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THE BATTLE FRONT OF THE LIBERATED AREAS

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE


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COMRADES! This Seventh Congress of our Party is being held at a time when the great Chinese people have been waging their heroic War of Resistance Against Japan for nearly eight years. I feel it a great honour to be able at our Party Congress to speak for over nine hundred thousand men belonging to the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the South China Anti-Japanese Column and two million and several hundred thousand militiamen — heroes all. There is one thing I ought to say at the start: that during these eight years our splendid Chinese people have formed a national united front against Japanese aggression. The whole people, men and women, young and old, have been waging a tremendous, life-and-death struggle against the invaders on all fronts. No matter how brutal and ruthless the Japanese invaders have been, no matter how mistaken the policies of the Kuomintang government and its high command, the Chinese people have doggedly carried on this great patriotic war. There can be no possible doubt that the Chinese people will achieve final victory. During these eight years our great people's armies — the Eighth Route, the New Fourth and the South China Anti-Japanese Column — have fought shoulder to shoulder with all other anti-Japanese forces in defence of our motherland. And, alongside the rest of the Chinese people, we Communists have shed our blood unsparingly on the battle fronts in the Liberated Areas in northern, central and southern China. We Chinese
Communists can proudly claim to be the best sons and daughters of our nation because we have upheld the cause which the Chinese people have most at heart; and we shall steadfastly continue to do so.

I want to take this opportunity to pay homage to the memory of the men and women of all the armed forces throughout the country who have given their lives in the War of Resistance Against Japan, to the memory of all members of the Communist Party and all others who made the supreme sacrifice in fighting the Japanese invaders. (All stand bare-headed for three minutes.)

I should also like to extend heartfelt greetings to all our countrymen fighting on anti-Japanese fronts anywhere in China—to the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the South China Anti-Japanese Column and the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces in northeastern China.

Comrades! This Congress is meeting to sum up experience in the War of Resistance, and to prepare ourselves to work, in ever closer co-operation, and in common struggle with the entire Chinese people and all friendly forces fighting the Japanese, to bring this war to final victory. I am in whole-hearted agreement with the political report entitled On Coalition Government made by the leader of our Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It is a great historic document, which embodies and sums up the experience gained in the Chinese people's bitter struggle for independence, freedom, democracy, unity and prosperity. It proposes practical measures and presents a programme for defeating the Japanese invaders, for building a new China. It maps a road which, followed by our Party and the whole Chinese people, will lead to victory in the War of Resistance and shape China's post-war destiny.

Without a correct political policy there can be no correct military policy. The people's war can end in victory only if its course is guided by a correct political policy, pursued by a democratic coalition government with the people as the mainstay. For eight years now our great people's armies—the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column—have waged a war of unparalleled heroism, fought bitter, magnificent and triumphant battles, and become the kingpin of China's War of Resistance. They have done so because the political and military policies of Comrade Mao Tse-tung are the correct ones. The application of Mao Tse-tung's correct political policy in combination with his correct military policy has brought results: the creation of the armed forces of the people; the Liberated Areas; the democratic coalition government based on the "three thirds system";¹ and a genuine people's war in the Liberated Areas. All this has enabled us to win one great military victory after another on the battle fronts of the Liberated Areas. Now, as we prepare ourselves for nation-wide victory in the War of Resistance, we must follow the lead given in Comrade Mao Tse-tung's political report and act on the guidance provided by his general political policy.

¹ The "three thirds system" was a political system adopted by all anti-Japanese democratic governments in the Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance. According to this system, the proportion of personnel in these governments was one-third each for the Communists (representing the working class and poor peasants), the progressive elements (representing the petty bourgeoisie) and the middle elements (representing the middle bourgeoisie and enlightened gentry).
It would be an obvious mistake to divorce military from political affairs, and to discuss military affairs solely from the military point of view. The military report I am submitting to our Seventh Party Congress is based, in spirit and policy, on the political report of Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

I. EIGHT YEARS OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

Comrades! As I said earlier, we have carried on the War of Resistance Against Japan for nearly eight years. During these eight years the military situation has undergone complex changes. But complex as they were, they have still not gone beyond the course of development which Comrade Mao Tse-tung scientifically forecast in his *On the Protracted War*: that the War of Resistance would be marked by three stages: the enemy offensive, stalemate, and our counter-offensive. We have still not passed through all these stages: we are just about to enter the third.

The first stage began with the July 7th Incident\(^1\) of July 7, 1937 and ended with the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. During this stage, the Kuomintang authorities were compelled to turn from non-resistance to Japan to resistance, and adopt certain progressive measures of domestic policy. They were forced to do so as a result of the all-out offensive by Japanese imperialism, the growing pressure of demands for resistance from the entire Chinese people, and particularly, because of our Party's insistence on a correct policy on the formation

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\(^1\) On July 7, 1937 Japanese imperialist forces stationed near Peking, fired with the ambition to conquer the whole of China, attacked the Chinese garrison at Lukouchiao, southwest of Peking. This marked the beginning of the all-out attack on China by the Japanese warlords, and of the Chinese people's heroic eight-year War of Resistance.
of a national united front against Japanese aggression. During this period quite a number of Kuomintang troops and forces under the provincial authorities put up an active resistance to the invaders at the front, though other Kuomintang units did not do so but fled in panic the moment they encountered the enemy. The change in policy pursued by the Kuomintang authorities at that time was welcomed and supported by us Communists and by the Chinese people as a whole. Unfortunately the change did not go half far enough. At the very start of the War of Resistance the Central Committee of our Party pointed out that without a people’s war, a total war, it was impossible to carry the War of Resistance through to victory. Since, however, the Kuomintang authorities persisted in maintaining their regime and their standpoint against the people, they were incapable of waging such a people’s war—a situation of which the Japanese invaders took great advantage to attack us. It was, in fact, by taking advantage of this weakness on the battle front in the Kuomintang-held areas that the invaders, in a mere fifteen months, contrived to occupy Canton and Wuhan, and swallow up a large part of northern and central China, besides key points in the South. Of course the Japanese, too, have many points of weakness. The war they are waging is imperialist, aggressive, barbarous and unjust, and therefore theirs is an unpopular cause. Japanese imperialism has inherent weaknesses, and its manpower, military strength, financial and material resources are all inadequate. The Japanese imperialists’ calculations were one-sided. They took into consideration only the strength of the Kuomintang authorities, and overlooked the fighting will and strength of the great Chinese people and their armies—the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Because of the above weaknesses, the Japanese aggressors have to employ a strategic disposition and command which is characterized by using their troops in a dispersed and piecemeal way. The Japanese aggressors are a powerful enemy but by no means invincible. Their weaknesses should have been exploited. Unfortunately they were not exploited by the Kuomintang. On the contrary, it was the Kuomintang’s own great weakness—its one-party dictatorship—that was exploited by the Japanese. The political system which militated against the people, with its attendant defeatist strategy of relying solely on defence, was such that the several million troops under Kuomintang command suffered tremendous losses within the first fifteen months. This stupid strategy made it impossible for those officers and men who did put up an heroic fight at the front to achieve the victories they deserved.

It was, however, in this first stage that our great people’s armies—the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies—penetrated through the lines of the advancing enemy and established themselves in the rear. This move represented our counter-attack during the stage of the enemy’s strategic attack. For, while the enemy was attacking and the Kuomintang army was beating a mass retreat, with unparalleled heroism the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies launched counter-offensives in the enemy’s rear and won victory after victory. They tied the enemy down, established strategic bases, created Liberated Areas, and raised the fighting morale of the whole Chinese people. Thus facts have proved that the assumption that China will be conquered is fallacious, and that a war waged by the people will assuredly
triumph in the end. They have also shown, however, that the idea of winning a quick victory is equally fallacious. In present conditions, while the enemy is strong and we are weak, we must go through a people's war in order gradually to turn the tide. That is why the War of Resistance is a protracted war.

The fifteen months of the first stage witnessed great changes in China. Changes also occurred on the side of the Japanese invaders. From the standpoint of resisting Japan, the Kuomintang authorities had no good reason to be unhappy at the fact that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies had successfully opened new fronts and recovered a vast amount of lost territory in the rear of the enemy. However, they did not like it. In fact they were most annoyed. Immediately after the fall of Wuhan the Kuomintang authorities changed their policy. They ceased to fight the Japanese invaders save in a half-hearted way, and began to go all out on the home front against the people and the Communists. As for the Japanese, they had succeeded in occupying such large areas in our country that the last thing they expected was to encounter such powerful opponents as the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in northern and central China. Our recovery of so many of the places they occupied was like thrusting a dagger into their heart. The result was that the Japanese, too, changed their policy. They stopped attacking on the battle fronts in Kuomintang-held areas, contenting themselves with inducing the Kuomintang authorities to surrender, and instead concentrated their forces for "mopping-up" campaigns against the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. Thus the stage of strategic stalemate came about. One thing at any rate is certain: with the enemy advancing and the Kuomintang defeated and retreating, this stage could never have been reached but for the counter-attacks launched against the enemy by our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

The second stage — strategic stalemate — began, as I have said, after the fall of Wuhan. Characteristic of this phase are the recurring waves of furious attacks and counter-attacks by the enemy and the Liberated Areas. What we mean by stalemate is that both the Liberated Areas and the enemy fought to a virtual standstill. The truth is that the main forces of the Japanese invaders in China were tied up, fighting against the Liberated Areas, for the whole of the five and a half years from the fall of Wuhan in October 1938 till 1944, when they once more launched a strategic offensive against the Kuomintang battle front. Until 1943 sixty-four per cent of all the aggressive forces of Japan in China, and ninety-five per cent of the puppet troops, were pinned down in the Liberated Areas. During the whole of this long period not a single major battle was fought on the front in the Kuomintang-held areas. These are the facts about the stalemate stage.

The war launched from the Liberated Areas is a great people's war, all-sided in the true sense of the term. The incomparable heroism and doggedness displayed by the people of the Liberated Areas during this stage of the war will remain for ever a glorious chapter in the history of the Chinese nation. If there had been no Liberated Areas front; if the fighting on that front had not reached a position of stalemate; and if the war on that front had not been carried on over a long period under the most difficult conditions, the enemy would have continued to advance into southwestern and north-
western China. And in that case the Kuomintang, with its whole political structure and armies directed against the people, would have been utterly incapable of halting the enemy's advance. There could have been no question of stalemate, and the carrying on of the War of Resistance would long since have become unthinkable. After the fall of Wuhan, particularly, the Kuomintang authorities took the wrong step of shifting the emphasis from external to internal problems. Their conduct of the war lapsed into passivity, their oppression of the people and the Communists became active. They launched three campaigns specifically against the Communists. Their most dastardly breach of faith was the cowardly attack on the New Fourth Army in southern Anhwei. If the Chinese people had failed to stem the tide of reaction and hold this onslaught in check, there would have been no Liberated Areas; no protracted fighting ending in stalemate between them and the enemy; and, what is more, it would have been utterly impossible to sustain the War of Resistance. The sweeping victories won by the Japanese in the course of their renewed attacks on the Kuomintang-held areas in 1944 prove this beyond a shadow of doubt. Moreover, had the strength of the Liberated Areas not been an intensely formidable obstacle to the capitulation and compromise to which the Kuomintang government was prone, the ever-present danger of such capitulation would not have been overcome. Then the War of Resistance would have petered out prematurely. Facts, experience and enemy documents prove this, too, up to the hilt, though the censorship imposed by the Kuomintang has prevented its becoming known to many people outside the Liberated Areas.

During the long period of five and a half years there was ample opportunity for the Kuomintang government to try to push ahead and prepare counter-offensives. Instead of doing so, it launched the three campaigns against the Communists. Instead of strengthening the forces engaged in the War of Resistance, it weakened them. Instead of taking a bold line in the conduct of the war, it put forward the watchword: "Save the country by indirect means" and flirted with the enemy. As a consequence, the Kuomintang troops in the enemy's rear could not stand the strain. Either they failed to hold their own, or themselves became puppet troops of the Japanese. When the invaders launched their 1944 attacks with a view to opening up lines of communication on the mainland, vast territories in Honan, Hunan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces under Kuomintang rule quickly fell into their hands; and this created the most critical situation known in the Kuomintang-con-

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1 In January 1941, while the Chinese people were fighting the Japanese aggressors, Chiang Kai-shek launched a second campaign against the Communists. For no valid reason he ordered the New Fourth Army, led by the Communist Party, then fighting the Japanese in southern Anhwei, to move north of the Yangtse. It obeyed. While on the move with its headquarters and over ten thousand men, it was encircled and attacked by over eighty thousand Chiang troops lying in ambush, sustaining heavy casualties. Yeh Ting, Commander of the New Fourth Army, was captured, and his deputy, Hsiang Ying, killed in action. After this cowardly attack, now known as the South Anhwei Incident, Chiang announced the cancellation of the designation of the New Fourth Army and ordered attacks against its other units.

1 During the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek ordered some of his troops to surrender to Japan. These troops then, with the Japanese, fought the Communists and the people. They endeavoured to deceive the populace by talk of "saving the country by indirect means."
trolled areas since the outbreak of the War of Resistance. It was, in fact, at a time when little resistance was being offered to the enemy in the Kuomintang areas that the Liberated Areas, after surmounting the severe difficulties of 1941-42, launched their vigorous counter-offensives. When the enemy attacked the Kuomintang areas, we attacked the enemy from our fronts in the Liberated Areas. This has been the new situation since 1944, characteristic of the latter phase of the stalemated stage as distinguished from its earlier one.

It is consequently clear to everybody that the Kuomintang authorities have left undone those things which they ought to have done, and vigorously done those things which they ought not to have done, and that as a result the Kuomintang armies have grown weaker and weaker. In the Liberated Areas the position is just the reverse: in the course of fighting, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column have become stronger and stronger. They have recovered much lost territory, tided over the most serious difficulties, and are now entering on a new stage of development and expansion. The present centre of the War of Resistance is on the Liberated Areas battle front, not on the Kuomintang-held front.

As a result of the eight years’ struggle of the Chinese people, the triumphant march of the great Soviet army into, and the imminent total collapse of, fascist Germany, the successes of the American and British troops in the Far East—and here the efforts of the American people call for special mention—and the decisive position held in the Far East by the Soviet Union following her abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression and Neutrality Treaty, there is no room for doubt that our War of Resistance is now about to enter on the stage of a great counter-offensive.

How is this great counter-offensive to be prepared and launched? In his political report Comrade Mao Tse-tung has gone into all the political aspects. The only point I want to make here is that the prolonged, heroic fighting of the people of the Liberated Areas, linked with their constructive efforts in other fields, has laid the basis of and constituted the finest preparation for this great counter-offensive on the Chinese mainland. I said a little while back that but for the fact that military operations on the Liberated Areas front protected the Kuomintang-held areas and for a long time held up the enemy’s attack, the situation all over China would have long since changed. In the coming counter-offensive, the battle front of the Liberated Areas will be the strategic starting point as well as the foremost strategic base. In the Liberated Areas there is an immense concentration of manpower (about a million regular troops, over two million militia, and nearly ten million members of the self-defence corps). Immense material resources have been preserved and developed (we have produced a considerable amount of foodstuffs, and public, private and handicraft industries have been operating). There is a special geographical situation (large cities, railways and quite a stretch of coastline occupied by the Japanese are encircled or dominated by the Liberated Areas). We hold important strategic points (the mountainous regions and plains of northern China and the central China plains are terrain favourable for our counter-offensive, and, furthermore, northern China is an important gateway to northeastern China and Inner Mongolia). On top of this, there is the determined will to fight among the people.
that comes from the tempering they have received during the protracted war. Finally, the practice of democracy in the Liberated Areas creates political conditions favourable to the launching of a big counter-offensive. It will certainly be a gross blunder for anyone to ignore the enormous significance of the battle front of the Liberated Areas to the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and the common cause of the anti-fascist Allies, to overlook the signal achievements made on this battle front, or to fail to take into account the ninety-odd million heroically fighting people of the Liberated Areas.

I shall now speak in some detail about the battle front of the Liberated Areas.

II. THE BATTLE FRONT OF THE LIBERATED AREAS

OPENING THE FRONTS IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out in his report that “From the very beginning there have been two battle fronts in China’s anti-Japanese war: the Kuomintang front and the front of the Liberated Areas.” This is the special feature of that war. The Liberated Areas battle front was the creation of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column, on whom, and on whom alone, devolved the responsibility of joining battle with the enemy in those areas.

These armies — the Eighth Route, the New Fourth and the South China Column — are armies of the Chinese people, and successors to the Chinese Red Army. When our Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, voicing the will of the Chinese people, created this people’s army, they defined its sacred mission as service to the people and defence of the motherland; and they defined its aim as the liberation of the nation and the people. Ever since the September 18th Incident, the great people’s army,

— On September 18, 1931 the Japanese “Kwantung Army” stationed in northeastern China, in order to occupy the three provinces of the Northeast, seized Shenyang. Obeying Chiang Kai-shek’s order of “absolute non-resistance,” the Kuomintang army there and elsewhere in northeastern China withdrew south of the Great Wall, and Japanese troops promptly occupied all provinces in the Northeast.
roused to bitter indignation by seeing our sacred territory desecrated, has been straining to get to grips with the Japanese invaders. For several years, in the course of which we waged many arduous and bloody struggles and completed the Long March, this army tried by every possible means to achieve the great task of ending civil war and fighting as one against the Japanese invaders. On reaching the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, it made a number of substantial preparations for the War of Resistance: The joining of forces by the three units of the Red Army, the peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident, the training of personnel and the establishment of contacts with many friendly forces all over China. That was a task well done. The very day after the July 7th Incident, the Central Committee of our Party and all officers and men of the people’s army issued an appeal asking for the people’s army to be sent to the front to fight the Japanese. Not long afterwards it made its appearance in the front line of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

In September 1937 the Eighth Route Army, guided by the brilliant strategy worked out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, penetrated the enemy rear in northern China. Our 115th Division entered the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area; the 120th entered northwest Shansi; and the 129th southeast Shansi. In 1938 our army advanced further eastward: one part to the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Plain and the Hopei-Shantung Plain, another to the Central Hopei Plain, and yet another advanced still farther, reaching eastern Hopei in time to join the great anti-Japanese uprising in which two hundred thousand people took part. The New Fourth Army opened its front soon after the Eighth Route Army, in the spring of 1938. It penetrated the enemy rear in central China and started guerrilla warfare against the Japanese on both banks of the Yangtse River. In the winter of the same year

1 Following Chiang Kai-shek’s fifth campaign of “encirclement and suppression,” to put itself in a position to fight Japanese aggression in northern China, the First Front Army (Central Red Army) began a great strategic movement in October 1934. Setting out from its base area in Kiangsi Province, it marched 8,330 miles through eleven provinces. Its course took it over many snow-bound mountain ranges and vast tracts of wild, uninhabited marshland. After frustrating the pursuits, obstructions and interceptions by some six hundred Chiang Kai-shek regiments, in October 1935 the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shensi, joining with other Red Army units already there. This was the Long March, which has no parallel in world military history.

The Second and Fourth Front Armies, which had left their bases in Hunan and Szechuan Provinces, made another long march and in October 1936 also arrived in the Shensi-Kansu area to join forces with the central body.

2 Originally a revolutionary base area built up from 1931 onwards in the course of the revolutionary guerrilla war in northern Shensi. When the Central Red Army arrived there after the Long March, this became the central base of the revolution and the seat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. When the Anti-Japanese National United Front was formed in 1937, this region, which comprised twenty-three counties in the adjacent provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Ningsia, was given its present name.

1 In 1936 the Kuomintang’s Northeastern Army headed by Chang Hsueh-liang and the Kuomintang’s Northwestern Army headed by Yang Hu-cheng were stationed in and around Sian; they were charged with the task of attacking the Chinese Red Army which had arrived in northern Shensi. Influenced by the Chinese Red Army and the people’s anti-Japanese movement, they agreed to the Anti-Japanese National United Front put forward by the Communist Party of China and demanded that Chiang Kai-shek unite with the Communist Party to resist Japan. Chiang Kai-shek turned down the demand, became
the Tungkiang Column\(^1\) in Kwangtung Province started an uprising in the Tungkiang area after the fall of Canton. In 1939, when Hainan Island fell, the local people, led by our Party, organized guerrilla forces to fight the Japanese. In its first engagement with the enemy at Pinghsingkuan,\(^2\) the Eighth Route Army fought the first battle of annihilation in the nation-wide War of Resistance.

After the September 18th Incident our Party systematically organized resistance to the Japanese in Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Shanghai, Wuhan, Hongkong, Canton and other large cities and in wide areas of the countryside, winning the goodwill of the masses. Although such activities were ruthlessly suppressed all through the civil war, the seeds of resistance to Japan spread by our Party, even more active in his military preparations for the "suppression of the Communists" and massacred the anti-Japanese youth of Sian. Chiang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng took joint action and arrested Chiang Kai-shek. This was the famous Sian Incident of December 12, 1936. Chiang Kai-shek was forced to accept the terms of unity with the Communist Party and resistance to Japan and was then set free to return to Nanking.

\(^1\) The Tungkiang Column was a Communist-led armed resistance force organized in October 1933, after Canton fell to the Japanese, by the people of the Tungkiang area in Kwangtung Province.

\(^2\) On September 23, 1937 when crack Japanese troops attacked Chinese positions around the passes of Pinghsingkuan and Yenmenkuan in Shansi, the Kuomintang troops there fled in a panic. Part of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army reorganized from the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, arrived at the battle front in northern Shansi. With dauntless spirit and adroit resourcefulness they fought the Japanese for the first time outside Pinghsingkuan, a pass on the Great Wall, and took a toll of over 3,000 enemy troops. This was the first crushing blow dealt to the Japanese aggressors.

no matter how difficult the situation, in many places took firm root among the people, and developed into a great potential force. Worthy of special mention is the Student Movement of December 9, 1935,\(^1\) which, led by our Party, played an important part in hastening armed resistance to Japanese aggression. After northern and central China fell one after the other into enemy hands, our local Party organizations helped the people, no matter what their status or calling, to organize armed uprisings or withdraw to the countryside to foster guerrilla warfare far and wide in the enemy's rear. Large numbers of young intellectuals and working people joined our army. In Shansi Province a League for Self-Sacrifice and National Salvation and a Dare-to-Die Corps were organized with refugee students from Peking and Tientsin as their backbone. The Dare-to-Die Corps became the new army of Shansi Province, and we gave it our fraternal support. In central Hopei an anti-Japanese contingent organized by the Hui people joined the Eighth Route Army. We also gave energetic support to many other armed forces opposing the Japanese. These local people's armed forces co-operated with the people's army — the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies — and became a strong anti-Japanese force.

\(^1\) The year 1935 saw a new upsurge in the patriotic movement of the Chinese people. Students in Peking, led by the Communist Party, were the first to hold a patriotic demonstration on December 9, putting forward such slogans as "End civil war and unite to resist foreign aggression!" and "Down with Japanese imperialism!" This movement immediately won vast popular support and broke the long reign of terror imposed by the Kuomintang government in league with the Japanese invaders. It has since become known as the "December 9 Movement."
In this way the battle areas in northern and central China, lost following the disastrous defeat of the Kuomintang army, were quickly recovered by our Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in co-operation with the people. Areas in the rear of the enemy were transformed into front lines in the War of Resistance.

In this way the purely defensive warfare sustained by the Kuomintang before it retreated gave way to people’s guerrilla warfare led by the Communist Party in the rear of the enemy.

In this way vast territories which had been lost by the Kuomintang and which had fallen under despotic Japanese rule were, one by one, recovered and turned into huge Liberated Areas — the three Liberated Areas of northern, central and southern China — full of hope and promise. “The rise and fall of a nation is the concern of every citizen,” as the Chinese proverb goes. Every Chinese has the duty of recovering territory lost by the Kuomintang. That is exactly what we have been doing.

In this way, from the early stages of the War of Resistance a considerable number of the invading Japanese troops had been tied down on the battlefields of the Liberated Areas and prevented from driving an all-out advance westward. Later the front in these areas became the main battle front in the war against Japan.

In this way the battle front of the Liberated Areas assumed a strategic position of decisive importance and became the centre of gravity of the War of Resistance. The shameless plan worked out by some of the reactionaries to use the Japanese invaders to wipe out the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies came to grief.

These are the results achieved by the people’s army, the people’s war and the incomparable people’s strategy of Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

THREE STAGES IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

In the period between the Pinghsingkuan victory in September 1937 and the great “Hundred Regiments” Battle¹ in 1940, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies began to balk the “mopping-up” tactics of the Japanese expeditionary forces, who were trying the method of attacking a point by closing in from all directions. From 1939 onwards our armies smashed, one after another, every attempt to apply new tactics devised by the Japanese commanding general, Hobun Yamashita, and the divisional commander, Kuwaki, which combined, as they said, “blockade, dismemberment and mopping-up.” These successive victories brought about a new situation and resulted in the creation of Liberated Areas in northern and central China. The Eighth Route Army grew from five figures to 400,000 men, and the population of the Liberated Areas to some forty millions. The New Fourth Army grew from 12,000 to 100,000, and liberated a population of thirteen millions. This, then, was the

¹ One hundred and fifteen regiments (numbering 400,000 men) of the Eighth Route Army in the rear of the enemy simultaneously launched all-out attacks against the Japanese invaders in northern China on the night of August 20, 1940, in co-ordination with a powerful militia force. The battle lasted three and a half months, and over twenty thousand Japanese were killed or wounded. This great assault is known as the “Hundred Regiments” Battle.
stage of the creation and expansion of the Liberated Areas in the enemy's rear.

In the autumn of 1940, alarmed by our resounding victory in the great "Hundred Regiments" Battle launched by the Eighth Route Army, the enemy dismissed the commander-in-chief of their expeditionary force in northern China and appointed Yasuji Okamura in his place. Japanese plans for attacking our army were thoroughly overhauled, and the establishment of a "New Order in Greater East Asia" was proposed. Moreover, to prepare for a war in the Pacific, the enemy reaffirmed their aggressive task, first proposed in 1939, of effectively safeguarding "the military bases of the Greater East Asian War" in northern China. In consequence of this plan, the Japanese invaders concentrated their forces against the Liberated Areas in northern China and waged total warfare against them — military, economic, cultural, and through espionage. The methods they employed in the "mopping-up" campaigns were "iron-ring encirclement, surprise attack, mopping-up in length and breadth, lightning tip-and-run raids, and repeated combing-out." Wherever the enemy set foot they burned and killed with the utmost ruthlessness, attempting to create a waste land and destroy all means of sustenance for our army. Moreover, the Japanese invaders often employed some hundred thousand troops against a single locality in their repeated "mopping-up" campaigns. Each campaign lasted as long as three or four months. This led to an extremely serious situation, particularly as at that time famine broke out in various parts of northern China, and both army and people were forced to exist on leaves and grass-roots. But, despite a worsened situation, our army united with the people and waged an heroic and stubborn struggle. During this period, which lasted till 1942, the Liberated Areas shrank and their population fell to 50,000,000, and the Eighth Route Army to 300,000 men. In the Central China Liberated Area, however, while the number of engagements was second only to that in northern China, the New Fourth Army continued to grow in strength. Although in this difficult period our army and population in the Liberated Areas decreased in number, their qualities were steeled in battle. While the tricks of the Japanese invaders' "mopping-up" tactics were limited, our army's measures to counter them were legion. During that period we entered into ever closer unity with the people, and consequently learned many methods which enabled us to maintain our dogged struggle against the powerful enemy and defeat them. In this way the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies successfully tided over this most difficult period in the War of Resistance on the fronts of the Liberated Areas.

In the winter of 1942 our work in the various Liberated Areas of southern, central and eastern Hopei Province began to revert to normal. The Liberated Areas in northern China began to grow again. In other words, the third stage of the War of Resistance in the Liberated Areas began. The Japanese invaders tried to maintain the savage "mopping-up" campaign which they had begun earlier that year; but our army employed the strategy of penetrating deep into the rear of the enemy as they advanced, to open up new Liberated Areas and break the force of the attack. This strategy was most effective, and the Liberated Areas grew even faster than at the beginning of the War of Resistance. Immediately after-
wards, in response to the great rectification movement and the great production campaign started in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region by the Central Committee of the Party, the various other Liberated Areas swung into action, with magnificent results. In the same period the campaign for reduction of rent and interest pressed further ahead in many places, so that the masses became even more eager to fight the Japanese. The establishment of the new-democratic government, a coalition government based on the "tripartite system," further strengthened unity in the Liberated Areas. From the military point of view, the continuous growth of the main force and the local units and the widespread mobilization of the people's militia brought further accession of strength to the Liberated Areas. As a result, they were consolidated and strengthened in a way never before known.

At the beginning of the first period the relationship between the Kuomintang troops left in the rear of the enemy and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies was not too bad. But after the fall of Wuhan the Kuomintang reactionaries became active in opposing the Communists and the people from the time of carrying out an anti-Communist policy and especially from the time of promulgating restrictive measures against what they termed an "alien party" and an "alien army," and collaborated with the Japanese invaders in attacking the Liberated Areas, thus serving as active wreckers of the battle front of these areas. In the second stage, as a result of these measures taken against the people's real interests, the several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops in the enemy rear could not withstand the Japanese "mopping-up" campaigns, and were in 1941 defeated in the Chungtiao Mountains in southern Shansi. In 1942 Kuomintang troops in Chekiang and Kiangsi disintegrated, and in 1943 those in Shantung Province collapsed. All this went to show that anti-popular armies could not hold their own in the rear of the enemy. From 1941 onwards Kuomintang troops in the rear of the enemy began to surrender in large numbers. By the third stage, after the surrender of Pang Ping-hsun and Sun Tien-ying, nearly half a million Kuomintang troops and some seventy generals had surrendered. This swelled the puppet army and helped the enemy intensify "mopping-up" campaigns against the Liberated Areas.

GLORIOUS SACRIFICES, GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS

Comrades! I have so far dealt with the creation of the battle front in the Liberated Areas and the different stages it went through. It must be obvious that, in a protracted war of this kind, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the South China Anti-Japanese
Column, the people of the Liberated Areas and the Communists have endured sufferings and made sacrifices far too numerous to detail here. Nor do I intend to detail them, but I do want to quote you some round figures to show what the Chinese people have gained at the cost of such bitter battles and heavy sacrifice.

In the seven and a half years from September 1937 to March 1945, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese Column fought more than 115,000 battles, large and small, killed or wounded 960,000 and captured 280,000 Japanese and puppet troops. On top of this, over 100,000 were induced to surrender and come over to our side. All told, the losses sustained by the Japanese and puppet troops amounted to 1,360,000 men. (Statistics are not available for the South China Anti-Japanese Column prior to 1943.)

The main booty captured by our army comprised 1,028 pieces of artillery, over 7,700 machine-guns and 430,000 rifles and carbines. We also captured 34,000 blockhouses and 11,000 strongholds.

In 1944, before the battle of the Central China Plains, as I mentioned in the first part of this report, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column were engaging 64 per cent of the Japanese invading forces in China and 95 per cent of the puppet troops. Even today, out of the forty Japanese divisions numbering some 580,000 men (Japanese forces in northeastern China not included), 22½ divisions numbering 320,000 and representing 56 per cent of all Japanese troops in China, are engaged by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese Column. As far as the puppet troops are concerned, the situation remains as before. The fact that the Japanese invaders have stationed a large number of troops in northern and central China explains the ever-increasing difficulty of the task to be shouldered in the War of Resistance by our armies.

The remarkable achievements in the people's war against Japan are reflected even in disclosures by the enemy. For example, in June 1943 General Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in northern China issued a communiqué stating: "From January to May of this year the Army fought 5,524 engagements with the Communist army of 567,424 men." To cite another example in the same year, Japanese Expeditionary Army Headquarters in northern China reported:

The greater part of the enemy are not Chiang Kai-shek's but Communist troops. Of our 15,000 engagements this year, those with Communist troops constituted 75 per cent, and of the two million enemy troops we fought, more than half were Communist. Of the 199,000 bodies found abandoned on the battlefields, half were Chinese Communist troops. But of the 74,000 prisoners we captured, Chinese Communist troops formed only 15 per cent. This reveals the inferior calibre of Chiang's troops, and at the same time testifies to the growing fighting spirit of the Chinese Communist troops. . . . Therefore the Imperial Army in northern China from now on is confronted with the vitally important task of conducting a war of annihilation against the Chinese Communist troops — our deadly enemy in northern China.

Is it not crystal clear that the achievements on the battle front of the Liberated Areas are those of an all-out people's war and that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, the South China Anti-Japanese Column and the people of the Liberated Areas, by their unparalleled, heroic resistance, by their matchless fortitude despite bitter hardships and heavy sacrifices, have displayed the greatest valour and written the most heroic and immortal epic of the Chinese nation in the War of Resistance?
At the cost of such great sacrifices the Chinese people achieved these things: they have created the Liberated Areas which extend over nineteen provinces in northern, central and southern China and have a population of 95,500,000.

Our Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army and South China Anti-Japanese Column number 910,000 regulars and over 2,200,000 militia. These figures speak for the great development of the people's war on the battle front of the Liberated Areas, in sharp contrast to the disastrous defeats suffered by the Kuomintang troops on theirs.

This strength of the Liberated Areas accrues to the whole Chinese people. Because of it the Chinese people now have great prospects of victory, democracy and a brilliant future.

EXPERIENCE GAINED BY THE LIBERATED AREAS IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

People may ask: Why is it that the Liberated Areas can, in the midst of the most cruel fighting, grow stronger every day, despite the fact that our armies are short of weapons — especially up-to-date weapons — and receive no external assistance, despite the fact that their flanks are exposed to attack by Kuomintang reactionaries? The section in Comrade Mao Tse-tung's report on people's war provides the answer. Here I shall say a little more about our experience in this connection.

What has been the general experience? In a nutshell, it is that, led by our Party and in line with Comrade Mao Tse-tung's policy of the people's war, Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles, the policy of new democracy, have been applied in the Liberated Areas. In consequence we have been able, in the Liberated Areas, to secure general mobilization of the whole people to prosecute the War of Resistance, to create a democratic coalition government, to bring about great unity between the various classes, and, moreover, to establish unified leadership in the War of Resistance. Without all this the Liberated Areas could not have waged an all-out people's war; and without an all-out people's war nothing at all could have been accomplished.

In the political field, the Liberated Areas have succeeded in mobilizing all the people and forging solid national unity by bringing about democracy and improvement in the people's livelihood. The hearts of tens of millions beat as one in the fight against the common enemy; and so a genuine foundation for the conduct of a people's war has been laid. The Kuomintang-controlled areas bear witness that without genuine democracy and real improvement in the people's livelihood there can

1 The Three People's Principles were the principles and programmes put forward by Sun Yat-sen on the questions of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood in the bourgeois democratic revolution in China. In 1924, in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, a congress characterized by co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Sun Yat-sen restated the Three People's Principles, interpreted nationalism as opposition to imperialism and expressed active support for the movements of the workers and peasants. The old Three People's Principles thus developed into the new Three People's Principles with the Three Great Policies, that is, alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. The new Three People's Principles provided the political basis for the co-operation between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang during the First Revolutionary Civil War period.
be no people's war. On the other hand, the Liberated Areas have proved that a people's war can be waged, given real democracy and improvement of the people's livelihood.

That is how, in the Liberated Areas, the people's enthusiasm in the War of Resistance and their confidence in their own nation have been brought to so high a pitch. That is why, despite the unparalleled cruelty of the policy—"burn all, kill all, loot all"—pursued by the enemy, the fighting spirit of the people of the Liberated Areas has never faltered.

That is how the solidarity between army and people, between officers and men, has reached such heights; why the campaigns to support the government and care for the people, and to support the army and look after soldiers' families, have spread far and wide. Notwithstanding attacks by the Japanese and puppet troops from without, and provocation by their spies and agents within, this solidarity can never be shattered.

That is how we have achieved political unity, unity in the army, and unity between political and military affairs, that is how the plans of the Japanese and their puppets to wage "total war" have been balked.

That is how, in conditions of extreme difficulty, we have been able to carry out the policy of raising the quality of our troops and simplifying government administration; how combatant units have been strengthened to cope with enemy encirclement and attack; and why, no matter what changes take place in our base areas, any of our organizations has been able to carry on and direct the struggle in close co-ordination with the people.

That is the reason why we can sap the morale of the Japanese army, and break up and win over puppet troops by strengthening our political work. Everyone knows that Japanese prisoners-of-war are pretty obstinate, but our work in this respect has been well done. We are particularly grateful to the Japanese People's Emancipation League led by Comrade Susumu Okano, one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, and to the Korean Independence League. They have worked in the noble spirit of internationalism, and their help in this respect has been of inestimable value.

That is how, through underground work, we can effectively win over all patriotic people in the enemy-occupied areas, and foil enemy attempts to induce them to surrender.

Economics is the very foundation of political, military and cultural affairs. By providing the people with a better livelihood we mean, in the first place, reducing rent and interest, and, at the same time, seeing that the reduced rent and interest are paid. That is to ensure that we have a sound economic foundation for the conduct of the War of Resistance in the Liberated Areas, where the peasantry constitutes from 80 to 90 per cent of the population.

That is how the peasants' interest in production has been stimulated, how production has proceeded uninteruptedly even during the enemy's repeated "mopping-up" campaigns.

That is how we have succeeded in mobilizing the peasants to organize mutual aid in labour (labour-exchange teams, work-exchange groups, etc.), how general enthusiasm has been roused for increased production throughout the Liberated Areas. In this way pro-
ductivity has been raised to new heights. Not only agriculture (which is, in the present stage, the foundation of economic activity in every Liberated Area) but also home handicraft industries and handicraft workshops have been developed. So we are well on the way towards becoming self-sufficient, well-fed and well-clothed.

That, too, is why the publicly-owned industries and the industrial and commercial co-operative enterprises are winning the genuine support of the people, how a real foundation for their growth has been laid.

That is how co-operation in production between the army and people has been brought about—a co-operation which, coupled with the policy of raising the quality of our troops, simplifying government administration, getting the army to take part in production, and the economy campaign, is lightening the burden on the people, economizing manpower and available materials, and reducing waste. All this eases the strain on the people and makes possible the accumulation of material resources for the long-term struggle.

That is how, in the economic sphere, the Liberated Areas have been able to exert their efforts in a co-operative way, to give each other neighbourly help when hit by natural calamities and so save millions of lives. As a consequence we have been able to do what we set out to do: carry on the struggle.

Military affairs are interrelated with political and economic affairs. The people’s war is, in essence, a war of the masses, and only by means of the political and economic measures I have mentioned has the conduct of such a war been possible. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s On the Protracted War says: “With the common people of the whole country mobilized, we shall create a vast sea of humanity and drown the enemy in it, remedy our shortage in arms and other things, and secure the prerequisites to overcome every difficulty in the war.” That is the starting point of the strategy and tactics employed during the past eight years by the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column, the basis on which the entire system of strategy and tactics employed during the people’s anti-Japanese war on the battle front of the Liberated Areas has been created. The characteristic feature of this war of the masses is that the people not only give political and economic assistance, but also help in military operations. A war of this kind is not waged by the army alone, but also by the people, who fight in skilful co-ordination with the army. The main forces fight in co-ordination with the local forces, and the regular army in co-ordination with the guerrilla forces, the militia and people’s self-defence corps.

Thus, in attacking the enemy on the flanks, flexible tactics of fighting on both exterior and interior lines have been adopted.

In this way we can counter the enemy’s encirclement by counter-encirclement, his “mopping-up” campaigns by counter-“mopping-up” campaigns, his “gradual encroachment” by counter-“gradual encroachment,” and blockade by counter-blockade.

In this way, we can wrest the initiative in strategic command and in directing a campaign from the enemy, contrive to extricate ourselves from a defensive position, and force the enemy on to the defensive.

In this way, by making repeated thrusts we are able to repulse the enemy’s “lightning tip-and-run raids,” and,
by skilfully scattering, concealing and moving our forces, seek out the enemy’s weak points and break his encirclement in depth.

In this way we can annihilate scattered enemy forces by a concentration of our forces, and, conversely, can attack concentrated enemy forces by our scattered forces.

In this way the enemy’s blockade and tactics of disembemterment can be disrupted by the destruction inflicted by our people and army; and enemy probing and combing-out efforts smashed by land-mine warfare conducted by the militia together with our scattered small units.

In this way, by co-ordinated attacks in several areas we can relieve neighbouring areas, smash the enemy’s encircling, “mopping-up” campaigns, press forward with guerrilla warfare on the plains to aid guerrilla warfare in the mountains, and vice versa.

Thus the main force is enabled to move about freely and engage in, or make preparations for, well-timed, successful counter-attacks, while local forces carry on guerrilla warfare in the vicinity of their bases, engage the enemy in skirmishes and so harass and wear him out.

In this way, we have created armed work teams as a form of struggle, using them as a keen weapon with which to open up and resume work in enemy-occupied areas. While the enemy extends his “mopping-up” campaign to our bases, our armed work teams are busy carrying out various forms of anti-Japanese struggle in the enemy areas themselves, keeping them in a state of mortal fear, and working out ways of combining unarmed and armed struggle.

During the eight years of the War of Resistance, what Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his On the Protracted War
III. THE MILITARY LINE ADOPTED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE DURING THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

TWO MILITARY LINES

Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his report rightly points out that there are two different lines in the War of Resistance. "One," he says, "enables us to defeat the Japanese aggressors and the other, instead of this, actually helps one way or another the Japanese aggressors and hampers us from carrying on the anti-Japanese war." These two lines are evident not only in the political, but also in the military field.

One of them is born out of oppression of the people and the treatment of soldiers as slaves; out of a policy of carrying on a purely passive war of resistance, or, acting as mere spectators; out of relying entirely on foreign aid; out of preserving the main forces intact in preparation for civil war; out of excluding people who hold different opinions, and generally disrupting unity. This has led to the emergence of a defeatist, purely defensive military line of policy, directed against the people—a line which explains why the Kuomintang has suffered a series of reverses on its battle fronts.

Exactly the reverse of this is the anti-Japanese military line taken by the Chinese people, the foundation-stone of which is a policy of fully mobilizing all the people, uniting all anti-Japanese forces and actively striking blows against the enemy. This line makes for unity between army and people, between officers and men, for unity among all friendly armies, for strategy and tactics concerned with hitting the enemy hard and making ourselves strong. This explains why, on the battle fronts of the Liberated Areas, victories have been won.

The first line stands for the preservation of the old system, the old habits and tactics of the Chinese army. It takes a stand against any introduction of reforms called for by new conditions in the war against Japan. That explains why a handful of people have for so long been able to usurp control of the army and use it as an instrument for oppressing the people and setting up a ruthless dictatorship. The second line stands for reforming the Chinese army in the light of the military experience gained in the wars of the Northern Expedition and the Agrarian Revolution, in conformity with Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s principle: “Unite the army with the people, make it an army of the people.” That is the only way in which the army can be united with the people, the only way in which the army’s morale can be raised and the enemy defeated.

The first line assumes that the War of Resistance can be won in a short time, that it is a war of quick decision. No effort, therefore, is made to rally the people’s strength for resistance. On the contrary, any such efforts by the people themselves are deliberately balked. The second line, on the contrary, considers that the War of Resistance cannot be won in a short time, that it is necessarily a long-drawn-out affair, and that therefore
ever greater efforts must be made to rally and extend the people’s strength.

The champions of the first line argue that the whole course of the War of Resistance falls into two stages only: the stage before the fall of Wuhan, when the enemy was winning and we were losing, and the stage afterwards, in which we pass from defeat to victory. This, however, ignores the intermediate stage of stalemate. Those who uphold the second line, on the contrary, maintain that the whole course of the war falls into three stages: strategic retreat, strategic stalemate, and strategic counter-offensive. Stalemate is the most trying stage, with so many things all crying out to be done at once. In the first place, we must introduce democracy and improve the livelihood of the people as a basis for getting them organized as a force. In this stage, too, we must make effective efforts to create all the necessary conditions for a counter-offensive before we can talk about launching it.

The supporters of the first line, again, have all along pinned their hopes of victory on war between Japan and the Soviet Union and on the war in the Pacific. They do not pin their hopes of victory on their own political or military reforms, and on their own efforts in the War of Resistance. Naturally they have been disappointed. The war in the Pacific has broken out, yet all last year they suffered heavier defeats than ever. Supporters of the second line, on the contrary, have always anchored their faith in the people’s strength. While they strive for foreign aid, they do not rely on it. For the past few years the victories on the battle fronts of the Liberated Areas have been won by our own efforts, with no outside help at all.

And again, supporters of the first line advocate, and put into practice, a passive strategy of mere defence, while those of the second favour an active strategy of offensive defence as a preliminary to the great counter-offensive.

Upholders of the first line do not punish generals who surrender to the enemy, on the contrary, they connive at their doings and imprison those who, like General Yeh Ting and others, perform meritorious service. Advocates of the second line oppose all ideas of surrender, commend meritorious fighters, resolutely demand punishment for generals and other officers who mutiny or surrender to the enemy, commend loyalty and build up the people’s morale.

In pursuit of the first line, an erroneous conscription system is enforced. Able-bodied men are pressganged everywhere, and bribery is resorted to flagrantly. The best sons of the Chinese people are treated as “expendible” and persecuted. In application of the second line, the system of militia and self-defence corps, which is what the people want, and the volunteer system, all on a completely voluntary basis, are widely applied. Such arrangements meet the needs of the army, and at the same time properly preserve China’s manpower.

The first line is the military line of the Kuomintang; the second, that of the Communist Party.

The two are utterly different; and what has happened in the past eight years on the two battle fronts in the war — one becoming weaker and weaker and the other stronger and stronger — has long since proved which is right and which is wrong.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s famous military treatises such as On the Protracted War and Strategic Problems in the
Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War, as is well known, represent the correct military line of the Communist Party. The military line propounded by Comrade Mao Tsetung is, in a word, that of a people's army and a people's war, a line which will lead to victory in the War of Resistance.

The military line of the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang is determined by its political line. Its military line follows its military theory; and Kuomintang military theory is saturated with German, Italian and Japanese fascist ideology. The outstanding feature of this ideology is that the army lords it over the people (through the special authority of the army over the people), and that the officers ride roughshod over the soldiers (through the special authority of the officers over the men). With such a powerful foe as the Chinese nation has to face, military ideology of this kind amounts to disarming ourselves and laying us open to defeat.

THE PRINCIPLES OF BUILDING AN ARMY

On the problems of building an army, I am in perfect agreement with what Comrade Mao Tsetung said in the sections of his report dealing with the people's war and the people's army, in the course of which he raised certain questions and proposed solutions for them.

I now want to say a word or two about our aims in building an army. In order to do so, I should like to make a comparison between two different schools of thought in relation to army-building in China today.

Think of the thousands upon thousands of troops, the thousands upon thousands of men with guns! Who are they? The people! The vast majority of them are peasants. But there are two kinds of armies, now as in the past. One kind organizes, arms and trains the people to protect the interests of the people and serve the people. The other also organizes, arms and trains the people; but it does so to protect the interests of the few—the big landlords, the big compradors and big bankers—and to oppress, exploit and enslave the people.

There is no army which is not under the control of the state. There are, however, two kinds of state. One is the new-democratic state—a state which belongs to the people, to the workers, peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and others who love their country. The other is the feudal, fascist, anti-popular state—a state which is under the dictatorship of the big landlords and bourgeoisie. The people's army is an army which belongs to the new-democratic state. The army of the big landlords, big compradors and big bankers belongs to a state under the dictatorship of the big landlords and bourgeoisie.

The people's army, for the very reason that it is closely united with the people, can effectively protect the country against foreign invasion, and, inside the country, can safeguard the people's rights to democracy and freedom. The army of the big landlords and bourgeoisie, for the reason that it is divorced from the people, is bound to be powerless to defend the country; it vacillates, becomes defeatist, and may even betray its trust (to the extent of becoming a puppet army). Moreover, it undermines and suppresses the democratic liberties of the people.
The people's army practises democracy within its own ranks. Officers and men are as one. It is democratic in relation to the people: people and army are as one. Because of this, it can sweep away the warlord system. The army of the big landlords and bourgeoisie imposes within its own ranks a system of oppression and double-dealing. If that were not the case, it could not order its officers and men, the vast majority of whom come from the people, to act against the people. Of course this kind of army is bound to oppress people. If it did not, it would not be a tool of the big landlords and bourgeoisie for oppressing, exploiting and enslaving the people. So this army not only preserves the warlord system but extends it. Even in controlling its own troops it employs the most savage and shameless fascist methods. That is just what the reactionary ruling clique inside the Kuomintang is doing for all it is worth.

To which of these two kinds of armies do the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese Column belong?

They belong to the first category; and Chinese history has never before seen their like. We Communists can be proud that it is we who are building this army of the people.

Like their predecessor, the Red Army of the civil war period, our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, are national, popular and democratic in character. They are national, because they have always opposed foreign invasion, and displayed the utmost enthusiasm in defending their native land. They are popular, because they come from the people and have always striven hard for the liberation and well-being of the people. They are democratic, because they join with the people, because there is unity between officers and men, because they have done away with the warlord system and made themselves the instrument of the struggle for people's democracy. It is because they have these three characteristics that they fight so well, that they are invincible. Thanks to the guidance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's concrete policy, during the War of Resistance these characteristics have become even more apparent, and in consequence our armies have gone from strength to strength and built up such a tremendous record in this cruel war in defence of our motherland.

The three characteristics of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are, in fact, the three principles on which to build an army. But, in the last analysis, the main one is: the army must start from the interest of the people and serve the people. Because such an army is one that serves the people and belongs to the people, it regards it as a sacred duty to safeguard the motherland. That is why a high degree of democracy has been introduced into the army. A people's army of this kind is the army of a really democratic country, an army that possesses a keen political awareness and the power to put up a real fight.

There is no doubt that the method of building an army adopted by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is the one that should be adopted by all armies in China. It is the model on which all the armies of China should be re-formed. It opens up brilliant prospects for the Chinese army, a road which it will be a blessing for our country to take. If the Chinese people want to win victory in the War of Resistance, to achieve democracy and liberation, they must exert every effort to organize and expand armies like the Eighth Route and the New
Fourth. If, on the other hand, there are people who try to weaken or reorganize the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies on the pattern of the anti-popular army, it means that they really want to destroy their own defences; that they will, inevitably, undermine the War of Resistance, jeopardize the country and serve as cat’s-paws for the Japanese invaders. This the Chinese people will never let them do.

What we want to see is all the armies all over the country going forward on this bright road, changing from private armies into people’s armies, not into private tools for the oppression of the people. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung says in his report, “All patriotic and conscientious officers in the Kuomintang army should rise to revive Dr. Sun’s spirit and reform their troops.”

These, then, are the main principles on which we build our army. Now let me go on to some specific problems that arise in the building.

RECRUITMENT

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two systems of recruitment. Officers and men of a people’s army join of their own accord. The volunteer system now operated by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, and the sort of system of obligatory military service which might be introduced by a coalition government of new democracy, are based on the wishes of the people. The recruiting system of an army of big landlords and bourgeoisie must necessarily be against the wishes of the people: without compulsion, nobody would join. The present so-called recruiting system of the Kuomintang works against the will of the people, and has now degenerated into a particularly vicious system. Its recruiting methods are “buying,” pressganging and trickery. In the areas controlled by the Kuomintang, recruiting officers take bribes, break the law at will, and show no regard for human life. Recruits are callously treated. They are roped together and forced to endure cold, starvation, imprisonment and flogging. They are not even allowed to attend to calls of nature except at arbitrarily fixed times. As a result, great numbers of them die or escape to become bandits. Only about one in five actually reaches barracks.

But the system adopted by our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is a voluntary one. Those who join our army come of their own free will because they want to resist Japanese aggression, save their country and build up a China with a system of new democracy. Some of them are Communists. The majority are not. The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, just because they have this close contact with the people, have an inexhaustible supply of manpower.

When in the future a coalition government and a joint supreme command are set up, a system of obligatory military service will possibly be adopted. But any such system will be radically different from the vicious conscription system of the Kuomintang government, because it will be built on a voluntary basis, a basis of persuasion.

MAINTAINING THE ARMY

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two ways of maintaining them. An army not based on,
and in fact antagonistic to, the people maintains itself by exploitation of the people, and consequently by exploitation of the soldiers as well! But the method of a people’s army is one based on love for the people, and consequently, love for the soldiers, too. The latter is the method practised by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

Starting from exploitation of the people and the soldiers, the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang employs various schemes to extort military funds from the people on the pretext that “the state should maintain the troops.” Not satisfied with extorting money at home, it turns to foreign countries for loans in the name of the state. And when funds for military purposes are collected, the Kuomintang reactionaries pocket the money by “padding the payroll” and other devices. Embezzlement is rife among officers from top to bottom.

The higher the officer’s rank, the more he can appropriate for himself. In consequence, even if ample military funds are forthcoming, the men remain haggard, skinny and short of clothing. The Chinese warlords are usually rolling in money—and they get it from military funds. But in reactionary Kuomintang circles this ugly business goes even further. Nobody can make head or tail of military impress accounts. Nobody can even guess how much “military expenditure” has been appropriated by these gentry.

How do the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies maintain their troops?

Our soldiers are armed peasants in uniform. Our army is a collection of ordinary people under arms and in uniform. They want to wear clothes, to eat, drink, rest and work just like the common people. Their main material needs are clothing, food, housing and transport. Their spiritual need is education to resist Japanese aggression and to love the people. In maintaining the army the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies pay special attention to both spiritual and material needs.

In the first place, the material upkeep of the army follows the principle that it shall not become too heavy a burden on the people, otherwise a conflict of interests will be created between army and people. If the people’s life is made hard, army life will become hard too. Its strength to fight the enemy will be sapped. When a situation develops requiring expansion of the army, it must be expanded without excessively increasing the burden on the people. When we run into difficult times, as we did in 1942, the principle we work on is to take into consideration the interests of both army and people: we reduce the number of troops, raise their quality, and simplify government administration in the enemy rear. In the second place, our treatment of the whole army is based on the principle of equal treatment for officers and men. The officers set an example by taking the rough with the smooth, along with their men. Only those who have the interests of their men at heart, who take into account what they have to put up with, and who do not stand aloof from the rank and file, can be considered good officers. That is the line we work on in maintaining our army. In this way the rotten practice of padding payrolls and exploiting soldiers in the army is cut out, and a new chapter is written in Chinese military history. In the third place, we have in recent years introduced a completely new principle into the maintenance of the army, by enabling it, in intervals between periods of fighting and training, to engage in
productive work, and, in so doing, help to meet the material needs of the army and lighten the burden on the people. For the army this new contribution is something extremely important. Experience gained in the border region from the army’s participation in productive work shows that, in the absence of fighting, we can in the first year become partly self-supporting, in the second, half self-supporting, and in the third, wholly so. In areas where fighting is going on, the army may, by taking part in such work, become partly or half self-supporting. Personal participation of commanders in this productive work is an important means of drawing the army in, too. Whenever the army takes part in production, the people’s burden is lightened, the ties between army and people become closer, army life becomes richer, the army becomes more close-knit, training is more effective, fighting spirit is enhanced; and an inexhaustible source of funds to maintain the army is tapped.

As regards special treatment for the families of men fighting the Japanese and care of disabled or demobilized soldiers, we have taken a number of new measures in recent years. Besides getting their neighbours to plough the land of such families, giving them pensions and other assistance, we are helping soldiers’ families to go in for production so that they can become economically independent. Indeed, many heroes of labour have emerged from among them, and they are not doing so badly. Every Liberated Area should endeavour to do this work well and see that they live comfortably.

This method of maintaining the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies represents a reform unparalleled in Chinese military history. It is a reform characteristic of both the internal life of the army and its external life, that is, its relations with the people. That is why these armies, without outside assistance, can maintain their soldiers, and maintain them well.

LEADING THE ARMY

And just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two methods of leading them. The method used by an army not based on the people, one in fact antagonistic to them, is to treat soldiers as slaves, whereas the method used by a people’s army is to treat them as politically conscious fighters. The latter is the method used by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

The big landlords and bourgeoisie organize and arm people so as to have an army to use against the people. That, of course, is no easy matter; and that is why an army of this kind resorts to all sorts of barbarities in leading its troops. The policy of the reactionaries is to keep soldiers in a state of ignorance, applying the maxim that “the most valuable quality in generals is wisdom, in soldiers ignorance.” For if soldiers were wise they would not act against the people. So the reactionaries devise a set of military codes, military orders and discipline, on the basis of which they impose a ruthless system of dictatorship and absolute obedience. Those who fail to toe the line are punished, those who do, get promotion and grow rich! On the one hand the reactionaries use threats, on the other they dangle baits. A whole system is built up of ill-treating soldiers, using secret agents to spy on them and even surreptitiously murdering them. What this means is that they do not regard their subordinates and soldiers as individual human beings, but
bully and cow them, through this rotten system of absolute obedience, into allowing dictators to use the army just as they think fit. The big landlords and bourgeoisie want to oppress, exploit and enslave the people. By what method except such savagery can they command their army?

The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have completely wiped out the system of oppression which prevailed in the army for thousands of years. At the very birth of the Chinese Red Army in 1927 we abolished the system of brutality against soldiers. We regard officers and men alike as individual human beings on an equal footing. The only difference between them is in matters of duty. No officers are allowed to oppress the men, no senior officers to oppress their juniors. Our soldiers join the army to serve the people, not the officers. We call for extremely strict discipline, both in military affairs and in relations with the people. This kind of discipline is based on political understanding, and observed by officers and men alike without exception.

In recent years, we have had a new way of leading soldiers, that is, to start the movement for educating soldiers to respect their officers and officers to care for their men. This movement has enormously strengthened unity within the army, has greatly raised the enthusiasm of officers and men, and enabled the army in all fields of work to make extraordinarily rapid progress.

**TRAINING THE ARMY**

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two methods of training them. The method employed in training an army not founded on the people but actually antagonistic to them is based on ignorance and compulsion; whereas the method used in training a people’s army is based on political understanding and voluntary acceptance. The second method is that used by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

Training an army falls into three aspects: training the mind, physical training, and training in military technique.

The first thing in training an army is to train the mind of the soldier. There will be no spirit of initiative in an army whose political understanding is low, which does not know what it is fighting for. In that case no amount of training will get results. Courage without political understanding is brute bravery. Conscious courage resulting from political awareness is real courage. To heighten political understanding and military knowledge, a certain educational level is essential.

Since the army of the big landlords and bourgeoisie employs the policy of tricking the soldiers, the soldiers are not interested in physical and technical training, and it proves ineffective. Equip them with modern, up-to-date weapons, and they will hand them over to the enemy.

The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have achieved remarkable results in cultivation of mind. The political understanding of our army is high, and that is why it is unconquerable. As a result of our fight in recent years against tendencies to be dogmatic or formalistic, political training has become more practical and advanced. Both officers and men have systematically improved their military knowledge, and a considerable advance has been made in the study and application of strategy and tactics. With regard to all-round education,
while we could show some results right from the start, we have done much better in recent years. As far as cultivation of mind goes, we have for the past year or so given our troops training for various productive occupations as well as political and general education. Such training for production not only helps the campaign to secure greater output, but also fosters a sound attitude towards labour and prevents our men from becoming scoundrels in uniform or loafers. When the war is over they will still be useful members of society.

It should also be pointed out that we owe a great deal of the success of cultivation of mind in our army to the many intellectuals and young men of good education who have joined it since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. I want to take this chance of expressing our sincere appreciation.

Now a word on physical training. Fighting involves hand-to-hand combat, a matching of strength. Physical training, therefore, is important. Building physical strength demands, first of all, a full stomach and warm clothing. Only then can we set about various forms of physical exercise. As the army of the big landlords and bourgeoisie operates by exploiting the rank and file, naturally its soldiers cannot have good physique. In the people's army, with its emphasis on consideration and care for the men, it is quite the reverse.

Next comes training in technique and tactics. In the past there was a tendency in our army to pooh-pooh the idea of physical strength and technique. It was regarded as enough for the army to have political awareness. This is quite wrong. Did we win battles in the past? Well, yes, we did. But that does not mean that our technique was either good enough or adequate enough. If we had had greater physical strength and better technique, as well as political awareness, we might have won greater battles and suffered fewer casualties. It is only fair to say that this wrong tendency has now been corrected. During the last couple of winters we carried out training on a large scale. In some areas this developed into military training for the whole people. Our regular troops have improved enormously, and large numbers of the militia have now learned how to lay mines. To have done so much is pretty significant.

In recent years we have worked out a new method of training troops by replacing the "officer line," which gave officers and instructors sole control of conduct of training from above, with the "mass line" on a basis of co-operation between officers and men. In our army we have introduced a new educational method, one of improving ourselves through both teaching and learning. The officers teach the men and the men teach the officers. The officers teach each other and the men teach each other. Those who are intellectuals and those who are of worker or peasant origin help and learn from each other. Such an arrangement is just what is needed in our present war conditions. We place a high value on the lectures on special technical skills given by our officers or military experts. Since the War of Resistance broke out many military specialists have joined our army and played a fine part in raising our fighting capacity. We give them a warm welcome. At the same time officers must not overlook the fact that every one of the hundreds or thousands of men under their command has his own strong points, that in our army there are highly skilled men from every trade. Officers should not be too proud to learn from them. We have changed the attitude of
officers from one of conceive and superiority to one of untiringly learning from others and teaching others. Scarcely had this system of relying on the masses in training troops been adopted when we discovered not a few whose abilities had remained unknown among the hundreds of thousands of men in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. In the course of troop training, new heroes and new skills have been discovered every day, and our technique has been vastly enriched. This wave of study is the very basis on which our men can master new skills. In short, the classrooms and drill grounds which the men used to fear have been turned into places where military skill and knowledge are cultivated and tempered. The whole atmosphere is different, interest has been heightened, and the barracks have been turned into schools.

We have certainly done a very great deal in training troops. But can we be satisfied with this? No, we cannot. To prepare for future counter-offensives, we must from now on learn to master new techniques; and the most important thing we have to learn is artillery warfare.

We have still to improve our tactics by painstakingly summing up the experience gained in battle and on field manoeuvres. The contents of the Four Main Courses¹ should be used only as reference material for tactical and technical education. From them we should take whatever is of practical value, but not take them textually. It is too early yet for the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies to master every aspect of military science and technique completely. We still have a long way to go in this respect. But it is most important that the whole army should go on studying in order to master all the new military techniques which we need.

This principle of troop training ensures that the rank and file of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are intelligent, resourceful fighters on the anti-Japanese battle front, while tomorrow, after victory, they will form the hard core of a modernized national defence force, and be capable of leading the work of production and education in the period of national economic construction. This being the case, the demobilization of our army will not create any difficulty for the people or the nation.

**PROSECUTING THE WAR**

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two different methods of carrying on a war. An army not based on, and, in fact, hostile to the people, is necessarily limited to cut-and-dried rules and formulas. But a people’s army uses methods of extreme flexibility and constantly adapts itself to the situation; and this is true of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

Because the army of the big landlords and bourgeoisie oppresses the people and receives no help from them, because there is no community of interest between officers and men, such an army cannot, when engaged in war, rely on the initiative and morale of its junior officers and men. It is, in fact, compelled to make great efforts at such a time to prevent large-scale desertions. This makes it very difficult to wage a war with such an army. The higher command issues orders based entirely on

¹ The reference is to Tactics, Ordnance, Topography and Defence Works—the four main courses in old-fashioned cadet schools in China.
preconceived, cut-and-dried rules, without weighing enemy strength against its own and disregarding special conditions of time and place. Consequently such orders are utterly impracticable. When a unit receives orders which cannot be carried out, it makes a false report to the higher command. Both superiors and subordinates try to pull the wool over each other's eyes. Can such an army win victories? In the course of the War of Resistance many fantastic incidents have occurred. Mutinous generals have never been brought to justice. Generals who surrendered to the enemy have been given important positions after their return. And some generals who defended cities in conditions of enormous difficulty have been shot! This is a queer system of rewards and punishments, isn't it?

With the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army things are entirely different. Whenever we are fighting we are helped everywhere by the people. Since the organization of the militia and the starting of tunnel-digging and mine-laying movements, the scale and importance of the help the people have given us are incalculable. Within the army itself, because it has a high degree of political understanding and because there is mutual understanding and a feeling of solidarity between officers and men, everyone knows where he stands and can act on his own initiative. Having a single aim, the fighters are mobile and swift; they can fight bravely. As Sun Tzu1 said: "If generals do not know their men, they deliver the nation to the enemy. If the men do not know their generals, they deliver the generals to the enemy." That is something that never happens in our army!

Our policy in conducting the war may be summed up like this. Whether we join battle depends on the weapons we possess, the kind of enemy we have to cope with, and the time and place of the engagement. It means, too, that battle has to be planned and fought on the basis of our own equipment, the strength of the enemy, and taking into account the factors of time and place. This new method of conducting war is both practical and materialist. I use these words advisedly. Many a military expert, in China and abroad, both nowadays and formerly, failed disastrously in this respect. And some of our comrades who held "Leftist" ideas in the past failed to understand just this point. Earlier on, when the only weapons at our disposal were rifles, spears and big swords, we simply had to study conditions, make up our minds and determine our tactics accordingly. We didn't talk in high falutin terms about tactics of a mechanized army. When we passed from the period of civil war to that of the anti-Japanese war, when the enemy we had to face was the Japanese army, we did not content ourselves with sticking to experience gained in the civil war period. On the basis of that experience we made the changes and improvements necessary. We made up our minds and determined our tactics through a thorough study of the situation of the enemy. And of course, on the battle front of the Liberated Areas, we have to map out tactics applicable to the time and place of a battle front of this kind. Alongside these general rules for conducting war goes a special feature—the unity between army and people. On the one hand, the fight waged by the army serves to help the various struggles in which

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1 Eminent Chinese expert on military science and strategy in the fifth century B.C. and author of Sun Tzu which contains thirteen chapters.
the people are engaged; and on the other, the people’s efforts — political, economic, cultural and military, as well as disruption of the enemy lines of communication—serve to help the army wage war. This co-ordination in all spheres between army and people is thoroughly carried out on the battle fronts, in every campaign and in every battle. This is the new method of making war which we have worked out in the course of the people’s war — the method worked out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

Officers, men and people have one constant endeavour: to seek to attack the enemy in every possible way. Consequently, as long as orders issued by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies suit the conditions and are practicable, they are always carried out. Even if, once in a while, orders are impracticable or belated, no harm is done, because lower units are able to adapt themselves to circumstances, and judge and act independently. That is why we are winning all along the line.

Last year Kuomintang troops sustained a miserable defeat in Honan Province. Those who have reviewed the campaign have come to the conclusion that the defeat was due to five discordant factors: the various armies were at odds with each other; the officers were at odds with the men; the army was at odds with the government, with the Kuomintang party, and with the people. This is true enough. An army of the big landlords and bourgeoisie runs into disagreements everywhere, while the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies meet with agreement and harmony everywhere. That is the fundamental difference.

Now a word on military theory. Whenever this subject is discussed, some people like to show off with a series of high-sounding military academy lectures, or quote at length from the military history of one country or another. What they say is all very profound, but unfortunately their theories are not necessarily of practical value to the Chinese people. Undoubtedly we must absorb the military theories and experience of all countries. We ought to learn from them. It will be bad for us if we do not. What we must not do is to apply such theories and experience mechanically; we must not accept them as immutable dogmas. The Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the eight years of the anti-Japanese war have given birth to a correct military science which, as events prove, best suits the needs of the Chinese people. It is a military science which combines theory with practice. The many books which Comrade Mao Tse-tung has written on warfare are expositions of this new military science. From the various battles which were fought in the period of the revolutionary civil war, from the battles now being fought on the Kuomintang and Liberated Areas fronts, we can see the correctness of the ideas set out in these works. Experience gained in the War of Resistance Against Japan is a yardstick to test and prove the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s military theories. Everything I mentioned when dealing with the military experience in the War of Resistance on the battle fronts of the Liberated Areas, and the whole strategy of the people’s war, arise from the successful application of Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s method of waging war.

In our persistent struggle behind the enemy lines we gain victories by adopting the basic principles of strategy and tactics laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. These basic principles are: to avoid rashness in attack; to avoid conservatism in defence; and to resist any tendency to
run in panic from the enemy when withdrawing from a point. These basic principles are bound up with the close fighting unity between army and people; and because of this unity they can be applied.

**POLITICAL WORK IN THE ARMY**

The two kinds of armies are paralleled by two kinds of political work.

The aim of political work conducted in the army by the reactionary clique within the Kuomintang is to trick the officers and men, for otherwise the big landlords and bourgeoisie would not be able to do as they please. Therefore, instead of anti-Japanese education, the reactionaries within the Kuomintang carry on anti-Communist education in the army. Instead of teaching officers and men to work for democracy, they demand blind obedience. They try to set up secret service rule in the army. Officers and men who have democratic ideas are labelled dangerous elements and kept under surveillance, dismissed, arrested, or even secretly done away with. This sinister, merciless secret service regime sets out to damp down the political consciousness of the soldiers, to encourage their ignorance, to spy on, and even murder, officers and men who hold democratic views, to isolate the army from the people and use the army to oppress the people. If the men of an army are ground down, that army will never serve the people, but will inevitably grind the people down. In such an army secret service work is called “political” work; but it is as different from our political work as chalk from cheese.

The aim of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is to serve the people and safeguard the country, and therefore political work is the life-blood of these armies. Our political work sets out: (1) to raise the political understanding of officers and men, to inspire them with love for their country and their people, and to fire them with a desire to re-educate themselves; (2) to bring about unity between friendly army units; (3) to cement the unity between army and people, so as to make the people more politically aware, to safeguard the country and democracy, and to help spread education and culture among the people; (4) to demoralize the Japanese and puppet troops by political and psychological means so as to sap their fighting strength; and (5) to consolidate and raise the fighting strength of our army, to guarantee the carrying out of orders, and to help the army itself make an intensive study of politics, military matters, general education and production. These five aspects of our political work are interrelated and complementary to one another. They are the things which characterize our political work. Ours is a people’s army with unity between army and people, between officers and men. The war we wage is a people’s war. We can apply the strategy and tactics of a people’s war; and we have won battles. All these things are inseparable from our political work.

**THE ARMY COMMAND**

The two kinds of armies are paralleled, likewise, by two methods of command and two kinds of organization of command.

Because the reactionaries in the Kuomintang want to get rid of those who differ from them, they appoint their own nominees as divisional commanders. More often
than not these commanders take orders only from the supreme commander of the Kuomintang army, and pay no attention to anyone else. As a result many army commands above divisional level have become superfluous and serve no purpose at all. In the course of a battle shoals of orders are issued, often at variance with or flatly contradicting each other. The staff organizations, even the general staff at the headquarters of the supreme commander, frequently become mere channels for transmitting orders.

Commanding bodies of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are regulated and checked from top to bottom. They have duties as well as powers. Harmony prevails in their ranks, and orders are unified, while sufficient latitude is left for lower units to display initiative. In this way the army is united from top to bottom.

One of the special merits of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is the ability of various units to co-operate with each other and take co-ordinated action. The lower units never try to get round orders from higher authorities, and when no orders are forthcoming they co-operate voluntarily. Excellent co-operation is also maintained between the main forces and local, guerrilla, militia and self-defence forces. As a result there is unity among all our forces.

Army staffs of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies really have to work. And that is the fundamental difference between them and those of the Kuomintang army. During recent years our staff work has improved, and this is due to the efforts of the staff itself. To prepare for the forthcoming counter-offensives it must be still further improved. In modern conditions large army groupings cannot be commanded by a single individual; they require an organized command. Effective command bodies are impossible without effective staff work. On the other hand, our army staffs must themselves continue to improve their work, first and foremost in reconnaissance and communications, so as to collect accurate and up-to-the-minute intelligence.

EQUIPMENT AND OTHER PROBLEMS

For several years the most difficult problem we have been up against on the battle fronts of the Liberated Areas is that of obtaining equipment and military supplies. We are solving it in several ways. First, we arm ourselves with weapons seized from the enemy. For several years now we have relied on this method of strengthening our forces and maintaining our fighting power. Secondly, we make use of materials obtainable locally. The abundance of coal and iron, and metal obtained from dismantled railway tracks in northern China have greatly facilitated our manufacture of arms; and this is how the greater part of the militia forces have been able to extend the tactics of mine-laying. Thirdly, we have set up small-scale ordnance factories by assembling odds and ends of equipment captured from the Japanese and puppet troops. Fourthly, these factories, which often become the target of enemy “mopping-up” campaigns, must be dispersed and camouflaged. Greater armed protection must be provided for them so that ammunition can be uninterruptedly produced to supply the front. As far as medical supplies go, we have adopted the principle of using both Chinese herbal medicines and Western medicines. We manufacture only a small part
of the medicines we use, the main source of supply being seizure from the enemy and purchase. We are most grateful to overseas Chinese and friends in other countries who helped us with medical supplies at the beginning of the War of Resistance. Since the Kuomintang authorities in 1939 started a blockade of the Liberated Areas, such sources have dried up. But we are not daunted by difficulties; thanks to the efforts made by our military supply personnel we can solve them.

**STRONG MAIN FORCES AND STRONG RESERVES**

The armed forces in the Liberated Areas fall into three categories: the main forces, local forces, and self-defence militia forces. The main job of the militia and self-defence forces is to protect their own villages while carrying on with their regular work. By protecting homes and defending themselves they are, wherever they may be, fighting the war against Japan in conjunction with other districts and the whole of the Liberated Areas. Local and national tasks in this war go hand in hand. In the whole history of our armies there have never been militia forces on such a scale in the Liberated Areas, and the very fact that we have learned to organize such a militia speaks volumes. For once the militia is organized, it can fight either in co-ordination with the regular army or on its own. It has done a fine job in protecting the people so that they could push ahead and produce more; and the recovery of many positions behind the enemy lines owes a great deal to the success of the militia in tying down the enemy. For weapons, the militia use chiefly land-mines. Besides these they have some rifles, hand-grenades and sundry primitive weapons, including improvised grenade-throwers. To solve the problem of securing arms by their own efforts, in many places the militia reclaim plots of land and use the money raised by the sale of produce to buy arms. In many localities the militia is organized in such a way that it can fight in co-ordination with the militia of other areas. Here we see the militia starting to turn into regular local forces. Moreover, the militia and local self-defence forces take an active part in production: they are both fighters and producers, both a military and a labour force. That is something that radically changes the former face of the countryside. The local forces occupy a place midway between the main forces and the militia. They are responsible for the defence of one or several counties. They are responsible not only for the comparatively important military task of launching counter-"mopping-up" campaigns, but for looking after the immediate interests of the people, for example, giving protection to the local people at the time of harvest or sowing, besides fighting flood, drought and other hazards of nature. The men who form these local forces naturally love the locality where they were born, where they grew up and where their forefathers are buried. That makes it possible for us to strengthen such forces so that they can act as local garrisons in the War of Resistance. Then, as each local force, in carrying out this task, becomes tempered and strong, it gets more like and more on the level of a main force. Sometimes the main forces are concentrated. At other times they are dispersed, and then it is necessary for them to join with local and militia forces to add to their strength and attack the enemy with greater weight. Working in unity with each other, the main, local and militia forces become an organic whole. When cir-
circumstances are critical, we can act on the principle of dispersing the main forces and mingling them with the masses to our advantage. On the other hand, when the situation favours the expansion of our work, the militia and local forces can, in certain conditions, come together to co-operate with the main forces, or actually become part of the main forces themselves so as to fulfil the more important tasks called for by such expansion. By such measures the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have created a militia of over two million men to serve as their support and reserve. That is one of the reasons why they can withstand protracted warfare. This is an enormous step forward in the process of building up our military forces in the Liberated Areas.

In his political report Chairman Mao Tse-tung said:

On arriving at any place, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armed forces of the people should immediately assist the native people to organize not only militia and self-defence corps but local armed units and army corps headed by local cadres. Then they can organize main forces—armed units and army corps—under the leadership of the natives. This is an extremely important task. Without accomplishing this we cannot build strong anti-Japanese bases and expand the people’s army.

This, then, is the task we must perform.

**BREAKING UP THE PUPPET TROOPS**

In recent years our army has done a good deal to demoralize the puppet troops.

These puppet troops are Chinese. In helping the Japanese invaders to oppress and slaughter their fellow-countrymen they have committed the worst of crimes. Unless they change their ideas pretty quickly, cross over to our side and do their utmost to work their passage, they will be liable to such severe punishment as the nation demands. They will find themselves in the same boat as the Japanese invaders.

The composition of the puppet troops is very mixed. Among the eight hundred thousand whom we face, half a million are former Kuomintang troops who surrendered to the enemy as a result of the ridiculous order given by the Kuomintang reactionaries to “save the country by indirect means.”

We cannot, therefore, apply the same hard and fast rule to all puppet troops. With the die-hards who have worked hand in glove with the enemy and repeatedly turned a deaf ear to our advice there is only one thing to be done—unhesitatingly wipe them out. Those puppet officers and men, however, who surrendered to the enemy because they were fooled by the Kuomintang reactionaries, those who love their country at heart but are temporarily confused—them we shall win over by propaganda, rescue them from crime and bring them back to the arms of our motherland.

We must, however, give them a word of warning. Hitler has been knocked out, and it will not be long before the Japanese invaders go the same way. These puppets committed many crimes. Unless they cross over to our side pretty quickly, they won’t have time to render service to their country and redeem themselves; and they will be punished as the nation demands. If they dither any longer, they spell their own doom.
IV. OUR FUTURE MILITARY TASKS

Comrades! Earlier in my report I dealt with our military line in a fairly systematic way and explained how we should carry on our work in various fields. Now I want to say something about our future military tasks.

MILITARY TASKS THROUGHOUT THE NATION

As Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in his political report:

In China, an urgent need exists beyond all doubt for representatives of all political parties and groups and of people without party affiliation to unite and establish a provisional democratic coalition government so as to carry out democratic reforms, surmount the present crisis, mobilize and unify all the anti-Japanese forces of the country and co-ordinate effectively with the Allies in military operations, thereby defeating the Japanese aggressors and liberating the Chinese people from their clutches. After that, we should, on a broad democratic basis, convene a national assembly and form a permanent democratic government, which will also be a coalition and include on an even larger scale representatives of all parties and groups and of people without party affiliation, and which will lead the liberated people throughout the country to build up a new China, independent and free, democratic and united, prosperous and powerful. In short, we must follow a line of unity and democracy in order to defeat the aggressors and build up a new China.

This proposal of Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the political guide to victory in China’s War of Resistance, and to building the nation.

In pursuance of this political line, our military task is to bring about the unity of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies with all friendly forces engaged in the War of Resistance, in order to defeat the Japanese aggressors. To facilitate it, the army and the people of the entire country urgently demand that the supreme command, now under the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, be reorganized and replaced by a joint supreme command capable of exercising unified command and based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s principle of democracy.

This joint supreme command should work strictly according to Dr. Sun’s principle of so identifying the armed forces with the people that they become armed forces of the people. If this is done, all existing corrupt practices in the Kuomintang command and army, which serve to divorce army and people, which are contrary to the interests of the people, must be wiped out or drastically changed. Military plans and policies not in the interests of the War of Resistance and the people must be changed. Defeatist and pro-Japanese elements holding high rank must be dismissed, and military training must be strengthened. Democratic methods of work and political consciousness must be fostered in the army, and secret service rule within the army completely abolished. The conscription system, which harms both the people and the conduct of the War of Resistance, must be radically changed. Discipline in accordance with national honour and interest must be observed, and the treatment accorded to officers and men improved. Only in such ways can relations between the Kuomintang army and
the people, and between officers and men in the Kuomintang army, be improved, real unity between army and people achieved, and the fighting capacity of the armed forces turned into a real asset in the War of Resistance. Therefore, the establishment of a joint supreme command is in the interests of the patriotic officers and men of the Kuomintang army.

The creation of such a joint supreme command is also in the interests of those officers and men in every provincial force who love their country, because it would do away with all the unequal treatment that has divided the armed forces in the country. It would put an end to the defeatist strategy of preserving their own strength at the expense of others. It would help provincial forces to go ahead and do what the people expect of them. It would unite all armies throughout the country, and radically change the war situation.

A joint supreme command of this sort is needed, too, by the battle front of the Liberated Areas—a front which for eight years has borne the brunt of the fighting—and by all the armies engaged in bitter fighting behind the enemy lines—the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other friendly forces, so that operations in both the Kuomintang-held areas and the Liberated Areas can be effectively co-ordinated, and all forces in the Liberated Areas given far more vigorous assistance to defeat the Japanese aggressors.

It is specially necessary to emphasize that this joint supreme command must equip without exception all forces which are capable of fighting the enemy with all the latest weapons, so as to speed the victory over the enemy, to wipe them out and liberate the nation. Such a command should not keep such weapons for the purpose of fighting civil war against the people.

Members of the Communist Party themselves must strive for the closest collaboration, both inside and outside the army, with all democratic elements and all military units in China. In the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies Communist Party members are in the minority, for officers and men are not compelled (as the Kuomintang army compels them to join the Kuomintang party) to join the Communist Party. In actual fact, therefore, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are allied armies of Communists and other democratic elements; they are armies of the people.

All officers and men of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are willing to make common cause with anti-Japanese forces throughout the country, to take part in a common struggle to get a joint supreme command set up and to defeat the Japanese aggressors. All past prejudices should be buried and all friction ended. It is our opinion that officers and men of all anti-Japanese forces have been fighting heroically in the War of Resistance and have rendered meritorious service to the country and to the people. In reorganizing the Kuomintang command to create a basis for unity among all armies in the country, it is, above all, necessary to reinforce their united strength so as to bring about, in collaboration with our Allies, the speedy defeat of the Japanese. This is not only what the army, the people throughout the country and democratic public opinion among the Allies expect, but it is also what is expected by most of the patriotic officers and democratic elements within the Kuomintang.
OUR MILITARY TASKS IN AREAS UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION

Our military tasks in the areas occupied by the Japanese are: to intensify political work so as to win the people over; to intensify organizational work among them; to strengthen our political influence over the Japanese and puppet troops and police so as to get them to revolt against the Japanese and cross over to our side; to carry out more intensive work in the cities in the rear of the enemy; and to organize our underground forces. If all these tasks are carried out in co-ordination with the actions of our army, then our army can assuredly take the lead in expelling the Japanese aggressors from the mainland of China when the great day for the all-out counter-offensive arrives.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has often said: "We ought to learn from the experience gained by the French underground forces in liberating France." All Chinese in the Japanese-occupied areas who love their country, all our comrades working in these areas should always bear Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s advice in mind. They should be conscious of their great responsibilities, they should be practical and make preparations, so that when the time is ripe they can smash the Japanese bandits and recover their beloved soil.

OUR MILITARY TASKS IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

The army in the Liberated Areas, as the spearhead of the great counter-offensive on the Chinese mainland, has to shoulder the extremely important strategic task, in conjunction with all friendly forces throughout the country and the forces of our Allies, of defeating the Japanese aggressors.

Our military tasks in the Liberated Areas may be set out under eight heads.

1) We must extend the Liberated Areas and reduce the area occupied by the Japanese. Every inch of enemy-occupied territory must be recovered, on the principle that "the rise and fall of a nation is the concern of every citizen." Comrade Mao Tse-tung told us:

Under the present conditions the troops of the Liberated Areas should launch extensive attacks on all vulnerable positions occupied by the enemy and puppet troops in order to expand the Liberated Areas and reduce the enemy-occupied areas.

Meanwhile it should be borne in mind that the enemy is still strong and may launch further attacks on the Liberated Areas. The army and the people of the Liberated Areas must be ever ready to smash his attacks and must do all kinds of work to consolidate these areas.

Last year our army recovered sixteen county towns behind the enemy lines. In four months this year another twelve have been recovered. This has been possible because the Japanese invaders have had far too much on their hands, while we have been growing stronger and stronger as we were tempered in battle. In these circumstances, and in carrying out Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s instructions, it is advantageous to us to mass still stronger forces for an offensive against any areas which can be recovered. This will reduce the number of enemy attacks and gradually pave the way for the change from guerrilla to mobile warfare. At the same time we must take into account the fact that the enemy is still able to mount attacks against the Liberated Areas, and should make proper preparations to smash them. We should still avoid foolhardiness in attack and
any concentration of forces for actions not warranted by circumstances.

2) We must expand the people's forces so as to break up and wipe out Japanese and puppet troops. If victory in the War of Resistance is to be won and the danger of civil war prevented, there must be an expansion of our main forces as well as of our local, guerrilla and militia forces. But this expansion must be effected in such a way as not to throw too heavy a burden on the people. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out, "A new China or an old China: these two prospects lie before the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party. . . ." And he added that these two prospects will still remain, even when Japanese imperialism is beaten. To bring the new China into being, to give the Chinese people the promise of a brilliant future, we must have strong people's forces. I have already explained how we must go about breaking up and wiping out the Japanese and puppet forces. Our job now is to set to work and do it without delay.

3) We have to intensify the training of our existing forces — the regular troops, local forces, militia and self-defence corps — in preparation for the counter-offensive. By way of getting our main forces ready to take part in mobile warfare, we must ensure that they are steadily tempered, that they learn by experience in the course of properly-planned, concentrated attacks on the enemy. We must also see that the militia get their training. They should go in for manufacturing mines of every type on a large scale, and learn all methods of detonation so that they can make the widest possible use of them.

4) We must improve military technique. Strategic counter-attack calls for modern equipment. From now on we must improve military technique so that we can handle such equipment when opportunity arises. We have now captured some pieces of artillery. We must learn all about gunnery and the tactics of modern warfare.

5) We must strengthen the commands. We must improve our staff work so as to make it equal to the task of commanding our troops under present condition, and at the same time get it ready for an expansion of the war. We must make better preparations for a great counter-offensive. We must strengthen our political work, encourage our soldiers and enhance their morale, and intensify military studies so as to make sure that the present situation behind the enemy lines can be successfully dealt with. We must, moreover, make certain that if the situation should undergo any radical change we are able to meet any new battle. In our political task we have a new duty: both to make proper arrangements to deal with the present situation, and to work out far-sighted plans for the changes which the future will bring.

The work of the rear service must be strengthened in regard to stores, sanitation, ordnance, and so forth. The work of military supply should be that of meeting both current war needs, and planning and preparing to meet the needs of the future counter-offensive. Then we shall not be caught napping when the time of great need comes. We shall in the future need highly qualified personnel in vast numbers for our commands, and we should not hesitate to send large numbers of our best and most active people into the army.
6) We must prepare a material basis from which to launch the general counter-offensive. The whole army should be mobilized for productive work, mobilized to practise economy and accumulate stocks of food and materials. In collecting the materials required for our counter-offensive we have to rely on our own efforts. And when the time comes for concentrated operations, we must be fully prepared for every exigency.

7) We must take better care of the families of anti-Japanese fighters. We must improve pension services for the wounded and the families of those killed in action; and we must arrange for resettlement of crippled, disabled and discharged soldiers.

8) In order to promote all this work and fulfil all these tasks, firm unity must be created within the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armed forces of the people. And, with this as its basis, unity must be extended to the vast number of friendly armies. Unity and progress are inseparable. Comrades must guard against conceit and pride, which are one of the sources of "mountain-top-ism." No matter how great the service rendered, credit should go not to any individual, but to the people. And not only should we avoid such faults, but should criticize ourselves every so often and learn from one another, so as to raise our abilities and not fall short of the people's confidence and trust. If we refuse to allow ourselves to get swelled heads or become arrogant, this "mountain-top-ism" will decline, a stronger unity will be created both inside and outside the army, and we shall be invincible.

All these military tasks which will be facing the Liberated Areas from now on, in other words, the central strategic task that must be prepared for, correspond, generally speaking, with what Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in the early stage of the War of Resistance: that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies had to be prepared for a strategic change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the later stages of the war. It is now time for us to be prepared to effect this change, step by step, in the course of our practical work. To do so, all personnel in the army should be thoroughly prepared to make changes in their outlook and practical work, so as to be ready for the great counter-offensive against the Japanese aggressors.

I have said before, and here I must stress again, that whoever underrates the importance of the battle front of the Liberated Areas, and the fight they and their ninety-odd million heroic, militant people have waged in the cause of China's liberation and the great counter-offensive against the Japanese aggressors, will certainly make serious mistakes.

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1 A form of local sectarianism, one placing sectional interests before those of the whole. This tendency originated during the long years of guerrilla warfare when revolutionary bases in rural areas were scattered and out of contact with one another. As such bases were generally established in mountainous areas, this form of sectarianism came to be called "mountain-top-ism."
VI. CONCLUSION

Soon victory will dawn over China, over all the world, in all its glory. The great objective for which the Chinese people have striven these eight years past is gradually approaching its moment of decisive triumph. The political report made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung shows the political direction the Chinese people are taking. My report summarizes their military experience — mainly that gained in the Liberated Areas — during the eight years of the War of Resistance. Its purpose is to discover a way of fulfilling Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s directives in the military sphere, and performing the great tasks he has set before the Chinese people in waging the War of Resistance and building up the nation.

Comrades! The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other armies of the people were created by the blood and sacrifice of countless numbers of our comrades, of the Chinese people. Every comrade, every fighter who has made the supreme sacrifice will be forever remembered. I should like to recall what Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in his report about the people’s army:

This army is powerful because all who have joined it are self-disciplined; they have united themselves and fought together not for the private interests of a few individuals or a small clique, but for the interests of the broad masses of the people and the interests of the whole nation. To stand firmly on the side of the Chinese people and to serve them whole-heartedly — that is the sole aim of this army.

Fighting for this aim, this army marches forward unchallenged, vanquishes all enemies and never yields to them. No matter what the difficulties and tribulations, so long as one man remains, he will fight on.

The conclusion which Comrade Mao Tse-tung has drawn is forthright and bold — and it is true. It reflects the deep-rooted strength of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the other armies of the people. These armies embody the strength of the Chinese people, the quintessence of the strength of the Chinese people — and they have a boundless future. This strength will continue in existence as long as the great Chinese nation exists. These armies will go on, with the Chinese people, to defeat the Japanese invaders, to conquer all obstacles which prevent China from becoming an independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous nation. The present Congress of our Party, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, will lead us forward along the road to victory.

Comrades! For twenty-four years our great Communist Party of China, side by side with the entire Chinese people, has been engaged in a struggle for national liberation and social progress. In the course of this struggle we have not only worked out a most powerful political line which can lead to the solution of China’s political problems, but also a most powerful military line which can solve the problems of China’s revolutionary war. This military line and our political line are both personified in our leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung. For the victory of the War of Resistance, I here at the Congress specially call on the comrades to study Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s writings on military matters just as seriously as they do his writings on politics, economics and
culture. All units of the army, all military schools and all military training classes must regard Comrade Mao Tse-tung's military writings as their basic textbook, as the living substance of their studies. In so doing they will become better armed mentally and be able to defeat the enemy.

Long live the victory of the Seventh Congress of our Party!

Long live Comrade Mao Tse-tung, leader of our Party!

Long live the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column!

Unite all friendly forces to defeat the Japanese invaders!

Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

Long live the independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous new China!

April 1945