Evidence of the firebrand policy of Peking's leaders

Novosti Press Agency Publishing House
Moscow 1978
From the Editors

The present book is a collection of excerpts from a vast number of sources, giving a wide range of opinion on China’s policy today — Peking’s attitude to war and peace, to the arms race and to disarmament; China’s expansionist schemes in Asia and other parts of the world; Peking’s aspirations to world domination and its drawing close with the forces of imperialism and reaction; Soviet-Chinese relations, and so on. The sources include newspapers and periodicals in socialist, capitalist and developing countries, the Chinese press, documents issued by political parties and statements by government leaders.

The collection is far from all-inclusive, of course — too much is being written and said on the subject of China’s current policy by the mass media every day. The editors have, therefore, selected what in their opinion was most essential and most topical. To avoid repetition and to save space the excerpts, except those in quotation marks, are given in digest form.
# Part One

## Peking's Policy and World Public Opinion

### Chapter I. War? Very Good!

### Chapter II. Peking's Course — Militarism and Armament

### Chapter III. Dreams of Nuclear Blackmail

### Chapter IV. Sabotage of International Disarmament Initiatives

### Chapter V. The Entire Globe — A Target for Expansion

### Chapter VI. Huachiao in the Role of Marines

### Chapter VII. Why Is Peking Praised by the Pretoria Racists and the Chilean Junta?

### Chapter VIII. The West's 'Chinese Card'

### Chapter IX. Peking: Fight the USSR to the Last European Soldier!

### Part Two

## Relations Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (Documents)

### Chapter I. Concerning Relations Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (Excerpts from Speeches by Leonid Brezhnev)

### Chapter II. On Soviet-Chinese Relations

### Chapter III. Reality and Fabrications (Concerning Soviet-Chinese Border Settlement)

## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part One</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peking's Policy and World Public Opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I. War? Very Good!</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II. Peking's Course — Militarism and Armament</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III. Dreams of Nuclear Blackmail</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV. Sabotage of International Disarmament Initiatives</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V. The Entire Globe — A Target for Expansion</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI. Huachiao in the Role of Marines</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII. Why Is Peking Praised by the Pretoria Racists and the Chilean Junta?</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VIII. The West's 'Chinese Card'</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IX. Peking: Fight the USSR to the Last European Soldier!</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part Two</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relations Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (Documents)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I. Concerning Relations Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (Excerpts from Speeches by Leonid Brezhnev)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II. On Soviet-Chinese Relations</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Position of Communist and Workers' Parties</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III. Reality and Fabrications (Concerning Soviet-Chinese Border Settlement)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronicle of Soviet Initiatives</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I.

WAR? VERY GOOD!

"War? Why, that's good. It will be possible to do away with imperialism completely all the sooner. They estimate it can be done away with in three years. With atomic bombs the war may last a year less. But there will be no more wars after that. If there's a war, there will be casualties... In my view, the atomic bomb is no more terrible than a big sword. In the Second World War the Soviet Union lost 20 million people, and the other European countries — 10 million. The total was 30 million dead. After the Tang and Ming Emperors wars were fought with swords and 40 million people were killed then. If half of mankind are killed in the war — it does not matter. It's nothing terrible, even if only a third of the population remains. It will grow again in so many years. If atomic war really does break out it will not be as bad as all that: capitalism will perish as a result, and there will be everlasting peace on earth."

Mao Tse-tung, 1958

The present international situation is one characterized by great disorder on earth. "The wind sweeping through the tower heralds a rising storm in the mountains..." Relaxation is a temporary and superficial phenomenon and great disorder will continue. Such great disorder is a good thing for the people, not a bad thing. It throws the enemies into confusion and causes division among them, while it arouses and tempers the people.

From the documents of the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of China, August, 1973
“There can be absolutely no tranquillity in this world, nor can there be any lasting peace. Either they [the United States and the USSR] will start a war against each other, or the peoples will rise to carry out a revolution.”

“Jenmin jihpao” (CPR), April 11, 1974

In the course of the war in various parts of the world the peoples of different countries will have broad opportunities for organizing wars against aggression. And after a protracted joint effort the peoples of the world will finally destroy the warmongers.

“Jenmin jihpao” (CPR), November 1, 1974

“We must definitely be ready for war. We cannot afford to let time slip through our fingers, as it waits for no one.”

Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, May, 1977

“We must be clearly aware of ... the situation, keep war in mind and be prepared for it, be prepared for war breaking out at an early date, be prepared for a big war. We must... work as quickly as possible so that well before the outbreak of war we will have built up industry in the interior.”

Yeh Chien-ying, Vice-Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, May, 1977

The Military Council of the CPC Central Committee has issued a decree on “intensifying the education and training of troops”. The decree urges the army to assign a strategic place to the education and training of troops and, in accordance with the military ideas and policy of Chairman Mao, thoroughly to organize and train troops so that their fighting ability is comprehensively increased and they are in constant readiness to carry out all and any combat mission they may be charged with by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, the Party Central Committee and its Military Council.

Hsinhua News Agency (CPR), May 15, 1978

“We believe that in a class society war is a normal phenomenon in relations between the two worlds. War is a continuation of politics, it is also a continuation of peace. A new world war can only be delayed, but it cannot be avoided. A Third World War may break out any day.”

Hsu Hsiang-chien, member of the CPC Central Committee’s Politbureau and CPR Defence Minister, July, 1978

“In international affairs we shall continue to pursue Chairman Mao’s revolutionary foreign policy line.” (See Mao Tse-tung’s statement given earlier. — Ed.).

Huang Hua, China’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking at the 33rd Session of the UN General Assembly, as quoted by the Hsinhua News Agency on September 30, 1978

Chinese propaganda has been drumming into the population that the best thing that could happen is an “early and major war” and “war as a trial by strength”. The Chinese people are being conditioned for a “long-drawn-out war” which could “last from 10 to 20 years”... China’s population is being oriented towards “major national sacrifices” for the sake of a “due contribution to the cause of mankind’s liberation”.

“International Affairs” (USSR) March, 1978
The CPC leadership regards its objectives as attainable only in an atmosphere of international tension reminiscent of the worst cold war days, nor does it rule out the use of armed force.

It will be recalled that pre-revolutionary China was characterized by recurring periods of tension and war. Memories of them are still fresh in Chinese society. The Maoist leadership deliberately revives past experiences, since this helps it to lean on tradition and at the same time to represent tension as a “natural condition.”

“World Marxist Review”, June, 1976

Peking plans to create a kind of superstate in Asia (and later — not only in Asia) that would spread over the greater part of the mainland — from the Pacific Ocean to the Caspian Sea and from the Indian Ocean to the Bering Sea — now inhabited by nearly a third of the world’s population.

How is this to be achieved? Through sparking off a Third World War. It is for this reason that Chinese diplomacy is continually clamouring about the “invisibility” of a new world war. It wants one.

“Znamya” (USSR), September, 1978

II.

PEKING’S COURSE—MILITARISM AND ARMAMENT

“Power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Only with guns can the whole world be transformed.”

ao Tse-tung, 1938

“We must speed up the revolutionization and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, intensify preparations for the eventuality of war, maintain vigilance and be in constant readiness to destroy all enemies who dare invade our territory.”

Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, May, 1978

To speed up the revolutionization and modernization of the armed forces it has been decided to introduce a system combining compulsory and voluntary military service and to extend the term of service to three years for the ground forces; to four years for the ground-based troops of the Air Force and the Navy, and for the special technical units of the ground forces; to five years for the crews of the Navy and the naval units of the ground forces.

Hsinhua News Agency (CPR), March 7, 1978
The doctrine to “make China a great, powerful and modern country by the end of the century” on the basis of “four modernizations” (and primarily the modernization of the armed forces) has been written into the Constitution. Militarization of the economy as a means of strengthening the material war base has become the main trend of China’s development.

“Izvestia” (USSR), May 20, 1978

Both the air force and naval chiefs are now on the all-powerful Politbureau as well as the army leaders... The row of military uniforms among the top people is impressive.

“Financial Times” (Britain), September 14, 1977

Militarization targets have been formulated in most concrete terms: “to advance and intensify preparation for war”, “not only to intensify but also to accelerate” the modernization of the Chinese army, to “intensify the formation of a home guard” and to “raise the army’s equipment status to a new level”, which refers primarily to nuclear missiles, the air force and the navy. Virtually any problem of China’s economic development is now put in the context of preparation for war.

“International Affairs” (USSR), March, 1978

China today is a huge military camp. Militarism has permeated all spheres of the life of Chinese society — ideology, politics, economy. One of its aims is to build up a war psychosis under slogans alleging China to be “a fortress surrounded by external enemies”. This facilitates the Maoists’ struggle against the opposition and all manifestations of discontent with their policy.

In order to boost military allocations further, a policy of lowering the people’s living standards is being pursued. Severe asceticism, work without remuneration, and restrictions in food consumption are being encouraged. All this is called preparation for a new world war, which is declared “inevitable”.

“Prace” (Czechoslovakia), August 10, 1976

Preparation for war is an ideal theme to stimulate patriotic fervour and make people work harder.

France-Presse News Agency, January 30, 1970

China is building subterranean tunnels and shelters and laying in grain stocks.

“Daily Nation” (Kenya), May 17, 1970

In 1978 Peking will spend 36 billion on defence, of which an estimated 10 billion is earmarked for purchases of advanced Western technology.

“Time” (USA), July 3, 1978

The vigour with which China pursues its policy of global confrontation and the enthusiasm with which it is endorsed by our Cold War veterans should at least give us cause for reflection before we accede to its tentative enquiries about weapon purchases. Its interest in acquiring Western arms appears to stem from a fundamental shift in military strategy.
A surprising amount of technology capable of military application has already been supplied to China by the West.

"New Statesman" (Britain) August 18, 1978

The Chinese army has increased by almost one million men over the past two years.

"International Affairs", (USSR), March, 1978

The venture undertaken by the Chinese Navy in the Paracel Islands area¹ may be variously explained. Obviously, however, the Navy needed some practice and this was its first limbering-up session.

In recent years the strength of China’s Navy has been growing and now they are beginning to regard the Western part of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean as regions in which they ought to make their presence felt.

"Patriot" (India), January 22, 1974

US naval strategists are carefully observing the growth of China’s Navy. The present Chinese leadership is stepping up the building of destroyers, while modernizing the existing fleet. China’s Navy now has 1,500 vessels.

Although few experts in Washington believe that the Chinese fleet can present any “serious threat” in the near future, it may introduce a destabilizing element into the complicated military-political equilibrium in East Asia in the late 70s and in the 80s. Are not the Chinese leaders trying, on the sly, to build an ocean-going fleet?

"Christian Science Monitor" (USA), June 30, 1976

¹ Early in 1974, naval and air force units of the People’s Liberation Army of China carried out a military operation and captured the Paracel Islands situated 240 km off the coast of Vietnam. — Ed.

III.

DREAMS OF NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

"The People’s Army, equipped with Mao Tse-tung’s ideas and armed with technically advanced weapons and equipment, will be like a winged tiger, invincible in the world.”

"Kwangmin jihpao (CPR), January 21, 1971

“Our strategy and tactics are to kill people, to destroy fully the enemy’s manpower.”

Su Yu, Member of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee. (Quoted in“Izvestia”, July 26, 1978)

“Steel alloy is not all that hard, nor is the neutron bomb. When heroes take on the job, they attain a world level.”

From a poem by Chang Ai-ping, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army

The Chinese representative at the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly (1975) declared that China was prepared “to cease all nuclear tests at any time, but this can happen only on the day when the superpowers completely prohibit and thoroughly destroy their nuclear weapons”. This was an attempt to establish nuclear superiority for China, for once the nuclear powers destroyed their nuclear
stockpiles, Peking would only end its nuclear tests, leaving its own nuclear stockpiles intact.

"International Affairs" (USSR), March, 1978

China continues to muck up the international atmosphere with radioactive fallout from its nuclear bomb tests. Its last blast, on November 17, 1976 ended up dusting some millions of Americans with a quantity of poisonous iodine 131. If that is not a hostile act — hostile in effect, if not intent — what is? Who do the Chinese think they are?

"Washington Post" (USA) December 8, 1976

"The entire personnel engaged on the study, manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons have declared their determination to rally even closer round the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, to carry high the great banner of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and, in accordance with the line proclaimed by the 11th Congress of the Party, to raise their spirits and strengthen solidarity in the struggle, so as to make a new contribution to speedier modernization of the country's defence."

Hsinhua News Agency (CPR), March 17, 1978

Peking conducts nearly every one of its atomic tests in the atmosphere. In March, 1978 China carried out its 23rd nuclear test. A giant radioactive cloud, having shed some of its noxious fallout over a number of Asian countries, reached Alaska and other Western states of the US. There was a real threat of radioactive contamination of the soil and crops.

"Sovetskaya Rossia" (USSR), August 1, 1978

...We should think of what the world will look like ten years hence if China possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of destroying America's cities either renews her Soviet alliance or is hostile to both the United States and the Soviet Union. The specter of a billion
Chinese armed with nuclear weapons would then haunt us all.

“Foreign Affairs” (USA), October, 1976

A nation of 700 million, growing rapidly in population, surrounded mostly by weak neighbours, itself isolated and pugnacious, led by unsophisticated men — a nation with these attributes might risk nuclear war to achieve its ends... The vast expanses of China and the huge population might make Chinese leaders think their country could absorb nuclear bombardment better than any other nation.

“New York Herald Tribune” (USA), September 1, 1963

It is only in recent years that the American public and politicians have begun, under the pressure of facts, to give some thought to Peking's assertions that it is building up its nuclear potential to defend China from the Soviet Union. For that purpose it needs missiles with a range of about 5,000 km. Why then is Peking working hard on missiles with a range of up to 11,000 km? Each of such missiles will have a 3-megaton warhead. Their development will be completed in the second half of the 70s.

“Rude Pravo” (Czecho-slovakia), September 21, 1973

From all accounts, the Chinese strike forces have reached a level where they can be regarded as effective. Their missiles are capable of reaching Moscow, while their technical experts are perfecting an ICBM first tested in 1976 (it had a range of about 6,500 km). A most up-to-date carrier is being devised for it; a solid-fuel missile with a range of 12,800 km and a one-megaton nuclear warhead (similar to US Titan-2) will be developed in a few years.

“Le Matin” (Belgium), August 29, 1978

IV.
SABOTAGE OF INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES

“Disarmament is out of the question.”
Chou En-lai, 1972

“It is silly to talk of general disarmament.”
Chiao Kuan-hua, former Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, October, 1973

“The unrealistic dream of disarmament should by no means be nurtured.”
Huang Hua, China’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, June, 1978

“We have always held that the most effective way to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and guarantee the security of nations is complete prohibition and ultimate destruction of nuclear weapons”.
Huang Hua, China’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking at the 33rd Session of the UN General Assembly, as quoted by the Hsinhua News Agency on September 30, 1978

Since 1971, when China’s rights were restored in the United Nations, the Chinese delegation has not advancee
a single constructive proposal or taken a single positive initiative to strengthen world peace. There is not one international agreement aimed at curbing the arms race or stopping nuclear weapon tests to which China is a signatory.

All appeals by peaceloving countries to strengthen security in Asia through the collective effort of all Asian states and in relations between them to affirm the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs have met with resolute opposition in China.

All this expresses the essence of the policy pursued by the Chinese leadership.

"Pravda" (USSR), May 14, 1977

China refuses to assume any international commitments that might tie its hands:
— at the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly the Chinese delegation opposed the proposal to convene a World Disarmament Conference;
— at the 27th Session it opposed the idea of the non-use of force in international relations and a ban on nuclear weapons for all time;
— at the 28th Session it opposed a reduction of the military budgets of permanent member states of the Security Council by 10 per cent and the allocation of a part of the resources thus saved for aid to developing countries;
— at the 29th Session it opposed the adoption of a definition of aggression;
— at the 30th Session it opposed a draft treaty on the complete and universal banning of nuclear weapon tests, as well as a resolution prohibiting modification of the natural environment and climate for military or other purposes hostile to humanity;
— at the 31st Session it opposed a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations;
— at the 32nd Session it opposed a Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of Detente and refused to vote on draft resolutions concerning general and complete disarmament, the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and other documents.

At the 33rd Session China's Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, finally pronounced the word "disarmament", but only to reject, right off the cuff, the Soviet proposal to conclude an international convention on greater security guarantees for non-nuclear states.

A review compiled by the Editors

At the special UN General Assembly session on disarmament the Chinese delegates displayed considerable cunning: trying to torpedo constructive proposals on disarmament and to avoid any commitments in that respect, they at the same time posed as "active supporters" of disarmament.

Some foreign information media which favour Peking's militarist policy began, in this connection, speaking about a "constructive approach" and "positive changes" in China's policy. During the discussion of the special session's final document, the Chinese delegation proposed about 60 amendments — all aimed at depriving the final document of its main content — demand for disarmament, and at adapting it to China's own conceptions opposed to world peace. The UN special session rejected Peking's "constructive proposals", since they were directed against any disarmament measures.

"Pravda" (USSR), October 11, 1978

China is against disarmament because an arms race means disruption of detente, the preservation of old hotbeds of international conflict and the appearance of new ones, and turning the world back to the times of the Cold War; it also means balancing on the brink of war, in conditions of which the Chinese leaders believe they are better able to realize their ambitious plans of gaining a leading position in the world.

"Izvestia" (USSR), July 26, 1978
V.

THE ENTIRE GLOBE—A TARGET FOR EXPANSION

"It has become an immediate task for China to return all our territories, and not just uphold our sovereignty as far as the Great Wall."

Mao Tse-tung, 1935

"We must conquer the globe. Our target is the entire globe, where we shall create a mighty power."

Mao Tse-tung, 1965

Peking's expansionist schemes are aimed primarily at the South. There is a logical sequence to China's outwardly random hostile actions against its neighbours:
— border clashes with India (in 1959 and 1962);
— stepping up military preparations in Tibet against India (in the 70s);
— continual interference in the domestic affairs of nearby Asian countries—India, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, including support of separatist and anti-government movements there;
— constantly bringing up the question of “lost” Chinese territories, which involves practically all of China’s neighbours;
— Peking's official confirmation (in the 70s) of its claims to a number of island territories and parts of the continental shelf in the East China and South China Seas after an oil-bearing stratum was discovered there;
— seizure of the Paracel Islands (in 1974) and laying claims to other islands in the South China Sea;
— incident with Japan over possession of the Senkaku Islands and Peking's demarche opposing a Japanese-South Korean agreement on joint development of the continental shelf.

In June, 1977 the newspaper Jenmin jihpao stated that in the South China Sea alone China regarded over 200 islands, reefs and shallows as its own. It is being said in Peking that “in time” they are to be “liberated”.

If at the present time, when it does not yet possess a “modernized” military and economic potential, Peking dare undertake actions indicative of its refusal to recognize existing frontiers and its readiness to enforce territorial claims, what can China’s weaker neighbours expect of it in the future?

"Izvestia" (USSR), May 20, 1978

The chain of visits by Chinese leaders to countries in South-East and South Asia has been accompanied by assurances of “traditional friendship”. Thus, some time ago, Teng Hsiao-ping, Deputy Premier of China's State Council, visited Burma. While the Chinese leader assured the Burmese of the “warmest feelings of fraternal friendship and good-neighbourliness”, Peking's agents were completing preparations for new sallies on the Burmese-Chinese frontier. The day after the end of the visit the rebels, supplied with Chinese arms, launched a fresh offensive.

"Pravda" (USSR), June 13, 1978

Burma represents another example of contradictions in China's policy in South-East Asia, or, as the Burmese say, its attempt “to carry a lighted torch in one hand and a pail of water in the other”. China supports the rebels in Burma and at the same time plays footsie with the government which these rebels are trying to overthrow.

Associated Press (USA), February 1, 1978
This map is included in "The Atlas of the Chinese People's Republic" published in Peking in 1973. Delineating China's frontiers in the South China Sea area, the map shows practically all of the archipelagos and islands in that area as belonging to China. The marine frontier is moved up against the coast of Vietnam, the Malaysian part of the North Kalimantan, and the Philippine islands of Luzon and Palawan. In other words, it is hundreds of miles away from China's shores.

Where Asia's "great silk route" once wound its way through the mountain fastness in the heart of the continent, there now runs a modern 800-km motorway, the Karakorum highway. It was built by Chinese and Pakistani military engineers to link the southwestern part of the People's Republic of China, via Kashmir, with Islamabad, capital of Pakistan. Although formally the Karakorum highway ends at the Pakistani capital, it has a continuation in the Islamabad-Karachi road. Taken together these roads make up a through motorway from Central China to Karachi, the biggest port on the Arabian Sea. The Karakorum highway is for China an overland outlet to the Indian Ocean and is clearly intended to serve Peking's military-strategic aims.

"New Times" (USSR), July 28, 1978

Far from scaling down its arms supplies to the hostile Naga and Mizo tribes, Peking has actually increased its subsidies for subversive operations in India's northeastern regions. The Chinese leaders continue to instigate the neighbouring countries against India in a bid to cause suspicion and mistrust for it in Katmandu, Colombo and Islamabad.

"Blitz" (India), March 19, 1978

It is reported from Gangtok that the Chinese regime in Tibet has increased considerably the mobility and striking power of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The manpower strength is believed to have been increased to 300,000, not counting locally raised Tibetan levies.

A number of bases have been established with missile capability varying between 600 and 2,500 miles, which could put New Delhi and Kabul under threat.

"Amrita Bazar Patrika" (India), February 15, 1974
The Chinese leaders' exaggerated anti-Sovietism is a convenient cover to camouflage and carry through more successfully their ambitions of territorial expansion and to receive more easily recognition, legitimacy and acceptance from friendly NATO and other imperialist quarters. The fate awaiting India in this emerging arrangement can well be imagined.

"Times of India", June 27, 1978

In the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan the authorities have discovered and eliminated several groups sent in from abroad to instigate anti-government armed actions. A part of the arms captured from the insurgents was of Chinese manufacture.

Tass News Agency (USSR), August 1, 1978

"Hua Kuo-feng suggested that Iran initiate the setting up of a defence bloc of the Persian Gulf area oriented against the USSR, and promised assistance in the matter."

"Al-Ahram" (Egypt), August 31, 1978

Large-scale concentration of Chinese troops and the construction of various military-strategic installations continue in areas close to the Mongolian border. Since 1969 more than 250 military exercises have been held in the border areas and there were 87,000 explosions. At times, Chinese officers and men advanced 15-20 km into Mongolian territory taking reconnaissance photographs and opening fire on herds of grazing cattle.

The Chinese leaders are well aware that after the victory of the revolution in China the Mongolian People's Republic reduced its armed forces to a minimum and abolished its frontier troops, leaving only several border checkpoints to perform the usual formalities when its citizens crossed the Mongolian-Chinese border.

"Unen" (Mongolia), April 20, 1978

This map was printed back in Chiang Kai-shek's time. It appeared in the book "China's Frontiers" by Hua Chi-yun, which was published in 1933. The interrupted line shows the "old border" which allegedly existed before 1840; the dash-and-dot line indicates China's borders at the time the map was printed; and the shaded areas are "lost Chinese territories". These include Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan (then occupied by Japan), Annam (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, a part of India, and vast areas in the Soviet Union. Without any explanations, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was shown as part of China, although by the time Hua Chi-yun's book was published the independent state of the Mongolian working people had been in existence for 13 years.

In 1953, four years after the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed, "A Short History of Modern China", a text-
book by the well-known scholar Liu Pei-hua, was published in Peking. It included a map of China whose borders encompassed territories corresponding to the largest territorial claims ever made by the Kuomintang.

Over the past 20 years, Peking has laid claim to parts of the territory of its neighbours — a total of 4,500,000 square kilometres, or nearly half the area of China itself.

"Izvestia" (USSR), May 20, 1978

VI.

HUACHIAO IN THE ROLE OF MARINES

“We must without fail get hold of South-East Asia, including South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore... South-East Asia is a very rich region; it abounds in minerals and will be well worth the expense of getting hold of it. In the future it will be very useful for the development of Chinese industry. In this way the expenses will be fully returned. After we get hold of South-East Asia the wind from the East will prevail over the wind from the West.”

Mao Tse-tung, 1965

China’s Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien, told the members of a visiting Japanese delegation that in relations between Vietnam and China at present there were five major problems, including territorial disputes concerning the Paracel and Spratly Islands and the Gulf of Tonkin, as well as the land frontier between the two countries and ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam.

Kyodo Tsushin News Agency (Japan) reporting from Peking on September 30, 1978

In various South-East Asian countries, where over 20 million huachiao, that is to say, persons of Chinese nationality live, attention is being increasingly drawn to Peking’s encroachments on the sovereignty of other states through its influence on local Chinese residents. The smouldering fires of nationalist sentiment would have long ago been extinguished if they were not fanned by Peking, if great-Han chauvinism was not whipped up under
the cover of inculcating "patriotic feelings" in huachiao, if Peking did not recruit agents from among members of Chinese communities abroad.

"Pravda" (USSR), June 13, 1978

Large-scale infiltration of Indonesia by persons of Chinese nationality and the creation of "special bureaux" in Hong Kong and elsewhere to issue fictitious Indonesian documents to these people should be regarded as part of premeditated operation.

"Sinar Harapan" (Indonesia), quoted in "Pravda", June 13, 1978

The huachiao's influence on the economy of South-East Asian countries is so great that within a few days they can play havoc with the whole of the economic life of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The role of the "overseas Chinese" in the economy of politically independent states is understood in China as one of the forms of its domination over the latter. The huachiao themselves appeal ever more frequently to Peking for support whenever any complications arise, and the PRC patronizes them — by no means gratuitously, of course.

"Merdeka" (Indonesia), July, 1978

"Those who are engineering a war on the south-western border of our country and disturbances in connection with the question of persons of Chinese nationality are at the same time generating tension on the Vietnamese-Chinese border. They have organized illegal border crossings, they have used armed forces to violate our border, warplanes to violate our air space and warships to violate our territorial waters; they are erecting fortifications along the border with Vietnam and concentrating troops there... Peking is feverishly trying to turn many frontier regions of the two countries into zones where it could at any moment carry out hostile and subversive acts against Vietnam... Along with carrying out these acts Peking has of late been fomenting anti-Vietnamese hysteria among the Chinese people and fabricating fables about Vietnam 'ostracizing ethnic Chinese', 'coming out against China' and so on.

"In its diplomatic activity Peking has been using all means at its disposal in attempting to conduct anti-Vietnamese propaganda and distort facts about the incidents that have been taking place between the two countries."

Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, September, 1978

Peking's main aim is to force Vietnam to accept the "Three Worlds concept". And this policy lumps together the two social systems — socialism and capitalism. Vietnam declares that it cannot accept this concept. In this country they will not meekly underwrite China's hostile attitude to the Soviet Union, because they know that the Soviet Union maintains a principled position on the world-wide struggle against imperialism, for peace and social progress.

From an interview given by William Kashtan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada, broadcast by Soviet television on August 1, 1978

The mass exodus of huachiao from Vietnam was provoked by Chinese propaganda, which asserted that if China supported Kampuchea in a war against the SRV a clash between China and the SRV would be inevitable. Therefore, it was claimed, all "huachiao would do well to quit Vietnam immediately."
Why did Peking find it necessary to persuade ethnic Chinese to leave Vietnam but not to abide by accepted international rules?

“Afrique-Asie” (France), July-August, 1978

The Chinese leaders disguise their intentions with regard to Vietnam by so-called “concern for the victimized Chinese emigrants”. If they are really concerned about them, why do they ignore the desperate plea for salvation of the hundreds of thousands of Chinese emigrants who are being terrorized and murdered by the Kampuchean butchers? Why do they show no concern for the thousands of Chinese emigrants who have fled the terror of the Pol Poth-Ieng Sary clique and live with the assistance and support of the Vietnamese people? It is these people who are really victimized Chinese emigrants. Why, then, haven't the Chinese authorities taken them home?

“Cong San” (Vietnam), July, 1978

The current anti-Vietnamese actions of the Peking leaders are a repetition of the actions which were conducted in their time against socialist Mongolia by the Maoists after they had renounced economic cooperation and recalled their builders who had been working in Mongolia on the basis of inter-government agreements. This seriously hindered the fulfilment of the national economic plan of the MPR. Moreover, the reconstruction of a number of enterprises which had been built by the Chinese and went out of operation two or three years later because of poor design, miscalculations in production technology and delivery of unserviceable equipment involved the MPR in tremendous additional capital investment.

Today we are observing the same picture in Peking’s anti-Vietnamese actions.

“Unen” (Mongolia), August 10, 1978

What lies behind the anti-Vietnamese campaign being whipped up by Peking? Why has it coincided with the intensification by the Kampuchean authorities of aggressive actions along the entire Vietnamese border? All these actions are aimed at creating additional difficulties for Vietnam and undermining its authority and influence in the international arena.

“Pravda” (USSR), June 1, 1978
WHY IS PEKING PRAISED BY THE PRETORIA RACISTS AND THE CHILEAN JUNTA?

The existing points of contact and the partial identity of Western and Chinese interests in Africa create good prerequisites for the establishment of, to some extent, mutually complementary lines of action in the nearest decade. China could replace the West in the process of decolonization in Rhodesia and Namibia.

“General-Anzeiger” (Federal Republic of Germany), August, 1967

While the progressive nations and governments of the whole world are strengthening solidarity with the Chilean patriots and demanding an end to any aid to the military fascist junta in Chile, the Peking government is willing to grant a new, 100-million-dollar loan to the reactionary dictatorship.

Committee of Solidarity with the Anti-Fascist Struggle of the Chilean People

“My government is certainly anti-communist. This, however, does not prevent us from maintaining cordial relations with the People's Republic of China.”

General A. Pinochet, head of the Chilean military junta
"The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Chile... suggests naming a date convenient for holding talks of a joint commission of representatives of the Republic of Chile and the People's Republic of China to settle the technical details of the transfer of the arms chosen by the armed forces of Chile."

Note of the Chinese Embassy in Chile, October 28, 1975

During the visit of the former Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fai, to Britain in June, 1973 Britain and China agreed upon a kind of division of labour in their African policy: Chi Peng-fai promised that China would not interfere with the further development of Britain's traditional economic and political relations with the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, while the British government reacted positively to China's interest in purchasing strategic raw materials and mining equipment in these countries, and promised its good offices.

"Palaver" (Ghana), September 5, 1973

China is interested in freezing the problem of the boycott of Rhodesia established by the United Nations on the initiative of independent African states, because part of the chrome exported by Southern Rhodesia ends up in Peking.

"Daily News" (Kuwait), January, 1975

The unbending anti-Communist government of Southern Rhodesia seems to be interested in establishing diplomatic relations with Communist China. South Africa and China hold the same end of the thread of the civil war in Angola. It is quite probable that the Chinese do not want to mar their reputation before the Third World countries by open alliance with the racist South Africa, but Peking can be suspected of a concealed form of cooperation with it.

"Newsweek" (USA), December 22, 1975

According to South African sources, Peking and Pretoria have of late been conducting secret talks, primarily on the exchange of Chinese oil for South African uranium and nuclear technology.

"Toronto Star" (Canada), July, 1977

All diplomatic representatives of the Republic of South Africa have been instructed to broaden ties with Chinese diplomats. According to South African diplomatic sources, the Chinese diplomats' reaction has not been "negative".

"Afrique-Asie" (France), July, 1978

China actively trained and equipped Holden Roberto's CIA-maintained bands in Zaire which tried to seize power in Angola. Peking's actions were to the liking of the South African racists. Condemning Communism, Minister of the Interior and Information Mulder stressed that this did not apply to Peking and spoke out in favour of the South Africa's close cooperation with China. Vorster, Prime Minister of the racist regime, also "highly appreciated" Peking's actions.

"New Age" (India), September, 1977

China has revised the principles of its cooperation with Third World states, withholding financial and technical assistance to the countries which Peking does not regard as strategically important and which cannot pay a high price for PRC's assistance. Now assistance is given only to "key" countries which China uses as bases for the extension of its "revolutionary" influence in developing countries.

"Daily Express" (Nigeria), March 5, 1978
Peking's advisers with Holden Roberto, leader of the reactionary National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

In the 1968-70 civil war in Nigeria China supported the Biafran separatists in their attempts to dismember Nigeria, Africa's biggest state in population and economic potential.

"People's Evening News" (Ghana), December, 1977

We supported China at the time of its admission to the UN. But what is its gratitude worth if we can no longer count upon it as our ally? China has gone in for collusion with reactionary regimes; it has sacrificed friends and, acting in accordance with the principle “the enemies of my enemies are my friends”, is fraternizing with its enemies of yesterday for its own egoistical purposes. This shows a real lack of principle.

"Target" (Kenya), July, 1976

We expect that the Chinese people, who suffered greatly from colonialism and waged an armed struggle for the liberation of their country, will take a firm stand in relation to the just cause of the Palestinian people and will not be swayed by erroneous views. We regret China's support for the Egyptian President's betrayal which is rejected by the entire Arab world.

A. Jalloud, member of the General Secretariat of the General People's Congress of Libya, August, 1978

The policy of advancing the imperialist interests of the United States meets with Peking's support, which fits in well with the Chinese leaders' overall highly reactionary foreign policy line. They land in the same camp as those who are acting against the Angolan people, and fully agree with Pinochet. They declare their approval of the presence of American troops in Asia and Western Europe, support West German "ultras", and persistently call for strengthening the political and military alliance of so-called Little Europe.

"Le Monde" (France), August 12, 1978

Georges Marchais, General Secretary of the French Communist Party, February, 1976
The CPC's policy with regard to the progressive revolutionary forces in Chile, Egypt, the Sudan, Vietnam and Angola has long since been rousing the ever greater concern of all progressive mankind. As a result China has come to play a no less reactionary and anti-popular role than that played by imperialism. China suppresses revolutionary and liberation movements throughout the world, welcomes reactionary leaders and strengthens anti-popular forces in different continents, inciting them to acts of aggression.

Mengistu Haile Mariam
Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and the Council of Ministers of Socialist Ethiopia, September, 1978

Is it really so strange that the Chinese government should be supporting the bloody fascist regime of Pinochet and repressive military and reactionary governments in Latin America? Is it so amazing that China should be cooperating with Mobutu together with the interventionist forces of the NATO bloc? And why should one be surprised at China having joined hands with the Republic of South Africa against Angola, with Somali in its aggression against the Ethiopian revolution, with Egypt in its policy of a separate peace and concessions, with conservative and reactionary forces in Angola and the Federal Republic of Germany, with NATO in Europe and with Yankee imperialism here, there and everywhere? And is there anything surprising in China's blunt and dangerous preaching of the inevitability of a Third World War?

The haughty attitude toward peoples, norms and principles must have a limit, must stop at some point, must meet with real rebuff in the minds of people.

Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba, Chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, July, 1978

Chinese arms delivered to the counterrevolutionary forces in Angola.
What can one say of a gang who mouth the words of Marxism-Leninism, but have become the chief ideological and political mobilizers for extreme reaction, who have become the most vocal proponents of the Hitlerian big lie of anti-Sovietism?

What can one say about a clique that mouths phrases about peace, but states that detente, peaceful coexistence and nuclear arms control are policies of appeasement of the Soviet Union?

What can one say about a political bureau of a Communist Party who are an active force in supporting the imperialist forces in every corner of the world — the fascists and racists in Chile, Angola, Zaire, Afghanistan, NATO and on and on?

Maoism is a temporary phenomenon. But it will not disappear without a struggle. Maoism, like all opportunism, must be fought and exposed.

Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USA, June 30, 1978

VIII.

THE WEST’S “CHINESE CARD”

China is the best assistant of the United States in the world arena. Peking provokes a split in the Communist bloc and abuses the Russians. Its rhetoric notwithstanding, it is acting in such a way as to fortify the American presence in South Korea and Japan, in the Philippines and Thailand. It restrains North Korea and North Vietnam. From time to time it helps also in the UN.

"Washington Post" (USA), December 1, 1975

Certain US circles urge the Carter Government to “play the Chinese card” and consider that if this game is played to the end China will virtually become a member of the American economic and military system, even if not an official member of the American alliance.

"Christian Science Monitor" (USA), July 1, 1977

Instead of facing the facts soberly, some Western circles delude themselves with the hope of turning Peking’s expansionism away from themselves and channelling it in another direction. They are forgetting the bitter lessons of recent history, when appeasement of an aggressor brought about a dire catastrophe both for the “appeasers” themselves and for universal peace. Where is the guarantee that history will not repeat itself?

"Pravda" (USSR), May 14, 1978

In recent months Peking has been a mecca for every arms salesman in the world. The list is too long to include
in its entirety, but a few examples are worth giving:

— West German General Johannes Steinhoff, former chairman of the Military Committee of NATO, who arrived in Peking in the company of Adolf Kielmanseg and Heinrich Trattner, specialists in surprise attacks and aerial landings;

— Manfred Woerner, current chairman of the Federal Republic of Germany’s Bundestag Commission on Defense;

— Admiral Poser, former head of the NATO Information Service;

— James Schlesinger, former US Secretary of Defense and currently director of the US Federal Energy Agency, considered to be a Pentagon “hawk” and a bitter enemy of the process of international detente;

— Marshal Neil Cameron, Chief of the General Staff of the British army, who, while in Peking recently, stated without any beating about the bush that the British and Chinese both considered the Soviet Union to be the main enemy;

— Hiedo Miyoshi, former Chief of the General Staff of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, who stated that visits to China by Japanese military officials would increase.

“Granma” (Cuba), June 1, 1978

High-ranking officers of the Chinese army tour Western Europe shopping for new types of weapons. This picture was taken in West Germany.

“We have received reliable reports that the Chinese secret services are working in close collaboration with the French, US, West German and NATO secret services. It must be said that incredible as it seems, it is absolutely true.”

Fidel Castro, in an interview to “Afrique-Asie” (France), May, 1977
As far back as the summer of 1977, The New York Times leaked a secret document revealing that high levels of the Pentagon and State Department were discussing the pros and cons of supplying China with military technology, communications, installations, nuclear reactors, laser equipment, helicopters, antitank missiles, etc. Chinese military delegations have become assiduous marauders of NATO arsenals. Last autumn a Chinese military delegation headed by Yang Chen-wu, Associate Chief of the General Staff, travelled to France. It visited land and naval bases and expressed an interest in acquiring air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles. China hopes to purchase vertical takeoff Harrier fighter planes in England.

"Granma" (Cuba), June 1, 1978

It is not at all illogical to say that China is a 16th member of the North Atlantic alliance.

General A. Haig, NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, February, 1978

The Chinese are over and over again urging the West-Europeans to strengthen NATO in order to avert the threat from the Russians, and over and over again drawing an alluring picture of the second front China could establish in the East.

For all that, it should not be forgotten that the Chinese have always been masters at "double-crossing" policies. They also realize full well that their warnings about the military threat from the Soviet Union sound exaggerated, to say the least.

"Welt der Arbeit" (FRG), August 19, 1978

To seek to "drive the Russians out of Europe" with the help of the Chinese creates the very insecurity which endangers peace on our continent. Any conflict between China and either of the two super-powers could drag Central Europe into a new war, irrespective of whether it began on the Ussuri or in the Pacific. In the nuclear age this road leads directly to wholesale annihilation.

"Frankfurter Rundschau" (FRG), October, 1977
leaders had in common when he said that "a secure and powerful China was in the interests of the United States and that a powerful reliable United States that had commitments around the world was in the interests of China."

"Granma" (Cuba), May 30, 1978

China is playing a dangerous game, and its partners ought to give serious thought to this. It may well be that Hua Kuo-feng's train is moving in an entirely different direction from that in which they would like to move.

"Indian Express" (India), August 30, 1978

Any US-China military link might be the first step down a "slippery slope" of US involvement in problems and conflicts it should stay out of. China's internal politics and its leadership are still so unpredictable that the possibility of a reversion by the Chinese to hostile policies cannot be ruled out. Therefore, any improvement of China's military capabilities might simply increase Peking's ability to threaten US allies.

"Foreign Affairs" (USA), April, 1977

If the United States and the NATO countries are not averse to exploiting in their own interests the difficulties that have arisen in Soviet-Chinese relations, the Peking leaders have something else on their mind — to aggravate relations between the USSR and the USA to the limit, to exploit this aggravation not by any means in America's interests but in their own. A Soviet-American confrontation or, better still, war — that is Peking's cherished dream.

"Pravda" (USSR), June 17, 1978

IX.

PEKING: FIGHT THE USSR TO THE LAST EUROPEAN SOLDIER!

The continuing desire of many Europeans to seek better relations with Russia makes them react with irritation when the Chinese reject the concept of detente as a fraud.

"The Times" (Britain), November 4, 1974

A Chinese military delegation in Britain.

Peking, while trying to involve Britain and the West in an alliance against the USSR, is sure that it will have to fight a war against the Russians to the last Englishman and last Frenchman.

"Economist" (Britain), December 31, 1977
To sow discord between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, to pit them against each other is but part of a task temporarily pushed to the forefront. The main thing is to change the very basis of Europe's unification — that is the pivot of Peking's long-term foreign policy. A united sovereign Europe pursuing an independent foreign policy and guided by its own interests does not suit Washington. To perpetuate Europe's opposition to the Soviet Union would mean solving the problem. Chinese diplomacy is doing the most thankless work for the Americans by trying in roundabout ways to induce the Europeans to take a highly risky road upon which they may be deprived of the possibility of freely deciding their own affairs.

What is actually involved is a division of spheres of influence between the USA and the PRC. Europe is finding itself in the American sphere of influence and Peking is trying to ensure that it remain there.

"Courrier de politique étrangère" (France). September, 1975

China calls for the strengthening of NATO, buys West European weapons, invites West European military delegations, asks for student places for Chinese in West European universities, extends aerial communication with Western Europe — and all this not for love of our beautiful blue eyes, but because we, who neighbour on the Soviet Union from the opposite side, are of momentary interest to an ancient country which, on the whole, has always been self-satisfied and regarded all foreigners as barbarians.

"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" (Switzerland). September 20, 1978

Peking has repeatedly warned the USA that the Soviet Union is "outstripping" it in the "global rivalry" and that, as China's Foreign Minister put it during his meeting with a US delegation, "it had better come to its senses" and stop its policy of appeasing the Soviet Union.

"Christian Science Monitor" (USA). November 21, 1977

Peking has tried to incite the USA and other imperialist powers to "go ahead" and start a war. According to Kyodo Tsushin, Teng Hsiao-ping said at a meeting with a group of Japanese parliamentarians in early September 1977 that the USA was capable of starting a world war, but could not "pluck up courage to do so", that Japan had "neither the courage, strength, nor the capability of sparking off a war", and that the Soviet Union was the only country "prepared to provoke a world war".

"International Affairs" (USSR), March, 1978

China's leaders are full of advice for others. They want Turkey to stand up to the Russians, they want NATO strengthened, and Japan to stand by its alliance with the US. They want Americans involved in the tangle of African wars and politics. But is it good advice?

"U.S. News and World Report" (USA). July 17, 1978

If a war breaks out, declares PRC Defense Minister Hsu Hsien-chiang, "we shall be well placed". An armed clash between the Soviet Union and the USA — precisely that, according to the plans of Peking's strategists, will be achieved when the "Chinese card" is finally played.

"Pravda" (USSR). August 5, 1978

In order to survive, we must have business with one (the United States) in order to defeat the other (the USSR). At the present time let the USA protect us from the Soviet Union's influence and defend the coasts of the East China Sea so that we may concentrate more forces to stand up to the northern power and pay more attention to the country's
development. When we find that the time has come, we shall say to Uncle Sam: "Please pack your bag and go."

Keng Piao, member of the Political Bureau, head of the International Relations Department of the CC CPC, February, 1978

The latest events—the conclusion of a [Japanese-Chinese] treaty by dint of which there emerges a potentially powerful combination of the 950-million strong population of China and its rich natural resources with Japan's vast possibilities in terms of industry, technology and marketing—betoken major changes in that region of the globe. In connection with the shift in the strategic correlation of forces many questions arise, especially for the United States.

"Wall Street Journal" (USA), August 22, 1978

The rapprochement between two major Asian powers, Japan and China, has given rise to grave apprehensions among other countries in the region. What will happen if the resources and vast population of China are wedded to the economic might and advanced industrial technology of Japan? From the standpoint of long-term prospects the Japanese-Chinese treaty is regarded as a potential threat.

"Daily Yomiuri" (Japan), quoted in "Za' Rubezhon", August 18, 1978

The point of the Japanese-Chinese treaty is the setting up of an "Eastern NATO" through linking up the peace and friendship treaty with the Japanese-American security treaty. China undoubtedly has in mind that the Japanese-Chinese treaty has been concluded as one of the links in Chinese diplomacy, which is seeking at all costs to stem the Soviet Union's influence in Asia.

"Hsinchihshih" (Hong Kong), August, 1978

War gambler...
PRC Premier Hua Kuo-feng has made a trip to countries of Central Europe and visited Iran, everywhere trying to kindle enmity to the Soviet Union. Hua's demagogic speeches, full of hostility, certainly irritate the Russians. But it's hard to say whether Hua is the famous "Chinese card" played by the Carter government, or he himself is playing his "American card". President Carter and his National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski are acting as if they had to reward the PRC for steps which in very large measure accord with its own interests. But the thing is that the extent of the harm which greater hostility on the Soviet Union's part can do to us—and to the PRC—can be greater than the extent of Peking's usefulness to us.

"Washington Post" (USA), September 12, 1978

It is no longer a question of the West making use of China. The Chinese are determined to make use of us too. China is well and truly in the world power game — and not as a card, but a player.

"Observer" (Britain), August 27, 1978

In fact, what happened in the thirties is repeating itself in a new historical setting. At that time the leaders of the West were trying to turn fascist aggression against the USSR. The nazi chieftains for their part leaned in their aggressive policies upon the West's anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. In this way they were clearing the way for establishing control over small and medium countries in Europe before proceeding to new territorial seizures. The anti-Soviet gamble with expansionist forces turned out badly for its authors. But it also cost the whole of mankind the most grievous sacrifices and hardships in the world conflict triggered off in the late thirties.

Those lessons were tragic enough. Only irresponsible leaders who deem it permissible to gamble with the lives of millions of people can think of pitting one state against another.

"Izvestia" (USSR), August 2, 1978

Part Two

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (DOCUMENTS)
CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Excerpts from Speeches by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Our policy with regard to China is consistent and based on principle. The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government chart their policy on the long-term perspective. We are conscious of the fact that the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples coincide. We have always persevered and will continue to persevere in our efforts to keep alive the friendly feelings which exist among the Soviet people for the fraternal Chinese people, and we are certain that the Chinese people, too, have the same feelings towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

From the Speech at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Moscow, June 7, 1969

Chinese official representatives tell us that relations between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Well, if Peking does not find it possible to go further in its relations with a socialist state, we are prepared to conduct Soviet-Chinese relations on this basis today... we not only proclaim such readiness, but we translate it into the language of concrete and constructive proposals on non-aggression, on settlement of border disputes, on improvement of relations on a mutually advantageous foundation. The Chinese leaders
have known these proposals a long time. The next move is China's.

From the Speech at the 15th Congress of the Trade Unions of the USSR, March 20, 1972

The Chinese leaders claim to be disturbed about some threat emanating from the Soviet Union. If these statements are not hypocritical, it is impossible to understand why China has not replied to our proposal, repeatedly made since 1969, to assume clear, firm and permanent commitments ruling out an attack by one country on the other. If Peking is really concerned about China's security, why has not the PRC leadership agreed to conclude a special treaty renouncing the use of force, the draft of which was submitted to the Chinese side on January 15, 1971? The draft of this treaty states unequivocally that the sides — and I quote — “shall not use against each other arms or forces employing any type of arms, including: a) conventional, b) missile, or c) nuclear.” No, the Chinese leaders' complaints about a mythical “Soviet threat” quite obviously do not stand up to scrutiny.

From the Report “The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”, December 21, 1972

At first sight, it would seem that the leaders of the People's Republic of China are also in favour of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, however, their deeds do not live up to their words.

Peking, in fact, puts forward, as a preliminary condition, nothing less than the demand for withdrawal of the Soviet frontier guards from a number of areas of our territory, which the Chinese leaders have now decided to lay claim to, calling them “disputed areas”. And Peking declares outright that it will only agree to negotiations on frontier questions after its demands concerning these “disputed areas” are satisfied.

Comrades, it is absolutely clear that this position is totally untenable, and we reject it.

From the Speech at a Joint Gala Meeting of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the People's Great Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic, to Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 3rd Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the Proclamation of the Mongolian People's Republic, November 26, 1974

RELATIONS WITH CHINA, of course, are a special and separate question. The policy of its present leaders is openly directed against the majority of the socialist states. More, it merges directly with the position of the world's most extreme reaction — from the militarists and enemies of detente in the Western countries to the racists of South Africa and the fascist rulers of Chile. This policy is not only entirely alien to socialist principles and ideals, but has also, in effect, become an important aid to imperialism in its struggle against socialism.

Peking's frantic attempts to torpedo detente, to obstruct disarmament, to breed suspicion and hostility between states, its efforts to provoke a world war and reap whatever advantages
may accrue, present a great danger for all peace-loving peoples. This policy conducted by Peking is deeply opposed to the interests of all peoples. We shall continue to repulse this incendiary policy, and to protect the interests of the Soviet state, the socialist community, and the world communist movement. Now it is far too little to say that the Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist teaching; they are directly hostile to it.

In its relations with China, our Party firmly adheres to the course charted by the 24th Congress. This course has been proved correct by facts. We shall continue the struggle against Maoism — a principled and irreconcilable struggle.

At the same time, we should like to repeat once again that in our relations with China, as with other countries, we adhere firmly to the principles of equality, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and non-use of force. In short, we are prepared to normalize relations with China in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence. What is more, we can say with assurance that if Peking returns to a policy truly based on Marxism-Leninism, if it abandons its hostile policy towards the socialist countries and takes the road of cooperation and solidarity with the socialist world, there will be an appropriate response from our side and opportunities will open for developing good relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China consonant with the principles of socialist internationalism. The matter rests with the Chinese side.

The UN General Assembly's special session on disarmament is drawing to an end in New York. It has reaffirmed the profound interest of all mankind in terminating the arms race. The overwhelming majority of UN members have spoken out in favour of disarmament.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have submitted to the session a broad, bold and at the same time realistic programme for a complete termination of the arms race. Their proposals have been the main subject of businesslike discussion at the Assembly.

The session has also shown that the leaders of several major NATO countries, and above all the USA, clearly do not wish to display a constructive approach to the implementation of disarmament tasks. How else is one to appraise the holding of the NATO Council session in Washington which adopted a new long-term armament programme at a time when the special session of the UN General Assembly in New York was discussing a diametrically opposite problem — how to curb the arms race and achieve disarmament? Is this not disregard for the vital concerns and expectations of the peace-loving peoples? It appears that in Washington the NATO countries were laying down a "real policy" while in New York they participated in the discussions only to distract attention, so as not to draw just criticism and censure.

The Peking rulers are coming forward in support of this position. It seems that their representative had been confused as to the rostrum from which he was speaking. With his bellicose speech he should have spoken not in the United Nations, but at the NATO bloc's session.

By the way, this line taken by Peking is well appreciated in Washington. Of late, attempts have been made in the USA — at a high level and in a rather cynical form — to play the "Chinese card" against the USSR. This is a short-sighted and dangerous policy! Its authors may bitterly regret it.

Some leaders of capitalist countries now obviously count on the present contradictions and estrangement between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries continuing for a long time and even growing more acute in the future. We think that this is a short-sighted policy. Those who pursue it may well miscalculate.

From the Report "The Great October Revolution and Mankind's Progress", November 2, 1977
The General Assembly session is completing its work. The ideas and proposals put forward at the session will undoubtedly live on and exert their influence. The struggle for the implementation of practical steps to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament continues and must be intensified.

From the Speech at the Gala Meeting in the City of Minsk on the Occasion of Presenting the City the Order of Lenin and Gold Star Medal, June 25, 1978

ON SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

In keeping with the Leninist policy of peace, the Soviet government has constantly adhered to a principled stand on the question of relations between the USSR and China, sincerely striving to adjust them.

The 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU are known to have reaffirmed the principles on which Soviet-Chinese relations could be normalized and improved to benefit the vital interests of the peoples of both countries, and the cause of peace and socialism. In pursuance of these principles the Soviet Union has advanced a number of concrete and realistic initiatives, including a number of constructive proposals, among them those for concluding a treaty on the non-use of force (1971); a non-aggression treaty (1973); for holding high-level meetings of representatives of the two sides; for resuming economic and cultural cooperation, scientific and technical contacts and cooperation in the field of health protection and between public organizations.

These initiatives, pursuing the sole aim of returning the relations between the USSR and the PRC to the path of good-neighbourliness, have been either rejected by the Chinese side or ignored. Nevertheless, prompted by the historical responsibility for the consolidation of world peace and by concern for the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Soviet Union decided upon a new good-will step.

On February 24, 1978, on the eve of the session of the National People's Congress, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet sent a message to its Standing Committee.

The message states that over the recent years Soviet-Chinese relations have assumed a character which cannot but cause serious concern. The existing situation creates an atmosphere of mutual distrust and growing tension in inter-state relations. The vital interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples demand that definite practical measures
be taken to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations in keeping with their aspirations and hopes.

The Soviet government has repeatedly made concrete proposals aimed at restoring the USSR-PRC good-neighbourly relations, and expressed readiness to normalize relations with China on peaceful coexistence principles. For its part, the government of the People’s Republic of China has made official statements to the effect that the PRC was prepared to base its relations with the USSR on the principles of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet people sincerely wish to see China a friendly prospering power.

Expressing the will and aspirations of the Soviet people, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declares once again its readiness to end the present abnormal situation in the relations between the USSR and the PRC, and check the dangerous process of further aggravation of relations which can have serious negative consequences for our countries and peoples, for the destinies of peace in the Far East, in Asia, and throughout the world.

In order to materialize the desire, expressed by both sides, to base their relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence and embody it in a meaningful international act, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet proposes that the two countries issue a joint statement on the principles of relations between them. The Soviet Union considers that a joint statement to the effect that the sides will build their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, firmly adhering to the principles of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and non-use of force, would advance normalization of their relations.

We propose — if the idea of issuing such a statement appeals to the Chinese side — that representatives of the two sides meet at a sufficiently high level in order to agree on a mutually acceptable text of the statement as soon as possible.

We in the Soviet Union, the message states, are ready to receive representatives of the People’s Republic of China. If the Chinese side finds it expedient that Soviet representatives should visit Peking for the aforesaid purpose, we agree to this as well. For our part, we are ready to examine proposals of the People’s Republic of China aimed at normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations.

This important document expresses in no uncertain terms the Soviet Union’s striving for normal relations with China on peaceful coexistence principles, with account of each other’s interests and without any preliminary conditions.

However, again the PRC leadership has adopted a negative stand. On March 9, 1978, it reiterated the unacceptable preliminary conditions which it had set earlier, evading a substantive discussion of questions pertaining to an improvement of inter-state ties, and continuing its unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union.

Hope was expressed in Soviet circles that the Chinese leadership would respond positively to the message of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet so that constructive talks may begin with the aim of cardinally improving inter-state relations. This, regrettably, has not happened. The last session of the NPC has shown that hostility towards the Soviet Union continues to be China’s state policy.

The attitude of Chinese authorities shows once again that their words and deeds are patently at variance as their protestations to improve relations are not supported by practical action. Judging by everything, tension in Soviet-Chinese relations and artificial fanning of anti-Sovietism suit some persons in China more than normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

As far as the Soviet leadership is concerned, it firmly believes that there are no problems in the USSR-PRC relations which could not be resolved in a spirit of good-neighbourliness. Displaying good will, the Soviet side will continue to work in this direction. It stands to reason that the Soviet Union cannot ignore Peking’s present hostility towards the USSR. However, the Soviet people do not lose hope that with the passage of time relations of cooperation and good-neighbourliness between the USSR and the PRC will be restored in the interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples and world peace. Everything depends on the position of the PRC.

“Pravda”, March 21, 1978
THE POSITION OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES

"We regret to say that the present leaders of China continue to oppose detente and disarmament. They are pursuing an openly anti-Soviet policy and are strengthening political, economic and even military ties with the most reactionary quarters of imperialism. They are also working to knock together a political alliance with the Right-Wing revisionists in their struggle against the international communist movement."

From a report made by Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party at the national party conference in April, 1978

"On many occasions the Soviet Union has made constructive proposals to the People's Republic of China to conclude a non-aggression treaty and a treaty banning the use of force. It has also proposed that the two sides hold a high-level meeting and resume cooperation in various fields. All these initiatives have met with no response from the Chinese side. Moreover, relations between the two countries have, through Peking's fault, over the past few years assumed a character which has caused anxiety among progressive people of the world.

"It is in this situation that the Soviet Union has made another initiative of great political importance — the message of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet the key point of which is the proposal to end the abnormal situation in relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and to halt the dangerous process of their further deterioration. The Soviet side points out that the best way to achieve this is to make a joint statement containing the formulation, in the form of an authoritative international act, of the basic principles of relations between the two countries, the principles of peaceful coexistence... This Soviet proposal confers no advantages on either side, it serves the common interests of both the USSR and the PRC without any preconditions.

"Unfortunately this neighbourly act of the Soviet Union has not been reciprocated by the People's Republic of China. Thus yet another good opportunity for constructive dialogue aimed at achieving results that would benefit both sides has been missed."

"Rabotnichesko Delo", organ of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, March 22, 1978

"We must fight against the disruptive activities of the Chinese leaders. These activities are clearly biased in a certain direction and this, naturally, is a matter of concern to us. Today the Chinese leaders are seeking to alienate Communist parties and socialist countries from the Soviet Union, they are trying to isolate the USSR. And this is what we must not fail to realize."

From a statement made by Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, at the plenary meeting of the CC HSWP, April, 1978

"The present Chinese leaders pay nothing but lip service to what they call their allegiance to the principles of peaceful coexistence. Their actions speak to the contrary. The latest evidence of this is Peking's negative reaction to the message of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the normalization of relations between the USSR and PRC at state level..."
"The Chinese leaders are clearly pursuing disruptive tactics when they try to turn the other socialist countries against the USSR, when they hasten to support any act of nationalistic narrowmindedness. The Peking leaders want to give the impression that the socialist countries, which have made notable achievements in various fields thanks to assistance from the Soviet Union, are its 'victims'. Such allegations not only flout the truth, but also offend the national feelings of these peoples."

"Nepszabadsag" (Hungary), organ of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, April 14, 1978

"The Communist Party of Venezuela, supporting the peaceful initiatives and good will repeatedly displayed by the Soviet leaders, vigorously condemns the seditious plans of the Chinese leaders, which are directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist community states...

"While the striving for peace is gaining in strength throughout the planet and the peoples' struggle against mass annihilation weapons is expanding, the Chinese leaders are coming out in support of the production of the neutron bomb and seek to instigate a war. The Chinese leadership is encouraging Japan's revanchist aspirations in relation to the Soviet Union and is inciting the West German neo-nazis against the German Democratic Republic. The Chinese leaders support the South African racists and other forces of reaction and oppression, such as the Pinochet and Mobutu regimes..."

Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Venezuela, April, 1978

"In accordance with the policy outlined at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China, some of the modifications in the domestic policy announced at this session serve to stabilize the present regime in order to pursue by more effective methods its old great-power chauvinistic goals. The struggle against the Soviet Union and the socialist community, the preparations for war which the People's Republic of China declares unavoidable, have been confirmed constitutionally and elevated to a status of long-range national policy.

"The Soviet Union has taken another initiative to normalize its relations with the PRC. Shortly before the session of the National People's Congress, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR addressed a relevant message to its Standing Committee. This is proof of the consistency and sincerity of the Soviet Union's policy aimed at restoring good-neighbourly relations with China and we wholeheartedly approve this action.

"In a message to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the State Council of the German Democratic Republic hailed the Soviet initiative and suggested that the Chinese side take steps in line with the proposals made by the Soviet Union. We expressed our concern over the fact that the PRC Government had rejected the proposals made by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. At the same time we pointed out that China's normal relations with the Soviet Union and with all the other socialist states, which would accord with the best interests of world peace and with the best interests of all nations, would have a positive impact on the relations between the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China."

From a statement made by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, at a plenary meeting of the CC SUPG, May, 1978

"The activity of China's present leaders on the international scene bears the worst marks of Maoist policy, its anti-Soviet, militarist and great-power chauvinist expansionist tendencies. The 'three worlds' theory formulated by Mao Tse-tung has now been concretized by Teng Hsiao-ping and has been turned into a call for a 'united front against the USSR', a front that would include the United States."

"We hold that the recent message of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to the Standing Committee of the PRC National People's Congress contains a constructive basis for beginning negotiations, given good will, with the aim of normalizing relations between the two countries. "Communists across the world, including the Indonesian Communists, were profoundly disappointed by the fact that this time also the PRC leadership has rejected the Soviet proposal..."

Letter of the Indonesian Communist Party's Central Committee to the CPC Central Committee, April, 1978

"The new Soviet proposal is imbued with a desire to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations, with concern for peace and cooperation among nations. At the same time the Chinese leaders, just as before, have rejected the constructive Soviet initiative. This negative reaction of the Peking leaders shows the existence of a deep chasm between their words and deeds, and it exposes the falsity of their repeated assurances that China allegedly stands for relations with other nations, including the Soviet Union, based on peaceful coexistence. It also shows that the Chinese leaders are determined to follow a hostile course in their relations with the USSR and the other socialist states."

"Unen", organ of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Mongolia, April 20, 1978

"We are particularly concerned over the fact that despite the numerous peace initiatives of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, the Chinese side is adamant in its negative stance, which runs counter to the interests of the peoples, eroding thereby the unity of the socialist camp and favouring the implementation of imperialism's aggressive plans...

"The Maoist leadership's activities in Latin America, its support of the criminal actions of the fascist junta in Chile, its contacts with assassins like Augusto Pinochet, its treacherous interference in the African events aimed against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, its support of Israel in the Middle East conflict and convergence with the Sadat government, which has undermined the common front of the Arab countries, establishment on a new basis of relations with the revanchist quarters in West Germany, its attempts to improve its image in the eyes of the US government and the most reactionary governments of the European capitalist states, aggressive and frankly hostile policy toward the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the Communist parties of the whole world — all this yet again confirms the correctness of those who assess the disruptive course of the Maoist leadership of the PRC as one of betrayal..."

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru, March, 1978

"Recent events have shown that the Chinese leaders are opposed to the Soviet proposals aimed at bettering relations between China and the USSR. The Chinese leaders are acting in the international arena as enemies of peace and detente."

M. Knutsen, Chairman of the Communist Party of Norway, April, 1978

"The government of the People's Republic of China has repeatedly declared that it wants to build relations with other states on the principles of peaceful coexistence and that this also applies to the Soviet Union. However, these words have not been followed up by deeds, as may be judged from China's reaction to the latest Soviet proposal in which the principle of peaceful coexistence is regarded as the cornerstone of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Moreover, it has become almost a rule with the Chinese leaders that every new initiative from the Soviet Union aimed at normalizing its relations with China causes a fresh spate of anti-Soviet attacks... This shows that the present Chinese leaders do not want an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, that what they actually want is to maintain the atmosphere of tension they themselves have created in these relations."
“This, of course, is not an aim in itself. The hostility to the USSR which is being kept up and even further built up in China is at the centre of Peking’s policy spearheaded against detente and underlies its attempts to knock together an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist front.

“Therefore the negative stand taken by China’s leaders with regard to the Soviet proposal to normalize Sino-Soviet relations affects not only these two countries but the whole world whose future depends on the removal of the barriers to a lasting peace and the security of the peoples, also on relations of good-neighbourliness and cooperation with other states.

“Therefore the position of China’s leaders with regard to the Soviet proposal to normalize relations between the USSR and the PRC defies the very spirit of our times, the desire of the peoples to strengthen the foundations of peaceful coexistence between countries.”


“The Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party considers it its duty in the present international situation to appeal to you through this letter to reconsider the stand taken by the Chinese leadership in relation to the Soviet initiative aimed at normalizing relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. This would meet the interests of the Chinese people, the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the whole world, as well as the interests of security and peace in Asia and throughout the world...

“Can’t you see that your present course favours the reactionaries and capitulators in the ranks of the national movement and the world revolutionary movement? In the Arab countries this line benefits those who have betrayed their country, who have rejected revolution and taken the road of total capitulation, like Sadat and his ilk, for instance...”

From a letter of the Syrian Communist Party’s Central Committee to the CPC Central Committee, April, 1978

“We resolutely reject the dangerous and adventurist policy of the present Chinese leaders who, in pursuance of their great power and chauvinist ends, are acting in collusion with the most reactionary forces of world imperialism and whose war orientation poses a grave threat to all nations of the world.”

From a speech made by Gustav Husak, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, at the Prague Castle, May, 1978

“The anti-Soviet character of China’s domestic and foreign policy is intensifying all the time. Anti-Sovietism has become part and parcel of the ideology and practical policy of Maoism.

“Despite the apparent deterioration of relations between the USSR and China, for which the Peking leaders are responsible, the Soviet Union does not slacken its efforts to normalize relations between the two countries. One of the recent steps taken in this direction was the message addressed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of People’s
Congress. In this message the Soviet Union voices a desire to normalize its relations with China on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

"The message contains a proposal to normalize relations between the two states, with consideration given to their national interests, without any preconditions, and in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs and non-use of force.

"The Chinese leaders responded to this Soviet initiative in an insulting tone and, as they had done so many times in the past, rejected all Soviet proposals.

"At the same time the new Soviet initiative has met with world-wide support. In their commentaries the progressive press in different countries denounces the chauvinistic anti-Soviet obstructionist policy of Peking, a policy aimed at exacerbating world tensions, and at mounting fresh anti-Soviet attacks. This policy clearly shows that the Chinese leaders do not want to establish good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union."

"Rude Pravo", organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, March 30, 1978

By pursuing its great-power hegemonistic policies, Peking is increasing international tension, using for this all the means available in order to weaken the socialist community, the revolutionary and liberation forces of our time. In their bid to have access to NATO's weapons, China's rulers are advertising in every way their enmity to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and have come out in open defence of the unbridled arms drive. This policy is all the more dangerous since it enjoys the support of the most reactionary quarters in the imperialist states.

"Even today China's leaders do not stop short of expansionist actions. Evidence of this is the rude chauvinist pressure that China has brought to bear on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, also China's instigation of Kampuchea's military provocations against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the territorial claims that Peking is pressing on its neighbours."

CPSU Central Committee, "Pravda", August 27, 1978

"The growing international support for Chile's patriots contrasts sharply with the stand taken by Peking. It is no longer any secret that the Chinese authorities are trying to activize their relations with Pinochet's fascist junta in all areas. This alliance between the Maoists and extreme reactionaries again shows up the bias of Peking's foreign policy, a policy of militarism, hegemonism and anti-Sovietism."

Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Chile, April, 1978

"The Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee emphasizes the serious danger that the actions of the present leaders of China constitute for the cause of peace and socialism."
III.

REALITY AND FABRICATIONS

(Concerning Soviet-Chinese Border Settlement)

The Soviet Union has constantly shown a principled approach to the relations between the USSR and China, prompted by a sincere desire for their normalization and development.

The principles on whose basis Soviet-Chinese relations could be improved in the vital interests of the peoples of both countries, for the benefit of peace and socialism, the principles formulated at the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU, have been confirmed by the Soviet Union's concrete and realistic proposals.

One recent proof of this is the message sent by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on February 24, 1978.

Regrettably, Peking has again taken a negative stand. Moreover, the rejection of the new Soviet proposal served, as it were, as a signal for a fresh wave of the anti-Soviet campaign in China, which has been going on for years now.

What draws attention is a point which is reiterated in the speeches and statements by Chinese officials, as well as in the comments of Peking propaganda agencies, namely, the reference to the so-called mutual understanding on the question of normalization of relations between the two countries, allegedly achieved during the meeting of the Heads of Government of the USSR and China, which took place in Peking on September 11, 1969.

The Chinese version is that talks on border matters must be preceded by a number of preliminary conditions to be fulfilled by the Soviet Union, i.e., recognition of the existence of so-called "disputed areas" in the Soviet territory adjoining the border, the withdrawal of armed forces from these areas, and the conclusion of an agreement on the preservation of the status quo on the border. In addition, Peking demands that Soviet troops be withdrawn from the Mongolian People's Republic and the entire length of the Soviet-Chinese border.

Certain Western quarters have eagerly snatched up this version. It is even claimed that during the meeting the sides allegedly signed some kind of a document, almost a "treaty".

This version has nothing in common with reality. By resorting to obvious distortions and deliberately misleading world public opinion, Peking makes use of the circumstance that at the meeting itself no documents (for instance, a declaration, a statement, uniform minutes) were drawn up, except for a brief statement for the press, the agreed text of which was unilaterally changed by Peking. However, the fact is intentionally concealed that the positions of the sides were documented, but after the meeting, through an exchange of letters between the sides.

1

How does the Chinese side interpret the matters which were discussed at the above-mentioned meeting and in the subsequent official correspondence? What are they?

One group consists of questions on which the sides expressed either identical or close views.

Agreement was reached that certain steps be taken to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations (to restore relations at ambassadorial level, expand trade between the two countries, etc.). The sides also held that a border settlement was an important link in the matter of normalization of inter-state relations. They agreed not to permit armed conflicts to occur on the border and to settle matters through negotiation.

In keeping with this agreement, the Soviet side took a number of measures which Peking was informed about in a letter dated September 26, 1969. What are these measures?

— To maintain normal relations between the Soviet and Chinese border units and the status quo on the border;

— to follow a procedure under which all border
questions should be examined through consultations in a spirit of good will and an atmosphere of good-neighbourliness prevail on the border, and the use of arms and force be ruled out;
— in keeping with the traditionally friendly relations existing between the peoples of the USSR and China, to take into account, in a spirit of good will and reciprocity, the interests of the population of the border areas of both countries in the field of economic activity;
— not to conduct propaganda on the border against the other side, including the use of amplifiers.

Peking, in its turn, announced in written form that the Chinese side had also taken appropriate steps.

Thus, both sides acknowledged mutual interest in normalizing inter-state relations and the situation on the border. Mutual understanding was achieved, and it was an important result of the meeting. Later on, the sides exchanged ambassadors, and measures were adopted for the expansion of trade.

It must be emphasized here that neither during the meeting nor in the subsequent exchange of letters between the sides was the achievement of positive results at the talks made dependent on the fulfilment of any preliminary conditions. At any rate, the Soviet Union did not advance such conditions and did not undertake commitments that would impair its interests.

The Soviet Union was intent on preventing border conflicts and on starting Soviet-Chinese talks on questions of border settlement and the basic principles of future constructive negotiations. The recognition of the existing border is one of these principles.

As for the concrete and specific questions pertaining to border settlement, they were to be tackled by the delegations appointed by the governments of both countries.

The sides agreed that during the talks both delegations should proceed from the fundamental principles, that is: border questions shall be settled on the basis of the Russo-Chinese contractual documents in force and the sides shall have no territorial claims against each other.

At the meeting questions also emerged on which the sides immediately recorded their disagreement. Mutual consent and consensus were not registered on the question of “disputed areas”, the disengagement of armed personnel and the procedure of economic activity either at the meeting of the sides or in their correspondence.

It was the Chinese Premier who put forward the “disputed areas” issue and tried to impose it upon the Soviet side. Asked what he meant by the term “disputed areas”, he said: “When we begin border talks, it will become clear to you, we shall give you our maps”.

Peking’s letter dated September 18, 1969, said that the question about the Chinese-Soviet border should be solved through peaceful negotiations and that pending its settlement each side would take interim measures to normalize the situation on the border and avoid armed conflicts. The letter listed five points to achieve these measures. In particular, it was proposed to recognize the existence of “disputed areas”, effect the “disengagement” of the armed forces there, and also determine the procedure of economic activity there. In conclusion the letter said: “If the above-mentioned measures are confirmed by a letter from the Head of the Soviet Government, they will become an agreement between the two governments.”

In this way the Chinese side confirmed in this letter the absence of agreement on a number of questions, including the “disputed areas”. Perhaps the Soviet side eventually changed its position and accepted Peking’s proposals? No, consent was not given either in the reply letter of the Soviet side, dated September 26, 1969, or in any subsequent Soviet letters and documents. It is not accidental that the second letter of the Chinese side, dated October 6, 1969, again expressed the wish “to reach agreement” on the said questions, including the “disputed areas”.

Nowadays Peking even presents its unilateral demands about the withdrawal of Soviet troops “deployed along the border” and also about the withdrawal of troops from the Mongolian People’s Republic as a part of “mutual understanding”. The truth, however, is that the matter was not raised at all either at the meeting or in the subsequent correspondence between the sides.

This is the real state of affairs. Yet Peking harps on the “mutual understanding” version it invented, accusing
the Soviet Union of “rejecting” and “violating” this “mutual understanding”.

2

Let us see what meaning Peking leaders impart to the concept of “disputed areas”, and how and when it originated.

Until 1960 China had not made any territorial claims to the Soviet Union, not counting the Chiangkaishekites’ expansionist encroachments upon Soviet territory. More than that, it was repeatedly admitted that the territorial integrity of the two sides was respected and that it was determined by the contractual documents whose validity nobody questioned. The joint declaration of the Soviet and Chinese governments, dated October 12, 1954, and other documents say that cooperation between the two countries is based on the principles of equality, mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Soviet Union has stated on several occasions that there was not, nor is there, any territorial problem between it and the People’s Republic of China. The problem emerged when the Chinese leaders, having ruptured friendly relations with the USSR, embarked upon nationalistic and great-power positions. It was then that Peking made attempts at changing the Soviet-Chinese border and not only on paper for that matter.

Soviet-Chinese consultations to specify the line of the border on its individual sections were held in 1964 on Soviet initiative. During the consultations the delegations exchanged topographic maps. Then it came to light that the Chinese maps showed a number of areas on Soviet territory as belonging to China and that the border line of these areas was arbitrarily traced in the depth of Soviet territory, behind the line which had been protected by Soviet frontier guards since the establishment of the Soviet state. It was these areas of Soviet territory that the Chinese side called “disputed”.

It is important to stress that the border line of the “disputed areas” marked on the Chinese maps, has no juridical foundations whatsoever. It does not coincide with the line determined by the Russo-Chinese contractual documents. It is not accidental that in order to substantiate its tracing of the border line Peking refuses to consider the contractual documents which constitute the only juridical substantiation of the existing border. On top of it, Peking says that the Soviet Union should first admit the existence of “disputed areas” on its territory and that after that it will be given “substantiations”. Insisting on the recognition of the existence of “disputed areas”, Peking wants to undermine the contractual-legal foundation of the existing borderline.

Peking’s scheme is rather simple: by confirming in a bilateral interim agreement, which, in Peking’s view, should precede any discussion of the border issue, the existence of “disputed areas”, the Soviet side would de facto recognize the legitimacy of the Maoist claims. This also would create a pretext for new territorial claims to the USSR.

Judging by everything, Peking hopes that recognition by the Soviet side of the existence of “disputed areas” would allow it:
— to call in question the validity of the Russian-Chinese agreements which determine the present Soviet-Chinese border;
— to maintain that at present there is no single and continuous borderline between the USSR and China defined by any agreements;
— to lay claim to large areas of Soviet territory before the discussion of the border problem;
— to count on a unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal from “disputed areas”, which, in fact, open the border with a frontage of thousands of kilometres; as a result the Soviet population would have no defence or cover, whereas the Chinese troops would remain where they were and the Chinese authorities would have an opportunity to “develop” these areas.

In his speech in Ulan Bator in November 1974, Leonid Brezhnev said: “Peking, in fact, puts forward as a preliminary condition nothing less than the demand for withdrawal of Soviet frontier guards from a number of areas of our territory, which the Chinese leaders have now decided to lay claim to, calling them ‘disputed areas’... It is absolutely clear that this position is totally unacceptable and we reject it.
“As for the Soviet Union, we do not lay down any preliminary conditions for the normalization of relations with China. We have long offered the Chinese side to begin businesslike and concrete negotiations. We do not lay claims to any foreign territories, and for us there are no ‘disputed areas’.

3

The fact that in the past the border between the two countries came to be known as a “friendship” border shows once again that China is deliberately and maliciously exaggerating the “border problem”. Such a problem does not exist and never existed. Chinese leaders themselves admitted this. Replying to a question put in April 1960 at a press conference in the capital of Nepal, whether there were unsettled border sectors between the USSR and China, none other than China’s Premier said: “There are minor differences on the maps. They are very easy to settle peacefully.”

True, no one says that the Soviet Union and China should not, in some areas, establish more accurately the borderline determined by the Russian-Chinese agreements. This is what the Soviet side had in mind when it invited Peking to discuss border settlement issues in 1964 and 1969.

This is not hard to do: one should just take the Russian-Chinese agreements and work things out on their basis.

The Chinese side has taken an absolutely different position on the border settlement. From the very beginning of the talks it tried to dodge the discussion of the main item, that is, establishing more accurately the borderline in some areas, and as stubbornly insisted on a preliminary agreement on so-called “interim measures”, whose chief purpose was to force the Soviet Union to recognize the existence of “disputed areas”.

The Chinese side refers to the agreement on the preservation of the status quo on the border as an important element of “mutual understanding” and puts it forward as the main condition for further negotiations on border problems. Meanwhile the Chinese government itself said on October 7, 1969, that this proposal was not provided for by the agreement between the Heads of State and was made “in addition” to it.

Displaying good will and guided by a sincere desire to achieve progress at the negotiations, the Soviet side did not object to a status quo agreement and submitted a draft of such an agreement on February 11, 1970. It did not contain any preliminary conditions and, given minimum good will, could be a basis for working out mutually acceptable solutions. Later on the Soviet side presented several drafts of the agreement which took into account all reasonable proposals made by Peking. Moreover, at various stages of the talks we made many important constructive proposals and did all we could to achieve progress. The Chinese delegation, however, arbitrarily rejected all constructive Soviet initiatives.

The Soviet side is for the status quo, by which it understands the preservation of the present border determined by the Russian-Chinese treaty documents while not denying, as has already been mentioned, the need for some adjustments. In contrast, the Chinese side links the status quo with the recognition of “disputed areas” and a recarving of the historically established border. The Soviet Union naturally cannot accept such an interpretation of the status quo.

For more than eight years now China’s representatives have suggested one and the same scheme at the Soviet-Chinese talks: without the conclusion of an agreement on the status quo there can be no adjusting the border line, and without the recognition of “disputed areas” there can be no agreement on the status quo.

The entire behaviour of Peking indicates that it is not after a settlement of border issues; it seeks deliberately to exaggerate them for its anti-Soviet, chauvinistic ends. This is the only possible explanation for the clamorous provocative campaign in “substantiation” of the claims to Soviet lands which has been conducted in Peking for many years now.

Peking goes out of the way to prove that China is the “injured party”, that the Soviet Union wants to “destroy” China and that in these conditions it is impossible to achieve success at the talks. But will it not be more correct
to say that while deliberately putting off the settlement of the border issues the Chinese authorities find it more convenient to concoct fables about the so-called “Soviet threat”?

If Peking is really concerned about China’s security, then why did it refuse to sign the treaty on the non-use of force, the draft of which was handed to the Chinese side on January 15, 1971, as well as the Soviet-proposed non-aggression treaty of 1973? Perhaps, the Chinese leaders believe that the anti-Soviet propaganda being fanned up in China day after day is Peking’s contribution to creating favourable conditions” for the talks and for bettering state relations between the USSR and China? Or, in its opinion, the language of ultimatums in regard to neighbouring countries is conducive to the creation of such conditions? Yet it is precisely this language that Peking seeks to establish in the sphere of inter-state relations, demanding, for example, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the borders and the withdrawal of military units from the Mongolian People’s Republic where they are stationed at the request of the Mongolian government. The language of ultimatums, however, has never led to genuine normalization.

It is not very convenient to be in two boats, the Chinese say. To pretend to be desirous of developing relations between countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and “strengthening friendship between peoples” meanwhile calling for the unification of all the dark forces of reaction and imperialism for the struggle against the Soviet Union, and to make territorial claims to the people while protesting friendship means to take a double-faced and provocative stand.

If Peking really wants to improve relations between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China and to complete the talks on border issues on a practicable basis, there is every opportunity for this. The PRC leadership well knows of the many important Soviet initiatives which fully correspond to the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples and are aimed at achieving positive shifts in relations between the Soviet Union and China.

“There is no point in trying to guess how Soviet-Chinese relations will shape up in the future,” Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said on November 2, 1977. “I would merely like to say that our numerous proposals to normalize them still hold good.”

A sincere, genuine expression of good will and a desire to improve relations — this is what the interests of the peoples of our two countries demand. In almost two decades many complex problems have of course accumulated in Soviet-Chinese relations, but this only confirms the need for constructive exchange of opinions. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that there are hardly any problems existing between the USSR and China that cannot be solved given good will.

Now the matter rests with the Chinese side.

“Pravda”, April 1, 1978
After the Chinese leaders broke off all Party contacts, the CPSU made a number of proposals for establishing high-level government contacts between the USSR and China. The meeting between the heads of government of the two countries that took place in September, 1969, in Peking was held on Soviet initiative. In the course of the talks with Chou En-lai the two sides agreed that similar meetings should be held in the future, if necessary. In 1970 the Soviet side suggested that another such meeting be held. In June, 1973 the USSR formally expressed to the Chinese side its readiness to meet China's representatives at any, even the highest, level.

* * *

In September 1969, the Soviet Union proposed that the two sides pledge, on the basis of reciprocity, not to attack each other and that this pledge be formalized in a special high-level government act.

* * *

On July 8, 1970, the Soviet government proposed that the two sides conclude an agreement on mutual non-aggression by their armed forces, including nuclear forces, and banning the propaganda of war and preparation for war against the other side.

* * *

On January 15, 1971, the Soviet government raised the question of signing without delay a treaty between the USSR and China on the non-use of force or the threat of force in any form, including conventional, rocket and nuclear weapons. The Soviet government handed the text of a draft of such a treaty to the Chinese government.

* * *

On March 6, 1973, in an effort to break the stalemate over the talks on border questions, the Soviet side proposed that the sides proceed to examine the line of the Soviet-Chinese border, beginning with its Eastern part.

* * *

On June 14, 1973, the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the USSR and China, making it binding on both sides not to attack each other with any types of weapons on land, at sea or air, and not to threaten each other with such an attack.

* * *

In addition to these proposals the Soviet side in February 1972 proposed concluding long-term contracts and resuming border trade between the USSR and the PRC.

— In March 1973 the Ministry of Health of the USSR made a proposal to the Chinese side for resuming cooperation in the sphere of health protection.

— In October 1974 the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship with Foreign Countries sent an invitation to the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society to take part in the Third All-Union Conference of USSFFC.

— Various Soviet organizations and officials made proposals to the Chinese side on the resumption of the earlier practice of repairing Soviet ships in Chinese ports and sending Soviet plant to China. They also proposed that China and the Soviet Union resume contacts and cooperation between their Academies and friendship societies, exchange correspondents of national newspapers, exchange scientific and technical information, begin work
on the publication in China of a Sino-Russian dictionary compiled in the Soviet Union and so on.

None of these Soviet initiatives has been followed up by the Chinese side.

"THERE IS NO POINT IN TRYING TO GUESS HOW SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS WILL SHAPE UP IN THE FUTURE. I WOULD MERELY LIKE TO SAY THAT OUR REPEATED PROPOSALS TO NORMALIZE THEM STILL HOLD GOOD."

From L. I. Brezhnev's report "The Great October Revolution and Mankind's Progress" delivered at a jubilee meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR to mark the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, November 2, 1977