Russia's enemies in Britain

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RUSSIA'S ENEMIES
in
BRITAIN

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ONE

WHEN SEBASTOPOL FELL

JUNE, 1942: Hitler’s threatened Spring offensive had not materialised, and on Midsummer Day, whilst the grim defence of Sebastopol continued and the world’s greatest tank battle raged around Kursk, there was still no sign that Hitler would ever again be able to launch a simultaneous offensive along the whole Russian front as he had done in 1941.

In Great Britain it seemed that whatever other differences might exist among the people, on one thing the nation was united, that was in admiration of their Soviet ally. Unbounded was the admiration expressed in Parliament and on the political platform, in the press and from the pulpit. But these public utterances, warm as they were, lagged far behind the feelings of the ordinary man and woman, as expressed in workshop or office, in the bus or in the pub. When the Prime Minister spoke of “the Russian Glory” it would seem that he had epitomised the feeling of the whole nation, from which not a single one would dissent. This was hardly surprising, for had not the achievements of the Soviet people, their leaders, and their armed forces been of epic dimensions? And to add to that, there was the fact that to the great majority of Britain’s people these Russian achievements had come as a bolt from the blue.

From the French alliance everything had been expected—it was proclaimed from every housetop that France was the mightiest military power in the world, that the Maginot Line represented the last word in modern warfare, and was an obstacle against which Hitler would crack his skull in vain. So much had been expected and so little had resulted. At the first on-
slaughters of the Panzer Divisions the French Army was rolled back, and France fell.

How different were the views held by many as to the military might and internal unity of the U.S.S.R.? Said “Student of War,” the armchair strategist of the Daily Telegraph, in that paper’s issue of June 16, six days only before Hitler’s invasion of Russia:

“I cannot believe that even Stalin has any confidence in his armed forces. Their showing against Finland was lamentable.” Their airplanes might damage Germany, but it is in the perfect discipline and liaison of all its parts that the German army is formidable; and, never characteristic of the Russian army, these are completely lacking at present.”

That or something like it, was the view expressed then by the greater part of the press, and by innumerable public men. “If Hitler attacks Russia, his Panzers will cut through the Red Army like a knife through butter,” was the formulation that passed from mouth to mouth. Not only was Russia’s military strength doubted, but widely held was the belief that the Soviet State was unstable, that it would fall to pieces as soon as it was attacked and that, especially in the Ukraine, whole hordes of Quislings would rise up to welcome Hitler as liberator.

If these were the pre-conceptions, they were greatly falsified; and if the disillusionment about France had led to pessimism, is there any wonder that the achievements and the spirit of the Soviet Union should result in a wave of enthusiasm such as has seldom been aroused in any nation by another one. As time went on, so this enthusiasm grew and became more surely based upon knowledge; and with this knowledge grew resentment against those who had so woefully misled the people in the past.

The Red Army proved to be the first to demonstrate the folly of regarding Hitler as “invincible.” As Stalin pointed out in his broadcast on July 3, 1941—the first public utterance of this great leader to be adequately reported in Britain: “History shows that there are no such things as invincible armies, neither that of Napoleon, nor of Kaiser Wilhelm, nor of Hitler.”

The Red Army showed that it could take it; what is more, it showed that it could also hand it out.
As for the solidarity of the Soviet people, the unity between the Government and the masses, and between the 200 different nationalities which composed its population—all this was demonstrated by the fact that in Russia alone of all the countries attacked by Hitler, no Fifth Column showed its head, no Quisling, no Laval. The Soviet Government had the combined guts and gumption to get rid of its Quislings before they had any opportunity to quizzle. None but a united nation could have carried through the scorched earth policy with the thoroughness with which the Soviet Union did it, or could have raised its industrial production far above pre-war level after losing territory containing a large proportion of the most important industrial undertakings of the country.

And so it is little wonder that by June, 1942, the whole nation seemed united in admiration of the U.S.S.R., united in pride that this great country was now their Ally in war and their Ally in peace for a minimum period of twenty years.

If anything was needed to ram home the justification for the pride felt in this alliance it was the heroism of the defenders of Sebastopol, whose deeds rose to epic heights. “Sebastopol has become a symbol for stoutheartedness,” said The Times’ leading article on July 3.

Said the Daily Express:

“Sebastopol falls at last. By all the laws of war, by all the measurements of armour, Sebastopol should have fallen weeks ago. But trench by trench, fort by fort, casemate by casemate, it has been defended by the Red Army. Into the fight for Sebastopol the Russians have put all the fury and white-hot patriotism of their defence of Russia. The glory of Sebastopol shines forth, even among the other glories of Russian arms.”

Said the Military Critic of the News Chronicle:

“If the German claim to have taken Sebastopol is confirmed, it marks the honourable conclusion of one of the most gallant defences in the records of warfare. The Russian blood which has flowed in the defence of the Crimean fortress will pulse again in the memory of new generations of men when they know the need of patriotism, resolution and self-sacrifice, as the Allies know this need today.”

And inside the giant epic of Sebastopol’s heroic defence for
over 200 days are contained stories of individual heroism unparalleled in modern warfare, such as the action of the defenders of the Fort Maxim Gorky who, with the upper stories in enemy hands, refused to evacuate the below-ground floors, refused to listen to German emissaries calling on them to surrender, but fought on to the last gasp of the last man.

Small wonder, then, that Britain should seem united with her Ally. And, indeed, this was no mere seeming. The great mass of the people, of all parties and creeds, were so united. But there was a handful whose hatred of all things Soviet had not melted in the glory of Russian achievement, whose hatred lacked the open expression to which it had been given full rein previously, and was made all the more insensate thereby. Yet in the month of June, while the Soviet Union was throwing everything that it had in wealth, materials, and, above all, man-power, into the struggle for human freedom, there were those in Britain who chose that moment to reset the train for their old anti-Soviet campaigns. Not that they had ever forgotten it; but the rumours of the impending Treaty made them desperate.

These men are self-avowed enemies of the Soviet Union; but every enemy of Russia is, under the circumstances of today, an enemy of Britain, too. Let us recall the words of the Prime Minister in his historic broadcast in the evening of June 22, 1941, the day on which the German onslaught on Russia was launched:

"Any man or any state who fights against Nazism will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe. . . . It follows therefore that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and to the Russian people. We shall appeal to all our friends and Allies in every part of the world to take the same course and pursue it as we shall, faithfully and steadfastly to the end."

A year's experience of Russia in the field had shown that aid to Russia was still more aid to Britain, but whilst in the factories men and women sweated night and day to build tanks and planes for the Russian front, whilst a steady flow of ships was passing between British and Russian ports with British and Russian seamen daily risking their lives to ensure the safe arrival of their precious cargoes, whilst Russian soldiers were dying in the inferno of Sebastopol, and British soldiers gave their lives in Libya, a handful of men, professing to be followers of the Prime Minister, were subterraneously circulating their poison, aiming at destroying
confidence in that Alliance which constituted not only the life-line of Britain, but of all men and women throughout the world who would be free.

Who were these enemies of the Soviet Union, these enemies of Britain, these men whose policy would destroy the life line of their country?

TWO

IMPERIAL POLICY GROUP

In 1933 there came into existence an organisation calling itself the Imperial Policy Group, sponsored by a number of parliamentarians of the extreme Right, with the late Sir Reginald Mitchell Banks, K.C., then Member of Parliament for Swindon, as its chairman. Apart from the fact that it combated socialism and collective security, not much was known of the group, whose work in the first year of its existence was largely of a very private character.


"About a year ago a number of persons—both in and out of Parliament, being seriously alarmed as to the drift of public opinion to the Left—set themselves to form a group whose object was to evolve a policy in terms which would capture the imagination of the electorate and to propagate it by every means in their power, in order to secure the return of a Government pledged to a sound home and Imperial policy."

Naturally, detestation of the Soviet Union was one of the things
which united this group of Diehards who, equally naturally, became the apologists in Britain for every reactionary and fascist movement throughout the world, the prime movers in appeasement, and, when Neville Chamberlain assumed the Premiership, the principal worshippers at his shrine.

Some of the original committee are dead, others have found alternative spheres of activity, but not one of them at any time in his public life has been associated with other than the most reactionary movements, both domestic and foreign.

Among the activities of the Group has been the publication of a monthly bulletin on world affairs. Until April this year, this bulletin was described as the publication of the Imperial Policy Group. Since April it has been described as published and edited by Kenneth de Courcy, supported by an Advisory Committee, of which the President is Lord Phillimore, and the other members are Lord Mansfield, Major A. R. Wise, M.P., Victor Raikes, M.P., and W. Nunn, M.P. All of these were original Committee members of the Group, and were described as its Committee up to April, 1942.

This was the group which in June, 1942, circulated to its subscribers the current issue of their Review of World Affairs, whose central theme was that the Anglo-Soviet alliance was a worthless reed for the British people to lean upon.

Mr. de Courcy advanced the argument that “dramatic though the summer’s events upon the Continent are no doubt destined to be, it is only for Germany and Russia that the stake there is supreme.” “Great efforts,” he went on, “have been made to induce the British public to believe that if Russia fails all will be lost. Happily for the world, Britain and America can, in fact, still look upon the continental military scene with some measure of detachment.”

This theory is expanded still further, as follows:—

“The same cannot be said of parts of Asia and Africa, where the stakes are as high as they could be, by force of elementary fact... The Russians may be driven back from the Volga and the Urals, losing contact with Trans-Caucasia in the south, Murmansk and Archangel in the North and Vladivostok in the East, without Britain and America being defeated.”

From which, if this document means anything at all, the only
possible conclusion to be drawn is, that in its author's opinion, the Anglo-Soviet Alliance is of but secondary importance. But, of course, such views cannot be propounded without some justification being attempted. This takes the form of what Mr. A. J. Cummings described in the News Chronicle of June 9 as "the gloomiest picture of the Russian position I have seen since the Germans began their invasion of the Soviets nearly a year ago."

The Review went on to provide justification for its thesis by a number of statements casting doubts upon the general position on the Russian front, upon man-power, upon the Russian industrial position and the Russian food position, which "above all threatens to prove decisive."

The interesting thing about these statements is that although they ran counter to all generally held opinion and the statements of every accredited newspaper correspondent on the spot, not an atom of proof was adduced for any one of them, but merely high-faluting assertions such as:—

"Despite all opinions to the contrary, Russia is now largely dependent upon outside supplies which can only reach her by three routes," all of which are described as "immediately threatened," and, according to Mr. de Courcy, it will be "miraculous if the northern and southern outlets are held." From which one gathers the inference that Russia is entirely dependent on outside supplies, and that these are almost certain to be entirely cut off.

Nothing could be further from the truth. At the end of a year of war, Russia was producing more planes, more tanks, more guns than ever in her history, and at no period did she receive more than a small proportion of her requirements from outside. Nevertheless, the Russians could and can answer Hitler gun for gun; but in tanks Hitler—with all Europe producing for him—has a considerable superiority in numbers. One is entitled to demand from Mr. de Courcy an answer to the question where he gets the "information" on which he purports to base his positive and defeatist statements. But, in comparison with Mr. de Courcy faced with that question, the oyster is a garrulous beast. According to this Review, Russian military strength and resources are exaggerated, and the infamous suggestion that Russian troops only fight because they are driven into battle is made in the following cunning manner:—
“Political detachments, we are told, are stationed behind the Russian lines with orders to take immediate disciplinary action against any soldiers or units showing the slightest slackness, inefficiency or wavering.”

To quote Mr. A. J. Cummings once more:—

“Since disciplinary action is taken in all armies in such circumstances, why does Mr. de Courcy insinuate such observations, save for the purpose of diminishing our confidence in our Ally, whose Army and people have already proved their courage and patriotism, and have done, and are doing, more to resist and destroy the principal enemy than any nation in the world?”

The same observation can be made, the same question asked, about other allegations, equally baseless, in this astounding document. For instance, what can one say of the statement that 150,000 Ukrainians are organised as a fighting army for Hitler, commanded by a certain Colonel Savtshenko? In case anybody should assume that this man is a common or garden Fifth Columnist, pains are taken to assure the reader that he and his friends have refused to be “German tools.” Presumably in the eyes of this de Courcy group, Savtshenko is a Ukrainian liberator.

Yet all the world knows that no Fifth Column has been formed on Soviet territory. It is true that in Berlin, and in other capitals, groups of White Guard Ukrainian émigrés have been held together for the past twenty years, for the purpose of one day destroying the U.S.S.R. It is true that reactionary groups in London have kept close contact with them during all this period. No doubt these men are now being expected to earn the retaining fees paid them for so long, but that they remain Ukrainians is an allegation that no true Ukrainians would admit, and that they number more than an odd thousand or so, all told, is something to which credence cannot be given.

The one ascertainable, indisputable fact is that no Soviet Ukrainians have gone over to the enemy, and the Ukrainians have vied with the Great Russians in the manner in which they have thrown everything into the battle for the destruction of the foe. As Mr. Anthony Eden said in his broadcast on January 4th this year: “In all the territory that Hitler has overrun there is not one Russian Quisling.” It comes by way of
anti-climax to read: "It would be very unwise to take too
rosy a view of the Russian position, or of the general
prospects..."

Only one concession does Mr. de Courcy make, that the
Russian soldier should not, for one reason and another, "be
underrated." The Russian soldier will not thank him for the
belated compliment. He is in no danger of being underrated
by anybody except those circles whose anti-sovietism has become
pathological, and blinded them both to reason and to decency.

This document, put out in June, 1942, was but one of a series
of similar activities by this and kindred groups, all of whom
were working to disrupt the most vital alliance that Britain has
ever made.

All of those gentlemen who constitute the committee that pro-
claimed itself as the Imperial Policy Group until April this year,
and now appear as the Committee running the Review of World
Affairs, are Members of Parliament, except one, Mr. Kenneth
de Courcy, of whom more anon.

The two Members of the House of Lords, Phillimore and
Mansfield, have a long record of activity in reactionary under-
takings. Lord Mansfield is President of the British Empire
Union, a member of the British Society of Monarchists, one
of the founders of the Imperial Policy Group and, in his spare
time, Chairman of the Edinburgh Royal Insurance Co.

Lord Phillimore became notorious from 1936 onwards as
the Chairman of the Friends of Nationalist Spain, the most
irresponsible propagandist of Franco in Great Britain. Lord
Phillimore was to the fore in the anti-Soviet campaign against the
U.S.S.R. at the time of Finland, when he was Chairman of the
Finland Committee. His social viewpoint can be gauged from
the fact that he is also Chairman of the Executive Council of the
Central Landowners' Association, and a Vice-President of
the Economic League, well known as anti-Labour.

The three Members of the House of Commons, Messrs.
Raikes, Wise and Nunn, have had similar activities. Of them,
Mr. Raikes has been the most vocal. Like his colleagues, he
was a strong supporter of the Munich policy, and as
“Cameronian” recently reminded the readers of Reynolds, he made a very considerable exhibition of himself in the House of Commons on August 2nd, 1939. On that day Mr. Chamberlain moved that, despite the crisis, the House of Commons should adjourn till October 3rd. Arthur Greenwood, backed by Churchill and others, proposed that the adjournment be limited to August 24th. This brought Mr. Raikes to his feet. He sneered at Churchill, suggesting that the dominating desire of Neville’s critics was to see the nation plunged into war. He was positive the country could leave peace safe in the hands of Halifax and Hitler for two months. The House’s holiday was brought to a conclusion on August 24th and war came a little more than a week later.

Another occasion on which Mr. Victor Raikes gave evidence of his extraordinary lack of political prescience was when, a week after Munich, in October, 1938, he exclaimed, apropos of Mr. Chamberlain: “There should be full appreciation of the fact that our leader will go down to history as the greatest European statesman of this or any other time.”

On May 20, 1939, Mr. Raikes launched an attack in the House of Commons on the negotiations that were then being opened with the U.S.S.R.

But the most interesting member of the Group is its one non-Parliamentarian, Mr. Kenneth de Courcy. He is the publicist of the Group, and, in the words of A. J. Cummings, he does the job “with consummate skill, and with an air of objectivity conveyed in such a manner as to suggest that he, or the not very impressive committee for whom presumably he speaks, has valuable sources of information not available to the common man.”

Not much is to be found about him in the standard reference books. All that can be said positively of him is that he comes from an Irish family, and that for some time he ran an office in Grosvenor Place, publishing propaganda for “monetary reform,” and that, being graded C3, he is exempted from military service.

It is a matter of interest, and perhaps some significance, that
a great many organisations of an extremely reactionary and near-fascist character have been sponsored by currency reformers.

A diligent study of the press in the early post-Hitler period shows that, along with other members of the Imperial Policy Group, de Courcy spent a great deal of time visiting various continental capitals. For instance, The Times of May 21st, 1936, reports as follows:—

"Representing the Imperial Policy Group of 50 members of both Houses of Parliament, Lord Mansfield, Mr. A. R. Wise and Mr. K. de Courcy are leaving on Tuesday for Warsaw. They will be received on arrival at Warsaw by officials of the Polish Foreign Office and will then proceed for a private exchange of views with the British Ambassador. They will subsequently visit Vienna."

A fortnight later, the trio again figured in The Times. Warsaw had been left behind, Vienna had not been reached, but Rome had:—

"Lord Mansfield and Messrs. Wise and de Courcy, members of the Imperial Policy Group, were yesterday received by Signor Mussolini in Rome."

The invaluable Times keeps one informed of other foreign trips made by Mr. de Courcy, but among the more interesting, is one on August 22nd, 1939, just prior to the outbreak of war, when it was announced that he had:—

"left Budapest where he saw the Hungarian Prime Minister and attended the St. Stephen's Day celebrations as a guest of the Hungarian Foreign Office. He was also in Rome last week. . . . Mr. de Courcy will return to London shortly."

Whether Mussolini was again visited on that occasion is not recorded. It is perfectly true that the personnel of this Committee is not very impressive, but the most cursory glance reveals that they have quite interesting connections in important circles. It is not every young Irishman touring abroad who can be received by the heads of States and Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries.

Mr. de Courcy is not a Member of Parliament. But he has aspirations in that direction. When one of the Brighton seats
fell vacant, Mr. de Courcy applied to the Brighton Conservative Association for consideration as a candidate. It says a lot for the Brighton Conservatives that although he did much canvassing and got the support of influential Members of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, he received no single vote from the members of the Association. One who is reputed to have a high opinion of Mr. de Courcy’s talents is Lord Caldecote, now Lord Chief Justice of England, a gentleman whose knowledge of law is no doubt tremendous, but whose political acumen has not infrequently been called in question.

Naturally, the publication of the sensational Review in June aroused a certain amount of interest. Its contents were first given publicity, in wider circles than was the author’s intention, by the Russia Today Society, which circulated all Members of Parliament on the matter, asking them to inquire from the Government what was its attitude in this matter. On the same day that this letter was received by every Member of Parliament, Mr. A. J. Cummings, in the columns of the News Chronicle, also raised the matter very sharply indeed.

The result was a number of questions in the House of Commons. On June 16th the following questions were put, and answered in the House by Mr. Osbert Peake, on behalf of the Home Secretary:—

“Sir H. Morris Jones asked the Home Secretary whether he intends taking any action against those responsible for a publication called Review of World Affairs, which in its June 1 issue, has an article calculated to cast doubt upon the loyalty and effectiveness of Russia as an ally?”

Mr. Peake: I have seen the publication referred to, and I share the view of my hon. Friend as to the objectionable nature of some of the references made in it to the significance of the Russian war effort in relation to the Allied cause and to internal conditions in Russia. On the other hand, it is the considered policy of His Majesty’s Government—and I think of this House—that the special powers conferred on the Executive in war time should not be used to interfere with expressions of opinion in insignificant publications of limited circulation, however objectionable and deplorable, provided they are not likely to have appreciable effect on the war effort.

Sir H. Morris Jones: Is not the whole of this article in its effect
if not in its purpose, calculated to endanger the Alliance in many
directions and also jeopardise victory? May I further ask whether
the Minister’s attention has been drawn to another aspect of this
publication, namely, that owing to the auspices under which it is
published it is regarded by many as an official or semi-official
publication? From that point of view will he not take some action?

Sir Thomas Moore: Does the Minister think it wise to give publicity
to this publication which otherwise would continue in its present
obscurity?

Mr. Peake: In reply to the first part of the Question put by the
hon. Member for Denbigh (Sir H. Morris Jones), I think we ought
to remember that the appeal of this publication is neither universal
nor obvious, and that it requires persons gifted with wholly excep-
tional powers of application and concentration to peruse it.

Mr. Shinwell: Was not the Daily Worker banned for much less?

Commander Locker-Lampson: Is this review subsidised by the
enemy?

Mr. Neil MacLean: Is it not the case that a very large number
of passages in this particular article were put forward not as expres-
sions of opinion but as statements of fact regarding incidents and
conditions in Russia, and does he not think it fit either to warn or
stop this publication in the same manner as he did in the case of the
Daily Worker and the Daily Mirror?

Mr. Peake: I am sure the producers of this publication will take
heed of the feelings of the House, and will have regard to the answer
I have given on behalf of the Home Secretary.

Mr. MacLean: Is the Minister aware that this has been going on
for more than a year?

Mr. Bosom: Is the Minister aware that the publication is sent
abroad, and can he say whether it was examined and passed by the
censor before it was sent abroad?

Mr. Peake: Yes, Sir. I believe that was, in fact, done, and the
Censor took exactly the same view of this publication as does the
Home Secretary.

Mr. MacLean: If the censor is passing material of this character
to go abroad into countries favourable to us, what other sort of stuff
is allowed to go out of this country?

A day later a further series of questions was put to the Minister
of Information by Neil MacLean. Mr. Brendan Bracken took very much the same line as his colleague of the Home Office:—

"I think," he said, "that the achievements of our ally Russia, can safely be left to speak for themselves, and I do not think I need set out to counteract the opinions of the few people who seek to belittle the Russian war effort."

To further questions, Mr. Bracken added: "I do not like this publication at all," but reiterated that he could take no action in the matter. So, while complete agreement was reached on the undesirability of this publication, a blank was drawn where official action was concerned.

THREE

INSIGNIFICANT PUBLICATION?

Mr. Peake gave it as the Home Office view that action against the Review of World Affairs was unnecessary, "however objectionable and deplorable" the publication, on the ground that it was "an insignificant publication of limited circulation."

"Limited" is a vague term. What its actual circulation is one does not know, but Mr. de Courcy claimed in January, 1940, that the figure had risen to 11,000, and that subscribers included "some of the highest military commanders at home and overseas, Embassies, Legations, etc." A year later he claimed that it had again gone up, by now to between 17-18,000 (including a separate American-Canadian edition published in Toronto). In September, 1941, it was claimed that 200 M.P.s were subscribers, and that the Review was read each month by 165,000 people.

On July 18th, 1942—a month after the condemnation of the Review in the House of Commons, Mr. de Courcy again circularised wealthy potential subscribers, stating:—

"This Review is now taken and read by many of our higher Commanders, Government Departments, Military Colleges, Universities, Libraries, and business houses, and over 200 Members of Parliament."
The present writer would be the last person in the world to accept Mr. de Courcy’s statements as conclusive evidence for anything on earth, but nevertheless independent investigation does show that this publication has a considerable circulation in officers’ messes, country houses, among the squirearchy and in similar circles; at least one instance has come to our notice where an Army officer reads the Review aloud to his men in the weekly Current Affairs classes. The Review has no working-class circulation, neither is it intended to have. Each issue consists of between eight and twelve large pages, and the price is 2s. 6d. per copy, or 24s. a year—in itself a sufficient deterrent to purchase by all except the opulent. Would-be subscribers (including newspapers and organisations) known to be of progressive views sometimes experience difficulty in getting access to it.

There is ample evidence to suggest that the Review and the Group do wield a not inconsiderable influence in quarters that are themselves influential in the conduct of Great Britain’s affairs. Mr. Peake’s plea that these folk should be allowed licence because of their insignificance reads curiously by contrast with the attitude taken by the Home Office over the Week, the privately circulated news-sheet edited by Claude Cockburn, which was suppressed at the same time as the Daily Worker. The toleration which is shown to the Review’s despatch abroad—“The Censor took exactly the same view of this publication as does the Home Secretary”—is also in striking contrast to the fact that the ban on the export of the monthly magazine Russia Today (devoted entirely to fostering good Anglo-Soviet relations) is still maintained. No copy can legally leave this country—not even to the U.S.S.R.

There can rarely (if ever) have been a group of public men putting themselves forward as propagandists of a realist policy who have been so consistently and terribly wrong on every single point as the members of the Imperial Policy Group. One cannot think of any single aspect of foreign affairs on which their policy, if it had been followed, would not have been disastrous. And, alas, only too often the policy which has been followed has been theirs. Fundamentally, their policy was that of appeasement, open and unashamed, and it was carried on long after the war had started.
As late as March, 1940, in the period of the so-called "phony war," Mr. de Courcy wrote: —

"It would be disastrous if the Allies were pressed by an ill-informed public opinion to premature military action in Western Europe."

That was eight months after war had begun, and the positive policy put forward was "non-intercourse with Germany (with whom we were at war) and Russia" (with whom we were not).

Since the outbreak of war, although the idea of appeasement died hard, the main emphasis of the Review was upon preventing any closer relations with the U.S.S.R.

In 1936, during the Italo-Abyssinian war, the Manchester Guardian referred to the Imperial Policy Group, as "the group which represents anti-sanctionist opinions in the Conservative Party." The Conservative Party, not unnaturally, disclaimed any official connection with such embarrassing allies, but one thing that is quite certain is that the Munichites who still hold leading positions in the Conservative Party still share the general outlook of the Group. Whatever the privately circulated views of these Members of Parliament may be, they are being compelled to cloak them considerably for public consumption in the present circumstances.

Take, for instance, Mr. W. Nunn, who misrepresents West Newcastle in the House of Commons. In May, one month before the publication of the most notorious issue of the Review, he was approached by the Russia Today Society in Newcastle for a contribution to their funds. The Newcastle friends of Russia were obviously not conversant with the views of their M.P. What is equally obvious is that Mr. Nunn was not at all desirous that they should become conversant with them, for he replied: —

"I am sorry that I cannot subscribe to the funds of your Society. I have been seriously hit by events in the Far East and have to limit drastically my expenditure."

Maybe that statement was true. It certainly provides an explanation of Mr. Nunn's support of the theory that so long as we hold on to Asia and Africa the outcome of the war in Europe is of secondary importance. But it certainly was dis-
ingenious of Mr. Nunn to suggest that had his finances been less straitened he would have gladly supported the activities of an organisation which had openly been fighting for years against all those things that were the central theme of the Group whose Vice-President was Mr. Nunn.

Then there is the case of Mr. Raikes, whose venom against the U.S.S.R. knows no bounds—"Soviet Russia is not some sort of democracy but simply an Asiatic tyranny with a slight veneer of Western culture"*—this gentleman found it convenient, in the light of the prevailing public sentiment, to speak at an Anglo-Soviet meeting held in Grays Park, in his constituency of S.E. Essex, on June 20th, 1942. Maybe he would justify himself as did another Member of Parliament, not openly associated with this Group, who in an "off the record" conversation with a journalist gave vent to some strong anti-Soviet sentiments. When asked how he reconciled this with equally laudatory remarks that he made on the platform in support of the Alliance, he replied: "Surely a man may have a private opinion as well as a public one!"

The Members of the Imperial Policy Group would seem to find no difficulty in maintaining two entirely opposing views on the U.S.S.R. under present circumstances, although they found one viewpoint on this question ample for their needs prior to June 22, 1941.

In pre-war days the Group advocated a policy of revision of the League of Nations Covenant to exclude the article on Sanctions and they demanded no "commitments in Europe except those which are strictly necessary for safeguarding our interests."

From its inception the Review combined its advocacy of appeasement with encouragement to Hitler to attack Russia. In December, 1938, for instance, it declared: "Germany will turn to the East... Russia will offer practically no resistance of a serious character." In the early months of 1939, during the abortive negotiations for an alliance with the U.S.S.R., the group did its utmost to sow distrust of Russia. When at one point M.

* Quoted in Guilty Men, by Cato, 1940. (Gollancz.)
Maisky publicly expressed confidence that the negotiations would prove successful, the Review suggested that he was playing an "unconventional role." "It would be interesting to know," it continued, "how he has so much confidential information" about "departmental secrets of the Foreign Office." (August, 1939.)

In July—determined to do all in its power to prevent an Anglo-Soviet agreement being reached, it had declared: "The effective strength of the Russian Air Force is not very considerable," while as to the Red Army "its power is very problematic."

But during all this time the references to Hitler and the Nazis were few and far between; never by any chance was more than a mild criticism voiced. As for Italy, the Group’s view on Mussolini was expressed by Mr. Victor Raikes, M.P., in his contribution to a symposium on peace aims, published shortly after Italy’s entry into the war:—

"If Signor Mussolini had continued to display those high qualities of statesmanship which he once seemed to possess, the Allied Powers would doubtless have been prepared to consider reasonable Italian claims in a most generous spirit; indeed the demand for the control of the port of Jibuti in the interests of the Abyssinian development might well be met with advantage both to Italy herself and to the wider cause of world appeasement."

Even more than his colleagues has Major Wise proclaimed his admiration for Mussolini. Fascist Italy and Great Britain, he declared, according to the Smethwick Telephone of May 14, 1938, are "two nations with absolutely identical ideas and ambitions." He added: "Let them think where they would have been with the Socialist Party in office, or indeed with Mr. Winston Churchill and his supporters in authority at Westminster." Today Major Wise is officially a supporter of Mr. Churchill, but a supporter who runs counter to his chief at every opportunity.

In this connection it is relevant to recall what the Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on January 29, 1942. "When Rudolf Hess flew over here some months ago he freely believed that he had only to gain access to certain circles in this country for what he described as a Churchill clique to be thrown out of power, and for a Government to be set up with which Hitler could negotiate a magnanimous peace." It seems not un-
natural that Hess and Hitler should have had this idea in view of such utterances as those of Major Wise, particularly when the latter also said in the House of Commons on July 27, 1938, that "the business of standing up to the dictators can be over done." Major Wise may have no love for Hitler, but he hates the Soviet Union still more, if his speech, quoted in the same Samethwick newspaper, of February 24, 1940, was accurately reported:

"The Soviets are a pack of murderers, the enemies of God and man; their armed force is worthless as an ally, even had they any intention of co-operating."

FOUR

LABOUR THE DANGER

The outbreak of war must have created a certain amount of embarrassment for the Imperial Policy Group. In August, 1939, they had ridiculed the possibility of war in Europe, but also claimed that "British aircraft production (was) now probably the highest in the world." In wartime something had to be done to explain the comparative absence of past criticism of the Nazis in a Review which had ranged the whole world in its columns and prided itself on being frank and outspoken. But Mr. de Courcy is nothing if not ingenious, and he wrote in September, 1939:

"Before the war commenced it was not desirable to say much about the Fuehrer and his regime, for all men of goodwill were striving for a peaceful settlement of European affairs. A full publication of some of the reports reaching London about Herr Hitler and his colleagues would not have been a contribution towards mutual understanding. Now the more said the better."

That was followed by a stream of such invective as had previously been reserved for the sections of the Review dealing with Russia, about the "lustful cruelty," the "drift towards paganism," "the cold hatred of Christianity," etc., of the Nazis.

The restraint previously shown by Mr. de Courcy in this respect was in marked contrast to the complete absence of
restraint, or even of common truthfulness, that marked the
Russian reports. Apparently "a peaceful settlement" with
Russia did not come high in the Group's aims. Naturally, the
Russo-German pact of non-aggression led to some wild specula-
tion on the part of de Courcy—"all the evidence before us
shows... the conclusion of a full and complete alliance
secretly negotiated" between the "two militarist powers."
During the first period of the war, as has already been shown,
Mr. de Courcy and his friends were full out against any military
activity being taken by this country. "The first phase of the
struggle must be won on the home front," he said, adding: "We
can so reorganise our whole economic system that from the
present emergency immense benefits... can be derived."

What constitute "benefits" in the mind of these people can be
seen from the following quotation from the Review of December,
1941:

"The Government should form District Production Committees
throughout the country... They should be composed of active,
practical industrialists... These men should be responsible for
treating production programmes... One of the greatest
dangers in the present situation is that labour knows that many
factories are not being used effectively. They criticise managements,
and this has dangerous political repercussions."

But the inactive period of the war in the west came to an end.
Mr. de Courcy and his friends seemed both perplexed and
disappointed. Hitler, "this strange man, has a genius for
evolving a masterly plan, and then casting it away for something
else." The fall of France brought the I.P.G. pundits out in their
true colours.

Already at the end of May, Weygand was being canvassed as
"a possible leader of the French Right," "always an opponent
of the evil political system which grew up after the Great War,"
"his authority grows daily, and the greater it becomes the better
for France." When the June issue of the Review was written,
France had not yet fallen, but Mr. de Courcy was preparing his
readers for what might happen. Pétain joined Weygand in the
the hierarchy of saviours of France:

"Marshal Pétain is, of course, the greatest national figure in France.
Far above politics in times like these, he is none the less of the

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Right. . . He represents everything that is best in France. . . . He has little in common with most of those who have controlled French politics during latter years. Those who love France rejoice to see these two soldiers charged with the destinies of a great country. They can count on the support of all the best elements in British political life.”

The fall of France, however, called for some modification of these ecstacies, but all the blame was put on the shoulders of the early Popular Front Governments. The report speaks of “the very representative character of the French (Pétain) Cabinet,” going on to declare that “in our considered opinion Pétain’s action represents the desire of the overwhelming majority of the French people.” Mr. de Courcy looks to Pétain for “the first step towards the re-birth of France.” In order the better to whitewash his friends, de Courcy attempts to blacken his enemies.

The issue of the Review quoted above states: “There is no single outstanding (French) Communist figure who is not well known to have been in German pay.” The shamelessness of this can be seen in the subsequent record of French Communists such as Gabriel Péri, Pierre Semard, etc.

At no time has the Review or any other of the Group’s committee come out openly for capitulation, but it was certainly difficult to see on what ground they wanted the war against Hitler continued in July, 1940, as apparently the triumph of fascism in France was welcomed as having been both inevitable and desirable.

In the autumn of 1940, the Review gave considerable prominence to reports of Hitler’s peace offensive. While stressing “Britain’s absolute and inflexible determination to continue the struggle until complete military victory,” it also stressed the unimportance of the future of the Continent to Britain’s vital interests, emphasised the increasing strain of the war at home, and inquired into the possibility that Hitler would show an intelligent generosity towards the defeated countries.

At intervals the Review has advocated the resumption of friendly relations with Vichy, and has deplored the recognition of De Gaulle (December, 1940); it has wondered how “the aggressive spirit can be rooted out of (Hitler’s) New Order without destroying what is valuable in that system.”
Regularly, the Review discoursed, prior to June, 1941, on the alleged aggressive designs of Russia upon Sweden, Persia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, India, China, etc., combining this with savage onslaughts on all in Britain suspected of hoping for better relations with the U.S.S.R.

In relation to the U.S.S.R., a certain crazy consistency shows itself as one traces a path through the web of Mr. de Courcy and his friends. All the other policies seem to be subordinate to, and dependent upon, relations with the U.S.S.R. To bedevil them at all costs seems to have been the underlying purpose.

Naturally, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war came to these gentry as a blow between the eyes, and Mr. de Courcy’s ingenuity was called into play again. How this situation was dealt with is indicated in the following excerpts from the July, 1941, issue of the Review:

"Everyone feels the deepest sympathy with the simple, non-political patriotic Russians in the trial. . . . The dispassionate historian, however, cannot forget the record of the Bolsheviks . . . though the liberal spectator will be generous enough to distinguish between the Russian masses and their Government."

A little further on, Mr. de Courcy proclaimed that "We must be devoutly thankful" for the Government’s statement that the Anglo-Russian alliance has "nothing more than military significance, for if we should ally ourselves with the Bolsheviks in our fight against the Nazis, we should be guilty of moral inconsistency for which we might suffer much. . . . If our case is one for religion and the ordered way against paganism and destructive revolution, then we must be scrupulous in our policy." This apologia ended:

"Apart from all other considerations we must remember that large numbers of the Russian people would regret if we moved an inch from our position, for . . . whatever the outcome of the war, M. Stalin will not survive it. Long ago he made his choice, ‘better to reign in Hell than to serve in Heaven.’ The great calamity in which Russia finds herself is largely due to his disastrous policy."

Month by month the Review went out of its way to undermine the confidence of its readers in the Soviet Union, to belittle its achievements, and to make propaganda against the establishment
of a Second Front. When the Red Army brought the first great German offensive to a standstill at Smolensk in August, the amiable suggestion of the Review was that it had been voluntarily stopped by the Germans in order first to cut off Leningrad and occupy the Ukraine.

In October, the Review insisted that "too much attention should not be paid to the scorched earth policy, stories of which have been greatly exaggerated... The conquered population (naturally of a low standard of education)... has more or less fallen in with the desires of the occupying power" and is bringing in the harvest; "the crops have not been destroyed."

The Russian successes in November were played down to the utmost: "Too much attention is being paid to minor details of favourable news here and there, the seizing of a few guns, the knocking out of a few tanks."

At the end of November the pauses in the German advance are explained as due to "German technical problems connected with the lengthening of communications," and "competent neutral observers" were quoted as being "in no doubt" that Moscow and Rostov will fall. When Rostov is retaken, the German attack on Moscow repulsed, and the Germans begin to retreat in December, the Review gives prominence to German reports of "deliberate withdrawals" and emphasises the "heavy price" paid by the Russians. When Russian successes continue in January, Mr. de Courcy still has his explanation—the Russians have brought reserves from Siberia and the Germans have "been fighting with much smaller forces than people think. ... Two-thirds of the strength of nearly every unit has been sent into the rear."

Stalin's speech in February occasions speculation as to whether he will make a separate peace with Germany once Russian soil is cleared.

In April the theme is alleged Russian intrigues with Japan—

"The Japanese Envoy in Russia... has easier access to the highest officials than any other foreign diplomat in Russia. He is treated with the utmost respect and his views are considered to be of the first importance."
Surprising though it may seem, Mr. de Courcy professes to think a Russian defeat undesirable—for two reasons:—(a) it would strengthen Hitler’s prestige, and (b) it “would desperately depress the British public which now thinks a Russian success a condition of victory.” As we have seen from the June issue, the Groupers do not concur with the latter view—they believe that Britain and America can “look upon the continental scene with some measure of detachment.” It is hard to fathom the real intentions of this Group of professed patriots who are now loud in acclaiming their desire to see Hitlerism destroyed.

But their intentions are of secondary importance; it is their actions that count. Whatever their intentions, their Review is precisely the kind of document which any Fifth Column in this country would be glad to sponsor. For if there is one thing which such a Fifth Column would wish today it is that confidence in the Anglo-Soviet Alliance should be weakened. And if that is not the purpose of this document then it has no discernible purpose.

**FIVE**

**MODEST VIOLETS**

As I have said before, the members of the Group are none too anxious for publicity outside their own limited circle, which they believe is big enough to give their propaganda a snowball effect, reaching all kinds of remote quarters whence the responsibility will not devolve back upon them.

Their June issue came in for a trouncing in press and Parliament; the members of the Group were kept busy explaining that they had been misrepresented by quotations torn from their context—although how such quotations could be made decent in any context is something they have not been able to explain.

And in the July issue there is a remarkable and unusual reticence concerning the Soviet Union in the columns of the Review. On June 11 Mr. Eden announced in the House of Commons that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty had been concluded. The occasion was one of most intense national rejoicing. Yet this Review, which ranges far and near for its allegedly exclusive
reports, does not seem to have heard of the Treaty concluded on its own doorstep; at any rate no mention is made of it in its usually voluble columns. Can it be that Mr. de Courcy’s ingenuity had failed him for once; that here was such a body-blown to the Group that their Editor could not trust himself to write with the decent reticence that the previous month’s onslaught called for. In August, too, the references are only of the most casual and passing character.

Early in July a meeting was held in Smethwick, the constituency of Major Wise, to put the facts before his constituents, and ask them whether in their opinion he could be considered a fit and proper person to represent them. The Major was asked to be present or to make any comments; he replied, in a letter to the Russia Today Society, with that same bashfulness that characterises all the Group members when there is any attempt to bring their activities into the open:—

“I fear that as I am a serving soldier, it would hardly be proper for me to indulge in public controversy at this time. In any case I am too busy taking part in the war to waste my time arguing about it with persons whose patriotic zeal is of very recent growth.”

The Major then gives it as his opinion that the Review constituted a “perfectly fair and objective statement.” The general tenor of the article, he added, “appears not to be inconsistent with what is in fact taking place.” Then comes the extraordinary assertion that “in any case most of the statements in it have appeared in the rest of the press in very much the same form.”

That statement is definitely untrue—no single responsible newspaper has published any statements remotely resembling even the lesser anti-Soviet slanders for which the Imperial Policy Group have been responsible. Enough has been written to give a broad idea of the policy of this Group and those who think with them.

Fundamentally reactionary, they are drawn to every manifestation of reaction in the world; even though in some of its localised aspects it may be unpalatable to them. Hence the strong belief in Mussolini, in Franco, and the way they pinned their hopes on Petain and Weygand in France. But a reactionary is necessarily opposed to progress, and consequently to the
U.S.S.R., which represents to them a new kind of State threatening all their vested interests, and challenging every one of their conceptions of life.

For Hitler the members of the Imperial Policy Group have never expressed the admiration that they have done for the other Fascist and near-Fascist rulers, but, as we pointed out above, they abstained from criticism, seeing in him and his regime a weapon for combating the hated Soviets. That policy is the natural complement of Munichism and appeasement, and, whatever their personal views on the Nazis, it brought them into close contact with other reactionaries who were as openly pro-Nazi as they themselves were pro-Franco. A great many of the Friends of National Spain (so-called) were to be found linked up with such notorious organisations as the Link and the Anglo-German Fellowship.

I have been at pains to show the consistent underlying policy of anti-Sovietism pursued by these people; that does not mean that all those who were anti-Soviet in the past are necessarily so today. Many have learned a great deal as a result of Soviet achievements in the war, whilst others have realised that whatever differences of theory and practice may separate the political and economic systems of the two countries, the interests of both demand close co-operation and an attempt at understanding, not only for the duration of the war, but also in the winning of the peace, and the re-building after the war.

But to some, hatred of the Soviet Union, and desire to encompass its destruction surpasses all other interests. And these in their blindness and criminal folly led the country down the path of destruction from Rome to Berlin, Munich and Berchtesgaden, and into the war, which an alliance with the U.S.S.R. prior to 1939 would have rendered impossible. These are the people that one sees lined up today in the anti-Churchill camp.

In the course of its career the Imperial Policy Group, and Mr. de Courcy, have relied a great deal on discreet lunches in luxury hotels (Claridge’s has been particularly favoured in this respect) as a means of spreading their doctrines. A list of the guests at such luncheon parties is of interest, as showing not who are members of the Group, but who the Group thought, at various times, was suitable material for influencing. It is
probable that many of those who were honoured by such invitations in the past would be horrified to be associated with the crude anti-Soviet propaganda put out today. But they can hardly blame Mr. de Courcy if he thought that such ardent supporters of the policy now summed up in one word—Munich—were likely grist for his mill.

Most of the people with whom the Group associated in their public and semi-public activities would no doubt describe themselves as Conservatives in politics; many of them are Catholic in religion. But that implies no general condemnation of either Conservatives or Catholics—the great majority of Conservatives and the great majority of Catholics abhor the policy and the tactics pursued by these men just as much as do their fellow citizens of other political and religious persuasions.

SIX

THE SPIRIT OF MUNICH

Before we glance at the luncheon associates of Mr. de Courcy, a moment can be profitably spent in observing the reactions of the Catholic Herald, which has consistently supported this Group in its activities.

This journal, unlike the Review, has a large circulation, but, like the Review, it never tires of sniping at our Soviet Allies. In its issue of June 26th, 1942, it went out of its way to defend de Courcy and Co. in the following terms:

"It is the height of stupidity—as well as pure fascism—to hurl insults at those patriots who may honestly believe—and have reason for believing—that Russia, for all the valour of her people, is neither a model for Britain nor an altogether safe wall to lean against."

There is nothing to suggest that any of "those patriots" believe those anti-Soviet slanders, and still less reason to believe that they have any reason for so doing.

The attitude of the Catholic Herald can be judged from the fact that, alone of all the public prints issued in this country,
it launched a virulent attack on the Anglo-Soviet Alliance, at the moment of its announcement, as follows:—

"Ourselves, our children and our children’s children may yet have to deplore a policy which turns its back upon the sources of Christian civilisation and culture in order to establish as the strongest power in the world, the immense territories, the teeming masses and the vast undeveloped wealth of a country as alien as possible from ourselves." (June 19, 1942.)

One is not surprised at the preliminary conclusion drawn in the same leading article, namely that:

"Treaties of the same kind between this country, Germany and Italy would have equally good, if not better, effects, had they been concluded with honest intention and in good time."

There breathes the spirit of Munich, the spirit which led Mr. Chamberlain to meet in conference, after Munich, with Hitler, Mussolini, and Daladier, with a view to setting up a Four-Power pact from which the Soviet Union was to be excluded, and which would of necessity evolve into an anti-Soviet combination.

The spirit shown by the Editor of the Catholic Herald on this occasion was typical of the general conduct of his paper. At the time of the great Allied Pageant at the Albert Hall, the Catholic Herald reported that the audience reserved its loudest cheers for Mr. Maisky, adding with supreme impertinence, "despite this Russophile outbreak, the tone of the gathering as a whole was in the best British tradition."

Credit must be given to the Editor of that paper, Mr. Michael de la Bedoyere, for one piece of ingenuity in which he excelled even the master, de Courcy, himself. In January, endeavouring to explain away the heroism of the Soviet armies battling in winter conditions, he did so in the following terms:—

"Subjection to a cruel authority and to the harsh conditions of a winter campaign are welcomed by the Russian soul as an ascetic congenial to its love of suffering."*

I expect you find it hard to believe that the Russian really likes

*Ascessis, a Greek word for asceticism.
hunger, hardship, wounds and freezing to death. I certainly do—and what's more, I flatly refuse to believe it, even if a hundred enemies of Russia tell me so.

As far back as January the Catholic Herald was worrying as to the possibilities of closer Anglo-Soviet co-operation, and expressing its fears in the following decisive terms:

"We read with the profoundest misgivings the inspired commentaries on Mr. Eden's secret visit to Moscow... We deplore the Government's spontaneous invitation to the present regime in Russia to be an equal and permanent partner in shaping the new world civilisation and justice. It contradicts the very essence of our moral cause."

It seems necessary to emphasise once again that the enemies of Russia are the enemies of Britain.

One gentleman whose views seem to have a considerable similarity to those of the Imperial Policy Group is Captain J. E. Crowder, M.P., Secretary of the 1922 Committee. Here again one finds the same emphasis on the relative unimportance of the European front, although the open declaration of hostility to Russia is lacking, maybe because the occasion was of a more public character, a meeting of his constituents at Finchley on June 13, with the press present. Said Captain Crowder:

"Of course, the outcome of the battles in the East between Russia and Germany are extremely important, but I do suggest that we should keep our sense of proportion. Europe is not for us, as it is for Germany, the truly supreme stake in all circumstances. I find it very difficult to agree that Allied intervention on the Continent at this stage, on a large scale, could turn the tide in the East."

Captain Crowder would appear to be one of the important people who not only reads the Review, but takes it seriously. Such an argument can produce only one conclusion, and Captain Crowder produces it: Popular agitation pressing for what was wrongly called a Second Front was "a dangerous example of intrusion by the uninformed on the expert."

He advances his armament in words practically identical with those of Mr. de Courcy. Said the latter: "dramatic though the summer's events upon the Continent are destined to be, it is only for Germany and Russia that the stake there is supreme." Said Captain Crowder: "Europe is not for us, as it is for Germany the truly supreme stake in all circumstances." It would be remarkable if the phrase "supreme stake" were purely coincidental.

And Captain Crowder, it must be remembered, is the Secretary of the 1922 Committee, the most influential organisation of Conservative back-benchers.

All this was coupled with complaints that the British and American missions in Russia are not allowed to get full information, with the same inference as that drawn by Mr. de Courcy, namely, that Russia could not be relied upon. As to "the intrusion of the uninformed upon the expert," Captain Crowder is definitely barking up the wrong tree. Complete agreement has been reached between the two Governments and their experts upon the necessity of creating a Second Front in Europe. It is the experts who have agreed upon the urgency of a Second Front, and the intrusion is Captain Crowder's.

The evidence accumulates that there are those who would like to pick a quarrel with the Soviet Union, and that they are not very particular on what pretext they do so, as the following incident which occurred in the spring of 1942 shows:—

A British Government Department received an unofficial request from a British Minister abroad, wanting to know whether Moscow broadcast regularly in the language of the country to which he is accredited, a country, incidentally, whose Government is known to have strong pro-Axis leanings. The curiosity of the Minister in this respect was due to the fact that he had heard that these broadcasts sometimes contained material likely to cause friction between Great Britain and the Government to which he was accredited. He was anxious to learn the hours at which such broadcasts took place, so that he could check up on them, hoping that out of such data he would be able to present the British Government with a case for making a protest to Moscow. Naturally there was indignation in the Government department concerned, where it was realised that the country in question was one where the anti-fascist sympathies of the people
alone prevented the Government from openly throwing in its lot with the Axis.

In such a case, appeasement of the Government would prove as fruitless as the whole appeasement policy of the days before the war, and of the early days of the war when successive attempts were made to appease Italy and Japan, with what scant success is now obvious.

**Seven**

**AN HOSPITABLE HOST**

Let us return to the luxurious and discreet atmosphere of Claridge’s in the heart of London’s West End, and see who were the people on whom Mr. de Courcy lavished his hospitality. In pre-war days foreign Ambassadors and Ministers were usually his guests of honour, and since the outbreak of war, such gentlemen have usually been included in the list of guests present. In each case I am indebted to *The Times* for the list of the favoured ones, “not all of whom are members of the Group.”

The largest party of the series was that given to Count Grandi, Mussolini’s Ambassador, back in May, 1938. No doubt the size of the party, some 68 men and women, reflected the esteem in which he and his Government were held by this group, at that time. After all, de Courcy himself had had the signal honour of being received in person in Rome by Mussolini on at least one occasion.

The list of guests included Lord Hailsham, then Lord Chancellor of England, and Sir Thomas Inskip, at present Lord Chief Justice, under the title of Lord Caldecote. A reference has been made earlier to Lord Caldecote’s intimacy with de Courcy.

At that time Lord Caldecote was Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, an appointment concerning which a famous statesman is alleged to have remarked in the smoke-room of the House of Commons: “There has been no similar appointment since the Roman Emperor Caligula made his horse a Consul.”

Another guest was Lord Rennell, a veteran of the Diplomatic
service whose views were strictly reactionary on all themes. There was the late Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.—one of the most devout admirers of Hitler in pre-war Britain. The same Mr. Crowder, of whom mention was made in the last chapter, was also a guest. In fact, he was not infrequently present at these luncheons in that capacity.

Mr. H. Channon, M.P., one of those fortunate enough to marry into the Guinness family, who was present, was also distinguished before the war for his interest in and sympathy with fascist movements abroad. "I personally am very pro-Franco, and I hope that he wins," said Mr. Channon, in March, 1937, according to the Southend Standard. After Channon, Hannon—Sir Patrick Hannon, M.P., a gentleman whose interests are so considerable that he occupies a whole column in Who's Who. A director of H.P. Sauce, and of Gordon Hotels Ltd., a leading figure in the Birmingham Small Arms Co. and of the Albion Bottle Co. Ltd., of Daimler's and Lea & Perrin's. Is it any wonder that Sir Patrick should also have been for many years the Chairman of the Industrial Group in the House of Commons and President of the National Union of Manufacturers? Sir Patrick was one of those who in pre-war days could always be relied upon to show an understanding sympathy for the problems of Germany and Italy, whom he regarded as bulwarks against Bolshevism, and in the Spanish war; he made his position clear in a letter to the Daily Mail in which he declared:—

"Whatever critical attitude the people of the British Empire may feel impelled to take up in relation to Germany and Italy, in the complexity of international affairs, it must be in its soul convinced that both these countries are acting with strict correctness in relation to Spain." *

He is one who has somewhat altered his views on Russia of late. Having recently stated that Russia will be a most important industrial country after the war, he naturally looks forward to doing business with her then.

Then there is Major (now Colonel) Ralph Rayner, M.P. for Totnes. There is little to record of him except that he was a

* Quoted from Tory M.P. by Simon Haxey (1939).
member of the Anglo-German Fellowship, and on July 12th 1941, after Russia had come into the war, he contributed a column to the Mid-Devon Advertiser in which he said:

"Now we find ourselves in the extraordinary situation of fighting with a country which has done all she can to sabotage our own war effort. . . A land where freedom is non-existent. It is indeed difficult to keep pace with the developments of this amazing war."

There is no evidence, either before or since, that the Major ever made any serious attempt to do so.

Commander Bower, M.P., is another who was present. He was prominent in such organisations as the Anglo-German Fellowship and the Friends of National Spain, and lately has been noticeable for his particularly outspoken attacks on the Prime Minister.

Commander Bower it was who distinguished himself in the House of Commons on July 21, 1942, during a debate on Regulation 18B by demanding the release of many of the fascists now interned in the Isle of Man, and whitewashing the Mosley brand of fascism.

Fascism in other countries, he declared in the face of all evidence, "has always come from the Left," concluding his speech by lumping Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin together as "the three principal totalitarian leaders."

Another name of interest among those who attended this luncheon, as well as other similar functions, is that of Lieut.-Col. J. H. Llewellyn, at present Minister of Aircraft Production.

Amongst the non-parliamentarians present at this luncheon, considerable interest attaches to the person of Sir Charles Petrie, one of Mussolini's most devoted pre-war adherents in this country, as well as an outstanding Chamberlain acolyte. Sir Charles Petrie wrote a book, Lords of the Inland Sea, in which the principal characteristics attributed to Mussolini are, "wide knowledge and strong moral purpose," and, "his extraordinary ability to dissociate in any question the important from the trivial." Further light on the political views of this gentleman are contained in the following enlightening paragraph from the same book:
“Great Britain is a monarchical and Conservative Power. As such, her statesmen must never forget that she stands in virtual and real, though perhaps unconscious alliance with every Government in the world that is based upon the Christian principles of Western civilisation.”

Notice the unconscious way in which the terms “monarchical and Conservative” are taken as synonymous with “Christian civilisation.” Notice also the wide interpretation given to the latter term; it is made to apply to Mussolini and, one suspects, Hitler was not meant to be excluded, as witness the following additional excerpts:—

“There is not the slightest evidence that Nationalist Spain would become a satellite of Germany and Italy, even were such a development objectionable from a British point of view, which in itself is open to question.”

Naturally, Sir Charles’ dislike of the U.S.S.R. is as immoderate as the warmth of his feelings for Mussolini.

One of the more frequent guests at Mr. de Courcy’s luncheon gatherings is the Archduke Robert of Austria, who was present at least twice last year at Claridge’s, in that capacity. The last occasion was on December 4th. Among the fellow-guests of this Hapsburg Prince were Viscount and Viscountess Camrose, proprietors of the Daily Telegraph.

As has been pointed out earlier, it was this paper’s “Student of War” who six days before Russia’s entry into the war was proclaiming the weakness of Russia and her inability to resist Hitler. For many years the newspapers of my Lord Camrose were notorious for their consistent anti-Soviet campaigning, in which they were unparalleled, except by the newspapers of his brother, Lord Kemsley, who runs the Sunday Times, the Daily Sketch and a horde of provincial journals.

A frequent contributor to the Daily Telegraph is Mr. W. R. Titterton, and he, in its issue of September 26, 1939, wrote as follows:—

“I conceive the possibility of a wide and fluid federation of the little Christian Powers of Central Europe, from Poland and Austria
in the west to Greece in the South, to guard our civilisation against its other ancient enemy, the barbarian of the eastern steppes."

It was the *Daily Telegraph*, too, which a month later—October 31, 1939*—quoted approvingly from the American commentator Dorothy Thompson to show that Chamberlain and Daladier, against the interests of Britain and France, had turned down the possibility of a Russian alliance. This is the quotation:

"Every military consideration favoured acceptance of the Russian terms by the Allies. But more than military considerations are at stake. For the object of this war is not to destroy Germany—which, with the aid of Russia might not have been difficult—but to save Germany for western civilisation against her own leadership."

Mr. Titterton and Miss Thompson link up very nicely with Sir Charles Petrie and the Hapsburg Archduke. Others present at a party where the conversation must have possessed more than usual interest included Mr. F. T. A. Ashton-Gwatkin and Mr. Philip Farrer. The latter, an ex-member of the Military Intelligence, has held several secretarial posts to members of the Government, and was a close political associate of the Marquess of Salisbury, leader of the British Diehards. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin’s career is more interesting. From Eton and Balliol he went into the Diplomatic Service, and is now Principal Establishment and Finance Officer at the Foreign Office. Among his diplomatic jobs he was attached to the suite of the Crown Prince of Japan on his visit to England, for which he was rewarded with the Japanese Order of the Sacred Treasure (4th Class), and was acting Counsellor of the British Embassy in Moscow in 1929. Most interesting of all, he was one of the advisers who accompanied the Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia in 1938.

On the 20th June, 1941, Mr. de Courcy gave another party at Claridges with, apart from the Archduke Robert, an entirely different assortment of guests. Major-General Sir John Kennedy was present. Little of his activities have been public, but he appears to enjoy the company of de Courcy, having been a guest at three out of the eight luncheon parties, of whose personnel I have a list before me. The Lithuanian Minister put in an appearance, which in view of the fact that the whole world was speculating on whether Hitler was about to invade Russia in the

next day or two must have given his views a certain importance. Of course, in reality there was no Lithuanian Minister functioning in London; that country having been incorporated in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ambassador alone represented its interests. But the Minister of the old regime, who had refused to accept the will of his people as expressed in the incorporation, had remained in London, where he lost no opportunity of injecting anti-Soviet poison into the ears of all who would listen.

This particular luncheon had a decidedly military air about it, for, in addition to General Kennedy, already mentioned, two Field-Marshal's honoured Mr. de Courcy with their presence—Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob and Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, to say nothing of one additional General, General Lee.

From the social point of view, that must have been the most distinguished luncheon party of all, for let us glance at the comparatively small list of guests, only nine in all. They included one Prince, two Foreign Ministers (even if one of them no longer represents anybody), two Field-Marshal's, and two Generals. Only two plain Misters were present, and the ladies were entirely absent. Maybe this party had political, as well as social, significance. One cannot help feeling that this was what its host intended.

Other guests listed in The Times as having attended various of Mr. de Courcy's convivial gatherings include the Turkish and Brazilian Ambassadors in September, 1941, along with two Anglican Church dignitaries, the Bishop of Southwark and the Dean of Westminster, on the same occasion. The Belgian Ambassador, with the Saudi Arabian Minister, was a guest in December, 1941, along with Mr. W. S. Morrison, M.P., whose past Cabinet rank makes him a person of some importance. Of interest, if not of importance, is the presence of Sir Hugh O'Neill, M.P., at this same gathering. He sits in the British Parliament for Antrim, and was the first Speaker of the Parliament of Ulster. From all of which one gathers that the circle of acquaintance of Mr. de Courcy is very wide, stretching into the upper reaches of the Army, the Diplomatic Service, the Church and Parliament. The names mentioned are only a small proportion of those listed in The Times as having attended these functions. And, no doubt, even the full list of The Times would do far less than justice to the real range of the de Courcy social contacts.
But it must not be forgotten that in addition to being an hospitable host, Mr. de Courcy is also a publicist, an energetic one at that, and that no gathering called together by such a man can be without its significance.

EIGHT

MEMBER FOR CHIPPENHAM

Major Victor Cazalet,* Member of Parliament for Chippenham, is one of the handful of people in Britain who have seen Russia at war from the inside. Early this year he went to Moscow as liaison officer with General Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister. On his return he addressed a large number of meetings at factories and elsewhere—for British-Soviet Committees, the Ministry of Information, etc.—and the general impression given by the Major was that he was a keen supporter of our Russian Ally.

But Major Cazalet is one of those who allows himself the luxury of two opinions—a public as well as a private opinion. For, in private, so it turned out, his opinion of the Soviet Union was not so enthusiastic as it appeared to be from his utterances on the public platform. Major Cazalet was so anxious to tell his friends what his real views were that he wrote a book about his visit to Russia. Not the ordinary, common or garden kind of book that you and I can buy on the railway bookstall, or take out of a library. This was a very special kind of book, a rare, limited edition, of which only some 300 copies were printed. Even this 300 could not be subscribed for, on the principle of first come first served. They were reserved for the Major’s personal friends and those whom he thought would make good use of them.

Like members of the Imperial Policy Group, the Major prefers to do his good deeds by stealth, and did not appear at all pleased, when, as a result of one copy travelling beyond the charmed circle

* Promoted in July, 1942, to the rank of Colonel in the Territorial Army.
of his friends, it attracted a considerable amount of newspaper attention.

The Major calls his book: *With Sikorski to Russia*, which, in view of the contents, I should very much resent if I were Sikorski, for this book is full of the most calculated anti-Soviet innuendos, combined with rumours and gossip, whose circulation is rendered no more justifiable by Cazalet's warning to his readers that his account is "probably full of inaccuracies."

Here is just one extract from it:—

"One of the foreign diplomats told me that in his opinion very little had altered in Russia. Before 1917 about four-five hundred thousand people lived really well; about the same number do so today. About twelve million enjoyed reasonable conditions of life. It might be about the same today. The rest just didn't count. The difference is, of course, that no one, rich or poor, lives as well as their counterparts lived before."

That is precisely the kind of guff that various colleagues in the Diplomatic Corps tried to put across the U.S.A. Ambassador, Joseph Davies, and which he recounts in his diary. Fortunately Ambassador Davies did not accept such statements at their face value, but investigated for himself and came to very different conclusions.

Other passages in the book were directed to suggesting that Sir Stafford Cripps was dissatisfied with his treatment in Russia, and so was General MacFarlane. Sir Stafford Cripps, on his return, would appear to have answered that part of the allegations by the glowing reports he gave of Soviet war organisation. And on his return General MacFarlane broadcast an enthusiastic account of Soviet morale as witnessed by himself.

Another astounding statement was:—

"During our visit we heard a good deal about the Beaverbrook mission and the various repercussions from it. We were given the impression that perhaps it was not in every way the overwhelming success that the papers in England had made it. No doubt from the point of view of sending a certain quantity of armaments to Russia it was quite satisfactory."

That is a curious paragraph. Cazalet admits that the Mission was a success from the point of view of getting armaments to
Russia—it certainly seems to have been one of the most successful of the war—but yet his informants gave him the impression that the Mission had failed. How could this be? Let the following paragraph explain:

"It seems, however, that an opportunity was missed of explaining to the Russians why we could not start an offensive in the West..."

And that accounts for a lot. Why did not Lord Beaverbrook explain our inability "to start an offensive in the West"? Because he did not believe in it, because he has constantly declared in the light of his knowledge, much fuller than that of Cazalet, that it was not only possible, but essential for the speedy attainment of victory and the fullest co-operation between the countries.

Interviewed in his suite at the Dorchester Hotel, Park Lane, of which he is a Director, Major Cazalet had difficulty in holding the reporters at bay. Naturally they were not satisfied with his excuse that the passages had been taken out of their context.

The Major admitted, however, that the Russians were doing magnificent things but—he feared it was at a price, to which he added: "I do not believe in dictatorship of any kind."

Judging by the reported interview in *News Review*, the Major by the time he had got out the last-quoted sentiment was beginning to let himself go, for here is the remainder of the interview as it appeared in that journal on May 28, 1942:

"The Russians were fighting for their Fatherland as they had done in the days when they did not own the land. Now that the land had been taken away from them individually and returned to them 'collectively' they did just the same.

"And in any case you could not possibly have anything remotely approaching the Soviet system here. Sacrifices from people like himself would be necessary in the post-war world, but taken all round our brand of democracy was the fairest, kindest to freedom of thought and speech.

"These were Major Cazalet's reasons for putting his Soviet diary into print. It was just too bad, it got misinterpreted."

Apparently, after having had his private view so indecently exposed, the Major felt that he could be a little bolder on the public
platform than hitherto. There is no noticeable diminution in the number of meetings that he addresses. But while he retains the little bits of praise for the gallantry of the Russian soldier, his criticisms as a whole begin to take shape in a form similar to those in his book.

Certain passages in this book appear to give a clue to his intentions. For instance, the following—

"Russia is winning the war for themselves and incidentally, for us. The Germans are being killed in vast numbers. If, after victory, we continue to live in England in even a relatively free condition of politics and economics, it will be because millions of so-called Communists have died to help us defeat the Germans. . . . No one has yet suggested how we should ever have won the war until Russia had been attacked by Germany. . . ."

"Very little really changes in Russia. It is just different people doing the same thing under different names. The Germans are being defeated by exactly the same enemies as were Charles XII of Sweden and Napoleon—the size of Russia, the coldness of the Russian winter, and the inherent bravery of her people. In Russia the individual simply doesn't count. There are always hundreds, and thousands, and millions more."

Notice the frank admission at the beginning, and the difficulty with which the Major is confronted. It would never do to admit that it was these Communists who had saved the world, therefore the whole issue must be side-tracked. General Colossus, General Winter, and General Populus. Give no credit for the skill of the Russian leadership, for the forethought which had produced organisation where previously there was chaos. A few pages later, the Major carries his argument a stage further:—

"My own view is that the only way to put over the Russian cause today and to check the hysteria which seems to pervade large sections of the community is along the following lines. The Russians are different from us. . . . If you regard Russia as the most westerly of oriental countries, and not the most easterly of European, you will not be so surprised, shocked or confused by what happens there."

What does Major Cazalet mean by the "Hysteria which seems to pervade large sections of the community"? Precisely the same as his friend Harold Nicolson, M.P., meant when he wrote in the
Spectator of May 22, 1942, that he was “disconcerted” at the realisation “with what depths of emotion the men and women of this country centre their hopes upon the Russian front.”

So consequently this hysteria has to be countered; a semi colour-barrier is erected by talk of the “most western orientals” a pure and simple appeal to prejudice. Never admit anything about the regime, says the Major in effect, and such good things as you cannot deny attribute to age-long Russian peculiarities.

One or two other things are of interest in this Diary. One is the assertion that every European and American diplomat in Russia is “bored, utterly bored, longing to get out, and hating the regime. They know nothing, they see nothing, they never speak to a Russian.” Yet it is from the same diplomats that Major Cazalet accepts accounts and estimates of what is taking place in that country.

Ambassador Davies provides the answer to all this nonsense. He found bored diplomats, who hated the regime, willing to pump him full of their propaganda, but he went to see for himself, and drew different conclusions. And because he went to see for himself, he was welcomed with open arms by the Russians and given facilities for going everywhere such as turned his contemporary diplomats green with envy.

Who is this Cazalet? We know that the greater part of the Cazalet family fortune was lost in the Russian Revolution. It must be said that he did his best to defend it, for he was with Kolchak, on the British staff in Siberia in 1918-19, fighting against the Soviets.

He is a Director of the romantically named Hudson’s Bay Co., and of the Dorchester Hotel Ltd. He started his appeasement career early. In 1934 he was advocating the pampering of Japan. In the House of Commons he stated that Japan must be treated with great courtesy, and that we must not attempt to bully her or dictate to her.

Later in the same year he advocated an alliance with France and Italy, as a result of which we could say to Hitler Germany: We quite realise in this country that you have certain grievances and you have the right to certain arms.
A few years later he expressed his disbelief in the theory that German rearmament was directed against Britain. In 1935 Cazalet surprised many people by advocating a loan to Russia; but it quickly became apparent that his oft-expressed anti-Soviet views had not changed, witness the following letter to the *Daily Telegraph* in explanation of his attitude on April 20th, 1935; he wrote:—

“As one who had consistently opposed both political and-economic rapprochement with the Soviet Government,”

but he nevertheless advocated the loan to Russia so that British creditors might receive some measure of compensation . . . “no compensation will ever be made by the Russians if we adopt a negative policy.”

During the Abyssinian campaign, Cazalet gave it as his opinion in the House of Commons that: “Practically no nation has any national or individual grievance against Italy.”

During the war in Spain there was no more ardent devotee of General Franco than Cazalet. In a letter to *The Times* on February 4, 1937, he declared that: “Everybody in Spain loves Franco,” adding that there were no atrocities committed by the Franco men, but that terrible things had been done by the “Reds.” As a last word, he added: “German and Italian troops are conspicuous by their absence.”

In 1937 he was touting for cash on behalf of Franco propaganda.

In 1938, speaking to the 1912 Club, on March 9, he declared: “General Franco’s movement in Spain is controlled neither by Nazi ideology nor fascist principles, but is based on Christian ideas and love of order, toleration and justice.” Other eulogies bestowed on Franco by him include: “A progressive in the best sense of the word. The leader of our cause to-day, quiet, courteous and gentle, the man who, if I may say so, is working to lead a great people to happiness and better times.” During the Spanish War, the Labour Party in his constituency, Chippenham, passed a resolution in which they condemned his utterances as being “in cynical disregard of the need for defending democracy.”

At the beginning of June, 1942, Major Cazalet’s friends were
declaring, according to the *New Statesman*, that he had a minimum of 62 M.P.’s supporting his policy and that this group had sent a deputation of 18 M.P.’s to the Foreign Office.

In the same issue of the *New Statesman* it was reported that the Cazalet group counts among its supporters people ranging from Mr. Erskine Hill, M.P. (of the 1922 Committee) to Mr. Frederick Voigt (Editor of the *Nineteenth Century and After*), and from Lord Kensley to Harold Nicholson, M.P.

Outside the direct scope of this booklet are the activities of the Vansittart group, but there seem to be certain contacts between them and the prime anti-Soviet movers. Of this tendency Mr. Voigt provides an interesting example which will be examined later. These gentlemen centre their propaganda around the Baltic Soviet Republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These countries applied for admission to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1940, and the evidence that as a result of the acceptance they were making tremendous strides, industrially, culturally and in every way until Hitler’s invasion of Russia is overwhelming.

There is no reason to believe—and every reason to disbelieve—that the Baltic peoples would ever voluntarily revert to the bad old days. Yet the anti-Soviet Vansittartites pretend to treat the question as purely one of Soviet security, and argue thus:

"If the German danger is eliminated for ever then the Russian claim to the Baltic States on the ground of security loses its force."

In the remaining pages we shall endeavour to examine some of the miscellaneous anti-Soviet activities of the past year, from which it is only possible to deduce that however varied the angle of approach of the persons concerned, there is some common source of inspiration.

**NINE**

**ANTI-SOVIET ODDMENTS**

Sufficient has surely been written to demonstrate that there are in Britain today—we are not speaking of direct Nazi agents—many people with influential connections (sometimes even influential
people (themselves) who much as they may dislike the prospect of a Nazi victory in the abstract, fear still more the effect of a victorious Soviet Union. These are the people to whom even a Nazi victory would appear the lesser evil to a socialist Europe. They are the people who protest at what they call “the Left-wing domination” of the B.B.C., who hate appeals going over the air to the people of Europe to revolt against their oppressors. Captain Crowder, M.P., in his speech already quoted, wherein he echoed the line of the Imperial Policy Group about the European front, also expressed himself as “tired of the Left-wing propaganda emanating from the B.B.C.”

But, in addition to these, there are others who have, because of their long-standing prejudices, allowed themselves to become the unconscious tools of the active anti-Soviet propagandists. A vigorous whispering campaign has been carried on to suggest that the U.S.S.R. will make a separate peace with Hitler, despite the pledge of the Soviet Government contained in Article 2 of the Treaty with Great Britain:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake . . . not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other state associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.”

In this category comes Mr. James Walker, M.P., of the British Iron, Steel and Kindred Trades’ Association, who, speaking for the Executive at the Labour Party Conference debate on the Daily Worker, suggested that the ban on that paper must be continued because it might revert to its former policy “if things change in the East.” In the public spreading of this slanderous insinuation, Mr. Walker has not been alone. Mr. Harold Nicolson, M.P.—no longer Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Information, but still a Governor of the B.B.C.—wrote in the Spectator of May 22, 1942:

“We must remember that Hitler (who has small regard for the property of others) is in a position, if necessary, to offer rich rewards in return for an Eastern peace. He could promise to give her (Russia) if he wins, not the Straits only, but the Persian Gulf and the whole Empire of India. What counter-offer could the United Nations oppose to such extreme generosity.”
He went on to argue from this, as the *Evening Standard* pointed out in its issue of May 29, 1942, that "we should not put all our eggs in the Russian basket."

Commenting on this article of Mr. Nicolson's, which it very moderately described as "singularly ill-judged," the *New Statesman* of June 13, 1942, said that if Nicolson really thought the Soviet Union was open to bribes from Hitler, "the odd thing was that his deduction from this was not, as one would have expected, that we should take the necessary action to assure Stalin of the honesty of our alliance."

One hears reports, from sources which make it difficult to discount them, of similar innuendos being spread in private conversations, and at semi-private gatherings, by responsible public men—some of them leading Labour men and trade union officials. All of which goes to show that the whispering campaigns spread by even the least influential enemies of the Soviet Union have a habit of spreading far beyond the immediate circle of their originators.

Another gentleman who does not appear by his utterances to be helping the Anglo-Soviet Alliance very much is Lord Elton. This individual is one of those ennobled when the National Government was formed by Ramsay MacDonald, whose henchman he was, and whom he followed out of the Labour Party, to edit the monthly magazine of that queer assortment of political misfits which called itself the "National Labour Group."

In the *Evening Standard* of May 19, 1942, it was reported that Lord Elton had been speaking to a gathering of notabilities, and that his general theme had been the necessity for "regeneration through suffering."

His Lordship's references to Russia appeared to annoy the *Standard* man as much as they will annoy the readers of this booklet. He stated that the Russians must learn that "no permanently healthy civilisation can be founded on the secret police," adding that we went to war against an omnipotent and pagan state, and approximately these same characteristics were to be found in Russia.

I have had previous occasion to mention the activities of Mr. Michael de la Bedoyere, the Editor of the *Catholic Herald*, as
one of those who have consistently sought every opportunity to attack the Soviet Union. Such people exist also, unfortunately, in the Church of England, although, one of the most heartening features of the present situation is the magnificent way in which leading Churchmen have rallied to the Alliance and have been in the forefront of the struggle for British-Soviet unity. One has only to mention such names as the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Dean of Canterbury (than whom no man has done more to cement friendship between the two peoples) and the Bishop of Chelmsford, to realise how true this is. And, in addition, throughout the length and breadth of Britain, local Ministers of all denominations have taken a leading part in the work of Anglo-Soviet Committees, the Russia Today Society, and similar organisations.

But amongst those who have not been conspicuous for their helpfulness in this connection is the Right Reverend Arthur Caley Headlam, Bishop of Gloucester. Until the entry of Russia into the war, the Bishop was an open enemy of the Soviet Union. The changed situation placed him in somewhat of a dilemma. In the early days of the war, he said little about Britain’s new Ally. He must have found himself at a loss for a critical basis for his dislike in face of the Russian achievements and the unprecedented solidarity shown by the Soviet peoples.

But, by March, 1942, Bishop Headlam had provided himself with a theory, namely, that the Soviet Union is an authoritative state, centralised, destructive of hierarchy, eminently fitted for war, but a tyranny in times of peace. That was his description of the Soviet Union in his Diocesan Magazine. This new formula was provided for him by no less a person than Mr. Victor Gollancz, and appeared in the form of an appreciation of a book by the latter, which occupied more than a page of the Magazine. Mr. Gollancz’s book, says the Bishop, proves that Russia has not produced a classless society; has not succeeded in raising the standard of life of the people; and that there is no liberty in Russia.

Mr. Gollancz and the Bishop of Gloucester make strange allies, because in the days when the Left Book Club was a power in the land it had no more vigorous opponent than Dr. Headlam. Now that Mr. Gollancz appears to him as an apostle of anti-Sovietism the Bishop is prepared to take him by the hand as a man and a brother.
It might be pointed out to the Bishop that in the U.S.S.R. it is a criminal offence for one human being to exploit another; he who attempts to buy in the cheapest market and to sell in the dearest goes to gaol; in the Soviet Union there is no exploiting class, and consequently no exploited class. Therefore Soviet Russia has succeeded in producing a classless society. In addition, the Soviet Union has succeeded in raising the standard of living of its people, as well as in giving them economic security. It is the only country which has been able to produce more guns as well as more butter; it has been able to do this because its planned economy has meant an enormous increase in its aggregate production. No doubt the standard would have risen even more rapidly if it had not been for the necessity of arming the people for the defence of their country against aggression, but that is an entirely separate question.

As for liberty in Russia; no one pretends that complete and absolute liberty exists there or in any other country in the world; although, when asked at a London meeting on July 15, 1942, what was his attitude to the policy of the Imperial Policy Group, Major Cazalet, M.P., declared that "I believe in the right of any man to write and publish exactly what he thinks; after all, that is one of the things for which we are fighting Hitler."

Even the Major was exaggerating his own feelings in the matter, else he would have been one of the small handful of M.P.s who voted against the suppression of the Daily Worker, and opposed the threats to the Daily Mirror. On the contrary, he supported these limitations on freedom of expression.

But, although there is not absolute freedom in Russia, there is widespread liberty for the ordinary man in the street, which the Russians themselves regard as being greater than that existing anywhere else in the world. It is because they believe in the liberty, prosperity and happiness which the Soviet system has guaranteed them that the Soviet peoples have shown such unity of purpose as has amazed the world.

It will take more than the united efforts of the Bishop of Gloucester and Mr. Victor Gollancz to give life to the old lie which denied the reality of Soviet freedom, which is as unchallengeable as the Russian Glory itself.

Another Anglican dignitary who continues to traduce the Soviet Union is the Rt. Rev. George Kennedy Allen Bell, D.D., Bishop of Chichester. In his Diocesan Gazette for July he
indicts our Russian ally by means of quotations alleged to be made by anonymous Swedes. Here is a typical quotation:

"They (the Swedes) could not understand sympathy with the Soviet regime as such, nor how Lord Lang, as Archbishop of Canterbury, could have called English people to pray for the Soviet forces."

His utterances have brought forth a storm of protest in the columns of the *West Sussex Gazette*, in the issue of which for July 23, 1942, many recalled previous occasions when he has, no doubt unconsciously, acted as Hitler's echo in Sussex. As one writer puts it:

"The Bishop is incorrigible and the limelight irresistible."

Before we leave the clerical traducers of Russia, a word ought to be said about a certain Dr. Zernov, of the Russian Church in London, who is touring the country speaking on Russia. When he spoke at Redhill, Surrey, in March, 1942, the *Surrey Mirror* commented:

"Many members of the audience were a little disconcerted, and possibly disappointed by what they heard. Dr. Zernov did not expatiate on the phenomenal social and economic changes wrought in his country since the Revolution, nor, except casually, in reply to a question, did he dwell on its epic resistance to Hitler's invading hordes."

Instead, Dr. Zernov devoted himself to what he called "the irreconcilable conflict between Communism and Christianity, inspired by the German Jew, Karl Marx." Naturally, with this theme to help him, every conceivable slander was resurrected. Yet this man is lecturing up and down the country, and no doubt impressing the gullible, without let or hindrance; in the Soviet Union itself, the clergy and the religious community have shown themselves to be as solidly behind the Government as all other sections of the people.

J. Hampden Jackson is the name of yet another anti-Soviet lecturer who, under the guise of objectivity, is spreading anti-Soviet propaganda. This man poses as an expert on the Baltic countries of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and devotes himself to the interests of the old gang of reactionaries who were cleared out when the peoples of those countries took the position that their future welfare could best be secured by incorporation into the U.S.S.R. This process is picturesquely referred to by Mr. Jackson as "the rape of the Baltic States." The best answer to
this sort of propaganda is to be found in the way in which the peoples of these territories have rallied to the Soviet cause against the German invader. For some curious reason Mr. Jackson appears to have open access to the platform of the Workers’ Educational Association.

A similar sort of propaganda is carried on by Sir Paul Dukes, one-time Secret Service agent in Russia, although he reaches a somewhat different kind of audience. Early in the war he was a Ministry of Information speaker, but latterly his activities appear to have been limited to such bodies as the Historical Societies of small towns, with audiences composed of the local gentry.

This latter kind of propagandist still makes play with the Russo-Finnish campaign of 1939-40, in which connection the position of Mr. Geoffrey Cox is of interest.

Geoffrey Cox is one of Britain’s ablest reporters. After sterling work in reporting the Spanish War, he covered the campaign in Finland. His despatches were uniformly unfriendly to the U.S.S.R. This position he modifies somewhat in a book he published just prior to the invasion of Russia. But on March 21, 1942, he wrote to the New Statesman a letter which is of great significance. In this letter he said:—

"The Russo-Finnish war in 1939-40 is old history now, but there is always the danger that the feelings it aroused may be dragged out of the cupboard to disturb relations between Britain and Russia, particularly after the present war. I think, therefore, that those of us who saw the 1939 campaign at first-hand should re-examine in the light of present events the view we expressed on it.

"My view which I expressed in The Red Army Moves, was that the Russians were right in their aims but wrong morally and technically in their methods. They should not have resorted to war, I believed, if they could have got by the threat of war, as appeared possible at that time, Hango and a substantial part of the Karelian Isthmus.

"I see now that that view is unrealistic. I have changed my opinion not because the Russians are now fighting alongside us, but because my own ideas of the realities of war have been modified considerably by a year of experience as a soldier in Crete and Libya.

"I can see now that the primary thing in war is not to hold this position or that, but to destroy the enemy’s forces. The Russians realised this and set out not just to get the Mannerheim Line, but to smash the Finnish Army. For that Army, though small, was highly efficient, and the pro-Nazi character of its General Staff meant that it would always be brought in on Hitler’s side in any war with
Russia. Ruthlessly, but rightly, the Russians determined to break that army while they had the chance to tackle it in their own time.

One need not necessarily endorse everything Geoffrey Cox says, but it is of interest as showing how a somewhat longer perspective, aided by later experience of military campaigns and Nazi methods, may radically alter views.

Only one point needs to be emphasised: “the pro-Nazi character of its General Staff.” Yet it was the members of this same General Staff, Mannerheim, Wallenius, etc., who were being held out to the British people by our Men of Munich as their beau ideal of democracy; and it was on their behalf that we sent more planes and guns to Finland than we were able to muster for France at the hour of the German advance.

TEN

LADY ASTOR LEARNS A LESSON

“There is more trouble in the Polish Corridors. I mean, of course, the corridors at Malet Street, Stratton Street, and similar official centres where certain Polish propagandists assemble to denounce the suggestion that having obtained paper from the British Government, and publication licences from the British Government, they should for an instant refrain from conducting an agitation of the most dangerous kind against the unity of the Allies and the Soviet Union,” so said the New Statesman of May 16 this year.

The article went on to state that certain officials of the Polish Government had themselves complained to him that “some of the material, the publication of which was facilitated by the British Government,” could hardly be more damaging if it were the work of Nazi agents.

A leading Pole, by name Maskiewicz, has written a great deal in some of these Polish language papers, not only attacking the Soviet Union, but also the Czechs, in the following terms:

“Of what value is an alliance if one of the Allies fails to defend even the diplomatic frontiers of another Ally? The Czechs do not defend us from the predatory Soviet claims, but instead coo about the future union of Czechoslovakia and Poland.” (Quoted from the New Statesman, May 16, 1942.)
M. Stronski, the Polish Minister of Information, has declared in *Dziennik Polski*, that Maskiewicz's writings are “a black spot in the history of the Polish press.”

Then there is a Polish officer called Neugebauer who has written a book entitled *The Battle for Poland*, published in English by the Kolin Publishing Company in Holborn, which contains the most violent anti-Soviet tirades which I have come across since June, 1941.

The majority of Poles in this country, both military and civilian, are profoundly grateful that General Sikorski has been able to come to a warm understanding with the Soviet Government, and breathe a sigh of relief that the bad old days of Colonel Beck and anti-Soviet intrigues are now past. But, in their ranks, as in our own, there is the minority whose irresponsible actions aim at destroying all the good work done by others in breaking down old barriers.

Towards the end of last year similar signs of anti-Soviet hostility showed themselves in the Dutch Cabinet, where two Ministers—Dr. Van Steenberghe, Minister of Economics, and Mr. Welter, Colonial Minister—protested against moves to improve relations between their country and the U.S.S.R. This was scotched by prompt action on the part of the Dutch Prime Minister, Dr. Gerbrandy, who left the Cabinet Room to telephone Queen Wilhelmina. Within ten minutes he was back, and two minutes later the resignation of the two Ministers was in his pocket.

In close touch with the anti-Soviet elements among the refugees from occupied Europe is Mr. F. A. Voigt, Editor of the *Nineteenth Century and After*, and one-time foreign expert of the *Manchester Guardian*. He represents the “Liberal wing” of the Vansittartites, and in one recent article in his Review he came to the following conclusions:

"Russia is not, and never has been, a democracy—and perhaps never will be."

"Whether Russia can be part of any European system must remain an open question. Her future is as uncertain as that of any country in Europe."

"In Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, in Estonia and Lithuania, the Russians deported of executed writers, lawyers, politicians, and almost all who played a prominent part in the national life. . . . Communists in the regions occupied by the Germans were, for the most part, executed."
"It is particularly important that Great Britain make no concessions, that are not essential to victory over the Germans, in Eastern Europe. That is true even of the three Baltic States. ... No one can tell what frontiers, even of the smallest and seemingly weaker states, will be in the interests of England, and most favourable to the balance of power, because the conditions of Eastern Europe at the end of the war is unpredictable."

Like the gentlemen of the Imperial Policy Group, he views with considerable friendliness the men of Vichy, particularly Pétain, as the following quotation from the article cited above shows:

The time perhaps will come when it will be seen that Marshal Pétain will have played a decisive part in promoting the final defeat of the Germans.

Once again it will be seen how, whatever form anti-Soviet propaganda may take, somewhere or other it contacts the propaganda of Mr. De Courcy and his friends.

So far there has been no mention in these pages of Lady Astor, Member of Parliament for the Sutton Division of Plymouth. For the first year of the Russian war even her garrulity was quelled—in public at any rate. But on August 1, 1942, she could keep silence no longer, and speaking at Southport, she indulged in a tirade against Russia, in the following terms:

"After the Battle of Britain it was America who came to our aid; the Russians at that time were allies of Germany, and it is only now they are facing the Germans that they have come into the fight. To hear people talk you would think that they came to us in our own dire need. Nothing of the kind. It was America and don't you forget it."

No sane person wishes to make invidious comparisons between one ally and another, but the statement that Russia was an ally of Hitler's in the early part of the war cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. The Non-Aggression Pact (a very different thing from an alliance) was entered into after the policy of Munich, whose spiritual home in this country was Cliveden (the country seat of the Astors), had rendered the development of a system of collective security on the Continent impossible. And the U.S.A., also, only entered the war after it had been attacked.

In case anyone should be prepared to give Lady Astor the benefit of the doubt and to believe that she spoke in the heat of the moment, it should be recalled that in the News Chronicle of the following day appeared an interview with her, in which she underlined her earlier statement:
“Russia, Russia, Russia,” she said, “that’s all we hear in the newspapers, all we hear in the broadcasts.”

In both the News Chronicle and the Daily Herald she was soundly castigated editorially. But the sternest rebuke to her came from her home country, America, in the Chicago Sun, which influential paper commented in its issue of August 5:

“...The high priestess of the Cliveden Set dashes iced water on British-American-Russian solidarity with her latest statement, which shows little progress in the Astor thought pattern since the invasion of Poland destroyed the appeasement policy which the Cliveden Set symbolised. The Second Front carried through will prevent the crushing of the Russian front. Thus the purport of the Astor anti-Bolshie appeal is apparent.

“...She tortures the facts to show that Russia went to war to save Russia and that America went to war to save America. Lend-lease helped Britain to help us. Our sympathy was extended despite the political immorality of the Astor clique.

“...European collective security consistently supported by the Russians was sabotaged by the Cliveden policies. The Sun does not need to defend the Russo-German 1939 Pact, and does not blame Stalin for trying to gain time to build Russian defences.

“...Astor would have brought upper-class security from Hitler. She is one of the last who should preach sermons on who is helping whom in this war, and few newspapers in the U.S.A. will incline to support this latest speech.”

It will not come as a surprise that Lord Astor, on August 2, 1942, was featured in an interview in his own paper, the Western Independent, as opposing the propaganda for a Second Front, although he showed ingenuity in giving as his reason that it would do harm to Russia.

But Lady Astor had not reckoned on the storm her utterance aroused. In her own constituency, throughout Britain, in the U.S.A., condemnation was all but universal. The result was that on August 11 she issued a statement declaring her speech to have been misrepresented, adding: “Nobody but a madman would attack Russia at this time.” With characteristic impudence she added the assertion that it was the action of Fifth Columnists to “misrepresent” her.

Her conversion is too belated to carry much conviction.

What do the Astors really think? A clue is provided in the new 1,700-page edition of Hitler’s collected speeches, to which Lord Astor has contributed an introduction. Hitler, he says, “by the constant repetition of a few simple fixed ideas,” has
persuaded Germany to accept National Socialism. And he comments:

"The strength of the system lies in the fact that it has turned to base uses, ideas and ideals which do but wait re-interpretation to serve as building stones in the reconstruction for which we hope."

The "simple, fixed ideas" of Hitler obviously appeal to the Astors. It is only Hitler's ungentlemanly method of applying them of which they disapprove. Naturally the "simple, fixed ideas" of the Soviet Union—the very antithesis of Hitler's—must be as strongly disapproved of by them.

* * * *

There is no section of the British population more generally friendly to our Soviet ally than the scientists, which is natural, as nowhere in the world have science and scientists the same unrivalled opportunities as in the U.S.S.R. There is, however, one little group, calling themselves the Society for Freedom in Science, who do their puny best to discredit the U.S.S.R. as far as they can.

The founder of this group is one, J. R. Baker, who recently published a book entitled The Scientific Life, which is liberally peppered with such statements as:

"Let us compare Pasteur's freedom with the shackles surrounding the scientific worker in a totalitarian state. In Soviet Russia a research worker cannot change his subject without wide discussions with the rest of his staff of his institute, and an individual's desire as to what he wants to work at receives little consideration."

Which calls forth the obvious question: "Why then 'the wide discussion?'" And perhaps Mr. Baker is unaware that Pasteur carried out his work along lines laid down by the French Government, not merely following the dictates of his own inclination. In the field of science Baker and his friends are but small fry, unlikely to wield any influence, but outside there is always the danger that they may in less well-informed quarters be accepted at this own valuation.

* * * *

Sportsmen have not lagged behind their fellows in expression of their appreciation of Soviet efforts, and when at the beginning of August a great Sports Festival was held in Moscow, a warm message was sent from this country signed by outstanding figures in every branch of sport, including Freddie Mills, Don
McCorkindale, Ted Broadribb, Sydney Hulls, George Allison (Arsenal F.C.), Eddie Hapgood, Eric Boon and many more. Only one body stood aloof from the sending of greetings—that was the M.C.C., who said:

"We keep aloof from anything savouring of politics."

The Old School Tie still seems to retain its ascendancy in the purlieus of St. John's Wood.

**ELEVEN**

**WORLD CALL FOR SECOND FRONT**

July, 1942! Sevastopol has fallen, and in so doing has added yet one more imperishable page to the Russian Glory. The centre of the Russian scene has shifted to the area between the mighty rivers, Volga and Don. An unprecedented weight of armaments on land and in the air has been hurled against Voronezh; the Caucasus itself is menaced. The constant recurrence of the name of the city of Stalingrad, recalls how that town, then named Tsaritsin, was saved by Stalin and Voroshilov in 1920.

The Soviet Red Army is fighting back with the same bravery and tenacity that has always distinguished it; its Commanders and the Government show the same skill and imagination, the same iron nerves that have served them so well throughout; the Soviet peoples have given the world another object lesson in morale. But the position is grave, and with their accustomed candour the Russian leaders make no attempt to conceal this fact. *The Times* Moscow correspondent reported in the issue of July 16:

"The gravity of the situation was emphasised by the Soviet authorities at a meeting with the foreign press yesterday. ... Hitler, it was stated, was throwing about 10 times as many men and five times as many tanks against the Don as against the Nile, aiming not only at seizing rich territory but also at forcing the Soviet High Command to engage its operational reserves, thus reducing their eventual striking power in co-ordination with a blow from the West. So far these reserves remained intact, but the territory now threatened could not be abandoned with the same confidence as that which fell into German hands during the great fighting withdrawal of last year. In order to buy time, space was being sold last year, though dearly. The margin of territory that can be safely lost now without gravely prejudicing the outcome of the war, is very narrow."
In such circumstances the effect on the Russian people of repeated reports that fresh troops withdrawn from France and Belgium are being thrown into action against them can be nothing but most disheartening. Hitler presumably banks upon a continuance of the policy which has allowed him to retain the initiative everywhere except on the Russian front. He openly scoffs at the threat of a Second Front. He believes that the leadership of the United Nations outside of Russia and China is nerveless and incapable of determined action. He must be shown that he is wrong, that we can launch that Second Front which alone spells victory within a reasonable space of time.

One thing stands out—informed opinion everywhere demands a Second Front without delay. Those who have called for it include not only the Russians—Stalin, Litvinov, Maisky, etc.—but General Sikorski, the leaders of the Fighting French, and almost all the other allied countries, the Americans, and the leaders of the British Dominions.

Amongst the latter stands out prominently General McNaughton, the Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian forces abroad, whose name is mentioned as a possible Commander of the United Nations when the Second Front is launched.

Said the Sydney Morning Herald on June 1, 1942:—

“A feeling of frustration akin almost to despair would fill the hearts of the British and American peoples were they to imagine that Russia would be left to bear unaided the total weight of the German war machine—that no strategy had been devised in the months before Hitler struck which would force him to fight on more than one major front.”

That comes from the most solid Conservative newspaper published in the Commonwealth, while the more liberal Sydney Daily Telegraph says on the same day:—

“Any risk is worth while if it diverts a substantial portion of Hitler’s strength from the Eastern front to give the Russians a chance to recover from the counter-attack. There is only one way to beat Hitler—by concentrating the forces of the United Nations against him and his partners as desperately as he is throwing his entire Axis forces into the battle.”

The Melbourne Herald joins in the chorus as follows:—

“Russia’s need for a Second Front in Europe is urgent, and the longer the opening is deferred, the longer and harder is the prospect before Britain and all the United Nations.”
And here are a few selections from the American press:

"It is worth sacrifices to keep Russia in the war. This brings the Allied planning right down to the bedrock of total war, to a ruthless impersonal analysis not of what should be done, but of what must be done." (New York Sun, July 14, 1942.)

"Act now or Britain and the U.S.A. will have to do the lion's share of fighting later, instead of having willing Russians to do it. . . Is not an army of two million, highly-trained and fully equipped men, an army which Britain has built since Dunkirk, with the aid of our supplies and equipment, enough to get going on before it is too late?" (New York Post, July 14, 1942.)

"Now is the time for the diversion. The United Nations could pick no better time for the opening of a Second Front if they are prepared to do so. A less well-prepared diversion now would be far more effective than a much better-prepared diversion after Russian resistance had crumpled." (New York Times, July 14, 1942.)

The Committee of Industrial Organisations, one of America's great trade union combinations, opened a campaign for 500,000 postcards addressed to President Roosevelt, in the following terms:

"Victory is endangered unless a Second Front is opened immediately. I am behind your Second Front agreement. It is needed without further delay."

What does the Soviet Union say? It is said loudly and clearly by G. Alexandrov, head of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in the Soviet War News of July 16, in the following terms:

"In estimating the prospects of the struggle one cannot proceed solely from the fact that all the objective prerequisites for victory exist; that the United Nations can produce more arms than Germany and can mobilise greater armed forces, that they have inexhaustible supplies of strategic raw materials and fuel. That is only half the problem. The other half is the ability of the United Nations to employ their assets, to achieve victory in a practical struggle, to transform the possibility of victory into a reality. . . .

"As Stalin said some years ago, the history of states and armies affords instances in which all the prerequisites for victory existed, and yet were wasted, so that the armies possessing them suffered defeat. . . .

"The method of translating the favourable actual conditions for victory into the reality of victory is exceptionally varied. The prime tasks in this sphere are:

"The full implementing of the understanding reached between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, as well as between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., to open a Second Front in Europe in 1942."
“The working out and execution of strategic plans by the High Command of the Red Army and the armies of the other freedom-loving peoples.

“The concentration of the armed forces of the anti-Hitler coalition in decisive directions, the choice of the right moment to strike hard at the enemy, proper manœuvring and the use of large reserves.”

As Michael Foot wrote of the Second Front in the Evening Standard of July 16:

“Nothing less than our total effort at the hour of Russia’s total effort will do it. Can we do it? Dare we do it? There is no other issue of equal dimensions in the whole range of world politics.”

We are bound by Treaty to open such a front before the end of 1942; we are bound by honour and self-interest alike to open it at the earliest possible moment. We have the men; our own men, of whom at least two million at home are fully trained; we have the men from Canada and from the United States; we have the gallant men from the occupied countries of Europe. As individual armies their numbers are few, but they are picked men, itching to get at the enemy who holds their own lands enslaved.

Have we the machines? Lord Beaverbrook has given the answer to that. He says we possess them in abundance. He is no uninformed armchair critic. From his position in the Government he must have learned better than most what resources this country possesses.

Above all, we have mastery in the air. So far as ships are concerned, we have been able to take close upon a million men to the Middle East, to take huge convoys to India, to bring food to our shores. Whatever else Britain lacks, it certainly is not ships.

Of course we haven’t everything to guarantee victory. But victory can never be guaranteed until it is won, and it is usually won by the side which takes the risk. It can never be won by leaving the initiative to the enemy. What is the alternative to opening up the Second Front now? It certainly is not to wait until next year. For the position can never be more favourable than it is now. To say that we cannot open such a Front is tantamount to saying that we cannot win the war, that all we can do is to play for a draw.

““In some quarters,” says Michael Foot, in the above-quoted article, “whispers are spread abroad. These doubts are traitors. They must
be killed. For in this hour nothing should possess the minds and hearts of our people but a flaming purpose to do the deed."

As we have seen, those who hate the Russian alliance and who, at best, regard it as a painful necessity, differ on many things, but they have one thing in common in August, 1942. No matter whether in the past they flaunted their membership of the Anglo-German Fellowship, or confined their activities to the more genteel Friends of National Spain; whether it is Mussolini, Franco, Pétain or Salazar that they see as saviour of mankind; whether they are men of Munich or the “revolutionaries” of the I.L.P. and the Socialist Appeal; whether German-haters of the Vansittart brand or those who looked to Munich as their spiritual home, without exception today they unite in opposing the Second Front, in spreading abroad the doubts that must be killed.

In Lord Kemsley’s Sunday Times of July 19, Scrutator can write:—

“Nothing would be more timely than a Second Front if—but only if—it could be large and successful. Meanwhile German morale might be really battered by mass bombing-raids, provided they occurred often enough.”

This, and its companion sheets from the Kemsley stable, were the shrillest opponents of the “arm-chair critics” who demanded the Second Front before 1941 was out. Today they have to modify the expression of their hostility, but as will be noticed, their enthusiasm for the Second Front is still less than moderate.

The Imperial Policy Group believe that the European Front is not the decisive one for Britain in this war; and they also deplore “ill-informed clamour” for a Second Front. Major Cazalet, M.P., speaking for the League of Nations Union on July 15, in London, states that he believes the European front must be decisive; but he also limits his attitude to the Second Front in precisely the same manner as the others. So does the Catholic Herald, in its columns week after week. So does Captain Crowder of the 1922 Committee. None dare oppose it now in its entirety, but none of these will do anything to bring its advent nearer.

What do the people say? Let me quote Mr. Joseph Curran, president of the National Maritime Union of U.S.A., on his return from Britain in July this year:—

“The British working man is grumbling because there is no Second Front.”
And here is Mr. Jack Tanner, in his Presidential Address to
the Conference of the International Metal Workers’ Federation,
at Blackpool, on July 25:—

“Not until the Second Front is opened will the defeat of Germany
come in sight. It is the only real aid we can give our valorous
Allies.”

A Second Front in Europe would bring us countless allies
throughout the Continent. Those 500 men and women of St.
Nazaire who gave their lives when they took a Commando raid
for a serious British invasion of the Continent, are an earnest of
what is to come once the effort is made. The men and women
in the forces and in the factories are at one in demanding action
now.

Hitler is sceptical of the effort being made. He believes that he
can withdraw large sections of his already depleted forces from
Western Europe to Russia. He believes that the motley crowd
of the over-cautious, the haters of Russia and the pro-Nazis will
be able to hold up operations until it is too late. He must be
proved wrong.

And one of the first ways to prove him wrong is to put an end
to the utterances and activities of all who throw doubt upon our
capacity and who strive to undermine the British-Soviet alliance
which holds the only key to the ultimate victory of the freedom-
loving peoples of the world.

Remember that—the enemies of Russia in Britain today are
the deadliest enemies of the British people. Let me quote once
more the words of Winston Churchill on June 22, 1941:

“Any man or any state who fights against Nazism will have our
aid... We shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the
Russian people.”

What will be the verdict of history on those who at this crucial
hour campaign against our Ally?
ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE JEWISH QUESTION

1. RENNAP

What are the roots of anti-Semitism? Why have the Nazis been able to revive the persecution of the Jews on a scale unparalleled since the Middle Ages? Are Fascists the only Jew haters and Jew baiters? Is anti-Semitism a menace to the Jewish people alone?

These and many other aspects of the "Jewish question" are discussed in the present small volume by a well-known Marxian writer, who, treating the problem historically, takes us through the centuries from the days of the Old Testament records to the days of Hitler and reveals to us, as William Gallacher, M.P. points out in his Introduction, "The road that must be travelled by Jew and Gentile alike."

BRITAIN IN THE WORLD FRONT

R. PALME DUTT

"It is, in fact, a book that contains within its pages a complete guide to victory—but not only that. For if the policy it puts forward is operated it not only guarantees that victory, but—something equally important—it will have already laid the basis for the immediate operation of so many of those things that will help to produce a better form of society in Britain than exists at present."

HARRY POLLITT in "The Labour Monthly."

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