The Strategy for People's War in India
Repudiation of
the Views on Military Line of the Central Reorganisation Committee,
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
This article originally
appeared in Spring Thunder no. 1 in 1998, then the theoretical journal
of the Maoist Unity Centre CPI(ML). Since that time the MUC has
ceased to exist, having joined forces with Communist Party of India
(ML) Naxalbari [CPI (ML) Naxalbari ] in April of 1999 to form a
united organisation which upholds the basic positions in this article.
Because of its length AWTW was forced to cut approximately
25% of the article. The whole article is available from us upon
request. - AWTW
From its formation in 1979 till its dissolution in 1991 the views
of the CRC,CPI(ML) on armed struggle and military line underwent
three important shifts. The first one took shape in the period 1979-1982.
It was sanctioned by the All-India Conference of 1982 and further
developed during the following months. The second one emerged during
the discussions leading to the 1985 All-India Plenum and the Second
All-India Conference held in 1987. It was formalised in 1988. The
third shift took place with the adoption of the document "On
Proletarian Democracy", put forward in the form of a draft
for discussion. It could not be finalised since the CRC,CPI(ML)
was liquidated in October 1991. Throughout this period the CRC,CPI(ML)
claimed to uphold the path of people's war and its basic concepts.
This is why we have characterised the changes in its views on armed
struggle and military line as "shifts". But, as we shall
see below, they really represented a consistent, step by step deviation
from the military science of the proletariat.
MOVING AWAY
FROM CHARU MAZUMDAR
The CRC,CPI(ML)
[CRC] upheld the "proletarian revolutionary line of Comrade
Charu Mazumdar" as one of its basic positions. It stated, "Armed
struggle is the main form of struggle and all other forms of struggle
should be complementary to it." But, from the very beginning,
the main constituents of the new organisation diverged in their
grasp and practice of this basic position. The Andhra Pradesh unit
was of the view that the main weakness of the earlier movement lay
in the military aspect. Whereas the Kerala unit considered that
it should be sought in errors in developing mass organisations,
mass struggles and economic programme. Just preceding the formation
of the CRC, the Kerala State Committee (KSC) had adopted certain
positions on these questions. Pointing to particular conditions
in Keralam, it argued that the armed struggle could be initiated
only after "uncovering and sharpening contradictions by intervening
in ongoing mass and trade union struggles and developing them into
political struggles". These differences were settled by the
1982 Conference. The issue was decided in favour of the Kerala State
Committee's positions. An earlier draft "Tactical Line"
document, drawn up along the lines of the basic position adopted
in 1979, was withdrawn by decision of the Conference. Since the
positions of the KSC became decisive in the further evolution of
the CRC's views on armed struggle and military line, we will probe
them in more detail.
The positions of the KSC diverged from the 1970 line of the CPI(ML)
in two important aspects. The more obvious one was its proposal
to develop mass struggles into political struggles in order to prepare
the ground for initiating armed struggle. This contradicted Charu
Mazumdar's well-known opposition to making economic or partial struggles
a precondition for the initiation of armed struggle. It also contradicted
Lenin's refutation of economism and the Leninist stand that economic
struggles cannot be developed into the political struggle for power.
By now, the KSC had already come to the view that the CPI(ML) failed
to develop mass organisations and struggles complementary to people's
war. It held that this remained as a major issue of rectification.
This was the justification for diverging from Charu Mazumdar. But
the contradiction with Leninism could not be explained away so readily.
The KSC sought to do this by adopting a new style of militant mass
struggle built around the slogan, "To rebel against injustice
is right". The thrust of its practice was on intervening in
local issues and conducting "People's Trials" with mass
participation mobilised on the basis of this slogan. Contradictions
among the masses, as well as contradictions between the masses and
local oppressors, were handled in these trials. They were conducted
by People's Committees temporarily formed to take up specific issues.
These trials were projected as "rudimentary forms of parallel
political power".
Work along these lines spread out very quickly. In some areas this
led to a sharpening of the contradictions with local oppressors
and annihilations. The whole experience appeared to validate the
KSC's claim of developing mass struggle, complementary to armed
struggle, without sliding into economism. Furthermore, it also appeared
to substantiate its claim of applying the lessons of the struggle
in defence of Mao Tsetung Thought and the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution (GPCR) against the capitalist usurpers in China, to resolve
the crucial problems facing the Indian new-democratic revolution.
We noted that KSC positions diverged in two ways. The second, not
so obvious one, was contained in the assumption that the armed struggle
could be initiated only after uncovering and sharpening the contradictions.
This implied that, apart from the subjective conditions, the objective
conditions for initiating armed struggle were also either absent
or weak. Yet this conclusion was never spelt out. Rather, the CRC
continued to maintain that, despite being uneven, a continuous revolutionary
situation existed throughout India.
While discussing the prospects for initiating and sustaining the
armed struggle for the seizure of power, Mao Tsetung had pointed
to the existence of a continuous revolutionary situation in China.
This was formed by objective contradictions, namely, the contradiction
between imperialism and the people and that between feudalism and
the broad masses. Mao had also pointed out that the revolutionary
situation was never static. Depending on conditions and the advance
of armed agrarian revolution, it could be stagnating or developing
and there could be ebbs and high tides. By initiating the war in
regions of sharp contradictions, building up armed forces and seizing
power areawise, the communist party should expand red power in wave
upon wave. Thus, it should accelerate the development of the revolutionary
situation.1 Charu Mazumdar had insisted on these Maoist positions
as one of the cornerstones of the new party's ideological and political
line.2
Accepting the existence of a continuous revolutionary situation
in the oppressed countries means, in essence, accepting the objective
possibility and necessity of initiating armed struggle to seize
political power, without waiting for the maturing of a countrywide
revolutionary crisis. Evidently, this does not negate the necessity
of preparations, the building up of sufficient subjective forces
to initiate and sustain armed struggle. But it makes this preparation,
and only this preparation, the key ideological, political
and organisational task which must be addressed by a Maoist party.
Though the KSC's positions on the necessity of uncovering and sharpening
contradictions appeared to be in the nature of such preparations,
its essence was quite different. If conditions in Keralam had created
a situation where the objective contradictions were nowhere sharp,
then apart from the preparation of the subjective forces, the objective
conditions for taking up the armed struggle for seizure of power
itself had to mature. In that case, armed struggle could not be
on an immediate agenda, regardless of the level of the subjective
forces.
This was the key to the camouflaged economism of the KSC. Although
not everywhere and in equal intensity, the objective conditions
for the initiation and development of people's war always exist
in an oppressed country. The central task of a Maoist party is to
seize this opportunity and make the initiation and development of
war the centre of gravity in all its areas and spheres of activity.
If this task is kept aside or grasped in a formal way then the party's
line will be economist, no matter what its subjective intentions
are. Because, when socio-economic and political conditions have
already put the armed struggle for seizure of power, the highest
task of revolution, on the agenda, any line which falls short of
directly taking it up will be economist.
Once again, this does not mean that the party should initiate armed
struggle without preparation. It also does not mean that it should
be initiated in all of its areas of activity. Even in the vast countryside,
where contradictions are comparatively sharper, there will be regions
where the objective conditions are less developed. The party should
make a materialist evaluation, through investigations, identify
that region (or regions) most suitable for the initiation and development
of people's war and concentrate there. Besides, its work in other
regions, both in the countryside and cities, must be handled in
a manner serving the task of initiation. "Before the outbreak
of war all organisation and struggle arise in preparation for the
war….After the war breaks out, all organisation and struggle are
co-ordinated with the war, either directly or indirectly."3
The successful initiation and development of People's Wars in Peru
and Nepal at the end of the twentieth century is powerful testimony
to the Maoist position: The central and immediate task of a communist
party in an oppressed country is to seize power from the class enemy
through people's war. All of its activities should be oriented towards
the resolution of this task. All the activities of the party should
be judged primarily in relation to this central task. It should
either carry out the seizure of power or should be preparing for
it.
During this period, the KSC [and later the CRC] was upholding the
strategic line of an Indian new-democratic revolution. There was
no question of drawing up a separate tactical line for Keralam.
Yet, instead of reviewing and rectifying the KSC positions, they
were made the dominant guidelines of the CRC. Moreover, the KSC's
contention on the particular conditions existing in Keralam was
never investigated and challenged in a systematic manner.
True, certain transformations were taking place in Kerala's class
relations. They played a role in the ebb of the revolutionary situation
since the mid-1970s. But the agrarian question was by no means resolved.
Besides, even in those conditions, there were still regions of sharp
contradictions with explicit forms of semi-feudal exploitation.
In other words, unevenness remained (and remains) as an important
feature. In particular, this period of ebb was also a period of
intensification in the exploitation and oppression of the Adivasi
masses, by any standards the lowest section of society. Land-grabbing
from Adivasis became an immensely profitable business for powerful
landlords and money-lenders. The two parliamentary fronts led by
the Congress and the CPI(M) had reached stagnation. Significant
sections of the Dalit basic masses were being alienated from the
parliamentary left. The rise of new forms of sharecropping and tenure,
the rapid growth of private financiers (known among the masses as
"blade" companies) and the evolution of new bureaucrat
capitalist relations in agriculture and industry, through the agencies
of the state and co-operatives, were also part of the new situation.
In other words, the transformations in class relations had not at
all made the Maoist basic principles irrelevant in Keralam.
Instead of making a concrete analysis of the concrete conditions,
the KSC made a summary evaluation, which, in essence, wrote of the
possibility of initiating people's war in Keralam. Its acceptance
of a continuous revolutionary situation was formal and idealist,
since it neither analysed nor grasped the specificities of the revolutionary
situation. This deviation was endorsed and further worsened by subsequent
positions of the CRC.
These two intertwining strands of economism and idealism were continued
in the CRC's positions on parallel political power and its concept
of political power. As mentioned earlier, People's Trials were seen
as a rudimentary or embryonic form of parallel political power.
In reality, they were no more than the imposition of the momentarily
organised will of the masses in some specific partial issues. Just
as much as a forcible seizure of land does not, in itself, contain
the seizure of political power, a People's Trial leading to the
annihilation of a hated tyrant also does not represent anything
more than the violent resolution of a partial issue. Furthermore,
these trials were not protected by any means of revolutionary armed
force. Hence, they could be conducted only up till the point that
the enemy's political power unleashed its suppression. Once the
enemy decided that enough was enough and started suppressing those
organising and participating in such trials, they came to a stop.
The lesson was not a new one. No amount of "organised will"
can stand up to the enemy's armed suppression unless it takes up
arms. Political power can only grow through the barrel of a gun.
The enemy's political power must be destroyed through armed struggle
to set up and defend the new power. Without such political power
"everything is illusion". In the case of the CRC, this
illusion was created and maintained by its concept of parallel political
power. It was later deepened with its "new concept of political
power".
We will first analyse the concept of parallel political power. Parallel
to what? If it is supposed to be parallel to the enemy's power,
then the question of whether it can exist over a long period of
time must be answered. More fundamentally, the question must be
answered of whether at all revolutionary political power
can exist in parallel to the enemy's power. The Maoist concept of
red power, base area, liberated area, etc., can be said to be parallel
political power only in the sense that they exist in a small part
(or parts) of a country where countrywide political power is still
held by the enemy. Within the base area red power is the sole
power. Moreover, as proved by the experience of the October
Revolution, even in capitalist countries "dual" power
can exist only for a brief period. It can exist only under exceptional
circumstances, where neither of the contending powers is in a position
to forcefully impose its domination. This duality has to be resolved
in favour of one or other power. In a certain sense, the red power
pockets, established through people's war, also face a similar urgency.
Unless the pockets of red power are created and sustained as base
areas of the people's war, unless they are expanded to accelerate
the revolutionary situation, unless the war is developed as a "total
war"4 , aiming at the countrywide seizure of power, they will
not be able to exist for long. This is apart from the constant possibility
of their being abandoned temporarily, in order to manoeuvre, or
their being seized back by the enemy.
Within the strategy of people's war, particularly in the initial
period leading to the areawise seizure of power, parallel power
other than as pockets of red power has no place and can have no
place. Any concept of establishing power, without the areawise
armed smashing of the enemy's power and the building up of armed
forces to defend the new power, is sheer idealism. It is the substitution
of the "illusion of power" for real political power. This
is why Mao insisted that, "The fundamental conditions for
establishing a base area are that there should be armed forces,
that these armed forces should be employed to inflict defeats on
the enemy and that they should arouse the people to action."5
Lenin himself had pointed out that the seizure of power even in
a small area would immediately confront the revolutionaries with
all the tasks of government.6 The point is that one cannot
have power in parts. Areawise seizure of power is partial only in
relation to the countrywide power of the enemy. Within that area
or base, it must be the sole power. Otherwise it is not yet political
power. We will have to come to back to this question later on.
'LEFT' SPONTANEITY
COMPLEMENTS ECONOMISM
The positions of the KSC, which later on became the line of the
CRC, did not go unchallenged. Within the Kerala unit itself some
comrades had opposed these positions and many had doubts. But the
strongest opposition came from the Andhra Pradesh (AP) unit. It
continued the struggle till splitting away in 1985.
As pointed out earlier, the AP unit had identified the military
aspect as the principal issue of the setback. On its own, and later
as part of the CRC, it launched a number of armed assaults. But
they could not be sustained. Many leading cadres were caught and
killed by the police.
Actually, apart from correctly identifying the military aspect as
the key issue to be taken up, the AP State Committee never tried
to make a systematic summation of the military line and experiences
of the CPI(ML). Merely insisting on the correctness of Charu Mazumdar's
positions and trying to keep the flag of armed struggle flying,
it repeated a number of errors which were evident in the armed struggle
led by the CPI(ML) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There was
no rupture from the powerful elements of spontaneity in military
matters. This failure sustained 'left' errors in developing mass
work to prepare for and serve the people's war. Ultimately, its
correct stand, on seeing the military aspect as the principal issue
leading to the setback, did not advance beyond a formal assertion.
The failure of the AP unit in taking up the military question from
the standpoint of line and synthesising both the positive and negative
lessons of the armed struggle led by the CPI(ML), gave ample room
for the CRC leadership to establish the Kerala experience as the
cornerstone of its summation of CPI(ML) experience.
The feeble opposition in Keralam also suffered from a similar weakness.
From 1967 until 1976, the revolutionary movement in Keralam had
carried out armed struggles, including successful assaults on police
outposts. But the struggle could not be sustained. In fact, unlike
other states in India, the movement was totally crushed a number
of times by the enemy. Given this experience, some hard thinking
was called for. Dogmatist denial of mass struggles and organisation
and secrecy had helped the CPI-CPM revisionists in isolating the
party. Yet it still enjoyed prestige among the basic masses. After
the repeal of the state of emergency in 19777 most of the cadres,
including leading ones, could resume revolutionary activities. Based
on these positive strengths, a proper summation of the political-military
failures, aimed at charting the application of the path of people's
war in the concrete conditions of Keralam, was needed. But the opposition
to the new positions failed to rise up to this task. They too failed
to rupture from the elements of spontaneity, subjectivity and one-sidedness
in the CPI(ML)'s line and practice. Subsequently they were swept
up into the spontaneity of economism.
SUMMING
OUT REVOLUTION
All the elements
of the CRC's positions on armed struggle as it existed until 1985
had thus emerged by 1982. What remained to be done was the task
of placing them in a comprehensive line and making this the basis
of evaluating the experiences of the CPI(ML). This was done in the
First All-India Conference.
The CRC's summation, "Towards a New Phase of Spring Thunder",
picked on some real errors in Charu Mazumdar's positions and the
CPI(ML) line and practice in order to reverse correct verdicts.
Charu Mazumdar's "counterposing of mass struggles and mass
organisation to guerrilla struggle", ignoring the necessity
of an agrarian programme and one-sided stress on secret work, etc.,
were identified as the major reasons for the setback. Regarding
military line, it argued, "...the party was not implementing
a well thought-out and well defined line on the military front.
At times the military line was developing spontaneously and at other
times comrade Charu Mazumdar was attempting to give a shape to it."8
But this justified criticism of spontaneity covered up the worship
of spontaneity from the opposite, economist end. The CRC's ideas
about a "conscious development" of military line meant
that, "…the communist revolutionaries who were leading the
Naxalbari9 struggle could not chalk out a thorough, concrete programme
for establishing parallel power centres and continuing it for a
long time because they did not think seriously about the possibility
of the existence of dual power centres in the countryside for a
long time. Without a political line of setting up people's power
centres in parallel to the enemy's existing power centres and gradually
overcoming the latter through a long drawn-out struggle, the concept
of establishing political power at the local level can never be
realised, leading ultimately to the countrywide seizure of power."10
This error was attributed to "…the lack of the very concept
of protracted war".11 Charu Mazumdar's counterpoising of the
struggle for political power and the struggle for "economic
gains" was also identified as one of the reasons leading to
the setback. In fact, this was characterised as the very basis of
"…the dogmatic understanding of the question of political power
and one-sided rejection of other forms of struggle and organisation".12
Let us start from this argument. Any class seizes power in order
to overturn existing relations of production and establish new ones
corresponding to its class interests. This is also a decisive way
of suppressing and eliminating the overturned class. Areawise seizure
of power also entails these tasks, though not in its fullest dimension.
In an oppressed country the crux of these tasks is the overturning
of semi-feudal agrarian relations and the implementation of "land
to the tiller". This is what an agrarian programme should deal
with. Though the CPI(ML) did not have a worked-out agrarian programme,
it did have a clear-cut agrarian policy. This policy was realised
in the Naxalbari armed rebellion. The Terai report gave an exhaustive
account of this experience.13 It also summed up the reasons for
the setback at Naxalbari in the following way: "...lack of
strong party organisation; failure to rely wholeheartedly on the
masses and to build a powerful mass base; ignorance of military
affairs; thinking on old lines and a formal attitude towards
the establishment of political power and the work of land reform."14
Obviously, all these are linked to one another and the crux is the
seizure of power. Without overturning the political, economic and
social relations enforced by the political power of the enemy classes,
the peasants could never impose the programme of "land to the
tiller". Their seizure of land was not a struggle for economic
"demands" or "gains" in a partial sense. It
was decisive in overturning the whole semi-feudal structure in Naxalbari.
This was the gist of Charu Mazumdar's summation, "…militant
struggles must be carried on not for land, crops, etc., but for
the seizure of political power".15 Seizing on the lapse16 in
this formulation, which gave room for excluding the economic dimension
in the areawise seizure of power, the CRC reduced the struggle in
this sphere to one of "economic demands". It then went
on to argue that this struggle should precede the struggle for political
power.
One year after Naxalbari, Charu Mazumdar explained his line for
developing protracted People's War by relying on the masses: "To
forge close and intimate links with the people, the peasants comprising
the poor and landless peasants must organise the class struggle
of the broad peasant masses by spreading and propagating revolutionary
politics in accordance with the Thought of Chairman Mao. When
such class struggles are organised, these party units, comprising
the poor and landless peasants, will be transformed into guerrilla
units. These guerrilla units must then broaden and strengthen
the party's mass base by spreading and propagating revolutionary
politics through armed struggle. Only in this way and through
a protracted struggle can a regular armed force be created and the
struggle developed into a people's war."17 On this, the CRC
said, "By merely propagating revolutionary politics, class
struggle cannot be developed. All the day to day problems of the
people are to be handled using all possible open and secret mass
activities and thus developed into higher forms of class struggle.
Along with implementing such a programme, we have to propagate revolutionary
politics. Otherwise in the absence of such a programme for the fulfilment
of the economic demands of the people, the revolutionary politics
will appear as abstract slogans unconnected to real life."18
Thus, organising class struggle on the basis of revolutionary
politics, i.e. the seizure of political power, is replaced with
organising class struggle on the basis of economic demands. The
revolutionary agrarian programme, which alone can fulfil the economic
demands of the masses in a fundamental sense, is replaced with a
programme of struggle for partial demands. Economic struggle is
separated from revolutionary politics.
At this point it is worthwhile recapitulating the struggle between
Charu Mazumdar's line and the line of Nagi Reddy. The crux of the
struggle was the issue of armed struggle for the seizure of power.
Charu Mazumdar correctly stressed that the party should centre all
its work from the very beginning on the armed struggle for the areawise
seizure of power, whereas Nagi Reddy tried to theorise the spontaneous
course of development of the Telengana armed struggle into a line.
He argued that the peasants must first be mobilised to struggle
for land. Following this, an armed resistance struggle to defend
this economic gain must be developed. This resistance struggle should
be developed into the struggle for political power. For convenience
sake we will term this as the "phase theory of people's war".
(Some sections had argued that the armed resistance should be organised
simultaneous to land seizure and blamed the postponing of resistance
as economism. Clearly this is only a variation of the same line.)
The essence of this line is the view that the masses can be mobilised
for the struggle to seize power only in phases - struggle for land,
armed resistance to defend gains and then the struggle for power.19
In opposition to this Charu Mazumdar stressed the development of
class struggle to the highest level by arming the masses with the
politics of the areawise seizure of power. Even though the CRC formally
declared itself in support of Charu Mazumdar's line, its thrust
was towards a rehashed version of the Nagi Reddy line.
This political deviation guided the CRC's evaluation of military
experience. As quoted earlier, the CRC saw the main military reason
for the setback at Naxalbari in the lack of the very concept of
protracted war. This was explained as the absence of a concrete
programme for establishing parallel power centres and continuing
them for a long time. We have already pointed out the error in the
concept of parallel power. Here we can further note how this concept
serves, and is served by, economism, both politically and militarily.
Dual power centres existing over a long period of time, as conceived
by the CRC, could only exist as such by restricting themselves to
the handling of partial issues. Perhaps in a militant way, but nevertheless
partial issues. In actual fact, this would not be a political power
centre but rather a new type of mass organisation, even if they
were backed by revolutionary armed force. The CRC's choice of words
itself are revealing. Instead of the seizure of power, it spoke
about "setting up" people's power centres. Instead of
the wavelike expansion of red power through armed struggle, it wanted
to "gradually overcome" the enemy's power "through
a long drawn-out struggle". Finally, the areawise seizure of
power was replaced with "establishing power at the local level".
This last point was heralded by the CRC as its unique contribution,
and must be probed further. We will start with this quotation from
its summation document, "Under the present circumstances, the
concept of establishing political power at the local level has got
a wider significance. Generally this concept is considered to be
applicable only to the colonial and semi-colonial countries. But
comrade Charu Mazumdar had pointed out that it was Lenin himself
who put forward the concept of establishing political power at the
local level….Comrade Charu Mazumdar continued: In the era of socialism,
all the elements of areawise seizure of power are present in our
framework. It is quite clear that comrade Charu Mazumdar was not
confining the concept of the areawise seizure of power to a mere
tactical concept for revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries….Of
course we can't say that comrade Charu Mazumdar was having, at that
time, a clear-cut understanding of all the elements of this concept
about which we can discuss today. Moreover the distinction between
the present concept of establishing political power at the local
level and the areawise seizure of power was not understood properly
at that time. Now we have all the experiences of the GPCR and also
that of the fierce struggle taking place in China since the capitalist-roaders
have come to power. Today we know that even in a socialist society,
the key factor in the struggle against capitalist restoration is
to establish and consolidate the real political power of the working
class at the local level, at the level of each factory, co-operative
farm, commune or any other such institution....So at present the
concept of establishing political power at the local level...has
become the real essence of the struggle for socialism and communism.
Indeed this concept itself has undergone a qualitative change."20
Later on, while discussing Revolutionary Committees, the document
said, "…in the beginning when comrade Charu Mazumdar was talking
about areawise seizure of power he was not referring to this new
concept of Revolutionary Committees evolved out of the GPCR. The
tactic of areawise seizure of power is only a part of the military
strategy of people's war. But the concept of establishing political
power at the local level is aiming at the decentralisation of political
power by developing people's power centres at the local level through
unleashing the initiative of the people. Of course, this concept
can be easily connected with the tactic of areawise seizure of power."21
First of all, refuting the revisionist thesis on seizing power at
the centre, in one stroke, with areawise seizure of political power,
is not at all a mere matter of tactics. In the theory
of people's war, the establishment of base areas (which is
what is meant by areawise seizure of power) is an essential aspect
of strategy. Reducing this to tactics implies the possibility
of using "other tactics" to seize power. It undermines
the very essence of the path of people's war.
Moreover, it is wrong to equate the areawise seizure of power to
the "establishment of power at the local level" for two
reasons. The "establishment of political power at the local
level" can also be done after seizing power at the centre through
an insurrection. So this equation will open the door to abandoning
the path of people's war. And this is exactly what the CRC did later
on. More basically, red power created through the areawise seizure
of power is from the very beginning itself the centralised
power of the revolutionary classes led by the proletariat. It can
be termed "local" only in the sense of the restricted
area controlled by it. Obviously, depending on the spread of the
area under red power, the power structure must have local organs,
apart from the central organs. But these local organs are still
parts of the single, centralised power. State power, however
limited the area controlled by it, can only be centralised power.
The simple reason is that it represents the interest of a class
(or classes). This interest cannot be divided up or "decentralised".
It emerges from the objective conditions and historical role of
the class. It is common to all of its members. The CRC's position
on "local level power", linked to the idea of "decentralising"
power, emerged from a misreading of the lessons of the GPCR. It
confused centralisation and decentralisation in the administration
of power with the impossible task of decentralising state power.
This initiated a deviation from Marxist teachings on state power.
In the Indian context, this weakened the vital struggle against
the reactionary ideology of Gandhism, which has always prattled
about decentralised power (Panchayati Raj) in order to cover up
the reactionary character of the Indian state and present political
power as something neutral or standing above classes.22
IDEALIST
READING OF THE GPCR LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY LINE
In the immediate
period following the capitalist coup in China, the KSC leadership
published a series of articles entitled "Socialist Path and
Capitalist Path", written by K. Venu. (They were published
in the 1979 issues of Mass Line.) This work exposed the revisionist
fallacies of the Deng-Hua clique and refuted their distortion of
Mao's teachings and the lessons of the GPCR. In line with this,
it exposed the material basis of capitalist restoration - the bourgeois
right and the capitalist elements engendered by it. But this mainly
correct analysis23 was soon replaced by one which identified the
roots of capitalist restoration in the bureaucratisation of the
party and state machinery.
This view was elaborated in the article "The Concept of People's
Power - a Re-examination". It said, "...in a juridically
socialised system (when the entire means of production are turned
into state property), the entire means of production are governed
by a few individuals at the top of the hierarchy. So the slogan
of socialisation in the absence of a concrete programme for the
decentralisation of political power will prove to be counter-productive...no
serious attempt at decentralisation of this centralised power took
place in the Soviet Union. Consequently, the bureaucratisation of
the state machinery and the emergence of the new bourgeoisie were
facilitated, leading to capitalist restoration at a later stage."
"In a socialist society the process of capitalist restoration
starts at the local level. It is taking place at the level of each
factory, co-operative or commune. At each level, wherever the worker-peasant
masses are not vigilant enough to wield the political power in their
own hands and to fight against the emerging new bureaucratic class,
the people lose their power into the hands of this emerging new
bourgeoisie."24
Let us keep aside the grossly distorted presentation of state power
and the economy in the socialist Soviet Union in order to concentrate
on the basic argument raised here. This is the thesis that bureaucratisation
and the emergence of a new bourgeoisie were facilitated by centralised
political power. According to Mao (and later as elaborated by Chang
Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan), the roots of the new bourgeoisie lie
in bourgeois right, in the continuing, though restricted, role of
commodity production, exchange and the law of value.25 In other
words, in the continuing elements of capitalism in the socialist
economy. This is why the revolutionary transformation of production
relations and the superstructure has to be carried out continuously,
taking class struggle as the key link. The positions advanced by
the CRC replaced this materialist analysis of the contradictory
nature of socialism with an idealist and erroneous view of the "new
bourgeoisie springing up from the bureaucracy". Is perhaps
this view supported by Mao's later comment that the "bourgeoisie
is within the party"? No. The bourgeoisie within the party
are the agents of bourgeois relations. The struggle between the
socialist road and the capitalist road, the two-line struggle within
the party, is nothing other than the reflection of class struggle
arising out of the material contradictions of socialist society.
The capitalist-roaders within the party violate the democratic centralist
principles and mass line of the party and try to subvert them by
promoting bureaucratism. Bureaucratism is thus the result,
not the cause, of the capitalist road.26
The idealist error of the CRC is further worsened by its argument,
"capitalist restoration starts at the local level". By
this it did not mean that new elements of capitalism are engendered
at the basic level of the economy. When it mentioned factories,
co-operatives and communes, this meant the local organs of power.
Besides, it was discussing the restoration of capitalism,
not the engendering of the capitalist road. The restoration of capitalism
does not start at the local level. It starts at the very
top, when capitalist roaders usurp power or parts of it.
Idealist readings of the GPCR lessons and the stress on decentralisation
of power as the key means of preventing capitalist restoration,
lead in turn to an idealist and metaphysical deviation in the very
concept of political power. The CRC argued that the old concept
that stated, "...political power grows out of the barrel of
a gun" and that "…the army is the chief component of the
political power of a state...is only partially true and quite inadequate."27
Distorting Mao's teachings, it claimed that he had "...developed
his earlier inadequate definition of political power" by creating
"parallel power centres of the people at the local level through
unleashing the initiative of the people and developing their political
consciousness.…[W]ith this development the concept of people's power
came to acquire a wider and altogether different meaning. Seizing
power through the gun is an important factor in building up people's
political power. But real political power will never be created
by this act alone. Mobilisation of the political will of the people
is a must here.…Real people's political power can be established
only if both these aspects - the armed might of the people and the
political will of the people - are developed and brought together
as complementary aspects of the same phenomenon."28
The main thing to be noted here for the purpose of our topic of
review is the formulation, "seizing power through the gun is
an important factor in building up people's political power".
What this shows is how an idealist concept of political power inevitably
leads to undermining the central role of armed struggle in
the seizure of political power. This arises from the separation
of political power into political will and armed might. This separation
is idealist and metaphysical. There can be no "political will"
separate from the means to impose it. If no such means exist or
are not created, this "will" can be really nothing more
than a political aspiration. The real purpose of this separation
was29 to argue that the processes of politically mobilising the
masses and that of armed struggle are two distinct, separate processes
- "to be developed and brought together". The next
step was this argument, "Whenever the people take an organised
decision they are exercising their own political power"; and
"[T]he old idea that we can talk about political power only
when a liberated area with a standing army is established is negating
this dialectical process of the development of political power."30
Thus, there can be a preliminary stage or phase, where "embryonic
forms of political power" already emerge through the "organised
decisions" of the masses. This will be followed up by a phase
where these organised decisions are now enforced by armed might.
The "new" concept of political power was supposed to ward
off economism. What really took place was that economist theory
and practice led to the denial of the central role of armed struggle.
The line of replacing the struggle for political power by the "illusion
of power" was further advanced. The strategic task of the areawise
seizure of power was thoroughly undermined. These positions were
explicitly laid out in a follow-up article, "To Work Out a
Military Line".
DIGGING
AWAY MAOISM
It was argued
that, unlike China, there were no warring groups among the rulers
in India and the centralised and powerful state is capable of reaching
every nook and corner of the country. It stated, "From our
own experiences, we can conclude that unless the state machinery
is challenged on a very wide scale, simultaneously, from
many parts all across India, it is almost impossible to even think
of building up liberated areas in one or two or a few pockets here
and there." "The pivotal question is...how to force
the enemy to disperse his forces and compel him to leave many areas
out of this direct control."31
Apparently, this seems to address some real military questions.
But the very posing of the issue indicated a line of thinking contrary
to the theory of people's war. Even militarily, the pivotal question
in the areawise seizure of power is NOT the dispersal of
enemy forces. It is the construction of a red army as the main form
of organisation and the piecemeal destruction of the enemy's armed
force.32 The schematic picture presented by the CRC was like this:
first force the enemy to disperse his armed force by a simultaneous
attack all across the country, then concentrate forces to destroy
him in a few suitable areas. This scheme denies the very dynamics
of war - preserve oneself by destroying the enemy. When, in
keeping with the principles of people's war, the armed struggle
is initiated even before the capacity for a simultaneous attack
from many or all parts of the country is attained,33 it can sustain
itself only by pursuing a line of offensive within the strategic
defensive. Guerrilla struggle must be developed over larger and
larger areas. The masses must be drawn into the war and revolutionary
armed forces must be built up. The areas of operation must be transformed
into guerrilla zones as a step towards the areawise seizure of power.
This is the only way to sustain and advance, because the
dynamic of war is equally valid for the enemy. It cannot (and will
not) restrain or limit its armed suppression on the plea that the
revolutionary party has not yet launched an offensive to seize power.34
Within a specific strategic campaign to seize base areas in suitable
regions, tactical diversionary attacks or movements, aimed at luring
away the enemy or dispersing its concentration in the main point
of attack, will have to be carried out. But this is properly part
of the overall military plan and its sub-plans. It cannot be the
strategic plan for the whole war or for its initiation.
The article negated the view that, "...in an area - however
small or isolated it might be - the struggle can be developed to
the maximum extent of smashing the enemy power totally and establishing
real people's political power." It said, "But now,
under the present conditions in India, we know that it is practically
impossible to build up such areas of people's power in a few places
at one go."35 Once again this argument appeared to be
a rectification of some real errors in the military thinking of
the CPI(ML). And once again, it was picking on real errors to negate
its positive aspects - aspects which made Naxalbari possible. This
was done by confusing the total destruction of the enemy's political
power with the establishment of stable base areas. It is not
only possible but also absolutely necessary to totally destroy enemy
power locally. In fact, this is decisive in the development
of people's war. But this destruction will lead to the establishment
of a base area only if the revolutionary armed forces are able to
expand the zone of guerrilla actions and militarily prevent the
enemy's attempts to restore his power. The party must consistently
prepare the grounds by developing and spreading guerrilla struggle.
It must evaluate the overall conditions and judge the correct time
for launching its military campaign to seize base areas. The error
of the CPI(ML) leadership lay in its failure to prepare such military
plans, due to the strong elements of spontaneity and subjectivism
in its military thinking. But it was absolutely correct in
insisting on the total destruction of enemy power locally and directing
the guerrilla struggle towards the areawise seizure of power.
In the CRC's scheme, during the first phase the party must "...consciously
delimit the extent of struggle to the level of spreading class struggles
including all sorts of mass struggles to wider and wider areas,
and developing them to confrontation with the enemy at a lower level".
In this phase it must "...take a decision not to launch offensives
aimed at wiping out the enemy forces in any particular area before
we reach the stage in which our struggle has spread to a number
of points so that the enemy can be kept engaged in all these areas".36
To repeat, this is a negation of the dynamics of war. It denies
the fact that, apart from the seizure of base areas, the armed
struggle itself can be spread only by repeatedly wiping out the
enemy.
The developed form of the CRC's "phase theory" was an
outgrowth of its deviations on the question of political power and
its economist line of activity. So, it naturally concluded that
in the first phase, "...the main stress must be to build and
expand the mass base." This military line was an inseparable
part of the whole package - parallel political power, "new"
concept of power, mobilisation of political will, etc. It still
claimed that military squads must be built in order to implement
the decisions of parallel political power centres and carry out
"lower level" confrontation with the enemy, including
annihilations. But this "armed struggle" was totally different
in content from the people's war launched by the Naxalbari rebellion,
which directly addressed the task of the areawise seizure of power.
It was a reformist concept, a line of "armed resistance to
gain and defend partial demands". This line went on to advocate
"insurrectionary tactics" in areas where working class
masses were the major force. (Such areas included the whole of Keralam!)
Of course, it also had some words to refute an outright rejection
of people's war, which was advanced by a section who later left
the party. They had derived the roots of social fascism in armed
struggle carried out by squads without the direct participation
of the masses. But this refutation only helped to worsen matters.
It said, "Mass struggle cannot develop into military struggle
spontaneously because the two are, as forms of struggle, qualitatively
different from each other. Special training and organisational forms
are needed to develop armed struggle."37 The politics of the
seizure of political power from which armed struggle and its forms
of organisation emerge is replaced by "special training and
organisational forms". The point that mass struggles cannot
develop into military struggles, because the latter represents a
leap into the "highest form of politics", is covered up
with a plea for "consciously" developing mass struggles
into armed struggle.
We will end this section by probing the CRC's concept of base area.
The CRC conceived base areas as something permanent, emerging at
"one go".38 Apart from the question of the "one go"
setting up of base areas, even if they are established through a
prolonged struggle, base areas are never considered to be absolute
or permanent in the theory of people's war. During the course of
war they can exchange hands a number of times. They may have to
be abandoned in the face of attack or for purposes of manoeuvring.
Besides, Mao wrote about various types of base areas - stable, relatively
stable, temporary and seasonal.39 Whatever the type or favourable
location for building them, the crux of the matter is that the areawise
seizure of power and building up of base areas is the essence of
people's war. Politically, the people's war advances and accelerates
the revolutionary situation by expanding red power in waves. Militarily,
without base areas the red army and guerrilla forces will not be
able to sustain the war over a protracted period in the face of
enemy encirclement and suppression. The essence of the position
that starts by posing the question, "is it possible to build
base areas which cannot be crushed by the enemy?", is this:
negation of the areawise seizure of power and the path of people's
war; considering external conditions such as a crisis in the ruling
class and the overall political situation as the decisive factors
in setting up base areas; and negation of Mao's line on accelerating
the revolutionary situation by developing people's war and expanding
red power in waves. If such metaphysical ideas on base areas
are not rooted out thoroughly, they can lead to the derailment of
the preparations for war and the loss of initiative even if the
people's war has been launched.
…
STEPPING
FORWARD TO LEAP BACK
During this
period the military significance of the multinational character
of the Indian state and the absence of a dominant nationality were
identified. This was seen as an inherent weakness of the Indian
state. The CRC leadership acknowledged that it had earlier overestimated
the enemy's strength. It admitted that this had led to a complacent
attitude towards developing armed struggle. This had also indirectly
encouraged many rightist tendencies. The revolt of a section of
Sikh soldiers in the wake of Operation Blue Star and the Indian
state's political-military compulsions, which made it handle the
Gorkhaland agitation in a cautious manner, were taken as pointers
to the military potential of the national question. It was acknowledged
that in situations where nationalist forces were already engaged
in armed struggle, the party could intervene only by initiating
armed struggle on its own. These positions were developed over the
period 1984-1987. They were formally sanctioned by the Second All-India
Conference held in 1987. The Conference also accepted the plan of
action proposed by the leadership - initiate armed struggle in Punjab
and prepare for initiation in Keralam and Maharashtra within one
year.
While this appeared to be forward motion on the military question,
it was actually constituted on the foundations of a backward leap
to revisionism and liquidationism. The theory of neo-colonialism
itself was an attack on the path of people's war. It reduced the
armed agrarian revolution to a task for areas where semi-feudal
relations still prevailed. This theory also argued that the trend
towards the elimination of feudalism by imperialism was dominant
even in such regions. Thus, it became a "passing task"
in comparison to the national liberation struggle. Along with this,
the concept of new-democratic revolution in India, as an ensemble
of the new-democratic revolutions of the different oppressed nationalities,
fractured the path of people's war into separate people's wars with
separate people's armies. These two positions became the foundations
of the CRC's line after the 1985 Plenum and were enshrined in its
"Strategic Line" adopted in the 1987 Conference.
…
The pitfalls of its nationalist vision were further seen in its
ruling out of civil war. It stated, "Since the contradiction
with the central state and imperialism is principal, and since intervention
by the centre will bring out national oppression more openly, the
people's war will mainly be a national war, regardless of
the direct aggression of imperialism. Though internal class struggle
will be there...this cannot be taken as civil war since the army
and armed forces we face from the very beginning will be controlled
by the Central state."40 Whether we "take it" as
civil war or not is basically a matter of whether we stand for overturning
all the dominant relations of exploitation and oppression. As Lenin
said, "In politics, too, it is possible to restrict oneself
to minor matters and it is possible to go deeper, to the very foundations.
Marxism recognises a class struggle as fully developed...only if
it does not merely embrace politics but takes in the most significant
thing in politics - the organisation of state power"41
(meaning the revolutionary seizure of power). If the war is to be
waged principally for the right of self-determination, then "class
struggle" will necessarily be restricted by the political compulsions
of this strategic aim. We will not be able to go all out to overthrow
the dominant exploiters and mobilise the masses on that basis.42
Moreover, the new military line ignored the fact that the dominant
local ("national") exploiters were very much a
part of the ruling classes and the central state. This is not to
deny the national contradictions existing in India. We definitely
do have the possibility to turn national sentiments in favour of
the new-democratic revolution in a situation of widespread suppression
by the central armed forces. (Most usually the forces used for this
comprise troops from other nationalities.) But this has never taken
place in a linear manner. It will not take place in this manner.
This possibility will emerge as a favourable political factor only
through the further intensification of class polarisation achieved
by means of civil war. As experience shows, the dominant local exploiters
will use their roots in the nation as a powerful weapon to
isolate and attack the revolutionary party as disrupters of "national
development". The "national banner" will itself be
fought over. And the issue will be clinched ultimately by the development
of the revolutionary civil war, because this alone will pose the
issue of national liberation on a revolutionary basis as part of
the task of new-democratic revolution.
Finally, despite its criticism of the "phase theory of people's
war", this line did not critically sum up the whole package.
It also accepted the theses of parallel political power as the form
of power in the initial stages of the war.
We have devoted much time to a critical examination of this military
line precisely because of its "leftism". This illusion
of being 'left' was the main obstacle preventing a sharp polarisation
and line struggle within the CRC central leadership. Its influence
lingered on for quite some time, even after the liquidation of the
CRC,CPI(ML) and the rejection of many of its blatantly anti-Marxist
positions. But, although much time has been devoted here to this
line, the CRC hardly devoted any effort to practice it. The brief
period of its formal dominance was also the period during which
the motion towards explicit bourgeois nationalist positions and
practice became intense. By the end of 1989 the majority of the
central leadership had started "re-examining"43 this military
line. The adoption of the document "On Proletarian Democracy"
delivered the final blow.
TOWARDS
REMOVING INCONSISTENCIES
Following
the adoption of this document, the CRC leadership prepared yet another
draft document "On Military Line". Most of the earlier
positions not totally consistent with the bourgeois political line
were ironed out. Based on the bourgeois stand of rejecting the dictatorship
of the proletariat, it openly attacked the theory and practice of
people's war. It said, "So far, discussion on military line
has been mainly centred around the theory and practice of people's
war, developed by Mao based on his famous dictum that political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun. This very concept was emanating
from the concept and practice of party dictatorship implemented
in the name of proletarian dictatorship since the October Revolution
of 1917. The political power is considered as a centralised entity
in the form of the proletarian state, the main pillar of which is
the army.…"44 Of course, it did not reject armed struggle!
But this was to be a struggle to "...smash the existing state
structure…."45 And, for this limited purpose it accepted
that this "...can be fulfilled only under the centralised
leadership of the party and the army under it. So the task of
developing the military line remained as important as earlier."46
Along with this "important as ever" sweet talk, the grounds
for exploring the possibilities of peaceful transformation were
also prepared. It was argued that, neo-colonialism replacing direct
imperialist military control with economic-political domination,
"...coupled with the widening democratisation process all over
the world, has significantly strengthened the role of global public
opinion....Even the most powerful superpower is not in a position
to arbitrarily assert its will, using its military might over a
small country disregarding global public opinion."47 (This
was written during the Gulf war period!) To clear up all doubts
about what is meant by smashing the state structure, it said, "Political
mobilisation of the broad masses can lead to conditions of insurrection
even in Third World countries. Even such an insurrection
can smash the existing state, as was seen in the case of the
Iranian revolution of 1979...."48 On the United Front it
said, "It is through this organ (UF) that the political will
of the people is being consolidated. This consolidation is aimed
not simply for seizing power, rather for advancing it as the real
power of the proletariat...."49 This separation of seizing
power, i.e. smashing the existing state, from "advancing real
power", was already contained in the previously discussed "new
concept of political power". Now it fulfils its legitimate
role, freed from all "dogmatism". The task is to smash
the state structure, not the state. Therefore, "simply"
smashing the state will not do. It must be "smashed" to
the extent of replacing control by the centre with that of the nation-state.
The military activities and organisations necessary for this become
nothing more than tools of pressure tactics. The party must be able
to switch them on and off depending on the needs of "political
mobilisation". "The party must have two wings...an (open)
wing...and a separate military wing.... This organisation will be
completely under the party leadership, but it will be able to operate
claiming to be an independent organisation."50 After
having said all this, it did not forget to add, "Basically
(this military strategy)...is the strategy of people's war applied
in our developing situations(sic)"!51
"Our situations" were certainly "developing".
By the end of the year the CRC,CPI(ML) was liquidated. All the "burdens"
of Marxism were unloaded. Soon enough, any idea of using armed activities,
even as a bargaining chip, became a hindrance. The theory of "non-class
aspects of democracy" came to the rescue. And the hitherto
"unrecognised" potential of parliamentary elections for
"broad political mobilisation" was finally discovered.
Ultimately, the author of this line, K.Venu, ended up as a Congress-supported
[The ruling class political party in India since Independence in
1949 until recently. AWTW] candidate in the 1996 State Assembly
elections - politically mobilised to serve the Indian ruling classes.
SOME LESSONS
FOR THE FUTURE
One important
lesson of this review is the indivisibility of proletarian ideology.
That is, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism cannot be applied in bits and pieces.
The class content of this ideology, its universal principles, must
guide each and every aspect of the party's line, policies, organisation
and practice. The moment this is violated and alien ideologies are
imported, the party enters the danger zone of changing its colour.
This is what happened with the CRC, CPI(ML). In the name of tackling
"new questions" and breaking away from "dogmatism",
it opened itself up to petit-bourgeois and bourgeois ideological
currents.52 Once these ideologies became implanted in the line of
the party, they spread like a virus and, one after the other, all
aspects of line, policy, organisation and practice got corrupted.
First, it was a matter of "applying Marxism in specific conditions".
Then it became one of "solving the new questions of political
power". This "concern" led to "fresh thinking
on military line". Finally, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was itself
rejected as "fundamentalism".
Another important lesson is this. If a deviation is left not rectified,
it will generate conditions for its growth into a wrong line. It
will do this by moulding the thinking of the leaders and cadres
in its own image. We have discussed the differences and struggles
within the CRC, CPI(ML) in the preceding sections. We also saw how
this opposition not only failed, but also ended up as fuel for the
wrong line itself. This happened because there were a lot of common
views shared by the contending ideas, at first in the form of 'left'
and right spontaneity, later in the form of 'left' and right nationalism.
Despite all its eclecticism, a wrong line has its logic and dynamics.
It will incessantly push the party away from Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
The obvious divergence from Marxist-Leninist-Maoist positions will
no longer seem to be so. Large sections within the party may not
feel comfortable with such a divergence. But their ideological alertness
is already being dulled by liberal thinking - "well, they do
have a point which must also be considered". More ground is
yielded to the wrong line. Ultimately, the struggle against the
wrong line flounders within the ideological, political boundaries
set up by that line itself, causing demoralisation.
Finally, the most important lesson is this. No matter how high the
heap of garbage, it can always be dug away - provided Marxism-Leninism-Maoism
is firmly grasped and wielded with determination to make a total
rupture.
Footnotes
1 Mao Tsetung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains",
"Why Is It that Red Power Can Exist in China" and "A
Single Spark Can Light a Prairie Fire", Selected Works
(SW), Volume I (Peking, FLPH, 1977).
2 Charu Mazumdar, "Who Can We Unite With?", Collected
Works, Malayalam edition, 1979.
3 Mao Tsetung, "Problems of War and Strategy", SW, Volume
II, p. 221.
4 For a discussion on this topic see the article "It Is Right
to Rebel" in A World To Win 1995/21, particularly Section
E entitled "Once the Red Flag is Raised, There is No Bringing
Ýt Down". This article was an important contribution from the
Union of Communists of Iran (Sarbedaran) on the ongoing ideological
struggle against the capitulationist, right opportunist line within
the Communist Party of Peru (PCP).
5 Mao Tsetung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla Warfare",
SW, Volume II, p. 98.
6 Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social Democracy", Collected
Works, Vol. 9, pp. 78-79.
7 [The draconian measures instituted in ??? under the Indira Ghandi
government. 30,000 revolutionaries were imprisoned. - AWTW.]
8 "Towards a New Phase of Spring Thunder", 1982,
p.117.
9 [Naxalbari: 1967 marked the outbreak of armed struggle of the
peasant masses led by communist revolutionaries in the village of
Naxalbari, located in India's state of West Bengal, near the city
of Darjeeling, not far from the borders of Nepal and Bangladesh
- AWTW.]
10 Spring Thunder, p. 50.
11 Spring Thunder, p. 50.
12 Spring Thunder, p. 49.
13 "The revolutionary peasants, through their activities, made
their decrees the law in the villages:
1) A blow was dealt at the political, economic, and social structure
in the villages based on the monopoly land ownership which dragged
the peasants more and more into the depths of pauperisation.…They
marked out all land in the Terai with their plough shares and made
it their own...the old feudal structure that had existed for centuries
was thus smashed through this action of peasants." (Reproduced
in Spring Thunder, p. 46)
14 Spring Thunder, pp. 49-50. Emphasis added.
15 Charu Mazumdar, "One Year of Naxalbari", Liberation
Anthology, Vol. 1, Suniti Kumar Ghosh (ed.), 1992, p.96.
16 In a note in his Liberation Anthology, (Vol. 1, p. 96)
Suniti Kumar Ghosh has pointed out that this was a mistake in translation.
The original Bengali version said,"...not only for their
partial demands…." This is a significant correction. But
it should be noted that the formulation published in the English
version of this article in "Liberation" was repeated in
other articles also. Some of them have been reproduced in the "Anthology"
without correction. So it is not clear whether the translation error
was for that particular article or was repeated. Since this formulation
is repeated in a number of articles and largely corresponded to
Charu Mazumdar's views (of that period) on economic struggle, we
think it has to be examined and criticised.
17 "Undertake the Work of Building a Revolutionary Party"
Spring Thunder, 1968, p. 61. Emphasis added.
18 Spring Thunder, p.61.
19 Some examples of this are given here: "…we have ample experience
to show that if properly and correctly conducted, all anti-landlord
struggles will reach the level of land seizure in a short time.
And that is the time to start a partisan warfare." (D.V. Rao,
"Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought Is Our World Outlook",
Proletarian Line Publications, Hyderabad, 1993, p.56.) "The
main direction of the party's work should be consciously oriented
towards building a revolutionary peasant movement. Selection of
strategic areas, concentration of cadres, formulation of fighting
and agitational slogans with extensive discussions of the people
of the area, mobilising the peasants for struggle on these issues,
building the peasant organisations, arming the people with locally
available weapons in the anti-feudal struggle from the very beginning,
organising of the village voluntary force people's resistance to
landlord-goonda-police violence and repression and thus create,
develop and defend areas of sustained resistance and thus advance
to establish base areas in the countryside." (Chandra Pulla
Reddy, Selected Works, Volume II, Pratighatana, Hyderabad,
1996, p.37)
Such views are closely related to seeing the seizure of land as
THE stepping stone to armed agrarian revolution or its highest stage.
D.V. Rao wrote, "The seizure of land and partisan warfare is
interlinked. Seizure of the land of landlords can never be a partial
demand.…" (p.70, cited above. Emphasis added.) According to
C. P. Reddy, "All these (partial) struggles, whichever be the
issue, they should be oriented towards the distribution of the landlord's
land which is the highest stage of armed agrarian revolution."
(p.34, cited above, emphasis added). Actual experience shows numerous
examples of land seizures from landlords which have not developed
beyond militant partial struggles. Besides, such views contradict
Mao Tsetung, "In semi-colonial China the establishment and
expansion of the red army, the guerrilla forces and the red areas
is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of
the proletariat...." (Mao Tsetung, "A Single Spark Can
Start a Prairie Fire", SW, Volume I, FLPH, Peking, 1977, p.118.)
The real issue is not whether mass struggles, including land struggles,
should be organised or not. In order to raise the fighting will
of the masses and propagate the line of people's war, the party
should carry out mass activity and organise struggles during the
period of preparation itself. But it is important that the party
grasps this point - however correct and necessary such mass activity
might be at a certain stage, war is a rupture from the preceding
struggles. It is a leap into a totally new and different process.
The concept that war can be initiated only as an organic outgrowth
of organising peasants in mass organisations and militant struggles
is a right opportunist deviation.
20 Spring Thunder, pp. 36-37.
21 Spring Thunder, pp. 79-80.
22 The germs of the CRC's last act of liquidation and its theory
on the "non-class aspect of democracy" can be seen in
this argument. The question of the centralisation of power under
socialism was raised by the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA.
The gist of its arguments was published in the April 1983 issue
of Liberation. (pp. 50-51) The main argument was that the
CRC's position on the establishment of political power at the local
level, as the key issue in preventing the restoration of capitalism,
negates the decisive role of the line leading the party and
the state. It pointed out that there is no evidence to show that
Mao talked about the decentralisation of power. Unleashing the initiative
of the masses at the local level has nothing to do with the decentralisation
of power.
23 This article was also not totally free from idealist tendencies.
Criticising the "theory of productive forces" by basing
itself on Marx's "Preface to the Critique of Political Economy",
it argued, "...if the overall development of human history
is examined we can see that productive forces and economic base
have played the decisive role in it. But the role of the production
relations and superstructure is not ignored." (Samskara
Padhana Kendram, "Socialistu Pathayum Muthalalitha Pathayum",
Ernakulam, 1989, p. 46. Emphasis added. This article was serialised
in the 1979 issues of Mass Line). In Marx's explanation the
"economic base is the sum total of production relations."
But the way it is explained in this article, production relations
are considered as something other than the economic base. A tendency
to move away from historical materialism is contained in
this formulation.
24 Liberation, April 1982, pp. 13-14.
25 Mao Tsetung: "Our country at present practices a commodity
system, the wage system is unequal too, as in the eight-grade wage
scale, and so forth. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat such
things can only be restricted. Therefore, if people like Lin Piao
come to power, it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist
system." "In a word, China is a socialist country. Before
liberation she was much the same as a capitalist country. Even now
she practices an eight-grade wage system, distribution according
to work and exchange through money, and in all this differs very
little from the old society. What is different is that the system
of ownership has been changed."
Chang Chun-chiao: "We often say that the issue of ownership
'has in the main been settled'; this means that it has not been
settled entirely, and also that bourgeois right has not been totally
abolished in this realm." "...in the short term, there
will be no basic change in the situation in which ownership by the
whole people and collective ownership co-exist. So long as we still
have these two kinds of ownership, commodity production, exchange
through money and distribution according to work are inevitable.
And since 'under the dictatorship of the proletariat such things
can only be restricted', the growth of capitalist factors in the
town and country and the emergence of new bourgeois elements are
likewise inevitable." Chang Chun-chiao, "On Exercising
All Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie", quoted from Bombard
the Capitalist Road, Progressive Publishers, New Delhi, 1984,
pp. 27-31.
26 This point is discussed in detail in Bob Avakian, "Democracy:
More than Ever We Can and Must Do Better Than That!" A World
To Win 1995/21. See the section "The Exercise of Power
in Socialist Society", pp. 42-44.
27 Liberation, April 1982, p. 15.
28 Liberation, April 1982, pp. 15-16.
29 "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of
the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution.
This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally,
for China and for all other countries." Mao Tsetung, "Problems
of War and Strategy", SW, Volume II, p.219.
30 Liberation, April 1982, p. 21.
31 Liberation, July 1982, p. 28. Emphasis added.
32 "The fundamental conditions for establishing a base area
are that there should be...armed forces, that these armed forces
should be employed to inflict defeats on the enemy and that they
should arouse the people to action. Thus the establishment of a
base area is first and foremost a matter of building an armed force."
Mao, SW, Volume II, p.98.
33Another way in which the CRC's argument could be interpreted is
the more obvious negation of people's war. That is, the war should
not be launched until the capacity for a simultaneous attack
across the country is attained.
34 Of course, this could be possible for the enemy, to some extent,
if the armed struggle leaves out the question of seizing power and
is carried out as armed activities for gaining and defending partial
demands. Even then it will not be able to continue this "policy
of restraint" over a long period.
35 Liberation, July 1982, p. 29. Emphasis added.
36 Liberation, July 1982, pp. 29-30.
37 Liberation, July 1982, p. 32. Emphasis added.
38 See the previous section of this article entitled: "Summing
Out Revolution". Here the formulation on "real" political
power is itself a reflection of an absolutist concept of base areas.
As if they are real only when they are permanent.
39 "Retreat is necessary, because not to retreat a step before
the onset of a strong enemy inevitably means to jeopardise the preservation
of one's forces." Mao Tsetung, section on "Strategic Retreat"
in "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War",
SW, Volume I, p. 215. The Communist Party of Peru has aptly termed
this see-saw struggle over base areas as "restoration/counter-restoration".
On the types of base areas see, Mao Tsetung, Section 1, "The
Type of Base Area" in "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla
War", SW, Volume II.
40 The original version of On Developing a Military Line,
pp. 3-4. Emphasis in original.
41 Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 19, Progress Publishers,
Moscow, 1980, p. 121-122.
42 The minefield hidden in this line of thinking blew up the practice
of the CRC,CPI(ML)'s Andhra Pradesh unit. Given the conditions existing
in its area of work, it had to take up the anti-feudal struggle.
Soon enough the question of confronting the armed power of the landlords
and state came up. One section of the State leadership argued for
abandoning this area, since practise was leading to the 1970 line
and taking the party away from "national liberation".
The majority rejected this and stuck to developing armed resistance.
But any consistent development of such resistance became impossible
for two major reasons. The tasks of taking up the national question
and fighting feudal oppression were pulling in opposite directions.
The anti-feudal struggle was blunted by the neo-colonialism theory,
which declared that semi-feudalism was already on its way out. The
basic masses were motivated by their class interests and were hardly
enthused by "national interest". So, in practice the "national
liberation" slogan became a mere catchword. But it could still
be used by the CRC leadership as a handy stick. When a setback took
place, it accused the state leadership of "dogmatism".
Because of the ideological-political positions of the proponents
of the new military line within the central leadership, they could
not stand firm against this attack. They had to go along with the
criticism against "dogmatism", causing more confusion
and demoralisation.
43 Some armed propaganda actions were carried out in Punjab. But
this State Committee also joined the "re-examination"
camp and later played a prominent role in the liquidation of the
CRC,CPI (ML).
44 On Military line, 1991, p. 1.
45 On Military line, p. 1. Emphasis added.
46 On Military line, p. 1. Emphasis added. This glaring inconsistency
is criticised by Bob Avakian - "The arguments made in this
CRC document ("On Proletarian Democracy") on the role
of the party...lead toward a line of 'peaceful transition'. The
very logic of these arguments leads towards the conclusion that
violent overthrow is itself 'coercive' and 'elitist' towards the
masses...and therefore is fundamentally wrong." "You cannot
'logically' argue that the vanguard must not impose its will on
the people when it is in power but it may do so in coming to power
in the first place." ("Democracy - More Than Ever We Can
and Must Do Better Than That", AWTW 1992/17, pp. 34-35.
Emphasis in original.)
47 On Military Line, p. 2.
48 On Military Line, p. 3. Emphasis added. The hard fact
that the Iranian revolution was aborted from accomplishing
the "smashing of the state" is clearly exposed in "Defeated
Armies Learn Well", AWTW 1985/4. This article was contributed
by the Union of Communists of Iran (Sarbedaran).
49 On Military Line, p. 4.
50 On Military Line, p. 4.
51 On Military Line, p. 7.
52 "...the tendency to negate the universality of this ideology
(Marxism-Leninism-Maoism) was present in the leadership [of CRC,CPI(ML)]
from the very beginning itself. Instead of applying proletarian
ideology in the analysis of particular questions, the tendency was
to search for answers elsewhere, under the plea that the leaders
of the proletariat have not dealt with such issues. Due to this
approach, liberalism in ideological matters inevitably developed,
even while the party formally opposed such liberalism." (Section
2.1, Critique of the CRC,CPI(ML) Line, Maoist Unity Centre,
CPI(ML), 1997.)