A HISTORY OF THE MODERN CHINESE REVOLUTION (1919—1956)

HO KAN-CHIH

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CHAPTER ONE

THE MAY 4 MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN CHINA

(May 1919—June 1921)

1. PENETRATION OF CHINA BY FOREIGN CAPITALISM. TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA FROM A FEUDAL SOCIETY INTO A SEMI-COLONIAL AND SEMI-FEUDAL SOCIETY. THE OLD TYPE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND ITS FAILURE

In feudal China, a combination of small-scale farming and home handicrafts constituted the main mode of production. The Chinese peasant was at the same time a handicraftsman, supplying himself with all the agricultural produce and most of the handicraft products he needed. Natural economy was predominant. But in spite of the slow development of feudal society, there emerged some large manufactories commanding a nation-wide market, as in the porcelain and silk industries. The mode of manufacture was a type of capitalist mass production based on division of labour, cooperation and the handicraft technique of wage-workers. It was akin to handicraft production in that it was based on handicraft technique, and to a capitalist production in that it involved large-scale production based on the exploitation of wage-workers. It was the transitional stage between simple handicraft production and large-scale machine production. As it emerged and flourished mainly in such economically more developed regions as those south of the Yangtze River, it never became a dominant mode of production in feudal China. Neither could it be said to occupy a leading position in the whole domain of handicraft production, as many of the major branches of handicrafts had not yet set up manufactories. Therefore, Chinese industry, as a whole, had not yet entered the stage of manufacture at the time of the Opium War. However, the manufactories that did exist contained within themselves the embryo of capitalism. If her independent development had not been interrupted by the penetration of foreign capitalism, China would have grown, inevitably, though slowly, into a capitalist society, like many other countries.

With the penetration of China by foreign capitalism in the middle of the 19th century, some important changes took place within the feudal structure of Chinese society, impelling it to take the road to semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism. Thus, its independent development was interrupted.

The process of the penetration of China by foreign capitalism corresponded with the development of foreign capitalism itself. From the Opium War of 1840 to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 the capitalist powers waged a series of aggressive wars on China. Defeated in these wars, China was forced to sign many unequal treaties, under which she was obliged to cede territories, pay indemnities,
open trade ports, accept the conventional tariff system, grant consular jurisdiction, recognize the freedom of missionary activities, and so forth. This was a period of free capitalist competition in which economic aggression was characterized by the export of commodities. The unequal treaties created favourable conditions for the capitalist powers to dump their goods in China.

When, towards the end of the 19th century, world capitalism entered the stage of imperialism and monopoly took the place of free competition, imperialist aggression began to show new characteristics, such as the gradual increase of the export of capital and the greater monopolistic nature of aggression. This gave rise to a more acute conflict among the imperialist powers themselves in their struggles over the partition of China. These characteristics were amply shown in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and in the aggressive war of the Eight Powers' Allied Army of 1900. Following the Sino-Japanese War, China was forced to conclude the Treaty of Shimonoseki, conceding to Japan the special right to set up factories in China. Thereafter an ever-increasing number of imperialists came to China to run factories, open mines, build railways and establish banks, thereby obtaining control over China's industry and banking. Besides, through a series of political loans to China, they were able to manipulate China's finance and the Chinese government. The division of "spheres of influence" in China as bases for their further aggression threw them into mutual conflicts.

The imperialist powers did their utmost to prop up the Chinese feudal rulers as their agents in order to maintain and extend their domination over China, while the Chinese feudal rulers on their part were only too willing to sell themselves to the imperialists and serve their interests obsequiously in order to maintain their exploitation and oppression of the people. The imperialists supported, first, the Ching (Manchu) government in stamping out the Taiping Revolution, and then, Yuan Shihkai in strangling the Revolution of 1911. An alliance was formed between the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the Chinese reactionaries. With the support of the imperialists, the feudal system of exploitation not only remained intact, but, combined with comprador-capitalism, continued to play a dominant role in China's economic life.

The penetration of China by foreign capitalism after 1840 exercised a twofold influence on her.

In the first place, it disintegrated China's natural economy, and stimulated and accelerated the emergence and growth of capitalism, thus changing her from a feudal to a semi-feudal society. By means of dumping goods and extorting raw materials, the capitalist countries destroyed China's natural economy and made the Chinese peasants depend more and more on the market. Thus a commodity market for capitalism was built up in China. Meanwhile, the crowding out of handicraft goods from the market by machine products, together with the heavy burden of indemnities and exorbitant levies and taxes, drove the broad masses of peasants and handicraftsmen into bankruptcy. Thus a labour market for capitalism was created. In a word, imperialist aggression in China not only destroyed her self-sufficient natural economy but also created some favourable conditions for the emergence and growth of capitalism.

With the disintegration of the feudal society, certain elements of capitalism began to emerge and develop. China was now no
longer a feudal society pure and simple, but a semi-feudal society.

Secondly, it was the intention of the imperialist aggressors to turn China into a colony. Relying on their military, political, economic and cultural forces, they controlled China's military and political affairs as well as the main threads of her economy. They placed China's agricultural economy at their service and overwhelmed her national industry, which had never been strong, thus obstructing the growth of her productive forces. As a result, the Chinese economy lost its independence and became a component part of imperialist economy. China also lost her power of self-defence and her national independence, only nominally maintaining her sovereignty and a certain degree of independence. She was virtually reduced to the status of a semi-colony.

The fundamental contradictions in semi-colonial and semi-feudal Chinese society were those between imperialism and the Chinese nation and between feudalism and the masses of the people, the former being the primary contradiction. The process in which imperialism collaborated with feudalism to reduce China to a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society coincided with the process of the Chinese people's resolute struggle against imperialism and feudalism. During the 109 years from the Opium War of 1840 to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese people carried on unflinchingly and heroically a long series of revolutionary struggles against imperialism and feudalism. The revolution falls into two periods, each with its own historical characteristics: the revolution during the 80 years before the May 4 Movement of 1919 was of the old-democratic type, which was led by the bourgeoisie and constituted a part of the world bourgeois revolution; the revolution from the May 4 Movement to 1949 was of the new-democratic type, which was led by the working class and constituted a part of the world proletarian revolution.

In the period of the old-democratic revolution, the Chinese people waged frequent revolutionary struggles, among which the peasant war of the Taipings, and the Revolution of 1911, led by the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie represented by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, were the most important, both in scope and influence. These revolutionary struggles dealt heavy blows to feudalism and imperialism.

Hung Hsiu-chuan, leader of the Taiping Revolution, founded the Pai Shang Ti Hui, a society for the worship of God, and revised the Christian religion, as brought to China by Western missionaries, according to the peasants' ideas of freedom and equality, thus integrating the ideals of peasant revolution with Christian doctrines. Through the Pai Shang Ti Hui, Hung Hsiu-chuan organized the poverty-stricken peasants and handcraftsmen and started an armed uprising. The Taiping Revolution lasted 14 years (1851-64) and its influence at one time extended to 17 provinces. The Taiping leaders set up a revolutionary government in Nanking. They challenged the basic ideas of feudal culture, and promulgated the Agrarian Law of the Heavenly Regime, abolishing the feudal land system. But the revolution failed, chiefly because it was still a peasant uprising of the old type without the leadership of an advanced working class. The peasantry is a revolutionary class opposed to feudal rule and national oppression, but as a class of small produ-

* See pp. 10-15.
cers it is handicapped by its backward mode of production and betrays some characteristic weaknesses such as a tendency toward scattered activities, conservatism and selfishness. It was laid down in the Taiping land programme that land should be allotted equally, each family receiving the same number of mulberry trees, chickens and pigs as well as an equal area of land. Each peasant was to contribute an equal amount of labour in production and receive an equal share of produce. It was imagined that each peasant would thus always keep an equal amount of property on the basis of scattered farming and small-peasant economy. As a matter of fact, even if such a programme had been put into practice, the prospects of the peasant would still be fairly gloomy, for instead of developing the productive forces it would keep them at a standstill in the form of a backward small-peasant economy. So in spite of its anti-feudal revolutionary character, the Taiping land programme was from the viewpoint of social development tinged with the ideas of Utopian agricultural socialism. Besides, the Taiping Army failed to set up any solid bases in its occupied areas. After establishing a government in Nanking, its leaders committed a series of military and political mistakes, like the split in their leading core and their failure to establish good co-operation with other peasants' uprisings. Consequently they were unable to withstand the joint attack of the counter-revolutionary Ching imperial troops and the American, British and French aggressors.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the representative of the bourgeois revolutionary democrats, founded the Tung Meng Hui (Revolutionary League) in 1905 and started a democratic revolution under the leadership of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. The League put forth a programme for overthrowing the Ching monarchy and setting up a democratic republic under the slogan of "freedom, equality and fraternity," borrowed from the French Revolution. Upholding the banner of democratic revolution, the League openly denounced the advocates of a constitutional monarchy. It led a series of revolutionary uprisings between 1905 and 1911.

By overthrowing the Ching dynasty, the Revolution of 1911 put an end to the feudal monarchy which had reigned in China for over 2,000 years, and gave birth to the Republic of China and a provisional revolutionary government in Nanking. But the state power soon fell into the hands of the counter-revolutionary Yuan Shih-kai. So the Revolution of 1911 also ended in failure. The root of its failure lay in the weakness of the Chinese bourgeoisie. It had not worked out a thoroughgoing anti-imperialist and anti-feudal programme. So it failed to mobilize effectively the peasantry, the greatest and strongest democratic force in China, and throw it into the struggle. Besides, the Revolution of 1911 led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen lacked a solid foundation because it failed to solve the land problem, the basic problem in any democratic revolution. Hence, although it overthrew the corrupt Ching government, it became powerless when confronted with the imperialist-supported feudal comprador government represented by the Northern warlord Yuan Shih-kai. In China, a revolution led by the bourgeoisie was doomed to failure.

Sun Yat-sen thought that capitalism and its abuses could be prevented from growing in China. In his own words, "both the political and the social revolution will be accomplished at one stroke,"
i.e., the tasks of democratic revolution and those of socialist revolution could be fulfilled simultaneously. The programme put forward by Dr. Sun Yat-sen for preventing capitalism was the "equalization of landownership." Such a land programme by its very nature would foster capitalism instead of preventing it. What was then taking place in Europe was socialist revolution. It was natural that Sun Yat-sen, inspired by this storm of proletarian revolution, should have dreamed of socialism and imagined that the backward conditions in China would make "social revolution" all the easier. This was sheer subjective socialism. Had the bourgeois Revolution of 1911 been successful, it would have paved the way for the development of capitalism and the establishment of a capitalist society. But in semi-colonial China in the age of imperialism, such an event was altogether impossible.

All the peasant uprisings of the old type and all the bourgeois-led revolutions after the Opium War had ended alike in failure, and left the task of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movement unfulfilled. It was impossible to accomplish the democratic revolution and pass on to socialism until a new class with its political party appeared to assume leadership. This new class was the Chinese working class, and its party and vanguard, the Chinese Communist Party.

2. EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM AND ITS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT DURING WORLD WAR I. GROWTH OF CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHINESE WORKING CLASS. EARLY WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

The emergence of China's modern industry began in the latter half of the 19th century. Shortly after the influx of foreign capitalism certain modern enterprises were built up in China. From the forties, Britain began to set up modern industries in Hongkong. British, American, French and German merchants started shipyards, steamship companies, filatures, brick-tea factories and printing presses in Shanghai, Canton and Amoy. These factories were closely linked with the export of commodities, plunder of raw materials and cultural aggression on the part of the capitalist countries. It was in these foreign enterprises that the first batch of industrial workers, mainly seamen and shipping workers, were born. In the sixties, the Chinese feudal rulers, with Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang as their representatives, began to run military industries which in turn stimulated the growth of the coal and iron industries. These were expanded to include profitable civil industries in the eighties. At the same time a section of Chinese merchants, landlords and officials also began to invest in modern industries, which gave birth to another batch of industrial workers.

After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the imperialists stepped up their economic aggression against China in scope, scale and speed. Foreign investments in railways, mines and industries increased considerably. In railways, the Yunnan-Vietnam, Chinese Eastern, Tsingtao-Tsinan, Peking-Hankow, Peking-Fengtien, Tientsin-Pukow, Shanghai-Nanking and Peking-Suiyuan lines were all built in this period. They were either financed and run directly by the imperia-
lists or placed under their control. In mining, foreign capital secured a monopolist position. In 1913 the total output of coal in the whole country reached 12,879,770 tons, of which 7,136,545 tons or 55.4 per cent was controlled by the monopoly capital of the imperialists. In iron production imperialist monopoly was even more powerful. The total national output of 459,711 tons in 1913 was all under the control of Japanese capital.

China’s national industry also had some preliminary development with the gradual increase of privately-owned industries. In 1911 the total capital of China’s factories and mines reached 159,654,812 silver dollars, of which the capital of privately-owned factories and mines amounted to 88,552,367 dollars, constituting about one half of the total. In China’s national industry, coal and iron-mining and the textile industry predominated. The distribution of China’s capital in these two branches of industry was: mining and metallurgy, 41,315,992 dollars; textiles, 40,788,689 dollars.

Still another batch of industrial workers emerged from these Chinese and foreign-owned enterprises.

With the coming of World War I, the imperialist powers in Europe, busy with their military operations, temporarily relaxed their aggression on China, thus affording China’s national industry and trade an opportunity to develop. The number of spindles in cotton mills rose from 544,780 in 1914 to 658,748 in 1919. The export of raw silk increased from 70,150 tan in 1913 to 118,028 tan in 1919. The number of spindles in Chinese cotton mills in Shanghai rose from 160,900 in 1914 to 216,236 in 1919. The number of reels in silk filatures rose from 14,424 in 1914 to 18,306 in 1919. In this period the profit per bale of yarn of the cotton mills increased from 19.58 silver dollars in 1914 to 70.56 in 1919. As to foreign trade, taking the index number of imports and exports in 1913 as 100, the index number in 1919 was: imports, 156.4, and exports, 113.5.

As Chinese national capitalism had a chance to grow only when the imperialists temporarily relaxed their aggression, China’s national industries were naturally under-developed. In 1920, of the total number of 1,550,840 spindles in cotton mills in China, the imperialists owned 41.9 per cent; and of the total output of 21,318,825 tons of coal, the imperialists owned 50.9 per cent. The output of iron, totalling 258,868 tons, was entirely controlled by Japanese capital.

According to the statistics of 1915, China had about ten million workers (including handicraftsmen), of whom more than 600,000 or 6 per cent worked in factories. Most of the modern factories were small ones. In 1913 the total amount of capital in 565 registered factories was 50 million silver dollars. Four hundred and seventy-nine of these factories had a capital of less than 100,000 dollars each, 66 factories had from 100,000 to 500,000 dollars each and only 20 factories (less than 4 per cent) had over 500,000 dollars each.

While the British, French and German imperialists were occupied with the war, the Japanese and U.S. imperialists made haste to intensify their aggression in China. Though Britain and France temporarily relaxed their hold during the war, yet their power in China remained intact, and they lost no time in resuming and intensifying their aggression as soon as the war ended.
The characteristic features of the imperialist economic aggression on China were as follows:

First, foreign investments mostly took the form of direct investments. The imperialists controlled the whole of China's industry through the firms they opened in China, and their factories overwhelmed those run by Chinese capitalists. As a result of the imperialist plunder of China's industrial raw materials, China's resources were exported in large quantities and her heavy industry remained extremely backward. In 1919 the national output of iron ore was 1,009,542 tons, of which 662,632 tons were exported. The output of iron amounted to 442,594 tons, but iron imports amounted to 325,158 tons, or 70 per cent of the home output.

Secondly, foreign investments were chiefly commercial in nature. In 1914 the total capital of foreign enterprises was 1,000 million U.S. dollars. Of this sum, 83.1 per cent was invested in commerce; industrial investments, i.e., investments in manufacturing and mining, constituted only 16.9 per cent. Many of the factories were processing factories and repairing and assembling plants of imported parts. The influx of foreign investments which consisted largely of commercial capital undermined the foundation of China's natural economy and promoted the development of capitalism, but as a matter of fact among China's modern industries, only the textile industry developed to some extent.

Thirdly, China was at that time under the domination of several imperialist countries, but the development of their economic aggression in China was uneven. At the end of the 19th century, the chief imperialist countries which controlled China were Britain, Germany, tsarist Russia and France. At the beginning of the 20th century the U.S. and Japanese imperialists intensified their aggression in China with the result that China came under the domination of the six powers: Britain, Germany, Russia, France, the United States and Japan. After the victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet Union abolished all tsarist privileges in China and abrogated all the unequal treaties between the two nations. Germany also dropped out, owing to her defeat in the war. Thus after World War I China became the foraging ground for Britain, the United States, Japan and France.

The development of capitalism in China coincided with the growth of the Chinese working class. During the war, the Chinese working class expanded its ranks and increased its strength. Born with the establishment of the imperialist-operated enterprises in China, thus antedating the birth of China's national capitalism, the Chinese working class boasts a longer history and greater strength than the national bourgeoisie. The aggression of the imperialists created their own grave-diggers, the Chinese working class, and made it stronger day by day.

The Chinese working class rapidly became an advanced class two million strong, with political consciousness and the will to fight. It shared the main strong points of the working class in general, such as its connection with the most advanced form of economy, its strong sense of organization and lack of privately-owned means of production. Its connection with the advanced economic form of mass production made it a class with a great future before it. Working in factories where production proceeded in an organized and planned way and where all operations were limited by the machine and
mutually dependent, the working class most easily lent itself to organization. The working class was made up of wage-workers who had no means of production, sold their labour power and lived on wages. It was this that made the working class the most revolutionary of all classes. These fundamental strong points were shared by the working class of the whole world.

Apart from the characteristics common to workers of all lands, the Chinese working class had a number of strong points peculiar to itself.

First, the Chinese working class suffered under the threefold oppression of imperialism, feudalism and capitalism. Even the modern enterprises still smacked strongly of feudal exploitation, as witnessed by the labour contract system, the apprentice systems and so forth. The working day was exceedingly long: at least 10 hours, in some cases even as long as 16 hours. The wages were very low—only 20 or 30 fen a day, not enough to keep a worker and his family alive. Women and children were paid even lower wages, though they had to work equally long hours. A great inequality in payment existed between foreign and Chinese labour, some foreign (English) workers being paid seven times as much as a Chinese worker. No safety devices whatever were installed in factories and mines, as the capitalists were more concerned with their machines than with human beings. Consequently, accidents were very common and countless workers were disabled or killed. Since labour insurance was unknown, the workers were constantly menaced by want, old age, illness, death and disablement. They were deprived of all freedom of speech, assembly, association and strikes, and had no democratic rights whatever. Because of the treble oppression and exploitation, the Chinese working class possessed a determination and thoroughness in the revolutionary struggle unrivalled by any other class.

Secondly, the Chinese working class was highly concentrated. This was brought about by the concentration of Chinese industries. In terms of trade, the workers were brought together in railway, mining, shipping, textile and ship-building industries. In geographical distribution, they were concentrated in such large cities as Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Wuhan and Canton. Lastly, in terms of enterprises they mostly worked in big enterprises employing over 500 workers each. According to statistics compiled in 1919 by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce of the Peking government, there were in 13 provinces 144 factories each employing over 500 workers and 29 factories each employing more than 1,000 workers. The concentration of the working class facilitated the manifestation of its class consciousness and the pooling of the workers' wisdom and strength in their struggles. Consequently, the Chinese working class possessed an immense fighting power. Furthermore, as the cities were the centres of imperialist domination in China, the struggle of the workers constituted a direct menace to the imperialists.

Thirdly, though numbering only about two million, the Chinese industrial workers had natural allies in the other toiling people, i.e., the over ten million handicraftsmen and shop assistants and hundreds of millions of farm labourers and poor peasants. As the majority of workers were originally bankrupt peasants, they had natural ties with the peasantry. These proletarians and semi-proletarians in the urban and rural areas constituted more than one half of the country's population, and formed a solid basis on which the working class
might carry on its revolutionary struggles and make a strong alliance with the peasantry.

The above-mentioned characteristics of the Chinese working class explain why it conducted its struggles with an indomitable will and wide participation, and displayed an immense concentrated fighting power. Once the Chinese working class came into contact with Marxism-Leninism and formed its own political party—the Chinese Communist Party—it immediately became the leading class in the Chinese revolution under the Party's leadership.

The Chinese working class had taken part in revolutionary struggles long before the May 4 Movement of 1919, but the role it had played then was that of a mere follower of the bourgeoisie as yet unconscious of its own political demands and programme for struggle. A few instances might be listed. In 1906, 6,000 miners of the Anyuan Colliery took part in an uprising organized by the Tung Meng Hui in Pinghsiang (in Kiangsi Province), Liuyang and Liling (both in Hunan Province). In the Revolution of 1911, the workers who were building the Chungking-Hankow Railway staged an uprising in response to the bourgeois movement against the Ching government's attempt to "nationalize the railways." Besides, the workers had waged many economic struggles for the improvement of their living conditions, such as the 1913 strike of the Peking postal workers against the increase of their daily trips, the strike of the workers of the Hanyang Arsenal against payment of wages in depreciated currency, and the 1914 general strike of the workers of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, and the British-owned Butterfield and Swire, and Jardine, Matheson & Co. in Shanghai, in support of part of the workers who demanded a wage increase. There had been numerous other cases of strikes for higher wages in Shanghai and elsewhere from 1916 to 1919.

In order to win victory, the workers established organizations of every possible form, like secret societies—Ke Lao Hui (the Society of Brothers), Lao Chun Hui (the Taoist Society) and others—and craft and regional guilds. But these organizations could not lead the workers to victory because they were usually controlled by compradors and local gangsters.

Owing to the impressive growth of its strength, the Chinese working class was playing an increasingly important role in the political and economic life of the country. With the intensification of imperialist and feudal oppression and exploitation and under the influence of the international working-class movement, the political consciousness of the Chinese working class was rapidly raised.

3. THE INFLUENCE OF THE OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION ON THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

The October Socialist Revolution in 1917 brought about a fundamental change in Chinese as well as in world history. Its influence on the Chinese revolution was most far-reaching and profound.

(1) The October Revolution filled the Chinese people with great confidence in their struggle for liberation. From the victory won
by the Russian people headed by the Russian proletariat and their founding of the first state under proletarian dictatorship, from the independence and freedom enjoyed by the former oppressed nationalities in Soviet Russia, from the collapse of German-Austrian imperialism and the outbreak of revolution in these two countries, and from the weakening of British and French imperialism, the Chinese people saw a new hope for the liberation of their nation. The Russian proletariat had removed all the obstacles to social progress like the tsar, aristocrats, bureaucrats, militarism and capitalism, and declared the inevitable doom of the imperialist world system. Their victory was a powerful stimulus to the Chinese people's will to fight.

(2) The October Revolution erected a bridge between the proletariat of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East. This means that after the October Revolution, a bulwark of world revolution was built up which, under the banner of Leninism, gave unstinted aid to the national liberation movements. Enjoying the support of the socialist Soviet Union, the revolution in the colonies then became part of the world proletarian revolution. Lenin and the Russian people ardently loved the Chinese people and regarded the Chinese revolution as possessing an unfathomable force. In deep sympathy with the Chinese people in their revolutionary struggle, and in full accord with the proletarian principle of internationalism, they gave constant support to the liberation movement of the Chinese people throughout its entire course. In 1919 and 1920, the Soviet Government made two statements concerning China, declaring the abolition of all the privileges seized by tsarist Russia and demanding the expulsion of the tsarist officials from China. Thus the Soviet Union was the first state that gave up its legacy of privileges in China. The Chinese people enthusiastically hailed the noble spirit of internationalism shown by the Soviet Government. Young students and the press began spontaneously to do propaganda work about the victory of the October Revolution. Realizing that Soviet foreign policy marked a new beginning in world diplomatic history, the Chinese people hailed the new-born Soviet state as "the Favourite Child of Justice and Humanity," and the Russian workers, peasants and soldiers as "the most beloved people in the world." The Chinese people who had been thus awakened began to prepare themselves for a persistent fight against the reactionary government of warlords and bureaucrats.

(3) The October Revolution brought Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese people, and showed them the way for their own liberation. "The salvoes of the October Revolution awakened us to Marxism-Leninism." This universal truth helped progressive Chinese intellectuals to see the future of their country and to reconsider their problems in the light of the proletarian world outlook. They began to embrace Marxism-Leninism and founded the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of the working-class movement. "Once integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism has made the Chinese revolution assume a new aspect."

Marxism-Leninism, brought by the October Revolution, illuminated the way for the Chinese people in their advance to liberation. They therefore count Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik Party as their greatest teachers and friends. It is from their teachings that they draw their ideological strength.

The patriotic May 4 Movement marked the outbreak of a new revolutionary storm and the advance of the Chinese revolution to a new stage.

The Revolution of 1911 was bourgeois-democratic in nature. Owing to its lack of strong leadership and other weaknesses, however, the revolution left some loopholes open to the Chinese feudal forces and foreign aggressors. The imperialists backed Yuan Shih-kai as the new ruler and employed this schemer-traitor as their new instrument. Making use of his power, Yuan played a devilish double-game between the Ching government and the revolutionaries, forcing the Ching emperor to abdicate and the revolutionaries in Nanking to agree to a compromise. The imperialists openly or secretly supported his intrigues and set him up as the head of the Chinese reactionaries.

In 1916, an abortive attempt to restore the monarchy led to Yuan Shih-kai's downfall. As the imperialist powers in Europe were then too busily occupied with the war among themselves to interfere in China, the Japanese imperialists seized the opportunity to set up another Northern warlord, Tuan Chi-jui, as their servile agent. So immediately after Yuan's death, Tuan Chi-jui came to power in the Peking government.

As Yuan Shih-kai had been recognized by the imperialist powers as their common agent, he had undertaken, immediately after he came to power, to comply with all the traitorous treaties concluded by the Ching government. In 1913, a Six-Power Consortium headed by the United States granted Yuan Shih-kai a big loan amounting to 25 million pounds to suppress the revolutionary movement in China, on condition that the consortium should have direct supervision over Chinese finance. In 1915, Japan compelled Yuan Shih-kai to sign the "Twenty-one Demands," thereby securing a monopoly position in China. After Yuan's death the Japanese-supported Tuan Chi-jui government obtained from Japan a series of loans amounting to 500 million yen in all. In return China conceded to Japan the right to exploit Manchuria, Mongolia and Shantung and to control the Chinese army and police as well as to interfere in her civil administration.

But the Tuan Chi-jui government played its most despicable role during the Japanese militarists' attack on the Soviet Union, when it acted as their lackey. As a result of the anti-Soviet war, Japanese troops marched into China and gained control over her northeastern provinces and over her military apparatus.

The conflict between the U.S. and Japan grew more acute after World War I. They vied with each other in their search for new agents among Chinese warlords, bureaucrats and compradors and used them as their tools to fight each other. In the international sphere, the U.S. proposed to organize an international consortium comprising the U.S., Britain, France and Japan, with a view to undermining Japan's monopoly of China and securing for herself a leading position in the consortium on the strength of her eco-
nomie power. The consortium was formed in 1920, but owing to the contradictions between the four countries, especially between Japan and the U.S., no agreement was ever reached.

World War I ended in the defeat of Germany and Austria. The Versailles Peace Conference was held in Paris on January 18, 1919. This was a conference for the sharing of the spoils, convened under the manipulation of the U.S. imperialists for the purpose of carving up the defeated countries and redividing the colonies.

As China had fought on the side of Britain, France and the U.S., she was also represented at the conference. Under the pressure of public opinion, the Chinese delegation submitted an appeal to the conference demanding the abolition of the privileges held by the imperialists in China, the abrogation of the "Twenty-one Demands" concluded between Yuan Shih-kai and the Japanese imperialists and the return to China of the German privileges in Shantung seized by Japan during the war.

Prior to this, Woodrow Wilson, President of the U.S., had issued in January 1918 the so-called "Fourteen Points of Peace Conditions," hypocritically declaring that the demands of the colonial peoples should be respected, and that the political independence and territorial integrity of each nation should be guaranteed by all. This showed the contradiction between the "Open-door" Policy of the U.S. and the monopoly policy of Japan, a contradiction that was brought into the open when the Japanese delegation subjected its demand to the conference that all the German interests in Shantung should be taken over by Japan. As the Japanese demand had the support of Britain and France, the U.S., to maintain the counter-revolutionary imperialist front, compromised with Japan by supporting her unreasonable claim and turning down China's just demands. It was laid down in the Peace Treaty with Germany that all the German interests in Shantung were to be handed over to Japan. As to the Chinese demands for the abolition of the privileges enjoyed by the foreign powers in China and for the annulment of the "Twenty-one Demands," the conference did not take the trouble to discuss them at all. Thus the Paris Conference revealed the fierce features of the imperialists, fighting with one another to plunder China while presenting a common front when China's interests were to be sacrificed.

China's diplomatic failure disillusioned the Chinese people, especially the progressive elements and the young students under their influence, who had pinned their hopes on the Paris Conference. They came to realize that only by relying on their own efforts could they decide the destiny of their country.

On May 4, 1919, the students of Peking held a mammoth patriotic demonstration. Three thousand students gathered in front of the Tien An Men, front entrance to the former Imperial Palace, and after the meeting they staged a parade demanding the punishment of the three traitors: Minister of Communications, Tsao Ju-lin, who as Vice-Foreign Minister under the Yuan Shih-kai government signed the "Twenty-one Demands"; Director of the Currency Bureau, Lu Tsung-yu, who served as the Chinese Minister to Japan when the "Twenty-one Demands" was signed; and the then Chinese Minister to Japan, Chang Tsung-hsiang, who sold out a series of railway rights to Japan. While the students were wrecking Tsao Ju-lin's residence, gendarmes and policemen arrived to
stop them, arresting more than 30 on the spot. The Peking government also forced Tsai Yuan-pei, President of Peking University, to resign. Immediately, the students of Peking staged a strike and carried on patriotic propaganda in the streets. On June 3, the Peking government, at the bidding of the Japanese imperialists, sent out large numbers of gendarmes and policemen to arrest over 300 students (and an additional thousand on the next day) and banned all patriotic movements. The sole result of this high-handed policy on the part of the traitorous government was the still more rapid expansion of the student movement throughout the country.

After June 3, the centre of the patriotic movement shifted from Peking to Shanghai, and the working class came forward as the main force of the movement, in place of the students. From June 5 to 11, about 70,000 workers of the textile and metal-working industries and transport and public services in Shanghai—China's largest industrial and commercial centre—went on strike. That the strike also involved workers in the Japanese-owned textile mills and in U.S., British and French enterprises showed its anti-imperialist character. In Tangshan on the Peking-Mukden Railway and Changhsintien on the Peking-Hankow Railway, the workers staged patriotic parades.

This was the first anti-imperialist strike of the working class in the history of China. The working class was the most powerful contingent in the ranks of the May 4 Movement. It dealt a heavy blow to the warlord government with strikes in Shanghai (the most important industrial and commercial city of China), in Changhsintien and Tangshan (two important centres of industry and mining) and along the Shanghai-Nanking Railway (an important line of communications). The coming to the fore of this contingent constituted an extremely important factor for the victory of the May 4 Movement. It inspired the people with courage and made all other social strata feel the increase of the people's strength.

The Chinese bourgeoisie also joined the ranks of the patriotic movement. As the market for Chinese manufactures widened after the outbreak of the May 4 Movement, the bourgeoisie in Shanghai took a favourable attitude towards the student movement. Under the influence of the workers' strikes, industrial and commercial enterprises simultaneously suspended business on June 5, and immediately afterwards those in neighbouring cities and in other major cities throughout the country followed suit. The bourgeoisie in Shanghai, however, manifested its weakness at the very beginning of the movement. They opposed "rioting" and advocated what they called "civilized resistance," that is, that all strikes of workers, students and merchants should be carried out in "legal" form and kept within the limits permitted by the imperialists and the warlord government.

The May 4 Movement spread from Peking to the whole country and became an extensive patriotic mass movement embracing workers, students, merchants and other social strata.

The great strength shown by the Chinese people in their struggle forced the reactionary government to release the arrested students and dismiss the traitorous officials, Tsao Ju-lin, Chang Tsung-hsiang and Lu Tsungyu. It also forced the Chinese delegation to the Paris
Conference to refuse to sign the Treaty of Versailles. Thus the patriotic May 4 Movement scored a great victory.

The great political strikes of the workers during the May 4 Movement hastened the victory of the Chinese people's anti-imperialist struggle, and began to demonstrate the great strength of the Chinese working class. The need was then felt for a political party which would stand for the interests of the working class and know how to lead it in its struggle. This accounts for the rapid integration of Marxist-Leninist theory with the working-class movement in China, and constitutes the class basis for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.

At the beginning of the 20th century, before the advent of Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary petty-bourgeois and bourgeois intellectuals in China had energetically propagated democratic culture. They advocated democracy and opposed monarchy and warlordism. They upheld science against old conventions and jargon, superstition, blind obedience, dogmatism and the old moral code which served the interests of the feudal ruling class. The struggle on the ideological front inevitably led to reforms in language and literature—the vehicles of ideological expression. Consequently, they advocated the vernacular against the classical style of writing, the new literature against the old.

The most influential periodicals in disseminating democratic culture were *New Youth* and *Weekly Review*. The former was started in September 1915, the latter in December 1918. These two journals relentlessly attacked the old feudal ideology and dogmas. Among the champions of democratic culture were Li Ta-chao, Chen Tushiu and Lu Hsun.

Although the democratic cultural movement prior to the May 4 Movement did not go beyond the scope of a bourgeois cultural revolution, yet, by reason of its revolutionary spirit and militant courage, it dealt a heavy blow to feudal ideology and played a considerable role in disseminating new ideas before the advent of Marxism-Leninism.

The first person to embrace Marxism in China was Li Ta-chao. Towards the end of 1918, he began to make propaganda for the October Socialist Revolution and declared with full confidence that the victory of the Russian revolution was the victory of Bolshevism, for the theory which led the proletarian socialist revolution to victory was none other than Bolshevism—Marxism-Leninism. This was a declaration of supreme significance.

Li Ta-chao pointed out sharply that the end of World War I represented the decay and defeat of capitalism and the victory of the common people and of democracy—the new democracy of the common people.

He expounded the Marxist economic theory and materialist view of history. The materialist view of history, he said, was a guiding force that enabled man to fight for social progress and gave him the militant spirit which led to action. Li Ta-chao foresaw the awakening of the Chinese working class and declared his determination, as well as that of other Marxists, to devote himself to the working-class movement.

From 1918 to 1919, the *New Youth* carried many articles on the study of Marxism, the Soviet Union and the Chinese working-class movement. Under the influence of the October Revolution, the
revolutionary intellectuals in China began to awaken, and the spread of Marxism-Leninism became a conscious movement.

The new cultural movement began as a revolutionary movement of the cultural united front of three sections of intellectuals: the communist, the petty bourgeois and the bourgeois. Within the united front the proletarian ideology and the bourgeois ideology were antagonistic to each other. The socialist tendencies of New Youth and Weekly Review aroused the dissatisfaction of the bourgeoisie. With the gradual expansion of the influence of the proletarian outlook, the struggle sharpened. Shortly after the May 4 Movement of 1919, Hu Shih, representative of the Right-wing bourgeoisie, published in the July number of Weekly Review an article entitled “More About Problems, Less About Isms,” openly opposing the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in China.

Li Ta-chao launched a powerful counter-attack on Hu Shih, pointing out clearly that an “-ism” was a viewpoint, a theory and a method to solve problems and that ignorance of “-isms” meant ignorance of the laws of objective reality, and without an understanding of these laws no one could hope to solve any “problems.” The problem of China required a basic solution. “This basic solution is the necessary postulate to the solution of individual problems.” The “-ism” which would help people to study and solve China’s basic problem was none other than Marxism-Leninism, the only correct “-ism” which could serve as a guide to the Chinese revolution.

Li’s refutation of Hu Shih’s ideas about problems and “isms” was the first counter-attack by proletarian ideology against bourgeois ideology. It dealt a heavy blow to the bourgeois distortion and slander of Marxism-Leninism and criticized pragmatism, a reactionary philosophy of the bourgeoisie in the era of imperialism, and bourgeois reformism, thus extending the influence of Marxism-Leninism in China. After this controversy, the Right wing of the bourgeoisie, represented by Hu Shih, began to take the road of compromise and surrender.

5. INTEGRATION OF THE CHINESE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT WITH MARXISM-LENINISM. THE EARLY REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES OF COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG

In order to further disseminate Marxism-Leninism and carry on propaganda and organizational work among the workers, Chinese Communists founded a Marxist study society in Shanghai in 1918 and another in Peking in 1919. On this basis, Communist and Socialist Youth League groups were formed in one place after another throughout the country. A Communist group was established in Shanghai in May 1920, another in Peking in September and another in Canton at the end of the same year, all three cities being at that time well-developed political, economic and cultural centres of China. Other Communist groups were set up later in Hunan, Hupeh and Shantung Provinces as well as among Chinese students in Tokyo and Paris.

Under the leadership of the Marxist study societies and the Communist groups a nation-wide propaganda movement of Marxism-Leninism was launched. The New Youth Press began to publish Chinese
translations of Communist classics in a planned way, like *The Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels, and *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* by Engels. It also published books on socialist theories, such as *Class Struggle* and *The History of Socialism*. On May 1, 1920, *New Youth* published a May Day special number, which carried articles on the working-class movement of various countries in the world, contributions to a discussion among the Hunan women workers in the Housheng Cotton Mill in Shanghai, and reports of investigations into the conditions of the workers in different parts of China. A series of articles entitled “Studies of Russia” also appeared in successive numbers of that magazine. After the founding of the Communist group of Shanghai, *New Youth* became its official organ. In November 1920, the Communist group of Shanghai put out a monthly called *The Communist Party*, with essays on Marxism-Leninism, the Russian revolution, the Russian Communist Party and the Communist Parties of other countries.

The Chinese Communists also carried on propaganda and organizational work among the workers.

The Peking group with the Peking-Hankow Railway as its centre of its activities ran workers’ night schools, and published *Labour’s Voice*, a workers’ tabloid. On May 1, 1920, the workers of Changhsintien staged a demonstration and adopted the decision to establish a trade union, which was subsequently founded under the name of “The Workers’ Club.” The activities in Changhsintien promoted the trade union movement in other parts of North China.

The Communist group of Shanghai ran workers’ schools with Hsiaoshatu in the western suburbs as a starting point and published a workers’ tabloid, *Labour World*. With workers as its readers, it carried articles written in simple, clear and stirring language. It gave popular explanations of socialism and the economic theories of Marx. The Communists went to the midst of the worker masses to carry on organizational work. First of all, regular workers’ correspondence was published in a special column of the *Labour World*, establishing connections among workers and between workers and Communists. The Machinists’ Trade Union was founded under the leadership of the Communist group of Shanghai. It was a product of the synthesis of Marxism-Leninism with the working-class movement. Later on the Printers and the Textile Workers’ Trade Unions were established.

Changhsintien and Hsiaoshatu were the bases from which the Chinese Communists started the trade union movement. Then the Canton group followed their example by setting up workers’ schools and publishing a tabloid called *Labour’s Echo*. The groups of Hunan and other places also carried on propaganda and organizational work among the workers.

All this activity awakened and strengthened the Chinese working class, thus preparing the ideological and organizational groundwork and nurturing the necessary cadres for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.

During this period Comrade Mao Tse-tung was doing revolutionary work in Hunan. While studying in the First Provincial Normal School of Hunan in 1917, he organized a society for disseminating the new culture, known as the New People’s Study Society. In the following year, he went to Peking and worked in the library of
Peking University. His unfailing interest in political theories quickly led him to accept Marxism. Thus the fundamental principles of communism were instilled into the mind of this young intellectual.

Mao Tse-tung returned to Hunan in 1919. After the outbreak of the May 4 Movement, he actively led the struggle against imperialism in Changsha, the provincial capital. He founded the Hsiang-chiang Review, opposing imperialism, feudalism and warlordism, and advocating democracy and new culture. The influence of this magazine reached all the provinces of South China. At the same time, he also rallied the students and revolutionary intellectuals of Hunan in taking an active part in the struggle to expel the warlords from Hunan.

In 1920 he founded the Marxist study society and set up the Socialist Youth League in Hunan, which under his leadership was active in the working-class movement, uniting it with Marxism-Leninism.

Thanks to his leadership, a firm ideological and organizational foundation was laid and cadres were trained for the founding of the Communist Party branch in Hunan.

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1 Since the end of the 18th century, Britain had exported large quantities of opium into China. In the middle of the 19th century, the Chinese people realized the pernicious effect of the drug traffic upon their national life and its inroads upon their silver reserves and vigorously protested. Under the pretext of safeguarding her trade, Britain launched armed aggression against China in 1840. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu put up resistance, and the people in Canton spontaneously organized the “Quell-the-British Corps.” In 1842, however, the corrupt Manchu regime signed the Treaty of Nanking with the British, paying indemnities, ceding Hongkong, opening the seaports of Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo and Canton to British trade and agreeing to fix jointly with Britain the duties on imported British goods.

2 The war broke out as a result of Japan’s aggression upon Korea and her provocation against China’s ground and sea forces. Although her armed forces fought heroically, China was defeated in the next year because of the corruption of the Manchu government and the lack of preparation for a resolute fight against aggression. The result was the conclusion of a humiliating treaty at Shimonoseki (Bakan), whereby the Manchu government agreed to cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan, to pay an indemnity of 200 million taels (a tael being about 1.33 ounces) of silver, to allow the Japanese to establish factories in China, to open Shasi, Chungking, Soochow and Hangchow as treaty ports, and to place Korea in Japan’s hands as her vassal state.

3 In 1900, there broke out a vast spontaneous mass movement—the Yi Ho Tuan (“Boxer”) Movement—of the peasants and handicraftsmen in North China. Forming themselves into secret societies based upon superstitious cults, these peasants and handicraftsmen carried out an armed struggle against imperialism. The joint forces of the eight Imperialist powers of Britain, the United States, Japan, Germany, tsarist Russia, France, Italy and Austria thereupon occupied Peking and Tientsin and suppressed the movement in a most cruel manner. The Manchu government was eventually compelled to sign the humiliating Protocol of 1901.

4 See p. 3.
5 See pp. 4, 10.
6 See pp. 4-5.
Compradors were Chinese managers or senior employees in foreign commercial establishments who, making use of their close connection with imperialism and foreign capital, became magnates in Chinese industry and commerce.

The name by which Shenyang (Mukden) was then known.

A tan is equivalent to 50 kilogrammes or 0.98 cwt.

Under the labour contract system, agents used to recruit girls from the countryside for a term of three to five years, mainly for the textile industry. A small sum of money was paid to the girl's family on the signing of the contract. For the term of the contract, the girl was deprived of all freedom. All her earnings over and above the cost of her food and lodging went into the pocket of the agent. Another form of this system consisted in the employing of workers by labour-contractors or gang-masters, who hired them out to capitalists and retained a large part of their wages as commission.

This was a method of obtaining free labour and keeping down the adult wage-rate. During the period of "training," usually three to five years, the apprentice received no pay apart from the cost of his food and clothing. When his apprenticeship was ended, he was bound to continue to work for the employer at extremely low wages.

Wuhan is the collective name of Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang in Hupeh Province.


Put to the Yuan Shih-kai government on January 18, 1915, these demands were divided into five parts. The first four contained the following: transferring to Japan Germany's privileges and interests in Shantung and granting to Japan additional privileges and interests there; allowing the Japanese to lease or own land, to reside, to engage in industry and commerce, and to have exclusive rights of railway-building and mining in southern Manchuria and eastern Mongolia; reorganizing the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company in Central China into a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise; and abstaining from leasing or ceding any harbours or islands along China's coastline to any third power. The fifth part demanded that Japan be allowed to control China's government, finance, police and national defence, and to build the vital railway lines connecting the provinces of Hupeh, Kiangsi and Kwangtung.

After the Japanese ultimatum on May 7, Yuan Shih-kai accepted all the demands except those in the fifth part, about which he pleaded for "further negotiation."

The name by which Northeast China was then known.

One of the earliest propagators of Marxism-Leninism in China and a founder of the Chinese Communist Party. Executed in April 1927 by the warlord Chang Tso-lin.

Lu Hsun (1881-1936) was the father of modern Chinese literature and the greatest and most militant standard-bearer of China's cultural revolution. Apart from The True Story of Ah Q, A Madman's Diary and The New Year's Sacrifice—his most famous works—he wrote many short stories and essays, in which he vehemently attacks feudalism and imperialism, gives force to the aspirations of the oppressed and exposes the people's enemy in his true colours. He always identified his work with the Chinese people's revolution, for which he waged a relentless struggle until his death in October 1936.
CHAPTER TWO

FOUNDING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE WORKING-CLASS

MOVEMENT

(July 1921—December 1923)

1. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BETWEEN 1921
AND 1923. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND THE
AGREEMENT OF IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE
PARTITION OF CHINA

The United States made enormous profits out of World War I. She entered the war only during its final stage when the belligerent powers had almost exhausted themselves, and thus acquired an undisputed military and economic superiority over the other powers. The need of the belligerent powers as well as of the United States herself for large quantities of arms created a vast market, and paved the way for the expansion of U.S. industry both during and after the war. While the European imperialist countries suffered great losses in their economic might and manpower, the United States alone escaped all the calamities of the war. In fact, she made a huge fortune out of the same war that drained the resources of the other nations. This was an important factor in the post-war economic prosperity of the United States.

Consequently, a great change took place in the relative strength of the imperialist countries. In 1913 the steel output of the United States constituted 40 per cent of the total output of the capitalist world, and, continuing in its upward curve, rose to 50 per cent in 1929. Thus the United States soon became a leading industrial power and the boss of the capitalist world. As economic power was at the back of the U.S. post-war expansion, China naturally became one of the principal colonial markets that she proceeded to plunder.

After the war the main contradiction of the imperialist powers in the East was that between the United States and Japan. At the Paris Peace Conference the United States, instead of weakening Japan’s monopolist position in China, had recognized her special rights and interests. This did not relax but sharpened the contradiction between the two.

As Japanese inroads into British markets in the Far East hampered Britain’s expansion there during the post-war period, the contradiction between Britain and Japan also became intensified.

The international relations centring around China drew the United States and Britain closer to each other. A struggle was thus started between the U.S. and Britain on the one hand and Japan on the other.

This struggle was primarily reflected in the armaments race. All three expanded their naval forces, particularly their fleets in the Pacific, to prepare for a new imperialist war.
This struggle was also reflected in the wars among the warlords in China. To expand and consolidate its own position for aggression, each imperialist power sought for agents among the Chinese warlords, while the Chinese warlords wanted to rely upon the imperialist powers to maintain and expand their own spheres of influence. Thus, one group of the Northern warlords—the Chihli clique headed by Wu Pei-fu and Tsao Kun—became the tools of Britain and the United States, while the other cliques—the Anhwei clique headed by Tuan Chi-jui and the Fengtien clique headed by Chang Tso-lin—fell under the sway of Japan. These warlords of different cliques were engaged in perpetual warfare against each other. The Chihli-Anhwei war in July 1920, the first Chihli-Fengtien war in April 1922 and the second in September 1924 were but reflections of the struggles between the United States, Britain and Japan in China; and the triumph or defeat of the various warlord cliques marked the contraction or expansion of the privileges and interests of the three imperialist powers.

In order to exert pressure on Japan and impose certain restrictions on Japanese influence in the Far East, the United States and Britain convened in November 1921 the Washington Conference, with the participation of the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, China, Holland, Portugal and Belgium. In the matter of armaments, it fixed the tonnage of naval vessels of the United States, Britain and Japan at a 5:5:3 ratio. A Nine-Power Treaty was concluded in which the notorious “Open-door” Policy was reaffirmed in relation to the China problem. This agreement was made possible only by U.S. and British recognition of Japan's special rights and interests in China. A new situation thus emerged. The exclusive rule of China by Japan gave place to the old course of joint domination of China by the imperialist powers, and the path for the U.S. monopolization of China was cleared. The Washington Conference was a conference for the partition of China by the imperialist powers.

About the time of the Washington Conference, commentaries in New Youth, The Communist Party and Vanguard—all published by the Chinese Communists—analysed the outstanding characteristics of post-war international relations centring around the problem of China, exposed the loot-splitting nature of this conference and the danger of a division of China by the Japanese, British and U.S. imperialists, and pointed out that the political task before the Chinese people was to unite in waging a relentless struggle against imperialism and the warlord government.


On July 1, 1921, with the assistance of the Communist International, the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Shanghai. Twelve delegates elected by the various Communist groups attended the Congress. Among them were Mao Tse-tung,
Tung Pi-wu, Chen Tan-chiu and Ho Shu-heng. In all, they represented 57 Communist members. The First National Congress adopted the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, and elected the leading body of the Party. The Communist Party of China was formally founded.

The Chinese Communist Party was established on the pattern of the Russian Bolshevik Party, a new type of revolutionary party. Such a party is the vanguard and class-conscious detachment of the working class, a detachment armed with the science of Marxism-Leninism. It is an organized detachment of the working class, in which the members are held together by unified will, action and discipline. It is the highest of all forms of organization of the working class, and it is its mission to guide all the other working-class organizations.

The fundamental condition for forming such a party is to insist on the strict standard of its membership, raising its members to a high level and absorbing into the Party the finest, the most advanced and revolutionary elements of the working class and of the labouring people in general.

To be a united detachment of the working class, the Party must arm itself with revolutionary theories, with a knowledge of the laws governing the development of society and of revolution. It must insist on the ideological unity of Marxism-Leninism within the Party and apply Marxism-Leninism under the varying conditions of the class struggle. Therefore the Party must wage an uncompromising struggle against various kinds of opportunism within its ranks.

Various reasons accounted for the possibility of forming the Party along the above-mentioned line. First, as it was born after the October Socialist Revolution, it was able to model itself on the Russian Bolshevik Party and be helped and guided by the Communist International. Secondly, unlike the European countries, China had neither a stage of "peaceful" development of capitalism which would allow the working class to carry on peaceful parliamentary struggles, nor a labour aristocracy: that is to say, the social basis of reformism was not existent in China. Thus from the very beginning the Communist Party of China had absorbed the fine tradition of the Russian Bolshevik Party, uncontaminated by any sort of social reformism. This is the most prominent characteristic of the birth of the Party. The achievement of the First National Congress was that it laid the foundation for the correct organizational principles of the Party.

But as semi-colonial China was a country with a large petty-bourgeois population, the great majority of the Party members came from the urban petty bourgeoisie or peasantry. It was therefore inevitable that they should have brought into the Party in varying extent petty-bourgeois ideas which were the social origin of "Left" and Right opportunism. Hence, remoulding all non-proletarian ideas with Marxism-Leninism and raising the general ideological level of the whole Party became a task of paramount importance in the building of the Chinese Communist Party.

The First National Congress of the Party opposed two erroneous viewpoints. One was the Right viewpoint of "Legal Marxism," which aimed at turning the Party into an academic institution where intellectuals might study Marxism. The "Legal Marxists" held that instead of setting up a strict organization to carry on the working-
class movement the Marxists in China should only carry on propaganda work by establishing schools and publishing newspapers and take part in parliamentary struggles. The other was the “Left” adventurist viewpoint which held that proletarian dictatorship was the immediate aim of the Party, and opposed the Party's participation in the bourgeois-democratic movement, the launching of legal activities and the admission of intellectuals into the Party.

Chen Tu-hsiu did not attend this congress. A radical democrat before the introduction of Marxism into China, he became later an influential socialist propagandist and one of the sponsors of the founding of the Communist Party. At the First National Congress, he was elected to head the Central Committee of the Party. He was, however, not a good Marxist. Though he had propagated Marxist philosophy in China, there was a large admixture of bourgeois idealism in his mental make-up. He had, for instance, alleged that the Marxist philosophy and the reactionary bourgeois philosophy of pragmatism were “the two most important methods of thinking in modern times” and proposed the formation of a united front of these two totally antagonistic schools of philosophy. His opinion that Marxism could only explain social phenomena but not their essence landed him in the mire of agnosticism. It is true that he had propagated socialist ideas in China, but how was China, in his opinion, to enter a socialist revolution? At first he thought that China should begin the socialist revolution at once, thereby showing that he had confused the different stages of China's revolution. Later he switched to the view that the Chinese revolution must go through two stages: the democratic revolution under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, and the socialist revolution under the leadership of the proletariat.

These erroneous viewpoints of his developed into an erroneous Party policy during the revolution of 1924-27. A comprehensive and well-integrated understanding of the unity of the Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution was entirely beyond him.

Since the very beginning of the Communist Party of China, Comrade Mao Tse-tung had paid particular attention to the problem of building a party of the new type.

After the First National Congress Comrade Mao Tse-tung was sent back to Hunan to take up the post of Party Secretary for that province. He not only absorbed into the Party, through a rigorous sifting process, the advanced elements in the existing revolutionary organizations and in the Socialist Youth League, but also recruited advanced workers into the Party while he was extending the workers' movement.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung paid great attention to the ideological work of the Party. He established two monthly magazines, Self-Study University and New Times, in August 1921 to raise the ideological and political level of the Party members and Youth League members and help them master Marxism-Leninism and to carry on Communist education among the masses.

The influence of Self-Study University reached as far as Peking, Shanghai and other places. Many progressive newspapers of the country highly recommended it.

After the founding of the Party the Chinese revolution took on a radically new aspect.
Under the guidance of Lenin, the Communist International convened in Moscow in January 1922 the First Congress of the Communist Parties and the National Revolutionary Bodies of the Various Countries in the Far East. The Communist Party of China sent a delegation to this congress.

The congress exposed the imperialist nature of the Washington Conference and pointed to imperialism and feudalism as the biggest enemies of China and of the other oppressed nations of the East. It stressed the need to form an alliance between the oppressed nations of the East and the proletariat of the West. Therefore, the task of the Chinese people and the peoples of other Eastern countries was to carry out an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, national democratic revolution with the assistance of the Russian proletariat and the proletariat of the Western countries.

The congress was of great importance to the Communist Party of China. Though the ultimate aim of the Party, as defined at the time of its founding, was to build communism in China, the road to attain this aim remained indistinct. According to Leninism, however, for the semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries to realize a socialist and then a communist society, the immediate task was to carry out an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution.

After returning from the Moscow Congress, the delegates of the Chinese Communist Party attended the Second National Congress of the Party, which laid down a maximum programme and a minimum programme for the Party, based on the Leninist theories concerning revolutions in the colonies and semi-colonies.

The Second National Congress of the Party was held in Shanghai in July 1922. It was attended by 12 delegates representing 123 Party members.

By the application of Marxist-Leninist theories, the congress correctly handled the problem of the programmes of the Chinese revolution. The Manifesto issued by this congress represented the Party's observations and conclusions regarding the problems of the Chinese revolution.

It falls into three parts. The first part points out the necessary dependence of capitalism and imperialism on colonial markets and the fact that, after suffering 80 years of foreign aggression, China had been turned into their biggest common colony. It analyses the imperialist nature of the Paris Conference and the Washington Conference, especially the new situation of "joint aggression" by the imperialists, which was created in China after the Washington Conference. It also points out the existence of two antagonistic camps in the post-war world: the counter-revolutionary imperialist camp, whose intention it was to jointly plunder the proletariat and the oppressed nations, and the revolutionary camp formed by the unity of the proletarian revolution with the national revolution. This revolutionary camp was determined to send imperialism into its grave.

The second part analyses the nature of Chinese society, and of the Chinese revolution and its motive forces. China was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society, which was confronted with an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution, or a national-democratic revolution. The motive forces of the revolution embraced the working class, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie was also a revolutionary force.
In the third part of the Manifesto are laid down the maximum and minimum programmes of the Party, which constituted the central question discussed at the congress. The Manifesto declares, "The Communist Party of China is the political party of the Chinese proletariat. Its aim is to organize the proletariat so as to achieve, by means of class struggle, a political dictatorship of the workers and peasants, to abolish the system of private property and gradually to bring about a communist society." That was the Party's maximum programme which was based on the belief that only by building a communist society in this country could the Chinese people achieve complete emancipation. The Manifesto also points out that under the historical conditions of the time, the basic tasks of the Chinese people's revolution were: (1) to eliminate civil strife, overthrow the warlords and establish internal peace, (2) to cast off the yoke of international imperialism and achieve the complete independence of the Chinese people, and (3) to unify China into a genuine democratic republic. These formed the Party's minimum programme. Thus a genuine revolutionary democratic programme was laid before the Chinese people by the Party.

"Down with Imperialism!" "Down with the Feudal Warlords!" "Build a Democratic Republic!"—these were the cardinal slogans of China's democratic revolution. This revolution, which dates back to the Opium War, had already gone through numerous struggles, but up to the May 4 Movement none of its leaders had clearly realized that its fundamental task was to oppose imperialism and feudalism. These slogans were first put forward by the Second National Congress of the Party as the basic political line of the Party and the basic programme of action for the Chinese people's liberation movement. The Party thus proved itself the wise leader of the Chinese revolution, capable of guiding it to victory.

As this revolutionary democratic programme was radically different from any bourgeois reformist programme, naturally it also met with opposition from the bourgeois reformists.

When the Chinese Communist Party put forward for the first time in China the slogan of opposing imperialism, Hu Shih immediately exclaimed: "Such an observation is utterly groundless, it's like countryfolk talking about wonders in a strange land!" He tried to defend imperialism with his special brand of logic, asserting that the United States and the other imperialist countries all wanted to see a "peaceful and united" China, that the Washington Conference was actually an expression of American "aid to China," that the new banking consortium organized by the United States meant no "harm," that imperialist investments in China were "all to the good," and so on and so forth. He even tried to palm off on the Chinese people the preposterous argument that "there is not much danger in China now of foreign aggression"; therefore he objected to the press "mentioning what is called foreign imperialism." This faithful lackey of imperialism dropped his mask when he went on to claim that China's struggle for democracy and foreign imperialism were totally unrelated.

The bourgeois reformists sought to achieve democracy by such means as a parliament, president, constitution, "gentlemen's government," confederation of autonomous provinces, and so forth. They thought it possible to set up a bourgeois parliamentary system under the warlord government. They proposed a reformist cabinet
(the equivalent of what they considered a "gentlemen's government") in the Peking Central Government to promote the peace talks between North China and South China, to restore parliament and frame a constitution. With regard to local government, they proposed provincial autonomy because they thought that a "unitary government" would be unsuitable to China. The best way, they said, would be to extend the power of the local assemblies, which would thus be in a position to keep the warlords "under control."

With such a plan, the bourgeois reformists attempted to grab some political power from the warlord government. They even indulged in the wishful thinking that the landlords, bureaucrats and warlords would become members of the bourgeoisie. Of course, this blueprint, in which the reactionary rule of the feudal warlords was kept intact, could never lead anywhere. The so-called parliament, president, constitution, gentlemen's government, etc., would only become convenient tools in the hands of the central warlords, and provincial autonomy a pretext for squabbles and conflicts among the local warlords. Those warlords who aimed at expansion would advocate the unification of China by force or the establishment of a powerful central government, while those in control of their own provinces would advocate a confederation of autonomous provinces. Therefore, it was impossible, under the warlord system, for either a central or local government to free itself from the dictatorship of the warlords.

Thus the Chinese Communists criticized the various errors of bourgeois reformism of that time, pointing out that the democratic section of the Kuomintang had failed in their successive revolutionary attempts precisely because of this lack of thoroughness. The Communist Party called on all democrats to establish a united front on the basis of this revolutionary democratic programme so as to launch a struggle against imperialism and feudalism.

The Second National Congress laid the foundation of the Party's political line and programme, as the First National Congress had laid the foundation of its organizational principle. Nevertheless, the Second Congress also had a number of weaknesses—particularly on the question of proletarian leadership. Though it pointed out that the proletariat would eventually become the leading class of the revolution, yet it failed to emphasize the necessity of proletarian leadership in the immediate bourgeois-democratic revolution, holding instead that the Party's task was only "to guide the workers in helping along the democratic revolutionary movement." This amounted to degrading the proletariat from the role of a leader in the democratic revolution to that of a mere assistant to the bourgeoisie. Closely related to this was its failure to put forward the workers' and peasants' demand for political power and the peasants' demand for land, as the congress merely envisaged the gains of "some rights" for the workers and peasants after the success of the democratic revolution. It overlooked the fact that the establishment of the people's democratic dictatorship, led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, was not only absolutely necessary and possible, but the only way leading to socialism and communism in China, without the interposition of a period of bourgeois dictatorship in between. These weaknesses were further developed by the Chen Tu-hsiu Right opportunist clique into
a serious deviation in Party policy during the revolution from 1924 to 1927. As a result, the revolution suffered a setback.

The congress adopted decisions to join the Comintern and publish a Party central organ—The Guide weekly. The Guide was launched in September 1922, and played a significant role in advocating the revolutionary united front and in disseminating anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ideas.


After its foundation in July 1921 the Party concentrated its efforts on leading the working-class movement. The Chinese Trade Union Secretariat was established soon after the Party's First National Congress to guide the workers' struggles. Its chief tasks were to publish newspapers and periodicals and to set up clubs and night schools for the workers and to lead them in their day-to-day struggles. Thanks to the correct leadership of the Party and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese working class, the first big wave of strikes of the workers occurred from January 1922 to February 1923. It started with the Hongkong seamen's strike in January 1922 and reached its climax in February 1923 with the Peking-Hankow Railway workers' big political strike, lasting, in all, 13 months and including over 100 big and small strikes, with more than 300,000 workers taking part. Most of these strikes were crowned with complete success. Encouraged by these victories, workers rushed to join the Communist-led trade unions. With the working-class movement and the workers' organizations rapidly expanding, the important role played by the working class in China's political and economic life became all the more evident.

On January 12, 1922 Chinese seamen of the foreign shipping firms in Hongkong came out on strike.

The Chinese seamen had been suffering manifold oppression. They earned pitifully low wages that were insufficient even for self-support, and were fleeced by the foremen, who, working hand in glove with the capitalists, enjoyed the exclusive privilege of contracting for and recommending workers. Wage-scales were extremely unfair, a Chinese seaman being paid only a fifth of the wage of a foreign seaman. On top of all this was political inequality. Under the influence of the surging revolutionary tide of the post-war world, the Chinese seamen quickly became class-conscious. The strike was for an increase in wages and the right of the trade unions to recommend workers. More than 30,000 seamen and transport workers came out on strike, with the Chinese Seamen's Union taking the lead. After the outbreak of the seamen's strike, the transport workers were the first to come out in sympathy; then a general strike of all the workers of Hongkong was called. The strike also received support from workers all over the country. In order to break the strike, the Hongkong government tried every conceivable means, such as force, bribery, mediation, sowing dissension and recruiting scab labour, but all these intrigues were shattered by the strikers. The chief tactics employed by the seamen
was to blockade Hongkong, which, being an isolated island, could not produce enough to meet the needs of its inhabitants. All foodstuffs and part of its daily needs had to be imported from Kwangtung. Now, with communications between Hongkong and Kwangtung cut by the strike, there was an acute shortage of grain and other food supplies in Hongkong and prices soared: rice by over 60 per cent and meat by 20-30 per cent.

The vigorous struggle of the Hongkong workers forced the British imperialists to make concessions. On March 6, the Hongkong authorities announced the cancellation of the order to close down the seamen's union. The arrested workers were released and a 15-30 per cent increase in wages obtained. On March 8 the big strike came to a victorious end. This marked the Chinese people's first victory in a century of anti-imperialist struggle, and it was won on their own strength. It also revealed the Chinese working class as the most resolute vanguard of the Chinese people in their fight against imperialism.

The victory of the Hongkong seamen's strike greatly encouraged the workers' struggle in the country as a whole. In answer to the rising tide of strikes and to strengthen the leadership in the working-class movement, the Chinese Communist Party called for the convening of a national labour congress. Under the sponsorship of the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat, the First National Labour Congress was held in Canton on May 1, 1922. It was attended by 162 delegates representing 12 cities, over 100 trade unions and 270,000 trade-union members. Among those present were representatives of the Communist Party, the Kuomintang and the Anarchist Party, as well as people with no party affiliation. The following problems were discussed at the congress: participation by the workers in the democratic revolution; establishment of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions to eliminate the guild outlook prevalent in local trade unions; and the organization of socialist education among the workers. It adopted the slogans put forward by the Communist Party: "Down with Imperialism!" and "Down with the Warlords!"; adopted resolutions on the eight-hour day and the principle of mutual aid in strikes; and recognized the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat as the national liaison centre pending the establishment of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. This last resolution and the whole course of the congress indicated that all the participants unanimously recognized the Communist Party as the leader of the Chinese working-class movement. At the same time, the congress marked the beginning of nation-wide unity of the Chinese working class and thus gave a mighty impetus to the current strike movement.

The fact that their strikes were everywhere suppressed by the warlords and the imperialists brought home to the workers the importance of political freedom. Accordingly they started a movement for labour legislation under the leadership of the Party. An "Outline of Labour Law," which aimed at protecting the rights and freedom of the workers, was drafted by the Trade Union Secretariat and submitted to the Parliament in Peking for ratification. It consisted of 19 clauses, which included among others freedom of assembly and association for workers; the right of workers to stage general strikes and the right of collective bargaining; recognition of the eight-hour day; protection of woman and child labour;
establishment of a minimum wage scale; and recognition of the workers' right to establish international connections. This outline was published in newspapers throughout the country and widely circulated among the workers. The workers throughout the country actively responded to the call of the Trade Union Secretariat to take part in the movement for labour legislation. Of course it would be the height of naivety to expect a parliament under the control of warlords to give the workers human rights and freedom or to adopt a labour law that was in their interests. Nevertheless, these 19 clauses strongly impressed the workers and became their programme of struggle in the strikes. The movement taught the working class that no political freedom could be won without persistent struggle.

The nation-wide strikes continued to forge ahead. Hunan was at that time one of the provinces where the working-class movement made the great headway. After the Party's First Congress in 1921, Comrade Mao Tse-tung had returned to Hunan to lead the Party's work there. After the First National Labour Congress in May 1922, the Trade Union Secretariat moved from Shanghai to Peking, and set up branches in the major cities of the country. Comrade Mao Tse-tung was elected Chairman of the Hunan branch. He worked hard for the working-class movement, leading the strikes of Changsha, the Anyuan Colliery and the Shuikoushan Lead Mine. Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and others were in close contact with the masses of the workers, kept themselves well-informed about their problems and always stood at the very forefront of their struggles.

The year 1922 and the early part of 1923 witnessed a vigorous development of the working-class movement in Hunan and the country as a whole. Heroic strikes for wage increase and political rights spread over the whole province. The one that had the greatest influence over the working-class movement in Hunan and the rest of the country was the great Anyuan strike.

The Anyuan Colliery in Pinghsiang Country, Kiangsi Province, had at that time a daily output of over 2,000 tons of coal. It supplied the Tayeh Iron Mine and the Hanyang Iron Works (both in Hupeh Province) with the fuel they needed. In all, there were about 20,000 men employed in the mines and on the Chuchow-Pinghsiang Railway.

The Anyuan Colliery was an enterprise owned by bureaucrat-capitalists under the control of Japanese imperialism. The successive directors were all corrupt bureaucrats, real power concerning the mining projects being in the hands of foreign supervisors. The entire enterprise was run on the feudal gangmaster system. The workers groaned under the treble oppression of imperialism, bureaucrat-capitalism and feudalism. Therefore the Anyuan Colliery contained immense revolutionary possibilities.

After 1921, the Party at first ran spare-time schools for the workers at the mine to carry on Marxist education; then it organized a trade union, which was formally founded on May 1, 1922. Meanwhile, a branch of the Socialist Youth League was formed among the workers, the best members of which were later absorbed into the Party.

The big strike of the Anyuan coal-miners, which had repercussions throughout the country, broke out on September 10, 1922.
The authorities of the mine and the railway had delayed payment to the workers for several months and attempted to dissolve their union. Further, the workers were encouraged by the victory of the strike in the Hanyang Iron Works. They demanded the safe-guarding of their political rights, improvement in their working conditions and an increase in wages.

Pickets were organized after the outbreak of the strike to keep order in the mining district. When the warlords of Kiangsi Province sent troops to suppress the strike, the workers under the guidance of the Party went to agitate among the soldiers, and succeeded in winning their sympathy to such an extent that the soldiers refused to open fire on them. The authorities tried through sham “negotiations” to arrest Comrade Liu Shao-chi, who was leading the strike, but thousands of strikers surrounded the meeting place and foiled the warlords’ plan.

Owing to the solidarity of the workers and their vigorous struggle, the authorities were forced to accept the workers’ demands on the fifth day of the strike and thus the strike was victoriously concluded.

After the victory of the strike the trade union was organized along new lines. The basic unit of organization was a ten-man group. Each group had a representative, every ten groups an intermediate representative, and each pit or workshop a chief representative. Every pit and workshop had its board of representatives or intermediate representatives; and above them all was the supreme conference of the chief representatives. Thus the workers were better and more strictly organized. Their political rights were extended and their living conditions markedly improved. The workers also expanded their schools and opened consumers’ co-operatives. The Anyuan trade union was at that time one of the strongest in the country. It alone stood firm when nearly all the unions in the other big enterprises were destroyed during the low ebb of the working-class movement which followed the massacre of the Peking-Hankow Railway workers on February 7, 1923. In the course of the Northern Expedition in 1926, the Anyuan workers gave strong support to the Expeditionary Army. They also took part in the armed struggle during the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927. From 1928 onwards, Anyuan was the liaison centre of the Chingkang Mountains revolutionary base.

For two years the Hunan workers won all their struggles. Their success was owing to two factors: the nation-wide expansion of the strike movement, and, what was more important, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

How did the Party organize and lead the workers of Hunan in their struggles?

First, it paid full attention to ideological work. Through running evening classes in the workers’ quarters, the Party educated the workers in Marxism-Leninism, aroused their class consciousness and became acquainted with their life, ideas and feelings. When the time was ripe the Party immediately voiced their most urgent demands and led them into struggle. During the course of the struggle and after its victory, the Party never for a moment neglected its task of consolidating and raising the political understanding of the workers.

Secondly, it set up strict organizations among the workers.
above all, the trade union and its basic organizations. To carry on a struggle, the Party had to make an accurate estimate of the strength of the two sides and of all the possible fluctuations that might occur in the course of the struggle. It had to explain clearly to the masses the demands of the strike and the slogans for the struggle. In short, there must be strict organization, a leadership with foresight and a well-thought-out plan. Everything must be fully prepared and the outcome made absolutely sure. In the struggle, special attention was given to training leaders from among the workers and expanding the workers' organizations.

Thirdly, it applied flexible tactics. The Party made full use of the contradictions among the enemy, took advantage of the "provincial constitutions" and, relying on the broad masses, exposed the tricks of the ruling class and forced them to recognize the workers' freedom of assembly and association and right to strike and to send trade union delegates to negotiate with the government. Various influential social bodies were drawn in to give direct or indirect support to the just actions of the workers to one degree or another.

On the basis of these victories and the solidarity of the masses, the Hunan Provincial Trade Union Federation, a united working-class organization of the whole province, was founded in November 1922. This federation became the banner under which the masses in Hunan carried on their revolutionary struggles.

The strike movement reached its climax in the massacre of February 7, 1923, when the workers of the Peking-Hankow Railway rose to oppose the high-handed policy of the warlord government under Wu Pei-fu. The event was occasioned by Wu's suppression of the establishment of the Peking-Hankow Railway Workers Trade Union. The railwaymen began to organize themselves into trade unions as early as 1921. By the end of 1922, when there were already 16 small unions along the Peking-Hankow line, it was decided to inaugurate a general trade union at Chengchow, Honan Province on February 1, 1923. Previously, Wu Pei-fu, the leading warlord in control of the provinces of Hopei, Honan and Hupeh, had hypocritically announced his desire "to protect labour." To win popular support, he also declared his intention to set up a labour bureau and approve labour legislation. Now that the workers' organization was daily growing stronger, he laid bare his reactionary character by issuing orders forbidding the establishment of the trade union. But despite all this, the delegates decided to hold the meeting as planned. When the day came, the delegates broke through the cordon of troops and police, held the meeting, and proclaimed the founding of the Peking-Hankow Railway Workers Trade Union. At the meeting they put forward the following goals for the Trade Union to struggle for: improvement of the workers' living conditions, enhancement of the political consciousness of the working class, unity with the working class of the country and of the whole world. After the meeting, the delegates were forced to leave Chengchow. In protest against this high-handed action of the warlord, the Trade Union decided on that evening to call a general strike of the Peking-Hankow Railway workers on February 4. The headquarters of the Union was then moved to Kiangan, Hankow, and an appeal issued to the workers calling upon them to fight for freedom and human rights.
On February 4, the general strike broke out along the entire Peking-Hankow Railway. All passenger, freight and military trains were held up. On the third day of the strike, the representatives of the trade unions in Wuhan and the workers of Kiangan district, totalling over 10,000 men, held a big demonstration. It was then that the imperialists began to interfere openly in the Chinese working-class movement. The foreign “Diplomatic Body” handed in a joint note to the Peking government and instigated it to suppress the workers. For the purpose of smashing the strike, the British consul in Hankow convened a conference, attended by the deputies of the warlord Hsiao Yao-nan and foreign capitalists. On February 7, the massacre started. Under the pretence of mediating in the dispute, Hsiao’s officers lured the representatives of the workers to conduct talks at the headquarters of the Railway Workers Trade Union at Kiangan where an ambush had been laid for them. Before their arrival, Hsiao’s troops had already begun their attack on the unarmed pickets outside the Trade Union headquarters, killing 37 of them and wounding over 200. Lin Hsiang-chien, Chairman of the Kiangan Branch Union, was arrested and bound to a pole at the railway station, and attempts were made to force him to call off the strike. He refused with grim determination and was murdered on the spot. Similar atrocities took place in Chang-hsintien, Cheng-chow, Hsinyang, Kwangshui and Chumatien. Shih Yang, legal adviser for the Wuhan Trade Union Federation, was arrested and then murdered in Wuchang on February 15. By that time, the Hupeh Provincial Trade Union Federation and other trade unions in Wuhan had all been closed down.

On the very day of the massacre, the Hupeh Provincial Trade Union Federation called a general strike, whereupon all the workers in the major factories in Wuhan downed tools. In response to the call, the workers on the Taokou-Chinghua, Chengting-Taiyuan, Tientsin-Pukow and Canton-Hankow Railways staged a succession of strikes. Strikes were also brewing on the Peking-Fengtien and Peking-Suiyuan Railways. Associations were organized in all the major cities of the country for the support of the Peking-Hankow Railway strike. The All-China Students’ Federation and associations of various social circles also issued statements in support of the righteous struggle of the workers.

The Comintern also issued a manifesto on the event.

The big strike of the Peking-Hankow Railway workers was an event of tremendous political significance. It shook the whole country and the whole world.

After the massacre, the troops and police of the warlord government set upon the workers and bound them with ropes in an effort to get them to resume work, threatening them with bayonets and rifles. But the workers resolutely refused to resume work before the Trade Union gave the order. The branch unions in other cities also stuck loyally to the decisions of the Trade Union headquarters, refusing separate negotiations with the local authorities. It was not until the headquarters of the Peking-Hankow Railway Workers Trade Union and the Wuhan Trade Union Federation decided to call off the strike in order to preserve the strength of the working class that they reluctantly went back to work. All told, there were along the whole railway line over 40 workers killed, several hundred wounded, more than 40 imprisoned and over 1,000 expelled or lived in exile.
in other parts of the country. Orders were sent out for the arrest of the whole staff of the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat in Peking. The Secretariat thereupon moved from Peking to Shanghai. All the railway unions were shut down. Thus, under the high-handed policy of the reactionary government, the workers’ struggle temporarily turned to a low ebb.

In its incipience, the Chinese working-class movement met with brutal suppression by the imperialists and the warlord government. It was clear then that the Chinese working class could only emancipate itself by conducting first of all a national democratic revolution, and that the interests of the Chinese working class were identical with those of the liberation movement of the Chinese nation as a whole. The struggle in which the working class showed such resolution, thoroughness and discipline, greatly raised the political prestige of the working class and the Communist Party among the entire Chinese people and proved that a great leading force had emerged in China's democratic revolution. Furthermore, it demonstrated that the working class must have an armed force of its own in order to achieve success in China's democratic revolution, for there was no other way to overcome the fully armed reactionaries in a country where democracy was non-existent. Lastly it showed that in order to play a leading role in the revolution, the working class must have a broad alliance, that is, an alliance with the peasants who constituted over 80 per cent of the entire population of the country, with the urban petty bourgeoisie who amounted to scores of millions of people, and with the democratic sections of the national bourgeoisie who had anti-imperialist and anti-feudal leanings. Thereafter the Communist Party began to take effective steps to form a revolutionary united front with the Kuomintang led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and to help it organize an army in order to wage a revolutionary war against the imperialists and feudal warlords.

4. BASIC TACTICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY FOR THE FORMATION OF A UNITED FRONT

The Third National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Canton in June 1923. It was attended by 30 delegates, representing 432 Party members. The centre of the discussion was the establishment of a revolutionary united front with the Kuomintang led by Sun Yat-sen.

In face of a formidable and ferocious enemy, the working class had to mobilize and organize the broad masses and unite with all classes, parties, organizations and individuals that were willing to oppose imperialism and feudalism, and form a broad united front before they could win national independence and liberation. Accordingly, the establishment of a national revolutionary united front in China was an absolute necessity.

The greatest oppression that the Chinese people were then suffering from was national oppression. However, the imperialists and their agents in China were isolated, as they were opposed by a great many people. The working class, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie were all against them. Besides these, the national bourgeoisie, at certain times and to a certain extent, might also join
the opposition. To establish a national revolutionary united front in China was therefore clearly possible.

The Party was quick to recognize the importance of this question. At the Third National Congress it was correctly resolved to form a revolutionary united front based on the co-operation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang to carry on the Chinese revolution. The Third Congress thus laid down the basic tactical principles of the Party.

Tung Meng Hui, predecessor of the Kuomintang, had been the chief organizer of the Revolution of 1911. Politically it was a loose alliance of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois radicals, bourgeois liberals and anti-Manchu landlords. After the betrayal of the Revolution of 1911, it split into two sections. One was composed of many small political cliques of compromisers, mainly the original anti-Manchu landlords and bourgeois liberals, who went over to the side of the imperialists and the Chinese reactionaries. The other section headed by Sun Yat-sen was that of the bourgeois democrats, who, though still persisting in the democratic struggle, were becoming increasingly disintegrated owing to repeated setbacks, as they failed to find the correct road for the revolution and did not know where to seek sources of revolutionary strength. However, the success of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the correct policy of the Soviet Union towards the national liberation movements of the oppressed peoples in China and other Eastern countries, the Soviet Union's concern for and help to Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary activities, the rise of the Chinese working-class movement after the May 4 Movement, and the founding of the Communist Party of China—all these factors gradually attracted the attention of Dr. Sun and other progressive members of the Kuomintang, and inclined them to ally with the Soviet Union and co-operate with the Communist Party, in order to carry on the Chinese revolution.

Because the Kuomintang led by Sun Yat-sen was composed of bourgeois revolutionary democrats and was very widely known on account of its having served as an alliance of the former anti-Manchu united front, the Chinese Communist Party took active steps to co-operate with it and to help transform it into an organization representing a revolutionary united front, a Communist-led, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolutionary alliance of the working class and other democratic forces.

Having accurately assessed Dr. Sun's democratic stand against imperialism and feudalism and the possibility of transforming the Kuomintang into an alliance of the working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, the congress adopted the policy of co-operating with the Kuomintang.

Discussion of this policy at the congress led to a bitter struggle, in the course of which two opportunist tendencies in the Party were exposed and refuted.

One was the tendency towards capitulation represented by Chen Tu-hsiu. These capitulationists held that the present revolution, being of a bourgeois-democratic character, should be led by the bourgeoisie, that "all work should be handed over to the Kuomintang" and that "once the democratic revolution has succeeded, the proletariat will get nothing more than some rights and freedom." Therefore, they argued, in this first revolution, the proletariat should play a passive and supplementary role and not the role of a leader. They
maintained that the proletariat should wait until the bourgeois republic had been established and capitalism had further developed; then the bourgeois republic could be overthrown and replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism realized. Therefore their theory was known as "the theory of dual revolution."

Chen Tu-hsiu even offered a formula for the Chinese revolution. "The present task of the Kuomintang," he said, "is to lead the revolutionary bourgeoisie, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat, to realize the bourgeois-democratic revolution." The leader of the Chinese revolution, in his opinion, was to be the Kuomintang, a party mainly composed of the bourgeoisie, and the main force of the revolution was to be drawn from the national bourgeoisie, while the working class could only serve as its reserve. As for the peasantry, it was not even included among the motive forces of the revolution but was consigned to complete oblivion.

Another tendency was that of sectarianism represented by Chang Kuo-tao. The sectarians were of the opinion that the Communist Party should not co-operate with the Kuomintang, because the latter was not revolutionary, and that the working class should only carry on the revolution under the banner of the Communist Party. Co-operation with the Kuomintang, they argued, would create ideological confusion among the workers. For the same reason, they opposed Communists, workers and peasants joining the Kuomintang.

This view represented by Chang Kuo-tao was likewise wholly erroneous. The sectarians failed to understand that the question of allies was the key to the proletarian leadership of the revolution, that the proletariat must avail itself of all opportunities to unite with its allies, even if these were merely temporary and unreliable. They didn't know that in semi-colonial China, it was both possible and necessary for the working class to unite with the national bourgeoisie. The opinion that ideological confusion would ensue if the Communists and workers did not engage in revolutionary activities under the banner of their own political party was in fact a denial of the leading role of the Party and the working class in the revolutionary united front.

The congress criticized both the Right and "Left" deviations. It decided that the Party should co-operate with the Kuomintang and that part of the Party members should join the Kuomintang in their personal capacity. Thus the Party would help to reorganize the Kuomintang into a national democratic revolutionary alliance, while retaining its ideological and political independence. The congress emphasized that in this co-operation the Communist Party should display its revolutionary determination and thoroughness and overcome the compromising and reformist tendencies of its ally. It pointed out that the Communist Party should help the Kuomintang to expand its organization and at the same time should recruit advanced workers and peasants into the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the congress failed to thoroughly solve the question of the leadership in the revolution, nor did it pay due attention to the peasant question or the question of the revolutionary army.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung attended the congress, upholding the correct opinions and opposing the wrong ones. At this congress he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Party.
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE EARLY YEARS OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The fundamental demand of the Chinese people at this time was the realization of national independence and people's democracy in China through an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. To accomplish such a great task, they must have the leadership of the Chinese working class and of its vanguard, the Chinese Communist Party.

It was after World War I, after the October Socialist Revolution and the May 4 Movement, that the Chinese working class began to grow strong and the Chinese Communist Party came into being. With the comparatively rapid development of China's national industries during World War I, the ranks of the Chinese working class and the scale of their struggle expanded. Following the October Socialist Revolution Marxism-Leninism was introduced into China, and the May 4 Movement accelerated the integration of China's working-class movement with Marxism-Leninism.

The Chinese Communist Party was the product of this integration. The Chinese Communist Party was founded in July 1921. The First National Congress of the Party laid down the organizational principles of the Party after the Bolshevik pattern. A completely new-type party of the working class, a Leninist party, thus appeared in China. The Second National Party Congress defined the immediate basic tasks of the Chinese revolution and put forward a truly revolutionary democratic programme.

First of all, the Party regarded it as its central task to lead the working-class movement and further unite the movement with communism. Consequently, the first rise of the working-class movement appeared in China from 1922 to February 1923. The important role of the working class in China's political and economic life was thereby fully demonstrated.

When the first rise of the Chinese working-class movement suffered a serious setback at the hands of the reactionaries, the Party came to realize that the working class, instead of fighting the enemy single-handed, must co-operate with all democratic forces and form the broadest possible alliance. The Third National Party Congress fixed the tactics for a revolutionary united front, and decided to energetically help Sun Yat-sen transform the Kuomintang into an organization of the revolutionary united front, that is, an alliance of the working class and the other democratic forces.

The founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the laying of the foundation for the Party's organizational principles, tactical principles, and programme were the most significant events in China's modern history. Thenceforth the aspect of the Chinese revolution underwent a fundamental change.

But during this period the Party had not yet given timely attention to, or found the correct solution for, such problems as the proletarian leadership in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the people's political power, the peasants' demand for land and the revolutionary army. With the expansion of the revolutionary movement these problems became more acute and led to two basically different lines within the Party, the Bolshevik line, represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, and the Menshevik line, represented by Chen Tu-hsiu.
To maintain and consolidate their rule, the warlords of some provinces advocated local autonomy. They framed "provincial constitutions" and thus covered up their militarist control in the name of "democracy and autonomy." The warlord Chao Heng-ti in Hunan was the first to promulgate a "provincial constitution."
CHAPTER THREE

FORMATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT. RISE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

(January 1924—July 1926)

1. THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SITUATION FROM 1924 TO 1927

The international situation from 1924 to 1927 was marked by stability in the socialist Soviet Union and temporary stability in the capitalist countries. The two kinds of stability were radically different.

Having crushed the imperialist armed intervention and the White Guard revolts, the Soviet Union entered in 1921 a period of national economic rehabilitation. By 1927, the Soviet national economy had surpassed its pre-war level. The industrial output in 1926-27 amounted to 100.9 per cent of the pre-war level, and the agricultural output, 108.3 per cent. The national economy of the Soviet Union was developed in conformity with the policy for socialist industrialization. With her industrial output in 1926-27 constituting 38 per cent of the total output of the national economy, the Soviet Union was gradually becoming an industrialized country. That she was making rapid progress along the socialist road was shown by the fact that her socialist sector of industry accounted for 86 per cent of the total industrial output in the same period.

The increase in the strength of the Soviet Union was further indicated by the fact that the workers of all lands had cast in their lot with the Soviet Union, being firmly convinced that this was the only country in the world that was led by the working class and that the Russian working class could not only destroy the capitalist system but also build up a socialist system after it had seized state power. Another indication was the admiration felt by all the oppressed nations for the Soviet Union and their willingness to become her allies, out of the conviction that she alone could really help the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples, and find a correct solution of the problem of her national minorities.

This means that the stability of the Soviet Union rested on a sound basis and was daily becoming more consolidated.

The various capitalist countries of the world had also entered on a phase of temporary stability. During the period from 1924 to 1927 these countries recovered temporarily from their post-war economic and political crises, with their production reaching, and in some cases surpassing, the pre-war level; the tide of the revolution was at a low ebb.

In 1926 the output of iron in the capitalist countries reached 100.5 per cent of the pre-war level; steel, 122.6 per cent; coal, 96.8 per cent; and five different kinds of cereals, 110.5 per cent. But the production in a number of capitalist countries (e.g. the United States
and Japan) developed by leaps and bounds rather than steady progress. This is characteristic of the uneven development of capitalism.

The temporary stability of the capitalist world was mainly attained through the U.S. "aid," and at the expense of the Western European countries becoming financially dependent on the United States. The centre of world finance capital had shifted from Europe to the United States after the war. It was only through the import of American capital that these European countries managed to drag along. Thus the United States became the biggest creditor of the world, to whom almost every European country had to pay annually huge sums in debts and interest. Consequently these countries were forced to impose on their own people ever-increasing taxes, thereby worsening the material conditions of the toiling masses; to exact enormous indemnities (130,000 million Rentenmarks) from Germany, which disrupted German economy and increased the number of unemployed in the country; and to exploit even more ruthlessly the colonial peoples, aggravating the economic crisis of those countries and causing the living conditions of the peoples to deteriorate. All this inevitably intensified the conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between the imperialists themselves and between the imperialists and the colonial peoples. Resting on such a basis, the stability of the capitalist world could only be temporary and insecure.

A new phenomenon of great significance emerged from these two kinds of stability. A temporary balance of power between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries ushered in a period of "peaceful co-existence."

As there had been no war during this period to weaken the imperialist countries, and a temporary balance of power between the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary camp had come into existence, the imperialists found it possible to rally greater strength to oppose the revolution of the Chinese people, and to form a temporary but powerful reactionary alliance to strangle it. This caused many difficulties to the Chinese revolution. In fact, the Chinese revolution had to face more difficulties than the Russian revolution before attaining ultimate victory.

On the other hand, the sharpening of the revolutionary crisis in the colonies and semi-colonies was also a special feature of this period. During and after World War I, the economic and revolutionary crises in the various colonial countries had become more intensified, owing to the growing strength of the industrial proletariat and the national bourgeoisie, the spread of Marxism-Leninism and democratic ideas, and the cruel imperialist oppression and exploitation.

The struggle of India and Egypt against Britain, of Syria and Morocco against France, and, above all, the armed struggle of the Chinese people against Britain, the United States and Japan threatened to deprive the imperialist powers of their "backyards." That is to say, while the seizure of state power by the European proletariat still did not admit of immediate realization, the liberation of the oppressed nations had already become an urgent problem, as no sign of stability was discernible in the colonies and semi-colonies. The post-war liberation movement of the oppressed nations, and particularly of China, dealt heavy blows to the imperialist rule.

The increasing imperialist oppression and exploitation of China during the post-war period severely impaired China's national indus-
try. Take, for instance, the textile industry, which was the main branch of China's national industry. From 1919 to 1927, it was practically at a standstill. The following figures show the proportion of yarn spindles, thread spindles and looms in Chinese-owned mills to the total: yarn spindles, 53.3 per cent in 1919, and 57.4 per cent in 1927; thread spindles, 88.7 per cent in 1919, and 45.8 per cent in 1927; looms, 40.8 per cent in 1919, and 50.3 per cent in 1927. From 1922 to 1927, the proportion of the cotton yarn produced by Chinese-owned mills to the gross output of the whole country sank from 92 to 58 per cent, while the yarn produced by foreign-owned mills rose from 8 to 42 per cent. From 1925 to 1927 the proportion of cotton cloth produced by Chinese-owned mills to the total output of the whole country fell from 83 to 47 per cent, while that produced by foreign-owned mills rose from 17 to 53 per cent.

As to foreign trade, the unfavourable balance which had diminished greatly during the war, once more rapidly increased. While the year 1919 showed a near balance, with a difference of only 16,188,270 silver dollars, in 1920 there was a tremendous increase of imports over exports, with an unfavourable balance of 220,618,930 dollars, and an even greater one in the next few years.

In this period the imperialists pursued their old policy of backing up China's various warlord governments and inciting civil wars between the warlords of different cliques. In 1924 there occurred the Kiangsu-Chekiang War and the Second Chihli-Fengtien War, followed in 1925 by the Chekiang-Fengtien War and the joint attack by the Fengtien and Chihli cliques on "The National Army"* which had revolutionary leanings.

Most of the wars among the Northern warlords were staged in such provinces as Liaoning, Jehol, Hopei, Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang and Hupeh. The forces mobilized on each side ranged from 100,000 to 400,000 men. Within the period from September 1924 to December 1925 the damages caused to industry and commerce by these wars totalled 790 million silver dollars. Under the rule of the warlord governments, exorbitant taxes were levied on the people, while the peasants suffered savage exploitation in rents and usury.

As a result of the imperialist aggression and the wars among the warlords, the development of China's social productive forces was seriously hampered and disrupted. Industry and commerce were ruined and the people impoverished. This impelled the entire population of the country to carry on revolutionary struggles against the imperialists and the warlord governments.

2. FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE KUOMINTANG.

Having correctly evaluated Dr. Sun Yat-sen's democratic stand against imperialism and feudalism, and the possibility of transfor-
ming the Kuomintang into an alliance of the workers and other
democratic forces; the Third National Congress of the Chinese Com-
munist Party adopted the policy of a united front.

For some time before this congress the Party had been actively
working for the establishment of a united front and the promotion
of the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. It had exerted positive
influence on Sun Yat-sen through many of its members, particularly
Li Ta-chao and Lin Po-chu, who did a great deal of useful work
under the direction of the Party.

Supported by the Communist Party, Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed a
revolutionary government in Kwangtung in March 1923. In Octo-
ber, he issued a manifesto on the reorganization of the Kuomint-
ang, put forward a draft party programme and defined his Three
Cardinal Policies of alliance with Soviet Russia, co-operation with
the Communist Party and assistance to the workers and peasants.

In January 1924 the Kuomintang held its First National Con-
gress in Canton. Li Ta-chao, Mao Tse-tung and other Communists
attended the congress and played an important leading role. The
congress passed the resolution to admit members of the Communist
Party and of the Socialist Youth League (in their individual capac-
ity) into the Kuomintang, adopted the new party programme and
constitution as well as various concrete measures to reorganize the
Kuomintang. It also adopted the “Manifesto of the First Na-
tional Congress of the Kuomintang of China,” a document of great
historic significance, in which Dr. Sun Yat-sen gives a new inter-
pretation to the Three Principles of the People, namely, the New
Three Principles of the People based on the above-mentioned Three
Cardinal Policies.

Thus the Kuomintang became a united front organization under
the leadership of the Communist Party, an organization of the alli-
ance of the four classes—the working class, the peasantry, the
petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie.

The New Three Principles of the People showed some fundamental
difference from the old. The Old Three Principles of the People re-
lected the historical features of the old democratic revolution, which,
led by the bourgeoisie, aimed at establishing a bourgeois dictator-
ship and a capitalist society. In the period of the new-democratic
revolution, they had become outdated, and the New Three Prin-
ciples of the People came into being. The new Principle of Na-
tionalism was opposed to imperialism and advocated the “self-emancipa-
tion of the Chinese nation” and “full equality for all the nationa-
lities within China.” The new Principle of Democracy advocated
that democratic rights should be shared by the common people, by
all individuals and bodies who opposed imperialism and feudalism,
and not be monopolized by a handful of capitalists. The new Prin-
ciple of Livelihood advocated the “equalization of landownership,”
“land to the tillers,” “control of capital,” and improvement of the
living conditions of the workers, and opposed the control of national
welfare and the livelihood of the people by a handful of capitalists
and landlords.

Since the New Three Principles of the People were based on the
Three Cardinal Policies, and advocated opposition to imperialism
and feudalism, and the establishment of a democratic coalition
government of all the revolutionary classes, they were basically in
agreement with the programme of the Chinese Communist Party
during the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. These principles thus became the political basis of the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation.

Hence, the Kuomintang’s First National Congress, in which the Communists participated and played a leading role, became the starting point of a new rise in the Chinese revolution.

Two other momentous events that accelerated the tempo of the revolution fell within this period: the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and China and the building up of the revolutionary army.

The Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship, signed on May 31, 1924, was the first treaty based on genuine equality and friendship in the diplomatic history of China.

The Peking government had twice refused the proposal made by the Soviet Union in her statements on China for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. When the representative of the Soviet Government arrived in Peking in 1922, he was warmly welcomed by the Peking inhabitants, but treated with indifference by the Peking government. However, the great friendship between the peoples of these two countries was inalienable. When the Soviet Government once more sent an envoy to Peking in September 1923, reiterating its willingness to relinquish all tsarist privileges in China and to conduct peace talks with the Chinese Government, the latter was hard put to it to find any excuse for refusal. The negotiations resulted in the conclusion of a friendly treaty—The Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R.

In accordance with the principles enunciated in the Soviet statements on China, the Soviet Government declared in the Agreement the unconditional abrogation of all the unequal treaties concluded between the tsarist and the Chinese governments relinquishment of all rights to concessions, leased territories, and so on in China, as well as of the Russian portion of the “Boxer” indemnity and extraterritoriality, and abandonment of all the privileges (with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations) in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway. This treaty, unprecedented in China’s history of foreign relations, elicited enthusiastic response from the Chinese people.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union helped Sun Yat-sen to establish a revolutionary army. The extreme importance of such an army had been borne upon Sun Yat-sen by the repeated failures of past revolutionary attempts. Accordingly, he decided to set up a military academy on the pattern of that of the Soviet Red Army. The result was the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton in May 1924. Cadets of this academy formed the backbone of the newly-established National Revolutionary Army, the chief fighting force which later brought the whole of Kwangtung under the revolutionary government and carried out the Northern Expedition.

The establishment of the revolutionary united front aroused the hostility and fear of the imperialists, warlords and compradors, who began to make joint efforts to oppose it. A reflection of this struggle within the ranks of the Kuomintang was the activities of Feng Tzu-yu and other reactionaries, who openly opposed the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, the Communist Party itself, the Soviet Union
and the workers' strikes, and set about organizing an anti-Communist alliance in collusion with the imperialists and all other reactionaries. Subsequently, they were followed by Chang Chi. Hsieh Chih, Tsou Lu and other anti-Communist elements in the Kuomintang who also opposed the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and the revolutionary united front.

The struggle between the revolutionaries and the counter-revolutionaries assumed its fiercest form in the Incident of the Kwangtung Merchant Volunteers Corps in October 1924. The corps was an armed organization of landlords and compradors headed by Chen Lim-pak, a comprador of the British-owned Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Backed by the British imperialists and allied with the warlord Chen Chiang-ning, the corps schemed for the overthrow of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary government in Kwangtung by a concerted attack from both within and without. But Sun Yat-sen displayed great resolution in the struggle, and with the support of the worker and peasant masses, the revolutionary government successfully put down the armed riot of the Merchant Volunteers Corps.

With the rise of the Chinese revolution, the working-class movement revived.

After the February 7 Massacre, the trade unions on the Peking-Hankow Railway and in the city of Wuhan were banned and other trade unions were also compelled to go underground, with the exception of those in Canton and Hunan. But though the revolutionary government in Canton had recognized the trade unions, and much was achieved by the Anyuan Trade Union which persisted in its struggle, the working-class movement of the country as a whole was temporarily at a low ebb. At that time the most urgent tasks of the trade unions were to provide relief to the workers and to resume the struggle. The Trade Union Secretariat organized a special committee to make collections for the relief of the many victims and their families. Learning from the experiences of the international working-class movement, the Chinese Communist Party made it a central task to organize "factory trade union groups," i.e., secret groups of less than ten people in factory workshops, for the purpose of organizing the masses of the workers. In February 1924, the National Railway Workers Trade Union Federation was established in Peking.

The political programme of the Kuomintang provided for the "enacting of labour laws" and "protecting labour organizations." The working-class movement in Canton was thus enabled to forge ahead, and even a workers' army was set up.

In July 1924, the Communist Party led a big strike of the workers in the foreign factories in the British concession of Shameen, Canton, against the new police regulation which requested the Chinese to show their identification cards on entering and leaving the district. The strike went on for over a month, and the imperialists were eventually forced to withdraw that discriminating regulation. The strike caused more than a local sensation; its repercussions resounded as far as Central and North China. It was followed by strikes of the workers in the Nanyang Tobacco Factory, Shanghai, of Hankow rickshamen, Soochow weavers and the salt workers in Yuyao, Chekiang. Over 10,000 workers took part in each of these
strikes. All this evidenced the revival of the working-class movement in the country.

During this period the peasant movement also developed steadily in the South. As early as 1921, Peng Pai had already done much revolutionary work among the peasants in Kwangtung. Struggles against the despotic landlords and for rent reductions were waged by the Haifeng Peasant Association, which was set up in January 1923 and had a membership of 100,000. Although the association was dissolved in February 1924 by the reactionary warlord Chen Chiang-ming, this form of peasant organization rapidly spread from Haifeng and Lufeng to Chaochow and Swatow and then to the whole province of Kwangtung. In October 1923 the Party organized 100,000 peasants into peasant associations in Hengshan, Hunan, and led them to wage bitter struggles against the Hunan warlords and landlords. The peasant movement in the South centring on Kwangtung and Hunan not only expanded its organizations and conducted economic struggles, but took part in political struggles as well. The peasant self-defence detachments around Canton even helped Sun Yat-sen to suppress the riot of the Merchant Volunteers Corps.

In the course of the Second Chihli-Fengtien War, Feng Yu-hsiang of the Chihli clique staged a coup d'etat in October 1924. He renamed his troops the National Army and expelled the Chihli warlords from Peking. Following the coup d'etat, the influence of the Fengtien warlords penetrated into North China and eventually they took over political power in Peking. The main forces of the Chihli clique, after the defeat of Wu Pei-fu, withdrew to the Yangtse Valley, and proceeded to gather strength for a comeback. The Peking regime took the form of a coalition government under the control of three cliques: Chang Tso-lin, Tuan Chi-jui and Feng Yu-hsiang—with Tuan Chi-jui as its head, assuming the title of "Provisional Executive-General."

The new warlord government in Peking, unstabilized as yet, temporarily relaxed the oppression of the workers. This gave the Party an opportunity to rescue the worker leaders imprisoned since the February 7 Massacre, restore the railway trade unions and find work for the unemployed. In February 1925, the Second National Congress of Railway Trade Unions was held in Peking. The immediate sequel to the congress was the great strike of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway workers, followed by a series of other strikes at Peking, Wuhan, Shenyang and Tangshan.

Under these circumstances the Party decided to mobilize and organize the broad masses under the banner of the democratic revolution by initiating a nation-wide mass movement for the convocation of the National Assembly and the abrogation of unequal treaties. In answer to the Party's call, "Associations for the Promotion of the National Assembly" were successively set up in Shanghai, Chekiang, Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, and other places.

In January 1925 when the mass movement was already in full swing, the Fourth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Shanghai. It was attended by 20 delegates, representing 980 Party members.

The congress analysed in detail the political situation at that time and decided on the political task of the Party. It was a period when the rule of the warlords was rapidly heading for collapse, as the old ruling warlords had been overthrown and the new
ruling warlords had not yet consolidated their position. This was favourable to the further development of the people's movement in China. As the success of the movement entirely depended on the Party's policies and its propaganda and organizational work among the masses, the problem of how to develop a nation-wide people's movement naturally became the centre of discussion at the congress.

The congress pointed out that in participating in the bourgeois-democratic revolution the working class had an aim of its own, namely, to lead the people on to a proletarian revolution after the complete success of the democratic revolution. Therefore, the position of the working class in this revolution was different from the other classes. The working class must not be an appendage to the bourgeoisie, but keep its own independence and aims. Only with the working class assuming the leadership could the Chinese democratic revolution score a complete victory.

The congress pointed out that a new period had begun for the trade-union movement, which was moving forward again. The convocation of the National Assembly in China was at that time a distinct possibility. Hence the working class must take an active part in the movement and set up powerful popular organizations of its own so as to secure for itself a leading position in the national democratic movement. In the warlord-controlled areas, these organizations should take the form of trade-union groups to be set up in each factory or workshop with more than three workers; these groups should be combined into branches according to the different departments of work in each factory; over these branches should be factory trade unions, to be amalgamated into regional trade unions. The organizational work should first of all be carried out in such industries as railways, mines, and textiles and in such industrial and commercial cities as Shanghai, Hankow and Tientsin.

The congress further pointed out that the peasantry was the basic force in China's national democratic revolution and the chief ally of the working class. The Communist Party must therefore do everything possible to organize the peasants to wage political and economic struggles. Accordingly it was decided to set up peasant associations and peasant self-defence detachments to fight the landlord regime and its armed forces. The experiences of the peasant movement in the southern provinces were to be fully utilized and popularized, in order to expand the peasant movement throughout the country.

The congress criticized the mistakes of "Left" and Right opportunism in the work of the united front during the past year. It pointed out the emergence of the Left, Middle and Right sections within the Kuomintang since its reorganization, and adopted the policy of expanding the ranks of the Left, criticizing the Middle and opposing the Right.

The achievement of the Fourth National Congress of the Party was mainly that it prepared organizationally for a new wave of mass struggles.

Its shortcoming lay in its failure to put forward an agrarian programme.

During his Peking coup d'etat, Feng Yu-hsiang was inclined to the revolution and invited Dr. Sun Yat-sen to come to the North, with a view to bolstering up his own position. Tuan Chi-
jui and Chang Tso-lin, both bidding for popularity, made the same offer to Dr. Sun, on the pretence of inviting him to a consultation about national affairs. With the Communist Party's firm support, Sun Yat-sen left Kwangtung for Peking in October 1924, and issued his "Manifesto Concerning My Trip to the North," in which he called for the abrogation of the unequal treaties and the convocation of the National Assembly. When he arrived in Peking, however, he found Tuan Chi-jui was not at all interested in the convocation of the National Assembly. As a matter of fact, Tuan was trying to oppose it by convening the "Conference on National Rehabilitation." In order to counter Tuan's plan, in March 1925 Sun Yat-sen and Li Ta-chao called the National Congress of the Associations for the Promotion of the National Assembly. The congress had great effect in exposing the character of the Conference on National Rehabilitation, disseminating revolutionary ideas and stirring the masses to political activity.

On March 12, 1925 Dr. Sun Yat-sen died after a relapse resulting from overwork and fatigue incurred during his trip north. On his death-bed he wrote to the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, expressing his eager hope for the friendly co-operation between the two great nations, China and the Soviet Union. In the name of Stalin, the Central Executive Committee of the C.P.S.U. telegraphed its condolences on his death. The telegram pointed out that the great achievement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen would live in the memory of the Chinese workers and peasants for ever and encourage the democratic section of the Kuomintang to hold aloft the banner of Sun Yat-sen until complete victory in the democratic revolution was achieved.

The mourning of the whole nation over the sudden death of this democratic revolutionary and great friend of the Communist Party occasioned an extensive movement of political propaganda. Owing to the co-operation of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang and the joint effort of the revolutionary members of both parties, the Three Principles of the People, based on the three cardinal anti-imperialist and anti-feudal policies, became quickly known throughout the country.

3. ANTI-JAPANESE STRIKES OF THE CHINESE WORKERS. SECOND NATIONAL LABOUR CONGRESS. THE MAY 30 ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT IN SHANGHAI. GREAT STRIKE IN CANTON AND HONGKONG. CONSOLIDATION OF THE KWANGTUNG REVOLUTIONARY BASE. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT.

One of the chief ways the imperialists used to carry out their economic aggression was to establish factories, mainly cotton mills, in China. The post-war years saw a great increase in the number of cotton mills opened in China by foreign capitalists, particularly by the Japanese.

Faced with the threat of an ever-shrinking domestic market for textile goods after the war, the Japanese capitalists tried to save themselves by adopting a policy of monopoly at home and by expanding their investments in China. And there were many favour-
able conditions for Japan to set up factories in China. She could exploit China's cheap labour, and taking advantage of the special rights she enjoyed in the Japanese concession and in collaboration with the Chinese warlord government, adopt a high-handed policy towards the Chinese workers. Japanese goods were protected by the conventional tariff system. She controlled all the cotton production in North and Northeast China, and owned a complete network of transport on Chinese territory. In addition, Japanese capitalists possessed abundant capital and advanced production techniques, and ran their factories efficiently. Accordingly, they could not only extract super-profits from China but also knock out rival Chinese enterprises. From 1913 to 1925, the proportion of spindles in Japanese-owned factories to the total number of spindles in China rose from 13.6 to 45.3 per cent, while the proportion of spindles in Chinese-owned factories sank from 58.8 to 44 per cent. The Japanese cotton mills being concentrated in Shanghai and Tsingtao, the Chinese mills were in no position to compete with them.

The Japanese proprietors of these cotton mills cruelly exploited and oppressed the Chinese workers by making them work overtime and cutting down their wages. Most infamous of all, the Japanese mills in Shanghai prepared to train children to replace adult workers, so as to intensify their exploitation and oppression. These ruthless measures of the Japanese capitalists occasioned a big strike in February 1925, which involved most of the Japanese-owned cotton mills in Shanghai. Thereupon, Japan dispatched warships to China for an "armed demonstration"; at the same time, the Japanese minister to China gave a strong warning to the Peking government. The event shocked the whole Far East.

The strike fully convinced the workers of the strength of their own class, and a growing number of workers began to join the trade unions. They organized themselves within each factory, thereby laying a solid foundation for the unions. Frightened at the growing strength of the unions, the Japanese capitalists decided to ban them and dismiss their organizers. This caused another strike of the Shanghai workers. On May 15, a Japanese factory guard opened fire on the strikers, killing a worker named Ku Cheng-hung and wounding a dozen others.

Similar repressive measures by the Japanese proprietors in certain Tsingtao mills caused a big strike on April 19. On May 28, the Japanese owners locked up the factories and forced the workers to leave the premises. Japanese troops fired point-blank on the workers and killed many of them.

Such atrocities further aroused the wrath of the Chinese people, and strengthened their determination to go on with the struggle.

At the time the main task of the Chinese Communist Party was to strengthen and consolidate the working class. Under the leadership of the Party and the auspices of the four biggest unions of China—the National Railway Workers Trade Union Federation, the Hankow-Tayeh-Pingshiang Trade Union Federation, the Chinese Seamen's Union Federation and the Kwangtung Worers' Conference—the Second National Labour Congress was convened in Canton on May 1, 1925, on the eve of an impending nation-wide anti-imperialist storm. The congress was attended by 281 delegates, representing 166 trade unions and 540,000 organized workers.

The congress pointed out that the working class should take part
in the national democratic revolution and assume the leadership, and that it must look for allies, of which the most reliable was the peasantry. It stated that the immediate economic demands of the workers in the present struggle were for the establishment of the minimum wage scales, introduction of an eight-hour day, improvement of the working conditions of women and children, implementation of labour and social insurance and abolition of the contract labour system. It declared that all efforts should be made to recruit the workers into trade unions, which were the broadest mass organizations of the working class, and that a trade union organized on an industrial basis was the best form. Finally, it called on the workers to comb out all spies and blacklegs lurking within their ranks.

The achievements of the congress were: First, it founded the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, adopted its constitution and elected its leading organ, the Executive Committee. Secondly, it resolved to join the Red International of the Trade Unions. This meant that the Chinese workers began to join hands with the workers of all lands for the realization of world revolution. The congress occupies an important position in the history of China's working-class movement.

Less than 20 days after the congress, the May 30 Movement broke out.

Many college students in Shanghai had been arrested, some while raising funds in the streets for the families of the workers who had been killed or wounded, some while on their way to attend a memorial service in honour of the worker Ku Cheng-hung. The imperialists fixed the date of their trial for May 30 at the Mixed Court. They further planned to adopt on June 2 the repressive acts put forward by the Municipal Council of the "International Settlement" with a view to hampering China's national industry. These proposals included increase of wharfage dues, regulation of the press, and registration of the stock exchange. The increase of wharfage dues was aimed at imposing heavier levies on Chinese imports and exports. The registration of the stock exchange at the Municipal Council of the "International Settlement" was intended to restrict the democratic rights of the Chinese residents in the foreign "concessions" and deal a blow on the Chinese capitalists. The regulations of the press, providing for the registration of all publications at the Municipal Council and for the imposition of fines and imprisonment for any infringement, would not only have restricted the Chinese publishers but encroached upon the Chinese people's freedom of speech and publication. The proposals therefore aroused vehement indignation among the people of Shanghai.

After the death of Ku Cheng-hung, 20,000 textile workers in the western section of Shanghai staged a strike for higher wages. The Japanese proprietors tried to break the strike by a lock-out. On May 28 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held a meeting at which it was decided that in order to win over all the revolutionary forces, the economic struggle of the working class should be linked with the daily growing anti-imperialist movement and turned into a clear-cut political struggle. A decision was made for the organization on May 30 of an anti-imperialist demonstration in the "International Settlement." At 3 p.m. on that day when 10,000 paraders marched down Nanking Road, the British police
opened fire on the unarmed masses, killing on the spot about a dozen paraders and arresting over 50.

The city was in a turmoil—mass meetings were held everywhere and public speeches were made. At a conference of the Central Committee, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a policy for stepping up the anti-imperialist movement by calling on all the Shanghai workers, merchants and students to go on strike and forming a Committee of Action to lead the strike movement. Under the Party's leadership, the Shanghai Trade Union Federation, with a membership of 200,000 organized workers, was set up on May 31 as the nucleus of the anti-imperialist struggle. June 1 marked the beginning of the great strike movement. Over 200,000 workers downed tools, over 50,000 students quitted studies, and overwhelming majority of merchants closed up shops, and even the Chinese police in the "International Settlement" struck. Subsequently a Federation of Workers, Merchants and Students was founded. It was an organization comprising the Shanghai Trade Union Federation, the Shanghai Merchants' Union, the All-China Students' Federation and the Shanghai Students' Union. Only the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, an organization of the comprador bourgeoisie, refused to join. On June 6 the Party issued an appeal to the people, squarely pointing out that the solution of the Shanghai Incident lay "not in law but in politics"; and that the chief goal of the struggle should be "the elimination of all imperialist privileges in China." On June 11, over 200,000 Shanghai workers, merchants and students held a mass meeting, which passed the Seventeen Anti-Imperialist Demands. These included: withdrawal of all foreign land and naval forces from China, abrogation of consular jurisdiction, freedom of speech, publication and assembly for the Chinese residents in the "Settlement," right for workers to hold strikes and organize trade unions, Chinese representation in the "Municipal Council" in the "Settlement" and restoration to China of the Mixed Court. The Shanghai workers played the role of vanguard and leader in the May 30 Anti-Imperialist Movement.

Confronted with this revolutionary storm, the imperialists first threatened the Chinese people with a show of force. The United States, Britain and Japan mustered a large number of warships on the Whangpoo River and landed their marines in Shanghai, who took to assaulting the Chinese people in the streets. However, on realizing the impossibility of suppressing the revolution by brute force, the imperialists turned to insidious intrigues and, in collusion with the big comprador-capitalists, tried to split the anti-imperialist united front by promising an increase of seats for Chinese representatives in the Board of Directors of the Ratepayers' Meeting of the "Settlement" and the restoration of the Mixed Court to China. On the one hand they decoyed the national bourgeoisie of Shanghai to compromise with proposals of a "judicial investigation" and a "customs conference" and on the other, threatened them with the stopping of loans, remittance, transport and power supply. Meanwhile, the imperialists enjoined Tai Chi-tao and Hu Shih to put forward a proposal of settlement "by friendly consultation." As a result of this imperialist policy, the national bourgeoisie of Shanghai began to vacillate, and Yu Hsia-ching, a big comprador, seized the opportunity to revise the Seventeen Demands, call off the strike of the shops under his influence, pocket the relief
funds which people of other cities collected for the Shanghai workers, and force them to resume work. The warlords of the Fengtien clique suppressed the strikes in Tsingtao, Tientsin and Nanjing, closed up the Shanghai Federation of Workers, Merchants and Students, and the Shanghai Trade Union Federation, and arrested many of the revolutionary leaders. To preserve the organizations of the working class and the victories already won, the Shanghai Trade Union Federation resolved to call off the general strike on condition that satisfactory settlement be made of the workers' economic demands and of the regional disputes. In July and August the workers gradually went back to work.

The May 30 massacre of Chinese people in Shanghai set the whole nation afame with indignation against the imperialists. Anti-imperialist parades, demonstrations and strikes of workers, merchants and students successively broke out in Peking, Hankow, Changsha, Kiukiang, Hangchow, and other places. The biggest and most influential was the great Canton-Hongkong Strike.

The famous Canton-Hongkong Strike was preluded by the workers' protests against the Shanghai Incident. On June 19, a strike involving over 100,000 Chinese workers broke out in Hongkong. Apart from their unanimous support for the Seventeen Demands raised by the Shanghai Federation of Workers, Merchants and Students, the strikers put forward six demands of their own: political liberty, equality before the law, general elections, labour legislation, reduction of house rent, and freedom of domicile. Instead of replying to these demands, the Hongkong authorities immediately declared martial law and imposed a blockade on the revolutionary government of Kwangtung which supported the just action of the Hongkong workers. On June 23 a demonstration was held in Canton by 100,000 workers, students, soldiers and other inhabitants in support of the anti-imperialist May 30 Movement. While the demonstrators were passing through Shakee Street, the British and French troops in Shameen, the foreign concession, fired upon them across the creek, killing 50 and wounding over 100. Immediately after the Shakee Massacre, the Kwangtung revolutionary government declared an economic break with Britain, and blockaded the seaports. Another big strike involving 250,000 broke out in Hongkong under the leadership of Su Chao-cheng and Teng Chung-hsia. Of these strikers, about 130,000 returned in separate groups to Canton, where in collaboration with the Canton workers and under the leadership of the Canton-Hongkong Strike Committee, they set up a regular picket corps more than 2,000 strong, to enforce a strict boycott of British and Japanese goods.

Above the Canton-Hongkong Strike Committee was established a Congress of Strikers, a deliberative body of over 800 delegates; under it were an executive bureau, legislative bureau, judicial bureau, auditing bureau, financial committee, gaols, armed picket corps, hospitals, schools and so forth. The whole organization amounted virtually to a government.

Under the leadership of the Strike Committee, the Canton workers blockaded all the Kwangtung seaports, and the entire coastline between Swatow in the east and Pakhoi in the west, breaking off all contacts with Hongkong and Macao.

The strike dealt a heavy blow to the British imperialists.

First, it inflicted serious economic losses on Hongkong.

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During the strike period the exports of Hongkong were reduced by over half. A great number of shops were closed. People refused to use Hongkong banknotes, and the Hongkong government sank into a financial quagmire. The daily loss amounted to 3,500,000 Hongkong dollars.

On the other hand, the strike fostered the economic independence and development of Kwangtung. When the shipping between Canton and Shanghai was opened by the Strike Committee, the merchants who formerly bought directly from Hongkong now came to Canton for their purchases, so that the wholesale business in Canton not only went up to its pre-strike level, but became more prosperous day by day. The paper currency issued by the Kwangtung government regained its credit, and the government revenues were greatly increased.

Secondly, the strike completely deprived British imperialism of its political prestige.

This strike which lasted for 16 months from June 1925 to October 1926 was not only a great event in the history of the Chinese revolution, but had few parallels in the history of workers' strikes throughout the world.

With the support and help of the Canton-Hongkong strikers and the Kwangtung peasants, the Kwangtung revolutionary base became increasingly consolidated.

At the beginning of the strike, the revolutionary government was in a very difficult position. Two warlords inside the government, Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan, were plotting with the Kuomintang Rightists for a coup. Externally, there were the besieging troops of the warlords Chen Chiung-ming and Teng Pen-yin. The reactionaries were making a concerted attempt to send the revolutionary government toppling. But with the support of the workers and peasants, the crisis was successfully overcome.

About the time when Dr. Sun Yat-sen went to the North, Chen Chiung-ming, with the military support of the British imperialists and the Peking government under Tuan Chi-jui, was using the Huichow-Chaochow-Swatow sector as his base of operations against Canton. So in February 1925, the Revolutionary Army launched the First Eastern Expedition. Its main force was composed of the cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy, totalling only about 3,000 men in all, who faced the troops of Chen and his allies, about 90,000 strong. Thanks to the Party's political work in the Whampoa Military Academy and the pluck and tactical dexterity of the cadets, the revolutionary army routed Chen's crack troops and occupied Chaochow and Swatow at the end of March.

Early in June 1925, the warlords Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan planned a coup to overthrow the revolutionary government. The Revolutionary Army which was then fighting the warlord Chen Chiung-ming in eastern Kwangtung, following the policy resolutely advocated by the Communist Party and the Left-wing Kuomintang members, swung back to Canton, attacked Yang and Liu and routed their reactionary forces. Thus the revolutionary government was saved.

After this battle, the National Government was formally founded in Canton on July 1. The National Revolutionary Army was formed of all the troops who had participated in the revolution with the cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy as its backbone.
Though the National Government had been set up, sharp struggles still existed within the Kuomintang. It had come to the knowledge of the Strike Committee that Hu Han-min and Hsu Chung-chih were plotting a revolt. Therefore, on August 11, the Kwangtung workers staged a huge demonstration for the liquidation of the traitors within the government. This proved a strong support to the Left wing of the Kuomintang. However, the Left-wingers kept vacillating and were afraid to strike. Consequently the situation worsened. It was then that Liao Chung-kai, leader of the Left wing of the Kuomintang, was assassinated by the counter-revolutionaries. Then the Kwangtung revolutionary government, with the backing of the people, disbanded the reactionary troops, and expelled Hu Han-min and Hsu Chung-chih from Canton.

In October 1925, the Revolutionary Army launched the Second Eastern Expedition against Chen Chiung-ming. It began by capturing Huichow, the nest of the warlord. By the end of October it had crushed all of Chen's troops and recovered the whole area of Tungkiang.

This was followed by a Southern Expedition. The revolutionary army captured Kaohchow, Leichow, Chinchow, and Lienchow in December and wiped out enemy remnants on Hainan Island in February 1926. Thus, the whole province of Kwangtung came under the power of the Revolutionary Army.

The peasant movement in the whole country also made a rapid advance from May 1925 to July 1926. The May 30 Movement gave a strong push to the peasant movement throughout the country. After that anti-imperialist movement, the peasant struggle linked up with the national revolutionary struggle and rose like a strong new army in the Chinese revolution.

The National Institute of the Peasant Movement was the chief centre for training peasant cadres. Part of the graduates remained in Kwangtung, but a greater part were sent off to various provinces to work among the peasants.

The First National Peasant Congress was convened on April 20, 1926. In its letter to the congress the Central Committee of the Party pointed out that the peasant movement must be united with the working-class movement and the national revolutionary movement as a whole and that a real victory of the struggle could only be achieved under the leadership of the working class.

By June 1926, the total membership of peasant associations in the country had reached 980,000, most of whom, 647,000, were in Kwangtung Province. It was in Kwangtung, the revolutionary base of China at that time, that the peasant movement started expanding. A Provincial Peasant Congress was convened in 1925 and another in 1926. Important resolutions were adopted to throw out corrupt officials, and overthrow local bullies and bad gentry, to abolish the paonom⁴ system, to reduce rents and recover the deposits which the peasants had paid to the landlords, to organize the Peasants' Self-Defence Corps, to abolish the landlords' "defence corps" and to establish a worker-peasant alliance, and so forth. During this period, the Kwangtung peasants had actually progressed from abolishing exorbitant levies and miscellaneous taxes, reducing rents and recovering deposits to fighting the local bullies, bad gentry and the landlords' "defence corps."

The Kwangtung peasants also plunged into the struggle against
the warlords and imperialists. In the Tungkiang campaign, the peasants of Haifeng, Lufeng, Wuhua and other counties helped the National Revolutionary Army to defeat Chen Chiung-ming. The peasants in the outlying areas around Canton fought in co-ordination with the army against Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan. In the blockade of Hongkong, the peasants co-operated with the workers, thus lending active support to the big Canton-Hongkong Strike.

Kwangtung was at that time one of the provinces where the peasant movement had made a great advance. It was on the basis of the worker-peasant movement that the Kwangtung revolutionary government was founded and consolidated.

The peasant movement in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi began to develop on the eve of the Northern Expedition. In Hunan, there were about a million peasants under the Party's influence, of whom over 400,000 were organized. The Hupeh peasant associations had a membership of 72,000. The peasants of these provinces launched economic and political struggles, and were preparing to act as assistants and guides to the Revolutionary Army in its northward march.

In the northern provinces, Honan, Shensi, Shantung, Hopei and others, peasant riots were constantly breaking out against the civil wars between the warlords, exorbitant levies and multifarious taxes, payment of land-tax in advance, and corrupt officials. In their struggles, the peasants made use of such primitive organizations as the Red Spear Society. But since such organizations were often dominated by the landlords or rich peasants, they were not infrequently made to serve the interests of the landlord class.

Through the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, such primitive peasant organizations as were found in North China were step by step reformed into advanced ones, namely, the peasant associations. The Honan Provincial Peasant Association was established in April 1926, with a membership of 270,000 and the Peasants' Self-Defence Corps numbering 100,000 men. Under the rule of the warlords, they carried on a struggle against the payment of levies and taxes.

The Chinese revolution developed rapidly from 1924 to the beginning of 1926. As a result of the consolidation of the revolutionary base in Kwangtung and the rise of a nation-wide working-class movement and peasant movement, a decisive battle between revolution and counter-revolution came to a head in the country as a whole. Within the revolutionary camp itself the struggle between revolution and reaction, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie also reached a high degree of tension.

That was how the situation stood on the eve of the Northern Expedition in 1926.

* See p. 60.
At this crucial juncture, however, the Party was divided over the fundamental question of who could lead the revolution to victory. To be more specific, who should be the leader of the revolution—the proletariat or the bourgeoisie? Who should be the basic ally of the working class—the peasantry or the bourgeoisie? These questions had not yet been correctly solved among many Communists. The Right opportunist clique headed by Chen Tu-hsiu maintained that the bourgeois-democratic revolution must be led by the bourgeoisie, that its objective was to set up a bourgeois republic and that the bourgeoisie was the only democratic force with which the working class should unite itself. They were so much absorbed in the idea of co-operation with the bourgeoisie that they forgot the broadest and most fundamental ally—the peasantry, and, as a result, showed themselves weak and impotent in the revolutionary struggle. On the other hand, the “Left” opportunists represented by Chang Kuo-tao saw only the working-class movement; they also ignored the peasantry. Both schools of opportunists were fully aware of their own feebleness, yet did not know where to look for a powerful ally.

In order to oppose these two erroneous tendencies within the Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote in March 1926 the “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society.”

Basing himself on the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method and the Leninist theory concerning the national revolution in the colonies, Comrade Mao Tse-tung laid down the fundamental ideas of the new-democratic revolution, a revolution of the broad masses led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance. These ideas were governed by the following two considerations:

First, regarding the domestic situation, Comrade Mao Tse-tung gave the first scientific analysis of the economic status and political attitudes of the various classes in Chinese society.

All those in league with imperialism—the warlords, the bureaucrats, the compradors, the big landlords and the reactionary section of the intelligentsia dependent on them—are our enemies. The industrial proletariat is the leading force in our revolution. All sections of the semi-proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie are our closest friends. As to the vacillating middle bourgeoisie (here Comrade Mao has in mind the national bourgeoisie—Ed.), its Right wing may become our enemy and its Left wing may become our friend, but we must be constantly on our guard towards the latter and not allow it to create confusion in our front.5

The Chinese landlord and comprador classes represented the most reactionary and backward relations of production in China and seriously hampered the development of her social productive forces. For their existence and development they depended entirely on the imperialists and were in reality no more than the latter’s lackeys. Therefore their existence was completely incompatible with the objectives of the Chinese revolution. In other words they were reactionaries, and the enemies and targets of the Chinese revolution.

The revolutionary classes in China were the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. Because of the great strength of the working class and the extreme weakness of the bourgeoisie, the leadership of the Chinese revolution naturally fell on the working class.
The working class represented China's new productive forces and was the most progressive class in modern China. It was most concentrated, had an extremely low economic status, and consequently showed itself most militant in the revolutionary struggle. Its strength was amply evidenced in the many recent, historically significant strikes of seamen, railway workers, coal miners, and especially of the Shanghai and Hongkong workers. From these facts, Comrade Mao Tse-tung drew the indisputable conclusion that the working class should be the leader of the Chinese revolution.

The broadest and most trustworthy allies of the working class were the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a concrete analysis of the economic status of the various strata of the peasantry and of the petty bourgeoisie and their respective attitudes towards the revolution and pointed out the different degrees of their revolutionary qualities. A small part of them, the owner-peasants, the handicraftsmen and the petty intellectuals, might in normal times be sceptical about the victory of the struggle against the imperialists and feudal warlords, but they would join the revolution when it rose to great heights. The greater part of them, the semi-tenants, the poor peasants, the petty handicraftsmen and shop assistants, had always been in an oppressed and exploited position. They were consequently very susceptible to revolutionary ideas and would plunge themselves into the revolution without hesitation. The semi-tenants, together with the poor peasants, constituted an overwhelming majority of the rural population. "The 'peasant problem' is essentially their problem." The peasantry, as a class, possessed huge revolutionary potentialities. Thus, Comrade Mao Tse-tung expounded the important problem of the chief ally of the revolution, in other words, the problem of the worker-peasant alliance.

The national bourgeoisie was inconsistent in its attitude towards the revolution because it had both a revolutionary and a compromising side. This dual character was determined by its own economic status.

The development of China's national capitalism was hindered by imperialism and feudalism. In the words of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, "when it suffers from the blows of foreign capital and the oppression of the warlords, it feels the need of a revolution and favours the revolutionary movement against imperialism and the warlords." Therefore, there was a possibility for it to join the revolution and the Party must therefore unite with it. But on the other hand, its development was in some ways connected with imperialism and feudalism, and it had always a strong urge to climb up to the position of the big bourgeoisie. Hence its lack of revolutionary determination; particularly "when the proletariat at home takes a militant part in the revolution and the international proletariat abroad gives its active support, so that it senses the threat to the realization of its desire to develop as a class into the status of a big bourgeoisie, it becomes sceptical about the revolution." It was afraid of a thorough-going revolution. Judged from this angle, it might even go from compromise and vacillation to downright desertion of the revolution for the counter-revolution. Therefore the Party should be highly vigilant and engage constantly in resolute but inexcessive struggle against its compromising character.

This dual character of the national bourgeoisie was clearly seen in the course of events from the Revolution of 1911 to the May 30
Movement of 1925. In 1925 there were some people who even clamoured, “Raise your left fist to knock down imperialism and your right fist to knock down the Communist Party”—lashing out madly right and left, so to speak.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung foresaw the inevitable polarization of the national bourgeoisie, and predicted that part of it would turn Left by joining the revolution and recognizing the leadership of the working class, and the other part of it would turn Right by joining the counter-revolution and following the comprador bourgeoisie. This scientific forecast was fully borne out by the events of 1927.

Secondly, regarding the international situation, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that after the October Socialist Revolution, the world had been divided into two big forces, the socialist and the imperialist force. China must side with one of them against the other. And only by joining the socialist force and becoming part of the anti-imperialist camp under the banner of Leninism could the Chinese revolution achieve victory. This was because all the Chinese revolutionary movements since the Opium War had been crushed by the imperialists, while the Soviet Union had not only put a curb on the imperialist counter-revolutionary force by her very existence and achievements, but had encouraged and supported the struggle of the oppressed peoples with her experience and ever-growing strength.

Thus, in the light of the international and domestic situation, the following basic political line of the revolution was put forward. The Chinese revolution was part of the proletarian socialist revolution. It was to be led by the working class, which should regard the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie as its most reliable allies, and unite with the revolutionary national bourgeoisie. Its objective was to fight against the imperialists, landlords and compradors, to strive for the complete victory of the democratic revolution and pave the way for the advance to socialism.

The essay was the earliest and most clear-cut Marxist-Leninist document in China. It analysed and discussed, in a manner at once concrete and scientific, many basic questions in the Chinese revolution and correctly solved all the fundamental problems which had been left unsolved or solved inadequately in the successive national congresses of the Party, viz., the problem of the proletarian leadership in the revolution, the peasant problem and the problem of what attitude to take towards the national bourgeoisie. It resolutely confuted the “Left” and Right opportunist views then existing in the Party and expounded in a penetrating way the general line and the main task of the Party in the period of the democratic revolution.

This work was also intended as a refutation of the reactionary tenets of the Kuomintang Rightists, of whom Tai Chi-tao was the chief spokesman. His theories were embodied in such pamphlets as “The National Revolution and the Kuomintang” and “The Philosophical Foundation of the Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen.” This anti-Communist mouthpiece was looked upon as the “theoretician” of the reactionary Kuomintang Rightists.

What are the main ideas and reactionary contents of Tai Chi-tao’s theories?

First, he was violently opposed to class struggle and denounced the struggle waged by the Chinese working class against the Chinese
bourgeoisie. To protect the interests of the working class—so his argument ran—it was not necessary to go in for struggle. Kindness and a loving heart would be enough to move the capitalists and make them respect the workers' interests. This is in essence to ask the workers and peasants to stop their struggle and live as menials depending on the "charity" of the capitalists.

Secondly, Tai Chi-tao maintained that "state" and "nation" were the supreme political criteria. But in his "state" and "nation," the bourgeoisie were the masters and the workers and peasants could only play the role of subordinates and subjects. He was in reality trying to fool the worker and peasant masses with these two high-sounding terms so as to make them give up their just demands for revolution. His ultimate goal was to establish a bourgeois dictatorship.

Thirdly, Tai Chi-tao held that the Communists within the Kuomintang should believe in the Three Principles of the People instead of communism, recognize the Three Principles as the only correct political theories, and the Kuomintang as the only political party that could save the country. Therefore, he was opposed to the Communists' joining the Kuomintang and demanded their withdrawal or expulsion. His attempt was to control, and, if possible, wipe out ideologically, politically and organizationally the vanguard of the proletariat—the Communist Party.

Although Tai Chi-tao was tireless in his denunciation of class struggle, he nonetheless carried it out in actual practice with his theories and his actions. The only difference was that his class struggle took the form of the bourgeois oppression of the proletariat. He clamoured for "a dictatorship at all costs." This was an undisguised battlecry, designed to instigate the Kuomintang Rightists to launch a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat.

From the latter half of 1925 onwards, a reactionary movement for the dissemination of Tai Chi-tao's theories was started in the Kuomintang. The movement culminated in the formation of the Western Hills Clique in November. The clique was so called because a section of reactionaries within the Kuomintang had held a meeting before Dr. Sun Yat-sen's coffin in the Pi Yun Temple in the Western Hills near Peking, vociferously denouncing the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. Later they set up a second Kuomintang in Shanghai and established organizations in Peking and other places to carry on counter-revolutionary activities.

Under the influence of Tai Chi-tao's theories, another anti-Soviet, anti-Communist reactionary organization called the "Society for the Study of Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines" was set up in Canton.

In January 1926 when the struggle between the revolution and the reaction inside the Kuomintang was becoming acute, the Kuomintang called its Second National Congress in Canton. At this congress the Communists and the Left-wing Kuomintang members prevailed, and resolutions were passed to carry out with determination the testament of Sun Yat-sen and his Three Cardinal Principles, reprimand the Rightists for their reactionary activities and take disciplinary measures against the leaders of the Western Hills Clique. But in guiding the work of this congress, the opportunists within the Communist Party committed a number of serious mistakes. Instead of adopting the correct view of some comrades to combat resolutely the Rightist leaders and to expel them from the
Kuomintang, the opportunists made unprincipled compromises and concessions. They called back Tai Chi-tao, Sun Fo and other Rightists, who had been driven out of Kwangtung by the revolutionaries, from Shanghai to attend the congress, and elected them to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, and the Rightists Wu Chih-hui and Li Shih-tseng as members of the Supervisory Committee. As a result of the elections, of the 36 members of the Central Committee only 7 were Communists, and 14 belong to the Kuomintang Left wing, while 15 were Rightists or middle elements. In the Supervisory Committee, the Rightists obtained a majority. Thus the Rightists were enabled to conduct reactionary activities by making use of their official positions in the Kuomintang. But the crowning error was the election of Chiang Kai-shek as a member of the Central Committee, thus raising his prestige in the revolutionary ranks.

Chiang Kai-shek was an adventurist and careerist lurking in the revolutionary camp. He had been a broker in the Shanghai Exchange at the time when the Revolution of 1911 failed. When Sun Yat-sen adopted the policy of allying with the Soviet Union, Chiang offered his services, thinking that it would be a profitable speculation. He had visited the Soviet Union once and returned seemingly full of revolutionary enthusiasm. Mistaking him for a real revolutionary, Sun Yat-sen appointed him commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy. After obtaining this important post, Chiang Kai-shek continued to play his double game and paid much lip-service to the revolutionary cause. Actually, however, he was making preparations to usurp the leadership of the revolution and eventually to betray it.

Soon after Chiang Kai-shek was elected into the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, he was appointed general supervisor of the National Revolutionary Army. From then on, he was much sought after by all the imperialists and the big bourgeoisie who regarded him as a potential political agent. Thus emboldened, he made ready to fabricate an incident in order to seize for himself the leadership of the revolution.

In March 1926, with the help of the leaders of the “Society for the Study of Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrines,” Chiang planned the “Cruiser Chungshan Incident,” which marked the beginning of his attack on the Communists.

On March 18, Chiang Kai-shek conspired with his followers to send an order in the name of the Canton Office of the Whampoa Military Academy to Li Chih-lung, a Communist who was then Acting Director of the Naval Bureau, instructing him to dispatch the Cruiser Chungshan to Port Whampoa for some assignment. As soon as the cruiser reached Whampoa, the conspirators spread rumours that the Communists were going to start a riot to overthrow the government. So on the morning of the twentieth, claiming that a Communist riot was brewing, Chiang Kai-shek called in his armed forces, declared martial law, cut off all communications in and around Canton and surrounded the Canton-Hongkong Strike Committee and the office and lodgings of the Soviet advisers. Over 50 Communists were arrested, including Li Chih-lung; besides, all the Communist members in the Whampoa Military Academy and the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army, headed by Comrade Chou En-lai, were taken into custody. Subsequently he forced the Com-
munists to withdraw from the First Army, and thus seized its command.

On May 15, 1926, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek proposed a “Bill on Reorganizing the Party’s Affairs,” which aimed at restricting the activities of the Communists. The main points were: Communists should not occupy more than one-third of the executive posts in the higher KMT organizations; no Communist should be appointed as director of the Central Departments; no KMT member should be allowed to join the Communist Party; and the list of Communists who were concurrently members of the KMT should be handed over to the Chairman of the KMT. The real significance of this bill lay in the Chiang Kai-shek clique’s plot to seize the leadership of the KMT. After that meeting, Chiang began to gather all the power of the Kuomintang Central Committee into his own hands.

These intrigues on the part of Chiang Kai-shek were made possible because of Chen Tu-hsiu’s Right opportunism, which held sway in the leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party. After the Cruiser Chungshan Incident, Comrade Mao Tse-tung and others proposed a counter-attack against the perfidious activities of Chiang Kai-shek, and advocated an offensive against all his reactionary plots. The success of such an offensive was well within the range of possibility because Chiang was at that time in rather an isolated position, the troops under his command constituting but a small part of the National Revolutionary Army in Kwangtung and all the mass movements being completely under the influence of the Communist Party. Had the Party adopted a firm policy, Chiang’s anti-Communist plots would have been frustrated. However, the Chen Tu-hsiu opportunists refused to do so, harping endlessly on “co-operation” to the total exclusion of struggle. They held that the revolution had reached a low ebb, and the forces of the Communist Party and the Left wing of the Kuomintang were not strong enough to hold Chiang Kai-shek in check. On the other hand, they argued that Chiang had not only a powerful army but also the whole bourgeoisie behind him; therefore, in order to keep the bourgeoisie within the united front, the Party must make concessions. After the “Cruiser Chungshan Incident,” Chen Tu-hsiu erroneously regarded Chiang as the “pillar” of China’s national revolutionary movement, and those who opposed Chiang as imperialist “instruments.” For the sake of “unification,” the Chen Tu-hsiu opportunists, even when knifed in the back, did not dare to hit back and apparently had not the slightest intention of doing so. On June 4 Chen even addressed an open letter to Chiang, in defence of the latter’s crimes. To quote Chen’s own words, “The facts plainly show that from the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy to March 20, Chiang had never done anything that could be regarded as counter-revolutionary.” Since Chen Tu-hsiu saw the careerist and adventurer Chiang Kai-shek as a revolutionary, it was not surprising that he should go to the length of considering any opposition to Chiang as “counter-revolutionary.”

This policy of compromise and concession further encouraged Chiang’s counter-revolutionary ambition.

But as the plan of the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique was to make use of the force of the workers and peasants to seize more and greater profit for themselves, they were as yet unwilling and afraid to oppose openly the Communist Party. Accordingly, after the adoption
of the "Bill on Reorganizing the Party's Affairs," Chiang continued his counter-revolutionary double-dealing. He talked about co-operation with the Communists, but in reality he was all the time preparing for a bigger counter-revolutionary coup.

1 Peng Pai was a Communist leader of early peasant movement in China and founder of the revolutionary government in the rural areas of Halfeng and Lufeng, Kwangtung Province. He was elected to the Central Committee of the Party and to its Political Bureau in 1927 and 1928 respectively. In 1929 he was arrested and murdered by the Kuomintang government in Shanghai.

2 One of the Communist leaders of the early working-class movement in China, and an organizer and leader of the great Hongkong seamen's strike in 1922 and the Canton-Hongkong strike in 1925. In 1927 he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and an alternate member of its Political Bureau. In 1928 he was elected to the Central Political Bureau of the Party and died in January 1929 in Shanghai.

3 A Communist leader of the early working-class movement in China. In 1922 he was the Chairman of the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat and a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1928 he was sent by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions as its representative to the Red International of Trade Unions, and at the Fourth Congress of the Trade Union International he was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the Red International. In 1930 he returned to China and served as the Political Commissar of the Second Army Corps of the Red Army in the Western Hunan-Western Hupeh Revolutionary Base. He was arrested by the Kuomintang government in Shanghai in 1933 and murdered in Nanking in the same year.

4 A system by which capitalists organized a company to rent large areas of land from landlords and let it out in small lots. In this way, tenants suffered double exploitation.


6 Poor peasants who work partly on their own land and partly on land they rent from others.


9 Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION. CRITICAL STAGE 
IN THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR 
(July 1926—July 1927)

1. THE INTERNAL SITUATION BEFORE THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION. MARCH OF THE NORTHERN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY TOWARDS THE YANGTSE VALLEY. FRESH CHANGES IN CLASS RELATIONS DURING THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION

After the Peking coup d'état in 1924, Chang Tso-lin, warlord of the Fengtien clique, became the head of the reactionary forces in North China. His clique opposed the National Assembly, excluded Feng Yu-hsiang's National Army, which was inclined to the revolution, expanded the Fengtien warlords' areas south of the Great Wall and suppressed the people's revolutionary movement. Thus, the rising patriotic movement resulting from the May 30 Incident was completely destroyed by the high-handed policy of the Fengtien warlords. As these treacherous Fengtien warlords were the most powerful tools of the imperialists, all the Chinese people strongly opposed them, and a mass anti-Fengtien movement swept through the whole country.

Taking advantage of the people's anti-Fengtien sentiment, Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang, two Chihli warlords, declared war on Chang Tso-lin and proceeded to attack the Shanghai area of Kiangsu. They attempted to secure a leading position in the anti-Fengtien movement so as to compete with the Fengtien clique in winning the imperialists' favour. In December 1925, during the rise of the nation-wide anti-Fengtien movement, an incident known as the "Kuo Sung-ling Mutiny" broke out within the ranks of the Fengtien clique. Kuo organized a rising at Luanchow in Hopei and led his army to the environs of Fengtien.

Thus, Chang Tso-lin's reactionary rule in North China was tottering.

The Japanese imperialists openly and unscrupulously helped Chang Tso-lin with arms. And, seeing that the people's nation-wide anti-Fengtien movement directed against this most useful imperialist agent had become a serious threat to their domination in China, the American and British imperialists brought about a reconciliation between Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu under the slogan of "fighting the Reds," and urged them to attack the Chinese people and the National Army which inclined towards the revolution.

The first imperialist armed intervention occurred in December 1925 when Japanese troops were sent to Fengtien to help Chang Tso-lin defeat Kuo Sung-ling, thus preserving the central base of the Fengtien troops. The second was in March 1926 when Japan helped Chang Tso-lin to attack Chihli (Hopei Province), with the result that the National Army was compelled to retreat from Tientsin, Peking and later from Nankou and Changchiakou. At the same time, Britain helped Wu Pei-fu to attack Honan, and disarm the National Army there.
When Chang Tso-lin's troops were marching against the National Army in Chihli, Japanese warships helped him by shelling the National Army from Port Taku. This enraged the people of Peking who staged a demonstration on March 18, 1926 to protest against the imperialist interference in China's internal affairs. Many patriotic people taking part in the movement were ruthlessly slaughtered by Tuan Chi-jui. This was later known as the "March 18 Incident."

With the massacre in Peking, the attempt of the imperialists to suppress the Chinese revolution achieved partial success. As a result, the "Anti-Red" movement continued to spread throughout the country. First, the imperialists rallied the Chihli and Fengtien cliques, consolidated their domination in North and Central China and organized a coalition government of these two cliques in Peking. Secondly, they helped Chang Tso-lin to drive the National Army beyond the Great Wall and even farther to the Northwest. Thirdly, they helped the Chihli clique to make an encircling attack upon the Kwangtung revolutionary base from Hunan, Kiangsi and Fukien.

At that time, Honan and Hupeh were under the control of Wu Pei-fu; Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Fukien under Sun Chuan-fang; and Hopei, Chahar and Shantung, in addition to the northeastern provinces, under Chang Tso-lin. Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang attacked the revolutionary forces in the South while Chang Tso-lin attacked those in the North.

In spite of the widening split within the warlord camp as a result of frequent quarrels and conflicts between Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin in the "Anti-Red" movement, the two cliques of Chihli and Fengtien became united as a result of imperialist machinations. Their many disputes about the division of power in the Central Government did nothing to alter its basic reactionary character. The imperialists controlled their respective warlords and competed for superiority in China, but they jointly supported the reactionary rule of the Northern warlords.

The steps taken by Wu Pei-fu against the revolutionary forces in the South were: first, to support all the reactionary armies in Hunan in driving out of that province the revolutionary-inclined troops and to strike at the revolutionary forces there; secondly, to rally all the troops of Hupeh and part of the troops of Honan, Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces to attack Kwangtung and Kwangsi—the revolutionary bases at that time. Seeing that the Chinese people could no longer tolerate the rule of the Chihli and Fengtien warlords, the revolutionary government in Kwangtung decided to smash the reactionary government of the Northern warlords by means of a revolutionary war and to realize the independence and unity of China in conformity with the urgent demands of the oppressed masses throughout the country. Besides, the revolutionary government was then the object of an encirclement, and the only way to extricate itself from this unfavourable position was to start a northern expedition.

In July 1926, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a statement on the current situation, calling on the workers, peasants, merchants, students and soldiers of the whole country to unite, to consolidate the revolutionary national united front and to overthrow the rule of the warlords and imperialists. This was a great incentive to the Kwangtung revolutionary government in its prosecution of the Northern Expedition. But Chen Tu-hsiu, violating the resolution of the Central Committee of the Party, published in
The Guide weekly an article “On the Northern Expedition of the National Government,” in which he underestimated the significance of the Northern Expedition and considered that conditions were still immature for it, and that the present task should be “defence” instead of the Northern Expedition. He held that the Expedition was the task of the Kuomintang and the National Government while the Communist Party was only to help them as a party not in power. Such a passive attitude in reality diminished the political significance of the Expedition and cleared the way for Chiang Kai-shek to seize the military leadership in the war.

The Revolutionary Army started its northward march in July 1926.

Following the pattern of the Soviet Red Army, the Chinese Communist Party introduced the system of political work in the Revolutionary Army. The fact that most of the political work was undertaken by Communists was an important factor in the ultimate success of the Expedition.

The strategic plan of the Northern Expedition was to put the main force of the Revolutionary Army on the Hunan-Hupeh front, and send two contingents to the eastern and northern borders of Kwangtung to keep in check the enemies in Fukien and Kiangsi. When victory had been won on the Hunan-Hupeh front, the Northern Expeditionary Army would concentrate their forces for an attack on Sun Chuan-fang’s troops, keeping Chang Tso-lin as the final target.

The first battle of the Northern Expedition took place on the Hunan-Hupeh front where 100,000 of Wu Pei-fu’s troops were stationed. To destroy Wu’s reactionary army became the primary task of the Northern Expeditionary Army.

On this front were launched the Fourth Army and other troops, 50,000 strong. The Independent Regiment of the Fourth Army led by General Yeh Ting was the vanguard. It was a body of picked troops (mostly Communists and members of the Communist Youth League) which had never known defeat.

Before the main body of the Army started off, the Independent Regiment drove into Hunan, thus paving the way for the advance of the Northern Expeditionary Army. They quickly took Changsha and Yueyang, shattering Wu Pei-fu’s prestige and demoralizing his army. Then the Revolutionary Army pushed on northward without a hitch.

The battle of Tingszechiao in Hupeh was the bitterest engagement in the war. Tingszechiao was an almost impregnable strategic point on the Canton-Hankow Railway in Hupeh. It was surrounded by water on the north, south, and west and protected by high mountains on the east with the only approach on the southwest, where the railway stretched west of a deep river. Some of Wu Pei-fu’s troops defended this point, while others poured down from the north as reinforcements for a counter-offensive. Their plan was to hold on until Sun Chuan-fang in Kiangsi should get ready to cut off the retreat of the Revolutionary Army by an attack upon Changsha. But the Northern Expeditionary Army moved faster than had been expected and took Tingszechiao at the end of August, upsetting Wu Pei-fu’s fighting plan. The battle was barely over when Wu Pei-fu’s troops from the north arrived at Hankow and Sun Chuan-fang ordered his main force in Kiangsi to go into action. This shows the great significance of the quick victory of the battle of Tingszechiao on the whole front.

The next strategic point on the Canton-Hankow Railway was Hoshengchiao, also garrisoned by Wu Pei-fu’s troops. The Northern
Expeditionary Army took the command positions of the enemy, annihilating Wu's main force in Hunan and Hupeh. Subsequently, it captured Hankow and on October 10, Wuchang, two cities which were to become the centre of the revolution for a period of time to come. By the end of 1926, the remnants of Wu Pei-fu's troops had been driven beyond Wushengkuan Pass. The unification of Hupeh Province was thus effected.

The second battle front was the Kiangsi-Anhwei-Kiangsu front. After the decisive victory won on the Hunan-Hupeh front, the main force of the Northern Expeditionary Army there turned to Kiangsi. Thanks to the political work of the Communists, the Second and the Sixth Armies crushed Sun Chuan-fang's main force in the battle of Kiangsi. But a contingent of Chiang Kai-shek's own First Army commanded by Wang Po-ling was routed in its first encounter with Sun Chuan-fang's troops, having been rendered incapable of fighting as a result of excluding the Communists. In Anhwei, the Northern Expeditionary Army advanced from Kiukiang down the Yangtse River, and aided by warlord troops who had come over, took Hofei, Pengfu, Anking and Wuhu, reached the gates of Nanking. Nanking was thus caught in a pincers' movement from the north and the south.

For a period of time afterwards Nanchang was occupied by Chiang Kai-shek and turned by him into a counter-revolutionary centre.

The third battle front was the Fukien-Chekiang front. When the Northern Expedition started, another contingent of Chiang Kai-shek's own First Army led by Ho Ying-chin thrust into Chaochow and Swatow in Kwangtung in order to keep out the enemy from Fukien. While the battle of Kiangsi was in progress, the troops of Chou Yin-jen, a Fukien warlord, penetrated into Sungkow, a district in Meihsien, Kwangtung, while Ho Ying-chin rushed his troops from the east of Kwangtung to Changchow, Chuanchow and Foochow. There was no fierce fighting in the battle of Fukien owing to the absence of Sun Chuan-fang's main force. The battle of Chekiang began in December when the local troops, who had mutinied, were forced by Sun Chuan-fang's troops to retreat into Chuichow. Taking advantage of this situation, Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi entered the town from Kiangsi and proceeded from there to Hangchow and Shaohsing, which they occupied in February 1927.

The Northern Expeditionary Army was actively supported by the worker and peasant masses in its march along the Yangtse Valley. When the Expeditionary Army set out, the workers who had taken part in the Canton-Hongkong Strike organized transport, propaganda and medical units involving many thousands of people to march northwards with the army. In order to facilitate the progress of the revolution, the Canton-Hongkong Strike Committee of its own accord put an end to the strike after the capture of Wuhan by the Northern Expeditionary Army.

The worker and peasant masses in Hunan and Hupeh under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party gave the Revolutionary Army powerful support which enabled it to penetrate quickly into the two provinces.

On the eve of the Northern Expedition the workers, peasants and students of Hunan were already well organized on a large scale. The province had in all 110,000 organized workers and over 400,000 organized peasants. Over a million people were directly under the Party's influence. Most of the college and secondary school students were
organized and had the experience of many revolutionary struggles behind them.

On March 9, 1926, in order to protest against the massacre of people's leaders by the warlord government, the citizens of Changsha held a rally, at which they formed the Hunan People's Provisional Committee. They then staged a demonstration. Under popular pressure the warlord Chao Heng-ti fled from Changsha. The workers and peasants took an active part in all the battles of the Northern Expeditionary Army in Hunan, serving as front-line fighters, guides, messengers, and transport workers, sniping off the fleeing enemy and organizing propaganda brigades and entertainment teams. When the warlord Yeh Kai-hsin escaped from Changsha on the arrival of the Northern Expeditionary Army, the Provincial Trade Union Federation organized the Workers' Security Corps of over 1,000 men to guard the important streets and roads inside and outside the city and maintain public order. The workers of Changsha, Anyuan in Kiangsi and other places organized a team of several thousand people to help the Revolutionary Army with its transport. The workers on the Canton-Hankow Railway organized a railway-destroying corps, and the workers in the Hanyang Arsenal staged a general strike to co-ordinate with the northward march of the Revolutionary Army.

The support of the worker and peasant masses was one of the main factors making for the rapid occupation of Changsha, Yuehyang and Wuhan by the Northern Expeditionary Army.

In less than six months (from July to December 1926) the Kwangtung Revolutionary Army took Hunan, Hupeh, Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsi and Anhwei, put Wu Pei-fu's troops out of action and defeated Sun Chuan-fang's main force. Shanghai, Nanking and other towns in Kiangsu were encircled. The attempt of the Chihli warlords Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang to check the progress of the Revolutionary Army was decisively frustrated. The downfall of the Chihli clique brought about a momentous change in the national situation that was favourable to the revolution—the counterpoise of the National Revolutionary Army in the South to the Fengtien clique in the North. As the National Revolutionary Army advanced further and achieved more victories, it seemed all but certain that with the support of the broad masses, it would defeat the imperialists and the Northern warlords and bring about the independence and unification of China.

But serious crises were lurking in the triumphal march of the Revolutionary Army. First, the revolutionary camp became disunited. At the beginning of the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek usurped the post of commander-in-chief and laid claim to the control of all the army, navy and air force under the National Government as well as of the Political Department, the General Staff and the Department of Military Supplies. After the Expedition had started, all the administrative and financial branches of the National Government were placed under the control of the commander-in-chief, who was also responsible for the appointment and dismissal of all civil and military personnel. Thus, by virtue of his authority as the commander-in-chief, Chiang Kai-shek established a fully-developed system of counter-revolutionary dictatorship. But, on the other hand, the armies, particularly the Fourth Army, under the leadership and influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the
Left wing of the Kuomintang smashed the main forces of Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang during the northward march. And there was a steady rise in the mass movement of workers and peasants in Hunan and Hupeh. The result was the emergence of two centres after the occupation of Wuhan. Wuhan became the centre of the revolution represented by the Communist Party and the Left wing of the Kuomintang, while Nanchang became the centre of the counter-revolutionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

Secondly, in the battle of Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsi and Anhwei, the mutiny of Sun Chuan-fang's troops more or less cleared the way for the unimpeded advance of the Revolutionary Army. Many of the southern warlords had also come over. As a result, the National Revolutionary Army was greatly enlarged by newly-added units, most of which were still organized on the basis of warlordism. By making use of the system of mercenaries, the generals still retained their military power, their surrender to the Canton revolutionary government being actuated by a desire to preserve their strength rather than any genuine inclination towards the revolution.

As the revolutionary movement of the worker and peasant masses steadily grew in dimensions, the working class became the most important political factor in the movement. Hence, seeing that the development of the anti-imperialist and anti-Northern warlord struggle under the leadership of the working class was getting out of their control and threatening to endanger the interests of their own classes, the bourgeoisie and the warlords within the revolutionary ranks, under the pressure and cajolery of the imperialists, began to connive together and make preparations to seize the leadership of the revolution so as to undermine it.

Thus, on the eve of the capture of Shanghai and Nanking by the Revolutionary Army, a new alignment of classes within the revolutionary ranks was also taking shape.


The victorious advance of the Northern Expeditionary Army towards the Yangtse Valley made Hunan the centre of the nation-wide peasant movement and an arena where the most intense struggle in the country between revolution and counter-revolution took place. Therefore, the development of the peasant movement in Hunan was closely tied up with the general situation of the Chinese revolution.

The rise of the nation-wide peasant movement could not be separated from Comrade Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary activities. He had been running the National Institute of Peasant Movement in Canton from 1925 to 1926. With the beginning of the Northern Expedition, he left for Shanghai to take the post of Chairman of the Committee on the Peasant Movement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Afterwards he proceeded to Wuhan to be Secretary-General of the National Peasant Association.

At the end of 1925, following the development of the revolutionary
situation, the Hunan students studying in the National Institute of Peasant Movement went back to their province to work along the railway. Going into the midst of the peasants, they first of all got into contact with a number of active elements, mostly poor peasants and poor people with some education, and then founded peasant associations in townships. When a sufficient number of these township associations had been set up, district associations were organized to lead them. Thus they laid a solid foundation at lower levels for the peasant movement in Hunan.

After the Northern Expeditionary Army entered Hunan, the peasants' conscious participation in the war led quickly to the expansion of their organization—the peasant association. They brought forward on their own initiative their urgent political and economic demands with the determination to struggle for political power.

By November 1926 peasant associations had been formed in over 50 countries in Hunan with a membership of 1,367,000.

The peasant association became the sole organ of authority in the countryside—"All Power to the Peasant Association." It was really a form of political power under the peasants' revolutionary dictatorship. Through their own associations, the peasants carried out political, economical and ideological struggles in a vigorous and resolute way. (1) They smashed the power of the landlord class so far as its political and social position was concerned, and established the authority of the peasant association; overthrew the township and district organs dominated by the local bullies and bad gentry and obtained control of the country government by means of the joint council of the magistrate and the revolutionary mass organizations; conducted education among themselves to raise their political consciousness; and established a revolutionary social order by prohibiting gambling, and eliminating banditry. (2) They put a ban on taking grain out of the area and on forcing up its price; effected the reduction of rents and the return of deposits which the landlord had exacted from his tenants as a condition of tenancy; forbade the cancellation of leases and abolished exorbitant levies; set up consumers', marketing, and credit co-operatives and prescribed limits to middlemen's exploitation and usury. (3) They opposed clan authority, theocratic authority and the authority of the husband, and boldly freed themselves from these spiritual shackles. The peasant associations opened night schools for peasants to learn to read and write. In December 1926 a provincial peasant congress was convened in Changsha which adopted important proposals on lowering rents and returning deposits, prohibiting usury, opposing exorbitant levies and taxes, eliminating corrupt officials, local bullies and bad gentry, establishing peasant governments, abolishing the landlords' "defence corps" and organizing the peasants' militia for self-defence. An organization was also set up to lead the peasant movement of the whole province.

A great, earth-shaking revolution was effected within a few months' time in Hunan by tens of millions of peasants, with the over one-million-strong peasant association as their backbone.

Thus, a decisive fight between revolution and counter-revolution started on the peasant problem. Landlords, bullies, Right wingers of the Kuomintang and reactionary officers in the Northern Expeditionary Army all came out to attack the revolutionary peasants through reactionary propaganda and other means.

The reactionaries slandered the peasant movement as a movement
of "lazy" peasants and of "riff-raff," and the peasants' revolutionary struggle as a "manifestation of inertia" sufficient to arrest the development of agricultural production. From their extremely reactionary standpoint, they denied the role the peasant movement was playing in the revolution.

Another piece of malicious propaganda concocted by the reactionaries was that the peasant movement had driven away the rich people, and that this had resulted in a sharp fall of tax revenue and in underfrayed military expenses. Claiming that the peasant movement had reduced the government revenue and hampered the Northern Expeditionary War, they attempted to charge the peasants with the crime of disturbing the rear.

By making use of the landlords' armed forces, popularly known as the "defence corps," the reactionaries went so far as to openly slaughter peasant leaders and revolutionary peasants. In remote areas, they started riots, instigating backward peasants to make demonstrations in the streets and smash up the offices of peasant associations, Kuomintang headquarters and government organs. Moreover, they tried to sabotage the peasant movement by organizing bogus peasant associations, making use of the landlords' influence and armed forces, bribing rascals and local knaves to worm their way into peasant associations, controlling the lower levels of the Kuomintang and conspiring with reactionary officers in the Northern Expeditionary Army.

In face of the reactionaries' attack, the opportunists headed by Chen Tu-hsiu, instead of hitting back, persistently denied the role of the peasants in the revolution and opposed the peasants' revolutionary struggle.

In July 1926 the Party called an Enlarged Session of the Third Central Executive Committee, and passed a resolution written by Chen Tu-hsiu which marked the development of his Right opportunist ideas into a Right opportunist line.

Chen Tu-hsiu advocated the establishment of a "united front in the countryside," saying that the peasant association should not be "tainted with class distinctions," and that besides poor peasants, farm labourers and middle peasants, it should also admit small and medium-sized landlords. If this had been followed, landlords and rich peasants would have penetrated into the peasant association and controlled it. In opposing the peasants' revolutionary government, Chen Tu-hsiu upheld the view of replacing the old authority of the gentry (i.e. the bad gentry) by a reformed one (i.e. the so-called good gentry). This meant, in reality, nothing but the preservation of the power of the feudal landlord class. He argued further that the peasants' armed forces should operate only as the reactionary "defence corps," that they were never to attack because the purpose they served was to be exclusively one of self-defence. Actually Chen Tu-hsiu's opposition to organizing the peasants' armed forces as a standing army to fight against the "defence corps" and reactionary troops was tantamount to the elimination of the peasants' own armed forces.

In line with the above, Chen Tu-hsiu did not propound any revolutionary agrarian programme but brought forward instead some reformist policies such as "setting a maximum limit for rentals," and "curbing usurious extortion." With his attention exclusively focussed on cooperation with the bourgeoisie, he completely forgot the peasantry. Consequently he threw away the proletarian responsibility of leading the peasant revolution. He pointed out in the resolution
adopted by the Central Committee that "The Chinese national revolution would run into great difficulties, even dangers, without the Chinese bourgeoisie playing a vital part." He also maintained that the Communist Party would not fight with the Kuomintang for political power in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. "Only in the period of proletarian revolution will the Communist Party seize political power. Such a problem does not arise in the period of national revolution."

In the eyes of Chen Tu-hsiu, the question of proletarian leadership in the bourgeois-democratic revolution was non-existent and would never "arise." Therefore, he pointed out in the resolution that the Chinese revolution would lead to the establishment of a "national capitalist society" in China, asserting that China could not enter a socialist society without first passing through a capitalist society. "We are not Utopian socialists," he said, "and so we do not imagine that a direct transition from a semi-feudal society to a socialist society by passing the capitalist society, can be effected at one leap."

Thus, tailing after the reactionaries, Chen Tu-hsiu virtually restrained the peasant movement which had been steadily growing during the Northern Expedition.

Chen Tu-hsiu hoped to placate the landlord and bourgeois elements in the Kuomintang with concessions and compromises so that they would not desert the united front, and hoped thereby to save the revolutionary cause. The result was that the more concessions the Communist Party made, the more unbridled the reactionary forces became while the mass movement met with repeated obstructions and sustained heavy losses because of the erroneous policy of the Right opportunists in the Party's leading body.

In support of the peasant struggles which had already arisen or were still arising during the Northern Expedition, Comrade Mao Tsetung went to Hunan in January 1927 to make an investigation and wrote the most important work of the Party during the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War — "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan." Comrade Mao Tse-tung extolled the heroic deeds and revolutionary creations of the peasants and, by taking the correct revolutionary line of the proletariat, summed up various experiences and achievements of the peasant revolution of the time. This was a scientific generalization of the problem of the peasant movement made by the Chinese Communist Party during the First Revolutionary Civil War.

First, this report fully appraised the role of the peasants in the Chinese revolution.

The peasant revolution was directed against all feudal forces, which had served as the social basis of imperialist domination over China. The struggle against feudalism was a historical mission of the Chinese peasantry. In enthusiastically praising the peasant revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung clearly confirmed its great significance, for it was to accomplish a task left unfulfilled by a series of peasant uprisings for thousands of years in Chinese history and by Dr. Sun Yat-sen's 40 years of revolutionary struggle.

At that time, there was some rumour representing the interests of the landlord class that the peasant movement was "an awful mess." But Comrade Mao Tse-tung representing the interests of the several hundred million peasants of China acclaimed the movement as something "very good indeed." He pointed out that the revolution in the rural
areas would rise like a mighty storm, and that no power, however
great, would be able to stop it. It would sweep all imperialist and
feudal forces to their graves. All political parties would have to stand
before the revolutionary peasants to be tested, and to be accepted or
rejected by them. They would have to make a quick choice of one
of three ways: “To march at their head and lead them? Or to follow
at their rear, gesticulating at them and criticizing them? Or to face
them as opponents?” On behalf of the Chinese proletariat and its
party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung chose the first way, thus showing the
proletariat to be the real leader of the peasants.

The peasantry consisted of several sections, among which the poor
peasants, who constituted the majority of the rural population, were
the most revolutionary force. The rich, middle and poor peasants
adopted different attitudes towards the revolution. The rich peas­
ants remained inactive throughout while the middle peasants vacillated,
though, unlike the rich peasants, they could be drawn into the revo­
lution when it was at its height. The poor peasants were the main
force in the countryside which had always put up the bitterest fight.
They were the backbone, the pioneers and the foremost heroes of the
revolution. Being the most revolutionary, they had won the leader­
ship in the peasant associations and held practically all the leading
posts at the lowest level. They rose and took power into their hands
and united themselves with the middle peasants, thus neutralizing the
rich peasants. In the words of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, “Without the
poor peasants there can be no revolution. To reject them is to reject
the revolution. To attack them is to attack the revolution.” The
so-called “movement of the riff-raff” and “movement of the lazy pea­
sants” were opprobrious epithets used by the counter-revolutionary
landlords and gentry in their extremely malicious attack on the poor
peasants.

Secondly, this report advocated the revolutionary idea of boldly
mobilizing the masses to establish a revolutionary government and
organize the peasants’ armed forces.

The world-shaking changes in the countryside were regarded by
the reformists as “turning everything upside down,” “going too far”
and “excessive.” Comrade Mao Tse-tung, however, pointed out defi­
nitely that these changes were inevitable in the revolution. First,
the peasants had reacted in revolt against the landlords’ oppression,
and the violence of their revolt was naturally in proportion to the
ruthless oppression they had suffered. Their direction of the revolu­
tion had not been wrong at all. “As to who is bad and who is not,
who is the most ruthless and who is less so; who is to be severely
punished and who is to be dealt with lightly, the peasants keep per­
factly clear accounts and very seldom has there been any discrep­
ancy between the punishment and the crime.” Secondly, in a revo­
lution, the new could not grow up without suppressing the old; there­
fore in a period of revolutionary action, it was necessary to have
a violent revolutionary high-tide and establish the absolute authority
of the peasants.

The struggle against feudalism in the countryside was a bitter class
struggle, the final encounter between the feudal and democratic forces.
The fundamental distinction between revolutionists and reformists lay
in their positive or negative attitude towards the revolution. The
reformists attempted to hamper the revolutionary actions of the pea­sants, permitting them to act only within the limits of the feudal sys-
tem. They would allow the peasants to patch up the feudal system, but not to destroy it. Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted this reactionary viewpoint, saying that "To right a wrong it is necessary to exceed the proper limits, and the wrong cannot be righted without the proper limits being exceeded." That is to say, the feudal system could be overthrown only by mass revolutionary methods, not by reformist methods.

Of course, the masses might commit some mistakes in their struggle. But one should never on that account restrict their activities, dampen their enthusiasm, or go so far as to deny the significance of their struggle altogether. Here, revolutionary leadership was of paramount importance. The Chinese Communist Party must march at the head of the peasants and lead them.

One learns how to carry out a revolution when it is started, not beforehand. It is the leaders' duty to put their trust in the correct, creative ideas of the masses, summarize their revolutionary experience and lead them onto the correct road to victory.

True, some leaders of the peasant associations at lower levels, who had been labelled by the gentry as "riff-raff," had, in varying degrees, acquired bad ideas and habits as they were brought up in the old society. But when they took power into their hands in the revolutionary storm, many of them were remoulded. "They are themselves energetically prohibiting gambling and exterminating banditry. Where the peasant association is powerful, gambling and banditry have vanished. In some places it is literally true that people do not pocket articles dropped on the road and that doors are not bolted at night. According to a survey of Hengshan, 85 per cent of the poor peasant leaders have now turned out to be quite reformed, capable and energetic." Here, Comrade Mao Tse-tung proved the truth that the peasant masses are capable of performing revolutionary marvels and that their strength is inexhaustible. They had remoulded themselves while transforming the old society. This was a revolutionary creation of the masses and their self-reorientation as well.

This report clearly pointed out the need to establish a revolutionary government and a peasants' army in the rural areas. It pointed out that a revolution was an act of violence whereby the oppressed class overthrew the rule of the oppressing class. The revolution in the countryside of Hunan was just such an act by which the peasants overthrew the authority of the landlords and established a revolutionary regime. Their peasant association became the sole organ of authority. "All power to the peasant association" was the slogan of the ten million revolutionary peasants of Hunan. The peasant association, supreme in authority, forbade the landlords to have their say and dictated its own orders. People who had no standing in the old society now stood up and took power into their hands.

The mainstay of the revolutionary government was its revolutionary armed forces, which alone enabled the peasants to protect their own interests and suppress the revolts of all the reactionaries. The peasants' armed forces in Hunan at that time comprised two parts: one was the reorganized armed forces of the landlords, the other was the spear corps organized by the peasants themselves. The spear corps was more powerful than the reorganized armed forces of the landlords, its strength varying with each country from 30 to 80,000. Comrade Mao Tse-tung reminded the
revolutionary authorities in Hunan that this kind of armed force should be established throughout the whole province and that every young peasant should be given a spear so that the armed forces could be reinforced to secure the complete victory of the revolution.

While mobilizing the masses, it is necessary to oppose both commandism and tailism, because both show alienation from the masses. Commandism means to act beyond the political consciousness of the masses, violating the principle of voluntariness and having no confidence in the correct activities of the masses. Tailism means to lag far behind their political consciousness, violating the principle of leading them a step further and failing to concentrate their will and experiences and lead them onto the road to victory.

One of the characteristics of the Communist Party which distinguishes it from other political parties is its close connection with the masses. This characteristic is fully illustrated in Comrade Mao Tse-tung's views on the Chinese proletarian leadership of the peasant revolution. He scientifically estimated the agrarian revolution as constituting the main content of the Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution and the peasants as its basic force, thus formulating the basic idea of boldly mobilizing the peasant masses to establish a revolutionary government and their own army in the countryside. This was an embodiment of the idea of the new-democratic revolution on the question of the peasant revolution.

"Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan" is a historical document of great significance. With his unexcelled revolutionary and scientific spirit Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the success of the Chinese revolution depended on whether or not the working class could lead the peasants. Thus, the work has become a classic on the leadership of the Chinese proletariat over the peasantry.


Alarmed at the victorious advance of the Northern Expeditionary Army and the revolutionary upsurge of the worker and peasant masses, the imperialists intensified their interference in the Chinese revolution.

The interference assumed two forms: suppressing the Chinese people's struggle by barbarous slaughter, and aiding the counter-revolutionary forces to oppose the victorious revolutionary movement.

Without the financial, military and moral support of the British, Japanese and U.S. imperialists the Northern warlords Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuan-fang, Chang Tsao-lin and Chang Tsung-chang could never have united to oppose the revolution as they did. This was flagrant intervention on the part of the imperialists, and the Chinese revolution, which aimed to exterminate these warlords, struck at the
imperialists' interventionist policy as well.

When the Kwangtung Revolutionary Army was advancing towards the Yangtse Valley, the imperialists saw that to crush the revolution they had to find more effective tools than the Northern warlords. They, therefore, resorted to even more vicious measures, seeking for allies within the revolutionary united front, their hope being to work in collusion with the reactionaries hidden in the revolutionary ranks in order to disrupt the united front and sabotage the revolution from within.

On January 3, 1927, the Wuhan government held a mass meeting in Hankow to celebrate the removal of the National Government to the north and the victory of the Northern Expedition. A propagandist was speaking on the border of the British concession in Hankow, when British marines were landed to disperse the crowd. They attacked the listeners with bayonets, killing and wounding many people. To urge the Chinese Government to lodge a strong protest with the British Government, the people of Hankow held a demonstration on January 5 and occupied the British concession, forcing the British authorities to return it to the Chinese Government. On January 6, after British soldiers had shot some Chinese workers in Kiukiang, the local people occupied the British concession there, which was subsequently also handed over to the Chinese Government.

The recovery of the concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang was an unprecedented event in the history of the anti-imperialist struggle.

After taking Wuhan, the Northern Expeditionary Army turned to Kiangsi, Fukien and Anhwei to fight against Sun Chuan-fang’s troops. To co-ordinate with its advance, the workers in Shanghai, led by the Party, held three uprisings and liberated the city which had for many years been a stronghold of imperialist aggression and warlord domination.

Back on May 30, 1926, prior to the armed uprising, the people of Shanghai, led by the working class, held a large-scale anti-imperialist demonstration. This was followed by a big strike under the leadership of the Shanghai Trade Union Federation. From June to August 200,000 workers went on strike, and even in September there were still 30,000 workers who persisted in the struggle. The workers struck for freedom of assembly and association, minimum wages, a shorter work-day, improvements in working conditions and so forth. The capitalists retaliated by closing down their shops and factories and prevailed upon the warlord government to ban the Shanghai Trade Union Federation. They even discharged those who had taken no part in the strike or slashed their wages without reason. They also hired provocateurs to make trouble for the workers. But the strikes in Shanghai did not stop on that account. From the latter half of August, the strike movement was directed against the Japanese imperialists, who had slaughtered Chinese workers. The strike called by the Shanghai Textile Union Federation further strengthened the workers’ will to fight and enhanced their organized strength.

With the capture of Wuchang by the Northern Expeditionary Army in October 1926, Wu Pei-fu lost his last foothold. The main force of the Expeditionary Army then headed for Kiangsi where it was met by the bulk of Sun Chuan-fang’s troops. Meanwhile, Hsia Chao, one of Sun’s subordinates in Chekiang whose sympathies lay with the revolution, denounced Sun publicly in Hangchow and
marched up to the suburbs of Shanghai. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Shanghai workers launched the first armed uprising on October 23. Before the uprising, they organized a fighting unit of 1,130 workers among whom only 130 were armed, while the enemy had 3,000 infantrymen and police in the city and a brigade stationed on the banks of the Yangtse River near Shanghai. Owing to inadequate preparations and Hsia Chao's defeat, the uprising ended in failure.

After the occupation of Hangchow and Chiahsing by the Northern Expeditionary Army, the Party decided to stage a second armed uprising in co-ordination with the progress of the expedition. On February 19, 1927, the Shanghai Trade Union Federation issued an order calling for a general strike and proclaiming its demands. On the first day 150,000 workers came out on strike, on the second day the number rose to 270,000, on the third to 350,000, and on the fourth to 360,000. From the first day of the strike, the warlord government, collaborating with the “Shanghai Municipal Council” of the International Settlement, imposed a reign of White terror over the city. The armed uprising started on the fourth day (February 22). A Shanghai Citizens’ Provisional Revolutionary Committee was formed by the representatives of workers, merchants, students and of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.

There were, however, conditions unfavourable to the armed uprising. First, the units of the Northern Expeditionary Army under the command of the reactionary Pai Chung-hsi had stopped attacking Shanghai, leaving the workers alone to fight against Sun's troops, in the hope that they would cut each other to pieces. Secondly, the Party did very little work among either the warlord armed forces (the vacillating navy and Li Pao-chang's army) or the intermediate classes. Actually, these forces could have been won over to disintegrate the enemy from within. The Party did not call the man-in-the-street into action. It ignored the petty bourgeoisie and relied solely on the big bourgeoisie like Niu Yung-chien and Yu Hsia-ching. On February 23, the Trade Union Federation announced that the strike would be called off at one o'clock on the following afternoon. The second uprising had also ended in failure.

Then, with great courage and perseverance, the Party prepared for the third uprising on a much larger scale. It did a great deal of political and organizational work in the trade unions and among the poor people in the city and the petty-bourgeois masses. The slogan of establishing a people's government was circulated among the worker masses. The petty bourgeoisie was aroused to form a solid alliance with the working class. While maintaining contacts with the big bourgeoisie, the Party forced it to submit to the will of the masses and abandon its policy of compromise.

When the Northern Expeditionary Army attacked Lunghua in the vicinity of Shanghai on March 21, 1927, the Shanghai Trade Union Federation issued another order for a general strike, to which 800,000 workers responded. Under the leadership of the Party, the armed uprising began in seven districts: Nanshi, Hongkew, Pootung, Woo-sung, East Shanghai, West Shanghai and Chapei. At the very beginning of the uprising, the workers cut the railways, the power and water supply, and occupied the Police Headquarters, the telephone and the telegraph offices. The firing of guns and the shouting of slogans by the masses resounded all over Shanghai. The unarmed masses now seized weapons from the enemy. By the afternoon of Feb-
ruary 21, all districts except Chapei had been taken. The battle of
Chapel was the most violent and lasted two days and one night. Vic-
tory was not won until six o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd. White
Russians and British armoured cars were found fighting side by side
with the Hopei-Shantung warlord troops. After the seizure of the
various police offices, the workers and the people occupied Tientungan
Railway Station and the Commercial Press Club. The final battle
was concentrated on the capture of the North Station. Thanks to
the heroic attacks launched by the workers' armed force and the par-
ticipation of the broad masses in the battle, the station was taken and
the reactionary forces were defeated. Thus, the third uprising was
crowned with victory, and Shanghai, the biggest commercial and in-
dustrial city in China, was liberated by the people and the working
class under the leadership of the Communist Party. The Party held
immediately a mass rally of Shanghai citizens to elect officials of the
Shanghai People's Government.

Nanking was liberated on March 24, 1927 by the Sixth Army, the
Second Army and other units of the Northern Expeditionary Army.
The same night British, U.S., Japanese and French warships shelled
Nanking, killing and wounding 2,000 soldiers and civilians. It was
the purpose of the imperialists to threaten the Chinese people with
cannons and strike a crushing blow to the heart of the revolution.
The Nanking Incident was a signal for intensified intervention of
the imperialists in the Chinese revolution. Shortly afterwards, with
the support of these imperialists, Chiang Kai-shek staged a counter-
revolutionary coup d'etat on April 12.

When the Northern Expeditionary Army entered the Yangtse V:alley,
the counter-revolutionary activities of the Right wing of the Kuomin-
tang became increasingly flagrant. After Chiang Kai-shek's arrival
at Nanchang in the winter of 1926, the dispute over the issue of mov-
ing the capital arose. Using Nanchang as a centre of his counter-
revolutionary activities to counterpoise Wuhan, the revolutionary cen-
tre, Chiang Kai-shek opposed the suggestion made by the Communist
Party and the Left wing of the Kuomintang that the capital shottld
move to Wuhan. However, in November 1926, the Central Executive
Committe of the Kuomintang decided to move the capital, and together
with the National Government, it promptly moved to Wuhan. In
March 1927, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang held
a plenary session in Hankow. With the active support of the Chinese
Communist Party and the Left wing of the Kuomintang, resolutions on
raising the authority of the party, promoting democracy and prevent-
ing dictatorial rule were adopted unanimously. Chiang Kai-shek was
removed from the chairmanship of both the Central Executive Com-
mittee and the Military Commission. The session ended in the vic-
tory of the revolutionary section over its opponents. After the ses-
sion, Chiang Kai-shek busily prepared for his betrayal, actively in-
creasing his own armies and widely enlistin warlord troops who had
come over in the battles of Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsi and Anhwei
Provinces. He appealed to the imperialists for help, collaborating
with the Japanese imperialists through Tai Chi-tao, with the British
through Wang Cheng-ting, with the U.S. through T. V. Soong, and
with the French through Li Shih-tseng and Wu Chih-hui. The Japa-
nese, U.S. and British imperialists on their part also sought to nego-
tiate the terms for staging a counter-revolution with Chiang Kai-shek
through Yu Hsia-ching, a big Shanghai comprador. At the instiga-
tion of the imperialists, many old bureaucrats and politicians, such
as Huang Fu and Chang Chun, rallied to Chiang's support and helped him in his counter-revolutionary activities. There were at that time more than 30,000 British, U.S., French and Japanese troops concentrated in Shanghai, and more troops were steadily coming in to Chiang's support. Exulting over his intimate relations with the imperialists, Chiang became more reactionary and ferocious than ever. In March 1927, he assassinated Chen Tsan-hsien, President of the Trade Union Federation of Kanchow in Kiangsi, and suppressed the working-class movement there. Then he dissolved the Trade Union Federation of Kiukiang, killing and wounding many workers. In Anking he set up a bogus Trade Union Federation of Anhwei Province, which in a riot wrecked the headquarters of the legal Provincial Trade Union Federation and the provincial party headquarters of the Kuomintang Left wing. When Shanghai was liberated by the workers, Chiang went there to meet the imperialists, big compradors and landlords, and gained their support. At the instigation of the imperialists and the compradors, he made preparations for his coup.

Starting with important cities around Shanghai, Chiang Kai-shek sent some of his own henchmen to occupy Nanking and Hangchow, thus isolating the revolutionary force in Shanghai. At the so-called Plenary Session of the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang held on April 2, Wu Chih-hui proposed an impeachment against the Communist Party. This was intended as a prelude to the counter-revolutionary coup. Then the Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei blocs held a joint anti-Communist conference and came to some agreements such as suppressing the Communist Party and the Shanghai armed workers and refusing to carry out the order of the Kuomintang headquarters at Wuhan. Immediately afterwards Chiang Kai-shek rallied the gangsters in Shanghai and organized the "China March-Together Society" and the "Shanghai Federated Association of Labour Unions" in opposition to the Shanghai Trade Union Federation. Reactionary troops were sent to Chapei to watch the Shanghai Trade Union Federation and the workers' pickets and a Shanghai-Woosung Martial Law Headquarters headed by the bloodthirsty reactionaries Pai Chung-hsi and Chou Feng-chi was set up to restrict the revolutionary activities of the workers by banning all meetings, strikes and parades.

In the meantime Chiang Kai-shek continued to engage in his counter-revolutionary double-dealing. Though he doubtlessly regarded the workers' pickets as a thorn in his side, he did not betray his feelings. Instead he presented the workers' pickets with a silk banner carrying the words "To Our Common Struggle," with a view to blunting the revolutionaries' vigilance against the possibility of the type of sudden attack on the revolution which he was planning. Furthermore, taking advantage of Chen Tu-hsiu's opportunistic tendencies, he forbade the founding of the Shanghai People's Municipal Government (which was scheduled to be set up on March 29) and incited the representatives of the bourgeoisie to hand in their resignations. As a result, the project of funding a people's government was abandoned. On the other hand, instead of mobilizing the masses to support the government, Chen Tu-hsiu threw proletarian principles to the winds, and leaned over to ingratiate himself with the bourgeois representatives for fear that the government might be unable to function without them. Encouraged by Chen Tu-hsiu's weakness and incompetence, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his henchmen to organize the "Shanghai Provisional Political Committee," thus usurping the political power...
of the people of Shanghai. A so-called "Joint Statement" by Chen Tu-hsiu and Wang Ching-wet was issued on April 5, which contained not a single word condemning the counter-revolutionary scheme. On the contrary, it served as a kind of camouflage for Chiang Kai-shek's murderous plans.

Chiang Kai-shek left Shanghai for Nanking on April 9 after completing the preparations for his reactionary plot. Before dawn on April 12 Chiang Kai-shek ordered the massacre of all the workers' pickets stationed in Chapei, Woosung, Putung and Nanshih. Gangsters and counter-revolutionary troops, fully equipped, went into action simultaneously, the former rushing out from the foreign concessions to attack the workers and the latter divesting them of arms, either on the pretext of helping them, or by force. After disarming the workers' pickets, the executioner Pai Chung-hsi brazenly ascribed the gangsters' attack on the workers to "internal dissension among the workers," and claimed that was why the pickets had to be disarmed. In the meantime, an order banning all strikes was issued for fear the workers might go on strike in support of the disarmed pickets.

The workers of Shanghai launched a bold counter-attack in protest against Chiang Kai-shek's disarming of the pickets. They recovered the office of the Trade Union Federation at noon on April 12. Thereupon, the Trade Union Federation immediately issued an order calling for a general strike throughout the city starting from that very day. In this strike, more than 200,000 workers took part in spite of the White terror.

The workers and citizens of Shanghai held mass meetings everywhere to voice their strong protest against the reactionaries. After a mass meeting in Nanshih, about half a million citizens marched to Lunghua, the Commanding Headquarters of the Northern Expeditionary Army, to present a petition to Pai Chung-hsi and succeeded in forcing him to agree to certain terms.

On the 13th the Trade Union Federation called a mass rally in Chapei, after which the masses marched to the headquarters of Chou Feng-chi, a divisional commander of the Northern Expeditionary Army, to present their petition. But when passing through Paoshan Road they were attacked by reactionary troops. More than 100 were killed and countless people were wounded.

After the big massacre Chiang Kai-shek ordered the dissolution of the Trade Union Federation and instigated his gangsters in the Shanghai Federated Association of Labour Unions (later renamed the Shanghai United Committee of Union Organizations) to occupy the office of the Shanghai Trade Union Federation, close down all union organizations and massacre the leaders of the workers. Then all revolutionary institutions and bodies were closed down one after another. Thenceforth the workers and revolutionaries of Shanghai were deprived of all their freedom. Capital punishment was meted out to those who held meetings or came out on strike. Under these circumstances, if the workers in their isolated position had continued the general strike, they would have sacrificed lives for nothing. So the Trade Union Federation ordered a resumption of work on the evening of the 14th in order to preserve the workers' strength.

Though the working-class movement in Shanghai was seriously frustrated and the general strike was called off under compulsion, the workers of Shanghai did not yield. In the midst of the White terror, the General Trade Union still carried on underground activities, leading the workers of Shanghai in their struggle against the reactionaries.
Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal ushered in a reign of terror in the southeastern provinces and in Kwangtung where large numbers of Communists and outstanding revolutionaries suffered death at the hands of the Chiang Kai-shek gangsters.

On April 15, the Kuomintang reactionaries in Kwangtung arrested and killed many Communists and advanced workers, disarmed the pickets of the Whampoa Military Academy and the Canton-Hongkong Strike Committee and searched such revolutionary mass organizations as trade unions and peasant associations. During the counter-revolutionary coup d'etat in Kwangtung, over 2,100 Communists and active workers were killed, more than 100 were secretly shot and more than 2,000 railway workers lost their jobs. On June 19 and 23, the workers rose heroically to resume the general strike, but it was also suppressed.

Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal marked the partial failure of the revolution, but the revolution, as a whole, continued on its way to a higher stage of development.

4. GROWING MASS MOVEMENT OF WORKERS AND PEASANTS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE WUHAN REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. FIFTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The April 12 Incident was an open counter-revolutionary attack by the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek bloc on the revolution. After this incident, there appeared two camps in South China: the revolutionary camp with Wuhan as its centre and the counter-revolutionary camp with Nanking as its centre.

Owing to the imperialists' policy of intervention, the Wuhan revolutionary government was surrounded by the enemy on all sides, with Chiang Kai-shek to the east, the Szechuan warlord Yang Sen to the west, the Fengtien warlord Chang Tso-lin to the north and the Kwangtung warlords in the south. Since the situation did not allow the revolutionary forces to attack on all the four fronts at the same time, the Wuhan government decided as an urgent measure of defence to continue its northward advance against Chang Tso-lin's troops, which were moving south in an attempt to occupy Wuhan. Since Wuhan was a commercial centre, the encirclement must be broken in order to deliver the city from economic chaos. Also, for the purpose of minimizing or averting the danger of an attack by the Fengtien forces, the Wuhan government intended to link up with Feng Yu-hsiang's forces in Honan before veering around to attack Chiang's armies along the Lushan Railway.

Therefore, to consolidate itself both militarily and economically, the Wuhan government thought it best first to link up with Feng Yu-hsiang's forces. Meanwhile, it made every effort to carry out the agrarian revolution, and expand and deepen the revolution before tackling the question of attacking Chiang Kai-shek.

The worker-peasant mass movement continued to develop and the peasant movement was on the ascendancy especially in Hunan and Hupeh.

There were over 57,900 members of the Communist Party at the time of its Fifth National Congress, while there had been only a little over 900 at its Fourth Congress. The Party had increased its political influence even more quickly and extensively than its membership, and
now had about 2,800,000 workers and 9,000,000 peasants directly under its leadership.

The basic characteristics of the working-class movement were politically that it was moving from the struggle for the freedom of assembly, association and strike to the demand for participation in the government; economically, from the struggle for improvement of living conditions and the right of collective bargaining to that for participation in the management of state enterprises; and organizationally, towards the concentration of the powers of the trade unions by gradually transforming the scattered guilds into industrial unions, with the general trade unions in each locality enjoying the highest authority.

Under the leadership of the revolutionary government, the peasant movement broke out like a tornado in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi. In June 1927 there were altogether about 9,150,000 members of the peasant associations throughout the whole country. Hunan came first with 4,510,000 members and Hupeh with 2,500,000 members came second.

The countryside of Hunan was caught in a revolutionary storm. The peasants took over the control and distribution of grain, swept away the rule of the landlords, and settled the agrarian problem by first measuring up the land and fixing the rent on this basis, then planting landmarks on the land designating anew the right to cultivation and finally confiscating and redistributing the land owned by the landlords.

After the occupation of Wuhan by the Northern Expeditionary Army, the peasant movement in Hupeh greatly expanded. The First Provincial Peasant Congress was held in March 1927, after which the peasants waged a violent class struggle in the countryside. The peasant association was converted into a revolutionary peasant regime, establishing its own self-defence corps, and demanding a redistribution of land following the reduction of rent and interest.

After the Provincial Peasant Association was formed in Kiangsi in February 1927, the peasants there waged a struggle for overthrowing the power of the landed gentry and for reducing rent and interest. Because Kiangsi had long been under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek and its government had twice changed hands between the Left wing and the Right wing of the Kuomintang, the peasant movement there was just beginning.

The peasant movement developed earliest in Kwangtung where the peasant masses had long been demanding the redistribution of the land, though under the reactionary rule peasant organizations were subjected to harsh persecution. A struggle for reducing rent and refusing to pay taxes broke out in the southeastern provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang and Fukien. In Honan, the Red Spear Society carried out struggles against the warlords and against levies and taxes. In the northern provinces, groups of peasants also rose against the tyranny of the warlords.

The peasant movement in Hunan, Hupeh and Kwangtung was carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party and with the poor peasants as its backbone. This was clear evidence that the movement would ultimately lead to the agrarian revolution. The poor peasants formed the mainstay of the peasants' regime. The seizure of political power by the peasants was the key to the revolution, for the peasants could not even have their rent reduced without a government of their own, let alone getting land. The peasants' stru-
ggle began with reduction of rent and interest and then proceeded to the overthrow of the landlords' rule and the agrarian revolution.

While the peasant movement was developing unevenly throughout the country, in the southern provinces it had on the whole entered the stage of overthrowing the landlords' rule and beginning the struggle for the land. This was the basic characteristic of a new period in the Chinese revolution.

At this critical juncture of the revolution, the Chinese Communist Party held its Fifth National Congress in Hankow on April 27, 1927. The congress was attended by 80 delegates representing over 57,900 Party members.

At the congress, Chen Tu-hsiu did not attempt to liquidate his Right opportunist line. Far from drawing the correct conclusion from a criticism of his own opportunist errors in adopting a policy of concession and compromise with regard to the Cruiser Chung-shan Incident, he laid the blame on the revolutionary forces for not being strong enough to overwhelm Chiang Kai-shek and excused himself by saying that Chiang's counter-revolutionary motives had not been fully exposed. With regard to the uprising of the Shanghai workers, Chen maintained that the working class should limit its struggles to economic issues and that it was wrong to wage political struggles or organize uprisings, thus completely renouncing the leadership of the working class and denying the great significance of the struggle for revolutionary political power.

The most fundamental problem at that time was the agrarian problem which was the key to the entire revolution. But how did Chen Tu-hsiu deal with this problem? He advocated that the land of the small landlords should be left untouched. Although he agreed to the confiscation of the land owned by the big and medium-sized landlords, this was only an admission in principle, not a directive for immediate action. As a matter of fact, Chen Tu-hsiu completely evaded this problem and put forward instead the idea of "political confiscation," that is, merely confiscating the land and properties belonging to the counter-revolutionaries.

One of Chen's opportunist theories was "the theory of expanding the revolution." He treated the expansion and intensification of the revolution as two mutually exclusive issues, either as a matter of expanding the revolution, i.e. continuing the Northern Expedition and enlarging the sphere of the revolution, or one of intensifying the revolution, i.e. carrying out the agrarian revolution and establishing a people's regime. He chose the former not so much for the purpose of going on with the Northern Expedition, as he claimed, as to slow down the agrarian revolution and relax the class struggle.

Another opportunist theory of his was that of "going northwest." He held that the revolution could not make any progress in Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin and other industrial districts where the forces of the imperialists and feudal warlords were strong, but could more easily take root in the northwestern provinces where the imperialist influence was fairly weak. Hence, his proposal to withdraw the revolutionary forces from the southeastern provinces to the Northwest.

These theories were a continuation and development of his Right opportunist line.

The congress adopted resolutions condemning opportunism and calling for the implementation of agrarian reform.
The “Resolution on the Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party” adopted at the congress pointed out that Chen’s political line was absolutely wrong and contrary to the resolutions and directives of the Communist International in that it abandoned the leadership of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, thus depriving the revolution of its vital guarantee for victory.

The congress refuted Chen’s erroneous notion of treating the expansion and intensification of the revolution as mutually exclusive, inasmuch as the two were in fact mutually dependent. If the revolution were to be given a solid foundation, it had to be intensified as well as expanded. The congress pointed out that “the theory of expanding the revolution” only served to pave the way for bourgeois nationalism. It also pointed out the danger of expanding the revolution without intensifying it. A case in point was what had happened in the areas occupied by the revolutionary forces in the past. Owing to the failure to intensify the revolution in those areas no solid revolutionary basis had been laid and parts of the reactionary social basis had been left intact. Consequently, when the Chiang Kai-shek clique turned traitor, they were not isolated, but had a strong following who broke away from the united front with them.

The congress also pointed out:

Any idea that the Northern Expedition must be completed before carrying out a radical land reform and establishing a democratic government will only help the bourgeoisie who have donned the mask of nationalism to entrench themselves rapidly in the coastal provinces to the benefit of the imperialists.

That is to say, the theory of completing the Northern Expedition before carrying out land reform would make it easy for Chiang Kai-shek to put on the mask of a nationalist and consolidate his position in the southeastern provinces, since he, too, advocated “going on with the Expedition and unifying the whole country.”

The congress pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek’s betrayal had not defeated the revolution, that the revolution was then not at a low ebb but on the ascendancy and that the time had come for the agrarian revolution. The view of going northwest was categorically refuted as extremely absurd.

The congress set before the whole Party two important tasks: carrying out the agrarian revolution and establishing a people’s regime.

The congress elected 29 members and 11 alternate members to the Central Committee. As Chen Tu-hsiu declared he accepted the resolution of the congress, he was again elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party.

But actually Chen Tu-hsiu still adhered stubbornly to his opportunist viewpoint. After the congress, many members of the Political Bureau were unable to work on the Central Committee, as the Party remained under Chen’s control to all intents and purposes.

Therefore, the Fifth National Congress did not really accomplish anything of vital importance.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung attended the congress, but he was excluded from the leadership by Chen and illegally deprived of the right to vote.
5. VACILLATION OF THE KUOMINTANG IN WUHAN DURING THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ATTACK. DAMAGE DONE TO THE REVOLUTION BY CHEN TU-HSIU CAPITULATIONIST LINE. BETRAYAL BY THE WANG CHING-WEI BLOC. FAILURE OF THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR

Ever since the founding of the Wuhan government the city had been encompassed by difficulties.

It was an important commercial city with many trade routes radiating from it but at that time it was blockaded by the imperialists and the warlord government. As a result many business firms in the city were forced to close down.

The British, U.S. and Japanese capitalists in Wuhan closed down their enterprises. The American merchants even transported all their stocks of kerosene out of Wuhan. The shortages of fuel and raw materials forced the factories to cut down production. Prices soared as a result of lack of commodities, and when the supply of grain and other foodstuffs dried up, panic ensued.

Then, the Chinese capitalists began to flee from Wuhan, carrying large amounts of silver dollars with them. When the Wuhan Government decided at the end of April to prohibit the outflow of silver and required all the banks to register their cash funds, it met with opposition from the banks, which openly suspended all their business transactions.

The commercial crisis affected the financial revenue, which became increasingly inadequate for defraying the large military expenses incurred in the continued prosecution of the Northern Expedition. The Wuhan government was compelled to adopt the emergency measure of issuing a large number of banknotes to cover the financial deficit.

The Wuhan government found itself facing an economic crisis. Taking advantage of the serious economic crisis, the capitalists intensified their exploitation of the workers. This plus unemployment and soaring prices worsened the workers' living conditions and sharpened the class contradictions.

In areas under the jurisdiction of the Wuhan government the peasant movement continued to rise. In many counties the peasants confiscated the landlords' land by force.

In the face of the economic blockade, commercial bankruptcy, shortage of grain, financial crisis, depression in industry and the worker-peasant revolution, the middle bourgeoisie and the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie began to desert the revolution.

The Northern Expeditionary Army occupied Chengchow and Kaifeng in Honan Province on June 1, 1927, where they joined hands with the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang. This victory would have consolidated the position of the Wuhan government, had it not been for internal conflicts and splits which proved that the Wuhan government was actually crumbling.

The landlords and the bourgeois elements in the region under the Wuhan government were the first to oppose the worker and peasant movement. They attacked the peasant associations and the trade unions in the cities as lawless organizations. Acting in unison with them, the reactionaries in the Wuhan government rose in revolt. Hsia Tou-yin was the first to rebel openly on May 17, while the revolutionary armies were marching on Honan, and the troops of
the Szechuan warlord Yang Sen were attacking Wuhan. Then Hsu Ke-hsiang, another reactionary officer, followed suit in Changsha on May 21, laying siege to the buildings of the Provincial Trade Union Federation, the Provincial Peasant Association and all other revolutionary organizations, arresting and killing Communists and the revolutionary masses Chu Pei-teh in Nanchang, Kiangsi, forced all the political workers in the army out of the province and murdered many leaders of the worker-peasant movement, making Kiangsi independent of the Wuhan government.

The areas under the control of the Wuhan government were greatly reduced as a result of these revolts and betrayals.

All this was bound to have its impact upon the Kuomintang leaders in Wuhan, who were surrounded and influenced by landlord and bourgeois elements. The economic and political crises in Wuhan made them vacillate all the more and eventually betray the revolution.

They claimed that the worker and peasant masses had gone too far and would arouse the opposition of the army, that all industrialists and merchants would join in the opposition, and that the imperialists would step up their intervention. If such a state of affairs was allowed to remain, they said, the besieged Wuhan government would soon collapse. After the April 12 Incident, they thought that since the one million peasants in Kwangtung had been easily defeated by the local warlords, and the 800,000 workers in Shanghai by Chiang Kai-shek, the army alone was to be relied on, not the worker and peasant masses.

The course from vacillation to betrayal first showed itself in relation to the agrarian question. In the spring of 1927 the Kuomintang in Wuhan set up a Central Agrarian Committee. In the discussion on the agrarian question, the reactionary standpoint of the Kuomintang leaders was fully exposed. They opposed the agrarian reform under various pretexts. Some said that the land belonging to officers of the Northern Expeditionary Army should be exempt from confiscation; others would also exempt the land belonging to the small landlords; and still others even suggested that the land of counter-revolutionary elements should be kept intact. There was also the argument that since only 15 per cent of the land in China was under cultivation, it was not necessary to confiscate the landlords' land. All that was required was to give the waste land to the peasants. Later, an agrarian programme was worked out, which actually aimed at limiting the scope of the confiscation of land. The resolution adopted in May only acknowledged in principle the confiscation of the big landlords' land. True, it provided for reduction of rent, setting the top limit at 40 per cent of the total produce, but the provisions were not made public. Later on an order was issued to protect the "good gentry," in other words, the rule power of the feudal landlord class. Finally, even the peasant associations in Huangkang and Huangpi, the two biggest counties in Hupeh, were dissolved.

All this fully proved that the Wuhan Kuomintang leaders were opposed to the peasant movement and the agrarian reform. They were also opposed to working-class struggle. Laws were promulgated imposing forced arbitration with the power of final decision vested in the government, restricting the demands of workers and shop-assistants, forbidding workers to take part in the management of factories and shops, and workers' pickets to fine and arrest law-
breaking capitalists.

All these measures were intended to suppress the worker-peasant movement with a view to subordinating it to the interests of the ruling class.

The Kuomintang leaders did not take any severe measures against the rebel generals. They were only willing to disarm a part of Hsia Tou-yin's troops. They distorted the facts, saying the Changsha Incident was an attack made by the workers' pickets on Hsu Ke-hsiang's troops. As to Chu Pei-teh's betrayal in Kiangsi, they maintained absolute silence, pretending not to know anything about it.

Thus the Wuhan Kuomintang leaders became the political tools of the warlords.

But what did the Chen Tu-hsiu bloc, then the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, do at that time?

At such a critical moment, the Party should have pushed further the mass movement of workers and peasants without any hesitation, particularly the peasant movement centring around Hunan, in order to allow the strength of the masses to repulse the joint attack of the imperialists and the Chinese reactionaries. It should have called for the expulsion of the Kuomintang Rightists from the National Government and the Revolutionary Army, and the admission of new worker and peasant leaders into the Kuomintang and its government. It should have organized speedily a new army of workers and peasants and assumed direct control over the government and the army. That was the only way to lead the revolution to victory.

But the Chen Tu-hsiu capitulationists did not do this, and their mistakes were not really corrected at the Fifth Party Congress.

As to the agrarian programme, the Right opportunists in the Party were entirely at the bidding of the Kuomintang leaders, and made no protest whatsoever against the latter's resolution to oppose the peasant movement. They even echoed the landlords and the bourgeoisie in the Kuomintang in their clamour against the so-called "excesses" of the peasant movement, and proposed to stop the agrarian revolution, demanding that it be criticized in the press and its "deviations" rectified by proclamations from the Ministry of Agriculture. As to the question of peasants' political power, the opportunists agreed to the policy of "rural autonomy" put forward by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Wuhan with the aim of stopping the peasant movement. They even spread the venomous rumour that the mass struggle in Wuhan was started by Chiang Kai-shek agents.

When the Changsha Incident broke out, there were only 1,000 soldiers under the command of Hsu Ke-hsiang in the city while tens of thousands of peasants were encircling it. It would have been quite easy for the peasants to take the city, but the leading body of the Party cancelled the plan of attack. This practically amounted to a betrayal of the revolution. After the Changsha Incident, the capitulationists attempted to settle things by political manoeuvres which only ended in the reactionaries becoming more rampant.

The treacherous stand of the opportunists in the Party was equally manifest in their attitude towards the working-class movement. They accepted all the Kuomintang decrees concerning compulsory arbitration, prohibition of strikes in foreign-owned enterprises, restriction of union activities, prohibition of workers' struggle, and so forth. They rejected the suggestion to arm 1,500 workers at the
time of Hsia Tou-yin's rebellion, and even refused to receive the weapons. What was worse, on seeing the dissatisfaction of the reactionary officers in Wuhan, they immediately disarmed and dissolved the workers' pickets, thus exposing the workers to enemy attack.

In the Wuhan period, there had been joint meetings of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but the capitulationists voluntarily surrendered the leadership. They ordered all Communists working in the headquarters of the Kuomintang and newspaper offices to submit themselves to the Kuomintang's guidance and give up their own views. According to their instructions, the leadership of the democratic revolution should belong to the Kuomintang, and the Communists who were concurrently members of the Kuomintang and worked in the revolutionary government should join the government as members of the Kuomintang, and not in the capacity of a Communist. In order to help Kuomintang leaders deal with the serious political situation created by the attacks launched by the reactionaries, these Communists were advised to ask for long leaves of absence. It was also provided that the mass organizations of workers and peasants should be placed under the leadership and supervision of the Kuomintang and their armed forces must submit to the Kuomintang's command.

All this meant not only the loss of independence of the Communist Party but also the liquidation of the revolutionary mass movement in general, abandoning it to the supervision of the Kuomintang.

The attack by the reactionaries both inside and outside Wuhan frightened not only the Kuomintang leaders but also the capitulationists in the leading body of the Communist Party. Both groups vacillated. But while Chen Tu-hsiu's vacillation resulted in concession, i.e. handing over the leadership to the Kuomintang, Wang Ching-wei's vacillation was followed by an offensive aimed at seizing the leadership from the Communist Party.

After Hsia Tou-yin's betrayal and the Changsha Incident, the counter-revolutionaries in Wuhan openly leaned towards Chiang Kai-shek's side. Influenced by the reactionaries, Feng Yu-hsiang, commander of the Northwestern Army, called on June 10 a conference in Chengchow, attended by Kuomintang leaders and officers of the Northern Expeditionary Army. As a result of the conference, Tang Sheng-chih's troops came back from Honan to Wuhan to suppress the movement of workers and peasants. On June 19, Feng Yu-hsiang and Chiang Kai-shek held a conference in Hsuchow, after which Feng telegraphed to the Kuomintang leaders in Wuhan, pushing them on to the road of open betrayal.

At this critical moment, the capitulationists in the Party, instead of making preparations for an emergency, tried to persuade the Kuomintang leaders in Wuhan to launch an "eastern expedition." They thought that Wang Ching-wei and other Kuomintang leaders were not likely to break with the Communist Party before taking the southeastern provinces and they asked them not to split the ranks before defeating Chiang Kai-shek. But what the Kuomintang leaders wanted was not an "eastern expedition," but the submission of the Communist Party.

On June 29, Ho Chien, a reactionary officer of the Wuhan government, gave his subordinates anti-Communist instructions, ordering them to split with the Communists. The Wang Ching-wei bloc held
on July 15 the “Conference of Splitting with the Communist Party,” bringing forward a formal resolution to that effect, and thus betraying the revolution. The Communist Party issued a declaration condemning the crimes of the Wang Ching-wei bloc, and withdrawing its members from the Wuhan government. From July 15 onwards the Wuhan reactionaries closed down the organizations of workers and peasants and suppressed the revolutionary movement by slaughtering Communists and other revolutionaries in large numbers.

The democratic group of the Kuomintang, represented by Soong Ching Ling, firmly supported Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People and his Three Cardinal Policies and condemned the Kuomintang leaders for violating Dr. Sun’s revolutionary principles and policies and for being disloyal to his teachings, and pointed out that their betrayal would reduce the Kuomintang to the role of a tool of the warlords. They pointed out that the agrarian revolution was the urgent demand of the peasants and that the solution of the agrarian problem by revolutionary means was Dr. Sun’s great ideal. They made a statement solemnly declaring this revolutionary stand.

The First Revolutionary Civil War ended in failure after the massacres of April 12 and July 15.

The failure was due in the first place to the overwhelming predominance of the counter-revolutionary forces of the imperialists, the Northern warlords and the Kuomintang reactionary bloc over the revolutionary forces; and secondly, to the Right opportunist mistakes committed by the Party’s leadership.

The mistakes of the Chen Tu-hsiu opportunists consisted primarily in their renouncing of the leadership of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, its leadership over the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and, above all, the armed forces. The result was that in the face of the enemy attack the Party was unable to organize effective resistance and therefore the revolution was defeated.

But the flames of revolution can never be quenched. Under the leadership of the Communist Party the Chinese people fought on.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR

The war of 1924-27 was the first anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary war waged by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

The co-operation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang in 1924 marked the beginning of the struggle for the establishment of the revolutionary base in Kwangtung. With the support of the revolutionary masses of workers and peasants, the revolutionary base was unified and consolidated and the foundation of the Northern Expeditionary War was thus laid.

The Northern Expeditionary War started in July 1926. Within half a year, the Northern Expeditionary Army crushed the troops of the Chihli warlords and extended its forces to the Yangtse Valley, counterpoising the Fengtien warlords in the North. There was a real possibility that the development of the revolution would lead to the unification and independence of China.
But the foundation of the rapidly expanding revolution was far from solid as warlordism in the Revolutionary Army had not been abolished and the landlords' rule in the areas occupied by the revolutionary forces had not been shattered.

Taking advantage of such a weakness, the Kuomintang reactionaries, instigated and supported by the imperialists, made a sudden attack on the revolution. Meanwhile, the leading body of the Communist Party, dominated by the capitulationists headed by Chen Tu-hsiu, who suppressed the correct views represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, failed to organize effective resistance against the attack. The revolution thus ended in failure.

A struggle between the two opposing lines showed itself through the entire course of the revolution. On the one hand, the bourgeoisie tried to seize the leadership. In collusion with the imperialists, it launched an offensive against the revolution in an attempt to bring it to an end by setting up capitalist domination. On the other, the proletariat tried to consolidate its leadership and overcome the resistance of the bourgeoisie by fully mobilizing the tens of millions of the labouring masses, in order first to achieve complete victory in the democratic revolution and then to make a gradual transition to the socialist revolution. The reflection of this struggle within the Party assumed the form of a struggle between the Right opportunist line represented by Chen Tu-hsiu and the Marxist-Leninist line represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Owing to the inadequate preparedness in theory during the early years of the Party, many members made no serious efforts to grasp the essence of Marxism-Leninism although in the struggle they had displayed unlimited loyalty to the revolution and great organizational ability. This weakness enabled the opportunism of the Chen Tu-hsiu clique to exercise temporary control in the leading organs of the Party.

The First Revolutionary Civil War bore out the following fundamental principles of the Chinese democratic revolution:

1. The democratic revolution in modern China must be undertaken by a united front led by the working class. The victory of the revolution could not be achieved without this united front, and the united front would fail if it were not led by the working class.

2. The key question in working-class leadership in China's democratic revolution was the peasant question. Only when the peasants were won over as a revolutionary ally would the victory of the revolution be achieved.

3. The main form of the revolution in China could only be that of armed revolution in opposition to armed counter-revolution; nothing could be achieved without a revolutionary army.

All this was the key to success, both in the First Revolutionary Civil War and the democratic revolution as a whole.

As a democratic revolution, the First Revolutionary Civil War exerted a far-reaching influence upon the broad masses of workers and peasants. The Communist Party had controlled and influenced a part of the armed forces, exposed the reactionary nature of the Kuomintang, the imperialists, the landlord and comprador classes, and the dual character of the national bourgeoisie, thus establishing its prestige among the people and laying the foundation of the Second Revolutionary Civil War.

The international significance of the First Revolutionary Civil War was that it dealt a heavy blow to world capitalism by upsetting
its temporary stability and promoted the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples in the East, thereby supporting the Soviet Union in her socialist construction.

Lenin once said, "Without the 'dress rehearsal' of 1905, the victory of the October Revolution in 1917 would have been impossible." The First Revolutionary Civil War was a brilliant rehearsal of the Chinese revolution.

1 "For What Are We Struggling Now?" The Guide, No. 172, Chinese edition.


3 Ibid., p. 32.

4 Ibid., p. 27.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 33.

CHAPTER FIVE

LOW EBB OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY BASES

(August 1927—September 1931)

1. THE POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER THE DEFEAT OF THE REVOLUTION IN 1927. THE REVOLUTION AT A LOW EBB

The stability of the capitalist world between 1924 and 1927 was marked by an essential weakness—the stability could not be consolidated and, in fact, contained the embryo of a new crisis.

The most striking feature about the increase of capitalist production during this period was its unevenness. More countries in the world were searching for markets for their increased production, but the size of the markets and the spheres of influence remained more or less unchanged. As a result, the problem of markets, especially foreign markets, became acute. Herein lay the fundamental cause of the intensification of the irreconcilable contradictions among capitalist countries in this period.

The imperialist powers tried to stabilize the situation in the capitalist world by signing treaties (the Versailles and Washington treaties) for restoring order in Europe and the Far East, and for a short time they succeeded. But owing to the acute market problem, the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy and Germany soon became dissatisfied with the way the colonial markets were divided at the conclusion of World War I, and considered the division obsolete.

So a redivision of the world and of spheres of influence with respect to foreign markets became the basic contradiction among the imperialists. The market in the East with China as its centre was the chief bone of contention among the imperialists. A new crisis thus emerged from the temporarily stable situation, making war inevitable among the imperialist countries.

This accounted for the intensification of the conflicts among the imperialists in China after the failure of the revolution in 1927. It was reflected in a series of wars among the new Kuomintang warlords. Between August 1927 and 1930, six major civil wars were unleashed. They were the war between Chiang Kai-shek and Li Tsung-jen on the one hand and Wang Ching-wei and Tang Sheng-chih of Wuhan on the other in October 1927; the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangtung warlords for the control of Kwangtung in December of the same year; the war waged by Chiang Kai-shek, Li Tsung-jen, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan against Chang Tsulin, the warlord of the Fengtien faction, in April and May 1928; the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords for the control of Central China in March and April 1929; the two wars between Chiang and the united forces of Feng and Yen in August 1929 and in April 1930. Besides, there were also wars between the warlords in Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan. Wars raged in the greater part
of the country in the first three years of the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords as never before in modern Chinese history. These wars reflected the contradictions among the imperialist countries. Chiang Kai-shek finally came out as the winner in these wars because of his superior forces and the support of the U.S. imperialists.

The imperialist-backed rule of the new Kuomintang warlords represented by Chiang Kai-shek completely capitulated to the imperialists and sold out China's national interests. Moreover, they relied completely on feudal forces to oppress the broad masses in China. Having betrayed the revolution, Chiang Kai-shek did not and could not solve any of China's problems. On the contrary, he became the common agent of the imperialists, feudalists and comprador-bourgeoisie.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has made a penetrating analysis of the reactionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek:

The present regime of the new Kuomintang warlords is still a regime of the comprador class in the cities and the landed gentry in the countryside, a regime which has in foreign affairs capitulated to imperialism and at home replaced old warlords with new ones, and has subjected the working class and peasantry to an economic exploitation and a political oppression even more ruthless than before. The bourgeois-democratic revolution which started from Kwangtung was only half-way through when the comprador class and the landed gentry usurped its leadership and immediately switched it on to the road of counter-revolution; throughout the country the workers, the peasantry, other sections of the common people, and even the bourgeoisie (meaning the national bourgeoisie—Ed.) have remained under the counter-revolutionary rule and obtained not the least particle of political or economic liberation.

That is to say, so far as the class background was concerned, the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords was just the same as that of the old warlords, except that it was more brutal. It was a political body consisted of compradors, gangsters, warlords and party bosses, with the banking compradors in Kiangsu and Chekiang as the core, imposing on the people throughout the country a terrorist rule of military force and secret police. The rule of the new warlords turned the Kuomintang from a united-front organization into a fascist organization of the big bourgeoisie. They used the revolutionary banner to cover up their counter-revolutionary activities, and hoodwink the people. Therefore, terrorism together with political deceit characterized the rule of Chiang Kai-shek.

After the failure of the revolution in 1927, the class alignment in China underwent a new change. The big bourgeoisie had betrayed the cause of the revolution, the national bourgeoisie had capitulated and part of the petty bourgeoisie had deserted. Only the working class, the peasantry and the poverty-stricken section of the petty bourgeoisie persisted in the revolutionary struggle. The imperialists, landlords, bureaucrat compradors and the Right wing of the Kuomintang formed a counter-revolutionary alliance whose strength far surpassed that of the revolution. So the revolution reached a low ebb.

The Kuomintang reactionary regime did not give any political rights or economic profit to the national bourgeoisie and the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie which had crossed over to the side of the big bourgeoisie. The fact that one or two representatives of the national bourgeoisie did participate in the reactionary Kuomintang
government was no more than an attempt to whitewash its real nature of fascist dictatorship. The Kuomintang reactionaries ruthlessly slaughtered the workers and peasants who persisted in the revolutionary fight. One hundred thousand workers and peasants were killed between January and August in 1928 while those who survived were more ruthlessly oppressed and exploited than ever before.

The Kuomintang reactionaries first attacked the workers in the cities.

The rule of the Kuomintang reactionaries was far more brutal than the rule of old warlords. The workers were completely deprived of the economic advances and democratic rights they had already gained.

One of the chief victories resulting from the union struggles of the workers in Shanghai, Canton and Wuhan had been an increase of wages. After the counter-revolutionary coup d'état, however, the wages of the workers in these cities were drastically slashed.

The working day was again fixed at 11 hours and more. The previously granted half-an-hour's rest after lunch was cancelled. Generally speaking, the workers either had no Sundays off unless they chose to lose a day's pay.

Working conditions seriously worsened and the intensity of labour increased. For instance, each worker had to run three or four machines as compared with one or two machines in the past. Child labourers were as heavily exploited as before and women workers no longer enjoyed the one-month rest during confinement. Moreover, workers in factories were required to secure a guarantor or guarantors, and they were watched over by specially hired detectives, police and even troops.

In short, all the economic advances which the unions had won for the workers were thrown overboard after the failure of the revolution.

The Kuomintang reactionaries attacked the Red (Communist-led) trade unions more brutally than ever, subjecting them to White terror, closing them down and driving them underground. All activities of the workers and their leaders were suppressed. About 80 per cent of the workers who had experience in revolutionary struggle were either murdered or sacked.

The Kuomintang reactionaries, however, could only maintain a temporary stability in their rule. Any real stability, political or economic, was entirely beyond their power. In spite of their worsening political and economic conditions, the workers persisted in their struggle.

One hundred and forty strikes broke out in Shanghai in 1928, involving 233,802 workers, who carried on the struggle under extremely difficult conditions.

But because the workers' strikes were carried on under the reign of counter-revolutionary terror at a time when the Red trade unions were forced underground, they inevitably bore the following hallmarks characteristic of a revolution at a low ebb:

First, the workers' struggle was mostly economic in character. For instance, 92 per cent of the disputes between capital and labour in the latter half of 1928 were caused by economic factors, and centred around the demand for higher wages. The workers felt the urgent need to struggle because they were suffering extremely cruel exploitation.

Secondly, the struggle was largely spontaneous. No less than 49 per cent of the strikes were launched by the workers themselves, while 12 per cent were led by the Yellow trade unions and 37 per
cent by the Red trade unions.

Thirdly, a large proportion of the strikers were shopkeepers, handi-
craftsmen and stevedores. They accounted for 94 trades (about 48
per cent) out of a total of 196 that took part in the struggle. The
factory workers had not yet recovered from the blow sustained under
the counter-revolutionary terror.

Fourthly, only 22 per cent of the strikes ended in complete victory,
19 per cent in partial victory, while 59 per cent, by far the greater
part, ended in defeat or without accomplishing anything.

Under the counter-revolutionary terror, the working-class move­
ment in the cities had passed from a high tide to a low ebb, from
the offensive to the defensive.

The new Kuomintang warlord rule of Chiang Kai-shek gave an op­
portunity to the landlords in the countryside to counter-attack and get
even with the peasants. As a result, most of the revolutionary local
governments established by the peasants in the Northern Expedition
were destroyed, and the decrees for reduction of rent and interest
abrogated. With the landlords frantically increasing rent and interest
and the reactionary government levying exorbitant land-tax and other
duties, the peasants were deprived of the necessary conditions for
their livelihood and production.

The peasant movement in Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi
assumed the form of an armed occupation. The peasants organized
their own armies and set up their own governments in Haifeng and
Lufeng in eastern Kwangtung, on Hainan Island, on the Hunan­
Kiangsi and Hunan-Kwangtung borders and in Huangan and Macheng
in Hupeh. Peasant struggles against the payment of rents and taxes
broke out in Kiangsu and Chekiang, the centre of Chiang Kai-shek's
rule. The struggle of such primitive peasant organizations as the
Red Spear Society of Honan was increasingly intensified. In certain
districts of Hopei and Shantung, there were peasant riots.

Amidst extremely difficult circumstances, the peasant masses still
persisted in their struggles. But under the White terror, the peasant
movement also had the characteristics of a movement at a low ebb,
as was correctly pointed out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from his ex­
perience of carrying out guerrilla warfare on the Hunan-Kiangsi
border after the failure of the revolution:

Having fought in various places in the past year, we are keenly
aware that the revolutionary upsurge in the country as a whole
is subsiding... Wherever the Red Army goes, it finds the masses
cold and reserved; only after propaganda and agitation do they
slowly rouse themselves. We have to fight the enemy forces
hard whoever they are, and scarcely any mutiny or uprising has
taken place within the enemy forces.\(^2\)

This penetrating analysis of the domestic situation was of vital im­
portance. The coldness and reserve on the part of the masses meant
that the smashed mass movement had not yet recovered. The hard
fighting in guerrilla warfare showed that the rule of the reactionary
classes had not yet reached the stage of complete collapse.

What was true of the Hunan-Kiangsi border was also true of other
places.

Most of the peasant uprisings of this period occurred in Kwang­
tung, Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi, where a revolutionary foundation
had been laid under the influence of the great revolutionary storm
during the Northern Expedition, and where the rule of the imperia­
lists and feudal warlords in the countryside was relatively weak. But
only with the Party's correct leadership could the peasants' armed forces and regime be consolidated and developed. Since the strength of the Party's leadership and that of the revolutionary forces varied with different districts, the development of the peasant movement was uneven.

Generally speaking, the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords after 1927 was still the rule of the comprador class in the cities and the landed gentry in the countryside. Accordingly, China still remained then in the period of bourgeois-democratic revolution. But after the failure of the revolution, the forces of workers and peasants were repressed and scattered by ruthless White terror. The revolutionary wave was then in the interval between two crests, the one already past and the other yet to come.

However, the rule of the new warlords was unstable. These warlords were completely isolated from the people and their contradictions with them were daily becoming sharper for their rule was steadily established through an unprecedented bloody suppression of the workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals. All their organizations (government, armed forces, parties, and so on) were weak because they were founded on a backward social and economic basis. Their strength was further sapped by internal strife and wars. All this indicated that in spite of the great weakening of the revolutionary forces the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords was far from stable. This made a second rise of the revolutionary tide inevitable.

The formation of revolutionary strategy and tactics had to proceed from the political situation following the failure of the revolution. From this was formulated the correct revolutionary line of the Communist Party during the Second Revolutionary Civil War—a line represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung—which gradually turned the tide of the Chinese revolution.

2. TRANSITION OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION FROM ADVANCE TO RETREAT. RECTIFICATION OF THE FIRST "LEFT" LINE WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

At the critical juncture when first Chiang Kai-shek and then Wang Ching-wei had betrayed the revolution, the Party set out to salvage the revolution from defeat by organizing an armed uprising in Nanchang, Kiangsi, on August 1, 1927 with more than 30,000 troops under the command of Comrades Chou En-lai and Chu Teh. A leading organ called the Revolutionary Committee was formed. The uprising was started at dawn, and after only three hours' fighting the Kuomintang reactionary troops were put out of action and the city was liberated.

On August 5 the revolutionary forces evacuated Nanchang and started on a march towards Kwangtung.

Owing to the leadership's failure to realize the necessity of integrating the armed revolt with the peasant movement, the question of the next move after the uprising was not dealt with correctly. With the peasant movement in Kiangsi, Hunan and Hupeh still in full swing, the revolutionary forces should have gone to the rural areas, to get the peasants armed for carrying out the agrarian revolution according to a thoroughgoing land reform programme and establishing revolutionary bases for waging a persistent and prolonged guerrilla war. But, instead, they made an expedition southward in an attempt to recapture Canton and other parts of Kwangtung. They also
made an unwise decision as to what route to take. Instead of marching through western Kiangsi, where the peasant movement had a strong footing, they went by way of the desolate region in eastern Kiangsi, where the peasant movement had not yet risen. After the victories in Juichin and Huichang, they did not go down south to take Meihsien County but turned back to take Chaochow and Swatow by way of Shanghang and Tingchow, thus allowing enemy troops to make adequate preparations for counter-attack. Because of insufficient political work, propaganda was not disseminated thoroughly among the troops and the masses, and Party branches were only established in regiments and not in companies. The result was that the majority of the troops met with defeat in the face of an overwhelming reactionary force. Only a small section was preserved.

Despite its defeat, the Nanchang Uprising had great historical significance.

It marked the beginning of the struggle of the revolutionary armed forces under the sole leadership of the Communist Party against the counter-revolution. It was a brave struggle that aimed to save the revolution at the critical juncture by opposing the counter-revolutionary massacre with an armed uprising. It provided a splendid example of persistent revolutionary struggle for the Chinese people.

The Nanchang Uprising marked the birth of the Chinese people's army, an army under the sole leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and whole-heartedly dedicated to the cause of the people's revolution. A new historical period thus began for the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people.

In order to take measures for saving the revolution, the Chinese Communist Party held an emergency conference of the Central Committee on August 7 at Kiukiang, Kiangsi Province.

The conference criticized the erroneous capitulationist line of the Right opportunist Chen Tu-hsiu on the questions of revolutionary leadership, revolutionary armed forces and agrarian revolution, and removed Chen Tu-hsiu from the leading post. It maintained that, as the agrarian revolution was the key to the Chinese democratic revolution, the Party must lead the peasants in solving the agrarian problem by revolutionary means. It laid down a general line of putting up armed resistance to the Kuomintang reactionaries' policy of massacre and called upon the whole Party and the masses to persist in the revolutionary struggle. It established a Revolutionary Committee which was to serve first as the leading body in the uprising and then as the provisional revolutionary government after the uprising had achieved victory. It decided to found a workers' and peasants' revolutionary army and to carry out extensive political work and establish a system of Party representatives in the army. These were the achievements of the August 7 Conference and constituted its main feature.

The conference called on the peasants to launch uprisings at the time of the autumn harvest to save the revolution.

It was decided to start the uprising in Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Kwangtung, where the revolution had the strongest footing. Since it was in autumn that the peasants took in their harvest and the landlords came to collect rent, the uprising led by the Party was timed so that the landlords, bullies, and bad gentry would not get one grain of rice, and their land would be confiscated into the bargain.
Thereupon a series of rising broke out in Hsiangtan and Ninghsiang (central Hunan); in Pingkiang, Liling and Liuyang (eastern Hunan); in Huangan and Macheng (eastern Hupeh); in Puchi and Hsielenning (southern Hupeh); and in Haifeng and Lufeng (eastern Kwangtung). Comrade Mao Tse-tung was sent to Hunan to lead the Autumn-Harvest Uprising. There he organized the miners from the Anyuan Colliery, the Kuomintang Guards Regiment which had been under the Party's influence and crossed over from Wuchang and the Peasants' Self-Defence Corps from Pinghsiang, Liling and Liuyang into the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. The uprising took place on September 8, but suffered losses from the defection of Hsia Tou-yin's remnant troops. Then Comrade Mao Tse-tung took his men to Sanwan, Yungkin County, Kiangsi Province, where they were reorganized into the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army by appointing new commanders, introducing the system of Party representatives in the army and setting up the Front Committee of the Party as the supreme leading body in the army. After the reorganization, the army marched according to plan towards the Chingkang Mountains on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. There the first revolutionary base was set up in October.

To resist the Kuomintang reactionaries' policy of massacre, the workers and soldiers in Canton staged the well-known Canton Uprising on December 11, 1927 under the leadership of the Party. The uprising was started by the Soldiers' Training Corps under the command of Yeh Chien-ying in unison with the Workers' Red Guards. The former at first constituted the main force, but the latter was soon strengthened by nearly 60,000 volunteers. A democratic government of workers and peasants known as the Canton Commune was established and a revolutionary programme proclaimed. Since this was an uprising in a big city, the soldiers and workers were up against overwhelming odds. The Kuomintang troops stationed in the city outnumbered the revolutionary forces by five or sixfold. In addition, other armed forces of the Kuomintang, police and militia made a concerted attack on Canton from all sides, under cover of U.S., British, and Japanese imperialist gunboats. Failure to co-ordinate with the peasant uprisings at Haifeng and Lufeng contributed to the rapid defeat of the uprising. A period of White terror followed. About 8,000 revolutionaries were killed by the Kuomintang warlords. All this went to prove that it was impossible to occupy big cities like Canton for long when the revolution was at a low ebb and the revolutionary forces were greatly outnumbered.

The Autumn-Harvest Uprising increased the influence of the Party among the peasant masses, and deeply impressed them with the idea of agrarian revolution. A part of the troops, workers' pickets and peasants' self-defence corps which had joined the uprising formed, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and others, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, forerunner of the People's Liberation Army.

After the failure of the revolution in 1927, the Right opportunists in the Party, represented by Chen Tu-hsiu, became liquidators. Thinking that the Kuomintang reactionary rule of Chiang Kai-shek had been stabilized and the revolution had failed completely, they advocated a policy of retreat by withdrawing immediately all forces from the battlefield and putting a stop to all revolutionary struggles, and suggested carrying on "legal movements." Chen Tu-hsiu arbitrarily
asserted that seizure of political power through armed uprisings was an unwarranted illusion. He went on to propose that the peasants should merely refrain from paying rents, taxes, levies and debts, and should not engage in armed uprisings, the agrarian revolution and the founding of a Red regime. In essence, he and his followers were opposing the proletarian leadership of the democratic revolution, and helping to consolidate the rule of the imperialists, feudalists and compradors over the Chinese people. Such an attitude stemmed directly from an anti-Party stand.

At the same time there was a rapid rise of "Left" sentiment in the Party, a reflection of the impetuous attitude of the petty bourgeoisie, which was aggravated by hatred for the Kuomintang reactionaries' policy of massacre and indignation at Chen Tu-hsiu's capitulationism. The sentiment was first shown at the August 7 Conference of the Party and developed into "Left" putschism at the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee in November 1927. That was the first time the "Left" line dominated the central leading body of the Party.

Chu Chiu-pai and other leaders of the Party at that time wrongly confused the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution. They denied that the revolution should proceed by stages and that the democratic revolution had its own period and tasks. They thought that what ought to be accomplished in another stage could be done in the democratic revolution.

They erroneously appraised the Chinese revolution as being on a "continuous upsurge" and maintained that even after the failure in 1927 the tide of the revolution was rising rather than ebbing. They thought that the time was ripe for the peasant masses to seize political power in a number of provinces and even in some industrial and commercial centre. So they worked out plans or uprisings in Hunan and Hupeh; in Kiangsu and Chekiang, which were the centre of the Kuomintang rule; and even in the northern provinces, with Hopei as the starting point; and in the Northeast. Ignoring the difference between the struggles in the cities and those in the countryside, they erroneously held that the time had come for uprisings in the cities. Consequently, they ordered the workers of Shanghai to rise in co-ordination with the peasant uprisings in the neighbouring counties, and the workers of Nanking to hasten preparations for action after the peasant uprisings in Yihsing and Wusih. Neglecting the decisive importance of the peasant revolutionary bases, they pinned their hopes chiefly on uprisings in the major cities.

They denied that the First Revolutionary Civil War had ended in failure and that the revolution was then at a low ebb. Hence they opposed any retreat and demanded continued attack. They insisted on developing the economic struggles of urban workers and the peasants' struggle against levies and taxes into political struggles and armed uprisings which, they claimed, needed no preparations, and no retreat was permitted once an uprising had started. Disregarding the strength of the enemy and the exhaustion of the masses after the failure of the revolution, they ordered mere handfuls of Party members and revolutionaries to undertake military ventures which had not the slightest hope of success. Wherever there were Party organizations and Party members, orders were given to prepare actively for armed uprisings.

This erroneous "Left" line had from the very beginning met with just criticism from Comrade Mao Tse-tung and many comrades working in the Kuomintang-controlled areas. However, it had caused a
great deal of damage before it was abandoned in many places at
the beginning of 1928. In April, it was practically given up through-
out the country.

3. FOUNDING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY BASE IN THE
CHINGKANG MOUNTAINS

Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the participants
in the Autumn-Harvest Uprising undertook in October 1927 the
historic march to the Chingkang Mountains on the Hunan-Kiangsi
border, where the first revolutionary base was set up.

In April 1928, Comrade Chu Teh led the forces which had partici-
pated in the Nanchang Uprising to the Chingkang Mountains from
southern Hunan and joined with the troops under Comrade Mao Tse-
tung to form an army of a new type in China—the Fourth Army of
the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

From April to July 1928 when the reactionary rule in the south
enjoyed a spell of stability, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his troops in
Kiangsi and Hunan to converge on the border for three encircling
attacks. Each time at least 8 or 9 regiments, sometimes as many
as 18, of the reactionary forces were deployed. Yet with a force
of less than 4 regiments, the Red Army fought the enemy, smashed
its "joint expeditions" and consolidated the Chingkang Mountains
base.

Adherence to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Marxist-Leninist policy led
to the creation and development of the Chingkang Mountains revolu-
tionary base.

Two basic principles underlined this policy:

First, in military operations, the principle was concentration of
forces in coping with the enemy. Only by concentrating its forces
could the Red Army annihilate a comparatively superior enemy force,
occur cities and towns and consequently mobilize the masses on a
large scale to establish a revolutionary regime in an unbroken area
of several counties. The existence and the development of the Hunan-
Kiangsi border area were the results of such concentration of forces,
while dispersion of forces or isolated operations had, in fact, almost
always led to defeat. It is true that there had been instances of
successful dispersion between varying distances in this period, but
they had occurred only under the most favourable circumstances with
the aim of winning over the masses on a greater scale and expand-
ing and consolidating the base. Here the question of how things
stood with the reactionary government must be taken into considera-
tion: whether it was threatened by political splits or enjoying tempo-
rary stability. In the former case, it was possible to adopt a strategy
of relatively risky advance, and expand the base regime over a fairly
large area by armed force, always, of course, with the positions well
consolidated. But in the latter case, it was essential to adopt a
strategy of gradual advance, and enlarge the base in a series of
wave-like forward movements.

Secondly, in local work, efforts must be concentrated in laying a
solid foundation for a central area, that is, to establish a workers' and
peasants' democratic government, carry through the agrarian revolu-
tion, strengthen the people's armed forces and expand the Communist
Party. These were the underlying principles for establishing a Red
regime.
On the strength of the principles mentioned above, Comrade Mao Tse-tung worked out a series of measures for establishing bases.

(1) During the Chingkang Mountains period, a democratic regime in the form of representative conferences and governments of workers, peasants and soldiers were set up at all levels. This was the first truly democratic system that had ever been adopted in China. The workers' and peasants' government was elected at a mass meeting. In some places, congresses were held to elect executive committees, in which local governmental power was vested.

(2) Under the banner of the agrarian revolution, all the land was at first taken over and completely redistributed. This policy was later replaced by one of confiscating only the landlords' land and distributing it among the peasants on a township basis. Comrade Mao Tse-tung paid great attention to winning over the intermediate class, which, he pointed out, should in no case be subjected to excessive attack in the agrarian struggle. For a hostile intermediate class, taking advantage of their social position, would obstruct land distribution, withhold information about the actual acreage of their land and even turn traitor when faced with White terror.

(3) A revolutionary armed force of workers and peasants was built up. Since the Red Army was composed of workers, peasants, lumpen-proletarians and, above all, captives from enemy forces, political education was necessary among the troops. The system of Party representatives was introduced and Party branches formed on a company basis to guarantee the Party's leadership in the army. A democratic system was introduced in the army which forbade the beating and abusing of soldiers, and officers and men were placed on an equal footing. The Red Army helped the local forces to arm themselves for suppressing counter-revolutionaries, protecting the township government, and assisting the Red Army in encounters with the enemy. A correct policy was adopted towards captured soldiers, including release of the captives and medical treatment for the wounded.

(4) Party organizations were established and expanded. Comrade Mao Tse-tung paid great attention to the Party's ideological work, pointing out the great importance of strengthening the proletarian ideological leadership and of remoulding petty-bourgeois outlook, as ideological work was the key to the building of the Communist Party.

The above constituted the only correct policy through which bases could be established and expanded and used to bring about a nationwide revolutionary upsurge. Comrade Mao Tse-tung called it a policy of the "Chu Teh-Mao Tse-tung type or Fang Chih-min type."

One of the laws governing the development of the Chinese revolution discovered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung was to start the revolution first in the countryside by means of armed struggle, establishing bases and increasing their number and size, and then to encircle and subsequently seize the cities occupied by the counter-revolutionary forces by means of armed, revolutionary rural districts. This is the law of the development of the revolution at a time when the Party's forces in the cities have been crushed by a strong enemy and for the time being have no chance of revival there. The Chingkang Mountains base was the first of such revolutionary bases.

The choice of the Chingkang Mountains as the first base was determined by the following considerations:

1. The Chingkang Mountains formed the middle section of the Lohsiao Mountain range, which borders on Hupeh in the north,
Kwangtung in the south, Kiangsi in the east and Hunan in the west. Therefore the revolutionary development would influence the masses of workers and peasants in the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi.

2. There were in this area a relatively sound Party organization which had a strong influence among the masses and local armed forces who were experienced in struggles.

3. The rich land and resources in the neighbourhood made it easier for the Red Army to raise funds and obtain provisions.

4. Covering an area of 40 kilometres in width and 250 kilometres in circumference, protected by steep cliffs and thick forests and linked with the outside world by only five narrow paths, the Chingkang Mountains were almost impregnable.

The establishment of the revolutionary base at the Chingkang Mountains had tremendous historical significance, for it combined revolutionary attack with revolutionary retreat. The countryside was chosen as the central position in a period of retreat because here it was easier to accumulate revolutionary strength. It was the best planned, the most orderly and the least costly retreat for the Party as a whole, because besides preserving the revolutionary forces taking part in the retreat, it provided cover for the retreat of the revolution throughout the whole country. It was also an attack. In a situation in which the revolution had suffered a temporary defeat, the revolutionary attack was correctly shifted to the countryside where the strength of the counter-revolution was relatively weak, class contradictions were more numerous, and the revolution was relatively well-entrenched. It was the most powerful attack on the enemy’s most vulnerable spot. The march to the Chingkang Mountains opened up the only correct way for the advance of the revolution, the only way in which “a single spark” could start “a prairie fire” after the defeat of the revolution in 1927.

4. SIXTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG’S THEORY OF HOW CHINA’S RED REGIME COULD EXIST AND DEVELOP

In July 1928, the Chinese Communist Party convoked its Sixth National Congress, whose main task was to sum up the experiences in the First Revolutionary Civil War and analyse the nature and situation of the revolution at that time so as to lay down the Party’s policies, tasks and tactics for struggle.

The congress affirmed that the Chinese revolution remained a bourgeois-democratic revolution, whose general task was to establish an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants. For, first, China had not yet been liberated from imperialist oppression, and her true unity had not been achieved. Secondly, the feudal land system had not been abolished and the feudal forces had not been wiped out. Thirdly, the state power was still in the hands of the imperialist-supported landed gentry and comprador-bourgeoisie. The congress laid down a ten-point programme for the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants.

The congress pointed out that the revolutionary situation after 1927 was at a low ebb; it was a period between two big waves of revolutionary activity. The workers and peasants had suffered severe
blows and their revolutionary organizations had been disrupted. Within the revolutionary bases, the guerrilla warfare of the peasants was limited to sporadic flare-ups here and there. The congress also emphatically pointed out that a new upsurge was bound to come as none of the contradictions which gave rise to the Chinese revolution had been resolved, and that its advent would only be hastened with the intensification of these contradictions and the changes in the international situation.

On this basis, the congress decided that the Party's tactics at that time were not to launch attacks and uprisings in the cities, but to win over the masses in preparation for the new revolutionary rise that would take place.

The congress carried out a struggle on two fronts. It thoroughly rectified Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism, affirming that Chen Tu-hsiu had voluntarily surrendered revolutionary leadership. But Chen not only refused to accept the correct line of the Party and abandon his wrong line, but distorted the Party's policy of the revolutionary united front, holding the Communist Party of China and the Communist International responsible for the failure of the revolution. In league with the Trotskyists, he formed an anti-Party faction. Therefore, the Party expelled Chen Tu-hsiu in November 1929.

The congress also criticized the mistake of "Left" putschism, considering that the reckless armed revolts launched by the "Leftists" with authoritarian methods in big cities where the enemy forces occupied the predominant position were a form of military adventurism. As authoritarianism was incompatible with winning over the masses, an important task of the Party at that time, "Left" putschism therefore constituted the gravest danger to the Party.

Putschism, military adventurism and authoritarianism, all of which led to isolation from the masses, were the reflections of "Left" petty-bourgeois sentiments in the Party.

All this was the correct and main aspect of the Sixth Congress. But the congress also had its shortcomings and mistakes.

First, it failed to reach an adequate understanding of the importance of rural bases, the protractedness of the democratic revolution, the tactical retreat necessary for the Party and especially the key question of shifting the centre of the Party's activity from the cities to the countryside. As a result, the central body of the Party remained in the city and Party activities were still largely centred in the cities.

Secondly, it failed to work out a correct estimate regarding the dual character of the intermediate classes and the internal contradictions among the reactionary forces, for it considered the national bourgeoisie "one of the most dangerous enemies that hinder the victory of the revolution." Ignoring the position and the dual character of the national bourgeoisie under the Chiang Kai-shek regime, it failed to foresee the possibility of a change in the political attitude of this class. The congress also made the sweeping assertion that "all factions of the Kuomintang are reactionary," failing to make any distinction between them or take advantage of the contradictions among them so as to isolate the most reactionary enemies and crush them separately.

Thirdly, the criticism made by the congress of the first "Left" line did not go beyond pointing out the error of putschism and certain other obvious mistakes. It failed to criticize the wrong line
from the ideological point of view, that is, to use the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method to explore deeply the ideological root-cause of such a line.

Because of these shortcomings and the fact that the leadership remained in the hands of the “Leftists” after the congress, the “Left” mistakes were not thoroughly rectified but were later developed by “Left” opportunists into a full-fledged wrong line.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung did not attend the Sixth Congress of the Party. He was, however, elected a member of the Central Committee.

After the congress Comrade Mao Tse-tung, both in practice and theory, solved correctly the important problems of the Chinese revolution which the congress had left unsolved or had dealt with incorrectly.

After the revolutionary forces were defeated by a strong enemy in the cities, the only correct way was for these forces to transfer to the countryside where they could set up revolutionary bases, and muster and develop their strength in order to surround, and eventually capture, the cities. After the Autumn-Harvest Uprising, Comrade Mao Tse-tung led his forces into the region of the Chingkang Mountains, where they set up a revolutionary base, thereby solving one of the important problems of the revolution in actual practice. But could the revolutionary base or China’s Red regime exist and develop? This posed an important question to the whole Party, but as yet no satisfactory answer had been given.

There were two wrong views about the current situation among some comrades in the Party. One was to overestimate the forces of the revolution and underestimate the forces of counter-revolution, thus setting the revolution on the path of putschism. The other was to underestimate the forces of the revolution and overestimate the forces of counter-revolution, thus falling into pessimism. There were those who, regarding a rise in the revolution as something very remote resorted solely to guerrilla warfare and overlooked the work of setting up bases. There were also others who raised doubts about “how long the Red flag could be kept flying” every time they met with a defeat or were surrounded by the enemy.

As a result, to give a theoretical explanation of this problem by subjecting it to a scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis became an urgent political task of the time. Comrade Mao Tse-tung fulfilled this great task brilliantly.

The founding and development of the Red regime and the Red Army were the highest form of the peasant revolution in semicolonial China under the leadership of the working class. The revolution could not win victory quickly in major cities, which had long been occupied by the imperialists and feudal warlords. To avoid fighting the decisive battle prematurely with the enemy, the working class must dispatch its vanguard to the countryside to form a stable revolutionary alliance with the peasants, and set up political, military, economic and cultural bases in accordance with revolutionary strategy so as to resist enemy attacks and develop revolutionary forces.

The founding and development of revolutionary bases and the Red Army were the most important factors for hastening the advent of the nation-wide revolutionary upsurge. The development of the revolution in the countryside could turn the backward rural areas into revolutionary ones. From their basic position in the rural areas,
the Red Army could lay siege to the enemy in big and medium cities from all directions, and harass the counter-revolutionaries by repeated attacks, thus putting immense difficulties in the way of the enemy. The fact that the Red regime existed and developed proved that the Communist Party and the people's revolutionary forces were invincible. It gave great hopes to the people of China, inspiring them with the will to fight and accelerating the advent of the revolutionary rise.

Was it possible to act according to this line of reviving the Chinese revolution by setting up bases in the countryside, thus leading the revolution to nation-wide victory? To this question Comrade Mao Tse-tung gave an affirmative answer by scientifically explaining the reasons for the emergence and existence of revolutionary bases (Red regime) in the countryside.

First, in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China, weak capitalist economy and backward feudal economy coexisted and a small number of modern industrial cities stood alongside the vast countryside, medieval and backward. The development of China's economy showed ample evidence of its backwardness and unevenness, made all the more serious by the imperialist policy of division. This determined the great unevenness in the development of the Chinese democratic revolution. As China's economy was backward and not unified, so the Chinese countryside, to a certain extent independent of the cities, could be self-supporting and could harbour the revolution for a long time. As China's economic development was uneven, so the imperialist economic forces had no direct control over many remote areas, but only indirect control or none at all. As a result, it was possible for the Chinese revolution to win victory first in those areas where enemy forces were relatively weak.

Secondly, Red regime was not to be set up in any rural area indiscriminately. It should be set up first in areas which had felt the influence of the revolution such as Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangtung and Kiangsi, where the worker and peasant masses had been steeld in revolutionary wars and in bitter struggles against the landlord class, and where trade unions and peasant associations had been formed. In other words, the Red regime would have a better mass basis in these areas for its establishment and development. Among these provinces, Comrade Mao Tse-tung analysed the conditions of Kiangsi in particular. (1) The economy of Kiangsi was chiefly feudalistic and the armed forces of the landlords were weaker than in any other southern province. (2) Kiangsi had always been garri-soned by troops from other provinces who were not familiar with local conditions and consequently not keenly concerned with its problems. (3) Kiangsi was comparatively far-removed from imperialist influences and so uprisings in the countryside had been more wide-spread here than elsewhere.

Thirdly, whether the Red regime could last long depended on the further development of the revolutionary situation. After the Kuomintang betrayal, the revolution was at a low ebb. But none of the contradictions which gave rise to the revolution had been resolved. These were the contradictions between imperialism and the Chinese nation, among the imperialists in their scramble for China, among China's reactionary ruling classes, between the landlord class and the peasantry, between the bourgeoisie and the working class, between the warlords and the rank and file of their armies. While they were different from one another, they were also interrelated. Starting
from the basis of the general crisis of capitalism, Comrade Mao Tsetung saw that the bitter struggle of the imperialists over China would inevitably intensify the contradictions between imperialism and the Chinese nation and also those among the imperialists themselves, thus giving rise to endless wars among the warlords, which would in turn intensify other contradictions. The prolonged splits and wars among the Chinese warlords made it possible for one or several small revolutionary bases to emerge and develop amid the encirclement of the White regime.

Fourthly, the existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength was a necessary condition for setting up and developing the Red regime. With a regular Red Army, it was possible to concentrate the armed forces for repulsing enemy attacks, continue guerrilla warfare and extend revolutionary bases. The Red Army could also mobilize the masses and help them set up a revolutionary government and found Party organizations.

Fifthly, the existence of the Communist Party was a decisive condition for the existence and development of the Red regime. During the Chingkang Mountains period, Comrade Mao Tse-tung emphatically brought up the question of the need for proletarian ideological leadership, that is, that proletarian ideas should take the lead over the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. The experience of the Party in carrying out ideological struggle in the Red Army furnished a basis for the resolution adopted at the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army, which analysed the manifestations and sources of various non-proletarian ideas in the Party organizations of the Red Army and prescribed the methods of rectifying these wrong ideas. Thus, the basic ideological, political and organizational principles governing the building of the Communist Party were laid down. The Party must be built on a proper ideological basis because the wrong ideas in the Party were the source of a wrong political Party line. Subjective analysis of a political situation and subjective guidance of work would inevitably result either in Right opportunism or in “Left” putschism. The proper way to rectify the wrong ideas in the Party was to use the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and method in analysing the political situation and dealing with various problems, and to learn the working method of studying and investigating social, political and economic problems. While overcoming subjectivism on the ideological front, the Party must carry out a struggle against two deviations on the political front. On the one hand, it must oppose pessimism as a result of underestimating the forces of the revolution and failing to see its future; on the other hand, it must oppose putschism which was a reflection of the revolutionary impetuosity on the part of some comrades who were reluctant to do any minor and painstaking routine work. Organizationally, it must insist on democratic centralism and oppose the unwarranted restriction of centralism of the Party as well as the unwarranted restriction of inner-Party democracy. The proper way should be to enforce strictly the democratic life of the Party under centralized guidance. Consequently, ultra-democracy, absolute equalitarianism, non-organizational viewpoints and various kinds of individualism must be opposed. For only in this way could a truly Marxist-Leninist political party be built.

With the leadership of the Communist Party and the existence of the Red Army, it would be possible to take full advantage of the
struggles between various factions of the counter-revolution so that the revolutionary forces could survive and the revolution could win victory in the rural areas where the enemy forces were weak, and maintain their existence there in the countryside for a long time.

Thus, Comrade Mao Tse-tung reached a scientific conclusion by a correct analysis of the subjective and objective conditions of the revolution.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung brilliantly applied to semi-colonial and semi-feudal China the law expounded by Lenin and Stalin of the uneven economic and political development of capitalist countries in the era of imperialism, and explained the law of uneven economic and political development in China, pointing out that amid the encirclement of White regime, it was possible for one or several small areas under Red regime to exist and develop and that the revolution could win victory first in the countryside where the enemy forces were weak, and subsequently throughout the country. This new conclusion was a further development of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the law of uneven economic and political development of capitalist countries and the theory of the possibility for socialism to win victory first in one country. It was this new conclusion that led the Chinese revolution to victory.

5. FOUNDING OF THE CENTRAL AND OTHER BASES.
RECTIFICATION OF THE SECOND "LEFT" LINE BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THE GUIDING LINE OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE RED AREAS

After the Autumn-Harvest Uprising, all the revolutionary armed forces which developed followed a correct leadership and adopted a policy similar to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's—the policy of advancing to the countryside and setting up bases. By the beginning of 1930, after three years' struggle, revolutionary bases and the people's armed forces, that is, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, were established in many areas.

(1) The Central Base: The advance on the Chingkang Mountains in October 1927 laid the foundation for the Hunan-Kiangsi Base. In November 1928, part of the Fifth Army reached the Chingkang Mountains and joined forces with the Fourth Army led by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, adding to the Red Army's strength. To break the enemy blockade and encirclement, the Fourth Army entered southern Kiangsi and set up a base there in January 1929. Between February and December of the same year, it entered Fukien three times and set up the Western Fukien Base in conjunction with the local Party organizations. In March 1930 the Western Fukien and Southern Kiangsi Governments of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers were formed, and in June the First Army Corps of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In August the First and Third Army Corps joined forces to form the First Front Army with Chu Teh as Commander-in-Chief and Mao Tse-tung as Chief Political Commissar.

(2) The Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Base: After the Pingkiang Uprising in July 1928, the Fifth Army was formed. It carried on guerrilla warfare in Hunan and Kiangsi, and set up the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Base. After February 1930, the Red Army went to southeastern Hupeh, where it carried on guerrilla warfare, taking Tayeh
and several other counties, and expanded into the Third Army Corps.

(3) The Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Base: There had been two uprisings in Huangan and Macheng; the first in October 1927, and the second at the beginning of 1928, with the Tapieh Mountains as the central base. In March 1929, an uprising took place in Shangcheng, resulting in the setting up of a central base in southeastern Honan. Then followed the Liuan Uprising, which led to the establishment of a central base in northwestern Anhwei. These three bases were situated in the heart of the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei area, comprising more than a dozen counties. In February 1930, the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Special Region was formed. In 1931, the Red Army there was reorganized into the Fourth Front Army with Hsu Hsiang-chien as commander.

(4) The Hunghu-Huuan-Western Hupeh Base: From the end of 1927 to the beginning of 1930, the Red Army carried on guerrilla warfare in the Lake Hunghu area north of the Yangtse River, southern Hupeh, set up the Hunghu Base, and formed the Sixth Army. After the Autumn-Harvest Uprising, guerrilla warfare was carried on in Sangchih and Tayung of northwestern Hunan and in Enshih and Hofeng of southwestern Hupeh, which resulted in the establishment of the Hunan-Western Hupeh Base, and the formation of the Second Army. In 1930, the Second and Sixth Armies joined forces at Kungan in southern Hupeh and formed the Second Army Corps with Ho Lung as commander and Kuan Hsiang-ying as political commissar.

(5) The Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Base: After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, Fang Chih-min carried on revolutionary activities in Keyang and Hengfeng in eastern Kiangsi and led an armed uprising at the end of the year. In the following two years, the revolutionary base was expanded to the northeastern part of Kiangsi. Under the influence of the peasant movement in northeastern Kiangsi, the peasants of northern Fukien held an uprising in 1928. After the First Representative Conference of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers held at Hsinkiang in the winter of 1929, the leading body of Fukien, Chekiang, Anhwei and Kiangsi Provinces was formed. In May 1930, after the outbreak of the war of Chiang Kai-shek versus Feng Yuhsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, the Red Army reached the triangular area of Chingtehchen, Loping, Chihhua, Fuliang and Wuyuan, where they carried on guerrilla warfare. In 1930 the Northeastern Kiangsi Democratic Government of Workers and Peasants and the Tenth Army were formed.

(6) The Kwangsi (Yukiang River-Tsokiang River) Base: After the outbreak of the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords in October 1929, the Party led an uprising of peasant troops and the Kuomintang soldiers in the Yukiang River area, and in December the Yukiang Democratic Government of Workers and Peasants and the Seventh Army were formed. In February 1930 the Party led a section of Kuomintang soldiers at Lungchow in the Tsokiang River area in an uprising and organized them into the Eighth Army. This was followed by the formation of the Democratic Government of Workers and Peasants in this area. Although the Tsokiang revolutionary government soon collapsed, the Seventh Army and peasant troops persisted in their struggle in the Yukiang River area. In 1930 the main force of the Red Army advanced from the Yukiang River northwards and joined forces with the Central Red Army after fighting through Hunan.
From the Autumn-Harvest Uprising in 1927 to the beginning of 1930, the areas of armed uprisings and the rural revolutionary bases covered parts of Kiangsi, Fukien, Hunan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Honan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Chekiang Provinces. The Red Army grew to 60,000 men and, a little later, to 100,000.

For some time after the Sixth Congress the Party's work was fruitful. Under Comrade Mao Tse-tung's guidance and influence, the Red regime gradually developed in the countryside. In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, Party organizations were revived and their work resumed to a certain extent. But at that time "Left" ideas of adventurism still survived in the Party. As the revolutionary forces made some headway, especially after the outbreak in May 1930 of the war between Chiang Kai-shek on the one side and Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan on the other when the domestic situation had become favourable to the revolution, the "Left" ideas represented by Comrade Li Li-san began to gain more ground, culminating in the second "Left" line, which held sway over the leading body of the Party in June 1930.

Wherein did the mistake of the second deviation of "Left" adventurism lie?

First, Comrade Li Li-san and his followers denied the uneven development of the Chinese revolution, claiming that there was no fundamental distinction between the struggles in the cities and those in the countryside and between the working-class movement and the peasant movement, as they had all become equally acute. They also held that only uprisings in major cities could bring about a nationwide revolutionary upsurge and lead to victory in one or several provinces. So they mapped out a plan for uprisings first in the provinces centring around Wuhan. They underestimated the decisive role played by the anti-feudal struggle of the peasants under the leadership of the working class in the Chinese democratic revolution. Hence they erroneously labelled as "absolutely wrong" Comrade Mao Tse-tung's idea that for a long time emphasis should be laid on the creation of rural bases, which would form an encirclement of the cities and expedite the nationwide rise in the revolution.

Secondly, they denied the necessity of gathering organizational strength and making full preparations for the revolution, thinking that, since the forces of the revolution were beginning to make progress and the warlords were fighting among themselves, conditions were already ripe for launching armed uprisings immediately throughout the country. They believed that the masses would immediately answer the Party's call for uprisings. They maintained that the masses should only launch uprisings, not economic strikes; and go in only for big actions, not small ones. Consequently, they erroneously advocated that political struggles and political strikes of the workers should be intensified, so that each economic struggle would develop into a political one, that the armed forces of the workers should be expanded, and that military training should be strengthened in preparation for a nationwide uprising.

Thirdly, they denied the unevenness of the world revolution, thinking that the general outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to the general outbreak of the world revolution without which the victory of the Chinese revolution would be impossible.

Fourthly, they overlooked the protracted nature of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution and blurred the line of demarcation between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, thin-
king that as soon as victory was won in one or several provinces, the transition to the socialist revolution would begin. Consequently, they formulated “Left” adventurist policies towards the intermediate classes, maintaining that all factories, enterprises and banks belonging to the Chinese bourgeoisie should be confiscated as “counter-revolutionary weapons.”

In June 1930, the “Leftists” mapped out an adventurist plan for organizing armed uprisings in the major cities throughout the country and for concentrating all the units of the Red Army for attacking these major cities. They ordered the Red Army to attack and capture Nanchang, Kiukiang, Changsha, Wuhan, Kweilin, Liuchow and Canton. Later on they merged the leading bodies at all levels of the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions into Action Committees to prepare for armed uprisings, thus bringing all the routine work of these organizations to a standstill.

But the reign of Li Li-san’s line in the Party was short-lived, lasting only from June to September 1930. Since the Party and the revolutionary forces invariably suffered losses wherever the line was put into practice, great numbers of Party members demanded its rectification. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, in particular, rectified with supreme patience the “Left” mistakes in the First Front Army, with the result that during this period the Red Army stationed in the Kiangsi Revolutionary Base not only incurred no losses but expanded its ranks by utilizing the favourable situation, and successfully smashed Chiang Kai-shek’s first campaign of encirclement at the end of 1930 and the beginning of 1931.

In September 1930, the Sixth Central Committee of the Party held its Third Plenary Session. Both at this session and in the course of its subsequent work the Central Committee rectified the extremely “Left” appraisal of the revolutionary situation in China that marked the Li Li-san line, put an end to the execution of the plan of organizing uprisings throughout the country and concentrating all the forces of the Red Army to attack major cities, and re-established the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions as independent organizations capable of carrying on their routine work. Thus in putting an end to the above-mentioned mistakes of the Li Li-san line, the Third Plenary Session achieved some positive results. At the session, Comrade Li Li-san himself admitted the mistakes and subsequently left his leading post in the Central Committee. But since the Third Plenary Session and the Central Committee did not undertake to thoroughly criticize the Li Li-san line, so at the session and for a time after it, the mistake of sectarianism continued in the Party and “Left” ideas and policies still found frequent expression.

Wherever the Red regime existed and wherever the Red Army went, the broad peasant masses were mobilized under the leadership of the Party to carry on struggles for the confiscation of the landlords’ land and its distribution among the peasants.

Only when class struggle in the countryside was stirred up for a correct solution of the agrarian problem could the broad peasant masses be aroused to take part in the revolutionary war and the establishment of bases for the further expansion of the revolution.

The correct solution of the agrarian problem hinged on a correct guiding line of agrarian revolution. Comrade Mao Tse-tung concretely analysed the conditions of China and formed such a line, which stipulated that reliance should be placed upon the poor peasants and the farm labourers, while uniting with the middle peasants, restricting
the rich peasants and protecting the middle and small industrialists and merchants in order to eliminate the landlord class. This was the Party’s only correct line of the agrarian revolution in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

The farm labourer as a rule did not possess any land or implements. He made his living by selling his labour power. Hence the farm labourers were the proletariat of the countryside and the vanguard of the agrarian revolution. The poor peasant possessed very little land and an incomplete set of implements. As a rule he had to rent land, hire out a part of his labour power, and be exploited. The poor peasant masses were therefore staunch supporters of the agrarian revolution and the strongest supporters of the Party and of the proletariat in the countryside. So to depend upon the poor peasant and the farm labourer was the central policy of the Party in waging the agrarian struggle.

The middle peasant in general possessed land and owned a certain number of farm implements. He relied mainly on his own labour as the source of his income. As a rule he did not exploit other people, but was instead exploited and oppressed by the imperialists, landlords and capitalists. Normally he too would demand land. So the middle peasant could not only take part in the democratic revolution but also accept socialism. The middle peasant masses were the dependable ally of the proletariat. To unite with the middle peasants was an important policy of the agrarian revolution, as only by so doing could the resistance of the landlords be effectively overcome. Besides, after the agrarian revolution, middle peasants would form the bulk of the masses in the countryside. All policies must be supported by them. Their voices must be given due attention. Any attempt or action to infringe upon the interests of the middle peasants must be strongly opposed.

The rich peasant possessed land and in general abundant means of production. Although he was engaged in labour himself, he made his living largely by exploitation of hired labour, usury and land rent. The rich peasant was a semi-feudal exploiter, but his type of production could remain useful for a certain period of time. The rich peasant might take part in anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggles or assume a neutral attitude. Hence the policy of restriction towards the rich peasants, opposing any tendency towards exterminating the rich-peasant economy, while permitting it to exist.

The landlord possessed land, did not engage in labour himself and lived by exploiting the peasants. The landlords were feudal exploiters and oppressors and formed the main social basis of imperialist domination over China. As a class, the landlords obstructed the political, economic and cultural progress of Chinese society and were resolutely opposed to the revolution. Hence the policy of wiping them out as a class, while giving them the chance to make a living as individuals.

The protective policy adopted towards middle and small industrialists and merchants was a basic policy in the period of democratic revolution, essential for opposing imperialism and feudalism and promoting the economic development of the revolutionary bases.

This line of agrarian revolution was completely correct. Facts proved that in areas where this line was followed, the broad masses were mobilized, the feudal forces were overthrown and the agrarian struggle was successfully carried out.

From 1928 to 1931, in the Chingkang Mountains period and the founding of the Central Area, the Party’s agrarian policy was drawn
from summing up the revolutionary practice and creative experience of the masses under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

First, the distribution of land in the agrarian reform in the Red areas began with a land survey by the democratic government at the basic level, which ascertained the total acreage, the population and the per capita allotment. This was followed by discussion and approval at a mass meeting.

The land was equally distributed according to the population with the hsiang (township) as a basic unit. Distribution was based upon the principle of allotting the land to its present tiller and making necessary readjustment of the amount and quality of the land. This was a basic principle of the agrarian policy in the Red areas.

Secondly, the problems of the scope of the land to be confiscated and the right of ownership. The Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government promulgated two sets of agrarian law, that is, the Chingkang Mountains Agrarian Law in December 1928 and the Hsingkuo County Agrarian Law in April 1929. The former provided for the confiscation of all the land, not merely public land and land belonging to the landlords. But after the Red Army arrived in Hsingkuo County in southern Kiangsi from the Chingkang Mountains, an important change was introduced into the new Agrarian Law: the provision "confiscation of all the land" now read "confiscation of all public land and land belonging to the landlords."

As to the ownership, both provided that the land belonged to the government, not to the peasants. In other words, landlord ownership of land had been changed to state ownership. Directly connected with this problem was the banning of all transactions in land. In short, the peasants enjoyed the use of the land without owning it. But in 1930 these provisions were changed, and ownership of land passed into the hands of the peasants, who were allowed to sell it freely.

Thirdly, in the period of agrarian revolution it was necessary to win over those who were engaged in medium or small industrial or commercial enterprises. In a proclamation issued by the General Headquarters of the Red Army in January 1929, it was provided that "merchants in the cities, who have assiduously and slowly accumulated their small fortunes, are to be left alone so long as they obey the government," and that "exorbitant levies and taxes are all to be swept away." This was the Party's protective policy towards these people.

In the agrarian reform, the poor peasants and the farm labourers profited economically and politically. These people, who constituted the majority of the population, were given farm land, from which they derived their basic economic interests. All debts incurred before the revolution were cancelled. But the political advantage far outweighed these economic advantages, for they had now won political power.

Equal redistribution of the land was in the interest of the middle peasants, who did not have enough land and most of whom got more land after the redistribution. They were also benefited politically, because they were allowed to participate in the government together with the poor peasants and farm labourers. Middle peasants comprised about 40 per cent of those working in the local governments at the district and township levels.

In the township government, the lowest level of the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government established after the revolution, the chief cadres were poor peasants and farm labourers. It was a government of the labouring people with the most revolutionary poor
peasants and farm labourers as its core.

As the revolutionary bases were in a constant state of enemy encirclement, each township was organized along military lines. In each township, everyone from 8 to 50 years of age joined either the Children's Corps, the Young Pioneers or the Red Guards, according to their age. Their tasks were to serve as guards and sentinels in defence of their homes, for which they received the necessary military and political training.

These mass military organizations were also the chief sources of the Red Army. In these organizations the Red Army found a basis for reinforcement and expansion.

6. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF BUILDING UP THE RED ARMY AND OF THE RED ARMY'S STRATEGY AND TACTICS.


The establishment of revolutionary bases was the result of armed struggle. Without victory in the armed struggle, it would have been impossible to consolidate and expand the revolutionary bases or to promote the agrarian revolution. Success in the armed struggle required a people's revolutionary army different from all old-type armies, and this army had to fight under the guidance of correct strategy and tactics. The basic principles of building up the Red Army and of the Red Army's strategy and tactics were systematically and comprehensively formulated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung during this period. These basic principles, together with other military theories, constituted the military line of the Chinese Communist Party represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

First, what were the basic principles of building up the Red Army? The Red Army must be guided by proletarian ideology, serve the people's struggle and help the construction of the bases. This was the fundamental theory governing the building up of the Red Army.

In accordance with this fundamental theory, the Party's leadership over the Red Army must be ensured organizationally, politically and ideologically. By setting up Party organizations at various levels in the Red Army and putting in practice the system of political commissars, the Party would exercise a firm leadership over the Red Army and enable it to carry out resolutely the Party's programmes and policies. At the same time, a system of political work was to be established and strengthened in the Red Army. Its task was to educate the Red Army in the Party's programmes and policies, combat the non-proletarian ideas existing in the Red Army, and raise the level of Marxist-Leninist ideological consciousness of the Army and its fighting power.

Again, in line with this theory, the peasantry should be relied on in carrying out the revolutionary war. An army with the peasantry as its backbone should be set up and revolutionary bases founded in the rural districts to fight an extensive mass guerrilla war. Therefore, the task of the Red Army was not limited to combat alone. It should also shoulder such tasks as agitating the masses, organizing them, arming them, helping them to set up a revolutionary government and build the Party. On top of all this, the Red Army had the job of raising funds. Fighting, mass work,
and raising funds—these three tasks of the Red Army constituted an inseparable entity.

In addition, the Red Army must see to it that correct relationships were established between military and political organs, between the army and the people, and between officers and men. It must have a correct policy for disintegrating the enemy and winning over the prisoners of war.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s fundamental theory for building up the Red Army and the whole system of principles that grew out of it made the Red Army an unconquerable force and a revolutionary army different from all other armies.

Next, what were the basic principles of the Red Army’s strategy and tactics?

Comrade Mao Tse-tung elucidated the following four characteristics of China’s revolutionary war: (1) a vast semi-colonial country which was unevenly developed both politically and economically, and which had just gone through a great revolution; (2) the superior strength of the enemy; (3) the weakness and small size of the Red Army; (4) the Communist Party’s leadership and the agrarian revolution. These characteristics determined, on the one hand, the possibility of the Red Army growing and defeating its enemy, and on the other hand, the impossibility of the Red Army growing speedily or defeating its enemy quickly. In fact, they also pointed to the possibility of failure in case things were handled wrongly. The basic strategic and tactical principles that ensued from these characteristics included: reliance on the masses to carry out a people’s war, adoption of guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character as the chief forms of fighting, necessity for the Red Army to fight a strategically protracted war and individual battles of quick decision, to defeat the many with the few strategically but the few with the many in separate campaigns.

As has been pointed out above, the enemy force was strong and large but was estranged from the masses, whereas the Red Army was weak and small but was in close touch with the masses. Under these conditions, existence, victory and further development would be out of the question unless the Red Army fully exploited the enemy’s weaknesses and its own advantages. Therefore, to vanquish its stronger enemy, the Red Army must conduct a people’s war in which the main forces were co-ordinated with local units, the regular army with guerrilla and militia contingents, and the armed with the unarmed masses.

It was necessary for the Red Army to adopt guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character as its chief forms of fighting. One of the greatest contributions made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to military science lies precisely in his interpreting guerrilla warfare on a strategic level. He said:

What is guerrilla warfare? It is, in a backward country, in a big semi-colonial country, and for a long period of time, the indispensable and therefore the best form of struggle for the people’s armed forces to overcome the armed enemy and create their own strongholds.

The correct policy was to expand guerrilla warfare to its utmost limit, and then under specific conditions and following the growth of strength, to transform guerrilla warfare into regular warfare. The period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War already saw the gradual development of guerrilla warfare towards regular warfare.
But on the whole, the Red Army at that time was still fighting a mobile war of a guerrilla character.

Since in the matter of strength the Red Army was inferior to the enemy, a quick victory was unthinkable. Therefore, it was necessary to pursue a strategic policy of protracted warfare and gradually to bring about a change in the unfavourable balance of strength. The principle of operational and tactical direction was, however, the opposite—not protection but quick decision. There were many reasons for this. First, the Red Army had no source of replenishment of arms, especially of ammunition. Secondly, the enemy had a large number of separate detachments. If in fighting against one of them, the Red Army failed to win quickly, the others would come together to rescue the one under attack. Thirdly, after smashing one "encirclement campaign," the Red Army had to prepare itself speedily for another series of uninterrupted operations. These and other reasons determined the necessity for quick decision in a campaign. Long drawnout battles would work against the interest of the Red Army. Strategically to defeat the many with the few, and tactically the few with the many—this required the Red Army to so concentrate its forces as to have absolute numerical superiority in every battle in order to win, to preserve its own strength and eliminate the enemy and eventually to obtain a decisive victory.

It was Comrade Mao Tse-tung who discovered these characteristics of China's revolutionary war and, proceeding from them, laid down the strategy and tactics for the revolutionary war.

These correct strategic and tactical principles were gradually shaped in the course of struggles. During the struggle in the Chingkang Mountains, Comrade Mao Tse-tung had already formulated a number of well-known principles governing the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare, such as "Disperse the forces among the masses to arouse them, and concentrate the forces to deal with the enemy," and "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy halts, we harass; when the enemy tires, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue." The former is a principle to be followed by small units fighting a guerrilla war from small base areas. Its emphasis is on the method of "breaking up the whole into parts" and "gathering the parts into a whole." The latter covers the two phases of strategic defensive and strategic offensive, and in the defensive, the two phases of strategic retreat and strategic counter-offensive. These were the simple, basic principles in keeping with the conditions of the time, which were set forth with regards to the Red Army's guerrilla warfare. With the growth of the Red Army from small guerrilla units to large guerrilla detachments and with the expansion and consolidation of the base areas during the Counter-Encirclement Campaigns launched by the Kiangsi Central Area, other basic principles were brought forward, such as: "luring the enemy to penetrate deeply," concentration of troops, mobile warfare, war of quick decision and war of annihilation.

First, luring the enemy to penetrate deeply, or strategic retreat. This was a planned strategic step which an inferior force adopted in the face of a superior enemy force, with a view to conserving its own strength and waiting for an opportune moment to beat the enemy by counter-attack. Certain conditions favourable to the revolutionary forces and unfavourable to the enemy must be created before entering upon the counter-offensive. To be more explicit, the counter-offensive should not be launched unless the following conditions
were secured: an area where the masses were most, or relatively more, co-operative; a favourable terrain for operations, and discovery of the enemy’s weak spots.

Secondly, concentration of troops. This was necessary for reversing a situation of advance and retreat and of offensive and defensive between the enemy and the people’s forces, so that a strategically superior enemy who held the initiative could be reduced to a tactically inferior and passive position. Naturally, not all troops were to be concentrated, for the very purpose of troop concentration was to guarantee the absolute or relative superiority for operations on the battlefield; hence, it was also necessary to employ a section of the people’s forces in containing the enemy or in auxiliary campaigns.

Thirdly, the Red Army’s operations were characterized by mobile warfare and not by positional warfare. This was because the Red Area was very small in extent, the Red Army was greatly inferior to the enemy both in number and equipment, and there was only a single detachment of the Red Army to do all the fighting in each base area. Positional warfare, therefore, was basically useless to the Red Army. However, it was not to be ruled out altogether. In a strategic defensive when some key positions were to be stubbornly defended in a containing action, and in a strategic offensive when faced with an isolated enemy force, positional warfare was of course necessary as well as possible.

Fourthly, the policy of quick decision, which was to be followed in fighting individual battles. Each battle should be finished in a few hours or in one or two days. In the tactics known as “besieging the enemy to strike at his reinforcements,” it was necessary to prepare for a certain degree of protraction in the siege operations; but the aim of this manoeuvre was to beat not the besieged enemy, but the enemy reinforcements, and with the latter, it was still necessary to seek a quick decision.

Fifthly, as the Red Army obtained practically all its supplies from the enemy, annihilation was necessary. Only by annihilating the enemy’s manpower could the Red Army replenish itself.

These constituted a new advance on the military principles of the Red Army, enriched in content and modified in form, but in essence the same as the principles formulated during the Chingkang Mountains struggle.

The victories achieved by the Red Army in the four Counter-Encirclement Campaigns fully proved that these guiding principles in strategy and tactics formulated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung were the only principles correctly adapted to the actual conditions under which the Red Army was fighting.

The first encirclement campaign took place in the winter of 1930, after the conclusion of the war between Chiang Kai-shek on the one hand and Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang on the other. The Red Army had by then established many revolutionary base areas of various sizes. Alarmed at this growth of the people’s armed forces and the people’s regime, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched an army of 100,000 men to attack the Central Red Area.

With Lu Ti-ping as the commander-in-chief, the enemy forces advanced southward below the line between Chian in Kiangsi and Chienning in Fukien. The Red Army was then about 40,000 strong, and was concentrated in the district of Ningtu, Kiangsi.
divisions were Chiang's personal troops. The two divisions under Chang Hui-ts'an (concurrently the field commander) and Tan Tao-yuan made up the main forces of the "Army of encirclement," and were quartered at Lungkang and Yuantou respectively. The Lungkang-Yuantou sector was close to the point where the Red Army was concentrated. The largest number of Red troops was massed at Lungkang, because the people there were favourably disposed towards the revolution, and the terrain was good for military operations.

The counter-attack began on December 27, 1930. A surprise attack in which the Red Army concentrated its whole force completely annihilated Chang's troops. The pursuit of Tan's troops followed. On January 1, 1931 the counter-attack came to an end. One and a half enemy division were put out of action, and Chang Hui-ts'an was taken prisoner. The first encirclement thus came to an end.

In April 1931 Chiang Kai-shek despatched another army, numbering 200,000, against the Central Area. With Ho Ying-chin as commander-in-chief, the enemy adopted the strategy of "consolidation at every step," and constructed a 400-kilometre battle front that extended from Chia to Chienning.

As in the first campaign, none of the forces were Chiang's personal troops. The Red Army, about 30,000 strong, decided to strike at the weak spot of the besieging forces, namely, Wang Chin-yu's troops. The plan was to wait until Wang should leave the Futien sector, and then wipe out his troops while they were on the move.

The campaign began on May 16, 1931. While Wang Chin-yu was marching from Futien to Tungku, the Red Army made a furious assault upon him. The battle won, the Red Army, starting out from Futien, attacked successively the other enemy troops, pushing right up to the Chienning-Taining sector on the Kiangsi-Fukien border. During a 15-day campaign from May 16 to May 30, 1931, the Red Army covered on foot a distance of 350 kilometres, fought five battles, made a clean sweep of the 400-kilometre battle front and routed over 30,000 enemy troops. Thus the second encirclement was smashed to pieces.

In July 1931, Chiang Kai-shek made a third attempt at encircling the Red Army. The enemy troops employed in the campaign numbered 300,000, with Chiang himself assuming the supreme command. Deployed in three columns under the respective command of Ho Ying-chin, Chen Ming-shu and Chu Shao-liang, they penetrated into the Central Red Area. The main forces, totalling 100,000, were Chiang's personal troops. Next to these were Chen Ming-shu's troops. All the other forces were relatively weak.

The enemy adopted a strategy of a straightforward drive, hoping to press the Red Army back against the Kan River and annihilate it there. After much hard fighting, without waiting for a moment of rest or replacements, the Red Army made a detour at Chienning to reassemble in Hsingkuo, still following the policy of avoiding the enemy's main forces and striking at its weak spots.

The favourable conditions of the base areas were fully utilized by the Red Army to harass the enemy. In the beginning of August, the Red Army, after steering clear of the enemy's main forces, veered to Lientang and fought three victorious battles. Enemy casualties amounted to over 30,000.

At that juncture, the enemy's main forces that had been advancing westwards and southwards all veered to the east in a big, compact
encirclement, but the Red Army once more eluded them and reassembled within the borders of Hsingkuo for a rest. By that time the enemy forces were already hungry, fatigued and low in morale. There was nothing they could do but retreat. In the course of their retreat, they were vigorously pursued and attacked by the Red Army. In September, the third encirclement, like its predecessors, ended in complete failure.

When countering the three encirclement campaigns of the enemy, the Red regime smashed up repeated attacks by Chiang Kai-shek in which several hundred thousand modernized troops were employed. It proved its calibre by standing firm, expanding and consolidating itself.

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s basic idea about establishing the Red regime was to engage in a prolonged struggle by founding revolutionary bases in the rural areas under the leadership of the proletariat. When strength was accumulated, the Red Army would proceed from the rural districts to surround the cities so as to achieve the final victory of the revolution throughout the country.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung repudiated the theory which, based on the belief that the time for a nation-wide revolution had already come, advocated winning over the masses before establishing the revolutionary government, in other words, organizing the masses for a national armed uprising and for the establishment of a national government. This erroneous theory stemmed in the main from the failure to understand that China was then a semi-colony contended for by many imperialist powers.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung regarded the Red regime as the highest form of the peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in a semi-colony, and the most vital factor in accelerating the rise of the revolutionary tide throughout the country. This point is made perfectly clear in his essay entitled “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire.”

Only thus can we win the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, just as the Soviet Union has done throughout the world. Only thus can we create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their very foundations and precipitate their internal disintegration. And only thus can we really create a Red Army that will be our chief weapon in the coming great revolution. In short, only thus can we accelerate the revolutionary upsurge?

The Red regime thus triumphantly stood the test in the period from October 1927 to 1931, and, what is more, expanded and consolidated itself, forming a major incentive to the ascent of the revolution. From “a single spark,” it had developed into a veritable “prairie fire.”

The victories achieved in the Counter-Encirclement Campaigns caused the Chinese revolution to advance towards new heights.

1 Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 63.

2 Ibid., p. 99.

8 Hsia Tou-yin had rebelled against the Wuhan government but was crushed. His remnant troops had roamed southern Hunan before they were incorporated into the Workers' and Peasants' Army.
4 The small landlords and rich peasants.

5 A member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party elected at its Sixth National Congress and founder of the Red Area in northeastern Kiangsi and of the Red Tench Army, Fang Chih-min led the northward march of the Red Army's anti-Japanese advance units in 1934. Taken prisoner by the Kuomintang reactionary troops in an encounter in January 1935, he died a martyr's death six months later in Nanchang, Kiangsi.


7 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 117.
CHAPTER SIX

RISE OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY RECTIFIES THE "LEFT" DEVIATIONS AND RESOLUTELY TAKES THE PATH OF BOLSHEVIZATION

(September 1931 — December 1935)

1. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION FROM 1929 TO 1932 AND THE THREAT OF A NEW WAR

At the end of 1929 a devastating world economic crisis of unprecedented dimensions broke out in the capitalist countries. This crisis went on worsening for three years. The industrial crisis was interwoven with an agricultural crisis, and the crisis in production with crises in commerce and finance, which greatly aggravated the economic conditions in the capitalist countries.

By the end of 1932, industrial output in the United States had dropped to 53.8 per cent of the 1929 figure; that of Britain, to 83.8 per cent; of Germany, to 59.8 per cent, and of France, to 69.1 per cent. The duration and depth of this crisis set it apart from all other crises in the past. Previous crises lasted one or two years, but this one did not ease off until the end of 1932. It reduced to naught all the accumulated wealth which capitalism had squeezed from the people over a long period. It was the severest crisis that had ever taken place.

This economic crisis showed unprecedented staying power because it had broken out in the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism. The first decisive characteristic of the general crisis was that owing to the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, capitalist economy was no longer the sole, all-embracing world system and a new socialist economic system which stood opposed to it was daily growing stronger. The second characteristic was the crisis in the imperialist colonial system. A tremendous national liberation movement had broken out in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The leadership of this national movement in many colonial countries had begun to shift into the hands of the proletariat and its political party. Simultaneously, national capitalism emerged and developed in these colonial and semi-colonial countries and its competition with the capitalist countries intensified the struggle for the colonial market. The third characteristic lay in the fact that industry, transport and agriculture of the capitalist countries were operating beneath their capacity and there was a huge army of unemployed. Before the general crisis of capitalism, it had been possible for the capitalist countries during the years of periodic industrial boom to operate their productive enterprises at full capacity and to reduce the number of unemployed; but during the general crisis, even in years of relatively brisk economic activities, the productive forces of the various enterprises could not be fully utilized and the army of unemployed showed a steady increase.

There were additional reasons why this economic crisis sharpened and dragged on. First, this crisis affected all the capitalist countries,
dealing a particularly heavy blow to the U.S.A., which accounted for more than half of the production and consumption of the world. Consequently, it was difficult for some countries to manoeuvre at the expense of others. Secondly, this crisis became interwoven with the agricultural crisis in all the agrarian countries and this could not but render it more complicated and profound. Thirdly, the monopolist cartels which dominated industry tried their utmost to maintain their monopoly prices of commodities. This entailed mass bankruptcy among the producers outside the cartels, bringing great distress to the broad masses of consumers and hindering the marketing of commodity stocks.

The relations of production of the capitalist society had never been in such contradiction with the social character of the productive forces. During this period, the Soviet Union was carrying on socialist construction, and her industry and agriculture continued to forge ahead.

Industry in the Soviet Union consistently advanced along the road of socialist industrialization, of consolidating and developing her heavy industry. By 1931, the year when Japan launched her aggressive war against China, the output of industry in the Soviet Union increased by 214.7 per cent, as compared with the pre-war level of 1913. The proportion of industry in the total output of the national economy rose from 42.1 per cent in 1913 to 66.7 per cent in 1931. Industry therefore played the predominant role in the national economy. Heavy industry accounted for 55.4 per cent of the total industrial output. It therefore occupied the leading place in industry as a whole. The hallmark of socialist industrialization is the victory of the socialist sector over the capitalist and small commodity sectors. In this direction, the Soviet Union also scored a complete victory. In 1930, the socialist sector accounted for 99.7 per cent of the total output of large-scale industries. Capitalist remnants in industry were eliminated.

Agriculture in the Soviet Union also underwent a marked change; the collectivization of agriculture gained a great victory. The Soviet Communist Party held that there was only one way along which rural economy could advance, namely, the organization of large-scale socialist agriculture through setting up state farms, drawing the individual small peasants into collective farms and utilizing modern agricultural techniques.

Since the Fifteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, especially after the beginning of 1928 when the problem of grain became serious, the Party had consistently followed this line in its practical work.

This great task was accomplished. The proportion of collectivized peasant households to the total number of peasant households in the country rose from 3.9 per cent in 1929 to 23.6 per cent in 1930 and 52.7 per cent in 1931. The period from 1930 to 1931 saw a great change in the rural areas of the Soviet Union and the victory of agricultural collectivization.

This period witnessed a change in the economic life of all countries of the world, in the capitalist countries as well as in the Soviet Union. But in the Soviet Union the change resulted in greater economic development, while in the capitalist countries it led to a serious economic crisis.

The world economic crisis further intensified the contradictions between the imperialist powers, between the victorious countries and the vanquished, between the imperialist and the colonies and semi-colonies, between the workers and the capitalists and between the peasants and the landlords.
Stalin pointed out that the bourgeoisie would seek a way out of the economic crisis in two directions—by establishing the most reactionary fascist dictatorship to suppress the proletariat and other working people in their own country, and by fomenting war for the redivision of colonies and spheres of influence at the expense of the poorly defended countries.

Japan, with her narrow home market, was severely hit by the economic crisis. The ruling class of Japan saw an aggressive war as their only way out. Japanese militarists unleashed war against China, tearing up the Nine-Power Treaty with the intention of driving the European and U.S. imperialist powers out of China, and turning China into her own colony.

Stalin further pointed out that the way out for the proletariat must be sought in revolution: "The proletariat, in fighting capitalist exploitation and the war danger, will seek a way out through revolution." When the Chinese proletariat and its political party led the whole people to oppose the aggressive war launched by the Japanese imperialists, they were seeking a way out for themselves through a war of national revolution.

2. OCCUPATION BY THE JAPANESE IMPERIALISTS OF NORTHEAST CHINA. RISE OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY

While the European countries and the United States were occupied with their internal troubles in the economic crisis, and the Chiang Kai-shek government, after completely capitulating to the imperialists, was carrying on a reactionary civil war with Anglo-U.S. aid, the Japanese imperialists seized this opportunity to attack China, which was weak in national defence and had a vast market. They began by occupying Northeast China, as a base for colonizing the whole country.

On September 18, 1931, the Japanese army stationed in the Northeast launched a sudden attack on Shenyang (Mukden). Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Chinese army to offer no resistance. Acting on Chiang's orders, the Chinese troops in Shenyang and in other parts of the Northeast withdrew south of the Great Wall, thus making it possible for the Japanese imperialists to occupy the whole of the Northeast within less than three months.

On the night of January 26, 1932, the Japanese army attacked Shanghai, attempting to take the city and turn it into a second base for colonizing China. The army and civilians of Shanghai rose in heroic fight, repeatedly repulsing the invaders. But Chiang Kai-shek spared no efforts in undermining the resistance. After compelling the 19th Route Army then fighting against the aggressors to withdraw from Shanghai, he concluded the Shanghai Armistice Agreement with Japan, which stipulated that China should not station troops in Shanghai and should ban the anti-Japanese movement throughout the country.

The roaring guns of the Japanese imperialists awakened the broad masses of China, and roused their patriotic feelings. At the call of the Chinese Communist Party, they plunged into a vigorous campaign against the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek.

The people of the Northeast and a section of patriotic troops, led and assisted by the Chinese Communist Party, organized the Anti-Japanese Volunteers and carried on a heroic struggle. The guerrilla war waged by the volunteers at one time grew to big proportions. In
spite of many difficulties and setbacks, the guerrillas succeeded in defeating the enemy attempt to annihilate them; furthermore, they went on fighting until the colonial rule of the Japanese militarists in the Northeast came to an end.

In early October 1931, 800,000 Shanghai workers set up the Resist-Japan-and-Save-China Association and sent representatives to Nanking, demanding that the government send troops to fight Japan at once, and supply arms to the volunteer corps which they had organized. Workers in Peking also organized the Resist-Japan-and-Save-China Association as well as volunteer contingents and propaganda squads among postal workers. In other cities, too, anti-Japanese activities were carried on by the workers.

On September 28, 1931, students in Nanking smashed up the premises of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kuomintang government and assaulted the minister. At the end of 1931, student delegations from Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow and Canton came to Nanking to demonstrate, and smashed up the offices of the Kuomintang Party headquarters, the National Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Students in Shanghai smashed up the municipal headquarters of the Kuomintang, and organized a people's court to try the Mayor and the Chief of the Police Bureau. In many other places throughout the country, the offices of the local Kuomintang headquarters and local governments were attacked by the students.

After the September 18 Incident, the people of the country, including the urban industrialists and merchants, launched a campaign to boycott Japanese goods and break off economic relations with Japan. During the battle for Shanghai in 1932, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, Bankers' Association and Native Bankers' Guild suspended business. Newspapers representing the national bourgeoisie, such as the Shen Pao, carried commentaries, demanding that the Kuomintang change its political attitude, restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, put an end to the civil war, abolish one-party dictatorship, and lift the ban on other parties' activities so that the whole nation could unite against the Japanese imperialists.

The attempt of the Japanese imperialists to turn China into a colony under Japan's exclusive rule led to serious splits in China's ruling classes.

At the beginning of October 1931, when Japanese troops attacked Heilungkiang after occupying Liaoning and Kirin, the Chinese army under Ma Chan-shan rose in resistance.

In response to the call made by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to resist the Japanese imperialists, the 26th Route Army, more than 10,000 strong, which had been sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Kiangsi to attack the Red Army, launched an uprising in December 1931 in Ningtu under the leadership of Chao Po-sheng and Tung Chen-tang, and went over to the Red Army.

On January 28, 1932, the 19th Route Army started resisting the Japanese invasion of Shanghai. With the assistance of the workers, students and other citizens of Shanghai and the support of the people in the rest of the country, they stubbornly repulsed the Japanese aggressive forces and frustrated the Japanese militarists' scheme of taking Shanghai in a few hours.

Owing to the contradictions and clashes between the Kuomintang cliques headed respectively by Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min, the Nanking-Canton war broke out in September 1931, ending in the forced abdication of Chiang Kai-shek in December of
the same year.
Under the threat of Japan, the Nanking government moved to Lo-
yang on January 30, 1932.
The rule of the traitorous Nanking government dominated by the
Chiang Kai-shek clique was tottering.
In the Red area, in August 1931, the Central Red Army in Kiangsi
shattered Chiang Kai-shek's third encirclement campaign, and the
Red Army in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Base also defeated the Kuo-
mintang forces in a counter-encirclement campaign, expanding the
revolutionary bases. The Hunghu Base in Hupeh was recovered.
On the borders of Shensi and Kansu, the Red guerrilla contingents
appeared.
On November 7, 1931, the First National Congress of Workers,
Peasants and Soldiers was convened in Juichin, Kiangsi, proclaiming
the establishment of the Central Workers' and Peasants' Democratic
Government. Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh were elected
Chairman of the Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Red
Army respectively.
The Congress passed the fundamental law of the Workers' and
Peasants' Democratic Republic, the labour law, the agrarian law and
decrees concerning economic policies.
On April 15, 1932, the Central Workers' and Peasants' Democratic
Government issued a declaration of war against Japan, calling upon
the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the broad oppressed
masses to wage a national revolutionary war to drive the Japanese
imperialists out of China.
A great change took place in the internal political situation after
the Japanese invasion of the Northeast in 1931, as a result of the rise
of the popular anti-Japanese-and-anti-Chiang Kai-shek movement in
the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the split within the Kuomintang,
the anti-Japanese tendency of the national bourgeoisie, the victory of
the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the Third Counter-Encircle-
ment Campaign, and the establishment of the Chinese Workers' and pe-
sants' Democratic Government and its declaration of war on Japan.
The Japanese imperialist aggression brought about changes in the
relative positions of the revolutionary camp and the counter-revolu-
tionary camp. As the anti-Japanese movement of the Chinese people was
developing along a tortuous road, the situation of the whole country
was favourable to the revolution. Although the counter-revolutionary
forces still greatly surpassed the revolutionary forces, the people
were unwilling to be ruled as in the past; neither could the Chiang
Kai-shek clique go on ruling in the old manner. Many opposition
parties and anti-Chiang groups either agreed to overthrow the rule
of the Chiang Kai-shek clique or declared their neutrality. This politi-
cal situation was favourable to the revolution and unfavourable to
the counter-revolution.
A new revolutionary situation rapidly emerged. The slogan of the
Anti-Japanese United Front was put forward, which demanded resis-
tance to the Japanese aggressors and opposition to Chiang Kai-shek,
setting up a national defence government and an anti-Japanese allied
army. If the Party had adopted the right tactics by correctly mobi-
lizing the people and leading their struggle, uniting all the anti-Japa-
nese and anti-Chiang groups, encouraging the 19th Route Army and
leading the Workers', and Peasants' Red Army to take concerted
action, it would have been possible to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from
regaining his power, set up the national defence government and the
anti-Japanese allied army, and lead the nation-wide revolutionary forces to fight against Japan.

3. FORMATION OF THE THIRD "LEFT" LINE. LOSS OF A SITUATION ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE REVOLUTION UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE "LEFT" LINE

After the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party put a stop to the execution of the Li Li-san line, a group of doctrinaires, headed by Comrades Wang Ming and Chin Pang-hsien, rose to oppose the Central Committee. They maintained that the Li Li-san line was a sort of "Right opportunism under the cloak of 'Leftist' empty talk," charged the Third Plenary Session with "doing nothing to expose or combat the persistent Right opportunist theory and practice of the Li Li-san line," and censured the Central Committee for its failure to note that "the Right deviation remains the principal danger in the Party at present." They exaggerated the significance of fighting the capitalists and rich peasants and of the so-called "factors of socialist revolution" in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, denied the existence of intermediate classes, claimed that the tide of the revolution was still rising throughout the nation and stressed the need for a national line of offensive for the Party.

With regard to the revolutionary tasks, the exponents of this line, starting from an overestimation of the development of capitalism in China, placed the struggle against the bourgeoisie on an equal footing with the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle and the struggle against feudal forces, maintaining that only by resolutely opposing the bourgeoisie could a complete victory in the democratic revolution be won. They advocated a redistribution of the land of the rich peasants, in which the rich peasants themselves were to be allotted a certain amount of land of low quality. They also held the view that the rich peasants and capitalists should be deprived of their political rights under the worker-peasant regime.

They denied the existence of intermediate classes, asserting that the middle bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie were part of the bulwark of counter-revolution. It was therefore impossible, they maintained, that there should be such a thing as "a third group" or "an intermediate camp." They held that, in the democratic revolution then taking place, the role of the bourgeoisie was in no way progressive and that the forces of the Chinese revolution comprised only the working class, farm labourers, poor peasants, middle peasants and the lower stratum of the urban petty bourgeoisie.

They claimed that the nation-wide revolutionary rise was continuing and stressed the need for the Party to take the offensive throughout the country. They believed that under the conditions of a nation-wide revolutionary rise, it would be possible for the revolution to achieve victory first in one or several provinces; and that this victory would start with the seizure of one or several political or economic centres. It was therefore necessary, they held, to make preparations for staging general strikes and demonstrations in various parts of the country or in the major cities. Asserting that there would be a decisive fight between the two regimes, they advocated that the Party's strategy should be one of offensive.
Under the pressure of the “Left” doctrinaires, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party met in January 1931. At this session the doctrinaires secured the leading position in the Party’s Central Committee and the “Left” line was accepted, thus thereby initiating the period of the domination of the third “Left” line.

At this juncture, a chain of major events took place in China. The Red Army of the Central Area in Kiangsi won great victories in smashing successively the enemy’s second and third encirclement campaigns. Meanwhile, with the occupation of the Northeast by the Japanese imperialists, the movements for democracy and national independence throughout the country reached a new climax.

But the leading body of the Party found itself enmeshed in the blunders of the third “Left” line. The “Leftists” adopted a sectarian policy and opposed the policy of a united front. Thus they made it impossible for the Party to organize the broad masses on an extensive scale, and to rally all potential allies to wage a mammoth struggle against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. The revolution was not pushed forward in the favourable situation; on the contrary, it suffered fresh setbacks as a result of erroneous leadership.

1. The Japanese imperialist aggression brought about changes in internal class relations. The ascendancy of national contradictions over class contradictions made possible the formation of a united front against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. But the “Leftists” insisted that the imperialist powers would jointly attack the Soviet Union and the different Kuomintang cliques would jointly attack the Chinese revolution. They maintained that Japan’s military manoeuvres in the Northeast would be the prelude to an open war against the Soviet Union, and that the existing conditions, far from causing greater conflicts and dissensions among the different cliques of the Kuomintang, would lead to their unity in their endeavour to oppose the revolution.

This was the “Leftists’” erroneous view on the current situation.

Exaggeration of the unanimity of the imperialist powers in their attack upon the Soviet Union caused the “Leftists” to overlook the danger of Japan’s attempt to colonize first the Northeast and then the rest of China and the importance of safeguarding China’s territorial sovereignty — a misjudgement which caused the alienation of the Party from the extensive anti-Japanese movement at that time. On the other hand, they overlooked the intensifying contradictions and conflicts between the imperialist powers and the impending crisis of imperialist war. Thus the contradictions and cleavages between Japan and the other imperialist powers were not exploited in favour of the anti-Japanese struggle.

Owing to their overemphasis on the unanimity of the domestic ruling classes in their onslaught upon the Chinese revolution and on the unity of the counter-revolutionary blocs, they regarded all the ruling groups as equally reactionary. They overlooked the fact that the ruling groups were undergoing political and economic changes. They brushed aside all the contradictions within the ruling classes, between the national bourgeoisie which was out of power and the comprador and landlord classes which was in power, and between the national bourgeoisie and the Japanese imperialists. This made it impossible for the Party to adopt a flexible policy — one which would strengthen the forces of the revolution by making use of these contra-
dictions to isolate and strike the fiercest and most powerful enemy.

(2) The leaders of the “Left” line overestimated the crisis of the Kuomintang rule and the growth of the revolutionary forces. Consequently they one-sidedly stressed the antagonism between the two regimes and the need for a decisive fight between classes. They asserted that there were only two regimes in China—the Kuomintang regime and the Red regime, and denied the possible existence of a third regime that was also antagonistic to Nanking.

That was why the leaders of the “Left” line rejected the slogan of the national defence government. The national defence government would be neither the traitorous Nanking government, nor the Red government. It would be an anti-Japanese democratic government formed on the alliance of all classes, all political parties and groups. Although at that time the broad masses were opposing the traitorous Nanking government, they were not yet ready to establish a worker-peasant democratic government. The “Leftists” failed to take into account the fact that as yet these people were tarrying somewhere midway between the two antagonistic governments and that they demanded an anti-Japanese democratic government. Consequently the “Leftists” did not put forth the slogan of replacing the traitorous Nanking government with the anti-Japanese democratic government.

This error naturally led to another, the attempt to seize one or two major centres in order to achieve victory of the revolution in one or more of three provinces—Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi. After the Third Counter-Encirclement Campaign, the “Leftists” refused to allow the troops a period of time for rest and replacements, and gave instructions to keep on pursuing the enemy so as to “seize one or two major or secondary cities.” As a result of an incorrect analysis of the situation, they stressed the possibility of achieving revolutionary victory first in one or several provinces and strove to accomplish it as a central task of the Party.

4. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST JAPAN AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK DURING THE TEMPORARY EBB OF THE REVOLUTION

Chiang Kai-shek did not drop out for any length of time. With the help of the Japanese imperialists and in collaboration with the Wang Ching-wei clique, he was reinstated in power. Immediately following their re-emergence in the political arena in January 1932, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei set about suppressing the nation-wide anti-Japanese movement and sabotaging the battle against the Japanese invaders in Shanghai. With the signing of the Shanghai Armistice Agreement, Chiang immediately resumed his encirclement campaigns against the Red Army in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Area. He also founded, in addition to the C.C. Clique, the Society of National Revival (or the Blue Shirt Society)—both organizations employing the most insidious and brutal methods to undermine the Communist Party, to suppress patriotic, democratic movements, and to wreck the anti-Chiang groups within the Kuomintang. Under the slogan of opposing the Communist Party, Chiang convened the so-called “National Emergency Conference,” and formed a counter-revolutionary united front to bolster up his reactionary regime. During this period, the revolution sank temporarily to a low ebb.
But even in this period when the revolutionary tide was falling the Chinese people kept up their struggle against Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese aggressors.

After the signing of the Shanghai Armistice Agreement, the Japanese imperialists continued to press forward. Breaking through the Shanhaikuan Pass in January 1933, the Japanese army launched an attack on Jehol and, as the Kuomintang army fled without putting up any resistance, the whole of Jehol and northern Chahar Provinces soon fell into Japanese hands. In the middle of March the Japanese unleashed an all-out attack on the passes on the Great Wall. The Kuomintang troops then stationed in the Peking-Tientsin area outnumbered the enemy forces ten-fold, but Chiang Kai-shek forbade the Chinese army to fight. Consequently, the Japanese troops, having occupied all the passes on the Great Wall, pushed forward and closed in upon Peking and Tientsin. On May 31 the Kuomintang government signed the Tangku Agreement with the Japanese, virtually recognizing the latter's occupation of the three northeastern provinces and Jehol, and marking off eastern Hopei as a demilitarized zone, thus making it possible for Japan to extend her control over the whole of North China.

To cover up its treacherous activities, the Chiang Kai-shek government slanderously accused the Red Army of disturbing the rear, and spread the counter-revolutionary slogan: "Domestic rebellion must be suppressed before fighting a foreign foe." To shatter the preposterous propaganda of the Chiang Kai-shek government and to show the Red Army's determination to resist Japan, the Central Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government and the Revolutionary Military Council issued a declaration on January 17, 1933 to the effect that they were willing to conclude an agreement for resistance against Japan with any army on condition that the attacks upon the Red areas be stopped, that the people's democratic rights be guaranteed, and that the broad masses be armed.

The slanderous lies of the Kuomintang were thus utterly exposed. There was growing discontent among the Kuomintang members with its anti-Communist civil war policy. Besides, the declaration undermined the morale of the Kuomintang troops then encircling the Red Army. Chiang Kai-shek found himself in an extremely difficult position.

Japan's attempt to reduce China to a colony under her sole domination and the treacherous activities of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique widened the rift in the ruling camp of China. In 1933 Feng Yu-hsiang and Tsai Ting-kai took steps to unite with the Communists in a common fight against Japan.

Having taken all the passes on the Great Wall as well as the area east of the Luan River, the Japanese instigated the puppet troops to attack Chahar and seize Tolun and other counties in the eastern part of that province. In May 1933, under the influence and with the help of the Chinese Communist Party, Feng Yu-hsiang and others organized the Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Changchiakou, Chahar, and declared war on Japan. After hard fighting, they recovered the northern part of Chahar. Thereupon Chiang Kai-shek united his forces with Japanese troops in attacking the Anti-Japanese Allied Army. Feng Yu-hsiang was compelled to leave Chahar and the anti-Japanese troops led by Chi Hung-chang, then heading for eastern Hopei, were outflanked by the Japanese and Chiang's forces, and routed in October.
Tsai Ting-kai and other officers of the 19th Route Army, who had been dispatched to Fukien to “annihilate the Communists” gradually came to realize that nothing would come of fighting the Red Army. Therefore, in November 1933, joining forces with a section of the Kuomintang headed by Li Chi-shen, they set up the People’s Government in Fukien, openly broke with the Chiang Kai-shek government and concluded an agreement with the Red Army for resistance to Japan and struggle against Chiang Kai-shek.

The Fukien event coincided with the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign in the Red Area. The existence of the People’s Government in Fukien could have been turned to good account by the Red Army in its struggle to shatter the enemy’s encirclement and to extend the revolutionary base. Therefore, the Party was correct in concluding an armistice agreement with the 19th Route Army and encouraging it to resist Japan and oppose Chiang Kai-shek.

But strategically, the exponents of the “Left” line adopted quite a different policy. They could have launched a sudden attack on Chiang’s forces on the east front in co-ordination with the manœuvres of the 19th Route Army, a move which would have smashed Chiang’s fifth encirclement of the Central Area, but this they did not do.

The period from the establishment of the Provisional Central Committee, headed by Comrade Chin Pang-hsien, on September 1, 1931 to the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935, was one of the continuous development of the third “Left” line.

At the beginning of 1933, the headquarters of the Party moved from Shanghai to the revolutionary base in southern Kiangsi. Prior to this, the leaders of the “Left” line, disregarding the damage they had caused to the revolutionary movement and to the popular anti-Japanese movement in the Kuomintang-controlled areas after the September 18 Incident, had blindly estimated that the revolutionary situation was mounting with each passing day. They denied the law of the uneven development of the Chinese revolution; and labelled as “Right opportunist” the viewpoint that the working-class movement was lagging behind the peasant movement and that the revolutionary movement in the North was behind than in the South. They declared that the wave of strikes was gathering momentum in all the big cities of the country and that it was possible to build up the Red regime throughout North China. They affirmed without the slightest foundation that the revolutionary struggle at that time was a struggle between two ways—the way of the Red regime and the way leading to the colonization of China; in other words, it was what they called “a decisive fight between classes.” They considered that the most urgent task then was still to adopt a policy of “active offensive” and take big cities. They were opposed to utilizing the legal forms of struggle and confused open with underground work. Instead, disregarding the tremendous disparity in strength between the enemy and the forces of the revolution, they frequently organized strikes among workers and students, demonstrations, and even armed insurrections. Owing to this adventurist policy, the Party in the Kuomintang-controlled areas suffered grave losses.

On the other hand, they claimed that the principal danger within the Party was the so-called “Right deviation,” and slanderously labelled the correct line followed in the Central Area as the “line of the rich peasants.” After moving into the revolutionary base in Kiangsi, they changed the correct Party and military leadership.
which had been operating in the Central Area. They negated Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct agrarian policy, and enforced in the Red Areas an ultra-"Left" policy of not allotting any land to landlords and allotting only poor land to rich peasants. It was stipulated in their agrarian law that after the confiscation of their land, the landlords were to be deprived of the right to any share of land, and the rich peasants were to be allotted only arable land of relatively poor quality. The rich peasants could keep only such tools and draught animals as were needed to cultivate their newly allotted land; all extra tools and animals were to be confiscated. It was stipulated in the "Outlines of the Constitution" that the rich peasants were not to be allowed any democratic rights. Towards all those social strata under the Red regime which were of a capitalist character, they adopted ultra-"Left" policies as regards labour, economy, and political power; that is to say, an indiscriminate struggle was waged against all social elements other than the peasantry and the lower stratum of the urban petty bourgeoisie. Denying the uneveness between the development of the Central Area and that of the border areas, they rejected the proposition that the Party's policy should vary with different areas. They declared that the basic cultural and educational policy of the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government should be based on communist principles. Moreover, they carried out an ultra-"Left" policy in liquidating counter-revolutionaries and in many other matters. Thus, their erroneous line was further implemented in the Central Area and the surrounding areas.

The "Leftists" also adopted an utterly erroneous policy toward the Fukien event.

They indiscriminately regarded all the factions and cliques within the Kuomintang and its government as counter-revolutionary. They regarded as a new trick the establishment of the People's Government in Fukien which was an expression of the split within the Kuomintang. They denied any difference between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the Fukien government and the existence of a third kind of government. Instead of giving active assistance to the People's Government in Fukien, they censured it for adopting a political programme different from that of the Red regime. They even called upon the broad masses in Fukien to rise and take independent action "to accelerate the downfall of the seekers of a third road."

Hence, the People's Government in Fukien collapsed in 1934 owing to the three factors: the assault made by Chiang Kai-shek's superior forces, dissensions within its own ranks, and the erroneous policy of the third "Left" line.

The "Leftists" had brushed aside the correct Party and military leadership in the Central Area, but, thanks to the profound influence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct strategic principles, the Red Army was still able to gain victory in the Fourth Counter-Encirclement Campaign, in the spring of 1933 before it was permeated with the influence of the erroneous "Left" line.

After the victory of the Third Counter-Encirclement Campaign, the counter-revolutionary strongholds within the revolutionary bases were wiped out and the rear of the revolutionary forces was consolidated.

Chiang Kai-shek switched over to the defensive against the Red Army in the Central Area but concentrated his forces in attacking the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Area and the Hunghu Area. In January
1932, when he launched his attack against the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Area, the Fourth Front Army broke through his lines at Huanng-chuan and routed his reinforcements. The base area was extended to Shangcheng, Kushih and Hsinchi in Honan and to Chinchiachai and Yuehsi in Anhwei. The Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Area was of great strategic importance; it commanded the Yangtse River, pressed near to Hankow and Wuchang and its forces could threaten the Peking-Hankow Railway. In July Chiang Kai-shek started his fourth encirclement campaign against the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Area. In the battle of Chiliping his main force was routed. But the leaders of the Fourth Front Army, thinking that the Kuomintang troops had been greatly weakened and did not deserve their serious attention, failed to continue with their preparations for counter-encirclement after winning the victory. Therefore, when the enemy launched another attack, they were forced to put up a dogged resistance in a disadvantageous position, thus incurring losses so severe that they had to withdraw from the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Area in October 1932 and retreat into northern Szechuan via Honan and Shensi.

In the autumn of 1932, the Second Corps of the Red Army under the command of Ho Lung made its way north from the Hunghu Area. With its vanguard soon reaching the vicinity of Hanyang, it co-ordinated with the Fourth Front Army in a manoeuvre to bring pressure to bear upon Wuhan. When the Fourth Front Army veered westwards, the Second Corps pulled out of the Hunghu Area. Subsequently it moved into the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow borders, and opened a new base area there.

In the summer of 1932, Chiang Kai-shek mustered a force of 500,000 strong and launched the fourth encirclement campaign against the Central Area.

This campaign lasted eight months, from June 1932 to February 1933. The enemy adopted the tactics of advancing from north to south by many routes on Chinhsi. The Red Army, on the other hand, deployed large regiments in ambushing and encircling the enemy. In the battle at Huwan (West of Chinhsi), a whole division of the enemy was put out of action. Thereupon the enemy rearranged its forces and marched on Nanfeng and Kuangchang in three columns. The main force of the enemy was the eastern column and the two divisions forming the western prong were exposed to attack from the Red Army. After shifting its position and covertly gathering forces, the Red Army first struck at the two enemy divisions at Hwangpi in the southern part of Yihuang and put them out of action. When large enemy reinforcements arrived, the Red Army deployed its troops at Pilishan and Leikungsheng in the vicinity of Tungpi and Tsaotaikang to the south of Yihuang, and stamped out a whole division of enemy troops. With these two engagements the Red Army completely crushed the fourth encirclement campaign.

After the victory a movement was launched in the Central Area to expand the Red Army. The First Front Army, including the local armed forces, was at that time about 100,000 strong. The base areas stretched over parts of Hunan, Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangtung, with a population of around 3,000,000.

On January 22, 1934, the Second National Congress of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers was convened in Juichin. At this congress, Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a report summing up the work that had been accomplished.

In the summer of 1933 Chiang Kai-shek started active preparations
for his fifth encirclement campaign. He put into practice a new strategy of building blockhouses around the Red Area with Juichin as its centre. At the same time, he imposed a brutal economic blockade. In view of the situation Comrade Mao Tse-tung put the question of economic construction before the Second National Congress of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung correctly analysed the important role of economic construction in the revolutionary war. He pointed out that a struggle should be waged on the economic front to guarantee war supplies for the Red Army and to improve the living conditions of the people.

Under the guidance of this principle, significant results were achieved.

First, the economic construction gave support to the revolutionary war by ensuring supplies to the Red Army.

The primary task in the economic construction of the Red Area lay in the development of agriculture. Rational use of manpower and draught animals became a key question.

During the revolutionary war many young and middle-aged men went to the front. Therefore, the organization of manpower, especially from among the women, assumed great importance. The mutual-aid societies were organized in the Central Area in accordance with the voluntary principle of mutual benefit and on the basis of individual economy. Each society consisted of all the peasants in a village or township. Thus large numbers of women were enabled to take part in productive work.

Apart from organizing mutual assistance, these societies extended help to the families of Red Army men and the orphaned and old people with no children to support them.

Co-operatives were also formed in the Central Area to solve the problems of those peasants with too few draught animals or none at all. Members of the co-operatives pooled their funds to buy the animals for use in common.

With the setting up of these mutual-aid organizations in the Red Areas, agricultural production in some places not only reached the pre-revolution level, but even surpassed it. Thus the Red Army was guaranteed its provisions.

Industry (paper, tobacco, tungsten, camphor, farming implement, fertilizer, as well as cloth, pharmaceutical, sugar, saltpetre and salt) was developed in the three different sectors of the economy; state, co-operative and private. The aim was first to achieve self-sufficiency and secondly to produce commodities for trade with outside areas. Both were essential to the achievement of victory in the revolutionary war.

Trade with the Kuomintang-controlled areas was an important factor in economic work. Every year three million tan of unhusked rice, averaging one tan per person, were sent out from the Central Area in exchange for everyday needs. Tungsten was also sent out. The three million people in the Central Area needed about nine million yuan worth of salt and about six million yuan worth of cotton cloth every year. The Central Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government controlled the trade so as to sell goods at proper prices and to procure salt and cloth from outside areas. The government also issued bonds.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the national economy of the Red Areas was made up of three sectors: state, co-operative,
and private. He maintained that it was necessary to develop first and foremost the state sector of the economy by all possible measures and the co-operative sector on an extensive scale. As to the private sector, it was to be encouraged and promoted within legal limits. He emphasized that the leadership of the state sector over the private sector would constitute a condition for the future transition to socialism.

Secondly, the economic construction was aimed at improving the living conditions of the people and enhancing their understanding of the revolutionary war.

As an organizer of the life of the people, the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government did its utmost to solve their difficulties and raise their standards of living.

In those places of the Red Areas where the work was done well the living conditions of the people were invariably improved. Take, for instance, the townships of Changkang and Tsaihsi, which were honoured by the title of "model township." Before the revolution, the poor peasants and farm labourers in Tsaihsi had rice to eat only for three months a year. For all the remaining months they had to take other cereals like maize and sorghum, and in insufficient quantities at that. But in 1934 things were different. They could eat rice during half the year, and for the other half, sufficient quantities of cereals like maize and sorghum. In Changkang, there were twice as many poor peasants eating meat and three times as many workers. Peasants bought twice as much cloth as they had in the past, and there was plenty of cooking oil for all and to spare.

In the mobilization of the people for war, Changkang and Tsaihsi also achieved great results. Eighty per cent of the young and middle-aged men in Changkang, 88 per cent in Upper Tsaihsi, and 70 per cent in Lower Tsaihsi, left their homes to join the Red Army or engage in other kinds of revolutionary work.

This achievement was inseparable from the improvement of the living conditions of the people. From their personal experience the masses came to realize what the revolutionary war meant to them. Hence they all responded to the political call of the Party, for they regarded the revolution as their very life.

5. FAILURE OF THE FIFTH COUNTER-ENCIRCLEMENT CAMPAIGN UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE THIRD "LEFT" LINE. GREAT STRATEGIC SHIFT OF THE CHINESE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY

After the failure of his fourth encirclement campaign, Chiang Kai-shek proceeded to prepare for the fifth with the support of the imperialists. Having discovered that the tactics of concerted attacks by converging columns proved fruitless in assaulting the Red Areas, he projected a general offensive—military, political, economic and ideological—against the revolutionary base. At Lushan, Kiangsi, he set up his Officers Training Corps, where officers received fascist political and military training, including methods of fighting with the aid of blockhouses and in mountainous regions. He also established local security guards, strengthened the reactionary fascist rule, contracted foreign loans and imposed a strict economic blockade against the Red Areas.

By waging a war that was strategically protracted and tactically...
dependent on blockhouses, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to exhaust the human and material resources of the Red Army and pare down the revolutionary base before seeking the main forces of the Red Army for a final annihilation campaign.

Along with his military offensive against the Red Areas, Chiang conducted a cultural encirclement campaign. This took the form of an unprecedentedly brutal suppression of the revolutionary cultural movement in the Kuomintang-controlled areas.

In a "campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" against revolutionary culture, cultural weapons were needed. But the special brand of "culture" advocated by the Kuomintang found its most eloquent spokesmen in ultra-reactionary government officials and heads of the intelligence service. There were no Kuomintang writers and artists capable of producing anything worthy of mention. To counter revolutionary culture, the Kuomintang resorted to reviling, persecution, imprisonment, and massacre of revolutionary writers and artists and sent thugs, spies and murderers against them.

The Kuomintang banned all progressive books and journals. Any book, even if it had only the slightest tinge of revolutionary sentiment, or a red-lettered cover, or was merely written by a Left winger, or by a Russian writer, might be banned. Numerous bookshops which published or sold progressive books and magazines were closed down. At the same time, the Kuomintang did everything in its power to mislead the people and paralyse their fighting spirit. It encouraged the worship of Confucius and the study of the old "classics," and disseminated fascism. The suppression and massacre of revolutionary writers and young progressives were unparalleled in history. No less than 300,000 young people were butchered from the time of the Kuomintang's betrayal of the revolution in 1927 to 1935, not counting those who were missing or imprisoned.

When the Kuomintang clamped down a White terror of extreme cruelty in its efforts to strangle revolutionary culture and "annihilate" communist and democratic ideas, Lu Hsun, the greatest and resolute warrior in the whole revolutionary cultural camp, engaged the enemy in a bitter struggle on behalf of the Chinese people. He was the banner of the revolution on the cultural front. The Kuomintang cultural "encirclement campaign" ended in failure. All this showed up the Kuomintang as a most dark and brutal ruling clique and proved the Chinese proletarian revolutionary culture to be indestructible. The policy of massacre could only expose the hollowness of the Kuomintang culture. The revolutionary cultural movement, far from being destroyed, became the only cultural movement of the time.

In October 1933, when all preparations had been made, Chiang Kai-shek mustered one million troops for the fifth encirclement. Half of the troops were employed in a direct attack on the Central Red Area. Before the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign, a movement was started in the Central Red Area for expanding the Red Army, which proved so successful that 100,000 workers and peasants went to the front. The economic recovery and development ensured military supplies to the Red Army and brought about some improvement in the living conditions of the people. As a result of employing the strategy and tactics of Comrade Mao Tse-tung many victories had already been won in the Counter-Encirclement Campaigns. Strong support was also given to the Red Army by the revolutionary cultural movement in the Kuomintang-controlled areas. Moreover, in the Kuomintang areas, the people's movement against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek was surging
forward and the Fukien event was taking place, compelling Chiang Kai-shek to fight on more than one fronts. Under the leadership of the Party, in Shanghai and other major cities, preparatory committees were set up to form the Chinese People's Committee for Armed Self-Defence, sponsored by many noted figures of all social strata, headed by Soong Ching Ling and Ma Hsiang-po. They put forward a basic programme for the Chinese people's anti-Japanese war. Under these favourable conditions the Red Army should have been able to smash the fifth encirclement. However, the "Left" opportunist leaders failed to make use of these conditions, and particularly because of an utterly mistaken military line, caused the Red Army to suffer serious losses.

Still clinging to their viewpoint that the imperialist powers would jointly attack the Soviet Union and the various cliques in the Kuomintang would jointly attack the Chinese revolution, the leaders of the "Left" line overlooked China's national crisis caused by the Japanese aggression and continued to exaggerate the extent of the crisis of the Kuomintang rule and the growth of the Chinese revolutionary forces. With scarcely any factual warrant, they held that the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign would be the decisive battle of the war between the Kuomintang and the Red regime; that the victory in this battle would be the key to the victory in one or several provinces, or even in the whole country. What was still more absurd, they held that as soon as the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants was realized in certain important areas, the socialist revolution would be set afoot.

In the matter of military policy, they opposed the guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character, and put forward such slogans as "The Red Army must firmly hold its positions in the Counter-Encirclement Campaign, and must not yield an inch of the Red territory to the enemy."

In order to cut the connections between the Central Red Area and the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Area, the enemy first attacked Lichuan. Thereupon the Red Army engaged the enemy at Hsunkou and annihilated a whole division of their forces. The Red Army had always taken great pains with the first battle, which had to be won by all means, because its success or failure would have a tremendous effect upon the whole situation, and even the final engagement. Although the battle at Hsunkou had been won, the directors of the campaign, who were adherents of a purely defensive military line, did not regard it as the first battle of the Counter-Encirclement Campaign, nor did they make use of all the changes it brought about to guide the war to the road of victory. Instead, they took alarm at the loss of a single town and attempted to recover Lichuan and halt the enemy beyond the border of the base area. First the Red forces attacked Hsiaoshih in the White area north of Lichuan. Repulsed in that battle, they shifted their attack to Tzehsichiao, southeast of Hsiaoshih, but again they gained no ground. Then they moved back and forth between the enemy's main forces and blockhouses and were manoeuvred into a completely passive position.

In December, the enemy attacked Tuantsun, south of Lichuan. Because the strength of the Red Army was divided in this battle, it failed to annihilate the enemy. When the enemy forces reassembled and pressed southwards, paring down the base area, the Red Army retreated to Tehshengkuan and Tashanling on the Fukien-Kiangsi border, defending the Chienning-Taining line.

At the time of the Fukien event, the enemy withdrew some of his
troops to attack the 19th Route Army, and switched to the defensive on the Central Area front, building defence works all along the line. This provided a fine opportunity for the Red Army to annihilate the enemy. But under the direction of the "Left" line, instead of launching a counter-offensive against the enemy, the Red Army advanced on Wukiang (southeast of Chishui), Shenkang, and Tangkou. The Fukien People's Government collapsed owing to the superiority of the attacking forces and the internal discord within the 19th Route Army.

The enemy then concentrated its forces in attacking the Red Army. After holding out for nine months in the area of Kangtu (northwest of Chiennning), Chienning and Taining, the Red Army was at last compelled to retreat.

Thereupon the main force of the enemy pushed forward from Kanchu to Kuangchang, the north entrance to the Central Red Area. The aim of the north column of the enemy forces in taking Kuangchang was to facilitate a co-ordinated attack with all the other enemy columns against the Central Red Area. The "Leftist" leaders adopted a strategy of positional warfare; they employed the same tactics as the enemy, concentrating their troops and building blockhouses. The Red Army, poorly equipped as it was, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, but it was tied down to its position, with consequent loss of flexibility. As a result, it sustained great losses and failed to halt the enemy.

After the battle of Kuangchang, the first column of the enemy forces advanced from Taiho to Hsingkuo, the second column from Tengtien to Kulungkang, and the third column pressed towards Ningtu and Shihcheng. The Red Army dispersed to defend important positions on these routes, attempting to stop the enemy advance. In the battles at Kaohunao and Wannenting in the southern part of Kuangchang, the Red Army entirely employed the tactics of positional warfare, resisting the attacking enemy at one position after another. Here the positional warfare reached its climax in the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign. Though heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy, the Red Army was very much weakened by serious losses. Then the battle of Yichien (north of Shihcheng) took place. The Red Army made one retreat after another, and the base area shrank steadily.

Following the battle of Yichien, the Red Army on the Hsingkuo-Kaohsingyu-Laoyingpan line likewise retreated to the south of Hsingkuo.

All in all, during the course of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign, the leaders of the "Left" opportunist line made a series of bad mistakes. They failed to take advantage of the initial victory of Hsunkou, refused to support the Fukien People's Government, and insisted on "striking the enemy with both fists," on resisting the enemy's concentration of troops by concentrating the revolutionary forces and on dividing the Red Army for the defence of all the positions. These mistakes and many others of a similar kind were in essence negative measures or passive tactics which brought great losses to the Red Army and failed to halt the enemy. Consequently, after fighting for more than a year, the Red Army was still unable to smash the encirclement and finally had to withdraw from the base in Kiangsi.

In order to break through Chiang Kai-shek's encirclement and win new victories, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
started in October 1934 the worldshaking strategic shift, known as the Long March.

The Party had dispatched in July 1934 the Seventh Army Corps as an advance contingent against the Japanese aggressors in North China. This contingent moved from Fukien through Chekiang and Anhwei into Kiangsi, where they joined with the Tenth Army under the command of Fang Chih-min to form the Tenth Army Corps. After numerous battles, this new Army Corps moved into the Huaiyu Mountains at the end of 1934. There it was worsted in an engagement with the Kuomintang troops. Comrade Fang Chih-min was captured in January 1935 and died a heroic death in July in Nanchang. The remainder of the troops, under the command of Comrade Su Yu, continued to wage guerrilla warfare on the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi border.

Acting on the orders of the Central Committee of the Party, the Sixth Army Corps, commanded by Jen Pi-shih, evacuated the Hunan-Kiangsi Base Area in August 1934. As an advance guard of the main forces of the Red Army it broke through the encirclement to open a route of advance and reconnoitre the enemy. In December the Sixth Army Corps and the Second Army Corps under the command of Ho Lung linked up in the eastern part of Kweichow to form the Second Front Army and opened up the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow Base.

In September, the 25th Army which had been fighting in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Area broke through the encirclement at Loshan in Honan, and, penetrating into the southern part of Shensi, created the Honan-Hupeh-Shensi Base.

The northward movement of the anti-Japanese advance contingent, the western march of the Sixth Army Corps and the northwestern movement of the 25th Army gave strong support to the great strategic shift of the First Front Army of the Central Base Area and other Red Army units throughout the country.

In October 1934, the main forces of the Red Army, together with the staff in organizations at the rear, totalling about 100,000 men, started the Long March from Changting and Ninghua in Fukien and Juichin and Yutu in Kiangsi. After breaking through the first enemy cordon between Anyuan and Hsinfeng in Kiangsi, they entered the northern part of Kwangtung. They broke through the second enemy cordon between Kweitung and Jucheng in Hunan and occupied Yichang. Then they broke through the third cordon along the Canton-Hankow Railway and occupied Linwu and other counties. After that the Red Army pushed westwards by separate routes, crossed the Hsiao River and bore down on the Kwantsi border.

By the end of November, the Red Army reached the east bank of the Hsiang River, made a forced crossing, and got through the fourth enemy cordon. Advancing along the Hsiyen Mountains in Kwantsi, it entered the eastern part of Kweichow and took Liping, Chinpeng, Shihping, Yuching and other counties. Then it pushed on to Tsunyi. On the way it defeated the Kuomintang troops under the command of Wang Chia-lieh. Crossing the Wukiang River, it occupied Tsunyi on January 6, 1935. Here an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party was called. This was the famous Tsunyi Conference.
6. THE TSUNYI CONFERENCE STRUGGLE. AGAINST CHANG KUO-TAO’S WRONG LINE IN THE RED ARMY’S NORTHWARD MARCH AGAINST JAPAN. VICTORY OF THE RED ARMY IN ITS LONG MARCH

In January 1935, after the Red Army had taken Tsunyi an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party was held to save the imperilled Red Army and China’s revolutionary cause. By that time, the mistakes of “Left” opportunism had caused serious discontent among the cadres and the rank and file, and many comrades who had once committed “Left” mistakes began to wake up and turn against them. Thus, thanks to the resolute struggle put up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and many other comrades and to the support of the majority of the comrades, the Tsunyi Conference repudiated the wrong “Left” military line and approved the correct line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The “Left” opportunists were removed from their leading positions and a new Party leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung was established.

The Tsunyi Conference put an end to the rule of the “Left” line in the Central Committee of the Party and, in particular, to the military mistakes of “Left” opportunism, and established Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s position as leader of the whole Party. Thus, under the extremely difficult and dangerous conditions during the Long March, the Party succeeded in preserving and steeling the core of the Red Army, thereby rescuing itself and the revolution from danger. The beginning of a new leadership in the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung was a change of paramount historical importance in the Party. Thereafter, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese revolution, remaining under the Marxist-Leninist leadership of this great, outstanding and completely reliable leader, pushed ahead from victory to greater victory.

After the Tsunyi Conference, the Party adopted the military line of mobile warfare, and with the army reorganized and equipment and baggage reduced, proceeded to bewilder and elude the enemy with rapid, unpredictable manoeuvres.

It was decided at the Tsunyi Conference that the Red Army should continue its northward march. Hence the Kuomintang hurriedly redeployed its forces to prevent the Red Army from crossing the Yangtse River in Szechuan and effecting a junction with the Fourth Front Army of the Szechuan-Shensi Area. The Red Army first marched westwards from Szechuan to Weihsin in Yunnan, then, turning back to Kweichow and concentrating its main forces in the vicinity of Tsunyi, routed a number of Kuomintang contingents which were following in pursuit. After this battle, when the Red Army marched in a northwesterly direction, the Chiang Kai-shek troops blocked its route of advance and cut it off from the Second Front Army. Then the Red Army turned towards Kweiyang and from there headed for Yunnan. It successively took Sungming and Hsuntien, closing in on Kunming. By that time the Red Army had already left the Kuomintang forces far behind. The Party ordered the army to cross the Chinsha River. This was a key move in the course of the strategic shift. After crossing the Chinsha River, the Red Army continued to march north, and its advance guard reached Anshun-chang south of the Tatu River on May 15. A forced crossing was then made of the river, and the troops made straight along both banks for Luting.
One of the tributaries of the Yangtse River, the Tatu River flows rapidly through steep mountains. It was over 300 metres wide, with a depth ranging from seven to around a dozen metres. Though constantly checked and pursued by the enemy, the Red Army took on May 29 a strategic point—the Luting Bridge across the river north of Anshunchang. Then, after passing through Tienchuan and Lushan, the army began the ascent of Chiachinshan, a high peak of the southernmost extremity of the Great Snow Mountains on the Szechuan-Sikang border. On June 16, the Central Red Army and the Fourth Front Army joined forces in Maokung in western Szechuan and, continuing their northward march, climbed Mengpishan, another high peak in the Great Snow Mountains. On July 10 it reached Maoerkai, southwest of Sungpan County.

It was then that Chang Kuo-tao, who had been working in the Fourth Front Army, showed a serious tendency towards flight-ism and warlordism in the face of enemy attack. He lost all faith in the future of the revolution, because he denied the rise of the nation-wide anti-Japanese, democratic movement and magnified the strength of the enemy while belittling that of the revolutionary forces. A serious dispute thus arose between him and the Central Committee of the Party. The Central Committee held that the Red Army should march north and open up a base in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area to co-ordinate with the daily growing nation-wide anti-Japanese movement. But Chang Kuo-tao opposed this policy and advocated instead the defeatist line of withdrawing to the national minorities areas in Sikang and Tibet.

This wrong line of Chang Kuo-tao's to withdraw the Red Army to the national minorities areas could have only seriously weakened the Red Army and the nation-wide anti-Japanese movement, and even ended in the complete foundering of the revolutionary cause.

The Red Army had a month of rest in the Great Snow Mountains area. During this interval the Central Committee of the Party held two important conferences in Maokung and Maoerkai, both of which were successful, and rejected Chang Kuo-tao's line of flight-ism.

The Red Army then divided itself into two columns, one of which took the east route and the other the west, and continued to march north. The column on the east route, passing the deserted and marshy grasslands west of Sungpan, reached Pahsi on August 28. But the other, when it reached Apah, was arbitrarily ordered to turn south to Tienchuan and Lushan by Chang Kuo-tao. In addition, he ordered the troops of the Fourth Front Army, who were then following the east route, to recross the grasslands and march south with him. He took his troops to the Kantze area in Sikang, and established a bogus "Party Centre," undermining the solidarity of the Party and the Red Army. Besides, he plotted to place the Central Committee of the Party in danger.

Part of the Red Army, led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, resolutely marched northwards in the direction of Kansu and Shensi. Starting out from Maolung on September 5, they entered Minhsien in the southern part of Kansu, and occupied Tungwei. Breaking through the enemy's cordon at Liupanshan, they arrived in Huanhsien County by way of Kuyuan County. On October 19, 1935, they reached Wuchichen Town, Paoan County in northern Shensi. There they were met by the Red Army of northern Shensi led by Liu Chih-tan.

In November 1935, the Second Front Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army broke through the encirclement in the Hunan-
Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow border area, and in June 1936 joined forces with the Fourth Front Army in Kantze, Sikang. Owing to the persistent efforts of Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, Ho Lung, Kuan Hsiang-ying and other comrades in the face of Chang Kuo-tao's opposition, the Fourth Front Army moved northwards together with the Second Front Army. However, when the combined forces reached Huining and Chingning in Kansu in October 1936, where they joined forces with the First Front Army, Chang Kuo-tao again ordered the Fourth Front Army to march westwards toward Sinkiang. Consequently, with the exception of a small section, the Fourth Front Army fell victims to Chang Kuo-tao's wrong line, being annihilated on their way to Sinkiang. This was a serious loss sustained by the Red Army.

Thanks to the convening of the Party conferences in Maokung, Maoerkai and later, in Yenan, at which Chang Kuo-tao's anti-Party activities were combated, and to the correct policy on inner-Party struggle adopted by the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Fourth Front Army soon came round to accepting the correct leadership of the Central Committee. In dealing with Chang Kuo-tao's mistakes, the Central Committee consistently used the methods of education and persuasion. Out of spirit of leniency he was given a chance to redeem his errors, even after he had set up a bogus "Party Centre." But these methods, generous and eminently fair as they were, failed to check the degeneration of this opportunist, and he ended by deserting the revolution and selling himself to the Kuo-mintang.

During the 12 months from October 1934 to October 1935, the Central Red Army marched through 11 provinces (Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi), climbed high snow-covered mountains, crossed grasslands with practically no sign of life, and smashed the encirclement, pursuit, obstruction and interception attempted by the enemy. It marched for 12,500 kilometres, overcame the innumerable military and political difficulties as well as natural obstacles, and finally reached the revolutionary base in northern Shensi in triumph to join forces with the Red Army there. Prior to the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign, the Red Army had grown to a force of 300,000 men. But as a result of the wrong leadership of the "Leftists" and the splitting activities and sabotage of Chang Kuo-tao, it suffered great losses; at the time of its arrival in northern Shensi, it had dwindled to less than 30,000. Nevertheless, these constituted the flower of the Red Army and the Party and the greatest treasure of the Chinese people.

It was of great historic significance that the three main contingents of the Red Army carried out this colossal shift of positions and effected a successful joining of forces. In the words of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, "The Long March is the first of its kind ever recorded in history, it is a manifesto, an agitation corps and a seeding-machine." A new historic record, because the Long March was an event unparalleled in world history; a manifesto, because it confirmed the invincibility of the Red Army and proclaimed the failure of the imperialist-Chiang encirclement campaigns; an agitation corps, because it declared in a vast area of China that the road of the Red Army led to the people's liberation; and lastly, a seeding-machine, because it sowed the seeds of revolution in 11 provinces.

Thus, the Long March ended in the victory of the Red Army and the defeat of the enemy.

2 An organization of fascist spies headed by the brothers, Chen Kuo-fu and Chen Li-fu. It was established in 1929.

CHAPTER SEVEN

NEW RISE OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNAL PEACE

(December 1935—July 1937)

1. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION FROM 1933 TO 1935. BEGINNING OF A NEW IMPERIALIST WAR

The economic crisis which had broken out in the capitalist countries in the latter half of 1929 lasted till the end of 1932. Then the decline in industry stopped and the crisis passed into a depression, followed by a certain upward trend in industry. In 1933 industry in the capitalist countries began to recover and pick up somewhat. For a few years after 1933 it continued on the upgrade. Taking the 1929 industrial output in the capitalist countries as 100, in 1935, the year Japan invaded North China, it was 75.6 per cent in the United States; 105.8 per cent in Britain; 67.4 per cent in France; 93.8 per cent in Italy; 94 per cent in Germany; and 141.8 per cent in Japan. Japan and Britain had surpassed the pre-crisis level while Germany and Italy were pretty close to it, but the United States and France still fell short by an average of about 25 per cent.

What was the cause of this slight relaxation of the capitalist crisis? First, the internal economic forces of capitalism had had some effect; the monopolists in the capitalist countries had intensified the exploitation of the workers and reduced the prices of the agricultural produce in their own countries and in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Secondly, the relaxation was due to such artificial factors as preparations for an imperialist war and the policy of inflation pursued by the capitalist countries.

During this period Japan extended her aggression from the Northeast to North China. With the super profits grabbed from China, Japan expanded her armaments and pushed on the war of aggression, thus partly making up the losses she had sustained during the crisis, and causing a certain revival and a certain upward trend in industry.

The economic crisis further intensified the contradictions within the capitalist countries and between them.

While basing their foreign policy on chauvinism and war preparations, the imperialist countries, in their internal administration, carried out counter-revolutionary terror and the oppression of worker and peasant masses as the necessary means for consolidating the rear in the coming war. They were sinking into an abyss of internal and external contradictions which could not be overcome.

A new imperialist war as a way out of the existing situation became ever more imminent.

In the three war-like imperialist countries, Germany, Italy and Japan, the bourgeois-democratic system was thoroughly destroyed and open terrorist methods were used to implement a fascist dictatorship.
In their foreign policy, these three countries were dissatisfied with the Nine-Power Treaty and the Treaty of Versailles, regarding them as obstacles to their aggressive actions. Thus the three aggressive countries became the source of a new war. Italy occupied Ethiopia, thereby widening the contradictions between Britain and Italy. Germany wanted to revise the boundary lines with neighbouring countries, and prepared to occupy Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. After occupying Northeast China, Japan launched a new attack on North China and the rest of China. Germany and Italy tore up the Treaty of Versailles and Japan the Nine-Power Treaty, and these three countries withdrew from the League of Nations.

A new redivision of the world by means of war became imminent.

The new war was launched in different places of the world by the rulers of Germany, Italy and Japan. It was a war against the national liberation movements and also against the interests of British, French and U.S. imperialism, aimed at redividing the territories and the spheres of influence throughout the world.

Thus the alliance of the three aggressor states began to take shape.

During this period, industrial output in the Soviet Union was nearly trebled, rising to 293.4 per cent of the 1929 level by 1935. What was more important was the fundamental change brought about in the economic and social structure of the Soviet Union. During this period, the Soviet Union changed from an agricultural country into an industrial country, from a country of individual farming into a country of mechanized, collective agriculture.

As a result of the rapid development of industrialization in the Soviet Union, the industrial output occupied first place in the total volume of production of her national economy. In 1933, it accounted for 70.4 per cent of the gross output of industry and agriculture. The Soviet Union became an industrial country.

The transformation of the Soviet Union from an agricultural country to an industrial country also signified the elimination of capitalism. The socialist system gained an overwhelming superiority in industry. In 1935, 99.96 per cent of all industrial products in the Soviet Union came from socialist industry. With the elimination of capitalism, the socialist system became the only system in industry in the Soviet Union.

In agriculture, according to area sown to grain crops in 1933, the socialist system of economy represented 84.5 per cent of the total while individual peasant economy constituted only 15.5 per cent. The collective farms had won a permanent victory and the peasants in the Soviet Union had once and for all switched over to the side of socialism.

In her foreign policy, the Soviet Union consistently opposed war and safeguarded peace. Therefore her interests demanded that she enter into closer contact with those countries unwilling to break the peace.

At the end of 1934, after Germany, Italy and Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations, the Soviet Union joined it. Despite its weaknesses, the League could serve as a forum for exposing the aggressors. Therefore the Soviet Union made use of the League in her struggle against aggression. Mutual assistance treaties were concluded by the Soviet Union with other countries: with France and Czechoslovakia in May 1935, and with the Mongolian People's Republic in March 1936.
2. FORMATION OF CHINESE BUREAUCRAT-CAPITALISM. COLONIZATION OF THE KUOMINTANG-CONTROLLED AREAS. STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND JAPAN IN CHINA

After establishing a fascist military dictatorship in Nanking, the Kuomintang reactionaries began to organize an economic monopoly of bureaucrat-capitalists, represented by the "Four Big Families" of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and the Chen brothers (Chen Kuo-fu and Chen Li-fu).

The monopolist activities of the "Four Big Families" centred around the four banks: the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications and the Farmers' Bank of China. The Central Bank of China was established in November 1928. As the so-called "state bank," it enjoyed the right to issue banknotes, mint and circulate the coins of the national currency and to float government bonds. It was also in charge of the government treasury. From 1928 to 1935, the Chiang government, by means of increasing government capital, obtained the control of the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, formerly the financial pillars of the Northern warlord government. The Farmers' Bank of China was founded in 1935.

The Four Big Banks had a monopoly position among all Chinese banks. By 1936, they held 59 per cent of all the banking assets in China and 59 per cent of the deposits, and issued 78 per cent of the banknotes in the whole country. In fact, they served as banks for all the other banks, and exercised a monopoly control over China's commerce, industry and agriculture.

In November 1935, the Chiang government, in pursuance of what it called the "legal tender" policy, issued inconvertible currency in order to squeeze the people of their wealth and turn it into private property of the "Four Big Families." This was the most ruthless form of plunder. Up to the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war in July 1937, the total issue of "legal tender" amounted to C.N.$1,400 million.

With the Four Big Banks as the centre of their activities, the "Four Big Families" began their monopolizing and looting in the field of commerce. The Soong family organized a large-scale commercial trust in cotton, rice and other daily necessities and monopolized the nation's trade.

The years 1935 and 1936 were a period of crisis for national industry and commerce. After obtaining control of finance, the "Four Big Families" proceeded to dominate and monopolize industry. Under the cloak of state management, the "Four Big Families," in addition to annexing the existing bureaucrat industries, established the National Resources Commission as their main organization to monopolize the nation's industries. Their wolfram mines, steel and engineering works were jointly run with the imperialists. In the guise of private capitalists and by such means as making additional capital investment, reorganization and granting loans at exorbitant interests, the "Four Big Families" seized the control and ownership of privately owned industries when they were hard pressed for money. This was particularly evident in the textile industry. In the first half of 1937, the number of spindles in textile mills annexed or managed by the "Four Big Families" constituted 13 per cent of the total number in China.
In agriculture, the "Four Big Families" were the biggest landlords in the country and the most merciless exploiters of the peasantry. Backed by the reactionary regime, they also imposed heavy taxes upon the peasants all over the country, press-ganged them into forced labour, conscripted them for the army and requisitioned their land without compensation.

Through their monopolist control over finance, commerce, industry and agriculture, the "Four Big Families" plundered the people and became known as the biggest vampires of the country.

The Chiang Kai-shek clique maintained its reactionary domination by selling out China's sovereignty in exchange for foreign aid. It was during the reactionary regime of that clique that the imperialists completed the transformation of China into a colonial market.

Imperialist monopoly capital penetrated into all branches of China's national economy and dominated them. In 1936 foreign capital accounted for 55.7 per cent of China's coal output, while her iron mines were almost completely under the control of Japanese capital. In 1937, 90.7 per cent of China's railway investment came from the imperialists. In 1936 foreign vessels constituted 81.9 per cent of the tonnage of the vessels plying the Yangtse River and foreign plants produced 55 per cent of the electricity (in terms of kilowatt-hours) in the whole country. Of all bank properties, foreign capital constituted 20.8 per cent. However, no just estimate could be made of the economic power of the foreign banks merely from the amount of their capital in China, as they enjoyed the privileges of issuing banknotes and controlling the customs duty and salt tax. The exchange rate was also under their control. In 1936, 46.2 per cent of China's spinning spindles, 67.4 per cent of her twisting spindles and 56.4 per cent of her looms were owned by foreign capital. In 1935, 58 per cent of the total output of cigarettes was produced by foreign enterprises.

In short, before the anti-Japanese war, in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the imperialists monopolized the coal and iron industries, railway and water transport and other enterprises. They also controlled China's finance. In certain industrial departments, especially in textiles and cigarettes, foreign capital reigned supreme.

The imperialist investments were mostly squeezed from China rather than imported from abroad. The imperialists plundered China by extorting war indemnities, occupying land by force, seizing the ownership of enterprises by trickery and absorbing Chinese capital. In exchange for importing minute amounts of capital into China, the imperialist countries extracted huge profits. As a result of this imperialist economic aggression, China suffered an unfavourable balance in her international payments. The flow of capital in and out of China within the 43 years from 1894 to 1937 showed receipts of over U.S. $1,736 million, but expenditures amounting to $3,437 million. The difference was partly the result of China's unfavourable balance of international trade and partly of plundering by imperialist capital.

The expansion of imperialist monopoly capital in China was effected in the course of an intense struggle.

First, of the total sum of imperialist investments in China in 1936, U.S.$4,285 million in all, Britain held $1,045 million. As compared with the figure of $1,047 million in 1930, the British investments remained practically at a standstill. American investments amounted to over $340 million, which showed approximately a 20 per cent
increase compared with $285 million in 1930. However, the total sum of American investments was still small. Japanese investments totalled over $2,096 million, which showed a 48 per cent increase compared with $1,411 million in 1930. In this period, therefore, Japanese investments increased rapidly and occupied the first place, accounting for half of the gross sum of foreign investments in China.

Secondly, in 1936, Japanese investments in Northeast China were $1,455 million, over two-thirds of her total investments in China. But during this period, Japanese investments in the rest of China were small, nor did they show marked increase. It was only the United States that made any great increase in her investments in the rest of China; the rate of increase reached 40 per cent. Two-thirds of the financial loans of the Kuomintang government were obtained from the United States.

Thirdly, in 1936, the imperialist investments in enterprises in China (excluding the Northeast) amounted to over $1,369 million. Of this, Britain had the largest share—over $651 million. Japan held the second largest with $305 million; and the United States with over $210 million, the smallest. Of the imperialist capital investments of over $281 million in manufacturing industries in China (excluding the Northeast), Japan had the largest share—over $140 million. Britain held the second largest, with over $107 million, and the United States with over $20 million, the smallest.

The development of imperialist monopoly capital in China was most uneven.

During this period, Japan continued her aggression south of the Great Wall, monopolizing the cotton industry, electric power, banking, mines, railways and harbours of North China, and dumping, even smuggling, her commodities in China. In Shanghai, Japanese cotton mills further expanded, crowding out the Chinese mills and robbing them of their profits.

The Japanese imperialists' policy of conquering China seriously jeopardized the British and U.S. imperialists' interests in North and Central China and shattered the economic foundation of the "Four Big Families."

Thus the contradiction and rift between the British and U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in China—the "Four Big Families"—on the one side, and the Japanese imperialists on the other, were widened and deepened every day.

In the summer of 1935, the U.S. Economic Commission came to China; its visit was followed by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, chief economic advisor to the British Government, in the winter of the same year. At the instigation of Britain and the United States, the Chiang Kai-shek government enforced the so-called "monetary reform," making the notes issued by the Central Bank, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications sole "legal tender," and proclaimed the nationalization of silver. With foreign exchange as its basis, the "legal tender" was linked with the pound sterling. Credit was determined by the exchange rate, which was fixed at 1s 2d to one yuan. In the effort to maintain this rate, a large amount of Chinese silver flowed into the United States, adding greatly to the latter's profit. As a result of the adoption of the "legal tender" policy, the currency of the Chiang Kai-shek government came completely under the control of the U.S. dollar and the English pound.

The struggle among the imperialists caused dissension within the
Xuomintang and made the Nanking government waver in its policy towards Japan. There was a steady growth of the rift between the pro-British and pro-American clique and the pro-Japanese clique among the Kuomintang leaders. Those of the former clique in the Nanking government began to change their policy towards Japan under the impact of the surging anti-Japanese sentiment among the people and the influence of the U.S. and British Governments.

At the end of 1935, attempts were made on the life of Wang Ching-wei, head of the pro-Japanese clique, and of Tang Yu-jen, a member of the clique. Then followed a reshuffle of the Kuomintang government, resulting in the replacement of the pro-Japanese clique by Chiang Kai-shek's pro-British and pro-American clique and in a break between Wang and Chiang. From September to December 1936, many talks were held between Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador to China, and Chang Chun, Foreign Minister of the Chiang government. But Chiang deliberately dragged out the talks and rendered them fruitless.

With the Japanese invasion of North China in 1935, the contradiction between China and Japan became the primary one. This entailed important changes in international relations and in China's internal class relations. In view of these changes, the Party adopted after May 1936 a policy of forcing Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan and put forth the objective of linking China's Anti-Japanese National United Front with the world anti-fascist peace front.

3. JAPANESE IMPERIALIST INVASION OF NORTH CHINA. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S DECLARATION ON RESISTING JAPAN AND SAVING THE NATION. NEW RISE OF THE NATION-WIDE MOVEMENT TO RESIST JAPAN

In 1935 the Japanese invaders launched a new attack on North China.

Before this the Japanese Government had claimed that Japan was the master of Asia and the protector of China and that no other country had the right to interfere in Chinese affairs, nor could China maintain contact with any other country than Japan. Declaring that China was a colony under her sole control, Japan openly excluded other imperialists. This was the chief objective of the statement on China made by the Japanese Foreign Ministry on April 17, 1934.

At that time, Chiang Kai-shek was still entertaining the illusion that his authority south of the Yellow River would remain unchallenged. However, on May 29, 1935 extremely absurd demands were made by the Japanese warlords under the pretext that China had been giving aid to the volunteers in the Northeast. Japanese troops began to pour into North China, constituting a real menace to Peking and Tientsin, and the Japanese warlords threatened to take "free action" unless their terms were accepted.

The Nanking government was completely cowed by this new military offensive. The result was the "Ho-Umez" agreement, under which China lost her sovereign rights, bringing humiliation upon the whole nation. In accordance with this agreement, the Kuomintang headquarters in Hopei Province, Peking and Tientsin were closed down; the gendarmerie, the Central Army and the Northeastern Army were withdrawn from Hopei; a new governor
of Hopei and new mayors of Peking and Tientsin were appointed in place of the old ones; the Political Department of the Peking Branch of the Military Council was abolished and the anti-Japanese movement was suppressed. With the Nanking government complying with all their wishes, the Japanese imperialists proceeded to carry out their policy of the complete conquest of China.

On June 5, Japan demanded the removal of Sung Che-yuan, Governor of Chahar Province, on the pretext that Chinese troops had detained certain Japanese secret agents in Changpei.

In October, a group of provocateurs from Hsiangho, Changping, Wuching, Sanho and other counties in eastern Hopei staged a revolt at Japanese instigation and organized a “Peace Preservation Committee” in the county town of Hsiangho. Similarly, the traitor Yin Ju-keng established in November the bogus “Anti-Communist Autonomous Government of Eastern Hopei”; puppet officers Li Shou-hsin and Demchigdonrob established the bogus “Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia.”

To meet the Japanese demands for a “special government in North China,” the Nanking government appointed Sung Che-yuan, Wang Yi-tang and Wang Ke-min to form the “Hopei-Chahar Political Council,” thus putting these provinces beyond its own jurisdiction and reducing them to the status of a puppet state.

As the national crisis sharpened, China’s anti-Japanese movement reached new heights.

On August 1, 1935, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued its “Appeal to Fellow Countrymen Concerning Resistance to Japan and National Salvation,” calling on them to unite against the common foe, whatever the past or present differences in political opinions and interests, at a time when China was threatened with imminent extinction.

This declaration urged the joint establishment of a unified national defence government and an anti-Japanese allied army by the Workers’ and Peasants’ Democratic Government, the Red Army, other anti-Japanese troops and all people who were willing to resist Japan and save China.

After the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the main force of the Red Army had arrived in the Northwest and joined forces with the Red Army in Shensi and Kansu, a declaration was issued on November 13, 1935. It pointed out the danger of the Japanese imperialists’ colonization of China and of Chiang Kai-shek’s betrayal of national interests. Hence resistance to Japan and opposition to Chiang were the only way out for the Chinese people in their fight for national salvation. It emphasized that this struggle was waged under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. It appealed to the whole people to rise, get organized and support this only correct view for saving the nation from extinction and ensuring its survival.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Peking Students’ Union was formed in November 1935. This Union initiated a large-scale petition movement against the puppet “autonomy” in North China. On December 9, a great patriotic demonstration of about 6,000 students was held in Peking, putting forward the basic conditions for resisting Japan and saving China, and demanding that the Chiang Kai-shek government should end the civil war and resist aggression. The Kuomintang government tried to suppress this patriotic movement by such savage measures as massacres and
arrests, only to find it swell to greater proportions. Active preparations for further struggles on a larger scale went on uninterrupted. On December 10 all schools in Peking suspended teaching. Student associations in these schools were then formed to carry on propaganda and organizational work.

On December 16, when the "Hopei-Chahar Political Council" was scheduled to be inaugurated, 30,000 students and citizens of Peking staged a mammoth patriotic demonstration under the leadership of the Party. Breaking through the encirclement of Kuomintang gendarmes and policemen and foiling their assaults they held a mass meeting at Tienchiao in the south of the city, followed by a huge parade. Under the pressure of the masses, the puppets were forced to announce the postponement of the establishment of that "council."

The patriotic demonstrations on December 9 and 16 defied the joint reign of terror of the Kuomintang government and the Japanese imperialists, evoked immediate response from the students in other parts of China and spread the movement throughout the country.

After these demonstrations, many students went to the midst of the workers and peasants to broaden the basis of the movement for resisting Japan and saving China. This gave them an excellent chance to educate and steel themselves in establishing close ties with the working people.

The students of Peking and Tientsin organized propaganda brigades for extensive agitation and organizational work among the peasants and founded night schools for workers and peasants. On the basis of the closer relations with the masses the Party-led Vanguard of China's National Liberation was soon established in all parts of China. Less than two years later, when the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression started, large numbers of students took part in guerrilla warfare. As a result, wider and closer contacts between the intellectuals and the toiling masses were established.

In 1936, societies for national salvation were formed by various circles throughout the country. The All-China Association for National Salvation came into existence in Shanghai in May of the year.

By this time, the call to resist Japan and save China had been taken up by the entire Chinese people both in word and deed. A new rise of the revolutionary movement swept the whole country.


With the revolution once more on the upgrade, it was necessary to make a correct assessment of the domestic situation subsequent to Japan's attack on China and to decide the Party's policy. Therefore, on December 25, 1935, after the Long March had brought the Red Army to northern Shensi, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party held a conference in Wayaopa, which laid down the tactics of establishing an Anti-Japanese National United Front and adopted a "Resolution on the Current Political Situation..."
and the Tasks of the Party.” The resolution contained a full analysis of the political situation and the changes in the internal class relations and defined the tactics of the Party. The outstanding characteristic of the situation, the resolution pointed out, was Japan’s determination to turn China into her colony. In internal political life a change was coming about in the relations between various classes, parties, and their armed forces. Not only were the workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie determined to fight Japan, but a section of the ruling classes also put forward the demand to resist aggression. Conflicts and cleavages had appeared inside the ruling camp. Therefore the task of the Party was to mobilize through the broadest possible national united front all the anti-Japanese forces in the country to fight against the aggressors. The resolution refuted the “Left” sectarianism which then constituted the chief danger to the Party, and Right opportunism. Basing himself on that resolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered at a conference of Party activists held on December 27 a report entitled “On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism,” which furnished the theoretical basis for the Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Party.

(1) Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the main characteristic of the situation at that time was that Japanese imperialism wanted to reduce China to her colony. Particularly after Japan invaded North China in 1935, Japanese aggression threatened the very existence of the people throughout the country. As a result, the national contradiction between China and Japan had become the primary one while the internal class contradiction was relegated to a secondary place. In the face of the Japanese aggression, the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie all demanded resistance, the workers and the peasants most resolutely of all. As for the national bourgeoisie, it was true that they had gone over to the side of Chiang Kai-shek after 1927, but the fact remained that they had gained no advantage from forsaking their ally, the working class, and making friends with the landlords and comprador classes.

The national bourgeoisie had sustained severe economic blows after the Incident of September 18, 1931. To begin with, during the five-year period from 1926 to 1930, the annual imports of cotton yarn and cloth into Northeast China reached in value 12,888,977 and 53,199,255 Haikwan taels respectively. Of these, 9,906,183 Haikwan taels worth of cotton yarn, or 77 per cent of the total, and 13,857,174 Haikwan taels worth of cotton cloth, or 26 per cent of the total, were produced in the parts of China lying south of the Great Wall. Owing to the loss of the Northeast to the Japanese and various other reasons, over a million spindles in the textile mills in the provinces south of the Great Wall stood constantly idle from 1931 onwards. Next, prior to the incident, the Northeast, with a yearly coal output of about ten million tons, had been one of China's chief coal-producing areas. About half of the coal was exported; many factories in the provinces south of the Great Wall depended on the Northeast for their coal supply. But, beginning from 1931, Japan obtained complete control of the coal mines in the Northeast, thus adversely affecting the fuel supply of China’s industries. Lastly, the soya beans produced in the Northeast were one of the most important items in foreign trade; about half of the annual output of four to five million tons was exported. But after the Northeast was occupied, this important agricultural product was expropriated by the
Japanese imperialists. This seriously affected China's international receipts and her rate of foreign exchange. The proportion of international receipts, which came from the total exports, dropped from 61 per cent in 1930 to 42 per cent in 1933. China's industrialists and merchants sustained great losses in foreign trade and in the international market.

From 1931 to 1936, Japan actively expanded her factories in the provinces south of the Great Wall, especially textile mills. Consequently, many Chinese mills were swallowed up. Tsingtao and Tientsin are the two big textile centres in North China. In Tsingtao Japanese textile mills had long occupied a predominant position. In Tientsin, up to 1931 there had been no textile mills that were exclusively owned by Japanese capitalists, but by 1936, Japanese mills already accounted for 55.2 per cent of the total number of spindles and 32.9 per cent of the total number of looms. In Shanghai, the biggest centre of China's textile industry, the proportion of Japanese-owned spindles to the total number dropped from 51 per cent in 1931 to 49.9 per cent in 1936, but that of her looms increased from 52.8 to 57.7 per cent; the proportion of Chinese spindles remained more or less stationary (from 41.9 to 41.8 per cent), but that of her looms dropped from 34 to 29.1 per cent. In a word, Japan had the upper hand in China's three biggest textile centres.

The crisis of colonization of China and the threat of bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy to her national industry and commerce made possible a change in the political attitude of the national bourgeoisie—a change that might either draw it into the anti-Japanese struggle or neutralize it.

As Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in the report, "Even within the camp of the landlords and compradors there is no complete unity." China was a semi-colony under the joint control of many imperialist powers. Japan's endeavours to annex China would naturally widen the rift between the imperialists. To quote Comrade Mao Tse-tung again,

When our struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, the pet dogs of the United States or even Britain may, in obedience to the varying tones of their masters' command, engage in a veiled conflict or even an open conflict with the Japanese imperialists and their pet dogs. These changes in China's class relations and in the relations between the imperialist powers, which had resulted from Japan's aggressive actions, were a sufficient indication that the revolutionary front and the counter-revolutionary front in China were both undergoing a change. The camp of national revolution had grown more powerful, while the counter-revolutionary camp had weakened. Thus the setting up of an Anti-Japanese National United Front became possible.

With the great victory of the Red Army's Long March and the steady growth of the anti-Japanese movement of the Chinese people and the revolutionary movements of the whole world, the revolutionary situation was then changing from a localized into a nationwide one, and changing gradually from a state of unevenness into one of relative evenness. However, the development of the Chinese revolution on the whole remained uneven, and the revolutionary forces were still weaker than the counter-revolutionary forces. Herein lay the urgent necessity for the Chinese Communist Party to rally all the anti-Japanese forces of the country for the establish-
ment of a broad united front. It was both necessary and possible for the Party to strive to win over millions upon millions of the masses to the Anti-Japanese National United Front. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung put it in the report,

The task of the Party is to form a united national revolutionary front by integrating the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, peasants, students, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie of the whole country.\(^6\)

(2) In the report Comrade Mao Tse-tung put forward the slogan of a “people’s republic” and outlined the nature and the policies of such a republic. The people’s republic was to have a clear-cut popular character and a profound national character. The government of the people’s republic was to be based principally on the workers and peasants, but would at the same time admit the representatives of all other classes that were opposed to imperialism and the feudal forces. While giving protection first and foremost to the interests of the workers and peasants, it would permit the existence and development of national industry and commerce. Likewise, a protective policy would be adopted towards the land and other properties of the rich peasants, with the exception of those parts pertaining to feudal exploitation.

Shortly before the Wayaopao Conference, on December 6, 1935, the Central Committee had promulgated a resolution on changing the tactics towards the rich peasants. It pointed out that under the conditions of the national crisis, the rich peasants were beginning to participate in the struggle against imperialism and the Kuomintang traitorous government or were taking a sympathetic neutral stand. It further pointed out that, during the movement for a Red regime in the past, the intensification of the struggle against the rich peasants had given rise to a tendency to exterminate them as a class. This affected the middle peasants, who therefore showed no great interest in further developing their production. So the Central Committee decided to change the tactics towards the rich peasants. The resolution stipulated that only the feudal exploitation of the rich peasants was to be abolished, that the land, commercial enterprises and other properties which they managed with hired labour were to be exempt from confiscation, and that their freedom to expand reproduction and deal in industry and commerce was to be safeguarded by the democratic government. Again, in July 1936, about half a year after this conference, the Central Committee, with a view to making the Red regime the pivot of the Movement for Resisting Japan and National Salvation, issued instructions about the land policy, providing that the land and properties of traitors and the land, foodstuffs, houses, and other properties of the landlord class were to be confiscated, but that the land of all small owners (professional workers, petty tradesmen, handicraftsmen, small landlords who lived in want and others who rented out small portions of land) were to be exempt from confiscation.

(3) The tactic of the Anti-Japanese United Front was a Marxist-Leninist tactic, diametrically opposed to that of sectarianism. The sectarians denied that the Japanese endeavour to colonize China would bring about a change in the line-up of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces in China. They claimed that the whole camp of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie was united and consolidated, and they arbitrarily regarded as the most dangerous enemy of the revolution those intermediate groups that were actively
bestirring themselves at that moment. According to the sectarians, the forces of the revolution must be pure and absolutely pure, and the road of revolution must be straight and absolutely straight. The truth, however, was the exact opposite. The road of revolution, like the road of every activity in the world, was always tortuous, never straight, and the line-up of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces did not preclude the possibility of change. It was necessary for the revolutionary forces to organize millions upon millions of the people and manoeuvre a huge revolutionary army. Only such a force could smash the Japanese imperialists and the clique of traitors. The tactic of the united front was to accumulate large forces to surround and annihilate the enemy. It was a Marxist-Leninist tactic. On the contrary, the tactic of the sectarians was "to rely on a single horseman to wage a desperate fight with a formidable enemy!" They would drive to the enemy's side all those who could become friends of the revolution. They would be actually helping the enemy, retarding and isolating the revolution, causing it to dwindle, decline and even fail.

There was an immense difference between the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the Revolutionary United Front during the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War. The opportunist leadership existing in the Party during that period did not dare to expand its own ranks but relied solely on its temporary ally, the Kuomintang. Hence, the Revolutionary United Front crumbled for want of a mainstay. But in 1935, the domestic situation was entirely different. Now there were a well-steeled Communist Party and a well-steeled Red Army. The Red Army had victoriously concluded its great Long March. The Party and the Army would inevitably become the powerful mainstay of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and its firm leaders.

The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in this united front possessed a decisive significance. History had confirmed that China's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution must be led by the working class, not by the bourgeoisie. The Party's leadership in the united front ensured the victory of the revolution.

Precisely for this reason, it was imperative that the Party should expand its own ranks, and ensure its leadership in the united front; it should expand the Party organizations, the Party-led army and the revolutionary bases. A strong Communist Party, the Red Army and the revolutionary bases—these formed the mainstay of the united front.

(4) While Comrade Mao Tse-tung, with fearless militancy, voiced the inflexible will of the Chinese people to fight against Japanese imperialism and their confidence in the ultimate victory, he pointed out the need for international support. China's Anti-Japanese United Front was not isolated; it was sure to obtain help from the people of the world, headed by the Soviet Union. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in the report,

Our anti-Japanese war needs the support of the people of the world, above all, the support of the people of the Soviet Union; and they will certainly support us, because we and they are concerned with each other's weal and woe. The support of the Soviet people was an essential condition for China to achieve victory in her anti-Japanese war and in her revolution. On the other hand, to oppose this new aggressive war, China should also explore the possibilities of establishing proper relations
with all the capitalist countries in Europe and America that had contradictions with Japan. In short, China must link her Anti-Japanese National United Front with the peace front of the world, and completely isolate Japanese imperialism.


Under the correct leadership of the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the whole Party worked actively to build up an Anti-Japanese National United Front and gradually brought about its realization in an initial form.

As a first step, the Party thought it necessary to conclude a truce and an anti-Japanese agreement with the Northeastern Army and the 17th Route Army which had been dispatched by the reactionary Kuomintang government to Shensi in 1936 to wage an anti-Communist war. On January 25, 1936 the Red Army sent a letter to the officers and men of the Northeastern Army. It was pointed out in the letter that Chiang Kai-shek had dispatched the Northeastern Army, which was ready to fight Japan, against the Red Army, which was resolutely bent on the same cause, in order to destroy or weaken them both; that Chiang's discrimination against the Northeastern Army was fully evidenced by his dispatching them to the poverty-stricken provinces of Shensi and Kansu, and excluding them from the comparatively rich southern Shensi and southern Kansu; that Chiang had installed his own lackeys in the Northeastern Army to carry out spying and splitting activities; and that the only way out for them was to fight against Japan and oppose Chiang Kai-shek. The Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government and the Red Army were ready to unite with them in forming a national defence government and an anti-Japanese allied army, in order to fight together against Japan.

In response to the people's urgent demand to resist Japan and save the nation, the Anti-Japanese Vanguard of the Red Army was organized and ordered to cross the Yellow River on March 10. But the moment it occupied the Tatung-Puchow Railway and prepared to go to the front in Hopei and Chahar, Chiang Kai-shek sent a large force to block its way. He also ordered the Northeastern Army and the Northwestern Army to march northward to harass the rear of the Red Army.

Holding that in the national crisis, a decisive battle, no matter which side should come out the victor, would only reduce China's strength for national defence to the delight of the Japanese imperialists, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Red Army withdrew the Anti-Japanese Vanguard to the west of the Yellow River. On May 5 the Commission sent a circular telegram, advising the Nanking government to stop the nation-wide civil war, first of all the war in Shensi, Kansu and Shansi, so that both sides could send delegates to discuss specific measures for resisting Japan and saving the nation. The telegram also called upon the people of the whole country to organize a committee to hasten the cessation of the civil
war and send delegates to the front to stop the firing on both sides and to see to it that this proposal was completely carried out.

Prior to this, as Chiang Kai-shek continued to sell out the North-east and North China, the Central Committee of the Party had not included him in the Anti-Japanese United Front. But as the Japanese attack on North China had caused a serious clash of interests between the Japanese and the Anglo-U.S. imperialists, the Chiang Kai-shek clique, which had close affiliations with the Anglo-U.S. interests, might change its attitude towards Japan under the direction of the governments of the two countries. In the telegram, therefore, the Central Committee of the Party adopted a policy of forcing Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan.

The policies of the Party were: (1) to win over the Chiang Kai-shek clique to the United Front, and at the same time, to expose all the attempts of the Kuomintang government to compromise with Japan at the expense of China's sovereignty and national honour; (2) to unite with the various factions of the Kuomintang and their armies at the same time as efforts were being made to force Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan, for the more anti-Japanese democratic forces were drawn over, the more possible would it be to compel Chiang to change his mind; and (3) to act as the leader and organizer of the United Front before the people of the whole country and seek to promote internal peace and unity.

Knowing that the slogan “for a people's republic” would be unacceptable to Chiang Kai-shek, the Central Committee of the Party, prompted by a desire to urge the Nanking government and its army to take part in the fight against Japan, replaced it with the slogan “for a democratic republic” in a letter to the Kuomintang on August 25, 1936. The Central Committee sternly criticized the Kuomintang's attempt to substitute the National Defence Council, merely an advisory body of the Kuomintang government organized by a few high officials, for the All-China Congress for Resistance to Japan and National Salvation proposed by the Chinese Communist Party, and to substitute the National Assembly manipulated by the Kuomintang authorities for the Chinese Democratic Republic and its parliament advocated by the Party. The Central Committee pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party was always ready to join hands and form a United Front with the numerous patriotic people in the Kuomintang and in all walks of life, and expressed the hope that the patriotic members would become dominant in the Kuomintang. The Central Committee reaffirmed the Party's policy of forming an anti-Japanese National United Front and of renewing its co-operation with the Kuomintang.

In the “Resolution on the New Situation in the Movement to Resist Japan and to Save the Nation, and on the Democratic Republic,” adopted by the Central Committee of the Party in September 1936, specific explanations were given on the slogan “for a democratic republic,” pointing out that this meant a democracy geographically more extensive than that practised under the workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship, and a political system far more progressive than the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship. This would enable the people to take part in political activities and grant the Chinese Communist Party freedom to work for the future realization of socialism. The resolution maintained that to turn the slogan into a reality, it was necessary to strengthen the leadership of the Party and mobilize the masses. The resolution also made it clear that
after the democratic republic was established it should proceed on the Party's Programme for Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Nation. The two slogans, "for a people's republic" and "for a democratic republic," meant essentially the same thing despite the difference in wording.

The policies of the Chinese Communist Party for fighting Japan and saving the nation won the enthusiastic support of the people throughout the country. Under the leadership of Comrade Liu Shao-chi, the work of the Party and the people's anti-Japanese movement in the Kuomintang-controlled areas revived and expanded. In August 1936 when the Japanese and puppet troops began their invasion of Suiyuan, the Chinese garrisons there fought back, and the people of the whole country started a movement in support of the resistance. In November and December, anti-Japanese strikes were staged by textile workers in Shanghai and Tsingtao. In June 1936 even the Kwangsi and Kwangtung warlords within the ruling clique joined hands to oppose Chiang Kai-shek in the name of "resisting Japan and saving the nation."

Heedless of the steady growth of the anti-Japanese movement in the whole country, Chiang Kai-shek still clung to his policy of opposing the Communist Party and the people and continued his attack on the Red Army. The Northeastern Army headed by Chang Hsueh-liang and the Northwestern Army headed by Yang Hucheng had come under the influence of the Red Army and the People's anti-Japanese movement, and stopped fighting against the Red Army. Accepting the Communist Party's policy for an Anti-Japanese National United Front, Chang and Yang urged Chiang Kai-shek to unite with the Communists against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek rejected their demands and stepped up military preparations for "annihilating" the Communists. He even intended to remove them from their posts. Under the influence of the Party organization in Sian, the Northwest Association of the Various Circles for Resistance to Japan and for National Salvation, the Northeast China Association for National Salvation, the Students' Union and other anti-Japanese organizations held mass demonstrations in defiance of the Kuomintang troops, police, gendarmerie and spies. Spurred on by the people's anti-Japanese movement, Chang and Yang detained Chiang Kai-shek in Sian on December 12, 1936 and compelled him to stop the anti-Communist civil war, which could only end in the destruction of the country. With the detention of Chiang Kai-shek, the pro-Japanese elements, Wang Ching-wei and Ho Ying-chin, assumed control of the Nanking government. Large forces were mustered in preparation for an attack on Sian and plans were made to wrest political power from Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese imperialists, too, were eager to make capital out of the situation and expand China's civil war. Under the circumstances, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to upset the scheme of the Japanese imperialists and Wang Ching-wei and Ho Ying-chin and advocated, in the interests of the whole nation, a peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident. Consequently after Chiang Kai-shek accepted the terms of uniting with the Communists and resisting Japan, Chang and Yang set him free.

At the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang held in February 1937, Soong Ching Ling, on behalf of the democratic section of the Kuomintang, urged the Kuomintang to adhere to the three cardinal policies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,
to mobilize the masses and improve the living conditions of the people, to put an immediate end to the civil war and co-operate with the Communist Party and all democratic forces, and to unite in the struggle against aggression with all the nations headed by the Soviet Union, which treated the Chinese people on an equal footing. With a view to facilitating the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the Chinese Communist Party, in a telegram to the Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, pledged to fulfil the following four conditions: the Communist-led government in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia revolutionary base renamed as the Government of the Special Region, redesignation of the Red Army, abandonment of the policy of armed insurrection and discontinuance of the confiscation of the land of the landlords. At the same time, the Party made five demands on the Kuomintang: cessation of the civil war, guaranteeing of the freedom of speech, assembly and association, convocation of the Anti-Japanese People's Congress, completion of preparations for resisting Japan, and improvement of the living conditions of the people.

The pledges were necessary for changing the state of antagonism between the two regimes in conformity with the changes in China's internal and external contradictions. They were positive, conditional and principled concessions, made with the aim of obtaining in return a national war of resistance, on the condition of preserving the Communist Party's leadership in the Special Region and the Red Army, and the Party's independence and freedom of criticism in its relations with the Kuomintang.

In May 1937, the National Conference of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Yenan, which discussed and approved the political line of the Party since 1935.

At this conference, Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered a report entitled "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan." He pointed out that the task of the Party from December 9, 1935 to February 1937, when the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee held its third plenary session, had been to struggle for internal peace and stop internal armed conflicts. During that period, the struggle for internal peace provided the first necessary condition for the actual formation of an Anti-Japanese National United Front. After the Kuomintang's third plenary session the Chinese revolution was entering into the period of resistance to Japan. The Party's principal task was to fight for democracy and freedom in the country. The war against Japan required internal peace and mobilization of the people, but without democracy, peace, though won, could not be consolidated and there was no way to proceed with mobilization. The fight for political democracy and freedom was a central link in ensuring victory for armed resistance.

It was necessary to institute immediate democratic reforms of the political system. First, a democratic form of government based on the co-operation of all parties and all classes must be established. That undemocratic procedure of the elections to the National Assembly must be changed, and democratic elections to the Assembly carried out, followed by the drawing up of a democratic constitution, the convocation of a democratic parliament and the election of a democratic government. Secondly, the people's rights of freedom must be safeguarded, especially their freedom of speech, assembly and association.
In order to form and consolidate the united front and to realize a democratic republic, it was necessary to make the utmost efforts to win over the masses, i.e. to mobilize the workers, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and to win over the anti-Japanese section of the bourgeoisie. The basic task of the Party was therefore to strive to win over millions upon millions to the Anti-Japanese National United Front, overthrow Japanese imperialism and realize national liberation and social liberation.

Special emphasis was given in the report to the problem of the leadership of the Chinese working class in the anti-Japanese war.

Is the proletariat to follow the bourgeoisie or is the bourgeoisie to follow the proletariat? This question of the responsibility of leadership in the Chinese revolution is the pivot upon which the success of the revolution depends. The correctness of the conclusion drawn by Comrade Mao Tse-tung was borne out by the historical experience of the Chinese revolution. The inherent vacillation and lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie could only be overcome by fully calling forth the perseverance and thoroughness of the proletariat in the revolution. The fact that the Kuomintang adopted a largely passive attitude towards the Anti-Japanese United Front increased the responsibility of the political leadership of the proletariat and its party. The essentials for the proletariat to exercise this political leadership through its party, were the putting forward of its political programme, the exemplary example of the Party in revolutionary activities, the establishing of proper relations with its allies, and the expansion of the ranks of the Party.

The problem of democracy, brought up in this report, was later to become the focal point of struggle between the Party's policy of total resistance and the Kuomintang's policy of partial resistance. The problem of winning the leadership, too, was to become the basic point at issue between the correct line of the Party and the capitulationist line during the initial stages of the anti-Japanese war.

With the Japanese occupation and colonization of Northeast China, China changed from a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society to a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society.

Before the Incident of September 18, 1931, Japan had laid a firm political and economic foundation for herself in Northeast China where her Kwantung Army Headquarters and her Kwantung government controlled the military and political affairs, and her South Manchuria Railway Company dominated the industry and communications. On March 9, 1932, a puppet “Manchoukuo” was set up in the Japanese-occupied Northeast China.

During the rule of the Northeast by Japanese imperialism, Japanese investments there increased from over U.S. $550 million in 1932 to over $1,455 million in 1936. (The total of Japanese investments in China was at that time $2,000 million.) In 1937, the output of pig iron in the Northeast was 811,000 tons; of steel products, more than 246,000 tons. Japanese-owned railway lines in the Northeast totalled 8,296 kilometres, as against the 19,028 kilometres of lines in the country as a whole.

Through armed emigration and seizure of land, through the granting of loans at usurious rate of interest and the controlling of foodstuffs by the Japanese banks, the Japanese aggressors became the top feudal landlords in Northeast China.

Japan monopolized the market and the land in the Northeast, as well as the factories, mines, industrial raw materials, communica-
tions and transport, thereby making Northeast China a colony under her exclusive control.

The people of the Northeast and a patriotic section of the armed forces waged a courageous guerrilla war against the Japanese occupation. This war at one time expanded to a very considerable scale, but owing to the Japanese "mopping-up" campaigns, the splitting and sabotage activities of the Kuomintang and, above all, the failure to adopt a flexible strategy and tactics, the guerrilla units were one by one defeated by the spring of 1933.

Towards the end of 1933, the anti-Japanese war in the Northeast entered a new stage, the outstanding characteristic of which was that the armies led by the Chinese Communist Party became the backbone of the resistance. The Party-led guerrilla units in many places were well organized and strictly disciplined. Relying on the masses for their guerrilla warfare, they scored important victories, which raised the Party's prestige. Thanks to the implementation of the policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front, the dispersed and routed armed forces of the people and a section of the old-type armies rallied around the Party. They accepted its leadership or were reorganized.

When initial successes were achieved in co-ordinating the actions of the anti-Japanese units in the different districts, the problem of their unified leadership in the whole of Northeast China was brought to the fore. Thus, under the guidance of the Party, the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army was organized and a political programme of the army adopted in February 1935.

In line with the development of the situation of resistance to Japan and acting upon the instructions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Anti-Japanese Allied Army was divided into three contingents in 1937: the First Route Army to operate in the mountainous districts in eastern Liaoning Province, the Second Route Army in the mountainous districts in eastern Kirin and the Third Route Army in the mountains and plains of Heilungkiang. Preparations were made for large-scale guerrilla war when the Japanese aggressors should launch their all-out offensive against the rest of China. This would act as a powerful deterrent upon the enemy and fit in with the overall scheme of national resistance.

People of Korean nationality in the Northeast also established their guerrilla units, fighting heroically against the Japanese aggressors. Anti-Japanese base areas were founded in the Changpai Mountains and the Sungari River valley. The Korean People's Revolutionary Army and the Society for the Recovery of the Motherland were formed in 1934 and 1935 respectively. The Chinese and the Korean peoples fought shoulder to shoulder against their common enemy.

Thus, before the whole nation plunged into the all-out war against Japan, the people of the Northeast under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party had put up a brave resistance, weakening the rule of the Japanese aggressors and delaying their attack on other parts of China.

**BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR**

The Party managed to exist through the extremely grim reactionary period of 1927-37. During this period, on the one hand, the enemy
launched countless military attacks, attempting to completely annihilate the Party and the revolutionary forces. On the other, the Party, having overcome the Right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu, was repeatedly assailed by “Left” opportunism and injured by Chang Kuo-tao’s defeatist line and his splitting and sabotage activities. It was placed in grave danger. It was then that the Party came to recognize Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its great, brilliant and completely reliable leader. As a result, a new Party leadership headed by him was established.

Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the revolution started from the rural areas along the path of armed struggle, establishing itself in base areas which were gradually expanded in number and in size. In this way the cities occupied by the counter-revolution could be surrounded and finally seized by the armed revolutionary forces in the rural districts. This was the only correct law for the development of the Chinese revolution at a time when it had been defeated by powerful enemies in the cities, where there was no way to win victory for the time being. Thus, the Party created the Red Army and the revolutionary base areas and learned to lead the revolutionary war and the agrarian revolution and to establish political power.

Since the Incident of September 18, 1931, and particularly since their penetration into North China in 1935, the Japanese imperialists had pursued a policy of the complete conquest of China. This made the contradiction between China and Japan the primary one, and relegated China’s internal contradiction to a secondary position. A series of changes ensued in China’s internal class relations and international relations. The Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung accordingly put forward the tasks of setting up an Anti-Japanese National United Front and of linking the United Front with the peace front of the world.

Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Party successfully overcame the incorrect “Left” line and Chang Kuo-tao’s anti-Party activities during the struggle for setting up the Red regime, and rectified the “Left” sectarian tactics during the struggle against Japanese militarism.

Thus, during the reactionary period of ten years the Chinese Communist Party, under a correct, creative Marxist-Leninist leadership, repulsed the attacks of enemies both domestic and foreign, overcame the assaults of opportunism, preserved the key force of the Red Army, part of the revolutionary bases, and a large number of fine cadres, and accumulated rich revolutionary experience. After the firm establishment of the Party’s tactics for an Anti-Japanese National United Front at the end of 1935, the civil war came to an end, and a transition to the anti-Japanese war began.

The period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War was one in which the Party reached ideological and political maturity under extremely difficult circumstances. Therefore the Second Revolutionary Civil War completed the most important political preparations and nurtured the necessary cadres for the development of the Chinese revolution.

1 The agreement was signed in June 1935, by Ho Ying-chin, the Kuomintang government’s representative in North China, and Yoshijiro Umezu, Commander of Japanese armed forces in North China. In this agreement the Kuomintang government accepted the demand presented by Japan, thereby
substantially surrendering China's sovereign rights in the provinces of Hopei and Chahar.

2 This was a revolutionary youth organization formed under Communist leadership in September 1936 by the progressive youth who had taken part in the December 9 Movement of the previous year. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, many of its members went to the front and took part in establishing the base areas in the enemy rear.

3 Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 159.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., p. 163.

6 Ibid., p. 174.

7 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 269.
CHAPTER EIGHT

EARLY PERIOD OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE TO JAPANESE AGGRESSION. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY INSIST ON INDEPENDENCE AND INITIATIVE OF THE PROLETARIAT WITHIN THE UNITED FRONT AND ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANTI-JAPANESE BASES

(July 1937—December 1940)

1. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION FROM 1937 TO 1939. THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II

The War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression began and continued in a complex international situation.

The world economic crisis, which lasted from 1929 to 1932, was unprecedented in duration, depth and destructive power. In 1933, it turned into an economic depression. Under the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism, the depression, unlike those in the past, failed to usher in an industrial boom.

If the industrial output of the various capitalist countries in 1929 is taken as 100, then in 1937, the figures for the United States, France and Britain, the three so-called democratic countries, were 92.2, 82.8 and 123.7 respectively. The United States and France fell short of the pre-crisis level while Britain showed an increase. The corresponding figures for the industrial output of Germany, Japan and Italy, the three aggressor countries, were 117.2, 170.8 and 99.6 respectively. Germany and Japan exceeded the 1929 level while Italy almost attained it.

In the second half of 1937, another economic crisis broke out. Compared with the 1929 level, the industrial output of the United States in 1938 was 72 per cent; Britain, 112 per cent; France, 70 per cent; Italy, 96 per cent; Japan, 165 per cent and Germany, 125 per cent. The industrial production in all countries declined except in Germany where it experienced an upward trend. But Germany, having placed her national economy on a war footing, was bound to plunge into an economic crisis.

The only country where crises were unknown in this period was the Soviet Union. Her Second Five-Year Plan for industrial production was fulfilled ahead of schedule. By the end of 1937, Soviet industrial output had reached 428 per cent of the 1929 level. What was more important was the great success of socialism in the rise of industry. In 1937, socialist enterprises accounted for 99.97 per cent of the total industrial output—showing that the socialist system had become the only system of industry in the Soviet Union. Agricultural collectivization was also a great success. By 1937, 18,500,000 peasant households, or 93 per cent of the total, had joined the collective farms. This marked the completion of agricultural collectivization.

The outbreak of the new economic crisis in the capitalist countries
hastened their redivision of the world market, sources of raw materials, territories and spheres of influence by military actions.

Japan invaded North and Central China in 1937. Germany occupied Austria in the beginning of 1938, the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia in the autumn of the same year and the whole of Czechoslovakia in 1939. In the spring of 1939, Italy seized Albania, and together with Germany, helped Franco to establish a fascist regime in Spain. This was followed by the German invasion of Poland and the subsequent declaration of war on Germany by Britain and France. Thus began World War II.

This was a war against the national emancipation movement, and the Soviet Union, as well as against the imperialist interests of Britain, France and the United States. Before the outbreak of World War II, Germany, Italy, and Japan had on many occasions infringed upon the interests of Britain, France and the United States, but these three countries had consistently retreated, following a policy of non-interference and rejecting that of collective security and collective resistance to the aggressors. They even went so far as to help them in various ways.

It was with the support of the American, British and French imperialists that the German monopoly capitalists succeeded in reviving German militarism. The United States Government leaders, in particular, helped to rehabilitate and renovate Germany's heavy industry and war industry. Between 1924 and 1929, American monopoly capitalists exported to Germany a total capital equivalent to over 20,000 million marks for the purpose of setting up the German war industry. American financial aid provided a basis for the revival of German militarism. After Hitler came to power, the British and French Governments adopted a policy of appeasement towards him. In 1933, Britain, France, Germany and Italy concluded a Four-Power Pact in Rome. In 1934, through the mediation of Britain and France, Nazi Germany concluded a mutual non-aggression treaty with Poland. Britain and France connived at the rearmament of Germany, at the Italian occupation of Ethiopia and at the German-Italian aggression on Spain. In 1937, Britain consented to the occupation by Nazi Germany of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Danzig and even asked Hitler to admit Britain and France to the “Berlin-Rome Axis.” The British and French ruling circles were blind to the writing on the wall; they were attempting to divert the fascist aggression eastwards against the Soviet Union.

Though Britain, France and the United States were disgruntled at Japan's infringement upon their interests in China, they feared the success of the socialist construction in the Soviet Union, the rise of the working-class movement in Europe and the national emancipation movement in Asia. Hence, fascism was to them a powerful weapon against world revolution, and they adopted a “ringside-spectator” policy, hoping to see the belligerents fighting each other to exhaustion so that they could come out and dictate terms to both sides.

Any war unleashed by the aggressors was clearly a menace to all peace-loving nations. It was only too evident that a war that was to involve hundreds of millions of people would constitute a grave threat, especially to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union could not ignore such a dangerous turn of events. While adhering to her policy of peace, consolidating her trade relations with all countries, maintaining peaceful relations with
her neighbours and supporting those nations that were struggling for independence against aggression, the Soviet Union made strenuous efforts to raise the fighting power of the Red Army and Navy, determined to hit back with redoubled force at any war provocateurs that should venture to attack her.

Under the impact of the economic crisis, the German, Italian and Japanese imperialist powers launched World War II. Among the anti-fascist allies, however, there existed radical differences with regard to the purpose of the war and the task of maintaining peace in the post-war world.

The purpose of the anti-Axis war as conceived by the Soviet Union and all the freedom-loving peoples of the world war to restore and strengthen democracy, exterminate fascism, eliminate any possibility of renewed aggression on the part of the Axis countries and secure co-operation among all nations. But as conceived by the British, French and American imperialist powers, it was, on the contrary, to oust Germany and Japan from the world market and maintain their own domination over the world. It never occurred to them that the war would crush fascism, emancipate the countries enslaved by the fascist powers, and thus provide the conditions for democratic reforms in these countries.


On July 7, 1937, the Japanese fascist troops launched an attack on Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), some ten kilometres southwest of Peking. Under the influence of the rising anti-Japanese movement the local Chinese garrison put up resolute resistance in defiance of the Kuomintang intentions. On August 13, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai as a preparatory step to the invasion of Central China. The Chinese troops there fought back. Thus began China's War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression.

Because their internal and external contradictions had intensified, the Japanese imperialists unleashed a large-scale, desperate, adventurous war—an imperialist war of utmost brutality. The massacres, rapes, plunder, arson, demolition and other atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese fascist troops left an indelible stain on human history.

The enemy slaughtered the people indiscriminately. In the massacre after the fall of Nanking which went on for more than a month, no less than 300,000 defenceless civilians were killed. A great number of soldiers who had laid down their arms were machine-gunned in groups or burned alive.

Rape cases were even more appalling. Neither girls of tender age nor old women escaped. In many instances, rape was followed by mutilation, murder and indescribable brutishness.

By means of these atrocities the enemy obviously intended to subjugate the Chinese people and break their determination to resist aggression.

The Japanese aggressors set no limit to their plunder and destruction. Wherever they went they looted vehicles, livestock, foodstuffs, clothes, money and everything else they could lay their hands on. Furniture, doors and window-frames were used as fire-wood. Count-
less houses were burned down.

The enemy used every possible means in trying to ruin Chinese industry and trade. Kiangsu and Chekiang, the centre of Chinese national industry and trade, suffered most. From August 13 to November 1937, the total losses in Shanghai exceeded C.N. $3,000 million (pre-war national currency). Many other cities fared almost as badly.

The Chinese people's wealth, whether it consisted in modern factories or peasant cottages, met with the most outrageous destruction and plunder.

This barbarous policy drove all sections of the Chinese people into a mighty anti-Japanese struggle. Immediately after the Japanese offensive in North China the Movement for Resisting Japan and National Salvation was started again on a larger scale than ever. People contributed whatever they could to supporting the War of Resistance. Organizations to save the nation sprang up all over China. The entire Chinese people stood for resolute resistance, a drastic reform of all political organs and the implementation of democracy. They opposed any vacillation and compromise. Many officers in the Kuomintang army and many local Kuomintang branches also called for resistance. Thus the Movement for Resisting Japan and National Salvation gathered momentum as never before.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued on July 15, 1937 a statement calling for co-operation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, which said: "The Three Principles of the People being what China needs today, our Party pledges itself to fight for their complete realization." The statement also reaffirmed the Party's readiness to fulfil the four promises made in a telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. In doing so, the Party showed its selfless devotion to the national cause.

The efforts made by the Chinese Communist Party, coupled with the pressure of popular demand, at last bore fruit. The Kuomintang government announced on August 22, 1937 that the main forces of the Red Army in the Northwest were to be reorganized as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. (Later on, the guerrilla units left behind by the Red Army in the southern provinces were reorganized as the New Fourth Army.) On September 22 and 23, the Kuomintang officially published the statement made by the Chinese Communist Party in July, and Chiang Kai-shek, in a public statement, was compelled to recognize the legal status of the Party. Thus the Anti-Japanese National United Front initiated by the Party was established—a united front broad in scope and complex in nature, including workers, peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and even the big pro-British and pro-American bourgeoisie.

Throughout the War of Resistance, China received great support from the Soviet Union.

The great Soviet Union was the most reliable and powerful country that could help China in the war. She had always been deeply concerned with the weal and woe of the Chinese people and had regarded it as her duty to support all oppressed nations and all revolutionary wars. On August 21, 1937, the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression treaty with China, declaring that the use of war to pursue political ends should be forbidden in the relations between the two countries and that in the event of China being attacked by
a third power, the Soviet Union would refuse to give any aid, directly or indirectly, to the aggressor.

This treaty gave moral support to the Chinese people and dealt a blow to the aggressors.

The Soviet Union also rendered material aid. Vast supplies of arms, petrol and lorries were sent to China via the Northwest. Soviet airmen took part in the defence of China.

This great friendship extended in what was a difficult time for the Chinese people constituted an invaluable contribution to the cause of China's national liberation.

At the beginning of the war, none of the Western capitalist countries gave China any real help. Before the Lukouchiao Incident the Western press loudly asserted that China's national defence was powerless to resist the attack and that Japan would occupy the whole of China within a matter of a few months. The ruling circles of the Western bourgeoisie took a "wait-and-see" attitude. When Japan launched her attack, Britain, France and the United States withdrew from Shanghai, the centre of their domination in Central China; Britain withdrew also from Canton, a base under her exclusive rule in South China, and France from Hainan Island.

The Anglo-American imperialists pursued their policy of "watching the tigers fight from a safe distance" in the belief that in the Sino-Japanese war the flames of China's national liberation movement would be stamped out, while the Japanese imperialists would be weakened. Britain and especially the United States kept supplying Japan with huge quantities of war materials even after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. Most of the petrol, planes, iron, steel and other war materials used by Japan against China were supplied by the United States. According to the United States official figures, in her trade with Japan, war materials accounted for 58 per cent of her total exports to Japan in 1937, 66 per cent in 1938 and 81 per cent in 1939.

As the Japanese war of aggression against China impaired British and United States interests in the East, it naturally caused a rift. But in order to hamper the growth of the Chinese people's strength, to turn the war against the Soviet Union and to cope with the tense situation created by Hitler in Europe, the Anglo-American imperialists were eager to lessen their conflict with Japan. They even went to the length of encouraging the Japanese aggression. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, they either tried hard to seek a compromise with Japan or sat back in the hope that China and Japan would both be exhausted in the war.

Such was the real nature of the "non-intervention" policy then pursued by Britain and the United States.

3. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE AND INITIATIVE WITHIN THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT. THE PARTY WAGES GUERRILLA WARFARE AND ESTABLISHES ANTI-JAPANESE BASES BEHIND THE ENEMY LINES

From the very beginning of the anti-Japanese war, there emerged two opposite policies: one followed by the big landlords and big bourgeoisie represented by the Kuomintang, the other by the working class and the broad masses represented by the Chinese Commu-
The Kuomintang was compelled to put up resistance by popular pressure and by the fact that Japanese aggression had seriously impaired the interests of the British and American imperialists in China and of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie represented by the “Four Big Families.”

It was only on July 17, 1937 that Chiang Kai-shek made a statement in Lushan, reluctantly announcing his resistance to Japanese aggression. Nonetheless, in his attitude towards the war he continued to vacillate.

Immediately after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Kuomintang government, ready to capitulate, proposed negotiations with Japan, offering as terms that both the Chinese and Japanese troops were to withdraw simultaneously from a defined area of Chinese territory near Lukouchiao. But this proposal was rejected by the Japanese Government. The Kuomintang government then accepted the so-called “Plan for Peaceful Settlement,” worked out by the Japanese representatives and the local authorities in North China. (The two main items were: withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Peking, Tientsin, Lukouchiao and areas east of the Yungting River and an Anti-Communist Alliance between China and Japan.) These negotiations gave Japan the time she needed for bringing in her troops for a large-scale offensive.

It was not until the Japanese troops attacked Shanghai on August 13 and the rule of the “Four Big Families” over Southeast China began to totter that the Kuomintang was left no choice but to conduct the War of Resistance.

Before the fall of Nanking, the Kuomintang government, in repeated negotiations with Japan, was ready to capitulate; in one of these talks, as was known to all, the fascist German ambassador to China served as mediator. The terms put forward by Japan through him included China’s recognition of Manchoukuo, the puppet state established by Japan in Northeast China, and recognition of the independence of Inner Mongolia, Sino-Japanese “economic cooperation,” Sino-Japanese joint defence against communism, banning of the anti-Japanese movement in China and the demand that no troops be stationed in North China. Although these terms were obviously meant to subjugate China, the Kuomintang expressed its readiness to accept them as basis of negotiation. But the mounting determination of the Communist Party and the people all over China to resist the Japanese invasion frustrated the intrigues of Japan and the Kuomintang.

Since the Kuomintang’s policy towards Japan was one of compromise and capitulation, it was naturally dead set against the people’s total war, but relied solely on a partial war carried on by the government alone. Fearing that the national salvation movement might get out of its control, the Kuomintang tried feverishly to restrain the movement and take everything into its own hands. Although the Kuomintang government organized its own societies in support of the resistance, the real aim was to curb rather than encourage the movement. Many people’s organizations for national salvation were banned on the pretext of unified leadership, and participants in the anti-Japanese movement were persecuted by means of legal chicanery.

As a result of this anti-popular policy, the Kuomintang troops suffered defeat on all the fronts.
Within a month of the Lukouchiao Incident, the Kuomintang gave up Peking and Tientsin and soon afterwards the provinces of Chabar and Suiyuan. Shanghai fell in November 1937 and Nanking in December. By March 1938, only a little over six months after the outbreak of the war, the enemy had reached as far as Fenglingtu in Shan-si, Kueiteh in Honan and Tsaochuang in Shantung. In June 1938, the Kuomintang yielded the Matang Fortress on the Yangtse Rivcr, thus exposing Wuhan to enemy attack both from the north and the east. In face of the continuous assaults of the Japanese troops, the Kuomintang troops suffered one dabacle after another. In October 1938, Canton and Wuhan fell. Thus, nearly all of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Honan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Hupeh were lost one province after the other. In short, following the line of partial resistance to Japanese aggression while opposing the Chinese people, the Kuomintang troops retreated within a brief span of 15 months from Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton and Wuhan right up to Szechuan.

On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party on the very day following the Lukouchiao Incident issued a telegram to the whole nation calling for total resistance.

On July 23, 1937, Comrade Mao Tse-tung published an article entitled “The Policies, Measures and Perspectives of Combating Japanese Invasion,” in which he pointed out that there were two policies, two sets of measures and two perspectives to the anti-Japanese war. The policy adopted by the Communist Party was one of resolute resistance, and the measures to achieve this end consisted in reliance on the masses. Consequently, the perspective would be national liberation. On the other hand, the policy adopted by the Kuomintang was one of compromise and capitulation, and the measures it applied were aimed at suppressing the people. Consequently, the perspective would be a defeat. From this difference arose the struggle between the policy of the Chinese Communist Party and that of the Kuomintang in the anti-Japanese war.

On August 25, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held an enlarged meeting at Lochuan in northern Shensi. At the meeting it was pointed out that the difference and controversy between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang over the question of resistance to Japan centred around the way of winning the war. Hence the question of who should give leadership attained special prominence. The session endorsed the Ten-Point National Salvation Programme, a programme intended to ensure that the Communist Party gave leadership to the people throughout the country to win the anti-Japanese war and to oppose the Kuomintang’s anti-popular policy. It was the Party’s firm conviction that only by the thoroughgoing implementation of this programme could the aim of defending the motherland and defeating the enemy be achieved.

In order to implement its policy thoroughly and to forestall or correct any capitulationist tendencies which were likely to appear or had appeared, the Central Committee passed on September 25 a resolution concerning the question of participation in the government. It pointed out that the government then in existence was not one of the Anti-Japanese United Front, but was still under the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship. Hence, no Communists should participate in it lest such a step should obscure the stand of the Party and prolong the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang.

In military affairs the policy of independence and initiative meant
to carry on independent guerrilla warfare in mountain areas, to stick to guerrilla warfare in the main, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions; that is to say, to establish anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy lines and wage extensive guerrilla warfare on the enemy’s flanks.

In the early period of the war, many people, both inside and outside the Party, underestimated the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the anti-Japanese war and placed their hope for victory on the regular warfare waged by the Kuomintang and on the operations of the Kuomintang troops. The Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung repudiated this view, and pointed out that, by organizing the people’s forces behind the enemy lines and fighting for the extension of armed resistance from a preliminary strategic period of independent guerrilla warfare to a second strategic period of regular warfare, the Communist Party of China would certainly bring the war to a victorious end.

Immediately after the outbreak of the nation-wide War of Resistance, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung issued many directives concerning waging independent guerrilla warfare and establishing anti-Japanese bases in the enemy’s rear.

First, to wage guerrilla warfare independently and on its own initiative, the army should be divided into separate detachments and penetrate deep into the enemy’s rear to mobilize the people and establish anti-Japanese bases.

Secondly, the Party’s work in North China should have as its sole object the prosecution of guerrilla warfare around which all other activities should be centred. The local Party branches should mobilize the masses, collect scattered arms, enlist stray soldiers and form guerrilla units in all areas according to plan.

Thirdly, the most effective measures to consolidate the anti-Japanese bases already established (e.g. the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base Area) were to step up the reorganization and training of the troops and the work of the Party, clear the base areas of bandits, take great pains to educate all irregulars that were also to fight the aggressor, and eliminate local collaborators. With the success of these measures, efforts should be made to expand the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base Area from western and central Hopei to eastern Hopei.

Fourthly, if the whole nation persevered in the War of Resistance and the work to arouse the masses was done thoroughly, it would be quite possible to launch and keep up extensive anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare on the plains of Shantung and Hopei. Guerrilla zones should be immediately marked off in these plains, and command headquarters established, developing the guerrilla activities step by step. In the areas recovered from the enemy, anti-Japanese democratic governments should be formed, scattered arms collected, and the people mobilized to join guerrilla units or the regular army.

The Central Committee of the Party considered it possible for the New Fourth Army in Central China to mobilize the masses and establish anti-Japanese bases in the vast region between Kwangtseh, Soochow, Chenkiang, Nanking and Wuhu. After the establishment of the Maoshan Base Area, preparations should be made for dispatching forces to the triangular area between Soochow, Chenkiang and Wuhu. Besides, a detachment should be sent to the areas north of the Yangtse River. The New Fourth Army should seize the oppor-
portunity at that time to penetrate behind the enemy lines and establish guerrilla bases on either side of the river. Leaders of the New Fourth Army were instructed to explain to the Party members the radical difference between the anti-Japanese war and the civil war in the development of the struggle and in the methods of work; it was pointed out to them that only with the expansion of the Party and the revolutionary army could the united front be broadened and consolidated and the Kuomintang die-hards' policy of restricting the revolutionary forces be shattered.

During the stage of strategic defence in the anti-Japanese war, the Chinese Communist Party, in opposition to the Kuomintang policy, pursued the line of the people's total resistance, waged an independent guerrilla war and established a number of anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear.

In August 1937 the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army, totalling more than 40,000 men, marched to the front, the former to North China and the latter to the regions north and south of the Yangtze River. The Eighth Route Army, with Chu Teh as Commander-in-Chief, was made up of three divisions (the 115th, 120th and 129th), totalling more than 30,000 men. The New Fourth Army, with Yeh Ting as Commander and Hsiang Ying as Deputy Commander, had 12,000 men. Although the two armies were numerically inferior to the Kuomintang troops, they were far superior in quality, for they possessed a very high level of political understanding, had close ties with the people and were fighting for the interests of the whole nation. In none of these points could the Kuomintang troops match them. Consequently, as soon as they took to the field, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, in contrast to the Kuomintang troops, won a series of victories and recovered vast territories the latter had lost.

Immediately after its arrival at the front, the 115th Division, the main force of the Eighth Route Army, advanced to the Pass of Pinghsingkuan, with the aim of preventing the Japanese from marching south to Taiyuan. On September 25, they launched the first battle of annihilation against the enemy under the command of Lin Piao, and routed 3,000 of the enemy's crack troops. This victory greatly raised the prestige of the army and inspired the people with confidence in the final victory.

While the Kuomintang troops continued their disorderly retreat, the Eighth Route Army succeeded in containing the advancing Japanese along the Chengting-Taiyuan and Tatung-Puchow Railways in two successive campaigns at Hsinkou and Taiyuan.

Taiyuan fell to the Japanese on November 8, 1937, and the Kuomintang troops retreated towards the southwestern part of Shansi. But various units of the Eighth Route Army in the Wutaishan area in the northeastern part of Shansi and behind the enemy lines along the Chengting-Taiyuan Railway kept harassing the Japanese invaders and prevented them from crossing the Yellow River and advancing westwards, thus saving several hundred thousands of the retreating Kuomintang troops from collapse by a great feat of strategic covering.

From then onwards, the Eighth Route Army penetrated deep behind enemy lines and set about establishing a number of anti-Japanese bases:

The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Anti-Japanese Base Area—After the Battle of Pinghsingkuan, a section of the 115th Division remained
in the Wutaishan area. Things were then in a state of chaos in the region where the borders of Shansi, Chahar and Hopei met. Sometimes, it took no more than a handful of Japanese marauders, carrying a Japanese flag, to occupy a county town; the Kuomintang troops would flee southwards before they had caught sight of the enemy. This situation, resulting from the collapse of the local Kuomintang regime, was brought to an end by the Eighth Route Army in the autumn of 1937 when it established the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military Zone with Wutaishan as its centre. A regiment of the Northeastern Army crushed the puppet regime in Ankou, Hochien, Hsinhsien, Kaoyang and other counties and established the Anti-Japanese Base Area in the central Hopei plains. A conference of representatives of soldiers, officials and civilians of the border region was held in Fuping, Hopei, on January 15, 1938, and the Administrative Council of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region was set up. In June 1938 the Eighth Route Army, by leading an anti-Japanese uprising in eastern Hopei, established a base there as well.

The Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Anti-Japanese Base Area—While the Kuomintang troops were retreating southwards after the fall of Taiyuan, the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, in co-ordination with the local organizations of the Communist Party and the newly organized local anti-Japanese forces, established the Taihang-Taiyueh Base, with the Taihang Mountains as its centre. At the end of 1937 and in 1938, the 129th Division, after crossing the Peking-Hankow Railway to the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Plains, was organizing the masses for guerrilla warfare. The Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Zone was set up in March 1939 and the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Base Area established in the vast plain.

The Shansi-Suiyuan Anti-Japanese Base Area The 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army marched into the northwestern part of Shansi in the winter of 1937. In February 1938, the division undertook to cut off the north section of the Tatung-Puchow Railway in order to co-ordinate with the counter-attack which the Kuomintang claimed to unleash on Taiyuan. While large numbers of enemy troops were pushing southwards towards Linfen, those stationed at Tatung launched an attack on the northwestern part of Shansi. Thereupon the 120th Division turned and fought back, recovering seven counties. The Northwestern Shansi Anti-Japanese Base was set up in March. In August a detachment of the division advanced towards the Taching Mountains in northeastern Suiyuan and recovered Taolin in September and Wulanhua in October.

The Shantung Anti-Japanese Base Area—When Han Fu-chu, then ruler of Shantung, retreated at the end of 1937 without firing a shot, the Shantung Provincial Committee and the Taian County Committee of the Communist Party organized the local peasants and the students from Peking and Tientsin who had joined the national salvation movement and staged an anti-Japanese uprising in the Tsulai Mountains. By the autumn of 1938, the Shantung Column had expanded into nine detachments and founded a guerrilla base in the region of Huahsien, Penglai and Yehsien on the Shantung Peninsula. The Party’s local organization at Liaocheng helped Fan Chu-hsien, a local public figure, to start anti-Japanese activities in the northwest of Shantung Province.

The Central China Anti-Japanese Base Area—The New Fourth Army, reorganized from the Red guerrilla units in the south, set up its headquarters in Nanchang in January 1938. Subsequently,
it penetrated behind the enemy lines in Central China by two routes: one to the south of the Yangtse River and the other to the north. The southern detachment approached the Nanking-Shanghai Railway in June 1938 and established the South Kiangsu Liberated Area with Mount Maoshan as its centre. The northern detachment entered the region of Chaohu, Wuwei and Tingyuan in Anhwei Province in May 1938 and set up a liberated area, with Outang as its centre.

4. CLAMOUR FROM THE NATIONAL SUBJUGATIONISTS AND FROM THE BELIEVERS IN A QUICK VICTORY. MAO TSE-TUNG'S FORESIGHT CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

By May 1938, when the anti-Japanese war had been under way for ten months, the Chinese people who were suffering the calamities of the war and fighting for the survival of their nation, were counting the days to victory. But how would the war develop? Could the Chinese people win it? How should they strive for victory? These were questions which, to many people, remained unanswered. Both before and after the outbreak of the war, there were people in the Kuomintang who loudly proclaimed China's inevitable subjugation. In fact, this theory had furnished the Kuomintang with a pretext for refusing to resist Japan before the Lukouchiao Incident. When the Incident compelled the Chiang Kai-shek clique to go to war, the Wang Ching-wei clique, the mouthpiece of this theory, prepared for capitulation. Besides, the repeated defeats sustained by the Kuomintang troops in the early stages of the war gave rise to pessimism and despair among a section of the people.

On the other hand, after the outbreak of the war there also circulated a completely groundless, optimistic theory of quick victory. Some members of the Chinese Communist Party belittled the enemy and overestimated the strength of the Kuomintang and its role in the war. They saw only one aspect of the Kuomintang, that it was resisting, but overlooked the other aspect, that it was reactionary and corrupt. They thought that China could obtain a quick victory by relying solely on the Kuomintang. The Chiang Kai-shek clique, for their part, placed all their hopes on foreign support, and hung back waiting for Britain and the United States to fight Japan for them, so that they themselves could continue their reactionary rule in China. As represented by Ta Kung Pao, the organ of the Kuomintang Political Science Group, many people in the Kuomintang held the opportunist view that the battles at Talierchhuang and Hsuchow in March 1938 marked the beginning of the counter-offensive against Japan.

To refute these mistaken theories and to point out to the whole nation what the correct course of the war should be, Comrade Mao Tse-tung published in May 1938 his book *On the Protracted War*. From a comprehensive objective analysis of the relative strength of China and Japan in the light of dialectical and historical materialism, he drew the following conclusions concerning the orientation and prospect of the anti-Japanese war:

First, neither the theory of national subjugation nor that of a quick victory had any foundation in fact. From an analysis of domestic and international relations, Comrade Mao Tse-tung predicted that the anti-Japanese war would be a protracted struggle (as
against the theory of a quick victory) but that the final victory would be China’s (as against the theory of national subjugation). What was the basis for such a view? He said:

The Sino-Japanese war is none other than a war of life and death between a semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and an imperialist Japan in the thirties of the twentieth century. Herein lies the basis of the whole problem. From this basis arose four points of contrast between the warring parties. Japan was powerful, but small, retrogressive and lacking in international support; China was weak, but large, progressive and enjoying abundant international support. Of these four points, only one was to the advantage of Japan, namely, that Japan was powerful while China was weak. This meant that the war was inevitable, and that China would necessarily pass through a period of hardship in the war of resistance—which would be a protracted war, not one of quick decision. It would be wrong to forget or brush aside this point and only consider or exaggerate the three others, as the adherents of the “quick victory” theory had done.

Regarding the three other contrasts, the odds were definitely against Japanese aggression and in favour of China’s resistance. It was first of all to the disadvantage of Japan, a small country, to have invaded a big country like China. But this alone would not save China from subjugation, since history shows that a small but strong country could sometimes conquer a big but weak country, as Britain conquered India. It was due to the characteristics of the epoch that China could not be subjugated, and that so long as she carried on her armed resistance to the very end, the final victory would be hers. These characteristics were reflected in Japan’s retrogression and lack of support and China’s progress and abundance of support. Japan’s war against China was reactionary, barbarous and aggressive, whereas China’s war of resistance was a just, progressive war of national revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party. The unjust and predatory nature of the war waged by Japan against China would arouse most violent antagonism between the classes in Japan, between the Japanese and the Chinese peoples and between Japan and most of the countries of the world. All this would result in lack of support for Japan. On the other hand, because of the just and progressive nature of her War of Resistance, China could rally together the whole nation in solidarity and secure extensive international support, especially from the Soviet Union. It would be entirely wrong to exaggerate the strength of Japan and the weakness of China and ignore all other factors, as the advocates of the theory of national subjugation had done.

As to the course of the protracted war, Comrade Mao Tse-tung foresaw that China’s War of Resistance would pass through the three stages of strategic defence, strategic stalemate and strategic counter-offensive.

The first stage would be one of the enemy’s strategic offensive and China’s strategic defensive. The chief form of fighting to be adopted in the whole of China should be mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare. Behind the enemy lines guerrilla warfare should take precedence, but not to the exclusion of mobile warfare under favourable conditions.

The second stage would be one of strategic stalemate. The enemy would change from a strategic offensive to defence of his positions and set up a unified puppet regime so as to keep the territories he
had occupied. But he would be confronted with an extensive and stubborn guerrilla war. China's form of fighting should be mainly guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. The task should be to make preparations for the counter-offensive. This stage would be the most trying period for China, but it would also be the pivot of change.

The third-stage would be that of China's strategic counter-offensive. China would rely chiefly on her own strength, nurtured in the preceding stage and continuing to grow in this one. China should make efforts to gain international support and utilize the changes within the enemy country. The main form of fighting would be mobile warfare, but positional warfare would play an important role. The third stage would be the last one of the protracted war. To fight to the end would mean going through all these phases.

Secondly, there were two other even more important problems related to the first one: the role of leadership in the war and the possible changes both in domestic and international relations.

Superiority or inferiority in military strength constitutes the objective basis of initiative or passivity, but it does not in itself decide the issue. There must be struggle, there must be a contest in ability to direct a war between the two sides before initiative or passivity becomes an actuality. Correct direction of a war may turn inferiority into superiority, or passivity into initiative, and vice versa.

The difference between strength and weakness, between superiority and inferiority, was relative, not absolute. True, this difference, which counted as one of the four basic contrasts, was a real fact, by virtue of which the enemy was able to attack and invade China's territory. The enemy was on the offensive while China was on the defensive. As to the other three contrasts (i.e. largeness versus smallness, progressiveness versus retrogression, and abundance of support versus lack of support), they were either rudimentary or latent. To turn the tide, to halt the enemy's advance and prepare for the eventual counter-offensive, it would be necessary to turn the tables on the enemy and transform the conditions favourable to China from a rudimentary stage to one of predominance, from the potential to the actual. This would depend on the skill of leadership. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out:

People who direct a war cannot strive for victories beyond the limit allowed by the objective conditions, but within that limit they can and must strive for victories through their conscious activity.

Because of the enemy's strength and China's weakness, the enemy's strategic policy was one of offensive, quick decision and exterior-line operations while China's was one of defensive, protracted war and interior-line operations. But as Japan, a small country with limited forces, ventured to invade China, a large country with bigger forces, she could occupy only a part of China's territory and had to leave many parts of occupied areas ungarrisoned, affording a broad theatre of operations for China's mobile and guerrilla warfare. Thus in campaigns and battles, the initiative to make exterior-line attacks of quick decision might fall to China while the enemy might be forced into an interior-line, protracted defence. In an exterior-line attack of quick decision it was the aspect of "attack" that was of chief importance; the "exterior-line" referred to the scope of attack and "quick-decision" to its duration. Thus in individual battles, the
enemy's initiative would be transformed into passivity, strength into weakness and superiority into inferiority, while with China the case would be just the opposite. After a series of victories in these individual battles, the balance of strength would change. China would become stronger, and the enemy weaker.

The cumulative effect of many victories, coupled with other conditions favourable to China (i.e. changes inside the enemy camp and in the international situation), would transform the situation by first placing China on a par with the enemy and later in a superior position. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung said, "Here the efforts one makes to score more victories and commit fewer errors are the decisive factor." 5

Comrade Mao Tse-tung stressed the strategic significance of guerrilla warfare in the anti-Japanese war, pointing out that though mobile warfare was the primary form of fighting in the anti-Japanese war and guerrilla warfare should be considered secondary, yet guerrilla warfare played its important strategic role in the war. It would support regular warfare and transform itself into regular warfare.

Thirdly, mobilization of the people for the war was of paramount importance. War is a means to a given political end; in other words, it is the continuation of politics. The political aim of the anti-Japanese war was to drive out the Japanese imperialists and to build up a new China of freedom and equality. In his book On the Protracted War Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out, "The army and the people are the foundation of victory." 6 "The deepest source of the immense power of war lies in the masses of the people." 7 "With the common people of the whole country mobilized, we shall create a vast sea of humanity and drown the enemy in it, remedy our shortage in arms and other things and secure the prerequisites to overcome every difficulty in the war." 8 To win the war it was imperative to mobilize the people of the whole country and to expand and consolidate the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This was the basic condition for victory in the war.

The book On the Protracted War was published when Japan was launching her large-scale attack against Wuhan and when the absurd theories of national subjugation and of a quick victory were much in the air. Applying the Marxist-Leninist theories of materialist dialectics, Comrade Mao Tse-tung thoroughly refuted these theories, laid down the strategic line for a protracted war and predicted with scientific insight the course of this war, thus greatly raising and strengthening the people's confidence in final victory and placing the war under the guidance of scientific principles. The whole course of the anti-Japanese war fully confirmed the correctness of his view.


In the first stage of the war, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army moved behind the enemy lines, waged extensive guerrilla warfare, and established a number of anti-Japanese bases in North and Central China.
Owing to China's resolute resistance and Japan's shortage of armed forces, the Japanese invaders were compelled to stop their offensive after their occupation of Canton and Wuhan. As their rear lines were constantly exposed to attack by China's powerful guerrilla units, they had to turn back to defend the areas they had occupied. Thus the anti-Japanese war passed into a stage of strategic stalemate.

In the early period of this stage from the winter of 1938 to the end of 1940, the bases behind the enemy lines and the people's armed forces kept growing. Therefore the enemy gradually began to direct his main forces against the Communist Party while chiefly using political means to induce the Kuomintang to capitulate. Meanwhile, confronted with great tension in Europe, the U.S., Britain, and France also tried to coerce the Kuomintang government into capitulation, hoping to induce Japan to invade the Soviet Union at the expense of the interests of China.

As a result of the growth of the people's anti-Japanese forces, the efforts made by Japan to induce the Kuomintang government to capitulate and the attempts by Britain and the United States towards the same purpose, the Kuomintang adopted a policy of active opposition to the Communist Party and passive resistance to Japan.

(1) Growth of the people's anti-Japanese forces. Before the fall of Wuhan, four base areas had been set up behind the enemy lines in North China: the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan, the Shansi-Suiyuan and the Shantung Base Areas. In the two years that followed the loss of this city, these bases steadily expanded.

The first to be established behind the enemy lines was the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base Area. It lay in an area crossed by the five main railways of Peking-Hankow, Peking-Pao-tow, Tatung-Puchow, Chengting-Taiyuan and Peking-Shenyang, thus providing an excellent vantage ground from which to recover such strategic points as Peking, Tientsin, Shihchiachuang, Paoting, Tatung, Changchiakou and Chengtch, and the main lines of communication.

In August 1940, the base areas in Shansi, Hopei, Shantung and Honan were united and guerrilla warfare spread from its first base in the Taihang Mountains to a vast territory, extending from the Tatung-Puchow Railway and the Fen River in the west to the coast of the Gulf of Po Hai in the east, and from the Chengting-Taiyuan and Tsanghsien-Shihchiachuang Railways in the north to the Yellow River in the south.

The various bases in Shansi and Suiyuan were united into the Shansi-Suiyuan Base Area and an anti-Japanese democratic government was formed in February 1940. This area became a strategic bulwark for supporting the War of Resistance in North China and guarding Northwest China against the enemy.

The main forces of the 115th Division moved from Shansi to Shantung and joined forces with the local guerrilla units. Towards the end of 1940, anti-Japanese democratic governments were set up in a number of counties and several base areas were established in central and southern Shantung, the Po Hai area, and other places.

In Central China, the New Fourth Army established base areas in southern Kiangsu, northern Kiangsu, central Anhwei, north of the Hual River and on the borders of Hupeh, Honan and Anhwei, and set up two headquarters, bringing the guerrilla warfare on either side of the Yangtze River under a unified command. The
Central China Base Area occupied a vast territory, bordering on the sea in the east, screened by the Wutang Mountains in the west, and extending from the Lunghai Railway in the north to the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway in the south. Including many parts of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Honan and Hupeh Provinces as it did, it provided a favourable vantage ground from which to recover such strategically important enemy points as Nanking, Shanghai, Hsuchow, Wuhan and Hangchow, dealing a serious blow to the scheme of the Japanese army to control Central China and advance westwards.

After the fall of Canton, the South China Anti-Japanese Base was established under the leadership of local organizations of the Communist Party.

From the beginning of the war up to the end of 1940, the people's army recovered 150 counties and inflicted 400,000 casualties on the Japanese and puppet troops. It engaged half of the Japanese troops in China. The liberated and guerrilla areas had a population of 100 million and the membership of the Communist Party increased to 800,000. In the stage of stalemate, it was actually the people's armed forces behind the enemy lines that held the Japanese imperialists in check. In other words, the base areas were the centre of the resistance and the people's army its main force.

The people's army heroically smashed the enemy's numerous "mopping-up" and encirclement moves. A steady growth of the base areas resulted from these victories.

From September to November 1939, the people's army smashed the encirclement by 50,000 enemy troops of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region.

The greatest action was the Hundred Regiments Campaign which lasted for three and a half months from August to December 1940. One hundred and fifteen regiments of the people's army, totalling 400,000 men, were engaged in it.

In the first stage of this campaign, the object of the people's army was to wreck the enemy's communication lines. The attack was directed at all the railways in North China, with the Chengting-Taiyuan Railway as the main target. In the second stage the object was to attack the enemy strongholds, the main target being the enemy positions along the railways and in the base areas. In the third stage, the people's army countered the enemy's "mopping-up" campaigns, annihilating enemy troops in the five base areas of the Taihang Mountains, northwestern Shansi, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, central Hopei and the Taching Mountains.

This campaigns achieved three main results. The enemy's policy of splitting and blockading the bases was defeated, a great number of enemy troops were pinned down and prevented from launching an offensive on the main front, and the plots of the die-hards for compromise and capitulation were foiled. The enemy was greatly alarmed by the mighty power shown by the people's army. From then on, Japan overhauled her plans for attack and concentrated all her forces against the base areas in North China and waged total warfare against them—military, economic and cultural.

From the beginning of the war the Kuomintang had counted on weakening and eliminating the Communist Party and the people's armed forces with the aid of Japan. But, contrary to their hope, the people's forces steadily grew. The victories won on the battle front of the liberated areas formed a sharp contrast to the debacles of the Kuomintang troops, much to Chiang Kai-shek's surprise and
mortification. Constant defeats in the war and a growing anti-Communist sentiment drove the Kuomintang to still fiercer and more reckless anti-Communist and anti-popular activities.

(2) Japan’s attempt to induce the Kuomintang to capitulate. In the early period of the war, the Japanese imperialists took only the strength of the Kuomintang authorities into consideration and belittled the Chinese Communist Party; therefore their policy towards the Kuomintang was one of military offensive supplemented by political means to induce its surrender. But in the stalemate stage, the enemy paid greater attention to the Communist Party than to the Kuomintang, and turned his main forces against the battle fronts in his rear while halting his strategic offensive in the Kuomintang-held areas. In his policy towards the Kuomintang, the enemy relied mainly on political means to induce its surrender; military blows had become secondary.

In December 1938, Japanese Prime Minister Konoye made a statement concerning Japan’s basic policy towards China. It was a policy aimed at subjugating China. The “Sino-Japanese Economic Co-operation” referred to in his statement was later defined as follows: of the total investments in Central and South China 51 per cent were to be made by Chinese capitalists and 49 per cent by Japanese; whereas in North China the ratio between the Chinese and Japanese investments was to be reversed. It was Japan’s design to split China’s anti-Japanese camp through the bait of some economic concessions and thereby achieve her purpose of subjugating the country.

After the collapse of the Konoye cabinet, Kiichiro Hiranuma, the New Prime Minister, in a speech in March 1939 declared that Japan was ready to enter into negotiations with China on ending the hostilities, provided the Kuomintang government reconsidered its attitude towards Japan and co-operated with her. In this public statement the Japanese Government made it clear that it had changed its policy, that instead of insisting on Chiang Kai-shek’s resignation, it was now inducing him to capitulate.

(3) Intrigues of Britain and the United States to induce the Kuomintang government to capitulate. The “non-intervention” policy pursued by the United States, Britain, and France in Europe was, in its essence, a policy of conniving at a war of aggression for their own profit. But the greed of the fascist countries knew no bounds. Spain was the first to fall victim to this policy; then Austria and Czechoslovakia followed. As a matter of fact, in pursuing this policy, the United States, Britain and France were “lifting a rock only to have their own toes crushed,” hurting themselves as well as others.

After her annexation of Austria in March 1938, Nazi Germany claimed the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. France and Czechoslovakia rejected the Soviet Union’s proposal for collective resistance to aggression. On September 30, 1938, the Munich Pact was signed and Czechoslovakia was compelled to cede the Sudeten to Germany.

On March 15, 1939, Germany seized the whole of Czechoslovakia and was about to push further east into Poland. At this critical moment, the Soviet Union proposed a triple alliance with France and Britain, for the joint protection of countries menaced by the fascist powers.

The negotiations between the three powers went on from March to August 1939. The British and French Governments betrayed
their reluctance to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union on a basis of equality. They demanded that the Soviet Union should undertake the defence of Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Greece and Belgium (all these being countries which Britain and France were interested in defending), but they refused to do the same for the neighbouring countries of the Soviet Union, i.e. Latvia, Estonia and Finland. They wanted to safeguard only their own security, but not that of the Soviet Union. It was therefore natural that the negotiations failed.

While negotiating with the Soviet Union, the British and French Governments kept holding diplomatic talks with Nazi Germany. They were preparing to come to an agreement with Germany for redviding the spheres of influence throughout the world. In the event of the successful conclusion of such an agreement, Britain would have refused to guarantee the security of Poland, thus turning German aggression to the east. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union had to guard herself against the danger of being involved in a war engineered against her. Therefore, accepting a German proposal, she concluded a mutual non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939, thereby gaining for herself almost two years of peace up to June 21, 1941.

On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Two days later, France and Britain declared war on Germany. Thus began World War II.

In order to cope with the tense situation in Europe, the French, British and American imperialists conspired to engineer a "Munich in the Far East." They proposed in June 1939 to hold a Pacific Conference. As at Munich France and Britain had sought compromise with Germany and Italy at the expense of the peoples of Czechoslovakia and of the Soviet Union by recognizing Germany's occupation of the Sudeten, so in the Pacific Conference the United States, Britain and France were to seek compromise with Japan at the expense of the Chinese people and to try to turn the spearhead of Japanese imperialism against the Soviet Union.

When the war broke out between Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, the United States, Britain and France were eager to seek a compromise with Japan in order to concentrate their forces against Germany. Accordingly, they tried to coerce the Chinese Government into capitulation.

Under these circumstances, the pro-Japanese Wang Ching-wei clique in the Kuomintang was the first to go over openly to the enemy. Wang fled from Chungking on December 18, 1938 and issued in Hanoi a statement supporting Konoye's views. A little later he formed a puppet government in Nanking. Thus the Wang Ching-wei clique, which represented a section of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, openly turned traitor and became the enemy of the people.

Meanwhile the Chiang Kai-shek clique in the Kuomintang, representing the pro-American big bourgeoisie, was also on the brink of capitulation.

In January 1939, at a session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, Chiang Kai-shek declared his intention to resist to the last. But what he meant by "the last" was no more than the restoration of the status quo before the Lukouchiao Incident. The Chiang Kai-shek clique was ready to capitulate and turn traitor, provided Japan should keep intact the interests and domination in Central and South China of the "Four Big Families" and of the
American, British and French imperialists. Wang Chung-hui, the foreign minister of the Kuomintang government, declared in September 1939: "China has never rejected any chance of peaceful settlement since the outbreak of the war"—in other words, the Kuomintang government had never ceased its activities for compromise and capitulation.

In order to clear the way for capitulation, the Chiang Kai-shek clique concentrated its forces on opposing the Communist Party and the people, because the Chinese Communist Party and the people's anti-Japanese forces under its leadership were most resolutely opposed to compromise and capitulation. The die-hards attempted to unleash an anti-Communist civil war because this would inevitably put an end to the War of Resistance and lead to the realization of their aim, the conclusion of a treaty of capitulation with Japan.

To this end, the Chiang clique stepped up its anti-Communist activities. First, anti-Communist and anti-popular resolutions were adopted in a series of conferences of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, such as: "Measures to Deal with the Communist Problem," "Draft Plan for the Prevention of Communist Activities in the Enemy-Occupied Areas," "Measures to Deal with the Alien-Party Problem," and "Directives to Deal with the Alien-Party Problem." It was also decided to launch a military offensive against the base areas.

The Kuomintang die-hards attempted to abolish the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and all the anti-Japanese military and civil organizations in the North China base areas, and to set up anti-Communist bases and apply the pao-chia system in these areas. Their object was to restrict, sabotage and eliminate the people's anti-Japanese forces led by the Party in political, military and economic affairs, as well as in mass movements and propaganda. This they hoped to accomplish throughout the country, but first in northern Shensi and North China.

This reactionary plan soon found expression in practice. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region was encircled, the Eighth Route Army was ordered to retreat to the area north of the Tsanghsien-Shihchiachuang and Chengting-Taoyuan Railways, and large forces of the Kuomintang were concentrated for a northward attack on one of the base areas in Shansi. The manoeuvre was designed to co-ordinate with the southward drive of the Japanese troops who were engaged in a "mopping-up" campaign against the people's armed forces along the Changchiakou-Peking line. In the autumn of 1938, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the abolition of the South Hopei Administrative Office. Acting on Chiang's secret orders, the reactionaries created trouble everywhere. Kuomintang troops attacked the Shantung Column of the Eighth Route Army at Poshan in April 1939. Between April and May, Kuomintang troops attacked also the rear quarters of the Eighth Route Army at Shenshen in Hopei, while others raided the liaison office of the New Fourth Army at Pingkiang, Hunan. In September Kuomintang troops besieged the rear quarters of the New Fourth Army in Hupeh, and in November Kuomintang agents and troops attacked the rear service office of the New Fourth Army at Chuehsahan, Honan.

The political oppression and the military offensive started by the Kuomintang die-hards against the Communist Party reached a climax in the period from December 1939 to March 1940. This came to be
known as the first anti-Communist campaign.

This anti-Communist campaign was directed chiefly against the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, and the western and the southeastern parts of Shansi. In December 1939 Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Kuomintang troops which were besieging the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region to launch an offensive. They seized five counties. In the west of Shansi the Kuomintang warlord Yen Hsi-shan collected a force of six armies to attack the "Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps" and the "League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation in Shansi Province." In the spring of 1940, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his troops to attack the general headquarters of the Eighth Route Army in the Taihang Mountain Area.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1939 put forward the slogan: "Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation; persist in solidarity and oppose split; persist in progress and oppose retrogression." Under its leadership, the whole nation fought resolutely against the Kuomintang's tendency towards reaction and compromise. Following the principle of resolute self-defence embodied in the dictum, "We will never attack unless attacked; if attacked we will certainly counter-attack," the Party dealt severe counter blows to the offensives of the reactionaries. The Kuomintang anti-Communist troops which invaded the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region were routed. After inflicting heavy casualties upon Yen Hsi-shan's troops, the people's army shifted to the northwest of Shansi. In the Taihang Mountain Area, three divisions of Kuomintang troops were put out of action. Thus the anti-Communist forces collapsed on all fronts under the heroic counter-attacks.

The offensive by the Kuomintang die-hards during the first anti-Communist upsurge was not confined to the political and military spheres but extended to the ideological front as well. They trumpeted about Kemalism and bourgeois dictatorship to cover up the real nature of the Kuomintang regime, which was one of dictatorship by the big bourgeoisie only. They harped on the absurd theory of "a single revolution," deliberately confusing the two different revolutionary stages, the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, and even denied the raison d'être of communism by asserting that the Three Principles of the People applied to all kinds of revolutions. All this was used to oppose the Communist Party and the people, who stood for the War of Resistance, and to prepare the people's minds for the capitulation the die-hards intended.

The Kuomintang's clamour for compromise with Japan and its anti-Communist activities in the military, political and ideological spheres could only serve to undermine the general feeling of confidence and exhilaration which had resulted from Kuomintang-Communist co-operation since the outbreak of the war, and to plunge the whole nation once again into distress and despondency. Besides, it was necessary for the Chinese Communist Party to elucidate for the people such weighty problems as to how the war was to be carried on and what kind of state should be established after victory had been achieved. It was at this critical time that Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote, in January 1940, On New Democracy—a militant work of great historic significance. In the light of the Leninist theory of colonial and semi-colonial revolution and on the basis of the historical characteristics and revolutionary experiences of China, he made a comprehensive analysis of the fundamental laws gover-
ning the Chinese revolution and worked out a concrete programme for political, economic and cultural development under a new-democratic regime.

The task of the revolution in semi-feudal and semi-colonial China was to overthrow imperialist and feudal rule, rather than to abolish capitalism in general. For this reason, two steps had to be taken in the Chinese revolution. The first was to change a society that was semi-feudal and semi-colonial into an independent, democratic society. The second was to develop the revolution and build up a socialist society.

Though in its social character the first stage of the Chinese revolution was still fundamentally bourgeois-democratic, it no longer belonged to the old type of revolution led by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship, but belonged to the new type of revolution which, led by the proletariat, aimed at establishing first a new-democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes. Although the objective demand of the revolution was to clear the way for the development of capitalism, it served to create the conditions for the victory of socialism. So far as the revolutionary front was concerned, this revolution was no longer a part of the old bourgeois-democratic world revolution, but part of the new proletarian-socialist world revolution.

Consequently, after the completion of the democratic revolution, China would certainly develop into a socialist society, as a result of the steady increase of socialist factors—the growing influence of the proletariat and the Communist Party in the political life of the country and the expansion of the state-owned and co-operative sectors in the national economy—and of the favourable world situation. This new-democratic revolution would be a period of transition between the semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and the socialist society.

First of all, Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted the Kuomintang die-hards' absurd assertions about a bourgeois dictatorship. In the forties of the twentieth century when capitalism was dying and socialism rising, he pointed out, any idea about establishing in China a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship would be absolutely impracticable and illusory. Neither the domestic nor the international situation would permit China to take such a road. Comrade Mao Tse-tung ridiculed Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to play the role of Kemal, and pointed out that what Chiang did after his betrayal of the revolution was not to build an independent capitalist society, but to preserve the semi-colonial and colonial society; not to bring about any bourgeois dictatorship, but a miserable semi-colonial and semi-feudal dictatorship. Thereby Chiang had made himself a comprador and subordinate of the imperialists.

The first stage of the Chinese revolution would take quite a long time. So long as the task of opposing imperialism and feudalism remained unaccomplished, socialist revolution was out of the question. As democratic revolution and socialist revolution each had their own definite task and their proper time, it was wrong to merge the socialist tasks which could only be carried out at some other time with the democratic tasks and to try to accomplish both simultaneously. Of the two revolutionary stages, the first provided the conditions for the second. It was along such a line of development and transition that the Chinese revolutionary movement should proceed.
The theory of "a single revolution" was "stealing the beams and pillars and putting rotten timbers in their stead"; it was in reality an extremely reactionary scheme aimed at doing away with the revolution altogether.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung not only expounded in detail the basic laws of the Chinese revolution and refuted various reactionary theories, but also mapped out a concrete new-democratic political, economic and cultural programmes, thus furnishing the blue-prints for building up a new China.

1. The political programme provided for the establishment of new-democratic republic. This republic would be different both from the European—American form of a capitalist republic under a bourgeois dictatorship and from the socialist republics of the type in the Soviet Union under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It would be a people's democratic republic, led by the proletariat, based on the worker-peasant alliance, and under the joint dictatorship of all the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary classes. Thus, in the political sphere the absolute leadership of the proletariat would be ensured.

2. The economic programme provided for the nationalization of the big banks and big industrial and commercial enterprises. But the republic would not take over other forms of capitalist private property or forbid the development of capitalist production that did not dominate the livelihood of the people. In the rural areas, the land of the landlords should be confiscated and redistributed to peasants who had no land or only a little land, thus making a clean sweep of the feudal relations in the countryside and turning the land into the private property of the peasants. A rich-peasant economy would be tolerated. The state-owned enterprises of the new-democratic republic under the leadership of the proletariat would be socialist in character and constitute the leading force in the national economy, while all forms of co-operative enterprises would also contain some socialist elements. Thus the absolute leading role of the socialist elements in the economy would be ensured.

3. The cultural programme defined the new-democratic culture as a national, scientific and mass culture. This culture was to oppose imperialist oppression, uphold the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation and bear national characteristics. At the same time, China should absorb on a large scale the progressive cultures of foreign countries to enrich her own culture. However, wholesale uncritical absorption should be condemned. Things foreign must be adapted to the national characteristics and given a definite national form before they could be useful.

The new-democratic culture should be scientific. It would oppose all feudal and superstitious ideas, and stand for seeking the truth from facts and for the unity of theory and practice. In dealing with the cultural legacy, a correct attitude and scientific method would be adopted. Ancient culture was not to be rejected arbitrarily or accepted uncritically. Its democratic essence should be absorbed and its feudal dross discarded. Only in this way could a new culture be created.

The new-democratic culture should belong to the broad masses. The only right direction which it should take was in the service first and foremost of the toiling masses of workers and peasants who constituted over 90 per cent of the nation's population.

In view of the guiding role of Communist ideology and the existence
of socialist elements in politics and in the economy during the new-democratic revolution, efforts should be made to extend the dissemination of communism and intensify the study of Marxism-Leninism. But it should be clearly laid down that the line for national culture was new-democratic. The dissemination of communism did not mean its translation into an immediate programme of action. The purpose in disseminating Marxism was to apply the Marxist standpoint and methods to the analysis of various problems, the pursuit of scientific studies, the organization of work and the training of cadres, and not to make it the line of orientation for the national culture.

Ideologically, Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s militant work On New Democracy completely disarmed the Kuomintang reactionaries and their followers and supplied the Chinese working class and the Chinese people with spiritual weapons. It contributed greatly to the ideological unity of the Party and of the whole nation, to the unification of policies of all the liberated areas, and thereby to the advance of the Chinese revolution.

6. ADHERENCE TO THE TACTICAL LINE OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT. THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST UPSURGE AND ITS DEFEAT

The danger of capitulation among the Kuomintang die-hards was very serious at that time. The conflict between the capitulationist line of the pro-British and pro-American big bourgeoisie and the people’s line of armed resistance became more and more acute. These two different lines could lead to two different results. If the Kuomintang’s anti-Communist policy had been allowed to develop unchecked, capitulationist and anti-Communist activities would have spread over the whole country and, among other things, would have brought about the danger of a split in the United Front. The task of the Chinese Communist Party was therefore to adhere to the line of armed resistance and prevent capitulation. The Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a full analysis of the war situation and correctly defined the tasks of the Party. There were many favourable conditions both at home and abroad which enabled the Party to improve the situation and to persist in the resistance, in maintaining national solidarity and in fighting for progress. These conditions were as follows:

1. As Japan had suffered severe setbacks, the war had passed into the stage of strategic stalemate. But Japan still maintained her basic policy of subjugating China.

2. Although the contradictions between the United States, Britain and France on the one hand and Japan on the other began to decrease gradually, they did not yet allow for any real compromise. Besides, as the position of Britain and France in the East had been weakened by the war in Europe, it was impossible to convene a “Munich conference of the East.”

3. The Soviet Union had achieved further successes in her foreign policy; she still pursued a policy of active support to China’s War of Resistance.

4. The progressive forces under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party had developed enormously and constituted the backbone of the resistance.

5. Although the pro-Japanese section of the big bourgeoisie had
tumed traitor and gone over to the enemy, the pro-British and 
pro-American section remained in the camp of resistance. This 
section continued to suppress the progressive forces and was preparing 
to capitulate, but it had not actually capitulated. And, anyway, these 
bourgeois die-hards formed only a minority in the Kuomintang.

(6) The middle-of-the-road forces were opposed to capitulation.

So far as international and domestic conditions were concerned, 
there existed the possibility of maintaining the Anti-Japanese United 
Front and of improving the situation or, at least, of preventing it 
from getting worse. All military operations launched by the Kuomin-
tang die-hards against the Communist Party since 1939 remained local 
in scale. They were the mere preliminaries in the way of strategic 
reconnaissance and did not indicate an immediate all-out anti-
Communist war. They were intended to pave the way for capitulation, 
but did not point to immediate capitulation.

The report "Questions of Tactics in the Present Anti-Japanese 
United Front" made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in March 1940 at a 
meeting of the senior cadres of the Party, and the internal Party 
directives he wrote on the same subject defined further the 
general policy concerning the Anti-Japanese United Front and the 
tactical principles to be followed in the struggle against the 
Kuomintang die-hards.

The general policy formulated by the Central Committee of the 
Party concerning the Anti-Japanese United Front was to develop the 
progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces and isolate 
the die-hards.

To develop the progressive forces meant to develop the forces of 
the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie; to 
give free rein to the expansion of the Eighth Route Army and the 
New Fourth Army; to establish anti-Japanese democratic bases; and 
to give free rein to mobilizing the masses and setting up organizations 
of the Communist Party and the people's anti-Japanese political power 
in these bases. In the Kuomintang areas all possible efforts should 
be made to launch mass movements, demanding the Kuomintang's 
recognition of the legal status of anti-Japanese parties, groups and 
organizations. The progressive forces constituted the backbone of 
the United Front; only by developing them step by step could the 
Party more effectively win over the middle-of-the-road forces and 
isolate the die-hard forces, forecast the capitulation and splits of the 
latter, and lay a solid foundation for victory in the anti-Japanese 
war.

To win over the middle-of-the-road forces meant to win over the 
middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and influential local groups. 
Unlike the progressive forces, the middle-of-the-readers were only 
allies in the struggle against imperialism. The middle bourgeoisie 
and the enlightened gentry might take part in the common fight against 
Japan and in establishing the anti-Japanese democratic government, 
but they were afraid of agrarian reform. In the struggles against 
the die-hards, some of them might take part or remain neutral. The 
influential local groups belonged to the big landlord class and the 
big bourgeoisie. They might join in the fighting against Japan but 
not in forming the anti-Japanese democratic government. They 
would only observe a temporary neutrality in the struggles against 
the die-hards. The middle-of-the-readers were inevitably prone to 
vacillation and the die-hards, too, were making energetic efforts to 
win them over. Carrying considerable weight in China, they could
often be the decisive factor in the struggles against the die-hards. Therefore, in dealing with them, a cautious attitude and effective measures were called for.

To isolate the die-hard forces meant to isolate the forces of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, represented by Chiang Kai-shek, who pursued a dual counter-revolutionary policy. On the one hand, they resisted Japan, and on the other hand they carried out an extremely reactionary policy of destroying the progressive forces, in preparation for capitulation in the future. They were fighting against Japan, but not actively; they opposed the Communist Party, but they dared not as yet resort to an open split. To cope with this dual counter-revolutionary policy of the die-hards, it was necessary to adopt a dual revolutionary policy. In so far as they resisted Japan and dared not resort to a complete split, efforts should be made to unite with them and keep them for a comparatively long period of time in the Anti-Japanese United Front; but in so far as they stood for passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party and the people, a resolute fight should be waged against them on the political, military, and ideological fronts. Only by adopting such a dual policy was the Party able to limit the extent to which their reactionary policy was pursued, develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces and isolate the die-hards. Only by so doing could the Party keep them in the United Front and avoid a large-scale civil war.

Besides formulating the general tactical line concerning the United Front, the Central Committee of the Party laid down "justifiability," "expediency" and "restraint," as the three guiding principles in the fight against the Kuomintang die-hards.

Internationally there were three kinds of forces: Japan, the United States and Britain, and the Soviet Union. The Party made strict distinction between these forces. It distinguished between the Soviet Union and the capitalist powers such as the United States, Britain and France; between Japanese imperialism that was invading China and other imperialist powers that were not invading China; between Germany and Italy on the one side, that had formed an alliance with Japan, and Britain and the United States on the other, that stood in opposition to Japan; between the Britain and United States of the past that had adopted a Munich policy for the Far East, and the Britain and United States of today that had given up that policy; and between the people in Britain and the United States and the ruling classes in these countries. On these distinctions the Party based its foreign policy so as to enlist all anti-Japanese forces in the international sphere to further the war of resistance.

The Central Committee warned the whole Party against the possibility of the Kuomintang die-hards creating a sudden incident on a national scale, and pointed out the necessity for making all possible preparations to cope with attack, so that the Party and the revolution would not suffer unexpected losses.

An incident of this kind did later take place. It was the Southern Anhwei Incident of January 1941. At that time the international situation had become tense. In Europe the German fascists ran amuck. Nazi troops had seized Denmark and Norway in April 1940, started their attack on the English Channel in May and invaded Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg in August. With the fall of Paris in June, France capitulated. It was the intention of Japan to bring the Sino-Japanese war to an immediate end, so that she might act in
concert with Germany and Italy and turn her forces northwards against the Soviet Union and southwards into the South Pacific Ocean. Accordingly, she began to intensify her attempt at inducing the Chiang Kai-shek clique to surrender. She sowed discord and dissen­sion in China; hoping to weaken China's anti-Japanese movement through internecine strife, she attempted to instigate a civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. After Germany, Italy and Japan had concluded the Triple Alliance, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union all increased their financial and military aid to China. Therefore the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek held that the international situation was favourable and that their anti-Communist activities not only would meet with no opposition from Britain and the United States but would win support from Japan. In domestic developments, they took as a sign of weakness the Communist Party's earnest desire to save the nation by placing solidarity above minor differences. They thought that the Communists would not dare to risk an open split with them. Hence they attempted to coerce them into concessions or defeat their armed units one by one. In Chiang Kai-shek's view, the time was ripe for a large-scale anti-Communist campaign; he therefore made preparations for an extensive civil war, hoping that by so doing he would eventually arrive at a compromise with Japan.

In October 1940, the Kuomintang die-hards sent a message in the name of the Kuomintang Military Council to Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, and Yeh Ting, Commander of the New Fourth Army, ordering all units of the two armies that were operating south of the Yellow River to be transferred to the north of the river within one month. Their purpose was to remove a thorn in Japan's side by ousting the people's anti-Japanese troops from Central China. In addition, they were planning a surprise attack on the people's troops unprepared and on the move. To counter this, the Chinese Communist Party exposed the Kuomintang's treacherous scheme of opposition to the Communist Party and capitulation to Japan, thus putting the people of the whole country on their guard. In an open message to the Kuomintang and the whole nation dated November 9, 1940, Chu Teh, Yeh Ting and others pointed out: "A section of people at home is engineering a so-called new anti-Communist upsurge in an attempt to clear the path for capitulation." But to avoid a split in the United Front and to persist in the War of Resistance, the Communist Party agreed to shift some units of the New Fourth Army north of the Yangtse River. As the headquarters of the New Fourth Army with a contingent of about 10,000 men moved northwards on January 4, 1941, they were ambushed by 80,000 Kuomintang troops. They fought heroically for seven days and nights. But since they were outnumbered by the enemy and caught unprepared, all lost their lives, except about 1,000 men who succeeded in breaking through the encirclement. Yeh Ting was captured and Hsiang Ying was killed. Immediately after carrying out their treacherous scheme, the Kuomintang die-hards announced the cancel­ling of the designation of the New Fourth Army and publicly issued orders to attack its remaining units.

Faced with such a grave situation, the Party under the leadership of its Central Committee adopted a policy of resolute struggle and dealt a heavy counter-blows to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang by dexterously applying the tactical principles of “justifiability, expediency and restraint.”
A statement was made by the spokesman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Party, pointing out that the Southern Anhwei Incident was only the first step in the Kuomintang die-hards' treacherous scheme of opposition to the Communist Party and capitulation to Japan, that their next steps would be to launch an attack on the New Fourth Army units north of the Yangtse River, to cancel the designation of the Eighth Route Army, to invade the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and finally to destroy all Communist organizations throughout the country, that in exchange for these reactionary measures, Japan would undertake to withdraw from Central and South China, leaving these regions to Kuomintang troops, and would concentrate her forces in North China to deal with the Eighth Route Army. When all this had been accomplished, the Kuomintang would declare its decision to join the anti-Communist alliance of the Axis Powers. The Central Committee of the Party exposed this dangerous conspiracy and called on the whole nation to prevent it.

On January 20, 1941, by order of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Party, Chen Yi was appointed Acting Commander of the New Fourth Army, Chang Yun-ji Deputy Commander and Liu Shao-chi Political Commissar. The headquarters of the New Fourth Army was re-established with 90,000 troops under its command, which were reorganized into seven divisions to fight against the Japanese invaders in Central and East China.

These revolutionary measures frustrated the Kuomintang die-hards' plan of attack. The main force of the New Fourth Army became more consolidated and developed more rapidly than before the Southern Anhwei Incident.

The resolute attitude adopted by the Communist Party towards the counter-revolutionary policy of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang forced the die-hards to consider the danger a complete split of the nation would bring to them.

After the Southern Anhwei Incident, the democratic section of the Kuomintang reproached Chiang Kai-shek for his reactionary activities. It was during this period that the League of the Democratic Political Groups was formed. Some influential local groups also became dissatisfied with Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to destroy all "alien" elements. There were disputes even within the ranks of the die-hards themselves. The great majority of the middle-of-the-roaders and progressive people throughout the country stood for solidarity in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary measures.

Public opinion in the United States and Britain also reacted strongly to this incident. The governments of these two countries did not like the Kuomintang to start a civil war and relax the resistance against Japan. The aid of the Soviet Union to China and her attitude constituted another factor that the die-hards had to ponder carefully.

After the Southern Anhwei Incident, Japan tried to compel the Kuomintang to surrender, but without immediate success. Thus the contradiction between Japan and the Kuomintang remained unresolved. The troops of the Kuomintang sent over to Central China to suppress the Communists were made the target of a "mopping-up" campaign by the Japanese army.

The domestic and international situation forced the die-hards to relent their anti-Communist campaign for the moment. After the Southern Anhwei Incident, Chiang Kai-shek was worried about his own position and once more played the double-dealer. He harped on
the importance of "national defence" and "dealing with the foreign foe," and stigmatized partisan ideas as obsolete. It was his intention to perpetrate a political swindle by posing as a "national leader" not favouring any particular party or group.

The repulse of this anti-Communist upsurge was a highly significant event in China's internal political life. It represented an important change in the relative strength of classes within the Anti-Japanese United Front—a change that proved favourable to the people's cause of resistance.

1 The Ten Points were: 1. defeat of Japanese imperialism; 2. general mobilization; 3. mobilization of the people of the whole country; 4. reform of the government structure; 5. foreign policy for resistance to Japanese aggression; 6. a war-time financial and economic policy; 7. improvement of the people's living conditions; 8. an educational policy directed against Japanese imperialism; 9. elimination of collaborators, traitors and pro-Japanese elements in order to consolidate the rear; 10. national solidarity for resistance to Japan.

2 An extremely Right-wing political faction founded in 1916 by a number of bureaucrats and politicians who engaged in political speculation between the warlords of the Southern clique and those of the Northern clique, in order to hunt for government positions. During the Northern Expedition, from 1926 to 1927, a section of the Political Science Group went over to Chiang Kai-shek and made use of their reactionary political experience to help Chiang consolidate his counter-revolutionary regime.

4 Ibid., p. 201.
5 Ibid., p. 211.
6 Ibid., p. 237.
7 Ibid., p. 239.
8 Ibid., p. 204.

9 Pao-chia—a system founded on collective responsibility, which formed the lowest link in the chain of administrative organs and through which the Kuomintang clique maintained its fascist rule. On August 1, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed for the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei "Regulations for the Organisation of Pao and Chia and for a Population Census in the Counties," which provided that "the pao and chia are to be organized on a household basis; each of the three—the household, the chia (made up of ten households) and the pao (made up of ten chia)—with a responsible head of its own." The regulations also required neighbours to keep watch on each other and report to the authorities on each other's activities; all were punishable when one was found guilty. In addition, these regulations served to force people into compulsory labour. On November 7, 1934, the Kuomintang government officially announced that this fascist system was to be established in all provinces and municipalities under its rule.

10 The people's armed forces of Shansi which grew up under the influence and leadership of the Communist Party early in the anti-Japanese war.

11 A local mass organization which, in close co-operation with the Party, played a significant role in fighting against the Japanese aggressors in Shansi.

12 Kemal (1881-1938) represented the mercantile bourgeoisie of Turkey. In 1922 the Turkish people, aided by the Soviet Union, defeated the Greek aggressors instigated by British imperialism and in 1923 Kemal was elected President of Turkey. Stalin remarked in his Talk with Students of the Sun
Yat-sen University, "A Kemanist revolution is a revolution from the top, of the national mercantile bourgeoisie, a revolution which arises in the struggle against foreign imperialists and which is directed in its further development essentially against the peasants and workers, and against the very possibility of an agrarian revolution." (Joseph Stalin, *On Chinese Revolution*, p. 53, Books & Periodicals, Calcutta, 1977.)

13 The principle of "justifiability" meant never to fight without cause or justification. In other words, to fight only in self-defence and never to take the initiative in launching attacks, but when others attacked never to fail to strike back. "Expediency" was necessary to ensure victory. By this was meant to plan the counter-attacks well and to contrive to arrange the forces in such an expedient way as to be certain of the outcome of every encounter and of victory. The principle of "restraint" was one of making truces. After repulsing the Kuomintang reactionaries and before they could launch a new attack, hostilities would be brought to an end at the most suitable time.

CHAPTER NINE

GRIMMEST STAGE IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE. CONSOLIDATION OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE BASES BEHIND ENEMY LINES IN THE COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE

(January 1941 — December 1942)

1. SHORT- LIVED MILITARY SUPERIORITY OF THE FASCIST BLOC DURING THE EARLY PERIOD OF WORLD WAR II. EXTREMELY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR OF RESISTANCE

The Soviet Union always adhered to a policy of peace. Prior to World War II, she had made persistent efforts to safeguard world peace and had called on Britain, France, the United States and other capitalist countries to join together to prevent a new war. But instead of accepting the proposal of the Soviet Union, these countries attempted to induce the fascist powers to attack her. As the only socialist country then in existence, the Soviet Union, even with the support of the peace-loving peoples of other countries, was not strong enough to forestall an imperialist war.

World War II began in September 1939. From 1940 to 1941, Nazi Germany successively occupied Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, Greece and Yugoslavia. With most of the European countries under the iron heel of the Nazis, Hitler began to prepare for a war against the Soviet Union.

The treacherous attack was launched on June 22, 1941.

Conditions were at first unfavourable to the Soviet Union, and a considerable part of her territory was occupied by German troops during the initial period of the war. After seizing the greater part of the Ukraine and occupying Byelo-Russia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the enemy invaded the Donbas, laid siege to Leningrad, and bore down upon Moscow.

In order to overcome economic difficulties, the Soviet Government removed, in the early period of the war, many big enterprises from the regions menaced by the enemy to the rear, and established powerful industrial bases in the eastern regions. Owing to their contradictions with fascist Germany and Italy and under the pressure of their own peoples, Britain and the United States were compelled to make an alliance with the Soviet Union. An agreement for concerted operations against Germany was concluded between Britain and the Soviet Union in July 1941. An agreement for mutual assistance in the war against Germany was concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1942.

The Soviet Army put up a stubborn fight, exhausting the enemy troops, inflicting heavy casualties upon them and draining them of their equipment. Strong reserve forces were concentrated in the rear.
ready to hit back at the fascist aggressors. Pitched battles were fought around many Soviet cities, the most heroic being the battles in defence of Leningrad and Moscow. The Red Army successfully defended the two cities and smashed Hitler's "Blitzkrieg."

On December 8, 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbour, destroying several American battleships. At the same time, the U.S. and British colonies in the Pacific were invaded. The Pacific War was on.

From the outbreak of the Pacific War to April 1942, Japan occupied successively the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, which were under U.S. rule; Hongkong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, which were under British rule; the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. Then she began to direct her attack against India and Australia. In a few months, Japan had seized an area of 1,500,000 square kilometres in the tropics, rich in products and raw materials, with a population of about 120 million people. Her sphere of influence extended over the vast region from Midway Island in the east to the east coast of India in the west, and from the Siberian border in the north to the north coast of Australia in the south. Colonies that had been in the hands of the British, American, French and Dutch imperialists for over a century now all came under the control of Japan.

Thus Britain and the United States had the worst of it in the early stages of the Pacific War.

As the fascist bloc had secured a momentary military superiority in the early period of the Soviet-German War and the Pacific War, Japan wanted to reach a quick settlement of her problems in China, in order to expand her adventurist activities in other parts of the world. To turn China into her rear base in the Pacific War, she intensified the so-called campaign to strengthen the measures for public safety.

She therefore divided the regions of North and Central China according to three categories: the "safe regions" (i.e. the occupied regions), the "semi-safe regions" (i.e. the guerrilla regions) and the "unsafe regions" (i.e. the anti-Japanese bases). In the occupied regions, the enemy relied mainly on what he called the "village-combing" policy, tightening his fascist pao-chia system, merging several villages into one in order to eliminate the anti-Japanese fighters and intensify the extortion from, and suppression of, the people. In the guerrilla regions the enemy adopted, in the main, the policy of "nibbling up" the bases, by digging entrenchments, building blockade walls and block-houses, destroying villages and brutally creating large tracts of wasteland. In dealing with the anti-Japanese bases, the enemy depended primarily on "mopping-up" campaigns, carrying out the most brutal policy of "burn-all, kill-all and loot-all," and the measure of repeated "combings." Their overall objective was to deprive the soldiers and civilians in the anti-Japanese bases of their means of existence.

In 1941 and 1942, a series of "mopping-up" campaigns was directed against the anti-Japanese bases in North China. No less than 833,000 Japanese troops were employed in 174 battles, each involving 1,000 soldiers or more. Compared with the previous two years, the number of campaigns increased by 66 per cent, while the number of troops involved doubled. The land was dotted with blockhouses and criss-crossed with stone walls (five metres high) and trenches (five metres wide). By 1944, in the North China Liberated Areas covering 830,000 square kilometres, inhabited by over 83 million
people, the Japanese invaders had built, in addition to railways and highways, over 10,000 military strongholds, 30,000 blockhouses, 600 kilometres of stone walls and more than 10,000 kilometres of trenches.

In dealing with the Kuomintang die-hards, the Japanese continued their political offensive, supplementing it by the military offensive. They paid greater attention to inducing the Kuomintang government to surrender than to unleashing large-scale military operations. They combined cajolery with threat, and exerted military pressure only when peaceful negotiations had failed.

As a result of their drives against the Communists and against the people, the Kuomintang troops behind the enemy lines could not stand up to the Japanese “mopping-up” campaigns. In 1941, they suffered a disastrous defeat in the Chungtiao Mountains of Shansi Province, on the Chekiang-Kiangsi border in 1942 and in Shantung in 1943.

From 1941 onwards, Kuomintang troops behind the enemy lines began to surrender to the Japanese in large numbers. Incorporated into the puppet army, they were then flung into the attack on the liberated areas in collaboration with the Japanese troops.

While using large forces to encircle the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and other regions, Chiang Kai-shek treacherously and deliberately ordered many of his troops to surrender to Japan, with a view to unfurling openly the anti-Communist banner so as to attack the Chinese liberated areas in collaboration with the Japanese invaders. He calculated that, when Japan was defeated, these turncoats could again raise the Kuomintang flag and snatch the fruits of victory for him by seizing the cities and important communication lines originally occupied by Japan. This traitorous plot against the Communists and against the people was shamelessly described by Chiang Kai-shek as “saving the country by indirect means.” Under this pretext, half a million Kuomintang troops went over to the enemy, making up 62 per cent of the puppet army of 800,000 men. Twenty members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and 58 of his top generals surrendered. Once these Kuomintang troops became part of the puppet army they helped the Japanese to carry out the most horrible atrocities against the anti-Japanese bases. As a result, these areas had to fight not only the Japanese imperialist invaders, but their Chinese puppets and Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Communist turncoats as well.

Under this joint attack and pincers drive, the Eighth Route Army was reduced from 400,000 men in 1940 to 303,000 in 1941, and the bases shrunk, with the resulting decrease in population from 100 million to 50 million. During the two years from 1941-42, the anti-Japanese bases underwent extreme difficulties and both the troops and people suffered severe hardships.

2. BASIC POLICY OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE DEMOCRATIC REGIME. RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. EXTENSIVE PRODUCTION CAMPAIGN IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

During this most difficult period in the anti-Japanese war, the Chinese Communist Party took the lead in the people’s struggle behind the enemy lines. In order to win the war, the people’s initiative and strength, especially that of the peasantry, had to be fully utilized in the revolutionary struggle.
The Party established an anti-Japanese democratic regime in the base areas. This was the regime of the Anti-Japanese United Front, of all those who stood for resistance to Japan and for democracy, a joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the collaborators and reactionaries. A "tripartite system" was carried out under the democratic regime in which the Communists (representing the working class and the poor peasantry), the progressives (representing the petty bourgeoisie) and the middle-of-the-roaders (representing the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry) each occupied one third of the posts in all government organs and people's representative bodies. The administrative programme of the anti-Japanese democratic regime took as its basic starting point "resistance to Japanese imperialism, protection of the anti-Japanese people, readjustment of the interests of all the anti-Japanese social strata, improvement of the living conditions of the workers and peasants and suppression of collaborators and reactionaries."

The agrarian policy of the anti-Japanese democratic government provided for a reduction of the rent and interest collected by the landlords and also ensured the payment of this rent and interest by the peasants. It was laid down that rent should be cut generally by 25 per cent, that the rate of interest should not be reduced to the point where nobody in the community would be willing to give loans and that, after this reduction, rent and interest must be duly paid. Thus, both the landlord's ownership and the peasant's tenant rights were recognized.

The labour policy of the anti-Japanese democratic government provided for an appropriate improvement of the workers' living conditions and the fixing of working hours. But the workers were required to observe labour discipline once a contract had been drawn up between the employee and the employer, so as to ensure some margin of profit for the capitalists.

The economic policy called for the active development of industry and agriculture and promotion of trade in order to attain economic self-sufficiency. While developing state and co-operative enterprises, the government encouraged private enterprises and investments by capitalists from outside the base areas.

The tax policy was based on income. All people with income, except the poorest, were expected to pay tax to the government. The burden of taxation was not laid exclusively on the landlords and the capitalists, but was shared by over 80 per cent of the population.

The anti-Japanese democratic government granted personal right to all the landlords and capitalists who stood for resistance to Japan, the right to take part in political life and the right to own property, but vigilance was at the same time maintained against their possible counter-revolutionary activities.

Under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region became a model anti-Japanese democratic base. In this region a general election was held in 1937 and people's democratic governments were established at all administrative levels. In 1941, another election was held in conformity with the "tripartite system."

Village and county assemblies were set up immediately after the establishment of the bases in the rear of the enemy in North China. In the general election of 1940 in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, more than 70 per cent of the citizens went to the polls. Between 1941 and 1942, assemblies were elected in all the bases. The
Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Provisional Assembly was elected in 1941, and the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Assembly in January 1943. These assemblies discussed and promulgated administrative programmes and passed basic laws. As a representative body elected by the people, the assembly had the power to elect the government and make laws. The Communist Party strictly observed the practice that Communists should only make up one-third of the leading personnel in all government organs and people's representative bodies.

In the period of the tense struggle against the Japanese invaders, a Marxist-Leninist educational campaign known as the Rectification Campaign was conducted throughout the whole Party under the leadership of the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The aim was to get rid of the non-proletarian ideas which had once obtained to quite a serious extent in the Party and were still hindering the implementation of the Party's correct line and policies.

Before the campaign, the Party had already become a unified and consolidated party with the broad mass of the people as its basis. The Communist Party was the second largest party in the country, with a membership that had increased from several tens of thousands to 800,000. It was unified and sound, ideologically, politically and organizationally. Ideologically, it had learned to solve the problems of the Chinese revolution in the light of Marxism-Leninism; politically, it had formulated a Marxist-Leninist political and military line; and organizationally, it had a Bolshevik leading core.

Such was the general state of the Party prior to the Rectification Campaign. But it should be fully realized that the Party was still confronted with a number of serious problems. As the Party was working in the rural areas, it could not help being constantly affected by the broad mass of petty bourgeoisie which surrounded it. The bourgeoisie also tried every means to influence the Party. After the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, a large number of progressives of peasant or urban petty-bourgeois origin joined the Party. As the Party represented the interests of the whole nation as well as of the working class and enjoyed a very high prestige among the people, it was both inevitable and reasonable that a large number of progressives of petty-bourgeois origin should join the party of the Chinese working class and constitute a majority of its membership.

It was also inevitable that those members of petty-bourgeois origin who had not yet been sufficiently steeled ideologically and politically should attempt in various ways to influence the Party with their ideology and working style, and, in some cases, even to "reform" the Party according to petty-bourgeois ideology and ways of thinking. This had led to a contradiction within the Party between proletarian and non-proletarian ideologies, especially between proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideologies. Confronted with this grave problem within its own ranks, the Party decided to take up the urgent task of educating these members in Marxism-Leninism.

The Rectification Campaign was mainly directed against tendencies towards subjectivism in the approach to study, towards sectarianism in the style of Party work and towards their form of expression—stereotyped Party jargon in literary work.

(1) Rectification of the approach to study—opposition to subjectivism.

The problem of the approach to study was a problem of the attitude towards Marxism-Leninism. To rectify the approach to study meant
to educate the whole Party to adopt a correct attitude towards Marxism-Leninism.

There were in the Party two forms of subjectivism—doctrinairism and empiricism. The main emphasis was laid on the struggle against doctrinairism, which constituted the greater danger to the Party and the revolution.

Before the Rectification Campaign, confused ideas about what made a true Marxist prevailed among many Party members, who were ignorant of the Party's historical experiences. For a long period, doctrinaires as represented by Comrade Wang Ming had labelled themselves “perfect Marxists.” They studied Marxism in the abstract and without any aim; they did not study it for the purpose of meeting the needs of revolutionary practice. Thus they were unable to apply the Marxist class stand, its viewpoint and methods to the concrete analysis and solution of the problems of the Chinese revolution, but could only quote words of phrases from Marxist writings. Such an attitude towards Marxism was extremely harmful. A misconception had begun to gain currency among a section of Party members, that Marxism was nothing more than a random patchwork made up of selected quotations from books. Hence, in opposing doctrinairism, it was of first importance to give the following correct explanations of certain concepts: What is a theory? What makes a theoretician? What is the essence of Marxism-Leninism and what is the proper attitude in studying Marxism-Leninism? And so forth.

What is a theory? A theory is the generalization of actual problems. “There is only one kind of true theory in the world, the theory that is drawn from objective reality and then in turn verified by it.” The unity between theory and practice is one of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. One must study actual problems, classify and analyse the facts and formulate a theory from them. The next step is to verify these theories in practice. That was why the Central Committee of the Party called on all its members to take part in actual struggles and study actual problems.

Who are the theoreticians of the Party? They are those “who, basing themselves on the stand, viewpoint and method of Marxism-Leninism, correctly interpret the actual problems arising in history and revolution and give a scientific explanation and theoretical elucidation of China's various problems in economics, politics, military affairs and culture.” Theories must be made to serve the cause of revolution. A Party member cannot be regarded as a Marxist-Leninist theoretician but remains a doctrinaire, if he can only repeat certain conclusions and principles from Marxist writings and ignores the problems of China right under his nose.

The aim of studying Marxism-Leninism is to master it and apply it. For this purpose it is necessary to learn to solve correctly the problems arising from the practice of the Chinese revolution and study the problems in Chinese history from the Marxist class stand, viewpoint and method. Comrade Mao Tse-tung described figuratively the attitude which the Party should adopt in studying Marxism-Leninism as “shooting the arrow at the target.”

To overcome subjectivism, those with knowledge of books were urged to learn from practice, so that they would not confine themselves to book knowledge or commit the mistake of doctrinairism; while those with practical experience were urged to take up theoretical studies, so as to raise their experience to a theoretical plane and avoid the mistakes of empiricism.
(2) Rectification of the style in Party work—opposition to sectarianism.

The narrow-mindedness of the petty bourgeoisie manifested itself not only as subjectivism in ideology, but also as sectarianism in political life and organizational matters. To build up a truly united and consolidated party, subjectivism in ideology had first of all to be opposed, so as to establish and consolidate the leadership of Marxism in the Party. Simultaneously, sectarianism in organizational matters had to be fought against. Though sectarianism no longer played a dominant role in the Party at the time of the Rectification Campaign, there were still survivals of it, as for instance the assertion of “independence of action” and, above all, the “sentiment of the mountain-stronghold” which was an outcome of the separation of the base areas, and the high percentage of members of petty-bourgeois origin in the Party.

Instead of regarding the leading organs of the Party as the centralizer of the will of the whole Party, some members showed a sectarian attitude in their relations within the Party, which hindered its unity and solidarity and threatened to alienate the leading organs from the Party members. What had to be the basis of unity and solidarity in the Party? Ideologically it had to be the leadership of the ideology of the proletariat; the line and tactics of the Party had to be based on Marxism, for only a proletarian ideology could embody the will of the whole Party and the whole nation. Organizationally the Party’s principle, democratic centralism, had to be strictly observed. Furthermore, every member had the right to discuss freely and thoroughly the programmes and policies of the Party before any decisions were made. Then the Party centralized all opinions and made decisions. Made on a democratic basis, these decisions represented the opinions of the great majority. Once a decision had been made, everyone had to abide by it, following the principle of subordinating the minority to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, the part to the whole and the whole Party to the Central Committee. Although every member was permitted to maintain his personal opinion, he had to carry out the decisions resolutely.

Besides, a correct relationship had to be established among the cadres. As Party members took up different types of revolutionary work at different times and places, problems arose in the relationship between old and new cadres, cadres native to one locality and cadres from the outside, cadres in army service and cadres in civilian work, and cadres of different departments and localities. A correct relationship had to be established among all these cadres; they had to learn from each other, from each other’s strong points to overcome their own weakness, so as to foster solidarity of the whole Party and revolutionary ranks, eradicate the remnants of sectarianism and ensure unity in organization.

The survival of sectarianism in the Party’s relations with people outside was shown in the fact that a section of Party members were given to swaggering before non-Party people, looking down upon or excluding those who were willing to co-operate with the Party, and refusing to appreciate their good qualities. As to all those who were willing to, or in all probability could, co-operate with the Party, the Party members had the duty to co-operate with them, and absolutely no right to exclude them. Otherwise, they would be disregard the function of the Party as the representative of the interests of the people and as the centralizer of their will. This would isolate...
them from the masses and hinder the implementation of the Party line.

(3) Rectification of the literary style—opposition to the Party “eight-legged essay,” or stereotyped Party jargon.

How did the Party “eight-legged essay” appear?

The “eight-legged essay” in feudal China was a kind of literary acrobatics which emphasized form at the expense of content. It was dogmatic and formalistic. In opposing the old feudal “eight-legged essay” and dogma, the May 4 Movement showed itself to be progressive and revolutionary. The Chinese Marxists inherited the critical spirit of the movement, remoulded it on the basis of Marxism and created a lively, fresh and forcible Marxist literary style. But another road was taken by the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals who adopted a formalistic and anachronistic approach to problems and, in opposing the old “eight-legged essay,” created and developed a foreign “eight-legged essay” of their own. A number of Marxists also, failing to hold firm to Marxism, committed the mistake of formalism and developed the Party “eight-legged essay.” The continued existence of these literary styles within the revolutionary cultural circles did the whole Party great harm.

The Party “eight-legged essay” was a manifestation of subjectivism and sectarianism. Those infected with such a style were given to piling up a lot of ill-digested revolutionary terms and phrases in their articles, in which no problem was raised, analysed or solved. Therefore, instead of being the proper medium for expressing the revolutionary spirit, the Party “eight-legged essay” tended to stifle it.

It was necessary to learn to apply the Marxist method to writing and speaking. The process had to be to discover problems in the contradictions of things, subjecting these problems to a careful, systematic analysis and synthesis, defining their nature and suggesting the way to solve them. Filling endless pages with empty talk, a superficial arrangement of items, using a dry, savourless style, “shooting at random” or bluffing people with pretentious language had to be opposed. Only a Marxist literary style could disseminate Marxism, inspire the people and thereby advance the people’s revolutionary cause.

The method of study adopted during the Rectification Campaign was first to read intensively some of the principal Marxist-Leninist writings, grasp their essential ideas and, using them as a criterion, make a serious and practical criticism and self-criticism, in an examination of one’s own ideology or work. The next step was to analyse what was right or wrong, find out the causes, environmental circumstances and social roots of one’s mistakes, and lay down effective measures for their correction.

A similar method was adopted in studying the historical problems of the Party. First, a number of the principal Marxist-Leninist writings were studied; then, with the essential ideas of these writings as guiding principles, a comparison was made of those historical documents of the Party which embodied correct policies and those which embodied incorrect policies.

As the Rectification Campaign was a Marxist-Leninist educational campaign, the Party’s policy was to stress ideological education with regard to those who had made mistakes in their work through errors of judgement. Disciplinary measures were seldom taken. In other words, the Party adopted the policies of “clarifying ideas and
maintaining comradely solidarity" and of "learning from past experience in order to avoid future mistakes and treating the illness in order to save the patient." The policy of "learning from past experience in order to avoid future mistakes" meant that all erroneous ideas should be exposed, and then analysed, and criticized with the scientific attitude of "seeking truth from facts," so that after cleaning out the rubbish, the person concerned could raise his ideological level, be more careful and do his work better in the future. "Treating the illness in order to save the patient" meant conscientious efforts in maintaining solidarity among Party comrades. All comrades of non-proletarian origin should be helped to raise their ideological level if they had voluntarily discarded their original stand, accepted the leadership of the proletariat and joined the Party. Even in the case of those who had committed mistakes, no attitude of personal attack should be adopted. Instead, they should be helped to correct their errors so long as they did not persist in them. This policy adopted by the Chinese Communist Party in dealing with ideological problems and with people who had committed mistakes, was the only correct policy and constituted a highly valuable experience.

The Party's First Rectification Campaign, which was started in 1942, wiped out the influences of doctrinaireism which had existed in the Party since 1931, helped many new Party members of petty-bourgeois origin to discard their original stand, greatly raised the Party's ideological level and achieved an unprecedented unity of the whole Party around the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung. All this ensured the implementation of the political line of the Central Committee on all fronts, enabled the Party to overcome the extreme difficulties during the anti-Japanese war and laid the ideological basis for the convention of the Seventh Congress of the Party.

During this period, in order to overcome the serious economic and financial difficulties caused by the attack and blockade of Japanese and puppet troops and the Kuomintang reactionaries, the Central Committee called on the people and the troops in the liberated areas to carry out a policy of picked troops and simplified administration and to start an extensive production campaign.

As a result of this policy, the number of people not engaged in production was reduced, the people's burdens were lightened and the shortage of supplies was overcome. Besides, with the simplification of the military organs, a greater mobility and rapidity in fighting against the enemy was achieved. The contradiction between the enormous war machine and the actual war situation was thus removed; the military organs became better adapted to the situation in hand and therefore more efficient.

With regard to economic problems, a series of articles written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, "Economic and Financial Problems During the Anti-Japanese War," "Spread in the Base Areas the Campaign for Rent Reduction, for Production, and for the Army's Support of the Government and Protection of the People," "Let Us Get Organized," and "We Must Learn to Do Economic Work," formed the basic programmes of the Central Committee of the Party for the production campaign in the liberated areas. The economic policy in the liberated areas was a policy of development, that is, to secure supplies through economic development. To develop both public and private economic enterprises was the best guarantee for accumula-
ting financial resources. Therefore, the Central Committee of the Party carried out a two-sided struggle on the economic front: against the conservative view which ignored the economic development and insisted on overcoming financial difficulties by cutting down indispensable expenditure; and against the reckless view which advocated impracticable grandiose plans without regard to specific conditions.

In accordance with this basic policy, the Central Committee called upon the troops and civilians to start an extensive production campaign in both public and private-owned agriculture, industry, handicrafts, transport, stock-breeding and commerce, with special emphasis on agriculture. Everyone was to take part in production, in order to overcome the difficulties.

In the rural areas where war was constantly raging and the enemy frequently wrought havoc, the troops and government bodies engaged in productive work, so as to attain gradually complete or partial self-support in foodstuffs and manufactured goods.

In order to improve the living conditions of the people and to support the revolutionary war, measures were taken to develop the people's economy. The Party, government and army directed their best efforts towards helping the people raise their production. All the cadres helped the masses in their everyday life. In order to raise the peasants' enthusiasm for agricultural production, an extensive and thorough campaign for reduction of rent and interest was carried out in the liberated areas. The next step was to organize the peasants into mutual-aid teams or co-ops, in order to develop agricultural productive power and pave the way for the gradual transition to collectivization. The cadres were to devote ninety per cent of their energy to helping the people increase production and only ten per cent to collecting public grain from them. This was put forward as the Communist style of work, as against the Kuomintang style of extorting grain and money from the people without paying the least attention to their economic welfare.

Applying the Leninist theory on co-operatives and summing up the experience of the Chinese peasants in mutual-aid activities, Comrade Mao Tse-tung guided the peasants in the liberated areas towards various forms of mutual-aid and co-operation in production, on the basis of voluntary participation and mutual benefit. Since these co-operatives were labour organizations of the working people for collective mutual aid, they embodied socialist factors to a varying degree although they were still based on an individual economy. This remained the basic policy of the Chinese Communist Party during and after the anti-Japanese war for developing agricultural production and gradually leading the peasants along the road to collectivization.

During the anti-Japanese war, two production campaigns were undertaken by the troops and government bodies in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. The first, begun in 1938, aimed chiefly at the improvement of living conditions; the second, begun in 1941, at self-support. The extensive production campaign in the base areas behind the enemy lines was started in 1942. By 1943 it had become a widespread movement.

In the liberated areas this extensive production campaign achieved tremendous successes.

In the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region the area under cultivation increased from 8,994,483 mou* in 1938 to 12,486,937 mou.

* One mou = 0.0867 hectare or 0.1847 acre.
in 1942. The grain output went up from 1,300,000 tan in 1938 to 1,680,000 tan in 1942. In 1942, the annual output of home-spun cloth produced by individuals and state workshops was 100,000 bolts. Before the surrender of Japan, heavy and chemical industries included oil refining, iron smelting, machine building and repairing, the production of war materials and the manufacture of nitric acid, hydro-chloric acid, sulphuric acid, glass and pottery. In textiles, the annual output was 190,000 bolts of cloth. The employees and workers in these enterprises numbered over 10,000.

In 1942, troops, government organizations and schools still had to get all their foodstuffs from the people, but by 1943, they had attained partial self-support. As for non-staple foodstuffs and expenses for administration and military equipment, they were able to rely largely on their own production.

In the North China Base Areas in the rear of the enemy, the levy of public grain was greatly reduced as a result of the policy of picked troops and simplified administration and the production campaign. In the Taihang Region, for instance, the 1944 collection of public grain dropped by almost 50 per cent, as compared with 1941.

In the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Area, the joint efforts of the troops and the people triumphed over a big flood in 1939, the droughts of 1942 and 1943, and the plague of locusts in 1944.

The troops and people devoted strenuous efforts to production in order to achieve self-support to a greater or lesser extent. In 1943, every soldier was requested to cultivate three mou of land and produce enough grain to maintain himself for one season. In the way of industry, there was coal-mining, iron-smelting, production of ammunition, manufacturing of stationery and other daily needs, with the output of the last two fully meeting the local demand. To fight the enemy on the economic front, controls were imposed on trade with the enemy-occupied areas, the export of grain, cotton, iron and leather was prohibited, while the import of salt, matches, cloth, electric appliances, military equipment and other things needed was encouraged.

The victory won on the economic front successfully counter-acted the devastation, plunder and blockade by the Japanese, puppet and Kuomintang troops. It helped also to protect the resources of the base areas and to develop production.

These great victories won by the liberated areas on the political, ideological and economic fronts, especially the Rectification Campaign and the extensive production campaign, made it possible for the liberated areas to wage a more effective struggle against the enemy.


The people's political and economic reforms, the Rectification Campaign and the extensive production campaign made it possible for the liberated areas to wage a more effective struggle against the enemy.

In the base areas, a successful policy was adopted against the enemy's "mopping-up" campaign.

The troops and the people were united as one; the regular army,
guerrilla units and militia fought in close co-ordination. Every time the enemy attacked the base areas, the Party adopted the policy of “breaking up the whole into parts,” dividing its armed forces and waiting for an opportunity to crush the enemy, or moving to the enemy’s rear for a surprise attack. And then, before the enemy had a chance to consolidate his position, the Party “gathered the parts into a whole” and concentrated superior forces to stamp out one separate enemy unit. In the course of fighting, the people resorted to tunnel warfare, mine warfare and other new methods of war they created. Unflinching and intrepid, they thus inflicted frequent casualties on the enemy troops and kept them in a state of constant panic.

In the guerrilla areas, the enemy’s “nibbling-up” policy was countered. The strategy was to deal a heavy blow before they were able to consolidate their ground and start “nibbling” at the guerrilla areas. If they had already infiltrated into the base areas and established their positions, they were besieged and harassed until they were driven out. Sometimes the army and the people of the liberated areas dispatched armed work-teams to penetrate behind the enemy lines. Thus the enemy was menaced from both the front and the rear, and was hard put to it to deal with the situation.

In the enemy-occupied areas, the enemy’s “village-combing” policy was fought with counter-measures. The strategy employed was to penetrate deep behind the enemy lines as he advanced. The armed work-teams broke through the cordon of enemy troops and operated in the enemy-occupied areas. The teams were organized on the “three-in-one” principle—they were to fight as the troops, to do political work on behalf of the government but to act like the common people in ordinary times. Military and political struggles thus went hand in hand. The activities of the teams were planned to catch the enemy by surprise. The enemy troops in their strongholds would receive a sudden telephone call from the teams; members of the teams would appear blowing bugles on the roofs of an enemy-controlled village; unexpected guests would turn up in the homes of soldiers of the puppet army. Through political and military struggles waged openly or secretly in the enemy-occupied areas, the armed work-teams were often able to destroy the enemy’s government organs and thwart their attempts to press-gang able-bodied men, extort foodstuffs, exploit the resources of a given area and enslave the people. Moreover, political offensives were launched against many enemy and puppet organizations, causing them to split up, disintegrate or switch to a neutral stand, thus landing the enemy in isolation.

The armed work-teams would appear or disappear unexpectedly in the very heart of the enemy-occupied areas. Their whereabouts were known to the people all the time, but the enemy could never find them. Thus, besides the vast anti-Japanese base areas, there were many small scattered anti-Japanese positions behind the enemy lines. The enemy had tried to split the base areas asunder but it was his own “safe regions” that were split wide open and never for a moment allowed to know real safety.

The measures adopted to counter the enemy’s “mopping-up,” “nibbling-up” and “village-combing” policies were interrelated. These measures put the army and the people of the base areas on firm ground and tided them over the most difficult period.

Heroic campaigns were conducted in all the base areas behind the
enemy lines in accordance with these measures.

In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, the enemy threw a force of 130,000 men into an offensive on August 15, 1941, his plan being to encircle and annihilate the main forces of the people's army along both sides of the Great Wall. But the main forces lost no time moving behind the enemy lines, while numerous guerrilla and militia units kept harassing and obstructing him. After the enemy had dispersed his forces to "mop up" in different directions and was utterly exhausted the troops which had been operating on the exterior line swerved back and charged in co-ordination with those operating on the interior line. To support the campaign against the enemy's "mopping-up" in this region, concerted action was taken by all the other anti-Japanese base areas in North China. The enemy's main forces were eventually compelled to withdraw in the middle of September, leaving only a few units in the Border Region. Thereupon some units of the people's army stayed on the interior line to fight the remaining enemy troops, while its main forces advanced to the enemy-occupied areas to attack his strongholds and cut off his retreat. Faced with the imminent danger of annihilation, the enemy troops left behind on the interior line were forced to retreat in the middle of October. Along the way they were repeatedly ambushed and suffered further losses.

Thus the enemy's "mopping-up" campaign ended in complete defeat.

Of all the "mopping-up" campaigns launched by the enemy in North China in 1942, the most ferocious one was started in the Central Hopei Plain Area on May 1. The enemy covered the area with over 1,500 strongholds and patrolled it with 700 lorries. However, when enemy forces had gathered for the onset, the people's army made a well-timed shift to the heart of the enemy-occupied areas and along the railway lines, and launched surprise attacks that forced the enemy to withdraw in order to rescue his troops in the rear. When in the latter part of the campaign, the enemy started an extensive "mopping-up," the main forces of the people's army made a tremendous shift on the exterior line, leaving some scattered units to fight the enemy in co-ordination with local guerrilla and militia forces. The enemy adopted in this campaign his barbarous "three-all" policy and no less than 50,000 civilians were arrested or slaughtered outright. Nevertheless, the army and the people of the area succeeded in repulsing the attack of the enemy after two months of heroic struggle.

In the Peiyueh Area on the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, the enemy employed over 40,000 troops in a so-called "destructive mopping-up" campaign that lasted from September 16 to December 15, 1943.

The people's army dealt heavy blows to the enemy at every stage of this campaign. In the first stage when the enemy, after occupying the central area, divided his forces to engage in repeated "annihilation" campaigns, the army concentrated sufficient forces against isolated enemy units and forced them to coalesce for defence. In the second stage, when the enemy entrenched himself along the Huto River and was looting grain, the army made a sally on both sides of the river and, operating in concert with the militia, recovered the looted grain. In the third stage, the enemy made an infiltration attack on the government offices in the rear, but his efforts proved futile. People in these offices were not caught unprepared. They either fought skilfully against the enemy or evaded him. Though smaller in number after the adoption of the policy of picked troops and simplified
administration, they enjoyed greater rapidity of movement.

Throughout this campaign, the strategy employed by the people’s army was to co-ordinate operations of the main forces with those of the militia, the exterior-line operations with interior-line operations and a campaign against the enemy’s “mopping-up” with the political offensive. The main forces always fought in close co-operation with the militia. When the fighting in the region became acute, the troops on the exterior line penetrated behind the enemy lines and launched an attack, while the armed work-teams started a political offensive in the heart of the enemy-occupied areas to bring about the general demoralization of puppet troops and organizations.

As a result of these measures, this large-scale “mopping-up” campaign was also repulsed.

In the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Region, the enemy laid siege to an armament repair shop in Huangyentung, southeastern Shansi, in 1941. After fighting heroically against heavy odds, the defenders were forced to withdraw, but the operations of the exterior-line troops brought so much pressure to bear on the enemy that he too retreated in a hurry. On his way, he was ambushed and sustained great losses.

The Huangyentung Campaign was typical of a defensive war in which the few repulsed the many.

In June 1942, a “mopping-up” campaign by 30,000 enemy troops started in southeastern Shansi. The people’s army fought back and killed over 5,000 of them.

Against the Taiyueh Area 20,000 enemy troops were deployed in a severe “mopping-up” campaign from October 1 to November 19, 1943. The enemy concentrated his forces along a line that ran from the north to the south and, moving back and forth, “mopped up” the area repeatedly. Wherever he went, he killed the people, and destroyed or looted whatever he could lay hands on. The enemy’s aim was not only to devastate the Taiyueh Base Area, but also to gain experience for conducting similar campaigns in other areas.

Enemy officers and chiefs-of-staff from various places were summoned by Okamura Neiji, the enemy commander, to watch the campaign on the spot. But this “Observation Group” fell into an ambush near Hanlueh Village on the Lintun Highway on October 23, and all its members were killed. This was followed by a general debacle of the enemy on all fronts in this region.

Towards the New Fourth Army in Central China, the enemy adopted the same “mopping-up,” “nibbling-up” and “village-combing” policies as had been adopted in North China.

The enemy offensive started in northern Kiangsu. In July 1941, 25,000 Japanese and puppet troops launched a joint attack on Yencheng and Funing, with the purpose of destroying the headquarters of the New Fourth Army and its main forces in this area. The army broke through the encirclement in time and moved to the exterior line to strike at the enemy. With troops of the army in central Kiangsu fighting in concert, the enemy was forced to beat a hasty retreat southwards.

After the Pacific War broke out, the enemy adopted a most ruthless strategy of “village-combing” towards the Central China Area. He borrowed all the methods used by the Kuomintang in its fifth encirclement campaign against the Red Army. Special areas were marked off for “village-combing.” This atrocity was started in southern Kiangsu and extended gradually to central Kiangsu, central Anhwei and the outskirts of Wuhan. After seizing an area with superior
forces, the enemy built bamboo or timber fences, often hundreds of li* in length, to separate it from other areas and then made a village-to-village and house-to-house search for officers and soldiers of the New Fourth Army.

Under these circumstances, the New Fourth Army adopted the following strategies: (1) When the enemy was concentrating his forces to "comb" an area, the troops of the army in other areas would launch simultaneous attacks to harass his rear lines; (2) the main forces in the "village-combing" area would move behind the enemy lines or attack his flanks, or mobilize the mass of villagers to burn or pull down the fences in the night.

In fighting against the "nibbling-up" campaigns, as the enemy was gradually pushing forward from his positions into the base areas, the New Fourth Army strengthened the defence on the border line, dug tunnels, and evacuated whole villages. Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the enemy by frequent sallies and by laying mines on his way. This greatly retarded his advance.

As a result of these counter-measures against "mopping-up," "nibbling-up" and "village-combing," numerous savage attacks from the Japanese and puppet troops were repulsed and the liberated areas immeasurably consolidated. After turning the tide in this grave situation and overcoming extreme difficulties, the liberated areas began to grow rapidly right up to the victory in the anti-Japanese war and after.

4. THE MILITIA IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY

The war in the anti-Japanese base areas was a people's war in which the regular army, guerrilla units and militia fought in close co-ordination. The regular army defended the base areas as a whole, the guerrilla units, the counties and districts, and the militia, the villages and townships.

At the very beginning of the war, Party organizations had penetrated behind the enemy lines, roused the masses to action and built up the people's armed forces, the People's Self-Defence Corps. In the early stages of the war, the Corps watched for enemy espionage activities and did other war-time service for the regular army.

From 1941 to 1943, the Japanese invaders carried on ruthless "mopping-up" campaigns in the rear. Many campaigns in North China lasting several months were particularly destructive. The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies contended with the enemy troops for both vast tracts of land and small localities. The forms of operation included positional battles as well as hand-to-hand fighting. Under such circumstances, the regular forces often had to move about with great agility while looking for an opportunity to annihilate the enemy. Therefore, to meet the needs of the war, a section of the People's Self-Defence Corps joined the militia in actual fighting.

There were altogether about 2,500,000 militiamen in the liberated areas during the anti-Japanese war. In places with a dense population where political work had been done thoroughly, the militiamen sometimes comprised 8 per cent of the population. Under the direction of their own leading bodies, the People's Armed Forces

* One li=0.5 kilometre or 0.3107 mile.
Commissions at different levels, the militia became a well-organized fighting unit, a powerful assistant to the guerrilla units and the regular troops. With the participation of the militia, guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines became a real mass struggle.

(1) The militia in the campaigns to counter the enemy’s “mopping-up.”

The routine duties of the militiamen included patrolling and reconnoitring. Patrols would be sent near the enemy’s strongholds and scouts would often penetrate the enemy positions. The militiamen were further empowered to impose martial law over a certain district to search for spies and traitors. Their activities contributed greatly to the consolidation of the anti-Japanese democratic regime.

Sometimes, when enemy troops were approaching, the militia also led the inhabitants in burying and hiding all grain, firewood and fodder, leaving nothing to the enemy except vacant houses and empty fields.

They specialized in mine warfare. During the campaigns against enemy “mopping-up,” they laid mines everywhere on the enemy’s route of advance—on the borders or in the central parts of the base areas, along the roads or at the entrances to villages, on the hill-tops or in ditches. Death loomed over the enemy wherever he stepped.

(2) The militia during activities against “nibbling-up” campaigns.

The enemy’s “nibbling-up” policy was to cut up the anti-Japanese base areas into isolated pieces by a network of communication lines, blockhouses, ditches and walls, and then start to “comb” and “mop up” the areas thus isolated. To counter this, it was of paramount importance to destroy all the enemy’s devices of communication and partition.

Large-scale battles were fought by the regular forces in conjunction with the militia. The former attacked the enemy’s positions to hold him in check, while the latter gave cover to the people when they were wrecking the enemy’s lines of communication.

On the plains, the militia led the masses in digging up the roads and transforming them into ditches, thus changing the whole topography of the place. The ditches held up the fast-moving enemy units, but served as convenient cover for the troops and people of the base areas to move about. Thus, digging ditches to destroy the enemy’s communication lines became the main task of the militia in the struggle against the enemy.

Harder than ditch warfare was tunnel warfare. On the plains, tunnels connected villages, districts and counties, thus forming an underground network of communication lines along which the people and army moved without exposing themselves to the enemy. In the mountainous areas, tunnels were dug between mountains. It was the strength and ingenuity of the masses that made the building of such long tunnels possible.

The enemy tried to encircle the base areas by building tremendous numbers of strongholds, but this proved of no avail. These strongholds were besieged by the anti-Japanese armed forces. Every attempt of the enemy to thrust into the base areas was promptly defeated. In besieging the enemy, the militia would move from the exterior to the interior line and harass the enemy day and night until he was driven out.

(3) The militia in the campaign to counter “village-combing.”

The main strategy in the campaign to counter “village-combing” was to penetrate deep behind the enemy lines. With the steady
growth of the militia's fighting power, the militiamen entered enemy-occupied areas to capture enemy agents and collaborators and destroy the puppet organizations. Besides, there were underground militia forces in the enemy-occupied areas. These operated either as extremely secret organizations, or under cover of the enemy or puppet organizations into which they had infiltrated. Their tasks included serving a warning on enemy agents and collaborators by executing the most notorious of them, gathering information about the enemy, calling mass meetings, and so on. They carried on anti-Japanese activities in co-operation with the armed work-teams sent to operate in the enemy-occupied areas. The underground militia constituted the main force for establishing operational bases in the enemy-occupied area, keeping up the people's morale and harassing the enemy and the puppets. It was with the joint efforts of the underground militia and the armed work-teams that well-camouflaged anti-Japanese bases were set up behind the enemy lines.

(4) The militia in the production campaign.

In order to frustrate the enemy's "three-all" policy, it was necessary to lighten the people's burden by raising production besides strengthening the people's armed forces. In their struggles in the rear of the enemy, the militiamen paid as much attention to production as to fighting. They formed mutual-aid teams with the local working people. Their hours of fighting were counted as workdays in the teams. When there was no fighting, they would work together with other members of the teams.

In order to meet the war conditions behind the enemy lines, the militiamen adopted further measures. 1) They taught every member of the mutual-aid teams to lay mines, under the slogan of "every citizen a soldier." 2) Command headquarters were set up for war and production, thus integrating both by putting them under the same organizational leadership. 3) Joint defence lines of several villages were formed according to terrain and strategic needs. The militiamen of these villages concluded an agreement that if one of the villages was assailed by the enemy, the others would send reinforcements to launch converging attacks.

Fighting in co-ordination with the regular and the guerrilla forces throughout the anti-Japanese war, the militia and the People's Self-Defence Corps made valuable contributions towards consolidating the anti-Japanese bases and defeating the Japanese invaders.

2 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 34.
3 Ibid., p. 31.
4 Since most of the base areas were first established in isolated mountain regions, Party members naturally tended to band themselves into close-knit groups. Thus this cliquish tendency became known as the "sentiment of the mountain-stronghold."
CHAPTER TEN

LIBERATED AREAS BEGIN A PARTIAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. FINAL VICTORY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

(January 1943 — September 1945)

1. TURN IN THE ANTI-FASCIST WAR FROM THE DEFENSIVE TO THE OFFENSIVE. ANTI-JAPANESE STRUGGLES OF THE PEOPLE IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED AREAS. RESTORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIBERATED AREAS

The Battle of Stalingrad marked a turning-point in the anti-fascist war of the Soviet Union from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive.

As the government leaders of the United States and Britain made every effort to delay the opening of a second front in Europe, Germany was enabled to throw all her reserve forces and the forces of her allies on the southeastern front against the Soviet Union. German troops pushed towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus with a view to swooping down on Moscow from the east.

The Soviet Army first wore down the invaders, and then encircled all the German shock units that were attacking Stalingrad. In the battle for this city which lasted from November 1942 to February 1943, the Soviet Army won a complete victory, annihilating 330,000 German troops.

In the 12 months from November 1942 to November 1943, the Soviet Union recovered nearly two-thirds of the territories occupied by the enemy. The year 1943 was a year of fundamental change in the anti-fascist war.

In 1944, the Soviet Union drove the last of the Nazi invaders from her land.

In that year the Soviet Army dealt a series of shattering blows to the German troops along the whole battle front from north to south and, recovering all the lost territories between the Black Sea and the Barents Sea, carried the war into the enemy's own territory.

Then followed the liberation of many European nations.

The defeat of Nazi Germany led to the collapse of the fascist bloc. First, the dictatorial rule of Mussolini was overthrown, and Italy withdrew from the war. Then in succession Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Norway were liberated by Soviet troops in 1944. The anti-fascist war waged by the Soviet Union was at one with the struggle for freedom and independence of the European peoples.

The Soviet victory compelled Britain and the United States to open a second front in June 1944 by landing their forces on the north coast of France. But in spite of this, the main force of the German Army still remained on the Soviet-German front.

Victory in the Soviet anti-fascist war encouraged the nations in the East and isolated Japan both militarily and politically. It created a favourable international situation for the Chinese people's counter-
offensive and was instrumental in bringing about a speedy victory in the War of Resistance.

After the outbreak of the war, puppet governments had been set up in the enemy-occupied areas in North, Central and South China. These areas had become Japan's colonies. Besides the "Autonomous Mongolian Government," Japan had set up the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China" in North China and the "Reformed Government" in Nanking. To split the Chinese united front and to plunder the occupied areas, Japan had merged these puppet organizations into a "united government," the "National Government" formed by the Wang Ching-wei clique in Nanking in March 1940. At the end of the previous year, the Wang Ching-wei clique had secretly concluded a traitorous agreement with Japan, known as the "Outline Programme for Regulating the New Relationship Between Japan and China." It was laid down in this programme that Northeast China was to be ceded to Japan, while Mongolia, North China, the lower Yangtze Valley and the islands in South China were to be garrisoned permanently by Japanese troops. Besides, Japan was to supervise the puppet government, control its financial and economic policies, exploit China's natural resources, train the puppet army and police, and provide them with armaments. Every form of anti-Japanese movement was to be banned.

Concurrently with the establishment of the Nanking puppet government, Wang Ching-wei formed another Kuomintang and claimed that its task was to implement the "Three Principles of the People." His "Principle of Nationalism" was in fact synonymous with Pan-Japanism or Pan-Asianism under Japanese hegemony. Wang's moral turpitude was such that he thought it no shame to admit that, in his view, Japan was the lord of Asia and China a Japanese satellite. Thus, what he labelled as "nationalism" was nothing else than national capitulationism. His "Principle of Democracy" meant coercion of the people in the enemy-occupied areas into unconditional acceptance of the fascist rule of the enemy and the puppet government. His "Principle of the People's Welfare" was directed at forcing the people to help "develop" the financial reserves of the puppet government by "gradual accumulation." When the Pacific War broke out in the winter of 1941, the Nanking puppet government launched the "New National Movement," calling on the people under its rule to "make sacrifices to save the world" and to "exert themselves to the utmost, both physically and mentally." In fact, it was all set to drive the people to the last extremity.

The enemy-occupied areas were ruthlessly plundered by the Japanese invaders.

In the early period of the war, the enemy destroyed all Chinese economic enterprises in North, Central and South China with his exploitation either through direct military control or commissioning others to do the dirty work for him. The intention was to "keep the war going by warlike measures." To this end, he adopted a policy of so-called "Sino-Japanese co-operation" and plundered further China's resources by absorbing investments made by Chinese collaborators through the "North China Development Company" and the "Central China Development Company."

Japan's plunder of the occupied areas showed a big increase under the puppet regime. Her takings of iron ore, for instance, increased from 4,502,222 tons in 1939 to 10,654,325 tons in 1943; pig iron, from 868,485 tons in 1938 to 1,818,517 tons in 1943; and coal,
27,451,968 tons in 1938 to 50,075,141 tons in 1943.

Between 1936 and 1938 Japan seized about 1,330,000 spindles from Chinese cotton mills in North and Central China. In the occupied areas in the Northeast and in North China the output of cotton yarn, cloth, flour and cigarettes fell steadily.

In the countryside south of the Great Wall, the Japanese invaders seized the land in ruthless ways. They occupied the land by force as when they dug trenches and built stone walls to deal with the anti-Japanese guerrilla war, or purchased it at a reduced price, or simply confiscated it, as when they set up their agricultural companies and farms to grow more cotton and grain. Whenever land was thus seized, all the inhabitants, landlords as well as peasants, were ejected. Those peasants who were allowed to stay were treated as serfs.

The anti-Japanese movement in the enemy-occupied cities and villages became more widespread and intensive after the outbreak of the Pacific War. Large-scale armed uprisings of peasants broke out even in many parts of Kiangsu, the region regarded by the enemy and his collaborators as the centre of the “village-combing” campaign. Wuhu, a town famous for its rice market, was the scene of a hunger riot involving about 100,000 people. In Tsingtao, Taiyuan, Tientsin, Peking and other cities the famished people broke into rice stores.

In North China, the people in enemy-occupied areas near anti-Japanese bases, besides fighting for the reduction of rent and interest, organized underground forces to reconnoitre, protect the people’s property and join in military operations. In Shanghai, the heart of the enemy’s rule in Central China, there were over a million unemployed who formed, together with their families, more than half the city’s population. The rickshawmen there frequently staged strikes, primary school teachers suspended classes, while industrial workers either went slow or downed tools. As for the railway workers in enemy-occupied areas, it was their constant practice to fight by “slow-down,” sabotage and secret removal of materials.

To sum up, the victories of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany from 1943 to 1944 created a favourable condition for the Chinese people to strive for the final victory in their War of Resistance. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, there was a further rise of the anti-Japanese movement in all areas under Japanese control, and the rule of Japan and the puppet government began to totter.

Under these circumstances, a series of partial counter-offensives were launched in the liberated areas of Shantung, Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan, all in North China; in the areas of northern Kiangsu, southern Kiangsu, Huaipei and Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei, all in Central China and in the areas of the Tung Kiang River and on Hainan Island, in South China.

In 1944, in the Shantung Area alone, 36,000 enemy and puppet troops were put out of action, more than 10,000 puppet troops won over, eight county towns and a territory of 118,000 square kilometres recovered and a population of over 7,400,000 liberated.

In the same year in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Area, over 1,000 enemy strongholds were captured, eight county towns and a territory of over 200,000 square kilometres with a population of over five million were recovered.

In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Area over 1,500 enemy strongholds were captured, 24 county towns were temporarily recovered and such important cities as Shihchiachuang and Paoting were twice liberated for a short time. Vast territory was restored in the Central Hopei.
Plain. In the Peiyueh Area, the first line of enemy blockhouses was completely levelled to the ground.

In the Shansi-Suiyuan Area a territory of over 97,000 square kilometres was recovered and a population of 370,000 liberated, thus strengthening the defence line along the Yellow River.

As a result of the partial counter-offensive, the liberated area in Central China grew in size. In the Northern and Central Kiangsu Areas the ports of Hsinsheng, Changhuang and Shihkang along the Yangtze River and the harbour of Chenchia on the Yellow Sea coast were captured, threatening the enemy's water transport. With the capture of Funing, the Northern and Central Kiangsu Areas were merged. In the Southern Kiangsu Area, Changhsing, Liyang and Lishui were taken one after the other, and the scattered bases of guerrilla units were united into one big base area. The Central Anhwei Area expanded to the border of Kiangsu in the east and to the border of Hupeh in the west. The Hupeh-Honan-Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region occupied an area of 300,000 square kilometres with a population of over 9,000,000.

The South China Liberated Area was also expanded. The Tung Kiang River Area extended to Huiyang in the east, Sanshui and Shinhui in the west, Tsengchung in the north, and the sea coast in the south. It constituted a direct menace to the enemy in Canton and Hongkong. A detachment of troops on Hainan carried on their guerrilla war stubbornly and had the vast rural area of the island under their control.

In 1944, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column engaged the enemy and puppet troops in a total of over 20,000 battles, inflicted on them over 260,000 casualties, took more than 60,000 prisoners of war, won over 30,000 puppet troops, recovered 16 county towns, captured 5,000 enemy strongholds, recovered a territory of over 80,000 square kilometres and liberated a population of over 12,000,000.

2. CORRUPT REACTIONARY RULE OF CHINESE BUREAUCRAT-CAPITALISM. THE THIRD ANTI-COMMUNIST UPSURGE CHECKED. RISE OF THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN CHINA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

While rehabilitation and development were going ahead in the liberated areas, a serious crisis occurred in the Kuomintang areas.

Semi-feudal China was backward in her economy, the southwestern and the northwestern provinces even more so than the southeastern provinces. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, industrial enterprises in the coastal provinces were one after another moved to the interior. This went on till 1940. Besides the factories moved from the war regions, quite a number of new factories were set up in the southwestern and the northwestern provinces. Most of these factories, moved from other areas or newly built, were in Szechuan; the rest were in Hunan, Shensi, Kwangsi, Yunnan and other provinces. The vast regions of Southwest and Northwest China possessed huge manpower and rich natural resources. Instead of making full use of them to increase the power of resistance to aggression, the Kuomintang die-hards ruthlessly plundered whatever they could. The “Four Big Families” took advantage of the national crisis to increase their own wealth.
Chinese bureaucrat-capitalism as represented by the “Four Big Families” expanded very rapidly during the War of Resistance. Under the pretext of resisting Japan, the bureaucrat capitalists resorted to the most savage methods of exploitation by extra-economic compulsion, accumulating great wealth for themselves and monopolizing all the economic activities in the country.

The Joint Board of the Four Government Banks became the organ of financial monopoly of the Kuomintang government. It used the so-called “national currency” as a means of extortion and monopoly. The amount of “national currency” issued by the Kuomintang government during the War of Resistance reached C.N. $10,318,000 million. The people were forced to accept valueless paper in return for their property and goods. The “national currency” was the chief means by which the “Four Big Families” plundered the Chinese people and monopolized China’s finance.

During the war, the “Four Big Families” turned the financial monopoly into a commercial monopoly. The chief business of the four big banks in war time was commercial speculation. Commercial loans formed the lion’s share in the total amount of loans granted, while industrial and mining loans were insignificant. From 1937 to 1942 only 19.7 per cent of the total amount of loans were made to factories and mines; the remaining 80.3 per cent were all made to commercial enterprises. The “Four Big Families” organized the Trade Committee, an official organ of commercial monopoly. Besides this, they owned a number of private commercial enterprises. They monopolized the purchase and sale of such export items as raw silk, tea, tung oil, bristles, wolfram and antimony, as well as the sale of daily needs like cotton, cotton yarn, cloth, table salt, sugar, cigarettes and matches. Through their unscrupulous practice of buying low and selling high, they robbed the peasants, the handicraftsmen and the industrialists of their just profit, and squeezed the consumers in the whole country.

An organ of industrial monopoly run by the “Four Big Families” was the Industry and Mining Regulation Commission. The method it adopted was to subsidize industries operated by officials and annex those owned by ordinary citizens. Industries which came nominally under the administration of the National Resources Commission and the Administrative Office of Munitions had really become the property of the “Four Big Families.” Besides, there were industries run privately by the “Four Big Families.” In 1945, the proportions of products of heavy industry of the enterprises under the National Resources Commission as compared with the total amount in the Kuomintang areas were: coal, 11.9 per cent; electricity, 35.9 per cent; pig iron, 46.5 per cent; steel, 56 per cent; and petrol, kerosene, iron ores, antimony and tin, all 100 per cent. In investment, in power-units and in production, bureaucrat industries reigned supreme. It was estimated that bureaucrat capital comprised about 70 per cent of the total. The industrial monopoly of the “Four Big Families” strangled national industry and commerce.

In agriculture, the “Four Big Families” were the biggest feudal landlords and usurers. The cruelest form of exploitation used was the collection of land tax in kind. In Szechuan, for instance, more than half of the total agricultural produce was paid out as land tax. This heavy burden fell entirely on the shoulders of the peasants. The Farmers’ Bank of China controlled by the “Four Big Families” took the place of the usurers of the old days. Its agricultural loans were
usurious in nature, for the term was fixed at one year and the peasants who were compelled to borrow in the lean season when the prices of grain ran high had to pay back in the harvest season when the prices of agricultural produce dropped enormously. Thus they were mercilessly exploited on both occasions. Besides, the loans were granted through usurers in the countryside so the peasants' exploitation was further intensified. Thus the Farmers' Bank committed two crimes at once: fostering the feudal forces and sucking the blood of the peasants.

The intensive efforts made by the bureaucrat-capitalists during the war to monopolize the national economy and concentrate huge wealth in their own hands completely destroyed China's productive enterprises. The economic basis of the Kuomintang reactionary rule became rotten to the core. This was the chief reason why the Kuomintang die-hards adopted the policies of strangling democracy to maintain their dictatorial rule and of passive resistance to Japanese aggression.

To carry out its reactionary domestic policy, the Kuomintang intensified its fascist rule. The C.C. Clique and the Society of National Revival were its most handy tools for strangling democracy, and powerful pillars of its fascist dictatorial rule. The specialized in repressive measures against the Communist Party and the anti-Japanese troops under its leadership, the patriotic democrats and the anti-Chiang Kai-shek groups within the Kuomintang itself. First, they secretly murdered Communists and progressives and destroyed the underground organizations of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang areas. Secondly, they trained large numbers of secret agents who seized every opportunity to sneak into the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the base areas behind the enemy lines for espionage and sabotage. Thirdly, they collaborated with the Japanese and puppet organizations to destroy the underground organizations of the Communist Party and other anti-Japanese groups in the enemy-occupied areas. In a word, in accordance with Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary policy these two organizations did all kinds of dirty work during every stage of the war.

In 1943, when the anti-fascist world war was about to take a decisive turn towards victory, the Kuomintang die-hards, in their attempt to suppress the people's forces and reap the spoils of the war after the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, staged a third anti-Communist campaign.

Before launching the campaign, Chiang Kai-shek made preparations in the ideological sphere in order to enlist the aid of public opinion. In March 1943, Chiang Kai-shek published his notorious book *China's Destiny*, in which he announced his intention of settling problems at home, namely, to destroy the Communist Party and all revolutionary forces, within two years. Besides, taking advantage of the dissolution of the Comintern, he ordered his secret agents in the Kuomintang areas to masquerade as "popular organizations" and demand the dissolution of the Communist Party.

In June 1943, when he thought everything was ready, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Kuomintang garrisons on the Yellow River to move towards the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. They began shelling the region on July 7 and planned to advance along nine different routes to strike a lightning blow and capture Yanan. The Central Committee of the Communist Party exposed in time Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary schemes of withdrawing the garrisons from...
the Yellow River and demanding the dissolution of the Communist Party, and sent a circular telegram, calling upon the whole nation to safeguard peace and oppose civil war. Meanwhile the troops and people of the Border Region and the liberated areas held meetings, staged protest demonstrations and made preparations for a counter-attack. Since the Communist Party had forestalled the Kuomintang die-hards' action by exposing and denouncing their schemes and put up a resolute struggle against their counter-revolutionary policy and since the people throughout the country had voiced their opposition, the Kuomintang reactionaries were compelled to stop their third anti-Communist campaign.

With the anti-fascist war taking a decisive turn, Japan found herself in a corner. The great victories won by the Soviet Army on the European front enabled Britain and the United States to move part of their troops to the Pacific front and start an offensive. The difficulties of the aggressors grew further as a result of the successful counter-attacks the Chinese people launched from the liberated areas. The Japanese therefore planned to open up an overland communication line from Peking to Canton and Nanning, which would link their troops on the Chinese mainland with those in the Pacific whose position was becoming more difficult. This was also to facilitate their other military operations in China. In 1944, they launched an offensive on the Kuomintang areas. This became known as the Honan-Hunan-Kwangsi Campaign.

In March 1944, the Japanese army attacked the Kuomintang troops in Honan. In May it advanced upon northern Hunan and in August upon southern Hunan. By December 2, it had captured Tushan County in Kweichow Province. Thus, within the short span of eight months, the Japanese invaders occupied the greater part of the provinces of Honan, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung and Fukien, and a part of Kweichow, and secured for themselves an overland communication line from Northeast China to Indo-China. The Kuomintang army lost over half a million troops and 146 cities of various sizes and abandoned to the enemy a population of over 60 million. Once again the disastrous rout of the Kuomintang troops who ran away from the aggressors in panic-stricken confusion brought untold sufferings to the people.

Such corruption and impotence was the natural outcome of the Kuomintang's reactionary fascist policy.

The people of the whole country could no longer tolerate the economic plunder, political reaction and military defeats of the Kuomintang reactionaries. It was clearly brought home to them that the only way to prepare for the counter-offensive and put a speedy end to the war was to carry out a drastic reform of the reactionary Kuomintang government.

From April to August 1944, the Chinese Communist Party entered into negotiations with the Kuomintang. Representing the will and wishes of the people, the delegate of the Communist Party, Lin Po-chu, demanded that the Kuomintang put political democracy into practice and settle the pending issue between the two parties—the problem of recognizing the legal status of the anti-Japanese troops and the anti-Japanese base areas. The Kuomintang, however, not only refused to discuss the question of introducing political democracy, but even attempted to disband three-fourths of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies (the rest to be assembled within a definite period) and abolish the anti-Japanese democratic government.
behind the enemy lines. Owing to the obstruction by Kuomintang die-hards, the negotiations failed to produce any result.

At the National Political Council which was convened in September 1944 in Chungking by the Kuomintang, Lin Po-chu proposed the convocation of an emergency conference on state affairs to be attended by representatives of all anti-Japanese parties and groups, anti-Japanese troops, local governments and people's organizations; he also demanded the abolition of the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship and the formation of a democratic coalition government. These proposals evoked a warm response from the people all over the country and won the support of the Democratic League, successor to the League of the Democratic Political Groups, and the democratic section of the Kuomintang itself.

In September 1944, the Democratic League announced its political programme. It stood for the immediate convocation of a conference on state affairs and the formation of a coalition government for the purpose of carrying out political reform and overcoming the crisis in the war. A number of democrats within the Kuomintang, dissatisfied too with the dictatorial rule of the die-hards, demanded the democratization of the government and of the Kuomintang. They organized themselves into the Association of the Upholders of the Three Principles of the People.

After the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party had opened, patriotic democrats in Chungking, Chengtu, Kunming and other places unanimously demanded democracy, political reforms and an end to fascism. In September 1944, when the Chinese Communist Party issued a call for the formation of a democratic coalition government, it was endorsed by various democratic parties and groups, by national industrialists and traders, by teachers, students and journalists in the Kuomintang-controlled areas who unanimously favoured the abolition of one-party dictatorship. People of all walks of life in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the base areas behind the enemy lines demanded with one voice the reorganization of the Kuomintang government and the army command. Democrats in Chungking, Chengtu and Kunming formed the Society for the Promotion of Democracy, held meetings and staged demonstrations. The call for a democratic coalition government led to the upsurge of the movement for democracy in the Kuomintang-controlled areas.

But this movement of the Chinese people met with interference by an aggressive foreign power. The United States which had gained ascendancy over Japan in the Pacific War now attempted to extend her aggressive influence to China, in order to take over Japan's monopoly of the Chinese market and to turn China into an American colony. Towards this end, the United States gave unstinted support to the Kuomintang reactionary rule through the Lend-Lease Act and under the pretext of fighting Japan. Large numbers of American "experts" infiltrated the Kuomintang government; Kuomintang troops were trained by American officers; huge quantities of war materials were supplied and military transport lines opened up by the U.S.A.

While the Chinese people were agitating for the formation of a democratic coalition government, the United States, pretending to be impartial, offered to arbitrate between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. In the capacity of a "third party," Patrick J. Hurley, the United States representative, flew to Yanan and entered into negotiations with the Communist Party. An agree-
ment was reached concerning the establishment of a democratic coalition government and a united supreme command.

But it was not long before the American Government betrayed the fact that it stood on the side of Chiang Kai-shek. When Hurley returned to Chungking, he threw overboard the agreement reached in Yenan and worked actively to bolster up Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Communist Party was asked to place its troops under the command either of the Kuomintang Military Council, which was under Chiang Kai-shek's control, or under a three-man committee composed of delegates of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party and the United States in which the U.S. delegate would occupy the leading position. In return, Chiang Kai-shek would recognize the legal status of the Communist Party and appoint some Communists as members of the Executive Yuan in the Kuomintang government.

With this treacherous scheme, the United States and Chiang Kai-shek intended to counter the Communist Party's demand for a coalition government, to get rid of the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies and to occupy the liberated areas. When these terms were rejected by the Communist Party, Hurley threatened that the U.S. Government would co-operate only with Chiang Kai-shek but not with the Chinese Communist Party, and that it would help Chiang Kai-shek to unify China by force. Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of the U.S. troops in China, gave instructions to all his subordinates not to help any individuals or groups who did not belong to the Kuomintang government. The U.S. Government continued to supply the Kuomintang with large quantities of materials and to arm the Kuomintang troops, thus actively preparing to steal from the Chinese people the fruits of victory in their War of Resistance.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung justly exposed the vile intent behind the American policy towards China, pointing out that the policy would "become a hindrance to the anti-Japanese war at present and to world peace in the future." He warned that the implementation of such a policy would impose a crushing burden on the American Government as "it will place itself in opposition to the hundreds of millions of awakened or awakening Chinese people." He also warned the people of the United States that the reactionary policy of their government would "plunge them into endless woes and troubles," for a government which was pursuing an aggressive policy abroad would certainly adopt high-handed measures towards its own people.

3. THE BASIC POLICIES FOR GAINING ULTIMATE VICTORY IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR AND THE BASIC TASKS AFTER THE WAR, AS LAID DOWN BY THE SEVENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was opened at Yenan on April 23, 1945. It was attended by 544 delegates and 208 alternates, representing a total of 1,210,000 Party members.

At the Congress Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered a political report entitled "On Coalition Government."

Comrade Mao Tse-tung began with a concrete analysis of the current international situation. He foresaw that, after World War II,
there would be a further struggle between the anti-fascist peoples and the remnant fascist forces, between democracy and anti-democracy, and between national liberation and national oppression. He also summarized very clearly the struggle going on between the two lines and the two prospects in the anti-Japanese war.

In view of this situation, the Congress laid down the general political task of the Party as follows: "... to boldly arouse the masses to action and strengthen the people's forces in order to defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people and build up a new-democratic China under the leadership of our Party." China belonged to the Chinese people, not to the reactionaries. It was the Chinese people who would determine China's destiny. In his closing speech at the Congress, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, in a fearless and militant spirit, pointed out that imperialism and feudalism were two big mountains lying like a dead weight on the Chinese people and obstructing the development of Chinese society, but that they could surely be removed if the broad mass of people throughout China joined efforts with the Communists.

First, there must be unity within the vanguard. Armed with Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese Communist Party had brought about among the Chinese people a new style of work, mainly characterized by the integration of theory with practice, close contact with the masses and the practice of self-criticism. It was upon this style of work that the Party had grown, advanced, and achieved unity in the great political struggle. This style was an outstanding feature that distinguished the Communist Party from all other political parties. With a strong Communist Party, with unity in its own ranks and with solidarity with the people throughout the country, and a favorable international situation, it was certainly possible to win the anti-Japanese war and the democratic revolution. Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in his political report:

It should also be made clear to every comrade that no enemy can crush us but we can crush any enemy and overcome any difficulty so long as we rely on the people, firmly believe in their inexhaustible creative power and consequently trust them and become one with them.

The report explained in detail the general and specific programmes of the Party for uniting all the people in the country in order to win the anti-Japanese war and the democratic revolution. The general programme was to establish a new-democratic society after the defeat of the Japanese aggressors. In this society, the political leadership of the proletariat together with the state enterprises and co-operatives led by the proletariat would be socialist factors. The inevitable trend of events would lead to the realization of socialism in China.

The specific programme dealt with vital war-time and post-war problems. They included the complete defeat of the Japanese aggressors; the formation of a democratic coalition government; the guarantee of civil liberties for the people; the implementation of national unity; the establishment of a people's army; the carrying out of agrarian reform; the development of modern industry; the promotion of a people's culture; the realization of the equality of all nationalities of China; and an independent peaceful foreign policy.

But, without the abolition of the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic coalition government, these
measures could never be carried out.

The Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship was in reality a dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. This dictatorship disrupted China's national unity, caused defeats on the Kuomintang front in the anti-Japanese war and was the root of civil war. Therefore its abolition had become the unanimous demand of the Chinese people. The Kuomintang reactionary clique, however, attempted to dodge and counteract the people's demand by convoking the so-called "national assembly" to adopt a "Constitution," under the pretence of "returning the state power to the people," while actually "returning" it to the Kuomintang reactionary clique itself for maintaining its reactionary rule. This was a line of disunity, of civil war, a halter with which the reactionaries were bound to strangle themselves in the end. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung said, "They are putting a halter on their own necks, never to be loosened and this halter is called the 'national assembly.'"6

At this Congress Comrade Chu Teh made a military report entitled "The Battle Front of the Liberated Areas." It was a detailed and systematic exposition of the victorious military line of the people's army, the people's war and the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War, based on Comrade Mao Tse-tung's military theory and the 17 years' experience the Party had gathered in its leadership of the revolutionary wars. This report dealt with various aspects of work necessary for the implementation of this line, such as the principles of building an army; recruitment; maintenance, leadership and training of the army; prosecution of the war; political work in the army; army command and equipment; co-ordination of the main forces with local troops or the militia; and breaking up the puppet troops. The victories in the anti-Japanese war on the battle front of the liberated areas were summarized. As a result of carrying out the military line of the people's war, the Communist Party had opened up a battle front along the vast liberated areas, established anti-Japanese bases, stopped Japan's strategic offensives, borne the brunt of attack by the main force of the enemy and puppet troops, and made the liberated areas the centre of gravity in the War of Resistance.

At this Congress, Comrade Liu Shao-chi made a report on the revision of the Party Constitution. Subsequently, a new constitution was adopted.

The new Party Constitution laid special stress on the mass line as the basic political and organizational line of the Party. The organization and work of the Party, it was stated, must be closely linked with the broad mass of the people. To put the mass line into practice, the new Constitution emphasized several fundamental principles, namely, that everything should be done on behalf of the masses, responsibility should be fully discharged to them, faith should be kept in their self-emancipation, and one should learn from them. These are the basic principles the vanguard of the working class adopts towards the masses. They guarantee that the Party will always rid itself of the wrong attitudes of doctrinaireism and empiricism which would lead to estrangement from the masses.

Finally the Congress elected a new Central Committee with Comrade Mao Tse-tung at its head.

After the Congress, the People's Liberation Army made still greater progress in its counter-offensive, containing the Japanese aggressors in
the cities they had occupied and along their slim lines of commu-
nication.

4. PEOPLE'S LIBERATED AREAS AS THE MAIN FORCE
OF THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. SIGNING OF THE SINO-
SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE

During the partial counter-offensives, the liberated areas were
expanded, the enemy-occupied areas reduced and the people's troops
strengthened.

By April 1945, the people's army had expanded to 910,000 men,
the militia to 2,200,000 and the Self-Defence Corps to 10,000,000.
Nineteen liberated areas had been established covering an area of
950,000 square kilometres, inhabited by a population of 95,500,000.

The 19 liberated areas were: the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Area, the
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Area, the Shansi-Hopei-Honan Area, the Hopei-
Shantung-Honan Area, the Shansi-Suiyuan Area, the Hopei-Jehol-
Liaoning Area, the Shantung Area, the Northern Kiangsu Area, the
Central Kiangsu Area, the Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei Area, the
Eastern Chekiang Area, the Huaipei Area (north of the Huai River),
the Huainan Area (south of the Huai River), the Central Anhwei
Area, the Honan Area, the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Area, the Hunan-
Hupeh Area, the Tung Kiang River Area and the Hainan Island
Area.

The liberated areas occupied very important strategic positions.
Most of the Japanese-occupied major cities, communication lines and
coastal lines were surrounded by the people's troops.

Throughout the War of Resistance, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border
Region was the seat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party and of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.
Hence this region and its capital, Yenan, became the general rear
of the Chinese people's anti-Japanese troops and the political cent-
tral of all the bases behind the enemy lines and of the people's revolu-
tionary struggle throughout the country. It was at Yenan that the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade
Mao Tse-tung worked out directives on various important political,
military, economic and cultural problems, which guided the Chinese
people in their anti-Japanese war.

The liberated areas in North China consisted of the strategic
areas of Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, Shansi-Hopei-Honan, Hopei-Shantung-
Honan, Shansi-Suiyuan, Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning and Shantung. They
stretched to the Gulf of Po Hai and the Yellow Sea in the east, the
Yellow River in the west, the Lunghai Railway in the south, and
the cities of Paotow, Tolun and Chinchow in the north. They were
in a position to control the Peking-Suiyuan, Peking-Hankow, Tatung-
Puchow, Chengting-Taiyuan, Peking-Liaoning Railways and threa-
tened the enemy strongpoints of Peking, Tientsin, Shihchiachuang,
Paoting, Tatung, Taiyuan, Changchiakou and Chengteh.

The liberated areas in central China consisted of the ten strategic
areas of northern Kiangsu, central Kiangsu, Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei,
eastern Chekiang, Huaipei, Huainan, central Anhwei, Honan, Hupeh-
Honan-Anhwei, and Hunan-Hupeh. They were crossed by the
Yangtse, the Huai, the Han and the Yellow Rivers, facing the sea
in the east, bordering on the Wutang Mountains in the west, stretching
as far as Chekiang and Kiangsi in the south, and reaching the Lunghai Railway in the north. They embraced most of Kiangsu, large parts of Anhwei and Hupeh, parts of Honan and chekiang and a small part of Hunan. They constituted a threat to the enemy strongpoints of Nanking, Shanghai, Wuhan, Hsuchow and Hangchow and commanded the Tientsin-Fukow Railway, the southern section of the Peking-Hankow Railway, the Huaainan Railway and the network of land and water transport in these areas.

The liberated areas in South China consisted of those of the Tung Kiang River and Hainan Island. The Tung Kiang River Area menaced the enemy occupation of Canton, Hongkong, the Canton-Kowloon Railway and the southern section of the Canton-Hankow Railway. The Hainan Island Area threatened the enemy's chief routes to Vietnam, Malaya, Dutch Borneo and the Philippines.

As Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in his political report "On Coalition Government":

In all the liberated areas, the essential policies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front have been wholly put into practice, and governments based on co-operation between the Communists, and representatives of other anti-Japanese parties as well as people without party affiliation, i.e. local coalition governments, have been or are being elected by the people. In the liberated areas all the people have been mobilized. It is owing to all these factors that, despite the pressure of a formidable enemy, the blockade and attacks of the Kuomintang troops and the complete absence of outside help, China's liberated areas have been able to stand unshaken, to develop daily by reducing the enemy-occupied areas and expanding themselves, and become the model of a democratic China and a main force in co-ordinated action with the allied countries to drive out the Japanese aggressors and liberate the Chinese people.

Towards the end of 1944, Soviet troops entered East Prussia, the main lair of the German fascists, from which Germany had started many wars of aggression against other countries in the past few centuries.

Between January and February 1945, the Soviet thrust against the enemy became fiercer. Powerful mopping-up operations were conducted along the whole line from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains. Within two months, the Soviet Army liberated the whole of Poland and the greater part of Czechoslovakia, occupied Budapest after defeating Hungary, the last ally of Germany in Europe, helped the Hungarian people establish their own political power, captured East Prussia and the greater part of German Silesia, and opened up the road to Brandenburg, Pomerania and to the suburbs of Berlin.

Meanwhile the British and U.S. troops also began attacks on the western front. Passing through France and crossing the Rhine, they entered west Germany and approached the Elbe River. As the main force of German troops was still concentrated on the eastern front, they did not meet with vigorous resistance. The Soviet troops from the east and the British and U.S. troops from the west converged on the enemy and joined forces near Torgau in central Germany on April 25, thus cutting off the German troops in the north from those in the south.
The time had come for the final defeat of fascist Germany.

Resorting to the vilest plot in her last-minute struggle, Germany had been carrying on secret negotiations with the British and U.S. reactionaries for an anti-Soviet alliance. But thanks to the swift advance of the Soviet Army, this criminal plan came to naught.

In April 1945, the Soviet Army started the campaign for the capture of Berlin. In the last battle of this campaign, no less than 41,000 guns and trench mortars were used. The Soviet Communist Party called upon the Soviet armed forces to finish off the fascist beast in its own lair, and to hoist the flag of victory over Berlin. On May 2, the Soviet Army captured Berlin and raised the Red flag over Hitler's Reichstag. Germany acknowledged her defeat and surrendered unconditionally.

The protocol for Germany's surrender was signed at Rheims on May 7. The next day the representative of the German high command signed the final surrender at Berlin in the presence of the representatives of the Soviet Supreme Commander.

The great day of the Soviet people's complete victory over German fascism had come. In his "Proclamation to the People" on May 9, Stalin announced that the day was henceforth to be commemorated as Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.

On the eve of World War II, Germany in the west and Japan in the east had formed two big bases of world fascism and forces of aggression. It was they that had started World War II; it was they that had brought human civilization to the brink of destruction.

Like Hitlerite Germany, imperialist Japan was the enemy of the Chinese people, the Soviet people, the Eastern peoples, in fact, the most ferocious enemy of all mankind.

In her criminal plans of aggression, Japan had considered the invasion of China and of the Soviet Union as her main tasks. Her effort to conquer China was a preparatory step towards invading the Soviet Union. In 1938, Japan encroached upon Soviet territory at Vladivostok in the vicinity of Lake Hasan. In 1939, when Japanese forces pushed into the Mongolian People's Republic and approached the River Khalkhin-gol, they attempted to cross the Soviet border, and cut the main line of the Siberian Railway. But both invasions were crushed completely by the Soviet Army. In the summer of 1943, Japan was preparing to attack the Soviet Union in the event of the fall of Stalingrad. Naturally this plan, too, came to nothing. Since the beginning of Japan's war of aggression against China in 1937, and especially during the four years of the anti-fascist war, the Soviet Union had always maintained strong defensive forces in the Far East in anticipation of possible attacks from Japan.

After the crushing defeat of Hitlerite Germany, it became imperative to eradicate this eastern base of aggression, so as to ensure the safety of the Soviet Union and help the liberation movement of the Chinese people.

The complete defeat of Germany and her unconditional surrender placed Japan in utter isolation. But Japanese imperialism, unwilling to accept its fate, still dreamed of continuing the war of aggression by using the Chinese mainland, first of all the Northeast, as its strategic base, and the one million crack troops of the Kwantung Army stationed in the Northeast as its main force.

At the beginning of 1945, the British and U.S. Governments,
realizing the difficulties they would encounter in trying to defeat Japan in the Pacific, had reached an agreement with the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference about the latter’s participation in the war against Japan. In order to eliminate this source of war in the East and to save the world from further destruction and sacrifice, the Soviet Union decided to declare war on Japan three months after Germany was defeated.

At the conference, it was decided that Japan should return to the Soviet Union the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands which she had seized in the Russo-Japanese War. It was also agreed that, to prevent a revival of the Japanese forces of aggression, China and the Soviet Union should place the Changchun Railway under their joint management and the port of Lushun (Port Arthur) at their common disposal, and convert Taliien (Dairen) into a free port. These agreements were to be laid down in a treaty.

On August 14, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed.

This treaty provided that both signatories should co-operate with the other allied countries in fighting Japan until her final defeat; that neither of them should singly enter into negotiations or conclude an armistice or peace treaty with Japan; and that they should jointly adopt all possible measures after the cessation of the anti-Japanese war to prevent renewed aggression on the part of Japan.

Besides, there were Sino-Soviet agreements concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway, Taliien and Port Lushun.

Owing to the Soviet Union’s participation in the war, Japan’s plan for a last-ditch defence was completely frustrated.

5. THE SOVIET UNION DECLARES WAR ON JAPAN. THE CHINESE ARMY STARTS ITS COUNTER-OFFENSIVE FROM THE LIBERATED AREAS. VICTORIOUS CONCLUSION OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE TO JAPAN

The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945. The brave Soviet Red Army, the main force of the global anti-fascist war, pushed in four columns into Northeast China, and swooped down upon the enemy troops before they had time to settle down in their new positions of defence in depth.

Thus, at one blow, all the strategic bases from which the Japanese imperialists had attempted to continue their stubborn resistance were destroyed, and the whole of the crack Japanese Kwantung Army was put out of action.

The Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan brought the Chinese War of Resistance to its last stage—the stage of strategic counter-offensive.

On August 9, the day following the Soviet declaration of war, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, in a statement entitled “The Last Round with the Japanese Invaders,” called on all the anti-Japanese forces in China to launch a nation-wide counter-offensive, to expand the liberated areas, reduce the areas under enemy occupation and fight the enemy in close and effective co-ordination with the operations of the Soviet Union and other allied countries. He called for the formation of armed squads which should penetrate deep into the rear of the enemy-occupied areas to mobilize the people to wreck the enemy’s communication lines and support the operations of the
regular armies. He also called upon the people in the enemy-occupied areas to organize underground forces immediately, prepare armed uprisings and annihilate the enemy in co-ordination with the regular forces attacking from without. At the same time, the statement reminded the Chinese people of the necessity for preventing the danger of civil war.

On August 10, an order to advance against the enemy was issued to all the armed forces in the liberated areas by Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh. The anti-Japanese armies at the front, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, demanded that the Japanese and puppet troops stationed in the neighbouring areas lay down their arms and surrender, and prepared to take over all enemy-occupied cities, towns and communication lines. Because of the great fighting power and swift advance of the Soviet Army, the Kwantung Army, considered the cream of the Japanese forces, was rapidly put out of action. This brought about Japan's unconditional surrender on August 14.

After the Japanese surrender, however, Chiang Kai-shek, with the support of the United States, ordered the Japanese and puppet troops to remain at their respective posts to "maintain order" locally, to continue resistance to the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which was encircling them, and not to surrender to the Chinese people. Hence the People's Liberation Army felt duty-bound to recover the territories held by the enemy, to independently accept the surrender of enemy troops and to annihilate those who refused to surrender.

Every victory of the Chinese people had to be won by a bitter fight.

The People's Liberation Army in the Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning Area advanced along the Peking-Shenyang Railway and liberated the Northeast in co-operation with the Soviet Army and the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army. The Liberation Army in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Area liberated Chahar and encircled Peking, Tientsin and Paoting. The Liberation Army in the Shansi-Suiyuan Area liberated vast parts of Suiyuan and Shansi. The Liberation Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Area liberated vast tracts along the Yellow River. The Shantung Liberation Army liberated 100 counties of that province. The Central China Liberation Army advanced against the enemy along the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo, the Nanking-Wuhu, the Chekiang-Kiangsi and the Huainan Railways and the east section of the Lunghai Railway. The South China Anti-Japanese Column attacked the enemy along the Canton-Kowloon and Chaochow-Swatow Railways.

Within two months, from August 11 to October 10, the People's Liberation Army liberated 315,200 square kilometres of territory, with a population of 18,717,000, recovered 190 cities, and killed or wounded over 230,000 enemy and puppet troops. The liberated areas were thus greatly expanded. The major cities were besieged by the People's Liberation Army, but owing to the active interference by U.S. imperialism and to Kuomintang obstruction, not all of them were liberated. In such peculiar circumstances the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression was concluded.

The Japanese surrender was signed on September 2, 1945.
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE TO JAPAN

"The Sino-Japanese war is none other than a war of life and death between a semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and an imperialist Japan in the thirties of the twentieth century."  

The Sino-Japanese war ended with victory for the Chinese people and defeat for the Japanese imperialists.

The Chinese people's anti-Japanese forces grew during the War of Resistance despite difficulties and setbacks. They passed through the three stages of "rising, falling and rising again." The final victory over aggression was won by the united efforts of the working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie and a section of the landlords and comprador-capitalists, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

The whole Party, the army and the people of the liberated areas followed the correct political and military lines, in keeping with the complexities of the situation, as laid down by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung. To lead the anti-Japanese war to victory, a people's victory, the Marxist-Leninist principle of the proletariat keeping its independence and initiative within the united front was adhered to and the policy of developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle-of-the-road forces and isolating the die-hard forces was put into practice. Guerrilla warfare was developed independently and freely behind the enemy lines, so that the anti-Japanese armed forces grew, and anti-Japanese bases were created, where the Communist-led, anti-Japanese democratic governments carried out political, economic and cultural reforms for the benefit of the people.

As a result of carrying out these lines, the Party from 1937 to 1940 opened a vast battle front from the liberated areas. It thus tided over the crisis and kept a firm footing during the extremely difficult years of 1941 and 1942 when it was brought under three-sided attack from the Japanese, puppet and Kuomintang troops. From 1943 on, partial counter-offensives were launched, paring down the enemy-occupied areas and turning the liberated areas into strategic bases for the final offensive.

The victory in the War of Resistance was won by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This convincingly demonstrates that, so long as it is led by a Leninist Party, a colonial or semi-colonial country is wholly capable of winning its struggle against imperialist aggression.

The victory of the Chinese people was also won with the great help of the Soviet Union and other international revolutionary forces.

The tremendous aid given by the Soviet Union to the Chinese people during the War of Resistance, and the annihilation of the Japanese Kwantung Army by the Soviet Red Army contributed enormously to the Chinese people's victory over their enemy. The great friendship of the people and government of the Soviet Union for China in her difficult days proved instrumental in bringing about the victory of the Chinese people's revolution.

The friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union is the bulwark against imperialist aggression in the Far East.


2 Ibid.
Made up of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other anti-Japanese people's armed forces.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

STRUGGLE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE FOR INTERNAL PEACE AND DEMOCRACY
AFTER THE JAPANESE SURRENDER
(September 1945—June 1946)

1. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AFTER WORLD WAR II

The unconditional surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945 marked the end of China's War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and World War II, ushering in a new era for China and for the rest of the world.

Great changes took place in the world situation. On the one hand, Germany, Italy and Japan were defeated, Britain and France were weakened, and the U.S. obtained hegemony in the whole imperialist camp. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, having won a great victory in the anti-fascist war, became more powerful than ever; there appeared in Europe a number of People's Democracies, which broke away from the capitalist system and formed with the Soviet Union a united powerful socialist camp; and in the colonial and dependent countries the national liberation movements were reaching a new height. A heavy blow had been dealt to the entire capitalist world, and the balance of strength between the socialist and capitalist camp had undergone enormous change in favour of the former. In short, in the post-war period world capitalism was further weakened and socialism steadily strengthened. The whole situation was disadvantageous to the reactionary forces, but advantageous to the people of the world.

If the industrial output of the countries in the world in 1929 is taken as 100, the average output of the capitalist countries was 107 in 1946 and 130 in 1949. In 1946 the output of the United States was 153; of Britain, 118; France, 63; Italy, 72; West Germany, 35; and Japan, 51. During the 17 years from 1929 to 1946 industrial production in the capitalist countries remained more or less on the same level as before the world economic crisis. The United States alone showed considerable increase, but this was the outcome of her hectic expansion of military industries during the war. Britain's increase was very slight, while France dropped by 37 per cent. The three defeated countries showed a general decrease: Italy, of 28 per cent, West Germany, 65 per cent, and Japan, 49 per cent. But in 1946, the total industrial output of the Soviet Union reached 466, in spite of the heavy war damage to her national economy.

The attempts made by each imperialist power during and after World War II to consolidate its economic position and shake off the crisis at the expense of others proved futile.

The different effects produced by the war on different capitalist countries led to important changes in their economic relations.

The economy of Germany, Italy and Japan had suffered serious ravages; that of Britain and France had incurred great losses. The
U.S. alone made a fabulous fortune out of the war. In order to extend their influence in the world market after the conclusion of the war, the U.S. monopoly capitalists took advantage of the bankruptcy or decline of their rivals and seized a large part of the colonial markets of Britain and France and of the markets in the capitalist world by means of the so-called “Marshall Plan.” Of what these countries received from the U.S., only 16 per cent was the industrial equipment that they needed so urgently after the war; the biggest bulk of it was surplus foodstuffs and such industrial products as coal, flour and cotton fabrics. Since 1949, the U.S. aid to Western Europe has been of a military nature rather than economic.

The U.S. disrupted the capitalist world market and boosted up her exports by large-scale dumping and by preventing foreign goods from getting into her own market. Furthermore, the U.S. prevented West European countries from exporting industrial products to the East European countries in exchange for foodstuffs and raw materials.

Such a high-handed policy on the part of the U.S. inevitably led to the intensification of her contradictions with Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan. As a result, the capitalist economic system became more chaotic and unstable than before the war.

The slight rise in the industrial production of the capitalist countries was due to war preparations. Both the U.S. and the West European countries placed their economy on a war footing. Expenditure for armaments expansion occupied an increasingly large proportion of their state budgets; orders for military stores played a decisive role in their main branches of industry. Increase in military expenditure naturally entailed heavier taxation and a steady depreciation of currency. A short-lived economic boom resulting from stimulation of war preparations and currency inflation was accompanied by a sharp decrease of production of consumer goods because a large part of manufactured products were converted into military supplies or stored up as strategic materials. The expansion of military production only served to pave the way for grave economic crises.

The outcome of World War II was a great disappointment to the imperialist powers. Hence, as soon as the war was concluded, the imperialist camp headed by the U.S. reactionaries began to prepare for a new war. The U.S. ruling clique knew very well that world hegemony could not be secured by peaceful means, and they considered that without launching another war their hope of dominating the world and conquering all other countries would come to nought. Consequently, they made feverish preparations for a new war. As the Soviet Union had always been the chief opponent of a new war and the principal bulwark of peace, the U.S. ruling clique naturally concluded that the spearhead of their attack should be directed against her and the other peace-loving countries. That is why after the war the U.S. organized the NATO, established military bases around the Soviet Union, re-armed West Germany and Japan, expanded her own armaments, and rejected the proposal of a peace pact.

Under the cloak of “fighting communism,” the U.S. imperialists based their war plans on making use of the territories and the armed forces of other countries, including those of West Germany, Japan, and even Britain and France. The U.S. ruling clique drew up certain regulations concerning war preparations for the countries of the NATO bloc as well as the defeated nations in World War II, using them as tools to carry out the U.S. imperialist policies to the detriment
of their own national interests.

It was only to be expected that in thus transforming Britain and France into dependent nations and robbing them of their colonies, in utilizing the occupation system to throttle completely the economy of West Germany and Japan and to control their foreign and domestic policies, the United States would provoke intense anti-U.S. struggles on the part of the peoples of these countries.

The threat of a new war impelled the peoples of all countries to throw themselves into the peace movement. The peace movement in the post-war period aimed at raising the enthusiasm of the broad masses in opposing war, strengthening the organizations for the defenders of peace, and exposing the intrigues of the war instigators, so as to safeguard peace and avert a new war.

The defeat of the three imperialist powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, in World War II, the efforts of colonialist countries such as Britain and France to shift to the colonies their heavy burden of the post-war years arising from their militarized economy and the expansionist policy of the U.S., the infiltration of the U.S. into the colonies and her establishment of military bases in many of them, and the further deterioration of the economy of the colonies as a result of century-old imperialist and feudal oppression and exploitation—all this created a crisis in the colonial system and sped up the rise of the national liberation movements. With increasing determination, the colonial peoples opposed their imperialist enslavers. The peoples of Korea and Vietnam, for instance, won their liberation; India, Burma and Indonesia gained independence. With the spread of the national liberation movements after the war, the imperialist powers were gravely threatened from the rear.

The Soviet Union consistently pursued a policy of peace and international friendship. She made untiring efforts to defend the cause of peace and opposed wars of aggression as well as any intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Among the many positive measures she adopted after the war were to make a drastic cut in her armed forces, withdraw the Red Army within the shortest possible time from the territories of China, Korea, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, endorse the Peace Defence Act, and repeatedly put forward proposals for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

The Soviet Union was willing to co-operate with the U.S., Britain and France in safeguarding peace. She opposed taking a vindictive attitude towards the peoples of the defeated countries, Germany, Italy and Japan. Her policy was to enable those countries that had signed the unconditional surrender to enjoy peace and democracy, to develop their civilian industry and agriculture, to sell their goods in foreign markets, and to set up the necessary armed forces for national defence.

At the same time, the Soviet Union maintained a high vigilance, and opportuneley exposed the underhand activities of the enemies of peace. She strengthened her national defence so as to be fully prepared in the event of any aggressive attack.

A number of People's Democracies emerged with the conclusion of the war. They broke away from the capitalist system and formed a socialist camp with the Soviet Union. Socialism thus transcended the boundaries of one nation, and became a world system. It was a supreme international obligation for the Soviet Union to strengthen her friendly relations with the People's Democracies.

To sum up, the great victory of the Soviet Union in World War II, the defeat of the three fascist countries, Germany, Italy and Japan,
the weakening of Britain and France, the isolation of U.S. imperialism, the emergence of the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe, the rise of the national liberation movements in the colonial countries and the expansion of the peace movement in all countries of the world—these were all important factors in the international situation that contributed to the victory of the Chinese people's revolution. The post-war international situation was, therefore, in favour of the Chinese people in their struggle against the U.S. interventionists and the Chinese reactionaries.

2. THREAT OF A NEW CIVIL WAR

When the Japanese Government announced its unconditional surrender on August 14, 1945, the General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army in Yenan immediately issued orders to the enemy and puppet troops demanding their surrender within a specified period of time. At the same time instructions were given to the People’s Liberation Army in North and Central China to advance rapidly, disarm the enemy and puppet troops and accept their surrender. Since the People’s Liberation Army was the main anti-Japanese force and the people were the real victors, there was every reason to take this step.

The Kuomintang troops were at that time far away in Southwest and Northwest China. It was exclusively the people’s troops who were encircling and attacking the enemy in North, Central and Northeast China. To grab the fruits of victory from the hands of the people, Chiang Kai-shek “ordered” the various units of the People’s Liberation Army “to wait for instructions on the spot,” and brazenly slandered as “a rash and illegal act” the orders issued by the Yenan Headquarters to the enemy and puppet troops. He even went so far as to call the People’s Liberation Army “the enemy of the people,” and threatened to “enforce military discipline.” This was an unmistakable sign of the Kuomintang’s intention to launch an open civil war.

An order was issued by Chiang Kai-shek to his personal troops to “speed up military operations” and “press forward vigorously.” But as the Kuomintang forces were still away in the Southwest and Northwest, he ordered the enemy and puppet troops to “maintain local order and protect the people.” What he was actually intent on doing was to maintain the “order” of the feudal, comprador and fascist rule, and protect the “interests” of the traitors and collaborationists.

On August 15, 1945, the Japanese chief commander, Okamura Neiji, telegraphed to Chiang Kai-shek, saying that the Japanese troops were evacuating Nanking, leaving “a nucleus force” to maintain order before his arrival. Similarly the Nanking puppets made a public statement that they would “maintain local order” till the return of the Kuomintang government to Nanking. The traitors in Peking organized the “Committee for the Maintenance of Peace” to carry out the instructions of Chiang Kai-shek.

Regarding the areas occupied by the People’s Liberation Army, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the enemy and puppet troops “to recover them and turn them over to our (Chiang’s) troops.” Instead of immediately disarming the Japanese troops who had surrendered, Chiang gave them instructions to attack the people and the troops.
of the liberated areas. When the enemy and puppet troops that attacked the areas claimed they were "acting upon instructions received," they meant instructions from Chiang.

In the areas occupied by the Kuomintang troops, only 6 per cent of the Japanese troops were disarmed. As for the puppet troops, not only were all of them allowed to retain their arms but they were even designated as units of the "National Army"! Thus, both Japanese and puppet troops were transformed into Kuomintang troops.

In order to attain her aim of conquering China, the U.S., besides supplying the Kuomintang with munitions for a civil war, helped to transport Kuomintang troops to the large cities still under Japanese occupation and to the frontlines around the liberated areas. Under the pretext of "helping" China to disarm the Japanese army, the U.S. stationed troops in Tsingtao, Tientsin and other cities. The U.S. forces in Chinwangtao, the Shantung Peninsula and other places openly attacked the Chinese liberated areas and interfered in China's domestic affairs.

With the backing of the U.S. Government, the Kuomintang reactionaries maintained intact the "order" of the enemy and his puppets and took over without any change all their fascist military, political and economic organizations. Consequently, the fascist forces of the enemy and his puppets were openly or covertly preserved and transformed into the tools of the Kuomintang in its attempt to oppose the Chinese people and start a new war in the Far East.

Thus, before the war in the Far East had really come to an end, the U.S. imperialists, the Kuomintang reactionaries, the traitors and the Japanese fascists had sown the seeds of a new war through such collaboration and partnership.

With the conclusion of the anti-Japanese war, the internal contradictions in China underwent a great change. The contradiction between China and Japan gave way to that between the broad masses of the Chinese people represented by the Communist Party on the one hand, and the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie represented by the Kuomintang reactionaries, with the support of the U.S. imperialists, on the other, as the main factor dominating the domestic situation. The Kuomintang reactionaries not only obstructed the realization of the aspirations of the people for national independence, people's democracy and social emancipation, but plunged them into the abyss of civil war and misery.

The Chinese Communist Party adopted a clear-cut policy of resolutely opposing and preventing the civil war which the reactionaries planned to start. The Party was fully aware of the imminent danger of such a war. But while the Kuomintang reactionaries were out to rob the people of their fruits of victory, the people were determined to defend their newly won rights against any infringement by the reactionaries. Should the reactionaries force a war on them, there was no alternative but to take up arms and fight. Hence the Chinese Communist Party regarded it as its central task to spare no efforts in smashing the Kuomintang attacks. It was a question of self-defence.

During this period, the Chinese Communist Party launched a campaign for agrarian reform in the liberated areas. After the Japanese surrender, the peasants of the various liberated areas in Shansi, Hopei, Shantung and Central China obtained land from the landlords in the course of liquidating traitors, settling accounts and
reducing rents and interests. The traitors, local despots and landlords fled to the cities, raining curses down upon the peasants' struggle. The middle-of-the-roaders showed doubts. A number of people in the Party wavered. In the directive issued on May 4, 1946, the Party resolutely supported all just demands and actions of the peasants, approved their ownership of the land they had obtained or were about to obtain and proclaimed the change from a policy of rent and interest reduction to one of confiscating the landlords' land and distributing it among the peasants. The claims of traitors, local despots and landlords were repudiated; the doubts of the middle-of-the-roaders were dispelled; and the mistaken views in the Party were rectified. The agrarian reform was enthusiastically supported by the peasants, and increased their determination to defend the liberated areas and struggle for peace and democracy. Thereby they became the basic forces of the Party in fighting the reactionaries.


The people of the whole country who had suffered great hardships throughout the long years of war and were now menaced by a new civil war had a strong yearning for peace, national independence, political democracy and social emancipation. As their only way to prevent the revival of Japanese militarism, heal the wounds of war, restore and develop China's social productive force, protect their vital interests and consolidate the peace in the Far East and in the rest of the world, the whole Chinese people urgently demanded peaceful national construction. The intermediate class and its political parties still cherished illusions about the U.S. Government and the Kuomintang. They admired "democracy of the U.S. type," were beguiled by the sham "neutrality" and "mediation" of the U.S. Government, and mistakenly believed in the "legitimacy" of the Kuomintang regime.

Representing the will and aspirations of the people, the Chinese Communist Party resolutely raised the banner of peace and democracy and made the greatest efforts to lead the people in seeking a way to avert civil war and realize peace.

On August 25, 1945, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a "Declaration Concerning the Present Situation," calling on the people to realize the unification of the whole country on the basis of peace, democracy and solidarity, laying down as the Party's primary policy and first objective of struggle the achievement of peace, democracy, solidarity and unification and putting forward emergency measures to avert civil war.

For this purpose Comrade Mao Tse-tung went to Chungking on August 28 to hold talks with the Kuomintang. The talks lasted for over 40 days until October 10, 1945, when the representatives of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Kuomintang signed the "Minutes of the Talks Between the Kuomintang and Communist Representatives," which became known as the October 10 Agreement. The agreement, published two days later, stipulated that both sides were to resolutely avert civil war, and on the basis of peace, democracy,
solidarity and unification, to build up an independent, free, prosperous and powerful new China. The agreement also contained measures for safeguarding the internal peace such as the convocation of a political consultative conference to discuss the peaceful construction of the country.

The policy for the peaceful construction of the country was none other than the policy for peace, solidarity, democracy and unification laid down by the Communist Party, the most faithful representative of the people, to meet what was the most pressing popular demand since the victory of the anti-Japanese war.

During the talks, the Chinese Communist Party made many concessions, such as the withdrawal of the Liberation Army from eight liberated areas in Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh and Honan and the reorganization of the Liberation Army of 1,300,000 strong into 20 to 24 divisions. In the course of the talks and shortly afterwards, the New Fourth Army withdrew from several districts along the Yangtse River and assembled in the liberated areas north of the Lunghai Railway and in northern Kiangsu and northern Anhwei.

The Chinese Communist Party faithfully carried out the agreement it had undertaken to fulfil. The whole nation saw its boundless devotion to the interests of the country and the people and its untiring efforts in the cause of peace and national solidarity.

The Kuomintang reactionaries, however, used the agreement only as a smoke screen to start a civil war. On September 17, 1945, while the talks were still going on, Chiang Kai-shek had secretly distributed among his henchmen "Manual on Bandit Suppression." On October 13 and 15, when the agreement had just been published, he ordered the Kuomintang troops to attack the People's Liberation Army. In November 1945, he called a military conference in Chungking at which an all-round plan of military operations against the liberated areas was drawn up.

To unleash the civil war, the Kuomintang reactionaries mobilized 1,270,000 troops of their own and directed or reorganized 500,000 Japanese and puppet troops. A general offensive was launched against the liberated areas in the 11 provinces of Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Suiyuan, Chahar, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei and Kwangtung. While the New Fourth Army was carrying out the orders to withdraw to the north, the Kuomintang troops repeatedly intercepted and pursued them.

In September 1945, the People's Liberation Army succeeded in halting the Kuomintang offensive against Changchihkou and completely routed the enemy troops at the end of the following month. In the middle of October 1945, in the well-known battle in Hsiangyuan, Changchih, Tunliu, and other surrounding counties, Shansi Province, an attacking force of over 30,000 men was put out of action. At the end of the month, another Kuomintang force of over 70,000 men, advancing northwards from Changteh along the Peking-Hankow Railway, met a similar fate. A total of 110,000 enemy troops, or one-tenth of the Kuomintang's attacking force, were wiped out. The fact that all these attacks were repulsed was owing to the sharp vigilance which the Chinese Communist Party, in the course of striving for peace and democracy, had consistently maintained against the eventuality of an enemy offensive and to the war-weariness prevalent among the Kuomintang troops.

The Kuomintang policy of civil war was opposed by the people
of the whole country. In November 1945, an Anti-Civil-War Association was set up in Chungking, calling on the people of all walks of life to stop such a war. On December 1, the same year, the students in Kunming staged a mammoth demonstration in opposition to civil war.

In order to play for time to redeploy their troops and make some gesture of yielding to the great pressure of the people, the Kuomintang and its U.S. masters were compelled to accept the demands made by the Chinese Communist Party and other democratic parties and the Cease-Fire Agreement was signed on January 10, 1946. On the same day, both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party issued cease-fire orders, to be effective from midnight, January 13. In accordance with the agreement, an Executive Headquarters for military mediation was set up in Peking, with three commissioners consisting of representatives of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and the U.S. Government. George C. Marshall had come to China, as the special representative of the U.S. President, ostensibly to “mediate” between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but in reality to help the Kuomintang speed up war preparations behind the smoke screen of the “mediations.”

At the same time as the cease-fire orders were issued, the Political Consultative Conference opened at Chungking, attended by delegates of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, the Democratic League, the Youth Party and individuals without party-affiliations, representing the Left, Right, and middle-of-the-road political groupings of the country. Despite the fact that the reactionaries were in the majority, the conference adopted five resolutions which contributed to peace, solidarity, democracy, and unification, namely, on government reorganization, the national assembly, the programme for the peaceful construction of the country, the draft constitution and military questions. It was only under the great pressure of the people and as a result of fierce struggles that these resolutions were passed, the military questions and the draft constitution being the subjects of especially bitter controversy.

With regard to the military questions, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their followers, the Youth Party, put forward a proposal for the “nationalization of the armed forces.” Dancing to the tune of the Kuomintang, Chen Chi-tien, a delegate of the Youth Party, alleged that “the question of the nationalization of the armed forces must come before the question of political democratization” and that “without laying down arms first, there can be no talk of democracy or of constitutional government.” This meant that the Kuomintang reactionaries intended to take over the people’s armed forces in the name of practising democracy.

The delegates of the national bourgeoisie adopted, at the Political Consultative Conference, largely the same attitude as that of the Communist Party. They stood for peace and democracy, and against civil war and dictatorship. But the coalition government they proposed was nothing more than a parliament of the European and U.S. type. And they viewed the nationalization of the armed forces in the abstract without concretely analysing to what kind of state the troops should belong, a democratic state or a dictatorial one.

The Chinese Communist Party put forward the fundamental principles and the basic plan for the nationalization of the armed forces. In view of the fact that no state in the world had ever existed in the abstract, it pointed out that there were two types of states the armed forces might belong to. In a democratic state, the armed forces,
when nationalized, became a part of the democratic state machine; in a dictatorship, a part of the state machine of the dictatorship. The Communist Party stood for the first way of nationalization.

First, before the nationalization of the armed forces, the state must be democratized, that is to say, the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship must be abolished and replaced by a democratic coalition government. The armed forces, too, must be democratized, on the principle of co-operation between the army and the people and between officers and men. Democratization of the state and the armed forces—these were the two prerequisites for the nationalization of the armed forces.

Secondly, following the establishment of a democratic coalition government and a united supreme command, the Communist Party would instantly hand over the People's Liberation Army, on condition that the Kuomintang would do the same with all its armed forces. In fact, the basic plan for the solution of the question of the armed forces consisted in the simultaneous surrender of them by both the Kuomintang and the liberated areas to a democratic coalition government.

In the resolution on military questions, a number of principles were laid down. The first principle of "separation of army and party" provided that no party or individual should make use of the army as a tool of political struggle. The second, "separation of military and civil administration," provided that officers in active service should not concurrently hold civil posts. The third, "politics in command of the army," stipulated that the Kuomintang Military Council should be reorganized into the Ministry of National Defence, which would come under the Executive Yuan and would command all the armed forces of the country. The fourth, "reorganization of the armed forces of the whole country on a fair and equitable basis," provided that after the reorganization, the troops of the whole country should become the national defence army.

As to the draft constitution, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their lackeys thought they had everything pat. They sought to have a Kuomintang-monopolized "national assembly" pass the Kuomintang-concocted "May 5 Draft Constitution," so as to effect a transition from the Kuomintang reactionaries' fascist "political tutelage" to a fascist "constitutional government." The Chinese Communist Party took a determined stand against such a reactionary attempt.

In the resolution on the draft constitution, it was provided that the Legislative Yuan, corresponding to the parliament of a democratic state and elected directly by the people, would be the supreme organ of state power, and the Executive Yuan, corresponding to the cabinet, would be the highest administrative organ of state. The Executive Yuan would be responsible to the Legislative Yuan which would have the power to approve, veto or vote non-confidence on any decision of the Executive Yuan. The Control Yuan, elected by the provincial assemblies and the national autonomous regions, would be the highest control organ of state with the power to approve, impeach and supervise the work of the Executive Yuan. The Judicial Yuan would be the supreme court. The Examination Yuan would be in charge of the examinations of civil servants and professionals. The resolution also provided for a system of provincial autonomy by which a province would have the power to draw up a provincial constitution provided it was one that did not conflict with the national
constitution. Adoption of the parliamentary system, the cabinet system and the system of local autonomy would basically solve the question of the draft constitution.

Three other resolutions called for the participation of the various democratic parties in the government and termination of the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang; the calling of a national assembly to draw up a democratic constitution; and certain policies to be carried out by a democratic coalition government.

These five resolutions were in fact a repudiation of the Kuomintang's dictatorial rule and civil-war policy and of the government system of the feudal, comprador and fascist political tutelage. Under the existing conditions, they fundamentally conformed to the aspirations of the people of the whole country for peace and democracy. They represented a political victory for the people and a political defeat for the reactionaries. That is why the reactionaries were furious at the adoption of the resolutions while the people everywhere acclaimed with enthusiasm the success of the Political Consultative Conference.

4. PREPARATIONS OF THE KUOMINTANG REACTIONARIES FOR AN ANTI-COMMUNIST CIVIL WAR WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

The Chinese Communist Party, true to its word as always, issued on January 10, 1946, a cease-fire order to all units of the People's Liberation Army, and proceeded to strive for the implementation of the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference together with the whole people.

In the eyes of the Kuomintang reactionaries, however, the Cease-Fire Agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference were nothing more than political manoeuvres to facilitate their military operations against the Communists. Feeling secure in the support of the U.S. imperialists, the Chinese reactionaries regarded the Chinese Communist Party and the Liberation Army as the chief obstacles to the realization of their schemes. Only for the purpose of gaining time to prepare for a counter-revolutionary civil war did they pretend to comply with the people's demand for peace.

While the Political Consultative Conference was in session, special agents of the Kuomintang reactionaries raided a gathering at Tsangpai Hall of the Association of Chungking Residents in Support of the Political Consultative Conference, organized by people in various walks of life; they also searched the lodgings of several delegates to the conference. On February 10, after the close of the conference, a meeting at Chiaochangkou in Chungking in celebration of the successful conclusion of the Political Consultative Conference was raided by Kuomintang agents. Speakers at the meeting, including Kuo Mo-jo and Li Kung-po, were wounded. This became known as the Chiaochangkou Incident. Afterwards, the Kuomintang organized anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and anti-democratic demonstrations in many parts of China. On February 20, 1946, its agents wrecked the Executive Headquarters for military mediation in Peking. In all these outrageous acts against the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, the agents disguised themselves as ordinary citizens.

In March 1946, the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee at a
plenary session openly nullified the fundamental democratic principles concerning the draft constitution, laid down in a resolution of the Political Consultative Conference, which provided for the adoption of the parliamentary system, the cabinet system and the system of provincial autonomy. These principles contained the democratic essence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's doctrines and under the conditions then obtaining, would have set China on the path of democratic constitutionalism. These principles were of key importance in enabling China to transform the dictatorship into a democratic political system. Hence they became the pivot around which the struggle between the Chinese democrats and reactionaries raged.

The Kuomintang reactionaries were doing away completely with the democratic essence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's doctrines. They claimed that the constitution must be based on *The Outline of Principles for the Establishment of the State* and "the Five-Powers Constitution." They used this as a pretext for overthrowing the principles laid down by the Political Consultative Conference regarding the draft constitution. They clamoured for "a distinction between power and ability," and for "the separation of five powers," arguing that administrative authority should rest with "those who have ability," while political power should belong to "those who have power." They slandered the people as having "no ability" and consequently being incapable of governing the country. Their assertions would lead to depriving the people's representative institutions of any political power. As a matter of fact, political power is something concrete; government organizations, courts, troops, police, and gendarmerie are its specific manifestations. Whoever control these have both political power and administrative authority; the two are one and the same thing. A genuine democracy is one in which the power of the people becomes the power of the government. If the people and their representatives are deprived of administrative authority, then the people have no political power. Using Dr. Sun Yat-sen's ideas about separating power from ability as a pretext, the Kuomintang reactionaries were simply usurping the state machine, establishing the feudal and comprador dictatorship, and placing the whole nation under the iron heel of fascism.

In April 1946, at a meeting of the National Political Council, Chiang Kai-shek once more referred to the so-called "legitimate government system," saying that it should not be allowed to be discontinued. The "legitimate government system" was, in fact, none other than the "Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage," which had been adopted at the National Conference of 1931, and on the basis of which the National Government was alleged by Chiang Kai-shek to have been founded. But in fact, the legitimate system of the National Government had long been discontinued on April 12, 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek and his clique turned against the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. The National Conference of 1931 was only a conference of the Chiang clique, held without the representatives of other groups of the Kuomintang, not to mention those of the people. In calling that conference, Chiang Kai-shek had attempted to work out an organic law for a fascist state, and on the basis of fascist dictatorship, to expand the civil war for the purpose of massacring the people and getting rid of all his rivals.

On January 10, 1946, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a cease-fire order to all units of the Libera-
tion Army in the whole country. But there still existed then large numbers of Japanese and puppet troops which kept provoking the Liberation Army in violation of the Cease-Fire Agreement. In order to end all conflicts, the Chinese Communist Party proposed to the Three-Man Committee and the Peking Executive Headquarters that joint measures should be quickly adopted for the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party to disarm all Japanese and puppet troops. The enforcement of these measures would certainly have contributed to domestic peace. But this task was one that could only have been carried out by a democratic government and democratic supreme command. The Chinese Communist Party therefore demanded a quick reorganization of the Kuomintang government and its Military Council.

But as Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were insincere in signing the Cease-Fire Agreement, they kept violating it. On January 7, 1946, Chiang ordered his troops to seize "vantage points" before the issue of a cease-fire order; and on the day before the order came into force, he again ordered his troops "to rush for strategic points." Openly, he issued the cease-fire order, but secretly he issued orders to open fire.

It was provided in the Cease-Fire Agreement that all hostilities in all parts of the country should cease immediately. The Northeast, being a part of China, was naturally no exception. However, the Kuomintang troops in the Northeast continued to attack the Democratic Allied Army in defiance of the Cease-Fire Agreement. It was only because of severe losses on the battle fronts and the pressure of the whole nation that the Kuomintang was compelled to sign a special cease-fire agreement for that area. But Chiang Kai-shek still refused to carry it out, as he was bent on attacking the Democratic Allied Army and overthrowing the local autonomous government set up by the people of the Northeast. He was prepared to stop at nothing in waging war there.

For the sake of peace, the People's Liberation Army voluntarily evacuated Changchun. But the Kuomintang troops continued their attack. In the battle of Szepingchieh they were annihilated in large numbers. On June 6, 1946, the Kuomintang was compelled to cease fighting. But afterwards it demanded the withdrawal of the Liberation Army from all large cities and areas along the railway lines in the Northeast within a specified period of time.

South of the Great Wall, the Kuomintang planned to dispatch 300,000 troops for "encircling and annihilating" the long-surrounded 60,000-strong Liberation Army of Central China. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party warned the Kuomintang that this action, if not stopped, would have nation-wide repercussions and mark the beginning of an all-out civil war. But the Kuomintang put its plan into action on June 26 when talks were still going on in Nanking, and the Liberation Army was forced to make a break-through.

One of the important items of the cease-fire order was to stop the movement of all troops. From the day the cease-fire order was issued up to the end of May 1946, however, the Kuomintang manoeuvred 1,300,000 of its troops into position in preparation for the civil war and built blockhouses in western Hopei, southern Shansi, southern Honan and northern Hubei, with the aim of encircling and blockading the liberated areas.

From January to June 1946, the Kuomintang army launched 4,365
attacks on 4,158 places in the liberated areas, occupied 40 towns and 2,577 villages and towns. The forces used in these attacks totalled 2,770,000.

On June 17, Chiang Kai-shek arbitrarily demanded that the Chinese Communist Party accept totally absurd terms before holding political talks. He insisted on taking over almost all the nine provinces of Northeast China, the Kiangsu-Anhwei Area, Jehol and Hopei Provinces, the Lunghai and Tientsin-Pukow Railways and the ports of Weihaiwei and Yentai.

The mediation of the U.S. Government during this period and later greatly helped the Kuomintang strengthen its war preparations.

China was the biggest colonial market that the U.S. monopoly capitalists wanted to gain exclusive control of, and to turn her into a U.S. colony was one of the principal post-war policies of the U.S. imperialists. To this end, they used the Kuomintang reactionaries as an instrument for attacking the Chinese people by means of a civil war. In fact, it was only with their aid that the Kuomintang was able to launch its anti-Communist civil war. On this basis, the United States and the Kuomintang further collaborated in active preparation for war.

George C. Marshall came to China in December 1945. In name he was a mediator in China's civil war, but in fact, he helped the Kuomintang intensify its war preparations. When the Political Consultative Conference was in session, he prepared a plan to consolidate Chiang Kai-shek's position in the Chinese Government. On February 7, 1946, the U.S. State Department forwarded to the Kuomintang an anti-Soviet note, which encouraged the reactionaries in China in their activities against the Soviet Union, the Communists and democracy. The U.S. Government directed Albert C. Wedemeyer to help the Kuomintang government transport its troops to the ports of Northeast China and supplied it with large quantities of materials.

On June 14, 1946 James Byrnes, U.S. Secretary of State, submitted a bill to the Congress providing for military aid to Chiang Kai-shek over a period of ten years and declared that the United States would not withdraw its forces from China. In Chinwangtao and Tsingtao, the U.S. forces provoked the Chinese People's Liberation Army and fought as advance guards for the Kuomintang army.

In the U.S. White Paper (1949), United States Relations with China, the U.S. Government admitted to its policy of imperialism in China after World War II. The U.S. was confronted with three possible lines of action in China after the war. The first was to "pull out lock, stock and barrel." The U.S. Government would not do this, because, it maintained, it would have represented an abandonment of its "international responsibilities" (in other words, domination of the world) and its "traditional" (i.e. aggressive) policy for China. The second was that the United States "could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists." But the U.S. Government clearly knew that the Chinese people were strongly patriotic and any infringement upon the sovereignty of China would meet with their resolute opposition. Moreover, the American people would never have sanctioned a war against China. The United States did not dare to take this course.

Being unwilling to take the first course and not daring to take the second, the U.S. Government came to the third—that of assisting the Kuomintang to assert its authority over as much of China as possible. It was with these imperialist aims that George C. Marshall
came to China to mediate. Thus, in accordance with its policy towards China, the U.S. Government took direct action in helping the Kuomintang to reach a temporary agreement with the Chinese Communist Party, so as to "preserve and even increase the influence of the National Government." The aim of the mediation of the U.S. Government was to increase the strength of the Kuomintang reactionaries in order to launch the anti-Communist civil war and to help the Kuomintang maintain its dark rule in China and use it as an instrument to enslave the Chinese people.

The U.S. Government's military aid to the Kuomintang reactionaries and intervention in China's internal affairs caused the civil war to break out, to expand and to become difficult to stop. It was the U.S. Government that pushed China into the pit of civil war, disunity, terror and poverty. The reactionaries in China were isolated and entangled in difficulties. Without the aid of foreign imperialists, they could never have had the strength to fight a civil war after World War II. With the steadily increasing practical help of many kinds from the U.S. Government, Chiang Kai-shek became more and more perverse. The U.S. policy of mediation as a subterfuge for helping Chiang Kai-shek was a fundamental cause of the civil war in China.

After the anti-Japanese war, it was inevitable that the Kuomintang would persist in attempting to launch an anti-Communist, anti-popular civil war. So long as there were in China the reactionary classes supported by the imperialists—the landlord class and the bureaucrat-capitalist class, there existed the economic basis for the civil war. Nevertheless, the relative strength of the classes and the struggle waged by the revolutionary forces could play, under certain conditions, an important role in determining whether the civil war could break out. After the anti-Japanese war, the people throughout the country demanded peace and democracy and were opposed to civil war and dictatorship. The people persistently endeavoured to induce the Kuomintang to accept peace and carry out reform under peaceful conditions. Before the outbreak of the civil war, the people resorted to every possible means to maintain the peace. In order to fulfill the good intentions and demands of the Chinese people and to save peace at the last moment, and also to fully expose the Kuomintang's warlike aims in the eyes of the people, the Chinese Communist Party exerted the greatest efforts and displayed the greatest patience in leading the people of the whole country in a struggle to avoid war and realize peace.

Although the struggle failed to prevent the war from breaking out, the Chinese Communist Party, in this period, gave extensive and effective education to the people throughout the country. Through the October 10 agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, the Party propagated its policies and made known the fact that it was struggling tirelessly for peace and democracy. By exposing the bad faith of the Kuomintang in scrapping the Cease-Fire Agreement and the resolutions of the PCC, and the U.S. Government's intrigue of engineering the civil war under cover of mediation, the Communist Party educated the people of the whole country, enabling them gradually to shed their illusions about peace, the Kuomintang and the U.S. Government and to realize the necessity of overthrowing the Kuomintang reactionaries and driving the U.S. imperialists out of China before they could enjoy peace, democracy, independence and the right to live. The perfidious activities of the Kuomintang reactionaries and the U.S. imperialists were laid bare
before the Chinese people. The more the reactionaries slighted the people's demand for peace, the more isolated they became politically.

The Chinese Communist Party had long since known of the U.S. intrigues of backing the Kuomintang in launching the civil war and had, therefore, made sufficient ideological and organizational preparations. While exposing the reactionary policy of the Kuomintang of preparing for civil war, the Chinese Communist Party led the army and people to expand the liberated areas and link up them which had hitherto been separated from one another. The Party also gave leadership to the people of the liberated areas in carrying through the struggle against Kuomintang agents and for the reduction of rent and interest, in pushing forward the agrarian reform, and in unfolding a movement for increasing production and practical economy. All these and other measures were taken with the aim of ensuring that the reactionaries would be completely defeated when they launched a nation-wide civil war and the war instigators would stew in their own juice.

1 In order to deceive the people and consolidate its fascist rule, the Kuomintang in 1936 drew up a "Draft Constitution of the Republic of China," ostensibly to "return the state power to the people." This "Draft Constitution" was made public on May 5, 1936; hence its name.

2 In his The Outline of Principles for the Establishment of the State, Dr. Sun Yat-sen divided "the process of the establishment of the state" into three periods: military government, political tutelage, and constitutional government. For a long time, the Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek had been using the terms "military government" and "political tutelage" as pretexts for postponing the "constitutional government" and installing a counter-revolutionary dictatorship, thus robbing the people of all freedom.

3 They consist of executive, legislative, control, judicial and examination.
CHAPTER TWELVE

STRATEGIC DEFENCE IN THE THIRD REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR. REPULSING OF THE KUOMINTANG'S MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

(July 1946 — June 1947)

1. POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRINCIPLES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

In July 1946, the Chiang Kai-shek clique, the world's Number One traitorous clique, with the support of the United States, the world's biggest imperialist power, in defiance of the will of the people, imposed a nation-wide war on the people's liberated areas.

At the outbreak of the war the enemy was superior in strength, with an army totalling 4,300,000 men and a population of over 300 million, besides having the control of all the major cities of the country and most of the railway lines and rich resources. In addition, the Kuomintang government had taken over the complete equipment of one million Japanese troops. But the most important factor of all was the active aid from the American imperialists, who trained and equipped Kuomintang troops and transported them to the front to attack the liberated areas. United States forces landed in China to defend the major cities for the Kuomintang or help the Kuomintang troops make inroads into the liberated areas. The United States Government provided the Kuomintang reactionaries with the necessary supplies for carrying on the civil war, and it was a fact that preparations for such an anti-Communist civil war had long been under way. It was precisely because of the full support of the American imperialists that the Kuomintang reactionaries dared to launch their full-scale civil war in the fond hope of wiping out the liberated areas in a few months.

On the other side of the picture, the Chinese People's Liberation Army had just a little over 1,200,000 men in all. The enemy troops were three and a half times as many as the people's forces and their equipment, too, was far superior. The population in the then liberated areas numbered only a little over 130 million, roughly one-third of that in the Kuomintang-controlled areas. Besides, within the liberated areas, agrarian reform had not yet been fully carried out, nor had the feudal reactionary forces been completely eliminated. As a result, the rear of the People's Liberation Army was not yet fully consolidated.

In the balance of military strength, the Kuomintang army was superior in all respects except in political calibre and in relations with the people. Therefore, as soon as the war started, Chiang Kai-shek launched a regular army of 1,600,000 men in a furious all-out attack against the army and the people of the liberated areas, in an attempt to wipe them out at one blow. The enemy struck at the liberated areas from all directions. In this early stage of the war, the army and the people of the liberated areas therefore decided to adopt defensive warfare.
The Chinese reactionaries and their American masters, however, had overestimated their own strength, and underestimated the strength of the army and the people of the liberated areas. They mistakenly thought that the efforts for peace and democracy which the Chinese Communist Party, representing the will of the people, had made since the conclusion of the anti-Japanese war, were signs of weakness, timidity and incompetence. They saw only the superiority of their own army in number and in equipment. Therefore, in defiance of the people's will for peace, they tore up the Cease-Fire Agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, and ventured to start a civil war by relying on the strength of their military superiority and especially on the military aid from the American imperialists. But the reactionaries were wrong in their calculations.

Some people, however, were intimidated by outward appearances. A handful of shameless politicians long trained in time-serving and speculation, like Tseng Chi of the Youth Party and Chang Chun-mai of the National Socialist Party, naturally lost no time in hurrying over to the side of the Kuomintang reactionaries. But even among politically experienced people, including those who were friends of the revolution, there were some who began to doubt whether the People's Liberation Army, fighting against such tremendous odds, would be able to defeat the Kuomintang reactionaries.

The Chinese Communist Party successfully dissipated such pessimism and doubts. At the very beginning of the war, the Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a scientific analysis of the international and domestic situation in the light of Marxist-Leninist theory and clearly pointed out that the people not only should but could defeat the Kuomintang reactionaries. They should defeat them, because the war the Kuomintang reactionaries had started was directed against the national independence of China and against democracy for the people. If they did not rise to oppose the counter-revolutionary war with a revolutionary war, they would be enslaved by the American and Chinese reactionaries. The people were able to defeat the Kuomintang reactionaries because military superiority and American aid were factors that could bear only a temporary influence, whereas the justness or unjustness of a war and the support or opposition of the broad masses were factors that would bear a constant and far-reaching influence.

The civil war launched by the Chinese reactionaries was a counter-revolutionary war which was traitorous, autocratic and anti-popular. In order to wage an anti-Communist war the reactionaries had to oppress and exploit the people still more cruelly than before. Hence, they would also have on their hands a war against the unarmed people of the areas under their rule. The practice of forcing civilians into military service, and the consequent lowering of morale in the army, were the inescapable outcome of a counter-revolutionary war in which the soldiers were all the time ready to lay down their arms. This was the fatal weakness of the Kuomintang reactionaries. As a result, war-weariness began to tell on the Kuomintang troops, and the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas opposed the war. Besides, there were serious contradictions among the various factions and cliques within the Kuomintang and acute hostility between the officers and men in the Kuomintang army. The economy of the Kuomintang reactionary regime was founded on bureaucrat-capitalism which monopolized the national economy. This bureaucrat-capital-
lism not only oppressed the workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie, but injured the interests of the middle bourgeoisie as well. Hence the demand to overthrow the Kuomintang reactionary rule was not merely limited to the workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie. It was even possible for the middle bourgeoisie to join in the struggles against the Kuomintang or to remain neutral. On the other hand, the war of liberation was a just revolutionary war, which had the support of the entire people. In this the army and the people of the liberated areas had the greatest advantage. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party pursued in the rural areas a policy of transforming feudal landownership into ownership of the land by the peasants, and, in the cities, a policy of confiscating bureaucrat capital and protecting national industry and commerce. In order to reduce the number of opponents, the Party in the agrarian reform relied on the poor peasants and the farm labourers, united with the middle peasants and drew a distinction between the common run of rich peasants, middle or small landlords on the one hand and collaborationists, bad gentry and local bullies on the other. In the cities, the Party relied on the working class, united with the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie and endeavoured to win over the middle-of-the-roaders, in order to isolate the reactionaries. These policies won the support of the entire people, consolidated the rear of the People's Liberation Army, and laid the political foundation for the nation-wide victory of the revolutionary war.

The Kuomintang reactionaries pinned their hopes on American aid. These was a reflection of their innate weakness, alarm, and loss of confidence—an expression of their awareness that except to fall back on American aid, there was absolutely no way out for them.

A specific analysis of the domestic and international situation showed that it was possible to form in China, on a very extensive basis, a people's democratic united front under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This was a vital factor in winning the victory of the Chinese people's revolution. The basic weakness of the reactionaries lay in the reactionary nature of their political stand. However strong any force might be, it was doomed to failure if it was reactionary and hostile to the people.

In order to defeat the Kuomintang offensive, the Party's Central Committee laid down a correct strategic plan, which aimed chiefly at the annihilation of the enemy's manpower rather than the defence of any particular town or area. For this reason, when in a campaign the Kuomintang started a large-scale offensive and marched against the People's Liberation Army from several directions in concerted action, the PLA was to concentrate its forces so as to obtain absolute numerical superiority over one section of the enemy troops and wipe it out at the proper time. The particular section chosen should be the one that was comparatively weak, or inadequately reinforced, or situated in an unfavourable position both from the point of view of terrain and mass support. Meanwhile the PLA should deploy small forces to hold the other enemy units so as to prevent them from coming speedily to the rescue of the besieged section. In deciding the next step to be taken after the victory—whether to keep on wiping out other parts of the enemy or to suspend fighting and rest in order to prepare for renewed fighting—considerations were to be guided by the actual development of the war. Tactically, when a superior force was to be concentrated to encircle and annihilate a section of the enemy troops, the various units taking part in the
offensive should not deploy their forces over all points in an attempt
to exterminate the whole of the enemy forces at one blow. This
would inevitably affect the fighting strength of the various attacking
units and would delay the annihilation of the enemy or even make
it difficult to accomplish this aim. Instead, the concentrated superior
force should seek out the most vulnerable point of this section of
the enemy, make a fierce attack on it in order to make victory an
absolute certainty. Having won the victory, it was necessary to
enlarge at once the sphere of attack and beat the enemy units one
by one.

The advantage of such a strategic plan was twofold: complete anni­
hilation and quick decision. Only by complete annihilation could the
PLA hit the enemy hard by effectively wiping out his manpower. This
was the way to replenish the PLA to the fullest degree, solve its
problem of manpower and materials, and most effectively demoralize
the enemy soldiers while raising the morale of the PLA. Only a
quick settlement could smash the enemy without running into his
reinforcements.

The revolutionary war was protracted, and battles occurred with
great frequency. In view of this, constant attention should be paid
to training the troops. Intervals between battles should be well
employed in military and political training, and a summing-up of
experience should be made in the whole unit after every battle. In
order to annihilate better-equipped enemy troops, special emphasis
should be laid on training in night fighting, hand-to-hand fighting
and unbroken, long-drawn-out fighting. The principle of concen­
trating forces to annihilate a section of the enemy and crushing
different units of the enemy one by one was part of the fine
tradition of the PLA since the day it was founded. Moreover,
during the Third Revolutionary Civil War, the great strength
of the PLA made it possible to adopt mobile warfare with concen­
trated forces as the chief form of fighting and to supplement it by
means of guerrilla warfare with scattered forces.

In this way, while the strength of the PLA remained inferior when
viewed against the entire war situation, in every single battle it was
able to oppose the enemy with an absolute superiority in numbers
and thus ensure its victory. With the lapse of time, superiority in
all aspects of the war would shift to the hands of the PLA, which
replenished itself with whole sets of the enemy arms and most of
the captured enemy troops.

These major strategic principles for defeating the Kuomintang were
initiated by the People's Liberation Army under the leadership of
the Central Committee of the Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung in
the course of prolonged armed struggles against domestic and foreign
enemies. Chiang Kai-shek was fully acquainted with these prin­
ciples and had studied the ways and means of countering them, but all
to no purpose. The reason for this was simple. The PLA's strategy
and tactics were the outgrowth of a people's war; no counter-revolu­
tionary army could make any use of them.

The Kuomintang had dared to unleash the anti-Communist civil
war by making an all-out attack on the liberated areas chiefly because
it possessed superior military strength. But from a military point
of view, the Kuomintang also had a number of irremediable weak­
nesses. Dictated by the demands of a nation-wide war, its policy
was to occupy the Central Plain, northern Kiangsu Province, Cheng­
teh, Antung and Harbin, to control the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway
and the Tatung-Puchow Railway and to open up a communication line from Nanking in the south to Changchun in the northeast. This communication line extended over a long distance and was flanked by mountainous ridges and high cliffs. The Northeast lay at the end of a supply line 500 kilometres long. As with merely 1,600,000 men the Kuomintang attempted to occupy so many areas and such long communication lines with all the cities along them, it was compelled to scatter its forces in garrisons. Hence it suffered from a shortage of manpower. Owing to the wide dispersion of its troops, as soon as the Kuomintang gathered somewhat superior forces against one area, many vulnerable points would be exposed in other areas under its control, and an ideal opening provided for a counter-attack.

Chiang's policy of eliminating alien elements led him to discriminate consistently against all Kuomintang forces other than his personal troops. Consequently there were acute contradictions between the central armies and the local armies within the Kuomintang camp. Only those he considered reliable were appointed to important military posts, while the disposition of troops was placed entirely under his own command and carried out through an incompetent chief-of-staff. This gave rise to twin fundamental weaknesses: intestine strife and lack of unified command.

The American-made equipment was naturally an asset for the Kuomintang troops, but in another sense it was a liability. Mechanized forces required good communication lines, which were very inadequate in China. When such forces entered the mountainous regions of the liberated areas, their vehicles were of little use. Consequently, they could not operate with full effect.

The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party strengthened the fighting will and confidence in victory of the army and the people all over the country. The entire people, closely rallying around the Party, gave material and moral support to the large-scale revolutionary war.

2. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S ADOPTION OF A STRATEGY OF ACTIVE DEFENCE. UtTER FRUSTRATION BY THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY OF THE KUOMINTANG'S ALL-OUT AND CONCENTRATED OFFENSIVES

During the initial stages of the war when the Kuomintang forces broke into various liberated areas, the PLA withdrew from many cities and localities. The enemy's all-out offensive south of the Great Wall started at the end of June 1946, when the PLA in the Central Plain was encircled and attacked. This was followed by campaigns against southern Shansi, northern Kiangsu, south-western Shantung, the Shantung Peninsula, eastern Hopei, eastern Suiyuan, southern Chahar, Jehol and southern Liaoning. The PLA adopted a strategic policy of active defence and abandoned of its own accord a number of cities and localities in order to lure the enemy to penetrate deep. Then it concentrated overwhelmingly superior forces several times larger than those of the enemy, singled out certain weak or isolated enemy units, and knocked them out one by one in mobile warfare. Its object in so doing was to effect a fundamental change in the strategic situation.

The enemy's all-out offensive was checked after eight months of
fighting from July 1946 to February 1947, in which the People's Liberation Army inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.

During the first four months, the PLA in the Central Plain under Li Hsien-nien's command succeeded in breaking through the enemy encirclement at Hsuanhuatien. Then it moved to the area of southern Shensi and western Honan and to the border region between Szechuan and Shensi, and continued to carry on guerrilla warfare in the area of eastern Hupeh and western Anhwei. Another unit of the PLA under the command of Wang Chen, after marching through the four provinces of Hupeh, Honan, Shensi, and Kansu, and repeatedly frustrating the enemy's encirclements, returned in September to the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. Thus, the Kuomintang plan of annihilation through encirclement was reduced to bankruptcy. The northern Kiangsu unit of the People's Liberation Army in East China fought a number of successful battles in mobile defence, first in the area north of the Yangtse and east of the Grand Canal, and then in the area of Huaiyin, Huaian, Lienshui and Suining. The People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area waged a large-scale battle against the enemy first along the Kaifeng-Hsuchow section of the Lunghai Railway and then in Tingtao in southwestern Shantung. The Taiyueh Mountain units fought in southern Shansi in close co-ordination with the People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area which was operating in northern Shansi. The People's Liberation Army in Shantung Province fought the enemy along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway. The People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area repulsed an enemy attack on Changchiakou from both the east and the west. The Democratic Allied Army in Northeast China annihilated enemy forces in the Kuantien Area in southern Liaoning.

During the second four months, the People's Liberation Army in East China launched large-scale annihilation operations against the enemy in the campaigns of Suchien in Kiangsu, Tsaochuang and Yihshien in southern Shantung and Laiwu in central Shantung, and thwarted the Kuomintang's plan of catching Shantung in a pincers' movement from the north and the south. The People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Area exterminated the enemy in a series of battles in northern Honan, southwestern Shantung, eastern Honan and northwestern Anhwei. In the campaign of southwestern Shansi the People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Suiyuan Area and the Taiyueh Mountain units of the People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Area smashed the enemy's attempt to cross the Yellow River in a westward march against the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. The People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Area made an attack on the area south of Paoting along the Peking-Hankow Railway. Units of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army fought in co-ordination on the northern and the southern fronts in the Northeast. Those in the north marched three times into the Sungari region, and others in the south repulsed four enemy attacks upon Linkiang. Thus the enemy's plan of offensive in the south and defensive in the north was frustrated, and the enemy offensive in Northeast China was brought to an end.

The People's Liberation Army armed itself with equipment captured from the enemy and reinforced itself with captured soldiers after re-education. The enemy had occupied a number of cities and localities of the liberated areas, but only at tremendous cost. Certain
cities and localities had been voluntarily evacuated in accordance with a pre-arranged strategic plan of active defence, and the Kuomintang had to detail troops to garrison every one of them. As a result, in spite of the further increase in the number of Kuomintang troops employed for attacking the liberated areas, its mobile forces were very much reduced and its fighting strength for first line attacks greatly weakened. Thus, in the course of the war, the People's Liberation Army grew bigger and stronger, while the Kuomintang army became smaller and weaker.

From March 1947 onwards, the enemy was compelled to abandon the all-out offensive in favour of a concentrated offensive, resulting in a war on a seesaw pattern with the enemy's partial offensive balanced by a partial counter-offensive. The chief targets of the enemy were Shantung and northern Shensi.

The enemy was compelled to adopt a new strategy, which consisted in driving two powerful columns from the east and the west towards the People's Liberation Army operating in areas south and west of the Yellow River. The idea was to dislodge the people's troops from their positions before annihilating them separately. Under the command of Ku Chu-tung 450,000 enemy troops, as many as two-thirds of the Kuomintang's total attacking force, were hurled against the Shantung Liberated Area, and over 230,000 enemy troops (ten times as many as the local People's Liberation Army units) under the command of Hu Tsung-nan assaulted the Northern Shensi Liberated Area. After much hard fighting, the PLA eventually succeeded in smashing the enemy's concentrated offensives against Shantung and northern Shensi.

The large-scale enemy offensive against the Shantung Liberated Area started on April 6, 1947. In the three big campaigns of Yimeng, Mengyin and Laimeng, the enemy's main forces were wiped out. The campaign of Mengyin was especially outstanding in that there the spearhead of the Kuomintang offensive was smashed and the Kuomintang crack units were annihilated. The People's Liberation Army began to obtain the initiative in the war. This marked the beginning of a change in the balance of strength on the East China battlefield, and along with the victories won on other battlefields, paved the way for the People's Liberation Army's nation-wide counter-offensive.

The enemy's major offensive against northern Shensi started on March 13, 1947. This concentrated offensive was smashed after a series of battles fought at Yenan, Wayaopao, Yulin and other places. Meanwhile counter-offensives were launched by the People's Liberation Army in Northeast China, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Area and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Area against the enemy troops there, who had fallen back on the defensive. This brought about a fundamental change in the war situation on these different battlefields.

In the summer of 1947, the Northeast Democratic Allied Army attacked the enemy on various battlefields in the Northeast, Jehol, and eastern Hopei. The enemy was pinned down within the narrow corridor along the Chinese Changchun Railway and the Peking-Shenyang Railway and forced to adopt a concentrated defensive.

The People's Liberation Army in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Area carried on offensive operations on the outer sphere of Shihchia-chuang, along the northern section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and in the area north of Paoting.
During this one year the People's Liberation Army put out of action a total of 1,120,000 regular and irregular enemy troops, while its own regular army grew from 1,200,000 to 2,000,000 strong. The enemy's strategic offensive was thus repulsed.

The Kuomintang troops suffered defeat on every battlefield. The reactionaries no longer felt so arrogant as they had done when they launched the all-out offensive in 1946, or when they started the concentrated offensive in March 1947. They had miscalculated the strength and tactics of the People's Liberation Army, regarding the strategic retreat of the PLA as an indication of timidity and its temporary abandonment of certain cities and localities as genuine setbacks. Their complete defeat was a natural outcome of this downright error of judgement.

Having lost a great number of men, the Kuomintang reactionaries had no alternative but to pass from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive.

Thenceforward the war situation in the whole country was changed from the enemy's partial attack and the PLA's partial counter-attack to the enemy's overall defensive and the PLA's all-out offensive. In other words, the People's Liberation Army was now ready to wipe out the Kuomintang attacking troops resolutely, thoroughly and completely.

3. FURTHER COLONIZATION OF THE KUOMINTANG-CONTROLLED AREAS. BANKRUPTCY OF THE KUOMINTANG'S POLITICAL SWINDE

Simultaneously with the Kuomintang's military crisis, there broke out an economic crisis in the Kuomintang-controlled areas. It was a result of the colonization of the Kuomintang-controlled areas and the anti-Communist civil war.

After Japan's surrender, the Kuomintang received huge quantities of surplus goods, relief supplies and materials on credit from the United States and took over a great deal of materials from the Japanese and their puppets. This was financially the "golden age" for the Kuomintang government.

From the time of Japan's surrender to July 1947, the United States supplied the Kuomintang with materials amounting in value to over 4,000 million U.S. dollars.

The Kuomintang government took over from the Japanese and their puppets various financial organs along with all the gold, silver and ready cash which had been robbed from the Chinese people by brute force and savage economic plunder. Moreover, the Kuomintang government took over all the materials, trade companies and commercial establishments which had been seized by the Japanese from the Chinese people, as well as all the big industrial enterprises which the Japanese had during a long period of time built up in China through forced labour and forced annexation. The total value of these enemy and puppet assets was estimated by the U.S. Government at 1,800 million U.S. dollars. As a result of this "takeover," the proportion of the output produced by bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises to the total output of the country in 1947 was as follows: coal, 38.8 per cent; electric power, 83.3 per cent; steel, 90 per cent; cotton spindles, 37.6 per cent; looms, 60.1 per cent; oil, iron and non-ferrous metals, 100 per cent. In short, the capital owned
by the “Four Big Families” amounted to 70-80 per cent of the total
industrial capital of the whole country. Besides, the Kuomintang
took over all the agricultural organs and the attached land and assets
which the Japanese had wrested from the Chinese people. All this
wealth which the Chinese people had created with their blood and
sweat was thus transferred from the hands of the Japanese to those
of the “Four Big Families.”

The co-operation of Chinese bureaucrat-capital with American
monopoly capital led to the colonization of the economy of the
Kuomintang-controlled areas and augured its impending ruin.

To convert China into an American colony and a military base
against the Soviet Union was a basic policy of the American imperia-
lists. For this imperialist purpose, the U.S. Government supported
the Kuomintang in carrying on the civil war, while the Kuomintang
bartered national sovereignty for American aid.

Since the end of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression,
the Kuomintang government had openly or secretly signed with the
U.S. Government a number of traitorous treaties and agreements,
among which the “Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Trade and
Navigation” signed on November 4, 1946, was the most notorious.
By this treaty, the Americans were granted special privileges in
residence, travel, trade and all kinds of business management on
Chinese soil. Thus the United States obtained unrestricted privi-
leges in China’s economy.

After Japan’s capitulation, the influx of American commodities
through American corporations, or establishments jointly managed
by American capitalists and Chinese bureaucrat-capitalists, or those
operated by the “Four Big Families,” converted China into an Ameri-
can-monopolized market. Of the total value of China’s imports,
American commodities, not including smuggled goods, constituted
51.2 per cent in 1946 as against 22.6 per cent in 1936. Of the total
volume of China’s exports, the United States absorbed 57.2 per cent
in 1946 as against 19.7 per cent in 1937.

The “Four Big Families” placed the Japanese and puppet industries
which they had taken over at the service of American monopoly
capital. All the capital, technique, management and training of
personnel of these enterprises were put under American control. In
addition, the United States set up factories in China, while the
“revised company law” adopted by the Kuomintang government
granted American capital all kinds of privileges. American capital
and Chinese bureaucrat-capital made use of the Kuomintang state
organs to evade taxation, monopolize power and raw materials, and
control the market and transport facilities, thus completely stifling
China’s national industry and commerce.

The wealth seized by the Kuomintang was rapidly consumed in the
civil war, which, however, raged on without the least sign of abate-
ment. To carry on the war the Kuomintang government practised
an extremely ruthless robbery of the people, by compelling them to
offer grain, pay taxes and enter military service, by issuing paper
currency with the sky as the limit, and by raising the prices of
commodities. Consequently an economic crisis of an unprecedentedly
serious nature broke out in the Kuomintang-controlled areas. The
prices of rice and other commodities soared like a kite whose string
had broken as paper money rolled off the printing press. Compared
with pre-war standards, prices had increased 1,800-fold on the eve
of Japan’s surrender and 60,000-fold by April 1947. The amount
of "national currency" issued by the Kuomintang government was C.N.$1,400 million on the eve of the anti-Japanese war, C.N.$500,000 million on the eve of Japan's surrender, and over C.N.$16,000,000 million in April 1947.

By 1948, prices in Shanghai had risen three million times as compared with the pre-war period. With the prices reaching astronomical figures, the "national currency" had completely lost its value as a medium of exchange. Consequently business transactions were carried on in terms of basketfuls of paper money. On August 19, the Kuomintang government proclaimed the replacement of the "national currency" by the "gold-yuan" at the exchange rate of G. Y. 1 to C.N.$3 million, or U.S. dollar 0.25, and announced that the total issuance of the new currency was to be limited to G.Y. 500 million. However, from the first day the new currency went into circulation, it was issued in enormous quantities in order to make up the war deficit, and people were compelled to accept the "gold-yuan" in return for all their private holdings of U.S. dollars and other foreign currencies. Severe inflation ensued, accompanied by a panic buying of commodities. By October 1, the amount of the "gold-yuan" issued had increased to six times its set limit. Owing to its unrestricted issuance and the futility of price control, the "gold-yuan" like its predecessor was finally declared invalid.

Having started the civil war, the Kuomintang stepped up its oppression against national industry and commerce. Before the anti-Japanese war, there were over 5,400 factories in Shanghai, but only 582 of them were in operation in 1947. At the beginning of 1949, over 80 per cent of the machine factories had stopped production. In 1947 about 70 per cent of the factories in Tientsin and 50 per cent of those in Tsingtao suspended operation.

Rural labour power, farm implements and draught animals in the Kuomintang-controlled areas were reduced to such an extent that agricultural production became seriously impaired. With the ruin of agriculture, famine stalked the land, and hunger-stricken people could be seen everywhere. In 1946, 30 per cent of the arable land in Honan, and 40 per cent in Hunan and Kwangtung lay waste.

During this period, the political swindle of the Kuomintang also went completely bankrupt.

In March 1946, at a plenary session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, Chiang Kai-shek mustered his reactionary lackeys to work out a series of plans to annul the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. The scheme was to call a "national assembly" and to draw up a bogus constitution for the purpose of hoodwinking the masses. On October 11, the People's Liberation Army evacuated Changchiakou for strategic purposes. Chiang Kai-shek, dizzy with "triumph," issued on that very day an order to convene the "National Assembly."

The so-called National Assembly, unilaterally convened by the Kuomintang, met from November 15 to December 25, 1946. This was a sheer violation of the principle of political consultation.

The assembly adopted a Kuomintang constitution. To allay public indignation, Chiang Kai-shek persuaded his henchmen not to adopt the overtly fascist and dictatorial "May 5 Draft Constitution" which they had prepared, but to adopt a veiled fascist constitution—the "Constitution of the Republic of China."

However, the bogus constitution turned out to be thoroughly dictatorial in its provisions regarding the people's power, the relationship
between the central government and the local governments and between the legislative and executive organs. Power was to be vested not in the people, but in the government; not in the local governments, but in the central government; not in the legislative, but in the executive organs. The bogus constitution provided for the people's "rights," but at the same time it was careful to stipulate that in case of emergency and to maintain social order, such rights were liable to legal restriction. Hence the express provision for the people's rights was manifestly no more than a dead letter, a soap bubble to be pricked by any order that the reactionary government might be pleased to issue at any time. The bogus constitution further provided that the president should be elected every six years, that if re-elected he could go on holding his office, that he should command the army, navy and air force of the whole country, and have the right to proclaim emergency decrees and veto any resolution adopted by the legislative body. In this way, the Kuomintang dictator would seize all the state power while the people would have none whatever. Besides, the bogus constitution denied, among other things, the principle of regional autonomy, denied autonomous rights to national minorities and the rights of ratification and veto to the legislature.

Therefore, about this constitution, even Ta Kung Pao, organ of the Political Science Group of the Kuomintang, could not but acknowledge that "it concentrates all power in one person and all thoughts in one head."

None of the successive reactionary governments of China during the 40 years or so before liberation had really wanted a constitution, but each of them, when on its deathbed, would try to save itself with a bogus constitution. The reactionary Kuomintang regime was no exception. Tottering under the attacks of the revolutionary forces, it drew up a bogus constitution as a means of resisting the revolution and hoodwinking the people. The Kuomintang reactionaries tried to make use of a bourgeois constitution as a cloak to cover up the fact that their reactionary regime was rotten to the core. This, of course, was purely wishful thinking. The bogus constitution had not been published three years before it was liquidated along with its authors, the Kuomintang reactionaries.

On April 18, 1947 the Kuomintang announced a "reorganization" of its government.

After the reorganization, Chiang Kai-shek brazenly alleged that the new government was "liberal" and "multi-party" and marked a "transition from political tutelage to constitutionalism." The chief actors in this farce were Chang Chun, Tseng Chi, Chang Chun-mai and Wang Yun-wu. Chang Chun was the head of the Political Science Group representing the interests of the bureaucrat-compradors, and a veteran member of the pro-Japanese faction. Tseng Chi was a parasite who used to wait upon the traitor Wang Ching-wei. Chang Chun-mai was a survival of the royalist bureaucrats of the Northern clique, as well as an extremely reactionary metaphysician. Wang Yun-wu was an unprincipled politician. These hardened traitors, feudal left-overs, and shameless politicians were supporters of the reactionary Kuomintang regime, accomplices in annulling the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and the cease-fire orders, and favourites of the U.S. rulers. They were suddenly transformed into "liberals" and became "men of the day." The "multi-party" government of Chiang Kai-shek could
boast, besides the Kuomintang, of two other "parties," the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, which had come into existence as a result of the split of the China Democratic League, and which were ready to put up their souls for sale. The American imperialists were the wire-pullers behind the Kuomintang government. Kuomintang warlords, party bosses and financial magnates formed the nucleus of the Kuomintang government while the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party were merely a group of political mercenaries, with whom Chiang sought to whitewash his dictatorship. After the "reorganization," members of the Youth Party and of the Democratic Socialist Party and various other "personages" obtained posts as members of the National Government, administrative officials of the Executive Yuan or ministers. Members of the Youth Party, having secured posts in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Economy, jockeyed for the control of the Resources Commission and the China Reconstruction Textile Company as shamelessly as any Kuomintang officials. Around September 1947, as a result of wrangling over positions in the Kuomintang government, the Democratic Socialist Party split into two factions, making abusive attacks on each other. These were the individuals and parties of which the reorganized Kuomintang government was composed. Yet Chiang Kai-shek had the effrontery to dub his government "liberal" and "multi-party."

Why did the Kuomintang government reorganize itself? The answer is simple—for the purpose of raising a loan from the American reactionaries with which to carry on the civil war and maintain the fascist dictatorship.

In November 1947 Chang Chun requested the U.S. Government for aid for a term of four years. In exchange for American aid, the Kuomintang Government would voluntarily receive U.S. advisers to supervise its finances and other economic affairs. The U.S. Congress adopted in March 1948 a bill of aid to the Kuomintang, totalling 570 million U.S. dollars.

4. RISE OF THE PATRIOTIC DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

Along with the defeat of the Kuomintang's military offensive, the economy of the Kuomintang-controlled areas collapsed and the Kuomintang's political swindle went bankrupt. The people, who harboured undying enmity against the Kuomintang reactionaries and would never be reconciled to them, were rising to fight, so that in the Kuomintang-controlled areas the patriotic democratic movement rose more vigorously with each passing day. The patriotic movement in these areas and the armed struggles in the liberated areas constituted two revolutionary fronts.

In September 1946, a call for the "G.I.s, Leave China!" week, sponsored by progressive American organizations and immediately spreading all over China, developed into a very broad mass movement, whose supporters declared they would go on agitating until all American troops withdrew from China. They also demanded that the U.S. Government should stop giving any kind of aid to the Kuomintang. The campaign unfolded in the big cities throughout the country and reached an unprecedented height especially in Shanghai and Chungking.

On December 1, during the session of the "National Assembly," a stall-keepers' struggle broke out in Shanghai. As the broad
masses of that city had to rely for their daily necessities on wayside stalls, there were many stall-keepers in Shanghai. In an attempt to monopolize the market, the Kuomintang government issued orders banning stalls from the pavement, thus making it impossible for stall-keepers to earn their living. To fight for the right to keep themselves alive, the stall-keepers put up a petition to the Shanghai authorities, but met with a cruel massacre. However, their struggles won the sympathy and support of the citizens of Shanghai and the people in other parts of the country. It was hardly an accident that the event should have taken place in Shanghai where the Sino-American reactionary forces were the most concentrated. It was a symbol of the grave crisis of the reactionary Kuomintang rule.

At the end of December 1946, the students of the whole country launched a demonstration campaign in protest against atrocities committed by American G.I.s, which included an assault on a girl student of Peking University. More than half a million students in all the big and medium-sized cities of the country took part in these struggles.

In May 1947 when the Kuomintang government was "reorganizing" itself, there broke out a students' patriotic movement on an even larger scale and of even greater and more far-reaching influence. The slogan put forward in this movement was to fight against starvation, civil war and persecution. This student movement was outstanding on account of its broadness and firmness. It involved the students from all parts of the country, who fought back resolutely against the reactionaries on every count. For instance the reactionaries forbade the students to go on strike; as a reply, the students came out on strike on an even larger scale. The reactionaries forbade the students to go to Nanking for petition, but the students got there by driving the train themselves. The Kuomintang troops, civil and military police, and secret agents attacked the students, but the students snatched the weapons from their hands.

During this period, there was also an ever-expanding tide of workers' strikes in the cities. From August 1945 to September 1946, 1,920 strikes broke out in Shanghai in protest against the closing down of factories, the dismissal of workers by the capitalists and the rocketing prices. There were altogether 1,185,000 participants in these struggles, excluding those involved in the strikes of rickshawmen and the disputes settled directly between the workers and the capitalists. The strikes in Shanghai were of an even larger magnitude than those which took place at the time of the May 30 Incident in 1925. Similar strikes were launched by workers in Chungking, Tientsin, Tangshan and Chinwangtao.

The peasants were likewise organized on a broad basis. Struggles against the payment of rents, taxes, and miscellaneous levies, struggles against press-ganging, collaborationists and local bullies, and rice riots spread over the Kuomintang-controlled areas. Several hundred thousand peasants in Kiangsu, Chekiang, southern Anhwei and broad regions in Hunan took up arms and fought resolutely against the Kuomintang troops. Of the more than 130 counties in Szechuan, every single one witnessed peasant risings at one time or another. In Sikang the peasant forces numbered 500,000. Labourers, handicraft workers, city paupers and army deserters also took part in these struggles.

The struggles of the people of Taiwan figured prominently in this period. Taiwan is one of the richest provinces of China. For 50
years, the people of Taiwan had been under the rule of the Japanese invaders and longing for emancipation. After the surrender of Japan, the Kuomintang took over all the Japanese-owned enterprises and assets in Taiwan and extorted money from the people at will. The Kuomintang looked upon Taiwan as its colony and the people of Taiwan as slaves. The people were excluded from all the important posts in the economic enterprises and government bodies. Feeling that they had simply exchanged one tyrant for another, the people of Taiwan demanded autonomy and the right to manage the economic affairs of their own province. Besides, they demanded that the Kuomintang should abolish the monopoly system for the sale of certain commodities, that local people should be appointed as administrative officials in Taiwan, and so forth. Their demands were reasonable and just. On February 28, 1947, there broke out a large-scale movement for autonomy. A provisional autonomous regime was set up, and a programme for reforming the political system of Taiwan adopted.

On the mainland, the Kuomintang adopted terrorist methods to suppress all the patriotic democratic movements. On May 18, 1947, the Kuomintang government issued a decree entitled “Provisional Measures for Maintaining Social Order,” which stipulated that “emergency measures and effective steps” would be adopted in dealing with all students’, workers’ and tradesmen’s strikes, all parades and demonstrations that involved more than ten persons as well as all petitions that passed over the authorities in charge and appealed to higher organs.

Clashes between the Kuomintang troops, civil and military police and secret agents on the one side and students and citizens on the other were seen everywhere. The reactionary government resorted to all kinds of atrocious means such as arrests, confinement, beating and massacre, to cope with unarmed students and citizens. The repression, however, proved futile. The students’ patriotic movement became the vanguard of the people’s struggles in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, and won the sympathy and support of practically everyone in the land.

The Kuomintang made ineffectual attempts to suppress the peasant uprisings which had broken out in all the provinces by organizing large-scale “punitive” expeditions. But in many places the Kuomintang security corps, or even its regular army, mutinied. As a result, with every expedition, the armed forces of the peasants became still stronger and more numerous.

Against the movement for the autonomy of Taiwan, the Kuomintang adopted a policy of military terrorism. Over 10,000 people in Taiwan were butchered. Although the movement was suppressed, the enmity of the people of Taiwan against the Kuomintang reactionaries became deeper and more intense.

The anti-popular reactionaries found themselves beset by the entire people. On the political as well as on the military front, things were going badly for them. They were confronted with a grave political crisis.

Military offensives and political swindles were the two chief props used by the reactionaries to maintain their rule. However, during the period from July 1946 to June 1947, their political swindles like their military offensives also ended in complete failure.

1 By April-May 1949 the “gold-yuan” had depreciated to quotations ranging between G. Y. 3 million and 10 million to U.S. $1.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN THE THIRD REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR. NATION-WIDE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION

( July 1947—October 1949 )

1. BEGINNING OF THE NATION-WIDE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE. AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE LIBERATED AREAS. FORMATION OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC UNITED FRONT. THE PARTY'S PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR LEADING THE PEOPLE TO NATION-WIDE VICTORY

By July 1947 the total number of Kuomintang reactionary troops had been reduced from 4,300,000 at the beginning of the war to 3,700,000, while the People's Liberation Army had grown from 1,200,000 to nearly 2,000,000.

In the first year of the war, in spite of his numerical superiority, the enemy suffered a series of military setbacks, which, coupled with economic collapse and political bankruptcy, resulted in a general weakening of his fighting strength, and a lowering of morale. He was exposed to attacks in the rear and opposed by the people. On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army had gained strength from repeated victories. Its morale rose; it had the people's support and an increasingly consolidated rear. Thus the situation at the beginning of the war when the people's forces were up against such tremendously heavy odds had completely changed. The People's Liberation Army switched from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive, while the Kuomintang forces were compelled to do exactly the opposite.

This was a fundamental change in the war situation. Strategically, the people's revolutionary forces had been on the defensive for over 20 years. A shift from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive foreshadowed the impending overthrow of the reactionary rule.

The People's Liberation Army followed a policy of exterior-line operations. It started a large-scale offensive and penetrated into the Kuomintang-controlled areas, bringing the war to the Yangtse regions. This policy frustrated the criminal plan of the Kuomintang to destroy the liberated areas, linked up the extensive liberated areas and restored the relative stability of these areas. At the same time, it extended and drove the revolutionary war deep into enemy territory and enlarged the scale and influence of the revolution, thereby laying the foundation for its nation-wide victory.

The People's Liberation Army began its nation-wide offensive by crossing the Yellow River and advancing southwards.

In July 1947 the People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Area under the command of Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping crossed the Yellow River and the Lunghai Railway in its southward advance, reached the Tapieh Mountains and set up the Central Plain Liberated Area. A dagger was thus thrust into the
heart of the Kuomintang reactionary rule, that is, the area between Wuhan and Nanking. In August, another unit of the People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Area crossed the Yellow River from southern Shansi and liberated a wide area including western Honan and the border regions between Honan and Shensi, thus isolating Loyang, the enemy's chief city in western Honan and closing in upon Tungkuan.

In August the People's Liberation Army in East China under the command of Chen Yi and Su Yu directed an attack from central Shantung against the southwestern part of that province, and advancing southwards across the Lunghai Railway as far as the Huai River, isolated Kaifeng and Chengchow, two of the enemy's key points. From then on the People's Liberation Army switched to exterior-line operations and launched a large-scale offensive against the enemy on the vast plain bordering on the Yellow River in the north, the Yangtse in the south, the Han River in the west and the sea in the east.

Meanwhile the People's Liberation Army likewise started an offensive along interior lines. The People's Liberation Army in the Northwest recovered Yenan and an overwhelming part of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Liberated Area, linking up the latter with the liberated area in the east of the Yellow River. The People's Liberation Army in East China regained the bulk of Shantung, thus connecting it with the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area. Furthermore, it re-established the liberated area in eastern Anhwei and linked it with the Central Plain Liberated Area. The People's Liberation Army in the Northeast, after one year fighting, liberated 99 per cent of the territory of the Northeast and left the enemy in possession of only a few strong points. All the key points of the enemy in the North China Liberated Area, with the sole exception of Taiyuan, were taken and occupied. Thereby it became possible to integrate the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area with the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area and further link them with the Shantung Liberated Area and the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area.

Under these large-scale offensives along both interior and exterior lines, the Kuomintang troops were put to rout. In the first year of the war the enemy was forced to shift from all-out offensive to concentrated offensive, and in the second year to shift from all-out defensive to concentrated defensive. Thus the military offensive launched by the Kuomintang reactionaries under the wing of American imperialism ended in utter defeat.

One of the primary factors that contributed to the successful repulsing of the Kuomintang offensive and the speedy change of the People's Liberation Army from a defensive to an offensive strategy was the agrarian reform which had been universally carried out in the liberated areas. The Chinese Communist Party had drawn up the "Outline of the Agrarian Law" and published "How to Analyse the Classes" and "Resolutions Concerning Some Problems Arising from Agrarian Struggles." In the "Talk at the Conference of Cadres from Shansi and Suiyuan" by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and "Some Problems of Agrarian Reform" by Comrade Jen Pi-shih, and other articles, the agrarian policies of the Party were clearly defined.

The "Outline of Agrarian Law" stipulated the abolition of the feudal and semi-feudal land system and the realization of the principle of land to the tillers.

In agrarian reform, it was of primary importance to rely firmly
on the poor peasants and farm labourers and help them to get organized, so that they would become the backbone of the movement. It was also necessary to unite with the middle peasants and encourage them to rally closely round the poor peasants and farm labourers so as to form a solid worker-peasant alliance. The correct procedure for mobilizing the peasant masses was to carry out thoroughgoing ideological and educational work among them on the basis of their own experiences; to go into their midst and form the closest of ties with the activists among the poor peasants and farm labourers, and through them to get the masses moving; and to adopt a policy of gradual expansion and intensification in promoting the advance of the peasant movement. In uniting with the middle peasants, the following principles were to be observed. Great care must be taken, while determining the class status of the peasants, not to make the mistake of classifying a middle peasant as a rich peasant. The opinions of the middle peasants were to be taken into consideration in the equal distribution of land, and concessions made to them if they objected to any arrangement. They could be allowed to retain a large acreage of land than the average portion allotted to the poor peasants. The activists among the middle peasants were to be encouraged to work in peasant associations and local governments; and fair play was to be observed in levying land tax and assigning war duties and services.

As to the rich peasants, their surplus land and property were to be confiscated. For rich peasants of the old type were in general strongly tainted with feudal exploitation and the conditions under which their labourers worked were, likewise, feudal. The land in their possession was fairly extensive and better than the average. Moreover, at that time the outcome of the revolutionary war was still uncertain, and the rich peasants were inclined to sympathize with the reactionaries, while the needs of the people's war called for large contributions from the peasants in the way of military service, grain supplies, and voluntary labour so as to bring about its victorious conclusion.

Agrarian reform aimed at the elimination of the feudal landlords as a class, but not at wiping them out as individuals. To eliminate them as a class, it was necessary to proceed step by step and with discrimination. The movement was to begin by striking down the local bullies, settling accounts and reducing rents and interests and go on to carry out agrarian reform only when the conditions—political atmosphere, masses, and cadres and so forth—were ripe. Distinction was to be made between landlords and rich peasants, between big landlords and middle and small landlords, and between the common run of landlords and those who were local bullies. Each category was to be treated differently within the framework of land reform.

Land was to be distributed in the following way: all the public land and the land owned by the landlords was to be taken over by the local peasant association and, together with the rest of the land in the locality, redistributed equally on a per-capita basis. An overall readjustment of landholdings with regard to both quantity and quality was to be made so that every person in the locality should become the owner of a parcel of land roughly equal to that of the next.

Within a year of the promulgation of the "Outline of Agrarian Law," 100 million peasants in the liberated areas received land.
After the agrarian reform, the Party led the peasants in a movement for mutual aid and co-operation on a voluntary basis in order to restore and develop agricultural production. Agrarian reform not only laid the foundation for raising agricultural production but provided conditions for industrial development in the liberated areas. Having obtained land, the peasants enthusiastically participated in the war and gave active support to the war of liberation. As a result, agrarian reform further consolidated the rear of the People's Liberation Army and paved the way for its switch from the defensive to the offensive. It likewise laid the political foundation for the nation-wide victory of the revolutionary war.

Simultaneously with the agrarian reform, the Chinese Communist Party led all its members in a rectification campaign to tidy up its organizations at the grass-roots level, improve the working style of Party members in the rural areas and expel the alien elements. This was a decisive step in solving the agrarian problem and supporting the war of the people's liberation. Only by preserving the purity of the Party, getting rid of the alien elements and overcoming bad working style, could the Party stand on the side of the broadest masses of the labouring people and lead them forward. Only by so doing could the Party's agrarian policies be resolutely and correctly carried out and the rear of the People's Liberation Army be firmly consolidated.

In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the patriotic democratic movement, organized and influenced by the Chinese Communist Party and with the student movement in the van, opened up a second front for the people's revolution and formed a part of the swelling tide of the nation-wide revolution.

During the first year of the strategic offensive by the People's Liberation Army, the patriotic movement continued to expand in the Kuomintang-controlled areas. By May 1948, the campaign against U.S. support of the resurgence of Japanese aggressive forces had taken on a nation-wide character. Hundreds of thousands of students, teachers and staff members took part in the struggle and won the profound sympathy and warm support of the people of all walks of life. The people of the whole country placed their hopes in the Chinese Communist Party and looked forward to the complete victory of the people's revolutionary war.

On October 10, 1947 the Chinese People's Liberation Army issued a manifesto in which the slogan "Down with Chiang Kai-shek! Liberate the whole country!" was put forward. The slogan was aimed at destroying the reactionary Kuomintang state apparatus and its whole foundation. The Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army called on the people all over the country to carry the new-democratic revolution to its successful end. First, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, all those who were opposed to imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism were to unite and establish a people's democratic regime to replace the feudal-comprador fascist regime. Secondly, the entire basis of the reactionary Kuomintang regime was to be smashed, bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises confiscated and the feudal agrarian system abolished.

Were there still at this juncture people who remained skeptical about the line of new-democratic revolution adopted by the Chinese Communist Party? Yes, there were. At the outbreak of the war, a section of the national bourgeoisie and the upper strata of the
intellectuals in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, with Chang Po-chun and Lo Lung-chi as their representatives, had doubted the future of the new-democratic revolution led by the Party, opposed the Party’s policies and cherished illusions about the Kuomintang and the United States Government.

They had clung to a “neutral,” “independent and third-party” stand and sought for a reformist middle road between revolution and counter-revolution, fondly hoping that the middle-of-the-roaders would occupy a completely independent position and be courted by both sides, and that through the adoption of a reformist political line, national independence and democracy could be achieved under the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang which had the full backing of the U.S. imperialists. In other words, they had hoped to realize their aim by preserving the reactionary Kuomintang state apparatus and its entire foundation.

However, when the People’s Liberation Army began its all-out offensive and carried the war into the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the Kuomintang reactionaries became more rampant in their use of terrorist methods and deprived not merely the Communist Party but all other democratic parties of their legal status. Thereupon the third road went bankrupt. The order issued on October 27, 1947 by the Kuomintang government dissolving the China Democratic League tolled the knell of the third road.

After the dissolution of the China Democratic League, the middle-of-the-road political bodies re-grouped themselves. In the spring of 1948 several democratic organizations within the Kuomintang combined to form the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. A new headquarters of the Democratic League was established in Hongkong by leading personages of that organization who stood for co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party and against the reactionary policies of the Kuomintang and the U.S. policy of aggression towards China. At about the same time other democratic parties, too, began to adopt a relatively more positive political attitude. But Chang Po-chun, Lo Lung-chi and their ilk still clung to their reactionary third-road stand.

Conditions were gradually becoming ripe for a national revolutionary united front of various democratic parties and groups, with the Chinese Communist Party taking the lead.

On May 1, 1948 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party proposed in its May Day slogans the convocation of a new people’s political consultative conference, with no reactionary elements taking part in it, to discuss the establishment of a democratic coalition government. The Party’s proposal gained the support of the people all over the country. All the democratic parties sent messages in favour of the convocation of such a conference. Thus the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which was first convened in September 1949, became the organizational form of the people’s democratic united front.

The Chinese people’s revolution had entered a new stage. The time was ripe, both in a military and a political sense, for the Chinese people to win a nation-wide victory. To prepare for the forthcoming new and greater victory, the Central Committee of the Party held on December 25, 1947 a meeting in northern Shensi, at which Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a report entitled “The Present Situation and Our Tasks.” In that report, he correctly analysed the current situation of the revolutionary war and proposed the military,
political and economic tasks of the Chinese Communist Party essential to the winning of a still greater victory in the revolutionary war.

To begin with, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the Chinese people's revolutionary war had reached a historic turning-point in that the People's Liberation Army had passed from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive. The main force of the People's Liberation Army had already thrust itself into the Kuomintang-controlled areas and fighting was being carried on chiefly there rather than in the liberated areas. The Chinese People's Liberation Army had shattered the counter-revolutionary plans of U.S. imperialism and Kuomintang reaction, while placing the people's revolution on the way to victory. This was the turning-point from development to extinction of Chiang Kai-shek's 20-year counter-revolutionary rule, and of the imperialist rule in China which had lasted for over 100 years. The change was of great importance. Since armed struggle was the chief form of the Chinese revolution, a strategic switch from the defensive to the offensive by the People's Liberation Army was evidence that the Chinese revolution was soon bound to win a nation-wide victory. This would come as a great inspiration to all the oppressed nations of the world, particularly of the East, and render them great support.

Secondly, he summed up the chief method by which the People's Liberation Army would defeat the Kuomintang. In every campaign, forces would need to be concentrated in overwhelming numbers to annihilate in mobile warfare the enemy's manpower step by step, with full preparation and absolute certainty. During the second year of the war, the People's Liberation Army had already taken a number of small and medium-sized cities, such as Shihchiachuang, Szeiping, Loyang, Kaifeng and so forth, learned the tactics of storming strongholds and built up its own artillery and engineer units. On the basis of this experience, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out emphatically and in good time that the People's Liberation Army was in the future to stress positional warfare and the art of storming fortresses in preparation for taking more cities. Cities were to be taken step by step and with discrimination—first the small and medium-sized ones, then the big ones; first those cities where the enemy defence was weak, then, at the opportune moment, those where the enemy defence was fairly strong, and finally, when conditions became ripe, those where the enemy defence was very strong.

Thirdly, he gave important instructions about the agrarian reform and the Party's rectification campaign which were then being carried on. The basic principles of agrarian reform were to satisfy the demands of the poor peasants and farm labourers, which was the most fundamental task of agrarian reform, and to unite firmly with the middle peasants whose interests should not be impaired. Only by holding steadfastly to these two fundamental principles could agrarian reform be successfully accomplished and the deviation of jeopardizing the interests of the middle peasants—a deviation which was already in evidence—be corrected in time.

To consolidate the organizations of the Party, to comb out alien elements and rectify bad working style within the Party so as to enable the Party to stand on the same side as the broadest labouring masses and lead them in their advance—this was a vital factor in solving the land problem and rallying support for the revolutionary war.
Fourthly, with the rapid development of the revolutionary war, more cities would be liberated. To gain a greater victory, the Party should have, in addition to a correct agrarian policy, a correct urban policy. In the report the economic programme of the Party was clearly defined. To turn over to the peasants the land confiscated from the feudal landlord class; to turn over to the people's republic the bureaucrat capital owned chiefly by the "Four Big Families"; and to give protection to national industry and commerce—these were the three main planks in the economic programme of the new-democratic revolution.

Bureaucrat-capitalism represented by the "Four Big Families" was the economic basis of the reactionary Kuomintang regime. It reached its heyday during the anti-Japanese war and after the surrender of Japan, and provided adequate material conditions for the new-democratic revolution. For it was precisely the Party's policy to confiscate bureaucrat capital and turn it over to the people's republic, and to change bureaucrat-capitalist economy into socialist economy. The objective of the new-democratic revolution was to overthrow imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism, but not to eliminate capitalism in general. Owing to the economic backwardness of China, it was necessary, even after the revolution had won a nationwide victory, to allow small and medium-sized capitalist enterprises to exist for a fairly long period and, according to the division of work in the national economy, to develop those sections which were beneficial to national welfare and the people's livelihood. There would be no danger in allowing the existence and development of small and medium-sized capitalist enterprises, as through the confiscation of bureaucrat capital, the people's state would hold in its own hands a huge state economy of a socialist character which would control the main economic arteries of the whole nation. This state economy would be of decisive significance and would play a leading role in the economic life of the people's state.

The report pointed out clearly the reactionary political tendency of the national bourgeoisie and the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, and the protective policy that the Party had adopted towards these classes in the economic field. To fight their reactionary political tendencies was not the same as to eliminate them economically and the two things should by no means be confused. These classes were to be resolutely protected in all regions where the new-democratic state power existed. A number of cadres in the Party were severely criticized for the mistake of adopting an excessively "Left" policy towards small and medium-sized capitalist enterprises.

Fifthly, he pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people had won a great victory on the political front in that the revolutionary united front had expanded further and become more consolidated than ever before. As the crimes of the U.S. imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries had been fully exposed in the eyes of the Chinese people, as the Chinese Communist Party had carried out correct agrarian and urban policies, and as the People's Liberation Army had won a great victory, the Party had gained the confidence of the people throughout the country. This was the basis for the expansion and consolidation of the revolutionary united front. It would be impossible for the new-democratic revolution of China to succeed without a broad united front comprising the overwhelming majority of the entire population. Moreover, no
victory could possibly be won if this united front was not placed under the firm and strong leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The Central Committee of the Party reminded the whole Party of a lesson from past experience. In 1927 when the revolution was at a high point, the capitulationists in the leading body of the Party had renounced leadership of the revolution, thus causing it to be defeated. On the other hand, during the period of the anti-Japanese war, as capitulationism was combated in the Party and the principle that the proletariat should keep its independence and initiative in the Anti-Japanese United Front was adhered to, the great victory of the War of Resistance was ensured.

The report was an important piece of preparatory work on the part of the Chinese Communist Party in leading the people to strive for a nation-wide victory under the new revolutionary conditions. It defined the various basic policies to be adopted by the Party after the war had shifted from the defensive to the offensive: policies regarding military affairs, agrarian reform, consolidation of the Party, economic matters and the united front. The report thus constituted a programme of action on which the Party could lead the entire people to final victory.

2. THE PARTY'S POLICIES CONCERNING NEWLY LIBERATED AREAS AND CITIES. STRENGTHENING THE DISCIPLINE OF THE PARTY AND PUTTING THE PARTY COMMITTEE SYSTEM ON A SOUND BASIS

Following its switch to the offensive, the People's Liberation Army liberated broad areas and a great number of cities in quick succession and established the Central Plain Liberated Area with a population of 30 million. At that time there was a total population of over 160 million in the liberated areas. With the great progress made by the People's Liberation Army in the art of storming fortifications, many medium-sized cities were recovered or liberated, including such strongly garrisoned cities as Anshan, Szeping in the Northeast, Weihsiien in Shantung, Shihchiachuang in Hopei, Yuncheng and Linfen in Shansi, Paochi in Shensi, Kaifeng and Loyang in Honan, and Hsiangyang in Hupeh.

The Central Committee of the Party called on the whole Party to pay great attention to the study and correct implementation of the policies towards newly liberated areas and cities. To formulate the policy towards new areas and have it carried out, the Central Committee pointed out the following basic working method for the whole Party to follow: to analyse concretely the specific conditions of various areas so as to set the tasks and decide on the working method to be used according to these conditions. A distinction was to be drawn between the city and the countryside, old and semi-old liberated areas, guerrilla areas and newly liberated areas.

Regarding the newly liberated areas and cities, it was necessary to be sure that they could be firmly held. If the answer was yes, then the following questions should, first of all, be attended to. On the one hand, for the purpose of establishing the people's democratic state power, all counter-revolutionary armed forces were to be absolutely wiped out, all counter-revolutionary organizations disbanded, and their ringleaders arrested, and bureaucrat capital and the properties of the chief counter-revolutionaries confiscated; on
the other hand, effective protection was to be given to all law-abiding national industrial and commercial enterprises and to all public and private properties not on the confiscation list. To maintain social order and avoid chaos, as many as possible of the employees in the economic, educational and cultural departments of the Kuomintang government were to be kept on. Necessary social reforms were to be carried out step by step according to the degree of political awakening and organization of the masses.

The task and method of social reforms in the cities should differ entirely from those of agrarian reform in the countryside. In carrying out social reforms in newly liberated cities, the over-riding task was to confiscate bureaucrat capital. The confiscated bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises were not to be broken up but kept intact, and every effort was to be made to ensure that they should continue or resume production. The key to resumption and development of production in the city was to rely on the working class. Therefore it was imperative to carry out democratic reforms in all public and private enterprises, appropriately raise the position of the workers and ensure their livelihood.

Three conditions were required for carrying out agrarian reform in the newly liberated areas. (1) Reactionary armed forces should be completely eliminated and peace and order restored in the neighbourhood. (2) There should be a demand for the distribution of land on the part of the overwhelming majority of the basic section of the masses. (3) The Party should have a sufficient number of cadres capable of correctly leading the local agrarian reform. When agrarian reform was completed, the right of landownership was to be defined, and the people’s burden readjusted and lightened. Whenever possible, help should be given to the peasants so as to enable them to develop agricultural production. In those areas where conditions for agrarian reform were not yet mature, a social policy of reduction of rent and interest and readjustment of grain-and-seed supply as well as a financial policy of equitable taxation should be carried out so as to win over or neutralize all the social forces that could be won over or kept neutral. This was necessary for exterminating the Kuomintang armed forces and smashing the ruling landlords.

Following the rapid victory in the revolutionary war, the Party had established its rule in a number of areas with a total population of over 160 million, many of which had been linked up. Furthermore, the day was approaching when the Party would be the leading party of the people's democratic state power of the whole nation. In order to hold what had already been won and achieve nation-wide victory it was of primary significance to strengthen Party discipline.

The revolutionary situation throughout the country demanded complete unification of Party policies on political, military and economic affairs.

Accordingly, the Central Committee of the Party issued instructions in January 1948, demanding that the whole Party should strengthen discipline and establish a system for local organizations to report at regular intervals to the Central Committee.

At the same time, the Central Committee also took a decision to put the Party committee system on a sound basis. It demanded that Party committees at all levels should practise collective leadership and get rid of the error found in certain leading bodies of the Party of individuals taking everything into their own hands.
and solving important problems entirely on their own. The decision pointed out that the Party committee system was an important system to ensure collective leadership and prevent individuals from taking everything into their own hands. All important problems were to be fully discussed in the Party committee and separately dealt with after definite decisions were reached. On the other hand, neither collective leadership nor individual responsibility was to be stressed to the exclusion of the other.

These instructions of the Central Committee of the Party were promptly carried out. As a result, the whole Party was greatly unified, its leadership more centralized and its ties with the masses were further strengthened.

The conference held in December 1947 by the Central Committee and the work accomplished later by the Party provided the necessary conditions for the Party to lead the people to nation-wide victory.


In the third year of the war, another radical change occurred in the war situation. Nation-wide victory for the Chinese people's revolution had become a certainty as a result of three major campaigns launched by the People's Liberation Army, in which the main forces of the reactionary Kuomintang army were completely annihilated. They were the Liaoehi-Shenyang Campaign, the Huai-Hai Campaign and the Peking-Tientsin Campaign.

First, the PLA in East China launched on September 16, 1948 a campaign against Tsinan, capital of Shantung Province. Tsinan, a city of strategic importance, had a population of 700,000, a Kuomintang garrison numbering over 100,000 and many modern fortifications. The terrain there was favourable for defence, but unfavourable for attack. However, after eight days of continual attack by the PLA the city was completely liberated. This was the beginning of the large-scale encirclement and annihilation of the enemy's main forces and the liberation of the big cities. The liberation of Tsinan demonstrated convincingly that no defensive plan could hold against the People's Liberation Army.

From September 12 to November 2, 1948 the PLA in Northeast China started the gigantic Liaoehi-Shenyang Campaign. First it liberated Chinchow, severing the connecting-link between the enemy units in the Northeast and those south of the Great Wall and blocking the enemy's retreat overland. Then followed the liberation of Changchun. The enemy in the Shenyang area began fleeing to western Liaoning and was totally annihilated in the area of the Tahu and Black Mountains. Thus Shenyang and the whole territory of Northeast China were liberated. The Northeast, where lay the most important industrial cities and the most richly productive regions of the whole country, came permanently into the possession of the people. In the Liaoehi-Shenyang Campaign, over 470,000 Kuomintang troops were put out of action. It was a decisive
victory in the people's revolutionary war, for it marked the beginning of the PLA's quantitative as well as qualitative superiority over the enemy. The total military strength of the enemy was reduced to 2,900,000, while the PLA grew to 3,000,000.

By this time the various field army units of the PLA in Northwest China, the Central Plain, East China and Northeast China had been reorganized respectively into the First, Second, Third and Fourth Field Armies, each commanding several army corps. These units went through unified reorganization together with the three army corps in North China under the direct command of the General Headquarters of the PLA.

From November 7, 1948 to January 10, 1949, the Second and Third Field Armies jointly launched the great Huai-Hai Campaign. In the Nienchuang area east of Hsuehwei in Kiangsu the PLA completely destroyed the enemy army corps, 170,000 strong, under Huang Potaos command. Huang himself was killed in action. Then in the neighbourhood of Shuangtulicf1 southwest of Shuhsien in northern Kiangsu, over 120,000 men of Huang Wei's army corps which had come post-haste from Central China for reinforcement were encircled and smashed, with Huang Wei himself taken prisoner. Three other army corps, over 250,000 strong, under the command of Tu Yu-ming, abandoned Hsuehwei and fled towards Yungcheng in eastern Honan. They were destroyed in the northeast of Yungcheng, and Tu Yu-ming was captured. This campaign lasted two months and five days. The PLA put over 550,000 crack enemy troops out of action, liberated all the areas north of the Huai River and brought the greater part of the areas south of it under control. This was another great decisive victory in the people's revolutionary war. Enemy remnants in East China and the Central Plain north of the Yangtse hastened to withdraw and flee to the south of the river. Thus the Kuomin­tang's ruling centres—Nanking and Shanghai—were exposed to attack.

Meanwhile from December 5, 1948 to January 31, 1949, the Fourth Field Army and the Second Army Corps in North China launched the great Peking-Tientsin Campaign. Prior to this campaign, the PLA had encircled the enemy in certain isolated cities, such as Tientsin, Peking and Changchiakou. First Changchiakou was taken. Then the PLA started a general offensive against Tientsin, after the proposal for the peaceful liberation of that city had been rejected by Chen Chang-chieh, commander of the enemy troops defending the city. It did not take much longer than two days for Tientsin, the first industrial and commercial city of North China, to be entirely liberated—an event which took place on January 15. Over 130,000 reactionary Kuomintang troops were routed, and Chen Chang-chieh was taken captive. On the other hand, the 200,000 enemy troops defending Peking under the command of Fu Tso-yi accepted the proposal of peaceful reorganization by the PLA. The liberation of Peking, ancient capital of China, was announced on January 31, 1949. In the Peking-Tientsin Campaign, the enemy forces put out of action in addition to those reorganized reached a total of 520,000.

The talks for Peking's peaceful liberation had started as soon as the PLA laid siege to that city. But right up to the eve of Tientsin's liberation, the enemy troops in Peking had consistently refused to accept the terms of their peaceful reorganisation. Owing to the mighty strength of the PLA, the rapid liberation of Tientsin, the low morale of the enemy officers and men and the resolute support
for peace by the broad masses in Peking, the peaceful liberation of Peking was eventually realized. The peaceful liberation of Peking was the first great victory of the policy to end the war by peaceful means which the Party had advocated. This victory pointed the way to the liberation of the areas south of the Yangtse and of other areas as well.

By the end of the three big campaigns, the People's Liberation Army had smashed over 1,500,000 Kuomintang crack troops, and liberated the whole of the Northeast, the greater part of North China and vast areas north of the lower Yangtse, thus gaining a decisive military victory. From a political and economic point of view, the Kuomintang was also divided, torn, and on the verge of total collapse. Such a state of affairs was very favourable to the southward drive of the People's Liberation Army across the Yangtse River to liberate the whole country. It was perfectly plain that with a few more large-scale offensives against the remnant Kuomintang troops, the entire reactionary ruling machine of the Kuomintang would be shattered.

The crisis of the Kuomintang rule gave rise to greater contradictions in the ranks of the reactionaries. Chiang Kai-shek found it difficult to maintain his rule. The local Kuomintang military chieftains of Hopei, Chahar, Shantung, Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Kwangsi and Hunan for self-preservation hoped to maintain semi-independence in their own areas and to obtain American aid by virtue of this semi-independence. Li Tsung-jen was elected "Vice-President" at the bogus National Assembly convened in the spring of 1948 with the support of Hu Shih and other pro-American intellectuals and a number of Kuomintang bigwigs. The U.S. Government, however, realized that the forced "retirement" of Chiang Kai-shek would only hasten the disintegration of the Kuomintang. If it were not to back up Chiang Kai-shek, who else would it back? On this question the U.S. Government had no definite policy. Nor could it decide whether the Kuomintang reactionaries should go on fighting or ask for peace talks. Thus with the crumbling and disintegration of the Kuomintang reactionary government, U.S. policy towards China also went completely bankrupt.

Under these complicated circumstances Chiang Kai-shek issued on New Year's Day, 1949, a message asking for peace. He proposed to the Chinese people the following conditions as a basis for peace talks: maintenance of the state power of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie; recognition of the legitimacy of the bogus regime of the Kuomintang reactionaries and the bogus constitution; preservation of the reactionary Kuomintang army and so forth.

These overtures were patently designed to win a brief respite which would enable Chiang to make preparations for a renewed attack upon the revolutionary forces with a view to stamping them out. In a statement on the current situation made on January 14, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek's terms aimed at continuing the war and consequently were no peace terms at all. He further pointed out that, although the Chinese People's Liberation Army was fully justified in and completely capable of wiping out the remnant armed forces of the reactionary Kuomintang government within a short space of time, yet, in order to hasten the conclusion of the war, attain genuine peace and alleviate the sufferings of the people, the Chinese Communist Party was willing to negotiate peace with the Kuomintang government in Nanking as
well as local Kuomintang governments and military groups on the basis of the following eight conditions: (1) punishment of war criminals; (2) renouncement of the legitimacy of the bogus regime; (3) abolition of the bogus constitution; (4) reorganization of all reactionary troops on democratic principles; (5) confiscation of bureaucrat capital; (6) implementation of agrarian reform; (7) annulment of treaties betraying national interests; and (8) convocation of a political consultative conference with no reactionary elements participating, and establishment of a democratic coalition government which would take over all the power of the reactionary Kuomintang Nanking government and its subordinate governments at all levels. The Chinese Communist Party considered that only by the fulfilment of these eight conditions could there be genuine peace. If these conditions should be rejected by the Kuomintang reactionaries, it would prove that the "peace" they were after was nothing but a deception.

As was expected, with the proposal of these eight conditions, Chiang Kai-shek's "peace offensive" was shown up for what it was. On January 21, at the suggestion of the United States, Chiang Kai-shek announced his "retirement," as being "unable for certain reasons to tend to matters of state," handed over his duties to "Vice-President" Li Tsung-jen to act on his behalf. This was in fact a "division of labour" devised by the U.S. imperialists. With Li Tsung-jen now playing the "peace-maker," Chiang Kai-shek could sneak backstage to make war preparations. Before "leaving his post," Chiang Kai-shek had made new arrangements for carrying on the counter-revolutionary war and installed a number of his henchmen in Taiwan, Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung and Szechuan. He had appointed Chen Cheng governor of Taiwan Province to replace Wei Tao-ming. Part of the gold bars and silver ingots in the hands of the Kuomintang government had been sent to Taiwan and Amoy, and the state treasury and ammunition dump in Taiwan were all placed under Chiang's personal control. Besides, he had ordered Chang Chun to muster reactionary forces in the southwestern provinces for continued resistance. Living in "retirement" in Fenghua, his native place in Chekiang, Chiang made even more frenzied preparations for war, even going to the length of working out a criminal plan for enlisting two and a half million recruits in the hope of replenishing his shattered troops. In short, Chiang Kai-shek still exercised actual control over the Kuomintang government, its finances and army.

On the other hand, Li Tsung-jen pretended to accept the eight conditions proposed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung as the basis for peace talks. Thereupon the Central Committee of the Party decided to form a delegation headed by Comrade Chou En-lai to hold these talks, which began on April 1. As the reactionary Nanking government was solely responsible for starting the counter-revolutionary civil war, it had long forfeited the right to represent the Chinese people. However, it was allowed to send delegates to participate in peace talks because it was still in possession of some reactionary armed forces. If it had realized that its remnant forces could no longer offer any resistance, and consequently consented to a settlement through negotiations on the basis of the eight conditions, then the people would have undergone less suffering and the people's revolutionary cause would have been benefited.

At the end of half a month of negotiations the delegation of the
Chinese Communist Party put forward the Final Revised Agreement on Internal Peace, which was based on the eight conditions. The first article concerning the punishment of war criminals contained in the agreement provided that “all war criminals who prove themselves truly repentant by choosing correctly between right and wrong and performing deeds that benefit the cause of the war of liberation and facilitate the peaceful settlement of internal problems shall be removed from the list of war criminals and given lenient treatment.” This extremely generous stipulation made it possible for all war criminals, except Chiang Kai-shek and his die-hard accomplices, to atone for their crimes by performing meritorious acts. This was the last chance offered them by the Chinese people to turn over a new leaf. The Agreement was, however, rejected by the Nanking government on April 21.

The rejection was clear evidence that the Kuomintang reactionaries were determined to carry to the very end the counter-revolutionary war they had started. Thus the peace intrigue of the Kuomintang was completely exposed.

On April 21, 1949 the Chinese People’s Liberation Army advanced across the Yangtse as well as towards Northwest China in order to liberate the entire country. The People’s Liberation Army consented to sign regional peace agreements with those local Kuomintang governments and military cliques who were willing to stop the war and come to a settlement by peaceful means. It did not take the invincible People’s Liberation Army more than three days of fighting to cross the Yangtse and liberate Nanking, which had been the centre of the Kuomintang’s reactionary rule for 22 years. The liberation of Nanking marked the end of the reactionary Kuomintang rule. Then the People’s Liberation Army pushed forward valiantly along the two battle fronts (south of Yangtse and the Northwest) mopping up enemy remnants. Taiyuan, Hangchow, Wuhan, Sian, Shanghai, Lanchow, Canton, Kweiyang, Kweilin, Chunching and Chengtu were successively liberated. The provinces of Hunan, Suiyuan, Sinkiang, Sikang and Yunnan were liberated by peaceful means. By the end of 1949, with the sole exception of Tibet, the entire mainland of China had been liberated.

After the great Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peking-Tientsin Campaigns, the days of the Kuomintang reactionaries were already numbered. Under the circumstances of new victories, the Seventh Central Committee of the Party held its Second Plenary Session in March 1949, at which decisions were made on the basic policies of the Party for securing nation-wide victory as well as on those to be adopted subsequent to that victory.

It was pointed out at the session that after nation-wide victory the centre of Party’s work should be shifted from the countryside to the cities. Since the failure of the First Revolutionary Civil War in 1927 the Party, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, had temporarily transferred the centre of its work from the cities to the countryside and set up revolutionary bases and accumulated revolutionary force in the countryside for encircling and eventually seizing the cities. After over 20 years of arduous struggle, this task was now accomplished. Henceforth the centre of Party’s work was to be shifted from the countryside to the cities and the cities would lead the countryside.

Such a shift would give rise to many new problems which
demanded solution. The Party had yet to learn how to manage administrative affairs and undertake the construction of a city. Owing to long residence in the countryside, it was not familiar with the central task in the city which was to restore and develop industrial production. It had yet to learn the technique of production and the methods of management. It had also to learn commerce, banking and other kinds of work which were closely related to production. Only by restoring and developing production in the cities could the people's regime be consolidated. The key to city administration and construction was to rely on the working class. For a long time, with its centre of work placed in the countryside, the Party had been separated geographically from the working class. To do city work well, it was imperative to rely whole-heartedly on the Party's own class and unite with other urban labouring people, intellectuals and the national bourgeoisie in order to defeat the enemy and build cities that belonged to the people. Industry was to be developed in the following order: first, state-owned enterprises; second, private-owned capitalist enterprises; and third, handicrafts.

It was further pointed out at the session that the tasks subsequent to the nation-wide victory of the revolution should be to rapidly restore and develop production, to cope with foreign imperialism and to transform China step by step from an agricultural country into an industrial one, from a new-democratic state into a socialist state. Accordingly, the session defined the correct economic policy which the Party was to adopt for the fulfilment of these tasks.

The Party's economic policy after the victory of the revolution was based upon the actual condition, namely, that industry constituted only about 10 per cent of the national economy of China as a whole while agriculture constituted about 90 per cent. This was the economy of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. It formed the basic starting-point from which the Party should proceed in considering all problems during a fairly long period after the victory of the Chinese revolution.

First, though its output made up only about 10 per cent of the total volume of production in the national economy, China's modern industry was extremely concentrated, the most essential and largest amount of capital being in the hands of the Chinese bureaucrat-capitalists. By confiscating this capital after the victory of the revolution and turning it over to the people's republic under the leadership of the proletariat, all the key industries would be placed under the control of the people's republic and a leading sector of economy which was socialist in character would be established in the national economy as a whole. Whoever overlooked this point would be liable to commit errors of Right opportunism.

Secondly, scattered agriculture and handicrafts which were based on individual ownership accounted for about 90 per cent of the national economy and would still retain their basic characteristics for a fairly long period. Whoever overlooked this point would be liable to commit "Left" opportunist errors. On the other hand, it would be wrong to let things drift; for scattered agriculture and handicrafts based on individual ownership should and could cautiously, gradually yet actively be induced to develop in the direction of modernization and collectivization. It was imperative to make
great efforts to organize, promote and develop co-operative economy with a view to guiding the labouring people in gradually transforming an individual economy into a collective one. Only in this way could the gradual transition to socialist society and the consolidation of proletarian leadership of the state power be effected. Whoever overlooked this point would be liable to commit Right opportunist errors.

Thirdly, China's private capitalism was likewise a force to be reckoned with. As the national bourgeoisie of China and its representatives had participated in the people's democratic revolution and as China's economy was backward, the active service of the urban and rural bourgeoisie should be engaged to the fullest extent to promote the development of the national economy after the victory of the revolution. But capitalism, free competition and free trade needed restriction to keep them from growing to inordinate proportions. This restrictive policy towards private capitalism was bound to meet with opposition of varying degrees and diverse forms from the bourgeoisie. Consequently restriction and resistance to restriction would be the main form of class struggle within a country under the people's democratic dictatorship. It would be entirely erroneous to think that there was no need to restrict capitalism. This would be a Right opportunist viewpoint. On the other hand, to think that private capitalism might be eliminated very quickly was also erroneous.

Under the leadership of the state-owned socialist economy, to transform individual economy by means of the co-operative and to transform private capitalist economy by means of state-capitalism—this was the relationship between the five economic sectors of the people's republic.

The political leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the working class, and the leading position of the state-owned socialist economy controlled by the working class in the national economy, would ensure China's steady transition to socialism.

These principles laid the foundation for the economic policy formulated later in the Common Programme.

Finally, it was pointed out at this session that the achievement of nation-wide victory would be but the first step in a long march of ten thousand li and that the way ahead would be longer, the work greater and more arduous. After the victory of the new-democratic revolution, two basic contradictions would continue to exist in China—the contradiction between the Chinese people and the imperialists in the international sphere and the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie within the country. Therefore all members of the Party were urged to enhance their political vigilance and keep a cool head, an unassuming attitude and a working style that defied all hardships and difficulties. After the smashing of all armed enemies, there would still be enemies who carried no arms, and they would inevitably put up a desperate struggle in a hidden way. Therefore, these enemies should by no means be underrated. Members of the Party were also called upon to maintain constant vigilance against the bourgeoisie's "sugar-coated bullets," otherwise they would be weakened or corrupted by their unprincipled flattery.

At this session an analysis was made of the various sectors of economy which would be present in the country after the victory of
the revolution. The leading position of the state-owned economy of
a socialist character in the national economy was emphasized, and
a series of specific policies which the Party was to adopt towards
the various economic sectors were laid down. It was on this basis
that the fundamental principles for China's transition to socialism
were formulated.

4. THE PARTY'S THEORY OF THE STATE UNDER THE
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP LED BY THE
WORKING CLASS. CONVOCATION OF THE CHINESE
PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE AND
FORMULATION OF THE COMMON PROGRAMME. FOUNDING
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. WORLD SIGNIFI-
CANCE OF THE VICTORY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

In 1949 the People's Liberation Army wiped out the remnant
military forces of the Kuomintang reactionaries as swiftly and
irresistibly as the autumn wind sweeps away fallen leaves. The
revolution had won a basic victory in the whole country. Under the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party the democratic parties
and representatives from various walks of life took part in the
preparatory work for the convocation of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference and the founding of the People's Republic
of China. The situation posed a number of questions, which the
Chinese Communist Party had to answer. What kind of state would
the People's Republic of China be? What would be the positions
and interrelations of the different classes in such a state? And,
finally, what would be its future? These questions were satisfactorily
answered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his essay entitled "On People's
Democratic Dictatorship," which was published on July 1, 1949.

In nature, the People's Republic of China would be a people's demo-
cratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class through
the Communist Party and based upon the alliance of the workers and
peasants. It was only after having gone through infinite toil that
the Chinese people had discovered this path. Since China's defeat
in the Opium War of 1840, progressives among the Chinese people
had exerted themselves to learn the way of national salvation from
the Western capitalist countries. From that time until a few years
after the Revolution of 1911, they had consistently sought a way
out for China according to the pattern of a bourgeois republic and
in the direction of capitalism. But it had proved impossible to
establish a bourgeois republic and a capitalist society in China,
because the Chinese bourgeoisie was incapable of leading the
people to victory over foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism.
Consequently the programme for bourgeois democracy and for a
bourgeois republic had become bankrupt in the eyes of the Chinese
people.

It was not until after the October Socialist Revolution that Chinese
progressives began to take note of the decline of capitalism and the
glorious prospects of socialism. This convinced them that socialism,
not capitalism, would be the way out for China. Since its founding
in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party had shouldered the respon-
sibility of leading the people's democratic revolution, that is, the new-democratic revolution. After passing through four revolutionary wars, the great victory of the people's revolution was achieved in 1949. This victory showed that the path from new democracy to socialism was the only way for China's liberation, and a people's republic under the leadership of the working class the only form of state to be set up in China. History had proved that bourgeois democracy would give way to people's democracy under the leadership of the working class and the bourgeois republic to the people's republic. For this reason, the nature of the People's Republic of China would be that of the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance.

The people's democratic dictatorship would be a class alliance of a definite type. The basis of this dictatorship would be an alliance between the working class and the peasantry. The broad masses of the peasants would play a very active part in the socialist revolution, and agriculture would provide a basis for the development of industry in socialist construction. Therefore it would be necessary to rely upon such an alliance during the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. Without a worker-peasant alliance it would not be possible to realize socialism.

The people's democratic dictatorship would also include an alliance between the labouring people and the non-labouring people, i.e. between the working class and the national bourgeoisie. In the people's republic, more representatives of the national bourgeoisie and its parties than during the period of the revolutionary bases would join the government, and would continue to maintain a political alliance with the working class and the Communist Party in the building of socialism. The national bourgeoisie had in the past developed modern industry, led the democratic revolution of the old type, and to a certain extent participated in the new-democratic revolution. After the nation-wide victory it expressed willingness to accept the leadership of the working class. Moreover, this class could play a definite role during the transitional period since it possessed a fairly rich knowledge of modern science and culture and a fairly large number of intellectuals and specialists. In the course of the socialist revolution the alliance between the working class and the bourgeoisie would play an active part in educating and remoulding members of the bourgeoisie. But the national bourgeoisie could not lead the revolution, nor should it occupy the chief position in the state power.

The state of the people's democratic dictatorship would practise democracy towards the people and dictatorship towards the reactionaries. It would protect the people and provide them with democratic rights. Only with a state of their own could the people educate and remould themselves by democratic means and shake off the influence of foreign and Chinese reactionaries, rectify the bad ideas and habits they had acquired from the old society, and continue to march forward. The education of the peasants offered a serious problem. The peasants were small owners. It would take a long time and a great deal of patient work to induce them to take the socialist road. It would also be necessary to educate and remould members of the national bourgeoisie and so enable them to accept
the leadership of the working class. Later, when the time arrived for the nationalization of private enterprises, they would have to be educated and remoulded further so as to eliminate capitalism for good.

Imperialist agents in China, that is, the landlord class, the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, and the Kuomintang reactionaries who were the political representatives of these two classes, would be deprived of their political rights in the state of the people's democratic dictatorship. Provided, however, these people did not engage in rebellious or subversive activities, they would be given land or work to enable them to live and remould themselves through labour into self-supporting labourers.

Since the imperialists and the domestic reactionaries still existed, and classes still existed in the country, an urgent task would be to increase the power of the people's state machine, that is, to strengthen the people's army, the people's police and the people's court, in order to consolidate national defence and protect the people's interests, and on the basis of this to enable China to advance steadily step by step into a socialist and communist society. When that time came, classes would disappear and the state would gradually wither away, having outlived its usefulness.

Internationally, the People's Republic would unite with the Soviet Union, the People's Democracies, and the peoples of all countries. It would belong to the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. Genuine friendship and aid for the Chinese people were to be sought only in this camp, not in the imperialist camp. Neutrality between the two camps, or fence-straddling, was out of the question.

Under the guidance of the basic programme of the Chinese Communist Party for the establishment of a people's republic, the People's Political Consultative Conference was convened, the provisional charter of the Chinese people—the Common Programme—was formulated, and the People's Republic of China was founded.

As early as May 1, 1948 the Central Committee of the Party had issued a call for the convocation of a new political consultative conference with no reactionaries participating. This call elicited enthusiastic response from all the democratic classes and parties of the country. On November 25 of the same year, representatives of various parties met in the Northeast to discuss the question of convening such a conference and the scope of representation. The representatives unanimously agreed that New Democracy should be the political basis for the founding of New China, and that all those who were to attend the new political consultative conference must be opposed to imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. Hence it was decided that qualified representatives for this conference must come from among the following categories: the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and patriotic democratic elements who had split with the reactionary classes. After Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Shanghai and Wuhan were successively liberated, the First Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was convened in Peking on September 21, 1949 in order to wipe out remnant Kuomintang reactionaries, rehabilitate and develop the people's economy and culture, consolidate national defence and establish the People's Republic of China. The People's Political Consultative Conference was of a broad representative character, representing the will of the whole nation and exercising the functions and powers of the National
People’s Congress pending the convocation of the latter.


The Common Programme provided that the nature of the People’s Republic of China should be a people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class, based on the worker-peasant alliance and uniting all the democratic classes and all the nationalities of the country. On the question of the relationship between the five sectors of the national economy, the Common Programme provided that under the leadership of the state-owned economy the five sectors of economy should carry out division and co-ordination of labour, and play their proper parts in promoting the development of the social economy as a whole. Thus the working-class leadership in the political field, and the leadership of the state-owned economy of a socialist character in the economic field were stipulated by law. This constituted the chief guarantee for the transition of the People’s Republic of China to socialism.

The Organic Law of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China provided the form of state power that accorded with the nature of a people’s democratic dictatorship, that is, a system of people’s congresses based on democratic centralism. This system, which ensured full democracy for the people as well as effective dictatorship over the reactionary classes, was incomparably superior to the bourgeois parliamentary system.

The Organic Law of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference provided that the People’s Political Consultative Conference should be the organizational form of the democratic united front of the whole people and that the purpose of such a conference was to unite all the democratic classes and nationalities of the country through the various democratic parties and people’s organizations to establish and consolidate the People’s Republic of China under the people’s democratic dictatorship.

The People’s Political Consultative Conference elected Mao Tse-tung Chairman of the Central People’s Government and Chu Teh, Liu Shao-chi, Soong Ching Ling and others, Vice-Chairmen. The inauguration of the new state was held on October 1, 1949. Chairman Mao Tse-tung issued a message to the entire world, solemnly proclaiming the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the Central People’s Government. Thenceforth the history of China entered a new era.

The establishment of the People’s Republic of China marked the conclusion, in the main, of the first stage of the Chinese revolution, the stage of the new-democratic revolution, and heralded its second stage, the stage of the socialist revolution.

The victory of the Chinese people’s revolution and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China brought about a radical change in the history of China. It was the greatest event in world history since the October Socialist Revolution of 1917 and the victory of the anti-fascist war in 1945. The victory of the Chinese people’s democratic revolution had a great world significance in that it extended and deepened the great influence exercised by the October Revolution upon all mankind.

First, with the victory of the Chinese people’s revolution, the
country with the largest population in the world had, following in the wake of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, broken the chains of world capitalism and achieved her own liberation. China, with a quarter of the world's population and abundant resources, was formerly an important market contended for by the imperialists. The victory of the Chinese revolution pronounced the bankruptcy of the aggressive policies of the U.S. and other imperialist countries as well as the failure of their plans for the enslavement of China. Consequently the victory of this revolution dealt a severe blow to the imperialists and weakened their strength, sharpened the general crisis of capitalism, demonstrated that bourgeois rule was approaching its doom, and accelerated the final victory of the labouring people of the whole world. Moreover, having won the victory, the Chinese people stood resolutely by the side of the camp of peace, democracy and socialism and proved themselves a vital force against imperialism, tipping the scales in favour of the camp of peace, democracy and socialism and very much against the imperialist camp of aggression.

Secondly, the Chinese revolution was a revolution that took place in the largest semi-colonial country under imperialist oppression in the East, with a population of 600 million. The victory of this revolution could not but encourage and inspire the oppressed nations of the East and strengthen their confidence in victory. The places where the imperialists drew their super-profits to maintain their existence had become or were becoming the centres of anti-imperialist revolutionary storms.

Thirdly, the victory of the Chinese people's revolution was a new victory for Marxism-Leninism. It proved that Marxism-Leninism was the only true guide for the liberation of the Chinese people and for the liberation of all other oppressed peoples. Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist Party scientifically and systematically solved the problem of the Chinese revolution by adopting the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method. This revolution was another great revolution following the October Socialist Revolution, but of a different type, for it took place in a country oppressed by imperialism. It fully bore out the dynamic force of Marxism-Leninism as being able to guide a revolution successfully not only in an imperialist country, but also in a colonial or semi-colonial country.

The triumph of Marxism-Leninism in China helped the working class and the broad masses of the oppressed countries in Asia and in the rest of the world to march resolutely on the way to democratic revolution, and after achieving victory, to advance further on the road to socialism.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE THIRD REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR

In July 1946, the Chiang Kai-shek clique—the biggest traitorous clique in the world—with the all-out support of the United States, the world's biggest imperialist power, started a counter-revolutionary civil war on an unprecedented scale, despite the Chinese people's will for peace, the efforts made by the Chinese Communist Party to secure peace, and the opposition expressed by democratic public opinion all over the world. Under the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party, the Chinese people, after four years of heroic struggle, overthrew the dark and reactionary rule of the imperialists and the Kuomintang (the former having reigned in China for over 100 years and the latter for 22 years), and founded the great People's Republic of China under the people's democratic dictatorship. Since then the Chinese people have been the masters of their own destiny.

Many factors contributed to the Chinese people's victory over the Kuomintang reactionaries armed by the American imperialists. The people's revolutionary war was waged after World War II when the camp of peace, democracy and socialism was growing in strength and world imperialism was further declining. The post-war international situation was thus favourable to the Chinese people, and unfavourable to the Chinese and American reactionaries. The Chinese people, steeled during the eight-year War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, had greatly enhanced their political consciousness and organizational ability and had created the powerful liberated areas and the People's Liberation Army, which formed the solid basis for the Chinese people to defeat their internal and external reactionary enemies. Most important of all, by applying the Marxist-Leninist theory, the Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tsetung correctly formulated the political and military principles for defeating the reactionaries, and the rural and urban policies for the liberation of the entire people. As a result, the People's Liberation Army was enabled to shift swiftly from the defensive to the offensive and from a disadvantageous to an advantageous position, thus bringing the new-democratic revolution to a victorious conclusion and ushering in a period of transition to socialism.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
RESTORATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

(October 1949—1952)

1. GROWING STRENGTH OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP AFTER THE FOUNDING OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. EMERGENCE OF THE TWO WORLD MARKETS

The founding of the People's Republic of China marked the end of the bourgeois-democratic stage in the Chinese revolution and the beginning of its socialist stage. The task in this stage was to build a socialist society in China.

In China the transitional period from capitalism to socialism began after the founding of the People's Republic. To build a socialist society, it was necessary to carry out in this period socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce. But this does not mean that these two great tasks were to be begun in every field immediately after the founding of the People's Republic of China. In the first few years of this period it was necessary, first of all, to attend to the tasks of healing the wounds inflicted by the long civil war and carrying out social reforms, that is, carrying out agrarian reform and solving the contradictions between democracy and feudalism in the vast rural areas, confiscating bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and turning them into socialist enterprises, continuously expanding the socialist state economy and starting the socialist transformation of private capitalism in the cities.

The restoration and transformation of the national economy required favourable conditions, both at home and abroad. Such conditions were created.

The founding of the People's Republic of China was hailed by the people all over the world. The Soviet Union, the greatest and staunchest friend of the Chinese people, recognized the People's Republic of China and established diplomatic relations the day after the new nation was born. The People's Democracies—Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Korea, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Mongolia, the German Democratic Republic, Albania and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—soon followed suit. Besides these countries, India, Sweden, Denmark, Burma, Indonesia, Switzerland, Finland and Pakistan also established diplomatic relations.

The Soviet Union, China and the other People's Democracies formed a powerful and united socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. The formation of this camp, and, above all, the existence of the Soviet Union, was one of the international conditions favourable to the economic restoration and socialist construction of China.

The People's Republic of China has always stood firmly by the side of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and made every effort to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two countries. On December 16, 1949, Chairman Mao Tse-tung visited
the Soviet Union. This was an important event in the diplomatic history of the two countries. With Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Marshal Stalin taking a direct part in the negotiations, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance; the Sino-Soviet Agreement Concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway, Lushun (Port Arthur) and Talien (Dairen); and the Sino-Soviet Agreement on Credits to China, all three of great historic significance, were signed in Moscow on February 14, 1950, by Foreign Minister Chou En-lai on behalf of the Government of China and Foreign Minister A. Y. Vyshinsky on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union. With the signing of these documents, the Chinese people and the Soviet people were more than ever united in the great cause of opposing imperialist aggression and safeguarding the lasting peace of the world, and the friendly co-operation of the two nations in economy and culture was further strengthened. On February 17, 1950, Chairman Mao Tse-tung said in his farewell speech at the Moscow railway station:

It will be clear to everybody that the solidarity between the Soviet and the Chinese peoples, consolidated by a treaty, will be everlasting, indestructible and inalienable. It will inevitably bring its influence to bear not only on the prosperity of the two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, but on the future of humanity and on the victory of world peace and justice.

To oppose aggression and safeguard peace, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and the agreements stipulated that the resurrection of Japanese militarism and the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or of any other state that might collaborate with Japan in acts of aggression should be prevented. The treaty stated:

In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any other state allied with her and thus becoming involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.

This meant that if the Japanese militarists and their allies should dare to attack China, they would receive a crushing blow from the two great countries, China and the Soviet Union. The friendship, alliance, mutual assistance and co-operation between China and the Soviet Union was the bulwark of peace in the Far East and the most vital factor in safeguarding world peace.

The treaty and the agreements were also of great significance for the tasks of restoring the national economy and carrying out socialist construction in China. According to the Agreement on Credits to China, the Soviet Union would grant to China within a five-year period U.S. $300,000,000 (at the rate of one per cent interest per annum). There were various other forms of economic and technical assistance, such as equipment for power stations, engineering plants, mining and railway transport, rails, and so forth. Many Soviet experts came to China on the invitation of the Chinese Government. Filled with the noble spirit of internationalism, they worked selflessly and imparted to China without reserve their advanced technological experiences in industry, transport, agriculture, water conservancy and medicine.

The continued aggression against China by the American imperia-
lists and their attempt in collusion with the Japanese reactionary clique to speed up the revival of Japanese militarism and to launch a new war seriously endangered China's security and disrupted the peace of Asia and the world.

In September 1952, delegates of the Chinese and the Soviet Governments held a talk in Moscow on vital political and economic problems concerning the two countries. During this talk, the Sino-Soviet Agreement concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway, Lushun (Port Arthur), and Talien (Dairen), signed on February 14, 1950, was also discussed. It was agreed that the Soviet Government should transfer to China without compensation all her rights to the jointly administered Chinese Changchun Railway at the date originally stipulated in the agreement. At the same time, the Soviet Government consented to the proposal of the Chinese Government that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the jointly-used Chinese naval base of Lushun as stipulated in the treaty be postponed. The Lushun area being of great strategic importance to national defence of China and to the prevention of Japanese aggression, this new agreement safeguarded the coasts of North China and dealt a heavy blow to the aggressive designs in the Western Pacific of the Japanese militarists and their ally.

The economic consequence of the existence of the two opposite camps after World War II was the disintegration of the single, all-embracing world market and the emergence of two parallel and opposite world markets, namely, that of the socialist camp, made up of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the other People's Democracies, and that of the imperialist camp, made up of the capitalist countries and many of their economically backward colonies and dependencies.

During the post-war period, the countries of the socialist camp formed economic ties with each other through agreements of economic co-operation and mutual assistance, but the American imperialists pursued a policy of blockade and embargo, hoping thereby to strangle China, the Soviet Union and the other People's Democracies. The effect, however, was quite the reverse. The new socialist market was further strengthened and consolidated.

The economic relations between the countries of the socialist market were of a new type. They were characterized by the complete equality of all the countries concerned, protection of each other's sovereignty and independence, respect for each other's national interests, mutual trust and friendship, close economic co-operation, and the common effort to restore and further develop the economic and cultural ties between them.

In the period from 1949 to 1952, China's trade with the Soviet Union and the other People's Democracies registered a rapid growth. The percentage of China's trade with these countries in the whole of her foreign trade rose from 26 in 1950 to 72 in 1952. The imports from these countries were a great help to China's economic construction. Industrial equipment and materials were entirely or largely imported from these countries, while China's farm produce, animal products, minerals and handicrafts were almost all exported to these countries.

The rich resources of the socialist camp enabled each country within the camp to find what she needed for her economic development. The long-term economic agreements concluded between the countries in this camp ushered in a new stage in their co-operation.
The conclusion of such long-term economic agreements was made possible by the fact that these countries had one after another drawn up and put into practice long-term plans for economic construction. Such agreements ensured a continuous flow of equipment, raw materials and commodities among these countries.

During the post-war period a great change took place in the foreign trade of the Soviet Union in that the big bulk of it (80 per cent in 1952) was carried on with the countries in the socialist camp. It was largely thanks to the great help of the Soviet Union that China and the other People's Democracies rapidly consolidated their positions economically and politically.

A sharp contrast to the economic relations between the countries in the socialist camp was offered by the imperialist market, where the ruling clique of the United States greedily plundered raw materials, seized commodity markets and enslaved the people of other countries. In order to relieve her own economic crisis, the United States adopted a policy of increasing her exports by large-scale dumping on foreign markets and by buying very little in return. From the end of the war to 1952, the annual exports of the United States averaged $12.500 million, while her annual imports averaged only $7.200 million, the excess of exports over imports averaging $5.000 million per year. Unequal trade relations with the Latin American and Asian countries were further intensified. For instance, the United States controlled the production of copper in Chile, tin in Bolivia and coffee in Brazil and bought these products at an extremely low price, while she sold them her own goods at a very high price, thus crippling the economy of the other capitalist countries and underdeveloped countries. Therefore the trade relations between the countries in the imperialist camp were entirely different from those between the countries in the socialist camp. This sharpened the contradictions among the imperialist countries and between the imperialist and the colonial countries, and hastened the disintegration of the imperialist market.

The mighty strength of the socialist camp and the emergence and development of the socialist market created an international situation extremely favourable for the restoration and the transformation of the national economy of China.

2. ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE FIRST YEARS AFTER LIBERATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFIED MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC WORK OF THE STATE. BASIC POLICY FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL TURN FOR THE BETTER IN THE STATE FINANCE AND ECONOMY

The People's Republic of China, in tackling the task of rehabilitation and transformation of her national economy, met with great difficulties in finance and economy. These difficulties came from two sources. First, the Kuomintang reactionaries had left things in a great mess. Industry was on the verge of total bankruptcy, with most of the workers out of work. Almost all the mines were flooded, and railway traffic was paralysed. Agriculture was in an equally deplorable state. Under the rule of the Kuomintang, China, an agricultural country, had depended on foreign imports for a large part of her grain and cotton. Compared with the record output in
the pre-liberation years, the 1949 output of coal was down by over 50 per cent, iron and steel by 80 per cent, cotton goods by 25 per cent, grain by 26 per cent and cotton by 48 per cent. The number of draught animals had dropped by 16 per cent as compared with the pre-war peak level, and of chief farming tools by 30 per cent. The flames of inflation had danced for over ten years, with the industrial and commercial market at the mercy of the speculators. Prices in the Kuomintang-controlled areas multiplied six million times from August 1937 to August 1948, and the menacing shadows of currency depreciation and skyrocketing prices loomed over the life of the common people.

There were also the economic difficulties which followed in the wake of victory. The war of liberation proceeded very rapidly in 1949, and many places were liberated without a battle. The policy of taking over all old military and civil personnel who refrained from offering resistance had greatly increased the expenditure of the government. In the matter of revenue, the old liberated areas had to give huge quantities of grain in support of the war and the newly liberated cities, while the collection of public grain was introduced in only a small part of the newly liberated areas. As the war had just come to an end in the newly liberated areas, some time had to elapse before the exchange of commodities between the city and the countryside could be restored. Hence the revenue yielded by taxation in the cities was very slender. All this meant that the revenue and expenditure of the government were far from being balanced.

To overcome such economic difficulties, the Party and Government gave their first attention to the balancing of revenue and expenditure and the stabilization of currency and commodity prices, these being the prerequisites to the restoration and development of the national economy.

The Party and Government waged fierce struggles against the disruptive activities of the capitalists. In a battle against speculation which went on from the latter part of 1949 to 1950, a severe blow was dealt to the speculators, who had on several occasions jacked up prices.

In March 1950, the Decision on Unified Control of National Economy and Finance was published by the Central People's Government, the gist of which was the unified control of revenue and expenditure, the unified utilization of materials on a nation-wide scale, and the unified control of currency. As a result of the unified control of revenue and expenditure, the chief part of the national revenue, namely, the revenue of the Central People's Government (grain collected by the state, taxes, materials in warehouses, profit made by state-owned enterprises and part of their depreciation funds) was devoted to meet the main items of state expenditure on national defence and major construction projects. With unified utilization, all the main materials of the country (grain, cotton cloth, industrial equipment) were concentrated and turned to effective use. The unified control of currency provided that, with the exception of that part which was earmarked for immediate use, all ready cash which had hitherto been scattered in state-owned enterprises, government organizations and army units was to be deposited in state-owned banks, to be used and apportioned under the unified control of the People's Bank of China. The decision was instrumental in overcoming the financial and economic difficulties, that is, in balancing revenue and expenditure and in stabilizing commodity prices. It
concentrated the financial resources and materials of the country for rational use and apportionment, and brought about an approximate balance between revenue and expenditure. As a result, currency and commodity prices were gradually stabilized.

In June 1950, the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was convened in Peking. The chief objective of the session was to lay down, in accordance with the current situation in national finance and economy, the basic tasks of the Party and the people in the next three years or so. The session discussed and adopted Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s report entitled “Strive for a Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Financial and Economic Situation of the State.”

Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that “conditions for carrying out economic construction in a planned way have not yet been achieved” in China at that time. To bring about a fundamental turn for the better in finance and economy, that is, to achieve the rehabilitation of the national economy, three conditions were needed: (1) the completion of agrarian reform; (2) the proper readjustment of existing industrial and commercial enterprises; and (3) large reduction of expenses in government organs. He declared with full confidence:

Like the rest of you, I am perfectly certain that by working hard we shall be able to bring about these conditions in about three years. Then we shall see the entire financial and economic situation of our country fundamentally improved.

The Third Plenary Session unanimously adopted Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s report and called on the whole Party and the whole people to strive for the realization of this aim.

3. THE GREAT RESIST-AMERICA-AND-AID-KOREA MOVEMENT. CONSOLIDATION OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP

To the Chinese people busily engaged in the restoration and transformation of their national economy, an international situation of general security and enduring peace was indispensable.

In June 1950, the American imperialists launched their war of aggression against Korea and the American Seventh Fleet simultaneously seized Taiwan. To conquer the whole of Korea and then to invade China was part of their crazy design to dominate the whole world. From the very beginning of the Korean War, the Chinese people had insisted on a peaceful settlement, and serious warning was given to the United States, demanding the immediate stop of her aggression against Korea and the withdrawal of her armed forces from Taiwan. Ignoring the proposal and warning, the American aggressors pushed ahead in Korea and directed their spearhead towards the northeastern frontiers of China, gravely menacing her security. The Chinese people rose in arms to safeguard peace. The Chinese People’s Volunteers were organized and crossed the border on October 25 to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Korean People’s Army against aggression and to safeguard peace in the Far East. With the enthusiastic support of the Chinese people, the Chinese People’s Volunteers won one victory after another, until by May 1951 enemy troops were driven back to near the 38th Parallel,
where they had first started the war of aggression. From then on, the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army adopted a positional warfare of active defence and constructed an impregnable line of fortifications across the whole breadth of Korea, thus keeping the front fixed roughly along the 38th Parallel. Beginning from December 1951, however, the American aggressors, in defiance of international law and humanity, resorted to large-scale bacteriological warfare. But this heinous atrocity proved no more effective than their military operations.

Since the Chinese and Korean peoples were forced to engage in a war against aggression with a view to creating conditions for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on a fair and reasonable basis, they and their governments immediately responded to the proposal of an armistice made by the Soviet Union in June 1951. The American imperialists were compelled to do the like in the face of the mighty strength of the Korean and Chinese armed forces and the world peace movement, and of the serious contradictions within the imperialist camp resulting from their defeat. But the American imperialists, bent as they were on dominating the world, had no real intention of coming to peace terms. It was quite natural, then, that the truce talks in Korea should turn out to be a fierce military and diplomatic struggle, complicated and prolonged. While negotiations were going on about the establishment of a military demarcation line and the suspension of hostilities, the American imperialists attempted to tilt the talks in their favour by armed pressure and other insolent measures, but failed to attain their purpose. Then when agreement was about to be reached, they resorted shamelessly to delaying and obstructionist tactics on the question of the repatriation of the prisoners-of-war. China and Korea repeatedly smashed the enemy's "military pressure" and base schemes, dealt severe blows to their insolence, and frustrated their intrigues, thus making it impossible for the American imperialists to get at the conference table what they had failed to get on the battlefield. At the same time China and Korea displayed, great firmness and patience in adhering to the policy of peaceful settlement. Finally an agreement was reached at the Korean armistice talks, which had lasted for two years. The armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom in Korea on July 27, 1953.

Although the United States had mustered a good part of her armed forces in the Korean War, in addition to the troops of a number of other countries, and paid the price of over one million casualties and 20,000 million U.S. dollars, she still failed to attain her goal, while the armed forces of the Korean and Chinese peoples became steadily stronger in the war and achieved a series of brilliant successes that forced the American imperialists to sign the armistice agreement. This victory of the Chinese and Korean peoples, besides safeguarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and strengthening China's national defences, proved beyond doubt that an awakened nation fighting for its own independence and security is invincible. The victory was a severe blow to the United States as well as to the whole imperialist camp and ensured the peace in the Far East and the world. All this was indispensable for the smooth advance of the economic rehabilitation and construction in China.

China needed a lasting peace for her socialist construction; she needed also an army with modern equipment to deal with any
eventuality and to defend her socialist construction. For this reason, the Party modernized the People's Liberation Army on its original basis while the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea was in progress. The PLA was transformed into a mighty military force on land, sea and in the air. A movement for studying modern science and technology and modern military science was carried on in the People's Liberation Army. The army was regularized, unified in its command, organization, training and discipline. To guard against possible surprise attacks from the imperialists, the government also constructed the necessary fortifications for national defence and worked out plans for a reserve force. The task of defending the country against imperialist attacks and safeguarding socialist construction was ranked as the foremost one for the People's Liberation Army.

The reactionary classes within the country, though overthrown, were by no means willing to submit to defeat. In the early years after the liberation, a large number of counter-revolutionaries still infested the newly liberated areas. There were hidden counter-revolutionaries in the old liberated areas too. They had formed counter-revolutionary underground squads and gangs of “political” bandits to start riots, carry on various sabotage activities and assassinate revolutionary cadres and activists among the masses.

To consolidate the people’s regime and safeguard economic construction, the Chinese people launched, in December 1950, a nation-wide movement for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. As a result of adhering correctly to the policy laid down by the Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung of “punishment for the ringleaders and pardon for the coerced accomplices; leniency towards those who confess frankly, and severity towards those who refuse to do so; atonement of crimes for service rendered and reward for especially distinguished service,” as well as the Regulations Governing the Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries promulgated by the Central People's Government, justice was executed on all the bandits, secret agents, key members of reactionary parties and groups and heads of reactionary secret societies—who still rode roughshod over the people—and severe punishment was meted out to the notorious ringleaders who had committed serious crimes against the country and the people.

With the tremendous success in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, the prestige of the Party and the People's Government was enhanced, the solidarity of the people strengthened, the people's democratic dictatorship consolidated, and the restoration and development of the national economy ensured.

Great achievements were likewise obtained in building up the people's democratic regime.

According to the Common Programme, the basic political system of the country was a system of really democratic people's congresses, elected by universal franchise. In the early years of the People's Republic of China, when the mainland was not yet completely liberated, the agrarian reform in the greater part of the country not yet thoroughly carried out and the broad masses not yet fully organized, it was impossible to carry out elections by universal franchise on a nation-wide scale. Under these circumstances it was decided that the People's Political Consultative Conference should exercise the functions and powers of the National People's Congress and the local people's representative conferences should step by step
exercise the functions and powers of the local people's congresses. In the transitional period, such provisional measures were quite necessary.

During the first three years after the liberation, people's representative conferences were convened and established in various provinces, municipalities, counties and townships throughout the country. The vast majority of the representatives of the township people's representative conferences were directly elected by the people, those of the people's representative conferences of counties and municipalities were indirectly elected. Representatives thus directly or indirectly elected constituted in general over 80 per cent of the total.

Almost all the important work undertaken by the people and their state power, such as the agrarian reform, the Resist-America-and-Aid-Korea Movement, the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, the campaign for democratic reforms and the patriotic movement for the increase of production, was deliberated at the people's conferences, and the masses were mobilized to participate in such campaigns. Thus the people's political consciousness, patriotism, revolutionary vigilance and productive initiative were greatly enhanced.

This transitional form of organization which functioned as the people's congress played a historic role in uniting the whole people, consolidating the people's democratic dictatorship, restoring the national economy, resisting American aggression and aiding Korea and other gigantic tasks.

During this period democratic reforms were carried out among the workers and other sections of the labouring people. Remnant feudal elements hidden in their ranks were eliminated, counter-revolutionaries rooted out, old technicians united and remoulded, obsolete and irrational systems abolished and new, democratic systems adopted. These reforms helped to raise the political consciousness and productive initiative of the workers and the other labouring people.

During this period a campaign for ideological remoulding was launched among the intellectuals. The great and arduous task of socialist construction required the service of as many intellectuals as possible, hence it was necessary for the intellectuals to thoroughly remould themselves and gradually acquire a proletarian outlook on life. The campaign took the form of a mass movement, which relied on the educational method of criticism and self-criticism for the self-education and self-remoulding of the intellectuals. In the campaign, imperialist, feudal and bureaucrat-capitalist influences on the intellectuals were thoroughly exposed and largely swept away, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas were criticized and the question, "Whom should the intellectuals serve?" was given a correct preliminary answer. Most of the intellectuals became supporters of the socialist system and energetically applied themselves to the study of Marxism-Leninism. A small number, in the course of time, became Communists. The leading role of proletarian ideas among the intellectuals was thereby more firmly established and further consolidated.

Great successes were likewise achieved in the work concerning nationalities during this period.

The minority peoples constituted 6 per cent of the total population of the country, but the areas they inhabited amounted roughly to 60 per cent of China's total territory, much of which was rich in industrial resources.
According to Marxism-Leninism, full democratization was the basis for the settlement of the national question. The basic line to be followed in a multi-national country was to establish regional autonomy based on genuine co-operation among the various nationalities, to adhere to the principles of national equality in politics and economy, and to take into account the historical peculiarities and differences of the various nationalities. First, as China was a people's democratic state led by the working class, it was able to solve the national question by thoroughly democratic methods. Secondly, starting out from the idea of equality, friendship and mutual assistance among the nationalities, the right of the minorities to autonomy was safeguarded by applying the principle of national regional autonomy. The advantages of national regional autonomy were twofold. It gave the minority peoples power to administer their own affairs and foster their own growth according to their specific conditions; and it united all the fraternal nationalities into one big family on a basis of equal status and rights, so that they could take part in the joint administration and development of the country. To live together in the large family of the motherland was the common desire of all the nationalities and the inevitable outcome of historical development. Thirdly, the Han nationality which had a relatively higher economic, political and cultural level should help the other nationalities, while the other nationalities should realize the importance of this help. Han chauvinism and local nationalism were both wrong. The former tended to overlook the special characteristics of the national minorities, the part they could play in the socialist construction of the country, their development and progress and their rights to equality and autonomy. The latter tended to neglect the common, long-range interests of the various nationalities, the interests of the nation as a whole and the valuable experience and help which each could obtain from the other. Fourthly, the methods and steps in carrying out democratic reforms and socialist transformation could not be the same for all nationalities, since each had its own historical background. Their differences, their wills and political consciousness, and even what remained of the past barriers between them, had all to be taken into consideration. It was necessary to stick to peaceful methods in carrying out reforms among the national minorities and allow the minorities to think over their own problems. It was also necessary to unite and co-operate with the upper-class people of the national minorities for a long period of time and constantly consult with them regarding the work. This policy of carrying out reforms among the national minorities by steady steps reflected the needs of the actual situation in the settlement of the national question in China.

After the liberation, state-operated trade enterprises were set up in remote, out-of-the-way districts inhabited by the national minorities to supply them with tools of production and daily necessities and to purchase from them special local products, both the buying and the selling being done at reasonable prices. Where the minority peoples so desired, agrarian reform was carried out in their agricultural areas and other necessary reforms in their pastoral areas. The People's Government helped them in various ways to develop their agriculture and animal husbandry. Health clinics were set up in every county with the result that the population began to increase steadily. Communications in the minority areas were improved, and modern industries were built up in some places.
Huge bases of iron and steel, non-ferrous metal and oil industries were built in Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. In pursuance of the policy of recruiting Party members actively and yet prudently, and training minority cadres in large numbers and on a broad basis, the Party established itself in the minority areas and trained many local cadres. The People's Government also helped the minority peoples in their education and paid great attention to co-operating with many of them to devise or improve their written languages. Their customs, habits and religions were accorded full respect. Thus, all the nationalities were united in one big family of the country and achieved remarkable and unparalleled advances in politics, economy and culture. The Marxist-Leninist national theory and the national policy of the Chinese Communist Party lighted the way along which all nationalities in China could advance.

In May 1951 the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was signed between the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet.

The agreement stipulated that the Tibetan local government should resolutely rid itself of imperialist influences and actively help the People's Liberation Army enter Tibet; that all external affairs in Tibet should be handled by the Central People's Government—in other words, the Tibetan local government must cut its ties with the imperialists and once more join the big family of the People's Republic of China. As to Tibet's internal affairs, the agreement stipulated that its existing political system and the position and authority of the Dalai Lama would remain unchanged, and the Tibetan people's religious beliefs would be fully safeguarded. A positive attitude was adopted towards social reforms in Tibet, but there was to be no compulsion. Rather, the local government of Tibet was expected to carry out the reforms of its own accord. In case the people demanded reforms, the matter should be settled by consultation.

This agreement once for all freed the Tibetan people from imperialist enslavement and gave them full enjoyment of the rights to national equality and regional autonomy. After the liberation, the ties between the Tibetan people and other nationalities of the country were strengthened as a result of the Party's work in establishing in Tibet a patriotic, anti-imperialist united front. For national construction as well as for the construction of the new Tibet, the Sikang-Tibet and the Chinghai-Tibet Highways were constructed across the formerly inaccessible Tibetan plateau. Additional highways were built between major cities in Tibet and an air line opened. Investigation of the resources in Tibet was extensively carried on. It was expected that, as a result of the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the Tibetan people would emerge from darkness into light, the population of Tibet would gradually grow and its economy and culture would be further developed. This was a victory for the Tibetan people, for the Chinese people as a whole, for the national theory of Marxism-Leninism, and for the national policy of the Chinese Communist Party.

The success in national work and the great unity of the various nationalities in China strengthened China's national defence and consolidated the people's democratic dictatorship in the People's Republic of China.
4. COMPLETION OF AGRARIAN REFORM. TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE. THE SAN FAN AND WU FAN MOVEMENTS. COMPLETION OF THE REHABILITATION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

After the Resist-America-and-Aid-Korea Movement had been crowned with victory and the people's state power had been further consolidated, the Chinese people proceeded to reform the agrarian system under the direction of the Party.

Considering that the people's revolutionary war had been completed in the main and that the poor peasants' lack of land and shortage of means of production could be alleviated by loans from the state, the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party adopted the policy of neutralizing the rich peasants. In place of the policy of confiscating the rich peasants' surplus land and property, the session adopted one of keeping their economy intact. As a result, the landlords were further isolated and the restoration of production in rural districts speeded up.

On June 30, 1950, the Central People's Government promulgated the Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China, under the guidance of which the people in all the newly liberated areas embarked on the struggle for agrarian reform. By the end of 1952, agrarian reform was basically completed in the whole country, with the exception of areas inhabited by the minority peoples. As a result of the reform, 700 million mou of land were distributed among 300 million peasants, and over 30 million tons of grain, which formerly went to the landlords annually as rent, were now appropriated by the peasants for their own use. After the completion of the agrarian reform, the peasants, under the leadership of the Party, started a nation-wide movement for co-operation and mutual aid on a voluntary and mutually beneficial basis. Co-operation among the peasants had already a long history, but mutual aid and co-operation as a mass movement led by the Party only came into being after the founding of the People's Republic. There were more than 300 co-operatives at the end of 1951. The number increased to 4,000 in 1952. On the basis of agrarian reform, mutual aid and co-operation, and under the strong leadership and help of the Party and Government, the peasants embarked on an extensive patriotic movement for the increase of production. They were now working for their own well-being as well as for national construction. A large number of new farm implements and draught animals were added to the peasants' belongings. Agricultural technique was gradually improved and agricultural production as a whole speedily restored and developed. The implementation of the correct line laid down by the Central Committee of the Party led to a great victory in agrarian reform—the line of relying upon the poor peasants and farm labourers, while uniting with the middle peasants and neutralizing the rich peasants, to eliminate the feudal system of exploitation step by step and to develop agricultural production. Agrarian reform was a fierce class struggle. It was necessary to mobilize the peasants to the full so that they would take action on their own initiative. To mobilize the masses intensively as well as extensively, work teams were formed to go to rural areas and help organize, step by step, peasant associations of the poor peasants and farm labourers, which later expanded to include middle peasants. It was the Party's policy to protect firmly the interests of the middle peasants. A section of the middle peasants
who possessed more than the average per capita landholding in the locality were allowed to retain their land. Another section with insufficient land were given shares in the distribution of the land. In this way, the average holding of middle peasants as a whole was larger than before the agrarian reform. It was also the Party's policy to protect the rich peasants. The Agrarian Reform Law contained the following provisions: (1) Land owned by rich peasants and cultivated by themselves or by hired labour and their other properties were to be protected from infringement; (2) Small portions of land rented out by rich peasants were to remain untouched, but in certain special areas, the land thus rented out might be requisitioned in part or in whole; (3) Rich peasants of a semi-landlord type who rented out large portions of land were to have the rented-out portions requisitioned. In this way, the land possessed by each rich peasant after the agrarian reform was, in general, double the average per capita landholding in the locality.

The process by which the agrarian reform was effected was roughly as follows: First, propaganda was carried out among the peasants by the peasant association or peasants' conference so as to raise their political consciousness and understanding of the Party's policy. Next, the broad masses rose of their own accord and waged resolute struggles against the landlords. After the struggle against local despots and for rent reduction and return of deposits, the land and property of landlords were confiscated and distributed among the peasants who were short of land and tools of production, thus bringing the reform through its last stage. The land possessed by each poor peasant and farm labourer now amounted to 90 per cent of the average per capita landholding in the locality. Thus, their urgent needs were basically satisfied.

The agrarian reform abolished the feudal system which had ruled China for over 2,000 years, eliminated the landlord class which was the mainstay of reactionary forces and imperialism in China, and liberated the rural productive forces, thus paving the way for the industrialization of the country.

In the same period, transformation of industry and commerce was also carried out by the Chinese people under the direction of the Party.

This transformation centred around three basic questions: the relations between public and private interests, between capital and labour and between production and marketing, all of which required readjustment.

The readjustment of the relations between public and private interests meant that private economy should have a chance to develop under the guidance of state economy. In this respect, the policy followed by the government was to help those privately-owned factories which were able to maintain themselves and which were beneficial to the national welfare and the people's livelihood by placing orders with them for processing and manufacture or by some other means, encouraging them to produce what was required by the national economy, and allowing them to make such profits as were regulated by law. By placing orders with them for processing and manufacture, the state strengthened the leadership of state economy over private enterprises and the planning for production and marketing, and solved a number of problems that confronted private enterprises, such as the supply of raw materials and the marketing of products. At the same time, the private enterprises were not
debarred from making reasonable profit. This was the first step in the socialist transformation of capitalist economy.

In June 1952, state orders for processing, manufacture and purchase amounted to 80 per cent of the total volume of business transacted by privately-owned factories in Shanghai. In Tientsin and Canton, the proportion was 60 per cent and over 50 per cent respectively.

In the relations between capital and labour, deviations on both sides had occurred in the early years after the liberation. On the one hand, some capitalists had stubbornly refused to concede to the workers their essential democratic rights; on the other hand, some workers had put forward excessive demands. To rectify both, it was necessary to induce the capitalists to recognize the workers' essential democratic rights and the benefit that the development of production would bring to the people's economy. The tension between capital and labour was eased by consultation, and the relations between them normalized by contracts.

To readjust the relations between production and marketing, all the private and public sectors of the economy were urged to strengthen their planning, overcome blindness and anarchy in production and keep a balance between production and marketing.

At the Third Session of the First National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference convened in October 1951, it was resolved that in order to embark on large-scale economic construction, the People's Government should devote its main efforts to launching a nation-wide movement for increasing production and practising economy.

To further such a movement, a relentless struggle had to be waged against corruption, waste and bureaucracy, for corruption and waste held back the increase of production and practice of economy, while bureaucracy was the hotbed where corruption and waste were fostered. To eliminate these evils, the san fan movement was carried out among government employees in the winter of 1951 and the first half of 1952.

Corruption, waste and bureaucracy had continued to exist under the revolutionary regime. There were two main reasons for this. First, after the victory of the revolution, the Party had adopted a policy of taking over all the personnel of Kuomintang government organs and enterprises, many of whom had not had time to remould themselves ideologically. Then, a considerable number of cadres failed to have a clear perception of the change in class relations after the victory of the revolution and were not vigilant enough against the corrosion and attack by the decadent bourgeois ideas. They neglected or ignored the warning given by the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party that it was imperative to guard against the "sugar-coated bullets" of the bourgeoisie. As corruption, waste and bureaucracy were expressions of a decadent bourgeois outlook, the san fan movement was virtually a struggle against this outlook.

Parallel with the san fan movement, the wu fan movement was carried out among industrialists and businessmen. This was a counter-blow at the repeated onslaughts made by the bourgeoisie against the working class during the three years after liberation. Many capitalists had been kicking at the Party's policy of restricting capitalist industry and commerce. They were only ready to take government orders for processing and manufacture when the
market was dull and the supply of raw materials short. But when
the market was brisk and raw materials easily obtainable, they would
attempt to shake off all restrictions and seek high profit in the free
market. Some of them had actually gone so far as to make super-
profits by illegal means. Employing as their weapons the "five
evils," they made a furious assault on cadres in government organs
and enterprises. Most cases of large-scale corruption and embezzle-
ment were committed by agents of the bourgeoisie inside govern-
ment organs or enterprises in collusion with law-breaking capita-
lists. This state of affairs was not merely a question of violation
of law and discipline on the part of the offenders, but was chiefly
the upshot of the corrosive influence of the bourgeoisie and their
furious onslaught on the revolutionary camp. The bourgeoisie had
fondly hoped to rob the people of the fruits of their revolution. This
was tantamount to making a frontal attack on the leadership of the
working class. Hence the san fan and wu fan movements were
essentially struggles for the preservation and consolidation of the
leadership of the working class.

The san fan movement cleansed government organs, established
closer ties between the government and the masses, strengthened disce-
pline and increased efficiency in government work, and greatly reduced
government expenditure. The wu fan movement curbed substantially the
illegal activities among the capitalist industrialists and businessmen
and brought capitalist industry and commerce within the orbit of
state plans.

In the three-year period from 1949 to 1952, the People's Government
carried out many major construction projects. Important advances
were achieved particularly in the fields of railway building and water
conservancy.

In a country so vast as China, communication and transport facili-
ties were essential if her industrial and agricultural areas were to
be interwoven into a single economic entity. For this reason, after
the old railways had all been repaired and re-opened to traffic in the
first half of 1950, the government allotted huge sums for the construc-
tion of new railways. Among the railways built, the most notable
were the extension of the Lunghai Railway to Lanchow and the
completion of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway. The latter had been
the dream of the Szechuan people for several decades from the last
years of the Ching dynasty to the liberation. But, two years after
liberation, the line was completed. These railways greatly helped
the economic development of the southwestern and northwestern
provinces.

In the same period, the government organized the repair of the
greater part of the 42,000 kilometres of dikes in the country. Control
projects were started for the entire courses of such rivers as the
Huai and the Yungting which were given to serious flooding. The
Hual River Project and the Chingkiang Flood Diversion Project
were truly unprecedented in Chinese history both in the magnitude
of their scope and in the speed of their execution. With big rivers
like the Yellow River and the Yangtse which would not lend them-
selves to short-term conservancy projects, provisional measures for
the prevention of flood were taken. Altogether, during these three
years over 1,700 million cubic metres of earthwork were completed,
in water conservancy, equivalent to the digging of 10 Panama Canals
or 23 Suez Canals. These successes changed the sorry conditions of
neglect into which water conservancy had fallen under the reactionary
Kuomintang regime. The threat of flood which had haunted the Chinese people for thousands of years was largely eliminated and the restoration of agricultural production and the security of the inhabitants in vast rural areas were ensured.

Owing to the correct leadership of the Party, the great efforts made by the people all over the country, especially by the workers and peasants, and the disinterested help given by the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, the rehabilitation of the national economy was basically accomplished within three years after the liberation. China's national finance and economy made a fundamental turn for the better and the call of the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was triumphantly realized. This success was achieved at the time the Chinese people were carrying on the campaign for resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea.

The fundamental turn for the better in the finance and economy was shown in the rehabilitation of the economy, the balancing of revenue and expenditure and the stabilization of commodity prices.

(1) Rehabilitation of the economy. By the end of 1952, industrial and agricultural production had not only been restored but had surpassed the pre-war peak level. Its total value in that year was 77.5 per cent up on the 1949 figure, and the output value of modern industry was up by 278.6 per cent. In 1949, the output value of modern industry constituted 17 per cent of the total value of agricultural and industrial output; it jumped to 26.7 per cent in 1952. The production of capital goods developed more rapidly than that of consumer goods, and the value of capital goods in the total value of industrial output was raised from 29 per cent in 1949 to 39.7 per cent in 1952. There was a rapid development of socialist industry. The proportion of the socialist and semi-socialist sector in the industry as a whole rose from 36.7 per cent in 1949 to 61 per cent in 1952, while the proportion of the private capitalist sector fell from 63.3 per cent to 39 per cent.

The total value of agricultural output in 1952 was 48.5 per cent up on that of 1949, with the value of grain up by 44.8 per cent and cotton by 193.4 per cent. There was not only enough grain for home consumption, but a surplus for export. The production of cotton was also enough to meet domestic demands. Agriculture supplied the rapidly developing industry with increasing quantities of raw materials. It kept pace with the growing demand of the people for grain and provided a market for the steadily increasing output of manufactured goods.

(2) Balancing of the budget. State revenue steadily increased during the three years after the liberation, and the budget was completely balanced in 1952. Taking the state revenue in 1949 as 100, it was 239 in 1952. This increase in revenue came from the expansion of production. For example, in 1950, taxes and profits from state-owned enterprises and from co-operatives constituted only 34 per cent of the total revenue of the government; in 1952, the proportion was 56 per cent. In expenditure, though it was necessary then to allot large sums for strengthening national defence and supporting the Resist-America-and-Aid-Korea Movement, more than half of the outlay in the 1952 budget nonetheless went to economic and cultural development.

(3) Stabilization of commodity prices. Taking the index of wholesale prices in the whole country in March 1950 as 100, when unified
control of economic and financial work was first put into effect, that of December 1950 was 85.4; of June 1951, 91; of December 1951, 96.6; of June 1952, 92.4; of December 1952, 90.6. This showed that in a period of a little over two and a half years, commodity prices remained fairly stable. Complete stabilization was effected in 1953. The threat of rocketing prices which had lasted for over ten years was once and for all eliminated.

Economic rehabilitation, the balancing of revenue and expenditure and the stabilization of commodity prices laid a solid foundation for large-scale economic construction and marked the end of the period of the rehabilitation of the national economy. The year 1953 ushered in a new historic period, the period of the First Five-Year Plan for Economic Construction.

5. NEW DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT. CONSOLIDATION AND BUILDING OF THE PARTY

The working class, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, had proved itself through long years of heroic struggle to be the leading force not only in the Chinese people's revolution, but in the construction of New China as well.

When the Sixth National Congress of Labour was convened in 1948, the People's Liberation Army was actively engaged in liberating the whole country. In view of this, the Party laid down specific tasks for the working class in the liberated and Kuomintang-controlled areas. After the Congress, the Chinese working class proceeded to march ahead along the road pointed out by the Party. Workers in the liberated areas enthusiastically called on production to support the revolutionary war; those in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, by rallying people from all walks of life, expanded and consolidated the united front. Prior to the liberation of the cities, the workers took upon themselves the duty of protecting the factories and the people's property from being wrecked by the enemy. In the liberated cities, they helped the People's Government to take over bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and convert them into socialist enterprises.

After the workers had taken over the factories and mines from the hands of the enemy, their central task was to restore and develop production. In the course of restoring production it was necessary to institute democratic reforms. These reforms were followed by a mass movement for the increase of production and practice of economy to develop the productive potential, spread advanced experience, carry out business accounting, and raise labour productivity.

During the three years after the liberation, extensive emulation drives were carried out among the workers. Over 80 per cent of the workers took part in such drives, in the course of which some 223,000 model workers emerged and over 489,000 rationalization proposals were adopted. The rapid restoration of the economy was chiefly due to this enthusiastic emulation on the part of the workers.

In the early years after the liberation, the workers in private enterprises correctly carried out the Party's united front policy in dealing with the national bourgeoisie, and helped the capitalists overcome their difficulties, thus promoting the restoration of those private concerns which were beneficial to the national economy and the people's livelihood. Later, when the bourgeoisie launched a furious offensive of "five evils" against the working class, the workers, under
the leadership of the Party, carried out the *wu fan* movement, repulsed the onslaught and brought the private enterprises within the orbit of state plans.

Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the trade unions called on millions of workers to take part voluntarily in economic construction. The aim was, on the one hand, to fulfil the state production plans, accumulate funds for the enterprises and increase the wealth of the nation, and on the other hand, to raise the workers' wages, introduce labour insurance, and improve working and living conditions. Thus individual interests were linked with those of the country, the improvement of the workers' livelihood with the development of production, the labour movement with the Communist movement, and economic construction with communism. The trade unions, in educating the workers, enabled them to realize that their immediate, partial interests should be subordinated to long-term, overall interests, and that they should struggle bravely for the splendid future of a communist society.

In order to consolidate the Party and strengthen the Party organizations, it was decided at the National Conference on Organizational Work called by the Central Committee of the Party in 1951 that starting from the latter half of the year, all the basic Party organizations should be subject to a general check-up. In consideration of the large number of Party members and the time lag between the liberation of one area and another as well as the varying degrees of ability among the cadres, it was expected that the work of consolidating the Party would take three years to complete. At root, the method was to educate the members of the basic Party organizations in the teachings of communism and the Communist Party, and, with this as a groundwork, to subject each member to a close examination.

After this check-up, the work of Party building was carried out in various areas, thus swelling the ranks of the Party.

Party consolidation and Party building further purified and unified the whole Party ideologically, politically and organizationally and raised still higher its quality and fighting power, thereby enabling the Party the better to lead and organize the work of national construction.

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1 Later the following countries established diplomatic relations with China: Norway, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Nepal, Yemen, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Republic, Cambodia, Iraq, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

2 In view of the changed situation in the Far East subsequent to the armistice in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indo-China and of the strengthening of China's national defence, the Soviet Union and China agreed, on October 12, 1954, that Soviet troops be withdrawn from the naval base of Lushun, and the administration of Talien be entirely handed over to China.

3 A movement against what was known as the "three evils"—corruption, waste and bureaucracy.

4 A campaign against the "five evils"—bribery of government personnel, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing economic information.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN

BASIC VICTORY OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

(1953—June 1956)


After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese revolution passed from the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution to the stage of socialist revolution, that is, it entered the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. Marxism-Leninism holds that there must be a transitional period between capitalist society and socialist society. The existence of such a period is necessary because it requires time to create the economic and cultural conditions essential to the complete victory of socialism, and to transform non-socialist economic factors according to socialist principles. The more backward a country economically and culturally, the longer the transitional period. China needs a fairly long transitional period before she can create the economic and cultural conditions essential to the complete victory of socialism, and transform the vast agriculture and handicrafts based on individual economy as well as capitalist industry and commerce.

As early as 1952, the Central Committee of the Party put forward the general line for the transitional period. In 1954, this line was accepted by the National People's Congress and written into the Constitution. Its realization therefore became the fundamental task of the country in the transitional period.

The general line of the country in the transitional period was to gradually realize the socialist industrialization of the country and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce over a relatively long period of time.

It would have been impossible to build a socialist society in the country without socialist industrialization, because China was economically quite backward. The little industry she had in the past formed only a very small part of the national economy. The proportion of heavy industry was even smaller. It is true that China's economy took a step forward after the period of rehabilitation but she was still a poor, backward agricultural country. It was imperative to carry out socialist industrialization so that China would have a powerful industry capable of producing all kinds of industrial equipment and exclusively socialist in nature.

The development of industry as a whole is based on heavy industry, whose rate of development determines the general rate of industrial progress. Therefore, the key to the socialist industrialization of a country is the development of heavy industry. To carry out socialist industrialization in China, a country with a population of 600
million, the largest in the world, and to give it a comprehensive industrial system, the development of heavy industry had to be given priority.

The national economy is a complex organic whole, which comprises, besides heavy industry, many other economic branches, such as agriculture, light industry, commerce, communications and transport and so on, that supply the people's needs, accumulate funds for construction or engage in reproduction in co-ordination with the entire society. Therefore, while the main emphasis should be laid on the development of heavy industry, each of the above-mentioned branches as well as cultural and educational work must also have a corresponding development according to plan.

The socialist transformation of agriculture and handicrafts was an important part of the primary task in the transitional period. For after the completion of agrarian reform, small-peasant economy still occupied an overwhelmingly dominant position in agriculture. Being scattered and backward, the small-peasant economy held up the development of the agricultural productive forces and the scattered nature of the small commodities produced by such an economy was incompatible with the planned economic construction of the country. Besides, small-peasant economy was unstable, for it constantly led to class differentiation.

Agriculture was a very important branch of the national economy in China. It provided industry with raw materials and grain. The peasants provided the biggest market for manufactured goods, and agricultural produce constituted the bulk of China's exports. Hence, the development of agriculture brought much influence to bear on the growth of industry.

It was clear that small-peasant economy could not produce enough to meet the needs of the state and the people. According to the Marxist theory of reproduction, modern society cannot advance without an annually increasing accumulation, which in turn depends on an annually expanding reproduction. The industry of the country was developed in accordance with the Marxist theory of expanded reproduction, and production was increased every year. However, for the bulk of the small-peasant economy, annual expansion of reproduction was impossible. It is well known that in the national economy a correct proportion must be kept between industry and agriculture. Socialist construction includes both industry and agriculture. To realize socialism, these two economic branches had to be closely linked. Without such a correct proportion, particularly when industry and agriculture were placed on two diametrically opposed economic bases—an advanced socialist industry on the one hand and a scattered, backward agriculture based on small-peasant economy on the other—then the whole national economy was in danger of falling apart, and any idea of building socialism was out of the question.

In transforming an agriculture based on small-peasant economy into a modernized agriculture two roads were open to the Chinese people—the capitalist road and the socialist road. The capitalist road would have hastened the polarization process among the peasants, promoting a handful of speculators and exploiters to the bourgeoisie while consigning the overwhelming majority to the position of the exploited and oppressed. The socialist road consisted in uniting individual peasant households into advanced co-operatives armed with new techniques and entirely socialist in character, thus enabling
the peasant masses to lead a life that was steadily improving in both material welfare and culture. Since China could allow her rural economy neither to remain long as a small-peasant economy, nor to grow spontaneously into a capitalist economy, the only possible course was to carry out the socialist transformation of agriculture, and guide it onto the socialist road.

There was only one way to accomplish the socialist transformation of agriculture—by way of co-operation. First, mutual-aid teams with an embryo of socialism were to be organized. These would then advance to semi-socialist co-operatives and later to fully socialist co-operatives. This development, which would mark the steady increase in the factors of socialism to the stage of complete socialist co-operation, was the way to transform the small-peasant economy of the country.

The handicrafts played and are still playing an important role in the national economy. Handicraftsmen were closely linked with the vast peasant masses and supplied them with the chief tools for production and consumer goods. But handicraft production, being a form of individual economy based on private ownership of the means of production, was short of funds and limited in scale and seriously tainted with conservatism and guildism. As a result, its productive capacity was very low. The individual handicraftsman could neither carry on planned production, nor undertake technical improvements. This naturally led to blind production and speculation, which, besides being detrimental to the producers and consumers, also adversely affected the plan of national construction.

The socialist transformation of handicrafts based on an individual economy was also to be accomplished by way of co-operation, that is, they were to go through the three stages of supply-and-marketing groups, supply-and-marketing co-operatives and producers' co-operatives before the private ownership by individual handicraftsmen could be replaced by collective ownership.

The socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce also constituted an important part of the fundamental task in the transitional period in China. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party towards capitalist industry and commerce was to use, restrict and transform them. It was necessary to use capitalist industry and commerce, because they would help to increase the supply of manufactured goods, accumulate funds for the industrialization of the country, expand the circulation of commodities, provide employment, and train skilled workers and administrative personnel. However, restriction was also necessary because capitalism was always hunting after profit, and its intrinsic mercenary nature would naturally lead to speculative activities and the "five evils." Finally, transformation was of paramount importance because the production relations of capitalism were in conflict with the development of the productive forces, and its anarchy in production was incompatible with the planned development of the socialist economy. Therefore, it was imperative to gradually replace capitalist ownership by ownership by the whole people.

The way to the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce was through state-capitalism. Private capitalism could be guided into the channel of state-capitalism by means of control exercised by the administrative organs of the state, the leadership given by state-

* See note No. 4 on p. 290.
owned economy and supervision by the workers. State-capitalism was a special form of capitalism in which the chief aim of production was to meet the needs of the state and the people, and the capitalists were not allowed unlimited freedom in their pursuit of profit. It had three forms. The elementary form consisted in the exclusive buying and marketing of the products of a private enterprise by the state, the intermediate form in placing state orders for processing and manufacture with private enterprises, and the advanced form in joint state and private ownership and operation.

The transformation of enterprises was to be carried out in conjunction with the remoulding of the individual capitalist and his agents. On the one hand, capitalist enterprises were to be gradually transformed into progressive socialist enterprises; on the other hand, capitalists and their agents were to be remoulded ideologically so that they would, as far as possible, play an active and useful role in the socialist transformation of the country.

The utilization, restriction and transformation of capitalist industry and commerce was a new form of class struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie in the transitional period. The development of a socialist economy and the growing strength of the working class would certainly help to hasten the building of socialism and the elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class.

The First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) for Development of the National Economy was an important step in the realization of the general line laid down by the Party in the transitional period.

At the beginning of 1951, the Chinese Communist Party started drawing up the First Five-Year Plan, and planned economic construction began in 1953. Though many difficulties were encountered in the course of framing this long-term plan for construction, yet, as a result of the two years' practice in economic construction, a wealth of experience had been gained. After many additions and changes, a draft five-year plan was eventually completed. In March 1955, the National Conference of the Chinese Communist Party carefully examined it, and resolved that after necessary revisions by the Central Committee it be submitted to the National People's Congress for deliberation and adoption as a plan for the country. On July 30, 1955, the plan was formally adopted at the Second Session of the First National People's Congress.

The basic tasks outlined in the First Five-Year Plan fell under two headings, the socialist industrialization of the country and the transformation of non-socialist economic factors. It was necessary, in the first place, to lay the preliminary groundwork for China's socialist industrialization by carrying out industrial construction with the chief accent on heavy industry, that is, establishing and expanding such industries as power, coal, oil, iron and steel and non-ferrous metals as well as the basic chemical industries, and establishing machine-building industries and so on. Such being the case, it provided that 40.9 per cent of the total investment should go into industry and that 88.8 per cent of the investment in capital construction of industry was to be devoted to industries manufacturing the means of production. The development of heavy industry was to proceed simultaneously with the setting up of textile and other light industries, communications and transport, as well as medium-sized and small industrial enterprises to serve agriculture.

As a result of implementing this enterprising policy of socialist industrialization, industrial production developed very rapidly. During
the five years, the average annual increase in industrial output would be 14.7 per cent, resulting in a twofold increase by 1957. This rate of development, possible only in socialist countries, was something that the capitalist countries could not even dream of.

Then there was to be the transformation of agriculture and handicrafts based on individual economy and of private industry and commerce. In agriculture, the co-operative movement was to be promoted, and semi-socialist co-operatives were to be used as the chief form to bring about a preliminary transformation of small-peasant economy. On this basis, technical reforms in agriculture would be carried out, the output per unit area increased, and the largest possible amount of waste land reclaimed to ensure the further development of agricultural production. Meanwhile, attention would be paid to developing the potentialities of peasants who worked on their own. It was planned that the average annual increase of agricultural output and that of its side lines would be 4.3 per cent. The measures for transforming capitalist industry and commerce were, according to needs and degrees of possibility, to gradually expand the joint state-private enterprises, increase orders with the private enterprises for processing and manufacture, strengthen the exclusive purchasing and marketing of their products and get the privately owned shops to act as commission agents for state enterprises and state co-operatives, thus laying the groundwork for the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce. It was laid down in the plan that within a five-year period the transformation of private industry and commerce into various forms of state-capitalism should be basically realized all over the country.

With the complete fulfilment of the plan, the value of modern industrial production in the total value of industrial and agricultural output would rise from 26.7 per cent in 1952 to 36 per cent in 1957. The value of the means of production in the total value of industrial production would rise from 39.7 per cent in 1952 to 45.4 per cent in 1957. There would also be a substantial increase in the socialist factor of the economy. The value of output of state-owned, co-operative-owned and joint state-private-owned industries in the total value of industrial output of the country would rise from 61 per cent in 1952 to 87.8 per cent in 1957. Of the total value of retail trade in 1957, the value of the trade handled by state-owned co-operatives and joint state-private enterprises would account for 73.9 per cent.

The Chinese Communist Party, in leading the Chinese people to struggle for the realization of the general line in the transitional period, aimed at building up a great socialist society in China. This would be a broader and more profound revolution than the bourgeois-democratic revolution, as it would result in the complete elimination of exploitation in the country. An acute class struggle was, therefore, unavoidable.

To strengthen the leading role of the Party and consolidate its solidarity and unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism was the fundamental guarantee for the realization of the general line in the transitional period.

In the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in February 1954, warning was given to Party members and non-Party people that the imperialists together with those reactionaries at home who belonged to classes which had been or were being eliminated, would resort to all
means at their disposal to sabotage the cause of the Chinese revolution.

These would-be saboteurs knew very well that the most effective way of undermining the cause of the Chinese people was to attack the Chinese Communist Party by making use of the wavering and untrustworthy elements in the Party. They placed their greatest hopes on a split in the Party and on the Party's degeneration.

The Fourth Plenary Session called on all the members of the Party to heighten their sense of responsibility to the revolution and their vigilance against the enemy's plots as well as against the possible emergence of political careerists in the Party. To strengthen the solidarity of the Party and crush the plots of the enemy, who aimed at destroying and splitting the Party, a struggle had to be waged within the Party against such erroneous ideological tendencies as individualism, liberalism, sectarianism, departmentalism and regionalism, because members with such wrong ideas were liable to be won over and made tools of by the enemy. At the Fourth Plenary Session a final warning was given to the anti-Party elements: whoever deliberately disrupted the solidarity of the Party, resolutely opposed the Party and stubbornly stuck to their own errors, or even stopped so low as to engage in sectarian and splitting activities or other activities detrimental to the interests of the Party, would be severely punished and even expelled from the Party.

The plot of an anti-Party bloc formed by the two political careerists, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, exposed before and after the Fourth Plenary Session, was a sharp reflection of the serious class struggle within the Party.

It was characteristic of this anti-Party bloc that they did not propose any programme against the Central Committee of the Party, but attempted to seize supreme power by conspiratorial means. As they themselves were well aware, all the members of the Party and all the people in the country fully trusted the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. If they came out openly to oppose the leadership of the Central Committee, their true reactionary character would at once be exposed before the whole Party and the whole nation, and they would meet with ignominious defeat.

Therefore they dared not engage publicly in disrupting and splitting the Party. Instead, they took to double-dealing, professing loyalty to the correct line laid down by the Party, but in reality surreptitiously attempting to realize their own political ambitions. They carried on sectarian activities, spread rumours and made false accusations, created enmity by inciting people against each other, tried to win followers by bribery, and sowed dissension within the Party whenever an opportunity offered itself. They opposed the unified leadership of the Party and regarded the areas or departments under their leadership as "independent kingdoms." All this was in preparation for the usurpation of supreme power of the Party and the state. By resorting to the type of intrigue and machinations practised by the landlords and bourgeoisie, they proved themselves to be an entirely unprincipled bloc of conspirators, which arose within the Party under the special conditions of class struggle at that time. There was no getting away from the fact that their anti-Party activities suited the desires of the imperialists and bourgeois reactionaries. And, if the supreme power of the Party and the state had fallen into the hands of these conspirators, it would have paved the way for the restoration of the reactionary regime. Hence they were, in
fact, acting as agents of the imperialists and of the bourgeoisie within the Party.

From the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party held in February 1954 to the National Conference of the Party in March 1955, the whole Party, under the leadership of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, completely exposed the plot of this anti-Party bloc of Kao Kang and Jao Shushih, and smashed it to pieces.

2. PEACE POLICY OF CHINA. STRUGGLE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE FOR THE LIBERATION OF TAIWAN. FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Chinese people want to build their motherland into a great socialist country. They are engaged in peaceful labour and need a peaceful international situation.

Ever since the People's Republic of China was established, she has been closely allied with the great Soviet Union and the other People's Democracies in a common effort to safeguard world peace and prevent aggressive war. She has strengthened peaceful co-operation with countries in Southeast Asia and other neighbouring countries, and established normal relations with some of the Western countries. She is willing to normalize relations and develop trade with Japan, and to establish relations of peaceful co-operation with all countries in Europe, America, Australia and Africa.

China has made unremitting efforts to safeguard world peace and ease international tensions. To oppose the imperialist aggression against Korea, the Chinese people launched the great Resist-U.S.-and-Aid-Korea Movement, and the struggle waged by the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army compelled the United States to accept an armistice in July 1953. China, the Soviet Union and other countries took part in the Geneva Conference, and, clearing away the obstruction put up by the United States Government, finally brought about an agreement on the question of restoring peace in Indo-China. This conference eased international tension and consolidated world peace. In June 1954, the Chinese premier held separate talks with the Indian and the Burmese premiers, and the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, were laid down and confirmed as the basic principles guiding Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese relations. These principles have gained popular support all over the world.

The U.S. aggressors, however, consistently pursued a policy of war and aggression. They formed various military and political blocs and alliances for aggression. In Europe, the U.S., British and French imperialists established the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and reached an agreement in Paris which paved the way for the revival of German militarism and drew West Germany into the aggressive military bloc of the Western countries.

In Asia, the United States called an eight-nation conference in Manila at which the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty was concluded. This was, in fact, a military alliance among the colonial countries, aimed at spreading feelings of hostility against the People's
Republic of China, interfering in the internal affairs of the Asian countries and creating new tension. Backed by this military alliance, the U.S. aggressors tried to impose their will on the Asian peoples and suppress their liberation movements.

The U.S. aggressors had attempted armed intervention in China from three bases—Taiwan, Korea and Indo-China. After the flames of war in Korea and Indo-China had been put out, the U.S. aggressors intensified their war preparations and subversive activities against China through the Chiang Kai-shek clique entrenched in Taiwan. On December 2, 1954, they signed the “Mutual Defence Pact” with the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek gang, and even attempted to rally the reactionary elements in Japan and South Korea together with the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek gang, into a “Northeast Asia defence alliance,” to be linked up with the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty Organization, with a view to stepping up armed intervention in China.

Taiwan is an inalienable part of China; no aggression by the U.S. imperialists shall be tolerated. The liberation of Taiwan is a matter concerning China’s sovereignty and China’s internal affair; no interference by the U.S. imperialists shall be tolerated. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. As long as Taiwan remains unliberated, there will be no territorial integrity for China, no tranquil environment for her peaceful construction, and no security for peace in the Far East or throughout the world. To infringe on other countries’ sovereign rights, to occupy their territory and to interfere in their internal affairs is to endanger world peace, while the Chinese people’s just struggle for the liberation of Taiwan and against the aggression of the United States is to safeguard world peace. On August 11, 1954, the Central People’s Government of China called on the whole nation to struggle for the liberation of Taiwan and bring to a victorious conclusion the sacred cause of national liberation. In response to this call, all the democratic parties and people’s organizations of China issued a joint statement on August 22, declaring solemnly to the whole world that Taiwan was a part of China’s territory, and that the Chinese people were determined to liberate Taiwan. This was a manifestation of the determination and firm stand of the 600 million people of China.

To prepare for the liberation of Taiwan and to safeguard peace, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army had launched fierce attacks on the positions of the Chiang Kai-shek troops on Tachen, Quemoy and Yikiangshan Islands from November 1954 onwards. Yikiangshan Island was liberated on January 19, 1955 and Tachen Island on February 13. These victories were of great significance for the final liberation of Taiwan and fully testified to the fact that no force was strong enough to obstruct the Chinese people in their just struggle for the liberation of Taiwan and other islands off the mainland.

The Chinese people always advocated peace and made all efforts to achieve peace. The Chinese Government time and again pointed out that alongside the use of force, the possibility also existed of liberating Taiwan by peaceful means. It appealed to the patriotism of all the responsible military and administrative personnel of the Kuomintang in Taiwan and called on them to help bring about the peaceful liberation of Taiwan. One thing, however, was made clear. No matter what means were adopted, the liberation of Taiwan remained China’s internal affair. No interference from a third party would be tolerated.
The development of the economic construction of China and the improvement of the people's livelihood cannot be separated from the ever-increasing consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship and the growing comprehensiveness of the state apparatus.

In the first few years after the liberation, when conditions were not yet ripe for the convening of the people's congresses at various levels, the Chinese Government adopted the provisional measure of convoking local people's representative conferences at various levels to function, step by step, as local people's congresses and to elect the local people's governments at various levels. In 1953, elections based on universal franchise were held in various parts of the country. After the elections at the basic level were accomplished, the local people's congresses at various levels were convoked at which deputies to the congresses at and above the county level were elected. Deputies to the National People's Congress were elected on this basis.

On September 15, 1954, the First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China was held in Peking. The task of building China into a socialist country was given legal form and written into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. The Constitution clearly defines the social, economic and political systems of China in the transitional period, thus ensuring the complete victory of the socialist construction in the country. The Constitution is directed towards the realization of socialism in China. In other words, it is a constitution for the building of socialism, embodying in legal form the basic interests and aspirations of the Chinese people.

(1) The Constitution lays down the steps and measures for the transition to socialism in the country. Article 4 of the Constitution states:

The People's Republic of China, by relying on the organs of state and the social forces, and by means of socialist industrialization and socialist transformation, ensures the gradual abolition of systems of exploitation and the building of a socialist society.

To implement the policy laid down in this article, many provisions are made in other articles in Chapter One, which form the essential part of the Constitution.

The question revolves around the proper form of transition in the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce, and around the realization of socialism by peaceful means.

First, to build a socialist society means to replace all forms of non-socialist ownership by socialist ownership, which is finally to become the sole form of ownership in the country. It is clearly stated in the Constitution that besides the state sector of the economy which is owned by the whole people and socialist in character, and the co-operative sector of the economy which is either socialist or semi-socialist in character according to the degree of collective ownership by the working masses, there exist in the country ownership by individual working people and capitalist ownership, both of which are forms of private ownership. The Constitution stipulates that the state protects the right of individual working people to own land, means of production, and other property according to law. At the same time, it encourages them to organize themselves step by
step into co-operatives voluntarily and to pass through partial collective ownership to complete collective ownership. The state protects the right of capitalists to own means of production and other property according to law. At the same time, it encourages capitalist industry and commerce to transform themselves gradually into various forms of state-capitalist economy, and finally into socialist economy owned by the whole people.

For the socialist transformation of agriculture and handicrafts, the chief transitional form is the co-operative based on the partial collective ownership by the working masses, like the elementary agricultural producers' co-operative characterized by the pooling of land and unified management. The transitional form for the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce is state-capitalism. That these transitional forms were written into the Constitution had profound bearing on the socialist transformation of the country.

Secondly, as laid down in the Constitution, the socialist transformation of the national economy of the country shall be realized by peaceful means. In the General Principles of the Constitution it is stated that "the People's Republic of China is a people's democratic state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants." This clearly shows the basic social relations and class relations in the country. The people's democratic state is the most important guarantee for China's peaceful transition to socialism. The state system of the people's democracy led by the working class was established and China's socialist state economy expanded daily, becoming the leading force in the whole sphere of the national economy and ousting capitalism from the dominant position. Besides, there existed the alliance between the working class and the national bourgeoisie. Such a state apparatus and social forces could be relied upon to realize the socialist transformation of the country step by step. Of course, class struggle would be inevitable in the course of the restriction and subsequent elimination of capitalism, but the control exercised by government administration, the leadership of the state-owned economy and supervision by the working masses, made it possible to realize the aim of peaceful struggle.

(2) The Constitution stipulates that the state system is the system of the people's congresses. The first two articles in Chapter One state that "the People's Republic of China is a people's democratic state," and "all power in the state belongs to the people." Since the ruling power is held in the hands of the people, it was necessary for them to adopt proper organizational forms to establish state organs and to exercise this power. The people's congress is the basic form of the state organs.

The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state authority and the only legislative body. All the central organs of state are created by it, supervised by it, and may be removed by it. It decides on national economic plans, examines and approves the state budget and the financial report, decides on general amnesties, questions of war and peace, and other important matters of state. It unites the legislative and the executive powers of the state and achieves the concentration of state power in a high degree.

The power exercised by the people's congresses comes directly from the people, as the deputies are elected on the basis of universal suffrage. These congresses fully represent the will of the people and ensure that all power belongs to the people.
In the state organs, all of which stem from the people’s congresses, the principle that local governments are subordinated to the Central Government and governments of a lower level to those of a higher level is adhered to so as to guarantee the centralized and unified leadership of the Central Government in the whole country. According to this principle of centralized and unified leadership, all the laws and decrees enacted by the National People’s Congress and all the national economic plans and policies for national construction decided by it are to be strictly observed and carried out by all the state organs.

The Constitution also makes suitable provisions on the functions and powers of the local people’s congresses and the local people’s councils at various levels and of the organs of self-government in autonomous regions. This is to ensure that in carrying out the tasks and plans prescribed for the whole nation, the initiative of the various localities can be brought into full play.

That the state organs are to carry out the wishes of the people, that government workers are to serve the people loyally, and not to lord it over them or play the bureaucrat by utterly disregarding their welfare—all this is given full guarantee in Chapter One of the Constitution dealing with general principles.

These provisions show that the state structure and systems had become more complete, the people’s democratic life more developed. They ensure that in the great cause of building socialism the country can unite and mobilize all social forces, give free play to the enthusiasm and creativeness of the masses and of all local state organs and on this basis, exercise highly centralized and unified leadership.

Many articles of the Constitution contain provisions concerning the rights and freedoms enjoyed by the people.

The fundamental rights and duties of citizens as defined in the Constitution show the superiority of the system of people’s democracy. The Constitution stipulates the following rights and freedom of the people while participating in the administration of state affairs and engaging in political activities. They enjoy freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and demonstration. They have the right to lodge complaints against any government worker for transgression of law or neglect of duty. They have the right to vote and to stand for election. Their freedom of person and their homes are inviolable. Their rights to take part in productive labour and cultural activities are also defined. They have the right to work and receive education. Working people have the right to rest and leisure and are entitled to material assistance in old age and in case of illness or disability. All citizens enjoy freedom of religious belief.

On the other hand, every citizen is expected to discharge his duties voluntarily. These duties include observing the Constitution and the law, adhering to labour discipline, keeping public order, respecting social ethics, respecting and protecting public property, and, according to law, paying taxes, performing military service and defending the motherland.

The rights and duties of citizens are united and indivisible. Duties without rights are unthinkable, just as are rights without duties. Every citizen is entitled to full enjoyment of his rights, but it is also obligatory for him to discharge his duties conscientiously.

(3) It is laid down in the Constitution that all nationalities should co-operate with and help each other on a basis of friendship and
equality. The rights of the national minorities to self-government and to the political, economic and cultural development of their own nationalities in keeping with the national construction of the motherland shall be safeguarded.

Article 3 of the General Principles stipulates that all the nationalities are equal. Discrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality, and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities, are prohibited.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, all nationalities in the country were integrated into one great family of free and equal nations. New relations of friendship and co-operation were established between them. The successes in this field are reflected in the Constitution, which states in the Preamble:

... This unity of China's nationalities will continue to gain in strength, founded as it is on ever-growing friendship and mutual aid among themselves, and on the struggle against imperialism, against public enemies of the people within the nationalities, and against both dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism....

The Constitution guarantees the friendship, mutual aid and co-operation between the nationalities on a footing of equality.

Section V of Chapter Two of the Constitution provides for regional autonomy for the national minorities, that is, for the establishment of autonomous regions, autonomous chou, or autonomous counties in areas where the national minorities live in compact communities and the setting up of organs of self-government so that the people of these areas may exercise their right to autonomy within the limits of the authority prescribed by the Constitution and the law, and promote their political, economic and cultural development according to their own national characteristics, by measures and steps acceptable to themselves.

It is pointed out in the Preamble of the Constitution that the solid unity of all the nationalities within the country is an important condition for implementing the fundamental task of the country in the transitional period. The consolidation and development of the friendship, mutual aid and co-operation between the various nationalities will further strengthen the people's democratic dictatorship and advance the cause of socialism.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the superstructure of a society is a product of its economic basis, but that once it is formed, it can react upon and further the development of the economic basis. The constitution of a country is an important form of superstructure which actively safeguards and develops the established economic basis. That is why the Constitution of the People's Republic of China has become a most effective weapon in the struggle for the building of socialism and a happy life for the people.

At the National People's Congress, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people, was elected Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Comrades Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Chen Yun, and other leading members of various nationalities, democratic classes and democratic parties, were also elected or assigned important leading posts in the government.
3. NATION-WIDE RISE IN THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

The winter of 1955 and the first half of 1956 witnessed a rise of socialist revolution, which appeared first in the countryside.

The rapid speed of the country's industrial development called for a proper pace in agriculture. For socialist industrialization could not be carried out independently of agricultural co-operation. A policy had, therefore, to be adopted to co-ordinate the nation's agricultural co-operation with the socialist industrialization. If the over 500 million peasants had not been enlisted to participate in the socialist construction, there would have been a lag in the production of grain and industrial raw materials, and the industrialization of the country would have run into great difficulties.

Before the high tide of agricultural co-operation set in, the majority of peasants had already displayed initiative in taking the socialist path. First, while the livelihood of the broad peasant masses had somewhat improved after the agrarian reform, there were still many among them who were not well-off because of the insufficiency of cultivated land, the frequent natural calamities, the backwardness in farming methods, and so on. This explains why the great majority of peasants were so keen on taking the socialist path. Secondly, the national economy of the country under the direction of the First Five-Year Plan was making gigantic strides, especially in socialist industrialization. That, too, provided an impetus to agricultural co-operation. Thirdly, the movement for mutual aid and co-operation had already been going on for a number of years. Many of the co-operatives which had been established in various places had demonstrated their superiority in the increase of production and won the admiration of large sections of peasants. The movement for mutual aid and co-operation that was spreading throughout the country had furnished an organizational basis for the development of the co-operatives. The peasants displayed great enthusiasm in setting up these co-operatives, sometimes going ahead spontaneously without having received approval from the leadership. These were the objective conditions that made possible the rise of agricultural co-operation.

However, on this question of agricultural co-operation, there were some Right conservative ideas in the Party which showed lack of confidence in the peasants' initiative in taking the socialist path, nor in the strength of the Party's leadership in the countryside. Members having such conservative ideas disapproved of the policy of the Central Committee of the Party which demanded that the nation's agricultural co-operation keep fitting pace with the development of socialist industrialization. They claimed, instead, that agricultural co-operation should be developed at a much slower rate than industrialization. Thus, in their practical work they adopted a line of "compression" and dissolved a large number of agricultural producers' co-operatives.

In his report, "The Question of Agricultural Co-operation," given at a conference of secretaries of the provincial, municipal and autonomous regional committees of the Chinese Communist Party, in July 1955, Comrade Mao Tse-tung subjected this type of Right, erroneous ideas and actions to a searching, comprehensive criticism and laid down the correct policy and procedure for the development of the agricultural co-operative movement. This policy and procedure were adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee convened in October and written down as decisions of the
Concerning the policy for the development of the co-operative movement in agriculture, it was stated that there should be comprehensive planning and more active leadership. To put comprehensive planning into practice, the Central Committee of the Party divided the country into three different kinds of regions. The first was where the development of mutual-aid and co-operative movement had made comparative headway; the second, where the movement had just begun to develop; and the third, where the movement was rather weak. Attention had to be given to the differences between these regions, and the speed of development of the co-operative movement adjusted to the different conditions.

In carrying out the work of planning, special care had to be given to plans for townships or villages, since these would be the basis of comprehensive planning.

To strengthen the leadership, the Central Committee of the Party instructed local Party committees at all levels to concentrate their efforts on leading the agricultural co-operative movement. They had to realize the great importance of rural problems and earnestly improve the art of leadership in rural work.

Concerning the procedure for the development of the agricultural co-operative movement, there had to be a strong nucleus consisting of the activists from the poor peasants and the lower section of the new middle peasants, and including some of the activists from the lower section of the old middle peasants. The peasant masses had to be organized in the following manner. First, full deliberation and discussion; then division according to the level of their political consciousness into groups that would set up co-operatives or be accepted into co-operatives that already existed. Those who did not wish to join a co-operative for the time being should be allowed to remain outside.

When the co-operatives were organized, the well-to-do middle peasants, apart from those who really wanted to join of their own accord, were not to be taken in for the time being, least of all forced in. Good relations were to be established with the middle peasants, whether or not they belong to a co-operative, and their interests were never to be damaged.

Before the co-operatives were organized, preparations were to be made in laying an ideological foundation among the masses and in the matter of organization and cadres. With the co-operatives formed, the work of checking-up was to be carried out. They were to be checked over not once, but two or three times a year, so that they would be steadily improved and consolidated. During the setting-up or checking-up of a co-operative, the members' private property (land, draught animals and farm implements) was to be dealt with in such a way as to benefit the development and consolidation of the co-operative.

Agricultural producers' co-operatives were to work out a series of measures concerning production plans, organization of labour, financial management and ideological work to ensure the development of agricultural productive forces.

Only when co-operation had largely obtained in a certain district and the co-operatives were already consolidated, were the former landlords and rich peasants who had long given up their exploitation and were engaged in honest labour to be admitted, and this was to be done in separate groups, at various periods and under specific
conditions.

The Right erroneous ideas having been rectified, the Party's correct policy and procedure took hold of the masses, and within a few months the countryside witnessed a high tide in agricultural co-operation. By June 1956, 91.7 per cent of the Chinese peasant households had joined the co-operatives and the biggest bulk of them had joined the advanced ones. In the vast expansion of the movement it was not only the broad mass of the poor peasants who actively joined the co-operatives, but also many of the middle peasants. The demand was not limited to individual peasant households but often made in common by whole villages and districts, and by the whole strata of the poor peasants and the lower middle peasants. The co-operative movement rose to unprecedented dimensions.

With the rise in agricultural co-operation came a high tide in the socialist transformation of private capitalist industry and commerce in the city. The events of the day brought home to the bourgeoisie the truth that only when they had further accepted socialist transformation and linked their interests with those of the country could they become masters of their destiny. The situation had developed as follows: (1) Since 1953, the state had carried out planned purchase and supply of grain and other important agricultural products and fixed reasonable prices for them, thus virtually ridding the market of capitalist speculation in these commodities. (2) The tremendous progress in the country's industrialization enabled the socialist sector of the economy to expand rapidly, while the proportion of the capitalist sector in the national economy as a whole became smaller every day. (3) With the development of the agricultural co-operative movement, the broad peasant masses had finally abandoned the capitalist for the socialist path. It was under these circumstances that the high tide in the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce came about at the beginning of 1956.

During the first few years in the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, most of the private enterprises took the intermediate form of state-capitalism by accepting government contracts for the processing and manufacture of goods. Beginning from 1954 the state had systematically transformed capitalist industry through the form of joint state-private enterprises. Most of the big private enterprises thus became joint enterprises. But this was no longer adequate. It was now not only individual factories and shops which made the change-over, but whole trades of industry and commerce. This placing of whole trades under joint state-private ownership was a new form in the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce.

First, the change-over by whole trades to joint state-private enterprises was superior to that by individual factories and shops. For it cut through the boundaries between factories, merging many of them into one enterprise so that the state's policy of unified planning and over-all arrangement could be applied to the production of such an enterprise. In carrying out the transformation of whole trades according to the socialist principle, the labour power, technical personnel, equipment and installations, funds and cadres of various enterprises could be apportioned in a unified manner and utilized rationally, so as to raise the labour productivity. In short, the change-over by whole trades to joint state-private enterprises was the highest form of state-capitalism.

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Secondly, with the development of the form of joint state-private ownership, the method of redemption changed. Before the change-over to joint state-private enterprises by whole trades, redemption took the form of profit distribution; after the change-over, it took the form of fixed interest. In the period of joint state-private management, the interest on the private shares of the capitalists was fixed at a definite rate. On February 8, 1956, the State Council stipulated that the annual interest should be 1.6 per cent. On June 18, the State Council fixed the annual interest uniformly at 5 per cent. With the introduction of fixed interest, the capitalist would receive a definite sum as dividend whether the business was making or losing money. In this way, the state would pay every year a certain amount of cash (dividends) to the capitalists as a price for purchase of their enterprises until the conditions were ripe for nationalization. On the other hand, the capitalists and their associates who could work would be assigned posts by the state, and for those who could not, suitable arrangements would be made. This constituted a necessary part of the buying-over.

The system of fixed interest imposed strict restraint on the capitalists' exploitation of the working class. Thus, in the joint state-private enterprises that adopted the system, there was a profound change in the relations of production. The capitalists' ownership in the joint enterprises manifested itself only in the fixed interest they received. They could not assume direct control of the joint enterprises, nor could they sell them. The means of production were under the direct control of the state. The capitalist took part in the management of the enterprises not as capitalist but as ordinary personnel under the leadership of the state.

The state's direct control of the means of production of the enterprises, the administration and management of the enterprises according to socialist principles and the fixing of the capitalists' dividends at a definite rate made this type of enterprises semi-socialist in nature. When capitalist industry and commerce took this decisive step, it meant socialism had replaced capitalism.

Thirdly, after the placing of whole trades under joint state-private ownership, special state-owned companies were set up to accomplish certain economic and political tasks. Their economic task was to make an inventory of the properties and reorganize the enterprises. In a directive issued by the State Council on February 8, 1956, it was stipulated that the inventory and assessment of the existing properties of joint state-private enterprises was to be done according to fair and reasonable principles. It was further stipulated that when private enterprises had obtained approval to become joint state-private enterprises, sufficient preparations were to be made before changing the original system of production and management. The political task of the special companies was to remould the bourgeois elements. A positive method of education was adopted towards the capitalists. They were encouraged to study Marxism-Leninism, take part in social reform movements and practise criticism and self-criticism among themselves, so as to gradually change their outlook from that of exploiters to that of working people who live on their own labour.

Transformation of the enterprises was combined with ideological remoulding. Only when the enterprises were transformed did the bourgeois elements come to realize the evils of capitalist management and control. And nothing short of ideological remoulding
would make them abandon their ideas of exploitation, change from exploiters to labourers and actively join in transforming the enterprises, thus reducing the obstructions in the path of future nationalization.

As a result of the establishment of a long-term united front with the bourgeoisie by the working class, the increasing consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship and the Party's adoption of a policy of step-by-step transformation and buying-over, the general trend of events was in favour of the national bourgeoisie accepting peaceful transformation.

Beginning from January 1956, the movement for the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce in the country surged forward at an amazing speed. Within a few months, all the private industrial and commercial enterprises in large and medium-sized cities throughout the country had become joint state-private enterprises, and all the handicrafts in these areas had formed co-operatives.

Thus, with the rise of the socialist transformation of agriculture in the countryside, over 91 per cent of the total peasant households of the country joined the agricultural producers' co-operatives. With the high tide of the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce and of private handicrafts, all the private industry and commerce in large and medium-sized cities were placed under joint state-private ownership, and all the private handicrafts organized into producers' co-operatives.

These great successes meant that capitalism had lost not only its foothold in the countryside with the disappearance of the small-peasant economy but the position it had in the cities as well. The socialist revolution in the ownership of the means of production was, in the main, completed in the country. Thus the revolution to eliminate capitalism by peaceful means was realized. This great contribution was an illustration of the brilliant application by the Chinese Communist Party of the Marxist-Leninist theory of peaceful transformation.

The basic victory of the socialist revolution on the economic front did not mean the completion of the socialist revolution. Still less did it mean that class struggle had come to an end. The socialist revolution is the most profound and far-reaching revolution in history; it is, politically, economically and ideologically, the most thoroughgoing revolution. The change in the system of ownership did not bring the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class to an end. The struggle between the two roads—socialism versus capitalism—remains a long-term struggle. That is why apart from the completion of the socialist revolution on the economic front, a thoroughgoing socialist revolution had to be carried out on the political and ideological fronts so as to consolidate the socialist system and achieve the complete victory of the socialist revolution. This is the historic mission of the Party during the whole transitional period.

1 The Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China provides for direct elections at the basic level of state power in townships, towns, municipal districts and in municipalities not divided into districts, and for indirect elections from the county level up.

2 Old, middle peasants are those who were middle peasants before the agrarian reform. New middle peasants are those who have risen to the standard of middle peasants since the agrarian reform.
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It is a good introduction to Marxian economics and as such should be of immense help to the younger generation of Marxists who aspire to enter the formidable portals of Marx's *Capital*. In our days when Marxism-Leninism is being attacked not only by our class enemies but also by the revisionists who substitute a fake analysis of capitalist society in place of the scientific one given by Marx, it is all the more necessary to master Marx's doctrine.

According to Leontiev, it is the development of the mode of production and exchange i.e. the economic development of society, which is the basis of the whole of social development. From this historical materialist standpoint, Leontiev shows how Marxism investigates the laws of development of capitalist society, and discovers in the production of surplus value, the key to understanding the capitalist economic system.

Here Leontiev makes it clear how Marxism thus exposing the essential nature of the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class, and by doing so, it arms the working class with an economic theory which enables us to understand the laws of development of capitalism, to see where capitalism comes from and where it is leading, to realize the nature of the class struggle of the working class against the capitalist class, and the historic mission of the working class to take power, expropriate the capitalists and build socialism.

With study questions at the end of each chapter.
ON CHINESE REVOLUTION  JOSEPH STALIN

A collection of Stalin’s speeches and articles on China in the years 1926-7 which are of profound significance as providing the theoretical foundations of the policy of Communism in relation to China, and thereby of understanding the revolutionary tasks throughout the whole of the colonial and semi-colonial world.

They should be read in association with the study of Lenin’s policy in the 1905 Revolution in Russia, as set forth in *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. Stalin applies and develops Lenin’s ideas in considering the tasks of the revolution in China.

In the period 1926-7, with which Stalin was dealing, the revolutionary national armies of the Kuomintang were overcoming the armies of the reactionary warlords and generals backed by the imperialists. There was a great rise in the united anti-imperialist struggle of the bloc of workers, peasants and national bourgeoisie. But precisely in this period of the victory of the Kuomintang armies, the right wing leaders of the Kuomintang turned against the revolution and entered into a compact with imperialism against the revolution.

Stalin’s whole approach is based on the recognition of the need (1) to take into account the special national peculiarities of China; (2) to win all possible allies at each stage of the revolution; (3) to adapt slogans to the changing situation in order to lead the masses and enable them to learn from their own experience at each stage.

As regards the policy of the imperialists in China, he stresses that imperialist intervention takes the form not only of foreign invasion, but also of the use of home-bred reactionaries, “intervention by means of catspaws.”
ANARCHISM OR SOCIALISM? JOSEPH STALIN

This article was written by young Stalin when he was leading the party in Transcaucasia. At that time a group of anarchists was disrupting the Transcaucasian workers' organizations, and Stalin set out to explain the ideas of Marxism in opposition to those of the anarchists. The book was addressed to the ordinary rank and file workers, and contains a very simple and popular exposition of the fundamentals of Marxist theory; it is a model of how profound questions of theory should be linked with the immediate tasks of the working class struggle.

The book consists of three short chapters. The first two deal respectively with the dialectical method and the materialist theory. Here are set forth the same ideas which Stalin was to elaborate more fully in his Dialectical and Historical Materialism.

The third chapter deals with socialism. Stalin here explains the nature of capitalism, the nature of the future socialist society and of the transition from socialism to communism, the grounds for maintaining the inevitability of the advance to socialism, the nature of the working class struggle, the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the tasks of the working class party.