CAN THE BOLSHEVIKS RETAIN STATE POWER?
V. I. Lenin

Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?
FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION

The present pamphlet, as is evident from the text, was written at the end of September and was finished on October 1, 1917.

The October 25 Revolution has transferred the question raised in this pamphlet from the sphere of theory to the sphere of practice.

This question must now be answered by deeds, not words. The theoretical arguments advanced against the Bolsheviks taking power were feeble in the extreme. These arguments have been shot to pieces.

The task now is for the advanced class—the proletariat—to prove in practice the viability of the workers' and peasants' government. All class-conscious workers, all the active and honest peasants, all working and exploited people, will do everything they can to solve the immense historic question in practice.

To work, everybody to work, the cause of the world socialist revolution must and will triumph.

St. Petersburg, November 9, 1917

N. Lenin

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On what are all trends agreed, from Rech to Novaya Zhizn inclusively, from the Kornilovite Cadets to the semi-Bolsheviks, all, except the Bolsheviks?

They all agree that the Bolsheviks will either never dare take over full state power alone, or, if they do dare, and do take power, they will not be able to retain it even for the shortest while.

If anybody asserts that the question of the Bolsheviks alone taking over full state power is a totally unfeasible political question, that only a swelled-headed "fanatic" of the worst kind can regard it as feasible, we refute this assertion by quoting the exact statements of the most responsible and most influential political parties and trends of various "hues".

But let me begin with a word or two about the first of the questions mentioned—will the Bolsheviks dare take over full state power alone? I have already had occasion, at the All-Russja Congress of Soviets, to answer this question in the affirmative in no uncertain manner by a remark that I shouted from my seat during one of Tsereteli's ministerial speeches. And I have not met in the press, or heard, any statements by Bolsheviks to the effect that we ought not to take power alone. I still maintain that a political party—and the party of the advanced class in particular—would have no right to exist, would be unworthy of the name of party, would be a nonentity in any sense, if it refused to take power when opportunity offers.

We shall now quote statements by the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and semi-Bolsheviks (I would prefer to say quarter-Bolsheviks) on the question that interests us.

The leading article in Rech of September 16:
“Discord and confusion reigned in the Alexandrinsky Theatre,” and the socialist press reflects the same picture. Only the views of the Bolsheviks are definite and straightforward. At the Conference, they are the views of the minority. In the Soviets, they represent a constantly growing trend. But in spite of all their verbal pugnacity, their boastful phrases and display of self-confidence, the Bolsheviks, except for a few fanatics, are brave only in words. They would not attempt to take ‘full power’ on their own accord. Disorganisers and disruptors par excellence, they are really cowards who are fully aware of both their own intrinsic ignorance and the ephemeral nature of their present successes. They know as well as we all do that the first day of their ultimate triumph would also be the first day of their precipitous fall. Irresponsible by their very nature, anarchists in method and practice, they should be regarded only as a trend of political thought, or rather, as one of its aberrations. The best way to get rid of Bolshevism for many a year, to banish it, would be to place the country’s fate in the hands of its leaders. And if it were not for the awareness that experiments of this kind are impermissible and fatal, one might in desperation decide on even this heroic measure. Happily, we repeat, these dismal heroes of the day are not by any means actually out to seize full power. Not under any circumstances are they capable of constructive work. Thus, all their definite and straightforward views are confined to the political rostrum, to soap-box oratory. For practical purposes their position cannot be taken into consideration from any point of view. In one respect, however, it has some practical consequence: it unites all other shades of ‘socialist thought’ opposed to it. . . .”

This is the way the Cadets reason. Here, however, is the view of the biggest, “ruling and governing,” party in Russia, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, also expressed in an unsigned, i.e., editorial, leading article in their official organ Dyelo Naroda of September 21:

... “If the bourgeoisie refuse, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, to work with the democracy on the basis of the platform that was endorsed by the Conference, then the coalition must arise from within the Conference itself. This would be a serious sacrifice on the part of the supporters of the coalition, but even those campaigning for the idea of a ‘pure line’ of power will have to agree to it. We are afraid, however, that agreement may not be reached here. In that case a third and final combination remains, namely: the government must be organised by that half of the Conference which on principle advocated the idea of a homogeneous government.

“Let us put it definitely: the Bolsheviks will be obliged to form a Cabinet. With the greatest energy, they imbued the revolutionary democrats with hatred of the coalition, promising them all sorts of benefits as soon as ‘compromise’ was abandoned, and attributing to the latter all the country’s misfortunes.

“If they were aware of what they were doing by their agitation, if they were not deceiving the people, it is their duty to redeem the promissory notes they have been handing out right and left.

“The question is clear.

“Let them not make futile attempts to hide behind hastily concocted theory that it is impossible for them to take power.

“The democracy will not accept these theories.

“At the same time, the advocates of coalition must guarantee them full support. These are the three combinations, the three ways, open to us—there are no others!” (The italics are those of Dyelo Naroda.)

This is the way the Socialist-Revolutionaries reason. And here, finally, is the “position” (if attempts to sit between two stools can be called a position) of the Novaya Zhizn “quarter-Bolsheviks”, taken from the editorial in Novaya Zhizn of September 23:

“If a coalition with Komov and Kishkin is formed again, it will mean nothing but a new capitulation by the democracy and the abrogation of the Conference resolution on the formation of a responsible government on the platform of August 14...

“A homogeneous ministry of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries will be able to feel its responsibility as little as the responsible socialist ministers felt it in the coalition cabinet. This government would not only be incapable of rallying the ‘live forces’ of the revolution around itself, but would not even be able to count on any active support from its vanguard—the proletariat.

“But the formation of another type of homogeneous cabinet, a government of the ‘proletariat and poor peasants’, would be, not a better, but an even worse way out of the situation, in fact it would not be a way out at all, but sheer bankruptcy. True, nobody is advancing such a slogan except in casual, timid and later systematically ‘explained away’ comments in Rabochy Put. 101

(This glaring untruth is “boldly” written by responsible journalists who have forgotten even the Dyelo Narada editorial of September 21.)

“Formally, the Bolsheviks have now revived the slogan ‘All Power to the Soviets’. It was withdrawn after the July days, when the Soviets, represented by the Central Executive Committee, definitely adopted an active anti-Bolshevik policy. Now, however, not only can the ‘Soviet line’ be regarded as straightened out, but there is every ground to assume that at the proposed Congress of Soviets the Bolsheviks will have a majority. Under such circumstances, the slogan ‘All Power to the Soviets’, resurrected by the Bolsheviks, is a ‘tactical line’ for achieving precisely the dictatorship of the proletariat and the ‘poor peasants’. True, the Soviets also imply the Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies; the Bolshevik slogan therefore implies a power resting on the overwhelmingly greater part of the entire democracy of Russia. In that case, however, the slogan ‘All Power to the Soviets’ loses all independent significance, for it makes the Soviets almost identical in composition to the Pre-parliament set up by the Conference....”
(Novaya Zhizn's assertion is a brazen lie, equivalent to declaring that spurious and fraudulent democracy is "almost identical" to democracy: the Pre-parliament is a sham which passes off the will of the minority of the people, particularly of Kuskova, Berkenheim, Chaikovsky and Co., as the will of the majority. This is the first point. The second point is that at the Conference even the Peasants' Soviets that had been packed by the Avksentyevs and Chaikovskys gave such a high percentage opposed to the coalition that taken together with the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, they would have brought about the absolute collapse of the coalition. And the third point is that "Power to the Soviets" means that the power of the Peasants' Soviets would embrace mainly the rural districts, and in the rural districts the predominance of the poor peasants is assured.

"If it is one and the same thing, then the Bolshevik slogan should be immediately withdrawn. If, however, 'Power to the Soviets' is only a disguise for the dictatorship of the proletariat, then such a power would mean precisely the failure and collapse of the revolution.

"Does it need proof that the proletariat, isolated not only from the other classes in the country, but also from the real live forces of the democracy, will not be able either technically to lay hold of the state apparatus and set it in motion in an exceptionally complicated situation, or politically to resist all the pressure by hostile forces that will sweep away not only the proletarian dictatorship, but the entire revolution into the bargain?

"The only power that will answer the requirements of the present situation is a really honest coalition within the democracy."

* * *

We apologise to the reader for quoting these lengthy extracts, but they are absolutely necessary. It is necessary to present a precise picture of the positions taken by the different parties hostile to the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to prove in a definite manner the extremely important fact that all these parties have admitted that the question of the Bolsheviks taking full state power alone is not only feasible, but also urgent.

Let us now proceed to examine the arguments which convince "everybody", from the Cadets to the Novaya Zhizn people, that the Bolsheviks will not be able to retain power.

The respectable Rech advances no arguments whatsoever. It merely pours out upon the Bolsheviks a flood of the choicest and most irate abuse. The extract we quoted shows, among other things, how utterly wrong it would be to say, "Watch out, comrades, for what the enemy advises must certainly be bad", thinking that Rech is "provoking" the Bolsheviks to take power. If, instead of weighing up the general and concrete considerations in a practical way, we allow ourselves to be "persuaded" by the plea that the bourgeoisie are "provoking" us to take power, we shall be fooled by the bourgeoisie, for the latter will of course always maliciously prophesy millions of disasters that will result from the Bolsheviks taking power and will always maliciously shout, "It would be better to get rid of the Bolsheviks at one blow and 'for many a year' by allowing them to take power and then crushing them." These cries are also "provocation", if you will, but from a different angle. The Cadets and the bourgeoisie do not by any means "advise", and have never "advised", us to take power; they are only trying to frighten us with the allegedly insoluble problems of government.

No. We must not allow ourselves to be frightened by the screams of the frightened bourgeoisie. We must bear firmly in mind that we have never set ourselves "insoluble" social problems, and as for the perfectly soluble problem of taking immediate steps towards socialism, which is the only way out of the exceedingly difficult situation, that will be solved only by the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasants. Victory, and lasting victory, is now more than ever, more than anywhere else, assured for the proletariat in Russia if it takes power.

We shall in a purely practical manner discuss the concrete circumstances that make a certain moment unfavourable; but we shall not for a moment allow ourselves to be scared by the savage howls of the bourgeoisie; and we shall not forget that the question of the Bolsheviks taking full power is becoming really urgent. Our Party will now be threatened with an immeasurably greater danger if we forget this than if we were to admit that taking power is "premature". In this respect, there can be nothing "premature" now: there is every chance in a million, except one or two perhaps, in favour of this.
Concerning the irate abuse poured out by Rech, we can, and must, say:

In savage cries of irritation
We hear the voice of approbation,
Not in dulcet sounds of praise. 12

That the bourgeoisie hate us so passionately is one of the most striking proofs that we are showing the people the right ways and means of overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie.

* * *

This time, by way of rare exception, Dyelo Naroda did not deign to honour us with its abuse nor did it advance a ghost of an argument. It merely tried, by indirect hints, to frighten us with the prospect that “the Bolsheviks will be obliged to form a cabinet”. I can quite believe that while trying to frighten us, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are themselves sincerely scared to death by the phantom of the frightened liberal. I can equally believe that the Socialist-Revolutionaries do succeed in certain exceptionally high and exceptionally rotten institutions, such as the Central Executive Committee and similar “contact” (i.e., contact with the Cadets, in plain language, hobnobbing with the Cadets) commissions, in scaring some Bolsheviks because, first, the atmosphere in all those Central Executives, preparliaments, etc., is abominable, putrid to the point of nausea, and harmful for any man to breathe for any length of time; and secondly, sincerity is contagious, and a sincerely frightened philistine is capable of converting even an individual revolutionary into a philistine for a time.

But however much we may, “humanly” speaking, understand the sincere fright of a Socialist-Revolutionary who has had the misfortune to be a minister in the company of the Cadets, or who is eligible as a minister in the eyes of the Cadets, we would be committing a political error that might only too easily border on treachery to the proletariat if we allowed ourselves to be scared. Let us have your practical arguments, gentlemen! Cherish no hope that we shall allow ourselves to be scared by your fright!

This time we find practical arguments only in Novaya Zhizn. On this occasion the paper comes out in the role of counsel for the bourgeoisie, a role that suits it far better than that of counsel for the defence of the Bolsheviks, which so obviously “shocks” this lady with many good points. 13

The counsel has advanced six pleas:

1) the proletariat is “isolated from the other classes in the country”;
2) it is “isolated from the real live forces of the democracy”;
3) it “will not be able technically to lay hold of the state apparatus”;
4) it “will not be able to set this apparatus in motion”;
5) “the situation is exceptionally complicated”;
6) it “will be incapable of resisting all the pressure by hostile forces that will sweep away not only the proletarian dictatorship, but the entire revolution into the bargain”.

Novaya Zhizn formulates the first plea in a ridiculously clumsy fashion, for in capitalist and semi-capitalist society we know of only three classes: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie (which consists mainly of the peasantry), and the proletariat. What sense is there in talking about the proletariat being isolated from the other classes when the point at issue is the proletariat’s struggle against the bourgeoisie, revolution against the bourgeoisie?

Evidently, Novaya Zhizn wanted to say that the proletariat is isolated from the peasants, for it could not possibly have meant the landowners. It could not, however, say clearly and definitely that the proletariat is now isolated from the peasants, for the utter incorrectness of this assertion would be too obvious.

It is difficult to imagine that in a capitalist country the proletariat should be so little isolated from the petty bourgeoisie—and, mark you, in a revolution against the bourgeoisie—as the proletariat now is in Russia. The latest returns of the voting by “curias” 14 for and against coalition with the bourgeoisie in Tsereteli’s “Bulygin Duma”, i.e., in the notorious “Democratic” Conference, constitute
one of the objective and incontrovertible proofs of this. If we take the Soviets' curias we get:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For coalition</th>
<th>Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviets of Peasants' Deputies</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Soviets</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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So, the majority as a whole is on the side of the proletarian slogan: against coalition with the bourgeoisie. We have seen above that even the Cadets are obliged to admit the growth of Bolshevik influence in the Soviets. And here we have the Conference convened by yesterday's leaders in the Soviets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who have an assured majority in the central institutions! Obviously, the actual degree to which the Bolsheviks predominate in the Soviets is here understated.

Both on the question of coalition with the bourgeoisie and on the question of immediately transferring the landed estates to peasant committees, the Bolsheviks already have a majority in the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, a majority of the people, a majority of the petty bourgeoisie. Rabochy Put No. 19, of September 24, quotes from No. 25 of the organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries Znamya Truda a report on a conference of local Soviets of Peasants' Deputies held in Petrograd on September 18. At this conference the Executive Committees of four Peasants' Soviets (Kostroma, Moscow, Samara and Taurida gubernias) voted for an unrestricted coalition. The Executive Committees of three gubernias and two armies (Vladimir, Ryazan and the Black Sea gubernias) voted in favour of a coalition without the Cadets. The Executive Committees of twenty-three gubernias and four armies voted against a coalition.

So, the majority of the peasants are against a coalition! So much for the “isolation of the proletariat”.

We should note, by the way, that the supporters of a coalition were three outlying gubernias, Samara, Taurida and the Black Sea, where there is a relatively very large number of rich peasants and big landowners who employ hired labour, and also four industrial gubernias (Vladimir, Ryazan, Kostroma and Moscow) in which the peasant bourgeoisie are also stronger than in the majority of the gubernias in Russia. It would be interesting to collect more detailed figures on this question and to ascertain whether information is available concerning the poor peasants in the gubernias where there are larger numbers of “rich” peasants.

It is interesting, moreover, that the “non-Russian groups” revealed a considerable predominance of opponents of a coalition, namely, 40 votes against 15. The policy of annexation and open violence pursued by the Bonapartist Kerensky and Co. towards the non-sovereign nations of Russia has borne fruit. Wide sections of the people of the oppressed nations (i.e., including the mass of the petty bourgeoisie) trust the proletariat of Russia more than they do the bourgeoisie, for here history has brought to the fore the struggle for liberation of the oppressed nations against the oppressing nations. The bourgeoisie has despicably betrayed the cause of freedom of the oppressed nations; the proletariat is faithful to the cause of freedom.

At the present time the national and agrarian questions are fundamental questions for the petty-bourgeois sections of the population of Russia. This is indisputable. And on both these questions the proletariat is “not isolated”—farther from it than ever. It has the majority of the people behind it. It alone is capable of pursuing such a determined, genuinely “revolutionary-democratic” policy on both questions which would immediately ensure the proletarian state power not only the support of the majority of the population, but also a real outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm among the people. This is because, for the first time, the people would not see the ruthless oppression of peasants by landowners and of Ukrainians by Great Russians on the part of the government, as was the case under tsarism, nor the effort to continue the same policy camouflaged in pompous phrases under the republic, nor nagging, insult, chicanery, procrastination, underhand dealing and evasions (all that with which Kerensky rewards the peasants and the oppressed nations), but would receive warm sympathy proved by deeds, immediate and revolutionary measures against the landowners, immediate restitution of full freedom for Finland, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, for the Moslems, and so on.
The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik gentlemen know this perfectly well, and are therefore dragging in the semi-Cadet bosses of the co-operative societies to help them pursue their reactionary-democratic policy against the people. That is why they will never dare canvass popular opinion, take a popular referendum, or at least a vote of all the local Soviets, of all the local organisations, concerning definite points of practical policy, for example, whether all the landed estates should at once be handed over to peasant committees, whether certain demands of the Finns or the Ukrainians should be conceded, etc.

Take the question of peace, the crucial issue of today. The proletariat "is isolated from the other classes". On this issue the proletariat truly represents the whole nation, all live and honest people in all classes, the vast majority of the petty bourgeoisie; because only the proletariat, on achieving power, will immediately offer a just peace to all the belligerent nations, because only the proletariat will dare take genuinely revolutionary measures (publication of the secret treaties, and so forth) to achieve the speediest and most just peace possible.

The proletariat is not isolated. The gentlemen of Novaya Zhizn who are shouting about the proletariat being isolated are only betraying their subjective fear of the bourgeoisie. The objective state of affairs in Russia is undoubtedly such that the proletariat, precisely at the present time, is not "isolated" from the majority of the petty bourgeoisie; because only the proletariat, on achieving power, will immediately offer a just peace to all the belligerent nations, because only the proletariat will dare take genuinely revolutionary measures (publication of the secret treaties, and so forth) to achieve the speediest and most just peace possible.

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The second plea is that the proletariat "is isolated from the real live forces of the democracy". What this means is incomprehensible. It is probably "Greek", as the French say in such cases.

The writers of Novaya Zhizn would make good ministers. They would be quite suitable as ministers in a Cadet cabinet because all these ministers need is the ability to spout plausible, polished, but utterly meaningless phrases with which to cover up the dirtiest work and which are therefore sure of winning the applause of the imperialists and social-imperialists. The Novaya Zhizn writers are sure to earn the applause of the Cadets, Breshkovskaya, Plekhanov and Co. for asserting that the proletariat is isolated from the real live forces of the democracy, because indirectly they imply—or will be understood to imply—that the Cadets, Breshkovskaya, Plekhanov, Kerensky and Co. are the "live forces of democracy".

This is not true. They are dead forces. The history of the coalition has proved this.

Overawed by the bourgeoisie and by their bourgeois-intellectual environment, the Novaya Zhizn people regard as "live" the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks like Volya Naroda, Yedinstvo, and others who in essentials do not differ from the Cadets. We, however, regard as live only those who are connected with the people and not with the kulaks, only those whom the lessons of the coalition have repelled. The "active live forces" of the petty-bourgeois democracy are represented by the Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. That this wing has gained strength, particularly since the July counter-revolution, is one of the surest objective signs that the proletariat is not isolated.

This has been made even more strikingly evident by the very recent swing to the left of the Socialist-Revolutionary Centrists, as is proved by Chernov's statement on September 24 that his group cannot support the new coalition with Kishkin, and Co. This swing to the left of the Socialist-Revolutionary Centre, which up to now had constituted the overwhelming majority of the members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the leading and dominant party from the point of view of the number of votes it obtained in the urban and particularly in the rural districts, proves that the statements we quoted from Dyelo Naroda that the democracy must, under certain circumstances, "guarantee full support" for a purely Bolshevik government are at any rate not mere empty phrases.

Facts like the refusal of the Socialist-Revolutionary Centre to support the new coalition with Kishkin, or the predominance of the opponents of the coalition among the Menshevik-defencists in the provinces (Jordania in the
Caucasus, etc.), are objective proof that a certain section of the people which has up to now followed the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries will support a purely Bolshevik government.

It is precisely from the live forces of the democracy that the proletariat of Russia is now not isolated.

* * *

The third plea, that the proletariat "will not be able technically to lay hold of the state apparatus" is, perhaps, the most common and most frequent. It deserves most attention for this reason, and also because it indicates one of the most serious and difficult tasks that will confront the victorious proletariat. There is no doubt that these tasks will be very difficult, but if we, who call ourselves socialists, indicate this difficulty only to shirk these tasks, in practice the distinction between us and the lackeys of the bourgeoisie will be reduced to nought. The difficulty of the tasks of the proletarian revolution should prompt the proletariat's supporters to make a closer and more definite study of the means of carrying out these tasks.

The state apparatus is primarily the standing army, the police and the bureaucracy. By saying that the proletariat will not be able technically to lay hold of this apparatus, the writers of Novaya Zhizn reveal their utter ignorance and their reluctance to take into account either facts or the arguments long ago cited in Bolshevik literature.

All the Novaya Zhizn writers regard themselves, if not as Marxists, then at least as being familiar with Marxism, as educated socialists. But Marx, basing himself on the experience of the Paris Commune, taught that the proletariat cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machine and use it for its own purposes, that the proletariat must smash this machine and substitute a new one for it (I deal with this in greater detail in a pamphlet, the first part of which is now finished and will soon appear under the title *The State and Revolution. A Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution*). This new type of state machinery was created by

* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 381.—Ed.
not yet replaced the old "fabric", and this old "fabric" is not the state fabric of the old regime, but the state fabric of both tsarism and of the bourgeois republic. But at any rate, Martov here stands head and shoulders above Novaya Zhizn.

The Soviets are a new state apparatus which, in the first place, provides an armed force of workers and peasants; and this force is not divorced from the people, as was the old standing army, but is very closely bound up with the people. From the military point of view this force is incomparably more powerful than previous forces; from the revolutionary point of view, it cannot be replaced by anything else. Secondly, this apparatus provides a bond with the people, with the majority of the people, so intimate, so indissoluble, so easily verifiable and renewable, that nothing even remotely like it existed in the previous state apparatus. Thirdly, this apparatus, by virtue of the fact that its personnel is elected and subject to recall at the people's will without any bureaucratic formalities, is far more democratic than any previous apparatus. Fourthly, it provides a close contact with the most varied professions, thereby facilitating the adoption of the most varied and most radical reforms without red tape. Fifthly, it provides an organisational form for the vanguard, i.e., for the most class-conscious, most energetic and most progressive section of the oppressed classes, the workers and peasants, and so constitutes an apparatus by means of which the vanguard of the oppressed classes can elevate, train, educate, and lead the entire vast mass of these classes, which has up to now stood completely outside of political life and history. Sixthly, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of the parliamentary system with those of immediate and direct democracy, i.e., to vest in the people's elected representatives both legislative and executive functions. Compared with the bourgeois parliamentary system, this is an advance in democracy's development which is of world-wide, historic significance.

In 1905, our Soviets existed only in embryo, so to speak, as they lived altogether only a few weeks. Clearly, under the conditions of that time, their comprehensive development was out of the question. It is still out of the question in the 1917 Revolution, for a few months is an extremely short period and—this is most important—the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders have prostituted the Soviets, have reduced their role to that of a talking-shop, of an accomplice in the compromising policy of the leaders. The Soviets have been rotting and decaying alive under the leadership of the Liebers, Dans, Tseretelis and Chernovs. The Soviets will be able to develop properly, to display their potentialities and capabilities to the full only by taking over full state power; for otherwise they have nothing to do, otherwise they are either simply embryos (and to remain an embryo too long is fatal), or playthings. "Dual power" means paralysis for the Soviets.

If the creative enthusiasm of the revolutionary classes had not given rise to the Soviets, the proletarian revolution in Russia would have been a hopeless cause, for the proletariat could certainly not retain power with the old state apparatus, and it is impossible to create a new apparatus immediately. The sad history of the prostitution of the Soviets by the Tseretelis and Chernovs, the history of the "coalition", is also the history of the liberation of the Soviets from petty-bourgeois illusions, of their passage through the "purgatory" of the practical experience of the utter abomination and filth of all and sundry bourgeois coalitions. Let us hope that this "purgatory" has steeled rather than weakened the Soviets.

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The chief difficulty facing the proletarian revolution is the establishment on a country-wide scale of the most precise and most conscientious accounting and control, of workers' control of the production and distribution of goods.

When the writers of Novaya Zhizn argued that in advancing the slogan "workers' control" we were slipping into syndicalism, this argument was an example of the stupid schoolboy method of applying "Marxism" without studying it, just learning it by rote in the Struve manner. Syndicalism either repudiates the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, or else relegates it, as it does political power in general, to a back seat. We, however, put it in the fore-
made by large-scale capitalism (in the same way as the proletarian revolution can, in general, reach its goal only by utilising these achievements).

Capitalism has created an accounting apparatus in the shape of the banks, syndicates, postal service, consumers' societies, and office employees' unions. Without big banks socialism would be impossible.

The big banks are the "state apparatus" which we need to bring about socialism, and which we take ready-made from capitalism; our task here is merely to lop off what capitalistically mutilates this excellent apparatus, to make it even bigger, even more democratic, even more comprehensive. Quantity will be transformed into quality. A single State Bank, the biggest of the big, with branches in every rural district, in every factory, will constitute as much as ninetenths of the socialist apparatus. This will be country-wide book-keeping, country-wide accounting of the production and distribution of goods, this will be, so to speak, something in the nature of the skeleton of socialist society.

We can "lay hold of" and "set in motion" this "state apparatus" (which is not fully a state apparatus under capitalism, but which will be so with us, under socialism) at one stroke, by a single decree, because the actual work of book-keeping, control, registering, accounting and counting is performed by employees, the majority of whom themselves lead a proletarian or semi-proletarian existence.

By a single decree of the proletarian government these employees can and must be transferred to the status of state employees, in the same way as the watchdogs of capitalism like Briand and other bourgeois ministers, by a single decree, transfer railwaymen on strike to the status of state employees. We shall need many more state employees of this kind, and more can be obtained, because capitalism has simplified the work of accounting and control, has reduced it to a comparatively simple system of book-keeping, which any literate person can do.

The conversion of the bank, syndicate, commercial, etc., etc., rank-and-file employees into state employees is quite feasible both technically (thanks to the preliminary work performed for us by capitalism, including finance capitalism) and politically, provided the Soviets exercise control and supervision.
As for the higher officials, of whom there are very few, but who gravitate towards the capitalists, they will have to be dealt with in the same way as the capitalists, i.e., "severely". Like the capitalists, they will offer resistance. This resistance will have to be broken, and if the immortally-naive Peshekhonov, as early as June 1917, lisped like the infant that he was in state affairs, that "the resistance of the capitalists has been broken", this childish phrase, this childish boast, this childish swagger, will be converted by the proletariat into reality.

We can do this, for it is merely a question of breaking the resistance of an insignificant minority of the population, literally a handful of people, over each of whom the employees' unions, the trade unions, the consumers' societies and the Soviets will institute such supervision that every Tit Titych will be surrounded as the French were at Sedan. We know these Tit Tityches by name: we only have to consult the lists of directors, board members, large shareholders, etc. There are several hundred, at most several thousand of them in the whole of Russia, and the proletarian state, with the apparatus of the Soviets, etc., will be able to appoint ten or even a hundred supervisors to each of them, so that instead of "breaking resistance" it may even be possible, by means of workers' control (over the capitalists), to make all resistance impossible.

The important thing will not be even the confiscation of the capitalists' property, but country-wide, all-embracing workers' control over the capitalists and their possible supporters. Confiscation alone leads nowhere, as it does not contain the element of organisation, of accounting for proper distribution. Instead of confiscation, we could easily impose a fair tax (even on the Shingaryov scale, for instance), taking care, of course, to preclude the possibility of anyone evading assessment, concealing the truth, evading the law. And this possibility can be eliminated only by the workers' control of the workers' state.

Compulsory syndication, i.e., compulsory amalgamation in associations under state control—this is what capitalism has prepared the way for, this is what has been carried out in Germany by the Junkers' state, this is what can be easily carried out in Russia by the Soviets, by the proletarian dictatorship, and this is what will provide us with a state apparatus that will be universal, up-to-date, and non-bureaucratic.*

* For further details of the meaning of compulsory syndication see my pamphlet: The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It. (See Collected Works, Vol. 25, pp. 342-45.—Ed.)
resistance of the capitalists, for subordinating them to the proletarian state. These means of control and of compelling people to work will be more potent than the laws of the Convention and its guillotine. The guillotine only terrorised, only broke active resistance. For us, this is not enough.

For us, this is not enough. We must not only “terrorise” the capitalists, i.e., make them feel the omnipotence of the proletarian state and give up all idea of actively resisting it. We must also break passive resistance, which is undoubtedly more dangerous and harmful. We must not only break resistance of every kind. We must also compel the capitalists to work within the framework of the new state organisation. It is not enough to “remove” the capitalists; we must (after removing the undesirable and incorrigible “resisters”) employ them in the service of the new state. This applies both to the capitalists and to the upper section of the bourgeois intellectuals, office employees, etc.

And we have the means to do this. The means and instruments for this have been placed in our hands by the capitalist state in the war. These means are the grain monopoly, bread rationing and labour conscription. “He who does not work, neither shall he eat”—this is the fundamental, the first and most important rule the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies can and will introduce when they become the ruling power.

Every worker has a work-book. This book does not degrade him, although at present it is undoubtedly a document of capitalist wage-slavery, certifying that the workman belongs to some parasite.

The Soviets will introduce work-books for the rich and then gradually for the whole population (in a peasant country work-books will probably not be needed for a long time for the overwhelming majority of the peasants). The work-book will cease to be the badge of the “common herd”, a document of the “lower” orders, a certificate of wage-slavery. It will become a document certifying that in the new society there are no longer any “workmen”, nor, on the other hand, are there any longer men who do not work.

The rich will be obliged to get a work book from the workers’ or office employees’ union with which their occupation is most closely connected, and every week, or other definite fixed period, they will have to get from that union a certificate to the effect that they are performing their work conscientiously; without this they will not be able to receive bread ration cards or provisions in general. The proletarian state will say: we need good organisers of banking and the amalgamation of enterprises (in this matter the capitalists have more experience, and it is easier to work with experienced people), and we need far, far more engineers, agronomists, technicians and scientifically trained specialists of every kind than were needed before. We shall give all these specialists work to which they are accustomed and which they can cope with; in all probability we shall introduce complete wage equality only gradually and shall pay these specialists higher salaries during the transition period. We shall place them, however, under comprehensive workers’ control and we shall achieve the complete and absolute operation of the rule “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.” We shall not invent the organisational form of the work, but take it ready-made from capitalism—we shall take over the banks, syndicates, the best factories, experimental stations, academies, and so forth; all that we shall have to do is to borrow the best models furnished by the advanced countries.

Of course, we shall not in the least descend to a utopia, we are not deserting the soil of most sober, practical reason when we say that the entire capitalist class will offer the most stubborn resistance, but this resistance will be broken by the organisation of the entire population in Soviets. Those capitalists who are exceptionally stubborn and recalcitrant will, of course, have to be punished by the confiscation of their whole property and by imprisonment. On the other hand, however, the victory of the proletariat will bring about an increase in the number of cases of the kind that I read about in today’s Izvestia for example:

“On September 26, two engineers came to the Central Council of Factory Committees to report that a group of engineers had decided to form a union of socialist engineers. The Union believes that the present time is actually the beginning of the social revolution and places itself at the disposal of the working people, desiring, in defence of the workers’ interests, to work in complete unity with the workers’ organisations. The representatives of the Central Council of Factory Committees answered that the Council will gladly set up in its organisation an Engineers’ Section which will embody in its programme the main theses of the First Conference of Factory Committees on work-
ers' control over production. A joint meeting of delegates of the Central Council of Factory Committees and of the initiative group of socialist engineers will be held within the next few days." (Izvestia, September 27, 1917.)

The proletariat, we are told, will not be able to set the state apparatus in motion. Since the 1905 revolution, Russia has been governed by 130,000 landowners, who have perpetrated endless violence against 150,000,000 people, heaped unconstrained abuse upon them, and condemned the vast majority to inhuman toil and semi-starvation.

Yet we are told that the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party will not be able to govern Russia, govern her in the interests of the poor and against the rich. These 240,000 are already backed by no less than a million votes of the adult population, for this is precisely the proportion between the number of Party members and the number of votes cast for the Party that has been established by the experience of Europe and the experience of Russia as shown, for example, by the elections to the Petrograd City Council last August. We therefore already have a "state apparatus" of one million people devoted to the socialist state for the sake of high ideals and not for the sake of a fat sum received on the 20th of every month.

In addition to that we have a "magic way" to enlarge our state apparatus tenfold at once, at one stroke, a way which no capitalist state ever possessed or could possess. This magic way is to draw the working people, to draw the poor, into the daily work of state administration.

To explain how easy it will be to employ this magic way and how faultlessly it will operate, let us take the simplest and most striking example possible.

The state is to forcibly evict a certain family from a flat and move another in. This often happens in the capitalist state, and it will also happen in our proletarian or socialist state.

The capitalist state evicts a working-class family which has lost its breadwinner and cannot pay the rent. The bailiff appears with police, or militia, a whole squad of them. To effect an eviction in a working-class district a whole detachment of Cossacks is required. Why? Because the bailiff and the militiaman refuse to go without a very strong military guard. They know that the scene of an eviction arouses such fury among the neighbours, among thousands and thousands of people who have been driven to the verge of desperation, arouses such hatred towards the capitalists and the capitalist state, that the bailiff and the squad of militiamen run the risk of being torn to pieces at any minute. Large military forces are required, several regiments must be brought into a big city, and the troops must come from some distant, outlying region so that the soldiers will not be familiar with the life of the urban poor, so that the soldiers will not be "infected" with socialism.

The proletarian state has to forcibly move a very poor family into a rich man's flat. Let us suppose that our squad of workers' militia is fifteen strong; two sailors, two soldiers, two class-conscious workers (of whom, let us suppose, only one is a member of our Party, or a sympathiser), one intellectual, and eight from the poor working people, of whom at least five must be women, domestic servants, unskilled labourers, and so forth. The squad arrives at the rich man's flat, inspects it and finds that it consists of five rooms occupied by two men and two women—"You must squeeze up a bit into two rooms this winter, citizens, and prepare two rooms for two families now living in cellars. Until the time, with the aid of engineers (you are an engineer, aren't you?), we have built good dwellings for everybody, you will have to squeeze up a little. Your telephone will serve ten families. This will save a hundred hours of work wasted on shopping, and so forth. Now in your family there are two unemployed persons who can perform light work: a citizeness fifty-five years of age and a citizen fourteen years of age. They will be on duty for three hours a day supervising the proper distribution of provisions for ten families and keeping the necessary account of this. The student citizen in our squad will now write out this state order in two copies and you will be kind enough to give us a signed declaration that you will faithfully carry it out."

This, in my opinion, can illustrate how the distinction between the old bourgeois and the new socialist state apparatus and state administration could be illustrated.
We are not utopians. We know that an unskilled labourer or a cook cannot immediately get on with the job of state administration. In this we agree with the Cadets, with Breshkovskaya, and with Tsereteli. We differ, however, from these citizens in that we demand an immediate break with the prejudiced view that only the rich, or officials chosen from rich families, are capable of administering the state, of performing the ordinary, everyday work of administration. We demand that training in the work of state administration be conducted by class-conscious workers and soldiers and that this training be begun at once, i.e., that a beginning be made at once in training all the working people, all the poor, for this work.

We know that the Cadets are also willing to teach the people democracy. Cadet ladies are willing to deliver lectures to domestic servants on equal rights for women in accordance with the best English and French sources. And also, at the very next concert-meeting, before an audience of thousands, an exchange of kisses will be arranged on the platform: the Cadet lady lecturer will kiss Breshkovskaya, Breshkovskaya will kiss ex-Minister Tsereteli, and the grateful people will therefore receive an object-lesson in republican equality, liberty and fraternity.... Yes, we agree that the Cadets, Breshkovskaya and Tsereteli are in their own way devoted to democracy and are propagating it among the people. But what is to be done if our conception of democracy is somewhat different from theirs?

In our opinion, to ease the incredible burdens and miseries of the war and also to heal the terrible wounds the war has inflicted on the people, revolutionary democracy is needed, revolutionary measures of the kind described in the example of the distribution of housing accommodation in the interests of the poor. Exactly the same procedure must be adopted in both town and country for the distribution of provisions, clothing, footwear, etc., in respect of the land in the rural districts, and so forth. For the administration of the state in this spirit we can at once set in motion a state apparatus consisting of ten if not twenty million people, an apparatus such as no capitalist state has ever known. We alone can create such an apparatus, for we are sure of the fullest and devoted sympathy of the vast majority of the population. We alone can create such an apparatus, because we have class-conscious workers disciplined by long capitalist “schooling” (it was not for nothing that we went to learn in the school of capitalism), workers who are capable of forming a workers’ militia and of gradually expanding it (beginning to expand it at once) into a militia embracing the whole people. The class-conscious workers must lead, but for the work of administration they can enlist the vast mass of the working and oppressed people.

It goes without saying that this new apparatus is bound to make mistakes in taking its first steps. But did not the peasants make mistakes when they emerged from serfdom and began to manage their own affairs? Is there any way other than practice by which the people can learn to govern themselves and to avoid mistakes? Is there any way other than by proceeding immediately to genuine self-government by the people? The chief thing now is to abandon the prejudiced bourgeois-intellectualist view that only special officials, who by their very social position are entirely dependent upon capital, can administer the state. The chief thing is to put an end to the state of affairs in which bourgeois officials and “socialist” ministers are trying to govern in the old way, but are incapable of doing so and, after seven months, are faced with a peasant revolt in a peasant country! The chief thing is to imbue the oppressed and the working people with confidence in their own strength, to prove to them in practice that they can and must themselves ensure the proper, most strictly regulated and organised distribution of bread, all kinds of food, milk, clothing, housing, etc., in the interests of the poor. Unless this is done, Russia cannot be saved from collapse and ruin. The conscientious, bold, universal move to hand over administrative work to proletarians and semi-proletarians, will, however, rouse such unprecedented revolutionary enthusiasm among the people, will so multiply the people’s forces in combating distress, that much that seemed impossible to our narrow, old, bureaucratic forces will become possible for the millions, who will begin to work for themselves and not for the capitalists, the gentry, the bureaucrats, and not out of fear of punishment.
Pertinent to the question of the state apparatus is also
the question of centralism raised with unusual vehemence
and ineptitude by Comrade Bazarov in Novaya Zhizn
No. 138, of September 27, in an article entitled: “The
Bolsheviks and the Problem of Power”.

Comrade Bazarov reasons as follows: “The Soviets are
not an apparatus suitable for all spheres of state life”, for,
he says, seven months’ experience has shown, and “scores
and hundreds of documents in the possession of the Eco­
nomic Department of the St. Petersburg Executive Commit­
tee” have confirmed, that the Soviets, although actually
enjoying “full power” in many places, “have not been able
to achieve anything like satisfactory results in combating
economic ruin”. What is needed is an apparatus “divided
up according to branches of production, with strict central­
isation within each branch, and subordinated to one, coun­
try-wide centre”. “It is a matter”, if you please, “not of
replacing the old apparatus, but merely of reforming it... no
matter how much the Bolsheviks may jeer at people
with a plan.....”

All these arguments of Comrade Bazarov’s are positively
amazing for their helplessness, they echo the arguments of
the bourgeoisie and reflect their class point of view.

In fact, to say that the Soviets have anywhere in Russia
ever enjoyed “full power” is simply ridiculous (if it is not
a repetition of the selfish class lie of the capitalists). Full
power means power over all the land, over all the banks,
over all the factories; a man who is at all familiar with the
facts of history and science on the connection between
politics and economics could not have “forgotten” this
“trifling” circumstance.

The bourgeoisie’s device is to withhold power from the
Soviets, sabotage every important step they take, while at
the same time retaining government in their own hands,
retaining power over the land, the banks, etc., and then
throwing the blame for the ruin upon the Soviets! This is
exactly what the whole sad experience of the coalition
amounts to.

The Soviets have never had full power, and the measures
they have taken could not result in anything but palliatives
that added to the confusion.

The effort to prove the necessity for centralism to the
Bolsheviks who are centralists by conviction, by their pro­
gramme and by the entire tactics of their Party, is really
like forcing an open door. The writers of Novaya Zhizn
are wasting their time only because they have totally failed
to understand the meaning and significance of our jeers at
their “country-wide” point of view. And the Novaya Zhizn
people have failed to understand this because they merely
pay lip-service to the doctrine of the class struggle, but do
not accept it seriously. Repeating the words about the class
struggle they have learned by rote, they are constantly
slipping into the “above-class point of view”, amusing in
theory and reactionary in practice, and are calling this
fawning upon the bourgeoisie a “country-wide” plan.

The state, dear people, is a class concept. The state is an
organ or instrument of violence exercised by one class
against another. So long as it is an instrument of violence
exercised by the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, the
proletariat can have only one slogan: destruction of this
state. But when the state will be a proletarian state, when
it will be an instrument of violence exercised by the
proletariat against the bourgeoisie, we shall be fully and
unreservedly in favour of a strong state power and of
centralism.

To put it in more popular language, we do not jeer at
“plans”, but at Bazarov and Co.’s failure to understand
that by repudiating “workers’ control”, by repudiating the
“dictatorship of the proletariat” they are for the dictor­
ship of the bourgeoisie. There is no middle course; a mid­
dle course is the futile dream of the petty-bourgeois de­
ocrat.

Not a single central body, not a single Bolshevik has
ever argued against centralisation of the Soviets, against
their amalgamation. None of us objects to having factory
committees in each branch of production, or to their cen­
tralisation. Bazarov is wide of the mark.

We laugh, have laughed, and will laugh not at “central­
ism”, and not at “plans”, but at reformism, because, after
the experience of the coalition, your reformism is utterly
ridiculous. And to say “not replace the apparatus but re­
form it” means to be a reformist, means to become not a
revolutionary but a reformist democrat. Reformism means
nothing more than concessions on the part of the ruling class, but not its overthrow; it makes concessions, but power remains in its hands.

This is precisely what has been tried during six months of the coalition.

This is what we laugh at. Having failed to obtain a thorough grasp of the doctrine of the class struggle, Bazarov allows himself to be caught by the bourgeoisie who sing in chorus “Just so, just so, we are by no means opposed to reform, we are in favour of the workers participating in country-wide control, we fully agree with that”, and good Bazarov objectively sings the descant for the capitalists.

This has always been and always will be the case with people who in the thick of intense class struggle want to take up a “middle” position. And it is because the writers of Novaya Zhizn are incapable of understanding the class struggle that their policy is such a ridiculous and eternal oscillation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Get busy on “plans”, dear citizens, that is not politics, that is not the class struggle; here you may be of use to the people. You have many economists on your paper. Unite with those engineers and others who are willing to work on problems of regulating production and distribution; devote the centre page of your big “apparatus” (your paper) to a practical study of precise facts on the production and distribution of goods in Russia, on banks, syndicates, etc., etc.—that is how you will be of use to the people; that is how your sitting between two stools will not be particularly harmful; such work on “plans” will earn not the ridicule, but the gratitude of the workers.

When the proletariat is victorious it will do the following, it will set economists, engineers, agronomists, and so forth, to work under the control of the workers’ organisations on drawing up a “plan”, on verifying it, on devising labour-saving methods of centralisation, on devising the simplest, cheapest, most convenient and universal measures and methods of control. For this we shall pay the economists, statisticians and technicians good money... but we shall not give them anything to eat if they do not perform this work conscientiously and entirely in the interests of the working people.

We are in favour of centralism and of a “plan”, but of the centralism and plan of the proletarian state, of proletarian regulation of production and distribution in the interests of the poor, the working people, the exploited, against the exploiters. We can agree to only one meaning of the term “country-wide”, namely, that which breaks the resistance of the capitalists, which gives all power to the majority of the people, i.e., the proletarians and semi-proletarians, the workers and the poor peasants.

* * *

The fifth plea is that the Bolsheviks will not be able to retain power because “the situation is exceptionally complicated”....

O wise men! They, perhaps, would be willing to reconcile themselves to revolution if only the “situation” were not “exceptionally complicated”.

Such revolutions never occur, and sighs for such a revolution amount to nothing more than the reactionary wails of a bourgeois intellectual. Even if a revolution has started in a situation that seemed to be not very complicated, the development of the revolution itself always creates an exceptionally complicated situation. A revolution, a real, profound, a “people’s” revolution, to use Marx’s expression, is the incredibly complicated and painful process of the death of the old and birth of the new social order, of the mode of life of tens of millions of people. Revolution is a most intense, furious, desperate class struggle and civil war. Not a single great revolution in history has taken place without civil war. And only a “man in a muffler” can think that civil war is conceivable without an “exceptionally complicated situation”.

If the situation were not exceptionally complicated there would be no revolution. If you are afraid of wolves don’t go into the forest.

There is nothing to discuss in the fifth plea, because there is no economic, political, or any other meaning whatever in it. It contains only the yearning of people who are distressed and frightened by the revolution. To characterise this yearning I shall take the liberty of mentioning two little things from my personal experience.
I had a conversation with a wealthy engineer shortly before the July days. This engineer had once been a revolutionary, had been in the Social-Democratic movement and even a member of the Bolshevik Party. Now he was full of fear and rage at the turbulent and indomitable workers. "If they were at least like the German workers," he said (he is an educated man and has been abroad), "of course, I understand that the social revolution is, in general, inevitable, but here, when the workers' level has been so reduced by the war... it is not a revolution, it is an abyss."

He was willing to accept the social revolution if history were to lead to it in the peaceful, calm, smooth and precise manner of a German express train pulling into a station. A sedate conductor would open the carriage door and announce: "Social Revolution Station! Alle aussteigen! (All change)" In that case he would have no objection to changing his position of engineer under the Tit Tityches to that of engineer under the workers' organisations.

That man has seen strikes. He knows what a storm of passion the most ordinary strike arouses even in the most peaceful times. He, of course, understands how many million times more furious this storm must be when the class struggle has aroused all the working people of a vast country, when war and exploitation have driven almost to desperation millions of people who for centuries have been tormented by the landowners, for decades have been robbed and downtrodden by the capitalists and the tsar's officials. He understands all this "theoretically", he only pays lip service to this, he is simply terrified by the "exceptionally complicated situation".

After the July days, thanks to the extremely solicitous attention with which the Kerensky government honoured me, I was obliged to go underground. Of course, it was the workers who sheltered people like us. In a small working-class house in a remote working-class suburb of Petrograd dinner is being served. The hostess puts bread on the table. The host says: "Look what fine bread. They dare not give us bad bread now. And we had almost given up even thinking that we'd ever get good bread in Petrograd again."

I was amazed at this class appraisal of the July days. My thoughts had been revolving around the political significance of those events, weighing the role they played in the general course of events, analysing the situation that caused this zigzag in history and the situation it would create, and how we ought to change our slogans and alter our Party apparatus to adapt it to the changed situation. As for bread, I, who had not known want, did not give it a thought. I took bread for granted, as a by-product of the writer's work, as it were. The mind approaches the foundation of everything, the class struggle for bread, through political analysis that follows an extremely complicated and devious path.

This member of the oppressed class, however, even though one of the well-paid and quite intelligent workers, takes the bull by the horns with that astonishing simplicity and straightforwardness, with that firm determination and amazing clarity of outlook from which we intellectuals are as remote as the stars in the sky. The whole world is divided into two camps: "us", the working people, and "them", the exploiters. Not a shadow of embarrassment over what had taken place; it was just one of the battles in the long struggle between labour and capital. When you fell trees, chips fly.

"What a painful thing is this 'exceptionally complicated situation' created by the revolution," that's how the bourgeois intellectual thinks and feels.

"We squeezed 'them' a bit; 'they' won't dare to lord it over us as they did before. We'll squeeze again—and chuck them out altogether," that's how the worker thinks and feels.

* * *

The sixth and the last plea: the proletariat "will be incapable of resisting all the pressure by hostile forces that will sweep away not only the proletarian dictatorship, but the entire revolution into the bargain".

Don't try to scare us, gentlemen, you won't succeed. We saw these hostile forces and their pressure in Kornilovism (from which the Kerensky regime in no way differs). Everybody saw, and the people remember, how the proletariat and the poor peasants swept away the Kornilov gang; and how pitiful and helpless proved to be the position of the supporters of the bourgeoisie and of the few exceptionally well-to-do local small landowners who were
exceptionally “hostile” to the revolution. *Dyelo Naroda* of September 30 urges the workers to “be patient and put up with” Kerensky (i.e., Kornilov) and the fake Tsereteli Bulygin Duma until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (by the protection of “military measures” against insurgent peasants!) and, with great gusto, it repeats precisely *Novaya Zhizn’s* sixth plea and shouts until it is hoarse: “The Kerensky government will under no circumstances submit” (to the rule of the Soviets, the rule of the workers and peasants, which *Dyelo Naroda*, not wishing to lag behind the pogrom-mongers and anti-Semites, monarchists and Cadets, calls the rule of “Trotsky and Lenin”: these are the lengths to which the Socialist-Revolutionaries go!).

But neither *Novaya Zhizn* nor *Dyelo Naroda* can scare the class-conscious workers. “The Kerensky government,” you say, “will under no circumstances submit”, i.e., it will repeat the Kornilov revolt, to put it more simply, bluntly and clearly. And the gentlemen of *Dyelo Naroda* dare to say that this will be “civil war”, that this is a “horrible prospect”!

No, gentlemen, you will not fool the workers. It will not be civil war but a hopeless revolt of a handful of Kornilovites. If they want to “refuse to submit” to the people and at all costs provoke a repetition on a wide scale of what happened to the Kornilov men in Vyborg—if that is what the Socialist-Revolutionaries want, if that is what the member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Kerensky wants, he may drive the people to desperation. But you will not scare the workers and soldiers with this, gentlemen.

What boundless insolence. They faked up a new Bulygin Duma; by means of fraud they recruited a crowd of reactionary co-operators and village kulaks to help them, added to these the capitalists and landowners (the so-called property-owning classes) and with the aid of this gang of Kornilovites they want to thwart the will of the people, the will of the workers and peasants.

They have brought affairs in a peasant country to such a pass that peasant revolt is spreading everywhere like a river in flood! Think of it! In a democratic republic in which 80 per cent of the population are peasants, the peasants have been driven to revolt... This same *Dyelo Naroda*.

Chernov’s newspaper, the organ of the “Socialist-Revolutionary” Party, which on September 30 has the effrontery to advise the workers and peasants to “be patient”, was obliged to admit in a leading article on September 29:

“So far practically nothing has been done to put an end to those relations of bondage that still prevail in the villages of central Russia.”

This same *Dyelo Naroda*, in the same leading article of September 29, says that “the dead hand of Stolypin is still making itself strongly felt” in the methods employed by the “revolutionary ministers”; in other words, putting it more clearly and simply, it brands Kerensky, Nikitin, Kishkin and Co. as *Stolypins*.

The “Stolypins” Kerensky and Co. have driven the peasants to revolt, are now taking “military measures” against the peasants, are trying to soothe the people with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (although Kerensky and Tsereteli have already deceived the people once by solemnly proclaiming on July 8 that the Constituent Assembly would be convened on the appointed date, September 17; they then broke their promise and postponed the Constituent Assembly even against the advice of the Menshevik Dan, postponed the Constituent Assembly not to the end of October as the Menshevik Central Executive Committee of that time wished, but to the end of November). The “Stolypins” Kerensky and Co. are trying to soothe the people with the imminent convocation of the Constituent Assembly, as if the people can believe those who have already lied in this matter, as if the people can believe that the Constituent Assembly will be properly convened by a government which has taken military measures in remote villages, that is to say, is openly conniving at the arbitrary arrest of class-conscious peasants and the rigging of the elections.

The government has driven the peasants to revolt and now has the effrontery to say to them: “You must be patient”, you must wait, trust the government which is pacifying insurgent peasants by ‘military measures’!

To bring matters to such a pitch that hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers perish in the offensive after June 19, the war is being protracted, German sailors have mutinied and are throwing their officers overboard, to bring
matters to such a pitch, all the time uttering phrases about peace but not offering a just peace to all the belligerents, and yet to have the effrontery to tell the workers and peasants, “you must be patient”, trust the government of the “Stolypin man” Kerensky, trust the Kornilov generals for another month, perhaps in that month they will send several tens of thousands more soldiers to the slaughter.... “You must be patient”....

Isn’t that shameless?

But you won’t fool the soldiers, gentlemen of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Kerensky’s fellow party members. The workers and soldiers will not endure the Kerensky government for a single day, for an extra hour, for they know that the Soviet Government will immediately offer all the belligerents a just peace and therefore will in all probability achieve an immediate armistice and a speedy peace.

Not for a single day, not for an extra hour will the soldiers of our peasant army allow the Kerensky government—the government which is employing military measures to suppress the peasant revolt—to remain in power against the will of the Soviets.

No, gentlemen of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Kerensky’s fellow party members, you won’t fool the workers and peasants any more.

* * *

On the question of the pressure by hostile forces which the mortally frightened Novaya Zhizn assures us will sweep away the proletarian dictatorship, still another monstrous logical and political mistake is made, which only people who have allowed themselves to be frightened out of their wits can fail to see.

“Pressure by hostile forces will sweep away the proletarian dictatorship,” you say. Very well. But you are all economists and educated people, dear fellow-citizens. You all know that to contrast democracy to the bourgeoisie is senseless and a sign of ignorance; it is the same as contrasting pounds to yards, for there is a democratic bourgeoisie and undemocratic groups of the petty bourgeoisie (capable of raising a Vendée).
for capital and it is possible to stand for labour, but it is impossible to stand for long in between. In Russia this coalition has for six months tried scores of ways and failed.

Or, finally, all power to the proletarians and the poor peasants against the bourgeoisie in order to break their resistance. This has not yet been tried, and you, gentlemen of Novaya Zhizn, are dissuading the people from this, you are trying to frighten them with your own fear of the bourgeoisie.

No fourth way can be invented.

If Novaya Zhizn, therefore, is afraid of the proletarian dictatorship and rejects it because, as it claims, the proletarian power may be defeated by the bourgeoisie, it is tantamount to its surreptitiously reverting to the position of compromise with the capitalists! It is as clear as daylight that whoever is afraid of resistance, whoever does not believe that it is possible to break this resistance, whoever warns the people: “beware of the resistance of the capitalists, you will not be able to cope with it”, is thereby again calling for compromise with the capitalists.

Novaya Zhizn is hopelessly and pitifully muddled, as are all the petty-bourgeois democrats who now realise that the coalition is bankrupt, dare not defend it openly and, at the same time, protected by the bourgeoisie, fear the transfer of all power to the proletarians and poor peasants.

* * *

To fear the resistance of the capitalists and yet to call oneself a revolutionary, to wish to be regarded as a socialist—isn’t that disgraceful? How low must international socialism, corrupted by opportunism, have fallen ideologically if such voices could be raised?

We have already seen the strength of the capitalists’ resistance; the entire people have seen it, for the capitalists are more class-conscious than the other classes and at once realized the significance of the Soviets, at once exerted all their efforts to the utmost, resorted to everything, went to all lengths, resorted to the most incredible lies and slander, to military plots in order to frustrate the Soviets, to reduce them to nought, to prostitute them (with the aid of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), to transform them into talking shops, to wear down the peasants and workers by months and months of empty talk and playing at revolution.

We have not yet seen, however, the strength of resistance of the proletarians and poor peasants, for this strength will become fully apparent only when power is in the hands of the proletariat, when tens of millions of people who have been crushed by want and capitalist slavery see from experience and feel that state power has passed into the hands of the oppressed classes, that the state is helping the poor to fight the landowners and capitalists, is breaking their resistance. Only then shall we see what untapped forces of resistance to the capitalists are latent among the people; only then will what Engels called “latent socialism” manifest itself. Only then, for every ten thousand overt and concealed enemies of working-class rule, manifesting themselves actively or by passive resistance, there will arise a million new fighters who had been politically dormant, writhing in the torments of poverty and despair, having ceased to believe that they were human, that they had the right to live, that they too could be served by the entire might of the modern centralised state, that contingents of the proletarian militia could, with the fullest confidence, also call upon them to take a direct, immediate, daily part in state administration.

The capitalists and landowners, with the kind help of Plekhanov, Breshkovskaya, Tsereteli, Chernov and Co., have done everything in their power to defile the democratic republic, to defile it by servility to wealth to such a degree that the people are being overcome by apathy, indifference; it is all the same to them, because the hungry man cannot see the difference between the republic and the monarchy; the freezing, barefooted, worn-out soldier sacrificing his life for alien interests is not inclined to love the republic.

But when every labourer, every unemployed worker, every cook, every ruined peasant sees, not from newspapers, but with his own eyes, that the proletarian state is not cringing to wealth but is helping the poor, that this state does not hesitate to adopt revolutionary measures, that it confiscates surplus stocks of provisions from the parasites
and distributes them to the hungry, that it forcibly installs the homeless in the houses of the rich, that it compels the rich to pay for milk but does not give them a drop until the children of all poor families are sufficiently supplied, that the land is being transferred to the working people and the factories and banks are being placed under the control of the workers, and that immediate and severe punishment is meted out to the millionaires who conceal their wealth—when the poor see and feel this, no capitalist or kulak forces, no forces of world finance capital which manipulates thousands of millions, will vanquish the people's revolution; on the contrary, the socialist revolution will triumph all over the world for it is maturing in all countries.

Our revolution will be invincible if it is not afraid of itself, if it transfers all power to the proletariat, for behind us stand the immeasurably larger, more developed, more organised world forces of the proletariat which are temporarily held down by the war but not destroyed; on the contrary, the war has multiplied them.

* * *

How can one be afraid that the Bolshevik government, that is to say, the proletarian government, which is assured of the devoted support of the poor peasants, will be “swept away” by the capitalist gentlemen! What shortsightedness! What disgraceful fear of the people! What hypocrisy! Those who show this fear belong to that “high” (by capitalist standards, but actually rotten) “society” which utters the word “justice” without believing in it, from habit, as a trite phrase, attaching no meaning to it.

Here is an example.

Mr. Peshekhonov is a well-known semi-Cadet. A more moderate Trudovik, one of the same mind as the Breshkovskayas and Plekhanovs, will not be found. There has never been a minister more servile to the bourgeoisie. The world had never seen a more ardent advocate of “coalition”, of compromise with the capitalists.

Here are the admissions this gentleman was forced to make in his speech at the “Democratic” (read: Bulygin) Conference as reported by the defencist Izvestia:

"There are two programmes. One is the programme of group claims, class and national claims. This programme is most frankly advocated by the Bolsheviks. It is not easy, however, for the other sections of the democracy to reject this programme. They are the claims of the working people, the claims of the cheated and oppressed nationalities. It is not so easy, therefore, for the democracy to break with the Bolsheviks, to reject these class demands, primarily because in essence these demands are just. But this programme, for which we fought before the revolution, for the sake of which we made the revolution, and which we would all unanimously support under other circumstances, constitutes a very grave danger under present conditions. The danger is all the greater now because these demands have to be presented at a time when it is impossible for the state to comply with them. We must first defend the whole—the state, to save it from doom, and there is only one way to do that; not the satisfaction of demands, however just and cogent they may be, but, on the contrary, restriction and sacrifice, which must be contributed from all quarters.” (Izvestia, September 17.)

Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand that as long as the capitalists are in power he is defending not the whole, but the selfish interests of Russian and “Allied” imperialist capital. Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand that the war would cease to be an imperialist, predatory war of annexation only after a rupture with the capitalists, with their secret treaties, with their annexations (seizure of alien territory), with their banking and financial swindles. Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand that only after this would the war become—if the enemy rejected the formal offer of a just peace—a defensive war, a just war. Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand that the defence potential of a country that has thrown off the yoke of capital, that has given the peasants land and has placed the banks and factories under workers’ control, would be many times greater than the defence potential of a capitalist country.

The main thing that Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand is that he surrenders his entire position, the entire position of the entire petty-bourgeois democracy when he is forced to admit the justice of Bolshevism, to admit that its demands are the demands of the “working people”, i.e., of the majority of the people.

This is where our strength lies. This is why our government will be invincible; because even our opponents are forced to admit that the Bolshevik programme is that of the “working people” and the “oppressed nationalities”.
After all, Mr. Peshekhonov is the political friend of the Cadets, of the Yedinstvo and Dyelo Naroda people, of the Breshkovskayas and Plekhanovs, he is the representative of the kulaks and of the gentlemen whose wives and sisters would come tomorrow to gouge out with their umbrellas the eyes of wounded Bolsheviks if they were to be defeated by Kornilov's or (which is the same thing) Kerensky's troops.

A gentleman like that is forced to admit the "justice" of the Bolshevik demands.

For him "justice" is merely an empty phrase. For the mass of semi-proletarians, however, and for the majority of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie who have been ruined, tortured and worn out by the war, it is not an empty phrase, but a most acute, most burning and immense question of death from starvation, of a crust of bread. That is why no policy can be based on a "coalition", on a "compromise" between the interests of the starving and ruined and the interests of the exploiters. That is why the Bolshevik government is assured of the support of the overwhelming majority of these people.

Justice is an empty word, say the intellectuals and those rascals who are inclined to proclaim themselves Marxists on the lofty grounds that they have "contemplated the hind parts" of economic materialism.

Ideas become a power when they grip the people. And precisely at the present time the Bolsheviks, i.e., the representatives of revolutionary proletarian internationalism, have embodied in their policy the idea that is motivating countless working people all over the world.

Justice alone, the mere anger of the people against exploitation, would never have brought them on to the true path of socialism. But now that, thanks to capitalism, the material apparatus of the big banks, syndicates, railways, and so forth, has grown, now that the immense experience of the advanced countries has accumulated a stock of engineering marvels, the employment of which is being hindered by capitalism, now that the class-conscious workers have built up a party of a quarter of a million members to systematically lay hold of this apparatus and set it in motion with the support of all the working and exploited people—now that these conditions exist, no power on earth can prevent the Bolsheviks, if they do not allow themselves to be scared and if they succeed in taking power, from retaining it until the triumph of the world socialist revolution.

**AFTERWORD**

The foregoing lines were already written when the leading article in Novaya Zhizn of October 1 produced another gem of stupidity which is all the more dangerous because it professes sympathy with the Bolsheviks and offers most sagacious philistine admonitions "not to allow yourselves to be provoked" (not to allow ourselves to be caught in the trap of screams about provocation, the object of which is to frighten the Bolsheviks and cause them to refrain from taking power).

Here is this gem:

"The lessons of movements, like that of July 3-5, on the one hand, and of the Kornilov days, on the other, have shown quite clearly that the democracy, having at its command organs that exercise immense influence among the population, is invincible when it takes a defensive position in civil war, and that it suffers defeat, loses all the middle vacillating groups when it takes the initiative and launches an offensive."

If the Bolsheviks were to yield in any form and in the slightest degree to the philistine stupidity of this argument they would ruin their Party and the revolution.

For the author of this argument, taking it upon himself to talk about civil war (just the subject for a lady with many good points), has distorted the lessons of history on this question in an incredibly comical manner.

This is how these lessons, the lessons of history on this question, were treated by the representative and founder of proletarian revolutionary tactics, Karl Marx:

"Now, insurrection is an art quite as much as war or any other art, and is subject to certain procedural rules which, when neglected, will bring about the downfall of the party neglecting them. These rules, logical deductions from the nature of the parties and the circumstances you have to deal with in such a case, are so plain and simple that the brief experience of 1848 made the Germans fairly well acquainted with them. Firstly, never play with insur-
rection unless you are fully prepared to go the whole way [literally: face the consequences of your game].* Insurrection is an equation with very indefinite magnitudes, the value of which may change every day; the forces opposed to you have all the advantage of organisation, discipline and habitual authority [Marx has in mind the most “difficult” case of insurrection: against the “firmly established” old authority, against the army not yet disintegrated by the influence of the revolution and the vacillation of the government]; unless you bring strong odds against them you are defeated and ruined. Secondly, once you have entered upon the insurrectionary career, act with the greatest determination, and on the offensive. The defensive is the death of every armed rising; it is lost before it measures itself with its enemies. Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattered, prepare the way for new successes, however small, but prepare daily; keep up the moral superiority which the first successful rising has given to you; rally in this way those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest impulse and which always look out for the safer side; force your enemies to retreat before they can collect their strength against you; in the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary tactics yet known: de l’audace, de l’audace, encore de l’audace!” (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany, German edition, 1907, p. 118.)

We have changed all that, the “would-be Marxists” of Novaya Zhizn may say about themselves: instead of triple audacity they have two virtues: “We have two, sir: moderation and accuracy.”28 For “us”, the experience of world history, the experience of the Great French Revolution, is nothing. The important thing for “us” is the experience of the two movements in 1917, distorted by Molchalin spectacles. Let us examine this experience without these charming spectacles.

You compare July 3-5 with “civil war”, because you believed Alexinsky, Pereverzev and Co. It is typical of the gentlemen of Novaya Zhizn that they believe such people (and do absolutely nothing themselves to collect information about July 3-5, although they have the huge apparatus of a big daily newspaper at their disposal).

Let us assume for a moment, however, that July 3-5 was not the rudiment of civil war that was kept within the rudimentary stage by the Bolsheviks, but actual civil war. Let us assume this.

In that case, then, what does this lesson prove?

First, the Bolsheviks did not take the offensive, for it is indisputable that on the night of July 3-4, and even on July 4, they would have gained a great deal if they had taken the offensive. Their defensive position was their weakness, if we are to speak of civil war (as Novaya Zhizn does, and not of converting a spontaneous outburst into a demonstration of the type of April 20-21, as the facts show).

The “lesson” therefore proves that the wise men of Novaya Zhizn are wrong.

Secondly, if the Bolsheviks did not even set out to start an insurrection on July 3 or 4, if not a single Bolshevik body even raised such a question, the reason for it lies beyond the scope of our controversy with Novaya Zhizn. For we are arguing about the lessons of “civil war”, i.e., of insurrection, and not about the point that obvious lack of a majority to support it restrains the revolutionary party from thinking of insurrection.

Since everybody knows that the Bolsheviks received a majority in the metropolitan Soviets and in the country (over 49 per cent of the Moscow votes) much later than July 1917, it again follows that the “lessons” are far, far from what Novaya Zhizn, that lady with many good points, would like them to be.

No, no, you had better not meddle with politics citizens of Novaya Zhizn! If the revolutionary party has no majority in the advanced contingents of the revolutionary classes and in the country, insurrection is out of the question. Moreover, insurrection requires: (1) growth of the revolution on a country-wide scale; (2) the complete moral and political bankruptcy of the old government, for example, the “coalition” government; (3) extreme vacillation in the camp of all middle groups, i.e., those who do not fully sup-

* Interpolations in square brackets (within this passage quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin.—Ed.
port the government, although they did fully support it yesterday.

Why did Novaya Zhizn, when speaking of the "lessons" of July 3-5, fail even to note this very important lesson? Because a political question was not dealt with by politicians but by a circle of intellectuals who had been terrified by the bourgeoisie.

To proceed. Thirdly, the facts show that it was after July 3-4 that the rot set in among the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, precisely because the Tseretelis had exposed themselves by their July policy, precisely because the mass of the people realised that the Bolsheviks were their own front-rank fighters and that the "social-bloc" advocates were traitors. Even before the Kornilov revolt this rot was fully revealed by the Petrograd elections on August 20, which resulted in a victory for the Bolsheviks and the rout of the "social-bloc" advocates. (Dyelo Naroda recently tried to refute this by concealing the returns for all parties, but this was both self-deception and deception of its readers; according to the figures published in Dyen of August 24, covering only the city, the Cadets' share of the total vote increased from 22 to 23 per cent, but the absolute number of votes cast for the Cadets dropped 40 per cent; the Bolsheviks' share of the total vote increased from 20 to 33 per cent, while the absolute number of votes cast for the Bolsheviks dropped only 10 per cent; the share of all "middle groups" dropped from 58 to 44 per cent, but the absolute number of votes cast for them dropped 60 per cent!)

That a rot had set in among the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks after the July days and before the Kornilov days is also proved by the growth of the Left wings of both parties, reaching almost 40 per cent: this is "retribution" for the persecution of the Bolsheviks by the Kerenskys.

In spite of the "loss" of a few hundred members, the proletarian party gained enormously from July 3-4, for it was precisely during those stern days that the people realised and saw its devotion and the treachery of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. So, the "lesson" is far, very far from being of the Novaya Zhizn sort, it is one entirely different, namely: don't desert the seething masses for the "Molchalis of democracy"; and if you launch an insurrection, go over to the offensive while the enemy forces are scattered, catch the enemy unawares.

Is that not so, gentlemen "would-be Marxists" of Novaya Zhizn?

Or does "Marxism" mean not basing tactics on an exact appraisal of the objective situation but senselessly and uncritically lumping together "civil war" and "a Congress of Soviets and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly"?

But this is simply ridiculous, gentlemen, this is a sheer mockery of Marxism and of logic in general!

If there is nothing in the objective situation that warrants the intensification of the class struggle to the point of "civil war", why did you speak of "civil war" in connection with "a Congress of Soviets and the Constituent Assembly"? (For this is the title of the leading article in Novaya Zhizn here under discussion.) In that case you should clearly have told the reader and proved to him that there is no ground in the objective situation for civil war and that, therefore, peaceful, constitutionally-legal, juridically and parliamentarily "simple" things like a Congress of Soviets and a Constituent Assembly can and should be the cornerstone of tactics. In that case it is possible to hold the opinion that such a congress and such an assembly are really capable of making decisions.

If, however, the present objective conditions harbour the inevitability or even only the probability of civil war, if you did not "idly" speak about it, but did so clearly seeing, feeling, sensing the existence of a situation of civil war, how could you make a Congress of Soviets or a Constituent Assembly the cornerstone? This is a sheer mockery of the starving and tormented people! Do you think the starving will consent to "wait" two months? Or that the ruin, about the increase of which you yourselves write ever day, will consent to "wait" for the Congress of Soviets or for the Constituent Assembly? Or that the German offensive, in the absence of serious steps on our part towards peace (i.e., in the absence of a formal offer of a just peace to all belligerents), will consent to "wait" for the Congress of Soviets or for the Constituent Assembly? Or are you in possession of facts which permit you to conclude that the
history of the Russian revolution, which from February 28 to September 30 had proceeded with extraordinary turbulencé and unprecedented rapidity, will, from October 1 to November 29, proceed at a super-tranquil, peaceful, legally balanced pace that will preclude upheavals, spurs, military defeats and economic crises? Or will the army at the front, concerning which the non-Bolshevik officer Dubasov said officially, in the name of the front, “it will not fight”, quietly starve and freeze until the “appointed” date? Or will the peasant revolt cease to be a factor of civil war because you call it “anarchy” and “pogrom”, or because Kerensky will send “military” forces against the peasants? Or is it possible, conceivable, that the government can work calmly, honestly, and without deception to convene the Constituent Assembly in a peasant country when that same government is suppressing the peasant revolt?

Don’t laugh at the “confusion in the Smolny Institute”, gentlemen! There is no less confusion in your own ranks. You answer the formidable questions of civil war with confused phrases and pitiful constitutional illusions. That is why I say that if the Bolsheviks were to give in to these moods they would ruin both their Party and their revolution.

October 1, 1917

N. Lenin

Written at the end of September-October 1 (14), 1917
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NOTES

1 The article was written at Vyborg between late September and October 1 (14), 1917. First published in the journal Prosveshchenie (Education) No. 1-2 for October 1917.

Prosveshchenie—a Bolshevik theoretical journal legally published in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. On the eve of the First World War it was closed down by the government, and although publication was resumed in the autumn of 1917, only one double issue appeared.

Title page

2 Rech (Speech)—a daily, the central organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 23 (March 8), 1906. After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution, it gave active support to the Provisional Government’s home and foreign policy and conducted a vicious campaign against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. It continued to be published until August 1918 under the titles: Nasha Rech, Svobodnaya Rech, Vek, Novaya Rech and Nash Vek.

3 Novaya Zhizn (New Life)—a Menshevik daily, the organ of a group of Social-Democrats, known as the internationalists, among whom were Mensheviks, Martov’s followers and intellectuals of Menshevik sympathies. It appeared in Petrograd from April 1917. After the October Socialist Revolution it adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet government and in July 1918 was closed down.

Mensheviks—representatives of the petty-bourgeois opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic Party, who were the vehicle of bourgeois influence among the workers. The name mensheviki (meaning members of the minority) dates from the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. which took place in August 1903; in the elections to the central organs of the Party, held at the end of the Congress, they were in the minority, while the revolutionary Social-Democrats, headed by Lenin, constituted the majority (bolsheviki means members of the majority). The Mensheviks favoured co-operation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and pursued an opportunistic policy within the working-class movement. The February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 led to the establishment of dual power
in Russia—the bourgeois Provisional Government existed side by side with the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, as represented by the Soviets. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries entered the Provisional Government, supported its imperialist policy and fought to hold down the mounting proletarian revolution. In the Soviets, the Mensheviks pursued the same policy of supporting the Provisional Government and diverting the masses from the revolutionary movement.

After the October Socialist Revolution the Mensheviks became an openly counter-revolutionary party, organising and participating in plots and revolts aimed at the overthrow of Soviet power. p. 5

_Cadets_ (Constitutional-Democratic Party)—the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia, which was set up in October 1905. Its membership was made up of bourgeoisie, landowners and bourgeois intellectuals. The Cadets eventually developed into a party of the imperialist bourgeoisie. During the First World War they actively supported the tsarist government's expansionist foreign policy. During the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, they tried to save the monarchy; playing a leading part in the bourgeois Provisional Government, they conducted a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the people's interests.

After the October Socialist Revolution they became rabid enemies of Soviet power and participated in all the counter-revolutionary military operations and the campaigns of foreign interventionists. After the defeat of the whiteguards and interventionists, the Cadets fled abroad and continued their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity. _Kornilovites—_followers of Kornilov, a tsarist general who organised a counter-revolutionary revolt in August (September) 1917 (see Note 23). p. 5

This happened on June 4 (17), 1917, during the speech of the Menshevik Tsereteli, a Minister in the Provisional Government. He said that there was no political party in Russia which was prepared to take over full power. On behalf of the Bolshevik Party Lenin interrupted Tsereteli with the remark: “There is!” Later in his speech from the rostrum, Lenin declared that the Bolshevik Party “is ready to take over full power at any moment”. p. 5

_Socialist-Revolutionaries_ (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party founded in late 1901 and early 1902, when various Narodnik groups and circles merged. The S.R.s' views were a mixture of Narodnik and revisionist ideas. During the First World War most of them held social-chauvinist views.

After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917, the Socialist-Revolutionaries together with the Mensheviks were the mainstay of the bourgeois-landowner Provisional Government, and the party's leaders (Avksentyev, Kerensky and Chernov) were members of its Cabinet. The party refused to support the demand of the peasants for the abolition of landed estates and favoured the preservation of landed proprietorship. S.R. Ministers in the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against peasants who seized landed estates.

At the end of November 1917, the Left wing formed a separate party, which in an effort to retain its influence among the peasants formally recognised Soviet power and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks. Very soon, however, they began to fight against Soviet power.

During the foreign armed intervention and Civil War, the S.R.s engaged in subversive activity and gave whole-hearted support to the Interventionists and whiteguards; they took part in counter-revolutionary plots and staged terrorist acts against Soviet Government and Communist Party leaders. After the Civil War they continued to engage in such activities at home and among the whiteguard émigrés abroad. p. 5

_The Alexandrinsky Theatre_ in Petrograd was the place where the Democratic Conference was convened. p. 6

_The All-Russia Democratic Conference_ was convened by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, which was dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, to decide on the question of state power, but its actual purpose was to divert the attention of the masses away from the mounting revolutionary movement. The conference was first arranged for September 12 (25), and later postponed until September 14-22 (September 27-October 5), 1917. The conference, held in St. Petersburg, was attended by more than 1,500 delegates. The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders did their utmost to reduce the number of workers' and peasants' delegates and increase the number of delegates from various petty-bourgeois and bourgeois organisations, thereby securing a majority. The Bolsheviks decided to attend in order to expose the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Democratic Conference adopted a resolution on the establishment of a Pre-parliament (Provisional Council of the Republic), which was an attempt to create the impression that Russia now had a parliamentary system. According to the Provisional Government's regulations, however, the Pre-parliament was to constitute a consultative body responsible to the government.

In the articles "Heroes of Fraud and the Mistakes of the Bolsheviks", "From a Publicist's Diary. The Mistakes of Our Party", and "The Crisis Has Matured", Lenin criticised the Bolshevik tactics in connection with the Democratic Conference; he categorically demanded that the Bolsheviks should withdraw from the Pre-parliament and concentrate on preparing for the insurrection. The Central Committee debated Lenin's proposal and adopted a resolution on the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-parliament despite resistance on the part of Kamelev, Rykov and other capitulators.
On October 7 (20), the opening day of the Pre-parliament, the Bolsheviks read a declaration and walked out.

9 Dyelo Naroda (People’s Cause)—a daily, the organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, published in Petrograd from March 1917 to July 1918 under various names. It adopted a defencist and conciliatory stand and supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. It appeared under various names in July-October 1917, such as Pravda, Proletary, Rabochy Put, and Chernyi Socialist Revolution, from October 27 (November 9), 1917, the name Pravda was published.

10 Rabochy Put (The Workers’ Path)—one of the names under which Pravda was published.

Pravda (The Truth)—a legal Bolshevik daily, published in St. Petersburg. It was founded on the initiative of St. Petersburg workers in April 1912. Lenin provided Pravda with ideological direction, wrote for it almost daily, and issued instructions to its editors to make it a militant revolutionary newspaper.

Pravda was constantly being hounded down by the police and was finally closed down on July 8 (21), 1914.

It resumed publication after the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution. On March 5 (18), 1917 it became the organ of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

When Lenin returned to Petrograd he became a member of its editorial board and the newspaper launched a campaign in support of his plan for turning the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

The Provisional Government, with the knowledge and consent of the Central Executive Committee, which was then in session. Its delegates went to the city districts to stop the masses from going into action, but the movement had already got under way and it proved impossible to stop it.

Late that night, the Central Committee, together with the Petrograd Committee and the Military Organisation, taking account of the mood of the masses decided to take part in the demonstration on July 4 so as to try and lend it a peaceful and organised character. Lenin was away on a short holiday, feeling unwell after an exhausting stretch of work. Being informed of the events, he returned to Petrograd on the morning of July 4 (17) and took charge.

More than 500,000 took part in the demonstration on July 4 (17). The demonstrators carried Bolshevik slogans, such as “All Power to the Soviets”, and demanded that the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Soviets should take power, but the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders refused to do so.

The events of July 3-5 reflected the profound political crisis in the country. It was a movement of soldiers and workers, who were incensed at the Provisional Government’s counter-revolutionary policy: the failure of the Russian offensive at the front, unleashed on Kerensky’s orders on June 18 (31), the growth of unemployment as a result of factories being closed down by the capitalists, rising prices and the acute food shortages. The movement started on July 3 (16) by spontaneous demonstrations which threatened to develop into an armed revolt against the Provisional Government.

The Bolshevik Party was opposed to insurrection at that time because it believed that the revolutionary crisis had not yet matured, that the army and the peasants were not yet prepared to come to the support of the insurrection in the capital. The Central Com-
Znaemya Truda (The Banner of Labour)—a daily, the organ of the Petrograd Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published from August 1917. From November 1917 (No. 59) it was the organ of the Petrograd Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the group of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Central Executive Committee of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets. From December 1917 (No. 105) the paper became the central organ of the Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. It was closed down in July 1918 during the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' revolt. p. 12

Volga Naroda (People's Will)—a daily, the organ of the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Published in Petrograd from April 1917. It was closed down in November 1917 and subsequently published under other names before it was closed down for good in February 1918. p. 15

Yedinstvo (Unity)—a newspaper, the organ of the extreme Right group of Menshevik defencists led by Plekhanov. It was published in Petrograd. Four issues appeared in May and June 1914, and then, from March to November 1917, it appeared daily. From December 1917 to January 1918 it was published under the name of Nashe Yedinstvo. Yedinstvo appealed for support of the Provisional Government, for a coalition with the bourgeoisie and “firm government”. It campaigned against the Bolsheviks, often resorting to the dishonest methods of the gutter press. It adopted a hostile attitude to the October Socialist Revolution and Soviet power. p. 15

Struvism—a liberal-bourgeois distortion of Marxism named after P. B. Struve, the chief representative of “legal Marxism” in Russia. Legal Marxism emerged as a socio-political trend in the 1890s among the Russian liberal bourgeois intellectuals. “Legal Marxists” led by Struve tried to use Marxism in the interests of the bourgeoisie. Struve lauded capitalism, and proposed “learning” from it. Lenin points out that Struvism took from Marxism everything acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie and discarded Marxism’s most important feature, its revolutionary core—the theory of the inevitable collapse of capitalism, the theory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. p. 19

Tit Titych—a rich merchant from Ostrovsky’s comedy Shoulder ing Another’s Troubles. Lenin applies this name to capitalist tycoons. p. 22

Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies—a daily, published from February 28 (March 13), 1917. Following the formation, at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the paper became the organ of the Executive Committee. From August 1 (14) (No. 132) it was called the Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and from September 29 (October 12) (No. 184) the Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. All this time the paper was under the control of the Mensheviks and S.R.s and waged a fierce fight against the Bolshevik Party.

After the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the paper came under a new editorial board and became the official organ of the Soviet government. It carried the first major documents of the Soviet Government, and Lenin’s articles and speeches. From March 1918 it was published in Moscow. Since January 26, 1938 it has been known as the organ of the Soviets of Working People’s Deputies. p. 25

See Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow 1965, p. 263. p. 26

Reference to Chekhov’s The Man in a Muffler, a story which portrays a narrow-minded philistine wary of every little innovation. p. 34

Kornilov’s revolt—the counter-revolutionary revolt of the bourgeoisie and the landowners in August 1917, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the tsarist general Kornilov. The plotters planned to take Petrograd, destroy the Bolshevik Party, disperse the Soviets and establish a military dictatorship with a view to restoring the monarchy. A. F. Kerensky, the head of the Provisional Government, took part in the revolt, but when the revolt was in progress he realised that he would be swept away together with Kornilov; therefore he disassociated himself from Kornilov and declared him a rebel against the Provisional Government.

The revolt broke out on August 25 (September 7).

The mass struggle against Kornilov was led by the Bolshevik Party, which continued, as Lenin demanded, to expose the Provisional Government and its Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik accomplices. On the call of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party the Petrograd workers, revolutionary soldiers and sailors rose to quell the mutineers. The workers swiftly organised Red Guard units and revolutionary committees were set up in several places. The advance of Kornilov’s troops was halted and their morale was undermined by Bolshevik agitators.

The Kornilov revolt was crushed by the workers and peasants led by the Bolshevik Party. Under pressure from the masses the Provisional Government was forced to order the arrest and prosecution of Kornilov and his accomplices on charges of organising the revolt. p. 35

Vendée—a province in France, which was a hotbed of counter-revolution during the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. The backward peasants of the Vendée, who were strongly influenced by the Catholic clergy, were wax in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries in their fight against revolutionary France. p. 38
On April 20 (May 3), the newspapers carried a note from Foreign Minister Milyukov to the Allied Governments in which the Provisional Government reaffirmed its intention to honour all the treaties of the tsarist government and to carry on the war to a victorious conclusion. There was mass indignation over this imperialist policy. On April 21 (May 4), the workers of Petrograd downed tools. They staged a demonstration which demanded peace and was attended by more than 100,000 workers and soldiers. Demonstrations and protest meetings were also staged in Moscow, the Urals, the Ukraine, Kronstadt and other cities and regions of Russia. Resolutions protesting against Milyukov's note were received by the Petrograd Soviet from the Soviets of many cities. The April demonstration led to a government crisis. Mass pressure forced Milyukov and Guchkov to resign from the Cabinet; the first coalition government was formed on May 5 (18) and included, besides 10 capitalist ministers, party leaders who collaborated with them, namely, Kerensky and Chernov from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Tseretel and Skobelev from the Mensheviks, etc. The bourgeois government was saved by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks who openly sided with the bourgeoisie.

NAME INDEX

Alexinsky, Grigory Alexeyevich (b. 1879)—Social-Democrat during the early period of his political activities; supported the Bolsheviks in the 1905 revolution. In the period of reaction (1907-10) he took part in organising the anti-Party Vperyod group. During the First World War he adopted a social-chauvinist position and contributed to several bourgeois newspapers. He joined Plekhanov's Yedinstvo group in 1917. He was hostile to the revolution and in July 1917, jointly with military intelligence service, fabricated false documents and slandered Lenin and the Bolsheviks. In April 1918 he fled abroad and joined forces with the counter-revolutionary émigrés.

Bazarov, B. (Rudnev, Vladimir Alexandrovich) (1874-1939)—took part in the Social-Democratic movement from 1896 onwards and contributed to a number of Bolshevik publications between 1905 and 1907. In the years of reaction (1907-10) he split away from the Bolsheviks and became one of the chief representatives of Machist revisionism of Marxism. In 1917 he was an editor of the semi-Menshevik newspaper Novaya Zhizn (New Life); opposed the October Socialist Revolution. After 1921 he worked in the State Planning Commission; in the latter years of his life he translated...
literary and philosophical works.—30, 31, 32

Berkenheim, Alexander Moiseyevich (1880-1932)—Socialist- Revolutionary, who participated in the co-operative movement. After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution he was Chairman of the Moscow Food Committee. In 1922 he emigrated.—8

Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Yekaterina Konstantinovna (1844-1934)—one of the organisers and leaders of the Socialist- Revolutionary Party; belonged to its extreme Right wing. After the February 1917 revolution she supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and was in favour of continuing the imperialist war to a victorious finish. After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution he was a member of the Unite Labour Popular Socialist Party Central Committee and both the Executive Committees of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russia Council of Peasants' Deputies. After the October Socialist Revolution he organised anti-Soviet revolts and supported the foreign intervention against Soviet Russia. In 1919 she emigrated to the U.S.A., and later lived in France. She contributed to the white émigré publication Daily (Days) in Paris, slandered Soviet Russia and advocated organising a new intervention.—15, 28, 41, 42, 44

Briand, Aristide (1862-1932)—French statesman and diplomat. For some time he was a member of the Socialist Party Left wing. In 1902 he was elected to parliament and became a reactionary bourgeois politician avowedly hostile to the working class; was Prime Minister in 1913, 1915-17, 1921-22, and Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1926 and 1931.—21

Bulgarin, Alexander Grigorevich (1851-1919)—statesman in tsarist Russia. In 1905 he was Minister of the Interior and directed the drafting of a bill to convene a consultative State Duma for the purpose of weakening the revolutionary movement. However, it was never convened.—11

Chaikovsky, Nikolai Vasilevich (1850-1926)—Narodnik, later a Socialist-Revolutionary. "Popular Socialist". After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution he was a member of the United Labour Popular Socialist Party Central Committee and both the Executive Committees of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russia Council of Peasants' Deputies. After the October Socialist Revolution he organised anti-Soviet revolts and supported the foreign intervention against Soviet Russia. In 1919 he emigrated to Paris where he was an active supporter of Denikin and Wrangel.—8

Chernov, Viktor Mikhailovich (1871-1947)—a Menshevik leader, a social-chauvinist during the First World War. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the first convocation; he supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Socialist Revolution he actively opposed Soviet power. Early in 1922 he was exiled from the country for his anti-Soviet activities.—19, 37

Dan (Gurovich), Fyodor Ivanovich (1871-1947)—a Menshevik leader, a social-chauvinist during the First World War. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the first convocation; he supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Socialist Revolution he actively opposed Soviet power. Early in 1922 he was exiled from the country for his anti-Soviet activities.—19, 37

Danton, Georges Jacques (1759-1794)—prominent leader of the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth century.—46

Dubasov—non-Party officer who fought at the front during the First World War.—50

Engels, Frederick (1820-1895)—

Gvozdyov, Kuzma Antonovich (b. 1889)—Menshevik. Appointed Minister of Labour in the bourgeois Provisional Government in September 1917.—20

Jordania, Noi Nikolayevich (1870-1953)—Social-Democrat, leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks. During the First World War he adopted a social-chauvinist position. After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution he was Chairman of the Tiflis Soviet of Workers' and Deputies and headed the Georgian counter-revolutionary Menshevik government (1918-21). He emigrated in 1921.—15

Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich (b. 1881)—Socialist-Revolutionary; a rabid social-chauvinist during the First World War. After the February 1917 revolution was Minister of Justice, War and Naval Minister, and then Chairman of the bourgeois Provisional Government and Commander-in-Chief. Following the October Socialist Revolution he fought against Soviet power; in 1918 he fled abroad.—13, 15, 20, 34, 35, 36, 37, 44, 45, 50

Kishkin, Nikolai Mikhailovich (1870-1953)—Social-Democrat, worked in the People's Commissariat of Security in the last bourgeois Provisional Government. On the eve of the October Socialist Revolution he was appointed "dictator" of Petrograd; one of the leading members of the "Tactical Centre", a whiteguard counter-revolutionary organisation in Moscow in 1919; in the latter years of his life he worked in the People's Commissariat of Health.—7, 15, 37

Kishkin, Nikolai Mikhailovich (1864-1930)—physician by profession; a leader of the Cadet Party; Minister of Social Security in the last bourgeois Provisional Government. On the eve of the October Socialist Revolution he was appointed "dictator" of Petrograd; one of the leading members of the "Tactical Centre", a whiteguard counter-revolutionary organisation in Moscow in 1919; in the latter years of his life he worked in the People's Commissariat of Health.—7, 15, 37
Konovalov, Alexander Ivanovich
(b. 1875)—big textile manufacturer; was Minister of Trade and Industry in the Kerensky Provisional Government.—7

Kuskova, Yekaterina Dmitriyevna
(1869-1958)—bourgeois public figure and publicist.—8

Kiev
Lieber (Goldman), Mikhail Isaakovich
(1880-1937)—one of the Bund leaders, Menshevik. During the First World War he adopted a social-chauvinist stand. After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution, Lieber was a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the first convocation; he supported the coalition Provisional Government. Lieber adopted a hostile attitude towards the October Socialist Revolution; was subsequently engaged in administrative work.—19

Martov, Leo (Tsederbaum, Yuli Osipovich)
(1873-1923)—a Menshevik leader. During the First World War he adopted a Centrist position. Following the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution headed the group of Internationalist Mensheviks and was a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. After the October Socialist Revolution he opposed Soviet power; in 1920 he emigrated to Germany where he published a Menshevik counter-revolutionary organ Sotsialistichesky Vestnik (Socialist Messenger) in Berlin.—17, 18

Marx, Karl
(1818-1883)—16, 17, 33, 45, 46

N
Nikitin, A. M. (b. 1876)—Menshevik and a lawyer by profession; after the July events he was made Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and then Minister of the Interior in Kerensky's bourgeois Provisional Government.—20, 37

Pereverzev, Pavel Nikolayevich—lawyer, sympathised with the Socialist-Revolutionaries; he was Minister of Justice in the first coalition bourgeois Provisional Government. In July 1917 he published false documents fabricated by Alexinsky jointly with military intelligence service which slandered Lenin and the Bolsheviks.—46

Peshekhonov, Aleksei Vasilyevich
(1867-1933)—bourgeois public figure and publicist, one of the leaders of the petty-bourgeois party of Popular Socialists from 1906. In 1917 he held the post of Minister of Food in the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Socialist Revolution Peshekhonov fought against Soviet power; from 1922 onwards he joined the camp of the White émigrés.—22, 42, 43, 44

Plekhanov, Georgy Valentinovich
(1856-1918)—prominent figure in the Russian and international socialist movement, outstanding propagandist of Marxism; later he became a Menshevik.—15, 41, 42, 44

Prokopovich, Sergei Nikolayevich
(1871-1955)—bourgeois economist and publicist, member of the Central Committee of the Constitutional-Democratic Party; Minister of Food in the bourgeois Provisional Government (1917). After the October Socialist Revolution he fought against Soviet power; he was exiled from Russia for his anti-Soviet activities.—20

Shingaryov, Andrei Ivanovich
(1869-1918)—Cadet and member of the Cadet Central Committee from 1907. After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution was Minister of Agriculture in the first bourgeois Provisional Government and Minister of Finance in the coalition bourgeois Provisional Government.—22

Stolypin, Pyotr Arkadyevich
(1862-1911)—Chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1906 to 1911, a rabid reactionary. His name is associated with the suppression of the first Russian revolution of 1905-07 and the ensuing period of political reaction.—37, 38

Stroeve, Pyotr Berngardovich
(1870-1944)—bourgeois economist and publicist, outstanding representative of "legal Marxism".—19

Taureteli, Irakly Georgiyevich
(1882-1959)—one of the Menshevik leaders; during the First World War he adopted a Centrist position. After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and of the first Central Executive Committee of the Soviets; Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the bourgeois Provisional Government and after the July events in 1917 became Minister of the Interior; encouraged the hounding and persecution of the Bolsheviks. After the October Socialist Revolution he became one of the leaders of the counter-revolutionary Menshevik government of Georgia; later he emigrated.—5, 11, 19, 20, 28, 38, 37, 41, 48
REQUEST TO READERS

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В. И. Ленин
УДЕРЖАТ ЛИ БОЛЬШЕВИКИ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННУЮ ВЛАСТЬ?
На английском языке