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Our great leader
Chairman Mao wrote Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War in 1936 to
sum up the experience of the Second Revolutionary Civil War. In this work, which
was the result of a major inner-Party controversy on military questions during
the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-37) and a summing-up of
the struggle of Chairman Mao’s correct line against the erroneous line, Chairman
Mao used the principle of dialectical materialism and historical materialism to
analyse the characteristics and laws of China’s revolutionary war and
systematically explained its problems of strategy. Upholding the materialist
theory of reflection with regard to the problem of war and opposing idealist
apriorism, he stressed that the line for directing war must conform with
objective laws and regarded the study of the laws of war as the point of
departure in mapping out strategy and tactics.
Specific Laws of China’s Revolutionary War
Chairman Mao has
said: "We must study not only the laws of war in general, but the specific
laws of revolutionary war, and the even more specific laws of revolutionary war
in China." "The laws of China’s revolutionary war are a problem which anyone
directing China’s revolutionary war must study and solve." "Without an
understanding of the characteristics of China’s revolutionary war, it is
impossible to direct it and lead it to victory." These are guiding
principles which we must follow in our study of China’s revolutionary war.
War is a motion of
matter and a historical phenomenon of class society. Like other things in the
world, it has its own inherent laws which exist objectively and cannot be
conjured up in the mind. They are the inner links between the political,
economic, military and geographical factors of the two warring sides, determine
the general trend of the development of war and run through the entire course of
war. To wage a revolutionary war, we must study its laws. Unless we understand
the actual circumstances of a revolutionary war, its nature and its relations to
other things, we will not be able to direct a war or win victory.
Every war is waged at
a specific time and place, against specific opponents and for specific political
purposes. This accounts for the fact that between one war and another there are
at once similarities and dissimilarities. The similarities constitute the laws
of war or revolutionary war in general. For example, attack and defence are the
basic forms of fighting, and preserving oneself and destroying the enemy the
object of war. They are applicable to all wars, ancient or modern, in China or
elsewhere. On the other hand, the dissimilarities mean particular contradictions
which distinguish one war from another and constitute the specific laws of that
war. China’s revolutionary war was waged in the specific environment and under
the specific conditions of China. Compared with war and revolutionary war in
general, it has its own specific circumstances and nature. Therefore, in
addition to the general laws of war and revolutionary war, it has specific laws
of its own. To direct China’s revolutionary war, it is imperative to study its
specific laws.
After the First
Revolutionary Civil War had failed, our Party entered a new period of seizing
political power by armed force. Several small armed independent areas under Red
political power emerged amidst the encirclement of a White regime. The enemy
ruled the whole country, while we had only small armed forces which were
constantly under enemy "encirclement and suppression." Such being the case, how
should the Red Army deal with its enemy? And how should it fight? Chairman Mao
used the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method to make a concrete analysis of the
concrete conditions — political, economic, military and geographical — on the
enemy’s side and our own in China’s revolutionary war. He pointed out that
China’s revolutionary war had four principal characteristics, namely, a vast
semi-colonial country which was unevenly developed politically and economically
and which had gone through the great revolution of 1924-27; a big and powerful
enemy; a small and weak Red Army; and the leadership of the Communist Party and
the agrarian revolution. These characteristics determined that it was possible
for the Red Army to grow and defeat its enemy, but at the same time it was not
possible for it to grow very rapidly and defeat its enemy quickly; in other
words, the war would be protracted and might even be lost if it was mishandled.
This showed that there were both favourable factors and difficulties in China’s
revolutionary war and these two aspects existed simultaneously. These were the
basic laws of China’s revolutionary war. We must base our guiding line and
strategic and tactical principles on these characteristics and laws. On the
basis of studying the characteristics and laws of China’s revolutionary war,
Chairman Mao opposed the idealist and mechanical approach to the problem of war,
critically absorbed what was useful to us in war and revolutionary war in
general and scientifically summed up the rich practical experience of China’s
revolutionary war. As a result, he worked out the guiding line of active defence
and a series of correct principles of operation — luring the enemy in deep,
concentration of troops, mobile warfare and war of annihilation — all of which
corresponded with the laws of China’s revolutionary war, and led it to win one
victory after another.
Active Defence
Chairman Mao has
taught us: "Active defence is also known as offensive defence, or
defence through decisive engagements. Passive defence is also known as purely
defensive defence or pure defence. Passive defence is actually a spurious kind
of defence, and the only real defence is active defence, defence for the purpose
of counter-attacking and taking the offensive." The strategic concept of
active defence was Chairman Mao’s basic guiding thought in directing China’s
revolutionary war, which found expression in: despising the enemy strategically
and taking him seriously tactically, gaining mastery by striking the enemy only
after he has struck, using a small force to fight a large one and using a weak
force to defeat a strong one. This strategic concept dialectically combined
attack and defence, the two fundamental forms of war movements, and closely
integrated strategic defence with attack in campaigns and battles, embodying
attack in defence, carrying out defence for the purpose of attack, and
alternately using attack and defence. Through the correct implementation of a
series of strategy and tactics such as luring the enemy in deep, concentration
of troops, mobile warfare and war of annihilation, we gradually brought about a
change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, completely
gained the initiative strategically and forced the enemy to move from a superior
position as a whole to an inferior position and to shift from the strategic
offensive to the defensive. Then we launched a strategic counter-offensive and
moved on to the attack to fight decisive strategic battles against the enemy and
make strategic pursuit until his troops were thoroughly put out of action and
victory in the war was won.
Chairman Mao’s
strategic concept of active defence and the series of principles of fighting he
has formulated give full expression to the dialectics of revolutionary war —
resorting to retreat as a means of advance and defence as a means of attack,
transforming the enemy into the weak and ourselves into the strong. War is a
contest of strength and at the same time a contest of subjective ability in
directing it. Chairman Mao has pointed out: "In his endeavour to win a war, a
military man cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material conditions;
within these limitations, however, he can and must strive for victory. The stage
of action for a military man is built upon objective material conditions, but on
that stage he can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and
colour, power and grandeur." When attacked by a powerful enemy, the Red Army
did not rely on its "weakness" to defeat the enemy, but on the basis of
objective material conditions, it brought into full play its subjective
initiative to transform itself into the strong and triumph over the enemy.
Contradictory states between the enemy and ourselves, such as superiority and
inferiority, having the initiative and in a passive position, attack and defence,
are not dead and rigid, but living and mobile. They transform themselves into
their opposites under given conditions in the course of war. To bring about this
transformation hinges on correct guiding principle and subjective effort. To
carry out active defence is to use defence as a means to change the balance of
forces between the enemy and ourselves, thereby enabling us to shift from
defence to counter-offensive and attack and completely annihilate the enemy.
During the first, second, third and fourth counter-campaigns against
"encirclement and suppression," strategically and as a whole, the enemy employed
superior forces to attack on exterior lines while we employed inferior forces to
defend on interior lines; the enemy was strong and had the initiative while we
were weak and in a passive position. But guided by Chairman Mao’s military line,
we adopted the principle of luring the enemy in deep before launching the
strategic counter-offensive; we resorted to protracted defensive warfare on
interior lines strategically and quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior
lines in campaigns and battles. By concentrating a force several times that of
the enemy, we struck at one part of the enemy forces before turning on the rest
and smashing them one by one. In this way, we emerged the stronger and had the
initiative while the enemy became the weaker and was in a passive position in
each campaign or battle and in separate areas of the war theatre. This gradually
changed the general situation in which the enemy was strong and we were weak
and, strategically, the enemy had the initiative and we were in a passive
position. And when the general situation had changed in the direction
advantageous to us and disadvantageous to the enemy, we staged strategic
counter-offensives and annihilated the enemy in large numbers. It was under the
guidance of Chairman Mao’s strategic concept of active defence that we triumphed
in the four countercampaigns against "encirclement and suppression."
— From Peking Review No. 45, November
10, 1972
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