APPENDIX 5

THE BITTER FRUIT OF MAOISM
—“Cultural Revolution” and Peking’s Policy
(Excerpts)

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The April Events at the Tien An Men Square

Judging by the fact that the Chinese mass media have stepped up their attacks on those whose views are not to the liking of the Maoists, dissatisfaction with Mao’s policies and the harsh regime in the country is mounting among various sections of the population. According to routine accepted by the Maoist propaganda, the manifestations of discontent are ascribed to a “handful of class enemies.” In fact, however, they mirror the mood of broad sections of the people.

Ever more Chinese working people and officials get convinced from their own experience that economic “leaps” and political campaigns of “purges” cannot bring solution to the task, put forward by the January (1975) Session of the National People’s Congress, of converting China into a “powerful modern socialist state” by the end of the 20th century. This is because Maoism and socialism are incompatible.

One question which constantly evokes sharp differences in the upper crust and among broad sections of the Chinese society is the attitude toward the “cultural revolution.” It is here, as the Maoists have to admit, that the “watershed between revolution and counter-revolution” runs. Peking’s official propaganda laments with irritation that “there still exist people who are hostile to the cultural revolution and who are trying in every way to deny its great results.”

A fresh exacerbation of the people’s discontent with many aspects of Maoist policy and the accompanying fight within the Chinese ruling clique began in the summer of 1975. According to the Chinese press, it was in July, August and September last year that the “Right-wing deviationist whirlwind of revising the correct conclusions made by the cultural revolution” was started.

The Chinese press noted that the people who had fanned the “whirlwind” came out against Mao Tse-tung’s instructions to intensify the class struggle, denied the need to carry out the “cultural revolution” and the importance of the “new phenomena” it had

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engendered. When assessing the home situation, they “said that today it is worse than it was yesterday” and “headed the spear” against Mao Tse-tung and his line.

In response, last autumn, according to Mao’s directives and under his personal guidance, a campaign was launched against “capitulationists,” i.e., the attempts to depart from the methods of the “cultural revolution” and return to socialist principles of construction. The campaign started with the Maoists taking action in the higher educational institutions against the “revisionist” appeals to return to the socialist methods of education which existed prior to the “cultural revolution.” Such appeals were condemned by Maoist propaganda as “ridiculous and monstrous reasoning.” Soon, however, the struggle between the supporters and opponents of the “cultural revolution” involved practically all spheres of China’s social, political and economic life and culminated in the tragic events in Peking and other cities in April 1976.

As is known, on April 4-6, 1976, the working people of Peking, making use of the official permission to mark the Day of Remembrance and lay wreaths to the Monument of the Heroes of Revolution at Tien An Men (Peking’s main square), staged a large-scale demonstration in the centre of the city. This demonstration turned into the spontaneous expression of popular protest against the Maoist regime, and the overt popular dissatisfaction with the endless political campaigns launched by Mao Tse-tung’s group all over the country. Jenmin Jihpao was forced to admit that the leaflets and verses, circulated in the city, stated that the “Chin Shih-huang epoch has fallen into oblivion” (Chin Shih-huang was a Chinese emperor, whose cruelty Mao Tse-tung liked to set as an example), and that “China is no longer what she was yesterday and the people are not as brainwashed as they were formerly.”

At the same time, the Chinese people displayed their support for the line toward stability and order in the country, the consistent economic development and higher living standards for the working people, thereby opposing the anti-popular vicious policy of Mao Tse-tung. That is why the April developments in Peking and some other cities and provinces profoundly alarmed the “Left wingers” of the Peking elite—the principal sponsors of the “cultural revolution”—and were regarded by Mao Tse-tung and his associates as a hostile act menacing the Maoist regime.

The people’s demonstrations on Peking’s main square, which involved 100,000 men and women, assumed such a serious character that they were discussed at a special sitting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and were labelled there as a “counter-revolutionary political incident.” The actions of the working people were ruthlessly suppressed by the security bodies, by minping and armed forces.
Dozens of people were killed and wounded, hundreds of demonstrators were imprisoned and subjected to persecution. The suppression of the demonstrations at the Tien An Men square were portrayed by the Maoists as a “struggle against the counter-revolutionary violence by applying revolutionary violence.” Peking propaganda issued appeals to “defend” Mao Tse-tung (apparently, from the Chinese people) and threatened the population that “if necessary, revolutionary violence will again be used, and freedom of speech will be curtailed.” The subsequent political campaign caused a new purge of the Party and state machinery both in the centre and the provinces, with the people “rehabilitated” in recent years being persecuted in the first place.

What were the charges against the people labelled as the “elements of the new and old bourgeoisie” and the “outraging cutthroats”? The charges were that back in July 1975, some of these people “established broad contacts with each other and secretly prepared a letter to the Party Central Committee demanding that Teng Hsiao-ping be appointed Premier,” while others stuck up “reactionary slogans and verses” and made “reactionary speeches,” appealing for a struggle against the “anti-Marxist class enemies.” Summing up the charges against Mao’s opponents, Jenmin Jihpao wrote that they all “firstly, expressed discontent with the great cultural revolution and, secondly, demanded its reappraisal.” They also sought to “split the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, striking a blow against the great leader, Chairman Mao, and his revolutionary line.”

The scale of this campaign of repression looked too impressive for the object against which it was spearheaded. If one is to believe the Maoist press, then “on such fronts as education, science and technology an extremely small group consisting of several persons emerged and launched a Right-deviationist whirlwind of revising the correct conclusions.” Why then should a “handful of class enemies,” a “small group” of people, look so dangerous for Mao Tse-tung and his entourage and for the entire enormous machinery of violence and suppression created by them? It seems that this is not a matter of personalities (like Lin Piao or Teng Hsiao-ping) to whom all sins are now attributed, from failures in home and foreign policy to the attacks against the “cultural revolution” and against Mao Tse-tung personally. The nature of the charges against these people reflects the aspects of China’s social and economic life which caused massive discontent in Chinese society. The recent large-scale campaigns testify to the nationwide resistance to the Maoist line and prove that it is not a “handful of persons” but the people as a whole who are coming out against Mao’s drive to exacerbate the “class struggle,” and who are condemning the “cultural revolution” and the “new phenomena” it has engendered.
The Maoists, who flout legality and the principles of democratic centralism, see a threat even in the demands that, as production and technology develop, "the rules and regulations should be more rigorous and should be more strictly observed." Allegedly opposing the "procedures of controlling, curbing and curtailing, which constitute the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie over the workers and working people," the Maoists actually ignore both Party and state discipline.

Here are some examples. China’s vital issues are being solved either by Mao Tse-tung personally or together with a small group of his entourage. Even the basic provisions of the 1975 Maoist Constitution are being violated: the appointment of the new Premier was done bypassing the constitutional procedure which provides for the candidate’s approval at a session of the National People’s Congress at the proposal of a Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC. No information is available about the routine activities of the National People’s Congress or local people’s congresses as envisaged in the Constitution.

Peking propaganda continues to emphasise the "need and importance of limiting the bourgeois right." Under this pretext, however, the Maoists are seeking to take concrete moves at freezing or even lowering the people’s living standards. In practice, the most zealous advocates of this Maoist tenet try to abolish the 8-rate wage system in industry and cut the earnings of the relatively well-paid skilled workers with a long term of service to the level of the low-paid workers. The Maoists have not given up their intentions to eliminate the peasants’ individual plots, reduce domestic crafts as a source of additional income for the rural population, and limit free-market trade.

Insisting on the earliest possible liquidation of the vestiges of the "bourgeois right," the Maoists intend, through exploiting socialist slogans, to get the most out of the workers and peasants (in particular, through unpaid labour). They are in no way guided by the desire to satisfy the working people’s material and cultural requirements to the maximum. All this is naturally bound to cause discontent among the working class and peasantry.

Growing Discontent

According to the Chinese press, various strata of Chinese society are levelling especially sharp criticism against Maoists’ methods of political persecution of their opponents, anti-scientific, voluntarist methods of economic management, an erroneous policy in the sphere of training and distributing cadres, and the negative, destructive activity in education, culture, science and technology.

Maoist propaganda fiercely attacks those who believe that the "sole
task at present, for the coming 25 years and the whole historical period of socialism is production and construction.’’ Hung Chi states that this is ‘‘neither the main nor the sole task of our Party. The basic Party line set forth by Mao Tse-tung boils down to an intense class struggle during the whole historical period of socialism.’’ According to Mao Tse-tung, ‘‘in China, in our Party it is apparently necessary to continue this struggle for at least another 20 years or, perhaps, even 50 years. In the final analysis, the struggle may cease when classes are completely destroyed.’’

Theoretically, such statements are unscientific and constitute flagrant distortion of the Marxist-Leninist tenets on the building of socialism, on classes and class struggle. Practically, they doom the Chinese people to permanent and senseless political upheavals.

According to the Maoist press, it is widely held in China that since the ‘‘cultural revolution’’ ‘‘it has become a tradition to talk about politics and not economics, about revolution and not production.’’ Those who raise the question of improving production and economic construction are labelled as ‘‘revisionists’’ and adherents of the ‘‘theory of productive forces.’’ Endeavouring to refute this opinion, the Maoists assert that an ‘‘immense number of facts’’ show that the ‘‘cultural revolution’’ is a powerful impetus for developing China’s productive forces.’’ But it proved impossible to cite such facts. Contentions that the ‘‘massive criticism of the revisionist line and the theory of the productive forces gave a powerful impetus to rapid progress in the socialist production and yielded copious fruit’’ have similarly proved groundless.

Reality shows the reverse to be the case. As a rule, the Maoist political campaigns result in disorganisation of production, decline of labour discipline and, in the long run, unfulfilled plans and recessions in China’s industrial development. According to the Chinese press, in the first two weeks after Teng Hsiao-ping had been dismissed from all his posts, following a directive from above, 55,000 tatzupao were written and 5,800 ‘‘meetings of criticism’’ were held at the Anshan Steel Company alone. Similar developments were registered at other factories as well. Obviously, if nearly 400 meetings were daily held at a single enterprise this is bound to disrupt production.

Chinese propaganda roundly condemns those who state that the revolution in education results in a ‘‘denial of knowledge’’ and a ‘‘denial of education.’’ It also attacks people who dare say that ‘‘quality of education is low,’’ ‘‘research is lagging behind’’ and that ‘‘the genuine battle is the struggle for steel, and steel is a hard nut to crack.’’

Pointing to the inadmissibly low level of knowledge among students studying according to the ‘‘open doors’’ principle, China’s workers in
education demand higher educational level of future specialists. Profound discontent with Maoist policies has even been expressed among the scientific and technical intelligentsia who are dissatisfied with the arrogant attitude of the Maoist leadership to the development of science and education. Here are some statements demonstrating their critical attitude toward the \textit{“cultural revolution”}: \textit{“the successes are, as a matter of fact, rather insignificant,” “due to the cultural revolution science and technology are a blank,”} and so on. Scientists in the PRC complain that the uneducated \textit{“propagandists of the thought of Mao Tse-tung,”} who are being sent to research institutes, simply impede the work. At the same time, demands are being made to send the specialists who were banished to the rural areas back to the research centres. Also criticised is the Maoist system of enrollment to the so-called \textit{“July 21 universities”} and \textit{“May 7 schools”} (the dates of Mao’s respective \textit{“supreme injunctions”}) of untrained young people, often lacking secondary education, who are among the \textit{“best followers of the cultural revolution.”} As a result, these \textit{“universities”} \textit{“are unable to give any knowledge, and their diplomas mean nothing.”} \footnote{\textit{Hung Chi}, No. 5, 1976.} The discontent with the present state of scientific and technical development in China and her obvious backwardness compared with other countries is clearly seen from the following statements made by instructors at Peking higher educational institutions: \textit{“Today our science and technology are in the grip of a crisis...They are marking time...they are paralysed and chaotic.”} \footnote{\textit{Hung Chi}, No. 5, 1976.}

The incessant criticism of Maoist tenets and the appeals to return to the socialist construction, as before the \textit{“cultural revolution,”} show the unsoundness of Peking’s present home policies and the Maoist leaders’ inability to ensure conditions for China’s economic, scientific, technical and cultural development at a high level.

\footnote{\textit{Jenmin Jihpao}, March 10, 1976.}{\textit{Jenmin Jihpao}, Feb. 14, 1976.}
\footnote{\textit{Hung Chi}, No. 5, 1976.}{\textit{Ibid.}, Feb. 14, 1976.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}{\textit{Ibid.}, Feb. 8, 1976.}
\footnote{\textit{Hung Chi}, No. 5, 1976.}{\textit{Hung Chi}, No. 5, 1976.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, Feb. 6, 1976.}{\textit{Hung Chi}, No. 5, 1976.}
\footnote{\textit{Kwangming Jihpao}, Feb. 11, 1976.}{\textit{Hung Chi}, No. 5, 1976.}
\footnote{\textit{Jenmin Jihpao}, April 20, 1976.}