INTRODUCTION

MAO TSETUNG’S LAST GREAT BATTLE

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If there was one question that concentrated the contending viewpoints and lines within the Communist Party of China in the years 1973-76, it was how to evaluate the Cultural Revolution. The reasons were two-fold. First, the Cultural Revolution had not been concluded even though it had become commonplace outside of China to assume it was over by 1969. Second, the changes it had wrought became the focus of intense struggle at every level of the Party and society. The revolutionary forces were seeking to preserve and extend these changes and the rightist forces were trying to limit, undermine and ultimately eliminate them.

Great revolutions engender reaction as well as change and progress. Overthrown classes will never reconcile themselves to their fate. But more than this, as the Chinese revolution has demonstrated, with the continuing advance of the proletarian revolution in the direction of rooting out the inequalities and divisions of class society, there are some who cease to move forward with the new tasks of the day. There are communists, especially some leading members of the Party, who try to bring the revolution to a halt, come into opposition to it and become the target since it is they who wield power. They are revolutionaries and communists only in name. The Cultural Revolution gave rise to new struggles and alignments.

As indicated, one’s attitude toward the Cultural Revolution became the touchstone of how he stood with respect to the rule of the working class. Mao, needless to say, had been most clear on this question. In 1969, he explained, “It seems that it won’t do not to carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, for our foundation is not solid. Judging from my observations, I am afraid that in a fairly large majority of factories—I don’t mean all or the overwhelming majority of them—leadership was not in the hands of genuine Marxists and the masses of workers...There were good people among the secretaries, deputy secretaries and members of Party committees and among Party branch secretaries, but they followed that line of Liu Shao-chi’s simply resorting to material incentive, putting profit in command, and instead of promoting proletarian politics, handing out bonuses, and so forth.” “But there are indeed bad people in the factories.” “This shows that the revolution is still unfinished.” In other words, had this revolution not occurred, power would have been lost. Moreover, it was not over! Some
two and a half years later Mao would say, "We have been singing the Internationale for 50 years, yet on ten occasions certain people inside our Party tried to split it. As I see it, this may happen another ten, twenty, or thirty times."

What Mao was underscoring in these years immediately following the stormiest episodes of the Cultural Revolution was that the question of whether the revolution would stay on course—whether China would stay on the socialist road—was by no means resolved and that, in fact, major struggles would continue to erupt, the outcome of which would determine the very survival of the revolution. These struggles were not simply defensive maneuvers or holding actions on the part of the working class. The Cultural Revolution was an unprecedented event in history in that it marked the first time in socialist society that a mass revolutionary struggle had been mounted against new exploiting elements that had arisen within party and state structures. But the results went beyond knocking these forces down and reclaiming those segments of society they had seized. In the course of these struggles major transformations in the character and functioning of the institutions of society were carried out (in fact, this was the only guarantee that the working class would hold on to them) and the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie, new and old, was challenged in every sphere.

The fruits of the Cultural Revolution were embodied in what came to be called the "newborn things" or "socialist new things." These included worker-peasant-soldier enrollment in the universities, settling of educated youth in the countryside, revolutionary committees in factories to replace one-man management, the participation of Party cadres in productive labor, model revolutionary theatrical works, a widespread network of health clinics at low or no cost and the emergence of "barefoot doctors" (doctors and medics trained from and living among the peasantry) in the countryside, and so forth. These "new things" struck deep at the influence of capitalism and made it possible for the working class to extend its rule to institutions like the universities which had been run by academic overlords and which nurtured intellectuals and experts divorced from the masses and mass movements, both class struggle and the struggle for production. Precisely because of this such measures aroused strong opposition.

**Lin Piao Affair**

In 1969, at the time when Mao once again spoke to the need to continue the revolution, a major struggle was beginning to take shape with Lin Piao, Defense Minister and Vice Chairman of the Party, who had succeeded in having himself named Mao's official successor. Liu Shao-
Mao's Last Great Battle

chi had headed up an encrusted bureaucracy which was severely punctured and challenged through the political upheaval of the Cultural Revolution. Essentially Lin Piao took advantage of this turmoil to fill the vacuum created by the criticism and dismissal of many cadre and officials and the dismantling of old mass organizations. Lin Piao's power base was mainly the army and he sought to fill these vacant posts with his men. The first major clash with Lin occurred over a draft Political Report that he and his forces prepared for the 9th Party Congress in 1969 which basically stated that the Cultural Revolution had achieved its aims and it was now time to push forward the economy. Lin had encouraged upheavals where there were others in his way and pushed revisionism where he had gotten his people into position. He used the masses as a pressure group for his own aims but didn't hesitate to clamp down on them when he had achieved those aims.

Lin was strongly rebuked by Mao, and the Report was rewritten to emphasize the continuing importance and scope of the Cultural Revolution. It is noteworthy that in the period 1969-71 record rates of increase in industrial output were attained under Mao's line of "grasp revolution, promote production." This principle means that politics must be in command of economics and that only by arousing the conscious activism of the masses is it possible to truly unleash the productive forces and transform the world according to the interests of the working class. For example, rules and regulations which confine workers to one post or skill and which make technical innovation or management the prerogative of a select few hamper the development of the productive forces because they stifle the initiative and activism of the masses and even promote antagonisms among them, conflicts over the use of machinery, for example. These are fetters that must be struck down, but this can only happen through the mobilization of the masses exactly because such fetters represent the continuing influence of the bourgeoisie.

As the struggle developed, Lin continued to insist on a wider range of participation of the army in the running of China. Mao was trying to de-emphasize the role of the army and establish the leading role of the Party on the basis of its reconstruction. With Soviet border pressures mounting and serious engagements occurring in April of 1969, Lin pushed for a policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union and reliance upon it for heavy weaponry. Mao recognized that accommodation with the Soviets was nothing more than capitulation. Lin also opposed any sort of rehabilitation of cadre and officials who had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution since it was totally anathema to his ambitions of having the army and his people in general dominate and monopolize the vital sectors.
Lin's power grabs and deception were not the result of some kind of megalomania. These methods flowed from a political line—a revisionist line—of not relying on the masses to change the world. At the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee held in the summer of 1970, Lin's forces were madly waving the red flag to oppose the red flag—extolling Mao's "genius" in order to render him a harmless icon while they planned to have themselves installed in various posts. Lin by then had been openly attacking many of the gains and transformations of the Cultural Revolution, labeling cadre participation in productive labor as "forced labor reform" and declaring that the policy of sending youth into the countryside amounted to nothing more than "disguised unemployment." According to Lin the economy was hopelessly shipwrecked and the masses had suffered long enough. What they didn't need and what they weren't interested in was more politics; the only thing that concerned them was food on the table and wood for the home fires. It was a brazen attempt to play upon and stir up dissatisfaction and resentment among a section of the youth, especially the more highly educated, the cadre, and backward people among the masses, and to attack these new things because they went against his revisionist program.

Increasingly exposed and isolated, Lin was forced to attempt a military putsch in September of 1971. The Lin Piao affair was a traumatic one for China. It occurred at a time when attempts were being made to consolidate much of what had been won through the Cultural Revolution, when the Soviet threat had grown dangerously, and when the right wing that was under attack was beginning to recover from the more jolting blows of the early years of the Cultural Revolution and was regrouping and launching a counter-attack. Moreover, the attempted coup itself and the fact that its principal figure was the man who had been designated Mao's successor, caused great anxiety among the masses of people. It destabilized things, particularly within the army, and also raised questions about the Cultural Revolution since Lin had been so closely associated with it.

There arose the need to reorganize the army and uphold the Cultural Revolution. The situation gave an opening to the Right, however, which quickly seized upon the opportunity in the name of achieving order and stability. For Mao the task was to shore up the Party and army and struggle against the influence of Lin Piao, and to continue to build on the transformations of the Cultural Revolution. Yet at the same time many people who had earlier gone along with the Cultural Revolution now, under the guise of opposing Lin Piao, increasingly fought against the Cultural Revolution.

The struggle against Lin Piao in the period starting in late 1968 and intensifying in 1969 temporarily brought together two forces within the
Chinese Communist Party. There was the Left headed up by Mao, having as its base leaders of the Cultural Revolution. The other force was the old guard from within the Party center, the State Council and the regional and central military hierarchies, who continued to be an influential and numerically powerful section of the Party. These were grouped around Chou En-lai. The Cultural Revolution had exposed and removed Liu Shao-chi and the leaders close to him. Thousands of cadre had been criticized and overthrown in the course of the struggle against Liu. But there were many in the Party who, while basically holding to Liu’s policies, were not directly in his camp and had escaped some of the harsher criticism. Others went along with the Cultural Revolution but did so in order to save their hides, while never really accepting its basic tenets.

Many who opposed or were at best half-hearted in their support of the Cultural Revolution, particularly within the State Council, were protected by Chou En-lai. This included people like Li Hsien-nien, Yu Chiu-li (both of whom had long been involved in planning and finance and periodically associated with Liu Shao-chi and his chieftains in these fields) and others. Such “protection” wasn’t wrong in every case, but in some it definitely was.

Chou, himself, went along with the Cultural Revolution—after a point and up to a point. There was a bourgeois-democratic streak that ran through his entire career which accounts for the fact that his overall role in the Cultural Revolution was a negative one. Chou was a leading force among veteran cadre for whom the supreme achievement of the struggle of the Chinese people would be the building of the country into a modern state. When the feudal landlords and foreign imperialists obstructed this they fought them, and sometimes valiantly. But once power had been seized they tended to regard the political struggle as done and over and sought to put economic development above all else. This could only mean bourgeois economic development since their schemes rested on foreign technology, experts in command, and keeping the workers and peasants in their place as grateful oxen. By the mid-'60s Chou had concluded that China’s defense and economic construction depended on accommodation and alliance with the West. This he saw not as tactical maneuverings and the exploiting of divisions within the enemy camp, but as a strategic orientation through which a “prosperous” China would be assured.

Chou had haltingly and grudgingly supported the mass movements of the 1950s and '60s but never really united with and gave leadership to them because, like other bourgeois democrats, he saw such movements as disruptive of making China powerful and modern. If Chou was ambivalent in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, as it developed
further he actively opposed it. His sheltering of many rightists as Liu went down contributed to the development of a new bourgeois headquarters which increasingly had Chou, the consummate bourgeois politician, as its prime sponsor. That the revisionists ruling China exalt Chou while lashing out at Mao’s line indicates exactly what Chou was up to for some time, perhaps even going back to 1949—promoting and protecting the interests of the Right.

For the revolutionary forces, Lin Piao in this period of 1969-70 posed the gravest threat to the gains of the Cultural Revolution since it became clear that he was not only bent on shoving it aside and seizing power but was in the strongest position to do so in the short run. For the forces who rallied around Chou, Lin also posed the most direct threat since his program basically amounted to sweeping aside all but his own people. The Left and the old guard Right therefore entered into alliance to oppose Lin and, directly related to this, to effect a shift in emphasis on two key policy questions. First, there was the matter of reducing the role of the army. Of the 170 full members of the 9th Central Committee, 74 were representatives of the PLA, and 38 of these were commanders or commissars from the regions. The tendency toward “independent kingdoms” had to be checked along with the military’s dominant position in mass and Party organizations.

Second, there was the re-orientation of foreign policy based on the increasing Soviet threat. The handling of the subsequent “opening to the West” and its influence on the domestic class struggle would become the basis for sharp division between these two forces. And just as this unity was far from absolute, so, too, the forces around Chou were by no means in opposition to Lin Piao’s position that principal emphasis must be placed on the development of the economy. This would soon become their loudly broadcast credo. In short, each went after Lin Piao for different reasons and would use the campaign against him toward different ends: the revolutionaries did so to get at the counter-revolutionary—and basically rightist—features of Lin’s outlook and program, the rightist forces used that attack on him to heap abuse on the Cultural Revolution as “ultra-left” and clear the way for undoing it and the revolution in general.

Right after Lin’s fall, 32 key military generals occupying top posts were arrested or dismissed. Twenty-five regional and district commanders were removed in early 1973. The damage Lin had caused the army and Party had been considerable. In light of this and the Soviet threat, it became necessary to rectify the Party and army and reassert the Party’s authority. In this context it also became necessary to rehabilitate more cadre—even some who had made serious errors. But how far this should go and on what basis people would be rehabilitated
would be a major bone of contention between the two camps. Many of these cadres harbored deep grudges and sought revenge for what they considered to be mistreatment at the hands of the masses during the Cultural Revolution and were not fully won to the changes of the Cultural Revolution which to them seemed impractical and dangerous. (Wang Hung-wen’s speech to the Central Study Class, Text 1, speaks, among other matters, to this problem.)

The Left argued that it was necessary to bring many people back, but this had to be done on a principled basis of self-criticism and support for the Cultural Revolution. And bringing certain people back had not only to do with giving them a chance to prove themselves, but with winning over their social base of cadre who could be pushed into the enemy camp if their “leaders” were not given the opportunity to make a contribution. In sum, it was correct to bring certain people back and, further, it was necessary. Yet on no account could principle be cast to the winds.

The unity between the revolutionary forces and those headed by Chou grew more precarious and fragile by 1972. The Right had blasted Lin Piao as an “ultra-leftist,” and in the name of re-establishing Party traditions he had damaged, they clamored for the return of more people who had been knocked down. The Cultural Revolution, because it was such a mass upheaval, undoubtedly had led to some excesses, and Lin had persecuted innocent people. But many people had to be criticized and knocked down, and big changes and transformations—which could only be achieved through revolutionary struggle—were necessary if the working class was to maintain its rule and continue the revolution. For the Right, rectification came to mean not strengthening Party and army organs on the basis of the Cultural Revolution, but restoring many of the practices that had been abolished through it.

Debates were increasing in 1972—in the realm of economic planning over how much initiative should be exercised at the local levels, and in the realm of industrial management over the viability of many reforms in the workplace such as collective leadership and the integration of technical personnel into production. The question of discipline and work norms was raised by the Right. In and of themselves these questions were not unimportant. There was continuing experimentation and the need for assessment; in fact, many of the practices pioneered in the early years of the Cultural Revolution had not been consolidated in many units until 1972, which gives some idea of the resistance to them. But the Right was not talking about protecting and consolidating these gains—and on that basis further improving them—they were questioning their basic feasibility. In March of 1972 they even talked about restoring individual management. Opponents of their attempts to rehabilitate cadre indiscriminately were branded “ultra-left.” In debates over wage reform
(an issue that went unresolved in the early years of the Cultural Revolution) the Right put the stress on avoiding egalitarianism and continued to entertain the idea of the usefulness of incentives.

The forces led by Chou began to coalesce around a program of subordinating everything to economic development with specialists and experts in command and the large-scale rehabilitation of and granting of extensive powers to "experienced" cadre whom the Right argued were indispensable if China were to move forward. In the summer and fall of 1972, what was later described as an "evil wind" was stirred up on the educational front. This was the first real assault against a major innovation of the Cultural Revolution. Articles were written complaining of the lowering of academic standards since new recruitment policies and teaching methods had taken effect. Under the influence and pressure of the Right, some of the changes of the Cultural Revolution were undermined.

At the July 21st School at the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant, where workers, students and teachers had devised an examination system to remove the onus of success and failure, tests were now given in which, as a reversal of the policies of educational reform, students were not allowed to use books, discuss questions or even sit two at a desk. This was in direct opposition to Mao, who said examinations should teach and not be attacks on people. The worker-propaganda teams, which Mao said should be a permanent fixture of higher education, had diminished in importance in many universities.

Chou En-lai had a big hand in whipping up this "wind." He is credited by the current rulers of China with having attempted to tackle the question of the "level of education" in 1972, apparently incurring the wrath of the Four. He was said to be acting on the instructions of Mao, which was the exact opposite of the case. Where Mao stood was well known and in the educational debate of 1975-76 Mao came out clearly in support of the continued revolution in education (of which more later).

The tack of the Right was to harp on "ultra-leftism" as the main enemy of the revolution by making it seem that Lin Piao's problem was his excessive revolutionary zeal, and indirectly painting the Cultural Revolution as "ultra-left" and an unmitigated disaster since, they would argue, it gave rise to none other than Lin Piao. On this basis they went on the offensive; actually, they pretty much had the upper hand in the developing Party campaign to criticize Lin Piao through the end of 1972.

The Left went at the Lin Piao question in this period by carrying on criticism and study of his theory of genius which undercut the role of the masses in making history. This was part of the effort to link Party
rectification with criticism of revisionism. In August of 1972 in an article entitled "The Laws of Class Struggle in the Socialist Period" (Text 2) it was explained that "The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the socialist period, therefore, sometimes rises high and sometimes subsides like the waves. In terms of time, it finds expression in a major struggle every few years." The article, in addition to observing the inevitability of major struggles every few years, also slammed those who push a revisionist line in one struggle but escape undetected, only to jump out again. The point of what the Left was saying was obvious. It was not simply past history and Lin Piao that was being summed up but the current situation as well.

The coalition that had united in opposition to Lin Piao was now clearly fracturing and the two forces, those grouped around Mao on the Left and those broadly grouped around Chou on the Right, were coming into sharper conflict. The "evil wind" on the educational front and a string of rehabilitations climaxing in the return in April of 1973 of Teng Hsiao-ping, who had been the number two person in authority criticized during the Cultural Revolution, were dramatic indications of the power of the Right.

Teng could not have been brought back without strong backing from Chou, who from the beginning sought to unleash Teng against the Left. Chou’s Confucian "care and concern" for people and institutions criticized during the Cultural Revolution and Teng’s unrestrained arrogance suited the Right’s needs well in their bid for power. Mao probably acceded to Teng’s return, though not without strong reservations and certainly with the full knowledge that Teng would wind up doing what he had always done—organize around his political line in opposition to Mao. Mao’s agreement to the rehabilitation of Teng, long a bitter enemy of Lin Piao, was most likely immediately linked to the need to carry out a major transfer of eight regional military commanders. But his return and rapid rise subsequent to all this was a measure of the strength of the Right and added to that strength.

To the revolutionaries it became increasingly apparent that the Right had seized initiative and this called for a counter-attack. In late 1972 and early 1973, the Left fought successfully for the verdict that Lin Piao was a rightist, cut from the same cloth as Liu Shao-chi. An article appeared in December 1972 earmarking Confucius for criticism based on his attempts to turn back the wheel of history. In March the concept of "new things" was elaborated in the Party press, along with the importance of upholding them. In Shanghai and Peking the first local trade union congresses since the early Cultural Revolution were held and strong criticisms were leveled against economism (the strategy of narrowing down the workers’ outlook to the most immediate wage and
other economic concerns) and the policy of incentives. (These had come up in the wage reform discussion of 1972.) As 1973 wore on, preparations were being made for a Party Congress to render final judgment on the Lin Piao affair and set the future course of the revolution. In particular, an assessment of the Cultural Revolution and those who opposed it and demeaned its importance loomed as a major question. And there was the question of where people from the two camps would be represented in the Party structures.

10th Party Congress

It was obvious that there was intense struggle going into this Congress. The anniversary of the Party's forming in July was not formally celebrated, and Army Day in August was extremely low-key and perfunctory. There was no mention in the press of a final meeting of the Central Committee to prepare for the 10th Congress. But far more indicative of the intensity of the struggle was the fusillade of articles in the press controlled by the Left just before the Congress convened. There was the account of Chang Tieh-sheng, a student on a commune in Liaoning province who, instead of going through with an examination, had protested the unfair procedures and character of entrance exams. His example of fighting the attempts to undo the innovations of the Cultural Revolution was promoted.

Articles appeared in July and August upholding new Party members and worker-cadre as a vital force in the Party. The May 7th Schools which had been slandered by Lin Piao were defended as enduring achievements of the Cultural Revolution. These were usually farms where cadre would go periodically to engage in productive labor—growing their own crops for food and carrying on light construction—and to study Marxism-Leninism. The importance of carrying out the revolution in the superstructure was widely expounded in the press. In all, it was a rising crescendo of support for the gains of the Cultural Revolution linked, no doubt, with the struggle going into the Congress. The Left would probably have preferred that the Congress be put off some in order to accumulate its forces. The Right probably wanted to get it over with as quickly as possible since the Left was beginning to counter-attack.

The results of this Congress represented an overall victory for the Left. The line adopted at this Congress was a revolutionary one, even if the question of personnel and succession had not been satisfactorily resolved. In fact, on this level it was undeniably a stalemate.

The Political Report given at the 10th Congress resolved the important questions of line that were being battled out in favor of the revolu-
tionary forces. It hailed the Cultural Revolution and cited Mao's 1969 statement that "Probably another revolution will have to be carried out after several years." Lin Piao was branded a revisionist whose political line flowed from Liu Shao-chi's view at the 8th Party Congress that the main contradiction in China was between her advanced social system and backward productive forces. This summation was extremely pivotal to the perspective of the Congress and it would be contested once again in Teng's, Hua's and the whole Right's "General Program" of 1975.

The Report also drew attention to the dangers inherent in the new foreign policy laid down at the 9th Congress and which Chou had been most closely identified with. It stated that "Today, in both international and domestic struggles, tendencies may still occur similar to those of the past, namely, when there was an alliance with the bourgeoisie, necessary struggles were forgotten and when there was a split with the bourgeoisie, the possibility of an alliance under given conditions was forgotten." While both deviations of no struggle and no alliance were mentioned, clearly it was the former being targeted, given that China was undertaking an "opening to the West." The Report upheld the principle of "going against the tide," affirmed support for socialist new things, and vigorously defended the policy of instituting three-in-one combinations of old, middle-aged and young cadres as an important measure for bringing forward new successors to the revolution.

Wang Hung-wen's Report on the new constitution (Text 3) amplified some of these themes. It was emphasized that the three principles of "practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire," which Mao had formulated in the wake of the Lin Piao struggle, were predicated on the first, "practice Marxism, and not revisionism." But not only did this Report elaborate on the principles which Party members were to observe, it also warned of problems and incorrect practices. For one, it alluded to the "unhealthy tendencies" of "going in by the back door," which referred to the abuse of position by cadre in which they would pull strings to get their children admitted into college or to get out of work in the countryside. It strongly warned against the leading cadre suppressing criticism.

Mao was obviously responsible for the inclusion of the principle of "going against the tide" in the Constitution. It revealed two things. First, that there was a rather strong conservative tide to go against and, second, that Mao stood against it. The question of the suppression of criticism can only be viewed in the same light. And the positive appraisal of the Cultural Revolution enshrined in this Constitution was a
blow to those conservatives responsible for such a tide and who had been insisting that the Cultural Revolution be stopped.

How was it that Chou En-lai, who was by no means enthusiastic about the Cultural Revolution in these years, would be delivering the Political Report to this Congress with its overall revolutionary thrust? To begin with, the Report itself was not the work of one person, but the result of intense struggle. And Mao had led the struggle to incorporate the lessons and perspectives of the Cultural Revolution into the Report. Lin Piao, as this very Report mentioned, had delivered a Report at the 9th Party Congress which completely ran counter to the line he had been organizing around.

More to the point, the fact that a correct line was embodied in this 10th Congress Report said something about the methods of the two camps in the developing struggle. The Right was whittling away at innovations on the educational front, attempting to restore the regime of specialists and profits in command in the factories, building its strength in the apparatus of government, and sowing doubts about the Cultural Revolution. Yet, they were not prepared nor was it to their advantage to confront Mao and the whole Left directly in order to have a revisionist line adopted. They knew Mao was quite ready and capable of resisting attempts to overhaul the general line. The Left could be forced to compromise on other questions, but not on this. The strength of the Right did not lie in open ideological struggle, especially since sticking to principle is not the hallmark of those who seek to undermine revolution.

Beyond these factors, it was important to the Left that Chou deliver this Report since he was the rallying point for the existing and emerging rightist forces. It was important that he go on record branding as "revisionist trash" Lin's proposition that the main task was developing production, since that line had great currency in 1973 with Western technology then available, the Soviet menace growing, and eight years of intense class struggle and the trauma of the Lin Piao affair fresh in people's minds. It was important that Chou endorse revolutionary views because as the struggle sharpened he would either stick to them or openly oppose them. In this way, the basis was being laid for the masses to grasp Chou's role and position in the struggle from the standpoint of political line.

Moreover, Mao was trying to win over as many as possible, including Chou, to that correct line. In other words, it was a line that was being upheld and in which the masses were being educated. When it came under attack, public opinion would have been created to go on the offensive against its enemies. This was not only a principle that Mao had generally applied in past struggles; it was particularly relevant in deal-
ing with Chou, who commanded enormous authority and prestige among great sections of the Party and millions of Chinese people, just as Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao had in the '60s.

The distribution of key posts within the Party hierarchy involved considerable compromise. The question of succession was complicated and neither the Left nor the Right had a decisive edge in these positions. Chang Chun-chiao had been Secretary General of the Presidium but was not appointed a Vice Chairman of the Party Central Committee. Wang Hung-wen had been elevated to the number three position in the Party—a meteoric rise which could only have occurred with the backing of Mao—but was joined only by Chang (not counting Mao) from the Left on the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Given that Wang was a relative newcomer, the Right reckoned that they could more effectively and easily isolate him as a leading person. Chang was a long-standing nemesis and his promotion was unacceptable to them.

The Central Committee contained many more representatives of the mass organizations which had developed through the Cultural Revolution, but it also contained 20 former Central Committee members who had been dropped in the Cultural Revolution, led by people like Teng and Tan Chen-lin (a former minister of agriculture); in addition, new people were added to the Central Committee who had been criticized and demoted during the Cultural Revolution. This was an index of Chou's strength and his persistent demands to bring experienced cadre back into the fold in order "to run the country well."

Why had Mao turned to the Four and brought them forward? First, because they had proven themselves in the Cultural Revolution, having played an outstanding and leading role in it. The 1967 January Storm in Shanghai with which Chang, Yao and Wang were directly associated was the first seizure of power during this struggle and served as a model for others. Workers united their ranks and overthrew the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and the administrative organs under its revisionist control. This was the first time that the question of removing capitalist roaders in power was resolved by the direct action of the masses. Chiang Ching had made enormous contributions on the cultural front which, it must be added, is a critical and quite difficult battleground for the working class since art has long been a stronghold of the old ruling classes.

The Four had also struggled to defend the gains of the Cultural Revolution in the years in which the disagreements between Mao and Chou were widening over how to proceed in the aftermath of the Lin Piao affair. Powerful pressures had been exerted to slow the Cultural Revolution in the face of Lin's wrecking and the growing Soviet menace and with conscious attempts being made by revisionists within the Party
to hammer away at and subvert the transformations of the Cultural Revolution, especially as more of them came back into the saddle.

The Four emerged as the most reliable people to carry the struggle forward. Many high-ranking veteran cadre could possibly be won over, but they could not be trusted to spearhead the continuing struggle. Mao saw the Four as the core of a revolutionary leadership within the Party and worked to create the most favorable conditions for this leadership to develop and in which the struggle against the Right could be prosecuted.

“Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius”

Following the 10th Congress the Left began to seize the initiative. An editorial in the September 29th People’s Daily spoke of the need to establish local armed forces with real proletarian leadership, linked closely with the Party and capable of waging class struggle. The policies of sending educated youth into the countryside and struggling against tendencies to sneak out of this service through family connections were upheld in a publicized exchange of letters between parents and children from Liaoning. But the most significant counter-attack of the Left was the “Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius” campaign.

It was in the period preceding the Congress that articles concerning Confucius first began to appear in great numbers, but the campaign itself took shape only after the Congress. In February of 1974, it was announced that “A mass political struggle to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, initiated and led by our great leader Chairman Mao, is developing in depth in all spheres of life.” It was emphasized that “Whether one is active or inactive towards this cardinal issue of criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius is a test for every leading comrade.... It is necessary to link this criticism with current class struggle and the struggle between the two lines, persist in revolution, oppose retrogression, adopt a correct attitude towards the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and enthusiastically support new emerging socialist things.” (Editor’s emphasis; see Text 5.) This is the first salvo fired by Mao in the struggle against the bourgeois headquarters of Chou and Teng.

What were the main themes and purposes of this campaign and why did it assume the form it did? To begin with, the historical period that was being scrutinized was that of the replacement of the dictatorship of the slave-owning class by that of the landlord class. This was an important episode in Chinese history insofar as it marked a relatively thorough change in social systems. (The bourgeoisie in China was not able to effect a comparable change in the form of a democratic revolution given its weakness, and it fell to the working class to lead and carry
through this revolution.) This rise to power by the landlord class was accompanied by prolonged and sharp struggles against the declining slave-owners and their political and ideological representatives. As it turned out, there was a recurring struggle lasting over a period of several hundred years between the slaveholding and landlord classes over who would hold power. For the ruling proletariat whose historic mission is to wipe out exploitation and classes, this was an object lesson in two senses. It demonstrated that where an overthrown class has some strength it will attempt a restoration, and that the ability of the new class to hold on to and extend its power depends on its willingness and capacity to carry through with sweeping changes and adopt the sternest of measures against restorationists.

The historical personages highlighted in this campaign included Shang Yang and Chin Shih Huang. Shang was an official who had originated the system of feudal prefectures and country-wide rule through central appointments in place of the old slave system custom of granting territories to local rulers who could do what they wanted with them. Shang Yang also carried out an important land reform which allowed agriculture to develop more rapidly. The Legalists (so named because they advocated that arbitrary rule of slaveowners be replaced by a legal code conforming to feudal society) were those who fought to carry on and defend such reforms. Chin Shih Huang had continued the reforms pioneered by Shang Yang and defended them. He burned the books of Confucius, who had tried everything he could to save the old institutions under the slave system. Most spectacularly, he buried alive those scholars who opposed the reforms. Though what he was defending were the reforms of a landlord class, they pushed forward the development of society against the resistance of the slave-owners and their political representatives.

Confucius was, needless to say, central to the points being hammered at in the campaign. With the newly-rising landlord class stepping onto the center stage of history, Confucius advanced two slogans around 500 B.C.: "Revive states that have been extinguished, restore families whose line of succession has been broken, and call to office those who have retired to obscurity." This was a blatant call to bring back the dying and decadent; in a word, to restore the old order. The philosophical principle he based this on was "benevolence." As an injunction to the slave-owners it meant for them to put aside their differences and unite to defend their embattled system by throwing a few crumbs to the masses. Directed towards the masses, it was a transparent attempt to exact submission and obedience.

But Confucius was more than a contemplative "sage." He was an active counter-revolutionary who would conceal his treachery by his
clever dissembling—by his fraud of sincerity and of concern for the general well-being. He had gone back on a promise to peasants who had risen in revolt. Later, in his capacity as minister of justice and acting prime minister of the state of Lu in ancient China, he had killed one Shaocheng Mou who had attracted a large following on account of his advocacy of reforms. Confucius was a tyrant who had hypocritically decked himself out in the philosophical garb of benevolence and moderation.

The teachings of Confucius were the ideological grist and rallying point for reactionary forces throughout most of Chinese history. Lin Piao himself had taken up Confucian principles and had even taken to training his son in the doctrines of Confucius in order to prepare him to carry on a Lin dynasty. His theory of genius was but a lame extension of the Confucian cant that only the highest are wise. The Confucian kowtowing to authority and the contempt for those who work with their hands were still strongly felt influences in China and, in this respect, the campaign was linked with ongoing struggles against the Confucian legacy. For instance, many folk sayings and proverbs abusive of women have their origins in Confucius, and attention was turned during the campaign to the continuing manifestations of the subordination of women. This applied in their representation in leading positions, pay controversies in the rural areas, customs in courtship and marriage, and to the division of labor in the household.

The main political target of the campaign was the restorationist forces, those who hankered for the old and disparaged the socialist new things, people like Lin Piao who clamored that things had gone to extremes (expressing the Confucian "doctrine of the mean") under the weight of the mass movement, and that nothing good could come of all this. The aim of the campaign was to arm the masses to understand the danger of restoration and the attempts by the right to reverse the correct verdicts of the Cultural Revolution. Its contemporary meaning was drawn by historical analogy to the restoration attempts by political representatives of the slave-holding class. This was a strong counter-attack against the efforts of the Right to challenge the reforms and transformations of the Cultural Revolution and to bring back cadre who were proven die-hards.

This was a campaign which was generally educational in nature. The goal was to build public opinion against the designs of the Right and to urge on people an understanding of the gravity of the situation. At its inception the purpose of the campaign was not so much to immediately launch a struggle of the sort that characterized the early years of the Cultural Revolution when leading cadre were toppled, but it was connected with and strengthened the continuing efforts to protect the gains
of the Cultural Revolution. On the Shanghai docks, at about the same time this campaign was unfolding, a major struggle occurred in which quotas had once again been put before political work and material incentives reintroduced to bribe workers to work and forget everything else, most of all revolution. Elsewhere workers had raised the slogan "Where are our cadres' hammers?" to protest the fact that in many units leading personnel had grown overbearing and had refused to engage in productive labor. These were struggles explicitly against retrogression.

There were other themes as well. The regionalism and localism that persisted and posed a serious problem in the military and the attempts by some provincial secretariats to oppose the unified line of the Party were attacked by way of upholding Chin Shih Huang's policies of unification. And the campaign also touched on the matter of national betrayal; as Confucians during the Western Han dynasty had slandered its war preparations and resistance to the maraudings of a reactionary slaveowning aristocracy to the north, so Lin had conspired to bring China under the protective umbrella of the Soviets—which meant nothing less than surrendering to them.

Yet, in looking back on this campaign it can be seen that Mao and the Left he led were not simply raising the issue of restoration in the abstract but alluding to and hinting at the actual officials involved through the medium of allegory. This was a long tradition in Chinese politics and a common method of argumentation and polemic within the Chinese Communist Party. In this case the Left was adroitly targeting Chou, Teng and others from their camp. Could it possibly be without significance that this was a campaign to criticize the person Confucius as well as Lin Piao and not just Confucianism—though as mentioned earlier, this was obviously part of it? Confucius, we learn from several articles, had been confined to bed because of a serious illness. Despite his much touted erudition we find that he "narrated but did not write." The parallels and insinuations are quite striking and it is Chou and also Teng who are the modern day Confucius.

Chou was the leading rightist or, at least, the leading sponsor of the Right within the Party and more than anyone else he was responsible for returning many disgraced and unrepentant officials to office. The "rites of Chou" (an ancient dynasty) was the political program of the Confucianists and referred to the policy of strict distinction between the social position of the slave-owners and the slaves, and to maintaining the rank and title of each of the slave-owning aristocrats. The name Chou would be enough to arouse suspicions as to who was being attacked, but the content of these rites is unmistakably analogous to the policies of Chou En-lai: his crash program of rehabilitation and cham-
pioning the old hierarchy of the Party. The Duke of Chou figures as a reactionary figure in the Confucian period and, as indicated, Confucius himself had been acting prime minister, an obvious allusion to Teng. The Right made it clear as to who symbolized what at the riot they incited following Chou’s death where they raised the slogan “Down with Chin Shih Huang,” who to both the Left and Right stood for Mao.

What gave added force and relevance to the Confucius image was the fact that he was sinister and cunning at the same time that he spoke of righteousness and benevolence. Chou En-lai was exactly this sort of person—pious and sage-like and a self-declared protector of the people—who was conniving against the revolution. Perhaps it seems incredible that Chou En-lai, someone who had long been popularly associated with Mao and who seemed to possess distinguished revolutionary credentials, could function as the chief of the counter-revolutionary headquarters in the Party. But Chou was typical of an entire layer of Party officials and leaders who had come into its ranks out of patriotic and even, maybe, noble (in both senses of the word) aspirations but who regarded the continuing development of the revolution as more bother than it was worth and a threat to their security and position. That people like Chou may have played a positive role in the struggle at one time or another—especially in the early stages of the new-democratic revolution—may be true, but the line of demarcation between revolution and counter-revolution was no longer fundamentally whether you were willing to fight for independence and the abolition of feudalism in China but whether you were for continuing the revolution and upholding the Cultural Revolution. Chou En-lai was the Confucian par excellence, working for restoration everywhere in the guise of self-restraint and righteousness.

The Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign flowed from the points of principle that Mao would not compromise on at the 10th Congress: that the Cultural Revolution must be defended, that the Right was the main danger and Lin Piao was a rightist, and that “going against the tide is a Marxist principle.” It should come as no surprise that the forces grouped around Chou, whose tide was being challenged, never played any sort of active role in this campaign—they had all along wanted a campaign against all they labeled Lin Piao’s “ultra-leftism.” The muted and somewhat elliptical character of the Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign was determined by the fact that this was the opening shot of what was clearly going to be a protracted struggle as evidenced by the line-up of forces at the 10th Congress. The struggle needed to unfold in a thorough way and public opinion gradually to be built up so that if a showdown came, it would be under the most favorable circumstances.
The situation that existed in early 1974 was that the Left had re-taken the initiative. But the question that divided the Party was still the Cultural Revolution, and this increasingly came to be interwoven with the struggle over succession. The Right had denounced Lin Piao to denounce the Cultural Revolution, and many officials who returned to power proceeded to attack its policies. With the campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius developing, the Right would cast aspersions on the Cultural Revolution by blaming it for problems and difficulties that existed in different sectors. At the same time, they would try to fortify their position in the central government. On the one hand, this enabled the Right to carry out its policies. (The foreign trade ministry, for instance, was fairly well controlled by them and they were able to introduce new trade policies. They broke with the long-standing practice of maintaining rough import-export equality and entered into long-term purchasing agreements involving disguised interest payments.) On the other hand, they could build up their political strength and squeeze out the Left. Teng was brought onto the Political Bureau in January of 1974.

The Left, by contrast, was building a political movement among the broad masses. But by the summer of 1974 the Right was able to regain the upper hand and the Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign was snarled. The Right would blame it for production difficulties and inciting workers to turn on each other. The Left insisted on linking it with production. Many units reported increases in output when workers criticized Confucius’ idea that only the talented can rule and related this to establishing more comradely relations between workers and managers which further broke down the division of labor between them.

The struggle on the cultural front heated up considerably in late 1973 and early 1974. The appearance in China of symphonic orchestras from abroad stirred great controversy. The Left did not oppose these visits as such; the question was on what terms and on what basis would they be hailed or would such cultural exchanges be recognized as an aspect of necessary diplomatic initiatives to the West which, however, increased bourgeois influences. Chou En-lai, it seems, was responsible for making the arrangements for these visits and the Right was generally accelerating its efforts to open the floodgates to bourgeois culture. In response, Chiang Ching, or those working under her direction, wrote articles analyzing the nature of Western classical music. (See Text 11.) Can such music like untitled sonatas and concertos purporting to be above time and place actually be considered devoid of meaning and without class content? It was explained that this music was bourgeois and must be criticized, though some of the form could be critically assimilated.

These discussions of classical music were not idle academic exercises.
As Mao continually emphasized, the role of the superstructure—not only politics but culture as well as ideology, etc.—is extremely important in socialist society—at times, decisive. Many areas of the superstructure remain strongholds of the bourgeoisie. They will use their influence in certain spheres, like art and literature, to spread reactionary ideology and create public opinion favorable to them. Such influence, if not opposed head on, can undermine and sabotage the socialist economic base. This is why it is an urgent necessity for the working class to occupy and transform all aspects of the superstructure.

At the same time, this involves the very important question of what is the correct policy toward intellectuals—in particular, full-time cultural workers—whom the bourgeoisie tries to cultivate as an element of its social base. The intellectuals are the most inclined to prostrate themselves before this music. They must be struggled with and, on that basis, encouraged to contribute to the revolution by portraying the images and the world outlook of the proletariat—critically assimilating what is useful from the past and from abroad.

The Left was taking up this question in connection with the “opening to the West” and the dangers inherent in the necessary initiatives taken by the Chinese government toward establishing certain ties with capitalist countries. The point they were making was not that it was wrong to deal with the West as a counter-weight to the Soviet threat, but that this could not be taken as a license to swallow the whole thing—bourgeois culture and all its corrosive influence. This fawning before foreign culture went hand in glove with the debasing of new proletarian art—like the revolutionary operas—and obstructing their development. And if there was any doubt as to where this foreign culture would lead, the Left held up the example of Italian film producer Michelangelo Antonioni who ostensibly set out to make an objective documentary about China, which was nothing but a wholesale attack on socialism, even though it was “artfully” and “subtly” executed.

The Right was so emboldened on the cultural front, which the Left controlled, that they brought out an opera called “Going Up Peach Tree Peak Three Times,” a rather undisguised re-make of an opera of a slightly different name, “Going Down Peach Tree Peak Three Times” which Liu Shao-chi had made use of to promote his agricultural policies. It was as if the Right were throwing down the gauntlet and saying “to hell with all your Cultural Revolution.” And speaking of opera, none other than Hua Kuo-feng had a hand in the production and subsequent filming of an opera in Hunan depicting school life called “The Song of the Gardener.” The Left raked this opera over the coals in August of 1974 for its derogatory treatment of students and its view
of teachers as all-knowing.

It was at this time that the Chou forces began to translate their antipathy toward the Cultural Revolution into a more definite program to be consecrated as the "four modernizations." At the same time, further efforts were made through additional rehabilitations and promotions to shore up their flanks and provide for acceptable successors. The Right was not an undifferentiated bloc. It was shot through with feuds and rivalries suggestive of the warlords. There were policy differences over the degree to which concessions should be made to the Soviet Union, over how fast to embrace the West, and so on. But the Right was defined and determined in relation to its opposite—Mao and the Left he led. The glue that held the Right together was its unyielding insistence that Mao's line not be carried out and carried forward by the Four. The leading figures of the Right were Chou and Teng, the former its unifying force and main rallying point, and the latter its hatchet man against the Left.

Who were the forces allied in the camp headed by Chou? First were people like Chou, Li Hsien-nien, Yeh Chien-ying and others whom Chou had protected on the State Council. These were at best wavering elements in the Cultural Revolution who tried at critical junctures to short-circuit it. This was most notable in the February Adverse Current of 1967 which Yeh and Li had been connected with. This was an attempt to call the Cultural Revolution to an end before too many toes got stepped on.

Chou himself, it seems, had been won by Mao to going along with the Cultural Revolution. Back in 1956-57 Chou had dragged his feet and, in effect, opposed the great upsurges that led to the Great Leap Forward, though he later came around to supporting it. So it should come as no surprise that Mao would say that he was a minority of one at times among the old guard on the Central Committee in the period leading to the Cultural Revolution. Chou's eventual support was no doubt conditional on certain limits being placed on the scope of the Cultural Revolution and with assurances that he could maintain some order. But the continuing upheavals and the carnage left by Lin Piao most likely convinced him that Mao's conviction that the Cultural Revolution would continue, admittedly in different forms and with varying degrees of intensity, was reckless and out of touch with the necessity of getting down to building China's economy and thereby strengthening its defense.

Precisely how this break with Mao took shape is, of course, a matter of speculation, but the policies he had been associated with and the forces that Chou turned to—Teng being the most obvious—place him squarely in the camp of reaction. Chou En-lai was a shrewd and cagey
politician, not as the Western bourgeoisie would have us believe because he was a realist, but because he himself had learned something from the two-line struggles that had taken place within the Chinese Communist Party. He was ready to exploit the prestige that was his and play upon the careerism of many Party cadre, along with sentiments for a "return to normalcy" that undoubtedly existed among some sections of the masses as well as a good number of cadres and intellectuals. In a word, he was a condescending savior who epitomized everything the Cultural Revolution was aimed against—which in small measure accounts for the scorn heaped on the Cultural Revolution by the current rulers for whom Chou stands as the archetypal "practical-minded" communist.

In Chou’s camp were not only the half-hearted elements among the cadres and intellectuals whom he protected, as well as unrepentant capitalist roaders like Teng. There were also people in his camp like Chi Teng-kuei, Wang Tung-hsing, and Hua Kuo-feng. Chi and Hua had been knocked down in the early phases of the Cultural Revolution (in 1966 Hua was attacked as a "royalist" and removed from the Hunan secretariat), but they came back rather quickly and supported the Cultural Revolution to the extent that they didn’t have to stick their necks out. These people were not militant partisans of the Cultural Revolution, but they were beneficiaries of it. The Cultural Revolution had destroyed the careers of not a few high Party officials and made it possible for lower-ranking cadres to rise. They profited from some of the changes of the Cultural Revolution and would at times defend them. These people had a certain stake in recognizing its legitimacy.

Hua had come into the State Council in 1971-72 to work under Chou and to work along with people like Wang Tung-hsing in the security network as part of the investigation team around the Lin Piao affair. They were part of a new guard that had not played a major role either in supporting or opposing the Cultural Revolution but whose political sensibility was basically that of the Right. They would fall out differently on particular questions depending on particular interests, how their careers were affected and what the balance of forces was; however, on the fundamental question of where things would go after Mao died and the Four emerged as the leadership core to continue his policies, they lined up with the forces of reaction.

4th National People’s Congress

Preparations began towards the end of 1974 for a National People’s Congress. The Right went into it with a certain amount of clout. Their base had solidified somewhat with many returned cadres in place, and
the economy had not fared as well as anticipated, providing them with some ammunition that things were getting wildly out of hand. This argument about the dismal state of the economy would rear its head again and again. It was a rather stale one at that, since the Right had been raising the specter of economic disorder and collapse in a big way beginning with the Great Leap Forward in 1958, which saw peasants organize into communes and alter the landscape of the countryside with industry and construction projects that relied on mass initiative. To the Right, the prospects of peasants making steel or workers discarding oppressive rules and regulations was tantamount to the worst sort of anarchy. The revolutionary view, the view of the Left, was that, yes, unleashing mass movements to spur production and raise the technical level of the workers and peasants would unquestionably lead to some dislocations and problems, but the long-term benefits more than justified these difficulties—it meant the rational geographic distribution of industry, the diffusion of skills and the more direct participation of the masses in the running of the economy. Typically the Right would hamper and sabotage these movements, but later when some of these construction projects, for instance, began to pay off, they’d turn around and take credit for them, saying, “Hey, look, we brought back the order that made all this possible.”

If one were to gauge the success of revolution on the basis of immediate economic results then it might be better to invite international capital in to exploit and develop resources (something which the current rulers of China seem on the verge of doing). For that matter, one might move to Indonesia which in the late '60s and early '70s had a higher per capita growth rate than China. But since when does a communist predicate his strategy and basic principles on what happens in one or a few years?

The revisionist rulers’ attempts to justify their reversals on the grounds that disruptions existed within the economy is merely a circular argument. It was the Right that was actively pushing bourgeois policies (as outlined earlier). The Left mobilized the masses to wage big struggles to prevent the Right from imposing these policies, and then the Right would turn around and say, “See, we need such policies to restore order and get the economy going.” As for the health of the economy, although the rate of industrial growth had slipped to 4% in 1974, in the period since 1964 industrial output had increased by over 190%. And the most important point was that the masses were increasingly involved in running the economy, and this provided the basis to solve production difficulties in the interests of the working class, which in the long run would result in more rapid and socialist growth.

The political struggle and maneuvering going into the National Peo-
ple’s Congress, as with the 10th Party Congress, was quite intense. It was decided at the 2nd Plenum of the 10th Central Committee held shortly before the People’s Congress that Teng Hsiao-ping would be made Chief of Staff of the Army and Chang Chun-chiao made head of its Political Department. Mao neither attended this meeting nor the People’s Congress and, as his subsequent instructions would indicate, he was unhappy with the direction in which things were going.

Chou delivered the Main Report on the Work of the Government (Text 15). The line in the Report, in the main, upheld the revolutionary program of the Left. The Cultural Revolution was assessed as having far-reaching influence, and the Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign was affirmed and, most important, declared to be the “primary task,” which was mentioned in connection with supporting socialist new things. The Report even underscored a fundamental theme of the Left—the struggle of the Legalists against the Confucianists, that is, the historic struggle against restorationists. Who but Mao could have had this put into the Report, given the fact that Chou and Teng had hardly anything to do with this campaign save being targets of its criticism and doing what they could to obstruct it?

In addition, the Report says “Reactionaries at home and abroad asserted that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution would certainly disrupt the development of our national economy, but facts have now given them a strong rebuttal.” (Exactly who was asserting this is, by now, no mystery.) The Report underscored that “socialist revolution is the powerful engine for developing the social productive forces.” Finally, the Report put forward a plan for economic development spanning the next 25 years. It conceived of a two-stage process of modernization which would culminate in China’s “economy advancing in the front ranks of the world” by the year 2000.

In effect, the Report passed judgment on the key question of the significance of the Cultural Revolution and socialist new things, and what the primary task was, i.e., broadening the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius “in line with the principle of making the past serve the present” (emphasis in original).

As for the question of modernization, Chou, interestingly, could find no recent statement by Mao in connection with this plan. Mao had in 1974 issued a directive to push the national economy forward, but Chou was forced to predicate his plans for modernization on a 1964 statement by Mao made prior to the last People’s Congress in 1964. Mao was not opposed to modernization, but—as later struggle would make even clearer—he was opposed to making it the overall task facing the Chinese people.

These were the terms of the impending showdown between the forces
headed by Chou and those headed by Mao: what was principal, modernization or class struggle? In Chang Chun-chiao’s Report on the State Constitution (Text 16) he explained that the inclusion of the right to strike in Article 13 was at Mao’s personal insistence. Why? Because although Mao recognized the desirability of unity and stability, he never lost sight of on what terms—the waging of the class struggle. He was quite clearly not of the opinion that it was time to rein in the class struggle for the sake, or in the name, of modernizing.

As conceded by the current rulers, Mao spent a sleepless night before the Fourth People’s Congress was to convene and put forward an instruction to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Shortly after the Congress completed its deliberations, Mao released this statement along with several others: “Why did Lenin speak of exercising dictatorship over the bourgeoisie? It is essential to get this question clear. Lack of clarity on this question will lead to revisionism. This should be made known to the whole nation.”

Mao then spoke about the socialist system: “In a word, China is a socialist country. Before liberation she was much the same as capitalism. Even now she practices an eight-grade wage system, distribution to each according to his work and exchange by means of money, which are scarcely different from those in the old society. What is different is that the system of ownership has changed.” “Our country at present practices a commodity system, and the wage system is unequal too, as in the eight-grade wage system, etc. These can only be restricted under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, if people like Lin Piao come to power, it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system. That is why we should do more reading of Marxist-Leninist works.” “Lenin said, ‘Small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale.’ This also occurs among a section of the workers and a section of the Party members. Both within the ranks of the proletariat and among the personnel of state organs there are people who follow the bourgeois style of life.”

Mao issued these statements because he saw the Right beginning to move boldly, and it was necessary to challenge them on the theoretical front. The class struggle focused exactly on grasping why the proletariat must exercise its dictatorship. Mao was concerned that the necessary tasks of economic construction were unleashing powerful bourgeois influences and that the Right was using modernization to liquidate revolution. As Teng would express it, “More hard work, less empty talk.” Therefore, Mao re-emphasized the struggle against revisionism.

Central to Mao’s plan was the release of two articles, On the Social Basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique by Yao Wen-yuan, and On Ex-
ercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie by Chang Chun-chiao (Texts 18 and 19), which made important analyses of the nature of the socialist transition period. That these pamphlets were signed indicated that they were to be taken seriously and that a major struggle was brewing. It was similar to Mao's release of a signed article by Yao in 1965 which was an opening shot in the Cultural Revolution. Chang and Yao's 1975 articles were a major counter-attack on the revisionism the Right was pushing, particularly in connection with the Fourth National People's Congress. The Right maintained that the key to China's development and survival as a socialist country lay in the so-called "four modernizations." The Left answered that economic growth in and of itself was no guarantee that socialism would advance. As Chang put it in analyzing the experience of the Soviet Union, "Never should we forget the experience of history in which the satellites went up to the sky while the red flag fell to the ground." What followed was a deeper analysis showing that the very soil of socialist society gives rise to capitalist relations and new bourgeois elements representing them and, consequently, that the key to the survival of the revolution lay in persevering in the dictatorship of the proletariat and waging class struggle against the bourgeoisie.

One of the key things being challenged was the notion that China's weak economic foundation made it impossible to restrict bourgeois right in distribution. This is the principle of payment according to work performed which, though a great advance over exploitation, actually sanctions inequality since people's needs and capabilities differ. (At a wages conference held in the spring of 1975, Teng had argued that the material conditions wouldn't permit the narrowing of wage differentials.)

In addition the Left maintained, in keeping with Mao's statements, that unless the relations of production were continually reformed and differences restricted, capitalism would grow rapidly, enabling new bourgeois elements to grab up more wealth and increase their power over the productive process and society as a whole. The Left insisted that the existence of the form of collective ownership was not enough to ensure the rule of the workers and the advance toward communism. What counted was the actual content of the ownership—whether the workers were really in charge of enterprises and whether a line of narrowing and restricting or one of expanding differences and inequalities was in command. The dictatorship of the proletariat could not stop half-way, either at a certain level of ownership or only in certain sectors. The working class must exercise all-round and long-term dictatorship if the political, economic and ideological strength and influence of the bourgeoisie were to be defeated and society to move forward. This
could only be achieved through continued revolution. Those who refused to recognize this were not genuine communists.

"Three Poisonous Weeds"

The Right, it goes without saying, would have none of this. It ran completely counter to Chou's prescription of modernization above all else. Teng, who by now was the functioning Premier, geared for a counter-attack. Pivotal to this was the Right's use of the central government organs which were being stacked with their people. Out of 30 appointments to the Center in 1975, 20 had been rehabilitated cadre. The Right's motives for bringing people back in droves by the end of 1974 were now patently obvious.

Teng pushed for conferences in the period between May and October 1975 for the steel and national defense industries, agriculture, education, science and technology, and military affairs. According to wall posters he attended at least six of these and similar conferences. These conferences were in tune with a "General Program" that had been drafted under his supervision in the summer of 1975. (See Appendix 1.) The program was a coherent—if nakedly revisionist—account of what the Right's plan for modernization entailed. At the heart of it was putting the development of the national economy in command of everything else and major (and ruthless) rectification and adjustment in all areas of industry, agriculture, finance, commerce, education and so on.

Essentially the argument raised was that production had been so stymied and impaired by the new and more simple administrative structures and the rational rules and regulations fought for by the workers, so disrupted by the carrying on of political campaigns and education in the plants that only the most drastic of measures, described as "rectification," would enable production to get going at a rapid clip. The crux of this "rectification" was what Teng called the "question of leading bodies." That meant getting rid of people—the revolutionaries. It only made sense: if you're going to impose top-down methods of management and push a revisionist line, then it becomes crucial to have the right people who are steeped in this outlook in the right place, i.e. on the leading bodies. (For a remarkably similar view to Teng's caterwaulings about how the political movements were ruining production the reader is advised to look at the Soviet commentary (see Appendix 5) which puts forward the same analysis as Teng, that is, socialism in China is a failure because the masses are running amuck and must be put back in their place. While the contradictions between the ruling revisionists of China and the Soviet Union are quite sharp, they represent bourgeois nationalist conflicts, and what these revi-
ionists have in common is an unbridled hatred and contempt for the masses, revolution and Mao's line.)

The "General Program" took three instructions that Mao had issued at different times in 1974 concerning the development of the economy, promoting stability and unity, and studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and combined them into one "interrelated and inseparable" whole which was to serve as the general program for the next 25 years, that is it would guide the "four modernizations." This became known as "taking the three directives as the key link" and it was designed to scotch the class struggle, as Mao would later point out. The "General Program" resurrected the summation of Lin Piao as "ultra-left" and challenged the formulation contained in the report given at the Fourth National People's Congress that "only when we do well in revolution is it possible to do well in production," and ridiculed the anti-Confucius campaign. It portrayed the Left as factional disrupters and basically issued a call to attack and purge revolutionary cadre and to pounce on the new things. This was the "rectification" so earnestly desired.

Two other reports, one on Industrial Management and Planning and the other on Science and Technology (see Appendices 2 and 3) slammed the innovations of the Cultural Revolution in these spheres. Taken together these documents proposed a plan for economic development no different in substance from what Teng had been criticized for in the Cultural Revolution. It entailed dependence on the acquisition of advanced technology from abroad, the bartering away of resources to get it, and the reimposition of highly centralized management and strict rules and regulations to push workers harder. These were the "three poisonous weeds" and Hua Kuo-feng was, by acknowledgment of the current rulers in China, directly involved in the preparation of the report on science and technology, while he was linked with the two others.

In the realm of science and technology, the hue and cry raised by the revisionists was "What is the revisionist line in scientific research? Can anyone give a clear answer?" The implication, of course, was that science is science and how can politics possibly have anything to do with it. Well, a revisionist line in science was not so much of an imponderable; Hua and others, in collaboration with the functioning head of the Academy of Sciences, had crystallized such a line in their "Outline Report on Science and Technology." The essence of their Report was that a serious gap existed between science and technology in China and world standards, and that policies which had been established through the Cultural Revolution such as "open door research"—which involves combining study and work in the laboratory with investigation and work in relation to productive labor and scien-
tific experiment by the masses—had been "indiscriminately applied." The Report then went on to say that scientific research, not the experiences and innovations, and the conscious activism, of the masses, was the leading factor furthering production. On that basis, it proposed that new conditions be established so that scientists and technicians could carry on their research unimpaired by the commanding role of proletarian politics.

What was being called for by the Right was the return to pre-eminence of bourgeois intellectuals, the so-called first-rate authorities, whose lives were being "wasted" because they had to go out and share their knowledge with others, link their work with the concrete needs of socialism in China under the leadership of the Party—putting applied research in first place—and learn from the mass movements of the workers and peasants. Hua's Report was a paean to professionalism and expertise, to reinforcing the separation of intellectuals from the masses.

Knowledge according to these revisionists was not the product of mass movements and collective experience but was the preserve of individuals. Scientific knowledge was not a weapon to use to change the world; it was a commodity which entitled those who owned it to rank, position and fame. Not only was this line a direct attack on Mao, who had formulated the policy of "imparting knowledge to the working people and requiring the intellectuals to take up manual work," but it would—and will now that this line is being implemented today in China—have the effect of stifling and distorting scientific work since it flows, not from the actual needs of the masses of people, but from the pursuit of gain and recognition.

There is no better example of what all this means than the hymns of praise that have been sung to some effete mathematician in China who for years has been agonizing over the so-called Goldbach conjecture whose practical application is little if any, but whose value in the eyes of bourgeois intellectual circles is apparently inestimable. So we find articles gushing with admiration for this fellow who spends virtually every waking minute of the day locked up in his study trying to prove the theory which will enable you to understand that 8 equals 3 plus 5. This is the model for scientific work promoted in China today—not that of scientists who go among the people—and just to remove the doubt as to what rewards are in store for these people, the rulers have reinstated the system of titles and regular promotions. In accordance with the recommendations of the Outline Report, scientific workers are now being recalled in droves from the factories and the countryside.

The circulation of these documents, the convening of these conferences, and attacks on and dismissals of revolutionary cadre (perhaps as many as 2000 younger cadre, most of whom had become leading
people during the Cultural Revolution, were ousted in the Peking area between the end of 1973 and the circulation of these weeds in 1975) marked this rightist offensive which would later be known as the right deviationist wind. Teng and his confederates on the State Council were directly rebuking Mao. Nowhere, for instance, in the discussion of wage principles in the Report on Industry is there any mention of, much less agreement with, Mao’s statements earlier in the year that the existence of the eight-grade wage system can make it possible for people like Lin Piao to rig up a capitalist system relatively easily if they come to power.

Teng was riding high, proudly and unabashedly broadcasting revisionism. He would bluster that he wasn’t afraid to be uttering such counter-revolutionary notions. He called upon others to summon up the courage to “pay attention to production,” as though that somehow were a forbidden subject when, in fact, he was hoisting the banner of production above all else—especially revolution. This much must be said about Teng Hsiao-ping: he was as crude in his revisionism as Chou En-lai was refined in his.

The campaign to study the dictatorship of the proletariat and combat and prevent revisionism found expression in new practices and experiences to criticize and limit bourgeois right in various sectors and to gradually remove the conditions which, the Left emphasized, gave rise to capitalism. The Chaoyang Agricultural Institute in Liaoning was put forward as a model in 1975 to illustrate how restricting bourgeois right was being carried out in education (see Text 34). What distinguished this Chaoyang Institute was that it was located in a rural area and most of its students would return to the communes. Even in this period, by contrast, many agricultural schools were based in the cities and substantial numbers of students would not go back to the countryside. The Chaoyang curriculum reflected the actual needs of socialist development in the countryside and insisted on the closest integration of teachers, students and peasants in work and study. Political questions received first attention.

Attempts were also made to restrict the corrosive influence of rural trade fairs—where private trade went on—and an experimental socialist big fair in Liaoning Province was cited as a model to learn from. In a *People’s Daily* article (Text 21) explaining the approach in dealing with such questions it was stated that “In the period of socialism, there inevitably exist bourgeois rights such as the trade fair... Their existence is allowed by the Party’s policy. But they should not be given oxygen and blood and be allowed to grow unrestrictedly.” It then proceeded to recount efforts to establish new kinds of fairs which limited bourgeois rights in the sphere of exchange and to some degree in production.
These models were not warmly received by the Right. The sharpening struggle within the Party was reflected throughout society in 1975 in major struggles, and disruptions occurred in factories in many parts of the country. There had been escalating struggle in 1974 as the anti-Lin Piao/Confucius campaign unfolded and workers had fought to resist attempts to reduce the scope of worker participation in management and cadre participation in labor. But now this began to dovetail more directly with the increasingly open collision between the two headquarters within the Party. In Hangchow in the summer of 1975, major disputes broke out in some 25 factories and the PLA was called in to restore order.

While the exact terms of the struggle (working conditions and cadre participation in labor seem to have been part of it) and the forces represented locally are not entirely clear, the clashing perspectives of the dictatorship of the proletariat campaign and the Teng-led counter-offensive were certainly involved, as were principals from both camps. To blame the Four for disruptions ignores the fact that the Right would try to blunt the cutting edge of various campaigns and use them for their own political purposes by getting workers to form into factions which local leaders could use against their opponents. Moreover, the Right had a vested interest in proving that the reforms of the Cultural Revolution weren’t working, which meant sabotaging the development of the new things and causing disruptions. They were the ones mainly responsible, and to the extent that the Left caused disruptions, it was necessary in order to defend the gains the Right was attacking. These were righteous struggles which would be far less disruptive to socialism than a counter-revolutionary seizure of power—exactly what the Right was building towards.

One of the most concerted and concentrated bids to undo the victories of the Cultural Revolution was on the educational front. This only made sense since the educational system is an indispensable link in the rule of one class or another—shaping the outlook of new generations. But the Right was not only trying to reverse policies. It was also attempting to appeal to the intellectuals and teachers who had been subjected to intense criticism during the educational struggles and who were an important element of the social base that could be mobilized by the Right. In July, Chou Jung-hsin, the newly appointed Minister of Education, went on tour and vented his spleen against policies such as open door education in which students would spend time in factories and the countryside as part of their studies. He decried the “lowering” of academic standards (only recently his mentor, Teng, has referred to a whole generation of “intellectual cripples” who were products of the educational reforms). The complaints of “deterioration” and “things are not working” were voiced
more openly. The point, of course, was that as long as these new things were around, bourgeois standards of excellence were bound to "deteriorate."

**Criticism of Water Margin**

This was the right deviationist wind that was being fanned and in mid-August Mao struck back. He issued an instruction calling for criticism of the classical Chinese novel, *Water Margin*. The merit of the book, Mao pointed out, "lies precisely in the portrayal of capitulation." Why was it important to criticize this novel? Because "it serves as teaching material by negative example to help all the people to recognize capitulationists." As in the anti-Confucius campaign, but in a more intense way, Mao was beginning to create public opinion through historical analogy. In this case, Sung Chiang, who is the main figure in the novel, sneaks his way into the ranks of the peasant rebels and seizes leadership. After having put up a show of resistance for a while he capitulates to the emperor and turns on the peasant rebels.

Broadly, Mao was making two points. One concerned the connection between revisionism and national betrayal. A revisionist line of experts in command and relying on assistance from abroad in a poor country like China will ultimately lead to dependency and defeat. By the same token a policy of conciliation towards the external enemy will only invite disaster. Economic and foreign policy issues such as the use of China's resources, trade talks and the border negotiations with the Soviets were certainly involved as was the release that year of several captured Soviet helicopter pilots—with a virtual apology—which Teng had evidently engineered.

Mao was also taking up the question of the conflicting viewpoints on how to deal with the war danger posed by the Soviets in particular. Would it entail a crash program of industrialization and foreign trade and with it a playing down of the class struggle so as not to allow anything to interfere with the execution of this program? Would China be strengthened by the imposition of order, any order? Mao saw things differently. While certainly upgrading of weaponry and further strides in the economy were important, and some compromises with certain imperialists and reactionaries were necessary because of the changing world situation, the strongest possible basis on which China could go into a war situation lay not in attempting to establish some kind of social peace but in mobilizing the people to wage the class struggle and in this way confront enemies at home and abroad. Any other strategy would lead to defeat.

It is not possible to examine Chinese foreign policy under Mao in any
depth here, but clearly the *Water Margin* criticism makes clear that Mao did not regard some sort of grand alliance with the Western powers as the linchpin of China’s war preparations. His subsequent criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping for not making any distinction between imperialism and Marxism is aimed precisely at those forces who were glossing over the differences between the interests of the working class and those of reactionary foreign powers. Bringing China under the wing of one superpower today—and perhaps another tomorrow—this kind of bowing down in the name of national security will only lead to capitulation. This was the point Mao was making.

As for the “three worlds” theory which is attributed to Mao, he may have made some references to particular groupings of countries to analyze some secondary conflicts in the world, but he never intended this as a substitute for class analysis within these countries or the waging of class struggle. This is clear from many examples. When the new Chinese government Constitution was adopted by the ruling revisionists at the Fifth People’s Congress, the so-called “three worlds” analysis was made the cornerstone or the functional equivalent of proletarian internationalism. Significantly, the last government Constitution, adopted when Mao was alive, contains no such formulation. And it is interesting that this “three worlds” analysis was not put forward as Mao’s great strategy until after he died. As a strategy and as it is being put forward by China’s rulers today, the “three worlds” theory makes alliances between China and various reactionary governments the starting point for foreign policy. It is a line that obliterates Marxism and revolution and proclaims the defense of China, and the “four modernizations” as the basis for this, the sacred and highest duty not only of China but of revolutionaries everywhere.

As for the Four, the present leadership in Peking accuses them of having cursed the “three worlds” theory. The whole history of the Four in combating the bourgeoisie in China, of resisting capitulation, as well as several statements on this subject (which is by its nature very sensitive) that are available, all argue that Hua and Co. are correct in accusing the Four of not going along with this theory. In Wang Hung-wen’s speech to a delegation of Cambodians (Text 14) given a week before Teng’s U.N. speech (Appendix 6) which first put out this theory, Wang called for continued support for revolutionary struggles and said that Mao “recently” reminded them, “We are communists, and we must help the people; not to help the people would be to betray Marxism.” Similarly, in the course of the Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign, the Four called attention to the revisionist line of “the liquidation of struggle against the imperialists, reactionaries and modern revisionists, and the reduction of assistance and support to the revolutionary struggles
and the people of various countries’’ (see Text 13). Such criticism clearly applied to then-current struggles.

The basic point Mao was making through the campaign around the Water Margin was to warn against imposters like Sung Chiang who infiltrated into the ranks of the revolution only to commit treachery. These people would, like Sung Chiang, fight the corrupt officials but not the emperor. In other words, they would be for certain changes but not for thoroughgoing and continuing revolution. They would not persevere in the class struggle; they would only go so far and then betray it. Sung incidentally—or not so incidentally—was from a landlord background, and this biographical fact was a veiled allusion to the venerable and “veteran” cadre like Chou who were unwilling to fight the emperor—the bourgeoisie in all its forms and stages of development.

The release of Mao’s comments on Water Margin was a siren that a big struggle was in the wind and that there were dangerous and despicable traitors within the ranks of the revolutionaries whose defeat required the greatest vigilance. It was time to start looking for them. It would come as little surprise, then, that the current rulers of China have precious little and nothing of substance to say about this campaign.

Once again, the methods of the contending headquarters and the programs around which they rallied their supporters came into sharper relief. The Left, using its influence in the media and with Mao as its sponsor, sought to mobilize public opinion against the lines of the Right by initiating these educational political campaigns which would, as they developed, force the issues and ultimately the backers of the rightist lines out into the open. The program around which they rallied people was that of continued revolution, of putting class struggle above all other tasks. The Right resorted to bureaucratic measures—adding to and consolidating its people in the government, Party and military hierarchies—and threatening “rectification” against those who would not comply.

Those like Hua who had come forward through the Cultural Revolution but whose experience was largely administrative (Hua had been linked with Li Hsien-nien for some time) were part of the Right’s camp, though not always rigidly attached. There were rivalries and differences among these people, but what bound them together was their opposition to the program of continued revolution. And, especially, they stood opposed to the prospect of Mao’s successors, the Four, assuming the reins of authority within the Party because that meant continuing to place the class struggle above and in command of production. The program that united this camp was the “four modernizations”—that is, modernization above everything else.
More "Right Deviationist Wind"

In October 1975 the Right made another major offensive at a "Learn from Tachai Conference."* Hua’s Report was part of the rightist wind being whipped up. The significance of this conference and the Report was that this was the first major expression of the line of modernization above everything else which Chou tried but failed to have adopted at the Fourth National People’s Congress earlier in the year. The implications of this "modernization" line became more apparent and this Tachai conference was a bellweather for what the Right had in mind for the economy.

It has been said that there was sharp struggle at this conference and Chiang Ching was reported to have branded Hua’s Report—and not without good reason—as revisionist. The Report barely mentioned the Cultural Revolution and approached the class struggle at the time it was delivered as basically a mopping up operation consisting of wiping out the few remaining saboteurs and swindlers, most of whom were outside the Party. It was the same theme that ran through the "General Program": great victories have been won and it’s time to get on with business—achieving the "four modernizations."

Hua’s speech quoted Mao’s statement that the country still practiced a commodity system and the eight-grade wage system but chopped off the conclusion that "if people like Lin Piao come to power, it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system. That is why we should do more reading of Marxist-Leninist works." In cutting this out, the essential thrust of Mao’s statement was lost. The question of restricting bourgeois right was given only passing reference and, in particular, narrowing the differences between production teams was not spoken to. Significantly, Hua’s report called for "rectification" at the county Party level—directing people’s attention away from the struggle at the highest levels. The issue at this conference was not the importance of farm mechanization just as it was not the importance of modernizing industry, science and technology, and defense. It was on what terms to approach development of the economy and whether revolution would be in the leading position. Hua’s speech left no doubt as to where he stood, and it became a key weapon in the Right’s arsenal.

That same month some members of the Tsinghua Revolutionary Committee wrote Mao complaining of the decline of the quality of education on account of the innovations of the Cultural Revolution, as

* Tachai was an agricultural brigade which Mao put forward as a national model in the mid-’60s because of its ability to overcome natural difficulties and calamities and achieve high yields through the political mobilization of the masses against the influence of revisionism and bourgeois ideology.
had Chou Jung-hsin earlier in July. Mao sent their written criticisms to the students and staff of the University and called for a big debate around the line on education. Mao knew this would set off major struggles and raise large questions as to who was behind all of this and what was going on. How people lined up on this crucial question of the educational revolution would make it clearer where they stood with respect to other matters of fundamental principle. Mao said in this connection, “The question involved in Tsinghua is not an isolated question but a reflection of the current two-line struggle.”

The dictatorship of the proletariat campaign had been slowed—more accurately, sabotaged—by the Right in the summer, and they in turn were attacking. The Water Margin criticism and the debate on the educational front were Mao’s response to the Right’s bolder initiatives. In particular, the “farrago” on the educational front, as it was called, sparked the struggle against the “right deviationist wind” in November.

The Four entered this struggle on the educational front in a big way and played a leading part in it. Chang Chun-chiao spoke at Tsinghua in defense of the principle of working class leadership in education, the continuing reform of the examination system and the importance of combining social practice and investigation with study. It was here that he evidently made the statement, “Bring up exploiters and intellectual aristocrats with bourgeois consciousness and culture, or bring up workers with consciousness but no culture; which do you want? I’d rather have workers without culture than exploiters and intellectual aristocrats with culture.” This statement is held up to attack by the current rulers in China as though Chang believed workers didn’t need culture. His point was they don’t need the elitist anti-working class culture whose restriction the Right bemoaned, and that political consciousness was the principal consideration in schools, laboratories, factories, everywhere.

Where Mao saw all this going and who was being targeted was made even clearer in a statement that he made toward the end of 1975 which appeared in the 1976 New Year’s Editorial. In response to Teng’s line of “taking the three directives as the key link,” Mao says, “Stability and unity do not mean writing off class struggle; class struggle is the key link and everything else hinges on it.” It was about this same time that Mao said, in direct reference to the Right’s attempts to wipe out the changes brought about through the Cultural Revolution, “reversing correct verdicts goes against the will of the people.” Along with these blasts at Teng and Company, Mao brought out two poems (see Text 25), whose themes that the masses want more than just plenty more to eat, that they want a whole new world, and that only by daring to scale
the heights can the world be transformed, were obvious retorts to Teng’s efforts to rally the masses around the most narrow concerns and interests and his hankering for the past. By this time the educational struggle had been spreading to other institutions and Mao was expanding the line struggle beyond education. The “‘General Program” and its line was coming under attack and its sponsors, notably Teng and, behind him, Chou, were being pressed.

On January 6th Chou died. The effect of this on the developing struggle was two-fold. The Left, which was beginning to retake the initiative and beginning to expose Teng more thoroughly, could begin to move decisively now that Chou himself could no longer protect Teng. On the other hand, the issue of succession was forced and the two camps would directly clash on this question. The developing movement against Teng was initiated by Mao, and it could only have been as a result of Mao’s intervention that Teng was passed over as Premier. Some wall posters have it that Mao acted in defiance of majority opinion and that Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien and Chu Teh were not seen for some time after the meeting, indicating their displeasure with the whole thing.

Be that as it may, Hua Kuo-feng was appointed acting Premier. This designation, and the fact that Hua, by himself, did not have any substantial power base, could only mean that this was an expedient measure dictated by the balance of forces. Mao and the Left, who wanted Chang Chun-chiao as Premier, could not prevail. But Teng, having been deflated by Mao already and coming under the gun of mass criticism, could not be pushed forward by the Right. Yet the Right was strong enough to insist on Hua. Though he was part of their camp, he was not the same rallying figure that Teng was and did not command the same personal following. For this reason—and only for this reason—he was “unanimously” appointed.

The situation was volatile and both sides would press their assault. Shortly after, the Left published an article in the Party press about unrepentant capitalist roaders. The Right would soon swing into action. Between the 29th of February and the 5th of April, the Right organized demonstrations in Peking culminating in a riot on the latter date. Military vehicles were overturned and burned, and people were assaulted as the Right massed thousands of people to pay tribute to Chou and his policies, as represented by Teng, and to attack the Left. This Tien An Men Square incident (Text 27) was a rather blatant attack on Mao himself as well as the Left in general. Signs declaring that “the time of Chin Shih Huang has gone already,” “down with the Empress Dowager,” and “long live the four modernizations” were posted and similar slogans chanted. It took the combined efforts of PLA units,
police and militia to put it down. Similar incidents occurred in other cities as well.

The Right was emboldened to act because it became necessary to disrupt the campaign against the right deviationist wind that was bound to develop into a major assault on its strongholds. And while this demonstration was put down, it did succeed in dramatically hoisting the banner of the Right and making it clear that it was not going to go down without a fight, that in fact it would wage more savage resistance. In short, it was a call to its followers and would-be followers to take heart—the struggle would continue.

The demonstration, therefore, did achieve its aim of making a statement to and actively mobilizing the Right’s social base. It was not intended as an actual bid for power. The incident also forced the Left to move immediately against Teng—who was a leading figure behind it. This, strange as it might seem, had the effect of blunting the campaign against him. He was ousted from his posts not as the culmination of a protracted campaign which had thoroughly exposed his line and revealed its revisionist roots through the course of intense ideological struggle and education. He was dealt with organizationally—summarily relieved of his posts—and at a time when the Left could not have someone from their camp appointed Premier.

Teng was dismissed. The Right had to go along with it since opposing this decision would have meant challenging Mao head on—something which, even as sick as Mao was, would not have been to their advantage at the time. On the other hand, they blocked Chang Chun-chiao from assuming the post of Premier and allowed Teng to keep his Party membership. Hua was appointed Premier and first Vice Chairman of the Party on the strength of the Right. Li Hsien-nien, a rightist who previously ranked above Hua in the Party and the State Council, might have been the Right’s first choice after Teng, but Hua was right with him. Hua’s appointment was part of the compromise made by the Left to get rid of Teng. To suggest that Hua was Mao’s choice misses the point that given the balance of forces he was the only choice. The Right got Hua and blocked Chang—going along with the removal of Teng was their end of the bargain. What this demonstrated was that the Right possessed considerable strength, with Mao being their main obstacle to moving decisively against the Left.

Mao’s thinking on the question of succession and the continuing fight against the Right (since as he would say “the capitalist roaders are still on the capitalist road”) was that the best hope for the Left lay in the deepening of the anti-Teng and anti-right deviationist wind campaign which was probably seen as going on not for months, but years. Through the popular mobilization, the Left could build up enough
strength to win over a majority of the Central Committee to unite with, or accept, appointments of the Left to the highest posts of the Party and state when Mao died. The possibility also existed that the Left wouldn’t marshal the forces to win it at that level, and this argued even more strongly for developing the political movement. As for the Right, what they had to do was quash the movement.

Hua had to put up a semblance of support for the anti-Teng and anti-right deviationist wind campaign since Mao had launched it. Putting Hua in the situation of having to support this movement was important to the Left insofar as his opportunism would be revealed more starkly in the likely event that he stuck to this rightism. This didn’t rule out the possibility that he could be won over as the struggle developed, but the Left was not counting nor relying on it. As for Mao’s supposed statements about Hua—his being at ease and so forth—these statements, if they are real, can only be understood in the context of this battle for succession in which the Right had the strength to impose its “compromise” candidate and the Left had the necessity of blocking the proven unrepentant and more powerful elements among the Right. It is important to remember that it was Chou who had brought Hua forward, and Hua’s reputation was hardly that of a warrior for the Cultural Revolution. His support for collectivization and the Great Leap Forward (in his characteristically bureaucratic style), and—after a while and after a fashion—the Cultural Revolution, meant that he was less tarnished and blemished than the die-hard elements and in this he was extremely useful to the Right.

**Criticize Teng**

Against this backdrop of the succession struggle, the Campaign to Criticize Teng Hsiao-ping and Beat Back the Right Deviationist Wind went into high gear. As noted, Mao had said, “Reversing correct verdicts goes against the will of the people” in early 1976 in connection with the struggle on the educational front and others. An all-out campaign was launched to criticize Teng’s revisionism on the educational, cultural, scientific and technological, industrial and transport, and foreign trade fronts, for his general capitulation to imperialism and for his policies wrecking socialist agriculture. These were highly important measures in which Teng’s views were subjected to thorough analysis and made issues for millions to take up. Articles by workers appeared summarizing the similarity of Teng’s management “reforms” and Soviet economic policy, including the widespread establishment of trusts. Philosophical articles on the relationship between practice and theory in scientific work—upholding the former as principal and
decisive—were publicized. Mass meetings were held to discuss these questions.

Mao also issued statements in the spring of 1976 on the emergence and nature of capitalist roaders in the Party. This represented an extension of his thinking that had developed through the Socialist Education Movement in 1964 when he had spoken of an antagonistic contradiction between the bureaucrat class and the working class and of the question of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road elaborated during the Cultural Revolution. Mao explained: "After the democratic revolution the workers and the poor and lower-middle peasants did not stand still, they want revolution. On the other hand, a number of Party members do not want to go forward; some have moved backward and opposed the revolution. Why? Because they have become high officials and want to protect the interests of the high officials."

Speaking of these same people he pointed out, "With the socialist revolution they themselves come under fire. At the time of the cooperative transformation of agriculture there were people in the Party who opposed it, and when it comes to criticizing bourgeois right, they resent it. You are making the socialist revolution, and yet don't know where the bourgeoisie is. It is right in the Communist Party—those in power taking the capitalist road. The capitalist-roaders are still on the capitalist road."

There were people, therefore, who joined the revolution at one stage but whose thinking and ideology didn't advance with its further development. This applied especially to those who had joined the Party during the stage of the democratic revolution. These were the "bourgeois democrats" who constituted a rather large layer of the Party (see Text 39). It wasn't that all these people were bad from the beginning or that some of them had not made important contributions to the revolution. It was just that many of them did not keep step with the revolution and the new tasks it presented. They had not revolutionized their thinking and got stuck, as it were, in the previous stage of the revolution when the issue was driving out the imperialists and overthrowing the domestic reactionaries, especially the feudal landlord class. In their eyes the revolution had already accomplished its aims—clearing the ground on which to build China into a powerful country. Many of them developed bureaucratic and self-serving airs, falling back on their past exploits as capital to preserve their positions and place themselves above criticism. Many of these veteran cadre threw up resistance to the further development of the revolution both because they could not grasp what remained to be done and had recognized that further changes might upset their privileged positions.

The privileges they sought to protect had their material basis in such
things as bourgeois right in distribution and the difference between manual and mental labor whose restriction was a major task of the revolution if it were to push forward. We must ask, who is it that resents criticizing bourgeois right (as Mao put it)? Who thinks that this is "ultra-leftism" and will only hinder the historic mission of modernization? The Four or people like Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping and Hua Kuo-feng? And why is this question such a dividing line? Because in the existence of bourgeois right lies the basis for capitalism to re-emerge and where one stands on this question—whether to restrict or expand bourgeois right—has all to do with whether one stands for or against the revolution.

Mao's formulation that the bourgeoisie was in the Party has been lambasted by the ruling revisionists (Appendix 7). Understandably so. Mao was talking about them and their development. As a result of the changes in the balance of class forces and the deepening of the revolution, the bourgeoisie's economic lifeblood is no longer private ownership of factories or interest payments, but the existence of bourgeois rights in the socialist economic base which if allowed to expand can in substance become capitalist ownership. For instance, if inequalities in distribution as between managers and production workers are not restricted, and as the former exempt themselves from participation in productive labor, then the higher salaries and bonus payments of these managers will increasingly take on the character of exploiting the labor of others even though private ownership does not exist formally. Politically, the bourgeoisie's strength resides not in separate organizations calling for the return of capitalism, but in factions and headquarters within the communist party, where they organize around a revisionist line.

The social position the capitalist roaders occupied—situated in the ruling structures of society—and the ideology they pushed, made them the core of the bourgeoisie and the commander of its social forces. Mao's line was an admonition to guard against the emergence of revisionism at the highest levels of the Party and to look there for the most dangerous source of restoration. It was a blow to those "condescending saviors" like Chou, Teng and Hua who would instruct the masses to stick to their posts, be diligent and obedient, and least of all worry about who's leading the Party and where they're leading it and the country as a whole.

It was the criticism of the "three poisonous weeds" (see especially Texts 30, 31, 32 and 35) and this concept of the bourgeoisie inside the Party (see Texts 39 and 40) that were the principal themes, ideologically and politically, of this campaign to criticize Teng and the right deviationist wind. This was a struggle to defend the new things and to
prepare people for a more serious trial of strength with the capitalist roaders. But the ante had been upped. In contrast to the previous campaigns—anti-Lin Piao/Confucius, the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combating and preventing revisionism, and the criticism of capitulationism as represented by the hero of the novel Water Margin—this new campaign was characterized by open, at times violent, battles with the forces of the Right on a major scale. The class struggle had developed such that by early 1976 there was all-out confrontation between the two headquarters within the Party. The economy would be affected as would the functioning of various other institutions. There were strikes in many parts of the country and sit-ins at government and Party offices, and the ministers of education and railways were toppled.

The campaign against the revisionist wind was obstructed from the beginning by the Right. Provincial authorities in many instances poured cold water on it. And contrary to the conventional wisdom dished up by the rulers in China today, it was the Right that had the most to gain from disruptions and disorder, from creating anarchy that would muddle the issues involved, take the heat off themselves and increase the masses’ desire for order which the Right would translate as “let’s put a stop to it all.” They would seize on any and everything to hinder the prosecution of this campaign and attack the Left—even earthquakes.

In fact, the earthquakes of late May provided them with a pretext to dump the campaign. After all, they would argue, how could politics take precedence over human suffering and life. The Left countered by insisting that anti-quake work be linked with the campaign (Text 42). It was a perfectly consistent Marxist position since man struggles with nature through the medium of society—class society in this epoch of history.

Apart from the Right’s political attempts to use the earthquake to crush the developing mass movement, there were, in fact, important political questions thrown up by the earthquake whose resolution would affect relief work. Should workers receive extra pay for overtime work performed to help the stricken areas? Should people be reimbursed for material used for the construction of shelters and to whom ought these shelters belong? The Right used the quake to spread fears of continuing disorder and played upon traditional superstitions to do so. The Left retorted through the press that earthquakes don’t dishearten revolutionaries; such disasters can actually steel and temper them. This was an extremely sharp struggle. The Right also used the earthquake to tighten their hold in the army, which was deployed widely in the relief work. And they seized upon the earthquake to build up the image of Hua as someone who, rather than being absorbed in “fruitless bicker-
ing," was ostensibly out there solicitous of people's needs, or so they would picture it as they took charge of the work.

Hua had decisively cast his lot in with the Right both because he (and others he was linked with) knew that if the struggle the Left was waging deepened they would eventually come under attack, and because the balance was being tipped in the Right's favor. The crucial issue that drew the lines by this time was simply which line and which group—the Four or the Right—would win out. This question concentrated the debates of the last few years—in particular, the issue of modernization or class struggle as the key link—that had now boiled over into open warfare. Differences and rivalries, of which there were undoubtedly many on the Right, paled beside the question of smashing the Four and the revolutionary line they represented. The struggle had been intensifying when Mao died on September 9th. The Right took that as their signal to move; Mao, after all, had been the protector of the Four. According to usually reliable sources, Mao did two things just before he died. He met with the Politburo and wrote a poem to Chiang Ching in which he castigated the Right for waiting for him to die so they could get on with their plots, explaining that Chiang Ching had been wronged and must carry the struggle forward. Moreover, he warned that both superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., must be fought.

The Coup

The key figures in the coup were obviously Yeh Chien-ying, Hua, Chen Hsi-lien and Wang Tung-hsing, with Teng playing a powerful behind-the-scenes role. Yeh had effectively been in control of the armed forces since 1971. He was closely allied with Chou and a bitter enemy of the Left. More than any other figure, he was most likely the architect of the coup. He enjoyed the loyalty of many military commanders and was best placed to move against the Left. Without Yeh's support, Hua was nowhere.

Chen Hsi-lien was the People's Liberation Army commander of the Peking region. Wang Tung-hsing commanded the elite unit 8341 which guarded the compound where high ranking Party leaders resided. It was Wang who would arrest the Four, and his alliance with Yeh and Chen Hsi-lien assured that Peking would be taken from within and without a major uprising. Pulling off the coup and preserving the appearance of continuity with Mao made it desirable for the Right to have Hua—though they would have gone ahead without him. It would seem that he was presented with a fait accompli by Yeh and other diehard forces of the Right and more than rose to the occasion. On October 6th the Four were placed under arrest. And so a temporary end was brought to the era of Mao and proletarian rule in China.
It is not the purpose here to make a thorough analysis of why the Left was defeated, but some tentative conclusions can be reached. The most obvious fact is that the Right was quite strong, more so than had been thought by many, given the victories of the Cultural Revolution. It was Mao who had said that more revolutions would be required, and it was Mao who in the final years of his life was warning of the very serious danger of capitalist restoration. The Right could stage the coup because they had the army leadership in the main in their camp. This included the central military hierarchy, many of whom had been disgraced during the Cultural Revolution, and leaders of some of the field armies who joined with the Chou forces in the anti-Lin Piao campaign. There were some regional commanders like Chen Hsi-lien who early in their careers were associated with Teng, but who later apparently supported Mao during the Cultural Revolution. At times, he also appeared to side with the Left in the most recent years. As the crunch came he went with who looked to be the winner.

But generally, the army was a stronghold of the Right. The Cultural Revolution had not penetrated deeply into the army. The Lin Piao affair gave the Right a further pretext to try to keep major political movements out of the army. The Right would seize upon certain particularities in conducting political movements in the army to deny their need altogether, and this reinforced tendencies toward professionalism that would inevitably rise within the army. Most of the changes that had taken place in the army in these years had to do with reducing the scope of its involvement in running things, but this was not the same thing as reducing revisionism within its ranks. Finally, the Right’s arguments that modernization was essential if the country were to survive a Soviet invasion found a sympathetic hearing in many quarters of the military where demands for advanced weaponry had been mounting and where some of the leading officers regarded Mao’s doctrine of people’s war as outdated and suicidal.

The Left recognized this problem and was able to get Chang Chunchiao appointed as head of the PLA General Political Department. But he was not able to make substantial inroads. In March 1975 he convened a forum among officers to discuss the dictatorship of the proletariat campaign, but it encountered tremendous resistance and interference. The Left launched some campaigns in the navy, but in all these campaigns the Left was not able to build up a substantial base of support in the military. The militia which had been reorganized and strengthened at the initiative of the Left following the 10th Party Congress was not intended as a substitute for the PLA, though the fact that the Shanghai militia put up resistance to the PLA after the October 6th coup says something about the revolutionary influences within it.

Beyond the immediate military dispositions, the Right had other ad-
vantages. First, they had strength at various levels of the state and Party apparatus during this entire period. While the Left could marshal the forces to have its line upheld at the Tenth Congress and launch its campaigns over the years, it was quite another thing to have these decisions implemented. The Right would resist and interfere with political campaigns and hack away at the gains of the Cultural Revolution through their entrenched positions. Mao did not have a free hand.

Second, the Right had Chou En-lai, who was a symbol of the continuity of the Chinese Revolution and, most importantly, of stability. He was a rallying point for many cadre, intellectuals, and those among the masses who were tiring of the struggles that had continued through the 1970's. The line he represented and promoted was that the economy was faltering, the new things weren't working, and the incessant struggles of the last few years were leading nowhere and only causing anarchy. Things were a mess and, especially in the face of the Soviet menace, a new course was called for; it was embodied in the "three poisonous weeds" and it is enshrined as official line in China today. Chou served the Right well. In the face of resistance and opposition, they could raise the specter of Chou being attacked to whip up emotional support for their policies.

The Right took full advantage of the real threat from the Soviets and actual difficulties of the economy to argue that time was running out for China to pull herself back together again. The class struggle was interfering with more important things, they would say, proceeding to "rectify" with a vengeance. As Mao points out, those who preach the dying out of class struggle invariably wind up attacking the revolutionary forces.

All in all, the Right was a powerful force to contend with, and Chou could even exploit his popular identification with Mao to disarm the opposition. The situation was made more difficult for the Left by the fact that many cadre who had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution would not respond to the calls to unite with the forward motion of the revolution. Those who had been rehabilitated without having changed were obviously just waiting to get back at their tormentors. But among the many honest forces there were those who worried that any mass movement would result in their getting knocked down again. During the "farrago" on the educational front, many professors who went along with the reforms of the Cultural Revolution showed themselves unwilling to stand up and defend them when these reforms were challenged.

Mao's role in the great struggles during the years 1973-76 boils down to this: he initiated the major political campaigns in this period and gave strong backing to forces of the Left whose leadership core was the Four. The anti-Lin Piao/Confucius campaign, the study of the theory
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combating and preventing revisionism campaign, the Water Margin campaign, and the campaign to criticize Teng and beat back the right deviationist wind—each of these targeted the Right as the main danger. Mao issued important instructions with regard to them and intervened at crucial moments assuring, for example, the publication of Yao’s and Chang’s pamphlets and the dismissal of Teng in 1976. Mao was none too unambiguous about Teng: “This person does not grasp class struggle; he has never referred to this key link. Still his theme of ‘white cat, black cat,’ making no distinction between imperialism and Marxism.” “He knows nothing of Marxism-Leninism; he represents the bourgeoisie. He said he would ‘never reverse the verdict.’ It can’t be counted on.”

Is there any indication that Chou, Teng or Hua played any kind of major role in supporting the anti-Confucius campaign, in studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or the Water Margin campaign? No, there is not, nor could there be, since these campaigns were taking aim at their lines. And how do the current rulers of China regard these campaigns? They are either ignored or vilified and must be since, again, they were directed at the very lines that are now palmed off as Marxism. And as for the struggle against Teng and the right deviationist wind, it is rather clear what role Teng played in this—and the same was true of Chou before he died.

The personal calumny and invective hurled at the Four speaks volumes to the bankruptcy of the current rulers in China. The method of attack was first to single out four communists who had been most closely associated with the Cultural Revolution and Mao, and to focus not on political line but fabricated horror stories: the Four were “usurpers” and ne’er-do-wells who had nothing better to do than lead decadent and dissolute lives and grab for power; Chang Chun-chiao was a KMT agent and Chiang Ching was a long-time renegade who lived the life of a prima donna (the suggestion that she was a prostitute lingered barely below the surface). A volley of groundless accusations was repeated so often and threateningly that it was expected, in the fashion of the big lie technique, that they would be believed as a matter of course.

“The ‘Gang of Four’ paid no attention to production.” Where is the evidence for this? Certainly not in Shanghai where major technical innovations were pioneered and new ground broken in establishing cooperative relations between enterprises. (See Text 10, 20 and 33.) This was a city, by the way, which supplied great numbers of skilled workers to other parts of the country. So, again, where is the proof? In some statement distorted or ripped out of context.

“The ‘Gang of Four’ didn’t want the trains to run on time.” It’s hard to say what’s more incredible—the charge, itself, which is so
patently ridiculous, or the fact that the revisionists ruling China really expect people to believe this nonsense. What did the Four do, get hold of train schedules and then radio engineers and conductors with instructions to pull in 15 minutes late? What's the point of this, that the Four didn't understand what Mussolini did, that the trains must run on time?

Even assuming the Four made the statement that they'd rather have late socialist trains than capitalist trains that run on time, it should be perfectly clear what and who this was directed at. It was the Right that was saying that the masses couldn't get the trains running on time and that only experts in charge and strict rules shackling the masses could. Typically, these revisionists, awash in eclecticism, erect some straw man like "one-sided opposition to profits" or "one-sided opposition to discipline" (perhaps "one-sided opposition to punctual trains" will be cited soon) and fire away so that these supposed deviations become the main problem—which clearly they were not—and so their revisionism then becomes a proper and acceptable corrective.

The accusations levelled at the Four barely conceal the true motives of those in power for whom modernization and "great order" are the supreme goals to which the working class can aspire. The Four, we are told, liquidated production and wouldn't allow people to speak their minds. Isn't it obvious that these charges are designed to justify liquidating revolution and suppressing those who dare to speak their minds and act against this counter-revolution? But more than this, the phrase "Gang of Four" is a code-word for Mao Tsetung, for the Four upheld and fought for his line and were at the forefront of the campaigns he initiated. It is of more than passing interest that while Mao was alive Teng could be brought down, while only after his death could the Four be overthrown—and Teng ride high, unencumbered by Mao's struggle against the Right. In short, the attacks on the "Gang of Four" are unbridled attacks on Mao and his line. Having made the Four the embodiment of all that is evil, the revisionists can now attack Mao's line by associating it with the Four—which, in fact, it was.

This struggle against the Right did not at the beginning and for the most part assume the form of great upheavals and rebellions that characterized the early years of the Cultural Revolution. One of the most striking characteristics of these campaigns was their largely educational orientation, i.e., study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, criticize Confucius, etc. This was dictated both by international and domestic circumstances. The war danger had grown considerably since the early years of the Cultural Revolution when the U.S. was bogged down in Vietnam and the Soviets were just beginning to contend on a world scale with the U.S. as a superpower. The situation in the mid-1970s required that the struggle be waged in a somewhat dif-
It was also because of the situation in China itself that the struggle took on this largely educational character; time was needed to prepare the masses ideologically so that when the struggle came to a head they would be in the strongest possible position. This was related as well to the truth that mass movements cannot be sustained indefinitely at the same level of intensity. There was some uneasiness among the masses with Lin jumping out in 1971 and other rightists creating a lot of confusion. And then there was Chou. He would not be easy to get at. Wasn’t it true that it took many years and different forms of struggle to build up a mass movement that could thoroughly expose and dislodge Liu Shao-chi? It didn’t just start in 1966-67.

For Mao what was principal, always, was line—not summarily purging, but developing movement through which the masses could grasp the questions involved, unleash their strength and enthusiasm, and heighten their awareness of right and wrong. This was also the most fertile ground on which to win over many who held incorrect lines. Furthermore, from a tactical point of view, it is not always to the advantage of the revolutionaries to precipitate a decisive showdown with the forces of the Right when the two camps have not yet been fully formed and consolidated. So Mao saw unfolding a political movement which was mainly educational as creating the most favorable conditions for the revolutionary forces to take on powerful internal enemies.

Mao’s instruction in late 1974 on the desirability of stability and unity was a reflection of this necessity to proceed in this fashion. This did not preclude major struggles in individual units and the overthrow of particular officials; nor, it goes without saying, did it (or could it) mean that the Right would not go for broke at any given point. And it emphatically did not mean, as Mao made clear in his denunciation of Teng, putting unity and stability on a par with class struggle. Nevertheless, the best chance for winning lay in developing the movement in this form.

The struggle against Teng and the right deviationist wind marked a transition to a more open and all-out contest with the Right, though it still did not assume the same form as the 1966-68 period. The Four continued to focus on the critical line questions after Teng went down, and they stepped up efforts to draw broader ranks of the masses into the movement. But the Right had gained the upper hand when Mao died and was able to put a stop to it, though not without resistance.

The People’s Liberation Army had to be called in to Shanghai and Peking and other areas as well. In the key railway juncture, Paoting, just south of Peking, it was reported that thousands of troops sided with the rebels, and even the current rulers acknowledge that it wasn’t until March of 1977 that the opposition was subdued. Provincial radio
broadcasts monitored abroad between November 1976 and June 1977 reveal frequent incidents of attacks on Party offices and military installations and acts of armed resistance. In some areas traffic on the railways was not resumed until March of 1977, and strikes had been reported in several large plants in different parts of the country. In Wuhan there were reports of massive absenteeism in protest against the imposition of pre-1966 rules and regulations. And, recently, reports have filtered out of struggles in the universities. Yet it must be acknowledged that the Right is firmly in command at this point.

About one quarter of the Central Committee (including alternates) was purged in the wake of the coup. Some 51 of these people were mass leaders from the working class. Six ministers associated with the Four were removed from the State Council and 13 out of the 29 Party leaders of the administrative units (provinces, autonomous regions, etc.) were ousted. The most sweeping changes occurred in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee and the central information media, which from the early days of the Cultural Revolution had been a bastion of the Left with Mao’s active support. Fourteen of the leading officials now occupying key posts in the reconstituted media apparatus had been overthrown during the Cultural Revolution. But it was at the most basic levels that the repression was directed, since this is where the revolutionary forces had their greatest strength.

By March 1977 reports of executions were first made on wall posters, and a year after the coup a joint editorial in People’s Daily, Red Flag and the PLA newspaper called for “greater efforts in criticizing the ‘Gang of Four’” and for the “complete destruction of its bourgeois factional network,” which is not only an indication of continuing resistance but also of the wave of terror being carried out on the grass roots level (as well as factional fighting within the Right itself). The new state Constitution adopted in early 1978 calls for a major reorganization of the militia and for the dismantling of the revolutionary committees on the basic levels, which were mass structures in individual units. These measures, the enforcement of a new legal code, and the reappearance of what amounts to prosecutors’ offices point to what the current leaders have in store for any opposition. As for those Party members who still may have qualms about this coup, the new Party Constitution adopted in August 1977 has conveniently omitted the article calling for active ideological struggle that was a fruit of the Cultural Revolution and incorporated into the 9th and 10th Party Constitutions.

What congealed the various forces of the Right into a bloc was their shared hatred for the Cultural Revolution and their common cause in putting down the Four who stood for it and with Mao. Now that this has been accomplished this bloc will undergo division and realignment.
There may be major struggles over how quickly to undo the transformations of the Cultural Revolution, though the pace has been frankly astonishing. Those like Hua may want to preserve some veneer of these new things, since his legitimacy rests to some degree on his identification with Mao, whereas Teng is impelled to remove even the pretense of upholding Mao's line. But there is no real choice here. To put it bluntly, the "three poisonous weeds" and the socialist new things cannot be reconciled. They embody different world outlooks and different class interests. Production cannot be organized, for instance, around the principle, "if it works, then it must be all right," and at the same time continue to develop the initiative of workers and establish more advanced socialist relations since these things cut against the grain of convention and the force of habit. The socialist new things were not some sort of adornment—they were concrete expressions of the all-round dictatorship of the proletariat, of the revolutionary transformation of all aspects of society.

Mao's policies must now be dropped and attacked for the simple reason that they reflect and serve the mobilization of the masses to advance towards the elimination of classes and all differences that can give rise to class division. The consolidation of revisionist rule requires that the masses be ideologically disarmed and politically deactivated, and this is precisely what is happening in China today. There will, necessarily, be sharp struggle over the spoils of the coup—the distribution of posts, who moves aside for whom. There is an inevitable conflict between the old cadre trying to get back what was taken from them and newer cadre trying to advance their careers. This revanchism and careerism and the struggle for survival among all of them will make for intense infighting. This is not the product of human nature. It is the inevitable consequence of the replacement of a proletarian line by a bourgeois line and with it the return to the laws of the jungle.

With respect to Hua, one of his biographers has cited a statement by Marx that certain historical moments turn the most mediocre of men into heroes. Actually a man of enormous mediocrity has emerged as one of history's most despicable scoundrels and traitors. As for the Chinese people, they are faced with a very difficult situation. But the experiences and lessons of the struggle to push forward against all enemies and odds towards a future which is inevitable for all mankind will not be lost. Mao has left a rich legacy and as he himself predicted in 1966, "If the Rightists stage an anti-Communist coup d'état in China, I am sure they will know no peace either and their rule will most probably be short-lived, because it will not be tolerated by the revolutionaries who represent the interests of the people making up more than 90% of the population."