FIFTY YEARS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the people's own army—an armed force of workers and peasants created and built up by Chairman Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Communist Party. August 1, 1977 marked this army's 50th birthday. Commemorating this glorious anniversary, the Party, the army and China's multi-nationality people celebrated with various festivities. Many recollections appeared in the press. Here we present in translation some of the main articles, including the full text of a speech by Yeh Chien-ying, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the C.P.C. Central Committee and Minister of National Defence, at a Peking rally to observe the occasion.

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Comrades:

It is now 50 years since the birth of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, founded and nurtured by our great leader and teacher, Chairman Mao Tsetung. We are overjoyed today as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of our army's founding at a time when we are cheering the great victory of our Party's 11th two-line struggle.

With the spread of Marxism-Leninism in China in 1919, the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921 and the birth of the people's army under Communist Party leadership in 1927, the Chinese people took their destiny into their own hands. The Chinese nation's centuries-long history of untold suffering was nearing its end; a new China was dawning, a China of which countless people with lofty ideas had long dreamed and for whose sake they laid down their lives.

The Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927 signalled the beginning of armed revolution led independently by the Chinese Communist Party. It fired the first shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries and raised the bright banner of armed struggle for the whole Party and the people throughout the country. However, it was the
Autumn Harvest Uprising and the march to the Ching-kang Mountains under the personal charge of Chairman Mao that brought this uprising to fruition and marked the great beginning of victory in the people's armed revolution. Chairman Mao founded the first contingent of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and established the first rural revolutionary base area. This new path blazed by him, the encirclement of the cities from the countryside and the seizure of political power by armed force, was a great innovation in the history of proletarian revolution.

Vivid yet those crowded months and years.* The young people of 50 years ago are now grey-haired. And many who led the revolution at that time have passed away. But the revolutionary cause for which they fought all their lives has yielded rich results.

We infinitely cherish the memory of our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Tsetung, the founder of our Party, our army and our People's Republic!

We infinitely cherish the memory of our esteemed and beloved Premier Chou En-lai, Chairman Chu Teh of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and Vice-Chairman Kang Sheng of the Party Central Committee, who dedicated their lives to the Chinese people's revolutionary cause; our esteemed and beloved Vice-Chairman of the N.P.C. Standing Committee, Tung Pi-wu, who together with Chairman Mao was a founder of our Party; and Comrades Ho Lung, Chen Yi, Lo Jung-huan and Yeh Ting,* and Fang Chih-min,** Liu Chih-tan*** and other proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation who made outstanding contributions to founding and expanding our army!

Eternal glory to the comrades who laid down their lives in the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the Canton† Uprising and the uprisings in many other areas, to the martyrs who died heroically in the Chinese people's war of liberation and the people's revolution! Eternal glory to Comrade Norman Bethune and many other internationalist fighters who laid down their lives for the Chinese people's revolutionary cause.

Comrades:

The history of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in its 50 years has been a magnificent epic of victories won under the great banner of Chairman Mao over powerful enemies both at home and abroad; it is also a history of the victory of Chairman Mao's correct political and military line over "Left" and Right opportunist lines. A fundamental issue in our Party's struggles — from those against Chen Tu-hsiu, Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-tao to those against Peng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao "gang of four" — has been whether to wage armed struggle and whether to have an army placed under the absolute leadership of the Party, an army which always maintains its proletarian character.

* From Chairman Mao's poem, "Changsha — to the tune of Chin Yuan Chun."
** See article on pp. 162-69.
*** See article on pp. 170-75.
† Now generally transliterated as Kwangchow.
Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution in 1927 and plunged the workers and peasants in a bloodbath. Was there hope for the Chinese revolution? And whither should it go? These were grave questions facing the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people. Chairman Mao set forth the famous thesis that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” The enemy resorted to White terror in their determination to annihilate us. Why shouldn’t we resolve to annihilate them? The enemy could kill us because they had swords and guns in their hands. Why couldn’t we seize arms from the enemy or make them ourselves? Guided by Mao Tsetung Thought, the Communists and revolutionary masses took up arms and went to the mountains or lakes, using armed revolution against armed counter-revolution. As Chairman Mao pointed out: “Having learned a bitter lesson from the failure of the revolution, the Party organized the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Canton Uprising, and entered on a new period, the founding of the Red Army. That was the crucial period in which our Party arrived at a thorough understanding of the importance of the army.”

Making a scientific, Marxist analysis of the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, the contradictions between the imperialist powers and between the various cliques of warlords in China and the uneven political and economic development of contemporary Chinese society, Chairman Mao foresaw the protracted nature of the Chinese revolution. He took full account of the peasants’ enthusiasm for the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, and charted the course of building strength and using armed force to establish workers’ and peasants’ independent regimes in the countryside, where reactionary rule was weak, and encircling the cities from the rural areas, and finally taking the cities and seizing political power throughout the country.

This brilliant concept of Chairman Mao was decisive for the victory of the Chinese revolution. It opposed both Chen Tu-hsiu’s Right capitulationism and “Left” adventurism. The lines of Chu Chi-pai, Li Li-san and Wang Ming all proved impractical and ended in defeat. The way indicated by Chairman Mao proved the only correct one leading to victory.

A single spark can start a prairie fire. With the proletarian vanguard, the Communist Party, as the leader, the vast expanse of the countryside as base and the peasants as the main force, an agrarian revolution was carried out, an army was formed, cadres were trained and political power was established. These conditions made it possible for revolutionary base areas to grow in both size and numbers by advancing wave upon wave. The prolonged revolutionary wars were thus sustained, the people’s army developed and grew in strength while the enemy was gradually weakened and finally annihilated.

It was precisely by following this course charted by Chairman Mao that the Chinese people created the People’s Republic of China out of the barrel of a gun after 22 years of revolutionary war. The victory of the revolution in a large country of several hundred million people changed the situation in the East and the world as a whole. It was a momentous event of world significance following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution led by Lenin.

Chairman Mao pointed out: “Without a people’s army the people have nothing.” “Without armed struggle neither the proletariat, nor the people, nor the Commu-
nist Party would have any standing at all in China and it would be impossible for the revolution to triumph.” It is clear that without a powerful People’s Liberation Army led by the Party and armed with Mao Tsetung Thought, the old China could not have been destroyed and the new China established, and even if it had been, it could not have been consolidated. The presence of such a People’s Liberation Army is also a vital reason why in the 28 years since the liberation we have been able to succeed in the socialist revolution and socialist construction, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the struggle which smashed the “gang of four,” and to ensure stability across the land.

The victory of the Chinese people should be attributed to our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao. His banner is the banner of unity and victory. It is thanks to him that our Party has become a great, glorious and correct Party. Thanks to him, too, our army has become a great and invincible people’s army. Just as Engels said in eulogizing Marx: If it had not been for him, we should all still be groping in a maze of confusion. The immense contributions of Chairman Mao are immortal.

Chairman Mao was the greatest Marxist of our time. Integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, he inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism in all respects. His military thinking has tremendously enriched the treasure-house of Marxist-Leninist military theory; it is a never failing source of victory for us. It is a powerful ideological weapon for the oppressed people and nations to defeat the enemy and win liberation.

Important in Chairman Mao’s military thinking is his concept of the people’s army. The resolution of the Ku-

tient Congress, a programmatic document drafted by Chairman Mao, made Marxism-Leninism the sole basis for building our army into a new-type people’s army different from every old-type army. Chairman Mao continuously developed his concept of the people’s army in the practice of protracted revolutionary struggle.

Our army is under the absolute leadership of the Communist Party of China. It has political commissars and political organizations, with the Party branch organized on a company basis, and applies the system of division of labour among the leading cadres working under the collective leadership of the Party committee. This is something that never happened nor could have happened before in China’s history. By relying on the leadership of the Party and following its correct line, our army has been able to maintain its character as a proletarian people’s army and avoid becoming an instrument of bourgeois careerists and conspirators. It is easier to rock a mountain than the Liberation Army. This is why no one, from Chang Kuo-tao to Lin Piao and the “gang of four,” has ever been able to destroy it.

Our army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Apart from the main task of fighting, it also shoulders other tasks as a political work force and a production corps. “Every man . . . becomes able not only to fight and do mass work but also to produce.” In his “May 7 Directive” of 1966 which gives the orientation for building our army during the period of socialism, Chairman Mao stated that our army should be a great school. Apart from fighting, it should do various kinds of work and always be ready to participate in the struggle to criticize and repudiate the bourgeoisie in the cultural revolution. Even when fight-
ing, it should not just conduct military struggle. It should serve political struggles, and in many cases fighting is itself a form of political struggle.

A very important and outstanding characteristic of our army is its revolutionary political work. This is its life-blood, a fact which has given our army a completely new look. Chairman Mao proposed to educate the troops in the Party’s correct line, to carry out the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention* as well as the principles of unity between officers and men and between the army and the people, and of disintegrating the enemy forces, and to practise democracy in the three main fields — political, economic and military. This would completely eliminate the antagonism between officers and men, between higher and lower ranks and between the army and the people which is characteristic of old-type armies; it would create a political situation in which there would exist both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness. Such a political situation is highly important not only for the army but also for the Party and state. It enables the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country to unite as one, surmount all difficulties and withstand any storm.

In the final analysis, the general principle of our army is to stand firmly with the people and serve them wholeheartedly. The people are the best judges. It is not up to the army but to the people to judge whether ours is a people’s army. An army regarded by the people as their own is invincible.

* See note on p. 50.

Also important in Chairman Mao’s military thinking is his concept of people’s war. There is nothing mysterious about our victory over Chiang Kai-shek, Japanese imperialism and other powerful and ferocious enemies at home and abroad during the decades of revolutionary war. Our victories were due to our reliance on the people. We turned the entire people into soldiers, adopted a system which combined field armies, regional troops and militia, and integrated the armed populace with the unarmed. Reliance on the people, the first essential for our army, compensated for our lack of weapons and equipment, changed our army’s inferior position into a superior one and created a vast ocean in which to drown the enemy. We have grown strong and won victory by means of people’s war, our magic weapon, past, present and future.

Through his great, long-time experience in building the people’s army and directing revolutionary wars, Chairman Mao did much to develop and perfect the strategy and tactics of people’s war. With his great revolutionary mettle and superb military art, he commanded large armies, directed many campaigns, led the arduous Long March and won many major victories like which are rare in the history of war. Chairman Mao deployed troops with great skill and formulated splendid plans which won victory in distant battles. He kept the entire situation under control in commanding our millions of troops and compelled the enemy to move according to his will. He was able to seize the initiative in all circumstances and turn danger into safety at every crisis. From those years in the Chingkang Mountains — when Chairman Mao evolved the formula, “the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires,
we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue" — to the years when he enunciated the ten major principles of operation,* he was never rigid in directing battles. **You fight in your way and we fight in ours.** He applied materialist dialectics to war in a masterful way.

In summing up the historical experience of the Paris Commune, Marx pointed out that to eliminate class rule and class oppression and bring about the fundamental transformation of society, it is necessary first of all to exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the first condition of that is a proletarian army. Chairman Mao's concepts of the people's army, people's war and its strategy and tactics have enriched and developed the Marxist theory of proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Every great creation of Chairman Mao is based on Marxist-Leninist principles and revolutionary practice. Chairman Mao's Marxist creativity is a fine example for us to learn from.

Chairman Mao's military thinking is an ever-fresh, universally applicable truth of Marxism. It is our ever-victorious weapon as long as there are classes and class struggle, imperialism and social-imperialism, and as long as the monster of war is not eliminated from human society. A fundamental task before us today is to conscientiously study and grasp Chairman Mao's military thinking and to comprehend and implement Mao Tse-tung Thought and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line accurately and entirely. Veteran comrades should study all their lives and successfully pass on their experience to younger comrades and give them help and guidance.


Young comrades should resolve to inherit this invaluable legacy and hand it down from generation to generation. Lin Piao deliberately distorted Mao Tse-tung Thought and tried to separate it from Marxism-Leninism. The Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao “gang of four” said Mao Tse-tung Thought and the fine traditions of our Party and our army were “things of the period of the democratic revolution” and strummed the old revisionist tune that they were “outdated.” Fundamentally negating the theoretical basis that guides our Party's thinking, they attempted to restore capitalism. But they were mere ants trying to shake a giant tree. How they overrated themselves!

Lin Piao and the “gang of four” bitterly hated our great army. They frantically opposed it and tried to disrupt it. They ruthlessly attacked and persecuted its leading cadres loyal to the Party and to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Their aim was to destroy our Great Wall.* We must cherish our army as our eyesight. A summing-up of our experience, especially our experience in the struggle against Lin Piao and the “gang of four,” shows that we must revive and carry on the fine traditions and style of work of our Party and our army if we are to do still better in building our army according to Chairman Mao's thinking and line.

We must see to it that the gun remains firmly in the hands of the Party and the people, and must never let big or small careerists like the “gang of four” and Lin Piao usurp the leadership at any level in our army.

We must practise Marxism, unite and be open and above-board; we must never practise revisionism, create

* I.e., the People's Liberation Army.
splits or engage in intrigues and conspiracies as the “gang of four” and Lin Piao did.

We must understand and apply Chairman Mao’s thinking and line accurately and entirely; we must not distort or tamper with Mao Tsetung Thought by quoting it out of context to deceive and intimidate people as the “gang of four” and Lin Piao did.

We must maintain our Party’s style of work characterized by seeking truth from facts and following the mass line; we must never practise idealism and metaphysics, tell lies or lord it over people as the “gang of four” and Lin Piao did.

We must uphold the proletarian Party spirit and proceed in all cases from the interests of the people; we must never form bourgeois factional setups and work for personal power and gain as the “gang of four” and Lin Piao did.

We must maintain a normal democratic life and encourage the free airing of views; and we must never set up “hat factories” and “steel plants,” as the “gang of four” and Lin Piao did, to label and deal mortal blows at people who raise different views.

We must firmly uphold Party and army discipline; we must never spread anarchism, “kick aside the Party committees in making revolution,” and engage in sabotage or wanton disruption as the “gang of four” and Lin Piao did.

We must speed up the revolutionization and modernization of our army; we must never counterpose military affairs to politics, strangle revolutionization and negate modernization as the “gang of four” and Lin Piao did.

Comrades! In my speech at the working conference of the Party Central Committee held in March this year, I stated that Chairman Mao said in all earnestness before his death that he had in his life accomplished two things. One was defeating Japanese imperialism and driving it out of China, then overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and driving him to Taiwan. The other was successfully carrying out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao made tremendous contributions to the Chinese people, the international proletariat and the revolutionary people the world over. He accomplished far more than those two things in his lifetime. Chairman Mao said this because, having summed up the experience gained in more than half a century, he wanted to cite these two accomplishments to warn us to prevent capitalist restoration at home by adhering to the proletarian revolutionary line, boldly arousing the masses and, when necessary, using mass democracy and carrying out a great cultural revolution, to warn us to be on the alert against war and ready at all times to smash social-imperialist and imperialist aggression by means of people’s war. This is the “golden counsel” of far-reaching significance Chairman Mao bequeathed us for continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We are now in an important historical period of carrying forward our revolutionary cause and forging ahead into the future. Comrade Hua Kuo-feng is Chairman Mao’s good, chosen successor. He is Chairman Mao’s good student and our good leader and supreme commander. Chairman Hua is faithfully carrying out Chairman Mao’s behests and holding high his great banner. After smashing the “gang of four,” he set forth the strategic policy decision to grasp the key link of class struggle, run the country well and bring about great order across the land. He has taken a series of effective
measures to implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and policies. This has produced remarkable results, to the great joy of the people. With Chairman Hua as our leader, we are assured that the supreme leadership of our Party and state will remain steady for a long time to come. This is a matter of cardinal importance; it is very inspiring and most significant to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. We can say with full confidence that, with the leadership of our wise leader Chairman Hua and the collective political experience and wisdom of the Party Central Committee headed by him, our Party, our army and our country certainly will continue the revolution and advance triumphantly along the course charted by Chairman Mao.

Chairman Hua has called on us to "seize the present opportune moment, strive to do our work well and make our country strong and prosperous as soon as possible." He has instructed us time and again to grasp the key link of class struggle and run the army well, and "accelerate the revolutionization and modernization of the People's Liberation Army." Revolutionization means all-round implementation of Chairman Mao's line and his policies and principles concerning army building. This is the commander, the soul. Revolutionization means inheriting and carrying forward the fine traditions of our Party and army which Chairman Mao nurtured, and maintaining the revolutionary spirit of hard struggle. Only by strengthening revolutionization can we accelerate modernization. Our army's modernization calls for powerful ground, air and naval forces and modern arms and equipment, including guided missiles and nuclear weapons. It calls for rigorous and hard training to develop the ability to wipe out the enemy as required in actual combat and for mastery of the new techniques involved in handling modern arms and equipment and of the related new tactics. Workers, peasants and intellectuals throughout the country and all PLA commanders and fighters must seize the time and step up the building of the army, the militia and the people's defence against air raids, scientific research in national defence, and production in the defence industries.

At present, the Soviet Union and the United States are locked in an ever fiercer struggle for hegemony, and a world war will break out some day. We must clearly recognize this situation, be aware of the war problem, and conscientiously implement Chairman Mao's strategic policy, "Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony," and his instructions that "it is necessary to consolidate the army" and that the nation must "be ready for war." We must be prepared against a war breaking out at an early date and on a large scale. So long as we are fully prepared against any foreign enemy launching aggression against us, we can certainly, under the leadership of our wise supreme commander Chairman Hua, wipe out the enemy resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely by using the method of people's war that Chairman Mao taught us.

"Taiwan must be liberated"—this is the behest of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou and the common desire of our 800 million people. Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. When and how we will liberate it is China's internal affair, and no one has the right to interfere. We are determined to work with our compatriots in Taiwan and accomplish the great sacred cause of liberating Taiwan and reunifying the motherland.
Comrades! The recent Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Party Central Committee over which Chairman Hua presided was a session of great historic importance. It consolidated and developed the great victory of smashing the “gang of four” and made full preparations for the convocation of the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. We should greet the successful convocation with splendid achievements in revolution and production. We must always hold high and defend the great banner of Chairman Mao. The banner of Chairman Mao bears the words “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat” and “Continue the Revolution” in bold, glowing characters. We must persist in taking class struggle as the key link, uphold the Party’s basic line and carry the proletarian revolutionary cause pioneered by Chairman Mao through to the end! We must bring about a new high tide in studying works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and by Chairman Mao so as to transform a great ideological force into a tremendous material force. We must deepen the exposure and criticism of the “gang of four,” thoroughly eliminate their pernicious influence politically, ideologically and organizationally and bring this great struggle to complete victory. We must follow Chairman Mao’s strategic concept of the three worlds, firmly carry out his revolutionary line in foreign affairs and oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. We must further promote the mass movements to learn from Taching in industry, learn from Tachai in agriculture, learn from Lei Feng and learn from the “Hard-Boned Sixth Company” of the PLA, and launch a large-scale emulation drive in revolution and production. We must build China into a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, ind-

Long live the great Chinese people!
Long live the great Chinese People’s Liberation Army!
Long live the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China!
Long live the great People’s Republic of China!
Long live invincible Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought!
GREAT VICTORY FOR CHAIRMAN MAO'S GUIDELINES ON WAR

— In Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army

by Su Yu*

It has been 50 years since our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao founded the Chinese People's Liberation Army. With the birth of this army of the people, an entirely new period began in the Chinese revolution, a period of revolutionary war led independently by the Communist Party of China.

World-shaking changes occurred in China as soon as the Party and the people took up weapons to oppose armed counter-revolution with armed revolution. After 22 years of revolutionary wars, the Chinese people led by Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 overthrew the criminal rule of the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries and so removed the three “big mountains” of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism from their backs and brought the new-democratic revolution to complete victory. The Chinese people then fought the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, repulsed intrusions by the social-imperialists and the reactionaries and ably defended the great cause of socialist revolution and socialist construction.

The historic victory of the Chinese people is a victory for Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. In the long years of revolutionary war, Chairman Mao integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of China's revolutionary war and developed creatively and in an all-round way the Marxist-Leninist teachings on military affairs. He thus greatly enriched the treasure-house of Marxist-Leninist military theory. Chairman Mao not only formulated for us the correct line for building the people's army. He also set forth correct guidelines on war. Chairman Mao's military thinking and military line are powerful ideological weapons for the proletariat and other revolutionary people to wage revolutionary wars; they are our traditional invincible weapon for vanquishing the enemy.

In a situation of the class or national enemy resorting to violence and starting a war, whether one dares to wage revolutionary war against counter-revolutionary war is a question of making revolution or not. It is also the foremost question in directing a war.

In semi-colonial, semi-feudal China, armed struggle was the principal form of struggle in the revolution. No problem in the Chinese revolution could have been solved without armed struggle. In its initial stage the Chinese Communist Party failed to grasp the importance of immediate preparations for war and the organization of

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* The author is a member of the Standing Committee of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
armed forces. Nor did it acquire sufficient understanding on this issue in the first period of co-operation with the Kuomintang in the Northern Expeditionary War, even though it gained some grasp of the importance of military affairs and exercised leadership over some army units. In particular, the Right opportunists, who were represented by Chen Tu-hsiu and dominated the Party Central Committee at that time, rejected the correct views of Chairman Mao and other comrades and abandoned the Party’s leadership over the revolution and especially over revolutionary war. Consequently, when Chiang Kai-shek and then Wang Ching-wei betrayed the revolution, when imperialism, the feudal forces and the comprador bourgeoisie, in open collaboration, began massacring Communists and other revolutionaries, the Party and the people were unable to organize effective resistance, and the ongoing revolution suffered disastrous defeat. But the butchery and bloodshed taught the Party and the people a lesson. “Warlords, landlords, local bullies and bad gentry and the imperialists all have swords in their hands and are out to kill. The people have come to understand this and so act after the same fashion.” Guided by Mao Tsetung Thought, the Party and the revolutionary people took up arms and staged the Nanchang, Autumn Harvest, and Canton uprisings. On August 1, 1927 Comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho Lung, Yeh Ting and Liu Po-cheng led the world-shaking Nanchang Uprising, firing the first shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries. This signalled the start of the revolutionary war led independently by the Chinese Communist Party. Back in the period of the Northern Expeditionary War, Chairman Mao already advocated “overthrowing the armed forces of the landlords and establishing those of the peasants.” He enthusiasti-

cally supported the workers and peasants taking up arms. After the failure of the great revolution in 1927, Chairman Mao enunciated the famous thesis that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” and stated that the Party leadership should now put the main stress on armed struggle. In September that year, Chairman Mao led the historic Autumn Harvest Uprising, founded the first units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and established China’s first rural revolutionary base area in the Ching-kang Mountains. By doing so he hoisted the red banner of the armed independent regime of workers and peasants for the first time and opened the road for the armed seizure of political power by establishing rural base areas, encircling the cities from the countryside and finally capturing the cities. Chairman Mao profoundly pointed out: “That was the crucial period in which our Party arrived at a thorough understanding of the importance of the army.” Had there been no founding of the Red Army and no revolutionary war fought by its forces in this period, the development of the Chinese revolution would have been inconceivable. Only after the Party assumed independent leadership over revolutionary war did the Chinese revolution resume its triumphant advance. In particular, the establishment of Chairman Mao’s leadership throughout the Party at the Tsunyi Meeting (an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee held in Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in January 1935) provided a fundamental guarantee for victory in the Chinese revolution.

Firmly grasping the inexorable historical law of revolutionary new forces triumphing over reactionary, decadent forces, Chairman Mao analysed penetratingly and comprehensively the basic situation regarding the
enemy and ourselves as well as the characteristics of each side. When the Chinese people were faced with formidable enemies, he always held aloft the banner of armed struggle, showing his thoroughgoing revolutionary spirit and exercising his superb leadership as a proletarian vanguard. He belittled the enemy strategically while taking full account of him tactically. He fearlessly and confidently led our Party, army and people in defeating vicious enemy forces one after the other, winning victory after victory in the revolutionary war and promoting the revolution. In 1927, when White terror reigned throughout the country, Chairman Mao led the troops that had staged the Autumn Harvest Uprising into the Chingkang Mountains and launched the War of Agrarian Revolution (1927-37). With the tiny, young Red Army in a small Red base area surrounded by the White regime and attacked from all sides by much stronger Kuomintang reactionary troops, Chairman Mao said with great vision: “A single spark can start a prairie fire.” He led the armymen and civilians of the base area in dauntless struggles that smashed the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns; the Red political power stood firm against the huge Kuomintang reactionary regime, demonstrating its immense political might. On the Long March, too, under extremely difficult conditions resulting from Wang Ming’s “Left” opportunist line, Chairman Mao led Red Army contingents totalling a few tens of thousands to freedom from encirclement, pursuit, obstruction and interception by several hundred thousand enemy troops. Overcoming all hazards and defeating Chang Kuo-tao’s Rightist line of taking to flight, the Red Army with Chairman Mao’s leadership completed this strategic shift unprecedented in history and arrived at the forefront of resistance to Japan, beginning a new period in China’s revolutionary war. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, when China was confronted with Japanese imperialism which called itself “the first-rate power of the East” and had strong invading forces at its disposal, Chairman Mao issued a great call “for the mobilization of all the nation’s forces for victory in the War of Resistance” and proceeded to conduct unyielding warfare against the invaders. Adhering to the principle of independence and initiative in waging guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, he resolutely dispatched the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, totalling some 50,000 men, to areas behind enemy lines, and directed them to mobilize the masses on a broad scale for guerrilla warfare and the establishment and expansion of revolutionary base areas. Eight years of resistance resulted in the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and an enormous growth of the people’s strength. After the Japanese surrender, Chiang Kai-shek, backed by U.S. imperialism and relying on his four million troops equipped with modern arms, brazenly launched all-out civil war against the Liberated Areas. Chairman Mao pointed out promptly that we must never be intimidated by the bluster of the reactionaries, but should hold to the correct principle, “to give him [Chiang Kai-shek] tit for tat and to fight for every inch of land,” be courageous enough to fight through to victory and smash the attacks of the Kuomintang reactionaries by a war of self-defence. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army which had only 1.2 million men at the beginning of the War of Liberation (1945-49) was able to defeat Chiang Kai-shek’s eight-million-strong armed forces in just over three years, and overthrow Chiang’s rule. Soon after the liberation of the entire mainland, U.S. imperialism in 1950 unleashed its
war of aggression against Korea, spread the war flames to China's northeast border and occupied China's Taiwan Province by armed force. At a time when the No. 1 imperialist power of the world was threatening China with its aggressor troops armed with the latest weapons, Chairman Mao decided to launch the great struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, sending the Chinese People's Volunteers to Korea to fight beside the Korean army and people. The U.S. aggressors were defeated in nearly three years of bitter fighting; the Chinese People's Volunteers had performed their internationalist duty and defended China's socialist revolution and construction. Chairman Mao's great mettle and brilliant deeds in opposing counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war greatly encouraged the Chinese people and the people of the world, and provided them with an inexhaustible source of strength in their revolutionary struggles.

Standing for violent revolution or not, daring to solve problems by war or not, constitutes a basic difference between Marxism and revisionism. The struggle between the two lines in our Party on this point has been a long and intense one, focusing on the question of upholding or abandoning the Party's absolute leadership in revolutionary war. After our Party triumphed over Chen Tuhsiu's Right capitulationist line, other opportunist chieftains stepped in at various stages to interfere with and sabotage the revolutionary wars, especially at crucial times of a change from one revolutionary war to another. Wang Ming, whose "Left" opportunism caused a second major setback in the Chinese revolution during the War of Agrarian Revolution, turned around and pushed a Right opportunist line at the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, advocating "everything through the united front" [with the Kuomintang] and "everything must be submitted to the united front." Wang Ming went hat in hand to Chiang Kai-shek, to whom he would willingly surrender the Red Army itself. On the eve of the all-out civil war unleashed by Chiang Kai-shek following victory in the War of Resistance, Liu Shao-chi came out with his capitulationist programme of "the new stage of peace and democracy" in his attempt to get government posts at the cost of handing over the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. All these aimed essentially at nullifying the revolutionary war under the Party's leadership. Chairman Mao resolutely and promptly criticized their opportunist lines and rectified them, persisting in revolutionary war and promoting the development of the revolution.

Though China was still confronted by imperialist and social-imperialist war threats after the country-wide liberation, Peng Teh-huai and Lin Piao, who took a bourgeois stand, clung stubbornly to a bourgeois military line, advocated the strategic principle of passive defence, opposed preparations against war, opposed the Party's absolute leadership over the army, and sabotaged the building of the army and the militia and national defence efforts. Lin Piao plotted to stage a counter-revolutionary armed coup and usurp Party and state leadership, but he ended his life as a vile renegade and traitor while on his way to throw himself into the arms of Soviet revisionism. Chairman Mao saw through the plotters' various tricks and waged unremitting struggles against them, overcame their interference and sabotage and ensured the enhancement of our preparedness against war.

Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan were bourgeois careerists and conspira-
tors; they were out-and-out ultra-Rightists and formed a sinister gang of new and old counter-revolutionaries. They madly opposed the People's Liberation Army and attempted to disrupt it, openly calling for the liquidation of the standing army and the building of a "second military force." They attempted to undermine China's armed forces system combining the field armies, regional units and militia. They tried to sabotage our army's revolutionization and modernization, our defence industry and our preparations against war, so as to place us in an entirely unprepared state in the event of imperialist or social-imperialist aggression. Had their scheme of seizing Party and state leadership succeeded, the fruits of victory gained through the protracted revolutionary wars under Chairman Mao's leadership would have been forfeited forthwith, and socialist China would have become again a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua took wise, decisive measures, smashed the "gang of four" at one stroke and paved the way for our Party and state to continue along the revolutionary route charted by Chairman Mao.

II

Chairman Mao's guidelines on war mean essentially people's war. The reason why China's revolutionary war, starting as a single spark, grew into a prairie fire and finally destroyed powerful domestic and foreign enemies was that it was a progressive and just war, a genuine people's war waged under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Party by relying on the masses.

"The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them." By creatively applying to revolutionary war the basic Marxist-Leninist principle that the people are the makers of history, Chairman Mao developed the great Marxist-Leninist teachings on people's war and personally led the Chinese people in waging a protracted, extensive and all-round war of this type.

China's revolutionary war was essentially a proletarian-led peasant war. If the proletariat had not established the most reliable and extensive alliance with the peasants and mobilized them in their hundreds of millions, there could have been no genuine people's war. We fought by relying mainly on the peasants. To help the peasants to unite and fight for their own liberation, Chairman Mao closely linked armed struggle with the solution of the land problem from the time our Party assumed independent leadership in revolutionary war, and led them in overthrowing feudal exploitation and oppression.

During the period of the War of Agrarian Revolution, our army concentrated its forces to fight the enemy while dividing them to mobilize the masses and organize the peasants for struggle against local despots and in dividing up the land. In accordance with the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front in the War of Resistance Against Japan, a policy of reducing rent and interest replaced that of confiscating the landlords' land. During the War of Liberation, land reform was promptly carried out in the Liberated Areas to provide basic solution to the land question for the peasants. In the light of their own interests China's hundreds of millions of peasants came to realize that the revolutionary war led by our Party was a genuine war for their emancipation. They therefore wholeheartedly supported it, aided it and fought in it. Chairman Mao formulated for our Party correct
policies and tactics in different periods towards the various classes and strata in the country so as to unite all the forces that could be united and gain as many allies as possible to wage armed struggle and concentrate our attack against the chief enemy. The most powerful foundation possible was thus laid for waging people’s war.

Without revolutionary base areas, it would have been impossible for China’s revolutionary war to succeed. In the protracted revolutionary war, Chairman Mao closely identified armed struggle with the establishment of revolutionary base areas. The existence of these areas changed the countryside from a backward expanse into advanced revolutionary bastions, enabling us to augment and temper our revolutionary forces, expedite a revolutionary high tide and gradually seize country-wide political power. Moreover, with the establishment of these areas and the setting up of revolutionary political power, the people became their own masters whose political rights and economic interests were guaranteed. That was why they fought consciously to defend their own political power at all costs.

Revolutionary base areas were strategic bases for carrying on people’s war. Basing itself there, our army could effectively attack and wipe out the enemy with the assistance and co-operation of the people and, shielded by them, it could consolidate and train, rest and build strength. In particular, it could continually replenish its manpower and logistic supplies for protracted revolutionary war. At the same time, only by continuously defeating enemy troops could we defend the base areas so as to build, consolidate and expand them.

The people’s army founded and educated by Chairman Mao is a new-type army based on Marxism-Leninism. Under the absolute leadership of the Party, this army adheres to the principle of wholeheartedly serving the people. It has carried out the tasks of being at once a fighting force, a political work force and a production force. It has developed vigorous revolutionary political work, followed the three major principles—unity between officers and men, unity between the army and the people, and disintegrating enemy troops—and has carried out democracy in the political, economic and military fields. It has strictly abided by the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,* forged ties with the people comparable to the relationship between fish and water, and shared joy and sorrow with them. This army has the indomitable spirit of fighting tenaciously and the fine style of hard struggle; it has evolved a series of strategic and tactical concepts for waging people’s war and has played its full role as the backbone in such war.

To defeat the enemy, we have instituted in the long years of people’s war the system of armed forces which combine field armies, regional units and the militia. Under the unified leadership of the Party, we combine the main forces with the regional forces, the regular troops with the guerrilla units and the militia, and the armed people with the unarmed civilians. With these combinations, the main forces can at any time carry out mobile operations beyond the limits of a locality, mainly to deal with and wipe out the enemy’s regular troops; the regional forces, on their part, persist in fighting in their respective localities in co-ordination with the guerrilla units, militia and other armed organizations of the masses to defend and

* See note on p. 50.
consolidate the base areas, actively helping the main forces to attack and annihilate the local enemy forces. This organization forms a net for vanquishing the enemies. With these three kinds of combinations, it is possible to make every person a soldier, while the militia can replenish the regular forces at any time so that the guerrilla units and regional forces can gradually develop into main forces, in this way expanding the backbone force for waging people's war. To defeat the enemy, our Party co-ordinates armed struggle directly or indirectly with the struggles of the workers, peasants, youth, women and all other forms of people's struggle throughout the country, and with the struggles in the political, economic, ideological, cultural and all other fields. This makes for a people's war in which the army and the people as a whole are mobilized, and gives full play to the tremendous power of people's war.

The historical experience of China's revolutionary war has proved that so long as the masses are mobilized and organized for fighting and supporting the war, there will be strength enough to make up for any shortage of arms and equipment, to overcome any difficulty and defeat any enemy. In the protracted revolutionary war, the masses volunteered for service, strengthened defence works and cleared the fields of food to prevent its falling into enemy hands. They gathered intelligence, acted as guides, prevented the leakage of information, captured enemy scouts, and carried out sabotage operations, mine warfare, tunnel warfare and sparrow warfare* among other methods of attacking and harassing the enemy. These operations played an extremely important role in helping our army win battles.

During the years of war when our economic conditions were most difficult and our struggle was extremely arduous, the heroic people cast in their lot with the army, supporting and protecting it at the risk of their lives and so performing many glorious and meritorious deeds. In the War of Liberation, our army carried out mobile warfare on an unprecedented scale. Millions of peasants supported the front; they pushed or drove carts to transport supplies and carried stretchers, braving enemy fire and crossing mountains and rivers under difficult conditions. They followed the army wherever it marched, giving it whatever help it needed to guarantee its victory. This confirmed time and again Chairman Mao's brilliant statement: "The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people." It is in people's war that our superiority lies, and that is why no enemy can defeat us.

We always attach importance to the role of weapons in waging a people's war. In the years of revolutionary war, we relied mainly on weapons seized from the enemy to arm ourselves. Under extremely hard conditions we also set up a number of small arsenals and produced our own weapons and ammunition to supplement those captured. On the eve of the founding of the new China, Chairman Mao pointed out: "We will have not only a powerful army but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy." Later, he again pointed out: "We are stronger than before and will be stronger still in the future. We will have not only more planes and artillery but atom bombs too. If we are not to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without the bomb." Now we have built up China as a

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*The meaning of this term is twofold: first, it refers to warfare on an extensive scale, like sparrows flying in the sky; second, it means flexible warfare, with people fighting in groups of three or five to harass and attack the enemy by surprise.
socialist country with the beginnings of prosperity. We are striving to modernize our industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology. We pay full attention to making the best use of the weapons we now have. At the same time, we are determined to rely on our own efforts to constantly improve our military equipment so that we will not only have what the enemy has but also have what he has not. Future wars against aggression will be people's wars in contemporary conditions. By stepping up modernization we will greatly increase the power of people's war, and even when we have better weapons we will still fight people's war. We are firmly convinced that the people are always the main force in a war and the decisive factor for victory or defeat. The emergence of any new weapons cannot alter the fundamental law of people's war. As our conditions for waging people's war become increasingly better, any enemy who dares to invade will be totally submerged in a people's war conducted on a more colossal scale than ever before.

III

In the course of directing China's revolutionary war, Chairman Mao applied materialist dialectics, combined theory with practice and worked out strategy and tactics based on people's war and characterized by flexibility and manoeuvrability. Chairman Mao said: "You fight in your way and we fight in ours; we fight when we can win and move away when we can't." This is an incisive summing-up of our strategy and tactics which, diverse and varied as they are, boil down to the above-mentioned words of Chairman Mao. When we move away, you will not be able to hit us. Our moving away is for the purpose of fighting. When we fight, we make sure you can't get away and we hit you squarely and wipe you out. In a word, our aim is to fight a war of annihilation, to put out of action or capture enemy troops and so wipe out his effective strength.

To stress annihilating the enemy's effective strength is the basic concept guiding our army's operations. Chairman Mao told us that the object of war, or its essence, is to "preserve oneself and destroy the enemy." In directing a war, one must not lose sight of the contrast between the fundamental factors on each side or of the object of the war. In the course of military operations, these contrasting fundamental factors reveal themselves in the struggle by each side to preserve itself and destroy its enemy. Thus preserving oneself and destroying the enemy are dialectically linked. "Destruction of the enemy is the primary object of war and self-preservation the secondary." The aim of self-preservation is to destroy the enemy; only by destroying enemy troops in large numbers can one effectively preserve and develop oneself, change the balance of forces between the enemy and oneself and finally win the war. Chairman Mao said that as "the life of Chia Pao-yu of the Grand View Garden depended upon a piece of jade in his necklace, the life of the Kuomintang depends upon its army." For us only by completely wip-

* Chia Pao-yu is a character in A Dream of Red Mansions, an 18th century Chinese novel; Grand View Garden is his family estate. Chia Pao-yu is said to have been born with a piece of jade in his mouth, and this was "the root of his life" and so had to be worn constantly round his neck.
ing out the enemy’s effective strength, pulling out the root of its life, can we solve problems through war.

The continual revolutionary wars in China all began with massive offensives against us by an enemy which was superior to us in both numerical strength and equipment, and for quite a long time these wars were fought in this situation of the enemy being strong while we were weak. In the circumstances, as Chairman Mao pointed out, “the primary problem, and a serious one too, is how to conserve our strength and await an opportunity to defeat the enemy. Therefore, the strategic defensive is the most complicated and most important problem facing the Red Army in its operations.” Chairman Mao laid down for us the strategic principle of active defence, which he defined as “defence for the purpose of counterattacking and taking the offensive.” In the first, second and third counter-campaigns against the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” which took place in the Central Revolutionary Base Area in Kiangsi in the period of the agrarian revolution, the enemy mounted attacks against us with a force several times or even more than ten times greater than ours. Under the personal command of Chairman Mao, our army carried out active defence, first luring the enemy troops deep into our area in a planned way and creating conditions favourable to ourselves and unfavourable to the enemy, and then seizing the opportunity for fighting and launching counter-offensives at the opportune moment. In other words, we conducted quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles to wipe out the enemy’s effective strength. Though only part of the powerful enemy troops were annihilated, his “encirclement and suppression” campaigns were defeated; our army grew in strength and the revolutionary base areas were consolidated and expanded. Failing to understand all this, Wang Ming and other “Left” opportunists followed the principle of passive defence in the fifth counter-campaign against “encirclement and suppression” in 1934. They did not dare to break through the enemy’s encirclement, advance to the enemy’s rear and attack him there, and strike at him from exterior lines, which would have been to our advantage, nor did they dare to lure the enemy in deep and await an opportunity to wipe him out. Afraid of losing territory, they advocated instead “engaging the enemy outside the gates,” dividing up the troops for defence, setting up defences everywhere, conducting defensive actions at every step and fighting a war of short swift thrusts, blockhouse warfare and a war of attrition. As a result, the Red Army suffered heavy losses and the whole Central Revolutionary Base Area was lost.

During the War of Liberation, Chairman Mao correctly analysed the change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and laid down a strategic principle aimed chiefly at wiping out the enemy’s effective strength, and not at holding a place. In the early stage of the war, in order to gain time for an all-round switch-over to a war of self-defence and provide cover for the Liberated Areas to complete all preparations to meet Chiang Kai-shek’s attacks head-on, Chairman Mao, who was fully aware of the will of the armymen and people in the Liberated Areas to fight against the common enemy, seized the opportune moment when the enemy was just starting his massive offensive to instruct our army to attack the enemy precisely at his weak points and fight several battles of annihilation mainly in the frontal sections of the Liberated Areas according to the principle of winning sure victory.
in the first battle. This also boosted the morale of the armymen and people and deflated the enemy’s arrogance. Later, our army advanced and withdrew over long distances and wiped out large numbers of enemy troops in mobile warfare. This speeded the change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and finally enabled us to switch over to the strategic offensive. The primary objective throughout the course of active defence was to destroy the enemy, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly or by a series of manoeuvres. By so doing, one grasps the principal aspect of the contradiction between preserving oneself and destroying the enemy.

Historical experience tells us that focusing on wiping out the enemy’s effective strength or not doing so is an important criterion whether one’s defence is active or passive, involving two different strategic principles. The concept of focusing on annihilating the enemy’s effective strength can find fuller expression in the stage of strategic offensive. Between the autumn of 1948 and the spring of 1949 in the later period of the War of Liberation, Chairman Mao personally directed the three great campaigns of Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin. These were great campaigns of strategic decision in the War of Liberation and, in fact, in China’s 22-year-long revolutionary war. In these three great campaigns, we put out of action 1,540,000 enemy troops, basically annihilating the crack troops on which the Kuomintang relied to wage its counter-revolutionary civil war. The victory of these three great campaigns fully demonstrated Chairman Mao’s superb art and skill in directing a war.

The concept of wiping out the enemy’s effective strength is extensively and profoundly reflected in the series of operational guiding principles formulated by Chairman Mao. During the period of struggle in the Chingkang Mountains in 1928, Chairman Mao put forward the 16-character formula: “The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.” He incorporated the dialectical relationship between self-preservation and destruction of the enemy into the operational principles of guerrilla warfare. During the War of Liberation, he summed up the basic experience of our army in winning battles and formulated the famous Ten Major Principles of Operation, including the principle of attacking dispersed, isolated enemy forces first and concentrated, strong enemy forces later, of taking as our main objective the wiping out of the enemy’s effective strength and not the holding or seizing of a city or place, of striving to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare, of concentrating an absolutely superior force to completely encircle the enemy forces and striving to wipe them out thoroughly in every battle, and of not fighting a battle unprepared or a battle we are not sure of winning. The concept of wiping out the enemy’s effective strength in directing operations thus finds fuller and more complete expression in our army’s principles of operations.

“Concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one” is the best method to defeat the enemy. It was basically by relying on this method that we succeeded in reversing the situation between the enemy and ourselves during strategic defence and won victories. In terms of each campaign or battle, only by concentrating a superior force, adopting the tactics of encircling and outflanking the enemy troops and attacking one of the enemy detachments or a part of the enemy forces could we achieve complete annihilation and quick decision and
render the enemy reinforcements useless, and so facilitate the swift deployment of our troops to deal with another part of the enemy forces and destroy them one by one. All the splendid battles of annihilation fought by our army in the past resulted from employing this method of fighting. An example is the third counter-campaign our army fought under the personal command of Chairman Mao in the Central Revolutionary Base Area against the Kuomintang’s “encirclement and suppression” in 1931. In that struggle we had only 30,000 men fighting against 300,000 enemy troops. With this tremendous disparity in strength between the enemy and ourselves, almost all of our base areas were occupied by the enemy. But our army evaded the enemy’s main forces and attacked his weaker links instead, concentrating our troops to destroy the enemy forces one by one. We massed a superior force at one point to fight and win battles of quick decision and then swiftly deployed our troops to wipe out other enemy forces. In seven days we fought three successive battles of annihilation, keeping the enemy’s main forces on the move until he was exhausted, ran out of food and had to withdraw. Taking advantage of their panic retreat, we went on to wipe out a division and a brigade of enemy troops and completely smashed his “encirclement and suppression.” From this it can be seen that concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one is an effective method of fighting to move from a passive position to gaining the initiative and annihilating a large part of the enemy’s effective strength. Chairman Mao pointed out: “The concentration of troops seems easy but is quite hard in practice.” To really succeed in concentrating the troops, military leaders must have a good head for strategy and not be misled by complicated circum-
stances; they must make an objective analysis, have the whole situation in mind and truly grasp what is of the greatest importance so as to make a prompt choice of the target for attack and annihilation and concentrate the main forces to finish off the enemy at one blow.

The forms of fighting were determined and adopted according to our strategic principles and must always be based on the concept of putting the stress on annihilating the enemy’s effective strength. Mobile warfare with quick-decision offensives on exterior lines in campaigns and battles was our army’s main form of warfare. Chairman Mao pointed out: “The pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare.” On the vast battlefield, our army advanced or withdrew in great strides, swiftly regrouped or dispersed again. This had the advantage not only of luring the enemy troops out of their heavily fortified strongholds, compelling them to move about or stay temporarily in one place, fully exposing their weaknesses. It also helped bring our army’s strong points into play, enabling it to fight at close range or at night, encircle and outflank the enemy and attack him from all directions. Our army could more effectively apply the operational method of concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one and achieve the aim of quick decision and complete annihilation. For example, during the War of Liberation, Chiang Kai-shek in March 1947 launched his “attacks against key sectors” on our Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Liberated Area with a force of 230,000 men—massively outnumbering our main force of only 20,000 men. Under the personal command of Chairman Mao, our army withdrew from Yenan and other places on our own initiative so as to avoid the enemy’s attacks, and employed the tactics of “wear and tear” to completely
exhaust the enemy troops and then concentrate a superior force to annihilate them one by one in mobile warfare. In ten months of fighting we wiped out more than 70,000 enemy troops and forced the enemy onto the defensive. Then our army started at once to fight battles on exterior lines and, using the tactic of “besieging the enemy in order to strike at his reinforcements,” eliminated another 30,000 enemy troops at one stroke in the battle of Yichuan. This not only changed the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves in the northwest China war theatre and laid the foundation for the liberation of all northwest China; it also helped develop a situation favourable to us throughout the country and hasten the stage of strategically decisive campaigns, setting a brilliant example in fighting mobile warfare.

Positional warfare was to our army a supplementary form, and its proportion to the other forms of warfare varied in the different periods and stages of war. Our positional warfare was generally applied in co-ordination with mobile warfare; it was used to besiege a city and strike at the enemy’s reinforcements, to attack enemy strongholds and strike at his reinforcements and to storm heavily fortified points and intercept reinforcements. We also combined positional defence, positional attacks and attacking the enemy troops on the move or temporarily stationary so as to annihilate them. Towards the end of the War of Liberation, our army carried out mobile warfare on an extensive scale and at the same time fought an even greater number of battles by positional attacks to annihilate the enemy where he held fast to his positions. In the specific conditions obtaining at the later stage of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, who fought in co-

ordination with the Korean People’s Army, relied on their positions to launch tactical counterattacks, and destroyed entire enemy platoons, companies or battalions or the bulk of them. Then when the enemy counterattacked, they again inflicted heavy casualties on him in the seesaw battles. Chairman Mao highly valued this kind of positional warfare, which illustrated the continuous development of our tactics under new conditions and the flexible application of the various methods of fighting according to objective conditions.

Guerrilla warfare is a form of fighting widely used in people’s war. Tied in most closely with the masses, it can demonstrate its tremendous power in a prolonged and relentless war with guerrilla fighters operating behind enemy lines. It not only plays the role of co-ordinating with regular warfare in campaigns and battles but also an enormous co-ordinating role strategically. By developing guerrilla warfare to pin down and harass the enemy troops everywhere, we can make the enemy’s rear his front line, hit him hard, worry him, and inflict losses on him in manpower and matériel. Though this cannot wipe out as many enemy troops as mobile warfare does, it can diminish the enemy bit by bit, and the multiple minor victories will add up to a major one.

The strategy and tactics laid down for us by Chairman Mao through practice in the revolutionary war are a powerful and wonderful weapon for defeating all enemies. To use this wonderful weapon to the full, it is necessary to bring into play the commanders’ subjective dynamic role on the basis of specific objective material conditions and flexibly apply it well to the changing specific conditions. In directing our battles, Chairman Mao counted much on the commanders’ and fighters’ will
to fight and on their revolutionary initiative. While requiring commanders at various levels to pay attention to the situation as a whole and meet its needs, he always stressed flexibility and manoeuvrability and the necessity of fighting battles according to the prevailing conditions of time and place.

Since wars and their various stages differ, as do the target, time, area of fighting and the arms and equipment, our method of fighting should change and develop accordingly. We must be flexible in deploying our troops and in applying and changing our tactics, and we should constantly study and acquire up-to-date tactics resulting from the development of techniques and equipment. The conditions in a war change constantly, and those on the battlefield change even more rapidly; favourable opportunities for fighting are not easily available. So the commanders must have a clear picture of the conditions on both sides in various fields, take prompt and determined actions in the light of the instructions of their superiors, strive to create and seize the opportunity for fighting, choose the most favourable time and place, employ the most effective methods of fighting and boldly and resolutely carry out the operations to destroy the enemy. Practice in war tells us that steadfastness in achieving the aim of a battle and flexibility in directing it are both indispensable. Only when operational command conforms to the actual conditions can the correct policies and principles be better implemented.

The strategy and tactics Chairman Mao worked out for our army are based on a people’s war. Ours is a just revolutionary war and our army is one that fights in the interest of the people. All our actions in war therefore have the full support of the masses, and this is why our strategy and tactics can be used to the full to display their enormous power. The imperialists, social-imperialists and reactionaries are fully aware of our strategy and tactics and they try hard to study ways and means to cope with them, but they cannot make use of our strategy and tactics, nor can they cope with them because theirs is an unjust counter-revolutionary war firmly opposed by the people.

Every time the imperialists and reactionaries launched a war against us, they invariably clamoured that they were sure to bring about a “quick and complete victory.” Our friends expressed great anxiety for us. But the wars always ended with the shameless defeat of the imperialists and reactionaries, while we always came out victorious. We defeated the enemy and put our friends at ease.

Nevertheless, the imperialists and reactionaries will never learn from lessons of the past. They always overestimate their own strength and underestimate that of the people. At present, both the Soviet revisionists and U.S. imperialists are trumpeting the might of their modern arms and equipment, describing their aircraft, tanks, guided missiles and nuclear weapons as almighty in an attempt to intimidate and blackmail the revolutionary people. In fact, it is doubtful whether they themselves have faith in these weapons, because they know that any modern weapon, inevitably has its inherent weakness, and new weapons inevitably bring in their wake new ways and means to deal with them. What is more, modern arms and equipment can hardly do the job expected of them once the conditions ensuring their performance diminish or are unavailable. In particular, weapons are dependent on the people who use them. The
Soviet revisionists and U.S. imperialists have more modern weapons than we, but the morale of their troops is low and they are beset with insurmountable contradictions at home and abroad, and this can in no way be compensated by any new-type weapons. We do not deny that nuclear weapons have great destructive power and inflict heavy casualties, but they cannot be counted on to decide the outcome of a war. The aggressors can use them to destroy a city or town, but they cannot occupy these places, still less can they win the people’s hearts; on the contrary, they will only arouse indignation and resistance from the people of the country invaded and the world's people at large. Those who believe in ghosts and spirits are the ones who are most afraid of them, and so it is with those who have blind faith in nuclear weapons. Everybody knows that when both sides have nuclear weapons, such weapons pose a much greater threat to the imperialist and social-imperialist countries, whose industries and population are highly concentrated. China’s economic construction takes agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor and adopts the principle of combining industry with agriculture, the cities with the countryside, large projects with medium-sized and small ones, and production in peace time with preparations against war. Our economic construction cannot therefore be destroyed by any modern weapons. If the imperialists and social-imperialists should dare to start a nuclear war, they would have to pay doubly for the blood debts they incur.

Imperialism means aggression and war. The two hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are the hotbeds of a new world war, and Soviet social-imperialism in particular is the more dangerous.

With regard to a new world war, our attitude has always been: “First, we are against it; second, we are not afraid of it.” We must adhere to Chairman Mao's strategic principles: “Be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people” and “Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony”; also his important directives: “It is necessary to consolidate the army” and “be ready for war.” We must maintain high vigilance against any possible war of aggression launched by imperialists, particularly a surprise attack by the Soviet social-imperialists. We must be fully prepared mentally and materially. “We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.” If the imperialists or social-imperialists should impose a war on us, whether conventional or nuclear, we will surely fight them to the end! And once the war breaks out, it will be a protracted and all-round people’s war. To use a just war to eliminate an unjust war, we are prepared to make the greatest national sacrifice and contribute our share to the cause of the liberation of mankind.

Taiwan Province is China’s sacred territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan so as to carry out the behests of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou, bring to fruition the common aspiration of the 800 million Chinese people and accomplish the great cause of reunifying our motherland.

We are fully confident of our success in future. We should rally closely round the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua, hold aloft the great banner of Chairman Mao, carry out his behests and grasp the key link of class struggle so as to run the country and the
army well. We should further promote the revolutionization and modernization of our armed forces, prepare well against a war of aggression and for the liberation of Taiwan, strive to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and safeguard our great socialist country.

FIFTY GLORIOUS AND MILITANT YEARS

— Highlights in the History of the Chinese People's Liberation Army

by the War History Department of the Academy of Military Science of the CPLA

The Chinese People's Liberation Army, commanded and educated by our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Communist Party, has grown ever stronger in protracted struggles against domestic and foreign class enemies. The PLA has contributed magnificently to the seizure of political power, to the defence of the socialist motherland and to the consolidation of proletarian dictatorship.

THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR (1927-37)*

On August 1, 1927, Comrade Chou En-lai, Secretary of the Party Front Committee, and Comrades Chu Teh, Ho

* This followed the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War, 1924-27. The revolution was an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary struggle, whose main content was the Northern Expedition carried out on the basis of co-operation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. After consolidating its revolutionary base areas in Kwangtung Province, the rev-
Lung, Yeh Ting and Liu Po-cheng led the famous Nanchang Uprising under the guidance of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line, firing the first shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries. This marked the beginning of a revolutionary war directed independently by the Party and the founding of a revolutionary army.

On September 9, 1927, relying on the strength built up in the peasant movement in Hunan, Comrade Mao Tsetung initiated and led the Autumn Harvest Uprising along the Hunan-Kiangsi border, shortly afterwards commanding the insurgent troops in a march to the Chingkang Mountains. On September 29, the troops arrived at Sanwan in Yunghsin County, Kiangsi Province, where he reorganized the troops and established the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces as a basic principle, and strengthened political work by instituting a democratic system and a revolutionary discipline. In October Comrade Mao Tsetung established China’s first rural base area in the Chingkang Mountains,

initiating the struggle to “establish independent regimes of the workers and the peasants by armed force” and opening the road to victory — the course of encircling the cities from the countryside, finally capturing them, and seizing country-wide political power. His integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution proved a shining example of epoch-making significance in the history of the Chinese revolution and the building of the people’s army.

On December 11, 1927, the Canton Uprising was staged, with Chang Tai-lei, Yeh Ting and Yeh Chien-ying among its leaders. The action dealt the enemy a heavy blow.

Summing up the historical experience of this period, Chairman Mao pointed out: “Our Party failed to grasp the importance of engaging itself directly in preparations for war and in the organization of armed forces for a period of three or four years, that is, from 1921 (when the Chinese Communist Party was founded) to 1924 (when the First National Congress of the Kuomintang was held), and it still lacked adequate understanding of this issue in the 1924-27 period and even later; nevertheless, after 1924, when it began to participate in the Whampoa Military Academy, it entered a new stage and began to see the importance of military affairs. Through helping the Kuomintang in the wars in Kwangtung Province and participating in the Northern Expedition, the Party gained leadership over some armed forces. Then, having learned a bitter lesson from the failure of the revolution, the Party organized the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Canton Uprising, and entered on a new period, the founding of the Red Army.”
In April 1928, the troops remaining from the Nanchang Uprising were led by Comrades Chu Teh and Chen Yi into the Chingkang Mountains where they joined forces with the units under Comrade Mao Tsetung. The two were combined into the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army with Comrade Chu Teh as commander and Comrade Mao Tsetung as Party representative. Comrade Mao Tsetung accumulated a wealth of experience for the Chinese revolution in the struggle in this mountain area. In the operational field, he worked out the principle: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue," which formed a basis for the Red Army's strategic and tactical principles. Progress was great also in political work. Comrade Mao Tsetung laid down the "Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Six Points for Attention"* for the army.

The Fourth Army under Comrade Mao Tsetung in January 1929 drove into southern Kiangsi and western Fukien where it opened up new base areas, forming a triangle with the Chingkang Mountain Base Area, which later developed into the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Base Area, and the new bases developed into the Central Revolutionary Base Area.

The Fourth Army’s Party organization led by Comrade Mao Tsetung held its Ninth Party Congress in December 1929 at Kutien in Shanghang County, Fukien Province. The congress adopted a resolution drawn up by Comrade Mao Tsetung, “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party,” which placed the Red Army on an entirely Marxist-Leninist basis, eliminating the influences of the old-type armies. This resolution was carried out not only in the Fourth Army but also in all other Red Army units, and the whole Chinese Red Army became a genuine people’s army in every respect. In the past fifty years, Party activities and political work in the people's army have gone forward and branched out tremendously, yet the Kutien resolution remains the beacon light for its advance.

Between the autumn of 1927 and the beginning of 1930, the Party organizations and people in various places launched more than 100 armed uprisings, acting on the decision of an emergency meeting of the Party Central Committee on August 7, 1927 and inspired by the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Red Army’s struggle in the Chingkang Mountains. In this two-year period, a number of Red Army units were established and revolutionary base areas set up, including the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei, Hunan-Western Hupeh, Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi and Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi base areas, and those in Haifeng and Lufeng counties and on Hainan Island in Kwangtung Province, and along the Yukiang and Tsokiang rivers in Kwangsi Province.

* These were developed later into the "Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention."

The Three Main Rules of Discipline are:
1. Obey orders in all your actions.
2. Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
3. Turn in everything captured.

The Eight Points for Attention are:
1. Speak politely.
3. Return everything you borrow.
4. Pay for anything you damage.
5. Do not hit or swear at people.
6. Do not damage crops.
7. Do not take liberties with women.
8. Do not ill-treat captives.
The Red Army units grew to more than 100,000 men in the first half of 1930. In mid-June of the same year, Comrade Mao Tsetung called an enlarged meeting of the Party Front Committee of the Red Army's Fourth Army in Changting County, Fukien Province, at which it was decided to establish the First Army Group of the Red Army on the basis of the Fourth Army. Meanwhile the Third Army Group was organized, incorporating the insurgent troops of Pingkiang, the local armed forces of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi and part of the insurgent troops of southern Hupeh. In August, the First and Third Army Groups joined forces at Yunghoshih in Liuyang County, Hunan Province, becoming the First Front Army of the Red Army. Comrade Chu Teh was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and Comrade Mao Tsetung General Political Commissar and Secretary of the Party's General Front Committee. Comrade Mao Tsetung resisted the erroneous idea of attacking big cities as advocated by Li Li-san's "Left" opportunist line. Leading the First Front Army back to Kiangsi Province, he saved the troops from losses and achieved their expansion. The Red Army units in the Hupeh-Hunan-Anhwei Base Area were organized into the Fourth Army of the Red Army, and later expanded into its Fourth Front Army. The units in the Hunan-Western Hupeh Base Area were organized into the Second Army Group, while the units in northeastern Kiangsi Province and along the Tsokiang and Yukiang rivers in Kwangsi Province were organized into the Tenth, Eighth and Seventh Armies.

From the winter of 1930 to September 1931, the First Front Army of 30,000 to 40,000 men commanded by Comrade Mao Tsetung shattered three large-scale counter-revolutionary "encirclement and suppression" campaigns launched by Chiang Kai-shek with a respective strength of 100,000, 300,000 and 500,000. In the three counter-campaigns the Red Army formulated a whole set of strategy and tactics for people's war. The Kuomintang's 26th Route Army, in response to our Party's call for resistance to Japan, staged the Ningtu Uprising in Kiangsi Province in December 1931, joined the Red Army there, and was reorganized as the Fifth Army Group. While the First Front Army frustrated the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, the Red Army troops in the Hunan-Western Hupeh and the Hupeh-Hunan-Anhwei base areas also smashed three similar enemy campaigns.

In January 1931 the "Left" opportunist line of Wang Ming gained control of the Party Central Committee, and soon developed a military adventurism of attacking key cities. Though the Wang Ming line excluded Comrade Mao Tsetung from Red Army leadership at a meeting in Ningtu County, Kiangsi Province in October 1932, his correct military line and operational principles had already exerted a profound influence on the Red Army, enabling it to smash the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign launched with 500,000 men against the Central Revolutionary Base Area between February and March 1933.

In October that same year, the Kuomintang unleashed its fifth campaign of "encirclement and suppression" against the central base area, using the new strategy of building blockhouses. In the counter-campaign the leaders of the Wang Ming line, completely rejecting Comrade Mao Tsetung's military line and his strategy and tactics, pushed military adventurism by engaging the enemy outside the base area, and then turned to military
conservatism by fighting him in positional battles of attrition. Finally, when the Red Army was compelled to set out on the gigantic strategic shift of the Long March in October 1934, flightism became their policy, which caused the Red Army heavy losses and placed it in a dangerous position. At this critical moment the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, on Comrade Mao Tsetung’s suggestion, called an enlarged meeting in Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in January 1935 while on the Long March. This historic meeting established the leadership of Comrade Mao Tsetung in the whole Party and the whole army, ending the domination of Wang Ming’s “Left” opportunist line. It enabled the Party and the army to resume their advance along the road of Marxism-Leninism, saving them and the whole Chinese revolution. The meeting marked a turning point of tremendous historical significance for the Party.

Now the 30,000-strong First Front Army of the Red Army commanded by Comrade Mao Tsetung defeated the encirclement, pursuit, obstruction and interception by an enemy force of several hundred thousand, and regained the initiative. Frustrating the interference of Peng Teh-huai and Lin Piao, it crossed the Chihshui River four times, slipped across the Golden Sand River and forced a crossing of the Tatu River to capture Luting Bridge and ascend Chiachin Mountains.

The First and Fourth Front Armies joined forces at Maokung in western Szechuan in June 1935, the Fourth Front Army having withdrawn from the Szechuan-Shensi border area in March that year. When Chang Kuo-tao openly broke with the Party Central Committee by leading the Fourth Front Army to the Szechuan-

Sikang* border and establishing his own bogus central committee, Comrade Mao Tsetung waged uncompromising struggle against his Right deviationist line of creating a split and resolutely led the Red Army in the northward march. It traversed trackless grassland, broke through Latzukou, crossed Liupan Mountains and finally reached Wuchichen in the Northern Shensi Revolutionary Base Area on October 19, 1935. There it joined forces with the 15th Army Group of the Red Army, a unit reorganized from Red Army units in northern Shensi, and the 25th Army which had arrived in northern Shensi from the Hupeh-Hnon-Anhwei Base Area after the Long March. In late November the same year, these Red Army units under Chairman Mao Tsetung won the battle of Chihlochen, and thus laid the cornerstone for the task undertaken by the Central Committee of the Party, the task of setting up the national headquarters of the revolution in northwestern China. In 1936 the Red Army units crossed the Yellow River in an eastern expedition. Then, in a western expedition they reached Huanhsien, Tingpien and Tunghsin near the borders of Shensi, Kansu and Ningsia provinces. All this expanded and consolidated the Northern Shensi Base Area.

The Second and Sixth Army Groups of the Red Army, later organized as the Second Front Army, started their Long March from the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow Base Area in November 1935. This army arrived at Kantze in Sikang Province in late June, 1936, and there joined forces with the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army. Chang Kuo-tao was compelled through struggle

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*The province of Sikang was abolished in 1955; part of it is now under the jurisdiction of Szechuan Province while the rest comes under that of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
to agree to shift northward together with the Second Front Army. In early July the Second and Fourth Front Armies continued their march from Kanzhe, the First, Second and Fourth Front Armies joining forces at Huining, Kansu Province in October.

When the Red Army's main forces started their Long March, they left behind some guerrilla units to operate in the southern provinces where, under Party leadership, they persisted in guerrilla warfare for three years.

After the September 18th Incident of 1931,* our Party organized and led anti-Japanese volunteer forces in the three northeastern provinces and later, the Anti-Japanese United Army, which engaged in heroic guerrilla fighting.

THE PERIOD OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN (1937-45)

After occupying China's three northeastern provinces in 1931, Japanese imperialism intensified its attempts to annex the whole of China. The Chinese nation was in peril. In December 1935 Chairman Mao outlined the Party's tactics for establishing a broad Anti-Japanese National United Front and fighting Japanese imperialism. Influenced by the Communist Party, Chang Hsueh-liang, general of the Kuomintang's Northeastern Army, and

* On September 18, 1931, the Japanese "Kwantung Army" in northeastern China seized Shenyang. Under Chiang Kai-shek's order of "absolute non-resistance," the Chinese troops at Shenyang and elsewhere in the Northeast (the Northeastern Army) withdrew to the south of Shanhaikuan, and the Japanese forces rapidly occupied the provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang. This act of Japanese invasion became known as the "September 18th Incident."

Yang Hu-cheng, general of the Kuomintang's Northwestern Army, demanded that Chiang Kai-shek unite with the Communist Party to resist Japan. Chiang refused, continuing his attacks against the Communists, whereupon the two generals arrested Chiang Kai-shek in Sian on December 12, 1936. Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee sent Comrades Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying to Sian for negotiations, during which they forced Chiang Kai-shek to accept the terms of stopping the civil war for united resistance to Japanese aggression. The peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident promoted the formation and development of a national united front against Japan.

By staging the Lukouchiao Incident on July 7, 1937,* the Japanese imperialists launched all-out invasion of China. Now, from the extreme "Left," Wang Ming jumped over to the ultra-Right. In view of this, Chairman Mao defined the Party's line as one of armed struggle under its independent leadership and of giving full play to mass struggle. This countered Wang Ming's Right capitulationist line of "doing everything through the united front" and "everything must be submitted to the united front," which meant essentially that every issue must be submitted to the Kuomintang. Strategically, Chairman Mao laid down for our army the principle of independent guerrilla warfare with the initiative in its own hands.

* On July 7, 1937, the Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison at Lukouchiao, some 10 kilometres southwest of Peking. Under the influence of the surging nation-wide anti-Japanese movement, the Chinese troops put up resistance. This incident marked the beginning of the Chinese people's heroic War of Resistance Against Japan which lasted for eight years.
The Lukouchiao Incident sparked off the nation-wide war of resistance against Japanese aggression. In August, the main forces of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army were reorganized according to an agreement reached by the Communist Party and the Kuomintang and designated the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. This consisted of the 115th, 120th and 129th Divisions, numbering altogether more than 42,000 men. The guerrilla units left in the southern provinces by the Red Army's main force at the time of the Long March were reorganized in October the same year as the New Fourth Army with four detachments — a force of more than 10,000 men. Following the instructions of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies marched to north and central China behind enemy lines. The triumph over the Right capitulationist line represented by Wang Ming, the upholding of the principle of independence and initiative and the struggles against capitulation and the "friction" created by the Kuomintang in the united front, and the development of guerrilla war by boldly mobilizing the masses resulted in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies wiping out large numbers of Japanese and puppet troops and shattering many attacks and encirclements by the Japanese aggressors while the Kuomintang army was retreating from one place to another. Up to 1939, the Communist-led armies had opened up huge battlefields in the enemy's rear and established the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeci, Shansi-Suiyuan, Shansi-Hopeci-Honan, Shantung and Hopei-Shantung-Honan base areas in north China. In central China they established base areas in southern Kiangsu, central Anhwei, eastern Anhwei and northeastern Anhwei, and on the Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu and the Hupeh-Honan borders. Meanwhile, Red Army guerrilla units that had remained on Hainan Island and along the Tungkiang River in Kwangtung Province fought an anti-Japanese guerrilla war in south China, and were later organized into the Hainan and Tungkiang Columns. After the September 18th Incident of 1931, the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army led by the Party kept up an arduous struggle against Japanese aggression.

After the fall of Canton and Wuhan in October 1938 the Japanese aggressors reversed their policy of taking the Kuomintang seriously and the Chinese Communist Party lightly, halting their strategic offensive against the Kuomintang front and gradually shifting their main forces to conduct large-scale "mopping-up" operations against our anti-Japanese base areas. The War of Resistance now entered a stage of stalemate. In 1939 and 1940, the people's forces resisting Japan continued to grow in strength, and by intense struggle our army and people shattered countless big and small "mopping-up" operations by the Japanese invaders and their puppets, and also repulsed the first anti-Communist onslaught launched by the Kuomintang. The people's armed forces grew to half a million men, our base areas expanded and the population of the areas increased to roughly 100 million.

But for the next two years the army men and people in the enemy's rear faced formidable difficulties. The Japanese invaders waged a "total war" in the military, political, economic and cultural fields. The enemy adopted a policy of "burn all, kill all and loot all" against our anti-Japanese base areas in a vain attempt to destroy these bases and our armed forces. The Kuomintang, on its part, stepped up its capitulationist activities, having
switched over to a policy of active opposition to the Communists and passive resistance to Japan. Large numbers of Kuomintang troops surrendered to the Japanese invaders and became their accomplices. The Kuomintang unleashed a second anti-Communist onslaught, dispatching armed forces against our army. The most serious case was the massacre of officers and men of the New Fourth Army in January 1941 known as the Southern Anhwei Incident. More than 80,000 Kuomintang troops mounted a surprise attack on the army which was moving north along a jointly agreed route and inflicted heavy losses on it. In this situation, our army firmly carried out the policies and principles of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, such as unified leadership, better troops and simpler administration, the rectification movement to correct our style in study, Party relations and writing, combating the “mopping-up” operations of the Japanese invaders and the “friction” created by the Kuomintang reactionaries, developing production and conducting a movement to support the government and cherish the people. In two years of hard struggle, though our base areas shrank in size to embrace a population of less than 50 million, and the Eighth Route Army was reduced to 300,000 men, we finally smashed the Japanese aggressors’ “total war” and repulsed the Kuomintang’s second anti-Communist onslaught. Our armed forces thus overcame the difficulties, tempered themselves and increased their combat effectiveness.

From 1943 on, there was a fresh rise in the people’s strength behind enemy lines while the Japanese aggressors continued to direct their main attacks on our Party and army. The Kuomintang’s domestic policies became still more reactionary, and its onslaught against the people’s forces intensified. Fighting heroically and tenaciously, the armymen and people of our base areas resisted 64 per cent of the invading Japanese troops and 95 per cent of the puppet troops, beating back the Kuomintang’s third anti-Communist onslaught. In 1944 our army launched one powerful military and political offensive after another on the battlefields in the enemy’s rear, wiping out large numbers of the enemy troops and expanding the liberated areas so that those cut up by the enemy were linked into contiguous ones.

In April 1945, on the eve of final victory in the worldwide anti-fascist war, the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held, presided over by Chairman Mao. The congress defined our Party’s political line: Boldly to mobilize the masses and expand the people’s forces so that, under the leadership of our Party, they will defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people and build a new-democratic China. This political line guided our army to make full preparations for a general nation-wide counter-offensive. The Soviet Government led by J. V. Stalin declared war on Japan on August 8. The following day Chairman Mao issued a statement: “The Last Round with the Japanese Invaders,” calling on all the Chinese people’s anti-Japanese forces to launch a country-wide counter-offensive. On August 10, Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh ordered our armed forces to give the enemy troops encircled by them a time limit for surrender. Responding to Chairman Mao’s great call and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh’s order, our army marched to enemy-held cities and key communication lines, liberating more than 200 county towns, gaining control over some sections of the Peiping-Hankow, Tien-
tsin-Pukow and Peiping-Suiyuan and other railways, and wiping out large numbers of Japanese and puppet troops. 

Hit hard by the Chinese people’s and other anti-fascist forces of the world, the Japanese imperialists were forced to announce their unconditional surrender on August 14, signing the instrument of surrender on September 2. This marked the triumph of China’s national war of liberation against Japan. In the eight years of the war, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, supported and assisted by the people and their militia, fought more than 125,000 battles and wiped out more than 1,714,000 Japanese and puppet troops, capturing some 694,000 light arms and more than 1,800 artillery pieces. Liberated areas were established in 19 provinces and regions with an area of more than one million square kilometres and a population of over 100 million, while the army and the militia grew to a strength of 1.2 million and 2.2 million respectively. The conditions were created for defeating Chiang Kai-shek and liberating the whole of China.

**THE PERIOD OF THE THIRD REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR (1945-49)**

After the conclusion of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek was bent on triggering off an all-out counter-revolutionary civil war. Liu Shao-chi stepped out at this time with his capitulationist line, alleging that “China has entered the new stage of peace and democracy.” In contrast, the policy Chairman Mao laid down for us was to “give him [Chiang Kai-shek] tit for tat and to fight for every inch of land,” to eliminate counter-revolutionary war by revolutionary war, seize political power throughout the country by armed force and establish a new-democratic state of the people led by the proletariat.

Acting on Chairman Mao’s directives, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army cleared away the interference by Liu Shao-chi’s capitulationist line and made twofold preparations to cope with the enemy’s all-out civil war: First, we would counterattack in self-defence when the Kuomintang troops assailed the liberated areas; we wiped out large numbers of enemy troops during the Shangtang, Hantan and other campaigns, and repulsed the successive attacks launched by the enemy after the conclusion of the Kuomintang-Communist truce agreement on January 10, 1946. Second, we would make a strategic redeployment by evacuating eight liberated areas in the south and opening up others in the Northeast. An armed force of 1,200,000 — 600,000 in the field armies and 600,000 in the regional forces — was organized in the Central Plains, eastern China, the Shanssi-Suiyuan, Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan and Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border regions, the Northeast, northern Shensi and other strategic zones.

With U.S. imperialist backing and relying on their superior military and economic strength, the Kuomintang reactionaries openly tore up the truce agreement and launched an all-out offensive against the liberated areas on June 26, 1946, beginning with a massive converging attack on the Central Plains Liberated Area.

Chairman Mao issued the great call to “smash Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive by a war of self-defence” and laid down for our army the correct operational principle which “is aimed chiefly at annihilating the enemy’s effective strength, not at holding or seizing a place.”
Following Chairman Mao's directives, the army men and people in the liberated areas went into action in self-defence. In an eight-month period from July 1946 to February 1947, they fought more than 160 big and small battles, knocked out 710,000 enemy troops, and in March 1947 forced the enemy to begin shortening his battle lines, give up his "all-out offensive" and mass troops in northern Shensi and Shantung provinces to carry out "attacks against key sectors." That same month our army withdrew from Yanan, Chairman Mao and Comrade Chou En-lai remaining in northern Shensi. Chairman Mao not only directed operations in all theatres of the War of Liberation. He also took personal command of the army fighting in northern Shensi. The enemy's "attacks against key sectors" were basically shattered in only four months during which our forces in northern Shensi and Shantung continued their defensive operations, tying down the enemy's main forces around them and providing opportunities for those in the other war theatres to shift to the strategic counter-offensive.

In July 1947 the War of Liberation entered its second year. The Chinese People's Liberation Army went over from strategic defensive to strategic offensive on a nationwide scale. As Chairman Mao remarked, "This is a turning point in history."

The key sector for the PLA's strategic offensive lay in the Central Plains. The main force of the Shansi-Hopai-Shantung-Honan Field Army broke the enemy defence line along the Yellow River by the end of June 1947 and pushed towards the Taipieh Mountains. The Taiyueh Army of the Shansi-Hopai-Shantung-Honan Field Army forced the Yellow River in August and thrust into western Honan. The main force of the Eastern China Field Army thrust into the Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu border region from southwestern Shantung in September. These three great armies, forming a large "A," fought battles throughout the vast expanse of the Central Plains. By June 1948 they had wiped out more than 300,000 enemy troops and created the Central Plains Liberated Area with a population of 30 million. At the same time, army units fighting on interior lines also recovered large territories and expanded the liberated areas in Shantung, northern China, the Northeast, the Shansi-Suiyuan border region and northern Shensi, wiping out large numbers of enemy troops. The main forces of our army had now carried the war into the Kuomintang-controlled areas.

From the autumn of 1947 to the spring of 1948, our army units were led by Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee to conduct a new type of ideological education between battles. "Pouring out grievances" caused by reactionary rule, and the "three check-ups" (on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight), further extended democracy in the three main fields — political, economic and military. Chairman Mao spoke highly of this: "Through the new type of ideological education movement in the army by the methods of 'pouring out grievances' and of the 'three check-ups' the People's Liberation Army will make itself invincible." In October 1947, Chairman Mao reissued the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, and in December the same year he summed up the rich combat experience of our army, setting forth the Ten Major Principles of Operation.*

* See note on p. 10.
After analysing scientifically the change in the war situation, Chairman Mao resolutely took the wise decision in the latter half of 1948 to engage the enemy in strategically decisive campaigns. He then issued the concepts of operations for the Liaohsi-Shenyang, the Huai-Hai and the Peiping-Tientsin campaigns. In the five months between September 1948 and January 1949, he personally directed these three major campaigns as well as many others, in which nearly two million enemy troops were wiped out. The numerical superiority long enjoyed by the Kuomintang army turned into numerical inferiority, and the military situation in China reached a new turning point. During the Liaoshih-Shenyang and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns, Chairman Mao severely criticized and corrected Lin Piao’s Right opportunist line, ensuring overwhelming victory in both campaigns. To meet the requirements of strategically decisive campaigns, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Party Central Committee on November 1, 1948 classified all troops in the big strategic areas into field, regional and guerrilla forces, and later redesignated the Northwest, Central Plains, Eastern China and Northeast Field Armies as the First, Second, Third and Fourth Field Armies, each comprising two to four armies. The three armies making up the Northern China Field Army were placed under the direct command of the CPLA General Headquarters.

On April 21, 1949, Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh issued the Order to the Army for the Country-Wide Advance, whereupon the PLA crossed the Yangtze and marched into areas not yet liberated. By liberating Nanking, the site of the Kuomintang central government, on April 23, it proclaimed the downfall of the reactionary Kuomintang regime. Then it swept across eastern, central-south, southwest and northwest China, eliminating three million enemy troops by June 1950. Together with those annihilated from late June 1946, the total number wiped out in four years exceeded eight million, including more than 1,600 officers at or above the divisional (brigade) level or from the rank of major general up who were either killed or captured. With the liberation of all Chinese territory except for Tibet, Taiwan and some other islands, the war ended in great victory.

THE PERIOD OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION SINCE 1949

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has made new contributions in the struggle to defend the socialist motherland and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Chairman Mao pointed out that, after the founding of the new China, “Our national defence will be consolidated and no imperialists will ever again be allowed to invade our land. Our people’s armed forces must be maintained and developed with the heroic and steeled People’s Liberation Army as the foundation. We will have not only a powerful army but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy.” This directive of Chairman Mao gave our army the glorious task of defending the dictatorship of the proletariat and pointed out specifically how it must be revolutionized and modernized in a new historical period.

In the 28 years since the founding of the new China, the PLA has followed the teaching of Chairman Mao that “the People’s Liberation Army is always a fighting force.” Coordinating with the people and the militia, it marched into
Tibet in October 1950, joined the Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea during the same month, and conducted counterattacks for self-defence on the Sino-Indian border in 1962, on Chenpao Island in 1969 and on the Hsisha Islands in early 1974, and so fulfilled missions entrusted to it by the Party and the people. The PLA strengthened its land, sea and air defences, stepped up military and political training and carried out national defence construction projects and other work in preparation against war.

Over these 28 years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has constantly upheld Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and actively participated in the struggle to expose and criticize the anti-Party cliques of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, Peng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and the “gang of four.” The commanders and fighters have conscientiously studied works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and by Chairman Mao, and criticized revisionist and bourgeois military lines. PLA work teams played a great role in the socialist education movement. The officers and men have earnestly implemented Chairman Mao’s brilliant “May 7” Directive and made energetic efforts to make the army a great school. They have also actively participated in and courageously defended the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and sent large numbers of cadres and soldiers to carry out the task of supporting industry, agriculture and the masses of the Left, exercising military control and conducting political and military training.

Along with the speedy growth of the nation’s economy, the PLA has considerably improved its techniques and equipment to become an armed force with various services and arms, modern armament and tremendous fighting power. The military system of our country has undergone a great change: a compulsory service system has been introduced, and various acts, rules and regulations have been formulated. The building of a people’s militia has also made rapid headway according to Chairman Mao’s directives on organizing contingents of the people’s militia on a big scale, making everybody a soldier, and placing the people’s militia on a solid basis organizationally, politically and militarily.

The PLA has participated in large-scale socialist construction and produced to supply its own needs, both with remarkable results.

In July 1975, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee showed great concern for the PLA by directing the Central Committee’s Military Commission to hold an enlarged meeting at which Vice-Chairmen Yeh Chien-ying and Teng Hsiao-ping delivered important speeches and put forward vital measures for implementing Chairman Mao’s directives that “It is necessary to consolidate the army,” and that the nation must “be ready for war” — instructions that were warmly supported by the whole army.

On September 9, 1976 our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao left us, his death preceded by those of our esteemed and beloved Premier Chou En-lai and Chu Teh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao “gang of four” then stepped up their machinations to usurp supreme power in the Party and state. The Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng, carrying out Chairman Mao’s will, smashed the anti-Party “gang of four” at one stroke, ridding the Party of a scourge and avoiding a major split and retrogression in our Party and
country which could have wrecked the revolution and the Party. Our Party and army now have their own wise leader and supreme commander in Comrade Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Party Central Committee and of the Party Central Committee's Military Commission. Chairman Hua is greatly concerned with our army building and has given many instructions on it. Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice-Chairman Yeh Chien-ying have directed the whole army to study earnestly the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and of Chairman Mao, and thoroughly expose and criticize the "gang of four." They stress that the army must follow Chairman Mao's military thinking and line to speed its revolutionization and modernization, that it should energetically prepare against aggressive war and for the liberation of Taiwan, and extensively promote learning from the Taching Oilfield and the Tachai Production Brigade, from Lei Feng, Chairman Mao's good soldier, and from the "Hard-Boned Sixth Company." In line with Chairman Mao's directive that "everybody must be a soldier" and a series of other directives, we must promote the building of the people's militia. Acting on the directives of Chairman Hua and the Party Central Committee, the whole army is holding high the great banner of Chairman Mao and achieving new successes in the struggle to run the army well by grasping the key link of class struggle.

IN MEMORY OF COMRADE CHU TEH

by the Theoretical Group of the Headquarters of the General Staff of the CPLA

August 1, 1977 marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. On this red-letter day of historic significance, we honour with deep respect the memory of our great leader Chairman Mao Tsetung and his tried and close comrades-in-arms—our beloved Premier Chou En-lai and Comrade Chu Teh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, as well as the other proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation.

It was our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao who founded the people's army and led the whole Party in taking the road of seizing political power by armed force and overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary rule and founding the People's Republic of China in 1949 after a prolonged, hard struggle. Following that, he led the whole nation in resolute struggles against domestic and foreign class enemies, winning great victories in socialist revolution and construction. Under his wise leadership, Comrade Chu Teh made immortal contributions to the Party and the people in building and developing an invincible people's army, building and expanding the revolutionary base areas, overthrowing the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, winning the victory of the new-democratic revolution,
building up revolutionary political power in our country, consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and developing socialist revolution and construction. The name of Comrade Chu Teh will shine forever in the history of the Chinese revolution!

CHAIRMAN MAO’S CLOSE COMRADE-IN-ARMS

Throughout the half century of tortuous revolutionary struggle, Comrade Chu Teh fought together with Chairman Mao and was his long-tested and close comrade-in-arms.

In the course of struggle, Comrade Chu Teh achieved a deep understanding of the great significance and correctness of Mao Tsetung Thought, and he held Chairman Mao in high esteem. While in the Chingkang Mountains (1928-29), he said to the Red Army’s leading cadres: Commissar Mao (Chairman Mao was at that time Political Commissar of the Red Army’s First Front Army) is very resourceful; the Red Army cannot do without him. During the Long March he often said: Comrade Mao Tsetung’s leadership is correct. Following his line, we’ll win victory. In the 1942 all-Party rectification campaign he pointed out: “Forged out of protracted revolutionary struggle, our Party now has a most wise leader in Comrade Mao Tsetung. He has a genuine command of Marxist-Leninist theory and is good at applying it to guide the Chinese revolution step by step to victory.”

After the founding of the People’s Republic, Comrade Chu Teh said on many occasions that the victory of the Chinese revolution was due first of all to Chairman Mao’s leadership. He said that having Chairman Mao as the helmsman for the present generation meant glory for the Party and happiness for the people.

At every critical juncture in the Chinese revolution and in the major two-line struggles within the Party, Comrade Chu Teh always firmly supported Chairman Mao’s leadership and carried out and defended his revolutionary line. The historic Tsunyi Meeting in January 1935 put an end to the domination of Wang Ming’s “Left” opportunist line in the Party Central Committee and established Chairman Mao’s leadership in the whole Party. The meeting saved the Party, the Red Army and the revolution at a most critical moment. At the meeting Comrade Chu Teh sternly repudiated the “Left” opportunist line and upheld Chairman Mao as our Party’s leader. He declared unequivocally: I am going to follow Comrade Mao Tsetung through thick and thin.

In the struggle against the criminal activities of Chang Kuo-tao, chieftain of the Right opportunist line, to split the Party and the Red Army, Comrade Chu Teh showed still stauncher loyalty to Chairman Mao. In June 1935, after the First and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army had joined forces in the Maokung region in Szechuan Province, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee analysed the political situation at that time and decided to continue the march northward to lead the nation-wide anti-Japanese movement. The northward march was to take two separate routes, the troops taking the left route to be led by Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh and Chang Kuo-tao. But Chang, who took a dim view of the situation and had the ambition of usurping Party leadership, arbitrarily ordered the troops to march south instead, obstinately clinging to his erroneous line of fleeing and going so far as setting up his own
bogus central committee in open opposition to the Party. Taking a clear-cut stand, Commander-in-Chief Chu waged a resolute struggle against Chang Kuo-tao, who called a meeting to attack the Commander-in-Chief and force him to issue a statement against Chairman Mao and against the northward march to resist the Japanese invaders. Commander-in-Chief Chu sternly rejected all this and declared: “Marching north to resist Japanese aggression is the decision of the Central Committee, whose line is correct. I have voted for it and will stand by it.” He insisted that the Party had only one Central Committee, namely, the Central Committee led by Comrade Mao Tsetung. Firmly opposing Chang Kuo-tao’s anti-Party action in setting up a bogus central committee, Comrade Chu Teh demonstrated the firm stand of a Communist who upheld political principles and never yielded to brute force. Chang Kuo-tao resorted to further despicable means to attack and harass Commander-in-Chief Chu, including bringing false charges against him. Though placed in a most difficult position, Commander-in-Chief Chu kept the whole situation of the revolution in mind, adhered to the correct principle of inner-Party struggle, patiently explained the Central Committee’s correct decision, carried out deep-going ideological education and actively promoted the unity of the commanders and fighters on the basis of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line. In June 1936, the Second Front Army joined forces with the Fourth Front Army, expanding the ranks of those struggling against Chang Kuo-tao. The victory of Chairman Mao’s and the Party Central Committee’s line for marching north to fight the Japanese aggressors, plus the resolute struggle waged by Commander-in-Chief Chu and other leading comrades, led to the commands of the Fourth Front Army demanding that they continue their northward march to resist Japanese aggression. Chang Kuo-tao was forced to dissolve his bogus central committee and agree to march north and join the Central Committee. But, when his troops crossed the grasslands and were about to join the other armed forces, Chang Kuo-tao, still ambitious, once again secretly ordered the Fourth Front Army to turn westward. Commander-in-Chief Chu learned of this and took prompt action. He first telegraphed the Central Committee, reporting on the situation, and then called an emergency meeting at which Chang Kuo-tao’s splittist scheme was exposed and frustrated, and issued a fresh order to march north. The First, Second and Fourth Front Armies finally joined forces in October 1936 at Huining in Kansu Province, a great victory for Chairman Mao’s correct line over Chang Kuo-tao’s wrong one. Chairman Mao spoke highly of Commander-in-Chief Chu for displaying lofty revolutionary integrity in the struggle, saying that his willpower was strong as iron and his vision as broad as the ocean.

Comrade Chu Teh and Chairman Mao forged a profound revolutionary friendship in the long years of revolutionary struggle. Comrade Chu Teh had warm feeling for Chairman Mao, complete faith in him and deep respect for his leadership. Comrade Chu Teh never hesitated in carrying out Chairman Mao’s decisions. Every time he went out on a mission, he always asked for Chairman Mao’s advice beforehand and reported to him afterwards. Chairman Mao in turn highly respected Commander-in-Chief Chu and attached great importance to the suggestions he made. In the interest of the revolu-
Throughout the decades of war Comrade Chu Teh was the Commander-in-Chief of our army and one of Chairman Mao's faithful comrades-in-arms in commanding the troops and directing operations. He was an outstanding proletarian military strategist of our Party.

The failure of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27) was a bitter lesson for the Party, which later "organized the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Canton Uprising, and entered on a new period, the founding of the Red Army." In this period, Comrade Chu Teh held high the banner of armed struggle and consciously followed the path of the Chingkang Mountains blazed by Chairman Mao, who advocated building rural revolutionary base areas, carrying out armed struggle, encircling the cities from the countryside and finally seizing political power throughout the country. In this way Chu Teh made outstanding contributions to the founding and building of the people's army.

Guided by Mao Tsetung Thought and with great revolutionary boldness and vision, Comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho Lung, Yeh Ting, Liu Po-cheng and other comrades led the famous Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, which fired the first shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries. By taking this revolutionary armed action they repudiated the Right opportunist line of Chen Tushih, the Party's General Secretary at that time. After the uprising failed, Comrade Chu Teh and others led a part of the insurrectionary forces in fighting against great odds in the Hunan-Kwangtung-Kiangsi border area. The revolution was at a low ebb, and some who failed to stand the test wavered and left the revolutionary ranks.
One of the deserters was Lin Piao. Comrade Chu Teh, firmly convinced that the revolution would triumph, and undaunted by difficulties and setbacks, led the troops to carry on the fight. On arriving at Tienhsinhsu in Kiangsi, he called a meeting of the rank and file, telling them: “After the failure of the revolution of 1905 in Russia, darkness reigned in that country. But that was only temporary, for the revolution eventually succeeded in 1917. The Chinese revolution has now met with setbacks and the sky is overcast. But this darkness is also temporary, for China too will have its own ‘1917.’” He then went on to analyse the political situation and stressed the necessity of securing a foothold by merging with the peasant movement. He also spoke of the need to carry on guerrilla warfare to expand the armed forces and gain strength by making use of the contradictions among the warlords. These far-sighted ideas, which conformed to Chairman Mao’s, helped the troops to see clearly the bright prospects of the revolution and strengthen their confidence in victory. While on the move, the troops were immensely inspired on learning that Chairman Mao had led the forces taking part in the Autumn Harvest Uprising to the Chingkang Mountains and established the first rural revolutionary base area there. Chairman Mao was also greatly concerned about the men who had participated in the Nanchang Uprising, and sent a party to look for them. In early 1928, Comrade Chu Teh and others staged an uprising in southern Hunan. Soon afterwards, Chu Teh, Chen Yi and other comrades led their forces also into the Chingkang Mountains, and Chairman Mao personally led the troops to meet and welcome them. On April 28, 1928 they joined forces in the Chingkang Mountains and formally set up the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army with Comrade Chu Teh as the commander and Chairman Mao the Party representative. From that time the names of Comrade Chu Teh and Chairman Mao were closely linked. The triumphant joining of forces in the Chingkang Mountains laid the foundation for the further development of a new-type people’s army and was a powerful impetus to the consolidation and expansion of the revolutionary base area. It was an event of tremendous significance in the history of the Chinese revolution.

In building our army, Commander-in-Chief Chu adhered firmly to Chairman Mao’s line and upheld the policies and principles defined at the Kutien Congress.* On the question of building the Red Army, Comrade Chu Teh who always stressed the Party’s absolute leadership over the army said: “The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army can fulfil its great historic mission only under the correct leadership of the Communist Party.” When the Kuomintang and the Communist Party co-operated for the second time in the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1937–45, the Red Army was redesignated as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Acting firmly in accordance with the decision of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, he rejected the Kuomintang’s demand to place its political personnel in the Eighth Route Army, ensuring the absolute leadership of the Communist Party. After liberation, criticizing Kao Kang’s fallacy that “the army creates the Party,” Comrade Chu Teh pointed out: “We senior cadres in the armed forces must at all times keep in mind this directive from Comrade Mao Tsetung: Our

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* See p. 51 above.
principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.” Commander-in-Chief Chu always laid stress on political work, saying that “no matter how military technology develops, our experience of putting politics in command will never become outdated.” He called on everyone, political and military personnel alike, to engage in political work. He helped by his own exemplary conduct to foster the fine style of the armed forces: unity between officers and men, unity between the army and the people, bravery and tenacity, hard work and plain living. He always advocated educating and training the troops in Chairman Mao’s military thinking, which he profoundly elucidated in his many military writings. In his military report, The Battle Front of the Liberated Areas, made at the Seventh National Party Congress in 1945, he issued the call: “All units of the army, all military schools and all military training classes must use Comrade Mao Tsetung’s military writings as their basic textbook, as the most essential part of their education.” After the founding of the new China, Commander-in-Chief Chu showed great concern for the revolutionization and modernization of our army. He inspected coastal and frontier defence works, went to PLA units for investigation and study, and gave many important directives on the building of the various general departments, the various arms and services, and the military academies and schools, on scientific research connected with national defence and on arms production. He pointed out explicitly that Chairman Mao’s military thinking is “the very basis of our army building and operations,” that the principles embodied in the resolution of the Kutien Congress “are still applicable to this day” and that the glorious tradition of our army must be preserved and carried forward.

Commander-in-Chief Chu resolutely acted on Chairman Mao’s concept of people’s war and strategic and tactical principles, and dedicated his outstanding military talents to helping Chairman Mao lead and direct the revolutionary wars in the various historical periods.

In the ten years of civil war (1927-37), fighting against Chiang Kai-shek’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh kept to Chairman Mao’s operational principle of guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character. In the Battle of Chichiling in 1928, both Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Chu remained at the front to direct the Red Army to concentrate its forces and wipe out the enemy forces one by one, smashing the attacks by two enemy divisions and setting a fine example of using a small force to defeat a numerically superior enemy force. In 1930, Chiang Kai-shek threw 100,000 troops into a frenzied attack against the Central Revolutionary Base Area. In firm opposition to Li Li-san’s “Left” military adventurism, Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Chu jointly signed an operational order which read: “Lure the enemy troops deep into the Red area and wipe them out when they are worn out.” Under their command, the Red Army completely annihilated the troops under Chang Hui-tsan, the Kuomintang’s front-line commander, and pulverized the enemy’s first “encirclement and suppression” campaign. Commander-in-Chief Chu then helped Chairman Mao direct the Red Army in smashing the Kuomintang’s second and third “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
In the War of Resistance Against Japan, Commander-in-Chief Chu resolutely followed Chairman Mao's strategic principle of fighting a protracted war and carrying out independent guerrilla warfare in mountainous areas. Between 1937 and 1940, on instructions from Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, he led the Eighth Route Army deep into the enemy rear in north China, where it boldly mobilized the masses, launched guerrilla warfare and fought the Japanese invaders and puppet troops under extremely difficult conditions. There were altogether more than 10,000 operations in which over 100,000 enemy troops were put out of action. In the course of fighting, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan, Shansi-Suiyuan and Shantung anti-Japanese base areas were set up, and the people's anti-Japanese armed forces developed and expanded rapidly. In building the Anti-Japanese National United Front, he persevered in the principle of unity and struggle, did much to unite with the Kuomintang troops and win them over for joint resistance against Japanese aggression; he waged struggles on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint against those die-hards who actively opposed the Communist Party while offering passive resistance to the enemy. In 1941 and 1942, as a result of the Japanese invaders' savage attacks and the Kuomintang's blockade, the liberated areas faced enormous financial and economic difficulties. In accordance with Chairman Mao's directive on overcoming difficulties with our own hands, Commander-in-Chief Chu energetically encouraged and organized the troops to engage in production. He went personally to Nanniwan in northern Shensi to help survey the land and plan its reclamation. Under his guid-

ance, the 359th Brigade succeeded in building Nanniwan into a model of production by the army to attain self-sufficiency in war time. This spurred a vast production movement in the liberated areas. In the eight years of war against the Japanese invaders, Commander-in-Chief Chu assisted Chairman Mao in directing operations on the various battle fronts of the liberated areas and made great contributions to developing the people's revolutionary forces and defeating Japanese imperialism.

After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan in August 1945, Chiang Kai-shek, with the support of U.S. imperialism, obstinately clung to his reactionary policy of bolstering up his dictatorial rule and fighting a civil war. In an attempt to seize the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance, he ordered our troops "to stay where they are, pending further orders" and forbade them to "take presumptuous action on their own" against the Japanese invaders and puppet troops. In accordance with decisions by Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, Commander-in-Chief Chu signed seven successive orders for our army to launch powerful attacks on the enemy-occupied areas, take over the arms of the Japanese and the puppets and accept Japan's surrender, paying Chiang Kai-shek back in kind. After the Kuomintang launched civil war on a nation-wide scale in the summer of 1946, Commander-in-Chief Chu went to the north China front to take personal command, firmly implementing Chairman Mao's "ten major principles of operation." In 1947, under his direction, the troops in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military Area won a war of annihilation at Chingfengtien and the war to liberate the city of Shihchiachuang by storming enemy strongholds.
In the latter battle, Commander-in-Chief Chu cross-examined the captives for information about the enemy troops, mapped out a plan for the disposition of troops for the campaign and, after the battle was over, summed up the experience gained in storming enemy strongholds. Between September 1948 and January 1949, Commander-in-Chief Chu and Comrade Chou En-lai helped Chairman Mao in organizing and directing the Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns, winning victory in these strategically decisive operations. At this time, when our army was winning nation-wide victory, the Kuomintang attempted to use peace talks to halt the advance of the People’s Liberation Army. Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Chu issued the order for country-wide advance, and our troops, one million strong, crossed the Yangtze, fiercely attacked the enemy, toppled the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang and won the great victory of the War of Liberation.

After the founding of the People’s Republic, Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh firmly implemented Chairman Mao’s strategic policy of active defence in the struggle to defend the socialist motherland. In 1950, U.S. imperialism launched its war of aggression against Korea, posing a direct threat to China’s security. Firmly carrying out the strategic decision of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, Commander-in-Chief Chu personally mobilized the PLA units. He also listened to reports by the Chinese People’s Volunteers on the war situation, examined and checked supplies to be sent to the front, and did much other work towards winning the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. He showed great concern for enhancing preparedness against war, and reminded our army to heighten vigilance and be ready at any moment to crush imperialist and social-imperialist aggression and accomplish the sacred cause of liberating Taiwan and reunifying the motherland.

**SPLENDID MODEL IN CONTINUING THE REVOLUTION**

When China entered the new historical period of socialist revolution, Comrade Chu Teh closely followed the great leader Chairman Mao, adhered to the Party’s basic line for the entire historical period of socialism and worked tirelessly to build China into a great socialist country. Comrade Chu Teh was a splendid model in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Over the past two decades and more, under Chairman Mao’s leadership, Comrade Chu Teh waged a relentless struggle against class enemies inside and outside the Party. In 1953, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih set up a clandestine headquarters for usurping Party and state power. At a conference of senior Party cadres of the nation’s military departments in January the following year, Comrade Chu Teh, condemning the conspiratorial activities of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, repeatedly stressed the need to strengthen “unity under the leadership of Chairman Mao, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the correct political and organizational lines.” Then at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Party’s Seventh Central Committee, Comrade Chu Teh exposed and criticized the criminal activities of the Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance. At the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Party Cen-
Central Committee in 1959, at which Peng Teh-huai viciously attacked the Party’s general line for socialist construction, the great leap forward and the people’s commune in an attempt to overthrow the correct leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, Comrade Chu Teh struggled against Peng Teh-huai face to face. After the meeting, Comrade Chu Teh again criticized and educated Peng Teh-huai and resolutely defended Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution initiated and led by Chairman Mao is a great practice of the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Comrade Chu Teh stood staunchly on the side of Chairman Mao and waged continuous struggle against the three bourgeois headquarters of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, and the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao anti-Party clique. In April 1966, Comrade Chu Teh delivered an important speech at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress resolutely supporting the Cultural Revolution. With ardent revolutionary zeal he declared: “We’ll do exactly as Chairman Mao says!” When Liu Shao-chi pushed a bourgeois reactionary line in an attempt to quench the flames of the Cultural Revolution, Comrade Chu Teh took his position beside Chairman Mao to review the Red Guards, went to grassroots units to read big-character posters, attended mass meetings and enthusiastically backed the revolutionary actions of the masses. When Lin Piao, Chen Pota and the “gang of four” went all out to “overthrow everything” and incite “all-out civil war” and rabidly persecuted revolutionary leading cadres, Comrade Chu Teh sternly pointed out that what they were doing had nothing in common with Chairman Mao’s policies. He patiently told the masses to hold firmly to the general orientation of the struggle, and instructed cadres to take a correct attitude towards the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, towards the masses and towards themselves. In the struggle which smashed Lin Piao’s plot for a counter-revolutionary coup d’état, Comrade Chu Teh produced irrefutable evidence exposing and criticizing Lin Piao’s crimes of opposing Chairman Mao and the Party. He stressed the need to uphold the three basic principles put forward by Chairman Mao: “Practise Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don’t split; be open and above-board, and don’t intrigue and conspire.”

After the Tenth Party Congress, the “gang of four” stepped up its conspiratorial activities to usurp Party and state power. Chairman Mao saw through this gang’s scheme and severely censured them. He also made arrangements for solving the problem of the “gang of four.” Comrade Chu Teh firmly supported the wise decision of Chairman Mao and carried on a resolute struggle against the gang. Early in 1976 Comrade Chu Teh received a letter exposing the “gang of four.” Realizing that this was an important matter, he expressed his unqualified support in a note and sent it together with the letter to Chairman Mao. After the death of Premier Chou En-lai, the “gang of four” directed the spearhead of its attack at Comrade Hua Kuo-feng. Chairman Mao realized the gang’s malicious intent and proposed that Comrade Hua Kuo-feng be appointed First Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Premier of the State Council. When Chairman Mao himself selected Comrade Hua Kuo-feng as his successor, Comrade Chu Teh gave firm support and expressed great
satisfaction and full confidence in Comrade Hua Kuo-feng.

Comrade Chu Teh faithfully carried out Chairman Mao’s line, principles and policies for socialist construction. He exerted tremendous effort to carry out the great historic task of achieving the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology within this century. When in 1956 Chairman Mao delivered his important speech On the Ten Major Relationships, Comrade Chu Teh immediately wrote to Chairman Mao expressing his full support. To promote the building of socialism with greater, faster, better and more economical results, Comrade Chu Teh made investigation and study tours to various parts of the country and issued many important directives. In the great leap forward year of 1958, at the age of 72, Chu Teh visited 11 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, including Sinkiang and Chinghai, in eight months from April to December. He talked warmheartedly with the cadres and workers beside steel furnaces, with the peasants in commune fields, with soldiers in their barracks, with Kazakh herdsmen in their yurts. He conducted energetic propaganda on the general line, the great leap forward and the people’s commune, and enthusiastically supported the socialist new things. He paid much attention to the development of socialist industry and did his best to promote the mass movement to learn from Taching in industry. Twice he went to the Taching Oilfield on inspection tours and highly praised the Taching people for blazing a new trail for building socialist enterprises. He also paid great attention to developing socialist agriculture and zealously supported and cherished the red banner of Tachai planted by Chairman Mao.

He pointed out that learning from Tachai in agriculture was the best way to develop China’s agriculture. He showed particular concern for construction in the frontier regions, visiting various reclamation centres in the deserts of Sinkiang and encouraging the armymen to continue giving full play to the Nanniwan spirit and transform the frontier regions. Comrade Chu Teh also often gave his attention to the development of culture, education, science and technology, medical and health work and sports. He took a keen interest in the Kiangsi Communist Labour University which Chairman Mao had commended. He went there on many occasions to inspect and listen to the classroom teaching. He commended the university for its correct orientation and for taking the lead in developing a socialist educational system. He stressed that, in medical and health work, traditional Chinese medicine and Western medicine must be integrated and that attention must be paid to the role played by barefoot doctors. He consistently advocated the popularization of sports among the people, stressing that sports must serve the people, production and national defence construction. He received scientists and technicians on many occasions, encouraging them to become both red and expert so as to contribute to the building of socialism. Comrade Chu Teh was extremely angry with the "gang of four," the scourge of the Chinese nation, for its disruption of production and revolution. He showed great concern for the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology, right up until his death, and instructed leading comrades visiting him to pay attention to economic construction and push production forward.
Supporting the world revolution was to Comrade Chu Teh an important aspect of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Representing our Party and state, he paid visits to foreign countries, and he frequently received foreign visitors and diplomatic envoys to China. On international issues he firmly upheld Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and policies in foreign affairs. In accordance with Chairman Mao’s strategic concept of the three worlds and his teaching that China will never seek hegemony Comrade Chu Teh worked for unity with all forces that could be united with to oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. In the international communist movement, he held high the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and carried on an uncompromising struggle against modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique at the core.

Comrade Chu Teh’s revolutionary vigour in continuing the revolution never flagged. For him, the study of works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and Chairman Mao’s works was imperative in combating and preventing revisionism and in continuing the revolution. He always encouraged himself as well as others with these words: “Go on making revolution and go on studying, go on remoulding and go on following Chairman Mao till our last breath!” Day in and day out over the decades, he read indefatigably and diligently, conscientiously took notes and did not let travelling or hospitalization interfere with his study. On his 90th birthday early in 1976, he wrote on a scroll: “Carry the revolution through to the end!” as an expression of his firm, lifelong dedication to the cause of communism. He constantly drew on our Party’s historical experience and the lesson of the Soviet Union turning revisionist to educate the cadres and exhort them to continue resisting revisionism, persevere in continuing the revolution and pass the red banner of revolution from generation to generation till the realization of communism.

THE PEOPLE’S LOYAL SERVANT

Comrade Chu Teh’s noble qualities of serving the people with his whole heart and his fine style of maintaining close ties with the masses, his plain living and hard work, have long been known throughout the Party, the whole army and the people of all nationalities in China. The people affectionately call him an “old revolutionary hero” and a loyal servant of the people.

Comrade Chu Teh was most loyal to the Party and the people, whose interests he always placed above everything else. He dedicated his all to the proletarian revolutionary cause. When in 1939 his Party branch awarded him a banner with the words “Model Party Member,” he said earnestly: “I’m just an untutored rustic. It is the Party which has assigned me to be the commander-in-chief.” He often said: “I don’t want anything especially. I just want to be an ordinary Party member. That is all I ask.” These words, so simply put, fully indicate his staunch proletarian Party spirit. Comrade Chu Teh’s heart was full of the Party and the people, and there was no room for himself. On the battlefield he was always steadfast and calm; he fought courageously, disregarding his own safety. In the acute and complex struggles between the two lines, he was always selfless.
and fearless, open and above-board, and struggled resolutely against anything that contravened the interests of the Party and the people. He had a high sense of responsibility towards his work. To the end of his days he maintained the same vigour as he displayed in the years of revolutionary wars, working day and night for the Party and the people. In those difficult days when Chairman Mao was gravely ill and when Premier Chou was no longer with us, his revolutionary will was ever stronger and he tossed aside his walking stick and took an even more active part in state affairs. When comrades urged him not to overdo, he replied: "A Communist lives to do as much as he can for the Party, and do it well." Despite his illness, he continued to receive foreign visitors right up until shortly before his death. When he was critically ill, he continued to attend to Party and state matters. He instructed his secretary to tell the Foreign Ministry not to hesitate to send in credentials of ambassadors going abroad for his signature. "I can still write my name!" he said. In this way Chairman Chu Teh of the N.P.C. Standing Committee carried on his work for the Party and people to his last breath. Our late Premier Chou had said with deep affection about him: "To the Party and the people, he is loyalty itself."

Comrade Chu Teh was unassuming and approachable, maintained close ties with the people and was of one mind with the masses. Though he was a leader of the Party, the state and the army, he acted as an ordinary Party member at Party branch meetings and an ordinary soldier when he visited a company. He was never assuming among the people but always regarded himself as an ordinary worker. During the war years he always marched by the side of officers and men and did all sorts of work alongside them. When he visited the companies he talked with the soldiers and the cooks and joined in basketball games. During the Long March, his horse carried sick and wounded comrades oftener than it did him. When supplies ran short, he would give his meagre rations to the sick and wounded. The Red Army ran out of food while crossing the grasslands during the Long March. One soldier, however, still had a strip of dried beef he had saved for Commander-in-Chief Chu. But Chu Teh tore it into shreds and distributed them among the comrades without keeping any for himself. The soldier wept out of concern for the Commander-in-Chief's health. But Comrade Chu Teh comforted him: "The revolution depends on all of us. If we all tide over this difficult period, the revolution will have a chance."

He was not only concerned for the commanders' and fighters' well-being, but paid even greater attention to them politically. He patiently and painstakingly helped them study politics, military affairs and culture. In the Central Soviet Area, he taught the staff officers of the general headquarters how to do their work well. In the Taihang Mountains, he taught the cadres guerrilla warfare. Even when Japanese planes were bombing and strafing, Commander-in-Chief Chu calmly continued his lectures on dialectics under the cover of the growing crops. The officers and men cherished great love for their Commander-in-Chief. "He looks after us like a kind mother," they said, "and is our excellent teacher, too."

Wherever Commander-in-Chief Chu went he took every opportunity to go among the people, inquire after their daily life and work with them. Whenever possible, he urged the army to help the people solve their problems
in production and livelihood. On an inspection tour of
the mountainous regions after liberation, he pointed out
to comrades in the departments concerned that our rev-
olution began in the mountains, but the life of the people
in some places there was still pretty hard, and measures
must be taken to speed up construction in these places
and improve the people's livelihood. He always had the
people's interest at heart, often stressing that our country
has hundreds of millions of people, and whatever we do
we must never for a moment forget them.

Throughout his life, Comrade Chu Teh worked hard
and lived plainly. During the war years he ate the same
course food as the soldiers, wore the same rough home-
spun uniform and lived in a thatched hut or a cave like
everyone else. In the Chingkang Mountains, in order to
store grain to frustrate enemy blockade and encirclement,
Commander-in-Chief Chu headed the commanders and
fighters carrying supplies up the mountains from 25 kilo-
metres away. One day the comrades took away his
shoulder-pole and hid it, for they did not like their Com-
mander-in-Chief carrying grain day after day while
having to plan military operations far into the night. But
Commander-in-Chief Chu made another shoulder-pole
for himself, carved his name on it this time, and went
on carrying grain with the others. Before long, the story
about Comrade Chu Teh's shoulder-pole spread far and
wide. It was an inspiration to all the soldiers and ci-
vilians in the base area and spurred them on to greater
efforts to overcome difficulties and defeat the enemy. In
Yenan, Commander-in-Chief Chu led the others to take
up the hoe and open up land to grow vegetables. In Pe-
king, after nation-wide liberation, Comrade Chu Teh went
on as usual taking part in productive labour. In 1958,
already in his seventies, he went to work at the construc-
tion site of the Ming Tombs Reservoir on the outskirts
of Peking. Comrade Chu Teh, who lived simply, often
said that we mustn't forget the past now that things are
better. Several times each year he and his family would
have a meal of various plants found growing in the wilds
to remind themselves of past hardships. When comrades
called one day to repair his house, he told them that the
house was all right as it was, that they should use the
money on new housing for the people. Comrade Chu
Teh's clothes, socks and shoes were all much mended,
and he died in one of his old shirts. He made the same
strict demands on his children and relatives, asking them
to be diligent in their study of the works of Marx, Engels,
Lenin and Stalin and of Chairman Mao, remain part of
the working people and never seek privileges. When he
heard that comrades had specially kept one of his grand-
sons in Peking to help look after him in his old age, he
was very displeased. "I want a worthy successor to the
revolutionary cause," he said in all seriousness, "not a
filial grandchild!" He insisted that the lad be sent away.
Before his death, Comrade Chu Teh gave the instruction
that the money he had saved out of his salary be given
to the Party as his Party membership dues, that none
was to be given to his children. This was how he con-
sciously restricted bourgeois right and made a clean break
with traditional ideas, demonstrating his lofty commu-
nist spirit.

THE PEOPLE'S GLORY

In 1946 Chairman Mao wrote for Comrade Chu Teh
the inscription: "The People's Glory." This paid tribute
to Comrade Chu Teh for his magnificent contributions to the Party and the people and for this proletarian revolutionary’s flesh-and-blood ties with the people. It also gave expression to the high esteem and love the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country had for Comrade Chu Teh.

Comrade Chu Teh was a fine member of the Communist Party of China, a great revolutionary fighter and proletarian revolutionary of the Chinese people and an outstanding leader of the Party, the state and the army, deeply loved and respected by the people of the whole country. The revolutionary road he trod was that taken by the Chinese people and their outstanding representatives for nearly a century. In his early years he took part in the Chinese people’s revolutionary activities against imperialism and feudalism. In 1909 he joined the Tung Meng Hui (the Chinese Revolutionary League) led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In 1911 he took part in the bourgeois-democratic revolution that overthrew the feudal rule of the Ching Dynasty, and in 1915 he joined in the uprising in Yunnan against Yuan Shih-kai’s assumption of the throne. Through these struggles he came to see that the old democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie could not save China. To ensure a bright future for China he set about seeking a new revolutionary road. After the October Revolution, he gradually accepted Marxism-Leninism and gave up his post as a brigade commander of the local troops in Yunnan. He also turned down an offer from a Szechuan warlord to become a division commander, but travelled between Peking and Shanghai looking for the Communist Party. When his application for Party membership was rudely rejected by Chen Tu-hsiu, he was not discouraged, but went to Germany where he studied Marxism and took part in the workers’ movement. In the autumn of 1922, upon Comrade Chou En-lai’s recommendation, he was admitted into the Communist Party of China in Berlin. From then on he was a communist fighter holding aloft the great banner of Chairman Mao. At every historical stage of the Chinese revolution he fought courageously and indefatigably, and was always in the van of the struggle. The greatness of Comrade Chu Teh as an advanced representative of the Chinese people was shown by his active participation in the old democratic revolution. As history moved forward, his greatness manifested itself still more clearly in his conscious efforts to advance from a revolutionary democrat to a Communist devoting his life to the cause of communism. Comrade Chu Teh’s life was one of dedication to the cause of communism. His was a life of perseverance in continuing the revolution and whole-hearted service to the people.

As we recall the glorious and militant life of Comrade Chu Teh, we are filled with bitter hatred for Lin Piao and the “gang of four.” For a long time they viciously attacked Comrade Chu Teh and wilfully tampered with history. Lin Piao and company had the brass to claim that it was he, and not Commander-in-Chief Chu, who led the armed forces to join Chairman Mao in the Chings-kang Mountains. The “gang of four” banned any mention of Commander-in-Chief Chu in records of the Nan-chang Uprising and the Long March. They sought to write off the historical role played by the older generation of proletarian revolutionaries and negate the splendid history of our Party so as to realize their criminal aim of usurping the supreme leadership of the Party and
As we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, we are deeply stirred by the memory of the revolutionary, fighting life of Comrade Ho Lung, one of the foremost leaders of the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927. Comrade Ho Lung died on June 9, 1969, a victim of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique and the counter-revolutionary “gang of four,” who persecuted Comrade Ho Lung by bringing false charges against him. Today's open and solemn commemoration of this outstanding Communist fighter is politically a direct result of overthrowing the Lin Piao anti-Party clique and the “gang of four.”

Comrade Ho Lung was a proletarian revolutionary of the older generation in our Party, an outstanding military strategist and one of the founders of our army. Under the leadership of the Party and Chairman Mao, Comrade Ho Lung staunchly braved all sorts of rigours and dangers and made brilliant achievements in the War of Agrarian Revolution (1927-37), the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45) and the War of Liberation (1945-49) as well as in socialist revolution and socialist construction.
He won the respect and love of the whole Party, the whole army and the whole nation. On his death, the Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao and Premier Chou accorded him a high appraisal. The Party Central Committee pointed out explicitly: "Comrade Ho Lung was a good comrade who for several decades made great contributions to the Party and the people's revolutionary cause under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee. All his life, whether in the years of war or after the country-wide liberation, he was loyal to the Party, to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and to the cause of socialism."

Comrade Ho Lung was born in 1896 in Hungchiakuan, Sangchih County, Hunan Province. In his early childhood he worked in the fields beside his father. Inspired by the 1911 bourgeois-democratic revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, he took revolutionary action by getting hold of two kitchen knives and seizing arms from a salt bureau to oppose the local government's exorbitant tax levies and other extortions, starting his long record of armed struggle. Later he joined the Army of National Salvation which fought Yuan Shih-kai's restoration of the monarchy, became a regimental commander and later a brigade commander and garrison commander of Lichou in Hunan Province. China's weakness at that time and the poverty of its people greatly disturbed him, while he felt highly disgusted at the benightedness of the old officialdom marked by a general scramble for power and gain. He had deep sympathy for the new things and the rising popular revolutionary movement. During the early stage of the great revolution of 1924-27 he gave a banquet to which members of both the Communist Party and the Kuomintang were invited and at which both were asked to present their views on the current situation and China's future. Having heard the views of both sides, Comrade Ho Lung concluded: "It's the theory of the Communist Party that's correct." During the great revolution he firmly followed Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three great revolutionary policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. He took an active part in the Northern Expeditionary War as division commander and army commander; in fighting the Northern warlords he won many battles and was one of the well-known leftist generals in the National Revolutionary Army of that time. He highly respected the Communists sent to work in his armed forces and gave them strong support. In the years of struggle, through his many contacts with the political activists of the Communist Party, he came to accept without reserve the great truth of communism and determined to fight for the communist cause.

In July 1927 our Party decided to stage armed uprisings as counterblows against the betrayal of the revolution by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, and to repudiate Chen Tu-hsiu's Right capitulationism. Though not yet a member of the Communist Party, Comrade Ho Lung stood firmly on the side of the revolutionary people, resolutely carried out the policy decision of the Communist Party and unreservedly accepted the leadership of Comrade Chou En-lai who was the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Secretary of the Front Committee. Ho Lung expelled the reactionaries from his ranks and resolutely led the 20th Army in the heroic Nanchang Uprising, serving as Commander-in-Chief of the insurrectionary army. Not
long afterwards he joined the Chinese Communist Party and began a new militant career.

In the years between 1928 and 1936 Comrade Ho Lung held the following posts: Commander of the Second Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and Secretary of the Party’s Front Committee; Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army Group and Member of the C.P.C. Hunan-Western Hupeh Base Area Sub-Bureau; Commander-in-Chief of the Second and Sixth Army Groups and concurrently Commander of the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow Military Area, Chairman of the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow Sub-Military Commission of the Party, and Commander of the Second Front Army of the Red Army. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, he was made Commander of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army and concurrently Commander of the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Area. From the middle period of the Anti-Japanese War and during the War of Liberation he was Commander of the Army of Joint Defence of Shensi, Kansu, Ningsia, Shansi and Suiyuan Provinces, Commander of the Northwest Military Area and Second Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, he was appointed Member of the Central People’s Government, Commander of the Southwest Military Area and Vice-Chairman of the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee, and Third Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee. He was later transferred to work in the Central Government as Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Council and Vice-Premier of the State Council, concurrently Minister in charge of the Physical Culture and Sports Commission.

He was elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh and Eighth National Congresses of the Party, and after the Party’s Eighth National Congress became Member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee.

**UPHOLDING CHAIRMAN MAO’S REVOLUTIONARY LINE IN RESOLUTE STRUGGLES AGAINST ERRONEOUS LINES**

Comrade Ho Lung had great respect and deep feeling for Chairman Mao. While in Changsha, Hunan, Comrade Mao Tsetung initiated a number of mass struggles against imperialism and the warlords in the early days of the Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Ho Lung later recalled how highly he had regarded the revolutionary prowess displayed by Comrade Mao Tsetung in these movements, and what a strong influence it had on him. In August 1934, the Sixth Army Group of the Red Army of the Hunan-Kiangsi Military Area (the Chingkang Mountains) under Comrade Jen Pi-shih started its Long March and joined forces with the Second Army Group of the Red Army led by Comrade Ho Lung in eastern Kweichow in October. Comrade Ho Lung, who greatly admired Chairman Mao, lost no time in learning from Comrade Jen Pi-shih and others all he could about Comrade Mao Tsetung’s brilliant ideas, the Central Red Army’s experience in countering the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns and in the agrarian revolution. He sincerely supported the line and policies formulated by Chairman Mao, including the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,
and highly valued his works. Ho Lung also held Vice-Chairman Chou En-lai and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh in high respect. His many talks supporting Chairman Mao, Commander-in-Chief Chu and Vice-Chairman Chou did much to cement the unity of the two army groups in fighting the enemy. When in February 1935 the Second and Sixth Army Groups received telegrams on the resolution of the Tsunyi Meeting and the organizational decisions of the Party Central Committee which established Comrade Mao Tsetung's leadership in the Party Central Committee, Comrade Ho Lung gave his firm support and showed his readiness to act on orders from Chairman Mao. He said excitedly: "Though I've never met Comrade Mao Tsetung, my own experience and lessons, and what I've learned from his articles tell me beyond doubt that he is our correct leader."

When the Second Front Army of the Red Army arrived in the Shensi-Kansu border area in the autumn of 1936, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee sent Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping and others to greet the troops and brief them on the Wayaopao Meeting called by the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, and on Chairman Mao's report at the meeting, "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism." Comrade Ho Lung firmly supported Chairman Mao's wise decisions and exclaimed: "Wonderful! From now on we'll be under Chairman Mao's direct leadership!" Events over the subsequent decades fully demonstrated Comrade Ho Lung's wholehearted support for Chairman Mao and his loyalty to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.

In the Party's two-line struggles, Comrade Ho Lung stood firmly for Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and made important contributions to the revolution.

Comrade Ho Lung's determined participation in the Nanchang Uprising of 1927, in which the first shot was fired against the Kuomintang reactionaries in the revolutionary armed struggle led independently by the Chinese proletariat, was a direct and powerful repudiation of Chen Tu-hsiu's Right capitulationist line.

In the summer and autumn of 1930 the Party Central Committee fell under the domination of Li Li-san's "Left" adventurism. It refused to admit that the revolution was at a low ebb, rejected Chairman Mao's correct idea of establishing rural revolutionary base areas, and advocated armed uprisings in key cities in a general showdown with the enemy. It gave an erroneous order for the Second Army Group of the Red Army led by Comrade Ho Lung to leave the Hunan-Western Hupeh Base Area and join in an attack on Changsha. Comrades Ho Lung and Chou Yi-chun among others waged a stern struggle against this erroneous line.

Between the spring of 1932 and the autumn of 1934, due to the harm done by the third "Left" line represented by Wang Ming, the Second Army Group of the Red Army suffered heavy losses and was compelled to evacuate the Hunghu Lake Base Area and go to the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow borders. Comrade Ho Lung refused to follow the Wang Ming line, especially its practice of widening the scope in suppressing counter-revolutionaries, and thus protected a large number of revolutionary cadres. With full confidence he closely united the Red Army and its guerrilla units in an arduous revolutionary struggle.

In 1936, while on the Long March, Comrade Ho Lung unwaveringly opposed Chang Kuo-tao's Right line of taking to flight and creating a split. That April Chang
Kuo-tao, who had usurped the post of General Political Commissar of the Red Army, telegraphed the Second and Sixth Army Groups of the Red Army an order for them to cross the Chinsha River. He directed the two army groups to march to Kantze, Sikan Province, along separate routes in an attempt to alienate them from each other. In June the same year the two groups were combined and redesignated the Second Front Army. Arriving in Kantze, the army joined forces with the heroic and combat-worthy Fourth Front Army and learned of Chang Kuo-tao's sinister establishment of a bogus central committee and his criminal attempt to split the Red Army. Comrade Chu Teh, then detained by Chang Kuo-tao, was very pleased at the Second Front Army's arrival. He said to Comrade Ho Lung: "So you've come. We can go north together, go where the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao are." Together with Comrade Chu Teh, Comrade Ho Lung was among those who stood firm by the side of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao and sharply denounced Chang's establishment of a parallel central committee. Comrade Ho Lung and others also frustrated Chang Kuo-tao's attempt to distribute, among the Second Front Army, documents directed against the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao. The Sub-Military Commission headed by Comrade Ho Lung rejected Chang Kuo-tao's proposal for a joint meeting of the Second and Fourth Front Armies aimed at inducing the Second Front Army to fall in with his anti-Party line. On the other hand, Comrade Ho Lung tried hard to persuade Chang Kuo-tao to lead his troops to the north to fight the Japanese invaders. He told the Second Front Army cadres how Comrade Hsu Hsiang-chien, Commander of the Fourth Front Army, and its other officers and fighters refused to go along with Chang Kuo-tao in his wrong actions, and how the fighters of the Fourth Front Army had knit woollen vests and socks for the comrades of the Second Front Army, showing the militant friendship between the fraternal units. Owing to the resolute efforts of Comrades Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, Ho Lung, Liu Po-cheng and Kuan Hsiang-ying in defence of the correct line of the Party Central Committee, and also to the commanders and fighters of the Fourth Front Army under Comrade Hsu Hsiang-chien unanimously requesting to march north and join forces with the Central Red Army, Chang Kuo-tao's attempt to split the army was frustrated and he had to dissolve his bogus central committee and take the troops north. It was this situation that made possible the joining of the three front armies.

Comrade Ho Lung fully supported the concept of the Anti-Japanese National United Front advanced by Chairman Mao to meet the national crisis then confronting China. Before the Second Front Army arrived in northern Shensi, the First Front Army and the northern Shensi 15th Army Group, both led by Chairman Mao, had in 1936 marched east across the Yellow River into Shansi where they won a resounding victory, after which they swung back to the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area and fought the Kuomintang's Northeast and Northwest Armies while at the same time doing much to extend the work of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This strategic move won warm support among people of various classes and strata in China and evoked an active response from the Northeast and Northwest Armies' commanders, Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng. In December 1936 the world was shocked by the Sian Incident in which
Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng arrested Chiang Kai-shek. Comrade Ho Lung heartily agreed when he heard that Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee had sent Comrades Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-yong to Sian for negotiations. He fully supported Chairman Mao’s policy and tactics for a peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident and believed that Comrades Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-yong would achieve complete success, that the civil war would cease and the nation unite to fight the Japanese invaders.

In the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Comrade Ho Lung carried out Chairman Mao’s policy of persevering in independent guerrilla warfare and opposed Wang Ming’s Right capitulationist line of submitting every question to the Kuomintang.

In the two-line struggles inside the Party after country-wide liberation, Comrade Ho Lung continued to take a firm stand in upholding Chairman Mao’s correct line and opposing wrong ones. Fully supporting the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, he joined China’s revolutionary masses in actively fighting Liu Shao-chi’s revisionist line.

Under Chairman Mao’s leadership, Comrade Ho Lung for several decades fought opportunism in all forms at critical junctures and maintained a firm, clear-cut stand to the end. He was a comrade to learn from.

**HO LUNG MADE GREAT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF OUR ARMY AND BASE AREAS**

After the insurrectionary troops from Nanchang fought hard battles against stronger counter-revolutionary forces around Chaochow and Swatow in Kwangtung and met with defeat, the Party Central Committee proposed to send Comrade Ho Lung to the Soviet Union via Shanghai to study military science. Ho Lung thought for a moment, then answered: “Better let me go back to the Hunan-western Hupeh border to wage guerrilla war and carry out the agrarian revolution.” And so he, Comrade Chou Yi-chun and five others were assigned by the Party Central Committee to wage guerrilla war and set up a base in that area. Before they set out, the Party Central Committee presented them with a copy of the *Manjefio of the Communist Party* and two pistols. Chiang Kai-shek had placed 100,000 silver dollars on Comrade Ho Lung’s head, and the search for him was hot everywhere. The masses gave him cover, however, and he succeeded in outwitting the enemy and arriving in the Hunghu Lake district as planned. Ho Lung and the other comrades were inspired by the rural guerrilla warfare conducted by the troops which had staged the Autumn Harvest Uprising under Comrade Mao Tsetung and their building of the Chingkang Mountains Revolutionary Base Area. Guided by Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line, they co-operated with the local Party organizations and led the workers and peasants in powerful revolutionary armed struggles. Undeterred by setbacks and building on successes, they soon formed the Second Army Group of the Red Army and established the rural revolutionary base area with Hunghu Lake as the centre. As Chairman Mao pointed out, “the guerrilla warfare round the Hunghu Lake kept up for several years in the Red Army period” testified to “the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and of establishing base areas in the river-lake-estuary regions.” It was Com-
rade Ho Lung’s correct leadership, exemplary deeds and arduous struggle that developed the guerrilla warfare around the Hunghu Lake Base Area. This base area, together with the Central, the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei and the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi revolutionary base areas, formed a strategic encirclement of the enemy-occupied key cities in Kiangsi, Hunan and Hupeh provinces, advancing the revolutionary movement throughout the country.

Given Chairman Mao’s timely guidance, Comrade Ho Lung’s ability to conduct military operations was brought into full play. An example of this occurred in 1934 when the Second and Sixth Army Groups joined forces. Under the command of the Sub-Military Commission headed by Comrade Ho Lung, they firmly carried out Chairman Mao’s military line, concentrated their forces for mobile warfare and won a series of victories over an enemy a dozen times their strength. They built a base area and carried out land reform along the borders of Hunan, Hupeh, Szechuan and Kweichow provinces with the Yungshun-Sangchih-Tayung area as the centre, and formed the Border Area’s Revolutionary Committee and Military Area. In February 1935, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the warlord troops in Hunan and Hupeh to attack the Red Army forces there from six directions. The Revolutionary Military Commission of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao promptly telegraphed directives for making use of the contradictions between the enemy forces in Hunan and those in Hupeh, concentrating a superior force and seizing every opportunity to destroy these forces one by one at their weak points through mobile warfare. Comrade Ho Lung and the Sub-Military Commission followed the military line defined by the Tsunyi Meeting and resolutely implemented the directives. Analysing the terrain and the conditions of material supplies and mass support along the Hunan-Hupeh border, Ho Lung adopted the policy of operating on interior lines in a strategic sense and fighting on exterior lines in campaigns and battles by utilizing the vast expanse of the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow borders. When the enemy forces advanced on us along separate routes for a converging attack, we would lure them in deep and wipe them out one by one. Ho Lung’s troops first annihilated the bulk of the Hunan warlord Chen Chu-chen’s three brigades at Lungchiachai, Yungshun County. Then they wiped out by an absolutely superior force a whole brigade of Chen Yueh-han’s column at Chenchiaho, Sangeih County and, in pursuing the enemy, eliminated another brigade and a division command at Taotzusii, recovering the town of Sangchih and the large area around. Following up the victory, the troops turned east and swept into the enemy’s rear at Tzuli, forcing him to retreat.

At this moment Commander Ho Lung, Political Commissar Jen Pi-shih and some others studied again Chairman Mao’s instructions, analysed the contradictions between the enemy forces in Hunan and those in Hupeh, and decided to take the defensive in dealing with the ones in Hunan while taking the offensive in fighting those in Hupeh. Hence, by surrounding Hsuanen in Hupeh to draw enemy reinforcements, our troops wiped out a brigade and a division command in the Chungpao area and captured Chang Chen-han, the column and division commander. Laying an ambush at Panliyuan, the Red Army troops completely wiped out the enemy’s 85th Division and killed its commander Hsieh Pin after which
they routed ten more regiments at Pachiaoto. All this gave direct support to the Central Red Army on the Long March.

Acting on Comrade Ho Lung’s proposal which was approved by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, the Second and Sixth Army Groups which had gained resounding fame by smashing the enemy encirclement started a powerful eastward drive and captured the towns of Chinshi, Lichou, Linli and Shimen, threatening Changteh. The result was a substantial increase in the Red Army’s numerical strength and supplies. In November 1935, to place themselves in a more favourable position before the onset of a larger enemy campaign, the Second and Sixth Army Groups left Sangchih, passed Tayung and, with speed and valour, penetrated the blockade lines along the Lishui and Yuanchiang rivers to reach central Hunan where they captured Hsinhua, Hsiuangshan, Chenhsi and Hsupu by surprise and so joined the Long March.

Throughout this period, the Red Army’s Second Front Army comprising the Second and Sixth Army Groups fought brilliant battles with masterful flexibility and irresistible force, writing a glorious chapter in its war history.

In the War of Resistance Against Japan, Comrade Ho Lung directed the 120th Division in its advance into northwest Shansi behind enemy lines. Defeating the Japanese aggressors’ “mopping-up” operations, the division recaptured seven county towns including Kolan, Wuchai and Shenchih. Then it marched east and, coordinating with Comrade Nieh Jung-chen’s forces, fought in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area and central Hopei and developed guerrilla warfare on the plains.

Smashing the Japanese invaders’ attack, they took many Japanese prisoners-of-war and captured large quantities of arms and supplies. Comrade Ho Lung took command at the front in the famous battle at Chihui in central Hopei, and was wounded by a poison-gas shell. Still he persisted in commanding his troops till the enemy fled in confusion. The next great victory was in the battle at Chenchuang in western Hopei. In December 1939, the Kuomintang reactionaries launched the first anti-Communist onslaught with the Shansi warlord Yen Hsi-shan’s diehard troops frenziedly attacking the anti-Japanese base area in northwest Shansi. Comrade Ho Lung was ordered to lead his troops back to that area by night, and there they wiped out the KMT diehards and established the Shansi-Suiyuan Base Area. Following Chairman Mao’s line and policies, Comrade Ho Lung and other comrades of the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau of the Party Central Committee fully mobilized the masses for a battle against the enemy, a powerful movement for the reduction of rent and interest, the establishment of the people’s political power, and improvements in production, finance and economic affairs. The Shansi-Suiyuan Base Area was steadily consolidated and expanded to become an important bastion shielding the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Party Central Committee, and a strong link between the border region and the various base areas behind enemy lines. After returning to work in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, Comrade Ho Lung devoted himself to training troops and defending the border region, a large-scale production movement, the rectification campaign initiated by Chairman Mao and the study of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought.
During the War of Liberation of 1945-49, when Chairman Mao took command in northern Shensi, Comrade Ho Lung directed operations as Commander of the Northwest Military Area. While fighting there he did much to enlarge the reserve forces and build up the rear area, working tirelessly for the liberation of northwest China. In southwest China, too, Comrade Ho Lung led his troops to Szechuan and, in co-ordination with the Second Field Army, fulfilled the missions assigned them by Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee. Later Ho Lung again organized troops going into Tibet and made further important contributions to the country-wide liberation.

In protracted armed struggle, Comrade Ho Lung gained a deep appreciation of the necessity of following Chairman Mao’s ideas on army building, of placing the army under the absolute leadership of the Party and of strengthening Party building together with political and ideological work in the army. He often reminded cadres of these fundamental principles in army building. After the country-wide liberation, Ho Lung made major contributions to the revolutionization and modernization of our army. He showed great concern for national defence, paid constant attention to both arms production and military training, and so energetically promoted our armed forces’ preparations against war. In 1964, when the PLA “Hard-Boned Sixth Company” was cited as a heroic example in army building on a company basis, Comrade Ho Lung instructed it to “strengthen the role of the Party branch as a fighting bastion.”

Comrade Ho Lung paid constant attention to stationing troops on the frontiers for defence and reclamation, as well as to construction in the interior. In 1965 and 1966, though in poor health, he went on two tours of inspection to the Chengtu-Kunming Railway and various industrial bases, encouraging the cadres, workers and technicians at work in these places.

In sports and physical culture, Comrade Ho Lung firmly implemented Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line: “Promote physical culture and build up the people’s health.” He helped to build up a proletarian contingent of athletes for the country.

PLACING THE INTEREST OF THE REVOLUTION ABOVE EVERYTHING ELSE

In October 1936, on the occasion of the First, Second and Fourth Front Armies joining forces in Huining, Kansu Province, Comrade Ho Lung and other leaders of the Second Front Army telegraphed the Party Central Committee that they were placing themselves under its unified leadership. The telegram read: “The correct decision of placing the three front armies under unified military leadership . . . naturally leads to the solution of the question of unification and unity inside the Party. This is a highly gratifying condition favourable to the Party and China’s revolutionary cause.”

On the eve of the Eighth Route Army’s departure for the front at the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Chairman Mao suggested at the Lochuan Meeting of the Party Central Committee Political Bureau that part of the troops be kept in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region for its defence. Lin Piao, who had illusions about the Kuomintang, disagreed. Comrade Ho Lung supported Chairman Mao’s proposal and agreed to deploy some troops to defend the region and the Party Central Committee.
Conditions in the Shansi-Suiyuan Base Area were generally rather unfavourable. In particular, the population was too sparse to allow for expansion of the armed forces. Yet Comrade Ho Lung persevered in the struggle there to meet the needs of the Party, and gained success. At one report on work to the Central Committee Ho Lung mentioned the lack of people in northwest Shansi, to which Chairman Mao replied that there might be a shortage of people but not land. Comrade Ho Lung promptly conveyed Chairman Mao’s message to his cadres. He often advised them to take the whole situation into consideration and to exert every effort. Enemy sabotage plus years of natural disasters often left the troops in the Shansi-Suiyuan Base Area with nothing to eat but black beans. Comrade Ho Lung actively mobilized armymen and civilians to produce to meet their own needs, live frugally and do their utmost to support the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

Comrade Ho Lung treated well all army personnel under him, whether cadres who had worked with him from the beginning, cadres transferred from other units, or newcomers. He regarded the troops under him as belonging to the Party, and placed them at the Party’s disposal. He did every job the Party asked him to, always kept in mind the interest of the whole, and willingly carried out Party decisions.

OPEN AND ABOVE-BOARD, HARD WORKING
AND PLAIN LIVING

Throughout his long years of revolutionary struggle, Ho Lung adhered to principle, upheld the truth and opposed erroneous tendencies; he insisted on the unity of the Party and of the army and opposed any split. Open and above-board himself, he opposed intrigues and conspiracies.

Ho Lung came from the old society but was not corrupted by it. He was a revolutionary optimist who was never daunted by difficulties but always did his best to overcome them. In 1928 when he returned to the Hupei border, some people could not understand why he should have given up his position and power as Army Commander and spurned a life of ease, preferring instead to share the lot of the suffering masses and wage guerrilla war in straw sandals. But these were the very facts that demonstrated his firm revolutionary stand.

Comrade Ho Lung was good at bringing about unity among the comrades, cherished his soldiers and the people, maintained close links with the masses, showed concern for them, hated what they hated and loved what they loved. These fine qualities have long been known in the Party and the army and praised by the people.

Because Comrade Ho Lung had waged serious struggles first against Lin Piao and later against Chiang Ching and their henchmen, these counter-revolutionary cabals harboured inveterate hatred for him. In 1967, Lin Piao, Chiang Ching et al. colluded in bringing false charges against Comrade Ho Lung and subjected him to frantic persecution. They used the power they had usurped to do this, while keeping the truth from the Party Central Committee. As a serious consequence of this, many old comrades who followed Comrade Ho Lung in fighting across the country also became victims. The Lin Piao-Chiang Ching persecution of Ho Lung and other old
revolutionary fighters alone amply revealed the wild ambitions and vicious plots of these conspiring careerists in opposing Chairman Mao and his revolutionary line and policies, and how they trampled socialist legality underfoot as they attempted to overthrow many revolutionaries of the older generation. It also proved to the hilt that these two counter-revolutionary conspiratorial cliques were truly agents of the landlord class, the bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang reactionaries who had sneaked into the Party. They did what the Kuomintang army and special agents had been unable to do through the decades. But truth eventually prevailed. At Comrade Ho Lung’s funeral ceremony, our esteemed and beloved Permier Chou eulogized him highly on behalf of the great leader and teacher Chairman Mao and deeply mourned the loss. Premier Chou at the same time fully exposed and denounced the crimes of Lin Piao and his clique, giving expression to the wishes of the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country. The “gang of four,” however, was not reconciled to this. In the spring and summer of 1976, one of the gang’s trusted followers slandered this funeral ceremony attended by Premier Chou as a “typical case of capitalist restoration and reversing the established verdicts,” as well as a “failure to take a correct attitude towards the Great Cultural Revolution.” The sinister aim was to reverse the correct verdict on Lin Piao as a renegade and serve the schemes of the “gang of four.” This attempt showed how reactionary and desperate they had become. But the resplendent image of Comrade Ho Lung as a fighter loyal to the Party, to Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and to the people could never be besmirched by Lin Piao and his cohorts or by the “gang of four,” who have ended up in infamy as dictated by the irresistible law of history. Comrade Ho Lung’s life of struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people and for communism, and his noble qualities, will be remembered by the revolutionary people from generation to generation.
Comrade Chen Yi was born in 1901 in Lochih County, Szechuan Province. As a youth he was most unhappy with the dark, corrupt society and thirsted for the truth and revolution. Influenced by the May 4th Movement, he went to France in 1919 at the age of 18 on a part-work, part-study programme and there began to accept Marxism. In 1921, after taking part in the patriotic movement of Chinese students in France, he was sent back to China under armed guard by the Chinese and French governments. In 1922 he edited the *Hsin Shu Pao (New Szechuan Journal)* in Chungking, and in the following year entered the Franco-Chinoise University in Peking where he joined the Communist Party of China. Under the leadership of the Party, he was active in the student movement, the workers' movement and the national revolutionary movement in Peking. During the Northern Expedition, when the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang entered into their first period of co-operation, he did political work in the armed forces in Szechuan to help the Northern Expeditionary Army. The next year, 1927, he was transferred to the Central Military Academy in Wuhan to do political work.

**THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR PERIOD**

The Chinese revolution was in crisis at that time. The big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek turned traitor and launched the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, subjecting the Chinese Communists and revolutionary masses to sanguinary suppression. As the correct line represented by Comrade Mao Tsetung...
triumphed over Chen Tu-hsiu’s Right opportunist line, Comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho Lung, Yeh Ting, Liu Po-cheng and others launched the world-renowned August 1, 1927 Nanchang Uprising to save the Chinese revolution. Comrade Chen Yi left Wuhan for Kiangsi Province where he caught up with the insurgent troops which had pulled out of Nanchang and were heading south. He became Party representative in a regiment. When the insurgent troops reached Kwangtung Province in the south, their main force met with defeat in the Chaochow-Swatow area. Comrades Chu Teh and Chen Yi led part of the troops that had stayed on in Sanhopa to the Kwangtung-Kiangsi-Hunan border. In the ensuing months of fending off attacks from pursuing enemy forces, bandits and the despotic gentry’s soldiery, the number of the insurgent troops rapidly dwindled. Their position was perilous, and there was confusion with regard to the future. At this crucial moment when the very existence of the insurgent troops was at stake, Comrade Chu Teh, raising his fist, shouted: “Whoever wants to make revolution, come with me!” Comrade Chen Yi immediately responded and helped Comrade Chu Teh to do effective ideological and political work among the troops, patiently pointing out to them the prospects of the revolution, boosting their morale and encouraging them to keep up the struggle. Thanks to the leadership and organizational work of Comrades Chu Teh and Chen Yi, the core of the troops that had taken part in the Nanchang Uprising was preserved.

Shortly afterwards they learned that Comrade Mao Tsetung had led the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops in establishing a revolutionary base area in the Chingkang Mountains. The revolutionary road opened up by Com-
In the period of the Central Soviet Area (1930-34), Comrade Chen Yi opposed Wang Ming’s “Left” opportunist line, for which he suffered ostracism and attack. But when Comrade Chen Yi was in charge of the work of the Kiangsi Military Area, he resolutely carried out the line laid down by Chairman Mao for expanding first the local Red Guards and the local Red Army troops, and then the main forces of the Red Army. He built up a strength of two armies for the Red Army and took part in smashing several counter-revolutionary “encirclement and suppression” campaigns launched by the Kuomintang reactionaries against the Central Soviet Area. Yet because of the incorrect leadership under Wang Ming’s “Left” opportunist line, the fifth counter-campaign against the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” ended in defeat, and the Central Red Army had to shift its position strategically by undertaking the Long March to the north to resist Japanese aggression. Comrade Chen Yi, who was seriously wounded, remained in Kiangsi where he persevered in guerrilla warfare for three years. The enemy carried out the most ruthless “encirclement and suppression” campaigns by combing the mountains, burning the trees and grass, moving out the inhabitants, etc., and the guerrilla units fought under extremely harsh and hazardous conditions. Braving wind and rain, lying low during the day and marching at night, Chen Yi and his comrades-in-arms firmly relied on the support and cover provided by the masses to carry out flexible guerrilla operations. In the winter of 1936, Comrade Chen Yi was besieged at Meishan for more than 20 days, during which his life was in jeopardy. At that time he wrote these fearless lines:

What if my head falls today?  
Revolution is hard; it takes a hundred battles.  
I shall rally my comrades of old in the nether regions,  
A mighty host to wipe out the King of Hell.

The struggle waged by the guerrilla units on the Kiangsi-Kwangtung border under the leadership of Chen Yi and other comrades kept alive the embers of the revolution, sapped the arrogance of the Kuomintang reactionaries, pinned down and depleted the enemy’s effectives, complemented the struggle going on in the other guerrilla base areas and supported the Red Army in its northward march to resist Japanese aggression.

Speaking highly of these various guerrilla zones in the south led by Comrade Chen Yi and others, Chairman Mao pointed out that these guerrilla zones represented “part of the gains of our decade of sanguinary warfare with the Kuomintang, our strategic strongholds for the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war in the southern provinces.”

THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR PERIOD

After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1937, the Red Army guerrilla units which had remained in a dozen areas in Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, Chekiang and Anhwei provinces, acting on the instructions of the Party Central Committee, held talks with the Kuomintang, put an end to the civil war, formed the New Fourth Army and went to the front to fight the Japanese aggressors. Maintaining high vigilance against the Kuomintang reactionaries, Comrade Chen Yi frustrated their plot to make use of
the talks to wipe out the guerrilla units. At the same time, he went deep into the various guerrilla base areas relaying the instructions of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, and did much painstaking ideological work to help the Red Army cadres and fighters adapt to the turn in the situation. After the formation of the New Fourth Army, under the guidance of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line, Comrade Chen Yi and others led their forces to the battlefield behind enemy lines in central China, everywhere dealing telling blows at the enemy and turning the region into a vast battlefield against the Japanese invaders.

Comrade Chen Yi was the chief representative in carrying out Chairman Mao’s correct line in the New Fourth Army. He implemented in an exemplary way Chairman Mao’s policy of forming an Anti-Japanese National United Front and the relevant tactics and his whole set of strategy and tactics for the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, and waged a resolute struggle against Wang Ming’s Right opportunism. As soon as the New Fourth Army headquarters was set up in Nanchang in January 1938, Chairman Mao instructed it to proceed east, close in on Shanghai and then move north into northern Kiangsu Province. In February 1939, Comrade Chou En-lai went to the New Fourth Army headquarters in southern Anhwei to relay the principle set down by Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee requiring the army to consolidate in the south, attack east and spread northward. Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee on May 4, 1940 further instructed Comrade Hsiang Ying, then in charge of the work of the Party Central Committee’s Southeast Bureau, to “reach out into all enemy-occupied areas and not to be bound by the Kuomintang’s restrictions but to go beyond the limits allowed by the Kuomintang, not to expect official appointments from them or depend on the higher-ups for financial support but instead to expand the armed forces freely and independently, set up base areas unhesitatingly, independently arouse the masses in those areas to action and build up united front organs of political power under the leadership of the Communist Party.”

Under the influence of Wang Ming’s Right opportunist line, however, Comrade Hsiang Ying did not dare to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries’ policy of containing, restricting and combating the Communist Party, did not dare to go beyond the limits prescribed by the Kuomintang, did not dare to boldly arouse the masses to action and expand the people’s army and the anti-Japanese base areas in the Japanese-occupied areas. Instead, he kept the army headquarters in Yunlingchen, a town in Chingshen County, southern Anhwei Province, reluctant to move eastward, and was mentally and organizationally unprepared for the possibility of a reactionary attack from the Kuomintang diehards. Consequently, when Chiang Kai-shek ruthlessly staged the Southern Anhwei Incident in January 1941, the New Fourth Army headquarters and 9,000 troops suffered heavy losses.

Other leading comrades of the New Fourth Army, with Comrade Chen Yi as their representative, firmly carried out the important instruction of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee and resisted Wang Ming’s Right opportunism. Comrade Chen Yi led his troops to the areas south of the Yangtze River and, after setting up the Maoshan base area, sent units further east under the designation of Anti-Japanese Volunteers South of the
Yangtze which pushed on to the outskirts of Shanghai. The battle at Hungchiao airport, during which four enemy aircraft were destroyed, shocked the world. Utterly defeated in their first anti-Communist onslaught in the winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940, the Kuomintang diehards stepped up their plot to create friction in central China. Ignoring Comrade Hsiang Ying’s opposition, Comrade Chen Yi successively sent Yeh Fei, Tao Yung and other comrades with the troops under their command across the Yangtze northward. They established a base area in northern Kiangsu and waged a blow-for-blow struggle against the Kuomintang diehards. Relying on the superior strength of his forces entrenched in northern Kiangsu, Han Teh-chin, the Kuomintang governor of Kiangsu Province and commander of the Kuomintang’s 24th Group Army, planned to wipe out the New Fourth Army units in northern Kiangsu at one swoop. Certain contradictions existed at that time between the local Kuomintang troops of miscellaneous brands under the command of Li Ming-yang and Li Chang-chiang in northern Kiangsu and Chen Tai-yun’s revenue guards under T. V. Soong’s control on the one side, and Chiang Kai-shek’s own troops under Han Teh-chin on the other. Comrade Chen Yi resolutely implemented Chairman Mao’s tactic of “developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces and combating the diehard forces” within the Anti-Japanese National United Front, adopted a policy of both uniting and struggling against Li Ming-yang, Li Chang-chiang and Chen Tai-yun, and did a vast amount of work to keep them neutral when the Kuomintang diehards attacked us. In October 1940, when Han Teh-chin attacked New Fourth Army units in northern Kiangsu with his main force of one army plus one brigade totaling 15,000 men, Comrade Chen Yi put into practice Chairman Mao’s policy to “lure the enemy troops in deep so as to concentrate our forces and annihilate them.” Comrade Chen Yi mustered all the 7,000 and more troops of the main force and, applying the tactic of “retreat towards the centre,” withdrew them to Huangchiao Town, seat of the northern Kiangsu command of the New Fourth Army, where they fought the renowned decisive battle of Huangchiao. He mobilized his forces by pointing out that this battle had a vital bearing on defeating the Kuomintang diehards and setting up a base area in northern Kiangsu, and urged them to go all out to win this battle of decision. He took overall command of a 24-hour operation during which more than 10,000 troops of Han Teh-chin’s main force were wiped out. Li Shouwei, commander of Chiang Kai-shek’s 89th Army, fled for his life and was drowned in a river. Advancing in triumph, our forces captured Tungtai and Yencheng, and then joined forces with south-bound Eighth Route Army units at Funing, opening up a new phase in the resistance to Japan in central China.

This victorious battle was a result of Comrade Chen Yi firmly implementing Chairman Mao’s political line and military line, carrying out his united front policy and flexibly applying his strategy and tactics; it also demonstrated Comrade Chen Yi’s superb leadership in integrating political and military battles with courage and determination. The Party Central Committee and its Revolutionary Military Commission gave this a high appraisal and had Comrade Chen Yi’s report circulated for study among cadres at and above regimental level.
After the Southern Anhwei Incident, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee on January 20, 1941 appointed Comrade Chen Yi Acting Commander of the New Fourth Army, which re-established its headquarters at Yencheng. Because he and other leading comrades of the army correctly implemented Chairman Mao's line, principles and policies, relied on the masses and persisted in arduous struggle, the New Fourth Army rapidly grew into an army comprising seven divisions. The army carried on anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare on an extensive scale, set up organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power, engaged the greater part of the Japanese and puppet troops in central China, frustrated their "village-combing" and "mopping-up" operations, and smashed the Kuomintang diehards' provocative attacks. Later, Comrade Chen Yi waged principled struggles against the bourgeois conspirator and careerist Jao Shushih, an agent planted by Liu Shao-chi in the New Fourth Army. With only a little over 10,000 men at its founding early in the Anti-Japanese War, the New Fourth Army, guided by Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, grew to more than 300,000 men by the end of the war. Like the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth was a heroic army of the Chinese people led by our Party in resisting Japanese aggression.

LIBERATION WAR PERIOD

When the War of Resistance Against Japan was drawing to a victorious conclusion, our Party and the people of the whole country were faced with the serious struggle between two Chinas and two prospects - the choice between a bright new China and the dark old one. At the Party's Seventh National Congress held in April 1945, our great leader Chairman Mao put before the whole Party the great task: "boldly to mobilize the masses, expand the people's forces and unite all the forces of the nation capable of being united in order to struggle under our Party's leadership to defeat the Japanese aggressors and build a bright new China, a China that is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and strong." After the close of the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek, the political representative of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie, blatantly concentrated all his forces to attack our Liberated Areas. During the War of Liberation in the ensuing three years, Comrade Chen Yi was successively Commander and Political Commissar of the Shantung Field Army, the Eastern China Field Army and the Third Field Army. Firmly carrying out the political and military lines of the Seventh Party Congress, he led and organized the army and people of the liberated areas in east China in a victorious struggle for the liberation of the whole of China.

Chiang Kai-shek started the war with blusterous attacks on the liberated areas. Following Chairman Mao's strategic principle of active defence, Comrade Chen Yi directed our army in east China to meet them from several directions and won the first battles. He then gradually concentrated his main force, lured the enemy in deep, annihilated large numbers of enemy troops in mobile warfare and won victories in the campaigns fought north of Suchien and later in southern Shantung. The latter was the first campaign in which our poorly equipped troops successfully annihilated a mechanized column of the Kuomintang reactionaries. Comrade Chen Yi held to
Chairman Mao's military principle aimed chiefly at annihilating the enemy's effective strength, not at holding or seizing a city or place, and did serious work to solve questions in the minds of officers and men arising from the necessity to make big and swift forward thrusts or retreats.

In February 1947, Kuomintang troops mounted attacks against our liberated areas in Shantung Province from the north and south. The enemy troops along the south line attacked Linyi with eight reorganized divisions [each equivalent to an army], while three armies in the north drove south in a concerted movement. Following Chairman Mao's wise decision, Comrade Chen Yi directed a small force of our army bravely to intercept those in the south while ordering our main force to march northward day and night to Laiwu for the annihilation of the enemy group army under Li Hsien-chou. Three days and nights of fierce fighting resulted in our main force wiping out the whole enemy group army of more than 60,000 men, the capture of Li Hsien-chou, and the recovery of 13 cities in Shantung. The enemy received a heavy blow. As Chiang Kai-shek met with utter defeat everywhere in his all-out offensive against the liberated areas, he was compelled to pull back his troops, shorten his battle lines and carry out what he called "attacks against key sectors" on the liberated areas in Shantung and northern Shensi. To smash these attacks and co-ordinate with the counter-offensives in the various theatres across the country, Comrade Chen Yi led the Eastern China Field Army in launching, under the slogan of "defend Chairman Mao, defend the Party Central Committee," the battle of Mengliangku to "pull a fang from the tiger's mouth." Following Chairman Mao's military thinking, Comrade Chen Yi bided his time; he kept as great a main force as possible and waited for the enemy to commit errors. Finally, from among the enemy's eight or nine re-organized divisions confronting him in line formation, Comrade Chen Yi seized upon and encircled the Kuomintang's crack unit, the Reorganized 74th Division, which was inordinately arrogant at the time, completely annihilated it at one stroke and killed its commander Chang Ling-fu. This battle dealt a crushing blow to the enemy's "attacks against key sectors" and so incensed Chiang Kai-shek that he literally spat blood.

In the summer of 1947 the People's Liberation Army switched over to a nation-wide strategic offensive. The main force of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Hongan Field Army under the command of Comrades Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping made a breakthrough across the Yellow River and, driving into the Central Plains and making the Tapieh Mountains its centre of operations, fought in the vast battlefields south of the Huai and north of the Yangtze rivers, dealing powerful blows at the enemy and putting large numbers of enemy troops out of action. A part of the Eastern China Field Army operating on exterior lines, commanded by Comrade Chen Yi himself, marched into Honan, Anhwei and Kiangsu provinces and, fighting in co-ordination with the army under Comrades Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping, wiped out large numbers of enemy troops and established the Liberated Area in the Central Plains. The Shantung Army of the Eastern China Field Army remained on the interior lines for persistent attacks on the enemy. In autumn that year, Comrade Chen Yi arrived in northern Shensi to report to Chairman Mao on work and ask for instructions.
Then he joined Comrades Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping operating in the area between the Yangtze and Huai rivers, and the two field armies under their command, fighting in still closer co-ordination, wiped out in quick succession a large number of the Kuomintang army's effectives and liberated many cities and a vast rural area.

In November 1948, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Party Central Committee decided to set up the General Front Committee composed of Comrades Teng Hsiao-ping, Liu Po-cheng, Chen Yi and the two of us, with Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping as secretary. This committee, under the wise leadership of Chairman Mao, commanded more than 600,000 PLA troops for the Huai-Hai campaign. After 65 days of hard fighting, 22 enemy corps, or 56 divisions, of the Kuomintang's crack forces, comprising 555,000 men, were completely annihilated and the areas of east China and the Central Plains north of the Yangtze were in the main liberated. With the victorious conclusion of the Liaohsi-Shenyang, Peiping-Tientsin and Huai-Hai campaigns which Chairman Mao personally directed, Chiang Kai-shek's main forces were basically destroyed by our army.

Shortly afterwards, Chairman Mao ordered the crossing of the Yangtze and a country-wide advance. Under the command of Comrades Chen Yi, Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping, one million PLA men crossed the great river and liberated Nanking, the seat of Chiang Kai-shek's regime, and vast areas south of the Yangtze.

In 22 years of arduous revolutionary wars, Comrade Chen Yi, under the leadership of Chairman Mao, made indelible contributions to destroying the dark old China and establishing a bright new China.

AFTER THE FOUNDING OF NEW CHINA

After liberation, Comrade Chen Yi was appointed Commander of the East China Military Area and concurrently Mayor of Shanghai. Faithfully implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, he contributed to the rehabilitation of the national economy and the carrying out of socialist transformation, to the building of a socialist new Shanghai and to our army's revolutionization and modernization. He was transferred to work in the central government in 1954, serving as Vice-Premier of the State Council and later concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was also Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee. As Foreign Minister, Comrade Chen Yi assisted Premier Chou En-lai in firmly carrying out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs and accompanied Premier Chou on missions abroad on ten occasions. He did a great deal of work to unite with friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America and oppose Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism. He was Premier Chou's right-hand man and was highly regarded internationally.

Comrade Chen Yi enthusiastically supported the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution personally initiated and led by Chairman Mao, and waged a resolute struggle against the Liu Shao-chi anti-Party clique. In this Cultural Revolution, bourgeois careerists and conspirators like Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta, Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-chiao unscrupulously sabotaged Chairman Mao's strategic moves, guiding principles and policies, and incited people to "overthrow all" and conduct "all-out civil war." They bitterly hated Comrade Chen Yi and the other old proletarian revolutionaries and frantically vilified them,
framed charges against them and persecuted them while cruelly suppressing great numbers of revolutionary cadres and ordinary people in order to attain their criminal counter-revolutionary objective of usurping Party and state leadership. To defend Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Comrade Chen Yi, with his thoroughgoing proletarian revolutionary fearlessness, took a clear-cut stand in a relentless struggle against them. After the September 13th Incident in 1971, in which Lin Piao fled the country as a traitor and died in a plane crash at Undur Khan, Comrade Chen Yi, though suffering from cancer, attended the meeting of veteran comrades called by the Party Central Committee where he made a long speech exposing with many iron-clad facts Lin Piao's anti-Party crimes. His very last ounce of energy was given to the struggle against the Lin Piao anti-Party clique.

LOYAL TO THE PARTY

Comrade Chen Yi's noble proletarian revolutionary qualities have long been praised by the people. He diligently studied works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and by Chairman Mao, and kept up this study even during military operations. He upheld Marxism and waged an uncompromising struggle against the opportunist and revisionist lines of Wang Ming, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, Peng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao "gang of four." He was good at uniting with cadres and encouraging them to do their best, to work boldly under the guidance of the overall aim. He always bore in mind the interests of the whole and never went in for factional activities. Moreover, he was good at uniting with and helping comrades who had made mistakes and working together with them. In our Party Comrade Chen Yi was truly a model in forging unity for the sake of the common struggle.

Comrade Chen Yi was open and above-board and broad of mind. He implemented thoroughly Chairman Mao's admonition that Communists, senior Party cadres in particular, "must all be open and above-board politically, always ready to express our political views openly and take a stand, for or against, on each and every important political issue. We must never follow the example of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih and resort to scheming." Comrade Chen Yi acted upon Chairman Mao's teachings and gained the esteem and trust of the overwhelming majority of the comrades.

The untimely death of Comrade Chen Yi on January 6, 1972 was a tremendous loss to our Party and our army. On January 10, Chairman Mao attended the memorial meeting for Comrade Chen Yi at Papaoshan, highly evaluated his immense contributions to the people, consoled his wife Comrade Chang Chien and the children and encouraged them to work hard and serve the people.

The "gang of four" and their followers, however, flagrantly opposed Chairman Mao's evaluation of Comrade Chen Yi and continued to slander him. They even went to the length of ordering organized criticism of the revolutionary cadres and people of Shanghai who mourned Comrade Chen Yi and used this to attack some cadres. The deep hatred these bourgeois careerists had for Comrade Chen Yi showed this proletarian revolutionary's implacable opposition to them.
Those who knew Comrade Chen Yi all remember that he never tried to cover up his shortcomings and mistakes, which were unavoidable in long years of revolutionary struggle. He frequently drew lessons from his errors due to inexperience in his early days in the revolution, to teach and encourage cadres to study works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and by Chairman Mao in a still better way and earnestly remould their world outlook. Whenever mistakes occurred in work, he always claimed the responsibility on his own initiative and summed up the experience in the interest of later struggles. He corrected his mistakes promptly and thoroughly. “History proves that those who claim to be infallible often turn out to be incorrect,” he was heard to say frequently. This was a scathing criticism of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and the “gang of four” who shamelessly advertised themselves as “representatives of the correct line.”

Of intellectual origin, Comrade Chen Yi embraced Marxism quite early and remained at one with the workers, peasants and soldiers over the years. He acquired his proletarian revolutionary steadfastness through taking part in the extremely difficult and intense struggles of the Chinese revolution. This noble quality of Chen Yi was most pronounced during the ebb periods of the Chinese revolution. His Marxist insight and materialist-dialectical world outlook enabled him to see the bright future ahead in times of trial, and he once wrote these lines:

Things reverse themselves at the extreme,
Heaven and earth overturned,
Red will be the five continents.

As he grew older, he encouraged himself and others with Chairman Mao’s serious admonition to veteran comrades about maintaining their revolutionary integrity in their later years, and he persevered in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Comrade Chen Yi was unassuming and approachable, honest in dealing with people, large-minded and straightforward, and had a fine sense of humour. He got along well with cadres under him and showed close concern for them. If a comrade made a mistake or had some shortcomings, he criticized the comrade concerned in a forthright manner and persuaded him by reasoning things out. He sincerely welcomed criticism and help from comrades. He made a correct appraisal of himself and never claimed credit or talked about his achievements but always attributed them to the wise leadership of Chairman Mao, to the Party and the people. In his own words:

A single individual counts for nothing;
All power belongs to the Party and the masses.

He had a deep love for the people, regarding them, in his own words, as his “second parents.” He said: “The victory of the Huai-Hai campaign was won through the strenuous efforts of the Shantung people pushing their carts.” He placed himself in the ranks of the proletariat. He was exceptionally close to the People’s Liberation Army and took great pride in being a veteran soldier under the leadership of Chairman Mao.

The “gang of four” and their henchmen framed all sorts of vicious charges to slander Comrade Chen Yi, which, however, could not in the least mar his lofty image. History has confirmed that throughout his life Comrade Chen Yi was loyal to the Party, loyal to our great leader Chairman Mao and loyal to Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line. The life of Comrade Chen Yi was
one of selfless and fearless battles for the liberation of the proletariat and one of being open and above-board and making revolution till his last days. Back in 1960, Comrade Chen Yi wrote a poem praising the evergreen pine:

Heavy snow weighs down the pine,
But straight and proud stands the tree.
When the snow melts you will see
Its unbowed integrity.

This pine which stood straight and unbending in high wind and heavy snow represents exactly Comrade Chen Yi’s life.

LO JUNG-HUAN — A COMRADE LOYAL TO CHAIRMAN MAO THROUGH THE YEARS

by the Theoretical Group of the General Political Department of the CPLA

Comrade Lo Jung-huan was a great revolutionary fighter of the Chinese people and a fine member of the Chinese Communist Party. An outstanding leader of the People's Liberation Army, he led a glorious and militant life. Firm and loyal over the decades, he dedicated his all to the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and the splendid ideal of communism, faithfully implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, working hard and fighting courageously. During the protracted revolutionary wars, in socialist revolution and construction, and in the revolutionization and modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, he made important contributions and rendered outstanding service towards the strengthening of our army, particularly its political work. He set an example for the whole Party, the whole army and the people throughout the country.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan was born in 1902 in Hengshan County, Hunan Province. In 1927 he joined the Chinese Communist Youth League, and became a Party member the same year. In the various periods of the Chinese revolution, he served as Party representative at the company, battalion and regimental levels in the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, Political Commissar
of the Fourth Army of the Red Army, Director of the General Political Department of the First Army Group of the Red Army, Political Commissar and Acting Commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Shantung Military Area, Secretary of the Shantung Sub-bureau of the Party Central Committee, First Political Commissar of the Fourth Field Army of the PLA, Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission, Director of the PLA's General Political Department and General Department for Cadre Affairs, and Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. He was elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh and Eighth National Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party and elected a member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee at the First Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan held high the great banner of Mao Tsetung Thought. He cherished unshakable confidence in the triumph of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought as early as 1927 when he led part of the peasant armed forces from Tungcheng, southern Hupeh, to the Hunan-Kiangsi border to join in the Autumn Harvest Uprising and then followed Chairman Mao into the Chingkang Mountains. In the extremely arduous and complicated struggles during the various historical periods of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Lo Jung-huan stood firm on the side of the correct line represented by Comrade Mao Tsetung, adhered to principle and took a clear-cut stand in resolute struggle against "Left" and Right opportunism. He was open and above-board, selfless and fearless. He kept the whole situation in mind and defended the fundamental interests of the Party and the people in all circumstances. Modest and prudent, he consistently identified himself with the collective and attributed all achievement to the Party and Chairman Mao. He used to say: "The Chinese people found their great and wise leader Chairman Mao only after shedding much blood, travelling tortuous paths and suffering many setbacks and failures in their revolutionary struggles. Thanks to Chairman Mao's leadership, the Chinese revolution has advanced from victory to victory." No difficulty, setback or failure could shake his confidence in the revolution's final victory. Whether in the Chingkang Mountains or on the Long March, he taught and encouraged the army commanders and fighters in the light of Chairman Mao's teaching: "A single spark can start a prairie fire."

During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937-45), Comrade Lo Jung-huan led the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army deep into the enemy's rear in Shantung, where he carried out Chairman Mao's strategic principle of waging independent guerrilla warfare in mountain regions with the initiative in our own hands, resolutely opposing Wang Ming's Right capitulationist line. In the most difficult conditions there, he boldly aroused the masses, enforced the reduction of rent and interest and transformed the organs of political power at the basic level so as to establish and expand the base area. Flexibly applying Chairman Mao's ideas on strategy and tactics in the direction of operations, he gave wide scope to our strong points in attacking the enemy where he was weak. In 1941, 50,000 enemy troops started a "mopping-up" campaign in the Yimeng Moun-
tains in Shantung and launched a pincers attack on our operational headquarters. Firm and cool, Lo Jung-huan correctly sized up the enemy situation, chose the most favourable direction and opportunity and personally led picked troops in breaking through the enemy's heavy encirclement, moving the headquarters to safety and shattering the enemy offensive. When the enemy carried out "nibbling" operations against our revolutionary base area in Shantung, Comrade Lo Jung-huan gave full play to the role of small army units, armed work teams and people's militia in carrying out "mine warfare" and "sparrow warfare" against the enemy. These, in co-ordination with the main forces, smashed the enemy's attacks. Lo Jung-huan did much towards gathering and expanding armed strength by his active work in developing the regional troops and strengthening the main forces so that, around the time of Japan's surrender, he was immediately able to organize both into powerful units for large-scale counterattacks. Then, acting on the strategic plan formulated by Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, he led a large number of cadres and of main force troops to the Northeast. Firmly carrying out Chairman Mao's instruction on "building stable base areas in the Northeast," Lo Jung-huan struggled uncompromisingly against Lin Piao's Right opportunism. He led the troops in mobilizing the masses, carrying out agrarian reform and overcoming various difficulties by sheer hard work and thus succeeded not only in establishing the Northeast base areas but also in annihilating many enemy troops. He spent great energy on running schools and training cadres and reserves for the army, keeping a regular army reserve of 100 regiments. He faithfully carried out Chairman Mao's concepts of operation during the Liaohsi-Shenyang and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns, augmenting his enormous contributions to the victory of the liberation war.

Chairman Mao highly eulogized Comrade Lo Jung-huan upon his death in 1963, saying that it was not easy for anyone to be so consistently loyal for decades on end. Comrade Lo Jung-huan never deviated from Chairman Mao's political and military lines but dedicated his whole life to building up the political work of the people's army. In our army's early days, Lo Jung-huan firmly carried out Chairman Mao's teachings on army building and instituted an effective system of political work in army units. He consistently followed the correct orientation charted by the Kutien Congress and emphasized the Party's absolute leadership over the army. After the founding of the People's Republic, Comrade Lo Jung-huan became Director of the PLA General Political Department. When Peng Teh-huai followed foreign patterns and wanted to introduce one-man leadership at all levels in the army and abolish the system of political commissars and political departments, Comrade Lo Jung-huan put up strong opposition and declared explicitly that the glorious traditions of political work established by Chairman Mao in our army should never be abandoned. He went to see Chairman Mao, who supported his correct views and instructed the army to persist in the system of two-men leadership* and a division of labour among the leading officers under the leadership of the Party committee and to bring into full play the glorious traditions of our Party and our army. Lo Jung-huan

* I.e., leadership exercised jointly by the military commander and the political commissar.
firmly applied Chairman Mao's instructions and guaranteed the carrying out of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in our army.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan applied Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought in making revolution and building the army. While propagating Mao Tsetung Thought, he called for an earnest study of Chairman Mao's works and the resolutions and instructions of the Party Central Committee. He often taught the cadres from his own experiences and understanding, telling them how upholding Mao Tsetung Thought meant victory, while acting contrary to it would lead to failure. An example in studying Chairman Mao's works, Comrade Lo Jung-huan read the Selected Works of Mao Tsetung several times over between 1951 and his last days. In September 1963, though terminally ill, he was still stressing that every cadre in the PLA General Political Department should read through the Selected Works. He said: "Chairman Mao's works are summations of revolutionary experience which appear ever more convincing and enlightening as we restudy them today. Study them conscientiously." While Lin Piao opposed Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought by purposely distorting it and advocating simply memorizing a few sentences or essays and picking "ready-made answers" out of Chairman Mao's works, Comrade Lo Jung-huan resolutely opposed this erroneous approach, sharply pointing out that in studying Chairman Mao's works one should get to the essence, learn from Chairman Mao's standpoint, viewpoint and method, understand these thoroughly, and use Mao Tsetung Thought as the guide to action.

Concentrating on political work at the company level, Comrade Lo Jung-huan stressed that the role of the company Party branch as a fighting bastion and the exemplary role of Party members should be brought into full play, that Party members and veteran fighters with the company Party branch as the nucleus should act as the backbone force and unite the whole company to fulfill the fighting tasks assigned it. He devoted much attention to building up the company ideologically, holding that political education should be guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and conducted according to the actual situation, starting with examples that the fighters could easily understand. He instructed the army units to carry out constant education on class struggle, the current situation, the tasks and the revolutionary traditions, and to conduct democratic check-ups.* He said: "It is necessary to tell the cadres and fighters about the whole picture — the conditions, tasks and difficulties, so that everybody is mentally prepared and doesn't mind difficulties when they arise." He frequently called together company leaders and political directors for discussions and fact-finding sessions, listening to their views and making suggestions for improving political work in the companies. He gave lectures or talks in the companies. On such occasions as New Year, Spring Festival, or important anniversaries he would go to the army units to make reports.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan gave serious consideration to the work of political departments, stressing that political workers should go into the thick of practical struggles and base their work on the companies. He called on the leaders at various levels and the cadres of political departments to learn from the political work in the com-

* Cf. p. 65 above.
pany, saying that in political work, too, “bricks cannot be made without straw.” He often organized office cadres to go to the companies, where they could learn the actual conditions and study various problems. There he would listen to reports and help solve problems in the army units, especially in the companies. He pointed out that the actual conditions in a company must be taken into account before assigning that company a task, and it must not be burdened with the work of the offices. He stressed that political departments should establish extensive contacts with the masses, being as near and dear to them as their homes, where both cadres and masses liked to speak their minds. They should never be like a yamen in the old times which no one dared to visit, he said. Promoting democracy in the army, he often called the cadres in to discuss work, encouraging their initiative in considering and solving problems. In wartime he did so on most nights to talk over the situation and get both cadre and mass opinion. He would then give his own views and ask for comments. He asked the political department always to pay attention to the situation as a whole, to the operations and to military affairs, often urging political workers to study military science as well. As director of the political department he kept up a timely study of the military reports and required senior cadres in his department to do likewise. His wish was for a militant political department doing powerful political work.

While carrying out Chairman Mao’s policy on cadres, Comrade Lo Jung-huan showed great concern for them and was good at uniting cadres from all parts of China, giving equal treatment and drawing very close to all. Cadres who approached him with problems were invariably received warmly. After nation-wide liberation, Comrade Lo Jung-huan would say: “Now that we have entered the cities, it is all the more necessary for us to keep in close touch with the cadres and go among the masses. We should warmly welcome cadres from lower organizations who come to see us. They do so only when necessary.” In discussing problems with a cadre he would listen to him intently, encourage him where he was correct, while patiently correcting his mistaken ideas. No cadre was not benefited by a talk with him. He saw to it that cadres were trained and educated in the day-to-day struggles so as to develop their good points and arouse their initiative. He also gave personal help and guidance to new leading cadres, and conducted general cadre training through the examination of work, summing-up of experience and the running of short-term courses or training corps. He would publicly commend or encourage cadres for their strong points and creative work. When a cadre made mistakes, Comrade Lo Jung-huan patiently helped him to realize and draw lessons from them so as to actively correct them. He showed great concern for any cadres in difficulty and did everything possible to help them to solve their problems. For all these reasons he was held in high esteem.

In more than three decades of revolutionary struggles Comrade Lo Jung-huan showed fervid loyalty to the cause, worked hard and lived plainly, fully displaying the selfless revolutionary spirit of a great communist fighter. In the years of bitter struggle in Shantung Province, he managed to handle work even while ill, sometimes planning military dispositions and commanding operations from a stretcher. His style of work was to seek truth from facts and handle things in a practical
He never put off till tomorrow what he could do today. When making speeches or reports, writing articles or discussing matters, and when posing problems and tackling them, he always proceeded from reality and explained things in a clear and simple language. He fought all pompous styles of work, and never made long, empty speeches or wrote dry, dogmatic articles. Regarding himself as an ordinary Party member, he would join the staff members, cooks, clerks and messengers at meetings of the Party branch or group to which he belonged. Unassuming and approachable, he was one with the cadres and fighters and found time to have heart-to-heart talks with them, tell them stories and discuss problems with them, and so became their trusted friend. He placed strict demands on himself in daily life, bearing in mind frugality and observing rules and regulations wherever he went.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan's indelible contributions to the Party, the army and the people, his fine proletarian character, will remain fresh in the minds of the Chinese people.

COMRADE YEH TING — INDOMITABLE PEOPLE'S FIGHTER

by the Theoretical Group of the Academy of Military Science of the CPLA

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, we naturally thought of Comrade Yeh Ting who led the Nanchang Uprising together with Comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho Lung, Liu Po-cheng and others. He commanded the New Fourth Army in the early period of the Anti-Japanese War. Chairman Mao evaluated him highly after the Southern Anhwei Incident in 1941, saying that "Commander Yeh Ting has an outstanding record in leading the army against the enemy." He was among our esteemed veteran proletarian revolutionaries.

Yeh Ting was born in 1896 in a peasant family in Huiyang County, Kwangtung Province. The family was too poor to send him to school, and his few years of schooling were made possible only by the financial help of relatives and friends. Later he studied at the Paoting Military Academy and, after graduation, became battalion commander in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's guards regiment in 1922. When Chen Chiung-ming, a warlord in Kwangtung, turned against the revolution, Yeh Ting and his men protected Dr. Sun by defeating enemy forces several times their number.
In 1924 Comrade Yeh Ting went to the Soviet Union to study in the Communist University of the Toilers of the East and the Military Academy, and joined the Communist Party of China the same year. He returned to China in 1925. Our Party was still in its infancy and many comrades had yet to acquire sufficient knowledge of the importance of armed struggle. To prevent our Party from gaining control over the armed forces, the Kuomintang right wing represented by Chiang Kai-shek created the “Cruiser Chungshan Incident” and drove all Communists from the Whampoa Military Academy and the First Army. Chen Tu-hsiu, who represented the Right opportunist line in the Party, retreated step by step in face of Chiang Kai-shek’s attacks, while Comrade Mao Tsetung and others stood firmly for building a revolutionary armed force under the direct leadership of the Party. An Independent Regiment with Communists as its core was organized on Comrade Mao Tsetung’s proposal and placed under Comrade Chou En-lai’s direction. The regiment was nominally under the Fourth Army, but was actually administered by the Party independently in the transfer and appointment of officers and recruitment of men. Comrade Yeh Ting, just back from the Soviet Union, was appointed the regiment’s commander. Well-disciplined, the Independent Regiment established close ties with the masses and won their support. Led by the Party and brilliantly commanded by Yeh Ting, it became an invincible force enjoying the active co-operation of the workers’ pickets and the peasant self-defence corps.

When the Northern Expedition was launched against the Northern warlords in the summer of 1926, the Independent Regiment under Yeh Ting fought as the vanguard unit and was the first to march to the front in Hunan Province. Mobilizing his men, Yeh Ting said: “Ours is a people’s force and the vanguard unit of the Northern Expedition. We represent not only the revolutionary army but also the Communist Party of China.” During the expedition the heroic regiment drove deep into the north and conquered such important towns as Liling, Changsha, Pingchiang and Yuehyang in Hunan Province. To block the regiment’s northward march, the Northern warlord Wu Pei-fu concentrated his main force at Tingszechiao, a vital point on the route to Wuchang. Yeh Ting led his forces in fierce attacks on Tingszechiao and defeated the Northern warlord troops, which were driven into battle by a “broad sword corps” from behind. The victors then pursued the enemy to Hoshengchiao and inflicted another defeat on him there, finally opening the way to Wuchang. In the general offensive against Wuchang the Independent Regiment served as the main assault force and broke into the city after capturing Snake Mountain. Its name spread far and wide, the people acclaiming it as an invincible “army of iron.”

After the Northern Expedition forces captured Wuchang, part of the Independent Regiment was enlarged into the 24th Division, with Yeh Ting as division commander and concurrently garrison commander of Wuhan. After Chiang Kai-shek’s counter-revolutionary coup d’etat on April 12, 1927, the warlord Hsia Tou-yin, in open betrayal of the revolution, took the opportunity of the expedition’s main force moving northward to attempt the seizure of Wuchang by surprise. Yeh Ting led part of his troops and a newly formed force of Communists and revolutionary students in a counterattack, defeating Hsia’s traitor forces. But on July 15 that same year, Wang
Ching-wei, then in Wuhan, also turned traitor, and the first great revolution ended in failure.

To retrieve the revolutionary situation, Yeh Ting joined Chu Teh, Ho Lung and Liu Po-cheng to stage the pivotal Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927 under the leadership of the Party’s Front Committee headed by Chou En-lai, and acted as frontline commander-in-chief and commander of the 11th Army. After the failure of the Nanchang Uprising, Yeh Ting went to Canton on orders from the Party Central Committee and, together with Chang Tai-lei and Yeh Chien-ying, led the Canton Uprising on December 11 that year as commander-in-chief of the insurgent army. The Canton Uprising also failed, and Yeh Ting was sent by the Party to Moscow to study. Later he left the Soviet Union, lost his contact with the Party and spent about ten hard years abroad.

Recalling how the Chinese Communist Party came to see the importance of armed struggle, Chairman Mao pointed out: “Then, having learned a bitter lesson from the failure of the revolution, the Party organized the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Canton Uprising, and entered on a new period, the founding of the Red Army. That was the crucial period in which our Party arrived at a thorough understanding of the importance of the army.” He also pointed out that had there been no armed struggle in this period, any success in China’s revolutionary wars in later years would have been inconceivable. Comrade Yeh Ting acquitted himself excellently in the Northern Expedition and in the initial period of the War of Agrarian Revolution. Known as the “famous general of the Northern Expedition” for his heroism and military skill, Yeh Ting won for the Communists high prestige among the people.

He played an important role in posing armed revolution against armed counter-revolution and in founding a people’s army under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. He held leading posts in two of the three armed uprisings mentioned by Chairman Mao above. The forces remaining from the Nanchang Uprising were later led by Comrades Chu Teh and Chen Yi to join Comrade Mao Tsetung in the Chingkang Mountains, and became part of the Fourth Army of the Red Army.

In 1937, Comrade Yeh Ting returned to China to take part in the War of Resistance Against Japan. Knowing his reputation in the Northern Expedition, the Kuomintang offered him the post of army commander, which Comrade Yeh Ting flatly rejected.

At the end of the year Comrade Yeh Ting answered the Party’s call and went to Yenan where he was appointed commander of the New Fourth Army led by the Party. Chairman Mao said at the meeting welcoming Comrade Yeh Ting to Yenan: Why do we welcome General Yeh Ting today? We do so because he was a famous general of the Northern Expedition during the great revolution; because he has accepted the post of commander of our New Fourth Army; and because he endorses our Party’s policy for an Anti-Japanese National United Front. Yeh Ting was moved to say: “The comrades are here today to give me a welcome which I hardly deserve. Making revolution is like climbing a mountain. Many comrades feared neither the height nor the difficulties and made straight for the top, while I once got halfway up and then turned back. I’m catching up now, and will follow the road indicated by the Party. Under the leadership of the Party and Chairman Mao, I am resolved to carry the resistance to Japan through to the end.”
In this declaration before the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, and later before the New Fourth Army cadres, Yeh Ting related his experience in the revolution and expressed his revolutionary resolve. He said emphatically that he must learn from those comrades who had persevered in the three years of guerrilla war* and carry the revolution through to the end. His frankness and sincerity won the respect of the cadres.

Carrying out Chairman Mao's instructions, Comrade Yeh Ting led the newly formed New Fourth Army in forcing its way behind enemy lines in central China, where it waged large-scale guerrilla war under the Party's leadership and with extensive popular support, establishing anti-Japanese base areas in southern and northern Kiangsu, in southern, central, eastern and northeastern Anhwei, and in the Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu border region. In its first three years, the New Fourth Army engaged the enemy in over 4,000 battles, wiping out more than 100,000 Japanese and puppet troops while increasing its own strength from 10,000 to 100,000. Yeh Ting was at the front directing every major operation. In April 1940, to smash the Japanese offensive at Yunling where the New Fourth Army headquarters was located, Yeh Ting led part of his army in a fierce assault on Chinsien county town, promptly recovering it and other places from Japanese occupation and completely smashing the enemy's "mopping-up" operations in southern Anhwei Province. This became well-known as the Nanling-Fanchang battle.

In the winter of 1940 Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang launched its second anti-Communist onslaught and staged the deliberately planned Southern Anhwei Incident of January 1941 mentioned above. Chiang Kai-shek had given the New Fourth Army a time limit to withdraw north from southern Anhwei. At the same time, he secretly deployed seven divisions to encircle the New Fourth Army in an attempt to wipe out its headquarters and troops in southern Anhwei. The secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee's Southeast Bureau and deputy commander of the New Fourth Army, Comrade Hsiang Ying, followed Wang Ming's Right opportunist line and underestimated the gravity of the Kuomintang reactionaries' offensive, and did not prepare adequately against it. He did not proceed northward along the route designated by the Party Central Committee, but took the direction prescribed by the Kuomintang. Setting out from Yunling on the night of January 4, 1941, the army was attacked head-on and encircled by Kuomintang troops as it entered the Maolin area. A fierce battle ensued. When our forces attacked Hsingtan on the 7th, only two battalions of enemy troops were found to be stationed there; our army could make a breakthrough if it seized the town. But Hsiang Ying rejected Yeh Ting's advice to capture Hsingtan, ordering the army to change the direction of its march. While upsetting the plan of movement for the army, he gave the enemy time to tighten its encirclement. Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, who placed every confidence in Comrade Yeh Ting, telegraphed him at this critical moment, giving him full power to command all

* After the Red Army's main forces started the Long March, its guerrilla detachments remaining in some 13 regions in China's eight southern provinces persevered in guerrilla war under the most trying circumstances from October 1934 to the end of 1937. Early in the Anti-Japanese War these guerrilla units were reorganized as the New Fourth Army.
military actions of the southern Anhwei troops. Yeh Ting, moved to tears, promptly telegraphed a reply in which he pledged to follow all orders of the Party Central Committee and to fight to the last. He addressed his troops, calling on all commanders and fighters to force a breakthrough at any cost for the survival of the nation and the Party's cause. Under Yeh Ting's command, the heroic New Fourth Army fought bitterly against the enemy, but being far outnumbered it suffered heavy casualties. Finally, food and ammunition supplies were exhausted. On January 14th, Yeh Ting sent his last telegram to the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, then destroyed the secret code and radio transmitter. Gravely wounded in the final, desperate breakthrough attempt, Yeh Ting was taken prisoner.

The Kuomintang reactionaries resorted to every despicable means to win him to their side. Ku Chu-tung, commander of the Kuomintang's third war zone, posed as a “close friend” of Yeh Ting and gave a banquet in his honour at which he offered his “sincere advice.” Ku said, “After all, you are not a Communist, and we can work together well.” He said that as soon as Yeh Ting issued a statement, he would be appointed deputy commander of the KMT third war zone. Yeh Ting sternly denounced this sinister move, saying, “No more of your dirty schemes. Our country is in danger, and as always, I stand only for resisting Japan, while you have perfidiously created the Southern Anhwei Incident to frame the New Fourth Army despite your promise of co-operation with the Communist Party to resist Japan. You are shameless! I can shed my blood and die, but my will cannot be bent!”

Yeh Ting remained a man of lofty revolutionary integrity throughout his imprisonment. On the window of his cell he wrote that three months in prison had taught him more than ten years in school. Yeh Ting actually spent more than five years in prison, being transferred from Shangjiao in Kiangsi Province to Enshih in Hupeh, then to Kweilin in Kwangsi and finally to Chungking in Szechuan. Yeh Ting remained unmoved before the Kuomintang's continual threats and cajoling throughout his years in prison. In 1938, while in command of the New Fourth Army, he had asked Comrade Kuo Mo-jo to write in his calligraphy the couplet: “The commander-in-chief of three armies may be captured. But the will of a real man can never be conquered.” Such was Yeh Ting's resolve, and he fully carried out the spirit of the couplet. He managed through the warden to smuggle the lines to the other New Fourth Army officers in jail with him, encouraging them to fight on.

Yeh Ting wrote on the prison wall his Song of a Prisoner, two lines of which run as follows: “Men cannot turn tail and crawl like curs from out the cell.” “Through raging flames and spilt blood I will win through to immortality.”

In January 1946 the Political Consultative Conference was held in Chungking. Repeated and sharp struggles conducted by the Party through negotiation, plus the pressure of the political situation, finally resulted in the Kuomintang's release of Comrade Yeh Ting. On March 5, the day after his glorious release, he telegraphed the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, applying to join the Communist Party. The telegram read: “Released last night. Have decided to fulfil my long years' desire by applying for membership in the great Chinese
Communist Party. Under your leadership I dedicate myself to liberating the Chinese people. I request the Central Committee to examine my history to see whether I qualify. Please reply.” The Party Central Committee accepted his application, telegraphing him on the 7th:

“Dear Comrade Yeh Ting: Your telegram of the 5th received. News of your release overjoyed everyone. Having struggled for more than twenty years for China's liberation and mankind's emancipation, you have withstood every severe test and demonstrated to the whole country your complete loyalty to the Chinese nation and people. The Central Committee accepts you into the Chinese Communist Party. Congratulations. Welcome.”

As an honoured member of the Communist Party, Comrade Yeh Ting could contribute still more to the Chinese people's liberation. Chiang Kai-shek, directed by U.S. imperialism, was preparing to unleash all-out civil war, and Comrade Yeh Ting left Chungking for Yenan by air on April 8, 1946 to accept his new assignment by the Party Central Committee. His plane unfortunately crashed in the Heichashan Mountains, Hsinghsien County, Shansi Province, and Yeh Ting died at the age of only 30.

In memory of Comrade Yeh Ting and the other comrades killed in the airplane crash, the great leader Chairman Mao wrote this epitaph in the Yenan Liberation Daily: “It is glorious to die for the people.” Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh also wrote for the same paper: “The sacrifice was made for the cause of peace, democracy and unity of the people of the whole country.” Vice-Chairman Chou En-lai, who was working in Chungking at the time, wrote a memorial article in which he expressed his deep grief.

Comrade Yeh Ting was a fine member of the Chinese Communist Party and an outstanding proletarian strategist. He had profound love for the Party, Chairman Mao, and the people, and fully carried out Chairman Mao's instructions. He thoroughly hated and resolutely struggled against the enemy, displaying the indomitable revolutionary spirit of a proletarian fighter. Yeh Ting made important contributions to creating and establishing the people's army, trained it strictly, and shared the lot of his officers and men. He advocated the militant style of boldness in charging forward and fighting, and of hot pursuit in battle. Frank and honest, Yeh Ting firmly upheld the truth. He never tried to conceal his errors but was always ready to assume responsibility and correct mistakes. In times of danger he stood unyielding, unreservedly devoted to the revolution. His brilliant contributions to the revolutionary cause will remain forever in the hearts and minds of the entire Chinese people.
FANG CHIH-MIN, HEROIC MARTYR

by the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution

It is on August 1, the date of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, that we especially remember those comrades who contributed to its founding. One of the outstanding comrades of that period was Fang Chih-min, a good student of Comrade Mao Tsetung and an outstanding member of the Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Fang established the revolutionary base area in northeastern Kiangsi Province and founded the 10th Red Army. He devoted his whole life to the cause of the Party and the people. He wrote: “The enemy can chop my head off but he can never shake my faith, for our faith is the universal truth!”

Fang Chih-min was born in 1899 in a peasant family of Hutang Village, Yiyang County in Kiangsi Province. In the autumn of 1919, the year the May 4th Movement arose as a revolutionary storm against imperialism and feudalism, he enrolled in the Kiangsi provincial polytechnical school, where he was soon fiercely assailing the corrupt educational system. After the May 4th Movement, when Marxism was being disseminated rather widely throughout China, he borrowed the English editions of Capital and the Manifesto of the Communist Party from a friend and made a thorough study of them. The truth of Marxism became the guide to Fang Chih-min’s actions.

In 1922 he was admitted into the Socialist Youth League and in 1923 joined the Communist Party of China, pledging: “From this day on, I’ll give all I have, even my life, for the Party.” He was one of the founders of the Kiangsi Party organization.

During the great revolution of 1924-27, a vigorous peasant movement under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tsetung swept Hunan Province in central China. Fang Chih-min, still in Kiangsi, mobilized the peasants of his village against the local tyrants and evil gentry. In May 1926 he went to Canton where he met with Comrade Mao Tsetung, who was in charge of the National Institute of the Peasant Movement. A report by Comrade Mao Tsetung at the Second Peasant Congress of Kwangtung Province greatly encouraged and educated him, and in 1926, after the start of the Northern Expedition, he returned to Kiangsi where he poured all his energy into the peasant movement, co-ordinating it with the Northern Expeditionary Army’s march into Kiangsi. Together with members of the peasant association in his native township he seized three rifles from the local police station, including one with half its barrel missing. The story of Fang Chih-min making revolution with two and a half rifles quickly spread among the masses. Fang was trusted by the peasants and elected a standing committee member and secretary-general of the provincial peasant association.

After the defeat of the great revolution, the Party launched the Nanchang, Autumn Harvest and Canton uprisings under the guidance of Mao Tsetung Thought. In December 1927, Fang Chih-min organized an armed uprising in the Yiyang-Hengfeng area in northeastern Kiangsi, founding a Red Army unit and a revolutionary
base area there. He served first as secretary of the Yiyang-Hengfeng Regional Party Committee, and was later appointed secretary of the Party's Special Committee of Northeastern Kiangsi and then secretary of the Provincial Party Committee of the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Border Area.

Comrade Mao Tsetung established and expanded the first rural revolutionary base area in the Chingkang Mountains. This launched our Party on the fresh course of seizing political power by armed force. Following that orientation, Fang Chih-min led the Red Armymen and the people in northeastern Kiangsi in deepening the agrarian revolution, developing armed struggle and building up Red political power. They frustrated the enemy's mopping-up operations several times and achieved a steady consolidation and expansion of both the Red Army and the base area. In the summer of 1930 the Northeastern Kiangsi Worker-Peasant Democratic Government was established here, with Fang Chih-min elected its chairman. The Red Army units he founded were redesignated the 10th Red Army. Comrade Mao Tsetung, in his article “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire” written in January 1930, severely criticized Lin Piao and others for their pessimistic Rightist views and their ideology of roving rebel bands. He fully endorsed Fang Chih-min's policy when he said that “the policy which merely calls for roving guerrilla actions cannot accomplish the task of accelerating this nation-wide revolutionary high tide, while the kind of policy adopted by Chu Teh and Mao Tsetung and also by Fang Chih-min is undoubtedly correct—that is, the policy of establishing base areas; of systematically setting up political power; of deepening the agrarian revolution; of expanding the people's armed forces by a comprehensive process of building up first the township Red Guards, then the district Red Guards, then the county Red Guards, then the local Red Army troops; of spreading political power by advancing in a series of waves, etc., etc.”

At the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in July 1928, Fang Chih-min was elected to the Central Committee. In June 1930, the influence of Li Li-san’s “Left” opportunism in the Party prompted its central organ to order Red Army forces to leave the base areas and attack key cities. A liaison man was sent to northeastern Kiangsi to specifically order the 10th Army to attack Chiuchiang. Fang Chih-min replied: “Chiuchiang is an important stronghold on the bank of the Yangtze River. A great many enemy troops are stationed there, which can also be reinforced easily. To send the 10th Army far away from its base area for an attack on Chiuchiang beyond Poyang Lake invites the total doom of the army.” He firmly upheld Comrade Mao Tsetung’s correct line and struggled resolutely against the wrong line of Li Li-san.

Fang Chih-min came to realize through struggle that Comrade Mao Tsetung’s idea of “establishing independent regimes of the workers and the peasants by armed force” was the correct one, and the only way out. He took the Central Red Base Area as his model in building up the Northeastern Kiangsi Base Area, frequently sending comrades to the central base area to report on work and ask for instructions. The leading comrades in the central base area showed great concern for the struggle in northeastern Kiangsi. Warmly receiving comrades from that area, Comrades Chou En-lai and Chu Teh spoke
highly of the successes achieved there, which greatly encouraged Comrade Fang Chih-min.

From the winter of 1930 to May 1931, Chiang Kai-shek deployed heavy concentrations of troops in his first and second “encirclement and suppression” campaigns against the Central Red Base Area, at the same time launching repeated attacks on the Northeastern Kiangsi Base Area. Fang Chih-min, making flexible use of Comrade Mao Tsetung’s strategic principle of active defence, ordered his men to lure the enemy in deep, “avoid his strong forces and attack his weak ones, and take him unawares, in this way defeating his offensive and increasing the strength of the Red Army.” The Northeastern Kiangsi Revolutionary Base Area was gradually expanded into the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Revolutionary Base Area.

In April 1931, the “Left” opportunists headed by Wang Ming sent Tseng Hung-yi to northeastern Kiangsi as “representative of the Party Central Committee.” Tseng hit out at Comrade Fang Chih-min, slagging the work in the base area as a manifestation of “Right conservatism,” “feudalist localism,” “accommodationism,” “the rich peasant line,” etc., etc. Fang Chih-min put up a stern struggle against the incorrect line of Wang Ming. During Chiang Kai-shek’s fourth “encirclement and suppression” campaign against the central base area, he frustrated the interference of Tseng Hung-yi and led his troops on a second march to northern Fukien in support of the struggle in the central base area. Fang’s troops won the great victory of annihilating six enemy regiments.

At the First National Congress of Workers’ and Peasants’ Representatives held in Juichin, Kiangsi Province in November 1931, Comrade Mao Tsetung was elected Chairman of the Central Workers’ and Peasants’ Demo-

cratic Government, and Comrade Fang Chih-min was elected to the executive committee and presidium of the government along with Comrades Chou En-lai and Chu Teh.

At the Second National Congress of Workers’ and Peasants’ Representatives held in Juichin in January 1934, Chairman Mao warmly praised Fang Chih-min and other comrades working in northeastern Kiangsi. He said that they “have done good work and are also model workers.”

In July 1934, the Red Army’s Seventh Army Group was assigned by the Party to act as vanguard in a northerward march from Juichin. In early November it reached the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Revolutionary Base Area where it was combined with the 10th Army and redesignated the 10th Army Group. Fang Chih-min was placed in command. Proceeding towards southern Anhwei, the 10th Army Group dealt heavy blows at Kuo-mintang troops. This alarmed Chiang Kai-shek, who hurriedly dispatched eight times as many troops as Fang’s to encircle the latter and block their advance. In valiant battles fought under Fang Chih-min’s command, the far-outnumbered 10th Army Group suffered heavy casualties, and Fang shifted it to Huaiyu, a mountainous area in northeastern Kiangsi, where it was again heavily surrounded. The bitter fighting lasted seven days and nights. Finally, on January 24, 1935, when Fang Chih-min was crossing the enemy’s blockade line, he was betrayed and fell into enemy hands.

Defying torture during his imprisonment, he did not yield an inch but showed the fine qualities that make a Communist. When torture failed, the enemy resorted to soft tactics to induce him to surrender. He replied: “Surrender? What are you anyway? Nothing but a bunch
of robbers, a gang of cowards selling out the country! All you can do is murder workers and peasants! We are irreconcilable enemies! At most, you fascist brigands can cut off our heads; you can never shake our faith!"

In prison, despite his wounds and illness, Fang Chih-min never forgot the Party's cause and the Chinese people's struggle to resist Japanese aggression and save the nation. Carefully avoiding the enemy's watchful eyes, he seized every minute to write articles. He organized the comrades, and set up a Party branch to struggle against the prison authorities, seeking opportunities to escape. Among Fang Chih-min's works created in prison are Beloved China, Honest Poverty and Some Notes Jotted Down in Jail. He succeeded in persuading a prison guard to smuggle these writings out and forward them to Lu Hsun. The post-liberation publication of this martyr's works, including Beloved China, must be credited to Lu Hsun's safekeeping. These writings fully embody the communist ideology and are gems among China's educational materials on the revolutionary tradition.

In the summer of 1935, the year he was arrested, he read from an old newspaper used as wrapping and from newspapers circulated secretly among the prisoners that the Central Red Army had reached Tsunyi in Kweichow Province and had won a major battle at Loushankuan, annihilating two divisions and eight regiments of the enemy. He was so overjoyed that he wrote on the margins of the newspaper these words of congratulation:

"Dear comrades of all of China's Red Armies! From prison, I enthusiastically congratulate you on your great victory! I hope that, under the Party Central Committee's leadership, you will fight resolutely to wipe out every Whiteguard and build a new China!"

Early one morning in August that summer, the Kuomintang reactionaries took him secretly to Hundred Flowers Islet in Nanchang. His cries, "Down with Japanese imperialism!" "Down with the traitorous Kuomintang!" "Long live the Chinese Communist Party!" "Long live the victory of the Red Army!" were still on his lips when the KMT bandits killed him. He was only 35.

Fang Chih-min is dead, but he lives on in the memory of the people. As a great communist fighter and a people's hero, he will always be a brilliant example for us. In 1965, on the 30th anniversary of his death, Chairman Mao wrote the inscription for his gravestone: "Tomb of the Martyr Fang Chih-min."
LIU CHIH-TAN — A COMRADE LOYAL TO THE PARTY AND THE COUNTRY

by the Party and Revolutionary Committees of Chih-tan County, Shensi Province

In the first month of the lunar year,
Comrade Liu Chih-tan appeared in northern Shensi.
Liu Chih-tan is indeed an upright man,
Leading his men up Mt. Hengshan.
He gives his heart to the communist cause.

So goes a folk song popular in northern Shensi. As we sing it, we cherish deep memories of Comrade Liu Chih-tan who performed monumental deeds in creating the Northern Shensi Revolutionary Base Area and founding the Red Army units there.

Comrade Liu Chih-tan was born in Paoan (now Chih-tan) County, Shensi Province, in 1902. Plunging into revolutionary work when he was very young, he joined the Chinese Socialist Youth League in 1924 and the Communist Party in 1925. In the autumn of that year, on the Party's suggestion, he entered the Whampoa Military Academy. During the great revolution of 1924-27, Liu Chih-tan headed the Political Department of the Fourth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, besides holding other posts, and took an active part in the war against the Northern warlords.

After the failure of the great revolution in 1927 he travelled in several provinces including Hupeh, Anhwei and Shensi, organizing revolutionary uprisings. In 1928, he and other comrades organized an uprising in Weinan and Huahsien counties. When Japanese imperialism invaded China in 1931, he organized the Northwest Anti-Imperialist Union Army, of which he was Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff. This Union Army was later renamed the Shensi-Kansu Guerrilla Detachment of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, with Liu Chih-tan as Deputy Commander-in-Chief and then Commander-in-Chief. In 1932 he became a leader of the Red Army's 26th Army on its founding. In May 1935, the 26th and 27th Armies of the Red Army established their frontline general command headquarters with Comrade Liu Chih-tan as Commander-in-Chief. In the autumn of 1935 when the 26th, 27th and 25th Armies of the Red Army joined forces and were combined as the 15th Army Group, he became its Deputy Commander and concurrently Chief of Staff. That same autumn, Liu Chih-tan was imprisoned on false charges by opportunists in authority in the Party and was not released until Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee arrived in northern Shensi at the end of the Long March. He was then appointed Vice-Chairman of the Northwest Revolutionary Military Committee, Commander-in-Chief of the North Route Army and Commander of the 28th Army of the Red Army. In April 1936, Liu Chih-tan led his troops across the Yellow River, after which they marched east on their way to fight the Japanese invaders. In a battle at Sanchiaochen in Chungyang County, Shansi Province, Liu Chih-tan died a martyr at the age of 34.

Comrade Liu Chih-tan was a fine Communist, a loyal and gallant leader of the Red Army in northern Shensi and a staunch proletarian revolutionary. Throughout his lifetime he cherished deep love for the great leader and
teacher Chairman Mao and upheld Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. He believed fully in Chairman Mao's thinking on establishing independent armed regimes and revolutionary base areas. At times of setbacks in the revolution he explained to his men the reason why sooner or later the revolution would succeed. Never without a colourful story about the revolutionary bases established by Chairman Mao in the Chingkang Mountains to bolster his men's confidence in the inevitability of the revolution's success, he often said to his comrades: "The experience gained by Comrades Mao Tsetung and Chu Teh in armed struggle in the south shows us that revolutionary armed forces must emerge and grow in the fight against counter-revolutionary armed forces. We must resolutely wipe out the enemy where they are weak and in this way build up our own forces. . . ." He brought together activists to organize armed forces with weapons seized from the enemy and led them in guerrilla war in Hoshui, Paoan and Ansai. After Chairman Mao led the Party Central Committee and Central Red Army to northern Shensi, Comrade Liu Chih-tan was all the more confident in the victory of the revolution. He cheered, "Chairman Mao has come! Everything goes well when he leads us!"

That winter, Liu Chih-tan noticed Chairman Mao still in thin shoes and asked his wife to make him a pair thickly padded with cotton. "Chairman Mao must wear those shoes to march all over the country in winter snow directing millions of troops to strike down the three big mountains of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and create the new China!" Cherishing great love and respect for the wise leader Chairman Mao, he fought courageously for the liberation of the labouring people until he laid down his life in his prime.

A Communist of noble character who gave his life for the proletarian revolution, Comrade Liu Chih-tan always subordinated himself to the Party's leadership. He was loyal to the Party, un Concerned for personal position, fame and gain, but willing to carry out any Party task wherever that task may be. He was cool, firm and courageous in battle, never awed by the enemy's strength. In 1931, arrested by the enemy, he remained unyielding and optimistic and did much work in prison. Repeated setbacks failed to shake his confidence and hope, but rather spurred him to greater effort for victory. Nor did he yield to the opportunists within the Party. Comrade Liu Chih-tan upheld the Party's correct line, fighting uncompromisingly against "Left" and Right opportunism. On his release from detention by the opportunists, he was greeted by the country folk with concern. "Commander-in-Chief, I hear you were wronged!" But Comrade Liu Chih-tan said with a smile, "It didn't matter much. Am I not still going strong?"

A founder of the northern Shensi Red Army, Comrade Liu Chih-tan was held in high esteem by the Red Army rank and file. Warm and outgoing, he cherished the people, while they, old and young, found in him a good friend. Notwithstanding his being a division commander, army commander and commander-in-chief, Liu Chih-tan was affectionately called "Old Liu" by his comrades. When the troops camped, he went among the local people making first-hand investigation on enemy activity and the social situation. He became known as a "living map," with the location of every hill, stream, roadway
and village in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region at his finger tips. On the march, he took great precautions in billeting his men and posting sentries. In camp, he often found time to twist rope and weave straw sandals alongside the soldiers. His life-style was the plain living of the soldiers, wearing patched clothes and hemp sandals. Life was also hard for his family, which had only two earthen bowls and two pairs of sorghum stalk chopsticks. When some country folk visited them, he managed to give them a meal of pumpkin, though the chopsticks had to be used in turns.

Early in 1936, on instructions from Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, Comrade Liu Chih-tan led the 28th Army across the Yellow River at a point north of Chiahsien County. The army cut straight into western Shansi Province and swept through Heiyukou, Hsinhsien county town and Kangningchen, winning one victory after another. Then an urgent telegram came from the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee that the 28th Army should “find a chance to capture Sanchiaochen town, tie down the enemy forces and manipulate them.” Comrade Liu Chih-tan went to the frontlines to survey the terrain, study the enemy position and work out the operational plan. One night in April during the battle, Comrade Liu Chih-tan went to the First Regiment command post where he studied the enemy movements and directed his Red Army troops in their offensive. There, on a height, he received a mortal machinegun-bullet wound and lost consciousness. Reviving momentarily, he mustered his remaining strength and said to the comrades at his side: “Hurry up and wipe out the enemy!” These were his last words. Liu Chih-tan had spent his whole life in struggle, and he fought to the last breath for the liberation of the labouring people.

Chairman Mao highly appraised Comrade Liu Chih-tan. In 1943, on the 7th anniversary of his death, Chairman Mao wrote: “After I came to northern Shensi, I met Comrade Liu Chih-tan once, and I knew that he was a fine Communist. His heroic death came unexpectedly, but his spirit of infinite loyalty to the Party and the country will live forever in the hearts of our Party members and the people.” Today, honouring the memory of Comrade Liu Chih-tan and the other proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation, the Chinese people resolve to learn from their resolute adherence to Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and their utter devotion to the Party and the country. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, they will carry the revolution through to the end!
光辉的战斗历程

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