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THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING:

Its **ORIGINS,**
POTENTIAL
and **PROSPECTS**

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PROSPECTS**

Novoyti

Moscow 1990

Contents

What Is New in New Political Thinking?	4
The Evolution of Ideas: From Peaceful Coexistence to New Political Thinking	22
Practical Evolution: Confrontation, Detente, Coexistence. What Next?	35
The Past 70 Years: the Internal Sources of the New Way of Thinking	46
New Thinking and the World: the First Reaction	59
Potentialities and Prospects	72

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НОВОЕ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ МЫШЛЕНИЕ:
ИСТОКИ, ПОТЕНЦИАЛ, ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ
на английском языке
цена 35 к.

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Translated from the Russian by Oleg Svetlov

New political thinking is often described as the response of the present Soviet leadership headed by Mikhail Gorbachev to the problem of survival of mankind created by the nuclear menace. This is not quite true.

The Soviet Union became aware of the nuclear menace virtually as soon as nuclear weapons appeared. Now, in retrospect, it is possible to reassess the measure of realism inherent in Soviet proposals advanced in different years. Yet, the incontrovertible fact is that the Soviet Union began to campaign for banning and eliminating nuclear weapons as early as June 19, 1946, when it proposed signing an international convention to prohibit the production and use of atomic weapons. Certainly, the global nuclear stockpiles and the danger of nuclear arms have dramatically changed since that time, and people everywhere, in the Soviet Union as well, have become much more sensitive to the "nuclear aspect" of world politics. All this is true. Still, as regards the efforts against the risk of nuclear war, present Soviet thinking draws, though in an innovative manner, on the trends and traditions that were built into the theoretical and practical aspects of Soviet foreign policy a few decades ago.

There is another reason why it is a misconception to view new political thinking only as a response to the survival problem. Such a view would deprive policy (not only Soviet policy but policy in general) of its humanitarian impact and civilising influence. Indeed, if people are ready to stop and think only when faced with the greatest possible threat, doesn't this mean that it is in their interest to bless and cherish this threat, not reduce it, let alone eliminate it? Can this kind of human race be considered civilised and reasonable, and endowed with conscience and morality? What about the age-old traditions of

pacifism, love of peace, non-violence, and the humanitarian schools of thought and teachings? These traditions have existed in all historical systems, cultures and civilisations.

Furthermore, to state that new political thinking is only a response to the nuclear menace would have meant substituting effect for cause. True, the new Soviet concept of international security and a nuclear-free and non-violent world is a major, central part of new political thinking. But it is only a part. Moreover, it is an applied, practical part, which stems from the philosophy of new political thinking. It does not dictate this philosophy by itself, in isolation from all other factors. The overall perception of the world inherent in new thinking is not derived from the realisation of the nuclear menace. But the awareness of it and its nature, the moral rejection of this menace and the understanding of ways of reducing it are the content and mentality of the new approach to reality.

No doubt, the Soviet Union is not the only nation searching for ways of protecting itself from nuclear disaster. New Soviet thinking has absorbed many ideas and practical proposals that were formulated in other countries by different social and political forces. On the other hand, it has been recognised that new Soviet policy is not a repetition of the past. It is new not only for the Soviet Union but for the entire system of international relations. Nor is it denied—and, in effect, is even asserted—that new political thinking, both its theory and practice, has extended the intellectual horizons of all parties involved in international communication, even those who are not yet prepared to accept the new philosophy and its conclusions and recommendations.

So what is the substance of new political thinking? What is new about it, and for whom is it new?

What Is New in New Political Thinking?

A correct assessment of realities. An ability to review what must be reviewed. A vision of the world as a complex, multifarious and interdependent system. A realisation of the fact that nuclear or any other “superweapons” cannot in themselves guarantee security, and that lasting and reliable security must be the result of collective, not unilateral, let alone self-interested, actions.

These components, all together or in various combinations, can create a new policy, only when the preceding policy was built on some other, different principles. As for new thinking, these ideas, which are correct in themselves, do not contain any fundamentally new elements. If references to nuclear arms are cast aside or replaced with something historically appropriate, these ideas would in principle be true of any other age or any configuration of the international system. In effect, they appeal to common sense.

New political thinking—these are binding words. They require new intellectual and informational input into the thinking process as such. They require new results from it and new behaviour, which in itself will indicate if any real changes in thinking have occurred, how substantial they are, and what they are about.

“The new political outlook is bound to raise civilisation to a qualitatively new level. This alone serves to show that this is not a one-time adjustment of position but a methodology for conducting international affairs”. This was how one of its goals was described by Mikhail Gorbachev when he addressed the International Forum “For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity” held in Moscow in February 1987.

These words offer a key to understanding the substance of new political thinking. Indeed, any methodology is always a kind of bridge from knowledge to action.

The ideas of peace, international security, disarmament and cooperation among states belonging to different systems are traditional in Soviet foreign policy. Let us leave aside the potential doubts of some readers about how sincere these expressed ideas were, how Soviet policy corresponded to them in different periods, or how flexible and successful this policy was. These are large subjects which must be analysed one by one. The important thing is that the ideas of a world without wars and weapons, the ideas of collective security and peaceful coexistence have been inherent in Soviet foreign policy since its inception, i.e., since the adoption of Lenin’s Decree on Peace.

The novelty of the present re-evaluation of these ideas, which signals a genuine revolution in Soviet foreign-policy thinking and foreign-policy consciousness as a whole, consists primarily in what part these concepts make up of the overall picture and system of world outlook.

The world outlook that prevailed in the past, whose influence has diminished but not disappeared altogether, was exceptionally stable, rigid and almost canonised.

According to that world outlook the world is split by burgeoning social changes into two parts—the old, capitalist, and the new, socialist one. The first is doomed by history to crisis, decay and demise. The other has a future in history. The first is the focal point of all vices and evils, the other has the power of eradicating them. Historically, the two systems are irreconcilable because of the conflicting types of property: private property under capitalism, and public property under socialism. But they have to coexist and it is best for them to coexist peacefully, without wars or conflicts, and even cooperate with each other wherever possible. Imperialism, however, does not agree to such coexistence and cooperation and has to be made to accept peace by foiling its designs or hopes of achieving social revenge militarily. True, there are many nations which, strictly speaking, can be classed neither as capitalist nor as socialist. They are in a transition phase which is bound to lead them towards socialism, with some passing through capitalism, and others bypassing it, depending on circumstances.

In that kind of world the foreign policy of a socialist state appeared quite obvious and, in its main aspects, set once and for all. It implied class unity, ideological affinity, brotherhood and cooperation, and mutual assistance with the other socialist countries (all this was designated by the term “internationalism” or “socialist internationalism”); sympathy with the developing nations, as much support and assistance as possible for their progressive internal development and anti-imperialist struggle, and respect for their status as non-aligned nations; peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries, including a reliable defence against imperialist aggression, a defence capable not only of defeating an aggressor but of averting the very act of aggression.

Needless to say, much of this pattern is open to criticism. Everybody has enough hindsight for that. Leaving any criticism aside, let us focus on the psychological content of the scheme. These are answers without questions. Everything seems so clear, with all the goals fixed, the trends outlined, the friends and foes identified, and the social processes and developments organised into a system which has an internal logic and which is related to the historical experience of the world's

first socialist revolution and the world's first socialist state whose history, including its international history, has been very difficult indeed, and whose existence did come under threat from outside many times. Still, this is an answers-without-questions mentality, a mentality of one's own infallible rightness.

Contrary to it, new political thinking is questions calling for answers. It is an instrument which can be used for recognising that the world has indeed changed a lot. Much of what it is now would have been unthinkable only 15 or even 10 years ago. Much was not foreseen or predicted. New problems have emerged which require unconventional approaches and solutions. This power of insight is precisely the intrinsic substance of the revolution in foreign-policy consciousness and mentality. All the rest is derived from it.

Needless to say, it would be wrong to assert that the previous picture of the world inherent in socialist consciousness has collapsed entirely or that socialist consciousness has gone back on the values, ideals and principles that gave it purpose and guidance in previous years.

The point is that knowledge is taking the place of faith. Questions necessitating knowledge or a search for knowledge are superseding dogmas. Authoritarian mentality manifested in all manner of bans and taboos is giving way to a mentality of democratic world outlook, a mentality of emancipation. Ideologised set-scheme approaches—this-is-the-way-it-must-be attitudes—are yielding their place to a readiness to take life as it is and learn from it without imposing any views on others, and a desire to improve what really needs to be improved and can be improved by mutual agreement. In this respect, new thinking signals a turn toward tolerance.

The relationship between the state of the international system and a nation's foreign policy, on the one hand, and socio-political development, on the other, is also being re-evaluated. This kind of relationship is one of the fundamental Marxist ideas, and in this sense it is not new. What seems to be happening for the first time, though, is that all areas of development are beginning to be realised in practical terms as an integral whole, not as a linear progression which development was imagined to be not so long ago, i.e., the succession of feudalism, capitalism, socialism and communism, and not as convergence, a conceptually naive doctrine to our mind, assert-

ing as it does that at a certain advanced stage of the scientific, technological and informational revolution and the internationalisation of life, capitalism and socialism would merge into some indistinguishable entity. That could hardly happen.

Everywhere and at all times, practical development has been prodded by diversity. There must be some variety in forms of life, if life itself is to make one step further or rise one step higher. Capitalism and socialism are two of the many components of the present-day world and its progress. Can the world develop without either, and if so, where and how? It is not the answer to this question that matters but the fact that political consciousness has posed the question as such. Hence, such elements of new political thinking as recognition of the intrinsic value of the diversity of social forms, i.e., property, political structure, cultural and national traditions, even religions, recognition of various models of socialism, instead of the one and only model that used to be regarded as "genuine", and recognition of the right of peoples to choose any form of social and economic organisation, from either end of the spectrum.

The recognition of the world as an integral, though diverse, whole gives priority to general human interests and values on a new political scale. On the previous scale they were regarded as those that distracted from class categories of thinking and policy. Now which class could this be? Working people? They, however, constitute the overwhelming majority of mankind, the overwhelming majority of the population in all countries and groups of countries. What in this case are the "fundamental differences", if any, between the real interests of this large mass of people, who support themselves with their work, and general human interests? There are none and there must not be any. No differences between social or political systems can be more important than international peace and survival, which are now, however, reduced only to disarmament and the prevention of war. In present conditions the confrontation of states with different social systems cannot be regarded as the leading trend any more. In fact, it must be sharply limited in scale and means, and confined purely to considerations of security.

Development is closely linked with another problem, survival, which is one of the central elements of new political thinking. The survival of humanity as a species began to be debated

in connection with a potential global nuclear war and its possible consequences, especially climatic ones. Very soon, however, it became clear that such a war was not the only threat to the peoples of the earth. In the long run, it may not even be the direst of threats. Irreparable environmental and climatic damage may also result from a large-scale non-nuclear conflict, especially if it takes place in a highly industrialised region. There are many more potential threats.

What will become of this world if hunger, poverty, backwardness and ecological barbarity continue to grow? What will happen to it if the energy and water problems remain unresolved? What will happen if international drug trafficking, which has become one of the wealthiest and mightiest enterprises of the world, continues with impunity? What will happen if terrorism and interethnic and religious conflicts go on unbridled? And what could be the consequences of a civil war, interethnic clashes or even a national strike in an industrialised nation, if this interferes with the normal course of many industrial technologies?

In other words, survival can hardly be considered the ideal for the human race. Survival is the minimal condition, the least of the objective challenges facing people and states. This condition has arisen due to the scope of present-day barbarity and ignorance, which can only produce arrogance and conceit. The world will become a place worthy of human life only when natural resources and productive forces are used in the best possible way and in the interests of all nations. When countries are able, through joint efforts, to deal effectively with all the global problems confronting them. When unavoidable social change is not slowed down or stopped but is accepted as the basis of new and more dynamic socio-political structures of government and social arbitration, both on the national and the international scale.

Here we come to another highly important feature of new political thinking as a methodology for conducting international affairs. The thing about it is that it is indeed political thinking, and this is the novelty of it. It does not deny the significance of force, including armed force, in society or in international relations. Force is part of our reality. Every nation still has and is entitled to maintain a reliable potential to defend itself both from foreign aggression and from domestic violence, be it in the form of conflicts of whatever kind,

crime, or attempts to overthrow its constitutional system. Unfortunately, force still remains indispensable.

The origins of any modern society, any system, any social setup can be traced to some form of violence. These violent roots may go back to earlier in this century, or the last, or even further back into history. It is history indeed, and there is nothing one can do about it. But having announced its commitment to the ideals of humanism and a democratic world without wars or violence, new political thinking does not just reject the self-sustaining and absolute significance of force, which has been so typical of the past and even of the present. New political thinking is thoroughly examining these violent sources and roots in order to uncover and understand their causes, mechanisms and laws. And once these are found and understood, it seeks to develop ways and means of limiting violence, placing an unsurmountable barrier to it, and making any society and the international community as a whole live in conformity with the rules of law and morality, and reasonable self-government by the people.

Traditional diplomacy views negotiations and compromise solutions as political instruments, not as goals in themselves. New political thinking regards dialogue both as a means and, in a certain measure, as an end. The world is being faced with ever more problems, which cannot be solved immediately. They must be thoroughly analysed, and different strategies of behaviour may be developed to deal with them. The potential consequences of each of these strategies should be examined beforehand as well. It is not by chance that modern science draws a clearcut line between the resolution of problems and the decision-making. Since problems are becoming increasingly international and they require concerted international actions, dialogue is becoming an indispensable part and a requirement of world politics.

But rational and constructive dialogue must not be a hostage to chance. It can be held only in a proper atmosphere, and this takes some time to develop. At least, there must be a minimum of good will, mutual respect, trust and understanding. More and more this kind of dialogue seems to resemble a scientific symposium or a conference for an engineering project.

For instance, there is the "open sky" idea. But the question is how to implement it in practical terms? How much time will

it take to prepare the route, the aircraft, and technical and monitoring procedures before an inspecting aircraft takes off? How much more time and effort will be required if the inspection flight is envisaged for several nations, not just one? These would seem to be purely technical problems but in time, if an appropriate international agreement is reached, they will gain both political and legal significance. Anyway, it is clear that an experiment is needed involving representatives of different countries. Now would this have been possible in the atmosphere of the cold war?

The cold war broke out in the late 1940s, when the pain, the scars, the shock of World War II were still fresh. There is no need to say how much the world of those days differed from what it has become now. Dozens of years have passed and everything has changed so dramatically—science and technology, the economy and the daily life, life styles and internal policies, the political map of the world and its interdependence. Political parties have succeeded one another in government, some more than once. Dozens of persons have held top posts in their countries.

When they took office and consequently entered into world politics, they were all confronted with the cold-war situation which had been created long before they came along. That situation, like any other, had its logic, laws, and line of evolution. Far from all politicians and government leaders of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s were ardent supporters of the cold war and many openly stated their resentment of it. But they all remained its captives and continued to play the "game"—some with gusto, others through inertia, still others with some resistance.

New political thinking drastically changes the "game" and thereby its logic and rules. Things that were exceptionally difficult to do amidst stiff political and military confrontation with its relentless win-it-or-lose-it choice prove quite feasible and even natural in a world that appears as contradictory to those living in it. Contradictions are beginning to reveal perfectly new and truly valuable facets: they are not a reason for hostility but a challenge which we can jointly tackle and thereby make our world a little bit better, more humane, and safer.

This is yet a tendency, not an accomplished fact. It is difficult to assess major political shifts and developments that

have begun just recently and continue to evolve. Still, let us ask ourselves: is a relapse from the present state of the East-West relations to a freezing point possible now? A relapse not into a full-scale cold war but into something of a seriously negative nature? Apparently, an honest and simply a cautious answer should be that it would be dangerous to ignore such a possibility completely.

New political thinking—and this is its another feature—does not attempt to portray the present changes for the better in international affairs, however important they may be, as a “breakthrough” or a “revolution” which resolves all problems and contradictions once and for all. On the contrary, it calls attention to the fact that it takes unflagging constructive efforts and constant work to maintain an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.

This point must be stressed primarily because in the past any growth of the detente trend in the East-West relations and any positive development dragged, like a comet, a tail of complacency and pipe dreams. The intensity of the disenchantment that followed was proportional not only to the reason for it but to the length and intensity of that tail of euphoria, which far from promoting detente, at times even hampered it.

The objective interest of the media in sensation, or at least in sensational presentation of news, results, among other things, in building up euphoria and too much hope in matters that should not be dramatised. Sometimes, politicians themselves act as euphoria-builders, some in order to exaggerate their achievements, real or imaginary, others in order to pursue their own self-interests. The latter realise that the more euphoria they create, the better they will be able to exploit the disenchantment that will follow. Nor should one forget the natural feeling of ease that many people feel when they hear of something good and positive, especially after many decades of tension and confrontation.

It is now realised that worthwhile political results, constructive results that can win internal support in different countries at one and the same time, can be achieved only in an appropriate international atmosphere. This atmosphere must be created, maintained and cultivated even when obvious stimuli seem to be absent. A Russian proverb says: “Don’t spit into a well, you may need its water.” The present-day world and its politics “advance” this thought even further: clean the well and keep it

in good order, you will need it sooner or later. This, too, is new political thinking.

In a significant, and in some aspects in a prevailing measure, new political thinking is motivated by moral, ethical and humanitarian categories. Take nuclear war: what for, for what supreme goals, ideals or values could such a war be launched? What rational or moral reasons could there be to justify a confrontation that would destroy not only the belligerents but the entire world?

At the time of the medieval “holy wars”, the crusaders had a reason to hope that their faith could be imposed by sword and fire. The other side entertained the same hopes, for sure. Now what faith or what values would be established on the lifeless ashes of a nuclear conflict? And since such a conflict has been recognised as a disaster that can lead nowhere, then—from the standpoint of logic, common sense and morality—what is the goal and purpose of a policy that keeps pushing us back to nuclear confrontation or, in effect, nuclear blackmail?

The hijacking of an airliner and the use of its passengers as hostages is terrorism, pure and simple. The laws of all or almost all countries recognise this. Now what is the fundamental difference between it and attempts at nuclear intimidation? Of course, the two situations are not directly related to each other. Politicians may even fume at such a comparison: we, they would say, are pursuing perfectly different goals, working for the prevention of aggression, and for security and disarmament.

Subjectively, that is true. But the 20th century teaches many things. The moral image of any epoch is built both of high-minded trends and of low crimes. And of deceptively inconspicuous and habitual rules and principles that were considered natural but were not really so.

In the early 20th century it seemed that there was just not enough knowledge for a reasonable and prosperous life, and social justice. This century has immeasurably expanded our knowledge and capabilities. And now, in the end of it, it has become clear that what is lacking is a moral and responsible person, a citizen. The future life on our planet depends on morality, and not only on knowledge and economic abilities. To fuse politics with morality and gear it to serving general human natural values has become one of the strongest imperatives.

New political thinking is imbued with this understanding.

It focusses on the fact that passive precaution against the nuclear menace, or the arms race and its consequences, hunger, ecological imbalance, whatever, is not enough any more. It is time to act. And the appeal for such action and the preparedness to support it in practical terms is fundamentally important. Not simply to tolerate some inevitable evil nor just to limit it by some available means, but to actively and purposefully identify its roots and causes, and to take concerted joint action to reduce the evil and scale down its deleterious effects. And, wherever possible, to uproot it, under the most stringent international supervision, if necessary. New political thinking provides for forward-looking action, for reasonable pre-emption of events based on the understanding that it is immoral to be able to exercise a positive influence and not to do so.

Another thing about new political thinking is that it is addressed to the most diverse social forces. There was a time when Soviet foreign policy, diplomacy, even propaganda were not ready to appeal to everyone. They would deal with some on a par, and with others condescendingly, didactically, even with injunction. They would be constructive to some, and shrill and confrontatory to others. Hopefully, those times have gone forever.

In fact, new thinking as a political philosophy is not a finished doctrine or a set scheme designed to win a following. It is only a set of initial ideas and principles that can and must be evolved, and not only by its authors. The philosophical, political, ethical and applied approaches of new political thinking will have to be developed jointly, collectively, by the combined intellect and effort of all peace-loving, democratic and responsible-minded forces. The goal is not just to coexist and to live in peace with each other, but to think and act together toward achieving this goal and moving beyond it. The interdependence of the world leaves no other sensible alternative. As Mikhail Gorbachev has said, "... we want a world free of war, without arms races, nuclear weapons and violence, not only because this is an optimal condition for our internal development. It is an objective global requirement that stems from the realities of the present day".

In urging others to give up set schemes and stereotypes and take a fresh, new look at the world, new thinking makes the same appeal to us, the Soviet side. It is inherently self-critical.

Certainly, the aim is not to question all things under the sun merely for doubt's sake. Now that we have realised how much dogma and distortion has occurred in Soviet society owing to dead schemes, scholasticism and idolatry, and how deeply these vices have penetrated all spheres of life, theory and practice alike, vices that people failed to see for so long, so sincerely and with such conviction, and learned to live with them is only normal and natural to try to see if all the residues of routine and conservatism have been uncovered.

But it is not only self-criticism that matters. This is a delicate point. Nobody in the Soviet Union has ever insisted that in the West or anywhere else people must fully accept the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence. Then, Soviet diplomacy has been flexible enough, and the detente agreements were the result of compromise solutions that took years to achieve. Still, many people, including specialists, seemed to believe that the West would awaken and accept the concept of peaceful coexistence—from the Soviet Union, China, or the non-aligned movement—whose views had much in common and on the whole did not contradict each other.

New political thinking envisages that the Soviet Union, too, may accept ideas and concepts from the rest of the world, not only ideas and concepts developed jointly with the rest of the world, but entirely originating there, provided, of course, they accord with the ideas, values and interests of Soviet society and of socialism. Nobody has ever stated that the Soviet Union will never accept ideas originating in other countries or even in the West. But on the other hand, it is now difficult to understand the biting and at times crass, inexpert and even invective ideological criticism that was levelled at the views of other communist parties, not to mention conservative, religious, reformist, social-democratic and environmentalist views.

New thinking, however, means more than a mere preparedness to accept everything rational, just and justified. If this were so, it would be nothing more than the restoration of normalcy. New thinking takes socialism back to the fold of progressive thought. Socialism was born by the most progressive, democratic and humanitarian thought of its times. It emerged from a scientific analysis of the latest economic, political and social ideas and realities. It was based on the humanitarian ideals of the French and American revolutions, which would in later years be called great revolutions. But it

saw the limits they had reached and desired to step over those limits and advance further toward the ideals of freedom and brotherhood of people, and progress.

Later, the decades of Stalinism with its wholesale violence, lawlessness, repressions, flaunted contempt for the personality and hostility to all things individual, with its barren intellectualism and its fossilising of living thought into cold religious dogma which could only be worshipped with pagan frenzy—those decades and the force of their inertia blotted out the original image of the socialist ideal. Now perestroika and new political thinking are restoring that image, giving it back its purpose and daring, and peeling off the layers of dogmatism, scholasticism, all kinds of complexes, and bureaucratic disdain of people and their daily life.

Such, on the whole, are the fundamental features of the consciousness and philosophy of perestroika, which can rightly be called new political thinking. They have already produced new ideas and new political realities, both domestic and international.

Now what is the Soviet Union ready to contribute, and is already contributing, to the joint building of the future? The answer to this question constitutes the political content of new political thinking as expressed in Soviet foreign policy.

The idea of the world as being integral and interdependent, contradictory and interdependent both in its contradictions and in its prospects for survival, was officially formulated for the first time in 1986, in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress. Central to new political thinking, it gives the only correct outlook for the world. It does not view problems, of which there are many both regionally and internationally, as irreversible, incurable vices of the "alien" social system, nor as the unavoidable result of some all-pervasive and omnipotent ill will, or some cunning and vile designs. Though, for sure, there are vices, and corruption, and ill will—ours is not an ideal world. Still, the present-day problems and conflicts are rooted in objective causes. Unless we learn to identify them and patiently but surely resolve them, there can be no hope for progress. These problems must be recognised today. It is necessary to understand that all countries and peoples, all social systems are faced with them. But each is tackling them in its own way, in its own order of priority, in the context of its own history. All this must not be a pretext for strife and mutual recrimination, but an additional

stimulus for cooperation.

The main field of cooperation in the contemporary world is security. It can only be general, it can only be achieved by joint efforts, it can only be based on political and legal foundations, never on unilateral military improvisations. This idea seems to be increasingly realised. True, some governments continue to insist on maintaining armed force and deterrent power. But these views are no longer opposed to the idea of general security and are not intended to be substituted for it.

The logical question is: can one trust a partner in this difficult search who only yesterday was perceived exclusively as an adversary? The potential threat of nuclear conflict is of unparalleled dimensions. For this reason, each side formulates the question of trust in much the same way: "OK, I believe in the good will and sincerity of your leaders' intentions. But is there any guarantee that everything will remain as it is when new leaders take office? And is there any guarantee that in their sensible actions your present leaders do not work against the inherent nature and logic of the system they represent and that one day the system will not revolt against their present decisions and actions?"

These questions are asked in a variety of ways. In the West: "Is it in our interests to help Gorbachev?", "Is the Soviet system capable of reforming itself?", "What will happen after Gorbachev goes and how will this affect Western interests?" In the Soviet Union the same questions are formulated differently: "Can anything—and if so, what exactly—influence the nature of modern imperialism and exercise such an impact on this nature in the present phase of world development, at the new level of interdependence and wholeness of the world, that it would block its most dangerous manifestations?" "Can the capitalist system get rid of militarism, and function and develop in the economic sphere without it?" "Can the capitalist system do without neocolonialism which is currently one of the factors essential to its survival?" And finally: "How realistic is our hope that the awareness of the terrible threat the world is facing . . . will become a part of practical policies" on the part of Western nations?

The fact that these questions are asked means that they can be answered in the affirmative. "Is it in the West's interests to help Gorbachev?" Yes, it is. "Can capitalism get rid of its worse qualities, or limit them or compensate for them?" Yes, it can.

This is hypothetical, of course, and no one knows the exact answers. But whoever could have so much as thought of this ten years ago? The mere fact that these points are raised at top official levels can only mean that political consciousness has profoundly changed, both in scope and content, on both sides.

A new kind of criticism is emerging concerning relations between states and systems. It is not levelled against the personality of a politician or the image of the opposite side (for it is quite obvious that neither can change arbitrarily). New criticism is levelled against a concrete action or attitude of the opposite side to some specific problem. It has proved possible to identify mutual misunderstandings. It has proved possible to criticise the action of the United States in Panama in a way that was not insulting to the American side and did not affect Soviet-American relations. It has proved possible to come to agreement on such matters as the combatting of terrorism and drug trafficking, and other problems, and certainly there will be many more points of agreement. There are still relapses into past practices. But even they are now taken differently, without that mutually instigating effect or pseudo-patriotic smokescreens.

The idea of a world that is whole in its contradictions has produced a new vision of the entire range of the East-West relations. It is not only that the East and the West can and must coexist. The fundamentally new idea is that, since relations between socialism and capitalism have shaped out the 20th century, perhaps the two socio-economic systems are in a way useful and even necessary to each other. It is true that socialism and capitalism have been in continual conflict for seventy-odd years. But hasn't capitalism borrowed some ideas concerning social policy, the role of the state and economic planning from socialism? And hasn't capitalism used many of the scientific and technical ideas which originated in the socialist world? This point should be stressed since it is commonly believed that the process has always occurred in the opposite direction. Hasn't the socialist world tried to borrow useful and acceptable ideas from capitalism? No doubt, those were not mechanical borrowings. Combined with the practical, if limited, experience of constructive relations, they show how much everyone would stand to gain if erratic flashes of common sense could become a system, a norm. This is no longer just wishful thinking.

The change toward more tolerance puts a new perspective

on the problem of a nation's right to a choice of social and economic forms of life. The more complicated the world becomes with its advancing economies, social forms and relations, the more these interact with one another, and the more alternatives open up before civilisation, society and man. These alternatives can be rational and irrational, constructive and destructive, and more or less costly. All this will have to be sorted out. But, considering the 20th-century experience with its unprecedentedly cruel wars and conflicts, it is extremely important to begin with the recognition of the right of every person and nation to a choice, including the right to review previous choices, and the right to an alternative life.

General human values should constitute the criterion of any action and initiative in international politics. Change is needed and justified only if it makes the life of a person, society and the whole international community better and safer. Imperialist, nationalist, class or any other kind of egoism, especially extremist and aggressive egoism, is incompatible with the realities of our interdependent world, though in a way it is encouraged by it. But as a long time ago people learned to live in society, now associations of people, however different from one another, must learn to live in peace and cooperation, like good neighbours.

These fundamental ideas lead new political thinking to a broader understanding of security. This is based on recognising the supreme self-value of every human life and the inalienable right of everyone to life. There must be peace, if this right is to be exercised. Now, peace must mean more than just the absence of war or violence.

"War and violence occur when there is no peace within people"—the church has been preaching this for more than two thousand years. It teaches people to cultivate peace in their hearts.

But the science and politics of the late 20th century have revealed another truth: a person is moulded by society, conditions, customs and traditions in which he lives, in a word, by his environment. The measure in which words stack up against actions, declarations against policies, and ideals against realities plays a highly important role in this respect. Violence and turmoil within is not an inherent human blemish, but rather a reflection and a consequence of the imperfect society in which the person lives. Needless to say, one can resist the pressure of

some circumstances. But this requires so much endurance, concentration, readiness to sacrifice the good things of life, one's peace of mind or even one's life that it would be unnatural to accept it as a rule of life for a human being or a society.

We can advance to a world without violence, i.e., a safe world, only through the betterment of both man and society, with these two processes supporting and consolidating each other. But these are not two roads, it is one road. The world cannot be safe, if new and ever more effective weapons systems require more cynicism and cruelty from people. It cannot be safe if economic and technological progress is paid for with moral erosion and the destruction of human individuality, combined with psychological instability, lack of confidence, and inferiority complexes.

Nor can man and society, being as they are part of life, be healthy in a polluted environment where "progress" is paid for by the violation and destruction of nature. The 1970s seem to have produced a technocratic, utilitarian understanding of environmental problems, i.e., pollution is a bad thing and has to be dealt with, but this is a costly, difficult and unpleasant affair, and not always feasible. The 1980s contributed fundamental political changes: a destroyed environment is bound to cripple the human being, morally and socially. Even routine, peaceful technologies create a threat to normal life on our planet, not to mention any large-scale military conflict, even a conventional one. An ecologically unstable and crippled world cannot be safe either physically, morally, or politically.

Hence, a new understanding of security oriented toward humanity and development. Needless to say, the paramount global challenge is disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, the drastic reduction of weapon stockpiles, and the prohibition and elimination of certain weapon types and systems. As a matter of fact, this is now being done, and the present negotiations give hope that the process will widen and deepen. The need to ensure security by political means has been recognised and accepted as a principle. What must follow are practical actions to deal with any specific problem or situation.

The political conception of security helps to identify its components, such as social justice and democracy, at an international level. All people must be ensured the possibility of pursuing normal socio-economic development without artificial obstacles and barriers, which may cause a highly dangerous

destabilised situation on a national and international scale.

New political thinking with its modern views on man and progress, security and survival, and other pressing global problems rejects not only wars between nations but what could be called "a world civil war". In the opinion of some scholars, the cold war and the confrontation between the East and the West was a war of this kind. In the first half of the 1980s many a hothead insisted that all developments in world politics, including regional conflicts, should be viewed through the prism of this confrontation.

One can easily imagine the consequences such attitudes could have produced if they had prevailed. Leaving aside the patently wrong premises on which they were based, i.e., regional conflicts viewed as deriving from the East-West relations (not without some influence of these relations, of course), they could have turned the whole world into a battlefield. Still worse, they viewed the peoples as puppets in somebody else's hands, and this was fraught with the risk of a highly dangerous underestimation of these peoples' wishes, hopes and potentials.

The present-day world is not a single state, of course, and it will not become one in the foreseeable future. From this viewpoint, "a world civil war", as the confrontation between the two systems since October 1917 is often called in the West, is nothing but journalese. The world does require **civil and legal regulation**, but not necessarily with the help of a "world government". The willpower and efforts of most nations and governments would suffice. Civil regulation does not deny or preclude the possibility of a limited use of force in international affairs—but invariably on the basis of international law and by decision of the United Nations.

Here, too, new political thinking ushers in a post-confrontation age. In November 1989 the United Nations General Assembly by consensus adopted a resolution entitled **Enhancing International Peace, Security and International Cooperation in All Its Aspects in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations**. For the first time in the nearly fifty-year history of the United Nations, two great nations, the Soviet Union and the United States, cooperated on an important political problem, acting as the initiators of that document. The resolution points to the need to enhance the role of the United Nations in world affairs. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the main bodies of the United Nations, enhance its

peace-keeping operations, promote the role of international law, and raise the effectiveness of the International Court of Justice. Any changes in the world must proceed without impairing stability, jeopardising general security, or upsetting established international relations. This point of view is backed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

Another reality of the East-West relationship has become massive human contacts and dialogue at all levels, unparalleled in its political scope and content. Serious and important as they are, countless meetings and forums have become so common that their organisers find it difficult to stir interest among the media.

New thinking applies to the domestic affairs of Soviet society and the government's domestic policy. It reveals itself not only in how many (though certainly not all) are now assessing the problems and the content of socialism, but also in situations that seem to invite force, but in which the government is in no hurry to use it. Some say the government is dragging its feet. But how many victims would there be if our society remained mystified with force, believing it to be all-powerful and, ultimately, justifiable on moral grounds.

Even these examples show that the new political philosophy is no longer confined to ideas and has already produced many practical results, of which there should be many more. Much of it is new not only to the USSR or Soviet policy but to world politics, to other nations, and to the East-West, East-East and even West-West relations.

Still, a logical question is often asked, and not only in the West: how stable is new political thinking, how deep has it struck its roots, and how independent is it as part of consciousness and practice? If it is all that, new political thinking can at least be accepted as part of objective reality and drawn upon in long-term planning. If not, what is the chance of its leaving the scene together with its architects? For an answer, we need to go back to its sources.

The Evolution of Ideas: From Peaceful Coexistence to New Political Thinking

Mikhail Gorbachev wrote: "A new way of thinking is not an improvisation, nor a mental exercise". It is the result of many

years of serious theoretical reflection on the past decades of world development, international relations, and the foreign policies of leading political forces and nations, including Soviet policy, in the 20th century. This explains the philosophical content and significance of the new way of thinking. Still, the analysis of international affairs and reactions to them was not its only source.

Three factors merged as its source:

—the theoretical foundations of socialist foreign policy, especially the concept of peaceful coexistence;

—the practical results of this policy analysed not diplomatically but historically and politically, including all its trends, shifts and effects over the decades;

—and the sphere of the domestic life of socialism, including the measure of correspondence between words and deeds, theory and practice, ideals and realities, a sphere which is assessed primarily from the standpoint of Soviet society but is not confined to it; it represents a picture of world socialism and the problems and relations of the "socialism-capitalism" dichotomy. As a matter of fact, all these key elements of the new way of thinking had existed some time before the new Soviet leadership headed by Mikhail Gorbachev publicly outlined this innovative concept.

Now for the sources of new political thinking. We must go back to the theory of peaceful coexistence, which in the Soviet Union is traced back to Lenin, and in the West to Khrushchev. Why is this so?

In effect, there is no contradiction at all. The idea of peaceful coexistence is indeed traced to Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state. True, in the early 1920s, it was called differently, "peaceful cohabitation". This is mostly a difference in name, not in content, though there is some substantive difference. More about this later.

Lenin's idea of peaceful cohabitation was based on a profound and sincere faith in the inevitability of a global socialist revolution. Not because it was desired but because such were the logic of history and the laws of progress. On the other hand, it was clearly realised that such a revolution was impossible in 1917 and in the following few years. There was a socialist revolution in Russia and another in Mongolia in 1921. The 1918 revolutions in Germany and Hungary were defeated

(though the 1917 revolution in Mexico came to a victorious end, it was not socialist). It was realised that it would take some time, perhaps a lot of time, for other revolutions to break out in Europe and the rest of the world.

In that context, Lenin's idea of peaceful cohabitation between socialist Soviet Russia and all the other countries, which belonged to the capitalist world, was a diplomatic formula intended to protect the interests and ensure the survival of the newly established Soviet Republic. The West immediately and correctly assessed this aspect of the Lenin-Chicherin initiative and took its time replying to it. But this is a subject in its own right.

There was another aspect however, which, it would appear, the West failed to understand and duly assess. But it was the leading aspect on a longer-term basis. That the West denied it even a minimum of philosophical and political support made it easier later, under the impact of Stalin's foreign policy, to reject the cohabitation idea.

This other aspect was that philosophically and morally, as well as politically, the idea of peaceful cohabitation appealed to the common sense and pragmatism of the world bourgeoisie. It fitted well with its pacifist views and traditions, its sense of historical responsibility, and its ability of social foresight. No doubt, certain parts of the ruling classes and political forces of the bourgeois world possessed all those qualities. But their combined potential proved insufficient at the time. The rejection of the socialist revolution, Bolshevism and Soviet Russia was so strong, so widespread, in effect all-embracing, that the West as a whole failed to accept, or even understand, all the aspects of the new and unusual policy of the new and seemingly hostile world. This, however, is no reason to go fault-finding. Acceptance was a difficult affair in those days. We will just state the fact.

Once in power, Stalin abandoned many of the fundamental components of Lenin's domestic and foreign policy for decades, though he paid lip service to it, presenting his own ideas and actions as drawing upon Leninism and evolving it. Two factors made it easier for Stalin to revise the whole of Lenin's concept of peaceful cohabitation between states with different socio-economic systems, namely:

—the concept itself had not yet developed into the balanced theory which the concept of peaceful coexistence or new polit-

ical thinking, for example, are now. Accordingly, it had not begun to play an important or systematic role in the foreign policy, ideology or mass consciousness of Soviet society in those days. It proved much easier to "jettison" than many of the other ideas of those days such as the views of economists and political economists;

—far from accepting or supporting the appeal for peaceful cohabitation theoretically or politically, the West daily proved its extreme rejection of and hostility toward the USSR (founded in 1922) with statements, actions and political manoeuvres. It never hid its desire to see socialism destroyed, militarily if necessary. This, too, is a historical fact, not an accusation.

The closer World War II loomed on the horizon (and its first fires began burning in the early 1930s), the less clearly the appeal for peaceful cohabitation was heard, and the more naive it seemed that the voice of reason, the voice of morality could drown out gunfire, military marches, jingoistic rhetoric and muscle-building exercises. And then later, after the horrifying global slaughter, the cold war came.

Thousands of books about its causes have been and will be written in the East and the West. Naturally the first impulse was to accuse the other side. Later, with each new thaw both in the West and in the East, it was just as natural to do some self-searching. In the West, especially in the United States, this occurred in the mid-1960s and then in the first post-Vietnam years, and in the latter half of the 1970s. The Soviet Union seemed to follow suit when perestroika was launched. Anyway, the need for at least slight self-criticism was felt on both sides of the global socio-political watershed. Having realised it to be impossible and pointless to sit it out in the old trenches, conservatives and conformists on both sides seem prepared to agree that "most of the responsibility rests with the other side, though we didn't act in the best way either" or even that "the truth is somewhere in between". No, the truth is not anywhere halfway but at another level, that of theory, not condemnation or arbitration.

Now that it has been generally recognised that the world has a contradictory, yet dialectically whole and interdependent nature, we can look from this point of view not only ahead but back. The world has always been such, even when people did not know or realise this. An overview of the first half of the 20th century gives one a kind of electric shock: there is no way

a cold war could not have broken out. It was not so much the result of someone's malice or evil designs as a natural reaction of a divided humanity to the brutalising fifty years of the global civil war climaxing as it did with World War II.

This is not an exaggeration. There was the socialist revolution, the civil war and Stalin's reforms on one-sixth of the world's land surface, in Russia (later the Soviet Union); the confrontation between capitalism and socialism; the turmoil and fighting in China, which eventually went socialist in 1949; the national-liberation and bourgeois revolutions in Latin America and Asia; the historical confrontation between democracy and all kinds of authoritarian and totalitarian rule. All this was interlaced in an incredibly tight knot of global strife.

True, there were right and wrong causes, criminals and heroes, winners and losers. There was a dramatic, sacrificial struggle between convictions, ideals, interests and hopes. All this is true. Some hidden deep-lying historical forces and trends were at play as well. Still, it is perfectly clear that throughout the first fifty years of the 20th century the world was sliding into an abyss of more and more violence. Yes, this was the payment for social progress and national and social liberation. But it was too dear a price, involving too many unacceptable risks.

Was it possible to stop all at once? To clear the bloodshot eyes, cool the passions, forgive the blows and losses, and speak a language of tolerance and common sense? Certainly, not. There had to be some time to "cool down". The cold war provided that time. There had to be a "cold shower" to bring the world to its senses. The nuclear arms and the missile crises provided that shower. There had to be some mutual feeling-out: how would the other side react to potential gestures of peace, what would it think of them? The relaxation of tension at the turn of the 1960s and the detente of the 1970s played that role. But only now, with the advent of new political thinking, does the world seem to begin to be thinking and acting rationally.

But this is a look from the perspective of today. In the mid-1950s, with the memory of the world war still fresh, with the upsurge of the anti-colonial and national-liberation struggle, with the East-West confrontation, and with the atomic weapons and the first strategic missiles, it was realised for the first time that the world was approaching a dangerous limit. All

the more so as nobody was quite sure where the limit was drawn.

At its 20th Congress in 1956, the CPSU reached a conclusion which was revolutionary, and not only for the Soviet system of thinking. It stated that another world war was not inevitable. During "Khrushchev's thaw", as the period was called later, Soviet foreign policy reverted to Lenin's idea about lasting peaceful "cohabitation" between capitalism and socialism being possible and, in effect, inevitable. But the concept of peaceful coexistence differed from the original cohabitation idea, the difference being the result of the intervening thirty years. Cohabitation provided for as much mutual openness as possible and for close economic relations—not only trade or concessions but joint enterprise, in effect, anything considered acceptable and mutually beneficial. Such a degree of openness had been made impossible by the political fetters of the 1930s and 1940s, the world war, the postwar confrontation, the atomic weapons, and Stalin's heritage on the domestic scene. There could not be any convergence between the two systems, and anything remotely reminiscent of it was interpreted as a sign of hostility. Ideological struggle had to be continued and even intensified. Coexistence had to be peaceful but amidst continued confrontation between the two systems. The hand Lenin had extended to the West in a gesture of "peaceful cohabitation" was now cautiously withdrawn behind the back to avoid misunderstandings.

The important thing is that all this was not political guidelines. It was more the political mentality of those days, the overall state of social consciousness which was just beginning to come to its senses after half a century of endless confrontation. Certainly, there were many differences, including fundamental ones, between this consciousness as it existed in the West and the East. But there was also much in common, which is particularly important to stress now. In our opinion, caution, confrontation, mistrust were reciprocal.

Still, Lenin's idea was revived, transformed into peaceful coexistence, and translated into policy. In effect, peaceful coexistence gained international scope. Its further impact depended on its practical achievements, and on how these achievements encouraged the idea itself to evolve in the world at large and in the country of origin, what objective and subjective obstacles it had to, and was able to overcome.

Now that early writings by Andrei Sakharov are beginning to be published in the Soviet Union, writings that landed him in disfavour with the authorities, many who read them for the first time wonder why it was that they caused the wrath of the upper echelons of power? Indeed, his ideas were new for that time, challenging stereotypes, forward-looking and, as such, unconventional indeed, and they did advance the views of those days, which means they were built on their inherent principles, logic and methodology. Some of his assessments subjectively ran against the grain of top leaders. So was Sakharov's fall from grace due to the subjectivist feelings prevailing in highly important matters of international politics?

Sakharov's works written at the start of his "political" career are indicative of many things. They were written in an eventful period when Khrushchev's thaw had come to an end and Brezhnev's stagnation had set in. When conservative forces mounted a counteroffensive, throwing into recess what had been done to expose and denounce Stalinism and do away with its ideological and practical heritage. That was on the domestic scene. Internationally, it was the time when the Americans launched aggression in Indochina. The first military and political agreements of the late 1960s began to be observed, but the strategic arms race got off to a start amidst a series of nuclear missile crises. Czechoslovakia, 1968. The six-day war in the Middle East. The Soviet-Chinese dispute.

I don't mean to say that Sakharov was all alone developing a new philosophy. With all my respect for his personality and merits as a great scientist, citizen and thinker, this was not the case. The late Academician Sakharov's contribution is interesting not only because of the essence of his views. There is another reason.

There is an influential school of thought among Western, and especially American, Sovietologists which comes down to the simple idea: the Soviet system is incapable of any change, whatever the circumstances may be, now or in the future. On the other side, this doctrine is reflected, as if in a mirror, in the conviction of some groups of the scientific community and the public that capitalism and especially imperialism are infinitely vile. Hence, the importance of tracking down the emergence of a new point of view which denied and developed the past at one and the same time, an opinion which appeared at a time when it seemed impossible that any new idea at all could ever come

up in one's mind, let alone be uttered and defended.

In June 1968 Andrei Sakharov wrote an article titled **Reflections About Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom**. The West thought it naive, yet published it to score propaganda points against the "Soviets". The East regarded it as dangerous, subversive and anti-Soviet. It was not until January 1990 that the article was officially published in the Soviet Union for the first time.

It said at the beginning: "The author's views developed within the scientific and scientific-technological community of the intelligentsia, who are deeply concerned over specific fundamental aspects of home and foreign policy and the future of the human race. More particularly, this concern is nourished by an awareness that the scientific method of shaping politics, economics, art, education and military matters has still not been translated into reality. . . . a method based on a profound study of the facts, on theories and views presupposing unprejudiced open discussion, dispassionate as concerns its conclusions."

The message is given briefly, as if in passing: in the age of the scientific and technological revolution based on widespread intellectual involvement by professionals and the spreading of scientific methods of analysis, organisation of production and management, there are bound to be the stimuli, necessity and possibility to apply these principles and methods to all spheres of life. It is this social base and these changes in consciousness and thinking that laid the groundwork for perestroika and new political thinking in Soviet society.

Back in 1968 Andrei Sakharov set out two theses which he was convinced "very many share the world over". One was the disunity of the human race, which held out the menace of its doom—nuclear war, hunger, the stupefying impact of mass culture, the deleterious effects of national bureaucratic and dogmatic structures, and degeneration and death from the unpredictable consequences of rapid environmental change. The other thesis was that human society needed intellectual freedom, freedom to receive and propagate information, freedom for unprejudiced and fearless discussion, freedom from the pressure of authority and bias.

"The facts show given any other alternative except increasingly deepening coexistence and cooperation between the two systems and the two spheres, whereby contradictions will be

smoothed over and mutual assistance be rendered, the human race is doomed. There is no alternative”.

Let us make some comparisons. Lenin used to talk of “cohabitation” and was prepared for it. Khrushchev made a huge step ahead from Stalin’s years but did not achieve, and objectively could not achieve, Lenin’s openness. Yet, the time and the global problems building up at the turn of the 1960s, problems that were beginning to be recognised, demanded a much more straightforward attitude. Now, in retrospect, we can see this quite clearly.

The proponents of peaceful coexistence had to answer an important question: why should capitalism want to accept it? When he suggested cohabitation, Lenin appealed to common sense. But coexistence cannot be confined just to this; from the standpoint of common sense there must be cooperation. Common sense also suggests that there will be some uncertainty and risk stemming from continued, if limited, confrontation. So the stimuli must be greater than the risk, if peaceful coexistence and cooperation are to be successful. What kind of stimuli can there be?

Not only material advantage, for sure. This would be too primitive to be true. Until recently, official science would refer to impelling conditions, social and economic, military and political, internal and external. In other words, conditions must be such that capitalism sees peaceful coexistence as a lesser evil than other alternatives: either coexist, or you’re in for trouble. Not surprisingly, when both sides had accepted that logic for some time, detente coexisted with a continued, if not an expanding, arms race and more confrontation.

Sakharov answered the question differently: “There is no reason to declare (as is often done in line with dogmatic tradition) that the capitalist mode of production drives productive forces up a blind alley. . . For every non-dogmatic Marxist the ongoing development of the productive forces under capitalism is a fact of paramount theoretical significance in principle; it is precisely this fact that comprises the theoretical basis for peaceful coexistence* and offers the option in principle that capitalism, if faced with an economic impasse, will not neces-

*A fundamentally new understanding of the whole basis for peaceful coexistence on the principles defined by Lenin: to coexist not because there is no hope but because such is the logic of development providing for mutual, though qualitatively different, progress.

sarily be compelled to undertake a desperate war gamble. Both the capitalist and socialist have the opportunity of developing over a long period of time, meanwhile drawing positive features from one another (and, in fact, coming together in essential aspects)”.

What Sakharov means to say is that peaceful coexistence is based on free choice, not on coercion. It is not a less hurtful loss but the key to a mutual win. It is the product of cooperation, not of confrontation. All this was fundamentally different from official dogma.

What should the role of socialism be in peaceful coexistence? Should it join in as a mobilised military camp, an authoritarian system convinced in its ultimate victory in 100, 200 or more years? Or should it accept some new basic principles and ideas about its own objectives?

From Andrei Sakharov: “The capitalist world could not but produce the socialist world; yet the socialist world should not employ armed violence to destroy the soil that generated it. That would be suicidal in the given conditions for the human race. Socialism must ennoble this soil by the model it presents and the other indirect forms of pressure it exerts and fuse with it. The closing up with the capitalist world should not be an unscrupulous ‘plot’ between ruling groupings directed against the people (which is possible in principle, as is to be gauged from the ‘extreme’ instance afforded by the developments in 1939-40). This must proceed not only on a socialist basis, but also on the democratic basis of the entire people, under the eye of public opinion through all the democratic institutions of publicity, elections, etc.”

In other words, development “implies not only sweeping social reform in the capitalist countries, but also substantial **modification** in the structural pattern of ownership, implying an increase in state and cooperative ownership and at the same time **retention** of the basic features of the structural pattern of ownership of the means and implements of production in the socialist countries”.

Peace is more preferable than death, it is only natural for man, and the leaders of both systems will some day have to accept it. “Society’s intellectual freedom will ease and evolutionise this transformation towards tolerance, flexibility and safety from dogmatism, fear and adventurism. The entire human race. . . is interested in freedom and safety”.

In Andrei Sakharov's opinion, hopes for a peaceful, free and sensible world are based:

- a) on global interest in overcoming division;
- b) on diverse developments in the searchings and modifications in the Soviet and capitalist countries, which in a number of cases minimise contradictions and differences;
- c) on the global stake that the intelligentsia, working class and other progressive forces have in a scientific and democratic approach to politics, economics and culture;
- d) on the absence of insuperable obstacles to the development of the productive forces within the two world economic systems, which otherwise could inevitably result in an impasse, despair and adventurism".

Nowadays hardly anyone would disagree with the ideas quoted. But at the time he first announced them, Sakharov was castigated "in high places". This was due to a number of reasons, the more important of which were as follows:

First, Sakharov violated an unwritten rule whereby new problems, attitudes and wordings could originate only "at the top" through "secret" official memorandums and other documents. This, in effect, amounted to a monopoly on socio-political thought. Perestroika has now broken both the rule and the monopoly.

Second, Sakharov voiced some ideas about the situation in the party and in Soviet society as a whole which clashed with prevailing official views and strongly refuted some of them. The leadership could not help feeling displeased.

Third, Sakharov "insulted" two ideological sanctities: the uncompromised rejection of convergence which was considered "an ideological subversion", and the purported aggravation of ideological struggle in the future.

But for these exceptions—which were considered serious at the time and which resulted from objective reality not without some influence of subjective factors—all that Sakharov said about peaceful coexistence, including his new ideas, was quite compatible with the prevailing scientific concepts, official politics and mass consciousness. But under the impact of past traditions, these exceptions were made the prime target of social and political criticism.

Some time had to pass before many of the dogmas, routine practices and stereotypes could become subject to review. Time alone could teach the ability to see that the socialist and

capitalist economies, politics and social patterns had much in common, the common features being due to the nature of the productive forces. At the same time it could teach the ability to distinguish between the social content of many processes that outwardly appeared similar, "alike". Time was to provide the motivation to re-assess the content, significance and political meaning of present-day ideological processes. All this took nearly twenty years.

But all this was not enough for a new philosophy of political thinking to shape up. Peaceful coexistence was a mere hypothesis during the "thaw" of the 1950s, in the period of detente of the 1970s, and, of course, in 1968 when Sakharov wrote his article. Only life could prove how correct and potent it was.

What had to be done in the first place was to persuade the other side that it was a realistic, acceptable and even advantageous proposal. The West had to give some kind of response to peaceful coexistence. For this it had to go through its own intellectual, political and theoretical evolution. It is impossible to examine it here. What must be said is that it was no less complicated and difficult, and at times no less excruciating, than the evolution of Soviet society and its mentality. It took much time and effort to be accomplished.

To prove that peaceful coexistence was correct in principle was insufficient, however, for the emergence of new political thinking. Theory and consciousness had to be projected much further, elevated to a new level of understanding. But to this end, it was essential to reveal the inherent limits of the very concept of peaceful coexistence, and this was a purely practical job. Only practice could show that these limits were not a mirage, an illusion, and that for the sake of peaceful coexistence, consolidation and extension of the use of its results they required the next step to be made.

The concept of peaceful coexistence was accepted by world politics as a range of options rather than a set scheme. As such, it proved a viable system and its theoretical depth and political limits were open for examination. The ideas and moral principles of peaceful coexistence gave rise to the "Five Principles of Panch Sheel" and the "spirit of Bandung"; they were adopted and adjusted by the Non-aligned Movement. Having originated in the Soviet Union and other socialist nations, peaceful coexistence became a reciprocal commitment with dozens of other countries regardless of their socio-political orientation. This

happened in the mid-1950s.

From the mid-1960s onwards the ideas and principles of peaceful coexistence created a *de-facto* framework for burgeoning European detente; in the early 1970s they were recognised *de-jure* in the fundamental Soviet-US agreements and the Helsinki accords, and for the first time in the history of this concept they were filled with the military, political, economic and humanitarian content. These ideas and principles lived through a period of international upheavals and conflicts and of internal political struggle in the leading Western nations. On the whole, they stood the test.

In the 1970s the idea of peaceful coexistence experienced an unexpected theoretical evolution. The conflict that began between the Soviet Union and China at the turn of the 1960s and escalating to border clashes in 1969 put the spotlight on relations between socialist countries that were in a state of political, ideological and even military confrontation.

This was a very important problem. Up to that time the accepted opinion in the socialist world was that war was impossible between socialist nations inasmuch as socialism was supposed to eliminate the socio-economic and other causes of war once and for all. This was considered a sacred truth which was sincerely and ardently believed. All of a sudden, it proved wishful thinking. Once again life proved more complex than schemes, even well-intentioned ones.

The implications were far-reaching. Neither side was happy with the prospect of continued military confrontation. Then China offered peaceful coexistence. From the practical point of view, the offer could not be rejected. But it was at variance with theory for peaceful coexistence had always been regarded as a type of relations between opposing, not kindred, social systems. It was seen as arising from the differences between the two systems and was expected to lead to a peaceful victory by either side some time in the future. Suddenly, the same type of relations was supposed to apply to the socialist world where, according to the same formula, relations could only be brotherly, internationalist and equal.

Intense, though low-pitched, discussion started in the Soviet Union whose echo can still be heard and whose significance should not be underestimated. Whereas detente with the West revealed the practical and political limits to peaceful coexistence, which is the subject of the next chapter, the relationship

with China bore out its theoretical limits. The complicated processes developing in the East and the West had to be studied at greater depth. The concept of peaceful coexistence had proved viable and capable of effectively dealing with current political challenges and global problems. But it was increasingly realised that it might not prove enough for the future. It was to be extended and substantiated both in theory and in practice. It could not be discarded, for from this point on it had a role to play. It had to be extended, though nobody was quite sure how. Life was supposed to teach another lesson.

Practical Evolution: Confrontation, Detente, Coexistence. What Next?

No doubt, new political thinking should be traced back to October 1917.

Each revolution is profoundly convinced in its historic mission. Without such faith a revolution is impossible. The faith nourishing the Russian revolution of October 1917 was that a global socialist revolution was inevitable, and coming soon.

Two vital questions facing every revolution are: how is it to survive and defend itself, and how is it to carry out its historic mission, which is viewed as another factor and guarantee of survival? In practical politics, answers or searches for answers become indistinguishably interlaced. With revolutionary passions running high and with changes being at times unpredictable and totally new to domestic and foreign opinion, these searches are undertaken by different political groups, schools of thought and factions whose political weight becomes clear later.

The socialist revolution in Russia was confronted with hostility from the governments and ruling classes of all the leading capitalist powers of the time. Internally, the revolution was gripped by an ongoing, though not always visible, dispute between the need to build itself up and the temptation, and at times the necessity, of defending and sustaining its historic mission, a dispute that Western Sovietologists have dubbed

“Narkomindel and Comintern”.*

The hopes of an early world revolution were soon dashed. But class solidarity, naturally, remained as a major constant value of Soviet foreign policy. It would have appeared unrealistic to expect anything else. Prior to World War II this was primarily expressed in the Communist International activities, and after the war, in the Soviet people's assistance in establishing people's democracies, ensuring their safety and independence, and supporting their subsequent development. But there was more to this.

The “world revolution” idea and the conviction that it was to be expected and welcomed, and practically prepared, were linked theoretically and psychologically to subsequent concepts, i.e., national-liberation movements and ideological struggle. The former was understood as a complex conglomerate of forces, movements and countries fighting against colonialism and later neocolonialism. The latter often designated not only an objectively natural and inevitable competition and confrontation of ideas in the world, but the political and psychological attributes of the confrontation, its propaganda support, and one of the manifestations of the cold war.

Looking back at the not so distant past, one realises that all the talk about a relentless aggravation of ideological struggle, which lasted for decades, did not actually reflect reality. For some it was a kind of invocation whose meaning was never given a thought. For the dogmatists, of whom there were many, it was a cover concealing their confusion in the face of the growing spate of new problems, ideas, and political and scientific schools of thought. Amidst the rhetoric of the cold war and confrontation, the political barometer alternated between high and low, reflecting the state of political relations as a whole. But the frequent and tough-worded references to “ideological struggle” created the impression even among unprejudiced people that the authors themselves wanted to see that struggle aggravated. Needless to say, all this did nothing to help overcome mistrust, suspicion or simply ideological antipathy, even when a political need for that arose.

Naturally, the West and the East laid emphasis on different aspects of these concepts and their political applications. Let

*People's Commissariat (Ministry) of Foreign Affairs and the Communist International.—Ed.

us not go into detail. Each side has its own logic and truth. Let us instead look at the problem in a broader way, from the vantage point of new political thinking.

Revolutions that are destined to win and influence the world's evolution are not the result of anyone's good will or evil designs. They take a lot of time to develop. During this time they remain latent. A nation has to be “led” to revolution by a situation where there is disregard for all social problems or resistance to reform. It has to be “led” to revolution by decades or centuries of oppression and aggressive humiliation, which eventually results in a social explosion. It is naive and utterly wrong to believe that revolutions, and history as such, grow from conspiracy.

It is just as naive to expect that the old system will not resist. Wherever conservative forces retain enough acumen, common sense and political courage to launch reform in good time, wherever conservatism is stronger than reaction, revolutions stand no chance. But if there is a revolution, the old system is certain to put up the stiffest possible resistance.

“Don't you dare to wreck the existing structure, don't you dare to make revolution”, some seem to say. “Don't lead us to this, and if you must, then you must pay and learn to live a new life”, others reply. This long-standing argument was echoed even in the 1970s when governments and conservative forces in the West, especially the United States, tried to interpret detente in such a way as to imply Soviet responsibility for the revolutionary and liberation processes that were under way or in the making in Third World countries. The Soviet Union justly replied that no “rules of detente” and no “code of conduct”, even if such had existed, could stop the march of history and social change. Still, there is no avoiding confrontation over this problem.

There was another reason that fuelled tensions. Military force does not always produce the desired results. Furthermore, a military solution may prove far too costly. And then it's human nature to try more acceptable means to some end before resorting to force. Some role was played by atomic weapons which appeared in the late 1940s. All told, the two sides objectively faced the need to develop and adopt a system of instruments that would enable them to influence the foreign and, desirably, the domestic policy of the other side peacefully or at least non-militarily.

This was an objective need since subjectively the West and the Soviet Union viewed this problem from different angles. The priority tasks confronting the Soviet Union were to survive, rebuild the war-ravaged economy, raise living standards and, later, adequately respond to the arms race imposed on it. The official foreign-policy objective, which was openly declared, was to secure the most favourable external conditions possible for the nation's normal development.

The objective formulated in the West, especially the United States, after World War II was to develop ways and means of influencing Soviet policy. Not surprisingly, the article in the *Foreign Affairs* magazine signed X, which opened the history of "containment" policy, appeared at the same time as the "atomic factor" was built into the foreign policy of the United States and into the international politics. The same line, i.e., how and by what means to influence the Soviet Union's internal development and foreign policy, still stands. A substantial contribution to it was made by Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s when he was involved in US-Soviet detente.

All these factors eventually produced a policy, relationship and infrastructure based more or less on mutual containment. Containment as such solidifies the state and expectation of confrontation and thereby keeps reproducing conditions that make a military conflict more probable. And as a consequence, containment becomes ever more necessary and requires even more impressive levers of intimidation. Such is the logic of confrontation fuelling the arms race, and of the arms race fuelling confrontation. It is a vicious circle. How can it be broken, and if it is, what state should the two sides strive for? Without a hard and fast answer, the broken circle will lock up again, possibly with worse consequences than before.

Today **new political thinking** does answer this most difficult question. It is essential once and for all to recognise the right of every nation to a free socio-political choice, including the right to review previous choices if this is what the nation wants. The balance of forces must be replaced with a balance of interests, if international relations are to become peaceful and non-confrontational. These two principles—freedom of choice and balance of interests—must become universal; they can and will rid the world of power politics and trigger-happy mentalities, and all the other things associated with them. This new conclusion, made in the framework of new political thinking,

is based on an analysis of the entire history of the East-West relations and the relations among all nations in the 20th century.

Looking back over the decades that have elapsed since October 1917 when the socialist revolution took place in Russia, one can see that on the whole the relations between the capitalist and the socialist world have been evolving from all-out confrontation to the present, more complicated relationship which combines conflict of interests in some areas and partnership or even cooperation in others. Overall, relations have become more civilised and natural, based upon international law and opening up vistas for continued progress. This evolution has proceeded by leaps and bounds, with ups and downs.

Peaceful coexistence has come to stay. One has to put up with the reality in which the opponent whom one does not like too much, or even hates, will live next door for many dozens of years. There is simply no choice.

The next step is how to deal with him. A minimum relationship is possible—especially if it is a forced relationship—amidst the continued high level of rejection and animosity. But the opponent must be viewed differently when broader and longer-term relations become part of the agenda. There must be a more balanced, objective and constructive relationship, which should be sought in a variety of ways.

Apparently, it is essential to distinguish between cooperation in specific and, possibly, highly important matters which is dictated by certain interests; detente as the entire relationship changing for the better; and a policy based on the philosophy of new political thinking. This is a conventional type of difference. The three processes have many more things in common, and each of the processes leads up to the next. Still, the difference must be pointed out. Why?

Cooperation in specific matters involving two or more nations can be dictated by imperative factors which leave no other rational choice. At times these factors are so strong that the parties agree to cooperate even when one or several of them are opposed to such cooperation on ideological, political or other grounds.

A most vivid example of this is the cooperation between the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, including the Soviet Union and the United States, during World War II. Impressed by the

obvious importance of the anti-Hitler coalition, many Soviet authors have called this Allied relationship an example of peaceful coexistence, apparently in support of the ideal of a world without wars. But to my mind, this interpretation of both peaceful coexistence and of the Soviet-American cooperation during the last war can hardly be accepted.

In the first place, it runs counter to common sense. Cooperation in a war; cooperation against a common enemy, a cruel, vile and perfidious enemy, an enemy indeed, not a competitor; cooperation of which there was none in the years leading up to the war and which became possible only because there was such an enemy, such a war, and such a situation which placed the Soviet Union and the United States in a certain relationship. And all these things together exemplify peaceful coexistence? This does not seem to make sense.

These assertions also contradict history. The cooperation within the anti-Hitler coalition developed cracks back in the war years and collapsed almost immediately after it. It does not really matter which side is more responsible. What is much more important is that the international entity, passed off as peaceful coexistence, proved totally unfit for peacetime. The reasons will be analysed a little later.

On the other hand, things seem to make sense if we abandon highfalutin assessments and recognise the fact that the anti-Hitler coalition exemplified pragmatic, *force-majeure* cooperation, which in no way belittles either its role or significance. There have been a great many instances of such cooperation in the history of all countries and peoples.

It is important to single out the fundamental thing about this cooperation, i.e., its being pragmatic and goal-oriented (functional). It becomes possible in a very special situation and for quite definite purposes. As soon as these purposes have been achieved, or if the situation changes dramatically, or if the parties experience change of heart, the linking chord snaps. The experience gained may leave some political or emotional aftertaste which can facilitate (or, conversely, aggravate) subsequent cooperation. But that is it. There must be many instances of functional cooperation for the parties to be able to embark on a close, trustworthy and long-term relationship. Not that this always happens.

At any rate, peaceful coexistence stands for more than one such episode of cooperation or even the sum total of such

episodes. The conceptual framework was explained earlier. At this point, it is essential to say that peaceful coexistence is viewed by all those who have supported the idea as a long-term relationship. No doubt, there may be differences, disputes, clashes of interests, and even a limited and latent military confrontation never evolving into a conflict. Still, in the conditions of peaceful coexistence the level of cooperation should be much higher than the level of preparedness for conflict. Furthermore, all the parties to peaceful coexistence should make conscious efforts to reduce their differences and conflicting interests to a minimum, and raise their understanding, trust and cooperation to a maximum.

The scheme appears quite attractive, if only as an ideal to strive for. It does not require anyone to be self-effacing or give up his goals and interests. It only calls for mutual responsibility, restraint, and common sense. In the 1970s the principles of peaceful coexistence in effect laid the groundwork for detente. The 1972 agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States outlining the principles governing their relationship stated directly that in this nuclear age there could be no other basis for their relations except peaceful coexistence. The same principle forms the basis of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Yet, detente was on the ebb only a few years after it had set in. Why was the concept of peaceful coexistence not realised then? Was it only that recognising a principle was not tantamount to harmonising views and assessments? Indeed, the events that followed showed that peaceful coexistence and detente were understood differently and were translated into different policies in the East and the West.

It is wrong, however, to say that detente failed. The fact that peaceful coexistence was included in paramount international instruments and that some of its basic principles were implemented in policies means that it was realised to a certain extent.

Second, since it has proved possible, if only for some time, to avoid a nuclear war or even a military confrontation between the East and the West and even to launch practical arms limitation and reduction; since human contacts and economic, scientific, cultural and other exchanges are expanding; and since admittedly the climate in the East-West relations is now becoming much better than it used to be—one can say that peaceful coexistence has in effect triumphed.

It is also a fact, however, that both the East and the West felt some disillusionment with the results of the detente of the 1970s. The East had hoped to achieve more, especially in the field of disarmament; it was disappointed to see detente wrapped up for several years in a number of areas. The West felt the same frustrations. Some also said that detente had become a "one-way street" and had not resulted in the "internal transformation of the Soviet system". It does not matter how realistic these expectations were. What matters is that they contributed significantly to the disillusionment with detente among some of the social forces in the West.

Such illusions might have been fostered consciously in order to wreck detente in the end. This possibility can't be dismissed out of hand. Some people in the West did expect, quite sincerely, that detente would lead to "Westernisation". (In a way, the same is happening now with respect to new political thinking and perestroika.) Therefore, to put the disillusionment down to preconceived designs and conspiracy would mean reverting to confrontation, which must be avoided. The disillusionment of ten years ago was due to deeper causes.

The most important of these was that detente revealed the objective limits of peaceful coexistence, no matter if this is understood in the "Eastern" or "Western" sense. With detente understood in the Soviet Union as a road to peaceful coexistence, the logic of politics raised the issue of the "destination", or, using the formula of many Western articles of those days, of "what will happen after detente?" This appears a legitimate question. It is the practical results that matter.

The thing is that many people, especially in the West, understand peaceful coexistence as a sort of armistice. And this gives rise to the question: how long is it going to last? This is a mental attitude taught by millennia of wars and violence. An attitude that specialists call "a zero-score game", i.e., any point gained by one side is seen as one point lost by the other.

If we are to remain under the wraps of conventional mentality fostered by the rules, views and experience of the past, this dilemma will be unsolvable. It is a foregone conclusion in a civilisation based on violence. So it does not make sense even to ask such questions.

But the thing is that detente has placed these rather common mental and socio-cultural attitudes in a concrete political context thereby encouraging an investigation into its own his-

torical role and meaning.

"Detente from what and to what?" was how the problem was formulated a few years after the process had been launched. Indeed, unlike coexistence, detente cannot go on forever. Detente is a transitional state, dynamic and, as such, unstable; it is evolution from one quality to another. It should, quickly enough, either result in a new relationship, more normal, stable and positive than before, or else stumble into another spiral of tension, hostility and confrontation. This would be the next spiral, not the pre-detente one, inasmuch as the earlier animosity would mingle with the disillusionment from the dashed hopes and the embitterment from the misplaced trust.

The Soviet Union has always stressed the point that detente must become a gateway to a new world and must usher in wide-ranging cooperation in the economic, trading, scientific and cultural fields, as well as in the military and political sphere. The East firmly stated its preparedness to embark on a new type of relations between the two systems. And it acted accordingly: the Soviet concept of security and cooperation in Europe and the Soviet proposals of the 1970s to supplement political detente with military detente and to improve and expand relations with the United States were aimed at widening the spheres of cooperation.

Unlike the East, the West did not have its own concept of peaceful coexistence or detente. This is not intended as criticism—this is only a factual statement. Therefore, the West argued about the meaning and goals of detente as detente went along. Which means that theory was lagging behind practice and was tied to it politically. In practical policy, especially US policy—which, again, is not criticism but a factual statement—the predominant desire was to develop more effective means to put pressure on the Soviet Union and its policies. The Soviet proposals for cooperation were seen purely as a means of pursuing economic interests (which, certainly, were there); the theoretical component of Soviet policy and the Soviet views on detente were underestimated or even rejected as patently "insincere" propaganda.

It was not only that there was some malice toward socialism and the Soviet Union, or that politicians lacked far-sightedness or broad-mindedness. These factors did exist to some extent and will continue to do so. There was another reason, however, that became apparent to the Soviet people due to perestroika.

How could the West possibly have full trust in the foreign-policy declarations of the Soviet Union when there was such a striking gap between the Brezhnev leadership's words and its actions on the domestic scene?

All these factors created a situation at the turn of the 1980s when, in the atmosphere of detente, the world had approached the frontier beyond which lay the promise of new political thinking demanded by life itself. The necessary conditions—theoretical, intellectual and practical—had already been established. The new, detente relations made new thinking possible. Yet, it did not eventuate then.

Among the reasons for that failure, one deserves special mention. It seems to have been overlooked, though it is indeed important.

Consciousness develops according to its own laws. Ever since human life began, it has been scorched by faults and failures. The more faults, the more hurtful they are and the more they tell about things that can be done and cannot be done, what means can be employed to achieve an end, and what the cause-and-effect relationships are. Then follows a struggle, lasting and dramatic at times, to uphold the new values. And again—new mistakes, new losses, and new lessons dearly paid for.

This is how humanity has accumulated its experience. It is valid experience because it is based on survival which can never be doubted. The fact that the human race has not just survived but has achieved outstanding cultural, scientific, technological and economic success means that the earlier views, approaches and teachings developed by our distant and recent ancestors were for the most part rational and correct. By rejecting them as obsolete and based on pre-scientific thinking, aren't we running the risk of putting ourselves in a position in which we will have to begin everything from scratch? These are not simply natural fears. They are particularly important at the end of the 20th century when societies which for different reasons rejected their previously gained experience some time ago and, as a result, having suffered grave moral and material losses, are now returning to general human values, having paid the price with the loss of millions of human lives. Societies are coming back to a renewed appreciation of the great experience that humanity has accumulated in its past history. They seem to be re-learning the truism that civilisation is accumulation of

wealth, knowledge, culture, morality. To reject this experience or to overlook it would mean regressing and impairing our further progress.

Yet, civilisation cannot go ahead by only looking back. The process of accumulation must go on, and experience and knowledge grow. The present-day world of global industrialisation and the scientific and technological revolution particularly needs the ability to foresee the future, the ability to predict as accurately as possible the remotest consequences of the present activity (or inactivity) and adopt the best strategy in taking care of present and future needs, possibilities and imperatives. But to foresee means to act in conformity with knowledge rather than habit, taking one's cue from reason rather than instinct. This moral improvement is not easy to achieve at all. It requires a lot of willpower, determination, courage, and confidence.

Detente was a mode of action based on reason. Everything that we know about peace, security, nuclear threat and all other attributes of the global political glossary was understood in those years. The intervening fifteen years have added nothing new. A little more courage and common sense was needed in order to overcome the age-long fears and suspicions multiplied by the cold war and the nuclear menace lurking behind it.

And indeed there must be a lot of courage in order to overcome prejudice and superstition. Some people say that it is enough to dismantle enemy stereotypes and other shibboleths for new political thinking to become a reality. Everything does appear so simple. But this is good only for computer software. One can feed any software, both new and old, into a computer. And that is the difference between a computer and social consciousness. A computer will be a computer no matter what software it has, or even without any. As for consciousness, any new idea raises it higher, but this through an excruciating internal crisis, doubts, uncertainty, and the pressure of earlier knowledge.

The same happened when new political thinking was about to see the light. There had to be another episode of confrontation at an unacceptably high level of risk to act as the catalyst of change. The new bout of confrontation occurred in 1981-1985 when, following new missile deployment, flight-to-target time and consequently the time for decision-making had been reduced from half an hour to several minutes. It was then

that "alternatives" to "a launch at first warning" and "automatic retaliation" began to be discussed in earnest, amidst more and more reports of false alerts and faults in early-warning systems and computers. It was then that the ghost of a global war against the Earth from space appeared, the threat originating not from extraterrestrials but from the Star Wars concept. It was then that science told the hard truth: even a "small-scale" nuclear war, even one launched by "mistake" would cause irreparable and disastrous climatic damage. Such a war must never be started under whatever circumstances, and those who continue planning it under cover of "deterrence" are at best unaware of what they are doing.

Historians, political scientists, psychologists and other experts will have to thoroughly analyse the first half of the 1980s and uncover the springs and mechanisms of that short-lived but highly intense and dangerous confrontation. But what is clear and important to us is that it proved the last straw. Common sense revolted and cried out for new political thinking whose birth was met with hope and joy all over the world.

On the other hand, the history of new political thinking would be incomplete without examining another of its important sources. This is a critical evaluation of the road travelled since the October 1917 Revolution, of everything that has been gained and lost. It is a sober-minded analysis of how words have stacked up against deeds, and ideals against realities. It is the most profound self-analysis in the past 70-odd years, embracing all spheres of life. It is the transformation of many earlier ideas about our place in the world. In a word, it is everything that has nurtured new political thinking from within Soviet society.

The Past 70 Years: the Internal Sources of the New Way of Thinking

Now that tens of thousands of independent organisations and unofficial movements have sprung up in the Soviet Union; that in the Communist Party itself and those under the influence of different communist political clubs and groups operating under opposing slogans, from the left-wing Democratic Platform to the ultra-conservative Rossiya; that the opposi-

tion—the Interregional Group—is organising itself and developing its policies in the supreme national legislature; that the press almost daily reports mass-scale actions ranging from demonstrations to strikes which were unthinkable only two or three years ago not so much because of official bans as because of the constraints of mass consciousness—now that all these things and many others have turned from sensation into reality, it becomes obvious that all these developments result from diverse and intense intellectual processes. Different in their content, impact, orientation and social support, they add up to a genuine revolution, a most profound shift in people's mentality and consciousness. It is a shift whose significance and consequences are as yet impossible to evaluate.

Another thing is just as clear. Before our life could burst out in this wealth of views, appraisals, emotions and relationships, which remained hidden, latent, lurking, unmentioned for so long, they had to grow and mature. In a more open society, these processes would have been noticed earlier. Still, the absence of glasnost in pre-perestroika Soviet society cannot be equated to fossilised social thought and feeling.

Needless to say, there was detachment, dogmatism, and bans on original ideas and critical analysis. Still, the picture of pre-perestroika thinking was much more complicated. Many of the ideas that set the stage for perestroika and new thinking had long been quite openly expressed in legal publications and circulating in social consciousness. This applied to the whole range of economic ideas many of which had been formulated as early as the reform of the late 1950s.

Indeed, new thinking, no matter how it expresses itself, amounts to a cognitive revolution, however small in scale or limited in its significance. Still, it is a revolution. For it to get started, there had to be either new objective realities or some preliminary breakthroughs in theory, in society's intellectual life and in the instruments it uses for self-cognition and self-expression, or a combination of both groups of factors. Talking of Soviet society, new political thinking followed serious change in all three components.

It would be impossible to draw a detailed picture of all these changes, which took dozens of years to evolve, even in a comprehensive book wholly devoted to the subject. Here I will attempt to single out the main trends of change and their meaning.

Ideas always follow from realities, no matter how the latter get transformed in people's minds. The realities of Soviet society have undergone tremendous changes in the past fifty years, and especially in the past thirty years. Perestroika, the political struggle and the clash of opinions over it and in the course of it, have highlighted the problems, scarcities and drawbacks of the Soviet economy, social sphere and public life. In this respect, poignant and passionate assessments have been made, which at times overdramatise the situation according to the aims a particular speaker has in mind.

That Soviet society is faced with grave problems is an indisputable fact. It is no longer necessary to prove that the command, extensive and bureaucratic economy and the authoritarian, bureaucratic and overcentralised political system that went hand in hand with it had exhausted their capabilities by the early 1980s and required cardinal change.

But a world of perfect and all-pervasive harmony and a society without contradictions and difficulties, without conflict and struggle has been an eternal human dream. It was born in a world strained to the limit by the struggle for survival, against poverty and privations, ignorance and violence, bodily and moral ailments.

In the more developed nations, the scientific, technological, industrial and social advances lessen the problem of survival and help effectively resolve other problems that have long been contributing to the misery of human life. In the meantime, new problems arise, often even more complicated ones. But such is the dialectic of life.

To get rid of poverty in the conditions of underdevelopment is a barely feasible task. In this situation escapism into day-dreams and utopia is a natural social and mental reaction, a response to the objective impossibility of breaking out of the circle of poverty and backwardness. A modern and developed society can, without promising wonders, resolve its problems rationally and in a chosen order of priority, or at least weaken their effects on human life. What is needed is not pipe-dreams, but rational definition of priorities, rational policies, and rational organisation of life as a whole. But these methods, like the mentality corresponding to them, become available only when a sufficiently high level of social progress is achieved.

Soviet society is now experiencing something of this kind, with perestroika being the consequence and manifestation of

it. So what has changed particularly in the last fifty years? The economy, though crisis-ridden and failing to meet people's present requirements, is still the world's third largest industrial economy. The level and quality of life doesn't compare with that of the more developed nations and comes under fire at home; on the other hand, most of the Soviet people have never before lived at the level that has been reached in the past thirty years, and at no other time in history did relative wellbeing last so long. Living standards rose particularly from the early 1960s onwards but the improvement petered out in the 1980s, and this is another reason for perestroika. Education, though not ideal and inviting a lot of just criticism, has nonetheless become a universal rule in a country more than three-quarters of whose population could neither read nor write before the 1917 Revolution. As for security, Russia has never, in its more than 1,000 years, been so confident of its security as it is now, and never before has an uninterrupted period of peace lasted so long as after 1945, despite the cold war, confrontation, and arms race.

As a consequence of it all, Soviet society has changed socially and psychologically; it has changed irreversibly and beyond recognition. It is not only new ideas, but new generations, that have come to the fore. They are not better and, hopefully, not worse than their predecessors. They are simply different in the main individual and collective characteristics. They have fewer phobias and more rationalism, more knowledge and appreciation of it, a greater desire for normal healthy pragmatism, and more confidence in themselves and their abilities. The new generations are more independent and critical-minded; they have more desires and expectations; they want change now, not some time in the future.

Vast changes have occurred everywhere in people's mentality and the level of knowledge, in the entire content and structure of consciousness, in the nature of people's requirements and the information to which they have access. A different life has produced different people, changing the mentality of society and especially of its more active groups. Even in pre-perestroika times all this generated gradual change in the intellectual climate of society and its self-awareness and scientific and theoretical views, which are so important to socialist thought. Perestroika has opened new flood-gates, releasing pent-up energies and proclaiming its commitment to pluralism and freedom of creative thought and action. But before it could

do that, it had to ripen itself, drawing on the intellectual processes fermenting in Soviet society and accumulating the energy for the coming intellectual and moral breakthrough. And finally the breakthrough did come.

So what was it that played the leading role? This seemed to be the moral feelings that motivated the arts, especially literature, and social consciousness as such. For dozens of years there grew the feeling, vague at first, more or less clear later and perfectly lucid in the end, that life was morally unjust the way it was.

Perestroika went through the latent period of moral growth in the 1960s and 1970s. The first impetus, no doubt, was "Khrushchev's thaw". It restored the human personality, the living human being with all his feelings, doubts and imperfections to literature, the cinema and art in general. The make-up heroes and situations of Stalin's years faded away, and with them that aggressively primitive "socialist realism" which unbendingly expressed the prevailing ideology contrasting everything in black and white. Objectively, that primitive art corresponded best to the cultural level of a nation most of which had made a giant and most difficult stride from ignorance and illiteracy to civilisation. It had to be simple, straightforward and even primitive to reach out to as many people as possible. Admittedly, the literature and cinema of the 1920s and 1930s helped the Soviet Union win the Great Patriotic War. But the new times and new circumstances brought new world outlooks.

By that time world outlooks had experienced profound change in the very bedrock of mass consciousness. By the mid-1950s, when the "thaw" set in, Soviet government had existed for forty years. In those forty years the people had been exposed to a fundamentally different culture than before: any religious culture had been rejected and weeded out. It was superseded with a consciousness based not only on socialist ideals and values but also on atheism. This new world outlook was always said to be of a scientific nature since it relied on the latest achievements of the most progressive social thought.

We have realised now how many reservations must accompany this scheme of reasoning, and what distance lies between wishful thinking and reality, between the official declaration and the actual fact. But the people of those years were much more naive, "purer" as they would say, than the people of the 1980s. A great many things that at first, superficial glance

appeared to be morally and logically correct, undoubted or even justified were grasped by them as such and taken to heart as values, ideals and convictions. To them they were positive values and ideals, and humanitarian convictions. All this produced a largely unexpected effect in the subsequent decades, which was a stepping-stone to perestroika.

All told, the human being was restored to art at the turn of the 1960s. Russian and Soviet literature had always tended to incline towards politics, this tendency being due to the authoritarian socio-political setup and the impossibility for the people to take a democratic part in social government. The literature of the 1960s and 1970s had remained true to this tradition, projecting it to the individual and his life. This could be a life of success or of defeat, a life of grave personal trials or of personal wellbeing and easy success. Many critics rebuked the literature and art of the 1960s for avoiding the larger problems in order to examine the routine life of the "little man". Still, in the past quarter of a century art has continued to focus on the moral side of the problem which could be called "our contemporary in our society".

The moral impact of this revealed itself in full some time later, proving two-pronged. In the first place, after the decades of Stalin's rule and the transformations it had caused both in society and in the moral and intellectual sphere, art's renewed interest in the ordinary human being turned out to be the first legal and officially recognised form of opposition. It was *de facto* opposition, even though some of its leaders perceived themselves in a different capacity. It grouped together the most illustrious, non-conformist, independent and creative people of the time. They disagreed and quarrelled among themselves, but objectively they were worshipping one and the same god, i.e., restoring the diversity of thought, personal freedom, human self-value, and democracy.

On the other hand, they started the long and arduous task of de-mythologising the social consciousness that had been bred by Stalinism. They started out in an area which was the most difficult to them and the most vulnerable to Stalinism, and this was its professed love of and loyalty to the people, and its promises of a secure, plentiful and honest life for the people. As they set out on this work, most of them sincerely shared that faith. Hence, the more impressive and socially imperative were the results of their searches.

Needless to say, some of the more outspoken, challenging and uncompromising authors fell under all manner of bans, persecutions and injunctions from the censors or the authorities. Still, it was officially permitted literature, not self-published writings, that carried out a thorough moral analysis of the state of society and the prevailing way of life—at times even winning high government awards. What it showed was that wellbeing was not only wishful thinking, but that non-wellbeing was growing at a dangerous rate and in dangerous proportions.

Art presented documentary proof of how far divorced our real life was from our own ideals. That was not a new mission for art. But in those years it threw its seeds into the soil of the new world outlook, thereby encouraging a scientific analysis: if life is such, what is it that's wrong about it and how can it be changed for the better? What stops us from making it better? What, in general, must be the basic moral principles to guide these processes?

The most important moral change that took place in the 1960s and 1970s was the destruction of the myth that we had built a fine society in all respects. It emphasised as a moral imperative the need for practical and ongoing improvement of the socialist society that had in effect been built. It oriented social consciousness toward measuring achievements not with slogans or formulas but with the objective criteria of progress and eternal universal human values, i.e., kindness, integrity and humanity.

Reform has now become a moral imperative of society, not a daring attempt by some politicians. Rejection of it, even without any "aggravating" actions, began to be perceived in social consciousness as a sign of conservatism, reaction and impure morality. Little wonder, in the years that are now called "Brezhnev's stagnation" official quarters had to put in quite a lot of effort and imagination to produce the semblance of intense work of transformation. This pretence opened up, if only in a limited field, the possibility for actions by those who sincerely believed in change and tried to encourage reform.

Morality cleared up the political and ideological arrears inherited from the dictatorial regime, encouraged action, and energised efforts to stop social degradation. But it was only science and social and political thought that could answer all the what's, how's and why's. In that domain passions were

running high and processes were evolving in accordance with their own logic.

Socialism has always considered itself not only social practice but also social cognition. On the whole, this approach is correct and potentially fruitful. Analysed from this standpoint, the socialist idea was only a hypothesis in Russia prior to the October Revolution. However correct, far-sighted and positive it might have been, it was still a hypothesis. No experience of socialist revolution or socialist development had existed anywhere in the world. The idea could only be tested with practice.

Now we fully realise that the hypothesis was indeed a far cry from the scientific ideal. There was so much to learn and know even about the problems of modern capitalism. There was so much uncertainty about the degree to which the views and criteria that had originated in Western Europe could be transplanted into the specific conditions of Russia (capitalism prevailing only in some parts of the country; autocracy and the strong survivals of serfdom; a multinational and a multireligion environment; pre-feudal forms of social organisation surviving in many parts of the nation; the working class accounting for only a small percentage of the population; the intelligentsia constituting only a thin substratum of society). We now realise that objectively the socialist hypothesis of the time could not have been anything else. It had to consist of many conjectures, assumptions and very general ideas about what the desired socialist society should look like and what the road to it should be. And as long as that road was not tried by any nation, the hypothesis would have remained a hypothesis, inasmuch as there was no way to stack up theory against practice.

But was it really worthwhile to undertake such a difficult social experiment with so many uncertainties and unforeseen turns?

The world's socio-historical development has so far proceeded spontaneously, and largely continues to do so nowadays. Spontaneously means through violence because the only spontaneous regulator is force (in the military, economic, financial, and now also in the scientific and technological fields). There must be a combination of three basic conditions, if social development is to be managed consciously: scientific knowledge; social prerequisites and institutions; and practical, material capabilities. This work had to be launched at some time or

other. In its first phase, knowledge was bound to be far from adequate both in its volume and quality; socio-political and economic conditions could hardly have been ideal; and material capabilities must have been limited. The only way to proceed was through trial and error. It was an objective historical necessity for humanity to embark on the road of conscious management of social development—with or without socialism.

But history decided that the first step was to be made by socialism, and in Russia. The specific Russian conditions made three developments unavoidable: first, the initial underestimation of the entire volume of feedback without which a normal society cannot exist; second, the objective lack of this feedback; and third, the intentional disruption of what feedback there was, to further the aims and interests of an unlimited one-man totalitarian dictatorship, which Stalin's regime was. For this reason, the original socialist ideal, correct in principle, was turned into violence against the human being and society. An objective assessment of the initial socialist hypothesis and its implementation was delayed by dozens of years. The first practical experience of socialism began to be canonised, by the wealth of socialist thought being ravaged for dogmas to please authoritarian rule and by those dogmas being turned into a kind of new religion. Whatever did not fit in the Procrustean bed of "Marxism-Leninism", as Stalin called his compilation of dogmas, was subjected to persecution.

But there was resistance, and this was manifested in two ways. One was the real processes taking place in society and the economy, which would not fit into the dead schemes. The other was the inherent logic of a rationalist, materialist, scientific perception of the world. The former called for honest and ongoing analysis of reality, and for the adoption of appropriate practical measures. The latter required that all this be done, otherwise the authority of power and the authority of the doctrine itself would have been irreparably undermined, and this was a doctrine that was still capable of admitting some *force-majeure* circumstances but could never justify human inactivity in the face of imminent problems, not to mention conscious resistance to reform.

Now there is much talk of the need to rid the socialist idea of "the distortions of Stalin's legacy." As an attitude and a principle, this is indisputable, but in practical terms it looks

rather vague. Far from everything in the theory and practice of socialism that came about in Stalin's years is incorrect and vicious, nor must it be rejected only by virtue of its date of birth. On the other hand, far from everything that was built into the socialist hypothesis at the time of its inception must be recognised as correct and impeccable only by virtue of its being original. No doubt, some of the more repulsive inventions of Stalinism, theoretical and practical alike, could be discarded fairly easily just because their ugliness was obvious. In fact, this is what happened after the 20th Party Congress in 1956, and some of it even earlier. But what remained the greatest obstacle both to theory and practice were the ideas and dogmas that were not so clearly associated with Stalinism.

As years went by, it became increasingly necessary to compare the entire body of ideas, concepts and views that had created the moral and intellectual sphere of existing socialism with the socialist ideal on the one hand and with socialist practice on the other. This would have given the key to identifying what was valuable and promising, and what was faulty, utopian and obsolete. Such an attitude was being encouraged in society by the moral search, the experience of the reforms, the development of science, and society's political evolution.

Contrary to what is popularly believed, limited economic experiments and partial reforms were carried out in Soviet society one after another beginning in the mid-1950s. Some were successful, which more often than not are referred to as reforms proper, others were not. Some people sincerely believed in them and devoted all their energy to them. To others, among whom there were quite a few Party leaders and government officials, the partial reforms and experiments, as became clear later, offered an escape from the genuine reforms that were so badly needed.

Strictly speaking, the main lessons of economic experimentation proved anything but economic; they were political, moral, educational, methodological, whatever, except economic. On a purely economic plane, they showed that Soviet enterprises, if placed in a normal economic context, even for a short time, could operate at a level of quality equal to world standards. They emphatically stressed the need for a legal and full-bloodied market and for commodity-money relations, and the need to grant the producer independence and sovereignty. On the whole, they proved the necessity of building up a

normal economic system which could develop in accordance with its natural laws. Frankly speaking, this did not come as a surprise, since thinking people had long been reasoning along these lines. Now a wealth of factual material has been accumulated. It was systematised, analysed in specialised and general publications, and made public. It was so extensive that it could no longer be ignored.

The experiments also showed that total state control, too much centralisation and bureaucratic management had resulted in contempt for the human being and in an immoral economy. They had encouraged the constant growth of the "shadow" economy without which the official economy could not have survived a week. They had produced a "shadow" policy, which, for example, might necessitate the manager of a plant having to trespass the law. And in so doing he was easily controlled, though some in this position were capable of, and were striving, to answer for their actions. Objections to management based on economic expediency were shown to be rooted in group interests; therefore economic reform had to be supplemented with political reform. It turned out that in the conditions of total state control over the economy and of bureaucratic management, people became less socially protected and less confident of their future, and it was considered that social protection and confidence in the future constituted a major achievement of socialism making up for all other shortcomings.

Scientific thought was faced with a grave dilemma. Society's problems had become so acute and so numerous that the propaganda branch of science, which did exist, became increasingly powerless. As for science proper, it could only be honest. It realised that many premises of the original socialist hypothesis had to be reviewed. It was not the fault of the socialist idea as such, nor even of those who had distorted and discredited it by wrong applications. The problem was a much more profound one, rooted as it was in the changing world outlooks of the 20th century.

In the 19th century, when socialism was first conceived, science operated by direct cause-and-effect relationships. Social science was captive to the classical formula of mechanics which prevailed in the natural sciences. The world was a mechanism of which it itself was not quite aware. What chaos there was could be controlled by being turned into a coherent system, a

hierarchy. Hence, the belief that society could be improved quite simply and quickly. To that end, it was only necessary to make the economic, social and political structures as simple as possible.

The 20th century has rejected these premises one after another. Cause-and-effect relationships have proved more complicated, multitiered, and collateral. Life's processes follow the laws of probability. Though they are in the nature of a system, much in them is relative, dynamic, evolving. It is well known that natural sciences have a great impact on other sciences and people's views in general. The scientific and technological revolution has produced a revolution in mass consciousness all over the world. It made itself particularly felt in the latter half of the century. In Soviet society this revolution was like an explosion as it came at the same time as the socialist experience of the past 70 years began to be re-evaluated. In fact, it encouraged this re-evaluation.

What collapsed in the first place was the naive belief that socialist society can only develop onwards, without setbacks or crises, without political or ideological struggle. Another subjectivist belief collapsed—that under socialism it is possible to skip historical phases, set any objectives, and channel social processes at will. It became clear that to improve social relations was a highly complicated "eternal" problem. It was realised that accumulation was the key to progress, not only economic accumulation, but cultural, political and social experience and the positive quality of life.

Seventy years after socialism came into existence, the argument between the new system and the old has become a thing of the past. Soviet society has adopted a new ideology, which has now undoubtedly become the prevailing one. The differences of opinion typical of the 1920s and 1930s—who are for the new system and who are against it—have been superseded by others—how is the new society to be organised in a more moral, rational and purposeful way. True, attempts have been made to portray some differences as political or ideological, and to label undesirable opponents as enemies of socialism. In the 1970s these attempts whipped up a campaign against the so-called dissidents, which eventually deprived the nation of tens of thousands of creative persons in the prime of their lives. The campaign proved counterproductive and discredited everything that perestroika challenged in later years.

The political mentality of Soviet society has changed as well. Following the 1917 Revolution a great many people having left or ultraleft views, actions and personality types took leading jobs in government. Once in power, they pushed the whole of society far to the left. What with the civil war and the state of dislocation, and with the repressive measures of the 1930s and 1940s, they could do that quite easily. But later all these factors changed. In conditions of normalcy, especially after Stalin's personality cult was condemned in the 1950s, a balance between conservatives and radicals was gradually restored. There were also moderates, euphoric romanticists, and disaffected pessimists. This is a natural political and psychological arrangement which, for all its fluctuations, exists in any society living in normal conditions. The democracy released by perestroika has shown that Soviet society embraces this natural broad range of political and psychological attitudes, personality types and behaviour patterns.

This was how new political thinking shaped up domestically. The new took root everywhere—in material life, in social and political institutions, in scientific and social thought, and in public mentality. At one point the new broke loose like an explosion, spreading into all spheres of life.

The greatest moral and intellectual achievement of perestroika is the ability, being born in throes, to see ourselves the way we are, to see facts as they are, and to realise that good ideals can become a reality, not helpless illusions. This, indeed, is the foundation of new political thinking, and its roots are in the native soil. This part of it, the part that faces our society, is the motive force of perestroika and, consequently, of our new foreign policy.

It would be saying too much, no doubt, to claim that new political thinking has gained a foothold in Soviet society once and for all. It still has many critics, including highly-placed officials. And the critics draw not only on dogmas, inertia and old stereotypes but on quite tangible and highly powerful realities, both domestic and international. And this is natural, for it is not an internal argument but an argument that deals with the vital contradictions of our civilisation, the question being whether the future world will be a world of peaceful, non-violent and manageable progress. For this reason, the future of new political thinking largely depends on what response it evokes in other countries and on what trace it will leave in world thought and development.

New Thinking and the World: the First Reaction

International attitudes to new political thinking and the foreign policy of perestroika based on it are exceptionally wide-ranging but, more importantly, highly dynamic and contradictory.

This is a good and promising sign. Nothing that is truly valuable and lasting is achieved easily. It is always born in labours and doubts, in moral and intellectual searches and in the very trials and tribulations of life—in overcoming the inertia of interests and circumstances, the inertia of views and policies. That new political thinking is experiencing the hard life of any great beginning proves its significance, its hope for the future, and its ability to wield a positive influence on people's lives.

The decades of confrontation have produced a fortified and powerful mechanism, which supports tens of millions of people. This is the crux of the matter. All these people have to be provided with means to earn their livelihood in a new world without confrontation. They must be able at least to maintain their present level of wellbeing. But this must not be a kind of social welfare. They must be paid for work that is necessary and useful to society. Theoretically, the goal is clear. But on a practical plane, it is extremely difficult to achieve.

It is already clear that in its initial phases arms limitation and reduction might, from the economic standpoint, cost nations no less than a continued arms race, or even more. The human race will have to tackle the problem some day; otherwise it stands no chance of surviving. But before that, it will have to create the mechanisms of new relations and non-violent structures of interests. The difficulties of the present, initial phase must not cause disenchantment with the new attitudes. What these difficulties really show is that new and healthier social relations are being established, relations that must be examined as realistically as possible. Problems and unexpected difficulties must not be avoided. Instead, they must be challenged and analysed so that solutions can be found in good time.

On this road, however, the inertia of objective circumstances will be encountered. Here is just one example. Let us imagine the ideal situation: the whole world is aflame with a desire to help the needy pull themselves out of poverty, backwardness, ignorance and disease, and achieve a modern level and quality of life as soon as possible.

Think of the resources that will have to be provided. Even if these are provided, think of how much time and effort will have to go into industrial development and the cultivation of huge territories with unfavourable climates. How much time and effort will have to be put into eradicating disease and hereditary defects and providing adequate nutrition and physical development for children, without which no breakthrough in education and culture is possible. The main obstacle, however, is not a material one. It is the social relations and the mentality of people and social groups that keep them so closely attached to their past. We do not yet have either cogent experience or trustworthy theories as to how to overcome this.

It is clear that, given the most favourable circumstances, it will take dozens of years to solve the problems of the Third World. Perhaps, from the standpoint of history it is not too much time. But, on the strength of the laws of biological and social heredity, it cannot be less than the lifetime of three or four generations. Suppose, it will be just this. But until the desire for change leads to the setting of the stage for improvement, the world will continue to reproduce the social and economic causes of disproportion and discontent, the prerequisites of tension, conflict and outbreaks of violence. That is, given the best conceivable course of events, circumstances objectively working against new thinking will continue to be reproduced for decades to come.

Inertia is both part of politics and of ideas. Mentality change can only be fixed as a social and historical task, not as a task geared to the individual. Apparently, any person can change his views and psyche, but only in the same fairly small degree in which he can change his physique. In both cases, a downward slide is easier and gives more short-lived pleasures than an upward climb, which requires willpower and effort. The evolution of thinking is possible only at the social level and proceeds only under the impact of changing circumstances or interests.

Hence, the initial international reaction to new political

thinking. It proved the most predictable and the least dynamic wherever the pressure of deeply ingrained interests, circumstances and subjective views was the greatest. As often happens, ideological and political extremes, the poles of the present-day world became allies in the total rejection of new thinking.

On the one hand, perestroika in the Soviet Union and all processes attending it, including new thinking, were summed up as "another communist manoeuvre" and another attempt to "fool" the West or "put it to sleep". Naturally, it had to be resisted. But as perestroika went on, it became clear that the renewal of Soviet society was meant in earnest. After the renewal processes swept through Eastern Europe, the right radicals and the militarist groups in the West changed their views.

Now they declared that everything that was happening in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was "the collapse of communism" and a victory for the West's power politics. The right in the West, especially the United States, began to discuss whether it was best to wait for communism to die of its "natural causes" or else to try to push it towards its end.

By the way, the more orthodox and conservative forces in the Soviet Union, who regard perestroika as "a slide into capitalism", seem to form a kind of alliance with the West's right. The diehards in both camps argue along much the same lines and tenderly help each other to slow down, if not reverse, the renewal processes in Soviet society.

The Sunday Telegraph of London has made an interesting observation. "Few people", it said, "seem to realise the enormously important part played by the fear of Russia in recent years in keeping America's feet on the ground. Even given the discipline of the cold war, the excesses of feminism, anti-racism, cultural relativism, lesbianism, homosexuality, Jane Fonda-ism, etc., have been harmful enough. Without it, they would have been far worse. . . The threat of aggressive Russian communism has been of incalculable value to the cause of Western civilisation in the last 40 years, justifying values and practices which would otherwise have been long ago eliminated by the dominant liberal zeitgeist".)

Now, apparently, out of fear of the obvious effects of new thinking, the ultrarightists are raising their bids. One of their ideologists, William Safire, wrote in early 1990: "As we risked

peace to preserve freedom, we must risk instability to see freedom's victory. Now there is a right-wing word: not accommodation, not detente, but victory". It must be a victory that, using the momentum of burgeoning change, must "force genuine change in the centre of superstatism", i.e., the Soviet Union. In his opinion, President Bush chose "the wrong enemies" when he called for eliminating unpredictability and instability from world politics.

Obviously enough such recommendations could throw the world much further back than the early 1980s. They lack any interest in the success of perestroika and new thinking. In effect, they indicate an utter reluctance to give a constructive response to it. Such, so to speak, are the views of the "incorrigible".

They go hand-in-hand with the orthodox, irreconcilable and dogmatic views of the left who have declared perestroika and new thinking "revisionism", a "departure" from Marxism-Leninism, or even "betrayal" of it. In the past five years, their numbers have somewhat shrunk but their views have become even more irreconcilable.

Such are the extremes. Most of the international response to new thinking, however, has been different. It was a spontaneous and immediate reaction, a sigh of relief. It was a sincere, heartfelt reaction which showed that the world had grown tired of living in confrontation, in the cold war, amidst the undiminishing nuclear threat.

This first reaction was followed by a "wait and see" attitude: what is new thinking all about, what is the new formula of relations suggested by the Soviet leaders?

There are quite a few people in the world who find it difficult to accept new political thinking for various reasons. Power-politics thinking still remains quite strong. In effect, many fundamental dogmas, those "sacred cows" of power culture have not yet been subjected to doubt, let alone review. The paradox is that those dogmas can coexist with the perfectly clear and realistic understanding of nuclear war as being inadmissible. Coexist and encourage the development of weapons that would not be so disastrous for the environment, "surgical weapons", as they are sometimes called.

Is it a lesser evil? If developed, such weapons would certainly reduce the potential disastrous consequences of war, reduce the scale of destruction, devastation and climatic damage. But

wouldn't they therefore make the use of armed force and military conflicts more probable? And wouldn't it all resuscitate the mentality and practice of violence and restore confrontation, militarism and "might is right" doctrines if only to a certain part of international politics?

New political thinking objectively opposes the millennia of the culture of violence. It will be an uphill job to dismantle everything that this culture has generated—fear, suspicion, mistrust, negative consciousness, political traditions, and social reflexes. Those who continue thinking in power-politics categories will have to put their views and political practices to serious review. Not because Soviet diplomacy wants that, but because life demands it. Is there any reason to hope that such a review will take place in the West's socio-political thought and practices?

The question, we believe, can be definitely answered in the affirmative. Back in 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev said: "We can see the first signs of new thinking in many countries, in different strata of society". But there is one reservation. It would be absolutely wrong to expect that this review will lead the West to accept the same ideas, concepts and premises that have been formulated as part of new political thinking. Anyway, such a review will not be forced by objective circumstances, as was envisaged by the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The motivation will come from the inherent logic of evolution of thought and thinking.

Something totally different should happen: concrete political solutions, formulas and recommendations will have to be developed jointly. That is, each side will have to travel its part of the road, coping with its specific problems and obstacles. But for any joint progress to be possible, this process must be based on some common, jointly shared goals and values, and in the course of it jointly acceptable concepts and theories must be identified or developed. Something of the kind is now happening with respect to and due to new political thinking.

It seems that capitalism made its first step toward reviewing the strategy and tactics of all-out confrontation with socialism following the Great Depression of 1929-1932, in the context of its long-term social and political consequences.

Two trends stood out. The first was fascism rising on the high tide of the crisis and climaxing with Hitler coming to power in Germany in 1933. For the first time capitalism began

to realise that the utterly selfish traditional policy transplanted from the 19th century into the 20th, in effect "gunboat" policy, was fraught with highly dangerous consequences both internally and internationally. The internal crisis in Russia, aggravated tenfold by World War II and the fact that Russia was forced to fight in it, had exploded in a socialist revolution. Germany's defeat in that war, followed by a crisis, also produced a revolution which, however, was put down. But the Versailles plunder and humiliation of Germany that followed triggered off fascist counter-revolution; only six years after coming to power fascism unleashed World War II. It was in the interests of the West itself to avoid such "extremes" for their price was too high.

The other trend was the formation, beginning with the Great Depression, of social-reformist politics and mechanisms in the West. Less dramatic-looking and more protracted in time, this line eventually proved more productive both in practical, political and theoretical terms. In Adam Smith's opinion, the state was supposed to be the watchdog of a private-enterprise economy. It was expected to protect the owner's property, for which it was fed. But, like any dog, it must never interfere in the owner's affairs. Such was the scheme of the age of classical capitalism.

According to John Maynard Keynes and Franklin Roosevelt, the state was given the role of regulator and moderator in the economic and social sphere. State regulation of the economy and finances, meetings of the Big Seven and international coordination, all kinds of social insurance and aid programmes—these and many things appeared due to the truly revolutionary re-evaluation of the role played by the bourgeois state in the present-day world. The capitalism of the latter half of the 20th century borrowed a lot from the ideas and stock-in-trade of socialism. Needless to say, it did not become socialist, but now even the most conservative parties and leaders do not think it possible to abandon economic regulation and social programmes. The most they can do is make some corrections. The problem has been solved irreversibly, in principle.

The experience of dealing with internal problems, the experience of international politics in the past fifty years, and reflections about the difficult problems of the Third World following the collapse of the colonial system—all these factors

seem to have transformed the mentality of capitalism and solidified the reformist trends. This should not be understood in absolute terms, for it refers only to a trend, a trend that has differed from country to country and has expressed itself differently in the left, right and centrist parts of the internal political spectrum.

When, under the pressure of objective realities and in reply to the persistent calls from the East, relaxation of tension, detente and peaceful coexistence were placed on the global agenda, socialism was no longer regarded as an absolute anathema. The mental attitude of John Foster Dulles, who insisted that in the conflict between good and evil (that is, in the West-East confrontation) neutrality was immoral, now appeared as what it really was—a caveman's mentality. The stage was set for the first attempt at coexistence.

In an effort to avoid new revolutionary tempests and upheavals, capitalism tried to translate as many of the socialist slogans into reality as possible. One factor that contributed to the success of these efforts was that social-democratic and other reformist governments and forces remained in power in many Western countries for quite long periods of time. Possessing more powerful economic potentials and avoiding many of the trials that had befallen Soviet society, these nations achieved substantial social and economic progress.

The current changes in policies and practice are beginning to be analysed theoretically both in the East and the West. The first theoretical efforts in this respect were undertaken in the 1960s when the West developed its doctrines of convergence and de-ideologisation. It argued that industrial, scientific and technological advances were bringing the socio-economic systems of capitalism and socialism closer together, making them increasingly similar if not identical in some areas. Therefore, ideologies now had a smaller role to play, would play no role at all in the future, and would yield their place to pragmatic, professional management.

The East rejected the ideas of convergence and de-ideologisation out of hand, chiefly on ideological grounds. The conservative and right-wing forces and leaders in the United States and other NATO countries showed a cautious attitude, to say the least. The events that followed in the second half of the 1960s, especially the Vietnam war, the student riots in France in May 1968 and the August events in Czechoslovakia,

dismissed any talk of convergence as politically irrelevant. Nor did the West in real life, unlike in theoretical schemes, try to become the East, or the East try to become the West.

The next quarter of a century proved, on the one hand, that ideologies were indestructible. Some ideologies may experience ups and downs. But ideology is not subject to change; nobody and nothing can replace it in modern society. The slogan of de-ideologisation—in the economy and international relations—was revived in the late 1980s but on perfectly different grounds. It did not announce “the death of ideologies” but called for carrying on ideological arguments in a civilised manner, without letting them intrude destructively into non-ideological areas and aspects of relations. This approach is supported by new thinking and opens up good prospects for cooperation in policy and theory.

On the other hand, the early 1990s have produced a better understanding of the entire socio-economic sphere as a kind of life-sustaining system for any society or state, and for humanity in general. Many factors have contributed to this understanding—both the social and political experience of the 20th century; the development of science and its penetrating influence on mass consciousness, including systems thinking, environmental consciousness, the theory of large economic systems, mass-scale services, etc; and space exploration, which has now become a kind of routine, with its “Spacecraft Earth” imagery.

Since the economy, infrastructure and social policy constitute the life-sustaining systems of society they, like any other systems, must have their own technologies which must be geared to performing specific functions and meeting the objective needs of society, and of the economy itself, and other technological capabilities, not ideological preferences or someone’s whims and fads. For this reason capitalism is making ever greater use of elements of planning, centralisation and socialisation, whereas the socialist countries are cultivating private property, decentralisation, commodity-money relations, and the market. It is hard to say in what measure this promotes new political thinking, but it is an indisputable fact.

The erstwhile views of Marxism and socialism, and of capitalism and imperialism, are evolving too, though more slowly and in a less dramatic form. One can say that Marxism as a scientific method and a cognitive methodology has won the

world. Even in the bastion of “free enterprise”, the United States, from 50 to 80 percent of scientists polled at different times have said that they use this method in their professional work. Socialism is also increasingly understood as an objective branch of socio-historical development capable of internal diversity, not as a subjective “invention” or the only “model” with rigidly preset properties. Likewise, it is increasingly realised that classical capitalism, as it is still portrayed in some of the ideological manuals by conservative forces in the West, is nothing more than a nostalgia for the bygone days, and that in all its main characteristics Western society has irreversibly departed from those moth-eaten schemes.

What constitutes a powerful factor facilitating the West’s positive response to new political thinking is the entire complex of social and humanitarian sciences that has been established there, especially such features of it as methodological and philosophical pluralism; the mutual tolerance of different schools and trends despite the tough competition among them; freedom of thought, scientific research, speech and dissemination of information; democracy of science and general and political culture. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that these traditions are having a positive effect on the whole world, including new thinking.

It is not only the influence of universal democratic, humanitarian and scientific traditions that matters. Progressive social thought in the West has created many practical applications for the social sciences the significance of which may substantially increase in the conditions of new political thinking and the diplomacy based on it. Quite a few concrete social theories, approaches and methods have been developed; it would take many pages of a book just to enumerate them. Public opinion polls; legal safeguards of democratic freedoms, processes and institutions; theories of conflict and conflict resolution; people’s involvement in running the affairs of a company, community and society; social forecasting; scientific support for methods of public relations—these and many other concepts can be used more in international relations and can become the areas of cooperation both in research and in practical applications.

In restoring and promoting the priority of universal human values, new political thinking clears the way for a synthesis of world science regarding society and man, which in the past was torn between the rivalling ideological domains. Genuine

science is integral. The difference between the various socio-cultural, political and ideological systems lies in how it is used. But differences do not necessarily mean confrontation.

Some hope for a constructive response to new thinking is inherent in the various Western approaches to foreign policy as such, and to relations between nations and states. To begin with, the theory of these relations—understood in the broadest possible sense as the sum total of theoretical views on ways of forming and steering foreign policy, international processes and world development—constitutes one of the most developed and developing areas of Western political science.

But the significance of this science of international relations to modern practices based on new thinking reaches beyond mere pragmatism. Over the past century, one of the traditional trends of Western social thought, which has exercised a substantial moral, and at times a political, influence has been pacifism which has gone through extensive intellectual, moral and theoretical evolution.

It started as a response of a fairly small part of society, yet the most courageous part politically, to the moral and religious dilemmas of war. As European cultural standards and wellbeing increased, those groups became increasingly preoccupied with morality, which in those days was totally imbued with religious moral precepts. With war becoming ever more expansive, cruel, destructive and disastrous to civilians, it was perceived as an outrageous challenge to the common notions of humanism, kindness and mercy. Pacifism was the reaction to the ravages of war. Not surprisingly, one of its main periods of growth occurred during World War II. But, in its opposition to the war from the standpoint of religious and moral humanism, pacifism proved quite vulnerable to demagogic accusations of being unpatriotic in its reluctance to serve the nation militarily. It was accused of pusillanimity, if not outright cowardice. It is obvious now that pacifism does not need to be justified, and that the courage of morality is the supreme and most difficult kind of courage. But years ago all this prevented it from exercising any great political weight or influence, especially amidst the imperial nationalist sentiments proliferating in Europe.

Still, the moral and political traditions of the first pacifists have not only survived but been extended. Following World War II, and especially after atomic weapons were developed,

progressive scientific thought struck up an alliance with pacifism. The ideas of atomic war as being unacceptable and inadmissible were formulated most exhaustively and lucidly in the first postwar decade. They were set out in letters from Albert Einstein and other leading physicists of the time to the President of the United States. These letters, however, were only made public in later years.

Back in 1955 a group of world-famous scientists, including Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell and Frédéric Joliot-Curie, published a manifesto, which later became recognised. Nuclear war, they said, was irrational; nobody could win it; nuclear arms could not be the instruments of a reasonable and responsible policy; the international behaviour of states must be based on fundamentally new principles. The top priority in this behaviour must be universal human interests and values; all nations must at long last feel part of the one human family. Such were the manifesto's central ideas. Though rejected by the politicians, they were not left unnoticed and became part of the intellectual achievement of the age, largely influencing all the subsequent development of social thought in the West and the rest of the world.

Nothing fundamentally new has since been added to the assessment of nuclear war, or its role in politics, or its inadmissibility. There has only been more proof, in support of this assessment, practical proof, through international crises, acute confrontations, and technical failures; and theoretical proof, through research to estimate the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict.

As a parallel development, original pacifism has transformed itself politically, organisationally and ideologically. It evolved into a powerful movement with millions of supporters, and later became an anti-war movement with a cardinaly changed political spectrum. Whereas in the first half of the 1950s it consisted mostly of left-wing political forces and organisations, Communists and some of the clergy, in the 1980s and the early 1990s it embraced all political forces and schools of thought, including centrists, conservatives, and businessmen. Its main ideas and goals are publicly supported by the Pope. The anti-war movement has risen to a new level of political quality and organisation and has become a powerful factor in the internal political struggle and election campaigns.

Consciousness has undergone substantial changes as well.

True, there still occur erratic outbreaks of the kind of jingoism that was cultivated by the centuries-old traditions of violence. But mass consciousness seems to be slowly awakening to the fact that genuine patriotism has nothing whatever to do with militarism. Genuine patriotism means to work for the progress and prosperity of one's nation, and this can be achieved only in cooperation with other nations, not in confrontation or war. Progress and prosperity are possible in conditions of expanding democracy, while militarism can only weaken and undermine democracy even in traditionally democratic nations.

At the level of science and theory, there has appeared a highly representative and wide-ranging area of research known as peace research. Though a motley entity, it has a number of indubitable merits. In the first place, it attempts to answer the theoretical and practical question of what peace is—just the absence of war or something much more important? Now can peace be preserved and stabilised, and at the same time harmonised with the exigencies of the time, development, and social change? What legal and social procedures and mechanisms will be needed for that, and how can they be created? These are difficult questions to answer, and so far there have been more questions than answers, and what answers and recommendations have been offered often defy convention to the point of being shocking. But the very fact that these problems are being scientifically analysed brings closer both the political quest and practical results. Another thing, which is also exceptionally important, is that peace research involves scientists working in different fields and representing different schools of thought, which paves the way for a synthesis both of knowledge and of its practical applications.

Finally, it is clear that the West's official policy has been evolving as well, and together with it the schools of social and theoretical thought that are closest to it. Here are the main aspects of this evolution.

In the first place, it has affected the West's foreign policy, and the entire complex of the West-East relations, and even more than that. What has been subject to study and analysis is where and how world development will proceed, what the West's interests will be in the changing world, and how to secure them. Since the early 1960s when the Club of Rome launched its activities and prepared its first reports, other authoritative and representative centres of this kind have

gained acclaim. The most popular among them appears to be the Trilateral Commission, an influential organisation, a forum of leading politicians, financiers, businessmen and scientists.

The detente of the 1970s made it possible for these organisations to cooperate with scientists and scientific organisations in the Soviet Union and East European countries. This joint work laid the foundations for new understanding, which bore political fruit as early as the latter half of the 1980s. Having based its activities on these principles, the Palme Commission in 1982 developed a formula, the first such formula in world politics and world political science: "the security of your potential adversary is part of your own security". This was a real breakthrough for both sides, the West and the East, the latter being represented in the commission on a permanent basis. It was not only a conceptual but a political and psychological breakthrough.

The West's practical policy has been changing. One should not see through rose-coloured glasses, of course. Still, all the positive processes of recent years would have been impossible without the West playing its part. Cooperation in Europe, the destruction of intermediate and shorter-range missiles, the series of well-known negotiations, agreements and initiatives—all this became possible only because the West was prepared and willing to participate. That being so, the West must have gone through a serious enough process of re-evaluating its interests, motives and policy objectives.

Recently these changes have acquired a new quality. President Bush has spoken of reaching beyond "the limits of containment" in US-Soviet relations and in the NATO-Warsaw Treaty relations. Thus far his statement should be understood as outlining the potential prospects, not as stating an accomplished fact. But it is none the less important for that. It is the first time that the possibility has been indicated at such a high level—if only in principle and intended for the future—that the United States and the rest of NATO may abandon what remained central to their strategy toward the Soviet Union for almost half a century. Another indication of the changes in the views of the West's ruling groups is that there has been talk recently of how the West can assist perestroika. Time will show what will come of this talk and how sincere it is. On the other hand, even rhetoric of this kind would have been unimaginable only three or four years ago.

A skeptic or a pessimist may object: Why should this talk be taken seriously? The West can always say that the Soviet Union has not lived up to its expectations and refuse to give up containment. That is quite possible.

In abstract terms, it is indeed. And it is too early to discard this probability. But, on the other hand, it does not require any brainpower, political courage, or acumen to revert to confrontation. Until recently every nation could live on its own. But now the world has become an interdependent whole, and the success of every nation will now increasingly depend not only on its own efforts but on the progress of others. We seem to have begun to realise this, and it is a promising sign.

Potentialities and Prospects

The foreign policy based on the principles and attitudes of new thinking has already produced substantial practical results winning deserved appreciation around the world. Relations between states are vigorously breaking out of the traps of confrontation. The integrity of modern civilisation has become more evident, and this requires a new policy and makes such a policy easier to launch it. The cold war has been stopped, without winners or losers, clearing a wide field for constructive action in Europe and the rest of the world. The threat of a global military conflict has been staved off. A new relationship has been opened between the Soviet Union and the United States, producing its first results. The first major steps have been made toward practical disarmament. Dialogue and negotiation are becoming the dominant form of international relations, especially in key areas and with respect to conflict situations and explosive problems. Political methods are gaining recognition and priority in settling regional conflicts. Political and material resources are being released to meet the needs of development and progress. There are new vistas for social, political and economic evolution. There is the possibility for nations to exercise their freedom of choice, a possibility that was unthinkable in the conditions of confrontation when the mentality and attitudes of power politics prevailed.

New political thinking—and we are convinced that it will become the flesh and blood of international politics—is faced with three groups of particularly important problems. These

are the deideologisation of relations among states; international security problems understood in the broadest possible sense, not only in the military or military-political sense; and negotiating the first and most difficult phase of truly global cooperation in the interests of development.

To deideologise relations among states does not mean to rid them of any ideological presence—that is simply impossible to accomplish. Some kind of ideology is inevitably present in any social views, values and ideals. And any progress always involves the struggle of thoughts, political ideas, programmes and objectives. What is a must, however, is to prevent ideological differences or contradictions from developing into a kind of modern religious war, to stop them from sliding to the brink of military and political confrontation, and to refrain from attempts to settle ideological disputes with military or other violent means.

Ideological struggle is not necessarily a source of tension, quarrel or conflict. It is just as capable of encouraging new views, attitudes and solutions. It all depends on whether the two sides opt for reason or fanaticism, a search for mutually acceptable solutions or confrontation for survival, a search for reasonable compromise or the imposition of views by force. In effect, ideology is a long-term strategy for society's life. Though at the turn of the 21st century, it is bound to preserve some elements of faith, it cannot be just a religion any more. It must correspond to national and international realities, draw on scientific methods for analysis and identification of targets, and suggest rational and moral ways of achieving them.

There is nothing inherently unacceptable in this understanding of ideology and its role in politics or life in general for either side. It does not require that they give up their ideologies or sacrifice any universal human or specific values. The only thing that must be done is to adopt civilised means to settle ideological disputes and differences, which by the way has long been the rule in most of the democratic nations both in the West and the East. The same rule must apply to a sphere in which any mistakes or miscalculations cost a particularly dear price, i.e., relations between states. Furthermore, as Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, has said, "our call for deideologising relations among states is not addressed only to the West; it is addressed to the entire international community and consequently, not in the least, to ourselves".

One of the many consequences of the cold war is that ideology and the ideological struggle began to be closely, and even worse, unnaturally associated with security and military-political relations. The world religions of our times have in their long histories witnessed different types of international relations, and the rise and fall of many an empire. None of the countries where these religions originated has survived to our day. At least, none has survived in its former shape and with its former frontiers. But the ideological systems have not simply survived but have spread their influence worldwide and multiplied the number of their supporters. This is an example of the relationship between ideology, security and statehood being a far cry from the unchangeable entity some imagine it to be.

Apparently, two aspects should be singled out in international security: one that is a tag-along from the past, and the other that concerns the various options for subsequent development.

What our world has inherited from the past is classical wars, aggressions, territorial feuds, strife over spheres of influence, and a distorted understanding of national prestige and dignity, i.e., prestige and dignity understood through force and violence. The measures that the world can put up against these forms of existence are obvious enough. Thus, the Soviet concept of an all-embracing system of international security envisages a comprehensive series of such measures. In the military sphere the Soviet Union proposes that:

—the nuclear powers renounce nuclear and conventional war against each other and against third countries;

—an arms race be prevented in space, all tests of nuclear weapons be discontinued and all nuclear arms eliminated, chemical weapons be banned and destroyed, and no new systems of mass destruction be developed;

—the military potentials of states be scaled down to limits of reasonable sufficiency under stringent supervision;

—military groupings be disbanded and, as a step toward this, that they not be expanded and new ones not be established;

—military budgets be reduced in a proportionate and commensurate manner.

These measures can and must be supplemented with political steps, such as respect for the right of every nation to make

a sovereign choice of the ways and forms of its development; just and democratic settlement of international crises and regional conflicts with political means; the development and implementation of confidence-building measures, the elaboration of effective guarantees against outside aggression, and the inviolability of national frontiers; the development of effective ways to prevent international terrorism; expanding cooperation in the humanitarian field; aligning national laws and practices as regards human rights and social protection; and the promotion of all kinds of economic, scientific and technological exchanges.

All this remains to be done. Yet, new political thinking should already be going further, identifying the next priorities and resolving present problems so as to ease solutions to future problems, especially in the security sphere.

Security is indivisible. Either there is security and in this sense it is equal security for all, or else there is no security for anyone. The only way to ensure equal security for all is by recognising all peoples and states as equal and enjoying equal rights to pursue their legitimate interests in international affairs.

The demand for equal and indivisible security must determine the nature of future military doctrines. There is no avoiding such doctrines in the future since a transition from the world of the arms race and confrontation to a non-violent world in which the rule of international law prevails cannot be effected overnight either in practical affairs or in people's minds. Armies will remain and there will have to be doctrines about how they may be used in time of need. It is in the interests of the international community, however, that these doctrines be open to verification using political and technical means—through the reasonable sufficiency of armaments, non-offensive defence, the appropriate structures and deployment patterns of the armed forces, the elimination of asymmetries and imbalances between different types of weapons, and the withdrawal of offensive forces to a distance that would preclude the possibility of accidental or unsanctioned clashes breaking out.

Equal and indivisible security together with measures of a military and a military-political nature also requires that law play a much greater role in international affairs and that firm guarantees be provided for the rule of law. Let us consider two

examples in this context.

How much wrath was rained on the Soviet Union over Afghanistan! Imbued with sincerity or hypocrisy, concern about the future of the world, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union itself, or else animosity toward socialism, the Soviet Union and the popular government of Afghanistan, all these protests had one thing in common: they had their effect. The Soviet Union left Afghanistan. It pulled out of its own accord, in conformity with the morality and logic of new political thinking. A debate was started in Soviet society, which included specialists, about the facts relating to Afghanistan and the lessons taught from the experience. The nation's legislature condemned the war and those who had made the decision to move Soviet forces into Afghanistan. One can say with confidence that all this establishes a moral and political precedent whose significance goes far beyond Soviet society.

Then, ten years later, in December 1989, almost the day the Soviet forces moved into Afghanistan, a foreign military operation was launched in Panama. It is not our purpose to criticise the United States—that has already been done by the world press, including the US press. The purpose is to consider the unique precedent created by this operation. Afghanistan can, at least in its beginning, be viewed as a consequence of the cold war, as continuing the policy, thinking and psychology of the global confrontation between the two systems. Panama does not fall under this category. The situation in it and around it was perfectly different. There was never any question raised of opposing "world communism" there.

Let us take the official justification for the operation at face value. That Panama's former military leader had allegedly been involved in drug trafficking (though no direct proof has been presented to date); that he rigged election results; that the change of government in Panama was undertaken in order to protect democracy in that country; that American lives were under threat; even that the ousted leader was a former CIA agent who had fallen out with the agency but who knew too much. Suppose, all this was so or could have been so.

Then the conclusion would seem to be that any time such circumstances develop in any country, the world and that country should expect foreign military intervention. Does the combination of these or even worse circumstances warrant outside interference based on armed force? If so, who has that

right: anyone willing to intervene, or some group, or some "select few", or only one particular nation? Who defines when this right may be granted and how? Who decides about the means of intervention and its limits? Who decides and who bears responsibility for its real or potential consequences and during what time before, during or after the operation? Is it only the United States that may intervene in Panama in this way, or is Panama too entitled to launch a similar action with regard to the United States?

These are by no means propaganda or rhetoric exercises but quite serious and inevitable questions that must be answered, if we are to proceed toward international law, not international power politics. Drug trafficking must indeed be combatted. We must condemn the usurping of power, and all kinds of undemocratic falsehoods and encroachments. Nor is there any doubt that any morally healthy person will prefer democracy to dictatorship, or that the state must protect the lives and interests of its citizens in other countries.

But all this must be done using internationally recognised legal procedures, not force, through international bodies established for this purpose, not in circumvention of them, unilaterally. Otherwise violence, which has dogged humanity all through its history, will continue.

It is likewise inadmissible if international law flagrantly contradicts internal law. In this case catastrophic damage would be caused to both and to the very idea of an international rule-of-law community. How would an American court react to the arrest of a drug dealer during which several hundred—the exact figure has not yet been established—passers-by were killed, along with some of the dealer's friends against whom no charges had ever been brought? This is exactly what happened in Panama when Noriega was arrested.

In early 1990 the United States Supreme Court passed a "historic" decision whereby the actions committed against foreign citizens by American officials outside US territory do not fall under the legal rules and limitations fixed by the Bill of Rights. True, the decision met with a wave of protests in the United States itself. But it remains in force. It gives special services freedom of action and at the same time, whether the American judicial authorities meant this or not, establishes a vastly negative international precedent. In the light of this decision, the intention of Islamic fundamentalists to destroy

the author Salman Rushdie would appear quite lawful. And what could stop the judicial authorities of any other nation from adopting a similar decision? What would the world become in this case even if missiles and other armaments are scrapped and other good and useful initiatives are undertaken? Would it be a truly safe world?

World development in the 20th century from the standpoint of international security leads us to another conclusion. It seems that classical acts of war and aggression are indeed becoming a thing of the past. They, however, do not account for most of the military conflicts that have taken place in this century, especially in its latter half. The lion's share of the existing or potential conflicts of our times are internationalised conflicts or conflicts that may become internationalised, but invariably rooted in internal causes. These are revolutions, civil wars, ethnic or tribal clashes and religious wars breaking out of their national frontiers.

It is a sad picture, yet one that could have been expected. Things just cannot be different in our interdependent and integral world. A fire in any home always threatens to spread to the neighbour's home. This is all the more probable because there are always outside forces that have a stake in some conflict or other; inside society there are all kinds of groups or movements, usually clans, which seek support and assistance from the outside. How does it all measure up against present political morality which prohibits outside interference in internal affairs, and rightly so?

There is only one solution: to employ every means available to prevent internal developments from crossing the line beyond which lies violence; to refrain from intervening in existing conflicts and from being provoked into launching action from the outside; and to try to achieve settlement by political means.

There is another sphere of possibilities. It is based on the understanding that in the present-day world genuine security can only be ensured by way of creating the best possible internal and external conditions for the optimal socio-economic development of every nation and by making maximum use of these possibilities. In other words, development becomes a major security guarantee not only for every nation but for the entire system of international relations. The greater socio-economic development every nation achieves and the higher the international community rises as a result, the more chance

and possibility there is of building relations on a civilised basis.

Needless to say, even good things cannot be imposed by force. Every nation must decide for itself what development pattern to choose, and how quickly this development must proceed, and what the priorities should be. Nobody has the right to impose any solutions from the outside, this can only be counterproductive. The only outside influence can be the force of example, knowledge and information, useful advice and recommendations, and assistance. But it is the nation that must decide if it is to use any of these possibilities, and how. These truths have been dictated by the entire historical experience.

On the other hand, the international community can do a lot. In the first place, it should realise that any resources released from the defence or attack potential and rechannelled into development improve the security of all, in principle, provided of course these resources are used in a rational and effective way. But this is quite a feasible task. Some nations have already passed through the phase of initial accumulation—of capital, culture and infrastructure—and on this basis are now boosting their development. All of humanity will have to pass through this phase. Only then will it be able to effect a genuine breakthrough toward a qualitatively better and a truly humane, civilised and safe world.

The process of accumulation will be different from what has been. In some countries initial accumulation was achieved at the expense of others. Initial global accumulation can take place only through the efforts of all countries and peoples. There is no other source, unless we revel in fantasy. This means that in the foreseeable future the international community will have to undertake the function of and responsibility for encouraging these efforts and making rational use of the results achieved, and of the planet's resources. This job must be undertaken on a truly just and democratic basis. But this will be possible only when the entire aftermath of the age of confrontation has been eliminated and all the ice of the cold war has been melted.

New political thinking shows the way to this kind of future, if only because it helps to destroy the self-imposed myth that

the world is revolving only around the East-West relationship.

It has already become perfectly clear that the world is moving toward a totally new system of international relations. It does not matter how many poles there will be—two, five or more. What really matters is something much more substantial, profound and important. It is not yet clear what it is precisely—time will show that. But many things need to be studied jointly, not single-handedly. New thinking is clearing the approaches as well to such analysis.

It is also playing the role of a kind of international political psychotherapy. An analysis of new global developments will be productive and constructive only if every nation analyses them without former prejudices, with a desire and a preparedness to understand and accept the new. Every nation should abandon its aggressively defensive instincts, and ambitious self-confidence. Instead, it must have reasonable confidence in itself and in the power of common sense, and reasonable trust towards its international partners in the case where there are problems at home. In the final analysis, these are only natural foundations for healthy relations between people and nations.

Nowadays, thanks to new political thinking, we can already understand these principles and apply them to policy. The first step has already been made. We can and must go further.

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