MAO TSE-TUNG

OUR STUDY
AND
THE CURRENT SITUATION

APPENDIX: RESOLUTION ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS IN THE HISTORY OF OUR PARTY
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From 1942 to 1944 the central organs and senior cadres of the Communist Party of China held discussions on the history of the Party, especially of the period from the beginning of 1931 to the end of 1934. These discussions greatly helped to bring about ideological unity in the Party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

The enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee which had been held at Tsunyi, Kweichow, in January 1935, had corrected the erroneous “Left” line pursued from early 1931 to late 1934, changed the composition of the leading organs of the Central Committee, established the leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and set the Party line on the correct Marxist-Leninist track; nevertheless, many Party cadres had not yet reached a thorough understanding of the character of the erroneous lines of the past. In order to raise further the Marxist-Leninist ideological level of Party cadres, the Political Bureau held several discussions in 1942-43 on the history of the Party, and then led the senior cadres of the whole Party in holding similar discussions during 1943-44. These discussions were an important preparation for the Seventh National Congress of the Party in 1945 and enabled this Congress to attain an ideological and political unity without precedent in the history of the Communist Party of China.

“Our Study and the Current Situation” was a speech made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a meeting of senior cadres in Yenan on April 12, 1944 on the subject of these discussions. For the detailed conclusions arrived at by the Central Committee on the errors of the “Left” opportunist line that was pursued from the beginning of 1931 to the end of 1934, see the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party”, which was adopted by the Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and which follows as an Appendix to this article.

Committee for the Publication of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
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Since last winter, the senior cadres of our Party have been studying the question of the two lines that existed in the history of the Party. This has very greatly raised the political level of these numerous senior cadres. In the course of the study, comrades have brought up many questions, and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee has reached conclusions on some of the important ones. They are as follows:

(1) On the question of what attitude to adopt in studying our historical experience. The Central Committee holds that we should enable the cadres to become perfectly clear ideologically on the questions that arose in the history of the Party and that at the same time we should adopt a lenient policy in arriving at decisions about comrades who formerly committed errors, so that on the one hand the cadres understand thoroughly the historical experience of our Party and avoid repeating past errors, and on the other hand all comrades can be united for our common endeavour. In the history of our Party there were great struggles against the erroneous lines of Chen Tu-hsiu and of Li Li-san, and they were absolutely necessary. But there were defects in the methods employed. For one thing, the cadres were not brought to a full understanding ideologically of the causes of these errors, the circumstances in which they were committed and the detailed ways and means of correcting them, so that errors of a similar nature came to be repeated; and for
another, too much stress was placed on the responsibility of
individuals, so that we failed to unite as many people as we
could have done for our common endeavour. We should
take warning from these two defects. This time, in dealing
with questions of Party history we should lay the stress not
on the responsibility of certain individual comrades but on
analysis of the circumstances in which the errors were com-
mitted, on the content of the errors and on their social,
historical and ideological roots, and this should be done in
the spirit of “learning from past mistakes to avoid future
ones” and “curing the sickness to save the patient”, in order
to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and
unity among comrades. The adoption of a careful attitude
in handling cases of individual comrades, neither glossing
things over nor doing harm to comrades, is a sign that our
Party is vigorous and flourishing.

(2) Treat all questions analytically; do not negate every-
thing. The question concerning the line of the leadership
of the Central Committee during the period from the Fourth
Plenary Session to the Tsunyi Meeting, for example, should be analysed from two aspects. It should be pointed
out on the one hand that the political tactics, the military
tactics and the cadres policy which the central leadership
adopted during that period were wrong in their main aspects,
but on the other hand that on such fundamental issues as opposing Chiang Kai-shek and carrying on the Agrarian
Revolution and the struggle of the Red Army there was no
dispute between ourselves and the comrades who committed
errors. And even the tactical side needs to be analysed.
On the land question, for instance, their error consisted in
the ultra-Left policy of allotting no land to the landlords and
poor land to the rich peasants, but these comrades were at
one with us on confiscating the land of the landlords for
distribution among peasants who had little or no land. Con-
crete analysis of concrete conditions, Lenin said, is “the most
essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism”.8
Having no head for analysis, many of our comrades do not
want to go deeply into complex matters, to analyse and
study them over and over again, but like to draw simple
conclusions which are either absolutely affirmative or abso-
lutely negative. The fact that our newspapers are lacking
in analytical articles and the habit of analysis is not yet fully
cultivated in the Party shows that there are such short-
comings. From now on we should remedy this state of affairs.

(3) On the discussion of the documents of the Sixth Na-
tional Congress of the Party. It should be stated that the
line of the Sixth National Congress was basically correct,
since that Congress defined the character of the present
revolution as bourgeois-democratic, defined the situation at
that time as an interval between two revolutionary high tides,
repudiated opportunism and putschism and promulgated the
Ten Point Programme. 4 All this was correct. The Congress
also had its defects. For instance, among its other short-
comings or mistakes, it failed to point out the very protracted
nature of the Chinese revolution and the very great im-
portance of rural base areas in the revolution. Nonetheless,
the Sixth National Congress played a progressive role in the
history of our Party.

(4) On the question of whether the Provisional Central
Committee that was formed in Shanghai in 1927 and the Fifth
Plenary Session which it subsequently convened were legal
or not. The Central Committee holds that both were legal,
but it should be stated that the procedures for the election
were inadequate and that this case should be taken as a historical lesson.

(5) On the question of factions in the history of the Party. It should be stated that as a result of the series of changes since the Tsunyi Meeting the factions which formerly existed and played an unwholesome role in the history of our Party no longer exist. In our present study of the two lines within the Party, it is absolutely necessary to point out that these factions did exist and did play an unwholesome role. But it would be wrong to think that factions with the same erroneous political programmes and organizational forms still exist in the Party, after all the changes brought about by so many inner-Party struggles - the Tsunyi Meeting of January 1935, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938, the enlarged session of the Political Bureau in September 1941, the Party-wide rectification movement in 1942 and the campaign begun in the winter of 1943 for the study of the past struggles between the two lines within the Party. The old factions are gone. What is left is only the remnants of dogmatist and empiricist ideology, which can be overcome by continuing and intensifying our rectification movement. But what still exists in our Party to a serious extent, and almost everywhere, is a more or less blind tendency towards "mountain-strongholdism". For instance, there is a lack of mutual understanding, mutual respect and unity among comrades of different units, which arises from differences in their background of struggle, differences in the areas in which they work (as between one base area and another and as between the Japanese-occupied areas, the Kuomintang areas and the revolutionary base areas) and differences in their departments of work (as between one army unit and another and as between one kind of work and another); this phenomenon seems quite commonplace but in fact it seriously obstructs the unity of the Party and the growth of its fighting capacity. The social and historical roots of mountain-strongholdism lie in the fact that the Chinese petty bourgeoisie is particularly large and that for a long period our rural base areas have been cut off from one another by the enemy, while the subjective cause is the insufficiency of inner-Party education. The important task now confronting us is to point out these causes, to persuade our comrades to get rid of their blindness and raise the level of their political awareness, to break down the ideological barriers that separate comrades and to promote mutual understanding and respect, so as to bring about unity throughout the Party.

A clear understanding of these questions by the whole Party, will not only assure the success of the present study within the Party, but will also assure the victory of the Chinese revolution.

II

The present situation has two characteristics: one is that the anti-fascist front is growing stronger and the fascist front is declining, and the second is that within the anti-fascist front the people's forces are growing stronger and the anti-popular forces are declining.' The first characteristic is quite obvious and people can readily see it. Hitler will be defeated before long and the Japanese aggressors, too, are heading for defeat. The second characteristic is not yet so obvious and people cannot readily see it yet, but it is daily becoming
more manifest in Europe, in Britain and the United States and in China.

The growth of the people’s forces in China has to be explained with our Party as the centre of the picture.

The growth of our Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan can be divided into three stages. The first stage was from 1937 to 1940. In 1937 and 1938, the first two years of this stage, the Japanese militarists took the Kuomintang seriously and the Communist Party lightly; therefore they threw their main forces against the Kuomintang front and, in their policy towards the Kuomintang, military attack was primary and political inducement to bring about capitulation was supplementary; they did not take the Communist-led anti-Japanese base areas seriously, believing that these amounted to only a handful of Communists engaged in guerrilla actions. But after occupying Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese imperialists began to change their policy and to take the Communist Party seriously and the Kuomintang lightly. In their policy towards the Kuomintang, political inducement to bring about capitulation became primary and military attack supplementary, while at the same time they gradually shifted their main forces to deal with the Communists. For the Japanese imperialists now felt it was no longer the Kuomintang, but the Communist Party, that was to be feared. In 1937 and 1938, the Kuomintang put rather more effort into the War of Resistance, its relations with our Party were comparatively good and it permitted rather more freedom, although imposing many restrictions on the people’s anti-Japanese movement. After the fall of Wuhan, however, because of its defeats in the war and its increasing hostility towards the Communist Party, the Kuomintang gradually became more reactionary, more active against the

Communists and more passive in the war against Japan. In 1937, as a result of the setbacks in the civil war period, the Communist Party had only about 40,000 organized members and an army of 30,000 men; hence it was taken lightly by the Japanese militarists. But by 1940 the Party’s membership had risen to 800,000, our army had grown to nearly 500,000, and the population of the base areas, including those paying grain tax only to us and those paying it both to us and to the Japanese and puppet rulers, totalled about 100,000,000. In the course of several years our Party had opened up such an extensive theatre of war, the Liberated Areas, that for no less than five and a half years we were able to prevent any strategic offensive by the main forces of the Japanese invaders against the Kuomintang front, draw these forces around ourselves, extricate the Kuomintang from the crisis in its theatre of war and maintain the protracted War of Resistance. But during that stage some comrades in our Party committed an error; they underestimated Japanese imperialism (and so disregarded the protracted and ruthless nature of the war, maintained that mobile warfare with large formations should be primary and belittled guerrilla warfare), placed reliance on the Kuomintang, and failed to pursue soberly an independent policy (hence their capitulationism towards the Kuomintang and their vacillation in applying the policy of boldly and freely arousing the masses to establish anti-Japanese democratic base areas behind the enemy lines and greatly expanding the armed forces led by our Party). Meanwhile our Party had recruited large numbers of new members who were still inexperienced, and all the base areas in the enemy’s rear were newly established and not yet consolidated. During this stage, a kind of conceit appeared within the Party because of the favourable develop-
ment of the general situation and the growth of our Party and armed forces, and many members became swelled-headed. During this stage, however, we overcame the Right deviation in the Party and carried out an independent policy; we not only hit Japanese imperialism hard, created base areas and expanded the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies, but also repulsed the first large-scale anti-Communist onslaught by the Kuomintang.

The years 1941 and 1942 formed the second stage. The Japanese imperialists, in order to prepare and prosecute the war against Britain and the United States, pursued more actively the policy to which they had switched after the fall of Wuhan, the policy of concentrating on the Communist Party and not on the Kuomintang. They massed a still larger part of their main forces around all the Communist-led base areas, conducted one "mopping-up" operation after another, and executed the ruthless policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all", concentrating their attacks on our Party. As a result, in those two years 1941-42, our Party was placed in an extremely difficult position. During this stage its base areas shrank in size, the population fell to under 50,000,000, the Eighth Route Army was reduced to 300,000, the loss of cadres was very great, and our finances and economy were very heavily strained. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang, finding its hands free, moved against our Party in a thousand and one ways, unleashed its second large-scale anti-Communist onslaught and attacked us in co-ordination with the Japanese imperialists. But this difficult position served to educate us Communists and we learned many things. We learned how to combat the enemy's "mopping-up" operations, his policy of "nibbling" our territory, his "tighten public security" campaign, his policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all" and his policy of extorting political recantations. We learned or began to learn how to carry out the Three Thirds System in the state organs of the united front, how to carry out the land policy, the rectification movement to correct our style of study, style in Party relations and style of writing, the policy of picked troops and simplified administration, the policy of unified leadership, the movement for supporting the government and cherishing the people, and the development of production. And we overcome many shortcomings, including the conceit of many people that had arisen during the first stage. Although our losses in the second stage were very heavy, we held our ground; we repulsed the offensives of the Japanese invaders and also the second large-scale anti-Communist onslaught of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang's attacks on the Communist Party and the struggles we had to wage in self-defence gave rise to a kind of ultra-Left deviation in the Party, one example being the belief that Kuomintang-Communist co-operation would soon break down, with the result that excessive attacks were made on the landlords and unity with public figures outside the Party was neglected. But we overcame this deviation also. In the struggle to counter the friction created by the Kuomintang we affirmed the principle of waging struggles "with good reason, with advantage and with restraint", in united front work we pointed out the necessity of "unity, struggle, unity through struggle". Thus we maintained the anti-Japanese national united front throughout the country as well as in the base areas.

The third stage extends from 1943 to the present. Our various policies have become more effective and, in particular, the rectification movement and the development of production have yielded results of a fundamental nature,
thereby making our Party invincible both ideologically and materially. Moreover, last year we learned, or began to learn, how to carry out the policy on the examination of the histories of cadres and the policy on combating secret agents. It is in these circumstances that our base areas have again expanded, that the population has risen to over 80,000,000, including those paying the grain tax only to us and those paying both to us and to the Japanese and puppets, that our army has grown to 470,000 and our people's militia to 2,275,000, and that our Party membership has reached 2,000,000 and more.

In 1943 the Japanese militarists made no appreciable change in their policy towards China and continued to direct their main attacks at the Communist Party. For more than three years, from 1941 to the present, over 60 per cent of the Japanese troops in China have been pressing hard on the anti-Japanese base areas led by our Party. During these years the several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops who were left behind the enemy lines have been unable to withstand the blows of Japanese imperialism; about half surrendered and about half were wiped out, the number of those who survived and made good their withdrawal being very small. Those Kuomintang troops who surrendered to the enemy have turned and attacked our Party, and our Party has had to resist over 90 per cent of the puppet troops. The Kuomintang has only had to resist less than 40 per cent of the Japanese forces and less than 10 per cent of the puppet troops. For fully five and a half years since the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese militarists have not launched any strategic offensives on the Kuomintang front; there have been only a few relatively big operations (in Chekiang-Kiangsi, Changsha, western Hupeh, southern Honan and Changteh), and even those were mere raids, while they concentrated their main attention on the anti-Japanese base areas led by our Party. In this situation, the Kuomintang has pursued the policy of “retreating into the mountains” and “watching others fight”, simply staving off blows when the enemy advanced and looking on with folded arms when he withdrew. In 1943 the Kuomintang became even more reactionary in its domestic policy and made its third large-scale anti-Communist onslaught, which we again repulsed.

From 1943 to the spring of this year, the Japanese aggressors have been steadily losing ground in the Pacific theatre, the United States has been intensifying its counter-offensive and now, in the West, Hitler is tottering under the heavy blows of the Soviet Red Army. In an effort to avert their doom, the Japanese imperialists have conceived the idea of forcing open the Peiping-Hankow and Hankow-Canton Railways for through traffic and, since they have not yet succeeded in their policy of inducing the Kuomintang in Chungking to capitulate, they have found it necessary to strike it another blow; hence their plan for a large-scale offensive on the Kuomintang front this year. The Honan campaign has been going on for over a month. The enemy forces there amount to only a few divisions, yet several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops have collapsed without a battle, and only the “miscellaneous brands” of troops have been able to put up some sort of fight. In Tang En-po's command, utter disorder prevails, with the officers estranged from their men and the troops from the people, and more than two-thirds of his total forces have been lost. Likewise, the divisions which Hu Tsung-nan dispatched to Honan collapsed at their first encounter with the enemy. This is wholly the result of the reactionary policies which the Kuo-
mintang has rigorously enforced for the past few years. During
the five and a half years since the fall of Wuhan, the
theatre of war of the Liberated Areas led by the Communist
Party has borne the brunt of resisting the main forces of the
Japanese and the puppets; and although there may be some
change in the future, this can only be temporary because
the Kuomintang, rendered utterly degenerate by its reaction-
ary policy of passive resistance to Japan and active opposi-
tion to the Communists, is bound to suffer serious reverses.
When that happens, our Party’s task in fighting the enemy
and the puppets will become heavier still. What the
Kuomintang has gained from looking on with folded arms
for five and a half years is the loss of its fighting capacity.
What the Communist Party has gained from fighting and
struggling hard for five and a half years is the strengthening
of its fighting capacity. This is what will decide China’s
destiny.

Comrades can see for themselves that in the seven years
since July 1937 the people’s democratic forces under the
leadership of our Party have gone through three phases —
a rise, a decline and a new rise. We have beaten back
the ferocious attacks of the Japanese invaders, established
extensive revolutionary base areas, greatly expanded the
Party and the army, repulsed three large-scale anti-Com-
munist onslaughts by the Kuomintang and overcome the
erroneous Right and “Left” ideologies in the Party; and the
whole Party has gained much valuable experience. This
sums up our work over the past seven years.

Our present task is to prepare ourselves for a still greater
responsibility. We must prepare to drive the Japanese in-
vaders out of China, no matter what the circumstances. To
enable our Party to shoulder this responsibility, we must
further expand and further consolidate our Party, our army
and base areas, pay attention to work in the big cities and
along the main lines of communication and raise the work
in the cities to a position of equal importance with that in
the base areas.

As to our work in the base areas, during the first stage
these areas were greatly expanded but not consolidated, and
so in the second stage they contracted as soon as they came
under the heavy blows of the enemy. In the second stage all
the anti-Japanese base areas led by our Party went through
a hard tempering process and improved greatly as compared
with the first stage; the cadres and Party members consi-
derably advanced their ideological and political level, and
learned many things they did not know before. But it takes
time to clarify thinking and to study policy, and we have
still much to learn. Our Party is not yet sufficiently strong,
not yet sufficiently united or consolidated, and so cannot
yet take on greater responsibility than we now carry. From
now on the problem is further to expand and consolidate
our Party, our army and base areas in the continued pros-
cution of the War of Resistance; this is the first indis-
penable item in our ideological and material preparation for
the gigantic work of the future. Without this preparation,
we shall not be able to drive out the Japanese invaders and
liberate the whole of China.

Our work in the big cities and along the main lines of
communication has always been very inadequate. If now
we do not strive to rally around our Party the tens of
millions of the toiling masses and other people oppressed
by the Japanese imperialists in the big cities and along the
main lines of communication, and do not prepare armed
mass insurrections, our army and rural base areas will face
all sorts of difficulties for lack of co-ordination with the cities. For more than ten years we have been in the countryside and have had to encourage people to know the countryside well and to build the rural base areas. During these ten years and more the task of preparing insurrections in the cities, as decided by the Party’s Sixth National Congress, was not and could not have been carried out. But now it is different, and the resolution of the Sixth National Congress will be carried out after the Seventh National Congress. This Congress will probably be held soon and will discuss the problems of strengthening our work in the cities and winning country-wide victory.

The industrial conference of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, now in session, is of great significance. In 1937 the number of factory workers in the Border Region was only 700, it increased to 7,000 by 1942 and is now 12,000. These figures are not to be treated lightly. While we are in the base areas, we must learn how to administer the industry, commerce and communications of big cities, otherwise we shall not know what to do when the time comes. Thus the second indispensable item in our ideological and material preparation for the future is to organize for armed insurrections in the big cities and along the main lines of communication and to learn how to administer industry and commerce. Without this preparation too, we shall not be able to drive out the Japanese invaders and liberate the whole of China.

III

In order to win new victories we must call on the Party’s cadres to get rid of their baggage and start up the machinery.

“To get rid of baggage” means to free our minds of many encumbrances. Many things may become baggage, become encumbrances, if we cling to them blindly and uncritically. Let us take some illustrations. Having made mistakes, you may feel that, come what may, you are saddled with them, and so become dispirited; if you have not made mistakes, you may feel that you are free from error and so become conceited. Lack of achievement in work may breed pessimism and depression, while achievement may breed pride and arrogance. A comrade with a short record of struggle may shirk responsibility on this account, while a veteran may become opinionated because of his long record of struggle. Worker and peasant comrades, because of the glory of their class origin, may look down upon intellectuals, while intellectuals, because they have a certain amount of knowledge, may look down upon workers and peasants. Any specialized skill may be capitalized on and so may lead to arrogance and contempt of others. Even one’s age may become ground for conceit. The young, because they are bright and capable, may look down upon the old; and the old, because they are rich in experience, may look down upon the young. All such things become encumbrances or baggage if there is no critical awareness. An important reason why some comrades are very lofty, isolating themselves from the masses and making repeated mistakes, is that they carry such baggage. Thus, a prerequisite for maintaining close links with the masses and making fewer mistakes is to examine one’s baggage, to get rid of it and so emancipate the mind. There have been several occasions in the history of our Party when great conceit manifested itself, and we suffered in consequence. The first was in the early half of 1927. The Northern Expeditionary Army
had reached Wuhan, and some comrades became so proud and overweening as to forget that the Kuomintang was about to assault us. The result was the error of the Chen Tu-hsiu line, which brought defeat to the revolution. The second occasion was in 1930. Taking advantage of Chiang Kai-shek's large-scale war against Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, the Red Army won a number of battles, and again some comrades became proud and overweening. The result was the error of the Li Li-san line, again causing some losses to the revolutionary forces. The third occasion was in 1931. The Red Army had smashed the Kuomintang's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign and, immediately afterwards, faced with the Japanese invasion, the people throughout the country started the stormy and heroic anti-Japanese movement; and again some comrades became proud and overweening. The result was an even more serious error of political line, which cost us about 90 per cent of the revolutionary forces that we had built up with so much toil. The fourth occasion was in 1938. The War of Resistance had begun and the united front had been established; and once again some comrades became proud and overweening. As a result they committed an error somewhat similar to the Chen Tu-hsiu line. This time the revolutionary work suffered serious damage in those places where the effects of these comrades' erroneous ideas were more especially pronounced. Comrades throughout the Party should take warning from these instances of pride and error. Recently we have reprinted Kuo Mo-jo's essay on Li Tau-cheng, so that comrades may also take warning from this story and not repeat the error of becoming conceited at the moment of success.

"To start up the machinery to work" means to make good use of the organ of thought. Although some people carry no baggage and have the virtue of close contact with the masses, they fail to accomplish anything because they do not know how to think searchingly or are unwilling to use their brains to think much and think hard. Others refuse to use their brains because they are carrying baggage which cramps their intellect. Lenin and Stalin often advised people to use their brains, and we should give the same advice. This mechanism, the brain, has the special function of thinking. Mencius said, "The office of the mind is to think." He defined the function of the brain correctly. We should always use our brains and think everything over carefully. A common saying goes, "Knit the brows and you will hit upon a stratagem." In other words, much thinking yields wisdom. In order to get rid of the practice of acting blindly which is so common in our Party, we must encourage our comrades to think, to learn the method of analysis and to cultivate the habit of analysis. There is all too little of this habit in our Party. If we get rid of our baggage and start up the machinery, if we march with light packs and know how to think hard, then we are sure to triumph.

NOTES

1 The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in January 1931.
2 The Tsunyi Meeting was the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau called by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at Tsunyi, Kweichow province, in January 1939.
3 See "Communism", Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXXI. Criticizing Bela Kun, the Hungarian Communist, Lenin said that he "gives up the
most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism: the concrete analysis of concrete conditions.”

4 The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1928 adopted the following ten-point programme: (1) Overthrow imperialist rule; (2) Confiscate foreign capitalist enterprises and banks; (3) Unify China and recognize the right of the nationalities to self-determination; (4) Overthrow the Kuomintang warlord government; (5) Establish a government of councils of workers, peasants and soldiers; (6) Institute the eight-hour day, increase wages, and establish unemployment relief and social insurance; (7) Confiscate the land of the landlord class, return the land to the peasants; (8) Improve the living conditions of the soldiers, give land and jobs to ex-soldiers; (9) Abolish all exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, adopt a consolidated progressive tax; and (10) Unite with the world proletariat, unite with the Soviet Union.

5 The Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in January 1934.

6 This session of the Political Bureau, in September 1941, reviewed the question of political lines in the past history of the Party, especially during the Second Revolutionary Civil War.

7 “Mountain-strongholdism” was a tendency to form cliques and arose mainly out of the circumstances of the protracted guerrilla war in which rural revolutionary bases were scattered and cut off from each other. Most of these bases were first established in mountain regions. Each tended to regard itself as a compact unit, like a single mountain stronghold, so this wrong tendency became known as mountain-strongholdism.

8 In the relatively stable parts of the base areas the people paid the regular grain tax only to the Anti-Japanese Democratic Government. But in the outlying parts of the base areas and the guerrilla zones, which were constantly harassed by the enemy, the people were often forced to pay another grain levy to the enemy’s puppet government.

9 In March 1941 the Japanese invaders and Chinese traitors in northern China proclaimed a “campaign for tightening public security measures”. These “measures” included raiding the people’s houses, establishing the neighbourhood guarantee system, making house-to-house check-ups, and organizing puppet troops, all for the purpose of suppressing the anti-Japanese forces.

10 In March 1944 the Japanese invaders launched their campaign in Honan Province with a force of 50,000-60,000. The 400,000 Kuomintang troops under Chiang Ting-wen, Tang En-po and Hu Tsung-nan melted away before the Japanese invaders. Thirty-eight counties, in-
APPENDIX: RESOLUTION ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS IN THE HISTORY OF OUR PARTY

Adopted on April 20, 1945 by the Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

I

The Communist Party of China, ever since its birth in 1921, has made the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution the guiding principle in all its work, and Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory and practice of the Chinese revolution represent this integration. With the founding of our Party a new stage of the Chinese revolution was immediately unfolded, the stage of the New Democratic revolution, as pointed out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Throughout the twenty-four years of struggle for New Democracy (from 1921 to 1945), throughout the three historical periods—the First Great Revolution, the Agrarian Revolution and the War of Resistance Against Japan—our Party has consistently led the broad masses of the Chinese people in extremely arduous and bitter revolutionary struggles against their enemies, imperialism and feudalism, and has gained great successes and rich experience. In the course of its struggle the Party has produced its own leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Representing the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese people, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has creatively applied the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, the acme of human wisdom, to a country such as China, a large semi-feudal and semi-colonial country where the peasantry constitutes the bulk of the masses and the immediate task is to fight against imperialism and feudalism, where the area is vast and the population enormous, and where the situation is extremely complicated and the struggle extremely hard, and he has brilliantly developed the theories of Lenin and Stalin on the colonial and semi-colonial question as well as Stalin's theory concerning the Chinese revolution. It is only because the Party has firmly adhered to the correct Marxist-Leninist line and waged a victorious struggle against all erroneous ideas opposed to this line that it has scored great achievements in these three periods, has arrived at today's unprecedented ideological, political and organizational solidarity and unity, has developed into the powerful revolutionary force of today, with over 1,200,000 members and leading China's Liberated Areas with their population of nearly 100,000,000 and an army of nearly 1,000,000, and has become the centre of gravity for the whole nation in the War of Resistance Against Japan and in the cause of liberation.

II

In the first period of China's New Democratic revolution, from 1921 to 1927, and especially from 1924 to 1927, the great anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the Chinese people, correctly guided by the Communist International and
influenced, impelled forward and organized by the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, advanced rapidly and won great victories. In this great revolution, the whole membership of the Communist Party of China carried out tremendous revolutionary work, developed the labour movement, the youth movement and the peasant movement throughout the country, pushed forward and assisted in the reorganization of the Kuomintang and the formation of the National Revolutionary Army, provided the political backbone of the Eastern Campaign and the Northern Expedition, led the great country-wide struggle against imperialism and feudalism, and so wrote a most glorious chapter in the history of the Chinese revolution. Nevertheless, this revolution ended in defeat because the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang, which was then our ally, betrayed the revolution in 1927; because the combined forces of the imperialists and the reactionary Kuomintang clique were then too strong; and in particular because the Rightist ideology in our Party, represented by Chen Tu-hsiu, developed into a line of capitulation during the concluding period of this revolution (for about six months) and dominated the Party's leading body, which refused to carry out the many wise directives of the Communist International and of Comrade Stalin and refused to accept the correct views of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and other comrades, with the result that, when the Kuomintang betrayed the revolution and sprang a surprise attack on the people, the Party and the people were unable to organize effective resistance.

In the ten years from the defeat of the revolution in 1927 to the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1937, it was the Communist Party of China, and the Communist Party of China alone, which continued in unity to hold aloft the great banner of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism under the counter-revolutionary reign of extreme terror and which led the broad masses of workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and other revolutionaries in great political, military and ideological struggles. During these struggles the Communist Party of China created the Red Army, established the Government of Councils of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers, set up revolutionary bases, distributed land to impoverished peasants and resisted both the attacks of the reactionary Kuomintang government and, after September 18, 1931, the aggression of Japanese imperialism. As a result, the Chinese people achieved great successes in their New Democratic cause of national and social liberation. Similarly, the whole Party fought in unity against the counter-revolutionary activities of the Trotskyist Chen Tu-hsiu clique and of Lo Chang-lung, Chang Kuo-tao and others who tried to split the Party and who betrayed it; thus the unity of the Party on the basis of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism was ensured. Over these ten years, this general policy of the Party and the heroic struggles to carry it out were entirely correct and necessary. Countless Party members, countless numbers of the people and many revolutionaries outside the Party carried on fiery revolutionary struggles on the various fronts, dauntlessly fighting and sacrificing themselves, indomitably stepping into the breach as others fell; by their spirit and deeds they have won immortality in our nation's history. Except for all this, the War of Resistance Against Japan could not have been effected; or having been effected, it could not have been sustained and carried through to victory because there would not have been as its backbone a Chinese Communist Party...
which had accumulated a rich experience of people’s war. This is beyond all doubt.

We rejoice especially in the fact that in those ten years our Party, with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its representative, made very great advances in creatively applying to Chinese conditions the revolutionary theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. At last, towards the end of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, our Party established definitely the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the Central Committee and throughout the Party. This was the greatest achievement of the Communist Party of China in that period and it is the surest guarantee of the liberation of the Chinese people.

We must point out, however, that besides its great achievements in those ten years, our Party at certain times committed a number of errors. The gravest of all was the “Left” error in the political, military and organizational lines from the time of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party in January 1931 to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in January 1935 (the Tsunyi Meeting). That error caused serious losses to our Party and to the Chinese revolution.

In order to learn the historic lessons of the Chinese revolution, “to learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones and to cure the sickness to save the patient”, to make “the overturning of the chariot in front a warning for the chariot behind” and, on the basis of a common Marxist-Leninist ideology, to unite the whole Party like one harmonious family, like solid steel; and in order to fight for total victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and for the complete liberation of the Chinese people; this Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China considers it useful and necessary to set forth formal conclusions on certain questions of Party history during those ten years, and particularly on the line of the leadership of the Central Committee from the Fourth Plenary Session to the Tsunyi Meeting.

III

After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, there occurred in our Party both “Left” and Right deviations.

The handful of capitulationists of the period of the First Great Revolution, with Chen Tu-hsiu as their representative, became pessimistic about the future of the revolution and gradually turned into liquidationists. They took the reactionary Trotskyist stand, holding that after the 1927 revolution the Chinese bourgeoisie was already victorious over imperialism and the feudal forces, that its rule over the people was being stabilized, and that Chinese society was already one in which capitalism was dominant and would develop peacefully. Therefore, they arbitrarily asserted that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China had been completed and that the Chinese proletariat must wait until the future to make the “socialist revolution” and could engage for the time being only in a so-called legal movement centring on the slogan “For a National Assembly”, thus liquidating the revolutionary movement. Therefore, they opposed all the revolutionary struggles waged by the Party and slandered the Red Army movement as a “movement of roving rebels”. They not only refused to accept the Party’s advice and abandon their opportunist, liquidationist anti-Party viewpoint,
but even joined with the reactionary Trotskyists\(^5\) and formed an anti-Party faction; as a result, they had to be expelled from the Party and later degenerated into counter-revolutionaries.

On the other hand, petty-bourgeois revolutionary impetuosity, which was aggravated by hatred of the Kuomintang’s policy of massacre and by indignation at Chen Tu-hsiu’s capitulationism, was also reflected in the Party and led to a rapid growth of “Left” sentiment. This “Left” sentiment first appeared at the Emergency Meeting of the Party’s Central Committee on August 7, 1927. In the history of the Party the August 7th Meeting made a contribution. At a critical moment of the Chinese revolution this meeting resolutely corrected and ended the capitulationism of Chen Tu-hsiu, decided upon a general policy of agrarian revolution and armed resistance to the massacres by the Kuomintang reactionaries and called on the Party and the masses of the people to continue the revolutionary fight. All this was correct and constituted the main aspect of the meeting. But in combating Right errors the meeting paved the way for “Left” errors. Politically, it failed to realize that either appropriate counter-attacks or necessary tactical retreats had to be organized at that time, according to the different conditions in the different localities, in order to preserve revolutionary positions and muster the revolutionary forces in a planned way. Instead, it tolerated and fostered tendencies towards adventurism and commandism (especially the forcing of workers to strike). Organizationally, the meeting initiated excessive and sectarian inner-Party struggles, unduly or improperly stressed the importance of the leading cadres’ being exclusively of working-class origin and brought about a rather serious state of ultra-democracy in the Party. After the August 7th Meeting this “Left” sentiment continued to grow until, at the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Party in November 1927, it took shape in a “Left” line of putschism (\textit{i.e.}, adventurism) and for the first time brought the “Left” line into a dominant position in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party. The putschists of that time maintained that the Chinese revolution was by nature a so-called “permanent revolution” (they confused the democratic with the socialist revolution) and that the Chinese revolution was in a situation of so-called “permanent upsurge” (they denied the defeat of the 1927 revolution). Consequently, they not only failed to organize an orderly retreat but, on the contrary, disregarding the enemy’s strength and the state of the masses after the defeat of the revolution, they ordered handfuls of members and followers of the Party to stage all over the country local insurrections which had not the slightest hope of success. Along with this political adventurism, there also developed a sectarian organizational policy of attacking comrades. However, as this wrong line from its outset evoked correct criticism and objection on the part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and many comrades working in the White areas, and as it caused many losses in practical work, it had ceased to be applied in many places by the beginning of 1928 and by April of the same year (less than six months from its beginning) it was virtually terminated in practical work throughout the country.

The line of the Sixth National Congress of the Party, held in July 1928, was basically correct. The Congress rightly affirmed that Chinese society was semi-colonial and semi-feudal, pointed out that none of the fundamental contradictions giving rise to the contemporary Chinese revolution had
yet been resolved, and therefore defined the Chinese revolution at the present stage as still a bourgeois-democratic revolution and proclaimed a ten-point programme for that democratic revolution. The Congress correctly pointed out that the current political situation was an interval between two revolutionary high tides, that the development of the revolution was uneven and that the general task of the Party at that time was not to take the offensive or organize insurrections but to win over the masses. It waged a two-front struggle, repudiating both Rightist Chen Tu-hsiuism and “Left” putschism, and in particular indicated that the most dangerous tendency in the Party consisted in putschism, military adventurism and commandism which alienate the masses. All this was absolutely necessary. On the other hand, the Sixth Congress also had its shortcomings and mistakes. It lacked correct estimates and policies concerning the dual character of the intermediate classes and the internal contradictions among the reactionary forces; it also lacked the necessary understanding of the Party’s need for an orderly tactical retreat after the defeat of the Great Revolution, of the importance of rural base areas and of the protracted nature of the democratic revolution. Although these shortcomings and mistakes prevented the thorough eradication of the “Left” ideas that existed after the August 7th Meeting, and although they were made more extreme and were greatly magnified by the subsequent “Left” ideas, nevertheless the shortcomings and mistakes cannot eclipse the correctness of the Congress in its main aspect. For some time after the Congress, the Party’s work was fruitful. During that time, Comrade Mao Tse-tung not only, in practice, developed the correct aspect of the line of the Sixth Congress and correctly solved many problems which

the Congress had either not solved or had solved incorrectly, but also, in theory, provided a fuller and more concrete, scientific Marxist-Leninist basis for the orientation of the Chinese revolution. Under his guidance and influence, the Red Army movement gradually developed into an important political factor in the country. In the White areas, too, Party organizations and Party work revived to some extent.

But during the second half of 1929 and the first half of 1930, certain “Left” ideas and policies that still existed in the Party once more gained some ground. From this basis they developed into the second “Left” line when events turned in favour of the revolution. Excited by the domestic situation after the outbreak of war in May 1930 between Chiang Kai-shek on the one side and Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan on the other, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, led by Comrade Li Li-san, adopted on June 11 the “Left” resolution, “The New Revolutionary High Tide and Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces”, whereupon the “Left” line came to dominate the leadership of the Central Committee for the second time. This wrong line (the Li Li-san line) arose for a number of reasons. It arose because Li Li-san and other comrades refused to recognize that the revolution required adequate preparation through building up its own organizational strength, but held that “the masses want only big actions, not small ones”, and therefore believed that the incessant wars among the war-lords at that time, together with the initial unfolding of the Red Army movement and the initial revival of our work in the White areas, already provided conditions for “big actions” (armed insurrections) throughout the country. It arose because they refused to recognize the uneven development of the Chinese revolution but held that the revolutionary
crisis was growing uniformly in all parts of the country, that preparations should be made for immediate insurrections in all parts of the country and that the key cities in particular should take the lead and become centres of country-wide revolutionary upsurge; and they slandered as "utterly erroneous...localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality" the idea of Comrade Mao Tse-tung that for a long time we should employ our main strength to create rural base areas, use the rural areas to encircle the cities and use these bases to advance a high tide of country-wide revolution. It arose because they refused to recognize the uneven development of world revolution but held that the general outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to a general outbreak of world revolution and that the Chinese revolution could be successful only with the general outbreak of world revolution. And it arose because they refused to recognize the protracted character of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution but held that the beginning of victory in one or more provinces would mark the beginning of the transition to socialist revolution, and so they formulated a number of untimely and "Left" policies. With these wrong views, the leaders of the Li Li-san line made an adventurist plan for organizing armed insurrections in the key cities throughout the country and for concentrating the whole of the Red Army to attack these cities. Then they merged the various leading bodies of the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions into action committees at corresponding levels for preparing armed insurrections, and thus brought all day-to-day work to a standstill. In the course of formulating and executing these wrong decisions, Comrade Li Li-san rejected the correct criticisms and suggestions of many comrades, stressed the fight within the Party against the so-called "Right deviation" and, under the slogan of combating the "Right deviation", wrongly attacked those cadres who disagreed with his views, thereby deepening inner-Party sectarianism. Thus, the Li Li-san line assumed a more fully developed form than did the first "Left" line.

However, the domination of the Li Li-san line in the Party was also short-lived (lasting less than four months). Since the Party and the revolutionary forces suffered losses wherever this line was put into practice, broad sections of cadres and Party members demanded that it be corrected. Comrade Mao Tse-tung in particular never agreed with the Li Li-san line, and indeed most patiently corrected the "Left" mistakes of the First Front Army of the Red Army; consequently, the Red Army in the revolutionary base in Kiangsi, instead of suffering losses in this period, actually grew stronger by utilizing the favourable situation created by the war between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan and it successfully smashed the enemy's first campaign of "encirclement and suppression" in late 1930 and early 1931. And with a few exceptions, the Red Army in the other revolutionary base areas achieved more or less the same results. In the White areas also there were many comrades engaged in practical work who opposed the Li Li-san line through the organizational channels of the Party.

The Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee held in September 1930 and the subsequent Central Committee played a positive role in putting an end to the application of the Li Li-san line. Although the documents of this plenary session showed a conciliatory and compromising spirit with regard to the Li Li-san line (for instance, in denying that it was a wrong line and in saying that it was only "wrong tactically") and although organizationally this...
plenary session continued the error of sectarianism, it nevertheless corrected the ultra-Left appraisal of the situation of the Chinese revolution, dropped the plan for organizing a general nation-wide insurrection and concentrating the whole of the Red Army to attack key cities, and restored the independent organizations and the day-to-day work of the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions; it thereby terminated the most characteristic errors of the Li Li-san line. At the Third Plenary Session, Comrade Li Li-san himself admitted the mistakes that had been pointed out and then relinquished his leading position in the Central Committee. The Central Committee after the Third Plenary Session, going a step further, declared in its supplementary resolution of November 1930 and in Circular No. 96 of December that the line of Li Li-san and other comrades was wrong and that the conciliatory attitude of the plenary session was also wrong. Of course, both the Third Plenary Session and the subsequent Central Committee failed to examine thoroughly the ideological essence of the Li Li-san line and to correct it, and so certain “Left” ideas and policies that had existed within the Party ever since the August 7th Meeting in 1927, and especially since 1929, strongly persisted at this session and afterwards. However, since both the Third Plenary Session and the following Central Committee did take the positive measures described above to end the Li Li-san line, all Party comrades should have made further efforts, on the basis of these measures, to carry through the struggle against the “Left” errors.

But at this time, a number of Party comrades who were inexperienced in practical revolutionary struggle and guilty of “Left” dogmatist errors came forward, with Comrade Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming) at their head, and fought against the Central Committee under the banners of “Against the Li Li-san Line” and “Against the Line of Conciliation”, and with a sectarian stand even more violent than that of the Li Li-san line. Their fight was not designed to help the Central Committee liquidate the ideological essence of the Li Li-san line and those “Left” ideas and policies which had existed in the Party since the August 7th Meeting in 1927, and particularly since 1929, and had never been thoroughly dealt with. They put forward what was actually a new political programme, in Comrade Chen Shao-yu’s pamphlet published at that time, *The Two Lines—The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China*, a programme that continued, revived or developed the Li Li-san line and other “Left” ideas and policies in a new guise. Thus, there was a further growth of “Left” ideas in the Party which took the form of a new “Left” line.

Although this new “Left” line under Comrade Chen Shao-yu’s leadership criticized the “Left” errors of the Li Li-san line and the error of conciliation on the part of the Third Plenary Session, its distinctive feature was that it mainly criticized the Li Li-san line as “Rightist”, that it accused the Third Plenary Session of “doing nothing to expose and attack the consistently Right opportunist theory and practice of the Li Li-san line” and that it blamed Circular No. 96 for failure to see that “the Right deviation is still the main danger in the Party at present”. On the question of the nature of Chinese society and class relations, the new “Left” line exaggerated the relative weight of capitalism in China’s economy, exaggerated the significance of the struggle against the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants and the significance of the “elements of socialist revolution” at the present stage of
the Chinese revolution, and it denied the existence of the intermediate camp and of third parties and groups. On the question of the revolutionary situation and the tasks of the Party, the new “Left” line continued to stress that there was a “revolutionary high tide” throughout the country and that the Party should have a “line of offensive” on a nation-wide scale, and it maintained that an “immediate revolutionary situation” would soon occur in one or more major provinces containing key cities. From a “Left” viewpoint it slanderously asserted that in China there was as yet no “genuine” Red Army and no “genuine” Government of Councils of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers and asserted with special emphasis that the main danger in the Party then consisted of “Right opportunism”, “opportunism in practical work” and “the rich peasant line”. Organizationally, the exponents of this new “Left” line violated discipline, refused the work assigned them by the Party, committed the error of joining with a number of other comrades in factional activities against the Central Committee, wrongly called upon the Party membership to set up a provisional central leading body and demanded that “fighting cadres who “actively support and pursue” their “Left” line should be used to “reform and strengthen the leading bodies at all levels”; and thereby they created a serious crisis in the Party. Hence, generally speaking, the new “Left” line was more determined, more “theoretical”, more domineering and more fully formed in its “Leftism” than the Li Li-san line, even though it did not call for organizing insurrections in the key cities and, for a time, did not call for concentrating the Red Army to attack those cities.

In January 1931 the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party was convened under circumstances in which pressure was being applied from all directions by the “Left” dogmatist and sectarian elements headed by Comrade Chen Shao-yu and in which some comrades in the Central Committee who had committed empiricist errors were compromising with these elements and supporting them. The convening of this session played no positive or constructive role; the outcome was the acceptance of the new “Left” line, its triumph in the central leadership and the beginning of the domination of a “Left” line in the Party for the third time during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. The Fourth Plenary Session immediately put into effect two interrelated and erroneous tenets in the programme of the new “Left” line: the fight against the alleged “Right deviation” as the “main danger in the Party at present”, and the “reform and strengthening of the leading bodies at all levels”. Ostensibly it still carried the banner of opposition to the Li Li-san line and to the “line of conciliation”, but in essence its political programme was chiefly “against the Right deviation”. In its resolutions, the Fourth Plenary Session did not analyse the current political situation or lay down concrete political tasks for the Party and merely opposed in a general way the so-called “Right deviation” and “opportunism in practical work”, but in fact it approved Comrade Chen Shao-yu’s pamphlet, The Two Lines—The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China, the pamphlet which represented the “Left” ideas in the Party and was taken by people then, and for another ten years or more, to have played a “correct programmatic role”, although, as can be seen from the above analysis, this pamphlet was basically a completely wrong, “Left” opportunist general programme “against the Right deviation”. Under this programme the Fourth Ple-
nary Session and the subsequent Central Committee on the one hand promoted the “Left” dogmatist and sectarian comrades to leading positions in the Central Committee; on the other hand they excessively attacked those comrades who had committed the errors of the Li Li-san line, wrongly attacked those comrades headed by Chu Chiu-pai who were alleged to have committed “the errors of the line of conciliation”, and immediately after the Fourth Plenary Session the Central Committee wrongly attacked the great majority of the so-called “Rightist” comrades. In fact, the so-called “Rightists” of that time were mainly the creation of the factionalist struggle “against the Right deviation” conducted at this session. Of course, among these people there was a handful of splitters headed by Lo Chang-jung, who later became real Rightists, degenerated into counter-revolutionaries and were permanently expelled from the Party, and who, beyond any doubt, had to be resolutely combated; their establishment of a duplicate Party organization and their persistence in maintaining it were absolutely impermissible according to Party discipline. But as for Lin Yu-nan, Li Chiu-shih, and some twenty other important Party cadres who were then attacked, they had done much useful work for the Party and the people and maintained close ties with the masses, and when they were arrested shortly afterwards, they stood firm and unyielding before the enemy and died as heroes. Comrade Chu Chiu-pai, who was alleged to have committed “the error of the line of conciliation”, was then a Party leader of prestige, and after he was attacked, he continued to do much useful work (mainly in the cultural field) and died heroically in June 1935 at the hands of the enemy executioners. The memory of the proletarian heroism of all these comrades should be cherished forever. The kind of “reform” which the Fourth Plenary Session carried out in the central bodies was likewise extended to the local organizations in all the revolutionary bases and White areas. As compared with the Third Plenary Session and the subsequent Central Committee, the Central Committee after the Fourth Plenary Session was more insistent and more systematic in sending its representatives, agencies or new leading cadres to all parts of the country to carry through its fight “against the Right deviation”.

The resolutions issued by the Central Committee on May 9, 1931, shortly after the Fourth Plenary Session, showed that the new “Left” line was already being concretely applied and developed in practical work. Then a series of major events occurred in China. Before the Central Committee following the Fourth Plenary Session had time to carry through its erroneous line, the Red Army of the Central Area in Kiangsi, under the correct leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and through the vigorous efforts of all comrades, won great victories and smashed the enemy’s second and third campaigns of “encirclement and suppression”; most of the other revolutionary base areas and Red Army units also won many victories and made much progress in the same period and under the same conditions. Meanwhile, the Japanese imperialist invasion, which began with the September 18th Incident in 1931, aroused a new upsurge in the national democratic movement throughout the country. The new Central Committee, from the very beginning, made an entirely wrong appraisal of the new situation created by these events. It greatly exaggerated both the current crisis of the Kuomintang regime and the growth of the revolutionary forces; it ignored the fact that after the September 18th Incident the national contradiction between China and
Japan was mounting and that the intermediate classes were making demands for resistance to Japan and for democracy; it emphasized that Japanese imperialism and other imperialist powers would combine to attack the Soviet Union and that the imperialist powers, the Chinese counter-revolutionary cliques and even the intermediate groups would combine to attack the Chinese revolution; and it categorically asserted that the intermediate groups were the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese revolution. The new Central Committee therefore continued to advocate ‘down with everything’ and held that "the very heart of the political situation in China is a life-and-death struggle between counter-revolution and revolution"; hence it once again put forward many adventurist proposals, such as the seizure of key cities by the Red Army in order to win victory first in one or more provinces, the arming of workers and peasants everywhere in the White areas and the calling of general strikes there. These errors first found expression in the Central Committee’s "Resolution on the Urgent Tasks Arising from the Smashing of the Enemy’s Third Campaign of ‘Encirclement and Suppression’ by the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and from the Gradual Maturing of the Revolutionary Crisis", dated September 29, 1931. They were repeated and given fuller expression in the following documents, which were drawn up either by the subsequent Provisional Central Committee or under its leadership:

"Resolution on the Forcible Occupation of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialism" (September 22, 1931);
"Resolution on the Struggle for the Victory of the Revolution First in One or More Provinces" (January 9, 1932);
"Resolution on the January 28th Incident" (February 26, 1932);
"Opportunist Vacillation Within the Communist Party of China in the Struggle for the Victory of the Chinese Revolution First in One or More Provinces" (April 4, 1932);
"Resolution of the Central Area Bureau of the Central Committee on Leadership of and Participation in a Campaign Week Against the Imperialist Attack on the Soviet Union and Partition of China and For Extending the National Revolutionary War" (May 11, 1932); and
"The Mounting Revolutionary Crisis and the Tasks of the Party in Northern China" (June 24, 1932).

The period from the establishment of the Provisional Central Committee headed by Comrade Chin Pang-hsien (Po Ku) in September 1931 to the Tsunyi Meeting in January 1932 was one of continued development of the third “Left” line. During this period, because of the serious damage which the incorrect line had done to the work in the White areas, the Provisional Central Committee moved to the southern Kiangsi base area, early in 1933, and this move facilitated the further application of its incorrect line there and in the neighbouring base areas. Before that, the correct line followed in the base areas of southern Kiangsi and western Fukien had already been maligned by the Party congress of the southern Kiangsi base area in November 1931 and by the Ningtu Meeting of the Central Committee in August 1932, in accordance with the erroneous programme of the Fourth Plenary Session "against the Right deviation" and for "reforming the leading bodies at all levels" - the correct line had been called a "rich peasant line" and an "error of the most serious and consistent Right opportunism"
achieving national liberation’, etc., etc. Using the slogans of fighting ‘the main danger, Right opportunism’, ‘fighting the conciliatory attitude towards Right opportunism’ and fighting ‘the use of double-dealing to sabotage the Party line in practical work’, it continued and developed the excessive factional struggles and the policy of attacking comrades.

In the revolutionary base areas the most disastrous consequence of the third “Left” line was the failure of the campaign against the fifth “encirclement and suppression” in the area where the Central Committee was located and the withdrawal from there of the main forces of the Red Army. In the military operations during the withdrawal from Kiangsi and on the Long March, a different error, the error of flightism, was committed under the “Left” line, causing further losses to the Red Army. Similarly, on account of the domination of the “Left” line, the Party’s work suffered defeat in most of the other revolutionary bases (the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi area, the Hubei-Hunan-Anhwei area, the Hunan-Hubei-Kiangsi area, the Hunan-Kiangsi area, the western Hunan-Hubei area and the Szechuan-Shensi area) and in the vast White areas. As for the Chang Kuo-tao line, which once dominated the Hubei-Hunan-Anhwei and the Szechuan-Shensi areas, it not only was a “Left” line of the general type but also manifested itself in a particularly serious form of warlordism and in flightism in the face of enemy attacks.

Such was the main content of the erroneous “Left” line which dominated the whole Party for the third time and the leaders of which were the two dogmatists, Comrades Chen Shao-yu and Chin Pang-hsien.

Cloaking themselves in “Marxist-Leninist theory” and relying on the political and organizational prestige and in-
fluence built up by the Fourth Plenary Session, those comrades who were guilty of dogmatist errors caused the third “Left” line to hold sway in the Party for four long years, gave it the fullest and most systematic expression ideologically, politically, militarily and organizationally, and enabled it to exercise the most profound influence in the Party and consequently to do the greatest damage. Nevertheless, in defiance of the facts, the comrades guilty of this wrong line bragged long and hard about the “correctness” and the “immortal achievements” of the Central Committee’s line of leadership following the Fourth Plenary Session, using such dogmatic phrases as “further bolshevization of the Communist Party of China” and “hundred per cent Bolshevik”. Thus they completely distorted the history of the Party.

The comrades who advocated the correct line, with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as their representative, were diametrically opposed to the third “Left” line during the period of its domination. They disagreed with the “Left” line and demanded that it be rectified, and as a result their correct leadership was everywhere overthrown by the Central Committee that followed the Fourth Plenary Session and by the agencies or representatives it dispatched. But the repeated failures of the “Left” line in practical work, and especially the repeated defeats in the campaign against the fifth “encirclement and suppression” in the area where the Central Committee was located, had begun to reveal the wrongness of this line to more and more leading cadres and rank-and-file Party members and to arouse their doubt and dissatisfaction. After the Red Army in that area set out on the Long March, this doubt and dissatisfaction grew so much that some of the comrades who had formerly committed “Left” errors began to awaken and take a stand against these errors. Accordingly, large numbers of cadres and Party members who were opposed to the “Left” line rallied under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It was therefore possible for the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, held under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung in January 1935 at the city of Tsunyi in Kweichow Province, triumphantly to put an end to the domination of the “Left” line in the Central Committee and to save the Party at that most critical juncture.

The Tsunyi Meeting was entirely correct in concentrating all its efforts on rectifying the military and organizational errors, which at that time were of decisive significance. The meeting inaugurated a new leadership of the Central Committee, headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung—a historic change of paramount importance in the Chinese Communist Party. Precisely because of this change, our Party was able to conclude the Long March victoriously, to preserve and steel a hard core of cadres in the Party and the Red Army under the extremely difficult and dangerous conditions of the Long March, to overcome successfully the line of Chang Kuo-tao who insisted on retreat and fleeing and actually set up a duplicate Party, to save the Northern Shensi Revolutionary Base Area from the crisis brought about by the “Left” line, to lead correctly the national salvation movement of December 9, 1935, to settle correctly the Sian Incident of 1936, to organize the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and to set in motion the sacred War of Resistance Against Japan.

Since the Tsunyi Meeting, the political line of the Central Committee of the Party, led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has been entirely correct. The “Left” line has been gradually overcome politically, militarily and organizationally. Since
1942, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Party-wide movement for the rectification of subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing and also for the study of Party history has corrected, at their very ideological roots, the various “Left” and Right errors that have arisen in the history of the Party. The overwhelming majority of the comrades who committed “Left” or Right errors have made great progress through a long process of learning from experience and have done much good work for the Party and the people. They are now united with the masses of other comrades on the basis of common political understanding. This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session is happy to point out that through its successes and reverses our Party has at last attained, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the unprecedentedly high level of solidarity and unity it now enjoys — ideologically, politically, organizationally and militarily. It is a Party that will soon win victory, a Party no force can conquer.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session holds that, since the stage of the War of Resistance is not yet concluded, it is appropriate to postpone to a future date the drawing of conclusions on certain questions in the history of the Party during the War of Resistance.

IV

In order that comrades may have a better understanding of the errors of the various “Left” lines, and particularly of the third “Left” line, and so that, “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones”, they may prevent the recurrence of errors of this kind, we now set forth the main content of these lines where they were contrary to the correct line politically, militarily, organizationally and ideologically.

1. Politically:

As Comrade Stalin pointed out and as Comrade Mao Tse-tung has analysed in detail, China at the present stage is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country (reduced in some parts to a colony since the September 18th Incident), and the revolution in this country since World War I has been a national democratic revolution in the era in which the international proletariat has won victory in the Soviet Union and the Chinese proletariat has awakened politically. This determines the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage as an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution under the leadership of the proletariat, with the workers and peasants forming the main body and with other broad social strata taking part, i.e., it is a New Democratic revolution, distinct both from the old democratic revolution and from a socialist revolution. As China at the present stage is a large semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, dominated by a number of powerful yet conflicting imperialist countries and by the feudal forces of China, her economic and political development is extremely uneven and lacking in uniformity. This determines the extreme unevenness in the development of China’s New Democratic revolution and renders it necessary for the revolution to go through a protracted, tortuous struggle before country-wide victory can be achieved; at the same time, this renders it possible in the struggle to make extensive use of the enemy’s contradictions and to set up and maintain armed revolutionary base areas, first in those vast territories where the enemy’s control is comparatively weak. These basic characteristics and basic laws of the Chinese revolution, which have been verified by revolutionary prac-
tice in China, were not comprehended but were contravened both by the various Right lines and by the various “Left” lines, and especially by the third “Left” line. Therefore, the “Left” lines erred politically in three main respects.

First. The various “Left” lines were in error, in the first place, on the question of the task of the revolution and the question of class relations. As far back as the period of the First Great Revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, like Comrade Stalin, pointed out not only that the task of the Chinese revolution in its present stage is to fight imperialism and feudalism, but also, and more particularly, that the peasants’ struggle for land is the fundamental content of the fight against imperialism and feudalism in China, that the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution is in essence a peasant revolution and that the basic task of the Chinese proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution is therefore to lead the peasants’ struggle.15 In the early period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, Comrade Mao Tse-tung again pointed out that what China needed was still the bourgeois-democratic revolution and that China “must go through such a democratic revolution” before one could speak of the prospect of socialism.16 He stated that the agrarian revolution was all the more important because of the defeat of the revolution in the cities and that “in the revolution in semi-colonial China, it only happens that the peasant struggle fails for lack of leadership from the workers, but it never happens that the revolution is harmed because the peasant struggle outgrows the forces of the workers.”17 He pointed out that after the betrayal of the revolution by the big bourgeoisie, there was still a difference between the liberal bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie; that there were still broad strata of people who demanded democracy and especially demanded a fight against imperialism; that it was therefore necessary to treat the various intermediate classes correctly and do everything possible to make an alliance with them or neutralize them; and that in the countryside it was necessary to treat the middle and rich peasants correctly (“taking from surplus to fill out deficiency, taking from the fat to fill out the lean” while firmly uniting with the middle peasants, protecting the well-to-do middle peasants, providing certain economic opportunities for the rich peasants and also enabling the ordinary landlord to make a living).18 These are all basic ideas of New Democracy, yet they were not understood and were opposed by the exponents of the “Left” line. Although many of the revolutionary tasks set by the various “Left” lines were democratic in character, the exponents of the “Left” lines were invariably confused about the definite distinction between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution and subjectively were anxious to go beyond the democratic revolution; they invariably underestimated the decisive role of the peasants’ anti-feudal struggle in the Chinese revolution; and they invariably advocated a struggle against the bourgeoisie as a whole, including even the upper petty bourgeoisie. The third “Left” line went further and put the struggle against the bourgeoisie on a par with the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, denied the existence of an intermediate camp and of third parties and groups and laid particular stress on the struggle against the rich peasants. Especially after the September 18th Incident in 1931, there was an obvious and great change in China’s class relations but, far from recognizing this change, the third “Left” line categorically labelled as “the most dangerous enemy” those intermediate groups which had contradictions with the reactionary Kuomintang rule and
were taking positive action. It should be said that the exponents of the third “Left” line did lead the peasants in distributing the land, in setting up political power and in offering armed resistance to the attacks of the Kuomintang government. All these undertakings were correct. However, owing to the “Left” views mentioned above, they mistakenly feared to acknowledge that the Red Army movement was a peasant movement led by the proletariat and they mistakenly opposed what they called the “peculiar revolutionaryness of the peasants”, “peasant capitalism” and “the rich peasant line”. Instead, they carried out a number of so-called “class-line” policies which went beyond the democratic revolution, for instance, a policy of eliminating the rich peasant economy, and other ultra-Left economic and labour policies; a state policy in which no exploiters had any political rights; a policy of popular education which in its content stressed communism; an ultra-Left policy towards the intellectuals; a policy of working among enemy troops to win over only the soldiers but not the officers; and an ultra-Left policy in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. Thus, the immediate tasks of the revolution were distorted, the revolutionary forces were isolated and the Red Army movement suffered setbacks. Similarly, it should be said that in the Kuomintang areas after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, our Party persevered in leading the people's national democratic movement, in leading the economic struggles of the workers and the other masses and the revolutionary cultural movement and in fighting the Kuomintang government's policies of betraying the national interests and oppressing the people. After the September 18th Incident, in particular, our Party led the Northeast Anti-Japanese Amalgamated Armies, supported the war of January 28, 1932 and the Allied Anti-Japanese Armies in northern Chahar, formed an anti-Japanese democratic alliance with the Fukien People's Government, put forward three conditions on which the Red Army would ally with the Kuomintang troops to resist Japan and six conditions for forming a Committee for National Armed Self-Defence with all sections of the people, and on August 1, 1935 issued “An Appeal to All Fellow-Countrymen for Resistance to Japan and for National Salvation” which called for the formation of a government of national defence and the formation of allied anti-Japanese armies. All this too was correct. But because the guiding policy was erroneous during the dominance of the various “Left” lines, and especially of the third, the Party was unable to solve problems correctly in practice and consequently, in the Kuomintang areas too, the Party's work either did not achieve such results as it should, or ended in failure. On the question of resistance to Japan, it was of course not yet possible at that time to foresee the changes that would take place after the Northern China Incident of 1935, and particularly after the Sian Incident of 1936, within the Kuomintang's chief ruling groups, which represented the main sections of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie. But at that time the intermediate strata, and some local groups of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, were already changing into our allies against Japan. While this change was recognized by the broad ranks of our Party members and the people, it was either ignored or denied by the exponents of the third “Left” line, who thus created a serious state of closed-doorism and fell far behind the Chinese people in political life. This state of isolation and lagging behind, which resulted from the error of closed-doorism, remained basically unchanged until the Tsunyi Meeting.
Second. The various “Left” lines were also in error on the question of revolutionary war and revolutionary base areas. Comrade Stalin said, “In China it is armed revolution against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the characteristics and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution.”21 Like Comrade Stalin, Comrade Mao Tse-tung had correctly pointed out as far back as the early period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War that, in the Chinese revolution, armed struggle is the main form of struggle and an army composed chiefly of peasants is the main form of organization, for the reason that semi-colonial and semi-feudal China is a large, non-uniform country which lacks democracy and industry. Comrade Mao Tse-tung also pointed out that the vast rural areas inhabited by the broad masses of the peasantry are the indispensable, vital positions of the Chinese revolution (revolutionary villages can encircle the cities, but revolutionary cities cannot detach themselves from the villages), and that China can and must establish armed revolutionary base areas as the starting point for country-wide victory (democratic unification of the whole country).22 In the period of the 1924-27 revolution, when a coalition government had been formed through Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, the base areas had certain big cities as their centres, but even then, in order to consolidate the foundations of the base areas, it was necessary, under the leadership of the proletariat, to build a people’s army with the peasants as the main body and solve the land problem in the rural areas. But in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, since the cities were all occupied by powerful counter-revolutionary forces, base areas had to be set up, expanded and consolidated mainly by relying on peasant guerrilla warfare (not on positional warfare) and first of all in the countryside where counter-revolutionary rule was weak (not in the key cities). Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that in China the historical conditions for the existence of such armed revolutionary rural base areas are the “localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy) and the imperialist policy of marking off spheres of influence to divide and exploit” and the resulting “prolonged splits and wars among the White regimes”.23 He also pointed out the historic significance of such base areas for the Chinese revolution:

Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has done throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration. And only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become the chief weapon for the future great revolution. In short, only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.24

As for mass work in the cities during that period, the principal policies should have been those advocated by Comrade Liu Shao-chi, the exponent of the correct line for work in the White areas, namely, to act mainly on the defensive (and not on the offensive); to utilize all possible legal opportunities for work (and not to reject the use of legality) so that the Party organizations could go deep among the masses, stay under cover for a long time and accumulate strength; and always to be ready to send people to develop armed struggle in the rural areas, and thereby to co-ordinate with the struggle in the countryside and advance the development
of the revolutionary situation. Therefore, until such time as the general situation again made it possible to form democratic government in the cities, the Chinese revolutionary movement should have made rural work primary and urban work supplementary. Victories of the revolution in the countryside but temporary inability to win victories in the cities, offensives in the countryside but a general defensive position in the cities, even victory and the offensive in one rural area but defeat, retreat and the defensive in another—all these formed the criss-cross pattern of revolution and counter-revolution up and down the country during that period and accordingly determined the course from defeat to victory which the revolution had to follow. But the exponents of the various “Left” lines did not understand the specific characteristics of semi-colonial and semi-feudal Chinese society, did not understand that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China was in essence a peasant revolution and did not understand the uneven, tortuous and protracted nature of the Chinese revolution; therefore they underestimated the importance of military struggle, and especially of peasant guerrilla warfare and rural base areas, and opposed what they called “the doctrine of the gun” and “localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality”. They were forever dreaming that the struggles of the workers and the other masses in the cities would suddenly break through the enemy’s severe repression and surge upward, erupt into armed insurrections in key cities, achieve “victory first in one or more provinces”, and bring about a so-called country-wide revolutionary high tide and country-wide victory; and they made this dream the basis on which all their work was planned and organized. In reality, however, given the general relation of class forces after the defeat of

the revolution in 1927, the first result of this dream was none other than the failure of the urban work itself. This was how the first “Left” line met with defeat; and the second “Left” line repeated the same error, the only difference being that now support was demanded from the Red Army, for the Red Army had become a considerable force. The second “Left” line too ended in failure, yet the third “Left” line continued to demand “real” preparations for armed insurrections in the big cities, the only difference being that now the main demand was for the Red Army to seize big cities, because the Red Army had become even stronger, while the work in the cities had shrunk even further. The result of subordinating rural work to city work, instead of the other way round, was that after the work in the cities failed, most of the rural work failed too. It should be pointed out that after 1932 the actions aimed at capturing key cities had in fact come to a halt because the Red Army could not capture or hold them, and particularly because the Kuomintang was attacking on a large scale; furthermore, after 1933, owing to the still greater damage done to our city work, the Provisional Central Committee itself moved from the city to a rural base area. Thus a change did take place. But as far as the comrades of the “Left” line were concerned, this change was not effected consciously or as a result of correct conclusions reached through a study of the specific characteristics of the Chinese revolution; therefore they continued to direct all the work in the Red Army and the base areas from their erroneous urban viewpoint, and caused great damage to the work. The following instances are clear proof: they advocated positional warfare and opposed guerrilla warfare or mobile warfare of a guerrilla character; they wrongly stressed what they called “regularization” of the Red
Army and opposed its so-called “guerrilla-ism”; they did not realize that they had to adapt themselves to dispersed rural areas and to protracted guerrilla warfare in areas cut off from one another by the enemy, and so they did not use the manpower and material resources in the base areas sparingly or take other necessary measures; in the campaign against the fifth “encirclement and suppression” they put forward the wrong slogans of “The decisive battle as between the two roads for China” and “Do not yield a single inch of territory of the base areas”.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session declares emphatically that a change in the situation is now imminent, the very change our rural work should have promoted and our city work should have awaited in the period discussed above. Only now, in the final stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan, when the army under our Party’s leadership has grown strong and will grow still stronger, is it correct to place work in the Japanese-occupied cities on a par with work in the Liberated Areas, actively to prepare all the conditions for annihilating the Japanese aggressors in the key cities by co-ordinated attacks from within and without and then to shift the centre of gravity of our work to these cities. This will be a new change of historic significance for our Party, which shifted the centre of gravity of its work to the countryside with so much difficulty after the defeat of the revolution in 1927. All Party members should prepare for this change with full political awareness and should not repeat the error made by the “Left” line on the matter of the shift from the cities to the countryside during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, an error which was manifested first in opposing and refusing to shift and then in shifting reluctantly under compulsion and without political awareness. In the

Kuomintang areas, however, conditions are different; there our immediate tasks, whether in the countryside or in the cities, are to go all out to mobilize the masses, resolutely to oppose civil war and a split, to strive for peace and unity and to demand redoubled efforts in the war against Japan, the abolition of the Kuomintang’s one-party dictatorship and the formation of a unified democratic coalition government. When the Japanese-occupied cities are liberated by the people and a unified democratic coalition government is really established and consolidated, the rural base areas will have accomplished their historical task.

Third. The various “Left” lines were also in error on the directing of tactics for attack and defence. Correct direction of tactics, as Comrade Stalin pointed out, requires a correct analysis of the situation (a correct estimate of the relation of class forces and a correct judgement of the ebb and flow of the movement), requires correct forms of struggle and organization based thereon, and requires correctly “taking advantage of every rift in the camp of its enemies, and the ability to find allies”; and one of the best models is Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s direction of the Chinese revolutionary movement. After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, Comrade Mao Tse-tung correctly pointed out that the tide of revolution was at a low ebb throughout the country, that the enemy was stronger than we in the country as a whole, and that adventurist attacks would court inevitable defeat, but that it was possible for “a Red regime to come into being in one or more small areas encircled by a White regime” in the general conditions in which there were incessant splits and wars within the reactionary regime and the demand of the people for revolution was gradually reviving and growing, and in the specific conditions in which the
masses had gone through the struggles of the First Great Revolution, there was a Red Army possessing considerable strength and there was a Communist Party with correct policies. He also stated that in a period when there are splits within the ruling classes the expansion of Red political power “can be comparatively bold and the area carved out by military operations can be comparatively large”, whereas in a period of relative stability for the ruling classes, such expansion must be gradual. In such a period, in military affairs, the worst thing is to divide our forces and advance rashly, and in local work (distributing land, establishing political power, expanding the Party and organizing local armed forces) the worst thing is to scatter our personnel and neglect to lay a solid foundation in the central districts. Even within one and the same period, our tactics should vary according to the differences in strength of our enemies; therefore, the area we carved out on the Hunan-Kiangsi border “stood on the defensive against Hunan, where the ruling power was comparatively strong, and took the offensive against Kiangsi, where the ruling power was comparatively weak”. Later, when the Red Army of the Hunan-Kiangsi border reached the Fukien-Kiangsi border, a plan was proposed for “taking Kiangsi and also western Fukien and western Chekiang”. An important basis for determining our varying tactics is the different way in which the revolution affects the interests of different enemies. Consequently Comrade Mao Tse-tung has always advocated that we “utilize every conflict within the counter-revolution and take active measures to widen the cleavages within it”, and “oppose the policy of isolation and affirm the policy of winning over all possible allies”. The application of the tactical principles, “make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one”, was brilliantly developed in the campaigns Comrade Mao Tse-tung led against the “encirclement and suppression” and especially, after the Tsunyi Meeting, in the Long March and in the work of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Comrade Liu Shao-chi’s ideas on tactics for work in the White areas are likewise a model. Correctly taking into account the glaring disparity between the enemy’s strength and our own in the White areas, and particularly in the cities, after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, Comrade Liu Shao-chi advocated systematic organization of our retreat and defence and “the avoidance of decisive engagements with the enemy for the time being, while the situation and conditions are unfavourable to us”, in order “to prepare for revolutionary attacks and decisive engagements in the future”. He also advocated that the Party’s open organizations of the period of the 1924-27 revolution be transformed systematically and strictly into underground organizations, while “utilizing open legal means as far as possible” in mass work to enable the Party’s underground organizations to conceal their strength for a long time in such mass work, go deep among the masses and “accumulate and strengthen the forces of the masses and heighten their political consciousness”. With respect to leadership in mass struggles, Comrade Liu Shao-chi held that it was necessary, in accordance with the situation and the specific conditions at a given time and place and the degree of political consciousness of the masses, to advance limited slogans,
demands and forms of struggle acceptable to the masses in order to set the mass struggle in motion and then, in accordance with the changing conditions in the course of the struggle, either gradually to raise the mass struggle to a higher stage or, "knowing how far to go", temporarily to conclude the battle so as to prepare for the next battle at a higher stage and on a larger scale.

On the question of utilizing the enemy's internal contradictions and winning temporary allies, he held that it was necessary to push these contradictions to the breaking point and form a temporary alliance against the chief enemy with those elements in the enemy camp who may co-operate with us or who are not yet our chief enemy; and to make necessary concessions to the allies who are willing to co-operate with us, induce them to join with us and participate in common action and then influence them and win over their mass following.\(^{35}\)

The success of the December 9th Movement in 1935 proved the correctness of these tactical principles for work in the White areas. In contrast to such correct direction of tactics, the comrades of the various "Left" lines failed to examine objectively the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, failed to adopt corresponding forms of struggle and organization and did not recognize or pay sufficient attention to the enemy's internal contradictions. Therefore, not only did they meet with defeat as a result of blindly executing a so-called "offensive line" when they should have been on the defensive, but they also met with defeat even when an offensive was timely, because they did not know how to organize a victorious offensive. Their way of "appraising a situation" was to take individual, incipient, indirect, one-sided and superficial phenomena favourable to their viewpoint and magnify them into something widespread, grave, direct, all-sided and essential, and they were afraid to acknowledge or were blind to all facts not in conformity with their viewpoint (such as the enemy's strength and temporary victory, our weakness and temporary defeat, the inadequate political consciousness of the masses, the enemy's internal contradictions and the progressive side of the middle-of-the-roaders). They never envisaged the most difficult and complex situations, which might arise; they always dreamed about the most favourable and simplest situations, which could not possibly arise. In the Red Army movement, they invariably described the enemy encircling the revolutionary base areas as "terribly shaky", "extremely panicky", "approaching final extinction", "collapsing at an accelerating speed", "totally collapsing", and so on. The exponents of the third "Left" line even held that the Red Army enjoyed superiority over the entire Kuomintang forces, which outnumbered it many times, and therefore kept on pressing the Red Army to make reckless advances regardless of the conditions and even without resting. They denied the unevenness of revolutionary development as between southern and northern China, resulting from the 1924-27 revolution (a situation that was not reversed until the War of Resistance Against Japan), wrongly opposed what they called "the theory of the backwardness of the north" and demanded the establishment of Red regimes everywhere in the countryside of northern China and the organization of mutinies in all the White armies there so as to form Red
Army units. They also denied the unevenness of development as between the central and border sections of the base areas and wrongly opposed what they called the "Lo Ming line". They refused to make use of the contradictions among the various warlords attacking the Red Army and to reach compromises with those forces which were willing to stop attacking. As for work in the White areas, they refused to take the necessary steps for retreat and defence or to make use of all legal possibilities in the cities where the revolutionary tide had ebbed and the counter-revolutionary ruling forces were very powerful. Instead, they continued to take the offensive in forms inadmissible under the prevailing conditions, they set up large unprotected Party organizations and various "Red mass organizations" divorced from the broad masses and duplicating the Party, they constantly and regardless of conditions called for and organized political strikes, joint strikes, and strikes of students, merchants, troops and policemen, and also parades and demonstrations, lightning meetings and even armed insurrections—actions which were unlikely or unable to win the participation or support of the masses—and they misrepresented the failures of these actions as "victories". To sum up, the comrades of the various "Left" lines, and particularly of the third, were versed in nothing but closed-doorism and adventurism, they believed blindly in "struggle above all and all for struggle" and in "continuously expanding the struggle and raising it to a higher level!", and they therefore continuously met with defeats which should not have occurred and could have been avoided.

2. Militarily:

At the present stage of the Chinese revolution, military struggle is the main form of political struggle. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War it became the most urgent question in the Party line. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has applied Marxism-Leninism to formulate not only the correct political line for the Chinese revolution, but also, beginning with the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the correct military line subordinate to this political line. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's military line proceeds from two fundamental points. First, our army is and can be an army of only one kind; it must be an instrument subordinate to the ideological leadership of the proletariat and serving the struggle of the people and the building of revolutionary base areas. Second, our war is and can be a war of only one kind; it must be a war in which we recognize that the enemy is strong and we are weak, that the enemy is big and we are small, and in which therefore we fully utilize the enemy's weaknesses and our strong points and fully rely on the strength of the masses for survival, victory and expansion. From the first point, it follows that the Red Army (now the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armed forces of the people) must fight whole-heartedly for the line, programme and policies of the Party, that is, for all the manifold interests of the whole people, and must combat the tendencies towards warlordism, which run counter to this. Therefore, the Red Army must oppose the purely military point of view and the roving-rebel ideology, according to which the military does not obey the political, or even commands the political. The Red Army must shoulder simultaneously the threefold task of fighting, doing mass work and raising funds (which at present means production); doing mass work means becoming a propagandist and organizer for the Party and for the people's political power and means helping.
the local people in land distribution (at present, the reduction of rent and interest) and in establishing armed forces, organs of political power, and Party organizations. Hence, in its relations with the government and the people, it is required that the Red Army scrupulously respect the organs of the people's political power and the mass organizations, strengthen their prestige and strictly observe the "Three Main Rules of Discipline" and the "Eight Points for Attention". Within the army it is necessary to establish a correct relationship between officers and men and to have both an appropriate democratic life and an authoritative military discipline based on political consciousness. In the work among the enemy troops, it is necessary to have a correct policy for disintegrating enemy forces and winning over prisoners. From the second point of departure, it follows that the Red Army had to recognize that, during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character were the main forms of warfare, and must recognize that only a people's war, in which the main forces are integrated with regional forces, the regular army with guerrilla units and people's militia, and the armed masses with unarmed masses, can bring victory over an enemy many times stronger than ourselves. Hence, in strategy, the Red Army must oppose a war of quick decision and in tactics, must oppose protracted fighting; in strategy, it must adhere firmly to protracted warfare and in tactics, to quick decisions; in campaigns and battles it must oppose the use of the few to defeat the many and must adhere firmly to the use of the many to defeat the few. The Red Army must therefore carry out the following strategic and tactical principles:

Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy;

Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy camps, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue;

To extend stable base areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling round; lure the enemy in deep;

Concentrate superior forces, pick the enemy's weak spots, and fight when you are sure of wiping out part, or the greater part, of the enemy in mobile warfare, so as to crush the enemy forces one by one.

Militarily, the various "Left" lines were diametrically opposed to the line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The putschism of the first "Left" line caused the Red Army to become alienated from the masses of the people; the second "Left" line led the Red Army into adventurerist attacks. But neither was completely systematized militarily. A fully integrated system came only with the third "Left" line. On the question of building the army, the exponents of the third "Left" line reduced the Red Army's threefold task to the single one of fighting and neglected to educate the Red Army on the correct relations between army and people, between army and government and between officers and men; they demanded undue regularization and opposed the then sound guerrilla character of the Red Army as "guerrilla-ism"; furthermore, they fostered formalism in the political work in the army. On the question of military operations, they denied the premise that the enemy was strong and we were weak; they demanded positional warfare and so-called "regular" warfare, which relied solely on
the main forces; they demanded the strategy of a war of quick decision and the tactics of protracted fighting; they demanded “attack on all fronts” and “strike with two fists”; they opposed luring the enemy in deep and regarded necessary shifts of troops as “retreat and flightism”; and they also demanded fixed battle lines and an absolutely centralized command. In brief, they negated guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character and did not understand how to conduct a people’s war correctly. During the campaign against the fifth “encirclement and suppression”, the exponents of the third “Left” line began with adventurism in attack, advocating that we “engage the enemy outside the gates”; then they turned to conservatism in defence, calling for division of our forces to defend everything, for “short, swift thrusts” and for “a contest of attrition”; and they ended with real flightism, when they were compelled to withdraw from the Kiangsi base area. Such were the consequences of their attempt to substitute positional warfare for guerrilla and mobile warfare and to substitute “regular” warfare for a correctly conducted people’s war.

During the stages of strategic retreat and strategic stalemate in the War of Resistance Against Japan, there has been an even greater disparity between the enemy’s strength and our own, and so the correct principle for the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army has been to “engage mainly in guerrilla warfare, but lose no opportunity for mobile warfare under favourable conditions”. It would have been a mistake to press for too much mobile warfare. But in the approaching stage of strategic counter-offensive, just as the centre of gravity in the work of the whole Party will have to be shifted from the countryside to the cities, so in strategy it will be necessary to shift from guerrilla warfare as primary to mobile and positional warfare as primary, provided our forces obtain modern equipment. For this impending change, too, the whole Party must make preparations with full awareness.

3. Organizational:

As Comrade Mao Tse-tung says, a correct political line should be “from the masses, to the masses”. To ensure that the line really comes from the masses and in particular that it really goes back to the masses, there must be close ties not only between the Party and the masses outside the Party (between the class and the people), but above all between the Party’s leading bodies and the masses within the Party (between the cadres and the rank and file); in other words, there must be a correct organizational line. Therefore, just as in each period of the Party’s history Comrade Mao Tse-tung has laid down a political line that represented the interests of the masses, so he has laid down an organizational line that serves the political line and maintains ties with the masses both inside and outside the Party. There were important developments in this respect during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, which were crystallized in the resolution of the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army in 1929. 41 This resolution raised Party-building to the plane of ideological and political principle and firmly upheld the leading role of proletarian ideology; it fought in a correct manner against the purely military viewpoint, against subjectivism, individualism, equalitarianism, the roving-rebel ideology, putschism and other tendencies; and it pointed out the roots and harmfulness of these tendencies and the methods for correcting them. At the same time, the resolution firmly upheld strict democratic centralism, opposing improper restrictions either on democracy or on cen
tralism. Proceeding from the interests of the unity of the whole Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung insisted that the part should obey the whole and, in accordance with the concrete characteristics of the Chinese revolution, he defined the proper relationships between new and old cadres, between outside and local cadres, between army cadres and other cadres working in the locality and between cadres of different departments or localities. Thus Comrade Mao Tse-tung provided us with a model of how to combine perseverance in truth as a matter of principle with submission to organization as a matter of discipline, a model of how to conduct inner-Party struggles in a correct way while maintaining inner-Party unity in a correct way. Conversely, whenever an erroneous political line became dominant, an erroneous organizational line inevitably emerged, and the longer the domination of the erroneous political line, the more the harm done by its organizational line. Accordingly, the various “Left” lines of the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War were opposed not only to Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s political line but also to his organizational line; they created a sectarianism which alienated the masses outside the Party (that is, which did not regard the Party as the representative of the interests of the masses and the concentrator of the will of the masses) as well as a sectarianism which alienated the masses within the Party (that is, which did not subordinate the partial interests of some of the Party members to the interests of the whole Party and did not regard the leading body of the Party as the concentrator of the will of the whole Party). In particular, in order to enforce their will, the exponents of the third “Left” line invariably and indiscriminately branded all Party comrades who found the wrong line impracticable and who therefore expressed doubt, disagree-
organizations. Thus, they not only attacked the old cadres but spoiled the new ones. Moreover, in many places where an incorrect policy for suppressing counter-revolutionaries became entangled with the factionalist policy towards cadres, large numbers of fine comrades were unjustly dealt with under false charges, and this caused the Party most grievous losses. Such factionalist errors very greatly weakened the Party, causing dislocation between higher and lower organizations and many other anomalies in the Party.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session hereby declares: Any penalty, or any part of a penalty, that was wrongly inflicted upon a comrade by the exponents of the erroneous line shall be rescinded in accordance with circumstances. Every comrade who upon investigation is proved to have fallen victim to false charges shall be exonerated and re-instatement be held in honour by all comrades.

4. Ideologically:

The correctness or incorrectness of any political, military or organizational line has ideological roots — it depends on whether or not the line starts from Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism and historical materialism and whether or not the line starts from the objective realities of the Chinese revolution and the objective needs of the Chinese people. From the very day he embraced the cause of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has devoted himself to applying the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the investigation and study of the actual conditions of Chinese society; time and again during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, he laid great stress on the principle, “No investigation, no right to speak”, and time and again fought against the dangers of dogmatism and subjectivism.

Indeed, the political, military and organizational lines laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in that period were brilliant achievements which he made on the basis of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, of dialectical and historical materialism, by his concrete analysis of the actual situation and its characteristics inside and outside the country and inside and outside the Party and by his concrete summing up of the historical experience of the Chinese revolution, and especially of the 1924-27 revolution. For Chinese Communists, living and fighting in China, the purpose of studying dialectical materialism and historical materialism should be to apply them to the study and solution of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung has done. But, of course, none of the comrades who committed “Left” errors was able at that time to understand or accept his method, and the exponents of the third “Left” line even slandered him as being a “narrow empiricist”. The reason was that their ideology was rooted in subjectivism and formalism and, during the domination of the third “Left” line, this expressed itself in a still more pronounced form as dogmatism. It is characteristic of dogmatism that it does not start from actual conditions but from particular words and phrases taken out of books. The dogmatists did not base themselves on the Marxist-Leninist standpoint and method to make a serious study of China’s past and present — political, military, economic and cultural — and of the practical experience of the Chinese revolution, to draw conclusions as a guide to action in the Chinese revolution and to test the validity of these conclusions in the practice of the masses. On the contrary, throwing away the essence of Marxism-Leninism, they transported particular words and phrases from Marxist-Leninist literature into
the country and took them for dogma, without any study as to whether these quotations were suited to the actual conditions of present-day China. Inevitably, therefore, the “theories” of the dogmatists were divorced from reality, their leadership was divorced from the masses and instead of seeking truth from facts they were opinionated, arrogant, glib and afraid of correct criticism and self-criticism.

Empiricist ideology, which was the collaborator and assistant of dogmatism in the period of its domination, is likewise a manifestation of subjectivism and formalism. Empiricism differs from dogmatism in that it starts not from books but from narrow experience. It should be emphasized that all the useful experiences gained by vast numbers of comrades in practical work are most precious assets. It is definitely not empiricism, but Marxism-Leninism, to sum up such experiences scientifically as the guide to future action, just as it is definitely not dogmatism, but Marxism-Leninism, to take the theories and principles of Marxism-Leninism as the guide to revolutionary action and not as dogma. But among all the comrades versed in practical work, if there are some who remain satisfied with their own limited experience and with that alone, who take it for dogma that can be applied everywhere, who do not understand and moreover do not want to acknowledge the truth that “without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement” and that “in order to lead, one must foresee”, and who consequently belittle the study of Marxism-Leninism which is the summation of world revolutionary experience, and are infatuated with a narrow practicalism which is devoid of principle and with a brainless routinism that does not lead anywhere; and if they nevertheless sit and give orders from on high, if in their purblindness style themselves heroes, put on the airs of veterans and refuse to heed the criticism of comrades or to practise self-criticism — then indeed these comrades have become empiricists. Thus, in spite of their different points of departure, the empiricists and the dogmatists were essentially one in their method of thinking. Both severed the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism from the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution; both violated dialectical and historical materialism and magnified partial and relative truths into universal and absolute truths; and the thinking of neither corresponded to the objective, actual situation as a whole. Hence they shared many misconceptions about Chinese society and the Chinese revolution (for instance, their erroneous views about the cities as the centre of gravity, about work in the White areas as the centre of gravity and their erroneous views about “regular” warfare, irrespective of actual conditions). Such were the ideological roots which made it possible for these two different sets of comrades to collaborate. On account of their limited and narrow experience, most of the empiricists lacked independent, clear-cut and systematic views on problems of a general nature and therefore they usually played second fiddle in their association with the dogmatists; but the history of our Party proves that it would not have been easy for the dogmatists to have “spread their poison throughout the Party” without the collaboration of the empiricists; and after the defeat of dogmatism, empiricism became the main obstacle to the development of Marxism-Leninism in the Party. Hence we must overcome not only subjectivist dogmatism but also subjectivist empiricism. Only by completely overcoming both dogmatist and empiricist ideology can the Marxist-Leninist
ideology, line and style of work spread far and wide and take deep root in the whole Party.

The errors discussed above in their four aspects, political, military, organizational and ideological, were the fundamental errors of the various “Left” lines, and especially of the third. And the political, military and organizational errors all stemmed ideologically from the violation of Marxist-Leninist dialectical and historical materialism, from subjectivism and formalism, from dogmatism and empiricism.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session points out that in negating the errors of the various “Left” lines we must bear in mind and carry out Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s injunction, “Treat all questions analytically; do not negate everything”. It should be noted that the comrades who made these errors were not wrong in all their views; some of their views on fighting imperialism and feudalism, on the agrarian revolution and on the war against Chiang Kai-shek were in agreement with the views of the comrades who upheld the correct line. It should be further noted that, despite the especially long domination of the third “Left” line and despite the especially heavy losses it inflicted on the Party and the revolution, the Party in the same period scored great achievements in practical work in many areas and in many fields (for example, in warfare, in the building of the army, in war mobilization, in the building of political power and in the work in the White areas) thanks to the active work and heroic struggles of vast numbers of cadres and members, together with the broad masses of the soldiers and the people. It was precisely because of these achievements that over several years we were able to sustain the war against the attacks of the enemy and to hit him hard; and it was only because of the domination of the erroneous line that these achievements were in the end destroyed. The Party and the people will forever revere all the leaders, leading personnel and cadres inside and outside the Party, all the members of the Party and the masses who heroically sacrificed their lives in the interests of the people during the domination of the various erroneous lines, just as they revere those who sacrificed their lives in other periods of the Party’s history.

V

The errors of the “Left” line in the four aspects discussed above were not accidental; they had very deep social roots.

Just as the correct line represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung reflected the ideology of the advanced elements of the Chinese proletariat, so the “Left” line reflected the ideology of the Chinese petty-bourgeois democrats. Semi-colonial and semi-feudal China is a country with an enormous petty bourgeoisie. Not only is our Party surrounded by this vast stratum; within the Party too, people of petty-bourgeois origin make up most of the membership, the reason being that large numbers of petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats have turned to the proletariat for a way out of their predicament, because in China a strong petty-bourgeois political party has been rendered impossible by the great world victories of Marxism-Leninism following the October Revolution, by the existing social and political conditions in China, and especially by the historical development of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Moreover, in the economic conditions of China, even the masses of workers and Party members of working-class origin are
liable to have a petty-bourgeois tinge. It is therefore not surprising but inevitable that petty-bourgeois ideology should frequently be reflected inside our Party in every shape and form.

Among the petty-bourgeois masses outside the Party, in addition to the peasants who form the main force in the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution, the urban petty bourgeoisie is also one of the motive forces of the revolution in the present stage because the great majority of its members are subjected to all kinds of oppression, are being constantly and rapidly driven to poverty, bankruptcy and unemployment, and very urgently demand economic and political democracy. But as a class in transition, the petty bourgeoisie has a dual character. As to its good and revolutionary side, the great majority of this class are receptive to the political and organizational influence of the proletariat and even to its ideological influence, at present they demand a democratic revolution and are capable of uniting and fighting for it, and in the future they can take the path of socialism together with the proletariat; but as to its bad and backward side, not only does this class have various weaknesses which distinguish it from the proletariat, but when deprived of proletarian leadership, it often veers and falls under the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie, or even of the big bourgeoisie, and becomes their prisoner. In the present stage, therefore, the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party of China, should base themselves on a firm and broad alliance with the masses of the petty bourgeoisie outside the Party, should be lenient in dealing with them and tolerate their liberal ideas and style of work, insofar as these do not impede the struggle against the enemy or disrupt the social life we share in common, and at the same time should give them appropriate education so as to strengthen our alliance with them.

But the case is entirely different with those people of petty-bourgeois origin who have voluntarily abandoned their original class stand and joined the party of the proletariat. The Party should adopt a policy towards them that differs in principle from the policy towards the petty-bourgeois masses outside the Party. Since such people were close to the proletariat to begin with and joined its party voluntarily, they can gradually become proletarian in their ideology through Marxist-Leninist education in the Party and steeling in mass revolutionary struggles, and they can be of great service to the proletarian forces. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the people of petty-bourgeois origin who have joined our Party have fought bravely, made sacrifices for the Party and the people and progressed ideologically, and many of them have already become Marxist-Leninists. It has to be emphasized, however, that the revolutionary character of the petty bourgeoisie who has not yet been proletarianized is essentially different from the revolutionary character of the proletariat, and that this difference can often develop into a state of antagonism. Party members with a petty-bourgeois revolutionary character have joined the Party organizationally, but they have not yet joined the Party ideologically, or have not done so fully, and they are often liberals, reformists, anarchists, Blanquists, etc. in the guise of Marxist-Leninists. Such being the case, not only are they incapable of leading to victory China's communist movement of tomorrow, but they cannot even lead to victory her New Democratic movement of today. If the advanced elements of the proletariat do not draw a firm and sharp line between Marxist-Leninist ideology and the original ideology of those
Party members who came from the petty bourgeoisie and do not educate them and struggle with them in a serious but appropriate and patient way, it will be impossible to overcome their petty-bourgeois ideology, and what is more, these members will inevitably strive to remould the vanguard of the proletariat in their own image and usurp Party leadership, thus damaging the cause of the Party and the people. The more numerous the petty bourgeoisie outside the Party and the more numerous the members of petty-bourgeois origin inside the Party, the more strictly must the Party preserve its purity as the vanguard of the proletariat; failing this, petty-bourgeois ideology will assail the Party the more violently and the damage will be the greater. In the history of our Party, the struggles between the correct line and the various erroneous lines have been in essence the acting out within the Party of the class struggle outside it, and the political, military, organizational and ideological errors of the “Left” lines discussed above have been reflections in the Party of precisely this petty-bourgeois ideology. This question may be analysed from three aspects.

First, the method of thinking. The petty-bourgeois method of thinking manifests itself basically in subjectivism and one-sidedness in viewing problems, that is, it does not proceed from an objective and comprehensive picture of the balance of class forces, but takes subjective wishes, impressions and empty talk for reality, takes a single aspect for all aspects, the part for the whole and the tree for the forest. Petty-bourgeois intellectuals, being detached from the actual process of production, have only book knowledge, lack perceptual knowledge, and so their method of thinking is apt to manifest itself in the dogmatism discussed above. Those petty-bourgeois elements associated with production, though they have some perceptual knowledge, suffer from the limitations characteristic of petty production—narrowness, diffuseness, isolation and conservatism—and so their method of thinking is apt to manifest itself in the empiricism discussed above.

Second, political tendency. The political tendency of the petty bourgeoisie is apt to manifest itself in vacillation between the Left and the Right because of its mode of life and the resulting subjectivism and one-sidedness of its method of thinking. Many representatives of the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries hope for an immediate victory of the revolution in order to bring about a radical change in their present status; therefore, they lack the patience needed for protracted revolutionary endeavour, are fond of “Left” revolutionary phrases and slogans and, in their sentiments and actions, are given to closed-doorism or adventurism. Reflected in the Party, this petty-bourgeois tendency gave rise to the various errors of the “Left” line on the questions we have discussed above, namely, the tasks of the revolution, the revolutionary base areas, the direction of tactics and the military line.

But the same petty-bourgeois revolutionaries when placed in a different set of circumstances—or another section of the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries—may become pessimistic and despondent and express Rightist sentiments and views, tailing after the bourgeoisie. The Chen Tu-hsiuism of the latter period of the 1924-27 revolution, the Chang Kuo-taoism of the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution and the flightism of the early period of the Long March were all reflections within the Party of such petty-bourgeois Rightist ideology. And during the War of Resistance Against Japan, capitulationist ideas appeared once again. Generally speak-
ing, “Left” errors are more liable to occur in periods when there is a split between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (for instance, the “Left” line dominated the leading body of the Party no less than three times during the period of the Agrarian Revolution), while Rightist errors are more liable to occur in periods when there is an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (for instance, in the latter part of the 1924-27 revolution and in the early part of the War of Resistance Against Japan). But whether “Left” or Right, these tendencies benefit not the revolution but only the counter-revolution. Vacillation to the “Left” or to the Right, the fondness for going to extremes, flashiness without substance and slick opportunism, all of which occur under the stress of changing conditions, are features of the bad side of petty-bourgeois ideology. They are all reflections in the ideological sphere of the unstable economic status of the petty bourgeoisie.

Third, organizational life. Because of the limitations in the way of life and the method of thinking of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and particularly because of China's backward and decentralized social environment with its clans and guilds, the tendency of the petty bourgeoisie in organizational life is apt to manifest itself in individualism and sectarianism, which alienate the masses. This tendency, when reflected in the Party, led to the erroneous, “Left” organizational line, which was discussed above. The circumstance that the Party had for a long time been fighting a scattered guerilla war in the countryside made it still easier for this tendency to grow. This tendency consisted not of working selflessly for the Party and the people, but of making use of the strength of the Party and the people and undermining their interests for personal or sectarian ends; it was therefore incompatible with the Party’s principle of close links with the masses, incompatible with the democratic centralism of the Party and with Party discipline. This tendency frequently took such forms as bureaucracy, patriarchalism, punitiveness, commandism, individualist heroism, semi-anarchism, liberalism, ultra-democracy, assertion of “independence”, the guild mentality, “mountain-strongholdism”, 46 favouritism towards fellow-townsmen and schoolmates, factional squabbles and rascally tricks, all of which undermine the Party’s ties with the masses of the people and its internal unity.

These are the three aspects of petty-bourgeois ideology. The subjectivism in ideology, the “Left” and Right deviations in politics and the sectarianism in organization which have all appeared on various occasions in our Party, are obviously anti-Marxist-Leninist and anti-proletarian manifestations of petty-bourgeois ideology, whether or not they crystallize into a line and gain control of the Party leadership. In the interests of the Party and the people, it is absolutely necessary to use the method of education to analyse and overcome petty-bourgeois ideology within the Party, and to help transform it into proletarian ideology.

VI

It can be seen from above that the various “Left” lines, and especially the third “Left” line which dominated the whole Party, were not accidental but were the products of specific social and historical conditions. Hence if we are to overcome erroneous “Left” or Right ideology, we cannot go about it either casually or impetuously, but must deepen
Marxist-Leninist education and raise the ability of the whole Party to differentiate between proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideology; we must give full play to inner-Party democracy, develop criticism and self-criticism, proceed with the work of patient persuasion and education, make a concrete analysis of errors and their dangers and explain their historical and ideological roots as well as the means of correcting them. Such is the proper attitude for Marxist-Leninists in overcoming errors within the Party. This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session points out that the policy Comrade Mao Tse-tung has adopted for the present rectification movement throughout the Party and for the study of Party history, namely, "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure the sickness to save the patient", and "achieve clarity in ideology and unity among comrades", is a model of the correct attitude for Marxist-Leninists in overcoming errors within the Party. Therefore it has led to great achievements in unifying and raising the level of the whole Party ideologically, politically and organizationally.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session points out that the struggles which the Party waged in the course of its history against Chen Tu-hsiuism and Li Li-sanism were absolutely necessary. The defect in these struggles was that they were not undertaken consciously as serious steps for correcting the petty-bourgeois ideology which existed on a serious scale in the Party; consequently they neither clarified thoroughly the ideological essence and roots of the errors nor indicated properly the methods of correcting them, and so it was easy for these errors to recur. Moreover, undue stress was placed on personal responsibility in the belief that once an erring comrade was attacked the problem was solved. Having examined the errors committed during and

after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, the Party considers that such defects must be avoided in all future inner-Party ideological struggles and that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's policy must be applied resolutely. So long as any comrade who has erred in the past understands his errors and has begun to correct them, we should welcome him without prejudice and unite with him to work for the Party. We should take a sincere and comradely attitude even towards those comrades who have not yet properly understood and corrected their errors but who no longer persist in them, and we should help them to achieve understanding and correct the errors. The whole Party is now unanimous in its understanding of the erroneous lines of the past. The whole Party has rallied round the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Therefore, the task of the entire Party from now on is to strengthen unity by clarifying thinking and holding fast to principle—to "unite the whole Party like one harmonious family, like solid steel, in order to fight for total victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and for the complete liberation of the Chinese people", as stated in the second section of this Resolution. All our Party's analyses, criticisms and controversies concerning questions of Party history should start from the desire for unity and arrive at unity; any violation of this principle is wrong. Since petty-bourgeois ideology in the Party has its social roots and the Party has long been placed in an environment of protracted and scattered guerrilla warfare in the countryside, since ideological remnants of dogmatism and empiricism still exist and the criticism of empiricism in particular has been inadequate, and since "mountain strongholdism" with its sectarian tendencies is still quite widespread although serious sectarianism
has been mainly overcome in the Party, the whole Party should be alert to the fact that a long process of continuous struggle to overcome wrong ideas is required if the Party is to achieve complete Marxist-Leninist ideological unity. This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session therefore resolves that the whole Party must strengthen its Marxist-Leninist ideological education and stress the linking of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution, so as further to develop a correct Party style of work and overcome completely such tendencies as dogmatism, empiricism, sectarianism and “mountain-strongholdism”.

VII

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session declares emphatically that the practice of the Chinese revolution during the last twenty-four years has proved, and continues to prove, that the line represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the line of struggle of our Party and of the people of the whole country, is entirely correct. The great successes achieved by our Party in the present War of Resistance and the decisive role our Party has played testify most vividly to the correctness of this line. When viewed in relation to the Chinese revolution as a whole with its stormy development, great achievements and rich experience in the past twenty-four years under the leadership of our Party, the “Left” and Right errors in the Party during certain periods were only partial phenomena. It was difficult to avoid such phenomena completely at a time when the Party lacked adequate experience and political consciousness. Furthermore, it has been precisely through the struggle to overcome these errors that the Party has grown firmer and stronger. Today, with unprecedented unanimity the whole Party recognizes the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s line and with unprecedented political consciousness rallies under his banner. As Marxist-Leninist ideology, which Comrade Mao Tse-tung represents, grips more and more of the cadres, the Party members and the masses of the people more and more profoundly, the result will surely be tremendous progress and invincible strength for the Party and the Chinese revolution.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee is firmly convinced that under the correct leadership of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Communist Party of China, with the rich experience of the three revolutionary struggles—the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the War of Resistance Against Japan—will assuredly lead the Chinese revolution to complete victory.

NOTES

1 In 1924 Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in alliance with the Communist Party and the revolutionary workers and peasants, defeated the “Merchant Corps”, an armed force of the compradors and evil gentry which engaged in counter-revolutionary activities in Canton in league with the British imperialists. Early in 1925 the revolutionary army which had been founded on the basis of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party set out from Canton on its Eastward Expedition and, with the support of the peasants, defeated the troops of the warlord Chen Chiang-ming. Then it returned to Canton and overthrew the Kwangsi and Yunnan warlords who had entrenched themselves there. That autumn it undertook its Second Eastern Campaign and finally wiped out Chen Chiang-ming’s forces. These campaigns, in which members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League fought heroically in the
front ranks, brought about the political unification of Kwangtung Province and prepared the way for the Northern Expedition.

8 Chen Tu-hsiu, originally a professor at Peking University, became well-known as editor of *New Youth*. He was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. Owing to his reputation at the time of the May 4th Movement and because the Party in its initial period was immature, he became general secretary of the Party. In the last period of the revolution of 1922-27, the Rightist thinking within the Party, of which Chen Tu-hsiu was the representative, developed into a line of capitulationism. In "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Comrade Mao Tse-tung said that the capitulationists at that time "voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban petty bourgeois and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution" (*Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV, p. 171). After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, Chen Tu-hsiu and a handful of other capitulationists lost faith in its future and became liquidationists. They took the reactionary Trotskyist stand and formed a small anti-Party group jointly with the Trotskyites. Consequently Chen Tu-hsiu was expelled from the Party in November 1929. He died in 1942.

5 Lo Chang-tung, an early member of the Chinese Communist Party, later turned traitor to the revolution. At the time of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party in 1931, Lo Chang-tung, pessimistic about the future of the Chinese revolution, openly supported the counter-revolutionary stand of the Trotskyist Chen Tu-hsiu clique in opposition to the line of the Sixth National Congress of the Party, vilified the Red Army and the Red base areas, and distributed leaflets in which he betrayed the names of Communist cadres to Chiang Kai-shek's gang of bandits. To undermine the revolutionary struggle led by the Party, he set up the so-called "Emergency Central Committee", "Second Provincial Committees", "Second Regional Committees" and "Second Party Fractions in Trade Unions" and carried out splitting activities in the Party. He was expelled from the Party in January 1931.

6 Chang Kuo-tao was a traitor to the Chinese revolution. In early life, speculating on the revolution, he joined the Chinese Communist Party. He made many mistakes which led to monstrous consequences. Most notoriously, in 1935 he opposed the Red Army's northward march, advocating a defeatist and liquidationist withdrawal by the Red Army to the minority-nationality areas on the Szechuan-Sikang border, and furthermore engaged in openly traitorous activities against the Party and the Central Committee, established his own bogus Central Committee, disrupted the unity of the Party and the Red Army, and caused heavy losses to its Fourth Front Army. The Fourth Front Army and its numerous cadres, thanks to patient education by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee, soon came back under the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and played an honourable part in subsequent struggles. Chang Kuo-tao, however, proved incorrigible and in the spring of 1938 ran away from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and joined the Kuomintang secret police.

7 After the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927, a small number of Trotskyites appeared in China. Ganging up with Chen Tu-hsiu and other renegades, they formed a small counter-revolutionary group in 1927. They spread counter-revolutionary propaganda, saying that the Kuomintang had already completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution, etc.; they were nothing but rank tools of the imperialists and the Kuomintang against the people. The Chinese Trotskyites openly joined the Kuomintang secret police. After the September 18th Incident of 1931, acting on instructions from the criminal Trotsky "not to hinder the Japanese empire in its occupation of China", they collaborated with the Japanese secret police, and drew pay from the Japanese aggressors for various activities that helped the latter.

8 See Note 4 of "Our Study and the Current Situation".

9 The First Front Army of the Red Army launched its second offensive against Changsha, capital of Hunan Province, in September 1930. As the enemy forces put up a stubborn defence behind fortifications and had the support of aircraft and warships, the Red Army failed to capture the city even after prolonged attacks. Meanwhile, enemy reinforcements were concentrating and the situation became unfavourable for the Red Army. Comrade Mao Tse-tung impressed upon the cadres of the First Front Army the need to withdraw the troops besieging Changsha, and then persuaded them to give up their idea of seizing the key city of Kiukiang in northern Kiangsi and attacking other big cities so as to change their policy and divide their forces in order to attack Chaling, Yuhien and Liling Counties in Hunan and Pingshiang and Kian Counties in Kiangsi. This enabled the First Front Army to expand greatly.

10 Comrade Chu Chiu-pai, one of the earliest members and leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, was elected to the Central Committee at the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth National Congresses of the Party in the years 1923-28. During the First Revolutionary Civil War he actively fought against the anti-Communist, anti-popular "Tai Chi-tao
doctrine" of the Kuomintang's right-wing and against the Right opportunism represented by Chen Tu-hsiu in the Chinese Communist Party. After the Kuomintang's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, he called the August 7th Emergency Meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, which ended the domination of Chen Tu-hsiuism in the Party. But from the winter of 1927 to the spring of 1928, while directing the work of the Central Committee, he committed the "Left" error of putschism. In September 1930 he conducted the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party, which put an end to the Li Li-san line that was harming the Party. However, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931, he was attacked by the "Left" dogmatists and factionalists and was pushed out of the central leadership. From that time to 1933 he worked in the revolutionary cultural movement in Shanghai in cooperation with Lu Hsun. In 1933 he arrived in the Red base area in Kiangsi and was made Commissioner of People's Education in the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Central Government. When the main forces of the Red Army embarked on the Long March, he was asked to stay behind in the Kiangsi base area. In March 1935 Comrade Chu Chi-pai was arrested by the Chiang Kai-shek gang in the Fukien guerrilla area and on June 18 he died a martyr's death in Changting, Fukien Province.

9 Comrade Lin Yu-nan, a member of the Chinese Communist Party and one of the early leaders and organizers of the Chinese trade union movement, was director of the Wuhan office of the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat, a member of the Executive Committee and concurrently secretary-general of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. In 1931 he was arrested by the Chiang Kai-shek gang and died a martyr's death at Lunghua in Shanghai.

10 Comrade Li Chiu-chih, a member of the Chinese Communist Party, served in 1928 on the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League and was head of its Propaganda Department and chief editor of its organ, Chinese Youth. In 1931, when he was working in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Party, he was arrested by the Chiang Kai-shek gang in Shanghai and died a martyr's death at Lunghua.

11 Comrade Ho Meng-hsiung, a member of the Chinese Communist Party, was one of the early organizers of the trade union movement in northern China and founder of the Railway Workers' Union on the Peking-Suiyuan Line. After the Kuomintang betrayed the revolution in 1927, he served as a member of the Communist Party's Kiangsu Pro-vincial Committee in Shanghai and as secretary of its Peasant Department. In 1931 he was arrested by the Chiang Kai-shek gang and died a martyr's death at Lunghua.

12 Comrade Chin Pang-hsien, also known as Po Ku, was a member of the Chinese Communist Party. From September 1931 to January 1935 he headed first the Party's Provisional Central Bureau in Shanghai and then its Central Bureau in the Red base areas. During this period he committed the serious error of the "Left" line. He worked in the Southern Bureau of the Party's Central Committee during the early period of the War of Resistance Against Japan. After 1941, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, he founded and directed the Chiehfang Jibao (Liberation Daily) and the Hsinhua News Agency in Yanan. He was re-elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the Party in 1945. In February 1946 he went to Chungking to take part in the negotiations with the Kuomintang. He died in April in an aeroplane crash on his way back to Yanan.

13 Comrade Chu Li-chih, who committed "Left" errors, arrived in the autumn of 1933 in the Northern Shensi Revolutionary Base Area (comprising the Shensi-Kansu border area and northern Shensi) as a representative of the Central Committee. In collaboration with Comrade Kuo Hung-tao, who was there and who also committed "Left" errors, he carried through the "Left" opportunist line in political, military and organizational work, and they pushed out Liu Chih-tan and other comrades who had pursued the correct line and had built up the Red Army and the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi. Then, in the work of suppressing counter-revolutionaries, they made the serious error of arresting a large number of cadres who were carrying out the correct line, and thus created a grave crisis in the Northern Shensi Revolutionary Base Area. The Central Committee of the Party, which arrived in northern Shensi in November 1933 after the Long March, corrected these "Left" errors, released Liu Chih-tan and the other comrades from prison, and thus saved the Northern Shensi Revolutionary Base Area from its dangerous situation.


19 From the “Letter of the Party Committee of the Front in the Chingkang Mountains to the Central Committee” in April 1929, quoted in “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire”, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I.


21 In January 1933, the Communist Party of China made a declaration proposing to all Kuomintang troops attacking the revolutionary base areas and the Red Army that a cease-fire agreement be concluded and joint resistance be conducted against Japan on three conditions: (1) Stop attacking the revolutionary base areas and the Red Army; (2) Grant freedoms and rights to the people; and (3) Arm the people.

22 The six conditions were those in the “Chinese People’s Basic Programme for Fighting Japan”, proposed by the Communist Party of China in April 1934 and published over the signatures of Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen) and others. The conditions were: (1) Mobilize all the sea, land and air forces to fight Japan; (2) Mobilize the people throughout the country; (3) Arm the whole people; (4) Confiscate the property of the Japanese imperialists in China and the property of the traitors to defray war expenses; (5) Establish an all-China committee for armed national self-defence, to be elected by the representatives of workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen; (6) Form an alliance with all the forces opposed to the Japanese imperialists, and establish friendly relations with all the countries that observe benevolent neutrality.


28 From the “Struggles in the Chingkang Mountains”, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 From the “Letter of the Party Committee of the Front in the Chingkang Mountains to the Central Committee” in April 1929, quoted in “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire”, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I.

32 From “General Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Fight Against the Enemy’s Fifth Campaign of ‘Encirclement and Suppression’” (Resolution of the Tsunyi Meeting).


35 From Comrade Liu Shao-chi’s “Eliminate Closed-Doorism and Adventurism”.

36 From Comrade Liu Shao-chi’s “Letter to the Central Committee on Past Work in the White Areas”.

37 From Comrade Liu Shao-chi’s “Eliminate Closed-Doorism and Adventurism”.

38 Lo Ming, formerly a member of the Chinese Communist Party, was the acting secretary of the Fukien Provincial Committee of the Central Red Base Area in 1933. He was attacked by the “Leftists” because he held that as the Party was confronted with a rather difficult situation in Shanghang, Yungting and other outlying parts of western Fukien, its policy there should be different from that in the stable base areas. The “Leftists” wrongly and exaggeratedly represented his views as “a line of opportunist-liquidationist flight and retreat, due to pessimism and despair about the revolution”, and, organizationally, waged the so-called “struggle against the Lo Ming line”.

39 The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were drawn up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during the Agrarian Revolutionary War and were later adopted as rules of discipline by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and the present People’s Liberation Army. As these rules varied slightly in content in the army units of...
different areas, the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in October 1947 issued a standard version as follows:

The Three Main Rules of Discipline:
(i) Obey orders in all your actions.
(ii) Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
(iii) Turn in everything captured.

The Eight Points for Attention:
(i) Speak politely.
(ii) Pay fairly for what you buy.
(iii) Return everything you borrow.
(iv) Pay for anything you damage.
(v) Do not hit or swear at people.
(vi) Do not damage crops.
(vii) Do not take liberties with women.
(viii) Do not ill-treat captives.

38 From the "Letter of the Party Committee of the Front in the Ching-kang Mountains to the Central Committee" in April 1939, quoted in "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I.


40 From "The Conclusions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Breaking Through the Enemy's Fifth Campaign of 'Encirclement and Suppression'", February 1935.


42 From Lenin's What Is To Be Done?, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1947, Chapter I, Part IV.

43 From Stalin's "The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission", a report at a meeting of the activists of the Party organizations in Moscow, delivered on April 13, 1928, see Works, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1934, Vol. XI.

44 From "Our Study and the Current Situation".

45 Blanquism refers to the ideology of revolutionary adventurism as represented in France by Auguste Blanqui (1805-81). The Blanquists denied class struggle, and imagined that mankind could be delivered from the system of capitalist exploitation not through the class struggle of the proletariat, but through conspiracy by a handful of intellectuals.

46 See Note 7 of "Our Study and the Current Situation".

47 From "Our Study and the Current Situation".