Articles Exposing the ‘Gang of Four’
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‘Gang of Four’ Conspiracy to Usurp Power Smashed

CHUNG WEN

Posters exposing and criticizing the "gang of four" at Peking Teachers' University.

Construction workers in Shanghai shout, "Down with the 'gang of four' anti-Party clique!"
AST October the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng smashed the plot of the anti-Party clique of Wang Hung-ven, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wenyuan to usurp Party and state power and placed them in the dock of history. A mass movement to expose and criticize the clique has continued across the nation.

A Gang of Ultra-Rightists

The four had formed an anti-Party clique and for some time conspired to seize power. Using that part of authority they had usurped and the mass media which they controlled, they had publicized themselves for a long time as "Leftists", "heroes of the cultural revolution", "representatives of the correct line" and so on. Subsequent facts, however, revealed them as very dangerous conspirators and careerists who had wormed their way into the Party Central Committee. Their crimes brought great damage to the country and the people. They worked against the great leader and teacher Chairman Mao, against Premier Chou En-lai, against the appointment of Comrade Hua Kuo-feng as proposed by Chairman Mao, against the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, and attempted to usurp the top leadership of the Party and state, overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat and restore capitalism in China.

In violation of Chairman Mao’s basic principle, “Practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don’t split; be open and above-board, and don’t intrigue and conspire”, they tampered with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and suppressed, counterfeited or tampered with Chairman Mao’s directives. They practiced revisionism while waving the banner of Marxism and opposed Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line on a series of questions in domestic and foreign affairs. Engaging in criminal activities to split the Party, they set up their own system within the Party, did what they pleased, lorded it over others, and placed themselves above Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee.

Intriguing and conspiring in a big way, they meddled everywhere, creating enmity in order to disrupt Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and strategic plans. They sabotaged the cultural revolution and undermined socialist revolution and construction. They twisted right and wrong, manufactured lies, tried to create counter-revolutionary public opinion, cooked up charges and unscrupulously put labels on others in an attempt to overthrow large numbers of Party, government and army leaders in the central as well as local organs.

They expanded bourgeois rights in every way, perpetrated outrages, used socialist property as their own and squandered the money of the working people like water. They worshipped things foreign and fawned on foreigners, maintained illicit relations with foreigners, handed out important Party and state secrets, and practiced capitulationism and national betrayal. They used every conceivable method to carry out a counter-revolutionary revisionist line, an ultra-Right line. They are ultra-Rightists scheming to drag the country back to the old order, typical representatives of the bourgeoisie in the Party, unrepentant capitalist-roaders sticking to the capitalist road.

The great leader and teacher Chairman Mao discovered their anti-Party factional activities. He repeatedly and severely criticized them and tried to educate them, while making arrangements to settle their problem. In 1974 he warned them, “You’d better be careful; don’t let yourselves become a small faction of four.” Again he said, “Don’t form factions. Those who do so will fall.” In 1975 he again admonished them, “Don’t function as a gang of four, don’t do it any more, why do you keep doing it?” At the same time he said that if their problem “is not settled in the first half of this year, it should be settled in the second half; if not this year, then next year; if not next year, then the year after”. In all earnestness Chairman Mao told the story of how Liu Pang, first emperor of the Han dynasty 21 centuries ago, saw that his wife, the Empress Lu, wanted to usurp power after his death. Chairman Mao said, “Chiang Ching has wild ambitions” and “After I die, she will make trouble.” Thus he made it clear that the four were not satisfied with the portion of Party and state power they had usurped but wanted to seize all the power of the Party, the state and the army. Chairman Mao kept on criticizing, educating and struggling against them, telling them to pull back before it was too late. But toward Chairman Mao’s criticism, the “gang of four” adopted the attitude of counter-revolutionary double dealers who complied in public but opposed in private. Instead of mending their ways, they went further and further down the wrong track. During the critical stage of Chairman Mao’s illness and after his death, they attacked the Party even more feverishly in a hasty attempt to seize the supreme leadership of the Party and the state. This fully exposed their counter-revolutionary ambitions and brought their downfall.

Sabotaging the Cultural Revolution

After the cultural revolution initiated and led by Chairman Mao began in 1966, the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao clique styled themselves as “leaders of the Left” and “proletarian revolutionaries”. Their method of sabotaging the cultural revolution was to oppose the red flag while waving the red flag.

Chairman Mao himself formulated the line and policies of the cultural revolution, pointing out that “the main target of the present movement is those in authority within the Party taking the capitalist road”. Regarding cadres, Chairman Mao stressed that “to exclude and overthrow all cadres indiscriminately is the view advocated by those several people who put forth the bourgeois reactionary line, and this is precisely what they did”. The four, however, refused to carry out Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and policies. In league with the bourgeois careerist and plotter Lin Piao, they purposely confused the distinction between contradictions among the people and contradictions between the enemy and the people and tried their utmost to...
divert the main direction of the struggle. Spreading the reactionary idea of "suspecting and overthrowing everybody", they attempted to overthrow large numbers of leading cadres who adhered to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. This was to help prepare the way for seizing Party and state leadership.

During the cultural revolution Chairman Mao instructed that "it should be conducted by reasoning, and not by coercion or force". He also directed that the people should oppose bourgeois factionalism and work for revolutionary unity. The "gang of four", however, went their own way to put forward a reactionary slogan: "Attack by reasoning and defend by force." Reaching into all parts of China, they fanned up bourgeois factionalism, stirred up fights among the masses and created what Chairman Mao called "all-out civil war", a chaotic situation in which they aimed to lead the great cultural revolution astray.

Led by Chairman Mao, the Chinese people kept to the proletarian revolutionary line and policies, overcame the interference of Lin Piao and the "gang of four" and achieved victory in the cultural revolution. They shattered the two bourgeois headquarters of Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, repudiated their counter-revolutionary revisionist line, wrested back that part of the Party and state leadership they had usurped and smashed their plot to restore capitalism. This made it possible for China to forge ahead on the Marxist-Leninist road.

Interfering with the Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius

In the beginning of 1974 Chairman Mao initiated and led the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius in order to consolidate and develop the achievements of the cultural revolution. He linked the two advocates of retrogression and restoration of the old order, one in the present time and the other more than 2,000 years ago, so that by criticizing Confucius the people could dig out the ideological roots of Lin Piao's revisionist line and eradicate its pernicious influence.

Again from the very start the four tried to sabotage the movement by shifting its target and direction. Behind the backs of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, they raised demagogical slogans to make surprise attacks and inflame feelings against certain leaders. clamoring against the "great Confucian", the "Confucians of our time" and the "Confucians in the Party", they directed their attack at Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms Premier Chou En-lai and other high leaders. This criminal attempt was rebuked by Chairman Mao.

Using the criticism of the Confucians and the re-evaluation of the Legalists in Chinese history (the former advocated conservatism and retrogression while the latter reform and progress), the four opposed historical materialism. Falsely calling many historical figures "Legalists", they praised them to the skies and dressed up emperors, kings, generals and prime ministers as the motive force in pushing history forward. The gang, especially Chiang Ching, openly boosted Empress Lu and Wu Tse-tien (concubine of Emperor Kao Tsung of the Tang dynasty 1,300 years ago who became the only reigning empress in Chinese history). Chiang Ching was trying to create public opinion to support her seizure of Party and state power.

Plotting to Form a New 'Cabinet'

In the second half of 1974, just before the convening of the Fourth National People's Congress, the Party Central Committee was discussing its proposal of persons to compose the State Council and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Taking this as a step toward seizing Party and state power, the four secretly formed a "cabinet" of their own with Chiang Ching as the power behind the scenes.

They were busy with maneuvers. At one point Wang Hung-wen went to Chairman Mao with trumped-up charges against Premier Chou En-lai. This met with Chairman Mao's sharp reprimand. At another point Chiang Ching proposed Wang Hung-wen for the post of vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This again met with Chairman Mao's severe criticism. Chairman Mao pointed out, "Chiang Ching has wild ambitions. She actually wants Wang Hung-wen to be chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and herself to be chairman of the Party Central Committee."

Toward the end of 1974 Chairman Mao called on the entire nation to study Marxist-Leninist theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat so as to combat and prevent revisionism. He said, "Why did Lenin speak of exercising dictatorship over the bour-
geoisie? It is essential to get this question clear. Lack of clarity on this question will lead to revisionism. This should be made known to the whole nation."

The gang made use of this opportunity to interfere with and sabotage the study of this important theory. They went against Chairman Mao's instruction that revisionism is the main danger. They tampered with his directive and claimed that empiricism was the main danger and combating empiricism should be taken as the "key link" instead of class struggle. They gave lectures and wrote articles, deliberately confusing practical experience with empiricism. This was spearheaded at revolutionary cadres with long years of experience. They minced no words in stating that their anti-empiricism campaign was directed against members of the Party Central Committee and senior and medium-level cadres. They attacked leading comrades in the central and local organs by innuendo as "following the beaten track and sticking to routine" and "lacking the whole situation in mind and being shortsighted". They branded large numbers of old cadres loyal to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and rich with revolutionary experience as "stumbling blocks" which had to be removed. Chairman Mao promptly criticized them and thwarted their designs.

After Premier Chou passed away in early 1976, the wild ambitions of the gang became more apparent. They at once told people to put up big-character posters in Shanghai demanding that Chang Chun-chiao be made premier, thus applying pressure on Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee. In addition they opposed a series of directives of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, pursued an entirely different course in the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping to serve their own ends and sabotaged the unified leadership of the Party. They reached out everywhere to drag out "capitalist-roaders" at every level and "a whole stratum" of people, aiming to overthrow a large number of responsible comrades in the central and local organs of the Party, government and army.

Chairman Mao instructed, "Don't affect industry, agriculture, commerce and the army." The "gang of four" instigated and banded people into combat teams and even armed fighting teams. They clamored, "Kick away the Party committee to make revolution!" "Don't produce for the wrong line!" Thus they meddled everywhere in an attempt to paralyse Party and government organizations and sabotage revolution and production. They created pandemonium in some places so that capitalism went on the rampage.

Opposing the Successor Proposed by Chairman Mao

Chairman Mao saw through the conspiracy. In February 1976, Chairman Mao himself proposed that Comrade Hua Kuo-feng be appointed Acting Premier. The gang fought this bitterly. In early April Chairman Mao proposed further that Hua Kuo-feng be appointed First Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and concurrently Premier.

Chosen by Chairman Mao as the successor, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng is loyal to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and is resolute in carrying out Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and policies. He has been long tested and has accumulated rich experience in the new-democratic revolution, socialist revolution, socialist construction, the proletarian cultural revolution and the intense and complicated international and domestic struggles. Chairman Mao praised him as having had the overall experience of leading the work of a county, a prefecture and a province, and also the experience of working in the central organs. Chairman Mao pointed out that Comrade Hua Kuo-feng possessed the fine qualities required of a leader of the Party. Chairman Mao had great trust in Comrade Hua Kuo-feng. On April 30, 1976, he wrote to Comrade Hua Kuo-feng, "With you in charge, I'm at ease."

Mobilizing for the Seizure of Power

Chairman Mao's wise decision in proposing Comrade Hua Kuo-feng as his successor was a fatal blow to the wild ambitions of the "gang of four" to seize Party and state power. They hated this bitterly. In February 1976 Chang Chun-chiao, who coveted the position of premier, secretly wrote an essay cursing Comrade Hua Kuo-feng's appointment as Acting Premier of the State Council, saying, "Moving up so fast and so menacingly spells a downfall that will be just as rapid."

A People's Liberation Army unit in Peking holds a denunciation rally.
The "gang of four" conspired in every way and repeatedly launched savage attacks on Comrade Hua Kuo-feng. They prompted their accomplices to concoct an article, "Again On that Man Confucius", in which they were told to write that "when Confucius was 56 years old, he rose from the post of minister of public security to acting premier of the state of Lu", that he pretended to know about agricultural production and to be concerned about the life and sufferings of the people, etc. These words were maliciously aimed at Comrade Hua Kuo-feng.

In July 1976 at a forum on national planning, they prompted their accomplices to start attacking the State Council as "the source of the Right deviationist wind" and insinuated that Comrade Hua Kuo-feng was a "capitalist-road still on the capitalist road".

With Chairman Mao's passing on September 9, the whole nation was plunged in sorrow. But the "gang of four" was in high spirits. Thinking their chance had come, they stepped up their conspiratorial activities to usurp supreme power of the Party and state. On the very day of Chairman Mao's death they usurped the name of the office of the Party Central Committee to notify different parts of the country that important problems were to be reported to them at once for instructions. With this they tried to cut off the connection between the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng and the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions so that they could give orders and direct the whole country.

The "gang of four" went around advertising themselves as "representatives of the correct line" and put forward demagogic slogans to blatantly fan up opposition to the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng. They ordered units under their control to write letters to Chiang Ching pledging their loyalty to her and memorials petitioning her to "immediately step forward to shoulder the heavy task". At their instigation some openly opposed Chairman Mao's arrangement and proposed that Chiang Ching become Chairman of the Party Central Committee and its Military Commission.

Most despicable of them was that after careful planning, the four forged and advertised repeatedly in the press an instruction made by Chairman Mao before his death—"Act according to principles laid down"—an all-inclusive phrase that could be interpreted in any way they pleased. Their aim was to practice revisionism, split and conspire, and use every criminal means to seize power in the name of "acting according to principles laid down". Whoever kept to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and refused to follow their way they would label as going against the "principles laid down" and try to overthrow him.

On October 2, writing his comments on a document submitted for his approval, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng exposed the "gang of four" for forging this directive. Their situation now dangerous, the four bourgeois politicians at once adopted the counter-revolutionary tactic of protecting themselves by attacking others. On October 3 Wang Hung-wen clamored, "There'll be revisionism in the central organs" and "Keep your eyes open and watch out for revisionism."

On October 4 the gang, under the name of Liang Hsiao, published an anti-Party article—"Always Act According to Principles Laid Down by Chairman Mao"—attacking Comrade Hua Kuo-feng, whom Chairman Mao himself had proposed as his successor, and attacking the Party Central Committee headed by Hua Kuo-feng.

In this article the "gang of four" reversed right and wrong, called white black and made false charges. They themselves had forged the directive of Chairman Mao but in their article they charged that somebody else had tampered with it. "To tamper with the principles laid down by Chairman Mao", they wrote, "is to betray Marxism, betray socialism and betray the great teaching on continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." They themselves are counter-revolutionary revisionists who had wormed their way into the Party, but in their article they raved, "Any revisionist chieftain who dares to tamper with the principles laid down by Chairman Mao is bound to come to no good end." This is counter-revolutionary arrogance at its peak.

This article was their counter-revolutionary manifesto and mobilization order. They planned an armed rebellion and frantically declared, "We must be prepared to shed blood and have our heads cut off." They were ready with arms to kill. The counter-revolutionary coup d'état by the "gang of four" to overthrow the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng was like an arrow on a drawn bow ready to be shot at any instant.

Downfall

At this critical moment when the Party faced the actual danger of being turned revisionist and the state of changing its color, the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng took decisive measures against the clique and smashed their intrigue at one stroke. This saved the revolution and the Party. It was a great and decisive victory for the proletariat in its counterattack against the attack by the bourgeoisie. It prevented China from a disastrous reversal and her people from an immense calamity. It guaranteed that the Party and country would advance victoriously in the socialist and communist orientation pointed out by Chairman Mao.

The Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng has won the deep affection and warm support of the people of all nationalities throughout the country. They are determined to rally closely around the Party Central Committee headed by him, carry out the behests of Chairman Mao and carry the revolutionary cause of the proletariat through to the end. The overbearing and wildly ambitious anti-Party clique was overthrown all at once and Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wenyuan have become objects of universal condemnation. Like all chieftains of opportunist and revisionist lines in the past, they will be forever pilloried in history.
Struggle over Earthquake Work

The earthquake which hit the Tangshan area 150 kilometers east of Peking on July 28 last year caused tremendous losses of life and property. Around the question of prediction and relief, the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao Tsetung waged a sharp struggle against the "gang of four".

After the quake, Chairman Mao and the Central Committee, greatly concerned over the plight of the people in the disaster area, telegraphed their sympathy, sent a delegation to visit the survivors and set up a central headquarters to handle relief and reconstruction. Though seriously ill, Chairman Mao read and made decisions on the reports as they came in. When he became critically ill, he still thought about the people in the disaster area and how to build a new and more socialist Tangshan.

Premier Hua Kuo-feng, following Chairman Mao's instructions, together with other Central Committee and State Council leaders, personally directed relief and reconstruction work, organized the People's Liberation Army and the people of the country to provide powerful support in manpower and materials. The quake victims themselves waged a stubborn struggle against the disaster. Within ten days the Machiakou Mine of Kailuan resumed coal production, and in less than four months the Tangshan Power Plant completely restored its generating capacity. The people began to move into rows of neat, simply-constructed dwellings and the streets were lined with newly-built stores, markets, hotels and theaters. Schools and colleges resumed classes.

Earthquake Prediction

People well remember that when north China's Hsingtai was struck by an earthquake in 1966, Premier Chou En-lai flew there the following day to give support to the people. Later he pointed out that there are forewarnings of earthquakes and they can be predicted so that precautionary measures can be taken. He called on seismological workers to watch closely for any signs of an earthquake in the Peking-Tientsin area and contribute to the protection of major cities, large reservoirs, power grids and railway trunk lines. The Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao formulated the policy of prevention first, of combining the efforts of specialists and amateurs, of combining indigenous and foreign methods and of relying on the masses, all under the unified leadership of the Party.

Word of the incipient earthquake at Tangshan last year could have been got to the masses. Toward the latter half of July, before the quake, many macroscopic anomalies in animal behavior and subsurface water conditions as well as clear, prominent microscopic anomalies in instrument observations appeared in the Peking-Tientsin-Tangshan area. Many seismological observatories, stations and amateur observation points predicted that a destructive quake was probable and asked for an emergency conference.

This conference was never held. While the signs increased and the danger approached, the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao gang, as a step to seizing power, stirred up a campaign to ferret out "Teng Hsiao-ping's agents" at all levels in an attempt to overthrow large numbers of responsible comrades in the central and local organs and put in their own henchmen. They claimed that "the central task is to reorganize the leading groups" and that this had to be done by a set date. Work in the seismological departments was completely disrupted as many leading cadres, forced by the four to make self-examinations, had to stop their regular duties. Through the whole month of July the scientists were unable to discuss the import of the seismological data. As a result, for this earthquake which might have been predicted, no warning was issued and the people in the Peking-Tientsin-Tangshan area suffered serious losses.

Rescue and Relief

Large numbers of PLA units, under emergency orders, including construction and engineering corps, rushed to the disaster area. Day and night trucks loaded with relief materials filled the highways. At the height of the work, transport planes and helicopters from the air force were landing or taking off every 26 seconds at the Tangshan airfield, bringing in materials and personnel and taking out the critically injured.

Rescue work was intense. The people's soldiers ignored no cry for help. To save one life, often a company or a battalion was used. Sometimes they worked 20 or 30 hours at a stretch. As long as there was a one-percent chance of rescue, they would try one hun-
Premier Hua Kuo-feng, visiting earthquake survivors at the Tangshan Steel Plant.

Every province, municipality and autonomous region gave the disaster area immense assistance, sending men and materials as requested by headquarters. Twenty thousand doctors and nurses from across the country worked day and night. Some collapsed from exhaustion but went back to the operating tables as soon as they revived.

Chairman Hua at Tangshan

On August 4, while aftershocks continued, Premier Hua Kuo-feng led a Central Committee delegation sent by Chairman Mao to the disaster area. As he stepped off the plane he asked, "Is anyone here from the Kailuan Coal Mines?" He walked over to the representatives of the Kailuan miners and asked in detail about conditions underground. Learning that all the miners underground had been brought up safely, he said, "Fine! Chairman Mao is very worried about you. He'll be glad to hear this."

Premier Hua got into a car and went at once to Kailuan's Luchiado Mine. Here the quake had trapped 600 miners and cadres underground. Chia Pang-yu, member of the standing committee of the mine's Party committee and vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee, had organized all of them to climb out safely (see p. 40). Premier Hua went to the scene to inspect the quake damage and encourage the workers salvaging the installations. He asked for Comrade Chia Pang-yu and inquired in detail about conditions underground. Learning that miners had not panicked in spite of the pitch dark and falling rocks in the tunnels, he remarked, "Excellent! Chairman Mao is concerned about you. You are brave men and a credit to our country. I must learn from you!"

As night fell, Premier Hua continued to talk with people beside the rubble. He tasted the water supply. He went into the tents housing the injured. Everywhere he made arrangements and gave instructions on food and clothing, medical care and epidemic prevention, the urgent problems of relief and production and the long-range plans for a new Tangshan.

Premier Hua encouraged the Kailuan miners to rebuild their mines quickly in the spirit with which they had doubled their output during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (see p. 43). He told them the government would provide any equipment they needed. Later the miners were often notified that the items requested one day had been shipped out the next. The central government even delivered items the miners hadn't thought of, for example boilers for heating before the winter set in.

On his visit Premier Hua received representatives of army officers and soldiers who had risked their lives in the rescue work. He praised them as worthy members of the people's army created and commanded by Chairman Mao himself. He inquired about three dozen units and individuals outstanding in rescue and reconstruction work. Learning that Kuo Lai, political commissioner of the first battalion of an army unit who together with other soldiers had saved a child buried over six days, he asked how the child was. Kuo Lai reported that he was out of danger and could sit up. Premier Hua said, "On behalf of Chairman
Mao and the Party Central Committee, I want to thank you all."

On August 5 a detachment of construction corps which had done rescue work for eight days and nights heard that Premier Hua had gone to the Tangshan Steel Plant the day before. Its Party committee sent a wire to their higher command for permission to take part in rebuilding the plant. Their request was approved on the 6th. Early the next morning the troops arrived. In five days and nights, together with the workers they finished restoring the badly damaged transformer station. They climbed a shaking smokestack 26 meters high to reinforce it. With six hydraulic jacks they lifted a 120-sq.m. concrete roof weighing 120 tons back to its original place. On August 25, less than a month after the quake, the plant produced its first post-quake heat of steel, and on October 1 it produced the first batch of rolled steel.

At the same time other troops were helping the Tangshan people rebuild their homes. In less than two months they helped put up warm, quake-proof houses with several hundred thousand rooms. One day it started raining before the first platoon of the eighth company of a unit had finished building a home for a family. Political instructor Tsao Chih-ming and the soldiers immediately invited the family into their own tent. That night the owners were taken to their new home—the soldiers had finished the job in the rain.

Miners Condemn the Four

The "gang of four" refused to visit the disaster area and never even attended a meeting at which the conditions at Tangshan were reported and rescue and reconstruction problems discussed. During the fifty days and nights when Premier Hua and other central leaders were busy directing quake work, they accused the Party Central Committee of "disrupting the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping", "neglecting class struggle" and "dishing out the same old stuff of just pushing production but not revolution". "The anti-quake work," they claimed, "is a matter of only one million people, while the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping is a matter of 800 million." Again they said, "There are only a million people in Tangshan. There are 800 million in the whole country. So what if all of Tangshan is wiped out?" They organized people to put up criticism posters accusing leaders of the Central Committee of "suppressing the revolution". They even incited some people to block trucks and steal relief materials.

After the "gang of four" was exposed, criticism meetings were held everywhere in Tangshan. Yen Tzu-ching, Party committee secretary of the Machiakou Mine and an old miner, was the first to accuse the gang at a mass meeting. "In the old society," he said, "the capitalists and labor bosses regarded us as dirt. They said that three-legged frogs were hard to find but two-legged workers could be found anywhere. It didn't matter when a stinking worker died. Today while we are suffering from a disaster, the 'gang of four' said, 'There are 800 million people in China. What does it matter if a few die?' What difference is there between this gang and the capitalists and labor bosses of the old days?"

One worker declared, "There are two entirely different political lines. One is Chairman Mao's revolutionary line carried out by Premier Hua. It's for the people. The other is the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of the 'gang of four'. It's against the people. Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua, we will build a new, more beautiful and socialist Tangshan."
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng worked in Hunan province for many years. In this article cadres and Party members in Hunan recall his leadership of revolutionary work in the province.

In 1963 Comrade Hua Kuo-feng was secretary of the Hunan province Party committee and of the Hsiangtan prefecture Party committee. In October he led a group of leading members of the prefecture and city Party committees in Hunan to neighboring Kwangtung province to study its experience in developing farming. They visited four counties, seven communes and four other advanced units, resolved to apply Kwangtung's advanced experience to the concrete conditions of Hunan.

A report which this group wrote under the leadership of Comrade Hua Kuo-feng won approving comment from Chairman Mao, who wrote a directive on it praising Comrade Hua's modest attitude and his method of studying the advanced experience of other places. It was an important method, he noted, for developing China's political, economic, ideological, cultural, military and Party work. He stressed that it was a major question, not just a matter of work method in general. We leaders in Hunan understand that Chairman Mao was teaching us to learn Comrade Hua Kuo-feng's method of using Marxist philosophic thought to know and transform the world.

At the time of this investigation trip, the people of Hunan province...
had responded to Chairman Mao's call, "Never forget class struggle", and were overcoming the difficulties caused by Soviet revisionist sabotage, the interference of Liu Shao-chi and serious natural calamities which had struck for three consecutive years. They were rehobilitationg and developing their economy. That year the province wrested a bumper harvest in spite of a serious drought. Grain output in Hsiangtan prefecture where Comrade Hua Kuo-feng worked showed a marked increase.

As the situation improved, some people became conceited and complacent and ceased making progress. Comrade Hua Kuo-feng, however, did not let the praise go to his head. Weighing both the achievements and the shortcomings, he judged the situation correctly and clearly saw the gap between Hunan and advanced provinces and municipalities. He stressed freeing the mind of old thinking, continuing the revolution and learning earnestly from other places. He integrated the experience of other places and that of the People's Liberation Army with actual conditions in Hunan, combined revolutionary drive with the scientific attitude of getting truth from facts, and overcame the conceit and complacency. As a result, in 1964, the year after visiting Kwangtung, Hunan reaped a bumper harvest, 1,150,000 tons more than in 1963, almost 30 kilograms more per person in the province. Chairman Mao's directive became a motive force advancing all work in Hunan.

Line Struggle

Guided by the general line set by Chairman Mao of "going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism", China's economy took a great leap forward in 1958. Communes appeared and spread rapidly throughout the countryside. Socialist revolution and socialist construction made remarkable advances. Nevertheless, in the midst of these achievements some people lacked the materialist dialectical viewpoint of making a complete and thorough analysis of all problems. Thus they lost their perspective and forgot themselves. In some places there was exaggeration, blind direction, equalitarianism and the indiscriminate transfer of resources. These were, however, subsidiary problems not difficult to solve.

But the anti-Party clique headed by Peng Teh-huai exaggerated these problems in order to attack the Party's general line, the great leap forward and the people's communes, in an attempt to overthrow the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao. In this struggle, as in previous line struggles in the Party, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng always flew clear colors and stood firmly on the side of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. He used facts and material he had gathered at work in grass-roots units in the province to educate the cadres and the masses to the fact that they must distinguish...
what is essential in a thing and what is only superficial phenomenon, which the main trend and which subsidiary. Without this they would become disoriented.

In retrospect, because Comrade Hua Kuo-feng was good at using the basic law of the unity of opposites to observe and handle problems, he could stand high and see far in this complex struggle. He directed the writing of articles warmly praising the Party’s general line, the great leap forward, the people’s communes and the precious revolutionary drive of the people. He praised new socialist things, carrying on a tit-for-tat struggle with the Right opportunist line of the Peng Teh-huai anti-Party clique. After this clique was smashed at the Lushan meeting in 1959, Chairman Mao nominated Comrade Hua Kuo-feng secretary of the Hunan province Party committee.

Investigation and Study

When criticizing the opportunist line in the Party in 1930, Chairman Mao had said, “No investigation, no right to speak.” Always advocated by Chairman Mao, investigation and study have been a solid tradition in the Party.

Hunan comrades who worked with Chairman Hua for years say he is a fine embodiment of this tradition.

Back when the agricultural cooperatives were being organized, Liu Shao-qi was pushing a counter-revolutionary revisionist line and cutting the co-ops back drastically. Comrade Hua Kuo-feng led a work team to Tunglingwei in Hsiangyin county to make a thorough investigation and study. He warmly supported the enthusiasm of the poor and lower-middle peasants for taking the socialist road and helped them set up the first advanced agricultural producers’ co-op in Hunan.

Faced with the problem that some leaders were neglecting investigation and study, subjectively issued orders and were divorced from the masses, in 1960 Chairman Mao called on the whole Party to go in for investigation and study. Through his own example, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng led, influenced and educated Hunan cadres and Party members to carry on this excellent tradition of the Party.

In 1963 Comrade Hua Kuo-feng went to Yuehyang county’s Maotien district four times to talk with the cadres and masses. Together with the poor and lower-middle peasants, he worked out a plan for taming the mountains and streams and transforming this hilly district. As the plan was carried out, the features of Maotien changed rapidly. Thus, through penetrating, detailed investigation and study, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng helped make Maotien into Hunan’s first advanced unit in learning from Tachai in agriculture.

Comrade Hua Kuo-feng also persisted in making broad, penetrating, detailed, systematic and all-round investigation and study in the province-wide movement to learn from Tachai. The Lin Piao anti-Party clique, however, interfered with and sabotaged this movement. As a result, some places in Hunan did not study Tachai’s basic political experience, did not integrate it with their actual situation and did not implement the Party’s policies but only applied Tachai’s changes in a superficial, formalistic way. In other places, capitalist tendencies were rampant.

After becoming first secretary of the province Party committee, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng immediately took positive steps and decisions to strengthen the campaign to learn from Tachai, set forth concrete measures for improving the leadership’s style of work and stressed the necessity of investigation and study. He himself set an example, going among the masses at the grass roots and to all Hunan’s advanced units in learning from Tachai.

On the basis of broad investigation and study and repeated discussion, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng took the lead in writing “An Opinion on Some Present Problems in Rural Economic Policy”. He correctly implemented the Party’s economic policies, stopped the interference and sabotage, and consolidated the socialist positions in the countryside. Soon a group of advanced units in learning from Tachai emerged in the province. Chairman Mao praised Hunan for having its own models. By the time of the National Conference to Learn from Tachai in 1975, Hunan had already developed 22 advanced counties in the movement.

The Shaoshan irrigation district—Hunan’s first large-scale irrigation project—was built under the direction of Comrade Hua Kuo-feng in 1965. Comrades who took part in the project recall that he made extensive investigations and studies in the countryside and at worksites to develop a feasible plan. He visited old peasants, got peasant-builders, engineers, technicians and leading cadres together, and held over 150 mass meetings at which the people presented their ideas. He walked along most of the 100-kilometer length of the main canal and personally investigated every dangerous worksite. This big project was completed and carrying water in just 10 months. It did not occupy any existing fields, and created 100 hectares of new fields with the earth dug up. Today it is a model for large-scale farm irrigation projects.

Because Comrade Hua Kuo-feng is good at uniting Marxist theory with revolutionary practice, good at using the law of the unity of opposites in observing and handling problems, and goes among the masses to investigate and study, he knows the objective laws of the development of things, the revolutionary wishes and demands of the people, and the trends and characteristics of the class struggle. He has always stood in the front ranks of the revolutionary struggle and correctly and thoroughly implemented Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line, principles and policies in the people’s basic interests. Chairman Hua is an outstanding Marxist leader.
Present Conditions

A great mass movement to basically mechanize agriculture by 1980 is growing vigorously in China. To her 700 million peasants, the elimination of heavy manual labor of thousands of years is a great revolution.

Modern mechanized farming is already fairly extensive in some parts of China. Tractors and harvesters are used over large areas in the fertile northeastern plain. In the north, much machinery is used in irrigating with the waters of the Yellow River, and the area irrigated with wells and pumps has been increased several times. In the rice-growing south, diesel and electric pumps for irrigation and drainage, and machines for cultivating paddy fields, are in wide use. Electric plows and diesel-engine plowing boats are also being used. More and more counties, communes and brigades are using rice-transplanting machines. Machines are used in forestry, livestock breeding and fishing. Iron and steel implements are used everywhere in the Tibetan highlands where primitive wooden plows and harrows were used for centuries under the serf system. Large farm machines like tractors and combine harvesters are also beginning to be used in Tibet.

Today the machine-cultivated area in China is more than twice as large as in 1965, the year before the cultural revolution began. The total capacity of irrigation and drainage machinery has increased three times. Harvests are thus ensured in spite of drought or water-logging on one-third of the country's farmland.

Today the agricultural machinery industry has been basically spread out throughout the land. There are 1,600 factories manufacturing various farm machines. They make 1,300 kinds of products, including large tractors, combine harvesters and big pumps for agricultural use. Large and medium-sized chemical fertilizer plants have been built in 27 of China's provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. Ninety-six percent of the counties have built factories to make and repair farm implements.

Struggle

The mechanization of China's agriculture has developed in the midst of sharp struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and between the proletarian revolutionary line and the revisionist line. After the founding of the new China, Chairman Mao formulated a line for developing agriculture. He pointed out, "In agriculture, with conditions as they are in our country cooperation must precede the use of big machinery (in capitalist countries agriculture develops in a capitalist way)."

After the land reform, China's peasants began to collectivize their agriculture. By the end of 1958 people's communes were established in most of the country.

In 1959 Chairman Mao pointed out, "The fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization." Soon there was a vigorous movement by the workers and peasants to improve farm implements and the people's communes set up thousands of small factories.
to make and repair farm tools. That year China began producing medium and large tractors in great numbers.

The revisionist Liu Shao-chi first sabotaged the collectivization of agriculture. "Mechanization must precede collectivization," he insisted, and dissolved many of the new cooperatives. Then spreading the fallacy that "China has many people and little land and no need to mechanize", that "mechanization is impossible when we have meticulous cultivation", he sabotaged the mass movement to improve farm implements and dissolved many local farm machine industries. Thus by 1963 over half of all such industries were dissolved, workers and staff cut by two-thirds, and most of the agricultural machinery research organizations disbanded. This revisionist line was responsible for the slow growth of farm mechanization from 1956 to 1965.

Later, farm mechanization was sabotaged by Lin Piao's anti-Party clique. It made some units stress industry and slight agriculture, stress the cities and slight the countryside and made some enterprises unwilling to put out products to support agriculture as they were not profitable.

The cultural revolution smashed these two bourgeois headquarters.

Through criticizing their revisionist line, the broad masses better understood the general policy for developing the national economy formulated by Chairman Mao: "Take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor." Departments strengthened their work supporting agriculture.

In January 1976 at the Fourth National People's Congress, according to the program planned by Chairman Mao for China's socialist construction, Premier Chou En-lai, in his Report On the Work of the Government, put forward the task of the Chinese people—to "accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world".

In September of the same year at the first National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng stressed that completion of the great task put forward by Chairman Mao must be ensured—the basic mechanization of agriculture in 25 years beginning from 1955. Inspired by this call, a mass movement to build Tachai-type counties spread over the country. The situation in the mechanization of agriculture was encouraging.

The "gang of four", however, did its best to interfere. They heaped abuse on the drive to modernize agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology by calling it "creating material bases for capitalist restoration" and "westernization". They thus presented modernization as in opposition to socialism and equated it to capitalism. In places where their influence was strong they instigated some people to
attack those active in promoting production as adherents of the “theory of productive forces” and confused people’s thinking so as to keep production down. Instigated by the four, some people in some factories created so much trouble that production was stopped altogether. Though people in a number of areas effectively resisted their interference and actively developed agricultural mechanization, its overall progress in the country was nevertheless affected.

After the “gang of four” was smashed by the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, the Central Committee called the second National Conference on Learning from Ta-chai in Agriculture in December 1976. Five thousand deputies from different parts of the country indignantly exposed the crimes of the gang in sabotaging revolution and production, pointing out that after their overthrow the future for the country and agricultural mechanization is bright. The masses’ enthusiasm and initiative for building socialism, suppressed by the gang, is erupting like a volcano and surging into a renewed drive to build Ta-chai-type counties and mechanize agriculture in the countryside.

Policy

A key part of China’s policy in mechanizing agriculture is self-reliance and relying on the masses.

In the manufacture of farm machines, the policy is that they should be made mainly locally. Large agricultural machines are produced by centrally-run plants while small and medium-sized ones are mainly produced by small and medium-sized factories run by the provinces, prefectures and counties. Small factories run by communes and brigades also make farm machines. The provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions develop small iron and steel, coal and cement industries to provide more raw materials for the mechanization of agriculture.

The policy of building farm machines mainly locally brings local initiative into play and enables local resources to be fully explored and utilized. China has complicated terrain, a great variety of crops and different natural conditions and cultivating habits. Therefore she needs all kinds of farm machines and implements, especially small and medium-sized ones. Building machines locally in smaller enterprises makes it possible to proceed from actual local conditions and needs. Going in for commune and brigade-run industries means mobilizing China’s 700 million peasants to mechanize farming.

China’s economic foundation is poor, and she cannot modernize in one step. Therefore the local areas give great attention to developing semi-mechanized and improved farm implements. For instance, while developing tractor production they also pay great attention to improving animal-drawn implements. While more and more trucks are used in agriculture, the number of animal-drawn and hand-pushed rubber-tired carts has also steadily increased.

Apart from state farms, agricultural machines are mainly bought by the collectives, the people’s communes. The communes employ their manpower and material resources in a unified and planned way. While giving first place to grain production, they develop a diversified economy and gradually increase their collective accumulation funds from which they buy farm machinery. The state gives aid to communes and brigades with difficult conditions and helps them develop their production. As industry has developed, China has many times lowered the prices of farm machines.
HOW YENTAI SPEEDED UP FARM MECHANIZATION — I

The Fundamental Way Out

HSIAO TAN

The spirit of self-reliance and hard work has helped the nine million people of the hilly Yentai prefecture in Shantung province speed up the modernization of their agriculture since the cultural revolution began a decade ago.

The prefecture — two cities and 15 counties on the tip of the Shantung peninsula — followed Chairman Mao's advice, "The fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization", and did it by carrying out policies formulated by the Party Central Committee: Most farm machines should be made locally, and in medium and small sizes; they should be bought mainly by collectives. Yentai factories, over 1,000 of them in town and country, now turn out iron and steel, machine tools, motors and farm machinery.

By 1975 the different places in the prefecture had basically mechanized or semi-mechanized their cultivation, threshing, irrigation, transportation, fishing, flour milling and pig fodder processing. This so speeded up agricultural production that in 1976 the prefecture's per-hectare grain output reached 6.38 tons, 140 percent above 1965. The main crops are wheat, corn, peanuts and sweet potatoes.

Pioneering

Before the cultural revolution the prefecture could only make small farm tools such as hoes and sickles from raw materials brought in from outside. All machinery had to be bought from the state. The people once built a small iron and steel works during the cultural revolution, the masses uncovered Liu Shao-chi's sabotage of socialist construction. The result was a determination to produce iron and steel again and make farm machines themselves. Looking at the ruins of their small iron and steel works, they were furious. "We'll rebuild it rapidly and make up the time Liu Shao-chi wasted for us!"

Yentai prefecture now had a new revolutionary committee. Its members felt the same as the masses. They studied Chairman Mao's directives on the mechanization of agriculture. Then they checked work in the prefecture against what the Tenth Plenary Session of the Party's Eighth Central Committee had to say about it: The Party's basic line on the question of agriculture after completing the anti-feudal land reform is — first step, collectivize agriculture; second step, mechanize and electrify on the basis of collectivization.

The study made the members of the revolutionary committee realize that they had not fully understood the Party's basic line on the question of agriculture. They had not transformed agriculture as they should, by integrating the two revolutions — the formation of people's communes, which was completed, and the mechanization of farming. And when the revisionist line interfered, their steps had become even slower.

This realization made them support the people's demand for the reconstruction of their small steel works as the first project in building up the prefecture. It would solve the problem of raw material for mechanization.

The workers organized groups to go and learn from factories in other parts of the country. With new knowledge they built blast furnaces, converters, an electric furnace, a 150-cubic-meter oxygen generator and an ore-dressing plant. Just before National Day, October 1, 1969 the small steel works started producing again. At the same time 36 small mines — copper, lead, zinc etc. — were opened to provide ores needed for making farm machines.

Many Factories — One Tractor

The easy-driving East Is Red 20-horsepower tractor can be seen working today in the fields and roads of Yentai. But workers went through many twists and turns in manufacturing it locally.

Soon after iron and steel began coming out of the rebuilt works, the Yentai revolutionary committee began organizing the local manufacture of farm machines. A plan was drawn up for building a tractor plant in five years. It would cost 30 million yuan and put out 5,000 tractors a year.

The plan caused heated debate. Many people opposed it. "Rely on the government? And use 30 million yuan? That's not the spirit of self-reliance, it's begging. Besides, five years is too long. Let's follow Chairman Mao's policy of 'walking on two legs' — developing local as well as centralized industry at the same time. It doesn't matter if our base is poor. We'll organize, tap our potential and learn from the people of Taching. After all, they built a modern oil field from scratch — and we can build tractors!"

The ground had already been broken for the five-year tractor plant. Nevertheless the revolutionary committee accepted the masses' opinion and changed the plan. Instead it set up a farm mechanization campaign headquarters to direct the manufacture of small tractors and diesel engines through cooperation among 130 factories in the prefecture.
The Laiyang Tractor Repair Factory was rebuilt into a tractor assembly plant. The Chimo Farm Tool Factory switched to producing 20-h.p. diesel engines. Other factories made parts and special equipment. The different factories, some state-owned, others owned by communes or neighborhood committees, formed one production line. Even shipyards and rubber, chemical and building material factories joined the campaign.

The workers compared the campaign to build farm machinery to a train. "Don't hold it up in our station!" read a slogan in the cooperating factories.

The Wenteng County Farm Tool Repair Factory made crankshafts. It distinguished itself for always meeting its quotas for quality and quantity. Its workers said, "We're a socialist factory. The needs of socialism are our needs. The campaign to mechanize farming as quickly as possible."

**Equipping Themselves**

Repairing is not the same as manufacturing. Factories switching over needed a lot of special equipment. They made their own. The Laiyang Tractor Plant with 1,100 workers was a good example.

Before the campaign it had only two patternmakers and 53 old belt-drawn machines. The workers couldn't get enough iron for casting bodies for the new machines and making the patterns took too much time. But the area had a lot of granite and they used this instead of iron, cutting, grinding and smoothing it with emery. After much trial and error they made 15 machines, including vertical and up-cut millers and drilling, boring and thread-cutting machines. This reduced the cost by half and the machines performed well. Some people looked scornfully at the machines. "Who ever heard of machines made of stone! They don't even look like they'd run!" The workers retorted, "They run, all right, and what's more they represent the spirit of diligence and hard struggle." They went on and built four production lines for processing the tractor's transmission, clutch and rear-end housings and the front axle bracket.

When the punching shop was set up, it only had an electro-welder — difficult to use for cutting. To cut steel plate 20 mm. thick they had to go to Tsingtao 100 kilometers away. Worker Sun Ming-yi, 22, was impatient. "If we go on at this rate," he thought, "when will our folks get the machines they need to build a new Tachai-type countryside?" A commune member with a primary school education, he had come to the factory in 1967. Returning from a visit to factories in Shenyang in Liaoning province, Sun proposed to the factory Party committee that the workers try to make an advanced hydraulic guillotine for cutting steel plate. The committee supported the idea and assigned an engineer to help him.

Sun studied the principles of hydraulics in the evenings and took his questions to veteran workers during the day. He and the engineer worked through the complicated drawings in three months. When they started to make the body of the new cutter they had no large double-column planer. So first they cut a big steel plate into small ones and processed them one by one and then welded them together again. Working hard for eight months, they made their own hydraulic guillotine. Today Sun Ming-yi is head of the shop's technical innovation group which has made a hundred innovations in the last three years.

The Laiyang Tractor Plant has built four new shops with 282 hydraulic and electric machine tools, nearly half of them made by the workers themselves. It has reached the target of the original plan — 5,000 tractors a year, and it has done it not with 30 million but 6 million yuan. Today the plant is known for the way it has learned from the Taching oil field and for its close adherence to the general line of getting greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism.
Mass Participation

The people of Yentai weren't satisfied just with tractors. “Farming isn't mechanized if we don't have the implements a tractor draws.” The farm mechanization campaign headquarters got five county farm tool repair factories to make plows, harrows, trailers, seeders, harvesters and threshers. A mass movement was launched in which all the communes and people in the prefecture gave a hand in making and improving farm implements. The principles were: Implements must be improved versions of those already in use, they should be small and uncomplicated, suited to local conditions, and be made with local methods. They should require little material, be low cost and easy to make.

In Yehsien county, all tractor-drawn plows and seeders are made by commune farm implement factories. By 1973 all 45 brigades of the Hsuchia commune had tractors. But they had no seeders. Wheat was still sown with crude animal-drawn seeders shaken by hand.

Yentai commune cooperated with workers of the commune's farm tool factory to make a tractor-drawn seeder. Its members were men who had been repairing bicycles, mending caldrons and shoeing horses. None of them had gone beyond primary school. With confidence in their collective wisdom, they studied the principles of mechanical drawing and by examining each part of a seeder they had bought, made a set of drawings. By 1974 they had made seeders for all the brigades in the commune, in four models for the different conditions of soil and terrain. They also provided all the commune farm tool factories in the county with their drawings. In 1976, 80 percent of the county's 50,000 hectares of winter wheat was sown by machine.

In Jungcheng county a mass movement was launched in 1971 to develop new farm implements and improve old ones. The county grows a big crop of peanuts, threshing by hand took such a long time that some of the crop often froze under the snow and was spoiled. The store selling tools in Yintzu commune cooperated with workers of the commune's farm tool factory to make a mechanical thresher. It costs less than 100 yuan and puts out a ton and a half of peanuts an hour.

The county agricultural machinery bureau called a meeting to publicize the new machine. As a result more than 800 were made that autumn in the county so that its peanut crop was threshed in three days. Now every spring the county calls a conference for exchanging experience, citing advanced people and putting on an exhibit of farm machines and tools. In the last four years 22,000 new and simple farm machines and tools of 30 kinds have been put to use in the county.

The Yentai prefecture has also built 58 small factories making nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers. In the last four years the prefecture has produced 78 percent of its new irrigation and drainage machinery, 72 percent of its small tractors, 73 percent of its chemical fertilizers and 90 percent of its motorized fishing boats.

HOW YENTAI SPEEDED UP FARM MECHANIZATION — II

Relying on the Masses

Workers and engineers of farm machine factories in Yentai prefecture go to the countryside to check and repair their products.

YENTAI now had an iron and steel plant and produced its own farm machinery. But could the communes and brigades afford them? This was the third major problem encountered by the Yentai prefecture in mechanizing agriculture.

The answer was to increase the collective funds of the communes and brigades by helping them develop forestry, animal husbandry, sideline occupations and fishing while at the same time they worked to increase grain production. This was in line with China's policy of taking grain as the key link and ensuring an all-round development.

CHINA RECONSTRUCTS
The prefecture made an over-all plan to do this. Mountain and hill areas would develop orchards, woodlots, and mulberry and oak groves for raising silkworms. The 1,500-kilometer coast would promote fishing and cultivating tidal marine life. Inland, fish would be raised in reservoirs and ponds. Straw weaving, drawn work and silk embroidery, traditional in Yentai, would be expanded from the few well-known centers in counties and towns. Commune industries would continue to develop.

Today Yentai has 150 kinds of economic undertakings in ten major categories. They bring in twice as much income as they did in 1970, providing ample funds for buying farm machinery. Over the past five years, the people's communes have met 85 percent of the cost themselves. The rest came from state loans to poorer communes and brigades.

To expand all-round production, Yentai prefecture gave full play to the initiative of the commune members, following Chairman Mao's teaching, "The mass movement is necessary in all work. Things won't go without the mass movement."

The Huayuan brigade of the Yitao commune in Yehsien county has a cotton-spinning group made up of a dozen elderly women. At a general meeting to mobilize people to raise funds, one of them

Threshing wheat in the Yentai prefecture, Shantung province.
said, “Chairman Mao has called on us to mechanize farming, so we will work harder at our spinning and guarantee to pay for a tractor in one year.”

True to their word, they rose early and worked late, earning 4,600 yuan in a year. With this money the brigade bought the first tractor purchased in the commune since the cultural revolution began in 1966. “Self-reliance is a priceless principle,” one of the women said, running her hands over it. “We’ll work even harder from now on.”

Each year since, the Huayuan brigade has bought machines with income raised by the spinning group. They include wheat, corn and peanut threshers. Efforts like this in other occupations helped raise the level of mechanization rapidly.

**Maintenance Network**

With more farm machines in use, maintenance became a problem. Repair capacity couldn’t keep up; in a number of communes and brigades machines broke down and lay idle. To get them repaired often took a trip to Loyang or Tientsin, both outside the province. “When we didn’t have them, we wanted them,” a commune member said. “Now that we have them, we worry about repairs.”

The prefecture’s farm mechanization campaign headquarters turned to its factories to make spare parts and repairs. The headquarters also provided 3,000 machines and 1.5 million yuan to help communes equip their own farm tool repair plants. Today all 303 communes in the prefecture have such plants and 90 percent of the brigades have repair groups.

Jungcheng county’s experience in setting up a repair network covering the county, communes and brigades was used as a good example for the rest of the prefecture. Each of the relatively well-equipped farm tool repair and manufacturing plants in six central communes serves five neighboring communes when they can’t solve their own problem.

The brigade repair groups are important. Fengtou brigade in the mountainous north has a group with two dozen mechanics. They have a simple lathe, a small drill press, a grinder and an electric welder. The group overcomes difficulties in many ingenious ways to repair worn and broken parts themselves and avoid sending them out.

All farm tool repair plants provide field service. Before the busy season, workers tour the countryside doing preventive maintenance. To do a still better job, the Chimo No. 1 Farm Tool Plant set up a 24-hour service post. Rainstorms in the autumn of 1974 put a heavy load on drainage machinery. One night an oil line on a diesel pump broke. The worker on duty at the service post fixed it in less than half an hour. “Your plant’s really the farmers’ best friend,” a commune member said.

The farm tool repair plants also restore a lot of old parts. They call this “making false teeth” (for gears) and “setting bones” (for machines). This saves money for communes and brigades and saves raw material for the country.

Good management and maintenance keep over 90 percent of the prefecture’s farm machinery working.

**Training**

“Train before the machines arrive.” To keep pace with farm mechanization, the counties set up training classes for tractor drivers and diesel engine operators at their farm tool repair plants.

The Huanghsien county farm machinery bureau started a short course for tractor drivers in 1971. Teachers were veteran workers from county factories and the tractor stations. Eleven terms have trained 1,700 men and women drivers.

The Jungcheng county generating plant set up a short course to train electricians. It has trained at least two for every brigade in the county.

In these classes farm people learn not only technique but working-class thinking—socialist consciousness to serve the people. In the last five years the prefecture has trained 18,000 tractor drivers, 70,000 diesel engine operators, 2,700 mechanics, 380 farm machinery managers and 350 accountants and statisticians. A good corps of farm machinery personnel is shaping up.

Immediately after the first National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture in 1975, all Party committees in Yentai prefecture made new plans for the next year. They decided to mechanize farming throughout the prefecture by 1978, two years earlier than the previous plan.

Someone echoing the “gang of four” said that “when grain production crosses the Yangtze River, the red flag will fall to the ground” and “the higher production, the greater the crime.” Yentai’s Party committees led the masses in criticizing these fallacies.

The masses of the people felt that to strengthen the socialist system, it is necessary to raise production. “Those who say that when production crosses the Yangtze River the red flag will fall do not want us to produce,” they argued, “This is deliberately sabotaging our socialist construction, and that’s sabotaging the revolution. It is out and out revisionism. We will ignore them, listen to the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, and do what must be done.”

They didn’t change their plans or slow their pace. The movement to spread the experience of Tachai, build Tachai-type counties and mechanize farming continued to grow steadily throughout the prefecture.

The year 1976 saw new achievements in farm mechanization. A 25-h.p. caterpillar tractor suitable for use on hilly land went into production. Over 40 plants in the prefecture cooperated to produce their first 4-ton farm trucks. The total horsepower of farm motors owned by brigades in the prefecture increased nearly 20 percent over 1975.

*The National Program for the Development of Agriculture sets 6 tons per hectare as the goal for the region south of the Yangtze River. Yentai is between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers, where the target is 3.75 tons per hectare.
A production team builds fields on a river sandbank.

In the gear shop at the Laiyang Tractor Plant.

Twenty-h.p. East Is Red tractors made by the local Laiyang Tractor Plant.

Yentai-made corn threshers at work.
One of the greatest expressions of China's ancient civilization are her bronzes. They represent the material, cultural and artistic achievements of China in the stage of slave society. This period, lasting from the 16th to the 5th century B.C. (Shang and Chou dynasties and the Spring and Autumn period) is therefore rightly called China's Bronze Age.

Bronzeware of that time consisted mainly of vessels used by slaveowners for the sacrificial rites of ancestor worship, at banquets and entertainments, and for religious and other ceremonies. The superb workmanship reveals the creative talents of the slaves who made them. The wealth of bronze vessels unearthed during the cultural revolution throws new light on the economic system of China's slave society and the distribution of its culture.

Early Shang Until liberation in 1949, Shang culture had been found mainly in that part of the Yellow River valley in today's northern and eastern Honan and western Shantung provinces. Since then, particularly during the cultural revolution, Shang ruins, tombs and hoards, all of them containing bronzes, have been discovered over a much wider area than before, from north of the Great Wall to south of the Yangtze River. These discoveries suggest that Shang culture went much deeper and its influence was more widespread than originally thought.

From the 16th to 14th century B.C., when Shang slave society was on the rise, social production advanced. This is reflected in its bronze-making. The solid power of the slaveowners is symbolized, for example, by two important ritual vessels—large, square ting caldrons used in ancestor worship rites—unearthed at Chengchow, Honan province in 1974. The larger (see photo p. 24) is one meter high, the other 87 centimeters. This is the first square-shaped Shang ting to be found; all Shang ting previously found were rectangular or round. The four legs are hollow. The main decoration on both is nailhead-like bosses and the animal-mask design with two large protruding eyes set among firm, rhythmic lines. This distorted image typical of early Shang decoration conveys a feeling of mystery and solemnity.

We now know that Shang bronze culture reached the Yangtze valley before the 14th century B.C. This is borne out by two significant finds.

One is the remains of a Shang walled city discovered in 1974 at Panlungcheng in the Hupeh province county of Huangpi on the Yangtze. Within the walls were excavated ruins of a large palace. Tombs found outside the city contained skeletons of slaves buried alive with the dead as a sacrifice and also a large number of bronze and jade funerary objects. Bronzes found in the cemetery were mainly pre-14th century B.C., that is, Shang products, and included food vessels, wine and water vessels, weapons and tools. Among them are hsien steamers, kuei food containers, yu wine vessels and chueh tripod-shaped wine vessels with tube-shaped spouts never before found in exactly these shapes. The size of the city and palace and the wealth of funerary objects indicate that this region had long been a political center, though it is not mentioned in extant historical records.

Other large-scale Shang ruins and tombs were discovered in 1973-74 at Wucheng in Chingchian county, Kiangsi province. Decoration on the bronze vessels is basically the same as on the early Shang ware excavated at Chengchow. Some of the bronzes were cast from stone and not pottery molds. The objects in this excavation suggest that, by their time Shang bronze culture had already undergone a long period of development south of the Yangtze.

Late Shang Recent discoveries indicate that later Shang culture spread to areas which are now north of the Great Wall. A number of typical Shang bronzes have
been found in western and northwestern Liaoning province. An important find is a hsien steamer in a hoard at Kehshekhteng in northwestern Liaoning, 100 kilometers north of the Great Wall. Its extraordinarily large upper part, wide-rimmed mouth and big upright looped handles are the same as those of bronze hsien found in Shang ruins in Honan province, proving the presence of the Shang people in this region.

More than one group of later Shang bronzes has been discovered along the Yellow River as it circles Shensi and Shansi provinces and in the valley of the Fenshui River in Shansi. Two pou wine vessels outstanding for their fine workmanship were among the 30 bronze pieces found in a Shang tomb at Paoteh in northwestern Shansi in 1971. One bears dragon and animal-mask designs, the other a lozenge pattern with bosses against a background in fine lei pattern. Both are late Shang. These discoveries indicate that Shang bronze culture already had a long history in this far northern area inhabited by peoples other than the Hans.

Bronzes with late Shang characteristics have been unearthed from ruins and tombs at Kaoche in southern Hopei province. They include ting, pou, chia tripods, ku beakers, chueh, pi spatulas and such weapons as the ko halberds, spears, broadswords and arrowheads. Among them is a yueh ax with a blade of meteorite iron hammered into shape and fitted with a bronze handle. The fact that the blade has not yet completely corroded has aroused the interest of scientists.

Western Chou The Chou people, who were to succeed the Shang in ruling China, were in their early days centered in today's eastern Kansu province and around the Chingshui River in western Shansi province. A great number of Chou vessels have been unearthed in these regions during the cultural revolution. Many bear inscriptions which provide material for the study of the period's social and economic systems.

An early Chou tomb excavated at Lingtai county in Kansu province in September 1967 yielded 324 pieces of fine bronze ware and ornaments. There are 12 ritual vessels with inscriptions showing that the tomb is that of a slaveowner named Hei Po. They include the only cylindrical yu jar recovered from a Chou tomb since liberation. It is quite different from the usual ovoid yu jar. Other pieces include square and round ting, ku kettles and chio tripods, all covered with an all-over design incorporating the animal-mask motif.

The high level of bronze technology of early Chou days is also borne out by 14 bronze vessels from a tomb excavated in Chingyang in Shensi province in 1971. Two rare finds are a kuei food container and a yu wine vessel. The kuei is set on a square base and decorated with a large-headed coiled dragon. The ring-foot is adorned with a snake pattern against a background of a fine lei design. The animal heads on the handle rise above the rim of the vessel.

Coiled dragons also appear on the yu. The stateliness of its shape is accentuated by four projecting ribs. The inscription inside tells that this is a sacrificial vessel made by a slaveowner named Fu for his father Wu.

The tomb of a high-ranking slaveowner named Wen Po who lived during the middle of the Western Chou period contained the remains of nine slaves buried alive as sacrifice. In the tomb, excavated at Paochi, Shensi province in December 1974, were over 100 bronze ritual vessels, weapons and tools, several hundred ornaments for carriages and horses, and over 600 pieces of jade and stone. Among the ritual vessels are several tsun wine vessels in the shape of animals including a calf, an elephant with raised trunk and a bird resembling a turtledove. The latter, with an extra leg be-
**BRONZES**

Shang and Chou Dynasties

- **Yu wine vessel**, inscribed with the clan name "Ku", late Shang. Height 39 cm.

- Square *ting* cooking vessel with animal-mask design and bosses, early Shang. Height 100 cm., weight 82.4 kg.

- Chia with animal-mask and whorl design, late Shang. Height 30.1 cm.
Li cooking vessel inscribed as belonging to Po Chu, early Western Chou. Height 33 cm.

Ting with animal-mask and geometric designs, early Western Chou. Height 85 cm., weight 81.2 kg.

Warring States and Western Han Periods

Varnished lamp held by kneeling figure, Warring States. Height 48.9 cm.

Sacrificial pan basin in the form of a tiger chewing the tail of an ox, Western Han. Height 43 cm., length 76 cm.
neath its tail, might be a representation of the three-legged golden bird which according to legend lived in the sun.

The privileged status of slaveowners in Western Chou times is shown by the inscriptions on its bronze vessels.

All the bronzes in a hoard found in Fufeng county, Shensi province bear inscriptions. One ting has a 197-character vow by a man named Tsai. A high military officer under King Mu of Chou, he was ordered by the succeeding King Kung to inherit the official post of his ancestors and was also presented by the king with a suit of ceremonial clothing, standards and a carriage. This 105-kilogram, 85-cm-high ting was a piece of standard value in the time of King Kung and an important ritual vessel in the mid-Western Chou period. This is a rare post-liberation find. There is also a kuei with an inscription recording King Kung's bestowal of an official post and favors on a slaveowner named Chi.

Inscriptions on other vessels are valuable for studying the economic system in the latter days of slave society.

A hoard of 37 pieces of ritual bronzes and articles of daily use was discovered in February 1975 by commune members at Tungchia village in Chishan county, Shensi province while leveling their fields. Thirty bear inscriptions. Several of the vessels belonged to a big slaveowner named Chiu Wei. A 132-character inscription on a ho wine warmer records that in the third year of the reign of King Kung, Chiu Wei traded a piece of jade ware valued at 100 strings of cowrie shells and some quality clothing for 1,300 mu (86.6 hectares) of land. A 207-character inscription on a ting records that in the fifth year of the reign of King Kung, Chiu Wei exchanged some of his own land for 400 mu (26.6 ha.) of more desirable land with Li, the Lord of State of the vassal state he lived in, and ordered people to measure the land and fix the rate of rent. The inscription on another ting records that in the ninth year of the reign of King Kung, Chiu Wei exchanged an expensively-appointed carriage for a piece of woodland from a man named Chu Po.

Under the fief system of Western Chou times, all land had been the property of the king, who conferred a part of it as a favor on slaveowner-aristocrats. The latter had only the right to use their fiefs but not the right of possession. Such fiefs were therefore called "public land". Cases of a slaveowner obtaining land in exchange for other possessions were seen only rarely in previous inscriptions on bronzes. The Chiu Wei inscriptions show that by the reign of King Kung in the middle of the Western Chou period big slaveowner-aristocrats were exchanging tracts of hundreds and even thousands of mu as their private possessions. This suggests that the system of land ownership of the slave society had been shaken.

One of the most important discoveries of Western Chou ritual bronze vessels with inscriptions are those found in 1974 and 1975 in a cemetery at Liulilin in today's Fangshan county southwest of Peking, which was then part of the vassal state of Yen. The largest of the ting tripods, weighing 41.5 kg. and standing 62 cm. high and decorated with six groups of animal-mask designs just below the rim, bears a 26-character inscription inside. It records that the Marquis of Yen ordered Chin, the owner of the ting, to present gifts to the Grand Guardian at the Chou capital. The Grand Guardian rewarded Chin with cowrie shells, which then served as money. The Grand Guardian was one of the highest officials at the Chou court, and this particular one was the father of the Marquis of Yen. This indicates close relations between the ruler of Yen and the Chou royal household.

Another important piece is the Po Chu li, known by its owner's name (see photo p. 25). Each of the three hollow legs is in the shape of an ox-head with upturned horns. The decoration on the cover is also in the form of a large and a smaller ox-head. These finds show that the bronze technology which originated in the central plains along the Yellow River had spread north and there had developed to the full in early Western Chou times.

The fief the Marquis of Yen held under the Chou king, which had its center at today's Peking, was quite extensive. This is indicated by the discovery in 1975 of a group of bronze vessels belonging to him around the Taling River in western Liaoning province. Among the bronzes found in 1974 in Ketso county, also in western Liaoning province, was a hsiyen steamer belonging to Po Chu, the owner of the big li found near Peking.

Spring and Autumn Period further shaking of the 770-476 B.C. slave system in the early Spring and Autumn period is shown by a group of bronzes from this time discovered between 1966 and 1973 in Nanyang and Hsinheh counties in southern Honan province and Tsao-yang, Sulhsien and Chingshan counties in northern Hupeh province. All belonged to the State of Tseng. A significant find is a set of nine ting in the same shape but in graduated sizes belonging to the Marquis of Tseng. The two largest bear inscriptions. According to Chou rites, only the king was entitled to use nine ting and nobles no more than seven. The fact that the Marquis of Tseng was using nine showed that he was usurping royal rites. His name appears six times in inscriptions on bronze vessels unearthed in the five counties.

There is a hu wine vessel belonging to him found in Chingshan county with an allover body decoration of broad flowing bands and the cover decorated with lotus petals, a new trend of decoration that began in late Western Chou times.

By the late Spring and Autumn period the slave system was beginning to disintegrate. A landowning economy was beginning to take shape which was advancing social production. Iron implements had appeared. China's material culture had entered a new stage. Bronze was no longer the monopoly of the slaveowning class but had become widely employed for articles used daily by the new landlord class.
Uncovering the "Magic Mirror"

VISITORS to the Shanghai Museum often pause to admire an ancient mirror of Western Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 24) vintage. It is a circular disc of cast bronze 7.4 cm. in diameter and weighing 50 grams. The front is a smooth burnished surface in which one can see one's image undistorted, the back is covered with intricate designs in relief and an eight-character inscription: Chien jih chih kuang tien hsi t'ieh ta ming — "The radiance of the sun lights up the earth", a poetic comparison of the mirror to the sun.

This mirror is peculiar in that, in a strong light the smooth side casts on the wall a reflection of the designs and characters on the back. Thus these mirrors were known among the ancients as "translucent mirrors".

The secret of making such mirrors had been lost since the Tang dynasty (618-907). Probing into the subject — though with little success — had never ceased since then.

Early in 1975 some of our teachers and students in Futan University's Department of Optics took this up as a topic for research. In six months of effort, with help from the Shanghai Museum and technical personnel and workers from the Shanghai Non-ferrous Metals Foundry, we finally unravelled the mystery.

CHI LING is a member of the Department of Optics of Futan University in Shanghai.

The 2,000-rear-old antique bronze mirror from the Western Han dynasty.

Secret of the "Magic Mirror"

After several false starts including inlaying and grinding, we decided to try heat treatment. We cast a bronze mirror with the same designs and characters as on the antique mirror and, after polishing it to the required smoothness, subjected it to heat treatment, then a bath of cold water for swift cooling and a further polishing. It did reflect the designs.

Metallographic and X-ray fluorescence analyses and optical tests showed that the thinner areas of the metal disc, cooling faster than the thicker areas, constrict, causing them to become slightly convex on the smooth side so that the thicker parts are concave. When reflecting light the concave areas have the effect of concentrating the rays, and the convex ones of diffusing them. The thicker parts of the mirror reflect light more brightly than the thinner ones. Though the surface irregularities corresponding to the designs and characters on the back are so slight as to be imperceptible to the naked eye, they create a clearly-defined reflection. Actually the light does not penetrate the bronze disc at all.

Casting of such bronze mirrors with the thinnest parts barely 0.5 cm. thick presents many difficulties technically. The slightest inaccuracy will distort the reflection of the designs. In addition, a high tin content of 23-26 percent is needed to achieve the required hardness and polish. This makes cracking a constant threat during casting and quenching. Under the conditions of manual operation that prevailed two thousand years ago, the ancient craftsmen showed great ingenuity both in producing such a "metal lens" and in executing the elegant designs that make it an exquisite objet d'art. The mirror also attests to the high level attained by the ancients in smelting, casting and quenching techniques.

Our study of this ancient bronze mirror has yielded not only important data on the history of the development of natural science in ancient China but also much that is of value in the design and manufacture of modern precision optical instruments.
On the Hsisha Islands

Fishermen on Hsisha gather specimens from North Reef.

PLA soldiers on Chinyin Island with a good catch.
I'm studying plant life around an ancient well on Chenhang Island.

Flipping a turtle over.

Bringing up a king sea-slug.

Headquarters of the revolutionary committee of Kwangtung province's Haisha, Nansha and Chungsha islands on Yungshing Island.
Biological Resources of the Hsisha Islands

CHEN KUO-HSIAO and SUNG YU-CHIH

There are four major groups among China's islands in the South China Sea — the Tungsha, Hsisha, Chungsha and Nansha. Their tropical climate and high rainfall support a rich and varied plant, animal and marine life. The surrounding waters teem with fish and are excellent breeding grounds. Populated in very ancient times, mainly by fishermen from the coastal provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien, the islands engage in fishing, fertilizer production and agriculture.

Chinese scientists, together with the local people, have made many surveys of the islands' resources since liberation, especially since the cultural revolution began in 1966. Since 1973 the Academy of Sciences has sent two expeditions of biologists to the Hsisha Islands to investigate plant, animal and marine life. Below is a report by two scientists on one of these trips.

We set out from Yulin on Hainan Island, sailing south-east on a rough sea. After 20 hours of voyage a string of pearl-like islets appeared on the horizon — the Hsisha Islands in China's tropical zone.

Tropical Plants

The temperature on the Hsisha Islands never drops below 16° C. Warm weather and a plentiful rainfall favor the growth of plants in all seasons. Most of them have xeromorphic and saline-resistant features.

The lettuce tree (Pisonia alba), about 10 meters high, is a tropical plant typical of the Hsisha Islands, forming dense forests on Yung-hsing, Howu and Chinyin. Deeply-rooted and luxuriant, it can stand strong wind and scorching sun. Branches when broken by typhoons root themselves in the soil and grow new trees. The lettuce tree is useful in many ways — it can stabilize sand, conserve water, break the wind and lower the temperature. The tallest trees in the islands are the oil palms, standing more than 30 m. They are the first things seen by fishermen out at sea.

In the past people thought it difficult or even impossible to grow fruit, vegetables and grain on these coral islands. But long years of reclamation and cultivation by the Chinese working people, especially the exploitation of fresh water resources by the civilians and armymen on the islands since liberation, have resulted in the growing of coconut, papaya, oil palm, pineapple, bananas, and the successful introduction of sorghum, corn, sugar cane, turnips, pumpkins, string beans and tomatoes.

A survey shows that 93 percent of the 200 varieties of more advanced flora on the islands are the same as those on Hainan Island.

During our visit to the coconut groves on Yung-hsing and Howu islands, the local people told us of a centuries-old custom: Every fisherman coming from Hainan Island planted 20 coconut trees a year. More were planted on the Nansha Islands than on others. Many, however, were destroyed by typhoons. After liberation the armymen and civilians on the Hsisha Islands began to take meticulous care of the coconut trees. Because fresh water is scarce, every bit of waste water is used for the trees. To protect the saplings from the bites of hermit crabs, they build walls with coral rock around them. Thanks to their unremitting efforts, new groves have made the coconut palm the chief tree of economic value.

Birds and Wild Cattle

The coral reefs and sand beaches of the Hsisha Islands are nesting and breeding grounds for dozens of species of sea and migratory birds. The most common are the brown gannet, golden plover, little-ring plover, house swallow and silver-eye. On Howu Island we saw thousands of brown gannets, big as ducks, white-breasted, green-billed and with red webbed-feet. They build their nests in the towering lettuce trees. Toward evening when the gannets fly back to the nests, the air is filled with their cries and the tree-tops turn white. Unafraid of people, these birds swooped down toward us. Because they flock over shoals of fish for food, the fishermen on Hsisha used to follow them at sea. They called them "navigation pilot birds". China has put them on the list of protected birds.

The Hsisha Islands are rich in guano. In the past, a few of the islands were almost completely

CHEN KUO-HSIAO and SUNG YU-CHIH are researchers at the Peking Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
covered with guano, some of it a meter deep. Centuries of accumulation and drenching rain have turned it into fossilized guano and natural phosphorus, important raw materials used in making chemical fertilizer and refining caffeine. Before liberation the guano, like other resources in China, was plundered by the imperialists. The founding of new China made it possible to protect and rationally use the natural resources of the Hsisha Islands for socialist construction.

Deep in the forests in Howu Island there is a kind of wild ox. People say they were brought here for breeding by the fishermen on Hainan long ago. They roam in herds and only step out of the forests at dawn to search for water. To protect this rare animal, local armymen and civilians have dug ponds to store water for them.

**Marine Life**

Formed by coral, each island is surrounded by a reef like a tray holding the island above the water. Some of them are dozens of times bigger than the islands themselves. The reefs are the home of a rich variety of marine life of high economic value. With diving masks people can see the staghorn, Goniathea and Lobophyllia corals in gorgeous colors. Among the colonies of coral are sponges, coelenterates, molluscs, spiny-skinned creatures and shoals of beautiful coral fish.

There are more than 1,000 species of marine fish in the South China Sea. Hsisha, therefore, is one of China's important fishing grounds. It has some 400 varieties of fish alone. Over 30 of them such as the tuna, king mackerel, grouper, red snapper, caesio and shark are of high economic value. Tuna and king mackerel catches are especially high and they are the main targets of deep-sea fishing. Among the molluscs are cuttlefish, squid and octopus.

The islands are well known for sea turtles, hawk-billed turtles,
Lettuce trees.

Brown gannets.

A king sea-slug.

A shoal of coral fish among staghorn corals.

Lobsters and goatfish.

Damsel fish among sea anemone.
lobsters, king sea-slugs and pearl shells (*Pinctada spp.*). The king sea-slug is over one meter long and weighs about 10 kilograms. In early April we saw North Island fishermen preparing nets for the large numbers of sea turtles that come to the Hsisha Islands with the warm currents from the southwest between April and June every year to lay eggs. A large one may weigh over 100 kg. Awkward on land, they are easily turned over and caught on the beaches. The turtle’s meat is highly nutritious and its shell is a valuable medicine.

Lobsters may reach 30 cm. long and weigh two kg. The Marten’s pearl oyster (*Pteria pinctada martensi*) are well known throughout the world. There are giant clams a meter in diameter weighing over 200 kg. Local fishermen use a half shell as a trough for feeding pigs.

**Marine Products Port**

Every winter fishermen on the south China coast sail in fleets to the Hsisha Islands. To better organize their production, a fishing headquarters and aquatic products purchasing station have been set up on Yunghsing Island, the largest.

When we visited Yunghsing the harbor was crowded with freighters, fishing trawlers and naval ships. Cranes on the docks swung giant arms and trucks shuttled back and forth. At one end of the harbor workers were pouring cement to extend the wharves. Above the coconut groves looms a tall building housing the revolutionary committee of the Hsisha, Nansha and Chungsha islands.

Living quarters, stores, a hospital, a post and telegraph office and a cinema have been built for the fishermen and armymen on the island. Since the beginning of the cultural revolution greater changes have taken place in the Hsisha Islands. Under the leadership of the revolutionary committee, a power plant and docks with modern equipment were built. The meteorological station and oceanographical research center were expanded.
The Tachai farm brigade in Shanxi province is an outstanding new socialist village. Since liberation its less-than-a-hundred peasant families have transformed their stony mountainsides into high-yielding terraced fields. In 1964 Chairman Mao called on the country to learn from Tachai in agriculture. Energetic response to the call has resulted in greatly increased farm production. Chiang Ching, one of the “gang of four”, visited Tachai twice in the last two years. What was her purpose?

Kuo Feng-lien, Tachai’s Party branch secretary, describes her visits.

In 1975, just before the first National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture was to open, we received word that Chiang Ching was coming to visit our brigade on September 8.

We had never met her and knew little about her. But we had been visited by Premier Chou En-lai and other leaders from the Party Central Committee and the government. We expected that Chiang Ching, as a member of the Political Bureau, would guide and encourage us in our revolutionary work as Premier Chou and the others had done. But she turned out quite different.

She arrived in very grand style, in a special train with a retinue of more than a hundred people and several truckloads of baggage, including four horses. She took over the entire hotel we had built for foreign guests. Whenever Premier Chou had come to Tachai he occupied only one or two rooms and each time told us not to go to extra trouble but to keep things plain and simple.

Chiang Ching, on the other hand, demanded one special privilege after another. She wanted rugs for her room, then the air scented with perfume, then fluorescent desk lamps that didn’t hum when you turned them on, then black curtains to keep out the light when she was resting.

Premier Chou always told us not to disturb the people or take them away from their work. The first thing Chiang Ching did was to issue six taboos: 1. No dynamiting within 15 kilometers (the peasants were blasting hilltops to make new fields); 2. No broadcasting on the public-address system; 3. No motor vehicles should enter the village; 4. No blowers were to be used in the nearby kitchen; 5. No talking in loud voices; and 6. People must walk without making any noise.

She wanted doors to connect ten cave-houses, though with their construction this could not be done. The brick-paved compound in the hotel where she was staying was built on top of a row of cave-houses. She wanted the bricks dug up and flower beds laid out. We told her we did not plant flowers there so that water wouldn’t seep...
The book Water Margin lies pre-

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Novel Water Margin. We had just

said, “The heart of the matter in

the book. He said, “The merit of

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d a dispatch about it.

capitulationists.” Instead of dis-

ignore us and build for her on Tiger Head Mountain

spite of heavy pressure from

down. But she ignored us and

ordered flowers from Peking and

had them planted in the beds. This
damaged the cave-houses below.

Chiang Ching wanted us to

build a compound of cave-houses

for her on Tiger Head Mountain

above the village, saying she
planned to visit Tachai every year.
But we were working to transform
the village in order to build
socialism, as Chairman Mao said
we should. Why should we put
our effort into building her a villa
when we needed the area for fields,
reservoirs and animal farms? We
have good enough accommodations
in the village even if she was really
going to come once a year. So we
did not build the houses.

Chiang Ching didn’t do any real
work in the fields, she didn’t go
among the peasants, or inspect or
investigate anything. Instead she
was always trying to show off and
build up her own prestige. She
would carry a basket with her and
pose for photos under a pepper
tree, an apple tree or a grape trel-
ls. To create the impression that
she had worked at Tachai she hit
upon the idea of digging an air-
raid shelter on Tiger Head Moun-
tain—a useless thing because
there are lots of gullies and
culverts around our village. But
she insisted on it and chose a place
where a good crop of millet was
ripening. We simply couldn’t let
the people’s year-long labor go to
waste so we dug up the almost-ripe
tobacco plants from a plot and
cleared it for her. Actually she
ever lifted a finger at digging.

The truth is that after some of our
people finished the shelter she
went up there and posed with a
shovel in her hands for photogra-
phers and had reporters write
a dispatch about it.

One day she proposed giving us
a talk on the Chinese classical
novel Water Margin. We had just
heard Chairman Mao’s comment on
the book. He said, “The merit of
the book Water Margin lies pre-
cisely in the portrayal of capitula-
tions. It serves as a teaching
material by negative example to
help all the people recognize
capitalists.” Instead of dis-
cussing this idea Chiang Ching
said, “The heart of the matter in

Water Margin is the making of
Chao Kai into a figurehead. (Chao
Kai is the leader of a peasant
uprising army in the novel—Ed.)

Today in the Central Committee
there are people who are trying
to make Chairman Mao a figure-
head.” By twisting what Chairman
Mao had said about the book she
was actually attacking leaders in
the Central Committee by in-
nuendo.

We felt there was something
wrong about what she said and did
not organize discussions of her
talk. A few days later we learned
that Comrade Hua Kuo-feng had
reported her talk to Chairman Mao,
who sharply criticized it. We knew
we had been right not to print or
produce it.

Not long after she arrived at Ta-
chaei, Chiang Ching summoned
some eighty literary and art peo-
ple from Peking and Shanghai. She
had individual talks with some,
them called everybody together for
meetings. She flew off the handle
and berated them in public, and in
private meetings attacked central
leaders. She was especially angry
with the scriptwriter of the rev-
olutionary film about the Taching
oil workers, The Pioneers. She had
declared that there were “serious
political and artistic mistakes” in
the film. On a letter from the
scriptwriter to Chairman Mao ac-
cussing Chiang Ching of arbitrary
attacks, Chairman Mao had com-
mented, “There is no big error in
this film. Suggest that it be ap-
proved for distribution.” Now

Chiang Ching said to the script-
writer, “Even if there is no big
error there are minor ones... You
had the audacity to concoct a
wicked charge against me!”

What Chiang Ching said and did
made us aware that there was not
only struggle within the Party but,
most probably, stormy struggle.
Sure enough, after the 1975 learn-
from-Tachai conference, Wang
Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao and
Yao Wen-yuan started a drive to
attack Tachai and the conference
and subvert the movement to build
Tachai-type counties. They called
Tachai’s great efforts to develop
socialist agriculture a one-sided
stress on production to the neglect
of class struggle. They said our
slogan, “Go all out and build
faster”, was a reactionary slogan.

The pig farm built on the place where Chiang Ching had had others dig an air-raid shelter.

W

We were not intimidated. Guid-
ed by Chairman Mao’s rev-
olutionary line, we deepened our
criticism of revisionism and capita-
listism and our study of Marxist-
Leninist works. With the slogan,
“Destroy the old, build the new
and work for the future”, we
started new projects to increase
mechanization, bring more fields
under irrigation and completely
transform Tiger Head Mountain.

We went ahead with all this in

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A Tachai peasant tells how Chiang Ching tried to spoil their experiment plot of corn.

the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao gang. And in the midst of it we were told that Chiang Ching was coming again.

To tell the truth, every time we had heard that Premier Chou, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng or other leaders from Peking were coming to Tachai we had been so happy we could hardly get to sleep. When we heard Chiang Ching was coming we couldn’t sleep either—because we never knew what she was up to. Her last visit had shown us that we didn’t speak the same language. She was probably coming again with bad intentions.

She arrived on September 3, 1976 and the first thing she said was, “Do you know the purpose of my visit this time? I’ve come here to fight the revisionist line.”

First she wanted to go up Tiger Head Mountain and look at her “air-raid shelter”. I guess she expected the place to be fenced off with a sign honoring her. When she saw we had built a new pig farm, she flew into a rage and shouted at me, “Where’s my air-raid shelter? Why did you build pigpens here? Who said you could destroy my air-raid shelter?” She pointed a finger at my nose and said, “Don’t you know that my air-raid shelter is of great political significance? How did you dare destroy it without asking my permission? I know it’s Teng Hsiao-ping who told you to fill in the shelter.” Working herself up, she called me all kinds of names.

I couldn’t help thinking of how Chairman Mao had approved of our work and how Premier Chou and Comrade Hua Kuo-feng had encouraged us, and tears welled up in my eyes. The thought gave me courage and I told her, “If you want to point out our shortcomings we’ll be glad to accept criticism. But we didn’t build the farm on Teng Hsiao-ping’s orders, because he wasn’t here when we decided to build it. We’ve never even met Teng Hsiao-ping.”

“Anyway,” she said, staring at me coldly, “filling in my air-raid shelter is a political matter.” Then she said, “You people at Tachai have grown conceited. You’ve fallen behind politically. Do you realize that?” She demanded that I write a self-criticism and announced she was going to find out who was behind the shelter affair.

Then she said she wanted to look at the chufa, a kind of oil crop, we had planted. When she was at Tachai the year before she had brought some chufa and told me to plant it, care for it myself and send her a memo every ten days reporting on its growth. After she left I had our brigade science group plant it on a 46-square-meter plot. I did not take personal charge, nor did I send her any report. As I took her to the plot she never asked a word about whether or not our natural conditions were suitable for chufa. But before she even had a good look at it she exclaimed, “You’ve planted too closely! They don’t look well cared for.” Again she turned on me. “I got this chufa for you and selected the best seeds myself. Why didn’t you personally take charge of growing it? What kind of attitude is this to take toward me?” Then she grabbed a mattock and started to dig a ditch in the plot, but after a few hacks she said, “Oh, I’ve worked up a sweat. Somebody take over.” I was standing behind her so I said, “Here, I’ll do it.” But she snapped at me, “I don’t want you. You can’t represent me!”

It became clearer and clearer that she wasn’t really interested in how we had transformed our land and improved production but was only trying to find fault with us. She singled out an experimental plot where we had interplanted wheat with corn. The wheat had already been cut and the corn was growing well, each stalk with two ears. She began picking the lower and smaller ears, saying, “So this is what a Tachai experimental plot is like! I’m going to take these back and show them to your brigade members. You don’t manage your experimental plot well. You are lagging behind because you are conceited.” Then she began breaking off part of the stalks.

“The top leaves manufacture nutrients,” our science group leader said. “If you break them off, the kernels will not fill out and there won’t be a good yield.” She just ignored him and said she was going to get the entire brigade out to pick the lower ears and top off every stalk in all Tachai’s 40 hectares of corn.

Chiang Ching summed up our “three crimes”: 1. We filled in her air-raid shelter, a political mistake; 2. Our experimental plot was very poor because we were “too conceited”; 3. We grew too many apple trees and neglected oil crops. I think she would gladly have said more to discredit us if she could.

At our village co-op store she put on an act that showed her up as an ambitious careerist. It was a part of her scheme to prepare public opinion for her planned seizure of supreme power. After shopping she called the salesclerks together and said, “In matriarchal
society people knew only their mothers, not their fathers. Women held the power. Even in communist society there will be empresses and women will hold power."

While she was shopping many people gathered outside the door to watch. We talked them into dispersing so we could ensure her safety, but she was displeased. "Why shoo the people away? I'm here to be seen. Everywhere I go people always gather to watch."

Chiang Ching was always saying, "I represent Chairman Mao" or "Chairman Mao told me that I should. . .", presenting herself as Chairman Mao's "comrade-in-arms" and "pupil". Yet when an emergency message came from Peking on the night of September 5 telling her to return at once she didn't seem the least bit anxious, although she knew the summons meant that Chairman Mao was critically ill. She played cards during the two hours her things were being packed, chatting and laughing as usual — and went on playing another half hour after that. That was how the self-styled "comrade-in-arms" and "pupil" really felt toward Chairman Mao! We saw more clearly that Chiang Ching the actress was only good at playing the villain, never the good characters.

Chairman Mao said, "You are usually afraid of a thing when you have no knowledge of it. Take snakes for instance — people are very much afraid of them before they get to know them and understand their habits. But once people get to know snakes and understand their habits and weak points, they are no longer afraid and can catch them."

With Chiang Ching we went through a process of not knowing her to knowing her, and from knowing her to struggling against her. "Chiang Ching was always branding this person or that as a capitalist roader," we said. "Actually she is a capitalist roader and should be overthrown."

News of Chairman Mao's death plunged us into deep grief. We worried about the future of our Party and country. Then we heard that Comrade Hua Kuo-feng had been appointed Chairman of the Party Central Committee and Chairman of its Military Commission, as Chairman Mao himself had proposed, and that the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua had smashed the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao anti-Party clique. Our village promptly resounded with the sound of drums, gongs and firecrackers. We put up slogans and hung up lanterns. We held a victory rally and paraded round and round the village. We recalled Chairman Hua's visit to Tachai the year before and talked about his decisive move to protect the country. "The fall of the 'gang of four' has lifted a weight from our hearts," we said to each other. "How fine that Chairman Hua is now our chairman."

The Tachai brigade members listed these crimes of the "gang of four" in the rural areas: They opposed the mass criticism of capitalist tendencies in the countryside; they opposed going all out to build socialism in the countryside; they opposed the consolidation of Party organizations, rectification of the style of work and education of the Party's basic line in the countryside; they opposed the Party's centralized leadership. Their aim was to undermine the mass movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture and build up Tachai-type counties throughout the country in an attempt to restore capitalism in rural China.

Wall posters at Tachai exposing Chiang Ching's plot to seize top Party leadership.
The Kailuan Coal Mines, first opened in 1878 and today one of China's major coal producers with 100,000 workers, doubled its output during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1972-75). On July 28, 1976 it was severely damaged by one of the world's biggest earthquakes in more than a decade. Almost immediately its miners set about overcoming monumental difficulties to restore production. Why was it able to do this? A China Reconstructs correspondent on the spot gives the answer - the role played by its grassroots Party groups.

In socialist China all work is carried on under the leadership of the Communist Party. Party committees work down to the lowest levels in every factory, mine, enterprise and commune. Their duty is to educate Party members and the masses of the people in Marxism and to lead them in class struggle and in carrying out the Party's policies and tasks. They maintain close ties with the people.

In this issue China Reconstructs carries two stories describing how the Party committee of the Kailuan Coal Mines leads the people in coping with the quake, in class struggle and in the struggle between the proletarian and the bourgeois lines.

**WHEN THE EARTHQUAKE**

struck the Tangshan-Fengnan area, Hopei province, in the early hours of July 28, 1976, ten thousand workers on night shift at the Kailuan Coal Mines were underground. Power went out, the ventilation system stopped and water began to rise rapidly.

Wang Yung-wu, a deputy secretary of the Kailuan Coal Mines Party committee, crawled out of his collapsed house and, without stopping to take care of his injuries, set out for Kailuan's Tangshan Mine, the one closest to the Party headquarters. There he and other Party members on duty who had survived organized the rescue of the trapped miners. Chao Cheng-pin, secretary of the mines' Party committee, was buried in the rubble of a collapsed building. When he was dug out his first question was, "What about the mines? Are the workers all right?" He waved off suggestions that he have his injuries treated and said, "Don't bother about me. See about the mines and miners first. Go tell the Party committee members to assemble outside the headquarters."
Party committee members at Kailuan never stopped doing their duty for a minute. Teng Chun-nuan, another deputy secretary of the mines' Party committee, was underground at the Linhsi Mine when the quake struck. He immediately ordered the miners to climb up to the surface while he and a deputy secretary of the Linhsi Mine Party committee went to check damage at each of the workfaces before leaving the pit.

At the No. 1 shaft-sinking district in the Fankochuang Mine, 27 men were working 520 meters underground. While the earth continued to rock and more buildings threatened to collapse, the secretary and members of the construction department's Party general branch committee decided to lower a metal ladder by a hand-operated winch to bring the men up. Kuo Chen-hsing, a committee member, volunteered to descend with the ladder. It took him three hours to reach the men. Meanwhile underground water had been rising steadily. Directed by the Party organization, men aboveground worked the winch for 13 hours until the last of the workers were brought up.

Six hundred men were underground at the Luchiato Mine. Chia Pang-yu, standing committee member of the mine Party committee and vice-chairman of the mine revolutionary committee, was working with them. He and the other cadres formed a temporary Party branch and underground command post to direct an orderly exit through the ventilation shaft (see story on p. 40).

After the quake struck, the Kailuan Coal Mines Party committee held an enlarged meeting and passed a resolution calling on all the surviving workers to join in a massive effort to rebuild and restore production as quickly as possible.

At every level Party committees formed teams of workers, leaders and engineers to go underground to determine the extent of the damage. They found collapsed tunnels filled with gas and water. Yo Fu-yun, standing committee member of the Tangchiachuang Mine Party committee, and his team descended along a 2,700-meter slope and made their way through 4,200 meters of tunnels, often wading waist-deep in water or crawling through muddy sections only half a meter high. They spent seven hours underground.

The same thorough investigation of tunnels, workfaces and equipment above and below ground was made in all the mines.

On August 7, ten days after the disaster, the Machiakou Mine brought up its first post-quake load of coal. On that day Cheng Yu-chu, deputy Party branch secretary of Area No. 1, joined the morning shift and was the first to go down. Wading through knee-deep water, his quake-injured foot white and swollen, he never stopped. Spurred by his spirit, the men plunged into work with a will and sent up the first load of coal.

Leaders of Party branches and committees at all levels often stayed underground twenty or thirty hours at a stretch, stopping only to eat food they had brought along.

**Linking Study with Practice**

"Only by earnestly studying Marxism and truly understanding it are we able to distinguish between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism, between socialism and capitalism, and keep steadily to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line" — this is what the Party leaders at Kailuan have learned through direct experience. Since following the correct line is basic and having correct leadership is the key to running a socialist enterprise successfully, the Kailuan leaders give first priority to the study of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. All leaders spend one hour a day and one day a week in study. Each leader spends from two weeks to a month in full-time study at a class run by the next higher Party organization.

This system of study was quickly restored at the Tangchiachuang Mine after the earthquake. Discussions were carried out amidst collapsed buildings and rubble. The cadres took special note of the passage on the proletariat in Chairman Mao's *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society* in which he called the Chinese working class "particularly good fighters". They were determined to continue this tradition in rebuilding the mines and homes.

When the movement began to criticize the counter-revolutionary activities of the anti-Party clique of Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, the Kailuan Party leaders carefully studied Chairman Mao's past criticisms of this "gang of four." Linking study with practice, the mines' Party committee is first in criticizing the gang for sabotaging Chairman Mao's policy of "grasping revolution and spurring production". Chairman Mao taught that revolution liberates the forces of production and promotes its development. The relationship between revolution and production is one of commanding and being commanded. Stressing the commanding role of revolution does not mean that production is unimportant, much less that production can be neglected.

The "gang of four", however, set revolution against production, politics against the economy, class struggle against the struggle for production. Being opposed to giving attention to production and construction they attacked leaders and others who stuck to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and tried to keep production going well. They maintained that these people were stressing production to the exclusion of revolution. Actually the "gang of four" was trying to create chaos, put the blame on others and seize Party and state power. If the "gang of four" was
At 3:42 a.m. on July 28, a gigantic rumble sounded through the tunnels of the Kailuan Coal Mines' Luchiato Mine. The lights went out and the ventilation system stopped. The ground underfoot began to rock like a boat in a storm, knocking some of the miners off their feet. Pieces of rock fell from the roofs. “Earthquake!” someone shouted.

“Comrades! Keep calm, don’t panic!” called out Chia Pang-yu, a member of the mine Communist Party standing committee and vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee, who was working underground at the time. He rushed to the battery-operated phone. When he got through to the surface he was told that because the electricity was out they couldn’t use the lifts. All 600 people underground were to leave through the ventilation shaft at top speed.

Chia Pang-yu put down the receiver and weighed the factors in the situation. It was several kilometers to the mouth of the ventilation shaft through dark, slippery, steep tunnels with floors pitted with water-filled holes. The greatest danger would be if things weren’t organized well and people panicked. Those unfamiliar with this underground world and those with injuries might be left behind. The aftershocks were still coming and the danger was increasing by the minute.

First, an emergency meeting of cadres from each unit. When they had assembled, suggestions and expressions of determination came thick and fast in a way that Chia found most moving. “These are my class brothers,” he thought. They must all be gotten out safely, even if he had to give his own life.

He summarized their ideas into a four-point decision. 1. Set up a temporary Party branch with him as secretary and an underground headquarters headed by him. 2. Assure the workers that the situation was far from hopeless and could be overcome with courage and struggle. They should follow discipline and help each other during the evacuation. 3. The order of exit would be: non-mine personnel, people from the surface who had been helping out below, miners and finally the top leaders. 4. In any crisis Party members and cadres must if necessary sacrifice themselves to save others. They should put the interests of the masses in each unit first, of workers before cadres, who would be the last to go.

The decision, like a mobilization for battle, brought new confidence and strength to the endangered miners. The Party branch decided to leave some members underground at a few vital posts, and the response “I’ll stay! I’ll stay!” came from every Party member.

Though aftershocks were still racking the tunnels and shaking stones loose from the roofs as they made their way out, nobody panicked. Those who were unjured helped the injured and they all encouraged one another. When anyone fell or was hurt there was immediately someone beside him to help him up or carry him. People frequently shielded their comrades from falling stones with their own bodies. Without crowding, one by one, they began climbing the narrow ladder toward the mouth of the ventilation shaft.

Chia Pang-yu asked those in charge of each unit to count heads before ascending to be sure that nobody was left behind. Chu Yushan, a Communist who was director of the coal dressing plant and had also been working underground, found one worker missing. Risking his life, he ran back to search the workfaces for him. Once he came back to report he had not found him yet, and then was off again. Finally he found the missing worker, who had been injured, and helped him out.

Four hours later, some time after 8:00 that morning, all 600 had returned safely to the surface. Even then they did not leave, but stayed around the mouth of the ventilation shaft, peering into it. Why hadn’t Chia and the other leaders come up yet? Finally someone shouted, “Look!” All eyes turned toward the mouth of the shaft. In the distance were several bobbing points of light. A cheer went up.

“They’ve made it!”
Miners of Fankochuang Mine study Marxism.

allowed to carry on like this, China
would not be able to remain inde-
pendent economically or politically
and the people would be forced
to capitulate to imperialism, sell
out the country and be enslaved
again.

Following the earthquake, the
Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao gang
were unconcerned about the people
in the Tangshan-Fengnan area.
They brushed off the disaster with
the words, "There are only a mil-
lion people in Tangshan. There
are 800 million in the whole
country. So what if all of Tangshan
is wiped out?"

While the miners at Kailuan,
led by its Party committee and
braving strong aftershocks, worked
at feverish speed to drain under-
ground water, a henchman of the
"gang of four" descended on them
and declared that all this effort to
restore production meant a gross
negligence of class struggle, that
their leaders were "capitalist road-
ers who have not changed".

But the Kailuan Party commit-
tee and leaders at every level were
encouraged by the prompt visit
of a delegation sent by Chairman
Mao and the Party Central Com-
mittee and headed by Premier
Hua Kuo-feng. Ignoring the "gang
of four's" interference, the mines'
Party leaders kept on working to
resume production as quickly as
possible. After the "gang of four"
was smashed, the Party committee
launched a mass criticism of its

Collective Leadership

Kailuan's Party committee is a
united and militant leading group.
Its 46 members were democratical-
lly elected through consultation by
the mines' 20,000 Party members
and approved by the next higher
Party organization. The 18 stand-
ing committee members include
one secretary and four deputy
secretaries.

The mines' administrative or-
ganization is the revolutionary
committee. This is under the
Tangshan municipal revolutionary
committee, the Hopei provincial
revolutionary committee and the
Ministry of Coal Industry.
The Party committee gives unified leadership to the revolutionary committee, the trade union, the Communist Youth League, the militia and other people's organizations. This guarantees that all organizations will, on the basis of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, unify their understanding, follow the same policies, synchronize their plans, commands and actions. Party organizations (general branches and local branches) are set up at the lower levels (work areas and administrative departments) to lead the workers.

The Kailuan Party committee is made up of old, middle-aged and young people. Since the beginning of the cultural revolution, according to the Party's five requirements for members,* more than 2,000 people, 80 percent of them workers, have been promoted to leading posts at all levels. Worker-cadres account for 23.6 percent of the secretaries and deputy secretaries and revolutionary committee chairmen and vice-chairmen at the two top levels. Young people make up 5.2 percent of the cadres at these two levels. Workers account for 56 percent of the grass-roots leaders. Fourteen percent of these leaders are young people. The oldest of the 18 standing committee members of the Kailuan Coal Mines Party committee is 63, the youngest 27. Party secretary Chao Cheng-pin joined the revolution in 1945 at the start of the liberation war. Lu Yun-fa, a deputy Party secretary and a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee, was a miner who was made a cadre after liberation. Several other standing committee members are young people promoted from workers or grass-roots cadres during the cultural revolution. All members take a direct part in productive labor.

The mines' Party committee practices the principle of democratic centralism and collective leadership. Important questions involving all the mines are discussed by the whole committee before a decision is taken. The same is true at all levels.

For example, while discussing how to mechanize mining at the Tangshan Mine in 1974, a small number of members of the Party committee insisted that the old charge-and-blast method was a super way to get steady production than machines. Instead of taking a vote to establish majority rule, the Party secretary suggested that the members go down to the pits and hold discussions with the miners. When the minority members saw the heavy labor involved in the old method, they realized why the miners demanded mechanization. It was not, as they had first thought, only a matter of how to mine coal but also the interests of the working class. Once the Party committee reached a unanimous view, it was able to mobilize the whole mine to work for mechanization. In a short time the process of extraction, loading and transport was being done by eight mechanized units instead of the original one.

The Masses' Friend

For years all Kailuan leaders have worked in collective production. Leaders of the two top levels work in the mines or factory shops at least a hundred days a year, middle-level leaders about two hundred days and the grass-roots leaders the year round. This practice has convinced the leaders that ‘moving papers around in the office will not solve key problems in production’.

Yen Tzu-ching, Party secretary of the Machiakou Mine, gets things done by moving himself around. Once pressure over a workface became so great that the ceiling of the 1.8-meter-high tunnel sagged to a point where the men could only crawl through it. Yen and other Party leaders went down and themselves crawled through the tunnel to investigate. Then they discussed the problem with the miners and together they decided how to reinforce the ceiling and deepen the floor.

In distributing earthquake relief materials, the Kailuan Party leaders considered the masses first, then Party members and lastly themselves. No leader abused his power to get special privileges.

The principal leader at all levels personally takes charge of the welfare of the miners and their families. After the quake Yen Tzu-ching of the Machiakou Mine joined the PLA men in delivering drinking water sent from Peking to each family, also taking it directly to the injured.

Ma Szu, secretary of the Chao-kochuang Mine Party committee, personally supervised the prompt erection of temporary shelters for the miners and their families. The Party branch secretary at the installation shop of the machinery and electric section of the Tangshan Mine and his committee members helped build shelters for the workers. He put up a small hut for his own family only after the others were adequately housed.

Party leaders at Kailuan make special efforts to keep themselves under the masses' supervision. "Open-door rectification" is carried out periodically to solicit criticism and opinions from the masses in order to keep the leading groups revolutionary. The workers can put up big-character posters any time to criticize leaders. The top-level Party committee often invites the most critical workers to meetings to air their views.

Inspection groups made up of worker representatives and model workers are regularly invited to Party organizations at every level to check on the members' study, their participation in production and their work style. This worker supervision ensures that the leading groups keep to the revolutionary road pointed out by Chairman Mao.
How the 1971-75 Output Was Doubled

IN 1975 — eight days ahead of time — the workers of the Kailuan Coal Mines in Tangshan fulfilled their promise to double their annual output of coal during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75). Their victory came through constant struggle against the revisionist line.

Spurred by the cultural revolution, China's economy was accelerating rapidly as it entered the 70s. Factories, farms and homes were demanding more coal. How was Kailuan going to help meet the challenge?

"If we tap the unused potential in the old mines," the workers proposed, "we can probably double production in five years." Promptly the revolutionary committee's desks began to pile up with letters from workers pledging greater efforts, proposals for greater efficiency or requests for challenging tasks.

Double output? Two views clashed sharply at meetings of the revolutionary committee. Some leaders held that Kailuan was old, its shafts deep, tunnels long and equipment out of date. In fact, they said, the mines were becoming exhausted. It would be hard enough just to keep up present output. The mines' basic output figure was already high. Any increase would have to come slowly. To double Kailuan's annual output would be the same as...
building seven new mines, each putting out 1,800,000 tons a year. This would take 500,000,000 yuan in capital, seven or eight years of construction and thousands of additional workers. Conclusion: doubling output in five years was impossible.

The majority of leaders, however, were convinced it could be done. True, Kailuan was old, but since the cultural revolution began new deposits had been discovered, a new system of management introduced and a new makeup of leadership established at every level combining the old, middle-aged and young. These new factors meant great potential in production. But it could only be tapped under a correct political line.

These people reviewed Kailuan's history. For seventy years before liberation Kailuan had been controlled by the Ching dynasty, then the British, the Japanese and the Kuomintang reactionaries. In December 1948 the people finally took over Kailuan. The miners, called "pit beggars" by the imperialists, became masters of the country. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, they overthrew the labor-gang bosses and suppressed counter-revolutionaries. In a short time they got production going again. Great changes took place in the wake of more political movements and the socialist transformation of the enterprise. A new socialist relationship of comradeship and equality grew up between leaders and workers. Coal production rose yearly.

However, this new relationship later suffered a setback under the influence of Liu Shao-chi's revisionist ideas that "what the plant director says goes" and that material incentives are the only way to boost production. Worker and staff initiative and enthusiasm for socialism suffered. The annual output stayed on the same level for several years.

During the cultural revolution that began in 1966 Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line came under fire. More workers joined the leading bodies at every level, participating in management. More clearly aware than ever that they were mining for the revolution, workers, engineers and office staff worked selflessly and rejected the idea of material rewards. In 1969 "old" Kailuan's production was 2.2 million tons higher than 1965.

**Figuring It Out**

Before taking a decision on doubling output, the revolutionary committee turned the question over to the miners for discussion.

Within a few days the workers put up thousands of posters criticizing the conservative thinkers: "You people talk about this theory and that theory — all meaning that production can't go any higher. Why don't you also think about the power released in men by the cultural revolution? You figure this way and that way. Why don't you also figure on the initiative of the workers?"

The struggle was complicated. In 1970 the anti-Party clique of Lin Piao had seized part of the leadership of the Party and the state but hadn't yet been exposed. Lin was spreading the idea that politics overrides everything else to oppose Chairman Mao's correct line of grasping revolution in order to promote production. Influenced by this, some of the leaders were afraid to lead production boldly forward.

Then the 10,000-man Tangshan Mine set a target of 10,000 tons per day. In three months its extraction section No. 2 reached a record 6,030 tons a day in a part of the mine sealed off years ago by the imperialist bosses as "too dangerous" (but actually because it "wasn't profitable"). There were gas hazards and complex geological conditions but the miners overcame them. When the record was reported, however, the same leaders said the workers had ignored "grasping revolution" and only aimed at "spurring production".

The miners were irritated. Section Two's Party secretary, Wang Li, a veteran miner of 30 years, replied, "We not only got out more coal but we punctured the imperialists' lies about the section and made up for the time we lost under the revisionist line. This is a political victory. By grasping..."
revolution and spurring production nine hundred of us helped the country build socialism faster.

The Tangshan Mine Party committee supported Section Two's revolutionary action and launched a discussion which helped people see that the revisionist line that "politics overrides everything else" was actually a method of sabotaging socialist construction. Before the discussion ended the Tangshan miners fulfilled their pledge to produce 10,000 tons a day.

Good work by units such as this convinced the Kailuan Party committee that the overwhelming majority of the miners were ready to move in big strides. It called a conference of Communist Party members at the beginning of 1971 which adopted a resolution to broaden the movement to learn from the Taching oil field, the national pacesetter in industry. It raised the slogan: "Double coal production during the Fourth Five-Year Plan."

A few leaders still continued to insist that the slogan was not realistic. Their attitude caused wavering among some of the rank and file and by June and July that year production at the Tangshan, Tangchihchuang, Machiaokou and Fankochuang mines had actually fallen.

The Kailuan Party committee deepened the criticism of the revisionist line among the miners. At the same time it organized 96 investigation teams made up of 600 leaders, workers and engineers and sent them to the different mines to look into coal reserves, hoisting capacity, transportation, ventilation, water drainage and power supply. Their three-month investigation showed that the reserves were large, shafts and tunnels could be extended, and equipment could be modernized. In short, the material basis for doubling output was sound.

Most of the workers couldn't wait to get going. "Taching workers opened up a big oil field when the Soviet revisionists were trying to strangle us economically by tearing up contracts and withdrawing experts," they said. "That's independence and self-reliance, the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao. We have to learn more from them. The country demands more coal and that means our economy is moving ahead. Every extra ton of coal means we're giving that much more for building socialism."

More and more comments like this finally moved the conserva-
tives to admit, “We’ve been doing a lot of figuring, but the thing we didn’t figure on was the drive of the masses. Computers can’t help us measure that!”

Practice

In actual practice the struggle continued between boldness in action and conservative thinking.

The first problem was “big belly and narrow neck”, which meant hoisting coal up the shaft could not keep up with coal cutting. To increase hoisting capacity the usual procedure called for renovating the shaft and adding new equipment—a long process. The Tangshan miners set an example by boldly converting their air shaft so it could also be used for hoisting. At first some of the leaders and engineers proposed completing the change in six months. Too slow, said the miners. With more figuring the mine Party committee declared it could be done in 56 days. Quite a leap, they thought. But the workers converted the shaft in only 19 days.

Another issue was whether or not thin coal seams could give high yield. In the Tangchiachuang Mine the workfaces of Section Four had been nicknamed “the thin bones” because their daily output, done mostly with hand labor, had stayed around 800 tons for a long time. Some thought this was the best they could do. Kindled by the slogan to double output, they built small props, cutters and conveyors, mechanized cutting and hoisting, and succeeded in getting out 1,600 tons per day.

In order to keep pace with the new mining speed, the Tsung Chen-to tunneling team at the Luchiato Mine drilled 1,000 meters a month, three times their old record.

Nature’s Challenges

Nature also challenged the miners. In March 1972 water broke into Tunnel Nine of the Chaokochuang Mine, one of Kailuan’s oldest. Over 25 tons per minute flooded the section, halting its 2,000-ton-per-day production. It threatened the entire mine and two neighboring mines.

The Party committee set up headquarters down in the pit to direct the fight against flood. Leaders, engineers and workers tackled problems shoulder to shoulder. Kuo Piao, a deputy Party secretary, overruled doctors’ objections and left the hospital where he was being treated for heart and kidney trouble, and moved into the pit coordination office.

Chaokochuang’s 10,000 workers and staff members, with help from other units, kept up production and at the same time worked around the clock to put up a concrete wall and block off the water.

On June 30 in the middle of the night, a gale-force wind toppled a 200-ton, 80-m.-span, 28-m.-high gantry crane at the Luchiato Mine where coal was mined hydraulically. With the crane out of action the silt coal could not be removed and the waste water from the coal dressing plant could not be drained and recycled for extraction and hoisting.

The mine’s Party committee held an emergency meeting and decided that repair and production should proceed simultaneously. The miners responded with a pledge to maintain high output. While the crane was being repaired, miners, cadres, wives, students and nearby commune members removed the silt coal with shovels, baskets, carts and even wash basins. Normal production resumed two months later.

After these two big setbacks the Kailuan coalfield on November 7 was several hundred thousand tons behind schedule. To catch up meant an extra 6,000 tons per day until the end of the year. A few leaders who didn’t think Kailuan could double output in the first place again lost confidence. “Under the circumstances,” they said, “it shouldn’t be unreasonable to revise our quota.” A handful of class enemies gloated. “That’s the end of the double-output plan,” they said.

The great majority of the workers and engineers were ready to fulfill the full quota. Their determination was expressed by the mines’ Party secretary: “Kailuan miners are not going to bow to difficulties. The bigger the challenge, the more we’ll meet it head on!”

The Linhsi, Tangchiachuang and Tangshan mines, which had not had any trouble, offered to produce more than their quotas. The mines with troubles determined to maintain their regular quotas. By the end of the year Kailuan had produced 50,000 tons above its planned target, a 43-percent increase over 1970.

Victory

During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, Lin Piao and his group attacked the cultural revolution by saying it was causing the national economy to stand still. “That’s crap!” the Kailuan miners said. “Look at what we’ve done. Lin Piao is only trying to restore capitalism. Nothing doing! We’re driving for socialism!” The movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius generated greater drive.

At the end of 1973 the Machiakou Mine had succeeded in doubling output. It completed its five-year plan in three years.

This mine was opened in 1908. In 1936 the imperialist bosses closed it down because of “declining output”. It was reopened after liberation with a planned capacity of 900,000 tons a year. In spite of a steep slant, many faults and gas hazards, its engineers and miners modernized extraction methods and doubled output without adding people, equipment or workfaces.

Machiakou’s example inspired Linhsi, Tangchiachuang and Tangshan to double their production by 1974, one year ahead of plan.

In the five years 1971-75 Kailuan miners dug up 104,000,000 tons of coal.
Women Basketballers Asian Champs

Chinese and Philippine teams exchange mementos before their game at the 6th Asian Women's Basketball Championships.

China becomes the champion by beating South Korea.

Last November's 6th Asian Women's Basketball Championships in Hongkong saw teams from six countries and one region competing.

For a Chinese team, this was the first appearance since the international and Asian amateur basketball federations expelled the Chiang gang and restored China's legal membership.

Between November 2 and 12, the Chinese team beat the Singapore, Philippine, Japanese, Hongkong, Malaysian and South Korean teams in that order to win the championship.

Squaring off in the finals on November 12 were the Chinese and South Korean quintets in a keenly contested and hard-fought game. Over-cautious at the start, the Chinese tended to miss shots. Fast-breaking play by their opponents who took medium and long shots and got shots in from under the basket gave the latter a 43-31 lead at the end of the half.

Undiscouraged, the Chinese team came back in the second half calm and composed. Beefing up their moving the ball around, getting close to the basket and throwing up a tight-knit defense, the Chinese women gradually closed the gap. Their speedy offensives before the South Koreans could set up their defense netted four baskets in a row.

With six minutes left, they took the lead for the first time, 63-62, as the crowded gymnasium roared and applauded. Their play sharper all the time, the Chinese stayed on the offensive and began netting basket after basket on penalty shots. When the final whistle was blown, they had taken the game, 73-68, and were the new champions.

Champions at the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Asian women's basketball championships, the South Korean team had conquered the Bronze Medal Bulgarian team in the preliminaries at the 1976 Montreal Olympics.

Third place in the play in Hongkong went to the Japanese team.

The Chinese squad was quite young, average age under 22. Aside from the captain and deputy captain, the ten others were playing in their first international competition.

The team's achievement reflects the result of the vigorous development of basketball on a mass scale in China. People in China have taken to the sport, which has a broad mass base in factories, schools, villages and the armed forces. Even in places like Chinghai, Inner Mongolia and Tibet, where sports were very underdeveloped before liberation, bas-
Basketball has come on with a vengeance.

The game is a major item in extra-curricular sports schools for children and young people everywhere. Thousands of excellent players have come up in recent years. The women’s team that went to Hongkong had players from seven provinces, two municipalities and the People’s Liberation Army, including a worker, a salesgirl, students and PLA women.

Talking about their win in the Asian championships, the team all excitedly refer to the tremendous encouragement and drive they got from the excellent political situation in China. Before leaving for Hongkong, they took part in parades and a meeting to celebrate Comrade Hua Kuo-feng’s appointment as Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and of its Military Commission, and the great victory of smashing the plot by the anti-Party “gang of four” to usurp power in the Party and state and restore capitalism.

“The working class says that with the four overthrown, we can win victories in production,” one of the team said. “We’ll learn from their example, grasp revolution and promote training, and make a contribution to raising China’s level of sports as fast as possible.” In the Hongkong games they were relaxed and coordinated, and played hard. Showing the style characteristic of Chinese teams, they were fast and agile, mainly held the initiative and stayed on the offensive.

The 6th Asian Women’s Basketball Championships was a good opportunity for the young Chinese team to learn. “We came for friendship and to learn,” they said, “to promote the unity of the people of all countries and regions of Asia and do our bit to lift the level of sports in Asia with them.”
higher education has become a reality as a result of the cultural revolution. The two slogans on the banners read: "Education should be revolutionized" and "Warmly welcome the worker-peasant-soldier students to the university". Vermillion, greenish-yellow, yellow-green, light blue, brown and salmon.

Stamp 2. Teachers and students study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought under working-class leadership. The red poster upper left is a quotation from Chairman Mao, "The working class must exercise leadership in everything". Vermillion, Prussian blue, yellow, olive-green, purple, turquoise-green and salmon.

Stamp 3. A worker teaching university students on a building site. This, called open-door schooling, is a form of education in which teaching is directly linked with production. Lilac, lemon, blue, cobalt, yellow-green and vermillon.

Stamp 4. University students doing a scientific experiment with a China-made computer. Worker-peasant-soldier students, putting proletarian ideology and interests first, are trying to scale the heights of science. Venetian red, yellow-green, vermillon, lemon, turquoise-green, white and salmon.

Stamp 5. A university graduate being welcomed on her return back home in the countryside. By following Chairman Mao's educational policy, Chinese universities are turning out workers with both socialist consciousness and knowledge instead of an intellectual elite riding above the people as trained under the rule of the revisionist line in the past. Vermillion, yellow, Prussian blue, salmon, apple-green and bright blue.

All stamps are of 8 fen denomination. Size: 31 x 38.5 mm. Perf. 11.5. Photogravured. Serial numbers: T 16 (1-1 to 1-4).

Live-line Operations

On September 15, 1976 the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications released a set of four special stamps entitled "Live-line Operations". Working on live high-tension lines—an advanced method that helps speed China's socialist revolution and construction—was a development of the electricians' mass movement for technical revolution and innovation.

Stamp 1. A woman worker moves a shock-proof hammer on a 220-kv. transmission line by the equipotential method. Emerald, green, turquoise-blue, blue, salmon and brown.

Stamp 2. Two workers use an insulated cord pulley to replace a straight line insulator by the zero potential method. Mauve, bright blue, brown, yellow and grey.

Stamp 3. Two workers using a hydraulic lift-cage repair a ground lead by the equipotential method with explosion pressure welding. Light blue, yellow, emerald, black and grey-blue.

Stamp 4. A worker using an insulated lift to repair an oil switch by the equipotential method. Bright blue, orange-red, yellow-orange, red-brown, grey and buff.

All stamps are of 8 fen denomination. Size: 31 x 32 mm. Perf. 11.5. Photogravured. Serial numbers: T 18 (3-1 to 3-5).
Lesson 1

About Chinese and Our Lessons

From now on our Language Corner will consist of two parts, a new series of introductory lessons for beginners, and reading material to help those with some knowledge of Chinese to further their study.

The People's Republic of China is a united country with many nationalities who are equal and have the right to use their own languages. The Chinese language known abroad is that of the Han people who make up more than 90 percent of the Chinese population. It is the common language used by all nationalities in their intercourse.

The Han language has many dialects. Our lessons teach putonghua (the common speech) which is being popularized throughout the country. It is based on the Peking pronunciation of the dialect spoken in north China, and the grammar of modern Chinese.

Chinese ideographs (block characters) may seem quite difficult at first sight, but in structure they do follow certain rules, which we will give you in a subsequent lesson. Learning to pronounce and memorize them is much easier now that a phonetic alphabet has been devised for Chinese.

1. Phonetic sounds. On the last page of the magazine you will find a Key to the Chinese Phonetic Alphabet giving the equivalent of the sounds in international phonetic symbols and familiar non-Chinese words.

Watch out for these letters:
q sounds like ch in cheer, chimney, chin
x sounds like sh in she, shell, shoe
z sounds like the dz in reads, records, seeds
e sounds like the final ts in dots, products, students

Try reading the following sentences using the Key to the Phonetic Alphabet to guide you.

吴学中文。
Wǒ xuézhōng wén.
(I study Chinese.)

星期日我参观北京大学。
Xǐngqì rì wǒ cān guān Běijīng Dàxué.
(Sunday I visited Peking University.)

2. Tones. Every Chinese character has a tone. This tone is actually the contour of the rise or fall in pitch during pronunciation. There are four tones in putonghua, shown by the following marks:
- 1st tone, high and level
- 2nd tone, rising
- 3rd tone, falling-rising
- 4th tone, falling

The tone mark is placed above the main vowel, and when the main vowel is “i”, the dot is omitted. The tones are extremely important. Characters which have the same sound (that is, are spelled the same way in the phonetic alphabet) will have different meanings, and this is indicated by the tone. For example:

mā mā mǐ mǎ

mother hemp horse scold

tóngzhī tóngzhī tóngzhī

comrade notice rule

When a syllable is unstressed, it loses its original tone and is said to have a neutral tone. It is written without a tone mark. For example, in wǒmen 我们 (we), men is in the neutral tone and written without a mark.
In this lesson and the next we will present two groups of commonly-used sentences. Practically all the words and grammar in them have been given in previous Language Corner lessons. Beginners can try reading them for practice in using the Chinese phonetic alphabet.

1. How do you do? (Literally: How are you?)
2. Good morning.
3. Come in please.
4. Please sit down.
5. Please have a cup of tea.
6. Please have a cigarette.
7. Thank you.
8. Don’t mention it. (Or, You’re welcome.)
9. Excuse me,
10. It doesn’t matter. (Or, Never mind.)
11. I haven’t seen you for a long time.
12. Goodbye. (Or, See you again.)
13. Please give my best regards to my old friends.
14. Is Comrade (a name) at home?
15. Please wait a minute.
16. Please say that again.
17. I hope you have a good trip.
18. To your health, (A toast.)
19. Long live the friendship between the people of China and (a country)!
20. Long live the great unity of the peoples of the world!
21. What is your family name?
22. My family name is —.
23. What is your name?
24. My name is —.
25. Who is he?
26. He is a worker-engineer.
27. She went to the countryside after finishing middle school.
28. He hopes to be a fighter in the People’s Liberation Army.
29. Where are you going?
30. We are having our breakfast (lunch, supper).
31. You are cooking, washing clothes, reading a novel.
32. He is a worker-engineer.
### KEY TO CHINESE PHONETIC ALPHABET

#### (1) Initials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Phonetic Alphabet</th>
<th>International Phonetic Alphabet</th>
<th>Key Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b (o)</td>
<td>[p]</td>
<td>bay (de-voiced)&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p (o)</td>
<td>[p']</td>
<td>pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m (o)</td>
<td>[m]</td>
<td>may</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f (o)</td>
<td>[f]</td>
<td>fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d (e)</td>
<td>[d]</td>
<td>day (de-voiced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t (e)</td>
<td>[t']</td>
<td>take</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n (e)</td>
<td>[n]</td>
<td>lay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l (e)</td>
<td>[l]</td>
<td>lay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g (e)</td>
<td>[g]</td>
<td>gay (de-voiced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k (e)</td>
<td>[k']</td>
<td>koy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h (o)</td>
<td>[x]</td>
<td>hay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j (i)</td>
<td>[tc]</td>
<td>jeep (palatal)&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q (i)</td>
<td>[te']</td>
<td>cheer (palatal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x (i)</td>
<td>[s]</td>
<td>she (palatal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zh (i)</td>
<td>[ts]</td>
<td>judge (retroflex&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;, de-voiced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ch (i)</td>
<td>[ts']</td>
<td>church (retroflex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sh (i)</td>
<td>[s]</td>
<td>shirt (retroflex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r (i)</td>
<td>[z]</td>
<td>leisure (retroflex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>z (i)</td>
<td>[ts]</td>
<td>reads (de-voiced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c (i)</td>
<td>[ts’]</td>
<td>hats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s (i)</td>
<td>[s]</td>
<td>say</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y (i)</td>
<td>[j]</td>
<td>yea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w (u)</td>
<td>[w]</td>
<td>way</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (2) Finals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.P.A.</th>
<th>I.P.A.</th>
<th>Key Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>[a]</td>
<td>father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o</td>
<td>[o]</td>
<td>saw (approximately)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>[e]</td>
<td>her (British)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i (after z, c, s, zh, ch, sh, r)</td>
<td>[z, c, s, zh, ch, sh, r]</td>
<td>see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i (elsewhere)</td>
<td>[i]</td>
<td>see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>[u]</td>
<td>rude</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| u<sup>5</sup> | y | French tu, German fühlen (i with rounded lips) |
| er     | [er] | err (American) |
| ai     | [ai] | eye       |
| ei     | [ei] | eight    |
| ao     | [ou] | now       |
| ou     | [ou] | oh       |
| an     | [an] | can (more open) |
| en     | [an] | turn (British) |
| ang    | [e9] | German Gang |
| eng    | [e9] | sung     |
| ong    | [u9] | German Lunge |
| ia     | [ia] | Malaysia |
| ie     | [ie] | yes       |
| iao    | [iou] | yowl     |
| iu     | [iou] | yoke      |
| ian    | [i'en] | yen       |
| in     | [in] | in       |
| iang   | [i'en] | young (approximately) |
| ing    | [in] | sing     |
| iong   | [iun] | German jünger (approximately) |
| uan    | [uan] | one (approximately) |
| un     | [uan] | went (approximately) |
| uang   | [uan] | oo + ahng |
| üe<sup>5</sup> | [ye] | ü + eh |
| üan<sup>6</sup> | [yan] | ü + an |
| ün<sup>5</sup> | [yn] | German grün |

1. Saying the given sound plus the vowel in parentheses gives you the name of the letter. Thus you will be able to say the ABC's in Chinese.
2. "De-voiced" means the vocal cords do not vibrate.
3. "Palatal" means the front of the tongue touches the hard palate.
4. "Retroflex" means the tip of the tongue is slightly curled.
5. After j, q, x, y, the two dots above u are omitted.

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CHINA RECONSTRUCTS