more members there are in the C.C., the more men will be trained in C.C. work and the less danger there will be of a split due to some indiscretion. The enlistment of many workers to the C.C. will help the workers to improve our administrative machinery, which is pretty bad. We inherited it, in effect, from the old regime, for it was absolutely impossible to reorganise it in such a short time, especially in conditions of war, famine, etc. That is why those "critics" who point to the defects of our administrative machinery out of mockery or malice may be calmly answered that they do not in the least understand the conditions of the revolution today. It is altogether impossible in five years to reorganise the machinery adequately, especially in the conditions in which our revolution took place. It is enough that in five years we have created a new type of state in which the workers are leading the peasants against the bourgeoisie; and in a hostile international environment this in itself is a gigantic achievement. But knowledge of this must on no account blind us

Addition To The Letter of December 24, 1922.

Stalin is too rude and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealings among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a Secretary-General. That is why I suggest that

the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his stead who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may appear to be a negligible detail. But I think that from the standpoint of safeguards against a split and from the standpoint of what I wrote above about the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky it is not a detail, or it is a detail which can assume decisive importance.

January 4, 1923.

Lenin

Taken down by L.F.*

[* L.F.—initials of Lenin’s secretary, L. Fotieva]
to the fact that, in effect, we took over the old machinery of state from the tsar and the bourgeoisie and that now, with the onset of peace and the satisfaction of the minimum requirements against famine, all our work must be directed towards improving the administrative machinery.

I think that a few dozen workers, being members of the C.C., can deal better than anybody else with checking, improving and remodelling our state apparatus. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection on whom this function devolved at the beginning proved unable to cope with it and can be used only as an "appendage" or, on certain conditions, as an assistant to these members of the C.C. In my opinion, the workers admitted to the Central Committee should come preferably not from among those who have had long service in Soviet bodies (in this part of my letter the term workers everywhere includes peasants), because those workers have already acquired the very traditions and the very prejudices which it is desirable to combat.

The working-class members of the C.C. must be mainly workers of a lower stratum than those promoted in the last five years to work in Soviet bodies; they must be people closer to being rank-and-file workers and peasants, who, however, do not fall into the category of direct or indirect exploiters. I think that by attending all sittings of the C.C. and all sittings of the Political Bureau, and by reading all the documents of the C.C., such workers can form a staff of devoted supporters of the Soviet system, able, first, to give stability to the C.C. itself, and second, to work effectively on the renewal and improvement of the state apparatus.

December 26, 1922.

Taken down by L.F.

In increasing the number of its members, the C.C., I think, must also, and perhaps mainly, devote attention to checking and improving our administrative machinery, which is no good at all. For this we must enlist the services of highly qualified specialists, and the task of supplying those specialists must devolve upon the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

How are we to combine these checking specialists, people with adequate knowledge, and the new members of the C.C.? This problem must be resolved in practice.

It seems to me that the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (as a result of its development and of our perplexity about its development) has led all in all to what we now observe, namely, to an intermediate position between a special People's Commissariat and a special function of the members of the C.C.; between an institution that inspects anything and everything and an aggregate of not very numerous but first-class inspectors, who must be well paid (this is especially indispensable in our age when everything must be paid for and inspectors are directly employed by the institutions that pay them better).

If the number of C.C. members is increased in the appropriate way, and they go through a course of state management year after year with the help of highly qualified specialists and of members of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection who are highly authoritative in every branch—then, I think, we shall successfully solve this problem which we have not managed to do for such a long time.

To sum up, 100 members of the C.C. at the most and not more than 400-500 assistants, members of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, engaged in inspecting under their direction.

December 29, 1922

Taken down by M.V.
IV
KAMENEV ON STALIN AT THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B)
DECEMBER, 1925

[In 1925, a few months before the Fourteenth Congress, the party leadership split. Zinoviev and Kamenev formed the “New Opposition” based on the Leningrad Party organization which Zinoviev controlled. The members of the “New Opposition” got themselves elected as delegates to the Fourteenth Congress, where they acted as a separate group determined to oppose the Central Committee with a view to overthrowing it and taking over the leadership of the Party. At the Party Congress Zinoviev raised the theoretical problem of “state capitalism”, while Kamenev attacked Stalin and warned of the danger of Stalin’s becoming a personal dictator. The following is an excerpt from Kamenev’s speech.]

I turn to intraparty questions. To these questions I give three answers.

The first concerns the organizational forms of our intraparty life. Comrade Bukharin has said that we bought the controversy with Comrade Trotsky at the price, as he expressed it, of a convulsion in intraparty life. You must resolve this question in the sense that in the background of a general enlivening and heightening of the activity of all strata of the population, intraparty democracy is essential, its further development is essential. According to the testament of Lenin this has now become possible precisely because the declassing of the proletariat has ceased.

In the contrary case with this background you will inevitably have a new convulsion in intraparty life. This will be a phenomenon on a catastrophic order. I appeal to you not to choose this path, but the other path.

The things you hear about that path at the Congress—about defeatists, liquidators, Axelrodists, etc.—cannot be true; such things had not entered the party’s head even after it assembled at the Congress. This must be avoided. This can be avoided only if the minority, which is not made up of newcomers, which you know about fully—if this minority is given an opportunity to defend its views in the party, of course with the full responsibility which the party and the dictatorship impose upon us.

Second: Besides the invigoration of party discussion, besides granting the minority an opportunity to express its view to the whole party, as becomes Bolsheviks, within those limits which are set by the party statutes and the dictatorship of the party and the proletariat—it seems to me that you must resist this new tendency in the party which I have tried to sketch out to you. I am sure that if you find it impossible to do this now because of some organisational consideration or another—the facts of life, the course of the class struggle in our country, the growth of differentiation in the village will compel you to do this, and to say that the school which Bukharin has established is based on a departure from Lenin. What we need right now is in the slogan, Back to Lenin! (Voice from a seat: “Why back?”) Because this is going forward. Comrade, I know that in the first part of my speech you tried to attribute the matter to malice. We see that the matter is not one of malice, and I hope you will say this after a few months.

And finally the third point: We are against creating a theory of the “Duce”, we are against establishing a “Duce”. We are against the Secretariat, which has in practice com-
bined both policy and organization, standing over the political organ. We are for our upper level being organized in such a fashion that there would be a really all-powerful Politbureau, bringing together all our party's policies, and at the same time the Secretariat would be subordinate to it and execute the technical aspects of its decisions. (Noise) We cannot consider it normal but think it harmful to the party, if such a situation is continued where the Secretariat combines both policy and organization, and in fact predecides policy. (Noise) Here, Comrades, is what we need to do. Everyone who does not agree with me will draw his own conclusions. (Voice from a seat: "You should have begun with this.") The speaker has the right to begin with what he wants. You think I ought to have begun with what I have said, that personally I assert that our General Secretary is not the kind of figure that can unite the old Bolshevik staff around himself. I don't consider this a basic political question. I don't consider this question more important than the question of theoretical line. I feel that if the party adopted (Noise) a definite political line which was clearly marked off from those deviations which part of the Central Committee is now supporting, this question would not now be on the agenda. But I must say this out to the end. Precisely because I more than once told Comrade Stalin this, precisely because I more than once told a group of Leninist comrades, I repeat it here at the Congress. I have arrived at the conviction that Comrade Stalin cannot fulfil the role of unifier of the Bolshevik staff. (Voices from the audience: "Untrue!" "Nonsense!" "So that's what it is!" "He's shown his cards!" Noise. Applause by the Leningrad delegation. Shouts: "We won't surrender the commanding heights to you. Stalin! Stalin!" The delegates stand and cheer Comrade Stalin. Stormy applause. Shouts: "Here's where the party has become united. Now the Bolshevik staff must be united.")

(Yevdokimov, from his seat) "Long live the Russian Communist Party! Hurrah! Hurrah!"

(Stalin's Reply to Kamenev and Zinoviev, Sokolnikov and Lashevich, December 23, 1925. [From Kamenev's Speech to the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU (B), December, 1925 (Stenographic Report, Pp. 273-75)]

V

STALIN'S REPLY TO KAMENEV

[The Following is an excerpt from Stalin's Reply to Debate on the Political Report of the Central Committee, December 23, 1925.]

Let us now pass to the platform advanced by Zinoviev and Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Lashevich. It is time to speak also about the Opposition's platform. It is rather an original
one. Many diverse speeches have been delivered here by the Opposition. Kamenev said one thing, he pulled in one direction; Zinoviev said another thing, he pulled in another direction; Lashevich a third, Sokolnikov a fourth. But in spite of the diversity, all were agreed on one thing. On what were they agreed? What is their platform? Their platform is—reform of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The only thing they have in common and that completely unites them is the question of the Secretariat. This is strange and ridiculous, but it is a fact.

This question has a history. In 1923, after the Twelfth Congress, the people who gathered in the “cave” (laughter) drew up a platform for the abolition of the Political Bureau and for politicizing the Secretariat, i.e., for transforming the Secretariat into a political and organizational directing body to consist of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Stalin. What is the idea behind this platform? What does it mean? It means leading the Party without Kalinin, without Molotov. Nothing came of this platform not only because it was unprincipled at that time, but also because, without the comrades I have mentioned, it is impossible to lead the Party at the present time. To a question sent to me from the depths of Kislovodsk I answered: “Quite right!” (Laughter)

This was, so to speak, the first stage.

And now, it appears, the second stage has been ushered in, opposite to the first. Now they are demanding not the politicization, but the technicalization of the Secretariat; not the abolition of the Political Bureau, but its endowment with full powers.

Well, if the transformation of the Secretariat into a simple technical apparatus is really convenient for Kamenev, perhaps we ought to agree to it. I am afraid, however, that the Party will not agree to it. (A voice: “Quite right!”) Whether a technical Secretariat will prepare the questions it is supposed to prepare both for the Organization Bureau and for the Political Bureau, whether it will be able to do this, I have my doubts.

But when they talk about a Political Bureau endowed with full powers, such a platform deserves to be made a laughing-stock. Is not the Political Bureau endowed with full powers? Are not Secretariat and the Organization Bureau subordinate to the Political Bureau? And the Plenum of the Central Committee? Why does not our Opposition speak about the Plenum of the Central Committee? Is it thinking of endowing the Political Bureau with fuller powers than those possessed by the Plenum?

No, the Opposition is positively unlucky with its platform, or platforms, about the Secretariat.

What is to be done now, you will ask; what must we do to extricate ourselves from the situation that has been created? This question has engaged our minds all the time during the Congress, and also before it. We need unity of the Party ranks—that is the question now. The Opposition is fond of talking about difficulties. But there is one difficulty, and which the Opposition has created for us—the danger of the disintegration and disorganization of the Party. (Applause)

We must first of all overcome this difficulty. We had this in mind when, two days before the Congress, we offered the Opposition terms of a compromise agreement calculated to secure a possible reconciliation. This is the text of our offer:

“The undersigned members of the Central Committee believe that preparation of the Party Congress was made by a number of leading comrades of the Leningrad organization contrary to the line of the Central Committee of the Party and in opposition to the supporters of this line in Leningrad. The undersigned members of the Central Committee regard the resolution of the Moscow Conference as being absolutely correct in the substance and in form, and believe that it is the Central Committee’s duty...
to rebuff all and sundry tendencies that run counter to the Party line and disorganize the Party.

"However, with the object of preserving the unity of the Party, peace within the Party, of averting the possible danger of the alienation of the Leningrad organization, one of the best organizations in the R. C. P., from the Central Committee—the undersigned deem it possible, with the Congress endorsing the Central Committee's distinct and clear political line, to make a number of concessions. With this in view we make the following proposals:

"1. In drafting the resolution on the Central Committee's report, to take the resolution of the Moscow Conference as a basis, but to modify some of its formulations.

"2. The publication in the newspapers, or in bulletins, of the letter of the Leningrad Conference and of the Moscow Committee's reply to this letter be regarded, in the interests of unity, as inexpedient.

"3. Members of the Political Bureau...are not to speak against each other at the Congress.

"4. In speeches at the Congress, to dissociate ourselves from Sarkis (on regulating the composition of the Party) and from Safarov (on state capitalism).

"5. The mistake in connection with Komarov, Lobov and Moskvin be rectified by organizational measures.

"6. The Central Committee's decision to include a Leningrad man in the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be put into effect immediately after the Congress.

"7. With the view to strengthening connection with the Central Organ, to include one Party worker from Leningrad in the editorial board of the Central Organ.

"8. In view of the weakness of the editor of The Leningradskaya Pravda (Gladnev), to deem it necessary to replace him by a stronger comrade in agreement with the Central Committee.

KALININ, STALIN, MOLOTOV, DZERZHINSKY, and others.

December 15, 1925.

This is the compromise we offered, comrades.

But the Opposition was unwilling to come to an agreement. Instead of peace, it preferred an open and fierce struggle at the Congress. Such is the Opposition's "peaceableness".

In the main, we still hold the viewpoint of this document. In our draft resolution we, as you know, have already modified some formulations in the interests of peace in the Party.

We are opposed to lopping. We are opposed to the lopping policy. That does not mean that leaders will be permitted with impunity to give themselves airs and sit on the Party's head. No, excuse us from that. There will be no obeisances to leaders. (Voices: "Quite right!") Applause.) We stand for unity, we are opposed to lopping. The lopping policy is abhorrent to us. The Party wants unity, and it will achieve it with Kamenev and Zinoviev if they are willing, without them if they are unwilling. (Voices: "Quite right!") Applause.)

What is needed for unity? That the minority should submit to the majority. Without this there is no Party unity, nor can there be.

We are opposed to the publication of a special discussion sheet. The Bolshevik has a discussion section. That will be quite enough. We must not allow ourselves to be carried away by discussions. We are a Party that is governing a country—don't forget that. Do not forget that every disagreement at the top finds an echo in the country that is harmful to us. Not to speak of the effect it has abroad.

The organs of the Central Committee, apparently, will remain in their present shape. It is doubtful whether the Party will agree to break them up. (Voices: "Quite right!") Applause.) The Political Bureau is endowed with full powers as it is, it is superior to all the organs of the Central Committee except the Plenum. And the Plenum is the supreme organ—that is sometimes forgotten. Our Plenum decides everything, and it calls its leaders to order when they begin to lose their balance. (Voices: "Quite right!") Laughter. Applause.)

T. S. Q—7
THE STALIN QUESTION

There must be unity among us, and there will be if the Party, if the Congress displays firmness of character and does not allow itself to be scared. (Voices: “We won’t. We’ve been under fire before.”) If any of us go too far, we will be called to order—this is essential, this is necessary. The Party cannot be led except collectively. [Italics ours] Now that Ilyich is not with us it is silly to dream of such a thing (applause), it is silly to talk about it.

Collective work, collective leadership, unity in the Party, unity in the organs of the Central Committee on the condition that the minority submits to the majority—that is what we need now. [Italics ours] Now that Ilyich is not with us it is silly to dream of such a thing (applause), it is silly to talk about it.

As regards the Leningrad workingmen Communists, I have no doubt that they will always be in the front ranks of our Party. With them we built the Party, with them we reared it, with them we raised the standard of revolt in October 1917, with them we vanquished the bourgeoisie, with them we combated, and will combat, the difficulties in our path of construction. I am sure that the Leningrad workingmen Communists will not lag behind their friends in the other industrial centres in the struggle for the iron, Leninist unity of the Party. (Loud applause. The Internationale is sung.)

[From: J. Stalin: Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the C. P. S. U. (B); FLPH, Moscow, 1950. Pages 165-171.]

LENIN WITH TROTSKY AGAINST STALIN

[At the Eleventh Congress of the R. C. P. (B), on 28th March, 1922, in reply to Preobrazhensky’s criticism that Stalin had jobs in two commissariats, namely the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities and the Commissariat of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection (Rabkrin), Lenin said that there was no better candidate than Stalin to settle the political issues involved in the national question, and as regards the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection he argued that “to be able to handle investigations we must have at the head of it a man who enjoys high prestige.” Again, on Lenin’s motion, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R. C. P. (B), on April 3, 1922, elected Stalin General Secretary of the Central Committee. All this was clear evidence of Lenin’s confidence in Stalin. But after Lenin’s illness, and particularly from September 1922, relations between Lenin and Stalin became more and more strained. On certain questions Lenin began to rely more upon Trotsky against Stalin and the majority of the Central Committee. Trotsky, however, did not defend Lenin’s stand in the Central Committee. Trotsky, however, did not defend Lenin’s stand in the Central Committee. But later, in his struggle against the majority of the Central Committee, Trotsky attempted to prove with the help of Lenin’s secret and personal correspondence that Lenin had full confidence in Trotsky, and that there was complete political unanimity between them.

We reproduce below three excerpts from Trotsky’s book: The Real Situation in Russia, first published in 1927:

VI

LENIN WITH TROTSKY AGAINST STALIN
"After Lenin's Illness"; "With Lenin Against Stalin"; and "Lenin Broke Conclusively with Stalin."

TROTSKY:
AFTER LENIN'S ILLNESS

The falsifications and inventions in relation to the last period of Lenin's life are especially numerous. It would be wise for Stalin to be extremely cautious about this period, when Vladimir Ilych arrived at certain final conclusions about Stalin. It is naturally difficult to expound the inner history of the Politburo during Vladimir Ilych's active life. There were no stenographic reports and only the decisions were written down. That is why it is easy to lift out separate completely insignificant episodes, distort them and puff them up, or indeed simply invent "disagreements" where there was not a sign of one.

To be sure, practical disagreements arose often enough in the Politburo, and among them disagreements between Vladimir Ilych and me. The whole question is, what place did these disagreements occupy in the common work? On that theme the Stalin faction, with extreme lack of caution, is putting into circulation spiteful legends which go to pieces at the first touch of real fact, and which will ultimately turn wholly against Stalin.

To refute these legends it is necessary to take first of all the period of Lenin's illness—more accurately, the period between the two heavy attacks of it—when the doctors permitted Lenin to take part in the work, and when many important questions were decided in correspondence. In this correspondence—that is, in unquestionable documents—it is possible to see what debated question arose in the Central Committee, who had disagreements with whom, and in part also what was the attitude of Vladimir Ilych toward individual comrades. I will adduce a few examples.

In the Central Committee, at the end of 1922, there arose a very fundamental disagreement on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. I do not want to exaggerate its significance in the retrospect, but the political grouping created in the Central Committee around that problem was nevertheless very characteristic.

On the initiative of Comrade Sokolnikov, the Central Committee adopted a decision which meant a serious breach in the monopoly of foreign trade. Vladimir Ilych was decisively against this resolution. Knowing from Krassin that I was not present at the meeting of the Central Committee and that I had expressed myself against the resolution, Lenin entered into correspondence with me. Those letters are not yet published, as also the correspondence of Lenin with the Politburo on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. The censorship established over our inheritance from Lenin is ruthless. You publish two or three words written by Lenin on a scrap of paper, if only they may directly or indirectly injure the Opposition. You suppress documents of vast and fundamental significance, if they directly or indirectly injure Stalin.

I quote the letters from Lenin touching that problem:

"Comrade Trotsky:"

"I am sending you a letter from Krestinsky. Write immediately. Do you agree? I will fight at the plenum for the monopoly. And you?"

"Yours,"

"LENIN."

"P. S. Better return it quick."

"To Comrades Frumkin and Stomoniakov, copy to Trotsky:"

"In view of my increasing sickness, I cannot be present at the plenum, I am conscious how awkwardly, and even worse than awkwardly, I am behaving in relation to you, but all the same I can't do any better."
"Today I have received a letter from Comrade Trotsky, with which I agree in all essentials, with the exception perhaps of the last lines about the Gosplan. I will write Trotsky of my agreement with him and my request that he take upon himself, in view of my sickness, the defence of my position at the plenum.

"I think that this defence ought to be divided into three parts. First, the defence of the fundamental principle of the monopoly of foreign trade—its full and final confirmation; second, delegate to a special commission the detailed consideration of those practical plans for realizing this monopoly which are advanced by Avenesov; in this commission there ought to be no less than 50 percent of members from the Commissariat of Foreign Trade; third, the question of the work of the Gosplan ought to be considered separately. And by the way, I think that there will be no disagreement between me and Trotsky, if he confines himself to the demand that the work of the Gosplan, carried on under the aegis of the development of state industry, should give its opinion about all parts of the activity of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade.

"I hope to write again today or tomorrow, and send my declaration on the essence of the given problem at the plenum of the Central Committee. At any rate I think that this question is of such fundamental importance that in case I do not get the agreement of the plenum, I ought to carry it into the Party Congress, and before that, announce the existing disagreement at the faction of our party at the coming Congress of the Soviets.

"LENIN
"Dictated to L. F.

"Dec. 12, 1922."

"To Comrade Trotsky, copy to Frumkin and Stomoniakov:"

"I received your comment on the letter of Krestinsky and the plan of Avenesov. I think that we are in maximum agree-
advantageous to lose out before the Party Congress, and immediately turn to the faction of the Congress, than to lose out after the Congress. Perhaps such a compromise as this would be accepted: adopt the decision about confirmation of the monopoly now, but raise the question nevertheless at the Party Congress, and make that agreement now. No other compromise in my opinion would be to our interest in any circumstances.

“LENIN.

“Dec. 15, 1922.”

“Dictated by telephone to L. F.

“Comrade Trotsky”:

“I think we have arrived at a full agreement. I ask you to announce our solidarity in the plenum. I am in hope that our decision will go through, for a part of those voting against in October have now come over partially or completely to our side. If, unexpectedly, our decision does not go through, we will turn to our faction of the Soviet Congress and declare that we are going to carry the question into the Party Congress.

“Notify me in that case and I will send my declaration. If this question should be removed from the order of the day of the present plenum (which I do not expect and against which, of course, you must protest with all your strength in our common name), then I think we must turn just the same to the faction of the Soviet Congress, and demand the transfer of this question to the Party Congress. For any more wavering is absolutely unpermissible.

“All the materials which I sent you, you can keep until after the plenum.

“Yours,

“LENIN.

“Dec. 15, 1922.”

“Leon Davidovich:

“Professor Forster today permitted Vladimir Ilych to dictate a letter, and he dictated to me the following letter to you:

“‘Comrade Trotsky’:

“It seems we captured the position without firing a shot by mere movements of manœuvre. I propose that we not stop but continue the attack, and to that effect, introduce a resolution to raise the question at the Party Congress of reenforcing the monopoly of foreign trade and of measures looking to its better enactment. Announce this at the faction of the Soviet Congress. I hope you have no objection and will not fail to make a speech at the faction.

“‘N. LENIN.’

“Vladimir Ilych also asks you to telephone an answer.

“‘N. K. ULIANOVA.

“Dec. 21, 1922.”

Neither the content nor the tone of these letters needs any comment.

On the question of foreign trade, the Central Committee adopted a new decision annulling the old one. The joking words in Lenin’s letter about a victory gained “without firing a shot” refer to that.

It remains to ask: Suppose that in the number of those voting for the resolution destroying the monopoly of foreign trade had appeared the name of Trotsky, and that Stalin, in agreement with Lenin, had fought for the annulment of that resolution, how many books, brochures, and pamphlets would have been written in proof of the petty bourgeois and Kulak “deviation” of Trotsky?

TROTSKY:

WITH LENIN AGAINST STALIN

I will not quote here Lenin’s principal letter against Stalin on the national question. 12 It is printed in the stenographic reports of the plenum of July 26, and, moreover, it is being passed around in separate leaflets. They will fail to conceal
that letter. But there are other documents on the same theme, completely unknown to the party. Arkhivarius and the historians of the Stalin school are taking every measure to prevent those documents from appearing. They will continue to do so. They are quite capable, in fact, of simply destroying them.

For that reason I think it necessary to quote here the most important excerpts from the earliest letter of Lenin, and the answer of Stalin, on the question of the structure of the Soviet Union. Lenin's letter, dated September 27, 1922, was addressed to Comrade Kamenev, a copy being sent to all the members of the Politburo. Here is the beginning of the letter:

"You probably have received already from Stalin the resolution of his commission on the admission of the independent republics into the Soviet Union. If you have not received it, get it from the secretary and please read it immediately. I spoke about it yesterday with Sokolnikov, today with Stalin, tomorrow I will see Mdivani (a Georgian Communist suspected of advocating 'independence').

"In my opinion the question is supremely important. Stalin has a slight aspiration toward hurry. You must think it over well. Zinoviev too. (You once had the intention to take this matter up and did so to some extent.)

"Stalin has already agreed to one concession, in Section I, instead of saying 'entry' into the R.S.F.S.R. to say 'formal unification' with the R.S.F.S.R. in a union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia. I trust the spirit of this concession is obvious. We acknowledge ourselves on an equal basis with the Ukrainian Republic and the other Republics, and together with them on the basis of equality we enter into a new union, a new federation, 'the union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.'"

There follows a whole series of Lenin's corrections made in the same spirit. In the concluding part of his letter Lenin says:

"Stalin agreed to postpone introducing the resolution in the Politburo until my arrival. I arrive Monday, October 2, I should like to have an interview with you and Rykov for a couple of hours—in the morning, say, from one to two, and if necessary in the evening, say five to seven, or six to eight.

"Here is my preliminary project. On the basis of a conversation with Mdivani and other comrades, I will fight for it and change it. I urge you to do the same and answer me.

"Yours,
"LENIN.

"P. S. Send copies to all members of the Politburo."

Stalin sent his answer to Lenin to the members of the Politburo the same day, September 27, 1922. I quote from his answer two important passages:

"Lenin's correction to paragraph 2, proposing to create, along with the Central Executive Committee of the Russian Republic, a Central Executive Committee of the Federation, should not, in my opinion, be adopted. The existence of two Central Executive Committees in Moscow, one of which will obviously represent a 'lower house' and the other an 'upper house', will give us nothing but conflict and debate."

And further:

"4. On the subject of paragraph 4, in my opinion, Comrade Lenin himself 'hurried' a little, demanding a fusion of the commissariats of finance, food supply, labour and people's economy with the commissariats of the Federation. There is hardly a doubt that this 'hurriedness' will supply fuel to the advocates of 'independence', to the detriment of the national liberalism of Lenin.

"5. Lenin's correction to paragraph 5 is, in my opinion, superfluous.

"J. STALIN"

This extraordinarily illuminating correspondence, concealed from the party like many other documents, preceded the famous letter of Lenin on the national question. In his remarks upon Stalin's draft, Lenin is exceptionally reserved and gentle in his expression. Lenin still hoped, in that period, to adjust
the matter without a big conflict. He gently accuses Stalin of “hurrying”. Stalin's accusation against Mdivani of “independence” Lenin places in quotation marks, obviously dissociating himself from that accusation. Moreover, Lenin especially emphasizes the fact that he will introduce his correction on the basis of a conversation with Mdivani and other comrades.

Stalin's answer, on the contrary, is marked by rudeness; the concluding phrase of the fourth point, is especially worthy of attention:

“There is hardly a doubt that this ‘hurriedness’ will supply fuel to the advocates of ‘independence’, to the detriment of the national liberalism (!) of Lenin”. 76

Thus Lenin had arrived at the point of being accused of national liberalism.

The further course of the struggle about the national question showed Lenin that he could not straighten things out by means of inside and, so to speak, family methods of influencing Stalin; that it was necessary to appeal to the congress and to the party. With this purpose, Lenin wrote in several instalments, his letters on the national question.

Vladimir Ilych attributed enormous importance to the “Georgian” question, not only because he feared the consequences of a false national policy in Georgia—a fear which has been wholly confirmed—but also because upon that question was revealed to him the falseness of Stalin's whole course on the national question, and not only the national question. The big, fundamental letter of Lenin on the national question is concealed from the party to this day. The pretense that Lenin did not intend his letter to be read to the party is false to the bottom. Did Lenin intend his remarks in note books on and the borders of the books he read to be published? The fact is that you publish everything whatever which directly or indirectly strikes at the Opposition, but you hide the letter of Lenin giving his fundamental programme on the national question.

Here are two quotations from this letter:

“I think that here the hastiness and administrative impulsiveness of Stalin played a fatal role, and also his spite against the notorious ‘social chauvinism’. Spitefulness in general plays the worst possible role in politics”. (from Lenin's note of Dec. 30, 1922)

And here in more exact terms:

“It is of course necessary to hold Stalin and Dzerzhinsky responsible for all this really Great-Russian nationalistic campaign.” (from Lenin's letter of Dec. 31, 1922) 77

Vladimir Ilych sent me this letter at the moment when he felt that he would hardly be able to appear at the Twelfth Congress. Here is the note which I received from him in the course of the two last days of his participation in political life:

“Strictly secret. Personal.

“Esteemed Comrade Trotsky 75:

“I earnestly ask you to undertake the defence of the Georgian affair at the Central Committee of the party. That affair is now under ‘prosecution’ at the hands of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Indeed, quite the contrary. If you would agree to undertake its defence, I could be at rest. If for some reason you do not agree, send me back all the papers. I will consider that a sign of your disagreement.

“With the very best comradely greetings,

“LENIN.

“Dictated to M. V.

“March 5, 1923.”

“To Comrade Trotsky:

“To his letter, sent to you by telephone, Vladimir Ilych asks me to add for your information that Comrade Kamenev is going to Georgia Wednesday, and Vladimir Ilych asks me to find out whether you do not want to send something there from you.

“Signed, M. VOLODICHEVA.

“March 5, 1923.”
"To Comrades Mdivani, Makharadze, 7 9 and others
(copy to Comrades Trotsky and Kamenev) :

"Esteemed Comrades :

"I am working in your behalf with all my heart. I am
outraged at the rudeness of Orjonikidze and the connivance
of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing for you notes and
a speech. 8 0

"With esteem,
"LENIN.

"March 6, 1923."

"To Comrade Kamenev (copy to Comrade Trotsky) :

"Leon Borisovich :

"Supplementing our telephone conversation, I communi-
cate to you as acting president of the Politburo the following :

"As I already told you, December 31, 1922, Vladimir Ilych
has dictated an article on the national question.

"This question has worried him extremely, and he was
preparing to speak on it at the party conference. Not long
before his last illness he told me that he would publish this
article, but later. After that he got sick, without giving final
directions.

"Vladimir Ilych considered this article to be a guiding one
and extremely important. At his direction it was communi-
cated to Comrade Trotsky, whom Vladimir Ilych authorized
to defend his point of view upon the given question at the
party conference, in view of their solidarity upon it.

"The only copy of the article in my possession is preserved
at the direction of Vladimir Ilych in his secret archive.

"I bring the above facts to your attention.

"I could not do it earlier since I returned to work only
today after a sickness.

"L. FOTIEVA.

"March 16, 1923."

After all the slanders with which they have surrounded
the question of Lenin's attitude to me, I cannot refrain from
calling attention to the signature of his first letter—"with
the very best comradely greetings." Whoever knows Lenin's
parsimony of words and his manner of conversation and
correspondence, will realize that Lenin did not sign those
words to his letter accidentally. It was not accidental, either,
that Stalin, when he was compelled to read this correspon-
dence at the plenum of July 1926, substituted for the words
"with the very best comradely greetings" the official phrase
"with Communist greetings." Here again Stalin was true to
himself.

TROTSKY:

LENIN BROKE CONCLUSIVELY WITH STALIN

Yes, I had disagreements with Lenin. But Stalin's attempt,
relying upon these facts, to distort the general character
of our relations goes to pieces completely when confronted
with the facts of that period when, as I have said, things were
decided, not in conversation and votings which leave no
record, but by means of correspondence; that is, in the
interval between the first and second illnesses of Lenin.
To summarize :

(a) On the national question, Lenin was preparing for the
Twelfth Congress a decisive attack against Stalin. Of this
his secretary told me in his name and at his direction. The
phrase she repeated oftener of all was, "Vladimir Ilych is
preparing a bomb against Stalin."

(b) In Lenin's article about Rabkrin, he says :

"The People's Commissariat of Rabkrin does not enjoy
at the present moment a shadow of authority. Everybody
knows that a worse-organized institution than our Commissariat
of Rabkrin does not exist, and that in the present
circumstances you cannot expect a thing of that commissariat...
As a matter of fact, what is the use of creating a commissariat
whose work is carried on any old way, not inspiring the-
slightest confidence, and whose word enjoys an infinitely small authority...

"I ask any of the present leaders of Rabkrin or any of the people in contact with it—can they tell me on their conscience what is the practical use of such a commissariat as Rabkrin?"

Stalin stood at the head of Rabkrin throughout the first years of the revolution. Lenin's volley here was wholly directed against him.

(c) In the same article we read:

"(We have bureaucratism not only in the Soviet institutions, but also in the party.)"

Those words, clear enough in themselves, acquire an especially sharp significance in connection with my last conversation with Vladimir Ilych, quoted above, where he spoke of our forming a block against the Organization Bureau as the fountainhead of bureaucratism. The modest Lenin-like remark in parenthesis was wholly directed against Stalin.

(d) Of the Testament it is needless to speak. It is filled with distrust for Stalin, his roughness and disloyalty. It speaks of the possible misuse of power upon his part, and the danger, due to this, of a party split. The sole organizational inference indicated in the Testament, from all the characterization made there is this: "Remove Stalin from the post of General Secretary."

(e) Finally, the last letter which Lenin ever wrote in his life—or rather dictated—was a letter to Stalin breaking off all comradely relations with him. Comrade Kamenev told me of that letter on the same night when it was written (March 5-6, 1923). Comrade Zinoviev described that letter at the united plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee. The existence of the letter was confirmed in the stenographic copy of the testimony of M.I. Ulianova.

Counting over the "warnings," which Lenin gave to Stalin, Comrade Zinoviev said at the July plenum, 1926:

"And the third warning consists of this: That at the beginning of the year 1923, Vladimir Ilych, in a personal letter to Comrade Stalin, broke off all comradely relations with him."

M. Ulianova tried to present the matter in such a way that the breaking off of comradely relations announced by Lenin to Stalin in the last letter before his death seemed to be evoked by personal and not political causes. Is it necessary to recall that with Lenin personal motives always derived from political, revolutionary, party causes? "Rudeness" and "disloyalty" are also personal qualities. But Lenin warned the party about them, not for "personal", but for party reasons. Lenin's letter, breaking off comradely relations with Stalin, had exactly the same character. That last letter was written after the letter on the national question and after the Testament. Arduous attempts have been made to weaken the moral weight of the last letter of Lenin. The party has a right to know that letter!

That is how the facts stand. That is how Stalin is deceiving the party.

VII

STALIN SPEAKS ON LENIN'S TESTAMENT

THE TROTSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW SOME MINOR QUESTIONS

OCTOBER 23, 1927

[In 1927, when the international position of the U.S.S.R. had become very complicated, Trotskyists intensified their anti-Stalin and anti-Party struggle and circulated what they called the "Platform of the Eightythree". In the international]
sphere, persons like Ruth Fisher, Arkady Maslow, Souvaine, Max Eastman etc. made this an international issue. An open discussion on this 'platform' was launched by the Party at the joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on October 23, 1927. At this plenum Stalin delivered his famous speech: The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now. In the first part of his speech, Stalin dealt with the personal factor concerning Lenin's Testament. We reproduce below the relevant portion of Stalin's speech.

Comrades, I have not much time; I shall therefore deal with separate questions.

First of all about the personal factor. You have heard here how assiduously the Oppositionists hurl abuse at Stalin, abuse him with all their might. That does not surprise me, comrades. The reason why the main attacks were directed against Stalin is because Stalin knows all the opposition's tricks better, perhaps, than some of our comrades do, and it is not so easy, I dare say, to fool him. So they strike their blows primarily at Stalin. Well, let them hurl abuse to their heart's content.

And what is Stalin? Stalin is only a minor figure. Take Lenin. Who does not know that at the time of the August bloc the opposition, headed by Trotsky, waged an even more scurrilous campaign of slander against Lenin? Listen to Trotsky, for example:

"The wretched squabbling systematically provoked by Lenin, that old hand at the game, that professional exploiter of all that is backward in the Russian labour movement, seems like a senseless obsession" (see Trotsky's Letter to Chkheidze, April 1913).

Note the language, comrades. Note the language. It is Trotsky writing. And writing about Lenin.

Is it surprising, then, that Trotsky, who wrote in such an ill-mannered way about the great Lenin, whose shoe-laces he was not worthy of tying, should now hurl abuse at one of Lenin's numerous pupils—Comrade Stalin?

More than that. I think the opposition does me honour by venting all its hatred against Stalin. That is as it should be. I think it would be strange and offensive if the opposition, which is trying to wreck the Party, were to praise Stalin, who is defending the fundamentals of the Leninist Party principle.

Now about Lenin's "will". The Oppositionists shouted here—you heard them—that the Central Committee of the Party "concealed" Lenin's "will". We have discussed this question several times at the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, you know that. (A voice: "Scores of times.") It has been proved and proved again that nobody has concealed anything, that Lenin's "will" was addressed to the Thirteenth Party Congress, that this "will" was read out at the Congress (Voice: "That's right"), that the Congress unanimously decided not to publish it because, among other things, Lenin himself did not want it to be published and did not ask that it should be published. The opposition knows all this just as well as we do. Nevertheless, it has the audacity to declare that the Central Committee is "concealing" the "will".

The question of Lenin's "will" was brought up, if I am not mistaken, as far back as 1924. There is a certain Eastman, a former American Communist who was later expelled from the Party. This gentleman, who mixed with the Trotskyists in Moscow, picked up some rumours and gossip about Lenin's "will", went abroad and published a book entitled After Lenin's Death, in which he did his best to blacken the Party, the Central Committee and the Soviet regime, and the gist of which was that the Central Committee of our Party was "concealing" Lenin's "will". In view of the fact that this Eastman had at one time been connected with Trotsky, we, the members of the Political Bureau, called upon Trotsky to dissociate himself from Eastman who clutching at Trotsky and referring to the opposition, had made Trotsky responsible for slanderous
The Stalin Question

statements against our Party about the "will". Since the question was so obvious, Trotsky did, indeed, publicly disassociate himself from Eastman in a statement he made in the press. It was published in September 1925 in Bolshevik, No. 16.

Permit me to read the passage in Trotsky’s article in which he deals with the question whether the Party and its Central Committee was concealing Lenin’s "will" or not. I quote Trotsky’s article:

“In several parts of his book Eastman says that the Central Committee ‘concealed’ from the Party a number of exceptionally important documents written by Lenin in the last period of his life (it is a matter of letters on the national question, the so-called ‘will’, and others); there can be no other name for this than slander against the Central Committee of our Party. From what Eastman says it may be inferred that Vladimir Ilyich intended those letters, which bore the character of advice on internal organisation, for the press. In point of fact, that is absolutely untrue. During his illness Vladimir Ilyich often sent proposals, letters, and so forth, to the Party’s leading institutions and to its Congress. It goes without saying that all those letters and proposals were always delivered to those for whom they were intended, were brought to the knowledge of the delegates at the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congresses, and always, of course exercised due influence upon the Party’s decisions; and if not all of those letters were published, it was because the author did not intend them for the press. Vladimir Ilyich did not leave any ‘will’ and the very character of his attitude towards the Party, as well as the character of the Party itself, precluded the possibility of such a ‘will’. What is usually referred to as a ‘will’ in the emigre and foreign bourgeois and Menshevik press (in a manner garbled beyond recognition) is one of Vladimir Ilyich’s letters containing advice on organisational matters. The Thirteenth Congress of the Party paid the closest attention to that letter, as to all of the others, and drew from it conclusions appropriate to the conditions and circumstances of the time. All talk about concealing or violating a ‘will’ is a malicious invention and is entirely directed against Vladimir Ilyich’s real will, and against the interests of the Party he created.” (See Trotsky’s article “Concerning Eastman’s book, After Lenin’s Death,” Bolshevik, No. 16, September 1, 1925, p. 68)

Clear, one would think. That was written by none other than Trotsky. On what grounds, then are Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev now spinning a yarn about the Party and its Central Committee “concealing” Lenin’s “will”? It is “permissible” to spin yarns, but one should know where to stop.

It is said that in that “will” Comrade Lenin suggested to the Congress that in view of Stalin’s “rudeness” it should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin’s place as General Secretary. That is quite true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the Party. I have never concealed this and do not conceal it now. Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the Thirteenth Congress I asked the plenum of the Central Committee to release me from my duties as General Secretary. The Congress itself discussed this question. It was discussed by each delegation separately, and all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain at his post.

What could I do? Desert my post? That is not in my nature; I have never deserted any post, and I have no right to do so, for that would be desertion. As I have already said before, I am not a free agent, and when the Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey.

A year later I again put in a request to the plenum to release me, but I was again obliged to remain at my post.

What else could I do?

As regards publishing the “will”, the Congress decided not
to publish it, since it was addressed to the Congress and was not intended for publication.

We have the decision of a plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission in 1926 to ask the Fifteenth Congress for permission to publish this document. We have the decision of the same plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission to publish other letters of Lenin's, in which he pointed out the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev just before the October uprising and demanded their expulsion from the Party.

Obviously, talk about the Party concealing these documents is infamous slander. Among these documents are letters from Lenin urging the necessity of expelling Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party. The Bolshevik Party, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, have never feared the truth. The strength of the Bolshevik Party lies precisely in the fact that it does not fear the truth and looks the truth straight in the face.

The opposition is trying to use Lenin's "will" as a trump card; but it is enough to read this "will" to see that it is not a trump card for them at all. On the contrary, Lenin's "will" is fatal to the present leaders of the opposition.

Indeed, it is a fact that in his "will" Lenin accuses Trotsky of being guilty of "non-Bolshevism" and, as regards the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev made during October, he says that that mistake was not "accidental". What does that mean? It means that Trotsky, who suffers from "non-Bolshevism", and Kamenev and Zinoviev, whose mistakes are not "accidental" and can and certainly will be repeated, cannot be politically trusted.

It is characteristic that there is not a word, not a hint in the "will" about Stalin having made mistakes. It refers only to Stalin's rudeness. But rudeness is not and cannot be counted as a defect in Stalin's political line or position.

Here is the relevant passage in the "will"

"I shall not go on to characterise the personal qualities of the other members of the Central Committee. I shall merely remind you that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of course, not accidental, but that they can be blamed for it personally as little as Trotsky can be blamed for his non-Bolshevism."

Clear, one would think.


VIII

DISPUTE BETWEEN LENIN AND STALIN OVER THE NATIONAL QUESTION

After the October Revolution a "Transcaucasian Commissariat" was established at Tiflis on November 28, 1917. It was a coalition between the Azerbaijan chiefs and Georgian landowners led mainly by Mensheviks like Jordania. On April 22, 1918, the Transcaucasian assembly proclaimed an independent Transcaucasian Federal Republic. But the national friction stirred up by the ruling parties of the three constituent nations: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, made this unity impossible. On May 26, 1918, a Georgian national assembly, dominated by the Mensheviks, proclaimed an independent Georgian republic. In outlook it was essentially anti-Bolshevik. On May 28, 1918, through the signing of a German-Georgian treaty, Georgia became a virtual protectorate of Germany. When German and Turkish resistance against the Entente finally collapsed, British forces occupied principal towns of Transcaucasia and the Georgian rulers cooperated with the British
Government who were giving support to the “white” armies of Kolchak and Denikin against Soviet Russia. When Britain finally withdrew, Soviet Russia stepped into Transcaucasia. On May 7, 1920, Russia signed a treaty with the bourgeois Georgian Government controlled by the Mensheviks. Anti-Bolshevik activities of the Georgian Government, however, continued unabated. In September 1920, it received a delegation of some of the most distinguished social democrats of Western Europe including Kautsky, Vandervelde and Ramsay Macdonald, the sole purpose of whose Georgian trip was to collect material for anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Stalin, during his visit to Caucasus in October 1920, apprehended that with the conclusion of peace between Soviet Russia and Poland, the Entente might be expected to transfer its military operation to the south, in which case the Georgian Menshevik Government, the “kept mistress of the Entente” as she was, would not refuse to render service. By the end of February 1921, the Georgian Bolsheviks organised an upsurge, and on February 25, 1921, a Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic was proclaimed with Soviet Russia’s support. Lenin was in favour of a slower and more cautious approach to the Transcaucasian national problem. He advised a conciliatory attitude towards the intelligentsia and the Mensheviks. On March 2, 1921, he wrote to G. K. Orjonikidze “to devise an acceptable compromise for a bloc with Jordania and similar Georgian Mensheviks”. Lenin’s unusual anxiety to form a coalition with the Mensheviks was, however, not shared by Stalin and Orjonikidze. They saw great danger in the intensity of Georgian nationalism fostered by the Mensheviks, which made Georgia a kernel of separatist national resistance to the Soviet socialist power. Lenin’s conciliatory approach appeared to them as “national liberalism”. Ever since March 1921, the Georgian question became a source of uneasiness between Lenin and Stalin. On March 12, 1922, the three republics Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia concluded a treaty forming a Federation of Socialist Soviet Republic of Transcaucasia. But the Party demanded not a federation of republics but a single federal republic. This demand threw a section of the local communists into a state of revolt. In the summer of 1922, a special commission was sent down to Georgia by the Central Committee composed of Dzerzhinsky and two others to restore discipline. Local communist leaders Mdivani and Makharadze were relieved of their posts and recalled to Moscow. A Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets met in Tiflis, and on December 13, 1922, adopted the constitution of a Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. At the Twelfth Party Congress of April 1923, these proceedings were attacked by Mdivani, Makharadze and Bukharin and defended by Stalin, Orjonikidze and Enukidze. In this conflict Lenin promised to support Mdivani and Makharadze against the majority. Lenin, being ill, could not participate in the Congress and requested Trotsky to defend his stand. But Trotsky did not speak on the subject. We reproduce below four documents concerning this dispute: Lenin’s note on “The Question of Nationalities or Autonomisation” in full and excerpts from Stalin’s report and his replies to the debate on the report to the Twelfth Congress of the R. C. P. (B)
The Stalin Question

It is quite natural that in such circumstances the "freedom to secede from the union" by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is. There is no doubt that the infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and sovietised workers will drown in that tide of chauvinistic Great-Russian riffraff like a fly in milk.

It is said in defence of this measure that the People's Commissariats directly concerned with national psychology and national education were set up as separate bodies. But there the question arises: can these People's Commissariats be made quite independent? and secondly: were we careful enough to take measures to provide the non-Russians with a real safeguard against the truly Russian bully? I do not think we took such measures although we could and should have done so.

I think that Stalin's haste8 and his infatuation with pure administration, together with his spite against the notorious "nationalist-socialism", played a fatal role here. In politics spite generally plays the basest of roles.

I also fear that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who went to the Caucasus to investigate the "crime" of those "nationalist-socialists", distinguished himself there by his truly Russian frame of mind (it is common knowledge that people of other nationalities who have become Russified overdo this Russian frame of mind) and that the impartiality of his whole commission was typified well enough by Orjonikidze's "manhandling". I think that no provocation or even insult can justify such Russian manhandling and that Comrade Dzerzhinsky was inexcusably guilty in adopting a light-hearted attitude towards it.

For all the citizens in the Caucasus Orjonikidze was the authority. Orjonikidze had no right to display that irritability to which he and Dzerzhinsky referred. On the contrary, Orjonikidze should have behaved with a restraint which cannot
be demanded of any ordinary citizen, still less of a man accused of a "political" crime. And, to tell the truth, those nationalist-socialists were citizens who were accused of a political crime and the terms of the accusation were such that it could not be described otherwise.

Here we have an important question of principle: how is internationalism to be understood? December 30, 1922 Lenin. Taken down by M. V.

Continuation of the notes:
December 31, 1922

The question of Nationalities or Autonomisation (continued)

In my writings on the national question I have already said that an abstract presentation of the question of nationalism in general is of no use at all. A distinction must necessarily be made between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and that of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a big nation and that of a small nation.

In respect of the second kind of nationalism we, nationalists of a big nation, have nearly always been guilty, in historic practice, of an infinite number of cases of violence; furthermore, we commit violence and insult an infinite number of times without noticing it. It is sufficient to recall my Volga reminiscences of how non-Russians are treated; how the Poles are not called by any other name than Polyachiska, how the Tatar is nicknamed Prince, how the Ukrainians are always Khokhols and the Georgians and other Caucasian nationalists always Kapkasians.

That is why internationalism on the part of oppressors or "great" nations, as they are called (though they are great only in their violence, only as great bullies), must consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations but even in an inequality of the oppressor nation, the great nation, that must make up for the inequality which obtains in actual practice. Anybody who does not understand this has not grasped the real proletarian attitude to the national question, he is still essentially petty bourgeois in his point of view and is, therefore, sure to descend to the bourgeois point of view.

What is important for the proletarian? For the proletarian it is not only important, it is absolutely essential that he should be assured that the non-Russians place the greatest possible trust in the proletarian class struggle. What is needed to ensure this? Not merely formal equality. In one way or another, by one's attitude or by concessions, it is necessary to compensate the non-Russians for the lack of trust, for the suspicion and the insults to which the government of the "dominant" nation subjected them in the past.

I think it is unnecessary to explain this to Bolsheviks, to Communists, in greater detail. And I think that in the present instance, as far as the Georgian nation is concerned, we have a typical case in which a genuinely proletarian attitude makes profound caution, thoughtfulness and a readiness to compromise a matter of necessity for us. The Georgian who is neglectful of this aspect of the question or who carelessly flings about accusations of "nationalist-socialism" (whereas he himself is a real and true "nationalist-socialist", and even a vulgar Great-Russian bully), violates, in substance, the interests of proletarian class solidarity, for nothing holds up the development and strengthening of proletarian class solidarity so much as national injustice; "offended" nationals are not sensitive to anything so much as to the feeling of equality and the violation of this equality, if only through negligence or jest—to the violation of that equality by their proletarian comrades. That is why in this case it is better to overdo rather than underdo the concessions and leniency towards the national minorities. That is why, in this case, the fundamental interest of proletarian solidarity, and consequently of the proletarian class struggle, requires that we never adopt a formal attitude to the national question, but always take into
account the specific attitude of the proletarian of the oppressed (or small) nation towards the oppressor (or great) nation.

December 31, 1922
Taken down by M. V. Lenin.

Continuation of the notes.
December 31, 1922

What practical measures must be taken in the present situation?

Firstly, we must maintain and strengthen the union of socialist republics. Of this there can be no doubt. This measure is necessary for us and it is necessary for the world communist proletariat in its struggle against the world bourgeoisie and its defence against bourgeois intrigues.

Secondly, the union of socialist republics must be retained for its diplomatic apparatus. By the way, this apparatus is an exceptional component of our state apparatus. We have not allowed a single influential person from the old tsarist apparatus into it. All sections with any authority are composed of Communists. That is why it has already won for itself (this may be said boldly) the name of a reliable communist apparatus purged to an incomparably greater extent of the old tsarist, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements than that which we have had to make do within other People's Commissariats.

Thirdly, exemplary punishment must be inflicted on Comrade Orjonikidze (I say this all the more regretfully as I am one of his personal friends and have worked with him abroad) and the investigation of all the material which Dzerzhinsky's commission has collected must be completed or started over again to correct the enormous mass of wrongs and biased judgments which it doubtlessly contains. The political responsibility for all this truly Great-Russian nationalist campaign must, of course, be laid on Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.

Fourthly, the strictest rules must be introduced on the use of the national language in the non-Russian republics of our union, and these rules must be checked with special care...

There is no doubt that our apparatus being what it is, there is bound to be, on the pretext of unity in the railway service, unity in the fiscal service and so on, a mass of truly Russian abuses. Special ingenuity is necessary for the struggle against these abuses, not to mention special sincerity on the part of those who undertake this struggle. A detailed code will be required, and only the nationals living in the republic in question can draw it up at all successfully. And then we cannot be sure in advance that as a result of this work we shall not take a step backward at our next Congress of Soviets, i.e., retain the union of Soviet socialist republics only for military and diplomatic affairs, and in all other respects restore full independence to the individual People's Commissariats.

It must be borne in mind that the decentralisation of the People's Commissariats and the lack of co-ordination in their work as far as Moscow and other centres are concerned can be compensated sufficiently by Party authority, if it is exercised with sufficient prudence and impartiality; the harm that can result to our state from a lack of unification between the national apparatuses and the Russian apparatus is infinitely less than that which will be done not only to us, but to the whole International, and to the hundreds of millions of the peoples of Asia, which is destined to follow us on to the stage of history in the near future. It would be unpardonable opportunism if, on the eve of the debut of the East, just as it is awakening, we undermined our prestige with its peoples, even if only by the slightest crudity or injustice towards our own non-Russian nationalities. The need to rally against the imperialists of the West, who are defending the capitalist world, is one thing. There can be no doubt about that and it would be superfluous for me to speak about my unconditional approval of it. It is another thing when we ourselves lapse, even if only in trifles, into imperialist attitudes towards oppressed nationalities, thus undermining all our principled sincerity, all our principled defence of the struggle against imperialism. But the morrow of world history will be a day when the...
awakening peoples oppressed by imperialism are finally aroused and the decisive long and hard struggle for their liberation begins.

December 31, 1922 Lenin.

Taken down by M. V.

STALIN:

Excerpts from the "REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S ORGANISATIONAL REPORT" placed at the Twelfth Congress of the R. C. P. (B) APRIL 19, 1923.

Lastly, about Mdivani. May I be permitted to say a few words about this question, which has bored the whole congress. He talked about the Central Committee's vacillations. He said that one day it decides to unite the economic efforts of the three Transcaucasian republics, the next day it decides that these republics should unite in a federation, and the day after that it takes a third decision that all the Soviet republics should unite in a Union of Republics. That is what he calls the Central Committee's vacillations. Is that right? No, comrades, that is not vacillation, it is system. The independent republics first drew together on an economic basis. That step was taken as far back as 1921. After it was found that the experiment of drawing together the republics was producing good results the next step was taken—federation, particularly in a place like Transcaucasia, where it is impossible to dispense with a special organ of national peace. As you know, Transcaucasia is a country where there were Tatar-Armenian massacres while still under the tsar, and war under the Mus-savatists, Dashnaks and Mensheviks. To put a stop to that strife an organ of national peace was needed, i.e., a supreme authority whose word would carry weight. It was absolutely impossible to create such an organ of national peace without the participation of representatives of the Georgian nation. And so, several months after the economic efforts were united, the next step was taken—a federation of republics, and a year after that yet another step was taken, marking the final stage in the process of unifying the republics—a Union of Republics was formed. Where is there vacillation in that? It is the system of our national policy. Mdivani has simply failed to grasp the essence of our Soviet policy, although he regards himself as an old Bolshevik.

He asked a number of questions, insinuating that the major questions concerning the national aspect of affairs in Transcaucasia, and particularly in Georgia, were decided either by the Central Committee or, by individuals. The fundamental question in Transcaucasia is the question of the federation of Transcaucasia. Permit me to read a small document that gives the history of the directive of the Central Committee of the R. C. P. on the Transcaucasian Federation.

On November 28, 1921, Comrade Lenin sent me a draft of his proposal for the formation of a federation of the Transcaucasian republics. It states:

"(1) to recognise the federation of the Transcaucasian republics as absolutely correct in principle and its realisation as absolutely necessary, although it would be premature to apply it in practice immediately, i.e., it would require several weeks for discussion and propaganda, and for carrying it through from below;

"(2) to instruct the Central Committees of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to carry out this decision." 100

I wrote to Comrade Lenin and suggested that there should be no hurry about this, that we ought to wait a little to give the local people a certain period of time to carry through the federation. I wrote to him:

"Comrade Lenin, I am not opposed to your resolution, if you agree to accept the following amendment: instead of the words 'would require several weeks for discussion', in Point 1, say: 'would require a certain period of time for discussion', and so on, in accordance with your resolution. The point is that in Georgia it is impossible to 'carry through' federation..."
from below' by 'Soviet procedure' in 'several weeks'; since
the Soviets in Georgia are only just beginning to be organised.
They are not yet completely built. A month ago they did
not exist at all, and to call a Congress of Soviets there in
'several weeks' is inconceivable; and, well, a Transcaucasian
federation without Georgia would be a federation on paper
only. I think we must allow two or three months for the
idea of federation to triumph among the broad masses of
Georgia. Stalin."

Comrade Lenin answered: "I accept this amendment."

Next day that proposal was adopted by the votes of Lenin,
Trotsky, Kamenev, Molotov and Stalin. Zinoviev was
absent, his place was taken by Molotov. The decision was
adopted by the Political Bureau at the end of 1921, as you see,
unanimously. The struggle which the group of Georgian
Communists headed by Mdivani is waging against the Central
Committee's directive concerning federation dates back to that
time. You see, comrades, that the case is not as Mdivani
presented it. I quote this document against those unseemly
insinuations which Mdivani made here.

The second question: how is the fact to be explained
that the group of comrades headed by Mdivani has been
recalled by the Central Committee of the Party, what is the
reason of that? There are two chief and, at the same time,
formal reasons. I must say this because reproaches have been
levelled at the Central Committee, and at me in particular.

The first reason is that the Mdivani group has no influence
in its own Georgian Communist Party, that it is repudiated by
the Georgian Communist Party itself. This Party has held
two congresses: the first congress was held at the beginning
of 1922, and the second was held at the beginning of 1923.
At both congresses the Mdivani group, and its idea of rejec-
ting federation, was emphatically opposed by its own Party.
At the first congress, I think, out of a total of 122 votes he
obtained somewhere about 18; and at the second congress,
out of a total of 144 votes he obtained about 20. Mdivani
was persistently refused election to the Central Committee;
his position was systematically rejected. On the first occasion,
at the beginning of 1922, we in the Central Committee brought
pressure to bear upon the Communist Party of Georgia and
compelled it against its will to accept these old comrades
(Mdivani is certainly an old comrade, and so is Makhazrake),
thinking that the two groups, the majority and the minority,
would eventually work together. In the interval between the
first and second congresses, however, there were a number of
conferences, city and all-Georgian, at which the Mdivani
group was everywhere severely trounced by its own Party,
until finally, at the last congress, Mdivani barely scraped to-
gether 18 votes out of 140.

The Transcaucasian Federation is an organisation that
affects not only Georgia, but the whole of Transcaucasia. As
a rule, the Georgian Party congress is followed by a Trans-
caucasian congress. There we have the same picture. At the
last Transcaucasian congress, out of a total of, I think, 244
votes, Mdivani barely obtained about 10 votes. Such are the
facts. What is the Central Committee of the Party to do in
such a situation, where the Party, the Georgian organisation
itself, cannot stand the Mdivani group? I understand our
policy in the national question to be a policy of concessions
to non-Russians and to national prejudices. That policy is
undoubtedly correct. But is it permissible to go on without
end thwarting the will of the Party in which the Mdivani group
has to work? In my opinion it is not. On the contrary, we
must as far as possible harmonise our actions with the will of
the Party in Georgia. That is what the Central Committee
did when it recalled certain members of this group.

The second reason that prompted the Central Committee
to recall certain comrades of this group is that they repeatedly
disobeyed the decisions of the Central Committee of the
R.C.P. I have already told you the history of the decision
concerning federation; I have already said that without this
organ national peace is impossible; that in Transcaucasia
Only the Soviet Government succeeded in establishing national peace by creating the federation. That is why we in the Central Committee regarded that decision as being absolutely binding. But what do we see? That the Mdivani group disobeys that decision. More than that, it opposes it. That has been established both by Comrade Dzerzhinsky’s commission and by the Kamenev-Kuibyshev commission. Even now, after the decision of the March Plenum concerning Georgia, Mdivani is continuing to oppose federation. What is that if not contempt for the Central Committee’s decisions?101

Such are the circumstances that compelled the Central Committee of the Party to recall Mdivani.

Mdivani tries to make it appear that, in spite of his recall, he is the victor. If that is victory, I don’t know what defeat is. You know, of course, that Don Quixote, of blessed memory, also regarded himself as the victor when he was knocked head over heels by windmill sails. I have a notion that certain comrades who are working in a certain piece of Soviet territory called Georgia are not all there in their upper storeys.

I pass on to Comrade Makharadze. He declared here that he is an old Bolshevik in the national question, that he belongs to the school of Lenin. That is not true, comrades. At the conference held in April 1917, Comrade Lenin and I fought against Comrade Makharadze. He was then against the self-determination of nations, against the basis of our programme, against the right of nations to exist as independent states. He upheld that standpoint and fought the Party. Later he changed his opinion (that, of course, is to his credit), but still, he should not have forgotten this! He is not an old Bolshevik in the national question, but rather a fairly young one.

Comrade Makharadze put to me a parliamentary interpellation: do I admit, or does the Central Committee admit, that the organisation of the Georgian Communists is a real organisation which is to be trusted, and if so, does the Central Committee agree to this organisation having the right to raise questions and put forward its proposals? If all that is admitted, does the Central Committee consider that the regime that has been established there, in Georgia, is intolerable?

I shall answer this parliamentary interpellation.

Of course, the Central Committee trusts the Communist Party of Georgia—whom else should it trust? The Communist Party of Georgia represents the essence, the best elements, of the Georgian people, without whom it would be impossible to govern Georgia. But every organisation consists of a majority and a minority. We have not a single organisation in which there is not a majority and a minority. And in practice we see that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia consists of a majority which is carrying out the Party line, and of a minority which does not always carry out this line. Obviously, we are referring to trust in the organisation as represented by its majority.

The second question: have the national Central Committees the right to initiative, to raise questions; have they the right to make proposals?

Of course they have. That is obvious. What I do not understand is, why did Comrade Makharadze not present us with any facts to prove that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia is not allowed to raise questions, is not allowed to make proposals and to discuss them? I am not aware of any such facts. I think that Comrade Makharadze would submit such materials to the Central Committee if he had any at all.

The third question: can the regime that has been created in Georgia be tolerated?

Unfortunately, the question lacks concreteness. What regime? If he means the regime under which the Soviet power in Georgia has recently been ejecting the nobles from their nests, and also Mensheviks and counter-revolutionaries,
if he means that regime, then, in my opinion, there is nothing bad about it. It is our Soviet regime. If, however, he means that the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee has created conditions making it impossible for the Communist Party of Georgia to develop, I have no facts to show that this is so. The Georgian Central Committee that was elected at the last congress of the Georgian Communist Party by 110 votes against 18, did not raise this question with us. It is working in complete harmony with the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee of our Party. If there is a small group, a trend, in short, members of the Party, who are dissatisfied with the Party regime, they ought to submit the relevant material to the Central Committee. Two commissions have already been to Georgia to investigate such complaints, one that of Dzerzhinsky, and the other that of Kamenev and Kuibyshev. We can set up a third commission if need be.

With this I conclude the first part of my reply to the discussion on the Central Committee's organisational activities during the past year.

[J. V. Stalin: Works Vol. 5 Pages 231-239]

STALIN:

Excerpts from the REPORT ON NATIONAL FACTORS IN PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS placed before the Twelfth Congress of the R. C. P. (B), APRIL 23, 1923

The national question is also of importance for us from the standpoint of the internal situation, not only because the former dominant nation numbers about 75,000,000 and the other nations 65,000,000 (not a small figure, anyway), and not only because the formerly oppressed nationalities inhabit areas that are the most essential for our economic development and the most important from the standpoint of military strategy, but above all because during the past two years we have introduced what is known as the N. E. P., as a result of which Great-Russian nationalism has begun to grow and become more pronounced, the Smena-Vekhists idea has come into being, and one can discern the desire to accomplish by peaceful means what Denikin failed to accomplish, i.e., to create the so-called "one and indivisible".

Thus, as a result of the N. E. P., a new force is arising in the internal life of our country, namely, Great-Russian chauvinism, which entrenches itself in our institutions, which penetrates not only the Soviet institutions, but also the Party institutions, and which is to be found in all parts of our Party federation. Consequently, if we do not resolutely combat this new force, if we do not cut it off at the root—and the N. E. P. conditions foster it—we run the risk of being confronted by a rupture between the proletariat of the former dominant nation and the peasants of the formerly oppressed nations—which will mean undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But the N. E. P. fosters not only Great-Russian chauvinism—it also fosters local chauvinism, especially in those republics where there are several nationalities. I have in mind Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bukhara and partly Turkestan; in each of these there are several nationalities, the advanced elements of which may soon begin to compete among themselves for supremacy. Of course, this local chauvinism as regards its strength is not such a danger as Great-Russian chauvinism. But it is a danger nevertheless, for it threatens to convert some of the republics into arenas of national squabbling and to weaken the bonds of internationalism there.

The national question, at the basis of which lie the tasks of establishing correct relations between the proletariat of the former dominant nations and the peasantry of the other nationalities, assumes at the present time the special form of establishing the co-operation and fraternal co-existence of those nations which were formerly disunited and which are now uniting in a single state....
The basis of this Union is voluntary consent and the juridical equality of the members of the Union. Voluntary consent and equality—because our national programme starts out from the clause on the right of nations to exist as independent states, what was formerly called the right to self-determination. Proceeding from this, we must definitely say that no union of peoples into a single state can be durable unless it is based on absolutely voluntary consent, unless the peoples themselves wish to unite. The second basis is the juridical equality of the peoples which form the Union. That is natural. This equality finds expression in the fact that all the republics, in this case the four republics: Transcaucasia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine and the R. S. F. S. R., forming the Union, enjoy the benefits of the Union to an equal degree and at the same time to an equal degree forego certain of their independent rights in favour of the Union. If the R. S. F. S. R., the Ukraine, the Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian Republics are not each to have its own People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, it is obvious that the abolition of these Commissariats and the establishment of common Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for the Union of Republics will entail a certain restriction of the independence which these republics formerly enjoyed, and this restriction will be equal for all the republics forming the Union...

Thus, the concrete form the national question has assumed under the conditions at present prevailing in our country is how to achieve the co-operation of the peoples in economic, foreign and military affairs. We must unite the republics along these lines into a single union called the U.S.S.R. Such are the concrete forms the national question has assumed at the present time.

You know what the conducive factors are...

But there are also factors which hinder, which impede this union. The principal force impeding the union of the republics into a single union is that force which, as I have said, is growing in our country under the condition of the N. E. P. — Great-Russian chauvinism. It is by no means accidental, comrades, that the Smena-Vekhites have recruited a large number of Supporters among Soviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is it accidental that Messieurs the Smena-Vekhites are singing the praises of the Bolshevik Communists, as much as to say: You may talk about Bolshevism as much as you like, you may prate as much as you like about your internationalist tendencies, but we know that you will achieve what Denikin failed to achieve, that you Bolsheviks have resurrected or at all events will resurrect, the idea of a Great Russia. All that is not accidental. Nor is it accidental that this idea has even penetrated some of our Party institutions. At the February Plenum, where the question of a second chamber was first raised, I witnessed how certain members of the Central Committee made speeches which were inconsistent with communism—speeches which had nothing in common with internationalism. All this is a sign of the times, an epidemic. The chief danger that arises from this is that, owing to the N. E. P., dominant-nation chauvinism is growing in our country by leaps and bounds, striving to obliterate all that is not Russian, to gather all the threads of government into the hands of Russians and to stifle everything that is not Russian. The chief danger is that with such a policy we run the risk that the Russian proletarians will lose the confidence of the formerly oppressed nations which they won in the October days, when they overthrew the landlords and the Russian capitalists, when they smashed the chains of national oppression within Russia, withdrew the troops from Persia and Mongolia, proclaimed the independence of Finland and Armenia and, in general, put the national question on an entirely new basis. Unless we all arm ourselves against this new, I repeat, Great-Russian chauvinism, which is advancing, creeping, insinuating itself drop by drop into the eyes and ears of our officials and step by step corrupting them, we may lose down to the last shreds the confidence we earned at that time. It is this danger, comrades, that we must defeat at all costs.
Otherwise we are threatened with the prospect of losing the confidence of the workers and peasants of the formerly oppressed peoples, we are threatened with the prospect of a rupture of the ties between these peoples and the Russian proletariat, and this threatens us with the danger of a crack being formed in the system of our dictatorship.

It must be understood that if a force like Great-Russian chauvinism blossoms and spreads, there will be no confidence on the part of the formerly oppressed peoples, we shall have no cooperation within a single union, and we shall have no Union of Republics.

Such is the first and most dangerous factor that is impeding the union of the peoples and republics into a single union.

The second factor, comrades, which is also hindering the union of the formerly oppressed peoples around the Russian proletariat, is the actual inequality of nations that we have inherited from the period of tsarism.

We have proclaimed juridical equality and are practising it; but juridical equality, although in itself of very great importance in the history of the development of the Soviet republics, is still far from being actual equality.

But there is still a third factor that is impeding the union of the republics into a single union: the existence of nationalism in the individual republics. The N.E.P. affects not only the Russian, but also the non-Russian population. The New Economic Policy is developing private trade and industry not only in the centre of Russia, but also in the individual republics. And it is this same N.E.P., and the private capital associated with it, which nourish and foster Georgian, Azerbaijanian, Uzbek and other nationalism. Of course, if there were no Great-Russian chauvinism—which is aggressive because it is strong, because it was also strong previously and has retained the habit of oppressing and humiliating—if there were no Great-Russian chauvinism, then, perhaps, local chauvinism also, as a retaliation to Great-Russian chauvinism, would exist only in a much reduced form, in miniature, so to speak; because, in the final analysis, anti-Russian nationalism is a form of defence, an ugly form of defence against Great-Russian nationalism, against Great-Russian chauvinism. If this nationalism were only defensive, it might not be worth making a fuss about. We could concentrate the entire force of our activities, the entire force of our struggle, against Great-Russian chauvinism, in the hope that as soon as this powerful enemy is overcome, anti-Russian nationalism will be overcome with it; for, I repeat, in the last analysis, this nationalism is a reaction to Great-Russian nationalism, a retaliation to it, a certain form of defence. Yes, that would be so if anti-Russian nationalism in the localities were nothing more than a reaction to Great-Russian nationalism. But the trouble is that in some republics this defensive nationalism is turning into aggressive nationalism.

Take Georgia. Over 30 per cent of her population are non-Georgians. They include Armenians, Abkhazians, Azerbaidjanians, Ossetians and Tatars. The Georgians are at the head. Among some of the Georgian Communists the idea has sprung up and is gaining ground that there is no particular need to reckon with these small nationalities; they are less cultured, less developed, they say, and there is therefore no need to reckon with them. That is chauvinism—harmful and dangerous chauvinism; for it may turn the small republic of Georgia into an arena of strife. In fact, it has already turned it into an arena of strife.

Azerbaijan. The basic nationality here is the Azerbaidjanian, but there are also Armenians. Among a section of the Azerbaidjanians there is also a tendency, sometimes quite concealed, to think that the Azerbaidjanians are the indigenous population and the Armenians intruders, and therefore, it is possible to push the Armenians somewhat into the background, to disregard their interests. That is chauvinism too. It undermines the equality of nationalities on which the Soviet system is based.

Bukhara. In Bukhara there are three nationalities—Uzbeks,
the basic nationality; Turkmenians, a "less important" nationality from the point of view of Bukharan chauvinism; and Kirghiz, who are few in number here and, apparently, "less important".

In Khorezm you have the same thing: Turkmenians and Uzbeks. The Uzbeks are the basic nationality and the Turkmenians "less important".

All this leads to conflict and weakens the Soviet regime. This tendency towards local chauvinism must also be cut off at the root. Of course, compared with Great-Russian chauvinism, which in the general scheme of the national question comprises three-quarters of the whole, local chauvinism is not so important; but for local work, for the local people, for the peaceful development of the national republics themselves, this chauvinism is a matter of first-rate importance.

Sometimes this chauvinism begins to undergo a very interesting evolution. I have in mind Transcaucasia. You know that Transcaucasia consists of three republics embracing ten nationalities. From very early times Transcaucasia has been an arena of massacre and strife and, under the Mensheviks and Dashnaks, it was an arena of war. You know of the Georgian-Armenian war. You also know of the massacres in Azerbaijan at the beginning and at the end of 1905. I could mention a whole list of districts where the Armenian majority massacred all the rest of the population, consisting of Tatars. Zangezur, for instance. I could mention another province—Nakhichevan. There the Tatars predominated, and they massacred all the Armenians. That was just before the liberation of Armenia and Georgia from the yoke of imperialism. (Voice: "That was their way of solving the national question.") That, of course, is also a way of solving the national question. But it is not the Soviet way. Of course, the Russian workers are not to blame for this state of mutual national enmity, for it is the Tatars and Armenians who are fighting, without the Russians. That is why a special

organ is required in Transcaucasia to regulate the relations between the nationalities.

It may be confidently stated that the relations between the proletariat of the formerly dominant nation and the toilers of all the other nationalities constitute three-quarters of the whole national question. But one-quarter of this question must be attributed to the relations between the formerly oppressed nationalities themselves.

And if in this atmosphere of natural distrust the Soviet Government had failed to establish in Transcaucasia an organ of national peace capable of settling all friction and conflict, we would have reverted to the era of tsarism, or to the era of the Dashnaks, the Mussavatists, the Mensheviks, when people maimed and slaughtered one another. That is why the Central Committee has on three occasions affirmed the necessity of preserving the Transcaucasian Federation as an organ of national peace.

There has been and still is a group of Georgian Communists who do not object to Georgia uniting with the Union of Republics, but who do object to this union being effected through the Transcaucasian Federation. They, you see, would like to get closer to the Union, they say that there is no need for this partition wall in the shape of the Transcaucasian Federation between themselves—the Georgians—and the Union of Republics; the federation, they say, is superfluous. This, they think, sounds very revolutionary.

But there is another motive behind this. In the first place, these statements indicate that on the national question the attitude towards the Russians is of secondary importance in Georgia, for these comrades, the deviators (that is what they are called), have no objection to Georgia joining the Union directly; that is, they do not fear Great-Russian chauvinism, believing that its roots have been cut in one way or another, or at any rate, that it is not of decisive importance. Evidently, what they fear most is the federation of Transcaucasia. Why? Why should the three principal nations which inhabit Trans-
The bonds of the Transcaucasian Federation deprive Georgia of that somewhat privileged position which she could assume by virtue of her geographical position. Judge for yourselves. Georgia has her own port—Batum—through which goods flow from the West; Georgia has a railway junction like Tiflis, which the Armenians cannot avoid, nor can Azerbaijan avoid it, for she receives her goods through Batum. If Georgia were a separate republic, if she were not part of the Transcaucasian Federation, she could present something in the nature of a little ultimatum both to Armenia, which cannot do without Tiflis, and to Azerbaijan, which cannot do without Batum. There would be some advantages for Georgia in this. It was no accident that the notorious savage decree establishing frontier cordons was drafted in Georgia. Serebryakov is now being blamed for this. Let us allow that he is to blame, but the decree originated in Georgia, not in Azerbaijan or Armenia.

Then there is yet another reason. Tiflis is the capital of Georgia, but the Georgians there are not more than 30 per cent of the population, the Armenians not less than 35 per cent, and then come all the other nationalities. That is what the capital of Georgia is like. If Georgia were a separate republic the population could be reshifted somewhat—for instance, the Armenian population could be shifted from Tiflis. Was not a well-known decree adopted in Georgia to “regulate” the population of Tiflis, about which Comrade Makharadze said that it was not directed against the Armenians? The intention was to reshift the population so as to reduce the number of Armenians in Tiflis from year to year, making them fewer than the Georgians, and thus convert Tiflis into a real Georgian capital. I grant that they have rescinded the eviction decree, but they have a vast number of possibilities, a vast number of flexible forms—such as “decongestion”—by which it would be possible, while maintaining a semblance of internationalism, to arrange matters in such a way that Armenians in Tiflis would be in the minority.

It is these geographical advantages that Georgian deviators do not want to lose, and the unfavourable position of the Georgians in Tiflis itself, where there are fewer Georgians than Armenians, that are causing our deviators to oppose federation. The Mensheviks simply evicted Armenians and Tatars from Tiflis. Now, however, under the Soviet regime, eviction is impossible; therefore, they want to leave the federation, and this will create legal opportunities for independently performing certain operations which will result in the advantageous position enjoyed by the Georgians being fully utilised against Azerbaijan and Armenia. And all this would create a privileged position for the Georgians in Transcaucasia. Therein lies the whole danger.

Can we ignore the interests of national peace in Transcaucasia and allow conditions to be created under which the Georgians would be in a privileged position in relation to the Armenian and Azerbaijani Republics? No. We cannot allow that.

There is an old, special system of governing nations, under which a bourgeois authority favours certain nationalities, grants them privileges and humbles the other nations, not wishing to be bothered with them. Thus by favouring one nationality, it uses it to keep down the others. Such, for instance, was the method of government employed in Austria. Everyone remembers the statement of the Austrian Minister, Beust, who summoned the Hungarian Minister and said: “You govern your hordes and I will cope with mine”. In other words: you curb and keep down your nationalities in Hungary and I will keep down mine in Austria. You and I represent privileged nations, let’s keep down the rest.
The same was the case with the Poles in Austria itself. The Austrians favoured the Poles, granted them privileges, in order that the Poles should help the Austrians strengthen their position in Poland; and in return they allowed the Poles to strangle Galicia.

This system of singling out some nationalities and granting them privileges in order to cope with the rest is purely and specifically Austrian. From the point of view of the bureaucracy, it is an "economical" method of governing, because it has to bother only with one nationality; but from the political point of view it means certain death to the state, for to violate the principle of equality of nationalities and to grant privileges to any one nationality means dooming one's national policy to certain failure.

It is on to this dangerous path that our comrades, the Georgian deviators, are pushing us by opposing federation in violation of all the laws of the Party, by wanting to withdraw from the federation in order to retain an advantageous position. They are pushing us on to the path of granting them certain privileges at the expense of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Republics. But this is a path we cannot take, for it means certain death to our entire policy and to Soviet power in the Caucasus.

It was no accident that our comrades in Georgia sensed this danger. This Georgian chauvinism, which had passed to the offensive against the Armenians and Azerbaijanians, alarmed the Communist Party of Georgia. Quite naturally, the Communist Party of Georgia, which has held two congresses since it came into legal existence, on both occasions unanimously rejected the stand of the deviator comrades. But this is a path we cannot take, for it means certain death to our entire policy and to Soviet power in the Caucasus.

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It was also no accident that Comrade Lenin was in such a hurry and was so insistent that the federation should be established immediately. Nor was it an accident that our Central Committee on three occasions affirmed the need for a federation in Transcaucasia, having its own Central Executive Committee and its own executive authority, whose decisions would be binding on the republics. It was no accident that both commissions—Comrade Dzerzhinsky's and that of Kamenev and Kuibyshev—on their arrival in Moscow stated that federation was indispensable.

Lastly, it is no accident either that the Mensheviks of Sotsialistichesky Vestnik praise our deviator comrades and laud them to the skies for opposing federation: birds of a feather flock together.

J. V. Stalin: Works, Vol. 5, Pages 243-262

STALIN:

Excerpts from the REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE REPORT ON NATIONAL FACTORS IN PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS placed at the Twelfth Congress of the R. C. P. (B), APRIL 25, 1923

Comrades, before proceeding to report on the work of the committee, on the national question, permit me to deal with two main points in answer to the speakers in the discussion on my report. It will take about twenty minutes, not more.

The first point is that a group of comrades headed by Bukharin and Rakovsky has over-emphasised the significance of the national question, has exaggerated it, and has allowed it to overshadow the social question, the question of working-class power.

It is clear to us, as Communists, that the basis of all our work lies in strengthening the power of the workers, and that only after that are we confronted by the other question, a t. s. q—10
very important one but subordinate to the first, namely, the national question. We are told that we must not offend the non-Russian nationalities. That is perfectly true; I agree that we must not offend them. But to evolve out of this a new theory to the effect that the Great-Russian proletariat must be placed in a position of inequality in relation to the formerly oppressed nations is absurd. What was merely a figure of speech in Comrade Lenin’s well-known article, Bukharin has converted into a regular slogan. Nevertheless, it is clear that the political basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat is primarily and chiefly the central, industrial regions, and not the border regions, which are peasant countries. If we exaggerate the importance of the peasant border regions, to the detriment of the proletarian districts, it may result in a crack in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is dangerous, comrades. We must not exaggerate things in politics, just as we must not underrate them.

It should be borne in mind that in addition to the right of nations to self-determination, there is also the right of the working class to consolidate its power, and the right of self-determination is subordinate to this latter right. There are cases when the right of self-determination conflicts with another, a higher right—the right of the working class that has come to power to consolidate its power. In such cases—this must be said bluntly—the right of self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the working class in exercising its right to dictatorship. The former must yield to the latter. That was the case in 1920, for instance, when in order to defend working-class power we were obliged to march on Warsaw.

It must therefore not be forgotten when handing out all sorts of promises to the non-Russian nationalities, when bowing and scraping before representatives of these nationalities, as certain comrades have done at the present congress, it must be borne in mind that, in our external and internal situation, the sphere of action of the national question and the limits of its jurisdiction, so to speak, are restricted by the sphere of action and jurisdiction of the “labour question”, as the most fundamental question.

Many speakers referred to notes and articles by Vladimir Ilyich. I do not want to quote my teacher, Comrade Lenin, since he is not here, and I am afraid that I might, perhaps, quote him wrongly and inappropriately. Nevertheless, I am obliged to quote one passage, which is axiomatic and can give rise to no misunderstanding, in order that no doubt should be left in the minds of comrades with regard to the relative importance of the national question. Analysing Marx’s letter on the national question in an article on self-determination, Comrade Lenin draws the following conclusion:

“Marx had no doubt about the subordinate significance of the national question as compared with the ‘labour question’.

Here are only two lines, but they are decisive. And that is what some of our comrades who are more zealous than wise should drill into their heads.

The second point is about Great-Russian chauvinism and local chauvinism. Rakovsky and especially Bukharin spoke here, and the latter proposed that the clause dealing with the harmfulness of local chauvinism should he deleted; Their argument was that there is no need to bother with a little worm like local chauvinism when we are faced by a “Goliath” like Great-Russian chauvinism. In general, Bukharin was in a repentant mood. That is natural: he has been sinning against the nationalities for years, denying the right to self-determination. It was high time for him to repent. But in repenting he went to the other extreme. It is curious that Bukharin calls upon the Party to follow his example and also repent, although the whole world knows that the Party is in no way involved, for from its very inception (1898) it recognised the right to self-determination and therefore has nothing to repent of. The fact of the matter is that Bukharin has failed to understand the essence of the national question. When it is
said that the fight against Great-Russian chauvinism must be made the corner-stone of the national question, the intention is to indicate the duties of the Russian Communist; it implies that it is the duty of the Russian Communist himself to combat Russian chauvinism. If the struggle against Russian chauvinism were undertaken not by Russian but by the Turkestanian or Georgian Communists, it would be interpreted as anti-Russian chauvinism. That would confuse the whole issue and strengthen Great-Russian chauvinism. Only the Russian Communists can undertake the fight against Great-Russian chauvinism and carry it through to the end.

And what is intended when a struggle against local chauvinism is proposed? The intention is to point to the duty of the local Communists, the duty of the non-Russian Communists, to combat their own chauvinists. Can the existence of deviations towards anti-Russian chauvinism be denied? Why, the whole congress has seen for itself that local chauvinism exists, Georgian, Bashkir and other chauvinism, and that it must be combated. Russian Communists cannot combat Tatar, Georgian or Bashkir chauvinism; if a Russian Communist were to undertake the difficult task of combating Tatar or Georgian chauvinism it would be regarded as a fight waged by a Great-Russian chauvinist against the Tatars or the Georgians. That would confuse the whole issue. Only the Tatar, Georgian and other Communists can fight Tatar, Georgian and other chauvinism; only the Georgian Communists can successfully combat Georgian nationalism or chauvinism. That is the duty of the non-Russian Communists. That is why it is necessary to refer in the theses to the double task, that of the Russian Communists (I refer to the fight against Great-Russian chauvinism) and that of the non-Russian Communists (I refer to their fight against anti-Armenian, anti-Tatar, anti-Russian chauvinism). Otherwise, the theses will be one-sided, there will be no internationalism, whether in state or Party affairs.

If we combat only Great-Russian chauvinism, it will obscure the fight that is being waged by the Tatar and other chauvinists, a fight which is developing in the localities and which is especially dangerous now, under the conditions of the N. E. P. We cannot avoid fighting on two fronts, for we can achieve success only by fighting on two fronts—on the one hand, against Great-Russian chauvinism, which is the chief danger in our work of construction, and, on the other hand, against local chauvinism; unless we wage this double fight there will be no solidarity between the Russian workers and peasants and the workers and peasants of the other nationalities. Failure to wage this fight may result in encouraging local chauvinism, a policy of pandering to local chauvinism, which we cannot allow.

Permit me here too to quote Comrade Lenin. I would not have done so, but since there are many comrades at our congress who quote Comrade Lenin right and left and distort what he says, permit me to read a few words from a well-known article of his:

"The proletariat must demand freedom of political secession for the colonies and nations that are oppressed by its nation. Unless it does this, proletarian internationalism will remain a meaningless phrase; neither mutual confidence nor class solidarity between the workers of the oppressing and the oppressed nations will be possible."

These are, so to say, the duties of proletarians of the dominant or formerly dominant nation. Then he goes on to speak of the duties of proletarians or Communists of the formerly oppressed nations:

"On the other hand, the Socialists of the oppressed nations must particularly fight for and put into effect complete and absolute unity, including organisational unity, between the workers of the oppressed nation and the workers of the oppressing nation. Otherwise, it is impossible to uphold the independent policy of the proletariat and its class solidarity with the proletariat of other countries against all the subterfuges, treachery and trickery of the bourgeoisie. For the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations constantly converts the slogans of
The Stalin question

As you see, if we are to follow in Comrade Lenin's footsteps and some comrades here have sworn by him—both theses must be retained in the resolution—both the thesis on combating Great-Russian chauvinism and that on combating local chauvinism—as two aspects of one phenomenon, as theses on combating chauvinism in general.

With this I conclude my answers to those who have spoken here.


IX

ON BUREAUCRACY IN THE SOVIET ADMINISTRATION AND THE PARTY

[In his article, “Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?” written on October 1, 1917 and re-issued after the Revolution, Lenin wrote: “We need far far more engineers, agronomists, technicians and scientifically trained specialists of every kind than we needed before. We shall give all these specialists work to which they are accustomed...and pay these specialists higher salaries during the transition period. We shall place them, however, under comprehensive workers’ control.” On May 26, 1918, in his speech at the First Congress of Economic Councils, Lenin emphasised the task of “training of an enormous number of scientifically educated specialists” and to that end “the task of utilising the bourgeois experts.” As a result of this policy the number of officials of the Supreme Council of National Economy (Vesenkha) rose from 300 in March 1918 to 2500 in the next six months. The majority of the “specialists” had to be recruited from classes other than the proletariat. This provoked an outcry against the “revival of bureaucracy” and “revival of capitalist leadership”. But the recruitment of bourgeois specialists continued as the Civil War made their help indispensable. Lenin himself was fully aware of the danger of this influx of bureaucrats and he devised a method to check its evil effects through a system of workers’ control. By a decree of April 9, 1919, the People’s Commissariat of State Control was established and J. V. Stalin, who had already had a dual appointment in the Politbureau and Organisation Bureau, besides his post of People’s Commissar of Nationalities, was appointed its Commissar. On February 7, 1920, this body was transformed into the Commissariat of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection (Rabkrin) with the specific task of fighting bureaucratism and corruption in Soviet institutions. Stalin continued as Commissar until April 25, 1922. He being elected General Secretary of the Party, A. Tsyurupa was appointed Commissar of Rabkrin along with his post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars.

On April 11, 1922, Lenin, as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, issued a “Decree on the Functions of the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People’s Commissars and of the Council of Labour and Defence” which laid down that one of the main functions of the Deputy Chairmen was “to combat bureaucratic method and red tape.” The Decree also laid down that “The People’s Commissariat of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection must serve as the main staff of the Deputy Chairmen” and “the Deputy Chairmen must to a greater extent than hitherto exercise their powers to impose penalties for bureaucratic methods...and People’s Commissar of Justice must organise trials of such cases, to which great publicity must be given.” Trotsky launched a savage attack on this Decree.
In reply to Trotsky’s attacks Lenin calmly observed that the “remarks made by him renew old disagreements.... As regards the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, Comrade Trotsky is fundamentally wrong.” In his last two articles dictated on January 23 and March 2, 1923, Lenin returned to the problem of bureaucracy and severely criticised the functioning of the Rabkrim, and suggested that the Twelfth Congress of the Party should take a decision to amalgamate the Commissariat of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection with the Central Control Commission. The Twelfth Congress (April 17-25, 1923), in Lenin’s absence, took the decision of amalgamating the two bodies. At the Seventeenth Congress of the C. P. S. U. (B) (January-February, 1934), in view of the changed conditions a new apparatus was set up to check the evils of bureaucracy: the “Soviet Control Commission” under the Council of People’s Commissars, to be elected by the Party Congress. We reproduce below the documents from which the reader will be able to get an idea of the real problem of Soviet bureaucracy and arrive at his own conclusion as to the extent to which Stalin personally was responsible for enhancing bureaucratic practices in the administration and in the Party.

**TROTSKY:**

**MY LAST TALK WITH LENIN**

**OCTOBER 21, 1927**

At the Presidium of the Central Control Commission I recently told about my last conversation with Vladimir Ilych, not long before the second attack of his illness. I quote that narrative:

“Lenin summoned me to his room in the Kremlin, spoke of the terrible growth of bureaucratism in our Soviet apparatus and of the necessity of finding a lever with which to get at that problem. He proposed to create a special commission of the Central Committee, and invited me to take active part in the work. I answered him: ‘Vladimir Ilych, according to my conviction, in the present struggle with bureaucratism in the Soviet apparatus, we must not forget that there is going on, both in the provinces and in the centre, a special selection of officials and specialists, party, non-party and half-party, around certain ruling party personalities and groups—in the provinces, in the districts, in the party locals and in the centre—that is, the Central Committee, etc. Attacking the Soviet officials, you run into the party leader. The specialist is a member of his suite. In such circumstances I could not undertake this work.’

‘Vladimir Ilych reflected a moment and—here I quote him practically verbatim—said: ‘That is, I propose a struggle with Soviet bureaucratism, and you want to add to that the bureaucratism of the Organization Bureau of the party.’

“I laughed at the unexpectedness of this, because no such finished formulation of the idea was in my head.

“I answered, ‘I suppose that’s it.’

“Then Vladimir Ilych said, ‘Well, all right, I propose a bloc.’

“I said, ‘I’m always ready to form a bloc with a good man.’

“At the end of our conversation Vladimir Ilych said that he would propose the creation by the Central Committee of a commission for the struggle with bureaucratism ‘in general,’ and through that we would approach the Organization Bureau of the party. The organizational side he promised to think over ‘further’. At that we parted. I then waited two weeks for the bell to summon me, but Ilych’s health became continuously worse and he soon went to bed. After that Vladimir Ilych sent me his letters on the national question through his secretary. And so that work was never carried through.”

[ Trotsky: *The Real Situation in Russia*, Pages 304-5 ]
LENIN:

THE TRADE UNIONS, THE PRESENT SITUATION
AND TROTSKY'S MISTAKES (Excerpts)

DECEMBER 30, 1920

...My principal material is Comrade Trotsky's pamphlet, *The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*. When I compare it with the theses he submitted to the Central Committee, and go over it very carefully, I am amazed at the number of theoretical mistakes and glaring blunders it contains. How could anyone starting a big Party discussion on this question produce such a sorry excuse for a carefully thought out statement? Let me go over the main points which, I think, contain the original fundamental theoretical errors.

Trade unions are not just historically necessary; they are historically inevitable as an organisation of the industrial proletariat, and under the dictatorship of the proletariat embrace nearly the whole of it. This is basic...

In general, Comrade Trotsky's great mistake, his mistake of principle, lies in the fact that by raising the question of "principle" at this time he is dragging back the Party and the Soviet power. We have, thank heaven, done with principles and have gone on to practical business. We chatted about principles—rather more than we should have—at the Smolny. 112 Today, three years later, we have decrees on all points of the production problem, and on many of its components; but such is the sad fate of our decrees: they are signed, and then we ourselves forget about them and fail to carry them out. Meanwhile, arguments about principles and differences of principle are invented...

The actual differences, apart from those I have listed, really have nothing to do with general principles. I have had to enumerate my "differences" with Comrade Trotsky because, with such a broad theme as "The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions", he has, I am quite sure, made a number of mistakes bearing on the very essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But, this apart, one may well ask, why is it that we cannot work together, as we so badly need to do? It is because of our different approach to the mass, the different way of winning it over and keeping in touch with it. That is the whole point. And this makes the trade union a very peculiar institution, which is set up under capitalism, which inevitably exists in the transition from capitalism to communism, and whose future is a question mark. The time when the trade unions are actually called into question is a long way off: it will be up to our grandchildren to discuss that. What matters now is how to approach the mass, to establish contact with it and win it over, and how to get the intricate transmission system working (how to run the dictatorship of the proletariat) ...
and the names of its members are published. Trotsky walks but, refuses to serve on the commission, and disrupts its work. What are his reasons? There is only one. Lutovinov is apt to play at opposition. That is true, and that also goes for Osinsky. Frankly speaking, it is not a pleasant game. But do you call that a reason? Osinsky was making an excellent job of the seed campaign. The thing to do was to work with him, in spite of his "opposition campaign", for this business of disrupting the work of a commission is bureaucratic, un-Soviet, un-socialist, incorrect and politically harmful...

Heroism, zeal, etc., are positive side of military experience; red-tape and arrogance are the negative side of the experience of the worst military types. Trotsky's theses, whatever his intentions, do not tend to play up the best, but the worst in military experience. It must be borne in mind that a political leader is responsible not only for his own policy but also for the acts of those he leads.

The last thing I want to tell you about—something I called myself a fool for yesterday—is that I had altogether overlooked Comrade Rudzutak's theses. His weak point is that he does not speak in ringing tones; he is not an impressive or eloquent speaker. He is liable to be overlooked......

I make a comparison between Rudzutak's theses and those submitted by Trotsky to the Central Committee. At the end of theses 5, I read: "...a reorganisation of the unions must be started right away, that is, a selection of functionaries must be above all made from precisely that angle".

There you have an example of the real bureaucratic approach: Trotsky and Krestinsky selecting the trade union "functionaries" !....

The net result is that there are a number of theoretical mistakes in Trotsky's and Bukharin's theses; they contain a number of things that are wrong in principle. Politically, the whole approach to the matter is utterly tactless. Comrade Trotsky's "theses" are politically harmful. The sum and substance of his policy is bureaucratic harassment of the trade-unions. Our Party Congress will, I am sure, condemn and reject it. (Prolonged, and stormy applause.)


LENIN:

SPEECH CLOSING THE DISCUSSION DELIVERED AT THE MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP OF THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF MINERS (Excerpt), JANUARY 24, 1921

Shlyapnikov concluded his speech by saying: "We must eliminate bureaucratic methods in the government and the national economy." I say this is demagogy. We have had this question of bureaucratic practices on the agenda since last July. After the Ninth Congress of the R. C. P. last July, Preobrazhensky also asked: Are we not suffering from bureaucratic excesses? Watch out! In August the Central Committee endorsed Zinoviev's letter: Combat the evils of bureaucracy. The Party Conference met in September, and endorsed it. So, after all, it was not Lenin who invented some new path, as Trotsky says, but the Party which said: "Watch out: there's a new malaise." Preobrazhensky raised this question in July; we had Zinoviev's letter in August; there was the Party Conference in September and we had a long report on bureaucratic practices at the Congress of Soviets in December. The malaise is there. In our 1919 Programme we wrote that bureaucratic practices existed. Whoever comes out and demands a stop to bureaucratic practices is a demagogue. When you are called upon to "put a stop to bureaucratic practices", it is demagogy. It is nonsense. We shall be fighting the evils of bureaucracy for many years to come, and whoever thinks otherwise is playing demagogue and cheating, because overcoming the evils of bureaucracy requires hundreds of measures, wholesale literacy,
culture and participation in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Shlyapnikov has been People's Commissar for Labour and People's Commissar for Trade and Industry. Has he put a stop to bureaucratic practices? Kiselyov has been on the Central Board of the Textile Industry. Has he put a stop to the evils of bureaucracy?

Let me say that once again: We shall have grown up when all our Congresses resolve themselves into sections and marshall the facts about coalescence among the millers and the Donbas miners. But writing a string of useless platforms shows up our poor economic leadership. I repeat that nothing can break us, neither external nor internal forces, if we do not lead things up to a split. I say that Tsektran is more than a bludgeon, but exaggerating this has led up to a split. Anyone can be guilty of an excess of bureaucratic practices, and the Central Committee is aware of it, and is responsible for it. In this respect, Comrade Trotsky's mistake lies in that he drew up his theses in the wrong spirit. They are all couched in terms of a shake-up, and they have all led to a split in the union. It is not a matter of giving Trotsky bad marks—we are not schoolchildren and have no use for marks—but we must say that his theses are wrong in content and must therefore be rejected.


LENIN:

THE TAX IN KIND

(Excerpt), APRIL 21, 1921

[Economic roots of Soviet Bureaucracy]

Capitalism is a bane compared with socialism. Capitalism is a boon compared with medievalism, small production, and the evils of bureaucracy which spring from the dispersal of the small producers. Inasmuch as we are as yet unable to pass directly from small production to socialism, some capitalism is inevitable as the elemental product of small production and exchange; so that we must utilise capitalism (particularly by directing it into the channels of state capitalism) as the intermediary link between small production and socialism, as a means, a path, and a method of increasing the productive forces.

Look at the economic aspect of the evils of bureaucracy. We see nothing of them on May 5, 1918. Six months after the October Revolution, with the old bureaucratic apparatus smashed from top to bottom, we feel none of its evils.

A year later, the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (March 18-23, 1919) adopted a new Party Programme in which we spoke forthrightly of "a partial revival of bureaucracy within the Soviet system"—not fearing to admit the evil, but desiring to reveal, expose and pillory it and to stimulate thought, will, energy and action to combat it.

Two years later, in the spring of 1921, after the Eighth Congress of Soviets (December 1920), which discussed the evils of bureaucracy, and after the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (March 1921), which summed up the controversies closely connected with analysis of these evils, we find them even more distinct and sinister. What are their economic roots? They are mostly of a dual character: on the one hand, a developed bourgeoisie needs a bureaucratic apparatus, primarily a military apparatus, and then a judiciary, etc., to use against the revolutionary movement of the workers (and partly of the peasants). That is something we have not got. Ours are class courts directed against the bourgeoisie. Ours is a class army directed against the bourgeoisie. The evils of bureaucracy are not in the army but in the institutions serving it. In our country bureaucratic practices have different economic roots, namely, the atomised and scattered state of the small producer with his poverty, illiteracy, lack of culture, the absence of roads and exchange between agriculture and industry, the absence of connection
and interaction between them. This is largely the result of the Civil War. We could not restore industry when we were blockaded, besieged on all sides, cut off from the whole world and later from the grain-bearing South, Siberia, and the coalfields. We could not afford to hesitate in introducing War Communism, or daring to go to the most desperate extremes: to save the workers' and peasants' rule we had to suffer an existence of semi-starvation and worse than semi-starvation, but to hold on at all costs, in spite of unprecedented ruin and the absence of economic intercourse. We did not allow ourselves to be frightened, as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks did (who, in fact, followed the bourgeoisie largely because they were scared). But the factor that was crucial to victory in a blockaded country—a besieged fortress—revealed its negative side by the spring of 1921, just when the last of the whiteguard forces were finally driven from the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. In the besieged fortress, it was possible and imperative to "lock up" all exchange; with the masses displaying extraordinary heroism this could be borne for three years. After that, the ruin to the small producer increased, and the restoration of large-scale industry was further delayed, and postponed. Bureaucratic practices, as a legacy of the "siege" and the superstructure built over the isolated and downtrodden state of the small producer, fully revealed themselves.

We must learn to admit an evil fearlessly in order to combat it the more firmly, in order to start from scratch again and again; we shall have to do this many a time in every sphere of our activity, finish what was left undone and choose different approaches to the problem. In view of the obvious delay in the restoration of large-scale industry, the "locking up" of exchange between industry and agriculture has become intolerable. Consequently, we must concentrate on what we can do: restoring small industry, helping things from that end, propping up the side of the structure that has been half-demolished by the war and blockade. We must do everything possible to develop trade at all costs, without being afraid of capitalism, because the limits we have put to it (the expropriation of the landowners and of the bourgeoisie in the economy, the rule of the workers and peasants in politics) are sufficiently narrow and "moderate". This is the fundamental idea and economic significance of the tax in kind.

All Party and Soviet workers must concentrate their efforts and attention on generating the utmost local initiative in economic development—in the gubernias, still more in the uyezds, still more in the volosts and villages—for the special purpose of immediately improving peasant farming, even if by "small" means, on a small scale, helping it by developing small local industry. The integrated state economic plan demands that this should become the focus of concern and "priority" effort. Some improvement here, closest to the broadest and deepest "foundation", will permit of the speediest transition to a more vigorous and successful restoration of large-scale industry.

Hitherto the food supply worker has known only one fundamental instruction: collect 100 per cent of the grain appropriations. Now he has another instruction: collect 100 per cent of the tax in the shortest possible time and then collect another 100 per cent in exchange for the goods of large-scale and small industry. Those who collect 75 per cent of the tax and 75 per cent (of the second hundred) in exchange for the goods of large-scale and small industry will be doing more useful work of national importance than those who collect 100 per cent of the tax and 55 per cent (of the second hundred) by means of exchange. The task of the food supply worker now becomes more complicated. On the one hand, it is a fiscal task: collect the tax as quickly and as efficiently as possible. On the other hand it is a general economic task: try to direct the co-operatives, assist small industry, develop local initiative in such a way as to increase the exchange between agriculture and industry and put it on a sound basis.

Our bureaucratic practices prove that we are still doing...
a very bad job of it. We must not be afraid to admit that in this respect we still have a great deal to learn from the capitalist. We shall compare the practical experience of the various gubernias, uyezds, volosts and villages: in one place private capitalists, big and small, have achieved so much; those are their approximate profits. That is the tribute, the fee, we have to pay for the “schooling”! We shall not mind paying for it if we learn a thing or two. That much has been achieved in a neighbouring locality through co-operation. Those are the profits of the co-operatives. And in a third place, that much has been achieved by purely state and communist methods (for the present, this third case will be a rare exception).

It should be the primary task of every regional economic centre and economic conference of the gubernia executive committee immediately to organise various experiments, or systems of “exchange” for the surplus stocks remaining after the tax in kind has been paid. In a few months’ time practical results must be obtained for comparison and study. Local or imported salt; paraffin oil from the nearest town; the handicraft wood-working industry; handicrafts using local raw materials and producing certain, perhaps not very important, but necessary and useful, articles for the peasants; “green coal” (the utilisation of small local water power resources for electrification), and so on and so forth—all this must be brought into play in order to stimulate exchange between industry and agriculture at all costs. Those who achieve the best results in this sphere, even by means of private capitalism, even without the co-operatives, or without directly transforming this capitalism into state capitalism, will do more for the cause of socialist construction in Russia than those who “ponder over” the purity of communism, draw up regulations, rules and instructions for state capitalism and the co-operatives, but do nothing practical to stimulate trade.

Isn’t it paradoxical that private capital should be helping socialism?

Not at all. It is, indeed, an irrefutable economic fact. Since this is a small-peasant country with transport in an extreme state of dislocation, a country emerging from war and blockade under the political guidance of the proletariat—which controls the transport system and large-scale industry—it inevitably follows, first, that at the present moment local exchange acquires first-class significance, and, second, that there is a possibility of assisting socialism by means of private capitalism (not to speak of state capitalism).

Let’s not quibble about words. We still have too much of that sort of thing. We must have more variety in practical experience and make a wider study of it. In certain circumstances, the exemplary organisation of local work, even on the smallest scale, is of far greater national importance than many branches of central state work. These are precisely the circumstances now prevailing in peasant farming in general, and in regard to the exchange of the surplus products of agriculture for industrial goods in particular. Exemplary organisation in this respect, even in a single volost, is of far greater national importance than the “exemplary” improvement of the central apparatus of any People’s Commissariat; over the past three and a half years our central apparatus has been built up to such an extent that it has managed to acquire a certain amount of harmful routine; we cannot improve it quickly to any extent, we do not know how to do it. Assistance in the work of radically improving it, securing an influx of fresh forces, combating bureaucratic practices effectively and overcoming this harmful routine must come from the localities and lower ranks, with the model organisation of a “complex”, even if on a small scale. I say “complex”, meaning not just one farm, one branch of industry, or one factory, but a totality of economic relations, a totality of economic exchange, even if only in a small locality.

Those of us who are doomed to remain at work in the centre will continue the task of improving the apparatus and purging it of bureaucratic evils, even if only on a modest and
immediately achievable scale. But the greatest assistance in this task is coming, and will come, from localities. Generally speaking, as far as I can observe, things are better in the localities than at the centre; and this is understandable, for, naturally, the evils of bureaucracy are concentrated at the centre. In this respect, Moscow cannot but be the worst city, and in general the worst "locality", in the Republic. In the localities we have deviations from the average to the good and the bad sides, the latter being less frequent than the former. The deviations towards the bad side are the abuses committed by former government officials, landowners, bourgeois and other scum who play up to the Communists and who sometimes commit abominable outrages and acts of tyranny against the peasantry. This calls for terrorist purge, summary trial and the firing squad. Let the Martovs, the Chernovs, and non-Party phillistines like them, beat their breasts and exclaim: "I thank Thee, Lord, that I am not as 'these' and have never accepted terrorism." These simpletons "do not accept terrorism" because they choose to be servile accomplices of the whiteguards in fooling the workers and peasants. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks "do not accept terrorism" because under the flag of "socialism" they are fulfilling their function of placing the masses at the mercy of the whiteguard terrorism. This was proved by the Kerensky regime and the Kornilov putsch in Russia, by the Kolchak regime in Siberia, and by Menshevism in Georgia. It was proved by the heroes of the Second International and of the "Two-and-a-Half" International in Finland, Hungary, Austria, Germany, Italy, Britain, etc. Let the flunkey accomplices of whiteguard terrorism wallow in their repudiation of all terrorism. We shall speak the bitter and indubitable truth: in countries beset by an unprecedented crisis, the collapse of old ties, and the intensification of the class struggle after the imperialist war of 1914-18—and that means all the countries of the world—terrorism cannot be dispensed with, notwithstanding the hypocrites and phrase-mongers. Either the whiteguard, bourgeois terrorism of the American, British (Ireland), Italian (the fascists), German, Hungarian and other types, or Red proletarian terrorism. There is no middle course, no "third" course, nor can there be any.

The deviations towards the good side are the success achieved in combating the evils of bureaucracy, the great attention shown for the needs of the workers and peasants, and the great care in developing the economy, raising the productivity of labour and stimulating local exchange between agriculture and industry. Although the good examples are more numerous than the bad ones, they are, nevertheless, rare. Still, they are there. Young, fresh communist forces, steeled by civil war and privation, are coming forward in all localities. We are still doing far too little to promote these forces regularly from lower to higher posts. This can and must be done more persistently, and on a wider scale than at present. Some workers can and should be transferred from work at the centre to local work. As leading men of uyezds, and of volosts, where they can organise economic work as a whole on exemplary lines, they will do far more good, and perform work of far greater national importance, than by performing some function at the centre. The exemplary organisation of the work will help to train new workers and provide examples that other districts could follow with relative ease. We at the centre shall be able to do a great deal to encourage the other districts all over the country to "follow" the good examples, and even make it mandatory for them to do so.

By its very nature, the work of developing "exchange" between agriculture and industry, the exchange of after-tax surpluses for the output of small, mainly handicraft, industry, calls for independent, competent and intelligent local initiative. That is why it is now extremely important from the national standpoint to organise the work in the uyezds and volosts on exemplary lines. In military affairs, during the last Polish war, for example, we were not afraid of departing from the bureaucratic hierarchy, "downgrading", or transfer-
ring members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to lower posts (while allowing them to retain their higher rank at the centre). Why not now transfer several members of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, or members of collegiums, or other high-ranking comrades, to uyezd or even volost work? Surely, we have not become so "bureaucratized" as to "be ashamed" of that. And we shall find scores of workers in the central bodies who will be glad to accept. The economic development of the whole Republic will gain enormously; and the exemplary volosts, or uyezds, will play not only a great, but a positively crucial and historic role.

[Lenin: Collected Works, Vol. 32, Pages 350-357]

LENIN'S LETTER TO M. F. SOKOLOV  
(Excerpt), MAY 16, 1921

Comrade M. Sokolov, Secretary of the Department for Management of Property Evacuated from Poland.

Dear Comrade,

...You write:

"Independent mass activity is possible only when we wipe off the face of the earth that ulcer which is called the bureaucratic chief administrations and central boards."

Although I have not been out in the provinces, I know this bureaucracy and all the harm it does. Your mistake is to think that it can be destroyed all at once, like an ulcer, that it can be "wiped off the face of the earth".

This is a mistake. You can throw out the tsar, throw out the landowners, throw out capitalists. We have done this. But you cannot "throw out" bureaucracy in a peasant country, you cannot "wipe it off the face of the earth". You can only reduce it by slow and stubborn effort.

To "throw off" the "bureaucratic ulcer", as you put it in another place, is wrong in its very formulation. It means you don't understand the question. To "throw off" an ulcer of this kind is impossible. It can only be healed. Surgery in this case is an absurdity, an impossibility; only a slow cure—all the rest is charlatanry or naivete.

You are naive, that's just what it is, excuse my frankness. But you yourself write about your youth.

It's naive to wave aside a healing process by referring to the fact that you have 2-3 times tried to fight the bureaucrats and suffered defeat. First of all, I reply to this, your unsuccessful experiment, you have to try, not 2-3 times, but 20-30 times—repeat your attempts, start over again.

Secondly, where is the evidence that you fought correctly, skillfully? Bureaucrats are smart fellows, many scoundrels among them are extremely cunning. You won't catch them with your bare hands. Did you fight correctly? Did you encircle the "enemy" according to all the rules of the art of war? I don't know.

It's no use your quoting Engels.114 Was it not some "intellectual" who suggested that quotation to you? A futile quotation, if not something worse. It smells of the doctrine. It resembles despair. But for us to despair is either ridiculous or disgraceful.

The struggle against bureaucracy in a peasant and absolutely exhausted country is a long job, and this struggle must be carried on persistently, without losing heart at the first reverse.

"Throw off" the "chief administrations"? Nonsense. What will you set up instead? You don't know. You must not throw them off, but cleanse them, heal them, heal and cleanse them ten times and a hundred times. And not lose heart.

If you give your lecture (I have absolutely no objection to this), read out my letter to you as well, please.

I shake your hand, and beg you not to tolerate the "spirit of dejection" in yourself.

Lenin.

[Lenin: Collected Works, Vol. 35, Pages 491-493]
I pass to the second part of the report: concerning the Party and the state apparatus. The state apparatus is the chief mass apparatus linking the working class in power, represented by its party, with the peasantry, and which enables the working class, represented by its party, to lead the peasantry. I link this part of my report directly with the two well-known articles by Comrade Lenin. It seemed to many people that the idea Comrade Lenin elaborated in those two articles is entirely new. I think that the idea that is elaborated in those articles is one with which Vladimir Ilyich was already preoccupied last year. You no doubt remember the political report he made last year. He said that our policy was correct, but the apparatus was not working properly and therefore, the car was not running in the right direction, it swerved. I remember that Shlyapnikov commenting on this, said that the drivers were no good. That is wrong, of course, absolutely wrong. The policy is correct, the driver is excellent, and the type of car is good, it is a Soviet car, but some of the parts of the state car, i.e., some of the officials in the state apparatus, are bad, they are not our men. That is why the car does not run properly and, on the whole, we get a distortion of the correct political line. We get not implementation but distortion. The state apparatus, I repeat, is of the right type, but its component parts still alien to us, bureaucratic, half tsarist-bourgeois. We want to have a state apparatus that will be a means of serving the mass of the people, but some persons in the state apparatus want to convert it into a source of gain for themselves. That is why the apparatus as a whole is not working properly. If we fail to repair it, the correct political line by itself will not carry us very far; it will be distorted, and there will be a rupture between the working class and the peasantry. We shall have a situation in which, although we shall be at the steering wheel, the car will not obey. There will be a crash. These are the ideas Comrade Lenin elaborated as far back as a year ago, and which only this year he formulated in a harmonious system in the proposal to reorganise the Central Control Commission and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection in such a way that the reorganised inspection apparatus should be transformed into a device for re-arranging all the parts of the car, for replacing the old useless parts with new ones, which must be done if we really want the car to go in the right direction.

That is the essence of Comrade Lenin’s proposal.

I could mention a fact like the inspection of Orekhovo-Zuyev Trust, organised on Soviet lines, the function of which was to turn out the utmost quantity of manufactured goods to be supplied to the peasants, whereas this trust, organised on Soviet lines, delivered the goods it manufactured into private hands to the detriment of the state. The car was not going in the right direction.

I could mention the following fact, which Comrade Voroshilov told me the other day. We have an institution that is called the Industrial Bureau. There was an institution like that in the South-East. This apparatus had a staff of about 2,000. The function of this apparatus was to direct industry in the South-East. Comrade Voroshilov told me in despair, that it was a difficult job to manage this apparatus, that to do so they had to set up an additional small apparatus, i.e., to manage the managing apparatus. Well, we found some good men: Voroshilov, Eismont and Mikoyan, who set about making a thorough investigation. And it turned out that instead of a staff of 2,000 one of 170 was enough. And what happened? It turns out that it is working much better than before. Formerly, the apparatus ate up all it produced. Now it is serving industry. A multitude of facts of this kind could be quoted, more than there are hairs on my head.
All these facts point only to one thing, namely, that our Soviet apparatuses, although of the right type, are frequently staffed with people whose habits and traditions upset our essentially correct political line. That is why the whole mechanism is not working properly, and the result is a great political setback, the danger of a rupture between the proletariat and the peasantry.

The matter stands as follows: either we improve the economic apparatuses, reduce their staffs, simplify them, make them cheaper to run, staff them with people who are akin to the Party in spirit, and then we shall achieve the purpose for which we introduced the so-called N. E. P., i. e., industry will turn out the maximum quantity of manufactured goods to supply the countryside and receive the produce it needs, and in this way we shall establish a bond between peasant economy and industrial economy; or we fail to do this, and there will be a crash.

Or again: either the state apparatus itself, the tax-collecting apparatus, will be simplified, reduced, and the thieves and scoundrels driven out of it, and then we shall be able to take less from the peasants than we do now and the national economy will come through the strain; or this apparatus will become an end in itself, as was the case in the South-East, and all that is taken from the peasants will go to maintain the apparatus itself, and then there will be a political crash.

These, I am convinced, are the considerations that guided Vladimir Ilyich when he wrote those articles.

There is yet another side to Comrade Lenin's proposals. His aim is not only to improve the apparatus and to increase the Party's leading role in it to the utmost—for the Party built the state and it is its duty to improve it—but evidently he also has in mind the moral side. His aim is that there should not be left in the country a single official, no matter how highly-placed, concerning whom the ordinary man might say: he is above the law. This moral aspect is the third aspect of Ilyich's proposal; it is precisely this proposal that sets the task of purging not only the state apparatus, but also the Party, of those traditions and habits of domineering bureaucrats which discredit our Party.

I pass to the question of improving the Party's central organs. You have no doubt read the Central Committee's proposal that the functions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee should be quite clearly and precisely delimited from the functions of the Organising Bureau and of the Political Bureau. It is scarcely necessary to deal with this question separately, because it is perfectly clear. But there is one question—the enlargement of the Central Committee itself—which we have discussed several times inside the Central Committee, and which at one time gave rise to serious controversy. Some members of the Central Committee are of the opinion that the Central Committee should not be enlarged, but, on the contrary, reduced. I shall not give their reasons; let the comrades speak for themselves. I shall briefly give the reasons in favour of enlarging the Central Committee.

The present state of affairs in the Central apparatus of our Party is as follows: we have 27 members on the Central Committee. The Central Committee meets once every two months; but within the Central Committee there is a core of 10-15 persons who have become so skilled in the matter of directing the political and economic activities of our organs that they are in danger of becoming something in the nature of high priests in the art of leadership. This may be a good thing, but it has a very dangerous side: these comrades who have acquired great experience in leadership may become infected by self-conceit, may isolate themselves and become divorced from work among the masses. If some members of the Central Committee, or, say, the core of fifteen, have acquired such experience and have become so skilled that in drawing up instructions they make no mistakes in nine cases out of ten, that is a very good thing. But if they have not
around themselves a new generation of future leaders who are closely connected with the work in the localities, all the chances are that these highly-skilled men will become ossified and divorced from the masses.

Secondly, the core within the Central Committee that has gained great experience in the art of leadership is growing old; we must have people to take their place. You are aware of the state of Vladimir Ilyich’s health. You know that the other members, too, of the main core of the Central Committee are pretty well worn out. The trouble is that we have not yet the new cadres to take their place. The training of Party leaders is a very difficult matter, it takes years, 5 to 10 years, more than 10. It is much easier to conquer a country with the aid of Comrade Budyonny’s cavalry than to train two or three leaders from the rank and file capable of becoming real leaders of the country. And it is high time to think about training young leaders to take the place of the old. There is only one way of doing this, namely, to draw new, fresh forces into the work of the Central Committee and to promote them in the course of work, to promote the most capable and independent of them, those whose heads are screwed on the right way. Leaders cannot be trained by means of books. Books help to make progress, but they do not create leaders. Leading workers mature only in the course of the work itself. Only by electing new members to the Central Committee, by letting them experience the entire burden of leadership, shall we be able to train the replacements whom we need so much in the present state of things. That is why I think that the congress would make a profound mistake if it disagreed with the Central Committee’s proposal that it be enlarged to at least forty members.

[Stalin: Works, Vol. 5, Pages 222-224]
transformed into a debating society that would be eternally talking and would decide nothing. But above all our Party must be a party of action, for we are in power.

Furthermore, Lutovinov forgets that although we are in power within the federation and enjoy all the advantages of legality, from the international standpoint, however, we are going through a period similar to that which we went through in 1912, when the Party was semi-legal, or rather, illegal, when the Party had a few legal footholds in the shape of the group in the Duma, in the shape of legal newspapers and clubs, but at the same time was surrounded by enemies and was striving to accumulate forces in order to push forward, and to enlarge the legal framework. We are now going through a similar period on an international scale. We are surrounded by enemies—that is evident to everybody. The imperialist wolves who surround us are wide awake. Not a moment passes without our enemies trying to capture some gap through which to crawl and do us damage. There are no grounds for asserting that the enemies who surround us are not conducting some kind of preparatory work for a blockade, or for intervention. Such is the situation. Is it possible in such a situation to discuss all questions of war and peace in public? To discuss a question at meetings of 20,000 Party units is tantamount to discussing it in public. What would have become of us had we discussed in public all our preliminary work for the Genoa Conference? We would have gone down with a crash. It must be borne in mind that in a situation, when we are surrounded by enemies, a sudden stroke, an unexpected manoeuvre on our part, swift action, decides everything. What would have become of us if instead of discussing our political campaign at the Lausanne Conference in a narrow circle of trusted Party people, we had discussed all this work publicly, had exposed our hand? Our enemies would have taken all the weak and strong points into account, they would have defeated our campaign, and we would have left Lausanne in disgrace. What would become of us if we were to discuss publicly in advance the questions of war and peace, the most important of all important questions? For, I repeat, to discuss questions at meetings of 20,000 units is tantamount to discussing them in public. We would be smashed in no time. It is obvious, comrades, that for both organisational and political reasons Lutovinov’s so-called democracy is a fantasy, is democratic Manilovism. It is false and dangerous. Lutovinov’s road is not ours.

I pass on to Osinsky. He pounced upon the phrase in my statement that in enlarging the Central Committee we must get independent people on it. Yes, yes, Sorin, independent, but not free-lances. Osinsky thinks that on this point I established some sort of a link with Osinsky, with democratic centralism. I did say that the Central Committee should be reinforced with comrades who are independent. I did not say independent of what, knowing in advance that it is unwise to deal exhaustively with all points in the main speech, that something should be left for the speech in reply to the discussion. (Laughter. Applause) We need independent people in the Central Committee, but not people independent of Leninism—no comrades, God forbid! We need independent people, people free from personal influences, free from the habits and traditions of the internal struggle in the Central Committee that we have acquired, and which sometimes cause anxiety in the Central Committee. You remember Comrade Lenin’s article. He says in it that we are faced with the prospect of a split. Since that passage in Comrade Lenin’s article might have caused the organisations to think that a split is already maturing in the Party, the members of the Central Committee unanimously decided to dispel doubts that might arise and said that there is no split in the Central Committee, which is quite in accordance with the facts. But the Central Committee also said that the prospect of a split is not excluded. That, too, is quite correct. In the course of its work during the past six years the Central Committee has acquired (and was bound to acquire) certain habits and traditions of
struggle within it which sometimes create an atmosphere that is not quite good. I felt this atmosphere at one of the last plenary meetings of the Central Committee in February, and I remarked at the time that the intervention of people from the districts often decides the whole matter. We need people who are independent of those traditions and of those personal influences in order that, on becoming members of the Central Committee and bringing into it the experience of practical work and contact with the districts, they should serve as the mortar, so to speak, to cement the Central Committee as a single and indivisible collective body leading our Party. We need such independent comrades, free from the old traditions that have become established in the Central Committee, precisely as people who will introduce a new, refreshing element that will cement the Central Committee, and avert any possibility of a split within it. That is what I meant when I spoke about independent people.

\[ \text{J. V. Stalin: Works, Vol. 5, Pages 227-231} \]

**STALIN:**

Excerpt from a Speech Delivered at the Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League

**ORGANISE MASS CRITICISM FROM BELOW**

**MAY 16, 1928**

The second question concerns the task of combating bureaucracy, of organising mass criticism of our shortcomings, of organising mass control from below.

Bureaucracy is one of the worst enemies of our progress. It exists in all our organisations—Party, Y. C. L., trade-union and economic. When people talk of bureaucrats, they usually point to the old non-Party officials, who as a rule are depicted in our cartoons as men wearing spectacles. (Laughter) That is not quite true, comrades. If it were only a question of the old bureaucrats, the fight against bureaucracy would be very easy. The trouble is that it is not a matter of the old bureaucrats. It is a matter of the new bureaucrats, bureaucrats who sympathise with the Soviet Government, and finally, communist bureaucrats. The communist bureaucrat is the most dangerous type of bureaucrat. Why? Because he masks his bureaucracy with the title of Party member. And, unfortunately, we have quite a number of such communist bureaucrats.

Take our Party organisations. You have no doubt read about the Smolensk affair, the Artyomovsk affair and so on. What do you think, were they matters of chance? What is the explanation of these shameful instances of corruption and moral deterioration in certain of our Party organisations? The fact that Party monopoly was carried to absurd lengths, that the voice of the rank and file was stifled, that inner-Party democracy was abolished and bureaucracy became rife. How is this evil to be combated? I think that there is not and cannot be any other way of combating this evil than by organising control from below by the Party masses, by implanting inner-Party democracy. What objection can there be to rousing the fury of the mass of the Party membership against these corrupt elements and giving it the opportunity to send such elements packing? There can hardly be any objection to that.

Or take the Young Communist League, for instance. You will not deny, of course, that here and there in the Young Communist League there are utterly corrupt elements against whom it is absolutely essential to wage a ruthless struggle. But let us leave aside the corrupt elements. Let us take the latest fact of an unprincipled struggle waged by groups within the Young Communist League around personalities, a struggle which is poisoning the atmosphere in the Young Communist League. Why is it that you can find as many "Kosarevites" and "Sobolevites" as you like in the Young Communist League, while Marxists have to be looked for with a candle? \( \text{Applause} \)
What does this indicate, if not that a process of bureaucratic petrification is taking place in certain sections of the Y. C. L. top leadership?

And the trade unions? Who will deny that in the trade unions there is bureaucracy in plenty? We have production conferences in the factories. We have temporary control commissions in the trade unions. It is the task of these organisations to rouse the masses, to bring our shortcomings to light and to indicate ways and means of improving our constructive work. Why are these organisations not developing? Why are they not seething with activity? Is it not obvious that it is bureaucracy in the trade unions, coupled with bureaucracy in the Party organisations, that is preventing these highly important organisations of the working class from developing?

Lastly, our economic organisations. Who will deny that our economic bodies suffer from bureaucracy? Take the Shakhty affair as an illustration. Does not the Shakhty affair indicate that our economic bodies are not speeding ahead, but crawling, dragging their feet?

How are we to put an end to bureaucracy in all these organisations?

There is only one sole way of doing this, and that is to organise control from below, to organise criticism of the bureaucracy in our institutions, of their shortcomings and their mistakes, by the vast masses of the working class.

I know that by rousing the fury of the masses of the working people against the bureaucratic distortions in our organisations, we sometimes have to tread on the toes of some of our comrades who have past services to their credit, but who are now suffering from the disease of bureaucracy. But ought this to stop our work of organising control from below? I think that it ought not and must not. For their past services we should take off our hats to them, but for their present blunders and bureaucracy it would be quite in order to give them a good drubbing. (Laughter and applause.) How else? Why not do this if the interests of the work demand it?

There is talk of criticism from above, criticism by the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, by the Central Committee of our Party and so on. That, of course, is all very good. But it is still far from enough. More, it is by no means the chief thing now. The chief thing now is to start a broad tide of criticism from below against bureaucracy in general, against shortcomings in our work in particular. Only by organising twofold pressure—from above and from below—and only by shifting the principal stress to criticism from below, can we count on waging a successful struggle against bureaucracy and on rooting it out.

It would be a mistake to think that only the leaders possess experience in constructive work. That is not true, comrades. The vast masses of the workers who are engaged in building our industry are day by day accumulating vast experience in construction, experience which is not a whit less valuable to us than the experience of the leaders. Mass criticism from below, control from below, is needed by us in order that, among other things, this experience of the vast masses should not be wasted, but be reckoned with and translated into practice.

From this follows the immediate task of the Party: to wage a ruthless struggle against bureaucracy, to organise mass criticism from below, and to take this criticism into account when adopting practical decisions for eliminating our shortcomings.

It cannot be said that the Young Communist League, and especially Komsomolskaya Pravda, have not appreciated the importance of this task. The shortcoming here is that often, fulfilment of this task is not carried out completely. And in order to carry it out completely, it is necessary to give heed not only to criticism, but also to the results of criticism, to the improvements that are introduced as a result of criticism. [J. V. Stalin: Works, Vol. 11, Pages 75-78]
I should like to say a few words, however, about further work in connection with increased checking on the fulfilment of decisions.

The proper organisation of checking the fulfilment of decisions is of decisive importance in the fight against bureaucracy and red tape. Are the decisions of the leading bodies carried out, or are they pigeon-holed by bureaucrats and red-tapists? Are they carried out properly, or are they distorted? Is the apparatus working conscientiously and in a Bolshevik manner, or is it working to no purpose? These things can be promptly found out only by a well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions. A well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions is the searchlight which helps to reveal how the apparatus is functioning at any moment and to bring bureaucrats and red-tapists into the light of day. We can say with certainty that nine-tenths of our defects and failures are due to the lack of a properly organised check on the fulfilment of decisions. There can be no doubt that with such a check on fulfilment, defects and failures would certainly have been averted.

But if checking fulfilment is to achieve its purpose, two conditions at least are required: firstly, that fulfilment is checked systematically and not spasmodically; secondly, that the work of checking fulfilment in all sections of the Party, Soviet and economic organisations is entrusted not to second-rate people, but to people with sufficient authority, to the leaders of the organisations concerned.

The proper organisation of checking fulfilment is most important of all for the central leading bodies. The organisational structure of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection does not meet the requirements of a well-devised system for checking fulfilment. Several years ago, when our economic work was simpler and less satisfactory, and when we could count on the possibility of inspecting the works of all the People's Commissariats and of all the economic organisations, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was adequate. But now, when our economic work has expanded and has become more complicated, and when it is no longer necessary, or possible, to inspect it from one centre, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must be reorganised. What we need now is not an inspection, but a check on the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre—what we need now is control over the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre. We now need an organisation that would not set itself the universal aim of inspecting everything and everybody, but which could concentrate all its attention on the work of control, on the work of checking fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies of the Soviet power. Such an organisation can be only a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the U. S. S. R., working on assignments of the Council of People's Commissars, and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local bodies. And in order that this organisation may have sufficient authority and be able, if necessary, to take proceedings against any responsible executive, candidates for the Soviet Control Commission must be nominated by the Party Congress and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.

I think that only such an organisation could strengthen Soviet control and Soviet discipline.

As for the Central Control Commission, it is well known that it was set up primarily and mainly for the purpose of averting a split in the Party. You know that at one time there really was a danger of a split. You know that the Central Control Commission and its organisations succeeded in averting the danger of a split. Now there is no longer any danger of a split. But on the other hand, we are urgently in need of
an organisation that could concentrate its attention mainly on checking the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party and of its Central Committee. Such an organisation can be only a Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B), working on assignments of the Party and its Central Committee and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local organisations. Naturally, such a responsible organisation must have great authority. In order that it may have sufficient authority and be able to take proceedings against any responsible executive who has committed an offence, including members of the Central Committee, the right to elect or dismiss the members of this commission must be vested only in the supreme organ of the Party, viz., the Party congress. There can be no doubt that such an organisation will be quite capable of ensuring control over the fulfilment of the decisions of the central organs of the Party and of strengthening Party discipline.


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**STALIN:**

**REPLY TO THE GREETINGS OF THE WORKERS OF THE CHIEF RAILWAY WORKSHOPS IN TIFLIS, JUNE 8, 1926**

Comrades, permit me first of all to tender my comradely thanks for the greetings conveyed to me here by the representatives of the workers.

I must say in all conscience, comrades, that I do not deserve a good half of the flattering things that have been said here about me. I am, it appears, a hero of the October Revolution, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leader of the Communist International, a legendary warrior-knight and all the rest of it. That is absurd, comrades, and quite unnecessary exaggeration. It is the sort of thing that is usually said at the graveside of a departed revolutionary. But I have no intention of dying yet.

I must therefore give a true picture of what I was formerly, and to whom I owe my present position in our Party.

Comrade Arakel said here that in the old days he regarded himself as one of my teachers, and myself as his pupil. That is perfectly true, comrades. I really was, and still am, one of the pupils of the advanced workers of the Tiflis railway workshops.

Let me turn back to the past.

I recall the year 1898, when I was first put in charge of a study circle of workers from the railway workshops. That was some twenty-eight years ago. I recall the days when in the home of Comrade Sturua, and in the presence of Djibladze (he was also one of my teachers at that time), Chodrishvili, Chkheidze, Bochorishvili, Ninua and other advanced workers of Tiflis, I received my first lessons in practical work.

Compared with these comrades, I was then quite a young man. I may have been a little better-read than many of them were, but as a practical worker I was unquestionably a novice in those...
days. It was here, among these comrades, that I received my first baptism in the revolutionary struggle. It was here, among these comrades, that I became an apprentice in the art of revolution. As you see, my first teachers were Tiflis workers.

Permit me to tender them my sincere comradely thanks.

(Applause)

I recall, further, the years 1907-09, when, by the will of the Party, I was transferred to work in Baku. Three years of revolutionary activity among the workers in the oil industry steeled me as a practical fighter and as one of the local practical leaders. Association with such advanced workers in Baku as Vatsek, Saratovets, Fioletov and others, on the one hand, and the storm of acute conflicts between the workers and the oil owners, on the other, first taught me what it means to lead large masses of workers. It was there, in Baku, that I thus received my second baptism in the revolutionary struggle. There I became a journeyman in the art of revolution.

Permit me to tender my sincere comradely thanks to my Baku teachers.

(Applause)

Lastly, I recall the year 1917, when, by the will of the Party, after my wanderings from one prison and place of exile to another, I was transferred to Leningrad. There, in the society of Russian workers, and in direct contact with Comrade Lenin, the great teacher of the proletarians of all countries, in the storm of mighty clashes between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, in the conditions of the imperialist war, I first learnt what it means to be one of the leaders of the great Party of the working class. There, in the society of Russian workers—the liberators of oppressed peoples and the pioneers of the proletarian struggle of all countries and all peoples—I received my third baptism in the revolutionary struggle. There, in Russia, under Lenin’s guidance, I became a master workman in the art of revolution.

Permit me to tender my sincere comradely thanks to my Russian teachers and to bow my head in homage to the memory of my great teacher—Lenin.

(Applause)
Ludwig: No, that is really so, and for that very reason I shall put questions that may seem strange to you. Today, here in the Kremlin, I saw some relics of Peter the Great and the first question I should like to ask you is this: Do you think a parallel can be drawn between yourself and Peter the Great? Do you consider yourself a continuer of the work of Peter the Great?

Stalin: In no way whatever. Historical parallels are always risky. There is no sense in this one.

Ludwig: But after all, Peter the Great did a great deal to develop his country, to bring western culture to Russia.

Stalin: Yes, of course, Peter the Great did much to elevate the landlord class and develop the nascent merchant class. He did very much indeed to create and consolidate the national state of the landlords and merchants. It must be said also that the elevation of the landlord class, the assistance to the nascent merchant class and the consolidation of the national state of these classes took place at the cost of the peasant serfs, who were bled white.

As for myself, I am just a pupil of Lenin's, and the aim of my life is to be a worthy pupil of his.

The task to which I have devoted my life is the elevation of a different class—the working class. That task is not the consolidation of some "national" state, but of a socialist state, and that means an international state; and everything that strengthens that state helps to strengthen the entire international working class. If every step I take in my endeavour to elevate the working class and strengthen the socialist state of this class were not directed towards strengthening and improving the position of the working class, I should consider my life purposeless.

So you see your parallel does not fit.

As regards Lenin and Peter the Great, the latter was but a drop in the sea, whereas Lenin was a whole ocean.

Ludwig: Marxism denies that individual plays an outstanding role in history. Do you not see a contradiction between the materialist conception of history and the fact that, after all, you admit the outstanding role played by historical personages?

Stalin: No, there is no contradiction here. Marxism does not at all deny the role played by outstanding individuals or that history is made by people. In Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy* and in other works of his you will find it stated that it is people who make history. But, of course, people do not make history according to the promptings of their imagination or as some fancy strikes them. Every new generation encounters definite conditions already existing, ready-made when that generation was born. And great people are worth anything at all only to the extent that they are able correctly to understand these conditions, to understand how to change them. If they fail to understand these conditions and want to alter them according to the promptings of their imagination, they will land themselves in the situation of Don Quixote. Thus it is precisely Marx's view that people must not be counterposed to conditions. It is people who make history, but they do so only to the extent that they correctly understand the conditions that they have found ready-made, and only to the extent that they understand how to change those conditions. That, at least, is how we Russian Bolsheviks understand Marx. And we have been studying Marx for a good many years.¹

Ludwig: Some thirty years ago, when I was at the university, many German professors who considered themselves adherents of the materialist conception of history taught us that Marxism denies the role of heroes, the role of heroic personalities in history.

Stalin: They were vulgarisers of Marxism. Marxism has never denied the role of heroes. On the contrary, it admits that they play a considerable role, but with the reservations I have just made.

Ludwig: Sixteen chairs are placed around the table at which we are seated. Abroad people know, on the one hand,
that the U.S.S.R. is a country in which everything must be decided collectively, but they know, on the other hand, that everything is decided by individual persons. Who really does decide?

Stalin: No, individual persons cannot decide. Decisions of individuals are always, or nearly always, one-sided decisions. In every collegium, in every collective body, there are people whose opinion must be reckoned with. In every collegium, in every collective body, there are people who may express wrong opinions. From the experience of three revolutions we know that out of every 100 decisions taken by individual persons without being tested and corrected collectively, approximately 90 are one-sided.

In our leading body, the Central Committee of our Party, which directs all our Soviet and Party organisations, there are about 70 members. Among these 70 members of the Central Committee are our best industrial leaders, our best co-operative leaders, our best managers of supplies, our best military men, our best propagandists and agitators, our best experts on state farms, on collective farms, on individual peasant farms, our best experts on the nations constituting the Soviet Union and on national policy. In this areopagus is concentrated the wisdom of our Party. Each has an opportunity of correcting anyone’s individual opinion or proposal. Each has an opportunity of contributing his experience. If this were not the case, if decisions were taken by individual persons, there would be very serious mistakes in our work. But since each has an opportunity of correcting the mistakes of individual persons, and since we pay heed to such corrections, we arrive at decisions that are more or less correct.

Ludwig: You have had decades of experience of illegal work. You have had to transport illegally arms, literature, and so forth. Do you not think that the enemies of the Soviet regime might learn from your experience and fight the Soviet regime with the same methods?

Stalin: That, of course, is quite possible.

Ludwig: Is that not the reason for the severity and ruthlessness of your government in fighting its enemies?

Stalin: No, that is not the chief reason. One could quote certain examples from history. When the Bolsheviks came to power they at first treated their enemies mildly. The Mensheviks continued to exist legally and publish their newspaper. The Socialist-Revolutionaries also continued to exist legally and had their newspaper. Even the Cadets continued to publish their newspaper. When General Krasnov organised his counter-revolutionary campaign against Leningrad and fell into our hands, we could at least have kept him prisoner, according to the rules of war. Indeed, we ought to have shot him. But we released him on his “word of honour”. And what happened? It soon became clear that such mildness only helped to undermine the strength of the Soviet Government. We made a mistake in displaying such mildness towards enemies of the working class. To have persisted in that mistake would have been a crime against the working class and a betrayal of its interests. That soon became quite apparent. Very soon it became evident that the milder our attitude towards our enemies, the greater their resistance. Before long the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries—Gotz and others and the Right Mensheviks were organising in Leningrad a counter-revolutionary action of the military cadets, as a result of which many of our revolutionary sailors perished. This very Krasnov, whom we had released on his “word of honour”, organised the whiteguard Cossacks. He joined forces with Mamontov and for two years waged an armed struggle against the Soviet Government. Very soon it turned out that behind the whiteguard generals stood the agents of the western capitalist states—France, Britain, America and also Japan. We became convinced that we had made a mistake in displaying mildness. We learnt from experience that the only way to deal with such enemies is to apply the most ruthless policy of suppression to them.

Ludwig: It seems to me that a considerable part of the
population of the Soviet Union stands in fear and trepidation of the Soviet power, and that the stability of the latter rests to a certain extent on that sense of fear. I should like to know what state of mind is produced in you personally by the realisation that it is necessary to inspire fear in the interests of strengthening the regime. After all, when you associate with your comrades, your friends, you adopt quite different methods than those of inspiring fear. Yet the population is being inspired with fear.

Stalin: You are mistaken. Incidentally, your mistake is that of many people. Do you really believe that we could have retained power and have had the backing of the vast masses for 14 years by methods of intimidation and terrorisation? No, that is impossible. The tsarist government excelled all others in knowing how to intimidate. It had long and vast experience in that sphere. The European bourgeoisie, particularly the French, gave tsarism every assistance in this matter and taught it to terrorise the people. Yet, in spite of that experience and in spite of the help of the European bourgeoisie, the policy of intimidation led to the downfall of tsarism.

Ludwig: But the Romanovs held on for 300 years.

Stalin: Yes, but how many revolts and uprisings there were during those 300 years! There was the uprising of Stepan Razin, the uprising of Yemelyan Pugachov, the uprising of the Decembrists, the revolution of 1905, the revolution of February 1917, and the October Revolution. That is apart from the fact that the present-day conditions of political and cultural life in the country are radically different from those of the old regime when the ignorance, lack of culture, subservience and political downtroddenness of the masses enabled the “rulers” of that time to remain in power for a more or less prolonged period.

As regards the people, the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R., they are not at all so tame, so submissive and intimidated as you imagine. There are many people in Europe whose ideas about the people of the U.S.S.R. are old-fashioned: they think that the people living in Russia are, firstly, submissive and, secondly, lazy. That is an antiquated and radically wrong notion. It arose in Europe in those days when the Russian landlords began to flock to Paris, where they squandered the loot they had amassed and spent their days in idleness. These were indeed spineless and worthless people. That gave rise to conclusions about “Russian laziness”. But this cannot in the least apply to the Russian workers and peasants, who earned and still earn their living by their own labour. It is indeed strange to consider the Russian peasants and workers submissive and lazy when in a brief period of time they made three revolutions, smashed tsarism and the bourgeoisie, and are now triumphantly building socialism.

Just now you asked me whether everything in our country was decided by one person. Never under any circumstances would our workers now tolerate power in the hands of one person. With us personages of the greatest authority are reduced to nonentities, become mere ciphers, as soon as the masses of the workers lose confidence in them, as soon as they lose contact with the masses of the workers. Plekhanov used to enjoy exceptionally great prestige. And what happened? As soon as he began to stumble politically the workers forgot him. They forsook him and forgot him. Another instance: Trotsky. His prestige too was great, although, of course, it was nothing like Plekhanov’s. What happened? As soon as he drifted away from the workers they forgot him.

Ludwig: Entirely forgot him?

Stalin: They remember him sometimes—but with bitterness.

Ludwig: All of them with bitterness?

Stalin: As far as our workers are concerned, they remember Trotsky with bitterness, with exasperation, with hatred.

There is, of course, a certain small section of the population that really does stand in fear of the Soviet power, and fights against it. I have in mind the remnants of the moribund classes, which are being eliminated, and primarily that insigni-
significant part of the peasantry, the kulaks. But here it is a matter not merely of a policy of intimidating these groups, a policy that really does exist. Everybody knows that in this case we Bolsheviks do not confine ourselves to intimidation but go further, aiming at the elimination of this bourgeois stratum.

But if you take the labouring population of the U.S.S.R., the workers and the labouring peasants, who represent not less than 90 per cent of the population, you will find that they are in favour of Soviet power and that the vast majority of them actively support the Soviet regime. They support the Soviet system because that system serves the fundamental interests of the workers and peasants.

That, and not a policy of so-called intimidation, is the basis of the Soviet Government’s stability.

Ludwig: I am very grateful to you for that answer. I beg you to forgive me if I ask you a question that may appear to you a strange one. Your biography contains instances of what may be called acts of “highway robbery”. Were you ever interested in the personality of Stepan Razin? What is your attitude towards him as an “ideological highwayman”?

Stalin: We Bolsheviks have always taken an interest in such historical personalities as Bolotnikov, Razin, Pugachov, and so on. We regard the deeds of these individuals as a reflection of the spontaneous indignation of the oppressed classes, of the spontaneous rebellion of the peasantry against feudal oppression. The study of the history of these first attempts at such revolt on the part of the peasantry has always been of interest to us. But, of course, no analogy can be drawn here between them and the Bolsheviks. Sporadic peasant uprisings, even when not of the “highway robber” and unorganised type, as in the case of Stepan Razin, cannot lead to anything of importance. Peasant uprisings can be successful only if they are combined with uprisings of the workers and if they are led by the workers. Only a combined uprising headed by the working class can achieve its aim.

Moreover, it must never be forgotten that Razin and Pugachov were tsarists: they came out against the landlords, but were in favour of a “good tsar”. That indeed was their slogan.

As you see, it is impossible to draw an analogy here with the Bolsheviks.

Ludwig: Allow me to put a few questions to you concerning your biography. When I went to see Masaryk he told me he was conscious of being a Socialist when only six years old. What made you a Socialist and when was that?

Stalin: I cannot assert that I was already drawn to socialism at the age of six. Not even at the age of ten or twelve. I joined the revolutionary movement when fifteen years old, when I became connected with underground groups of Russian Marxists then living in Transcaucasia. These groups exerted great influence on me and instilled in me a taste for underground Marxist literature.

Ludwig: What impelled you to become an oppositionist? Was it, perhaps, bad treatment by your parents?

Stalin: No. My parents were uneducated, but they did not treat me badly by any means. But it was a different matter at the Orthodox theological seminary which I was then attending. In protest against the outrageous regime and the Jesuitical methods prevalent at the seminary, I was ready to become, and actually did become, a revolutionary, a believer in Marxism as a really revolutionary teaching.

Ludwig: But do you not admit that the Jesuits have good points?

Stalin: Yes, they are systematic and persevering in working to achieve sordid ends. But their principal method is spying, prying, worming their way into people’s souls and outraging their feelings. What good can there be in that? For instance, the spying in the hostel. At nine o’clock the bell rings for morning tea, we go to the dining-room, and when we return to our rooms we find that meantime a search has been made and all our chests have been ransacked...What good point can there be in that?....

T. S. Q.—13
Ludwig: My question is the following: You have often incurred risks and dangers. You have been persecuted. You have taken part in battles. A number of your close friends have perished. You have survived. How do you explain that? And do you believe in fate?

Stalin: No, I do not. Bolsheviks, Marxists, do not believe in “fate”. The very concept of fate, of “Schicksal”, is a prejudice, an absurdity, a relic of mythology, like the mythology of the ancient Greeks, for whom a goddess of fate controlled the destinies of men.

Ludwig: That is to say that the fact that you did not perish is an accident?

Stalin: There are internal and external causes, the combined effect of which was that I did not perish. But entirely independent of that, somebody else could have been in my place, for somebody had to occupy it. “Fate” is something not governed by natural law, something mystical. I do not believe in mysticism. Of course, there were reasons why danger left me unscathed. But there could have been a number of other fortuitous circumstances, of other causes, which could have led to a directly opposite result. So-called fate has nothing to do with it.

Ludwig: Lenin passed many years in exile abroad. You had occasion to be abroad for only a very short time. Do you consider that this has handicapped you? Who do you believe were of greater benefit to the revolution—those revolutionaries who lived in exile abroad and thus had the opportunity of making a thorough study of Europe, but on the other hand were cut off from direct contact with the people, or those revolutionaries who carried on their work here, knew the moods of the people, but on the other hand knew little of Europe?

Stalin: Lenin must be excluded from this comparison. Very few of those who remained in Russia were as intimately connected with the actual state of affairs there and with the labour movement within the country as Lenin was, although he was a long time abroad. Whenever I went to see him abroad—in 1906, 1907, 1912 and 1913—I saw piles of letters he had received from practical Party workers in Russia, and he was always better informed than those who stayed in Russia. He always considered his stay abroad to be a burden to him.

There are many more comrades in our Party and its leadership who remained in Russia, who did not go abroad, than there are former exiles, and they, of course, were able to be of greater benefit to the revolution than those who were in exile abroad. Actually few former exiles are left in our Party. They may add up to about one or two hundred out of the two million members of the Party. Of the seventy members of the Central Committee scarcely more than three or four lived in exile abroad.

As far as knowledge of Europe, a study of Europe, is concerned, those who wished to make such a study had, of course, more opportunities of doing so while living there. In that respect those of us who did not live long abroad lost something. But living abroad is not at all a decisive factor in making a study of European economics, technique, the cadres of the labour movement and literature of every description, whether belles lettres or scientific. Other things being equal, it is of course easier to study Europe on the spot. But the disadvantage of those who have not lived in Europe is not of much importance. On the contrary, I know many comrades who were abroad twenty years, lived somewhere in Charlottenburg or in the Latin Quarter, spent years in cafes drinking beer, and who yet did not manage to acquire a knowledge of Europe and failed to understand it......

Ludwig: Does ambition stimulate or hinder a great historical figure in his activities?

Stalin: The part played by ambition differs under different conditions. Ambition may be a stimulus or a hindrance to the activities of a great historical figure. It all depends on circumstances. More often than not it is a hindrance.

STALIN:

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION
CONGRESS OF COLLECTIVE FARM SHOCK
BRIGADES (Excerpt), FEBRUARY 19, 1933

Finally, a few words about the letter written by the collective farmers of Bezenchuk. This letter has been published, and you must have read it. It is unquestionably a good letter. It shows that among our collective farmers there are not a few experienced and intelligent organisers and agitators in the cause of collective farming, who are the pride of our country. But this letter contains one incorrect passage with which we cannot possibly agree. The point is that the Bezenchuk comrades describe their work in the collective farm as modest and all but insignificant work, whereas they describe the efforts of orators and leaders, who sometimes make speeches of inordinate length, as great creative work. Can we agree with that? No, comrades, we cannot possibly agree with it. The Bezenchuk comrades have made a mistake here. Perhaps they made the mistake out of modesty. But the mistake does not cease to be a mistake for all that. The times have passed when leaders were regarded as the only makers of history, while the workers and peasants were not taken into account. The destinies of nations and of states are now determined, not only by leaders, but primarily and mainly by the vast masses of the working people. The workers and the peasants, who without fuss and noise are building factories and mills, constructing mines and railroads, building collective farms and state farms, creating all the values of life, feeding and clothing the whole world—they are the real heroes and creators of new life. Apparently, our Bezenchuk comrades have forgotten this. It is not good when people overrate their strength and begin to be conceited about the service they have rendered. That leads to boasting, and boasting is not a good thing. But it is still worse when people begin to underrate their strength and fail to see that their "modest" and "insignificant" work is really great and creative work that decides the fate of history.

I would like the Bezenchuk comrades to approve this slight amendment of mine to their letter.

With that let us conclude, comrades.


STALIN:

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE
U.S.S.R. (Excerpt from OTHER REMARKS)
FEBRUARY 1, 1952

Should there be a special chapter in the text book on Lenin and Stalin as the founders of the political economy of socialism?

I think that the chapter, "The Marxist Theory of Socialism: Founding of the Political Economy of Socialism by V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin", should be excluded from the textbook. It is entirely unnecessary, since it adds nothing, and only colourlessly reiterates what has already been said in greater detail in earlier chapters of the textbook...

tion, and if he had played any part during the Civil War period it was militarily insignificant. Khrushchev too in his secret speech has made light of Stalin's military role during the October Revolution and the Civil War period. History, however, gives us a different picture: On October 16, 1917 the Petrograd Soviet created a "military revolutionary committee" under the chairmanship of Trotsky, who was already the Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. This committee was not fully Bolshevik. Left-Socialist Revolutionaries and Anarchists were also included in it, and its Chairman, Trotsky, himself a vehement anti-Bolshevik till the other day was now a Bolshevik only of a few weeks standing. It was impossible for the Party to establish its leadership in matters of military direction through such a committee. On the same day, therefore, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party met alone and, on Lenin's direction, appointed a "military revolutionary centre" consisting of Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritsky and Dzerzhinsky. Trotsky, however, has denied the very existence of such a centre. Though the insurrection was officially entrusted to the "revolutionary military committee" under Trotsky's leadership, and though all contemporary eyewitnesses pay tribute to Trotsky for the successful conduct of the insurrection, there is a lot of evidence to show that the strategic leadership of the revolution had actually been given by Lenin through the "military revolutionary centre" of the Party in which Stalin played a very significant role. During the Civil War period Trotsky attempted to build up his own military organisation outside party control, for which he was severely criticised at the Eighth Congress of the Party. During this period, it was Stalin who in close collaboration with Lenin devoted all his energy to the task of establishing the leadership of the Party in all military affairs. Lenin entrusted Stalin with military duties, but to avoid inevitable conflicts with Trotsky, he refrained from giving him any official military appointment in the earlier stages. His first appointment as General Director of Food Affairs in South Russia was entirely concerned with military activity. Stalin, however, insisted that without a clear military appointment such duties could not be performed. He was, therefore, appointed as the head of the North Caucasian Military Council on July 19, 1918. On September 17, Stalin was appointed Chairman of the newly formed Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front; on October 8, he was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of which Trotsky was the Chairman; and on November 30, 1918 when the all powerful Council of Defence was formed under Lenin's Chairmanship to coordinate and control all measures for the prosecution of the war, Stalin was appointed its Deputy Chairman.

We reproduce below a selection of mandates and letters and excerpts from biographical sketches of Stalin which will enable the reader to make his own assessment of Stalin's military activities during the Civil War period.

LENIN:

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR WAR

APRIL 22, 1918

On April 22 at 11 p.m. the Council of People's Commissars resolved that the War Commissariat be requested to take immediately all steps within its power to defend the eastern boundary of Kharkov Gubernia, especially Chertkovo station, which the Germans and haidamaks are trying to occupy in order to interrupt railway communication with Rostov.

Details to be discussed with Stalin.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

LENIN:
COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS' MANDATE ON THE APPOINTMENT OF J. V. STALIN AS THE GENERAL DIRECTOR OF FOOD AFFAIRS IN SOUTH RUSSIA. MAY 29, 1918

"People's Commissar Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, Member of the Council of People's Commissars, has been appointed by the Council of People's Commissars General Director of Food Affairs in South Russia and is vested with extraordinary powers. Local and regional Councils of People's Commissars, Soviets, Revolutionary Committees, military staffs and chiefs of detachments, railway organisations and station masters, organisations of river and maritime merchant fleet, post and telegraph, and food organisations, and all commissars and emissaries are hereby ordered to carry out the instructions of Comrade Stalin.

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)"

[J. V. Stalin: Works, Vol. 4, Page 433]

STALIN:
LETTER TO V. I. LENIN

To Comrade Lenin,

I am hurrying to the front, and writing only on business.

1) The railway south of Tsaritsyn has not yet been restored. I am firing or telling off all who deserve it, and I hope we shall have it restored soon. You may rest assured that we shall spare nobody, neither ourselves nor others, and shall deliver the grain in spite of everything. If our military "experts" (bunglers!) had not been asleep or loafing about the line would not have been cut, and if the line is restored it will not be thanks to, but in spite of, the military.

2) Large quantities of grain have accumulated on rail south of Tsaritsyn. As soon as the line is cleared we shall be sending you grain by through trains.

3) Have received your communication. Everything will be done to forestall possible surprises. You may rest assured that our hand will not flinch...

4) I have sent a letter by messenger to Baku.

5) Things in Turkestan are bad; Britain is operating through Afghanistan. Give somebody (or me) special authority (military) to take urgent measures in South Russia before it is too late.

Because of the bad communications between the border regions and the centre someone with broad powers is needed here on the spot so that urgent measures can be taken promptly. If you appoint someone (whoever it is) for this purpose, let us know by direct wire, and send his credentials also by direct wire, otherwise we risk having another Murmansk.

I send you a telegraphic tape on Turkestan.

That is all for the present.

Tsaritsyn,
July 7, 1918

Yours,
Stalin

[J. V. Stalin: Works, Vol. 4, Pages 120-121]

STALIN: LETTER TO V. I. LENIN

Comrade Lenin,

Just a few words.

1) If Trotsky is going to hand out credentials right and left without thinking—to Trifonov (Don region), to Avtonomov (Kuban region), to Koppe (Stavropol), to members of the French Mission (who deserve to be arrested), etc.—it may be safely said that within a month everything here in the North Caucasus will go to pieces, and we shall lose this region altogether. Trotsky is behaving in the way Antonov did at one time. Knock it into his head that he must make no appointments without the knowledge of the local people,
otherwise the result will be to discredit the Soviet power.

2) If you don’t let us have aeroplanes and airmen, armoured cars and 6-inch guns, the Tsaritsyn Front cannot hold out and the railway will be lost for a long time.

3) There is plenty of grain in the South, but to get it we need a smoothly-working machine which does not meet with obstacles from troop trains, army commanders and so on. More, the military must assist the food agents. The food question is naturally bound up with the military question. For the good of the work, I need military powers. I have already written about this, but have had no reply. Very well, in that case I shall myself, without any formalities, dismiss army commanders and commissars who are ruining the work. The interests of the work dictate this, and, of course, not having a paper from Trotsky is not going to deter me.

Tsaritsyn, July 10, 1918

J. Stalin

STALIN: LETTER TO V. I. LENIN

Dear Comrade Lenin,

The fight is on for the South and the Caspian. In order to keep all this area (and we can keep it!) we need several light destroyers and a couple of submarines (ask Artyom about the details). I implore you, break down all obstacles and so facilitate the immediate delivery of what we request. Baku, Turkestan and the North Caucasus will be ours (unquestionably!), if our demands are immediately met.

Things at the front are going well. I have no doubt that they will go even better (the Cossacks are becoming completely demoralized).

Warmest greetings, my dear and beloved Ilyich.

Yours,

Stalin

August 31, 1918

M, KALININ:
ON STALIN'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Comrade Stalin’s military activities during the Civil War were an epic in themselves. Their significance lies not only in the victories won, but also in the high strategical and tactical skill he displayed, the ability he showed in organizing and directing armed forces in a way that was most destructive to the enemy.

To describe Comrade Stalin’s military activities would require a separate work written by an expert of no ordinary calibre. How highly Lenin valued Comrade Stalin’s military activities may be seen from the telegram he sent to the defenders of Tsaritsyn in May 1919, in which he said: “Immediately form a special group of the most responsible and energetic persons in Tsaritsyn who helped in carrying out the measures indicated by Stalin for the defence of Tsaritsyn and instruct them to set about carrying out the present measures with equal energy.”

Comrade Voroshilov describes Comrade Stalin’s work on the fronts of the Civil War as follows:

“In the period from 1918 to 1920 Comrade Stalin was probably the only person whom the Central Committee shifted about from front to front, selecting the most vulnerable spots, the places where the threat to the revolution was most imminent. Stalin was never to be found where things were comparatively quiet and going smoothly, where success was attending our arms. But wherever, for various reasons, the Red armies suffered reverses, wherever the counterrevolutionary forces, pressing their successes, threatened the very existence of Soviet power, wherever alarms and panic might at any moment develop into helplessness and catastrophe—there Comrade Stalin was always sure to appear. During endless nights, foregoing sleep, he organized things, took the reins...
of leadership into his own firm hands, relentlessly broke down all obstructions—and the tide of affairs would turn, an improvement would set in.” (Voroshilov: *Stalin and the Red Army*, p. 8)

Thus, you see how immense was the part played by Comrade Stalin in the victory over the Whiteguard bands and the foreign forces of intervention.

[Kalinin: *Stalin—Sixty Years*, Pages 91-92]
on the road of victory by the great Stalin to the heights of human happiness—to Communism.

In these significant days the whole of progressive mankind beyond the frontiers of our Motherland, sends with feelings of deep gratefulness and love words of gratitude to the great leader and military commander of genius Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, Stalin, who, at the head of the Soviet people and its glorious and victorious army, has ensured hundreds of millions of people freedom, independence, the conditions for socialist transformation, and has rid all humanity of fascist slavery.

On the 22nd of June 1941, the German fascist army, treacherously breaking the pact of non-aggression, overran the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.

One hundred and seventy well-trained and technically equipped German divisions concentrated on our frontiers and supported by the huge resources and rich industrial base of Europe which the fascists had captured, also the intoxication following from their easy victories in the West—all this contributed to the illusory calculations of the fascist high command counting on finishing the war against the Soviet Union victoriously with "lightning" speed.

On the 30th of June 1941, the State Committee of Defence with Comrade Stalin at its head was formed. At the end of the first month of the war—on the 19th of July 1941, when the enemy in a mad onslaught was driving deep into our Motherland, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. appointed Comrade Stalin People's Commissar of Defence of the Union of the S.S.R. and in August 1941 by the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) Stalin took the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.

By the will of the Party and the Government, expressing the desires of the whole Soviet people, at the gravest moment for our Socialist State when a real danger to the life of our Motherland was threatening, Stalin became the leader of the Armed Forces of the SovietUnion.

In the course of the whole history of the Soviet State, the name of Stalin in the minds of Soviet men and women has always been associated with the idea of victory—no matter whether in the sphere of socialist construction or of war against the enemies of the Soviet people. The appointment of Stalin to the most responsible posts, therefore, was received by the Soviet public with relief and hope and filled the Soviet people with steadfast faith in victory even in this most arduous ordeal of history.

The Soviet people were not mistaken. At the end of the fourth year of the Great Patriotic War the multimillion Hitlerite army, well-drilled, equipped with modern military technique, spoiled by the easy victories in Europe, led by experienced military specialists, the army which had seemed invincible to many in the Old and the New World—suffered catastrophic defeat in single combat with the Soviet Army led by the brilliant communist commander Stalin.

Here we have not the opportunity to give a somewhat exhaustive analysis of the treasure house of Stalin's strategical plans and of those brilliant operations which were organized and carried out by our heroic Armed Forces under the leadership of its Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

But it is necessary if only superficially to touch on the basic stages of this great military epic.

When studying and examining the Great Patriotic War in relation to the character and results of the most decisive operations, the course of military events may be broken up into approximately four periods, each of which reflects the originality and constant progress of the development of Stalinite military art.

The first period includes the operations from June 1941, until about autumn 1942, that is, until our counteroffensive at Stalingrad. The Soviet Supreme Command, by active defence-
combined with counterattacks and counteroffensive in the most important strategic directions, broke during this period the striking force of the fascist army and buried the German strategy of "lightning" war. The genius of Stalin's leadership and the unexampled valour of our troops during that period turned the balance of strength in our favour and thus created in spite of the absence of a second front, favourable conditions for our troops to go over to a decisive offensive. Leningrad, Moscow, Tikhvin, Rostov, were the historic fields on which crushing blows were delivered against the German military forces. In this period the myth about the invincibility of the German army was exploded. The tireless, truly heroic labour of the Soviet people in all spheres of the national economy to meet the needs of the front, the valour of Soviet warriors at the front, the glorious battle actions of Soviet partisans in the rear of the enemy, never seen before on such a scale, the tense effort of the country in its entirety in the name of victory have no equal in the history of nations.

The second period, from about the end of 1942, that is, from the battle of Stalingrad, to the end of 1943, is the period of the radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Army in brilliant and numerous battles finally wrested from the enemy the strategic initiative, consolidated its superiority over the enemy forces, went over to a resolute offensive on a huge front and liberated two-thirds of occupied Soviet territory. Suffering huge losses the armed forces of fascist Germany were compelled to go over to the defence on all fronts.

The encirclement and capture of two German fascist armies in the Battle of Stalingrad which for the Germans turned into an unprecedented slaughter, after which the hitlerite army could not recover until the end of the war, the destruction of the German's southern front, the breaking of the siege of Leningrad, the rout of the German formations in the Kursk battle—Hitler's last attempt to turn the tide of the war in his favour, the liberation of left-bank Ukraine and the battle for the Dnieper—those were the most glorious and historic events on the road of the victorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union during this period.

The third period, including the operations of 1944 is the period of the decisive victories of the Soviet Army, known as the period of Stalin's ten blows. At this stage the sweep and overwhelming nature of the offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces reached their culminating point. As a result of these operations the Balkan allies of Germany were put out of action—monarchical Rumania and tsarist Bulgaria and after that pro-fascist Finland and Hungary under Horthy, and every one of the fascist aggressors were driven beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Land while all military operations were transferred to the territory of the enemy.

The defeat of the Germans at Leningrad and of the Finns in Karelia and in the Far North, the liberation of the Crimea and right-bank Ukraine, the destruction of the central German front in Byelorussia, the liberation of Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics, the occupation of Rumania and Bulgaria and the deep penetration into Hungry—all these operations were carried out in the style of classical Stalinite offensive strategy on a gigantic scale. In these operations the Soviet Army, making use of Stalin's skilled operational manoeuvring succeeded brilliantly in breaking through the enemy's front simultaneously at several points, thus depriving him of the possibility of gathering reserves for the parrying of our powerful, sudden blows. The most perfect form of manoeuvre for the surrounding and liquidating of the chief formations of the enemy formed during this period the basis for the battle operations of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The fourth and last period—from the end of 1944 up to the end of the second world war—may be described as the period of final victories of the Soviet Union over hitlerite Germany. Enriched by three years of experience in battle, having mastered to perfection all the complex forms of operational manoeuvre and tactical stratagems of total battle operations.
involving huge and skilful massing of battle technique in the
required directions, the Soviet Army rapidly overcame during
this period all the long-prepared fortifications in East Prussia
and in the central direction—from the Vistula to Berlin. These
fortifications no less formidable in strength than the
famous “Siegfried Line” considered by the hitlerite com-
manders to be an impregnable wall, were unable, however,
not only to stop but even to check the swift offensive of the
Soviet troops.

The most glorious victories of this period: the destruc-
tion of the southern wing of the German front and the
occupation of Budapest and Vienna, the defeat of the Germans
in East Prussia, the crushing of the enemy’s central formations
in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, in Czechoslovakia, in Silesia
and Pomerania and as the final blow—the complete destruc-
tion and capitulation of the Nazi-German army and the
capture of Berlin by our troops.

As a result of four years of war the Soviet people and
their victorious army, thanks to Stalin’s strategic genius and
generalship, gained complete victory over hitlerite Germany.

The “prophecies” of the enemy camp and of one or two of
the “allies” on the British Isles and across the ocean who
from the first months of the war had been waiting impatiently
for the defeat of the Soviet Army did not come true.

The hidden and open sabotage against the creation of a
second front in the West and the strategy of minor operations
of the Anglo-American command brought it about that the
whole might of the German army was concentrated against the
Soviet Union. By their unworthy game of provocation the
Anglo-American “allies”, who desired the greatest possible
exhaustion and weakening of the Soviet Union, and conse-
cquently the prolongation of the war, gave Hitler the oppor-
tunity of waging the war for three years solely on the Soviet
front without a glance behind him and having no fear for his
rear, having concentrated against the Soviet Union huge masses
of troops and equipment.

And only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of
the Soviet Army were unavoidably fatal and that the Soviet
Union singlehanded and independently would put an end to
Nazi Germany and her satellites, were Messrs. Churchills
and Marshalls compelled to hurry the opening of the second
front delayed... for two years.

Throughout the second world war the military thought of
the fascist generals at the base of which lay a reactionary,
metaphysical world outlook—added nothing new and could
add nothing new to the general principles of the warfare of
bourgeois states. The most that the fascist military clique
showed itself capable of was to turn once again to the
adventuristic idea of “blitzkrieg” already proved bankrupt
in the first world war, a conception which reflected the organic
inability of the German militarists to attain to the level of a
scientific understanding of modern war.

The results of the war of hitlerite Germany against the
U.S.S.R. showed the utter absurdity of counting on victory by
“blitzkrieg” methods. That which for hitlerism was effective
and real when it concerned the capitalist countries of Western
Europe, became illusory and disastrous in war against the
Soviet Union.

Only in the U.S.S.R. in conditions of a socialist system, in
conditions of the predominance of Marxist-Leninist ideology
and socialist practice, is real military science possible.

Soviet military science was born and perfected simultane-
ously with the beginning and development of the Armed Forces
of the Soviet Union. Military science is rightly called by us
Stalinite military science. From the first days of the creation
of the Soviet Armed Forces Stalin gave much attention and
spent no small labour on the scientific elaboration and theore-
tic foundations of the principles of Soviet military science.

Stalinite military science, basing itself on a correct under-
standing of the laws of social development was born with the
coming to power of the working class, developed and streng-
thened itself on the foundation of the Soviet state system.
Such decisive elements as a new socialist system of social structure with planned economy, new productive forces and new relations of production among people possessing a new ideology and new moral standard form the base on which rests the whole edifice of Stalinite military science.

Being a harmonious system of really scientific knowledge of the whole complex body of questions of modern war, Stalinite military science apart from purely military elements—strategy, operational skill, tactics, the organization and training of troops—embraces the sum total of social-political, economic and moral factors in their interaction and determining influence on warfare as a whole.

Soviet military art as a component part of a military science that had assimilated the experience of past wars and had adapted it to the socialist nature of the state, has armed our commanding cadres with theoretical and practical knowledge in the field of strategy, operational skill, tactics, the organization and training of troops and has thus allowed them to understand correctly the character of war, to comprehend the nature of modern operations and battle and also the role of various types of troops, their importance and practical use.

In this connection it is especially necessary to emphasize the Stalinite treatment of the question of constantly acting factors, among which the importance of the economic and moral potential of the country is given one of the decisive places in the organization and attainment of victory in modern war.

Stalin has divided these factors strictly into two groups: temporary, fortuitous, and constantly acting factors—and has designated the appropriate place, role and importance of each, as well as their mutual connection.

Of all the temporary, fortuitous factors on which the strategic calculations of the German command in planning war against the Soviet Union were based—Stalin singles out "the element of surprise" as the most effective military factor.

To the second group of factors determining the course and outcome of a war Stalin refers: the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the equipment of the army and the organizational ability of the commanding personnel of the army.

The deep scientific analysis of these factors given by Stalin has immense not only theoretical but—in conditions of the fiercest warfare—also practical significance. Soviet people have received the key to understanding the perspective of war and the inevitability of the victory of the Soviet Union. It is not by chance that in his speeches Stalin touches many times either on all these factors in their entirety or on one of them in accordance with the circumstances in which events took place.

Stalin's thesis about the advantages and significance of the enduring constantly acting factors and the limitations of the temporary fortuitous factors—implanted in the Soviet people and their army a firm conviction in our superiority over the enemy, confirmed the unshakeable faith in victory, mobilized for heroic deeds at the front, and for great feats of labour in the rear. Faith in our own strength, steadfast certainty of victory were a powerful factor and the natural prerequisite of victory.

In the idea of the stability of the rear is included all that constitutes the life and activity of the whole state—social system, politics, economy, the apparatus of production, the degree of organization of the working people, the ideology, science, art, moral condition of the people and other things.

The scale of modern military operations, the vast number of the people taking part in them and the huge quantity of technical battle equipment employed, place on the rear (i.e., the whole country) extremely high demands on the timely fulfilment of which depends the outcome of the battle actions of the troops and, in the final account, the outcome of the war as a whole.

The genius of Stalin in foreseeing even at the beginning of the war the inevitable defeat of the hitlerite army was founded on knowledge of the relative political-economic and social weakness of hitlerite Germany, that is, the instability of its
rear, and on the certitude of the stability of the Soviet rear, that is, of our whole state.

Enumerating the miscalculations of the German high command in the strategic planning of the war, Stalin gives first place to their miscalculations regarding the condition of their own rear and that of their opponent.

"...The enemy sadly miscalculated," says Stalin. "He failed to take into account the strength of the Red Army, failed to take into account the stability of the Soviet rear, failed to take into account the determination of the peoples of our country to achieve victory, failed to take into account the unreliability of the European rear of fascist Germany, and lastly, he failed to take into account the inherent weakness of fascist Germany and her army."

To question of the organization and work of the Soviet rear Stalin returned in his speeches and orders of the day many times and at all stages of the war, emphasizing the exceptional and decisive importance of the rear in the work of carrying out military operations and ensuring the destruction of the enemy.

"The fact that the Red Army was able successfully to perform its duty to our country and has expelled the Germans from the boundaries of our Soviet territory is due to the devoted support it received from the rear, from our entire country, from all the peoples of our country."

The next of the constantly acting factors is the morale of the army.

This factor is connected organically with the moral political condition of the rear which feeds the army not only with all kinds of equipment—with ammunition, technique, armaments, food, men, but also with ideas, ideology, moods and morale.

In all the wars of the past the moral steadfastness of fighting armies always played a role of primary importance. And in modern wars when not only the army fights but the whole country, the whole people, when armies many million strong on both sides take part in battle operations, when extremely long and tense battles are fought—the moral steadfastness, the endurance, the heroism of the troops engaged acquires exclusive significance. That is why Stalin singles out this factor particularly as one of the decisive factors of the Great Patriotic War.

All the commanders and theoreticians of military affairs in the past also assigned great importance to the moral factor. But they regarded it as an isolated element, unrelated to the character of war, to the social-political, economic and moral-ideological principles of the warring states, dissociated from the masses of the people—the main source of strength, deciding, in the final account, victory over the enemy.

Much has been written by bourgeois military writers about the moral factor of troops and its importance but their interpretation of the question of the moral qualities of an army has nothing in common with the treatment of this question by Stalin. Stalin makes the moral factor, the spirit of the army dependent primarily on the nature of the political aims of the war and consequently on the nature of the social system, the nature of domestic and foreign policy of the given state, on the level of consciousness and culture of the broad masses of the people, on the predominant ideology, etc.

The morale of the army, as Stalin teaches, depends in the first place and above all on the nature of the political aims of the war, that is, what the state is fighting for, on the degree of consciousness of the men and commanders of the army, on the depth of their understanding of the justness of the war which is taking place and the necessity of waging it to save their own country from the attacker, the aggressive enemy, on the depth of love for their Motherland and of their faith in the righteousness of their cause, of their faith in victory, of their faith in the leaders of the country and of the active armed forces.

"...The morale of our Army is higher than that of the German, for it is defending its native land against alien invaders and believes in the justice of its cause, whereas the German army is waging a war of annexation, is plundering a foreign country, and is unable to believe even for one moment in the justice of its vile cause." (J. Stalin.)
The noble and lofty aims of the war—and such were the aims of the Patriotic War of the Soviet people and its army defending their socialist Motherland from the aggression of bestial fascism—in these lies the guarantee of the unshakeable morale of a patriotic people and its army.

The other constantly acting factors—the quantity and quality of divisions, the equipment of the army, the organizational abilities of the commanding personnel, by which the framework of the strategic planning of the war and its execution is conditioned, are obvious and irrefutable, the more so in that they are, at bottom, determined by that same economic and moral-political might of the country.

The other side of the same question of long-term constantly acting factors is that in the course of the war it was necessary to ensure that the balance of these factors was in our favour since constantly acting factors are not a definite, immutable quantity. This favourable balance is created not by its own momentum, not mechanically but by the intense labour of the people and by correct leadership. The building up of this balance of all the decisive, enduring and constantly acting factors which ensured, in the final account, victory to Soviet arms was one of the greatest merits of the Party of Lenin and Stalin and of the leader of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

In line with the thesis concerning the constantly acting factors of victory, in the strategic planning of the war and its decisive campaigns and separate operations stands another, no less important thesis—concerning reserves.

Stalin has always paid very serious attention to the reserves. His evaluation of the role of reserves even during the Civil War and the war of intervention is well known.

That is why in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War alongside of the organization of active defence, the accumulation of strategic and operational reserves for the waging of a prolonged and victorious war occupied the lion's share of Stalin's attention.

It is known that at all stages of the war every operation by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief had to be ensured by the reserves necessary for its execution. In this lies one of the particularities of Stalinite strategical leadership of the battle actions of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War.

The Commander-in-Chief solved brilliantly one of the most important problems—the problem of creating commanding cadres.

During the course of the war new Soviet military commanders, generals and cadres of officers grew up who proved in action their devotion to their Motherland, to the Bolshevik Party and who were able in huge battles to turn Stalin's strategic and operational-tactical plans into a living reality.

The Great Patriotic War with a front extending upon thousands of kilometres demanded of the Soviet military command the solution of a most complex problem—the problem of organizing the strategic synchronization of several fronts. The organization, the uninterrupted supplying and conduct of operations of a similar kind directed, according to a single plan, towards the attainment of a single strategic aim, is a matter of extreme complexity and difficulty. This problem could be coped with only by Stalin's military genius, and he supplied its complete solution.

The offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1942-43 and particularly the liberation of left-bank Ukraine in 1943, after the victory of our army on the Kursk bulge, was carried out with amazing determination by the synchronized operations of many fronts, united in a thousand-kilometre theatre of military activity by a single strategic plan and the single commanding will of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, by the will of the great Stalin.

Even more amazing in their exceptionally extensive sweep and brilliant results from the point of view of synchronization of fronts were the offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1944-45, when on an enormous expanse of territory from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, Soviet troops with con-
secutive and simultaneous crushing blows definitely annihilated armies of fascist Germany and her allies.

In all these brilliant Stalinite operations, both the synchronization of groups of fronts in one strategic direction and the synchronization of fronts operating in separate directions, but all of them coordinated by the unity of Stalin's strategic plan, found their full expression. The genius of Stalin inspired the commanders of fronts and armies, officers and men of the mighty Soviet Army to heroic feats in the name of their Socialist Motherland.

In the Great Patriotic War under the leadership of Stalin one of the most complex and difficult problems of the art of war—the manoeuvre for the encirclement and annihilation of great masses of enemy troops—was solved in a fully practical way. In the course of the last war the German fascist command sought many times but without success to carry out a strategic manoeuvre of this kind against Soviet troops. In the offensive operations of the Soviet Army this strategic encircling manoeuvre became the principal form of its battle action.

The demands of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin—"to cut the enemy's communications by skilful and daring manoeuvres, surround and break up his forces and destroy and capture his manpower and materiel"—fully materialized in a variety of forms of encirclement used by the Soviet Army in the various conditions and circumstances of battle, and thus the widespread theory of bourgeois military specialists concerning the exceptional rarity and fortuity of encircling operations was refuted in deed. That which was impossible for bourgeois armies, for the German fascist imitators of their military theory and practice, became possible and realizable for the Armed Forces of the Soviet State.

The outstanding operations of encirclement and complete destruction of the enemy—at Stalingrad, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Minsk, Jassy-Kishinev, Berlin and many others—were a brilliant demonstration of the growth and maturity of Soviet soldiers, officers and generals of the Stalinite school, who in the course of the Great Patriotic War had been gradually mastering, and finally mastered to perfection, this most complex form of strategic and tactical operational manoeuvre, embodying it creatively in the most varied conditions of troop warfare.

After the historic battle at Kursk which buried forever the hitlerite offensive strategy, the fascist army suffered, right up till the Berlin capitulation, consecutive, crushing defeats to a greater or lesser degree similar to the debacle at Stalingrad.

From now on the historians of war and military art will not talk only of "Cannes" and "Sedan". The Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War transformed Stalin's strategic ideas into a reality and gave history remarkable examples of the execution and results of large encircling operations and the liquidation of the chief enemy groups. Many of these operations will be recorded as classical examples in the history of war.

It is known that in modern offensive operations in the overwhelming majority of cases where the lines of the enemy are deeply echeloned and powerfully defended, the decisive place belongs to the frontal blow as the radical method of breaking through these lines and developing the success in the depth of the enemy's defences.

The Soviet Supreme Command confronted during the war with the necessity of smashing the German fascist defences which had been brought to a high degree of perfection, found the strength, means and tactical-operational methods of solving this most difficult problem with enormous effect. Moreover, in numerous offensive operations to break through the defending front, the Soviet Supreme Command used with great creative variety the frontal blow. Such a frontal blow, after destroying the defences of the enemy, was quickly developed with the aid of powerful mobile forces—tanks, self-propelled artillery, motorized infantry and cavalry in coordination with air forces—into other types of manoeuvre, and inevitably led so the encirclement and liquidation of the enemy's troops, or
to the destruction and pursuit of the enemy to a depth of strategic importance.

A powerful frontal blow in one direction, a series of shattering blows in several others, breaking up the enemy’s defence on a wide front, a blow splitting his front to a great depth—all these Stalinite forms of manoeuvre strictly coordinated in operational and operational-strategical synchronization, were widely used in the offensive operations of the Soviet Army. The battle operations of our troops assumed a particularly destructive character in 1943-45, when thanks to the heroic work of the Soviet people in the rear the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was able to create the necessary concentration of striking forces and ordnance (tanks, air forces, self-propelled and other artillery) in the chief directions of the breakthrough. Under these conditions the German fascist defensive front definitely collapsed throughout its tactical depth on the day of the operation or the day after. As a result of this the offensive, as a rule, developed at extraordinarily high speed.

There should be mentioned such a decisive form of battle as strategic counterattack. Making use of it in the first stage of the war under conditions of the enemy’s overwhelming superiority in forces and equipment, the Soviet Armed Forces, having bled him dry in active defence, gained the operational and strategic initiative and created conditions for the subsequent counteroffensive operations on a gigantic scale along the entire Soviet-German front.

What has been said above by no means exhausts the whole wealth of strategic and operational-tactical problems so successfully solved in the Great Patriotic War under the supreme command of the great Stalin, by the excellent General Staff, by the corps of officers and the whole mighty, valorous, Soviet Army and Navy.

The huge sweep of consecutive and simultaneous operations along the front and in great depth, with their crushing character and speed; the skilled, tactical and operational synchronization of all types of troops, combined with flexible and daring manoeuvre in any kind of fighting conditions; active defence brought to perfection, capable of resisting blows of any strength and ensuring conditions for going over to a resolute counteroffensive; the effective use of massed armoured troops and aviation in the main directions of the offensive for the overwhelming of the whole operational-strategic depth of the enemy; artillery offensive as the most rational way of using all types of cannon, and a whole series of other important problems found their correct and fullest solution in the combat activity of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

The great, victorious Patriotic War will go down in history as a triumph of the Soviet socialist system, as a proof of the superiority of the armed forces of Socialism over the fascist armies, as the undeniable proof of the superiority of Soviet, Stalinite military science over the reactionary doctrine of German imperialism, as the triumph of the generalship, of the strategic and military genius of the great Stalin.

The great and historic victory of the Land of Socialism over fascist Germany and imperialist Japan, the victory won by the Soviet people under the leadership of the great Party of Lenin and Stalin led by the genius of Stalin, brought huge losses to the system of world capitalism and helped hundreds of millions of people to throw off the yoke of the old world.

There has grown up a mighty front of peace, democracy and Socialism, uniting around the Soviet Union the free peoples in a friendly, brotherly and democratic family.

Blinded by savage class hatred Anglo-American imperialism, powerless to stop the inevitable course of history openly threatens the free peoples with a new world war. But times have changed, the balance of real forces has changed.

Socialism has become the principle of life of many countries and peoples, the camp of the fighters for peace has grown into a gigantic force.

The mighty voice of great Stalin in defence of peace throughout the world has penetrated to every corner of the globe.
it has penetrated to the soul and heart of the working people, of the progressive men and women of the whole world. They, the simple, honest people, know that every word of the great Stalin is a tocsin calling for vigilance and effective opposition against the instigators of a new world war, and, in an answer to Stalin’s call they are forming in powerful columns of fighters for peace, for freedom and the happiness of mankind.

Glory to the wise and brilliant leader and teacher of working and progressive mankind!

May he live for many, long and glorious years to the happiness and triumph of the working people of the whole world, this wonderful man, the great friend of all the progressive people of the world—Stalin!

MARSHAL ZHUKOV:

ON MISCALCULATION ABOUT THE NAZI ATTACK

And now I think it is time to speak of the main error of that time which naturally gave rise to many others—the miscalculation in deciding the probable date on which the German forces would attack.

The 1940 operational plan which, after revision, was in force in 1941 provided that:

In the event of the threat of war all the armed forces are to be alerted;

Troop mobilization is to be carried out immediately on a nation-wide scale;

Troops are to be built up to war complements and under the mobilization plan;

All mobilized troops are to be concentrated and deployed along the western frontier in accordance with the plans of the frontier military districts and the High Military Command.

Measures specified by the operational and mobilization plans could be implemented only with special government permission. This was granted only on the night of June 21, 1941. In the last pre-war months the leadership’s directives did not call for any steps which should be taken urgently when the threat of war was particularly great.

The question naturally arises as to why the leadership headed by Stalin did not put through the measures contemplated in the operational war plan they themselves had endorsed.

Usually Stalin is blamed for these errors and miscalculations. Of course, he made mistakes but one cannot consider the causes of these mistakes apart from the objective historical processes and phenomena, from the entire complex of economic and political factors. Now that the consequences are known, nothing could be easier than to return to the onset of the events and give assessments of all kinds. And there is nothing more complicated than to penetrate at the given moment into the substance of the problem in its entirety—the antagonism of forces, the multitude of opposing opinions, information and facts.

Recalling and analysing all Stalin’s conversation with people close to him I have come to the firm conclusion that all his thoughts and deeds were dictated by the desire to avoid war and the confidence that he would succeed in that.

Stalin was well aware what misfortunes would befall the Soviet people in war with such a strong wily enemy as Nazi Germany. He strove, as our entire Party did, to avert war.

Today our attention is being concentrated, especially in popular mass publications, on the warnings received that preparations were being made for an attack on the USSR, that troops were being concentrated on our borders, and so on. But at that time, as is evident from enemy archives captured after the defeat of Nazi Germany documents of a quite different nature probably found their way to Stalin’s desk. Here is an example.
On February 15, 1941, acting on instructions from Hitler given at a conference on February 3, 1941, Field Marshal Von Kietel, Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, issued a special "Directive for Misinforming the Enemy". In order to conceal preparations for the Barbarossa operation, the intelligence and counter-intelligence division of the General Staff evolved and carried out numerous operations in spreading the false rumours and information. It was leaked out that the movement of troops to the East was part of the "greatest misinformation manoeuvre in history designed to distract attention from final preparation for the invasion of England."

Maps of England were printed in vast quantities, English interpreters were attached to units, preparations were made for "sealing off" some areas along the coast of the English Channel, the Strait of Dover and Norway. Information was spread about an imaginary "airborne corps", make-believe "rocket batteries" were installed along the shore, and rumours were circulated among the troops—some to the effect that they were being sent East for a "rest" before the invasion of England, and others that they would be allowed to pass through Soviet territory to attack India. To add credibility to the version that a landing was to be made in England special operations were worked out under the code names "Shark" and "Harpoon", the flood of propaganda was turned against England and the usual diatribes against the Soviet Union stopped; diplomats lent a hand, and so on.

Information of this kind along with shortcomings in the general combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces explain the extreme caution Stalin displayed when it came to carrying out the basic measures contemplated in the operational-mobilization plans regarding preparations for repulsing possible aggression.

Stalin also took into consideration the fact that, as I have already mentioned, the shift from the territorial system to the cadre system of troop maintenance had led to units and formations being headed by commanding and political cadres who had not yet acquired the operational and tactical skill necessary for the posts they held...

While wishing to preserve peace as the decisive condition for building socialism in the USSR, Stalin saw that the governments of Britain and the United States were doing everything possible to incite Hitler to make war on the Soviet Union, that Britain and other Western countries, being in a critical military situation and striving to save themselves from catastrophe, were extremely interested in a German attack on the USSR. That was why Stalin was so distrustful about information from Western governments that Germany was preparing to attack the Soviet Union.

I would like to draw the reader's attention to another set of facts which, when reported to Stalin, were likely to heighten his distrust of the above warnings. I mean the secret negotiations with Nazi Germany in London in 1939 at a time when Britain, France and the USSR were holding talks on war problems in Moscow.

British diplomats were proposing an agreement with the Nazis on dividing spheres of influence on a world scale. The British Minister of Trade, Hudson, said during his talk with Wohl, a Nazi privy counsellor close to Field Marshal Goering, that three extensive regions offering unlimited opportunities for economic activity—the British Empire, China and Russia—were open to the two countries. They discussed political and military issues, problems of procuring raw materials for Germany, etc. Other persons joined the talks. The German Ambassador in London, Dirksen, confirmed in his report to Berlin the existence of "a tendency towards constructive policy among government quarters here".

In this connection I think it relevant to recall the fact that the Soviet Union rejected flatly and unequivocally Hitler's proposal for discussing jointly the idea of dividing the world into spheres of influence. This is borne out by documents and the evidence of those who accompanied V.M. Molotov on his visit to Berlin in November 1940.
As is commonly known, Winston Churchill sent a message to Stalin at the end of April which read in part:

"I have sure information from a trusted agent that when the Germans thought they had got Yugoslavia in the net—that is to say, after March 20—they began to move three out of the five Panzer divisions from Roumania to Southern Poland. The moment they heard of the Serbian revolution this movement was countermanded. Your Excellency will readily appreciate the significance of these facts."

Stalin received the news sceptically. In 1940 rumours had circulated in the world press to the effect that the British and French were themselves preparing to invade the north Caucasus and bomb Baku, Grozny and Maykop. Documents confirming these rumours had appeared. In short, not only the anti-Communist views and actions which Churchill never bothered to conceal, but also many concrete facts relating to diplomatic activities, were likely to prejudice Stalin against information coming from imperialist circles.

The spring of 1941 was marked by a new wave of false rumours in the Western countries about large-scale Soviet war preparations against Germany. The German press raised a great outcry over these rumours and complained that such information clouded German-Soviet relations.

"You see", Stalin would say, "they are trying to frighten us with the Germans and the Germans with us, setting us one against the other."

As to the non-aggression pact concluded with Germany in 1939 at a time when our country might have been attacked on two fronts—by Germany and Japan—I do not think that Stalin had any illusions about it. The Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government proceeded from the fact that the pact did not deliver the USSR from the menace of fascist aggression but made it possible to gain time to strengthen our defences and hinder the emergence of a united anti-Soviet front. At any rate I never heard Stalin express any reassuring views regarding the non-aggression pact.

On May 5, 1941, Stalin addressed the students of Red Army academies and spoke at a reception in honour of the graduates. After congratulating them on their graduation, Stalin dwelt on the transformations that had taken place lately in the army...

"You will come to your units from the capital," Stalin continued. "Red Army men and commanders will ask you about what is happening now. Why has France been conquered? Why is England suffering defeat and Germany winning the victory? Is the German army really invincible?"

"Military thought in German army has advanced. The army has the latest weapons and equipment; it has been trained in the new ways of warfare and has acquired great experience. It's a fact that Germany has the best army both in materiel and organization, but the Germans are wrong in thinking that it's an ideal, invincible army. There are no invincible armies. Germany will have no success under the slogans of aggressive, predatory wars, under the slogans of conquering other countries and subduing other peoples."

Speaking at length on the causes of Germany's military successes in Europe, Stalin touched on the attitude to the army in some countries where due concern for the army was lacking and it received no moral support. It was then that a new morale appeared which disintegrated the army. The military began to be regarded contemptuously. But the army should enjoy the greatest concern and love of the people and government—it was in this that the army's great moral force lay. The army should be cherished.

The military school must and could train the commanding cadres only on the basis of the new weapons and equipment, making wide use of the experience of modern war. After briefly outlining the tasks of artillerymen, tankmen, fliers, cavalrymen and infantry communication men in war, Stalin emphasised that we must re-form our propaganda, agitation and Press.

"In order to prepare well for war", Stalin said, "it is not
enough to have a modern army—it is necessary to prepare politically. While strengthening our country's defences and re-equipping the army, we must be prepared for every surprise."

What conclusions, then, follow from the facts cited? How is one to assess what was done before the war, what we intended to do in the near future and what we did not have time to do or were unable to do in strengthening our country's defensive capacity? How is one to make that appraisal today after everything has been gone through, critically interpreting the past and at the same time putting oneself once more on the threshold of the Great Patriotic War?

I have thought long over this and here is the conclusion to which I came.

It seems to me that the country's defence was managed correctly in its basic and principal features and orientations. For many years everything possible or almost everything was done in the economic and social aspects. As to the period between 1939 and the middle of 1941, the people and Party exerted particular effort to strengthen defence...

Following once more in my mind's eye the development of the Civil War, I should say that here too we followed the right road in the main. There was constant improvement along the right lines in Soviet military doctrine, the principles of educating and training of commanding cadres and the structure and organization of the armed forces. The morale and fighting spirits of the troops and their political consciousness and maturity were always exceptionally high...

In basic matters—matters which in the end decide a country's fate in war and determine whether it is to be victory or defeat—the Party and the people prepared their motherland for defence....

In 1940 the Party and the Government undertook a number of additional measures to strengthen the country's defence. However, the economic potential did not permit of fully carrying out in such a short period the organizational and other measures concerning the armed forces. War caught the coun-

try in the stage of reorganizing, re-equipping and retraining the armed forces, in the stage of building up the necessary mobilization stores and state reserves. The Soviet people were not planning war and were striving to avoid it, putting all their efforts into the implementation of peaceful economic plans.

During the period the dangerous military situation was developing we army leaders probably did not do enough to convince Stalin that war with Germany was inevitable in the very near future and that the urgent measures provided for in the operational and mobilization plans must be implemented....

Today there are different versions about whether we knew the exact date the war would begin and the German plan for the war.

I cannot say precisely whether Stalin was correctly informed nor whether it had actually been reported to him the day the Germans would attack. He did not tell me about any important information of this kind which he may have received personally, though it is true he did say to me one day:

"A man is sending me very important information about the intentions of the Hitler Government but we have some doubts."...

Unfortunately, correct conclusions were not always drawn even from the reports received, which could definitely and authoritatively orient the country's leadership. Here are some documents from the military archives.

On March 20, 1941, General F. I. Golikov, Chief of the Intelligence Division, submitted a report to Stalin containing information of the greatest importance....

The report read: "Of the most probable military operations planned against USSR, the following deserves particular attention:

"Variant No. 3, according to information received in February 1941: 'For the attack on the USSR', the message reads, 'three army groups are being set up; the 1st group under the command of General Field Marshal von Bock will
strike in the direction of Petrograd; the 2nd group under the command of General Field Marshal von Rundstedt, in the direction of Moscow; and the 3rd group under the command of General Field Marshal von Leeb, in the direction of Kiev. The tentative date for beginning the attack on the USSR is May 20'.

"According to a message from our military attache of March 14", the report goes on, "a German major said: 'We are changing our plan completely. We are going East, against the USSR. We will seize the USSR's grain, coal and oil. Then we will be invincible and can go on with the war against England and America.'"

Finally this document cites a message from the military attache in Berlin saying that "the beginning of military operations against the USSR may be expected between May 15 and June 15, 1941."

However, the conclusion drawn from the information cited in the report actually nullified its importance. At the end of General Golikov's report it says:

1. "On the basis of all the statements cited above and possible variants of operations this spring I consider that the most probable time operation will begin against the USSR is after victory over England or the conclusion of an honourable peace treaty with her."

2. "Rumours and documents to the effect that war against the USSR is inevitable this spring should be regarded as misinformation coming from the English or perhaps even the German intelligence service."

On May 6, 1941, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, People's Commissar for the Navy, sent the following memorandum to Stalin:

"Our naval attache in Berlin, Captain 1st Class Vorontsov, reports that according to a German officer from Hitler's General Headquarters the Germans are preparing to invade the USSR on May 14 through Finland, the Baltic area and Roumania. Simultaneously big air raids are planned on Moscow and Leningrad and airborne troops are to be landed at border centres..."

The information contained in this document was also exceptionally valuable, but again Admiral Kuznetsov's conclusions as expressed to the leadership were not in accordance with the facts he cited. He wrote: "I consider that this information is false and was specially sent through this channel so that it would get to our Government and the Germans could see how the USSR would react."


MARSHAL ZHUKOV:

STALIN AS SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

On June 30, 1941, the State Committee for Defence was set up with General Secretary of the Party Central Committee, J. V. Stalin, in the chair. That was an authoritative body for leadership over the national defence and one enjoying absolute power. The civilian Party and Soviet organizations were obliged to carry out all the resolutions and instructions of the State Committee for Defence. Committee representatives worked in all districts and regions, military-industrial people's commissariats and at the most important enterprises and construction projects, to control the execution of its decisions.

The State Committee for Defence, whose sitting took place at any time of day or night in the Kremlin or at Stalin's country house, discussed and decided upon the crucial issues. Together with the Party Central Committee, and the people's commissars, whose rights had been considerably broadened, the Committee examined the plans for the biggest military operations. That allowed for the concentration of tremendous material resources along the most important directions whenever it was possible, following a single line in strategic..."
leadership and relying on the well-organized rear, coordinating military actions with the efforts of the whole nation.

Often sharp arguments arose at the Committee sittings. Views were expressed in definite and sharp terms. Stalin would usually walk up and down the room past the table, carefully listening to those who argued. He himself was short-spoken and would often stop others with remarks like "come to the point", "make yourself clear". He opened the sittings without any preliminaries and spoke in a quiet voice and freely, and only on the main points. He was laconic and precise.

If no agreement was reached at the sitting, a commission would be immediately formed of representatives of the two extreme sides which had to reach agreement and report on the proposals it would work out. Such incidents happened only when Stalin himself had not arrived at a definite decision. But should he come to the sitting with a ready resolution there would either be no argument at all, or it would die down soon, if he supported one of the parties.

In all the State Committee for Defence adopted some ten thousand resolutions on military and economic matters during the war. Those resolutions were carried out accurately and with enthusiasm. They inspired hard work and ensured the implementation of the single Party policy in the leadership of the country at that crucial time.

Stalin himself was strong-willed and no coward. It was only once I saw him somewhat depressed. That was at the dawn of June 22, 1941, when his belief that the war could be avoided was shattered.

After June 22, 1941, and throughout the war Stalin firmly governed the country, led the armed struggle and international affairs together with the Central Committee and the Soviet Government.

After 1940, when I served as Chief of Staff of the Red Army and later, during the war, as Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief I had occasion to get to know Stalin closely.

Stalin's outer appearance has been described on more than one occasion. Though slight in stature and undistinguished in outward appearance, Stalin was nevertheless an imposing figure. Free of affectations and mannerisms, he won the heart of everyone he talked with. His visitors were invariably struck by his candour and his uninhibited manner of speaking, and impressed by his ability to express his thoughts clearly, his inborn analytical turn of mind, his erudition and retentive memory, all of which even made old hands and big shots brace themselves and be "on the alert".

Stalin did not like to remain seated during a conversation. He used to pace the room slowly, stopping now and then, coming up close to the person he was talking with and looking him straight in the face. His gaze was clear, tenacious, and seemed to envelop and pierce through the visitor.

Stalin spoke softly, clearly shaping his phrases, almost without gesticulation. He used to hold his pipe, though not lighted at times, and stroke his moustache with the mouth-piece.

He spoke Russian with a Georgian accent, but flawlessly. In his speech he often used figures of speech, similes, metaphors.

One seldom saw him laughing; and when he laughed he did so quietly, as though to himself. But he had a sense of humour, and appreciated sharp wit and a good joke.

Stalin had excellent eyesight. He never used glasses in reading. As a rule, he wrote by hand. He read widely and was extensively knowledgeable in many different fields.

His tremendous capacity for work, his ability quickly to grasp the meaning of a book, his tenacious memory—all these enabled him to master, during one day, a tremendous amount of factual data, which could be coped with only by a very gifted man.

It is hard to say which of his character traits was predominant.

Many-sided and gifted as Stalin was, his disposition could
not be called even. He was a man of strong will, reserved, fervent and impetuous.

Ordinarily calm and sober-minded he sometimes lost his temper, and objectivity failed him. He virtually changed before one’s eyes—he grew pale, a bitter expression came to his eyes and his gaze became heavy and spiteful. I knew of few daredevils who could hold out against Stalin’s anger and parry the blow.

[From: The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. Pages 267-268 and 283.]

In July 1941 the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decreed a reorganization of the Armed Forces strategic command system. On July 10, the State Committee for Defence reorganized the General Headquarters of the High Command into the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command. The General Headquarters was composed of J. V. Stalin (Chairman), V. M. Molotov, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, S. M. Budenny, K. Ye. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov and General G. K. Zhukov. On July 19, J. V. Stalin was appointed People’s Commissar for Defence and on August 8—Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces. Thenceforth the supreme body of the strategic leadership was named—General Headquarters of the Supreme Command.

The population and the Army in the field were favourably impressed by Stalin’s nomination for he enjoyed great authority in the country and abroad....

As a rule the General Headquarters worked in an orderly, businesslike manner. Everyone had a chance to state his opinion.

Stalin was equally stern to everybody and rather formal. He listened attentively to anybody speaking to the point.

Incidentally, I know from my war experience that one could safely bring up matters unlikely to please Stalin, argue

It was impossible to go to Stalin without being perfectly familiar with the situation plotted on the map and to report tentative or (which was worse) exaggerated information. Stalin would not tolerate hit-or-miss answer, he demanded utmost accuracy and clarity.

Stalin seemed to have a knack of detecting weak spots in reports and documents. He immediately laid them open and severely reprimanded those responsible for inaccuracies. He had a tenacious memory, perfectly remembered whatever was said and would not miss a chance to give a severe dressing-down. That is why we drafted staff documents as best we possibly could under the circumstances....

Stalin based his judgment of crucial issues on the reports furnished by General Headquarters representatives, whom he would send to the Fronts for on-the-spot assessment of the situation and consultations with respective commanders, on conclusions made at the General Headquarters and suggestions by Front commanders and on special reports.

Before the war it was hard for me to judge of Stalin’s knowledge or abilities in military science, in problems of tactics and strategy, since the topics discussed in Stalin’s presence (at least whenever I had occasion to be in attendance) mainly related to problems of organization, mobilization or material and technical supply.

I can only repeat that Stalin devoted a good deal of attention to problems of armament and matériel. He frequently met with chief aircraft, artillery and tank designers whom he would question in great detail about the progress achieved in designing the various types of equipment in our country and abroad. To give him his due, it must be said that he was fairly well versed in the characteristics of the basic type of armament.

Stalin urged the chief designers and managers of munition plants (many of whom he knew personally) to produce new
models of aircraft, tanks, guns and other major materiel within established time-limits and to make sure their quality should be not only on a par with foreign-made models but even superior to them.

Before and especially after the war an outstanding role was attributed to Stalin in creating the Armed Forces, elaborating the fundamentals of Soviet military science and major doctrines of strategy, and even operational art.

Is it true that Stalin really was an outstanding military thinker, a major contributor to the development of the Armed Forces and an expert in tactical and strategic principles?

From the military standpoint I have studied Stalin most thoroughly, for I entered the war together with him and together with him I ended it.

Stalin mastered the technique of the organization of front operations and operations by groups of fronts and guided them with skill, thoroughly understanding complicated strategic questions. He displayed his ability as Commander-in-Chief beginning with Stalingrad.

In guiding the armed struggle as a whole, Stalin was assisted by his natural intelligence and profound intuition. He had a knack of grasping the main link in the strategic situation so as to organize opposition to the enemy and conduct a major offensive operation. He was certainly a worthy Supreme Commander.

Of course, Stalin had no knowledge of all the details with which the troops and all command echelons had to deal meticulously in order to prepare an operation properly by a front or a group of fronts. For that matter, this was something he didn't really need to know.

In these cases he would naturally consult the members of the General Headquarters, General Staff, and experts in artillery, tank, air and naval operations, and on problems of logistics and supply.

To Stalin is usually ascribed a number of fundamental innovations such as elaborating the methods of artillery offensive action, the winning of air supremacy, methods of encircling the enemy, the splitting of surrounded groups and their demolition by parts, etc.

All these paramount problems of the art of war are the fruits of battles with the enemy, the fruits of profound thinking, the fruits of the experience of a big team of military leaders and the troops themselves.

Here Stalin's merit lies in the fact that he correctly appraised the advice offered by the military experts and then in summarised form—in instructions, directives and regulations immediately circulated them among the troops for practical guidance.

As regards the materiel and technical organization of operations, the build-up of strategic reserves, the organization of production of materiel and troop supplies, Stalin did prove himself to be an outstanding organizer. And it would be unfair if we, the Soviet people, failed to pay tribute to him for it.

[op. cit, Pages 279-285.]

**STALIN: SPEECH AT THE RECEPTION IN THE KREMLIN IN HONOUR OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE RED ARMY, (Excerpt) MAY 24, 1945**

Comrades, permit me to propose another toast, the last one.

I would like to propose that we drink to the health of the Soviet people, and primarily of the Russian people. (Loud and prolonged applause and cheers.)

I drink primarily to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding of all the nations that constitute the Soviet Union.
I drink to the health of the Russian people, because, during this war, it has earned universal recognition as the guiding force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

I drink to the health of the Russian people, not only because it is the leading people, but also because it is gifted with a clear mind, a staunch character and patience.

Our government committed no few mistakes; at times our position was desperate, as in 1941-42, when our army was retreating, abandoning our native villages and towns in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, the Leningrad Region, the Baltic Region and the Karelo-Finnish Republic, abandoning them because there was no other alternative. Another people might have said to the government: You have not come up to our expectations. Get out. We shall appoint another government, which will conclude peace with Germany and ensure tranquillity for us. But the Russian people did not do that, for they were confident that the policy their government was pursuing was correct; and they made sacrifices in order to ensure the defeat of Germany. And this confidence which the Russian people displayed in the Soviet Government proved to be the decisive factor which ensured our historic victory over the enemy of mankind, over fascism.

I thank the Russian people for this confidence!

To the health of the Russian people! (Loud and prolonged applause.)

[J. Stalin: On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, Pages 200-202]

XIII

THE STATE TREASON TRIALS
1936-1937-1938

[Between 1936 and 1938 four State Treason Trials in the Soviet Union raised a storm of reaction in the world press and flood of wild speculations in the diplomatic circles of the Western countries. The case of the “Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre” against Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, Smirnov and others were heard between August 19 and August 24, 1936; the case of the “Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre” against Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and others were heard between January 23 and January 30, 1937; the case of the “Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites” against Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda, Krestinsky and others were heard between March 2 and March 13, 1938 before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. in open sessions in the presence of foreign diplomats and journalists. All the accused confessed their guilts in the open court. The other case was against such important military personnel as Marshal Tukhatchevsky, Generals Putna, Yakir, Feldman and others, heard in the secret session of the Military Collegium on June 11, 1937. According to the official report of the trial, the prisoners confessed to the charges and expressly admitted that for a long time they had acted as agents for a neighbouring state. They were sentenced to death.

A section of the Western press dubbed the trials as “fake”. It seemed unlikely to them that the men who had devoted their lives to revolution should turn traitors. Some people speculated that the confessions were prepared and rehearsed according to the promptings of the O.G.P.U. and delivered under the influence of drugs and narcotics. The Daily-
The Telegraph of August 24, 1936 asked "What in the first place induced the Soviet authorities to stage this trial at the present moment? The star of Stalin is high in the ascendant; that of Trotsky is beneath the horizon... the Stalin plan for the first five-year stage of the industrialization of Russia has been carried through with a remarkable measure of success... Then why, if all is going well, drag men like Zinoviev and Kamenev from their obscure prison and try them over again for complicity in the assassination of Kirov and plots against the life of Stalin..." Recalling these treason trials after twenty years, Khrushchev too asked in his secret speech almost in the same vein as The Daily Telegraph. "Did the Trotskyites at this time actually constitute such a danger to our party and to the Soviet state?... Trotskyism was completely disarmed... It is clear that in the situation of socialist victory there was no basis for mass terror in the country". As sufficient reason for the trials could not be found, some people invented a theory that Stalin was a sick man suffering from hysteria complex with mental aberration of personal danger and it was he who arranged these "fake" trials to prepare ground for shooting those who threatened his prominence. Khrushchev in his secret speech alleged that "Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war followed Stalin's annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness".

We reproduce below extracts from the last pleas of accused Kamenev and Zinoviev as recorded in the Court proceedings and a confidential despatch to the State Department from Joseph E. Davies, United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1938. We also include a selection of contemporary eyewitness reports. Observations of these Western analysts who were in no way friendly to the Stalin regime, but who nevertheless adhered to the principle of objective reporting would, we believe, help a great deal to clear the fog hanging over these state treason trials.

Last Pleas of Kamenev and Zinoviev Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.
August 23, 1936

During the morning session of August 23 the last pleas of the accused are continued.

"I, together with Zinoviev and Trotsky," declared Kamenev, "was the organizer and leader of a terrorist plot which planned and prepared a number of terroristic attempts on the lives of the leaders of the government and the Party of our country, and which carried out the assassination of Kirov.

"For ten years, if not more", continues Kamenev, "I waged a struggle against the Party, against the government of the land of Soviets, and against Stalin personally. In this struggle, it seems to me, I utilized every weapon in the political arsenal known to me—open political discussion, attempts to penetrate into factories and works, illegal leaflets, secret printing presses, deception of the Party, the organization of street demonstrations, conspiracy and, finally, terrorism.

"I once studied the history of the political movements and I cannot remember any form of political struggle that we did not use during the past ten years. The proletarian revolution allowed us a period of time for our political struggle which no other revolution gave its enemies. The bourgeois revolution of the 18th century gave its enemies weeks and days, and then destroyed them. The proletarian revolution gave us ten years in which to reform and to realize that we were in error. But we did not do that. Three times was I reinstated in the Party. I was recalled from exile merely on the strength of my personal statement. After all the mistakes I had committed, I was entrusted with responsible missions and posts. This is the third time I am facing a proletarian court on the charge of terroristic intentions, designs and actions.

T. S. Q—16
"Twice my life was spared. But there is a limit to everything, there is a limit to the magnanimity of the proletariat, and that limit we have reached. I ask myself," says Kamenev further, "is it an accident that alongside myself, Zinoviev, Evdokimov, Bakayev, and Marchkovsky are sitting emissaries of foreign secret-police departments, people with false passports, with dubious biographies and undoubted connections with the Gestapo? No! It is not an accident. We are sitting here side by side with the agents of foreign secret-police departments because our weapons were the same, because our arms became intertwined before our fate became intertwined here in this dock.

"Thus," says Kamenev in conclusion, "we served fascism, thus we organized counter-revolution against socialism, prepared, paved the way for the interventionists. Such was the path we took, and such was the pit of contemptible treachery and all that is loathsome into which we have fallen."

"I want to say once again," says the accused Zinoviev at the outset of his last plea, "that I admit that I am fully and completely guilty. I am guilty of having been an organizer of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc second only to Trotsky, the bloc which set itself the aim of assassinating Stalin, Voroshilov and a number of other leaders of the Party and the government. I plead guilty to having been the principal organizer of the assassination of Kirov.

"The Party," continues Zinoviev, "saw where we were going and warned us. In one of his speeches Stalin pointed out that tendencies may arise among the opposition to impose its will upon the Party by violence. At one of the conferences held before the XIV Congress of the party, Dzerzhinski called us Kronstadtists. Stalin, Voroshilov, Orjonikidze, Dzerzhinski and Mikoyan did all they could to persuade us, to save us. Scores for times they said to us: you may do enormous harm to the Party and the Soviet government, and you yourselves will perish in doing so. But we did not heed these warnings. We entered into an alliance with Trotsky. We filled the place of the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and white-guards who could not come out openly in our country. We took the place of the terrorism of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Not the pre-revolutionary terrorism which was directed against the autocracy, but the Right Socialist Revolutionaries' terrorism of the period of the Civil War, where the S-Rs shot at Lenin.

"My defective Bolshevism became transformed into anti-Bolshevism, and through Trotskyism I arrived at fascism. Trotskyism is a variety of fascism, and Zinovievism is a variety of Trotskyism...."


STATEMENT OF MR. DUDLEY COLLARD.

[An English barrister and member of the Executive of the National Council of Civil Liberties and the Howard League for Penal Reform]

Daily Herald, January 28, 1937

"I have never heard such a tale of treachery, murder, spying, sabotage, and terror as the prisoners have told, with complete callousness and effrontery."

"In my opinion, there can be no question of a 'faked' trial, either with or without the connivance of the accused."

"It is obvious to anybody that the prisoners who do most of the talking, while Prosecutor Vyshinisky confines himself to an occasional question, are behaving spontaneously."

"There is nothing to prevent any of them from alleging that the charges are 'framed'!"
"All assertions abroad of broken spirits of the defendants and the administration of narcotics upon them by the State to force proper replies is sheer nonsense. The accused are well dressed, appear to be well fed, and in the best of health.

"They speak their mind with rare interruptions from the prosecutor, often asking for the floor, and being given it in the course of fellow defendants' testimony".

JOSEPH E. DAVIES:
[United States Ambassador to Soviet Union 1936-1938]

FIFTH COLUMNISTS IN RUSSIA: A STUDY IN HINDSIGHT—1941

Note: Although this was written after the German invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941 it is inserted here because this seems the logical place to illustrate how the treason trials destroyed Hitler's Fifth Column in Russia.
—J.E.D.

Passing through Chicago, on my way home from the June commencement of my old University, I was asked to talk to the University Club and combined Wisconsin societies. It was just three days after Hitler had invaded Russia. Someone in the audience asked: "What about Fifth Columnists in Russia?" Off the anvil, I said: "There aren't any—they shot them."

On the train that day, that thought lingered in my mind. It was rather extraordinary, when one stopped to think of it, that in this last Nazi invasion not a word had appeared of "inside work" back of the Russian lines. There was no so-called "internal aggression" in Russia co-operating with the German High Command. Hitler's march into Prague in 1939 was accompanied by the active military support of Henlein's organizations in Czechoslovakia. The same was true of his invasion of Norway. There were no Sudeten-Henleins, no Slovakian Tisos, no Belgian De Grelles, no Norwegian Quislings in the Soviet picture.

Thinking over these things, there came a flash in my mind of a possible new significance to some of the things that happened in Russia when I was there. Upon my arrival in Washington, I hastened to re-read my old diary entries and, with the permission of the State Department, went through some of my official reports.

None of us in Russia in 1937 and 1938 were thinking in terms of "Fifth Column" activities. The phrase was not current. It is comparatively recently that we have found in our language phrases descriptive of Nazi technique such as "Fifth Column" and "internal aggression".

Generally speaking, the well informed suspected such methods might be employed by Hitler; but it was one of those things which many thought just couldn't really happen. It is only within the last two years, through the Dies Committee and the F.B.I., that there have been uncovered the activities of German organizations in this country and in South America, and that we have seen the actual work of German agents operating with traitors in Norway, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, who betrayed their country from within in co-operation with a planned Hitler attack.

These activities and methods, apparently, existed in Russia, as a part of the German plan against the Soviets, as long ago as 1935.

It was in 1936 that Hitler made his now famous Nuremberg speech, in which he clearly indicated his designs upon the Ukraine.

The Soviet government, it now appears, was even then acutely aware of the plans of the German high military and political commands and of the "inside work" being done in Russia, preparatory to German attack upon Russia.

As I ruminated over this situation, I suddenly saw the picture as I should have seen it at the time the story had
been told in the so-called treason or purge trials of 1937 and 1938 which I had attended and listened to. In re-examining the record of these cases and also what I had written at the time from this new angle, I found that practically every device of German Fifth Columnist activity, as we now know it, was disclosed and laid bare by the confessions and testimony elicited at these trials of self-confessed "Quislings" in Russia.

It was clear that the Soviet government believed that these activities existed, was thoroughly alarmed, and had proceeded to crush them vigorously. By 1941, when the German invasion came, they had wiped out any Fifth Column which had been organized.

Another fact which was difficult to understand at the time, but which takes on a new significance in view of developments was the manner in which the Soviet Government was "bearing down" on consular agencies of Germany, and Italy in 1937 and 1938. It was done in a very high-handed manner. There was a callous and almost brutal disregard of the sensibilities of the countries involved. The reason assigned by the Soviet government was that these consulates were engaged upon internal, political, and subversive activities; and that because of these facts they had to be closed up. The announcements of the trials and executions (purges), all over Russia that year, invariably charged the defendants with being guilty of treasonable and subversive activity in aiding "a foreign power" to overthrow the Soviet State.

Every evening after the trial, the American newspapermen would come up to the Embassy for a "snack" and beer after these late night sessions and we would "hash" over the day's proceedings. Among these were Walter Duranty and Harold Denny of The New York Times, Joe Barnes and Joe Phillips of the New York Herald Tribune, Charlie Nutter or Dick Massock of the Associated Press, Norman Deuel and Henry Shapiro of the United Press, Jim Brown of the International News, Spencer Williams representing the Manchester Guardian. They were an exceptionally brilliant group of men. I came to rely upon them. They were of inestimable value to me in the appraisal and estimate of men, situations, and Soviet developments. I had myself prosecuted and defended men charged with crime in many cases in the course of my professional life. Shapiro, too, was a lawyer, a graduate of the Moscow law school. His knowledge of Soviet law was most helpful. The other men were all very familiar with Soviet conditions, personalities, and Russian psychology. We had interesting discussions, which lasted long into the night.

All of us there in Moscow at the time paid comparatively little attention to that side of these cases. Some of us seemed to have "missed the boat". I certainly did. There is no doubt but that, generally speaking, we were centring our attention on the dramatic struggle for power between the "ins" and "outs"—between Stalin and Trotsky—and the clash of personalities and policies within the Soviet government rather than upon any possible German Fifth Column activities, which we were all disposed to discount at the time.

In my own case, I should have known better, for there were two facts which should have placed me on notice. They had come to my knowledge and were not known to the others. One of these occurred during an interview which I had shortly after my arrival in Moscow with an official of the Soviet Foreign Office; the other occurred before I reached Moscow, in the Berlin Foreign Office in January, 1937, during an interview which I had with a German Undersecretary of State.

The story which was unfolded in those trials disclosed a record of Fifth Columnist and subversive activities in Russia under a conspiracy agreement with the German and Japanese governments that were amazing. The gist of the testimony, which the record of the case discloses, is as follows:

The principal defendants had entered into a conspiracy among themselves, and into an agreement with Germany and Japan to aid these governments in a military attack upon the Soviet Union. They agreed to and actually did co-
operate in plans to assassinate Stalin and Molotov, and to project a military uprising against the Kremlin which was to be led by General Tukhatchevsky, the second in command of the Red Army. In preparation for war they agreed to and actually did plan and direct the sabotaging of industries, the blowing up of chemical plants, the destruction of coal mines, the wrecking of transportation facilities, and other subversive activities. They agreed to perform and did perform all those things which the German General Staff required should be done by them pursuant to instructions which they received from such General Staff. They agreed to and in fact did conspire and co-operate with the German and Japanese Military Intelligence Services. They agreed to and in fact did co-operate with German diplomatic consular representatives in connection with espionage and sabotage. They agreed to and actually did transmit to Germany and Japan information vital to the defence of the Soviet Union. They agreed among themselves and with the German and Japanese governments to co-operate with them in war upon the Soviet government and to form an independent smaller Soviet state which would yield up large sections of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and White Russia in the west to Germany and the Maritime Provinces in the east to Japan.

They agreed after the German conquest of Russia that German firms were to have concessions and receive favours in connection with the development of iron ore, manganese, oil, coal, timber, and the other great resources of the Soviet Union.

To appreciate fully the character and significance of this testimony, which I personally listened to, it should be borne in mind that the facts as to this conspiracy were testified to by two cabinet members of the first order, the Commissar for the Treasury and the Commissar for Foreign Trade, by a former Premier of the government, by two Soviet Ambassadors who had served in London, Paris, and Japan; by a former Undersecretary of State and by the acting Secretary of State;

of the government, as well as by two of the foremost publicists and editors of the two leading papers of the Soviet Union.

To appreciate its significance, it was as though the Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, Secretary of Commerce Jones, Undersecretary of State Welles, Ambassador Bullitt, Ambassador Kennedy, and Secretary to the President Early, in this country, confessed to conspiracy with Germany to co-operate in an invasion of the United States.

Here are a few excerpts of the testimony in open court:

Krestinsky, Undersecretary of State, said:

We came to an agreement with General Seeckt and Hess to the effect that we would help the Reichswehr create a number of espionage bases in the territory of the U.S.S.R. . . . In return for this, the Reichswehr undertook to pay us 250,000 marks annually as a subsidy.

Grinko, Secretary of the Treasury, said:

I knew and was connected with people both in the Ukrainian organization as well as in the Red Army who were preparing to open the frontier to the enemy. I operated particularly in the Ukraine, that is to say, at the main gates through which Germany is preparing its blow against the U.S.S.R.

Rosengoltz, Secretary of Commerce, stated:

I handed various secret information to the Commander in Chief of the Reichswehr...Subsequently, direct connections were established by the Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. to whom I periodically gave information of an espionage character.

Sokolnikov, former Ambassador to Great Britain, stated:

Japan, in the event of her taking part in the war, would receive territorial concessions in the Far East in the Amur region and the Maritime Provinces; as respects Germany, it was contemplated to satisfy the national interests of the Ukraine.

The testimony of many of the minor defendants went to establish the fact that, upon orders of the principal defendants,
they had direct connection with the German and Japanese Intelligence Services and co-operated with them in systematic espionage and sabotage; and either committed or aided and abetted in numerous crimes. For instance, Rataichak stated that he had organized and was responsible for two explosions at the Gorlovka nitrogen fertilizer plants which entailed enormous property losses as well as the loss of human life. Pushkin contributed or assumed responsibility for the disaster to the chemical plants of the Voskressensk Chemical Works and the Nevsky Plant. Knyazev told how he had planned and executed the wrecking of troop trains, entailing great loss of life, upon the express directions or instructions from foreign Intelligence services. He also testified as to how he had received instructions from these foreign Intelligence Services “to organize incendiarism in military stores, canteens, and army shipments,” and the necessity of using “bacteriological means in time of war with the object of contaminating troop trains, canteens, and army camps with virulent bacilli.”

The testimony of these cases involved and incriminated General Tukhatchevsky and many high leaders in the army and in the navy. Shortly after the Bukharin trial these men were arrested. Under the leadership of Tukhatchevsky these men were charged with having entered into an agreement to co-operate with the German High Command in an attack upon the Soviet state. Numerous subversive activities conducted in the army were disclosed by the testimony. Many of the highest officers in the army, according to the testimony, had either been corrupted or otherwise induced to enter into this conspiracy. According to the testimony, complete co-operation had been established in each branch of the service, the political revolutionary group, the military group, and the High Commands of Germany and Japan.

Such was the story, as it was brought out in these trials, at to what had actually occurred. There can be no doubt but what the Kremlin authorities were greatly alarmed by these disclosures and the confessions of these defendants. The speed with which the government acted and the thoroughness with which they proceeded indicated that they believed them to be true. They proceeded to clean house and acted with the greatest energy and precision. Voroshilov, Commander in Chief of the Red Army said:

It is easier for a burgler to break into the house if he has an accomplice to let him in. We have taken care of the accomplices.

General Tukhatchevsky did not go to the coronation in London as he had planned. He was reported to have been sent down to command the army of the Volga district; but it was understood at the time that he had been removed from the train and arrested before he arrived at his command. Within a few weeks thereafter, on June 11, he, along with eleven other officers of the High Command, were shot pursuant to judgement, after a trial by military court-martial, the proceedings of which were not made public. All of these trials, purges, and liquidations which seemed so violent at the time and shocked the world, are now quite clearly a part of a vigorous and determined effort of the Stalin government to protect itself from not only revolution from within but from attack from without. They went to work thoroughly to clean up and clean out all treasonable elements within the country. All doubts were resolved in favour of the government.

There were no Fifth Columnists in Russia in 1941—they had shot them. The purge had cleansed the country and rid it of treason.

TROTSKY ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KIROV MURDER AND ON THE TASK OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

[In his speeches at the Twentieth and Twenty-second Congresses Khrushchev dwelt at length on the "circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder". But he failed to consider it in the background of internal and external political situation then prevailing. Trotsky, who had been keeping a close watch on the developments in the Soviet Union, explained, from his own angle, the political significance of Kirov's murder and other terrorist activities, in his book The Revolution Betrayed, written on August 4, 1936, only a fortnight before the Trotskyite-Zinovievite treason trial began. In this book he laid down that the task of the Soviet section of the Fourth International was to prepare for and lead a new political revolution in the U.S.S.R. From the excerpt we reproduce below the reader will be able to judge for himself whether Trotskyism was totally disarmed or only driven underground to prepare for an insurrection at the opportune moment.]

TROTSKY:
THE INEVITABILITY OF A NEW REVOLUTION
AUGUST 4, 1936

In a true appraisal of the situation, the not infrequent terrorist acts against representatives of power have a very high significance. The most notorious of these was the murder of Kirov, a clever and unscrupulous Leningrad dictator, a typical representative of his corporation. In themselves, terrorist acts are least of all capable of overthrowing a Bonapartist oligarchy. Although the individual bureaucrat dreads the revolver, the bureaucracy as a whole is able to exploit an act of terror for the justification of its own violences, and incidentally to implicate in the murder its own political enemies (the affair of Zinoviev, Kamenev and the others). Individual terror is a weapon of impatient or despairing individuals, belonging most frequently to the younger generation of the bureaucracy itself. But, as was the case in tsarist times, political murders are unmistakable symptoms of a stormy atmosphere, and foretell the beginning of an open political crisis.

In introducing the new constitution, the bureaucracy shows that it feels this danger and is taking preventive measures. However, it has happened more than once that a bureaucratic dictatorship, seeking salvation in "liberal" reforms, has only weakened itself. While exposing Bonapartism, the new constitution creates at the same time a semilegal cover for the struggle against it. The rivalry of bureaucratic cliques at the elections may become the beginning of a broader political struggle. The whip against "badly working organs of power" may be turned into a whip against Bonapartism. All indications agree that the further course of development must inevitably lead to a clash between the culturally developed forces of the people and the bureaucratic oligarchy. There is no peaceful outcome for this crisis. No devil ever yet voluntarily cut off his own claws. The Soviet bureaucracy will not give up its positions without a fight. The development leads obviously to the road of revolution.

With energetic pressure from the popular mass, and the disintegration inevitable in such circumstances of the government apparatus, the resistance of those in power may prove much weaker than now appears. But as to this only hypotheses are possible. In any case, the bureaucracy can be removed only by a revolutionary force. And, as always,
there will be fewer victims the more bold and decisive is the attack. To prepare this and stand at the head of the masses in a favorable historic situation—that is the task of the Soviet section of the Fourth International. Today it is still weak and driven underground. But the illegal existence of a party is not nonexistence. It is only a difficult form of existence. Repressions can prove fully effective against a class that is disappearing from the scene—this was fully proven by the revolutionary dictatorship of 1917 to 1923—but violences against a revolutionary vanguard cannot save a caste which, if the Soviet Union is destined in general to further development, has outlived itself.

The revolution which the bureaucracy is preparing against itself will not be social, like the October revolution of 1917. It is not a question this time of changing the economic foundations of society, of replacing certain forms of property with other forms. History has known elsewhere not only social revolutions which substituted the bourgeois for the feudal regime, but also political revolutions which, without destroying the economic foundations of society, swept out an old ruling upper crust (1830 and 1848 in France, February 1917 in Russia, etc.) The overthrow of the Bonapartist caste will, of course, have deep social consequences, but in itself it will be confined within the limits of political revolution.

This is the first time in history that a state resulting from a workers' revolution has existed. The stages through which it must go are nowhere written down. It is true that the theoreticians and creators of the Soviet Union hoped that the completely transparent and flexible Soviet system would permit the state peacefully to transform itself, dissolve, and die away, in correspondence with the states of the economic and cultural evolution of society. Here again, however, life proved more complicated than theory anticipated. The proletariat of a backward country was fated to accomplish the first socialist revolution. For this historic privilege, it must, according to all evidences, pay with a second supplementary revolution—against bureaucratic absolutism. The program of the new revolution depends to a great extent upon the moment when it breaks out, upon the level which the country has then attained, and to a great degree upon the international situation. The fundamental elements of the program are already clear, and have been given throughout the course of this book as an objective inference from an analysis of the contradictions of the Soviet regime.

It is not a question of substituting one ruling clique for another, but of changing the very methods of administering the economy and guiding the culture of the country. Bureaucratic autocracy must give place to Soviet democracy. A restoration of the right of criticism, and a genuine freedom of elections, are necessary conditions for the further development of the country. This assumes a revival of freedom of Soviet parties, beginning with the party of Bolsheviks, and a resurrection of the trade unions. The bringing of democracy into industry means a radical revision of plans in the interests of the toilers. Free discussion of economic problems will decrease the overhead expense of bureaucratic mistakes and zigzags. Expensive playthings—palaces of the Soviets, new theaters, show-off subway—will be crowded out in favor of workers' dwellings. "Bourgeois norms of distribution" will be confined within the limits of strict necessity, and, in step with the growth of social wealth, will give way to socialist equality. Ranks will be immediately abolished. The tinsel of decorations will go into the melting pot. The youth will receive the opportunity to breathe freely, criticize, make mistakes, and grow up. Science and art will be freed of their chains. And, finally, foreign policy will return to the traditions of revolutionary internationalism.

More than ever the fate of the October revolution is bound up now with the fate of Europe and of the whole world. The problems of the Soviet Union are now being decided on the Spanish peninsula, in France, in Belgium. At the moment when this book appears the situation will be incomparably...
more clear than today, when civil war is in progress under the walls of Madrid. If the Soviet bureaucracy succeeds, with its treacherous policy of "people's fronts", in insuring the victory of reaction in Spain and France—and the Communist International is doing all it can in that direction—the Soviet Union will find itself on the edge of ruin. A bourgeois counterrevolution rather than an insurrection of the workers against the bureaucracy will be on the order of the day. If, in spite of the united sabotage of reformists and "communist" leaders, the proletariat of western Europe finds the road to power, a new chapter will open in the history of the Soviet Union. The first victory of a revolution in Europe would pass like an electric shock through the Soviet masses, straighten them up, raise their spirit of independence, awaken the traditions of 1905 and 1917, undermine the position of the Bonapartist bureaucracy, and acquire for the Fourth International no less significance than the October revolution possessed for the Third. Only in that way can the first Workers' State be saved for the socialist future.

[Trotsky: *The Revolution Betrayed* ch. XI Sec. 3
Pioneer Publishers 1945 ed. Pages 286-290]

**LETTER FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA (Excerpts)**

**MAY 4, 1948**

*The Withdrawal of Soviet Military Advisers From Yugoslavia*

In its letter of 27 March the CC of the CPSU stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet military advisers, and that the "Yugoslav affair" contained no problem which could not have been solved through party discussion; it was due to Stalin's obstinate and "shameful role" that the Soviet-Yugoslav relation had broken.

Between March 20, 1948 and June 28, 1948 several letters were exchanged between the CPSU and the CPY. In its letter dated March 27, 1948 to Tito and other members of the CPY, the CC of the CPSU alleged that any Soviet rumours such as "the CPSU is degenerate" "great-power chauvinism is remnant in the USSR" "the Cominform is a means of controlling the other parties" etc. were being circulated by the leading comrades of Yugoslavia. It further alleged that where, according to Marxism, the Party should control all the state organs, in Yugoslavia the Ministry of State Security was actually controlling the Party: moreover foreign agents and spies were occupying important positions in the state organs. It pointed out that with the knowledge of the Yugoslav leaders a British spy, Vladimir Velebit, was occupying the post of first Assistant Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia.

We reproduce below excerpts from the letter of the CC CPSU dated May 4, 1948 and the letter of the CC CPY dated May 17, 1948. These excerpts may help the reader to get an idea about the issues involved in the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute and realise their importance.]

**THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE**

[The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute reached a critical stage with the decision of the government of the U.S.S.R, to withdraw all military advisers and instructors as well as civilian experts from Yugoslavia in March 1948. It ended in the expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau on June 28, 1948. Khrushchev alleged that there was no significant basis for the development of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute. He said...
said that the information of the CC of the CPSU was based on the complaints of these advisers of the unfriendly attitude of the responsible Yugoslav officials towards the Soviet army and its representatives in Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj denounce these complaints as unsubstantiated. Why should the CC of the CPSU believe the unfounded statements of Tito and Kardelj rather than the numerous complaints of the Soviet military advisers? On what grounds? The USSR has its military advisers in almost all the countries of people's democracy. We must emphasize that until now we have had no complaints from our advisers in these countries. This explains the fact that we have had no misunderstandings in these countries arising from the work of the Soviet military advisers. Complaints and misunderstandings, in this field, exist only in Yugoslavia. It is not clear that this can be explained only by the special unfriendly atmosphere which has been created in Yugoslavia around these military advisers?

Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to the large expenses in connection with the salaries of the Soviet military advisers, emphasizing that the Soviet generals receive three to four times as much, in dinars, as Yugoslav generals, and that such conditions may give rise to discontent on the part of Yugoslav military personnel. But the Yugoslav generals, apart from drawing salaries, are provided with apartments, servants, food, etc. Secondly, the pay of the Soviet generals in Yugoslavia correspond to the pay of Soviet generals in the USSR. It is understandable that the Soviet Government could not consider reducing the salaries of Soviet generals who are in Yugoslavia on official duty.

Perhaps the expense of the Soviet generals was too great a burden for the Yugoslav budget. In that case the Yugoslav Government should have approached the Soviet Government and proposed that it take over part of the expenses. There is no doubt that the Soviet Government would have done this. However, the Yugoslavs took another course, instead of solving this question in an amicable manner, they began to abuse our military advisers, to call them loafers, and to discredit the Soviet army. Only after a hostile atmosphere had been created around the Soviet military advisers did the Yugoslav Government approach the Soviet Government. It is understandable that the Soviet Government could not accept this situation.

Regarding Velebit and other spies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia

It is not true, as Tito and Kardelj say, that Comrades Kardelj and Djilas, on the occasion of a meeting with Molotov, confined their doubts regarding Velebit to the remark 'that all was not clear about Velebit' to them. Actually, in their meeting with Molotov there was talk that Velebit was suspected of spying for England. It was very strange that Tito and Kardelj identified the removal of Velebit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his ruin. Why could not Velebit be removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without being ruined?

Also strange was the statement by Tito and Kardelj of the reasons for leaving Velebit in his position of First Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, it appears that Velebit was not removed from his position because he was under supervision. Would it not be better to remove Velebit just because he was under supervision? Why so much consideration for an English spy, who at the same time is so uncompromisingly hostile towards the Soviet Union?

However, Velebit is not the only spy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet representatives have many times told the Yugoslav leaders that the Yugoslav Ambassador in London, Leontic, is an English spy. It is not known why this old and trusted English spy remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

*Leontic was officially recalled from London early in June 1948; he had left earlier.*
The Soviet Government is aware that besides Leontic three other members of the Yugoslav Embassy in London, whose names are not yet disclosed, are in the English Intelligence Service. The Soviet Government makes this statement with full responsibility. It is also hard to understand why the United States Ambassador in Belgrade behaves as if he owned the place and why his 'intelligence agents', whose number is increasing, move about freely, or why the friends and relations of the executioner of the Yugoslav people, Nedic, so easily obtain positions in the State and Party apparatus in Yugoslavia.

It is clear that since the Yugoslav Government persistently refuses to purge its Ministry of Foreign Affairs of spies, the Soviet Government is forced to refrain from open correspondence with the Yugoslav Government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Regarding the Anti-Soviet Statement by Comrade Djilas about the Intelligence Service and Trade Negotiations

In our letter of 27 March, we mentioned the anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Djilas made at a session of the CC of the CPY, in which he said the Soviet officers, from a moral standpoint, were inferior to the officers in the English army. This statement by Djilas was made in connection with the fact that a few officers of the Soviet army in Yugoslavia indulged in actions of an immoral nature. We described this statement by Djilas as anti-Soviet because in referring to the behaviour of Soviet officers this pitiful Marxist, Comrade Djilas, did not recall the main difference between the Socialist Soviet army, which liberated the peoples of Europe, and the bourgeois English army, whose function is to oppress and not to liberate the peoples of the world.

In their letter of 13 April 1948, Tito and Kardelj state 'that Djilas never made such a statement in such a form', and that

*General Nedic was head of the puppet Serbian Government set up by Germany in 1941.*

'Tito explained this in writing and orally in 1945' and that 'Comrade Stalin and other members of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPSU' accepted this explanation.

We feel it necessary to emphasize that this statement by Tito and Kardelj does not correspond with the facts. This is how Stalin reacted to the statement by Djilas in a telegram to Tito:

I understand the difficulty of your situation after the liberation of Belgrade. However, you must know that the Soviet Government, in spite of colossal sacrifices and losses, is doing all in its power and beyond its power to help you. However, I am surprised at the fact that a few incidents and offences committed by individual officers and soldiers of the Red Army in Yugoslavia are generalized and extended to the whole Red Army. You should not so offend an army which is helping you to get rid of the Germans and which is shedding its blood in the battle against the German invader. It is not difficult to understand that there are black sheep in every family, but it would be strange to condemn the whole family because of one black sheep.

If the soldiers of the Red Army find out that Comrade Djilas, and those who did not challenge him, consider the English officers, from a moral standpoint, superior to the Soviet officers, they would cry out in pain at such undeserved insults.

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Djilas, which passed unchallenged among the other members of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous campaign conducted by the leaders of the CPY against the representatives of the Red Army in Yugoslavia, which was the reason for the withdrawal of our military advisers.

How did the matter with Djilas end? It ended with Comrade Djilas arriving in Moscow, together with the Yugoslav delegation, where he apologized to Stalin and begged that this unpleasant error, which he committed at the session of the CC of the CPY, be forgotten. As can be seen, the
matter appears entirely different when presented in the letter of Tito and Kardelj. Unfortunately, Djilas's error was not an accident.

On the Incorrect Political Line of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY in Regard to the Class Struggle in Yugoslavia

In our letter we wrote that the spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY, that the capitalist elements are increasing in the cities and the villages and that the leaders of the Party are not undertaking any measures to check the capitalist elements.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all this and consider our statements, which are a matter of principle, as insults to the CPY, avoiding an answer to the essential question. Their proofs are based only on the fact that consistent social reforms are being undertaken in Yugoslavia. However, this is almost negligible. The denial on the part of these comrades of the strengthening of the capitalist elements, and in connection with this, the sharpening of the class struggle in the village under the conditions of contemporary Yugoslavia, arises from the opportunist contention that, in the transition period between capitalism and socialism, the class struggle does not become sharper, as taught by Marxism-Leninism, but dies out, as averred by opportunists of the type of Bukharin, who postulated a decadent theory of the peaceful absorption of the capitalist elements into the socialist structure.

No one will deny that the social reforms which occurred in the USSR after the October revolution were all-embracing and consistent with our teaching. However, this did not cause the CPSU to conclude that the class struggle in our country was weakening, nor that there was no danger of the strengthening of the capitalist elements. In 1920-21 Lenin stated that 'while we live in a country of smallholders there is a stronger economic basis for capitalism in Russia, than there is for communism', since 'small-scale individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale'. It is known that for fifteen years after the October revolution, the question of measures for checking capitalist elements and later the liquidation of the kulaks as the last capitalist class, was never taken off the daily agenda of our Party. To underestimate the experiences of the CPSU in matters relating to the development of socialism in Yugoslavia, is a great political danger, and cannot be allowed for Marxists, because socialism cannot be developed only in the cities, and in industry, but must also be developed in the villages and in agriculture.

It is no accident that the leaders of the CPY are avoiding the question of the class struggle and the checking of the capitalist elements in the village. What is more, in the speeches of the Yugoslav leaders there is no mention of the question of class differentiation in the village; the peasantry are considered as an organic whole, and the Party does not mobilize its forces in an effort to overcome the difficulties arising from the increase of the exploiting elements in the village.

However, the political situation in the village gives no cause for complacency. Where, as in Yugoslavia, there is no nationalization of the land, where private ownership of the land exists and land is bought and sold, where considerable portions of land are concentrated in the hands of the kulaks, where hired labour is used, etc. the Party cannot be educated in the spirit of camouflaging the class struggle and smoothing over class controversies without disarming itself for the struggle with the main difficulties in the development of socialism. This means that the CPY is being lulled to sleep by the decadent opportunist theory of the peaceful infiltration of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin.

Nor is it by accident that some of the most prominent leaders of the CPY are deviating from the Marxist-Leninist
road on the question of the leading role of the working class. While Marxism-Leninism starts by recognizing the leading role of the working class in the process of liquidating capitalism and developing a socialist society, the leaders of the CPY have an entirely different opinion. It is enough to quote the following speech by Comrade Tito in Zagreb on 2 November 1946 (Borba, 2 November 1946): ‘We do not tell the peasants that they are the strongest pillar of our State in order that, eventually, we may get their votes, but because we know that that is what they are, and because they should be aware of what they are.’

This attitude is in complete contradiction to Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism considers that in Europe and in the countries of people’s democracy, the working class and not the peasantry is the most progressive, the most revolutionary class. As regards the peasantry, or rather its majority—the poor and middle peasants—they can be or are in a union with the working class, while the leading role in this union still belongs to the working class. However, the passage quoted not only denies the leading role to the working class, but proclaims that the entire peasantry, including that is the kulaks, is the strongest pillar in the new Yugoslavia. As can be seen this attitude expresses opinions which are natural to petty-bourgeois politicians but not to Marxist-Leninists.

On the Incorrect Policy of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY on the Question of Mutual Relations Between the Party and the People’s Front

In our previous letter we wrote that in Yugoslavia the CPY is not considered as the main leading force, but rather the People’s Front; that Yugoslav leaders diminish the role of the Party and are in fact dissolving the Party into a non-party People’s Front, allowing in this way the same cardinal error committed by the Mensheviks in Russia forty years ago.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny this, stating that all decisions of the People’s Front are decisions of the Party, but that they do not consider it necessary to state at what Party conference these decisions were approved.

In this lies the greatest error of the Yugoslav comrades. They are afraid openly to acclaim the Party and its decisions before the entire people so that the people may know that the leading force is the Party, that the Party leads the Front and not the reverse. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism the CP is the highest form of organization of workers, which stands over all other organizations of workers, among others over the Soviet in the USSR, over the People’s Front in Yugoslavia. The Party stands above all these organizations of working men not only because it has drawn in all the best elements of the workers, but because it has its own special programme, its special policy, on the basis of which it leads all the organizations of the workers. But the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY is afraid to admit this openly and proclaim it at the top of its voice to the working class and all the people of Yugoslavia. The Politbureau of the CC of the CPY feels that if it does not emphasize this factor, the other parties will not have occasion to develop their strength in their struggle. It also appears that Tito and Kardelj think that by this cheap cunning they can abolish the laws of historical development, fool the classes, fool history. But this is an illusion and self-deception. As long as there are antagonistic classes there will be a struggle between them, and as long as there is a struggle it will be expressed in the work of various groups and parties, legally or illegally.

Lenin said that the Party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The task of the leaders is to keep this weapon in readiness. However, since the Yugoslav leaders are hiding the banner of their Party and will not emphasize the role of the Party before the masses, they are blunting this weapon, diminishing the role of the Party and disarming the working class. It is ridiculous to think that because of the cheap cunning of the Yugoslav leaders the
enemies will relinquish the fight. Because of this the Party should be kept fighting fit and ever-ready for the struggle against the enemy. Its banner should not be hidden and it should not be lulled to sleep by the thought that the enemy will relinquish the struggle. The Party should not stop organizing its forces, legally or illegally.

We feel that this limiting of the role of the CPY has gone too far. We refer here to the relations between the CPY and the People's Front, which we consider incorrect in principle. It must be borne in mind that in the People's Front a variety of classes are admitted, kulaks, merchants, small manufacturers, bourgeois intelligentsia, various political groups, including some bourgeois parties. The fact that, in Yugoslavia, only the People's Front enters the political arena and that the Party and its organizations do not take part in political life openly under their own name, not only diminishes the role of the Party in the political life of the country but also undermines the Party as an independent political force, called upon to gain the confidence of the people and to spread its influence over ever broader masses of workers through open political work, through open propaganda of its opinions and its programme.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj forget that the Party develops and that it can develop only in an open struggle with the enemy, that cheap cunning and machinations of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY cannot replace this struggle as a school for educating Party cadres. Their determined lack of desire to admit the error of their statements—namely that the CPY has no other programme than the programme of the People's Front—shows how far the Yugoslav leaders have deviated from Marxist-Leninst views on the Party. This might start liquidation tendencies regarding the CPY which would be a danger to the CPY itself and lead eventually to the degeneration of the Yugoslav People's Republic.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj state that the errors of the Mensheviks regarding the merging of the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization were committed forty years ago and therefore can have no connection with the present mistakes of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY. Comrades Tito and Kardelj are profoundly mistaken. There can be no doubt of the theoretical and political connections between these two events, because, like the Mensheviks in 1907 so, to-day, Tito and Kardelj forty years later, are equally debasing the Marxist Party, equally denying the role of the Party as the supreme form of organization which stand over all other mass workers' organizations, equally dissolving the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization. The difference lies in the fact that the Mensheviks committed their errors in 1906-1907, and, after being tried by the Marxist Party in Russia at the London Conference, did not return to these errors, whereas the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, in spite of this instructive lesson are bringing the same error back to life after forty years, and are passing it off as their own Party theory. This circumstance does not lessen but, on the contrary, aggravates the error of the Yugoslav comrades.

Regarding the Alarming Situation in the CPY

In our previous letter we wrote that the CPY retains a semilegal status, in spite of the fact that it came into power more than three and a half years ago, that there is no democracy in the Party, there is no system of elections, there is no criticism or selfcriticism, that the CPY Central Committee is not composed of elected persons but of co-opted persons.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all these charges. They write that ‘the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY are not co-opted', that ‘in December 1940, when the CPY was completely illegal......at the Fifth Conference, which by the decision of the Comintern, had all the powers of a congress, a CC of the CPY was elected consisting of thirty-one members and ten candidates...' that ‘of this number ten members and six candidates died during the war’ that besides this ‘two members were expelled from the CC', that the CC of the CPY now has ‘nineteen members elected at the Confe-
rence and seven co-opted members’, that now ‘the CC of the CPY is composed of twenty-six members’.

This statement does not correspond to the facts. As can be seen from the archives of the Comintern, at the Fifth Conference, which was held in October and not in December of 1940, thirty-one members of the CC of the CPY and ten candidates were not elected, but twenty-two members of the CC and sixteen candidates. Here is what Comrade Valter (Tito) reported from Belgrade at the end of October 1940: “To Comrade Dimitrov: The Fifth Conference of the CPY was held from 19—23 October. One hundred and one delegates from all over the country participated. A CC of twenty-two members was elected, among them two women, and sixteen candidates. Complete unity was manifested. Valter’.

If, out of twenty-two elected members of the CC, ten died, this would leave twelve elected members. If two were expelled this would leave ten. Tito and Kardelj say that now there are twen­ty-six members of the CC of the CPY—therefore, if from this number we subtract ten, this leaves sixteen co-opted members of the present CC of the CPY. It thus appears that the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY were co-opted. This applies not only to the members of the CC of the CPY but also to the local leaders, who are not elected but appointed.

We consider that such a system of creating leading organs of the Party, when the Party is in power and when it can use complete legality, cannot be called anything but semi-legal, and the nature of the organization sectarian-bureaucratic. It cannot be tolerated that Party meetings should not be held or held secretly; this must undermine the influence of the Party among the masses; nor can it be tolerated that acceptance into the Party is concealed from the workers; acceptance into the Party should play an important educational role in linking the Party to the working class and to all the workers.

If the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY had regard for the Party it would not tolerate such a condition in the Party and

would, immediately on gaining power, that is, three and a half years ago, have asked the Party to call a Congress in order to reorganize on the lines of democratic centralism and start work as a completely legal Party.

It is entirely understandable that under such conditions in the Party, when there is no election of the leading organs, but only their appointment, there can be no talk of internal Party democracy, and much less of criticism and self-criticism. We know that members are afraid to state their opinions, are afraid to criticize the system in the Party and prefer to keep their mouths shut, in order to avoid reprisals. It is no accident that the Minister of State Security is at the same time the Secretary of the CC for Party cadres or, as Tito and Kardelj say, the organization secretary of the CC of the CPY. It is evident that the members and cadres of the Party are left to the supervision of the Ministry of State Security, which is completely impermissible and cannot be tolerated. It was sufficient for Zhu Jovic, at a session of the CC of the CPY, not to agree with a draft of the answer of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY to the letter from the CC of the CPSU, to be immediately expelled from the Central Committee.

As can be seen, the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY does not consider the Party as an independent entity, with the right to its own opinion, but as a partisan detachment, whose members have no right to discuss any questions but are obliged to fulfil all the desires of the ‘chief’ without comment. We call this cultivating militarism in the Party, which is incompatible with the principles of democracy within a Marxist Party.

As is known, Trotsky also attempted to force a leadership based on militarist principles on the CPSU, but the Party, headed by Lenin, triumphed over him and condemned him, militarist measures were rejected and internal Party democracy was confirmed as the most important principle of Party development.

We feel that this abnormal condition inside the CPY represents a serious danger to the life and development of the
The sooner this sectarian-bureaucratic regime within the Party is put an end to, the better it will be both for the CPY and for the Yugoslav Democratic Republic. . . .

Tito and Kardelj in their letter proposed that the CPSU should send representatives to Yugoslavia to study the Soviet-Yugoslav differences. We feel this course would be incorrect, since it is not a matter of verifying individual facts but of differences of principle.

As is known, the question of Soviet-Yugoslav differences has already become the property of the CC of the nine Communist Parties who have their Cominform. It would be highly irregular to exclude them from this matter. Therefore, we propose that this question be discussed at the next session of the Cominform.

Moscow, 4 May 1948

STATEMENT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO COMINFORM CONFERENCE JUNE 20, 1948

To the Informbureau:

Having received an invitation to send its representatives to the meeting of the Informbureau, which has already met for 'Discussion on the Situation in the CPY', the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia requests that the Informbureau session be informed of the following:

The CC of the CPY is always ready to participate in the work of the Informbureau. But it cannot send its representatives to this meeting of the Bureau because it does not accept the agenda of the meeting, considering that the solution of the question of disagreement between the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CC of the CPY, which constitutes the agenda sent to us, has from the beginning up until this meeting of the Bureau been put on an incorrect basis, for the following reasons:

1. The first letter of the CC of the CPSU to our CC was not composed in a spirit of comradely criticism to which the CC of the CPY could answer in the same tone, but was rather in the form of a rude and unjust accusation which we, considering its falsity, could accept only to the detriment of our Party and State, or not accept at all.

2. The CC of the CPY considers it thoroughly incorrect to base accusations of a brotherly Communist Party on one-sided information of what someone said or on isolated quotations and not on the basis of analysis of the entire activity of our Party, which passed through such great tests before, during, and after the war.

3. Some of the most serious accusations of the CC of the CPSU are obviously based on the information of anti-Party elements against which our Party waged a struggle before, during and after the war. The CC of the CPY considers it impermissible for such well-known remnants of former fractionalism in the CPY to receive the support of the CC of the CPSU.

4. The leaders of the member Parties of the Informbureau, uncritically accepting the accusations of the CC of the CPSU against our Party and without seeking any information from us, condemned our Party in written statements and refused to take into consideration the arguments in our answer to the first letter of the CC of the CPSU. Some of them, both within broad circles in their Parties and publicly, acted in a way harmful to our country.

5. The CC of the CPSU did not accept even one argument from our answer to its first letter but in response to that letter and later, too, brought out ever greater and totally unfounded accusations against the CPY. It is clear that such a stand makes it impossible for us to discuss matters on an equal footing.

All these facts are reasons why the CC of the CPY did not assent to the bringing out of the disagreements before the
Informbureau, considering that this would only result in a deepening rather than in a solution of the disagreements.

The CC of the CPY points out that it proposed to the CC of the CPSU that it send its representatives to Yugoslavia for a joint investigation of disputed questions on the spot. The CC of the CPSU did not accept this procedure, which in our opinion represents the only correct one, but even before receiving our answer, laid the disagreements before the other Parties of the Informbureau, that is, it sent them the text of the letter at the same time it was sent to us, at which the leaders of all the Parties, except the French and Italian, sent us written statements informing us of their judgment of our Party.

Such behaviour is not in the spirit of understanding or according to the principle of voluntariness upon which the Informbureau is based.

The CC of the CPY continues to adhere to its conviction that joint discussion of disputed questions by direct contact between the CC of the CPSU and the CC of the CPY in Yugoslavia itself is the correct way to solve the existing disagreements. The CC of the CPY expresses its deep sorrow at the fact that the disagreements have taken such a form on the part of the CC of the CPSU, and again appeals, both to the CC of the CPSU and to the Informbureau, that they agree with our opinion regarding the necessity for direct contact between the CC of the CPSU and the CC of the CPY for the solution of disagreements, and to this end to remove from the agenda the discussion of the situation in our Party, comprehending the incorrectness of such discussion without our consent.

The CC of the CPY greets the brotherly Communist Parties and declares that no disagreements will prevent the CPY from remaining true to its policy of solidarity and of the closest co-operation with the CC of the CPSU and other Communist Parties.

June 20, 1948

Politbureau, CC of the CPY

[The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, November, 1948]
MAO TSE-TUNG:
ON STALIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL ERRORS

[Excerpts from Talks at the Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees held on 27 January 1957]

Concerning dialectics Lenin said, "In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This grasps the kernel of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development." It is our job to explain and develop the doctrine. It needs to be explained, and so far we have done too little. And it needs to be developed; with our rich experience in revolution, we ought to develop this doctrine. Lenin also said, "The unity (coincidence, indentity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." Proceeding from this concept, we have advanced the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend.

Truth stands in contrast to falsehood and develops in struggle with it. The beautiful stands in contrast to the ugly and develops in struggle with it. The same holds true of good and bad, that is, good deeds and good people stand in contrast to bad deeds and bad people and develop in struggle with them. In short, fragrant flowers stand in contrast to poisonous weeds and develop in struggle with them. It is dangerous policy to prohibit people from coming into contact with the false, with idealism and metaphysics, and with the twaddle of Confucius, Lao Tzu and Chiang Kai-shek. It will lead to mental deterioration, one-track minds, and unpreparedness to face the world and meet challenges.

In philosophy, materialism and idealism form a unity of opposites and struggle with each other. The same is true of another pair of opposites, dialectics and metaphysics. When one talks about philosophy, one cannot do without these two pairs of opposites. Now in the Soviet Union they will have nothing to do with such "pairs" but are going in only for "singles" asserting that only fragrant flowers, but not poisonous weeds, grow there and denying the existence of idealism and metaphysics in a socialist country. As a matter of fact, idealism, metaphysics and poisonous weeds are found in every country. In the Soviet Union many of the poisonous weeds appear in the name of fragrant flowers, and many absurd statements bear the label of materialism or socialist realism. We openly recognize the struggle between materialism and idealism, between dialectics and metaphysics, and between fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds. This struggle will go on for ever and will move a step forward at every stage.

If your comrades here already know materialism and dialectics, I would like to advise you to supplement your knowledge by some study of their opposites, that is idealism and metaphysics. You should read Kant and Hegel and Confucius and Chiang Kai-shek, which are all negative stuff. If you know nothing about idealism and metaphysics, if you have never waged any struggle against these, your materialism and dialectics will not be solid. The shortcoming of some of our Party members and intellectuals is precisely that they know too little about the negative stuff. Having read a few books by Marx, they just repeat what is in them and sound rather monotonous. Their speeches and articles are not convincing. If you don't study the negative stuff, you won't be able to refute it. Neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin was like that. They made great efforts to learn and study all sorts of things, contemporary and past, and taught other people to do likewise. The three component parts of Marxism came into being in the course of their study of, as well as their struggle with, such bourgeois things as German classical philosophy, English classical political economy and French utopian socialism. In this respect Stalin was not as good. For instance, in his time, German classical idealist philosophy was described as a reaction on the
part of the German aristocracy to the French revolution. This conclusion totally negates German classical idealist philosophy. Stalin negated German military science, alleging that it was no longer of any use and that books by Clausewitz should no longer be read since the Germans had been defeated.

Stalin had a fair amount of metaphysics in him and he taught many people to follow metaphysics. In the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Stalin says that Marxist dialectics has four principal features. As the first feature he talks of the interconnection of things, as if all things happened to be interconnected for no reason at all. What then are the things that are interconnected? It is the two contradictory aspects of a thing that are interconnected. Everything has two contradictory aspects. As the fourth feature he talks of the internal contradiction in all things, but then he deals only with the struggle of opposites, without mentioning their unity. According to the basic law of dialectics, the unity of opposites, there is at once struggle and unity between the opposites, which are both mutually exclusive and interconnected and which under given conditions transform themselves into each other.

Stalin's viewpoint is reflected in the entry on "identity" in the *Shorter Dictionary of Philosophy*, fourth edition, compiled in the Soviet Union. It is said there: "There can be no identity between war and peace, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between life and death and other such phenomena, because they are fundamentally opposed to each other and mutually exclusive". In other words between these fundamentally opposed phenomena there is no identity in the Marxist sense; rather, they are solely mutually exclusive, not interconnected, and incapable of transforming themselves into each other under given conditions. This interpretation is utterly wrong.

Stalin failed to see the connection between the struggle of opposites and the unity of opposites. Some people in the Soviet Union are so metaphysical and rigid in their thinking that they think a thing has to be either one or the other, refusing to recognize the unity of opposites. Hence, political mistakes are made. We adhere to the concept of the unity of opposites and adopt the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. When fragrant flowers are blossoming, you will inevitably find poisonous weeds growing. This is nothing to be afraid of, under given conditions they can even be turned to good account.

For a long time Stalin denied that contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base exist under the socialist system. Not until the year before his death when he wrote *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* did he hesitantly mention the contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces under the socialist system and admit that incorrect policies and improper adjustments would lead to trouble. Even then he did not pose the question of the contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base under the socialist system as a question of over-all importance, nor did he realize that they are the basic contradictions which propel socialist society forward. He thought all was secure under his rule. We on our part mustn't presume that all is secure under our rule; it is secure and yet insecure.

According to dialectics, as surely as a man must die, the socialist system as a historical phenomenon will come to an end some day, to be negated by the communist system. If it is asserted that the socialist system and its relations of production and superstructure will not die out, what kind of Marxism would that be? Wouldn't it be the same as a religious creed or theology that preaches an everlasting God?

...In order that our militants and our Party workers may understand clearly the full significance of the errors of Stalin in the field of philosophy, we shall quote what Comrade Suslov said recently in his report in Moscow (Pravda, February 4, 1962).

"No little harm was caused by the personality cult to the science of philosophy. Stalin's work on Dialectical and Historical Materialism which outlined the principles of Marxist philosophy most sketchily, was regarded as the apex of scientific thought. In reality, however, this work only impaired the scientific and pedagogical activity of the philosophers".

It is therefore of the utmost importance today to examine the philosophical teachings of Stalin.

The initial mistake—that from which all the others follow—committed in the field of philosophy by Stalin is the separation of theory from practice. Thus, precisely that which is the core of Marxism has been put into question. Marxism distinguishes itself from all other philosophies in this: to transform the world, not only to interpret it (Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach). To place practice in the centre of thought as the source and the criterion of its truth—in this consisted the "revolution in philosophy" brought about by Marx.

In this new perspective of practice, materialism and dialectics found themselves inseparably united and radically different from all the previous concepts of materialism and of dialectics: practice becoming the source and the criterion of all truth—

(a) materialism cannot be dogmatic; it is no longer a point of departure, but a point of arrival, the conclusion of all practice (social and scientific). It is necessarily dialectical;

(b) dialectics can no longer be speculative; it is no longer the creation of the mind but the result of its correspondence with nature, its purpose being to reflect nature in movement. It is necessarily materialist. It is only when one starts from practice, the social and historical practice of man, that one breaks simultaneously with the 18th century French dogmatic materialism and with the speculative dialectics of Hegel.

Why do we say that the personality cult necessarily results in breaking the unity of theory with practice?

Because practice in the Marxist-Leninist meaning of the term, is the social experience of men, connected with nature and history. It is the work of millions upon millions of men, be it in economic and political struggles or in scientific, technical or artistic research. One of the fundamental theses of Marxism is that it is the masses who make history. It is in this sense that Marx said that the proletariat is the inheritor of philosophy. For, a Marxist philosophy does not reveal itself in the head of a "thinker" however great or profound he may be; it is the generalisation of the practical experience of all humanity in its struggle for the transformation of nature and of society.

This is the dynamic viewpoint of the working class which demands from the philosopher utmost modesty in regard to every political experience and every scientific discovery.

Such a conception of philosophy—that of Marxism-Leninism—is, by its very definition incompatible with the cult of personality, which assigns to an individual the privilege of creative development of philosophy and which gives the illusion to this individual of his power to withhold the truth or to fructify it without taking into account, patiently and humbly, the daily experience of the masses and the researches of savants, i.e. the creators of all order.
Such is the root of the evil, the root of dogmatism, which is the intellectual expression of this separation of theory from practice, of this divorce from life.

How does this manifest itself?

The first consequence of this separation of theory from practice, is the deadly illusion that it is possible to propound a theory that is valid once for all, as if practice does not constantly react on it, does not nourish it like a living, perpetually growing organism.

Theory, cut off from practice, which is its nourishment, gets faded and emaciated, it becomes something dead, which in philosophy is defined as scholasticism; one begins to believe that it is possible to summarise schematically the Marxist-Leninist philosophy in a certain number of precepts (exactly seven: three “principles” of materialism, and four “features” of dialectics). And that is the absolute truth, completed so that it can be put in one’s pocket like a bar of pure gold, or as in a catechism like a dogma.

Such a close list gets away from the vicissitudes of history as also from the sciences. Among the sciences and technology as well as in social struggles philosophy does not possess an extra-territorial privilege; in its development it is subject to the laws of all thought and all action.

This isolation of theory in relation to practice has its immediate consequences in practical politics, because this rupture leads to actions which do not correspond to the reality.

—Wasn’t it a loss of sight of reality in regard to the relationship of forces between the classes in the course of construction of socialism in the USSR? A so-called law is announced concerning the perpetual aggravation of the struggle between the classes, even after the liquidation of exploiting classes and the victories of socialism, and that leads theory to the justification of a false practice with all its murderous consequences.

—Wasn’t it a loss of sight of reality in regard to the relationship of forces between capitalism and socialism? One continues to believe in a law which was true at a time when imperialism reigned supreme and its laws of development were applicable to the entire history of the planet: War is inevitable.

—Were not the laws of dialectics turned into a dogma? One excludes from the beginning, carrying these laws to the absolute, certain historical possibilities like the peaceful transition to socialism in certain determined, concrete conditions.

In fact, on the philosophical plane, the defects of Stalin’s expositions can be grouped under three essential heads:

1. The materialism of Marx has been mixed up with pre-Marxist dogmatic materialism. Such an exposition hinders the understanding of Marxism as a revolution in philosophy beginning from the primacy of practice.

2. Dialectics is divorced from science which is developing and becomes only illustrations of the sciences of the past century. Such an exposition does not permit to get away from positivism and scientisme.

3. Dialectical materialism is divorced from philosophical heritage. Thus, it is impoverished and sterilized.

1. Dialectical Materialism and Dogmatic Materialism

The source of mistake is to radically separate materialism and dialectics by saying as Stalin has done: “Dialectical materialism has been named as such because its method is dialectical and its conception of the world, its theory, is materialist.”

Now, materialism, for a Marxist, is a world outlook and also a method. Lenin in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism has shown the richness of materialism as a world outlook and as a method: our materialist world outlook, he underlined, gives to the physicists a method which consists in never forgetting that our concepts are not only the construction of the mind; they visualise a reality external to us and independent of us which they attempt to reflect with increasing approximation.

Dialectics for a Marxist is a method and also a world outlook. This conception of the world is characterised by inse-
parable intimate liaison of matter and motion and by the relativity of knowledge. Lenin defined dialectics as a theory of evolution in its most complete aspect, most profound, least narrow, and as a theory of relativity of human knowledge in all its aspects, which gives us the image of matter in perpetual development.

If materialism, as a world outlook, is not dialectical, it is mechanical and dogmatic.

If dialectics, as a method, is not materialistic, it is speculative and dogmatic.

In order to measure the distortion which Stalin imposed on Marxist materialism it is sufficient to compare his exposition with the very succinct exposition given by Lenin in his article for the Encyclopaedia in 1918 (Works, Vol. 21, pp. 44-54).

Lenin notes very clearly that which distinguishes dialectical materialism from the materialism of the previous period, underlining like Engels the limitations of traditional materialism:

(a) it was mechanical and did not take into account the modern development of biology;
(b) it was neither historical nor dialectical;
(c) it did not consider man as “the ensemble of his social relationships”, and consequently did not take the position of “practical revolutionary activity.”

In this way Lenin avoided dogmatism, linking closely the exposition of materialism with the development of sciences and of social struggle, with dialectics of knowledge and with action.

Stalin does not even allude to the limitations of pre-Marxist materialism. His exposition of Marxist materialism remains entirely within these limits.

Stalin begins by a caricatural exposition of idealism which according to him “denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws”—(which is in itself peculiar because Hegel affirmed: all that is real is rational)—or furthermore “holds that the world is full of ‘things-in-themselves’” (which is quite the contrary of idealism)\(^\text{140}\).

And Stalin counterposes, purely and simply, affirmations of dogmatic materialism to those of dogmatic idealism. Precisely because of its limitations, and because of a mechanical conception of matter, pre-Marxist materialism was no longer able to explain the birth of thought, since according to idealism it was matter that had emerged from pure idea.

The problem could be posed in scientific terms only at the time when theories of evolution made their appearance: beginning with the hypothesis of Diderot, then of Lamarck, and finally of Darwin. Only then it became possible to elaborate the great dialectical materialist idea of the birth of consciousness and of thought as a stage of the complex development of matter\(^\text{141}\).

In so far as dialectical materialism is, not like dogmatic materialism an affirmation, an initial postulate, but the necessary conclusion verified daily by all science and by all human practice, Lenin (“On the 25th Anniversary of the Death of Joseph Dietzgen” Vol. 19, p. 60) giving a resume of the characteristics of dialectical materialism, specifically, enumerates these as: “to hold to the point of view of development, to understand the relativity of all human knowledge”. Stalin completely separates these dialectical aspects in his dogmatic exposition of materialism, distorting thereby Marxism.

“The active aspect of knowledge” appears nowhere in this exposition, and the theory of “reflection” is presented there in a mechanical form as if knowledge was a passive registration as in the pre-Marxist dogmatic materialism.

Such an exposition gives a false idea of the nature of the “reversal” of Hegelian dialectics done by Marx.

Beginning with an isolated citation of the totality of the ideas of Marx, the dialectics of Marx is presented as if it was nothing else but Hegelian dialectics, only placed in nature and not in thought, in a word as if the “reversal” consisted in replacing the dogmatic idealism of Hegel by dogmatic materialism, whereas, what was needed was the rejection of all dogmatism for the first time in the history of philosophy and the establishment of the primacy of practice as the source and
Marxist materialism is not just idealism turned upside down. Marxist dialectics is not just speculative dialectics turned upside down.

In such an exposition if materialism is not dialectical, dialectics is also not materialist. Firstly, because, reducing it to four "features", immutable and definite, gives it a metaphysical character (if not theological); furthermore because, this dialectics, identical in things as in knowledge, as if ready-made knowledge waiting inside things for us to pick it up, is a sort of interior thought inside things: we are here nearer to the objective idealism of Hegel than to dialectical materialism which has no need of the theological hypothesis of the presence of an idea inside things but which only asserts, as Lenin showed it in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, that the structure of things is such as can be correctly reflected only by a dialectical idea, and that the perfecting of this reflection is an endless process (scientific theory confirmed by experience—practice—invalidated by a better experience, corrected and so the process goes on). Only such a dialectical activity of thought can permit us to reflect more and more complex dialectics of nature. It is this which fundamentally distinguishes Marxist dialectics from Hegelian dialectics.

Dialectics, thus conceived and projected in nature, is necessarily impoverished: not only because it is reduced to a close list of laws, but because some of its authentic characteristics cannot be dogmatically applied to nature: for example, the negation of negation. In spite of the example cited by Engels in Anti-Duhring, from the example given by Hegel (in the preface of Phenomenology of Mind) of the negation of the flower by the fruit, in spite of the example of Marx transposing in Capital, with "the expropriation of the expropriators", the Hegelian theme of alienation of alienation, Stalin excludes negation of negation because this would be an act of the idea which cannot be applied to things. With a sleight of hand he makes it disappear when it comes to explaining the transition of the inferior to the superior.

It is the same in regard to the unity and the opposition of contradictions which dialectics seizes in their unity.

Stalin does retain the idea that the struggle of the opposites is the motive force of all development, but he discards the moment of the unity of the opposites. Consequently certain dialectical possibilities are excluded, for example, the possibility, in certain cases, of surmounting the contradictions by unity and even the fusion of contradictions. The construction of socialism, and then of Communism, gives numerous illustrations of this when contradictions seize to be antagonistic: for example, the manner of overcoming, in the transition to Communism, the opposition between manual labour and intellectual labour.

Another example of the impoverishment of the study of categories of dialectical materialism is that of the analysis of reciprocal action which Stalin, in his exposition, does not distinguish from the category of totality. Such a confusion does not permit the specification of the essence of reality, whereas Marx had, for example, underlined strongly the role of the category of totality, notably in history (see Eighteenth Brumaire, p.39 etc.) and in political economy (see A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, pp. 164-172).

We are face to face here with one of the most serious distortions of the Marxist philosophy: most authentically dialectic laws can no longer be attributed to nature because a concession is made to a "naturalist" conception, and finally to positivist and scientiste conception of the dialectics of nature.

By mixing up under the vague denomination of "features" of dialectics, the general characteristics of nature (motion), the principles (contradiction), categories (reciprocal action), laws (transformation of quantity into quality), the specific quality of philosophy in relation to science is thereby obliterated (in the manner of positivists).
One begins with a positivist conception of science; establish the facts and relate them with the laws of mathematics; and one ends with a positivist conception of philosophy which will not distinguish itself from science except by a superior degree of generalisation of these laws: a positivist and even an idealist can accommodate himself perfectly with such a definition of dialectics.

—the essential Hegelian teaching taken up by Marx is discarded;

—the conception of science in which a law is not just any sort of connection between two phenomena, but is an internal and necessary link (Marx: Capital, Vol. I, Part 3, p. 225);

—the criticism of alienation, which alone enabled Marx to make a devastating criticism of positivism in political economy. A remarkable example of the consequences of the positivist impoverishment of Marxism is given to us by the embarrassment of those who have accepted the positivist conception of Stalin in regard to pauperisation: unable to define it as the impoverishment of the totality of the life of the worker (alienation of alienation) as a consequence of the law of accumulation, the positivist economist rides on the hump of “real wages” and, being able to establish the law with this positivist method, which is not the method of Marx but the method of bourgeois economy, renounces this fundamental law of Marxist economy and even shamefully gives up the use of its name; a recent manual on the principles of Marxism-Leninism is a striking example of this.

Having thus mutilated Marxism from that which constitutes its fundamental originality—the role of practice, the active aspect of knowledge, the close relationship of materialism and dialectics—it has been made the inheritor of only the materialist tradition. Here also the same manual presents Marxist philosophy in a peculiar manner: 18th century materialism, scientific discoveries of 19th century added (on motion in nature) and this is Marxism: Holbach + Darwin = Marx. This is not only a historical error but a mutilation of Marxism.

Historical error: Lenin recalled in his Three Sources of Marxism that the philosophical source was “classical German philosophy”, i.e. Kant, Hegel and Feuerbach (infinitely poor beside Hegel, as Engels repeats constantly in Ludwig Feuerbach).

It is mutilation of Marxism, because by underestimating Hegelian heritage some of the essential elements of the world outlook of Marx disappear: the active aspect of knowledge, man created by his own labour, alienation of labour, rich dialectics of nature, and of knowledge and history.

This impoverishment of Marxism reduced to a variety of vulgar materialism, of naturalism, has serious consequences in regard to history. The specific quality of human history in relation to biological evolution, or of the development of socialism in relation to previous social orders is no longer visible. Whereas Marxism-Leninism (as we have seen above) does not identify nature and history, Stalin is contended with the following formula inspired by a non-dialectical materialism: “The world develops according to the laws of motion of matter”, thus effacing the qualitative links realised in the course of historical development; transition solely of biological evolution to history through labour—then the alienation of this labour and fetishism of commodity, human relationships appearing as relationship between things—then with socialism and especially Communism (passing from the “realm of necessity to the realm of liberty” as Marx and Engels said), the increasing role of subjective factor, of the Party, of the conscious will (without abolishing the objective character of the laws of development).

Such a conception leads to mechanism, to fatalism, with all the political consequences comprised in it, as is shown by the erroneous analysis of the action of objective laws in a socialist regime in the last work of Stalin: Economic Problems of Socialism.

In Stalin’s exposition, the relations between the base and the superstructure have not been correctly defined. These
relations are defined by Stalin in a pure mechanical manner. He retains from Marxist conception only three aspects (Marxism and Linguistics, Pages 12-17):
- the dependence of the superstructure on the base;
- the reaction of superstructure on the base;
- the gap between being and consciousness, and also he adds that when the base disappears, the superstructure disappears with it.

Now, living reality overflows to a very large extent this simple scheme.

(1) The necessary class analysis of a doctrine should not be mixed up with a deduction; it is not possible to “deduce” ideologies beginning simply from the base which engenders them. This attempt, a mechanist caricature of historical materialism, was characterised by Lenin as “Shuliatikovism”—so-called because of a certain Shuliatikov who managed to bring together all philosophical systems beginning from 17th to the 20th century to a simple justification of bourgeois politics (Lenin’s Works: Vol. 38, Pages 486-502).

(2) Why is such a “deduction” impossible?

(a) An ideology does not only reflect the practice and the exigencies of a class: it reflects objective reality through the distortions and the mystifications which practice and the exigencies of a class impose on it. To forget this means to slip into the “subjectivism of class” (notably developed by Lukacs in his History and Consciousness of Class) which led to the mistakes about “bourgeois science”, “proletarian science”.

(b) An ideology (artistic, religious, philosophical, etc.) is the direct and immediate reflection of a base; it imparts its ways of interpretation and expression to forms inherited from the past. For example, in regard to religion and arts, the myth, as Marx noted, plays this role of intermediary and it would be puerile and vain to want to search an economic explanation for every theme of this mythology. Similarly, all the philosophers, even the greatest, have imparted to earlier philosophies, to sciences, to theologies, to arts, concepts in a

language with the help of which they express an existing reality with all its new relationships (the book of Desanti on Spinoza is a convincing demonstration of this fact).

(c) An ideology can express itself in “alienated” forms. The ignorance of this concept of alienation leads to a mechanical conception, barren and wrong, of the relationships of the base with the superstructure, because one can no more take into account the fact that ideology is not only a reflection but often an inverted reflection of the base from which it is engendered.

For example: It is perfectly right that in general materialism (reality as it is, is without any external additions) corresponds to the ideological needs of a rising class (which derives support from reality to attain its objective), while idealism with the mystification and the falsifications which it carries, responds, in general to the needs of a decadent class which fears reality and which seeks to hide it and distort it. That is why one can legitimately distinguish, as Lenin did, “two lines” in philosophy: that of Democritus and that of Plato, materialism and idealism. But it is a grotesque and ugly caricature to transform this fecund and leading idea into an abstract schema permitting the classification of all philosophies of the past in the manner, as they say of Charlemagne classifying his pupils on the one side good, on the other bad. And there are three reasons for this:

(i) Because the struggle between idealism and materialism very often develops within a philosophy itself. This is true and valid in regard to the greatest among philosophers; for example, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, could not be classified purely and simply either under idealism or under materialism;

(ii) Because, from the point of view of their contribution to philosophy (the importance of those things in them which truly reflect reality and which we as Marxist-Leninists should accept) it very often happens that idealist philosophers are richer than materialists. To give an example of T. S. O—19
this from the time nearest to the birth of Marxism it is enough to remind ourselves of the judgment of Marx (German Ideology), of Engels (Ludwig Feuerbach), of Lenin (Philosophical Notebooks and The Three Sources), on what is given to us by the most typical of the idealists (Hegel, together with Feuerbach, infinitely poorer).

(iii) Lastly, one is led to fundamental errors by raising to the absolute level the idea that all materialism is progressive and all idealism reactionary. History furnishes us with examples of progressive movements which accepted idealist, even mystic, ideologies. In his Peasant War, Engels explains very well why literary movements necessarily took, in a determined historical period, the form of religious heresies.

An example of the errors which are caused by such schematism is the fundamentally false judgment on Hegel pronounced by Stalin. In Philosophical Dictionary, quoting textually, Hegelianism has been defined as “the aristocratic reaction to the French Revolution” (p. 233). But as a matter of fact, in the historical conditions of Germany with a retarded development, Kant, Fichte and Hegel expressed the aspirations of German bourgeoisie for whom the real revolutionary actions taking place in France became an ideal for the future. As Marx said, classical German philosophy was “the German theory of the French Revolution”.

Our Comrade Lucien Seve, who studies the evolution of materialist philosophy under the Second Empire, has provided me with several examples constituting the counter-proof of this thesis and showing how materialism at the end of the 19th century had got mixed up with the more reactionary racist and antisemitic doctrines. The author of Breviary of Materialism, Soury, was one of the first theoreticians and founder of Action Francaise. In that epoch in France materialism could, for certain people, identify itself with reaction.

(3) While Stalin claimed that superstructure disappears with the base that has given birth to it, Marx and Engels have underlined (specially Marx in Eighteenth Brumaire, Engels in the Letters which he wrote towards the end of his life) “the relative independence” and the “relatively autonomous development” of ideologies. The under-estimation of this aspect makes it impossible to elaborate correctly the study of ethics or of aesthetics.

Nevertheless, Marx has raised these problems and indicated the path for resolving them: he talked ironically about “the pretentious mania of the French of the 18th century... because in the field of mechanics and in other fields, we have surpassed the ancients, why should we not be capable of writing an epic poem? And Voltaire gives us La Henriade to replace Eliad!”. (History of Economic Doctrines, Vol. II, p. 159). And thus he posed the central question of aesthetics: “The difficulty is not in understanding that Greek art is derived from certain forms of historical development but in understanding that it still gives us joy and that it constitutes an unsurpassable ‘norm’.” (Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Page 175).

Taking into consideration these indications given by Marx, it is possible—above all, it is necessary—to elaborate such criteria for the appreciation of the works of arts which would lead us neither to unprincipled electicism nor to narrowness of outlook.

Lastly, the false thesis according to which the superstructure disappears with its base cannot but lead to contempt for cultural heritage, the subjectivism of class and to certain nihilism often condemned by Lenin.

2. Rupture Between Dialectics And Science

All the errors in this domain as in others flow from the rupture between theory and practice.

While Stalin, in his exposition, illustrates the “features” of dialectics with examples, borrowed from the scientific arsenal of 19th century, yet it is not simply due to ignorance of the more recent discoveries of science, but it is the consequence of
a fundamentally wrong conception of the relationships between philosophy and science.

After having recognised as demanded by dialectical materialism, that practice alone (that is to say, in this particular case, scientific and technical experience) permits us to reflect more and more correctly objective reality (because during the development of this practice, the successes and failures of our hypotheses and our experiments constantly permit us to correct our theory, our reflection of the real), it is impossible, for a Marxist, to admit that while science develops (just as social reality and struggles in other domains), philosophy (which does not draw its truth from a different source) can remain immutable as complete truth, as if it constituted an inert "core", without any relation with the life of the fruit, of the tree, of entire nature.

Now, during the last thirty years the development of sciences has questioned the principles which seemed to be immutable:

—Relativity has questioned, experimentally, the postulates of Euclid which had been till then opposed only by theoretical possibilities (by Lobachevsky, Bolyai and Riemann);

—the quantum physics has questioned, experimentally, principles of classical determinism.

This means that space, time, motion, causality, have to give up their traditional definitions and the categories which were apparently the most stable are now obliged to transform themselves into a function of a practice from a scale infinitely great to infinitely small, losing contact with the human scale.

Still more shocking, in such an epoch, was the claim to answer to all the questions by a commentary of the texts, and the affirmation that all truth is already contained in its essential, in the classics. Following this path led to Marxist "Thomism".

Marxism-Leninism has given us a conception of the world corresponding to the exigencies of a world in full metamorphosis; it has given us a method to tackle the problems. The worst mistake is to believe that one can reply to all the new questions, through the deductive method beginning from fundamental texts.

Neither the solution of political problems nor the solution of scientific problems can be achieved in this manner. On this point the text of Zhdanov on philosophy contains a fundamental contradiction.

As it happens often with Stalin, Zhdanov lays down a correct and fecund idea: strongly condemning the "cowardice" of those who have fear of the new and who are satisfied with the commentaries of the texts (p. 63), he calls for creative work, for the analysis of contradictions in socialist regime (p. 62), for the discovery of new laws of dialectics (p. 61). He denounces (p. 54) "the metaphysical idea that Marxism is a finished and perfect doctrine...tarnishes life and paralyses the spirit of research in philosophy", he calls for the necessity of a close link between philosophy and particular sciences (p. 55) and defines philosophy as "an instrument of scientific research, a method penetrating all the natural and social sciences and enriching their contribution in the course of their development" (p. 54). Lastly he lays down this golden rule: "One of the fundamental tasks of philosophy and its history is to continue to develop philosophy as a science, to establish new laws, to put its theses to the test of practice, to replace worn out theses with new ones" (p. 54).

Excellent precepts, but immediately contradicted. A few pages later, Zhdanov develops the positivist theses according to which "the domain of philosophy becomes continuously restricted, as a function of the development of positive sciences... and this emancipation of sciences...represents a progress as much for these as for philosophy itself" (p. 43). Thus he confuses speculative philosophy which in effect constantly retreats before the sciences, with scientific Marxist philosophy which progresses with them [sciences—Ed.].

A few pages further, Zhdanov gives a typical example of dogmatic judgment: "The question of Hegel has been solved
long time ago” (p. 58). The fact is that precisely the “solution” given by Stalin of this question deeply mutilated Marxism.

Zhdanov inspired by the orientation given by Stalin takes an extremely negative attitude to pre-Marxist philosophy.

He asserts that it was “unsuitable as an instrument of practical action upon the world” (p. 43), which is surprising when one thinks—to take only modern times—of Descartes or of the Encyclopædist.

He asserts that “the founders of philosophical systems of the past...have not been able to contribute to the development of natural sciences” (p. 43), which is flagrantly contrary to truth, at least up to the 18th century, if one thinks for example of the close link between the philosophy of Leibnitz (idealistic, speculative, metaphysical) with the discoveries in physics and in mathematics (Marx acknowledges this in Holy Family, Philosophical Works, Vol. II, p. 227).

However, the fact is that the claim to attain an absolute and immutable truth in philosophy which shall soar above the vicissitudes of relative truths that are characteristic to science, constitutes a speculative, metaphysical illusion which far from helping, hampers the progress of science.

What happens to Marxists themselves is that by losing sight of the dialectical links between relative truth and absolute truth (so well studied by Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism) they claim to establish a metaphysical opposition between the philosophical conception of matter and the scientific conception of the structure and properties of matter, when as a matter of fact these two concepts mutually enrich each other.

Absolute truth and relative truth are inter-dependent; their frontiers constantly keep changing and the sector of absolute truth gets enlarged.

To separate Marxist Philosophy, wrongly considered immutable, alien to the vicissitudes of science, leads to a positivist conception of science, to a scientiste naturalism. Marx had unburdened science of this illusion by showing in Capital in the particular case of political economy the role of “alienation” and of “fetichism of commodity” in the positivist mystification of science. The peculiar views of Stalin against this notion weakened the criticism of positivism in sciences and reduced philosophy to scientiste naturalism.

(Let us note in passing that the abandoning of Marxist analysis of alienation renders very difficult the criticism of religious ideology and the elaboration of an ethics; such abandonment leads us to the poor and wrong concepts of Kautsky, which are positivist concepts consisting simply of tracing a trajectory of historical development and of acting accordingly.)

Such a conception of philosophy cannot help the development of sciences; here dialectical materialism loses its quality of being an instrument of scientific research.

The editorial in Problems of Philosophy of January 1962 is justified in saying in regard to the exposition of Stalin:

“Things were represented in such a way that one could think that, through simple deduction one could, with the help of the general principles of dialectical and historical materialism, discover the solution of concrete questions concerning social and political practice of such and such science. In this manner the dialectical method itself, which is an instrument of research, became one does not know what kind of a universal key.”

This attitude had grave consequences in the scientific domain.

To believe in the Cartesian manner that one can instal oneself in absolute truth and by simple deduction beginning from the general principles of dialectical materialism discover the solution of this or that concrete question, has led to an attitude of contempt (when it did not lead to falsification) towards experience.

In the name of a dogmatic conception of dialectics, annoying “philosophical” interferences in the domain of quantum physics, in relativity, in the chemical theory of resonance, in classical
The basic philosophical mistake was—

(1) To consider Marxism as a finished system of principles and laws. Starting from here the value of a scientific theory depended on its accord or disaccord with this system or principles and laws. This is pure dogmatism;

(2) To believe that one can anticipate, barring Heuristic form, on the basis of experience in deducing the structure of the real, starting with the already known laws of dialectics. This is pure speculation (and even pure idealism, because this is believing that our mind imposes its laws on nature);

(3) Not to be able to distinguish the objective content of a scientific theory from its idealistic interpretation which can be given to it by the bourgeoisie or even by its author.

This three-sided mistake has one single origin: the abandonment of practice as the criterion of truth.

(Let us note in passing that on literary and artistic plane, symmetrical errors have been committed notably concerning a very poor definition of “socialist realism” with all the consequences which it entailed, notably:

(a) very narrow criteria for evaluating and for fruitfully utilising the cultural heritage;

(b) insufficient criteria for evaluating and stimulating creative works of artists or contemporary writers. On this point a special study is required.)

3. *Dialectical Materialist Philosophy Deprived of Its Philosophical Heritage*

In regard to pre-Marxist philosophy and actually non-Marxist philosophy, Stalin and Zhdanov begin with two fundamentally correct propositions:

—the class character of all philosophy;

—following from this, the partisan spirit in philosophy.

But they interpret these principles in such a manner that they end up by coming to conclusions which are nefarious for the development of Marxism-Leninism.

As regards the class character of all philosophy, we have seen as to what is meant by its mechanical interpretation: materialism is always progressive, idealism is always reactionary. Beginning from here to the *en bloc* rejection of the heritage of idealist philosophies, there is but one step and that was immediately taken. This fact is expressed, first of all, by the elimination of the richest part of the heritage: Hegelianism.

And as if this was in contradiction to the teachings of classical Marxism, they expurgated their works: *The Manuscripts of 1844* of Marx were not included in the edition of his works; it has been published in a separate volume for the first time in 1956 (these texts were known since 1932). The *Philosophical Notebooks* of Lenin were discarded from the fourth edition of *Complete Works* of Lenin and were added to them (as Volume 38) only in 1958, at the same time when the *Letters* of Lenin were added to the Works.

This exclusion of Hegel constituted a veritable rupture with authentic Marxism-Leninism.

Let us recall that Engels did not hesitate to write in his preface of 1874 to *The Peasant War In Germany*: “Without German philosophy, which preceded it, particularly that of Hegel, German scientific socialism—the only scientific socialism that has ever existed—would never have come into being.” (p. 32, Moscow, English Edition, 1956)

Let us also remember Lenin’s judgment: “One cannot understand fully *Capital* of Marx, and in particular his first chapter, without having studied and understood entirely *Logic* of Hegel. That is why not a single Marxist has understood Marx half a century after him”. (*Philosophical Notebooks* p. 149). Thus it was not by accident that Lenin, in 1915, made a page by page analysis of *Logic* of Hegel, which remains the best guide for approaching this book.

Now to amputate from Marxism the heritage of Hegel, as we have seen above, constitutes not only a historical error...
(denying the influence of Hegel on Marx) but it is a mutilation which disfigures Marxism-Leninism (and which has, therefore, a capital importance from the ideological and political point of view).

Marx and Engels have borrowed from Hegel three essential propositions, demystifying them:

1. **The Primacy of Action**: "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included"—Marx wrote, "is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such." *(First Thesis on Feuerbach)*. (Also see Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, Pages 174-175).


   These "points" can be summarised thus:
   
   (a) The world of man is the work of man, product of his labour;
   (b) Therefore, there is nothing which is inaccessible to the reason of man;
   (c) The wealth and the institutions created by man appear to him as things. Not as a product, but as something *given*, foreign, impenetrable and, hostile. This is *alienation*;
   (d) The liberty of man consists in surmounting these "alienations";
   (e) True liberty cannot be realised except in society and not outside it. Individualism is nothing but an illusion of liberty;
   (f) History is nothing else but the history of this liberation and of this construction of man by himself.

(3) **The dialectical method**: "The mystification which dialectics suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working *in a comprehensive and conscious manner.*" *(Capital—preface of 1873, Vol. I, p. 20, Moscow, English edition, 1958)*.

Talking about people who forgot all that and who considered Hegel as "a bloated dog", Marx wrote to Paul Lafargue, "according to their understanding, assuredly I am not a Marxist!" And Engels, criticising such poor interpretations of Marxism liked to say: "What these gentlemen all lack is dialectics...Hegel has never existed for them!" K. Marx and F. Engels: *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 327, Moscow, English edition, 1946; *Letter to Schmidt* of 27th October, 1890.

Such is the false interpretation of the conception of two "lines" in philosophy: that which consists in eliminating all contributions of the philosophers of the idealist "line".

The other mistake consists in interpreting "the partisan spirit" in philosophy as if it implies the ignorance of bourgeois philosophy and the vain pretension that nothing could be learnt from it.

In the text of Zhdanov (p. 47) an excellent text of Chernyshevsky has been cited wherein, speaking about the great creators of philosophical systems (notably Spinoza), he eulogises them thus: "in unveiling the shortcomings of the conceptions of their predecessors, they avow at the same time clearly how those (their predecessors) have contributed to the development of their own thought". Zhdanov thinks that in making this citation his own, the author of the *History of Philosophy* "is evidently on the path of renouncing the principle of the position of partisanship in philosophy, which is essential to Marxism-Leninism" (p. 47).
Beginning from here he shows his anger against Hegel and reproaches Alexandrov for having suggested that the philosophy of Hegel “contains as many progressive elements as reactionary elements” (p. 50). As a matter of fact, it contains many more progressive than reactionary elements. As Engels has very well said: “The conservatism of this manner of observation (that of Hegel) is relative, his revolutionary character is absolute” (Ludwig Feuerbach, Page 18).

To borrow from other philosophers all that in their works reflects truly any aspect of the real, to integrate to our conception of the world (the only true and fully coherent conception and which can accept and place in a just perspective all truth and reality), does not at all mean becoming “servile towards bourgeois philosophers”, “to strip our philosophy of its militant and aggressive spirit” (p. 49). “Intransigence towards the adversaries” (p. 50), the spirit of partisanship in philosophy does not imply either contempt for the past or ignorance of others’ contributions.

One would like to recall here the typical example of the study of dialectics and knowledge made in a fundamental idealist manner by M. Bachelard, in a work from which we can draw much provided we “set it on its feet”, that is to say, place this dialectics of knowledge in the perspective of materialist conception of dialectics and of the primacy of matter in relation to mind, and the historical and dialectical theory of reflection.

We should as much guard ourselves against dogmatic mistakes in this domain, as against anti-Marxism, because this is an epoch in which Marxism-Leninism alone can give an explanation of the transformation of the world and fully understand this transformation. This is a period in which anti-Marxists have been reduced to borrowing this or that element of Marxism in order to hoodwink and deceive honest people. Undoubtedly the fundamental reasons for the development of anti-Marxist ideologies are class reasons: they receive official help and means of propagating them; in the regime imposed by the dominant class these (anti-Marxist ideologies—Ed.) find a favourable milieu. And consequently even if our ideological work was absolutely perfect, adverse doctrines will be pronounced, developed and will find an audience. This does not exclude the fact that our errors and our shortcomings make the work of our adversaries easier and more effective, who are eager to exploit them.

We would like to give some examples.

The personalism of Mounier and his successors could only exist as a parasite of Marxism imparting to it the absurd idea that the individual man reduces himself to the totality of his conditions of existence. Whereas one of the most vital ideas of dialectics is the idea that whole is different from the sum-total of the parts which constitute it, and that a complete utilisation of all the mediations which historical materialism furnishes to us permits us to make the most profound analysis of the individual. For example, the Marxist dialectical method permits us to integrate all which is valid in the Christian tradition in regard to the notion of the individual: the value of reciprocity of conscience, the infinite development, the total man. (All which Marx called in the Jewish Question “the human basis of Christianity”.) Only Marxism can give to all this its true significance in the materialist perspective, putting an end to all which made it a dream and an evasion, and in posing these problems in terms of struggle and of the transformation of the world, to put it in brief through the disalienation and the demystification of these notions.

The existentialism of Sartre and of his disciples—whose influence is essentially due to the fact that it flatters the fundamental individualism of the bourgeoisie—in order to develop the idealist conception of the individual, of history, of liberty, has got hold of the basic ideas of psycho-analysis and phenomenology: the ideas of “signification” and of “project” (on which Marx has shed a clear light). Existentialism mystifies these ideas and one notices, on the healthy tree of knowledge, grafted new parasitical forms of idealism. This work of mystification is facilitated because we on our part do not take into
consideration the valid reflections of certain aspects of reality which Marx had perceived and which is our duty to explore.

Even Roman Catholic philosophers come to glean in the Marxist field. Following the social democrat Rubel, Fathers Bigo and Calvez have detached the notion of alienation from its materialist and scientific context in order to give it an idealist theological interpretation, “alienated”, so that they might bring Marxism to a utopian conception, to an “ethical” socialism.

It is the same with revisionism: Henri Lefebvre has been giving to his ideas since so many years the semblance of philosophical statute by exploiting (to the benefit of a vague and poor Hegelianism of the Left) the Hegelian roots of Marxism.

We must not leave these weapons in the hands of the enemy; we must force him to vacate the grounds which belong to us by right and to fight only on the declared ground of anti-Marxism. Our battle becomes easier when he is no longer able to possess himself with foils which we are making the mistake of leaving in his hands.

Such are the exalted perspectives of our philosophical work and the corrections which it is possible to make to enable dialectical materialism to play its full role—
— as an instrument of revolutionary struggle;
— as an instrument of scientific research.

Under no circumstances should the criticism of mistakes committed by Stalin in philosophy be allowed to lead to a revision of Marxism-Leninism. On the contrary, this criticism has no other objective but the correction of the deviation and dogmatic deformations, anti-dialectical and positivist, of the Marxist philosophy.

As Waldeck Rochet pointed out in his report on philosophical discussions and has been underlined today by Maurice Thorez in his intervention, our work in philosophy as elsewhere should be correctly balanced, and the main blow should be directed against bourgeois ideology and its shameful accomplices: revisionism and opportunism, in order to maintain the purity of the principles of dialectical materialism and of histori-
offensive against capitalism and the transition to socialism proceeded through several stages. In 1923 Lenin asserted that only by organising the peasantry into large cooperatives, it would be possible for the Soviet state to arrive at socialism. In 1929 Stalin launched an offensive against capitalism by eliminating the Kulaks as a class and organising large-scale cooperative farms. But collective farm property was still not socialist property. It was a form of cooperative property: a kind of transitional compromise between backward individualist peasant economy and highly developed socialist economy represented by state farms and state factories. Everybody knew that to arrive at complete socialism this collective farm property would in course of time have to be transformed into state property. After the great devastation of the Second World War, the task of restoring and further developing the socialist economy in the Soviet Union was given first priority and a lively discussion on the basic economic law of socialism was launched. In reply to several questions that arose out of the discussions Stalin wrote his last fundamental work *The Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, in 1952. In this work he spoke of the need 'to raise collective farm property to the level of public property'. He suggested that collective farm property and also commodity relations connected with it might be already 'beginning to hamper the development of productive forces.' In order to raise collective farm property to the level of public property Stalin proposed that 'the surplus collective farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity circulation and included in the system of product-exchange between state industry and collective farms'. Khrushchev and the Soviet economists made an all-out attack on this conception of the line of development and adopted a new agricultural programme opposed to it. Togliatti also pointed out the errors of Stalin's economic thinking and Mao Tsetung critically examined the book.

Stalin's book from first to last says nothing about the superstructure. It is not concerned with people; it considers things, not people. Does the kind of supply system for consumer goods help spur economic development or not? He should have touched on this at least. Is it better to have commodity production or is it better not to? Everyone has to study this. Stalin's point of view in his last letters is almost altogether wrong. The basic error is mistrust of the peasants.

Parts of the first, second, and third chapters are correct; other parts could have been clearer. For example, the discussion on planned economy is not complete. The rate of development of the Soviet economy is not high enough, although it is faster than the capitalists' rate. Relations between agriculture and industry, as well as between light and heavy industry, are not clearly explained.

It looks as if they have had serious losses. The relationship between long and short-term interests has not seen any spectacular developments. They walk on one leg, we walk on two. They believe that technology decides everything, that cadres decide everything, speaking only of "expert", never of "red", only of the cadres, never of the masses. This is walking on one leg. As far as heavy industry goes, they have failed to find the primary contradiction, calling steel the foundation, machinery the heart and innards, coal the food.... For us steel is the mainstay, the primary contradiction in industry, while foodgrains are the mainstay in agriculture. Other things develop proportionally.

* Reply to Comrades A. V. Sanina and V. G. Venzher

T. S. Q—20
In the first chapter he discusses grasping the laws, but without proposing a method. On commodity production and the law of value he has a number of views that we approve of ourselves but there are problems as well. Limiting commodity production to the means of subsistence is really rather doubtful. Mistrust of the peasants is the basic viewpoint of the third letter. Essentially, Stalin did not discover a way to make the transition from collective to public ownership. Commodity production and exchange are forms we have kept, while in connection with the law of value we must speak of planning and at the same time politics-in-command. They speak only of the production relations, not of the superstructure nor politics, nor the role of the people. Communism cannot be reached unless there is a Communist movement.

1. These comrades...it is evident...confuse laws of science, which reflect objective processes in nature or society, processes which take place independently of the will of man, with the laws which are issued by governments, which are made by the will of man, and which have only juridical validity. But they must not be confused.

This principle is basically correct, but two things are wrong: first, the conscious activity of the party and the masses is not sufficiently brought out; second, it is not comprehensive enough in that it fails to explain that what makes government decrees correct is not only that they emerge from the will of the working class but also the fact that they faithfully reflect the imperatives of objective economic laws.

2. Leaving aside astronomical, geological, and other similar processes, which man really is powerless to influence,

even if he has come to know the laws of their development....

2. This argument is wrong. Human knowledge and the capability to transform nature have no limit. Stalin did not consider these matters developmentally. What cannot now be done may be done in the future.

3. The same must be said of the laws of economic development, the laws of political economy—whether in the period of capitalism or in the period of socialism. Here, too, the laws of economic development, as in the case of natural science, are objective laws, reflecting processes of economic development which take place independently of the will of man.

3. How do we go about planning the economy? There is not enough attention given to light industry, to agriculture.

4. That is why Engels says in the same book: “The laws of his own social action, hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of nature foreign to and dominating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him”. (Anti-Dühring)

4. Freedom is necessary objective law understood by people. Such law confronts people, is independent of them. But once people understand it, they can control it.

5. The specific role of Soviet government was due to two circumstances: first, that what Soviet government had to do was not to replace one form of exploitation by another, as was the case in earlier revolutions, but to abolish exploitation altogether; second, that in view of the absence in the country of any readymade rudiments of a socialist economy, it had to create new, socialist forms of economy, “starting from scratch”, so to speak.

5. The inevitability of socialist economic laws—that is something that needs to be studied. At the Ch’engtu conference I said that we would have to see whether or not our general programme (“More! Faster! Better! More economically!” the three concurrent promotions, and the mass line) would
flop; or if it could succeed. This cannot be demonstrated for several or even as many as ten years. The laws of the revolution, which used to be doubted by some, have now been proved correct because the enemy has been overthrown. Can socialist construction work? People still have doubts. Does our Chinese practice conform to the economic laws of China? This has to be studied. My view is that if the practice conforms generally, things will be all right.

6. This [creating new, socialist forms of economy "from scratch"] was undoubtedly a difficult, complex, and unprecedented task.

6. With respect to the creating of socialist economic forms we have the precedent of the Soviet Union and for this reason should do a bit better than they. If we ruin things it will show that Chinese Marxism does not work. As to the difficulty and complexity of the tasks, things are no different from what the Soviet Union faced.

7. It is said that the necessity for balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy in our country enables the Soviet government to abolish existing economic laws and to create new ones. That is absolutely untrue. Our yearly and five yearly plans must not be confused with the objective economic law of balanced, proportionate development of the national economy.

7. This is the crux of the matter.

8. That means that the law of balanced development of the national economy makes it possible for our planning

* Mao is here talking about the excessive purchase of grain at the end of 1954 and the consequent rural grain shortages in spring of 1955. Subsequently, the quota for state purchases was reduced by 7 billion catties and tension in the countryside eased. These occurrences, however, took place in the spring of 1955, not at the end of that year, which was characterized by the continuing high tide of collectivization in China's countryside.
medium, and the small, the region and the centre; nor did they promote concurrently industry and agriculture. They have not walked on two legs at all. Their rules and regulations hamstrung people. But we have not adequately studied and grasped our situation, and as a result our plans have not fully reflected objective laws either.

9. Let us examine Engels' formula. Engels' formula cannot be considered fully clear and precise, because it does not indicate whether it is referring to the seizure by society of all or only part of the means of production; that is whether all or only part of the means of production are converted into public property. Hence, this formula of Engels' may be understood either way.

9. This analysis touches the essentials! The problem is dividing the means of production into two parts. To say the means of production are not commodities deserves study.

10. In this section, Commodity Production Under Socialism, Stalin has not comprehensively set forth the conditions for the existence of commodities. The existence of two kinds of ownership is the main premise for commodity production. But ultimately commodity production is also related to the productive forces. For this reason, even under completely socialized public ownership, commodity exchange will still have to be operative in some areas.

11. It follows from this that Engels has in mind countries where capitalism and the concentration of production have advanced far enough both in industry and agriculture to permit the expropriation of all the means of production in the country and their conversion into public property. Engels, consequently, considers that in such countries, parallel with the socialization of all the means of production, commodity production should be put an end to. And that, of course, is correct.

11. Stalin's analysis of Engels' formula is correct. At present there is a strong tendency to do away with commodity production. People get upset the minute they see commodity production, taking it for capitalism itself. But it looks as if commodity production will have to be greatly developed and the money supply increased for the sake of the solidarity of several hundred million peasants. This poses a problem for the ideology of several hundred thousand cadres as well as for the solidarity of several hundred million peasants. We now possess only a part of the means of production. But it appears that there are those who wish to declare at once ownership by the whole people, divesting the small and medium producers. But they fail to declare the category of ownership! Is it to be commune-owned or county-owned? To abolish commodities and commodity production in this way, merely by declaring public ownership, is to strip the peasantry. At the end of 1955, procurement and purchase got us almost 90 billion catties of grain, causing us no little trouble. Everyone was talking about food, and household after household was talking about unified purchase. But it was purchase, after all not allocation. Only later did the crisis ease when we made the decision to make this 83 billion catties of grain. I cannot understand why people have forgotten these things so promptly.

12. I leave aside in this instance the question of the importance of foreign trade to Britain and the vast part it plays in her national economy. I think that only after an investigation of this question can it be finally decided what would be the future [fate] of commodity production in Britain after the proletariat had assumed power and all the means of production had been nationalized.

12. Fate depends on whether or not commodity production is abolished.

13. But here is a question: What are the proletariat and its party to do in countries, ours being a case in point, where the conditions are favourable for the assumption of power by the proletariat and the overthrow of capitalism [where capitalism has so concentrated the means of production in industry that they may be expropriated and made
the property of society, but where agriculture, notwithstanding the growth of capitalism, is divided up among numerous small and medium owner-producers to such an extent as to make it impossible to consider the expropriation of these producers?... [This] would throw the peasantry into the camp of the enemies of the proletariat for a long time.

13. In sum, the principle governing commodity production was not grasped. Chinese economists are Marxist-Leninists as far as book learning goes. But when they encounter economic practice Marxism-Leninism gets short-changed. Their thinking is confused. If we make mistakes we will lead the peasantry to the enemy side.

14. Lenin's answer may be briefly summed up as follows:
(a) Favourable conditions for the assumption of power should not be missed—the proletariat should assume power without waiting until capitalism has succeeded in ruining the millions of small and medium individual producers;
(b) The means of production in industry should be expropriated and converted into public property;
(c) As to the small and medium individual producers, they should be gradually united in producers' cooperatives, i.e., in large agricultural enterprises, collective farms;
(d) Industry should be developed to the utmost and the collective farms should be placed on the modern technical basis of large-scale production, not expropriating them, but on the contrary generously supplying them with first-class tractors and other machines;
(e) In order to ensure an economic bond between town and country, between industry and agriculture, commodity production (exchange through purchase and sale) should be preserved for a certain period, it being the form of economic tie with the town which is alone-acceptable to the peasants, and Soviet trade—state, cooperative, and collective-farm—should be developed to the full and the capitalists of all types and descriptions ousted from trading activity.

The history of socialist construction in our country has shown that this path of development, mapped out by Lenin, has fully justified itself.

19. There can be no doubt that in the case of all capitalist countries with a more or less numerous class of small and medium producers, this path of development is the only possible and expedient one for the victory of socialism.

14. The passage has a correct analysis. Take conditions in China. There is development. These five points are all correct.

15. Our policy toward the national bourgeoisie has been to redeem their property.

16. We are developing the people's communes on an ever-larger scale.

17. This is precisely what we are doing now.

18. There are those who want no commodity production, but they are wrong. On commodity production we still have to take it from Stalin, who, in turn, got it from Lenin. Lenin had said to devote the fullest energies to developing commerce. We would rather say, devote the fullest energies to developing industry, agriculture, and commerce. The essence of the problem is the peasant question. There are those who regard the peasant as even more conscious than the workers. We have carried through or are in the process of carrying through on these five items. Some areas still have to be developed, such as commune-run industry or concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture.

19. Lenin said the same thing.

20. Commodity production must not be regarded as something sufficient unto itself, something independent of the surrounding economic conditions. Commodity production is older than capitalist production. It existed in slave-
owning society, and served it, but did not lead to capitalism. It existed in feudal society and served it, yet, although it prepared some of the conditions for capitalist production, it did not lead to capitalism.

21. Bearing in mind that in our country commodity production is not so boundless and all-embracing as it is under capitalist conditions, being confirmed within strict bounds thanks to such decisive economic conditions as social ownership of the means of production, the abolition of the system of wage labour, and the elimination of the system of exploitation, why then, one asks, cannot commodity production similarly serve our socialist society for a certain period without leading to capitalism?

20. This statement is a little exaggerated. But it is true that commodity production was not a capitalist institution exclusively.

21. This second plenary session of the Central Committee suggested policies of utilizing, restricting, and transforming commodity production.

22. This condition is fully operative in China.

23. This point is entirely correct. We no longer have such circumstances and conditions. There are those who fear commodities. Without exception they fear capitalism, not realizing that with the elimination of capitalists it is allowable to expand commodity production vastly. We are still backward in commodity production, behind Brazil and India. Commodity production is not an isolated thing. Look at the context: capitalism or socialism. In a capitalist context it is capitalist commodity production. In a socialist context it is socialist commodity production. Commodity production has existed since ancient times. Buying and selling began in what history calls the Shang ["Commerce"] dynasty. The last king of the Shang dynasty, Chou, was competent in civil and military matters, but he was turned into a villain along with the first emperor of the Ch’in and Ts’ao Ts’ao. This is wrong. “Better to have no books than complete faith in them.” In capitalist society there are no socialist institutions considered as social institutions but the working class and socialist ideology do exist in capitalist society. The thing that determines commodity production is the surrounding economic conditions. The question is, can commodity production be regarded as a useful instrument for furthering socialist production? I think commodity production will serve socialism quite tamely. This can be discussed among the cadres.

24. It is said that, since the domination of social ownership of the means of production has been established in our country, and the system of wage labour and exploitation has been abolished, commodity production has lost all meaning and should therefore be done away with.

24. Change “our country” to “China” and it becomes most intriguing.

25. Today there are two basic forms of socialist production in our country: state, or publicly owned production and collective farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned.

25. “Today” refers to 1952, thirty-five years after their revolution. We stand but nine years from ours. He refers to two basic forms. In the communes not only land and machinery but labour, seeds, and other means of production as well are commune-owned. Thus the output is so owned. But don’t think the Chinese peasants are so wonderfully advanced. In Hsiuwu county, Honan, the party secretary was concerned whether or not, in the event of flood or famine, the state would pay wages after public ownership was declared and the free supply system instituted. He was also concerned that in times of bumper harvest the state would transfer away public grain but not pay wages either, leaving the peasants to suffer whether the harvest succeeds or fails.

—Mencius. Mao seems to mean “Let’s not make a stock villain out of commodity production pedantically”.

CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
This represents the concern of the peasants. Marxists should be concerned with these problems. Our commodity production should be developed to the fullest, but it is going to take fifteen years or more and patience as well. We have waged war for decades. Now we still have to have patience, to wait for Taiwan’s liberation, to wait for socialist construction to be going well. Don’t hope for early victories!

26. [How the two basic forms of ownership will ultimately become one] is a special question which requires separate discussion.

26. Stalin is avoiding the issue, having failed to find a method or suitable formulation [on the transition from collective to public ownership.]

27. Consequently, our commodity production is not of the ordinary type, but is a special kind of commodity production, commodity production without capitalists, which is concerned mainly with the goods of associated socialist producers (the state, the collective farms, the co-operatives). The sphere of action of which is confined to items of personal consumption obviously cannot possibly develop into capitalist production, and which together with its “money economy”, is designed to serve the development and consolidation of socialist production.

27. The “sphere of action” is not limited to items of individual consumption. Some means of production have to be classed as commodities. If agricultural output consists of commodities but industrial output does not, then how is exchange going to be carried out? If “our country” is changed to “China”, the paragraph becomes all the more interesting to read. In China not only consumer goods but agricultural means of production have to be supplied. Stalin never sold means of production to the peasants. Khrushchev changed that.

28. (Chairman Mao commented on page 13 of the original text): Let us not confuse the problem of the dividing line between socialism and communism with the problem of the dividing line between collective and public ownership. The collective ownership system leaves us with the problem of commodity production, the goal of which is consolidating the worker-peasant alliance and developing production. Today there are those who say that the communism of the peasants is glorious. After one trip to the rural areas they think the peasantry is simply wonderful, that they are about to enter paradise, that they are better than the workers. This is the surface phenomenon. We shall have to see if the peasants really have a communist spirit, and more than that, we shall have to examine the commune ownership system, including the extent to which the means of production and subsistence belong to communal collective ownership. As the county party committee secretary of Hsiuwu, Honan, said, we still have to develop commodity production, and not charge blindly ahead.

29. Further, I think that we must also discard certain other concepts taken from Marx’s Capital—where Marx was concerned with an analysis of capitalism—and artificially applied to our socialist relations... It is natural that Marx used concepts (categories) which fully corresponded to capitalist relations. But it is strange to say the least, to use these concepts now, when the working class is not only not bereft of power and means of production, but, on the contrary, is in possession of the power, and controls the means of production. Talk of labour power being a commodity, and of “hiring” of workers sounds rather absurd now, under our system, as though the working class, which possesses means of production, hires itself and sells its labour power to itself.

29. In particular, the means of production in the industrial sector.

30. Commodity production has to be vastly developed, not for profits but for the peasantry, the agricultural industrial alliance, and the development of production.

31. Specially after rectification. After the rectification and
THE STALIN QUESTION

anti-rightist campaigns labour power was no longer a commodity. It was in the service of the people, not the dollar. The labour power question is not resolved until labour power is no longer a commodity.

32. It is sometimes asked whether the law of value exists and operates in our country, under the socialist system.

32. The law of value does not have a regulative function. Planning and politics-in-command play that role.

33. True, that law of value has no regulating function in our socialist production.

33. In our society the law of value has no regulative function, that is, has no determinative function. Planning determines production, e.g., for hogs or steel we do not use the law of value; we rely on planning.


THE BASIC ECONOMIC LAW


The Twenty-Second Party Congress has made an outstanding contribution to scientific communism, disclosing the basic laws governing the transition from the first phase of communism to its second, higher phase. It provided a scientific explanation of the content and method of the work of laying the material and technical foundation of communism; of the conditions for attaining abundance of blessings of life for all members of society; of the way of gradually approximating and then merging the two forms of socialist property into a single communist property of all the peoples; of the way of eliminating the social, economic, and cultural distinctions between town and country and those existing in their way of life; of the organic merging of mental and manual labour in the productive activities of man; of the transformation of work into the prime want of life of all members of society; of the gradual transition to the communist principle of distribution of material and cultural wealth according to need, etc....

The cult of Stalin's personality has caused considerable damage to the progress of economic science and to practical economic activity in the USSR. The condemnation of this cult by the 20th Congress has removed the danger that Stalin's erroneous propositions on essential questions pertaining to the development of the socialist economy would have an adverse effect on the country's economic policy and growth, and opened great prospects for further progress in economic science.

At the USSR conference which discussed the problems arising in ideological work it has been stated that in the field of economic theory Stalin committed serious errors on questions pertaining to the way of raising collective-farm property to the level of the property of all the people; to the curtailing of commodity circulation and replacing it by barter; he erred in affirming that under the socialist system the purchasing power of the population should always outstrip actual production. He supplied a faulty explanation of the source of commodity production under socialism; he was wrong in excluding the production of means of production from the sphere of commodity production; equally wrong was his proposition that the over-all volume of production in the leading capitalist countries was bound to drop in the postwar period, etc.

The Party has demonstrated how untenable were Stalin's assertions regarding the prospect of transition from socialism to communism and formulated a truly scientific programme of communist construction.

Let us dwell briefly on some of Stalin's unsustainable propositions which had wide currency in the past. In the Eco-
nomic Problems of Socialism  Stalin advanced the thesis that the raising of collective farm property to the level of public property would call for the exclusion of collective-farm production surpluses from the system of commodity circulation and their inclusion in a system of barter between state industry and collective farms. Life has demonstrated that this proposition is totally untenable. Underlying this fallacious assertion are two gross theoretical errors.

First, Stalin held that the output of a collective farm was the farm's only item of property. But it is wrong to imagine that the only property owned by a collective farm is its produce. In addition to it collective farm property includes machinery, beef and dairy cattle and draught animals, workshops and their small ancillary plants, perennial plantings, farm structures and cultural and utility facilities, irrigation installations, various material, cash funds, etc.

Second, Stalin subordinated the transformation of socialist production relations into communist ones not to the growth of social production but to the growth of the volume of exchange, to either the safeguarding or abolition of commodity circulation between town and country. Hence, in the resolving of the economic problems of communist construction he shifted the emphasis to the sphere of exchange of the necessities of life and urged to initiate communist transformations not in the sphere of production but in the sphere of circulation. This is in absolute opposition to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the two phases of communist formation and to the economic tenet of Marxism-Leninism, which is based on the premise that production plays a determining role.

The Party has resolutely rejected the wrong road to communism proposed by Stalin, a road running through the transformation of economic relations primarily in the sphere of circulation. Our Party has creatively advanced the Marxist-Leninist teachings on communism and generalized the rich practical experience accumulated in communist construction, and on this basis it has supplied a comprehensive analysis of the laws governing the gradual transition to the higher stage of communism. "We value communism only when it rests on a sound economic foundation," Lenin said. Guided by Lenin's idea, our Party has provided in its Programme a clear explanation of the road to follow in the work of building communism, stressing that the creation of a material and technical base and an immense growth of the social productive forces are the decisive factors in the transition to communism.

Contrary to Stalin's untenable assertion that collective-farm property becomes to a certain extent a break holding back the advance to communism, the Party has demonstrated that collective-farm property has not outlived itself, and that it is imperative to take advantage of every potentiality inherent in this form of property in order to stimulate a rapid rise in farm production on the road to communist society, and to promote further progress in the social relations in the countryside.

Stalin advanced a totally faulty proposition hampering practical work, that in the course of communist construction commodity and money relations outlive themselves and retard our progress toward communism, and that therefore the sphere of action of commodity circulation should be curtailed, and, conversely, the sphere of barter should be extended. Adhering to a scientific interpretation of the laws governing social progress during the period of transition to communism, our Party has pointed out in its Programme that in the work of building a communist society the fullest use should be made of commodity and money relations, in keeping with the new content they acquire under the socialist system.

[From New Age: Political Monthly of the Communist Party of India, May 1962]

* V. I. Lenin, Works, Vol. 29, p. 163.

T. S. Q.—21
[Khrushchev's secret speech led to sharp split of the world
communist opinion into three camps: the defenders of
Stalin; those seeking a mildly critical middle position;
and those fully supporting Khrushchev's stand. The Commu-
nist Parties of U.S.A. and Great Britain opened the pages
of their organs to the spokesmen of all the three camps.
The Party leadership, almost in all countries, with a few
exception in Great Britain, openly endorsed the pronounce-
ment of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. William
Z. Foster, leader of the U.S. Communist Party thus
wrote in the Daily Worker on March 28, 1956: "The essence
of Stalin's errors is that he multiplied, complicated, and
intensified a number of mistakes by his virtual liquidation
of collective leadership and by the omniscience and extreme
adulation with which he surrounded himself". The British
Communist leader R. P. Dutt wrote entirely in a different
tone in the May issue of his Labour Monthly: "What are
the essential theme of the Great Debate? Not about Stalin.
That there should be spots on any Sun would only startle
an inveterate Mithra-worshipper... To imagine that a great
revolution can develop without a million cross-currents:
hardships, injustices and excesses would be a delusion fit
only for ivory-tower dwellers in fairyland..." On May 13,
the Executive Committee of the CPGB adopted a resolution
which formally acknowledged that "a number of serious
mistakes and grave abuses had developed in the Soviet
Union between 1934 and 1935". On the same day Harry
Pollitt resigned as General Secretary of the Party. On
June 21, however, the Political Committee of the CPGB
issued a long statement in which while "regretting that a
public statement on the question had not been made by
the CPSU", it endorsed the CPSU's view concerning
Stalin. The Italian and French Communist Parties, how-
ever, while endorsing the Soviet Party's stand on the fight
against the Stalin cult in general, expressed their deep
dissatisfaction on many points and pressed the CPSU for
further clarification. In his replies to the nine questions
posed by Nuovi Argomenti regarding the Twentieth
Congress, Palmiro Togliatti pointed out the unsatisfactory
explanation given of the origin and development of Stalin's
errors. Relevant excerpt is given below.
In reply to these comments and criticisms the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee published its resolution of June 30, 1956.
relevant extracts from which we reproduce below.
In the meantime two world conferences of Communist and
Workers' Parties were held in Moscow, one in 1957 and the
other in 1960 to iron out differences and forge communist
unity. But in the Soviet Union itself, the fight against the
Stalin cult met with vehement opposition from a group of
reputed party leaders. The Chinese and Albanian Parties
too increased their attack on Soviet attitude to Stalin. As a
result Khrushchev came out with his fresh attack on the
Stalin cult at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961.
We reproduce below relevant portions from Khrushchev's
22nd Congress speech and the Albanian Party's reply to
Khrushchev's attack.]
Q. 5. Do you believe that the personal dictatorship of Stalin came about contrary to, and outside, Russian historical and political traditions, or that instead it was a development of these traditions?

Q. 6. Stalin’s personal dictatorship, to maintain and advance itself, made use of a series of coercive measures which in the West, since the French Revolution, has been called “terror”. Do you feel that this “terror” was necessary?

I shall reply to these two questions at the same time because, aside from their concrete formulation, which would limit the inquiry to theme of a particular order, they permit, once this limitation is overcome, facing the question which logically present itself at this point: that is, how is it that in Soviet society the mistakes denounced at the XXth Congress could have been perpetrated, and how was it possible for a situation to arise and last for a long time in which democratic life and Socialist legality underwent continual, serious, and extended violations? As can well be imagined, to this can be joined the question of co-responsibility for these mistakes of the entire political leadership group, including the comrades who today have taken the initiative, both in denouncing and in correcting the evil which had previously been committed, and the consequences which derived from it.

Two explanations have been advanced regarding co-responsibility. One is the more obvious and was examined by us in the discussion which took place within our party. It was also expounded by Comrade Courtade in a series of articles appearing in Humanite, and, if we can believe what the journalists report, also by Comrade Khrushchev in reply to a question put to him at a reception. The removal of Stalin from power when the seriousness of the mistakes that he was committing became apparent, while “legally possible”, in practice was impossible because, if the question had been aired, a conflict would have ensued which probably would have compromised the future of the revolution and of the state, against which the weapons of all parts of the world were pointed. It would suffice to have had even superficial contact with Soviet public opinion, in the years Stalin was ruling the country, and to have followed the International situation of those years to realize that this point is very true. Today, for example, the Soviet leaders denounce specific errors, and a moment of lack of confidence by Stalin at the outset of the war. But who in the Soviet Union at that time would have understood and accepted, I won’t say the removal of Stalin but only a diminution of his authority? There would have been a collapse if this had been or even suspected. And the same holds true for other times. The observation made by Khrushchev explains, it is true, the difficulty confronting those individuals who would have wished to correct the situation, but at the same time Khrushchev’s explanation complicates the over-all picture and increases its seriousness. We are forced to admit that either the mistakes Stalin made were unknown to the great mass of the leading cadres of the nation, and therefore to the people and this does not seem likely—or else they were not regarded as errors by this mass of cadres, and therefore by the public opinion which they (the cadres) guided and led. As you see, I rule out the explanation that a change was impossible solely because of the presence of a military, police, terror apparatus which controlled the situation with its means. The same apparatus consisted of, and was led by, men who in a serious moment of stress, for example such as Hitler’s attack, would have likewise been subject to elemental reactions if a crisis had developed. To me it seems much fairer to recognize that Stalin, in spite of the errors which he
was committing, continued to command the solidarity of the overwhelming majority of the nation, and above all had the support of his leading cadres and also of the masses. Was this because Stalin not only erred, but also did good, "he did a great deal for the Soviet Union", "he was the most convinced of Marxists, and had the strongest faith in the people"? [Quotes from Khrushchev's speech.] Comrade Khrushchev himself recognized this in the declarations referred to above, correcting in this way the strange but understandable error that was made, I feel, at the XXth Congress in maintaining silence on the subject of the merits of Stalin. But this does not explain everything, and it does not explain everything specifically because of the gravity of the mistakes which are being denounced today. The explanation can only be determined through careful and profound investigation of the manner in which the system characterized by Stalin's errors came about. Only in this way will it be possible to understand how these errors are not only something personal, but go deeper into the very roots of Soviet life. If I am not mistaken another explanation on why the necessary corrections were not made before has been given by Khrushchev, who states that if these could not be made it was because the position of state and Party leaders regarding Stalin's errors was not uniform at all times. There were, then, times when there was full solidarity of the others with Stalin, and this solidarity was the expression, specifically, of the consensus which we discussed above.

Here we must admit openly and without hesitation that while the XXth Congress greatly aided the proper understanding and solution of many serious and new problems confronting the democratic and socialist movement, and while it marks a most important milestone in the evolution of Soviet society, it is not possible, however, to consider satisfactory the position which was taken at the Congress and which today is being fully developed in the Soviet press regarding the errors of Stalin and the causes and conditions which made them possible.

The basic cause of everything allegedly lies in the "personality cult", and in the cult of one person with specific and serious faults who lacked modesty, leaned toward personal power, who at times erred because of incompetence, was not loyal in his relations with the other leaders, who had a megalomania for self-aggrandizement and excessive self-love, was suspicious in the extreme, and at the end through the exercise of personal power reached the point where he detached himself from the people, neglected his work, and even submitted to an obvious form of persecution mania. The present Soviet leaders knew Stalin much better than we (I will, perhaps, have occasion to speak at some other time of some contacts I had with him), and therefore we must believe them today when they describe him in this manner. We can only think, among ourselves, that since this was the case, aside from the impossibility of a timely change as already discussed, at least they could have been more prudent in those public and solemn exaltations of this man's qualities to which they had accustomed us. It is true that today they criticize themselves, and this is to their great credit, but in this criticism they are losing without doubt a little of their own prestige. But aside from this, as long as we confine ourselves, in substance, to denouncing the personal faults of Stalin as the cause of everything we remain within the realm of the "personality cult". First, all that was good was attributed to the superhuman, positive qualities of one man; now all that is evil is attributed to his equally exceptional and even astonishing faults. In the one case, as well as in the other, we are outside the criterion of judgment intrinsic in Marxism. The true problems are evaded, which are why and how Soviet society could reach and did reach certain forms alien to the democratic way and to the legality which it had set for itself, even to the point of degeneration. This study must be made following the various stages of development of this society, and it is our Soviet comrades above all others who have to do it because they know the situation better than we, who might err because of partial...
or erroneous knowledge of the facts.

We are reminded, first of all, that Lenin, in his last speeches and writings, stressed the danger of bureaucracy which threatened the new society. It seems to us that undoubtedly Stalin's errors were tied in with an excessive increase in the bureaucratic apparatus in Soviet economic and political life, and perhaps, above all, in Party life. And here it is extremely difficult to distinguish between cause and effect. The one gradually became the expression of the other. Is this excessive bureaucratic burden also a traditional outgrowth of political and organizational forms and customs of Old Russia?

Perhaps this cannot be ruled out and, in fact, I think Lenin says something to this effect; bear in mind, however, that following the revolution the leadership underwent a complete or nearly complete change, and we then are not so much interested in evaluating the residue of the old, as we are in the fact that a new type of bureaucratic leadership was growing from the new leadership class when this class was assuming entirely new tasks.

The first years after the revolution were hard and terrible years marked by superhuman difficulties, foreign intervention, war, and civil war. A maximum of power centralization was required along with severe repressive measures to crush the counter-revolution. In this period, as in time of war, this was inevitable: if a task is not carried out, the guilty party is brought to speedy justice! Lenin, in a letter to Dzerzhinsky and now made public, foresaw that a change of direction would have to be made when the counter-revolution and foreign invasion were completely eliminated, which came some years before his death. It will have to be determined if this change in course was actually accomplished, or if, almost because of inertia, a part of that which was destined for amendment or rejection was consolidated. At this time the fight erupted between groups who were at odds over the possibilities of socialist economic development, and this naturally had a widespread influence on all of Soviet life. This struggle also had all the elements of a real battle, which was decisive in determining who would assume power, and which had to be won at any price.

And it was in this period that Stalin assumed a positive role and the sound forces of the Party rallied and united around him. Now it can be observed that these forces rallied around Stalin and, guided by him, accepted such modifications in the function of the Party and of its directing organisms, i.e., the new functioning of the apparatus controlled from above, as a result of which either they could not offer opposition when the evils began to appear, or else at the outset they did not fully understand that they were evils.

Perhaps we are not in error in asserting that the damaging restrictions placed on the democratic regime, and the gradual emergence of bureaucratic organizational forms stemmed from the Party.

More important it seems to me should be a close examination of that which followed, when the first Five-Year Plan was carried out, and agricultural collectivization was realized. Here we are dealing with fundamental questions. The successes attained were great, in fact, superlative. A large socialist industrial system was created without foreign assistance or loans, through commitment and development of the internal forces of the new society.

The rural social structure was also overhauled, albeit in a less definite way, beset by excessive haste, errors, and significant difficulties. The results were something the world had never seen before and which few outside the Soviet Union would have believed possible. These results confirmed the victory of the October Revolution and the correctness of the political line used against opponents and enemies of every sort. They also marked the beginning of some erroneous trends which had serious and bad after-effects. In the exaltation of the achievements there prevailed, particularly in the then current propaganda but also in the general political line, a tendency to exaggerate, to consider all problems already
solved and objective contradictions, difficulties, and differences which are always inherent in the development of a society, as having been overcome. These objective contradictions, difficulties, and differences often are extremely serious in the building of a socialist society, and cannot be overcome unless they are fully and openly recognized and the working classes are called upon to face and resolve them with their labour and creative work. However, in this period one had the feeling in the Soviet Union that the leaders, even if they were aware of the true conditions, failed to present correctly these problems to the Party and the people. Perhaps this was based upon a fear of detracting in some way from the greatness and vastness of achievements realized. At a Party school which some students sent by us attended, a bitter debate lasting for months took place against those who had praised the “sacrifices” made by the Russian workers for the success of the Five-Year Plan. They were not supposed to mention sacrifices; otherwise what would the workers in the West think? But there had been sacrifices, because living conditions during the first Five-Year Plan had been extremely trying, and the working class does not become frightened when you tell them that extra effort and sacrifice are necessary to build socialism; on the contrary, this stimulates and raises the class spirit of the vanguard. This is a small episode but it demonstrates, as we were saying, an erroneous orientation in principle, because it is an error of principle to believe that once the first great successes are achieved socialist construction goes ahead by itself and not through the inter-play of contradictions of a new type, which must be solved within the framework of the new society by the action of the masses and of the party which leads them.

Two main consequences arose from this, I believe. The first was the stagnation of activity of the masses in the various places and organizations (Party, labour unions, factory, soviets) where the new and real difficulties of the situation should have been faced, and where, instead, writings and speeches full of pompous statements, of ready-made slogans, etc. began to become widespread. These were cold and ineffective because they had lost touch with life. True creative debate began to disappear little by little and at the same time the very activity of the masses diminished, directed more by orders from above than by its own stimulus. But the second consequence was still more serious. When reality came into play and difficulties came to light as the result of the imbalance and contrasts which still existed everywhere, there occurred little by little, until at last it was the main force, the tendency to consider that, always and in every case, every evil, every obstacle in the application of the plan, every difficulty in supplying provisions, in delivering raw materials, in the development of the various sectors of industry or agriculture, etc.—all was due to sabotage, to the work of class enemies, counter-revolutionary groups operating clandestinely, etc. It is not that these things did not exist; they did indeed exist. The Soviet Union was surrounded by merciless enemies who were ready to resort to any means to damage and to check its rise. But this erroneous trend in judging the objective situation caused a loss of the sense of limits, made them lose the idea of the borderline between good and evil, friend and enemy, incapacity or weakness and conscious hostility and betrayal, contrasts and difficulties which come from things and from the hostile action of one who has sworn to ruin you. Stalin gave a pseudo-scientific formulation to this fearful confusion through his erroneous thesis of the inherent increase in enemies and in the sharpening of the class struggle with the progress of building socialism. This made permanent and aggravated the confusion itself and was the origin of the unheard-of violations of socialist legality which have been denounced publicly today. It is necessary, however, to search more deeply in order to understand how these positions could be accepted and become popular. One of the lines of search will have to be the one indicated by us, if everything is to be understood. Stalin was at the same time the expression and
the maker of a situation, because he had shown himself the
most expert organizer and leader of a bureaucratic-type appa-
ratus at the time when this got the better of the democratic;
forms of life, as well as because he provided a doctrinal justi-
fication of what was in reality an erroneous line and on which
later was based his personal power, to the point of taking on
degenerate forms. All this explains the consensus (solidarity)
which surrounded him, which lasted until his demise, and
which still perhaps has retained some effectiveness.

Do not forget that even when this power of his was establi-
shed, Soviet society did not want for successes. These were
in the economic, political, cultural, and military fields, as well
as in the field of international relations. No one can deny that
in 1953 the Soviet Union was incomparably stronger, better
developed in every direction, more solid internally, and more
authoritative vis-a-vis the rest of the world than, e.g., at the
time of the first Five-Year Plan. How was it possible that so
many errors did not prevent so many successes? To this,
too, the Soviet leaders must give an answer, knowing that
today this is one of the problems which torment the sincere
militants of the international workers' movement. To what
point, from what time, and to what extent did the mistakes of
Stalin compromise the political line of the Party and create
related difficulties; what bearing did these difficulties have,
and how, in spite of those mistakes was it possible to pro-
gress? On the basis of what we know, we can only make a
few general statements which we are prepared to revise if
necessary. It seems to us that it must be recognized that the
line followed in building socialism continued to be correct,
even if the mistakes which have been denounced are such that
they must have seriously limited the success of its application.
This, however, is one of the points which will require the
greatest explanation because the restriction, and in some cases
even the disappearance, of democratic life is an essential ques-
tion as regards the validity of a political line. It seems irre-
futable to us, at any rate, that the bureaucratization of the-

Party, of the state organisms, of the labour unions, and, above
call, of the peripheral organisms which are the most important,
must have checked and compressed the democratic functioning
of the state and the creative drive of the entire society with real,
evident damage resulting therefrom. On the other hand
the very successes achieved, in peace and in war and after the
war, are proof of the remarkable capacity for work enthusiasm,
and sacrifice of the popular masses in whatever situation, of
their continued adherence to the goals which the policies of
the Party placed before the entire nation and which were
achieved through their work. It is difficult to say, e.g., what
other nation would have been capable of resisting, recovering,
and finally winning, with Hitler in the suburbs of Moscow and
then on the Volga, and in view of the terrible straits of war-
time. It must be concluded, therefore, that the substance of
the socialist regime was not lost, because none of its previous
conquests was lost, especially not the adhesion to the regime
on the part of the masses of workers, peasants, and intellec-
tuals who form Soviet society. This same adhesion proves
that, despite everything, this society maintained its fundamen-
tally democratic character.

We have said several times that it is the duty of our Soviet
comrades to face some of the questions raised by us and to
furnish the necessary elements for a comprehensive answer.
Thus far they have developed the criticism of the "personality
cult" above all by correcting the erroneous historical and poli-
tical judgments of facts and people and destroying the
myths and legends created for the purpose of exalting one single
person. This is very good, but it is not all that one must
expect of them. What is more important today is to reply
correctly, by a Marxist criterion, to the question of how the
mistakes which have been denounced today were interwoven
with the development of socialist society, and whether there
did not intervene at a certain moment in the very development
of this society certain elements of disturbance, mistakes of a
general character, against which the whole camp of socialism
The Stalin question must be put on guard—I mean all those who are already building socialism according to a path of their own and those who are still seeking their own path. One may readily agree that the central problem is to safeguard the democratic characteristics of socialist society; but what must be studied thoroughly and clarified are the problems pertaining to the inter-relation of political democracy and economic democracy, of internal democracy and the leadership function of the party with the democratic operation of the state, and how a mistake made in one of these fields may have repercussions on the entire system.

[Nuovi Argomenti, No. 20]

STATEMENT OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (Excerpts)
JUNE 18, 1956

The French Communists, as do the Communists of all countries, denounce the arbitrary acts of which Stalin is accused and which are contrary to the principles of Marxism-Leninism....

The explanation given up to now of Stalin's errors, their origin, and the conditions under which they developed, are not satisfactory. A thorough Marxist analysis to determine all the circumstances under which Stalin was able to exercise his personal power is indispensable.

It was wrong, while Stalin was still living, to shower him with dithyrambic praise and to give him the exclusive credit for all the successes in the Soviet Union which were due to a correct general policy in the construction of socialism. This attitude contributed to the development of the cult of the individual and negatively influenced the international labour movement. Today it is wrong to blame Stalin alone for every negative act of the CPSU.

Stalin played a positive role in a whole historic period. With the other leaders of the Party, he took an active part in the October Socialist Revolution, then in the victorious struggle against foreign intervention and counter-revolution. After the death of Lenin, he fought against the adversaries of Marxism-Leninism and for the application of the Leninist plan for the construction of socialism. He contributed in great measure to the formation of all Communist Parties.

Stalin acquired a deserved prestige, which he allowed to be transformed into a cult of the individual. The development of this cult was facilitated by the position of the Soviet Union, for a long time exposed alone to the undertakings of a world of enemies. This necessitated an extreme test of the people's strength, an iron discipline, and strict centralization of power of the proletarian state. These circumstances help to explain the enormous difficulties which the Soviet Union had to face, without justifying Stalin's activities, however. He committed a number of violations of Soviet legality; he carried out arbitrary repressive measures against militant Communists; he transgressed party principles, and, using condemnable methods, he did great harm to the Soviet Union and to the International Communist movement.

[ L'HUMANITE, Paris, June 19, 1956 ]

Resolution of the C.C. of the Communist Party of India on STRUGGLE AGAINST CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN CPSU (Excerpts)
JULY 1-11, 1956

...The cult of the individual belittled the role of the masses and the party, came in the way of the growth of their initiative. By undertaking these tasks, the CPSU leadership has rendered a great service to the cause of socialism....

It is evident that Stalin was mainly responsible for the
distortions of Soviet democracy and for the violation of inner-
party norms. It is also incontestable that in the later period of
his life, the cult of the individual assumed enormous propor-
tions. While fully recognising the negative features and
grave defects that developed in Stalin's methods of leadership,
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India
considers that a onesided appraisal of his role during the last
twenty years of mighty development in the USSR and the
world communist movement, causes bewilderment among the
masses and can be utilised by enemies of communism to con-
fuse them. The Central Committee, therefore, is of the opinion
that an objective assessment of Stalin's life and work in their
entirety, Stalin's great achievements and serious short-comings,
is essential for successfully fighting the cult of the individual
and for effectively combating the prevailing confusion.

The Central Committee considers that the excessive glori-
fication of Stalin's person and role which became a marked
phenomenon during his lifetime requires adequate explanation.
It is also necessary to undertake a fuller analysis of the causes
which led to the arbitrary acts and excesses. It is only then that
a correct appraisal of the growth of the cult of the individual
can be made. To ascribe all shortcomings and arbitrariness
to the defects of an individual falls short of Marxist-Leninist
standards of historic objectivity.

RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPSU (Excerpt)
JUNE 30, 1956

How could the cult of the person of J. V. Stalin, with all
its negative consequences, have arisen and become wide-spread
under conditions of the Soviet socialist system?

When examining this question it is necessary to keep in
mind both the objective, concrete historical conditions in which
socialism has been built in the USSR and certain subjective
factors connected with Stalin's personal qualities.

The October Socialist Revolution has gone down in history
as a classical example of the revolutionary transformation of a
capitalist society carried out under the leadership of the working
class. From the example of the heroic struggle of the Bolshevnik Party of the world's first socialist state, the
USSR, Communist Parties of other countries, and all pro-
gressive and democratic forces are learning to solve the basic
social questions arising from present-day social development.
In the course of almost 40 years of building a socialist
society, the working people of our country have amassed vast
experience which is being studied and creatively assimilated by
workers of other socialist countries, as it applies to their
specific conditions.

This was the first experience in history of building a socia-
list society, moulded in the course of searching, of testing in
practice many truths known hitherto to socialists only in
general outline, in theory. For over a quarter of a century,
the Soviet country was the only country paving the way to
socialism for mankind. It was similar to a besieged fortress
encircled by capitalism. After the intervention of fourteen
states in 1918-1920 failed, enemies of the Soviet country in
the west and east continued to prepare new "crusades" against
the USSR.

Enemies sent into the USSR a large number of spies, and
diversionists, trying in every way to undermine the world's
first socialist state. The threat of a new imperialist aggression
against the USSR became particularly acute after the advent
to power in Germany, in 1933, of fascism, with its announced
aim of destroying Communism, destroying the Soviet Union,
world's first state of the working people. Everybody remem-
bers the formation of the so called "Anti-Comintern Pact" and
the "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis", which were actively supported
by all the forces of international reaction. In an atmosphere
of a growing threat of a new war and the rejection by the
T. S. Q.—22
Western powers of measures to bridle fascism and to organize collective security, repeatedly proposed by the Soviet Union, the Soviet country was compelled to harness all its efforts to strengthen defence, to struggle against the intrigues of the enemy capitalist encirclement. The Party had to train the whole people in a spirit of constant vigilance and mobilized readiness in the face of foreign enemies.

The intrigues of international reaction were all the more dangerous because an embittered class struggle had been going on in the country for a long time; the question, "Who will gain the upper hand?" was being decided. After Lenin's death, hostile elements became active in the Party—Trotskyites, right-wing opportunists and bourgeois nationalists—whose position was a rejection of Lenin's theory that socialism can triumph in one country; this in point of fact would have led to the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. The Party waged a merciless struggle against these enemies of Leninism.

Fulfilling Lenin's behests, the Communist Party struck a course toward the socialistic industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture, and the realization of a cultural revolution.

In the course of solving these majestic tasks of building a socialist society in a single specific country, the Soviet people and the Communist Party had to overcome incredible difficulties and obstacles. Our country, in the shortest period of time from a historical point of view, without any economic help whatsoever from abroad, had to erase its centuries-old backwardness and rebuild its entire national economy on new socialist principles.

This complicated international and internal situation demanded an iron discipline, a continuously growing vigilance, and the strictest centralization of leadership, which could not help but have a negative effect on the development of certain democratic forms. In the course of a fierce struggle against the whole world of imperialism, our country had to submit to certain restrictions of democracy, justified by the logic of our people's struggle for socialism under circumstances of capitalist encirclement. But these restrictions were at that time regarded by the Party and the people as temporary, subject to removal as the Soviet state grew stronger and the forces of democracy and socialism developed the world over. The people consciously assumed these temporary sacrifices, seeing as they did new successes of the Soviet social system every day.

All these difficulties on the part of building socialism were overcome by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, which consistently carried out Lenin's general line.

The victory of socialism in our country, under conditions of enemy encirclement and a constant threat of attack from the outside, was a world-historic exploit performed by the Soviet people. During the initial Five-Year plans the economically backward country made, as a result of the intense heroic efforts of the people and the Party, a gigantic leap in its economic and cultural development. On the basis of successes of socialist construction, the working people's living standard was raised and unemployment ended for all time. A most profound cultural revolution took place in the country. Within a short period of time the Soviet people trained numerous cadres of the technical intelligentsia, who took their place on the level of world technical progress and raised Soviet science and technology to one of the first places in the world. The inspirer and organizer of these victories was the great party of Communists. On the example of the USSR, the working people of the world became clearly convinced that workers and peasants, having taken power into their hands, could, without capitalists and landowners, build and develop successfully their own socialist state, expressing and defending the interests of the broad masses of the people. All this played a tremendous, inspiring role in the growth and influence of Communist and Workers' parties in all countries of the world.

Holding the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party for a lengthy period, J. V. Stalin,
together with other leaders, actively struggled for the realization of Lenin’s behests. He was devoted to Marxism-Leninism and, as a theoretician and a good organizer, headed the struggle of the party against the Trotskyites, right-wing opportunists, bourgeois nationalists, and against the intrigues of the capitalist encirclement. In this political and ideological struggle Stalin acquired great authority and popularity. However, all our great victories began to be incorrectly connected with his name. The successes attained by the Communist Party and the Soviet country and the adulation of Stalin went to his head. In this atmosphere the cult of Stalin’s person began gradually to take shape.

N. S. KHURSHCHEV:

(Excerpts from the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU)

OCTOBER 17, 1961

The Leninist policy formulated by the Twentieth Congress had at first to be implemented in the face of fierce resistance from anti-Party elements, from zealous adherents of the methods and practices prevailing at the time of the cult of the individual, from revisionists and dogmatists. The Leninist line of the Party was opposed by a factional anti-Party group consisting of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, and of Shepilov, who later joined them.

At the beginning it was Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Voroshilov who bitterly resisted the Party line aimed at condemning the cult of the individual, fostering inner-Party democracy, condemning and rectifying all abuses of power and exposing those directly responsible for the repressive measures. That stand of theirs was no accident, for they are personally responsible for many instances of the wholesale repression of Party, government, economic, military and Komsomol personnel and for other practices of a similar nature, which occurred at the time of the cult of the individual. At first the group constituted a negligible minority in the Central Committee Presidium.

But when the Party set out to restore the Leninist standards of Party and government activity and to fulfil such pressing tasks as the development of new lands, the reorganisation of management in industry and building, the extension of the rights of the Union republics, the improvement of the living standards of the people and the restoration of revolutionary legality, the factional group stepped up its anti-Party subversion and began to recruit supporters within the Presidium of the Central Committee. The group was joined by Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov, and later by Shepilov. Realising that they had succeeded in marshalling a numerical majority in the Central Committee Presidium, the members of the anti-Party group launched an open attack, seeking to change the policy in the Party and the country, a policy laid down by the Twentieth Congress.

After reaching agreement at their clandestine gatherings the factionalist demanded an extraordinary meeting of the Presidium. They expected to carry out their anti-Party schemes and seize leadership in the Party and the country. They wanted to confront the members of the Central Committee and the Party as a whole with an accomplished fact.

But the anti-Party group had miscalculated. On hearing of the group’s factional activity within the Presidium, those Central Committee members who were then in Moscow demanded that a plenary meeting of the Central Committee be convened immediately.

The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee held in June 1957 resolutely exposed the anti-Party group and routed it ideologically. It demonstrated the political maturity and solid unity of the Central Committee, based on the Leninist line of the Twentieth Congress. (Stormy applause) Ideo-
logically defeated in the course of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and faced with unanimous condemnation by the Meeting, the members of the anti-Party group admitted that there had been collusion among them and that their anti-Party activity was harmful. Comrade Voroshilov admitted his errors in a speech at the Meeting, saying that he had been “misled by the factionalists”, that he fully realised his errors and emphatically condemned them, just as he condemned the entire subversive activity of the anti-Party group.

As you know, the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee passed its decision on the anti-Party group unanimously; the members of that group, too, voted for it, with the exception of Molotov, who abstained. Afterwards, when the results of the Plenary Meeting were being discussed by the primary Party organisation, Molotov stated that he, too, considered the decision of the Plenary Meeting correct and accepted it.

The decisions of the June Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee won the unanimous approval of the entire Party and all Soviet people. Somewhat later, in October 1957, the Plenary Meeting of the CC, CPSU, firmly repelled attempts by the former Defence Minister, Zhukov, to take an adventurous course, to dissociate the Armed Forces from the Party and oppose the Soviet Army to the Party leadership. Casting aside the bankrupt factionalists and scheming careerists, the Party closed its ranks; it strengthened its bonds with the people and rallied all forces for the implementation of its general line. (*Prolonged applause*)

The course adopted by the Twentieth Congress was applauded by the world Communist movement, by the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties. This found expression in decisions passed by congresses of the fraternal parties, as well as in other records of those parties, and in the documents of the meetings of representatives of the Communist and Workers' parties in 1957 and 1960.

OCTOBER 27, 1961 (Excerpt from the concluding speech)

One would think that the Leninist course adopted by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and supported by the fraternal parties should also have been backed by the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour, since the cult of the individual is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. What happened, however, was that the Albanian leaders began to extol the cult of Stalin's person and launched a bitter struggle against the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, in an effort to divert the socialist countries from this correct course. Needless to say that, that was no accident. All that was pernicious in our country at the time of the cult of the individual manifests itself in even worse form in the Albanian Party of Labour. It is no longer a secret to anyone that the Albanian leaders maintain their power by resorting to force and arbitrary methods.

[From *The Road to Communism*, Documents of the 22nd Congress of CPSU, Pages 128-132 and Page 338]

ENVER HOXHA ON STALIN

NOVEMBER 7, 1961

...According to the viewpoint of our Party, J. V. Stalin in his entire theoretical and practical activity, has been and remains one of the most distinguished leaders and personalities not only of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but also of the international communist and workers' movement, one of the most ardent defenders and greatest theoreticians of Marxism-Leninism. (*Thunderous applause. All stand up. Ovation.*) His great historic merit lies in the fact that for many years in succession he had been a loyal disciple and determined comrade-in-arms of V. I. Lenin in the struggle for the overthrow of Tzarism and the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution; while
following Lenin’s death, heading the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he faithfully defended Leninism against the rabid attacks by the Trotskyists, Bukharinists, Zinovievists and other enemies and destroyed them ideologically and politically. J. V. Stalin, as the main leader of the Party, made a great contribution to the successful direction of the up-building of socialism in the Soviet Union and the big patriotic war of the Soviet Union against fascism; he further developed Marxism–Leninism for a series of important questions of the Soviet socialist society and the construction of socialism and communism; he made a valuable contribution to the consolidation of the socialist camp and the international communist movement, as well as to the exposure of modern revisionism in the person of Tito’s revisionist traitorous group. By thus appraising J. V. Stalin’s activity, there is no doubt that the errors he may have committed during the last years of his life were partial and they cannot serve as a criterion to make a general evaluation of J. V. Stalin’s person and his activity. In the general evaluation of J. V. Stalin’s activity, in the foreground stand his great merits, his fight for the defence of Leninism, his struggle for the up-building of socialism in the Soviet Union, his struggle for the creation and consolidation of the socialist camp, for the strengthening of the unity of the international communist and workers’ movement; his consistent fight against imperialism; his policy for the defence of peace and the peaceful coexistence. They constitute his main characteristic feature as a leader and as a communist. Such has been and remains the firm position of the Party of Labour of Albania relating to the evaluation of J. V. Stalin’s work.

N. Khrushchev’s wrong position in his criticism against J. V. Stalin lies in the fact that:

(a) He unilaterally and tendentiously exaggerated beyond measure J. V. Stalin’s mistakes going even to such lengths as to make base slanders against him. Stalin was presented by him almost as an “enemy” of the Soviet Union and Communism; he was characterized as a “brutal”, “capricious”, as a “despot”, “murderer”, “blood-thirsty” and “criminal” towards the Party cadres and the loyal and tested revolutionaries, and as a “dupe” of the imperialists and fascists (hilarity), as a man who committed great “follies” both in practice and theoretical questions, who did not “understand” of what was being done in the Soviet Union, who manifested a “lack of respect towards Lenin’s memory”, and many other charges of this kind. The detached statements made at the 20th Congress and after it, to the effect that Stalin remains a distinguished Marxist–Leninist, etc. are entirely formal and were made to mitigate the bad impression and lawful anger aroused in the communists of the whole world by these accusations against Stalin. In fact, neither at the 20th Congress nor up to-day the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its propaganda has made any positive appraisal of J. V. Stalin’s theoretical legacy to show his positive sides and his contribution to the defence and further development of Marxism–Leninism. This inhuman attitude reached its climax at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where not only were repeated the accusations of the 20th Congress, this time publicly, but there was adopted also a special decision to remove J. V. Stalin’s embalmed body from the mausoleum. Unable to reject Stalin by arguments of principle in the field of theoretical activity and creativeness, Khrushchev, in order to fight Stalin, introduces the question into the police and espionage field, and he took measures also for the liquidation of Stalin’s corpse ...

(b) N. Khrushchev, at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet propaganda following that Congress, unilaterally treated the question of the fight against the personality cult, throwing into oblivion the Leninist doctrine about the relations among the masses, classes, parties and leaders. The Great Lenin, especially in his book of genius—Leftism—infantile sickness in Communism, forcefully pointed out the indispensability of the creation, in every Marxist Party, of a group of leaders, more or less lasting,
composed of the most authoritative, most influential and most experienced persons who are called leaders. Without such a stable leadership the struggle of the working class and its Communist Party cannot be crowned with success. In contrast with these clear teachings of Lenin, at the 20th Congress, under the pretext of the fight against the personality cult, the mass democracy was contraposed to the role of the leaders. It is not bad to recall what V. I. Lenin writes in connection with this: "To arrive for this reason at such a point as to oppose in general the dictatorship of the masses to the dictatorship of the leaders, is a ridiculous absurdity and a folly. It is especially ridiculous when you see that the old leaders who had human viewpoints about simple things, are indeed replaced (under the mask of the slogan: "down with the leaders!" by young leaders who say nonsenses which weigh nothing"." (V. I. Lenin, Works, Vol. 31, page 31, Albanian edition).

N. Khrushchev and his group used for their own anti-Marxist aims—and this is becoming ever more clear—the alleged "criticism of principle" against Stalin's personality cult. How he used it and for what purpose he is acting in the internal plan (in the Soviet Union and in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) this is not our business, this may be judged only by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Despite this, we can but note that in fact N. Khrushchev, dealing with the "crimes" that have been committed in Stalin's epoch, with the "murders of the innocent people", with the "elimination of thousands of cadres" through "false" court trials, with the regime of "terror", which is described with an unbridled enthusiasm, in the darkest colours, making all these things known to the international public opinion, is rendering a very bad service to the Soviet Union, pleasing only the imperialists and all the enemies of Communism. N. Khrushchev has accused the leadership of our Party of the just criticism, also at party meetings, against some unlawful actions with regard to our country, alleging that the Albanian leaders "throw mud at the Soviet Union".

But how should we call this same unbridled zeal of his to darken a whole glorious epoch, the epoch of the up-building of socialism in the Soviet Union, to discredit before the eyes of the whole world the glory of the Soviet Union, presenting it as the country where terror and murders have allegedly reigned, just as the whole reactionary bourgeois press has propagandized and is propagandizing?

Is it not he himself that, by his actions, is discrediting the Soviet Union? Is he not gravely offending the heroism of the Soviet peoples who, in struggle with internal and external enemies, in struggle with countless difficulties and obstacles, under the leadership of their Communist Party which was led by Stalin, laid the foundations of the socialist and communist society in the Soviet Union, when he proposes that there should be erected in Moscow a memorial to the "victims" of the personality cult? Someone calls such actions a "bold self-criticism". Let them think more deeply about how much good and how many evils has this kind of "bold self-criticism" brought to the Soviet and the communist movement.

N. Khrushchev, speaking of the "iniquities" and "victims of the period of the personality cult", declaring the various court trials as framed-up, regardless of the fact that in all that struggle there might have been made also some mistakes, he appears to be consistent with his anti-Marxist concepts about imperialism and its servitors. Indeed, he rendered a service to imperialism; for he presents it as not dangerous to the countries which are building up socialism; he is weakening the vigilance of the people in their struggle against the espionage network of imperialism which has acted and is fiercely acting against the socialist camp. N. Khrushchev adopted his tactics of silence also towards the plot organized by the Yugoslav revisionists, the Greek monarcho-fascists and the United States' sixth fleet—a plot which was unmasked in our country a few months ago. Moreover, after having recommended these tactics also to some other fraternal parties, he spread the slogan that the plot was an invention, that the participants in
this plot were “patriots” and “honest fighters”, whom later, at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in his concluding speech, he openly took under his protection. While not long ago N. Khrushchev, formally accused the Albanian leaders of being connected with the imperialist espionage. Therefore, according to his logic, it follows that he who fights against imperialism, he who fights against its agents, he who fights for the defence of the freedom and independence of the socialist homeland, is an agent of imperialism. And conversely, he who rises against the people’s power and the Party, he who places himself at the service of the enemies of socialism, is a “martyr”, a “good patriot”, he is taken under protection by the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to such person there will be erected memorials also.

The question of the fight against Stalin’s cult has been used by N. Khrushchev to uncrown Leninism, to prepare the ground to revise Marxism-Leninism and spread his opportunist views in the most important questions of the present day world development and the international communist movement. This action and these tactics of his are neither new nor original. In fact, in his fight against Leninism Trotsky, too, used the same tactics.

“...Trotsky in his writings”—J. V. Stalin says—“makes one more (one more !) attempt to prepare the condition for the substitution of Trotskyism to Leninism. Trotsky has to discredit, at all costs, the Party, its cadres that carried out the uprising with a view to passing from the discredit of the Party, to the discredit of Leninism. While he needs the discredit of Leninism to smuggle in Trotskyism as the ‘only’ ‘proletarian’ ideology (don’t take it for a joke). All this is certainly (yes, certainly) done under the banner of Leninism, so that the procedure of this smuggling should be carried out ‘without any damage at all’”. (J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 6, Page 361.)

N. Khrushchev used Stalin’s question to strike on the healthy Marxist-Leninist elements in the leaderships of the Communist and Workers’ parties of the different countries, to scare, and in case of resistance, also to liquidate any one who would dare to object; to reduce to silence the other parties and various leaders who would not support his revisionist views, his course.

That N. Khrushchev, under the pretext of the fight against the personality cult, is seeking to uncrown Leninism in order to pave the way to revisionism, is shown also by the fact that he is by no means concerned with the just and principled Marxist-Leninist fight against the personality cult. For, if such were the case, irrespective of his demagogical words, he could not have helped noticing that at present in the Soviet Union manifestations of the personality cult are appearing with every passing day, and even in more open and exalting forms for his own person. Thus, one can hardly find an issue of the Soviet illustrated reviews in which one will not find pictures of N. Khrushchev; the pages of the Soviet press are full of quotations from his speeches, he is the only one to speak in all parts and about all questions; a whole film is devoted to his life, and other films to his visits to various countries of the world; numerous praises are made to him in various speeches and writings attributing to him personally the greatest successes of the Soviet people in the field of the development of industry, science and technology. Great feverish efforts are being exerted to present Khrushchev not only as a “great military strategist”, but also almost as an “architect” of the victory over fascism in the Second World War.

Where does then lie N. Khrushchev’s respect for principles in the fight against the manifestations of the personality cult, which he so noisily advertizes in his unprincipled fight against the other fraternal parties and their leaders?...

(Excerpts from speech delivered at the Festive meeting devoted to the 20th Anniversary of the founding of the Party of Labour of Albania and the Forty-fourth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.)
THE C.P.C. ON THE CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

[The first official pronouncement on the Stalin Debate was made by the Communist Party of China on April 5, 1956, in an article entitled *The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. This article, though pointed out some positive sides of Stalin's role, in the main, endorsed the Soviet Party's stand in the following terms: "The cult of the individual is a reflexion in man's mind of a social phenomenon, and when leaders of the Party and State such as Stalin succumb to the influence of this backward ideology, they will in turn influence society, bringing losses to the cause and hampering the initiative and creativeness of the masses of the people.... The struggle against the cult of the individual which was launched by the Twentieth Congress is a great and courageous fight by the communists and the people of the Soviet Union to clear away the ideological obstacles in the way of their advance". But at the Chengtu Conference on March 10, 1958, Mao Tsetung gave an entirely different opinion: "There are two kinds of cult of the individual. One is correct, such as that of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and the correct side of Stalin. These we ought to revere and continue to revere for ever. It would not do not to revere them. As they held truth in their hands, why should we not revere them. We believe in truth; truth is the reflection of objective existence.... The question at issue is not whether or not there should be a cult of the individual, but rather whether or not the individual concerned represents the truth. If he does, then he should be revered. If truth is not present, even collective leadership will be no good", (*Mao Tsetung Unrehearsed* by Stuart Schram, p. 99)]

On June 14, 1963, the CPC addressed a letter to the CC of the CPSU containing a 25-point proposal concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement. As regards the cult of the individual, this letter stated that to "raise the question of 'combating the cult of the individual' is actually to counterpose the leaders to the masses", in violation of "Lenin's integral teachings on the inter-relationship of leaders, party, class and masses" (Point 20). In response to the CPC's 25 Points, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued an OPEN LETTER to all Party Organisations and to all Communists of the Soviet Union. In that letter the CC of the CPSU charged that the "CPC leaders have taken upon themselves the role of the defenders of the personality cult and peddlers of Stalin's erroneous ideas. They are trying to impose upon other parties the order of things, the ideology and morals, the forms and methods of leadership that flourished in the period of the personality cult". Pointing to the CPC's previous stand of the Twentieth Congress the Open Letter did comment that in the June 14 letter, the CPC leaders had "made a 180-degree turn in their evaluation of the Twentieth Congress of our Party".

The CPC issued nine comments on the Open Letter, between September 1963 and July 1964. The second comment was: *On the question of Stalin*, which we reproduce here in full.]

ON THE QUESTION OF STALIN
SEPTEMBER 13, 1963

[Comment on the Open Letter of the CC, CPSU (II) by the Editorial Department of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*]

The question of Stalin is one of world-wide importance which has had repercussions among all classes in every country-
The Stalin Question

and which is still a subject of much discussion today, with
different classes and their political parties and groups taking
different views. It is likely that no final verdict can be reached
on this question in the present century. But there is virtual
agreement among the majority of the international working
class and of revolutionary people, who disapprove of the com-
plete negation of Stalin and more and more cherish his mem-
ory. This is also true of the Soviet Union. Our controversy
with the leaders of the CPSU is with a section of people. We
hope to persuade them in order to advance the revolutionary
cause. This is our purpose in writing the present article.

The Communist Party of China has always held that when
Comrade Khrushchev completely negated Stalin on the pretext
of “combating the personality cult”, he was quite wrong and
had ulterior motives.

The Central Committee of the CPC pointed out in its letter
of June 14 that the “combating against the personality cult”
violates Lenin’s integral teachings on the interrelationship of
leaders, party, class and masses, and undermines the Commu-
nist principle of democratic centralism.

The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU
avoids making any reply to our principled arguments, but
merely labels the Chinese Communists as “defenders of the
personality cult and peddlers of Stalin’s erroneous ideas”.

When he was fighting the Mensheviks, Lenin said, “Not to
reply to the principled argument of the opponent and to ascribe
to him only ‘excitement’—this means not to debate but to
abuse”. The attitude shown by the Central Committee of the
CPSU in the Open Letter is exactly like that of the Mensheviks.

Even though the Open Letter resorts to abuse in place of
debate, we on our part prefer to reply to it with principled
arguments and a great many facts.

The great Soviet Union was the first state of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat. In the beginning, the foremost leader
of the Party and the Government in this state was Lenin.
After Lenin’s death, it was Stalin.

After Lenin’s death, Stalin became not only the leader of
the Party and Government of the Soviet Union but the ack-
nowledged leader of the international communist movement
as well.

It is only forty-six years since the first socialist state was
inaugurated by the October Revolution. For nearly thirty of
these years Stalin was the foremost leader of this state.
Whether in the history of the dictatorship of the proletariat or
in that of the international communist movement, Stalin’s
activities occupy an extremely important place.

The Chinese Communist Party has consistently maintained
that the question of how to evaluate Stalin and what attitude
to take towards him is not just one of appraising Stalin
himself; more important, it is a question of how to sum up the
historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat and
of the international communist movement since Lenin’s death.

Comrade Khrushchev completely negated Stalin at the 20th
Congress of the CPSU. He failed to consult the fraternal
Parties in advance on this question of principle which involves
the whole international communist movement, and afterwards
tried to impose a fait accompli on them. Whoever makes an
appraisal of Stalin different from that of the leadership of the
CPSU is charged with “defence of the personality cult” as well
as “interference” in the internal affairs of the CPSU. But no
one can deny the international significance of the historical
experience of the first state of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
or the historical fact that Stalin was the leader of the inter-
national communist movement; consequently, no one can deny
that the appraisal of Stalin is an important question of principle
involving the whole international communist movement. On
what ground, then, do the leaders of the CPSU forbid other
fraternal Parties to make a realistic analysis and appraisal
of Stalin?

The Communist Party of China has invariably insisted on
an overall, objective and scientific analysis of Stalin’s merits
and demerits by the method of historical materialism and the
T. S. Q—23
presentation of history as it actually occurred, and has opposed the subjective, crude and complete negation of Stalin by the method of historical idealism and the wilful distortion and alteration of history.

The Communist Party of China has consistently held that Stalin did commit errors, which had their ideological as well as social and historical roots. It is necessary to criticise the errors Stalin actually committed, not those groundlessly attributed to him, and to do so from a correct stand and with correct methods. But we have consistently opposed improper criticism of Stalin, made from a wrong stand and with wrong methods.

Stalin fought Tsarism and propagated Marxism during Lenin's lifetime; he became a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin; he took part in the struggle to pave the way for the 1917 Revolution; after the October Revolution he fought to defend the fruits of the proletarian revolution.

Stalin led the CPSU and the Soviet people, after Lenin's death, in resolutely fighting both internal and external foes, and in safeguarding and consolidating the first socialist state in the world.

Stalin led the CPSU and the Soviet people in upholding the line of socialist industrialization and agricultural collectivisation and in achieving great successes in socialist transformation and socialist construction.

Stalin led the CPSU, the Soviet people and the Soviet army in an arduous and bitter struggle to the great victory of the anti-Fascist war.

Stalin defended and developed Marxism-Leninism in the fight against various kinds of opportunism, against the enemies of Leninism, the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinists and other bourgeois agents.

Stalin made an indelible contribution to the international communist movement in a number of theoretical writings which are immortal Marxist-Leninist works.

Stalin led the Soviet Party and Government in pursuing a foreign policy which on the whole was in keeping with proletarian internationalism and in greatly assisting the revolutionary struggles of all people, including the Chinese people.

Stalin stood in the forefront of the tide of history guiding the struggle, and was an irreconcilable enemy of the imperialists and all reactionaries.

Stalin's activities were intimately bound up with the struggles of the great CPSU and the great Soviet people and inseparable from the revolutionary struggles of the people of the whole world.

Stalin's life was that of a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary.

It is true that while he performed meritorious deeds for the Soviet people and the international communist movement, Stalin, a great Marxist-Leninist and proletarian revolutionary, also made certain mistakes. Some were errors of principle and some were errors made in the course of practical work; some could have been avoided and some were scarcely avoidable at a time when the dictatorship of the proletariat had no precedent to go by.

In his way of thinking, Stalin departed from dialectical materialism and fell into metaphysics and subjectivism on certain questions and consequently he was sometimes divorced from reality and from the masses. In struggles inside as well as outside the Party, on certain occasions and on certain questions he confused two types of contradictions which are different in nature, contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and contradictions among the people, and also confused the different methods needed in handling them. In the work led by Stalin of suppressing the counter-revolution, many counter-revolutionaries deserving punishment were duly punished, but at the same time there were innocent people who were wrongly convicted; and in 1938 and 1937 there occurred the error of enlarging the scope of the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. In the matter of Party and
government organization, he did not fully apply proletarian
democratic centralism and, to some extent, violated it. In
handling relations with fraternal Parties and countries, he
made some mistakes. He also gave some bad counsel in the
international communist movement. These mistakes caused
some losses to the Soviet Union and the international commu­
nist movement.

Stalin’s merits and mistakes are matters of historical,
objective reality. A comparison of the two shows that his
merits outweighed his faults. He was primarily correct and
his faults were secondary. In summing up Stalin’s thinking
and his work in their totality, surely every honest Communist
with a respect for history will first observe what was primary
in Stalin. Therefore, when Stalin’s errors are being correctly
appraised, criticised and overcome, it is necessary to safeguard
what was primary in Stalin’s life, to safeguard Marxism­
Leninism which he defended and developed.

It would be beneficial if the errors of Stalin, which were
only secondary, are taken as historical lessons so that the
Communists of the Soviet Union and other countries might
take warning and avoid repeating those errors or commit fewer
errors. Both positive and negative historical lessons are bene­
ficial to all Communists, provided they are drawn correctly and
conform with and do not distort historical facts.

Lenin pointed out more than once that Marxists were
totally different from the revisionists of the Second Inter­
national in their attitude towards people like Bebel and Rosa
Luxemburg, who, for all their mistakes, were great proletarian
revolutionaries. Marxists did not conceal these people’s
mistakes but through such examples learned “how to avoid
them and live up to the more rigorous requirements of
revolutionary Marxism”. By contrast, the revisionists “crowed”
and “cackled” over the mistakes of Bebel and Rosa
Luxemburg. Ridiculing the revisionists, Lenin quoted a
Russian fable in this connection. “Sometimes eagles may
fly lower than hens, but hens can never rise to the height of
eagles”. Bebel and Rosa Luxemburg were “great Commu­
nists” and, in spite of their mistakes, remained “eagles”, while
the revisionists were a flock of “hens” “in the backyard of the
working-class movement, among the dung heaps”.

The historical role of Bebel and Rosa Luxemburg is by no
means comparable to that of Stalin. Stalin was the great leader
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the international
communist movement over a whole historical era, and greater
care should be exercised in evaluating him.

The leaders of the CPSU have accused the Chinese
Communist Party of “defending” Stalin. Yes, we do defend
Stalin. When Khrushchev distorts history and completely
negates Stalin, naturally we have the inescapable duty to come
forward and defend him in the interest of the international
communist movement.

In defending Stalin, the Chinese Communist Party defends
his correct side, defends the glorious history of struggle of the
first state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was
created by the October Revolution; it defends the glorious
history of struggle of the CPSU; it defends the prestige of the
international communist movement among working people
throughout the world. In brief, it defends the theory and
practice of Marxism-Leninism. It is not only the Chinese
Communists who are doing this; all Communists devoted to
Marxism-Leninism, all staunch revolutionaries and all fair­
minded people have been doing the same thing.

While defending Stalin, we do not defend his mistakes.
Long ago the Chinese Communists had first-hand experience
of some of his mistakes. Of the erroneous “Left” and Right
opportunist lines which emerged in the Chinese Communist
Party at one time or another, some arose under the influence
of certain mistakes of Stalin’s, in so far as their international
sources were concerned. In the late twenties, the thirties and
the early and middle forties, the Chinese Marxist-Leninists
represented by Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi
resisted the influence of Stalin’s mistakes; they gradually
overcame the erroneous lines of "Left" and Right opportunism and finally led the Chinese revolution to victory.

But since some of the wrong ideas put forward by Stalin were accepted and applied by certain Chinese comrades, we Chinese should bear the responsibility. In its struggle against "Left" and Right opportunism, therefore, our Party criticised only its own erring comrades and never put the blame on Stalin. The purpose of our criticism was to distinguish between right and wrong, learn the appropriate lessons and advance the revolutionary cause. We merely asked the erring comrades that they should correct their mistakes. If they failed to do so, we waited until they were gradually awakened by their own practical experience, provided they did not organize secret groups for clandestine and disruptive activities. Our method was the proper method of inner-Party criticism and self-criticism; we started from the desire for unity and arrived at a new unity on a new basis through criticism and struggle, and thus good results were achieved. We held that these were contradictions among the people and not between the enemy and ourselves, and that therefore we should use the above method.

What attitude have Comrade Khrushchev and other leaders of the CPSU taken towards Stalin since the 20th Congress of the CPSU?

They have not made an overall historical and scientific analysis of his life and work but have completely negated him without any distinction between right and wrong.

They have treated Stalin not as a comrade but as an enemy.

They have not adopted the method of criticism and self-criticism to sum up experience but have blamed Stalin for all errors, or ascribed to him the "mistakes" they have arbitrarily invented.

They have not presented the facts and reasoned things out but have made demagogic personal attacks on Stalin in order to poison people's minds.

Khrushchev has abused Stalin as a "murderer", a "criminal", a "bandit", a "gambler", a "despot of the type of Ivan the Terrible", "the greatest dictator in Russian history", a "fool", an "idiot", etc. When we are compelled to cite all this filthy, vulgar and malicious language, we are afraid it may soil our pen and paper.

Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as "the greatest dictator in Russian history". Does not this mean that the Soviet people lived for thirty long years under the "tyranny" of "the greatest dictator in Russian history" and not under the Socialist system? The great Soviet people and the revolutionary people of the whole world completely disagree with this slander!

Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as a "despot of the type of Ivan the Terrible". Does not this mean that the experience the great CPSU and the great Soviet people provided over thirty years for people the world over was not the experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat but that of life under the rule of a feudal "despot"? The great Soviet people, the Soviet Communists and Marxist-Leninists of the whole world completely disagree with this slander!

Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as a "bandit". Does not this mean that the first socialist state in the world was for a long period headed by a "bandit"? The great Soviet people and the revolutionary people of the whole world completely disagree with this slander!

Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as a "fool". Does not this mean that the CPSU which waged heroic revolutionary struggles over the past decades had a "fool" as its leader? The Soviet Communists and Marxist-Leninists of the whole world completely disagree with this slander!

Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as an "idiot". Does not this mean that the great Soviet army which triumphed in the anti-fascist war had an "idiot" as its supreme commander? The glorious Soviet commanders and fighters and all anti-Fascist fighters of the world completely disagree with this slander!

Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as a "murderer". Does not this mean that the international communist movement had
a "murderer" as its teacher for decades? Communists of the whole world, including the Soviet Communists, completely disagree with this slander!

Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as a "gambler". Does not this mean that the revolutionary people had a "gambler" as their standard bearer in the struggle against imperialism and reaction? All revolutionary people of the world, including the Soviet people, completely disagree with this slander!

Such abuse of Stalin by Khrushchev is a gross insult to the great Soviet people, a gross insult to the CPSU, to the Soviet army, to the dictatorship of the proletariat and to the socialist system, to the international communist movement, to the revolutionary people the world over and to Marxism-Leninism.

In what position does Khrushchev, who participated in the leadership of the Party and the state during Stalin's period, place himself when he beats his breast, pounds the table and shouts abuse of Stalin at the top of his voice? In the position of an accomplice to a "murder" or a "bandit"? Or in the same position as a "fool" or an "idiot"?

What difference is there between such abuse of Stalin by Khrushchev and the abuse by the imperialists, the reactionaries in various countries, and the renegades to communism? Why such inveterate hatred of Stalin? Why attack him more ferociously than you do the enemy?

In abusing Stalin, Khrushchev is in fact wildly denouncing the Soviet system and state. His language in this connection is by no means weaker but is actually stronger than that of such renegades as Kautsky, Trotsky, Tito and Djilas.

People should quote the following passage from the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU and ask Khrushchev: "How can they say such a thing about the Party of the great Lenin, about the motherland of socialism, about the people who, the first in the world, accomplished a socialist revolution, upheld its great gains in the bitterest battles against international imperialism and domestic counter-revolution, and display miracles of heroism and dedication in the struggle for the building of communism, honestly fulfilling its internationalist duty to the working people of the world!"

In his article, The Political Significance of Abuse, Lenin said, "Abuse in politics often covers up the utter lack of ideological content, the helplessness and the impotence, the annoying impotence of the abuser". Does this not apply to the leaders of the CPSU who, feeling constantly haunted by the spectre of Stalin, try to cover up their total lack of principle, their helplessness and annoying impotence by abusing Stalin?

The great majority of the Soviet people disapprove of such abuse of Stalin. They increasingly cherish the memory of Stalin. The leaders of the CPSU have seriously isolated themselves from the masses. They always feel they are being threatened by the haunting spectre of Stalin, which is in fact the broad masses' great dissatisfaction with the complete negation of Stalin. So far Khrushchev has not dared to let the Soviet people and the other people in the socialist camp see the secret report completely negating Stalin which he made to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, because it is a report which cannot bear the light of day, a report which would seriously alienate the masses.

Especially noteworthy is the fact that while they abuse Stalin in every possible way, the leaders of the CPSU regard Eisenhower, Kennedy and the like "with respect and trust". They abuse Stalin as a "despot of the type of Ivan the Terrible" and "the greatest dictator in Russian history", but compliment both Eisenhower and Kennedy as "having the support of the absolute majority of the American people"! They abuse Stalin as an "idiot" but praise Eisenhower and Kennedy as "sensible"! On the one hand, they viciously lash at a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary and a great leader of the international communist movement, and on the other, they laud the chieftains of imperialism to the skies. Is there any possibility that the connection between these phenomena is merely accidental and that it does not follow with inexorable logic from the betrayal of Marxism-Leninism?
If his memory is not too short, Khrushchev ought to remember that at a mass rally held in Moscow in January 1937 he himself rightly condemned those who had attacked Stalin, saying, “In lifting their hand against Comrade Stalin, they lifted it against all of us, against the working class and the working people! In lifting their hand against Comrade Stalin, they lifted it against the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin!” Khrushchev himself repeatedly extolled Stalin as an “intimate friend and comrade-in-arms of the great Lenin”, as “the greatest genius, teacher and leader of mankind” and “the great, ever-victorious marshal”, as “the sincere friend of the people” and as his “own father”.

If one compares the remarks made by Khrushchev when Stalin was alive with those made after his death, one will not fail to see that Khrushchev has made a 180-degree turn in his evaluation of Stalin.

If his memory is not too short, Khrushchev should of course remember that during the period of Stalin’s leadership he himself was particularly active in supporting and carrying out the then prevailing policy for suppressing counter-revolutionaries.

On June 6, 1937, at the Fifth Party Conference of Moscow Province, Khrushchev declared:

“Our Party will mercilessly crush the band of traitors and betrayers, and wipe out all the Trotskyist-Right dregs…...The guarantee of this is the unshakable leadership of our Comrade Stalin……We shall totally annihilate the enemies—to the last man and scatter their ashes to the winds.”

On June 8, 1938, at the Fourth Party Conference of Kiev Province, Khrushchev declared:

“The Yakyirs, Balyitskys, Lyubchenkys, Zatonskys and other scum wanted to bring Polish landowners to the Ukraine, wanted to bring here the German fascists, landlords and capitalists…….We have annihilated a considerable number of enemies, but still not all. Therefore, it is necessary to keep our eyes open. We should bear firmly in mind the words of Comrade Stalin, that as long as capitalist encirclement exists, spies and saboteurs will be smuggled into our country.”

Why does Khrushchev, who was in the leadership of the Party and the state in Stalin’s period and who actively supported and firmly executed the policy for suppressing counter-revolutionaries, repudiate everything done during this period and shift the blame for all errors on to Stalin alone, while altogether whitewashing himself?

When Stalin did something wrong, he was capable of criticizing himself. For instance, he had given some bad counsel with regard to the Chinese revolution. After the victory of the Chinese revolution, he admitted his mistake. Stalin also admitted some of his mistakes in the work of purifying the party ranks in his report to the 18th Congress of the CPSU (B) in 1939. But what about Khrushchev? He simply does not know what self-criticism is; all he does is to shift the entire blame on to others and claim the entire credit for himself.

It is not surprising that these ugly actions of Khrushchev’s should have taken place when modern revisionism is on the rampage. As Lenin said in 1915 when he criticized the revisionists of the Second International for their betrayal of Marxism, “In our time when words previously spoken are forgotten, principles are abandoned, world outlook is discarded and resolutions and solemn promises are thrown away, it is not at all surprising that such a thing should happen.”

As the train of events since the 20th Congress of the CPSU has fully shown, the complete negation of Stalin by the leadership of the CPSU has had extremely serious consequences.

It has provided the imperialists and the reactionaries of all countries with exceedingly welcome anti-Soviet and anti-Communist ammunition. Shortly after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the imperialists exploited Khrushchev’s secret anti-Stalin report to stir up a world-wide tidal wave against the Soviet Union and against communism. The imperialists, the reactionaries of all countries, the Tito clique and opportu-
nists of various descriptions all leapt at the chance to attack the Soviet Union, the socialist camp and various Communist Parties; thus many fraternal Parties and countries were placed in serious difficulties.

The frantic campaign against Stalin by the leadership of the CPSU enabled the Trotskyites, who had long been political corpses, to come to life again and clamour for the “rehabilitation” of Trotsky. In November 1961, at the conclusion of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, the International Secretariat of the so-called Fourth International stated in a “letter to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU and its new Central Committee” that in 1937 Trotsky said, a monument would be erected to the honour of the victims of Stalin. “Today”, it continued, “this prediction has come true. Before your Congress the First Secretary of your Party has promised the erection of this monument.” In this letter the specific demand was made that the name of Trotsky be “engraved in letters of gold on the monument erected in honour of the victims of Stalin”. The Trotskyites made no secret of their joy, declaring that the anti-Stalin campaign started by the leadership of the CPSU had “opened the door for Trotskyism” and would “greatly help the advance of Trotskyism and its organization—the Fourth International”.

In completely negating Stalin, the leaders of the CPSU have motives that cannot bear the light of day.

Stalin died in 1953; three years later the leaders of the CPSU violently attacked him at the 20th Congress, and eight years after his death they again did so at the 22nd Congress, removing and burning his remains. In repeating the violent attacks on Stalin, the leaders of the CPSU aimed at erasing the indelible influence of this great proletarian revolutionary among the people of the Soviet Union and throughout the world, and at paving the way for negating Marxism-Leninism which Stalin had defended and developed, and for the all-out application of a revisionist line. Their revisionist line began exactly with the 20th Congress and became fully systematized at the 22nd Congress. The facts have shown ever more clearly that their revision of the Marxist-Leninist theories on imperialist war and peace, proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, revolution in the colonies and semi-colonies, the proletarian party, etc., is inseparably connected with their complete negation of Stalin.

It is under the cover of “combating the personality cult” that the leadership of the CPSU tries to negate Stalin completely.

In launching “the combat against the personality cult”, the leaders of the CPSU are not out to restore what they call “the Leninist standards of Party life and principles of leadership”. On the contrary, they are violating Lenin’s teachings on the inter-relationship of leaders, party, class and masses and contravening the principle of democratic centralism in the Party.

Marxist-Leninists maintain that if the revolutionary Party of the proletariat is genuinely to serve as the headquarters of the proletariat in struggle, it must correctly handle the inter-relationship of leaders, party, class and masses and must be organized on the principle of democratic centralism. Such a Party must have a fairly stable nucleus of leadership, which should consist of a group of long-tested leaders who are good at integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution.

The leaders of the proletarian party, whether members of the central or local committees, emerge from the masses in the course of class struggles and mass revolutionary movements. They are infinitely loyal to the masses, have close ties with them and are good at correctly concentrating the ideas of the masses and then carrying them through. Such leaders are genuine representatives of the proletariat and are acknowledged by the masses. It is a sign of the political maturity of a proletarian Party for it to have such leaders, and herein lies the hope of victory for the cause of the proletariat.

Lenin was absolutely right in saying that “not a single class in history has achieved power without” producing its political
leaders, its prominent representatives able to organize a movement and lead it”. He also said, “The training of experienced and most influential party leaders is a long-term and difficult task. But without this, the dictatorship of the proletariat, its ‘unity of will’, will remain a phrase’.

The Communist Party of China has always adhered to the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the role of the masses and the individual in history and on the inter-relationship of leaders, party, class and masses, and upheld democratic centralism in the Party. We have always maintained collective leadership; at the same time, we are against belittling the role of leaders. While we attach importance to this role, we are against dishonest and excessive eulogy of individual and exaggeration of their role. As far back as 1949 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, on Comrade Mao Tse-tung's suggestion, took a decision forbidding public celebrations of any kind on the birthdays of Party leaders and the naming of cities, streets or enterprises after them.

This consistent and correct approach of ours is fundamentally different from the “combat against the personality cult” advocated by the leadership of the CPSU.

It has become increasingly clear that in advocating the “combat against the personality cult” the leaders of the CPSU do not intend, as they themselves claim, to promote democracy, practise collective leadership and oppose exaggeration of the role of the individual but have ulterior motives.

What exactly is the gist of their “combat against the personality cult”? To put it bluntly, it is nothing but the following:

1. On the pretext of “combating the personality cult”, to counterpose Stalin, the leader of the Party, to the Party organisation, the proletariat and the masses of the people;
2. On the pretext of “combating the personality cult”, to besmirch the proletarian party, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the socialist system;
3. On the pretext of “combating the personality cult”, to build themselves up and to attack revolutionaries loyal to Marxism-Leninism so as to pave the way for revisionist schemers to usurp the Party and state leadership;
4. On the pretext of “combating the personality cult”, to interfere in the internal affairs of fraternal Parties and countries and strive to subvert leadership to suit themselves;
5. On the pretext of “combating the personality cult”, to attack fraternal Parties which adhere to Marxism-Leninism and to split the international communist movement.

The “combat against the personality cult” launched by Khrushchev is a despicable political intrigue. Like someone described by Marx, “He is in his element as an intriguer, while a nonentity as a theorist”.

The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU states “while debunking the personality cult and fighting against its consequences” they “put high the leaders who... enjoy deserved prestige”. What does this mean? It means that, while trampling Stalin underfoot, the leaders of the CPSU laud Khrushchev to the skies.

They describe Khrushchev, who was not yet a Communist at the time of the October Revolution and who was a low-ranking political worker during the Civil War, as the “active builder of the Red Army”.

They ascribe the great victory in the decisive battle in the Soviet Patriotic War entirely to Khrushchev, saying that in the battle of Stalingrad “Khrushchev’s voice was very frequently heard” and that he was “the soul of the Stalingraders”.

They attribute the great achievements in nuclear weapons and rocketry wholly to Khrushchev, calling him “cosmic father”. But as everybody knows, the success of the Soviet Union in manufacturing the atom and hydrogen bombs was a great achievement of the Soviet scientists and technicians and the Soviet people under Stalin's leadership. The foundations of rocketry were also laid in Stalin's time. How can these important historical facts be obliterated? How can all credit be given to Khrushchev?
They laud Khrushchev who has revised the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism and who holds that Leninism is outmoded as the “brilliant model who creatively developed and enriched Marxist-Leninist theory”.

What the leaders of the CPSU are doing under the cover of “combating the personality cult” is exactly as Lenin said, “In place of the old leaders, who hold ordinary human views on ordinary matters, new leaders are put forth, who talk supernatural nonsense and confusion”.

The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU slanders our stand in adhering to Marxism-Leninism, asserting that we are trying to impose upon other Parties the practices, the ideology and morals, the forms and methods of leadership which flourished in the period of the personality cult”. This remark again exposes the absurdity of the “combat against the personality cult”.

According to the leaders of the CPSU, after the October Revolution put an end to capitalism in Russia there followed a “period of the personality cult”. It would seem that the “social system” and “the ideology and morals” of that period were not socialist. In that period the Soviet working people suffered “heavy oppression”, there prevailed an “atmosphere of fear, suspicion and uncertainty which poisoned the life of the people”, and Soviet society was impeded in its development.

In his speech at the Soviet-Hungarian friendship rally on July 19, 1963, Khrushchev dwelt on what he called Stalin’s rule of “terror”, saying that Stalin “maintained his power with an axe”. He described the social order of the time in the following terms: “…in that period a man leaving for work often did not know whether he would return home, whether he would see his wife and children again”.

“The period of the personality cult” as described by the leadership of the CPSU was one when society was more “hateful” and “barbarous” than in the period of feudalism of capitalism.

According to the leadership of the CPSU, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system of society which were established as a result of the October Revolution failed to remove the oppression of the working people or accelerate the development of Soviet society for several decades; only after the 20th Congress of the CPSU carried out the “combat against the personality cult” was the “heavy oppression” removed from the working people and “the development of Soviet society” suddenly “speeded up”.

Khrushchev said, “Ah! If only Stalin had died ten years earlier!” As everybody knows, Stalin died in 1953; ten years earlier would have been 1943, the very year when the Soviet Union began its counter-offensive in the Great Patriotic War. At the time, who wanted Stalin to die? Hitler!

It is not a new thing in the history of the international communist movement for the enemies of Marxism-Leninism to vilify the leaders of the proletariat and try to undermine the proletarian cause by using some such slogan as “combating the personality cult”. It is a dirty trick which people saw through long ago.

In the period of the First International the schemer Bakunin used similar language to rail at Marx. At first, to worm himself into Marx’s confidence, he wrote him, “I am your disciple and I am proud of it”. Later, when he failed in his plot to usurp the leadership of the First International, he abused Marx and said, “Being a German and a Jew, he is authoritarian from head to heels” and a “dictator”.

In the period of the Second International the renegade Kautsky used similar language to rail at Lenin. He slandered Lenin, likening him to “the god of the Monotheists” who had “reduced Marxism to the status not only of a state religion but of a medieval or oriental faith”.

In the period of the Third International the renegade Trotsky similarly used such language to rail at Stalin. He said that Stalin was a ‘despot’ and that “the bureaucrat Stalin spread the base cult of the leader, attaching holiness to the leader”.

T. S. Q—24
The modern revisionist Tito clique also use similar words to rail at Stalin saying that Stalin was the "dictator" "in a system of absolute personal power".

Thus it is clear that the issue of "combating the personality cult" raised by the leadership of the CPSU has come down through Bakunin, Kautsky, Trotsky and Tito, all of whom used it to attack the leaders of the proletariat and undermine the proletarian revolutionary movement.

The opportunists in the history of the international communist movement were unable to negate Marx, Engels or Lenin by vilification, nor is Khrushchev able to negate Stalin by vilification.

As Lenin pointed out, a privileged position cannot ensure the success of vilification.

Khrushchev was able to utilize his privileged position to remove the body of Stalin from the Lenin Mausoleum, but try as he may, he can never succeed in removing the great image of Stalin from the minds of the Soviet people and of the people throughout the world.

Khrushchev can utilize his privileged position to revise Marxism-Leninism one way or another, but try as he may, he can never succeed in overthrowing Marxism-Leninism which Stalin defended and which is defended by Marxist-Leninists throughout the world.

We would like to offer a word of sincere advice to Comrade Khrushchev. We hope you will become aware of your errors and return from your wrong path to the path of Marxism-Leninism.

Long live the great revolutionary teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin!

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AFTERWORD

Revolutionary Authority: the Marxist Concept

In his 'secret' speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU Khrushchev quoted Marx's letter to Wilhelm Bloss dated November 10, 1877, ostensibly to show "how severely classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual". This is an example of how revisionists fraudulently quote authorities to deceive uninformed readers. No text can be clearly understood without its proper historical perspective. Let us consider the historical background of the letter. In the 1870s a sizable section of the German Socialist Workers' Party became enthusiastic about the vulgar utopian philosophical views of Eugene Duhring. Duhring made gross attacks on all the component parts of Marxism. His followers among the German Social Democrats strove to enthrone Duhringianism in the place of Marxism as the official doctrine of the German working class movement. Bernstein published ecstatic comments on Duhring. Bebel too wrote highly of him in his article "A New Communist", and Liebknecht assured Engels that Duhring was "totally honest and resolutely on our side". Duhring became so popular with the social democrats that from 1869 onwards the book market virtually began to be flooded with his writings, which according to Marx, were nothing but "silly, stale, and reactionary from the roots up". (Letter to Sorge.) Alarmed at the spread of Duhringianism, Marx and Engels decided to attack its author. From January 3, 1877, Engels's articles criticising the false philosophy of Duhring began to be published in Vorwarts, the organ of the German Party. Duhring's supporters inside the Party tried to prevent the publication of Engels's articles. At the Gotha Congress of the Party in May 1877, the Duhringians succeeded in blocking the publication of Engels's articles in the Party...
newspaper. Referring to this untoward incident, Bloss, who himself was an out and out opportunist, wrote to Marx asking whether he himself and Engels were angry with the German comrades, and added in a rather patronising tone that, thanks to the agitation carried on by Social Democrats, Marx and Engels had become more popular than they themselves could possibly have imagined. Marx was really angry at the very tone of Bloss's letter and at the behaviour of the German comrades. In reply, therefore, in his characteristic style Marx wrote: "I am not angry" (as Heine puts it) and neither is Engels... But events like those at the last Party Congress—which are thoroughly exploited by enemies of the Party abroad—have compelled us at any rate to be circumspect in our relations with Party members in Germany".

That this 'circumspection' ultimately reached almost the point of breaking off relations with the German Party is now a part of history. It is well known that in the historic Circular letter (17-18 September, 1878) to German comrades, Marx and Engels wrathfully condemned their opportunist policy and proposed “publicly to declare our opposition to it and to dissolve the solidarity with which we have hitherto represented the German Party abroad”. Any attentive reader, therefore, cannot miss the real import of Marx's letter to Bloss: which is not denunciation of any cult of the individual but the assertion of his own and Engels's revolutionary authority over the German working class.

Since the publication of the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels considered themselves the only authority capable of advancing the world proletarian movement, and began to assert that authority by all means. They fought Mazzinni, Blanqui and Bakunin, the most popular and renowned heroic figures of their time, each of whom tried in vain to assert his own authority over the First International. One must not misinterpret Marx-Engels's words, such as their "antipathy to any cult of the individual" or to "public manifestation" to mean that they were on principle against real popularity among the masses and against the correct cult of the individual, the other name of which is Revolutionary Authority. Their apathy was to false popularity and fake cult. Because they saw how the great "heroes" of their time were running after false popularity and to that end were attempting to create their own cults in diverse foolish methods and were making themselves objects of ridicule. Indeed at times Marx and Engels shunned popularity and craved for isolation; but they did it only to come back to a greater popularity backed by real authority. Marx-Engels's attitude to public popularity and revolutionary authority was clearly expressed in the letter written by Engels to Marx in February 1851, after the defeat of the 1848-1851 revolution in Europe had become clear. Engels wrote to Marx: “Now at last we have again...the opportunity to show that we need no popularity, no 'support' from any party in any country, and that our position is altogether independent of such trifles...From now on we are responsible only for ourselves, and when the moment comes when these gentlemen need us we shall be in a position to dictate our terms. Till then we have at least peace...To be sure, with this goes some loneliness...Yet how can people like ourselves, who shun any official post like the plague, fit in a 'party'...i.e. into a band of asses who swear by us because they think we are of their sort...At the next occasion we can and must take this attitude: we hold no official position in the state, and as long as possible no official party post either, no seats in committees etc., no responsibility for asses (but instead we exercise) merciless criticism of all...What will be left of all the prattle-tattle in which this entire emigre mob may indulge at our expense, once you have come out in reply with your economic treatise?" (Marx-Engels, Briefwechsel Vol. I, Pages 179-182, quoted in Isaac Deutscher's The Prophet Outcast.)

Marx and Engels never tolerated any encroachment upon their real revolutionary authority. Whenever they found any possibility of encroachment they fought it back with vehemence, and if they failed, they severed all connections with the men
who opposed them. After the enthusiasm of the Paris Commune, when the International was flooded with the sectarians and the anarchists, they did not hesitate to break up the International at the Hague Congress in 1873. Explaining their reasons for the action taken at the Hague, Engels wrote to Bebel on June 20, 1873: “Now the sectarian quarrel-mongers are preaching conciliation and decrying us as the intolerant and the dictators. And if we had came out in a conciliatory way at the Hague, if we had hushed up the breaking out of the split—what would have been the result? The sectarians, especially the Bakuninists, would have got another year in which to perpetrate, in the name of the International, much greater stupidities and infamies even”.

Perhaps this much is enough to grasp the Marx-Engels idea about the cult of the individual. Any reader will now be able to understand how Khrushchev has proved himself an expert in the art of doctoring quotations to serve the revisionist purpose of fooling the revolutionary people and betraying the cause of the world socialist revolution. Throughout his ‘secret’ speech, while supposedly giving “the most characteristic examples of Stalin’s self-gloration”, in the same revisionist manner he has misquoted, distorted and misrepresented facts. We have pointed out many such instances in the annotations. Here we shall mention just one such misrepresentation by way of example. Referring to Stalin’s own additions in the Short Biography, Khrushchev has said that Stalin was not satisfied with the insertion: “Stalin is the Lenin of today” and therefore amended it to be read: “Stalin is the worthy continuer of Lenin’s work, or as it is said in our Party, Stalin is the Lenin of today”. Any unbiased reader will readily conclude that Stalin made the expression more modest. But Khrushchev adds jokingly: “You see how well it is said, not by the people but by Stalin himself”. As if, it was really Stalin who was glorifying himself while the people were not. The question is, in 1948, when the whole world was admiring Stalin in the most effusive terms, when about a dozen biographies in different languages had already been written by renowned authors like Emil Ludwig and Henri Barbusse, was it at all necessary for Stalin to glorify himself in that manner in such a very small official biography of himself? Is it not a fact that communists all over the world had been admiring him as “the Lenin of today” since the early 1930s? Let us see what Henri Barbusse wrote about Stalin in 1934: “Whenever there are revolutionaries, there is Lenin. But we may also say that it is in Stalin more than any one else that the thought and words of Lenin are to be found. He is the Lenin of today”. Let us see what Mao Tsetung said about Stalin as early as 1939: “Stalin is the leader of world revolution. This is of paramount importance. It is a great event that mankind is blessed with Stalin. Since we have him, things can go well. As you all know, Marx is dead and so are Engels and Lenin. Had there been no Stalin, who would be there to give directions?”

Once Lenin characterised Serrati in the following words: “As for Serrati, he is like a bad egg, which bursts with a loud noise and with an exceptionally pungent smell”. With what better and apter words can one compliment Khrushchev!

Revolutionary Authority: Its Historical Necessity

In reply to the German Social Democrat Heinz Starkenburg’s question—“What part is played by historic personality in Marx and Engels’ conception of history?”—what Engels said may be instructive for understanding the role of Stalin as a historic personality. In his letter dated January 25, 1894 Engels wrote: “Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan. ...Their aspirations clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, the complement and form of appearance of which is accident. The necessity which here asserts itself amidst all accidents is again ultimately economic necessity. This is where the so-called ‘great men’ come in for treatment. That such and such a man and precisely that man
arises at a particular time in a particular country is, of course, pure chance. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own warfare, had rendered necessary, was chance; but that, if a Napoleon had been lacking, another would have filled the place, is proved by the fact that the man was always found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell etc.

Necessity is that which necessarily must occur in the given conditions. And accidents might or might not occur. While necessity follows from the inner essence, from phenomena, accident or chance is not rooted in the phenomena, but in the influence of external conditions. Each phenomenon emerges by virtue of internal necessity, but the emergence of this phenomenon is associated with a plurality of external conditions. The relationship of necessity and phenomenon may best be understood from the following problem discussed by Engels. In his letter to Bebel dated October 24, 1891, Engels discussed the possibility of coming to power in Germany. He had been desiring that power should come “with the calm and inevitability of a process of nature”, then everything would “remain on its natural lines”. But he was also apprehending that power may come prematurely by accident, due to war. Engels wrote: “On the other hand if a war brings us to power prematurely, the technicians will be our chief enemies; they will deceive and betray us wherever they can and we shall have to use terror against them, but shall get cheated all the same”.

Here it may be observed, how the element of terror comes in because of accidental coming to power. Engels had been talking of Germany which was a capitalistically advanced country and because of that the economic necessity of terror was minimum. Now, we know, the proletariat came to power not in Germany, but in a backward country like Russia through accident. And what were the socio-economic conditions that prevailed in Russia during the commencement of the New Economic Policy? Lenin, in his article Tax in Kind, pointed out the existence of the following five socio-economic structures that existed in Russia at the time: 1) patriarchal peasant farming, 2) small commodity production, 3) private capitalism, 4) state capitalism, 5) socialism. And he clearly pointed out that in all these the petty-bourgeois elements predominated and were the source of greatest danger along with the 700,000 emigrés in Europe who were lying in wait for attacking the Soviet at any opportune moment as the agents of world capital. Along with this there were millions of bourgeois technicians and experts in the army, the production units and the administration. So far as the external conditions were concerned, Fascism raised its head and established its power in Italy whose main slogan was to destroy Soviet power. All these external and internal conditions necessitated the highest concentration of authority for the continuation of the revolution. And as Engels said: “A revolution is certainly the most authoritative thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon... and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries”. (S. W. 2, Page 379.)

Explaining the situation then prevailing, Lenin warned that “though no direct onslaught is being made on us now, the fight against capitalist society has become a hundred times more fierce and perilous, because we are not always able to tell enemies from friends”. (C. W. Vol. 33, Page 287)

Though for a time after the Civil War Lenin thought of relaxing terror, from experience he changed his attitude and demanded capital punishment to be included in the criminal code. (C. W. Vol. 42, Page 419)

“Proletarian dictatorship”, as Lenin pointed out, “is the direction of policy by the proletariat”. But how the proletariat...
was directing its policy? Lenin said, "bulk of the present membership of our Party is not proletarian enough." Therefore, the "proletarian policy of the Party is not determined by the character of its membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige enjoyed by the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party. A slight conflict within this group will be enough...to weaken the group to such a degree as to rob its power to determine policy." (Vol. 33, Pp. 256-257). And what was Lenin's own characterisation of the Old Guards as is evident from his 'Testament'? Bukharin did not understand Dialectics, he was "as soft as wax" on whom any unprincipled demagogue could leave an impression. Zinoviev and Kamenev could any moment betray for difference of policy. Trotsky was a 'Judas' and Stalin was 'rude'. And to bring home the point one need only quote Marx: "World history would indeed be very easy to make if the struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances. It would on the other hand be of a very mystical nature, if 'accidents' played no part...acceleration and delay are very much dependent upon such 'accidents', including the 'accident' of the character of the people who first head the movement." (Letter to Kugelmann, April 17, 1871)

Therefore, we find that historical necessity, growing out of the accident of capturing power by the proletariat in a backward country necessitated the emergence of Stalin, the 'man of steel'. It was the historical conditions that created the necessity of terror.

And one should not forget that along with this rule of terror that Stalin, as the leader of the proletariat and its party, imposed on the enemy classes, he also built up with the energy of a titan and the vision of a creator the amazing structure of the first exploitation-free society in the world which brought an entirely new stage of civilization into being.

NOTES

1. Stalin died on March 5, 1953. Serious struggle between the line of capitalist restoration and that of a leap forward towards communism was going on since 1945. The issues of the cult of the personality and of collective leadership were raised at the July 1953 Plenum. A joint session of the Academy of Sciences on October 19, 1953 discussed the cult of the personality issue. Pospelov advanced the argument that Stalin himself was opposed to it. Stalin's brithday, December 21, 1953, was passed over in silence. But the 1955 birthday anniversary was celebrated with enthusiasm. The Soviet press at large continued to praise Stalin right up to the 20th Congress. On January 12, 1956, Tass and the Literaturaya Gazeta announced the publication of Vol. 14 of Stalin's works on the occasion of the 20th Congress. Ultimately it was not published. It seems, the final decision to denigrate Stalin was taken after mid-January. Immediate cause for that last minute switch may be traced to the new "Geneva Spirit" i.e. the atmosphere of cordiality that developed after the Four-Power Summit talk at Geneva in July, 1955, and Foreign Ministers' Conference in November, 1955. □ 2. Letter dated Nov. 10, 1877. Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1965. p. 310. For Editor's comments see the Afterword. □ 3. For similar opinion of Stalin see p. 196. □ 4. For the full Testament see Pp. 82-89 of this book, and also C. W. Vol. 36, Moscow. For comment on this letter see Note 58. □ 5. J. V. Stalin was made personally responsible for the observance of the medical regimen ordered for Lenin by the Party Plenum. When, therefore, Lenin (with the permission of his doctors) on December 21, 1922, 'dictated a letter to Trotsky, Stalin rebuked Krupskaya for taking down the letter and threatened to take the matter to the Party Control Commission.
See Lenin C.W. Vol. 45, Pp. 607-608. For Lenin's Secretary, Volodicheva's note see C. W. Vol. 42, Pp. 493-494: "he asked it to put off, saying that he was not very good at it that day. He wasn't feeling good". "Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked that the letter to Stalin should not be sent". For comment see Note 91. 6. The 17th Congress was held between January 26 and February 10, 1934. It should be noted that the period following i.e. the second half of 1934 and the beginning of 1935 was a period of life and death struggle between Fascism and anti-Fascism. 7. Here, Khrushchev totally failed to take into account the international situation, the rise of Nazidom in Germany, Fifth-column activities etc. 8. For details of the Kamenev-Zinoviev issue see Lenin, C. W. Vol. 26, Pp. 216-219, 223-227, 304-305 and Note 86 on p. 549. Lenin in his letter to the C.C. of the R. S. D. L. P. (B) of October 19, demanded immediate expulsion of both of them from the Party. In the C.C. meeting Stalin said that their expulsion from the Party was no remedy. He proposed that both of them should be retained in the C.C. and should be made to abide by C.C. decisions. Stalin's proposal was accepted in a slightly amended form. Lenin did not agree with the decision and said, it was a compromise. In our view, Lenin's move was emotional and tactically incorrect. In this case Stalin showed greater political dexterity. At that time giving Kamenev and Zinoviev a free hand by expelling them would have been disastrous for the revolution. Stalin knew that they must be dealt with at the proper moment. 9. For Stalin's reply on this point see p. 189. 10. Khrushchev narrated to Senator Pierre Commin, a leader of the French Socialist Delegation that visited Moscow in May 1956, how Beria was murdered by a decision of the special session of the Presidium without sufficient juridical evidence: "Our inner conviction of his guilt was unshakable. But at that time we did not have at our disposal a sufficient amount of juridical evidence of his guilt. And we found ourselves in a difficult position, Evidence for his consignment to a court we still did not have, yet to leave him at liberty was impossible. "We came to the unanimous decision that the only correct measure for the defence of the Revolution was to shoot him immediately. This decision was adopted by us, and carried out on the spot." "But we felt much easier when, some time after his condemnation we received sufficient and irrefutable evidence of his guilt". (The above is a translation from Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik, Vol. XXXVI No. 7-8, July-August, 1956, quoted by Bertram D. Wolfe in Khruschev and his Ghost, App. E) 11. Compare this with the party purge undertaken by Lenin himself in 1921, when nearly 170,000 people i.e. 25% of the membership, were expelled from the Party. The specific object of the purge was the combing out of ex-Mensheviks. 99% of the Mensheviks who had joined the Party after 1918 were expelled. "To purge the Party it is very important to take the suggestions of the non-Party working people into consideration. 'It will produce big results'. (See Lenin, C.W. Vol. 33, Pp. 39-41). About the purge after the 17th Congress, Stalin made self-criticism in the 18th Congress Report: "It cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes". 12. After the 14th Congress of the Party, Zinoviev was removed from the leadership of the Leningrad Gubernia, and Kirov was elected new leader in 1926. He was shot dead in the Smolny, in Leningrad, on December 1, 1934. 13. See Sec. XIII & XIV, Pp. 239-256 for details. 14. See Editorial note on p. 252. 15. The quotation is incomplete. It continues as: "Needless to say, any attempt by the Entente to resume methods of war will force us to reintroduce the former terror; (we know that we are living in a time of the law of the jungle, when kind words are of no avail)". (C.W. Vol. 30, p. 327). Further: on 15 May 1922 he proposed to extend the "death sentence". (Vol. 42, p. 419) Also see the Afterword. 16. Khrushchev quotes from Article 7 of Lenin's draft on Party Unity, submitted to the 10th Congress. But, Art. 7 was not then operative. (Vol. 32, p. 244). 17. Many Western
authorities have given evidence of widespread sabotage and spying activities. See *The Great Conspiracy* by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn. Also see Pp. 244-251 of this book. 18. See Note 11 for Stalin's self-critical attitude. 19. See Pp. 243-244 for the contemporary opposite view. 20. Rome-Berlin Axis, a term denoting political collaboration between Italy and Germany during the Abyssinian conflict in 1936, further developed by Italy's joining the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1937. Germany's attack was unexpected because a non-aggression pact had been signed between Germany and Soviet Union on August 23, 1939. 21. For Marshal Zhukov's opinion see Pp. 222-231. 22. This is a Leninist method of purging the party with the help of non-party working people; the idea of workers' control in every sphere of activity. Khrushchev repeats here exactly what the governments of England and France put forward as a plea to avoid collective security against Hitler. See J. E. Davies—*Mission to Moscow* p. 115. 23. See Section XII. 24. *Ibid.* 25. Zhukov was removed by Khrushchev in October 1957 on the charge of taking an adventurous course. In the trial Zhukov admitted that in 1946 Stalin had removed him from the commanding post on the same charge. 26. It is a lie. See Stalin's book, *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 1946. (p. 185) where he said: “The generals and officers of the Red Army skilfully combined massed blows of powerful implements of war with skilful and swift manoeuvring.” See also *Joseph Stalin: A Short Biography*, p. 187, where the names of as many as thirty generals including Bulganin, Zhukov, Konev etc. have been mentioned as the “men who bore the burden of the war against Germany and her allies.” As to Stalin's role it has only been said that “he selected, educated and promoted” them. 27. An example of demagogy used to defame Stalin. 28. All these minority peoples belonged to Caucasus. German aim was to overrun Caucasus to make contact with the Turkish army 26 of whose divisions stood poised along Soviet borders.

By fomenting national discord with the help of these peoples and by reinstating private property the Germans were able to maintain their occupation in these areas for some time. The people who willingly responded to alien ideology were potential enemies and were correctly deported to other areas planfully. For contrast, this may be compared with the fate of millions after millions of people who were killed or left to become permanent refugees in “Democratic” countries, not because of any betrayal on the part of the people, but because of the “lofty” ideal of “peaceful transfer of power”. 29. For an analysis by a Western expert see *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.* by R. Conquest, Pp. 95-111. *Ibid.* Pp. 129-153. 30. *Ibid.* Pp. 129-153. 31. *Ibid.* 32. And now don't call Khrushchev a two-faced man on hearing him saying: “One of the most prominent leaders of the revolutionary Social Democrats in Georgia and the rest of Transcaucasia was J. V. Stalin, who later became an outstanding leader of our Party”, and getting stormy applause from the listeners. And this not before, but about five years after the 20th Congress, on May 12, 1961 before the Georgian people and communists at Tbilisi. (See N. S. Khrushchev : *Communism Peace and Happiness for the People*, Vol. I, FLPH, Moscow, 1963, p. 131.) 33. See Sec. XV. 34. See R. Conquest p. 154 ff. 35. See Note 10 above and Chap. 9 of R. Conquest. 36. Reference is to the allegation that in 1919 Beria accepted a post as a Secret Agent under the counter-revolutionary Mussavat Government in Azerbaizan. 37. Beria was vaguely accused at his trial of having persecuted Orjonikidze, without any proof. 38. See Note 10 above. 39. See Pp.88-89 of *Short Biography*. From the quotation, Khrushchev slyly omits the following portion: [Party] “consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Frunze, Dzerzhinsky, Kaganovich, Orjonikidze, Kirov, Yaroslavsky, Mikoyan, Andreyev, Shvernik, Zhdanov, Shkiriatov and others” [that]. Now does it appear that Stalin alone wanted to take the whole credit? 40. Here again Khrushchev has attempted to misguide the reader by
omitting the concluding part of the paragraph which reads:

"As for myself, I am merely a pupil of Lenin, and my life's aim is to be a worthy pupil of his." Also see Pp. 185-195 and the Afterword. □ 41. See Sec. XI and XII. □ 42. See Pp. 205-222 for Voroshilov's article on Stalin. □ 43. For Stalin's agricultural programme see 19th Congress Report, Pp. 64-80. Also, Russia's Soviet Economy by Harry Schwartz, Pp. 310-314. □ 44. Stalin said this because in raising poultry there was no state control. Peasants were really earning a good amount through private poultry business. According to the 19th Congress Report "there are still cases of collective-farm property being squandered", "some Party, Soviet and agricultural officials themselves engage in filching collective-farm property...Taking advantage of their official positions, these men convert to their own use common land, compel collective farm boards and chairmen to supply them with grain, meat, milk and other produce at low prices, and even gratis, to exchange highly productive and more valuable cattle for their own inferior cattle and so forth." (p. 76.) This justifies Stalin's claim that tax can be increased by controlling the management of the farms. □ 45. If the cult of the individual is to be abolished, then Lenin cult too must not be cherished. On the cult of the individual see the Afterword. □ 46. It is a lie that Stalin was in the habit of taking decisions himself. Zhukov has described Stalin's method of consulting comrades, which we have quoted in Sec. XII. About the importance of one-man decision see Engels's article on Authority, in Marx-Engels S. W. Vol. II. □ 47. With this self-contradictory statement Khrushchev has himself demolished the edifice of his anti-Stalin slander. □ 48. According to Stalin's draft and with Lenin's approval, the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Transcaucasian Federation and the Byelorussian S.S.R. were united to form the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. □ 49. Genoa Congress. (April 10—May 19, 1922) was convened for the purpose of determining the relations between the capitalist world and Soviet Union. It was attended by Great Britain, France, Italy and other capitalist countries on the one side and Soviet Union on the other. The Hague Congress (June 15-July 20, 1922) was a congress of experts convened with the same purpose. But both the congresses failed to yield any result because of the irreconcilability of the points of view of the two sides. □ 50. Entente Cordiale: Cordial understanding reached between France and Great Britain in 1904. Tsarist Russia joined it in 1907.

51. By two classes Lenin meant the proletariat and the peasantry. Here the State and the Party must not be confused. The Communist Party is a party of one class i.e. proletariat. But for a particular period the Soviet State had to become "not actually a workers' state but a workers' and peasants' state". (see Vol. 32, p. 24). □ 52. Party Plenum of April 13, 1922 elected Stalin the Secretary General on Lenin's motion. According to Trotsky's Real Situation in Russia (henceforth R. S. R.) the text reads: 'has concentrated an enormous power in his hands'. □ 53. According to R. S. R. "to be sure". □ 54. The diagnosis of a major shortcoming common to both Trotsky and Pyatakov—a lack of political as opposed to administrative capacity should be noted. □ 55. See Note 8. □ 56. Trotsky returned to Russia in May 1917. He joined the social-democratic group called the "United social-democrats" (or Mezhraiontsy) which claimed independence both of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. To forge an united front Lenin, on May 10, 1917 offered them a seat on the editorial board of Pravda and in the organising committee of the forthcoming Congress. Trotsky replied, "The Bolsheviks have de-bolshevised themselves, and I cannot call myself a Bolshevik. It is impossible to demand from us a recognition of Bolshevism". And, only after Kerensky was appointed the Premier, Lenin and Zinoviev escaped to Finland to avoid arrest, and in their absence when the Sixth Congress of the R. S. D. L. P. was being organised in July-August 1917, Trotsky joined the Bolsheviks with 4,000 of his followers. □
57. There are clear evidence of disloyalty against all the comrades mentioned here with the only exception of Stalin. Yet Lenin singled out Stalin for the blame. Why? See Note 58.

58. On December 23, 24 and 25 Lenin thought that the Party split might be avoided only by increasing the C.C. membership. In all respects Stalin was superior to all other comrades, only doubt about him was "whether" he would be able to use his "authority with sufficient caution". Now, only after ten days Lenin comes out with the proposal of removing Stalin from the post of G. S., with the charge of "rudeness", "intolerance" and "disloyalty". Why? Why was it not possible for Lenin to suggest any other name and thus keep the issue of Secretary General in a state of confusion?—Lenin had his second stroke on December 16, which paralysed him. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev—conscious of their guilt, knew that they had been maintaining their positions only due to Lenin's "tolerance". Party Plenum gave full responsibility of Lenin's regimen to Stalin. There are enough evidence to prove that Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev were making frenzied attempts to influence Lenin through Krupskaya. Stalin's directions about Lenin's regimen were being violated with Krupskaya's indulgence. Hence Stalin's strong reprimand. Lenin might have been informed about the "insult of Lenin's wife" immediately before writing this note, with the aim of extracting from Lenin a statement denouncing Stalin. The snowballing effect of this might be the cause of Lenin's Letter of March 5, threatening to break comradely relations with Stalin. It can very well be imagined under what a high degree of nervous strain, a man like Lenin could write such un-Bolshevik letter.

59. This proves, at least in part, our suggestion in Note 58.

60. This letter of December 12, 1922 has been quoted here from R.S.R. included in Vol. 45 of Lenin's Works as Document No. 804.


62. Here the letter has been quoted from Trotsky's R.S.R. Pp. 285-286. In Lenin's Vol. 45, p. 601 it has been editorially noted that "this letter has not been found."

63. Frumkin and Stomoniakov were non-members of the C.C. with whom Lenin entered into a sort of "conspiracy". This was undoubtedly a breach of Leninist standard of party behaviour. Hence Lenin's pricking of conscience.

64. Bureau of State Planning.

65. Lenin means the proposals of the Commission of Inquiry into the R.S.F.S.R. Missions abroad. Avenesev proposed that monopoly of foreign trade must not be abolished.


67. See Note 62.

68. See Lenin Vol. 45, p. 604.

69. See Note 62.

70. Quoted from R.S.R. p. 288. Also see Lenin Vol. 45, p. 604.

71. On Dec. 18, 1922, the Party Plenum rescinded the earlier decision and reaffirmed the absolute necessity of foreign trade monopoly.


73. Lenin wished that this article be published, but he could not make it ready for the press. After consulting Lenin's younger sister, Lenin's Secretary wrote to Stalin that "V. I. did not consider this article to be in its final form and ready for the printer." On the basis of Fotieva's letter Stalin decided that the articles could not be published "because they have not been reviewed by Com. Lenin". Hence the allegation that the article was suppressed.

74. See Lenin Vol. 42. The letter is dated 26. 9. 1922.

75. For details of Stalin's draft of resolution "On the Relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Independent Republics" and the controversy over that, see Lenin C.W. Vol. 42, note 481 (Pp. 602-605).

76. For Stalin's reply see Pp. 128-145 of this book.

77. See p. 126.

78. See Lenin, Vol. 45, Document 82; the address is "Dear Comrade".

79. See Lenin, Vol. 45, p. 608 and for Stalin's criticism of these comrades, see Pp. 128-134 of this book.

80. This letter is another example of pressure on Lenin's nerves. The denunciation of colleagues in the party C.C. and that of Stalin, the G. S., and a member of the Polit Bureau before ordinary party members was undoubtedly a breach of
discipline. 81. See Note 78. 82. This refers to the article "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'". See p. 121 ff. of this book. 83. This expression shows how a section of Party leaders was banking upon the final break between Lenin and Stalin. 84. Better Fewer, But Better, See Lenin Vol. 33, Pp. 490 ff. 85. For Stalin's comment on Rabkrin, see Pp. 168-171 of this book. 86. Stalin cannot be blamed, for he was the Commissar for Rabkrin from Feb. 1920 to April 25, 1922. At the 11th Congress Lenin told that Stalin was most suitable for the post. Stalin left the post because he became General Secretary and not because of his inefficiency. Lenin wrote this article on March 2, 1923. 87. See Pp. 152-153. 88. For Stalin's comment see Pp. 171-172. 89. For Stalin's comment on Lenin's Testament see Sec. VII. 90. See p. 8 of this book and Note 5. 91. This was a top secret personal letter which Lenin and Krupskaia hesitated several times before finally sending it to Stalin. Lenin's last order to his secretary was to take the letter personally to Stalin and bring a reply. Yet Kamenev knew about the letter and did not hesitate to tell about it to Trotsky. This is another proof of how conspiratorial activities, eavesdropping into personal affairs, were going on. 92. From Lenin's sister Ulyanova, we come to know that Stalin immediately dictated his reply and asked for an apology. The matter ended there. According to Ulyanova the matter was purely personal. Still Trotsky said, stamping his feet, "The Party has a right to know that letter". 93. August Bloc—Sixth All Russian Conference of the R. S. D. L. P. held at Prague in January 1912, expelled the Mensheviks and inaugurated a new party, the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky convened a conference of all anti-Bolshevik groups in August 1912, to give a united battle against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. It formed a provisional committee. The bloc had to be dissolved because of internal quarrel. 94. See Lenin C. W. Vol. 26. Pp. 216-219 and 223-227 for the letters. 95. See Lenin C. W. Vol. 32, p. 160. 96. For Bukharin's unholy alliance with Mdivani etc. see Note 101. 97. See Note 73. 98. For Stalin's own defence see Pp. 129-130. 99. About the "projected economic integration of the Transcaucasian republics" see Lenin's telegram to G. K. Orjonikidze of April 18, 1921. Vol. 45, Pp. 125-126. 100. See Lenin, Vol. 33, p. 127. 101. In October 1922 differences between the Central Committee and the Georgian leaders were ironed out in presence of Lenin and Mdivani. But when the decision of uniting the Transcausian federal republic with the R. S. F. S. R. was announced, the Georgian Party Central Committee was annoyed. An indignant telegram was sent to Moscow, addressed not to Stalin the G. S., but to Bukharin. Lenin was extremely irritated, and sent the following note in reply: "Astonished at the improper tone of the note by direct wire...handed to me for some reason by Bukharin and not by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee...I emphatically condemn the abuse of Orjonikidze, and insist on your dispute being submitted in proper and loyal terms for decision to the secretariat of the Central Committee. (The Interregnum by E. H. Carr, Penguin, p. 270). 102. Smena-Vekhists: A bourgeois intellectual trend which arose in Russia in 1921. Through their magazine Smena Vekhi they preached the idea that the New Economic Policy would gradually transform Russia into a bourgeois democracy. 103. "Which should be put first, the right of nations to self-determination, or Socialism? Socialism should". Thus said Lenin. See Vol. 27, p. 27. 104. On April 28, 1920, Pilsudski announced a general offensive against the people of Ukraine. By May 6, Kiev was in Polish hands. The All Russian Central Executive Committee issued an appeal to the workers, peasants and soldiers of Poland to rise in revolt, and Red Army marched in Warsaw. 105. Lenin, Vol. 20, p. 436. 106. Lenin, Vol. 22, p. 148. 107. Lenin, Vol. 26, p. 110. 108. Lenin, Vol. 27, p. 411. 109. Lenin, Vol. 33, p. 340. 110. Lenin, Vol. 33, p. 353. The base of bureaucracy was the specialists. While Trotsky had been
nourishing the specialists whether in the army or in the trade
unions, Stalin had been ruthlessly shooting them down or
removing them from their posts. He was rebuked more than
once by Lenin for his extreme apathy towards the specialists.
The narrative makes it clear that Trotsky was interested in
fighting Stalin and not the bureaucracy as such. During
the October days the Smolny Institute was the operating centre
of the Bolsheviks. Glavpolitput was the chief political
department of the People's Commissariat for Communications.
It adopted military discipline in the railways. That was its
good point. But its method helped to develop bureaucracy.
It was abolished in 1920. Tsektran—the Central Committee
of the Joint Trade Union of Rail and Water Transport workers.
It fell into the hands of the Trotskyites. It bred bureaucratic
practices. In December 1920, its practices were condemned
by the Party. Later it was included in the Central Council of
Trade Unions. The quotation Sokolov used was from The Peasant
War In Germany: "The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to
take over a government at a time when society is not yet ripe
for the domination of the class he represents and for the measure
which that domination implies". 1)

1) How we should Reorganize The Workers' And Peasants' Inspection.

The Lausanne Conference, held between November 20, 1922 and July 24, 1923 was convened on the initiative of France, Great Britain and Italy to discuss the Near Eastern question. Soviet Russia was invited to the conference only for the discussion of the question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. The Soviet Delegation proposed that the Straits be completely closed to the warships of all powers except Turkey. This proposal was rejected.

Shakhtry affair: This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary organisation of experts in Shakhty and other Donbas areas which were discovered in early 1928. The wreckers were connected with the former mine owners—

both Russian and foreign. For details see Stalin: Works Vol. 11, Pp. 57-68 and History of the CPSU (B) Short Course, 1952, p. 449.

For further reading one may refer to Stalin’s article, Against Vulgarising the Slogan of Self-criticism. Vol. 11, Pp. 133-144.

Emil Ludwig (1881-1948), German author, best known for his biographical essays. His popular studies include the lives of Goethe, Beethoven, Napoleon, Bismarck, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin.

Stepan Razin belonged to an affluent Cossack family. His peasant army fought not against the tsar but against boyars and government officials. He started his campaign in September 1669. He was executed on June 6, 1671. Pugachov, a Don Cossack, declared himself Emperor Peter III. He was joined by Cossacks and serfs. He had sixty peasant guerilla companies active between Nizhny Novogorod and the Don. It had become a real people's war against the nobility. He was executed on January 10, 1775.

Decembrists: Young and enlightened Army officers who attempted a rising on December 14, 1825.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937), Czech statesman and philosopher, founder of Czech Republic, a critic of Marx.

The Government of the Murmansk Territory Soviet where Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in a majority, made an agreement on March 2, 1918 with the Entente which enabled Britain, France and USA to land their troops in Murmansk. They violated repeated warnings from the Soviet Government and virtually placed the territory in the hands of the "Allies". Trotsky's policy at this time was: more hostility to the Germans and cooperation with the British. In his last warning to the Murmansk Government, Lenin wrote: "You are still disinclined to understand Soviet policy, which is equally hostile both to the British and to the Germans." (June 26, 1918) Vol. 35 p. 337.

To understand Stalin's anxiety, we quote the following information from Memoirs of a British Agent by Bruce Lockhart, Penguin, Pp. 245-246: “A large
French Military mission, headed by General Berthelot, had just arrived in Moscow...we proposed to Trotsky that he should make use of General Berthelot's services. The Red leader, who had already shown his good-will by appointing a committee of Allied officers to advice him, accepted the proposal with alacrity. At the first meeting of this new committee...Trotsky made a formal request for help...we seem to have secured a tactical advantage”.

125. The suggestion that such extolment of Stalin was peculiar to Voroshilov is not correct. This was common for the communists, as it was common for the Trotskyists to call Stalin “a betrayer of Leninism”. Some examples: Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1937: “You are the brain and the will to victory of the working people.” Litvinov to U.S. Ambassador Davies: “That the world would someday appreciate what a very great man Stalin was,” (1937); Mao Tsetung: “The world is blessed with Stalin.” (1939)

126. For similar opinion of Marshal Zhukov see p. 234.


128. It is interesting to note the following from George C. Marshall himself, the U.S. Chief of Army Staff, from his Biennial Report to the Secretary of War: “This generation of Americans can still remember the black days of 1942...when the German armies approached the Volga and the Suez. In those hours Germany and Japan came so close to complete domination of the world that we do not yet realize how thin the thread of Allied survival had been stretched. In good conscience this Nation can take little credit for its part in staving off disaster in those critical days. It is certain that the refusal of the British and Russian peoples to accept what appeared to be inevitable defeat was the great factor in the salvage of our civilization.”

129. Blitzkrieg: the idea of rapidly destroying the opponent by one or several concentrated annihilating blows. This doctrine was successfully applied by Hitler in the Polish campaign in 1939. But Blitzkrieg failed in Russia.

130. For Churchill’s appreciation of Stalin’s military grasp, his emphasis on the importance of striking at the morale of the German people and his struggle with Churchill for the “Second Front” see Churchill: Second World War Vol. IV ch. xxvii.

131. “Cannes” and “Sedan”: Cannes has no military history except that on March 1, 1815 Napoleon escaped from Elba and landed at Cannes. Perhaps Voroshilov wants to mean Cannae which is connected with Hannibal’s victory over the Romans at Cannae on August 2, 216 B.C. Cannae is regarded by military historians as a classic example of victorious double envelopment. Sedan is the place where France was defeated by Germany twice. Battle of Sedan of September 1, 1870 brought the downfall of Napoleon III’s Second Empire. Again the battle of Sedan of May 13-14, 1940 inaugurated the German invasion of France during World War II. The German victory was sweeping and with minimum loss. It was propagated that Germany had discovered a new method of war.

132. Lenin Vol, 38 p 223.

133. Ibid., p. 360.

134. Roger Garaudy was a Professor at the University of Poitiers. He was a Docteur es Lettres of the Sorbonne; Doctorate in science from the Soviet Academy of Sciences; Member of the Politbureau of the French Communist Party. Expelled from the Party in February 1970.

135. Stalin never claimed it to be the “apex of scientific thought”. See History of the C.P.S. U. (B) Pp. 164-165 where after emphasising the importance of studying Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Stalin’s pamphlet has been introduced with the following modest words: “In order to appreciate the tremendous part played by Lenin’s book in the history of our Party...we must acquaint ourselves, if only briefly, with the fundamentals of dialectical and historical materialism.”

136. See Appendix to Engels’s Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy.

137. Garaudy should have known the following words of Stalin uttered at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E. C. C. I.: “Marxism is a science. Can Marxism persist and develop as a science if it is not enriched by the new experience of the class struggle of the
proletariat, if it does not digest this experience from the standpoint of Marxism, from the point of view of the Marxist method? Clearly it cannot.” Vol. 9, p. 104. 138. In writing the pamphlet in question, Stalin has followed Engels’s method. Engels begins his chapter on Dialectics with the following words within brackets: “(The general nature of dialectics to be developed as the science of interconnections, in contrast to metaphysics)”. About dialectical law he writes “indeed they can be reduced in the main to three…” Dialectics of Nature Pp. 62-63. Stalin, however, made it more simple because he was not writing a thesis but a primer on dialectics for untaught activists. 139. Stalin begins his article thus: “Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is dialectical, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of this phenomena, its theory, is materialistic.” [History of the C.P.S.U.B., p. 165]. In this connection note Lenin’s comment: “The sum total, the last word and essence of Hegel’s logic is the dialectical method—this is extremely noteworthy.” (Vol. 38 p. 234). For the problem of separation of “materialist outlook” and “dialectical thinking” and the difficulty of returning to the self-evident understanding of unity between the two because of “more than two thousand years of an essentially idealist outlook on the world” after the ancient Greeks, see Engels’s Dialectics of Nature, Pp. 19-199. 140. History of the C.P.S.U. (B), p. 177. See Lenin’s note on this point, Vol. 38 p. 282. 141. Denis Diderot (1713-1784): Compiled the Encyclopaedia to combat feudal religious ideology. According to him experiment and observation were the methods and guides of cognition. He came very close to the standpoint of contemporary materialism. Lamarck (1744-1829) French naturalist. In 1809 he expounded the first comprehensive theory of the evolutionary development of the living world. Charles Darwin (1809-1882). English natural scientist. He used Lamarck’s idea of the role of environment and heredity in evolution to develop his own theory of the historical development of the organic world. 142. In this connection see Engels’s Old Preface to Anti-Dühring. (Dialectics of Nature, Pp. 45-46) 143. The Law of Negation of the Negation is organically bound up with the law of the unity and conflict of opposites. Negation of the old by the new is nothing else but the solving of contradictions in the process of development. According to the metaphysical view, development proceeds in a straight line or in a closed circle. On the contrary, according to dialectical view, development proceeds in an ascending line, a spiral. Stalin has brought in the idea of negation and negation in a simple manner in the following expressions: “The dialectical method therefore holds that—the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena but as a disclosure of contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a struggle of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions”; or “the process of development should be understood not as a movement in a circle”. [History of the C.P.S.U. (B) Pp. 169-170.] Of course, Stalin has not elaborated the “struggle of opposite tendencies”, which results in the return to the starting point though on a higher plane. For it would have been very difficult for the beginner to understand. 144. Giving undue importance to the moment of “unity” is always the demand of the revisionists. Trotsky and Bukharin proposed such fusion of contradictions in matters of trade unions. In this connection see Lenin’s article Once Again on The Trade Unions, Vol. 32. For Hegel’s idea of “moment” see Lenin Vol. 38 p. 147. 145. For a precise exposition of reciprocal action and totality see Engels’ Letter to Starkenburg, January 25, 1894. 146. Scientistic conception: the view that the method of the natural sciences should be applied in all areas of investigation, including philosophy, the humanities and the social sciences and that this is the only
fruitful method in the pursuit of knowledge. □ 147. **Alienation** is a concept describing both the process and the results converting, in definite historical conditions, the products of human and social activity and also man’s properties and capabilities into something independent of them and dominating over them, also the transformation of some phenomena and relations into something different from what they are in themselves. For Marx’s analysis, see *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844). He proceeded from the principle that alienation characterises contradictions at a definite stage in society’s development. □ 148. Lenin, Vol. 19 p. 24. According to Lenin, the struggle between philosophical idealism and philosophical materialism “Marx-Engels defended philosophical materialism. But Marx did not stop at 18th-Century materialism...he enriched it with the achievements of German Classical philosophy.” Garaudy is giving undue importance to the latter. □ 149. *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Pp. 10-12. □ 150. Stalin; *Marxism and Problem of Linguistics*, Moscow, 1954, Pp. 7-15. □ 151. *Action Francaise*: An anti-semitic organisation founded in 1898 which later became Royalist. □ 152. Stalin said: “The superstructure is the product of an epoch, the epoch in which the given economic basis exists and operates.” (Marxism and Problem of Linguistics p. 12.) Compare this passage with a passage in the *Communist Manifesto* p. 55: “What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed?” □ 153. Marx has given an explanation of this phenomenon. The reason, why we still enjoy Greek art, lies in the fact that this art reflected a naive yet healthy normal perception of reality. But this cannot be said about the art that was created during the 2000 years of domination of idealism. For the relation between the social base and their ideological superstructures in the shape of philosophy, religion and art see Engels’s *Anti-Duhring*, Pp. 124-125. □ 154. Objective idealist philosophy after the name of Thomas Aquinas. □ 155. The reference is to a speech by Zhdanov at the Conference of Philosophical Workers in 1947. □ 156. In criticising Alexandrov’s History of Western Philosophy what Zhdanov said on this point is this: “Like every discovery, like every leap, like every break in gradualness, like every transition into a new condition, the rise of Marxism could not have occurred without the previous accumulation of quantitative changes—in the given instance, the stages of development of philosophy prior to the discovery of Marx-Engels. But the author obviously does not understand that Marx-Engels created a new philosophy, differing qualitatively from all previous philosophical systems, however progressive they were.” (A. A. Zhdanov: *On Literature, Music and Philosophy*, p. 80). □ 157. **Heuristic**: The art of discourse which flourished among the ancient Greek sophists. □ 158. It may be noted that only a year and a half before his death, Lenin gave great emphasis on studying Hegelian dialectics. He advised to form a kind of “Society of Materialist Friends of Hegelian Dialectics.” See Vol. 33 Pp. 233-234.

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<td>1934 and 1935 1934 and 1953</td>
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</table>
INDEX

A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy : 285
Albanian Party of Labour : 2, 323, 343
Anti-Duhring : 284, 307, 371, 395-96
Barbusse, H. : 375
Bebel, A. : 371, 374
Beria, L. P. : 15, 34, 36, 50, 55-58, 380, 383, 384
Bernstein, E. : 371
Bloss, W. : 4, 371, 372
Bukharin (ites), N. I. : 9, 10, 20, 28, 60, 77, 86, 90, 121, 145, 147, 239, 250, 263, 344, 378
Bulganin, N. A : 70, 340, 382
Capital : 284, 286, 294, 297, 299, 317
Chinese Communist Party : 323, 350-51
Churchill, W. S. : 37, 38, 211, 226, 392-93
Communist Party of India : 321, 335
Concerning Marxism in Linguistics : 273, 288, 396
Cult of the individual, (also, personality cult, Stalin cult) : 1-75, 182, 279, 319, 323, 325, 327, 333, 340, 343, 345, 372, 374, 384
Denikin, A. I. : 23, 135, 137
Dialectical and Historical Materialism : 273, 278, 355
dialectical materialism (also dialectics, dialectical method) : 273-303
Djilas, M. : 360
Dzerzhinsky, F. E. : 23, 96, 110, 121-123, 126, 132, 134, 145, 198, 242, 328, 383
Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR : 197, 277, 287, 303-18, 320, 396
Enver Hoxha : 343
French Communist Party : 323, 334
Existentialism : 301
Garaudy, R. : 273, 278
Gotha Congress : 371
Heine, H. : 372
History of the CPSU (B) : 61, 62, 273, 276, 391, 394
Hitler, A. : 37, 38, 41, 210, 225, 229, 230, 244, 245
Italian Communist Party : 323
Kaganovich : 22, 56, 340, 383
Kautsky, K. : 120, 295, 360
Kerensky, A. F. : 14
Krupskaya, N. K. : 7, 379, 380, 386
Kugelmann, L. : 378
Lafargue, P. : 299
Lassalle, F. : 4
Liu shao-chi : 185-95, 375
Ludwig, E. : 288
Malenkov, G. M. : 40, 44, 340
Mao Tsetung : 273, 274, 277, 304, 305, 308, 318, 350, 357, 375, 392
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism : 281, 284, 294, 393
Mikoyan, A. I. : 45, 56, 71, 72, 169, 242, 383
Molotov, V. M. : 22, 71, 72, 94, 96, 130, 225, 234, 259, 340, 383
Orjonikidze, S. : 57, 58, 110, 120, 123, 126, 242, 383...
Paris Commune: 374
Pervukhin: 340
Plekhanov, G.: 191
Rodzyanko: 14
Role of the individual: 186-88, 301
Saburov: 340
Sartre, J. P.: 301
Shepilov: 340
*The Poverty of Philosophy*: 187
*Theses on Feuerbach*: 279, 298
Thorez, M.: 302
Tito, J.: 53, 81, 257-70, 344, 360
Togliatti, P.: 304, 323
Voroshilov, K. Y.: 64, 71, 169, 203, 204, 234, 242, 251, 340, 383-384
Yezhov, N. I: 22, 25, 32, 33
Yugoslav Communist Party: 2, 256-57, 261-72
Zhdanov, A. A: 22, 293, 294, 296, 299, 383
Zhukov, Marshal G. K.: 46, 204, 231, 234, 342, 382, 383
THE STALIN QUESTION
A GREAT DEBATE
an anthology on the question of Stalin

The question of Stalin is, in essence, the question of summing up the historical experience of an era—the summing up of the theory and practice of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the era of socialist construction, national liberation struggles and the general crisis of imperialism. As such, the question of Stalin will remain relevant for many more years to come.

THE STALIN QUESTION brings together most of the relevant materials—adequately prefaced and annotated—highlighting the basic aspects of the question as reflected in the writings of Lenin, Mao, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Togliatti, Tito, Garaudy, Hoxha, Trotsky and Stalin.

The editor, Banbehari Chakrabarty, a leading activist in the revolutionary mass movement in India since 1946, is a Marxist-Leninist of repute and is at present engaged in the study of the historical experience of the world communist movement since the October Revolution.

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