

SELECTED  
MILITARY WRITINGS  
OF  
MAO TSE-TUNG



WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!



毛泽东



**SELECTED  
MILITARY WRITINGS  
OF  
MAO TSE-TUNG**

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS  
PEKING 1963

**First Edition    April 1963**

***Printed in the People's Republic of China***

## CONTENTS

WHY IS IT THAT RED POLITICAL POWER CAN EXIST IN CHINA? ( <i>October 5, 1928</i> )	9
1. The Internal Political Situation	9
2. Reasons for the Emergence and Survival of Red Political Power in China	10
3. The Independent Regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and the August Defeat	13
4. The Role of the Independent Regime of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi	14
5. Economic Problems	15
6. The Problem of Military Bases	16
THE STRUGGLE IN THE CHINGKANG MOUNTAINS ( <i>November 25, 1928</i> )	19
The Independent Regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and the August Defeat	19
The Current Situation in the Area Under the Independent Regime	25
Military Questions	26
Land Questions	33
Questions of Political Power	36
Questions of Party Organization	38
The Question of the Character of the Revolution	43
The Question of the Location of Our Independent Regime	45
ON CORRECTING MISTAKEN IDEAS IN THE PARTY ( <i>December 1929</i> )	51
On the Purely Military Viewpoint	51
On Ultra-Democracy	54
On the Disregard of Organizational Discipline	55
On Absolute Equalitarianism	56
On Subjectivism	57
On Individualism	58
On the Ideology of Roving Rebel Bands	60
On the Remnants of Putschism	60
A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE ( <i>January 5, 1930</i> )	63

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR (December 1936)	75
I. How to Study War	75
1. The Laws of War Are Developmental	75
2. The Aim of War Is to Eliminate War	78
3. Strategy Is the Study of the Laws of a War Situation as a Whole	79
4. The Important Thing Is to Be Good at Learning	82
II. The Chinese Communist Party and China's Revolutionary War	87
III. Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War	90
1. The Importance of the Subject	90
2. What Are the Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War?	92
3. Our Strategy and Tactics Ensuing from These Characteristics	95
IV. "Encirclement and Suppression" and Counter-Campaigns Against It — the Main Pattern of China's Civil War	96
V. The Strategic Defensive	101
1. Active and Passive Defence	101
2. Preparations for Combating "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaigns	104
3. Strategic Retreat	107
4. Strategic Counter-Offensive	119
5. Starting the Counter-Offensive	121
6. Concentration of Troops	129
7. Mobile Warfare	135
8. War of Quick Decision	140
9. War of Annihilation	144
PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN (May 1938)	151
I. Why Raise the Question of Strategy in Guerrilla War?	151
II. The Basic Principle of War Is to Preserve Oneself and to Destroy the Enemy	153
III. Six Specific Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan	154
IV. Initiative, Flexibility and Planning in Conducting Offensives Within the Defensive, Battles of Quick Decision Within Protracted War, and Exterior-Line Operations Within Interior-Line Operations	155
V. Co-ordination with Regular Warfare	163
VI. The Establishment of Base Areas	165
1. The Types of Base Areas	166
2. Guerrilla Zones and Base Areas	168
3. Conditions for Establishing Base Areas	170
4. The Consolidation and Expansion of Base Areas	172
5. Forms in Which We and the Enemy Encircle One Another	173

VII. The Strategic Defensive and the Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War	174
1. The Strategic Defensive in Guerrilla War	175
2. The Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War	178
VIII. Development of Guerrilla War into Mobile War	179
IX. The Relationship of Command	181
ON PROTRACTED WAR ( <i>May 1935</i> )	187
Statement of the Problem	187
The Basis of the Problem	195
Refutation of the Theory of National Subjugation	198
Compromise or Resistance? Corruption or Progress?	202
The Theory of National Subjugation Is Wrong and the Theory of Quick Victory Is Likewise Wrong	206
Why a Protracted War?	208
The Three Stages of the Protracted War	210
A War of Jig-Saw Pattern	219
Fighting for Perpetual Peace	222
The Role of Conscious Activity in War	225
War and Politics	226
Political Mobilization for the War of Resistance	228
The Object of War	229
Offence Within Defence, Quick Decisions Within a Protracted War, Exterior Lines Within Interior Lines	231
Initiative, Flexibility and Planning	235
Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and Positional Warfare	244
War of Attrition and War of Annihilation	248
The Possibilities of Exploiting the Enemy's Mistakes	252
The Question of Decisive Engagements in the Anti-Japanese War	254
The Army and the People Are the Foundation of Victory	257
Conclusions	262
PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY ( <i>November 6, 1938</i> )	267
1. China's Characteristics and Revolutionary War	267
2. The War History of the Kuomintang	271
3. The War History of the Chinese Communist Party	273
4. Changes in the Party's Military Strategy in the Civil War and the National War	275
5. The Strategic Role of Guerrilla Warfare Against Japan	277
6. Pay Great Attention to the Study of Military Matters	280
CONCLUSIONS ON THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT ( <i>May 8, 1941</i> )	285
THE TURNING POINT IN WORLD WAR II ( <i>October 12, 1942</i> )	293

ON COALITION GOVERNMENT (TWO EXCERPTS, "THE PEOPLE'S WAR", "THE PEOPLE'S ARMY") ( <i>April 24, 1945</i> )	299
ON PRODUCTION BY THE ARMY FOR ITS OWN SUPPORT AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GREAT MOVEMENTS FOR RECTIFICATION AND FOR PRODUCTION ( <i>April 27, 1945</i> )	307
CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE ( <i>September 16, 1946</i> )	313
A THREE MONTHS' SUMMARY ( <i>October 1, 1946</i> )	319
THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NORTHWEST WAR THEATRE ( <i>April 15, 1947</i> )	325
STRATEGY FOR THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION ( <i>September 1, 1947</i> )	327
MANIFESTO OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ( <i>October 1947</i> )	333
ON THE REISSUE OF THE THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND THE EIGHT POINTS FOR ATTENTION — INSTRUCTION OF THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ( <i>October 10, 1947</i> )	341
THE PRESENT SITUATION AND OUR TASKS (SECTIONS I, II, III) ( <i>December 25, 1947</i> )	343
THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE ARMY ( <i>January 30, 1948</i> )	351
ON THE GREAT VICTORY IN THE NORTHWEST AND ON THE NEW TYPE OF IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION MOVEMENT IN THE LIBERATION ARMY ( <i>March 7, 1948</i> )	353
THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN ( <i>September and October 1948</i> )	361
THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE HUAI-HAI CAMPAIGN ( <i>October 11, 1948</i> )	367
THE MOMENTOUS CHANGE IN CHINA'S MILITARY SITUATION ( <i>November 14, 1948</i> )	371
THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE PEIPING-TIENTSIN CAMPAIGN ( <i>December 11, 1948</i> )	375
CARRY THE REVOLUTION THROUGH TO THE END ( <i>December 30, 1948</i> )	381
TURN THE ARMY INTO A WORKING FORCE ( <i>February 8, 1949</i> )	391
ORDER TO THE ARMY FOR THE COUNTRY-WIDE ADVANCE ( <i>April 21, 1949</i> )	395
PROCLAMATION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ( <i>April 25, 1949</i> )	405

# WHY IS IT THAT RED POLITICAL POWER CAN EXIST IN CHINA?\*

*October 5, 1928*

## 1. THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

The present regime of the new warlords of the Kuomintang remains a regime of the comprador class in the cities and the landlord class in the countryside; it is a regime which has capitulated to imperialism in its foreign relations and which at home has replaced the old warlords with new ones, subjecting the working class and the peasantry to an even more ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression. The bourgeois-democratic revolution which started in Kwangtung Province had gone only halfway when the comprador and landlord classes usurped the leadership and immediately shifted it on to the road of counter-revolution; throughout the country the workers, the peasants, the other sections of the common people, and even the bourgeoisie,<sup>1</sup> have remained under counter-revolutionary rule and obtained not the slightest particle of political or economic emancipation.

Before their capture of Peking and Tientsin, the four cliques of the new Kuomintang warlords, Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi warlords, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan,<sup>2</sup> formed a temporary alliance against Chang Tso-lin.<sup>3</sup> As soon as these cities were captured, this alliance broke up, giving way to bitter struggle among the four cliques, and now a war is brewing between the Chiang and the Kwangsi cliques. The contradictions and struggles among the cliques of warlords in China reflect the contradictions and struggles among the imperialist powers. Hence, as long as China is divided among the imperialist powers, the various cliques of warlords cannot under any circumstances

---

\* This article was part of the resolution, originally entitled "The Political Problems and the Tasks of the Border Area Party Organization", which was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Second Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area.

come to terms, and whatever compromises they may reach will only be temporary. A temporary compromise today engenders a bigger war tomorrow.

China is in urgent need of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and this revolution can be completed only under the leadership of the proletariat. Because the proletariat failed to exercise firm leadership in the revolution of 1926-27 which started from Kwangtung and spread towards the Yangtse River, leadership was seized by the comprador and landlord classes and the revolution was replaced by counter-revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution thus met with a temporary defeat. This defeat was a heavy blow to the Chinese proletariat and peasantry and also a blow to the Chinese bourgeoisie (but not to the comprador and landlord classes). Yet in the last few months, both in the north and in the south, there has been a growth of organized strikes by the workers in the cities and of insurrections by the peasants in the countryside under the leadership of the Communist Party. Hunger and cold are creating great unrest among the soldiers of the warlord armies. Meanwhile, urged on by the clique headed by Wang Ching-wei and Chen Kung-po, the bourgeoisie is promoting a reformist movement of considerable proportions<sup>4</sup> in the coastal areas and along the Yangtse River. This is a new development.

According to the directives of the Communist International and the Central Committee of our Party, the content of China's democratic revolution consists in overthrowing the rule of imperialism and its warlord tools in China so as to complete the national revolution, and in carrying out the agrarian revolution so as to eliminate the feudal exploitation of the peasants by the landlord class. Such a revolutionary movement has been growing day by day since the Tsinan Massacre<sup>5</sup> in May 1928.

## 2. REASONS FOR THE EMERGENCE AND SURVIVAL OF RED POLITICAL POWER IN CHINA<sup>6</sup>

The long-term survival inside a country of one or more small areas under Red political power completely encircled by a White regime is a phenomenon that has never occurred anywhere else in the world. There are special reasons for this unusual phenomenon. It can exist and develop only under certain conditions.

First, it cannot occur in any imperialist country or in any colony under direct imperialist rule,<sup>7</sup> but can only occur in China which is economically backward, and which is semi-colonial and under indirect imperialist rule. For this unusual phenomenon can occur only in conjunction with another unusual phenomenon, namely, war within the White regime. It is a feature of semi-colonial China that, since the first year of the Republic (1912), the various cliques of old and new warlords have waged incessant wars against one another, supported by imperialism from abroad and by the comprador and landlord classes at home. Such a phenomenon is to be found in none of the imperialist countries nor for that matter in any colony under direct imperialist rule, but only in a country like China which is under indirect imperialist rule. Two things account for its occurrence, namely, a localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy) and the imperialist policy of marking off spheres of influence in order to divide and exploit. The prolonged splits and wars within the White regime provide a condition for the emergence and persistence of one or more small Red areas under the leadership of the Communist Party amidst the encirclement of the White regime. The independent regime carved out on the borders of Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces is one of many such small areas. In difficult or critical times some comrades often have doubts about the survival of Red political power and become pessimistic. The reason is that they have not found the correct explanation for the emergence and survival of Red political power. If only we realize that splits and wars will never cease within the White regime in China, we shall have no doubts about the emergence, survival and daily growth of Red political power.

Second, the regions where China's Red political power has first emerged and is able to last for a long time were not those unaffected by the democratic revolution, such as Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan and the northern provinces, but were regions such as the provinces of Hunan, Kwangtung, Hupeh and Kiangsi, where the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers rose in great numbers in the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1926 and 1927. In many parts of these provinces trade unions and peasant associations were formed on a wide scale, and many economic and political struggles were waged by the working class and the peasantry against the landlord class and the bourgeoisie. This is

why the people held political power for three days in the city of Canton and why independent regimes of peasants emerged in Haifeng and Lufeng, in eastern and southern Hunan, in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area and in Huangan, Hupeh Province.<sup>8</sup> As for the present Red Army, it is a split-off from the National Revolutionary Army which underwent democratic political training and came under the influence of the masses of workers and peasants. The elements that make up the Red Army cannot possibly come from armies like those of Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Tso-lin, which have not received any democratic political training nor come under the influence of the workers and peasants.

Third, whether it is possible for the people's political power in small areas to last depends on whether the nation-wide revolutionary situation continues to develop. If it does, then the small Red areas will undoubtedly last for a long time, and will, moreover, inevitably become one of the many forces for winning nation-wide political power. If the nation-wide revolutionary situation does not continue to develop but stagnates for a fairly long time, then it will be impossible for the small Red areas to last long. Actually, the revolutionary situation in China is continuing to develop with the continuous splits and wars within the ranks of the comprador and landlord classes and of the international bourgeoisie. Therefore the small Red areas will undoubtedly last for a long time, and will also continue to expand and gradually approach the goal of seizing political power throughout the country.

Fourth, the existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength is a necessary condition for the existence of Red political power. If we have local Red Guards<sup>9</sup> only but no regular Red Army, then we cannot cope with the regular White forces, but only with the landlords' levies. Therefore, even when the masses of workers and peasants are active, it is definitely impossible to create an independent regime, let alone an independent regime which is durable and grows daily, unless we have regular forces of adequate strength. It follows that the idea of "establishing independent regimes of the workers and the peasants by armed force" is an important one which must be fully grasped by the Communist Party and by the masses of workers and peasants in areas under the independent regime.

Fifth, another important condition in addition to the above is required for the prolonged existence and development of Red

political power, namely, that the Communist Party organization should be strong and its policy correct.

### 3. THE INDEPENDENT REGIME IN THE HUNAN-KIANGSI BORDER AREA AND THE AUGUST DEFEAT

Splits and wars among the warlords weaken the power of the White regime. Thus opportunities are provided for the rise of Red political power in small areas. But fighting among the warlords does not go on every day. Whenever the White regime in one or more provinces enjoys temporary stability, the ruling classes there inevitably combine and do their utmost to destroy Red political power. In areas where all the necessary conditions for its establishment and persistence are not fulfilled, Red political power is in danger of being overthrown by the enemy. This is the reason why many Red regimes emerging at favourable moments before last April in places like Canton, Haifeng and Lufeng, the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, southern Hunan, Liling and Huangang were crushed one after another by the White regime. From April onward the independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was confronted with a temporarily stable ruling power in the south, and Hunan and Kiangsi would usually dispatch eight, nine or more regiments — sometimes as many as eighteen — to “suppress” us. Yet with a force of less than four regiments we fought the enemy for four long months, daily enlarging the territory under our independent regime, deepening the agrarian revolution, extending the organizations of the people’s political power, and expanding the Red Army and the Red Guards. This was possible because the policies of the Communist Party organizations (local and army) in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area were correct. The policies of the Border Area Special Committee and the Army Committee of the Party were then as follows:

Struggle resolutely against the enemy, set up political power in the middle section of the Lohsiao mountain range,<sup>10</sup> and oppose flight-ism.

Deepen the agrarian revolution in areas under the independent regime.

Promote the development of the local Party organization with the help of the army Party organization and promote the development of the local armed forces with the help of the regular army.

Concentrate the Red Army units in order to fight the enemy confronting them when the time is opportune, and oppose the division of forces so as to avoid being destroyed one by one.

Adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves to expand the area under the independent regime, and oppose the policy of expansion by adventurist advance.

Thanks to these proper tactics, to a terrain favourable to our struggle, and to the inadequate co-ordination between the troops invading from Hunan and those invading from Kiangsi, we were able to win a number of victories in the four months from April to July. Although several times stronger than we, the enemy was unable to prevent the constant expansion of our regime, let alone to destroy it, and our regime tended to exert an ever-growing influence on Hunan and Kiangsi. The sole reason for the August defeat was that, failing to realize that the period was one of temporary stability for the ruling classes, some comrades adopted a strategy suited to a period of political splits within the ruling classes and divided our forces for an adventurous advance, thus causing defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan. Comrade Tu Hsiu-ching, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, failed to grasp the actual situation and disregarded the resolutions of the joint meeting of the Special Committee, the Army Committee and the Yunghsin County Committee of the Party; he just mechanically enforced the order of the Hunan Provincial Committee and echoed the views of the Red Army's 29th Regiment which wanted to evade struggle and return home, and his mistake was exceedingly grave. The situation arising from this defeat was salvaged as a result of the corrective measures taken by the Special Committee and the Army Committee of the Party after September.

#### 4. THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT REGIME OF THE HUNAN-KIANGSI BORDER AREA IN HUNAN, HUPEH AND KIANGSI

The significance of the armed independent regime of workers and peasants in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, with Ningkang as its centre, is definitely not confined to the few counties in the border area; this regime will play an immense role in the process of the

seizure of political power in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi through the insurrection of the workers and peasants in these three provinces. The following are tasks of great importance for the Party in the border area in connection with the insurrections unfolding in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi: Extend the influence of the agrarian revolution and of the people's political power in the border area to the lower reaches of the rivers in Hunan and Kiangsi and as far as Hupeh; constantly expand the Red Army and enhance its quality through struggle so that it can fulfil its mission in the coming general insurrection of the three provinces; enlarge the local armed forces in the counties, that is, the Red Guards and the workers' and peasants' insurrection detachments, and enhance their quality so that they are able to fight the landlords' levies and small armed units now and safeguard the political power of the border area in the future; gradually reduce the extent to which local work is dependent on the assistance of the Red Army personnel, so that the border area will have its own personnel to take charge of the work and even provide personnel for the Red Army and the expanded territory of the independent regime.

## 5. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The shortage of necessities and cash has become a very big problem for the army and the people inside the White encirclement. Because of the tight enemy blockade, necessities such as salt, cloth and medicines have been very scarce and dear all through the past year in the independent border area, which has upset, sometimes to an acute degree, the lives of the masses of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie,<sup>11</sup> as well as of the soldiers of the Red Army. The Red Army has to fight the enemy and to provision itself at one and the same time. It even lacks funds to pay the daily food allowance of five cents per person, which is provided in addition to grain; the soldiers are undernourished, many are ill, and the wounded in the hospitals are worse off. Such difficulties are of course unavoidable before the nation-wide seizure of political power, yet there is a pressing need to overcome them to some extent, to make life somewhat easier, and especially to secure more adequate supplies for the Red Army. Unless the Party in the border area can find proper ways to deal with economic problems, the independent regime will have

great difficulties during the comparatively long period in which the enemy's rule will remain stable. An adequate solution of these economic problems undoubtedly merits the attention of every Party member.

## 6. THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY BASES

The Party in the border area has another task, namely, the consolidation of the military bases at Five Wells<sup>12</sup> and Chiulung. The Five Wells mountain area at the juncture of Yunghsin, Lingsien, Ningkang and Suichuan Counties, and the Chiulung mountain area at the juncture of Yunghsin, Ningkang, Chaling and Lienhua Counties, both of which have topographical advantages, are important military bases not only for the border area at present, but also for insurrections in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi in the future, and this is particularly true of Five Wells, where we have the support of the people as well as a terrain that is especially difficult and strategically important. The way to consolidate these bases is, first, to construct adequate defences, second, to store sufficient grain and, third, to set up comparatively good Red Army hospitals. The Party in the border area must strive to perform these three tasks effectively.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> By the term "bourgeoisie", Comrade Mao Tse-tung means the national bourgeoisie. For his detailed account of the distinction between this class and the big comprador bourgeoisie, see "On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism" (December 1935) and "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China" (December 1939).

<sup>2</sup> These four cliques of warlords fought together against Chang Tso-lin and occupied Peking and Tientsin in June 1928.

<sup>3</sup> Chang Tso-lin, who headed the Fengtien clique of warlords, became the most powerful warlord in northern China after defeating Wu Pei-fu in the second Chihli-Fengtien War in 1924. In 1926, with Wu Pei-fu as his ally, he marched on and occupied Peking. In June 1928, while retreating to the Northeast by rail, he was killed *en route* by a bomb planted by the Japanese imperialists whose tool he had been.

<sup>4</sup> This reformist movement arose after the Japanese invaders occupied Tsinan on May 3, 1928, and after Chiang Kai-shek openly and brazenly compromised with Japan. Within the national bourgeoisie which had identified itself with the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of 1927, a section acting in its own interests gradually began to form an

opposition to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The careerist counter-revolutionary group of Wang Ching-wei, Chen Kung-po and others which was active in this movement formed what became known as the "Reorganization Clique" in the Kuomintang.

<sup>5</sup> In 1928 Chiang Kai-shek, backed by British and U.S. imperialism, drove north to attack Chang Tso-lin. The Japanese imperialists then occupied Tsinan, the provincial capital of Shantung, and cut the Tientsin-Pukow railway line to check the northward spread of British and American influence. On May 3 the invading Japanese troops slaughtered large numbers of Chinese in Tsinan. This became known as the Tsinan Massacre.

<sup>6</sup> The organizational form of China's Red political power was similar to that of Soviet political power. A Soviet is a representative council, a political institution created by the Russian working class during the 1905 Revolution. Lenin and Stalin, on the basis of Marxist theory, drew the conclusion that a Soviet republic is the most suitable form of social and political organization for the transition from capitalism to socialism. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin, the Russian October Socialist Revolution in 1917 brought into being for the first time in world history such a socialist Soviet republic, a dictatorship of the proletariat. After the defeat of the 1927 revolution in China, the representative council was adopted as the form of people's political power in various places in the mass revolutionary uprisings led by the Chinese Communist Party and, first and foremost, by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. In its nature political power at that stage of the Chinese revolution was a people's democratic dictatorship of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, new-democratic revolution led by the proletariat, which was different from the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union.

<sup>7</sup> Comrade Mao Tse-tung's view on the question of establishing independent regimes in colonies under direct imperialist rule has changed. During World War II, many colonial countries in the East formerly under the imperialist rule of Britain, the United States, France and the Netherlands were occupied by the Japanese imperialists. Led by their Communist Parties, the masses of workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie and members of the national bourgeoisie in these countries took advantage of the contradictions between the British, U.S., French and Dutch imperialists on the one hand and the Japanese imperialists on the other, organized a broad united front against fascist aggression, built anti-Japanese base areas and waged bitter guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. Thus the political situation existing prior to World War II began to change. When the Japanese imperialists were driven out of these countries at the end of World War II, the imperialists of the United States, Britain, France and the Netherlands attempted to restore their colonial rule, but, having built up armed forces of considerable strength during the anti-Japanese war, these colonial peoples refused to return to the old way of life. Moreover, the imperialist system all over the world was profoundly shaken because the Soviet Union had become strong, because all the imperialist powers, except the United States, had either been overthrown or weakened in the war, and finally because the imperialist front was breached in China by the victorious Chinese revolution. Thus, much as in China, it has become possible for the peoples of all, or at least some, of the colonial countries in the East to maintain big and small revolutionary base areas and revolutionary regimes over a long period of time, and to carry on long-term revolutionary wars in which to surround the cities from the countryside, and then gradually to advance to take the cities and win nation-wide victory.

<sup>8</sup> These were the first counter-attacks which the people under Communist leadership launched in various places against the forces of the counter-revolution after

Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei successively turned traitor to the revolution in 1927. On December 11, 1927, the workers and revolutionary soldiers of Canton united to stage an uprising, and set up the people's political power. They fought fiercely against the counter-revolutionary forces, which were directly supported by imperialism, but failed because the disparity in strength was too great. Peasants in Haifeng and Lufeng on the eastern coast of Kwangtung Province had started a powerful revolutionary movement during 1923-25 under the leadership of Comrade Peng Pai, a member of the Communist Party, and this movement contributed greatly to the victory of the two eastward expeditions launched from Canton by the National Revolutionary Army against the counter-revolutionary clique headed by Chen Chiung-ming. After Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution on April 12, 1927, these peasants staged three uprisings in April, September and October and established a revolutionary regime which held out until April 1928. In eastern Hunan Province, insurrectionary peasants captured an area embracing Liuyang, Pingkiang, Liling and Chuchow in September 1927. At about the same time, tens of thousands of peasants staged an armed uprising in Hsiaokan, Macheng and Huangang in northeastern Hupeh Province and occupied the county town of Huangang for over thirty days. In southern Hunan, peasants in the counties of Yichang, Chenchou, Leiyang, Yunghsing and Tsehsing rose in arms in January 1928 and set up a revolutionary regime, which lasted for three months.

<sup>9</sup> The Red Guards were armed units of the masses in the revolutionary base areas, whose members carried on their regular productive work.

<sup>10</sup> The Lohsiao Mountains are a large range running along the borders of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces. The Ching kang Mountains are in its middle section.

<sup>11</sup> By the term "petty bourgeois", Comrade Mao Tse-tung means those elements other than the peasants — handicraftsmen, small merchants, professional people of various kinds and petty-bourgeois intellectuals. In China they mostly live in cities, but there are quite a number in the countryside.

<sup>12</sup> "Five Wells" designates the villages of Big Well, Small Well, Upper Well, Middle Well and Lower Well, in the Ching kang Mountains, which are situated between Yunghsin, Ning kang and Suichuan in western Kiangsi and Lingsien County in eastern Hunan.

# THE STRUGGLE IN THE CHINGKANG MOUNTAINS\*

*November 25, 1928*

## THE INDEPENDENT REGIME IN THE HUNAN-KIANGSI BORDER AREA AND THE AUGUST DEFEAT

China is the only country in the world today where one or more small areas under Red political power have emerged in the midst of a White regime which encircles them. We find on analysis that one reason for this phenomenon lies in the incessant splits and wars within China's comprador and landlord classes. So long as these splits and wars continue, it is possible for an armed independent regime of workers and peasants to survive and grow. In addition, its survival and growth require the following conditions: (1) a sound mass base, (2) a sound Party organization, (3) a fairly strong Red Army, (4) terrain favourable to military operations, and (5) economic resources sufficient for sustenance.

An independent regime must vary its strategy against the encircling ruling classes, adopting one strategy when the ruling class regime is temporarily stable and another when it is split up. In a period when the ruling classes are split up, as during the wars between Li Tsung-jen and Tang Sheng-chih in Hunan and Hupeh Provinces<sup>1</sup> and between Chang Fa-kuei and Li Chi-shen in Kwangtung Province,<sup>2</sup> our strategy can be comparatively adventurous and the area carved out by military operations can be comparatively large. However, we must take care to lay a solid foundation in the central districts so that we shall have something secure to rely on when the White

---

\* This was a report submitted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

terror strikes. In a period when the regime of the ruling classes is comparatively stable, as it was in the southern provinces after April this year, our strategy must be one of gradual advance. In such a period, the worst thing in military affairs is to divide our forces for an adventurous advance, and the worst thing in local work (distributing land, establishing political power, expanding the Party and organizing local armed forces) is to scatter our personnel and neglect to lay a solid foundation in the central districts. The defeats which many small Red areas have suffered have been due either to the absence of the requisite objective conditions or to subjective mistakes in tactics. Mistakes in tactics have been made solely because of failure to distinguish clearly between the two kinds of period, that in which the regime of the ruling classes is temporarily stable and that in which it is split up. In a period of temporary stability, some comrades advocated dividing our forces for an adventurous advance and even proposed leaving the defence of extensive areas to the Red Guards alone, as though oblivious of the fact that the enemy could attack not merely with the landlords' levies but even in concentrated operations with regular troops. In local work, they utterly neglected to lay a solid foundation in the central districts and attempted unrestricted expansion regardless of whether it was within our capacity. If anyone advocated a policy of gradual advance in military operations or a policy of concentrating our effort in local work on laying a solid foundation in the central districts so as to secure an invincible position, they dubbed him a "conservative". Their wrong ideas were the root cause of the defeats sustained last August by the Hunan-Kiangsi border area and by the Fourth Red Army in southern Hunan.

Our work in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area began in October last year. At the start, all our Party organizations in the counties were defunct. The local armed forces consisted only of the two units under Yuan Wen-tsai and Wang Tso in the vicinity of the Ching-kang Mountains, each unit having sixty rifles in bad repair, while the peasant self-defence corps in the counties of Yunghsin, Lienhua, Chaling and Linghsien had been totally disarmed by the landlord class and the revolutionary ardour of the masses had been stifled. By February this year Ningkang, Yunghsin, Chaling and Suichuan had county Party committees, Linghsien had a special district Party committee, and in Lienhua a Party organization was beginning to function and establish connections with the Wan'an County Commit-

tee. All the counties except Lingsien had a few local armed units. In Ningkung, Chaling, Suichuan and Yunghsin, and especially in the two latter counties, there were a good many guerrilla uprisings against the landlords which aroused the masses, and all were fairly successful. In that period the agrarian revolution had not yet been carried very far. The organs of political power were called governments of the workers, peasants and soldiers. Soldiers' committees<sup>3</sup> were set up in the army. When units went on separate missions, action committees were set up to direct them. The leading body of the Party there was the Front Committee (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary), which had been appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee during the Autumn Harvest Uprising. In early March, upon the request of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, the Front Committee was abolished and reorganized as the Divisional Party Committee (with Ho Ting-ying as secretary), which thus became a body in charge of Party organizations in the army only and without authority over the local Party organizations. Meanwhile, Mao Tse-tung's forces were dispatched to southern Hunan upon the request of the Special Committee there, and consequently the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was occupied by the enemy for more than a month. At the end of March came the defeat in southern Hunan, and in April the forces under Chu Teh and those under Mao Tse-tung, together with the peasant army of southern Hunan, withdrew to Ningkung and began to re-establish the independent regime in the border area.

From April onward the independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was confronted with a temporarily stable ruling power in the south, and Hunan and Kiangsi would dispatch at least eight or nine regiments of reactionary forces to "suppress" us and sometimes as many as eighteen. Yet with a force of less than four regiments we fought the enemy for four long months, daily enlarging the territory under our independent regime, deepening the agrarian revolution, extending the people's political power and expanding the Red Army and the Red Guards. This was possible because the policies of the Party organizations (local and army) in the border area were correct. The policies of the Border Area Special Committee (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary) and the Army Committee (with Chen Yi as secretary) of the Party were then as follows:

Struggle resolutely against the enemy, set up political power in the middle section of the Lohsiao mountain range, and oppose flight-ism.

Deepen the agrarian revolution in areas under the independent regime.

Promote the development of the local Party organization with the help of the army Party organization and promote the development of the local armed forces with the help of the regular army.

Be on the defensive against Hunan with its comparatively strong ruling power, and take the offensive against Kiangsi with its comparatively weak ruling power.

Devote great efforts to the development of Yunghsin, set up an independent regime of the people there and prepare for a prolonged struggle.

Concentrate the Red Army units in order to fight the enemy confronting them when the time is opportune, and oppose the division of forces so as to avoid being destroyed one by one.

Adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves to expand the area under the independent regime, and oppose the policy of expansion by adventurist advance.

Thanks to these proper tactics, to the terrain of the border area which favoured our struggle, and to the inadequate co-ordination between the troops invading from Hunan and those invading from Kiangsi, we were able to win a number of military victories and expand the people's independent regime in the four months from April to July. Although several times stronger than we, the enemy was unable to prevent the expansion of our regime, let alone to destroy it. Our regime tended to exert an ever-growing influence on Hunan and Kiangsi. The sole reason for the August defeat was that, failing to realize that the period was one of temporary stability for the ruling classes, some comrades adopted a policy suited to a period of splits within the ruling classes and divided our forces for an adventurous advance on southern Hunan, thus causing defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan. Tu Hsiu-ching, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and Yang Kai-ming, the secretary of the Border Area Special Committee who had been appointed by the Provincial Committee, failed to grasp the actual situation and, taking advantage of the fact that Mao Tse-tung, Wan Hsi-hsien and other strongly dissenting comrades were far away in Yunghsin, they disregarded the resolutions of the joint meeting of the Army Committee, the Special Committee and the Yunghsin County Committee of the Party, which disapproved of the views of the Hunan Provincial

Committee. They just mechanically enforced the order of the Hunan Provincial Committee to march to southern Hunan and fell in with the desire of the Red Army's 29th Regiment (composed of peasants from Yichang) to evade struggle and return home, thus causing defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan.

Originally, in mid-July, the Eighth Army from Hunan, under Wu Shang, had invaded Ningkung, penetrated to Yunghsin, sought battle with us in vain (our men tried to attack them from a side road but missed them) and then, being afraid of the masses who supported us, hurriedly retreated to Chaling via Lienhua. In the meantime, the major detachment of the Red Army, which was advancing from Ningkung to attack Lingsien and Chaling, changed its plans on reaching Lingsien and turned towards southern Hunan, while the enemy forces from Kiangsi, consisting of five regiments of the Third Army under Wang Chun and Chin Han-ting and six regiments of the Sixth Army under Hu Wen-tou, launched a joint assault on Yunghsin. At that point we had only one regiment in Yunghsin which, under the cover provided by the broad masses of the people, pinned down these eleven regiments within a radius of thirty *li* of Yunghsin county town for as long as twenty-five days by means of guerrilla attacks from every direction. In the end we lost Yunghsin because of the enemy's fierce assault, and also lost Lienhua and Ningkung shortly afterwards. At that moment internal dissensions suddenly flared up among the Kiangsi enemy forces; the Sixth Army under Hu Wen-tou withdrew in haste and presently engaged Wang Chun's Third Army at Changshu. The other five Kiangsi regiments then hastily withdrew to the county town of Yunghsin. Had our major detachment not moved to southern Hunan, it would have been entirely possible to rout this enemy force and extend the area of the independent regime to include Kian, Anfu and Pingsiang and to link it up with Pingkiang and Liuyang. But as the major detachment was away and the one remaining regiment was much too exhausted, it was decided that some men should remain to defend the Chingkung Mountains in co-operation with the two units under Yuan Wen-tsai and Wang Tso, and that I should take the rest to Kueitung to meet the major detachment and to invite it back. By that time the major detachment was retreating from southern Hunan to Kueitung, and on August 23 we joined forces there.

When the major detachment of the Red Army had arrived in Lingsien in mid-July, the officers and men of the 29th Regiment,

who were wavering politically and wanted to return to their homes in southern Hunan, refused to obey orders, while the 28th Regiment was against going to southern Hunan and wanted to go to southern Kiangsi, but in any case did not want to return to Yunghsin. As Tu Hsiu-ching encouraged the 29th Regiment in their mistaken ideas and the Army Committee failed to dissuade them, the major detachment set out from Lingsien for Chenchou on July 17. In an engagement with the enemy forces under Fan Shih-sheng in Chenchou on July 24, it was initially successful but was later defeated and withdrew from the battle. Thereupon, acting on its own, the 29th Regiment hurried homeward to Yichang with the result that one section was annihilated at Lochang by Hu Feng-chang's bandits, another scattered in the Chenchou-Yichang area and has never been heard of since, and no more than a hundred men were mustered again that day. Fortunately, the 28th Regiment, which was the main force, had not suffered great losses and on August 18 it occupied Kueitung. On August 23 the regiment was joined by the troops from the Ching kang Mountains, to which it was decided that the combined forces should return by way of Chungyi and Shangyou. When we reached Chungyi, battalion commander Yuan Chung-chuan defected with an infantry company and an artillery company, and though the two companies were brought back, our regimental commander Wang Erh-cho lost his life in this action. When our men were returning but had not yet reached their destination, enemy units from Hunan and Kiangsi seized the opportunity to attack the Ching kang Mountains on August 30. Using their points of vantage, the defending troops, numbering less than one battalion, fought back, routed the enemy and saved the base.

The causes of our August defeat were as follows: (1) some officers and men, who were wavering and homesick, lost their fighting capacity, while others, who were unwilling to go to southern Hunan, were lacking in enthusiasm; (2) our men were exhausted by long marches in the sweltering summer heat; (3) having ventured several hundred *li* away from Lingsien, our men lost contact with the border area and became isolated; (4) as the masses in southern Hunan had not yet been aroused, the expedition proved to be pure military adventurism; (5) we were uninformed about the enemy situation; (6) the preparations were inadequate, and officers and men did not understand the purpose of the operation.

## THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE AREA UNDER THE INDEPENDENT REGIME

Since April this year the Red areas have been gradually extended. After the battle of Lungyuankou (on the borders of Yunghsin and Ningkang) on June 23, in which we defeated the Kiangsi enemy forces for the fourth time, the border area reached the peak of its development, embracing the three counties of Ningkang, Yunghsin and Lienhua, small sections of Kian and Anfu, the northern section of Suichuan, and the southeastern section of Lingsien. In the Red areas the greater part of the land had been distributed and the remainder was being distributed. Organs of political power were set up everywhere in the districts and townships. County governments were set up in Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua and Suichuan, and a border area government was formed. Insurrectionary detachments of workers and peasants were organized in the villages, and Red Guards were formed at the district and county levels. In July the Kiangsi enemy forces launched attacks, and in August the Hunan and Kiangsi enemy forces jointly attacked the Ching kang Mountains. All the county towns and the plains in the border area were occupied by the enemy. The enemy's jackals — the peace preservation corps and the landlords' levies — ran amuck, and White terror raged throughout the towns and countryside. Most of the Party and government organizations collapsed. The rich peasants and the opportunists in the Party went over to the enemy in great numbers. It was not until the battle of the Ching kang Mountains was fought on August 30 that the Hunan enemy forces retreated to Lingsien; but the Kiangsi forces still held all the county towns and most of the villages. However, the enemy has never been able to capture the mountain areas, which include the western and northern districts of Ningkang; the Tienlung, Hsiaohsi-chiang and Wannianshan districts in the northern, western and southern sections of Yunghsin respectively; the Shanghsi district of Lienhua; the Ching kangshan district of Suichuan; and the Tsingshikang and Tayuan districts of Lingsien. In July and August, in co-ordination with the Red Guards of the various counties, one regiment of the Red Army fought scores of battles, big and small, losing only thirty rifles, before it finally withdrew to the mountains.

As our men were marching back to the Ching kang Mountains via Chungyi and Shangyou, the enemy force from southern Kiangsi, the Independent 7th Division under Liu Shih-yi, pursued us as far as

Suichuan. On September 13 we defeated Liu Shih-yi, captured several hundred rifles and took Suichuan. On September 26 we returned to the Ching-kang Mountains. On October 1, at Ning-kang, we engaged and defeated one of Hsiung Shih-hui's brigades commanded by Chou Hun-yuan, recovering the entire county of Ning-kang. Meanwhile, 126 men of the Hunan enemy forces under Yen Chung-ju, which had been stationed in Kueitung, came over to us and were organized into a special task battalion with Pi Chan-yun as commander. On November 9 we routed one regiment of Chou's brigade at Lungyuankou and the county town of Ning-kang. On the next day we advanced and occupied Yunghsin, but withdrew to Ning-kang shortly afterwards. At present our area, extending from the southern slopes of the Ching-kang Mountains in Suichuan County in the south to the border of Lienhua County in the north, embraces the whole of Ning-kang and parts of Suichuan, Linghsien and Yunghsin, forming a narrow unbroken stretch running north to south. The Shanghsi district of Lienhua and the Tienlung and Wannianshan districts of Yunghsin, however, are not firmly linked with this unbroken stretch. The enemy is attempting to destroy our base area by military attacks and economic blockade, and we are now preparing to defeat his attacks.

#### MILITARY QUESTIONS

Since the struggle in the border area is exclusively military, both the Party and the masses have to be placed on a war footing. How to deal with the enemy, how to fight, has become the central problem in our daily life. An independent regime must be an armed one. Wherever such an area is located, it will be immediately occupied by the enemy if armed forces are lacking or inadequate, or if wrong tactics are used in dealing with the enemy. As the struggle is getting fiercer every day, our problems have become extremely complex and serious.

The Red Army in the border area is drawn from: (1) troops formerly under Yeh Ting and Ho Lung in Chaochow and Swatow;<sup>4</sup> (2) the Guards Regiment of the former National Government at Wuchang;<sup>5</sup> (3) peasants from Pingkiang and Liuyang;<sup>6</sup> (4) peasants from southern Hunan<sup>7</sup> and workers from Shuikoushan;<sup>8</sup> (5) men captured from the forces under Hsu Ke-hsiang, Tang Sheng-chih,

Pai Chung-hsi, Chu Pei-teh, Wu Shang and Hsiung Shih-hui; and (6) peasants from the counties in the border area. However, of the troops formerly commanded by Yeh Ting and Ho Lung, the Guards Regiment and the peasants from Pingkiang and Liuyang, only one-third is left after more than a year's fighting. Casualties have also been heavy among the peasants from southern Hunan. Thus although the first four categories remain the backbone of the Fourth Red Army to this day, they are now far outnumbered by the last two categories. Furthermore, in the latter the peasants are outnumbered by the captured soldiers; without replacement from this source, there would be a serious manpower problem. Even so, the increase in men does not keep pace with the increase in rifles. Rifles are not easily lost, but men are wounded or killed, fall sick or desert and so are lost more easily. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send us workers from Anyuan,<sup>9</sup> and we earnestly hope it will do so.

As to class origin, the Red Army consists partly of workers and peasants and partly of *lumpen*-proletariat. Of course, it is inadvisable to have too many of the latter. But they are able to fight, and as fighting is going on every day with mounting casualties, it is already no easy matter to get replacements even from among them. In these circumstances the only solution is to intensify political training.

The majority of the Red Army soldiers come from the mercenary armies, but their character changes once they are in the Red Army. First of all, the Red Army has abolished the mercenary system, making the men feel they are fighting for themselves and for the people and not for somebody else. So far the Red Army has no system of regular pay, but issues grain, money for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and a little pocket money. Land has been allotted to all Red Army officers and men who are natives of the border area, but it is rather difficult to allot land to those from other parts of the country.

After receiving political education, the Red Army soldiers have become class-conscious, learned the essentials of distributing land, setting up political power, arming the workers and peasants, etc., and they know they are fighting for themselves, for the working class and the peasantry. Hence they can endure the hardships of the bitter struggle without complaint. Each company, battalion or regiment has its soldiers' committee which represents the interests of the soldiers and carries on political and mass work.

Experience has proved that the system of Party Representatives<sup>10</sup> must not be abolished. The Party Representative is particularly im-

portant at company level, since Party branches are organized on a company basis. He has to see that the soldiers' committee carries out political training, to guide the work of the mass movements, and to serve concurrently as the secretary of the Party branch. Facts have shown that the better the company Party Representative, the sounder the company, and that the company commander can hardly play this important political role. As the casualties among the lower cadres are heavy, captured enemy soldiers often become platoon leaders or company commanders in a very short time; some of those captured in February or March are already battalion commanders. It might seem that since our army is called the Red Army it could do without Party Representatives, but this is a gross error. At one time the 28th Regiment in southern Hunan abolished the system, only to restore it later. To rename the Party Representatives "directors" would be to confuse them with the directors in the Kuomintang army who are detested by the captured soldiers. A change of name does not affect the nature of the system. Hence we have decided to make no change. Casualties among Party Representatives are very heavy, and while we have started classes for training and replenishment we hope that the Central Committee and the Hunan and Kiangsi Provincial Committees will send us at least thirty comrades who are able to serve as Party Representatives.

Ordinarily a soldier needs six months' or a year's training before he can fight, but our soldiers, recruited only yesterday, have to fight today with practically no training. Poor in military technique, they fight on courage alone. As long periods of rest and training are out of the question, the only thing to do is to try and avoid certain engagements when circumstances permit and thus gain time for training. We now have a corps of 150 people in training as lower-ranking officers, and we intend to make this course a permanent institution. We hope that the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us more officers from platoon leader and company commander upwards.

The Hunan Provincial Committee has asked us to attend to the material conditions of the soldiers and make them at least a little better than those of the average worker or peasant. Actually they are worse. In addition to grain, each man receives only five cents a day for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and even this is hard to keep up. The monthly cost of these items alone amounts to more than ten thousand silver dollars, which is obtained exclusively

through expropriation of the local tyrants.<sup>11</sup> We now have cotton padding for winter clothing for the whole army of five thousand men but are still short of cloth. Cold as the weather is, many of our men are still wearing only two layers of thin clothing. Fortunately we are inured to hardships. What is more, all of us share the same hardships; from the commander of the army to the cook everyone lives on the daily food allowance of five cents, apart from grain. As for pocket money, everybody gets the same amount, whether it is twenty cents, or forty cents.<sup>12</sup> Consequently the soldiers have no complaints against anyone.

After each engagement there are some wounded. Also many officers and men have fallen ill from malnutrition, exposure to cold or other causes. Our hospitals up in the mountains give both Chinese and Western treatment, but are short of doctors and medicines. At present they have over eight hundred patients. The Hunan Provincial Committee promised to obtain drugs for us, but so far we have received none. We still hope the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us a few doctors with Western training, and some iodine.

Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on in spite of such poor material conditions and such frequent engagements is its practice of democracy. The officers do not beat the men; officers and men receive equal treatment; soldiers are free to hold meetings and to speak out; trivial formalities have been done away with; and the accounts are open for all to inspect. The soldiers handle the mess arrangements and, out of the daily five cents for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, they can even save a little for pocket money, amounting to roughly six or seven coppers per person per day, which is called "mess savings". All this gives great satisfaction to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that our army and the Kuomintang army are worlds apart. They feel spiritually liberated, even though material conditions in the Red Army are not equal to those in the White army. The very soldiers who had no courage in the White army yesterday are very brave in the Red Army today; such is the effect of democracy. The Red Army is like a furnace in which all captured soldiers are transmuted the moment they come over. In China the army needs democracy as much as the people do. Democracy in our army is an important weapon for undermining the feudal mercenary army.<sup>13</sup>

The Party organization now has four levels, the company branch, the battalion committee, the regimental committee and the army committee. In a company there is the branch, with a group in each squad. "The Party branch is organized on a company basis"; this is an important reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on such arduous fighting without falling apart. Two years ago, when we were in the Kuomintang army, our Party had no organizational roots among the soldiers, and even among Yeh Ting's troops<sup>14</sup> there was only one Party branch to each regiment; that is why we could not stand up to any serious test. In the Red Army today the ratio of Party to non-Party people is approximately one to three, or an average of one Party member in every four men. Recently we decided to recruit more Party members among the combat soldiers, so as to attain a fifty-fifty ratio.<sup>15</sup> At present the company branches are short of good Party secretaries, and we ask the Central Committee to send us a number of activists from among those who can no longer function where they are. Almost all the cadres from southern Hunan are doing Party work in the army. But since some of them were scattered during the retreat in southern Hunan in August, we now have no people to spare.

The local armed forces consist of Red Guards and insurrectionary detachments of workers and peasants. Armed with spears and shotguns, these detachments are organized on a township basis, each township having one detachment whose strength varies with the population. Its job is to suppress counter-revolution, protect the township government and assist the Red Army and Red Guards in battle when the enemy appears. The insurrectionary detachments started in Yunghsin as an underground force, but they have come into the open since we captured the entire county. The organization has now been extended to other counties in the border area and the name remains unchanged. The arms of the Red Guards are mainly five-round rifles but also include some nine-round and single-round rifles. There are 140 rifles in Ningkang, 220 in Yunghsin, 43 in Lienhua, 50 in Chaling, 90 in Lingsien, 130 in Suichuan and 10 in Wanan, making a total of 683. Most of the rifles have been supplied by the Red Army, but a small number were captured from the enemy by the Red Guards themselves. Fighting constantly against the peace preservation corps and levies of the landlords, most of the Red Guards in the counties are steadily increasing their fighting capacity. Before the May 21st Incident,<sup>16</sup> all the counties had peasant self-defence corps. There were

300 rifles in Yuhsien, 300 in Chaling, 60 in Lingsien, 50 in Suichuan, 80 in Yunghsin, 60 in Lienhua, 60 in Ningkang (Yuan Wen-tsai's men) and 60 in the Ching kang Mountains (Wang Tso's men), totalling 970. After the incident, apart from the rifles in the hands of Yuan's and Wang's men, which remained intact, only six rifles were left in Suichuan and one in Lienhua, all the rest having been seized by the landlords. The peasant self-defence corps were not able to hold on to their rifles as a result of the opportunist line. At present the Red Guards in the counties still have far too few rifles, fewer than those of the landlords; the Red Army should continue to help them with arms. The Red Army should do everything, short of reducing its own fighting capacity, to help arm the people. We have laid it down that each battalion of the Red Army should consist of four companies, each with seventy-five rifles, and, counting the rifles of the special task company, machine-gun company, trench-mortar company, regimental headquarters and the three battalion headquarters, each regiment will have 1,075 rifles. Those captured in action should be used as far as possible for arming the local forces. The commanders of the Red Guards should be people who have been sent from the counties to the Red Army training corps and have finished their training. The Red Army should send fewer and fewer people from outside areas to command local forces. Chu Pei-teh is arming his peace preservation corps and levies, while the armed forces of the landlords in the border counties are of considerable size and fighting capacity. This makes it all the more urgent to enlarge our local Red forces.

The principle for the Red Army is concentration, and that for the Red Guards dispersion. At the present time when the reactionary regime is temporarily stable, the enemy can mass huge forces to attack the Red Army, and dispersion would not be to the Red Army's advantage. In our experience, the dispersion of forces has almost always led to defeat, while the concentration of forces to fight a numerically inferior, equal or slightly superior enemy force has often led to victory. The Central Committee has instructed us to develop guerrilla warfare in much too large an area, extending several thousand *li* in both length and breadth; this is probably due to an overestimation of our strength. For the Red Guards dispersion is an advantage, and they are now using this method in their operations in all the counties.

The most effective method in propaganda directed at the enemy forces is to release captured soldiers and give the wounded medical treatment. Whenever soldiers, platoon leaders, or company or bat-

talion commanders of the enemy forces are captured, we immediately conduct propaganda among them; they are divided into those wishing to stay and those wishing to leave, and the latter are given travelling expenses and set free. This immediately knocks the bottom out of the enemy's slander that "the Communist bandits kill every one on sight". Writing about this measure, the *Ten-Day Review*, the journal of Yang Chih-sheng's 9th Division, exclaimed: "How vicious!" The Red Army soldiers show great concern for the prisoners and arrange warm farewells for them, and at every "Farewell Party for Our New Brothers" the prisoners respond with speeches of heartfelt gratitude. Medical treatment for the enemy wounded also has a great effect. Clever people on the enemy side like Li Wen-pin have recently imitated us by stopping the killing of prisoners and by giving medical attention to the wounded. Nevertheless, our men rejoin us at the very next engagement, bringing their arms with them, and this has happened twice already. In addition, we do as much written propaganda as possible, for instance, painting slogans. Wherever we go, we cover the walls with them. But we are short of people who can draw and hope the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us a few.

As for the military bases, the first base, the Chingkang Mountains, is at the juncture of four counties, Ningkang, Linghsien, Suichuan and Yunghsin. The distance between Maoping on the northern slope in Ningkang County and Huangao on the southern slope in Suichuan is 90 *li*. The distance between Nashan on the eastern slope in Yunghsin County and Shuikou on the western slope in Linghsien is 80 *li*. The circumference measures 550 *li*, stretching from Nashan to Lungyuan-kou (both in Yunghsin County), Hsincheng, Maoping, Talung (all in Ningkang County), Shihtu, Shuikou, Hsiatsun (all in Linghsien County), Yingpanhsu, Taichiapu, Tafen, Tuitzechien, Huangao, Wutouchiang and Che-ao (all in Suichuan County) and back to Nashan. In the mountains there are paddy-fields and villages at Big Well, Small Well, Upper Well, Middle Well, Lower Well, Tseping, Hsiachuang, Hsingchou, Tsaoping, Painihu and Lofu. All these places used to be infested by bandits and deserters but have now been turned into our base area. Its population is under two thousand, and the yield of unhusked rice is less than ten thousand piculs, and so the entire grain for the army has to be supplied from Ningkang, Yunghsin and Suichuan Counties. All the strategic passes in the mountains are fortified. Our hospitals, bedding and clothing workshops, ordnance

department and regimental rear offices are all here. At the present moment grain is being transported to the mountains from Ningkang. Provided we have adequate supplies, the enemy can never break in. The second base, the Chiulung Mountains, is at the juncture of the four counties of Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua and Chaling. It is less important than the Ching kang Mountains, but serves as the rearmost base for the local armed forces of the four counties, and it too has been fortified. It is essential for an independent Red regime encircled by the White regime to make use of the strategic advantages offered by mountains.

### LAND QUESTIONS

*The land situation in the border areas.* Roughly speaking, more than 60 per cent of the land belonged to the landlords and less than 40 per cent to the peasants. In the Kiangsi sector, landownership was most concentrated in Suichuan County, where about 80 per cent of the land belonged to the landlords. Yunghsin came next with about 70 per cent. In Wanan, Ningkang and Lienhua there were more owner-peasants, but the landlords still owned the bulk of the land, *i.e.*, about 60 per cent of the total, while the peasants owned only 40 per cent. In the Hunan sector, about 70 per cent of the land in both Chaling and Lingsien Counties belonged to the landlords.

*The question of the intermediate class.* Given this land situation, it is possible to win the support of the majority for the confiscation and redistribution of all the land.<sup>17</sup> The rural population is roughly divided into three classes, the class of big and middle landlords, the intermediate class of small landlords and rich peasants, and the class of middle and poor peasants. The interests of the rich peasants are often interwoven with those of the small landlords. The land of the rich peasants forms only a small percentage of the total, yet if the land of the small landlords is counted in, the amount is considerable. Probably this is more or less the case throughout the country. The land policy which has been adopted in the border areas is complete confiscation and thorough distribution; consequently, in the Red area the big and middle landlord class and the intermediate class are both being attacked. Such is the policy, but in its actual execution we have met with a great deal of obstruction from the intermediate class. In the early days of the revolution the intermediate class ostensibly

capitulated to the poor peasant class, but in reality they exploited their traditional social position and clan authority to intimidate the poor peasants for the purpose of delaying the distribution of land. When no further delay was possible, they concealed their actual holdings, or retained the good land and gave up the poor land. In this period the poor peasants, having long been trampled down and feeling that the victory of the revolution was uncertain, frequently yielded to the intermediate class and dared not take vigorous action. Vigorous action is taken against the intermediate class in the villages only when the revolution is on the upsurge, for instance, when political power has been seized in one or more counties, the reactionary army has suffered several defeats and the prowess of the Red Army has been repeatedly demonstrated. The most serious instances of delay in land distribution and concealment of landholdings occurred in the southern section of Yunghsin County, where the intermediate class was the largest. The actual land distribution in this area was carried out only after the Red Army won its great victory at Lungyuankou on June 23 and the district government punished several people for delaying distribution. But as the feudal family system prevails in every county, and as all the families in a village or group of villages belong to a single clan, it will be quite a long time before people become conscious of their class and clan sentiment is overcome in the villages.

*The defection of the intermediate class under the White terror.* Having been under attack during the revolutionary upsurge, the intermediate class deserted to the enemy as soon as White terror struck. In Yunghsin and Ningkang it was precisely the small landlords and rich peasants who led the reactionary troops in setting fire to the houses of revolutionary peasants. On the instructions of the reactionaries, they burned down houses and made arrests, and quite brazenly too. When the Red Army returned to the area of Ningkang, Hsincheng, Kucheng and Lungshih, several thousand peasants fled with the reactionaries to Yunghsin, because they were duped by the reactionary propaganda that the Communists would kill them. It was only after we had conducted propaganda to the effect that "peasants who have defected will not be killed" and "peasants who have defected are welcome back to reap their crops" that some of them slowly came back.

When the revolution is at a low ebb in the country as a whole, the most difficult problem in our areas is to keep a firm hold on the intermediate class. The main reason for betrayal by this class is that

it has received too heavy a blow from the revolution. But when there is a revolutionary upsurge in the country as a whole, the poor peasant class has something to rely on and becomes bolder, while the intermediate class has something to fear and dare not get out of hand. When the war between Li Tsung-jen and Tang Sheng-chih spread to Hunan, the small landlords in Chaling tried to placate the peasants, and some even sent them pork as a New Year gift (though by then the Red Army had already withdrawn from Chaling to Suichuan). But after the war ended, no one ever heard of such things again. Now that there is a nation-wide tide of counter-revolution, the intermediate class in the White areas, having suffered heavy blows, has attached itself almost wholly to the big landlord class, and the poor peasant class has become isolated. This is indeed a very serious problem.<sup>18</sup>

*The pressure of daily life as a cause of the defection of the intermediate class.* The Red and the White areas are now facing each other like two countries at war. Owing to the tight enemy blockade and to our mishandling of the petty bourgeoisie, trade between the two areas has almost entirely ceased; necessities such as salt, cloth and medicines are scarce and costly, and agricultural products such as timber, tea and oil cannot be sent out so that the peasants' cash income is cut off and the people as a whole are affected. Poor peasants are more able to bear such hardships, but the intermediate class will go over to the big landlord class when it can bear them no longer. Unless the splits and wars within the landlord class and among the warlords in China continue, and unless a nation-wide revolutionary situation develops, the small independent Red regimes will come under great economic pressure and it is doubtful whether they will be able to last. For not only is such economic strain intolerable to the intermediate class, but some day it will prove too much even for the workers, poor peasants and Red Army men. In the counties of Yunghsin and Ningkang there was at one time no salt for cooking, and supplies of cloth and medicines, not to mention other things, were entirely cut off. Now salt can be had again but is very expensive. Cloth and medicines are still unobtainable. Timber, tea and oil, which are all produced abundantly in Ningkang, western Yunghsin and northern Suichuan (all within our areas at present), cannot be sent out.<sup>19</sup>

*The criterion for land distribution.* The township is taken as the unit for land distribution. In hillier regions with less farm land, for instance, in the Hsiao Chiang district of Yunghsin, three or four townships

were sometimes taken as the unit, but such cases were extremely rare. All the inhabitants, men and women, old and young, received equal shares. A change has now been made in accordance with the Central Committee's plan whereby labour-power is taken as the criterion, so that a person with labour-power is allotted twice as much land as one without.<sup>20</sup>

*The question of concessions to the owner-peasants.* This has not yet been discussed in detail. Among the owner-peasants, the rich peasants have requested that productive capacity should be taken as the criterion, that is, that those with more manpower and capital (such as farm implements) should be allotted more land. They feel that neither equal distribution nor distribution according to labour-power is to their advantage. They have indicated that they are willing to put in more effort, which, coupled with the use of their capital, would enable them to raise bigger crops. They will not like it if they are allotted the same amount of land as everybody else and their special efforts and extra capital are ignored (left unused). Land distribution here is still being carried out in the way laid down by the Central Committee. But this question deserves further discussion, and a report will be submitted when conclusions are reached.

*The land tax.* In Ningkang the tax rate is 20 per cent of the crop, or 5 per cent more than the rate fixed by the Central Committee; it is inadvisable to make any change now as collection is already under way, but the rate will be reduced next year. Then there are the sections of Suichuan, Linghsien and Yunghsin under our regime which are all hilly areas, and where the peasants are so poverty-stricken that any taxation is inadvisable. We have to rely on expropriating the local tyrants in the White areas to cover the expenses of the government and the Red Guards. As for the provisioning of the Red Army, rice is obtained for the time being from the land tax in Ningkang, while cash is obtained solely from expropriation of the local tyrants. During our guerrilla operations in Suichuan in October, we collected more than ten thousand yuan, which will last us some time, and we shall see what can be done when it is spent.

#### QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL POWER

People's political power has been established everywhere at county, district and township levels, but more in name than in reality. In

many places there is no council of workers, peasants and soldiers. The executive committees of the township, district or even county governments were invariably elected at some kind of mass meeting. But mass meetings called on the spur of the moment can neither discuss questions nor help in training the masses politically, and, what is more, they are only too apt to be manipulated by intellectuals or careerists. Some places do have a council, but it is regarded merely as a temporary body for electing the executive committee; once the election is over, authority is monopolized by the committee and the council is never heard of again. Not that there are no councils of workers, peasants and soldiers worthy of the name, but they are very few. The reason is the lack of propaganda and education concerning this new political system. The evil feudal practice of arbitrary dictation is so deeply rooted in the minds of the people and even of the ordinary Party members that it cannot be swept away at once; when anything crops up, they choose the easy way and have no liking for the bothersome democratic system. Democratic centralism can be widely and effectively practised in mass organizations only when its efficacy is demonstrated in revolutionary struggle and the masses understand that it is the best means of mobilizing their forces and is of the utmost help in their struggle. We are drafting a detailed organic law for the councils at all levels (based on the outline drawn up by the Central Committee) in order gradually to correct previous mistakes. In the Red Army, conferences of soldiers' representatives are now being established on a permanent basis and at all levels so as to correct the mistake of having only soldiers' committees and not conferences.

At present, what the masses of the people generally understand by the "government of workers, peasants and soldiers" is the executive committee, because they are still unaware of the powers of the council, and think that the executive committee alone is the real power. An executive committee without a council behind it often acts without regard for the views of the masses, and there are instances everywhere of hesitation and compromise on the confiscation and redistribution of land, of squandering or embezzlement of funds, and of recoiling before the White forces or fighting only half-heartedly. In addition, the committee seldom meets in full session, all business being decided and handled by its standing committee. In the district and township governments even the standing committee rarely meets, and business is decided and handled separately by the four individuals who work

in the office, namely, the chairman, secretary, treasurer and commander of the Red Guards (or insurrectionary detachment). Thus democratic centralism has not become a regular practice even in the work of the government.

In the early days the small landlords and rich peasants scrambled to get on to government committees, especially at the township level. Wearing red ribbons and feigning enthusiasm, they wormed their way into the government committees by trickery and seized control of everything, relegating the poor-peasant members to a minor role. They can be cleared out only when they are unmasked in the course of struggle and the poor peasants assert themselves. Though not widespread, such a state of affairs exists in quite a number of places.

The Party enjoys immense prestige and authority among the masses, the government much less. The reason is that for the sake of convenience the Party handles many things directly and brushes aside the government bodies. There are many such instances. In some places there are no leading Party members' groups in the government organizations, while in others they exist but are not functioning properly. From now on the Party must carry out its task of giving leadership to the government; with the exception of propaganda, the Party's policies and the measures it recommends must be carried out through the government organizations. The Kuomintang's wrong practice of directly imposing orders on the government must be avoided.

#### QUESTIONS OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

*The struggle against opportunism.* It may be said that around the time of the May 21st Incident the Party organizations in the border area counties were controlled by opportunists. When the counter-revolution set in, there was very little resolute struggle. In October last year, when the Red Army (the First Regiment of the First Division of the First Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army) arrived in the border area counties, only a few Party members who had gone into hiding were left and the Party organizations had been entirely destroyed by the enemy. The period from last November to April was one of rebuilding the Party, and the period since May has been one of great expansion. But in the last twelve months manifestations of opportunism continued to be widespread. On the approach

of the enemy, some members, lacking the will to fight, hid in remote hills, which they called "lying in ambush". Other members, though very active, resorted to blind insurrection. These were both expressions of petty-bourgeois ideology. After a long period of tempering through struggle and of inner-Party education, such things have become less frequent. In the past year, the same petty-bourgeois ideology also existed in the Red Army. On the approach of the enemy, either reckless battle or precipitate flight would be proposed. Often both ideas emanated from the same individual in the course of the discussions on what military action to take. This opportunist ideology has been gradually corrected through prolonged inner-Party struggle and through lessons learned from actual events, for instance, from the losses incurred in reckless battle and the reverses suffered during precipitate flight.

*Localism.* The economy in the border area is agricultural, with some places still in the age of the hand-pestle (in the hilly regions the wooden pestle is still in general use for husking rice, while in the plains there are many stone pestles). The unit of social organization everywhere is the clan, consisting of people having the same family name. In the Party organizations in the villages, it often happens that a branch meeting virtually becomes a clan meeting, since branches consist of members bearing the same family name and living close together. In these circumstances it is very hard indeed to build a "militant Bolshevik Party". Such members do not quite understand when they are told that the Communists draw no sharp line of demarcation between one nation and another or between one province and another, or that a sharp line should not be drawn between different counties, districts and townships. Localism exists to a serious extent in the relations between counties and even between districts and townships within the same county. In eliminating localism, reasoning can at best produce only limited results, and it takes White oppression, which is by no means localized, to do much more. For instance, it is only when counter-revolutionary "joint suppression" campaigns by the two provinces make the people share a common lot in struggle that their localism is gradually broken down. Localism is declining as a result of many such lessons.

*The question of the native inhabitants and the settlers.* There is another peculiar feature in the border counties, namely, the rift between the native inhabitants and the settlers. A very wide rift has long existed between the native inhabitants and the settlers whose

forefathers came from the north several hundred years ago; their traditional feuds are deep-seated and they sometimes erupt in violent clashes. The settlers, numbering several millions, live in a zone extending from the Fukien-Kwangtung border all the way along the Hunan-Kiangsi border to southern Hupeh. These settlers, who live in the hilly regions, have been oppressed by the native inhabitants in the plains and have never had any political rights. They welcomed the national revolution of the past two years, thinking that the day had come for them to raise their heads. But unfortunately the revolution failed and they continue to be oppressed by the native inhabitants. Within our own area the problem of the native inhabitants and the settlers exists in Ningkung, Suichuan, Linghsien and Chaling, and is most serious in Ningkung. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the revolutionaries among the native inhabitants of Ningkung, together with the settlers, overthrew the political power of the native landlords and gained control of the whole county in 1926-27. In June last year the Kiangsi government under Chu Pei-teh turned against the revolution; in September the landlords acted as guides for Chu's troops in the "suppression" campaign against Ningkung and once again stirred up the conflict between the native inhabitants and the settlers. In theory, this rift between the native inhabitants and the settlers ought not to extend into the exploited classes of workers and peasants, much less into the Communist Party. But it does, and it persists by force of long tradition. Here is an example. After the August defeat in the border area, when the native landlords returned to Ningkung, bringing with them the reactionary troops and spreading the rumour that the settlers were going to massacre the native inhabitants, most of the native peasants defected, put on white ribbons and guided the White troops in burning down houses and searching the hills. And when the Red Army routed the White troops in October and November, the native peasants fled with the reactionaries, and their property in turn was seized by the settler-peasants. This situation, reflected in the Party, often leads to senseless conflicts. Our solution is, on the one hand, to announce that "peasants who have defected will not be killed" and "peasants who have defected will also be given land when they return", in order to help them shake off the influence of the landlords and return home without misgivings; on the other hand, it is to get our county governments to order the restoration by settler-peasants of any property they have seized, and to post notices that the native peasants will be protected.

Inside the Party, education must be intensified to ensure unity between these two sections of the membership.

*The defection of the careerists.* During the revolutionary upsurge (in June), many careerists took advantage of the Party's open recruitment of members and sneaked into the Party, with the result that the membership in the border area rapidly rose to more than ten thousand. Since the leaders of the branches and district committees were mostly new members, good inner-Party education was out of the question. As soon as the White terror struck, the careerists defected and acted as guides for the counter-revolutionaries in rounding up our comrades, and the Party organizations in the White areas mostly collapsed. After September the Party carried out a drastic house cleaning and set strict class qualifications for membership. All the Party organizations in Yunghsin and Ningkang Counties were dissolved and a re-registration was undertaken. Though greatly reduced in numbers, the membership has gained in fighting capacity. All Party organizations used to be in the open, but since September underground organizations have been built up to prepare the Party for carrying on its activities when the reactionaries come. At the same time, we have been making every effort to penetrate into the White areas and operate inside the enemy camp. But in the nearby towns the foundations have not yet been laid for Party organization. The reasons are that, first, the enemy is stronger in the towns and, second, our army hurt the interests of the bourgeoisie too much during its occupation of the towns, so that it is difficult for Party members to keep a foothold there. We are now correcting these mistakes and doing our best to build Party organizations in the towns, but so far without much success.

*The leading bodies of the Party.* The branch executive has been renamed the branch committee. Above the branch there is the district committee, and above that the county committee. Where there are special circumstances, a special district committee is formed between the district and the county levels, as for instance the Peihsiang Special District Committee and the Southeastern Special District Committee in Yunghsin County. In the border area there are altogether five county committees, in Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua, Suichuan and Linghsien. There used to be a county committee in Chaling, but as the work there did not take root, most of the organizations formed last winter and this spring have been crushed by the Whites; consequently for the last six months we have been able to work only in the hilly regions near Ningkang and Yunghsin, and so the Chaling

County Committee has been changed into a special district committee. Comrades were sent to Yuhsien and Anjen Counties, which can be reached only via Chaling, but they have returned without accomplishing anything. The Wanan County Committee was cut off from us by the Whites for more than six months after its joint meeting with us in Suichuan in January, and it was not until September, when the Red Army reached Wanan in a guerrilla operation, that we resumed contact. From Wanan eighty revolutionary peasants returned with our men to the Ching kang Mountains and were organized as the Wanan Red Guards. There is no Party organization in Anfu. The County Committee of Kian, which borders on Yunghsin, has got in touch with us only twice and has given us no help, which is very strange. In the Shatien area of Kueitung County land distribution was carried out on two occasions, in March and in August, and Party organizations have been built up and placed under the Southern Hunan Special Committee with its centre at Shihertung in Lunghsi. Above the county committees there is the Special Committee of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area. On May 20 the first Party congress of the border area was held at Maoping in Ning kang County, and it elected twenty-three people as members of the First Special Committee, with Mao Tse-tung as secretary. In July the Hunan Provincial Committee sent over Yang Kai-ming and he became acting secretary. In September Yang fell ill and Tan Chen-lin took his place. In August, when the major detachment of the Red Army had gone to southern Hunan and the White forces were pressing hard on the border area, we held an emergency meeting at Yunghsin. In October after the Red Army's return to Ning kang, the second Party congress of the border area was held at Maoping. In its three-day session beginning on October 14, it adopted a number of resolutions, including "The Political Problems and the Tasks of the Border Area Party Organization", and elected the following nineteen people as members of the Second Special Committee, Tan Chen-lin, Chu Teh, Chen Yi, Lung Chao-ching, Chu Chang-chieh, Liu Tien-chien, Yuan Pan-chu, Tan Szu-tung, Tan Ping, Li Chueh-fei, Sung Yi-yueh, Yuan Wen-tsai, Wang Tso-nung, Chen Cheng-jen, Mao Tse-tung, Wan Hsi-hsien, Wang Tso, Yang Kai-ming and Ho Ting-ying. A standing committee of five was formed, with Tan Chen-lin (a worker) as secretary and Chen Cheng-jen (an intellectual) as deputy secretary. The Sixth Party Congress of the Red Army was held on November 14 and it elected an Army Committee of twenty-three members, five of them forming

a standing committee with Chu Teh as secretary. Both the Border Area Special Committee and the Army Committee are subordinate to the Front Committee. The Front Committee was reorganized on November 6, with the following five members designated by the Central Committee: Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, the secretary of the local Party headquarters (Tan Chen-lin), a worker comrade (Sung Chiao-sheng) and a peasant comrade (Mao Ko-wen), with Mao Tse-tung as secretary. For the time being, this committee has set up a secretariat, a propaganda section, an organization section, a labour movement commission and a military affairs commission. The Front Committee is in charge of the local Party organizations. It is necessary to retain the Special Committee because sometimes the Front Committee has to move about with the troops. In our opinion the question of proletarian ideological leadership is very important. The Party organizations in the border area counties, which are composed almost exclusively of peasants, will go astray without the ideological leadership of the proletariat. Besides paying close attention to the labour movement in the county towns and other big towns, we should increase the workers' representation in the government bodies. The proportion of workers and poor peasants should also be increased in the leading organs of the Party at all levels.

#### THE QUESTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION

We fully agree with the Communist International's resolution on China. There is no doubt that China is still at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The programme for a thorough democratic revolution in China comprises, externally, the overthrow of imperialism so as to achieve complete national liberation, and, internally, the elimination of the power and influence of the comprador class in the cities, the completion of the agrarian revolution in order to abolish feudal relations in the villages, and the overthrow of the government of the warlords. We must go through such a democratic revolution before we can lay a real foundation for the transition to socialism. In the past year we have fought in many places and are keenly aware that the revolutionary tide is on the ebb in the country as a whole. While Red political power has been established in a few small areas, in the country as a whole the people lack the ordinary democratic rights, the workers, the peasants and even the bourgeois

democrats do not have freedom of speech or assembly, and the worst crime is to join the Communist Party. Wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof and only after our propaganda do they slowly move into action. Whatever enemy units we face, there are hardly any cases of mutiny or desertion to our side and we have to fight it out. This holds even for the enemy's Sixth Army which recruited the greatest number of "rebels" after the May 21st Incident. We have an acute sense of our isolation which we keep hoping will end. Only by launching a political and economic struggle for democracy, which will also involve the urban petty bourgeoisie, can we turn the revolution into a seething tide that will surge through the country.

Up to February this year we applied our policy towards the petty bourgeoisie fairly well. In March the representative of the Southern Hunan Special Committee arrived in Ningkang and criticized us for having leaned to the Right, for having done too little burning and killing, and for having failed to carry out the so-called policy of "turning the petty bourgeois into proletarians and then forcing them into the revolution", whereupon the leadership of the Front Committee was reorganized and the policy was changed. In April, after the whole of our army arrived in the border area, there was still not much burning and killing, but the expropriation of the middle merchants in the towns and the collection of compulsory contributions from the small landlords and rich peasants in the countryside were rigorously enforced. The slogan of "All factories to the workers", put forward by the Southern Hunan Special Committee, was also given wide publicity. This ultra-Left policy of attacking the petty bourgeoisie drove most of them to the side of the landlords, with the result that they put on white ribbons and opposed us. With the gradual change of this policy, the situation has been steadily improving. Good results have been achieved in Suichuan in particular, for the merchants in the county town and other market towns no longer fight shy of us, and quite a few speak well of the Red Army. The fair in Tsaolin (held every three days at noon) attracts some twenty thousand people, an attendance which breaks all previous records. This is proof that our policy is now correct. The landlords imposed very heavy taxes and levies on the people; the pacification guards<sup>21</sup> of Suichuan levied five toll charges along the seventy-*li* road from Huangao to Tsaolin, no farm produce being exempt. We crushed the pacification guards and abolished these tolls, thus winning the support of all the peasants as well as of small and middle merchants.

The Central Committee wants us to issue a political programme which takes into account the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, and we for our part propose that the Central Committee work out, for general guidance, a programme for the whole democratic revolution which takes into account the workers' interests, the agrarian revolution and national liberation.

A special characteristic of the revolution in China, a country with a predominantly agricultural economy, is the use of military action to develop insurrection. We recommend that the Central Committee should devote great effort to military work.

#### THE QUESTION OF THE LOCATION OF OUR INDEPENDENT REGIME

The area stretching from northern Kwangtung along the Hunan-Kiangsi border into southern Hupeh lies entirely within the Lohsiao mountain range. We have traversed the whole range, and a comparison of its different sections shows that the middle section, with Ningkang as its centre, is the most suitable for our armed independent regime. The northern section has terrain which is less suitable for our taking either the offensive or the defensive, and it is too close to the enemy's big political centres. Besides, stationing large forces in the area of Liuyang, Liling, Pinghsiang and Tungku would involve a considerable risk, unless we plan a quick seizure of Changsha or Wuhan. The southern section has better terrain than the northern, but our mass base there is not as good as in the middle section nor can we exert as great a political influence on Hunan and Kiangsi from there as we can from the middle section, from which any move can affect the lower river valleys of the two provinces. The middle section has the following advantages: (1) a mass base, which we have been cultivating for more than a year; (2) a fairly good basis for the Party organizations; (3) local armed forces which have been built up for more than a year and are well experienced in struggle — a rare achievement — and which, coupled with the Fourth Red Army, will prove indestructible in the face of any enemy force; (4) an excellent military base, the Ching kang Mountains, and bases for our local armed forces in all the counties; (5) the influence it can exert on the two provinces and on the lower valleys of their rivers, an influence endowing it with much more political importance than that possessed

by southern Hunan or southern Kiangsi, the influence of either of which can reach out only to its own province, or only to the upper river valley and the hinterland of its own province. The disadvantage of the middle section is that, since it has long been under the independent regime, and is confronted by the enemy's large "encirclement and suppression" forces, its economic problems, especially the shortage of cash, are extremely difficult.

As for a plan of action here, the Hunan Provincial Committee advocated three different plans within a few weeks in June and July. First Yuan Te-sheng came and approved our plan to establish political power in the middle section of the Lohsiao mountain range. Then Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang Kai-ming came and urged that the Red Army should move towards southern Hunan without the least hesitation and leave a force of only two hundred rifles behind to defend the border area together with the Red Guards; this, they said, was the "absolutely correct" policy. The third time, barely ten days later, Yuan Te-sheng came again with a letter which, besides rebuking us at great length, urged that the Red Army should set out for eastern Hunan; this was again described as the "absolutely correct" policy, to be carried out "without the least hesitation". These rigid directives put us in a real dilemma, because failure to comply would be tantamount to disobedience, while compliance would mean certain defeat. When the second message came, the Army Committee, the Border Area Special Committee and the Yunghsin County Committee of the Party met in a joint session and decided against carrying out the Provincial Committee's instructions, as it was considered dangerous to move towards southern Hunan. But a few days later, Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang Kai-ming, persisting in the Provincial Party Committee's plan and taking advantage of the 29th Regiment's homesickness, dragged the Red Army off to attack the county town of Chenchou, thus bringing defeat both to the border area and to the Red Army. The Red Army lost about half its men, and countless houses were burned down and innumerable people massacred in the border area; county after county fell to the enemy and some of them have not been recovered to this day. As for moving to eastern Hunan, it was certainly inadvisable for the main forces of the Red Army to do so unless there was a split among the ruling landlords of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi Provinces. If we had not advanced on southern Hunan in July, we would not only have averted the August defeat in the border area, but we could also have exploited the fighting between

the Kuomintang's Sixth Army and Wang Chun's Kuomintang forces in Changshu, Kiangsi Province, to crush the enemy forces in Yungshin, overrun Kian and Anfu, and make it possible for our advanced guard to reach Pinghsiang and establish contact with the Fifth Red Army in the northern section of the Lohsiao mountain range. Even if all that had happened, the proper place for our general headquarters should have still been Ningkang, and only guerrilla forces should have been dispatched to eastern Hunan. Since fighting had not broken out among the landlords and since formidable enemy forces were still in Pinghsiang, Chaling and Yuhsien on the Hunan border, we would have been giving the enemy his chance if we had moved our main forces northward. The Central Committee asked us to consider an advance on eastern or on southern Hunan, but either course was very dangerous; although the proposed expedition to eastern Hunan has not been carried out, the expedition to southern Hunan has proved a failure. This painful experience is always worth remembering.

We are not yet in a period when the regime of the landlord class has split up, and the "suppression" forces of the enemy deployed round the border area still number more than ten regiments. But if we can continue to find ways of getting cash (food and clothing no longer being a big problem), then, with the foundation for our work established in the border area, we shall be able to cope with these enemy forces, and even with larger ones. As far as the border area is concerned, it would at once suffer devastation, just as it did in August, if the Red Army moved away. Although not all our Red Guards would be wiped out, the Party and our mass base would receive a crippling blow, and although there are places in the mountains where we might retain a foothold, in the plains we would all have to go underground as in August and September. If the Red Army does not move away, then, building on the foundations we already have, we shall be able gradually to expand to surrounding areas and our prospects will be very bright. If we want to enlarge the Red Army, the only way is to engage the enemy in a prolonged struggle in the vicinity of the ChingKang Mountains where we have a good mass base, namely, in the counties of Ningkang, Yungshin, Linghsien and Suichuan, utilizing in this struggle the divergence of interests between the enemy forces of Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces, their need to defend themselves on all sides and their consequent inability to concentrate their forces. We can gradually enlarge the

Red Army by the use of correct tactics, fighting no battle unless we can win it and capture arms and men. With the preparatory work that had already been done among the masses in the border area between April and July, the Red Army could undoubtedly have been enlarged in August had its major detachment not made its expedition to southern Hunan. Despite that mistake, the Red Army has returned to the border area where the terrain is favourable and the people are friendly, and the prospects are not bad even now. Only through the determination to fight and stamina in fighting in places such as the border area can the Red Army add to its arms and train up good men. The Red Flag has been kept flying in the border area for a whole year. It has incurred the bitter hatred of the landlord class of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi and indeed of that of the whole country, but it is steadily raising the hopes of the workers, peasants and soldiers in the surrounding provinces. Consider the soldiers. Because the warlords are making the "bandit-suppression" campaign against the border area their major task and are issuing such statements as "a year has been spent and a million dollars used up in the effort to suppress the bandits" (Lu Ti-ping), or the Red Army "has 20,000 men with 5,000 rifles" (Wang Chun), the attention of their soldiers and disheartened junior officers is gradually turned towards us, and more and more of them will break away from the enemy to join our ranks, thus providing the Red Army with another source of recruitment. Besides, the fact that the Red Flag has never been lowered in the border area shows at once the strength of the Communist Party and the bankruptcy of the ruling classes, and this is of nation-wide political significance. Therefore, we hold, as we have always held, that it is absolutely necessary and correct to build up and expand Red political power in the middle section of the Lohsiao mountain range.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This war took place in October 1927.

<sup>2</sup> This war took place in November and December 1927.

<sup>3</sup> The system of the soldiers' representative conferences and soldiers' committees in the Red Army was later abolished. In 1947, the People's Liberation Army inaugurated a system of army-men's conferences and soldiers' committees, both under the leadership of cadres.

<sup>4</sup> These troops, originally under the command of Comrades Yeh Ting and Ho Lung, staged the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927. They were defeated in their advance on Chaochow and Swatow, Kwangtung Province, and some units, led by Comrades Chu Teh, Lin Piao and Chen Yi, withdrew to southern Hunan via Kiangsi to carry on guerrilla operations. They joined Comrade Mao Tse-tung's forces in the Ching kang Mountains in April 1928.

<sup>5</sup> In the revolutionary days of 1927 most of the cadres in the Guards Regiment of the National Government at Wuchang were members of the Communist Party. At the end of July 1927, after Wang Ching-wei and his associates had betrayed the revolution, the regiment left Wuchang to join in the uprising at Nanchang. Learning *en route* that the revolutionary forces had already gone south from Nanchang, the regiment made a detour to Hsiushui in western Kiangsi to join the peasant armed forces of Pingkiang and Liuyang.

<sup>6</sup> In the spring of 1927 peasant armed forces of considerable strength were formed in the area of Pingkiang and Liuyang, Hunan Province. On May 21, Hsu Ke-hsiang staged a counter-revolutionary coup in Changsha and massacred the revolutionary masses. The peasant armed forces then marched on Changsha on May 31 to hit back at the counter-revolutionaries, but were stopped by the opportunist Chen Tu-hsiu and turned back. Thereupon a section was reorganized into an independent regiment to engage in guerrilla warfare. After the Nanchang Uprising, these armed peasants joined forces with the former Guards Regiment of the Wuchang National Government at Hsiushui and Tungku in Kiangsi Province and at Pingkiang and Liuyang in Hunan Province, and staged the Autumn Harvest Uprising in co-ordination with the armed coal miners of Pinghsiang, Kiangsi. In October Comrade Mao Tse-tung led these forces to the Ching kang Mountains.

<sup>7</sup> In early 1928, while Comrade Chu Teh was directing revolutionary guerrilla warfare in southern Hunan, peasant armies were organized in the counties of Yichang, Chenchou, Leiyang, Yunghsing and Tsehsing, where the peasant movement had already taken firm root. Comrade Chu Teh subsequently led them to the Ching kang Mountains to join the forces under Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

<sup>8</sup> Shuikoushan in Changning, Hunan Province, is well known for its lead mines. In 1922 the miners there led by the Communist Party formed a trade union and for years conducted struggles against the counter-revolution. Many of the miners joined the Red Army after the Autumn Harvest Uprising of 1927.

<sup>9</sup> The Anyuan coal mines in Pinghsiang County, Kiangsi Province, employing twelve thousand workers, were owned by the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron and Steel Company. From 1921 onwards Party organizations and a miners' union were set up there by the organizers sent by the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party.

<sup>10</sup> In 1929 the Party Representatives in the Red Army were renamed political commissars. In 1931 the company political commissars were renamed political instructors.

<sup>11</sup> Expropriation of the local tyrants was only a temporary measure to defray part of the army's expenses. The growth of the army and the expansion of the base areas made it necessary and possible to defray army expenses through taxation.

<sup>12</sup> This practice of equal cash payment, necessary at the time, remained in force over many years in the Red Army. Later on, however, officers and men received payments which differed slightly according to rank.

<sup>13</sup> Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung lays special stress on the need for a definite measure of democracy in the revolutionary army, since, in the early period of the Red Army, without the stress on democracy it would not have been possible to arouse the revolutionary enthusiasm of the new peasant recruits and the captured

White troops who had joined our ranks, nor would it have been possible to eliminate the warlord ways of the reactionary armies which had infected our cadres. Of course, democracy in the army must not transcend the limits of military discipline and must serve to strengthen and not weaken discipline. Therefore, while a necessary measure of democracy should be promoted, the demand for ultra-democracy, which amounts to indiscipline, must be combated. Such indiscipline became a matter of serious concern at one point in the early days of the Red Army. For Comrade Mao Tse-tung's struggle against ultra-democracy in the army, see "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", pp. 51-62 of this volume.

<sup>14</sup> Comrade Yeh Ting commanded an independent regiment during the Northern Expedition in 1926. With Communists as its nucleus the regiment became famous as a crack force in the expedition. It was expanded into the Twenty-fourth Division after the capture of Wuchang by the revolutionary army and then into the Eleventh Army after the Nanchang Uprising.

<sup>15</sup> Subsequent experience in the Red Army showed that a ratio of one Party member to two non-Party men was adequate. This proportion was generally maintained in the Red Army and later in the People's Liberation Army.

<sup>16</sup> Instigated by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang army commanders in Hunan, including Hsu Ke-hsiang and Ho Chien, ordered a raid on the provincial headquarters of the trade unions, the peasant associations and other revolutionary organizations in Changsha on May 21, 1927. Communists and revolutionary workers and peasants were arrested and killed en masse. This signaled the open collaboration between the two counter-revolutionary Kuomintang cliques, the Wuhan clique headed by Wang Ching-wei and the Nanking clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

<sup>17</sup> Confiscation and redistribution of all the land was a provision in the Land Law promulgated in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area in 1928. Comrade Mao Tse-tung later pointed out that the confiscation of all land, instead of only the land of the landlords, was a mistake stemming from inexperience in agrarian struggles. In the Land Law of Hsingkuo County, Kiangsi, adopted in April 1929 the provision "confiscate all the land" was changed into "confiscate the public land and the land of the landlord class".

<sup>18</sup> In view of the importance of winning over the intermediate class in the countryside, Comrade Mao Tse-tung soon corrected the erroneous policy of dealing too sharply with this class. Apart from the present article, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's views on policy towards the intermediate class were also set forth in proposals to the Sixth Party Congress of the Red Army (November 1928), including "The Prohibition of Reckless Burning and Killing" and "Protection of the Interests of the Middle and Small Merchants"; in the January 1929 proclamation for the Fourth Red Army, which declared "merchants in the towns who have gradually built up some property are to be left alone so long as they obey the authorities"; in the Land Law of Hsingkuo County dated April 1929 (see preceding note), etc.

<sup>19</sup> With the spread of the revolutionary war, the extension of the revolutionary base areas, and the adoption of the policy of protecting industry and commerce by the revolutionary government, it became possible to change this situation, and a change did in fact occur later. What was crucial was resolutely to protect the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie and oppose ultra-Left policies.

<sup>20</sup> Labour-power is not an appropriate criterion for land distribution. In the Red areas land was in fact redistributed equally on a per capita basis.

<sup>21</sup> The pacification guards were a kind of local counter-revolutionary armed force.

## ON CORRECTING MISTAKEN IDEAS IN THE PARTY\*

*December 1929*

There are various non-proletarian ideas in the Communist Party organization in the Fourth Red Army which greatly hinder the application of the Party's correct line. Unless these ideas are thoroughly corrected, the Fourth Army cannot possibly shoulder the tasks assigned to it in China's great revolutionary struggle. The source of such incorrect ideas in this Party organization lies, of course, in the fact that its basic units are composed largely of peasants and other elements of petty-bourgeois origin; yet the failure of the Party's leading bodies to wage a concerted and determined struggle against the incorrect ideas and to educate the members in the Party's correct line is also an important cause of their existence and growth. In accordance with the spirit of the September letter of the Central Committee, this congress hereby points out the manifestations of various non-proletarian ideas in the Party organization in the Fourth Army, their sources, and the methods of correcting them, and calls upon all comrades to eliminate them thoroughly.

### ON THE PURELY MILITARY VIEWPOINT

The purely military viewpoint is very highly developed among a number of comrades in the Red Army. It manifests itself as follows:

---

\* This article was a resolution drawn up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army. The building of the Chinese people's armed forces was a difficult process. The Chinese Red Army (which became the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies during the War of Resistance Against Japan and is now the People's Liberation Army) was created on August 1, 1927, during the Nanchang Uprising, and by December 1929 had been in existence for over two years. During this period the Communist Party organization in the Red

1. These comrades regard military affairs and politics as opposed to each other and refuse to recognize that military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks. Some even say, "If you are good militarily, naturally you are good politically; if you are not good militarily, you cannot be any good politically" — this is to go a step further and give military affairs a leading position over politics.

2. They think that the task of the Red Army, like that of the White army, is merely to fight. They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up Party organizations. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.

3. Hence, organizationally, these comrades subordinate the departments of the Red Army doing political work to those doing military work, and put forward the slogan, "Let Army Headquarters handle outside matters". If allowed to develop, this idea would involve the danger of estrangement from the masses, control of the government by the army and departure from proletarian leadership — it would be to take the path of warlordism like the Kuomintang army.

4. At the same time, in propaganda work they overlook the importance of propaganda teams. On the question of mass organization, they neglect the organizing of soldiers' committees in the army and the organizing of the local workers and peasants. As a result, both propaganda and organizational work are abandoned.

---

Army learned a great deal and gained quite a rich store of experience in the course of combating various mistaken ideas. The resolution summed up this experience. It enabled the Red Army to build itself entirely on a Marxist-Leninist basis and to eliminate all the influences of armies of the old type. It was carried out not only in the Fourth Army but also in all other units of the Red Army successively; in this way the whole Chinese Red Army became a genuine army of the people in every respect. In the last thirty and more years the Chinese people's armed forces have made tremendous developments and innovations in their Party activities and political work, which now present a very different picture, but the basic line remains the same as that laid down in this resolution.

5. They become conceited when a battle is won and dispirited when a battle is lost.

6. Selfish departmentalism — they think only of the Fourth Army and do not realize that it is an important task of the Red Army to arm the local masses. This is cliquism in a magnified form.

7. Unable to see beyond their limited environment in the Fourth Army, a few comrades believe that no other revolutionary forces exist. Hence their extreme addiction to the idea of conserving strength and avoiding action. This is a remnant of opportunism.

8. Some comrades, disregarding the subjective and objective conditions, suffer from the malady of revolutionary impetuosity; they will not take pains to do minute and detailed work among the masses, but, riddled with illusions, want only to do big things. This is a remnant of putschism.<sup>1</sup>

The sources of the purely military viewpoint are:

1. A low political level. From this flows the failure to recognize the role of political leadership in the army and to recognize that the Red Army and the White army are fundamentally different.

2. The mentality of mercenaries. Many prisoners captured in past battles have joined the Red Army, and such elements bring with them a markedly mercenary outlook, thereby providing a basis in the lower ranks for the purely military viewpoint.

3. From the two preceding causes there arises a third, overconfidence in military strength and absence of confidence in the strength of the masses of the people.

4. The Party's failure actively to attend to and discuss military work is also a reason for the emergence of the purely military viewpoint among a number of comrades.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. Raise the political level in the Party by means of education, destroy the theoretical roots of the purely military viewpoint, and be clear on the fundamental difference between the Red Army and the White army. At the same time, eliminate the remnants of opportunism and putschism and break down the selfish departmentalism of the Fourth Army.

2. Intensify the political training of officers and men and especially the education of ex-prisoners. At the same time, as far as possible let the local governments select workers and peasants experienced in struggle to join the Red Army, thus organizationally weakening or even eradicating the purely military viewpoint.

3. Arouse the local Party organizations to criticize the Party organizations in the Red Army and the organs of mass political power to criticize the Red Army itself, in order to influence the Party organizations and the officers and men of the Red Army.

4. The Party must actively attend to and discuss military work. All the work must be discussed and decided upon by the Party before being carried out by the rank and file.

5. Draw up Red Army rules and regulations which clearly define its tasks, the relationship between its military and its political apparatus, the relationship between the Red Army and the masses of the people, and the powers and functions of the soldiers' committees and their relationship with the military and political organizations.

### ON ULTRA-DEMOCRACY

Since the Fourth Army of the Red Army accepted the directives of the Central Committee, there has been a great decrease in the manifestations of ultra-democracy. For example, Party decisions are now carried out fairly well; and no longer does anyone bring up such erroneous demands as that the Red Army should apply "democratic centralism from the bottom to the top" or should "let the lower levels discuss all problems first, and then let the higher levels decide". Actually, however, this decrease is only temporary and superficial and does not yet mean that ultra-democratic ideas are eliminated. In other words, ultra-democracy is still deep-rooted in the minds of many comrades. Witness the various expressions of reluctance to carry out Party decisions.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. In the sphere of theory, destroy the roots of ultra-democracy. First of all, it should be pointed out that the danger of ultra-democracy lies in the fact that it damages or even completely wrecks the Party organization and weakens or even completely undermines the Party's fighting capacity, rendering the Party incapable of fulfilling its fighting tasks and thereby causing the defeat of the revolution. Next, it should be pointed out that the source of ultra-democracy consists in the petty bourgeoisie's individualistic aversion to discipline. When this characteristic is brought into the Party, it develops into ultra-

democratic ideas, political and organizational. These ideas are utterly incompatible with the fighting tasks of the proletariat.

2. In the sphere of organization, ensure democracy under centralized guidance. It should be done on the following lines:

(1) The leading bodies of the Party must give a correct line of guidance and find solutions when problems arise, in order to establish themselves as centres of leadership.

(2) The higher bodies must be familiar with the situation in the lower bodies and with the life of the masses so as to have an objective basis for correct guidance.

(3) No Party organization at any level should make casual decisions in solving problems. Once a decision is reached, it must be firmly carried out.

(4) All decisions of any importance made by the Party's higher bodies must be promptly transmitted to the lower bodies and the Party rank and file. The method is to call meetings of activists or general membership meetings of the Party branches or even of the columns<sup>2</sup> (when circumstances permit) and to assign people to make reports at such meetings.

(5) The lower bodies of the Party and the Party rank and file must discuss the higher bodies' directives in detail in order to understand their meaning thoroughly and decide on the methods of carrying them out.

## ON THE DISREGARD OF ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE

Disregard of organizational discipline in the Party organization in the Fourth Army manifests itself as follows:

(a) Failure of the minority to submit to the majority. For example, when a minority finds its motion voted down, it does not sincerely carry out the Party decisions.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. At meetings, all participants should be encouraged to voice their opinions as fully as possible. The rights and wrongs in any controversy should be clarified without compromise or glossing over. In order to reach a clear-cut conclusion, what cannot be settled at one meeting should be discussed at another, provided there is no interference with the work.

2. One requirement of Party discipline is that the minority should submit to the majority. If the view of the minority has been rejected, it must support the decision passed by the majority. If necessary, it can bring up the matter for reconsideration at the next meeting, but apart from that it must not act against the decision in any way.

(b) Criticism made without regard to organizational discipline:

1. Inner-Party criticism is a weapon for strengthening the Party organization and increasing its fighting capacity. In the Party organization of the Red Army, however, criticism is not always of this character, and turns into personal attack. As a result, it damages the Party organization as well as individuals. This is a manifestation of petty-bourgeois individualism. The method of correction is to help Party members understand that the purpose of criticism is to increase the Party's fighting capacity in order to achieve victory in the class struggle and that it should not be used as a means of personal attack.

2. Many Party members make their criticisms not inside, but outside, the Party. The reason is that the general membership has not yet grasped the importance of the Party organization (its meetings and so forth), and sees no difference between criticism inside and outside the organization. The method of correction is to educate Party members so that they understand the importance of Party organization and make their criticisms of Party committees or comrades at Party meetings.

## ON ABSOLUTE EQUALITARIANISM

Absolute equalitarianism became quite serious in the Red Army at one time. Here are some examples. On the matter of allowances to wounded soldiers, there were objections to differentiating between light and serious cases, and the demand was raised for equal allowances for all. When officers rode on horseback, it was regarded not as something necessary for performing their duties but as a sign of inequality. Absolutely equal distribution of supplies was demanded, and there was objection to somewhat larger allotments in special cases. In the hauling of rice, the demand was made that all should carry the same load on their backs, irrespective of age or physical condition. Equality was demanded in the allotment of billets, and the Headquarters would be abused for occupying larger rooms.

Equality was demanded in the assignment of fatigue duties, and there was unwillingness to do a little more than the next man. It even went so far that when there were two wounded men but only one stretcher, neither could be carried away because each refused to yield priority to the other. Absolute equalitarianism, as shown in these examples, is still very serious among officers and soldiers of the Red Army.

Absolute equalitarianism, like ultra-democracy in political matters, is the product of a handicraft and small peasant economy — the only difference being that the one manifests itself in material life, while the other manifests itself in political life.

The method of correction: We should point out that, before the abolition of capitalism, absolute equalitarianism is a mere illusion of peasants and small proprietors, and that even under socialism there can be no absolute equality, for material things will then be distributed on the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" as well as on that of meeting the needs of the work. The distribution of material things in the Red Army must be more or less equal, as in the case of equal pay for officers and men, because this is required by the present circumstances of the struggle. But absolute equalitarianism beyond reason must be opposed because it is not required by the struggle; on the contrary, it hinders the struggle.

## ON SUBJECTIVISM

Subjectivism exists to a serious degree among some Party members, causing great harm to the analysis of the political situation and the guidance of the work. The reason is that subjective analysis of a political situation and subjective guidance of work inevitably result either in opportunism or in putschism. As for subjective criticism, loose and groundless talk or suspiciousness, such practices inside the Party often breed unprincipled disputes and undermine the Party organization.

Another point that should be mentioned in connection with inner-Party criticism is that some comrades ignore the major issues and confine their attention to minor points when they make their criticism. They do not understand that the main task of criticism is to point out political and organizational mistakes. As to personal shortcomings,

unless they are related to political and organizational mistakes, there is no need to be overcritical and to embarrass the comrades concerned. Moreover, once such criticism develops, there is the great danger that the Party members will concentrate entirely on minor faults, and everyone will become timid and overcautious and forget the Party's political tasks.

The method of correction is mainly to educate Party members so that a political and scientific spirit pervades their thinking and their Party life. To this end we must: (1) teach Party members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing a political situation and appraising the class forces, instead of making a subjective analysis and appraisal; (2) direct the attention of Party members to social and economic investigation and study, so as to determine the tactics of struggle and methods of work, and help comrades to understand that without investigation of actual conditions they will fall into the pit of fantasy and putschism; (3) in inner-Party criticism, guard against subjectivism, arbitrariness and the vulgarization of criticism; statements should be based on facts and criticism should centre on politics.

## ON INDIVIDUALISM

The tendency towards individualism in the Red Army Party organization manifests itself as follows:

1. Retaliation. Some comrades, after being criticized inside the Party by a soldier comrade, look for opportunities to retaliate outside the Party, and one way is to beat or abuse the comrade in question. They also seek to retaliate within the Party. "You have criticized me at this meeting, so I'll find some way to pay you back at the next." Such retaliation arises from purely personal considerations to the neglect of the interests of the class and of the Party as a whole. Its target is not the enemy class, but individuals in our own ranks. It is a corrosive which weakens the organization and its fighting capacity.

2. Cliquism. Some comrades consider only the interests of their own small group and ignore the general interest. Although on the surface this does not seem to be the pursuit of personal interests, in reality it exemplifies the narrowest individualism and has a strong corrosive and centrifugal effect. Cliquism used to be rife in the Red Army, and although there has been some improvement as a result of

criticism, there are still survivals and further effort is needed to overcome it.

3. The "employee" mentality. Some comrades do not understand that the Party and the Red Army, of which they are members, are both instruments for carrying out the tasks of the revolution. They do not realize that they themselves are makers of the revolution, but think that their responsibility is merely to their individual superiors and not to the revolution. This passive mentality of an "employee" of the revolution is also a manifestation of individualism. This mentality explains why there are not very many activists who work unconditionally for the revolution. Unless it is eliminated, the number of activists will not grow and the heavy burden of the revolution will remain on the shoulders of a small number of people, much to the detriment of the struggle.

4. Pleasure-seeking. In the Red Army there are also quite a few people whose individualism finds expression in pleasure-seeking. They always hope that their unit will march into big cities. They want to go there not to work but to enjoy themselves. The last thing they want is to work in the Red areas where life is hard.

5. Passivity. Some comrades become passive and stop working whenever anything goes against their wishes. This is mainly due to lack of education, though sometimes it is also due to the leadership's improper conduct of affairs, assignment of work or enforcement of discipline.

6. The desire to leave the army. The number of people who ask for transfers from work in the Red Army to local work is on the increase. The reason for this does not lie entirely with the individuals but also lies with: (1) the material hardships of life in the Red Army, (2) exhaustion after long struggle, and (3) the leadership's improper conduct of affairs, assignment of work or enforcement of discipline.

The method of correction is primarily to strengthen education so as to rectify individualism ideologically. Next, it is to conduct affairs, make assignments and enforce discipline in a proper way. In addition, ways must be found to improve the material life of the Red Army, and every available opportunity must be utilized for rest and rehabilitation in order to improve material conditions. In our educational work we must explain that in its social origin individualism is a reflection within the Party of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois ideas.

## ON THE IDEOLOGY OF ROVING REBEL BANDS

The political ideology of roving rebel bands has emerged in the Red Army because the proportion of vagabond elements is large and because there are great masses of vagabonds in China, especially in the southern provinces. This ideology manifests itself as follows: (1) Some people want to increase our political influence only by means of roving guerrilla actions, but are unwilling to increase it by undertaking the arduous task of building up base areas and establishing the people's political power. (2) In expanding the Red Army, some people follow the line of "hiring men and buying horses" and "recruiting deserters and accepting mutineers",<sup>3</sup> rather than the line of expanding the local Red Guards and the local troops and thus developing the main forces of the Red Army. (3) Some people lack the patience to carry on arduous struggles together with the masses, and only want to go to the big cities to eat and drink to their hearts' content. All these manifestations of the ideology of roving rebels seriously hamper the Red Army in performing its proper tasks; consequently the eradication of this ideology is an important objective in the ideological struggle within the Red Army Party organization. It must be understood that the ways of roving rebels of the Huang Chao<sup>4</sup> or Li Chuang<sup>5</sup> type are no longer permissible under present-day conditions.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. Intensify education, criticize incorrect ideas, and eradicate the ideology of roving rebel bands.
2. Intensify education among the basic sections of the Red Army and among recently recruited captives to counter the vagabond outlook.
3. Draw active workers and peasants experienced in struggle into the ranks of the Red Army so as to change its composition.
4. Create new units of the Red Army from among the masses of militant workers and peasants.

## ON THE REMNANTS OF PUTSCHISM

The Party organization in the Red Army has already waged struggles against putschism, but not yet to a sufficient extent. Therefore, remnants of the putschist ideology still exist in the Red Army. Their

manifestations are: (1) blind action regardless of subjective and objective conditions; (2) inadequate and irresolute application of the Party's policies for the cities; (3) slack military discipline, especially in moments of defeat; (4) acts of house-burning by some units; (5) the practice of shooting deserters and the practice of inflicting corporal punishment, both of which smack of putschism. In its social origins, putschism is a combination of *lumpen*-proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideology.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. Eradicate putschism ideologically.
2. Correct putschist behaviour through rules, regulations and policies.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> For a brief period after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, a "Left" putschist tendency arose in the Communist Party. Regarding the Chinese revolution as a "permanent revolution" and the revolutionary situation in China as a "permanent upsurge", the putschist comrades refused to organize an orderly retreat and, adopting the methods of commandism and relying only on a small number of Party members and a small section of the masses, erroneously attempted to stage a series of local uprisings throughout the country, which had no prospect of success. Such putschist activities were widespread at the end of 1927 but gradually subsided in the beginning of 1928, though sentiments in favour of putschism still survived among some comrades.

<sup>2</sup> In the guerrilla system of organization a column corresponded to a division in the regular army, with a complement much more flexible and usually much smaller than that of a regular division.

<sup>3</sup> These two Chinese idioms refer to the methods which some rebels in Chinese history adopted to expand their forces. In the application of these methods, attention was paid to numbers rather than to quality, and people of all sorts were indiscriminately recruited to swell the ranks.

<sup>4</sup> Huang Chao was the leader of the peasant revolts towards the end of the Tang Dynasty. In A.D. 875, starting from his home district Tsaotchow (now Hotse County in Shantung), Huang led armed peasants in victorious battles against the imperial forces and styled himself the "Heaven-Storming General". In the course of a decade he swept over most of the provinces in the Yellow, Yangtse, Huai and Pearl river valleys, reaching as far as Kwangsi. He finally broke through the Tungkuan pass, captured the imperial capital of Changan, now Sian in Shensi, and was crowned Emperor of Chi. Internal dissensions and attacks by the non-Han tribal allies of the Tang forces compelled Huang to abandon Changan and retreat to his native district, where he committed suicide. The ten years' war fought by him is one of the most famous peasant wars in Chinese history. Dynastic historians record that "all people suffering from heavy taxes and levies rallied to him". But as he merely carried on roving warfare without ever establishing relatively consolidated base areas, his forces were called "roving rebel bands".

<sup>5</sup> Li Chuang, short for Li Tse-cheng the King Chuang (the Dare-All King), native of Michih, northern Shensi, was the leader of a peasant revolt which led to the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty. The revolt first started in northern Shensi in 1628. Li joined the forces led by Kao Ying-hsiang and campaigned through Honan and Anhwei and back to Shensi. After Kao's death in 1636, Li succeeded him, becoming King Chuang, and campaigned in and out of the provinces of Shensi, Szechuan, Honan and Hupeh. Finally he captured the imperial capital of Peking in 1644, whereupon the last Ming emperor committed suicide. The chief slogan he propagated among the masses was "Support King Chuang, and pay no grain taxes". Another slogan of his to enforce discipline among his men ran: "Any murder means the killing of my father, any rape means the violation of my mother." Thus he won the support of the masses and his movement became the main current of the peasant revolts raging all over the country. As he too roamed about without ever establishing relatively consolidated base areas, he was eventually defeated by Wu San-kuei, a traitorous general of the Ming Dynasty, who colluded with the Manchu invaders in a joint attack on Li.

## A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE\*

*January 5, 1930*

Some comrades in our Party still do not know how to appraise the current situation correctly and how to settle the attendant question of what action to take. Though they believe that a revolutionary high tide is inevitable, they do not believe it to be imminent. Therefore, they disapprove of the plan to take Kiangsi and only approve of roving guerrilla actions in the three areas on the borders of Fukien, Kwangtung and Kiangsi; at the same time, as they do not have a deep understanding of what it means to establish Red political power in the guerrilla areas, they do not have a deep understanding of the idea of accelerating the nation-wide revolutionary high tide through the consolidation and expansion of Red political power. They seem to think that, since the revolutionary high tide is still remote, it will be labour lost to attempt to establish political power by hard work. Instead, they want to extend our political influence through the easier method of roving guerrilla actions, and, once the masses throughout the country have been won over, or more or less won over, they want to launch a nation-wide armed insurrection which, with the participation of the Red Army, would become a great nation-wide revolution. Their theory that we must first win over the masses on a country-wide scale and in all regions and then establish political power does not accord with the actual state of the Chinese revolution. This theory derives mainly from the failure to understand clearly that China is a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending. If one clearly understands this, one will understand first why it is only in China that there exists the unusual phenomenon of prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes, why this warfare is steadily growing fiercer and

---

\* This letter was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in criticism of certain pessimistic views then existing in the Party.

spreading, and why there has never been a unified regime. Secondly, one will understand the gravity of the peasant problem and hence why rural uprisings have developed on the present country-wide scale. Thirdly, one will understand the correctness of the slogan of workers' and peasants' democratic political power. Fourthly, one will understand another unusual phenomenon, which is also absent outside China, and which follows from the first (that in China alone there is prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes), namely, the existence and development of the Red Army and the guerrilla forces, and together with them, the existence and development of small Red areas encircled by the White regime. Fifthly, one will understand that in semi-colonial China the establishment and expansion of the Red Army, the guerrilla forces and the Red areas is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat, the inevitable outcome of the growth of the semi-colonial peasant struggle, and undoubtedly the most important factor in accelerating the revolutionary high tide throughout the country. And sixthly, one will also understand that the policy which merely calls for roving guerrilla actions cannot accomplish the task of accelerating this nation-wide revolutionary high tide, while the kind of policy adopted by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung and also by Fang Chih-min<sup>1</sup> is undoubtedly correct — that is, the policy of establishing base areas; of systematically setting up political power; of deepening the agrarian revolution; of expanding the people's armed forces by a comprehensive process of building up first the township Red Guards, then the district Red Guards, then the county Red Guards, then the local Red Army troops, all the way up to the regular Red Army troops; of spreading political power by advancing in a series of waves, etc., etc. Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration. Only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become the chief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.

Comrades who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity unduly overestimate the subjective forces of the revolution<sup>2</sup> and underestimate the forces of the counter-revolution. Such an appraisal stems mainly from subjectivism. In the end, it undoubtedly leads to putschism. On

the other hand, underestimating the subjective forces of the revolution and overestimating the forces of the counter-revolution would also constitute an improper appraisal and be certain to produce bad results of another kind. Therefore, in judging the political situation in China it is necessary to understand the following:

1. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China are now weak, so also are all organizations (organs of political power, armed forces, political parties, etc.) of the reactionary ruling classes, resting as they do on the backward and fragile social and economic structure of China. This helps to explain why revolution cannot break out at once in the countries of Western Europe where, although the subjective forces of revolution are now perhaps somewhat stronger than in China, the forces of the reactionary ruling classes are many times stronger than in China, and it also helps to explain why the revolution will undoubtedly move towards a high tide more rapidly in China, for although the subjective forces of the revolution in China at present are weak, the forces of the counter-revolution are relatively weak too.

2. The subjective forces of the revolution have indeed been greatly weakened since the defeat of the revolution in 1927. The remaining forces are very small and those comrades who judge by appearances alone naturally feel pessimistic. But if we judge by essentials it is quite another story. Here we can apply the old Chinese saying, "A single spark can start a prairie fire." In other words, our forces, although small at present, will grow very rapidly. In the conditions prevailing in China, their growth is not only possible but indeed inevitable, as the May 30th Movement and the Great Revolution which followed have fully proved. When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold, and once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing; this is the only reliable and scientific method of analysis.

3. Similarly, in appraising the counter-revolutionary forces, we must never look merely at their appearance, but should examine their essence. In the initial period of our independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, some comrades genuinely believed the incorrect appraisal made by the Hunan Provincial Committee, and regarded the class enemy as not worth a rap; the two descriptive terms, "terribly shaky" and "extremely panicky", which are standing jokes to this day, were used by the Hunan Provincial Committee at

the time (from May to June 1928) in appraising the Hunan ruler Lu Ti-ping.<sup>3</sup> Such an appraisal necessarily led to putschism in the political sphere. But during the four months from November of that year to February 1929 (before the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords),<sup>4</sup> when the enemy's third "joint suppression expedition"<sup>5</sup> was approaching the Ching kang Mountains, some comrades asked the question, "How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?" As a matter of fact, the struggle in China between Britain, the United States and Japan had by then become quite open, and a situation of tangled warfare between Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi clique and Feng Yu-hsiang was taking shape; hence it was actually the time when the counter-revolutionary tide had begun to ebb and the revolutionary tide to rise again. Yet pessimistic ideas were to be found not only in the Red Army and local Party organizations; even the Central Committee was misled by appearances and adopted a pessimistic tone. The Central Committee's February letter is evidence of the pessimistic analysis made in the Party at that time.

4. The objective situation today is still such that comrades who see only the superficial appearance and not the essence of what is before them are liable to be misled. In particular, when our comrades working in the Red Army are defeated in battle or encircled or pursued by strong enemy forces, they often unwittingly generalize and exaggerate their momentary, specific and limited situation, as though the situation in China and the world as a whole gave no cause for optimism and the prospects of victory for the revolution were remote. The reason they seize on the appearance and brush aside the essence in their observation of things is that they have not made a scientific analysis of the essence of the overall situation. The question whether there will soon be a revolutionary high tide in China can be decided only by making a detailed examination to ascertain whether the contradictions leading to a revolutionary high tide are really developing. Since contradictions are developing in the world between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between the imperialists and the proletariat in their own countries, there is an intensified need for the imperialists to contend for the domination of China. While the imperialist contention over China becomes more intense, both the contradiction between imperialism and the whole Chinese nation and the contradictions among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously on Chinese

soil, thereby creating the tangled warfare which is expanding and intensifying daily and giving rise to the continuous development of the contradictions among the different cliques of China's reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradictions among the reactionary ruling cliques — the tangled warfare among the warlords — comes heavier taxation, which steadily sharpens the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradiction between imperialism and China's national industry comes the failure of the Chinese industrialists to obtain concessions from the imperialists, which sharpens the contradiction between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class, with the Chinese capitalists trying to find a way out by frantically exploiting the workers and with the workers resisting. In the wake of imperialist commercial aggression, Chinese merchant-capitalist extortions, heavier government taxation, etc., comes the deepening of the contradiction between the landlord class and the peasantry, that is, exploitation through rent and usury is aggravated and the hatred of the peasants for the landlords grows. Because of the pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the worker and peasant masses, and the increase in government taxation, more and more dealers in Chinese-made goods and independent producers are being driven into bankruptcy. Because the reactionary government, though short of provisions and funds, endlessly expands its armies and thus constantly extends the warfare, the masses of soldiers are in a constant state of privation. Because of the growth in government taxation, the rise in rent and interest demanded by the landlords and the daily spread of the disasters of war, there are famine and banditry everywhere and the peasant masses and the urban poor can hardly keep alive. Because the schools have no money, many students fear that their education may be interrupted; because production is backward, many graduates have no hope of employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall see in what a desperate situation, in what a chaotic state, China finds herself. We shall also see that the high tide of revolution against the imperialists, the warlords and the landlords is inevitable, and will come very soon. All China is littered with dry faggots which will soon be aflame. The saying, "A single spark can start a prairie fire", is an apt description of how the current situation will develop. We need only look at the strikes by the workers, the uprisings by the peasants, the mutinies of soldiers and the strikes of students which are developing

in many places to see that it cannot be long before a "spark" kindles "a prairie fire".

The gist of the above was already contained in the letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee on April 5, 1929, which reads in part:

The Central Committee's letter [dated February 9, 1929] makes too pessimistic an appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective forces. The Kuomintang's three "suppression" campaigns against the Ching kang Mountains was the high water mark reached by the counter-revolutionary tide. But there it stopped, and since then the counter-revolutionary tide has gradually receded while the revolutionary tide has gradually risen. Although our Party's fighting capacity and organizational strength have been weakened to the extent described by the Central Committee, they will be rapidly restored, and the passivity among comrades in the Party will quickly disappear as the counter-revolutionary tide gradually ebbs. The masses will certainly come over to us. The Kuomintang's policy of massacre only serves to "drive the fish into deep waters",<sup>6</sup> as the saying goes, and reformism no longer has any mass appeal. It is certain that the masses will soon shed their illusions about the Kuomintang. In the emerging situation, no other party will be able to compete with the Communist Party in winning over the masses. The political line and the organizational line laid down by the Party's Sixth National Congress<sup>7</sup> are correct, *i.e.*, the revolution at the present stage is democratic and not socialist, and the present task of the Party [here the words "in the big cities" should have been added]<sup>8</sup> is to win over the masses and not to stage immediate insurrections. Nevertheless the revolution will develop swiftly, and we should take a positive attitude in our propaganda and preparations for armed insurrections. In the present chaotic situation we can lead the masses only by positive slogans and a positive attitude. Only by taking a positive attitude can the Party recover its fighting capacity. . . . Proletarian leadership is the sole key to victory in the revolution. Building a proletarian foundation for the Party and setting up Party branches in industrial enterprises in key districts are important organizational tasks for the Party at present; but at the same time the major prerequisites for helping the struggle in the cities and hastening the rise of the revolutionary tide are

specifically the development of the struggle in the countryside, the establishment of Red political power in small areas, and the creation and expansion of the Red Army. Therefore, it would be wrong to abandon the struggle in the cities, but in our opinion it would also be wrong for any of our Party members to fear the growth of peasant strength lest it should outstrip the workers' strength and harm the revolution. For in the revolution in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers.

The letter also contains the following reply on the question of the Red Army's operational tactics:

To preserve the Red Army and arouse the masses, the Central Committee asks us to divide our forces into very small units and disperse them over the countryside and to withdraw Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung from the army, so concealing the major targets. This is an unrealistic view. In the winter of 1927-28, we did plan to disperse our forces over the countryside with each company or battalion operating on its own and adopting guerrilla tactics in order to arouse the masses while trying not to present a target for the enemy; we have tried this out many times, but have failed every time. The reasons are: (1) most of the soldiers in the main force of the Red Army come from other areas and have a background different from that of the local Red Guards; (2) division into small units results in weak leadership and inability to cope with adverse circumstances, which easily leads to defeat; (3) the units are liable to be crushed by the enemy one by one; (4) the more adverse the circumstances, the greater the need for concentrating our forces and for the leaders to be resolute in struggle, because only thus can we have internal unity against the enemy. Only in favourable circumstances is it advisable to divide our forces for guerrilla operations, and it is only then that the leaders need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they must in adverse circumstances.

The weakness of this passage is that the reasons adduced against the division of forces were of a negative character, which was far from adequate. The positive reason for concentrating our forces is that only concentration will enable us to wipe out comparatively large

enemy units and occupy towns. Only after we have wiped out comparatively large enemy units and occupied towns can we arouse the masses on a broad scale and set up political power extending over a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we make a widespread impact (what we call "extending our political influence"), and contribute effectively to speeding the day of the revolutionary high tide. For instance, both the regime we set up in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area the year before last and the one we set up in western Fukien last year<sup>9</sup> were the product of this policy of concentrating our troops. This is a general principle. But are there not times when our forces should be divided up? Yes, there are. The letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee says of guerrilla tactics for the Red Army, including the division of forces within a short radius:

The tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years are indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign. With our tactics, the masses can be aroused for struggle on an ever-broadening scale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us. Ours are guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following points:

"Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy."

"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."

"To extend stable base areas,<sup>10</sup> employ the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around."

"Arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time and by the best possible methods."

These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be able to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have used for the past three years.

Here, "to cast the net wide" means to divide our forces within a short radius. For example, when we first captured the county town of Yunghsin in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, we divided the forces of the 29th and 31st Regiments within the boundaries of Yunghsin County. Again, when we captured Yunghsin for the third time, we once more divided our forces by dispatching the 28th Regiment to the border of Anfu County, the 29th to Lienhua, and the 31st to the

border of Kian County. And, again, we divided our forces in the counties of southern Kiangsi last April and May, and in the counties of western Fukien last July. As to dividing our forces over a wide radius, it is possible only on the two conditions that circumstances are comparatively favourable and the leading bodies fairly strong. For the purpose of dividing up our forces is to put us in a better position for winning over the masses, for deepening the agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and for expanding the Red Army and the local armed units. It is better not to divide our forces when this purpose cannot be attained or the division of our forces would lead to defeat and to the weakening of the Red Army, as happened in August two years ago when our forces were divided on the Hunan-Kiangsi border for an attack on Chenchou. But there is no doubt that, given the two above-mentioned conditions, we should divide our forces, because division is then more advantageous than concentration.

The Central Committee's February letter was not in the right spirit and had a bad effect on a number of Party comrades in the Fourth Army. At that time the Central Committee also issued a circular stating that war would not necessarily break out between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords. Since then, however, the appraisals and directives of the Central Committee have in the main been correct. It has already issued another circular correcting the one containing the wrong appraisal. Although it has not made any correction of the letter to the Red Army, its subsequent directives have not been couched in the same pessimistic tone and its views on the Red Army's operations now coincide with ours. Yet the bad effect which this letter had on some comrades persists. Therefore, I feel that it is still necessary to give some explanation.

The plan to take Kiangsi Province within a year was also proposed last April by the Front Committee to the Central Committee, and a decision to that effect was later made at Yutu. The following reasons were given in the letter to the Central Committee:

The armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords are approaching each other in the vicinity of Kiukiang, and a big battle is imminent. The resumption of mass struggle, coupled with the spread of contradictions among the ruling reactionaries, makes it probable that there will soon be a high tide of revolution. As for how our work should be arranged under these circumstances, we feel that, so far as the southern provinces are concerned, the

armed forces of the compradors and landlords in Kwangtung and Hunan Provinces are too strong, and that in Hunan, moreover, we have lost almost all our mass following, inside as well as outside the Party, because of the Party's putschist mistakes. In the three provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi and Chekiang, however, the situation is different. First, militarily the enemy is weakest there. In Chekiang, there is only a small provincial force under Chiang Po-cheng.<sup>11</sup> In Fukien, although there are five groups of enemy troops totalling fourteen regiments in all, Kuo Feng-ming's troops have already been smashed; the troops under Chen Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang<sup>12</sup> are bandits of small fighting capacity; the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast have never seen action and their fighting capacity is undoubtedly not high; Chang Chen<sup>13</sup> alone can put up some sort of a fight, but, according to an analysis made by the Fukien Provincial Committee, even he has only two relatively strong regiments. In addition, Fukien is now in a state of complete chaos, confusion and disunity. In Kiangsi, there are sixteen regiments under the two commands of Chu Pei-teh<sup>14</sup> and Hsiung Shih-hui;<sup>15</sup> they are stronger than the armed forces of either Fukien or Chekiang, but far inferior to those of Hunan. Secondly, fewer putschist mistakes have been made in these three provinces. We are not clear about the situation in Chekiang, but the Party's organizational and mass base is somewhat better in Kiangsi and Fukien than in Hunan. Take Kiangsi for example. In northern Kiangsi we still have some basis in Tehan, Hsiushui and Tungku; in western Kiangsi the Party and the Red Guards still have some strength in Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua and Suichuan; in southern Kiangsi the prospects are still brighter, as the Second and Fourth Regiments of the Red Army are steadily growing in strength in the counties of Kian, Yungfeng and Hsingkuo; and what is more, the Red Army under Fang Chih-min has by no means been wiped out. All this places us in a position to close in on Nanchang. We hereby recommend to the Central Committee that during the period of prolonged warfare among the Kuomintang warlords, we should contend with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi clique for Kiangsi Province and also for western Fukien and western Chekiang. In these three provinces we should enlarge the Red Army and create an independent regime of the masses, with a time limit of one year for accomplishing this plan.

This proposal to contend for Kiangsi erred only in setting a time limit of one year. It was based not only on conditions within the province itself, but also on the prospect that a nation-wide high tide of revolution would soon arise. For unless we had been convinced that there would soon be a high tide of revolution, we could not possibly have concluded that we could take Kiangsi in a year. The only weakness in the proposal was that it set a time limit of one year, which it should not have done, and so gave a flavour of impetuosity to the word "soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a high tide of revolution". As to the subjective and objective conditions in Kiangsi, they well deserve our attention. Besides the subjective conditions described in the letter to the Central Committee, three objective conditions can now be clearly pointed out. First, the economy of Kiangsi is mainly feudal, the merchant-capitalist class is relatively weak, and the armed forces of the landlords are weaker than in any other southern province. Secondly, Kiangsi has no provincial troops of its own and has always been garrisoned by troops from other provinces. Sent there for the "suppression of Communists" or "suppression of bandits", these troops are unfamiliar with local conditions, their interests are much less directly involved than if they were local troops, and they usually lack enthusiasm. And thirdly, unlike Kwangtung which is close to Hongkong and under British control in almost every respect, Kiangsi is comparatively remote from imperialist influence. Once we have grasped these three points, we can understand why rural uprisings are more widespread and the Red Army and guerrilla units more numerous in Kiangsi than in any other province.

How then should we interpret the word "soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a high tide of revolution"? This is a common question among comrades. Marxists are not fortune-tellers. They should, and indeed can, only indicate the general direction of future developments and changes; they should not and cannot fix the day and the hour in a mechanistic way. But when I say that there will soon be a high tide of revolution in China, I am emphatically not speaking of something which in the words of some people "is possibly coming", something illusory, unattainable and devoid of significance for action. It is like a ship far out at sea whose mast-head can already be seen from the shore; it is like the morning sun in the east whose shimmering rays are visible from a high mountain top; it is like a child soon to be born moving restlessly in its mother's womb.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Comrade Fang Chih-min, a native of Yiyang, Kiangsi Province, and a member of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was the founder of the Red area in northeastern Kiangsi and of the Tenth Red Army. In 1934 he led the vanguard detachment of the Red Army in marching north to resist the Japanese invaders. In January 1935 he was captured in battle against the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang troops and in July he died a martyr's death in Nanchang, Kiangsi.

<sup>2</sup> Namely, the organized forces of the revolution.

<sup>3</sup> Lu Ti-ping, a Kuomintang warlord, was the Kuomintang governor of Hunan Province in 1928.

<sup>4</sup> The war of March-April 1929 between Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang warlord in Nanking, and Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, the Kuomintang warlords in Kwangsi Province.

<sup>5</sup> The third invasion of the Red Army's base area on the Ching kang Mountains by the Kuomintang warlords in Hunan and Kiangsi lasting from the end of 1928 to the beginning of 1929.

<sup>6</sup> The quotation is from Mencius, who compared a tyrant who drove his people into seeking a benevolent ruler to the otter which "drives fish into deep waters".

<sup>7</sup> The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in July 1928. It pointed out that after the defeat in 1927, China's revolution remained bourgeois-democratic in nature, *i.e.*, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, and that since the inevitable new high tide in the revolution was not yet imminent, the general line for the revolution should be to win over the masses. The Sixth Congress liquidated the 1927 Right capitulationism of Chen Tu-hsiu and also repudiated the "Left" putschism which occurred in the Party at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928.

<sup>8</sup> The statement in brackets has been added by the author.

<sup>9</sup> The regime set up in western Fukien came into being in 1929, when the Red Army in the Ching kang Mountains sallied eastward to build a new revolutionary base area and established the people's revolutionary political power in the counties of Lungyen, Yungting and Shanghang in the western part of that province.

<sup>10</sup> Referring to the relatively stable revolutionary base areas established by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

<sup>11</sup> Chiang Po-cheng was then the commander of the Kuomintang peace preservation corps in Chekiang Province.

<sup>12</sup> Chen Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang were two notorious Fukien bandits whose forces had been incorporated into the Kuomintang army.

<sup>13</sup> Chang Chen was a divisional commander of the Kuomintang army.

<sup>14</sup> Chu Pei-teh, a Kuomintang warlord, was then the Kuomintang governor of Kiangsi Province.

<sup>15</sup> Hsiung Shih-hui was then a divisional commander of the Kuomintang army in Kiangsi Province.

# PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR\*

*December 1936*

## CHAPTER I

### HOW TO STUDY WAR

#### 1. THE LAWS OF WAR ARE DEVELOPMENTAL

*The laws of war* are a problem which anyone directing a war must study and solve.

*The laws of revolutionary war* are a problem which anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and solve.

*The laws of China's revolutionary war* are a problem which anyone directing China's revolutionary war must study and solve.

We are now engaged in a war; our war is a revolutionary war; and our revolutionary war is being waged in this semi-colonial and semi-feudal country of China. Therefore, we must study not only the laws of war in general, but the specific laws of revolutionary war, and the even more specific laws of revolutionary war in China.

It is well known that when you do anything, unless you understand its actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws governing it, nor know how to do it, nor be able to do it well.

---

\* Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this work to sum up the experience of the Second Revolutionary Civil War and used it for his lectures at the Red Army College in northern Shensi. Only five chapters were completed. The chapters on the strategic offensive, political work and other problems were left undone because he was too busy in consequence of the Sian Incident. This work, a result of a major inner-Party controversy on military questions during the Second Revolutionary Civil War, gives expression to one line in military affairs as against another. The enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held at Tsunyi in January 1935 settled

*War* is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations, states, or political groups and it has existed ever since the emergence of private property and of classes. Unless you understand the actual circumstances of war, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws of war, nor know how to direct war, nor be able to win victory.

*Revolutionary war*, whether a revolutionary class war or a revolutionary national war, has its own specific circumstances and nature, in addition to the circumstances and nature of war in general. Therefore, besides the general laws of war, it has specific laws of its own. Unless you understand its specific circumstances and nature, unless you understand its specific laws, you will not be able to direct a revolutionary war and wage it successfully.

*China's revolutionary war*, whether civil war or national war, is waged in the specific environment of China and so has its own specific circumstances and nature distinguishing it both from war in general and from revolutionary war in general. Therefore, besides the laws of war in general and of revolutionary war in general, it has specific laws of its own. Unless you understand them, you will not be able to win in China's revolutionary war.

Therefore, we must study the laws of war in general, we must also study the laws of revolutionary war, and, finally, we must study the laws of China's revolutionary war.

Some people hold a wrong view, which we refuted long ago. They say that it is enough merely to study the laws of war in general, or, to put it more concretely, that it is enough merely to follow the military manuals published by the reactionary Chinese government or the reactionary military academies in China. They do not see that these manuals give merely the laws of war in general and moreover are entirely copied from abroad, and if we copy and apply them exactly without the slightest change in form or content, we shall be "cutting the feet to fit the shoes" and be defeated. Their argument is: why should knowledge which has been acquired at the cost of

---

the controversy about the military line, reaffirmed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's views and repudiated the erroneous line. In October 1935 the Central Committee moved to northern Shensi, and in December Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a report "On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism" in which problems concerning the political line of the Party in the Second Revolutionary Civil War were systematically solved. He wrote this work a year later, in 1936, to explain the problems of strategy in China's revolutionary war in a systematic way.

blood be of no use? They fail to see that although we must cherish the earlier experience thus acquired, we must also cherish experience acquired at the cost of our own blood.

Others hold a second wrong view, which we also refuted long ago. They say that it is enough merely to study the experience of revolutionary war in Russia, or, to put it more concretely, that it is enough merely to follow the laws by which the civil war in the Soviet Union was directed and the military manuals published by Soviet military organizations. They do not see that these laws and manuals embody the specific characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army in the Soviet Union and that if we copy and apply them without allowing any change, we shall also be "cutting the feet to fit the shoes" and be defeated. Their argument is: since our war, like the war in the Soviet Union, is a revolutionary war, and since the Soviet Union won victory, how then can there be any alternative but to follow the Soviet example? They fail to see that while we should set special store by the war experience of the Soviet Union, because it is the most recent experience of revolutionary war and was acquired under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin, we should likewise cherish the experience of China's revolutionary war, because there are many factors that are specific to the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army.

Still others hold a third wrong view, which we likewise refuted long ago. They say that the most valuable experience is that of the Northern Expedition of 1926-27 and that we must learn from it, or, to put it more concretely, that we must imitate the Northern Expedition in driving straight ahead to seize the big cities. They fail to see that while the experience of the Northern Expedition should be studied, it should not be copied and applied mechanically, because the circumstances of our present war are different. We should take from the Northern Expedition only what still applies today, and work out something of our own in the light of present conditions.

Thus the different laws for directing different wars are determined by the different circumstances of those wars — differences in their time, place and nature. As regards the time factor, both war and its laws develop; each historical stage has its special characteristics, and hence the laws of war in each historical stage have their special characteristics and cannot be mechanically applied in another stage. As for the nature of war, since revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war both have their special characteristics, the laws governing them also have their own characteristics, and those applying

to one cannot be mechanically transferred to the other. As for the factor of place, since each country or nation, especially a large country or nation, has its own characteristics, the laws of war for each country or nation also have their own characteristics, and here, too, those applying to one cannot be mechanically transferred to the other. In studying the laws for directing wars that occur at different historical stages, that differ in nature and that are waged in different places and by different nations, we must fix our attention on the characteristics and development of each, and must oppose a mechanical approach to the problem of war.

Nor is this all. It signifies progress and development in a commander who is initially capable of commanding only a small formation, if he becomes capable of commanding a big one. There is also a difference between operating in one locality and in many. It likewise signifies progress and development in a commander who is initially capable of operating only in a locality he knows well, if he becomes capable of operating in many other localities. Owing to technical, tactical and strategic developments on the enemy side and on our own, the circumstances also differ from stage to stage within a given war. It signifies still more progress and development in a commander who is capable of exercising command in a war at its lower stages, if he becomes capable of exercising command in its higher stages. A commander who remains capable of commanding only a formation of a certain size, only in a certain locality and at a certain stage in the development of a war shows that he has made no progress and has not developed. There are some people who, contented with a single skill or a peep-hole view, never make any progress; they may play some role in the revolution at a given place and time, but not a significant one. We need directors of war who can play a significant role. All the laws for directing war develop as history develops and as war develops; nothing is changeless.

## 2. THE AIM OF WAR IS TO ELIMINATE WAR

War, this monster of mutual slaughter among men, will be finally eliminated by the progress of human society, and in the not too distant future too. But there is only one way to eliminate it and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with

national revolutionary war, and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war with revolutionary class war. History knows only two kinds of war, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just. Mankind's era of wars will be brought to an end by our own efforts, and beyond doubt the war we wage is part of the final battle. But also beyond doubt the war we face will be part of the biggest and most ruthless of all wars. The biggest and most ruthless of unjust counter-revolutionary wars is hanging over us, and the vast majority of mankind will be ravaged unless we raise the banner of a just war. The banner of mankind's just war is the banner of mankind's salvation. The banner of China's just war is the banner of China's salvation. A war waged by the great majority of mankind and of the Chinese people is beyond doubt a just war, a most lofty and glorious undertaking for the salvation of mankind and China, and a bridge to a new era in world history. When human society advances to the point where classes and states are eliminated, there will be no more wars, counter-revolutionary or revolutionary, unjust or just; that will be the era of perpetual peace for mankind. Our study of the laws of revolutionary war springs from the desire to eliminate all wars; herein lies the distinction between us Communists and all the exploiting classes.

### 3. STRATEGY IS THE STUDY OF THE LAWS OF A WAR SITUATION AS A WHOLE

Wherever there is war, there is a war situation as a whole. The war situation as a whole may cover the entire world, may cover an entire country, or may cover an independent guerrilla zone or an independent major operational front. Any war situation of such a character as to require comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war situation as a whole.

The task of the science of strategy is to study those laws for directing a war that govern a war situation as a whole. The task of the science of campaigns<sup>1</sup> and the science of tactics is to study those laws for directing a war that govern a partial situation.

Why is it necessary for the commander of a campaign or a tactical operation to understand the laws of strategy to some degree? Because an understanding of the whole facilitates the handling of the part, and because the part is subordinate to the whole. The view that

strategic victory is determined by tactical successes alone is wrong because it overlooks the fact that victory or defeat in a war is first and foremost a question of whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are properly taken into account. If there are serious defects or mistakes in taking the situation as a whole and its various stages into account, the war is sure to be lost. "One careless move loses the whole game" refers to a move affecting the situation as a whole, a move decisive for the whole situation, and not to a move of a partial nature, a move which is not decisive for the whole situation. As in chess, so in war.

But the situation as a whole cannot be detached from its parts and become independent of them, for it is made up of all its parts. Sometimes certain parts may suffer destruction or defeat without seriously affecting the situation as a whole, because they are not decisive for the situation as a whole. Some defeats or failures in tactical operations or campaigns do not lead to deterioration in the war situation as a whole, because they are not of decisive significance. But the loss of most of the campaigns making up the war situation as a whole, or of one or two decisive campaigns, immediately changes the whole situation. Here, "most of the campaigns" or "one or two campaigns" are decisive. In the history of war, there are instances where defeat in a single battle nullified all the advantages of a series of victories, and there are also instances where victory in a single battle after many defeats opened up a new situation. In those instances the "series of victories" and the "many defeats" were partial in nature and not decisive for the situation as a whole, while "defeat in a single battle" or "victory in a single battle" played the decisive role. All this explains the importance of taking into account the situation as a whole. What is most important for the person in over-all command is to concentrate on attending to the war situation as a whole. The main point is that, according to the circumstances, he should concern himself with the problems of the grouping of his military units and formations, the relations between campaigns, the relations between various operational stages, and the relations between our activities as a whole and the enemy's activities as a whole — all these problems demand his greatest care and effort, and if he ignores them and immerses himself in secondary problems, he can hardly avoid setbacks.

The relationship between the whole and the part holds not only for the relationship between strategy and campaign but also for that

between campaign and tactics. Examples are to be found in the relation between the operations of a division and those of its regiments and battalions, and in the relation between the operations of a company and those of its platoons and squads. The commanding officer at any level should centre his attention on the most important and decisive problem or action in the whole situation he is handling, and not on other problems or actions.

What is important or decisive should be determined not by general or abstract considerations, but according to the concrete circumstances. In a military operation the direction and point of assault should be selected according to the actual situation of the enemy, the terrain, and the strength of our own forces at the moment. One must see to it that the soldiers do not overeat when supplies are abundant, and take care that they do not go hungry when supplies are short. In the White areas the mere leakage of a piece of information may cause defeat in a subsequent engagement, but in the Red areas such leakage is often not a very serious matter. It is necessary for the high commanders to participate personally in certain battles but not in others. For a military school, the most important question is the selection of a director and instructors and the adoption of a training programme. For a mass meeting, the main thing is mobilizing the masses to attend and putting forward suitable slogans. And so on and so forth. In a word, the principle is to centre our attention on the important links that have a bearing on the situation as a whole.

The only way to study the laws governing a war situation as a whole is to do some hard thinking. For what pertains to the situation as a whole is not visible to the eye, and we can understand it only by hard thinking; there is no other way. But because the situation as a whole is made up of parts, people with experience of the parts, experience of campaigns and tactics, can understand matters of a higher order provided they are willing to think hard. The problems of strategy include the following:

Giving proper consideration to the relation between the enemy and ourselves.

Giving proper consideration to the relation between various campaigns or between various operational stages.

Giving proper consideration to those parts which have a bearing on (are decisive for) the situation as a whole.

Giving proper consideration to the special features contained in the general situation.

Giving proper consideration to the relation between the front and the rear.

Giving proper consideration to the distinction as well as the connection between losses and replacements, between fighting and resting, between concentration and dispersion, between attack and defence, between advance and retreat, between concealment and exposure, between the main attack and supplementary attacks, between assault and containing action, between centralized command and decentralized command, between protracted war and war of quick decision, between positional war and mobile war, between our own forces and friendly forces, between one military arm and another, between higher and lower levels, between cadres and the rank and file, between old and new soldiers, between senior and junior cadres, between old and new cadres, between Red areas and White areas, between old Red areas and new Red areas, between the central district and the borders of a given base area, between the warm season and the cold season, between victory and defeat, between large and small troop formations, between the regular army and the guerrilla forces, between destroying the enemy and winning over the masses, between expanding the Red Army and consolidating the Red Army, between military work and political work, between past and present tasks, between present and future tasks, between tasks arising from one set of circumstances and tasks arising from another, between fixed fronts and fluid fronts, between civil war and national war, between one historical stage and another, etc., etc.

None of these problems of strategy is visible to the eye, and yet, if we think hard, we can comprehend, grasp and master them all, that is, we can raise the important problems concerning a war or concerning military operations to the higher plane of principle and solve them. Our task in studying the problems of strategy is to attain this goal.

#### 4. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO BE GOOD AT LEARNING

Why have we organized the Red Army? For the purpose of defeating the enemy. Why do we study the laws of war? For the purpose of applying them in war.

To learn is no easy matter and to apply what one has learned is even harder. Many people appear impressive when discoursing on military science in classrooms or in books, but when it comes to actual fighting, some win battles and others lose them. Both the history of war and our own experience in war have proved this point.

Where then does the crux lie?

In real life, we cannot ask for "ever-victorious generals", who are few and far between in history. What we can ask for is generals who are brave and sagacious and who normally win their battles in the course of a war, generals who combine wisdom with courage. To become both wise and courageous one must acquire a method, a method to be employed in learning as well as in applying what has been learned.

What method? The method is to familiarize ourselves with all aspects of the enemy situation and our own, to discover the laws governing the actions of both sides and to make use of these laws in our own operations.

The military manuals issued in many countries point both to the necessity of a "flexible application of principles according to circumstances" and to the measures to be taken in case of defeat. They point to the former in order to warn a commander against subjectively committing mistakes through too rigid an application of principles, and to the latter in order to enable him to cope with the situation after he has committed subjective mistakes or after unexpected and irresistible changes have occurred in the objective circumstances.

Why are subjective mistakes made? Because the way the forces in a war or a battle are disposed or directed does not fit the conditions of the given time and place, because subjective direction does not correspond to, or is at variance with, the objective conditions, in other words, because the contradiction between the subjective and the objective has not been solved. People can hardly avoid such situations whatever they are doing, but some people prove themselves more competent than others. As in any job we demand a comparatively high degree of competence, so in war we demand more victories or, conversely, fewer defeats. Here the crux is to bring the subjective and the objective into proper correspondence with each other.

Take an example in tactics. If the point chosen for attack is on one of the enemy's flanks and it is located precisely where his weak spot happens to be, and in consequence the assault succeeds, then the subjective corresponds with the objective, that is, the commander's reconnaissance, judgement and decision have cor-

responded with the enemy's actual situation and dispositions. If the point chosen for attack is on another flank or in the centre and the attack hits a snag and makes no headway, then such correspondence is lacking. If the attack is properly timed, if the reserves are used neither too late nor too early, and if all the other dispositions and operations in the battle are such as to favour us and not the enemy, then the subjective direction throughout the battle completely corresponds with the objective situation. Such complete correspondence is extremely rare in a war or a battle, in which the belligerents are groups of live human beings bearing arms and keeping their secrets from each other; this is quite unlike handling inanimate objects or routine matters. But if the direction given by the commander corresponds in the main with the actual situation, that is, if the decisive elements in the direction correspond with the actual situation, then there is a basis for victory.

A commander's correct dispositions stem from his correct decisions, his correct decisions stem from his correct judgements, and his correct judgements stem from a thorough and necessary reconnaissance and from pondering on and piecing together the data of various kinds gathered through reconnaissance. He applies all possible and necessary methods of reconnaissance, and ponders on the information gathered about the enemy's situation, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from one thing to another and from the outside to the inside; then, he takes the conditions on his own side into account, and makes a comparative study of both sides and their interrelations, thereby forming his judgements, making up his mind and working out his plans. Such is the complete process of knowing a situation which a military man goes through before he formulates a strategic plan, a campaign plan or a battle plan. But instead of doing this, a careless military man bases his military plans on his own wishful thinking, and hence his plans are fanciful and do not correspond with reality. A rash military man relying solely upon enthusiasm is bound to be tricked by the enemy, or lured on by some superficial or partial aspect of the enemy's situation, or swayed by irresponsible suggestions from subordinates that are not based on real knowledge or deep insight, and so he runs his head against a brick wall, because he does not know or does not want to know that every military plan must be based on the necessary reconnaissance and on careful consideration of the enemy's situation, his own situation, and their interrelations.

The process of knowing a situation goes on not only before the formulation of a military plan but also after. In carrying out the plan from the moment it is put into effect to the end of the operation, there is another process of knowing the situation, namely, the process of practice. In the course of this process, it is necessary to examine anew whether the plan worked out in the preceding process corresponds with reality. If it does not, or does not fully, correspond with reality, then in the light of our new knowledge, it becomes necessary to form new judgements, make new decisions and change the original plan so as to meet the new situation. The plan is partially changed in almost every operation, and sometimes it is even changed completely. A rash man who does not understand the need for such alterations or is unwilling to make them, but who acts blindly, will inevitably run his head against a brick wall.

The above applies to a strategical action, a campaign or a battle. Provided he is modest and willing to learn, an experienced military man will be able to familiarize himself with the character of his own forces (commanders, men, arms, supplies, etc., and their sum total), with the character of the enemy forces (likewise, commanders, men, arms, supplies, etc., and their sum total) and with all other conditions related to the war, such as politics, economics, geography and weather; such a military man will have a better grasp in directing a war or an operation and will be more likely to win victories. He will achieve this because, over a long period of time, he has come to know the situation on the enemy side and his own, discovered the laws of action, and solved the contradictions between the subjective and the objective. This process of knowing is extremely important; without such a long period of experience, it would be difficult to understand and grasp the laws of an entire war. Neither a beginner nor a person who fights only on paper can become a really able high-ranking commander; only one who has learned through actual fighting in war can do so.

All military laws and military theories which are in the nature of principles, are the experience of past wars summed up by people in former days or in our own times. We should seriously study these lessons, paid for in blood, which are a heritage of past wars. That is one point. But there is another. We should put these conclusions to the test of our own experience, assimilating what is useful, rejecting what is useless, and adding what is specifically our own. The latter is very important, for otherwise we cannot direct a war.

Reading is learning, but applying is also learning and the more important kind of learning at that. Our chief method is to learn warfare through warfare. A person who has had no opportunity to go to school can also learn warfare — he can learn through fighting in war. A revolutionary war is a mass undertaking; it is often not a matter of first learning and then doing, but of doing and then learning, for doing is itself learning. There is a gap between the ordinary civilian and the soldier, but it is no Great Wall, and it can be quickly closed, and the way to close it is to take part in revolution, in war. By saying that it is not easy to learn and to apply we mean that it is hard to learn thoroughly and to apply skilfully. By saying that civilians can very quickly become soldiers we mean that it is not difficult to cross the threshold. To put the two statements together, we may cite the Chinese adage, "Nothing in the world is difficult for one who sets his mind to it." To cross the threshold is not difficult, and mastery, too, is possible provided one sets one's mind to the task and is good at learning.

The laws of war, like the laws governing all other things, are reflections in our minds of objective realities; everything outside of the mind is objective reality. Consequently what has to be learned and known includes the state of affairs on the enemy side and that on our side, both of which should be regarded as the object of study, while the mind (the capacity to think) alone is the subject performing the study. Some people are good at knowing themselves and poor at knowing their enemy, and some are the other way round; neither can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of war. There is a saying in the book of Sun Wu Tzu, the great military scientist of ancient China, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat",<sup>2</sup> which refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application, both to knowing the laws of the development of objective reality and to deciding on our own action in accordance with these laws in order to overcome the enemy facing us. We should not take this saying lightly.

War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups, and all the laws of war are applied by warring nations, states, classes, or political groups for the purpose of achieving victory for themselves. Unquestionably, victory or defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political, economic and natural conditions on both sides. But not by these alone. It is also determined

by each side's subjective ability in directing the war. In his endeavour to win a war, a military man cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material conditions; within these limitations, however, he can and must strive for victory. The stage of action for a military man is built upon objective material conditions, but on that stage he can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur. Therefore, given the objective material foundations, *i.e.*, the military, political, economic and natural conditions, our Red Army commanders must display their prowess and marshal all their forces to crush the national and class enemies and to transform this evil world. Here is where our subjective ability in directing war can and must be exercised. We do not permit any of our Red Army commanders to become a blundering hot-head; we decidedly want every Red Army commander to become a hero who is both bold and clear-headed, who possesses both all-conquering courage and the ability to remain master of the situation throughout the changes and vicissitudes of the entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, he not only must not flounder but must make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. The laws for directing war constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war.

So much for our methods.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

China's revolutionary war, which began in 1924, has passed through two stages, the first from 1924 to 1927, and the second from 1927 to 1936; the stage of national revolutionary war against Japan will now commence. In all three of its stages this revolutionary war has been, is and will be fought under the leadership of the Chinese proletariat and its party, the Chinese Communist Party. The chief enemies in China's revolutionary war are imperialism and the feudal forces. Although the Chinese bourgeoisie may take part in the revolutionary war at certain historical junctures, yet its selfishness and lack of political and economic independence render it both unwilling and

unable to lead China's revolutionary war on to the road of complete victory. The masses of China's peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie wish to take an active part in the revolutionary war and to carry it to complete victory. They are the main forces in the revolutionary war, but being small-scale producers they are limited in their political outlook (and some of the unemployed masses have anarchist views), so that they are unable to give correct leadership in the war. Therefore, in an era when the proletariat has already appeared on the political stage, the responsibility for leading China's revolutionary war inevitably falls on the shoulders of the Chinese Communist Party. In such an era, any revolutionary war will definitely end in defeat if it lacks, or runs counter to, the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party. Of all the social strata and political groupings in semi-colonial China, the proletariat and the Communist Party are the ones most free from narrow-mindedness and selfishness, are politically the most far-sighted, the best organized and the readiest to learn with an open mind from the experience of the vanguard class, the proletariat, and its political party throughout the world and to make use of this experience in their own cause. Hence only the proletariat and the Communist Party can lead the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie, can overcome the narrow-mindedness of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, the destructiveness of the unemployed masses, and also (provided the Communist Party does not err in its policy) the vacillation and lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie — and can lead the revolution and the war on to the road of victory.

The revolutionary war of 1924-27 was waged, basically speaking, in conditions in which the international proletariat and the Chinese proletariat and its party exerted political influence on the Chinese national bourgeoisie and its parties, and entered into political cooperation with them. But this revolutionary war failed at the critical juncture, primarily because the big bourgeoisie turned traitor and also because the opportunists within the revolutionary ranks voluntarily surrendered the leadership of the revolution.

The Agrarian Revolutionary War, lasting from 1927 to the present, has been waged under new conditions. The enemy in this war is not imperialism alone but also the alliance of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords. And the national bourgeoisie has become a tail to the big bourgeoisie. This revolutionary war is led by the Communist Party alone, which has established absolute leadership over it. The absolute

leadership of the Communist Party is the most important condition enabling the revolutionary war to be carried through firmly to the end. Without this leadership, it is inconceivable that the revolutionary war could have been carried on with such perseverance.

The Chinese Communist Party has led China's revolutionary war courageously and resolutely, and for fifteen long years<sup>3</sup> has demonstrated to the whole nation that it is the people's friend, fighting at all times in the forefront of the revolutionary war in defence of the people's interests and for their freedom and liberation.

By its arduous struggles and by the martyrdom of hundreds of thousands of its heroic members and tens of thousands of its heroic cadres, the Communist Party of China has played a great educative role among hundreds of millions of people throughout the country. The Party's great historic achievements in its revolutionary struggles have provided the prerequisite for the survival and salvation of China at this critical juncture when she is being invaded by a national enemy; and this prerequisite is the existence of a political leadership enjoying the confidence of the vast majority of the people and chosen by them after long years of testing. Today, the people accept what the Communist Party says more readily than what any other political party says. Were it not for the arduous struggles of the Chinese Communist Party in the last fifteen years, it would be impossible to save China in the face of the new menace of subjugation.

Besides the errors of the Right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu<sup>4</sup> and the "Left" opportunism of Li Li-san,<sup>5</sup> the Chinese Communist Party has committed two other errors in the course of the revolutionary war. The first error was the "Left" opportunism of 1931-34,<sup>6</sup> which resulted in serious losses in the Agrarian Revolutionary War so that, instead of our defeating the enemy's fifth campaign of "encirclement and suppression", we lost our base areas and the Red Army was weakened. This error was corrected at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at Tsunyi in January 1935. The second was the Right opportunism of Chang Kuo-tao in 1935-36<sup>7</sup> which developed to such an extent that it undermined the discipline of the Party and the Red Army and caused serious losses to part of the Red Army's main forces. But this error was also finally rectified, thanks to the correct leadership of the Central Committee and the political consciousness of Party members, commanders and fighters in the Red Army. Of course all these errors were harmful to our Party, to our revolution and the war, but in the end we overcame

them, and in doing so our Party and our Red Army have steeled themselves and become still stronger.

The Chinese Communist Party has led and continues to lead the stirring, magnificent and victorious revolutionary war. This war is not only the banner of China's liberation, but also has international revolutionary significance. The eyes of the revolutionary people the world over are upon us. In the new stage, the stage of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, we shall lead the Chinese revolution to its completion and exert a profound influence on the revolution in the East and in the whole world. Our revolutionary war has proved that we need a correct Marxist military line as well as a correct Marxist political line. Fifteen years of revolution and war have hammered out such a political line and such a military line. We believe that from now on, in the new stage of the war, these lines will be further developed, filled out and enriched in new circumstances, so that we can attain our aim of defeating the national enemy. History tells us that correct political and military lines do not emerge and develop spontaneously and tranquilly, but only in the course of struggle. These lines must combat "Left" opportunism on the one hand and Right opportunism on the other. Without combating and thoroughly overcoming these harmful tendencies which damage the revolution and the revolutionary war, it would be impossible to establish a correct line and win victory in the revolutionary war. It is for this reason that I often refer to erroneous views in this pamphlet.

### CHAPTER III

## CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

### 1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT

People who do not admit, do not know, or do not want to know that China's revolutionary war has its own characteristics have equated the war waged by the Red Army against the Kuomintang forces with war in general or with the civil war in the Soviet Union. The experience of the civil war in the Soviet Union directed by Lenin and Stalin has

a world-wide significance. All Communist Parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, regard this experience and its theoretical summing-up by Lenin and Stalin as their guide. But this does not mean that we should apply this experience mechanically to our own conditions. In many of its aspects China's revolutionary war has characteristics distinguishing it from the civil war in the Soviet Union. Of course it is wrong to take no account of these characteristics or deny their existence. This point has been fully borne out in our ten years of war.

Our enemy has made similar mistakes. He has not recognized that fighting against the Red Army requires a different strategy and different tactics from those used in fighting other forces. Relying on his superiority in various respects, he took us lightly and stuck to his old methods of warfare. This was the case both before and during his fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in 1933, with the result that he suffered a series of defeats. In the Kuomintang army a new approach to the problem was suggested first by the reactionary Kuomintang general Liu Wei-yuan and then by Tai Yueh. Their idea was eventually accepted by Chiang Kai-shek. That was how Chiang Kai-shek's Officers Training Corps at Lushan<sup>8</sup> came into being and how the new reactionary military principles applied in the fifth campaign of "encirclement and suppression"<sup>9</sup> were evolved.

But when the enemy changed his military principles to suit operations against the Red Army, there appeared in our ranks a group of people who reverted to the "old ways". They urged a return to ways suited to the general run of things, refused to go into the specific circumstances of each case, rejected the experience gained in the Red Army's history of sanguinary battles, belittled the strength of imperialism and the Kuomintang as well as that of the Kuomintang army, and turned a blind eye to the new reactionary principles adopted by the enemy. As a result, all the revolutionary bases except the Shensi-Kansu Border Region were lost, the Red Army was reduced from 300,000 to a few tens of thousands, the membership of the Chinese Communist Party fell from 300,000 to a few tens of thousands, and the Party organizations in the Kuomintang areas were almost all destroyed. In short, we paid a severe penalty, which was historic in its significance. This group of people called themselves Marxist-Leninists, but actually they had not learned an iota of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin said that the most essential thing

in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions.<sup>10</sup> That was precisely the point these comrades of ours forgot.

Hence one can see that, without an understanding of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war, it is impossible to direct it and lead it to victory.

## 2. WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR?

What then are the characteristics of China's revolutionary war?

I think there are four principal ones.

The first is that China is a vast, semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through the revolution of 1924-27.

This characteristic indicates that it is possible for China's revolutionary war to develop and attain victory. We already pointed this out (at the First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area)<sup>11</sup> when in late 1927 and early 1928, soon after guerrilla warfare was started in China, some comrades in the Chingkang Mountains in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area raised the question, "How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?" For this was a most fundamental question. Without answering this question of whether China's revolutionary base areas and the Chinese Red Army could survive and develop, we could not have advanced a single step. The Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1928 again gave the answer to the question. Since then the Chinese revolutionary movement has had a correct theoretical basis.

Let us now analyse this characteristic.

China's political and economic development is uneven — a weak capitalist economy coexists with a preponderant semi-feudal economy; a few modern industrial and commercial cities coexist with a vast stagnant countryside; several million industrial workers coexist with several hundred millions of peasants and handicraftsmen labouring under the old system; big warlords controlling the central government coexist with small warlords controlling the provinces; two kinds of reactionary armies, the so-called Central Army under Chiang Kai-shek and "miscellaneous troops" under the warlords in the provinces, exist

side by side; a few railways, steamship lines and motor roads exist side by side with a vast number of wheelbarrow paths and foot-paths many of which are difficult to negotiate even on foot.

China is a semi-colonial country — disunity among the imperialist powers makes for disunity among the ruling groups in China. There is a difference between a semi-colonial country controlled by several countries and a colony controlled by a single country.

China is a vast country — “When it is dark in the east, it is light in the west; when things are dark in the south, there is still light in the north.” Hence one need not worry about lack of room for manoeuvre.

China has gone through a great revolution — this has provided the seeds from which the Red Army has grown, provided the leader of the Red Army, namely, the Chinese Communist Party, and provided the masses with experience of participation in a revolution.

We say, therefore, that the first characteristic of China's revolutionary war is that it is waged in a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a revolution. This characteristic basically determines our military strategy and tactics as well as our political strategy and tactics.

The second characteristic is that our enemy is big and powerful.

How do matters stand with the Kuomintang, the enemy of the Red Army? It is a party that has seized political power and has more or less stabilized its power. It has gained the support of the world's principal counter-revolutionary states. It has remodelled its army which has thus become different from any other army in Chinese history and on the whole similar to the armies of the modern states; this army is much better supplied with weapons and *matériel* than the Red Army, and is larger than any army in Chinese history, or for that matter than the standing army of any other country. There is a world of difference between the Kuomintang army and the Red Army. The Kuomintang controls the key positions or lifelines in the politics, economy, communications and culture of China; its political power is nation-wide.

The Chinese Red Army is thus confronted with a big and powerful enemy. This is the second characteristic of China's revolutionary war. It necessarily makes the military operations of the Red Army different in many ways from those of wars in general and from those of the civil war in the Soviet Union or of the Northern Expedition.

The third characteristic is that the Red Army is small and weak.

The Chinese Red Army, starting as guerrilla units, came into being after the defeat of the first great revolution. This occurred in a period of relative political and economic stability in the reactionary capitalist countries of the world as well as in a period of reaction in China.

Our political power exists in scattered and isolated mountainous or remote regions and receives no outside help whatsoever. Economic and cultural conditions in the revolutionary base areas are backward compared with those in the Kuomintang areas. The revolutionary base areas embrace only rural districts and small towns. These areas were extremely small in the beginning and have not grown much larger since. Moreover, they are fluid and not stationary, and the Red Army has no really consolidated bases.

The Red Army is numerically small, its arms are poor, and it has great difficulty in obtaining supplies such as food, bedding and clothing.

This characteristic presents a sharp contrast to the preceding one. From this sharp contrast have arisen the strategy and tactics of the Red Army.

The fourth characteristic is Communist Party leadership and the agrarian revolution.

This characteristic is the inevitable consequence of the first one. It has given rise to two features. On the one hand, despite the fact that China's revolutionary war is taking place in a period of reaction in China and throughout the capitalist world, it can be victorious because it is under the leadership of the Communist Party and has the support of the peasantry. Thanks to the support of the peasantry, our base areas, small as they are, are politically very powerful and stand firmly opposed to the enormous Kuomintang regime, while militarily they place great difficulties in the way of the Kuomintang attacks. Small as it is, the Red Army has great fighting capacity, because its members, led by the Communist Party, are born of the agrarian revolution and are fighting for their own interests, and because its commanders and fighters are politically united.

The Kuomintang, on the other hand, presents a sharp contrast. It opposes the agrarian revolution and therefore has no support from the peasantry. Though it has a large army, the Kuomintang cannot make its soldiers and the many lower-ranking officers, who were originally small producers, risk their lives willingly for it. Its officers and men are politically divided, which reduces its fighting capacity.

### 3. OUR STRATEGY AND TACTICS ENSUING FROM THESE CHARACTERISTICS

Thus the four principal characteristics of China's revolutionary war are: a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a great revolution; a big and powerful enemy; a small and weak Red Army; and the agrarian revolution. These characteristics determine the line for guiding China's revolutionary war as well as many of its strategic and tactical principles. It follows from the first and fourth characteristics that it is possible for the Chinese Red Army to grow and defeat its enemy. It follows from the second and third characteristics that it is impossible for the Chinese Red Army to grow very rapidly or defeat its enemy quickly; in other words, the war will be protracted and may even be lost if it is mishandled.

These are the two aspects of China's revolutionary war. They exist simultaneously, that is, there are favourable factors and there are difficulties. This is the fundamental law of China's revolutionary war, from which many other laws ensue. The history of our ten years of war has proved the validity of this law. He who has eyes but fails to see this fundamental law cannot direct China's revolutionary war, cannot lead the Red Army to victories.

It is clear that we must correctly settle all the following matters of principle:

Determine our strategic orientation correctly, oppose adventurism when on the offensive, oppose conservatism when on the defensive, and oppose flight-ism when shifting from one place to another.

Oppose guerrilla-ism in the Red Army, while recognizing the guerrilla character of its operations.

Oppose protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision, and uphold the strategy of protracted war and campaigns of quick decision.

Oppose fixed battle lines and positional warfare, and favour fluid battle lines and mobile warfare.

Oppose fighting merely to rout the enemy, and uphold fighting to annihilate the enemy.

Oppose the strategy of striking with two "fists" in two directions at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one "fist" in one direction at one time.<sup>12</sup>

Oppose the principle of maintaining one large rear area, and uphold the principle of small rear areas.

Oppose an absolutely centralized command, and favour a relatively centralized command.

Oppose the purely military viewpoint and the ways of roving rebels,<sup>13</sup> and recognize that the Red Army is a propagandist and organizer of the Chinese revolution.

Oppose bandit ways,<sup>14</sup> and uphold strict political discipline.

Oppose warlord ways, and favour both democracy within proper limits and an authoritative discipline in the army.

Oppose an incorrect, sectarian policy on cadres, and uphold the correct policy on cadres.

Oppose the policy of isolation, and affirm the policy of winning over all possible allies.

Oppose keeping the Red Army at its old stage, and strive to develop it to a new stage.

Our present discussion of the problems of strategy is intended to elucidate these matters carefully in the light of the historical experience gained in China's ten years of bloody revolutionary war.

#### CHAPTER IV

### "ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION" AND COUNTER-CAMPAIGNS AGAINST IT — THE MAIN PATTERN OF CHINA'S CIVIL WAR

In the ten years since our guerrilla war began, every independent Red guerrilla unit, every Red Army and every revolutionary base area has been regularly subjected by the enemy to "encirclement and suppression". The enemy looks upon the Red Army as a monster and seeks to capture it the moment it shows itself. He is for ever pursuing the Red Army and for ever trying to encircle it. For ten years this pattern of warfare has not changed, and unless the civil war gives place to a national war, the pattern will remain the same till the day the enemy becomes the weaker contestant and the Red Army the stronger.

The Red Army's operations take the form of counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression". For us victory means chiefly

victory in combating "encirclement and suppression", that is, strategic victory and victories in campaigns. The fight against each "encirclement and suppression" campaign constitutes a counter-campaign, which usually comprises several or even scores of battles, big and small. Until an "encirclement and suppression" campaign has been basically smashed, one cannot speak of strategic victory or of victory in the counter-campaign as a whole, even though many battles may have been won. The history of the Red Army's decade of war is a history of counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression".

In the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and the Red Army's counter-campaigns against them, the two forms of fighting, offensive and defensive, are both employed, and here there is no difference from any other war, ancient or modern, in China or elsewhere. The special characteristic of China's civil war, however, is the repeated alternation of the two forms over a long period of time. In each "encirclement and suppression" campaign, the enemy employs the offensive against the Red Army's defensive, and the Red Army employs the defensive against his offensive; this is the first stage of a counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression". Then the enemy employs the defensive against the Red Army's offensive, and the Red Army employs the offensive against his defensive; this is the second stage of the counter-campaign. Every "encirclement and suppression" campaign has these two stages, and they alternate over a long period.

By repeated alternation over a long period we mean the repetition of this pattern of warfare and these forms of fighting. This is a fact obvious to everybody. An "encirclement and suppression" campaign and a counter-campaign against it — such is the repeated pattern of the war. In each campaign the alternation of the forms of fighting consists of the first stage in which the enemy employs the offensive against our defensive and we meet his offensive with our defensive, and of the second stage in which the enemy employs the defensive against our offensive and we meet his defensive with our offensive.

As for the content of a campaign or of a battle, it does not consist of mere repetition but is different each time. This, too, is a fact and obvious to everybody. In this connection it has become a rule that with each campaign and each counter-campaign, the scale becomes larger, the situation more complicated and the fighting more intense.

But this does not mean that there are no ups and downs. After the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, the Red Army

was greatly weakened, and all the base areas in the south were lost. Having shifted to the Northwest, the Red Army now no longer holds a vital position threatening the internal enemy as it did in the south, and as a result the scale of the "encirclement and suppression" campaigns has become smaller, the situation simpler and the fighting less intense.

What constitutes a defeat for the Red Army? Strategically speaking, there is a defeat only when a counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" fails completely, but even then the defeat is only partial and temporary. For only the total destruction of the Red Army would constitute complete defeat in the civil war; but this has never happened. The loss of extensive base areas and the shift of the Red Army constituted a temporary and partial defeat, not a final and complete one, even though this partial defeat entailed losing 90 per cent of the Party membership, of the armed forces and of the base areas. We call this shift the continuation of our defensive and the enemy's pursuit the continuation of his offensive. That is to say, in the course of the struggle between the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and our counter-campaign we allowed our defensive to be broken by the enemy's offensive instead of turning from the defensive to the offensive; and so our defensive turned into a retreat and the enemy's offensive into a pursuit. But when the Red Army reached a new area, as for example when we shifted from Kiangsi Province and various other regions to Shensi Province, the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns began afresh. That is why we say that the Red Army's strategic retreat (the Long March) was a continuation of its strategic defensive and the enemy's strategic pursuit was a continuation of his strategic offensive.

In the Chinese civil war, as in all other wars, ancient or modern, in China or abroad, there are only two basic forms of fighting, attack and defence. The special characteristic of China's civil war consists in the long-term repetition of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and of our counter-campaigns together with the long-term alternation of the two forms of fighting, attack and defence, with the inclusion of the phenomenon of the great strategic shift of more than ten thousand kilometres (the Long March).<sup>15</sup>

A defeat for the enemy is much the same. It is a strategic defeat for the enemy when his "encirclement and suppression" campaign is broken and our defensive becomes an offensive, when the enemy turns to the defensive and has to reorganize before launching another

“encirclement and suppression” campaign. The enemy has not had to make a strategic shift of more than ten thousand kilometres such as we have, because he rules the whole country and is much stronger than we are. But there have been partial shifts of his forces. Sometimes, enemy forces in White strongholds encircled by the Red Army in some base areas have broken through our encirclement and withdrawn to the White areas to organize new offensives. If the civil war is prolonged and the Red Army’s victories become more extensive, there will be more of this sort of thing. But the enemy cannot achieve the same results as the Red Army, because he does not have the help of the people and because his officers and men are not united. If he were to imitate the Red Army’s long-distance shift, he would certainly be wiped out.

In the period of the Li Li-san line in 1930, Comrade Li Li-san failed to understand the protracted nature of China’s civil war and for that reason did not perceive the law that in the course of this war there is repetition over a long period of “encirclement and suppression” campaigns and of their defeat (by that time there had already been three in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area and two in Fukien). Hence, in an attempt to achieve rapid victory for the revolution, he ordered the Red Army, which was then still in its infancy, to attack Wuhan, and also ordered a nation-wide armed uprising. Thus he committed the error of “Left” opportunism.

Likewise the “Left” opportunists of 1931-34 did not believe in the law of the repetition of “encirclement and suppression” campaigns. Some responsible comrades in our base area along the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border held an “auxiliary force” theory, maintaining that the Kuomintang army had become merely an auxiliary force after the defeat of its third “encirclement and suppression” campaign and that the imperialists themselves would have to take the field as the main force in further attacks on the Red Army. The strategy based on this estimate was that the Red Army should attack Wuhan. In principle, this fitted in with the views of those comrades in Kiangsi who called for a Red Army attack on Nanchang, were against the work of linking up the base areas and the tactics of luring the enemy in deep, regarded the seizure of the capital and other key cities of a province as the starting point for victory in that province, and held that “the fight against the fifth ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign represents the decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism”. This “Left” opportunism was the source of the

wrong line adopted in the struggles against the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area and in those against the fifth in the Central Base Area in Kiangsi; and it rendered the Red Army helpless before these fierce enemy campaigns and brought enormous losses to the Chinese revolution.

The view that the Red Army should under no circumstances adopt defensive methods was directly related to this "Left" opportunism, which denied the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, and it, too, was entirely erroneous.

The proposition that a revolution or a revolutionary war is an offensive is of course correct. A revolution or a revolutionary war in its emergence and growth from a small force to a big force, from lack of political power to the seizure of political power, from lack of a Red Army to the creation of a Red Army, and from lack of revolutionary base areas to their establishment, must be on the offensive and cannot be conservative; and tendencies to conservatism must be opposed.

The only entirely correct proposition is that a revolution or a revolutionary war is an offensive but also involves defence and retreat. To defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to move against the flanks in order to move against the front, and to take a roundabout route in order to get on to the direct route — this is inevitable in the process of development of many phenomena, especially military movements.

Of the two propositions stated above, the first may be correct in the political sphere, but it is incorrect when transposed to the military sphere. Moreover, it is correct politically only in one situation (when the revolution is advancing), but incorrect when transposed to another situation (when the revolution is in retreat, in general retreat as in Russia in 1906<sup>16</sup> and in China in 1927, or in partial retreat as in Russia at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918).<sup>17</sup> Only the second proposition is entirely correct and true. The "Left" opportunism of 1931-34, which mechanically opposed the employment of defensive military measures, was nothing but infantile thinking.

When will the pattern of repeated "encirclement and suppression" campaigns come to an end? In my opinion, if the civil war is prolonged, this repetition will cease when a fundamental change takes place in the balance of forces. It will cease when the Red Army has become stronger than the enemy. Then we shall be encircling and suppressing the enemy and he will be resorting to counter-campaigns, but political and military conditions will not allow him to attain the same position

as that of the Red Army in its counter-campaigns. It can be definitely asserted that by then the pattern of repeated "encirclement and suppression" campaigns will have largely, if not completely, come to an end.

## CHAPTER V

### THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

Under this heading I would like to discuss the following problems: (1) active and passive defence; (2) preparations for combating "encirclement and suppression" campaigns; (3) strategic retreat; (4) strategic counter-offensive; (5) starting the counter-offensive; (6) concentration of troops; (7) mobile warfare; (8) war of quick decision; and (9) war of annihilation.

#### 1. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENCE

Why do we begin by discussing defence? After the failure of China's first national united front of 1924-27, the revolution became a most intense and ruthless class war. While the enemy ruled the whole country, we had only small armed forces; consequently, from the very beginning we have had to wage a bitter struggle against his "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. Our offensives have been closely linked with our efforts to break these "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, and our fate depends entirely on whether or not we are able to break them. The process of breaking an "encirclement and suppression" campaign is usually circuitous and not as direct as one would wish. The primary problem, and a serious one too, is how to conserve our strength and await an opportunity to defeat the enemy. Therefore, the strategic defensive is the most complicated and most important problem facing the Red Army in its operations.

In our ten years of war two deviations often arose with regard to the strategic defensive; one was to belittle the enemy, the other was to be terrified of the enemy.

As a result of belittling the enemy, many guerrilla units suffered defeat, and on several occasions the Red Army was unable to break the enemy's "encirclement and suppression".

When the revolutionary guerrilla units first came into existence, their leaders often failed to assess the enemy's situation and our own correctly. Because they had been successful in organizing sudden armed uprisings in certain places or mutinies among the White troops, they saw only the momentarily favourable circumstances, or failed to see the grave situation actually confronting them, and so usually underestimated the enemy. Moreover, they had no understanding of their own weaknesses (*i.e.*, lack of experience and smallness of forces). It was an objective fact that the enemy was strong and we were weak, and yet some people refused to give it thought, talked only of attack but never of defence or retreat, thus mentally disarming themselves in the matter of defence, and hence misdirected their actions. Many guerrilla units were defeated on this account.

Examples in which the Red Army, for this reason, failed to break the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns were its defeat in 1928 in the Haifeng-Lufeng area of Kwangtung Province,<sup>18</sup> and its loss of freedom of action in 1932 in the fourth counter-campaign against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area, where the Red Army acted on the theory that the Kuomintang army was merely an auxiliary force.

There are many instances of setbacks which were due to being terrified of the enemy.

As against those who underestimated the enemy, some people greatly overestimated him and also greatly underestimated our own strength, as a result of which they adopted an unwarranted policy of retreat and likewise disarmed themselves mentally in the matter of defence. This resulted in the defeat of some guerrilla units, or the failure of certain Red Army campaigns, or the loss of base areas.

The most striking example of the loss of a base area was that of the Central Base Area in Kiangsi during the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression". The mistake here arose from a Rightist viewpoint. The leaders feared the enemy as if he were a tiger, set up defences everywhere, fought defensive actions at every step and did not dare to advance to the enemy's rear and attack him there, which would have been to our advantage, or boldly to lure the enemy troops in deep so as to herd them together and annihilate them. As a result, the whole base area was lost and the Red Army had to undertake the Long March of over 12,000 kilometres. However, this kind of mistake was usually preceded by a "Left" error of underestimating the enemy. The military adventurism of attacking

the key cities in 1932 was the root cause of the line of passive defence adopted subsequently in coping with the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign.

The most extreme example of being terrified of the enemy was the retreatism of the "Chang Kuo-tao line". The defeat of the Western Column of the Fourth Front Red Army west of the Yellow River<sup>19</sup> marked the final bankruptcy of this line.

Active defence is also known as offensive defence, or defence through decisive engagements. Passive defence is also known as purely defensive defence or pure defence. Passive defence is actually a spurious kind of defence, and the only real defence is active defence, defence for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive. As far as I know, there is no military manual of value nor any sensible military expert, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, that does not oppose passive defence, whether in strategy or tactics. Only a complete fool or a madman would cherish passive defence as a talisman. However, there are people in this world who do such things. That is an error in war, a manifestation of conservatism in military matters, which we must resolutely oppose.

The military experts of the newer and rapidly developing imperialist countries, namely, Germany and Japan, loudly trumpet the advantages of the strategic offensive and are opposed to the strategic defensive. Military thinking of this kind is absolutely unsuited to China's revolutionary war. These military experts assert that a serious weakness of the defensive is that it shakes popular morale, instead of inspiring it. This applies to countries where class contradictions are acute and the war benefits only the reactionary ruling strata or the reactionary political groups in power. But our situation is different. With the slogan of defending the revolutionary base areas and defending China, we can rally the overwhelming majority of the people to fight with one heart and one mind, because we are the oppressed and the victims of aggression. It was also by using the form of the defensive that the Red Army of the Soviet Union defeated its enemies during the civil war. When the imperialist countries organized the Whites for attack, the war was waged under the slogan of defending the Soviets, and even when the October Uprising was being prepared, the military mobilization was carried out under the slogan of defending the capital. In every just war the defensive not only has a lulling effect on politically alien elements, it also makes possible the rallying of the backward sections of the masses to join in the war.

When Marx said that once an armed uprising is started there must not be a moment's pause in the attack,<sup>20</sup> he meant that the masses, having taken the enemy unawares in an insurrection, must give the reactionary rulers no chance to retain or recover their political power, must seize this moment to beat the nation's reactionary ruling forces when they are unprepared, and must not rest content with the victories already won, underestimate the enemy, slacken their attacks or hesitate to press forward, and so let slip the opportunity of destroying the enemy, bringing failure to the revolution. This is correct. It does not mean, however, that when we are already locked in battle with an enemy who enjoys superiority, we revolutionaries should not adopt defensive measures even when we are hard pressed. Only a prize idiot would think in this way.

Taken as a whole, our war has been an offensive against the Kuomintang, but militarily it has assumed the form of breaking the enemy's "encirclement and suppression".

Militarily speaking, our warfare consists of the alternate use of the defensive and the offensive. In our case it makes no difference whether the offensive is said to follow or to precede the defensive, because the crux of the matter is to break the "encirclement and suppression". The defensive continues until an "encirclement and suppression" campaign is broken, whereupon the offensive begins, these being but two stages of the same thing; and one enemy "encirclement and suppression" campaign is closely followed by another. Of the two stages, the defensive is the more complicated and the more important. It involves numerous problems of how to break the "encirclement and suppression". The basic principle here is to stand for active defence and oppose passive defence.

In our civil war, when the strength of the Red Army surpasses that of the enemy, we shall, in general, no longer need the strategic defensive. Our policy then will be the strategic offensive alone. This change will depend on an over-all change in the balance of forces. By that time the only remaining defensive measures will be of a partial character.

## 2. PREPARATIONS FOR COMBATING "ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION" CAMPAIGNS

Unless we have made necessary and sufficient preparations against a planned enemy "encirclement and suppression" campaign, we shall

certainly be forced into a passive position. To accept battle in haste is to fight without being sure of victory. Therefore when the enemy is preparing an "encirclement and suppression" campaign, it is absolutely necessary for us to prepare our counter-campaign. To be opposed to such preparations, as some people in our ranks were at one time, is childish and ridiculous.

There is a difficult problem here on which controversy may easily arise. When should we conclude our offensive and switch to the phase of preparing our counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression"? When we are victoriously on the offensive and the enemy is on the defensive, his preparations for the next "encirclement and suppression" campaign are conducted in secret, and therefore it is difficult for us to know when his offensive will begin. If our work of preparing the counter-campaign begins too early, it is bound to reduce the gains from our offensive and will sometimes even have certain harmful effects on the Red Army and the people. For the chief measures in the preparatory phase are the military preparations for withdrawal and the political mobilization for them. Sometimes, if we start preparing too early, this will turn into waiting for the enemy; after waiting a long time without the enemy appearing, we will have to renew our offensive. And sometimes, the enemy will start his offensive just as our new offensive is beginning, thus putting us in a difficult position. Hence the choice of the right moment to begin our preparations is an important problem. The right moment should be determined with due regard both to the enemy's situation and our own and to the relation between the two. In order to know the enemy's situation, we should collect information on his political, military and financial position and the state of public opinion in his territory. In analysing such information we must take the total strength of the enemy into full account and must not exaggerate the extent of his past defeats, but on the other hand we must not fail to take into account his internal contradictions, his financial difficulties, the effect of his past defeats, etc. As for our side, we must not exaggerate the extent of our past victories, but neither should we fail to take full account of their effect.

Generally speaking, however, on the question of timing the preparations, it is preferable to start them too early rather than too late. For the former involves smaller losses and has the advantage that preparedness averts peril and puts us in a fundamentally invincible position.

The essential problems during the preparatory phase are the preparations for the withdrawal of the Red Army, political mobilization, recruitment, arrangements for finance and provisions, and the handling of politically alien elements.

By preparations for the Red Army's withdrawal we mean taking care that it does not move in a direction jeopardizing the withdrawal or advance too far in its attacks or become too fatigued. These are the things the main forces of the Red Army must attend to on the eve of a large-scale enemy offensive. At such a time, the Red Army must devote its attention mainly to planning the selection and preparation of the battle areas, the acquisition of supplies, and the enlargement and training of its own forces.

Political mobilization is a problem of prime importance in the struggle against "encirclement and suppression". That is to say, we should tell the Red Army and the people in the base area clearly, resolutely and fully that the enemy's offensive is inevitable and imminent and will do serious harm to the people, but at the same time, we should tell them about his weaknesses, the factors favourable to the Red Army, our indomitable will to victory and our general plan of work. We should call upon the Red Army and the entire population to fight against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaign and defend the base area. Except where military secrets are concerned, political mobilization must be carried out openly, and, what is more, every effort should be made to extend it to all who might possibly support the revolutionary cause. The key link here is to convince the cadres.

Recruitment of new soldiers should be based on two considerations, first, on the level of political consciousness of the people and the size of the population and, second, on the current state of the Red Army and the possible extent of its losses in the whole course of the counter-campaign.

Needless to say, the problems of finance and food are of great importance to the counter-campaign. We must take the possibility of a prolonged enemy campaign into account. It is necessary to make an estimate of the minimum material requirements — chiefly of the Red Army but also of the people in the revolutionary base area — for the entire struggle against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaign.

With regard to politically alien elements we should not be off our guard, but neither should we be unduly apprehensive of treachery

on their part and adopt excessive precautionary measures. Distinction should be made between the landlords, the merchants and the rich peasants, and the main point is to explain things to them politically and win their neutrality, while at the same time organizing the masses of the people to keep an eye on them. Only against the very few elements who are most dangerous should stern measures like arrest be taken.

The extent of success in a struggle against "encirclement and suppression" is closely related to the degree to which the tasks of the preparatory phase have been fulfilled. Relaxation of preparatory work due to underestimation of the enemy and panic due to being terrified of the enemy's attacks are harmful tendencies, and both should be resolutely opposed. What we need is an enthusiastic but calm state of mind and intense but orderly work.

### 3. STRATEGIC RETREAT

A strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior force for the purpose of conserving its strength and biding its time to defeat the enemy, when it finds itself confronted with a superior force whose offensive it is unable to smash quickly. But military adventurists stubbornly oppose such a step and advocate "engaging the enemy outside the gates".

We all know that when two boxers fight, the clever boxer usually gives a little ground at first, while the foolish one rushes in furiously and uses up all his resources at the very start, and in the end he is often beaten by the man who has given ground.

In the novel *Shui Hu Chuan*,<sup>21</sup> the drill master Hung, challenging Lin Chung to a fight on Chai Chin's estate, shouts, "Come on! Come on! Come on!" In the end it is the retreating Lin Chung who spots Hung's weak point and floors him with one blow.

During the Spring and Autumn Era, when the states of Lu and Chi<sup>22</sup> were at war, Duke Chuang of Lu wanted to attack before the Chi troops had tired themselves out, but Tsao Kuei prevented him. When instead he adopted the tactic of "the enemy tires, we attack", he defeated the Chi army. This is a classic example from China's military history of a weak force defeating a strong force. Here is the account given by the historian Tsochiu Ming:<sup>23</sup>

In the spring the Chi troops invaded us. The Duke was about to fight. Tsao Kuei requested an audience. His neighbours said,

"This is the business of meat-eating officials, why meddle with it?" Tsao replied, "Meat-eaters are fools, they cannot plan ahead." So he saw the Duke. And he asked, "What will you rely on when you fight?" The Duke answered, "I never dare to keep all my food and clothing for my own enjoyment, but always share them with others." Tsao said, "Such paltry charity cannot reach all. The people will not follow you." The Duke said, "I never offer to the gods less sacrificial beasts, jade or silk than are due to them. I keep good faith." Tsao said, "Such paltry faith wins no trust. The gods will not bless you." The Duke said, "Though unable personally to attend to the details of all trials, big and small, I always demand the facts." Tsao said, "That shows your devotion to your people. You can give battle. When you do so, I beg to follow you." The Duke and he rode in the same chariot. The battle was joined at Changshuo. When the Duke was about to sound the drum for the attack, Tsao said, "Not yet." When the men of Chi had drummed thrice, Tsao said, "Now we can drum." The army of Chi was routed. The Duke wanted to pursue. Again Tsao said, "Not yet." He got down from the chariot to examine the enemy's wheel-tracks, then mounted the arm-rest of the chariot to look afar. He said, "Now we can pursue!" So began the pursuit of the Chi troops. After the victory the Duke asked Tsao why he had given such advice. Tsao replied, "A battle depends upon courage. At the first drum courage is aroused, at the second it flags, and with the third it runs out. When the enemy's courage ran out, ours was still high and so we won. It is difficult to fathom the moves of a great state, and I feared an ambush. But when I examined the enemy's wheel-tracks and found them criss-crossing and looked afar and saw his banners drooping, I advised pursuit."

That was a case of a weak state resisting a strong state. The story speaks of the political preparations before a battle — winning the confidence of the people; it speaks of a battlefield favourable for switching over to the counter-offensive — Changshuo; it indicates the favourable time for starting the counter-offensive — when the enemy's courage runs out and one's own is high; and it points to the moment for starting the pursuit — when the enemy's tracks are criss-crossed and his banners are drooping. Though the battle was not a big one, it illustrates the principles of the strategic defensive. China's military history contains numerous instances of victories won on these principles. In such famous battles as the Battle of Chengkao between the states

of Chu and Han,<sup>24</sup> the Battle of Kunyang between the states of Hsin and Han,<sup>25</sup> the Battle of Kuantu between Yuan Shao and Tsao Tsao,<sup>26</sup> the Battle of Chihpi between the states of Wu and Wei,<sup>27</sup> the Battle of Yiling between the states of Wu and Shu,<sup>28</sup> and the Battle of Feishui between the states of Chin and Tsin,<sup>29</sup> in each case the contending sides were unequal, and the weaker side, yielding some ground at first, gained mastery by striking only after the enemy had struck and so defeated the stronger side.

Our war began in the autumn of 1927, and at that time we had no experience at all. The Nanchang Uprising<sup>30</sup> and the Canton Uprising<sup>31</sup> failed, and in the Autumn Harvest Uprising<sup>32</sup> the Red Army in the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border area also suffered several defeats and shifted to the Ching Kang Mountains on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. In the following April the units which had survived the defeat of the Nanchang Uprising also moved to the Ching Kang Mountains by way of southern Hunan. By May 1928, however, basic principles of guerrilla warfare, simple in nature and suited to the conditions of the time, had already been evolved, that is, the sixteen-character formula: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." This sixteen-character formulation of military principles was accepted by the Central Committee before the Li Li-san line. Later our operational principles were developed a step further. At the time of our first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in the Kiangsi base area, the principle of "luring the enemy in deep" was put forward and, moreover, successfully applied. By the time the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign was defeated, a complete set of operational principles for the Red Army had taken shape. This marked a new stage in the development of our military principles, which were greatly enriched in content and underwent many changes in form, mainly in the sense that although they basically remained the same as in the sixteen-character formula, they transcended their originally simple nature. The sixteen-character formula covered the basic principles for combating "encirclement and suppression"; it covered the two stages of the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive, and within the defensive, it covered the two stages of the strategic retreat and the strategic counter-offensive. What came later was only a development of this formula.

But beginning from January 1932, after the publication of the Party's resolution entitled "Struggle for Victory First in One or More Provinces

After Smashing the Third 'Encirclement and Suppression' Campaign", which contained serious errors of principle, the "Left" opportunists attacked these correct principles, finally abrogated the whole set and instituted a complete set of contrary "new principles" or "regular principles". From then on, the old principles were no longer to be considered as regular but were to be rejected as "guerrilla-ism". The opposition to "guerrilla-ism" reigned for three whole years. Its first stage was military adventurism, in the second it turned into military conservatism and, finally, in the third stage it became flight-ism. It was not until the Central Committee held the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau at Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in January 1935 that this wrong line was declared bankrupt and the correctness of the old line reaffirmed. But at what a cost!

Those comrades who vigorously opposed "guerrilla-ism" argued along the following lines. It was wrong to lure the enemy in deep because we had to abandon so much territory. Although battles had been won in this way, was not the situation different now? Moreover, was it not better to defeat the enemy without abandoning territory? And was it not better still to defeat the enemy in his own areas, or on the borders between his areas and ours? The old practices had had nothing "regular" about them and were methods used only by guerrillas. Now our own state had been established and our Red Army had become a regular army. Our fight against Chiang Kai-shek had become a war between two states, between two great armies. History should not repeat itself, and everything pertaining to "guerrilla-ism" should be totally discarded. The new principles were "completely Marxist", while the old had been created by guerrilla units in the mountains, and there was no Marxism in the mountains. The new principles were the antithesis of the old. They were: "Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred, fight bravely and determinedly, and exploit victories by hot pursuit"; "Attack on all fronts"; "Seize key cities"; and "Strike with two 'fists' in two directions at the same time". When the enemy attacked, the methods of dealing with him were: "Engage the enemy outside the gates", "Gain mastery by striking first", "Don't let our pots and pans be smashed", "Don't give up an inch of territory" and "Divide the forces into six routes". The war was "the decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism", a war of short swift thrusts, blockhouse warfare, war of attrition, "protracted war". There were, further, the policy of maintaining a great rear area and an absolutely centralized command. Finally there was a large-scale

“house-moving”. And anyone who did not accept these things was to be punished, labelled an opportunist, and so on and so forth.

Without a doubt these theories and practices were all wrong. They were nothing but subjectivism. Under favourable circumstances this subjectivism manifested itself in petty-bourgeois revolutionary fanaticism and impetuosity, but in times of adversity, as the situation worsened, it changed successively into desperate recklessness, conservatism and flight-ism. They were the theories and practices of hotheads and ignoramuses; they did not have the slightest flavour of Marxism about them; indeed they were anti-Marxist.

Here we shall discuss only strategic retreat, which in Kiangsi was called “luring the enemy in deep” and in Szechuan “contracting the front”. No previous theorist or practitioner of war has ever denied that this is the policy a weak army fighting a strong army must adopt in the initial stage of a war. It has been said by a foreign military expert that in strategically defensive operations, decisive battles are usually avoided in the beginning, and are sought only when conditions have become favourable. That is entirely correct and we have nothing to add to it.

The object of strategic retreat is to conserve military strength and prepare for the counter-offensive. Retreat is necessary because not to retreat a step before the onset of a strong enemy inevitably means to jeopardize the preservation of one's own forces. In the past, however, many people were stubbornly opposed to retreat, considering it to be an “opportunist line of pure defence”. Our history has proved that their opposition was entirely wrong.

To prepare for a counter-offensive, we must select or create conditions favourable to ourselves but unfavourable to the enemy, so as to bring about a change in the balance of forces, before we go on to the stage of the counter-offensive.

In the light of our past experience, during the stage of retreat we should in general secure at least two of the following conditions before we can consider the situation as being favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy and before we can go over to the counter-offensive. These conditions are:

1. The population actively supports the Red Army.
2. The terrain is favourable for operations.
3. All the main forces of the Red Army are concentrated.
4. The enemy's weak spots have been discovered.
5. The enemy has been reduced to a tired and demoralized state.
6. The enemy has been induced to make mistakes.

The first condition, active support of the population, is the most important one for the Red Army. It means having a base area. Moreover, given this condition, it is easy to achieve conditions 4, 5 and 6. Therefore, when the enemy launches a full-scale offensive, the Red Army generally withdraws from the White area into the base area, because that is where the population is most active in supporting the Red Army against the White army. Also, there is a difference between the borders and the central district of a base area; in the latter the people are better at blocking the passage of information to the enemy, better at reconnaissance, transportation, joining in the fighting, and so on. Thus when we were combating the first, second and third "encirclement and suppression" campaigns in Kiangsi, all the places selected as "terminal points for the retreat" were situated where the first condition, popular support, was excellent, or rather good. This characteristic of our base areas made the Red Army's operations very different from ordinary operations and was the main reason why the enemy subsequently had to resort to the policy of blockhouse warfare.

One advantage of operating on interior lines is that it makes it possible for the retreating army to choose terrain favourable to itself and force the attacking army to fight on its terms. In order to defeat a strong army, a weak army must carefully choose favourable terrain as a battleground. But this condition alone is not enough and must be accompanied by other conditions. The first of these is popular support. The next is a vulnerable enemy, for instance, an enemy who is tired or has made mistakes, or an advancing enemy column that is comparatively poor in fighting capacity. In the absence of these conditions, even if we have found excellent terrain, we have to disregard it and continue to retreat in order to secure the desired conditions. In the White areas there is no lack of good terrain, but we do not have the favourable condition of active popular support. If other conditions are not yet fulfilled, the Red Army has no alternative but to retreat towards its base area. Distinctions such as those between the White areas and the Red areas also usually exist between the borders and the central district of a base area.

Except for local units and containing forces, all our assault troops should, on principle, be concentrated. When attacking an enemy who is on the defensive strategically, the Red Army usually disperses its own forces. Once the enemy launches a full-scale offensive, the Red Army effects a "retreat towards the centre". The terminal point chosen for the retreat is usually in the central section of the base area, but

sometimes it is in the frontal or rear sections, as circumstances require. By such a retreat towards the centre all the main forces of the Red Army can be concentrated.

Another essential condition for a weak army fighting a strong one is to pick out the enemy's weaker units for attack. But at the beginning of the enemy's offensive we usually do not know which of his advancing columns is the strongest and which the second strongest, which is the weakest and which the second weakest, and so a process of reconnaissance is required. This often takes a considerable time. That is another reason why strategic retreat is necessary.

If the attacking enemy is far more numerous and much stronger than we are, we can accomplish a change in the balance of forces only when the enemy has penetrated deeply into our base area and tasted all the bitterness it holds for him. As the chief of staff of one of Chiang Kai-shek's brigades remarked during the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign, "Our stout men have worn themselves thin and our thin men have worn themselves to death." Or, in the words of Chen Ming-shu, Commander-in-Chief of the Western Route of the Kuomintang's "Encirclement and Suppression" Army, "Everywhere the National Army gropes in the dark, while the Red Army walks in broad daylight." By then the enemy army, although still strong, is much weakened, its soldiers are tired, its morale is sagging and many of its weak spots are revealed. But the Red Army, though weak, has conserved its strength and stored up its energy, and is waiting at its ease for the fatigued enemy. At such a time it is generally possible to attain a certain parity between the two sides, or to change the enemy's absolute superiority to relative superiority and our absolute inferiority to relative inferiority, and occasionally even to become superior to the enemy. When fighting against the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign in Kiangsi, the Red Army executed a retreat to the extreme limit (to concentrate in the rear section of the base area); if it had not done so, it could not have defeated the enemy because the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" forces were then over ten times the size of the Red Army. When Sun Wu Tzu said, "Avoid the enemy when he is full of vigour, strike when he is fatigued and withdraws", he was referring to tiring and demoralizing the enemy so as to reduce his superiority.

Finally, the object of retreat is to induce the enemy to make mistakes or to detect his mistakes. One must realize that an enemy commander, however wise, cannot avoid making some mistakes over a relatively

long period of time, and hence it is always possible for us to exploit the openings he leaves us. The enemy is liable to make mistakes, just as we ourselves sometimes miscalculate and give him openings to exploit. In addition, we can induce the enemy to make mistakes by our own actions, for instance, by "counterfeiting an appearance", as Sun Wu Tzu called it, that is, by making a feint to the east but attacking in the west. If we are to do this, the terminal point for the retreat cannot be rigidly limited to a definite area. Sometimes when we have retreated to the predetermined area and not yet found openings to exploit, we have to retreat farther and wait for the enemy to give us an opening.

The favourable conditions which we seek by retreating are in general those stated above. But this does not mean that a counter-offensive cannot be launched until all these conditions are present. The presence of all these conditions at the same time is neither possible nor necessary. But a weak force operating on interior lines against a strong enemy should strive to secure such conditions as are necessary in the light of the enemy's actual situation. All views to the contrary are incorrect.

The decision on the terminal point for retreat should depend on the situation as a whole. It is wrong to decide on a place which, considered in relation to only part of the situation, appears to be favourable for our passing to the counter-offensive, if it is not also advantageous from the point of view of the situation as a whole. For at the start of our counter-offensive we must take subsequent developments into consideration, and our counter-offensives always begin on a partial scale. Sometimes the terminal point for retreat should be fixed in the frontal section of the base area, as it was during our second and fourth counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi and our third counter-campaign in the Shensi-Kansu area. At times it should be in the middle section of the base area, as in our first counter-campaign in Kiangsi. At other times, it should be fixed in the rear section of the base area, as in our third counter-campaign in Kiangsi. In all these cases the decision was taken by correlating the partial situation with the situation as a whole. But during the fifth counter-campaign in Kiangsi, our army gave no consideration whatsoever to retreat, because it did not take account of either the partial or the whole situation, and this was really a rash and foolhardy conduct. A situation is made up of a number of factors; in considering the relation between a part of

the situation and the whole, we should base our judgements on whether the factors on the enemy's side and those on our side, as manifested in both the partial and the whole situation, are to a certain extent favourable for our starting a counter-offensive.

The terminal points for retreat in a base area can be generally divided into three types, those in the frontal section, those in the middle section, and those in the rear section of the base area. Does this, however, mean refusing to fight in the White areas altogether? No. It is only when we have to deal with a large-scale campaign of enemy "encirclement and suppression" that we refuse to fight in the White areas. It is only when there is a wide disparity between the enemy's strength and ours that, acting on the principle of conserving our strength and biding our time to defeat the enemy, we advocate retreating to the base area and luring the enemy in deep, for only by so doing can we create or find conditions favourable for our counter-offensive. If the situation is not so serious, or if it is so serious that the Red Army cannot begin its counter-offensive even in the base area, or if the counter-offensive is not going well and a further retreat is necessary to bring about a change in the situation, then we should recognize, theoretically at least, that the terminal point for the retreat may be fixed in a White area, though in the past we have had very little experience of this kind.

In general, the terminal points for retreat in a White area can also be divided into three types: (1) those in front of our base area, (2) those on the flanks of our base area, and (3) those behind our base area. Here is an example of the first type.

During our first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi, had it not been for the disunity inside the Red Army and the split in the local Party organization (the two difficult problems created by the Li Li-san line and the A-B Group),<sup>33</sup> it is conceivable that we might have concentrated our forces within the triangle formed by Kian, Nanfeng and Changshu and launched a counter-offensive. For the enemy force advancing from the area between the Kan and Fu Rivers was not very greatly superior to the Red Army in strength (100,000 against 40,000). Though the popular support there was not as active as in the base area, the terrain was favourable; moreover, it would have been possible to smash, one by one, the enemy forces advancing along separate routes.

Now for an example of the second type.

During our third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's offensive had not been on so large a scale, if one of the enemy's columns had advanced from Chienning, Lichuan and Taining on the Fukien-Kiangsi border, and if that column had not been too strong for us to attack, it is likewise conceivable that the Red Army might have massed its forces in the White area in western Fukien and crushed that column first, without having to make a thousand-*li* detour through Juichin to Hsingkuo.

Finally, an example of the third type.

During that same third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's main force had headed south instead of west, we might have been compelled to withdraw to the Huichang-Hsunwu-Anyuan area (a White area), in order to induce the enemy to move further south; the Red Army could have then driven northward into the interior of the base area, by which time the enemy force in the north of the base area would not have been very large.

The above, however, are all hypothetical examples not based on actual experience; they should be regarded as exceptional and not treated as general principles. When the enemy launches a large-scale "encirclement and suppression" campaign, our general principle is to lure him in deep, withdraw into the base area and fight him there, because this is our surest method of smashing his offensive.

Those who advocate "engaging the enemy outside the gates" oppose strategic retreat, arguing that to retreat means to lose territory, to bring harm on the people ("to let our pots and pans be smashed", as they call it), and to give rise to unfavourable repercussions outside. During our fifth counter-campaign, they argued that every time we retreated a step the enemy would push his blockhouses forward a step, so that our base areas would continuously shrink and we would have no way of recovering lost ground. Even though luring the enemy deep into our territory might have been useful in the past, it would be useless against the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in which he adopted the policy of blockhouse warfare. The only way to deal with the enemy's fifth campaign, they said, was to divide up our forces for resistance and make short swift thrusts at the enemy.

It is easy to give an answer to such views, and our history has already done so. As for loss of territory, it often happens that only

by loss can loss be avoided; this is the principle of "Give in order to take". If what we lose is territory and what we gain is victory over the enemy, plus recovery and also expansion of our territory, then it is a paying proposition. In a business transaction, if a buyer does not "lose" some money, he cannot obtain goods; if a seller does not "lose" some goods, he cannot obtain money. The losses incurred in a revolutionary movement involve destruction, and what is gained is construction of a progressive character. Sleep and rest involve loss of time, but energy is gained for tomorrow's work. If any fool does not understand this and refuses to sleep, he will have no energy the next day, and that is a losing proposition. We lost out in the fifth counter-campaign for precisely such reasons. Reluctance to give up part of our territory resulted in the loss of all our territory. Abyssinia, too, lost all her territory when she fought the enemy head-on, though that was not the sole cause of her defeat.

The same holds true on the question of bringing damage on the people. If you refuse to let the pots and pans of some households be smashed over a short period of time, you will cause the smashing of the pots and pans of all the people to go on over a long period of time. If you are afraid of unfavourable short-term political repercussions, you will have to pay the price in unfavourable long-term political repercussions. After the October Revolution, if the Russian Bolsheviks had acted on the opinions of the "Left Communists" and refused to sign the peace treaty with Germany, the new-born Soviets would have been in danger of early death.<sup>34</sup>

Such seemingly revolutionary "Left" opinions originate from the revolutionary impetuosity of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals as well as from the narrow conservatism of the peasant small producers. People holding such opinions look at problems only one-sidedly and are unable to take a comprehensive view of the situation as a whole; they are unwilling to link the interests of today with those of tomorrow or the interests of the part with those of the whole, but cling like grim death to the partial and the temporary. Certainly, we should cling tenaciously to the partial and the temporary when, in the concrete circumstances of the time, they are favourable — and especially when they are decisive — for the whole current situation and the whole period, or otherwise we shall become advocates of letting things slide and doing nothing about them. That is why a retreat must have a terminal point. We must not go by the short-sightedness of the small producer. We should learn the wisdom of the Bolsheviks. The naked eye is not

enough, we must have the aid of the telescope and the microscope. The Marxist method is the telescope and the microscope in political and military matters.

Of course, strategic retreat has its difficulties. To pick the time for beginning the retreat, to select the terminal point, to convince the cadres and the people politically — these are difficult problems demanding solution.

The problem of timing the beginning of the retreat is very important. If in the course of our first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi Province our retreat had not been carried out just when it was, that is, if it had been delayed, then at the very least the extent of our victory would have been affected. Both a premature and a belated retreat, of course, bring losses. But generally speaking, a belated retreat brings more losses than a premature one. A well-timed retreat, which enables us to keep the initiative entirely, is of great assistance to us in switching to the counter-offensive when, having reached the terminal point for our retreat, we have regrouped our forces and are waiting at our ease for the fatigued enemy. When smashing the enemy's first, second and fourth campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi, we were able to handle the enemy confidently and without haste. It was only during the third campaign that the Red Army was very fatigued by the detour it had had to make in order to reassemble, because we had not expected the enemy to launch a new offensive so quickly after suffering such a crushing defeat in the second campaign (we ended our second counter-campaign on May 29, 1931, and Chiang Kai-shek began his third "encirclement and suppression" campaign on July 1). The timing of the retreat is decided in the same way as the timing of the preparatory phase of a counter-campaign which we discussed earlier, that is, entirely on the basis of the requisite information we have collected and of the appraisal of the general situation on the enemy side and on our own.

It is extremely difficult to convince the cadres and the people of the necessity of strategic retreat when they have had no experience of it, and when the prestige of the army leadership is not yet such that it can concentrate the authority for deciding on strategic retreat in the hands of a few persons or of a single person and at the same time enjoy the confidence of the cadres. Because the cadres lacked experience and had no faith in strategic retreat, great difficulties were encountered at the beginning of our first and fourth counter-campaigns and during the whole of the fifth. During the first counter-campaign

the cadres, under the influence of the Li Li-san line, were in favour of attack and not of retreat until they were convinced otherwise. In the fourth counter-campaign the cadres, under the influence of military adventurism, objected to making preparations for retreat. In the fifth counter-campaign, they at first persisted in the military adventurist view, which opposed luring the enemy in deep, but later turned to military conservatism. Another case is that of the adherents of the Chang Kuo-tao line, who did not admit the impossibility of establishing our bases in the regions of the Tibetan and the Hui peoples,<sup>35</sup> until they ran up against a brick wall. Experience is essential for the cadres, and failure is indeed the mother of success. But it is also necessary to learn with an open mind from other people's experience, and it is sheer "narrow empiricism" to insist on one's own personal experience in all matters and, in its absence, to adhere stubbornly to one's own opinions and reject other people's experience. Our war has suffered in no small measure on this account.

The people's lack of faith in the need for a strategic retreat, which was due to their inexperience, was never greater than in our first counter-campaign in Kiangsi. At that time the local Party organizations and the masses of the people in the counties of Kian, Hsingkuo and Yungfeng were all opposed to the Red Army's withdrawal. But after the experience of the first counter-campaign, no such problem occurred in the subsequent ones. Everyone was convinced that the loss of territory in the base area and the sufferings of the people were temporary and was confident that the Red Army could smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression". However, whether or not the people have faith is closely tied up with whether or not the cadres have faith, and hence the first and foremost task is to convince the cadres.

Strategic retreat is aimed solely at switching over to the counter-offensive and is merely the first stage of the strategic defensive. The decisive link in the entire strategy is whether victory can be won in the stage of the counter-offensive which follows.

#### 4. STRATEGIC COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

To defeat the offensive of an enemy who enjoys absolute superiority we rely on the situation created during the stage of our strategic retreat, a situation which is favourable to ourselves, unfavourable to the enemy and different from that at the beginning of the enemy's

offensive. It takes many elements to make up such a situation. All this has been dealt with above.

However, the presence of these conditions and of a situation favourable to ourselves and unfavourable to the enemy does not yet mean that we have defeated the enemy. Such conditions and such a situation provide the possibility for our victory and the enemy's defeat, but do not constitute the reality of victory or defeat; they have not yet brought actual victory or defeat to either army. To bring about victory or defeat a decisive battle between the two armies is necessary. Only a decisive battle can settle the question as to which army is the victor and which the vanquished. This is the sole task in the stage of strategic counter-offensive. The counter-offensive is a long process, the most fascinating, the most dynamic, and also the final stage of a defensive campaign. What is called active defence refers chiefly to this strategic counter-offensive which is in the nature of a decisive engagement.

Conditions and situation are created not only in the stage of the strategic retreat, but continue to be created in the stage of the counter-offensive. Whether in form or in nature, they are not exactly the same in the latter stage as in the former.

What could remain the same in form and in nature, for example, is the fact that the enemy troops will be even more fatigued and depleted, which is simply a continuation of their fatigue and depletion in the previous stage.

But wholly new conditions and a wholly new situation are bound to emerge. Thus, when the enemy has suffered one or more defeats, the conditions advantageous to us and disadvantageous to him will not be confined to his fatigue, etc., but a new factor will have been added, namely, that he has suffered defeats. New changes will take place in the situation, too. When the enemy begins to manoeuvre his troops in a disorderly way and to make false moves, the relative strengths of the two opposing armies will naturally no longer be the same as before.

But if it is not the enemy's forces but ours that have suffered one or more defeats, then both the conditions and the situation will change in the opposite direction. That is to say, the enemy's disadvantages will be reduced, while on our side disadvantages will make their appearance and even grow. That again will be something entirely new and different.

A defeat for either side will lead directly and speedily to a new effort by the defeated side to avert disaster, to extricate itself from

the new conditions and situation unfavourable to it and favourable to the enemy and to re-create such conditions and such a situation as are favourable to it and unfavourable to its opponent, in order to bring pressure to bear on the latter.

The effort of the winning side will be exactly the opposite. It will strive to exploit its victory and inflict still greater damage on the enemy, add to the conditions that are in its favour and further improve its situation, and prevent the enemy from succeeding in extricating himself from his unfavourable conditions and situation and averting disaster.

Thus, for either side, the struggle at the stage of decisive battle is the most intense, the most complicated and the most changeful as well as the most difficult and trying in the whole war or the whole campaign; it is the most exacting time of all from the point of view of command.

In the stage of counter-offensive, there are many problems, the chief of which are the starting of the counter-offensive, the concentration of troops, mobile warfare, war of quick decision and war of annihilation.

Whether in a counter-offensive or in an offensive, the principles with regard to these problems do not differ in their basic character. In this sense we may say that a counter-offensive is an offensive.

Still, a counter-offensive is not exactly an offensive. The principles of the counter-offensive are applied when the enemy is on the offensive. The principles of the offensive are applied when the enemy is on the defensive. In this sense, there are certain differences between a counter-offensive and an offensive.

For this reason, although the various operational problems are all included in the discussion of the counter-offensive in the present chapter on the strategic defensive, and in order to avoid repetition the chapter on the strategic offensive will deal only with other problems, yet, when it comes to actual application, we should not overlook either the similarities or the differences between the counter-offensive and the offensive.

## 5. STARTING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

The problem of starting a counter-offensive is the problem of the "initial battle" or "prelude".

Many bourgeois military experts advise caution in the initial battle, whether one is on the strategic defensive or on the strategic offensive, but more especially when on the defensive. In the past we, too, have stressed this as a serious point. Our operations against the five enemy campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi Province have given us rich experience, a study of which will not be without benefit.

In his first campaign, the enemy employed about 100,000 men, divided into eight columns, to advance southward from the Kian-Chienning line against the Red Army's base area. The Red Army had about 40,000 men and was concentrated in the area of Huangpi and Hsiaopu in Ningtu County, Kiangsi Province.

The situation was as follows:

1. The "suppression" forces did not exceed 100,000 men, none of whom were Chiang Kai-shek's own troops, and the general situation was not very grave.

2. The enemy division under Lo Lin, defending Kian, was located across the Kan River to the west.

3. The three enemy divisions under Kung Ping-fan, Chang Hui-tsan and Tan Tao-yuan had advanced and occupied the Futien-Tungku-Lungkang-Yuantou sector southeast of Kian and northwest of Ningtu. The main body of Chang Hui-tsan's division was at Lungkang and that of Tan Tao-yuan's division at Yuantou. It was not advisable to select Futien and Tungku as the battleground, as the inhabitants, misled by the A-B Group, were for a time mistrustful of and opposed to the Red Army.

4. The enemy division under Liu Ho-ting was far away in Chienning in the White area of Fukien, and was unlikely to cross into Kiangsi.

5. The two enemy divisions under Mao Ping-wen and Hsu Ke-hsiang had entered the Toupi-Lokou-Tungshao sector lying between Kuangchang and Ningtu. Toupi was a White area, Lokou a guerrilla zone, and Tungshao, where there were A-B Group elements, was a place from which information was liable to leak out. Furthermore, if we were to attack Mao Ping-wen and Hsu Ke-hsiang and then drive westward, the three enemy divisions in the west under Chang Hui-tsan, Tan Tao-yuan and Kung Ping-fan might join forces, thus making it difficult for us to win victory and impossible to bring the issue to a final solution.

6. The two divisions under Chang Hui-tsan and Tan Tao-yuan, which made up the enemy's main force, were troops

belonging to Lu Ti-ping, who was commander-in-chief of this "encirclement and suppression" campaign and governor of Kiangsi Province, and Chang Hui-tsan was the field commander. To wipe out these two divisions would be practically to smash the campaign. Each of the two divisions had about fourteen thousand men and Chang's was divided between two places, so that if we attacked one division at a time we would enjoy absolute superiority.

7. The Lungkang-Yuantou sector, where the main forces of the Chang and Tan divisions were located, was close to our concentrations, and there was good popular support to cover our approach.

8. The terrain in Lungkang was good. Yuantou was not easy to attack. But were the enemy to advance to Hsiaopu to attack us, we would have good terrain there too.

9. We could mass the largest number of troops in the Lungkang sector. In Hsingkuo, less than a hundred *li* to the southwest of Lungkang, we had an independent division of over one thousand men, which could manoeuvre in the enemy's rear.

10. If our troops made a breakthrough at the centre and breached the enemy's front, his columns to the east and west would be cut into two widely separated groups.

For the above reasons, we decided that our first battle should be against Chang Hui-tsan's main force, and we successfully hit two of his brigades and his divisional headquarters, capturing the entire force of nine thousand men and the divisional commander himself, without letting a single man or horse escape. This one victory scared Tan's division into fleeing towards Tungshao and Hsu's division into fleeing towards Toupi. Our troops then pursued Tan's division and wiped out half of it. We fought two battles in five days (December 27, 1930 to January 1, 1931), and, fearing defeat, the enemy forces in Futien, Tungku and Toupi retreated in disorder. So ended the first campaign of "encirclement and suppression".

The situation in the second "encirclement and suppression" campaign was as follows:

1. The "suppression" forces numbering 200,000 were under the command of Ho Ying-chin with headquarters at Nanchang.

2. As in the first enemy campaign, none of the forces were Chiang Kai-shek's own troops. Among them the 19th Route Army under Tsai Ting-kai, the Twenty-sixth under Sun Lien-chung and

the Eighth under Chu Shao-liang were strong, or fairly strong, while all the rest were rather weak.

3. The A-B Group had been cleaned up, and the entire population of the base area supported the Red Army.

4. The Fifth Route Army under Wang Chin-yu, newly arrived from the north, was afraid of us, and, generally speaking, so were the two divisions on its left flank under Kuo Hua-tsung and Hao Meng-ling.

5. If our troops attacked Futien first and then swept across to the east, we could expand the base area to the Chienning-Lichuan-Taining sector on the Fukien-Kiangsi border and acquire supplies to help smash the next "encirclement and suppression" campaign. But if we were to thrust westward, we would come up against the Kan River and have no room for expansion after the battle. To turn east again after the battle would tire our troops and waste time.

6. Though our army (numbering over thirty thousand men) was somewhat smaller than in the first campaign, it had had four months in which to recuperate and build up energy.

For these reasons, we decided, for our first battle, to engage the forces of Wang Chin-yu and of Kung Ping-fan (totalling eleven regiments) in the Futien sector. After winning that battle we attacked Kuo Hua-tsung, Sun Lien-chung, Chu Shao-liang and Liu Ho-ting in succession. In fifteen days (from May 16 to May 30, 1931) we marched seven hundred *li*, fought five battles, captured more than twenty thousand rifles and roundly smashed the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaign. When fighting Wang Chin-yu, we were between the two enemy forces under Tsai Ting-kai and Kuo Hua-tsung, some ten *li* from the latter and forty *li* from the former, and some people said we were "getting into a blind alley", but we got through all the same. This was mainly due to the popular support we enjoyed in the base area and to the lack of co-ordination among the enemy units. After Kuo Hua-tsung's division was defeated, Hao Meng-ling's division fled by night back to Yungfeng, and so avoided disaster.

The situation in the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign was as follows:

1. Chiang Kai-shek personally took the field as commander-in-chief. Under him there were three subordinate commanders, each in charge of a column — the left, the right and the centre.

The central column was commanded by Ho Ying-chin, who, like Chiang Kai-shek, had his headquarters in Nanchang, the right was commanded by Chen Ming-shu with headquarters at Kian, and the left by Chu Shao-liang with headquarters at Nanfeng.

2. The "suppression" forces numbered 300,000. The main forces, totalling about 100,000 men, were Chiang Kai-shek's own troops and consisted of five divisions (of nine regiments each), commanded by Chen Cheng, Lo Cho-ying, Chao Kuan-tao, Wei Li-huang and Chiang Ting-wen respectively. Besides these, there were three divisions (totalling forty thousand men) under Chiang Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai and Han Teh-chin. Then there was Sun Lien-chung's army of twenty thousand. In addition, there were other, weaker forces that were likewise not Chiang's own troops.

3. The enemy's strategy in this "suppression" campaign was to "drive straight in", which was vastly different from the strategy of "consolidating at every step" he used in the second campaign. The aim was to press the Red Army back against the Kan River and annihilate it there.

4. There was an interval of only one month between the end of the second enemy campaign and the beginning of the third. The Red Army (then about thirty thousand strong) had had neither rest nor replenishments after much hard fighting and had just made a detour of a thousand *li* to concentrate at Hsingkuo in the western part of the southern Kiangsi base area, when the enemy pressed it hard from several directions.

In this situation the plan we first decided on was to move from Hsingkuo by way of Wanan, make a breakthrough at Futien, and then sweep from west to east across the enemy's rear communication lines, thus letting the enemy's main forces make a deep but useless penetration into our base area in southern Kiangsi; this was to be the first phase of our operation. Then when the enemy turned back northward, inevitably very fatigued, we were to seize the opportunity to strike at his vulnerable units; that was to be the second phase of our operation. The heart of this plan was to avoid the enemy's main forces and strike at his weak spots. But when our forces were advancing on Futien, we were detected by the enemy, who rushed the two divisions under Chen Cheng and Lo Cho-ying to the scene. We had to change our plan and fall back to Kaohsinghsu in the western part of Hsingkuo County, which, together with its environs

of less than a hundred square *li*, was then the only place for our troops to concentrate in. The day after our concentration we decided to make a thrust eastward towards Lientang in eastern Hsingkuo County, Liangtsun in southern Yungfeng County and Huangpi in northern Ningtu County. That same night, under cover of darkness, we passed through the forty-*li* gap between Chiang Ting-wen's division and the forces of Chiang Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai and Han Teh-chin, and swung to Lientang. On the second day we skirmished with the forward units under Shangkuan Yun-hsiang (who was in command of Hao Meng-ling's division as well as his own). The first battle was fought on the third day with Shangkuan Yun-hsiang's division and the second battle on the fourth day with Hao Meng-ling's division; after a three-day march we reached Huangpi and fought our third battle against Mao Ping-wen's division. We won all three battles and captured over ten thousand rifles. At this point all the main enemy forces, which had been advancing westward and southward, turned eastward. Focusing on Huangpi, they converged at furious speed to seek battle and closed in on us in a major compact encirclement. We slipped through in the high mountains that lay in the twenty-*li* gap between the forces of Chiang Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai and Han Teh-chin on the one side and Chen Cheng and Lo Cho-ying on the other, and thus, returning from the east to the west, reassembled within the borders of Hsingkuo County. By the time the enemy discovered this fact and began advancing west again, our forces had already had a fortnight's rest, whereas the enemy forces, hungry, exhausted and demoralized, were no good for fighting and so decided to retreat. Taking advantage of their retreat, we attacked the forces of Chiang Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai, Chiang Ting-wen and Han Teh-chin, wiping out one of Chiang Ting-wen's brigades and Han Teh-chin's entire division. As for the divisions under Chiang Kuang-nai and Tsai Ting-kai, the fight resulted in a stalemate and they got away.

The situation in the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign was as follows. The enemy was advancing on Kuangchang in three columns; the eastern one was his main force, while the two divisions forming his western column were exposed to us and were also very close to the area where our forces were concentrated. Thus we had the opportunity to attack his western column in southern Yihuang County first, and at one stroke we annihilated the two divisions under Li Ming and Chen Shih-chi. As the enemy then sent two divisions from the eastern column to give support to his central

column and advanced further, we were again able to wipe out a division in southern Yihuang County. In these two battles we captured more than ten thousand rifles and, in the main, smashed this campaign of "encirclement and suppression".

In the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign the enemy advanced by means of his new strategy of building blockhouses and first occupied Lichuan. But, in attempting to recover Lichuan and engage the enemy outside the base area, we made an attack north of Lichuan at Hsiaoshih, which was an enemy strongpoint and was situated, moreover, in the White area. Failing to win the battle, we shifted our attack to Tsehsichiao, which was also an enemy strongpoint situated in the White area southeast of Hsiaoshih, and again we failed. Then in seeking battle we milled around between the enemy's main forces and his blockhouses and were reduced to complete passivity. All through our fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", which lasted a whole year, we showed not the slightest initiative or drive. In the end we had to withdraw from our Kiangsi base area.

Our army's experience in these five counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression" proves that the first battle in the counter-offensive is of the greatest importance for the Red Army, which is on the defensive, if it is to smash a large and powerful enemy "suppression" force. Victory or defeat in the first battle has a tremendous effect upon the entire situation, all the way to the final engagement. Hence we arrive at the following conclusions.

First, the first battle must be won. We should strike only when positively certain that the enemy's situation, the terrain and popular support are all in our favour and not in favour of the enemy. Otherwise we should rather fall back and carefully bide our time. There will always be opportunities; we should not rashly accept battle. In our first counter-campaign we originally planned to strike at Tan Tao-yuan's troops; we advanced twice but each time had to restrain ourselves and pull back, because they would not budge from their commanding position on the Yuantou heights. A few days later we sought out Chang Hui-tsan's troops, which were more vulnerable to our attack. In our second counter-campaign our army advanced to Tungku where, for the sole purpose of waiting for Wang Chin-yu's men to leave their strongpoint at Futien, we encamped close to the enemy for twenty-five days even at the risk of leakage of information; we rejected all impatient suggestions for a quick attack and finally

attained our aim. In our third counter-campaign, although the storm was breaking all around us and we had made a detour of a thousand *li*, and although the enemy had discovered our plan to outflank him, we nevertheless exercised patience, turned back, changed our tactics to a breakthrough in the centre, and finally fought the first battle successfully at Lientang. In our fourth counter-campaign, after our attack on Nanfeng had failed, we unhesitatingly withdrew, wheeled round to the enemy's right flank, and reassembled our forces in the area of Tungshao, whereupon we launched our great and victorious battle in southern Yihuang County. It was only in the fifth counter-campaign that the importance of the first battle was not recognized at all. Taking alarm at the loss of the single county town of Lichuan, our forces marched north to meet the enemy in an attempt to recover it. Then, the unexpected encounter at Hsunkou, which had resulted in a victory (in which an enemy division was annihilated), was not treated as the first battle, nor were the changes that were bound to ensue foreseen, but instead Hsiaoshih was rashly attacked with no assurance of success. Thus the initiative was lost at the very first move, and that is really the worst and most stupid way to fight.

Second, the plan for the first battle must be the prelude to, and an organic part of, the plan for the whole campaign. Without a good plan for the whole campaign it is absolutely impossible to fight a really good first battle. That is to say, even though victory is won in the first battle, if the battle harms rather than helps the campaign as a whole, such a victory can only be reckoned a defeat (as in the case of the battle of Hsunkou in the fifth campaign). Hence, before fighting the first battle one must have a general idea of how the second, third, fourth, and even the final battle will be fought, and consider what changes will ensue in the enemy's situation as a whole if we win, or lose, each of the succeeding battles. Although the result may not — and, in fact, definitely will not — turn out exactly as we expect, we must think everything out carefully and realistically in the light of the general situation on both sides. Without a grasp of the situation as a whole, it is impossible to make any really good move on the chessboard.

Third, one must also consider what will happen in the next strategic stage of the war. Whoever directs strategy will not be doing his duty if he occupies himself only with the counter-offensive and neglects the measures to be taken after it succeeds, or in case it fails. In a particular strategic stage, he should take into consideration the

succeeding stages, or, at the very least, the following one. Even though future changes are difficult to foresee and the farther ahead one looks the more blurred things seem, a general calculation is possible and an appraisal of distant prospects is necessary. In war as well as in politics, planning only one step at a time as one goes along is a harmful way of directing matters. After each step, it is necessary to examine the ensuing concrete changes and to modify or develop one's strategic and operational plans accordingly, or otherwise one is liable to make the mistake of rushing straight ahead regardless of danger. However, it is absolutely essential to have a long-term plan which has been thought out in its general outline and which covers an entire strategic stage or even several strategic stages. Failure to make such a plan will lead to the mistake of hesitating and allowing oneself to be tied down, which in fact serves the enemy's strategic objects and reduces one to a passive position. It must be borne in mind that the enemy's supreme command has some strategic insight. Only when we have trained ourselves to be a head taller than the enemy will strategic victories be possible. During the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, failure to do so was the main reason for the errors in strategic direction under the "Left" opportunist and the Chang Kuo-tao lines. In short, in the stage of retreat we must see ahead to the stage of the counter-offensive, in the stage of the counter-offensive we must see ahead to that of the offensive, and in the stage of the offensive we must again see ahead to a stage of retreat. Not to do so but to confine ourselves to considerations of the moment is to court defeat.

The first battle must be won. The plan for the whole campaign must be taken into account. And the strategic stage that comes next must be taken into account. These are the three principles we must never forget when we begin a counter-offensive, that is, when we fight the first battle.

## 6. CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS

The concentration of troops seems easy but is quite hard in practice. Everybody knows that the best way is to use a large force to defeat a small one, and yet many people fail to do so and on the contrary often divide their forces up. The reason is that such military leaders

have no head for strategy and are confused by complicated circumstances; hence, they are at the mercy of these circumstances, lose their initiative and have recourse to passive response.

No matter how complicated, grave and harsh the circumstances, what a military leader needs most of all is the ability to function independently in organizing and employing the forces under his command. He may often be forced into a passive position by the enemy, but the important thing is to regain the initiative quickly. Failure to do so spells defeat.

The initiative is not something imaginary but is concrete and material. Here the most important thing is to conserve and mass an armed force that is as large as possible and full of fighting spirit.

It is easy to fall into a passive position in defensive warfare, which gives far less scope for the full exercise of initiative than does offensive warfare. However, defensive warfare, which is passive in form, can be active in content, and can be switched from the stage in which it is passive in form to the stage in which it is active both in form and in content. In appearance a fully planned strategic retreat is made under compulsion, but in reality it is effected in order to conserve our strength and bide our time to defeat the enemy, to lure him in deep and prepare for our counter-offensive. On the other hand, refusal to retreat and hasty acceptance of battle (as in the battle of Hsiaoshih) may appear a serious effort to gain the initiative, while in reality it is passive. Not only is a strategic counter-offensive active in content, but in form, too, it discards the passive posture of the period of retreat. In relation to the enemy, our counter-offensive represents our effort to make him relinquish the initiative and put him in a passive position.

Concentration of troops, mobile warfare, war of quick decision and war of annihilation are all necessary conditions for the full achievement of this aim. And of these, concentration of troops is the first and most essential.

Concentration of troops is necessary for the purpose of reversing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves. First, its purpose is to reverse the situation as regards advance and retreat. Previously it was the enemy who was advancing and we who were retreating; now we seek a situation in which we advance and he retreats. When we concentrate our troops and win a battle, then in that battle we gain the above purpose, and this influences the whole campaign.

Second, its purpose is to reverse the situation with regard to attack and defence. In defensive warfare the retreat to the prescribed

terminal point belongs basically to the passive, or "defence", stage. The counter-offensive belongs to the active, or "attack", stage. Although the strategic defensive retains its defensive character throughout its duration, still as compared with the retreat the counter-offensive already represents a change not only in form but in content. The counter-offensive is transitional between the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive, and in the nature of a prelude to the strategic offensive; it is precisely for the purpose of the counter-offensive that troops are concentrated.

Third, its purpose is to reverse the situation with regard to interior and exterior lines. An army operating on strategically interior lines suffers from many disadvantages, and this is especially so in the case of the Red Army, confronted as it is with "encirclement and suppression". But in campaigns and battles we can and absolutely must change this situation. We can turn a big "encirclement and suppression" campaign waged by the enemy against us into a number of small, separate campaigns of encirclement and suppression waged by us against the enemy. We can change the converging attack directed by the enemy against us on the plane of strategy into converging attacks directed by us against the enemy on the plane of campaigns and battles. We can change the enemy's strategic superiority over us into our superiority over him in campaigns and battles. We can put the enemy who is in a strong position strategically into a weak position in campaigns and battles. At the same time we can change our own strategically weak position into a strong position in campaigns and battles. This is what we call exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, encirclement- and suppression within "encirclement and suppression", blockade within blockade, the offensive within the defensive, superiority within inferiority, strength within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and initiative within passivity. The winning of victory in the strategic defensive depends basically on this measure — concentration of troops.

In the war annals of the Chinese Red Army, this has often been an important controversial issue. In the battle of Kian on October 4, 1930, our advance and attack were begun before our forces were fully concentrated, but fortunately the enemy force (Teng Ying's division) fled of its own accord; by itself our attack was ineffective.

Beginning from 1932, there was the slogan "Attack on all fronts", which called for attacks from the base area in all directions — north, south, east and west. This is wrong not only for the strategic defensive

but even for the strategic offensive. As long as there is no fundamental change in the over-all balance of forces, both strategy and tactics involve the defensive and the offensive, containing actions and assaults, and "attacks on all fronts" are in fact extremely rare. This slogan expresses the military equalitarianism which accompanies military adventurism.

In 1933 the exponents of military equalitarianism put forward the theory of "striking with two 'fists'" and splitting the main force of the Red Army in two, to seek victories simultaneously in two strategic directions. As a result, one fist remained idle while the other was tired out with fighting, and we failed to win the greatest victory possible at the time. In my opinion, when we face a powerful enemy, we should employ our army, whatever its size, in only one main direction at a time, not two. I am not objecting to operations in two or more directions, but at any given time there ought to be only one main direction. The Chinese Red Army, which entered the arena of the civil war as a small and weak force, has since repeatedly defeated its powerful antagonist and won victories that have astonished the world, and it has done so by relying largely on the employment of concentrated strength. Any one of its great victories can prove this point. When we say, "Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred", we are speaking of strategy, of the whole war and the over-all balance of forces, and in the strategic sense that is just what we have been doing. However, we are not speaking of campaigns and tactics, and in this sphere we must never do such a thing. Whether in counter-offensives or offensives, we should always concentrate a big force to strike at one part of the enemy forces. We suffered every time we did not concentrate our troops, as in the battles against Tan Tao-yuan in the Tungshao area of Ningtu County in Kiangsi Province in January 1931, against the 19th Route Army in the Kaohsinghsu area of Hsingkuo County in Kiangsi in August 1931, against Chen Chi-tang in the Shuikouhsu area of Nanhsung County in Kwangtung Province in July 1932, and against Chen Cheng in the Tuantsun area of Lichuan County in Kiangsi in March 1934. In the past, battles such as those of Shuikouhsu and Tuantsun were generally deemed victories or even big victories (in the former we routed twenty regiments under Chen Chi-tang, in the latter twelve regiments under Chen Cheng), but we never welcomed such victories and in a certain sense even regarded them as defeats. For, in our opinion, a battle has little significance when there are no prisoners or war booty, or when they do not

outweigh the losses. Our strategy is "pit one against ten" and our tactics are "pit ten against one" — this is one of our fundamental principles for gaining mastery over the enemy.

Military equalitarianism reached its extreme point in our fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in 1934. It was thought that we could beat the enemy by "dividing the forces into six routes" and "resisting on all fronts", but instead we were beaten by the enemy, and the reason was fear of losing territory. Naturally one can scarcely avoid loss of territory when concentrating the main forces in one direction while leaving only containing forces in others. But this loss is temporary and partial and is compensated for by victory in the place where the assault is made. After such a victory is won, territory lost in the area of the containing forces can be recovered. The enemy's first, second, third and fourth campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" all entailed the loss of territory — particularly the third campaign, in which the Kiangsi base area of the Red Army was almost completely lost — but in the end we not only recovered but extended our territory.

Failure to appreciate the strength of the people in the base area has often given rise to unwarranted fear of moving the Red Army too far away from the base area. This happened when the Red Army in Kiangsi made a long drive to attack Changchow in Fukien Province in 1932, and also when it wheeled around to attack Fukien after the victory in our fourth counter-campaign in 1933. There was fear in the first case that the enemy would seize the entire base area, and in the second case that he would seize part of it; consequently there was opposition to concentrating the forces and advocacy of dividing them up for defence, but in the end all this proved to be wrong. As far as the enemy is concerned, he is afraid to advance into our base area, but the main danger in his eyes is a Red Army that has driven into the White area. His attention is always fixed on the whereabouts of the main force of the Red Army, and he rarely takes his eyes off it to concentrate on the base area. Even when the Red Army is on the defensive, it is still the centre of the enemy's attention. Part of his over-all plan is to reduce the size of our base area, but if the Red Army concentrates its main force to annihilate one of his columns, the enemy's supreme command will be compelled to focus greater attention on the Red Army and concentrate larger forces against it. Hence it is possible to wreck an enemy plan for reducing the size of a base area.

Also, it was wrong to say, "In the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' campaign which is being carried on by means of blockhouse warfare, it is impossible for us to operate with concentrated forces, and all we can do is to divide them up for defence and for short swift thrusts." The enemy's tactics of pushing forward 3, 5, 8, or 10 *li* at a time and building blockhouses at each halt were entirely the result of the Red Army's practice of fighting defensive actions at every successive point. The situation would certainly have been different if our army had abandoned the tactics of point-by-point defence on interior lines and, when possible and necessary, had turned and driven into the enemy's interior lines. The principle of concentration of forces is precisely the means for defeating the enemy's blockhouse warfare.

The kind of concentration of forces we advocate does not mean the abandonment of people's guerrilla warfare. To abandon small-scale guerrilla warfare and "concentrate every single rifle in the Red Army", as advocated by the Li Li-san line, has long since been proved wrong. Considering the revolutionary war as a whole, the operations of the people's guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a man's right arm and left arm; and if we had only the main forces of the Red Army without the people's guerrillas, we would be like a warrior with only one arm. In concrete terms, and especially with regard to military operations, when we talk of the people in the base area as a factor, we mean that we have an armed people. That is the main reason why the enemy is afraid to approach our base area.

It is also necessary to employ Red Army detachments for operations in secondary directions; not all the forces of the Red Army should be concentrated. The kind of concentration we advocate is based on the principle of guaranteeing absolute or relative superiority on the battlefield. To cope with a strong enemy or to fight on a battlefield of vital importance, we must have an absolutely superior force; for instance, a force of forty thousand was concentrated to fight the nine thousand men under Chang Hui-tsan on December 30, 1930, in the first battle of our first counter-campaign. To cope with a weaker enemy or to fight on a battlefield of no great importance, a relatively superior force is sufficient; for instance, only some ten thousand Red Army men were employed to fight Liu Ho-ting's division of seven thousand men in Chienning on May 29, 1931, in the last battle of our second counter-campaign.

That is not to say we must have numerical superiority on every occasion. In certain circumstances, we may go into battle with a relatively or absolutely inferior force. Take the case of going into battle with a relatively inferior force when we have only a rather small Red Army force in a certain area (it is not that we have more troops and have not concentrated them). Then, in order to smash the attack of the stronger enemy in conditions where popular support, terrain and weather are greatly in our favour, it is of course necessary to concentrate the main part of our Red Army force for a surprise attack on a segment of one flank of the enemy while containing his centre and his other flank with guerrillas or small detachments, and in this way victory can be won. In our surprise attack on that segment of the enemy flank, the principle of using a superior force against an inferior force, of using the many to defeat the few, still applies. The same principle also applies when we go into battle with an absolutely inferior force, for example, when a guerrilla force makes a surprise attack on a large White army force, but is attacking only a small part of it.

As for the argument that the concentration of a large force for action in a single battle area is subject to the limitations of terrain, roads, supplies and billeting facilities, it should be evaluated according to the circumstances. There is a difference in the degree to which these limitations affect the Red Army and the White army, as the Red Army can stand greater hardships than the White army.

We use the few to defeat the many — this we say to the rulers of China as a whole. We use the many to defeat the few — this we say to each separate enemy force on the battlefield. That is no longer a secret, and in general the enemy is by now well acquainted with our way. However, he can neither prevent our victories nor avoid his own losses, because he does not know when and where we shall act. This we keep secret. The Red Army generally operates by surprise attacks.

## 7. MOBILE WARFARE

Mobile warfare or positional warfare? Our answer is mobile warfare. So long as we lack a large army or reserves of ammunition, and so long as there is only a single Red Army force to do the fighting in each base area, positional warfare is generally useless to us. For us, positional warfare is generally inapplicable in attack as well as in defence.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the Red Army's operations, which follows from the fact that the enemy is powerful while the Red Army is deficient in technical equipment, is the absence of fixed battle lines.

The Red Army's battle lines are determined by the direction in which it is operating. As its operational direction often shifts, its battle lines are fluid. Though the main direction does not change in a given period of time, within its ambit the secondary directions may shift at any moment; when we find ourselves checked in one direction, we must turn to another. If, after a time, we find ourselves checked in the main direction too, then we must change even the main direction.

In a revolutionary civil war, there cannot be fixed battle lines, which was also the case in the Soviet Union. The difference between the Soviet Army and ours is that its battle lines were not so fluid as ours. There cannot be absolutely fixed battle lines in any war, because the vicissitudes of victory and defeat, advance and retreat, preclude it. But relatively fixed battle lines are often to be found in the general run of wars. Exceptions occur only where an army faces a much stronger enemy, as is the case with the Chinese Red Army in its present stage.

Fluidity of battle lines leads to fluidity in the size of our base areas. Our base areas are constantly expanding and contracting, and often as one base area falls another rises. This fluidity of territory is entirely a result of the fluidity of the war.

Fluidity in the war and in our territory produces fluidity in all fields of construction in our base areas. Construction plans covering several years are out of the question. Frequent changes of plan are all in the day's work.

It is to our advantage to recognize this characteristic. We must base our planning on this characteristic and must not have illusions about a war of advance without any retreats, take alarm at any temporary fluidity of our territory or of the rear areas of our army, or endeavour to draw up detailed long-term plans. We must adapt our thinking and our work to the circumstances, be ready to sit down as well as to march on, and always have our marching rations handy. It is only by exerting ourselves in today's fluid way of life that we can secure relative stability tomorrow, and then full stability.

The exponents of the strategy of "regular warfare" which dominated our fifth counter-campaign denied this fluidity and opposed

what they called "guerrilla-ism". Those comrades, who opposed fluidity, managed affairs as though they were the rulers of a big state, and the result was an extraordinary and immense fluidity — the 25,000-*li* Long March.

Our workers' and peasants' democratic republic is a state, but today it is not yet a full-fledged one. Today we are still in the period of strategic defensive in the civil war, the form of our political power is still far from that of a full-fledged state, our army is still much inferior to the enemy both in numbers and technical equipment, our territory is still very small, and our enemy is constantly out to destroy us and will never rest content till he has done so. In defining our policy on the basis of these facts, we should not repudiate guerrilla-ism in general terms but should honestly admit the guerrilla character of the Red Army. It is no use being ashamed of this. On the contrary, this guerrilla character is precisely our distinguishing feature, our strong point, and our means of defeating the enemy. We should be prepared to discard it, but we cannot do so today. In the future this guerrilla character would definitely become something to be ashamed of and to be discarded, but today it is invaluable and we must stick to it.

"Fight when you can win, move away when you can't win" — this is the popular way of describing our mobile warfare today. There is no military expert anywhere in the world who approves only of fighting and never of moving, though few people do as much moving as we do. We generally spend more time in moving than in fighting and would be doing well if we fought an average of one sizable battle a month. All our "moving" is for the purpose of "fighting", and all our strategy and tactics are built on "fighting". Nevertheless, there are times when it is inadvisable for us to fight. In the first place, it is inadvisable to fight when the force confronting us is too large; second, it is sometimes inadvisable to fight when the force confronting us, though not so large, is very close to other enemy forces; third, it is generally inadvisable to fight an enemy force that is not isolated and is strongly entrenched; fourth, it is inadvisable to continue an engagement in which there is no prospect of victory. In any one of these situations we are prepared to move away. Such moving away is both permissible and necessary. For our recognition of the necessity of moving away is based on our recognition of the necessity of fighting. Herein lies the fundamental characteristic of the Red Army's mobile warfare.

Mobile warfare is primary, but we do not reject positional warfare where it is possible and necessary. It should be admitted that positional warfare should be employed for the tenacious defence of particular key points in a containing action during the strategic defensive, and when, during the strategic offensive, we encounter an enemy force that is isolated and cut off from help. We have had considerable experience in defeating the enemy by such positional warfare; we have cracked open many enemy cities, blockhouses and forts and broken through fairly well-fortified enemy field positions. In future we shall increase our efforts and remedy our inadequacies in this respect. We should by all means advocate positional attack or defence when circumstances require and permit it. At the present time, what we are opposed to is the general use of positional warfare or putting it on an equal footing with mobile warfare; that is impermissible.

During the ten years' civil war, have there been no changes whatsoever in the guerrilla character of the Red Army, its lack of fixed battle lines, the fluidity of its base areas, or the fluidity of construction work in its base areas? Yes, there have been changes. The period from the days in the Chingkang Mountains to our first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi was the first stage, the stage in which the guerrilla character and fluidity were very pronounced, the Red Army being in its infancy and the base areas still guerrilla zones. In the second stage, which comprised the period from the first to the third counter-campaign, both the guerrilla character and the fluidity were considerably reduced, front armies having been formed, and base areas with a population of several millions established. In the third stage, which comprised the period from the end of the third to the fifth counter-campaign, the guerrilla character and the fluidity were further reduced, and a central government and a revolutionary military commission had already been set up. The fourth stage was the Long March. The mistaken rejection of guerrilla warfare and fluidity on a small scale had led to guerrilla warfare and fluidity on a great scale. Now we are in the fifth stage. Because of our failure to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and because of this great fluidity, the Red Army and the base areas have been greatly reduced, but we have planted our feet in the Northwest and consolidated and developed our base area here, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. The three front armies which form the main forces of the

Red Army have been brought under a unified command, which is unprecedented.

Going by the nature of our strategy, we may also say the period from the days in the Chingkang Mountains to our fourth counter-campaign was one stage, the period of the fifth counter-campaign was another stage, and the period from the Long March to the present is the third. During the fifth counter-campaign the correct policy of the past was wrongly discarded; today we have correctly discarded the wrong policy adopted during the fifth counter-campaign and revived the earlier and correct policy. However, we have not thrown out everything in the fifth counter-campaign, nor revived everything that preceded it. We have revived only what was good in the past, and discarded only the mistakes of the period of the fifth counter-campaign.

Guerrilla-ism has two aspects. One is irregularity, that is, decentralization, lack of uniformity, absence of strict discipline, and simple methods of work. These features stemmed from the Red Army's infancy, and some of them were just what was needed at the time. As the Red Army reaches a higher stage, we must gradually and consciously eliminate them so as to make the Red Army more centralized, more unified, more disciplined and more thorough in its work — in short, more regular in character. In the directing of operations we should also gradually and consciously reduce such guerrilla characteristics as are no longer required at a higher stage. Refusal to make progress in this respect and obstinate adherence to the old stage are impermissible and harmful, and are detrimental to large-scale operations.

The other aspect of guerrilla-ism consists of the principle of mobile warfare, the guerrilla character of both strategic and tactical operations which is still necessary at present, the inevitable fluidity of our base areas, flexibility in planning the development of the base areas, and the rejection of premature regularization in building the Red Army. In this connection, it is equally impermissible, disadvantageous and harmful to our present operations to deny the facts of history, oppose the retention of what is useful, and rashly leave the present stage in order to rush blindly towards a "new stage", which is as yet beyond reach and has no real significance at the present time.

We are now on the eve of a new stage with respect to the Red Army's technical equipment and organization. We must be prepared

to go over to the new stage. Not to prepare ourselves would be wrong and harmful to our future warfare. In the future, when the technical and organizational conditions in the Red Army have changed and the building of the Red Army has entered a new stage, its operational directions and battle lines will become more stable; there will be more positional warfare; the fluidity of the war, of our territory and of our construction work will be greatly reduced and finally disappear; and we will no longer be handicapped by present limitations, such as the enemy's superiority and his strongly entrenched positions.

At present we oppose the wrong measures of the period of the domination of "Left" opportunism and, at the same time, the revival of many of the irregular features which the Red Army had in its infancy but which are now unnecessary. But we should be resolute in restoring the many valuable principles of army building and of strategy and tactics by which the Red Army has consistently won its victories. We must sum up all that is good from the past in a systematic, more highly developed and richer military line, in order to win victories over the enemy today and prepare to go over to the new stage in the future.

The waging of mobile warfare involves many problems, such as reconnaissance, judgement, decision, combat disposition, command, concealment, concentration, advance, deployment, attack, pursuit, surprise attack, positional attack, positional defence, encounter action, retreat, night fighting, special operations, evading the strong and attacking the weak, besieging the enemy in order to strike at his reinforcements, feint attack, defence against aircraft, operating amongst several enemy forces, by-passing operations, consecutive operations, operating without a rear, the need for rest and building up energy. These problems exhibited many specific features in the history of the Red Army, features which should be methodically dealt with and summed up in the science of campaigns, and I shall not go into them here.

#### 8. WAR OF QUICK DECISION

A strategically protracted war and campaigns or battles of quick decision are two aspects of the same thing, two principles which should receive equal and simultaneous emphasis in civil wars and which are also applicable in anti-imperialist wars.

Revolutionary forces grow only gradually because the reactionary forces are very strong, and this fact determines the protracted nature of our war. Here impatience is harmful and advocacy of "quick decision" incorrect. To wage a revolutionary war for ten years, as we have done, might be surprising in other countries, but for us it is like the opening sections in an "eight-legged essay" — the "presentation, amplification and preliminary exposition of the theme"<sup>36</sup> — and many exciting parts are yet to follow. No doubt developments in the future will be greatly accelerated under the influence of domestic and international conditions. As changes have already taken place in the international and domestic situation and greater changes are coming, it can be said that we have outgrown the past state of slow development and fighting in isolation. But we should not expect successes overnight. The aspiration to "wipe out the enemy before breakfast" is admirable, but it is bad to make concrete plans to do so. As China's reactionary forces are backed by many imperialist powers, our revolutionary war will continue to be a protracted one until China's revolutionary forces have built up enough strength to breach the main positions of our internal and external enemies, and until the international revolutionary forces have crushed or contained most of the international reactionary forces. To proceed from this point in formulating our strategy of long-term warfare is one of the important principles guiding our strategy.

The reverse is true of campaigns and battles — here the principle is not protractedness but quick decision. Quick decision is sought in campaigns and battles, and this is true at all times and in all countries. In a war as a whole, too, quick decision is sought at all times and in all countries, and a long drawn-out war is considered harmful. China's war, however, must be handled with the greatest patience and treated as a protracted war. During the period of the Li Li-san line, some people ridiculed our way of doing things as "shadow-boxing tactics" (meaning our tactics of fighting many battles back and forth before going on to seize the big cities), and said that we would not see the victory of the revolution until our hair turned white. Such impatience was proved wrong long ago. But if their criticism had been applied not to strategy but to campaigns and battles, they would have been perfectly right, and for the following reasons. First, the Red Army has no sources from which to replenish its arms and especially its ammunition; second, the White forces consist of many armies while there is only one Red Army, which

must be prepared to fight one operation after another in quick succession in order to smash each campaign of "encirclement and suppression"; and third, though the White armies advance separately, most of them keep fairly close to one another, and if we fail to gain a quick decision in attacking one of them, all the others will converge upon us. For these reasons we have to fight battles of quick decision. It is usual for us to conclude a battle in a few hours, or in a day or two. It is only when our plan is to "besiege the enemy in order to strike at his reinforcements" and our purpose is to strike not at the besieged enemy but at his reinforcements that we are prepared for a certain degree of protractedness in our besieging operations; but even then we seek a quick decision against the reinforcements. A plan of protracted operations is often applied in campaigns or battles when we are strategically on the defensive and are tenaciously defending positions on a holding front, or when, in a strategic offensive, we are attacking isolated enemy forces cut off from help, or are eliminating White strongholds within our base areas. But protracted operations of this kind help rather than hinder the main Red Army force in its battles of quick decision.

A quick decision cannot be achieved simply by wanting it, but requires many specific conditions. The main requirements are: adequate preparations, seizing the opportune moment, concentration of superior forces, encircling and outflanking tactics, favourable terrain, and striking at the enemy when he is on the move, or when he is stationary but has not yet consolidated his positions. Unless these requirements are satisfied, it is impossible to achieve quick decision in a campaign or battle.

The smashing of an enemy "encirclement and suppression" is a major campaign, but the principle of quick decision and not that of protractedness still applies. For the manpower, financial resources and military strength of a base area do not allow protractedness.

While quick decision is the general principle, we must oppose undue impatience. It is altogether necessary that the highest military and political leading body of a revolutionary base area, having taken into account the circumstances in its base area and the situation of the enemy, should not be overawed by the enemy's truculence, dispirited by hardships that can be endured, or dejected by setbacks, but should have the requisite patience and stamina. The smashing of the first enemy "encirclement and suppression" campaign in Kiangsi Province took only one week from the first battle to the last; the

second was smashed in barely a fortnight; the third dragged on for three months before it was smashed; the fourth took three weeks; and the fifth taxed our endurance for a whole year. When we were compelled to break through the enemy's encirclement after the failure to smash his fifth campaign, we showed an unjustifiable haste. In the circumstances then obtaining, we could well have held out for another two or three months, giving the troops some time for rest and reorganization. If that had been done, and if the leadership had been a little wiser after our breakthrough, the outcome would have been very different.

For all that, the principle of shortening the duration of a campaign by every possible means remains valid. Campaign and battle plans should call for our maximum effort in concentration of troops, mobile warfare, and so on, so as to ensure the destruction of the enemy's effective strength on the interior lines (that is, in the base area) and the quick defeat of his "encirclement and suppression" campaign, but where it is evident that the campaign cannot be terminated on our interior lines, we should employ the main Red Army force to break through the enemy's encirclement and switch to our exterior lines (that is, the enemy's interior lines) in order to defeat him there. Now that the enemy has developed his blockhouse warfare to a high degree, this will become our usual method of operation. At the time of the Fukien Incident,<sup>37</sup> two months after the commencement of our fifth counter-campaign, the main forces of the Red Army should undoubtedly have thrust into the Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei-Kiangsi region, with Chekiang as the centre, and swept over the length and breadth of the area between Hangchow, Soochow, Nanking, Wuhu, Nanchang and Foochow, turning our strategic defensive into a strategic offensive, menacing the enemy's vital centres and seeking battles in the vast areas where there were no blockhouses. By such means we could have compelled the enemy, who was attacking southern Kiangsi and western Fukien, to turn back to defend his vital centres, broken his attack on the base area in Kiangsi and rendered aid to the People's Government in Fukien — we certainly could have aided it by this means. As this plan was rejected, the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign could not be broken, and the People's Government in Fukien inevitably collapsed. Even after a year's fighting, though it had become inopportune for us to advance on Chekiang, we could still have turned to the strategic offensive in another direction by moving our main forces towards Hunan, that is,

by driving into central Hunan instead of going through Hunan to Kweichow, and in this way we could have manoeuvred the enemy from Kiangsi into Hunan and destroyed him there. As this plan, too, was rejected, all hope of breaking the enemy's fifth campaign was finally dashed, and we had no alternative but to set out on the Long March.

## 9. WAR OF ANNIHILATION

It is inappropriate to advocate a "contest of attrition" for the Chinese Red Army today. A "contest of treasures" not between Dragon Kings but between a Dragon King and a beggar would be rather ludicrous. For the Red Army which gets almost all its supplies from the enemy, war of annihilation is the basic policy. Only by annihilating the enemy's effective strength can we smash his "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and expand our revolutionary base areas. Inflicting casualties is a means of annihilating the enemy, or otherwise there would be no sense to it. We incur losses ourselves in inflicting casualties on the enemy but we replenish ourselves by annihilating his units, thereby not only making good our losses but adding to the strength of our army. A battle in which the enemy is routed is not basically decisive in a contest with an enemy of great strength. A battle of annihilation, on the other hand, produces a great and immediate impact on any enemy. Injuring all of a man's ten fingers is not as effective as chopping off one, and routing ten enemy divisions is not as effective as annihilating one of them.

Our policy for dealing with the enemy's first, second, third and fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns was war of annihilation. The forces annihilated in each campaign constituted only part of the enemy's total strength, and yet all these "encirclement and suppression" campaigns were smashed. In our fifth counter-campaign, however, the opposite policy was pursued, which in fact helped the enemy to attain his aims.

War of annihilation entails the concentration of superior forces and the adoption of encircling or outflanking tactics. We cannot have the former without the latter. Conditions such as popular support, favourable terrain, a vulnerable enemy force and the advantage of surprise are all indispensable for the purpose of annihilation.

Merely routing one enemy force or permitting it to escape has meaning only if, in the battle or campaign as a whole, our main force

is concentrating its operations of annihilation against another enemy force, or otherwise it is meaningless. Here the losses are justified by the gains.

In establishing our own war industry we must not allow ourselves to become dependent on it. Our basic policy is to rely on the war industries of the imperialist countries and of our domestic enemy. We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and, what is more, it is delivered to us by the enemy's transport corps. This is the sober truth, it is not a jest.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The science of strategy, the science of campaigns and the science of tactics are all components of Chinese military science. The science of strategy deals with the laws that govern the war situation as a whole. The science of campaigns deals with the laws that govern campaigns and is applied in directing campaigns. The science of tactics deals with the laws that govern battles and is applied in directing battles.

<sup>2</sup> Sun Wu Tzu, or Sun Wu, was a famous Chinese military scientist in the 5th century B.C., who wrote *Sun Tzu*, a treatise on war containing thirteen chapters. This quotation is from Chapter 3, "The Strategy of Attack".

<sup>3</sup> When Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this article in 1936, it was exactly fifteen years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921.

<sup>4</sup> Chen Tu-hsiu was originally a professor at Peking University and became famous as an editor of *New Youth*. He was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. Owing to his reputation at the time of the May 4th Movement and owing to the Party's immaturity in its initial period, he became General Secretary of the Party. In the last period of the revolution of 1924-27, the Rightist thinking in the Party represented by Chen Tu-hsiu developed into a line of capitulationism. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has observed that the capitulationists at that time "voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution" ("The Present Situation and Our Tasks", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV). After the defeat of 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu and a handful of other capitulationists lost faith in the future of the revolution and became liquidationists. They took the reactionary Trotskyist stand and together with the Trotskyites formed a small anti-Party group. Consequently Chen Tu-hsiu was expelled from the Party in November 1929. He died in 1942.

<sup>5</sup> The "Left" opportunism of Li Li-san, generally known as the "Li Li-san line", refers to the "Left" opportunist line which existed in the Party for about four months beginning from June 1930 and which was represented by Comrade Li Li-san, then the most influential leader of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The Li Li-san line had the following characteristics: It violated the policy of the Party's Sixth National Congress; it denied that mass strength had to be built up for the revolution and denied that the development of the revolution was uneven; it

regarded as "extremely erroneous . . . localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality" the ideas of Comrade Mao Tse-tung that for a long time we should devote our attention mainly to creating rural base areas, use the rural areas to encircle the cities and use these bases to advance a high tide of country-wide revolution; and it held that preparations should be made for immediate insurrections in all parts of the country. On the basis of this erroneous line, Comrade Li Li-san drew up an adventurist plan for organizing immediate armed insurrections in the key cities throughout the country. At the same time, he refused to recognize the uneven development of the world revolution, holding that the general outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to a general outbreak of world revolution, and that the Chinese revolution could be successful only with the general outbreak of world revolution; he also refused to recognize the protracted nature of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, holding that the beginnings of victory in one or more provinces would mark the beginning of the transition to socialist revolution, and thus formulated a number of inappropriate "Left" adventurist policies. Comrade Mao Tse-tung opposed this erroneous line, and the broad masses of cadres and members in the Party also demanded its rectification. At the Third Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee in September 1930 Comrade Li Li-san admitted the mistakes that had been pointed out and then relinquished his leading position in the Central Committee. Over a long period of time Comrade Li Li-san corrected his wrong views, and so he was re-elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the Party.

<sup>6</sup> The Sixth Central Committee of the Party at its third plenary session held in September 1930, and the Central Committee following the session, adopted many positive measures to put an end to the Li Li-san line. But after the session a number of Party comrades who were inexperienced in practical revolutionary struggle, with Comrades Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming) and Chin Pang-hsien (Po Ku) in the lead, came out against the Central Committee's measures. In the pamphlet, *The Two Lines or The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China*, they most emphatically declared that the main danger then existing in the Party was not "Left" opportunism but "Right opportunism" and, to justify their own activities, they "criticized" the Li Li-san line as "Rightist". They put forward a new political programme which continued, revived or developed the Li Li-san line and other "Left" ideas and policies in a new guise, and set themselves against the correct line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War* mainly to criticize the military mistakes of this new "Left" opportunist line. This erroneous line was dominant in the Party from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 to the meeting of the Political Bureau convened by the Central Committee at Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in January 1935, which ended the dominance of this erroneous line and established the new leadership of the Central Committee, headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The erroneous "Left" line dominated the Party for a particularly long time (4 years) and brought extremely heavy losses, with disastrous consequences, to the Party and the revolution. A loss of 90 per cent was inflicted on the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Red Army and its base areas, tens of millions of people in the revolutionary base areas were made to suffer the cruel oppression of the Kuomintang, and the progress of the Chinese revolution was retarded. Most of the errant comrades have realized and corrected their mistakes as a result of personal experience over a number of years, and have done much useful work for the Party and the people. Under Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership they united with all other comrades in the Party on the basis of a common political understanding. The "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party" adopted by the Seventh

Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in April 1945 made a detailed summary of the various aspects of this erroneous line.

<sup>7</sup> Chang Kuo-tao was a traitor to the Chinese revolution. Speculating on the revolution, he joined the Chinese Communist Party in his youth. In the Party he made many mistakes and ended by committing grave crimes. Most notoriously, in 1935 he opposed the Red Army's northward march, advocating a defeatist and liquidationist withdrawal by the Red Army to the minority-nationality areas on the Szechuan-Sikang border, and he engaged in openly traitorous activities against the Party and the Central Committee, established his own bogus Central Committee, disrupted the unity of the Party and the Red Army, and caused heavy losses to its Fourth Front Army. Thanks to patient education by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee, the Fourth Front Army and its numerous cadres soon came back under the correct leadership of the Central Committee and played an honourable part in subsequent struggles. Chang Kuo-tao, however, proved incorrigible, escaped by himself from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region in the spring of 1938 and joined the Kuomintang secret police.

<sup>8</sup> The Officers Training Corps at Lushan was an organization which Chiang Kai-shek set up in July 1933 on Lushan Mountain in Kiukiang, Kiangsi Province, for training anti-Communist military cadres. Officers of Chiang Kai-shek's armed forces were sent there in rotation to receive fascist military and political training from German, Italian and American instructors.

<sup>9</sup> These new military principles largely constituted the Chiang Kai-shek gang's policy of "blockhouse warfare" in accordance with which it advanced gradually and entrenched itself at every step.

<sup>10</sup> Lenin, criticizing the Hungarian Communist Bela Kun, said that he "gives up the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, the concrete analysis of concrete conditions" ("Communism", *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, 4th Russian ed., Vol. XXXI).

<sup>11</sup> The First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area was held on May 20, 1928 at Maoping, Ningkung County.

<sup>12</sup> For an explanation, see pp. 132-33 of this volume.

<sup>13</sup> See "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", Notes 4 and 5, pp. 61-62 of this volume.

<sup>14</sup> "Bandit ways" refers to plundering and looting resulting from lack of discipline, organization and clear political direction.

<sup>15</sup> The Long March of 25,000 *li* (12,500 kilometres) was made by the Red Army from Kiangsi Province to northern Shensi Province. In October 1934 the First Front Army, *i.e.*, the Central Red Army, comprising the First, the Third and the Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, began its great strategic shift. Setting out from Changtung and Ninghua in western Fukien and from Juichin and Yutu in southern Kiangsi, the Red Army traversed the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi. It climbed over high mountains perpetually covered with snow and marched across uninhabited wild marshes. Having undergone untold tribulations and repeatedly defeated the enemy in his attempts to encircle, pursue or intercept it, the Red Army ended its continuous march of 25,000 *li* by victoriously arriving in the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in October 1935.

<sup>16</sup> The period after the December uprising of 1905 was defeated, in which the revolutionary tide in Russia gradually receded. See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Chapter 3, Sections 5 and 6.

<sup>17</sup> The peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded between Soviet Russia and Germany in March 1918. Confronted with obviously superior enemy forces, the revolutionary forces had to make a temporary retreat in order to prevent the German imperialists from launching an attack on the new-born Soviet Republic which as yet had no army of its own. The conclusion of this treaty gained time for the Soviet Republic to consolidate the political power of the proletariat, reorganize its economy and build up the Red Army. It enabled the proletariat to maintain its leadership over the peasantry and build up sufficient strength to defeat the White Guards and the armed intervention of Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Poland and other countries in 1918-20.

<sup>18</sup> On October 30, 1927 the peasants of Haifeng and Lufeng in Kwangtung Province launched their third insurrection under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. They occupied Haifeng and Lufeng and the surrounding area, organized a Red Army and established the democratic political power of the workers and peasants. They were later defeated because they made the mistake of underestimating the enemy.

<sup>19</sup> The Fourth Front Army and the Second Front Army of the Red Army joined forces in the autumn of 1936 and shifted northward from the northeastern part of Sikang. Chang Kuo-tao was then still persisting in his anti-Party stand and in his policy of retreat and liquidation which he had hitherto pursued. In October of the same year, when the Second and Fourth Front Armies arrived in Kansu, Chang Kuo-tao ordered the advance units of the Fourth Front Army, numbering more than 20,000, to organize the Western Column for crossing the Yellow River and advancing westward to Chinghai. The Western Column was practically defeated after suffering blows in battles in December 1936 and was completely defeated in March 1937.

<sup>20</sup> See letter from Marx to Kugelmann on the Paris Commune.

<sup>21</sup> *Sbui Hu Chuan* is a celebrated Chinese novel describing a peasant war. The novel is attributed to Shih Nai-an who lived around the end of the Yuan Dynasty and the beginning of the Ming Dynasty (14th century A.D.). Lin Chung and Chai Chin are both heroes in this novel. Hung is the drill master on Chai Chin's estate.

<sup>22</sup> Lu and Chi were two feudal states in the Spring and Autumn Era (722-481 B.C.). Chi was a big state in the central part of the present Shantung Province, and Lu was a smaller one in the southern part. Duke Chuang reigned over Lu from 693 to 662 B.C.

<sup>23</sup> Tsochui Ming was the author of *Tso Chuan*, a classical chronicle of the Chou Dynasty. For the passage quoted, see the section in *Tso Chuan* entitled "The 10th Year of Duke Chuang" (684 B.C.).

<sup>24</sup> The ancient town of Chengkao, in the northwest of the present Chengkao County, Honan Province, was of great military importance. It was the scene of battles fought in 203 B.C. between Liu Pang, King of Han, and Hsiang Yu, King of Chu. At first Hsiang Yu captured Yunyang and Chengkao and Liu Pang's troops were almost routed. Liu Pang waited until the opportune moment when Hsiang Yu's troops were in midstream crossing the Chishui River, and then crushed them and recaptured Chengkao.

<sup>25</sup> The ancient town of Kunyang, in the north of the present Yehhsien County, Honan Province, was the place where Liu Hsiu, founder of the Eastern Han Dynasty, defeated the troops of Wang Mang, Emperor of the Hsin Dynasty, in 23 B.C. There was a huge numerical disparity between the two sides, Liu Hsiu's forces totalling 8,000 to 9,000 men as against Wang Mang's 400,000. But taking advantage of the

negligence of Wang Mang's generals, Wang Shun and Wang Yu, who underestimated the enemy, Liu Hsiu with only three thousand picked troops put Wang Mang's main forces to rout. He followed up this victory by crushing the rest of the enemy troops.

<sup>26</sup> Kuantu was in the northeast of the present Chungmou County, Honan Province and the scene of the battle between the armies of Tsao Tsao and Yuan Shao in A.D. 200. Yuan Shao had an army of 100,000, while Tsao Tsao had only a meagre force and was short of supplies. Taking advantage of lack of vigilance on the part of Yuan Shao's troops, who belittled the enemy, Tsao Tsao dispatched his light-footed soldiers to spring a surprise attack on them and set their supplies on fire. Yuan Shao's army was thrown into confusion and its main force wiped out.

<sup>27</sup> The state of Wu was ruled by Sun Chuan, and the state of Wei by Tsao Tsao. Chihpi is situated on the south bank of the Yangtse River, to the northeast of Chiayu, Hupeh Province. In A.D. 208 Tsao Tsao led an army of over 500,000 men, which he proclaimed to be 800,000 strong, to launch an attack on Sun Chuan. The latter, in alliance with Tsao Tsao's antagonist Liu Pei, mustered a force of 30,000. Knowing that Tsao Tsao's army was plagued by epidemics and was unaccustomed to action afloat, the allied forces of Sun Chuan and Liu Pei set fire to Tsao Tsao's fleet and crushed his army.

<sup>28</sup> Yiling, to the east of the present Ichang, Hupeh Province, was the place where Lu Sun, a general of the state of Wu, defeated the army of Liu Pei, ruler of Shu, in A.D. 222. Liu Pei's troops scored successive victories at the beginning of the war and penetrated five or six hundred *li* into the territory of Wu as far as Yiling. Lu Sun, who was defending Yiling, avoided battle for over seven months until Liu Pei "was at his wits' end and his troops were exhausted and demoralized". Then he crushed Liu Pei's troops by taking advantage of a favourable wind to set fire to their tents.

<sup>29</sup> Hsieh Hsuan, a general of Eastern Tsin Dynasty, defeated Fu Chien, ruler of the state of Chin, in A.D. 383 at the Feishui River in Anhwei Province. Fu Chien had an infantry force of more than 600,000, a cavalry force of 270,000 and a guards corps of more than 30,000, while the land and river forces of Eastern Tsin numbered only 80,000. When the armies lined up on opposite banks of the Feishui River, Hsieh Hsuan, taking advantage of the overconfidence and conceit of the enemy troops, requested Fu Chien to move his troops back so as to leave room for the Eastern Tsin troops to cross the river and fight it out. Fu Chien complied, but when he ordered withdrawal, his troops got into a panic and could not be stopped. Seizing the opportunity, the Eastern Tsin troops crossed the river, launched an offensive and crushed the enemy.

<sup>30</sup> Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province, was the scene of the famous uprising on August 1, 1927 led by the Communist Party of China in order to combat the counter-revolution of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei and to continue the revolution of 1924-27. More than thirty thousand troops took part in the uprising which was led by Comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho Lung and Yeh Ting. The insurrectionary army withdrew from Nanchang on August 5 as planned, but suffered a defeat when approaching Chaochow and Swatow in Kwangtung Province. Led by Comrades Chu Teh, Chen Yi and Lin Piao, part of the troops later fought their way to the Chinggang Mountains and joined forces with the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army under Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

<sup>31</sup> See "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?", Note 8, pp. 17-18 of this volume.

<sup>32</sup> The famous Autumn Harvest Uprising under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung was launched in September 1927 by the people's armed forces of Hsiushui,

Pingshiang, Pingkiang and Liuyang Counties on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, who formed the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. Comrade Mao Tse-tung led this force to the Ching kang Mountains where a revolutionary base was established.

<sup>33</sup> The A-B (initials for "Anti-Bolshevik") Group was a counter-revolutionary organization of undercover Kuomintang agents in the Red areas.

<sup>34</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (two-volume English ed.), Vol. II, Moscow, 1947. "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace", "Strange and Monstrous", "A Serious Lesson and a Serious Responsibility", "Report on War and Peace" and also *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Chapter 7, Section 7.

<sup>35</sup> The regions referred to here are those inhabited by the Tibetans in Sikang and the Hui people in Kansu, Chinghai and Sinkiang Provinces.

<sup>36</sup> The "eight-legged essay" was the prescribed form in the imperial competitive examinations in feudal China from the 15th to the 19th century. The main body of the essay was made up of the inceptive paragraph, the middle paragraph, the rear paragraph and the concluding paragraph, with each paragraph comprising two parts. Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung is using the development of the theme in this kind of essay as a metaphor to illustrate the development of the revolution through its various stages. However, Comrade Mao Tse-tung generally uses the term "eight-legged essay" to ridicule dogmatism.

<sup>37</sup> In November 1933, under the influence of the anti-Japanese upsurge of the people throughout China, the leaders of the Kuomintang's 19th Route Army, in alliance with the Kuomintang forces under Li Chi-shen, publicly renounced Chiang Kai-shek and established the "People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China" in Fukien, concluding an agreement with the Red Army to attack Chiang Kai-shek and resist Japan. This episode was referred to as the Fukien Incident. The 19th Route Army and the People's Government of Fukien, however, collapsed under the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's troops.

# PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN\*

*May 1938*

## CHAPTER I

### WHY RAISE THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR?

In the War of Resistance Against Japan, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. This point has already been correctly settled. If then there are only tactical problems in guerrilla warfare, why raise the question of strategy?

If China were a small country in which the role of guerrilla warfare was only to render direct support, over short distances, to the campaigns of the regular army, there would, of course, be only tactical problems but no strategic ones. On the other hand, if China were a country as strong as the Soviet Union and the invading enemy could either be quickly expelled, or, even though his expulsion were to take some time, he could not occupy extensive areas, then again guerrilla warfare would simply play a supporting role in campaigns, and would naturally involve only tactical but not strategic problems.

The question of strategy in guerrilla war does arise, however, in the case of China which is neither small nor like the Soviet Union,

---

\* In the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan, many people inside and outside the Party belittled the important strategic role of guerrilla warfare and pinned their hopes on regular warfare alone, particularly on the operations of the Kuomintang forces. Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted this view and wrote this article to show the correct road of development for anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. As a result, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which had only a little more than 40,000 men when the War of Resistance began in 1937, grew to a great army of one million by the time Japan surrendered in 1945, established many revolutionary base areas, played a great part in the war and thus, throughout this period,

but which is a both large and weak country. This large and weak country is being attacked by a small and strong country, but the large and weak country is in an era of progress; this is the source of the whole problem. It is in these circumstances that vast areas have come under enemy occupation and that the war has become a protracted one. The enemy is occupying vast areas of this large country of ours, but Japan is a small country, she does not have sufficient soldiers and has to leave many gaps in the occupied areas, so that our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare consists primarily not in interior-line operations in support of the campaigns of the regular troops but in independent operations on exterior lines; furthermore, China is progressive, that is to say, she has a staunch army and broad masses of people that are both led by the Communist Party, so that, far from being small-scale, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is in fact large-scale warfare. Hence the emergence of a whole series of problems, such as the strategic defensive, the strategic offensive, etc. The protracted nature of the war and its attendant ruthlessness have made it imperative for guerrilla warfare to perform many unusual tasks; hence such problems as those of the base areas, the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, and so on. For all these reasons, China's guerrilla warfare against Japan has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gates of strategy, and it demands examination from the viewpoint of strategy. The point that merits our particular attention is that such extensive as well as protracted guerrilla warfare is quite new in the entire history of war. This is bound up with the fact that we are now in the fourth decade of the 20th century and that we now have the Communist Party and the Red Army. Herein lies the heart of the matter. Our enemy is probably still cherishing fond dreams of emulating the Mongol conquest of the Sung Dynasty, the Manchu conquest of the Ming Dynasty, the British occupation of North America and India, the Latin occupation of Central and South America, etc. But such dreams have no practical value in present-day China because there are certain factors present in the China of today which were absent in those historical instances, and one of them is guerrilla warfare, which is quite a new phenomenon. If our enemy overlooks this fact, he will certainly come to grief.

---

made Chiang Kai-shek afraid to capitulate to Japan or launch a nation-wide civil war. In 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek did launch a nation-wide civil war, the People's Liberation Army, formed out of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, was strong enough to deal with his attacks.

These are the reasons why our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, though occupying only a supplementary place in the War of Resistance as a whole, must nevertheless be examined from the viewpoint of strategy.

Why not, then, apply to guerrilla warfare the general strategic principles of the War of Resistance?

The question of strategy in our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is indeed closely linked with the question of strategy in the War of Resistance as a whole, because they have much in common. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare is different from regular warfare and has its own peculiarities, and consequently there are many peculiar elements present in the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare. Without modification it is impossible to apply the strategic principles of the War of Resistance in general to guerrilla warfare with its own peculiarities.

## CHAPTER II

### THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF WAR IS TO PRESERVE ONESELF AND TO DESTROY THE ENEMY

Before discussing the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare in concrete terms, a few words are needed on the fundamental problem of war.

All the guiding principles of military operations grow out of the one basic principle: to do one's best to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy. In a revolutionary war, this principle is directly linked with basic political principles. For instance, the basic political principle of China's War of Resistance Against Japan, *i.e.*, its political aim, is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build an independent, free and happy new China. In terms of military action this principle means the use of armed force to defend our motherland and to drive out the Japanese invaders. To attain this end, the operations of the armed units will take the form of doing their utmost both to preserve their own strength and to destroy the enemy's. How then do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Every war exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high one. Is this not in contradiction with "preserving oneself"? In fact, there is no contradiction at all; to put it more exactly, sacrifice and self-preservation

are both opposite and complementary to each other. For such sacrifice is essential not only for destroying the enemy but also for preserving oneself — partial and temporary “non-preservation” (sacrifice, or paying the price) is necessary for the sake of general and permanent preservation. From this basic principle stems the series of principles guiding military operations, all of which — from the principles of shooting (taking cover to preserve oneself, and making full use of fire-power to destroy the enemy) to the principles of strategy — are permeated with the spirit of this basic principle. All technical, tactical and strategic principles represent applications of this basic principle. The principle of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy is the basis of all military principles.

### CHAPTER III

## SIX SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Now let us see what policies or principles have to be adopted in guerrilla war operations against Japan before we can attain the object of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. Since the guerrilla units in the War of Resistance (and in all other revolutionary wars) generally grow out of nothing and expand from a small to a large force, they must preserve themselves and, moreover, they must expand. Hence the question is, what policies or principles have to be adopted before we can attain the object of preserving and expanding ourselves and destroying the enemy?

Generally speaking, the main principles are as follows: (1) using initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations; (2) co-ordination with regular warfare; (3) establishment of base areas; (4) strategic defensive and strategic offensive; (5) the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare; (6) correct relationship of command. These six items constitute the whole strategic programme for guerrilla war against Japan and are the means necessary for the preservation and expansion of our forces, for the destruction and expulsion of the enemy, for co-ordination with regular warfare and the winning of final victory.

## CHAPTER IV

INITIATIVE, FLEXIBILITY AND PLANNING IN  
CONDUCTING OFFENSIVES WITHIN THE DEFENSIVE,  
BATTLES OF QUICK DECISION WITHIN PROTRACTED  
WAR, AND EXTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONS WITHIN  
INTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONS

Here the subject may be dealt with under four headings: (1) the relationship between the defensive and the offensive, between protractedness and quick decision, and between the interior and exterior lines; (2) the initiative in all operations; (3) flexible employment of forces; and (4) planning in all operations.

To start with the first.

If we take the War of Resistance as a whole, the fact that Japan is a strong country and is attacking while China is a weak country and is defending herself makes our war strategically a defensive and protracted war. As far as the operational lines are concerned, the Japanese are operating on exterior and we on interior lines. This is one aspect of the situation. But there is another aspect which is just the reverse. The enemy forces, though strong (in arms, in certain qualities of their men, and certain other factors), are numerically small, whereas our forces, though weak (likewise, in arms, in certain qualities of our men, and certain other factors), are numerically very large. Added to the fact that the enemy is an alien nation invading our country while we are resisting his invasion on our own soil, this determines the following strategy. It is possible and necessary to use tactical offensives within the strategic defensive, to fight campaigns and battles of quick decision within a strategically protracted war and to fight campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. Such is the strategy to be adopted in the War of Resistance as a whole. It holds true both for regular and for guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is different only in degree and form. Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise attacks. Although surprise attacks can and should be employed in regular warfare too, the degree of surprise is less. In guerrilla warfare, the need to bring operations to a quick decision is very great, and our exterior-line ring of encirclement of the enemy in campaigns and battles is very small. All these distinguish it from regular warfare.

Thus it can be seen that in their operations guerrilla units have to concentrate the maximum forces, act secretly and swiftly, attack the enemy by surprise and bring battles to a quick decision, and that they must strictly avoid passive defence, procrastination and the dispersal of forces before engagements. Of course, guerrilla warfare includes not only the strategic but also the tactical defensive. The latter embraces, among other things, containing and outpost actions during battles, the disposition of forces for resistance at narrow passes, strategic points, rivers or villages in order to deplete and exhaust the enemy, and action to cover withdrawal. But the basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be the offensive, and it is more offensive in its character than regular warfare. The offensive, moreover, must take the form of surprise attacks, and in guerrilla warfare it is even less permissible than in regular warfare to expose ourselves by ostentatiously parading our forces. From the fact that the enemy is strong and we are weak it necessarily follows that, in guerrilla operations in general even more than in regular warfare, battles must be decided quickly, though on some occasions guerrilla fighting may be kept up for several days, as in an assault on a small and isolated enemy force cut off from help. Because of its dispersed character, guerrilla warfare can spread everywhere, and in many of its tasks, as in harassing, containing and disrupting the enemy and in mass work, the principle is dispersal of forces; but a guerrilla unit, or a guerrilla formation, must concentrate its main forces when it is engaged in destroying the enemy, and especially when it is striving to smash an enemy attack. "Concentrate a big force to strike at a small enemy force" remains a principle of field operations in guerrilla warfare.

Thus it can also be seen that, if we take the War of Resistance as a whole, we can attain the aim of our strategic defensive and finally defeat Japanese imperialism only through the cumulative effect of many offensive campaigns and battles in both regular and guerrilla warfare, namely, through the cumulative effect of many victories in offensive actions. Only through the cumulative effect of many campaigns and battles of quick decision, namely, the cumulative effect of many victories achieved through quick decision in offensive campaigns and battles, can we attain our goal of strategic protractedness, which means gaining time to increase our capacity to resist while hastening or awaiting changes in the international situation and the internal collapse of the enemy, in order that we can launch a strategic counter-offensive and drive the Japanese invaders out of China. We

must concentrate superior forces and fight exterior-line operations in every campaign or battle, whether in the stage of strategic defensive or strategic counter-offensive, in order to encircle and destroy the enemy forces, encircling part if not all of them, destroying part if not all of the encircled forces, and inflicting heavy casualties on the encircled forces if we cannot capture them in large numbers. Only through the cumulative effect of many such battles of annihilation can we change the relative position as between the enemy and ourselves, thoroughly smash his strategic encirclement — that is, his scheme of exterior-line operations — and finally, in co-ordination with international forces and the revolutionary struggles of the Japanese people, surround the Japanese imperialists and deal them the *coup de grâce*. These results are to be achieved mainly through regular warfare, with guerrilla warfare making a secondary contribution. What is common to both, however, is the accumulation of many minor victories to make a major victory. Herein lies the great strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance.

Now let us discuss initiative, flexibility and planning in guerrilla warfare.

What is initiative in guerrilla warfare?

In any war, the opponents contend for the initiative, whether on a battlefield, in a battle area, in a war zone or in the whole war, for the initiative means freedom of action for an army. Any army which, losing the initiative, is forced into a passive position and ceases to be free, faces the danger of defeat or extermination. Naturally, gaining the initiative is harder in strategic defensive and interior-line operations and easier in offensive exterior-line operations. However, Japanese imperialism has two basic weaknesses, namely, its shortage of troops and the fact that it is fighting on foreign soil. Moreover, its underestimation of China's strength and the internal contradictions among the Japanese militarists have given rise to many mistakes in command, such as piecemeal reinforcement, lack of strategic co-ordination, occasional absence of a main direction for attack, failure to grasp opportunities in some operations and failure to wipe out encircled forces, all of which may be considered the third weakness of Japanese imperialism. Thus, despite the advantage of being on the offensive and operating on exterior lines, the Japanese militarists are gradually losing the initiative, because of their shortage of troops (their small territory, small population, inadequate resources, feudalistic imperialism, etc.), because of the fact that they are fighting on foreign soil

(their war is imperialist and barbarous) and because of their stupidities in command. Japan is neither willing nor able to conclude the war at present, nor has her strategic offensive yet come to an end, but as the general trend shows her offensive is confined within certain limits, which is the inevitable consequence of her three weaknesses; she cannot go on indefinitely till she swallows the whole of China. Already there are signs that Japan will one day find herself in an utterly passive position. China, on the other hand, was in a rather passive position at the beginning of the war, but, having gained experience, she is now turning to the new policy of mobile warfare, the policy of taking the offensive, seeking quick decisions and operating on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, which, together with the policy of developing widespread guerrilla warfare, is helping China to build up a position of initiative day by day.

The question of the initiative is even more vital in guerrilla warfare. For most guerrilla units operate in very difficult circumstances, fighting without a rear, with their own weak forces facing the enemy's strong forces, lacking experience (when the units are newly organized), being separated, etc. Nevertheless, the initiative can be built up in guerrilla warfare, the essential condition being to seize on the enemy's three weaknesses. Taking advantage of the enemy's shortage of troops (from the viewpoint of the war as a whole), the guerrilla units can boldly use vast areas as their fields of operation; taking advantage of the fact that the enemy is an alien invader and is pursuing a most barbarous policy, the guerrilla units can boldly enlist the support of millions upon millions of people; taking advantage of the stupidities in the enemy's command, the guerrilla units can give full scope to their resourcefulness. While the regular army must seize on all these weaknesses of the enemy and turn them to good account in order to defeat him, it is even more important for the guerrilla units to do so. As for the guerrilla units' own weaknesses, they can be gradually reduced in the course of the struggle. Moreover, these weaknesses sometimes constitute the very condition for gaining the initiative. For example, it is precisely because the guerrilla units are small and weak that they can mysteriously appear and disappear in their operations behind enemy lines, without the enemy's being able to do anything about them, and thus enjoy a freedom of action such as massive regular armies never can.

When the enemy is making a converging attack from several directions, a guerrilla unit can exercise initiative only with difficulty

and can lose it all too easily. In such a case, if its appraisals and dispositions are wrong, it is liable to get into a passive position and consequently fail to smash the converging enemy attack. This may occur even when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive. For the initiative results from making a correct appraisal of the situation (as regards both us and the enemy) and from making the correct military and political dispositions. A pessimistic appraisal out of accord with the objective conditions and the passive dispositions ensuing from it will undoubtedly result in the loss of the initiative and throw us into a passive position. On the other hand, an over-optimistic appraisal out of accord with the objective conditions and the risky (unjustifiably risky) dispositions ensuing from it will also result in the loss of the initiative and eventually land one in a position similar to that of the pessimists. The initiative is not an innate attribute of genius, but is something an intelligent leader attains through open-minded study and correct appraisal of the objective conditions and through correct military and political dispositions. It follows that the initiative is not ready-made but is something that requires conscious effort.

When forced into a passive position through some incorrect appraisal and disposition or through overwhelming pressure, a guerrilla unit must strive to extricate itself. How this can be done depends on the circumstances. In many cases it is necessary to "move away". The ability to move is the distinctive feature of a guerrilla unit. To move away is the principal method for getting out of a passive position and regaining the initiative. But it is not the sole method. The moment when the enemy is most energetic and we are in the greatest difficulties is often the very moment when things begin to turn against him and in our favour. Frequently a favourable situation recurs and the initiative is regained as a result of "holding out a little longer".

Next, let us deal with flexibility.

Flexibility is a concrete expression of the initiative. The flexible employment of forces is more essential in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.

A guerrilla commander must understand that the flexible employment of his forces is the most important means of changing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves and of gaining the initiative. The nature of guerrilla warfare is such that guerrilla forces must be employed flexibly in accordance with the task in hand and

with such circumstances as the state of the enemy, the terrain and the local population, and the chief ways of employing the forces are dispersal, concentration and shifting of position. In employing his forces, a guerrilla commander is like a fisherman casting his net, which he should be able to spread wide as well as draw in tight. When casting his net, the fisherman has to ascertain the depth of the water, the speed of the current and the presence or absence of obstructions; similarly, when dispersing his units, a guerrilla commander must take care not to incur losses through ignorance of the situation or through miscalculated action. Just as the fisherman must hold on to the cord in order to draw his net in tight, so the guerrilla commander must maintain liaison and communication with all his forces and keep enough of his main forces at hand. Just as a frequent change of position is necessary in fishing, so a frequent shift of position is necessary for a guerrilla unit. Dispersal, concentration and shifting of position are the three ways of flexibly employing forces in guerrilla warfare.

Generally speaking, the dispersal of guerrilla units, or "breaking up the whole into parts", is employed chiefly: (1) when we want to threaten the enemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive, and there is temporarily no chance to mass our forces for action; (2) when we want to harass and disrupt the enemy throughout an area where his forces are weak; (3) when we are unable to break through the enemy's encirclement and try to slip away by making ourselves less conspicuous; (4) when we are restricted by terrain or supplies; or (5) when we are carrying on mass work over a wide area. But whatever the circumstances, when dispersing for action we should pay attention to the following: (1) we should never make an absolutely even dispersal of forces, but should keep a fairly large part in an area convenient for manoeuvre, so that any possible exigency can be met and there is a centre of gravity for the task being carried out in dispersion; and (2) we should assign to the dispersed units clearly defined tasks, fields of operation, time limits for actions, places for reassembly and ways and means of liaison.

Concentration of forces, or "assembling the parts into a whole", is the method applied usually to destroy an enemy when he is on the offensive and sometimes to destroy some of his stationary forces when he is on the defensive. Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing of the main forces for use in one important direction while retaining or dispatching part of the forces

for use in other directions to contain, harass or disrupt the enemy, or to carry on mass work.

Although the flexible dispersal or concentration of forces according to circumstances is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how to shift (or transfer) our forces flexibly. When the enemy feels seriously threatened by guerrillas, he will send troops to attack or suppress them. Hence the guerrilla units will have to take stock of the situation. If advisable, they should fight where they are; if not, they should lose no time in shifting elsewhere. Sometimes, in order to crush the enemy units one by one, guerrilla units which have destroyed an enemy force in one place may immediately shift to another so as to wipe out a second enemy force; sometimes, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, they may have to disengage quickly and fight the enemy elsewhere. If the enemy's forces in a certain place present a particularly serious threat, the guerrilla units should not linger, but should move off with lightning speed. In general, shifts of position should be made with secrecy and speed. In order to mislead, decoy and confuse the enemy, there should be constant use of stratagems, such as making a feint to the east but attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and now in the north, hit-and-run attacks, and night actions.

Flexibility in dispersal, concentration and shifts of position is a concrete expression of the initiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas rigidity and inertia inevitably lead to passivity and cause unnecessary losses. But a commander proves himself wise not just by recognition of the importance of employing his forces flexibly but by skill in dispersing, concentrating or shifting them in good time according to the specific circumstances. This wisdom in sensing changes and choosing the right moment to act is not easily acquired; it can be gained only by those who study with a receptive mind and investigate and ponder diligently. Prudent consideration of the circumstances is essential to prevent flexibility from turning into impulsive action.

Lastly, we come to planning.

Without planning, victories in guerrilla warfare are impossible. Any idea that guerrilla warfare can be conducted in haphazard fashion indicates a flippant attitude, or ignorance of guerrilla warfare. The operations in a guerrilla zone as a whole, or those of a guerrilla unit or formation, must be preceded by as thorough planning as possible, by preparation in advance for every action.

Grasping the situation, setting the tasks, disposing the forces, military and political training, securing supplies, putting the equipment in good order, making proper use of the people's help, etc. — all these are part of the work of the guerrilla commanders, which they must carefully consider and conscientiously perform and check up on. Without doing so, there can be no initiative, no flexibility, and no offensive. True, guerrilla conditions do not allow as high a degree of planning as do those of regular warfare, and it would be a mistake to attempt very thorough planning in guerrilla warfare. But it is necessary to plan as thoroughly as the objective conditions permit, for it should be understood that fighting the enemy is no joke.

The above points serve to explain the first of the strategic principles of guerrilla warfare, the principle of using initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations. It is the key problem in the strategy of guerrilla warfare. The solution of this problem provides the major guarantee of victory in guerrilla warfare so far as military command is concerned.

Although a variety of matters have been dealt with here, they all revolve around the offensive in campaigns and battles. The initiative can be decisively grasped only after victory in an offensive. Every offensive operation must be organized on our initiative and not launched under compulsion. Flexibility in the employment of forces revolves around the effort to take the offensive, and planning likewise is necessary chiefly in order to ensure success in offensive operations. Measures of tactical defence are meaningless if they are divorced from their role of giving either direct or indirect support to an offensive. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an offensive, and exterior lines refer to its scope. The offensive is the only means of destroying the enemy and is also the principal means of self-preservation, while pure defence and retreat can play only a temporary and partial role in self-preservation and are quite useless for destroying the enemy.

The principle stated above is basically the same for both regular and guerrilla war; it differs to some degree only in its form of expression. But in guerrilla war it is both important and necessary to note this difference. It is precisely this difference in form which distinguishes the operational methods of guerrilla war from those of

regular war. If we confuse the two different forms in which the principle is expressed, victory in guerrilla war will be impossible.

## CHAPTER V

### CO-ORDINATION WITH REGULAR WARFARE

The second problem of strategy in guerrilla warfare is its co-ordination with regular warfare. It is a matter of clarifying the relation between guerrilla and regular warfare on the operational level, in the light of the nature of actual guerrilla operations. An understanding of this relation is very important for effectiveness in defeating the enemy.

There are three kinds of co-ordination between guerrilla and regular warfare, co-ordination in strategy, in campaigns and in battles.

Taken as a whole, guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, which cripples the enemy, pins him down, disrupts his supply lines, inspires the regular forces and the people throughout the country, etc., is co-ordinated with regular warfare in strategy. Take the case of the guerrilla warfare in the three northeastern provinces. Of course, the question of co-ordination did not arise before the nation-wide War of Resistance, but since the war began the significance of such co-ordination has become obvious. Every enemy soldier the guerrillas kill there, every bullet they make the enemy spend, every enemy soldier they stop from advancing south of the Great Wall, can be reckoned a contribution to the total strength of the resistance. It is moreover clear that they are having a demoralizing effect on the whole enemy army and all Japan and a heartening effect on our whole army and people. Still clearer is the role in strategic co-ordination played by the guerrilla warfare along the Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Tatung-Puchow, Chengting-Taiyuan and Shanghai-Hangchow Railways. Not only are the guerrilla units performing the function of co-ordination with the regular forces in our present strategic defensive, when the enemy is on the strategic offensive; not only will they co-ordinate with the regular forces in disrupting the enemy's hold on the occupied territory, after he concludes his strategic offensive and switches to the safeguarding of his gains; they will also co-ordinate with the regular forces in driving out the enemy

forces and recovering all the lost territories, when the regular forces launch the strategic counter-offensive. The great role of guerrilla warfare in strategic co-ordination must not be overlooked. The commanders both of the guerrilla units and of the regular forces must clearly understand this role.

In addition, guerrilla warfare performs the function of co-ordination with regular warfare in campaigns. For instance, in the campaign at Hsinkou, north of Taiyuan, the guerrillas played a remarkable role in co-ordination both north and south of Yenmenkuan by wrecking the Tatung-Puchow Railway and the motor roads running through Pinghsingkuan and Yangfangkou. Or take another instance. After the enemy occupied Fenglingtu, guerrilla warfare (conducted mainly by the regular forces), which was already widespread throughout Shansi Province, played an even greater role through co-ordination with the defensive campaigns west of the Yellow River in Shensi Province and south of the Yellow River in Honan Province. Again, when the enemy attacked southern Shantung, the guerrilla warfare in the five provinces of northern China contributed a great deal through co-ordination with the campaigns of our army. In performing a task of this sort, the leaders of each guerrilla base behind the enemy lines, or the commanders of a guerrilla formation temporarily dispatched there, must dispose their forces well and, by adopting different tactics suited to the time and place, move energetically against the enemy's most vital and vulnerable spots in order to cripple him, pin him down, disrupt his supply lines, inspire our armies campaigning on the interior lines, and so fulfil their duty of co-ordinating with the campaign. If each guerrilla zone or unit goes it alone without giving any attention to co-ordinating with the campaigns of the regular forces, its role in strategic co-ordination will lose a great deal of its significance, although it will still play some such role in the general strategy. All guerrilla commanders should give this point serious attention. To achieve co-ordination in campaigns, it is absolutely necessary for all larger guerrilla units and guerrilla formations to have radio equipment.

Finally, co-ordination with the regular forces in battles, in actual fighting on the battlefield, is the task of all guerrilla units in the vicinity of an interior-line battlefield. Of course, this applies only to guerrilla units operating close to the regular forces or to units of regulars dispatched on temporary guerrilla missions. In such cases, a guerrilla unit has to perform whatever task it is assigned by the

commander of the regular forces, which is usually to pin down some of the enemy's forces, disrupt his supply lines, conduct reconnaissance, or act as guides for the regular forces. Even without such an assignment, the guerrilla unit should carry out these tasks on its own initiative. To sit by idly, neither moving nor fighting, or to move about without fighting would be an intolerable attitude for a guerrilla unit.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS

The third problem of strategy in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is the establishment of base areas, which is important and essential because of the protracted nature and ruthlessness of the war. Since the recovery of our lost territories will have to await the nation-wide strategic counter-offensive, the enemy's front will by then have extended deep into central China and cut it in two from north to south, and a part or even a greater part of our territory will have fallen into the hands of the enemy and become his rear. We shall have to extend guerrilla warfare all over this vast enemy-occupied area, make a front out of the enemy's rear, and force him to fight ceaselessly throughout the territory he occupies. Until such time as our strategic counter-offensive is launched and our lost territories are recovered, it will be necessary to persist in guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, certainly for a fairly long time, though one cannot say definitely for how long. This is why the war will be a protracted one. And in order to safeguard his gains in the occupied areas, the enemy is bound to step up his anti-guerrilla measures and, especially after the halting of his strategic offensive, to embark on relentless suppression of the guerrillas. With ruthlessness added to protractedness, it will be impossible to sustain guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines without base areas.

What, then, are these base areas? They are the strategic bases on which the guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the aim of the war. It is a characteristic of

guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines that it is fought without a rear, for the guerrilla forces are severed from the country's general rear. But guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas. The base areas, indeed, are its rear.

History knows many peasant wars of the roving rebel type, but none of them ever succeeded. In the present age of advanced communications and technology, it would be all the more groundless to imagine one can win victory by fighting in the manner of the roving rebels. However, this roving rebel idea still exists among impoverished peasants, and in the minds of guerrilla commanders it becomes the view that base areas are neither necessary nor important. Therefore, ridding the minds of guerrilla commanders of this idea is a prerequisite for deciding on a policy of establishing base areas. The question of whether or not to have base areas and of whether or not to regard them as important, in other words, the conflict between the idea of establishing base areas and that of fighting like roving rebels, arises in all guerrilla warfare, and, to a certain extent, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is no exception. Therefore the struggle against the roving rebel ideology is an inevitable process. Only when this ideology is thoroughly overcome and the policy of establishing base areas is initiated and applied will there be conditions favourable for the maintenance of guerrilla warfare over a long period.

Now that the necessity and importance of base areas have been made clear, let us pass on to the following problems which must be understood and solved when it comes to establishing the base areas. These problems are the types of base areas, the guerrilla zones and the base areas, the conditions for establishing base areas, the consolidation and expansion of base areas, and the forms in which we and the enemy encircle one another.

## 1. THE TYPES OF BASE AREAS

Base areas in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare are mainly of three types, those in the mountains, those on the plains and those in the river-lake-estuary regions.

The advantage of setting up base areas in mountainous regions is obvious, and those which have been, are being or will be established in the Changpai,<sup>1</sup> Wutai,<sup>2</sup> Taihang,<sup>3</sup> Taishan,<sup>4</sup> Yenshan<sup>5</sup> and Maoshan<sup>6</sup> Mountains all belong to this type. They are all places where

anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare can be maintained for the longest time and are important strongholds for the War of Resistance. We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up base areas in all the mountainous regions behind the enemy lines.

Of course, the plains are less suitable than the mountains, but it is by no means impossible to develop guerrilla warfare or establish base areas of a sort there. The widespread guerrilla warfare in the plains of Hopei and of northern and northwestern Shantung proves that it is possible to develop guerrilla warfare in the plains. While there is as yet no evidence on the possibility of setting up base areas there and maintaining them for long, it has been proved that the setting up of temporary base areas is possible, and it should be possible to set up base areas for small units or for seasonal use. On the one hand, the enemy does not have enough troops at his disposal and is pursuing a policy of unparalleled brutality, and on the other hand, China has a vast territory and vast numbers of people who are resisting Japan; the objective conditions for spreading guerrilla warfare and setting up temporary base areas in the plains are therefore fulfilled. Given competent military command, it should of course be possible to establish bases for small guerrilla units there, bases which are long-term but not fixed.<sup>7</sup> Broadly speaking, when the strategic offensive of the enemy is brought to a halt and he enters the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas, he will undoubtedly launch savage attacks on all the guerrilla base areas, and those in the plains will naturally be the first to bear the brunt. The large guerrilla formations operating on the plains will be unable to keep on fighting there for long and will gradually have to move up into the mountains as the circumstances require, as for instance, from the Hopei Plain to the Wutai and Taihang Mountains, or from the Shantung Plain to Mount Taishan and the Eastern Shantung Peninsula. But in the circumstances of our national war it is not impossible for numerous small guerrilla units to keep going in various counties over the vast plains and adopt a fluid way of fighting, *i.e.*, by shifting their bases from place to place. It is definitely possible to conduct seasonal guerrilla warfare by taking advantage of the "green curtain" of tall crops in summer and of the frozen rivers in winter. As the enemy has no strength to spare at present and will never be able to attend to everything even when he has the strength, it is absolutely necessary for us to decide on the policy, for the present, of spreading guerrilla warfare far and wide and setting up temporary base areas in the

plains and, for the future, of preparing to keep up guerrilla warfare by small units, if only seasonally, and of creating base areas which are not fixed.

Objectively speaking, the possibilities of developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base areas are greater in the river-lake-estuary regions than in the plains, though less than in the mountains. The dramatic battles fought by "pirates" and "water-bandits", of which our history is full, and the guerrilla warfare round the Hunghu Lake kept up for several years in the Red Army period, both testify to the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and of establishing base areas in the river-lake-estuary regions. So far, however, the political parties and the masses who are resisting Japan have given this possibility little attention. Though the subjective conditions are as yet lacking, we should undoubtedly turn our attention to this possibility and start working on it. As one aspect in the development of our nation-wide guerrilla warfare, we should effectively organize guerrilla warfare in the Hungtse lake region north of the Yangtse River, in the Taihu lake region south of the Yangtse, and in all river-lake-estuary regions in the enemy-occupied areas along the Yangtse and on the sea coast, and we should create permanent base areas in and near such places. By overlooking this aspect we are virtually providing the enemy with water transport facilities; this is a gap in our strategic plan for the War of Resistance, which must be filled in good time.

## 2. GUERRILLA ZONES AND BASE AREAS

In guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, there is a difference between guerrilla zones and base areas. Areas which are surrounded by the enemy but whose central parts are not occupied or have been recovered, like some counties in the Wutai mountain region (*i.e.*, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area) and also some places in the Taihang and Taishan mountain regions, are ready-made bases for the convenient use of guerrilla units in developing guerrilla warfare. But elsewhere in these areas the situation is different, as for instance in the eastern and northern sections of the Wutai mountain region, which include parts of western Hopei and southern Chahar, and in many places east of Paoting and west of Tsangchow. When guerrilla warfare began, the guerrillas could not completely occupy these places

but could only make frequent raids; they are areas which are held by the guerrillas when they are there and by the puppet regime when they are gone, and are therefore not yet guerrilla bases but only what may be called guerrilla zones. Such guerrilla zones will be transformed into base areas when they have gone through the necessary processes of guerrilla warfare, that is, when large numbers of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated there, the puppet regime has been destroyed, the masses have been roused to activity, anti-Japanese mass organizations have been formed, people's local armed forces have been developed, and anti-Japanese political power has been established. By the expansion of our base areas we mean the addition of areas such as these to the bases already established.

In some places, for example, eastern Hopei, the whole area of guerrilla operations has been a guerrilla zone from the very beginning. The puppet regime is of long standing there, and from the beginning the whole area of operations has been a guerrilla zone for the people's armed forces that have grown out of local uprisings and for the guerrilla detachments dispatched from the Wutai Mountains. At the outset of their activities, all they could do was to choose some fairly good spots there as temporary rear or base areas. Such places will not be transformed from guerrilla zones into relatively stable base areas until the enemy forces are destroyed and the work of arousing the people is in full swing.

Thus the transformation of a guerrilla zone into a base area is an arduous creative process, and its accomplishment depends on the extent to which the enemy is destroyed and the masses are aroused.

Many regions will remain guerrilla zones for a long time. In these regions the enemy will not be able to set up stable puppet regimes, however much he tries to maintain control, while we, on our part, will not be able to achieve the aim of establishing anti-Japanese political power, however much we develop guerrilla warfare. Examples of this kind are to be found in the enemy-occupied regions along the railway lines, in the neighbourhood of big cities and in certain areas in the plains.

As for the big cities, the railway stops and the areas in the plains which are strongly garrisoned by the enemy, guerrilla warfare can only extend to the fringes and not right into these places which have relatively stable puppet regimes. This is another kind of situation.

Mistakes in our leadership or strong enemy pressure may cause a reversal of the state of affairs described above, *i.e.*, a guerrilla base

may turn into a guerrilla zone, and a guerrilla zone may turn into an area under relatively stable enemy occupation. Such changes are possible, and they deserve special vigilance on the part of guerrilla commanders.

Therefore, as a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between us and the enemy, the entire enemy-occupied territory will fall into the following three categories: first, anti-Japanese bases held by our guerrilla units and our organs of political power; second, areas held by Japanese imperialism and its puppet regimes; and third, intermediate zones contested by both sides, namely, guerrilla zones. Guerrilla commanders have the duty to expand the first and third categories to the maximum and to reduce the second category to the minimum. This is the strategic task of guerrilla warfare.

### 3. CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING BASE AREAS

The fundamental conditions for establishing a base area are that there should be anti-Japanese armed forces, that these armed forces should be employed to inflict defeats on the enemy and that they should arouse the people to action. Thus the establishment of a base area is first and foremost a matter of building an armed force. Leaders in guerrilla war must devote their energy to building one or more guerrilla units, and must gradually develop them in the course of struggle into guerrilla formations or even into regular units and formations. The building up of an armed force is the key to establishing a base area; if there is no armed force or if the armed force is weak, nothing can be done. This constitutes the first condition.

The second indispensable condition for establishing a base area is that the armed forces should be used in co-ordination with the people to defeat the enemy. All places under enemy control are enemy, and not guerrilla, base areas, and obviously cannot be transformed into guerrilla base areas unless the enemy is defeated. Unless we repulse the enemy's attacks and defeat him, even places held by the guerrillas will come under enemy control, and then it will be impossible to establish base areas.

The third indispensable condition for establishing a base area is the use of all our strength, including our armed forces, to arouse the masses for struggle against Japan. In the course of this struggle we must arm the people, *i.e.*, organize self-defence corps and guerrilla

units. In the course of this struggle, we must form mass organizations, we must organize the workers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and professional people — according to the degree of their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm — into the various mass organizations necessary for the struggle against Japan, and we must gradually expand these organizations. Without organization, the people cannot give effect to their anti-Japanese strength. In the course of this struggle, we must weed out both the open and the hidden traitors, a task which can be accomplished only by relying on the strength of the people. In this struggle, it is particularly important to arouse the people to establish, or to consolidate, their local organs of anti-Japanese political power. Where the original Chinese organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy, we must reorganize and strengthen them with the support of the broad masses, and where they have been destroyed by the enemy, we should rebuild them with the efforts of the masses. They are organs of political power for carrying out the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and should unite all the forces of the people to fight against our sole enemy, Japanese imperialism, and its jackals, the traitors and reactionaries.

A base area for guerrilla war can be truly established only with the gradual fulfilment of the three basic conditions, *i.e.*, only after the anti-Japanese armed forces are built up, the enemy has suffered defeats and the people are aroused.

Mention must also be made of geographical and economic conditions. As for the geographical conditions, we have already discussed three different categories in the earlier section on the types of base areas, and here we need only mention one major requirement, namely, that the area must be extensive. In places surrounded by the enemy on all sides, or on three sides, the mountainous regions naturally offer the best conditions for setting up base areas which can hold out for a long time, but the main thing is that there must be enough room for the guerrillas to manoeuvre, namely, that the area must be extensive. Given an extensive area, guerrilla warfare can be developed and sustained even in the plains, not to mention the river-lake-estuary regions. By and large, the vastness of China's territory and the enemy's shortage of troops provide guerrilla warfare in China with this condition. This is an important, even a primary condition, as far as the possibility of waging guerrilla warfare is concerned, and small countries like Belgium which lack this condition have little or no such possibility.

In China, this condition is not something which has to be striven for, nor does it present a problem; it is there, waiting only to be exploited.<sup>8</sup>

So far as their physical setting is concerned, the economic conditions resemble the geographical conditions. For now we are discussing the establishment of base areas not in a desert, where no enemy is to be found, but behind the enemy lines; every place the enemy can penetrate already has its Chinese inhabitants and an economic basis for subsistence, so that the question of choice of economic conditions in establishing base areas simply does not arise. Irrespective of the economic conditions, we should do our utmost to develop guerrilla warfare and set up permanent or temporary base areas in all places where Chinese inhabitants and enemy forces are to be found. In a political sense, however, the economic conditions do present a problem, a problem of economic policy which is of vital importance to the establishment of the base areas. The economic policy of the guerrilla base areas must follow the principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front by equitably distributing the financial burden and protecting commerce. Neither the local organs of political power nor the guerrilla units must violate these principles, or otherwise the establishment of base areas and the maintenance of guerrilla warfare would be adversely affected. The equitable distribution of the financial burden means that "those with money should contribute money", while the peasants should supply the guerrilla units with grain within certain limits. The protection of commerce means that the guerrilla units should be highly disciplined and that the confiscation of shops, except those owned by proved traitors, should be strictly prohibited. This is no easy matter, but the policy is set and must be put into effect.

#### 4. THE CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF BASE AREAS

In order to confine the enemy invaders to a few strongholds, that is, to the big cities and along the main communication lines, the guerrillas must do all they can to extend guerrilla warfare from their base areas as widely as possible and hem in all the enemy's strongholds, thus threatening his existence and shaking his morale while expanding the base areas. This is essential. In this context, we must oppose conservatism in guerrilla warfare. Whether originating in the desire for an easy life or in overestimation of the enemy's strength, con-

servatism can only bring losses in the War of Resistance and is harmful to guerrilla warfare and to the base areas themselves. At the same time, we must not forget the consolidation of the base areas, the chief task being to arouse and organize the masses and to train guerrilla units and local armed forces. Such consolidation is needed for maintaining protracted warfare and also for expansion, and in its absence energetic expansion is impossible. If we attend only to expansion and forget about consolidation in our guerrilla warfare, we shall be unable to withstand the enemy's attacks, and consequently not only forfeit the possibility of expansion but also endanger the very existence of the base areas. The correct principle is expansion with consolidation, which is a good method and allows us to take the offensive or the defensive as we choose. Given a protracted war, the problem of consolidating and expanding base areas constantly arises for every guerrilla unit. The concrete solution depends, of course, on the circumstances. At one time, the emphasis may be on expansion, *i.e.*, on expanding the guerrilla zones and increasing the number of guerrillas. At another, the emphasis may be on consolidation, *i.e.*, on organizing the masses and training the troops. As expansion and consolidation differ in nature, and as the military dispositions and other tasks will differ accordingly, an effective solution of the problem is possible only if we alternate the emphasis according to time and circumstances.

##### 5. FORMS IN WHICH WE AND THE ENEMY ENCIRCLE ONE ANOTHER

Taking the War of Resistance as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy because he is on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement. We on our part encircle each of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, because we apply the policy of the offensive and of exterior-line operations in campaigns and battles by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from exterior lines. This is the first form of our encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountain

region, or on three sides, like the northwestern Shansi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement. However, if one considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation to the battle fronts of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Tatung-Puchow Railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hopei and Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of our encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own — rather like a game of *weichi*.<sup>9</sup> Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It is in the matter of "dominating the spaces" that the great strategic role of guerrilla base areas in the rear of the enemy is revealed. We are raising this question in the War of Resistance in order that the nation's military authorities and the guerrilla commanders in all areas should place on the agenda the development of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and the establishment of base areas wherever possible, and carry this out as a strategic task. If on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, and the Soviet Union and other countries which may join it as other strategic units, we shall then have one more form of encirclement against the enemy than he has against us and bring about exterior-line operations in the Pacific region by which to encircle and destroy fascist Japan. To be sure, this is of little practical significance at present, but such a prospect is not impossible.

#### CHAPTER VII

### THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE AND THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WAR

The fourth problem of strategy in guerrilla war concerns the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive. This is the problem of how the policy of offensive warfare, which we mentioned in our

discussion of the first problem, is to be carried out in practice, whether we are on the defensive or the offensive in our guerrilla warfare against Japan.

Within the nation-wide strategic defensive or strategic offensive (to be more exact, the strategic counter-offensive), small-scale strategic defensives and offensives take place in and around each guerrilla base area. By strategic defensive we mean the strategic situation and policy prevailing when the enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive; by strategic offensive we mean the strategic situation and policy prevailing when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive.

### 1. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WAR

After guerrilla warfare has broken out and grown to a considerable extent, the enemy will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas, especially in the period when his strategic offensive against the country as a whole is brought to an end and he adopts the policy of safeguarding his occupied areas. It is essential to recognize the inevitability of such attacks, for otherwise the guerrilla commanders will be caught wholly unprepared, and in the face of heavy enemy attacks they will undoubtedly become alarmed and confused and their forces will be routed.

To wipe out the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy frequently resorts to converging attacks. For instance, in each of the four or five "punitive expeditions" directed against the Wutai mountain region, the enemy made a planned advance in three, four or even six or seven columns simultaneously. The larger the scale of the guerrilla fighting, the more important the position of the base areas and the greater the threat to the enemy's strategic centres and vital communication lines, the fiercer will be the enemy's attacks. Therefore, the fiercer the enemy's attacks on a guerrilla area, the greater the indication that the guerrilla warfare there is successful and is being effectively coordinated with the regular fighting.

When the enemy launches a converging attack in several columns, the guerrilla policy should be to smash it by counter-attack. It can be easily smashed if each advancing enemy column consists of only one unit, whether big or small, has no follow-up units and is unable to station troops along the route of advance, construct blockhouses or build motor roads. When the enemy launches a converging attack,

he is on the offensive and operating on exterior lines, while we are on the defensive and operating on interior lines. As for our dispositions, we should use our secondary forces to pin down several enemy columns, while our main force should launch surprise attacks (chiefly in the form of ambushes) in a campaign or battle against a single enemy column, striking it when it is on the move. The enemy, though strong, will be weakened by repeated surprise attacks and will often withdraw when he is halfway; the guerrilla units can then make more surprise attacks during the pursuit and weaken him still further. The enemy generally occupies the county towns or other towns in our base areas before he stops his offensive or begins to withdraw, and we should encircle these towns, cutting off his grain supply and severing his communications, so that when he cannot hold out and begins to retreat, we can seize the opportunity to pursue and attack him. After smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, and, by smashing them one by one, shatter the converging attack.

A big base area like the Wutai mountain region forms a military area, which is divided into four or five, or even more, military sub-areas, each with its own armed forces operating independently. By employing the tactics described above, these forces have often smashed the enemy's attacks simultaneously or successively.

In our plan of operations against a converging attack by the enemy, we generally place our main force on interior lines. But when we have the strength to spare, we should use our secondary forces (such as the county or rural district guerrilla units, or even detachments of the main force) on exterior lines to disrupt the enemy's communications and pin down his reinforcements. Should the enemy stay put in our base area, we may reverse the tactics, namely, leave some of our forces in the base area to invest the enemy while employing the main force to attack the region whence he has come and to step up our activities there, in order to induce him to withdraw and attack our main force; this is the tactic of "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei".<sup>10</sup>

In the course of operations against a converging attack, the local anti-Japanese self-defence corps and all the mass organizations should mobilize for action and in every way help our troops to fight the enemy. In fighting the enemy, it is important both to enforce local martial law and, as far as possible, to "strengthen our defence works and clear the fields". The purpose of the former is to suppress traitors and prevent the enemy from getting information, and of the latter

to assist our own operations (by strengthening our defence works) and prevent the enemy from getting food (by clearing the fields). "Clearing the fields" means harvesting the crops as soon as they are ripe.

When the enemy retreats, he often burns down the houses in the cities and towns he has occupied and the villages along his route, with the purpose of destroying the guerrilla base areas; but in so doing he deprives himself of shelter and food in his next offensive, and the damage recoils upon his own head. This is a concrete illustration of what we mean by one and the same thing having two contradictory aspects.

A guerrilla commander should not think of abandoning his base area and shifting to another, unless it proves impossible, after repeated operations, to smash the enemy's heavy converging attacks. In these circumstances he must guard against pessimism. So long as the leaders do not blunder in matters of principle, it is generally possible to smash the converging attacks and hold on to the base areas in the mountainous regions. It is only in the plains that, when confronted by a heavy converging attack, the guerrilla commander should consider other measures in the light of the specific circumstances, namely, leaving numerous small units for scattered operations, while temporarily shifting large guerrilla formations to some mountainous region, so that they can return and resume their activities in the plains once the main forces of the enemy move away.

Generally speaking, the Japanese cannot adopt the principle of blockhouse warfare, which the Kuomintang employed in the days of the civil war, because their forces are inadequate in relation to China's vast territory. However, we should reckon with the possibility that they may use it to some extent against those guerrilla base areas which pose a particular threat to their vital positions, but even in such circumstances we should be prepared to keep up guerrilla warfare in those areas. Since we have had the experience of being able to maintain guerrilla warfare during the civil war, there is not the slightest doubt of our greater capacity to do so in a national war. Though, in point of relative military strength, the enemy can throw forces that are vastly superior in quantity as well as in quality against some of our base areas, there remain the insoluble national contradiction between us and the enemy and the unavoidable weaknesses of his command. Our victories are based on thorough work among the masses and flexible tactics in our operations.

## 2. THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WAR

After we have smashed an enemy offensive and before the enemy starts a new offensive, he is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic offensive.

At such times our operational policy is not to attack enemy forces which are entrenched in defensive positions and which we are not sure of defeating, but systematically to destroy or drive out the small enemy units and puppet forces in certain areas, which our guerrilla units are strong enough to deal with, and to expand our areas, arouse the masses for struggle against Japan, replenish and train our troops and organize new guerrilla units. If the enemy still remains on the defensive when these tasks are under way, we can expand our new areas still further and attack weakly garrisoned cities and communication lines and hold them for as long as circumstances permit. These are all tasks of the strategic offensive, and the purpose is to take advantage of the fact that the enemy is on the defensive so that we may effectively build up our own military and mass strength, effectively reduce the enemy's strength and prepare to smash the enemy methodically and vigorously when he mounts an offensive again.

It is essential to rest and train our troops, and the best time for doing so is when the enemy is on the defensive. It is not a question of shutting ourselves off from everything else for rest and training, but of finding time for rest and training while expanding our areas, mopping up small enemy units and arousing the people. This is usually also the time for tackling the difficult problem of getting food supplies, bedding, clothing, etc.

It is also the time for destroying the enemy's communication lines on a large scale, hampering his transport and giving direct support to the regular forces in their campaigns.

At such times the guerrilla base areas, guerrilla zones and guerrilla units are in high spirits, and the areas devastated by the enemy are gradually rehabilitated and revived. The people in the enemy-occupied territories are also delighted, and the fame of the guerrillas resounds everywhere. In the camp of the enemy and his running dogs, the traitors, on the other hand, panic and disintegration are mounting, while there is growing hatred of the guerrillas and their base areas and preparations to deal with them are intensified. During the strategic offensive, therefore, it is impermissible for the guerrilla commanders

to become so elated as to underrate the enemy and forget to strengthen unity in their own ranks and to consolidate their base areas and their forces. At such times, they must skilfully watch the enemy's every move for signs of any new offensive against us, so that the moment it comes they can wind up their strategic offensive in good order, turn to the strategic defensive and thereby smash the enemy's offensive.

### CHAPTER VIII

## DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA WAR INTO MOBILE WAR

The fifth problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan is its development into mobile war, a development which is possible and necessary because the war is protracted and ruthless. If China could speedily defeat the Japanese invaders and recover her lost territories, and if the war were neither protracted nor ruthless, this would not be necessary. But as, on the contrary, the war is protracted and ruthless, guerrilla warfare cannot adapt itself to such a war except by developing into mobile warfare. Since the war is protracted and ruthless, it is possible for the guerrilla units to undergo the necessary steeling and gradually to transform themselves into regular forces, so that their mode of operations is gradually regularized and guerrilla warfare develops into mobile warfare. The possibility and necessity of this development must be clearly recognized by the guerrilla commanders if they are to persist in, and systematically carry out, the policy of turning guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare.

In many places, such as the Wutai mountain region, the present guerrilla warfare owes its growth to the strong detachments sent there by the regular forces. The operations there, though generally of a guerrilla character, have contained an element of mobile warfare from the very beginning. This element will gradually increase as the war goes on. Herein lies the advantage which makes possible the swift expansion of the present anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and its rapid development to a higher level; thus the conditions for guerrilla warfare are far superior to what they were in the three northeastern provinces.

To transform guerrilla units waging guerrilla warfare into regular forces waging mobile warfare, two conditions are necessary — an in-

crease in numbers, and an improvement in quality. Apart from directly mobilizing the people to join the forces, increased numbers can be attained by amalgamating small units, while better quality depends on steeling the fighters and improving their weapons in the course of the war.

In amalgamating small units, we must guard against localism, whereby attention is concentrated exclusively on local interests and centralization is impeded, and at the same time against the purely military approach, whereby local interests are brushed aside.

Localism exists among the local guerrilla units and local governments, which are frequently preoccupied with local considerations to the neglect of the general interest, or which prefer to act each on its own, because they are unaccustomed to acting in larger groups. The commanders of the main guerrilla units or of the guerrilla formations must take this into account and adopt the method of gradual amalgamation of part of the local units, allowing the localities to keep some of their forces and expand their guerrilla warfare; the commanders should draw these units into joint operations and then bring about their amalgamation without breaking up their original organization or reshuffling their cadres, so that the small groups may integrate smoothly into the larger group.

As against localism, the purely military approach represents the wrong viewpoint held in the main forces by those who are bent on expanding their own forces and who neglect to assist the local armed units. They do not realize that the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare means not the abandonment of guerrilla warfare, but the gradual formation, in the midst of widespread guerrilla warfare, of a main force capable of conducting mobile warfare, a force around which there must still be numerous guerrilla units carrying on extensive guerrilla operations. These guerrilla units are powerful auxiliaries to the main force and serve as inexhaustible reserves for its continuous growth. Therefore, if a commander of a main force has made the mistake of neglecting the interests of the local population and the local government as a result of a purely military approach, he must correct it in order that the expansion of the main force and the multiplication of the local armed units may both receive due attention.

To raise the quality of the guerrilla units it is imperative to raise their political and organizational level and improve their equipment, military technique, tactics and discipline, so that they gradually pattern

themselves on the regular army and shed their guerrilla ways. Politically, it is imperative to get both the commanders and the fighters to realize the necessity of raising the guerrilla units to the level of the regular forces, to encourage them to strive towards this end, and to guarantee its attainment by means of political work. Organizationally, it is imperative gradually to fulfil all the requirements of a regular formation in the following respects — military and political organs, staff and working methods, a regular supply system, a medical service, etc. In the matter of equipment, it is imperative to acquire better and more varied weapons and increase the supply of the necessary communications equipment. In the matter of military technique and tactics, it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to the level required of a regular formation. In the matter of discipline, it is imperative to raise the level so that uniform standards are observed, every order is executed without fail and all slackness is eliminated. To accomplish all these tasks requires a prolonged effort, and it cannot be done overnight; but that is the direction in which we must develop. Only thus can a main force be built up in each base area and mobile warfare emerge for more effective attacks on the enemy. Where detachments or cadres have been sent in by the regular forces, the goal can be achieved more easily. Hence all the regular forces have the responsibility of helping the guerrilla units to develop into regular units.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMMAND

The last problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan concerns the relationship of command. A correct solution of this problem is one of the prerequisites for the unhampered development of guerrilla warfare.

Since guerrilla units are a lower level of armed organization characterized by dispersed operations, the methods of command in guerrilla warfare do not allow as high a degree of centralization as in regular warfare. If any attempt is made to apply the methods of command in regular warfare to guerrilla warfare, its great flexibility will inevitably be restricted and its vitality sapped. A highly centralized

command is in direct contradiction to the great flexibility of guerrilla warfare and must not and cannot be applied to it.

However, guerrilla warfare cannot be successfully developed without some centralized command. When extensive regular warfare and extensive guerrilla warfare are going on at the same time, their operations must be properly co-ordinated; hence the need for a command co-ordinating the two, *i.e.*, for a unified strategic command by the national general staff and the war zone commanders. In a guerrilla zone or guerrilla base area with many guerrilla units, there are usually one or more guerrilla formations (sometimes together with regular formations) which constitute the main force, a number of other guerrilla units, big and small, which represent the supplementary force, and many armed units composed of people not withdrawn from production; the enemy forces there usually form a unified complex to concert their operations against the guerrillas. Consequently, the problem arises of setting up a unified or centralized command in such guerrilla zones or base areas.

Hence, as opposed both to absolute centralization and to absolute decentralization, the principle of command in guerrilla war should be centralized strategic command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles.

Centralized strategic command includes the planning and direction of guerrilla warfare as a whole by the state, the co-ordination of guerrilla warfare with regular warfare in each war zone, and the unified direction of all the anti-Japanese armed forces in each guerrilla zone or base area. Here lack of harmony, unity and centralization is harmful, and every effort must be made to ensure harmony, unity and centralization. In general matters, that is, matters of strategy, the lower levels should report to the higher and follow their instructions so as to ensure concerted action. Centralization, however, stops at this point, and it would likewise be harmful to go beyond it and interfere with the lower levels in matters of detail like the specific dispositions for a campaign or battle. For such details must be settled in the light of specific conditions, which change from time to time and from place to place and are quite beyond the knowledge of the distant higher levels of command. This is what is meant by the principle of decentralized command in campaigns and battles. The same principle generally applies in regular operations, especially when communications are inadequate. In a word, it means guerrilla warfare waged independently within the framework of a unified strategy.

Where a guerrilla base area constitutes a military area divided into sub-areas, each comprising several counties, each of which is again divided into districts, the relationship between the various levels, from the headquarters of the military area and sub-areas down to the county and district governments, is one of consecutive subordination, and every armed force must, according to its nature, be under the direct command of one of these. On the principle that has been enunciated, in the relationship of command at these levels matters of general policy should be centralized in the higher levels, while actual operations should be carried out in the light of the specific circumstances by the lower levels, which should have the right of independent action. If a higher level has something to say about the actual operations undertaken at a lower level, it can and should advance its views as "guidance" and must not issue hard and fast "orders". The more extensive the area, the more complex the situation and the greater the distance between the higher and the lower levels, the more advisable it becomes to allow greater independence to the lower levels in their actual operations and thus give those operations a character conforming more closely to the local requirements, so that the lower levels and the local personnel may develop the ability to work independently, cope with complicated situations, and successfully expand guerrilla warfare. As for an armed unit or bigger formation which is engaged in a concentrated operation, the principle to be applied is one of centralization in its internal relationship of command, for the situation is clear to the higher command; but the moment this unit or formation breaks up for dispersed action, the principle of centralization in general matters and of decentralization in details should be applied, for then the specific situation cannot be clear to the higher command.

Absence of centralization where it is needed means negligence by the higher levels or usurpation of authority by the lower levels, neither of which can be tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the military sphere. If decentralization is not effected where it should be, that means monopolization of power by the higher levels and lack of initiative on the part of the lower levels, neither of which can be tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the command of guerrilla warfare. The above principles constitute the only correct policy for solving the problem of the relationship of command.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Changpai mountain range is situated on the northeastern border of China. After the Japanese invasion on September 18, 1931, the region became a base area for the anti-Japanese guerrillas led by the Chinese Communist Party.

<sup>2</sup> The Wutai mountain range is situated on the borders between Shansi, Hopei, and what was then Chahar Province. In October 1937 the Eighth Route Army led by the Chinese Communist Party started building the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Anti-Japanese Base Area with the Wutai mountain region as its centre.

<sup>3</sup> The Taihang mountain range is situated on the borders between Shansi, Hopei and Honan Provinces. In November 1937 the Eighth Route Army started building the Southeastern Shansi Anti-Japanese Base Area with the Taihang mountain region as its centre.

<sup>4</sup> Taishan is one of the chief peaks of the Taiyi mountain range in central Shantung. In the winter of 1937 the guerrilla forces led by the Chinese Communist Party started building the Central Shantung Anti-Japanese Base Area with the Taiyi mountain region as its centre.

<sup>5</sup> The Yenshan mountain range is situated on the border of Hopei and what was then Jehol Province. In the summer of 1938 the Eighth Route Army started building the Eastern Hopei Anti-Japanese Base Area with the Yenshan mountain region as its centre.

<sup>6</sup> The Maoshan Mountains are in southern Kiangsu. In June 1938 the New Fourth Army led by the Chinese Communist Party started building the Southern Kiangsu Anti-Japanese Base Area with the Maoshan mountain region as its centre.


<sup>7</sup> Experience gained in the War of Resistance proved that it was possible to establish long-term and, in many places, stable base areas in the plains. This was due to their vastness and big populations, the correctness of the Communist Party's policies, the extensive mobilization of the people and the enemy's shortage of troops. Comrade Mao Tse-tung affirmed this possibility more definitely in later directives.

<sup>8</sup> Ever since the end of World War II, the national and democratic revolutionary movement has been surging forward in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In many countries the people, led by their own revolutionary and progressive forces, have carried on sustained armed struggles to overthrow the dark rule of imperialism and reaction. This demonstrates that in the new historical circumstances — when the socialist camp, the revolutionary forces of the people in the colonial countries and the forces of the people striving for democracy and progress in all countries are taking giant strides forward, when the world capitalist system is further weakening, and when the colonial rule of imperialism is heading for disintegration — the conditions under which the people of various countries conduct guerrilla warfare today need not be quite the same as those which were necessary in the days of the guerrilla warfare waged by the Chinese people against Japan. In other words, guerrilla war can be victoriously waged in a country which is not large in territory, as for instance, in Cuba, Algeria, Laos and southern Viet Nam.

<sup>9</sup> *Weichi* is an old Chinese game, in which the two players try to encircle each other's pieces on the board. When a player's pieces are encircled, they are counted as "dead" (captured). But if there is a sufficient number of blank spaces among the encircled pieces, then those pieces are still "alive" (not captured).

---

<sup>10</sup> In 353 B.C. the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan, capital of the state of Chao. The king of the state of Chi, an ally of Chao, ordered his generals Tien Chi and Sun Pin to aid Chao with their troops. Knowing that the crack forces of Wei had entered Chao and left their own territory weakly garrisoned, General Sun Pin attacked the state of Wei whose troops withdrew to defend their own country. Taking advantage of the exhaustion of the Wei troops, the troops of Chi engaged and routed them at Kueiling (northeast of the present Hotse County in Shantung). The siege of Hantan, capital of Chao, was thus lifted. Since then Chinese strategists have referred to similar tactics as "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei".



## ON PROTRACTED WAR\*

*May 1938*

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. It will soon be July 7, the first anniversary of the great War of Resistance Against Japan. For almost a year the forces of the whole nation, rallying in unity, persevering in resistance and persevering in the united front, have been valiantly fighting the enemy. The people of the whole world are attentively following this war, which has no precedent in the history of the East, and which will go down as a great war in world history too. Every Chinese suffering from the disasters of the war and fighting for the survival of his nation daily yearns for victory. But what actually will be the course of the war? Can we win? Can we win quickly? Many people are talking about a protracted war, but why is it a protracted war? How to carry on a protracted war? Many people are talking about final victory, but why will final victory be ours? How shall we strive for final victory? Not everyone has found answers to these questions; in fact, to this day most people have not done so. Therefore the defeatist exponents of the theory of national subjugation have come forward to tell people that China will be subjugated, that final victory will not be China's. On the other hand, some impetuous friends have come forward to tell people that China will win very quickly without having to exert any great effort. But are these views correct? We have said all along they are not. However, most people have not yet grasped what we have been saying. This is partly because we did not do enough propaganda and explanatory work, and partly because the development of objective events had not yet fully and clearly revealed their inherent nature and their features to the people, who

---

\* This series of lectures was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from May 26 to June 3, 1938, at the Yen-an Association for the Study of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

were thus not in a position to foresee the over-all trend and the outcome and hence to decide on a complete set of policies and tactics. Now things are better; the experience of ten months of war has been quite sufficient to explode the utterly baseless theory of national subjugation and to dissuade our impetuous friends from their theory of quick victory. In these circumstances many people are asking for an explanation in the nature of a summing-up. All the more so with regard to protracted war, not only because of the opposing theories of national subjugation and quick victory but also because of the shallow understanding of its nature. "Our four hundred million people have been making a concerted effort since the Lukouchiao Incident, and the final victory will belong to China." This formula has a wide currency. It is a correct formula but needs to be given more content. Our perseverance in the War of Resistance and in the united front has been possible because of many factors. Internally, they comprise all the political parties in the country from the Communist Party to the Kuomintang, all the people from the workers and peasants to the bourgeoisie, and all the armed forces from the main forces to the guerrillas; internationally, they range from the land of socialism to justice-loving people in all countries; in the camp of the enemy, they range from those people in Japan who are against the war to those Japanese soldiers at the front who are against the war. In short, all these forces have contributed in varying degrees to our War of Resistance. Every man with a conscience should salute them. We Communists, together with all the other anti-Japanese political parties and the whole people, have no other course than to strive to unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese invaders. July 1 this year will be the 17th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. A serious study of the protracted war is necessary in order to enable every Communist to play a better and greater part in the War of Resistance. Therefore my lectures will be devoted to such a study. I shall try to speak on all the problems relevant to the protracted war, but I cannot possibly go into everything in one series of lectures.

2. All the experience of the ten months of war proves the error both of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation and of the theory of China's quick victory. The former gives rise to the tendency to compromise and the latter to the tendency to underestimate the enemy. Both approaches to the problem are subjective and one-sided, or, in a word, unscientific.

3. Before the War of Resistance, there was a great deal of talk about national subjugation. Some said, "China is inferior in arms and is bound to lose in a war." Others said, "If China offers armed resistance, she is sure to become another Abyssinia." Since the beginning of the war, open talk of national subjugation has disappeared, but secret talk, and quite a lot of it too, still continues. For instance, from time to time an atmosphere of compromise arises and the advocates of compromise argue that "the continuance of the war spells subjugation".<sup>1</sup> In a letter from Hunan a student has written:

In the countryside everything seems difficult. Doing propaganda work on my own, I have to talk to people when and where I find them. The people I have talked to are by no means ignoramuses; they all have some understanding of what is going on and are very interested in what I have to say. But when I run into my own relatives, they always say: "China cannot win; she is doomed." They make one sick! Fortunately, they do not go around spreading their views, otherwise things would really be bad. The peasants would naturally put more stock in what they say.

Such exponents of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation form the social basis of the tendency to compromise. They are to be found everywhere in China, and therefore the problem of compromise is liable to crop up within the anti-Japanese front at any time and will probably remain with us right until the end of the war. Now that Hsuehchow has fallen and Wuhan is in danger, it will not be unprofitable, I think, to knock the bottom out of the theory of national subjugation.

4. During these ten months of war all kinds of views which are indicative of impetuosity have also appeared. For instance, at the outset of the war many people were groundlessly optimistic, underestimating Japan and even believing that the Japanese could not get as far as to Shansi. Some belittled the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance and doubted the proposition, "With regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to each part, guerrilla warfare is primary and mobile warfare supplementary." They disagreed with the Eighth Route Army's strategy, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions", which they regarded as a "mechanical" approach.<sup>2</sup> During the battle of Shanghai some

people said: "If we can fight for just three months, the international situation is bound to change, the Soviet Union is bound to send troops, and the war will be over." They pinned their hopes for the future of the War of Resistance chiefly on foreign aid.<sup>3</sup> After the Taierhchuang victory,<sup>4</sup> some people advocated that the Hsuechow campaign should be fought as a "virtually decisive campaign" and that the policy of protracted war should be changed. They said such things as, "This campaign marks the last desperate struggle of the enemy," or, "If we win, the Japanese warlords will be demoralized and able only to await their Day of Judgement."<sup>5</sup> The victory at Pinghsingkuan turned some people's heads, and further victory at Taierhchuang has turned more people's heads. Doubts have arisen as to whether the enemy will attack Wuhan. Many people think "probably not", and many others "definitely not". Such doubts may affect all major issues. For instance, is our anti-Japanese strength already sufficient? Some people may answer affirmatively that our present strength is already sufficient to check the enemy's advance, so why increase it? Or, for instance, is the slogan "Consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front" still correct? Some people may answer negatively that the united front in its present state is already strong enough to repulse the enemy, so why consolidate and expand it? Or, for instance, should our efforts in diplomacy and international propaganda be intensified? Here again the answer may be in the negative. Or, for instance, should we proceed in earnest to reform the military and political systems, develop the mass movement, enforce education for national defence, suppress traitors and Trotskyites, develop war industries and improve the people's livelihood? Or, for instance, are the slogans calling for the defence of Wuhan, of Canton and of the Northwest and for the vigorous development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear still correct? The answers might all be in the negative. There are even some people who, the moment a slightly favourable turn occurs in the war situation, are prepared to intensify the friction between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, diverting attention from external to internal matters. This almost invariably occurs whenever a comparatively big battle is won or the enemy's advance comes to a temporary halt. All the above can be termed political and military short-sightedness. Such talk, however plausible, is actually specious and groundless. To sweep away such verbiage should help the victorious prosecution of the War of Resistance.

5. The question now is: Will China be subjugated? The answer is, No, she will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly? The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly, and the War of Resistance will be a protracted war.

6. As early as two years ago, we broadly indicated the main arguments on these questions. On July 16, 1936, five months before the Sian Incident and twelve months before the Lukouchiao Incident, in a talk with the American correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, I made a general estimate of the situation with regard to war between China and Japan and advanced various principles for winning victory. The following excerpts may serve as a reminder:<sup>6</sup>

*Question:* Under what conditions do you think the Chinese people can defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan?

*Answer:* Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the achievement of the National United Front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a World Anti-Japanese United Front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement among the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. Of these, the central necessity is the union of the Chinese people themselves.

*Question:* How long do you think such a war would last?

*Answer:* That depends on the strength of the Chinese People's Front, many conditioning factors in China and Japan, and the degree of international help given to China, as well as the rate of revolutionary development in Japan. If the Chinese People's Front is powerfully developed, if it is effectively organized horizontally and vertically, if the international aid to China is considerable from those governments and peoples which recognize the menace of Japanese imperialism to their own interests, if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will be short and victory speedily won. If these conditions are not realized, however, the war will be very long, but in the end, just the same, Japan will be defeated, China will certainly win, only the sacrifices will be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world.

*Question:* What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily?

*Answer:* Now, the Japanese continental policy is already fixed and it is well known. Those who imagine that by further sacrifices of Chinese sovereignty, by making economic, political or territorial compromises and concessions, they can halt the

advance of Japan, are only indulging in Utopian fancy. But we know well enough that the Lower Yangtse Valley and our southern seaports are already included in the Japanese continental programme. Moreover, it is just as clear that the Japanese aspire to seize the Philippines, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. In the event of war, Japan will try to make them her strategic bases, cutting off Great Britain, France and America from China, and monopolizing the seas of the southern Pacific. These moves are included in Japan's maritime strategy. In such a period, it is beyond doubt that China will be in an extremely difficult position. But the majority of the Chinese people believe that such difficulties can be overcome; only the rich in the big port cities are defeatists because they are afraid of losing their property. Many people think it would be impossible for China to continue her fight against Japan, once the latter enforced a blockade. This is nonsense. To refute it we have only to refer to the history of the Red Army. In the anti-Japanese war the Chinese people would have on their side greater advantages than those the Red Army has utilized in its struggle with the Kuomintang. China is a very big nation; if Japan should succeed in occupying even a large section of China, getting possession of an area with as many as one hundred or even two hundred million people, we would still be far from defeated. We would still have left a great force to fight against Japan's warlords, who would have to fight defensive battles in their own rear throughout the war. Economically, of course, China is not unified. But the uneven development of China's economy also presents advantages in a war. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China is not as disastrous to the country as would be, for instance, the severance of New York from the rest of America. Moreover, it is impossible for Japan to isolate all of China: China's Northwest, Southwest and West cannot be blockaded by Japan. Thus, once more the central point of the problem becomes the mobilization and unification of the entire Chinese people and the building up of a United Front, such as has been advocated by the Communist Party.

*Question:* If the war drags on for a long time and Japan is not completely defeated, would the Communist Party agree to the negotiation of a peace with Japan and recognize her rule in northeastern China?

*Answer:* No. Like the people of the whole country, the Chinese Communist Party will not allow Japan to retain an inch of Chinese territory.

*Question:* What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy and tactics to be followed in this "war of liberation"?

*Answer:* Our strategy should be to employ our main forces in mobile warfare, over an extended, shifting and indefinite front, a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be a large-scale war of movement rather than a positional war depending exclusively on defensive works with deep trenches, high fortresses and successive defensive positions. This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic points, which can be defended by positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be a war of movement. Positional warfare must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and secondary strategic importance. Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to conduct mobile warfare most efficiently. In the face of our vigorous actions the Japanese forces will have to be cautious. Theirs is a ponderous slow-moving war-machine, with limited efficiency. Deep concentration and the exhausting defence of a vital position or two on a narrow front would be to throw away all the tactical advantages of our geography and economic organization, and to repeat the mistake of the Abyssinians. We must avoid great decisive battles in the early stages of the war, and must first employ mobile warfare gradually to break the morale, the fighting spirit and the military efficiency of the living forces of the enemy.

Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize and equip great numbers of guerrilla detachments among the peasantry. What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the revolutionary peasantry of all China. China's peasants have very great latent power. Properly led and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy twenty-four hours a day and worry them to death. It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and

guard them, maintaining large numbers of troops along all lines of communications to be on constant guard against attacks, and heavily garrisoning their bases in Manchuria and Japan as well.

The process of the war will present to China the possibility of capturing many Japanese prisoners, arms, ammunition, war-machines, and so forth. A point will be reached where it will become more and more possible to engage Japan's armies on a basis of positional warfare, using fortifications and deep entrenchment, for, as the war progresses, the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve, and will be reinforced by foreign help. Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long, expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will still be pouring forth men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines. All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China.

The above views have been proved correct in the light of the experience of the ten months of war and will be borne out in the future.

7. As far back as August 25, 1937, less than two months after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointed out in its "Decision on the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party":

The Japanese invaders' provocation at Lukouchiao and their occupation of Peiping and Tientsin are only the beginning of their large-scale invasion of China south of the Great Wall. They have already begun total mobilization in Japan. Their propaganda that they have "no desire to aggravate the situation" is only a smoke-screen for their invasion.

The resistance of July 7 at Lukouchiao marked the starting-point of China's nation-wide War of Resistance.

A new stage in China's political situation has begun, the stage of actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is over. The crucial task of the present stage is to mobilize all forces for victory in the War of Resistance.

The key to victory is to develop the War of Resistance already begun into a total nation-wide anti-Japanese war. Only such a total nation-wide war can bring final victory.

As there are still serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance, many difficulties may arise in its future course — setbacks and retreats, internal divisions and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises. We must therefore realize that this will be a hard-fought, protracted war. But we believe that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the War of Resistance which has already begun is sure to overcome all obstacles and continue to progress and develop.

The above thesis, too, has been proved correct in the light of the experience of the ten months of war and will be borne out in the future.

8. Epistemologically speaking, the source of all erroneous views on war lies in idealist and mechanistic tendencies on the question of war. People with such tendencies have a subjective and one-sided approach to problems. They either indulge in groundless and purely subjective talk, or, basing themselves upon a single aspect or a temporary manifestation, magnify it with similar subjectivity into the whole of the problem. But there are two categories of erroneous views, one comprising fundamental and therefore consistent errors which are hard to correct, and the other comprising accidental and therefore temporary errors which are easy to correct. Since both are wrong, both need to be corrected. Therefore, only by opposing idealist and mechanistic tendencies and taking an objective and all-sided view in making a study of war can we draw correct conclusions on the question of war.

### THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM

9. Why is the War of Resistance Against Japan a protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's? What is the basis for these statements?

The Sino-Japanese War is not just any war, it is specifically a war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the nineteen thirties. Herein lies the basis of the whole problem of the war. The two sides in the war have many contrasting features, which will be considered in turn below.

10. *The Japanese side.* First, Japan is a powerful imperialist country, which ranks first in the East in military, economic and political-organizational power, and is one of the five or six foremost imperialist countries of the world. These are the basic factors in Japan's war of aggression. The inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China are due to Japan's imperialist system and her great military, economic and political-organizational power. Secondly, however, the imperialist character of Japan's social economy determines the imperialist character of her war, a war that is retrogressive and barbarous. In the nineteen thirties, the internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven it not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale but also to approach its final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought by her ruling classes but to the very reverse, the doom of Japanese imperialism. This is what we mean by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is this reactionary quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism, that gives rise to the peculiar barbarity of Japan's war. All of which will arouse to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, the antagonism between the Japanese and the Chinese nations, and the antagonism between Japan and most other countries of the world. The reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for her inevitable defeat. Thirdly, Japan's war is conducted on the basis of her great military, economic and political-organizational power, but at the same time it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economic and political-organizational power is great but quantitatively inadequate. Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in manpower and in military, financial and material resources, and she cannot stand a prolonged war. Japan's rulers are endeavouring to resolve this difficulty through war, but again they will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is to say, the war they have launched to resolve this difficulty will end in adding to it and even in exhausting Japan's original resources. Fourthly and lastly, while Japan can get international support from the fascist countries, the international opposition she is bound to encounter will be greater than her international support. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only cancel out the support but even bear down upon Japan herself. Such is the law that an unjust cause finds meagre support, and such is the consequence of the very

nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in her great capacity to wage war, and her disadvantages lie in the reactionary and barbarous nature of her war, in the inadequacy of her manpower and material resources, and in her meagre international support. These are the characteristics on the Japanese side.

II. *The Chinese side.* First, we are a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The Opium War, the Taiping Revolution, the Reform Movement of 1898,<sup>7</sup> the Revolution of 1911 and the Northern Expedition — the revolutionary or reform movements which aimed at extricating China from her semi-colonial and semi-feudal state — all met with serious setbacks, and China remains a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. We are still a weak country and manifestly inferior to the enemy in military, economic and political-organizational power. Here again one can find the basis for the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China. Secondly, however, China's liberation movement, with its cumulative development over the last hundred years, is now different from that of any previous period. Although the domestic and foreign forces opposing it have caused it serious setbacks, at the same time they have tempered the Chinese people. Although China today is not so strong as Japan militarily, economically, politically and culturally, yet there are factors in China more progressive than in any other period of her history. The Communist Party of China and the army under its leadership represent these progressive factors. It is on the basis of this progress that China's present war of liberation can be protracted and can achieve final victory. By contrast with Japanese imperialism, which is declining, China is a country rising like the morning sun. China's war is progressive, hence its just character. Because it is a just war, it is capable of arousing the nation to unity, of evoking the sympathy of the people in Japan and of winning the support of most countries in the world. Thirdly, and again by contrast with Japan, China is a very big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plenty of soldiers, and is capable of sustaining a long war. Fourthly and lastly, there is broad international support for China stemming from the progressive and just character of her war, which is again exactly the reverse of the meagre support for Japan's unjust cause. To sum up, China's disadvantage lies in her military weakness, and her advantages lie in the progressive and just character of her war, her great size and her abundant international support. These are China's characteristics.

12. Thus it can be seen that Japan has great military, economic and political-organizational power, but that her war is reactionary and barbarous, her manpower and material resources are inadequate, and she is in an unfavourable position internationally. China, on the contrary, has less military, economic and political-organizational power, but she is in her era of progress, her war is progressive and just, she is moreover a big country, a factor which enables her to sustain a protracted war, and she will be supported by most countries. The above are the basic, mutually contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese War. They have determined and are determining all the political policies and military strategies and tactics of the two sides; they have determined and are determining the protracted character of the war and the fact that the final victory will go to China and not to Japan. The war is a contest between these characteristics. They will change in the course of the war, each according to its own nature; and from this everything else will follow. These characteristics exist objectively and are not invented to deceive people; they constitute all the basic elements of the war, and are not incomplete fragments; they permeate all big and small problems on both sides and all stages of the war, and they are not matters of no consequence. If anyone forgets these characteristics in studying the Sino-Japanese War, he will surely go wrong; and even though some of his ideas win credence for a time and may seem right, they will inevitably be proved wrong by the course of the war. On the basis of these characteristics we shall now proceed to explain the problems to be dealt with.

### REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION

13. The theorists of national subjugation, who see nothing but the contrast between the enemy's strength and our weakness, used to say, "Resistance will mean subjugation," and now they are saying, "The continuance of the war spells subjugation." We shall not be able to convince them merely by stating that Japan, though strong, is small, while China, though weak, is large. They can adduce historical instances, such as the destruction of the Sung Dynasty by the Yuan and the destruction of the Ming Dynasty by the Ching, to prove that

a small but strong country can vanquish a large but weak one and, moreover, that a backward country can vanquish an advanced one. If we say these events occurred long ago and do not prove the point, they can cite the British subjugation of India to prove that a small but strong capitalist country can vanquish a large but weak and backward country. Therefore, we have to produce other grounds before we can silence and convince all the subjugationists, and supply everyone engaged in propaganda with adequate arguments to persuade those who are still confused or irresolute and so strengthen their faith in the War of Resistance.

14. What then are the grounds we should advance? The characteristics of the epoch. These characteristics are concretely reflected in Japan's retrogression and paucity of support and in China's progress and abundance of support.

15. Our war is not just any war, it is specifically a war between China and Japan fought in the nineteen thirties. Our enemy, Japan, is first of all a moribund imperialist power; she is already in her era of decline and is not only different from Britain at the time of the subjugation of India, when British capitalism was still in the era of its ascendancy, but also different from what she herself was at the time of World War I twenty years ago. The present war was launched on the eve of the general collapse of world imperialism and, above all, of the fascist countries; that is the very reason the enemy has launched this adventurist war, which is in the nature of a last desperate struggle. Therefore, it is an inescapable certainty that it will not be China but the ruling circles of Japanese imperialism which will be destroyed as a result of the war. Moreover, Japan has undertaken this war at a time when other countries have been or are about to be embroiled in war, when we are all fighting or preparing to fight against barbarous aggression, and China's fortunes are linked with those of most of the countries and peoples of the world. This is the root cause of the opposition Japan has aroused and will increasingly arouse among those countries and peoples.

16. What about China? The China of today cannot be compared with the China of any other historical period. She is a semi-colony and a semi-feudal society in character and she is consequently considered a weak country. At the same time, she is historically in her era of progress; this is the primary reason for her ability to defeat Japan. When we say that the War of Resistance Against Japan is progressive, we do not mean progressive in the ordinary or general sense, nor

do we mean progressive in the sense that the Abyssinian war against Italy, or the Taiping Revolution or the 1911 Revolution were progressive, we mean progressive in the sense that China is progressive today. In what way is the China of today progressive? She is progressive because she is no longer a completely feudal country and because we already have some capitalism in China, we have a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, we have vast numbers of people who have awakened or are awakening, we have a Communist Party, we have a politically progressive army — the Chinese Red Army led by the Communist Party — and we have the tradition and the experience of many decades of revolution, and especially the experience of the seventeen years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. This experience has schooled the people and the political parties of China and forms the very basis for the present unity against Japan. If it is said that without the experience of 1905 the victory of 1917 would have been impossible in Russia, then we can also say that without the experience of the last seventeen years it would be impossible to win our War of Resistance. Such is the internal situation.

In the existing international situation, China is not isolated in the war, and this fact too is without precedent in history. In past history, China's wars, and India's too, were wars fought in isolation. It is only today that we meet with world-wide popular movements, extraordinary in breadth and depth, which have arisen or are arising and which are supporting China. The Russian Revolution of 1917 also received international support, and thus the Russian workers and peasants won; but that support was not so broad in scale and deep in nature as ours today. The popular movements in the world today are developing on a scale and with a depth that are unprecedented. The existence of the Soviet Union is a particularly vital factor in present-day international politics, and the Soviet Union will certainly support China with the greatest enthusiasm; and there was no such thing twenty years ago. All these factors have created and are creating important conditions indispensable to China's final victory. Large-scale direct assistance is as yet lacking and will come only in the future, but China is progressive and is a big country, and these are the factors enabling her to protract the war and to promote as well as await international help.

17. There is the additional factor that while Japan is a little country with a small territory, few resources, a small population and

a limited number of soldiers, China is a big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plenty of soldiers, so that, besides the contrast between strength and weakness, there is the contrast between a small country, retrogression and meagre support and a big country, progress and abundant support. This is the reason why China will never be subjugated. It follows from the contrast between strength and weakness that Japan can ride roughshod over China for a certain time and to a certain extent, that China must unavoidably travel a hard stretch of road, and that the War of Resistance will be a protracted war and not a war of quick decision; nevertheless, it follows from the other contrast — a small country, retrogression and meagre support versus a big country, progress and abundant support — that Japan cannot ride roughshod over China indefinitely but is sure to meet final defeat, while China can never be subjugated but is sure to win final victory.

18. Why was Abyssinia vanquished? First, she was not only weak but also small. Second, she was not as progressive as China; she was an old country passing from the slave to the serf system, a country without any capitalism or bourgeois political parties, let alone a Communist Party, and with no army such as the Chinese army, let alone one like the Eighth Route Army. Third, she was unable to hold out and wait for international assistance and had to fight her war in isolation. Fourth, and most important of all, there were mistakes in the direction of her war against Italy. Therefore Abyssinia was subjugated. But there is still quite extensive guerrilla warfare in Abyssinia, which, if persisted in, will enable the Abyssinians to recover their country when the world situation changes.

19. If the subjugationists quote the history of the failure of liberation movements in modern China to prove their assertions first that "resistance will mean subjugation", and then that "the continuance of the war spells subjugation", here again our answer is, "Times are different." China herself, the internal situation in Japan and the international environment are all different now. It is a serious matter that Japan is stronger than before while China in her unchanged semi-colonial and semi-feudal position is still fairly weak. It is also a fact that for the time being Japan can still control her people at home and exploit international contradictions in order to invade China. But during a long war, these things are bound to change in the opposite direction. Such changes are not yet accomplished facts, but they will be so in the future. The subjugationists dismiss this point.

As for China, we already have new people, a new political party, a new army and a new policy of resistance to Japan, a situation very different from that of over a decade ago, and what is more, all these will inevitably make further progress. It is true that historically the liberation movements met with repeated setbacks with the result that China could not accumulate greater strength for the present War of Resistance — this is a very painful historical lesson, and never again should we destroy any of our revolutionary forces. Yet even on the present basis, by exerting great efforts we can certainly forge gradually ahead and increase the strength of our resistance. All such efforts should converge on the great Anti-Japanese National United Front. As for international support, though direct and large-scale assistance is not yet in sight, it is in the making, the international situation being fundamentally different from what it was. The countless failures in the liberation movement of modern China had their subjective and objective causes, but the situation today is entirely different. Today, although there are many difficulties which make the War of Resistance arduous — such as the enemy's strength and our weakness, and the fact that his difficulties are just starting, while our own progress is far from sufficient — nevertheless many favourable conditions exist for defeating the enemy; we need only add our subjective efforts, and we shall be able to overcome the difficulties and win through to victory. These are favourable conditions such as never existed before in any period of our history, and that is why the War of Resistance Against Japan, unlike the liberation movements of the past, will not end in failure.

### COMPROMISE OR RESISTANCE? CORRUPTION OR PROGRESS?

20. It has been fully explained above that the theory of national subjugation is groundless. But there are many people who do not subscribe to this theory; they are good, honest patriots, who are nevertheless deeply worried about the present situation. Two things are worrying them, fear of a compromise with Japan and doubts about the possibility of political progress. These two vexing questions are being widely discussed and no key has been found to their solution. Let us now examine them.

21. As previously explained, the question of compromise has social roots, and as long as the roots exist the question is bound to arise. But compromise will not work. To prove the point, again we need only look for substantiation to Japan, China, and the international situation. Take first Japan. At the very beginning of the War of Resistance, we estimated that the time would come when an atmosphere conducive to compromise would arise, in other words, that after occupying northern China, Kiangsu and Chekiang, Japan would probably resort to the scheme of inducing China to capitulate. True enough, she did resort to the scheme, but the crisis soon passed, one reason being that the enemy everywhere pursued a barbarous policy and practised naked plunder. Had China capitulated, every Chinese would have become a slave without a country. The enemy's predatory policy, the policy of subjugating China, has two aspects, the material and the spiritual, both of which are being applied universally to all Chinese, not only to the people of the lower strata but also to members of the upper strata; of course the latter are treated a little more politely, but the difference is only one of degree, not of principle. In the main the enemy is transplanting into the interior of China the same old measures he adopted in the three northeastern provinces. Materially, he is robbing the common people even of their food and clothing, making them cry out in hunger and cold; he is plundering the means of production, thus ruining and enslaving China's national industries. Spiritually, he is working to destroy the national consciousness of the Chinese people. Under "the flag of the Rising Sun" no Chinese could avoid being a docile subject, a beast of burden forbidden to show the slightest trace of Chinese national spirit. This barbarous enemy policy will be carried deeper into the interior of China. Japan with her voracious appetite is unwilling to stop the war. As was inevitable, the policy set forth in the Japanese cabinet's statement of January 16, 1938<sup>8</sup> is still being obstinately carried out, which has enraged all strata of the Chinese people. This rage is engendered by the reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war — "there is no escape from fate", and hence an absolute hostility has crystallized. It is to be expected that on some future occasion the enemy will once again resort to the scheme of inducing China to capitulate and that certain subjugationists will again crawl out and most probably collude with certain foreign elements (to be found in Britain, the United States and France, especially among the upper strata in Britain) as partners in crime. But the general trend of events will not permit capitulation; the

obstinate and peculiarly barbarous character of Japan's war has decided this aspect of the question.

22. Second, let us take China. There are three factors contributing to China's perseverance in the War of Resistance. In the first place, the Communist Party, which is the reliable force leading the people to resist Japan. Next, the Kuomintang, which depends on Britain and the United States and hence will not capitulate to Japan unless they tell it to. Finally, the other political parties and groups, most of which oppose compromise and support the War of Resistance. With unity among these three, whoever compromises will be standing with the traitors, and anybody will have the right to punish him. All those unwilling to be traitors have no choice but to unite and carry on the War of Resistance to the end; therefore compromise is scarcely possible.

23. Third, take the international aspect. Except for Japan's allies and certain elements in the upper strata of other capitalist countries, the whole world is in favour of China's resistance, not of compromise by China. This factor reinforces China's hopes. Today the people throughout the country cherish the hope that international forces will gradually give China increasing help. It is not a vain hope; the existence of the Soviet Union in particular encourages China in her War of Resistance. The socialist Soviet Union, now strong as never before, has always shared China's joys and sorrows. In direct contrast to all the upper class elements in all the capitalist countries who seek nothing but profits, the Soviet Union considers it her duty to help all weak nations and all revolutionary wars. That China is not fighting her war in isolation has its basis not only in international assistance in general but in Soviet assistance in particular. China and the Soviet Union are in close geographical proximity, which aggravates Japan's crisis and facilitates China's War of Resistance. Geographical proximity to Japan increases the difficulties of China's resistance. Proximity to the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is a favourable condition for the War of Resistance.

24. Hence we may conclude that the danger of compromise exists but can be overcome. Even if the enemy can modify his policy to some extent, he cannot alter it fundamentally. In China the social roots of compromise are present, but the opponents of compromise are in the majority. Internationally, also, some forces favour compromise but the main forces favour resistance. The combination of these three factors makes it possible to overcome the danger of compromise and persist to the end in the War of Resistance.

25. Let us now answer the second question. Political progress at home and perseverance in the War of Resistance are inseparable. The greater the political progress, the more we can persevere in the war, and the more we persevere in the war, the greater the political progress. But, fundamentally, everything depends on our perseverance in the War of Resistance. The unhealthy phenomena in various fields under the Kuomintang regime are very serious, and the accumulation of these undesirable factors over the years has caused great anxiety and vexation among the broad ranks of our patriots. But there is no ground for pessimism, since experience in the War of Resistance has already proved that the Chinese people have made as much progress in the last ten months as in many years in the past. Although the cumulative effects of long years of corruption are seriously retarding the growth of the people's strength to resist Japan, thus reducing the extent of our victories and causing us losses in the war, yet the over-all situation in China, in Japan and in the world is such that the Chinese people cannot but make progress. This progress will be slow because of the factor of corruption, which impedes progress. Progress and the slow pace of progress are two characteristics of the present situation, and the second ill accords with the urgent needs of the war, which is a source of great concern to patriots. But we are in the midst of a revolutionary war, and revolutionary war is an antitoxin which not only eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our own filth. Every just, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power, which can transform many things or clear the way for their transformation. The Sino-Japanese War will transform both China and Japan; provided China perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front, the old Japan will surely be transformed into a new Japan and the old China into a new China, and people and everything else in both China and Japan will be transformed during and after the war. It is proper for us to regard the anti-Japanese war and our national reconstruction as interconnected. To say that Japan can also be transformed is to say that the war of aggression by her rulers will end in defeat and may lead to a revolution by the Japanese people. The day of triumph of the Japanese people's revolution will be the day Japan is transformed. All this is closely linked with China's War of Resistance and is a prospect we should take into account.

THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION  
IS WRONG  
AND THE THEORY OF QUICK VICTORY  
IS LIKEWISE WRONG

26. In our comparative study of the enemy and ourselves with respect to the basic contradictory characteristics, such as relative strength, relative size, progress or reaction, and the relative extent of support, we have already refuted the theory of national subjugation, and we have explained why compromise is unlikely and why political progress is possible. The subjugationists stress the contradiction between strength and weakness and puff it up until it becomes the basis of their whole argument on the question, neglecting all the other contradictions. Their preoccupation with the contrast in strength shows their one-sidedness, and their exaggeration of this one side of the matter into the whole shows their subjectivism. Thus, if one looks at the matter as a whole, it will be seen that they have no ground to stand on and are wrong. As for those who are neither subjugationists nor confirmed pessimists, but who are in a pessimistic frame of mind for the moment simply because they are confused by the disparity between our strength and that of the enemy at a given time and in certain respects or by the corruption in the country, we should point out to them that their approach also tends to be one-sided and subjective. But in their case correction is relatively easy; once they are alerted, they will understand, for they are patriots and their error is only momentary.

27. The exponents of quick victory are likewise wrong. Either they completely forget the contradiction between strength and weakness, remembering only the other contradictions, or they exaggerate China's advantages beyond all semblance of reality and beyond recognition, or they presumptuously take the balance of forces at one time and place for the whole situation, as in the old saying, "A leaf before the eye shuts out Mount Tai." In a word, they lack the courage to admit that the enemy is strong while we are weak. They often deny this point and consequently deny one aspect of the truth. Nor do they have the courage to admit the limitations of our advantages, and thus they deny another aspect of the truth. The result is that they make mistakes, big and small, and here again it is subjectivism and one-sidedness that are doing the mischief. These friends have their

hearts in the right place, and they, too, are patriots. But while "the gentlemen's aspirations are indeed lofty", their views are wrong, and to act according to them would certainly be to run into a brick wall. For if appraisal does not conform to reality, action cannot attain its objective; and to act notwithstanding would mean the army's defeat and the nation's subjugation, so that the result would be the same as with the defeatists. Hence this theory of quick victory will not do either.

28. Do we deny the danger of national subjugation? No, we do not. We recognize that China faces two possible prospects, liberation or subjugation, and that the two are in violent conflict. Our task is to achieve liberation and to avert subjugation. The conditions for liberation are China's progress, which is basic, the enemy's difficulties, and international support. We differ from the subjugationists. Taking an objective and many-sided view, we recognize the two possibilities of national subjugation and liberation, stress that liberation is the dominant possibility, point out the conditions for its achievement, and strive to secure them. The subjugationists, on the other hand, taking a subjective and one-sided view, recognize only one possibility, that of subjugation; they do not admit the possibility of liberation, and still less point out the conditions necessary for liberation or strive to secure them. Moreover, while acknowledging the tendency to compromise and the corruption, we see other tendencies and phenomena which, we indicate, will gradually prevail and which are already in violent conflict with the former; in addition, we point out the conditions necessary for the healthy tendencies and phenomena to prevail, and we strive to overcome the tendency-to-compromise and to change the state of corruption. Therefore, contrary to the subjugationists, we are not at all pessimistic.

29. Not that we would not like a quick victory; everybody would be in favour of driving the "devils" out overnight. But we point out that in the absence of certain definite conditions quick victory is something that exists only in our minds and not in objective reality, and that it is a mere illusion, a false theory. Accordingly, having made an objective and comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we point out that the only way to final victory is the strategy of protracted war, and we reject the completely groundless theory of quick victory. We maintain that we must strive to secure all the conditions indispensable to final victory, and the more fully and the earlier these conditions are secured, the

surer we shall be of victory and the earlier we shall win it. We believe that only in this way can the course of the war be shortened, and we reject the theory of quick victory, which is just idle talk and an effort to get things on the cheap.

### WHY A PROTRACTED WAR?

30. Let us now examine the problem of protracted war. A correct answer to the question "Why a protracted war?" can be arrived at only on the basis of all the fundamental contrasts between China and Japan. For instance, if we say merely that the enemy is a strong imperialist power while we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, we are in danger of falling into the theory of national subjugation. For neither in theory nor in practice can a struggle be protracted by simply pitting the weak against the strong. Nor can it be protracted by simply pitting the big against the small, the progressive against the reactionary, or abundant support against meagre support. The annexation of a small country by a big one or of a big country by a small one is a common occurrence. It often happens that a progressive country which is not strong is destroyed by a big, reactionary country, and the same holds for everything that is progressive but not strong. Abundant or scanty support is an important but a subsidiary factor, and the degree of its effect depends upon the fundamental factors on both sides. Therefore when we say that the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war, it is a conclusion derived from the interrelations of all the factors at work on both sides. The enemy is strong and we are weak, and the danger of subjugation is there. But in other respects the enemy has shortcomings and we have advantages. The enemy's advantages can be reduced and his shortcomings aggravated by our efforts. On the other hand, our advantages can be enhanced and our shortcomings remedied by our efforts. Hence, we can win final victory and avert subjugation, while the enemy will ultimately be defeated and cannot avert the collapse of his whole imperialist system.

31. Since the enemy has only one advantage but shortcomings in all other respects and we have shortcomings in only one respect but advantages in all others, why has this produced not a balance, but, on the contrary, a superior position for him and an inferior

position for us at the present time? Quite clearly, we cannot consider the question in such a formal way. The fact is that the disparity between the enemy's strength and our own is now so great that the enemy's shortcomings have not developed and, for the time being, cannot develop to a degree sufficient to offset his strength, while our advantages have not developed and, for the time being, cannot develop to a degree sufficient to compensate for our weakness. Therefore there can as yet be no balance, only imbalance.

32. Although our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and the united front have somewhat changed the enemy's strength and superiority as against our weakness and inferiority, there has as yet been no basic change. Hence during a certain stage of the war, to a certain degree the enemy will be victorious and we shall suffer defeat. But why is it that in this stage the enemy's victories and our defeats are definitely restricted in degree and cannot be transcended by complete victory or complete defeat? The reason is that, first, the enemy's strength and our weakness have been relative and not absolute from the very beginning, and that, second, our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front have further emphasized this relativity. In comparison with the original situation, the enemy is still strong, but unfavourable factors have reduced his strength, although not yet to a degree sufficient to destroy his superiority, and similarly we are still weak, but favourable factors have compensated for our weakness, although not yet to a degree sufficient to transform our inferiority. Thus it turns out that the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak, that the enemy is in a relatively superior and we are in a relatively inferior position. On both sides, strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority, have never been absolute, and besides, our efforts in persevering in resistance to Japan and in the united front during the war have brought about further changes in the original balance of forces between us and the enemy. Therefore, in this stage the enemy's victory and our defeat are definitely restricted in degree, and hence the war becomes protracted.

33. But circumstances are continually changing. In the course of the war, provided we employ correct military and political tactics, make no mistakes of principle and exert our best efforts, the enemy's disadvantages and China's advantages will both grow as the war is drawn out, with the inevitable result that there will be continual change in the difference in comparative strength and hence in the relative position of the two sides. When a new stage is reached, a great change

will take place in the balance of forces, resulting in the enemy's defeat and our victory.

34. At present the enemy can still manage to exploit his strength, and our War of Resistance has not yet fundamentally weakened him. His insufficiency in manpower and material resources is not yet such as to prevent his offensive; on the contrary, they can still sustain his offensive to a certain extent. The reactionary and barbarous nature of his war, a factor which intensifies both class antagonisms within Japan and the resistance of the Chinese nation, has not yet brought about a situation which radically impedes his advance. The enemy's international isolation is increasing but is not yet complete. In many countries which have indicated they will help us, the capitalists dealing in munitions and war materials and bent solely on profit are still furnishing Japan with large quantities of war supplies,<sup>9</sup> and their governments<sup>10</sup> are still reluctant to join the Soviet Union in practical sanctions against Japan. From all this it follows that our War of Resistance cannot be won quickly and can only be a protracted war. As for China, although there has been some improvement with regard to her weakness in the military, economic, political and cultural spheres in the ten months of resistance, it is still a long way from what is required to prevent the enemy's offensive and prepare our counter-offensive. Moreover, quantitatively speaking, we have had to sustain certain losses. Although all the factors favourable to us are having a positive effect, it will not be sufficient to halt the enemy's offensive and to prepare for our counter-offensive unless we make an immense effort. Neither the abolition of corruption and the acceleration of progress at home, nor the curbing of the pro-Japanese forces and the expansion of the anti-Japanese forces abroad, is yet a fact. From all this it follows that our war cannot be won quickly but can only be a protracted war.

### THE THREE STAGES OF THE PROTRACTED WAR

35. Since the Sino-Japanese War is a protracted one and final victory will belong to China, it can reasonably be assumed that this protracted war will pass through three stages. The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic con-

solidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible to predict the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends in the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions. The course of objective events will be exceedingly rich and varied, with many twists and turns, and nobody can cast a "horoscope" for the Sino-Japanese War; nevertheless it is necessary for the strategic direction of the war to make an outline sketch of its trends. Although our sketch may not be in full accord with the subsequent facts and will be amended by them, it is still necessary to make such a sketch in order to give firm and purposeful strategic direction to the protracted war.

36. The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's design is to occupy Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and link up these three points. To accomplish this aim the enemy will have to use at least fifty divisions, or about one and a half million men, spend from one and a half to two years, and expend more than ten thousand million yen. In penetrating so deeply, the enemy will encounter immense difficulties, with consequences disastrous beyond imagination. As for attempting to occupy the entire length of the Canton-Hankow Railway and the Sian-Lanchow Highway, he will have to fight perilous battles and even so may not fully accomplish his design. But in drawing up our operational plan we should base ourselves on the assumption that the enemy may occupy the three points and even certain additional areas, as well as link them up, and we should make dispositions for a protracted war, so that even if he does so, we shall be able to cope with him. In this stage the form of fighting we should adopt is primarily mobile warfare, to be supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare. Through the subjective errors of the Kuomintang military authorities, positional warfare was assigned the primary role in the first phase of this stage, but, nevertheless, it is supplementary from the point of view of the stage as a whole. In this stage, China has already built up a broad united front and achieved unprecedented unity. Although the enemy has used and will continue to use base and shameless means to induce capitulation in the attempt to realize his plan for a quick decision and to conquer the whole of China without much effort, he has failed so far, nor is he likely to succeed in the future. In this stage, in spite of considerable losses, China has made considerable progress, which will become the main basis for her continued resistance in the second stage. In the present

stage the Soviet Union has already given substantial aid to China. On the enemy side, there are already signs of flagging morale, and the momentum of attack of his army is less in the middle phase of this stage than in the initial phase and will diminish still further in the concluding phase. His finances and economy are beginning to show signs of exhaustion; war-weariness is beginning to set in among his people and troops; and within the clique that is running the war, "war frustrations" are beginning to manifest themselves and pessimism about the prospects of the war is growing.

37. The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the tail end of the first stage, the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal points to his strategic offensive owing to his shortage of troops and our firm resistance, and upon reaching them he will stop his strategic offensive and enter the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas. In the second stage, the enemy will attempt to safeguard the occupied areas and to make them his own by the fraudulent method of setting up puppet governments, while plundering the Chinese people to the limit; but again he will be confronted with stubborn guerrilla warfare. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's rear is unguarded, our guerrilla warfare will develop extensively in the first stage, and many base areas will be established, seriously threatening the enemy's consolidation of the occupied areas, and so in the second stage there will still be widespread fighting. In this stage, our form of fighting will be primarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will still retain a large regular army, but she will find it difficult to launch the strategic counter-offensive immediately because, on the one hand, the enemy will adopt a strategically defensive position in the big cities and along the main lines of communication under his occupation and, on the other hand, China will not yet be adequately equipped technically. Except for the troops engaged in frontal defence against the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and co-ordinating with the people's local armed forces, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied places, keeping the enemy on the move as far as possible in order to destroy him in mobile warfare, as is now being done in Shansi Province. The fighting in the second stage will be ruthless, and the country will suffer serious devastation. But the guerrilla warfare will be successful, and if it is well conducted the

enemy may be able to retain only about one-third of his occupied territory, with the remaining two-thirds back in our hands, which will constitute a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. By then the enemy-occupied territory as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrilla areas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will depend on the degree of change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy and on the changes in the international situation; generally speaking, we should be prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long time and to weather its hardships. It will be a very painful period for China; the two big problems will be economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of the traitors. The enemy will go all out to wreck China's united front, and the traitor organizations in all the occupied areas will merge into a so-called "unified government". Owing to the loss of big cities and the hardships of war, vacillating elements within our ranks will clamour for compromise, and pessimism will grow to a serious extent. Our tasks will then be to mobilize the whole people to unite as one man and carry on the war with unflinching perseverance, to broaden and consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism and ideas of compromise, promote the will to hard struggle and apply new war-time policies, and so to weather the hardships. In the second stage, we will have to call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government, oppose splits and systematically improve our fighting technique, reform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people and prepare for the counter-offensive. The international situation will become still more unfavourable to Japan and the main international forces will incline towards giving more help to China, even though there may be talk of "realism" of the Chamberlain type which accommodates itself to *faits accomplis*. Japan's threat to South-east Asia and Siberia will become greater, and there may even be another war. As regards Japan, scores of her divisions will be inextricably bogged down in China. Widespread guerrilla warfare and the people's anti-Japanese movement will wear down this big Japanese force, greatly reducing it and also disintegrating its morale by stimulating the growth of homesickness, war-weariness and even anti-war sentiment. Though it would be wrong to say that Japan will achieve no results at all in her plunder of China, yet, being short of capital and harassed by guerrilla warfare, she cannot possibly achieve rapid or substantial results. This second stage will be the transitional

stage of the entire war; it will be the most trying period but also the pivotal one. Whether China becomes an independent country or is reduced to a colony will be determined not by the retention or loss of the big cities in the first stage but by the extent to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second. If we can persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war, China will in that stage gain the power to change from weak to strong. It will be the second act in the three-act drama of China's War of Resistance. And through the efforts of the entire cast it will be possible to perform a most brilliant last act.

38. The third stage will be the stage of the counter-offensive to recover our lost territories. Their recovery will depend mainly upon the strength which China has built up in the preceding stage and which will continue to grow in the third stage. But China's strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces and on the changes that will take place inside Japan, or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this adds to China's tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy. In the third stage, our war will no longer be one of strategic defensive, but will turn into a strategic counter-offensive manifesting itself in strategic offensives; and it will no longer be fought on strategically interior lines, but will shift gradually to strategically exterior lines. Not until we fight our way to the Yalu River can this war be considered over. The third stage will be the last in the protracted war, and when we talk of persevering in the war to the end, we mean going all the way through this stage. Our primary form of fighting will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise to importance. While positional defence cannot be regarded as important in the first stage because of the prevailing circumstances, positional attack will become quite important in the third stage because of the changed conditions and the requirements of the task. In the third stage guerrilla warfare will still provide strategic support by supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not be the primary form as in the second stage.

39. It is thus obvious that the war is protracted and consequently ruthless in nature. The enemy will not be able to gobble up the whole of China but will be able to occupy many places for a considerable time. China will not be able to oust the Japanese quickly, but the greater part of her territory will remain in her hands. Ultimately the enemy will lose and we will win, but we shall have a hard stretch of road to travel.

40. The Chinese people will become tempered in the course of this long and ruthless war. The political parties taking part in the war will also be steeled and tested. The united front must be persevered in; only by persevering in the united front can we persevere in the war; and only by persevering in the united front and in the war can we win final victory. Only thus can all difficulties be overcome. After travelling the hard stretch of road we shall reach the highway to victory. This is the natural logic of the war.

41. In the three stages the changes in relative strength will proceed along the following lines. In the first stage, the enemy is superior and we are inferior in strength. With regard to our inferiority we must reckon on changes of two different kinds from the eve of the War of Resistance to the end of this stage. The first kind is a change for the worse. China's original inferiority will be aggravated by war losses, namely, decreases in territory, population, economic strength, military strength and cultural institutions. Towards the end of the first stage, the decrease will probably be considerable, especially on the economic side. This point will be exploited by some people as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise. But the second kind of change, the change for the better, must also be noted. It includes the experience gained in the war, the progress made by the armed forces, the political progress, the mobilization of the people, the development of culture in a new direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the increase in international support, etc. In the first stage, what is on the downgrade is the old quantity and the old quality, the manifestations being mainly quantitative. What is on the upgrade is the new quantity and the new quality, the manifestations being mainly qualitative. It is the second kind of change that provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war and win final victory.

42. In the first stage, changes of two kinds also occur on the enemy's side. The first kind is a change for the worse and manifests itself in hundreds of thousands of casualties, the drain on arms and ammunition, deterioration of troop morale, popular discontent at home, shrinkage of trade, the expenditure of over ten thousand million yen, condemnation by world opinion, etc. This trend also provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war and win final victory. But we must likewise reckon with the second kind of change on the enemy's side, a change for the better, that is, his expansion in territory, population and resources. This too is a basis for the protracted nature

of our War of Resistance and the impossibility of quick victory, but at the same time certain people will use it as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise. However, we must take into account the transitory and partial character of this change for the better on the enemy's side. Japan is an imperialist power heading for collapse, and her occupation of China's territory is temporary. The vigorous growth of guerrilla warfare in China will restrict her actual occupation to narrow zones. Moreover, her occupation of Chinese territory is creating and intensifying contradictions between Japan and other foreign countries. Besides, generally speaking, such occupation involves a considerable period in which Japan will make capital outlay without drawing any profits, as is shown by the experience in the three northeastern provinces. All of which again gives us a basis for demolishing the theories of national subjugation and of compromise and for establishing the theories of protracted war and of final victory.

43. In the second stage, the above changes on both sides will continue to develop. While the situation cannot be predicted in detail, on the whole Japan will continue on the downgrade and China on the upgrade.<sup>11</sup> For example, Japan's military and financial resources will be seriously drained by China's guerrilla warfare, popular discontent will grow in Japan, the morale of her troops will deteriorate further, and she will become more isolated internationally. As for China, she will make further progress in the political, military and cultural spheres and in the mobilization of the people; guerrilla warfare will develop further; there will be some new economic growth on the basis of the small industries and the widespread agriculture in the interior; international support will gradually increase; and the whole picture will be quite different from what it is now. This second stage may last quite a long time, during which there will be a great reversal in the balance of forces, with China gradually rising and Japan gradually declining. China will emerge from her inferior position, and Japan will lose her superior position; first the two countries will become evenly matched, and then their relative positions will be reversed. Thereupon, China will in general have completed her preparations for the strategic counter-offensive and will enter the stage of the counter-offensive and the expulsion of the enemy. It should be reiterated that the change from inferiority to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensive will involve three things, namely, an increase in China's own strength, an

increase in Japan's difficulties, and an increase in international support; it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about China's superiority and the completion of her preparations for the counter-offensive.

44. Because of the unevenness in China's political and economic development, the strategic counter-offensive of the third stage will not present a uniform and even picture throughout the country in its initial phase but will be regional in character, rising here and subsiding there. During this stage, the enemy will not relax his divisive tricks to break China's united front, hence the task of maintaining internal unity in China will become all the more important, and we shall have to ensure that the strategic counter-offensive does not collapse halfway through internal dissension. In this period the international situation will become very favourable to China. China's task will be to take advantage of it in order to attain complete liberation and establish an independent democratic state, which at the same time will mean helping the world anti-fascist movement.

45. China moving from inferiority to parity and then to superiority, Japan moving from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China moving from the defensive to stalemate and then to the counter-offensive, Japan moving from the offensive to the safeguarding of her gains and then to retreat — such will be the course of the Sino-Japanese War and its inevitable trend.

46. Hence the questions and the conclusions are as follows: Will China be subjugated? The answer is, No, she will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly? The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly, and the war must be a protracted one. Are these conclusions correct? I think they are.

47. At this point, the exponents of national subjugation and of compromise will again rush in and say, "To move from inferiority to parity China needs a military and economic power equal to Japan's, and to move from parity to superiority she will need a military and economic power greater than Japan's. But this is impossible, hence the above conclusions are not correct."

48. This is the so-called theory that "weapons decide everything",<sup>12</sup> which constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but also people. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest

of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by people. If the great majority of the Chinese, of the Japanese and of the people of other countries are on the side of our War of Resistance Against Japan, how can Japan's military and economic power, wielded as it is by a small minority through coercion, count as superiority? And if not, then does not China, though wielding relatively inferior military and economic power, become the superior? There is no doubt that China will gradually grow in military and economic power, provided she perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front. As for our enemy, weakened as he will be by the long war and by internal and external contradictions, his military and economic power is bound to change in the reverse direction. In these circumstances, is there any reason why China cannot become the superior? Nor is that all. Although we cannot as yet count the military and economic power of other countries as being openly and to any great extent on our side, is there any reason why we will not be able to do so in the future? If Japan's enemy is not just China, if in future one or more other countries make open use of their considerable military and economic power defensively or offensively against Japan and openly help us, then will not our superiority be still greater? Japan is a small country, her war is reactionary and barbarous, and she will become more and more isolated internationally; China is a big country, her war is progressive and just, and she will enjoy more and more support internationally. Is there any reason why the long-period development of these factors should not definitely change the relative position between the enemy and ourselves?

49. The exponents of quick victory, however, do not realize that war is a contest of strength, and that before a certain change has taken place in the relative strength of the belligerents, there is no basis for trying to fight strategically decisive battles and shorten the road to liberation. Were their ideas to be put into practice, we should inevitably run our heads into a brick wall. Or perhaps they are just talking for their own pleasure without really intending to put their ideas into practice. In the end Mr. Reality will come and pour a bucket of cold water over these chatterers, showing them up as mere windbags who want to get things on the cheap, to have gains without pains. We have had this kind of idle chatter before and we have it now, though not very much so far; but there may be more as the war develops into the stage of stalemate and then of counter-offensive.

But in the meantime, if China's losses in the first stage are fairly heavy and the second stage drags on very long, the theories of national subjugation and of compromise will gain great currency. Therefore, our fire should be directed mainly against them and only secondarily against the idle chatter about quick victory.

50. That the war will be protracted is certain, but nobody can predict exactly how many months or years it will last, as this depends entirely upon the degree of the change in the balance of forces. All those who wish to shorten the war have no alternative but to work hard to increase our own strength and reduce that of the enemy. Specifically, the only way is to strive to win more battles and wear down the enemy's forces, develop guerrilla warfare to reduce enemy-occupied territory to a minimum, consolidate and expand the united front to rally the forces of the whole nation, build up new armies and develop new war industries, promote political, economic and cultural progress, mobilize the workers, peasants, businessmen, intellectuals and other sections of the people, disintegrate the enemy forces and win over their soldiers, carry on international propaganda to secure foreign support, and win the support of the Japanese people and other oppressed peoples. Only by doing all this can we reduce the duration of the war. There is no magic short-cut.

### A WAR OF JIG-SAW PATTERN

51. We can say with certainty that the protracted War of Resistance Against Japan will write a splendid page unique in the war history of mankind. One of the special features of this war is the interlocking "jig-saw" pattern which arises from such contradictory factors as the barbarity of Japan and the shortage of her troops on the one hand, and the progressiveness of China and the extensiveness of her territory on the other. There have been other wars of jig-saw pattern in history, the three years' civil war in Russia after the October Revolution being a case in point. But what distinguishes this war in China is its especially protracted and extensive character, which will set a record in history. Its jig-saw pattern manifests itself as follows.

52. *Interior and exterior lines.* The anti-Japanese war as a whole is being fought on interior lines; but as far as the relation between the main forces and the guerrilla units is concerned, the former are on the interior lines while the latter are on the exterior lines,

presenting a remarkable spectacle of pincers around the enemy. The same can be said of the relationship between the various guerrilla areas. From its own viewpoint each guerrilla area is on interior lines and the other areas are on exterior lines; together they form many battle fronts, which hold the enemy in pincers. In the first stage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on interior lines is withdrawing, but the guerrilla units operating strategically on exterior lines will advance with great strides over wide areas to the rear of the enemy — they will advance even more fiercely in the second stage — thereby presenting a remarkable picture of both withdrawal and advance.

53. *Possession and non-possession of a rear area.* The main forces, which extend the front lines to the outer limits of the enemy's occupied areas, are operating from the rear area of the country as a whole. The guerrilla units, which extend the battle lines into the enemy rear, are separated from the rear area of the country as a whole. But each guerrilla area has a small rear of its own, upon which it relies to establish its fluid battle lines. The case is different with the guerrilla detachments which are dispatched by a guerrilla area for short-term operations in the rear of the enemy in the same area; such detachments have no rear, nor do they have a battle line. "Operating without a rear" is a special feature of revolutionary war in the new era, wherever a vast territory, a progressive people, and an advanced political party and army are to be found; there is nothing to fear but much to gain from it, and far from having doubts about it we should promote it.

54. *Encirclement and counter-encirclement.* Taking the war as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy, because he is on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines, while we are on the strategic defensive and operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement. We on our part can encircle one or more of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, because we apply the policy of fighting campaigns and battles from tactically exterior lines by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from strategically exterior lines. This is the first form of our counter-encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountain area, or on three sides, like the northwestern Shansi area. This is the second form of

enemy encirclement. However, if one considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation to the positions of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Tatung-Puchow Railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hopei and Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of our counter-encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own — rather like a game of *weichi*.<sup>13</sup> Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of enemy strongholds (such as Taiyuan) and our guerrilla base areas (such as the Wutai Mountains) resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. If the game of *weichi* is extended to include the world, there is yet a third form of encirclement as between us and the enemy, namely, the interrelation between the front of aggression and the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, France and Czechoslovakia with his front of aggression, while we counter-encircle Germany, Japan and Italy with our front of peace. But our encirclement, like the hand of Buddha, will turn into the Mountain of Five Elements lying athwart the Universe, and the modern Sun Wu-kungs — the fascist aggressors — will finally be buried underneath it, never to rise again.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, if on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, with the Soviet Union and other countries which may join it as other strategic units, and with the Japanese people's movement as still another strategic unit, and thus form a gigantic net from which the fascist Sun Wu-kungs can find no escape, that will be our enemy's day of doom. Indeed, the day when this gigantic net is formed will undoubtedly be the day of the complete overthrow of Japanese imperialism. We are not jesting; this is the inevitable trend of the war.

55. *Big areas and little areas.* There is a possibility that the enemy will occupy the greater part of Chinese territory south of the Great Wall, and only the smaller part will be kept intact. That is one aspect of the situation. But within this greater part, which does not include the three northeastern provinces, the enemy can actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of communication and some of the plains — which may rank first in importance, but will probably

constitute only the smaller part of the occupied territory in size and population, while the greater part will be taken up by the guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere. That is another aspect of the situation. If we go beyond the provinces south of the Great Wall and include Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai and Tibet, then the unoccupied area will constitute the greater part of China's territory, and the enemy-occupied area will become the smaller part, even with the three northeastern provinces. That is yet another aspect of the situation. The area kept intact is undoubtedly important, and we should devote great efforts to developing it, not only politically, militarily and economically but, what is also important, culturally. The enemy has transformed our former cultural centres into culturally backward areas, and we on our part must transform the former culturally backward areas into cultural centres. At the same time, the work of developing extensive guerrilla areas behind the enemy lines is also extremely important, and we should attend to every aspect of this work, including the cultural. All in all, big pieces of China's territory, namely, the rural areas, will be transformed into regions of progress and light, while the small pieces, namely, the enemy-occupied areas and especially the big cities, will temporarily become regions of backwardness and darkness.

56. Thus it can be seen that the protracted and far-flung War of Resistance Against Japan is a war of a jig-saw pattern militarily, politically, economically and culturally. It is a marvellous spectacle in the history of war, a heroic undertaking by the Chinese nation, a magnificent and earthshaking feat. This war will not only affect China and Japan, strongly impelling both to advance, but will also affect the whole world, impelling all nations, especially the oppressed nations such as India, to march forward. Every Chinese should consciously throw himself into this war of a jig-saw pattern, for this is the form of war by which the Chinese nation is liberating itself, the special form of war of liberation waged by a big semi-colonial country in the nineteen thirties and the nineteen forties.

### FIGHTING FOR PERPETUAL PEACE

57. The protracted nature of China's anti-Japanese war is inseparably connected with the fight for perpetual peace in China and the whole world. Never has there been a historical period such as

the present in which war is so close to perpetual peace. For several thousands of years since the emergence of classes, the life of mankind has been full of wars; each nation has fought countless wars, either internally or with other nations. In the imperialist epoch of capitalist society, wars are waged on a particularly extensive scale and with a peculiar ruthlessness. The first great imperialist war of twenty years ago was the first of its kind in history, but not the last. Only the war which has now begun comes close to being the final war, that is, comes close to the perpetual peace of mankind. By now one-third of the world's population has entered the war. Look! Italy, then Japan; Abyssinia, then Spain, then China. The population of the countries at war now amounts to almost 600 million, or nearly a third of the total population of the world. The characteristics of the present war are its uninterruptedness and its proximity to perpetual peace. Why is it uninterrupted? After attacking Abyssinia, Italy attacked Spain, and Germany joined in; then Japan attacked China. What will come next? Undoubtedly Hitler will fight the great powers. "Fascism is war"<sup>15</sup> — this is perfectly true. There will be no interruption in the development of the present war into a world war; and mankind will not be able to avoid the calamity of war. Why then do we say the present war is near to perpetual peace? The present war is the result of the development of the general crisis of world capitalism which began with World War I; this general crisis is driving the capitalist countries into a new war and, above all, driving the fascist countries into new war adventures. This war, we can foresee, will not save capitalism, but will hasten its collapse. It will be greater in scale and more ruthless than the war of twenty years ago, all nations will inevitably be drawn in, it will drag on for a very long time, and mankind will suffer greatly. But, owing to the existence of the Soviet Union and the growing political consciousness of the people of the world, great revolutionary wars will undoubtedly emerge from this war to oppose all counter-revolutionary wars, thus giving this war the character of a struggle for perpetual peace. Even if later there should be another period of war, perpetual world peace will not be far off. Once man has eliminated capitalism, he will attain the era of perpetual peace, and there will be no more need for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter and for all time, mankind will never again know war. The revolutionary wars which have already begun are part of the war for perpetual peace. The war between China and Japan, which have a

combined population of over 500 million, will take an important place in this war for perpetual peace, and out of it will come the liberation of the Chinese nation. The liberated new China of the future will be inseparable from the liberated new world of the future. Hence our War of Resistance Against Japan takes on the character of a struggle for perpetual peace.

58. History shows that wars are divided into two kinds, just and unjust. All wars that are progressive are just, and all wars that impede progress are unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress, but we do not oppose progressive, just wars. We Communists not only do not oppose just wars, but we actively participate in them. As for unjust wars, World War I is an instance in which both sides fought for imperialist interests; therefore the Communists of the whole world firmly opposed that war. The way to oppose a war of this kind is to do everything possible to prevent it before it breaks out and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust war with just war, whenever possible. Japan's war is an unjust war that impedes progress, and the peoples of the world, including the Japanese people, should oppose it and are opposing it. In our country the people and the government, the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, have all raised the banner of righteousness in the national revolutionary war against aggression. Our war is sacred and just, it is progressive, and its aim is peace. The aim is peace not just in one country but throughout the world, not just temporary but perpetual peace. To achieve this aim we must wage a life-and-death struggle, be prepared for any sacrifice, persevere to the end and never stop short of the goal. However great the sacrifice and however long the time needed to attain it, a new world of perpetual peace and brightness already lies clearly before us. Our faith in waging this war is based upon the new China and the new world of perpetual peace and brightness for which we are striving. Fascism and imperialism wish to perpetuate war, but we wish to put an end to it in the not too distant future. The great majority of mankind should exert their utmost efforts for this purpose. The 450 million people of China constitute one quarter of the world's population, and if by their concerted efforts they overthrow Japanese imperialism and create a new China of freedom and equality, they will most certainly be making a tremendous contribution to the struggle for perpetual world peace. This is no vain hope, for the whole world is approaching this point in the course of its social and economic development, and provided

that the majority of mankind work together, our goal will surely be attained in several decades.

### THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUS ACTIVITY IN WAR

59. We have so far explained why the war is a protracted war and why the final victory will be China's, and in the main dealt with what protracted war really is. Now we shall turn to the question of what to do and what not to do. How to conduct protracted war? How to win the final victory? These are the questions answered below. We shall therefore successively discuss the following problems: the role of conscious activity in war, war and politics, political mobilization for the War of Resistance, the object of war, offence within defence, quick decisions within a protracted war, exterior lines within interior lines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare, positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, the possibilities of exploiting the enemy's mistakes, the question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war, and the army and the people as the foundation of victory. Let us start with the problem of conscious activity.

60. When we say we are opposed to a subjective approach to problems, we mean that we must oppose ideas which are not based upon or do not correspond to objective facts, because such ideas are fanciful and fallacious and will lead to failure if acted on. But whatever is done has to be done by human beings; protracted war and final victory will not come about without human action. For such action to be effective there must be people who derive ideas, principles or views from the objective facts, and put forward plans, directives, policies, strategies and tactics. Ideas, etc. are subjective, while deeds or actions are the subjective translated into the objective, but both represent the conscious activity peculiar to human beings. We term this kind of conscious activity "self-conscious activity", and it is a characteristic that distinguishes man from all other beings. All ideas based upon and corresponding to objective facts are correct ideas, and all deeds or actions based upon correct ideas are correct actions. We must give full scope to such ideas and actions, such conscious activity. The anti-Japanese war is being waged to drive out imperialism and transform the old China into a new China; this can be achieved only when the whole Chinese people are mobilized and full scope is given to their conscious activity in resisting Japan. If we just sit by

and take no action, only subjugation awaits us and there will be neither protracted war nor final victory.

61. Conscious activity is a human characteristic. Man strongly displays this characteristic in war. True, victory or defeat in war is decided by the military, political, economic and geographical conditions on both sides, the nature of the war each side is waging and the international support each enjoys, but it is not decided by these alone; in themselves, all these provide only the possibility of victory or defeat but do not decide the issue. To decide the issue, subjective effort must be added, namely, the directing and waging of war, man's conscious activity in war.

62. In seeking victory, those who direct a war cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the objective conditions; within these limitations, however, they can and must exercise conscious activity in striving for victory. The stage of action for commanders in a war must be built upon objective possibilities, but on that stage they can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur. Given the objective material foundations, the commanders in the anti-Japanese war should display their prowess and marshal all their forces to crush the national enemy, transform the present situation in which our country and society are suffering from aggression and oppression, and create a new China of freedom and equality; here is where our subjective faculties for directing war can and must be exercised. We do not want any of our commanders in the war to detach himself from the objective conditions and become a blundering hothead, but we decidedly want every commander to become a general who is both bold and sagacious. Our commanders should have not only the boldness to overwhelm the enemy but also the ability to remain masters of the situation throughout the changes and vicissitudes of the entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, they must not flounder but make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. Strategy and tactics, as the laws for directing war, constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war.

## WAR AND POLITICS

63. "War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character. The anti-

Japanese war is a revolutionary war waged by the whole nation, and victory is inseparable from the political aim of the war — to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality — inseparable from the general policy of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front, from the mobilization of the entire people, and from such political principles as the unity between officers and men, the unity between army and people and the disintegration of the enemy forces, and inseparable from the effective application of united front policy, from mobilization on the cultural front, and from the efforts to win international support and the support of the people inside Japan. In a word, war cannot for a single moment be separated from politics. Any tendency among the anti-Japanese armed forces to belittle politics by isolating war from it and advocating the idea that “war is absolute” is wrong and should be corrected.

64. But war has its own particular characteristics and in this sense it cannot be equated with politics in general. “War is simply the continuation of politics by other . . . means.”<sup>16</sup> When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep away the obstacles in the way. For instance, the semi-independent status of China is an obstacle to the political growth of Japanese imperialism, hence Japan has unleashed a war of aggression to sweep away that obstacle. What about China? Imperialist oppression has long been an obstacle to China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution, hence many wars of liberation have been waged in the effort to sweep it away. Japan is now using war for the purpose of oppressing China and completely blocking the advance of the Chinese revolution, and therefore China is compelled to wage the War of Resistance in her determination to sweep away this obstacle. When the obstacle is removed, our political aim will be attained and the war concluded. But if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continue till the aim is fully accomplished. Thus anyone who seeks a compromise before the task of the anti-Japanese war is fulfilled is bound to fail, because even if a compromise were to occur for one reason or another, the war would break out again, since the broad masses of the people would certainly not submit but would continue the war until its political objective was achieved. It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.

65. From the particular characteristics of war there arise a particular set of organizations, a particular series of methods and a process

of a particular kind. The organizations are the armed forces and everything that goes with them. The methods are the strategy and tactics for directing war. The process is the particular form of social activity in which the opposing armed forces attack each other or defend themselves against one another, employing strategy and tactics favourable to themselves and unfavourable to the enemy. Hence war experience is a particular kind of experience. All who take part in war must rid themselves of their customary ways and accustom themselves to war before they can win victory.

### POLITICAL MOBILIZATION FOR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

66. A national revolutionary war as great as ours cannot be won without universal and thoroughgoing political mobilization. Before the anti-Japanese war there was no political mobilization for resistance to Japan, and this was a great drawback, as a result of which China has already lost a move to the enemy. After the war began, political mobilization was very far from extensive, let alone thoroughgoing. It was the enemy's gunfire and the bombs dropped by enemy aeroplanes that brought news of the war to the great majority of the people. That was also a kind of mobilization, but it was done for us by the enemy, we did not do it ourselves. Even now the people in the remoter regions beyond the noise of the guns are carrying on quietly as usual. This situation must change, or otherwise we cannot win in our life-and-death struggle. We must never lose another move to the enemy; on the contrary, we must make full use of this move, political mobilization, to get the better of him. This move is crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiority in weapons and other things is only secondary. The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war. To win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war. But all these are inseparable from the mobilization of the common people. To wish for victory and yet neglect political mobilization is like wishing to "go north by driving a chariot south", and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory.

67. What is political mobilization? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political aim of the war. It is necessary for every soldier and civilian to understand why the war must be fought and how it concerns him. The political aim of the war is "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality"; we must proclaim this aim to everybody, to all the soldiers and civilians, before we can create an anti-Japanese upsurge and unite hundreds of millions as one man to contribute their all to the war. Secondly, it is not enough merely to explain the aim to them; the steps and policies for its attainment must also be given, that is, there must be a political programme. We already have the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and also the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction; we should popularize both of them in the army and among the people and mobilize everyone to carry them out. Without a clear-cut, concrete political programme it is impossible to mobilize all the armed forces and the whole people to carry the fight against Japan through to the end. Thirdly, how should we mobilize them? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through plays and films, through schools, through the mass organizations and through our cadres. What has been done so far in the Kuomintang areas is only a drop in the ocean, and moreover it has been done in a manner ill-suited to the people's tastes and in a spirit uncongenial to them; this must be drastically changed. Fourthly, to mobilize once is not enough, and political mobilization for the War of Resistance must be continuous. Our job is not to recite our political programme mechanically to the people, for nobody will listen to such recitations; we must link the political mobilization for the war with developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement. This is a matter of immense importance on which our victory in the war primarily depends.

### THE OBJECT OF WAR

68. Here we are not dealing with the political aim of war; the political aim of the War of Resistance Against Japan has been defined above as "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality". Here we are dealing with the elementary

object of war, war as "man's politics with bloodshed", as mutual slaughter by opposing armies. The object of war is specifically "to preserve oneself and to destroy the enemy". (To destroy the enemy is to disarm him or "deprive him of the power to resist", and not to destroy every member of his forces physically.) In ancient warfare, the spear and the shield were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy, and the shield to defend and preserve oneself. To the present day, all weapons are still an extension of the spear and the shield. The bomber, the machine-gun, the long-range gun and poison gas are developments of the spear, while the air-raid shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete fortification and the gas mask are developments of the shield. The tank is a new weapon combining the functions of both spear and shield. Attack is the chief means of destroying the enemy, but defence cannot be dispensed with. In attack the immediate object is to destroy the enemy, but at the same time it is self-preservation, because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defence the immediate object is to preserve yourself, but at the same time defence is a means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over to the attack. Retreat is in the category of defence and is a continuation of defence, while pursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that destruction of the enemy is the primary object of war and self-preservation the secondary, because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectively preserve oneself. Therefore attack, the chief means of destroying the enemy, is primary, while defence, a supplementary means of destroying the enemy and one means of self-preservation, is secondary. In actual warfare the chief role is played now by defence and now by attack, but if war is taken as a whole, attack remains primary.

69. How do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Does it not contradict "self-preservation"? No, it does not; sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. War is politics with bloodshed and exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is incurred for the sake of general and permanent preservation. This is precisely why we say that attack, which is basically a means of destroying the enemy, also has the function of self-preservation. It is also the reason why defence must be accompanied by attack and should not be defence pure and simple.

70. The object of war, namely, the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy, is the essence of war and the basis of

all war activities, an essence which pervades all war activities, from the technical to the strategic. The object of war is the underlying principle of war, and no technical, tactical, or strategic concepts or principles can in any way depart from it. What for instance is meant by the principle of "taking cover and making full use of fire-power" in shooting? The purpose of the former is self-preservation, of the latter to destroy the enemy. The former gives rise to such techniques as making use of the terrain and its features, advancing in spurts, and spreading out in dispersed formation. The latter gives rise to other techniques, such as clearing the field of fire and organizing a fire-net. As for the assault force, the containing force and the reserve force in a tactical operation, the first is for annihilating the enemy, the second for preserving oneself, and the third is for either purpose according to circumstances — either for annihilating the enemy (in which case it reinforces the assault force or serves as a pursuit force), or for self-preservation (in which case it reinforces the containing force or serves as a covering force). Thus, no technical, tactical, or strategical principles or operations can in any way depart from the object of war, and this object pervades the whole of a war and runs through it from beginning to end.

71. In directing the anti-Japanese war, leaders at the various levels must not lose sight of the contrast between the fundamental factors on each side and of the object of this war. In the course of military operations these contrasting fundamental factors unfold themselves in the struggle by each side to preserve itself and to destroy the other. In our war we strive in every engagement to win a victory, big or small, and to disarm a part of the enemy and to destroy a part of his men and *matériel*. We must accumulate the results of these partial destructions of the enemy into major strategic victories and so achieve the final political aim of expelling the enemy, protecting the motherland and building a new China.

#### OFFENCE WITHIN DEFENCE, QUICK DECISIONS WITHIN A PROTRACTED WAR, EXTERIOR LINES WITHIN INTERIOR LINES

72. Now let us examine the specific strategy of the War of Resistance Against Japan. We have already said that our strategy for resisting Japan is that of protracted war, and indeed this is per-

fectly right. But this strategy is general, not specific. Specifically, how should the protracted war be conducted? We shall now discuss this question. Our answer is as follows. In the first and second stages of the war, *i.e.*, in the stages of the enemy's offensive and preservation of his gains, we should wage offensive campaigns and battles within the strategic defence, campaigns and battles of quick decision within the strategically protracted war, and campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategic interior lines. In the third stage, we should launch the strategic counter-offensive.

73. Since Japan is a strong imperialist power and we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, she has adopted the policy of the strategic offensive while we are on the strategic defensive. Japan is trying to execute the strategy of a war of quick decision; we should consciously execute the strategy of protracted war. Japan is using dozens of army divisions of fairly high combat effectiveness (now numbering thirty) and part of her navy to encircle and blockade China from both land and sea, and is using her air force to bomb China. Her army has already established a long front stretching from Paotow to Hangchow and her navy has reached Fukien and Kwangtung; thus exterior-line operations have taken shape on a vast scale. On the other hand, we are in the position of operating on interior lines. All this is due to the fact that the enemy is strong while we are weak. This is one aspect of the situation.

74. But there is another and exactly opposite aspect. Japan, though strong, does not have enough soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory, a large population and plenty of soldiers. Two important consequences follow. First, the enemy, employing his small forces against a vast country, can only occupy some big cities and main lines of communication and part of the plains. Thus there are extensive areas in the territory under his occupation which he has had to leave ungarrisoned, and which provide a vast arena for our guerrilla warfare. Taking China as a whole, even if the enemy manages to occupy the line connecting Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and its adjacent areas, he can hardly seize the regions beyond, and this gives China a general rear and vital bases from which to carry on the protracted war to final victory. Secondly, in pitting his small forces against large forces, the enemy is encircled by our large forces. The enemy is attacking us along several routes, strategically he is on exterior lines while we are on interior lines, strategically he is on the offensive while we are on the defensive; all this looks very

much to our disadvantage. However, we can make use of our two advantages, namely, our vast territory and large forces, and instead of stubborn positional warfare, carry on flexible mobile warfare, employing several divisions against one enemy division, several tens of thousands of our men against ten thousand of his, several columns against one of his columns, and suddenly encircling and attacking a single column from the exterior lines of the battlefield. In this way, while the enemy is on exterior lines and on the offensive in strategic operations, he will be forced to fight on interior lines and on the defensive in campaigns and battles. And for us, interior lines and the defensive in strategic operations will be transformed into exterior lines and the offensive in campaigns and battles. This is the way to deal with one or indeed with any advancing enemy column. Both the consequences discussed above follow from the fact that the enemy forces are small while ours are large. Again, the enemy forces, though small, are strong (in weapons and training) while our forces, though large, are weak (in weapons and training but not in morale), and in campaigns and battles, therefore, we should not only employ large forces against small and operate from exterior against interior lines, but also follow the policy of seeking quick decisions. In general, to achieve quick decision, we should attack a moving and not a stationary enemy. We should concentrate a big force under cover beforehand alongside the route which the enemy is sure to take, and while he is on the move, advance suddenly to encircle and attack him before he knows what is happening, and thus quickly conclude the battle. If we fight well, we may destroy the entire enemy force or the greater part or some part of it, and even if we do not fight so well, we may still inflict heavy casualties. This applies to any and every one of our battles. If each month we could win one sizable victory like that at Pinghsingkuan or Taierhchuang, not to speak of more, it would greatly demoralize the enemy, stimulate the morale of our own forces and evoke international support. Thus our strategically protracted war is translated in the field into battles of quick decision. The enemy's war of strategic quick decision is bound to change into protracted war after he is defeated in many campaigns and battles.

75. In a word, the above operational principle for fighting campaigns and battles is one of "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines". It is the opposite of our strategic principle of "protracted defensive warfare on interior lines", and yet it is the principle that is indispensable for carrying out this strategy. If we should use

“protracted defensive warfare on interior lines” as the principle for campaigns and battles too, as we did at the beginning of the War of Resistance, it would be totally unsuited to the circumstances in which the enemy is small while we are big and the enemy is strong while we are weak; in that case we could never achieve our strategic objective of a protracted war and we would be defeated by the enemy. That is why we have always advocated the organization of the forces of the entire country into a number of large field armies, each counterposed to one of the enemy’s field armies but having two, three or four times its strength, and so keeping the enemy engaged in extensive theatres of war in accordance with the principle outlined above. This principle of “quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines” can and must be applied in guerrilla as well as in regular warfare. It is applicable not only to any one stage of the war but to its entire course. In the stage of strategic counter-offensive, when we are better equipped technically and are no longer in the position of the weak fighting the strong, we shall be able to capture prisoners and booty on a large scale all the more effectively if we continue to employ superior numbers in quick-decision offensive battles from exterior lines. For instance, if we employ two, three or four mechanized divisions against one mechanized enemy division, we can be all the more certain of destroying it. It is common sense that several hefty fellows can easily beat one.

76. If we resolutely apply “exterior-line quick-decision offensive warfare” on a battlefield, we shall not only change the balance of forces on that battlefield, but also gradually change the general situation. On the battlefield we shall be on the offensive and the enemy on the defensive, we shall be employing superior numbers on exterior lines and the enemy inferior numbers on interior lines, and we shall seek quick decisions, while the enemy, try as he may, will not be able to protract the fighting in expectation of reinforcements; for all these reasons, the enemy’s position will change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior, while that of our forces will change from weak to strong, from inferior to superior. After many such battles have been victoriously fought, the general situation between us and the enemy will change. That is to say, through the accumulation of victories on many battlefields by quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, we shall gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the enemy, which will necessarily affect the general balance of forces and bring about changes in it. When that happens, these changes, together with

other factors on our side and together with the changes inside the enemy camp and a favourable international situation, will turn the over-all situation between us and the enemy first into one of parity and then into one of superiority for us. That will be the time for us to launch the counter-offensive and drive the enemy out of the country.

77. War is a contest of strength, but the original pattern of strength changes in the course of war. Here the decisive factor is subjective effort — winning more victories and committing fewer errors. The objective factors provide the possibility for such change, but in order to turn this possibility into actuality both correct policy and subjective effort are essential. It is then that the subjective plays the decisive role.

### INITIATIVE, FLEXIBILITY AND PLANNING

78. In quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines, as discussed above, the crucial point is the “offensive”; “exterior lines” refers to the sphere of the offensive and “quick-decision” to its duration. Hence the name “exterior-line quick-decision offensive warfare”. It is the best principle for waging a protracted war and it is also the principle for what is known as mobile warfare. But it cannot be put into effect without initiative, flexibility and planning. Let us now study these three questions.

79. We have already discussed conscious activity, so why do we talk about the initiative again? By conscious activity we mean conscious action and effort, a characteristic unique to man, and this human characteristic manifests itself most strongly in war; all this has been discussed already. The initiative here means an army's freedom of action as distinguished from an enforced loss of freedom. Freedom of action is the very life of an army and, once it is lost, the army is close to defeat or destruction. The disarming of a soldier is the result of his losing freedom of action and of his being forced into a passive position. The same is true of the defeat of an army. For this reason both sides in war do all they can to gain the initiative and avoid passivity. It may be said that the quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines which we advocate and the flexibility and planning necessary for its execution are designed to gain the initiative and thus force the enemy into a passive position and achieve the object

of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. But initiative or passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war. Consequently it is also inseparable from the correctness or incorrectness of the subjective direction of war. In addition, there is the question of exploiting the enemy's misconceptions and unpreparedness to gain the initiative and force the enemy into passivity. These points are analysed below.

80. Initiative is inseparable from superiority in capacity to wage war, while passivity is inseparable from inferiority in capacity to wage war. Such superiority or inferiority is the objective basis of initiative or passivity. It is natural that the strategic initiative can be better maintained and developed through a strategic offensive, but to maintain the initiative always and everywhere, that is, to have the absolute initiative, is possible only when there is absolute superiority matched against absolute inferiority. When a strong, healthy man wrestles with an invalid, he has the absolute initiative. If Japan were not riddled with insoluble contradictions, if, for instance, she could throw in a huge force of several million or ten million men all at once, if her financial resources were several times what they are, if she had no opposition from her own people or from other countries, and if she did not pursue the barbarous policies which arouse the desperate resistance of the Chinese people, then she would be able to maintain absolute superiority and have the absolute initiative always and everywhere. In history, such absolute superiority rarely appears in the early stages of a war or a campaign but is to be found towards its end. For instance, on the eve of Germany's capitulation in World War I, the Allied Powers became absolutely superior and Germany absolutely inferior, so that Germany was defeated and the Allied Powers were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority towards the end of a war. Again, on the eve of the Chinese victory at Taierhchuang, the isolated Japanese forces there were reduced after bitter fighting to absolute inferiority while our forces achieved absolute superiority, so that the enemy was defeated and we were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority towards the end of a campaign. A war or campaign may also end in a situation of relative superiority or of parity, in which case there is compromise in the war or stalemate in the campaign. But in general it is absolute superiority and inferiority that decide victory and defeat. All this holds for the end of a war or a campaign, and not for the beginning. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese War, it can be predicted, will be

that Japan will become absolutely inferior and be defeated and that China will become absolutely superior and gain victory. But at present superiority or inferiority is not absolute on either side, but is relative. With the advantages of her military, economic and political-organizational power, Japan enjoys superiority over us with our military, economic and political-organizational weakness, which creates the basis for her initiative. But since quantitatively her military and other power is not great and she has many other disadvantages, her superiority is reduced by her own contradictions. Within China, her superiority has been reduced still further because she has come up against our vast territory, large population, great numbers of troops and resolute nation-wide resistance. Hence, Japan's general position has become one of only relative superiority, and her ability to exercise and maintain the initiative, which is thereby restricted, has likewise become relative. As for China, though placed in a somewhat passive position strategically because of her inferior strength, she is nevertheless quantitatively superior in territory, population and troops, and also superior in the morale of her people and army and their patriotic hatred of the enemy; this superiority, together with other advantages, reduces the extent of her inferiority in military, economic and other power, and changes it into a relative strategic inferiority. This also reduces the degree of China's passivity so that her strategic position is one of only relative passivity. Any passivity, however, is a disadvantage, and one must strive hard to shake it off. Militarily, the way to do so is resolutely to wage quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, to launch guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy and so secure overwhelming local superiority and initiative in many campaigns of mobile and guerrilla warfare. Through such local superiority and local initiative in many campaigns, we can gradually create strategic superiority and strategic initiative and extricate ourselves from strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the interrelation between initiative and passivity, between superiority and inferiority.

81. From this we can also understand the relationship between initiative or passivity and the subjective directing of war. As already explained, it is possible to escape from our position of relative strategic inferiority and passivity, and the method is to create local superiority and initiative in many places, so depriving the enemy of local superiority and initiative and plunging him into inferiority and passivity. These local successes will add up to strategic superiority and initiative for us and strategic inferiority and passivity for the enemy. Such a change

depends upon correct subjective direction. Why? Because while we seek superiority and the initiative, so does the enemy; viewed from this angle, war is a contest in subjective ability between the commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for superiority and for the initiative on the basis of material conditions such as military forces and financial resources. Out of the contest there emerge a victor and a vanquished; leaving aside the balance of objective material conditions, the victor will necessarily owe his success to correct subjective direction and the vanquished his defeat to wrong subjective direction. We admit that the phenomenon of war is more elusive and is characterized by greater uncertainty than any other social phenomenon, in other words, that it is more a matter of "probability". Yet war is in no way supernatural, but a mundane process governed by necessity. That is why Sun Wu Tzu's axiom, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat",<sup>17</sup> remains a scientific truth. Mistakes arise from ignorance about the enemy and about ourselves, and moreover the peculiar nature of war makes it impossible in many cases to have full knowledge about both sides; hence the uncertainty about military conditions and operations, and hence mistakes and defeats. But whatever the situation and the moves in a war, one can know their general aspects and essential points. It is possible for a commander to reduce errors and give generally correct direction, first through all sorts of reconnaissance and then through intelligent inference and judgement. Armed with the weapon of "generally correct direction", we can win more battles and transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into initiative. This is how initiative or passivity is related to the correct or incorrect subjective direction of a war.

82. The thesis that incorrect subjective direction can change superiority and initiative into inferiority and passivity, and that correct subjective direction can effect a reverse change, becomes all the more convincing when we look at the record of defeats suffered by big and powerful armies and of victories won by small and weak armies. There are many such instances in Chinese and foreign history. Examples in China are the Battle of Chengpu between the states of Tsin and Chu,<sup>18</sup> the Battle of Chengkao between the states of Chu and Han,<sup>19</sup> the Battle in which Han Hsin defeated the Chao armies,<sup>20</sup> the Battle of Kunyang between the states of Hsin and Han,<sup>21</sup> the Battle of Kuantu between Yuan Shao and Tsao Tsao,<sup>22</sup> the Battle of Chihpi between the states of Wu and Wei,<sup>23</sup> the Battle of Yiling between

the states of Wu and Shu,<sup>24</sup> the Battle of Feishui between the states of Chin and Tsin,<sup>25</sup> etc. Among examples to be found abroad are most of Napoleon's campaigns and the civil war in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution. In all these instances, victory was won by small forces over big and by inferior over superior forces. In every case, the weaker force, pitting local superiority and initiative against the enemy's local inferiority and passivity, first inflicted one sharp defeat on the enemy and then turned on the rest of his forces and smashed them one by one, thus transforming the over-all situation into one of superiority and initiative. The reverse was the case with the enemy who originally had superiority and held the initiative; owing to subjective errors and internal contradictions, it sometimes happened that he completely lost an excellent or fairly good position in which he enjoyed superiority and initiative, and became a general without an army or a king without a kingdom. Thus it can be seen that although superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war is the objective basis determining initiative or passivity, it is not in itself actual initiative or passivity; it is only through a struggle, a contest of ability, that actual initiative or passivity can emerge. In the struggle, correct subjective direction can transform inferiority into superiority and passivity into initiative, and incorrect subjective direction can do the opposite. The fact that every ruling dynasty was defeated by revolutionary armies shows that mere superiority in certain respects does not guarantee the initiative, much less the final victory. The inferior side can wrest the initiative and victory from the superior side by securing certain conditions through active subjective endeavour in accordance with the actual circumstances.

83. To have misconceptions and to be caught unawares may mean to lose superiority and initiative. Hence, deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemy and then springing surprise attacks upon him is one means — indeed an important means — of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What are misconceptions? "To see every bush and tree on Mount Pakung as an enemy soldier"<sup>26</sup> is an example of misconception. And "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west" is a way of creating misconceptions among the enemy. When the mass support is sufficiently good to block the leakage of news, it is often possible by various ruses to succeed in leading the enemy into a morass of wrong judgements and actions so that he loses his superiority and the initiative. The saying, "There can never be too much deception in war", means precisely this. What does "being

caught unawares" mean? It means being unprepared. Without preparedness superiority is not real superiority and there can be no initiative either. Having grasped this point, a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by surprise attack. We say an enemy on the move is easy to attack precisely because he is then off guard, that is, unprepared. These two points — creating misconceptions among the enemy and springing surprise attacks on him — mean transferring the uncertainties of war to the enemy while securing the greatest possible certainty for ourselves and thereby gaining superiority, the initiative and victory. Excellent organization of the masses is the prerequisite for attaining all this. Therefore it is extremely important to arouse all the people who are opposed to the enemy, in order that they may arm themselves to the last man, make widespread raids on the enemy and also prevent the leakage of news and provide a screen for our own forces; thus the enemy is kept in the dark about where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis is created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part. It was largely owing to the organized, armed masses of the people that the weak and small force of the Chinese Red Army was able to win many battles in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Logically, a national war should win broader mass support than an agrarian revolutionary war; however, as a result of past mistakes<sup>27</sup> the people are in an unorganized state, cannot be promptly drawn in to serve the cause and are sometimes even made use of by the enemy. The resolute rallying of the people on a broad scale is the only way to secure inexhaustible resources to meet all the requirements of the war. Moreover, it will definitely play a big part in carrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by misleading him and catching him unawares. We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his asinine ethics.<sup>28</sup> In order to achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds. The above concerns the way in which the initiative or passivity is related to the subjective direction of the war. Such subjective direction is indispensable for defeating Japan.

84. By and large, Japan has held the initiative, in the stage of her offensive, by reason of her military power and her exploitation of our subjective errors, past and present. But her initiative is beginning to wane to some extent because of her many inherent disadvantages and of the subjective errors she too has committed in the course of

the war (of which more later) and also because of our many advantages. The enemy's defeat at Taierhchuang and his predicament in Shansi prove this clearly. The widespread development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear has placed his garrisons in the occupied areas in a completely passive position. Although he is still on the offensive strategically and still holds the initiative, his initiative will end when his strategic offensive ends. The first reason why the enemy will not be able to maintain the initiative is that his shortage of troops renders it impossible for him to carry on the offensive indefinitely. Our offensive warfare in campaigns and our guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, together with other factors, constitute the second reason why he will have to cease his offensive at a certain limit and will not be able to keep his initiative. The existence of the Soviet Union and changes in the international situation constitute the third reason. Thus it can be seen that the enemy's initiative is limited and can be shattered. If, in military operations, China can keep up offensive warfare by her main forces in campaigns and battles, vigorously develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear and mobilize the people on a broad scale politically, we can gradually build up a position of strategic initiative.

85. Let us now discuss flexibility. What is flexibility? It is the concrete realization of the initiative in military operations; it is the flexible employment of armed forces. The flexible employment of armed forces is the central task in directing a war, a task most difficult to perform well. In addition to organizing and educating the army and the people, the business of war consists in the employment of troops in combat, and all these things are done to win the fight. Of course it is difficult to organize an army, etc., but it is even more difficult to employ it, particularly when the weak are fighting the strong. To do so requires subjective ability of a very high order and requires the overcoming of the confusion, obscurity and uncertainty peculiar to war and the discovery of order, clarity and certainty in it; only thus can flexibility in command be realized.

86. The basic principle of field operations for the War of Resistance Against Japan is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. There are various tactics or methods for giving effect to this principle, such as dispersion and concentration of forces, diverging advance and converging attack, the offensive and the defensive, assault and containment, encirclement and outflanking, advance and retreat. It is easy to understand these tactics, but not at all easy to employ and vary them flexibly. Here the three crucial

links are the time, the place and the troops. No victory can be won unless the time, the place and the troops are well chosen. For example, in attacking an enemy force on the move, if we strike too early, we expose ourselves and give the enemy a chance to prepare, and if we strike too late, the enemy may have encamped and concentrated his forces, presenting us a hard nut to crack. This is the question of the time. If we select a point of assault on the left flank and it actually turns out to be the enemy's weak point, victory will be easy; but if we select the right flank and hit a snag, nothing will be achieved. This is the question of the place. If a particular unit of our forces is employed for a particular task, victory may be easy; but if another unit is employed for the same task, it may be hard to achieve results. This is the question of the troops. We should know not only how to employ tactics but how to vary them. For flexibility of command the important task is to make changes such as from the offensive to the defensive or from the defensive to the offensive, from advance to retreat or from retreat to advance, from containment to assault or from assault to containment, from encirclement to outflanking or from outflanking to encirclement, and to make such changes properly and in good time according to the circumstances of the troops and terrain on both sides. This is true of command in battles, command in campaigns and strategic command.

87. The ancients said: "Ingenuity in varying tactics depends on mother wit"; this "ingenuity", which is what we mean by flexibility, is the contribution of the intelligent commander. Flexibility does not mean recklessness; recklessness must be rejected. Flexibility consists in an intelligent commander's ability to take timely and appropriate measures on the basis of objective conditions after "judging the hour and sizing up the situation" (the "situation" includes the enemy's situation, our situation and the terrain), and this flexibility is "ingenuity in varying tactics". On the basis of this ingenuity, we can win more victories in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, change the balance of forces in our favour, gain the initiative over the enemy, and overwhelm and crush him so that the final victory will be ours.

88. Let us now discuss the question of planning. Because of the uncertainty peculiar to war, it is much more difficult to prosecute war according to plan than is the case with other activities. Yet, since "affairs succeed when prepared and fail when unprepared", there can be no victory in war without advance planning and preparations.

There is no absolute certainty in war, and yet it is not without some degree of relative certainty. We are comparatively certain about our own situation. We are very uncertain about the enemy's, but here too there are signs for us to read, clues to follow and sequences of phenomena to ponder. These form what we call a degree of relative certainty, which provides an objective basis for planning in war. Modern technical developments (telegraphy, radio, aeroplanes, automobiles, railways, steamships, etc.) have added to the possibilities of planning in war. However, because there is only very limited and transient certainty in war, complete or stable planning is difficult; the plan must change with the movement (flow or change) of the war and vary in scope according to the scale of the war. Tactical plans, such as plans for attack or defence by small formations or units, often have to be changed several times a day. A plan of campaign, that is, of action by large formations, can generally stand till the conclusion of the campaign, in the course of which, however, it is often changed partially or sometimes even wholly. A strategic plan based on the over-all situation of both belligerents is still more stable, but it too is applicable only in a given strategic stage and has to be changed when the war moves towards a new stage. The making and changing of tactical, campaign and strategic plans in accordance with scope and circumstance is a key factor in directing a war; it is the concrete expression of flexibility in war, in other words, it is also ingenuity in varying one's tactics. Commanders at all levels in the anti-Japanese war should take note.

89. Because of the fluidity of war, some people categorically deny that war plans or policies can be relatively stable, describing such plans or policies as "mechanical". This view is wrong. In the preceding section we fully recognized that, because the circumstances of war are only relatively certain and the flow (movement or change) of war is rapid, war plans or policies can be only relatively stable and have to be changed or revised in good time in accordance with changing circumstances and the flow of the war; otherwise we would become mechanists. But one must not deny the need for war plans or policies that are relatively stable over given periods; to negate this is to negate everything, including the war itself as well as the negator himself. As both military conditions and operations are relatively stable, we must grant the relative stability of the war plans and policies resulting from them. For example, since both the circumstances of the war in northern China and the dispersed operational actions of the Eighth

Route Army are relatively stable for a particular stage, it is absolutely necessary during this stage to acknowledge the relative stability of the Eighth Route Army's strategic principle of operation, namely, "guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions". The period of validity of a plan for a campaign is shorter than that of a strategic plan, and for a tactical plan it is shorter still, but each is stable over a given period. Anyone denying this point would have no way of handling warfare and would become a relativist in war with no settled views, for whom one course is just as wrong or just as right as another. No one denies that even a plan valid for a given period is fluid; otherwise, one plan would never be abandoned in favour of another. But it is fluid within limits, fluid within the bounds of the various war operations undertaken for carrying it out, but not fluid as to its essence; in other words, it is quantitatively but not qualitatively fluid. Within such a given period of time, this essence is definitely not fluid, which is what we mean by relative stability within a given period. In the great river of the war as a whole, in which fluidity is absolute, there are various stretches, each of which is relatively stable; this is our view regarding the essence of war plans or policies.

90. Having dealt with protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy and quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, and also with the initiative, flexibility and planning, we can now sum up briefly. The anti-Japanese war must have a plan. War plans, which are the concrete application of strategy and tactics, must be flexible so that they can be adapted to the circumstances of the war. We should always seek to transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into the initiative so as to change the situation as between the enemy and ourselves. The expression of all this is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles and protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy.

#### MOBILE WARFARE, GUERRILLA WARFARE AND POSITIONAL WARFARE

91. In content, our war is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles within the framework of the

strategy of interior lines, protracted war and defence, and in form, it is mobile warfare. Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operation. At the same time, it includes "mobile defence", which is conducted when necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also includes positional attack and positional defence in a supplementary role. Its characteristics are regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive, and fluidity.

92. China has a vast territory and an immense number of soldiers, but her troops are inadequately equipped and trained; the enemy's forces, on the other hand, are inadequate in number, but better equipped and trained. In this situation, there is no doubt that we must adopt offensive mobile warfare as our primary mode of operations, supplementing it by others and integrating them all into mobile warfare. We must oppose "only retreat, never advance", which is flight-ism, and at the same time oppose "only advance, never retreat", which is desperate recklessness.

93. One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides. However, it has nothing in common with flight-ism of the Han Fu-chu brand.<sup>29</sup> The primary requirement of war is to destroy the enemy, and the other requirement is self-preservation. The object of self-preservation is to destroy the enemy, and to destroy the enemy is in turn the most effective means of self-preservation. Hence mobile warfare is in no way an excuse for people like Han Fu-chu and can never mean moving only backward, and never forward; that kind of "moving" which negates the basically offensive character of mobile warfare would, in practice, "move" China out of existence despite her vastness.

94. However, the other view, which we call the desperate recklessness of "only advance, never retreat", is also wrong. We advocate mobile warfare, the substance of which is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles; it also includes positional warfare in a supplementary role, "mobile defence" and retreat, without which mobile warfare cannot be fully carried out. Desperate recklessness is military short-sightedness, originating often from fear of losing territory. A man who acts with desperate recklessness does not know that one characteristic of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits but requires a field army to advance

and to withdraw in great strides. In a positive situation, in order to draw the enemy into a fight unfavourable to him but favourable to us, it is usually necessary that he should be on the move and that we should have a number of advantages, such as favourable terrain, a vulnerable enemy, a local population that can prevent the leakage of information, and the enemy's fatigue and unpreparedness. This requires that the enemy should advance, and we should not grudge a temporary loss of part of our territory. For the temporary loss of part of our territory is the price we pay for the permanent preservation of all our territory and for the recovery of lost territory. In a negative situation, whenever we are forced into a disadvantageous position which fundamentally endangers the preservation of our forces, we should have the courage to retreat, so as to preserve our forces and hit the enemy when new opportunities arise. In their ignorance of this principle, the advocates of desperate action will contest a city or a piece of ground even when the position is obviously and definitely unfavourable; as a result, they not only lose the city or ground but fail to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the policy of "luring the enemy in deep", precisely because it is the most effective military policy for a weak army strategically on the defensive to employ against a strong.

95. Among the forms of warfare in the anti-Japanese war mobile warfare comes first and guerrilla warfare second. When we say that in the entire war mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we mean that the outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility in deciding the outcome. It does not follow, however, that the role of guerrilla warfare is unimportant in the strategy of the war. Its role in the strategy of the war as a whole is second only to that of mobile warfare, for without its support we cannot defeat the enemy. In saying this we also have in mind the strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. Guerrilla warfare will not remain the same throughout this long and cruel war, but will rise to a higher level and develop into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold, to support regular warfare and to transform itself into regular warfare. Considering the unprecedented extent and duration of guerrilla warfare in China's War of Resistance, it is all the more important not to underestimate its strategic role. Guerrilla warfare in China, therefore, has not only its tactical but also its

peculiar strategic problems. I have already discussed this in "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan". As indicated above, the forms of warfare in the three strategic stages of the War of Resistance are as follows. In the first stage mobile warfare is primary, while guerrilla and positional warfare are supplementary. In the second stage guerrilla warfare will advance to the first place and will be supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. In the third stage mobile warfare will again become the primary form and will be supplemented by positional and guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of the third stage will no longer be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; part, possibly quite an important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originally guerrillas but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare. From the viewpoint of all three stages in China's War of Resistance Against Japan, guerrilla warfare is definitely indispensable. Our guerrilla war will present a great drama unparalleled in the annals of war. For this reason, out of the millions of China's regular troops, it is absolutely necessary to assign at least several hundred thousand to disperse through all enemy-occupied areas, arouse the masses to arm themselves, and wage guerrilla warfare in co-ordination with the masses. The regular forces so assigned should shoulder this sacred task conscientiously, and they should not think their status lowered because they fight fewer big battles and for the time being do not appear as national heroes. Any such thinking is wrong. Guerrilla warfare does not bring as quick results or as great renown as regular warfare, but "a long road tests a horse's strength and a long task proves a man's heart", and in the course of this long and cruel war guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its immense power; it is indeed no ordinary undertaking. Moreover, such regular forces can conduct guerrilla warfare when dispersed and mobile warfare when concentrated, as the Eighth Route Army has been doing. The principle of the Eighth Route Army is, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." This principle is perfectly correct; the views of its opponents are wrong.

96. At China's present technical level, positional warfare, defensive or offensive, is generally impracticable, and this is where our weakness manifests itself. Moreover, the enemy is also exploiting the vastness of our territory to by-pass our fortified positions. Hence positional warfare cannot be an important, still less the principal, means for us. But in the first and second stages of the war, it is possible

and essential, within the scope of mobile warfare, to employ localized positional warfare in a supplementary role in campaigns. Semi-positional "mobile defence" is a still more essential part of mobile warfare undertaken for the purpose of resisting the enemy at every step, thereby depleting his forces and gaining extra time. China must strive to increase her supplies of modern weapons so that she can fully carry out the tasks of positional attack in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive. In this third stage positional warfare will undoubtedly play a greater role, for then the enemy will be holding fast to his positions, and we shall not be able to recover our lost territory unless we launch powerful positional attacks in support of mobile warfare. Nevertheless, in the third stage too, we must exert our every effort to make mobile warfare the primary form of warfare. For the art of directing war and the active role of man are largely nullified in positional warfare such as that fought in Western Europe in the second half of World War I. It is only natural that the war should be taken "out of the trenches", since the war is being fought in the vast expanses of China and since our side will remain poorly equipped technically for quite a long time. Even during the third stage, when China's technical position will be better, she will hardly surpass her enemy in that respect, and so will have to concentrate on highly mobile warfare, without which she cannot achieve final victory. Hence, throughout the War of Resistance China will not adopt positional warfare as primary; the primary or important forms are mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. These two forms of warfare will afford full play to the art of directing war and to the active role of man — what a piece of good fortune out of our misfortune!

## WAR OF ATTRITION AND WAR OF ANNIHILATION

97. As we have said before, the essence, or the object, of war is to preserve oneself and to destroy the enemy. There are three forms of warfare, mobile, positional and guerrilla, for achieving this object, and since they differ in degrees of effectiveness, there arises the broad distinction between war of attrition and war of annihilation.

98. To begin with, we may say that the anti-Japanese war is at once a war of attrition and a war of annihilation. Why? Because the enemy is still exploiting his strength and retains strategic superiority

and strategic initiative, and, therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot effectively and speedily reduce his strength and break his superiority and initiative. We still have our weakness and have not yet rid ourselves of strategic inferiority and passivity, and, therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot win time to improve our internal and international situation and alter our unfavourable position. Hence campaigns of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition. In this sense war of annihilation *is* war of attrition. It is chiefly by using the method of attrition through annihilation that China can wage protracted war.

99. But the objective of strategic attrition may also be achieved by campaigns of attrition. Generally speaking, mobile warfare performs the task of annihilation, positional warfare performs the task of attrition, and guerrilla warfare performs both simultaneously; the three forms of warfare are thus distinguished from war of attrition. In this sense war of annihilation is different from war of attrition. Campaigns of attrition are supplementary but necessary in protracted war.

100. Speaking theoretically and in terms of China's needs, in order to achieve the strategic objective of greatly depleting the enemy's forces, China in her defensive stage should not only exploit the function of annihilation, which is fulfilled primarily by mobile warfare and partially by guerrilla warfare, but also exploit the function of attrition, which is fulfilled primarily by positional warfare (which itself is supplementary) and partially by guerrilla warfare. In the stage of stalemate we should continue to exploit the functions of annihilation and attrition fulfilled by guerrilla and mobile warfare for further large-scale depletion of the enemy's forces. All this is aimed at protracting the war, gradually changing the general balance of forces and preparing the conditions for our counter-offensive. During the strategic counter-offensive, we should continue to employ the method of attrition through annihilation so as finally to expel the enemy.

101. But as a matter of fact, it was our experience in the last ten months that many or even most of the mobile warfare campaigns became campaigns of attrition, and guerrilla warfare did not adequately fulfil its proper function of annihilation in certain areas. The positive aspect is that at least we depleted the enemy's forces, which is important both for the protracted warfare and for our final victory, and did not shed our blood in vain. But the drawbacks are first, that

we did not sufficiently deplete the enemy, and second, that we were unable to avoid rather heavy losses and captured little war booty. Although we should recognize the objective cause of this situation, namely, the disparity between us and the enemy in technical equipment and in the training of troops, in any case it is necessary, both theoretically and practically, to urge that our main forces should fight vigorous battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favourable. And although our guerrilla units have to wage battles of pure attrition in performing specific tasks such as sabotage and harassment, it is necessary to advocate and vigorously carry out campaigns and battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favourable, so as greatly to deplete the enemy's forces and greatly replenish our own.

102. The "exterior lines", the "quick-decision" and the "offensive" in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines and the "mobility" in mobile warfare find their main operational expression in the use of encirclement and outflanking tactics; hence the necessity for concentrating superior forces. Therefore concentration of forces and the use of encirclement and outflanking tactics are the prerequisites for mobile warfare, that is, for quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. All this is aimed at annihilating the enemy forces.

103. The strength of the Japanese army lies not only in its weapons but also in the training of its officers and men — its degree of organization, its self-confidence arising from never having been defeated, its superstitious belief in the Mikado and in supernatural beings, its arrogance, its contempt for the Chinese people and other such characteristics, all of which stem from long years of indoctrination by the Japanese warlords and from the Japanese national tradition. This is the chief reason why we have taken very few prisoners, although we have killed and wounded a great many enemy troops. It is a point that has been underestimated by many people in the past. To break down these enemy characteristics will be a long process. The first thing to do is to give the matter serious attention, and then patiently and systematically to work at it in the political field and in the fields of international propaganda and the Japanese people's movement; in the military sphere war of annihilation is of course one of the means. In these enemy characteristics pessimists may find a basis for the theory of national subjugation, and passively-minded military men a basis for opposition to war of annihilation. We, on the contrary, maintain that these strong points of the Japanese

army can be broken down and that their destruction has already begun. The chief method of destroying them is to win over the Japanese soldiers politically. We should understand, rather than hurt, their pride and channel it in the proper direction and, by treating prisoners of war leniently, lead the Japanese soldiers to see the Japanese rulers' aggressiveness which is directed against the people. On the other hand, we should demonstrate to the Japanese soldiers the indomitable spirit and the heroic, stubborn fighting capacity of the Chinese army and the Chinese people, that is, we should deal them blows in battles of annihilation. Our experience in the last ten months of military operations shows that it is possible to annihilate enemy forces — witness the Pinghsingkuan and Taierhchuang campaigns. The Japanese army's morale is beginning to sag, its soldiers do not understand the aim of the war, they are engulfed by the Chinese armies and by the Chinese people, in assault they show far less courage than the Chinese soldiers, and so on; all these are objective factors favourable to waging battles of annihilation, and they will, moreover, steadily develop as the war becomes protracted. From the viewpoint of destroying the enemy's overweening arrogance through battles of annihilation, such battles are one of the prerequisites for shortening the war and accelerating the emancipation of the Japanese soldiers and the Japanese people. Cats make friends with cats, and nowhere in the world do cats make friends with mice.

104. On the other hand, it must be admitted that for the present we are inferior to the enemy in technical equipment and in troop training. Therefore, it is often difficult to achieve the maximum in annihilation, such as capturing the whole or the greater part of an enemy force, especially when fighting on the plains. In this connection the excessive demands of the theorists of quick victory are wrong. What should be demanded of our forces in the anti-Japanese war is that they should fight battles of annihilation as far as possible. In favourable circumstances, we should concentrate superior forces in every battle and employ encircling and outflanking tactics — encircle part if not all of the enemy forces, capture part if not all of the encircled forces, and inflict heavy casualties on part of the encircled forces if we cannot capture them. In circumstances which are unfavourable for battles of annihilation, we should fight battles of attrition. In favourable circumstances, we should employ the principle of concentration of forces, and in unfavourable circumstances that of their dispersion. As for the relationship of command in campaigns, we

should apply the principle of centralized command in the former and that of decentralized command in the latter. These are the basic principles of field operations for the War of Resistance Against Japan.

### THE POSSIBILITIES OF EXPLOITING THE ENEMY'S MISTAKES

105. The enemy command itself provides a basis for the possibility of defeating Japan. History has never known an infallible general, and the enemy makes mistakes just as we ourselves can hardly avoid doing so; in fact, the possibility exists of exploiting the enemy's errors. In the ten months of his war of aggression the enemy has already made many mistakes in strategy and tactics. There are five major ones.

First, piecemeal reinforcement. This is due to the enemy's underestimation of China and also to his shortage of troops. The enemy has always looked down on us. After grabbing the four northeastern provinces at small cost, he occupied eastern Hopei and northern Chahar, all by way of strategic reconnaissance. The conclusion the enemy came to was that the Chinese nation is a heap of loose sand. Thus, thinking that China would crumble at a single blow, he mapped out a plan of "quick decision", attempting with very small forces to send us scampering in panic. He did not expect to find such great unity and such immense powers of resistance as China has shown during the past ten months, forgetting as he did that China is already in an era of progress and already has an advanced political party, an advanced army and an advanced people. Meeting with setbacks, the enemy then increased his forces piecemeal from about a dozen to thirty divisions. If he wants to advance, he will have to augment his forces still further. But because of Japan's antagonism with the Soviet Union and her inherent shortage of manpower and finances, there are inevitable limits to the maximum number of men she can throw in and to the furthest extent of her advance.

Second, absence of a main direction of attack. Before the Taierhchung campaign, the enemy had divided his forces more or less evenly between northern and central China and had again divided them evenly inside each of these areas. In northern China,

for instance, he divided his forces evenly among the Tientsin-Pukow, the Peiping-Hankow and the Tatung-Puchow Railways, and along each of these lines he suffered some casualties and left some garrisons in the places occupied, after which he lacked the forces for further advances. After the Taierhchuang defeat from which he learned a lesson, the enemy concentrated his main forces in the direction of Hsuchow, and so temporarily corrected this mistake.

Third, lack of strategic co-ordination. On the whole co-ordination exists within the groups of enemy forces in northern China and in central China, but there is glaring lack of co-ordination between the two. When his forces on the southern section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway attacked Hsiaopengpu, those on the northern section made no move, and when his forces on the northern section attacked Taierhchuang, those on the southern section made no move. After the enemy came to grief at both places, the Japanese Minister of War arrived on an inspection tour and the Chief of General Staff turned up to take charge, and for the moment, it seemed, there was co-ordination. The landlord class, the bourgeoisie and the warlords of Japan have very serious internal contradictions, which are growing, and the lack of military co-ordination is one of the concrete manifestations of this fact.

Fourth, failure to grasp strategic opportunities. This failure was conspicuously shown in the enemy's halt after the occupation of Nanking and Taiyuan, chiefly because of his shortage of troops and his lack of a strategic pursuit force.

Fifth, encirclement of large, but annihilation of small, numbers. Before the Taierhchuang campaign, in the campaigns of Shanghai, Nanking, Tsangchow, Paoting, Nankow, Hsinkou and Linfen, many Chinese troops were routed but few were taken prisoner, which shows the stupidity of the enemy command.

These five errors — piecemeal reinforcement, absence of a main direction of attack, lack of strategic co-ordination, failure to grasp opportunities, and encirclement of large but annihilation of small numbers — were all points of incompetence in the Japanese command before the Taierhchuang campaign. Although the enemy has since made some improvements, he cannot possibly avoid repeating his errors because of his shortage of troops, his internal contradictions and other such factors. Moreover, what he gains at one point he loses

at another. For instance, when he concentrated his forces in northern China on Hsuehchow, he left a great vacuum in the occupied areas in northern China, which gave us full scope for developing guerrilla warfare. These mistakes were of the enemy's own making and not induced by us. On our part, we can deliberately make the enemy commit errors, that is, we can mislead him and manoeuvre him into the desired position by clever and effective actions behind the screen of a well-organized local population, for example, by "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west". This possibility has already been discussed. All the above shows that in the enemy's command, too, we can find some basis for victory. Of course, we should not take it as an important basis for our strategic planning; on the contrary, the only reliable course is to base our planning on the assumption that the enemy will make few mistakes. Besides, the enemy can exploit our mistakes just as we can exploit his. It is the duty of our command to allow him the minimum of opportunities for doing so. Actually, the enemy command has committed errors, will again commit errors in the future, and can be made to do so through our endeavours. All these errors we can exploit, and it is the business of our generals in the War of Resistance to do their utmost to seize upon them. However, although much of the enemy's strategic and campaign command is incompetent, there are quite a few excellent points in his battle command, that is, in his unit and small formation tactics, and here we should learn from him.

### THE QUESTION OF DECISIVE ENGAGEMENTS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

106. The question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war should be approached from three aspects: we should resolutely fight a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; we should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked. The characteristics differentiating our anti-Japanese war from many other wars are also revealed in this question of decisive engagements. In the first and second stages of the war, which are marked by the enemy's strength and our weakness, the enemy's objective is to have us concentrate our main forces

for a decisive engagement. Our objective is exactly the opposite. We want to choose conditions favourable to us, concentrate superior forces and fight decisive campaigns or battles only when sure of victory, as in the battles at Pinghsingkuan, Taierhchuang and other places; we want to avoid decisive engagements under unfavourable conditions when we are not sure of victory, this being the policy we adopted in the Changteh and other campaigns. As for fighting a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked, we simply must not do so, as witness the recent withdrawal from Hsuchow. The enemy's plan for a "quick decision" was thus foiled, and now he cannot help fighting a protracted war with us. These principles are impracticable in a country with a small territory, and hardly practicable in a country that is very backward politically. They are practicable in China because she is a big country and is in an era of progress. If strategically decisive engagements are avoided, then "as long as the green mountains are there, we need not worry about firewood", for even though some of our territory may be lost, we shall still have plenty of room for manoeuvre and thus be able to promote and await domestic progress, international support and the internal disintegration of the enemy; that is the best policy for us in the anti-Japanese war. Unable to endure the arduous trials of a protracted war and eager for an early triumph, the impetuous theorists of quick victory clamour for a strategically decisive engagement the moment the situation takes a slightly favourable turn. To do what they want would be to inflict incalculable damage on the entire war, spell finis to the protracted war, and would land us in the enemy's deadly trap; actually, it would be the worst policy. Undoubtedly, if we are to avoid decisive engagements, we shall have to abandon territory, and we must have the courage to do so when (and only when) it becomes completely unavoidable. At such times we should not feel the slightest regret, for this policy of trading space for time is correct. History tells us how Russia made a courageous retreat to avoid a decisive engagement and then defeated Napoleon, the terror of his age. Today China should do likewise.

107. Are we not afraid of being denounced as "non-resisters"? No, we are not. Not to fight at all but to compromise with the enemy — that is non-resistance, which should not only be denounced but must never be tolerated. We must resolutely fight the War of Resistance, but in order to avoid the enemy's deadly trap, it is

absolutely necessary that we should not allow our main forces to be finished off at one blow, which would make it difficult to continue the War of Resistance — in brief, it is absolutely necessary to avoid national subjugation. To have doubts on this point is to be short-sighted on the question of the war and is sure to lead one into the ranks of the subjugationists. We have criticized the desperate recklessness of “only advance, never retreat” precisely because, if it became the fashion, this doctrine would make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance and would lead to the danger of ultimate national subjugation.

108. We are for decisive engagements whenever circumstances are favourable, whether in battles or in major or minor campaigns, and in this respect we should never tolerate passivity. Only through such decisive engagements can we achieve the objective of annihilating or depleting the enemy forces, and every soldier in the anti-Japanese war should resolutely play his part. For this purpose considerable partial sacrifices are necessary; to avoid any sacrifice whatsoever is the attitude of cowards and of those afflicted by the fear of Japan and must be firmly opposed. The execution of Li Fu-ying, Han Fu-chu and other flightists was justified. Within the scope of correct war planning, encouraging the spirit and practice of heroic self-sacrifice and dauntless advance in battle is absolutely necessary and inseparable from the waging of protracted war and the achievement of final victory. We have strongly condemned the flight-ism of “only retreat, never advance” and have supported the strict enforcement of discipline, because it is only through heroic decisive engagements, fought under a correct plan, that we can vanquish the powerful enemy; flight-ism, on the contrary, gives direct support to the theory of national subjugation.

109. Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and then abandon territory? Will not our heroic fighters have shed their blood in vain? That is not at all the way questions should be posed. To eat and then to empty your bowels — is this not to eat in vain? To sleep and then to get up — is this not to sleep in vain? Can questions be posed in such a way? I would suppose not. To keep on eating, to keep on sleeping, to keep on fighting heroically all the way to the Yalu River without a stop — these are subjectivist and formalist illusions, not realities of life. As everybody knows, although in fighting and shedding our blood in order to gain time and prepare the counter-offensive we have had to abandon some territory, in fact we have gained time,

we have achieved the objective of annihilating and depleting the enemy, we have acquired experience in fighting, we have aroused hitherto inactive people and improved our international standing. Has our blood been shed in vain? Certainly not. Territory has been given up in order to preserve our military forces and indeed to preserve territory, because if we do not abandon part of our territory when conditions are unfavourable but blindly fight decisive engagements without the least assurance of winning, we shall lose our military forces and then be unable to avoid the loss of all our territory, to say nothing of recovering territory already lost. A capitalist must have capital to run his business, and if he loses it all he is no longer a capitalist. Even a gambler must have money to stake, and if he risks it all on a single throw and his luck fails, he cannot gamble any more. Events have their twists and turns and do not follow a straight line, and war is no exception; only formalists are unable to comprehend this truth.

110. I think the same will also hold true for the decisive engagements in the stage of strategic counter-offensive. Although by then the enemy will be in the inferior and we in the superior position, the principle of "fighting profitable decisive engagements and avoiding unprofitable ones" will still apply and will continue to apply until we have fought our way to the Yalu River. This is how we will be able to maintain our initiative from beginning to end, and as for the enemy's "challenges" and other people's "taunts" we should imperturbably brush them aside and ignore them. In the War of Resistance only those generals who show this kind of firmness can be deemed courageous and wise. This is beyond the ken of those who "jump whenever touched". Even though we are in a more or less passive position strategically in the first stage of the war, we should have the initiative in every campaign; and of course we should have the initiative throughout the later stages. We are for protracted war and final victory, we are not gamblers who risk everything on a single throw.

### THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE ARE THE FOUNDATION OF VICTORY

111. Japanese imperialism will never relax in its aggression against and repression of revolutionary China; this is determined by its

imperialist nature. If China did not resist, Japan would easily seize all China without firing a single shot, as she did the four provinces in the Northeast. Since China is resisting, it is an inexorable law that Japan will try to repress this resistance until the force of her repression is exceeded by the force of China's resistance. The Japanese landlord class and bourgeoisie are very ambitious, and in order to drive south to Southeast Asia and north to Siberia, they have adopted the policy of breaking through in the centre by first attacking China. Those who think that Japan will know where to stop and be content with the occupation of northern China and of Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces completely fail to perceive that imperialist Japan, which has developed to a new stage and is approaching extinction, differs from the Japan of the past. When we say that there is a definite limit both to the number of men Japan can throw in and to the extent of her advance, we mean that with her available strength, Japan can only commit part of her forces against China and penetrate China as far as their capacity allows, for she wants to attack in other directions and has to defend herself against other enemies; at the same time China has given proof of progress and power of stubborn resistance, and it is inconceivable that there should be fierce attacks by Japan without inevitable resistance by China. Japan cannot occupy the whole of China, but she will spare no effort to suppress China's resistance in all the areas she can reach, and will not stop until internal and external developments push Japanese imperialism to the brink of the grave. There are only two possible outcomes to the political situation in Japan. Either the downfall of her entire ruling class occurs rapidly, political power passes to the people and war thus comes to an end, which is impossible at the moment; or her landlord class and bourgeoisie become more and more fascist and maintain the war until the day of their downfall, which is the very road Japan is now travelling. There can be no other outcome. Those who hope that the moderates among the Japanese bourgeoisie will come forward and stop the war are only harbouring illusions. The reality of Japanese politics for many years has been that the bourgeois moderates of Japan have fallen captive to the landlords and the financial magnates. Now that Japan has launched war against China, so long as she does not suffer a fatal blow from Chinese resistance and still retains sufficient strength, she is bound to attack Southeast Asia or Siberia, or even both. She will do so once war breaks out in Europe; in their wishful calculations, the rulers of Japan have it worked out on a grandiose scale. Of course,

it is possible that Japan will have to drop her original plan of invading Siberia and adopt a mainly defensive attitude towards the Soviet Union on account of Soviet strength and of the serious extent to which Japan herself has been weakened by her war against China. But in that case, so far from relaxing her aggression against China she will intensify it, because then the only way left to her will be to gobble up the weak. China's task of persevering in the War of Resistance, the united front and the protracted war will then become all the more weighty, and it will be all the more necessary not to slacken our efforts in the slightest.

112. Under the circumstances the main prerequisites for China's victory over Japan are nation-wide unity and all-round progress on a scale ten or even a hundred times greater than in the past. China is already in an era of progress and has achieved a splendid unity, but her progress and unity are still far from adequate. That Japan has occupied such an extensive area is due partly to her strength but also partly to China's weakness; this weakness is entirely the cumulative effect of the various historical errors of the last hundred years, and especially of the last ten years, which have confined progress to its present bounds. It is impossible to vanquish so strong an enemy without making an extensive and long-term effort. There are many things we have to exert ourselves to do; here I will deal only with two fundamental aspects, the progress of the army and the progress of the people.

113. The reform of our military system requires its modernization and improved technical equipment, without which we cannot drive the enemy back across the Yalu River. In our employment of troops we need progressive, flexible strategy and tactics, without which we likewise cannot win victory. Nevertheless, soldiers are the foundation of an army; unless they are imbued with a progressive political spirit, and unless such a spirit is instilled through progressive political work, it will be impossible to achieve genuine unity between officers and men, impossible to arouse their enthusiasm for the War of Resistance to the full, and impossible to provide a sound basis for the most effective use of all our technical equipment and tactics. When we say that Japan will finally be defeated despite her technical superiority, we mean that the blows we deliver through annihilation and attrition, apart from inflicting losses, will eventually shake the enemy army's morale which is not on a level with its weapons. With us, on the contrary, officers and men are at one on the political aim of the

War of Resistance. This gives us the foundation for political work among all the anti-Japanese forces. A proper measure of democracy should be put into effect in the army, chiefly by abolishing the feudal practice of bullying and beating and by having officers and men share weal and woe. Once this is done, unity will be achieved between officers and men, the combat effectiveness of the army will be greatly increased, and there will be no doubt of our ability to sustain the long, cruel war.

114. The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people. It is mainly because of the unorganized state of the Chinese masses that Japan dares to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then the Japanese aggressor, like a wild bull crashing into a ring of flames, will be surrounded by hundreds of millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound of their voices will strike terror into him, and he will be burned to death. China's armies must have an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements, and the abuses of press-ganging and of buying substitutes,<sup>30</sup> which now exist at the lower levels, must immediately be banned and replaced by widespread and enthusiastic political mobilization, which will make it easy to enlist millions of men. We now have great difficulties in raising money for the war, but once the people are mobilized, finances too will cease to be a problem. Why should a country as large and populous as China suffer from lack of funds? The army must become one with the people so that they see it as their own army. Such an army will be invincible, and an imperialist power like Japan will be no match for it.

115. Many people think that it is wrong methods that make for strained relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, but I always tell them that it is a question of basic attitude (or basic principle) of having respect for the soldiers and the people. It is from this attitude that the various policies, methods and forms ensue. If we depart from this attitude, then the policies, methods and forms will certainly be wrong, and the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people are bound to be unsatisfactory. Our three major principles for the army's political work are, first, unity between officers and men; second, unity between the army and the people; and third, the disintegration of the enemy forces. To apply these principles effectively, we must start with this basic attitude of respect for the soldiers and the people, and of respect for the human dignity of prisoners of war once they have laid down

their arms. Those who take all this as a technical matter and not one of basic attitude are indeed wrong, and they should correct their view.

116. At this moment when the defence of Wuhan and other places has become urgent, it is a task of the utmost importance to arouse the active enthusiasm of the whole army and the whole people to the full in support of the war. There is no doubt that the task of defending Wuhan and other places must be seriously posed and seriously performed. But whether we can be certain of holding them depends not on our subjective desires but on concrete conditions. Among the most important of these conditions is the political mobilization of the whole army and people for the struggle. If a strenuous effort is not made to secure all the necessary conditions, or even one of these conditions is missing, disasters like the loss of Nanking and other places are bound to be repeated. China will have her Madrids in places where the conditions are present. So far China has not had a Madrid, and from now on we should work hard to create several, but it all depends on the conditions. The most fundamental of these is extensive political mobilization of the whole army and people.

117. In all our work we must persevere in the Anti-Japanese National United Front as the general policy. For only with this policy can we persevere in the War of Resistance and in protracted warfare, bring about a widespread and profound improvement in the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, arouse to the full the active enthusiasm of the entire army and the entire people in the fight for the defence of all the territory still in our hands and for the recovery of what we have lost, and so win final victory.

118. This question of the political mobilization of the army and the people is indeed of the greatest importance. We have dwelt on it at the risk of repetition precisely because victory is impossible without it. There are, of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but political mobilization is the most fundamental. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is a united front of the whole army and the whole people, it is certainly not a united front merely of the headquarters and members of a few political parties; our basic objective in initiating the Anti-Japanese National United Front is to mobilize the whole army and the whole people to participate in it.

## CONCLUSIONS

119. What are our conclusions? They are:

"Under what conditions do you think the Chinese people can defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan?" "Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the achievement of the National United Front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a World Anti-Japanese United Front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement among the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. Of these, the central necessity is the union of the Chinese people themselves."

"How long would such a war last?" "That depends on the strength of the Chinese People's Front, many conditioning factors in China and Japan. . . ."

"If these conditions are not realized, however, the war will be very long, but in the end, just the same, Japan will be defeated, China will certainly win, only the sacrifices will be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world."

"Our strategy should be to employ our main forces in mobile warfare, over an extended, shifting and indefinite front, a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain."

"Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize and equip great numbers of guerrilla detachments among the peasantry."

"A point will be reached where it will become more and more possible to engage Japan's armies on a basis of positional warfare, using fortifications and deep entrenchment, for, as the war progresses, the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve. . . . Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long, expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will still be pouring forth men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines. All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China." (From an interview with Edgar Snow in July 1936.)

"A new stage in China's political situation has begun. . . . The crucial task of the present stage is to mobilize all forces for victory in the War of Resistance."

"The key to victory is to develop the War of Resistance already begun into a total nation-wide anti-Japanese war. Only such a total nation-wide war can bring final victory."

"As there are still serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance, many difficulties may arise in its future course — setbacks and retreats, internal divisions and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises. We must therefore realize that this will be a hard-fought, protracted war. But we believe that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the War of Resistance which has already begun is sure to overcome all obstacles and continue to progress and develop." ("Decision on the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party", adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, August 1937.)

These are our conclusions. In the eyes of the subjugationists the enemy are supermen and we Chinese are worthless, while in the eyes of the theorists of quick victory we Chinese are supermen and the enemy are worthless. Both are wrong. We take a different view; the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war, and the final victory will be China's. These are our conclusions.

120. My lectures end here. The great War of Resistance Against Japan is unfolding, and many people are hoping for a summary of experience to facilitate the winning of complete victory. What I have discussed is simply the general experience of the past ten months, and it may perhaps serve as a kind of summary. The problem of protracted war deserves wide attention and discussion; what I have given is only an outline, which I hope you will examine and discuss, amend and amplify.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This theory of national subjugation was the view held by the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was unwilling to resist Japan and fought Japan only under compulsion. After the Lukouchiao Incident (July 7, 1937), the Chiang Kai-shek clique reluctantly took part in the War of Resistance, while the Wang Ching-wei clique became representatives of the theory of national subjugation, was ready to capitulate to Japan and did in fact subsequently do so. However, the idea of national subjugation not only existed in the Kuomintang, but also affected certain sections of the middle strata

of society and even certain backward elements among the labouring people. As the corrupt and impotent Kuomintang government lost one battle after another and the Japanese troops advanced unchecked to the vicinity of Wuhan in the first year of the War of Resistance, some backward people became profoundly pessimistic.

<sup>2</sup> These views were to be found within the Communist Party. During the first six months of the War of Resistance, there was a tendency to take the enemy lightly among some members of the Party, who held the view that Japan could be defeated at a single blow. It was not that they felt our own forces to be so strong, since they well knew that the troops and the organized people's forces led by the Communist Party were still small, but that the Kuomintang had begun to resist Japan. In their opinion, the Kuomintang was quite powerful, and, in co-ordination with the Communist Party, could deal Japan telling blows. They saw only one aspect of the Kuomintang, that it was resisting Japan, but overlooked the other aspect, that it was reactionary and corrupt, and they therefore made this erroneous appraisal.

<sup>3</sup> Such was the view of Chiang Kai-shek and company. Though they were compelled to resist Japan, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang pinned their hopes solely on prompt foreign aid and had no confidence in their own strength, much less in the strength of the people.

<sup>4</sup> Taierhchuang is a town in southern Shantung where the Chinese army fought a battle in March 1938 against the Japanese invaders. By pitting 400,000 men against Japan's 70,000 to 80,000, the Chinese army defeated the Japanese.

<sup>5</sup> This view was put forward in an editorial in the *Ta Kung Pao*, then the organ of the Political Science Group in the Kuomintang. Indulging in wishful thinking, this clique hoped that a few more victories of the Taierhchuang type would stop Japan's advance and that there would be no need to mobilize the people for a protracted war, which would threaten the security of its own class. This wishful thinking then pervaded the Kuomintang as a whole.

<sup>6</sup> The English text is based on Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China*, with some alterations made in accordance with the Chinese record of the interview.

<sup>7</sup> The Reform Movement of 1898, whose leading spirits were Kang Yu-wei, Liang Chi-chao and Tan Sze-tung, represented the interests of a section of the liberal bourgeoisie and the enlightened landlords. The movement was favoured and supported by the Emperor Kuang Hsu, but had no mass basis. Yuan Shih-kai who had an army behind him betrayed the reformers to the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, the leader of the die-hards, who seized power again and had the Emperor Kuang Hsu imprisoned and Tan Sze-tung and five others beheaded. Thus the movement ended in tragic defeat.

<sup>8</sup> On January 16, 1938, the Japanese cabinet declared in a policy statement that Japan would subjugate China by force. At the same time it tried by threats and blandishments to make the Kuomintang government capitulate, declaring that if the Kuomintang government "continued to plan resistance", the Japanese government would foster a new puppet regime in China and no longer recognize the Kuomintang as "the other party" in the negotiations.

<sup>9</sup> Referring chiefly to the capitalists of the United States.

<sup>10</sup> Referring to the governments of the imperialist countries — Britain, the United States and France.

<sup>11</sup> Comrade Mao Tse-tung's prediction that there would be an upswing in China during the stage of stalemate in the War of Resistance Against Japan was completely confirmed in the case of the Liberated Areas under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. But there was actually a decline instead of an upswing in the Kuomintang

areas, because the ruling clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek was passive in resisting Japan and active in opposing the Communist Party and the people. This roused opposition among the broad masses of the people and raised their political consciousness.

<sup>12</sup> According to the theory that "weapons decide everything", China which was inferior to Japan in regard to arms was bound to be defeated in the war. This view was current among all the leaders of the Kuomintang reaction, Chiang Kai-shek included.

<sup>13</sup> See "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan", Note 9, p. 184 of this volume.

<sup>14</sup> Sun Wu-kung is the monkey hero of the Chinese novel, *Pilgrimage to the West*, written in the 16th century. He could cover 108,000 *li* by turning a somersault. Yet once in the palm of the Buddha, he could not escape from it, however many somersaults he turned. With a flick of his palm Buddha transformed his fingers into the five-peak Mountain of Five Elements, and buried Sun Wu-kung.

<sup>15</sup> "*Fascism is unbridled chauvinism and predatory war*," said Comrade Georgi Dimitrov in his report to the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in August 1935, entitled "The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International". In July 1937, Comrade Dimitrov published an article entitled *Fascism Is War*.

<sup>16</sup> Lenin, "Socialism and War", Chapter I, and "The Collapse of the Second International", Section 3, *Collected Works*, 4th Russian ed., Vol. XXI.

<sup>17</sup> *Sun Tzu*, Chapter 3, "The Strategy of Attack".

<sup>18</sup> Chengpu, situated in the present Fanhsien County in Shantung Province, was the scene of a great battle between the states of Tsin and Chu in 632 B.C. At the beginning of the battle the Chu troops got the upper hand. The Tsin troops, after making a retreat of 90 *li*, chose the right and left flanks of the Chu troops, their weak spots, and inflicted heavy defeats on them.

<sup>19</sup> See "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", Note 24, p. 148 of this volume.

<sup>20</sup> In 204 B.C., Han Hsin, a general of the state of Han, led his men in a big battle with Chao Hsieh at Chingsing. Chao Hsieh's army, said to be 200,000 strong, was several times that of Han. Deploying his troops with their backs to a river, Han Hsin led them in valiant combat, and at the same time dispatched some units to attack and occupy the enemy's weakly garrisoned rear. Caught in a pincer, Chao Hsieh's troops were utterly defeated.

<sup>21</sup> See "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", Note 25, pp. 148-49 of this volume.

<sup>22</sup> See *ibid.*, Note 26, p. 149 of this volume.

<sup>23</sup> See *ibid.*, Note 27, p. 149 of this volume.

<sup>24</sup> See *ibid.*, Note 28, p. 149 of this volume.

<sup>25</sup> See *ibid.*, Note 29, p. 149 of this volume.

<sup>26</sup> In A.D. 383, Fu Chien, the ruler of the state of Chin, belittled the forces of Tsin and attacked them. The Tsin troops defeated the enemy's advance units at Lochien, Shouyang County, Anhwei Province, and pushed forward by land and water. Ascending the city wall of Shouyang, Fu Chien observed the excellent alignment of the Tsin troops and, mistaking the woods and bushes on Mount Pakung for enemy soldiers, was frightened by the enemy's apparent strength. Cf. "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", Note 29, p. 149 of this volume.

<sup>27</sup> Referring to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, having betrayed the first national democratic united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1927, launched a ten-year war against the people, and thus made it impossible for the Chinese people to be organized on a large scale. The Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek must be held responsible for these mistakes.

<sup>28</sup> Duke Hsiang of Sung ruled in the Spring and Autumn Era. In 638 B.C., the state of Sung fought with the powerful state of Chu. The Sung forces had already deployed in battle positions when the Chu troops were crossing the river. One of the Sung officers suggested that, as the Chu troops were numerically stronger, this was the moment for attack. But the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack one who is unprepared." When the Chu troops had crossed the river but had not yet completed their battle alignment, the officer again proposed an immediate attack, and once again the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack an army which has not yet completed its battle alignment." The Duke gave the order for attack only after the Chu troops were fully prepared. As a result, the Sung troops met with a disastrous defeat and the Duke himself was wounded.

<sup>29</sup> Han Fu-chu, a Kuomintang warlord, was for several years governor of Shantung. When the Japanese invaders thrust southward to Shantung along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway after occupying Peiping and Tientsin in 1937, Han Fu-chu fled all the way from Shantung to Honan without fighting a single battle.

<sup>30</sup> The Kuomintang expanded its army by press-ganging. Its military and police seized people everywhere, roping them up and treating them like convicts. Those who had money would bribe the Kuomintang officials or pay for substitutes.

# PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY\*

November 6, 1938

## 1. CHINA'S CHARACTERISTICS AND REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.

But while the principle remains the same, its application by the party of the proletariat finds expression in varying ways according to the varying conditions. Internally, capitalist countries have bourgeois democracy (not feudalism) when they are not fascist or not at war; in their external relations, they are not oppressed by, but themselves oppress, other nations. Because of these characteristics, it is the task of the party of the proletariat in the capitalist countries to educate the workers and build up strength through a long period of legal struggle, and thus prepare for the final overthrow of capitalism. In these countries, the question is one of a long legal struggle, of utilizing parliament as a platform, of economic and political strikes, of organizing trade unions and educating the workers. There the form of organization is legal and the form of struggle bloodless (non-military). On the issue of war, the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries oppose the imperialist wars waged by their own countries; if such wars occur, the policy of these Parties is to bring

---

\* This article is part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's concluding speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party. In his *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan* and *On Protracted War*, Comrade Mao Tse-tung had already settled the problem of the Party's leading position in the War of Resistance Against Japan. But some comrades, committing Right opportunist errors, denied that the Party must maintain its independence in the united front, and so

about the defeat of the reactionary governments of their own countries. The one war they want to fight is the civil war for which they are preparing.<sup>1</sup> But this insurrection and war should not be launched until the bourgeoisie becomes really helpless, until the majority of the proletariat are determined to rise in arms and fight, and until the rural masses are giving willing help to the proletariat. And when the time comes to launch such an insurrection and war, the first step will be to seize the cities, and then advance into the countryside, and not the other way about. All this has been done by Communist Parties in capitalist countries, and it has been proved correct by the October Revolution in Russia.

China is different however. The characteristics of China are that she is not independent and democratic but semi-colonial and semi-feudal, that internally she has no democracy but is under feudal oppression and that in her external relations she has no national independence but is oppressed by imperialism. It follows that we have no parliament to make use of and no legal right to organize the workers to strike. Basically, the task of the Communist Party here is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before launching insurrection and war, and not to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but the reverse.

When imperialism is not making armed attacks on our country, the Chinese Communist Party either wages civil war jointly with the bourgeoisie against the warlords (lackeys of imperialism), as in 1924-27 in the wars in Kwangtung Province<sup>2</sup> and the Northern Expedition, or unites with the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie to wage civil war against the landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie (also lackeys of imperialism), as in the War of Agrarian Revolution of 1927-36. When imperialism launches armed attacks on China, the Party unites all classes and strata in the country opposing the foreign aggressors to wage a national war against the foreign enemy, as it is doing in the present War of Resistance Against Japan.

---

doubted and even opposed the Party's line on the war and on strategy. In order to overcome this Right opportunism, bring the whole Party to a clearer understanding of the prime importance of the problems of war and strategy in the Chinese revolution and mobilize it for serious work in this connection, Comrade Mao Tse-tung again stressed the importance of the subject at this plenary session, approaching it from the viewpoint of the history of China's political struggles, and analysed the development of the Party's military work and the specific changes in its strategy. The result was unanimity of thought in the Party leadership and unanimity of action throughout the Party.

All this shows the difference between China and the capitalist countries. In China war is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of organization. Other forms such as mass organization and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war. Before the outbreak of a war all organization and struggle are in preparation for the war, as in the period from the May 4th Movement of 1919 to the May 30th Movement of 1925. After war breaks out, all organization and all struggle are co-ordinated with the war either directly or indirectly, as, for instance, in the period of the Northern Expedition when all organization and struggle in the rear areas of the revolutionary army were co-ordinated with the war directly, and those in the Northern warlord areas were co-ordinated with the war indirectly. Again in the period of the War of Agrarian Revolution all organization and struggle inside the Red areas were co-ordinated with the war directly, and outside the Red areas indirectly. Yet again in the present period, the War of Resistance, all organization and struggle in the rear areas of the anti-Japanese forces and in the areas occupied by the enemy are directly or indirectly co-ordinated with the war.

“In China it is armed revolution against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the characteristics and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution.”<sup>3</sup> This thesis of Comrade Stalin’s is perfectly correct and is equally valid for the Northern Expedition, the War of Agrarian Revolution, and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. They are all revolutionary wars, all directed against counter-revolutionaries and all waged mainly by the revolutionary people, differing only in the sense that a civil war differs from a national war, and that a war conducted by the Communist Party differs from a war it conducts jointly with the Kuomintang. Of course, these differences are important. They indicate the breadth of the main forces in the war (an alliance of the workers and peasants, or of the workers, peasants and bourgeoisie) and whether our antagonist in the war is internal or external (whether the war is against domestic or foreign foes, and, if domestic, whether against the Northern warlords or against the Kuomintang); they also indicate that the content of China’s revolutionary war differs at different stages of its history. But all these wars are instances of armed revolution against armed counter-revolution, they are all revolutionary wars, and all exhibit the characteristics and advantages of the Chinese revolution. The

thesis that revolutionary war "is one of the characteristics and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution" fits China's conditions perfectly. The main task of the party of the Chinese proletariat, a task confronting it almost from its very inception, has been to unite with as many allies as possible and, according to the circumstances, to organize armed struggles for national and social liberation against armed counter-revolution, whether internal or external. Without armed struggle there would be no place in China for the proletariat and the Communist Party, and it would be impossible to accomplish any revolutionary task.

Our Party did not grasp this point fully during the first five or six years after it was founded, that is, from 1921 to its participation in the Northern Expedition in 1926. It did not then understand the supreme importance of armed struggle in China, or seriously prepare for war and organize armed forces, or apply itself to the study of military strategy and tactics. During the Northern Expedition it neglected to win over the army but laid one-sided stress on the mass movement, with the result that the whole mass movement collapsed the moment the Kuomintang turned reactionary. For a long time after 1927 many comrades continued to make it the Party's central task to prepare for insurrections in the cities and to work in the White areas. It was only after our victory in repelling the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign in 1931 that some comrades fundamentally changed their attitude on this question. But this was not true of the whole Party, and there were other comrades who did not think along the lines presented here.

Experience tells us that China's problems cannot be settled without armed force. An understanding of this point will help us in successfully waging the War of Resistance Against Japan from now on. The fact that the whole nation is rising in armed resistance in the war against Japan should inculcate a better understanding of the importance of this question in the whole Party, and every Party member should be prepared to take up arms and go to the front at any moment. Moreover, our present session has clearly defined the direction for our efforts by deciding that the Party's main fields of work are in the battle zones and in the enemy's rear. This is also an excellent antidote against the tendency of some Party members to do only Party organizational work and work in the mass movement but to be unwilling to study or participate in warfare, and against the failure of some schools to encourage the students to go to the front,

and other such phenomena. In most of China, Party organizational work and mass work are directly linked with armed struggle; there is not, and cannot be, any Party work or mass work that is isolated and stands by itself. Even in rear areas remote from the battle zones (like Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan) and in enemy-occupied areas (like Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking and Shanghai), Party organizational work and mass work are co-ordinated with the war, and should and must exclusively serve the needs of the front. In a word, the whole Party must pay great attention to war, study military matters and prepare to fight.

## 2. THE WAR HISTORY OF THE KUOMINTANG

It will be useful for us to look at the history of the Kuomintang and see what attention it pays to war.

From the start, when he organized a small revolutionary group, Sun Yat-sen staged armed insurrections against the Manchu (Ching) Dynasty.<sup>4</sup> The period of the Chinese Revolutionary League was replete with armed insurrections,<sup>5</sup> right up to the armed overthrow of the Ching Dynasty by the Revolution of 1911. Then, during the period of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, he carried out a military campaign against Yuan Shih-kai.<sup>6</sup> Subsequent events such as the southern movement of the naval units,<sup>7</sup> the northern expedition from Kweilin<sup>8</sup> and the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy<sup>9</sup> were also among Sun Yat-sen's military undertakings.

After Sun Yat-sen came Chiang Kai-shek, who brought the Kuomintang's military power to its zenith. He values the army as his very life and has had the experience of three wars, namely, the Northern Expedition, the Civil War and the War of Resistance Against Japan. For the last ten years Chiang Kai-shek has been a counter-revolutionary. He has created a huge "Central Army" for counter-revolutionary purposes. He has held firmly to the vital point that whoever has an army has power and that war decides everything. In this respect we ought to learn from him. In this respect both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are our teachers.

Since the Revolution of 1911, all the warlords have clung to their armies for dear life, setting great store by the principle, "Whoever has an army has power".

Tan Yen-kai,<sup>10</sup> a clever bureaucrat who had a chequered career in Hunan, was never a civil governor pure and simple but always insisted on being both the military governor and the civil governor. Even when he became Chairman of the National Government in Canton and Wuhan, he was concurrently the commander of the Second Army. There are many such warlords who understand this peculiarity of China's.

There have also been parties in China, notably the Progressive Party,<sup>11</sup> which did not want to have an army; yet even this party recognized that it could not get government positions without some warlord backing. Among its successive patrons have been Yuan Shih-kai,<sup>12</sup> Tuan Chi-jui<sup>13</sup> and Chiang Kai-shek (to whom the Political Science Group,<sup>14</sup> formed out of a section of the Progressive Party, has attached itself).

A few small political parties with a short history, *e.g.*, the Youth Party,<sup>15</sup> have no army, and so have not been able to get anywhere.

In other countries there is no need for each of the bourgeois parties to have an armed force under its direct command. But things are different in China, where, because of the feudal division of the country, those landlord or bourgeois groupings or parties which have guns have power, and those which have more guns have more power. Placed in such an environment, the party of the proletariat should see clearly to the heart of the matter.

Communists do not fight for personal military power (they must in no circumstances do that, and let no one ever again follow the example of Chang Kuo-tao), but they must fight for military power for the Party, for military power for the people. As a national war of resistance is going on, we must also fight for military power for the nation. Where there is naivety on the question of military power, nothing whatsoever can be achieved. It is very difficult for the labouring people, who have been deceived and intimidated by the reactionary ruling classes for thousands of years, to awaken to the importance of having guns in their own hands. Now that Japanese imperialist oppression and the nation-wide resistance to it have pushed our labouring people into the arena of war, Communists should prove themselves the most politically conscious leaders in this war. Every Communist must grasp the truth, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. Yet, having guns, we can create Party organizations, as witness the powerful Party

organizations which the Eighth Route Army has created in northern China. We can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements. Everything in Yen-an has been created by having guns. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army. Some people ridicule us as advocates of the "omnipotence of war". Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad, it is Marxist. The guns of the Russian Communist Party created socialism. We shall create a democratic republic. Experience in the class struggle in the era of imperialism teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and the labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords; in this sense we may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed. We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun.

### 3. THE WAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Our Party failed to grasp the importance of engaging itself directly in preparations for war and in the organization of armed forces for a period of three or four years, that is, from 1921 (when the Chinese Communist Party was founded) to 1924 (when the First National Congress of the Kuomintang took place), and it still lacked adequate understanding of this issue in the 1924-27 period and even later; nevertheless, after 1924, when it began to participate in the Whampoa Military Academy, it entered a new stage and began to see the importance of military affairs. Through helping the Kuomintang in the wars in Kwangtung Province and participating in the Northern Expedition, the Party gained leadership over some armed forces.<sup>16</sup> Then, having learned a bitter lesson from the failure of the revolution, the Party organized the Nanchang Uprising,<sup>17</sup> the Autumn Harvest Uprising<sup>18</sup> and the Canton Uprising,<sup>19</sup> and entered on a new period, the founding of the Red Army. That was the crucial period in which our Party arrived at a thorough understanding of the

importance of the army. Had there been no Red Army and no war fought by the Red Army in this period, that is, had the Communist Party adopted Chen Tu-hsiu's liquidationism, the present War of Resistance would have been inconceivable or could not have been sustained for long.

At its emergency meeting held on August 7, 1927, the Central Committee of the Party combated Right opportunism in the political sphere, thus enabling the Party to take a big stride forward. At its fourth plenary session in January 1931, the Sixth Central Committee nominally combated "Left" opportunism in the political sphere, but in fact itself committed the error of "Left" opportunism anew. The two meetings differed in their content and historical role, but neither of them dealt seriously with the problems of war and strategy, a fact which showed that war had not yet been made the centre of gravity in the Party's work. After the Central Committee moved into the Red areas in 1933, this situation underwent a radical change, but mistakes in principle were again committed on the problem of war (and all other major problems), bringing serious losses to the revolutionary war.<sup>20</sup> The Tsunyi Meeting of 1935, on the other hand, was mainly a fight against opportunism in the military sphere and gave top priority to the problem of war, and this was a reflection of the war conditions of the time. Today we can say with confidence that in the struggles of the past seventeen years the Chinese Communist Party has forged not only a firm Marxist political line but also a firm Marxist military line. We have been able to apply Marxism to solve not only political but also military problems; we have trained not only a large core of cadres capable of running the Party and the state, but also a large core of cadres capable of running the army. These achievements are the flower of the revolution, watered by the blood of countless martyrs, a glory that belongs not only to the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, but also to the Communist Parties and the peoples of the whole world. There are only three armies in the whole world, led respectively by the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, of China and of Spain, which belong to the proletariat and the labouring people, and as yet Communist Parties in other countries have had no military experience; hence our army and our military experience are all the more precious.

In order to carry the present War of Resistance Against Japan to victory, it is extremely important to expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and all the guerrilla forces

led by our Party. Acting on this principle, the Party should dispatch a sufficient number of its best members and cadres to the front. Everything must serve victory at the front, and the organizational task must be subordinated to the political task.

#### 4. CHANGES IN THE PARTY'S MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE CIVIL WAR AND THE NATIONAL WAR

The changes in our Party's military strategy are worth studying. Let us deal separately with the two processes, the civil war and the national war.

The civil war can be roughly divided into two strategic periods. Guerrilla warfare was primary in the first period and regular warfare in the second. But this regular warfare was of the Chinese type, regular only in its concentration of forces for mobile warfare and in a certain degree of centralization and planning in command and organization; in other respects it retained a guerrilla character and, as regular warfare, was on a low level and not comparable with the regular warfare of foreign armies and, in some ways, even with that of the Kuomintang army. Thus, in a sense, this type of regular warfare was only guerrilla warfare raised to a higher level.

The War of Resistance Against Japan can also be roughly divided into two strategic periods, so far as our Party's military tasks are concerned. In the first period (comprising the stages of the strategic defensive and strategic stalemate) it is guerrilla warfare which is primary, while in the second (the stage of the strategic counter-offensive) it is regular warfare which will be primary. However, the guerrilla warfare of the first period of the War of Resistance differs considerably in content from that of the first period of the civil war, because the dispersed guerrilla tasks are being carried out by the regular (*i.e.*, regular to a certain degree) Eighth Route Army. Likewise, the regular warfare of the second period of the War of Resistance will be different from that of the second period of the civil war because we can assume that, given up-to-date equipment, a great change will take place both in the army and its operations. Our army will then attain a high degree of centralization and organization, and its operations will lose much of their guerrilla character and attain a high degree of regularity; what is now on a low level will then be

raised to a higher level, and the Chinese type of regular warfare will change into the general type. That will be our task in the stage of strategic counter-offensive.

Thus we see that the two processes, the civil war and the War of Resistance Against Japan, and their four strategic periods, contain three changes in strategy. The first was the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the civil war. The second was the change from regular warfare in the civil war to guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance. And the third will be the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the War of Resistance.

The first of the three changes encountered great difficulties. It involved a twofold task. On the one hand, we had to combat the Right tendency of localism and guerrilla-ism, which consisted in clinging to guerrilla habits and refusing to make the turn to regularization, a tendency which arose because some of our cadres failed fully to appreciate the changes in the enemy's situation and our own tasks. In the Central Red Area it was only after much painstaking education that this tendency was gradually corrected. On the other hand, we also had to combat the "Left" tendency of overcentralization and adventurism which put undue stress on regularization, a tendency which arose because some of the leading cadres wrongly evaluated the enemy, set the tasks too high and mechanically applied foreign experience regardless of the actual conditions. For three long years (before the Tsunyi Meeting) this tendency brought enormous sacrifices in the Central Red Area, and it was corrected only after we had learned lessons for which we paid in blood. Its correction was the achievement of the Tsunyi Meeting.

The second change in strategy took place in the autumn of 1937 (after the Lukouchiao Incident), at the juncture of the two different wars. We faced a new enemy, Japanese imperialism, and had as our ally our former enemy, the Kuomintang (which was still hostile to us), and the theatre of war was the vast expanse of northern China (which was temporarily our army's front but would soon be the enemy's rear and would remain so for a long time). In this special situation, our change in strategy was an extremely serious one. In this special situation we had to transform the regular army of the past into a guerrilla army (in respect to its dispersed operations, and not to its sense of organization or to its discipline), and transform the mobile warfare of the past into guerrilla warfare, so that we could adapt ourselves to the kind of enemy facing us and to the tasks before

us. But this change was, to all appearances, a step backward and therefore necessarily very difficult. Both underestimation and excessive fear of Japan, tendencies likely to occur at such a time, did actually occur among the Kuomintang. When the Kuomintang changed over from civil war to national war, it suffered many needless losses mainly because of its underestimation of the enemy, but also because of its excessive fear of Japan (as exemplified by Han Fu-chu and Liu Chih).<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, we have effected the change fairly smoothly and, instead of suffering losses, have won big victories. The reason is that the great majority of our cadres accepted the correct guidance of the Central Committee in good time and skilfully sized up the actual situation, even though there were serious arguments in the Central Committee and among some of the army cadres. The extreme importance of this change for persevering in, developing and winning the War of Resistance as a whole, as well as for the future of the Communist Party of China, can be seen immediately if we think of the historic significance of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in determining the fate of the national liberation struggle in China. In its extraordinary breadth and protractedness, China's anti-Japanese guerrilla war is without precedent, not only in the East but perhaps in the whole history of mankind.

The third change, from guerrilla to regular warfare against Japan, belongs to the future development of the war, which will presumably give rise to new circumstances and new difficulties. We need not discuss it now.

## 5. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN

In the anti-Japanese war as a whole, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, for only regular warfare can decide the final outcome of the war. Of the three strategic stages (the defensive, the stalemate and the counter-offensive) in the entire process of the war in the country as a whole, the first and last are stages in which regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. In the intermediate stage guerrilla warfare will become primary and regular warfare supplementary, because the enemy will be holding on to the areas he has occupied and we will be preparing

for the counter-offensive but will not yet launch it. Though this stage will possibly be the longest, it is still only one of the three stages in the entire war. If we take the war as a whole, therefore, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. Unless we understand this, unless we recognize that regular warfare will decide the final outcome of the war, and unless we pay attention to building a regular army and to studying and directing regular warfare, we shall not be able to defeat Japan. This is one aspect of the matter.

All the same, guerrilla warfare has its important strategic place throughout the war. Without guerrilla warfare and without due attention to building guerrilla units and guerrilla armies and to studying and directing guerrilla warfare, we shall likewise not be able to defeat Japan. The reason is that, since the greater part of China will be converted into the enemy's rear, in the absence of the most extensive and persistent guerrilla warfare the enemy will entrench himself securely without any fear of attacks from behind, will inflict heavy losses on our main forces fighting at the front and will launch increasingly fierce offensives; thus it will be difficult for us to bring about a stalemate, and the very continuation of the War of Resistance may be jeopardized. But even if things do not turn out that way, other unfavourable circumstances will ensue, such as the inadequate building up of strength for our counter-offensive, the absence of supporting actions during the counter-offensive, and the possibility that the enemy will be able to replace his losses. If these circumstances arise and are not overcome by the timely development of extensive and persistent guerrilla warfare, it will likewise be impossible to defeat Japan. Hence, though guerrilla warfare has a supplementary place in the war as a whole, it does occupy an extremely important place in strategy. In waging the War of Resistance Against Japan it is undoubtedly a grave error to neglect guerrilla warfare. This is the other aspect of the matter.

Given a big country, guerrilla warfare is possible; hence there was guerrilla warfare in the past too. But guerrilla warfare can be persevered in only when led by the Communist Party. That is why guerrilla warfare generally failed in the past and why it can be victorious only in modern times and only in big countries in which Communist Parties have emerged, as in the Soviet Union during its civil war and in China at present. Considering the present circumstances and the general situation with respect to the war, the

division of labour between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the anti-Japanese war, in which the former carries on frontal regular warfare and the latter carries on guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, is both necessary and proper, and is a matter of mutual need, mutual co-ordination and mutual assistance.

It can thus be understood how important and necessary it was for our Party to change its military strategy from the regular warfare of the latter period of the civil war to the guerrilla warfare of the first period of the anti-Japanese war. The favourable effects of this change can be summed up in the following eighteen points:

- (1) reduction of the areas occupied by the enemy forces;
- (2) expansion of the base areas of our own forces;
- (3) in the stage of the defensive, co-ordination with operations at the regular front, so as to pin down the enemy;
- (4) in the stage of stalemate, maintenance of a firm hold on the base areas behind the enemy lines, so as to facilitate the training and reorganization of troops at the regular front;
- (5) in the stage of the counter-offensive, co-ordination with the regular front in recovering lost territory;
- (6) the quickest and most effective expansion of our forces;
- (7) the widest expansion of the Communist Party, so that a Party branch may be organized in every village;
- (8) the broadest development of the mass movements, so that all the people behind the enemy lines, except for those in his strongholds, may be organized;
- (9) the most extensive establishment of organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power;
- (10) the widest development of anti-Japanese cultural and educational work;
- (11) the most extensive improvement of the people's living conditions;
- (12) the most effective disintegration of the enemy troops;
- (13) the most extensive and enduring impact on popular feeling and stimulation of morale throughout the country;
- (14) the most extensive impetus to progress in the friendly armies and parties;
- (15) adaptation to the situation in which the enemy is strong and we are weak, so that we suffer fewer losses and win more victories;

- (16) adaptation to the fact that China is large and Japan small, so as to make the enemy suffer more losses and win fewer victories;
- (17) the quickest and most effective training of large numbers of cadres for leadership;
- (18) the most effective solution of the problem of provisions.

It is also beyond doubt that in the long course of struggle the guerrilla units and guerrilla warfare will not remain as they are but will develop to a higher stage and evolve gradually into regular units and regular warfare. Through guerrilla warfare, we shall build up our strength and turn ourselves into a decisive element in the crushing of Japanese imperialism.

## 6. PAY GREAT ATTENTION TO THE STUDY OF MILITARY MATTERS

All the issues between two hostile armies depend on war for their solution, and China's survival or extinction depends on her victory or defeat in the present war. Hence our study of military theory, of strategy and tactics and of army political work brooks not a moment's delay. Though our study of tactics is still inadequate, our comrades who are engaged in military work have achieved a great deal in the last ten years and, on the basis of Chinese conditions, have brought forth much that is new; the shortcoming here is that there has been no general summing-up. But so far only a few people have taken up the study of the problems of strategy and the theory of war. First-rate results have been achieved in the study of our political work, which, in wealth of experience and in the number and quality of its innovations, ranks second only to that of the Soviet Union; here too the shortcoming is insufficient synthesis and systematization. The popularization of military knowledge is an urgent task for the Party and the whole country. We must now pay great attention to all these things, but most of all to the theory of war and strategy. I deem it imperative that we arouse interest in the study of military theory and direct the attention of the whole membership to the study of military matters.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lenin, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", "Conference of the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P. Abroad", "Defeat of One's Own Government in the Imperialist War", "The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionary Crisis" (*Selected Works*, Eng. ed., New York, 1943, Vol. V, Part II). These articles, written in 1914-15, deal specifically with the imperialist war of that time. Cf. also *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Chapter VI, Section 3, "Theory and Tactics of the Bolshevik Party on the Questions of War, Peace and Revolution".

<sup>2</sup> In 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in alliance with the Communist Party and the revolutionary workers and peasants, defeated the "Merchants' Corps", an armed force of the compradors and landlords which engaged in counter-revolutionary activities in Canton in collaboration with the British imperialists. The revolutionary army, which had been founded on the basis of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, set out from Canton early in 1925 on its eastern expedition and, with the support of the peasants, defeated the troops of the warlord Chen Chiung-ming. It then returned to Canton and overthrew the Yunnan and Kwangsi warlords who had entrenched themselves there. That autumn it undertook its second eastern expedition and finally wiped out Chen Chiung-ming's forces. These campaigns, in which members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League fought heroically in the van, brought about the political unification of Kwangtung Province and paved the way for the Northern Expedition.

<sup>3</sup> Stalin, "On the Prospects of the Revolution in China", *Works*, Moscow, 1948, Vol. VIII.

<sup>4</sup> In 1894, Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed a small revolutionary organization in Honolulu called the *Hsing Chung Hui* (Society for China's Regeneration). With the support of the secret societies among the people, he staged two armed insurrections in Kwangtung Province against the Ching Dynasty after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, one at Canton in 1895 and the other at Huichow in 1900.

<sup>5</sup> The Chinese Revolutionary League, or the *Tung Meng Hui* (a united front organization of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and a section of the landed gentry opposed to the Ching Dynasty), was formed in 1905 through the merging of the *Hsing Chung Hui* (see note above) and two other groups, the *Hua Hsing Hui* (Society for Building New China) and the *Kuang Fu Hui* (Society for Breaking the Foreign Yoke). It put forward a programme of bourgeois revolution advocating "the expulsion of the Tartars (Manchus), the recovery of China, the establishment of a republic and the equalization of landownership". In the period of the Chinese Revolutionary League, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, allying himself with the secret societies and a part of the new army of the Ching government, launched a number of armed insurrections against the Ching regime, notably those at Pinghsiang (Kiangsi Province), Liuyang and Liling (Hunan Province) in 1906, at Huangkang, Chaochow, at Chinchow (Kwangtung Province), and at Chennankuan (Kwangsi Province) in 1907, at Hokou (Yunnan Province) in 1908 and at Canton in 1911. The last was followed in the same year by the Wuchang Uprising which resulted in the overthrow of the Ching Dynasty.

<sup>6</sup> In 1912, the Chinese Revolutionary League was reorganized into the Kuomintang and made a compromise with the Northern warlord regime headed by Yuan Shih-kai. In 1913 Yuan's troops marched southward to suppress the forces which had emerged

in the provinces of Kiangsi, Anhwei and Kwangtung in the course of the 1911 Revolution. Armed resistance was organized by Dr. Sun Yat-sen but it was soon crushed. In 1914, realizing the error of the Kuomintang's policy of compromise, Dr. Sun formed the *Chung Hua Ke Ming Tang* (Chinese Revolutionary Party) in Tokyo, Japan, in order to distinguish it from the Kuomintang of the time. The new party was actually an alliance of the political representatives of a section of the petty bourgeoisie and a section of the bourgeoisie against Yuan Shih-kai. Through this alliance, Dr. Sun Yat-sen staged a minor insurrection in Shanghai in 1914. In 1915, when Yuan Shih-kai proclaimed himself emperor, Tsai Ao and others started a punitive expedition against him from Yunnan, and Dr. Sun was also very active in advocating and promoting armed opposition to Yuan Shih-kai.

<sup>7</sup> In 1917 Dr. Sun Yat-sen went from Shanghai to Canton at the head of a naval force which was under his influence. Using Kwangtung as a base and co-operating with the Southwestern warlords who were opposed to the Northern warlord Tuan Chi-jui, he set up a military government opposed to Tuan Chi-jui.

<sup>8</sup> In 1921 Dr. Sun Yat-sen planned a northern expedition from Kweilin, Kwangsi Province. But his plan was frustrated by the mutiny of his subordinate, Chen Chiung-ming, who was in league with the Northern warlords.

<sup>9</sup> The Whampoa Military Academy, located at Whampoa near Canton, was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 after the reorganization of the Kuomintang with the help of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Before Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, the academy was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Comrades Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Yun Tai-ying, Hsiao Chu-nu and others held responsible posts in the academy at one time or another. Many of the cadets were members of the Communist Party or the Communist Youth League, and they formed the revolutionary core of the academy.

<sup>10</sup> Tan Yen-kai was a native of Hunan who had been a *Hanlin*, a member of the highest official scholastic body under the Ching Dynasty. He was a careerist who first advocated a constitutional monarchy and then took part in the Revolution of 1911. His later adherence to the Kuomintang reflected the contradiction between the Hunan landlords and the Northern warlords.

<sup>11</sup> The Progressive Party was organized by Liang Chi-chao and others under the aegis of Yuan Shih-kai during the first years of the Republic.

<sup>12</sup> Yuan Shih-kai was the head of the Northern warlords in the last years of the Ching Dynasty. After the Ching Dynasty was overthrown by the Revolution of 1911, he usurped the presidency of the Republic and organized the first government of the Northern warlords, which represented the big landlord and big comprador classes; he did this by relying on a counter-revolutionary armed force and the support of the imperialists and by taking advantage of the innate tendency to compromise on the part of the bourgeoisie which was then leading the revolution. In 1915 he wished to make himself emperor and, to gain the support of the Japanese imperialists, he accepted Japan's Twenty-one Demands which were aimed at the seizure of exclusive control of all China. In December of the same year an uprising in Yunnan Province, directed against his assumption of the throne, promptly won country-wide response and support. Yuan Shih-kai died in June 1916 in Peking.

<sup>13</sup> Tuan Chi-jui was an old subordinate of Yuan Shih-kai and head of the Anhwei clique of Northern warlords. After Yuan's death he more than once controlled the Peking government.

<sup>14</sup> The extremely right-wing Political Science Group was formed in 1916 by a section of the Progressive Party and a section of the Kuomintang. It gambled now on the Southern, now on the Northern, warlords in order to grab government posts. During the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, its pro-Japanese members, such as Huang Fu, Chang Chun and Yang Yung-tai, began to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek and, using their reactionary political experience, helped him build up a counter-revolutionary regime.

<sup>15</sup> The Youth Party, also called the Chinese Youth Party or the *Étatiste* Party, was formed by a handful of unscrupulous fascist politicians. They made counter-revolutionary careers for themselves by opposing the Communist Party and the Soviet Union and received subsidies from the various groups of reactionaries in power and from the imperialists.

<sup>16</sup> Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring mainly to the independent regiment commanded by General Yeh Ting, a Communist, during the Northern Expedition. See "The Struggle in the Ching-kang Mountains", Note 14, p. 50 of this volume.


<sup>17</sup> For the Nanchang Uprising, see "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", Note 30, p. 149 of this volume.

<sup>18</sup> For the Autumn Harvest Uprising, see *ibid.*, Note 32, pp. 149-50 of this volume.

<sup>19</sup> For the Canton Uprising, see "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?", Note 8, pp. 17-18 of this volume.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", pp. 75-150 of this volume.

<sup>21</sup> Han Fu-chu was a Kuomintang warlord in Shantung Province. Liu Chih, another warlord, who commanded Chiang Kai-shek's personal troops in Honan Province, was responsible for the defence of the Paoting area in Hopei after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Both of them fled before the Japanese without firing a shot.



## CONCLUSIONS ON THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT\*

*May 8, 1941*

As the Central Committee's directive of March 18, 1941, has stated, the second anti-Communist onslaught has come to an end. What has followed since is the continuance of the War of Resistance Against Japan in new circumstances, international as well as domestic. The additional factors in these new circumstances are the spread of the imperialist war, the upsurge of the international revolutionary movement, the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan,<sup>1</sup> the defeat of the Kuomintang's second anti-Communist onslaught and the consequent decline in the political standing of the Kuomintang and rise in the political standing of the Communist Party, and, furthermore, the latest preparations by Japan for a new large-scale offensive against China. It is absolutely necessary for us to examine and study the lessons of our Party's heroic and victorious struggle against the recent anti-Communist onslaught, for the purpose of uniting the people throughout the country to persevere in the War of Resistance and for the purpose of continuing effectively to overcome the danger of capitulation and the anti-Communist counter-current of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie.

1. Of China's two major contradictions, the national contradiction between China and Japan is still primary and the internal class contradiction in China is still subordinate. The fact that a national enemy has penetrated deep into our country is all-decisive. As long as the contradiction between China and Japan remains acute, even if the entire big landlord class and big bourgeoisie turn traitor and surrender, they can never bring about another 1927 situation, with a repetition of the April 12th and the May 21st Incidents<sup>2</sup> of that year.

---

\* This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

The first anti-Communist onslaught<sup>3</sup> was appraised as another May 21st Incident by some comrades, and the second onslaught as a repetition of the April 12th and the May 21st Incidents, but objective facts have proved these appraisals wrong. The mistake of these comrades lies in forgetting that the national contradiction is the primary one.

2. In the circumstances, the pro-British, pro-American big landlord class and big bourgeoisie, who direct all Kuomintang government policy, remain classes with a dual character. On the one hand they are opposed to Japan, and on the other they are opposed to the Communist Party and the broad masses of the people represented by the Party. And both their resistance to Japan and their anti-communism bear a dual character. With regard to their resistance to Japan, while they are opposed to Japan, they are not actively waging war or actively opposing Wang Ching-wei and the other traitors, and sometimes they even flirt with Japan's peace emissaries. With regard to their anti-communism, they are opposed to the Communist Party, having gone so far as to create the Southern Anhwei Incident and to issue the Order of January 17, but at the same time they do not want a final split and still maintain their stick and carrot policy. These facts have been confirmed once again in the recent anti-Communist onslaught. Chinese politics, which are extremely complex, demand our comrades' deepest attention. Since the pro-British, pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie are still resisting Japan and are still using the stick and carrot in dealing with our Party, the policy of our Party is to "do unto them as they do unto us",<sup>4</sup> stick for stick and carrot for carrot. Such is the revolutionary dual policy. So long as the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie do not completely turn traitor, this policy of ours will not change.

3. A whole range of tactics is needed to combat the Kuomintang's anti-Communist policy, and there must be absolutely no carelessness or negligence. The enmity and brutality of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek towards the people's revolutionary forces were not only demonstrated by the ten years of anti-Communist war, but they have been fully demonstrated in the midst of the war against Japan by two anti-Communist onslaughts, and particularly by the Southern Anhwei Incident during the second anti-Communist onslaught. If a people's revolutionary force is to avoid extermination by Chiang Kai-shek and to compel him to acknowledge its existence, it has no alternative

but to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against his counter-revolutionary policies. The defeat resulting from Comrade Hsiang Ying's opportunism<sup>5</sup> during the recent anti-Communist onslaught should serve as a grave warning to the whole Party. But the struggle must be waged on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint; if any of the three is lacking, we shall suffer setbacks.

4. In the struggle against the Kuomintang die-hards, the big comprador bourgeoisie must be distinguished from the national bourgeoisie, which has little or no comprador character, and the most reactionary big landlords must be distinguished from the enlightened gentry and the general run of landlords. This is the theoretical basis of our Party's endeavour to win over the intermediate groupings and establish organs of political power on the "three thirds system",<sup>6</sup> and it has been repeatedly stressed by the Central Committee since March last year. Its correctness was proved afresh during the recent anti-Communist onslaught. The stand we took before the Southern Anhwei Incident, as expressed in our November 9 telegram,<sup>7</sup> was entirely necessary for our shift to the political counter-attack after the incident; otherwise we could not have won over the intermediate groupings. For unless they had been taught time and again by experience, the intermediate groupings would have been unable to understand why our Party must wage resolute struggles against the Kuomintang die-hards, why unity can be gained only through struggle and why there can be no unity whatsoever if struggle is abandoned. Although the leading elements in the regional power groups belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, generally they should also be regarded and treated as intermediate groupings, since there are contradictions between them and the big landlords and big bourgeois who control the central government. Yen Hsi-shan who was most active in the first anti-Communist onslaught took a middle stand in the second, and although the Kwangsi clique which took a middle stand in the first onslaught came in on the anti-Communist side in the second, it is still in contradiction with the Chiang Kai-shek clique and not to be identified with it. This applies with still greater force to other regional power groups. Many of our comrades, however, still lump the different landlord and bourgeois groups together, as though the entire landlord class and bourgeoisie had turned traitor after the Southern Anhwei Incident; this is an over-simplification of China's complex politics. Were we to adopt this view and identify all the landlords and the bourgeoisie with the Kuomintang die-hards,

we would isolate ourselves. It must be realized that Chinese society is big in the middle and small at both ends<sup>8</sup> and that the Communist Party cannot solve China's problems unless it wins over the masses of the intermediate classes and unless it enables them to play their proper role according to their circumstances.

5. Because some comrades have wavered on the point that the contradiction between China and Japan is the primary one and hence have wrongly appraised class relations in China, they have at times wavered on the policy of the Party. Proceeding from their appraisal of the Southern Anhwei Incident as another April 12th or May 21st Incident, these comrades now seem to think that the Central Committee's policy directive of December 25 last year is no longer applicable, or at least not altogether applicable. They believe that we no longer need the kind of state power that includes all who stand for resistance and democracy but need a so-called state power of the workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie, and that we no longer need the united front policy of the period of the War of Resistance but need a policy of agrarian revolution as during the Ten Years' Civil War. The Party's correct policy has become blurred in the minds of these comrades, at any rate for the time being.

6. When these comrades were instructed by the Central Committee of our Party to be prepared against a possible split by the Kuomintang, that is, against the worst possible development, they forgot the other possibilities. They do not understand that while it is absolutely necessary to prepare for the worst possibility, this does not mean ignoring the favourable possibilities; on the contrary, such preparation for the worst is precisely a condition for creating favourable possibilities and turning them into reality. On this occasion, we were fully prepared against a split by the Kuomintang, and so the Kuomintang dared not bring about a split lightly.

7. There are even more comrades who fail to understand the unity of the national struggle and the class struggle, and who fail to understand united front policy and class policy, and consequently the unity of united front education and class education. They hold that after the Southern Anhwei Incident special emphasis should be placed on class education as distinct from united front education. Even now they do not understand that for the whole period of the anti-Japanese war the Party has a single integral policy — the national united front policy (a dual policy) which integrates the two aspects, unity and struggle — towards all those in the upper and middle strata who are

still resisting Japan, whether they belong to the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie or the intermediate classes. This dual policy should be applied even to the puppet troops, the traitors and the pro-Japanese elements, except for those who are absolutely unrepentant, whom we must resolutely crush. The education which our Party conducts among its own members and the people in general likewise embraces both these aspects, that is, it teaches the proletariat, and the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, how to unite, in different ways, with the different strata of the bourgeoisie and the landlord class for resistance to Japan, and how to conduct struggles against them in varying degrees according to the varying degrees in which they compromise, vacillate and are anti-Communist. United front policy is class policy and the two are inseparable; whoever is unclear on this will be unclear on many other problems.

8. Other comrades do not understand that the social character of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas in northern and central China is already new-democratic. The main criterion in judging whether an area is new-democratic in character is whether representatives of the broad masses of the people participate in the political power there and whether it is led by the Communist Party. Therefore, united front political power under Communist leadership is the chief mark of a new-democratic society. Some people think that New Democracy can be considered as accomplished only if there is an agrarian revolution like that of the Ten Years' Civil War, but they are wrong. At present the political system in the base areas is a political system of the united front of all the people who are for resistance and democracy, the economy is one from which the elements of semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism have been basically eliminated, and the culture is an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses of the people. Therefore, whether viewed politically, economically or culturally, both the anti-Japanese base areas which have only enforced the reduction of rent and interest and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region which has gone through a thorough agrarian revolution are new-democratic in character. When the example of the anti-Japanese base areas is extended throughout the country, then the whole of China will become a new-democratic republic.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan, concluded on April 13, 1941, ensured peace on the eastern border of the Soviet Union, thus crushing the plot for a joint German, Italian and Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. It marked a major victory for the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy.

<sup>2</sup> The April 12th Incident was the counter-revolutionary coup d'état staged by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai on April 12, 1927, during which large numbers of Communists and revolutionary workers, peasants and intellectuals were massacred. For the May 21st Incident, see "The Struggle in the Ching-kang Mountains", Note 16, p. 50 of this volume.

<sup>3</sup> The first anti-Communist onslaught during the anti-Japanese war was conducted by Chiang Kai-shek in the winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940.

<sup>4</sup> The quotation is from the commentary by Chu Hsi (1130-1200), a Chinese philosopher of the Sung Dynasty, on the *Confucian Doctrine of the Mean*, Chapter 13.

<sup>5</sup> Comrade Hsiang Ying, who was secretary of the Southeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the time of the Southern Anhwei Incident, held strong Rightist views on the question of the anti-Japanese national united front. He did not carry out the Central Committee's policies resolutely. He was afraid to arouse the masses fully, to extend the Liberated Areas and to expand the people's armed forces in the Japanese-occupied areas, did not sufficiently understand the seriousness of the Kuomintang's impending reactionary attack, and so was unprepared for it mentally and organizationally. On May 4, 1940, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, on behalf of the Central Committee, wrote the directive "Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces; Resist the Attacks of the Anti-Communist Die-Hards". When this directive reached the Southeast Bureau, Comrade Chen Yi, who was a member of the bureau and Commander of the First Contingent of the New Fourth Army, immediately put it into effect, but Comrade Hsiang Ying was unwilling to carry it out. He continued to make no preparations to meet the Kuomintang's attack so that the forces under him were powerless when Chiang Kai-shek staged the Southern Anhwei Incident in January 1941. Nine thousand of our men were annihilated in southern Anhwei and Comrade Hsiang Ying himself was killed.

<sup>6</sup> The "three thirds system" was the Chinese Communist Party's policy for united front organs of political power in the Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan. According to this policy, the proportion of personnel in the anti-Japanese democratic political organs was roughly one-third each for Communist Party members, for left progressives, and for middle elements and others.

<sup>7</sup> The telegram of November 9, 1940 was sent by Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai, Commander and Deputy Commander of the Eighteenth Group Army (Eighth Route Army), and Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying, Commander and Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army, in reply to the telegram of the Kuomintang generals Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi, dated October 19, 1940. Exposing the plot by the Kuomintang reactionaries to attack the Communist Party and capitulate to Japan, they denounced Ho Ying-chin's and Pai Chung-hsi's absurd proposal that the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army should shift from the south to the north of the Yellow River. However, in a spirit of conciliation and compromise for the sake of maintaining unity against Japan, they agreed to shift their forces from the south to the north of the

---

Yangtse River, while demanding the solution of a number of major outstanding issues between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The telegram won the sympathy of the intermediate groupings and served to isolate Chiang Kai-shek.

<sup>8</sup> Comrade Mao Tse-tung's remark about Chinese society means that the Chinese industrial proletariat which led the revolution formed only a minority of China's population, as did also the reactionary big landlords and big bourgeoisie.



## THE TURNING POINT IN WORLD WAR II\*

October 12, 1942

The Battle of Stalingrad has been compared by the British and American press to the Battle of Verdun, and the "Red Verdun" is now famous all over the world. This comparison is not altogether appropriate. The Battle of Stalingrad is different in nature from the Battle of Verdun in World War I. But they have this in common — now, as then, many people are misled by the German offensive into thinking that Germany can still win the war. In 1916 the German forces launched several attacks on the French fortress of Verdun, two years before World War I ended in the winter of 1918. The commander-in-chief at Verdun was the German Crown Prince and the forces thrown into the battle were the cream of the German army. The battle was of decisive significance. After the ferocious German assaults failed, the entire German-Austrian-Turkish-Bulgarian bloc had no future, and from then on its difficulties mounted, it was deserted by its followers, it disintegrated, and finally collapsed. But at the time the Anglo-American-French bloc did not grasp this situation, believing that the German army was still very powerful, and they were unaware of their own approaching victory. Historically, all reactionary forces on the verge of extinction invariably conduct a last desperate struggle against the revolutionary forces, and some revolutionaries are apt to be deluded for a time by this phenomenon of outward strength but inner weakness, failing to grasp the essential fact that the enemy is nearing extinction while they themselves are approaching victory. The rise of the forces of fascism and the war of aggression they have been conducting for some years are precisely the expression of such a last desperate struggle; and in this present war the attack on Stalingrad is the expression of the last desperate struggle of

---

\* This editorial was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the *Liberation Daily*, Yenan.

fascism itself. At this turning point in history, too, many people in the world anti-fascist front have been deluded by the ferocious appearance of fascism and have failed to discern its essence. For forty-eight days there raged an unprecedentedly bitter battle, unparalleled in the history of mankind — from August 23, when the entire German force crossed the bend of the River Don and began the all-out attack on Stalingrad, through September 15, when some units broke into the industrial district in the northwestern section of the city, and right up to October 9, when the Soviet Information Bureau announced that the Red Army had breached the German line of encirclement in that district. Ultimately this battle was won by the Soviet forces. During those forty-eight days, the news of each setback or triumph from that city gripped the hearts of countless millions of people, now bringing them anxiety, now stirring them to elation. This battle is not only the turning point of the Soviet-German war, or even of the present anti-fascist world war, it is the turning point in the history of all mankind. Throughout these forty-eight days, the people of the world watched Stalingrad with even greater concern than they watched Moscow last October.

Until his victory on the western front, Hitler seems to have been cautious. When he attacked Poland, when he attacked Norway, when he attacked Holland, Belgium, and France, and when he attacked the Balkans, he concentrated all his strength on one objective at a time, not daring to disperse his attention. After his victory on the western front, he became dizzy with success and attempted to defeat the Soviet Union in three months. He launched an offensive against this huge and powerful socialist country along the whole front stretching from Murmansk in the north to the Crimea in the south, and in so doing dispersed his forces. The failure of his Moscow campaign last October marked the end of the first stage of the Soviet-German war, and Hitler's first strategic plan failed. The Red Army halted the German offensive last year and launched a counter-offensive on all fronts in the winter, which constituted the second stage of the Soviet-German war, with Hitler turning to retreat and the defensive. In this period, after dismissing Brauchitsch, his field commander-in-chief, and taking over the command himself, he decided to abandon the plan for an all-out offensive, combed Europe for all available forces and prepared a final offensive which, though limited to the southern front, would, he imagined, strike at the vitals of the Soviet Union. Because it was in the nature of a final offensive

on which the fate of fascism hung, Hitler concentrated the greatest possible forces and even moved in part of his aircraft and tanks from the North African battle front. With the German attack on Kerch and Sevastopol in May this year, the war entered its third stage. Massing an army of over 1,500,000, which was supported by the bulk of his air and tank forces, Hitler launched an offensive of unprecedented fury on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. He endeavoured to capture these two objectives at great speed for the twofold purpose of cutting the Volga and seizing Baku, intending subsequently to drive against Moscow to the north and break through to the Persian Gulf in the south; at the same time, he directed the Japanese fascists to mass their troops in Manchuria in preparation for an attack on Siberia after the fall of Stalingrad. Hitler vainly hoped to weaken the Soviet Union to such an extent that he would be able to release the main forces of the German army from the Soviet theatre of war for dealing with an Anglo-American attack on the western front, and for seizing the resources of the Near East and effecting a junction with the Japanese; at the same time, this would allow the main forces of the Japanese to be released from the north and, with their rear secure, to move west against China and south against Britain and the United States. That was how Hitler reckoned on winning victory for the fascist camp. But how did things turn out in this stage? Hitler came up against the Soviet tactics which sealed his fate. The Soviet Union adopted the policy of first luring the enemy in deep and then putting up a stubborn resistance. In five months of fighting the German army has failed either to penetrate to the Caucasian oil-fields or to seize Stalingrad, so that Hitler has been forced to halt his troops before high mountains and outside an impregnable city, unable to advance and unable to retreat, suffering immense losses and getting into an impasse. October is already here and winter is approaching; soon the third stage of the war will end and the fourth stage will begin. Not one of Hitler's strategic plans of attack against the Soviet Union has succeeded. In this period, bearing in mind his failure in the summer of last year when his forces were divided, Hitler concentrated his strength on the southern front. But as he still wanted to achieve the twofold purpose of cutting the Volga in the east and seizing the Caucasus in the south at a single stroke, he again divided his forces. He did not recognize that his strength did not match his ambitions, and he is now doomed — "when the carrying pole is not secured at both ends, the loads slip off". As for the Soviet Union,

the more she fights the stronger she grows. Stalin's brilliant strategic direction has completely gained the initiative and is everywhere drawing Hitler towards destruction. The fourth stage of the war, beginning this winter, will mark the approach of Hitler's doom.

Comparing Hitler's position in the first and third stages of the war, we can see that he is on the threshold of final defeat. Both at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus the Red Army has now in fact stopped the German offensive; Hitler is now nearing exhaustion, having failed in his attacks on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The forces which he managed to assemble throughout the winter, from last December to May of this year, have already been used up. In less than a month winter will set in on the Soviet-German front, and Hitler will have to turn hastily to the defensive. The whole belt west and south of the Don is his most vulnerable area, and the Red Army will go over to the counter-offensive there. This winter, goaded on by the fear of his impending doom, Hitler will once again reorganize his forces. To meet the dangers on both the eastern and western fronts, he may perhaps be able to scrape together the remnants of his forces, equip them and form them into a few new divisions and, in addition, he will turn to his three fascist partners, Italy, Rumania and Hungary, for help and extort some more cannon-fodder from them. However, he will have to face the enormous losses of a winter campaign in the east and be ready to deal with the second front in the west, while Italy, Rumania and Hungary, becoming pessimistic as they see that it is all up with Hitler, will increasingly fall away from him. In short, after October 9 there is only one road open to Hitler, the road to extinction.

The Red Army's defence of Stalingrad in these forty-eight days has a certain similarity to the defence of Moscow last year. That is to say, Hitler's plan for this year has been foiled just as was his plan for last year. The difference, however, is that, although the Soviet people followed up their defence of Moscow with a winter counter-offensive, they had yet to face the summer offensive of the German army this year, partly because Germany and her European accomplices still had some fight left in them and partly because Britain and the United States delayed the opening of the second front. But now, following the battle for the defence of Stalingrad, the situation will be totally different from that of last year. On the one hand, the Soviet Union will launch a second winter counter-offensive on a vast scale. Britain and the United States will no longer be able to delay the


opening of the second front (though the exact date cannot yet be foretold), and the people of Europe will be ready to rise up in response. On the other hand, Germany and her European accomplices no longer have the strength to mount large-scale offensives, and Hitler will have no alternative but to change his whole line of policy to the strategic defensive. Once Hitler is compelled to go over to the strategic defensive, the fate of fascism is as good as sealed. From its birth, a fascist state like Hitler's builds its political and military life on taking the offensive, and once its offensive stops its very life stops too. The Battle of Stalingrad will stop the offensive of fascism and is therefore a decisive battle. It is decisive for the whole world war.

There are three powerful foes confronting Hitler, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, and the people in the German-occupied territories. On the eastern front stands the Red Army, firm as a rock, whose counter-offensives will continue through the whole of the second winter and beyond; it is this force which will decide the outcome of the whole war and the destiny of mankind. On the western front, even if Britain and the United States continue their policy of looking on and stalling, the second front will eventually be opened, when the time comes to belabour the slain tiger. Then there is the internal front against Hitler, the great uprising of the people which is brewing in Germany, in France and in other parts of Europe; they will respond with a third front the moment the Soviet Union launches an all-out counter-offensive and the guns roar on the second front. Thus, an attack from three fronts will converge on Hitler — such is the great historical process that will follow the Battle of Stalingrad.

Napoleon's political life ended at Waterloo, but the decisive turning point was his defeat at Moscow. Hitler today is treading Napoleon's road, and it is the Battle of Stalingrad that has sealed his doom.

These developments will have a direct impact on the Far East. The coming year will not be propitious for Japanese fascism either. As time goes on its headaches will grow, until it descends into its grave.

All those who take a pessimistic view of the world situation should change their point of view.



## ON COALITION GOVERNMENT\*

(EXCERPTS)

*April 24, 1945*

### THE PEOPLE'S WAR

During the same period<sup>1</sup> the main forces of the Communist-led Red Army, which had moved to northwestern China, were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army, while the Chinese Red Army guerrilla units, which had remained in various places on both sides of the Yangtse River, were reorganized as the New Fourth Army of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army. The former went to the northern China and the latter to the central China front to fight. During the civil war period, the Chinese Red Army, which had preserved and developed the democratic tradition of the Whampoa Military Academy and of the National Revolutionary Army of the Northern Expedition days, had at one time grown to several hundred thousand men. But by the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan it had been reduced to a few tens of thousands as a result of the ruthless destruction wrought in our southern base areas by the Kuomintang government, our losses during the Long March, and other causes. Consequently there were some who looked down on this army and thought that the main reliance should be placed on the Kuomintang for the resistance to Japan. But the people were the best judges. The people knew that despite their small number at the time, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies were of high quality, that they alone could wage a real people's war and that boundless prospects would open up before them once they reached the anti-Japanese fronts and joined with the

---

\* This article consists of two excerpts from "On Coalition Government", the political report given by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

broad masses there. The people were right. By now, as I make this report, our army has already expanded to 910,000 men, and the number of our rural militia, who are not withdrawn from normal productive work, has grown to more than 2,200,000. Despite the fact that our regular army is still numerically much smaller than that of the Kuomintang (the Kuomintang units under local as well as central control), it has already become the main force in China's War of Resistance, judging by the number of Japanese and puppet forces it is engaging and the extent of its battle fronts, by its combat effectiveness, by the mass support it enjoys in its operations, and by its political quality, its cohesion and unity.

This army is powerful because all its members have a discipline based on political consciousness; they have come together and they fight not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them whole-heartedly.

Guided by this purpose, this army has an indomitable spirit and is determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield. No matter what the difficulties and hardships, so long as a single man remains, he will fight on.

Guided by this purpose, this army has achieved remarkable unity in its own ranks and with those outside its ranks. Internally, there is unity between officers and men, between the higher and lower ranks, and between military work, political work and rear service work; and externally, there is unity between the army and the people, between the army and government organizations, and between our army and the friendly armies. Anything that impairs this unity is prohibited.

Guided by this purpose, this army has a correct policy for winning over enemy officers and men and for dealing with prisoners of war. Without exception all members of the enemy forces who surrender, who come over to our side or who, after laying down their arms, wish to join in fighting the common foe, are welcomed and given proper education. It is forbidden to kill, maltreat or insult any prisoners of war.

Guided by this purpose, this army has built up a system of strategy and tactics which is essential for the people's war. It is skilled in flexible guerrilla warfare conducted in accordance with the changing concrete conditions and is also skilled in mobile warfare.

Guided by this purpose, this army has built up a system of political work which is essential for the people's war and is aimed at promoting unity in its own ranks, unity with the friendly armies and unity with the people, and at disintegrating the enemy forces and ensuring victory in battle.

Guided by this purpose, the whole army, operating under conditions of guerrilla warfare, is able to utilize, and has in fact utilized, the intervals between battles and between training periods to produce grain and other daily necessities, thus becoming wholly, half or at least partly self-supporting, so that economic difficulties are overcome, living conditions improved and the burden on the people lightened. Every possibility has been exploited to establish a number of small-scale armament works in various military base areas.

This army is powerful, furthermore, because it has the people's self-defence corps and the militia — the vast armed organizations of the masses — fighting in co-ordination with it. In the Liberated Areas of China all men and women, from youth to middle age, are organized in the people's anti-Japanese self-defence corps on a voluntary and democratic basis and without giving up their work in production. The cream of the self-defence corps, except for those who join the army or the guerrilla units, is brought into the militia. Without the co-operation of these armed forces of the masses it would be impossible to defeat the enemy.

Finally, this army is powerful because of its division into two parts, the main forces and the regional forces, with the former available for operations in any region whenever necessary and the latter concentrating on defending their own localities and attacking the enemy there in co-operation with the local militia and the self-defence corps. This division of labour has won the whole-hearted support of the people. Without this correct division of labour — if, for example, attention were paid only to the role of the main forces while that of the regional forces were neglected — it would likewise be impossible to defeat the enemy in the conditions obtaining in China's Liberated Areas. Under the regional forces, numerous armed working teams<sup>2</sup> have been organized, which are well trained and hence better qualified for military, political and mass work; they penetrate into the rearmost areas behind the enemy lines, strike at the enemy and arouse the masses to anti-Japanese struggle, thus giving support to the frontal military operations of the various Liberated Areas. In all this they have achieved great success.

Under the leadership of their democratic governments, all the anti-Japanese people in the Liberated Areas of China are called upon to join organizations of workers, peasants, youth and women, and cultural, professional and other organizations, which will wholeheartedly perform various tasks in support of the armed forces. These tasks are not limited to rallying the people to join the army, transporting grain for the army, giving preferential treatment to soldiers' families and helping the troops in meeting their material needs. They also include mobilizing the guerrilla units, militia and self-defence corps to make widespread raids and lay land mines against the enemy, gather intelligence about the enemy, comb out traitors and spies, transport and protect the wounded and take direct part in the army's operations. At the same time, the people in all the Liberated Areas are enthusiastically taking up various kinds of political, economic, cultural and health work. The most important thing in this connection is to mobilize everybody for the production of grain and articles of daily use and to ensure that all government institutions and schools, except in special cases, devote their free time to production for their own support in order to supplement the people's and the army's production campaigns for self-sufficiency, and thus help to create a great upsurge of production for sustaining the protracted War of Resistance. In China's Liberated Areas, the enemy has wrought great havoc, and floods, droughts and damage by insect pests have been frequent. However, the democratic governments there have been leading the people in overcoming these difficulties in an organized way, and unprecedented results have been achieved by the great mass campaigns for pest extermination, flood control and disaster relief, thus making it possible to persevere in the protracted War of Resistance. In a word, everything for the front, everything for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and for the liberation of the Chinese people — this is the general slogan, the general policy for the whole army and the whole people in the Liberated Areas of China.

Such is a real people's war. Only by waging such a people's war can we defeat the national enemy. The Kuomintang has failed precisely because of its desperate opposition to a people's war.

Once it is equipped with modern weapons, the army of China's Liberated Areas will become still more powerful and will be able to accomplish the final defeat of the Japanese aggressors.

.....

## THE PEOPLE'S ARMY

Without an army standing on the people's side, it is impossible for the Chinese people to win freedom and unification, establish a coalition government, thoroughly defeat the Japanese aggressors and build a new China. At present the only armed forces that stand wholly on the people's side are the Liberated Areas' Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, which are not very large; they are far from sufficient. Yet the group within the Kuomintang that is against the people is ceaselessly intriguing to undermine and destroy the armies of the Liberated Areas. In 1944 the Kuomintang government presented a so-called "memorandum" demanding that the Communist Party should "disband, within a definite time limit", four-fifths of the armed forces of the Liberated Areas. In 1945, during the most recent negotiations, it has further demanded the handing over of all the armed forces of the Liberated Areas by the Communist Party, after which it would grant the Communist Party "legal status".

These people tell the Communists, "Hand over your troops and we will grant you freedom." According to their theory, a political party that does not have any army should enjoy freedom. Yet whatever freedom the Chinese Communist Party enjoyed during 1924-27, when it had only a small armed force, vanished with the Kuomintang government's policies of "party purge" and massacre. And today, the Chinese Democratic League and the democrats within the Kuomintang, who have no armed forces, have no freedom either. Let us take the workers, peasants and students and the progressively inclined people in cultural, educational and industrial circles under the Kuomintang regime — for the last eighteen years none of them have had any armed forces, and none of them have had any freedom. Can it be that all these democratic parties and people have been denied freedom because they organized armies, perpetrated "feudal separatism", created "traitor areas" and violated "government and military orders"? Not in the least. On the contrary, they have been denied freedom precisely because they have done none of these things.

"The army belongs to the state" — that is perfectly true, and there is not an army in the world that does not belong to a state. But what kind of state? A state under the feudal and fascist dictatorship of the big landlords, big bankers and big compradors, or a new-democratic state of the broad masses of the people? The only

kind of state for China to establish is a new-democratic state and, on this basis, she should establish a new-democratic coalition government; all the armed forces of China must belong to such a government of such a state so that they may safeguard the people's freedom and effectively fight foreign aggressors. The moment a new-democratic coalition government comes into being in China, the Liberated Areas of China will hand their armed forces over to it. But all the Kuomintang armed forces will have to be handed over to it at the same time.

In 1924 Dr. Sun Yat-sen said, "Today should mark the beginning of a new epoch in the national revolution. . . . The first step is to unite the armed forces with the people, and the next step is to turn them into the armed forces of the people."<sup>3</sup> It is because they have applied this policy that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have become "the armed forces of the people", that is, the people's army, and have been able to win victories. During the earlier period of the Northern Expedition, the Kuomintang armies took Dr. Sun's "first step", and hence won victories. In the latter period of the Northern Expedition they abandoned even the "first step", took a stand against the people, and hence from that time right up to the present they have become more and more corrupt and degenerate; though "in their element" when fighting "internal war", they cannot but be "out of their element" when it comes to fighting "external war". Every patriotic officer in the Kuomintang army who has a conscience should set about reviving the Sun Yat-sen spirit and transforming his troops.

In the work of transforming the old armies, all officers who are capable of being educated should be helped to get rid of their obsolete outlook and to acquire a correct outlook through suitable education so that they can remain and serve in the people's army.

It is the duty of the whole nation to struggle for the creation of the army of the Chinese people. Without a people's army the people have nothing. On this question there must be no empty theorizing whatsoever.

We Communists are ready to give our support to the task of transforming the Chinese army. All those military forces which are willing to unite with the people and to oppose the Japanese aggressors instead of opposing the armed forces of the Chinese Liberated Areas should be regarded as friendly troops and be given proper assistance by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

---

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This period extended from the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7, 1937, which marked the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan, to the fall of Wuhan in October 1938.

<sup>2</sup> The armed working teams were small working teams which went deep into the enemy-occupied areas to organize the masses and strike blows at the enemy. Such a team consisted of cadres drawn from various organizations — the Communist Party, the governments in the Liberated Areas, the people's army and mass organizations — and was equipped with a few weapons. This was a convenient form of organization for carrying out activities in the enemy-occupied areas.

<sup>3</sup> This quotation is from Dr. Sun Yat-sen's *Statement on My Departure for the North* of November 10, 1924.



ON PRODUCTION BY THE ARMY FOR  
ITS OWN SUPPORT AND ON THE IMPORTANCE  
OF THE GREAT MOVEMENTS FOR  
RECTIFICATION AND FOR PRODUCTION\*

*April 27, 1945*

In the existing circumstances in which our army is facing extreme material difficulties and is engaged in dispersed operations, it is absolutely inadmissible for the leading bodies to assume full responsibility for provisioning the army, for to do so would both hamper the initiative of the large numbers of officers and men at the lower levels and fail to satisfy their needs. We should say, "Comrades, let us all go into action and overcome our difficulties!" If only the leadership at the higher levels sets the tasks well and gives the lower levels a free hand to overcome difficulties by their own efforts, the problem will be solved and, indeed, solved in a more satisfactory way. But if, instead, the higher levels always shoulder loads heavier than they can really carry, dare not give the lower levels a free hand and do not arouse enthusiasm for self-reliance among the broad masses, then in spite of all the efforts of the higher levels the result will be that both the higher and the lower levels will find themselves in a predicament, and the problem will never be solved in the existing circumstances. The experience of the last few years has amply borne this out. The principle of "centralized leadership and decentralized management" has proved to be the correct one for organizing all economic activities in our Liberated Areas in the present circumstances.

The armed forces of the Liberated Areas already total more than 900,000 men. To defeat the Japanese aggressors, we must increase them to several times this number. But we have so far received no

---

\* This was an editorial written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the *Liberation Daily*, Yenan.

outside aid. Even if we get it in the future, we shall still have to provide our own means of livelihood; on that score there must be no illusions whatsoever. In the near future we shall have to take the necessary number of military formations from the areas where they are now engaged in dispersed operations, and concentrate them for attack on some particular enemy objectives. Such big formations for concentrated action will be unable to engage in production to support themselves, and, what is more, will need large supplies from the rear; only the local troops and regional formations remaining behind (and they will still be considerable) will be able both to fight and to engage in production as before. Such being the case, is there any doubt that, as long as fighting and training are not impeded, all troops without exception should use the present opportunity to learn how to be partially self-supporting in production?

In our circumstances, production by the army for its own support, though backward or retrogressive in form, is progressive in substance and of great historic significance. Formally speaking, we are violating the principle of division of labour. However, in our circumstances — the poverty and disunity of the country (resulting from the crimes of the chief ruling clique of the Kuomintang), and the protracted and dispersed people's guerrilla war — what we are doing is progressive. Look how pale and emaciated the Kuomintang soldiers are, and how robust and strong our soldiers of the Liberated Areas are! Look what difficulties we ourselves had before we started production for self-support, and how much better off we have been since! Let us ask two army units here, say two companies, to choose between the two methods, *i.e.*, between the higher levels supplying them with their means of livelihood and the higher levels supplying little or nothing but letting them produce for themselves all that they need, or the greater part, or half, or even less than half of what they need. Which method will yield better results? Which will they prefer? After a year's serious experiment in production for self-support, they will surely answer that the second method yields better results and be willing to adopt it, and they will surely answer that the first method yields poorer results and be unwilling to adopt it. The reason is that the second method can improve the living conditions of everyone in the army, whereas the first method can never satisfy their needs in the present difficult material circumstances, however hard the higher levels may try. Because we have adopted what seems to be a "backward" and "retrogressive" method, our troops are able to overcome shortages

in the means of livelihood and improve their living conditions, so that every soldier is robust and strong; as a result, we are able to ease the tax burden on the people who are also in difficulties, thus winning their support, and we are able to keep up the protracted war and expand our armed forces, thus extending the Liberated Areas, reducing the enemy-occupied areas and attaining our objective of final victory over the aggressor and the liberation of the whole of China. Is this not of great historic significance?

Production by the army for its own support has not only improved the army's living conditions and lightened the burden on the people, thereby making it possible further to expand the army. In addition, it has had many immediate effects. They are as follows:

(1) Improved relations between officers and men. Officers and men work together in production and become like brothers.

(2) Better attitude to labour. What we now have is neither the old mercenary system nor universal military service, but a third system, the system of mobilizing volunteers. It is better than the mercenary system since it does not produce so many loafers, but it is not so good as universal military service. Nevertheless, our present conditions only allow us to adopt the system of mobilizing volunteers, and not that of universal military service. The mobilized soldiers have to lead an army life for a long time, which may impair their attitude to labour and turn some of them into loafers or taint them with certain bad habits characteristic of the warlord armies. But since the army began to produce for its own support, the attitude to labour has improved and loafer ways have been overcome.

(3) Strengthened discipline. Far from weakening discipline in battle and in army life, labour discipline in production actually strengthens it.

(4) Improved relations between the army and the people. Once an armed force begins to "keep house" for itself, encroachments upon the property of the people seldom or never occur. As the army and the people exchange labour and help each other in production, the friendship between them is strengthened.

(5) Less grumbling in the army about the government and improved relations between the two.

(6) An impetus to the great production campaign of the people. Once the army engages in production, the need for government

and other organizations to do likewise becomes more obvious, and they do so more energetically; also, the need for a universal campaign of the whole people to increase production naturally becomes more obvious, and this too is carried on more energetically.

The widespread movements for rectification and for production which began in 1942 and 1943 respectively have played and are still playing a decisive role, the one in our ideological and the other in our material life. Unless we grasp these two links at the right time, we shall be unable to grasp the whole chain of the revolution, and our struggle will not advance.

As we know, of the members who joined the Party before 1937, only a few tens of thousands are left, and most of our present membership of 1,200,000 come from the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The revolutionary fervour of these comrades is admirable and they wish to have Marxist training, but they have brought with them into the Party ideas which are out of keeping or not altogether in keeping with Marxism. The same is true of some people who joined the Party before 1937. It constitutes an extremely serious contradiction, an enormous difficulty. In these circumstances, could we have advanced smoothly if we had not started a widespread movement of Marxist education, that is, the rectification movement? Obviously not. But as we have solved or are in the process of solving this contradiction among large numbers of cadres — the contradiction, within the Party, between the proletarian ideology and non-proletarian ideologies (including those of the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie and even of the landlord class, but mainly of the petty bourgeoisie), *i.e.*, the contradiction between the Marxist ideology and non-Marxist ideologies — our Party can go forward with great, firm strides in unprecedented (though not complete) ideological, political and organizational unity. From now on our Party can and should grow even more and, guided by the principles of Marxist ideology, we shall be able to steer its further development still more effectively.


The other link is the movement for production. The War of Resistance has been going on for eight years. When it began we had food and clothing. But things got steadily worse until we were in great difficulty, running short of grain, short of cooking oil and salt, short of bedding and clothing, short of funds. This great difficulty, this great contradiction, came in the wake of the big Japanese offensives and the Kuomintang government's three large-scale attacks on the

people (the "anti-Communist onslaughts") in 1940-43. Could our anti-Japanese struggle have progressed if we had not overcome this difficulty, solved this contradiction, grasped this link? Obviously not. But we have learned and are still learning to develop production, and so we are again full of vigour and vitality. In a few years we shall not fear any enemy, and we shall prevail over them all.

Thus there can be no doubt of the historic importance of the two great movements for rectification and production.

Let us go forward and spread these two great movements everywhere as a foundation for the fulfilment of other tasks in our struggle. If we can do so, the complete liberation of the Chinese people will be assured.

Now is the season for spring ploughing, and it is hoped that the leading comrades, all the working personnel and the masses of the people in every Liberated Area will take the first opportunity to grasp the link of production and strive for even greater achievements than those of last year. Greater efforts must be made this year, particularly in areas which have not yet learned to develop production.



## CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE\*

*September 16, 1946*

1. The method of fighting by concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces<sup>1</sup> one by one must be employed not only in the disposition of troops for a campaign but also in the disposition of troops for a battle.

2. With regard to the disposition for a campaign, when the enemy employs many brigades<sup>2</sup> (or regiments) and advances against our army in several columns from several directions, our army must concentrate an absolutely superior force — six, five, four or at least three times the enemy strength — and pick an opportune moment to encircle and wipe out one enemy brigade (or regiment) first. It should be one of the enemy's weaker brigades (or regiments), or one that has less support, or one stationed where the terrain and the people are most favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy. We should tie down the other enemy brigades (or regiments) with small forces in order to prevent them from rushing reinforcements to the brigade (or regiment) we are encircling and attacking, so that we can destroy it first. When this has been achieved, we should, according to the circumstances, either wipe out one or several more enemy brigades or retire to rest and consolidate for further fighting. (Here are two examples of the former. Our troops under the command of Su Yu and Tan Chen-lin wiped out five thousand of the enemy's communications police corps<sup>3</sup> near Jukao on August 22, one enemy brigade on August 26, and one and a half brigades on August 27.<sup>4</sup> Our troops under Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping annihilated one enemy brigade near Tingtao

---

\* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

between September 3 and 6, another in the afternoon of September 6, and two more on September 7-8.)<sup>5</sup> In the disposition for a campaign, we must reject the wrong method of fighting, in which as a result of underrating the enemy we divide our forces to deal with all the enemy columns, for by this method we cannot destroy even a single enemy column but will land ourselves in a passive position.

3. In the disposition for a battle, when we have concentrated an absolutely superior force and encircled one of the enemy columns (a brigade or regiment), our attacking formations (or units) should not attempt to wipe out all the encircled enemy simultaneously at one swoop and thus divide themselves and strike everywhere without enough strength anywhere, losing time and making it hard to get results. Instead, we should concentrate an absolutely superior force, that is to say, a force six, five, four or at least three times that of the enemy, concentrate the whole or the bulk of our artillery, select one (not two) of the weaker spots in the enemy's positions, attack it fiercely and be sure to win. This accomplished, swiftly exploit the victory and destroy the enemy forces one by one.

4. The effects of this method of fighting are, first, complete annihilation and, second, quick decision. Only complete annihilation can deal the enemy the most telling blows, for when we wipe out one regiment, he will have one regiment less, and when we wipe out one brigade, he will have one brigade less. This method is most useful when employed against an enemy lacking second-line troops. Only complete annihilation can replenish our own forces to the greatest possible extent. It is now not only the main source of our arms and ammunition, but also an important source of our manpower. Complete annihilation demoralizes the enemy's troops and depresses his followers; it raises the morale of our troops and inspires our people. A quick decision makes it possible for our troops either to wipe out the enemy reinforcements one by one or to evade them. Quick decision in battle and campaign is a necessary condition for the strategy of a protracted war.

5. Among our military cadres there are still many who, when not in action, approve the principle of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one, but when in action often fail to apply it. That is due to underestimation of the enemy and to lack of intensive education and study. It is necessary to cite detailed cases of past battles to explain again and again the advantages of this method of fighting and to point out that it is the chief method of

defeating Chiang Kai-shek's attacks. Using this method, we shall win. Acting counter to it, we shall lose.

6. The principle of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one has been a fine tradition of our army ever since its founding more than a decade ago; this is not the first time it has been put forward. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, however, the dispersal of our forces for guerrilla warfare was primary, and the concentration of our forces for mobile warfare was supplementary. In the present civil war, since conditions have changed, the method of fighting should change too. The concentration of our forces for mobile warfare should be primary, and the dispersal of our forces for guerrilla warfare should be supplementary. Now that Chiang Kai-shek's army has acquired more powerful weapons, it is necessary for our army to lay special stress on the method of concentrating a superior force to wipe out the enemy forces one by one.

7. This method must be employed when the enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive. However, when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive, we should distinguish between two kinds of situation and adopt different methods. When our force is big and the enemy in the locality is rather weak, or when we are making a surprise attack on the enemy, we may strike at several of his units simultaneously. For example, between June 5 and 10, our troops in Shantung Province simultaneously attacked and captured more than ten towns on the Tsingtao-Tsinan and the Tientsin-Pukow Railways.<sup>6</sup> Or, to take another example, between August 10 and 21, our troops under Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping attacked and captured more than ten towns along the Lunghai Railway between Kaifeng and Hsuechow.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, when we do not have enough forces, we should seize the enemy-occupied towns one by one and should not attack the enemy at several towns simultaneously. That was how our forces in Shansi Province took the towns along the Tatung-Puchow Railway.<sup>8</sup>

8. When the main force of our troops is concentrated to annihilate the enemy, it must co-ordinate its operations with vigorous activities by the regional formations, local guerrillas and people's militia. When regional formations (or units) attack an enemy regiment, battalion or company, they should also adopt the principle of concentrating their forces to annihilate the enemy forces one by one.

9. The principle of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one is aimed chiefly at annihilating the enemy's effective

strength, not at holding or seizing a place. In some circumstances, it is permissible to abandon certain places for the purpose of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy or of enabling our main force to avoid heavy enemy attacks and to facilitate rest and consolidation for further fighting. So long as we are able to wipe out the enemy's effective strength on a large scale, it will be possible to recover lost territory and seize new territory. Therefore, all those who succeed in destroying the enemy's effective strength should be commended. This applies not only to those who destroy the enemy's regular forces but also to those who destroy his peace preservation corps, home-going contingents<sup>9</sup> and other reactionary local armed bands. However, we must hold or seize territory wherever the balance of forces makes it possible to do so or wherever such territory is significant for our campaigns or battles; to do otherwise would be a mistake. Therefore, those who succeed in holding or seizing such territory should also be commended.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The expressions "to destroy the enemy", "to wipe out the enemy" and "to annihilate the enemy" are used as synonyms in this book. They all include enemy troops killed, wounded and captured. To wipe out (annihilate, destroy) an enemy force means either to wipe it out completely or to wipe out the major part of that force.

<sup>2</sup> A regular corps of the Kuomintang army originally consisted of three (sometimes two) divisions, each with three regiments. Beginning in May 1946, the Kuomintang regular troops south of the Yellow River were reorganized in stages; what had been a corps became a reorganized division and former divisions became brigades, each with three (sometimes two) regiments. Part of the Kuomintang troops north of the Yellow River were not reorganized, and their designations remained the same. Some of the reorganized divisions later reverted to their original designation of corps.

<sup>3</sup> The communications police corps of the Kuomintang was formed in March 1945. Following Japan's surrender, the corps was deployed along communication lines for "garrison duties" under the pretext of guarding the railways, but actually to carry on secret police activities. It was one of the forces the Kuomintang used for fighting the civil war.

<sup>4</sup> In July 1946 the Kuomintang forces began a large-scale invasion of the Kiangsu-Anhwei Liberated Area, and our army fought bravely in self-defence. The Kuomintang troops attacking the Central Kiangsu Liberated Area consisted of fifteen brigades with about 120,000 men under Tang En-po. From July 13 to August 27, eighteen regiments of the Eastern China People's Liberation Army, commanded by Su Yu, Tan Chen-lin and other comrades, concentrated superior forces and fought seven successive battles in the region of Taihsing, Jukao, Hai-an and Shaopai in central Kiangsu. Our forces wiped out six enemy brigades and five battalions of the enemy's communications police corps. The text refers to the results of two of these battles.


<sup>5</sup> In August 1946 the Kuomintang forces advanced along two routes from the Hsuchow and Chengchow sectors and attacked the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area. The People's Liberation Army of this area, under the command of Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades, concentrated superior forces to engage the enemy column advancing from Chengchow. Between September 3 and 8 they wiped out four enemy brigades in succession in the region of Hotse, Tingtao and Tsaohsien in Shantung Province.

<sup>6</sup> Early in June 1946 the Shantung People's Liberation Army sent an expedition against the puppet troops along the Tsingtao-Tsinan and Tientsin-Pukow Railways and liberated more than ten towns, including Chiaohsien, Changtien, Choutsun, Tehchow, Tai-an and Tsaochuang.

<sup>7</sup> From August 10 to 21, 1946, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army, supporting the Central Plains and Eastern China People's Liberation Armies, moved by several routes and attacked the enemy troops stationed along the Kaifeng-Hsuchow section of the Lunghai Railway, capturing more than ten towns, including Tangshan, Lanfeng, Huangkou, Lichuang and Yangchi.

<sup>8</sup> In July 1946 the Kuomintang forces under Hu Tsung-nan and Yen Hsi-shan jointly attacked the Southern Shansi Liberated Area. The Taiyueh units of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army and a part of the Shansi-Suiyuan People's Liberation Army counter-attacked and beat back the enemy in southern Shansi. In August they started an offensive against the enemy between Linfen and Lingshih along the Tatung-Puchow Railway and liberated the towns of Hungtung, Chaocheng, Huohsien, Lingshih and Fenhsi.

<sup>9</sup> During the People's War of Liberation some landlords and local tyrants in the Liberated Areas fled to the Kuomintang areas. They were organized by the Kuomintang into "home-going contingents", "home-going legions" and other reactionary armed bands to attack the Liberated Areas together with the Kuomintang troops. Everywhere they robbed, killed and committed all kinds of atrocities.



## A THREE MONTHS' SUMMARY\*

*October 1, 1946*

1. The Central Committee's directive of July 20 on the current situation<sup>1</sup> stated: "We can defeat Chiang Kai-shek. The whole Party should be fully confident of this." The fighting in July, August and September has proved this judgement to be correct.

2. Apart from the fundamental political and economic contradictions which Chiang Kai-shek cannot resolve and which are the basic cause rendering our victory certain and Chiang's defeat inevitable, a sharp contradiction has arisen in the military sphere between Chiang's over-extended battle lines and his shortage of troops. That contradiction is bound to be the direct cause of our victory and Chiang Kai-shek's defeat.

3. The total of Chiang Kai-shek's regular troops attacking the Liberated Areas, not counting the puppet troops, the peace preservation corps and communications police corps, is more than 190 brigades. Besides this total, the most he can do is to move part of his troops from the south to the north again as reinforcements; but after that it will be hard for him to send any more reinforcements. Of the 190 odd brigades, 25 have been wiped out by our army in the past three months. This does not include the forces we wiped out in the Northeast from February to June this year.

---

\* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It summed up in detail the rich experience in the three months of fighting beginning with the outbreak of the country-wide civil war in July 1946, set forth the future strategy and fighting tasks of the People's Liberation Army and pointed out that after overcoming a period of difficulties we were certain to win victory in the People's War of Liberation. The directive also explained in principle the problems which needed to be solved for the support of and in co-ordination with the People's War of Liberation, such as land reform, the development of production in the Liberated Areas, the strengthening of leadership in the mass struggles in the Kuomintang areas and other relevant problems.

4. Of Chiang Kai-shek's more than 190 brigades, nearly half must perform garrison duties; only a little more than half can be put into the field. And when these field forces advance to certain regions, part or even a majority will have to switch over to garrison duty. The enemy's field forces are bound to dwindle as the fighting goes on because, first, they will be continually wiped out by us and, second, many will have to perform garrison duties.

5. Of the 25 brigades we destroyed in the past three months, 7 were under the command of Tang En-po (previously under Li Mo-an), 2 under Hsueh Yueh, 7 under Ku Chu-tung (previously under Liu Chih), 2 under Hu Tsung-nan, 4 under Yen Hsi-shan, 2 under Wang Yao-wu and 1 under Tu Yu-ming. Only the 4 groups under Li Tsung-jen, Fu Tso-yi, Ma Hung-kuei and Cheng Chien have not yet received blows from our army; all the remaining 7 groups have received serious blows or initial blows. Those who have received serious blows are Tu Yu-ming (taking into account the fighting in the Northeast from February to June this year), Tang En-po, Ku Chu-tung and Yen Hsi-shan. Those who have received initial blows are Hsueh Yueh, Hu Tsung-nan and Wang Yao-wu. All this proves that our army can defeat Chiang Kai-shek.

6. In the coming period our task is to wipe out some 25 more enemy brigades. The completion of this task will make it possible to halt Chiang Kai-shek's offensive and recover part of our lost territory. It can be predicted that after wiping out this second batch of 25 brigades our army will certainly be able to seize the strategic initiative and go over from the defensive to the offensive. Our task then will be to destroy a third batch of 25 enemy brigades. If we achieve that, we can recover most or even all of the lost territory and expand the Liberated Areas. By that time a tremendous change will surely have taken place in the relative military strength of the Kuo-mintang and the Communist Party. To attain this we must follow up our great achievement of wiping out 25 brigades in the past three months and destroy about 25 more in the coming three months or so. This is the key to changing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves.<sup>2</sup>

7. In the past three months we have lost a few dozen medium and small towns, such as Huaiyin, Hotse, Chengteh and Chining. The abandonment of most of these towns was unavoidable, and it was right to abandon them temporarily on our own initiative. Some others we were forced to abandon because we did not fight well. In any case, we shall be able to recover our lost territory, provided we fight well

from now on. In the future there may still be places we cannot prevent the enemy from taking, but we shall be able to recover all of them later. All areas should critically review their past fighting in order to learn the lessons of their experience and avoid repeating mistakes.

8. In the past three months our Central Plains Liberation Army has shown matchless stamina in overcoming difficulties and hardships and, aside from that part of the army which has moved into the old Liberated Areas, its main force has established two guerrilla bases in southern Shensi and western Hupeh.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, our troops are persisting in guerrilla warfare in both eastern and central Hupeh. All this has greatly helped, and is still helping, the fighting in the old Liberated Areas, and it will play a greater role in the long war ahead.

9. In the past three months of war we have pinned down south of the Great Wall several of Chiang Kai-shek's crack forces, which he had originally planned to send to the Northeast, and have thus gained time for resting and consolidating our troops and for arousing the masses in the Northeast. This, too, is of great significance for our future struggles.

10. To concentrate a superior force to wipe out the enemy forces one by one is the only correct method of fighting, the method we have used in the past three months to destroy 25 enemy brigades. Only by concentrating a force six, five, four or at least three times as strong as the enemy's force can we effectively wipe it out. This must be done both in campaigns and in battles. This method of fighting must be mastered not only by all high-ranking commanders but also by all middle and lower-ranking cadres.

11. In the past three months, in addition to 25 regular brigades of the enemy, our army has destroyed considerable numbers of other reactionary forces, such as puppet troops, peace preservation corps and communications police corps; this also is a great achievement. We should continue to annihilate such troops in large numbers.

12. The experience of the past three months has proved that in order to wipe out 10,000 enemy troops we have to pay a price of 2,000 to 3,000 casualties of our own. This is unavoidable. To cope with a long war (and everything, everywhere should be considered with such a war in mind) we must expand our army in a planned way, ensure that our main forces are always kept at full strength and train large numbers of military cadres. We must develop production and regulate finances according to plan and firmly put into effect the principles of developing our economy and ensuring supply, of unified

leadership and decentralized management, and of giving consideration to both the army and the people and to both public and private interests.

13. The experience of these three months has proved that higher fighting efficiency was shown by all troops who, during the period of the truce from January to June, intensified their military training according to the directives of the Central Committee (which has repeatedly instructed the various areas to regard troop training, production and land reform as their three central tasks). It has also proved that all troops not so trained showed much lower fighting efficiency. From now on, all areas must utilize the intervals between battles for intensified military training. All army units must strengthen their political work.

14. The experience of these three months has proved that the peasants stood with our Party and our army against the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's troops wherever the Central Committee's directive of May 4<sup>4</sup> was carried out firmly and speedily and the land problem was solved radically and thoroughly. The peasants took a wait-and-see attitude wherever the "May 4th Directive" was not carried out firmly or the arrangements were made too late, or wherever this work was mechanically divided into stages or land reform was neglected on the excuse of preoccupation with the war. In the coming few months all areas, no matter how busy they are with the war, must resolutely lead the peasant masses to solve the land problem and, on the basis of the land reform, make arrangements for large-scale production work next year.

15. The experience of these three months has proved that wherever the regional armed forces, including the people's militia, the guerrillas and the armed working teams,<sup>5</sup> are well organized, we can control vast rural areas even though many points and lines are temporarily occupied by the enemy. But wherever the regional armed forces are weak and the leadership is poor, the enemy is given a much easier time. From now on, in areas temporarily occupied by the enemy, we must strengthen the Party's leadership, develop the regional armed forces, persevere in guerrilla warfare, safeguard the interests of the masses, and strike blows at the activities of the reactionaries.

16. Three months of war have almost exhausted the reserve forces of the Kuomintang and seriously weakened its military strength in its own areas. At the same time, the Kuomintang's resumption of conscription and grain levies<sup>6</sup> has aroused popular discontent and created a situation favourable for the development of mass struggles.

The whole Party must strengthen its leadership of the mass struggles in the Kuomintang areas and intensify the work of disintegrating the Kuomintang army.

17. The Kuomintang reactionaries, under the direction of the United States, have violated the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference of January this year and are determined to wage the civil war in their attempt to destroy the people's democratic forces. All their fine words are nothing but humbug; we must expose all the plots of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek.

18. In these three months the broadest strata of the people in the Kuomintang areas, including the national bourgeoisie,<sup>7</sup> have quickly arrived at a better understanding of the fact that the Kuomintang and the United States government are working in collusion, have started the civil war and are oppressing the people. More and more people now realize the truth that Marshall's mediation is a fraud and that the Kuomintang is the arch-criminal of the civil war. The broad masses, disillusioned with the United States and the Kuomintang, now place their hopes on the victory of our Party. This domestic political situation is extremely favourable. The reactionary policy of U.S. imperialism is rousing increasing discontent among the broad masses of the people in all countries. The level of political consciousness of the people in all countries is rising every day. The people's democratic struggle is mounting in all capitalist countries, the strength of the Communist Parties in many countries has greatly increased, and it will be impossible for the reactionaries to reduce them to submission. The might of the Soviet Union and its prestige among the peoples are growing daily. The U.S. reactionaries and the reactionaries whom they support in other countries are bound to become more and more isolated. This international political situation is extremely favourable. The situation both at home and abroad differs greatly from that after World War I. The revolutionary forces have grown tremendously since World War II. We can defeat the Chinese and foreign reactionaries, no matter how rampant they are (this rampancy is historically inevitable and not at all strange). Leading comrades in all areas should explain this fully to those comrades in the Party who are gloomy about the future of the struggle owing to their inadequate understanding of the favourable situation at home and abroad. It must be made clear that the enemy still has strength, that we ourselves still have some weaknesses and that the struggle is still a long and cruel one. But undoubtedly we can win victory.

This understanding and conviction must be firmly established throughout the Party.

19. The coming few months will be an important and difficult period. We must strenuously mobilize the whole Party, undertake meticulously planned military operations and radically change the military situation. All areas must resolutely carry out the above policies and strive for a radical change in the military situation.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by a War of Self-Defence", pp. 89-95 of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV.

<sup>2</sup> Later developments showed that the situation as between the enemy and ourselves began to change in July 1947, when the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army forced the Yellow River and marched towards the Tapieh Mountains. By then the People's Liberation Army had fought for twelve months and wiped out about a hundred enemy brigades, averaging eight a month. This exceeded the estimate made in this article because, with the support of U.S. imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek had committed all his available forces in the offensive.

<sup>3</sup> At the end of June 1946 the Central Plains Liberation Army led by Li Hsien-nien, Cheng Wei-san and other comrades initiated a strategic shift of its forces and victoriously broke through an encirclement by 300,000 Kuomintang troops. The units mentioned by Comrade Mao Tse-tung as having moved into the old Liberated Areas were those led by Wang Chen and other comrades; they entered the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region after breaking through the encirclement. The guerrilla base in southern Shensi was founded by a part of the main force of the Central Plains Liberation Army and included Lushih and Hsichuan in western Honan and Lonan and Shanyang in southern Shensi. The guerrilla base in western Hupeh was set up by another part of the same army with the Wutang Mountains in north-western Hupeh as its centre.

<sup>4</sup> This refers to the "Directive on the Land Question" issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 4, 1946. After Japan's surrender, in view of the peasants' eager demand for land, the Central Committee decided to change the land policy of the period of the War of Resistance, that is, to change from the reduction of rent and interest to confiscation of the land of the landlords and its distribution among the peasants. The "May 4th Directive" marked this change.

<sup>5</sup> See "On Coalition Government", Note 2, p. 305 of this volume.

<sup>6</sup> This refers to land taxes in kind.

<sup>7</sup> The national bourgeoisie is the section of the bourgeoisie which has little or no connection with imperialism, as distinguished from that section of the bourgeoisie which is closely dependent on imperialism and is comprador in character, that is, the big bourgeoisie or bureaucrat-capitalists.

## THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NORTHWEST WAR THEATRE\*

*April 15, 1947*

1. The enemy is now quite tired, but not yet tired out. He is in considerable difficulties with his food supply, but not yet in extreme difficulties. Although our army has not destroyed any large number of the enemy's forces since wiping out his 31st Brigade,<sup>1</sup> in the last twenty days we have achieved the objective of tiring him and considerably reducing his food supplies, thus creating favourable conditions for tiring him out completely, cutting off all his food supplies and finally wiping him out.

2. At present, despite the enemy's fatigue and shortage of food, his policy is to drive our main force east across the Yellow River, seal off Suiteh and Michih and divide his forces for "mopping-up" operations. The enemy troops reached Chingchien on March 31 but did not advance north immediately; their purpose was to leave us a clear passage. Their advance west towards Wayaopao was designed to drive us to Suiteh and Michih. Having discovered our troops, they are now veering to the south and west of Wayaopao and then they will again advance towards that town to drive us northward.

3. Our policy is to continue our former method, that is, to keep the enemy on the run in this area for a time (about another month); the purpose is to tire him out completely, reduce his food supplies drastically and then find an opportunity to destroy him. There is no need for our main force to hurry north to attack Yulin or south to cut off the enemy's retreat. It should be made clear to the commanders and fighters and also to the masses that this method of our

---

\* This telegram was sent by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the Northwest Field Army, which was then composed of the People's Liberation Army forces of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia and Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Areas and commanded by Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung, Hsi Chung-hsun and other comrades.

army's is the necessary road to the final defeat of the enemy. Unless we reduce the enemy to extreme fatigue and complete starvation, we cannot win final victory. This may be called the tactics of "wear and tear", that is, of wearing the enemy down to complete exhaustion and then wiping him out.

4. As you are now in localities east and north of Wayaopao, it would be best to induce the enemy to move to the north of Wayaopao; then you may attack the weaker part of Liao Ang's<sup>2</sup> forces and induce the enemy to move east; afterwards you may turn towards Ansai, and induce the enemy to move west again.

5. But within a few days you must order the entire 359th Brigade to complete its preparations for a southward drive, so that a week from now it can be sent southward to make a surprise attack on the area south of the Yenchang-Yenan line and north of the Yichuan-Lochuan line and cut the enemy's food transport line.

6. Please reply whether you consider the above views sound.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Having withdrawn from Yenan on its own initiative, the Northwest People's Liberation Army sent out a small force to lure the enemy's main force as far as Ansai, northwest of Yenan, while leaving its main force to ambush the enemy in the Chinghuapien sector, northeast of Yenan. On March 25, 1947, a Kuomintang regiment of the 31st Brigade of Hu Tsung-nan's Reorganized 27th Division, led by the brigade headquarters, walked right into this trap and was completely destroyed in a battle lasting just over an hour.

<sup>2</sup> Liao Ang, Commander of the Reorganized 76th Division of the Kuomintang forces under Hu Tsung-nan, was later captured in a battle at Chingchien on October 11, 1947.

## STRATEGY FOR THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION\*

*September 1, 1947*

1. In the first year's fighting (from July last year to June this year), we wiped out 97 $\frac{1}{2}$  regular brigades, or 780,000 men, and puppet troops, peace preservation corps and others totalling 340,000 — altogether 1,120,000 of the enemy. This was a great victory. It dealt the enemy a heavy blow, created profound defeatism in the whole enemy camp, elated the people throughout the country and laid the foundation for the complete annihilation of the enemy by our army and for final victory.

2. In the first year's fighting, the enemy launched a large-scale offensive against the Liberated Areas, using 218 of his 248 regular brigades, or more than 1,600,000 men, and nearly 1,000,000 men from the special arms (navy, air force, artillery, engineer corps and armoured units) and from the puppet troops, communications police corps and peace preservation corps. Our army rightly adopted the strategy of fighting on interior lines; and in order to hold the initiative at all times and places it did not balk at paying the price of over 300,000 casualties and of enemy occupation of large tracts of territory. Consequently, we succeeded in wiping out 1,120,000 enemy troops, forced the enemy to disperse his forces, steeled and strengthened our own forces, launched strategic counter-offensives in the Northeast, Jehol, eastern

---

\* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China when he and the Central Committee were at Chukuanchai, Chiahsien County, northern Shensi. The directive formulated the basic task for the second year of the War of Liberation. This task was to carry the war into the Kuomintang areas with our main forces and to switch from fighting on interior lines to fighting on exterior lines, that is, to pass from the stage of the strategic defensive to that of the strategic offensive. In accordance with the strategic plan laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive on a country-wide scale during July-September 1947. The Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Field Army forced the Yellow River in southwestern Shantung

Hopei, southern Shansi and northern Honan, recovered large territories and liberated vast new areas.<sup>1</sup>

3. In the second year of fighting, our army's basic task is to launch a country-wide counter-offensive, that is, to use our main forces to fight our way to exterior lines, carry the war into the Kuomintang areas, wipe out large numbers of the enemy on the exterior lines and completely wreck the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary strategy, which is to continue to carry the war into the Liberated Areas, further damage and drain our manpower and material resources and make it impossible for us to hold out very long. In the second year's fighting, part of our army's task is to use some of our main forces and large numbers of our regional troops to continue fighting on interior lines, wipe out the enemy there and recover lost territory.

4. Our army will of course meet many difficulties in carrying out the policy of fighting on exterior lines and bringing the war into the Kuomintang areas. For it takes time to build new bases in the Kuomintang areas, and we can build stable bases only when we have wiped out large numbers of the enemy in many back-and-forth mobile operations, aroused the masses, distributed land, established our political power and built up the people's armed forces. Until then, there will be quite a few difficulties. But they can and must be overcome. For the enemy will be forced to spread out even more and vast territories will be available to our army as battlefields for mobile operations, and therefore we will be able to wage mobile warfare; the broad masses in those territories hate the Kuomintang and support us; and though part of the enemy forces still has a comparatively high combat effec-

---

on June 30, crossed the Lunghai Railway early in August and thrust into the Tapien Mountains. The Taiyueh Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Field Army forced the Yellow River from southern Shansi in late August and thrust into western Honan. The Eastern China Field Army thrust into southwestern Shantung early in September after smashing a concentrated attack by the enemy. In the same month the Shantung Army of the Eastern China Field Army started an offensive against the enemy in eastern Shantung. The Northwest Field Army went over to the offensive late in August. The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Field Army started an offensive against the enemy along the northern section of the Peiping-Hankow Railway early in September. Immediately after its summer offensive throughout the Northeast, the Northeast Field Army, beginning in September, launched a large-scale autumn offensive in the Changchun-Kirin-Szepinghai region and in the Chinhsi-Ihsien sector along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. The offensives in all these theatres of war constituted a general offensive by the entire People's Liberation Army. This large-scale offensive led to a turning point in the War of Liberation, marking a radical change in the war situation. See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", pp. 157-76 of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV.

tiveness, on the whole the enemy's morale and combat effectiveness are much lower than a year ago.

5. The keys to victory in fighting in the Kuomintang areas are, first, to be good at seizing the opportunities for fighting, to be brave and determined and to win as many battles as possible, and, second, to carry out resolutely the policy of winning the masses and enable the broad masses to benefit so that they side with our army. If these two points are carried out, we shall win victory.

6. Up to the end of August this year, the distribution of enemy forces, including those which had been wiped out or dealt crushing blows, was 157 brigades on the southern front, 70 on the northern front and 21 in the Kuomintang rear areas. The total in the whole country was still 248 brigades and the actual number of troops was about 1,500,000. Troops in the special arms, puppet troops, communications police and peace preservation corps numbered about 1,200,000. Non-combatants in the military institutions in the enemy rear numbered about 1,000,000. The entire enemy forces thus totalled about 3,700,000 men. Of the troops on the southern front, 117 brigades belong to Ku Chu-tung's group, 7 to Cheng Chien's group and others, and 33 to Hu Tsung-nan's group. Of the 117 brigades of Ku Chu-tung's group, 63 have been wiped out or have received crushing blows. Of these, some have not been replenished; others, although they are being replenished, have few men and low combat effectiveness; and still others, although their manpower and arms have been fairly well replenished and their combat effectiveness has to some extent been restored, are still far weaker than before. There are only 54 brigades which have neither been wiped out nor received crushing blows. Of Ku Chu-tung's entire forces, 82 to 85 brigades are employed for garrison duty and can be used only for local manoeuvres, and no more than 32 to 35 brigades can be used for strategic manoeuvres. The 7 brigades of Cheng Chien's group and others can in the main be used only for garrison duty, and one has already received a crushing blow. Of the 33 brigades of Hu Tsung-nan's group (including those east of Lanchow, south of Ningsia and Yulin, and west of Linfen and Loyang), 12 have been wiped out or received crushing blows, only 7 can be used for strategic manoeuvres, and the rest are on garrison duty. On the northern front the enemy has 70 brigades altogether. Of these, the Northeast group has 26 brigades, of which 16 have been wiped out or have received crushing blows; Sun Lien-chung's group has 19 brigades, of which 8 have been wiped out or received crushing

blows; Fu Tso-yi has 10 brigades, of which 2 have received crushing blows; and Yen Hsi-shan has 15 brigades, of which 9 have been wiped out or received crushing blows. These enemy troops are now mainly on the defensive and only a small part is available for mobile operations. In the Kuomintang rear areas there are only 21 brigades on garrison duty. Of these, 8 brigades are in Sinkiang and western Kansu, 7 in Szechuan and Sikang, 2 in Yunnan, 2 in Kwangtung (that is, the 69th Division that was wiped out) and 2 in Taiwan. There are no regular troops at all in the six provinces of Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Fukien, Chekiang and Kiangsi. The Kuomintang is planning, with U.S. assistance, to recruit 1,000,000 men this year to replenish the front and to train a number of new brigades and replacement regiments. However, if our army can wipe out an average of 8 enemy brigades a month, as it did in the first year of fighting, and wipe out another 96 to 100 brigades in the second year (already in July and August 16½ brigades were wiped out), then the enemy army will be further and greatly weakened, its strategic reserve will be reduced to the minimum, and it will be forced into a defensive position in all parts of the country and will be attacked by us everywhere. Although the Kuomintang has this plan of recruiting 1,000,000 men and training new brigades and replacement regiments, it will be of no avail. Since its only methods of recruiting are press-ganging and hiring, to reach a million will certainly be difficult and many will desert. Moreover, our army will be able to reduce the enemy's manpower and material resources by carrying out the policy of fighting on exterior lines.

7. The operational principles of our army remain the same as those laid down before:

Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first (this applies also to large-scale campaigns of annihilation directed against several brigades, such as the Laiwu campaign<sup>2</sup> in February and the South-western Shantung campaign<sup>3</sup> in July this year); attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.

Take medium and small cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.

Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a place our main objective. Holding or seizing a place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.

In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force, encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces.

On the one hand, be sure to fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves. On the other hand, give full play to our fine style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time).

Strive to draw the enemy into mobile warfare, but at the same time lay great stress on learning the tactics of positional attack and on stepping up the building of the artillery and engineer corps in order to capture enemy fortified points and cities on a large scale.

Resolutely attack and seize all fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. At opportune moments, attack and seize all fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. For the time being, leave alone all fortified points and cities which are strongly defended.

Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the soldiers captured from the enemy (80-90 per cent of the men and a small number of the junior officers). Seek replenishment chiefly from the enemy and from the Kuomintang areas and only partly from the old Liberated Areas; this applies especially to the armies on the southern front.

In all the new and old Liberated Areas, we must resolutely carry through the land reform (which is the most fundamental requirement for supporting a long war and winning country-wide victory), develop production, practise economy and strengthen the building of war industry — all for victory at the front. Only by doing this can we support a long war and win victory in the whole country. If we do so, we shall certainly be able to support a long war and win victory throughout the country.

8. The above sums up the year's fighting and sets forth the principles for future fighting. Leading comrades in all areas are requested

to pass the contents on to all cadres of regimental rank and above, of the level of prefectural Party committee and above and of the level of prefectural commissioner's office and above, so that everyone will understand his own task and carry it out resolutely and unwaveringly.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This strategic counter-offensive in the Northeast, Jehol and eastern Hopei was the 1947 summer offensive of the Northeast People's Liberation Army. On May 13 the People's Liberation Army began simultaneous offensives on these fronts and by July 1 had wiped out over 80,000 enemy troops and recovered more than 40 county towns. The enemy plan of cutting up the Liberated Areas in northeastern China was thus completely wrecked. The enemy troops, driven into two narrow corridors along the Chinese Changchun Railway and the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, were forced into the "defence of key points". This changed the whole situation in northeastern China. The strategic counter-offensive in southern Shansi and northern Honan comprised the offensives launched by the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army in northern Honan and on the flanks of the Tatung-Puchow Railway in southern Shansi between March and May 1947. Our army in northern Honan started attacking on March 23. After taking Yenchin, Yangwu, Puyang and Fengchiu one after another, our army turned north to exploit these successes. By May 28 it had captured Tsihsien, Chunhsien, Huahsien and Tangyin and wiped out over 45,000 enemy troops. Our troops in southern Shansi began offensive operations on April 4. By May 4 they had captured twenty-two county towns, including Chuwo, Hsinchiang and Yungtsi, and two important ferry crossings on the Yellow River, Yumenkou and Fenglingtu, and had wiped out over 18,000 enemy troops.

<sup>2</sup> The Laiwu campaign was a campaign of mobile warfare fought by the Eastern China People's Liberation Army in the Laiwu region, southeast of Tsinan, Shantung Province. Towards the end of January 1947 the Kuomintang troops launched an offensive against the Shantung Liberated Area from both the north and the south. From the south, eight Kuomintang reorganized divisions drove northward by three routes along the Yiho and Shuho Rivers towards Linyi and from the north, in co-ordination with them, three Kuomintang corps belonging to the Li Hsien-chou group advanced southward on Laiwu and Hsintai from Mingshui, Tsechuan and Poshan, seeking to engage the main force of the Eastern China People's Liberation Army in a decisive battle in the Yi-Meng mountain area. Our army used part of its forces to block the enemy from the south but marched its main force north towards Laiwu to destroy the Li Hsien-chou group. All the enemy troops, over 60,000 men, were wiped out in a battle which started on February 20 and ended on the afternoon of February 23. Li Hsien-chou, Deputy Commander of the 2nd Pacification Zone of the Kuomintang's Hsuehchow Pacification Headquarters, was captured, and thirteen towns were recovered.

<sup>3</sup> This Southwestern Shantung campaign was the campaign fought by the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army in July 1947 in the region of Hotse, Yuncheng, Chuyeh, Tingtao, Chinhsiang and Tsaohsien, in southwestern Shantung Province. In this campaign 4 Kuomintang division headquarters and 9½ brigades, totalling more than 56,000 men, were wiped out.

# MANIFESTO OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY\*

*October 1947*

The Chinese People's Liberation Army, having smashed Chiang Kai-shek's offensive, has now launched a large-scale counter-offensive. Our armies on the southern front are advancing on the Yangtse River valley, and our armies on the northern front are advancing on the Chinese Changchun Railway and the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. Wherever our troops go, the enemy flees pell-mell before us and the people give thunderous cheers. The whole situation has fundamentally changed as compared with a year ago.

The aim of our army in this war, as proclaimed time and again to the nation and the world, is the liberation of the Chinese people and of the Chinese nation. And today, our aim is to carry out the urgent demand of the people of the whole country, that is, to overthrow the arch-criminal of the civil war, Chiang Kai-shek, and form a democratic coalition government in order to attain the general goal of liberating the people and the nation.

For eight long years the Chinese people fought heroically against Japanese imperialism for their own liberation and national independence. After the Japanese surrender the people longed for peace, but Chiang Kai-shek wrecked all their peace efforts and forced the disaster of an unprecedented civil war on them. Hence the people of all strata throughout the country had no alternative but to unite to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek.

---

\* This political manifesto was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. It analysed the political situation in China at the time, raised the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and liberate all China!" and announced the eight basic policies of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which were also those of the Communist Party of China. The manifesto was issued on October 10, 1947, and was known as the "October 10th Manifesto". It was drafted at Shenchuanpao, Chiahsien County, northern Shensi.

Chiang Kai-shek's present policy of civil war is no accident but is the inevitable outcome of the policy against the people he and his reactionary clique have consistently followed. As far back as 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, devoid of all gratitude, betrayed the revolutionary alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party<sup>1</sup> and betrayed the revolutionary Three People's Principles and the Three Great Policies of Sun Yat-sen;<sup>2</sup> then he set up a dictatorship, capitulated to imperialism, fought ten years of civil war and brought on the aggression of the Japanese bandits. In the Sian Incident of 1936,<sup>3</sup> the Communist Party of China returned good for evil and co-operated with Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng in setting Chiang Kai-shek free in the hope that he would repent, turn over a new leaf and join in the fight against the Japanese aggressors. But once again he proved devoid of all gratitude; he was passive against the Japanese invaders, active in suppressing the people and extremely hostile to the Communist Party. The year before last (1945), Japan surrendered and the Chinese people once more forgave Chiang Kai-shek, demanding that he should stop the civil war he had already started, put democracy into practice and unite with all parties and groups for peace and national reconstruction. But no sooner had the truce agreement been signed, the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference adopted and the four pledges<sup>4</sup> proclaimed than the utterly faithless Chiang Kai-shek went back on his word completely. Time and again the people showed themselves forbearing and conciliatory for the sake of the common good, but, aided by U.S. imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek was determined to launch an unprecedented all-out offensive against the people, in utter disregard of the fate of the country and the nation. From January last year (1946), when the truce agreement was announced, up to the present, Chiang Kai-shek has mobilized more than 220 brigades of his regular troops and nearly a million miscellaneous troops<sup>5</sup> and launched large-scale attacks against the Liberated Areas which the Chinese people wrested from Japanese imperialism after bloody battles; he has seized successively the cities of Shenyang, Fushun, Penki, Szepingkai, Changchun, Yungchi, Chengteh, Chining, Changchiakou, Huaiyin, Hotse, Linyi, Yen'an and Yentai and vast rural areas. Wherever Chiang Kai-shek's troops go, they murder and burn, rape and loot, carry out the policy of the three atrocities and behave exactly like the Japanese bandits.<sup>6</sup> In November last year Chiang Kai-shek convened the bogus National Assembly and proclaimed the bogus constitution. In March this year he expelled the

representatives of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang areas. In July he issued an order of general mobilization against the people.<sup>7</sup> Towards the just movement of the people in different parts of the country against civil war, against hunger and against U.S. imperialist aggression and towards the struggle for existence waged by the workers, peasants, students, townspeople, government employees and teachers, Chiang Kai-shek's policy is one of repression, arrest and massacre. Towards our country's minority nationalities, his policy is one of Han chauvinism, of persecution and repression by every possible means. In all the areas under Chiang Kai-shek's rule corruption is rife, secret agents run amuck, taxes are innumerable and crushing, prices are skyrocketing, the economy is bankrupt, all business languishes, conscription and the grain levy are imposed and voices of discontent are heard everywhere; all this has plunged the overwhelming majority of the people throughout the country into an abyss of suffering. Meanwhile the financial oligarchs, corrupt officials, local tyrants and bad gentry, all headed by Chiang Kai-shek, have amassed vast fortunes. Chiang Kai-shek and his like made these fortunes by using their dictatorial powers to extort taxes and levies and promote their private interests under the guise of serving the public. To maintain his dictatorship and carry on the civil war, Chiang Kai-shek has not hesitated to sell out our country's sovereign rights to foreign imperialism, to collude with the U.S. armed forces so that they should remain in Tsingtao and elsewhere and to procure advisers from the United States to take part in directing the civil war and training troops to slaughter his own fellow-countrymen. Aircraft, tanks, guns and ammunition for the civil war are shipped from the United States in great quantities. Funds for the civil war are borrowed from the United States on a large scale. In return for its favours, Chiang Kai-shek has presented U.S. imperialism with military bases and the rights of air flight and navigation, concluded a commercial treaty of enslavement,<sup>8</sup> etc. — acts of treason many times worse than those of Yuan Shih-kai.<sup>9</sup> In a word, Chiang Kai-shek's twenty-year rule has been traitorous, dictatorial and against the people. Today, the overwhelming majority of the people throughout the country, north and south, young and old, know his towering crimes and hope that our army will quickly launch the counter-offensive, overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and liberate all China.

We are the army of the Chinese people and in all things we take the will of the Chinese people as our will. The policies of our army

represent the urgent demands of the Chinese people and chief among them are the following:

(1) Unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coalition government.

(2) Arrest, try, and punish the civil war criminals headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

(3) Abolish the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship, carry out the system of people's democracy and guarantee freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of association for the people.

(4) Abolish the rotten institutions of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, clear out all corrupt officials and establish clean government.

(5) Confiscate the property of the four big families<sup>10</sup> of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and the Chen Li-fu brothers, and the property of the other chief war criminals; confiscate bureaucrat-capital, develop the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie, improve the livelihood of workers and employees, and give relief to victims of calamities and to poverty-stricken people.

(6) Abolish the system of feudal exploitation and put into effect the system of land to the tillers.

(7) Recognize the right to equality and autonomy of the minority nationalities within the borders of China.

(8) Repudiate the traitorous foreign policy of the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government, abrogate all the treasonable treaties and repudiate all the foreign debts contracted by Chiang Kai-shek during the civil war period. Demand that the U.S. government withdraw its troops stationed in China, which are a menace to China's independence, and oppose any foreign country's helping Chiang Kai-shek to carry on civil war or trying to revive the forces of Japanese aggression. Conclude treaties of trade and friendship with foreign countries on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Unite in a common struggle with all nations which treat us as equals.

The above are the basic policies of our army. They will be put into practice at once wherever our army goes. These policies conform with the demands of more than 90 per cent of the people in our country.

Our army does not reject all Chiang Kai-shek's personnel but adopts a policy of dealing with each case on its merits. That is, the

chief criminals shall be punished without fail, those who are accomplices under duress shall go unpunished and those who perform deeds of merit shall be rewarded. As for Chiang Kai-shek, the arch-criminal who started the civil war and who has committed most heinous crimes, and as for all his hardened accomplices who have trampled the people underfoot and are branded as war criminals by the broad masses, our army will hunt them down, even to the four corners of the earth, and will surely bring them to trial and punishment. Our army warns all officers and men in Chiang Kai-shek's army, all officials in his government and all members of his party whose hands are not yet stained with the blood of innocent people that they should strictly refrain from joining these criminals in their evil-doing. Those who have been doing evil should immediately stop, repent and start anew and break with Chiang Kai-shek, and we will give them a chance to make amends for their crimes by good deeds. Our army will not kill or humiliate any of Chiang Kai-shek's army officers and men who lay down their arms, but will accept them into our service if they are willing to remain with us or send them home if they wish to leave. As for those Chiang Kai-shek troops who rise in revolt and join our army and those who work for our army openly or in secret, they shall be rewarded.

In order to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and form a democratic coalition government at an early date, we call on our fellow-countrymen in all walks of life to co-operate actively with us in cleaning up the reactionary forces and setting up a democratic order wherever our army goes. In places we have not yet reached, they should take up arms on their own, resist press-ganging and the grain levy, distribute the land, repudiate debts and take advantage of the enemy's gaps to develop guerrilla warfare.

In order to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and form a democratic coalition government at an early date, we call on the people in the Liberated Areas to carry through the land reform, consolidate the foundations of democracy, develop production, practise economy, strengthen the people's armed forces, eliminate the remaining strongholds of the enemy and support the fighting at the front.

All comrade commanders and fighters of our army! We are shouldering the most important, the most glorious task in the history of our country's revolution. We should make great efforts to accomplish our task. Our efforts will determine the day when our great motherland will emerge from darkness into light and our beloved

fellow-countrymen will be able to live like human beings and to choose the government they wish. All officers and fighters of our army must improve their military art, march forward courageously towards certain victory in the war and resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely wipe out all enemies. They must all raise their level of political consciousness, learn the two skills of wiping out the enemy forces and arousing the masses, unite intimately with the masses and rapidly build the new Liberated Areas into stable areas. They must heighten their sense of discipline and resolutely carry out orders, carry out our policy, carry out the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention — with army and people united, army and government united, officers and soldiers united, and the whole army united — and permit no breach of discipline. All our officers and fighters must always bear in mind that we are the great People's Liberation Army, we are the troops led by the great Communist Party of China. Provided we constantly observe the directives of the Party, we are sure to win.

Down with Chiang Kai-shek!  
Long live New China!

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> In 1924, with the help of the Communist Party of China, Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Kuomintang and effected co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The Revolutionary War of 1924-27 was launched on the basis of this co-operation. This first co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was wrecked as a result of betrayals by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei in 1927.

<sup>2</sup> The Three People's Principles were the principles and programmes put forward by Sun Yat-sen on the questions of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood in the bourgeois democratic revolution in China. In 1924, in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, a congress characterized by co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Sun Yat-sen restated the Three People's Principles, interpreted nationalism as opposition to imperialism and expressed active support for the movements of the workers and peasants. The old Three People's Principles thus developed into the new Three People's Principles with the Three Great Policies, that is, alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. The new Three People's Principles provided the political basis for the co-operation between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang during the First Revolutionary Civil War period.

<sup>3</sup> In 1936 the Kuomintang's Northeastern Army headed by Chang Hsueh-liang and the Kuomintang's Northwestern Army headed by Yang Hu-cheng were stationed

in and around Sian; they were charged with the task of attacking the Chinese Red Army which had arrived in northern Shensi. Influenced by the Chinese Red Army and the people's anti-Japanese movement, they agreed to the Anti-Japanese National United Front put forward by the Communist Party of China and demanded that Chiang Kai-shek unite with the Communist Party to resist Japan. Chiang Kai-shek turned down the demand, became even more active in his military preparations for the "suppression of the Communists" and massacred the anti-Japanese youth of Sian. Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng took joint action and arrested Chiang Kai-shek. This was the famous Sian Incident of December 12, 1936. Chiang Kai-shek was forced to accept the terms of unity with the Communist Party and resistance to Japan and was then set free to return to Nanking.

<sup>4</sup> The "four pledges" were made by Chiang Kai-shek at the opening session of the Political Consultative Conference in 1946. They were, to guarantee freedom of the people, to guarantee the legal status of political parties, to hold a general election and to release political prisoners.

<sup>5</sup> By miscellaneous troops are meant the Kuomintang's irregular troops which included the local peace preservation corps, communications police corps, gendarmes, the puppet troops taken over and reorganized by the Kuomintang, etc.

<sup>6</sup> The Japanese invaders carried out the policy of the three atrocities — burn all, kill all, loot all — against the Liberated Areas in China.

<sup>7</sup> On July 4, 1947, the reactionary Kuomintang government adopted Chiang Kai-shek's "General Mobilization Bill" and immediately afterwards issued the "Order for General Mobilization to Suppress the Insurrection of the Communist Bandits". In fact, Chiang Kai-shek had carried out a general mobilization for his counter-revolutionary civil war much earlier. By that time the Chinese People's Liberation Army had begun to shift to a country-wide offensive. Chiang Kai-shek himself admitted that his regime was in a "serious crisis". The "Order for General Mobilization" was merely his dying kick.

<sup>8</sup> This refers to the "Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" concluded between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the U.S. government on November 4, 1946. This treaty, which sold out a large part of China's sovereignty to the United States, contains thirty articles, the main contents of which are as follows:

(1) U.S. nationals shall enjoy in "the whole extent of . . . the territories" of China the rights to reside, travel, carry on commercial, manufacturing, processing, scientific, educational, religious and philanthropic activities, explore and exploit mineral resources, lease and hold land, and follow various occupations and pursuits. In regard to economic rights U.S. nationals in China shall be accorded the same treatment as Chinese.

(2) In respect of taxation, sale, distribution and use in China, U.S. commodities shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the commodities of any third country or to Chinese commodities. "No prohibition or restriction shall be imposed" by China on the importation from the United States of any article grown, produced or manufactured in the United States, or on the exportation to the United States of any Chinese article.

(3) U.S. vessels shall have the freedom of sailing in any of the ports, places or waters in China which are open to foreign commerce or navigation, and their personnel and freight shall have freedom of transit through Chinese territory "by the routes most convenient". On the pretext of "any . . . distress", U.S. vessels, including warships, can sail into "any of the ports, places or waters" of China which are "not open to foreign commerce or navigation".

Wellington Koo, then Chiang Kai-shek's ambassador to the United States, openly and shamelessly stated that this treaty meant "the opening of the entire territory of China to U.S. merchants".

<sup>9</sup> See "Problems of War and Strategy", Note 12, p. 282 of this volume.

<sup>10</sup> This refers to the four big monopoly capitalist groups of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Li-fu. See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Section 6, pp. 167-69 of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV.

ON THE REISSUE OF  
THE THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND  
THE EIGHT POINTS FOR ATTENTION  
—INSTRUCTION OF  
THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF  
THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

*October 10, 1947*

1. Our Army's Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention<sup>1</sup> have been practised for many years, but their contents vary slightly in army units in different areas. They have now been unified and are hereby reissued. It is expected that this version will be taken as the standard one for thorough education in the army and strict enforcement. As to other matters needing attention, the high command of the armed forces in different areas may lay down additional points in accordance with specific conditions and order their enforcement.

2. The Three Main Rules of Discipline are as follows:

- (1) Obey orders in all your actions.
- (2) Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
- (3) Turn in everything captured.

3. The Eight Points for Attention are as follows:

- (1) Speak politely.
- (2) Pay fairly for what you buy.
- (3) Return everything you borrow.
- (4) Pay for anything you damage.
- (5) Do not hit or swear at people.
- (6) Do not damage crops.
- (7) Do not take liberties with women.
- (8) Do not ill-treat captives.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were the rules of discipline laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. They formed an important part of the political work of the Red Army and played a great role in building the people's armed forces, handling relations within the army correctly, forging unity with the masses of the people and laying down the correct policy of the people's army towards captives. From the earliest days of the Red Army, Comrade Mao Tse-tung required the soldiers to speak politely to the masses, pay fairly for all purchases and never impress people into forced labour or hit or swear at people. In the spring of 1928, when the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was in the Chinggang Mountains, Comrade Mao Tse-tung set down Three Rules of Discipline: (1) Obey orders in your actions; (2) Do not take anything from the workers and peasants; and (3) Turn in all things taken from local tyrants. In the summer of 1928 he set forth Six Points for Attention: (1) Put back the doors you have taken down for bed-boards; (2) Put back the straw you have used for bedding; (3) Speak politely; (4) Pay fairly for what you buy; (5) Return everything you borrow; and (6) Pay for anything you damage. After 1929 Comrade Mao Tse-tung made the following changes: Rule 2 became "Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses", and Rule 3 was changed first to "Turn in all money raised" and then to "Turn in everything captured". To the Six Points for Attention he added two more: "Do not bathe within sight of women" and "Do not search the pockets of captives". This was the origin of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention.

# THE PRESENT SITUATION AND OUR TASKS\*

(EXCERPTS)

December 25, 1947

## I

The Chinese people's revolutionary war has now reached a turning point. That is, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has beaten back the offensive of several million reactionary troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the running dog of the United States of America, and gone over to the offensive. Already in the first year of the present war, from July 1946 to June 1947, the People's Liberation Army beat back Chiang Kai-shek's offensive on several fronts and forced him onto the defensive. And beginning with the first quarter of the second year of the war, July-September 1947, the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive on a national scale and wrecked Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary plan of continuing to carry the war into the Liberated Areas in order to destroy them completely. Now the war is no longer being fought chiefly in the Liberated Areas but in the Kuomintang areas; the main forces of the People's Liberation Army have carried the fight into the Kuomintang areas.<sup>1</sup> In this land of China, the People's Liberation Army has turned back the wheel of counter-revolution — of U.S. imperialism and its lackey, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang — and sent it down the road to destruction, and has

---

\* This report was made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held on December 25-28, 1947, at Yang-chiakou, Michih County, northern Shensi. In addition to those members and alternate members of the Central Committee able to attend, responsible comrades of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region were present. The meeting discussed and adopted this report and also another document written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, "Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation" (see *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV, pp. 87-88). Con-

pushed the wheel of revolution forward along the road to victory. This marks a turning point in history. It is the turning point from growth to extinction for Chiang Kai-shek's twenty-year counter-revolutionary rule. It is the turning point from growth to extinction for imperialist rule in China, now over a hundred years old. This is a momentous event. It is momentous because it is occurring in a country with a population of 475 million and, having occurred, it will certainly culminate in victory throughout the country. Furthermore, it is momentous because it is occurring in the East, where over 1,000 million people — half of mankind — suffer under imperialist oppression. The turn of the Chinese People's War of Liberation from the defensive to the offensive cannot but gladden and inspire these oppressed nations. It is also of assistance to the oppressed people now struggling in many countries in Europe and the Americas.

## II

From the day Chiang Kai-shek started his counter-revolutionary war we said we must defeat him and can defeat him. We must defeat him because the war he started is a counter-revolutionary war directed by U.S. imperialism against the independence of the Chinese nation and the liberation of the Chinese people. After the conclusion of World War II and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism, the task of the Chinese people was to complete the new-democratic transformation politically, economically and culturally, to achieve national unification and independence and to change China from an agricultural into an industrial country. But at that time, after the victorious con-

---

cerning Comrade Mao Tse-tung's report, the decision adopted at the meeting stated, "This report is a programmatic document in the political, military and economic fields for the entire period of the overthrow of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek ruling clique and of the founding of a new-democratic China. The whole Party and the whole army should carry on intensive education around, and strictly apply in practice, this document and, in connection with it, the documents published on October 10, 1947 [namely, 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army', 'Slogans of the Chinese People's Liberation Army', 'Instruction on the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention', 'Outline Land Law of China' and 'Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Promulgation of the Outline Land Law of China']. In carrying out policies in different places any departure from the principles laid down in the report should be rectified at once." Other important decisions taken at the meeting were:

clusion of the anti-fascist Second World War, U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in various countries stepped into the shoes of German and Japanese imperialism and their lackeys and formed a reactionary camp against the Soviet Union, against the People's Democracies in Europe, against the workers' movements in the capitalist countries, against the national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies and against the liberation of the Chinese people. At that time, the Chinese reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek acted as the running dog for U.S. imperialism — just as Wang Ching-wei had done for Japanese imperialism — sold out China to the United States and unleashed a war against the Chinese people to check the advance of their liberation. At that time, if we had shown weakness or given ground and had not dared to rise resolutely to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, China would have become a world of darkness and the future of our nation would have been forfeited. The Communist Party of China has led the Chinese People's Liberation Army in firmly waging a patriotic, just and revolutionary war against Chiang Kai-shek's offensive. The Communist Party of China, having made a clear-headed appraisal of the international and domestic situation on the basis of the science of Marxism-Leninism, recognized that all attacks by the reactionaries at home and abroad had to be defeated and could be defeated. When dark clouds appeared in the sky, we pointed out that they were only temporary, that the darkness would soon pass and the sun break through. When the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang launched the country-wide counter-revolutionary war in July 1946, they thought it would take them only three to six months to defeat the People's Liberation Army. They reckoned that they had a regular army of two million, more than a million irregulars and another million or more men in the military establishments and

---

(1) That every effort should be made to carry the Chinese people's revolutionary war forward uninterruptedly to complete victory, and that the enemy should not be allowed to use stalling tactics (peace negotiations) to gain time for rest and reorganization for a fresh attack on the people.

(2) That the time was not yet ripe for the formation of a revolutionary central government, which was to be considered only when our army had won greater victories, and that the promulgation of a constitution was even more so a question for the future.

The meeting also discussed in detail current tendencies in the Party and certain specific policies in the land reform and the mass movements. The results of these discussions were subsequently set forth by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the article "On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy" (see *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV, pp. 181-89). Only the first three sections of this report are given here.

armed units in the rear, making a total military strength of more than four million; that they had taken time to complete their preparations for the offensive; that they had regained control of the big cities; that they had a population of more than 300 million; that they had taken over all the equipment of a million Japanese invading troops; and that they had received huge military and financial aid from the U.S. government. They also reckoned that the People's Liberation Army was tired after fighting for eight years in the War of Resistance Against Japan and was far inferior to the Kuomintang army in numbers and equipment; that the population of the Liberated Areas was only a little more than 100 million; and that in most of these areas the reactionary feudal forces had not yet been cleaned up and land reform had not yet been generally and thoroughly carried out, in other words, that the rear area of the People's Liberation Army had not yet been consolidated. Proceeding from this appraisal, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang ignored the Chinese people's desire for peace, finally tore up the truce agreement signed by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in January 1946 as well as the resolutions adopted by the Political Consultative Conference of all parties, and launched an adventurist war. We said then that Chiang Kai-shek's superiority in military forces was only transient, a factor which could play only a temporary role, that U.S. imperialist aid was likewise a factor which could play only a temporary role, while the anti-popular character of Chiang Kai-shek's war and the feelings of the people were factors that would play a constant role, and that in this respect the People's Liberation Army was in a superior position. Patriotic, just and revolutionary in character, the war waged by the People's Liberation Army was bound to win the support of the people of the whole country. That was the political foundation for victory over Chiang Kai-shek. The experience of eighteen months of war has fully confirmed our judgement.

### III

In seventeen months of fighting (from July 1946 to November 1947; December figures are not yet available), we killed, wounded or captured 1,690,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's regular and irregular troops — 640,000 killed or wounded and 1,050,000 captured. Thus we were

able to beat back Chiang Kai-shek's offensive, preserve the main territories of the Liberated Areas and go over to the offensive. Speaking from the military aspect, we were able to do this because we employed the correct strategy. Our principles of operation are:

1. Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.

2. Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.

3. Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.

4. In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we shall be absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy.

5. Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.

6. Give full play to our style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest).

7. Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.

8. With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. At opportune moments, seize all enemy fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. As for strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait till conditions are ripe and then take them.

9. Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and *matériel* are at the front.

10. Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should not in general be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.

These are the main methods the People's Liberation Army has employed in defeating Chiang Kai-shek. They are the result of the tempering of the People's Liberation Army in long years of fighting against domestic and foreign enemies and are completely suited to our present situation. The Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang and the U.S. imperialist military personnel in China are very well acquainted with these military methods of ours. Seeking ways to counter them, Chiang Kai-shek has often assembled his generals and field officers for training and distributed our military literature and the documents captured in the war for them to study. The U.S. military personnel have recommended to Chiang Kai-shek one kind of strategy and tactics after another for destroying the People's Liberation Army; they have trained Chiang Kai-shek's troops and supplied them with military equipment. But none of these efforts can save the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang from defeat. The reason is that our strategy and tactics are based on a people's war; no army opposed to the people can use our strategy and tactics. The People's Liberation Army has developed its vigorous revolutionary political work, which is an important factor in winning victory over the enemy, on the basis of a people's war and of the principles of unity between army and people, of unity between commanders and fighters and of disintegrating the enemy troops. When we abandoned many cities on our own initiative in order to evade fatal blows from superior enemy forces and shift our forces to destroy the enemy when he is on the move, our enemies were jubilant. They took this to be a victory for them and a defeat for us. They became dizzy with this momentary "victory". On the afternoon of the day he seized

Changchiakou, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the convening of his reactionary National Assembly, as though his reactionary regime had from that moment become as stable as Mount Taishan. The U.S. imperialists, too, danced with joy, as though their wild scheme for converting China into a U.S. colony could now be realized without obstruction. But with the lapse of time, Chiang Kai-shek and his U.S. masters began to change their tune. Now all our enemies, domestic and foreign, are gripped by pessimism. They heave great sighs, wail about a crisis and no longer show any sign of joy. In the past eighteen months, most of Chiang Kai-shek's high-ranking field commanders have been replaced for losing battles. Among them are Liu Chih (Chengchow), Hsueh Yueh (Hsuchow), Wu Chi-wei (northern Kiangsu), Tang En-po (southern Shantung), Wang Chung-lien (northern Honan), Tu Yu-ming and Hsiung Shih-hui (Shenyang) and Sun Lien-chung (Peiping). Chen Cheng, too, was relieved of his post as Chiang Kai-shek's chief of general staff in over-all command of operations and demoted to command a single front in the Northeast.<sup>2</sup> However, it was in the very period when Chiang Kai-shek himself assumed over-all command in Chen Cheng's place that the situation changed and that his armies shifted from the offensive to the defensive, while the People's Liberation Army went over from the defensive to the offensive. By now the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique and its U.S. masters should have realized their mistake. They had regarded as signs of cowardice and weakness all the efforts for peace and against civil war which the Communist Party of China, representing the wishes of the Chinese people, had made over a long period after the surrender of Japan. They had overestimated their own strength, underestimated the strength of the revolution and rashly unleashed the war, and so were caught in their own trap. Our enemy's strategic calculations failed completely.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> For the circumstances of how the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive on various fronts in succession and carried the war into the Kuomintang areas, see "On the Great Victory in the Northwest and on the New Type of Ideological Education Movement in the Liberation Army", Note 4, pp. 357-58 of this volume.

<sup>2</sup> Liu Chih, Director of the Kuomintang's Pacification Headquarters in Chengchow, Honan Province, was dismissed in November 1946 for his defeat in the battle

of Tingtao, southwestern Shantung Province, in September. Hsueh Yueh, Director of the Kuomintang's Pacification Headquarters in Hsuehchow, Kiangsu Province, was dismissed in March 1947 for a series of heavy defeats suffered by the Kuomintang troops under his command: in the campaign in the area north of Suchien, Kiangsu Province, in December 1946; in the campaign in southern Shantung in January 1947; and in the Laiwu campaign, central Shantung, in February 1947. Wu Chi-wei, Deputy Director of the Kuomintang's Pacification Headquarters in Hsuehchow, was dismissed in March 1947 for his defeat in the campaign in the area north of Suchien in December 1946. Tang En-po, Commander of the Kuomintang's 1st Army, was dismissed in June 1947 because the Kuomintang's Reorganized 74th Division was wiped out in the battle of Mengliangku, southern Shantung, in May. Wang Chung-lien, Commander of the Kuomintang's 4th Army, was dismissed in August 1947 for his defeat in the Southwestern Shantung campaign in July. Tu Yu-ming, Commander of the Kuomintang's Peace Preservation Headquarters in the Northeast, and Hsiung Shih-hui, Director of the Kuomintang Generalissimo's Headquarters in the Northeast, were both dismissed for being severely defeated by the People's Liberation Army in its summer offensive in the Northeast in June 1947. Sun Lien-chung, Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone, was demoted to Director of the Pacification Headquarters in Paoting, Hopei Province, for his defeats in the Ching-Tsang campaign and the campaign in the Hsushui area north of Paoting in June 1947. Chen Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek's chief of general staff, was demoted to governor-general of the Northeast in August 1947 because of the successive defeats of the campaigns he directed in Shantung Province.

## THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE ARMY\*

*January 30, 1948*

The policy for political work in our army units is fully to arouse the rank and file, the commanders and all working personnel in order to achieve three major objectives through a democratic movement under centralized leadership, namely, a high degree of political unity, better living conditions, and better military technique and tactics. The Three Check-ups and Three Improvements<sup>1</sup> now being enthusiastically carried out in our army units are intended to attain the first two of these objectives through the methods of political and economic democracy.

With regard to economic democracy, the representatives elected by the soldiers must be ensured the right to assist (but not to by-pass) the company leadership in managing the company's supplies and mess.

With regard to military democracy, in periods of training there must be mutual instruction as between officers and soldiers and among the soldiers themselves; and in periods of fighting the companies at the front must hold big and small meetings of various kinds. Under the direction of the company leadership, the rank and file should be roused to discuss how to attack and capture enemy positions and how to fulfil other combat tasks. When the fighting lasts several days, several such meetings should be held. This kind of military democracy was practised with great success in the battle of Panlung<sup>2</sup> in northern Shensi and in the battle of Shihchiachuang<sup>3</sup> in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area. It has been proved that the practice can only do good and can do no harm whatsoever.

The rank and file should have the right to expose the errors and misdeeds of bad elements among the cadres. We should be confident

---

\* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

that the soldiers will cherish all the good and fairly good cadres. Moreover, the soldiers should have the right, when necessary, to nominate those whom they trust from their own ranks for lower-level cadre posts, subject to appointment by the higher level. When there is an acute shortage of lower-level cadres, this kind of nomination is very useful. It is not to be the rule, however, but is to be done only when necessary.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The "Three Check-ups" and "Three Improvements" constituted an important movement for Party consolidation and for ideological education in the army which was carried out by our Party in conjunction with the land reform during the People's War of Liberation. In the localities, the "Three Check-ups" meant checking on class origin, ideology, and style of work; in the armed units, the check-ups were on class origin, performance of duty, and will to fight. The "Three Improvements" meant organizational consolidation, ideological education, and rectification of style of work.

<sup>2</sup> Panlung, northeast of Yen-an, was a town where the Northwest People's Liberation Army surrounded and wiped out over 6,700 Kuomintang troops under the command of Hu Tsung-nan in May 1947.

<sup>3</sup> Shihchiachuang was liberated by units of the People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region on November 12, 1947. Its enemy garrison of more than 24,000 men was totally destroyed. It was the first important city liberated by the People's Liberation Army in northern China.

ON THE GREAT VICTORY IN THE NORTHWEST  
AND ON THE NEW TYPE OF  
IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION MOVEMENT  
IN THE LIBERATION ARMY\*

*March 7, 1948*

Commenting on the recent great victory of the Northwest People's Liberation Army, a spokesman for the General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army said: This victory has changed the situation in the Northwest and will affect the situation in the Central Plains. It has proved that the People's Liberation Army will make itself invincible through the new type of ideological education movement in the army using the methods of "pouring out grievances" and of the "three check-ups".

The spokesman said: On this occasion, the Northwest People's Liberation Army suddenly encircled an enemy brigade at Yichuan, and Hu Tsung-nan ordered Liu Kan, Commander of his 29th Corps, to rush 4 brigades of 2 reorganized divisions from the Lochuan-Yichun line to the relief of Yichuan. They were the 31st and 47th Brigades of the Reorganized 27th Division and the 53rd and 61st Brigades of the Reorganized 90th Division, totalling more than 24,000 men; they reached the area southwest of Yichuan on February 28. The Northwest People's Liberation Army started a battle of annihilation and, in thirty hours of fighting on February 29 and March 1, completely wiped

---

\* This commentary was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. At that time the enemy offensive in the Northwest theatre of war had been smashed, and our army had gone over to its own offensive. This commentary analysed the situation in the Northwest theatre and also outlined conditions in the other theatres of war. More important, it stressed the great significance of the new type of ideological education movement in the army, carried out by the methods of "pouring out grievances" and of the "three check-ups". This new type of movement was an important development of the political work and the democratic movement in the People's Liberation Army.

out these reinforcements, letting none escape from the net. More than 18,000 men were captured, and more than 5,000 were killed or wounded; Liu Kan himself, Yen Ming, Commander of the 90th Division, and other officers were killed. Then on March 3 we captured Yichuan and here again wiped out over 5,000 men of the 24th Brigade of the enemy's Reorganized 76th Division which was defending the city. In this campaign we wiped out, all told, 1 corps headquarters, 2 division headquarters and 5 brigades of the enemy, a total of 30,000 men. This is our first great victory in the Northwest theatre.

Analysing the situation in the Northwest theatre, the spokesman said: Of the 28 brigades of the so-called "Central Army" directly commanded by Hu Tsung-nan, 8 belonged to his 3 crack divisions, the Reorganized 1st, 36th and 90th Divisions. Of these divisions, the 1st Brigade of the Reorganized 1st Division had been wiped out<sup>1</sup> by us once before at Fushan, southern Shansi, in September 1946, and the main force of the same division's 167th Brigade had been wiped out once at Panlung town, northern Shensi, in May last year; the 123rd and 165th Brigades of the Reorganized 36th Division had been wiped out once at Shachiatien in Michih County, northern Shensi, in August last year; and this time the Reorganized 90th Division was also completely wiped out. Of the remainder of Hu Tsung-nan's main force, only the 78th Brigade of the Reorganized 1st Division and the 28th Brigade of the Reorganized 36th Division have not yet been wiped out. Hu Tsung-nan's whole army can therefore be said to have practically no more crack units. As a result of the Yichuan battle of annihilation, of the 28 regular brigades formerly under Hu Tsung-nan's direct command, only 23 are left. These 23 brigades are distributed in the following areas: 1 brigade at Linfen in southern Shansi is immobilized and doomed, 9 brigades are on the Shensi-Honan border and along the Loyang-Tungkuan line to cope with our field army

---

It was the reflection in the army of the movements for land reform and Party consolidation then vigorously proceeding in all the Liberated Areas. This movement greatly enhanced the political consciousness, discipline and combat effectiveness of all officers and soldiers. At the same time it most effectively speeded the process of reforming large numbers of captured Kuomintang soldiers into Liberation Army fighters. Thus it played an important role in consolidating and expanding the People's Liberation Army and in ensuring victories in the field. For the significance of this movement, see also "The Democratic Movement in the Army", pp. 331-32 of this volume, "Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area", pp. 227-39, and "On the September Meeting — Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", pp. 269-77, of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV.

under Chen Keng and Hsieh Fu-chih, and another brigade in southern Shensi is guarding the Hanchung area. The remaining 12 brigades are distributed along the T-shaped communication lines from Tungkuan to Paoki and from Hsienyang to Yen-an. Of these, 3 are "reserve brigades" composed entirely of recruits, 2 have been completely wiped out by our army and recently replenished, another 2 have received crushing blows from us and 5 have received relatively few blows. It can be seen that these forces are not only very weak but are also mostly on garrison duty. In addition to Hu Tsung-nan's army, there are 2 brigades under Teng Pao-shan defending Yulin, while 9 brigades under Ma Hung-kuei of Ningsia Province and Ma Pu-fang of Ching-hai Province are distributed in the Sanpien and Lungtung areas.<sup>2</sup> All the regular troops under Hu Tsung-nan, Teng Pao-shan and the two Mas now total 34 brigades, including the units replenished after having been wiped out once or twice.

That is how things stand with the enemy in the Northwest. To return to the T-shaped communication lines, of those 5 brigades which have received relatively few blows, 2 are hemmed in at Yen-an and 3 are in the Greater Kuanchung Area.<sup>3</sup> As for the other brigades there, most of them have been recently replenished, and a few have received crushing blows. In other words, the enemy's forces in the whole Greater Kuanchung Area, and especially in Kansu Province, are very sparse and weak and cannot possibly stop the offensive of the People's Liberation Army. This situation is bound to affect some of the dispositions of Chiang Kai-shek's forces on the southern front and, in the first place, his dispositions vis-à-vis our field army under Chen Keng and Hsieh Fu-chih on the Honan-Shensi border. In its present southward drive the Northwest People's Liberation Army has won victory as soon as its banner was displayed, gained resounding fame and changed the relation of forces between us and the enemy in the Northwest; from now on it will be able to fight even more effectively in co-ordination with the forces of the People's Liberation Army on the southern fronts.

The spokesman said: Since last summer and autumn our three field armies, commanded respectively by Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping, Chen Yi and Su Yu, and Chen Keng and Hsieh Fu-chih, have advanced south across the Yellow River, swept through the length and breadth of the territory enclosed by the Yangtse, Huai, Yellow and Han Rivers, wiped out large numbers of enemy troops, manipulated and drawn towards themselves some 90 out of the 160 odd brigades

which Chiang Kai-shek has on the southern front, forced his armies into a passive position, played a decisive strategic role and won the acclaim of the people all over the country.<sup>4</sup> In its winter offensive our North-east Field Army braved bitter cold of 30 degrees below zero, annihilated most of the enemy troops, captured one well-known city after another and won resounding fame throughout the country.<sup>5</sup> After wiping out large numbers of enemy troops in heroic battles last year,<sup>6</sup> our field armies in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area, Shantung, northern Kiangsu and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan area completed their training and consolidation last winter, and they will soon unfold their spring offensive.<sup>7</sup> A review of the whole situation proves one truth. Provided we firmly oppose conservatism, fear of the enemy and fear of difficulties, and provided we follow the general strategy of the Central Committee of the Party and its directive on the ten major principles of operation,<sup>8</sup> we can unfold our offensives, wipe out vast numbers of enemy troops, and strike such blows at the forces of the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang that they can only temporarily parry them without being able to hit back, or cannot even parry them and will be completely wiped out, one after another.

The spokesman stressed: The combat effectiveness of our Northwest Field Army is far higher than at any time last year.<sup>9</sup> In last year's fighting the Northwest Field Army could destroy at most two enemy brigades at a time; now in the Yichuan campaign it has been able to wipe out five enemy brigades at one time. The reasons for this outstanding victory were many, among which we should point out the firm yet flexible command of the leading comrades at the front, the energetic support given by the leading comrades and the broad masses in the rear, the relative isolation of the enemy troops and a terrain favourable to us. What is most noteworthy, however, is the new type of ideological education movement in the army, which was carried out for more than two months last winter by the methods of pouring out grievances and of the three check-ups. The correct unfolding of the movement for pouring out grievances (the wrongs done to the labouring people by the old society and by the reactionaries) and the three check-ups (on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight) greatly heightened the political consciousness of commanders and fighters throughout the army in the fight for the emancipation of the exploited working masses, for nation-wide land reform and for the destruction of the common enemy of the people, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang. It also greatly strengthened the firm unity of all com-

manders and fighters under the leadership of the Communist Party. On this basis, the army achieved greater purity in its ranks, strengthened discipline, unfolded a mass movement for training, and further developed its political, economic and military democracy in a completely well-led and orderly way. Thus the army has become united as one man, with everybody contributing his ideas and his strength, an army fearless of sacrifice and capable of overcoming material difficulties, which displays mass heroism and daring in destroying the enemy. Such an army will be invincible.

The spokesman said: It is not only in the Northwest that this new type of ideological education movement in the army has been carried out; it has been, or is being, carried on in the People's Liberation Army throughout the country. Conducted between battles, the movement does not interfere with fighting. This ideological education movement is bound to make the People's Liberation Army invincible when combined with the movement for Party consolidation and the land reform movement now being correctly carried out by our Party, when combined with our Party's correct policy of narrowing the scope of attack by opposing only imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, by strictly forbidding beating and killing without discrimination (the fewer killings, the better) and by firmly uniting the masses of the people who make up over 90 per cent of the country's population, and when combined with the application of our Party's correct urban policy and its policy of firmly protecting and developing the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie. However desperate the exertions of the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang and its master, U.S. imperialism, against the great struggle of the Chinese people's democratic revolution, victory will certainly be ours.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See "Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One", Note 1, p. 316 of this volume.

<sup>2</sup> Sanpien is an area in northwestern Shensi Province. Lungtung is the eastern part of Kansu Province. Both Sanpien and Lungtung were then prefectures in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Liberated Area.

<sup>3</sup> This refers to central Shensi Province.

<sup>4</sup> Starting from June 30, 1947, 7 columns of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Field Army led by Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades forced the

FORGED

Yellow River and pushed towards the Tapih Mountains, thus ushering in the strategic offensive of the People's Liberation Army. By the end of March 1948, more than 100,000 enemy troops had been wiped out, and new base areas had been built on the Hupeh-Honan border, in western Anhwei, in the Tungpai mountain area on the Hupeh-Honan border, the plains between the Yangtse and Han Rivers and other places. Having smashed the enemy's concentrated attacks on Shantung Province in August 1947, eight columns of the Eastern China Field Army led by Chen Yi, Su Yu and other comrades swept into southwestern Shantung and the Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu Border Region, wiped out over 100,000 enemy troops, built the Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu Liberated Area and isolated the enemy's strategic centres of Kaifeng and Chengchow. Two columns and one corps of the Taiyueh Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan area, commanded by Chen Keng, Hsieh Fu-chih and other comrades, forced the Yellow River in southern Shansi in August 1947, advanced into western Honan, wiped out more than 40,000 enemy troops and built base areas on the Honan-Shensi-Hupeh border and in southern Shensi, completely isolating Loyang, the enemy's strategic centre in western Honan Province, and threatening Tungkuang.

<sup>5</sup> Fighting continuously for ninety days from December 15, 1947 to March 15, 1948, 10 columns and 12 independent divisions of the Northeast Field Army led by Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades waged a winter offensive on an unprecedented scale along the Szepingkai-Tashihchiao section of the Chinese Changchun Railway and the Shanhaikuan-Shenyang section of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway; they wiped out more than 156,000 enemy troops and captured the enemy's heavily-fortified strategic centre of Szepingkai and eighteen other cities. One enemy division garrisoning Yingkow revolted and came over to our side. The enemy force defending the city of Kirin fled towards Changchun. After this, the area under enemy control in the Northeast shrank to only 1 per cent of the whole, and the enemy lairs in the cities along the Changchun-Shenyang-Chinchow line were isolated.


<sup>6</sup> From early September to mid-November 1947, 5 columns of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Field Army led by Nieh Jung-chen and other comrades fought successive battles in the area north of the Taching River and in the Chingfengtien area and the battle for the liberation of Shihchiachuang, wiping out a total of nearly 50,000 enemy troops and linking up the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Areas into one continuous territory. From September to December 1947, 3 columns of the Shantung Army belonging to the Eastern China Field Army and regional armed forces fought the Eastern Shantung campaign under the command of Hsu Shih-yu, Tan Chen-lin and other comrades, wiping out more than 63,000 of the enemy and recovering more than ten county towns; this changed the whole situation in Shantung Province. From August to December 1947, units of the Eastern China Field Army in northern Kiangsu, in successive battles at Yencheng, Lipao and other points, annihilated more than 24,000 enemy troops and recovered a wide area in northern Kiangsu. In December 1947, units of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Field Army led by Hsu Hsiang-chien and other comrades fought in co-ordination with units of the Northwest Field Army and captured Yuncheng, destroying more than 13,000 enemy troops; they wiped out all the enemy forces in southwestern Shansi and isolated the enemy at Linfen.

<sup>7</sup> In the spring of 1948, following a period of training and consolidation in the previous winter, the field armies of the People's Liberation Army launched successive offensives. Between March and May, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Field Army and units of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan and Shansi-Suiyuan Field Armies campaigned in southern Chahar, eastern Suiyuan and the Linfen area of Shansi, wiping out more

than 45,000 enemy troops and recovering much territory. Between March 8 and May 29, units of the Central Plains and Eastern China Field Armies fought successive battles at Loyang and Sungho and in the sectors west and east of Nanyang, wiped out more than 56,000 enemy troops and thus crushed the enemy's defence system on the Central Plains and expanded and consolidated the Liberated Area there. Between March 11 and May 8, the Shantung Army of the Eastern China Field Army fought battles first on the western section of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway and then at Weihsien, wiping out more than 84,000 enemy troops. Thus, except for a few strong-points, such as Tsinan, Tsingtao, Linyi and Yenchow, which were held by the Kuomintang, Shantung Province was liberated. In March the Northern Kiangsu Army fought a successful battle at Yilin.

<sup>8</sup> For the ten major principles of operation, see "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Section 3, pp. 346-50 of this volume.

<sup>9</sup> The Northwest Field Army led by Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung, Hsi Chung-hsun and other comrades employed a main force of 2 columns and 2 brigades, totalling more than 25,000 men, in the fighting in northern Shensi in the summer of 1947. By the spring of 1948 the main force had increased to 5 columns, totalling more than 75,000 men. After having been steeled by a year's fighting and by the new type of ideological education movement in the army in the winter of 1947, the political consciousness of the broad masses of officers and soldiers and the combat effectiveness of the military units rose to unprecedented heights. This created the necessary conditions for the Northwest Field Army to turn to fighting on exterior lines in March 1948. On April 12, following its major victory at Yichuan, the Northwest Field Army launched a campaign in Hsifu (the area west of Sian and between the Chingshui and Weishui Rivers) and eastern Kansu, pushed forward into the broad area between the Chingshui and Weishui Rivers, cut the Sian-Lanchow Highway, and on April 22 recovered Yenan.



# THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN<sup>1\*</sup>

*September and October 1948*

## I. THE TELEGRAM OF SEPTEMBER 7

We are prepared fundamentally to overthrow the Kuomintang in about five years, counting from July 1946.<sup>2</sup> This is possible. Our objective can be attained provided we destroy about 100 brigades of Kuomintang regular troops every year, or some 500 brigades over the five years. In the past two years our army has annihilated a total of 191 brigades of enemy regulars, an average of  $95\frac{1}{2}$  brigades a year, or nearly 8 brigades a month. In the next three years it is required that our army should wipe out 300 or more brigades of enemy regulars. Between July this year and June next year we expect to destroy some 115 brigades of enemy regulars. This total is apportioned among our various field armies and armies.<sup>3</sup> The Eastern China Field Army is required to wipe out about 40 brigades (including the 7 already wiped out in July) and capture Tsinan and a number of large, medium and small cities in northern Kiangsu, eastern Honan and northern Anhwei. The Central Plains Field Army is required to wipe out about 14 brigades (including the 2 brigades wiped out in July) and capture a number of cities in the provinces of Hupeh, Honan and Anhwei. The Northwest Field Army is required to wipe out about

---

\* These telegrams addressed to Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades were drawn up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The concept of operations he set forth here for the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was fully carried out later. The results of the campaign were as follows:

(1) The destruction of 470,000 enemy troops, plus the victories in other theatres during that period, made the qualitatively superior People's Liberation Army superior to the Kuomintang army in numbers as well.

12 brigades (including the 1½ brigades wiped out in August). The army in northern China commanded by Hsu Hsiang-chien and Chou Shih-ti is required to wipe out about 14 brigades under Yen Hsi-shan (including the 8 brigades annihilated in July) and capture Taiyuan. You are required, in co-ordination with the 2 armies commanded by Lo Jui-ching and Yang Cheng-wu, to wipe out about 35 brigades of the 2 army groups under Wei Li-huang and Fu Tso-yi (including 1 brigade wiped out by Yang Cheng-wu in July) and capture all the cities along the Peiping-Liaoning, Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Chengteh and Peiping-Paoting Railways, except Peiping, Tientsin and Shenyang. The decisive factors for the achievement of this objective are the proper disposition and command of troops in campaigns and a proper balance between fighting and rest. If in the two months of September and October, or a little longer, you can wipe out the enemy along the line from Chinchow to Tangshan and take Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan, you will have achieved the task of wiping out some 18 enemy brigades. In order to do so, you must now prepare to employ your main force on this line, leaving the enemy forces at Changchun and Shenyang alone. When you are attacking Chinchow, also be

---

(2) The entire territory of northeastern China was liberated, and the conditions were created for the liberation of Peiping, Tientsin and all northern China.

(3) Our army gained experience in fighting large-scale campaigns of annihilation.

(4) As a result of the liberation of northeastern China, a strategically secure rear area with a fair industrial base was won for the War of Liberation, and the Party and the people obtained favourable conditions for gradually turning to economic rehabilitation.

The Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was the first of the three greatest campaigns of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. The other two were the Huai-Hai and the Peiping-Tientsin campaigns. In these three great campaigns, which lasted four months and nineteen days, 144 divisions (brigades) of the enemy's regular troops and 29 divisions of its irregular troops, or more than 1,540,000 men in all, were wiped out. During this period the People's Liberation Army also launched offensives on other fronts, destroying large numbers of the enemy. In the first two years of the war, the People's Liberation Army had wiped out an average of about 8 enemy brigades per month. Now the number of enemy troops destroyed by the People's Liberation Army no longer averaged 8 brigades per month but 38 brigades. These three major campaigns virtually annihilated the crack troops on which the Kuomintang relied for waging the counter-revolutionary civil war and greatly speeded victory in the War of Liberation all over the country. For the Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns, see "The Concept of Operations for the Huai-Hai Campaign", pp. 367-70, and "The Concept of Operations for the Peiping-Tientsin Campaign", pp. 375-79, of this volume.

prepared to wipe out the enemy forces that may come to its rescue from Changchun and Shenyang. Because the enemy forces in and near Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan are isolated from each other, success in attacking and wiping them out is pretty certain, and there is also a fair hope of success in capturing Chinchow and in attacking enemy reinforcements. If, however, you were to dispose your main force at Hsinmin and its northern environs in preparation for attacking the enemy forces which might come out from Changchun and Shenyang, then the enemy might not dare come out at all because you would be too great a menace. On the one hand, the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang might not come out. And, on the other hand, because the forces you dispatch towards Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan would be too small, the enemy in and near these three cities (comprising 18 brigades) would probably fall back on Chinchow and Tangshan, and you would find it rather difficult and yet necessary to attack them, wasting time and energy and thus perhaps landing yourselves in a passive position. For these reasons, it will be better to leave the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang alone and focus your attention on the enemy at Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan. Another point: you must prepare to fight three big campaigns in the ten months from September to next June and to spend about two months on each campaign, making a total of about six months and leaving four months for rest. During the Chinchow-Shanhaikuan-Tangshan campaign (the first big campaign), if the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang sallies forth in full strength to rescue Chinchow (because your main force will be disposed not at Hsinmin but around Chinchow, Wei Li-huang will be emboldened to come to the rescue), then, without leaving the Chinchow-Shanhaikuan-Tangshan line, you can follow up immediately with large-scale annihilating attacks on the enemy reinforcements and strive to wipe out all Wei Li-huang's troops on the spot. This would be the ideal situation. Hence, you should pay attention to the following:

- (1) Be firm in your resolve to attack and capture Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan and to take control of the entire line.
- (2) Be firm in your resolve to fight a battle of annihilation on a scale larger than you have ever fought before, that is, dare to fight all Wei Li-huang's army when it comes to the rescue.
- (3) In keeping with these two resolves, reconsider your plan of operations, make arrangements to meet the military requirements

of your whole force (food, ammunition, recruits, and so on) and to handle captives.

Please consider the above and telegraph your reply.

## II. THE TELEGRAM OF OCTOBER 10

1. From the day you start attacking Chinchow, there will be a period when the tactical situation will be very tense. We hope that you will inform us by radio every two or three days of the enemy's situation (the strength of the resistance by his forces defending Chinchow, the progress of his reinforcements from Hulutao and Chihsi and from Shenyang, and the probable course of action of his troops in Changchun) and of our own situation (the progress of our attack on the city and the casualties sustained in attacking the city and holding off enemy reinforcements).

2. It is highly possible that, as you have said, the tactical situation during this period will develop most favourably, that is, that you will be able to wipe out not only the enemy's forces defending Chinchow but also a part of his reinforcements from Hulutao and Chihsi and some or most of his forces fleeing from Changchun. If the enemy's reinforcements from Shenyang advance to the area north of the Taling River just after you have taken Chinchow and when you are thus able to shift your forces to encircle them, then it will be possible to wipe out these reinforcements as well. The key to all this lies in striving to capture Chinchow in about a week.

3. Decide on the disposition of your troops for checking the enemy reinforcements according to your progress in attacking Chinchow and their progress in advancing both from the east and from the west. Should the enemy reinforcements from Shenyang advance rather slowly (as may happen if, during your attack on Chinchow, the enemy besieged in Changchun breaks out but is caught and crushed by our 12th Column and other forces, in which case the enemy reinforcements from Shenyang may be so bewildered as to advance rather slowly, or halt, or turn back to rescue the Changchun forces) while the enemy reinforcements from Hulutao and Chihsi advance rather quickly, you should be ready to throw in your general reserves to help the 4th and 11th Columns wipe out part of the latter reinforcements and, first of all, to check their advance. If the enemy reinforcements from Hulutao

and Chinhsi are being tied down and checked by our 4th and 11th Columns and other forces and therefore advance rather slowly or halt, if the enemy forces in Changchun do not break out, if the enemy reinforcements from Shenyang advance rather quickly, and if most of the Chinchow enemy forces have been wiped out and the capture of the city is imminent, then you should let the enemy forces from Shenyang advance deep into the area north of the Taling River, so that you can make a timely shift of your forces to encircle them and wipe them out at your convenience.

4. You must centre your attention on the operations in Chinchow and strive to capture this city as quickly as possible. Even if none of the other objectives is attained and Chinchow alone is captured, you will have won the initiative, which in itself will be a great victory. It is hoped that you will give due attention to all the above points. Especially during the first few days of the battle for Chinchow, the enemy reinforcements from both the east and the west will not make any major moves, and you should concentrate all your energies on the operations on the Chinchow front.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was a gigantic campaign fought by the Northeast People's Liberation Army in the western part of Liaoning Province and in the Shenyang-Changchun area between September 12 and November 2, 1948. On the eve of the campaign, the total strength of the Kuomintang forces in northeastern China consisted of 4 armies, made up of 14 corps, or 44 divisions. These forces had shortened their lines and dug themselves in at three sectors isolated from each other, Changchun, Shenyang and Chinchow. With the aim of completely wiping out the enemy troops in the Northeast and quickly liberating the whole of the Northeast, the People's Liberation Army in this region, supported by the broad masses of the local people, began the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in September 1948 with a main force of 12 columns and 1 artillery column and with regional armed forces, in sum totalling 53 divisions or over 700,000 men. Chinchow, on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, was the strategic link between northeastern and northern China. The enemy forces garrisoning the Chinchow sector consisted of 8 divisions, with more than 100,000 men under Fan Han-chieh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang's Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters. The capture of Chinchow was the key to the success of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign. Acting on the directives of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Northeast People's Liberation Army used 1 column and 7 independent divisions to continue the siege operations against Changchun; 6 columns, 1 artillery column and 1 tank battalion to surround and attack Chinchow; and 2 columns, placed in the Tashan-Kaochiao sector southwest of Chinchow, along with 3 columns in the Heishan-Tahushan-Changwu sector, to intercept any reinforcements the enemy might send from Chinhsi and Hulutao and from Shenyang to relieve Chinchow. The fighting in the Chinchow area

started on September 12. Just as our army was mopping up the enemy in the outskirts of Chinchow after taking Ihsien, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly flew to the Northeast to take personal charge of the operations and urgently summoned 5 divisions from the Northern China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and 2 divisions from Shantung Province to join the 4 divisions in Chihsi; all these 11 divisions began a furious attack on our positions at Tashan on October 10 but could not break through. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang 9th Army under Liao Yao-hsiang, with 11 divisions and 3 cavalry brigades, which had sallied out from Shenyang to rescue Chinchow, was intercepted by our army northeast of Heishan and Tahushan. Our army began the assault on Chinchow on October 14 and, after thirty-one hours of fierce fighting, completely wiped out the defending enemy forces of more than 100,000 men, capturing Fan Han-chieh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, and Lu Chun-chuan, Commander of the 6th Army. The liberation of Chinchow impelled part of the enemy forces at Changchun to revolt against the Kuomintang and the rest to surrender. The complete collapse of the Kuomintang troops in the Northeast then became a foregone conclusion. But Chiang Kai-shek, still dreaming of recapturing Chinchow and of reopening the line of communications between northeastern and northern China, gave strict orders to the army under Liao Yao-hsiang to continue its advance towards Chinchow. After taking Chinchow, the People's Liberation Army immediately swung back to the northeast and closed in on Liao's army from Heishan in the north and Tahushan in the south. On October 26 the People's Liberation Army succeeded in surrounding the enemy in the Heishan-Tahushan-Hsinmin sector and, after stiff fighting lasting two days and one night, completely wiped them out, capturing army commander Liao Yao-hsiang, corps commanders Li Tao, Hsiang Feng-wu and Cheng Ting-chi, and more than 100,000 men. Our army vigorously followed up this victory and liberated Shenyang and Yingkow on November 2, wiping out over 149,000 enemy troops. The whole of the Northeast was thus liberated. A total of more than 470,000 enemy troops were wiped out in the campaign.

<sup>2</sup> At that time the estimate was that the entire Kuomintang army would be wiped out in about five years. The estimated time was later reduced to about three and a half years. See "The Momentous Change in China's Military Situation", pp. 371-73 of this volume.

<sup>3</sup> On November 1, 1948, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China classified all troops in the big strategic areas into field, regional and guerrilla forces in accordance with decisions made at the September meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. The field forces were organized into field armies. A field army was composed of armies, an army of corps (originally called columns), a corps of divisions, and a division of regiments. In accordance with their locations, the field armies were designated the Northwest Field Army, Central Plains Field Army, Eastern China Field Army, Northeast Field Army and Northern China Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The number of armies, corps and divisions in each field army differed according to the concrete conditions in each big strategic area. Later, the Northwest Field Army was renamed the First Field Army, comprising 2 armies; the Central Plains Field Army was renamed the Second Field Army, comprising 3 armies; the Eastern China Field Army was renamed the Third Field Army, comprising 4 armies; and the Northeast Field Army was renamed the Fourth Field Army, comprising 4 armies. The 3 armies making up the Northern China Field Army were placed under the direct command of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

## THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE HUAI-HAI CAMPAIGN\*

*October 11, 1948*

Here are a few points for your consideration concerning the dispositions for the Huai-Hai campaign.<sup>1</sup>

1. In the first stage of this campaign, the central task is to concentrate forces to wipe out Huang Po-tao's army, effect a breakthrough in the centre and capture Hsinanchen, the Grand Canal Railway Station, Tsaopachi, Yih sien, Tsaochuang, Lincheng, Hanchuang, Shuyang, Pih sien, Tancheng, Taierhchuang and Linyi. To achieve these objectives, you should use two columns to wipe out each enemy division, that is to say, use six or seven columns to cut up and wipe out the enemy's 25th, 63rd and 64th Divisions. Use five or six columns to hold off and attack enemy reinforcements. Use one or two columns to annihilate the one brigade under Li Mi at Lincheng and Hanchuang, and strive to capture these two towns in order to menace Hsuehchow from the north so that the two armies under Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi will not dare move east in full strength as reinforcements. Use one column plus regional formation in southwestern Shantung to make a flank attack on the Hsuehchow-Shangchiu section of the railway in order to tie down a portion of Chiu Ching-chuan's army (as three enemy divisions under Sun Yuan-liang are about to move east, it is hoped that Liu Po-cheng, Chen Yi and Teng Hsiao-ping will dispose their troops at once to attack the Chengchow-Hsuehchow line and so tie down Sun Yuan-liang's army). Use one or two columns to operate in the Suchien-Suining-Lingpi area to hold down Li Mi's army. These dis-

---

\* This telegram, addressed to the Eastern China and Central Plains Field Armies and the Bureaus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in those two areas, was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Party's Central Committee. The Huai-Hai campaign was one of the three greatest campaigns of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of

positions mean that before the objective of annihilating the three divisions of Huang Po-tao's army can be achieved, more than half our total force has to be employed against the two armies under Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi to tie down, check and destroy part of them. The dispositions should, by and large, be similar to those of last September for capturing Tsinan and attacking the enemy's reinforcements;<sup>2</sup> otherwise it will be impossible to achieve the objective of annihilating the three divisions of Huang Po-tao's army. You must strive to conclude the first stage two to three weeks after the start of the campaign.

2. In the second stage, use about five columns to attack and wipe out the enemy in Haichow, Hsinpu, Lienyunkang and Kuanyun and capture these towns. It is calculated that by then the enemy's 54th and 32nd Divisions will very likely have been transported by sea from Tsingtao to the Haichow-Hsinpu-Lienyunkang area.<sup>3</sup> Altogether three enemy divisions will be in that area, including the one division already there; therefore we must use five columns to attack them and employ the remaining forces (our main strength) to tie down the two armies under Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi, again on the principle underlying the dispositions made in September for capturing Tsinan and attacking the enemy's reinforcements. You must strive to conclude this stage also in two to three weeks.

3. In the third stage, it may be assumed that the battle will be fought around Huaiyin and Huai-an. By that time the enemy will have increased his strength by about one division (the Reorganized 8th Division in Yentai is being shipped south); therefore we must be prepared again to use about five columns as the attacking force, while using the rest of our main force to strike at and hold down the enemy's reinforcements. This stage will also take about two to three weeks.

These three stages will take about a month and a half to two months.

---

Liberation. The campaign was fought jointly by the Eastern China and Central Plains Field Armies and the regional troops of the eastern China and Central Plains areas. In this campaign over 555,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out. The concept of operations set forth by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in this telegram led to complete success; in fact, the campaign proceeded more smoothly than expected, and the victory was therefore quicker and greater. After this campaign, Nanking, the capital of the reactionary Kuomintang government, became subject to direct threat by the People's Liberation Army. The Huai-Hai campaign was concluded on January 10, 1949, and on January 21 Chiang Kai-shek announced his "retirement"; after that, the reactionary Kuomintang ruling clique in Nanking fell apart.

4. You are to complete the Huai-Hai campaign in two months, November and December. Rest and consolidate your forces next January. From March to July you will be fighting in co-ordination with Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping to drive the enemy to points along the Yangtse River, where he will dig in. By autumn your main force will probably be fighting to cross the Yangtse.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Huai-Hai campaign was a campaign of decisive importance fought by the People's Liberation Army over a large territory in Kiangsu, Shantung, Anhwei and Honan Provinces, centring on Hsuechow, and extending as far as Haichow in the east, Shangchiu in the west, Lincheng (now renamed Hsuehcheng) in the north and the Huai River in the south. The Kuomintang forces massed in this theatre of war consisted of 5 armies and the troops of three Pacification Zones — the 4 armies and the troops of three Pacification Zones under Liu Chih and Tu Yu-ming (respectively Commander and Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters at Hsuechow) and the army under Huang Wei, which was later dispatched there from central China as reinforcements. On the side of the People's Liberation Army, a force more than 600,000 strong took part in the campaign; it included 16 columns from the Eastern China Field Army, 7 columns from the Central Plains Field Army and regional armed forces from the Eastern China Military Area, the Central Plains Military Area and the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Area (then a part of the Northern China Military Area). The campaign lasted sixty-five days, from November 6, 1948 to January 10, 1949; 22 corps, or 56 divisions, of the Kuomintang's crack forces, comprising 555,000 men, were completely wiped out (including 4½ divisions which revolted and came over), and 2 armies under Liu Ju-ming and Li Yen-nien (reinforcements from Nanking) were repulsed. As a result of the campaign, those parts of the eastern China and Central Plains areas north of the Yangtse River were almost entirely liberated. The campaign took place in three stages. During the first stage, November 6-22, the Eastern China Field Army, in co-ordination with the Central Plains Field Army, surrounded and wiped out the army under Huang Po-tao in the Hsinanchen-Nienchuang sector east of Hsuechow, killing Huang Po-tao and liberating large territories on both sides of the Lunghai Railway east of Nienchuang, on both sides of the Hsuechow-Pengpu section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, and to the west and north of Hsuechow. In the Taierhchuang-Tsaochuang sector, 3½ divisions of the Kuomintang 3rd Pacification Zone, totalling over 23,000 men, revolted and came over to us. During the second stage, from November 23 to December 15, the Central Plains Field Army, in co-ordination with the main force of the Eastern China Field Army, surrounded and wiped out the army under Huang Wei at and around Shuangtuichi, southwest of Suhsien, capturing Huang Wei and Wu Shao-chou, the commander and deputy commander of the army; 1 division of this army revolted and came over to us. At the same time, our forces wiped out the army under Sun Yuan-liang which was fleeing west from Hsuechow. Only Sun Yuan-liang managed to escape. During the third stage, from January 6 to 10, 1949, the Eastern China Field

Army, in co-ordination with the Central Plains Field Army, surrounded and annihilated in the Chinglungchi-Chenkuanchuang sector, northeast of Yungcheng, 2 Kuomintang armies which were fleeing westward from Hsuehchow and were commanded respectively by Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi, under the personal command of Tu Yu-ming. Tu Yu-ming was captured, Chiu Ching-chuan was killed, and Li Mi barely escaped. This marked the successful end of the great Huai-Hai campaign.

<sup>2</sup> "Capturing Tsinan and attacking the enemy's reinforcements" refers to the tactics employed by the People's Liberation Army during the Tsinan campaign in the middle of September 1948. Tsinan, a strategic position of the Kuomintang in Shantung Province, was garrisoned by over 110,000 men of the Kuomintang 2nd Pacification Zone. In addition, 23 brigades of the Kuomintang's main forces, with some 170,000 men, which were disposed in the Hsuehchow area, were ready to move north to relieve Tsinan. Our Eastern China Field Army formed a group of 7 columns to assault the city and another group of 8 columns to strike at the enemy's reinforcements. The onslaught against Tsinan started on the evening of September 16, 1948. On September 24, after eight days and nights of continuous fighting, the enemy garrison was completely wiped out (1 corps revolted and came over to us), and Wang Yao-wu, Commander of the Kuomintang 2nd Pacification Zone, was captured. Our forces took Tsinan so rapidly that the enemy at Hsuehchow did not dare to go north to its rescue.

<sup>3</sup> In fact, these 2 enemy divisions did not dare to come.

## THE MOMENTOUS CHANGE IN CHINA'S MILITARY SITUATION\*

*November 14, 1948*

The military situation in China has reached a new turning point and the balance of forces between the two sides in the war has undergone a fundamental change. The People's Liberation Army, long superior in quality, has now become superior in numbers as well. This is a sign that the victory of the Chinese revolution and the realization of peace in China are at hand.

At the end of the second year of the war, that is, at the end of June this year, the Kuomintang army still had a total of some 3,650,000 men. This was 650,000 less than the 4,300,000 men the Kuomintang had in July 1946 when it started the country-wide civil war. The Kuomintang recruited about 2,440,000 men during the two years of war, which is the reason why the decrease was only 650,000, although in that period approximately 3,090,000 were wiped out or captured, or deserted (2,640,000 were wiped out or captured). A sudden change recently occurred. In the first four months of the third year of the war, from July 1 to November 2—when Shenyang was liberated, the Kuomintang army lost 1,000,000 men. Its replacements during these four months have not yet been ascertained; supposing it was able to recruit 300,000 men, then the net decrease would be 700,000. Thus the whole of the Kuomintang's armed forces—army, navy and air force, regulars and irregulars, combat troops and men in the rear-

---

\* This commentary was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency. Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung, basing himself on the new situation, that is, the change in the balance of forces after the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign, made a new estimate of the time needed to win victory in the People's War of Liberation and pointed out that the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang could be overthrown in no more than a year from November 1948. Subsequent developments in China's military situation fully confirmed his prediction.

service establishments — are now only some 2,900,000. On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army, which had 1,200,000 men in June 1946, grew to 2,800,000 in June 1948, and has now increased to more than 3,000,000. Thus, the numerical superiority long enjoyed by the Kuomintang army has rapidly turned into inferiority. This is the result of the heroic fighting by the People's Liberation Army during the past four months in all the war theatres of the country; it is especially the result of the Sui-Ki and Tsinan campaigns<sup>1</sup> on the southern front and of the Chinchow, Changchun, Liaohsi and Shenyang campaigns<sup>2</sup> on the northern front. Up to the end of June this year, the Kuomintang still had designations for 28½ divisions because it had frantically incorporated its irregulars into its regular forces. In these four months, the battalions and larger units wiped out by the People's Liberation Army totalled 83 divisions, including 63 whole divisions.

Accordingly, the war will be much shorter than we originally estimated. The original estimate was that the reactionary Kuomintang government could be completely overthrown in about five years, beginning from July 1946. As we now see it, only another year or so may be needed to overthrow it completely. A longer time will be needed, however, to eliminate the reactionary forces in all parts of the country and complete the liberation of the people.


The enemy is collapsing rapidly, but the Communists, the People's Liberation Army and people of all walks of life throughout the country must continue to unite as one man and redouble their efforts; only thus can we finally and completely wipe out the reactionary forces and build a united, democratic people's republic in the whole country.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Sui-Ki campaign, also known as the Eastern Honan campaign, was fought by the People's Liberation Army in the sector comprising Kaifeng, Suihsien and Kih sien. The campaign started on June 17, 1948. On June 22 our army captured Kaifeng. To save his critical military situation, Chiang Kai-shek went to the front, took personal command and mustered 3 armies under Chiu Ching-chuan, Ou Shou-nien and Huang Po-tao to start an attack on Kaifeng from several directions. Six columns of our Eastern China Field Army, 2 columns of our Central Plains Field Army and our Kwangtung-Kwangsi Column surrounded the armies under Ou Shou-nien and Huang Po-tao in the Suihsien-Kih sien sector and, after nine days and nights of fierce fighting (June 27-July 6), they wiped out 2 divisions, or 6 brigades, of Ou Shou-nien's army and a part of Huang Po-tao's army, a total of over 90,000 men. Ou Shou-nien,

army commander, and Shen Cheng-nien, Commander of the Reorganized 75th Division, were captured. For the Tsinan campaign, see "The Concept of Operations for the Huai-Hai Campaign", Note 2, p. 370 of this volume.

<sup>2</sup> The Chinchow, Changchun, Liaohsi and Shenyang campaigns in northeastern China, taken together, were called the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign. See "The Concept of Operations for the Liaohsi-Shenyang Campaign", Note 1, pp. 365-66 of this volume.



## THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE PEIPING-TIENTSIN CAMPAIGN<sup>1\*</sup>

*December 11, 1948*

1. The enemy forces in Changchiakou, Hsinpao-an and Huailai and in the entire area of Peiping, Tientsin, Tangku and Tangshan — except for a few units, such as certain divisions of the 35th, 62nd and 94th Corps, which still have a fairly high combat effectiveness for the defence of fortified positions — have little offensive spirit; they are like birds startled by the mere twang of a bow-string. This is especially the case since you advanced south of the Great Wall. You should on no account overrate the enemy's combat effectiveness. Some of our comrades have suffered through overrating the enemy's combat effectiveness, but they have arrived at a correct understanding after being criticized. The enemy at both Changchiakou and Hsinpao-an is definitely encircled and will in all probability find it extremely difficult to break through and escape. About half the 16th Corps has been speedily wiped out. The enemy's 104th Corps at Huailai has hurriedly fled south and will probably be wiped out today or tomorrow. After that is done, you will be ready to dispatch the 4th Column from the southwest<sup>2</sup> to the northeast to cut the link between Nankow and Peiping. We think this may not be easy to accomplish; for, either the 94th Corps and the remnants of the 16th Corps will quickly withdraw to Peiping, or the 94th, 16th and 92nd Corps will concentrate in the

---

\* This was a telegram drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and addressed to Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades. The Peiping-Tientsin campaign was the last of the three greatest campaigns of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. In this campaign, we wiped out or reorganized over 520,000 Kuomintang troops, liberated the important cities of Peiping, Tientsin and Changchiakou and, in the main, concluded the fighting for the liberation of northern China. The concept of operations for the campaign, set forth here by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, was fully realized in practice.

Nankow-Changping-Shahochen region for joint defence. But this move by our 4th Column will directly menace the northwestern and northern suburbs of Peiping and tie down those enemy forces so that they dare not move. If they should dare to move further west to reinforce the 35th Corps, we could either directly cut off their retreat or launch a direct attack on Peiping; therefore they will probably not dare to move further west. The army in northern China commanded by Yang Teh-chih, Lo Jui-ching and Keng Piao is employing 9 divisions to encircle 3 divisions of the enemy's 35th Corps; this constitutes absolute superiority. They have proposed to wipe out these enemy divisions at an early date, but we intend to ask them not to attack for the time being so as to lull the enemy at Peiping and Tientsin and make it difficult for him to come to a decision to flee by sea. They have employed 2 columns to encircle the 35th Corps and 1 column to check the 104th Corps and have beaten back both these enemy forces.

2. We now agree to your immediately sending the 5th Column to the vicinity of Nankow to menace the enemy at Peiping, Nankow and Huaijou from the northeast. This column will remain there so that later (in about ten or fifteen days, that is, when the army in northern China commanded by Yang Teh-chih, Lo Jui-ching and Keng Piao has annihilated the 35th Corps) your 4th Column can be released for service in the east. Therefore, please order the 5th Column to continue its march west today.

3. The 3rd Column should on no account go to Nankow but, in accordance with our telegram of the 9th, should move to the region east of Peiping and south of Tunghsien to threaten Peiping from the east and, together with the 4th, 11th and 5th Columns, form an encirclement around Peiping.

4. However, our real aim is not to encircle Peiping first but rather to encircle Tientsin, Tangku, Lutai and Tangshan first.

5. We estimate that your 10th, 9th, 6th and 8th Columns, your Artillery Column and your 7th Column will have assembled in the region around Yutien by about December 15. We propose that, in the few days between December 20 and 25, you move with lightning speed and employ the 6 columns — the 3rd (which is to march east from the eastern suburbs of Peiping), the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th — to encircle the enemy at Tientsin, Tangku, Lutai and Tangshan, provided that the enemy's situation at those points remains roughly the same as at present. The method is to place 2 columns around Wuching — at Langfang, Hohsiwu and Yangtsun — and to use 5 columns as wedges to be

driven between enemy positions at Tientsin, Tangku, Lutai, Tangshan and Kuyeh and so cut off contacts between the enemy forces. All these columns should build two-way blocking positions to ensure that the enemy cannot escape. Then they should rest and consolidate their troops and, after recovering from fatigue, attack and wipe out some small enemy groups. In the meantime the 4th Column should move from northwest to east of Peiping. Before the 4th Column starts to move, the army in northern China commanded by Yang Teh-chih, Lo Jui-ching and Keng Piao should wipe out the enemy in Hsinpao-an. In the east, according to circumstances, every effort should be made to wipe out the enemy in Tangku first and control that seaport. If these two points, Tangku (the most important) and Hsinpao-an, are captured, you will have the initiative on the whole chessboard. The above dispositions constitute, in reality, the wholesale encirclement of the enemy in Changchiakou, Hsinpao-an, Nankow, Peiping, Huaijou, Shunyi, Tunghsien, Wanping (Chohsien and Lianghsiang have been captured), Fengtai, Tientsin, Tangku, Lutai, Tangshan and Kaiping.

6. This method is generally the same as that you used in the fighting along the line through Ihsien, Chinchow, Chihsi, Hsingcheng, Suichung, Shanhaikuan and Luanhsien.<sup>3</sup>

7. In the two weeks beginning from today (December 11-25), the basic principle is to encircle without attacking (in the case of Changchiakou and Hsinpao-an) and, in some cases, to cut off without encircling (in the case of Peiping, Tientsin and Tungchow, to make only a strategic encirclement and cut the links between the enemy forces, but not to make a tactical encirclement) in order to wait for the completion of our dispositions and then wipe out the enemy forces one by one. In particular, you must not wipe out all the enemy forces at Changchiakou, Hsinpao-an and Nankow because that would compel the enemy east of Nankow to make a quick decision to bolt. Please make sure you grasp this point.

8. In order to avoid prompting Chiang Kai-shek into making a speedy decision to ship his troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area south by sea, we are going to order Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chen Yi and Su Yu, after they have wiped out Huang Wei's army, to spare the remainder of Tu Yu-ming's armies under Chiu Ching-chuan, Li Mi and Sun Yuan-liang (about half of which have already been destroyed) and for two weeks to make no dispositions for their final annihilation.

9. To prevent the enemy from fleeing towards Tsingtao, we are going to order our troops in Shantung to mass certain forces to control

a section of the Yellow River near Tsinan and to make preparations along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway.

10. There is little or no possibility that the enemy will flee towards Hsuchow, Chengchow, Sian' or Suiyuan.

11. The main, indeed the only, concern is that the enemy might flee by sea. Therefore, in the coming two weeks the general method should be to encircle without attacking or to cut off without encircling.

12. This plan is beyond the enemy's range of expectation, and it will be very difficult for him to discern it before you complete your final dispositions. At present, the enemy is probably calculating that you will attack Peiping.

13. The enemy always underrates the energy of our army and overrates his own strength, though at the same time he is like a bird startled by the mere twang of a bow-string. The enemy at Peiping and Tientsin will never expect you to be able to complete the above dispositions by December 25.

14. In order to complete these dispositions by December 25, you should inspire your troops in the next two weeks to ignore fatigue, to have no fear of depletion of numbers and have no fear of cold and hunger; after these dispositions have been made, they can rest and consolidate and take their time in attacking.

15. The sequence of attacks will be roughly the following: first, the Tangku-Lutai sector; second, Hsinpao-an; third, the Tangshan sector; fourth, the Tientsin and Changchiakou sectors; and, lastly, the Peiping sector.

16. What are your views on this plan? What are its shortcomings? Are there any difficulties in its execution? Please consider all this and reply by telegraph.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Peiping-Tientsin campaign, fought by the Northeast Field Army and two armies of the Northern China People's Liberation Army under the command of Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan, Nieh Jung-chen and other comrades, began early in December 1948, immediately after the victorious conclusion of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in the Northeast. Acting upon Comrade Mao Tse-tung's instructions, the Northeast Field Army swept south of the Great Wall immediately after it had victoriously fulfilled its task of liberating the whole Northeast, and joined the armies of the People's Liberation Army in northern China in co-ordinated actions to encircle and wipe out the Kuomintang troops in that region. Greatly alarmed by the victory of the People's Liberation Army in the Northeast, more than 600,000 Kuomintang

troops under Fu Tso-yi, Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang's Northern China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, hurriedly shortened their lines of defence with the intention of fleeing south by sea or west to Suiyuan Province. Moving with lightning speed, our army cut apart the enemy forces and surrounded them separately at five strong-points — Peiping, Tientsin, Changchiakou, Hsinpao-an and Tangku — thus blocking their escape routes to the south and west. On December 22, the enemy's main force at Hsinpao-an (the headquarters of his 35th Corps and 2 divisions) was surrounded and wiped out. On the 24th, Changchiakou was taken and a corps headquarters and 7 divisions of the enemy's 11th Army, over 54,000 men in all, were wiped out. On January 14, 1949, our troops surrounding Tientsin launched a general offensive against the city after Chen Chang-chieh, commander of the enemy garrison, refused to surrender. The city was liberated after twenty-nine hours' fierce fighting, the enemy garrison of over 130,000 men was wiped out and Chen Chang-chieh was captured. As a result, more than 200,000 enemy troops garrisoning Peiping were tightly surrounded by our troops and their fate was sealed. Owing to the efforts we made to win it over, the enemy's Peiping garrison, commanded by General Fu Tso-yi, accepted peaceful reorganization. On January 31, our troops entered Peiping, the city was proclaimed peacefully liberated and the Peiping-Tientsin campaign came to a victorious close. During this campaign, with the exception of the enemy garrison of over 50,000 men in Tangku, which fled by sea, over 520,000 Kuomintang troops were put out of action and reorganized by our army. In September 1949 the Kuomintang troops in Suiyuan Province declared by telegram that they had revolted and had come over to the people and that they would accept reorganization.

<sup>2</sup> This means the area southwest of Nankow.

<sup>3</sup> In September 1948, to prevent the enemy forces in Ihsien, Chinchow, Chihsi, Hsingcheng, Suichung, Shanhaikuan, Luanhsien and Changli, all points along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, from shortening their lines and concentrating, the North-east Field Army then operating along that railway adopted the method of first using part of its troops to encircle and cut apart the enemy units at these points and of then wiping them out one by one.



## CARRY THE REVOLUTION THROUGH TO THE END\*

*December 30, 1948*

The Chinese people will win final victory in the great War of Liberation. Even our enemy no longer doubts the outcome.

The war has followed a tortuous course. When the reactionary Kuomintang government started the counter-revolutionary war, it had approximately three and a half times as many troops as the People's Liberation Army; the equipment, manpower and material resources of its army were far superior to those of the People's Liberation Army; it had modern industries and modern means of communication, which the People's Liberation Army lacked; it had received large-scale military and economic aid from U.S. imperialism and had made long preparations. Therefore, during the first year of the war (July 1946-June 1947) the Kuomintang was on the offensive and the People's Liberation Army on the defensive. In 1946 in the Northeast, the Kuomintang occupied Shenyang, Szepingkai, Changchun, Kirin, Antung and other cities and most of Liaoning, Liaopei and Antung Provinces;<sup>1</sup> south of the Yellow River, it occupied the cities of Huaiyin and Hotse and most of the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei, Kiangsu-Anhwei, Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu and Southwestern Shantung Liberated Areas; and north of the Great Wall, it occupied the cities of Chengteh, Chining and Changchiakou and most of Jehol, Suiyuan and Chahar Provinces. The Kuomintang blustered and swaggered like a conquering hero. The People's Liberation Army adopted the correct strategy, which had as its main objective to wipe out the Kuomintang's effective strength rather than to hold territory, and in each month destroyed an average of some eight brigades of the Kuomintang regular troops (the equivalent of eight present-day divisions). As a result, the Kuomintang was finally compelled to

---

\* This New Year message for 1949 was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency.

abandon its plan for the over-all offensive and by the first half of 1947 it had to limit the major targets of its attack to the two wings of the southern front, *i.e.*, Shantung and northern Shensi. In the second year (July 1947-June 1948) a fundamental change took place in the war. Having wiped out large numbers of Kuomintang regulars, the People's Liberation Army went over from the defensive to the offensive on the southern and northern fronts, while the Kuomintang had to turn from the offensive to the defensive. The People's Liberation Army not only recovered most of the territories lost in northeastern China, Shantung and northern Shensi but also extended the battle front into the Kuomintang areas north of the Yangtse and Weishui Rivers. Moreover, in the course of attacking and capturing Shihchiachuang, Yuncheng, Szepingkai, Loyang, Yichuan, Paoki, Weihsien, Linfen and Kaifeng, our army mastered the tactics of storming heavily fortified points.<sup>2</sup> The People's Liberation Army formed its own artillery and engineer corps. Don't forget that the People's Liberation Army had neither aircraft nor tanks, but once it had formed an artillery and an engineer corps superior to those of the Kuomintang army, the defensive system of the Kuomintang, with all its aircraft and tanks, appeared negligible by contrast. By this time the People's Liberation Army was able to conduct positional warfare as well as mobile warfare. In the first half of the third year of the war (July-December 1948), another fundamental change has occurred. The People's Liberation Army, so long outnumbered, has gained numerical superiority. It has been able not only to capture the Kuomintang's heavily fortified cities but also to surround and destroy strong formations of Kuomintang crack troops, a hundred thousand or several hundred thousand at a time. The rate at which the People's Liberation Army is wiping out Kuomintang troops has become much faster. Look at the statistics on the number of Kuomintang regular units of battalion level and above which we have destroyed (including enemy troops who have revolted and come over to our side). In the first year, the equivalent of 97 brigades, including 46 entire brigades; in the second year, 94 brigades, including 50 entire brigades; and in the first half of the third year, according to incomplete figures, 147 divisions, including 111 entire divisions.<sup>3</sup> In these six months, the number of enemy divisions entirely wiped out was 15 more than the grand total for the previous two years. The enemy front as a whole has completely crumbled. The enemy troops in the Northeast have been entirely wiped out; those in northern China will soon be entirely wiped out, and in eastern China and the

Central Plains only a few enemy forces are left. The annihilation of the Kuomintang's main forces north of the Yangtse River greatly facilitates the forthcoming crossing of the Yangtse by the People's Liberation Army and its southward drive to liberate all China. Simultaneously with victory on the military front, the Chinese people have scored tremendous victories on the political and economic fronts. For this reason public opinion the world over, including the entire imperialist press, no longer disputes the certainty of the country-wide victory of the Chinese People's War of Liberation.

The enemy will not perish of himself. Neither the Chinese reactionaries nor the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism in China will step down from the stage of history of their own accord. Precisely because they realize that the country-wide victory of the Chinese People's War of Liberation can no longer be prevented by purely military struggle, they are placing more and more importance each day on political struggle. On the one hand, the Chinese reactionaries and the U.S. aggressors are using the existing Kuomintang government for their "peace" plot; on the other hand, they are scheming to use certain persons who have connections both with them and with the revolutionary camp, inciting and instigating these persons to work artfully in their endeavours to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and form a so-called opposition faction within it. The purpose is to preserve the reactionary forces and undermine the revolutionary forces. According to reliable information, the U.S. government has decided on this scheme and begun to carry it out in China. The U.S. government has changed its policy of simply backing the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary war to a policy embracing two forms of struggle:

1. Organizing the remnants of the Kuomintang's armed forces and the so-called local forces to continue to resist the People's Liberation Army south of the Yangtse River and in the remote border provinces, and
2. Organizing an opposition faction within the revolutionary camp to strive with might and main to halt the revolution where it is, or, if it must advance, to moderate it and prevent it from encroaching too far on the interests of the imperialists and their running dogs.

The British and French imperialists support this U.S. policy. Many people do not yet see this situation clearly, but it probably will not be long before they do.

The question now facing the Chinese people, all democratic parties and all people's organizations is whether to carry the revolution through to the end or to abandon it halfway. If the revolution is to be carried through to the end, we must use the revolutionary method to wipe out all the forces of reaction resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely; we must unswervingly persist in overthrowing imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism; and we must overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang on a country-wide scale and set up a republic that is a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat and with the worker-peasant alliance as its main body. In this way, the Chinese nation will completely throw off the oppressor, transforming the country from a semi-colony into a genuinely independent state, and the Chinese people will win full emancipation, overthrowing once and for all both feudal oppression and oppression by bureaucrat-capital (Chinese monopoly capital); they will thus achieve unity, democracy and peace, create the prerequisites for transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial country, and make it possible for her to develop from a society with exploitation of man by man into a socialist society. If the revolution is abandoned halfway, it will mean going against the will of the people, bowing to the will of the foreign aggressors and Chinese reactionaries and giving the Kuomintang a chance to heal its wounds, so that one day it may pounce suddenly to strangle the revolution and again plunge the whole country into darkness. That is how clearly and sharply the question is now posed. Which of these two roads to choose? Every democratic party, every people's organization in China must consider this question, must choose its road and clarify its stand. Whether China's democratic parties and people's organizations can sincerely co-operate without parting company halfway depends on whether they are agreed on this question and take unanimous action to overthrow the common enemy of the Chinese people. What is needed here is unanimity and co-operation, not the setting up of any "opposition faction" or the pursuit of any "middle road".<sup>4</sup>

In the long period of more than twenty years from the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, 1927<sup>5</sup> down to the present day, have not the Chinese reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek and his ilk given proof enough that they are a gang of blood-stained executioners, who slaughter people without blinking? Have they not given proof enough that they are a band of professional traitors and the running dogs of imperialism? Think it over, everybody! What

magnanimity the Chinese people have shown to this gang of bandits in the hope of achieving internal peace with them, since the Sian Incident of December 1936, since the Chungking negotiations of October 1945 and since the Political Consultative Conference of January 1946! But has all this goodwill changed their class nature one jot or tittle? Their history proves that not a single one of these bandits can be separated from U.S. imperialism. Relying on U.S. imperialism, they have plunged 475 million of our compatriots into a huge civil war of unprecedented brutality and slaughtered millions upon millions of men and women, young and old, with bombers, fighter planes, guns, tanks, rocket-launchers, automatic rifles, gasoline bombs, gas projectiles and other weapons, all supplied by U.S. imperialism. And relying on these criminals, U.S. imperialism on its part has seized China's sovereign rights over her own territory, waters and air space, seized inland navigation rights and special commercial privileges, seized special privileges in China's domestic and foreign affairs and even seized the privilege of killing people, beating them up, driving cars over them and raping women, all with impunity. Can it be maintained that the Chinese people, who have been compelled to fight such a long and bloody war, should still show affection and tenderness towards these most vicious enemies and should not completely destroy or expel them? Only by completely destroying the Chinese reactionaries and expelling the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism can China gain independence, democracy and peace. Is not this truth clear enough by now?

What deserves attention is that all of a sudden the enemies of the Chinese people are doing their best to assume a harmless and even a pitiable look (readers, please remember that in the future they will try to look pitiable again). Did not Sun Fo, who has now become president of the Kuomintang's Executive Yuan, state in June last year that a "settlement will finally come, provided militarily we fight to the end"? But this time, the moment he took office he talked glibly about an "honourable peace" and said that "the Government has been striving for peace and only resorted to fighting because peace could not be realized, but the ultimate objective of fighting is still to restore peace". Immediately afterwards, on December 21, a United Press dispatch from Shanghai predicted that Sun Fo's statement would meet with widespread approval in U.S. official quarters and among the Kuomintang liberals. At present, U.S. officials have not only become deeply interested in "peace" in China but also repeatedly assert that

ever since the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain in December 1945, the United States has adhered to a "policy of non-interference in China's internal affairs". How are we to deal with these worthies from the "Land of Gentlemen"? Here, it is fitting to quote an ancient Greek fable. One winter's day, a farmhand found a snake frozen by the cold. Moved by compassion, he picked it up and put it in his bosom. The snake was revived by the warmth, its natural instincts returned, and it gave its benefactor a fatal bite. The dying farmhand said, "I've got what I deserve for taking pity on an evil creature."<sup>6</sup> Venomous snakes, foreign and Chinese, hope that the Chinese people will die like the farmhand, that like him the Chinese Communist Party and all Chinese revolutionary democrats will be kind-hearted to them. But the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and the genuine revolutionary democrats of China have heard the labourer's dying words and will well remember them. Moreover, the serpents infesting most of China, big or small, black or white, baring their poisonous fangs or assuming the guise of beautiful girls, are not yet frozen by the cold, although they already sense the threat of winter.

The Chinese people will never take pity on snake-like scoundrels, and they honestly believe that no one is their true friend who guilefully says that pity should be shown these scoundrels and that anything else would be out of keeping with China's traditions, would fall short of greatness, etc. Why should one take pity on snake-like scoundrels? What worker, what peasant, what soldier, says that such scoundrels should be pitied? True, there are "Kuomintang liberals" or non-Kuomintang "liberals" who advise the Chinese people to accept the "peace" offered by the United States and the Kuomintang, that is, to enshrine and worship the remnants of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism so that these treasures shall not become extinct on earth. But they are decidedly not workers, peasants or soldiers, nor are they the friends of workers, peasants and soldiers.

We hold that the Chinese people's revolutionary camp must be expanded and must embrace all who are willing to join the revolutionary cause at the present stage. The Chinese people's revolution needs a main force and also needs allies, for an army without allies cannot defeat the enemy. The Chinese people, now at the high tide of revolution, need friends and they should remember their friends and not forget them. In China there are undoubtedly many friends faithful to the people's revolutionary cause, who try to protect the people's

interests and are opposed to protecting the enemy's interests, and undoubtedly none of these friends should be forgotten or cold-shouldered. Also, we hold that we must consolidate the Chinese people's revolutionary camp and not allow bad elements to sneak in or wrong views to prevail. Besides keeping their friends in mind, the Chinese people, now at the high tide of revolution, should also keep their enemies and the friends of their enemies firmly in mind. As we said above, since the enemy is cunningly using the method of "peace" and the method of sneaking into the revolutionary camp to preserve and strengthen his position, whereas the fundamental interests of the people demand that all reactionary forces be destroyed thoroughly and that the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism be driven out of China, those who advise the people to take pity on the enemy and preserve the forces of reaction are not friends of the people, but friends of the enemy.

The raging tide of China's revolution is forcing all social strata to decide their attitude. A new change is taking place in the balance of class forces in China. Multitudes of people are breaking away from Kuomintang influence and control and coming over to the revolutionary camp, and, isolated and abandoned, the Chinese reactionaries have fallen into hopeless straits. As the People's War of Liberation draws closer and closer to final victory, all the revolutionary people and all friends of the people will unite more solidly and, led by the Communist Party of China, resolutely demand the complete destruction of the reactionary forces and the thoroughgoing development of the revolutionary forces until a people's democratic republic on a country-wide scale is founded and a peace based on unity and democracy is achieved. The U.S. imperialists, the Chinese reactionaries and their friends, on the contrary, are incapable of uniting solidly and will indulge in endless squabbles, mutual abuse, recrimination and betrayal. On one point, however, they will co-operate — in striving by every means to undermine the revolutionary forces and preserve the reactionary forces. They will use every means, open and secret, direct and indirect. But it can definitely be stated that their political intrigues will meet with the same defeats as their military attacks. Having had plenty of experience, the Chinese people and their general staff, the Communist Party of China, are certain to smash the enemy's political intrigues, just as they have shattered his military attacks, and to carry the great People's War of Liberation through to the end.

In 1949, the Chinese People's Liberation Army will advance south of the Yangtse River and will win even greater victories than in 1948.

In 1949, on the economic front we shall achieve even greater successes than in 1948. Our agricultural and industrial production will rise to a higher level than before, and rail and highway traffic will be completely restored. In their operations the main formations of the People's Liberation Army will discard certain survivals of guerrilla warfare and reach a higher level as a regular army.

In 1949, the Political Consultative Conference will be convened with no reactionaries participating and having as its aim the fulfilment of the tasks of the people's revolution, the People's Republic of China will be proclaimed, and the Central Government of the Republic will be established. This government will be a democratic coalition government under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, with the participation of appropriate persons representing the democratic parties and people's organizations.

These are the main concrete tasks which the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China and all the democratic parties and people's organizations in China should strive to fulfil in 1949. We shall brave all difficulties and unite as one to fulfil these tasks.

In our struggle we shall overthrow the feudal oppression of thousands of years and the imperialist oppression of a hundred years once and for all. The year 1949 will be a year of tremendous importance. We should redouble our efforts.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Kuomintang government divided the three northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang into nine provinces, Liaoning, Liaopei, Antung, Kirin, Hokiang, Sungkiang, Heilungkiang, Nunkiang and Hsingan. In 1949 our Northeast Administrative Commission redivided the area into five provinces, Liaotung, Liaohsi, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Sungkiang. Together with Jehol, these provinces were then referred to as the six northeastern provinces. In 1954 the Central People's Government Council merged the two provinces of Liaotung and Liaohsi into the one province of Liaoning and the two provinces of Sungkiang and Heilungkiang into the one province of Heilungkiang, while Kirin remained unchanged. In 1955 Jehol Province was abolished and the area previously under its jurisdiction was divided and incorporated into the provinces of Hopei and Liaoning and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

<sup>2</sup> The dates of the capture of these key points were: Shihchiachuang, November 12, 1947; Yuncheng, December 28, 1947; Szepingkai, March 13, 1948; Loyang, first on March 14, 1948, and again on April 5, 1948; Yichuan, March 3, 1948; Paoki, April 26, 1948; Wehsien, April 27, 1948; Linfen, May 17, 1948; and Kaifeng, June 22, 1948. All these cities were fortified with many groups of blockhouses, and some had high, thick city walls; also, they all had auxiliary defence works, including multiple lines of trenches, barbed-wire entanglements and abatis. Our army at the time had neither planes nor tanks, and little or no artillery. In attacking and taking these cities, our army learned a complete set of tactics for taking strong fortifications. These tactics were:

(1) successive demolition — using explosives to demolish the enemy's different defence installations in succession;

(2) tunnel operations — secretly digging tunnels to and under the enemy's blockhouses or city walls, then blowing them up with explosives and following up with fierce attacks;

(3) approach trench operations — digging trenches towards the enemy's fortifications, and then approaching under cover to make sudden attacks;

(4) explosive package projectors — shooting packages of explosives from missile-projectors or mortars to destroy the enemy's defences;

(5) "sharp knife" tactics — concentrating manpower and fire-power to effect a breakthrough and to cut up the enemy forces.

<sup>3</sup> The brigades mentioned here were those designated as brigades after the reorganization of the Kuomintang army, while the divisions were pre-reorganization divisions (which were practically the same as the reorganized brigades).

<sup>4</sup> The "middle road" was also called the "third road". In the early stage of the People's War of Liberation some democratic personages fancied that they could find a so-called third road, apart from the Kuomintang dictatorship of big landlords and big bourgeoisie and apart from the people's democratic dictatorship led by the Communist Party of China. This third road was in fact the road of a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie on the British and U.S. pattern.

<sup>5</sup> See "Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught", Note 2, p. 290 of this volume.

<sup>6</sup> "Evil for Good" in *Aesop's Fables*.



## TURN THE ARMY INTO A WORKING FORCE\*

*February 8, 1949*

Your telegram of the 4th has been received. It is very good that you are speeding training and consolidation and preparing to start moving one month ahead of schedule.<sup>1</sup> Please proceed along these lines and do not slacken. Actually, however, training and consolidation must continue in March; the study of policy must be stressed and preparations must be made to take over and administer the large cities. From now on, the formula followed in the past twenty years, "first the rural areas, then the cities", will be reversed and changed to the formula, "first the cities, then the rural areas". The army is not only a fighting force, it is mainly a working force. All army cadres should learn how to take over and administer cities. In urban work they should learn how to be good at dealing with the imperialists and Kuomintang reactionaries, good at dealing with the bourgeoisie, good at leading the workers and organizing trade unions, good at mobilizing and organizing the youth, good at uniting with and training cadres in the new Liberated Areas, good at managing industry and commerce, good at running schools, newspapers, news agencies and broadcasting stations, good at handling foreign affairs, good at handling problems relating to the democratic parties and people's organizations, good at adjusting the relations between the cities and the rural areas and solving the problems of food, coal and other necessities, and good at handling monetary and financial problems. In short, you should from now on shoulder all urban problems, with which our army cadres and fighters were unfamiliar in the past. You are to advance and occupy four or

---

\* This telegram was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in reply to one from the Second and Third Field Armies. It was also sent to the other field armies and bureaus of the Central Committee concerned. Considering that the period of severe fighting had ended after the three great campaigns of Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out in good

five provinces, and in addition to the cities you will have to attend to vast rural areas. Since in the south all the rural areas will be newly liberated, the work will be fundamentally different from that in the old Liberated Areas of the north. In the first year, the policy of reducing rent and interest cannot be applied, and rent and interest will have to be paid in roughly the same way as before. These are the conditions under which our rural work will have to proceed. Therefore, rural work must also be learned afresh. However, as compared with urban work, rural work is easy to learn. Urban work is more difficult and is the main subject you are studying. If our cadres cannot quickly master the administration of cities, we shall encounter extreme difficulties. Consequently you must settle all other problems in February and use the whole month of March to learn how to work in the cities and in the new Liberated Areas. The Kuomintang has only one million several hundred thousand troops, scattered over a huge territory. Of course, there are still many battles to fight, but there is little possibility of such large-scale fighting as in the Huai-Hai campaign, and it may even be said that there is no such possibility and that the period of severe fighting is over. The army is still a fighting force, and in this respect there must be absolutely no relaxing; to relax would be a mistake. Nevertheless, the time has come for us to set ourselves the task of turning the army into a working force. If we do not now set ourselves this task and resolve to perform it, we shall be making a very big mistake. We are preparing to send 53,000 cadres south with the army, but this is a very small number. The occupation of eight or nine provinces and scores of big cities will require a huge number of working cadres, and to solve this problem the army must rely chiefly on itself. The army is a school. Our field armies of 2,100,000 are equivalent to several thousand universities and secondary schools. We have to rely chiefly on the army to supply our working cadres. You must understand this point clearly. Since severe fighting is basically over, replenishment of the army's manpower and equipment should be kept within suitable limits, and too much must

---

time that the People's Liberation Army was not only a fighting force but had to be a working force at the same time and that under certain conditions it should function mainly as a working force. This policy played a very important role in solving the cadre problem of that period in the new Liberated Areas and in ensuring the smooth development of the people's revolutionary cause. On the nature of the People's Liberation Army as both a fighting and a working force, see also "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", Section 2, pp. 362-63 of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV.

not be demanded as regards quantity, quality and completeness, lest it should cause a financial crisis. That is another point you should seriously consider. The above policies apply fully to the Fourth Field Army, and Comrades Lin Piao and Lo Jung-huan are likewise asked to pay attention to them. We have talked at length with Comrade Kang Sheng and asked him to hurry to your place by the 12th to confer with you. After conferring, please inform us promptly by telegram of your views and what you propose to do. The Eastern China Bureau and the Eastern China Military Area Headquarters should move at once to Hsuehow to work jointly with the General Front Committee<sup>2</sup> and with the Front Committee of the Third Field Army in a concentrated effort to plan the march to the south. Turn all your rear-area work over to the Shantung Sub-Bureau.

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Second and Third Field Armies had planned to advance the date of crossing the Yangtse River from April to March 1949. The crossing was postponed to late April because of the peace negotiations with the reactionary Kuomintang government.

<sup>2</sup> On November 16, 1948, in order to meet the needs of the Huai-Hai campaign, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to form a General Front Committee consisting of Comrades Liu Po-cheng, Chen Yi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Su Yu and Tan Chen-lin, with Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping as secretary, to assume unified leadership of the Central Plains Field Army and the Eastern China Field Army and to exercise command over military affairs and operations on the Huai-Hai front.



## ORDER TO THE ARMY FOR THE COUNTRY-WIDE ADVANCE\*

*April 21, 1949*

Comrade commanders and fighters of all field armies, comrades of the People's Liberation Army in the guerrilla areas of the south!

The Agreement on Internal Peace, drafted after long negotiations between the delegation of the Communist Party of China and the delegation of the Nanking Kuomintang government, has been rejected by that government.<sup>1</sup> The responsible members of the Nanking Kuomintang government have rejected the agreement because they are still obeying the orders of U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, the chieftain of the Kuomintang bandit gang, and because they are trying to block the progress of the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and prevent the internal problem from being solved by peaceful means. The Agreement on Internal Peace, comprising eight sections with twenty-four articles formulated by the two delegations in the negotiations, is lenient on the problem of war criminals, is lenient towards the Kuomintang officers, soldiers and government personnel, and provides appropriate solutions for other problems, all proceeding from the interests of the nation and the people. The rejection of this agreement shows that the Kuomintang reactionaries are determined to fight to the finish the counter-revolutionary war which they started. The rejection of this agreement shows that, in proposing peace negotiations on January 1 of this year, the Kuomintang reactionaries were

---

\* This order was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. After the reactionary Kuomintang government refused to sign the Agreement on Internal Peace, the People's Liberation Army acted on this order issued by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh and embarked upon a general advance, unprecedented in scale, into the vast areas which had not yet been liberated. On the morning of April 21, 1949, the Second Field Army led by Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades, and the Third Field Army led by Chen Yi, Su Yu, Tan Chen-lin and other

only trying to check the advance of the People's Liberation Army and thus gain a breathing space for a later comeback to crush the revolutionary forces. The rejection of this agreement shows that the Li Tsung-jen government at Nanking was utterly hypocritical in professing to accept the Chinese Communist Party's eight terms for peace as the basis for negotiations. Inasmuch as the Li Tsung-jen government had already accepted such fundamental terms as the punishment of war criminals, the reorganization of all the reactionary Kuomintang troops on democratic principles and the handing over of all power and authority by the Nanking government and its subordinate governments at all levels, it had no reason to reject the specific measures which were drawn up on the basis of these fundamental terms and which are most lenient. In these circumstances, we give you the following orders:

1. Advance bravely and annihilate resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely all the Kuomintang reactionaries within China's borders who dare to resist. Liberate the people of the whole country. Safeguard the independence and integrity of China's territory and sovereignty.

2. Advance bravely and arrest all the incorrigible war criminals. No matter where they may flee, they must be brought to justice and punished according to law. Pay special attention to arresting the bandit chieftain Chiang Kai-shek.

---

comrades, forced the Yangtse River on a front extending more than five hundred kilometres from Hukou (northeast of Kiukiang) in the west to Kiangyin in the east and completely destroyed the defence line along the Yangtse which the enemy had painstakingly built in three and a half months. On April 23 these forces liberated Nanking, which had been the centre of the counter-revolutionary rule of the Kuomintang for twenty-two years, and this signified the downfall of the reactionary Kuomintang regime. Then they thrust south along separate routes, liberated Hangchow on May 3 and Nanchang on May 22 and captured Shanghai, China's biggest city, on May 27. In June they began their march into Fukien Province; they liberated Foochow on August 17 and Amoy on October 17. On May 14 the Fourth Field Army led by Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades forced the Yangtse on a front of more than one hundred kilometres in the Tuanfeng-Wuhsueh sector east of Wuhan. On May 16 and 17 it liberated Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow, cities of strategic importance in central China. Then it marched south into Hunan. Cheng Chien, Kuomintang governor of Hunan Province, and Chen Ming-jen, Commander of the 1st Army, renounced their allegiance to the Kuomintang on August 4, and Hunan Province was peacefully liberated. The Fourth Field Army fought the Hengyang-Paoching campaign in September and October, wiped out the main force of the Kuomintang troops under Pai Chung-hsi and then pushed on to Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces. It liberated Canton on October 14, Kweilin on November 22 and Nanning on December 4. While the Second and Third Field Armies were forcing the Yangtse River, the armies in northern China led by Nieh Jung-chen, Hsu Hsiang-chien and other comrades captured

3. Proclaim to all Kuomintang local governments and local military groups the final amended version of the Agreement on Internal Peace. In accordance with its general ideas, you may conclude local agreements with those who are willing to cease hostilities and to settle matters by peaceful means.

4. After the People's Liberation Army has encircled Nanking, we are willing to give the Li Tsung-jen government at Nanking another opportunity to sign the Agreement on Internal Peace, if that government has not yet fled and dispersed and desires to sign it.

Mao Tse-tung

Chairman of the Chinese People's  
Revolutionary Military Commission

Chu Teh

Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese  
People's Liberation Army

---

Taiyuan on April 24, 1949. The First Field Army led by Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung and other comrades, after liberating Sian on May 20, continued its march into the Kuomintang areas in the Northwest together with two armies from northern China. They captured Lanchow on August 26, liberated Sining on September 5 and Yinchuan on September 23, and completely annihilated the Kuomintang troops under Ma Pu-fang and Ma Hung-kuei. Late in September Tao Chih-yueh, Kuomintang Garrison Commander-in-Chief of Sinkiang Province, and Burchan, the governor, renounced their allegiance to the Kuomintang, and Sinkiang was peacefully liberated. At the beginning of November the Second Field Army led by Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades, together with the 18th Army of the Northern China Field Army and part of the First Field Army led by Ho Lung, Li Ching-chuan and other comrades, began their march into southwestern China. They liberated Kweiyang on November 15 and Chungking on November 30. On December 9 Lu Han, Kuomintang governor of Yunnan Province, Liu Wen-hui, Kuomintang governor of Sikang Province, and Teng Hsi-hou and Pan Wen-hua, deputy directors of the Kuomintang Bureau of Military and Administrative Affairs in the Southwest, renounced their allegiance to the Kuomintang, and the two provinces of Yunnan and Sikang were peacefully liberated. In late December the People's Liberation Army which had entered the Southwest fought the Chengtu campaign, completely wiped out the Kuomintang troops under Hu Tsung-nan and liberated Chengtu on December 27. By the end of December 1949 the People's Liberation Army had wiped out all the Kuomintang troops on China's mainland and liberated the entire mainland except Tibet.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> On April 1, 1949, the Kuomintang government delegation headed by Chang Chih-chung arrived in Peiping to negotiate peace with the delegation of the Communist Party of China. An Agreement on Internal Peace was drafted after half a month of negotiations. The agreement (final amended version) was handed to the Nanking government delegation by the delegation of the Communist Party of China on April 15 and was rejected by the Nanking government on April 20. The full text of the agreement (final amended version) is as follows:

In the 35th year of the Republic of China, the National Government at Nanking, with the aid of the Government of the United States of America, defied the will of the people, wrecked the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and, on the pretext of opposing the Communist Party of China, launched a country-wide civil war against the Chinese people and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This war has lasted two years and nine and a half months. It has brought untold disaster to the people throughout the country. The country has suffered tremendous losses of financial and material resources, and its sovereignty has been further infringed. The people of the whole country have always expressed dissatisfaction with the National Government at Nanking for its violation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles and of his correct policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, and for its violation of his revolutionary testament. In particular, the whole people have voiced their opposition to the launching of the present unprecedented large-scale civil war by the National Government at Nanking and to the erroneous political, military, financial, economic, cultural and foreign policies and measures which that government has adopted in its pursuit of the civil war. The National Government at Nanking has completely forfeited the confidence of the entire people. In the present civil war its troops have already been defeated by the People's Liberation Army led by the Communist Party of China and commanded by the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission. Finding itself in this situation, the National Government at Nanking proposed to the Communist Party of China on January 1 of the 38th year of the Republic of China that negotiations should be held for the cessation of the civil war and the restoration of peace. On January 14 of the same year, the Communist Party of China issued a statement agreeing to this proposal of the Kuomintang government at Nanking and putting forward eight terms as the basis for the peace negotiations between the two sides. These terms are as follows: punish the war criminals; abolish the bogus constitution; abolish the bogus "constituted authority"; reorganize all reactionary troops on democratic principles; confiscate bureaucrat-capital; reform the land system; abrogate treasonable treaties; convene a New Political Consultative Conference without the participation of reactionary elements and form a democratic coalition government to take over all the power and authority of the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government and of its subordinate governments at all levels. These eight basic terms were agreed to by the National Government at Nanking. Thereupon, the Communist Party of China and the National Government at Nanking appointed their respective delegations, fully empowered to conduct negotiations and to sign an agreement. The delegates of both parties, met in Peiping, have affirmed first of all that the National Government at Nanking should bear the full responsibility for the present civil war and for all its erroneous policies and have agreed to conclude this agreement.

### SECTION ONE

Article 1. In order to distinguish between right and wrong and to establish responsibility, the delegation of the Communist Party of China and the delegation of the National Government at Nanking (hereinafter referred to as both sides) affirm that, as a matter of principle, punishment shall be meted out to the war criminals of the National Government at Nanking who are held responsible for launching and prosecuting the present civil war, but that they will be dealt with on the merits of each case in accordance with the following conditions:

Item 1. All war criminals, no matter who they are, may be cleared of the charge of being war criminals and treated with leniency, provided they show by actual deeds that they are really sincere in distinguishing right from wrong and in making a clean break with their past, thus facilitating the progress of the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and the peaceful settlement of the internal problem.

Item 2. All incorrigible war criminals, no matter who they are, shall be severely punished if they obstruct the progress of the cause of the people's liberation, hinder the peaceful settlement of the internal problem, or go so far as to instigate rebellion. The Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission will be responsible for suppressing any rebellion that they may lead.

Article 2. Both sides affirm that the National Government at Nanking was wrong in pronouncing General Yasuji Okamura, war criminal in the Japanese aggression against China, not guilty and releasing him on January 26 of the 38th year of the Republic of China and in granting permission on January 31 of the same year for the repatriation to Japan of 260 other Japanese war criminals. The cases of all these Japanese war criminals shall be reopened as soon as the Democratic Coalition Government of China, the new central government representing the people throughout China, is formed.

### SECTION TWO

Article 3. Both sides affirm that the "Constitution of the Republic of China", adopted by the "National Assembly" convened by the Kuomintang Government at Nanking in November of the 35th year of the Republic of China, shall be abolished.

Article 4. After the abolition of the "Constitution of the Republic of China", the fundamental law to be observed by the state and the people shall be determined in accordance with the resolutions of the New Political Consultative Conference and the Democratic Coalition Government.

### SECTION THREE

Article 5. Both sides affirm that the entire constituted authority of the National Government at Nanking shall be abolished.

Article 6. In all places entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army and after the Democratic Coalition Government is formed, the people's democratic constituted authority shall be promptly established, and all reactionary laws and decrees annulled.

### SECTION FOUR

Article 7. Both sides affirm that all armed forces under the Nanking National Government (all the ground, naval and air forces, gendarmerie, communications police corps, local troops, all military institutions, academies, factories, rear-service establishments, etc.) shall be reorganized into the People's Liberation Army on democratic principles. After the signing of the Agreement on Internal Peace, a national reorganization committee shall be established at once to take charge of this work of reorganization.

The reorganization committee is to consist of seven to nine members, four to five of whom shall be appointed by the People's Revolutionary Military Commission, and three to four by the National Government at Nanking, with one of the members appointed by the People's Revolutionary Military Commission serving as chairman and one of the members appointed by the National Government at Nanking serving as vice-chairman. In places entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, regional sub-committees of the reorganization committee may be established as required. The proportion of the members of both sides in the sub-committees and the allocation of the posts of chairmen and vice-chairmen shall be the same as in the national reorganization committee. A reorganization committee shall be established for the navy and another for the air force. All matters relating to the People's Liberation Army's entry into, and take-over of, the areas at present administered by the National Government at Nanking shall be decided by orders issued by the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission. The armed forces of the National Government at Nanking must not resist the entry of the People's Liberation Army.

Article 8. Both sides agree that the reorganization plan in each region shall be carried out in two stages:

Item 1. The first stage — assembling and regrouping.

Point 1. All the armed forces under the Nanking National Government (ground, naval and air forces, gendarmerie, communications police corps, local troops, etc.) shall be assembled and regrouped. The principle of regrouping shall be as follows: the reorganization committee shall, on the basis of the actual local conditions, order such armed forces in the areas entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army to move, area by area and stage by stage, to the designated places for assembling and regrouping, according to their original designations, formations and numerical strength.

Point 2. Before the People's Liberation Army enters and takes over, all the armed forces under the Nanking National Government shall be held responsible for maintaining local order and preventing any acts of sabotage where they are stationed, in large and small cities, along important lines of communication and rivers, at seaports and in villages.

Point 3. In the above-mentioned places, when the People's Liberation Army enters and takes over, the armed forces under the Nanking National Government shall, in accordance with the orders of the reorganization committee and its sub-committees, hand over peacefully and move to the designated places. While moving to the designated places and after arriving there, the armed forces under the Nanking National Government shall observe strict discipline and shall not disturb local order.

Point 4. When, in compliance with the orders of the reorganization committee and its sub-committees, the armed forces under the Nanking National Government leave their original stations, the local police or peace preservation corps stationed in those places shall not withdraw, but shall be responsible for maintaining local peace and order and shall obey the directions and orders of the People's Liberation Army.

Point 5. The reorganization committee, its sub-committees and the local governments shall be responsible for providing all the armed forces of the Nanking National Government which are being moved or assembled with necessary supplies, such as grain, fodder, bedding and clothing.

Point 6. The reorganization committee and its sub-committees shall, according to the actual conditions in the various areas, order the military

authorities under the Nanking National Government to hand over, area by area and stage by stage, all their military establishments (institutions, schools, factories, storerooms and the like, belonging to all their organizations ranging from the Ministry of National Defence to the Combined Rear-Service Headquarters), all their military installations (naval ports, forts, air bases and the like) and all their military supplies to the People's Liberation Army and the latter's Military Control Commissions in various places.

Item 2. The second stage — reorganization area by area.

Point 1. After the ground forces under the Nanking National Government (infantry, cavalry, special arms, gendarmerie, communications police corps and local troops) have moved to the designated places and have been assembled and regrouped, area by area and stage by stage, the reorganization committee shall, according to the actual conditions in the different areas, draw up plans for their reorganization area by area and carry out these plans at specified times. The principle of reorganization shall be that all the above-mentioned ground forces, after being assembled and regrouped, shall be reorganized into regular units of the People's Liberation Army in conformity with its democratic system and regular structure. The reorganization committee and its sub-committees shall be responsible for handling the cases of those soldiers who have been found eligible for retirement because of age or disability and who wish to retire, as well as the cases of those officers and non-commissioned officers who wish to retire or take up other occupations; the committees shall provide them with facilities to return home and with means of livelihood, so that everyone will be properly placed and no one will commit misdeeds because he lacks means of support.

Point 2. After the naval and air forces under the Nanking National Government have moved to the designated places and been assembled and regrouped, area by area and stage by stage, they shall be reorganized according to their original designations, formations and numerical strength by the navy and air force reorganization committees, in conformity with the democratic system of the People's Liberation Army.

Point 3. All the armed forces under the Nanking National Government, after being reorganized into the People's Liberation Army, must strictly observe the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention of the People's Liberation Army and loyally abide by the military and political systems of the People's Liberation Army, without any violation.

Point 4. The officers and men who have retired after reorganization must respect the local people's governments and obey the laws and decrees of the People's Government. The people's governments and the people of the various localities shall be considerate of these retired officers and men and shall not discriminate against them.

Article 9. After the signing of the Agreement on Internal Peace, all the armed forces under the Nanking National Government must cease conscripting or recruiting soldiers or other personnel. They must be responsible for protecting all their arms and ammunition, equipment, military institutions and installations and military *matériel*, and must not destroy, conceal, transfer or sell any of them.

Article 10. After the signing of the Agreement on Internal Peace, the National Government at Nanking must, in case any of its armed forces refuses to carry out the reorganization plan, assist the People's Liberation Army to enforce the reorganization plan and ensure its thorough execution.

## SECTION FIVE

Article 11. Both sides agree that all bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and property (including banks, factories, mines, vessels, companies and shops) acquired or seized during the rule of the National Government at Nanking through the use of political prerogatives and position shall be confiscated and become the property of the state.

Article 12. In areas not yet entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, the National Government at Nanking shall be held responsible for supervising the bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and property mentioned in Article 11 so that no theft or concealment, damage, transfer or secret sale shall occur. Assets which have already been moved shall be frozen wherever found, and their subsequent removal, transfer abroad or damage shall not be permitted. Bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and property located abroad shall be declared the property of the state.

Article 13. In areas already entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, the bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and property mentioned in Article 11 shall be confiscated by the local Military Control Commissions or institutions authorized by the Democratic Coalition Government. Private shares in them, if any, shall be investigated; after they have been verified as being in fact private and not secretly transferred bureaucrat-capital, they shall be recognized, and their owners shall be permitted to remain shareholders or to withdraw their shares.

Article 14. Bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises dating from the period prior to the rule of the National Government at Nanking, as well as those which date from the period of the rule of the National Government at Nanking, but are neither large nor harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood, shall not be confiscated. But among these, the enterprises and property of certain persons who have committed criminal offences, such as reactionaries guilty of heinous crimes which have been reported by the people and confirmed, shall be confiscated.

Article 15. In cities not yet entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, the provincial, municipal and county governments under the National Government at Nanking shall be responsible for protecting the people's democratic forces and their activities in the locality and must not suppress or injure them.

## SECTION SIX

Article 16. Both sides affirm that the feudal system of landownership in the rural areas of China shall be reformed step by step. After the entry of the People's Liberation Army, reduction of rent and interest shall generally be carried out first and distribution of land later.

Article 17. In areas not yet entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, the local governments under the National Government at Nanking shall be responsible for protecting the organizations of the peasant masses and their activities and must not suppress or damage them.

## SECTION SEVEN

Article 18. Both sides agree that all treaties and agreements concluded with foreign states during the rule of the National Government at Nanking and other diplomatic documents and archives, open or secret, shall be handed over by the National Government at Nanking to the Democratic Coalition Government and examined by the Democratic Coalition Government. All treaties or agreements which are detrimental to the Chinese people and their state, especially those which are in the nature of selling out the rights of the state, shall be either abrogated, or revised, or new treaties and agreements shall be concluded instead, as the case may be.

## SECTION EIGHT

Article 19. Both sides agree that after the signing of the Agreement on Internal Peace and before the formation of the Democratic Coalition Government, the National Government at Nanking and its *yuan*, ministries, commissions and other organs shall temporarily continue to function but must consult the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission in the conduct of affairs and assist the People's Liberation Army in matters relating to the taking over and handing over of the various areas. After the formation of the Democratic Coalition Government, the National Government at Nanking shall immediately hand over to the Democratic Coalition Government and proclaim its own termination.

Article 20. Upon the handing over of the National Government at Nanking and its local governments at various levels and all their subordinate organs, the People's Liberation Army, the local people's governments and the Democratic Coalition Government of China shall take care to enlist all the patriotic and useful persons among the former's personnel, give them democratic education and assign them to suitable posts so that they will not become destitute and homeless.

Article 21. Before the People's Liberation Army enters and takes over, the National Government at Nanking and its subordinate local governments in the provinces, cities and counties shall be responsible for maintaining peace and order in their respective areas, looking after and protecting all government organizations and state-owned enterprises (including banks, factories, mines, railways, postal and telegraph offices, aircraft, vessels, companies, warehouses and all communications facilities) and other movable and immovable properties belonging to the state; and no destruction, loss, removal, concealment, or sale is permitted. Books, archives, antiques, valuables, bullion, foreign currencies and all properties and assets which have been removed or concealed shall be frozen at once wherever they are found, pending their take-over. As for those properties which have been sent abroad or were originally abroad, the National Government at Nanking shall be responsible for their recovery and safekeeping and be prepared to hand them over.

Article 22. All the powers as well as the properties and assets of the state in areas already entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army shall be taken over by the local Military Control Commissions, the local people's governments or institutions authorized by the Coalition Government.

Article 23. After the Agreement on Internal Peace has been signed by the delegation of the National Government at Nanking and carried out by that government, the delegation of the Communist Party of China will take the responsibility of proposing to the preparatory committee of the New Political Consultative Conference that the National Government at Nanking should be permitted to send a number of patriotic persons as representatives to the Conference; after securing the approval of the preparatory committee, the representatives of the National Government at Nanking may attend the New Political Consultative Conference.

Article 24. After the National Government at Nanking has sent its representatives to the New Political Consultative Conference, the Communist Party of China will take the responsibility of proposing to the Conference that, in the interests of co-operation, a number of patriotic persons from the National Government at Nanking should be included in the Democratic Coalition Government.

The delegations of both sides declare: We hereby assume the responsibility of signing this agreement for the sake of the liberation of the Chinese people and the

independence and freedom of the Chinese nation and for the sake of an early conclusion of the war and the restoration of peace, so that the commencement of the great task of production and construction on a nation-wide scale will be facilitated and so that our country and people will steadily attain prosperity, strength and well-being. It is hoped that the people of the entire country will unite as one to struggle for the complete fulfilment of this agreement. This agreement shall enter into force immediately upon signature.

## PROCLAMATION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

*April 25, 1949*

The Kuomintang reactionaries have rejected the terms for peace and persist in their stand of waging a criminal war against the nation and the people. The people all over the country hope that the People's Liberation Army will speedily wipe out the Kuomintang reactionaries. We have ordered the People's Liberation Army to advance courageously, wipe out all reactionary Kuomintang troops who dare to resist, arrest all the incorrigible war criminals, liberate the people of the whole country, safeguard China's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and bring about the genuine unification of the country, which the whole people long for. We earnestly hope that people in all walks of life will assist the People's Liberation Army wherever it goes. We hereby proclaim the following eight-point covenant by which we, together with the whole people, shall abide.

1. Protect the lives and property of all the people. People in all walks of life, irrespective of class, belief or occupation, are expected to maintain order and adopt a co-operative attitude towards the People's Liberation Army. The People's Liberation Army on its part will adopt a co-operative attitude towards the people in all walks of life. Counter-revolutionaries or other saboteurs who seize the opportunity to create disturbances, loot or sabotage shall be severely dealt with.

2. Protect the industrial, commercial, agricultural and livestock enterprises of the national bourgeoisie. All privately owned factories, shops, banks, warehouses, vessels, wharves, farms, livestock farms and other enterprises will without exception be protected against any encroachment. It is hoped that workers and employees in all

occupations will maintain production as usual and that all shops will remain open as usual.

3. Confiscate bureaucrat-capital. All factories, shops, banks and warehouses, all vessels, wharves and railways, all postal, telegraph, electric light, telephone and water supply services, and all farms, livestock farms and other enterprises operated by the reactionary Kuomintang government and the big bureaucrats shall be taken over by the People's Government. In such enterprises the private shares held by national capitalists engaged in industry, commerce, agriculture or livestock raising shall be recognized, after their ownership is verified. All personnel working in bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises must remain at their posts pending the take-over by the People's Government and must assume responsibility for the safekeeping of all assets, machinery, charts, account books, records, etc., in preparation for the check-up and take-over. Those who render useful service in this connection will be rewarded; those who obstruct or sabotage will be punished. Those desiring to go on working after the take-over by the People's Government will be given employment commensurate with their abilities so that they will not become destitute and homeless.

4. Protect all public and private schools, hospitals, cultural and educational institutions, athletic fields and other public welfare establishments. It is hoped that all personnel in these institutions will remain at their posts; the People's Liberation Army will protect them from molestation.

5. Except for the incorrigible war criminals and counter-revolutionaries who have committed the most heinous crimes, the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government will not hold captive, arrest or subject to indignity any officials, whether high or low, in the Kuomintang's central, provincial, municipal and county governments, deputies to the "National Assembly", members of the Legislative and Control Yuans, members of the political consultative councils, police officers and district, township, village and *pao-chia*<sup>1</sup> officials, so long as they do not offer armed resistance or plot sabotage. All these persons are enjoined, pending the take-over, to stay at their posts, abide by the orders and decrees of the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government and assume responsibility for the safekeeping of all the assets and records of their offices. The People's Government will permit the employment of those of them who can make themselves useful in some kind of work and have not committed

any grave reactionary act or other flagrant misdeed. Punishment shall be meted out to those who seize the opportunity to engage in sabotage, theft or embezzlement, or abscond with public funds, assets or records, or refuse to give an accounting.

6. In order to ensure peace and security in both cities and rural areas and to maintain public order, all stragglers and disbanded soldiers are required to report and surrender to the People's Liberation Army or the People's Government in their localities. No action will be taken against those who voluntarily do so and hand over their arms. Those who refuse to report or who conceal their arms shall be arrested and investigated. Persons who shelter stragglers and disbanded soldiers and do not report them to the authorities shall be duly punished.

7. The feudal system of landownership in the rural areas is irrational and shall be abolished. However, it will be abolished step by step, after due preparation. Generally speaking, the reduction of rent and interest should come first and land distribution later; only after the People's Liberation Army has arrived at a place and worked there for a considerable time will it be possible to speak of solving the land problem in earnest. The peasant masses should organize themselves and help the People's Liberation Army to carry out the various initial reforms. They should also work hard at their farming so as to prevent the present level of agricultural production from falling and should then raise it step by step to improve their own livelihood and supply the people of the cities with commodity grain. Urban land and buildings will not be dealt with in the same way as the problem of rural land.

8. Protect the lives and property of foreign nationals. It is hoped that all foreign nationals will follow their usual pursuits and observe order. All foreign nationals must abide by the orders and decrees of the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government and must not engage in espionage, act against the cause of China's national independence and the people's liberation, or harbour Chinese war criminals, counter-revolutionaries or other law-breakers. Otherwise, they shall be dealt with according to law by the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government.

The People's Liberation Army is highly disciplined; it pays fairly for whatever it buys and is not allowed to take even a needle or a piece of thread from the people. It is hoped that the people throughout

the country will live and work in peace and will not give credence to rumours or raise false alarms. This proclamation is hereby issued in all sincerity and earnestness.

Mao Tse-tung


Chairman of the Chinese People's  
Revolutionary Military Commission

Chu Teh

Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese  
People's Liberation Army

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Pao chia* was the administrative system by which the Kuomintang reactionary clique enforced its fascist rule at the primary level. On August 1, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek promulgated the "Regulations for the Organization of *Pao* and *Chia* and for a Population Census in the Counties" covering the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei. The "Regulations" provided that "the *pao* and *chia* are to be organized on the basis of households; there is to be a head of each household, of each *chia*, which is made up of ten households, and of each *pao*, which is made up of ten *chia*". Neighbours were required to watch and report each other's activities to the authorities, and all were punishable when one was found guilty; various counter-revolutionary measures for exacting compulsory labour were also laid down. On November 7, 1934, the Kuomintang government officially announced that this system of fascist rule was to be established in all the provinces and municipalities under its rule.



毛澤東軍事文選

\*

外文出版社出版（北京）  
一九六三年四月第一版  
編号：（英）1050—268

