What kind of State is the People's Republic of China? What are the positions and relationships of the various classes and of the various sections of national economy? What is the future of such a State? To these questions, Mao Tse-tung's article On People's Democratic Dictatorship gives full and satisfactory answers.

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THIRTY YEARS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
AN OUTLINE HISTORY

by

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I THE FOUNDATION OF THE PARTY AND THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III THE WAR OF RESISTANCE TO JAPANESE AGGRESSION</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE THIRTY YEARS</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

The Communist Party of China, which was founded on July 1, 1921, is now thirty years old. Its thirty years' history is the history of how Marxism-Leninism has attained a great victory in a vast country with almost a quarter of the world's population, in a country which was semi-feudal and semi-colonial in character. It is the history of how the Chinese working class has led the broad masses of the peasants and other democratic forces in waging heroic struggles against the imperialists and their lackeys, in finally overthrowing their reactionary régime after going through a long period of difficulties and traversing a circuitous course, and in founding a People's Democratic Republic led by the working class and based on an alliance of the workers and peasants, thereby opening a broad road for the future transition to Socialism.

The history of the thirty years' struggle of the Communist Party of China may be related in four parts:

1. the foundation of the Party and the First Revolutionary Civil War, 1921-1927,
2. the Second Revolutionary Civil War, 1927-36,
3. the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, 1937-1945,
4. the Third Revolutionary Civil War, the foundation of the People's Republic of China, and the Period of Economic Recovery, 1945—

The following is a brief outline of the history of these thirty years.
Chapter One

THE FOUNDATION OF THE PARTY
AND THE
FIRST REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR

The Communist Party of China is the product of the synthesis of the Chinese working-class movement with Marxism-Leninism. It is no accident that the Party was founded in 1921. This took place following the First World War, the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, and the patriotic May Fourth Movement of the Chinese people, which began on May 4, 1919, against the imperialist Treaty of Versailles and, in general, against imperialism and feudalism.

During the First World War, China's feeble industries made relatively rapid strides, and correspondingly the Chinese working class increased numerically and the scale of its struggles developed. After the victory of the October Revolution in Russia, the influence of Marxism-Leninism permeated China's revolutionary intellectual circles. The May Fourth Movement brought about the synthesis of the Chinese working-class movement with Marxism-Leninism and laid the basis for the foundation of the Party. A year after the May Fourth Movement, Communist groups had been formed in such major cities as Shanghai, Peking, Hankow, Changsha, Canton, Tsinan, Hangchow and others.

The process of the growth of the Chinese working class coincided with the process of the reduction of China to a semicolonial status resulting from imperialist aggression and of the struggle of the Chinese people against the foreign aggressors and their lackeys—the Chinese feudal rulers.

In 1840, Britain's armed forces invaded China, began the Opium War, and compelled China to sign the first of the unequal treaties—the Treaty of Nanking. This was followed by the Anglo-French War against China of 1857, the Sino-French War of 1884, the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the Eight-Power War against China of 1900, and the Japanese seizure of China’s Shantung Peninsula in 1914. By means of these wars and other methods the foreign aggressors grabbed China’s territory, extorted “indemnities” from China, obtained the privileges of stationing troops on Chinese soil and of opening banks, commercial houses and factories in China, controlled China’s trading ports, communication lines and customs administrations, and carved out “spheres of influence” by means of which they manipulated China’s internal affairs and reduced China, politically and economically, to a semi-colonial status. Imperialist aggression threatened the very existence of the Chinese people and made China’s economic development and political advance impossible. Thus, to fight against imperialism and to overthrow imperialist rule in China became a most fundamental task of the Chinese revolution.

The penetration of foreign capitalism had the effect of breaking down China’s feudal economy and stimulating the development of Chinese capitalism. China’s modern industries began to emerge in the sixties of the last century, but these national industries developed feebly over several decades owing to their two-fold oppression by imperialism and feudalism. China’s reactionary rulers instituted a reign of brutality over the various strata of the labouring people. The landlord class owned the greater part of the agricultural land, took the bulk of the peasants’ income and enjoyed various privileges over them in addition to their economic privileges. Usurers, merchants, compradors, feudal bureaucrats and landlords jointly plundered the peasants and handicraftsmen. Of the industries, part belonged to the imperialists, part to the Chinese bureaucrats, and the part belonging to the Chinese capitalists was subjected to pressure and to being squeezed by the other two.

The feudal-bureaucratic government had long relied on imperialist support and assistance in suppressing the revolutionary movement of the Chinese people. After the defeat in the war of 1900, it completely surrendered to imperialism. This situation continued without any basic change under the successive warlord governments of the so-called “Republic of China” established in 1912. The change that occurred after 1912 was that China’s superficial unity became an open split. Backed by their respective imperialist masters, the warlords continuously fought among themselves. Both before and after 1912 the various factions of feudal rulers refused to carry out any real social reforms. Thus to fight against feudalism and to overthrow its rule in China became another most fundamental task of the Chinese revolution.

In the circumstances described above, the fundamental demands of the Chinese people were the overthrow of the oppression of imperialism and feudalism and the realisation of the country’s independence, democracy and freedom.

Correct leadership was needed to realise these vital demands. From the time of the Opium War to the eve of the May Fourth Movement, the Chinese people had waged many struggles against imperialism and feudalism. The most significant of these struggles were the Peasants’ Revolutionary War of 1851–1864, which broke out ten years after the Opium War and gave birth to the “Taiping Kingdom”, and the bourgeois revolution of 1911 which took place ten years before the Communist Party of China was founded. However, all these struggles and revolutions had failed. Being weak itself, the Chinese bourgeoisie feared imperialism and feudalism as well as the workers and peasants; far from being able to settle the question of fighting against imperialism and feudalism, it dared not even raise this question. The peasants were extremely numerous and they possessed the determination to oppose imperialism and feudalism, but because of the limitations of their obsolete and backward methods of production, they did not see the future of the struggle and were therefore incapable of undertaking the task of leading the revolution to victory.

A new class was needed to assume the responsibility of leadership. Such a class had to be capable of putting forward a correct and complete programme for the struggle, had to be capable of uniting all forces that could be united, both at home and abroad, to carry on a consistent and stubborn struggle against the powerful enemy. The working class was such a class. Although the Chinese working class was small in number (about three million), it differed from the peasantry in that it represented the new productive forces; it differed from the bourgeoisie in that it was the
victim of the three-fold oppression of imperialism, feudalism and capitalism, and possessed a resolute will to fight.

The Chinese working class first demonstrated its strength in the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and began to accept the influence of Marxism-Leninism. The workers in Shanghai, Tangshan and Changhai called a political strike, for the first time in Chinese history, as their part in the nation-wide anti-imperialist struggle of the people, thus helping to bring the struggle to a speedy victory. The growth of the strength of the Chinese working class served as an impetus to the left wing of China’s intellectuals in the May Fourth Movement and helped them to make up their mind to carry on revolutionary work among the workers. In the field of culture the May Fourth Movement raised the slogan of fighting for democracy and science, but under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia, the left wing of this movement—revolutionary intellectuals who had acquired a rudimentary idea of Communism—began to disseminate the viewpoint that China must realise Socialism and that it was essential to use Marxism-Leninism to guide the Chinese revolution. They held this viewpoint and carried on propaganda and organisational work among the workers. In this way, the Chinese working-class movement and the Chinese revolutionary movement entered a new stage.

In his book New Democracy, Comrade Mao Tse-tung considers the year 1919 as the turning point at which the Chinese democratic revolution was transformed from a democratic revolution of the old type into a democratic revolution of the new type. This was because from that date the democratic revolution in China had become a revolution led by the Chinese working class and constituted a part of the world proletarian socialist revolution. In this historic treatise, Comrade Mao Tse-tung particularly elaborated the Leninist-Stalinist theory that, following the First World War and the October Revolution in Russia, the national question had become part of the world proletarian socialist revolution, and he also stressed that the revolutionary movement of 1919 in China was an event that “occurred in response to the call of the world revolution, to the call of the Russian Revolution, and to the call of Lenin”.

It must especially be remembered in this regard that as early as 1900, and particularly in 1912 and 1913, Lenin himself had already paid great attention to and written important articles on the Chinese question. During the period 1918-20, the most critical years following the October Revolution, Lenin and Stalin on many occasions gave the most profound guidance concerning the national problem in the East. It was precisely this guidance which formed the principal starting-point of Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s New Democracy. At the Second Congress of the Communist International held in July 1920, Lenin made a special report and put forward a programme on the national and colonial question. These classic documents written by Lenin charted the fundamental revolutionary course for the oppressed nations and for the people of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, laid down the basic policy that the Communists should adopt in the national-revolutionary movements, and in so doing immensely helped the Chinese revolution.

On July 1, 1921, twelve delegates elected by the Communist groups that had developed in various centres after the May Fourth Movement, held the First Party Congress in Shanghai, a centre of China’s industries and working-class movement. These delegates included Mao Tse-tung, Tung Pi-wu, Chen Tan-chiu, Ho Shu-heng and others, representing about fifty Communists. The First Party Congress adopted the first Constitution of the Communist Party of China, elected the central organs of the Party and founded the Communist Party of China. From that time, there appeared in China an entirely new and united political party, a party of the working class, with Communism as its aim and with Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action. A representative of the Communist International was present at this Congress.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung was the delegate of the Party organisations in Hunan Province, where, prior to the May Fourth Movement, he had formed revolutionary organisations. In 1920 he had organised a group to study Marxism and in the same year formed the Socialist Youth League. After the First Party Congress, he returned to Hunan to take up the post
of Party Secretary for that province. His work enabled Hunan to become one of the most advanced provinces in the working-class movement and peasant movement during the First Revolutionary Civil War.

The First Party Congress elected Chen Tu-hsiu to lead the central organs of the Party. However, Chen Tu-hsiu was not a good Marxist. Before and during the May Fourth Movement he was well-known as a democrat of the most radical type. After Marxism came to China, he became a highly influential socialist propagandist and a sponsor of the Communist Party.

The Second Party Congress was held at West Lake (Hsihu), Hangchow, in May 1922. This Congress formulated a Party Manifesto in which it laid down the programme of the Party, criticised the various bourgeois reformist ideologies which were current, and defined the basic tasks of the Chinese people as follows:

"... to eliminate civil strife, overthrow the warlords and establish internal peace; to overthrow the oppression of international imperialism and achieve the complete independence of the Chinese nation; to unify the whole of China into a genuine democratic republic."

Thus, for the first time in Chinese history, the Party put before the Chinese people a slogan of genuine revolutionary democracy.

The shortcomings of the Manifesto were that it did not point out that the democratic revolution must be led by the proletariat, that it did not set forth the demand of the workers and peasants for political power or the demand of the peasants for land, and that it only called upon the workers and peasants to take part in the democratic revolution and to fight merely for their own rights. Later, during the Party leadership of the revolutionary work in the period 1924-27, these shortcomings were developed by the opportunist group of Chen Tu-hsiu into a serious error in the general political line.

The Second Party Congress also resolved that the Party join the Communist International.

In the two years following its foundation, the Party concentrated its efforts on leading the working-class movement. It established the legal Chinese Trade Union Secretariat to lead the working-class movement throughout the country, and it also convened the First All-China Labour Congress in May, 1922, in Canton. As a result of the effective work of the Party, the tide of the workers' struggle rose all over the country from January 1922 to February 1923. More than 300,000 workers took part in over a hundred strikes in the major cities and industrial centres throughout the country. These strikes were all carried out under the leadership of Communist Party members and the majority of them were completely successful. Communist-led trade unions were formed by the workers after these victories. The swift development of the working-class movement and the workers' organisations rapidly and clearly demonstrated the important role of the working class in China's political and economic life.

In February 1923, however, the reactionary ruling class dealt serious blows to this first upsurge of the Chinese working-class movement. Wu Pei-fu, the leading warlord who controlled the provinces of Hopei, Honan and Hupeh at the time, used force to suppress the inaugural meeting of the General Trade Union of the Peking-Hankow railway workers. When the workers on this and other lines struck in protest, Wu Pei-fu called out his troops and on February 7 massacred the railway workers at Hankow and Changhsintien. In this incident, known as the "February Seventh Massacre", some forty workers were killed and several hundreds injured.

The heroic struggle of the Chinese railway workers showed the rapid development of the organised strength and revolutionary initiative of the working class, and greatly enhanced the political prestige of the working class and of the Communist Party of China among the whole Chinese people. At the same time, it proved that without strong allies and without its own armed forces the working class could not defeat the fully armed reactionaries in circumstances where no democratic rights whatever existed. The new-born struggles of the workers ebbed temporarily as a result of the overwhelming pressure of the reactionary government. Facts taught the Party and the working class that in order to achieve victory in the Chinese revolution
it was necessary to form an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal alliance with the peasants, who constituted 80 per cent of the country's population, with the scores of millions of urban petty bourgeoisie, and with those democratic elements of the bourgeoisie who stood for fighting against imperialism and feudalism, and to oppose armed counter-revolution by armed revolution.

The Party then took positive steps to unite with the Kuomin-tang (KMT), led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, by which means it was hoped that the alliance of the working class and other democratic forces could be brought about. The Revolutionary League (Tungmenhui), predecessor of the KMT, was the chief organiser of the Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Manchu government. Politically, the Revolutionary League was a loose alliance of groups ranging from the radical elements of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie and the liberal elements of the bourgeoisie to the anti-Manchu elements of the landlord class.

After the Revolution of 1911 was betrayed, most groups of this alliance surrendered to imperialism and the reactionaries. The group headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, however, persisted in carrying on the bourgeois-democratic struggle and continued to suffer reverses. Dr. Sun Yat-sen had relied on the warlords in Kwangtung to conduct activities against the reactionary government in Peking, but he was driven out of Kwangtung Province by the warlord Chen Chiang-ming, thus adding to the disintegration within the KMT.

The victory of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the just policy pursued by the Soviet Union towards China and other oppressed peoples in the East, the May Fourth Movement, and the rise of the Communist Party of China and of the Chinese working-class movement after the May Fourth Movement—all gradually aroused the attention of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and other members of the KMT and inclined them towards a revolutionary policy of uniting with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

The Third Party Congress of the Communist Party of China which was held in June 1923, correctly evaluated Dr. Sun Yat-sen's democratic stand against imperialism and the feudal warlords as well as the possibility of transforming the KMT into a revolutionary alliance of the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie.

The Third Party Congress criticised the two major deviations within the Party. One was the deviation represented by the capitulationism of Chen Tu-hsiu which was expressed in the view that the bourgeois-democratic revolution should be led by the bourgeoisie, that "all work should be turned over to the KMT", and that "once democratic revolution has succeeded, all that the proletariat will gain will be some liberty and rights". Never for a moment did the exponents of this deviation try to enable the proletariat and the Communist Party to lead the revolution, so that the proletariat might be the first to gain from the victory of the revolution, become the nucleus of effective political power and use this political power to ensure the eventual advance of the country towards Socialism. They argued that in the first revolution the bourgeoisie should be allowed to establish a bourgeois republic in which the proletariat could secure only some "liberty and rights" and nothing else. Therefore they thought that in the bourgeois-democratic revolution the proletariat could only play a passive and supplementary role and not the role of a leader. They maintained that the proletariat could only wait until the bourgeois republic had been established and until the capitalist economy had developed to a further point, before overthrowing the bourgeois republic and replacing it with the dictatorship of the proletariat. They considered that only then could Socialism be realised. This was to be the second revolution. Thus their view was known as the "two-revolution theory".

The second deviation was the "closed-door" policy as represented by Chang Kuo-tao. The exponents of this deviation argued that the Communist Party must not co-operate with the KMT, that only the working class could carry through the revolution, and that the KMT could not carry through the democratic revolution. Therefore, they opposed Communist Party members, workers or peasants joining the KMT. The Congress criticised the erroneous views both of the Right and of the "Left", and decided to co-operate with the KMT and to allow members of the Communist Party to join the KMT so as to reorganise the KMT into
a democratic revolutionary alliance, while at the same time preserving the organisational and political independence of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the Third Party Congress did not pay proper attention to the peasant question and the question of revolutionary armed forces.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung attended the Third Party Congress. He firmly upheld the correct views and opposed the erroneous views. At this Congress, he was elected to the Central Committee of the Party.

The united front policy of the Party greatly accelerated the tempo of the Chinese revolution. Thanks to the efforts of the Communist Party of China and to the important assistance given by the leading body of the Communist International and by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the KMT held its first National Congress in Canton in January 1924, issued a Manifesto, laid down the programme of the democratic revolution, and formulated various measures for reorganising and revolutionising itself. This Congress, which was attended and jointly led by Communist Party members, was in reality the starting point of a revolutionary upsurge. The co-operation between the KMT and the Communist Party impelled Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the left wing of the KMT and the whole nation forward in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism and against their agents in the KMT—the right-wing elements. On the proposal of the Communist Party of China, and with its leadership and support, a revolutionary government and a revolutionary military academy were established in Kwangtung Province, an expeditionary war was launched against the reactionary forces in Kwangtung, and a nation-wide popular movement was initiated for the convocation of a National Assembly and for the abrogation of the unequal treaties. The working-class movement resumed its activities and the peasant movement was launched.

The Fourth Party Congress of the Communist Party of China, which was held in January 1925, made organisational preparations for a new wave of mass struggles. Dr. Sun Yat-sen died in March that year. The grief of the whole nation for this great revolutionary was expressed in a widespread campaign of political propaganda.

Following the big anti-British and anti-Japanese strike of the Shanghai workers in May 1925, a great nation-wide revolutionary storm broke out. On May 15, the capitalist owner of a Japanese textile mill in Shanghai killed a Communist worker, Ku Cheng-hung. On May 30, Shanghai’s workers and students held a demonstration in the Foreign Settlement in support of the textile workers. When the demonstrators marched down Nanking Road, they were fired upon by British police and many were killed or wounded. A wave of furious indignation swept Shanghai and the entire nation as a result of the May Thirtieth Massacre. In the next few days Shanghai’s workers, students and other citizens continued to demonstrate against this imperialist massacre of Chinese people and many of them were fired upon and killed by British, American and Japanese police. The workers throughout Shanghai called a general strike, students refused to attend classes, and the merchants stopped doing business.

The movement rapidly spread to the cities throughout the country where workers, students and citizens held many anti-imperialist demonstrations and downed tools, stopped attending classes, closed all shops and boycotted British and Japanese goods. After organising a general strike in Hong Kong, the workers there went to Canton, blockaded Hong Kong and turned it into a dead port. The striking workers from Hong Kong, together with workers and students in Canton, including the cadets of the military academy, held a demonstration on June 23 and were fired upon by British marines at Shameen, Canton. Many demonstrators were killed or wounded. This aroused still greater resistance throughout the nation.

In all these anti-imperialist movements, the whole nation unanimously demanded, among other things, the punishment of the murderers, payment of indemnities, apologies, the return of the foreign settlements and the withdrawal of foreign troops. But the warlord governments in Peking and in other parts of the country continued to surrender abjectly to imperialism and
suppressed the popular movement. Only the revolutionary government in Kwangtung supported the striking workers and the people in their struggles against imperialism and as a result the strikes in Hong Kong and Canton lasted as long as sixteen months.

The May Thirtieth Movement, as it became known from the bloody demonstration on May 30, greatly advanced the revolutionisation of Kwangtung Province and paved the way for a great revolution throughout the country. The "National Revolutionary Army" in Kwangtung rapidly unified the whole province and set out in July 1926 on the Northern Expedition to overthrow the feudal régime which ruled the nation with Peking as its centre. Because of the heroic struggle of the Communists and of the revolutionary elements of the KMT, and with the enthusiastic support of the people throughout the country, the Northern Expeditionary Army quickly defeated the reactionary armed forces and won great victories. In September 1926 the Northern Expeditionary Army occupied Hankow. In March 1927 the workers in Shanghai launched an uprising in co-ordination with the efforts of the Northern Expeditionary Army to occupy that city. The working-class movement and the peasant movement greatly expanded throughout the country. The total membership of the trade unions reached 2,800,000, and that of the peasants' associations grew to 9,500,000. The membership of the Communist Party of China increased from some 900 prior to the May Thirtieth Movement to more than 57,900.

But this swiftly developing revolution did not have firm foundations. Chen Tu-hsiu, then leader of the Communist Party, had assumed a passive and weak attitude throughout towards the fundamental tasks—that the proletariat must lead the democratic revolution, and that the Communists must lead KMT-Communist co-operation and the Northern Expeditionary War. Mass struggles were already taking place, especially the struggles of the peasants for land in many localities. But Chen Tu-hsiu failed to adopt a resolute and positive policy to support and continue to develop the mass movements so as to meet the demands of the masses. Nor had he organised the strength of the masses to reconstruct the organs of state power which were still in the hands of the reactionery elements, to create the masses' own armed forces and to expand the ranks of reliable revolutionary armies.

The revolution had already gained great prestige in the ranks of the massive Northern Expeditionary Army, but the Party remained without a correct policy for its work inside that Army. The Communists had carried on active political work in the Northern Expeditionary Army, but because the leading organs of the Party had overlooked the importance of controlling the armed forces, only an extremely small portion of the armed forces was actually under the control of the members of the Communist Party. Actual power in the Northern Expeditionary Army was for the most part kept in the hands of army officers of the old type and especially in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek, the right-wing KMT commander-in-chief of the "National Revolutionary Army" of that time. Chiang Kai-shek had already organised an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet conspiracy on March 20, 1926, even before his power had grown to any great extent. He created a pretext to attack the Communist Party in the army and in the leading organs of the KMT. Faced with such attacks by Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Tu-hsiu made opportunist concessions, and satisfied Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary demands to limit the activities of the Communist Party in the army and in the leading organs of the KMT. At the end of 1926, Chiang Kai-shek had turned his headquarters at Nanchang into a centre of opposition to the left wing of the KMT at Hankow.

By the beginning of 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu's erroneous tendencies had already developed into a right-opportunist line. The landlord and bourgeois elements in the KMT had become extremely apprehensive of the great development of the mass movement of the workers and peasants and their revolutionary firmness as displayed in the struggle. Threatened by the peasant movement in the countryside, the landlords fled to the cities in large numbers. They spread all sorts of rumours against the peasants, put out the story all over the cities that "excesses are being committed in the workers' and peasants' movements", and made use of this to attack the Communist Party. The petty-bourgeois revolutionary elements showed great vacillation. At this critical moment Chen Tu-hsiu was overwhelmed by the overbearing attitude of the re-
actionaries. He not only dared not rely on the workers' and peasants' movements, which were then on the upsurge, so as to unite the revolutionary groups, win over the intermediate groups and repel the reactionaries; he also followed at the heels of the reactionaries in reproaching the workers' and peasants' movements for "excesses" and restrained the mass movement, especially at that time the peasant movement. He vainly hoped to placate the landlord and bourgeois elements of the KMT by compromises and concessions so that they would not desert the revolutionary front, and hoped thereby to "save the revolution". The result was that the more compromises the Communist Party made, the stronger the reactionary forces became, while the strength of the masses was seriously undermined and sustained severe losses as a result of the mistaken policy of the Communist Party.

In this situation the imperialists quickly entered into collusion with Chiang Kai-shek. The feudal landlords and the big comprador bourgeoisie also made Chiang Kai-shek their new political representative and urged him to crush the great but still inexperienced Chinese revolution from within.

At that time there were possibilities that the Communist Party of China could avert, or at least mitigate, the subsequent defeat. For, as early as November 1926, Comrade Stalin had already served a timely and pertinent warning in his well-known speech On the Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution. In this speech Stalin pointed out with perfect correctness the feebleness of China's national bourgeoisie, and the serious danger that the imperialist powers would make use of the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces to carry out intervention against the Chinese revolution. He pointed out with perfect correctness that in the Chinese revolution it was extremely important to have genuine revolutionary armed forces, for the Communists to study military science and to be able to handle armed forces, to develop the revolution in the countryside and satisfy the demands of the peasants; and for the proletariat to rise and gain the leadership. Later, Comrade Stalin and the Executive Committee of the Communist International continued to give detailed guidance regarding the policy which the Chinese Communist Party should adopt in the Chinese revolution. If these

valuable opinions of Comrade Stalin and the Communist International had been successful in awakening the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in time, it would not have been possible for the enemy to have defeated the revolution at a single stroke.

At this first crucial juncture in the Chinese revolution Comrade Mao Tse-tung showed his great revolutionary genius. He was the first to employ the methods of Marxism-Leninism to analyse the class relationships in China and recognised that the success or failure of the Chinese revolution depended upon whether the working class was able to exercise leadership over the peasantry. This was the problem which had not been solved at the previous Party Congresses—including the Third Party Congress. At the end of 1924 Comrade Mao Tse-tung set out to study rural conditions in Human Province and to lead the peasants' revolutionary struggles. In 1925 and 1926, he headed the National Institute of the Peasant Movement in Kwangtung, directing his efforts to the training of cadres to lead the peasant struggle. In March 1926, Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his Marxist-Leninist work, An Analysis of the Various Classes in Chinese Society, formalised his observations on the Chinese peasants and other classes. He pointed out in this work that to distinguish true friends from enemies is a problem of primary importance in the revolution and that only in this way will it be possible to "unite our true friends to attack our real enemies". Then Comrade Mao Tse-tung proceeded to make a penetrating analysis of the economic and political position of the five main social forces in China—the landlord and comprador classes, the bourgeoisie, the middle peasants and other petty bourgeoisie, the poor peasants and other semi-proletarians, and the proletariat. He reached the conclusion: "All the warlords, bureaucrats, and comprador and big landlord classes in collusion with the imperialists, and that part of the reactionary intelligentsia attached to them, are our enemies. The industrial proletariat is the leading force in our revolution. All the semi-proletarian classes and petty bourgeoisie are our closest friends. Regarding the vacillating middle classes [here Comrade Mao Tse-tung
refers to the national bourgeoisie], their right wing is our potential enemy, and their left wing our potential friend, but we must be constantly on guard, lest they disrupt our front.”

Thus Comrade Mao Tse-tung opposed the Right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu which recognised only the bourgeoisie and the KMT but failed to see the peasants, as well as the “Left” opportunism of Chang Kuo-tao which recognised only the workers but failed to see the peasants.

In order to support the peasant struggles which had already arisen and were still arising during the Northern Expeditionary War, Comrade Mao Tse-tung made an investigation in January 1927 into the energetic struggles of the Hunan peasants to overthrow the landlords’ rule. He then wrote the most important work of the Party during the whole period of the First Revolutionary Civil War—Report on an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan. Comrade Mao Tse-tung severely denounced all those inside and outside the Party who doubted and reproached the peasants. He emphatically pointed out that if the Party would only adopt the revolutionary policy of mobilising the masses to the maximum extent, then “within a very short time, several hundred million peasants will rise in China’s central, southern and northern provinces. Impetuous as a hurricane, they will sweep along with such force that no power, however great, will be able to stop them. Racing towards the goal of liberation, they will break all bounds and drive all imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials and bad gentry into their graves.”

The main value of this work of Comrade Mao Tse-tung is that: (1) It gives a complete estimate of the role of the peasants in the Chinese revolution; (2) It points out the necessity of establishing peasant political power and peasant armed forces in the rural areas; (3) It analyses the various strata of the peasantry and points out that the poor peasants who constitute the majority of the Chinese population are the most revolutionary force among the peasants; (4) It emphatically advocates the revolutionary idea of mobilising, organising and relying on the masses to the utmost extent. For these reasons, this work has become a classic document for the Chinese Communists in leading the peasants’ struggle. But, at that time, although Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s correct views gained the support of a section of the Party membership, they were nevertheless rejected and suppressed by Chen Tu-hsiu’s opportunist leading clique which formed the decisive leadership of the Party. Therefore, the revolution could not be saved at that time.

Exactly as Comrade Stalin had foreseen, the imperialists stepped up their intervention against the Chinese revolution. On March 24, 1927, after the Northern Expeditionary Army had occupied Nanking, warships of the British, American, Japanese, French and Italian fleets bombarded the city. Under instructions from the imperialists, Chiang Kai-shek staged a counter-revolutionary coup in Shanghai on April 12, massacred large numbers of workers and Communist Party members and declared his opposition to the Communists. Although the KMT at Hankow publicly declared a punitive campaign against Chiang Kai-shek, the reactionary tendencies within its ranks nevertheless developed rapidly.

In this critical situation, the Chinese Communist Party held its Fifth Party Congress in Hankow on April 25. Comrade Mao Tse-tung was present at this Congress, but he was completely excluded from the leadership of the Congress by Chen Tu-hsiu and was not permitted to vote at the Congress. Certain comrades like Chu Chiu-pai and Jen Pi-shih criticised the opportunist leadership of Chen Tu-hsiu, but they lacked positive measures. Although the Fifth Party Congress accepted the correct guidance given by the Communist International regarding the Chinese revolution, although it passed resolutions condemning opportunism and calling for the carrying out of agrarian reform, it re-elected Chen Tu-hsiu as General Secretary of the Party in spite of the fact that Chen Tu-hsiu was still persisting in his inveterate opportunist viewpoints. Thus, the Fifth Party Congress actually did not solve any problems. Immediately afterwards, the reactionary army officer Hsu Ke-hsiang staged a counter-revolutionary coup in Changsha on May 21 and massacred many revolutionaries. On July 15, the KMT at Hankow formally decided to break with the Communist Party and thus betrayed the revolution. In this way the First Revolutionary Civil War met with defeat.

Although the First Revolutionary Civil War failed, it taught
the young Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people very great and important lessons. It bore out the following fundamental principles regarding China's democratic revolution:

1. The democratic revolution in present-day China must be undertaken by a united front led by the working class; the victory of the revolution could not be achieved without this united front, and the united front would fail if it were not led by the working class but by the bourgeoisie;

2. The central problem of the working-class leadership in China's democratic revolution was the peasant problem; only when the peasants were won over as a revolutionary ally could the victory of the revolution be attained;

3. The main form of the revolution in China could only be that of armed revolution opposing armed counter-revolution; everything would be lost without revolutionary armed forces.

These lessons proved to be correct not only during the First Revolutionary Civil War but also in the subsequent periods. The failure of the First Revolutionary Civil War demonstrated that the strength of counter-revolution in China, and first of all the strength of imperialism, far surpassed that of the revolution; that in order to defeat the powerful forces of international imperialism, which had for many decades invaded China, and its lackey, Chinese feudalism, it was necessary to carry on serious struggles; and that in order to lead these serious struggles to victory, reliance must be placed not merely on revolutionary zeal but also on the theoretical guidance of Marxism-Leninism.

The Chinese Communist Party, soon after its foundation, plunged into the tremendous nation-wide revolutionary struggle, during which many Communists displayed boundless loyalty to the cause of the working class and the people, as well as a high degree of organising ability. But, with the exception of Comrade Tse-tung and a limited number of others, they failed to study Marxism-Leninism seriously and to comprehend the spirit and substance of Marxism-Leninism. Because of this weakness, the leading organs of the Party were unable to grasp the revolutionary guidance given by Lenin, Stalin and the Communist International, and to overcome opportunist mistakes and bourgeois betrayal in the midst of intricate, critical and fast-changing revolutionary struggles. The inadequacy of theoretical knowledge of Marxism-Leninism in the Party indicated that the Party as a whole was still in its infancy at that time.

The Chinese Communist Party entered into a difficult period after the failure of the First Revolutionary Civil War. But it was during this difficult period that the Party reached both political and military maturity.
Chapter Two

THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR

In 1927, during the rapidly developing revolution, the young Communist Party of China was assailed by powerful enemies, both from inside and outside the ranks of the revolution. The Party failed to resist these assaults in a proper way because of errors committed by its leading organisations and, as a result, suffered extremely serious blows. The Party tried to save the revolution from defeat. On August 1, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Yeh Ting, Ho Lung and other comrades led over 30,000 men of the Northern Expeditionary Army, who were under the influence of the Party, in an armed uprising at Nanchang, Kiangsi Province. But instead of joining with the peasant movement in Kiangsi they marched southward to Kwangtung Province. Later, though they preserved a small part of their strength, the major part was defeated in battles against the enemy in the eastern part of Kwangtung Province. After that, the situation pointed to the inevitable defeat of the revolution. From April 12, when Chiang Kai-shek began his massacre, until after the defeat of the revolution, many brilliant leaders of the Party and many revolutionary workers, peasants and intellectuals were savagely slaughtered throughout the country. The whole country was suddenly plunged into darkness. Not only the national bourgeoisie, but many of the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie deserted the revolution. Large groups of intellectuals of petty bourgeois origin, who had joined the Party but who lacked resolution, announced their withdrawal from the Party. But the heroic Communist Party and the revolutionary people of China, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in his *Coalition Government*, "were not frightened, not conquered, and not annihilated. They stood up again, wiped off the bloodstains, buried their fallen comrades, and went on fighting".

Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, the betrayers of the revolution, did not and could not solve any of the problems that gave rise to the Chinese revolution. On the contrary, China's national crisis was aggravated by Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, who were even more thoroughly dependent upon imperialism and who suppressed the revolutionary people even more ruthlessly than the previous reactionary rulers. The imperialists made certain formal concessions to Chiang Kai-shek (such as giving up the rights of consular jurisdiction and conventional customs tariffs), for they knew it made no difference whether these rights were vested in Chiang Kai-shek or retained by themselves. But in reality their aggression penetrated ever deeper into China. Especially conspicuous was the ascendancy of American imperialist economic and political influence in China.

Manipulated as in the past by imperialism and feudalism, the new warlords of the KMT engaged in unceasing internecine wars with each other. Workers and peasants were subjected to heavier exploitation and oppression than before. Especially in the cities, KMT rule was even more brutal than that of the old-style warlords. After his betrayal of the revolution Chiang Kai-shek no longer represented the interests of the national bourgeoisie, but the interests of imperialism, feudalism and the comprador bourgeoisie. Chiang Kai-shek developed what was later termed bureaucratic capitalism—comprador, feudal, military, monopoly capitalism. Consequently, the national bourgeoisie suffered greater oppression under Chiang Kai-shek's rule than before. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, in summing up the situation at that time, stated in 1928:

"The workers, peasants, the common people throughout the country and even the bourgeoisie still remain under the counter-revolutionary rule without being liberated at all politically or economically." *(Why It Is Possible for China's Red State Power to Exist.)*

Herein lies the fundamental reason why Japanese imperialism dared to launch large-scale military offensives against China in 1931 and 1937.

Although the rule of Chiang Kai-shek was more brutal than the previous warlord rule, it had its weaknesses, which fundamentally were its separation from the people and its internal conflicts. Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary state apparatus was
strengthened in order to suppress the people. But its main strength could be put only in the cities. As a result, it was not easy for the people in the cities to resume or develop their struggles rapidly. However, it was impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to establish a powerful reactionary rule everywhere over the vast rural districts throughout the country. The continuous wars waged among the various factions of the KMT warlords added to Chiang Kai-shek's difficulties in this respect. Especially in the rural districts which had been influenced by the revolution, the peasants urgently wanted land and had experience in organising themselves to fight the landlord class. This was favourable to the revolution and unfavourable to the counter-revolution. If the defeat of the First Revolutionary Civil War resulted from the failure to correctly lead the peasants in solving the agrarian problem, then the hope of reviving the revolutionary movement lay precisely in correctly leading the peasants' struggle for land in the new conditions.

In the situation where the revolution had been defeated and Chiang Kai-shek had established his out-and-out reactionary rule, the task of the Party was to make clear to the people the necessity of continuing the revolutionary struggle, and to lead them along the correct path of reviving that struggle. To do so, the Party had to sum up the experiences of the First Revolutionary Civil War, correct the mistakes of the Party's leadership, and quickly assemble the revolutionary forces in order to organise an orderly retreat and defence in face of the enemy's offensive. In effect, it was necessary for some of the Party's organisations to move to the rural districts, where the counter-revolutionary forces were relatively weak and where the revolution was relatively well entrenched, in order to lead the peasants in carrying out agrarian reform and guerilla warfare; for another part of the Party's organisations to remain in the cities, go underground, and carry on work under cover in order to preserve the cadres and Party organisations and preserve and build up the revolutionary forces of the masses; and after this, for these two contingents to co-ordinate their struggles, to take advantage of the enemy's internal contradictions and weaknesses and to fight for the revival of the revolutionary movement.

Immediately after the KMT at Hankow turned against the Communist Party in July 1927, the Party called an emergency conference on August 7. This conference thoroughly rectified Chen Tu-hsiu's capitulationism and removed him from leadership. Chen Tu-hsiu's mistakes were again examined in greater detail at the Sixth Party Congress in July 1928. Chen Tu-hsiu did not admit his mistakes. He and his supporters stated at that time that with the victory of the bourgeoisie the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution was ended, that the bourgeoisie had already established and would consolidate its rule, and that the Chinese proletariat should give up the revolutionary struggle, turn to legal activities and wait for a Socialist revolution to be launched in the future. From that time on Chen Tu-hsiu and his supporters took the counter-revolutionary path of collaborating with the Trotskyites in carrying on anti-Party activities. Therefore the Party expelled them in 1929.

In order to save the revolution the Party at its August 7 Conference (1927) issued a call to the peasants to launch autumn harvest uprisings. After the conference Comrade Mao Tse-tung went to various places in the west of Kiangsi Province and the east of Hunan Province, where he led a part of the peasants, workers and troops of the Northern Expeditionary Army in carrying out uprisings, formed a contingent of the workers' and peasants' revolutionary army at the border of Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces and fought against the enemy.

In addition, from the autumn and winter of 1927 to the spring of 1928, the Party organised uprisings in Eastern Hupeh, in Eastern and Southern Hunan, in the city of Canton, in Eastern Kwangtung, on Hainan Island, and in other places. The uprisings in Southern Hunan were headed by Comrades Chu Teh, Chen Yi, Lin Piao and others, who led into Southern Hunan some of the troops that had participated in the Nanchang Uprising and were preserved after the defeat in Kwangtung. Soon after, they took their troops, together with the peasant army that was formed in the course of the uprisings, to join forces with the troops under Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Part of the armed forces which were created in the course of the uprisings in other places was also maintained intact.
In those places where these armed forces were correctly led, the revolutionary armed struggle developed step by step. After this the Second Revolutionary War began. These troops were the embryo of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the present-day Chinese People's Liberation Army.

But in the situation where the revolution had been defeated, what was required of the Party organisations as a whole was to conduct an appropriate retreat instead of continuing the offensive. For the time being local armed struggles could constitute nothing but a special form of defence. As a result of incorrectly appraising the situation at the time as though the revolution were still on the ascendant, and by refusing to admit that the revolution had failed, the Party, from the winter of 1927 to the spring of 1928, under the leadership of Comrade Chu Chiu-pai, fell into "Left" putchism, opposed retreat and wanted to continue the offensive, thus continuously causing no small losses to the remaining revolutionary forces.

The Sixth Party Congress, which was held in July 1928, liquidated Chen Tu-hsiu's capitulationism and at the same time criticised the error of "Left" putchism. It reaffirmed that the Chinese revolution was a democratic revolution in character and that the general task was to establish a workers' and peasants' anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic dictatorship. The Congress also worked out the various aspects of the programme for the workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship and put forward the task of founding a Red Army, establishing revolutionary bases in the countryside and carrying out land distribution. The Congress pointed out that the revolutionary upsurge was bound to come, but that the political situation then was one between two revolutionary upsurges; therefore the general task of the Party at that time was not to take the offensive or organise uprisings everywhere, but rather to win over the masses. These were the accomplishments of the Sixth Party Congress. The shortcomings of this Congress were: it lacked a correct appraisal of the protracted nature of the democratic revolution, the role of the intermediate classes and the contradictions within the reactionary forces; nor did it correctly understand that tactically the Party should conduct a retreat, and especially that the key question was the necessity of shifting the centre of the Party's activity from the cities, where the enemy was comparatively strong, to the rural districts, where the enemy was comparatively weak. The leadership of the Party was still in the hands of the "Left" elements.

These shortcomings of the Sixth Party Congress militated against the thorough rectification of the "Left" deviations in the Party.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung was not present at the Sixth Party Congress. The Congress elected him to the Central Committee of the Party.

The problems that had not been correctly solved by the Sixth Party Congress were solved later by Comrade Mao Tse-tung both in practice and in theory. In October 1927, Comrade Mao Tse-tung led a contingent of the newly formed workers' and peasants' revolutionary army in a withdrawal to the Chingkang Mountain area, on the borders of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces, established there the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region Workers' and Peasants' Government, repulsed repeated attacks by the enemy and started to lead the peasants in distributing the land.

After the troops under Comrades Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai had successively joined forces with the troops under Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the revolutionary bases with the Chingkang Mountain as their centre gradually expanded. During this period, under the leadership of the Party, peasant guerilla warfare and the struggle for the land also developed in Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangsi and other provinces. Several new contingents of the Red Army and several new revolutionary bases were founded one after another. In 1929, the Red Army, led by Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, advanced to the south of Kiangsi and the west of Fukien Province, and founded the Central Revolutionary Bases with Juichin, in Kiangsi, as their centre.

The revolutionary bases first founded by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the winter of 1927 and the revolutionary war led by him, as well as the revolutionary bases and the revolutionary wars founded and led elsewhere by other comrades, became the main content of China's revolutionary struggle in the new period. They constituted the main factor in the nation's political life, presented the greatest threat to Chiang Kai-shek's reac-
tional rule and represented the greatest hope of the labouring people throughout the country.

Why were the development of Red Army warfare and the creation of rural revolutionary bases possible? Why were they the main content of China's revolutionary struggle then? The theoretical answers to these questions were given by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his two articles: Why it is Possible for China's Red State Power to Exist, which was written in October 1928, and A Single Spark Will Kindle a Flame, which was written in January 1930.

In the first article, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that there were five main conditions which made the existence of Red state power possible at that time:

"(1) China's localised agricultural economy together with the imperialists' policy of carving up and exploiting China by dividing the country up among themselves into spheres of influence created gaps in the reactionary rule, of which advantage could be taken by the revolutionary forces.

"(2) The influence of the First Revolutionary Civil War still remained among the people in vast areas of the country.

"(3) The revolutionary situation throughout the country continued to develop.

"(4) There existed the Red Army to support the Red state power.

"(5) There existed the Communist Party, whose organisation was powerful and whose policy was correct, to guide the Red state power."

In the second article, Comrade Mao Tse-tung appraised in detail the significance of the war waged by the Chinese Red Army. He pointed out that the creation and expansion of the Red Army and revolutionary bases were "the highest form of the peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in semi-colonial China" and formed an "important factor in accelerating the forthcoming nation-wide revolutionary upsurge". Comrade Mao Tse-tung was of the opinion that the war waged by the Red Army, the agrarian revolution and the building up of revolutionary state power should be developed to the maximum extent. "Only by so doing can we win the confidence and respect of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has done throughout the world. Only by so doing can we create great difficulties for the ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their disintegration. And only by so doing can we really create a Red Army that will be one of the important instruments in the forthcoming great revolution. In short, only thus can we accelerate the oncoming revolutionary tide."

Thus, Comrade Mao Tse-tung discovered the only correct law of the development of the Chinese revolution in the situation where the Chinese revolution had been defeated in the cities by powerful enemies and where for the time being there was no way to win victory in the cities. This law was to encircle and subsequently to seize the cities occupied by the counterrevolution, by means of armed, revolutionary rural districts. The development of the Chinese revolution in the ensuing twenty years fully bore out Comrade Mao Tse-tung's foresight.

In this period, Comrade Mao Tse-tung not only mapped out for the Party the general course of development of the revolution in the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War, but also made important, creative contributions in various aspects of concrete policies, such as policies regarding the agrarian revolution, the intermediate classes, military strategy and tactics to defeat superior enemy forces, work among the troops and the work of building the Party in the rural districts and under war conditions. In view of the fact that the poor peasants and the farm labourers were the most revolutionary forces in the rural districts, that the middle peasants were an important force which firmly supported the revolution, that in the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the rich peasant economy still needed to be preserved, and medium and small-scale industry and commerce needed to be protected and developed, Comrade Mao Tse-tung correctly laid down and resolutely followed the line in the agrarian revolution of relying upon the poor peasants and farm labourers, unifying with the middle peasants, protecting the rich peasants and the medium and small industrialists and businessmen and liquidating only the landlord class.

Since the war was the main form of struggle and the army was the main form of organisation in the Chinese revolution, and since the characteristic of the revolutionary war at that time was
that the enemy was strong while we were weak, the enemy was
big while we were small, and that the enemy was divorced from
the masses while we were closely united with the masses. Comrade
Mao Tse-tung correctly laid down such basic principles as that
the Red Army must be propagandists and organisers in the work
of the Party, of the people's state power, of the agrarian reform
and of all other local work; that the Red Army must develop
strong political work and strict mass discipline among its rank
and file; that the war waged by the Red Army must be a people's
war relying on the masses, with guerilla warfare, or mobile war-
fare having the character of guerilla warfare, as its main form
of fighting at that time; that strategically the Red Army must carry
on a protracted war, but tactically it must fight battles of quick
decision; that it must at ordinary times send troops to mobilise
the masses and must at the time of battle concentrate superior
forces to encircle and annihilate the enemy.

All these basic principles and certain other military principles
constitute the military line of China's revolutionary wars. In
view of all this, it can be said that the work Comrade Mao Ts-
tung did in this difficult period of the Chinese revolution laid
the main foundations for leading the Chinese revolution towards
victory.

In 1930, the Red Army throughout the country grew to about
60,000 men, of whom over 30,000 were in the Central Area in
Kiangsi Province. In 1930 and a little later, revolutionary bases
were extended to Fukien, Anhwei, Honan, Shensi, Kansu and
other provinces as well as to Hainan Island, Kwangtung Province.
The rapid development of the Red Army caused a tremendous
shock to Chiang Kai-shek. Towards the end of 1930 Chiang Kai-
shek sent seven divisions, totalling about 100,000 men, in an en-
circlement campaign against the Red Army in the Central Area,
with the result that one and a half divisions were wiped out by
the Red Army and Chiang Kai-shek's field commander was cap-
tured. In February 1931, Chiang Kai-shek sent 100,000 men, with
Ho Ying-chin as commander, in a second encirclement campaign
against the Red Army in the Central Area. It was again crushed.
Over 30,000 men and over 20,000 small arms were captured by
the Red Army. In July of the same year Chiang Kai-shek started
a third campaign. Himself commanding and accompanied by
British, Japanese and German military advisers, he led 300,000
men and penetrated from three directions deep into the bases of
the Red Army in the Central Area. But again the attack was
-crushed. At the same time, many important victories were won
by the Red Army led by Comrade Hsu Hsiang-chien which was
first stationed at the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Base and later shifted
to the Northern Szechuan Base, and by the Red Army of the
Western Hunan and Western Hupeh Bases led by Comrade Ho
Lung.

Influenced by the victories of the Red Army, over 10,000
troops of the KMT 26th Route Army which was sent to attack
the Red Army mutinied at Ningtu, Kiangsi Province, in Decem-
ber 1931 under the leadership of Comrades Chao Po-sheng, Tung
Chen-tang and others, and joined the Red Army. Because of
such victories the strength of the Red Army continued to grow,
and a new revolutionary situation thus gradually approached
fruition.

It was just at this time that the large-scale invasion of North-
East China was started by Japanese imperialism on Septem-
ber 18, 1931. The Japanese imperialists, who had been deter-
mmed to invade China after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894,
saw that, following the economic crisis which had struck the
capitalist world by the end of 1929, Britain, the United States
and other countries were much too preoccupied with their
domestic affairs to compete with Japan in the seizure of China.
They also saw that Chiang Kai-shek's Government had com-
pletely capitulated to the imperialists, relying on the help of
the British and American imperialists to wage civil war among
the counter-revolutionaries themselves, as well as the civil war
against the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and dared not
resist the Japanese invasion of China. The Japanese imperialists
decided to start by invading the north-east and then gradually
to expand their aggression to other parts of China. Because
the Chiang Kai-shek Government persisted in carrying out its
policy of offering no resistance to Japan, stepping up the
"suppression of the Communists" and intensifying the fascist
terror, Japan quickly occupied the whole of the north-east in
1931. In January 1932, it invaded Shanghai. In 1933, it occupied Jehol Province and the northern part of Chahar Province. In 1935, it occupied the eastern part of Hopei Province.

The Japanese imperialist invasion brought about a fundamental change in the political situation in China. To resist Japanese invasion became an urgent task and universal demand of the whole Chinese people. Movements conducted by workers, peasants and students against Japanese imperialism gained momentum in all parts of the country. The upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, which withdrew from the revolution in 1927, now changed their political attitude, began to be politically active and demanded that Chiang Kai-shek’s Government change its policy. Political disintegration began, even in the ranks of the KMT and its troops. In January 1932, the KMT 19th Route Army, under the influence of the anti-Japanese movement of the Shanghai people, heroically resisted the Japanese troops invading Shanghai. In November 1933, the leaders of this army, together with other KMT members, founded a People’s Government in Fukien Province which opposed Chiang Kai-shek and co-operated with the Communists. In May 1933, Feng Yu-hsiang, in co-operation with the Communists, organised the Anti-Japanese People’s Allied Army at Kalgan, Chahar Province.

After the Japanese invaders had attacked China the Chinese Communist Party was the first to call for armed resistance. It also led, or took active part in, the nation-wide people’s anti-Japanese movement and the anti-Japanese guerrilla war waged by the people of the north-east. In January 1933, the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army declared that, on the three conditions of ceasing the attacks on the Red Army, safeguarding the people’s democratic rights and arming the masses, the Red Army was willing to stop fighting and make peace with all other troops throughout the country for the purpose of jointly resisting Japanese aggression. But in spite of this, the leadership of the Party committed new, serious “Left” mistakes in the 1931-34 period. As a result, the revolution not only failed to advance in the favourable conditions created by the Red Army’s victories and by the rising popular struggle against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, but it even suffered new setbacks.

In spite of the lessons of the failure of the First Revolutionary Civil War and the various events which ensued, the leading organs of the Party after the Sixth Party Congress were still located in Shanghai—the centre of counter-revolution—and the leadership of the Party still was not focused on Red Army warfare and did not have Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its centre. Imbued with petty-bourgeois impetuosity and ignorant of the significance and laws of Red Army warfare, the “Left” opportunists, who cherished illusions of organising uprisings in cities which were under counter-revolutionary white terror, continued to occupy leading positions in the central organs of the Party. Headed by Comrade Li Li-san, the central leading organs of the Party, from June to October of 1930, demanded that general uprisings be organised in the key cities and that a general offensive against the key cities be launched by all Red Army forces. This erroneous plan caused serious losses to the underground organisations of the Party in the KMT-controlled areas, but it did not produce serious effects on the Red Army where Comrade Mao Tse-tung firmly upheld the correct policy. In October 1930, Comrade Li Li-san’s mistakes were corrected at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected by the Sixth Party Congress. However, in January 1931, a new “Left” faction headed by Comrades Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu) and Po Ku (Chin Pang-hsien) and characterised by its doctrinaireism, made use of the cloak of Marxist-Leninist “theories” to attack the Third Plenary Session from the “Left”. The members of this faction held the view that the chief mistake committed by Comrade Li Li-san, and the chief danger within the Chinese Communist Party at that time, were Right deviations and not “Left” deviations. They charged that the Third Plenary Session “had not done anything to expose and attack the Right-opportunist theory and practice which the Li Li-san line had consistently followed”. They finally secured the leading positions in the central organs at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected by the Sixth Party Congress. This new “Left” faction headed by Wang Ming and Po Ku flatly
denied the important changes which the Japanese invasion had brought about in China's domestic political situation and regarded the various cliques in the KMT and the middle groups as equally counter-revolutionary; therefore they demanded that the Party should wage a "life-and-death struggle" against all of them without distinction.

As to the question of Red Army warfare, this "Left" group opposed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's ideas of guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare and persisted in demanding that the Red Army seize all the key cities. On the question of the Party's underground work in the KMT-controlled areas, they opposed the view of utilising legal forms and accumulating revolutionary strength, as firmly held by Comrade Liu Shao-chi, and continued to carry out the adventurist policies which isolated them from the masses. Under this erroneous leadership, almost all the Party organisations in the KMT-controlled areas were finally destroyed, although they had conducted many heroic struggles under extremely difficult conditions. The provisional central leading organs formed by the "Left" elements were compelled to move to the bases of the Central Red Army in 1933. The provisional central leading organs, following their arrival in the Red Army bases, joined up with the Central Committee members, such as Comrade Mao Tse-tung and others who had been working in the Red Army and the revolutionary bases, and later became the formally established official central leading organs. But Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership, especially his leadership in the Red Army, was thrust aside, and thus the revival of the revolution as demonstrated by the victories of the Red Army and the upsurge of the mass movement in the KMT-controlled areas was undermined.

From June 1932 to February 1933, Chiang Kai-shek, immediately after selling out the Anti-Japanese War in Shanghai, employed ninety divisions totalling 500,000 men in the fourth all-out encirclement campaign against the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Guided by Comrade Mao Tse-tung's strategy, the Red Army again won great victories in this counter-encirclement campaign. But in October 1933, Chiang Kai-shek unleashed the fifth encirclement campaign against the

Red Army, with a force of one million men, of whom 500,000 were employed in attacking the Central Red Army. During this campaign the Red Army failed to smash the enemy's encirclement, owing to the completely wrong military line of remaining solely on the defensive and other wrong policies pursued by the central leading organs of the Party.

In October 1934, the Central Red Army withdrew from its bases in Kiangsi Province and began the Long March which was unparalleled in world history. Meanwhile, other revolutionary bases and Red Army forces throughout the country suffered similar losses at the hands of the "Left" elements. With the exception of the Red Army units, led by Comrades Liu Tse-tan, Kao Kang and others in North Shensi, the Red Army units in various places withdrew from their original bases one after another and joined the Long March.

During the Long March of the Central Red Army, the central leading organs of the Party continued to commit military blunders which several times put the Red Army in dangerous predicaments and caused extremely great losses, with the enemy blocking the route of advance and pursuing from the rear. In order to save the imperilled Red Army and China's revolutionary cause, Comrade Mao Tse-tung and other comrades conducted a resolute struggle and secured the calling of an enlarged conference of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party in January 1935, at Tsunyi, Kweichow Province. With the majority of the comrades conscious of the issues and with their support, the Tsunyi Conference removed the "Left" opportunists from the Party leadership, and established Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leading position in the whole Party. From that time on, the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution have been continuously under the Marxist-Leninist leadership of this outstanding, great and completely reliable leader—and this is the most important guarantee for the victory of the revolution.

With incomparable tenacity, after overcoming innumerable military and political difficulties as well as natural obstacles, and after completing the Long March of 25,000 li (over 8,000 miles) and crossing almost impassable snow-clad mountains and steppes, the Central Red Army reached North Shensi in October 1935,
one year after the beginning of the Long March, and joined hands with the Red Army units in North Shensi. The Red Army units led by Comrades Jen Pi-shih and Ho Lung and the Red Army units led by Comrade Hsu Hsian-chien also joined forces with the Central Red Army in October 1936 in the Shensi-Kansu area.

Chang Kuo-tao, who worked in the Red Army units led by Comrade Hsu Hsian-chien, lost faith in the future of the revolution and engaged in activities to split and betray the Party. He refused to go northward from North-Western Szechuan in company with the Central Red Army, coerced part of the troops into retreat towards Sikang Province and unconstitutionally set up another central leading organ. Thanks to the correct policy on inner-Party struggle adopted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and thanks to the persevering efforts of Comrades Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, Ho Lung, Kuan Hsien-yu and others, the splitting intrigues of the traitor, Chang Kuo-tao quickly met with complete failure, but not before they had caused further great losses to the Red Army. Before the fifth KMT encirclement campaign, the Red Army had expanded into a force of 300,000 troops, but after reaching North Shensi at the end of the Long March, owing to the many setbacks caused by erroneous leadership within the Party, the Red Army totalled less than 30,000 troops. These were the most precious flower of the Red Army and the Party.

The victorious Long March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army marked the turn from danger to safety in the Chinese revolution. It gave the Chinese people hope in the future of the revolution and in the future of the anti-Japanese national salvation movement. It convinced China and the whole world of the invincible strength of the Communist Party of China and of the Chinese Red Army and forced them to see that, in order to defeat Japanese imperialism, whose ambitions of encroachments on China were insatiable, China had to rely upon the Communist Party and had to put an end to the civil war against the Communists.

In November 1935, immediately after joining forces, the Central Red Army, the Red Army units in North Shensi and the Red Army units which had marched northward from the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border areas, jointly smashed the third encircle-

ment campaign of the KMT troops against the revolutionary bases in North Shensi, thus greatly consolidating these bases and raising the prestige of the Red Army. Later, owing to further attacks on North China by Japanese imperialism, the “December Ninth” Movement, beginning with the great Resist-Japan-and-Save-China demonstration by students in Peking on December 9, 1935, spread to the whole of the country. During this movement the broad masses of the people unanimously adopted the slogan of “Stop the civil war: unite to resist Japan” formulated by the Communist Party of China.

The tide of the revolution was once more on the rise. Meanwhile, there was an urgent need to make an accurate analysis of the internal situation since the Japanese invasion of China, to decide the policy of the Party and to correct the “Left”, “closed-door” tendency prevalent within the Party. This work could not have been accomplished by the central leading organs of the Party between 1931 and 1934 and, similarly, it could not have been accomplished by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in 1935 during the Long March. This need was met when, aided by the correct policy of the united front against fascism adopted by the Communist International, the Communist Party of China issued a declaration on August 1, 1935, calling for a united front and, in particular, when the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party on December 25 passed a resolution on the current political situation and the tasks of the Party and when Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a report entitled The Policy of Fighting Japanese Imperialism at a conference of Party activists on December 27, 1935.

The problem of establishing a national united front against Japanese imperialism was systematically expounded in Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s report. After pointing out the possibilities that the left wing of the national bourgeoisie might join in the fight against Japanese imperialism, that the rest of the national bourgeoisie might move from vacillation to neutrality, that the KMT camp might split, that the clique of pro-Anglo-American compradors within it might, under given conditions, be compelled to take part in the fight against Japan, and after pointing out the great significance of the Long March, Comrade
Mao Tse-tung summarised the Party’s tasks as follows:

“The task before the Party is to integrate the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, peasants, students, the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie of the whole country, and to form out of this integration a united national-revolutionary front.”

Comrade Mao Tse-tung vigorously rebutted all the arguments which the “Left” elements in the Party had advanced against the united front. Comrade Mao Tse-tung raised the slogan of a People’s Republic to replace that of a Workers’ and Peasants’ Republic, and formulated a correct policy relating to the national bourgeoisie both politically and economically. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that during the period of bourgeois-democratic revolution the People’s Republic would protect the national bourgeoisie, who did not support imperialism and its lackeys, together with their industry and businesses, and that the People’s Republic, with the workers and peasants as its foundation, represented the interests of all strata of the people who opposed imperialism and feudalism.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the difference between the present united front and that of 1926 to 1927 lay in the participation of the resolute and powerful Communist Party and the revolutionary Army. Comparing the differences between the two periods, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said:

“But the situation is changed now. Not only are there a resolute and powerful Communist Party and a strong Red Army, but there are also bases for the Red Army. They are not only initiators of the national anti-Japanese united front but will inevitably become the strong supporting pillar in the future anti-Japanese government and army, thus ensuring the final frustration of the plots of the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek to disrupt the anti-Japanese national united front and spread defeatism among us.”

Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s report not only laid down the Party’s policy at that time and foretold the future development of the Chinese political situation, but also summarised the fundamental experiences of the two periods of revolutionary civil wars and defined the basic line of the Party in the period of democratic revolution.

The correct political line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China rapidly achieved great results and quickly brought into existence the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression. After driving into Shansi Province in February 1936 by advancing eastwards and winning many victories, the Red Army issued an open message to the KMT in May proposing cessation of hostilities, negotiations for peace and concerted action against Japanese imperialism, and secured a truce first with Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng, and others in Shensi Province. In the KMT-controlled areas, the Party work and the national salvation movements against Japan carried out by people of all strata were similarly resumed and were spreading under the correct leadership of Comrade Liu Shao-chi. But Chiang Kai-shek still clung to the reactionary policy of opposing the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people, and continued to attack the Red Army. On December 12, 1936, Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, who demanded an alliance with the Communist Party of China in resisting Japan, detained Chiang Kai-shek in Sian, forcing him to put an end to the anti-Communist civil war which was ruining the nation. In this situation, the Communist Party of China considered it necessary to secure a peaceful solution of the Sian Incident in order to resist Japanese imperialist aggression, and Chiang Kai-shek was therefore released and internal peace achieved.

After the peaceful solution of the Sian Incident, to assist in maintaining internal peace and to win the landlord class over to joint resistance to Japanese imperialism, the Communist Party of China decided temporarily to suspend carrying out the policy of confiscating and redistributing the land of the landlords. Thanks to the achievement of internal peace, when the Japanese imperialists used the pretext of the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7, 1937, to launch a new offensive against China, Chinese troops, including Chiang Kai-shek’s army, resisted Japanese aggression and the national War of Resistance broke out. The realisation of internal peace and of the War of Resistance, which resulted from the correct views and effective work of the Communist Party of China during and after the Sian Incident, greatly raised the prestige of the Communist Party among the masses of the people throughout the country.
In May, 1937, the Central Committee called a Party Conference which discussed and ratified the political line the Party had followed from 1935 and made political and organisational preparations for the War of Resistance.

During the years in which the revolution emerged from danger and was approaching a new upsurge, Comrade Mao Tse-tung devoted great efforts to theoretical work in order to sum up experiences and train cadres. In the autumn of 1936, he wrote a book entitled The Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary Wars, which summed up the experiences of the revolutionary wars between 1927 and 1936, explained the characteristics of China’s revolutionary wars and systematically criticised the mistaken military lines of the “Leftists” and the Rightists. This is one of the most brilliant Marxist works of the world Communist movement on military science. More than that, it is an important political and philosophical work, because it makes a penetrating analysis of the laws of the Chinese revolution as a whole, of the cause of victory and defeat in war, of the laws of war as well as the process of understanding the laws of war.

In the summer of 1937, Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote his renowned philosophical treatise entitled On Practice in which he made a comprehensive, profound and popular exposition of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. It is of the utmost importance and value in the history of Chinese thought and in the ideological work of the Party. It is the best textbook for teaching the people how to think, act and study correctly. It analyses the philosophical nature of the inner-Party controversies during the Second Revolutionary Civil War and by means of the irrefutable principles of materialism, exposed the doctrinaire and empiricist errors in the theory of knowledge of the “Leftists” and Rightists. It not only laid the foundation for the education of the Communist Party of China in Marxism-Leninism but also made a splendid contribution to the world’s philosophical treasury of Marxism-Leninism.

The period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War was a period in which the Communist Party of China, in extremely difficult circumstances, reached political maturity and advanced the revolution to new heights. During this period, mainly thanks to the efforts of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Party thoroughly realised the importance of military work and rural work, created the revolutionary army and the revolutionary bases in the countryside, and learned how to lead the revolutionary war, land reform and various kinds of work involved in State power. During this period, the Communist Party of China recognised Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its own real Marxist-Leninist leader, recognised the danger and harmfulness of the various types of “Left” petty-bourgeois ideology, and established its leadership, with Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the head, in the struggle against various erroneous petty-bourgeois ideologies.

The Right deviations in the KMT-Communist coalition presented the chief danger in the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War. But it was “Left” deviations that were the chief mistakes of the Party’s leadership during the next period. “Leftist” mistakes caused the Party and the Red Army to suffer serious setbacks, retarding the advance of the revolution to new heights. Nevertheless, the Party and the Red Army which emerged with rich experience from many tribulations and complex ordeals, later on constituted the main force that subsequently led the War of Resistance and the People’s Liberation War. In the light of these facts, it may be stated that it was during the Second Revolutionary Civil War that the most important political preparations and nurturing of cadres were made for the victory of the Chinese revolution today.

The Party tided over the extremely serious reactionary period 1927-1937. During this period, on the one hand, the enemy attempted to annihilate our Party completely, and our Party conducted most difficult, intricate and heroic struggles against them; on the other hand, having overcome the Right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu, the Party was assailed several times by “Left” opportunism, and was placed in grave danger. However, thanks to the correct creative Marxist-Leninist leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, his unusual patience and his spirit of observing discipline, the Party finally succeeded in overcoming the opportunist errors with perfectly satisfactory results and in extricating itself from an extremely dangerous position. Thus, during the ten-year period of reaction, the Party, in spite of being
assailed by enemies from both within and without, was able to educate the vast masses of the people throughout the country in the revolutionary spirit, uphold the revolutionary banner of the Party among the masses of the people, preserve the main forces of the Red Army and part of the revolutionary bases, preserve a large number of the outstanding cadres of the Party and tens of thousands of Party members and amass a wealth of revolutionary experience, especially regarding warfare and revolutionary bases, to meet the new revolutionary tide—the nation-wide patriotic War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and the new co-operation between the KMT and the Communist Party of China.

Chapter Three

THE WAR OF RESISTANCE TO JAPANESE AGGRESSION

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese army of invasion attacked the Chinese garrison troops stationed at Lukouchiao, south of Peking. The garrison heroically resisted the attack. On August 13, the Japanese army of invasion again attacked Shanghai and the Shanghai garrison troops also put up resistance. Then the entire nation entered the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression. After reaching an agreement with the Kuomintang Government, the Chinese Red Army and the guerilla forces which it had left behind in the various provinces of South China were reorganised successively into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and left for the North China and East China fronts to take part in the War of Resistance.

At that time, the basic political conditions relevant to the War of Resistance were as follows:

Internationally, there were three kinds of forces: Japan, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States. Japanese imperialism was fiercely aggressive. The Japanese policy of conquering the whole of China aroused the resistance of all patriotic Chinese people. Japan not only invaded China but also time and again provoked the Soviet Union, attempting to launch surprise attacks on the Soviet Union. At the same time, Japan tried to utilise such gestures to obtain concessions from the British and American imperialist elements who were carrying out an anti-Soviet policy. But Japanese aggression against China robbed Britain and the United States of their imperialist interests in China and threatened their imperialist interests throughout the whole of South-East Asia and in the Pacific. Therefore, contradictions existed between Japan and Britain and the United States, and these contradictions led to the outbreak of the Pacific War in December, 1941. During the war the revolutionary forces of the Japanese people opposed Japanese imperialism and helped
the Chinese people, but they were too weak to exert any serious influence.

The Soviet Union resolutely carried out a policy of supporting China in the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression. In August 1937, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of non-aggression with China and also extended financial and military aid to China. Furthermore, the Soviet Union resolutely carried out a policy of peace and vigilantly avoided the traps laid by the British and American imperialists, who wished to "watch the tigers fighting from a safe place". After destroying Hitlerite Germany in 1945, the Soviet Union lost no time in declaring war on Japan. Facts have shown that the policy of the Soviet Union was absolutely correct, because it conformed with the interests of the Soviet Union as well as with the interests of the people of China and of the world.

Britain and the United States at that time differed not only from Japan but even more so from the Soviet Union. The British and American imperialists were unwilling to let Japan grab their interests in the East. But in the first place they hoped to turn the war against the Soviet Union, so that they could "watch the tigers fighting from a safe place"; secondly, they were afraid that the growth of the Chinese people's strength would endanger their interests; thirdly, they were busy coping with the tense situation brought about by Hitler in the West and did all they could to moderate the conflicts between themselves and Japan in the East, for fear that Japan might attack them. Consequently, before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Britain and the United States kept trying to compromise with Japan, or hoped that Japan and China would both be ruined by war. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, and particularly after having gained the upper hand in the Pacific, the United States demanded that China launch an active counter-offensive against Japan. The plans of American imperialism, however, were to utilise the situation as a means of gaining monopoly control of China and suppressing the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people, so as to convert China into an American colony. The counter-revolutionary two-faced policy of the British and American imperialists made it necessary for the Chinese people to adopt a revolu-

tionary two-sided policy towards them, that is, to unite with them in opposing Japanese aggression on the one hand, and to guard against and oppose their conspiracies against the Chinese people on the other.

Within China, there were three kinds of forces: the people, the Kuomintang and the traitors. The people were resolutely opposed to Japan. The working class was the leader and the peasantry the main force of the War of Resistance. The urban petty-bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and even certain sections of the landlord class, especially the enlightened gentry who stemmed from the landlord class, joined in fighting against Japan. Therefore, the people's anti-Japanese united front was extremely broad. The traitors clung tenaciously to Japan and helped Japan to invade China and oppress the Chinese people. Japan had made great efforts to buy off the most reactionary sections of the big landlords, big bourgeoisie and other off-scourings as traitors, and the long-term reactionary policy of the Kuomintang had also encouraged the activities of the traitors. Shortly after the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Wang Ching-wei clique of the Kuomintang went over to the Japanese. But after all, the number of traitors was very small. The entire people throughout the country were unanimously opposed to the traitors and even the Kuomintang reactionaries had to oppose them in words.

The problem lay with the Kuomintang. The main body of the Kuomintang, the Chiang Kai-shek clique which represented the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, was in the main a clique of compradors of Britain and the United States. During many years of its reactionary rule it stubbornly opposed the people, opposed fighting against Japan and devoted all its efforts in attempts to wipe out the Communist Party.

Chiang Kai-shek put up resistance to Japan for the following reasons. First, the pressure of the people left him no choice but to resist Japan, for otherwise the whole Chinese people and many organised anti-Japanese forces would have risen up to fight Japan of their own accord and in that case he would have been unable to maintain his rule. Secondly, the Japanese imperialist invasion of the whole of China directly threatened his régime and
the contradictions between Chiang Kai-shek and Japanese imperialism. Thus the contradictions between Japan and Chinese imperialism had now become irreconcilable. Thirdly, there existed contradictions between Anglo-American imperialism and Japanese imperialism. At that time, although Britain and the United States did not want to offend Japan themselves, they wanted to see China fighting Japan so as to pin Japan down. These were the reasons why the Chiang Kai-shek clique revealed its counter-revolutionary, dual character in the War of Resistance.

On the one hand, Chiang Kai-shek wanted to fight against Japan and wanted other forces to fight actively against Japan. In the early years of the war, he displayed a measure of enthusiasm in fighting against Japan and hoped to gain a quick victory. On the other hand, he was opposed to the people and continued to oppress them. He was unwilling to let the people arise and fight against Japan, and was particularly unwilling to allow the Communist Party and other anti-Japanese forces to mobilise the people to fight against Japan. He wanted to monopolise the leadership of the War of Resistance, but he refused to carry out any of the genuine democratic reforms which were necessary to the fight against Japan. He tried his best to curb any development of the people's strength and particularly any development of the strength of the Communist Party. In the War of Resistance he secretly planned to eliminate, at the hands of the Japanese militarists, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other anti-Japanese forces and to preserve his own strength. To this end, he ordered the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to undertake the hardest fighting at the fronts and in the enemy's rear.

He did not believe that China's own strength could be relied on to win victory in the War of Resistance. Hence, he did not, nor was he willing to, rely on the strength of the Chinese people but pinned his hopes on foreign aid. He hoped that he could quickly stimulate Britain and the United States into intervening against Japan, that Britain and the United States, and particularly the United States, would do the fighting for him. But subsequent events showed that Britain and the United States were slow in intervening against Japan and repeatedly compromised with Japan.

After penetrating into the enemy's rear, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, instead of being annihilated by the Japanese army, became welded together with the broad masses of the people in the enemy's rear, scored victory after victory and developed great strength. The forces of the entire Chinese people arrayed against Japan broke through the limits imposed by Chiang Kai-shek and greatly developed. In contrast, most of his own troops were wiped out and suffered great losses in the War of Resistance and his prestige declined rapidly. All this could not but make him embittered and fearful. Thereafter, he carried out a policy of passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party and the people. He evaded battles and looked on while others fought. He preserved and accumulated his own armed forces and waited to reap the spoils of victory after others had defeated Japan, when he would use the armed forces he had preserved and accumulated to eliminate the forces of the Communist Party and of the people. This was the fundamental position and policy of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in the War of Resistance. This position and policy were, in reality, fully endorsed and supported by American imperialism, although they aroused dissatisfaction on the part of American public opinion in the last stages of the War of Resistance. Thus Chiang Kai-shek differed not only from the traitors but also from the people fighting against Japan. The people fighting against Japan demanded unity of all the forces throughout the country that could be united and first of all the mobilisation of all the forces of the people to carry on the War of Resistance. Therefore, it was necessary on the one hand to unite with Chiang Kai-shek to a certain extent, in order to enable the army under his command to fight against Japan, and on the other to conduct a determined struggle against his reactionary policy in order to preserve and mobilise the people's forces to struggle for victory, so that the people's forces might not be weakened and be overwhelmed by, but could themselves overwhelm, the conspiracy of Chiang Kai-shek and his masters, the American imperialists. It was, therefore, quite obvious that the Communist Party of China, representing the interests of the people who were fighting against Japan, had to insist on the principle of preserving its
own independence and initiative in forming a united front with the Kuomintang.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a correct appraisal of the complicated political situation in the War of Resistance. After the outbreak of the war he pointed out that the dispute between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, the dispute between the proletariat and big landlords and big bourgeoisie who were participating in the War of Resistance (the Chiang Kai-shek clique) was no longer a dispute as to whether the War of Resistance should be carried on, but as to how to achieve victory. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that there existed two opposite policies in the War of Resistance—the policy of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek, and the policy of the proletariat and the whole Chinese people represented by the Communist Party. He further pointed out that the war would certainly be lost if the “partial war” policy of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang were carried out—the policy that the War of Resistance should be fought by the Kuomintang Government alone, without the participation of the whole Chinese people—and that only by carrying out the policy of people's war, the “all-out war” policy, could victory be won.

In August 1937, at a conference held at Lochuan, near Yanan, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on the proposal of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, adopted the famous Ten-point Programme for National Salvation and Resistance to Japan as the guide to the Party in leading the Chinese people throughout the country to fight for victory in the War of Resistance and to oppose the reactionary double-dealing policy of Chiang Kai-shek. The Lochuan Conference decided that independent guerilla warfare should be initiated to the fullest possible extent in the enemy's rear, that guerilla warfare should shoulder the strategic tasks of fighting in co-ordination with front-line battlefields, opening up battlefields in the enemy's rear and establishing anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear, and that anti-Japanese mass movements should be initiated to the utmost extent in all Kuomintang-occupied areas. The Lochuan Conference decided to fight for the people's own political and economic rights on condition that by doing so the mobilisation of the people

throughout the country for participation in the war was facilitated. It also decided that the fundamental policy to be followed in solving the peasant problem during the war should be to reduce rents and interest.

The controversy over the two policies in the War of Resistance was also sharply reflected within the Party. Some comrades represented by Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu), who had committed serious “Left” errors during the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War, now criticised and opposed the Party line from a Right-opportunist standpoint. Furthermore, violating Party discipline, they arbitrarily carried out their Right-opportunist line in the work for which they were responsible. Seeing that the Communist Party and its military forces were temporarily weak, and that the Kuomintang was superficially strong, they drew the erroneous conclusion that victory in the War of Resistance must depend upon the Kuomintang, that it would inevitably be a victory for the Kuomintang and not a victory for the people, that the Kuomintang could become the leader of the War of Resistance but the Communist Party could not. They treated the role of Communist-led guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance lightly and nursed illusions about gaining a quick victory by relying upon the Kuomintang army. They repudiated the revolutionary policy of preserving independence and initiative in the united front, repudiated the revolutionary policy of “unity side by side with struggle and unity, through struggle.” They ignored the differences in principle between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang in the War of Resistance and demanded that the Communists make concessions to the anti-popular policy of the Kuomintang by confining their activities within the scope permitted by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, and demanded that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army be completely integrated with the Kuomintang army in order to achieve “unity in command, in organisation, in equipment, in discipline, in planning and in operations”. They were opposed to the all-out mobilisation of the masses in the struggle, and to the expansion of the Liberated Areas and people's armed forces in the Japanese-occupied areas. They feared that such actions would “frighten away” Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang
from the anti-Japanese united front. They arbitrarily issued many declarations, decisions and articles expressing wrong opinions without the consent of the Central Committee and rejected the correct directives of the Central Committee. These erroneous ideas and actions influenced the work for which Comrade Wang Ming was responsible in Wuhan in 1938 and the work of Comrade Hsiang Ying in the New Fourth Army prior to the “Southern Anhwei Incident” in January 1941, thus hampering the development of the people's War of Resistance in the Yangtse River area and leading to the defeat of the New Fourth Army in the “Southern Anhwei Incident”. Quite obviously, the views of the Right-wing elements suited the interests of Chiang Kai-shek and impaired the interests of the proletariat and the people fighting against Japan. This was the revival in a new situation of the Right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu during the First Revolutionary Civil War. Comrade Mao Tse-tung carried out a determined struggle against such erroneous ideas, with the result that they were overcome in practical work before they caused greater harm.

In order thoroughly to clarify the erroneous conceptions that existed inside and outside the Party concerning the War of Resistance, Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote On Protracted War in May 1938. In this book he made a comprehensive analysis of the political and military situation in China and Japan and pointed out that China's War of Resistance was sure of ultimate victory. He also pointed out that the war could only be a protracted war, that there could be no quick victory and that it was necessary to adopt the policy of a people's war, if the war was to be won.

In October 1938, an enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected by the Sixth Party Congress was held at Yenan. This meeting endorsed the line of the Central Political Bureau, headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, concerning the War of Resistance and the anti-Japanese national united front. The plenary session criticised the erroneous policy of appeasement on the question of the united front and decided that the entire Party should organise the people's armed struggle against Japan without restrictions and independently. It decided that the principal work of the Party should be in the war areas and in the enemy's rear, and criticised the wrong ideas of placing hopes for victory in the War of Resistance upon the Kuomintang army and of entrusting the people's destiny to the legal movement under the reactionary Kuomintang rule.

The actual development of the War of Resistance proved that Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China were correct. Although Chiang Kai-shek’s Army resisted the Japanese Army in the first stage of the War of Resistance, it was swiftly defeated as a result of Chiang Kai-shek’s political and military mistakes. By October 1938, his army had no alternative but to withdraw from Canton and Wuhan. From that time onward, Chiang Kai-shek concentrated the main forces of his army in the south-west and north-west of China, with Chungking and Sian as centres, in order to avoid fighting the Japanese Army. In contrast, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, armed the broad masses of people in North, East, Central and South China, developed powerful guerilla warfare against Japan and established many democratic anti-Japanese bases.

By 1940, at the time of the third anniversary of the War of Resistance, the people’s army which was fighting against Japan under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party had grown to about 500,000, as compared with somewhat more than 40,000 three years earlier. It was engaging half of all the Japanese troops in China. In three years of fighting, it recaptured 150 county towns. The population of the Liberated Areas and the guerilla areas increased to about 100 million. The membership of the Communist Party grew to 800,000 as compared with 40,000 three years earlier. At all the war fronts from Liaoning, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan to Kwangtung and Hainan Island there were people’s anti-Japanese armed forces led by members of the Communist Party. The War of Resistance had become a great, genuine national revolution.

After the occupation of Wuhan and Canton by the Japanese invaders, the tremendous development of guerilla war in the enemy’s rear threw the war into a stalemate, and the Japanese
invaders could not advance any further. Because they were exposed to attack by powerful guerilla forces in their rear, they could not but turn back to attack the guerillas. The Japanese invaders decided to bring their main pressure to bear on their rear areas. They stopped their frontal strategic offensive and used political means to induce Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang to capitulate. At this time the Communist Party of China raised the slogan: "Persist in the War of Resistance, oppose capitulation; persist in unity, oppose splits; persist in progress, oppose retrogression", and led the whole people throughout the country to struggle against the reactionary tendencies of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. The danger of capitulation by Chiang Kai-shek reached its peak in September 1939 when the war broke out between fascist Germany and Britain and France. At that time the United States and Britain were all the more eager to seek a compromise with Japan by sacrificing China so that Japan might not join with Hitler in opposing Britain and the United States. To force China to surrender, they had to intensify their opposition to the Communist Party, which was persistently carrying on the War of Resistance. In these circumstances, from the end of 1939 to the beginning of 1940, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang began the first anti-Communist campaign. The reactionary army of the Kuomintang attacked the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, which was under the leadership of the Communist Party, and captured five county towns; attacked the anti-Japanese "Dare-to-die" Corps led by the Communists in Western Shansi; and attacked the Eighth Route Army, led by the Communist Party, in the south-east part of Shansi. The Eighth Route Army resolutely repulsed the Kuomintang attacks, although they coincided with attacks by the Japanese.

The Communist Party of China and the Chinese people were confronted by serious struggles. It was very clear that in China, which was being subjected to Japanese invasion, whoever could win the War of Resistance would win victory throughout the nation. Since the Communist Party of China had proved itself to be the real leader in the war against Japan, it had to explain to the whole people its views regarding the Chinese revolution and the building up of a new China, so as completely to deprive the Kuomintang reactionaries and all their followers of moral weapons while providing adequate moral weapons to the Chinese working class and revolutionary people.

This task was undertaken by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his book New Democracy, which was published in January 1940. Taking as its starting-point Chinese history and world history, New Democracy explained that, following the great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the leadership of the Chinese revolution must of necessity belong to the Chinese working class; that the Chinese revolution must be divided into two stages—the New Democratic stage and the Socialist stage—and the future of New Democracy under the leadership of the working class would most certainly be Socialism; that during the period of the New Democratic revolution the Party must adopt New Democratic political, economic and cultural programmes, which were different from those of both capitalism and Socialism. The publication of New Democracy greatly furthered the ideological unity of the Party and of the revolutionary people throughout the country. It greatly helped to unify the policies of the people's Liberated Areas everywhere. Therefore, it greatly strengthened the Chinese revolution.

To expand and consolidate the anti-Japanese national united front still further, the Party, having overcome the Right deviations, adopted a series of measures to correct certain "Left" deviations which began to occur during the struggle against the attacks launched by the Kuomintang on the Chinese Communist Party and people. The Party held the opinion that in the period of the War of Resistance, because the enemy of the nation had penetrated deeply into our country, the contradictions between the two nations were still the main contradictions. So long as the Kuomintang did not capitulate to the Japanese invaders, it was necessary and also possible not to break with the Kuomintang and to carry on our struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries within the limits of not causing a rupture. As to the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry, more attention should be paid to achieving unity with them. Hence, the Party mapped out the general policy of "developing the progressive forces, winning over the intermediate forces and
isolating the diehards”, and the guiding principle that the struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries should be “justifiable, advantageous and prudent”. Moreover, the “Three-threes representative system”, namely the system whereby the Communists (representing the working class and the poor peasants), the progressive elements (representing the petty bourgeoisie), and the intermediate elements (representing the middle bourgeoisie and enlightened gentry) each contributed one-third of the leading personnel of the government administration, was introduced in all the Liberated Areas.

To weaken the forces of the Chinese Communist Party, Chiang Kai-shek started a second anti-Communist campaign in January 1941. He arbitrarily ordered the headquarters of the New Fourth Army and a section of that army numbering more than 10,000, which had hitherto been stationed in southern Anhwei Province, to move to the north bank of the Yangtse River. On January 7, while on the march, the New Fourth Army was encircled and assailed by more than 80,000 Kuomintang troops and suffered tremendous losses. The Commander of the Army, Yeh Ting, was taken prisoner and the Deputy Commander, Hsiang Ying, was killed in battle. Having carried out this plot, Chiang Kai-shek immediately abolished the designation of the New Fourth Army and ordered attacks on other sections of the New Fourth Army. This incident was known as the “Southern Anhwei Incident”. The Communist Party of China sharply rebutted Chiang Kai-shek’s “order” for the abolition of the New Fourth Army and smashed the Kuomintang’s offensives in thoroughly prepared actions. Moreover, the main body of the New Fourth Army became more consolidated than it had been before the Incident and the Army developed still more strongly in the East China areas.

Thanks to the tremendous efforts made by the Chinese Communist Party in the united front, both before and after the Incident, Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Communist policy failed to achieve its object of isolating the Communist Party, but on the contrary it served to bring about its own isolation by awakening and educating many people who formerly harboured illusions about him.

However, the Southern Anhwei Incident marked only the beginning of the Chinese people’s difficulties. As early as the beginning of 1941, Japan had concentrated more than 60 per cent of its aggressive forces on the fronts in the Liberated Areas which were located in the enemy’s rear, and intensified large-scale “mopping-up” campaigns against the Liberated Areas, carrying out the policy of “Burn-all, Kill-all and Loot-all”. The bulk of the Kuomintang troops left behind the Japanese lines surrendered to the enemy and became puppet troops. Over 90 per cent of these puppet troops were employed, under the command of the Japanese invaders, in attacking the Liberated Areas. Chiang Kai-shek had secretly ordered many of his troops to surrender to the Japanese invaders and then, under the command of the Japanese, to turn against the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.

In June 1941, fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Japan attacked the United States and Britain in the Pacific in the winter of the same year. The gains made by the fascist camp in the initial stages of the war further encouraged the Kuomintang reactionaries in their shameful efforts to surrender to the enemy, to collaborate with the enemy, to encircle the Liberated Areas, and to attack the Communists and the people.

At the same time the Kuomintang reactionaries adopted every means to undermine the strength of the Communist Party and of the people. In such circumstances, the Liberated Areas together with their populations and troops all diminished in size and encountered great financial difficulties. The Party had to make still more strenuous efforts to overcome such difficulties. It led all the government offices, schools and troops in the Liberated Areas to strive to be self-supporting by engaging in production and carried out the policy of reducing the numbers of troops, raising their quality and simplifying government administration, in order to lighten the burden on the people.

At the same time, emphasis was laid on leading the people to organise themselves to develop agricultural production, in order to provide relief in case of natural calamities. Side by side with the campaign to develop production, the Party led the peasants to carry out a large-scale movement to reduce rents and interest.
The people’s militia in the Liberated Areas was greatly developed in order to fight the enemy in the new situation. In addition to carrying out “counter-mopping-up” struggles, the army and the people of the Liberated Areas dispatched armed work-teams to penetrate deep into the rear of the enemy to lead struggles for the restoration and expansion of the Liberated Areas. As a result of such efforts all difficulties were overcome. The Liberated Areas were further consolidated and from 1943 onward were steadily expanded.

The Party seized on this period, when there were comparatively few changes in the situation, to conduct education in Marxism-Leninism throughout the Party. It had been extremely difficult to undertake such education on a large scale at times when the war and the revolution were developing swiftly or were undergoing rapid changes. The Party adopted the method of rectifying erroneous styles in Party work in studies—and in writing—to lead the cadre and Party members to recognise and overcome petty bourgeois ideas and styles of work, which were prevalent in the Party under the cloak of Marxism-Leninism, and especially tendencies to subjectivism and sectarianism and their form of expression—stereotyped party jargon. Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s lectures Reform Our Studies, Rectification of the Party’s Styles of Work, Oppose Stereotyped Party Jargon, and Addresses at the Yenan Round-Table Conference on Literature and Art, and Comrade Liu Shao-chi’s lectures How to Be a Good Communist and On Inner-Party Struggle, played a very important part in this study campaign, which helped to wipe out the evil influence exercised by doctrinaireism inside the Party from 1931. It helped a large number of new Party members of petty-bourgeois-intellectual origin to get rid of their former petty bourgeois standpoint and to adopt the standpoint of the proletariat. As a result, it helped the Party to take a big stride forward ideologically and become more united than ever before.

While the Communist Party of China was thus advancing through difficulties and hard struggle, the Kuomintang régime was heading towards the uttermost depths of corruption. The leading circles of the Kuomintang, taking advantage of their political position, and particularly the War of Resistance, inflation and so forth, amassed vast wealth, took control of China’s finances, commerce, industry and agriculture, engaged in unscrupulous plunder, and speedily developed feudal, comprador and military monopoly capital, namely, “bureaucratic capital”, headed by the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Li-fu. This “bureaucratic capital” of the Kuomintang sharply conflicted with the interests of the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie in the Kuomintang-occupied areas. Because of their extremely miserable living conditions and their lack of political freedom to fight against Japan, the people were loud in their complaints, and popular uprisings occurred in many places. Notwithstanding his own corruption and isolation, Chiang Kai-shek, in 1943, still vociferously alleged that the Communist Party had disrupted “unity”, asked, that a “punitive” campaign be launched against it and moved large numbers of troops in preparation for assaults on the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region. This was the Kuomintang’s third anti-Communist campaign. However, he was forced to halt this campaign because it was exposed and denounced in advance by the Communist Party of China and opposed by the people throughout the country. Obviously, at the time Chiang Kai-shek still thought that he could rely upon the several million troops which he had kept in the rear throughout the war. He did not yet realise that his reactionary policy had long before demoralised his own troops. This fact was fully revealed in 1944 when the Japanese launched their new offensive.

The year 1944 was a year of the victorious development of the world anti-fascist war, a year of the imminent collapse of the Hitlerite gang under the attacks of the heroic Soviet Army, but it was a year of another disastrous rout for the Kuomintang troops in the face of a new Japanese offensive. Japan’s position in the Pacific was becoming more and more difficult. Japan urgently needed to open up the lines of communication from Peking to Canton and Nanning. For this purpose, it launched a new offensive against the front battle-lines in March 1944. As the Kuomintang troops fled in utter
confusion, the Japanese invaders were able to occupy, in a short space of eight months, the greater part of the provinces of Honan, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, and a part of Kweichow Province, and caused enormous damage to the people. Encouraged by the great victories in the world anti-fascist war, in which the Soviet Union was the mainstay, and by the victorious development on the battlefields of the Chinese people's Liberated Areas, the whole nation could no longer tolerate the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the democratic struggles of the people and the activities of the democratic parties and groups steadily mounted. To reorganise the Kuomintang Government into a democratic coalition government became the unanimous demand of all patriotic people.

The struggle of the Chinese people for democracy, however, encountered a new form of foreign intervention. The tottering Kuomintang régime, bitterly hated by the people, received support from American imperialism which by then had already gained the upper hand in the Pacific. In September 1944, at the People's Political Council meeting called by the Kuomintang in Chungking, Comrade Lin Po-chu, the representative of the Chinese Communist Party, demanded the immediate convening of an emergency conference on national affairs as well as the abolition of the Kuomintang dictatorship, and the establishment of a democratic coalition government. The Kuomintang reactionaries, secretly backed by the American imperialists, obstinately rejected these demands of the Communist Party of China and of other democratic parties and groups.

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, the American imperialists had made every effort to reach a compromise with Japan at the expense of China. Now they wanted to take advantage of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression to extend their influence further in China, with the aim of taking the place of Japan after the war in monopolising China's markets and turning China into a colony of the United States. For this reason they tried very hard to prop up the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. On the one hand, the American imperialists sent a large number of officers to train and equip Chiang Kai-shek's troops, and detailed many experts to infiltrate into the Chiang Kai-shek government. On the other hand, they played the honest broker by "mediating" between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China. But it did not take long for the American imperialists to reveal the truth that their position was the same as that of Chiang Kai-shek. Both the American representatives and Chiang Kai-shek tried the device of "inviting" certain Communists to participate in the Kuomintang reactionary government to "achieve" its "unification" and "democratisation" and thus liquidate the demand for the reconstruction of that government into a democratic coalition government. Moreover, they attempted to use this trick to destroy the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the Liberated Areas. When the Chinese Communist Party had rejected this vicious proposal of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, the latter went so far as to propose the formation of a three-man committee, including an American, to "reorganise" the troops of the Liberated Areas. Meanwhile American representative Patrick J. Hurley threateningly declared that the United States would only co-operate with Chiang Kai-shek, and not with the Communist Party of China.

Of course, the threats and deception of American imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek could not shake the firm will of the Chinese people in their fight for independence and democracy. Nor could they check the advancing cause of the liberation of the Chinese people.

The Communist Party of China called its Seventh Party Congress in Yanan on April 24, 1945, which was attended by 544 delegates and 208 consultative delegates representing 1,210,000 Party members. The Congress heard and unanimously adopted Comrade Mao Tse-tung's political report On Coalition Government, Comrade Chu Teh's military report On the Battlefronts in the Liberated Areas and Comrade Liu Shao-chi's report on the revision of the Party Constitution. It adopted a new Party Constitution and elected a new Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

The Communist Party of China showed unprecedented solidarity and unity at its Seventh Party Congress. This solidarity and unity were in the main brought about by the victorious
development of the Chinese revolution since the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935, under the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party. The campaign for the rectification of erroneous styles of work launched throughout the Party in 1942, the discussions which were held among Party cadres prior to the Seventh Party Congress on the historical experience of the Party, and the Decisions on a Number of Historical Questions adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected by the Sixth Party Congress, had all played an important and active part in strengthening unity within the Party.

The Seventh Party Congress unanimously adopted the General Programme of the Party and the Party’s general and concrete programmes for the period of New Democratic Revolution. It correctly analysed the current world and domestic situations and called upon the whole Party and the people throughout the country to struggle for final victory in the War of Resistance and for the establishment of a democratic coalition government. In order to prepare for the nation-wide victory, the Congress especially urged the whole Party to give timely attention to strengthening the work in the cities, above all among the working class. The Congress pointed out that the Chinese people under the direct leadership of the Communist Party of China, had already created nineteen Liberated Areas during the war, with a total population of 95,500,000, a People’s Liberation Army of 910,000 men (including the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other anti-Japanese people’s troops) and a people’s militia of 2,200,000 men who were simultaneously engaged in production.

After 1944, the People’s Liberation Army had turned to a partial counter-offensive. From September 1937 to March 1945, it fought more than 115,000 major and minor engagements against the enemy, killed or wounded 960,000 Japanese and puppet troops, captured 280,000 men, and forced 100,000 Japanese and puppet troops to surrender or to cross over. A majority of China’s leading cities, lines of communication and coastlines were besieged or controlled by the People’s Liberation Army. Victory in the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and in the cause of democracy could be ensured by relying on the mighty People’s Liberation Army and on the unity of the people of the whole nation.

But because of the existence of the reactionary forces both at home and abroad, the Seventh Party Congress urged that the whole nation should remain sharply vigilant against the danger of a new nation-wide civil war and imperialist intervention.

After the Seventh Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the counter-offensive launched by the People’s Liberation Army against the Japanese invaders made rapid progress. On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, thus bringing China’s War of Resistance to its final stage. The Soviet Army quickly annihilated the Japanese Kwantung Army and liberated North-East China. The People’s Liberation Army, fighting in co-ordination with the Soviet Army, energetically wiped out the Japanese and puppet troops and liberated a large number of medium-sized and small cities which were previously occupied by the Japanese invaders. On August 14, Japan announced its unconditional surrender. After the Japanese surrender, the United States and Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and puppet troops to continue to “maintain local order” and to resist the People’s Liberation Army units that had encircled the Japanese invaders, and to wait for the arrival of the Kuomintang troops, which at that time were still far in the rear, to accept the Japanese surrender. The American land, air and naval forces in the meantime tried by every means to move Kuomintang troops to take over the big cities and major communication lines occupied by the Japanese invaders. With the collaboration of the American armed forces, the Japanese army of invasion and puppet troops, Chiang Kai-shek again gained a “dominant” position throughout the country after the conclusion of the War of Resistance.

The experience of the Chinese people’s War of Resistance was the experience of a backward, big country fighting an imperialist power, the experience of the union, under the leadership of the Communist Party, of the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and even a part of the landlord class and of the comprador bourgeoisie, to resist aggression. The Communist Party of China correctly
analysed this complex situation and correctly employed the political and military experiences gained during the two previous revolutionary civil wars from 1924 to 1936 and was able to adopt a correct political and military line, to rectify the deviations within the Party in time, to beat back the reactionary groups at home, and to win a great victory, thus laying solid foundations for nation-wide victory in the subsequent people's democratic revolution.

The War of Resistance proved that under the correct leadership of the proletariat imperialist aggression could be defeated by relying on the united struggle of the masses of the people, on the people's united front and on the people's war. This is a truth of extreme importance to the Chinese people and to the peoples in the colonial countries all over the world.

The War of Resistance also proved that the Anglo-American imperialists always adopt a hostile attitude towards the peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and that only the Soviet Union is the faithful supporter of the world's oppressed peoples. The aid given by the Soviet Union is of decisive significance for the victory of the people all over the world in their struggle against imperialism. This is a truth of equal importance to the Chinese people and to the peoples of the colonial countries throughout the world.

Chapter Four


Fresh changes took place in the class relationships in China after the conclusion of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression. During the War of Resistance the Kuomintang reactionaries, representing the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, pursued a policy of passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party in the hope of sapping the strength of the Communist Party and preserving and amassing their own strength, so that after the defeat of Japan at the hands of the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States and the Chinese people, as represented by the Chinese Communist Party, they might reap the spoils of victory and then launch an anti-Communist war to annihilate the Communist Party and establish their dark tyranny over the whole country. To this end all the arms supplied to the Kuomintang by foreign countries for use in the war against Japan had been stored up by the Kuomintang reactionaries for use against the Communists. Thus, the entire Chinese people were threatened by a civil war crisis as soon as the War of Resistance was ended.

After the Japanese surrender, the American imperialists tried to step into the position formerly occupied by Japan in China, to gain control of China's extensive markets and to convert China into an American colony. For this purpose, the United States had to help the Kuomintang in its efforts to annihilate the Communist Party, because the Communist Party constituted the greatest obstacle to the realisation of its aims. The Kuomintang had also to rely upon American aid to carry on its anti-Communist civil war. On this basis the collusion between the American imperialists and the Kuomintang became more close and they made active preparations to launch an all-out offensive.
against the people's Liberated Areas. They thought that the numerical and material superiority of the Kuomintang armed forces over the People's Liberation Army, the superiority both in population and resources of the Kuomintang-occupied areas over the Liberated Areas, and the political, economic and military aid given by the American Government to the Kuomintang Government, would enable them to attain their malevolent and shameless purpose.

A war against the people was a profitable business for the big bourgeoisie—the bureaucratic capitalists of the Kuomintang. After the Japanese surrender, the Four Big Families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Li-fu had resorted to unheard-of plunder and usurpation on the pretext of the “take-over”. In the course of the new war, they drained the blood of the people by means of inflation, taxation, requisitioning of grain and other economic controls. Their personal fortunes soon rose to as much as 20 billion U.S. dollars.

The policy of the Kuomintang during the War of Resistance sharpened to an extreme point the antagonisms between the Kuomintang and the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. Having gone through many years of war, the people of all classes throughout the country unanimously wished for peace so that the seriously damaged productive capacity might be revived. The people demanded that after the victory of the War of Resistance, national independence and political democracy should be achieved. The peasants wanted land. The Kuomintang not only denied all these things to the people but decided to plunge them once more into the abyss of civil war and bankruptcy. The Kuomintang gave all sorts of special privileges to America in the hope of getting American aid, with the result that the national industries and commercial enterprises in the Kuomintang-occupied areas, under the two-fold pressure of American capital and Kuomintang bureaucratic capital, closed down one after another and many workers were thrown out on to the streets. American military and other personnel in China insulted and harmed the Chinese people. Kuomintang secret service agencies unceasingly persecuted the people and the democratic elements with every method of terror. In the Kuomintang-occupied areas, what the Kuomintang Government did for the peasants was to conscript them by pressgangs and to requisition their grain; in the Liberated Areas, it organised the landlords to rob the peasants of the land they had acquired.

Although the civil war planned by the Kuomintang reactionaries had become inevitable and although they had become isolated from the people, the peace-seeking people were still willing to strive for peace by all means before the outbreak of an all-out civil war, and did not wish to break with the Kuomintang. Illusions about the Kuomintang and America, and about following a “third road” other than those of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, still existed in the national bourgeoisie and their parties and groups. The Communist Party of China, however, had long been well acquainted with the civil-war plot of the Kuomintang and American imperialism, and was adequately prepared both ideologically and organisationally. However, in order to save the peace at the last minute and to fully educate the people, the Chinese Communist Party, after the conclusion of the War of Resistance, made great efforts and displayed great patience in leading the people throughout the country to seek a path to avoid war and achieve peace and unity.

After the conclusion of the War of Resistance, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on August 25, 1945, issued a Declaration Concerning the Present Situation, which expressed the desire of the Chinese Communist Party for peace, democracy and unity. In order to realise this desire, Comrade Mao Tse-tung went to Chungking on August 28 and conferred for more than a month with Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang. On October 10, the results of the conference were finally made public. They contained many agreements on measures to safeguard internal peace. The Chinese Communist Party was ready to carry out faithfully these agreements to which it was a party, and it had already begun to put them into effect. But Chiang Kai-shek, on his part, regarded these agreements as nothing but tricks to cover up his plans for start-
ing war. He thought that after the conclusion of these agreements the Communist Party of China would relax its vigilance, and that if he launched a surprise attack he would surely score a great victory. Accordingly, when the agreements were made public he immediately started an offensive against the Liberated Areas. But the Chinese Communist Party was already on the alert and the military offensive of Chiang Kai-shek was smashed.

Chiang Kai-shek and his American masters discovered that they were not yet well prepared. Chiang Kai-shek's troops which had avoided fighting the Japanese, were stationed far away in the remote rear, in South-West and North-West China, while the People's Liberation Army, which had been fighting all the time against Japan at the front, was in North, East and North-East China. The situation at the time was unfavourable for Chiang Kai-shek and his American masters to launch an all-out civil war. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek still needed to take over quickly the cities and communication lines which were still occupied by the enemy and to transport millions of troops to the various civil war fronts. Chiang Kai-shek, of course, was unable to do all these things by himself. To help him to carry these things out, American troops landed at many points along the Chinese coast to receive the Japanese surrender and to prevent the People's Liberation Army from doing so, and turned all the arms taken from the Japanese armies over to Chiang Kai-shek. The American imperialists used aeroplanes and naval vessels to transport over a million men of Chiang Kai-shek's army to points around the Liberated Areas. In order to gain time to get these things done, Chiang Kai-shek nominally accepted the demands of the Chinese Communist Party, the various democratic parties and groups and the Chinese people, and on January 10, 1946, he issued a truce order and called a Political Consultative Conference embracing all parties and groups. At that time the American government also nominally advocated a truce and sent George C. Marshall to replace Patrick J. Hurley in carrying on "mediation" in China's civil war for the purpose of helping Chiang Kai-shek speed up his war preparations under the cloak of "mediation". Shortly after the announcement of the truce, Chiang Kai-shek ordered attacks against the People's Liberation Army which had gone to North-East China around the time of the Japanese surrender. KMT troops succeeded in occupying vast districts south of the Changchun-Kirin line, in the Liberated Areas in North-East China, extending to Antung in the south and Chングt eh in the west. From July 1946 onward, Chiang Kai-shek completely tore up the truce order and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, mobilised all his armed forces in an all-out offensive against the Liberated Areas, and occupied in succession many cities and vast rural districts in the liberated areas.

During this period the Chinese Communist Party conducted an extensive and effective campaign of popular education among the people throughout the country, gradually awakening them from their illusions about peace, as well as their illusions about Chiang Kai-shek and the American Government, so that they might come to understand that to achieve peace, democracy and independence and to maintain their right to live, they had to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and drive out the American imperialists. On the one hand, the Chinese Communist Party completely isolated Chiang Kai-shek and the American imperialists politically, and on the other hand it led the People's Liberation Army in making strenuous efforts to smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensives. The Communist Party of China held that Chiang Kai-shek's attacks not only must be defeated but could be defeated. The reason was that the effects of the enemy's military superiority and of the American aid could only be temporary, but the effects of the character of the war (whether it was just or unjust) and the attitude of the people (whether it was sympathetic or antagonistic) were constant. In this respect superiority certainly belonged to the People's Liberation Army, because of the determined efforts of the Chinese Communist Party in the cause of internal peace.

In order to defeat Chiang Kai-shek's attacks, Comrade Mao Tse-tung laid down a correct military policy, the chief aim of which was the annihilation of the enemy's manpower and not the defence of cities or localities. In order to wipe out the enemy every battle must be thoroughly prepared and its outcome assured; an overwhelmingly superior force, several times
resolution of the Political Consultative Conference and ordered the convocation of a dictatorial, bogus "National Assembly" which split up the nation. With the support of George C. Marshall, special American envoy, and Leighton Stuart, the American Ambassador, the bogus "National Assembly" opened on November 15 and adopted a bogus "Constitution". But facts confirmed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's prophetic assertion in his book Coalition Government: this step taken by Chiang Kai-shek was like "putting a noose around his own neck" and was without any popular support. In March 1947, the Kuomintang reactionaries compelled the Chinese Communist Party to withdraw its delegations in Nanking, Shanghai and Chungking to Yanan. Immediately after this, Kuomintang troops launched an offensive and occupied Yanan. This shattered all hopes of a peaceful settlement. The Chinese people, including the national bourgeoisie, focused their sympathy and hope on the Communist Party of China. Propaganda for a "third road", as represented by the Right wing of the national bourgeoisie, also went bankrupt. The revolutionary groups of the Kuomintang, the Democratic League of China, the Democratic National Construction Association of China, other democratic parties and groups and public figures refused to co-operate with the Kuomintang reactionaries; they refused to participate in the bogus "National Assembly" or in the reactionary government. At the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, the students throughout the country demonstrated against the rape of a Chinese girl student by American soldiers. In May 1947 the students all over the country held demonstrations against starvation, civil war and persecution. Workers and peasants in various places also conducted struggles against the Kuomintang. All these facts demonstrated that the American imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries had become completely isolated, while the united front of the New Democratic Revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party was much wider and more consolidated than ever before. Both military and political conditions were ripe for the Chinese people to win nation-wide victory.

On October 10, 1947, the Chinese People's Liberation Army issued a declaration, calling upon all the Chinese people to
overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and build a new China. To satisfy
the peasants' age-old desire for land, the Chinese Communist
Party on the same day made public the Basic Programme of
the Chinese Agrarian Law, providing for the abolition of the old
land ownership system based upon feudal exploitation and for
the institution of a new system of giving land to the tillers. The
carrying out of land reform fully aroused the peasants in the
Liberated Areas where the landlords were liquidated as a class,
thus greatly consolidating the Liberated Areas and greatly
facilitating the People's Liberation War.

Meanwhile, in order to carry out land reform thoroughly, to
enhance the fighting power of the People's Liberation Army and
to promote democracy in the countryside, the Communist Party
of China initiated a Party consolidation campaign at all levels
of the Party, thereby raising the level of class-consciousness in
the People's Liberation Army and correcting the impure com-
position of the Party organisations in the countryside and their
impure style of work.

To prepare for a new victory a conference was called in
North Shensi in December 1947, by the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China. At this conference Comrade
Mao Tse-tung made a report on The Present Situation and Our
Tasks. He pointed out in this report that the Chinese people's
revolutionary war had reached a turning point, which was also
"the turning point from the growth to the extinction of more
than 100 years' rule of imperialism in China". Comrade Mao
Tse-tung penetratively analysed the military, economic and
agrarian problems, and the problems of the united front, which
would confront the Party in the period when the revolutionary
war entered the offensive stage. In view of the deviations which
had damaged industry and commerce during the land reform
movement, Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his report emphatically
reiterated the Party's economic programme, which was to con-
fiscate the land of the feudal class and redistribute it to the
peasants, to confiscate all bureaucratic capital and make it the
capital of the new Democratic State, and to protect all national
industries and commerce. He also levelled scathing criticism at
certain functionaries within the Party who adopted an excessively
Left policy toward the elements of middle and petty bourgeois
economy. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the gigantic
State economy of a socialist character, which was to be created
from confiscated bureaucratic capital and which would control
the economic arteries of the whole nation, would certainly be
of decisive significance and play a tremendous leading role in
the economic life of a People's State. The middle and petty
bourgeois economic elements, therefore, were not only necessary
but there was also no reason to be afraid of them. As a result
of this conference and the Party's manifold work during this
period, the Party on its part was well prepared to lead the people
to fight for nation-wide victory.

The war progressed very rapidly in 1948 and 1949. By 1948
the People's Liberation Army had already adequately mastered
the technique of attacking cities, and liberated in quick suc-
esion a large number of cities which were "key points of defence" of
the Kuomintang. With the victorious conclusion of the Lia-
Sheng campaign from September 12 to November 2, 1948, the
whole of North-East China was liberated. In this campaign
472,000 Kuomintang troops were put out of action, giving the
People's Liberation Army numerical superiority over the Kuo-
imtang troops. Shortly afterwards, in the Huai-Hai campaign
fought near Hsuchow (Kiangsu Province) on the southern front
from November 7, 1948, to January 10, 1949, some 555,000
men of the Kuomintang army were put out of action. As a
result, the main body of the armed forces of the Kuomintang
reactionaries was destroyed and Nanking was exposed to attack
by the People's Liberation Army. At about the same time (from
December 5, 1948, to January 31, 1949) the People's Liberation
Army on the northern front launched a campaign to liberate
Tientsin and Peking. Kalgan and Tientsin were captured in
battle and Peking was liberated by peaceful means. In this
campaign the Kuomintang army lost a further 521,000 men.
Thus liberation of all places north of the middle and lower
reaches of the Yangtse River was now mainly achieved.

In March 1949 the Communist Party of China called the
Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected by
the Seventh Party Congress. The session decided on the funda-
mental policies by which nation-wide victory could be achieved and which should be pursued following that victory.

This session stressed that on the eve of nation-wide victory, the main emphasis of the Party's work should be shifted from the countryside to the cities. From the year 1927, the basic work of the Party had been to accumulate strength in the countryside, to use the countryside to surround the cities and eventually to capture the cities. By the time of the session this work had already been accomplished. The main emphasis of the Party's work should be shifted to the cities so as to use the cities to lead the countryside. The session further pointed out that the Party's work in the cities should whole-heartedly rely on the working class, and that the Party's central task was to restore and develop industrial production. The session discussed in detail the status of the various elements of China's economy and the correct policies the Party should adopt. The outcome of this discussion later formed the foundation of the economic policy of The Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

As to the Kuomintang reactionaries, Chiang Kai-shek, at the instigation of the American imperialists, pretended to retire; Li Tsung-jen, acting for Chiang Kai-shek, came out with an appeal for "peace". The Chinese Communist Party did not reject this appeal. After conducting negotiations with Kuomintang delegates a draft peace agreement was drawn up. The reactionary Kuomintang government, however, refused to sign the agreement, thus completely laying bare its trickery.

On April 21, 1949, Comrade Mao Tse-tung and Comrade Chu Teh ordered the Chinese People's Liberation Army to advance into South and North-West China to liberate the rest of China. On April 23, 1949, the People's Liberation Army liberated Nanjing and, in the course of 1949, liberated one after another many leading cities, including Taiyuan, Handchow, Hankow, Sian, Shanghai, Lanchow, Canton, Kweiyang, Kweilin, Chungking and Chengtu and vast territories. Hunan, Suiyuan, Sinkiang and Yunnan provinces were liberated by peaceful means. In April and May 1950, the People's Liberation Army crossed the sea and liberated Hainan Island and the Choushan Islands. In 1950, the People's Liberation Army mopped up 1,600,000 bandits left behind by the Kuomintang in the southern and south-western provinces. In November 1950, the People's Liberation Army started to advance into Tibet. In May 1951, after negotiation, the Central People's Government and the Tibetan local government reached an agreement concerning measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. Thus, except for Taiwan, which is still occupied by the remnants of the Kuomintang reactionaries and the American aggressors, the whole of China has been liberated.

From July 1946 to June 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army eliminated more than 8,070,000 men of the reactionary armed forces of the Kuomintang and captured more than 54,400 artillery pieces, 319,900 machine guns, 1,000 tanks and armoured cars, 20,000 motor vehicles and great quantities of other arms and equipment.

On October 1, 1949, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic was founded. The Central People's Government was elected by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference which was composed of 662 delegates of the various nationalities, democratic parties and groups, popular organisations, regions, armies and specially invited democratic personalities. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held its first plenary session from September 21 to 30, 1949. The Conference adopted The Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, The Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, and The Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. It elected Mao Tse-tung to be Chairman of the Central People's Government, elected Chu Teh, Liu Shao-chi, Soong Ching-ling, Li Chi-chen, Chang Lan and Kao Kang as Vice-Chairmen, elected fifty-six persons as members of the Central People's Government Council and selected Peking as the capital of the People's Republic of China. The establishment of the People's Republic of China was a glorious culmination of the struggles of the Chinese people over the past century against imperialism and feudalism and especially of their struggle
in the previous twenty-eight years under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

The People's Republic of China was established. Since then the Chinese revolution has entered a new stage. The situation throughout the country is entirely different from what it was at the time when New Democracy and Coalition Government were published. It is necessary to explain the questions arising from the conditions following the victory of the people's democratic revolution: What kind of State is the People's Republic of China? What are the positions and relationships of the various classes and of the various sections of national economy? What is the future of such a State? To these questions Comrade Mao Tse-tung's article On People's Democratic Dictatorship published on July 1, 1949, and The Common Programme adopted by the first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, have given full and satisfactory answers.

In his article On People's Democratic Dictatorship Comrade Mao Tse-tung defines the People's Republic of China as a "people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class (through the Communist Party) and with the alliance of the workers and peasants as its foundation". In explaining the significance of this formula, Comrade Mao Tse-tung writes:

"Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. Under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, these classes unite to form their own State and elect their own government so as to enforce their dictatorship over the henchmen of imperialism—the landlord class and bureaucratic capitalist class, as well as the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang, which represents these classes, and their accomplices. The People's Government will suppress such persons. It will only permit them to behave themselves properly. It will not allow them to speak or act wildly. Should they do so, they will be instantly turned and punished.

The democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the people, giving them freedom of speech, assembly and association. The right to vote is given only to the people, not to the reactionaries. These two things, democracy for the people and dictatorship for the reactionaries, when combined, constitute the people's democratic dictatorship."

Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out over and over again that the People's Republic of China must follow the example of the Soviet Union in advancing towards Socialism and Communism and must henceforth stand firmly on the side of the Soviet Union, on the side of Socialism. But in the present historical period, the People's Republic of China still permits the national bourgeoisie to exist. Herein lies the difference between People's Democracy in China and People's Democracy in the countries in South-East Europe. This difference results from different historical conditions.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung writes:

"The national bourgeoisie is of great importance during the present stage. We still have imperialism standing beside us, and this enemy is very ferocious. It will require a very long time for China to attain genuine economic independence. Complete and genuine independence can be achieved only when China's industry has developed and when China no longer depends economically upon foreign countries. China's modern industry is still very small compared with the nation's entire economy. In order to offset imperialist pressure and to advance her backward economy a step forward, China must utilise all elements of urban and rural capitalism which are beneficial and not harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood. She must unite the national bourgeoisie into the common struggle. Our current policy is to control capitalism, not to eliminate it."

The process of controlling capitalism is a process of uniting with and struggling against the national bourgeoisie and also a process of reforming the national bourgeoisie. Comrade Mao Tse-tung says:

"The other exploiting classes have been overthrown and only the national bourgeoisie remains. At the present stage a great deal of educational work can be carried on among them. When the time comes to realise Socialism, that is, to nationalise private enterprises, we will go a step further in our work of educating and reforming them. The people have a strong state apparatus in their hands, and they do not fear rebellion on the part of the national bourgeoisie."

The basic viewpoint of Comrade Mao Tse-tung concerning the People's Republic of China is laid down in legal form in The Common Programme. The general principles of The Common Programme state:

"The People's Republic of China is a New Democratic or a People's Democratic State. It carries out the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class, based on the alliance of workers and peasants, and uniting all democratic classes and all nationalities in China. It opposes imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism and strives for the independence, democracy, peace, unity, prosperity and strength of China."
The Common Programme systematically outlines the present basic policies of the Chinese people’s democratic united front and of the People’s Republic of China in the political, military, economic, cultural, national and diplomatic spheres. These policies are also the basic policies of the Communist Party of China at the present period. The Common Programme makes a particularly detailed explanation of the economic policies. It states:

“The basic principle for the economic construction of the People’s Republic of China is to develop production and bring about a prosperous economy through the policies of taking into account both labour and capital, of mutual aid between the city and countryside, and circulation of goods between China and abroad. The State shall co-ordinate and regulate state-owned economy, co-operative economy, the individual economy of peasants and handicraftsmen, private capitalist economy and state capitalist economy, in their spheres of operation, supply of raw materials, marketing, labour conditions, technical equipment, policies of public and general finance, etc. In this way all components of the social economy can, under the leadership of the state-owned economy, carry out division and co-ordination of labour and play their respective parts in promoting the development of the social economy as a whole.”

Thus, the political leadership of the working class and the economic leadership of socialist-type state economy under the control of the working class are legally recognised in The Common Programme and constitute the main guarantee of the development of the People’s Republic of China towards Socialism.

The establishment of the People’s Republic of China elated the peoples of the whole world. On October 2, 1949, the most staunch international friend of the Chinese people, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. The People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the People’s Republic of Rumania, the People’s Republic of Hungary, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Czechoslovakia, the Republic of Poland, the People’s Republic of Mongolia, the German Democratic Republic, the People’s Republic of Albania, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the Republic of India, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Union of Burma, the Republic of Indonesia, the Swiss Confederation, the Republic of Finland, and Pakistan have in turn established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Britain, Ceylon, Norway, Israel, Afghanistan and the Netherlands have recognised the People’s Republic of China. The People’s Republic of China stands firmly on the side of the world camp of peace headed by the Soviet Union and vigorously tries to strengthen the friendly relations between China and the Soviet Union. On February 14, 1950, with the personal participation of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Generalissimo Stalin, Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Vyshinsky signed on behalf of China and the Soviet Union the historically significant Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the Agreement Between China and the Soviet Union on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen and the Agreement Between China and the Soviet Union on the Granting of Credit to the People’s Republic of China. The Treaty and Agreements greatly strengthened the world camp of peace and democracy as well as the international position of New China and contributed much to China’s reconstruction work.

Immediately after its establishment, the Central People’s Government carried out enormous projects to restore and reform the national economy, which had been seriously devastated by imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, war and natural calamities. After confiscating the bureaucratic capital of the Kuomintang, the Central People’s Government built up a state economy of a socialist character, which swiftly exercised a great influence on the economic life of the whole country. Supported by the state economy, the Central People’s Government swiftly and effectively unified and balanced the national finances, curbed the acute inflation of the previous twelve years and systematically carried out tremendous schemes to restore industrial and agricultural production, communications and trade. In order to open up markets and to accumulate funds for industrialisation, the Central People’s Government decided to put the emphasis in economic work on the development of agriculture, light industries and domestic trade, and,
at the same time started to establish a number of the most urgent national defence industries and power industries. Because the state economy actually controls the economic life of the whole country and is highly concentrated, private capitalist industry and commerce are being gradually led on to the road of accepting the leadership of the state economy, and at the same time a state capitalist economy, serving the state economy, is gradually developing. The reorganisation or readjustment of industry and commerce to meet the needs of the country is an essential part of the preparations for planned industrial construction.

The Central People's Government regarded the carrying out of agrarian reform throughout the country as one of the main conditions for improving the entire economic situation and preparing for industrial construction. In June 1950 the Central People's Government adopted _The Agrarian Reform Law_ of the People's Republic of China and from the winter of 1950 to the spring of 1951 led the peasants in the newly liberated areas to complete agrarian reform in areas with a total rural population of 130 million. Because the war had been mainly concluded, the provisions in the _Basic Programme of the Chinese Agrarian Law_ promulgated in 1947 concerning the problem of the land of the rich peasants were modified in _The Agrarian Reform Law_ of the People's Republic of China. _The Agrarian Reform Law_ changes the policy of requisitioning the surplus land of the rich peasants to a policy of preserving rich peasant economy, that is, to requisition only under special conditions the land the rich peasant rents out and to leave the rest of his land intact. This new policy is an important means of ensuring the middle peasant's enthusiasm for production. At present, the agrarian reform has been completed in areas, including the old Liberated Areas, with a total rural population of 290 million and it will be completed in the rest of the country within one or two years. The agrarian reform, the building up of state power in the form of the people's representative conferences, which are being carried on all over the country, and the large-scale campaign, in which the broad masses of the people are participating, to suppress counter-revolutionary subversive activities, have greatly consolidated the foundations of the people's democratic dictatorship. Without such foundations, planned economic construction would be impossible.

The Communist Party of China realises that the consolidation of the Party is of decisive significance in all revolutionary work at present and in the future. The Party has developed swiftly in the successful years of the people's liberation war. Now the membership of the Communist Party of China is 5,800,000. The Party has decided in general to suspend recruiting new members in the old rural districts and to stress the recruitment of industrial workers into the Party. The Party had decided to conduct systematic Marxist-Leninist education seriously among its members in order that every Party member may thoroughly understand the necessity of relying on the working class and of realising Communism, and also to carry out a serious overhaul of the Party's organisations according to strict standards.

When the Chinese people started to reconstruct their country they did not forget the threat of new imperialist aggression. The American imperialists, who were not resigned to their defeat in China, openly occupied China's Taiwan Province in June 1950 when they carried out their armed intervention in Korea. The seizure of Taiwan by America was actually the continuation of the long-term armed intervention of the American Government in the Chinese people's liberation war and was the beginning of its armed intervention against the People's Republic of China. The American seizure of Taiwan proved that America's frenzied armed invasion of our friendly neighbour, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was part of its general aggressive plans against our country. The reason why the American interventionists supported the puppet clique of Syngman Rhee—the "Chiang Kai-shek of Korea"—in launching attacks upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was that it wanted to follow the old path of the Japanese aggressors: first to occupy Korea and seize Taiwan, and then occupy North-East China. In October 1950, the American army of invasion occupied Pyongyang and then madly thrust large numbers of troops northward to the Chinese-Korean frontier on the Yalu and Tumen Rivers,
seriously threatening the security of North-East China. The U.S. Air Force constantly bombed and strafed the countryside and cities of China near the north-east frontier and inflicted losses of life and property on our countrymen. The people throughout the country could not tolerate these actions any longer. They agitated to resist America and aid Korea and to protect their homes and defend their country by voluntary action. The Communist Party and other democratic parties of China issued a declaration supporting this patriotic demand of the people. Thus, with unparalleled enthusiasm, the Chinese people vigorously carried out a just, gigantic struggle to resist America and help Korea.

The Chinese people's volunteers started fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Korean People's Army on the Korean front in the latter part of October 1950 and quickly changed the once perilous situation encountered by the Korean people in their war against aggression. The frenzied assault of the American army of invasion was thrown back from North Korea and severe losses were inflicted upon the American invaders and the Syngman Rhee puppet army. From that time until the latter part of June 1951 the Chinese people's volunteers, together with the Korean People's Army, fought five campaigns and inflicted losses of over 250,000 men on the enemy in action (not including their non-combatant casualties). The severely beaten army of invasion was driven to the vicinity of the 38th Parallel in the centre of Korea. In April 1951, because of the series of defeats he had sustained, the commander-in-chief of the army of invasion, the notorious American warmonger, MacArthur, was dismissed from his post. In spite of the many difficulties caused by the aggressors' frantic bombing and destruction, the Chinese people's volunteers in Korea gallantly helped the Korean people to resist the American aggression. This action was enthusiastically hailed by the people of China, Korea and the whole world and gave rise to an unprecedented patriotic wave among the Chinese people. The patriotic Chinese people are deeply convinced that the task of helping Korea, liberating Taiwan and consolidating national defence is not only a vital guarantee for China's economic recovery and construction, but is also an important component part of the cause of world peace. The noble struggle of the Chinese people against American aggression will end in victory, just as did the People's War of Liberation against Chiang Kai-shek.
Chapter Five

A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE THIRTY YEARS

As has been said above, the thirty years which the Chinese Communist Party has passed through are thirty great and glorious years—thirty years in which the Chinese Communist Party and the working class and people of China, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, fought heroically against the imperialist aggressors and their lackeys, underwent many hardships and reverses, overcome various opportunist tendencies, mistakes and shortcomings within their own ranks, and finally defeated their enemies and gained victory.

The history of the Chinese Communist Party proves that without the leadership of such a party—a party of the Bolshevik type, which is “well-disciplined and armed with the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and which adopts the methods of self-criticism and maintains close contact with the masses of the people,” as described by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese working class and people would have been unable to overthrow the rule of the powerful imperialists and their lackeys and to establish an independent people’s democratic State.

Before the Chinese Communist Party was founded there existed in China political parties of the bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie which endeavoured to lead the Chinese revolution. These parties had played a certain progressive historical role, but they all failed under the manifold attacks of the enemy. Although the onslaughts against the Chinese Communist Party by the imperialists and their lackeys were far more ruthless and menacing than any previously experienced by the Chinese people, the Party nevertheless succeeded in leading the people to victory. This is because the Chinese Communist Party is a revolutionary proletarian party of a new type, cast in the mould of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).

At the Seventh Party Congress, Comrade Mao Tse-tung defined the outstanding characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party as the integration of theory and practice, the maintenance of close ties with the masses of the people and the practice of self-criticism. Only by integrating theory with practice has the Party been able to make effective and creative use of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, to overcome doctrinaire and empiricist deviations and to discover and define the correct way to defeat the powerful enemy and to build up a new nation. Only because of its close contact with the masses has the Party been able to lead the people’s revolutionary struggle and revolutionary war, create a people’s army and a people’s state power and, by relying on the inexhaustible strength of the people, defeat an enemy that was once obviously superior in strength. Only by practising self-criticism has the Party been able to learn lessons from its past failures and mistakes, improve itself and constantly maintain and improve its relations with the masses. A Party possessed of such characteristics is the essential guarantee of success in leading the Chinese revolution to final victory.

The history of the Chinese Communist Party proves that the correct leadership of the Party is primarily determined by its correct theory concerning the Chinese revolution. Without the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and the teachings of Mao Tse-tung it would have been impossible to lead the Chinese working class and the Chinese people to victory.

In reviewing and summing up the Party’s history in the First and Second Revolutionary Civil Wars and in the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote in October 1939 as follows:

“In the first stage the Party was in its infancy. In the early and middle periods of this stage, the Party line was correct, and the revolutionary zeal and activity of both the rank and file and the cadres of the Party was of an exceedingly high degree. Hence we achieved victory in the First Great Revolution. But the Party then was after all still in its infancy, inexperienced in the three basic questions of the united front, armed struggle, and Party building. It had very little or no knowledge of the characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution or about Chinese history and society, and still lacked an integrated understanding in uniting Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence in the last period of this stage, the critical juncture of this stage, the
dominant section of the Party's leading organisations was unable to give leadership to the whole Party to consolidate the victories of the revolution, but instead fell victim to the deceptions of the bourgeoisie. Consequently the revolution failed.

"In this stage the Party's organisation developed without being consolidated; the Party members, cadres and organisations were not consolidated either ideologically or politically. New members were numerous, but they were not given the necessary Marxist-Leninist education. Much experience was gained in the course of their work, but was not well summed up. Large numbers of careerists sneaked into the Party and were not cleaned out. Both our enemy and our ally were plotting against our Party, yet we showed no vigilance. Within the Party, a large number of active members came to the fore, but no time was found to transform them into the mainstay of the Party. The Party had a number of revolutionary armed forces, but could not establish full control over them. All these circumstances were consequences of the lack of experience, the lack of a profound revolutionary insight, and the lack of understanding in uniting Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution. Such was the first stage of Party building.

"The second stage was that of the ten years' civil war. With the experience of the first stage, with the advance in the understanding of the characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution, and the knowledge of Chinese history and society, and with the closer integration of Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution, our Party was able to lead the Red Army to carry on its ten-year war to victory. Although the bourgeoisie deserted the enemy and our Party was able to rely firmly on the masses, the Party organisation was not only developed anew but also consolidated. Despite the enemy's ceaseless conspiracy against our Party, we drove out the conspirators. Not only were there again large numbers of cadres coming to the fore in the Party, but these cadres became its mainstay. The Party opened the path for the people's political authority and thereby learned the art of administering the State and maintaining public order. It created strong armed forces and thereby learned the art of war. All these were momentous advances and achievements of the Party.

"But during this great struggle some members were slipping or had at one time slipped into the quagmire of opportunism. This was still due to their lack of humility in appreciating the experiences of the past, to their ignorance of the characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution, to their woefully inadequate knowledge of Chinese history and society, and to their lack of understanding in uniting Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence a section of the Party's leading organisations was unable completely and at all times to grasp the correct political and organisational lines throughout this stage. At one time the Party and the revolution were placed in jeopardy by the 'Left' opportunism of Li Li-san, at another time by the 'Left' opportunism in the revolutionary war and in the work in the white areas."

But all these were overcome at the Tsunyi conference (held at Tsunyi, Kweichow, January 1925). After the conference the Party was set once and for all on the road of Bolshevisation, and the foundations were laid for the subsequent victory over Chang Kuo-kuo's Right opportunism and for the establishment of the anti-Japanese national united front. Such was the second stage in the course of the Party's development.

"The third stage in the course of the Party's development is that of the anti-Japanese national united front. This stage is now already in its third year and the struggle during these years has been of great significance. Thanks to its experiences in the previous two revolutionary stages, to its organisational and armed strength, to its high political prestige among the people of the whole country, and to its more profound and unified understanding of the relations between Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution, the Party has not only established the anti-Japanese national united front, but has also carried on the great War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression. In the sphere of Party organisation, we have stepped out of narrow confines and become a great nationwide party. Our Party's armed forces are again growing and are being further strengthened in the struggle against the Japanese. The Party has widened its influence among the people throughout the country." (Mao Tse-tung: Introducing "The Communist").

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's vivid description of the Party's history fully explains the vital significance of revolutionary theory. A wrong theory can lead an epoch-making revolution quickly to disaster, whereas a correct theory can rescue the Party at the moment of its greatest difficulties and advance the revolution step by step toward an upsurge.

From the moment of its foundation the Chinese Communist Party was guided by the general principles of Marxism-Leninism. This was to the advantage of the Party. Nevertheless, in order to lead the Chinese revolution to victory it is not sufficient to rely only on the guidance of ready-made general principles. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's contribution has been to synthesise the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, and the guidance of Lenin and Stalin regarding the principles of the Chinese revolution, with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Such being the case, he had of necessity to make a further development of Marxism-Leninism. In his report in November 1919 to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organisations of the Eastern Peoples, Lenin issued the following call to the Communists of the Eastern Peoples:

"Here before you stands a task which was not faced before by the Communists of the world: relying on the general theory and practice of Communism, you must adapt yourselves to particular con-
Comrade Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communists have correctly solved this historical task set by Lenin, and thereby further developed Marxism-Leninism.

In summing up the experiences of the Chinese Communist Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has repeatedly pointed out that under the leadership of the Party, the people's democratic united front and the people's armed struggle as the main form of the revolution were the two fundamental experiences gained by the Chinese Communist Party in the course of the Chinese people's democratic revolution. The creation of these two experiences is an important example of the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.

The thirty years' history of the Chinese Communist Party proves that the development of the Party and the Chinese revolution was inseparable from the development of the Chinese people's democratic united front. The Party and the revolution speedily developed when the Party correctly solved the problem of working-class leadership in the people's democratic revolution, the problem of the alliance between the workers and peasants, and especially of uniting with, or struggling against, the different bourgeois blocs. Both the Party and the revolution suffered setbacks when these problems were wrongly dealt with.

Obviously, the Chinese Communist Party had to make an independent study of such serious and complex problems, on the basis of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution. It could not rely on any formula copied from any given foreign country. For example, during the Second Revolutionary Civil War the "Left" opportunists in the Party imitatively demanded that the Party regard the "middle camp" as the "most dangerous enemy", for they had never known a "middle camp" which was willing to accept the leadership of the working class. Again, for example, during the War of Resistance the Right opportunists in the Party also imitatively demanded that the Chinese Communists should carry out all their activities "through" the united front formed with Chiang Kai-shek, for they had never known an example of a revolutionary state power existing under a reactionary central state power, not breaking with that reactionary state power and yet maintaining its independence and autonomy.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung rejected these erroneous views. He formulated different policies to be applied at different times to different allies. He pointed out that after 1927 the Chinese bourgeoisie was still divided into two different groups: the big bourgeoisie or bureaucratic capitalists who were in power, and the middle bourgeoisie or national bourgeoisie who were being driven to the wall and victimised. The former group was the target of the Chinese revolution. Although some of them stood in the anti-Japanese camp during the war against Japan, they never formally entered into a united front with the Chinese Communist Party either in the sphere of organisation or programme. On the contrary, they regarded the Chinese Communists and the people as their bitter enemies. Therefore, the Communists could not carry out all activities "through" them, but had to maintain a high degree of independence and initiative within the united front.

The second group—the middle or national bourgeoisie—was a weak and vacillating force. It had differences with the working class, but it also had differences with imperialism, feudalism and the big bourgeoisie. For this reason, under certain specific conditions, this group could be won over. It might become to some degree or other linked with the working class, fill its still uncompleted historical role, and not become "the most dangerous enemy," provided the working class adopted a firm revolutionary policy and appropriate organisational procedure, at times uniting with the national bourgeoisie, and at times struggling against them. Facts have proved that the policy of Comrade Mao Tse-tung has successfully overthrown the rule of the big bourgeoisie, i.e., the bureaucratic comprador capitalists, and won the national bourgeoisie over to form a part of the people's democratic united front. In this case, it is obvious that Comrade Mao Tse-tung was correct, and that the "Left" or Right opportunists were wrong.
problems of the Chinese revolutionary wars. These, like his contributions in other fields, have resulted from determined struggles waged by true Marxism-Leninism against doctrinairism. The doctrinaires, for instance, ignored the teachings of Comrade Stalin, and during the four or five years after 1927 insisted that the Party should concentrate its work on preparations for uprisings in the cities. Later, after the ideas of organising uprisings in the cities had caused serious damage to the Party organisations and had been crushed by the logic of facts, the doctrinaires then imposed on the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of 1934 their ideas of positional warfare, with the result that the Red Army was forced to retreat from its original bases of military operations. In opposition to the doctrinaires, Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the actual practice of the Chinese revolution after 1927, first evolved the policy of encircling the cities from the rural areas as a substitute for the policy, which is applicable under normal conditions, of placing the rural areas under the leadership of the cities. Comrade Mao Tse-tung evolved a form of guerilla warfare, and guerilla-type mobile warfare, to guide the Red Army when it was absolutely inferior both in numbers and equipment to the enemy. Facts have proved that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's policy of encircling the cities from the rural areas has been completely successful, while the Red Army, developing in the course of victorious guerilla warfare, eventually grew into the powerful People's Liberation Army of today, well able to wage positional warfare. Here again, it is obvious that Comrade Mao Tse-tung was correct, and not the doctrinaires.

In summing up the historical experience of the Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out more than once the great significance of international aid for the Chinese revolution, and above all the aid given by the Soviet Union. The fundamental starting-point of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of China's New Democratic Revolution is that since 1919 the Chinese revolution has been an inseparable part of the world proletarian socialist revolution, which was inaugurated by the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, and that the Chinese revolution has been decisively influenced by the October Socialist Revolution.
The Chinese revolution has never proceeded in isolation or without help; it has gone forward constantly with the guidance, encouragement and support of the Soviet Union and the international proletariat. The thirteen years' history of the Chinese Communist Party has proved that without the great and unfailing assistance of the Soviet Union and the international proletariat, and particularly the aid given to the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people during the First Revolutionary Civil War by the Communist International under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, without the aid given by the Army of the Soviet Union in destroying Hitler in the West, and annihilating the Japanese Kwantung army in North-East China, without the assistance the Soviet Union has extended in diplomatic, economic and other spheres to the People's Republic of China since its inauguration, the present victory of the Chinese revolution could never have been achieved.

The victory of the Chinese revolution has firmly convinced the working class and the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of the world that the cause of the liberation of the world's working class and of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, which was unfolded by the great October Socialist Revolution, is bound to succeed.

In his article, *The October Revolution and the National Question*, written in 1918, Comrade Stalin explains the world significance of the October Revolution as follows:

"The great world significance of the October Revolution lies chiefly in that:

"(1) It extended the scope of the national question, transforming it from a particular problem of the struggle against national oppression in Europe into the general problem of the liberation of the oppressed peoples, the colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism.

"(2) It opened up broad possibilities and real paths for this liberation which made considerably easier the tasks of liberation of the oppressed peoples in the West and in the East, drawing them into the general stream of the victorious struggle against imperialism.

"(3) It thus threw up a bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East, establishing a new revolutionary front against world imperialism stretching from the proletariat of the West through the Russian revolution to the oppressed peoples of the East."

This great prophecy made by Stalin thirty-three years ago has become a great reality. Moreover, a strong revolutionary bulwark has been establish in the East as a result of the victory of the Chinese revolution. This bulwark has joined with the Soviet Union and with the People's Democracies in South-Eastern Europe in a single bulwark. There can be no doubt that this gives the working people of the whole world the greatest encouragement in their struggle, as well as faith in victory.

Imperialism is rapidly approaching its doom.

*Long live the great, glorious and consistently correct Communist Party of China and its leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung! Long live the teacher of the working people of the whole world, Comrade Stalin!*
Mongolian
People's
Republic
Mongolia
Autonomous Region

Suiyuan
Yellow River
Shansi
Hopei
Pingyuan
Shantung
Kiangsu
Nanking
Nanking
Chungking
Hunan
Kwangsi
Kwangtung
Fukien
Canton
Hongkong
South China Sea

Harbin
Sunchiang
Kirin
Mukden
Korea
Seoul
Foochow
Taiwan

Hunan
Kiangsu
Chekiang

Honan
Kiangsu
Shantung

Szechuan
Hupeh
Anhwei

Shansi
Hopei

Inner

China
East

Yellow Sea