VI

BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL ON THE FOUR

In the months since their arrest in October 1976, many stories have been circulated about China’s “gang of four” charging them with all manner of things. Outside of China, most people have heard something of Mao’s widow, Chiang Ching. But many know little of the other three former leaders—Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan.

Who were these four, and what were their backgrounds that led up to their prominent role in Mao’s last great battle—and made them so hated and vilified by the present Chinese leadership?

Chiang Ching was born in Shantung Province, East China, and joined the Communist Party when in her late teens. Chiang was sent to Shanghai by the Party, where she became a stage and film actress. After a few years, like many other progressive artists and writers, she asked to go to Yenan, the revolutionary citadel, to engage in cultural work more directly linked with the struggle. It was here that Mao and Chiang met. He had been divorced from his previous wife, Ho Tse-nien—who had not taken well to the revolutionary rigors of the Long March and life in Yenan—claiming she interfered in his political work. Mao and Chiang decided to marry. The Political Bureau was agreeable that Mao should divorce Ho since there had been complaints against her, but they were vehement in their opposition to the Chairman marrying Chiang, on the ground that she would become a burden on his political work as well, that she had a “low political level” and so on. But Mao had no intention of living like a monk, and besides he obviously was taken with this young revolutionary, so he insisted. The Political Bureau finally gave grudging consent—on the condition that Chiang would not be given any post and be kept strictly out of politics.

It was a strange demand, but Mao finally acceded to it, where upon he and Chiang were recognized as man and wife, and later the family was expanded by the birth of a daughter. However, for Chiang Ching her troubles started at that point. She became the repeated target of vicious gossip. Every time one of Mao’s political colleagues sought to aim some charge against him but was afraid to do so openly, the
rumor mill would start the campaign against the wife. It used to be said in China that Chiang Ching had hardly a day of comfort since she married Mao.

Under such conditions, it was quite obvious that Chiang became frustrated in her desire to participate in the revolution. She was constantly being put down or shoved aside. There are some who say that Chiang Ching was vindictive. It would be no wonder if, under these conditions, she occasionally acted that way. Certainly once the Chairman himself put her in a leadership position of the Cultural Revolution, as First Deputy-Chairman of the Cultural Revolution Group (a leading body set up by Mao during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution), she was fierce in struggle against the enemies of Mao's line and the continuing revolution. When she blasted Liu Shao-chi and his wife, Wang Kuang-mei, she was hitting at people who were not just her main tormentors, but were the political targets of the Cultural Revolution. It must be kept in mind that Chiang Ching always acted under Mao's direction for the purpose of carrying out his political objectives, even if on occasion she did go to extremes and was criticized and corrected by her husband. The fact is that Mao, feeling isolated politically from many of his old comrades, recognizing that they would not follow him in his quest to shake up the bureaucracy and maintain the purity of the revolution and carry it through to the end, had to rely on those he could trust, and quite obviously primary among them was his wife, Chiang Ching.

Chang Chun-chiao was born in Anhui Province, also East China, and began his revolutionary activities in the 1930s. As a young man, Chang was most active in the literary field as part of the underground Party in Shanghai. It is true that at that time this area was under the direction and influence of Wang Ming, who was then Secretary-General of the Party, and that his line politically would later be characterized by Mao as "Right opportunist," meaning capitulating to the whims of Chiang Kai-shek and thereby endangering the Party and the revolution. But during that period, those in the field could not have known of the debates going on in the central organs of the Party, and therefore faithfully carried out Wang Ming's instructions as coming "from the Central Committee." This even included some criticism and attacks against Lu Hsun, whom Mao later called one of China's great thinkers and revolutionaries.

These facts were well known to many people in China, certainly to Mao and other leaders, and most assuredly to Liu Shao-chi and An Tse-wen, for many years Liu's man at the head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee and in charge of personnel files and assignments. In fact, in March 1968, Liu's people, in an attempt to
divert the direction and orientation of the Cultural Revolution away from its attack on Liu and his "bourgeois headquarters," thereby saving their own hides, leaked out Chang Chun-chiao's file and tried to whip up a storm to unseat him from the leadership of the Cultural Revolution Group and the city of Shanghai, positions to which he had been appointed by Mao. Quite obviously, this did not meet with Mao's approval. The people in Shanghai were informed that Chang's record had been gone over with a fine-tooth comb not once but three different times and he was found to be a good revolutionary cadre. The attempt to unseat him subsided almost immediately, as it was taken in reality as an attack against "Chairman Mao's proletarian headquarters."

If Mao had had serious doubts about Chang, he most assuredly had the opportunity to do something about it at that point. Instead he repeatedly gave Chang important tasks in the Cultural Revolution because Mao believed his political line would be adhered to, and later he entrusted Chang with high positions in the Party and government.

During this same period both anarchist and rightist elements had attacked Chang. His house had been broken into and his life threatened. When word of one such incident reached Mao, he is quoted as having said, "If that meeting is held to bombard Chang Chun-chiao we will certainly take the necessary steps and arrest people."

Going back a bit, after the liberation of Shanghai in 1949, Chang became part of the administration of the Party and the city. For years he was Deputy Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee and Deputy Minister of Propaganda of that committee. He was also one of the heads of the Shanghai Committee for Friendly Relations with Foreign Countries and frequently met with guests from around the world.

During this period Chang had written an important article entitled "Break Away from the Idea of Bourgeois Right," which reflected ideas Mao had put forward concerning the egalitarian virtues of the free supply system practiced by the Red Army in the war of resistance and pointing out the stratification that the wage system currently practiced could lead to. This article was written as the Great Leap Forward—an unprecedented social movement which led to the formation of the people's communes in the countryside—was coming under attack from powerful forces in Party leadership as coming "too early, too quickly and too crudely." Mao ordered that Chang's article be reprinted in the People's Daily and he wrote some editorial notes basically supportive of it.

Starting from the mid-1950's, Chang worked very closely with Ko Ching-shih, the mayor of Shanghai until his death in 1965. Ko was known for his staunch support of Chairman Mao and his political line, and as well for his disdain of Liu Shao-chi personally and the line
emanating from his “bourgeois headquarters,” although at that time it was not called that. In the Cultural Revolution it would be revealed that Ko and Liu had been at loggerheads since the 1930s when they had worked in the same underground organization in Peking and Tientsin. One of the centers of their conflict was what policy to follow regarding Party members who had been arrested by Chiang Kai-shek’s police. Liu advocated allowing these people to sign anti-Communist statements and to vow never to engage again in revolutionary activity in order to escape execution and get out of prison; Ko said this was betrayal and only opened the Party ranks to all kinds of traitors and spies, for it was Chiang’s practice to spare lives on the condition that the released person would work for him. Mao sided with Ko, but Liu often acted to the contrary, meanwhile hosting a bitterness against Ko that would continue for years.

During the “Rectification Movement” of 1942 in Yenan, Liu and his supporters attempted to brand Ko as a traitor and spy for the Kuomin-tang, and actually placed him under arrest for a year and a half. The campaign against him was so virulent that Ko’s wife could not stand the pressure and committed suicide. It was only when Mao personally intervened that Ko was released and given work to do, but for years after that Liu managed to hang a cloud over his head and prevented him from rising to the highest leading circle. The battle between the two would continue until Ko was no longer on the scene.

Under these conditions, for Chang to openly become Ko’s man in Shanghai was a clear indication of where he stood politically, which was four-square behind Mao’s line. He was to suffer for this allegiance once Ko passed from the scene, for those who succeeded him as mayor and First Party Secretary in Shanghai, Tsao Ti-chiu and Chen Peihsien, were connected with Teng Hsiao-ping and Liu Shao-chi, the leaders of the “bourgeois headquarters.” Chang was shoved aside and actually demoted and left without any concrete work to do, until Mao decided to put him in the leadership of the Cultural Revolution Group as Deputy Leader. This was how he made his political comeback, in the forefront of the mass movement Mao led to prevent revisionism in China.

It was during the early 1960s that Chiang Ching spent long periods in Shanghai. She was recovering from an operation for cancer of the cervix, high blood pressure and a few other ailments, and on the doctors’ instructions attended plays, saw films and other artistic productions with the assistance of Chang Chun-chiao. It was during this period that they discovered what they felt was serious deviation from Chairman Mao’s line on art and literature, and that actually culture was being utilized to prepare people’s minds for a revisionist turn in Chinese
politics. Chiang wrote her husband about this and he encouraged her and Chang Chun-chiao to document their findings and prepare to expose the wrong-doers.

This work in culture involved two intertwined tasks—criticism of the old and creation of the new. Even before coming to Shanghai, Chiang Ching had battled to change Peking Opera. The reform fought for in the Peking Opera heralded a new day in proletarian culture and was regarded as one of the earliest victories of the Cultural Revolution. It was a victory because the highly stylized Peking Opera had been the dominion of the old culture and had proved over the years practically impervious to change. What distinguished Chiang's revolutionary model operas was the fact that these were plays which took up topical political themes in modern dress, though they used many of the artistic elements of classic opera. The struggle over the nature of these operas was really the curtain opener to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It was a struggle that pitted Mao's supporters led by Chiang Ching against the Party Propaganda and Cultural Departments.

And a fierce struggle it was. In November of 1963, Chiang Ching tried to make changes in *The Red Lantern*, a popular work, which would accentuate the traits of a true proletarian fighter. The Ministry of Culture, headed by Chou Yang, objected to her suggestions. Shortly after, she rewrote the script to an anti-Japanese war story to highlight the armed struggle. Peng Chen, mayor of Peking, banned the staging of the play and Chou Yang scoffed at the suggestion that it be made into a symphony, since according to him the peasants couldn't understand the music.

It was in the counter-attack against this rightist stranglehold on culture that Yao Wen-yuan made his appearance, joining together in Shanghai with Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-chiao. Yao had been a young literary critic attached to the Shanghai Branch of the Writers' Union. For years he had been under attack by the powers-that-be in the Union, most of whom were led nationally by a group of literary personages who were later identified as being in close collaboration with Liu Shao-chi. The reason for the ire they directed against Yao was his highly effective criticism of the political line which Chou Yang, Hsia Yen, Yang Han-sheng and Tien Han, whom Mao later termed the "four rogues," were promoting throughout art and literature. Yao was insistent that they were openly violating socialist standards which Mao had set down in his Yenan talks on art and literature in May 1942. Such people were later to refer to Yao as the "club" or the "assassin" because of his devastating commentaries.

During the "anti-Rightist" movement in 1957, in which Mao led the attack against advocates of reversing the historical process toward
socialism in China, an attempt was made by the supporters of the "four rogues" to label Yao as a "Rightist" and push him out of the Union. But Yao was able to defend himself as a supporter of Mao's line and of socialism, consequently this move failed. Attempts were even made to link Yao with his father, Yao Peng-tzu, who was a rightist and expressed very reactionary thinking, but this failed also, as Yao "drew the line" as they say in Chinese, between his political beliefs and those of his father and maintained his adherence to Chairman Mao's political line and the revolution.

It was against this background that Mao had to take action to meet the "revisionist" onslaught in the cultural field, which he felt was an attempt to restore capitalism in China. When he needed a vehicle for opening his counter-attack against Liu Shao-chi and his henchman, Peng Chen, Mao, through Chiang Ching, chose Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan to work on a document that would be his opening salvo.

Under Mao's direct instructions and with his personal supervision, Chiang Ching led this work, which had to be carried out with the greatest secrecy in Shanghai. Peking was no longer tenable for Mao, with Peng Chen bugging his living quarters, keeping him under surveillance and trying to keep the Chairman isolated, both physically and politically. Peng could not have done this without the instructions and support of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, who was then Secretary-General of the Party.

Mao selected as his initial target the play "Hai Jui Dismissed From Office," written and produced in 1959, the very year that open attacks began to be made inside the Party Central Committee against the Chairman's leadership. The author was Wu Han, the well-known historian who was also the vice-mayor of Peking and a close associate of Peng Cheng. The opera was a thinly disguised scolding of Mao for dismissing Peng Teh-huai in 1959 from his post as Minister of Defense. While audiences at the time could not catch the nuances, to Mao the play was a political attack, and Yao's long article, published in November 1965, had the task of meticulously dissecting the play and launching a political refutation to expose the whole plot to change China's socialist orientation and direction.

No amount of rhetoric at present can distort the fact that when Mao was in dire political straits, it was Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan who were at his side fashioning the approaching Cultural Revolution. Mao quite pointedly passed over many of the old cadres. He passed over the old marshals and generals in his army; he passed over the old and established figures in art and literature. This was not by chance, but by choice. It was deliberate because Mao had seen so many of these people disregard his advice to be aware of "the
sugar-coated bullets” of the deposed classes, who could not defeat them with arms but would corrupt their revolutionary ardor by elevated positions, special privileges and a living style far above that of the ordinary workers and peasants. Forming an important segment of society, especially becoming a force inside the leadership of the Communist Party, their attack against Mao and his political line obviously meant that they intended to reverse it.

Mao in fighting them back had to rely on those with the quality of judgment, and loyalty to his policies for the Chinese revolution. There is no doubt he recognized that too many of his old comrades would not follow him in this new development of the revolution. Succeeding events proved his judgment to be correct, when these very same marshals, generals, old cadres and established literary and art figures hated the Cultural Revolution and all its implications from the very beginning.

People like Peng Chen openly cursed Mao, but most of the others hid their dislike of Mao’s criticism of the direction China’s revolution had been going by leveling their attacks against Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan. Mao tried to make peace with those in opposition, to get them to change their minds and join him in the Cultural Revolution. He spoke with them face to face atop Tien An Men in Peking in 1966, after he had reviewed millions of Red Guards. He warned that the Chinese revolution had to take this new turn if it was to prevent revisionism, and encouraged them to join the youth of the nation and the masses of Chinese people in carrying out the Cultural Revolution. “What if we discover revisionism in the Central Committee?” he asked the assembled leaders. He indicated he intended to fight it tooth and nail, no matter what they decided.

Later, in March 1967, Mao would not give up on his old comrades, even though by now many of them were openly hostile to him and the Cultural Revolution. He dispatched Chiang Ching to talk to them again after the “February Counter-Current,” a rump Central Committee meeting called illegally to protest the seizure of power from below in Shanghai in January of that year which Mao had supported, and which he said should serve as the model for the rest of the country. Chiang Ching spoke of Mao’s high regard for these old timers and their contributions to the revolution. She said that Mao had specifically told her to inform them that he was counting on their backing in the future as well. But these efforts did little or nothing to alleviate their antagonism toward the Cultural Revolution or toward Chiang Ching and her associates personally.

Wang Hung-wen entered the picture much later. He was born in Northeast China (Manchuria). His family background was never clear,
but what is known is that as a very young man he joined the Volunteers that went into Korea to defend the northern part of that country against U.S. aggression in the early 1950s.

Apparently while in the army he displayed unusual political sagacity, for he was retained in the ranks long after the above conflict ended. This was the case only for those who had something special to offer the armed forces, and for a number of years Wang worked as a political commissar.

He was finally demobilized in 1964 and assigned to work in Textile Mill #17 in Shanghai. This was a factory with a long history of foreign and comprador control, therefore, the work force itself was extremely complicated as far as their political history and sympathies were concerned. The middle ranks of management and those of the workers, in addition, had gone through Japanese occupation and Kuomintang control, which only compounded their complexity. Wang Hung-wen was placed in charge of security work in the factory, which included physically guarding the plant from sabotage and intrusion, but most importantly working with personnel questions, that is, understanding the history, thinking and actions of those working there. This was important because Chiang Kai-shek had planted secret agents by the thousands in Shanghai, and it was always possible that there would be disruptive elements hidden within the work force.

After the death of Ko Ching-shih in 1965 and a change in the leadership of the Party and government of Shanghai, Wang Hung-wen began to discern subtle changes in the policies coming down from the Municipal Party Committee, which he felt violated Mao's political line and were out and out revisionist. Therefore, when the Chairman started the Cultural Revolution in earnest in 1966, Wang was one of the first people in Shanghai to grasp the significance of the movement and to put up dazibao (big-character posters) questioning the leadership of both the Municipal Party Committee and the city government.

In September 1966 Wang participated in a meeting at the East China Textile Institute and took the lead in organizing a city-wide criticism of the mayor, Tsao Ti-chiu, and the First Party Secretary, Chen Pei-hsien. By November Wang was in the leading group of a city-wide organization of Mao's followers in Shanghai's factories, educational, cultural and administrative institutions and other units. They decided to associate themselves with the Red Guards from several Peking organizations and form the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebels General Headquarters. Wang's activities did not go unnoticed, naturally, and the mayor and First Party Secretary had him marked for arrest as a "counter-revolutionary." It was even rumored that they wanted him assassinated. But mass support for what he was saying and doing
prevented the authorities from taking any action toward him.

The Shanghai struggle was very complicated. For example in November, in the face of continued refusal by Chen and Tsao to make self-criticism, a number of organizations sent off a delegation of 2500 workers by train to Peking to present their criticisms directly to the Party Center. In a suburb outside Shanghai, the train was surrounded by rightist forces. Chang Chun-chiao, representing the Cultural Revolution Group, went directly to the scene. At great personal risk, he waged long hours of struggle. He signed the demands of the rebels and demanded that the Municipal Committee hold a meeting. He then struggled with the workers on the train that they should go back to Shanghai to carry out the struggle there and send only a few representatives to Peking. What kind of example for the whole country, he asked those workers, would it be for the workers of Shanghai to abandon their posts, both in revolution and production, in Shanghai?

By January 1967 Wang's Headquarters had enough support from the masses, as well as encouragement from Chang Chun-chiao and the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking, to thwart any maneuvers Tsao and Chen took as they sought to evade the consequences of Mao's great political movement. In fact, the more they thrashed about, the more risky their evasions became, until it became quite obvious to the workers, students and other intellectuals and the peasants of Shanghai that they had to be thrown out of office. This the masses proceeded to do in what was called "The Shanghai January Storm."

Chang Chun-chiao described the nature of the process this way: "...we used to hold joint discussions. We would ask the rebels to come to our meeting to discuss each problem. One day forty organizations might be represented and the next day a hundred. Nobody knew anyone else. Although we were very busy and often in a state of chaos, we felt that this sort of thing was liable to happen in a revolution, and this was the way to get problems solved. It would have been wrong to be too hasty." Mao openly and specifically approved the "seizure of power" through the "January Storm" via editorials and Central Committee resolutions, and furthermore, called upon his supporters all over the country to emulate this action wherever it was needed to get the revolution back on the right track again.

Wang Hung-wen became a vice-head of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee in March of 1967. He was one of the leaders in the meticulous dissecting of the theory and practice of Liu Shao-chi's "bourgeois line" as exemplified in Shanghai through the policies of Tsao and Chen. His prestige was very high among the workers especially, but he also had the respect of the intellectuals and other sectors of society, for he was seen as a direct representative of Chang Chun-chiao,
who was leading the City Revolution Committee, and together they were considered as part of "Chairman Mao's proletarian headquarters."

Wang was for a while one of the key leaders of Shanghai, as both Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan were working in Peking most of the time. Later in 1971, after Lin Piao's conspiracy against Mao was discovered, and with his subsequent disappearance, Wang was suddenly transferred to Peking and elevated to the Vice-Chairmanship of the Central Committee just behind Mao and Chou En-lai. Such a move could not have been made without the specific approval of Mao himself, more so since Wang had leaped over Chiang, Chang and Yao, all of whom were members of the Political Bureau, having been elected to this position at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969.

No clear explanation was ever offered for this development, although inside China the general public read it as adhering to Mao's policy of cultivating successors to the leadership of the revolution. Wang had distinguished himself in standing up to Lin Piao at a Central Committee meeting in 1970 where Lin and his forces had made their first major move for power. As to why Wang was chosen ahead of Chiang, Chang and Yao, an educated guess would include two components. First Wang, exactly because he was a young man and a "newcomer," was probably viewed by those opposed to the Left as a person who could be more easily dismissed, discredited or pushed aside in the immediate struggles for succession after Mao's death. Secondly, because he had not been working at the Party Center he was not so easy to tar with the brush of association with Lin Piao during the start of Cultural Revolution. Chiang, Chang and Yao, to varying degrees, had been associated with Lin in some ways at the start of the Cultural Revolution. But then so had the whole Left, as Lin was the leading public figure in the struggle. Some of them may even have made mistakes which went along with some of Lin's wrong positions, but all of them strongly opposed his traitorous bid to usurp power and reverse the gains of the Cultural Revolution itself. In 1967 both Chiang and Yao wrote and spoke against the "May 16" conspiracy, an "ultra-left" group which has been linked to Lin Piao. And Chang was one of the very few leaders, including Mao, who were named as enemies in Lin Piao's Project 571 Outline for his attempted coup in 1971. Nonetheless Wang, having been in Shanghai, was most in the clear of the accusations being thrown around about ties with Lin Piao.

However, Mao faced bigger problems in that Lin Piao's defection was a traumatic event inside the Party and the country, and he had to forge a new unity. In resolving this issue, Mao sought younger and untainted political figures to move up the leadership ladder, and Wang
Hung-wen would be outstanding in this regard.

This did not sit well with the old marshals, generals and bureaucrats, who saw Wang simply as an extension of Chiang, Chang and Yao and thus sure to be a hard-liner as far as Mao’s political program was concerned. But they could not dislodge the young man, still in his thirties, since he was Mao’s choice, and after all, now he was Vice-Chairman of the Party. However, they could make jokes behind his back, such as labeling him “the helicopter politician,” referring to his rapid rise, and putting obstacles in his path when Mao dispatched him to various parts of the country to resolve urgent problems. This is what took place in the city of Hangchow in the summer of 1975 when there was factional strife left over from earlier struggles in the Cultural Revolution and Wang’s efforts were defeated by behind-the-scene maneuvering on Teng Hsiao-ping’s instructions. At that time Teng was Deputy Prime Minister and was exercising great power as Chou En-lai’s health deteriorated and he could not attend to daily affairs.

As can be seen, the political infighting was intense and bitter, with Chiang, Chang, Yao and Wang seeking to support what Mao wanted, and the “establishment” figures with Chou En-lai’s increasing support seeking to reverse many of the decisions taken during the Cultural Revolution, including the restoration to power of many of the former Party leaders and bureaucrats who had been criticized and deposed.

The Chairman had decreed during the Cultural Revolution that “old cadres who have made errors, even serious ones, should be allowed to make self-criticism before the masses, and if they pass be put back into positions of authority.” But there had always been sharp conflict in carrying out this instruction. First, Lin Piao held final decision back on many cases for his own purpose; that is, he wanted to place his own people in those positions of authority in preparation for his ascendency to the top position. Secondly, it became a partisan battle to decide where to draw the line in each case between “serious error” and “unrepentent capitalist roader.” This was a life and death political struggle, since crossing that line turned the problem into an “antagonistic contradiction” and a class enemy. There were those, who either out of conviction or otherwise, wanted to put certain old cadres on the other side of the line, and those who sought to pull them back into a “non-antagonistic contradiction” and restore them to power.

Each side saw this in larger political terms. Some, such as Chou En-lai, argued that practically all the old cadres except Liu Shao-chi and a few others should return to work. Mao, while believing the rehabilitation of some was necessary and correct, had insisted on two points. First it must be recognized that those overthrown certainly included bad eggs who should not return to power. And second those who were
returned to office should do so only on the basis of self-criticism for the mistakes they had made and on the basis of a correct attitude toward the Cultural Revolution. Even Teng Hsiao-ping was forced to say, he'd “never reverse the verdict”—a statement which could, and would, be later used against him when he made a mockery of those words by launching a major assault on the new institutions and policies of the Cultural Revolution. Chiang, Chang, Yao and Wang clearly felt that too many of the old leading cadres had betrayed Mao's line, had bitterly opposed the Cultural Revolution and by no means should be allowed to crawl back into power and thus open the way to reversing the whole process started by the Cultural Revolution.

What about Teng Hsiao-ping? While he had no shady associations in his distant past, he had for some time been part of Liu Shao-chi's "bourgeois headquarters." Still, due to the disarray inside the Party and army because of the Lin Piao incident (which came to a head in late 1971), Mao needed someone with broad connections within the bureaucracy and in the army. In this regard Teng was second only to Chou. In light of all this, Mao agreed to rehabilitate him and put him to work under Chou's guidance and supervision after Lin's fall. Mao was not then in basic agreement with Chou, he was battling the line—and many of the forces—Chou was supporting. But Mao recognized that it was necessary, if at all possible, to win over Chou, and therefore undoubtedly tried to do so down to the very end. To a great degree he had to work through Chou to try to win over others in Chou's camp, including Teng.

Why didn't the Chairman prepare to replace Chou with Chang Chun-chiao, for example? Most likely Mao understood quite clearly just how far he could go in any direction, and he knew that any attempt to put one of the Four into higher positions of power would immediately provoke rejection by the old bureaucrats and the army. Mao was undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist Party and of all China, but even he operated within definite political situations, and on more than one occasion, as he himself remarked frequently, he found himself in the minority. Therefore, no matter what his personal wishes may have been in this instance, he had to compromise in the face of the antagonism directed against the Four for carrying out the Chairman's own political line, from the very beginning of the Cultural Revolution. The most Mao could do at this juncture was to have Chang Chun-chiao appointed as Deputy Prime Minister and chief political commissar of the People's Liberation Army.

The activities of the Four in the final period of showdown with the forces of Chou, Teng, Hua, etc., have been described elsewhere, in the Introduction and texts of this book.
Yao Wen-yuan, in his capacity as leading member of the Central Committee Propaganda Department, played a very important role in propagandizing Mao’s line and directives as well as addressing many particular struggles. Yao himself wrote the important article “On the Social Basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique” in 1975 which analyzed the conditions of socialist society that give rise to careerists and conspirators of the Lin Piao type and the reasons that various strata of society can be hoodwinked by such counter-revolutionaries. It put forward what it described as a dual task in the socialist period: “on the one hand to gradually dig away the soil breeding the bourgeoisie and capitalism, and, on the other, to be able promptly to see through the new bourgeois like Lin Piao when they appear or are still emerging.”

Wang Hung-wen and Chiang Ching took an active part in many struggles. By 1974 the Right had launched an attack in the cultural sphere. Literary and art workers under Chiang Ching’s leadership fought to defend the new proletarian culture that had been developing (by the end of 1974 the number of model operas had expanded from 8 to 18, a number of new films had been produced and amateur theater and art groups had grown up throughout the country).

Chang Chun-chiao’s article, “On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie,” published shortly after Yao’s piece, helped lay the theoretical basis for the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combat and prevent revisionism—a campaign launched early in 1975 by Mao. It has been reported that in the same period Chang authored a work entitled Socialist Political Economy which based itself on and attempted to expand on Mao’s analysis of the nature of socialist society.

All these four, and Chang in particular, threw themselves personally into the first wide-open battle with Teng’s line in late 1975. This was termed the “farrago on the educational front” and involved the question: was education a mess which required a return to the old ways rejected in the Cultural Revolution, or should it continue to be developed according to the basic principles established in the Cultural Revolution. This “farrago” on the campuses was crucial in establishing the orientation of the political campaign which would soon be launched against Teng and the “right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts.” As Mao was to say, “The question involved in Tsinghua [University] is not an isolated question but a reflection of the current two-line struggle.”

After Mao’s death, the movement toward the final clash was rapid. Hua, Teng and others made their plans and the arrests of the Four were carried off on October 6, 1976, on the eve of a Politburo meeting.