

Selected
Works
of
**MAO
TSE-
TUNG**

Volume
Three

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THE MAY 4 MOVEMENT

This is an article written for the press in Yen-an in celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the May 4 Movement.

The May 4 Movement twenty years ago indicated that China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism had reached a new stage. The May 4 Movement, which turned into a movement for cultural reform, was but one of the manifestations of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism. As a result of the growth and development of the new social forces in that period, there arose a camp which later became a powerful force in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism, *i.e.* the camp composed of China's working class, student masses and young national bourgeoisie. In the period of the May 4 Movement, it was the hundreds of thousands of students who stood heroically at the head of the movement. This showed that the May 4 Movement had advanced a step further than the Revolution of 1911.

China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, if traced back to the period when it was getting under way, has passed through quite a number of stages: the Opium War, the War of the T'ai-p'ing Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894,¹ the Reformist Movement of 1898, the Boxer Movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4 Movement, the Northern Expedition and the War of the Agrarian Revolution. The Anti-Japanese War today is another new stage in its development, the greatest, the most vigorous, the most dynamic stage. The bourgeois-democratic revolution can be considered to have achieved success only when the foreign imperialist forces and the domestic feudal forces have been in the main overthrown and an independent democratic state established. Beginning with the Opium War, each of the stages in the development of the revolution has its own characteristics. But what constitutes the most significant distinction between these stages is whether they come before or after the emergence of the Communist

Party. However, taken as a whole, all these stages bear the character of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. This democratic revolution aims at establishing a social system unprecedented in Chinese history, namely, a society of democracy; this society will have been preceded by a feudal society (which was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society for the last hundred years), and its successor will be a socialist society. If a Communist is asked why he strives first for a bourgeois-democratic social system and then for a socialist social system, he will say: This is to follow the inevitable course of history.

The accomplishment of the democratic revolution in China depends on certain social forces. These social forces are the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the progressive section of the bourgeoisie, or in other words, the revolutionary workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, with the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary forces and the working class as the leader in the revolution. Apart from these basic revolutionary forces, apart from the leadership of the working class, it is impossible to carry out the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution. Today the principal enemies of the revolution are the Japanese imperialists and their Chinese collaborators, the basic policy in the revolution is the formation of an Anti-Japanese National United Front, a united front composed of all the anti-Japanese workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen. The final victory in the Anti-Japanese War will be won as soon as the united front of workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen is greatly consolidated and developed.

In the movement of the Chinese democratic revolution, the intellectuals were the first section of people to be awakened. Both the Revolution of 1911 and the May 4 Movement clearly demonstrated this point, and at the time of the May 4 Movement the intellectuals were more numerous and more awakened than at the time of the Revolution of 1911. But if the intellectuals do not become one with the masses of workers and peasants, then they will accomplish nothing. The ultimate line of demarcation between the revolutionary intellectuals on the one hand and non-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary intellectuals on the other lies in whether they are willing to, and actually do,

become one with the masses of workers and peasants. The ultimate line of demarcation between them lies in this alone, and not in whether they talk about the Three People's Principles or Marxism. A true revolutionary must be one who is willing to, and actually does, become one with the masses of workers and peasants.

It is now twenty years since the May 4 Movement and nearly two years since the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War. The youth and cultural workers of the nation bear a heavy responsibility for the democratic revolution and the Anti-Japanese War. I hope they will realise the nature and the motive forces of the Chinese revolution and, linking up their work with the masses of workers and peasants, go into their midst and become propagandists and organisers among them. The day on which the people of the whole country rise with determination will be the day of victory in the Anti-Japanese War. Youth of the whole nation: exert yourselves!

May 1939.

THE ORIENTATION OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

This is a speech delivered at a meeting to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the May 4 Movement, held by the youth in Yen-an.

Today is the twentieth anniversary of the May 4 Movement, and all our youth in Yen-an are gathered here to hold this commemoration meeting; I shall take the occasion to talk about some problems concerning the orientation of the Chinese youth movement.

First, it is quite right to have designated the fourth of May as the Youth-Day of China.¹ Twenty years have already elapsed since the May 4 Movement, but it is an event of great significance that in this year we have at last designated it as the national Youth Day. For this indicates that China's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution of the people will soon reach a turning-point. For several decades the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution of the people failed time and again and this situation is about to take a turn—not towards another failure but in the direction of victory. The Chinese revolution is now advancing, and it is advancing towards victory. The failures of the revolutions in history cannot and must not be allowed to go on repeating themselves; the situation must be turned into one of victory. But has the turn already taken place? No. Such a turn has not yet taken place, we have not yet won victory. But victory can be won. In the present Anti-Japanese War we are precisely striving to reach the turning-point from failure to success. What the May 4 Movement opposed was a government of traitors, a government that conspired with imperialism and betrayed the interests of the nation, a government that oppressed the people. Was it wrong to have opposed such a government? If so, then the May 4 Movement was simply a mistake. But it is perfectly clear that such a government must be opposed and a government of traitors ought to be overthrown. And we should note that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, long before the May 4 Movement, was already a

rebel against the government of his time, the Manchu government which he opposed and was to overthrow. Was he right in doing that? I think he was quite right. Because what he opposed was not a government that resisted imperialism, but a government that conspired with it; not a revolutionary government, but a government that suppressed the revolution. As the May 4 Movement carried out precisely the task of opposing a government of traitors, it was a revolutionary movement. The youth throughout China should see the May 4 Movement in such a light. Today, when the people of the whole country have vigorously risen to resist Japan, everyone, taking warning from the past experiences of failures in revolutions, has made up his mind to defeat Japanese imperialism, and will not tolerate the traitors any more nor allow the revolution to fail again. Except for one section, all the youth of the country are awakened and are determined to achieve victory; to designate "May 4" as Youth Day precisely indicates this point. We are advancing on the road to victory and, provided that the people of the whole country make concerted efforts, the Chinese revolution will surely attain victory in the course of the Anti-Japanese War.

Secondly, what is the Chinese revolution directed against? What are the targets of the revolution? Everyone knows that imperialism is one and feudalism the other. What are the two targets of the revolution today? One is Japanese imperialism and the other the Chinese collaborators. To make a revolution we must overthrow Japanese imperialism, we must overthrow the collaborators. Who are to make the revolution? Who are the active participants in the revolution? None other than China's common people. The motive forces of the revolution are the proletariat, the peasantry and all the people of the other classes that are willing to oppose imperialism and feudalism; all these are the revolutionary forces against imperialism and feudalism. But among such a great number of people, who constitute the basic force and the backbone of the revolution? None other than the workers and peasants who make up 90 per cent of the country's population. What is the character of the Chinese revolution? What kind of revolution are we making at present? We are now making a democratic revolution of a

bourgeois character, and nothing that we do will go beyond the scope of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. At present we should not yet destroy the bourgeois system of private property in general, and what we want to destroy is imperialism and feudalism—this is called a democratic revolution of a bourgeois character. But the bourgeoisie is already powerless to accomplish this revolution, which can be accomplished only through the efforts of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people. What is the aim to be achieved by this revolution? The aim is to overthrow imperialism and feudalism and to establish a people's democratic republic. This people's democratic republic is a republic based on the revolutionary Three People's Principles. It is different from the semi-colonial and semi-feudal state of today, and will also be different from the socialist system of tomorrow. Under the socialist system of society, no capitalists are needed, while under this system of people's democracy capitalists will still be permitted to exist. Will China always need capitalists? No, definitely not in the future. This is true not only of China, but of the whole world as well. All countries whether Britain or the United States, France or Japan, Germany or Italy, will have no need of capitalists in the future, and China can be no exception. The Soviet Union is a country where socialism has been established, and beyond all doubt the whole world will follow it in the future. That China will certainly develop towards socialism in the future is a law nobody can defy. However, in the present stage we are not to carry out socialism, but to destroy imperialism and feudalism, to change the present semi-colonial and semi-feudal status of China, and to establish a system of people's democracy. The youth of the whole country should strive for this.

Thirdly, what are the lessons that we have learnt from the past experiences in the Chinese revolution? This is also an important problem which our youth must understand. China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism was, properly speaking, started by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and had already continued for more than fifty years, while foreign capitalist countries have been committing acts of aggression on China for almost one hundred years. During the past hundred years China's struggles—starting with the Opium War

against British aggression which was followed by the War of the T'ai-p'ing Heavenly Kingdom, the War of 1894,² the Reformist Movement of 1898, the Boxer Movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4 Movement, the Northern Expedition and the Red Army's War—though they took place under different circumstances, have all been waged to resist foreign enemies or to change the existing conditions. But it was only with Dr. Sun Yat-sen that a comparatively distinct bourgeois-democratic revolution began. During the last fifty years, the revolution that started with Dr. Sun has both scored successes and met with failures. Just consider, was not the Revolution of 1911 a success in getting rid of the emperor? And yet it was a failure in the sense that it merely got rid of the emperor, that China still remained under the oppression of imperialism and feudalism and that the revolutionary task of opposing imperialism and feudalism was left unaccomplished. What was the May 4 Movement for? It was also for opposing imperialism and feudalism, but it failed in this respect, too, with the result that China still remains under the rule of imperialism and feudalism. The same was true of the revolution of the Northern Expedition; it scored successes, but it too failed. Ever since the Kuomintang started its anti-Communist campaign,³ China has again come under the domination of imperialism and feudalism. Hence inevitably there ensued the ten years' war of the Red Army. But the ten years' struggle has accomplished the revolutionary task only in a part of China, and not in the country as a whole. In summing up the results of the revolution during the past several decades, we may say that we have won only temporary and partial victories but not permanent and nation-wide victories. It is just as Dr. Sun Yat-sen once said: "The revolution is not yet completed, all my comrades must strive on". Now it may be asked: The Chinese revolution has been carried on for several decades and why has it not attained its goal so far? Wherein lie the causes? I think there are two causes: first, the enemy forces have been too strong and, secondly, our own forces have been too weak. Because one was strong and the other weak, the revolution did not succeed. In saying that the enemy forces are too strong we mean that the forces of imperialism (which is the principal) and of feudalism are too strong. In

saying that our own forces are too weak we have in mind the weaknesses manifested by us in the military, political, economic and cultural spheres; the chief reason for our weaknesses and our failure to accomplish the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal task, however, is that the toiling masses of workers and peasants, constituting 90 per cent of the country's population, have not been mobilised. If we want to sum up the results of the revolution during the past several decades we can say that not all the people of the country have been fully mobilised, and that the reactionaries have always opposed and disrupted such mobilisation. Only by mobilising and organising the broad masses of the workers and peasants, who constitute 90 per cent of the country's population, is it possible to overthrow imperialism and feudalism. Dr. Sun Yat-sen said in his Testament:

“For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experiences during these forty years have firmly convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common fight with those nations of the world who treat us on the basis of equality.”

It's now more than ten years since the death of Dr. Sun and, when the ten odd years are added to the forty years he mentioned, the total is a good fifty years. What is the lesson of the revolution in the last fifty or more years? Fundamentally it is a lesson of “arousing the masses of the people”. You should study this carefully, and all the youth of our country should study it carefully. All our youth must know that only by mobilising the broad masses of workers and peasants, who constitute 90 per cent of the country's population, can we defeat imperialism and feudalism. Now we want to achieve the aim of defeating Japan and building up a new China; this is impossible without mobilising the broad masses of workers and peasants of the whole country.

Fourthly, let me now return to the youth movement. On this very day twenty years ago there occurred in China the great historical event known as the May 4 Movement, in which the students participated; it was a movement of great significance.

What role have the Chinese youth played since the May 4 Movement? They have in a way played the role of the vanguard, and this is recognised by all the people of the country except the die-hards. What is meant by the role of the vanguard? It is to take the lead, *i.e.* to stand at the head of the revolutionary ranks. Among the ranks of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people in China, there is a contingent composed of the country's young intellectuals and students. This contingent is of considerable size; not counting those who have died, it numbers several millions at present. This contingent of several millions is a front army in the fight against imperialism and feudalism, and an important front army too. But this front army is not enough; we cannot defeat the enemy by relying on it alone, because it is not yet the main force. Who then constitute the main force? None other than the broad masses of workers and peasants. The young intellectuals and students of China must go into the midst of the masses of workers and peasants, and mobilise and organise these broad masses who constitute 90 per cent of the country's population. Lacking this main force of the workers and peasants, and relying only on the contingent of the young intellectuals and students, we cannot achieve victory in the fight against imperialism and feudalism. Therefore, the young intellectuals and students of the whole country must be united with the broad masses of workers and peasants and become one with them, so that a powerful contingent can be formed. A contingent of hundreds of millions of people! Only with this huge contingent can the enemy's strong positions be smashed and his last fortress broken down. In examining the youth movement of the past from this viewpoint, we should call attention to an incorrect tendency: in the youth movement of several decades ago, a section of youth, unwilling to unite with the broad masses of workers and peasants, opposed their movement and constituted a countercurrent in the tide of the youth movement. They were indeed very unwise in not uniting with these broad masses who constitute 90 per cent of the country's population and, what is more, in flatly opposing them. Was such a tendency good? I think not, because in opposing the workers and peasants they were in fact opposing the revolution, and, as I say, constituted a countercurrent in the youth movement. Such a

youth movement cannot bring about good results. A few days ago I wrote a short article⁴ in which I made this remark:

“The ultimate line of demarcation between the revolutionary intellectuals on the one hand and non-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary intellectuals on the other lies in whether they are willing to, and actually do, become one with the masses of workers and peasants.”

There I proposed a criterion which I regard as the only criterion. What should be taken as the criterion in judging whether a youth is a revolutionary? How shall we make him out? There is only one criterion, namely, to see whether he is willing to, and in practice does, unite and become one with the broad masses of workers and peasants. One who is willing to, and in practice does, unite with the workers and peasants is a revolutionary; otherwise he is a non-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. If today one unites with the masses of workers and peasants, then one is a revolutionary today; if one ceases to do so tomorrow, or turns round to oppress the common people, one will become a non-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. Some young people profess a good deal by word of mouth their belief in the Three People's Principles or in Marxism; but this does not count at all. Did not Hitler also profess his “belief in socialism”? And twenty years ago even Mussolini was a “socialist”! What at bottom is their “socialism”? It is nothing but fascism! Didn't Ch'en Tu-hsiu also once “believe” in Marxism? What did he do afterwards? He went over to the counter-revolution. Didn't Chang Kuo-t'ao also “believe” in Marxism? Where has he gone now? He took to his heels and plunged straight into the mire. Some people call themselves “disciples of the Three People's Principles” and old stalwarts of the Three People's Principles—but what have they done? In fact their Principle of Nationalism means precisely conspiracy with imperialism; their Principle of Democracy means precisely oppression of the common people; and their Principle of People's Welfare means precisely sucking as much blood from the common people as possible. They are adherents who affirm the Three People's Principles by word of mouth but deny them in their hearts. Hence when we look at a person and judge whether

he is a false adherent to the Three People's Principles or a true one, whether he is a false Marxist or a true one, we need only to find out about his relationship with the broad masses of workers and peasants, and then everything will become perfectly clear. There is only this criterion and no other. I hope that the youth of the whole country will keep in mind that they should never fall into that dark countercurrent but march towards a bright future, clearly recognising that the workers and peasants are their own friends.

Fifthly, the present Anti-Japanese War marks a new stage of the Chinese revolution, a new stage that is the greatest, the most vigorous, the most dynamic. In this stage the youth shoulder tremendous responsibilities. The revolutionary movement in our country during the last several decades has gone through many stages of struggle, but no struggle was so wide in scope as the present Anti-Japanese War. When we say that the present revolution in China has a characteristic which distinguishes it from that of the past, namely, that it will turn from failure to victory, we mean that the broad masses of the people in China have made progress, of which the progress of the youth is a clear proof. Hence this Anti-Japanese War should be victorious and cannot but be victorious. As everybody knows, the basic policy in the Anti-Japanese War is the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, which aims at overthrowing Japanese imperialism and the collaborators, transforming old China into new China, and liberating the whole nation from its semi-colonial and semi-feudal status. The disunity in the present Chinese youth movement is a serious defect. You should continue to demand unity, because only unity is strength. You must enable the youth of the whole country to understand the present situation and achieve unity and resist Japan to the end.

Sixthly and lastly, I want to speak about the youth movement in Yen-an. The youth movement in Yen-an is the model for the youth movement throughout the country. The orientation of the youth movement in Yen-an is precisely the orientation for the youth movement throughout the country. Why? Because the line of advance of the youth movement in Yen-an is correct. Just consider: the youth of Yen-an have not only striven for but also achieved unity. The youth in Yen-an have

achieved solidarity and unity among themselves. The youth in Yen-an, the young intellectuals, students, workers and peasants are all united. Hosts of revolutionary youth have come to Yen-an to study from all over the country and from among the overseas Chinese far away. Most of you who attend the meeting today hail from thousands or tens of thousands of *li* away; and irrespective of whether your surname is Chang or Li, whether you are a man or a woman, a worker or a peasant, all of you are of one mind. Shouldn't this be regarded as the model for the whole country? The youth in Yen-an are not only united among themselves, but are also united with the masses of workers and peasants; this in particular serves as a model for the whole country. What have the youth in Yen-an been doing? They have been learning the theory of revolution, studying the principles and methods of resisting Japan and of saving the nation. They have been carrying out the campaign for production and have reclaimed thousands and tens of thousands of *mou* of waste land. Such things as reclaiming waste land and cultivating the soil were not done even by Confucius. When Confucius ran his school, he had quite a number of students, "seventy worthies and three thousand disciples"—how magnificent! But his students were much fewer than the students in Yen-an and, what is more, they did not care to have any campaign for production. When his students asked him how to plough the fields, Confucius answered, "I don't know, I am not so good at that as the peasants." When they further asked him how to grow vegetables, he again answered, "I don't know, I am not so good at that as the vegetable gardeners." In the ancient times of China, the youth who studied with the sage neither learnt revolutionary theory nor took part in labour. At the present day, in the schools over vast regions of the country, little revolutionary theory is taught and a campaign for production is unheard of. Only our youth in Yen-an and in the anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy's rear are fundamentally different; they are really the vanguards for resisting Japan and saving the nation, because their political orientation is correct and their methods of work are correct. Hence I say the youth movement in Yen-an is the model for the youth movement throughout the country.

Today's general meeting is highly significant. I have said all that I wanted to say. I hope all of you will study the lessons of the Chinese revolution over the last fifty years, develop the good points and eliminate the mistakes, so as to unite the youth of the whole country with the entire people and turn the revolution from failure to success. The day when the youth and the people of the whole country are all mobilised, organised and united will be the day when Japanese imperialism is overthrown. Every one of our youth must shoulder this responsibility. Every one of our youth must be different from what he was in the past and must make a great resolve to unite the youth of the whole country and organise the people of the whole country to overthrow Japanese imperialism and reconstruct the old China into a new China. This is what I expect of all of you.

May 4, 1939.

OPPOSE CAPITULATIONIST ACTIVITIES

For a China confronted with the Japanese aggressors, the big question overshadowing all others has always been whether to fight or not to fight. This question aroused serious controversy during the period from the Incident of September 18, 1931 to the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7, 1937. "To fight means to survive, and not to fight means to perish"—this was the conclusion of all patriotic parties and groups and all our patriotic countrymen; "To fight means to perish, and not to fight means to survive"—this was the conclusion of all capitulators. The cannon roar of the War of Resistance at Lukouchiao temporarily settled the controversy. It proclaimed that the first conclusion was correct and the second wrong. But why did the cannon roar at Lukouchiao only temporarily and not finally settle the question? Because Japanese imperialism, adopted a policy calculated to induce capitulation, the international capitulators¹ tried to bring about a compromise, and a section of people in China's anti-Japanese front vacillated. Now the question has been brought up again by certain people and re-phrased as a "problem of continuing the fight or seeking peace". Thus inside China a controversy rages between the group for continuing the fight and the group for seeking peace. But the point at issue between them remains as of old; "To fight means to survive, and to seek peace means to perish"—this is the conclusion of the group for continuing the fight; "To seek peace means to survive, and to continue the fight means to perish"—this is the conclusion of the group for seeking peace. The group for continuing the fight, however, forms the majority of the nation, including all patriotic parties and groups and all our patriotic countrymen, while the group for seeking peace, namely, the capitulators, is composed only of a vacillating minority within the anti-Japanese front. Consequently, the so-called group for seeking peace cannot but resort to deceitful propaganda, first and foremost anti-Communist propaganda. They have

thus fabricated and sent forth in an avalanche false news, false reports, and forged documents and resolutions, such as: "the Communist Party engages in disruptive activities", "the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are moving about without fighting and refuse to obey orders", "an independent régime has been formed in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and expanded beyond its boundaries", "the Communist Party is plotting to overthrow the government", and even, "the Soviet Union is plotting to invade China"—all with a view to covering up the facts and to moulding public opinion for the purpose of making peace, for the purpose of capitulation. The group for seeking peace or the capitulators do this because they oppose the Communist Party, which is the initiator and firm upholder of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; they can never disrupt the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, break up the Anti-Japanese National United Front and capitulate to the enemy. Next, they pin their hopes on concessions to be made by Japanese imperialism. They think that Japan is exhausted, that she will change her basic policy and voluntarily withdraw from Central, South and even North China, and that China can win victory without further fighting. Furthermore, they pin their hopes on international pressure. Many in the so-called group for seeking peace are hoping not only that the big powers will bring pressure on Japan, forcing her to make concessions in order to negotiate a peace, but also that the big powers will bring pressure on the Chinese government so that they could say to the group for continuing the fight: "Look! The international atmosphere being such, we cannot but make peace!" "A Pacific international conference,"² they said, "would be to China's advantage; it would not be another Munich, but a step towards China's revival!" These form the sum total of the viewpoints, tactics and schemes³ of the group for seeking peace or the capitulators in China. Such things are now being done not only by Wang Ching-wei himself but, what is even more serious, by a great number of Chang Ching-weis and Li Ching-weis who, hidden in the anti-Japanese front, collaborate from the inside with Wang Ching-wei who is on the outside, some playing *shuanghuang*,⁴ some painting their faces red and some white.⁵

We Communists openly declare: We stand at all times on the side of the group for continuing the fight and resolutely oppose the group for seeking peace. Like other patriotic parties and groups and patriotic countrymen throughout the country, all we want is to strengthen solidarity, to strengthen the Anti-Japanese National United Front, to strengthen the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, to carry out the Three People's Principles, to resist Japan to the very last, and to fight all the way to the Yalu river and recover all lost territories.⁶ We resolutely condemn the plots of the Wang Ching-wei both in the open and under cover for creating an anti-Communist atmosphere, creating friction between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party,⁷ and even attempting to stir up once more a civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. To these people we say: All your plots for a split are in essence nothing but a preparatory step for actual capitulation, while your policies of capitulation and split indicate nothing but your plan to betray the interests of the nation and seek the private interests of a few individuals; as every one of the people has got eyes, your intrigues will be exposed by the people. We resolutely condemn the absurd statement that the Pacific conference would not be a Far Eastern Munich. The so-called Pacific conference is exactly a Far Eastern Munich, a preparatory step for turning China into another Czechoslovakia. We resolutely condemn the empty talk that Japanese imperialism may come to its senses and make concessions. Japanese imperialism will never change its basic policy of subjugating China. Japan's honeyed words after the fall of Wuhan that she had abandoned the so-called policy of "rejecting the National Government as one of the parties in negotiation",⁸ and would instead recognise the National Government as such a party, or that she would name the conditions for the withdrawal of her forces from South and Central China, represent nothing but a sinister policy of baiting the fish so as to hook it and broil it, and whoever swallows the bait must be prepared to be broiled. It is also a sinister policy on the part of the international capitulators to induce China to capitulate. They have countenanced Japan's aggression on China, while they themselves "sit on top of a mountain to watch the tigers fight", waiting for the opportune moment to engineer

the so-called Pacific conference for mediation so that they can profit like the fisherman.⁹ Anyone who pins his hope on these conspirators is also bound to fall grievously into a trap.

The question whether to fight or not to fight has now become one of whether to continue the fight or to seek peace, but it remains the same in nature; it remains the most important of all questions, the most fundamental question. In the last six months, owing to Japan's intensified prosecution of her policy of luring China to capitulate and the intensified activities of the international capitulators, and chiefly to the growing vacillation of a section of people in China's anti-Japanese front, a lot of dust and noise has been raised about the so-called question of whether to seek peace or to continue the fight and the possibility of capitulation has become the main danger in the present political situation, whereas the anti-Communist campaign, *i.e.* the campaign to break up the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, to break up the solidarity in resisting Japan, has become the first and most important move of the capitulators in their preparation for capitulation. Under such circumstances, all patriotic parties and groups and all patriotic countrymen must keep their eyes peeled to watch the activities of these capitulators, must realise the chief characteristic of the present situation, namely, that capitulation is the main danger and the anti-Communist campaign is the preparation for it, and must do their utmost to oppose capitulation and splits. We will never allow a section of people to undermine or betray the war against Japanese imperialism, which has been carried on for two years by the whole nation at the cost of flesh and blood. We will never allow a section of people to disrupt or break up the Anti-Japanese National United Front, which has been forged through the common effort of the whole nation.

Persist in fighting the war, persist in solidarity—China will certainly survive.

Persist in seeking peace, persist in splitting—China will certainly perish.

Which to reject and which to accept? Our countrymen must quickly make their choice.

We Communists will definitely persist in fighting the war, persist in solidarity.

All patriotic parties and groups and all our patriotic countrymen will also definitely persist in fighting the war, persist in solidarity.

Even if the capitulators, with their plot for capitulation and a split, should get the upper hand for a while, in the end they will be exposed and punished by the people. The historical task of the Chinese nation is to achieve liberation through solidarity and the War of Resistance, but the capitulators have chosen to go in the opposite direction; hence no matter how much they get the upper hand, how jubilant they are, fancying that "nobody can harm them", they are destined to be punished at last by the whole people.

Oppose capitulation and a split—this is at the present moment the most urgent task for all the patriotic parties and groups and all our patriotic countrymen.

People of the whole country, unite to persist in resistance and solidarity, and to suppress the conspiracy for capitulation and a split!

June 30, 1939.

THE REACTIONARIES MUST BE PUNISHED

This is a speech delivered at the Memorial Meeting held by the people of Yen-an for the martyrs in the Pingkiang Massacre.

Today, August 1, we are gathered here for a memorial meeting. Why should the memorial meeting be held? Because the reactionaries have killed revolutionary comrades, killed anti-Japanese fighters. Who should be killed these days? The collaborators, the Japanese imperialists should be killed. But China has fought the Japanese imperialists for two years and the issue is not yet decided. The collaborators are still rampant, and very few of them have been killed. Revolutionary comrades and anti-Japanese fighters, however, have been killed. Who killed them? The troops killed them. Why did the troops kill anti-Japanese fighters? The troops simply carried out orders, and certain people directed the troops to kill. Who directed the troops to kill? The reactionaries¹ directed them. Comrades! As a matter of logic, who should want to kill anti-Japanese fighters? First, the Japanese imperialists want to kill them; next, the collaborators and traitors, such as Wang Ching-wei, want to kill them. But the scene of the killing was not in Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin or Nanking, or anywhere else under the occupation of the Japanese invaders and Chinese collaborators, but in Pingkiang, in the rear of the Anti-Japanese War, and those who were killed were responsible comrades in the New Fourth Army's Liaison Office at Pingkiang—Comrades T'u Cheng-k'un, Lo Tzu-ming and the others. It is obvious that a gang of reactionaries in China received orders from Japanese imperialism and Wang Ching-wei and did the killing. Preparing to capitulate, these reactionaries have obsequiously carried out the orders of the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei to kill first the most resolute anti-Japanese fighters. That is no trivial matter; we must object, we must protest!

The whole country is now fighting Japan; the people in the whole country have formed a great union for resistance to

Japan. But within this great union, certain people are reactionaries and capitulators. What are they doing? Just killing anti-Japanese people to arrest progress and conspiring with the Japanese invaders and Chinese collaborators to prepare for capitulation.

Serious as this matter of killing the anti-Japanese comrades is, who has come forward to do anything about it? Since 3 p.m. on June 12, when the killing was done, up to the present day, August 1, have we seen anybody do anything about it? No. Who should do something about it? The law of the country should, the judges should. If such a thing had happened in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region our high court would have long ago done something about it. But now, although it is nearly two months since the Pingkiang Massacre, neither the law nor the judges have done anything about it. What is the reason? The reason is that China is not unified.²

China should be unified; without unification there can be no victory. But what does unification mean? It means that all should resist Japan, that all should unite, that all should strive for progress, and that there should be due rewards and punishments. Whom should we reward? We should reward those who resist Japan, those who stand for solidarity, and those who are progressive. And whom should we punish? We should punish the collaborators, the reactionaries, who undermine resistance, solidarity and progress. Is the country now unified? No. The Pingkiang Massacre is a proof of this. The event shows that what ought to be unified has not been unified. We have long demanded the unification of the whole country. First, unification through the War of Resistance. But at present not only are anti-Japanese comrades like T'u Cheng-k'un and Lo Tzu-ming unrewarded, but on the contrary they are massacred, whereas the rascals who oppose the War of Resistance, prepare to capitulate and commit murders go without punishment. That is not unification. We must oppose these rascals, oppose these capitulators and arrest these murderers. Secondly, unification through solidarity. Those who stand for solidarity ought to be rewarded and those who undermine solidarity ought to be punished. But now, Comrades T'u Cheng-k'un, Lo Tzu-ming and the others, who stood for solidarity, have been punished,

massacred, while the villains who undermine solidarity have not been punished at all. That is not unification. Thirdly, unification through progress. We want the whole country to make progress, we want the backward people to keep pace with the progressive people, and we must never make the progressive people keep pace with the backward people. The murderers in the Pingkiang Massacre butchered progressive people. Since the War of Resistance Communists and patriots have been assassinated by tens and even hundreds, and the Pingkiang Massacre is merely one of the latest instances. If this sort of thing continues, it is all up with China and the anti-Japanese people will all be killed. What does the killing of the anti-Japanese people mean? It means that, carrying out the orders of Japanese imperialism and Wang Ching-wei, and preparing to capitulate, the Chinese reactionaries first of all kill anti-Japanese soldiers, Communists and patriots. If such a thing is not checked China will certainly perish at the hands of these reactionaries. This event, therefore, concerns the whole country and is an extremely serious matter, and we must urge the National Government to punish these reactionaries severely.

Comrades must also understand that Japanese imperialism has recently intensified its disruptive activities more than ever, that international imperialism is more active in helping Japan,³ and that collaborators within China, both the Wang Ching-weis in the open and the Wang Ching-weis under cover, are more active in undermining the War of Resistance, in undermining solidarity and in bringing about retrogression. They want to make the greater part of China capitulate, to cause an internal split and to bring about a civil war. At present certain secret measures are being enforced everywhere in the country—the so-called “Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties”,⁴ which, reactionary through and through, are helpful only to Japanese imperialism and detrimental to the War of Resistance, to solidarity and to progress. What is an “alien party”? The Japanese imperialists constitute an alien party, the Wang Ching-weis constitute an alien party, and the collaborators constitute an alien party. The Communist Party and all other anti-Japanese parties and groups are united in resisting Japan. Are they “alien parties”? But in fact it is just the capitulators,

reactionaries and die-hards who are fomenting friction, creating a split within the anti-Japanese ranks—are such actions right or wrong? Utterly wrong! “To restrict!” Who at present should be restricted? The Japanese imperialists should be restricted, the Wang Ching-weis should be restricted, the reactionaries should be restricted, the capitulators should be restricted. Why should the Communist Party, which is the most resolutely anti-Japanese, the most revolutionary and the most progressive, be restricted? That is utterly wrong. We people in Yen-an raise our resolute objection, our resolute protest. We must oppose the so-called “Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties”, for such measures are at the very root of all the criminal actions that disrupt solidarity. Today we hold this general meeting precisely for the sake of keeping up the War of Resistance, upholding solidarity and continuing progress. For the sake of all this, the “Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties” must be abolished, the capitulators and reactionaries must be punished, and all revolutionary comrades, anti-Japanese comrades and anti-Japanese people must be protected.

August 1, 1939.

AN INTERVIEW WITH THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE *NEW CHINA DAILY* ON THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

THE CORRESPONDENT: What is the significance of the non-aggression pact concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany?¹

MAO TSE-TUNG: The Soviet-German non-aggression pact is the result of the growth of socialist strength in the Soviet Union and the Soviet government's persistence in a policy of peace. The pact has shattered the schemes for instigating a Soviet-German war on the part of the international reactionary bourgeoisie represented by Chamberlain, Daladier and others, smashed the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, consolidated peace between the Soviet Union and Germany, and ensured the furtherance of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. In the Far East it is a blow to Japan and a help for China; it strengthens the position of China's forces of resistance and deals a blow to China's capitulators. All this lays a foundation for helping the people throughout the world to win freedom and liberation. Such is the full political significance of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

QUESTION: Some people do not yet realise that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact is the result of the breakdown of the British-French-Soviet talks, but think on the contrary that the breakdown of the British-French-Soviet talks was the result of the Soviet-German pact. Will you please explain why the British-French-Soviet talks failed?

ANSWER: The British-French-Soviet talks failed simply because the British and French governments were insincere. In recent years the international reactionary bourgeoisie, primarily the Anglo-French reactionary bourgeoisie, has consistently pursued a reactionary policy with regard to the aggression of

fascist Germany, Italy and Japan, namely, the policy of "non-intervention". They do so in order to condone wars of aggression and to profit from them. Thus Britain and France have all along flatly rejected Soviet proposals for organising a genuine anti-aggression front, and have on the contrary taken a stand of non-intervention and condoned the aggression of Germany, Italy and Japan by watching on the side-line. Their aim was to step in to intervene only when the warring parties had worn each other out. In carrying out this reactionary policy they sacrificed half of China to Japan and the whole of Abyssinia, of Spain, of Austria and of Czechoslovakia to Germany and Italy.² On this occasion they even wanted to sacrifice the Soviet Union. Such a plot was clearly revealed during the recent British-French-Soviet talks. The talks lasted for more than four months from April 15 to August 23, during which the Soviet Union exercised the utmost patience. Britain and France, however, refused altogether to agree to the principle of equality and reciprocity; they merely demanded that the Soviet Union guarantee their security but, in order to leave a gap for the German army to march through, refused to guarantee her security or that of the small Baltic states; and furthermore they would not allow the Soviet army to pass through Poland to combat the aggressors. That is why the talks broke down. Meanwhile, as Germany agreed to stop her anti-Soviet activities and renounce the so-called "anti-Comintern pact",³ and recognised the inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet Union, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded. The "non-intervention policy" of the international reactionary bloc, primarily the Anglo-French reactionary bloc, is a policy of "sitting on top of a mountain to watch the tigers fight", a downright imperialist policy of profiting oneself by doing harm to others. This policy was initiated when Chamberlain took office, reached its height in the Munich agreement of September last year, and was finally exploded during the recent British-French-Soviet talks. After that the situation necessarily developed into a direct conflict between the two big imperialist blocs, with Britain and France on the one side and Germany and Italy on the other. As I said in October 1938 at the Central Committee's plenary session (the sixth since the Party's Sixth National

Congress), " 'Lifting a rock only to have his own toes squashed' —this will be the inevitable result of Chamberlain's policy." Chamberlain started with the aim of doing harm to others, and ended by injuring himself. This is the law of the development of all reactionary policies.

QUESTION: As you see it, how will the present situation develop?

ANSWER: The present international situation has already entered a new phase. The second imperialist war that has already started is one-sided in the sense that, with the "non-intervention policy", one party is carrying on aggression while another is sitting tight and watching; this situation of one-sidedness will inevitably be replaced by that of a total war so far as Europe is concerned. The second imperialist war has reached a new stage.

In Europe, a large-scale imperialist war to contest for the rule over the colonial peoples is impending between the German-Italian and the British-French imperialist blocs. In such a war, each of the warring parties will shamelessly declare itself just and call its opponent unjust in order to delude the people and win the support of public opinion. Actually this is a fraud. The aims of both sides are imperialist: both sides are fighting for the rule over the colonies and semi-colonies and for spheres of influence; both are waging a predatory war. At present this means a fight over Poland, the Balkan Peninsula and the Mediterranean coasts. Such a war is by no means just. Non-predatory wars of liberation are the only just wars in the world. Communists will never support any predatory war. They will, however, step forward bravely to support all just, non-predatory wars of liberation and will stand in the forefront of any such struggle. Intimidated and bribed by Chamberlain and Daladier, the Social Democratic Parties affiliated with the Second International are splitting up; one section, the reactionaries in the upper stratum, is following the same old disastrous road as in the First World War and preparing to support the new imperialist war. But another section will form with the Communist Party an anti-war and anti-fascist popular front. At present Chamberlain and Daladier, after the example of the Germans and the Italians, are becoming more and more reactionary, and are

taking advantage of the war mobilisation to introduce in their respective countries a fascist state structure and an economic organisation of war. In short, the two big imperialist blocs are feverishly preparing for war and the danger of a large-scale carnage is confronting millions upon millions of people. This situation will undoubtedly arouse a movement of opposition among the broad masses. In Germany or Italy, Britain or France, or anywhere in Europe or the rest of the world, if the people are unwilling to become cannon-fodder of imperialism, they will certainly rise and seek every means to oppose the imperialist war.

In the capitalist world, besides the two big blocs mentioned above, there is yet a third bloc, the bloc which is headed by the United States and includes many of the Central and South American countries. This bloc, in its own interests, will not for the time being enter the war. At present U.S. imperialism wishes to refrain, in the name of neutrality, from joining either warring party so that in the future it may emerge from behind the scenes to contend for the leading position in the capitalist world. The American bourgeoisie is not yet prepared to uproot democracy and peace-time economic life at home, and this is beneficial to the world peace movement.

Japanese imperialism, badly hit by the Soviet-German pact, faces a future beset with even greater difficulties. Two factions are fighting over its foreign policy. The militarists are contemplating an alliance with Germany and Italy to fulfil their purposes of exclusive occupation of China, invasion of South-east Asia and expulsion of Britain, the United States and France from the Far East; whereas a section of the bourgeoisie recommends concessions to Britain, the United States and France so as to concentrate on the plunder of China. At present there is a strong tendency towards a compromise with Britain. The British reactionaries, by offering to partition China with Japan as well as to give her financial and economic help, will induce Japan to serve as the watchdog of British interests in the Far East, to suppress China's movement for national liberation and to contain the Soviet Union. In any case, therefore, Japan's basic aim of conquering China will never change. The possibility of Japan's launching a large-scale frontal military

offensive on China may have somewhat diminished, yet she will proceed, more drastically than ever, with her political offensive to "control the Chinese by the Chinese"⁴ and with her economic aggression to "sustain the war by war",⁵ while keeping up her frantic "mopping-up" campaigns⁶ in the occupied areas and furthermore trying to make China surrender through British pressure. At a favourable moment Japan will propose a Far Eastern Munich and, with some major concessions as bait, entice as well as force China to accept peace terms under duress, thereby attaining her aim of conquering China. Until the Japanese people rise in a revolutionary upsurge, Japan's imperialist aim will remain unchanged, whatever cabinet change is made by the Japanese ruling class.

Outside the whole capitalist realm there is a bright world, the socialist Soviet Union. The Soviet-German pact has increased the possibility of the Soviet Union giving assistance to the world peace movement as well as to China's resistance to Japan.

Such is my appraisal of the international situation.

QUESTION: Under these circumstances, what are China's prospects?

ANSWER: There are two prospects for China: One is to persist in resistance, in solidarity and in progress, and that is the prospect of national revival. The other is to bring about compromise, splits and retrogression, and that is the prospect of national extinction.

In the new international situation, provided Japan becomes even more desperate and China persists in her firm refusal to compromise, the stage of our strategic retreat will end for good and the stage of strategic stalemate will begin. This stage of strategic stalemate is a stage of preparing for the counter-offensive.

However, a stalemate along the front lines produces an effect the reverse of stalemate in the enemy's rear: as a stalemate is reached along the front lines, the struggle in the enemy's rear will be intensified. Thus the large-scale "mopping-up" campaigns carried on by the enemy in the occupied areas (chiefly in North China) since the fall of Wuhan will from now on not only continue but also become intensified. Furthermore, as the

enemy's principal policy for the present consists in the political offensive to "control the Chinese by the Chinese" and economic aggression to "sustain the war by war", and as Britain's policy in the Far East is for a Far Eastern Munich, the danger of the capitulation of the greater part of China as well as of an internal split will be immensely increased. The strength of our country is still very small as measured against the enemy's, and no strength for the counter-offensive can be built up unless the whole nation achieves complete solidarity and exerts its utmost in the bitter struggle.

To persist in the War of Resistance remains therefore a very serious task for our country, and we must not on any account become negligent.

Hence, without the slightest doubt, China must not miss the present opportunity or make a wrong decision but should take a firm political stand.

In other words, first, persistently adhere to the stand of resistance and oppose any movement towards compromise. Resolute blows should be dealt to all the Wang Ching-weis, whether in the open or under cover. All forms of enticement, whether Japanese or British, should be resolutely turned down; China must never take part in a Far Eastern Munich.

Secondly, persistently adhere to the stand of solidarity and oppose any movement for a split. Any such movement, whether started by Japanese imperialism, or by other foreign quarters, or by the capitulators at home, should be strictly guarded against. Any internal friction injurious to the War of Resistance should be sternly checked.

Thirdly, persistently adhere to the stand of progress and oppose any movement towards retrogression. All ideas, systems and measures that obstruct the War of Resistance, whether in the military, political, financial or economic sphere, in the sphere of party affairs, in the cultural and educational sphere, or in the sphere of the mass movement, need to be reconsidered and effectively changed in order to facilitate the War of Resistance.

If we really carry out these things, China will be quite able to build up the strength for the counter-offensive.

From now on the whole nation must make "the preparation

for a counter-offensive" the all-embracing task in carrying on the War of Resistance.

At present we must, on the one hand, seriously keep up our defence along the front lines and vigorously support the war in the enemy's rear and, on the other, carry out political, military and other reforms and build up enormous strength so that, when the moment comes, we shall be able to throw all our strength into a large-scale counter-offensive to recover our lost territories.

September 1, 1939.

INTERVIEW WITH THREE
CORRESPONDENTS—FROM THE
*CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, THE SAO
TANG PAO AND THE HSIN MIN PAO*¹

THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE CORRESPONDENTS: We wish to ask for your views on a few questions. We saw in today's *New China News* your statement of September 1, which touches upon some of the questions, but we wish you would explain a few others more fully. The questions are divided into three groups as written, and we should like you to answer them in order.

MAO TSE-TUNG: I shall take them up according to your list.

You have raised the question whether the stage of stalemate in the War of Resistance has arrived. In my opinion, so far as certain conditions are concerned, the stage of stalemate has arrived. That is to say, it may be said to have arrived in view of the new international situation, in view of Japan's increasing desperation and China's persistence in her firm refusal to compromise. I do not deny that the enemy may launch new offensive campaigns on a large scale, for instance, he may attack Pakhoi, Changsha or even Sian. In saying that certain conditions have basically brought the enemy's large-scale strategic offensive and our strategic retreat to an end, I do not mean that there is no longer any possibility for the enemy to launch offensives and for us to make a retreat. The specific content of the new stage is to make preparations for the counter-offensive—everything else falls within this concept. That is to say, in the stage of stalemate China should build up all the strength required for the future counter-offensive. To prepare for the counter-offensive does not mean to launch it immediately, because a counter-offensive can never be launched without adequate conditions. Moreover, we are talking about the counter-offensive on a strategic plane and not the counter-offensive campaigns. Such counter-offensive campaigns, like our repelling the enemy during his "mopping-up" campaign in

eastern and southern Shansi, will be not only possible but also absolutely necessary. But the time for an all-out strategic counter-offensive has not yet arrived, and now is the time for actively preparing for such an all-out counter-offensive. In this period we shall have to repulse a certain number of offensive campaigns which the enemy may launch on the front line.

If we are to itemise the tasks of the new stage, then in the enemy's rear we must persist in guerrilla warfare, smash his "mopping-up" campaigns and wreck his economic aggression; on the front line we must strengthen our defences and repulse the offensive campaigns the enemy may launch; and in the great rear areas the main thing is to carry out positive political reforms. All of these form the specific features of our preparation for the counter-offensive.

Internal political reform is important because at present the enemy is mainly carrying on a political offensive, and so in particular we have to strengthen our political resistance. That is to say, only through promptly solving the problem of democratic government can we increase our power of political resistance and build up our military strength. In the War of Resistance China relies mainly on her own efforts for regeneration. Regeneration through our own efforts, which we have advocated in the past, has become even more important under the new international circumstances. The essential content of this regeneration lies in the establishment of democratic government.

QUESTION: You have just said that democratic government is essential to regeneration through our own efforts in order to achieve victory in the War of Resistance. Under present circumstances, what then is the method of bringing about such a system?

ANSWER: The three stages of military rule, political tutelage and constitutional government were originally envisaged by Dr. Sun Yat-sen.² But in his *Statement on My Departure for the North*,³ issued shortly before his death, Dr. Sun no longer spoke of the three stages, but said instead that a national assembly must be immediately convoked in China. This shows that long ago Dr. Sun himself had modified his doctrine according to the circumstances. Now, with the situation in the War of Resistance

so grave, it is imperative, in order to avert the calamity of national subjugation and to drive out the enemy, to convoke speedily a national assembly and bring about a democratic government. There are various arguments on this issue. Some say that as the common people are ignorant, a democratic government cannot be brought about. This is wrong. In the War of Resistance the common people have made speedy progress and, given leadership and a correct policy, they can surely bring about a democratic government. In North China, for example, a democratic government has already been brought about. There most of the heads of districts, townships, *pao's* and *chia's*⁴ are chosen by popular vote. Even some of the county magistrates are chosen by popular vote; many progressive people and promising young men have been elected magistrates. Such problems ought to be brought up for public discussion.

In the second group on your list there is the question of "restricting the alien parties", or in other words, the question of friction in various places. It is good of you to show concern about this matter. Although the situation has mended somewhat recently, there is still no fundamental change.

QUESTION: Has the Communist Party indicated its stand on this problem to the Central government?

ANSWER: We have lodged our protests.

QUESTION: In what way were they lodged?

ANSWER: As early as July a letter was written to Generalissimo Chiang by the representative of our Party, Comrade Chou En-lai. Again, on August 1, all sections of the people in Yenan jointly sent a telegram to Generalissimo Chiang and the National Government demanding the abrogation of the so-called "Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties", which have been passed around secretly and have been the cause of friction in various places.

QUESTION: Has there been any reply from the Central government?

ANSWER: No. But it is said that a good many people within the Kuomintang also disapprove of such "measures". As you know, an army participating in the common fight against the Japanese is called a friendly army, not an "alien army"; therefore, a party or group participating in the common fight against

Japan is also a friendly party and not an "alien party". There are many parties and groups taking part in the War of Resistance; though the parties and groups vary in strength, they are all taking part in the War of Resistance and must unite with one another completely rather than "restrict" one another. What is an alien party? The collaborators' party of Wang Ching-wei, Japan's jackal, is an alien party, because politically it has nothing in common with the anti-Japanese parties and groups; and such a party ought to be restricted. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party do have a common political ground—resistance to Japan. At present, therefore, the question is how to concentrate all strength on opposing and guarding against Japan, on opposing and guarding against Wang, not how to concentrate all strength on opposing and guarding against the Communists. The correct slogans can only be proposed on this basis. Now Wang Ching-wei has three slogans: "Oppose Chiang Kai-shek", "Oppose the Communists", and "Befriend Japan". Wang Ching-wei is the common enemy of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party as well as of the people of the whole country. The Communist Party, however, is not the enemy of the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang is not the enemy of the Communist Party, so they should not oppose or "restrict" each other, but unite with each other and help each other. The slogans of our people must be different from Wang Ching-wei's; they must be opposed to his slogans and must never be confounded with them. As he calls for opposing Chiang, our people must support Chiang; as he calls for opposing the Communists, our people must unite with the Communists; and as he calls for friendship with Japan, our people must resist Japan. We support everything the enemy opposes, and oppose everything the enemy supports. A remark which frequently occurs in the current writings of many people is: "Don't grieve your friends and gladden your enemies". This remark comes from a letter addressed to P'eng Ch'ung, prefect of Yuyang, by Chu Fou, a general under Liu Hsiu⁵ of the Eastern Han dynasty; in the letter we read: "In doing anything, you must see to it that you don't grieve your friends and gladden your enemies". Chu Fou's remark lays down an unequivocal political principle and we must by no means forget it.

In your list of questions you also ask about the Communist Party's attitude on so-called friction. I can tell you frankly that we are fundamentally opposed to the friction between the anti-Japanese parties and groups which cancels out each other's strength. But if any side persists in using violence, if it becomes overbearing and if it resorts to repression, then the Communist Party will have to cope seriously with all this. Our attitude is: "We will never attack unless attacked; if attacked, we will certainly counter-attack". But we adopt an unequivocal stand of self-defence; no Communist is allowed to go beyond the principle of self-defence.

QUESTION: How about the friction in North China?

ANSWER: Chang Yin-wu and Ch'in Ch'i-yung are the two friction-mongers there. Chang Yin-wu is in Hopeh and Ch'i-yung in Shantung; they simply defy all laws, human or divine, and their behaviour can hardly be distinguished from that of the collaborators. They seldom fight the enemy but frequently fight the Eighth Route Army. We have an abundance of indisputable proofs of this, and some of them, such as Chang Yin-wu's orders directing his subordinates to attack the Eighth Route Army, have already been sent to Generalissimo Chiang.

QUESTION: Is there any friction with the New Fourth Army?

ANSWER: There is. The Pingkiang Massacre is a serious incident that shocked the whole nation.

QUESTION: Some people say that the united front is important, but for the sake of unification the Border Region government should be abolished. What do you think of this?

ANSWER: Rubbish of all sorts is being talked everywhere, the so-called abolition of the border region being one example. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region is a democratic anti-Japanese base area and politically it is the most progressive section in the whole country; on what grounds should it be abolished? Moreover, the border region has long been recognised by Generalissimo Chiang and, as far back as in the winter of the twenty-sixth year of the Republic,⁶ official recognition was voted by the Executive Yuan of the National Government. China certainly needs unification, but it must be unified in the War of Resistance, in solidarity, and in progress. If we seek for unification in the opposite direction, China will surely perish.

QUESTION: Is there any possibility that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, owing to differences in their understanding of unification, will split from each other?

ANSWER: If we talk about possibilities alone, there are possibilities both for solidarity and for a split, depending on the attitude of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and especially on the attitude of the people of the whole country. As for us Communists, we have long made clear our policy of co-operation: we not only hope for a long-term co-operation but are striving for it. We hear that Generalissimo Chiang also said at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang that the domestic problems could not be solved by military means. As a formidable enemy is confronting us and as the Kuomintang and the Communist Party have both had some experience in the past, both must persist in a long-term co-operation and avoid a split. But in order to completely avoid the possibility of a split, we must find some political guarantee for long-term co-operation, *i.e.* we must persist in the War of Resistance to the very end and bring about a democratic government. If these things are really done, we shall be able to maintain solidarity and avoid a split; this depends on the common effort of the two parties and the people of the whole country and such efforts must be made. "Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation"; "Persist in solidarity and oppose split"; and "Persist in progress and oppose retrogression"—these are the three cardinal political slogans which our Party proposed in its "July 7 Declaration" of this year. We hold that China can avoid subjugation and drive out the enemy only when we do these things; there is no alternative.

September 16, 1939.

THE UNITY BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INTERESTS OF MANKIND

As the twenty-second anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution is drawing near, the Sino-Soviet Cultural Association has asked me to write an article. I wish to elucidate, on the basis of my own observations, a few problems concerning both China and the Soviet Union. For these problems are now being discussed among broad sections of the Chinese people, and as yet no definite conclusions seem to have been reached. It may not be without benefit, I think, to set forth on this occasion some of my views for the consideration of people concerned with the great war in Europe and with Sino-Soviet relations.

Some people say: the Soviet Union finds it advantageous to let the world war break out and it does not want the world to remain in peace; and the outbreak of the present world war was precipitated by the fact that the Soviet Union, instead of concluding a pact of mutual assistance with Britain and France, concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany. I consider such a view incorrect. For a long time the Soviet Union's foreign policy has consistently been a peace policy, which means precisely that the interests of the Soviet Union are interwoven with the interests of the majority of mankind. In the past, the Soviet Union not only needed peace for socialist construction and had to strengthen its peaceful relations with other countries for the prevention of an anti-Soviet war, but had to check the aggression of the fascist countries, to curb the war-mongering activities of the so-called democratic countries, and to delay the outbreak of an imperialist world war as long as possible so as to win peace on a world-wide scale. For years the Soviet Union has devoted great efforts to the cause of world peace. For example, it joined the League of Nations,¹ concluded pacts of mutual assistance with both France and Czechoslovakia² and strove to enter into security pacts with Britain and all other countries that are willing to have peace. As soon as Germany

and Italy carried out their joint aggression on Spain and when Britain, France and the United States adopted towards it the policy of nominal "non-intervention" but actual condonation, the Soviet Union actively helped the army of the Spanish government in its resistance to combat this non-intervention policy. When Japan invaded China, and when Britain, France and the United States likewise adopted a policy of "non-intervention", the Soviet Union not only concluded a pact of non-aggression with China but also actively helped China in her resistance. When both Britain and France abandoned Austria and Czechoslovakia by condoning Hitler's aggression, the Soviet Union spared no effort in exposing the dirty trick of the Munich policy and proposed to Britain and France that the further extension of aggression be checked. In the spring and summer of this year, when the Polish question became a burning one and a world war was liable to break out at the slightest provocation, the Soviet Union, despite the insincerity of Chamberlain and Daladier, carried on negotiations with Britain and France for more than four months in an endeavour to conclude a British-French-Soviet pact of mutual assistance to prevent the outbreak of the great war. All this, however, was handicapped by the imperialist policy of the British and French governments, a policy of condoning, instigating and spreading war, and thus the cause of world peace was finally thwarted and the imperialist world war finally broke out. The governments of Britain, France and the United States had no genuine desire to prevent the great war, but on the contrary precipitated its outbreak. For they refused to come to terms with the Soviet Union, to conclude with it a really effective pact of mutual assistance based on equality and reciprocity; this proves that they only wanted war and did not want peace. As everybody knows, in the world today to turn down the Soviet Union is to reject peace. Even Britain's Lloyd George, a typical representative of the bourgeoisie, knows this.³ It was in these circumstances and at this time, when Germany assented to desist from opposing the Soviet Union, renounce the anti-Comintern pact and recognise the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers, that the Soviet-German pact of non-aggression was concluded. The scheme of Britain, France and the United States was to spur Germany on

to attack the Soviet Union while they themselves would "sit on top of a mountain to watch the tigers fight" and would come down to wind up the whole affair when the Soviet Union and Germany have worn each other out in fighting. This intrigue was smashed by the Soviet-German pact of non-aggression. Some of our countrymen, paying no heed to such an intrigue, to the intrigue of Anglo-French imperialism of condoning, instigating and precipitating the outbreak of the world war, have actually been taken in by the propaganda of the honey-mouthed intriguers. In the case of Spain, China, Austria and Czechoslovakia, these intriguers did not have the slightest intention of checking aggression, but on the contrary condoned aggression and instigated war; putting others in the roles of the snipe and the clam with themselves acting the fisherman,⁴ they euphemistically described their attitude as "non-intervention", which was really "sitting on top of a mountain to watch the tigers fight." Quite a number of people throughout the world have been fooled by the honeyed words of Chamberlain and his collaborators, not sensing how terrible was the murderous intent behind their smiles, not knowing that it was only when Chamberlain and Daladier had decided to turn down the Soviet Union and to unleash the imperialist war that the Soviet Union and Germany concluded a non-aggression pact; these people should now wake up. This is how the Soviet Union tried to maintain world peace to the last minute, and shows the unity between the interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of the majority of mankind. This is the first problem I wanted to talk about.

Some people say: As the second imperialist world war has broken out, the Soviet Union will probably take sides in the war; in other words, it seems that the Soviet Red Army is about to join the war front of German imperialism. I consider such a view incorrect. The war that has just broken out, whether viewed from the Anglo-French side or from the German side, is an unjust, predatory and imperialist war. The Communist Parties and the people of all countries of the world should rise to oppose such a war; they should all lay bare the imperialism of both warring parties, which only does harm to and does not confer the slightest benefit on the people of the world; and they

should all expose the criminal action of the Social-Democratic Parties in supporting the imperialist war and betraying the interests of the proletariat. The Soviet Union is a socialist country, a country in which the Communist Party is in power, and it necessarily maintains a clear-cut twofold attitude towards wars: (1) Resolutely refrain from entering into any unjust, predatory and imperialist war and maintain strict neutrality towards both warring parties. Hence the Soviet Red Army will never join the war front of imperialism in disregard of principles. (2) Actively help in the wars that are just, non-predatory and aimed at liberation. For example, thirteen years ago the Soviet Union helped in the Chinese people's Northern Expedition; a year ago it helped in the Spanish people's war to resist Germany and Italy; for the last two years it has been helping in the Chinese people's Anti-Japanese War; in the last few months it has been helping in the Mongolian people's anti-Japanese war; and it will surely help in the people's wars of liberation or national liberation that may break out in future in other countries or between other nations—it will surely help in wars beneficial to the defence of peace. This the history of the Soviet Union over the past twenty-two years has proved and future history will continue to prove. Some people regard the Soviet Union's trade with Germany, which is based on the Soviet-German commercial agreement, as an act of joining the war front of Germany; this is also an incorrect view, because they have confused trade with participation in war. Trading must not be confused with taking part in a war, nor with rendering help. For example, during the Spanish war the Soviet Union traded with Germany and Italy, but the world regarded the Soviet Union not as rendering help to Germany and Italy in their aggression upon Spain, but as rendering help to Spain in resisting German and Italian aggression, because the Soviet Union actually rendered help to Spain. Again, in the present Sino-Japanese War the Soviet Union also trades with Japan, yet likewise the world regards it not as rendering help to Japan in her aggression on China, but as rendering help to China in resisting Japan's aggression, because the Soviet Union is actually rendering help to China. The fact that at present the Soviet Union maintains trade relations with both

parties in the world war cannot be regarded as its rendering help to either side, let alone its participating in the war. If the nature of the war changes, if the war in one or more countries, having undergone certain necessary changes, becomes advantageous to the Soviet Union and the peoples of the world, then it will be possible for the Soviet Union to help or participate in the war; otherwise it will be impossible. As to the fact that the attitude, friendly or hostile, of the belligerents towards the Soviet Union will affect the volume and terms of their trade with it, that is a matter for the belligerents themselves and has nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even if a certain country or certain countries adopt an anti-Soviet attitude, so long as they, like Germany before August 23, want to maintain diplomatic relations and conclude commercial treaties with the Soviet Union and do not declare war on it, the Soviet Union will not break off commercial relations with them. Such commercial relations do not mean rendering help, much less participation in war; this should be clearly understood. This is the second problem I wanted to talk about.

Many people in this country are confused on the problem of the Soviet troops' entry into Poland.⁵ The Polish question should be viewed from various sides, from the sides of Germany, of Britain and France, of the Polish government, of the Polish people and of the Soviet Union. Germany started the war to plunder the Polish people and to break up one flank of the war front of Anglo-French imperialism. The nature of such a war was imperialist; we cannot sympathise with it but should oppose it. Britain and France regard Poland as an object of plunder for their finance capital, used Poland as a handle to reject on a world-scale imperialist Germany's attempt at a redivision of their predatory gains, and made Poland a flank of their own imperialist war front; thus their war was an imperialist war and their so-called aid to Poland merely aimed at contesting Germany's right to rule Poland, a war we cannot sympathise with and should oppose. The Polish government was a fascist government, a reactionary government of the Polish landlord class and bourgeoisie, which ruthlessly exploited the workers and peasants and oppressed the Polish democrats; it was furthermore a government for a Greater Poland, for it subjected

to ruthless oppression numerous national minorities other than the Polish nation—the non-Polish national minorities of the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Jews, Germans and Lithuanians who altogether numbered over ten millions; therefore it was in itself an imperialist government. In the present war the reactionary Polish government willingly drove the Polish people to become cannon-fodder for British and French finance capital and willingly made itself a component part of the reactionary war front of international finance capital. For twenty years the Polish government consistently opposed the Soviet Union and, during the talks between Britain, France and the Soviet Union, obstinately rejected the aid of the Soviet army. And this government was moreover an utterly incompetent government; with a huge army of more than 1,500,000, it was unable to stand even a single blow and in only two weeks brought ruin to its country and abandoned the Polish people to be trampled by German imperialism. These are the flagrant crimes of the Polish government and we should be wrong if we sympathised with such a government. The Polish people were the victims; they should rise to oppose the oppression of fascist Germany and their own reactionary landlord class and bourgeoisie and establish an independent and free Polish democratic state. There is not the slightest doubt that our sympathy should go to the Polish people. The Soviet Union has taken an entirely just action. At that time two problems confronted the Soviet Union. The first problem was whether to let the whole of Poland sink under the rule of German imperialism or to liberate the national minorities of eastern Poland. On this problem, the Soviet Union chose the second course. The vast expanse of territory inhabited by Byelorussians and Ukrainians was snatched from the new-born Soviet Union by the German imperialists in 1918 when the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed, and it was later forcibly placed under the rule of the Polish reactionary government through the Versailles Treaty. Now the Soviet Union has merely recovered its lost territory and liberated the oppressed Byelorussians and the Ukrainians as well as rescued them from coming under German oppression. The cable dispatches of the last few days show how the masses of these national minorities welcomed the Red Army with food and drink and regarded the

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to ruthless oppression numerous national minorities other than the Polish nation—the non-Polish national minorities of the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Jews, Germans and Lithuanians who altogether numbered over ten millions; therefore it was in itself an imperialist government. In the present war the reactionary Polish government willingly drove the Polish people to become cannon-fodder for British and French finance capital and willingly made itself a component part of the reactionary war front of international finance capital. For twenty years the Polish government consistently opposed the Soviet Union and, during the talks between Britain, France and the Soviet Union, obstinately rejected the aid of the Soviet army. And this government was moreover an utterly incompetent government; with a huge army of more than 1,500,000, it was unable to stand even a single blow and in only two weeks brought ruin to its country and abandoned the Polish people to be trampled by German imperialism. These are the flagrant crimes of the Polish government and we should be wrong if we sympathised with such a government. The Polish people were the victims; they should rise to oppose the oppression of fascist Germany and their own reactionary landlord class and bourgeoisie and establish an independent and free Polish democratic state. There is not the slightest doubt that our sympathy should go to the Polish people. The Soviet Union has taken an entirely just action. At that time two problems confronted the Soviet Union. The first problem was whether to let the whole of Poland sink under the rule of German imperialism or to liberate the national minorities of eastern Poland. On this problem, the Soviet Union chose the second course. The vast expanse of territory inhabited by Byelorussians and Ukrainians was snatched from the new-born Soviet Union by the German imperialists in 1918 when the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed, and it was later forcibly placed under the rule of the Polish reactionary government through the Versailles Treaty. Now the Soviet Union has merely recovered its lost territory and liberated the oppressed Byelorussians and the Ukrainians as well as rescued them from coming under German oppression. The cable dispatches of the last few days show how the masses of these national minorities welcomed the Red Army with food and drink and regarded the

Red Army as their saviour; while from western Poland occupied by German troops and western Germany occupied by French troops not a single report like this has come in. This makes it clear that the Soviet Union's war is a war which is just, non-predatory and aimed at liberation, a war to help to liberate the weak and small nations, to help to liberate the people. The war waged by Germany, Britain and France is unjust, predatory and imperialist; it is a war for the oppression of other nations and peoples. Apart from this, another problem confronted the Soviet Union, namely, Chamberlain's attempt to continue his old anti-Soviet policy. His policy was: first, to impose a large-scale blockade on Germany from the west to bring pressure on Germany in the west; second, to attempt to unite with the United States, and buy over Italy, Japan and the countries of northern Europe to his side so as to isolate Germany; and third, to lure Germany by offering her Poland and even Hungary and Rumania as gifts. In a word, he resorted to all means of intimidation and bribery to urge Germany to renounce the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and turn her guns on the Soviet Union. This intrigue was carried on in the past, is being carried on at present and will also be carried on in the future. The powerful Soviet army's entry into eastern Poland was aimed at recovering the Soviet Union's own territory and liberating the small nations, and was also a concrete step to check the eastward expansion of the German aggressive forces and to smash Chamberlain's intrigue. Judging from the news of the last few days, this policy of the Soviet Union has been very successful. This is a concrete manifestation of the unity between the interests of the Soviet Union and those of the majority of mankind and of the oppressed people under the reactionary Polish régime. This is the third problem I wanted to talk about.

The signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, with its aftermath in the general situation, has dealt a big blow to Japan and rendered great help to China; it has strengthened considerably the position of China's forces of resistance and has dealt a serious blow to her capitulators. And it is quite proper that the Chinese people should have welcomed this pact. But after the signing of the Khalkhin-gol truce agreement⁶ the British and American news agencies were busily reporting that

a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact was about to be signed and a certain concern was felt by the Chinese people, some of whom thought that the Soviet Union might not help China any longer. I consider such a view incorrect. The Khalkhin-gol truce agreement is of the same nature as the previous Lake Hasan truce agreement;⁷ that is to say, being compelled to give in, the Japanese militarists recognised the inviolability of the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. Such truce agreements will make it possible for the Soviet Union to increase rather than decrease its aid to China. As for the so-called Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union has been proposing it for many years but Japan has rejected it all along. At present a clique within the Japanese ruling class is offering to conclude such a pact with the Soviet Union, but whether the Soviet Union is willing to conclude it depends on the basic principle—whether such a pact fits in with the interests of the Soviet Union and the majority of mankind. Specifically speaking, it depends on whether such a pact conflicts with the interests of China's war of national liberation. Judging from Stalin's report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Molotov's speech at the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, delivered respectively on March 10 and May 30 of this year, I think the Soviet Union will not change this basic principle. Should a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact be concluded, the Soviet Union will surely see to it that nothing in this pact limits its help to China. The interests of the Soviet Union will never conflict with the interests of China's national liberation and there will always be unity between them. I regard this point as absolutely beyond doubt. Those who are prejudiced against the Soviet Union are capitalising on the conclusion of the Khalkhin-gol truce agreement as well as on the rumour about the Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact to raise a storm of ill feeling between the two great nations, China and the Soviet Union. Such cases are found among the British, French and American intriguers as well as among the Chinese capitulators; they constitute a serious danger and we must thoroughly expose their dirty work. It is obvious that China's foreign policy should be one for resistance to Japan. This policy chiefly aims at achieving regeneration through our own

efforts while not neglecting to win all foreign aid that can possibly be secured. With the world embroiled in an imperialist war, what we call foreign aid comes chiefly from three sources: (1) the socialist Soviet Union, (2) the people within the capitalist countries throughout the world and (3) the oppressed nations in the colonies or semi-colonies throughout the world. Only these are the reliable sources of aid. Any other kind of foreign aid, even though possible, can only be regarded as complementary and temporary. Of course we should also try to secure such complementary and temporary foreign aid, but we must not depend too much on it or regard it as reliable. Towards the belligerents in the imperialist war, China should maintain strict neutrality and not take sides. The view that China should join the imperialist war front of Britain and France is the view of the capitulators, a view which is harmful to the resistance to Japan and to the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and should be flatly rejected. This is the fourth problem I wanted to talk about.

The above-mentioned problems are being widely discussed by our countrymen at present. It is a very good thing that our countrymen, aiming at victory in the resistance to Japan, have directed their attention to the study of international problems, to the relations between the imperialist world war and China's Anti-Japanese War and to the relation between China and the Soviet Union. I have set forth some of my basic views on these problems; I do not know whether these are correct and hope the readers will freely criticise them.

September 28, 1939.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS TO *THE COMMUNIST*

The Party's Central Committee has long planned to publish an internal Party journal, and now at last the plan has materialised. For the building of a bolshevised Chinese Communist Party of a nation-wide scope and a broad mass character, fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organisationally, such a journal is necessary. In the present situation the necessity is all the more evident. What distinguishes the present situation is that on the one hand the danger of capitulation, the danger of a split and the danger of retrogression are growing daily within the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and on the other hand our Party has stepped out of its narrow confines to become a major party of national scope. Thus the task of the Party is to mobilise the masses to overcome the danger of capitulation, of split and of retrogression as well as to make preparations for coping with possible emergencies, so that, in case they occur, the Party and the revolution will not suffer unexpected losses. At such a moment the publication of an internal Party journal like this is indeed fully necessary.

This internal Party journal is called *The Communist*. What is its task? What will it write about? In what way does it differ from other Party publications?

Its task is to help to build up a bolshevised Chinese Communist Party of nation-wide scope and broad mass character, fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organisationally. For the sake of the victory of the Chinese revolution, there is an urgent need to build up such a Party; the subjective and objective conditions for building up such a Party are on the whole present, and this great undertaking is in progress. An ordinary Party publication can offer little help in this great undertaking, a special Party publication is needed, and this is why *The Communist* is now published.

To a certain degree our Party is already a party of nation-wide scope and broad mass character and, considering its core of

leadership, certain components of its membership, its general line and its revolutionary work, it is already a party that is bolshevised and consolidated ideologically, politically and organisationally.

What, then, is the reason for proposing the new task?

The reason is that at present we have many new organisations, consisting of a large number of new members, which cannot yet be described as of a broad mass character, as ideologically, politically and organisationally consolidated, or as bolshevised. Meanwhile, we are faced, as regards the old members, with the question of raising their level and, as regards the old organisations, with the question of further bolshevising and further consolidating them ideologically, politically and organisationally. At present the circumstances in which the Party finds itself and the tasks which it shoulders are quite different from those in the civil war period, the present circumstances being much more complex and the present tasks much more difficult.

This is the period of the national united front, and we have formed a united front with the bourgeoisie; this is the period of the Anti-Japanese War, and the armed forces of our Party are waging a ruthless war against the enemy at the front in co-ordination with the friendly armies; this is the period of our Party's development into a major party of nation-wide scope, and the Party is no longer what it was before. When these conditions are viewed in their interrelation, we shall understand how glorious and momentous is the task we have proposed of "building up a bolshevised Chinese Communist Party of nation-wide scope and broad mass character, fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organisationally".

We now want to build up such a party, but how shall we go about it? We cannot solve this problem if we leave out the history of our Party, the eighteen years' history of our Party's struggle.

From the time of the First National Congress in 1921, the history of our Party has now embraced fully eighteen years. During these eighteen years the Party has gone through many great struggles. In these struggles Party members, Party cadres, and Party organisations have steeled themselves. They have experienced great revolutionary victories as well as serious

revolutionary defeats. They have formed a national united front with the bourgeoisie, and because of the split of this united front, they have waged serious armed struggles against the big bourgeoisie and its allies. For the last three years they have again entered into a period of forming a national united front with the bourgeoisie. It is through such complex relationships with the Chinese bourgeoisie that the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party have pursued the course of their development. This is a historical peculiarity, a peculiarity of the course of revolution in a colonial and semi-colonial country, which is not found in the revolutionary history of any capitalist country. Furthermore, the fact that China is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, a country which has developed unevenly in its political, economic and cultural aspects, a country with a predominantly semi-feudal economy and a vast territory, has on the one hand brought it about that at the present stage the Chinese revolution is a bourgeois-democratic revolution in character; that the principal targets of the revolution are imperialism and feudalism; that the basic motive forces of the revolution are the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, while in certain periods and to certain degrees even the national bourgeoisie may join in; and on the other hand it has brought it about that the principal form of the Chinese revolutionary struggle is armed struggle. The history of our Party may be called a history of armed struggle. Comrade Stalin says, "In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution".¹ This is perfectly correct. This peculiarity, a peculiarity of semi-colonial China, is not found in the history of revolutions led by the Communist Parties in capitalist countries; in other words, it marks the difference between China and those countries. Thus, (1) the proletariat either forms a revolutionary national united front with the bourgeoisie or is forced to split up the united front; and (2) armed struggle is the principal form of the revolution—these have become the two basic peculiarities of the course of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution. Here we have not described the Party's relations with the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie as a basic peculiarity;

this is because, first, such relations are in principle the same as in the case of the Communist Parties in various countries of the world, and secondly, in China, to mention armed struggle at all is in substance to imply peasant war, and the Party's close relations with the peasant war are but its relations with the peasantry.

Because of these two basic peculiarities and precisely because of them, the building up and bolshevisation of our Party take place under special circumstances. The Party's failure or success, its retreat or advance, its contraction or expansion and its development and consolidation cannot but be linked with its relations with the bourgeoisie and with armed struggle. When the Party takes a correct political line on the question of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie or splitting up the united front under necessity, it moves a step forward in its development, consolidation and bolshevisation; but when it takes an incorrect line on the relations with the bourgeoisie, then it moves a step backward in its development, consolidation and bolshevisation. Similarly, when our Party correctly handles the question of the revolutionary armed struggle, it moves a step forward in its development, consolidation and bolshevisation; but when it handles this question incorrectly, it moves a step backward in its development, consolidation and bolshevisation. For eighteen years the course of building up the Party, of bolshevizing the Party, has thus been closely connected with the Party's political line, with the correct or incorrect handling of the questions of the united front and of armed struggle. This assertion has been very clearly confirmed by the eighteen years' history of the Party. And conversely, because and only because of its increasing bolshevisation can the Party, with increasing correctness, decide on its political line and handle the questions of the united front and of armed struggle. This assertion has also been very clearly confirmed by the eighteen years' history of the Party.

Therefore the united front, armed struggle and Party building are the three fundamental problems of our Party in the Chinese revolution. To have a correct understanding of these three problems and their interrelation is as good as to give correct leadership to the whole Chinese revolution. By virtue

of our rich experience, the profound and rich experience of failure and success, retreat and advance, contraction and expansion in the eighteen years of our Party's history, we have been able to reach correct conclusions on these three problems. This means that we have been able to handle correctly the problem of the united front, the problem of armed struggle and the problem of Party building. This also means that our eighteen years' experience has enabled us to understand that the united front, armed struggle and Party building are the Chinese Communist Party's three magic wands, its three principal magic wands, for defeating the enemy in the Chinese revolution. This is a great achievement of the Chinese Communist Party as well as of the Chinese revolution.

Here let us briefly discuss each of the three magic wands, the three problems.

In the last eighteen years, the united front of the Chinese proletariat with the bourgeoisie and other classes has developed under three different kinds of circumstances and through three different stages, viz. the stage of the First Great Revolution from 1924 to 1927, the stage of the War of Agrarian Revolution from 1927 to 1937, and the stage of the present Anti-Japanese War. The history of the three stages has verified the following laws: (1) Because the greatest oppression on China is foreign oppression, the Chinese national bourgeoisie can, in certain periods and to certain degrees, participate in the struggle against imperialism and the feudal warlords. Therefore the proletariat should, in such periods, form a united front with the national bourgeoisie and, as far as possible, maintain it. (2) Owing to its economic and political flabbiness, the Chinese national bourgeoisie is likely to vacillate and become a turncoat under certain historical circumstances. Hence the composition of China's revolutionary united front cannot remain the same from beginning to end, but is subject to change. In a certain period the national bourgeoisie may take part in it while in another it may not. (3) The Chinese big bourgeoisie, which is of a comprador character, directly serves imperialism and is under its protection. Hence the Chinese big bourgeoisie with its comprador character has all along been a target of the revolution. Nevertheless, as the different blocs within the Chinese

big bourgeoisie with its comprador character have different imperialist powers as their respective backers, when the contradictions among the different imperialist powers grow sharp and the spearhead of the revolution is mainly directed against only one imperialist power, those blocs of the big bourgeoisie which are dependent upon other imperialist powers may, to certain degrees and in certain periods, participate in the struggle against that particular imperialist power. In such periods the Chinese proletariat may, with a view to weakening the enemy and expanding its own reserve forces, form such a united front with these blocs of the big bourgeoisie as is feasible and should, as far as possible, maintain it under conditions that are beneficial to the revolution. (4) The big bourgeoisie with its comprador character remains quite reactionary even when it has joined the united front to wage a struggle against the common enemy together with the proletariat; resolutely opposing the ideological, political and organisational development of the proletariat and its party, it will impose restrictions on them, adopt such disruptive policies as deceiving, enticing, "dissolving" and persecuting them, and furthermore make these policies the preparatory steps for its capitulation to the enemy and for splitting the united front. (5) The firm ally of the proletariat is the peasantry. (6) The urban petty bourgeoisie is also a reliable ally. The validity of these laws has not only been proved during the First Great Revolution and the Agrarian Revolution, but is also being proved in the present Anti-Japanese War. Therefore, with regard to forming a united front with the bourgeoisie (especially the big bourgeoisie), the party of the proletariat must carry on a resolute and stern struggle on two fronts. On the one hand it must guard against the mistake of overlooking the possibility that the bourgeoisie may, in certain periods and to certain degrees, participate in the revolutionary struggle. Such a mistake consists in not distinguishing the Chinese bourgeoisie from the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries and consequently in overlooking the policy of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie and maintaining it as far as possible; this is precisely "Left" closed-door sectarianism. On the other hand, it must guard against the mistake of identifying the programme, policy, ideology, practice, etc. of the proletariat with those of the

bourgeoisie, of overlooking the differences in principle between them. Such a mistake consists in ignoring the fact that the bourgeoisie (especially the big bourgeoisie) is making every effort to exert its influence not only on the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry but also on the proletariat and the Communist Party; to destroy the ideological, political and organisational independence of the proletariat and the Communist Party; to turn the proletariat and the Communist Party into an appendage of its own and of its political parties; and to ensure that a group or a political party belonging to its own class reaps all the fruits of the revolution; and it also consists in ignoring the fact that the bourgeoisie (especially the big bourgeoisie) will actually betray the revolution at the moment when the revolution conflicts with the self-interest of such a group or political party. To overlook this aspect is Right opportunism. A characteristic of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism² was that it led the proletariat to adapt itself to the self-interest of a group or a political party of the bourgeoisie, which was the subjective cause of the failure of the First Great Revolution. Since the dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic revolution greatly affects the political line and Party building of the Chinese Communist Party, we cannot understand our political line and Party building without understanding this dual character. An important part of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is to unite with as well as to struggle against the bourgeoisie. An important part of the building of the Chinese Communist Party is that the Party develops and steels itself in the course of both uniting with the bourgeoisie and struggling against it. Unity here means the united front with the bourgeoisie. Struggle means the "peaceful" and "bloodless" struggle waged along ideological, political and organisational lines when we unite with the bourgeoisie, a struggle which will turn into an armed struggle when we are forced to split with the bourgeoisie. If our Party does not understand how to unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, it cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop; if our Party does not understand how to wage a resolute and serious "peaceful" struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with the bourgeoisie, it will

disintegrate ideologically, politically and organisationally and the revolution will fail; and if our Party, when forced to split with the bourgeoisie, does not wage a resolute and serious armed struggle against the bourgeoisie, it will also disintegrate and the revolution will also fail. All this has been borne out by the history of the past eighteen years.

The armed struggle of the Chinese Communist Party is a peasant war under the leadership of the proletariat. Its history may also be divided into three stages. The first stage was its participation in the Northern Expedition. At that time our Party began to realise the importance of armed struggle, but did not yet understand it fully; it did not understand that armed struggle is the principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution. The second stage was the War of Agrarian Revolution. Our Party had by that time already built up its own independent armed forces, learnt the art of fighting independently, and set up the people's political power and the base areas. Our Party was already able to co-ordinate directly or indirectly the armed struggle, the principal form of struggle, with many other necessary forms of struggle; in other words, to co-ordinate the armed struggle, directly or indirectly and on a nation-wide scale, with the struggle of the workers, the struggle of the peasants (this is the main thing), the struggles of the youth, the women and all other sections of the people, the struggle for political power, the struggle on the economic front, the struggle on the anti-espionage front, the struggle on the ideological front and other forms of struggle. And this armed struggle is exactly the peasant's struggle for agrarian revolution under the leadership of the proletariat. The third stage is the present stage of the Anti-Japanese War. In this stage we are able to turn to account the experience in the armed struggle of the first stage and especially of the second stage, and of the experience in co-ordinating armed struggle with all other necessary forms of struggle. The general conception of this armed struggle is at present guerrilla warfare.³ What is guerrilla warfare? It is, in a backward country, in a big semi-colonial country, and for a long period of time, the indispensable and therefore the best form of struggle for the people's armed forces to overcome the armed enemy and create

their own strongholds. Up to the present the political line and the building of our Party have been closely linked with this form of struggle. Apart from armed struggle, apart from guerrilla warfare, it is impossible to understand our political line and, consequently, to understand our Party building. It is precisely armed struggle that forms an important part of our political line. For eighteen years our Party has learnt by degrees to wage armed struggle and has persisted in it. We know that in China without the armed struggle there would be no place for the proletariat, no place for the people, no place for the Communist Party and no victory for the revolution. For eighteen years the development, consolidation and bolshevisation of our Party have been undertaken in the midst of revolutionary wars; without armed struggle there would not have been a Communist Party such as it is today. Comrades throughout the Party must never forget this experience gained at the cost of blood.

Similarly, the course of Party building, the course of the Party's development, consolidation and bolshevisation, falls characteristically into three stages. The first stage was the Party's infancy. In the early and middle periods of this stage the Party line was correct and the revolutionary activity of both the rank and file and the cadres of the Party was developed to an exceedingly high degree; hence victories were achieved in the First Great Revolution. But the Party at that time was after all still a party in its infancy, a party inexperienced in the three basic problems of the united front, the armed struggle and Party building, a party without much knowledge about China's historical and social conditions, about the characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution, and a party which had yet no complete understanding of the unity between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence in the last period of this stage, at its critical juncture, those occupying a dominant position in the Party's leading body were unable to lead the whole Party to consolidate the victories of the revolution and, deceived by the bourgeoisie, caused the revolution to suffer defeat. In this stage the Party organisations, though expanded, were not consolidated, and Party members and cadres were not firmly set ideologically or

politically. New members were numerous but they were not given the requisite Marxist-Leninist education. Experiences in work were also plentiful but were not summed up well. Large numbers of opportunists sneaked into the Party and were not cleaned up. The Party was caught in a maze of schemes and intrigues of both its enemies and allies but it showed no vigilance. Within the Party a great number of active members surged forward but time was lacking for turning them into the backbone of the Party. The Party had a revolutionary armed force but it could not keep it well in hand. All this was due to the lack of experience, to the lack of a profound revolutionary understanding, and to the fact that the Party was not yet adept in uniting the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution. Such was the first stage of Party building. The second stage was the stage of the War of Agrarian Revolution. Owing to its experience in the first stage, to the progress it made in the understanding of China's historical and social conditions and the characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution, and to the fact that its cadres had learnt to understand better the theory of Marxism-Leninism and to unite it with the practice of the Chinese revolution, our Party was able to carry on the ten years' victorious struggle of agrarian revolution. Although the bourgeoisie had turned traitor, our Party was able to rely firmly on the peasantry. The Party organisation not only developed afresh but was also consolidated. Although the enemy tried daily to sabotage our Party, the Party drove out the saboteurs. Again large numbers of cadres surged forward within the Party and this time they became its backbone. The Party opened up the path of the people's political power and thereby learnt the art of administering the state and protecting the people. The Party created strong armed forces and thereby learnt the art of war. All these were the Party's momentous advances and achievements. Yet a section of our comrades fell, or for a time fell, into the quagmire of opportunism during this great struggle; this was again due to their failure to appreciate with an open mind the experiences of the past, to their lack of understanding of China's historical and social conditions, and of the characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution, and to their lack of an understanding of the

unity between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence throughout this stage certain people in the Party's leading organisation were unable to hold to the correct political and organisational lines. The Party and the revolution were at one time damaged by the "Left" opportunism of Comrade Li Li-san⁴ and at another time by the "Left" opportunism in the revolutionary war and the "Left" opportunism in the work in the White areas. And it was only after the Tsunyi meeting (a meeting of the Central Political Bureau held at Tsunyi, Kweichow, January 1935) that the Party was set once and for all on the road of bolshevisation and laid the foundations for its subsequent victory over Chang Kuo-t'ao's Right opportunism and for the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This was the second stage in the course of the Party's development. The third is the stage of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Three years in this stage have elapsed and the struggle during this period is of unusually great significance. Profiting from the experiences in the past two revolutionary stages, and relying on its organisational strength and armed strength, on its high political prestige among the people of the whole country, and on its deeper understanding of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution and its better grasp of the unity between the two, the Party has not only established the Anti-Japanese National United Front but also carried on the great Anti-Japanese War. The Party organisation has stepped out of its narrow confines to become a major party of national scope. The Party's armed forces are growing big again and are being further consolidated in the struggle against the Japanese invaders. The Party's influence among the people of the whole country is further expanding. These are all great successes. Nevertheless, large numbers of new Party members have not yet been given education and many new organisations have not yet been consolidated; between them and the old members and old organisations an enormous difference still exists. Large numbers of new Party members and new cadres have not yet acquired adequate revolutionary experience. They still know nothing or very little about China's historical and social conditions and about the characteristics and laws of the Chinese

revolution. Their grasp of the unity between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution is far from perfect. In the work of developing the Party's organisation in the past, although the Party centre emphatically proposed the slogan of "Expand the Party boldly but do not let in a single undesirable", a good many opportunists and saboteurs sent by the enemy did sneak in. Although the united front has been formed and maintained for three years now, the bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, is all the while attempting to destroy our Party; serious friction and conflicts engineered by the big bourgeois capitulators and die-hards are going on throughout the country, and there is always anti-Communist clamour. The big bourgeois capitulators and die-hards are also trying to make this a preparatory step to capitulating to Japanese imperialism, splitting up the united front and dragging China backwards. Ideologically the big bourgeoisie attempts to "dissolve" communism, while politically and organisationally it attempts to liquidate the Communist Party, the border region and the Party's armed forces. Under these circumstances our task is undoubtedly to overcome this danger of capitulation, split and retrogression, to preserve as far as possible the national united front and the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation to strive to persist in resistance to Japan, in solidarity and in progress, and at the same time to make preparations for coping with possible emergencies so that, in case they occur, the Party and the revolution will not suffer unexpected losses. To achieve this end, we must consolidate the Party's organisations and the Party's armed forces, and furthermore mobilise the people of the whole country to wage a resolute struggle against capitulation, split and retrogression. The accomplishment of this task depends upon the efforts of the whole Party and upon the unrelenting and persistent struggle of all Party members, Party cadres and Party organisations in every place and at every level. We believe that the Chinese Communist Party, with its eighteen years' experience, will certainly be able to achieve these ends through a joint effort of its old members and cadres who have experience and its new members and cadres who are young and vigorous, through a joint effort of its well-tried bolshevised Central and local

organisations, and through a joint effort of its strong armed forces and the progressive masses of the people.

Such are the principal experiences as well as the principal problems of our Party in its eighteen years.

Our eighteen years' experience shows that the united front and the armed struggle are the two chief weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on the armed struggle. And the Party organisation is the heroic fighter who wields the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the positions of the enemy. This is the inter-relation of the three.

How are we going to build up our Party today? How can we build up "a bolshevised Chinese Communist Party of nationwide scope and broad mass character, fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organisationally"? This can be understood by examining the Party's history; it can be understood by examining the problem of Party building in connection with the problems of the united front and armed struggle, by examining the problem of Party building in connection with the problem of our both uniting with the bourgeoisie and struggling against it, with the problem of the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies' persistent fight to keep up the anti-Japanese guerrilla war and their establishment of the anti-Japanese base areas.

On the basis of an understanding of the unity between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution, to sum up the experiences of these eighteen years and the fresh experiences of the present period and impart them to the whole Party, so that the Party will be consolidated and become as strong as steel and thereby avoid repeating the mistakes committed in its history—this is our task.

October 4, 1939.

THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE PARTY'S TASKS

This is a resolution written for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

1. The outbreak of the imperialist world war is a result of the attempt of the imperialist countries to extricate themselves from a new economic and political crisis. Whether viewed from the side of Germany or from that of Britain and France, the war is unjust, predatory and imperialist in character. The Communist Parties throughout the world should resolutely oppose such a war and oppose the criminal action of the Social Democratic Parties which are betraying the proletariat by supporting it. The socialist Soviet Union continues to uphold its peace policy by maintaining strict neutrality towards both warring parties and has, by sending armed forces into Poland, prevented the forces of German aggression from expanding eastward, consolidated peace in Eastern Europe, and liberated its brother nations in Western Ukraine and Byelorussia from the oppression of Polish rulers. The Soviet Union has concluded a number of treaties with its neighbouring countries to prevent possible assaults from the international reactionary forces, and is carrying on a struggle to restore world peace.

2. The policy of Japanese imperialism in this new international situation is to strive, by concentrating its attack on China, to solve the Chinese problem as a preparation for expanding the scale of its international adventures in the future. The policy by which it attempts to solve the Chinese problem is as follows:

(1) To strengthen its hold on the occupied areas as a preparation for subjugating the whole of China. To achieve this end, it has to start "mopping-up" campaigns against the anti-Japanese guerrilla base areas, to set about exploiting economic resources in the occupied areas and establishing puppet régimes, and to suppress the national spirit of the Chinese people.

(2) To launch against our rear offensives that are chiefly

political in form, and to supplement them by military attacks. By political offensives is meant that the emphasis is laid not on large-scale military offensives, but on disintegrating the anti-Japanese united front, breaking up the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and enticing the Kuomintang government to capitulate.

In the present period the enemy is not likely to launch large-scale strategic offensives like the attack on Wuhan in the past, because he has received blows in the course of more than two years of China's heroic resistance and his armed strength and financial resources are inadequate. In this sense the War of Resistance has basically reached the stage of strategic stalemate. This is precisely the stage of preparation for the counter-offensive. But in the first place, in saying that a stalemate has basically been reached, we do not deny the possibility of certain further offensive campaigns on the part of the enemy; the enemy is attacking Changsha and may attack certain other areas in future. Secondly, as the possibility of a stalemate on the front line grows, the enemy will intensify his "mopping-up" campaigns against our guerrilla base areas. Thirdly, if China fails to disrupt the enemy's occupation of the areas he has seized and allows him to succeed in strengthening his hold on these areas and exploiting them; if China fails to repulse the enemy's political offensives, to persist in the War of Resistance, in solidarity and in progress, and thereby to accumulate strength for the counter-offensive, or if the Kuomintang government really capitulates of its own accord, then the enemy may yet launch a large-scale offensive in the future. In that case, the stalemate already reached may yet be broken by the enemy and the capitulators.

3. The danger of capitulation, split and retrogression within the anti-Japanese united front remains the greatest danger in the present situation, and the present anti-Communist drive and retrogression are still the measures taken by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie in preparation for capitulation. In order to build up strength for the counter-offensive, our task remains one of working together with all the patriots in the country to mobilise the masses to carry out seriously the three cardinal political slogans, "Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation";

“Persist in solidarity and oppose a split”; and “Persist in progress and oppose retrogression”—slogans put forward in the “July 7 Declaration” of our Party. To achieve this end, in the enemy’s rear it is necessary to keep up the guerrilla war, defeat the enemy’s “mopping-up” campaigns, disrupt the enemy’s occupation of the areas he has seized, and carry out radical political and economic reforms beneficial to the broad masses of the anti-Japanese people. At the fronts it is necessary to keep up military defence and to repel all possible offensive campaigns of the enemy. In our rear it is necessary to carry out political reforms speedily and earnestly, to put an end to the Kuomintang’s one-party dictatorship, to convene a national assembly truly representative of the people’s will and invested with real power, to draw up a constitution and to put constitutionalism into practice. Any vacillation or sluggishness, any opposite policy, is absolutely erroneous. At the same time the leading bodies at all levels and all members of the Party should prepare to cope with any possible contingency which may damage the Chinese revolution by taking a more alert attitude towards changes in the current situation and by employing all their strength to consolidate ideologically, politically and organisationally our Party as well as the army and the political power under the Party’s leadership, so that the Party and the revolution will not suffer unexpected losses.

October 10, 1939.

DRAW IN LARGE NUMBERS OF INTELLECTUALS

This is a resolution written for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

1. In the long and ruthless war of national liberation, in the great struggle for building up a new China, the Communist Party must be proficient at drawing in the intellectuals so that it can organise a tremendous force for the resistance, organise millions upon millions of the masses of the peasants, develop the revolutionary cultural movement and expand the revolutionary united front. Without the participation of the intellectuals the revolution cannot achieve victory.

2. For the last three years our Party and our army have made considerable efforts to draw in the intellectuals, and much has been achieved in drawing large numbers of revolutionary intellectuals to join the Party and the army, to work in the government and carry on the cultural movement and the mass movement, with the result that the united front has expanded. But many cadres in the army are not yet aware of the importance of the intellectuals and are still afraid of intellectuals or even desire to keep them out of the ranks. Many of our schools still dare not freely admit young students in large numbers. Many local Party organisations are still unwilling to admit intellectuals. All this arises from a failure to understand the importance of the intellectuals for the revolutionary cause, to understand the difference between the intellectuals in colonial and semi-colonial countries and those in capitalist countries, to understand the difference between intellectuals in the service of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and in the service of the working class and the peasantry, to understand the serious fact that the bourgeois political parties are desperately contending with us for the intellectuals, while Japanese imperialism is also trying every means to buy over Chinese intellectuals and dope their minds; and above all, to understand that our Party and our army have already developed a core of steeled cadres and have

thus secured a condition favourable for keeping the intellectuals well in hand.

3. Therefore, we should from now on attend to the following:

(1) All Party organisations in the war areas as well as all armed forces led by the Party should draw in large numbers of intellectuals to join our army and our schools and to work in our government. We should by various means draw in all intellectuals who are willing to resist Japan and are relatively loyal and able to endure hardships and work hard; we should educate them, steel them in war and work, and enable them to serve the army, the government and the masses; and, according to the concrete circumstances, we should admit into the Party those intellectuals who fulfil the requirements of Party membership. As to those who are not qualified or who are not willing to join the Party, we should also establish good working relations with them and induce them to work together with us. (2) While drawing in large numbers of intellectuals, we should undoubtedly take extreme care not to admit those intellectuals who are sent by the enemy or the bourgeois political parties and those who are disloyal. We should sternly reject these people. In case they have already sneaked into our Party, army or government, we should, on the basis of firmly established evidence, clear them out resolutely but discriminatingly. But we must not on that account suspect intellectuals who are relatively loyal; we must vigilantly guard against false accusations of innocent people by counter-revolutionaries. (3) To all those intellectuals who are more or less competent or relatively loyal, we should assign appropriate work; we should give them good education and guidance so that they can gradually overcome their weak points in a long course of struggle, identify themselves with the revolution and with the masses, and live harmoniously with old Party members and old cadres and with the worker and peasant members of the Party. (4) As to that section of cadres and especially certain cadres in the main forces of our army who are opposed to the admission of intellectuals into our work, we should effectively convince them of its necessity. At the same time we should effectively encourage the worker and peasant cadres to intensify their study and raise their cultural level. Thus the worker and peasant cadres can become

intellectuals, while the intellectuals can acquire the good qualities of the worker and peasant masses. (5) In the Kuomintang-controlled areas and in the Japanese-occupied areas, the principles stated above are in the main applicable; but when we admit the intellectuals into the Party, we should pay the most attention to the degree of their loyalty, in order still further to close the ranks of the Party. As to the huge number of non-Party intellectuals who sympathise with us, we should establish proper connections with them so as to organise them into the great struggle for resistance to Japan and for democracy, into the cultural movement, and into the work of the united front.

4. All comrades in the Party must understand that a correct policy towards the intellectuals is one of the important conditions for the victory of the revolution. The incorrect attitude towards the intellectuals adopted by Party organisations in many localities and army units during the Agrarian Revolution should never be repeated in the future; the proletariat cannot rear intellectuals of its own without utilising the help of the intellectuals who already exist. The Central Committee hopes that Party committees at all levels and all comrades in the Party will give this matter their serious attention.

December 1, 1939.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

This is a textbook written jointly by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and several other comrades in Yanan in December 1939. Comrade Mao revised the draft of the first chapter, "Chinese Society", and wrote the second chapter, "The Chinese Revolution". A third chapter to deal with "Party Building" was left unfinished by the comrade drafting it. The present two chapters, especially Chapter II, have been instrumental in educating the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. In his *On New Democracy*, written in January 1940, Comrade Mao developed more fully his views on this subject as set forth in the second chapter of this pamphlet.

CHAPTER I CHINESE SOCIETY

I. THE CHINESE NATION

China is one of the largest countries in the world, with a territory almost as large as the whole of Europe. In this vast territory there are large areas of fertile land which provide us with food and clothing; mountain ranges, big and small, traversing the length and breadth of the country which provide us with extensive forests and rich mineral deposits; many rivers and lakes which provide us with facilities for water transport and irrigation; and a long coast line which provides us with the facility of communicating with other nations beyond the seas. From very ancient times our forefathers have laboured, lived and multiplied on this immense territory.

The present boundaries of China: the north-eastern, the north-western and part of the western frontiers are contiguous to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The northern frontier is contiguous to the People's Republic of Mongolia. The south-western and part of the western frontiers are contiguous to Afghanistan, India, Bhutan and Nepal. The southern frontier is contiguous to Burma and Indo-China. The eastern frontier is contiguous to Korea and close to Japan and the Philippines. This geographical setting of China gives the

Chinese people's revolution certain external advantages as well as creating a difficulty. The advantages are: contiguity to the Soviet Union, relative remoteness from the major European and American imperialist countries, and the fact that many of the countries bordering on China are colonial or semi-colonial countries. The difficulty is that Japanese imperialism, taking advantage of its geographical proximity to China, is constantly menacing the existence of the various nationalities in China and endangering the Chinese people's revolution.

China's population now totals 450 million, almost a quarter of mankind. Over nine-tenths of them are Hans. Besides the Hans, there are scores of national minorities, including the Mongols, the Huis, the Tibetans, the Uighurs, the Miaos, the Yis, the Chuangs, the Chung-chias and the Koreans, all of whom, though in different stages of cultural development, have long histories of their own. China is a country with a very large population composed of many nationalities.

Developing along the same lines as many other nations of the world, the Chinese nation (chiefly the Hans) first went through some tens of thousands of years of life in classless primitive communes. Up to now approximately 4,000 years have passed since the collapse of the primitive communes and the transition to class society, first slave society and then feudalism. In the history of Chinese civilisation, agriculture and handicraft have always been known as highly developed; many great thinkers, scientists, inventors, statesmen, military experts, men of letters and artists have flourished, and there is a rich store of classical works. The compass was invented in China very long ago.¹ The art of paper-making was discovered as early as 1,800 years ago.² Block-printing was invented 1,300 years ago.³ In addition, movable types were invented 800 years ago.⁴ Gunpowder was used in China earlier than in Europe.⁵ China, with a recorded history of almost 4,000 years, is therefore one of the oldest civilised countries in the world.

The Chinese nation is not only famous throughout the world for its stamina and industriousness, but also as a freedom-loving people with a rich revolutionary tradition. The history of the Hans, for instance, shows that the Chinese people would never submit to rule by the dark forces and that in every case they

succeeded in overthrowing or changing such a rule by revolutionary means. In thousands of years of the history of the Hans, there have been hundreds of peasant insurrections, great or small, against the régime of darkness imposed by the landlords and nobility. And it was peasant uprisings that brought about most dynastic changes. All the nationalities of China have always rebelled against the foreign yoke and striven to shake it off by means of resistance. They accept a union on the basis of equality, not the oppression of one nationality by another. In thousands of years of history of the Chinese nation many national heroes and revolutionary leaders have emerged. So the Chinese nation is also a nation with a glorious revolutionary tradition and a splendid historical heritage.

2. ANCIENT FEUDAL SOCIETY

Although China is a great nation with a vast territory, an immense population, a long history, a rich revolutionary tradition and a splendid historical heritage, yet she remained sluggish in her economic, political and cultural development after her transition from the slave system into the feudal system. This feudal system, beginning from the Chou and Ch'in dynasties, lasted about 3,000 years.

The economic and political system of China's feudal era had in the main the following characteristics:

1. A self-sufficing natural economy occupied the dominant position. The peasants produced not only agricultural products but most of the handicraft articles they needed. What the landlords and nobility exacted from the peasants as land rent was also chiefly for consumption and not for exchange. Though exchange developed at that time, it did not play a decisive role in the economy as a whole.

2. A feudal ruling class composed of the landlords, the nobility and the emperor owned most of the land, while the peasants had very little land or none at all. The peasants tilled the land for the landlords, the nobility and the royal family with their own farm implements and turned over to them for consumption 40, 50, 60, 70, or even 80 per cent or more of the crops. Such peasants were actually serfs.

3. Not only did the landlords, the nobility and the royal family themselves live on rent extorted from the peasants, but the state of the landlord class also exacted tribute and taxes from the peasants and imposed *corvée* on them to support a horde of government officials and an army used chiefly for the oppression of the peasants.

4. The feudal state of the landlord class was the organ of power for defending such a feudal system of exploitation. If in the period previous to the Ch'in dynasty there was a feudal state in which each prince held absolute sway in his own realm, then, after China was unified by the First Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty, a type of feudal state appeared in which power was centralised in the person of an autocratic ruler, though the independent feudal régimes remained to some extent. In the feudal state the emperor reigned supreme: he appointed local officials to take charge of the army, the courts, the treasury and the granary and relied on the landed gentry as the mainstay of the entire feudal rule.

It was under this feudal system of economic exploitation and political oppression that the Chinese peasants throughout the ages led a slave-like life in dire poverty and suffering. Under the yoke of feudalism they had no freedom of person. The landlords had the right to beat and insult them and even to put them to death at will, while the peasants had no political rights whatever. The extreme poverty and backwardness of the peasants resulting from such ruthless exploitation and oppression by the landlord class is the basic reason why China's economy and social life has remained stagnant for thousands of years.

In feudal society, the main contradiction is between the peasantry and the landlord class.

And in this society the peasants and the handicraftsmen alone formed the principal classes that created wealth and culture.

The ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression of the peasantry by the landlord class forced the peasants to rise repeatedly in revolt against its rule. From Ch'en Sheng, Wu Kuang, Hsiang Yu and Liu Pang⁶ of the Ch'in dynasty to the Hsinshins, the P'inglins, the Red Eyebrows, the Bronze Horses,⁷ and the Yellow Turbans⁸ of the Han dynasty, to Li Mi and Tou Chien-teh⁹ of the Sui dynasty, to Wang Hsien-chih

and Huang Ch'ao¹⁰ of the T'ang dynasty, to Sung Chiang and Fang La¹¹ of the Sung dynasty, to Chu Yuan-chang¹² of the Yuan dynasty, to Li Tzu-ch'eng¹³ of the Ming dynasty, and down to the T'ai'ing Heavenly Kingdom¹⁴ in the Ch'ing dynasty, there have been several hundred big and small uprisings, all of which were peasant movements of rebellion, that is, peasant revolutionary wars. The gigantic scale of such peasant uprisings and peasant wars in Chinese history is without parallel in the world. These class struggles of the peasants—the peasant uprisings and peasant wars—alone formed the real motive force of historical development in China's feudal society. For each of the major peasant uprisings and wars dealt a blow to the existing feudal régime and more or less furthered the development of the social productive forces. However, since neither new productive forces, nor new relations of production, nor a new class force, nor an advanced political party existed in those days, and consequently peasant uprisings and wars lacked such correct leadership as is given by the proletariat and the Communist Party today, the peasant revolutions invariably failed, and the peasants were utilised during or after each revolution by the landlords and the nobility as a tool for bringing about a dynastic change. Thus, although some social progress was made after each great peasant revolutionary struggle, the feudal economic relations and feudal political system remained basically unchanged.

Only in the last hundred years did fresh changes take place.

3. PRESENT-DAY COLONIAL, SEMI-COLONIAL AND SEMI-FEUDAL SOCIETY

It has been explained above that for 3,000 years Chinese society remained a feudal society. But is Chinese society today still a completely feudal society? No, China has changed. Since the Opium War of 1840¹⁵ China has changed step by step into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. Since the Incident of September 18, 1931 when the Japanese imperialists started their armed invasion of China, Chinese society has changed further into a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. We shall now explain the process of this change.

As mentioned in Section 2, Chinese feudal society lasted for

about 3,000 years. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that great internal changes took place in China as a result of the penetration of foreign capitalism.

As China's feudal society developed its commodity economy and so carried within itself the embryo of capitalism, China would of herself have developed slowly into a capitalist society even if there had been no influence of foreign capitalism. The penetration of foreign capitalism accelerated this development. Foreign capitalism played an important role in disintegrating China's social economy, because on the one hand it destroyed the foundation of her self-sufficing natural economy and disrupted her handicraft industries in both the cities and peasant homes, and on the other hand it accelerated the development of commodity economy in town and country.

Apart from its disintegrating effect on the foundation of China's feudal economy, this situation also created certain objective conditions and possibilities for the development of China's capitalist production. For the destruction of the natural economy created a commodity market for capitalism, and the bankruptcy of large numbers of peasants and handicraftsmen created a labour market for it.

In fact, as early as sixty years ago, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, owing to the stimulus of foreign capitalism and certain breaches in the feudal economic structure, some merchants, landlords and bureaucrats started investing in modern industries. About forty years ago, at the turn of the century, China's national capitalism developed in a rudimentary form. Then about twenty years ago, during the first imperialist world war, China's own industry, chiefly textiles and flour milling, developed further because the European and American imperialist countries, preoccupied with the war, temporarily relaxed their oppression of China.

The process of emergence and development of China's national capitalism has been at the same time the process of the emergence and development of China's bourgeoisie and proletariat. Just as certain sections of the merchants, landlords and bureaucrats were predecessors of the Chinese bourgeoisie, so certain sections of the peasants and handicraftsmen were predecessors of the Chinese proletariat. The Chinese bourgeoisie

and proletariat, as two distinct social classes, are new-born classes which never existed before in Chinese history. In embryo in feudal society, they evolved into new social classes. They are interlinked but antagonistic classes, the twins born of China's old (feudal) society. However, the emergence and development of the Chinese proletariat accompanied not only the emergence and development of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, but also the imperialists' direct operation of enterprises in China. As a result, a very large section of the Chinese proletariat has a much longer standing and more experience than the Chinese bourgeoisie, and so it is a greater social force with a broader social foundation.

Yet this fresh change represented by the emergence and development of capitalism constitutes only one aspect of the change that has taken place since imperialist penetration into China. There is another aspect which co-exists with it as well as hampers it, namely, the collusion of foreign imperialism with China's feudal forces to arrest the development of Chinese capitalism.

The imperialist powers certainly do not invade China with the purpose of transforming a feudal China into a capitalist China. Their aim is just the opposite—to transform China into their semi-colony or colony.

To this end the imperialist powers have adopted and are adopting the following measures of oppression, military, political, economic and cultural, to turn China step by step into a semi-colony or colony.

1. The imperialist powers started many wars of aggression against China, as for example, the Opium War launched by Britain in 1840, the War with the Anglo-French Allied Army in 1857,¹⁶ the Sino-French War of 1884,¹⁷ the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the War with the Eight-Power Allied Army in 1900.¹⁸ Having defeated China in war, they not only occupied many states bordering on China that were under her protection, but seized or "leased" part of her territory. For example, Japan occupied Taiwan and the Pescadores and "leased" Port Arthur, Britain seized Hongkong, and France "leased" Kwangchow Wan. Apart from these territorial annexations they exacted from China huge sums of indemnities. Thus severe blows were dealt to China's far-flung feudal empire.

2. They forced China to conclude numerous unequal treaties by which they acquired the right to station their land and sea forces in China and to enjoy consular jurisdiction,¹⁹ and China has even been divided up into spheres of influence²⁰ among a number of imperialist powers.

3. The imperialists have gained control of all the important trading ports in China by unequal treaties and have marked off parts of many of these ports as concessions under their direct administration.²¹ They also control China's customs and foreign trade as well as her sea, land, air and inland water communications. Thus they can dump their goods in China and turn her into a market for their industrial products, and also subordinate China's agricultural production to their own needs.

4. The imperialist powers are also running many light and heavy industries in China in order to make immediate use of China's raw materials and cheap labour, thereby directly exerting economic pressure on China's own industries and hampering the development of her productive forces.

5. By granting loans to the Chinese government and establishing banks in China, the imperialist powers have monopolised China's banking and finance. Thus they have not only overwhelmed China's national capitalism in commodity competition but have secured a stranglehold on China's banking and finance.

6. To facilitate their exploitation of the great masses of the Chinese peasantry and other sections of the Chinese population, the imperialist powers have, through the compradors and merchant usurers, established a network of exploitation which spreads from the trading ports to the remote and backward countryside, thus creating a comprador class and a merchant-usurer class in their service.

7. Besides the comprador class, imperialism makes the Chinese feudal landlord class the mainstay of its rule over China. Imperialism "first of all allies itself with the ruling classes of the previous social structure, with the feudal lords and with the trading and money-lending bourgeoisie, against the majority of the people. Everywhere imperialism attempts to preserve and to perpetuate all those pre-capitalist forms of exploitation (especially in the villages) which serve as the basis for the existence of its reactionary allies."²² "Imperialism, with all its

financial and military might, constitutes the force that supports, animates, fosters and perpetuates the feudal survivals, together with their bureaucratic militaristic superstructure.”²³

8. The imperialist powers supply the reactionary government in China with large quantities of arms and ammunition and a host of military advisers in order to foment the mixed fight among the warlords and oppress the Chinese people.

9. Besides, the imperialist powers have never slackened their efforts to poison the minds of the Chinese people, that is, to carry out a policy of cultural aggression. Carrying on missionary activities, establishing hospitals and schools, publishing newspapers and enticing Chinese students to study abroad, are the ways this policy is implemented. Their aim is to train intellectuals to serve their interests and to fool the great masses of the Chinese people.

10. Since September 18, 1931, the all-out offensive of Japanese imperialism has further reduced a large part of China's territory, already a semi-colony, into Japan's colony.

The above-mentioned facts represent the other aspect of the fresh change since imperialist penetration into China—the blood-stained picture of a feudal China being reduced into a semi-feudal, semi-colonial and colonial country.

It is thus clear that by penetrating into China the imperialist powers have on the one hand accelerated the disintegration of China's feudal society, caused factors of capitalism to emerge in China and transformed the feudal society into a semi-feudal one, and on the other hand imposed their ruthless rule on China and reduced an independent China into a semi-colonial and colonial China.

To sum up both aspects, this colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society of ours possesses the following characteristics:

1. The foundation of the self-sufficing natural economy of feudal times is destroyed, but the exploitation of the peasantry by the landlord class—the basis of feudal exploitation—not only remains intact but is linked with the exploitation of comprador and usurer capital, and holds an obviously dominant position in China's social-economic life.

2. National capitalism has developed to a certain extent and played a considerable part in China's political and cultural life,

but it has not become the principal social-economic form in China; quite feeble in strength, it is mostly tied in varying degrees to both foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism.

3. The autocratic rule of the emperors and the nobility has been overthrown, and in its place have arisen first the rule of the warlords and bureaucrats of landlord-class origin and then the joint dictatorship of the landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. In the occupied areas there is the rule of Japanese imperialism and its puppets.

4. Imperialism controls not only China's vital financial and economic arteries but also her political and military power. In the occupied areas everything is monopolised by Japanese imperialism.

5. China's economic, political and cultural development shows an extreme unevenness, because China has been under the rule, complete or partial, of several imperialist powers, because she has actually been in a prolonged state of disunity, and because her territory is immense.

6. Owing to the twofold oppression of imperialism and feudalism, and especially to the all-out offensive of Japanese imperialism, the broad masses of the Chinese people, particularly the peasants, have become more and more impoverished and have gone bankrupt in large numbers, living in hunger and cold and utterly deprived of political rights. Such extreme poverty and utter lack of freedom as the Chinese people have known are rare throughout the world.

These are the characteristics of China's colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society.

This situation has been brought about mainly by Japanese and other imperialist forces; it is the result of the combination of foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism.

The contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation, and the contradiction between feudalism and the great masses of the people, are the principal contradictions in modern Chinese society. Of course there are other contradictions, such as the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and the contradictions within the reactionary ruling classes themselves. The contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation, however, is the principal one among the

various contradictions. The struggles arising from these contradictions and their intensification inevitably result in the daily-developing revolutionary movements. The great revolutions of modern and contemporary China have emerged and developed on the basis of these fundamental contradictions.

CHAPTER II

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

I. THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS

The process of the transformation of China into a semi-colony and colony by imperialism allying with Chinese feudalism, is at the same time the process of the struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism and its lackeys. The Opium War, the Movement of the T'ai-p'ing Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the *coup d'état* of 1898, the Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4 Movement, the May 30 Movement, the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the present Anti-Japanese War all testify to the stubborn resistance of the Chinese people, who refuse to submit to imperialism and its lackeys.

Thanks to the unyielding and ever-renewed heroic struggles waged by the Chinese people during the last hundred years, imperialism has not been and will never be able to subjugate China.

At present, although Japanese imperialism is putting forth all its strength in an all-out offensive against China, and many landlords and big bourgeois, like the Wang Ching-weis in the open or under cover, have capitulated or are prepared to capitulate to the enemy, yet the heroic Chinese people will certainly fight on. They certainly will not cease fighting until Japanese imperialism is driven out of China and China achieves complete liberation.

The national revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people has a history of exactly one hundred years dating from the Opium War of 1840, and of thirty years dating from the

Revolution of 1911. As this revolution has not yet run its full course and there has not yet been any signal achievement with regard to the revolutionary tasks, it is still necessary for all the Chinese people, and above all the Chinese Communist Party, to assume the responsibility for a resolute fight.

What, then, are the targets of this revolution? What are its tasks? What are its motive forces? What is its character? And what are its perspectives? These are the questions we shall answer in the following pages.

2. THE TARGETS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

From the analysis given in Chapter I, Section 3, we already know that present-day Chinese society is a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. Only when we clearly understand the character of Chinese society can we clearly understand the targets of the Chinese revolution, its tasks, its motive forces, its character and its perspectives and transition. Therefore a clear understanding of the character of Chinese society, *i.e.* of the country's situation, is the basic premise for an understanding of all problems of the revolution.

Since the character of present-day Chinese society is colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal, then what after all are our chief targets or enemies at this stage of the Chinese revolution?

They are none other than imperialism and feudalism, namely, the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class at home. For these and none other are the principal agents that carry out oppression in Chinese society at the present stage and obstruct its advance. These agents conspire to oppress the Chinese people and, since national oppression by imperialism is the heaviest oppression, imperialism has become the foremost and fiercest enemy of the Chinese people.

Since Japan's armed invasion of China, the principal enemies of the Chinese revolution have been Japanese imperialism and all the collaborators and reactionaries who are in collusion with it, who have either openly capitulated or are prepared to capitulate.

The Chinese bourgeoisie, also actually oppressed by imperialism, once led revolutionary struggles; it played a principal

leading role, for instance, in the Revolution of 1911, and also joined such revolutionary struggles as the Northern Expedition and the present Anti-Japanese War. In the long period from 1927 to 1937, however, the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie, as represented by the reactionary bloc of the Kuomintang, was in league with imperialism and formed a reactionary alliance with the landlord class, turning against the friends who had helped it—the Communist Party, the proletariat, the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, betraying the Chinese revolution and thereby causing its defeat. At that time, therefore, the revolutionary people and their political party, the Communist Party, could only regard these bourgeois elements as a target of the revolution. During the Anti-Japanese War a section of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, as represented by Wang Ching-wei, has already deserted to the enemy and turned collaborator. Consequently the anti-Japanese people can only regard these big bourgeois, who have betrayed our national interests, as a target in the revolution.

It is clear, then, that the enemies of the Chinese revolution are quite powerful. Among them are not only powerful imperialism, but also powerful feudal forces and, at certain times, the reactionaries among the bourgeoisie who, in collusion with the other two, regard the people as their enemy. Thus the view is incorrect that belittles the strength of the enemies of the revolutionary Chinese people.

Confronted with such enemies, the Chinese revolution becomes protracted and ruthless in nature. Since the enemies are extremely powerful, the revolutionary forces, unless allowed a long period of time, cannot be massed and steeled into a power that will finally crush them. Since the enemy's suppression of the Chinese revolution is exceedingly ruthless, the revolutionary forces cannot hold their own positions and take over the enemy's unless they steel themselves and develop their tenacity. The view that the forces of the Chinese revolution can be built up in the twinkling of an eye and the Chinese revolutionary struggle can triumph overnight is therefore incorrect.

Confronted with such enemies, the Chinese revolution must, so far as its principal means or the principal form is concerned

be an armed rather than a peaceful one. This is because our enemy makes it impossible for the Chinese people, deprived of all political freedoms and rights, to take any peaceful political action. Stalin said, "In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."²⁴ This is a perfectly correct formulation. The view which belittles armed struggle, revolutionary war, guerrilla war and army work is therefore incorrect.

Confronted with such enemies, the Chinese revolution has also to tackle the question of revolutionary base areas. Since powerful imperialism and its allies, the reactionary forces in China, have occupied China's key cities for a long time, if the revolutionary forces do not wish to compromise with them but want to carry on the struggle staunchly, and if they intend to accumulate strength and steel themselves and avoid decisive battles with their powerful enemy before they have mustered enough strength, then they must build the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural revolutionary bastions, so that they can fight the fierce enemy who utilises the cities to attack the rural districts and, through a protracted struggle, gradually win an over-all victory for the revolution. In these circumstances, owing to the unevenness in China's economic development (not a unified capitalist economy), to the immensity of China's territory (which gives the revolutionary forces sufficient room to manoeuvre in), to the disunity inside China's counter-revolutionary camp which is fraught with contradictions, and to the fact that the struggle of the peasants, the main force in the Chinese revolution, is led by the party of the proletariat, the Communist Party, a situation arises in which, on the one hand, the Chinese revolution can triumph first in the rural districts and, on the other hand, a state of unevenness is created in the revolution and the task of winning complete victory in the revolution becomes a protracted and arduous one. It is thus clear that the protracted revolutionary struggle conducted in such revolutionary base areas is chiefly a peasant guerrilla war led by the Chinese Communist Party. To neglect building up revolutionary base areas in the rural districts, to neglect

performing arduous work among the peasants, and to neglect guerrilla war, are therefore all incorrect views.

However, to emphasise armed struggle does not mean giving up other forms of struggle; on the contrary, armed struggle will not succeed unless co-ordinated with other forms of struggle. And to emphasise the work in rural base areas does not mean giving up our work in the cities and in the vast rural districts under the enemy's rule; on the contrary, without the work in the cities and in other rural districts, the rural base areas will be isolated and the revolution will suffer defeat. Moreover, the capture of the cities now serving as the enemy's main bases is the final objective of the revolution, an objective which cannot be achieved without adequate work in the cities.

This shows clearly that it is impossible for the revolution to triumph in both the cities and the countryside unless the enemy's principal instrument for fighting the people—his armed forces—is destroyed. Thus besides annihilating enemy troops in war, it is important to work for their disintegration.

This shows clearly that, in the Communist Party's propaganda and organisational work in the cities and the countryside long occupied by the enemy and dominated by the forces of reaction and darkness, we must adopt, instead of an impetuous and adventurist line, a line of hiding the crack forces, accumulating strength and biding our time. In leading the people's struggle against the enemy we must adopt the tactics of advancing slowly but surely, by making the fullest possible use of all forms of open and legal activities permitted by laws and decrees and social customs and basing ourselves on the principles of justifiability, expediency and restraint; vociferous cries and rash actions can never lead to success.

3. THE TASKS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Imperialism and the feudal landlord class being the chief enemies of the Chinese revolution at the present stage, what are the present tasks of the revolution?

Unquestionably, the major tasks are to strike at these two enemies, to carry out a national revolution to overthrow imperialist oppression from the outside and a democratic

revolution to overthrow the oppression of the feudal landlords at home, and of the two tasks the primary one is the national revolution for the overthrow of imperialism.

The two major tasks of the Chinese revolution are interrelated. Unless the rule of imperialism is overthrown, the rule of the feudal landlord class cannot be ended, because imperialism is the principal support of the feudal landlord class. On the other hand, as the feudal landlord class forms the principal social basis for the rule of imperialism over China and the peasantry is the main force in the Chinese revolution, no powerful contingents of the Chinese revolution can be formed to overthrow the imperialist rule unless help is given to the peasantry in overthrowing the feudal landlord class. Therefore the two basic tasks, the national revolution and the democratic revolution, are at once distinguished from and related to each other.

As the main task of China's national revolution today is to oppose Japanese imperialism that has invaded her territory, and the task of her democratic revolution must be fulfilled in order to win the war, the two revolutionary tasks are already linked with each other. To regard the national revolution and the democratic revolution as two distinctly different stages is an incorrect view.

4. THE MOTIVE FORCES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

According to the foregoing analysis and definition of the character of Chinese society and of the targets and tasks of the Chinese revolution at the present stage, what are the motive forces of the Chinese revolution?

Since Chinese society is a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, since the targets against which the Chinese revolution is directed are principally foreign imperialist rule in China and domestic feudalism, and since the task of the Chinese revolution is to overthrow the two oppressors, then which among the classes and strata in Chinese society are the forces capable of fighting imperialism and feudalism? This is a question of the motive forces of the Chinese revolution at the present stage. The problem of the basic tactics of the Chinese revolution can be correctly solved only through a clear understanding of this question.

What classes are there in present-day Chinese society? There are the landlord class and the bourgeoisie; the landlord class and the upper strata of the bourgeoisie are the ruling classes in Chinese society. There are also the proletariat, the peasantry and all types of the petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry which, over the greatest part of Chinese soil, still remain the subject classes.

The attitudes and positions of all these classes in relation to the Chinese revolution are entirely determined by their social-economic status. Thus the character of China's economy determines not only the targets and tasks of the revolution but also its motive forces.

We shall now proceed to an analysis of the classes in Chinese society.

1. *The Landlord Class*

The landlord class forms the principal social basis for imperialist rule over China, the class that uses the feudal system to exploit and oppress the peasantry and obstructs the political, economic and cultural development of Chinese society rather than plays any progressive role.

Therefore the landlords, as a class, are a target and not a motive force of the revolution.

In the Anti-Japanese War a section of the big landlords, following a section of the big bourgeoisie (the capitulators), has surrendered to the Japanese invaders and turned collaborator, while another section, following the other section of the big bourgeoisie (the die-hards), has been extremely vacillating, though it still remains in the anti-Japanese camp. But as many of the enlightened gentry who are middle and small landlords, *i.e.* landlords of a more or less capitalist complexion, display some enthusiasm for resistance to Japan, we still have to unite with them for the common fight.

2. *The Bourgeoisie*

Among the bourgeoisie there is a distinction between the big bourgeoisie of a comprador character and the national bourgeoisie.

The big bourgeoisie of a comprador character is a class that

directly serves the capitalists of the imperialist countries and is fed by them; countless ties connect it closely with the feudal forces in the countryside. Therefore in the history of the Chinese revolution the big bourgeoisie of a comprador character has never been a motive force, but has always been a target of the Chinese revolution.

However, the different sections of the Chinese big bourgeoisie of a comprador character owe allegiance to different imperialist powers; when the contradictions among these powers grow into sharp antagonisms, and one of these powers becomes the particular object of the revolution, the sections owing allegiance to other imperialist groups may join the current anti-imperialist front to a certain extent and for a certain period of time. But as soon as their masters start to oppose the Chinese revolution, they will follow suit.

In the Anti-Japanese War the pro-Japanese big bourgeois (the capitulators) have either surrendered or are getting ready to do so. The pro-European and pro-American big bourgeois (the die-hards), though remaining in the anti-Japanese camp, are extremely vacillating, for they are double dealers, anti-Japanese on the one hand and anti-Communist on the other. Our policy towards the big-bourgeois capitulators is to treat them as enemies and resolutely strike them down. As to the die-hards of the big bourgeoisie, we deal with them by a revolutionary twofold policy, that is, on the one hand uniting with them—for they are still anti-Japanese and we should still utilise the contradiction between them and Japanese imperialism; and on the other hand waging struggles against them resolutely—for they are pursuing a high-handed anti-Communist and anti-popular policy to undermine resistance and unity, and without such struggles resistance and unity will be jeopardised.

The national bourgeoisie is a class with a dual character.

On the one hand, this class is oppressed by imperialism and fettered by feudalism and is consequently in contradiction with both. In this respect it constitutes one of the revolutionary forces. In the history of Chinese revolution it has shown some enthusiasm for fighting imperialism and the government of bureaucrats and warlords.

But on the other hand, it lacks the courage to oppose

imperialism and feudalism thoroughly because it is economically and politically flabby and its economic ties with imperialism and feudalism are not yet completely severed. This is most clearly revealed when the people's revolutionary strength grows.

This dual character of the national bourgeoisie means that at certain periods and to a certain extent this class can take part in the revolution against imperialism and against the government of bureaucrats and warlords and become a revolutionary force. But in other periods there is the danger that it may follow the big comprador bourgeoisie as its accomplice in counter-revolution.

The national bourgeoisie in China consists mainly of the middle bourgeoisie which, though having followed the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie in opposing the revolution in the period between 1927 and 1931 (before the Incident of September 18), has never really held political power, but has suffered from restrictions imposed by the reactionary policies of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie in power. During the War of Resistance to Japan, it distinguishes itself not only from the capitulators of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie but also from the big bourgeois die-hards and, up to now, remains a comparatively good ally of ours. Hence it is entirely necessary to adopt a cautious policy towards the national bourgeoisie.

3. *Various Types of the Petty Bourgeoisie other than the Peasantry*

The petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry consists of the vast numbers of intellectuals, small merchants, handicraftsmen and professionals.

With a status somewhat like that of the middle peasants among the peasantry, all these types of the petty bourgeoisie suffer from the oppression of imperialism, feudalism and the big bourgeoisie, and are driven daily nearer bankruptcy and ruin.

Hence these sections of the petty bourgeoisie form one of the motive forces of the revolution and a reliable ally of the proletariat. They can achieve their liberation only under the leadership of the proletariat.

Now we shall analyse the various types of the petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry.

First, the intellectuals and student youth. The intellectuals and student youth do not constitute a class or stratum. But judging from their family origin, their living conditions and their political outlook, most of the intellectuals and student youth in present-day China may be classed with the petty bourgeoisie. During the past decades a large group of intellectuals and student youth has emerged in China. Apart from a section of the intellectuals who are closely connected with imperialism and the big bourgeoisie and serve them in opposing the people, the intellectuals and student youth are generally oppressed by imperialism, feudalism and the big bourgeoisie, and are in danger of losing their jobs or the opportunity to study. Hence they are quite revolutionary. They are more or less equipped with bourgeois scientific knowledge, have a keen political sense, and often serve as the spearhead or as a bridge in the present stage of the Chinese revolution. The campaign to send students to study abroad before the Revolution of 1911, the May 4 Movement of 1919, the May 30 Movement of 1925 and the December 9 Movement of 1935 are striking proofs of this. In particular, great masses of the more or less impoverished intellectuals can join and support the revolution together with the workers and peasants. It was also among the intellectuals and the student youth that Marxist-Leninist ideology was first widely disseminated and accepted in China. No success can be achieved in organising the revolutionary forces and carrying on revolutionary work without the participation of the revolutionary intellectuals. But before the intellectuals identify themselves with the cause of the people's revolutionary struggles or resolve to serve the interests of the masses and become one with them, they often tend towards subjectivism and individualism, illusory in views and irresolute in action. Hence though the great masses of China's revolutionary intellectuals can serve as a spearhead or a bridge, not all of them can remain staunch revolutionaries. A section of the intellectuals often leaves the revolutionary ranks at critical moments and becomes passive, while a few may even become enemies of the revolution. The intellectuals can overcome these defects only after they have gone through a long period of mass struggle.

Second, the small merchants. Generally they run small

stores and hire only a few or no assistants. They are threatened with bankruptcy because of exploitation by imperialism, the big bourgeoisie and the usurers.

Third, the handicraftsmen. They amount to a great mass of people. They have their own means of production, and hire no workers or only one or two apprentices or helpers. Their position resembles that of the middle peasants.

Fourth, the professionals. They include men of various professions, such as the doctors. They do not exploit or only slightly exploit other people. Their position resembles that of the handicraftsmen.

The above-mentioned sections of the petty bourgeoisie amount to a great multitude and must be won over and attended to because they generally can join and support the revolution and are its good allies. Their drawback is that some of them are easily influenced by the bourgeoisie; hence it is necessary to pay attention to carrying out revolutionary propaganda and organisational work among them.

4. *The Peasantry*

The peasantry constitutes approximately 80 per cent of the nation's total population and is the mainstay of China's present-day national economy.

A process of radical differentiation is taking place among the peasantry.

First, the rich peasants. The rich peasants constitute about 5 per cent of the rural population (about 10 per cent together with the landlords), and are called the rural bourgeoisie. Most of the rich peasants in China let a part of their land, practise usury, ruthlessly exploit the farm labourers and are semi-feudal in character. But generally the rich peasants engage in labour themselves, and in this sense they are part of the peasantry. Their productive activities will remain useful for some time to come. And generally they might contribute some effort to the anti-imperialist struggles of the peasant masses and may stay neutral in the agrarian revolutionary struggles against the landlords. Therefore we should neither consider them as of the same class as the landlords nor adopt prematurely a policy of liquidating them.

Second, the middle peasants. The middle peasants constitute about 20 per cent of China's rural population. Economically self-supporting (possibly having a surplus when the crops are good and occasionally hiring a limited amount of labour or lending a little money at interest), they generally do not exploit others but suffer from exploitation by imperialism, the landlord class and the bourgeoisie. The middle peasants have no political rights. A section of the middle peasants does not have enough land, and only the section of well-to-do middle peasants has a little surplus land. Not only can the middle peasants join the anti-imperialist revolution and the agrarian revolution, but they can also accept socialism. Therefore the whole middle peasantry can become a reliable ally of the proletariat and is among the important motive forces of the revolution. The attitude of the middle peasants towards the revolution—whether they are for or against it—is a factor determining its victory or defeat, and this is especially true when the middle peasants become the majority in the countryside after the agrarian revolution.

Third, the poor peasants. The poor peasants in China, together with the farm labourers, constitute about 70 per cent of the rural population. The poor peasants are the broad peasant masses with no land or insufficient land—the semi-proletariat in the countryside, the biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution, and by nature the most reliable ally of the proletariat and the main contingent of China's revolutionary forces. The poor peasants and the middle peasants can achieve their liberation only under the leadership of the proletariat, and only when the proletariat has concluded a firm alliance with the poor peasants and middle peasants can it lead the revolution to victory, a thing otherwise impossible. The word "peasantry" refers mainly to the poor and middle peasants.

5. *The Proletariat*

Among the Chinese proletariat, the modern industrial workers number about 2,500,000 to 3,000,000; the hired labourers in small-scale industries and handicrafts in the cities and the shop assistants total about 12,000,000; and the rural proletariat (farm labourers) and other urban and rural proletarians also constitute a great number.

In addition to the basic good qualities of the proletariat in general—that it is associated with the most advanced form of economy, that it has a strong sense of organisation and discipline and that it owns no private means of production—the Chinese proletariat has many outstanding qualities.

What are the outstanding qualities of the Chinese proletariat?

First, the Chinese proletariat is subjected to threefold oppression (oppression by imperialism, by the bourgeoisie and by the feudal forces) with a severity and ruthlessness seldom found in other nations of the world, and consequently it is more resolute and more thoroughgoing in the revolutionary struggle than any other class. Since there is no such economic basis for social reformism in colonial and semi-colonial China as in Europe, the proletariat, with the exception of a few scabs, is very revolutionary as a whole.

Secondly, ever since its appearance on the revolutionary scene, the Chinese proletariat has been under the leadership of its own revolutionary political party—the Chinese Communist Party—and has become the most politically conscious class in Chinese society.

Thirdly, because the Chinese proletariat is largely made up of bankrupt peasants, it has natural ties with the vast peasantry, which facilitate their close alliance.

Therefore, in spite of certain unavoidable weaknesses—for example, its small size (as compared with the peasantry), its young age (as compared with the proletariat in capitalist countries) and its low cultural level (as compared with the bourgeoisie), the Chinese proletariat has nonetheless become the basic motive force of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese revolution certainly will not succeed without the leadership of the proletariat. To take an earlier example, the revolution of 1911 was abortive because the proletariat did not consciously participate in it and because there was as yet no Communist Party. More recently, the revolution of 1924-7 achieved great success for a time because of the conscious participation and leadership of the proletariat and the existence of the Communist Party, but later on it suffered defeat because the big bourgeoisie betrayed its alliance with the proletariat and abandoned the common revolutionary programme, and also because

the Chinese proletariat and its political party still lacked ample revolutionary experience. Subsequently, because of the leadership of the proletariat and the Chinese Communist Party in the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the whole nation has been united and the great Anti-Japanese War has been launched and resolutely carried on.

The Chinese proletariat ought to understand that, although it is the class with the highest political consciousness and sense of organisation, it cannot win victory by virtue of its own strength alone. In order to win victory it must unite, under various conditions, with all possible revolutionary classes and strata and organise a revolutionary united front. Among all the classes in Chinese society, the peasantry is the firm ally of the working class, the urban petty bourgeoisie is a reliable ally, and the national bourgeoisie is an ally in certain periods and to a certain extent; this is one of the fundamental laws proved by the history of modern Chinese revolution.

6. *The Vagrants*

China's colonial and semi-colonial status has created a multitude of unemployed people both in the countryside and in the cities. Denied any legitimate way of making a living, many of them are forced to resort to illegitimate means, hence the robbers, gangsters, beggars, prostitutes and all those who live upon superstitious practices. This social stratum is vacillating in character: while one section is liable to be bought over by the reactionary forces, another section can join the revolution. Lacking the constructive quality and given more to destruction than to construction, these people, after joining the revolution, become the source of the ideology of the roving insurgents and of anarchism among the ranks of the revolution. Therefore we should know how to remould them and forestall their destructiveness.

The above is our analysis of the motive forces of the Chinese revolution.

5. THE CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

We now understand the character of Chinese society, *i.e.* the special conditions in China, which is the most fundamental

premise for solving all China's revolutionary problems. We have also come to know the targets of the Chinese revolution, its tasks and its motive forces, which are the basic issues at the present stage of the Chinese revolution, arising from the special character of Chinese society and the special conditions in China. Having come to understand these things, we can now understand another basic issue of the Chinese revolution at the present stage, *i.e.* the character of the Chinese revolution.

What, after all, is the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage? Is it a bourgeois-democratic or a proletarian-socialist revolution? Obviously, not the latter but the former.

It is now clear that Chinese society is still a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, that the principal enemies of the Chinese revolution are still imperialism and the feudal forces, that the task of the Chinese revolution consists in a national revolution and a democratic revolution for overthrowing these two principal enemies, and furthermore that the bourgeoisie sometimes also takes part in this revolution and that, even if the big bourgeoisie betrays the revolution and becomes its enemy, the spearhead of the revolution will still be directed at imperialism and feudalism rather than at capitalism and capitalist private property in general. That being so, the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is not proletarian-socialist but bourgeois-democratic.

However, the bourgeois-democratic revolution in present-day China is no longer of the general, old type, which is now obsolete, but one of a special, new type. This kind of revolution is developing in China as well as in all colonial and semi-colonial countries, and we call it the new-democratic revolution. This new-democratic revolution is part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution, which resolutely opposes imperialism, *i.e.* international capitalism. Politically it means the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the imperialists, collaborators and reactionaries, and opposition to the transformation of Chinese society into a society under bourgeois dictatorship. Economically, it means nationalisation of all big capital and big enterprises of the imperialists, collaborators and reactionaries, distribution of the land of the landlords among the peasants, and at the same time the general preservation of

private capitalist enterprises without the elimination of rich-peasant economy. While clearing the way for capitalism, this democratic revolution of a new type creates the pre-condition for socialism. The present stage of the Chinese revolution is a transitional stage between putting an end to the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and establishing a socialist society—a process of new-democratic revolution. This process, begun only after the First World War and the Russian October Revolution, started in China with the May 4 Movement of 1919. A new-democratic revolution is a revolution of the broad masses of the people led by the proletariat and directed against imperialism and feudalism. China must go through this revolution before she can advance to a socialist society; otherwise she cannot advance to socialism.

This kind of new-democratic revolution differs greatly from the democratic revolutions in the history of European and American countries, in that it results not in the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, but in the dictatorship of the united front of all revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat. During the Anti-Japanese War, the anti-Japanese democratic political power built up in the anti-Japanese base areas under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is a political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, which is neither a one-class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie nor a one-class dictatorship of the proletariat, but a joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat. All those who stand for resistance to Japan and for democracy are qualified to share this political power, regardless of their party affiliations.

This kind of new-democratic revolution differs also from a socialist revolution in that it aims only at overthrowing the rule of the imperialists, collaborators and reactionaries in China, but not at injuring any capitalist sections which can still take part in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggles.

This kind of new-democratic revolution is basically in line with the revolution of the Three People's Principles as advocated by Sun Yat-sen in 1924. In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang issued in that year, Sun Yat-sen stated:

“The so-called democratic system in modern nations is usually monopolised by the bourgeoisie and has simply become an instrument for oppressing the common people. As to the Principle of Democracy of the Kuomintang, it stands for something to be shared by all the common people and not to be monopolised by a few.”

Further:

“Enterprises, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are monopolistic in character or which are on too large a scale for private management, such as banks, railways and air lines, shall be operated by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: This is the main principle of the control of capital.”

And again in his Testament, Sun Yat-sen pointed out the fundamental principle for domestic and foreign policies:

“... We must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common fight with those nations of the world who treat us on the basis of equality. . . .”

The Three People's Principles of the old democracy adapted to old circumstances at home and abroad were thus remoulded into the Three People's Principles of the New Democracy adapted to new circumstances at home and abroad. The Chinese Communist Party was referring to the Three People's Principles of the latter kind and not to anything else when it announced in its Manifesto of September 22, 1937, that “the Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party pledges itself to fight for their complete realisation”. It is the Three People's Principles of this kind that underlie Sun Yat-sen's three cardinal policies—alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communists and assistance to the peasants and workers. Under the new international and domestic conditions, any kind of Three People's Principles which depart from the three cardinal policies cannot be the revolutionary Three People's Principles. (That communism and the Three People's Principles agree only in the basic political programmes for the democratic revolution and differ in all other respects, is a question that will not be treated here.)

Thus whether in the alignment for struggle (the united front) or in the composition of the state, the position of the proletariat, the peasantry and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie should not be ignored in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution. Whoever tries to exclude China's proletariat, peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie from the picture certainly cannot shape China's destiny or solve any of her problems. The democratic republic which the Chinese revolution is striving to create at the present stage must be one in which the workers, peasants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie occupy definite places and play definite roles. In other words, it is to be a democratic republic with a revolutionary alliance of the workers, the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and all other anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can such a republic be completely realised.

6. THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Now that the basic problems as to the character of Chinese society and the targets, tasks, motive forces and character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage have been clarified, it is easy to understand the problem of the perspectives of the Chinese revolution, the problem of the relation between China's bourgeois-democratic and proletarian-socialist revolutions or between the present and the future stages of the Chinese revolution.

Since China's bourgeois-democratic revolution at the present stage is not a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the general, old type, but a democratic revolution of a special, new type, a new-democratic revolution, and since furthermore the Chinese revolution is now taking place in the new international setting of the 1930's and 1940's, characterised by the rise of socialism and the decline of capitalism, and in the period of the Second World War and of revolutions, there can be no doubt whatever that the ultimate perspective of the Chinese revolution is not capitalism but socialism and communism.

Since the Chinese revolution at the present stage aims at changing the existing colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal

status of society, and is a struggle to complete a new-democratic revolution, it is conceivable, and not surprising, that after the victory of the revolution, capitalist economy will develop to a certain extent in Chinese society because the obstacles to the development of capitalism will have been swept away. It is an inevitable result of the victory of the democratic revolution in economically backward China that capitalism will develop to a certain degree. But this will be only the result of the Chinese revolution in one aspect, not its whole outcome. The whole outcome of the Chinese revolution will be the development of the capitalist factors on the one hand, and of the socialist factors on the other. What are the socialist factors? They are the growing political influence of the proletariat and the Communist Party in the whole country; the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party that has been or may be recognised by the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the urban petty bourgeoisie; and the state enterprises of the people's republic and the co-operatives of the labouring people. All these are the socialist factors. Together with the favourable international situation, they are bound to make it possible that the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution will finally steer away from a capitalist future and head towards the realisation of socialism.

7. THE TWOFOLD TASK OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Recapitulating the points in the foregoing sections of this chapter, we can see that the Chinese revolution taken as a whole involves a twofold task. That is to say, it embraces a revolution that is bourgeois-democratic in character (a new-democratic revolution) and a revolution that is proletarian-socialist in character—it embraces the twofold task of the revolution at both the present and the future stages. The leadership in this twofold revolutionary task rests on the shoulders of the party of the Chinese proletariat, the Chinese Communist Party, for without its leadership no revolution can succeed.

To complete China's bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new-democratic revolution) and to prepare to transform it into a socialist revolution when all the necessary conditions are

present—that is the sum total of the great and glorious revolutionary task of the Communist Party of China. All members of the Party should strive for its accomplishment and should never give up half-way. Some immature Communists think that we have only the task of the democratic revolution at the present stage, but not that of the socialist revolution at the future stage; or that the present revolution or the agrarian revolution is in fact the socialist revolution. It must be emphatically pointed out that both views are erroneous. Every Communist must know that the whole Chinese revolutionary movement led by the Chinese Communist Party is a complete revolutionary movement embracing the two revolutionary stages, democratic and socialist, which are two revolutionary processes differing in character, and that the socialist stage can be reached only after the democratic stage is completed. The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable trend of the democratic revolution. And the ultimate aim of all Communists is to strive for the final building of socialist society and communist society. We can give correct leadership to the Chinese revolution only on the basis of a clear understanding of both the differences between the democratic and socialist revolutions and their interconnections.

Except for the Communist Party, none of the political parties, bourgeois or petty-bourgeois, is equal to the task of leading China's two great revolutions, democratic and socialist, to their complete realisation. And the Chinese Communist Party, from the very day of its birth, has placed this twofold task upon its own shoulders and has already strenuously fought for it for fully eighteen years.

A task like this is at once most glorious and most arduous. It cannot be accomplished without a bolshevised Chinese Communist Party of nation-wide scope and broad mass character, fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organisationally. It is therefore the duty of every Communist to take an active part in building up such a Communist Party.

December 1939.

STALIN IS THE FRIEND OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

The twenty-first of December this year is Comrade Stalin's sixtieth birthday. His birthday, we can well imagine, will call forth warm and affectionate congratulations from the heart of all those people throughout the world who know the occasion and are revolutionary.

To congratulate Stalin is not merely doing something in honour of the occasion. To congratulate Stalin means to support him, to support his cause, to support the victory of socialism, to support the path he points out for mankind, and to support our own close friend. This is because at present the great majority of mankind are sufferers, and only through the path Stalin points out and with the help he gives can mankind be freed from suffering.

We Chinese people are now living in a period of an unprecedented disaster in our history, a period when help from others is most urgently needed. The *Book of Odes* says, "A bird twitters to call forth a friend's responding voice". We are precisely at such a juncture.

But who are our friends?

One kind of so-called "friends" style themselves friends of the Chinese people and some Chinese also unthinkingly call them friends. But such friends can only be classed with Li Lin-fu¹ of the T'ang dynasty. Li Lin-fu was a prime minister of the T'ang dynasty, a notorious man described as having "honey dripping from his tongue and daggers concealed in his heart". The so-called "friends" nowadays are exactly friends with "honey dripping from their tongues and daggers concealed in their hearts". Who are these people? The very imperialists who say that they sympathise with China.

The friends of another kind are different; they have real sympathy for us and regard us as their own brothers. Who are these people? They are none other than the Soviet people, than Stalin.

No other country has renounced its special rights and privileges in China; the Soviet Union alone has done this.

During the First Great Revolution, all the imperialists were opposed to us; the Soviet Union alone aided us.

In the Anti-Japanese War, no government of any imperialist country has really given us help; the Soviet Union alone has helped us with aeroplanes and supplies.

Is this not clear enough?

To the cause of liberation of the Chinese nation and Chinese people only the socialist country, the socialist leaders, the socialist people and the socialist thinkers, statesmen and workers can give real help; and without their help it is impossible to win final victory for our cause.

Stalin is the true friend of the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people. The Chinese people's love and respect for Stalin and our friendship towards the Soviet Union are perfectly true and sincere; any attempt to sow dissension by rumour-mongering and slandering will prove of no avail in the end.

December 20, 1939.

IN MEMORY OF NORMAN BETHUNE

A member of the Communist Party of Canada, Comrade Norman Bethune¹ was over fifty when, sent by the Communist Parties of Canada and the United States to help China in the Anti-Japanese War, he made light of a distance of thousands of miles and arrived in China. He came to Yen-an last spring, went to work in the Wutai mountains, and unfortunately died a martyr to his duties. What kind of spirit is this that made a foreigner regard, without any selfish motive, the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, and every Chinese Communist must learn from this spirit. Leninism teaches that the world revolution can succeed only if the proletariat of the capitalist countries supports the struggle for liberation of the people of the colonies and semi-colonies and the proletariat of the colonies and semi-colonies supports the struggle for liberation of the proletarians of the capitalist countries.² Comrade Bethune has followed this Leninist line in his practice. We Chinese Communists must also carry out this line. We must unite with the proletarians of all the capitalist countries, with the proletarians of Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy and all other capitalist countries; only then can we overthrow imperialism, liberate our nation and people and liberate the nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the internationalism with which we oppose both national chauvinism and narrow patriotism.

Comrade Bethune's spirit of doing everything for others' benefit and nothing for his own was shown in his extreme sense of responsibility in his work and his extreme warmheartedness towards his comrades and the people. Every Communist must learn from him. Quite a number of people are irresponsible in their work, "picking up the light and shirking the heavy", *i.e.* shoving the heavy loads on to others and choosing the light ones for themselves. When anything comes up, they think of themselves first and of others only afterwards. When they have exerted themselves a little, they swell with pride and brag

about it in case others should not know. Towards their comrades and the people, they are not full of enthusiasm but cold and reserved, indifferent and apathetic. Such people are not really Communists, or at least cannot be counted as pure Communists. None who returned from the front failed to express their admiration for Bethune whenever his name was mentioned, and none remained unmoved by his spirit. None of the soldiers and civilians in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh border area, who had been treated by Dr. Bethune or had seen with their own eyes how he did his work, were unmoved. Every Communist must learn from Comrade Bethune this spirit of a true Communist.

Comrade Bethune was a doctor: he practised medicine as his profession and he was always improving his skill; and among the Eighth Route Army's whole medical personnel he stood very high for his skill. This is an excellent lesson for that crowd of people who wish to change their work the moment they see something different, and for those who despise technical work as of no consequence, as a blind-alley occupation.

I saw Comrade Bethune only once. Afterwards he wrote me many letters. But as I was busy, I wrote back only one letter and do not know if he ever received it. I feel deeply grieved over his death. Now all of us commemorate him; thus we can see how profoundly people are moved by his spirit. We must all learn from him the spirit that is so completely free from selfishness. Starting from this point one can become a person of great use to the people. A man's ability may be great or small, but if only he has this spirit, he is already a noble-minded man, a pure man, a moral man, a man who has left vulgar taste behind, a man who is useful to the people.

December 21, 1939.

measuring truth. This, I think, should be the standpoint of this publication *Chinese Culture*.

ON NEW DEMOCRACY

I. WHITHER CHINA?

Since the War of Resistance began, people throughout the country have taken on a cheerful and hopeful look and, with the rise of a general feeling that there is a way out, the expression of knitted brows and downcast eyes has completely disappeared. Lately, however, the dust and din of compromise and anti-communism has suddenly filled the air again, and once more the people of the whole country have been thrown into bewilderment. Especially the cultural workers and young students, being sensitive, are the first to be affected by it. The questions again arise: What is to be done? Whither China? On the occasion of the publication of *Chinese Culture*,¹ it may therefore be profitable to explain the problem of the trends of Chinese politics and Chinese culture. Being a layman on cultural problems, I hope to make a study of them, and I am just beginning. Fortunately many comrades in Yen-an have written exhaustive articles on this subject, so my sketchy treatment may serve as the beating of gongs and drums that precedes a theatrical performance. To the advanced cultural workers of the whole country, our writings serve only as a brick-bat thrown to induce them to cast precious stones, and the heaps of our suggestions may contain a grain of truth; we hope that they will join us in the discussion so that correct conclusions will be reached and the needs of our nation will be met. The scientific approach consists in "seeking truth from facts", and the presumptuous approach of "assuming one's own infallibility" and "posing as the master to all" can never be of any help in solving problems. The calamity of our nation is extremely grave, and only a scientific approach and a spirit of responsibility can lead our nation on to the road of liberation. There is but one truth, and the criterion for determining the question who has discovered the truth is after all not subjective boastfulness but objective practice. Only the revolutionary practice of millions upon millions of the people is the yard-stick for

2. WE WANT TO BUILD UP A NEW CHINA

For many years we Communists have struggled not only for China's political and economic revolution but also for her cultural revolution; all this aims at building up a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation. In that new society and new state there will be not only new politics and a new economy but also a new culture. That is to say, we want not only to change a politically oppressed and economically exploited China into a politically free and economically prosperous China, but also to change a China which has been ignorant and backward under the rule of the old culture into a China that will be enlightened and progressive under the rule of a new culture. In a word, we want to build up a new China. To build up a new culture of the Chinese nation is our aim in the cultural sphere.

3. CHINA'S HISTORICAL FEATURE

We want to build up a new culture of the Chinese nation, but what kind of culture is this new culture after all?

Any given culture (culture as an ideological form) is a reflection of the politics and economy of a given society, while it has in turn a tremendous influence and effect upon the politics and economy of the given society; economy is the basis, and politics is the concentrated expression of economy.² This is our fundamental view on the relation of culture to politics and economy and the relation between politics and economy. Hence, in the first place given forms of politics and economy determine a given form of culture, and only then does the given form of culture have any influence and effect upon the given forms of politics and economy. Marx says, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness".³ He also says: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to

change it".⁴ This is the scientific definition that for the first time in human history correctly solved the problem of the relation between consciousness and existence, and the basic viewpoint of the dynamic revolutionary theory of reflection which was later profoundly expounded by Lenin. In our discussion of China's cultural problems we must not forget this basic viewpoint.

Thus the problem is quite clear: the reactionary elements of the old culture of the Chinese nation which we wish to eliminate cannot be separated from its old politics and old economy, while its new culture which we want to build up cannot be separated from its new politics and new economy. The old politics and old economy of the Chinese nation form the basis of its old culture, and its new politics and new economy will form the basis of its new culture.

What is meant by the old politics and old economy of the Chinese nation? And what is meant by the old culture of the Chinese nation?

From the Chou and Ch'in dynasties onwards, China's society was a feudal one; her politics were feudal politics and her economy feudal economy. The culture which reflected such politics and economy and occupied the dominant position was feudal culture.

Since the invasion of foreign capitalism and the gradual growth of capitalist elements in Chinese society, China has changed by degrees into a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. In China today, society is colonial in the Japanese-occupied areas, and basically semi-colonial in the areas under Kuomintang rule; but both in the Japanese-occupied areas and in the areas under Kuomintang rule, society is predominantly feudal and semi-feudal. This, then, is the character of present-day Chinese society; this is also the state of affairs in present-day China. The politics of such a society are predominantly colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal politics; its economy is predominantly a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal economy, and its culture, which reflects such politics and such an economy and occupies the dominant position, is colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal culture.

Our revolution is precisely directed against these dominant

political, economic and cultural forms. What we want to eliminate is precisely such old colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal politics and economy, and the old culture that is in their service. What we want to build up is their direct opposite, *i.e.* the new politics, new economy and new culture of the Chinese nation.

What, then, are the new politics and new economy of the Chinese nation? And what is the new culture of the Chinese nation?

In the historical course of the Chinese revolution two steps must be taken: first, the democratic revolution, and secondly, the socialist revolution; these two revolutionary processes are different in character. The democracy in question no longer belongs to the old category—it is not old democracy; it belongs to the new category—it is New Democracy.

It can thus be affirmed that the new politics of the Chinese nation are the politics of New Democracy; the new economy of the Chinese nation, the economy of New Democracy; and the new culture of the Chinese nation, the culture of New Democracy.

This is the historical feature of the Chinese revolution at the present time. Any party or individual engaged in the Chinese revolution that fails to understand this historical feature will not be able to direct the revolution and lead it to victory, and will be forsaken by the people and become something pitifully whining in the corner.

4. THE CHINESE REVOLUTION IS PART OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION

The historical feature of the Chinese revolution consists in the two steps to be taken, democracy and socialism, and the first step is now no longer democracy in a general sense, but democracy of the Chinese type, a new and special type—New Democracy. How, then, is this historical feature formed? Has it been in existence for the past hundred years, or is it only of recent birth?

If we only make a brief study of the historical development of China and of the world we shall understand that this historical feature did not emerge as a consequence of the Opium

War, but began to take shape only after the first imperialist world war and the Russian October Revolution. Let us now study the process of its formation.

Evidently, the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of present-day Chinese society determines that two steps must be taken in the Chinese revolution. The first step is to change a society that is colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal into an independent, democratic society. The second step is to develop the revolution further and build up a socialist society. In the present Chinese revolution we are taking the first step.

The preparatory period for taking the first step began from the Opium War in 1840, *i.e.* from the time when Chinese society started to change from a feudal into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. The movement of the T'ai-p'ing Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Reformist Movement of 1898, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4 Movement, the Northern Expedition, the War of the Agrarian Revolution and the present Anti-Japanese War—these numerous stages have altogether taken up a whole century and, from a certain point of view, represent the first step taken by the Chinese people on different occasions and in various degrees to fight against imperialism and the feudal forces, to strive to build up an independent, democratic society and to complete the first revolution. The Revolution of 1911 was the beginning of that revolution in a fuller sense. In its social character, that revolution is bourgeois-democratic rather than proletarian-socialist. That revolution is not yet completed, and great efforts are still required because the enemies of the revolution are still very strong. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen said: "The revolution is not yet completed, all my comrades must strive on", he was referring to such a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

A change, however, occurred in the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution after the outbreak of the first imperialist world war in 1914 and the founding of a socialist state on one-sixth of the globe through the Russian October Revolution in 1917.

Before these events, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution belonged to the category of the old bourgeois-democratic world revolution, and was part of that revolution.

After these events, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution changes its character and belongs to the category of the new bourgeois-democratic revolution and, so far as the revolutionary front is concerned, forms part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

Why? Because the first imperialist world war and the first victorious socialist revolution, the October Revolution, have changed the historical direction of the whole world and marked a new historical era of the whole world.

In an era when the world capitalist front has collapsed in one corner of the globe (a corner which forms one-sixth of the world), while in other parts it has fully revealed its decadence; when the remaining parts of capitalism cannot survive without relying more than ever on the colonies and semi-colonies; when a socialist state has been established and has declared that it is willing to fight in support of the liberation movement of all colonies and semi-colonies; when the proletariat of the capitalist countries is freeing itself day by day from the social-imperialist influence of the Social-Democratic Parties, and has also declared itself in support of the liberation movement of the colonies and semi-colonies—in such an era, any revolution that takes place in a colony or semi-colony against imperialism, *i.e.* against the international bourgeoisie and international capitalism, belongs no longer to the old category of bourgeois-democratic world revolution, but to a new category, and is no longer part of the old bourgeois or capitalist world revolution, but part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution. Such revolutionary colonies and semi-colonies should no longer be regarded as allies of the counter-revolutionary front of world capitalism; they have become allies of the revolutionary front of world socialism.

Although in its social character the first stage of, or the first step taken in this revolution in a colonial and semi-colonial country is still fundamentally bourgeois-democratic, and although its objective demand is to clear the path for the development of capitalism, yet it no longer belongs to the old type of revolution led by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship, but belongs to the new type of revolution which,

led by the proletariat, aims at establishing a new-democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes. Thus this revolution exactly serves to clear a path even wider for the development of socialism. In the course of its progress such a revolution further falls into several stages because of changes in the enemy's conditions and in the ranks of its allies; but its fundamental character will remain unchanged.

Such a revolution deals unrelenting blows to imperialism, and hence is disapproved and opposed by imperialism. But it meets the approval of socialism and is supported by the socialist state and the socialist international proletariat.

Therefore, such a revolution cannot but become part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

The correct thesis that "the Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution" was propounded as early as 1924-7 during the period of China's First Great Revolution. It was propounded by the Chinese Communists and approved by all who participated in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle of the time. But at that time the meaning of this theoretical proposition was not yet fully expounded, and consequently it was only vaguely understood.

This "world revolution" refers no longer to the old world revolution—for the old bourgeois world revolution has long become a thing of the past—but to a new world revolution, the socialist world revolution. Similarly, to form "part" of the world revolution means to form no longer a part of the old bourgeois revolution but of the new socialist revolution. This is an exceedingly great change unparalleled in the history of China and of the world.

This correct thesis propounded by the Chinese Communists is based on Stalin's theory.

As early as 1918, Stalin wrote in an article commemorating the first anniversary of the October Revolution:

"The great world-wide significance of the October Revolution chiefly consists in the fact that:

"(1) It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular question of combating

national oppression in Europe into the general question of emancipating the oppressed peoples, colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism.

"(2) It has opened up wide possibilities for their emancipation and the right paths towards it, has thereby greatly facilitated the cause of the emancipation of the oppressed peoples of the West and the East, and has drawn them into the common current of the victorious struggle against imperialism.

"(3) It has thereby erected a bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East, having created a new front of revolutions against world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through the Russian revolution to the oppressed peoples of the East."⁵

Since writing this article, Stalin has again and again expounded the theoretical proposition that revolutions in colonies and semi-colonies have already departed from the old category and become part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. The article that gives the clearest and most precise explanation was published on June 30, 1925, in which Stalin carried on a controversy with the Yugoslav nationalists of that time. This article, entitled "The National Question Once Again", is included in a book translated by Chang Chung-shih, published under the title *Stalin on the National Question*. It contains the following passage:

"Semich refers to a passage in Stalin's pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question*, written at the end of 1912. It is stated there that 'the national struggle under the conditions of rising capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves'. By this he is evidently trying to hint that his own formula defining the social meaning of the national movement in present historical conditions is correct. But Stalin's pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, at a time when the national question in the eyes of Marxists had not yet assumed world significance, and when the basic demand of the Marxists, the right to self-determination, was judged to be not a part of the proletarian revolution, but a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would

be absurd to ignore the fact that the international situation has radically changed since that time, that the war on the one hand and the October Revolution in Russia on the other have converted the national question from a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. As early as October, 1916, Lenin in his article 'The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up', said that the fundamental point of the national question, the right of self-determination, had ceased to form part of the general democratic movement and that it had become converted into a component part of the general proletarian-socialist revolution. I will not mention later works of Lenin and of other representatives of Russian Communism on the national question. In view of all this, what interpretation can be placed on Comrade Semich's reference to a certain passage in a pamphlet by Stalin written in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, now that, as a result of the new historical situation, we have entered a new era, the era of the world *proletarian* revolution? The only interpretation that can be placed on it is that Comrade Semich is quoting without reference to space and time and without reference to the actual historical situation, and that he is thereby violating the most elementary demands of dialectics and failing to take account of the fact that what is correct in one historical situation may prove incorrect in another historical situation."⁶

From this it can be seen that there are two kinds of world revolution, the first belonging to the bourgeois and capitalist category. The era of this kind of world revolution is long past; it came to an end as early as 1914 when the first imperialist world war broke out, and especially in 1917 when the October Revolution occurred in Russia. Since then, the second kind, namely, the proletarian-socialist world revolution, has started. Such a revolution has the proletariat of the capitalist countries as its main force and the oppressed peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies as its allies. No matter what classes, parties or individuals in the oppressed nations join the revolution, and no matter whether or not they are conscious of the point

mentioned above or subjectively understand it, so long as they oppose imperialism, their revolution becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and they themselves become its allies.

The Chinese revolution has taken on a greater significance today. This is a time when the political and economic crises of capitalism are every day plunging the world more deeply into the Second World War; a time when the Soviet Union has reached the period of transition from socialism to communism, and can lead and help the proletariat and oppressed nations of the world in their fight against imperialist war and capitalist reaction; a time when the proletariat of the capitalist countries is preparing to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism; and a time when China's proletariat, peasantry, intelligentsia and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie have become a mighty independent political force under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. At such a juncture, should we not estimate that the Chinese revolution has taken on a greater significance in the world? I think we should. The Chinese revolution has become an important part of the world revolution.

The first stage of the Chinese revolution (itself subdivided into many minor stages) belongs, so far as its social character is concerned, to a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution, and is not yet a proletarian-socialist revolution; but it has long become part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and is now even an important part of such a world revolution and its great ally. The first step in, or the first stage of, this revolution is certainly not, and cannot be, the establishment of a capitalist society under the dictatorship of the Chinese bourgeoisie; on the contrary, the first stage is to end with the establishment of a new-democratic society under the joint dictatorship of all Chinese revolutionary classes headed by the Chinese proletariat. Then, the revolution will develop into the second stage so that a socialist society can be established in China.

This is the most basic feature of the Chinese revolution of today, the new revolutionary process in the past twenty years (counting from the May 4 Movement of 1919) and the vivid, concrete content of the Chinese revolution of today.

5. NEW-DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

The new historical feature of the Chinese revolution is its division into two historical stages, the first stage being a new-democratic revolution. But how does this new feature manifest itself concretely in the political and economic relations within China? We shall explain this below.

Before the May 4 Movement of 1919 (which occurred after the first imperialist world war of 1914 and the Russian October Revolution of 1917), the political leaders in the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution were the Chinese petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie (represented by their intellectuals). At that time the Chinese proletariat had not yet appeared on the political scene as an awakened and independent class force; it participated in the revolution only as a follower of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. The proletariat at the time of the Revolution of 1911, for instance, was such a class.

After the May 4 Movement, although the Chinese national bourgeoisie continued to participate in the revolution, the political leaders of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution belonged no longer to the Chinese bourgeoisie, but to the Chinese proletariat. By that time the Chinese proletariat, owing to its own maturity and the influence of the Russian Revolution, had rapidly become an awakened and independent political force. The slogan "Down with imperialism", together with the thoroughgoing programme of the entire bourgeois-democratic revolution of China, was proposed by the Chinese Communist Party, and the agrarian revolution was carried out by the Chinese Communist Party alone.

Being a bourgeoisie in a colonial and semi-colonial country and under the oppression of imperialism, the Chinese national bourgeoisie, even in the era of imperialism, retains at certain periods and to a certain degree a revolutionary quality which enables it to fight against foreign imperialism and the home governments of bureaucrats and warlords (instances of the latter can be found in the periods of the Revolution of 1911 and of the Northern Expedition), and ally with the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie to oppose the enemies it sets itself against. This is the point where the Chinese bourgeoisie differs

from the bourgeoisie of old tsarist Russia. Since tsarist Russia was itself already a country of militarist and feudalist imperialism which encroached upon other countries, the Russian bourgeoisie had no revolutionary quality to speak of. There the task of the proletariat was to oppose the bourgeoisie, not to unite with it. Since China is a colony as well as a semi-colony encroached upon by others, her national bourgeoisie has at certain periods and to a certain degree a revolutionary quality. Here the task of the proletariat is to attach due importance to the revolutionary quality of the national bourgeoisie and establish with it a united front against imperialism and the governments of bureaucrats and warlords.

But at the same time, just because the Chinese national bourgeoisie is a bourgeois class in a colony and semi-colony, it is extremely flabby politically and economically and possesses another character, namely, a proneness to compromise with the enemy of the revolution. Even when it takes part in a revolution, it is unwilling to break completely with imperialism and is moreover closely related to exploitation by land rent in rural areas; thus it is neither willing nor able to overthrow imperialism thoroughly, much less the feudal forces. So neither of the two basic problems, or the two basic tasks, of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution can be solved or accomplished by the Chinese national bourgeoisie. As for the Chinese big bourgeoisie represented by the Kuomintang, in the long period from 1927 to 1937 it has consistently nestled in the arms of the imperialists, formed an alliance with the feudal forces to oppose the revolutionary people. The Chinese national bourgeoisie also once sided with the counter-revolution in 1927 and for a time afterwards. During the present Anti-Japanese War, a section of the big bourgeoisie, with Wang Ching-wei as its representative, has again capitulated to the enemy, thus constituting a fresh betrayal on the part of the big bourgeoisie. This is another difference between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie in the history of European and American countries, especially that of France. When it was still in a revolutionary era, the bourgeoisie in those countries, especially in France, was comparatively thorough in carrying out the revolution; in China, the bourgeoisie is not even thorough to that extent.

On the one hand, the possibility of participating in the revolution; and on the other hand, the proneness to compromise with the enemy of the revolution—these constitute the dual character of “one person filling two posts” of the Chinese bourgeoisie. This dual character was also present with the bourgeoisie in European and American history. When confronted by a formidable enemy, they unite with the workers and peasants to oppose the enemy; but when the workers and peasants are awakened, they turn to unite with the enemy to oppose the workers and peasants. This is the general rule governing the bourgeoisie in every country of the world, but the trait is even more pronounced among the Chinese bourgeoisie.

It is quite evident that whoever in China can lead the people to overthrow imperialism and the feudal forces will win the people's confidence, because the mortal enemies of the people are imperialism and the feudal forces, especially imperialism. Today, whoever can lead the people to drive out Japanese imperialism and bring about a democratic government will be the saviour of the people. History has proved that the Chinese bourgeoisie is unable to fulfil this responsibility, which consequently cannot but fall on the shoulders of the proletariat.

Therefore, under all circumstances, the proletariat, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie in China are the basic forces determining her fate. These classes, some already awakened and others on the point of awakening, will necessarily become the basic component parts of the state structure and in the structure of political power of the democratic republic of China, with the proletariat as the leading force. The democratic republic of China which we now want to establish can only be a democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people led by the proletariat, that is, a new-democratic republic, or a republic of the genuinely revolutionary new Three People's Principles with the three cardinal policies.

On the one hand this new-democratic republic is different from the old European-American form of capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship, for such an old democratic republic is already out of date; on the other hand, it is also different from the socialist republics of the type of the U.S.S.R.,

republics of the dictatorship of the proletariat; such socialist republics are already flourishing in the Soviet Union and moreover will be established in all the capitalist countries and undoubtedly become the dominant form of state structure and of political power in all industrially advanced countries, yet, during a given historical period, they are not yet suitable for the revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries. Therefore the form of state to be adopted by the revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries during a given historical period can only be a third one, namely, the new-democratic republic. This is the form for a given historical period and therefore a transitional form, but an unalterable and necessary form.

Hence the multifarious types of state system in the world, classified according to the class character of their political power, are basically of three kinds: (1) republics under bourgeois dictatorship; (2) republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and (3) republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes.

The first kind includes the old democratic states. Today, after the outbreak of the second imperialist war, there is no longer even a dash of democratic flavouring in many of the capitalist countries, which have come under or are coming under the bloody militarist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Certain countries under the joint dictatorship of the landlords and the bourgeoisie can be classed with this kind.

The second kind exists in the Soviet Union and conditions for its birth are ripening in all capitalist countries. In the future it will become the dominant form throughout the world for a given period.

The third kind is the transitional form of state to be adopted by revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries. To be sure, revolutions in different colonial and semi-colonial countries necessarily have certain different characteristics, but these constitute only minor differences within a general framework of uniformity. So long as they are revolutions in colonies or semi-colonies, the state and political power will of necessity be basically the same in structure, *i.e.* a new-democratic state under the joint dictatorship of several anti-imperialist

classes. In China today, this new-democratic form of state assumes the very form of the anti-Japanese united front. It is anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist; it is also in the nature of a coalition of several revolutionary classes, of a united front. But unfortunately, after having resisted Japan for such a long period, the work of democratising the country has basically not yet started in most of the areas outside the anti-Japanese democratic bases under the leadership of the Communist Party, and Japanese imperialism has taken advantage of this most fundamental weakness to march in big strides to invade our country; if such a situation remains unchanged, the future of our nation will be gravely imperilled.

What is under discussion here is the question of "state system". Though this question of the state system has been wrangled over for several decades since the end of the Manchu dynasty, it is still not clarified. Actually it is simply the question of the status of various social classes in the state. The bourgeoisie, as a rule, conceals the status of classes and uses the term "citizenship" as a dodge to bring about the dictatorship of one class. Such concealment is not at all beneficial to the revolutionary people, and the matter must be clearly explained to them. The term "citizenship" may be employed, but it does not include the counter-revolutionaries and collaborators. A dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes over the counter-revolutionaries and collaborators is the kind of state we want today.

"The so-called democratic system in modern nations is usually monopolised by the bourgeoisie and has simply become an instrument for oppressing the common people. As to the Principle of Democracy of the Kuomintang, it stands for something to be shared by all the common people and not to be monopolised by a few."

This was a solemn statement contained in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang held in 1924 during the period of the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. For sixteen years the Kuomintang has violated this declaration and consequently created the grave national crisis of today. We hope the Kuomintang will correct this, the grossest

blunder it has made, in the baptism of fire of the Anti-Japanese War.

As to the question of "political structure", it is the question of the form of structure of political power, the form adopted by certain social classes in establishing their organs of political power to oppose their enemy and protect themselves. Without an adequate form of political power there would be nothing to represent the state. China can now adopt a system of people's congresses—the people's national congress, the people's provincial congresses, the people's county congresses, the people's district congresses, down to the people's township congresses—and let these congresses at various levels elect the organs of government. But a system of really universal and equal suffrage, irrespective of sex, creed, property or education, must be put into practice so that the organs of government elected can properly represent each revolutionary class according to its status in the state, express the people's will and direct revolutionary struggles, and embody the spirit of New Democracy. Such a system is democratic centralism. Only a government of democratic centralism can fully express the will of all the revolutionary people and most powerfully fight the enemies of the revolution. The spirit of "not to be monopolised by a few" must be embodied in the organisations of the government and the army; without a genuinely democratic system such an aim can never be attained, and that would mean a discrepancy between the political structure and the state system.

The state system—joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes. The political structure—democratic centralism. This is new-democratic government; this is a republic of New Democracy, the republic of the anti-Japanese united front, the republic of the new Three People's Principles with the three cardinal policies, and the Republic of China true to its name. Today we have a Republic of China in name, but not one in reality; the task today is to bring about the reality that would fit its name.

Such are the internal political relations which a revolutionary China, an anti-Japanese China, ought to and must not fail to establish; for these constitute the only correct orientation for our present work of "national reconstruction".

6. NEW-DEMOCRATIC ECONOMY

We must establish in China a republic that is politically new-democratic as well as economically new-democratic.

Big banks and big industrial and commercial enterprises shall be owned by this republic.

“Enterprises, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are monopolistic in character or which are on too large a scale for private management, such as banks, railways and air lines, shall be operated by the state so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: This is the main principle of the control of capital.”

This was also a solemn statement contained in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang during the period of the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation; this is the correct objective for the economic structure of the new-democratic republic. The state-operated enterprises of the new-democratic republic under the leadership of the proletariat are socialist in character and constitute the leading force in the national economy as a whole; but this republic does not take over other forms of capitalist private property, or forbid the development of capitalist production that “cannot dominate the livelihood of the people”, for China’s economy is still very backward.

This republic will adopt certain necessary measures to confiscate the land of landlords and distribute it to those peasants having no land or only a little land, carry out Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s slogan of “land to the tillers”, abolish the feudal relations in the rural areas, and turn the land into the private property of the peasants. In the rural areas, rich peasant economic activities will be tolerated. This is the line of “equalisation of land ownership”. The correct slogan for this line is “land to the tillers”. In this stage, socialist agriculture is in general not yet to be established, though the various types of co-operative enterprises developed on the basis of “land to the tillers” will contain elements of socialism.

China’s economy must develop along the path of “control of capital” and “equalisation of land ownership”, and must

never be “monopolised by a few”; we must never let the few capitalists and landlords “dominate the livelihood of the people”; we must never establish a capitalist society of the European-American type, nor allow the old semi-feudal society to remain. Whoever dares to run counter to this line will certainly fail to attain his aim, and will be knocked on the head.

Such are the internal economic relations which a revolutionary China, an anti-Japanese China, must and will necessarily establish.

Such an economy is new-democratic economy.

And new-democratic politics is the concentrated expression of such new-democratic economy.

7. REFUTATION OF BOURGEOIS DICTATORSHIP

Such a republic, with its new-democratic politics and new-democratic economy, is approved by over 90 per cent of the people of the whole country, and there is no alternative road to take.

To take the road of establishing a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship? To be sure, that was the old road taken by the European-American bourgeoisie; but unfortunately neither the international nor the domestic situation allows China to take it.

Judging by the international situation, that road is a blind alley. The present international situation is, basically speaking, one of a struggle between capitalism and socialism, a situation in which capitalism is declining and decaying and socialism is rising and growing. The establishment in China of a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship is in the first place not permitted by international capitalism or imperialism. The history of imperialist aggression upon China, of imperialist opposition to China’s independence and to her development of capitalism, constitutes precisely the history of modern China. Revolutions in China failed one after another because imperialism strangled them; hence innumerable revolutionary martyrs died nursing a feeling of everlasting indignation. At present it is powerful Japanese imperialism that is fighting its way into

China with the aim of reducing China to a colony; it is Japan developing her capitalism in China, not China developing hers; and it is the Japanese bourgeoisie exercising its dictatorship over China, not the Chinese bourgeoisie exercising its own. To be sure, this is a period of the final struggle of imperialism in a moribund condition: "Imperialism is moribund capitalism".⁷ But just because it is moribund, it depends all the more on colonies and semi-colonies for its survival, and will never allow any colony or semi-colony to establish anything like a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship. Just because Japanese imperialism is bogged down deep in serious economic crisis and political crisis, because it is moribund, it must invade China and reduce her to a colony, thereby blocking the path for China to establish a bourgeois dictatorship and to develop national capitalism.

In the second place, the establishment of a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship is not permitted by socialism. All the imperialist powers in the world are hostile to us; if China wants independence she can never attain it without the aid of the socialist state and the international proletariat. That is to say, she cannot attain it without the assistance of the Soviet Union, and the assistance given through anti-capitalist struggles waged by the proletariat in Japan, Britain, the United States, France, Germany and Italy. Although we cannot say that victory of the Chinese revolution must follow the victory of the revolutions in Japan, Britain, the United States, France, Germany and Italy, or victory in one or two of them, there is no doubt that we can only win victory by adding the strength of the proletariat of these countries to ours. In particular, aid from the Soviet Union is an absolutely indispensable condition for China's final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet aid and the revolution will fail. Are not the lessons of the anti-Soviet campaigns after 1927⁸ unusually illuminating? The world today is in a new era of revolutions and wars, a new era when capitalism is definitely dying and socialism is definitely flourishing. Under such conditions, is it not utterly fantastic to desire the establishment in China of a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship after her victory in fighting imperialism and feudalism?

If it is said that, after the first imperialist world war and the October Revolution, owing to certain specific conditions (the Turkish bourgeoisie's success in repelling Greek aggression and the extreme feebleness of the Turkish proletariat), there emerged a Turkey under the petty Kemalist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie,⁹ then there can never be another Turkey after World War II and after the Soviet Union has completed her socialist construction, much less a "Turkey" with a population of 450 million. Because of her special conditions (the bourgeoisie's flabbiness and its proneness to compromise and the proletariat's powerfulness and its revolutionary thoroughness), nothing has ever been done at so little cost in China as in Turkey. Did not the Chinese bourgeois elements clamour loudly for Kemalism after the Chinese Great Revolution failed in 1927? But where is China's Kemal? And where are China's bourgeois dictatorship and capitalist society? Besides, even the so-called Kemalist Turkey finally had to throw herself into the arms of Anglo-French imperialism, becoming more and more a semi-colony and a part of the reactionary imperialist world. In the international situation of today, the "heroes" in the colonies and semi-colonies must either stand on the side of the imperialist front and become part of the force of world counter-revolution or stand on the side of the anti-imperialist front and become part of the force of world revolution. They must stand either on this side or the other, for there is no third choice.

As to the domestic situation, the Chinese bourgeoisie should by now have learnt a good lesson. No sooner had the revolution of 1927 achieved victory through the strength of the proletariat, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, than the Chinese bourgeoisie, headed by the big bourgeoisie, spurned the broad masses of the people, monopolised the fruits of the revolution, and formed a counter-revolutionary alliance with imperialism and the feudal forces; moreover, it devoted all its energy to carrying out a ten-year "Communist-annihilation" campaign. But what was the result? Today, when a strong enemy is penetrating deep into our territory and after the Anti-Japanese War has been carried on for two years, is it possible that there are still people wanting to copy the old obsolete recipes of the

European-American bourgeoisie? The "ten-year Communist-annihilation campaign" failed to bring about anything resembling a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship—is it possible that there are still people wanting to have another try? It is true that the "ten-year Communist-annihilation campaign" has brought about a "one-party dictatorship", but it remains only a semi-colonial and semi-feudal dictatorship. As a result of the four years' "Communist-annihilation" (from 1927 to the Incident of September 18, 1931), a "Manchukuo" came into being and, after another six years of it, in 1937, the Japanese imperialists were able to invade China proper. If anyone were to try today to start an "annihilation" campaign for another ten years, it would have to be a new type of "Communist-annihilation", somewhat different from the old one. Yet is not there already one who, light of foot, has outstripped all others and boldly undertaken this new enterprise of "Communist-annihilation"? That one is Wang Ching-wei, who has already become a "celebrated" new-style anti-Communist figure. If anyone wishes to join his gang, well and good; but would not that person then feel even more embarrassed when harping on bourgeois dictatorship, capitalist society, Kemalism, a modern state, a one-party dictatorship, "one doctrine" and so forth? If, instead of joining the Wang Ching-wei gang, he intends once the Anti-Japanese War is won to spurn all the people resisting the Japanese, monopolise the fruits of victory and establish a perpetual one-party dictatorship—well, isn't that just day-dreaming? "Fight Japan!" "Fight Japan!" But through whose effort? If you leave aside the workers, and the peasants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, you cannot move a single step. Whoever still dares to spurn these people will most certainly be crushed himself—is not this again a matter of common sense? But the die-hards among the Chinese bourgeoisie (I am referring to the die-hards only) seem to have learnt no lesson whatever during the past twenty years. Do we not hear them still shouting: "Contain communism", "Dissolve communism" and "Oppose communism?" Do we not see that the "Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties" were followed by the "Measures to Deal with the Alien-Party Problem" and still later by the

"Directives to Deal with the Alien-Party Problem"? Heavens! With "restricting" and "dealing with" going on like that, one wonders what kind of future they are preparing for our nation and for themselves! We earnestly and sincerely advise these gentlemen to open their eyes and take a good look at China and the world, see how things stand inside as well as outside the country, and see what is the present situation. May it please them not to repeat their mistakes. If they go on making mistakes, the future of our nation will, of course, be calamitous and, I believe, they will also find their own affairs difficult to manage. It is certain, definite and true that unless the die-hards among the Chinese bourgeoisie wake up, things will not go smoothly with them and their prospect will be one of self-sought ruin. Therefore we hope that China's anti-Japanese united front will be maintained and that, with the co-operation of all the people, instead of the monopoly by a single clique, the anti-Japanese cause will become victorious; this is the only good policy, and any other policy is bad. This is the sincere advice of us Communists, and do not blame us for not having forewarned you.

An old Chinese saying runs: "If there is food, let all share it." It contains much truth. Since all have to fight if there is an enemy, then all should eat if there is food, all should work if there is work to do, and all should study if there are books. Such attitudes as expressed in "I alone must eat the whole cake" and "nobody can harm me" are merely old tricks of feudal lords and, in the last analysis, will not do in the forties of the twentieth century.

We Communists will never boycott anyone who is revolutionary; we shall uphold the united front and persist in a long-term co-operation with all those classes, strata, political parties and groups and persons that are willing to fight Japan to the end. But if certain other people want to boycott the Communist Party, that will not do; if they want to split the united front, that will not do either. China must keep on fighting Japan, uniting herself and making progress; whoever tries to capitulate, to cause splits or to retrogress will not be tolerated by us.

8. REFUTATION OF "LEFT" PHRASE-MONGERING

If the road of capitalism under bourgeois dictatorship is not to be taken, will it be possible then to take the road of socialism under proletarian dictatorship?

No, that is also impossible.

The present revolution undoubtedly represents the first step; and the second step, that of socialism, will be taken in the future. Only when China has entered the socialist era will her people attain true happiness. But today is not yet the time to introduce socialism. The present task of the revolution in China is one of opposing imperialism and feudalism; until this task is completed, socialism is out of the question. Two steps have to be taken in the Chinese revolution: the first is New Democracy, and the second socialism. Moreover, the first step will take quite a long time and can by no means be accomplished overnight. We are not utopians, and we cannot depart from the actual conditions confronting us.

Certain malicious propagandists deliberately mix up these two different revolutionary stages, advocating the so-called "theory of a single revolution" to prove that the Three People's Principles apply to revolutions of all kinds and that communism therefore loses its justification; with this "theory", they frantically oppose communism and the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region. Their hidden purpose is to eliminate completely whatever revolution there is, to oppose a thorough bourgeois-democratic revolution and a thorough resistance to Japan, and to prepare public opinion for their capitulation to the Japanese invaders. This situation has been deliberately created by Japanese imperialism. After its occupation of Wuhan, Japanese imperialism, having realised that military force alone could not subjugate China, began to resort to political offensives and economic enticements. Political offensives mean tempting the vacillating elements in the anti-Japanese camp, splitting up the united front and undermining the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. Economic enticements refer to the "joint industrial enterprises". In Central and South China the Japanese invaders are allowing a 51 per cent

capital investment by the Chinese capitalists, with Japanese capital taking up the other 49 per cent; in North China they are allowing a 49 per cent capital investment by the Chinese capitalists, with Japanese capital taking up the other 51 per cent. The Japanese invaders have also promised to return their former property to the Chinese capitalists and to count it, in cash terms, as capital subscribed by them. At such a prospect of profits, some capitalists, utterly devoid of conscience, forget all moral principles and are itching to have a go. One section, represented by Wang Ching-wei has already capitulated. Another section hidden in the anti-Japanese camp would also like to go over. But, with the guilty conscience of thieves, they fear the Communists will block their way and, what is more, that the common people would stigmatise them as collaborators. So they got together to hold a meeting and decided to prepare matters in advance in cultural and press circles. Having decided on their policy, they considered it unwise to wait, and hired some metaphysics-mongers¹⁰ together with some Trotskyists, who brandished their pens like lances, creating bedlam and hitting out in all directions. Thus there have appeared the "theory of a single revolution", the arguments that communism does not suit the national conditions of China and that there is no need for a Communist Party in China, the allegations that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are undermining the Anti-Japanese War, that their guerrillas are moving about without fighting the enemy, that the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region is a feudal independent régime and that the Communist Party is disobedient, dissident, intriguing and mischievous—such are the tricks they play to fool people who do not understand the world situation so that, when the opportune moment arrives, the capitalists may have adequate grounds for getting their 49 or 51 per cent and selling all the national interests to the enemy. This is called "stealing the beams and pillars and putting rotten timbers in their place"—preparing the people's mind as well as public opinion for their intended capitulation. These gentlemen who advocate in all seriousness the "theory of a single revolution" to oppose communism and the Communist Party are working for nothing but their 49 or 51 per

cent, and how hard they must have cudgelled their brains! The "theory of a single revolution" is simply a theory of no revolution; that is the gist of the matter.

But there is still another group of people who, apparently with no evil intentions, are also misled by the "theory of a single revolution", by the purely fanciful notion of "accomplishing both the political revolution and the social revolution at one stroke"; they do not understand that our revolution is divided into stages, that we can only proceed from one revolution to the other, and that there is no such thing as "accomplishing both at one stroke". Such a point of view mixes up the steps to be taken in the revolution and reduces the efforts directed towards the present task, and is very harmful. It is correct, and fits in with the Marxist theory of revolutionary development, to say that, of the two revolutionary stages, the first provides the conditions for the second and that the two must be consecutive without allowing any stage of bourgeois dictatorship to intervene. But if it is asserted that the democratic revolution has no definite task of its own and need not await its proper occasion, but its task can be merged with another task—*e.g.* the socialist task that can only be carried out at some other time—and that both tasks can be accomplished simultaneously; then this is the theory of "accomplishing both at one stroke," a utopian view rejected by true revolutionaries.

9. REFUTATION OF THE DIE-HARDS

The bourgeois die-hards then come forward and say: "Well, since you Communists have postponed the socialist social system until a later stage, and since you have declared, 'The Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party pledges itself to fight for their complete realisation',¹¹ then tuck away your communism for the time being." A frantic clamour has recently been made with this sort of argument, advanced under the so-called theme of "one doctrine". Such clamour essentially represents the bourgeois despotism of the die-hards. However, we may, out of courtesy, characterise it merely as totally devoid of common sense.

Communism is at once the entire ideological system of the

proletariat and a new social system. Different from any other ideological system or social system, it is the most perfect, the most progressive, the most revolutionary and the most rational system since human history began. The ideological system and social system of feudalism have a place only in the museum of history. The ideological system and social system of capitalism have also become museum-pieces in one part of the world (in the Soviet Union), while in other countries they resemble "a dying person who is sinking fast like the sun setting beyond the western hills", and will soon be sent to the museum too. On the other hand, the Communist ideological system and social system are sweeping the world with the momentum of a land-slide and the power of a thunderbolt, and enjoy perpetual youth. Since the introduction of scientific communism into China, people's vistas have been opened up, and the Chinese revolution has changed its physiognomy. Without the guidance of communism, the democratic revolution in China cannot succeed, let alone the later stage of the revolution. This is the reason why the die-hards of the bourgeoisie are so noisily demanding that communism be "tucked away". But in reality it should not be "tucked away"; once communism is "tucked away", China will perish. The whole world today depends on communism for its salvation, and China is no exception.

Everybody knows that, as regards the social system, the Communist Party has its present programme and its future programme, or its minimum programme and its maximum programme. For the present, New Democracy; and for the future, socialism—these are two parts of an organic whole, guided by one and the same Communist ideology. Is it not, therefore, in the highest degree absurd to shout wildly that communism should be "tucked away", on the ground that the minimum programme of the Communist Party is basically in agreement with the political tenets of the Three People's Principles? For us Communists, it is precisely because of this basic agreement between our minimum programme and the political tenets of the Three People's Principles that we find it possible to acknowledge "the Three People's Principles as the political basis for the anti-Japanese united front" and to

acknowledge that "the Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party pledges itself to fight for their complete realisation"; otherwise we would have found it impossible. This points to the united front between communism and the Three People's Principles in the stage of democratic revolution, the very kind of united front meant by Dr. Sun Yat-sen when he said: "Communism is a good friend of the Three People's Principles".¹² Denying communism is in reality denying the united front. It is just because the die-hards want to practise their one-party doctrine and deny the united front that they have concocted such absurd arguments to deny communism.

The theory of "one doctrine" is impracticable too. So long as classes exist, there will be as many doctrines as there are classes; and even the various groups within one class may have their respective doctrines. At present the feudal class has a feudal doctrine, the bourgeoisie a capitalist doctrine, the Buddhists Buddhism, the Christians Christianity, the peasants polytheism, and, recently, some people have advocated Kemalism, fascism, vitalism,¹³ "the doctrine of distribution according to labour",¹⁴ and what not—then why cannot the proletariat have communism? Since there are countless "isms" why should it be, at the sight of communism alone, that people shout that it should be "tucked away"? Frankly, "tucking it away" will not do; better let there be a contest. If anything else beats communism, we Communists will admit our own bad luck. But if not, then let all that stuff about "one doctrine", which violates the Principle of Democracy, be "tucked away" as soon as possible.

To avoid misunderstanding and open the eyes of the die-hards, it is necessary to show clearly wherein the Three People's Principles and communism are similar or different.

Comparing the two doctrines, the Three People's Principles and communism, we find both a similarity and some differences.

First, the similarity. This refers to the basic political programme of the two doctrines during the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution in China. The three revolutionary political tenets of Nationalism, Democracy and the People's

Welfare embodied in the Three People's Principles, as re-interpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924, basically agree with the Communists' political programme for the stage of democratic revolution in China. Because of this similarity and because of the carrying out of the Three People's Principles, the united front of the two doctrines and of the two parties came into existence. It is wrong to ignore this aspect.

Next, the differences include: (1) The difference in a part of the programme for the stage of democratic revolution. The Communists' programme for the whole course of the democratic revolution contains the planks of full realisation of the people's power, the eight-hour working day and a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution, whereas the Three People's Principles do not. Unless these are added to the Three People's Principles and preparations made for carrying them out, the two democratic programmes are only basically and not completely the same. (2) The difference between having and not having a stage of socialist revolution. Besides the stage of democratic revolution, communism envisages a stage of socialist revolution; hence besides the minimum programme it has its maximum programme, *i.e.* the programme for the realisation of the social system of socialism and communism. The Three People's Principles include only the stage of democratic revolution, but not the stage of socialist revolution; therefore they contain only a minimum programme and no maximum programme, *i.e.* no programme for building up a social system of socialism and communism. (3) The difference in world outlook. The world outlook of communism is dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and that of the Three People's Principles is the interpretation of history in terms of the people's welfare, which in essence is dualism or idealism; these two are opposed to each other. (4) The difference in revolutionary thoroughness. The Communists' theory is consistent with their practice, *i.e.* Communists have revolutionary thoroughness. Followers of the Three People's Principles, with the exception of those who are completely loyal to the revolution and to truth, are not consistent in their theory and practice and their words contradict their deeds; that is to say, they lack revolutionary thoroughness. The

above are the differences between the two. They distinguish Communists from the followers of the Three People's Principles. It is undoubtedly quite wrong to overlook this fact, to see only the side of unity and not the side of contradiction.

Having understood all this one can understand the meaning of the demand of the bourgeois die-hards that communism be "tucked away". It means either bourgeois despotism or a complete lack of common sense.

10. THE OLD AND THE NEW THREE PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLES

The bourgeois die-hards have absolutely no understanding of historical changes, and in this respect their knowledge is so scanty as to be practically nil. They know neither the difference between communism and the Three People's Principles, nor the difference between the new Three People's Principles and the old Three People's Principles.

We Communists acknowledge "the Three People's Principles as the political basis for the Anti-Japanese National United Front"; we acknowledge that "the Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party pledges itself to fight for their complete realisation"; and we acknowledge that the minimum programme of communism and the political tenets of the Three People's Principles are basically in agreement. But what kind of Three People's Principles is in question? The Three People's Principles in question are none other than the Three People's Principles as re-interpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang. I wish that the gentlemen of the die-hard clique, in their odd moments off from exultantly carrying on the work of "containing communism", "dissolving communism" and "opposing communism", would glance over this Manifesto. As a matter of fact, Dr. Sun Yat-sen stated in the Manifesto: "This is the true interpretation of the Kuomintang's Three People's Principles". Hence only these Three People's Principles are genuine, and all others are spurious. Only the interpretation of the Three People's Principles contained in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang is the "true interpretation", and all other interpretations are

false. This presumably is not a Communist "fabrication", for many Kuomintang members and I myself personally witnessed the adoption of this Manifesto.

This Manifesto marks off the two historical periods of the Three People's Principles. Before it was issued, the Three People's Principles belonged to the old category—they were the Three People's Principles of the old bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semi-colony, the Three People's Principles of the old democracy, the old Three People's Principles.

Since it was issued, the Three People's Principles belong to the new category—they become the Three People's Principles of the new bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semi-colony, the Three People's Principles of the New Democracy, the new Three People's Principles. Only this kind of Three People's Principles is the revolutionary Three People's Principles of the new period.

The revolutionary Three People's Principles of the new period, the new or genuine Three People's Principles, contain the three cardinal policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communists and assistance to the peasants and workers. Without these three cardinal policies or minus any one of them, they become, in the new period, the false Three People's Principles or the incomplete Three People's Principles.

In the first place, the revolutionary, new or genuine Three People's Principles must be those of alliance with Russia. The present situation makes it quite evident that if there is no policy of alliance with Russia, which means allying ourselves with the socialist state, then there will necessarily be a policy of alliance with imperialism, which means allying ourselves with the imperialist powers. Don't you see that this was exactly the situation after 1927? As the conflict between the socialist Soviet Union and the imperialist powers becomes further intensified, it is inevitable that China must stand either on one side or on the other. Is it possible to incline to neither side? No, this is an illusion. All the countries in the world will be swept into one or the other of these two camps, and in the world today "neutrality" is becoming merely a deceptive phrase. Especially is this true of China, which is fighting an imperialist

power which has penetrated deep into her territory; her final victory is inconceivable without aid from the Soviet Union. If alliance with Russia is replaced by alliance with imperialism, then the word "revolutionary" must be deleted and the Three People's Principles become reactionary. In the final analysis, there can be no "neutral" Three People's Principles; they must be either revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. Would it not be brave to undertake a "fight against attacks from two sides"¹⁵ according to an old statement of Wang Ching-wei, and to have a kind of Three People's Principles for the "fight against attacks from two sides"? But unfortunately even the inventor, Wang Ching-wei himself, has already abandoned (or "tucked away") this kind of Three People's Principles for the Three People's Principles of alliance with imperialism. Eastern and Western imperialisms, being different, suppose we, unlike Wang Ching-wei who allies himself with the Eastern imperialism, ally ourselves with a group of Western imperialists and then march eastward and attack, would not that be quite revolutionary? But unfortunately, the Western imperialists want to oppose the Soviet Union and communism, so if you are allied with them they will request you to march northward and attack, and your revolution will come to nothing. Thus all these circumstances mean that the revolutionary, new or genuine Three People's Principles must be those of alliance with Russia, and never those of alliance with imperialism against Russia.

In the second place, the revolutionary, new or genuine Three People's Principles must be those of co-operation with the Communists. If you do not co-operate with the Communists, then you must oppose them. To oppose communism is the policy adopted by the Japanese imperialists and Wang Ching-wei; if you too want to oppose communism, well and good, they will invite you to join their "Anti-Communist Company". But would not that look suspiciously like turning collaborator? "I am not following Japan but following some other country." That is ridiculous too. No matter whom you follow, the moment you oppose communism you become a collaborator, because you can no longer resist the Japanese. "I am going to oppose communism independently." That is

arrant nonsense. How can the "heroes" in a colony or semi-colony tackle a big counter-revolutionary job like this without depending on the strength of imperialism? For ten long years, almost all the imperialists of the world mobilised their forces to oppose the Communists without success. How can you today suddenly succeed in "independently" opposing them? It is reported that certain people in some other place have a saying to this effect: "Opposing Communism is good; succeed in it we never could." The saying, if not mere hearsay, is one half false: for what "good" is there in opposing communism? Nevertheless the other half is true: you certainly can "never succeed" in opposing communism. The reason for this lies basically not with the Communists but with the common people, who like communism and do not like "opposing" it. The common people are not lenient; and if you fight the Communists, at this moment when our nation's enemy is penetrating deep into our territory, they will take your life for it. This much is certain: whoever wants to oppose communism must prepare to be smashed to pieces. If you are not set on being smashed to pieces, you had certainly better stop this sort of fight. This is our sincere advice to all anti-Communist "heroes". Thus it is as clear as can be that the Three People's Principles of today must be the Three People's Principles of co-operation with the Communists, otherwise these principles will perish. This is a question of life and death for the Three People's Principles; co-operating with the Communists they will survive, and opposing the Communists they will perish—can anyone prove the contrary?

In the third place, the revolutionary, new or genuine Three People's Principles must be the Three People's Principles with a policy of assisting the peasants and workers. To reject this policy, to fail to give assistance to the peasants and workers sincerely and whole-heartedly or to carry out the instruction to "arouse the people" contained in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament, is to prepare for the defeat of the revolution and also for one's own defeat. Stalin has said that "the national question is *virtually* a peasant question".¹⁶ That is to say, the Chinese revolution is virtually the peasants' revolution, and the resistance to Japan now going on is virtually the peasants' resistance to

Japan. New-democratic politics is virtually the granting of power to the peasants. The new or genuine Three People's Principles are virtually the principles of the peasants' revolution. The problem of mass culture is virtually the raising of the peasants' culture. The Anti-Japanese War is virtually a peasants' war. Now is the time for following the "principle of going into the mountains";¹⁷ we hold meetings, perform our duties, attend classes, publish newspapers, write books and put on theatrical performances—all are done on mountain-tops and virtually for the sake of the peasants. And all that goes into the resistance to Japan and our own livelihood is virtually provided by the peasants. By "virtually" we mean essentially, not ignoring other factors, as Stalin himself has already explained. It is common knowledge to every schoolboy that 80 per cent of China's population are peasants. So the peasant problem has become the main problem of the Chinese revolution, and the strength of the peasants constitutes the principal force of the Chinese revolution. In the Chinese population the workers are second in size to the peasants. There are in China several million industrial workers and several tens of millions of handicraftsmen and agricultural workers. China cannot do without her workers in various industries, because they are the producers in the industrial sector of the economy. The revolution cannot succeed without the modern industrial working class, because it is the leader of the Chinese revolution and is the most richly endowed with revolutionary quality. Under such conditions, the revolutionary, new or genuine Three People's Principles must be the Three People's Principles with a policy of assisting the peasants and workers. If any kind of Three People's Principles lacks this policy, does not sincerely and whole-heartedly assist the peasants and workers or carry out the instruction to "arouse the people", it will certainly perish.

From this it can be seen that there is no future for any Three People's Principles which cast aside the three cardinal policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communists and assistance to the peasants and workers. All conscientious followers of the Three People's Principles must seriously consider this point.

Such Three People's Principles with the three cardinal policies, such revolutionary, new and genuine Three People's Principles are the Three People's Principles of New Democracy, a development from the old Three People's Principles, a great contribution of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and the product of the era when the Chinese revolution has become part of the world socialist revolution. It is only such Three People's Principles that the Chinese Communist Party describes as "being what China needs today", and declares itself "pledged to fight for their complete realisation". It is only such Three People's Principles that basically agree with the Communist Party's political programme for the stage of democratic revolution or its minimum programme.

As to the old Three People's Principles, they were a product of the old period of the Chinese revolution. Russia was then an imperialist power, and of course there could be no policy of alliance with her; there was then no Communist Party in our country, and of course there could be no policy of co-operation with the Communists; the workers' and peasants' movement at that time, with its political significance not yet fully manifest, did not attract the people's attention, and of course there could be no policy of alliance with the workers and peasants. Hence the Three People's Principles, as understood before the reorganisation of the Kuomintang in 1924, belong to the old category, and are the obsolete Three People's Principles. Had they not been developed into the new Three People's Principles, it would have been impossible for the Kuomintang to make any advance. The sagacious Dr. Sun Yat-sen saw this point and, with the help of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, re-interpreted the Three People's Principles, thus endowing them with new historical features, setting up the united front between the Three People's Principles and communism, establishing the first Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, winning the sympathy of the people of the whole country and carrying out the revolution of 1924-7.

The old Three People's Principles were revolutionary in the old period, and reflected its historical features. But if one still wants to go on repeating the old stuff in the new period when the new Three People's Principles have been established; or

wants to oppose the alliance with Russia after the socialist state has been established; or wants to oppose co-operation with the Communists when the Communist Party has come into existence; or wants to oppose the policy of assisting the peasants and workers after they have awakened and demonstrated their political might; then he is a reactionary ignorant of the times. The reaction since 1927 has been the result of this ignorance. A proverb says: "The superior people are those who understand the times." I hope the followers of the Three People's Principles today will bear this in mind.

There is no basic agreement between the Three People's Principles of the old category and the Communist Party's minimum programme, because the former fitted in with the old period and are now obsolete. If any kind of Three People's Principles opposes Russia, opposes communism and opposes the peasants and workers, then it is certainly a reactionary kind of Three People's Principles, which has absolutely nothing in common with the minimum programme of the Communist Party and moreover is its enemy, and there is no point in discussing it any further. This, too, the followers of the Three People's Principles should carefully consider.

But in any case, until the task of opposing imperialism and feudalism is basically accomplished, the new Three People's Principles will not be forsaken by people with a conscience. Wang Ching-wei and his like are the only people who have forsaken them. No matter how energetically they carry out their bogus Three People's Principles, which oppose Russia, oppose communism and oppose the peasants and workers, there will surely be people who, with conscience and a sense of righteousness, continue to support the genuine Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. If it can be said that large numbers of followers of the genuine Three People's Principles have continued to struggle for the Chinese revolution after the reaction of 1927, then their numbers will beyond doubt swell to thousands upon thousands now that the national enemy has penetrated deep into our territory. We Communists will from start to finish persist in long-term co-operation with all these true followers of the Three People's Principles, and we reject

only the collaborators and sworn enemies to communism, but will never forsake any of our friends.

II. NEW-DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

We have explained above the historical features of Chinese politics in the new period and the question of the new-democratic republic. We can now proceed to the question of culture.

A given culture is the ideological reflection of the politics and economy of a given society. There is in China an imperialist culture which is a reflection of the control or partial control of imperialism over China politically and economically. This part of culture is advocated not only by the cultural organisations run directly by the imperialists in China but also by a number of shameless Chinese. All culture that contains a slave ideology belongs to this category. There is also in China a semi-feudal culture which is a reflection of semi-feudal politics and economy and has as its representatives all those who, while opposing the new culture and new ideologies, advocate the worship of Confucius, the study of the Confucian canon, the old ethical code and the old ideologies. Imperialist culture and semi-feudal culture are affectionate brothers, who have formed a reactionary cultural alliance to oppose China's new culture. This reactionary culture serves the imperialists and the feudal class, and must be swept away. Unless it is swept away, no new culture of any kind can be built up. The new culture and the reactionary culture are locked in a struggle in which one must die so that the other may live; there is no construction without destruction, no flowing without damming and no moving without halting.

As to the new culture, it is the ideological reflection of new politics and new economy, and is in the service of new politics and new economy.

As we have stated in Section 3, Chinese society has gradually changed its character since the emergence of capitalist economy in China: it is no longer an entirely feudal society but a semi-feudal one, though feudal economy still predominates. In contrast to feudal economy, such capitalist economy is a new

economy. The new political forces which have emerged and grown simultaneously with this capitalist new economy are the political forces of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat. And what ideologically reflects these new economic and political forces and is in their service, is the new culture. Without capitalist economy, without the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and without the political forces of these classes, the new ideology or new culture could not have emerged.

All the new political, new economic and new cultural forces are revolutionary forces in China which are opposed to the old politics, old economy and old culture. The old things are composed of two parts: one is China's own semi-feudal politics, economy and culture and the other is imperialist politics, economy and culture, with the latter heading the alliance. All these are rotten and should be completely destroyed. The struggle between the new and the old in Chinese society is a struggle between the new forces of the broad masses of the people (the various revolutionary classes) and the old forces of imperialism and the feudal class. Such a struggle between the new and the old is a struggle between revolution and counter-revolution. This struggle has taken a full hundred years if dated from the Opium War, and nearly thirty years if dated from the Revolution of 1911.

But as has been said before, revolutions also can be differentiated into old and new, and what is new in one historical period will become old in another. The century of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution can be divided into two main stages—a first stage of eighty years and a second of twenty years. Each has a basic historical feature: China's bourgeois-democratic revolution in the first eighty years belongs to the old category, while that in the next twenty years, owing to the change in the international and domestic political situation, belongs to the new category. Old democracy—the feature in the first eighty years. New Democracy—the feature in the last twenty years. This distinction holds good in culture as well as in politics.

How does this distinction manifest itself in culture? This problem we shall explain below.

12. THE HISTORICAL FEATURES OF CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION

On China's cultural or ideological front, the period preceding the May 4 Movement and the period following it form two distinct historical periods.

Before the May 4 Movement, the struggle on China's cultural front was a struggle between the new culture of the bourgeoisie and the old culture of the feudal class. Before the May 4 Movement, the struggles between the modern school system and the imperial competitive examination system,¹⁸ between new learning and old learning, and between Western learning and Chinese learning, all partook of this character. The studies in the modern school or new learning or Western learning of that time consisted basically (we say basically, because they still retained some poisonous vestiges of Chinese feudalism) in the natural sciences and the bourgeois social and political theories, all of which are needed by the representatives of the bourgeoisie. At that time the ideology of the new learning played the revolutionary role of fighting the Chinese feudal ideology, and was in the service of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of the old period. However, as a result of the flabbiness of the Chinese bourgeoisie and the advent of the era of imperialism in the world, such bourgeois ideology was defeated in only a few rounds by the reactionary alliance of the slave ideology of foreign imperialism and the Chinese feudal ideology of going back to the ancients; as soon as this reactionary ideological alliance started a small counter-offensive the new learning folded up its banners, muffled its drums and beat a retreat, losing its soul and retaining only its carcass. The old bourgeois-democratic culture had decayed and become enervated in the era of imperialism: its failure was inevitable.

But since the May 4 Movement things have gone differently. Since then a brand new cultural force of fresh strength has appeared in China, namely, the ideas of a Communist culture guided by the Chinese Communists: the Communist world outlook and the Communist theory of social revolution. The May 4 Movement occurred in 1919, and in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was founded and China's labour movement

actually began, all following the First World War and the Russian October Revolution, *i.e.* at a time when the national problem and colonial revolutionary movements in the world changed their old physiognomy; here the connection between the Chinese revolution and the world revolution is quite obvious. As the new political force—the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese Communist Party—enters the Chinese political arena, the new cultural force too, in new uniform and with new weapons, mustering all possible allies and deploying itself in battle array, launches heroic attacks on imperialist culture and feudal culture. This new force has made great developments in the domain of the social sciences as well as that of arts and letters, whether philosophy, economics, political science, military science, history or literature and art (be it drama, film, music, sculpture or painting). For the last twenty years, in whatever direction this new cultural force has turned its spearhead, a great revolution has taken place in both thought-content and form (such as the style of written language). Its influence is so great and its power so tremendous that it is practically invincible wherever it goes. The vast scope of its mobilisation is unparalleled in any other period in Chinese history. And Lu Hsun was the greatest and the most militant standard-bearer of this new cultural force. He was the supreme commander in China's cultural revolution; he was not only a great man of letters, but also a great thinker and a great revolutionary. Lu Hsun had the most unyielding backbone and was totally free from any trace of obsequiousness and sycophancy; such strength of character is the greatest treasure among the colonial and semi-colonial peoples. Lu Hsun, representing the great majority of the people, was an unprecedented national hero on the cultural front, the most correct, the bravest, the firmest, the most loyal and the most zealous hero who stormed and broke up the enemy's front. The line he took is precisely the line of the new culture of the Chinese nation.

Before the May 4 Movement, the new culture of China was a culture of the old-democratic character and a part of the capitalist cultural revolution of the world bourgeoisie. Since the May 4 Movement, it has become a culture of the

new-democratic character and a part of the socialist cultural revolution of the world proletariat.

Before the May 4 Movement, China's new cultural movement, her cultural revolution, was led by the bourgeoisie, which was still playing a leading role. After the May 4 Movement, the bourgeoisie became even more backward in cultural ideology than in politics; the bourgeois cultural ideology could by no means play the leading role any longer, but could only, during the period of revolution, fulfil to a certain extent the role of member of an alliance in which the ideology of proletarian culture must be the leader. This is a hard fact which no one can deny.

What is called new-democratic culture is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses of the people; this is today the culture of the anti-Japanese united front. This culture can only be led by the proletarian cultural ideology, by the ideology of communism, and cannot be led by the cultural ideology of any other class. New-democratic culture is, in a word, the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal culture of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat.

13. THE FOUR PERIODS

Any cultural revolution is the ideological reflection of the political revolution and economic revolution and is in their service. In China there is a united front in the cultural revolution as in the political revolution.

The history of the united front in the cultural revolution during the last twenty years is divided into four periods: the first covering the two years from 1919 to 1921; the second, the six years from 1921 to 1927; the third, the ten years from 1927 to 1937; and the fourth, the three years from 1937 up to the present.

The first period extended from the May 4 Movement of 1919 to the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. In this period the May 4 Movement was the chief landmark.

The May 4 Movement was an anti-imperialist as well as an anti-feudal movement. Its outstanding historical significance lies in a feature which was absent in the Revolution of 1911,

namely, a thorough and uncompromising opposition to imperialism and a thorough and uncompromising opposition to feudalism. The May 4 Movement possessed this feature because capitalist economy in China had developed a step further, and because new hopes for the liberation of the Chinese nation had arisen as China's revolutionary intelligentsia saw that the three big imperialist powers, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, had collapsed, and two others, Britain and France, had been weakened, while the Russian proletariat had established a socialist state, and the German, Austrian (Hungarian) and Italian proletariat had risen in revolution. The May 4 Movement came into being at the call of the world revolution of that time, of the Russian Revolution and of Lenin. It was part of the world proletarian revolution of that time. Although there was still no Chinese Communist Party during the May 4 Movement, yet there had already appeared large numbers of intellectuals who approved of the Russian Revolution and had some rudimentary understanding of communist ideology. The May 4 Movement was in the beginning a revolutionary movement of the united front of three sections of people—the Communist intelligentsia, the revolutionary petty-bourgeois intelligentsia and the bourgeois intelligentsia (the last forming the right wing of the movement at that time). Its shortcoming was that it was confined to the intellectuals and did not secure the participation of the workers and peasants. But as soon as it developed into the June 3 Movement,¹⁹ not only the intelligentsia but also the broad sections of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie took part, and it became a revolutionary movement on a nation-wide scale. The cultural revolution ushered in by the May 4 Movement was a movement for thoroughly opposing feudal culture; since the dawn of Chinese history, there had never been such a great and thoroughgoing cultural revolution. Raising at that time the two big banners—opposition to the old ethics and promotion of the new, and opposition to the old literature and promotion of the new—the cultural revolution made a great achievement. At that time it was not yet possible for this cultural movement to extend widely among the masses of the workers and peasants. It put forward the slogan of "Literature for the common people", but

the term "common people" then referred only to the intelligentsia of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in the cities, or the so-called intelligentsia of the burghers. Both in ideology and in the matter of cadres the May 4 Movement prepared the way for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, as well as for the May 30 Movement and the Northern Expedition. The bourgeois intelligentsia then constituted the right wing of the May 4 Movement; in the second period, the greater part of it compromised with the enemy and turned to the side of reaction.

In the second period, which had as its landmarks the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, the May 30 Movement and the Northern Expedition, the united front of the three classes formed in the May 4 Movement was maintained and developed; the peasantry was induced to join it, and politically a united front of these classes was formed, witness the first instance of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was great not only because he led the great Revolution of 1911 (though it was a democratic revolution of the old period), but also because he was able "to adapt himself to the trends of the world and meet the needs of the masses", by bringing forward the three cardinal revolutionary policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communists and assistance to the peasants and workers, by interpreting the Three People's Principles in a new light and thus founding the new Three People's Principles with the three cardinal policies. Prior to this, the Three People's Principles were hardly linked with the educational and academic field or the youth, because they put forward neither the slogan of opposing imperialism nor the slogans of opposing the feudal social system and opposing the feudal cultural ideology. Prior to this, they were the old Three People's Principles which were looked upon as a time-serving banner of a group of men striving to seize government power and secure government posts, a banner only for political careerists. After this, the new Three People's Principles with the three cardinal policies appeared. The co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the joint efforts of the revolutionary members of the two parties extended

the new Three People's Principles to the whole of China, to a section of people in the educational and academic field and to the broad masses of young students. This was entirely due to the fact that the original Three People's Principles had developed into the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and new-democratic Three People's Principles with the three cardinal policies; without such a development, the dissemination of the ideas of the Three People's Principles would have been impossible.

In this period, the revolutionary Three People's Principles became the political basis of the united front of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and various revolutionary classes; as "communism is the good friend of the Three People's Principles", the two doctrines formed a united front. In terms of social classes, this was a united front of the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. At that time, with the Communist *Weekly Guide*, the Kuomintang's *Republican Daily News* of Shanghai and other newspapers in various places as bases of operation, the two parties jointly advocated the cause of anti-imperialism; jointly opposed the feudal education based upon the worship of Confucius and the study of the Confucian canon; and jointly opposed the old literature and old literary style of writing in the ancient feudal manner and promoted the new literature and the vernacular style of writing with an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal content. During the war in Kwangtung and the Northern Expedition this anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ideology was introduced into China's armed forces and thereby reformed them. Among millions upon millions of the peasant masses, the slogans of "Down with the corrupt officials" and "Down with the local bullies and bad gentry" were put forward, and great peasant revolutionary struggles were stirred up. Thanks to all this and to the aid of the Soviet Union, victory was won in the Northern Expedition. But as soon as the big bourgeoisie had climbed to political power, it put an end to this revolution and the political situation turned to a new phase.

The third period was the new revolutionary period between 1927 and 1937. By then, of the former four classes inside the revolutionary camp, only three—the proletariat, the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie (including the

revolutionary intelligentsia)—remained, because a change took place within the revolutionary camp at the end of the second period; the Chinese big bourgeoisie went over to the counter-revolutionary camp of the imperialist and feudal forces and the national bourgeoisie followed suit, and consequently the Chinese revolution had to enter a new period and be carried on by the masses under the sole leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This period was on the one hand a period of counter-revolutionary campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation", and on the other a period of the deepening of the revolutionary movement. There were then two kinds of campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation": military "encirclement and annihilation" and cultural "encirclement and annihilation". There was also the deepening of two kinds of revolution: the deepening of the agrarian revolution and the deepening of the cultural revolution. At the instigation of the imperialists, all the reactionary forces of China and of the world were mobilised for both kinds of campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation" which lasted no less than ten years and were unprecedented throughout the world in cruelty—hundreds of thousands of Communists and young students were slaughtered and millions of the worker-peasant masses were persecuted. To the people responsible for all this, it seemed that communism and the Communists could certainly be "suppressed and annihilated once and for all". However, the result was the opposite: both kinds of campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation" failed miserably. The outcome of the military campaigns was the northern march of the Red Army to resist the Japanese, and the outcome of the cultural campaigns was the outburst of the December 9 Movement of the revolutionary youth in 1935. And the common result of both kinds of campaigns was the awakening of the people of the whole country. All these three events were the positive results. The strangest thing of all was: as the Communist Party was in an utterly defenceless position in all the cultural institutions in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, why did the Kuomintang's cultural campaigns also completely fall to the ground? Does not this give food for prolonged and profound thought? And it was in the very midst of such campaigns of

“encirclement and annihilation” that Lu Hsun, the Communist, grew to be the giant of China’s cultural revolution.

The negative result of the counter-revolutionary campaigns of “encirclement and annihilation” was the invasion of our territory by Japanese imperialism. This is the main reason why even to this day the people of the whole country still bitterly detest those ten years of the anti-communist campaign.

In the struggle during this period, the revolutionary side upheld the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal New Democracy and new Three People’s Principles, both serving the interests of the broad masses of the people, while the counter-revolutionary side imposed a despotism supported by an alliance of the landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, both of which were under the direction of imperialism. That despotism politically and culturally dismembered Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s three cardinal policies and his new Three People’s Principles, causing a profound catastrophe to the Chinese nation.

The fourth period is that of the present Anti-Japanese War. The circuitous course of the Chinese revolution has again led to a united front of four classes, but its scope is very much broadened, for its upper stratum includes many representatives of the ruling classes, its middle stratum includes the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, and its lower stratum includes the entire proletariat; thus all classes and strata of the nation have become members of the alliance and have resolutely fought against Japanese imperialism. The first stage of this period concluded with the fall of Wuhan. During that stage, the whole nation was in a hopeful and cheerful mood; politically there was a tendency towards democratisation and culturally there was a rather extensive mobilisation. After the fall of Wuhan came the second stage, during which the political situation underwent many changes, with one section of the big bourgeoisie capitulating to the enemy and another section desiring an early conclusion of the resistance. In the cultural sphere, this situation was reflected in the reactionary attitude of Yeh Ch’ing,²⁰ Carson Chang and others, and in the suppression of the freedom of speech and the press.

To overcome this crisis, it is necessary to carry on a firm struggle against all ideas opposed to resistance, solidarity and

progress; unless these reactionary ideas are crushed, there is no hope of the victory of the resistance. What will be the future of this struggle? This is a big question which the people of the whole country now have in mind. Judging from domestic and international conditions, no matter how many obstacles there are on the road of the resistance, the Chinese people will certainly be victorious. The progress achieved during the twenty years after the May 4 Movement surpasses not only that of the preceding eighty years but practically that of the previous thousands of years in Chinese history as a whole. Can we not visualise the progress China will make in another twenty years? The unrestrained violence of all these dark forces, domestic and foreign, has brought calamity to our nation; but this unrestrained violence indicates not only that the dark forces have still some strength left but that they are also waging their last struggle, and that the masses of the people are gradually approaching victory. This is true of China, of the East as a whole and of the entire world.

14. SOME ERRORS ON THE QUESTION OF THE NATURE OF CULTURE

All new things are forged out of hard and bitter struggles. Similarly the new culture has traversed a circuitous course comprising three turns in the past twenty years, during which all sorts of things, good and bad, have been tried out.

The bourgeois die-hards are as entirely mistaken on the question of culture as on that of political power. They do not know the historical features of this new period in China and do not recognise the new-democratic culture of the broad masses of the people. Their starting point is bourgeois despotism, which in culture becomes the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie. A section (and I refer only to a section) of cultural workers of the so-called European-American school²¹ who supported the Kuomintang government’s “Communist-annihilation” on the cultural front seem now to be supporting its policy of “containing communism” and “dissolving communism”. They do not want the workers and the peasants to lift up their heads politically or culturally. This road of cultural despotism of the

bourgeois die-hards is a blind alley; as in the case of political power, the domestic and international conditions for it are lacking. Therefore this cultural despotism had also best be "tucked away".

So far as national culture is concerned, the guiding role is fulfilled by Communist ideology, and efforts should be made to disseminate socialism and communism among the working class and to educate, properly and methodically, the peasantry and other sections of the masses in socialism. But national culture as a whole is at present not yet socialist.

New-democratic politics, economy and culture all contain a socialist element, and not an ordinary but a decisive one at that, because they are under the leadership of the proletariat. But taken as a whole, the political, economic and cultural conditions are as yet not socialist but new-democratic. For the Chinese revolution at the present stage, with its central task of combating foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism, is a bourgeois-democratic revolution and not yet a socialist revolution which aims at the overthrow of capitalism. In the sphere of national culture, it is wrong to assume that national culture as a whole is at present, or should be, a national culture of socialism. That would mean confusing the question of the dissemination of communist ideology with the question of carrying out an immediate programme of action, and it would mean confusing the application of the communist standpoint and methods in examining various problems, in pursuing scientific studies, in organising work and in training cadres with the question of the line for national education and national culture as a whole in the stage of China's democratic revolution. A national culture with a socialist content must be the reflection of socialist politics and economy. As there is a socialist factor in our politics and economy, so there will be a socialist factor in our national culture by way of reflection; but taking our society as a whole, we have not yet achieved politics and economy which are wholly socialist, and therefore there cannot be a national culture that is wholly socialist. As the present Chinese revolution is part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution, the present new culture of China is also part of the world proletarian-socialist new culture, and is its great ally; though this part

contains the vital factor of socialist culture, yet, taking the national culture as a whole it forms part of the world proletarian-socialist new culture, not entirely in the capacity of socialist culture, but in the capacity of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal culture of the New Democracy of the broad masses of the people. Just as the present Chinese revolution cannot be separated from the leadership of the Chinese proletariat, so the present new culture of China cannot be separated from the leadership of the ideas of China's proletarian culture, of communist ideology. However, as the task of leadership at the present stage is to direct the broad masses of the people to carry on the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal political and cultural revolutions, the content of China's present new national culture as a whole is still new-democratic, not socialist.

Beyond doubt we should at present extend the dissemination of communist ideology and intensify the study of Marxism-Leninism; without such dissemination and study we shall be unable to lead either the Chinese revolution to the future stage of socialism or the present democratic revolution to victory. However, we must not only distinguish the dissemination of communist ideology and the communist social system from the implementation of the new-democratic programme of action, but also distinguish the communist theory and methods applied in examining various problems, in pursuing scientific studies, in organising work and in training cadres, from the new-democratic line provided for the national culture as a whole. It is undoubtedly incorrect to mix up the two.

It can thus be seen that the content of China's new national culture at the present stage is neither the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie, nor pure proletarian socialism, but the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal New Democracy of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of proletarian-socialist ideas of culture.

15. A NATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND MASS CULTURE

New-democratic culture is national. It opposes imperialist oppression and upholds the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to our own nation, and bears our

national characteristics. It unites with the socialist and new-democratic cultures of all other nations and establishes with them the relations whereby they can absorb something from each other and help each other to develop, and form together the new culture of the world; but it can never unite with the reactionary imperialist culture of any nation, for it is a revolutionary national culture. China should absorb on a large scale the progressive cultures of foreign countries as an ingredient for her own culture; in the past we did not do enough work of this kind. We must absorb whatever we today find useful, not only from the present socialist or new-democratic cultures of other nations, but also from the older cultures of foreign countries, such as those of the various capitalist countries in the age of enlightenment. However, we must treat these foreign materials as we do our food, which should be chewed in the mouth, submitted to the working of the stomach and intestines, mixed with saliva, gastric juice and intestinal secretions, and then separated into essence to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded—only thus can food benefit our body; we should never swallow anything raw or absorb it uncritically. So-called “wholesale Westernisation”²² is a mistaken viewpoint. China has suffered a great deal in the past from the formalist absorption of foreign things. Likewise, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese Communists must fully and properly unite the universal truth of Marxism with the specific practice of the Chinese revolution; that is to say, the truth of Marxism must be integrated with the characteristics of the nation and given a definite national form before it can be useful; it must not be applied subjectively as a mere formula. Formula-Marxists are only fooling with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no place for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution. China’s culture should have its own form, namely, a national form. National in form, new-democratic in content—such is our new culture today.

New-democratic culture is scientific. It is opposed to all feudal and superstitious ideas; it stands for seeking truth from facts, it stands for objective truth and for the unity between theory and practice. On this point, the scientific thought of the Chinese proletariat can form an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal

and anti-superstition united front with the still progressive bourgeois materialists and natural scientists, but it can never form a united front with any reactionary idealism. Communists may form an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front for political action with certain idealists and even with religious followers, but we can never approve of their idealism or religious doctrines. A splendid ancient culture was created during the long period of China’s feudal society. To clarify the process of development of this ancient culture, to throw away its feudal dross and to absorb its democratic essence is a necessary condition for the development of our new national culture and for the increase of our national self-confidence; but we should never absorb anything and everything uncritically. We must separate all the rotten things of the ancient feudal ruling class from the fine ancient popular culture that is more or less democratic and revolutionary in character. As China’s present new politics and new economy have developed out of her old politics and old economy, and China’s new culture has also developed out of her old culture, we must respect our own history and should not cut ourselves adrift from it. However, this respect for history means only giving history a definite place among the sciences, respecting its dialectical development, but not eulogising the ancient while disparaging the modern, or praising any noxious feudal element. As to the masses of the people and the young students, the essential thing is to direct them not to look backward, but to look forward.

New-democratic culture belongs to the broad masses, hence it is democratic. It should be in the service of the toiling masses of workers and peasants who constitute more than 90 per cent of the nation’s population, and it should gradually become their culture. The knowledge to be imparted to the revolutionary cadres and the knowledge to be imparted to the broad revolutionary masses must be qualitatively different from each other but also linked to each other; elevation and popularisation must be distinguished from each other but linked to each other. Revolutionary culture is a powerful revolutionary weapon for the broad masses of the people. Before the revolution comes, revolutionary culture prepares

for it in the ideological field; during the revolution, it is a necessary and important sector in the general revolutionary front. Revolutionary cultural workers are the commanders of various ranks on this cultural front. "Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement";²³ one can thus see how important the revolutionary cultural movement is to the practical revolutionary movement. And the cultural movement and practical movement are both of a mass character. Therefore all progressive cultural workers should have their own cultural army in the Anti-Japanese War, and this army is the broad masses of the people themselves. A revolutionary cultural worker who does not get close to the people is merely "a general without an army", and his fire power cannot bring the enemy down. For the realisation of this aim, our written language must be reformed in certain ways, and our spoken language must be brought close to that of the people; we must know that the people are the inexhaustibly rich source of our revolutionary culture.

National, scientific and mass culture is the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal culture of the broad masses of the people; it is new-democratic culture and the new culture of the Chinese nation.

The combination of new-democratic politics, new-democratic economy and new-democratic culture is precisely a republic of New Democracy, a republic of China in name and in fact and the new China we want to build.

This New China stands before every Chinese; we should welcome her.

The mast of the ship *New China* is appearing above the horizon; we should clap our hands and hail her.

Raise both your hands: New China is ours!

January 1940.

OVERCOME THE DANGER OF CAPITULATION—STRIVE TO MEND THE SITUATION

This is an internal Party directive written on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The development of the current situation proves that the appraisals made on different occasions by the Central Committee are correct. The line of capitulation taken by the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie is opposed to the line of armed resistance taken by the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, and the two sides are struggling against each other. At present both lines exist and either of the two prospects is possible. What all comrades in the Party should realise in this connection is that the serious cases of capitulation, anti-communism and retrogression occurring in various places are not to be seen in isolation from each other. We should realise their seriousness, fight them resolutely and not be overwhelmed by their menace. If we lack such a spirit; if we do not have a correct policy for resolutely combating these events; if we let the Kuomintang die-hards continue their "military and political restriction of communism"; and if we worry about nothing but the possible breaking up of the united front, then the prospect of the War of Resistance will be endangered, capitulation and anti-communism will prevail throughout the country and the united front will be in danger of being broken up. We must clearly realise that at present there still exist, at home as well as abroad, many objective conditions which are favourable to our struggle for further resistance, further solidarity and further progress: for example, Japan's policy towards China remains inexorable; in spite of the slight easing of the contradictions between them, there is no real reconciliation between Japan on the one hand and Britain, France and the United States on the other, and furthermore, with the weakening of

the Anglo-French position in the Far East by the European war, it is very difficult to convoke the so-called Munich conference of the Far East; and the Soviet Union is actively helping China—these are the international conditions which make it difficult for the Kuomintang to capitulate to or compromise with Japan, or to launch a nation-wide anti-Communist war. Moreover, the Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are resolutely opposing capitulation and upholding the policy of resistance and solidarity; the intermediate classes are also opposed to capitulation; the capitulators and the die-hards within the Kuomintang, though in power, are numerically a minority—these are the domestic conditions which make it difficult for the Kuomintang to capitulate or compromise, or to launch a nation-wide anti-Communist war. In view of these circumstances, the task of our Party is, on the one hand, to resist resolutely the military and political offensives of the capitulators and die-hards; and on the other, to develop actively the united front among the political parties, government organs, armed forces, the common people and the intellectuals throughout the country; to strive to win over the majority of the Kuomintang, the intermediate classes and the sympathisers in the anti-Japanese armies; to strive for a deepening of the mass movement; to strive to win over the intellectuals; to strive for the consolidation of the anti-Japanese base areas, for the development of the anti-Japanese armed forces and the anti-Japanese political power, and for our Party's consolidation and progress. Working along both lines simultaneously, we shall be able to overcome the danger of capitulation by the big landlords and the big bourgeois and to mend the situation. Therefore, to strive to mend the situation and at the same time to increase our vigilance towards any possible emergencies (emergencies on a limited scale and of a local character at present) constitute the general directive of the Party's present policy.

With Wang Ching-wei's announcement of his treasonable pact¹ and Chiang Kai-shek's publication of his message to the nation, the agitation for a truce with the enemy has certainly received a blow and the forces favouring the armed resistance will certainly develop, while, on the other hand, the "military

and political restriction of communism" will continue, more local incidents will occur and the Kuomintang may continue to stress so-called "unification for fighting the foreign enemy" in order to attack us. That is because the forces favouring armed resistance and progress still cannot in the immediate future develop to a strength sufficient to overwhelm the forces favouring capitulation and retrogression. Our policy is precisely to spare no effort in every locality in the country where there is a Communist Party organisation to carry on a propaganda campaign against Wang Ching-wei's treasonable pact. Chiang Kai-shek's message indicates that he intends to persist in armed resistance, but he does not stress the necessity of strengthening national solidarity, and he does not so much as mention any policy for persisting in resistance and progress, without which it will be impossible to persist in the resistance. Hence in the anti-Wang Ching-wei movement we should lay stress on the following points: (1) Support the national policy of resisting Japan to the very last and oppose Wang Ching-wei's treasonable pact; (2) The people of the whole country must unite to overthrow Wang Ching-wei the collaborator, and overthrow Wang Ching-wei's puppet central government; (3) Support the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and overthrow the anti-Communist policy of Wang Ching-wei; (4) Overthrow the secret collaborators with Wang's clique, for Wang Ching-wei anti-communism is his scheme to split the anti-Japanese united front; (5) Strengthen national solidarity and eliminate internal friction; (6) Reform the country's political system, develop the movement for constitutionalism and establish a democratic government; (7) Lift the ban on the political parties and grant legal status to anti-Japanese parties and groups; (8) Guarantee the people's freedom of speech and assembly for fighting the Japanese and the Chinese collaborators; (9) Consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas and oppose the disruptive schemes of Wang's clique of collaborators; (10) Support the troops which perform meritorious service in the Anti-Japanese War and secure sufficient supplies for the front; (11) Develop culture for resisting Japan, protect the progressive youth and proscribe all collaborationist views and opinions. The slogans listed above should be made widely

known. Large numbers of articles, manifestoes, leaflets and pamphlets should be published and speeches delivered in various places, and slogans suitable to the local circumstances should be added.

A mass rally in opposition to Wang Ching-wei's treasonable pact is scheduled for February 1 in Yen-an. Everywhere else, uniting with all sections of the people and with the anti-Japanese members of the Kuomintang, we should hold similar mass rallies in early or middle February in order to create a fervent nation-wide upsurge against capitulation, against the collaborators and against friction.

January 28, 1940.

UNITE ALL THE ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND COMBAT THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS

This is a speech delivered at a mass meeting in Yen-an during a campaign against Wang Ching-wei.

Why are we, people from all circles in Yen-an, meeting here today? We are here to denounce the traitor Wang Ching-wei and to unite all anti-Japanese forces to combat the anti-Communist die-hards.

We Communists have pointed out time and again that the policy of Japanese imperialism to subjugate China is firmly set. Whatever cabinet change there may be in Japan, her basic policy of subjugating China and reducing her to a colony will not change. Frightened out of his wits in face of such a policy, Wang Ching-wei, political representative of the pro-Japanese faction of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, grovelled before Japan, concluded a treasonable treaty with her and betrayed China to Japanese imperialism. Moreover, he wants to set up a puppet government opposed to the anti-Japanese government, to organise a puppet army opposed to the anti-Japanese army. Recently he has not made much mention of opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, which is said to have been displaced by "alliance with Chiang Kai-shek". To oppose communism is the main objective of both Japan and Wang Ching-wei. Knowing that the Communist Party is the most thoroughgoing in fighting Japan, and that the strength of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party will be increased through their co-operation, they are doing their utmost to break up that co-operation and separate the two parties from each other and, better still, to let them fight each other. Hence they have made use of the die-hard clique within the Kuomintang to make trouble everywhere. In Hunan, there was the Pingkiang Massacre;¹ in Honan, the Chuehshan Massacre;² in Shansi, the old army attacked the new army;³

in Hopeh, Chang Yin-wu attacked the Eighth Route Army;⁴ in Shantung, Ch'in Ch'i-yung attacked the guerrillas;⁵ in eastern Hupeh, Ch'eng Ju-huai killed between five and six hundred Communists;⁶ and as to the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region, the die-hards were busy about "point-and-line work"⁷ inside it and enforced a "blockade" from outside besides taking preliminary steps for an armed invasion.⁸ Moreover, a large number of progressive youth were arrested and sent to concentration camps;⁹ the metaphysics-monger Carson Chang was hired to make such reactionary proposals as the dissolution of the Communist Party, the abolition of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and the disbandment of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies; and such Trotskyites as Yeh Ch'ing were employed to write articles abusing the Communist Party. All this is aimed solely at disrupting the resistance to Japan and turning the people of the country into colonial slaves.¹⁰

Thus, the Wang Ching-wei clique on the outside and the Kuomintang's anti-Communist die-hard clique from the inside have conspired to turn the current situation into a chaos.

Many people are growing indignant at such a state of affairs, and think that our resistance to Japan is hopeless and that all members of the Kuomintang are villains and ought to be opposed. We must point out that the indignation is entirely justified, for how can anybody help feeling indignant in face of such a grave situation? But our resistance to Japan is still hopeful and not all the Kuomintang members are villains. Towards different sections of the Kuomintang, different policies should be adopted. As to those rascals who have completely lost all conscience, who have dared to open fire upon the rear of the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies, carry out massacres at Pingkiang and Chuehshan, disrupt the border region and attack the progressive armies, organisations and personnel, we must never tolerate them, must return their blows and must never yield a step to them. For such rascals have completely lost all conscience and, even when our national enemy has penetrated deep into our territory, they still want to create friction, carry out massacres and incite splits. Whatever they may think, they are actually helping Japan and

Wang Ching-wei, and some of them have been collaborators in disguise from the very beginning. If we do not punish such people, we shall be committing a mistake, encouraging the traitors, acting in a disloyal way to the national resistance and to the motherland, encouraging the rascals to disrupt the united front and running counter to the policy of the Party. But the policy of dealing blows to the capitulators and the anti-Communist die-hards is adopted solely for the sake of keeping up resistance to Japan, of safeguarding the anti-Japanese united front. Therefore, towards those Kuomintang members who are earnestly fighting Japan, and who are not capitulators or anti-Communist die-hards, we do express our good will; we unite with them, respect them and are willing to continue our long-term co-operation with them so as to put the state in good order. Whoever does otherwise will be running counter to the policy of the Party.

The policy of our Party is twofold: One is to unite all the progressive forces and all people loyal to the cause of resisting Japan, and the other is to oppose all the rascals who have completely lost all conscience, to oppose the capitulators and the anti-Communist die-hards. This twofold policy of our Party is adopted for a single objective, namely, to strive for a favourable turn in the current situation in order to defeat Japan. The task of the Communist Party and the people of the whole country is to unite all anti-Japanese progressive forces, to combat all forces of capitulation and retrogression, to strive for a favourable turn and avert an unfavourable turn in the current situation. Such is our basic objective. We shall never be pessimistic or despondent; we are optimistic. We are not afraid of any attack from the capitulators or the anti-Communist die-hards; we must smash them, and we certainly shall. The Chinese nation will certainly achieve liberation; China will never perish. China will certainly make progress; her retrogression is only a temporary phenomenon.

In our meeting today we also want to express to the people throughout the country our belief that for the sake of resisting Japan, solidarity and progress of the whole nation is essential. It is wrong that some people only emphasise resistance but are unwilling to emphasise solidarity and progress, or even to make

any mention of them at all. Without true and firm solidarity, without rapid and real progress, how can we persist in resistance to Japan? The anti-Communist die-hards within the Kuomintang emphasise unification, but what they call "unification" is a sham unification, not genuine unification; an irrational unification, not a rational unification; a formal unification, not an actual unification. They shout for unification, but what they really want is to liquidate the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region, arguing that so long as the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the border region exist, China will remain disunited; they want to turn over everything in the country to the Kuomintang; they want not only to continue their one-party dictatorship but also to expand it. If this is what they really want, what unification can there be? To tell the truth, if in the past the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region had not come forward to advocate truly and sincerely the cessation of civil war and a united resistance to Japan, there would have been nobody to initiate an Anti-Japanese National United Front or to take the lead in a peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident, and then no resistance to Japan could have been carried out. If the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and the democratic anti-Japanese base areas had not come forward to maintain truly and sincerely the general resistance to Japan and combat the dangerous tendencies towards capitulation, split and retrogression, the situation today would be a terrible mess. The several hundred thousand troops of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are holding two-fifths of the enemy forces in check and fighting seventeen Japanese divisions out of a total of forty,¹¹ so why should these armies be liquidated? The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region is the most progressive region in the whole country, and it is a democratic anti-Japanese base area. In this region, first of all there are no corrupt officials; secondly, there are no local bullies and bad gentry; thirdly, there is no gambling; fourthly, there are no

prostitutes; fifthly, there are no concubines; sixthly, there are no beggars; seventhly, there are no people forming cliques to seek selfish ends; eighthly, there is no atmosphere of slackness and laxity; ninthly, nobody here lives by friction-mongering;¹² and tenthly, nobody here profiteers out of the war—why then should it be liquidated? Only shameless people can utter such shameless words, and what moral right have the die-hards to say anything before us? Comrades! Things will certainly not turn out like that. The border region should not be liquidated, but the whole country should learn from it; the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should not be liquidated, but the whole country should learn from them; the Communist Party should not be liquidated, but the whole country should learn from it; and the progressive people should not keep pace with the backward people, but the backward should keep pace with the progressive. We Communists are the staunchest supporters of unification; we were the initiators of the united front, we have firmly maintained the united front and put forward the slogan for a unified democratic republic. Who else could have proposed these things? Who else could have put them into practice? Who else could have accepted a stipend of no more than five silver *yuan* per month?¹³ Who else could have formed such an incorruptible and clean government? Unification! Unification! The capitulators have their theory of unification, and they want us to become unified with them in capitulating to the Japanese; the anti-Communist die-hards have also their theory of unification, and they want us to become unified with them by way of a split and retrogression. Could we ever accept such arguments as theirs? If unification is not based on resistance, solidarity and progress, could it be considered genuine unification? Could it be considered rational unification? Could it be considered actual unification? What a dream! It is to put forward our theory of unification that we have met here today. Our theory of unification is precisely that of the people of the whole country, of all men of conscience. This theory of unification is based on resistance, solidarity and progress. Only through progress can we achieve solidarity; only through solidarity can we resist Japan; and only through progress, solidarity and resistance to Japan can we attain

unification. This is our theory of unification, a theory of genuine, rational and actual unification. The theory of sham, irrational and formal unification is one which will lead our country to extinction, and which is espoused only by people completely devoid of conscience. Such people want to liquidate the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, the democratic anti-Japanese base areas, and liquidate all local anti-Japanese forces, so that the country may be unified under the Kuomintang. This is a plot, an attempt to continue autocratic rule under the guise of unification, to sell the dog-meat of one-party dictatorship by displaying the sheep's head of unification; with a brazen face they are boasting and bragging, utterly lost to shame. We are meeting here today precisely to rip open this paper-tiger; we must resolutely oppose the anti-Communist die-hards.

February 1, 1940.

TEN DEMANDS TO THE KUOMINTANG

This is a circular telegram drafted on behalf of the Yen-an mass rally against Wang Ching-wei.

On February 1 a mass rally against Wang Ching-wei was held in Yen-an, and the whole attendance seethed with such righteous indignation that it unanimously resolved to denounce Wang Ching-wei for treason and capitulation and to support the War of Resistance to the very last. In order to overcome the present crisis and strive for victory in the War of Resistance, we hereby respectfully submit ten cardinal policies for national salvation, with the hope that the National Government, all parties and groups, officers and men fighting in the War of Resistance and all fellow-countrymen will accept them and put them into practice.

First, launch a nation-wide campaign to denounce Wang Ching-wei. As the traitor Wang has gathered a following, attached himself to the enemy and betrayed his country by signing treasonable secret treaties and serving as a tool for the enemy, it is natural that our countrymen unanimously demand his death. But this only takes care of the Wang Ching-wei in the open, and the Wang Ching-weis under cover are still left out of account. The Wang Ching-weis under cover either swagger through the busy streets after having grabbed key posts in the government, or worm themselves deep into the community by assuming disguises and concealing their identity. The corrupt officials are really their adherents, and all the friction-mongers their subordinates. Without a nation-wide campaign to denounce the Wang Ching-weis, in which all political parties, government organs, military units, civilian bodies, the press and the educational institutions, in the cities as well as in the countryside, from the higher-ups to the rank and file, are mobilised into action, Wang's supporters can never be eradicated, but will always continue their criminal activities of ushering in the invaders and undermining our rear, causing an unimaginable disaster. The government should issue a

decree calling on the whole nation to launch a campaign to denounce Wang Ching-wei. Officials are to be punished for any failure to act accordingly. We must see to it that Wang's supporters are eradicated and severely dealt with. This is the first thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

Second, strengthen solidarity. Speakers and writers today do not talk about solidarity, but about unification, implying that nothing short of liquidating the Communist Party, liquidating the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, liquidating the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and liquidating the anti-Japanese forces in all localities can be called unification. They do not realise that the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region are the staunchest advocates of unification in the whole country. Is it not the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the border region that recommended the peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident? Is it not the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the border region that initiated the Anti-Japanese National United Front, advocated the establishment of a unified democratic republic and have worked for both in earnest? Is it not the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the border region that have stood at the forefront of national defence, resisting seventeen enemy divisions, shielding the Central plains and the North-west and defending North China and the area south of the Yangtze river, and have resolutely carried out the Three People's Principles and the "Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction"? Ever since Wang Ching-wei sponsored the anti-Communist and pro-Japanese line, human monsters like Carson Chang and Yeh Ch'ing¹ have chimed in by pen-pushing, while the anti-Communist and die-hard cliques have chimed in with friction-mongering. Autocratic rule has been imposed under the pretext of unification. The cause of solidarity has been forsaken and the wedge of split driven in. "Szuma Chao's intention is obvious to every man in the street."² The Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the border region have resolutely advocated genuine

unification and opposed bogus unification; they have advocated rational unification and opposed irrational unification; and they have advocated unification in deed and opposed unification in mere form. What they advocate is not unification in capitulation but unification in resistance, not unification in split but unification in solidarity, not unification in retrogression but unification in progress. Unification on the basis of resistance, solidarity and progress is genuine unification, rational unification and unification in deed. Apart from this, to seek unification through whatever kinds of intrigues or deceptions is like going north while destined for the south, a thing to which we dare not agree. As for the local anti-Japanese forces, all of them deserve equal treatment and protection; there must be no discrimination in their treatment but all of them should be trusted, provisioned, supported and encouraged with reward. People should be treated sincerely without deceitfulness and magnanimously without narrow-mindedness. If things are really ordered in such a way, then all except those with an ulterior motive will follow to a man the path of a unified country. Unification must be based on solidarity, and solidarity must be based on progress; only progress brings solidarity; only solidarity brings unification—this is an unalterable law. This is the second thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

Third, vigorously put constitutionalism into effect. In the long years of "political tutelage", nothing has been achieved. As a thing negates itself when developed to the extreme, constitutionalism has become a most pressing question. But freedom of speech is not permitted, the ban on the political parties has not been lifted, and actions violating constitutionalism still occur everywhere. If the constitution is to be worked out in this way, it will be nothing but a piece of official formality. If constitutionalism is to be brought about in this way, it will be nothing but one-party dictatorship. Now that the national crisis has become acute, to carry on the present policy without any change, while the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei harass us from without and the traitors disrupt us from within, will gravely imperil the very life of our nation and people. The government should immediately lift the ban

on the political parties and encourage public opinion in order to show that it sincerely intends to put constitutionalism into effect. Nothing is more urgent than this for winning the full confidence of the people and opening up the prospect of a new nation. This is the third thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

Fourth, stop friction. Since the so-called "Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties" were introduced in March last year, the uproar about containing, dissolving and opposing communism has spread all over the country, and tragic incidents have taken place one after another with streams of blood shed everywhere. This, however, did not seem enough, and in October last year appeared the so-called "Measures to Deal with the Alien-Party Problem". Then in the North-west, North China and Central China appeared the so-called "Directives to Deal with the Alien-Party Problem". Observers say that the stage of "restricting communism politically" has been succeeded by the stage of "restricting communism militarily"; this is a well-grounded statement indeed, and how could it be otherwise? But "restricting communism" means anti-communism. And anti-communism is the cunning policy of the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei, their malignant scheme to subjugate China. Hence the people were shocked and hastened to tell one another about it, afraid that the tragedy of ten years ago might be staged again. These developments culminated in the Pingkiang Massacre in Hunan, the Chueh-shan Massacre in Honan, the attack on the Eighth Route Army by Chang Yin-wu in Hopeh, the annihilation campaign against the guerrillas by Ch'in Ch'i-yung in Shantung, the ruthless massacre of between five and six hundred Communists by Ch'eng Ju-huai in eastern Hupeh, the large-scale offensive on the garrison troops of the Eighth Route Army by the Central Army in eastern Kansu and, more recently, the tragedy staged in Shansi, during which the old army of the province simultaneously attacked the new army and invaded the front of the Eighth Route Army. If such things are not checked immediately, both sides involved will be doomed to extinction, and then how can victory in the resistance be achieved? To facilitate solidarity for resistance, the government should order

the punishment of all who engineered these massacres and announce to the whole nation that similar incidents will not be allowed to recur. This is the fourth thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

Fifth, protect the youth. A concentration camp has recently been established near Sian, where more than seven hundred progressive youths from the north-western and central provinces are being interned; people are horrified to learn that, condemned to penal servitude, spiritual and physical, they are actually leading the life of convicts. What crime have the youth committed to deserve such cruel treatment? The youth are the cream of the nation and the progressive youth are particularly our treasures in the Anti-Japanese War. Freedom of belief ought to be enjoyed by everyone and ideas can by no means be suppressed by force. When the crime of the "cultural annihilation" of the last ten years is already so obvious, why should it be committed again today? The government should immediately issue an order to the whole nation for the protection of the youth, for the abolition of the concentration camp near Sian and for the strict prohibition of the outrageous insults directed against the youth in various places. This is the fifth thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

Sixth, support the front. The foremost anti-Japanese troops who have accomplished great deeds, such as the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and certain other troops, are receiving the worst treatment; they are thinly clad and poorly fed, with no replenishment of ammunition and no adequate medical care. Yet traitors are shamelessly slinging mud at them, at will and without fear. One's ears are almost deafened by endless slanders, at once irresponsible and nonsensical. The great deeds of these troops have not been rewarded and their worthy services not recorded; on the contrary, the Kuomintang Government has become more and more frantic in setting traps for them and scheming against them. All these strange things damp the ardour of our officers and men and win applause only from the enemy; they should by no means be tolerated any longer. To heighten the morale of the troops and facilitate the war, the government should on the one hand give sufficient support to the troops at the front who have

accomplished great deeds, and on the other strictly prohibit false accusations by traitors. This is the sixth thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

Seventh, proscribe the secret service. In their unrestrained violence, the secret service agents have been compared by observers to Chou Hsing and Lai Tsun-ch'en³ of the T'ang dynasty and Wei Chung-hsien and Liu Chin⁴ of the Ming dynasty. Not directing its attention to the enemy but making a specialty of attacking our own countrymen, killing innumerable people and taking bribes insatiably, the secret service is in fact the headquarters of the rumour-mongers and the breeding ground of collaborators and evil-doers. The common people are more afraid of the utterly malignant and ferocious secret service agents than of anybody else, and many cast furtive glances around for fear of them. To preserve its own prestige, the government should proscribe the secret service with all possible speed, reorganise it, and define its task as dealing exclusively with the enemy and the Chinese collaborators, so that the people's confidence may be won back and the foundations of the state may be strengthened. This is the seventh thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

Eighth, proscribe the corrupt officials. Since the War of Resistance there have been cases of war-profiteering to the tune of 100 million *yuan* and of keeping as many as eight or nine concubines.⁵ Army conscription of men, subscription of government bonds, economic control, relief for victims of natural calamities and refugees, etc. have all been seized on by corrupt officials as opportunities for making money. With such a horde of tigers and wolves in the country, it is no wonder its affairs cannot be set in order. Although the people's discontent and indignation have reached the highest degree, no one dares expose the ferocity and ruthlessness of the corrupt officials. In order to save the state from the danger of collapse it is urgent and proper to take effective measures to proscribe all corrupt officials. This is the eighth thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

Ninth, carry out the Testament of Dr. Sun Yet-sen. The Testament says:

"For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experiences during these forty years have firmly convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses of the people. . . ."

Great indeed is this remark, and we, the 450 million people of China, have all heard it. However, the Testament is more often recited than carried out. Those who violate the Testament are rewarded while those who carry it out are punished. Can there be anything stranger than this? The government should announce that anyone who dares violate the Testament, who does not work towards arousing the people but instead tramples them underfoot, is to be punished as a traitor to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. This is the ninth thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

Tenth, carry out the Three People's Principles. The Three People's Principles are the principles to be observed by the Kuomintang. But there are many who, instead of working for the War of Resistance, regard anti-communism as their first duty and hinder the people in all sorts of ways when they rise to fight Japan—this means the abandonment of the Principle of Nationalism; the officials deprive the people of every scrap of their democratic rights—this means the abandonment of the Principle of Democracy; they look on the sufferings of the people with unseeing eyes—this means the abandonment of the Principle of the People's Welfare. Such persons pay only lip-service to the Three People's Principles, and when others take steps to carry them out seriously, they either ridicule them as busybodies or inflict severe punishment on them. Thus all sorts of strange things have sprung up and the government's prestige has fallen to the ground. It is urgent and proper to reissue an unequivocal order and to see to it that the Three People's Principles are realised throughout the country. All who violate the order will be severely punished. And all who act according to the order will be given much encouragement. Only in this manner can the Three People's Principles be carried out at long last and a foundation be laid for victory in

resisting Japan. This is the tenth thing which we urge you to accept and put into practice.

These ten points form the major policy of national salvation and are the essential things to be done in the War of Resistance. As the enemy is speeding up his plots against us and the traitor Wang is extremely rampant, we cannot refrain from telling you what we feel to be crucial issues. If you condescend to accept these points and put them into effect, that will be of great advantage to the War of Resistance, to the cause of the liberation of the Chinese nation. We have stated our views with an acute sense of urgency and shall be glad to learn your sagacious opinion.

February 1, 1940.

AN INTRODUCTORY REMARK TO *THE CHINESE WORKER*

The publication of *The Chinese Worker*¹ is a necessary step. For twenty years the Chinese working class, under the leadership of its own political party, the Chinese Communist Party, has carried on heroic struggles and become the most politically conscious section of the people in the whole country, the leader of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese working class, in alliance with the peasantry and all the revolutionary people, has opposed imperialism and feudalism and waged struggles to build up a new-democratic China and to drive out Japanese imperialism; this is a great contribution. But the Chinese revolution has not yet succeeded and it is still necessary to expend great energy to unite the working class itself, to unite the peasantry and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, to unite the intellectuals and to unite all the revolutionary people. This is a great political and organisational task. This is the duty of the Chinese Communist Party, the duty of the advanced elements of the working class and the duty of the working class as a whole. The ultimate liberation of the working class and the people as a whole can be achieved only in the era in which socialism is realised; the Chinese working class must struggle for this ultimate goal. But we must pass through the stage of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution before we can enter the stage of socialism. It is therefore the immediate task of the Chinese working class to unite itself and to unite the people, to oppose imperialism and feudalism, and to struggle for the building of a new China of New Democracy. It is to accomplish such a task that *The Chinese Worker* is published.

The Chinese Worker will explain in simple words the how's and why's of many things to the masses of the workers, report on the actual situation of the anti-Japanese struggle of the working class, and sum up its experiences; it will make every effort to fulfil its task.

The Chinese Worker should become a school for educating the workers and training cadres from among the workers, and its readers will be the pupils of this school. Among the workers a large number of cadres should be reared; they should possess knowledge and ability, and should not seek a reputation on the cheap but be competent in practical work. Without a large number of such cadres it is impossible for the working class to achieve its liberation.

The working class should welcome and never refuse the help of the revolutionary intellectuals. For without their help neither can the working class itself make progress nor can the revolution succeed.

It is my hope that this journal will be well run and publish much lively writing; great care should be taken against stiffness and triteness which would make it obscure, insipid and flat.

A journal, once started, must be taken seriously and must be made a success. This is not only the responsibility of those who run it but also the responsibility of those who read it. The readers should make suggestions and write and send in brief notes and articles to express what they like and what they dislike—this is very important and is the only way to make the journal a success.

This is what I hope, and it may serve as an introductory remark.

February 7, 1940.

WE MUST EMPHASISE SOLIDARITY AND PROGRESS

This is an article written for the *New China News* of Yen-an on its first anniversary.

Resistance, solidarity and progress—these are the three major objectives put forward by the Communist Party in commemorating “July 7” last year. The three objectives form an organic whole and none of them can be dispensed with. If we emphasise only resistance but not solidarity and progress, then the “resistance” is not solidly based and cannot last. Resistance without a programme for solidarity and progress will eventually turn into capitulation or end in failure. We Communists hold that the three objectives must be integrated into one. For the sake of resistance we must oppose capitulation, oppose Wang Ching-wei’s treasonable pact with Japan, oppose Wang Ching-wei’s puppet régime and oppose all traitors and capitulators hidden in the anti-Japanese front. For the sake of solidarity we must oppose splitting activities, oppose internal friction, oppose the attacks on the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and on all progressive forces from behind the anti-Japanese front, oppose the disruption of the anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy’s rear, oppose the disruption of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region, which is the rear of the Eighth Route Army, oppose the denial of legal status to the Communist Party, and oppose the avalanche of documents for “restricting the activities of alien parties”. For the sake of progress we must oppose retrogression, oppose the shelving of the Three People’s Principles and the “Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction”, oppose the refusal to carry out the injunction to “arouse the people” contained in the “Testament of Dr. Sun Yat-sen”, oppose the sending of progressive youths to concentration camps, oppose the total deprivation of what little freedom of speech and of the press the people enjoyed at the initial period of the resistance, oppose the design to turn the movement for constitutionalism into a

bureaucratic undertaking monopolised by a few, oppose the attacks on the New Army¹ in Shansi, the suppression of the League of Self-Sacrifice, and the massacre of the progressives,² oppose the activities of the Youth Corps of the Three People's Principles in kidnapping people along the Sienyang-Yulin highway and the Kansu-Haichow railway,³ oppose the shameless practices of taking nine concubines and war-profiteering to the tune of one hundred million *yuan*, and oppose the outrageous conduct of the corrupt officials and the rampages of the local bullies and bad gentry. Unless we do all this, unless we have solidarity and progress, the so-called resistance will be only empty talk and victory in the Anti-Japanese War a vain hope. What will be the political orientation for the *New China News* in its second year? It will be to emphasise solidarity and progress, so as to end the chaotic state of affairs which is detrimental to resistance and to achieve further victories in the cause of resisting Japan.

February 10, 1940.

NEW-DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM

This is a speech delivered before the Association for Urging the Advancement of Constitutionalism, Yen-an. At that time many comrades in the Party were misled by Chiang Kai-shek's lying propaganda about putting constitutionalism into practice and thought that the Kuomintang would really carry it out. In this speech Comrade Mao Tse-tung exposed Chiang Kai-shek's trick and turned the propaganda about constitutionalism, a weapon snatched out of Chiang's hands, into a means of awakening the people to place before Chiang their demand for democracy and freedom. Thereupon Chiang Kai-shek immediately tucked away his bag of tricks and dropped all his propaganda for so-called constitutionalism until the conclusion of the Anti-Japanese War.

Today the representatives of all sections of the people in Yen-an are holding here the inaugural meeting of the Association for Urging the Advancement of Constitutionalism, and it is of great significance that constitutionalism has become the common concern of all of us. What is the purpose of this meeting? It is to give voice to the popular will so that we can defeat Japan and build up a new China.

The resistance to Japan, a thing which all of us support, is already being carried out, and the question now is only one of persisting in it. There is something else, namely, democracy, which has not yet been carried out. At present these two things are of paramount importance to China. To be sure, China lacks many things, but chiefly she needs two: independence and democracy. Short of either, China's affairs cannot be well managed. On the one hand there are two things wanting, yet on the other there are two things superfluous. What are the two superfluous things? Imperialist oppression and feudal oppression. Because of these two superfluous things, China has become a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The demand of the people of the whole country now is mainly for independence and democracy, and therefore imperialism and feudalism must be destroyed. We have to destroy them resolutely and thoroughly and must not show the least leniency. Some say that only construction is needed, not destruction. Well, we should like to ask: Shouldn't Wang Ching-wei be

destroyed? Shouldn't Japanese imperialism be destroyed? Shouldn't the feudal system be destroyed? If you don't destroy these evil things, construction is inconceivable. It is only when such things are destroyed that China can find salvation, that she can set about construction; otherwise it is nonsense to talk of construction. Only by destroying the old, rotten things will it be possible to construct the new, sound things. Independence combined with democracy means resistance based on democracy or democracy based on resistance. Without democracy resistance to Japan will fail. Without democracy resistance to Japan cannot be kept up. With democracy, we are sure to achieve victory even if the resistance has to be carried on for eight or ten years.

What is constitutionalism? It is democratic government. I agree with what the venerable Comrade Wu¹ has just said. But what kind of democratic government do we want today? The new-democratic government, the new-democratic constitutionalism. Not the so-called democratic government which is old, obsolete and of the European-American type with its bourgeois dictatorship, nor the democratic government of the Soviet type with its proletarian dictatorship.

Democracy of the old type, put into practice in foreign countries, is now already on the decline and has turned into something reactionary. We can never accept such a reactionary thing. The constitutionalism that the Chinese die-hards are talking about belongs to the bourgeois democratic régimes of the old type in foreign countries. While they declare in words that they want such constitutionalism, they do not really want it, but talk about it to deceive the people. What they really want is fascist one-party dictatorship. On the other hand, the Chinese national bourgeoisie really wants such constitutionalism and wishes to establish in China the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, but it will never succeed for all that. For the Chinese people do not want it; they do not welcome the one-class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. China's affairs must be placed in the charge of the vast majority of the Chinese people, and the monopoly of government by the bourgeoisie alone must be absolutely rejected. How about socialist democracy? That of course is very good, and in the future the whole world

will put it into effect. But in China today this type of democracy is not yet practicable, and consequently we must shelve it for a while. Only when certain conditions become ripe in the future can we realise socialist democracy. At present the kind of democratic government we need in China is neither old-type democracy nor socialist democracy, but New Democracy which suits the current conditions of the Chinese nation. The constitutionalism that we are preparing to introduce at this moment should be new-democratic constitutionalism.

What is new-democratic constitutionalism? It is the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the collaborators and reactionaries. Somebody once said, "If there is food, let all share it." This, I think, may serve as a simile for New Democracy. If we are all to share what food there is, then it will be impermissible for one party or one group or one class to exercise dictatorship. The best elucidation of this is found in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's words in the "Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang of China". The Manifesto says:

"The so-called democratic system in modern nations is usually monopolised by the bourgeoisie and has simply become an instrument for oppressing the common people. As to the Principle of Democracy of the Kuomintang, it stands for something to be shared by all the common people and not to be monopolised by a few."

Comrades, to study constitutionalism, we should read various books, but particularly should we read this Manifesto and learn the preceding passage by heart. "Something to be shared by all the common people and not to be monopolised by a few"—that is the specific content of the new-democratic constitutionalism we are talking about, namely, the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the collaborators and reactionaries, and that is the constitutionalism we want today. Such constitutionalism is also the constitutionalism of the anti-Japanese united front.

The meeting we are holding today is called to urge the advancement of constitutionalism. Why do we have to "urge" its "advancement"? If all the people are advancing, then

nobody needs be urged. Why do we trouble to hold this meeting? Precisely because some people will not advance, but stay put and refuse to make progress. Not only do they refuse to advance, but they want to go backwards. You may call on them to advance, but they would rather die than do it; these people are called die-hards. They are such die-hards that we are forced to hold this big meeting to give them an "urging". Where does the term "urge" come from? Who first applied it in this connection? Not we, but a great man, the venerable elder who said: "For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution", namely Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Just look, in his Testament is there not written: "Most recently I have recommended the convocation of the National Assembly... and its realisation in the shortest possible time must be *urged* in particular. This is my sincerest adjuration." Comrades, this "adjuration" is not an ordinary "adjuration", but the "sincerest adjuration". The "sincerest adjuration" is an unusual adjuration, and how can it be lightly ignored? What is said here is "the shortest possible time"; it is, first, not the longest, secondly, not the relatively long, and thirdly, not the ordinarily short, but the "shortest" possible time. If we desire the National Assembly to come into being in the shortest possible time, then we have to "urge" it. Dr. Sun is now dead for fifteen years, but to this day the National Assembly he recommended has not yet been convoked. Fussing every day about political tutelage, certain people have stupidly fussed away the time, extending the shortest possible time to the longest time, and yet they falsely invoke Dr. Sun's name whenever they open their lips. I can imagine how Dr. Sun's shade would rebuke these unworthy followers of his! The matter is now perfectly clear—without "urging", there will never be any advance; since many are going backwards and many others are not yet awakened, we have to "urge" them.

As some people are not advancing, we must urge them. As others are advancing slowly, we must also urge them. That is why we have held so many meetings to urge the advancement. The youth have met to urge the advancement of constitutionalism, the women have met to urge the advancement of

constitutionalism, the workers have met to urge the advancement of constitutionalism, and the schools, government organisations and army units have met to urge the advancement of constitutionalism—these meetings have been attended with much enthusiasm and been very well conducted. Now we are holding a general meeting to urge the advancement; all of us have risen to urge them, so that constitutionalism can be put into practice the sooner, that Dr. Sun's teachings can be put into practice the sooner.

Some say: those people are in various places while you are in Yen-an; if you want to urge them and they take no notice, then what is the use? Yes, there is some use. For events are developing, and such people are bound to take notice. If we hold more meetings, write more articles, make more speeches and send more telegrams, they will find it impossible not to take notice. I think our numerous meetings in Yen-an for urging the advancement of constitutionalism have a twofold meaning. One is to study and the other is to push people forward. Why should we study? When they are not advancing, we urge them; but if they ask, "Why should you urge us?" then we have to answer the question. In order to answer such questions, we have to study seriously the how's and why's of constitutionalism. Our venerable Comrade Wu has just said a great deal about the how's and why's of it. Schools, government organisations, army units and all sections of the people should study the problem of constitutionalism confronting us.

Once we have studied it, we can push people on. To push them on is to "urge their advancement"; we give all sections of the people a push, and all of them will gradually move on. Then the many little streams will merge into a big river, which will wash away everything rotten and filthy; thus will new-democratic constitutionalism emerge. The effect of such a push will be very great. Our activities in Yen-an cannot but influence the whole country.

Comrades, do you think that once meetings are held and telegrams dispatched, the die-hards will be thrown into a panic, start to make progress and obey our command? No, it is not so easy for them to take advice. A great many die-hards are graduates from special training schools for die-hards. They

are die-hards today; they will be die-hards tomorrow; and they will remain die-hards even the day after tomorrow. What does "die-hard" mean? "Hard" means "inflexible" and "die" means "to stop dead" today, tomorrow and even the day after tomorrow. People of this description are called die-hards. To make such die-hards listen to what we say is no easy matter.

The constitutionalism hitherto existing in the world—whether in Britain, France, the United States or the Soviet Union—has always meant the promulgation of a body of basic laws, that is, a constitution, to confirm the success of a revolution and actual achievements in democracy. But China's case is different. In China the revolution has not yet succeeded and, except in areas like our border region, democratic government has not become a reality. In fact China is at present under a semi-colonial and semi-feudal rule, and even if a good constitution is promulgated, its enforcement will inevitably be hindered by the feudal forces and obstructed by the die-hards; it is impossible for a constitution to be put into effect smoothly. Thus the present constitutional movement has to strive for a democracy that is not yet achieved rather than confirm a democracy that has already been achieved. This is a great struggle, and by no means a light or easy matter.

Some people who have opposed constitutionalism all along² are now prating about it. Why do they prate about it? Because, driven to bay by the anti-Japanese people, they cannot but temporise a little. Moreover, they are shouting at the top of their voices: "We have consistently stood for constitutionalism!" What a terrific din they make with their drum-beating and trumpet-blowing! We heard the term "constitutionalism" years ago, but so far we have not seen a trace of constitutionalism. As they say one thing and do another, they can be called double-dealers in constitutionalism. Such double-dealing is the real feature of the so-called "consistent stand". The die-hards of today are precisely such double-dealers. Their "constitutionalism" is a fraud. You will see in the near future that there may be a constitution, with a president into the bargain. But how about democracy and freedom? Nobody

knows in what year or month those things will be granted. A Constitution—well, China has had one. Didn't Ts'ao K'un promulgate a constitution?³ But where were democracy and freedom? As to presidents, there have been a good many of them; the first one, Sun Yat-sen, was a good president, but Yuan Shih-k'ai deposed him. The second one was Yuan Shih-k'ai, the third one was Li Yuan-hung,⁴ the fourth one was Feng Kuo-chang⁵ and the fifth one was Hsu Shih-ch'ang⁶—what a bunch! But in what way are they different from the despotic emperors? Both the constitutions and the presidents were fakes. The so-called constitutionalism and democratic government in countries like Britain, France and the United States today are actually cannibal governments. Similar things can be found in Central and South America, where many countries are displaying the signboard of a republic while actually there is not a particle of democracy. The die-hards of China today are exactly the same. They talk about constitutionalism only to "sell dog-meat by displaying a sheep's head". They are displaying the sheep's head of constitutionalism while actually selling the dog-meat of one-party dictatorship. I am not attacking them groundlessly; my words are well-grounded, because while they talk about constitutionalism they do not grant the people the least particle of freedom.

Comrades, real constitutionalism can never be obtained easily; it can only be obtained through hard struggle. Therefore you must not believe that once our meetings are held, telegrams dispatched and articles written, there will be constitutionalism. Nor must you believe that, after the People's Political Council⁷ passes a resolution, the National Government issues a decree, the National Assembly⁸ is convoked on November 12 and promulgates a constitution and even elects a president, everything will be all right and there will be peace on earth. No, so don't get confused. And this must further be explained clearly to the common people so that they will not be confused either. Things cannot be as easy as that.

In that case, shouldn't we lament the cause as lost? For if things are so difficult, there seems to be no hope left for constitutionalism. But that is not true either. There is still

hope, and very great hope too, for constitutionalism, and China will certainly become a new-democratic state. Why? The difficulty confronting constitutionalism lies solely in the mischief made by the die-hards; but the die-hards cannot be die-hards for ever, so we still have great hopes. The die-hards in the world may be die-hards today, tomorrow and even the day after tomorrow, but they cannot be die-hards for ever; they will have to change in the end. Take Wang Ching-wei, for example; after being a die-hard for a long time, he could not keep on playing the die-hard any longer in the anti-Japanese arena and had to fall into the arms of Japan. Take Chang Kuo-t'ao as another example; he was also a die-hard for a long time, but he, too, took to his heels after we held a number of meetings to wage struggles against him this way and that way. The die-hards are hard, but not hard until death; after playing the die-hard for some time, in the end they have to change, to change into something beneath human contempt, like a heap of dog's dirt. But there are some who have changed for the better after we had waged struggles against them this way and that way; they have admitted their mistakes and changed for the better. At any rate, it is certain that the die-hards will change. They always have a number of schemes in hand, schemes to profit themselves by harming others, to act the double-dealer, and so on. But they always get just the opposite of their wishes. They always start by doing harm to others but end by ruining themselves. We once said that Chamberlain was "lifting a rock only to have his own toes squashed", and our word is now proved true. Chamberlain was formerly bent on picking up Hitler as a rock to squash the toes of the people of the Soviet Union, but on that day in September last year, when war broke out between Germany on the one side and England and France on the other, the rock in Chamberlain's hand dropped on his own toes. It is still hurting him. There are many similar instances in China as well. Yuan Shih-k'ai wanted to squash the toes of the common people, but he finally got his own squashed and died after being emperor for a few months.⁹ Tuan Ch'i-jui, Hsu Shih-ch'ang, Ts'ao K'un, Wu P'ei-fu and others all wanted to repress the people, but in the end they were all overthrown by the people.

Anyone who intends to profit himself by harming others will come to a bad end.

I think that unless they make progress, the anti-Communist die-hards of today cannot be exceptions to this rule. They want to use "unification" as a high-sounding pretext for liquidating the progressive Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region, the progressive Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, the progressive Communist Party and the progressive popular organisations. They have a whole number of schemes of this sort. But the outcome in the future, as I see it, will not be the die-hards liquidating the progressives but the progressives liquidating the die-hards. If the die-hards do not want to be liquidated they must make progress of their own accord. We have often advised the die-hards not to attack the Eighth Route Army and not to oppose the Communists and the border region. If they must do so, then they should draw up a resolution with the following as its first point: "With a view to resolutely liquidating ourselves, the die-hards, and giving the Communist Party an opportunity for large-scale expansion, we have the duty to oppose the Communists and the border region". The die-hards have abundant experience of "annihilating the Communists", and if they now want to "annihilate the Communists" again, they are free to do so. As they have taken meals at their own expense and had enough sleep, it is up to them whether they want to do some "annihilation". But if they do, they must inevitably be prepared to carry out the above resolution. The "annihilation of the Communists" in the past ten years was carried out according to that resolution. If they want to repeat the "annihilation" they will have to take that resolution again. Hence I advise them that they had better not go in for "annihilation". What the people of the whole country demand is to resist Japan, to achieve solidarity and to make progress, and not to "annihilate the Communists". Therefore anyone who tries to "annihilate the Communists" is bound to fail.

In short, any act of retrogression will in the event produce the reverse of the schemer's original wishes. There is no exception to this rule in modern or ancient times, in China or in foreign countries.

The same holds good of constitutionalism at the present day. If the die-hards still oppose constitutionalism, then the result will certainly be contrary to their wishes. As regards its course, the constitutional movement will never follow the course designated by the die-hards but, contrary to their wishes, will follow necessarily the course designated by the people. This is certain, for the people of the whole country demand this, the course of China's historical development demands this, and the trends of world affairs demand this of us, and who can run counter to this course? The giant chariot-wheels of history cannot be turned back. But to accomplish the task of constitutionalism requires time, for it cannot be accomplished in a single morning or overnight; it requires great effort, for it cannot be done in a casual manner; it requires the mobilisation of the great masses of the people, for it cannot be done effectively by a single pair of hands. It is a very good thing that we are holding this meeting today, after this meeting we shall write articles, send telegrams, and also hold meetings of a similar kind in many places in the Wutai mountains, in the Taihang mountains, in North China, in Central China and all over the country. If we keep on working in this way, if we work for several years, then our goal will not be far off. We must do a good job, we must struggle for democracy and freedom and we must put new-democratic constitutionalism into practice. If we do not work in this way but work in the way of the die-hards, the nation will perish. To avoid national extinction we must work in this way. For this purpose everybody must exert himself. If only we exert ourselves, there will be great hope for our cause. We must further understand that, after all, the die-hards are only a minority, while the majority of the people are not die-hards and can make progress. With the majority pitted against the minority, and with the majority exerting its efforts, our hope will be even greater. That is why I say that though things are difficult, there is great hope.

February 20, 1940.

PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE BASE AREAS

This is a Party directive which Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

1. This is a time when the anti-Communist die-hards of the Kuomintang desperately opposes our building the anti-Japanese democratic political power in North and Central China and in other places, while we, on our part, since we already have the means to do it, must endeavour to build up such a political power in the major anti-Japanese base areas. Our fight with the anti-Communist die-hard clique over the question of political power in North China, Central China and the North-west is of a nature to push forward the building of the political power of the united front all over the country, and we must handle the question carefully, because it has aroused nation-wide attention and interest.

2. In the period of the Anti-Japanese War, the political power we build up is that of the national united front. Such a political power is the political power of all those who approve of the resistance to Japan as well as of democracy, a joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the collaborators and reactionaries. It is different from the counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and also from the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants in the period of the Agrarian Revolution. To understand clearly the character of this political power and to put it conscientiously into practice will help greatly to push forward the democratisation of the entire country. Any deviation to the "Left" or to the Right will have a very bad influence on the whole people.

3. The work we have begun in convening the Provincial Assembly of Hopeh and holding the elections to the Administrative Committee of that province is of great significance. Similarly, the establishment of the new political power in north-western Shansi, in Shantung, in areas north of the Hwai

river, in the countries of Suiteh and Fu, and in eastern Kansu is also of great significance. We must proceed according to the above-mentioned principle, *i.e.* do all we can to avoid deviations, "Left" or Right. At present the most serious danger is the "Left" deviation which neglects to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry.

4. According to the principle of the political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, we must observe the following proportion of personnel: Communists, non-party leftist progressives and the middle-of-the-roaders should each constitute one-third.

5. We must ensure the leadership of the Communists in the organs of political power; therefore the Communists who constitute one-third must possess the best qualities. This condition alone will ensure the Party of its leadership even without a greater representation. By leadership is not meant that we have to shout about it as a slogan from morning till night, nor that we should imperiously force people to obey us, but that we should persuade and educate the people outside our Party through the Party's correct policies and our own exemplary work, so that they willingly accept our proposals.

6. The progressive elements outside the Party should be permitted to constitute one-third because they are linked with the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie. This will have a tremendous effect in winning over the petty bourgeoisie.

7. In giving one-third of the positions to the middle-of-the-roaders our aim is to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. To win over these strata is an important step in isolating the die-hards. At present we certainly have to take into account the strength of these strata and must treat them carefully.

8. As to the people outside the Communist Party, in so far as they stand for resistance to Japan and are willing to co-operate with the Communist Party, we should adopt a co-operative attitude towards them, regardless of their party affiliations, if any.

9. The proportion of personnel given above represents the Party's honest and sincere policy, and no perfunctoriness is allowed in this matter. In order to carry out this policy, we

must educate Party members in the government to overcome the narrow-mindedness manifested in their reluctance to co-operate with the people outside the Party, and in their being unaccustomed to do so, and we must advocate among them the democratic style in work, *i.e.* to consult with the people outside the Party and win the approval of the majority before taking any action. At the same time we must encourage in all possible ways the people outside the Party to express their views on various problems and listen to them with an open mind. We must not think that because we have the army and the political power, everything should unconditionally be done in strict accordance with our decisions, and consequently neglect to make any effort to convince people outside the Party of our views and induce them to carry them out willingly and wholeheartedly.

10. The numerical proportion of personnel given above is only a general stipulation to be applied according to the actual conditions in various places; it is not a matter of making up the quotas mechanically. The composition of the political power at the lowest level may be altered and modified according to the circumstances in order to prevent the landlords and the local bullies and bad gentry from sneaking into the organs of political power. In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh border region, the central Hopeh region, the Taihang mountain region and the southern Hopeh region, where the political power has long been built up, the authorities should re-examine their old directives on the basis of this principle. This principle must be followed in building up a new political power anywhere.

11. On the question of suffrage, the policy of the political power of the anti-Japanese united front must be that all Chinese who have reached the age of eighteen, irrespective of class, nationality, sex, creed, party affiliation or cultural level, in so far as they are in favour of resistance to Japan and of democracy, have the right to elect and to be elected. The anti-Japanese united front governments are to be elected by the people. Their organisational form should be democratic centralism.

12. The administrative programme of the government of the anti-Japanese united front should take as its basic starting-point

resistance to Japanese imperialism, protection of the anti-Japanese people, readjustment of the interests of all the anti-Japanese social strata, improvement of the living conditions of the workers and peasants and suppression of collaborators and reactionaries.

13. We must not demand that non-Communists taking part in our organs of political power live the same life and behave in the same manner as Communists; otherwise they will feel discontented and uneasy.

14. All the regional bureaux and sub-regional bureaux of the Central Committee, all the regional Party committees and the heads of all army units are hereby instructed to explain this directive clearly to the Party, so that it will be fully carried out in government work.

March 6, 1940.

QUESTIONS OF TACTICS IN THE PRESENT ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT

This is the outline of a report made at a meeting of the senior cadres of the Party in Yen-an.

I. The present political situation is: (1) Japanese imperialism, having received severe blows from China's resistance, is already powerless to launch any more large-scale military offensives and consequently the situation between the enemy and ourselves has become one of strategic stalemate; but the enemy still adheres to his basic policy of subjugating China and is carrying it out by undermining our anti-Japanese united front, intensifying his "mopping-up" campaigns in the rear and accelerating his economic aggression. (2) As the positions of Britain and France in the East are weakened by the war in Europe, and the United States continues to pursue a policy of "sitting on top of a mountain to watch the tigers fight", the convocation of a Far Eastern Munich conference is impossible for the moment. (3) The Soviet Union has achieved new successes in its foreign policy and continues to pursue a policy of actively assisting China's War of Resistance. (4) The pro-Japanese clique of the big bourgeoisie has long since completely capitulated to Japan and is rehearsing the foundation of a puppet government. The pro-European and pro-American clique of the big bourgeoisie continues to resist Japan, but its tendency towards compromise remains serious. It adopts a dual policy: On the one hand, it still wants to unite with the forces of various groups besides the Kuomintang to cope with the Japanese, and on the other, it is sparing no effort to destroy these forces, especially the Communist and the progressive forces. It forms the die-hard clique in the anti-Japanese united front. (5) The middle-of-the-road forces, including the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and the powerful groups in the provinces, because of their contradictions with the main ruling clique—the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie—on the one hand, and with the workers

and the peasants on the other, often take an intermediate position between the progressive forces and the die-hard forces. They constitute the middle-of-the-road group in the anti-Japanese united front. (6) The progressive forces of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, all under the leadership of the Communist Party, have recently grown much stronger and have on the whole succeeded in creating base areas in which the anti-Japanese democratic political power has been set up. Their influence is very great among the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeois throughout the country and is also considerable among the middle-of-the-roaders. On the anti-Japanese battlefield, the Communist armed forces are fighting against almost as many troops of the Japanese invaders as the Kuomintang armed forces are doing. They constitute the progressive group of the anti-Japanese united front.

The above is the present political situation in China. It is still possible for us to mend the situation or to prevent it from getting worse; the Central Committee's resolutions of February 1 are entirely correct.

II. The basic condition for the victory in the Anti-Japanese War is the broadening and consolidation of the anti-Japanese united front. To attain this end we must adopt the tactics of developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle-of-the-road forces and opposing the die-hard forces—these are the three inseparable links—and wage struggles as the means to attain solidarity among all the anti-Japanese forces. In the period of the anti-Japanese united front, struggles are the means to solidarity and solidarity is the aim of struggles. The truth has been gradually grasped by comrades in the Party that solidarity is realised through struggles and destroyed through concessions. Many, however, still fail to understand this, either thinking that struggles will split up the united front or believing that struggles can be employed without limit, either adopting incorrect tactics towards the middle-of-the-road forces or nursing an incorrect notion about the die-hard forces; and all this must be corrected.

III. To develop the progressive forces means to develop the forces of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty

bourgeoisie; to give free rein to the expansion of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army; to establish extensive anti-Japanese democratic base areas; to develop the organisations of the Communist Party throughout the country; to develop all over the country the mass movements of the workers, peasants, youth, women and the children; to win over all the intellectuals of the country; and to extend among the broad masses the movement for constitutionalism as a fight for democracy. Only by developing the progressive forces step by step can we prevent the deterioration of the situation, forestall capitulation and splits, and lay a firm, unshakable foundation for the victory of the Anti-Japanese War. But to develop the progressive forces involves a course of serious struggles which we must wage ruthlessly not only against the Japanese imperialists and collaborators but also against the die-hards. The reason is that the die-hards are opposed to the development of the progressive forces, and the middle-of-the-roaders are sceptical about it. Unless we wage a resolute struggle against the die-hards and achieve tangible results, we shall not be able to resist the pressure of the die-hards or dispel the scepticism of the middle-of-the-roaders, and the progressive forces can hardly be developed.

IV. To win over the middle-of-the-road forces means to win over the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and the powerful groups in the provinces. In the present circumstances these people, though of three different categories, all belong to the middle-of-the-road group. By the middle bourgeoisie is meant the national bourgeoisie, as distinguished from the comprador class, *i.e.* the big bourgeoisie. Although as a class it is in contradiction with the workers and does not approve of the independence of the working class, yet, being oppressed by Japanese imperialism in the enemy-occupied areas and restricted by the big landlords and the big bourgeois in the areas under the Kuomintang rule, it still wants to resist Japan and win political power for itself. On the question of resistance to Japan, it favours solidarity in resistance; and on the question of winning political power, it favours the movement for constitutionalism and attempts to achieve its objective by exploiting the contradictions between the progressives and the

die-hards. It is a stratum that we must win over. The enlightened gentry are the left-wing of the landlord class; they are a section of the landlords who have taken on a bourgeois complexion and who in the main adopt the same political attitude as the middle bourgeoisie. Although as a class they are in contradiction with the peasants, they are also in contradiction with the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. They do not approve of the die-hards, and want also to utilise the contradictions between us and the die-hards to attain their own political ends. We should on no account neglect this section of people and must adopt the policy of winning them over. The powerful groups in the provinces include those who control certain districts as well as those who control no districts but command troops of miscellaneous brands. Although they are in contradiction with the progressive forces, they are also in contradiction with the Kuomintang central government, which is pursuing the policy of seeking its own benefit at the expense of others; they, too, want to utilise the contradictions between us and the die-hards to attain their own political ends. The leading figures of the powerful groups in the provinces belong mostly to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, and though they may appear progressive at times during the Anti-Japanese War, they will soon become reactionary again; however, since they are also in contradiction with the forces of the Kuomintang central government, it is possible for them to maintain a neutral position when we carry on our struggle against the die-hards, so long as we have a correct policy. Our policy towards the above-mentioned three sections of the middle-of-the-road forces is to win them over. Nevertheless, this policy of winning them over is distinguished from that of winning over the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie and, besides, the policy for winning over each section of the middle-of-the-road forces is different. While the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie should be won over as our basic allies, the middle-of-the-roaders are to be won over only as our allies against imperialism. The middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry among the middle-of-the-road forces can join us in the common fight against Japan and in establishing an anti-Japanese democratic political power, but they are

afraid of the agrarian revolution. In the struggles against the die-hards, some of them may play a limited part, others may observe a benevolent neutrality, and still others may observe a rather reluctant neutrality. The powerful groups in the provinces, however, apart from joining us in the resistance to Japan, will only observe a temporary neutrality when we wage struggles against the die-hards; they are unwilling to join us in establishing a democratic political power, for they, too, belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. The middle-of-the-roaders are given to vacillation and will inevitably disintegrate; focusing our attention on their vacillating attitude, we must educate and criticise them properly.

To win over the middle-of-the-road forces is an extremely serious task for us in the period of the anti-Japanese united front, and it can be accomplished only under certain conditions. The conditions are: (1) that we have sufficient strength; (2) that we treat their interests with due respect; and (3) that we carry on resolute struggles against the die-hards and win victories step by step. Without these conditions the middle-of-the-road forces will vacillate or even become allies of the die-hards in their attack on us, because the die-hards are also exerting their utmost to win over the middle-of-the-roaders in order to land us in isolation. Carrying considerable weight in China, the middle-of-the-road forces can often be the decisive factor in our struggles against the die-hards, and we must therefore take a very cautious attitude towards them.

V. The die-hard forces at present are the forces of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. These classes, now divided into the clique of capitulation to Japan and the clique of resistance to Japan, will further differentiate by degrees. At present, the clique of resistance to Japan within the big bourgeoisie is different from the clique of capitulation to Japan. It pursues a dual policy: on the one hand it still stands for unity against Japan, and on the other it carries out an extremely reactionary policy of destroying the progressive forces in preparation for capitulating to the enemy in the future. As it is still willing to unite with us against Japan, we can still keep it in the anti-Japanese united front—the longer the better. It is wrong to disregard the policy of winning it over and

co-operating with it, and to think that it has actually capitulated and will soon launch an anti-Communist war. But at the same time, because it pursues throughout the country a reactionary policy of destroying the progressive forces; because it fails to carry out the common programme, namely, the revolutionary Three People's Principles, and is resolutely opposed to our doing so; because it is resolutely opposed to our stepping out of the bounds it has set for us, only allowing us to pursue its own line of passive resistance; and because, having failed in its attempts to assimilate us, it immediately brings ideological, political and military pressure to bear upon us—we must also adopt the tactics of struggling against its reactionary policy and carry on a resolute fight against it ideologically, politically and militarily. Such is our revolutionary dual policy to cope with the dual policy of the die-hards, and such is our policy of attaining solidarity through struggle. If ideologically we could advance a correct revolutionary theory and resolutely explode the counter-revolutionary theory of the die-hards; if politically we take timely tactical steps and resolutely attack their anti-Communist, anti-progressive policy; and if we adopt appropriate military measures and resolutely deal blows to their military offensive—then we shall be able to limit the extent to which their reactionary policy is pursued, force them to recognise the position of the progressive forces, develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces and isolate the die-hards. Furthermore we shall be able to win over those die-hards who are still willing to resist Japan and induce them to stay longer in the anti-Japanese united front, thereby averting a large-scale civil war like the one in the past. Therefore in the period of the anti-Japanese united front, the struggle against the die-hards is waged not only as a measure of defence against attacks so that the progressive forces can be protected against losses and can continue to expand, but also as a means to prolong the die-hards' resistance to Japan and their co-operation with us, thereby averting the outbreak of a large-scale civil war. Without waging struggles, the progressive forces will be exterminated by the die-hard forces, the united front can no longer exist and there will be nothing to prevent the die-hards' capitulation to the enemy,

and civil war will break out. Therefore the struggle against the die-hards is an indispensable means for uniting all the anti-Japanese forces to win a favourable turn in the situation and avert a large-scale civil war; this truth has been borne out by all our experiences.

However, in the period of the anti-Japanese united front, we must pay attention to the following principles in waging struggles against the die-hards. First, the principle of self-defence. We will never attack unless attacked; if attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. That is to say, we must never attack others without provocation; but once we are attacked, we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of the struggle. As to the military attacks of the die-hards, we must resolutely, thoroughly, utterly and completely smash them. Secondly, the principle of victory. We do not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must on no account fight without preparation and without certainty of the outcome. We should know how to utilise the contradictions among the die-hards and must not deal blows to many sections of them at the same time; we must pick out the most reactionary section to strike at first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Thirdly, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards and before they launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close. In the period that follows we should make a truce with them. Then we should on our own initiative seek unity with the die-hards and, upon their consent, conclude a peace agreement with them. We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies the temporary nature of every particular struggle. Only when the die-hards launch a new offensive should we retaliate with a new struggle. In other words, the three principles are "justifiability", "expediency" and "restraint". Persisting in such justifiable, expedient and restrained struggles, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces, isolate the die-hard forces and make the die-hards chary of heedlessly attacking us, or heedlessly compromising with the enemy, or heedlessly starting a large-scale civil war. And we can in this way win a favourable turn in the situation.

VI. The Kuomintang is a party composed of miscellaneous elements, including the die-hards and the middle-of-the-roaders, as well as the progressives; the Kuomintang as a whole is not to be equated with the die-hards. Because the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee has promulgated such counter-revolutionary and friction-causing decrees as the "Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties" and has mobilised all its forces throughout the country to clash with the revolutionary forces ideologically, politically and militarily, some of us think that the Kuomintang is entirely composed of die-hards; such a view is erroneous. Though at present the die-hards in the Kuomintang are still in a position to dictate its policies, numerically they constitute only a minority, while the great majority of the Kuomintang members (many of them are members only in name) are not necessarily die-hards. We must understand this point clearly, so that we can utilise the contradictions within the Kuomintang, adopt a policy of assuming different attitudes towards different sections of them, and make great efforts to unite with the middle-of-the-roaders and the progressives within the Kuomintang.

VII. On the question of establishing organs of political power in the anti-Japanese base areas, it must be made explicit that the political power to be established there is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, there is as yet no such political power. It is a political power of all the people who favour resistance to Japan as well as democracy, *i.e.* a joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the collaborators and the reactionaries. It is distinguished from the landlord-bourgeois dictatorship and also somewhat different from a strict worker-peasant democratic dictatorship. The proportion in the personnel of the organs of political power should be as follows: Communists should constitute one-third, representing the proletariat and the poor peasantry; the Left progressives should constitute another one-third, representing the petty bourgeoisie; and the middle-of-the-roaders and others should constitute the remaining one-third, representing the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Only collaborators and anti-Communist

elements are not qualified to participate in such organs of political power. It is necessary to establish such a general ratio of personnel; otherwise we cannot maintain the principle underlying the political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It is a genuine policy of our Party to keep such a proportion in personnel; it must be seriously carried out and no perfunctoriness will be tolerated. This is a general stipulation to be applied properly according to specific conditions, and we must not seek to fill up the quotas in a mechanical way. This stipulation may have to be modified somewhat in the organs of political power at the lowest level in order to prevent the bad gentry and the landlords from monopolising the political power; but we must not violate its fundamental spirit. As to the non-Communists in the organs of political power of the anti-Japanese united front, we must disregard their party affiliations, if any. In the areas under the political power of the anti-Japanese united front, all political parties, whether the Kuomintang or other parties, should be granted full legal status so long as they do not oppose the Communist Party but are willing to co-operate with it. On the question of suffrage, the policy of the political power of the anti-Japanese united front must be that all Chinese who have reached the age of eighteen, irrespective of class, nationality, party affiliation, sex, creed or cultural level, in so far as they are in favour of resistance to Japan and of democracy, have the right to elect and to be elected. The anti-Japanese united front governments are first to be elected by the people; then the National Government will be asked to confirm their appointment. Their organisational form should be one of democratic centralism. The platform of the political power of the anti-Japanese united front should take as its basic points of departure opposition to Japanese imperialism and the confirmed collaborators and reactionaries, protection of the anti-Japanese people, adjustment of the interests of all anti-Japanese strata and improvement of the living conditions of the workers and peasants. The establishment of such organs of political power of the anti-Japanese united front will exert a great influence on the whole nation and set a model for the organisation of the national political power of the anti-Japanese united front;

therefore these principles must be fully understood and resolutely carried out by comrades of the whole Party.

VIII. In the struggle to develop the progressive forces, to win over the middle-of-the-road forces and to isolate the die-hard forces, the role of the intellectuals must not be overlooked and, as the die-hards are doing their utmost to win them over, it is a necessary and important policy for us to win over all progressive intellectuals and bring them under the influence of our Party.

IX. In the matter of propaganda we should adhere firmly to the following programme: (1) Carry out the Testament of Dr. Sun Yat-sen by arousing the people to resist Japan to a man. (2) Carry out the Principle of Nationalism by resolutely resisting Japanese imperialism and securing the thorough liberation of the Chinese nation externally and the equality of the nationalities internally. (3) Carry out the Principle of Democracy by granting the people absolute freedom to resist Japan and to save their nation, letting them elect their governments at all levels and setting up the revolutionary democratic political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. (4) Carry out the Principle of the People's Welfare by abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous assessments, reducing rents and interest, enforcing the eight-hour working day, developing agriculture, industry and commerce, and improving the living conditions of the people. (5) Carry out Chiang Kai-shek's declaration that "every person, old or young, in the south or in the north, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending the soil of our country". All these things were put forward in the programme announced by the Kuomintang itself, which is also the common programme of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. But except for resistance to Japan, the Kuomintang cannot at present carry out any of these things; only the Communist Party and the progressive forces can. This is a programme of the utmost simplicity and has become generally known among the people, but many Communists still do not know how to use it as a weapon to mobilise the masses of the people and isolate the die-hards. Now we must always hold to these five items in the programme and disseminate them by means of public notices, manifestoes, leaflets, essays, speeches,

statements, etc. This programme is still a programme of propaganda in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, but in areas within the reach of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army it is already a programme of action. It is lawful for us to act in accordance with this programme, while it is unlawful for the die-hards to oppose our carrying it out. In the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, this programme of the Kuomintang is basically the same as our programme, but the ideology of the Kuomintang is entirely different from the ideology of the Communist Party. What we should put into practice is only this common programme of the democratic revolution, but decidedly not the ideology of the Kuomintang.

March 11, 1940.

FREELY EXPAND THE ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES; RESIST THE ATTACKS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS

The following directives were written on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party addressed to its South-east Bureau. At the time of writing, Comrade Hsiang Ying, member of the Central Committee and secretary of its South-east Bureau, was entertaining serious Rightist ideas and failing to carry out resolutely the directives of the Central Committee; he was afraid freely to arouse the masses into action, to extend the liberated areas and expand the people's army in the Japanese-occupied areas, nor did he sufficiently realise the seriousness of the Kuomintang's forthcoming reactionary attack, and so was not psychologically and organisationally prepared for it. When the directives of the Central Committee reached the South-east Bureau, Comrade Hsiang remained unwilling to carry them out, while Comrade Ch'en Yi, member of the South-east Bureau and commander of the First Contingent of the New Fourth Army, put them into effect immediately. Being unprepared for the Kuomintang's reactionary attack, Comrade Hsiang was in a weak and helpless position when Chiang Kai-shek staged the Southern Anhwei Incident in January 1941, during which 9,000 of our troops in southern Anhwei were annihilated and Comrade Hsiang Ying himself was killed.

1. In all regions in the enemy rear as well as in the war zones, we must emphasise identity and not particularity; otherwise we shall commit great mistakes. Whether in North China, in Central China or in South China, whether south or north of the Yangtze river, whether on the plains, in the mountainous regions or in the lake regions, and whether in the Eighth Route Army, in the New Fourth Army or among the Guerrilla Detachments of South China,¹ although each is a particular case, yet all have their identical points, that is, in all cases we are confronted by the enemy and in all cases we are putting up armed resistance. Thus in all cases we can and should expand. Time and again the Central Committee has pointed out to you this line of expansion. By expansion is meant that we should freely expand our armed forces both independently and on our own initiative, disregarding Kuomintang restrictions, going beyond the limits allowed by the Kuomintang, expecting no

official appointments and relying on no financial support from the higher authorities; that we should resolutely establish our base areas, arouse the masses there into action and build up there the Communist-led political power of the anti-Japanese united front independently and on our own initiative and extend it towards all the enemy-occupied areas. Take the province of Kiangsu for example; we must, regardless of criticism, restriction and oppression by anti-Communists like Ku Chu-t'ung, Leng Hsin and Han Teh-ch'in,² gain control of as many districts as we can in the area extending from Nanking in the west to the sea coast in the east, and from Hangchow in the south to Hsuehchow in the north, with the greatest possible speed and yet in a methodical and planned way; and we must independently and on our own initiative expand our forces, build up political power, set up fiscal offices to collect taxes in order to resist Japan, establish economic organisations to promote agriculture, industry and commerce, and establish various kinds of schools to train cadres in large numbers. The Central Committee previously instructed you that within this year you must, in the enemy's rear in Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces, expand the anti-Japanese forces to 100,000 men and rifles, build up political power speedily, etc.—what concrete measures have you taken in this connection? We missed our opportunity in the past; if we should let it slip again this year, things will become even more difficult.

2. When the anti-Communist die-hards of the Kuomintang are obstinately carrying out their policy of guarding against, containing and opposing communism in preparation for capitulating to Japan, we must stress struggle, not unity; otherwise we shall commit great mistakes. Thus we should on principle resolutely fight against and adopt an attitude of determined struggle towards all laws, orders, propaganda and criticism on the part of the anti-Communist die-hards aimed at guarding against, containing and opposing communism, ideologically, politically or militarily. Such a struggle must proceed from the principles of justifiability, expediency and restraint, that is, the principle of self-defence, of victory and of truce; this also means that at present every specific struggle is of a defensive, restricted and temporary character. With

regard to all the reactionary laws, orders, propaganda and criticism of the anti-Communist die-hards, we must adopt tit-for-tat measures and wage a resolute struggle against them. For example, when they demand that our Fourth and Fifth Contingents³ be moved to the south, we should counter by maintaining that the contingents cannot be moved southward under any circumstances; when they demand that the units under Yeh and those under Chang⁴ be moved to the south, we should counter by requesting that they allow some of these units to move to the north; when they charge us with having disrupted their conscription, we should request them to enlarge the recruiting area for the New Fourth Army; when they say that we are wrong in our propaganda, we should request them to stop entirely their anti-Communist propaganda and rescind all orders that create friction; and when they launch military attacks against us, we should launch military counter-attacks to smash them. We are justified in adopting such a tit-for-tat policy. Whatever is justifiable should be done not only by the Central Committee but also by every unit in our army. What Chang Yun-yi did to Li P'in-hsien and what Li Hsien-nien did to Li Tsung-jen⁵ are all good examples of how an officer makes a strong protest to his superior. It is only by adopting such a firm attitude and by applying the principles of justifiability, expediency and restraint in the struggle with the die-hards so as to make them afraid to oppress us, that we can reduce the die-hards' sphere of guarding against, containing and opposing communism, compel the die-hards to recognise our legal status, and furthermore make them hesitate to engineer a split. Therefore, struggle is by far the most important means for averting the danger of capitulation, for winning a favourable turn in the situation and for strengthening Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. Within our own Party and army, it is only by persisting in the struggle against these die-hards that we can heighten our morale, call forth our courage, unite our cadres, increase our strength and consolidate our army and our Party. In our relations with the middle-of-the-roaders, it is only by persisting in the struggle against the die-hards that we can win over the vacillating middle-of-the-roaders and give support to those among them

who are sympathetic to us; but not otherwise. In coping with any possible nation-wide emergency, it is also only by adopting a line of struggle that we can enable the whole Party and the whole army to be well prepared psychologically and to have their work well planned. Otherwise the mistakes of 1927⁶ will recur.

3. In appraising the present situation, we ought to understand that, although on the one hand the danger of capitulation has greatly increased, yet on the other hand there is still a possibility of averting it. The present military conflicts are local and not nation-wide. They are merely acts of strategic reconnaissance on the part of our opponents⁷ and are as yet not large-scale actions of "annihilating the Communists"; they are merely their preparation for capitulation and not yet steps for immediate capitulation. Our task is to carry out persistently and vigorously the three lines laid down by the Central Committee, which are the only correct lines—"developing the progressive forces", "winning over the intermediate forces", and "isolating the die-hard forces", thereby achieving the aim of overcoming the danger of capitulation and striving to mend the situation. It will also be extremely dangerous if we do not refute and rectify any "Left" or Right deviations that may occur in appraising the situation and in defining our tasks.

4. The battles of self-defence waged by the Fourth and the Fifth Contingents against the attacks of Han Teh-ch'in and Li Tsung-jen in eastern Anhwei, the battles of self-defence waged by Li Hsien-nien's Column against the attacks of the die-hards in central and eastern Hupeh, the determined struggle carried on by P'eng Hsueh-feng's Contingent north of the Hwai river, the expansion of Yeh Fei's forces north of the Yangtze river, and the southward march of more than twenty thousand men of the Eighth Route Army down to the north bank of the Hwai river and to eastern Anhwei and northern Kiangsu⁸—all these are not only absolutely necessary and absolutely correct, but are also indispensable steps for making Ku Chu-t'ung hesitate to attack you in southern Anhwei and southern Kiangsu. That is to say, the more victories we win and the more we expand north of the Yangtze river, the more afraid

will Ku Chu-t'ung be to act rashly south of the Yangtze river, and the easier will it be for you to develop your plans in southern Anhwei and southern Kiangsu. Similarly, the more the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the Guerilla Detachments of South China expand in the North-west and North China, Central China and South China respectively, and the more our Party expands its activities throughout the country, the more will it be possible to avert the danger of capitulation and win a favourable turn in the situation, and the easier will it be for our Party to develop its plans in the whole country. We shall be mistaken if we make an appraisal or adopt tactics to the contrary, thinking that the more our forces expand the more will the die-hards tend towards capitulation, that the more concessions we make the more vigorously will they resist the Japanese, or that the time of a nation-wide split has already arrived and Kuomintang-Communist co-operation is no longer possible.

5. In the Anti-Japanese War, our line for the whole country is one of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The democratic anti-Japanese base areas to be established in the enemy rear will also be in the character of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. You should carry out with determination the Central Committee's decisions on the question of political power.

6. Our line for the Kuomintang-controlled areas is different from that for the war zones and the areas in the enemy rear. In the Kuomintang areas our line is to conceal our crack forces, lie long under cover, accumulate our strength and bide our time, and avoid rashness and exposure. As for the tactics in the struggle against the die-hards there, we must, utilising all the Kuomintang's laws and decrees that serve our purpose as well as everything allowed by social custom, take sure and well-measured steps and accumulate our strength in accordance with the principles of justifiability, expediency and restraint. When any of our Party members are forced to join the Kuomintang, let them join it; our members should infiltrate extensively into the *pao* and *chia*⁹ organisations, educational organisations, economic organisations and military organisations; and they should extensively develop the work for the united front,

i.e. the work of making friends in the Kuomintang's Central army and its troops of miscellaneous brands.¹⁰ In all the Kuomintang-controlled areas the Party's basic line is likewise one of developing the progressive forces (developing the Party organisations and the mass movement), winning over the intermediate forces (the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, the troops of miscellaneous brands, the middle-of-the-road groups in the Kuomintang,¹¹ the middle-of-the-roaders in the Central army,¹² the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie and the small parties and groups—seven categories in all), and isolating the die-hard forces, in order to overcome the danger of capitulation and strive to mend the situation. At the same time we should fully prepare for coping with any possible emergency of a local or national character. In the Kuomintang-controlled areas the Party organisations should strictly go underground. The personnel (from the secretaries down to the cooks) in the South-east Bureau,¹³ as well as in all the provincial committees, special committees, county committees and district committees, ought to be strictly and exhaustively scrutinised one by one, and anyone open to the slightest suspicion must be removed from the leading organisations at all levels. We must pay full attention to protecting our cadres; if any of our cadres, whose Party affiliation is openly or almost openly known, are in danger of being arrested or killed by the Kuomintang, they should be either sent somewhere else to go underground or transferred to work in the army. In the Japanese-occupied areas (in big, medium-sized and small cities like Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhu and Wusih, as well as in the countryside) our line is fundamentally the same as in the Kuomintang-controlled areas.

7. The above tactical directives have been decided upon by the present meeting of the Central Political Bureau, and it is requested that comrades of the South-east Bureau and of the military sub-commission discuss them, transmit them to all cadres throughout the Party and the army, and resolutely carry them out.

8. These directives should be transmitted by Comrade Hsiang Ying in southern Anhwei and by Comrade Ch'en Yi in southern Kiangsu. Discussion and transmission of these directives should

be completed within a month after receiving this telegram. Party and army work in the whole area should be planned under Comrade Hsiang Ying's general direction in accordance with the line of the Central Committee, and Comrade Hsiang should report the results to the Central Committee.

May 4, 1940.

SOLIDARITY TO THE VERY END

The third anniversary of the War of Resistance to Japan and the nineteenth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party fall within a few days of each other. In commemorating the anniversary of the Resistance today we Communists feel all the more keenly our responsibility. All the anti-Japanese parties and groups and the people of the whole country are responsible for the survival of the Chinese nation but, as we Communists see it, our responsibility is even heavier. The Central Committee of our Party has issued a statement on the present situation, the gist of which is a call for resistance to the very end, and solidarity to the very end. This statement, it is hoped, will meet with the approval of the friendly parties and armies as well as the people throughout the country, and Communists in particular must conscientiously carry out the line it has laid down.

All Communists must realise that only through resistance to the very end can there be solidarity to the very end, and only through solidarity to the very end can there be resistance to the very end. They must therefore make themselves models of resistance and also models of solidarity. We are opposed only to the enemy and the determined capitulators and anti-Communist elements, but we must unite in earnest with all others. What we call determined capitulators and anti-Communist elements are but a minority anywhere. When I investigated the composition of a local government, I found that there were only forty to fifty determined anti-Communists out of 1,300 staff members, *i.e.* less than 4 per cent, while the rest all pinned their hopes on solidarity and resistance. Of course we cannot tolerate the determined capitulators and anti-Communists, because to tolerate them means simply to allow them to undermine resistance and solidarity; we must therefore resolutely oppose the capitulators and, in self-defence, resolutely repel the attacks of the anti-Communists. To fail to do this would be Right opportunism and detrimental to solidarity and the resistance. But we must adopt the policy of uniting with all

those who are not determined to capitulate or to oppose communism. Among these some are of two minds, others are acting under compulsion and still others have merely made a momentary slip, so we must win these people over to maintain solidarity and to support the resistance. To fail to do this would be "Left" opportunism and would also be detrimental to solidarity and resistance. All Communists must realise that as we have initiated the Anti-Japanese National United Front, we must maintain it. At present, with the daily intensification of the national crisis and the great change in the world situation, we must hold ourselves strictly responsible for the survival of the Chinese nation. We must defeat Japanese imperialism and we must build China into an independent, free and democratic republic; to attain this aim, we must unite the great majority of the people throughout the country, those who have party affiliations as well as those who have not. Communists are not permitted to form a united front with anybody in disregard of principles; hence we must oppose all such things as "dissolving, containing, guarding against and curbing communism" and must oppose Right opportunism within the Party. But at the same time no Communist is permitted to disregard the Party's policy for a united front; hence all Communists must, on the principle of resistance to Japan, unite all those who are still willing to resist Japan and must oppose "Left" opportunism within the Party.

To this end, so far as political power is concerned, we stand for a government of the united front, neither favouring a one-party dictatorship by any other party nor advocating a one-party dictatorship by the Communist Party, but proposing a joint dictatorship by all parties and groups, people of all circles and all armed units, *i.e.* the political power of the united front. When Communists destroy the enemy or puppet régimes in the enemy's rear and establish the anti-Japanese political power there, they should adopt the "tripartite system" decided upon by our Party's Central Committee, that is, in all government organs or people's representative bodies Communists should only make up one-third of the personnel, with the remaining two-thirds made up of members of other anti-Japanese and democratic parties and groups or people without party

affiliations. Any person, so long as he is not for capitulation or is not anti-Communist, may participate in government work. Any political party or group, so long as it is not for capitulation or is not anti-Communist, should be given the right to exist and carry on activities under the anti-Japanese political power.

As to the question of the armed forces, our Party's statement has made it clear that we will continue to carry out the decision of "not extending our Party organisations into any friendly army". Certain local Party organisations which have not strictly observed this decision should correct themselves immediately. We should invariably adopt a friendly attitude towards any army that does not start armed clashes with the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth Army. We should re-establish friendly relations even with those troops that clashed with us in the past, when they have brought the clashes to a stop. This means applying the policy of a united front in military matters.

As to the policies on other matters—finance, economy, culture, education and anti-espionage—they must, in view of the needs of the resistance to Japan, all take as their starting point the adjustment of the interests of the classes and serve to implement the united front policy; they must all be opposed to Right opportunism on the one hand and "Left" opportunism on the other.

The present international situation is that the imperialist war is spreading all over the world and the extremely grave political and economic crises brought about by the imperialist war will inevitably lead to revolutionary outbreaks in many countries. We are now in a new era of war and revolution. The Soviet Union, which has not been drawn into the maelstrom of the imperialist war, is the supporter of all the oppressed peoples and all the oppressed nations of the world. All the above-mentioned factors are favourable to China's War of Resistance. But at the same time, as Japanese imperialism is preparing to invade South-east Asia and intensifying its offensives in China, it will surely entice some among the vacillating people in China to capitulate; the danger of capitulation is more serious than ever before. The fourth year of the resistance is going to be the most difficult one. Our task is to unite all the anti-Japanese forces, to oppose the capitulators, to overcome all difficulties and to

maintain the nation-wide resistance. All Communists must unite with the friendly parties and armies to accomplish this task jointly. We believe that, through the common effort of all members of our Party, the friendly parties and armies and all the people, we shall be able to achieve the goal of preventing capitulation, overcoming difficulties, expelling the Japanese invaders and recovering our lost territories; the prospect for our War of Resistance is bright.

July 1940.

ON POLICY

This is an internal Party directive written on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

In the present anti-Communist upsurge the policy we adopt has a decisive significance. But many of our cadres still do not realise that there is a great difference between the Party's present policy and its policy during the Agrarian Revolution. It must be understood that throughout the Anti-Japanese War, whatever the circumstances, the Party's policy of an Anti-Japanese National United Front will never change; and that many policies pursued during the ten years of the Agrarian Revolution should no longer be applied uncritically. In particular, we must adopt none of the many ultra-Left policies of the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution, which are not only totally inapplicable today in the Anti-Japanese War, but were erroneous even at that time and resulted from the failure to realise the two basic features of the Chinese revolution—its being a bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semi-colonial country and its protracted nature. Such policies included the notion that the struggle between the Kuomintang's fifth campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" and our counter-campaign against it was to be a decisive engagement between what is known as the revolutionary line and the counter-revolutionary line; the economic elimination of the bourgeoisie (the ultra-Left labour policy and tax policy) and of the rich peasants (allotting poor land to them); the physical elimination of the landlords (allotting no land to them); the persecution of the intellectuals, the "Left" deviation in cleaning up the counter-revolutionaries, the Communists' complete monopoly of government work; the inculcation of communism in citizenship training; the ultra-Left military policy (seizure of big cities and rejection of guerrilla warfare); the adventurist policy in the work in the White areas and the organisational policy of victimisation within the Party.¹ These ultra-Left policies, the very opposite of the Right opportunism under the leadership of

Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the latter period of the First Great Revolution, are manifestations of the mistakes of "Left" opportunism. In the latter period of the First Great Revolution, the policy was one of all alliance and no struggle, whereas in the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution it was all struggle and no alliance (except with the basic section of the peasantry); these are striking examples illustrating the two extremist policies. And both these extremist policies caused very serious losses to the Party and the revolution.

The present policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is neither one of all alliance and no struggle nor one of all struggle and no alliance, but is a policy which integrates alliance and struggle. Specifically speaking, it means the following:

(1) All the anti-Japanese people unite (or all the anti-Japanese workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen unite) to form an Anti-Japanese National United Front.

(2) The policy of independence and autonomy in the united front—there must be at one and the same time unity and independence.

(3) In military strategy, an independent and autonomous guerrilla war is to be carried out under a unified strategy; guerrilla warfare is basic, but mobile warfare should not be neglected when conditions are favourable.

(4) In the struggle against the anti-Communist die-hards, we must take advantage of their contradictions in order to win over the majority, oppose the minority and crush the enemies separately; it is a line of justifiability, expediency and restraint.

(5) The policy in the enemy-occupied areas and in the Kuomintang-controlled areas is on the one hand to develop united front work to the greatest possible extent and on the other to conceal our crack forces; it is, in the matter of organisation and of struggle, a policy of concealing our crack forces, lying long under cover, accumulating our strength and biding our time.

(6) The basic policy as regards the class relations at home is to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces and isolate the forces of the anti-Communist die-hards.

(7) A revolutionary dual policy towards the anti-Communist die-hards, *i.e.* a policy of uniting with them in so far as they are

still willing to resist Japan and of isolating them in so far as they are determined to oppose communism. In their resistance to Japan the die-hards are again of a dual character; we adopt a policy of uniting with them in so far as they are still willing to resist Japan, and a policy of struggling against them and isolating them in so far as they vacillate (as in their secret dealings with the Japanese invaders and their lack of activity in opposing Wang Ching-wei and other collaborators). In their anti-communism the die-hards also reveal their dual character and our policy should be one of a dual character too, *i.e.* in so far as they are still unwilling to bring about a final break-up of the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, we adopt a policy of uniting with them and, in so far as they pursue a high-handed policy and make military offensives against our Party and the people, we adopt a policy of struggling against them and isolating them. Such people of a dual character are to be distinguished from collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements.

(8) Even among the collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements there are people of a dual character, towards whom we should also adopt a revolutionary dual policy. That is, in so far as they are pro-Japanese, we adopt a policy of dealing blows to them and isolating them; in so far as they are vacillating, we adopt a policy of drawing them nearer to us and winning them over. Such people of a dual character are to be distinguished from the determined collaborators like Wang Ching-wei, Wang I-t'ang² and Shih Yu-san.³

(9) We must on the one hand distinguish the pro-Japanese section of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie which is opposed to resistance to Japan from the pro-British and pro-American section of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie which stands for resistance to Japan; and we must on the other hand distinguish the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie who, being of a dual character, stand for resistance but vacillate and stand for solidarity but are anti-Communist, from the national bourgeoisie, the middle and small landlords and the enlightened gentry whose dual character is less pronounced. We should formulate our policies on the basis of these distinctions. The diverse policies mentioned above are all based on the differences arising from the class relations.

(10) The same is true of our way of dealing with imperialism. Though the Communist Party is against all imperialists, yet we must on the one hand distinguish Japanese imperialism which is invading China from other imperialist powers which are not invading China, and on the other distinguish German and Italian imperialism which has formed an alliance with Japan and recognised "Manchukuo" from British and American imperialism which stands in opposition to Japan; furthermore, we must distinguish the Britain and the United States of the past which adopted a Munich policy for the Far East and undermined our resistance from the Britain and the United States of today which have abandoned such a policy and changed to the position of supporting China in her resistance to Japan. Our tactical principle remains one of exploiting the contradictions among them in order to win over the majority, oppose the minority and crush the enemies separately. In foreign policy we differ from the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang alleges, "There is only one enemy, while all the others are friends"; apparently treating all countries other than Japan on an equal basis, it is really pro-British and pro-American. But we should draw certain distinctions; first, there is the distinction between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries; secondly, there is the distinction between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other; thirdly, there is the distinction between the people of Britain and the United States on the one hand and the imperialist governments of Britain and the United States on the other; and fourthly, there is the distinction between the Anglo-American policy during the Far East Munich period and that of the present period. We should formulate our policies on the basis of these distinctions. Our basic line, contrary to the Kuomintang's, is to utilise foreign aid to the fullest possible extent while upholding the principle of independent resistance and regeneration through our own efforts, and not, as the Kuomintang does, to rely upon foreign aid or sell our birthright to any imperialist bloc by giving up that principle.

The one-sided views of many cadres in the Party on tactical questions and the resulting deviations, now to the left and now to the right, cannot be overcome unless these cadres are enabled

to have a comprehensive and unified understanding of the changes and developments in the Party's policy, past and present. The main danger in the Party at present is still the mischief done by a "Left" stand. In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, many fail to carry out seriously the policy of concealing our crack forces, lying long under cover, accumulating our strength and biding our time, because they do not take the Kuomintang's anti-Communist policy seriously; at the same time, there are many others who fail to carry out the policy of developing united front work, because regarding the Kuomintang as utterly rotten they are at a loss what to do. A similar state of affairs exists in the Japanese-occupied areas.

In the Kuomintang-controlled areas and in the various anti-Japanese base areas, some people, caring only about alliance and not about struggle and overestimating the Kuomintang's determination to resist Japan, have blurred the difference in principle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, denied the policy of independence and autonomy within the united front, become accommodating to the big landlords, the big bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang, and, docilely letting themselves be bound hand and foot, have not dared freely to expand the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces and wage a resolute struggle against the Kuomintang's policy of opposing and containing communism; such Right viewpoints, which once existed to a serious degree, are now basically overcome. However, since the winter of 1939, "Left" deviations have appeared in many quarters as a result of the Kuomintang's anti-Communist friction and the struggles we waged in self-defence. Rectified to a certain extent, these deviations have not yet been thoroughly eliminated and still manifest themselves in various specific policies in a number of places. It is therefore necessary to study and clarify various specific policies.

The Central Committee has time and again issued directives regarding various specific policies; only a few points are given here by way of a summary.

The organisation of political power. We must resolutely put into practice the "tripartite system"—Communists should only make up one-third of the personnel in the organs of political power so as to draw a large number of non-Communists to

participate in them. In places like northern Kiangsu where we are just beginning to establish organs of the anti-Japanese democratic political power, the number of Communists may even be less than one-third of the total. Whether in government organs or in people's representative bodies, the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry who are not actively anti-Communist must be induced to take part; and those Kuomintang members who are not anti-Communist must also be allowed to take part. We may also allow a small number of right-wingers to sit in the people's representative bodies. We must definitely avoid the monopolisation of everything by our Party. We seek only to destroy the dictatorship of the big comprador bourgeoisie and the big landlord class, and not to replace it with a one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party.

Labour policy. The workers' enthusiasm in fighting Japan can be aroused only when their living conditions are improved. But we must by all means avoid "Left" deviations; we should not go to extremes in increasing wages and reducing working hours. Under China's present conditions, the eight-hour working day cannot yet be universally introduced, and in certain branches of production a ten-hour working day should still be permitted. In other branches of production the working day is to be fixed according to the circumstances. Once a contract is drawn up between capital and labour, the workers must observe labour discipline and must allow the capitalists to make some profit. Otherwise factories will be closed down and this would be detrimental not only to resistance to Japan but also to the workers themselves. In the matter of raising the wages and improving the living conditions of the workers in the rural areas, we must especially not make excessive demands on their behalf, or the peasants would protest, the workers would lose their jobs and production would decline.

Agrarian policy. We must explain to our Party members and the peasants that it is not yet the time to carry out a thorough agrarian revolution and that the whole set of measures taken during the Agrarian Revolution are inapplicable under present circumstances. Under the present policy it ought to be laid down that, on one the hand, the landlords should reduce rent and

interest, so that the basic sections of the peasant masses can be aroused to resist Japan actively and, on the other, the reduction must not be excessive. The general principle as regards land rent is to carry out a 25 per cent reduction; if and when the masses demand an increase of the percentage, we may allow 60 or 70 per cent of the crop to go to the tenant farmer while allowing the rest to the landlords, but we must not exceed this limit. The rate of interest must not be reduced to the point of making credit transactions in the community impossible. On the other hand, we should lay it down that the peasants are to pay rent and interest and that the landlords still retain their ownership of land and other property. The reduction of interest should not be such as to make it impossible for the peasants to obtain loans, nor the settlement of accounts be such as to enable the peasants to get back their mortgaged land gratis.

Tax policy. The rate of taxation must be fixed according to income. All people with an income—except the poorest, who ought to be declared exempt—in other words, more than 80 per cent of the inhabitants, including workers and peasants, must shoulder the burden of the taxes of the state, a burden which should not be laid exclusively on the landlords and the capitalists. The practice of securing provisions for the army by means of detaining people and imposing fines must be forbidden. As to the methods of taxation, before we have decided on new and more suitable ones, we may make use of the old methods of the Kuomintang with appropriate amendments.

Anti-espionage policy. We must resolutely suppress inveterate collaborators and anti-Communist elements, otherwise we cannot safeguard the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces. But we must not sentence too many people to death and should take care not to incriminate any innocent person. We must be lenient in dealing with those reactionaries who are wavering and those who act under coercion. In the treatment of criminals we must resolutely abolish torture and attach weight to evidence rather than uncritically believing depositions. In dealing with captives from the enemy troops, the puppet troops or the anti-Communist troops, except those who are bitterly hated by the people and deserve nothing less than capital punishment, and whose death sentence is approved by higher authorities, we

must adopt the policy of setting all of them free. We should win over to our army as many as possible of such captives as have been compelled to join the reactionary forces and are more or less revolutionary; as to the rest, we should release them and, if they are captured again, set them free again; we should not insult them, search them for their personal effects or exact confessions, but treat all of them sincerely and kindly. We should adopt this policy towards them, no matter how reactionary they are. This is very effective in isolating the reactionary camp. We should give renegades, the most flagrant ones excepted, a chance to reform themselves on condition that they stop opposing communism; if they can turn over a new leaf and rejoin the revolution, we shall accept them but not re-admit them into the Party. We must not identify the ordinary intelligence personnel of the Kuomintang with Japanese spies and Chinese collaborators, but must draw an essential distinction between them and handle them accordingly. We should put an end to the state of confusion in which any office or organisation is free to make arrests, and we must lay it down that, for the establishment of anti-Japanese revolutionary order, only a judicial or a public security organ of the government is empowered to make arrests, and an armed unit may do so only during combat.

The rights of the people. We must lay it down that all landlords and capitalists not opposed to resistance to Japan are to enjoy the same right of personal inviolability and the right to vote, and the same freedom of speech, of assembly, of association, of thought and of belief as the workers and peasants, for the government only interferes with those who organise sabotage or stage uprisings in our base areas, but gives protection to all others and does not interfere with them.

Economic policy. We must positively develop industry and agriculture and promote trade. We must induce those capitalists outside our base areas who are willing to come here and start industries. We should encourage private enterprises and regard state-operated enterprises only as a part of the sum-total of enterprises. All this is for the sake of achieving self-sufficiency. The destruction of any useful enterprise should be avoided. Both tariff policy and monetary policy should fit in with our

basic policy of developing agriculture, industry and commerce, and not run counter to it. To achieve self-sufficiency we must organise the economy in the various base areas conscientiously and with minute care rather than in a crude and sketchy way—that is the main link in maintaining such base areas over a long period of time.

Cultural and educational policy. This should centre on promoting and propagating among the great masses of the people national self-esteem as well as the knowledge and tactics for resisting Japan. We should allow bourgeois liberal educators, cultural workers, newspapermen, scholars and technological experts to come to our base areas and co-operate with us, to start schools and newspapers and to participate in our work. We should draw into our schools all intellectuals who show any activity in resisting Japan, give them a short-term training, and assign them to work in the army or government or among civilians; we must throw off all reserve in drawing them in, assigning them work and promoting them. We should not be overcautious or afraid that reactionaries may sneak in. Some such persons will inevitably creep in but there will be ample time to get rid of them in the course of their study and work. In every base area we must set up printing shops, publish books and newspapers and organise distribution and transport agencies. In each base area we must, as far as possible, open large-scale schools for training cadres—the larger and the more numerous the better.

Military policy. We must expand the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in every possible way, because these are the Chinese people's most reliable armed forces in maintaining the national resistance to Japan. Towards the Kuomintang troops, we must continue to adopt the policy of "we will never attack unless attacked", and develop to the utmost the work of making friends with them. We must do our best to draw those Kuomintang or non-party army officers who are sympathetic with us into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, so as to strengthen the building of our army. The situation that Communists, by sheer weight of numbers, have exclusive control of everything in our army should now also be changed. Of course, the "tripartite system" should not be introduced in

our main forces, but so long as the hegemony in the army remains in the hands of our Party (which is completely necessary and inviolable), we should not be afraid of drawing in large numbers of sympathisers to take part in a military or technological capacity in the building of our army. Now that the ideological and organisational foundation of both our Party and our army has been firmly laid, to draw in sympathisers (of course, not disrupters) is an essential policy because it is not only harmless but also indispensable for winning the sympathy of the whole people and expanding our revolutionary forces.

The various tactical principles in the united front mentioned above and the concrete policies formulated in accordance with them should be resolutely carried out by the whole Party. At a time when the Japanese invaders are intensifying their aggression upon China and when the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie at home are carrying out their anti-Communist, anti-popular, high-handed policies and military attacks, it is only by putting into effect the above-mentioned tactical principles and concrete policies that we can maintain the resistance to Japan, develop the united front, gain the sympathy of the whole people and bring about a favourable turn in the situation. In rectifying mistakes, however, we must proceed step by step, and not with such undue haste as to occasion discontent among the cadres, suspicion among the masses, counter-attacks from the landlords and other undesirable developments.

December 25, 1940.

ORDER AND STATEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN ANHWEI INCIDENT

January 20, 1941, Yenan.

Order of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party:

The New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army has performed meritorious service in the Anti-Japanese War and has won fame both at home and abroad. Commander Yeh T'ing, in leading the army to fight the enemy, has distinguished himself by great feats; recently, while moving northward as ordered, the New Fourth Army was subjected to a treacherous attack by the criminal pro-Japanese clique and Commander Yeh, wounded and exhausted with fighting, was taken prisoner. Having received from Ch'en Yi and Chang Yun-yi, Commander of the First Contingent of the army and the army's Chief of Staff respectively, one telegram after another giving accounts of the incident, we feel deeply concerned as well as indignant. Apart from taking appropriate measures to deal with the pro-Japanese clique's flagrant criminal act of undermining the resistance to Japan, making assaults on the people's armed forces and launching a civil war, the Commission hereby appoints Ch'en Yi as Acting Commander of the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, Chang Yun-yi as Deputy-Commander, Liu Shao-ch'i as Political Commissioner, Lai Ch'uan-chu as Chief of Staff and Teng Tzu-hui as Director of the Political Department. Acting Commander Ch'en and his associates are hereby instructed to spare no effort to get the army into fighting shape, strengthen its internal solidarity, maintain harmony between the army and the people, carry out the Three People's Principles, follow the Testament of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front, so as to struggle for defending our nation and state, for fighting the War of Resistance to a victorious end and for preventing the assaults of the pro-Japanese clique.

Statement of the Spokesman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Correspondent of the "Hsinhua News Agency" (January 22, 1941):

The recent anti-Communist Southern Anhwei Incident has long been brewing. The present development is but the beginning of a nation-wide emergency. After forming a triple alliance¹ with Germany and Italy, the Japanese invaders, with a view to bringing the Sino-Japanese War to a speedy end, have been actively plotting changes within China. Their purpose is to make use of the Chinese themselves to suppress the anti-Japanese movement in China and consolidate the rear for Japan's southward drive, so that they can freely carry out this drive in co-ordination with Hitler's offensive on Britain. Numerous leading elements of the pro-Japanese clique in China have long hidden themselves in the Kuomintang's various party, government and army organisations, agitating and enticing people day and night. By the end of last year, the preparations for their plot were complete. The assault on the New Fourth Army in southern Anhwei and the issue of the reactionary order of January 17 were only the first concrete manifestations of that plot. Incidents of the gravest nature are yet to be staged one after another. What is the plot of the Japanese invaders and the pro-Japanese clique in full? It is as follows:

- (1) Publish the two telegrams, dated October 19 and December 8² respectively, to Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai, Yeh T'ing and Hsiang Ying over the signatures of Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, in order to arouse public opinion.
- (2) Start a press campaign on the importance of military discipline and military orders in preparation for launching a civil war.
- (3) Wipe out the New Fourth Army units in southern Anhwei.
- (4) Declare that the New Fourth Army has "rebelled" and cancel its designation. All the above four steps have been taken.
- (5) Appoint T'ang En-po, Li P'in-hsien, Wang Chung-lien and Han Teh-ch'in as commanders of the various route armies for "Communist annihilation" in Central China, with Li Tsung-jen as the supreme commander, to launch attacks first upon the units of the New Fourth Army under P'eng

Hsueh-feng, Chang Yun-yi and Li Hsien-nien, and then, when that comes off successfully, make further attacks on the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army units in Shantung and northern Kiangsu, while the Japanese troops will fight in close co-ordination with them. This step is being taken.

(6) Find a pretext to declare that the Eighth Route Army has "rebelled", cancel its designation, and then order the arrest of Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai. Preparations are being made for taking this step.

(7) Close down the liaison offices of the Eighth Route Army in Chungking, Sian and Kweilin, and arrest Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Tung Pi-wu and Teng Ying-ch'ao. This step has just begun; the Eighth Route Army's liaison office in Kweilin has been closed down.

(8) Close down the *New China Daily*.

(9) Launch attacks on the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and capture Yen-an.

(10) Make wholesale arrests of anti-Japanese personages in Chungking and in the provinces and suppress the anti-Japanese movement.

(11) Destroy the Communist Party's organisations in the provinces and make wholesale arrests of Communists.

(12) Upon the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Central and South China, the Kuomintang government will proclaim "the recovery of lost territories" and at the same time carry out propaganda on the necessity of realising a so-called "honourable peace".

(13) Japan is to bring troops originally stationed in Central and South China to North China as reinforcements and to launch most ruthless attacks on the Eighth Route Army, attempting, in co-operation with the Kuomintang forces, to annihilate completely the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies.

(14) Besides attacking the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army without a moment's pause, a state of cease-fire like that of last year is to continue between the Kuomintang and the Japanese troops on all fronts in order to turn the situation into one of general truce and peace negotiation.

(15) The Kuomintang government is to sign a peace treaty

with Japan and join the triple alliance. Active preparations are being made for taking the above nine steps.

The foregoing is a general outline of the whole plot of Japan and the pro-Japanese clique. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party pointed out in its July 7 Declaration of the year before last: "Capitulation is the main danger in the present situation, and opposition to the Communist Party is the preparatory step for capitulation". Its July 7 Declaration of last year stated: "An unprecedented danger of capitulation and unprecedented difficulties in the War of Resistance have arisen". Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai, Yeh T'ing and Hsiang Ying pointed out even more concretely in their telegram of November 9 of last year:

"A section of people at home is engineering a so-called new anti-Communist upsurge in an attempt to clear the path for capitulation. . . . they want to end the War of Resistance by means of so-called Sino-Japanese co-operation in 'Communist annihilation'. They want to substitute civil war for the War of Resistance, capitulation for independence, splits for solidarity and darkness for light. Their activities are wicked and their designs venomous. People in the streets tell each other the news and feel shocked and horrified."

Indeed the situation has never been so critical as at present. Thus the Southern Anhwei Incident and the January 17 Order of the Military Council in Chungking were merely the beginning of a series of incidents. In particular, the January 17 Order is full of grave political implications. The fact that the authorities dared to risk universal condemnation by openly issuing such a counter-revolutionary order shows that they must have determined on a complete split and out-and-out capitulation. For the political representatives of the flabby class of big landlords and big bourgeoisie in China are unable to accomplish any task, however small, without their wire-pulling bosses, much less such an undertaking as shocks the whole world. Under the present circumstances it seems already very difficult to make those who issued the order change their minds and, unless emergency steps are taken by the people throughout the country and heavy diplomatic pressure is applied from international quarters, it

is probably impossible to make them change their minds. Hence the urgent task of the people throughout the country is to watch the development of events with the utmost vigilance and get ready for coping with any dark reactionary situation; they must not be careless or negligent. As to China's future, the matter is very clear. Even if the Japanese invaders and the pro-Japanese clique could realise their designs, we Chinese Communists and the Chinese people have not only the duty but also, as we know ourselves, the ability to step forward and command the situation; we will never permit the Japanese invaders and the pro-Japanese clique to go on wreaking havoc. However dark the present situation, however difficult the road that we have to travel, and however high the price that we have to pay for taking that road (the losses of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhwei are part of the price), the Japanese invaders and the pro-Japanese clique are doomed to failure. The reasons are as follows:

- (1) The Chinese Communist Party is no longer to be so easily deceived and destroyed as in 1927. The Chinese Communist Party is now a major party standing firmly on its own feet.
- (2) Among the members of other parties (including the Kuomintang) and groups, there must be many who, apprehensive of the disaster of national subjugation, are unwilling to capitulate and to fight a civil war. Though some of them are temporarily misled, they may awake when the time comes.
- (3) The same is true of the Chinese troops. They have taken an anti-Communist stand mostly under coercion.
- (4) The vast majority of the Chinese people are unwilling to become colonial slaves.
- (5) The imperialist war is already on the eve of a great change and all the parasites who depend on imperialism for their existence, however rampant they may be at the moment, will find that their wire-pulling bosses are not reliable; once the tree falls, the monkeys on it will flee helter-skelter, and the whole situation will change.
- (6) The outbreak of revolutions in many countries is only a matter of time; the revolutions in those countries as well as in China will certainly co-operate with each other to win victory.

(7) The Soviet Union is the greatest source of power in the world and it will decidedly help China to fight the War of Resistance to a victorious end.

For the reasons stated above, we still hope that those who play with fire will not be made too dizzy by the heat of the flame. We formally warn them by saying: Better be careful—such a fire is not to play with, and take good care of your own skins. If these people would think it over coolly for a while, they ought to proceed with the following things in good earnest and at a good speed.

(1) Stop provocation, like a rider reining in his horse on the brink of a precipice.

(2) Rescind the reactionary January 17 Order and publicly admit that they themselves have been completely wrong.

(3) Punish Ho Ying-ch'in, Ku Chu-t'ung and Shangkuan Yunhsiang, chief culprits responsible for the Southern Anhwei Incident.

(4) Release Yeh T'ing and reinstate him as the Commander of the New Fourth Army.

(5) Return to the New Fourth Army all its men and arms captured in southern Anhwei.

(6) Express sympathy with and give compensation to all officers and men of the New Fourth Army wounded in southern Anhwei and to the families of all who were killed.

(7) Withdraw from Central China the troops for "Communist annihilation".

(8) Demolish the cordon of blockade in the North-west.³

(9) Release all the patriotic political prisoners in the country.

(10) Abolish the one-party dictatorship and bring about a democratic government.

(11) Carry out the Three People's Principles and observe Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament; and

(12) Arrest all the leaders of the pro-Japanese clique and bring them to trial according to the nation's law.

If these twelve items are carried out, then things will naturally return to normal; we Communists and the people of the whole country will never push things to the extreme. If they are not, we are "afraid that Chi Sun's troubles come not from Chuanyu, but from his own master's household",⁴ and the reactionaries

will inevitably be "lifting a rock only to have their own toes squashed", and however much we may like to help, we shall find it too late. We set store by co-operation, but only when the other party does the same. To be frank, there is a limit to our concessions and the stage for us to make concessions is over. They have already given us the first slashing and the wound is very deep. If they still care for their future, they should come forth of their own will to heal that wound. "It is never too late to mend the corral even when the sheep are lost." This is a matter of life and death for themselves and we feel obliged to give a final piece of sincere advice. But if they remain incorrigible and continue to misbehave themselves, then the people of the whole country, having reached the end of their forbearance, will throw them into the cesspool and it will be too late for them to repent. As to the New Fourth Army, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has issued an order on January 20, appointing Ch'en Yi as Acting Commander, Chang Yun-yi as Deputy Commander, Liu Shao-ch'i as Political Commissioner, Lai Ch'uan-chu as Chief of Staff and Teng Tzu-hui as Director of the Political Department. With more than 90,000 of its men remaining in Central China and the southern part of Kiang-su province, this army, though subjected to pincers attacks by the Japanese invaders and the Chinese anti-Communist troops, will certainly be able to struggle through hardships and to perform loyal service for the nation and the state until final victory. Meanwhile, units of its brother army, the Eighth Route Army, will certainly not sit by and watch it suffer from pincers attacks but will take appropriate steps to render necessary assistance—this is something I can tell them bluntly. As to all that is said by the spokesman of the Military Council in Chungking, the only word we can find by way of comment is: "Self-contradictory". While the New Fourth Army was said to have "rebelled" on the order of the Chungking Military Council, it was described, in the statement of its spokesman, as moving into the Nanking-Shanghai-Hangchow triangular area to establish a base there. Now, let us reason according to their own words: Can a move into the Nanking-Shanghai-Hangchow triangular area be regarded as a "rebellion"? The stupid

spokesman in Chungking did not stop to think. After all, whom could the New Fourth Army rebel against when it was moving into that area? Isn't that an area under Japanese occupation? Then why should you prevent it from moving there, and try to exterminate it while it was still in southern Anhwei? Oh, yes, this is after all what the loyal servants of the Japanese should do. Thus the plan for a joint annihilation campaign by seven divisions emerged, thus the January 17 Order was issued, and thus Yeh T'ing was brought to trial. But we still want to say that the spokesman in Chungking is a stupid ass; he has, without any compulsion, made a voluntary confession and revealed the scheme of Japanese imperialism to the whole nation.

January 1941.

THE SITUATION AFTER THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST UPSURGE

This is an internal Party directive written on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

1. Touched off by the telegram of Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi of October 19 last year, the second anti-Communist upsurge,¹ reached its climax in the Southern Anhwei Incident and Chiang Kai-shek's "January 17 Order",² and ended with a rearguard action in the form of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist speech of March 6 and the People's Political Council's anti-Communist resolutions.³ From now on the situation may temporarily ease to some degree. On the eve of a decisive struggle between the world's two major imperialist blocs, the pro-British and pro-American big bourgeoisie in China, still opposed to the Japanese invaders, cannot but seek for some temporary and slight easing of the present strained relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. At the same time, the situation within the Kuomintang (there are contradictions between the central and local authorities, between the C. C. Clique and the Political Science Group, between the C. C. Clique and the *Fu Hsing* Society and between the die-hards and the middle-of-the-roaders; and there are also contradictions within the C. C. Clique and within the *Fu Hsing* Society respectively), the situation at home (the opposition of the broad masses to the Kuomintang's autocracy and their sympathy towards the Communist Party), and our Party's policy (continuing the campaign of protest)—all this does not permit the Kuomintang to prolong the strained relations between the Communist Party and itself at such a pitch as in the past five months. At present, therefore, Chiang Kai-shek has to seek for a temporary and slight easing of the tension.

2. The recent struggle has indicated the decline of the prestige of the Kuomintang and the rise of the prestige of the Communist

Party and has been instrumental in bringing about certain changes in the relative strength of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. This situation has compelled Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider his own position and attitude. By stressing national defence and shouting about the obsolescence of partisan ideas, he tries to pose as the "national leader" standing above the various contradictions at home and not favouring any particular class or party, so as to maintain the rule of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang. But if this is only deceptive camouflage and means no change in policy, his attempt will be futile.

3. At the beginning of the recent anti-Communist upsurge our Party adopted a policy of conciliation and concession with a view to saving the situation as a whole (as indicated by the telegram of November 9 last year⁴), and thus won the sympathy of broad sections of the people; and it also won the support of the people of the whole country when it turned to a vigorous counter-offensive after the Southern Anhwei Incident (the two sets of twelve demands,⁵ the refusal to attend the People's Political Council and the nation-wide campaign of protest). This policy, a policy of justifiability, expediency and restraint, was entirely necessary in repulsing the anti-Communist upsurge of this time, and it has already taken effect. Before the major differences between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party are reasonably settled, we should, in face of the Southern Anhwei Incident created by the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist cliques in the Kuomintang and all kinds of political and military oppression imposed by them, continue the campaign of stern protest and extend the propaganda on our first set of twelve demands, and we should not slacken in our effort.

4. The Kuomintang will never slacken in enforcing its policy of oppressing our Party and the progressives and in carrying out anti-Communist propaganda in the areas under its rule; our Party must increase its vigilance. The Kuomintang's attacks on the areas north of the Hwai river, in eastern Anhwei and in central Hupeh will probably continue and our army must repel them resolutely. In all the base areas the Central Committee's directive of December 25 of last year⁶ must be resolutely carried out, the internal Party education on tactics must be intensified

and the "Left" deviations in ideology corrected, so that these anti-Japanese democratic base areas will be unfalteringly maintained for a long time. Throughout the country and in all the base areas we must oppose the erroneous appraisal of the situation to the effect that there is already a final split or will soon be a split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, together with the many incorrect views arising from it.

March 18, 1941.

A REVIEW OF THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST UPSURGE

This is an internal Party directive written on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

As indicated in the Central Committee's directive of March 18, 1941, the recent anti-Communist upsurge is over. What follows is continued resistance to Japan in the new domestic and international circumstances. The additional factors in the new circumstances are: the spread of the imperialist war; the upsurge of the international revolutionary movement; the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan;¹ the repulse of the Kuomintang's second anti-Communist upsurge and consequently the decline of the Kuomintang's political prestige and the rise of the Communist Party's political prestige; and, finally, Japan's latest preparations for a new large-scale offensive against China. In order that the people throughout the country may be united to persist in resistance to Japan and continue to overcome effectively the danger of capitulation and the anti-Communist countercurrent of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, it is entirely necessary for us to study and learn the lessons which our Party has drawn from its heroic and victorious struggle against the recent anti-Communist upsurge.

1. Of the two major contradictions in China the contradiction between the Chinese and Japanese nations is still the basic one and the contradiction between the classes at home is subordinate. The fact that a national enemy has penetrated deep into the territory of our country plays an all-decisive role. As long as the Sino-Japanese contradiction remains sharp, even if the whole bunch of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie were to turn traitor and surrender, the situation of 1927 can never be brought about again, nor can the Incident of April 12² and the Incident of May 21³ be repeated. The previous anti-Communist upsurge⁴ had been appraised by some comrades as another Incident of May 21, and the recent anti-Communist upsurge was again appraised as a repetition of the Incident of

April 12 and the Incident of May 21, but objective facts have proved such appraisals to be incorrect. These comrades made a mistake because they forgot a point, namely, that the contradiction between the nations is the basic contradiction.

2. Under such circumstances, the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie, the policy-makers of the Kuomintang government, remain a class with a dual character; on the one hand they stand in opposition to Japan and on the other they stand in opposition to the Communist Party and the broad masses of the people represented by the Party. Again, both their resistance to Japan and their anti-communism bear a dual character. With regard to the former they stand in opposition to Japan, yet do not actively fight Japan, do not actively oppose Wang Ching-wei and other collaborators, and sometimes they even flirt with Japan's peace emissaries. With regard to the latter, though they oppose the Communist Party even to the extent of engineering the Southern Anhwei Incident and issuing the January 17 Order,⁵ they nevertheless do not desire a final split and still maintain the policy of striking and stroking alternately. These points have been verified once again in the recent anti-Communist upsurge. Chinese politics, which are extremely complex, demand the closest attention of our comrades. Since the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie are still resisting Japan and are still striking and stroking alternately in dealing with our Party, our policy is "to do unto them as they do unto us"⁶—to counter striking with striking and return stroking for stroking: such is the revolutionary dual policy. So long as the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie have not to this very day turned traitor completely, this policy will remain unchanged.

3. It requires a whole range of tactics to combat the Kuomintang's anti-Communist policy and we must not be careless and negligent. The animosity and cruelty of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek towards the people's revolutionary forces have not only been proved by the ten-year anti-Communist war in the past, but have also been completely proved in the two anti-Communist upsurges in the midst of the Anti-Japanese War, and particularly in the Southern Anhwei Incident during the second anti-Communist

upsurge. If any people's revolutionary force wishes to avoid extermination by Chiang Kai-shek and to compel him to recognise its existence, it has no alternative but to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against his counter-revolutionary policies. The failure resulting from Comrade Hsiang Ying's opportunism⁷ in the recent anti-Communist upsurge should serve as a severe warning to the whole Party. But our struggle should be marked by justifiability, expediency and restraint; if it lacks any of these three characteristics, we shall suffer losses.

4. In the struggle against the Kuomintang die-hards, the big bourgeoisie with a comprador character must be distinguished from the national bourgeoisie with none or less of that character, and the most reactionary big landlords must be distinguished from the enlightened gentry and the landlords in general—that is the theoretical basis of our Party's endeavour to win over the middle-of-the-roaders and establish the political power of the "tripartite system", and that has been repeatedly pointed out by the Central Committee since March last year. Its correctness was proved again in the recent anti-Communist upsurge. The stand we took before the Southern Anhwei Incident, outlined in the November 9 telegram,⁸ was entirely necessary for our turning to the political counter-attack after the incident; otherwise we could not win over the middle-of-the-roaders. For unless they had had repeated experiences, the middle-of-the-roaders would not be able to understand why our Party must carry on resolute struggles against the Kuomintang die-hards, why we have to seek solidarity through struggle and why there will be no solidarity whatsoever if we give up struggle. Although the leading sections of the powerful groups in the provinces are also big landlords and big bourgeois, yet, as they are in contradiction with the big landlords and the big bourgeois in control of the central political power, they should in general also be regarded and treated as middle-of-the-roaders. Yen Hsi-shan, who came out most actively against the Communists during the previous anti-Communist upsurge, took a middle-of-the-road position in the recent one, and although the Kwangsi clique which adopted a middle-of-the-road position on the previous occasion turned to the anti-Communist side this time, it is still in contradiction with the Chiang Kai-shek clique and we should

not regard the two as one and the same. This is even more applicable to other powerful groups in the provinces. Yet even now many of our comrades still speak of the different groups of the landlord class or the different groups of the bourgeoisie in the same breath, as if the landlord class and the bourgeoisie had in a body turned traitor after the Southern Anhwei Incident; this is an over-simplification of complex Chinese politics. If we adopt this view and consider all the landlords and the bourgeoisie as the same as the Kuomintang die-hards, we shall land ourselves in isolation. We must realise that Chinese society is of a shape bulging out in the middle while tapering off towards the two ends⁹ and that, if the Communist Party cannot win over the masses of the intermediate strata and enable them to fit into their places according to their respective conditions, it cannot solve the problems of China.

5. As some comrades are wavering as regards the point that the contradiction between China and Japan is the basic contradiction, and consequently make a wrong appraisal of the class relations in China, they sometimes also waver as regards the Party's policy. It seems that after the Southern Anhwei Incident these comrades, proceeding from their appraisal of it as another April 12 Incident or May 21 Incident, have begun to feel that the Central Committee's directive on principles issued on December 25 last year is no longer applicable, or at least not quite applicable. What is needed now, they hold, is no longer the political power that includes all people who stand for resistance and democracy but the political power of the workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeois, and no longer the united front policy for the period of resisting Japan but a policy of the agrarian revolution as during the ten years of civil war of the past. In the minds of these comrades, the Party's correct policy has at the least become blurred for the time being.

6. These comrades, when ordered by the Party's Central Committee to get ready to cope with a split which the Kuomintang might bring about, *i.e.* with the worst possible development, become at once oblivious of all other possibilities. They fail to understand that although it is entirely necessary to make preparations for the worst, this does not exclude the possibility of something good happening, and that our preparations are

themselves a condition for striving to turn such a possibility into actuality. This time, as we had made sufficient preparations to cope with the Kuomintang's attempt at a split, the Kuomintang dared not bring it about lightly.

7. There are even more comrades who fail to understand the unity between the national struggle and the class struggle, who fail to understand what the policy of the united front and the class policy are, and who consequently fail to understand the unity between education on the united front and class education. They hold that after the Southern Anhwei Incident particular emphasis should be laid on class education as something separate from united front education. Even now they are not aware that, throughout the Anti-Japanese War, the Party has only one fully-integrated policy towards all those in the upper and middle strata who are still resisting Japan, whether they belong to the big landlord class, the big bourgeoisie or the intermediate classes—the policy of the national united front which embodies both alliance and struggle (dual in character). We should apply this dual policy even to the puppet troops, the collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements, except those of them who obstinately refuse to repent and towards whom we must adopt a resolute policy of knocking them down. The education that our Party gives to its members as well as to the people is also an education that includes both these aspects, *i.e.* to teach the proletariat, the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie how to unite in different ways with the different strata of the bourgeoisie and the landlord class for resisting Japan, and how to wage in various degrees struggles against their attitude of compromise, vacillation and anti-communism of various degrees. The united front policy is the class policy and the two are inseparable; one will not be clear about many problems unless one is clear about this point.

8. Other comrades do not understand that the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and the anti-Japanese base areas in North China and Central China are already new-democratic in social character. In judging whether an area is new-democratic in social character, the main criterion is whether the representatives of the broad masses of the people participate in the political power there and whether the Communist Party

assumes leadership in it. Therefore, the united front political power under Communist leadership serves as the chief sign of a new-democratic society. Some people wrongly think that only the carrying out of such an agrarian revolution as the one during the ten years of civil war can be called the realisation of New Democracy. At present the political system in the anti-Japanese base areas is a political system of the united front of all the people who stand for resistance and democracy, the economy there is an economy in which semi-colonial and semi-feudal factors are basically eliminated, and the culture there is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses of the people. Therefore, whether viewed politically, economically or culturally, the anti-Japanese base areas that have only enforced the reduction of rent and interest, and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region that has gone through a thorough agrarian revolution, are both new-democratic in social character. When the example of the anti-Japanese base areas is followed throughout the country, then the whole of China will become a new-democratic republic.

May 8, 1941.

NOTES

THE MAY 4 MOVEMENT

1. This war broke out as a result of Japan's aggression upon Korea and provocation against China's ground and sea forces. Although her armed forces fought heroically, China was defeated in the next year because of the corruption of the Manchu government and the lack of preparation for a resolute fight against aggression. The result was the conclusion of a humiliating treaty at Shimonoseki (Bakan), whereby the Manchu government agreed to cede Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan, to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels (a tael being about 1.33 ounces) of silver, to allow the Japanese to establish factories in China, to open Shasi, Chungking, Soochow and Hangchow as treaty ports, and to place Korea in Japan's hands as her vassal state.

THE ORIENTATION OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

1. May 4 was first designated as the Youth Day of China by youth organisations in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region. Under the pressure of the patriotic upsurge of the broad masses of the youth, the Kuomintang agreed to this decision. But later on, afraid that the youth would turn revolutionary, it proclaimed March 29 as its own Youth Day, because on that day in 1911 an abortive uprising was staged in Canton, in which many revolutionaries were martyred (their remains were later buried at Hwanghwakang in the suburbs of the city). Yet May 4 continued to be observed as Youth Day in the revolutionary base areas under the leadership of the Communist Party. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government, in December 1949, officially proclaimed May 4 as China's Youth Day.
2. Referring to the Sino-Japanese War.
3. Referring to the counter-revolutionary *coups d'état* of 1927 staged by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai and Nanking and by Wang Ching-wei in Wuhan.
4. Referring to *The May 4 Movement*, this volume.

OPPOSE CAPITULATIONIST ACTIVITIES

1. Referring to the British and American imperialists who were plotting to reach a compromise with Japan at China's expense.
2. Through such a conference, generally spoken of as a Far Eastern Munich, the British, American and French imperialists, together with the group for seeking peace in China, plotted to betray China and reach a compromise with Japan. The absurd view that such a conference would not be a Far Eastern Munich, which Comrade Mao condemned here, was expressed by Chiang Kai-shek.

3. Meaning the whole set of viewpoints, tactics and schemes of Chiang Kai-shek. While Wang Ching-wei headed the capitulators in the open, Chiang headed the capitulators who hid themselves in the anti-Japanese front—the “Wang Ching-weis under cover”, or the “Chang Ching-weis and Li Ching-weis”, as Comrade Mao called them.
4. A comic performance by two persons, with one placed in the front acting pantomime and the other hidden behind him speaking the lines. By this Comrade Mao illustrates here how Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei worked together.
5. On the traditional Chinese stage, a good character's face is usually painted red, while the villain's is painted white. As the Kuomintang's group for seeking peace, with Chiang Kai-shek at its head, pursued a double-faced policy, pretending to fight in the War of Resistance while seeking all possible means of capitulating to the Japanese, Comrade Mao likened them to actors who appear both in the roles of good characters and in those of bad ones.
6. Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung gives a clear-cut definition of the well-known slogan, “Resist Japan to the very last” in order to combat Chiang Kai-shek's capitulatory interpretation of it. At the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Fifth Central Executive Committee in January 1939, Chiang openly declared that the slogan meant merely “to restore China to the status existing before the Lukouchiao Incident”.
7. “Friction” is a term in current use at that time, referring to the activities which the Kuomintang reactionaries directed against the Communist Party and the progressive forces with a view to disrupting the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
8. After the Japanese troops occupied Nanking on December 13, 1937, the Japanese government issued a statement on January 16, 1938, saying that Japan will “no longer accept the National Government as one of the parties in negotiation, and hopes that a new government will soon be established”. In October 1938 the Japanese troops seized Canton and Wuhan, and the Japanese government, making use of the Kuomintang's vacillation in the War of Resistance, changed its policy into one of luring Chiang Kai-shek to capitulate. Thereupon it issued another statement on November 3, which reads in part: “Provided the National Government would abandon its former erroneous policy and get new men to carry out rehabilitation and to maintain peace and order, the Empire will not decline to negotiate with it”.
9. A common Chinese expression meaning that, as the third party, the fisherman benefits from a fight between the snipe (whose bill is caught between the valves of the clam) and the clam (whose body is pierced by the bill of the snipe) by catching them both.

THE REACTIONARIES MUST BE PUNISHED

1. Referring to Chiang Kai-shek and his henchmen who plotted the Pingkiang Massacre. On June 12, 1939, acting on a secret order from Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang's Twenty-seventh Group Army sent its men to surround the New Fourth Army's Liaison Office at Pingkiang, Hunan. The reactionary troops cruelly murdered Comrade T'u Cheng-k'un, staff officer of the New Fourth Army, Comrade Major Lo Tzu-ming, adjutant of the Eighth Route Army, and four other comrades. The massacre aroused indignation not only

among the people in the anti-Japanese base areas but also among the righteous people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas.

2. Comrade Mao Tse-tung defined the term "unification" in the next passage in order to combat the Kuomintang reactionaries' attempt to liquidate, under the pretext of "unification", the anti-Japanese armed forces and the anti-Japanese base areas under Communist leadership. After the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was re-established for joint resistance to Japan, the Kuomintang always used the slogan of "unification" as the principal weapon against the Communist Party, accusing it of "trying to be exceptional, disrupting unification and damaging the cause of resistance". This reactionary clamour increased after the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Fifth Central Executive Committee, held in January 1939, adopted the "Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties" proposed by Chiang Kai-shek. Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrested the word "unification" from the Kuomintang reactionaries and turned it into a revolutionary slogan to combat the Kuomintang's actions against the people and the nation which would lead to a split.
3. After occupying Wuhan in October 1938, Japan shifted the centre of gravity of its policy to inducing the Kuomintang to capitulate by political means. The British and American imperialists chimed in and repeatedly hinted to Chiang Kai-shek that he should seek peace, and Chamberlain even indicated that he would take part in the "reconstruction of the Far East". In 1939 Japan and other imperialist powers intensified their conspiratorial activities. In April of that year, Kerr, the British Ambassador to China, acted as a go-between for Japan and Chiang Kai-shek and tried to arrange a peace parley. Britain and Japan came to an agreement in July, with the British government ready to accept fully the "realities" Japan had brought about in China. Cf. *Oppose Capitulationist Activities*.
4. Secretly issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in 1939. The measures provided for the severe restriction of the freedom of thought, speech and action of the Communist Party and all the progressives, and aimed at disrupting all the anti-Japanese organisations of the people. In places where, in the opinion of the Kuomintang, "the Communists were most active", the law of "collective responsibility and collective punishment" was enforced against people in the same neighbourhood and an "information network", a network of the counter-revolutionary secret service, was widely established on the basis of the *pao-chia* system (see Note 4 to *Interview with Three Correspondents—from the "Central News Agency", the "Sao Tang Pao" and the "Hsin Min Pao"*, p. 246 of this volume), to spy on the people and control their activities.

AN INTERVIEW WITH THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE *NEW CHINA DAILY* ON THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

1. Concluded on August 23, 1939.
2. Aided and abetted by the non-intervention policy of the British and French governments, fascist Germany and Italy accomplished a series of acts of aggression. Italy began her armed aggression on Abyssinia in October 1935 and occupied the whole country in May 1936. In July 1936 Germany and Italy jointly started their armed intervention in the internal affairs of Spain

- and supported the fascist Franco in his rebellion against the Popular Front government of Spain. After a prolonged war with the German and Italian interventionists and Franco's reactionary troops, the Popular Front government was defeated in March 1939. The German troops occupied Austria in March 1938 and invaded the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia in October. In March 1939 the whole of Czechoslovakia came under German occupation.
3. Japan and Germany concluded this pact in November 1936 and Italy signed it a year later.
4. This was a malignant scheme of the Japanese imperialists to facilitate their aggression on China. Up to the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War the Japanese imperialists, in an attempt to turn China into a house divided against itself, had fostered a number of Chinese who could serve as their tools for aggression. After the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, they made use, within the Kuomintang, not only of the openly pro-Japanese clique headed by Wang Ching-wei but also of Chiang Kai-shek's clique, for the purpose of harrasing the Communist Party which was the most resolute in carrying on the War of Resistance. They were precisely enforcing this policy of "controlling the Chinese by the Chinese" when, in 1939, they ceased their attacks on Chiang Kai-shek's troops and, in the political sphere, instigated him to carry out anti-Communist activities.
5. Japan's policy of defraying the expenses of its aggressive war on China by plundering ruthlessly the areas under her occupation.
6. The Japanese invaders' synonym for carrying out their barbarous "policy of triple atrocity", of burning all, killing all and looting all.

INTERVIEW WITH THREE CORRESPONDENTS —FROM THE *CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY*, THE *SAO TANG PAO* AND THE *HSIN MIN PAO*

1. The *Central News Agency* belonged to the Kuomintang. The *Sao Tang Pao* was the organ of the military section of the Kuomintang government. The *Hsin Min Pao* was a newspaper representing the national bourgeoisie.
2. Dr. Sun Yat-sen envisaged these three stages in his *Programme of National Reconstruction*. For a long time, the Kuomintang reactionary clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek used Dr. Sun's theory of the stages of "military rule" and "political tutelage" as a pretext for imposing a counter-revolutionary dictatorship on the people and depriving them of all freedoms and rights.
3. In the winter of 1924, war broke out for the second time between the warlords of the Chihli clique and those of the Fengtien clique (Chihli being the name of the present Hopeh province and Fengtien that of the present Liaotung and Liaosi provinces). Feng Yu-hsiang, originally belonging to the Chihli clique, refused to fight, withdrew his troops from the front and marched them to Peking, thus causing the downfall of Wu P'ei-fu, the most powerful warlord and actual leader of the Chihli clique. Feng wired Dr. Sun Yat-sen to come to Peking. Having accepted Feng's invitation, Dr. Sun made a statement on November 10, two days before he left Canton for Peking. In this statement, which won the support of the whole nation, Dr. Sun reiterated his opposition to imperialism and the warlords and urged that a national assembly be called to settle the problems facing the country.

4. *Pao* and *chia* were names for the basic administrative units under the Kuomintang régime. These names were retained in the liberated areas for a short time. Ten households made up a *chia* and ten *chia's* a *pao*.
5. That is, Emperor Kuang Wu (A.D. 25-56) of the Eastern Han dynasty.
6. That is, 1937.

THE UNITY BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INTERESTS OF MANKIND

1. An organisation formed by Britain, France, Japan and other imperialist powers after the First World War. Having occupied China's North-east in 1931, Japanese imperialism announced its withdrawal from the League in 1933 in order to facilitate the extension of its aggression. In the same year, after the Nazis came to power, Germany also withdrew from the League in order to make preparations for an aggressive war. In 1934, just at a time when the threat of a fascist war was daily increasing, the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, thereby transforming it from an instrument for dividing the world among the imperialist powers into one that might serve the cause of world peace. Italy, too, withdrew from the League in 1935, the year of her invasion of Abyssinia.
2. Both concluded in 1935.
3. During the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks, Lloyd George declared in Parliament that rejection of the Soviet proposals meant rejection of peace.
4. See Note 9 to *Oppose Capitulationist Activities*.
5. On September 1, 1939, the Germans invaded Poland and occupied most of her territory. On the 17th the reactionary Polish government fled abroad. On that day, the Soviet Union, in order to recover its own lost territories, emancipate the oppressed Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples and check the eastward drive of the German fascist troops, dispatched its troops to eastern Poland.
6. In May 1939 the Japanese-"Manchukuoan" troops began to attack the troops of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Mongolia at Khalkhin-gol on the border between Mongolia and Manchuria. In a heroic war of self-defence the Soviet and the Mongolian forces inflicted a smashing defeat on the Japanese-"Manchukuoan" troops, which had to beg for peace with the Soviet Union. Thus in September the Khalkhin-gol truce agreement was concluded in Moscow. Its main provisions were: (1) the immediate discontinuance of hostilities by both sides and (2) the formation of a commission of four, two from each side, to re-demarcate the Mongolian-"Manchukuoan" frontier at places where the conflict had taken place.
7. At the end of July and the beginning of August 1938, the Japanese committed acts of provocation against the Soviet troops in the Lake Hasan district on the border between China, Korea and the Soviet Union. Under the vigorous counter-attack of the Soviet troops, the Japanese were defeated and begged for peace. The two sides signed an agreement on August 11 in Moscow, which provided for an immediate cease-fire and the formation of a commission of four, two from each side, to investigate into the boundary lines and make a final settlement.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS TO THE COMMUNIST

1. Joseph Stalin, *On the Perspectives of the Revolution in China*, as translated in *Political Affairs*, New York, December 1950, p. 29.
2. Cf. Introductory Note to *Analysis of the classes in Chinese Society*, p. 13, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
3. The statement that in general the armed struggle in the Chinese Revolution is guerrilla warfare, sums up China's experiences in revolutionary wars from the Second Revolutionary Civil War (*i.e.* the War of Agrarian Revolution) to the initial period of the Anti-Japanese War. During the long period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War, the armed struggles led by the Chinese Communist Party all took the form of guerrilla warfare. In the latter stage of that period, as the strength of the Red Army grew, guerrilla warfare changed into mobile warfare of a guerrilla character which, according to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's definition, means guerrilla warfare on a higher level. But in the Anti-Japanese War, with a different enemy and under different circumstances, there was again a shift from mobile warfare of a guerrilla character back to guerrilla warfare. In the early days of the Anti-Japanese War, comrades in the Party who committed the error of Right opportunism belittled the importance of the guerrilla war conducted by the Party and reposed their hopes on the operations of the Kuomintang troops. Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted this view in his *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War*, *On the Protracted War and Problems of War and Strategy* and theoretically summed up in the present work the experiences gained in waging the protracted armed struggle of the Chinese revolution in the form of guerrilla warfare. Yet in the latter stage of the Anti-Japanese War and especially in the period of the Third Revolutionary Civil War which brought into being the People's Republic, the main form of the armed struggle led by the Chinese Communist Party, owing to the further growth of the revolutionary forces and fresh changes in the circumstances, developed from guerrilla warfare into regular warfare. The latter stage of the Third Revolutionary Civil War witnessed a further development into large-scale operations by huge field armies which, equipped with heavy arms, were able to storm the enemy's strongly fortified positions.
4. Cf. Note 3 to *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

1. The compass was mentioned very early by Chinese authors. The magnetic power of the loadstone was mentioned in *Lu Pu-wei's Almanac*, written in the Period of the Warring States (in the third century B.C.). In the early Eastern Han dynasty (the beginning of the first century A.D.), Wang Ch'ung in his *Lun Heng* said that loadstone points to the south—a proof that magnetic polarity was then already discovered. The compass had presumably come

- into popular use since the beginning of the twelfth century because its use in navigation was described in travelogues of the time.
2. Paper was first made in China by Ts'ai Lun, a eunuch of the Eastern Han dynasty, from bark, hemp, rags and worn-out fishing nets. In A.D. 105, the last year of the reign of Emperor Ho of the Han dynasty, Ts'ai Lun presented his invention to the emperor and paper came into common use, known as "Lord Ts'ai's paper".
 3. First invented in the Sui dynasty, about A.D. 600.
 4. First invented by Pi Sheng in the Sung dynasty during the years between 1041 and 1048.
 5. First invented in the ninth century. By the eleventh century the Chinese were already using gunpowder in war.
 6. Leaders of the first great peasant uprising in Chinese history. In 209 B.C., the first year during the reign of the Second Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty, Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang, who were among nine hundred conscripts on their way to take up garrison duty at a frontier post, rallied their fellow conscripts to rise at Chi county (now the county of Su in Anhwei province) against the tyranny of Ch'in. The whole country responded. Hsiang Yu and his uncle Hsiang Liang raised an army in Wu (now in Kiangsu) and Liu Pang raised an army in Pei (now in Shantung). Hsiang's army annihilated the main forces of Ch'in. But it was Liu Pang's troops which penetrated into the central part of Shensi and took Ch'in's capital. Then a war broke out between Liu Pang and Hsiang Yu; Hsiang was defeated and Liu became emperor and founder of the Han dynasty.
 7. In the last years of the Western Han dynasty peasant riots and scattered peasant uprisings occurred in many parts of the country. In A.D. 8, Wang Mang, overthrowing the dynasty to become emperor himself, introduced some measures of reform in order to ease the situation. As a result of a serious famine in the south, Wang K'uang and Wang Feng, natives of Hsinshih (now Kingshan county in Hupeh), were chosen by the starving masses as leaders in their uprising. When this peasant force fought its way to Nanyang (in the western part of the present Honan province), it became known as the "Hsinshih Army". At P'inglin (north-east of the present Sui county, Hupeh), more than one thousand people rose under Ch'en Mu, calling themselves the "P'inglin Army". Both the Bronze Horses and the Red Eyebrows were peasant forces which rose during the reign of Wang Mang in the present central Hopeh and central Shantung respectively. The Red Eyebrows, so named because all the soldiers painted their eyebrows red, were led by Fan Ch'ung, and formed the largest peasant uprising force at that time.
 8. A peasant force which rose under the leadership of Chang Chueh in the Eastern Han dynasty (in A.D. 184). So named because the soldiers wore yellow turbans.
 9. Leaders of the peasant uprisings at the opening of the seventh century, i.e. in the last years of the Sui dynasty. Li's army in Honan and Tou's in Hopeh were both very big forces.
 10. Wang Hsien-chih staged an uprising in Shantung in A.D. 874. In the following year Huang Ch'ao gathered a large number of men to support him. See Note 4 to *On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
 11. Well-known leaders of the peasant uprisings in the Sung dynasty during the years A.D. 1119-25. Sung Chiang was active along the borders between Shantung, Hopeh, Honan and Kiangsu, and Fang La was active in Chekiang and Anhwei.

12. In A.D. 1351 the people in many parts of the country revolted against the rule of the Mongols. A native of Fengyang, Anhwei, Chu Yuan-chang joined the force led by Kuo Tzu-hsing and became its commander upon Kuo's death. He finally overthrew the Mongol dynasty and founded the Ming dynasty.
13. See Note 5 to *On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
14. See Note 35 to *On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
15. For decades since the end of the eighteenth century, Britain exported to China an ever-increasing quantity of opium. This traffic not only subjected the Chinese people to drugging but also plundered China of her silver. It aroused China's opposition. In 1840, under the pretext of safeguarding its trade with China, Britain launched armed aggression against China. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu put up resistance, and the people in Canton spontaneously organised the "Quell-the-British Corps", which dealt serious blows to the British forces of aggression. In 1842, however, the corrupt Manchu régime signed the Treaty of Nanking with the British. This treaty provided for the payment of indemnities and the cession of Hongkong to Britain, and stipulated that Shanghai, Fuchow, Amoy, Ningpo and Canton be opened to British trade and that tariff rates for British goods imported into China be jointly fixed by China and Britain.
16. During 1856-60, Britain and France, with the support of the United States and tsarist Russia, jointly waged a war of aggression on China. Devoting all its efforts to suppress the peasant revolution of the T'ai'ping Heavenly Kingdom, the Manchu régime put up only a half-hearted resistance to the foreign aggressors. The Allied Army of Britain and France successively captured key cities like Canton, Tientsin and Peking, raided and burnt down Yuan Ming Yuan (the Manchu emperor's summer palace previous to Yi Ho Yuan) and finally forced the Treaty of Tientsin and Convention of Peking on the Manchu régime. The treaties chiefly provided that Tientsin, Newchwang, Tengchow, Taiwan, Tanshui, Chaochow, Kiungchow, Nanking, Chenkiang, Kiukiang and Hankow, be opened as trading ports and that foreigners be granted the special privilege to travel and to engage in missionary activities in China's interior as well as the special privilege of inland navigation. Thus foreign forces of aggression succeeded in penetrating deep into China.
17. In 1884 the French invaded Indo-China, Kwangsi, Fukien, Taiwan and Chekiang. The Chinese troops, led by Feng Tzu-ts'ai, Liu Yung-fu and others, put up resistance and won a number of battles. In spite of this, the corrupt Manchu régime signed the humiliating Tientsin Treaty with the French government, recognising its occupation of Viet-Nam and placing South China under its thumb.
18. In 1900 eight imperialist powers, Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Italy and Austria, sent their armed forces to China to suppress the Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Movement, a movement of the Chinese people against aggression. The Chinese people carried out a heroic resistance. But after the combined forces of the eight powers captured the Taku forts and further occupied Tientsin and Peking, the Manchu régime signed in 1901 a protocol with the eight imperialist countries. The treaty provided that China was to pay those countries 450 million taels (a tael being about 1.33 ounces) of silver as indemnities. It also granted the imperialist powers the privilege to station troops at Peking, Tientsin, the Shanhai pass and thereabouts.

19. Consular jurisdiction was one of the special rights which the imperialist powers wrung from China through the unequal treaties—first in the supplementary treaty to the Sino-British Treaty of Nanking, signed at the Bogue, 1843, and in the Sino-American Treaty of Wanghia of 1844 (the Cushing Treaty). It meant that if a foreign national in China (who is a citizen of a country granted this right) was a defendant in a law suit, civil or criminal, he was not to be tried by the Chinese courts but by the consul of his own country.
20. At the end of the nineteenth century the imperialist countries making aggression on China marked off different areas, economically and militarily within their reach, as their respective spheres of influence. For example, the provinces in the lower and middle Yangtze valley were specified as the sphere of influence for Britain; Yunnan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi for France; Shantung for Germany; Fukien for Japan; and the three north-eastern provinces, *i.e.* the present provinces of Liaotung, Liaosi, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Sungkiang, for tsarist Russia; and, after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the southern part of the three north-eastern provinces came under Japanese influence.
21. Having compelled the Manchu régime to open treaty ports along the coast and the Yangtze river, the imperialist powers seized “concessions” at will. In the “concessions” an imperialist system of colonial rule, entirely independent of Chinese law and administration, was established. Ensconcing themselves firmly in the “concessions”, the imperialists exercised, directly or indirectly, a political and economic control over the Chinese régime of the feudal comprador class. During the revolution of 1924–7 the Chinese revolutionary masses led by the Chinese Communist Party started a movement to abolish the “concessions” and took over the British “concessions” in Hankow and Kiukiang in January 1927. But the imperialists regained their concessions in various places after Chiang Kai-shek’s betrayal of the revolution.
22. Quoted from *Outline of the Revolutionary Movement in Colonies and Semi-Colonies*, Sixth Congress of the Communist International. (Translated from the Chinese.)
23. Quoted from Stalin’s speech at the Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. *The Chinese Revolution and the Tasks of the Communist International*, May 24, 1927. (Joseph Stalin, *Works*, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1953.)
24. J. V. Stalin, *On the Perspective of the Revolution in China*, as translated in *Political Affairs*, New York, December 1950, p. 29.

STALIN IS THE FRIEND OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

1. Li Lin-fu (eighth century A.D.) was prime minister under the Emperor Hsuantsung of the T’ang dynasty. The *Mirror of History for Wise Rulers* says: “When he was prime minister Li Lin-fu tried with all his might to get rid of those whose talent and fame or exploit and achievement were greater than his own, and those who were appreciated by the emperor and tended to become his rivals in position and power. He was especially jealous of scholars and would make friends with them, flatter them, yet secretly plot their ruin. Thus the saying went that Li Lin-fu had honey dripping from his tongue and daggers concealed in his heart.”

IN MEMORY OF NORMAN BETHUNE

1. Member of the Canadian Communist Party (renamed the Canadian Labour Progressive Party in August 1943) and a distinguished doctor. In 1936 when the German and Italian fascists invaded Spain, he went to the front to work for the anti-fascist Spanish people. At the outbreak of China’s Anti-Japanese War in 1937, he arrived in the Chinese liberated areas at the head of a medical corps of Canadian and American doctors. In April 1938 he went to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh border area by way of Yen-an, where he worked for two years and set a good example in self-sacrifice, enthusiasm for work and sense of responsibility. On November 12, 1939, he died in Wan county, Hopeh, of a fatal disease contracted when treating the wounded soldiers.
2. Cf. J. V. Stalin, *The Foundation of Leninism*, Part VI, “The National Problem”.

ON NEW DEMOCRACY

1. A magazine founded in January 1940 in Yen-an. This article originally appeared in its first number.
2. See V. I. Lenin, “The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and the Mistakes of Comrade Trotsky”, *Selected Works*, in 12 volumes, Eng. ed., Vol. IX.
3. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Author’s Preface.
4. Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach”, published as the Appendix to F. Engels’ *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*.
5. J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Eng. ed., Vol. IV, pp. 169–70, Moscow, 1953.
6. Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, London, 1947.
7. V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.
8. Referring to a series of anti-Soviet movements launched by the Kuomintang government after Chiang Kai-shek’s betrayal of the revolution. On December 13, 1927, it had the Soviet vice-consul in Canton murdered and on the next day it issued in Nanking the “order to break off relations with Russia”, withdrawing official recognition of Soviet consuls in the provinces and forcing all Soviet commercial establishments to close down. In August 1929 Chiang Kai-shek, under the instigation of the imperialists, committed in the North-east acts of provocation against the Soviet Union, which resulted in armed clashes.
9. Kemal (1881–1938) represented the mercantile bourgeoisie of Turkey. In 1922 the Turkish people, aided by the Soviet Union, defeated the Greek aggressors instigated by British imperialism and in 1923 Kemal was elected President of Turkey. Stalin remarked in his *Talk with Students of the Sun Yat-sen University*, “A Kemal revolution is a revolution from the top, of the national mercantile bourgeoisie, a revolution which arises in the struggle against foreign imperialists and which is directed in its further development essentially against the peasant and workers, and against the very possibilities of an agrarian revolution”. (*Stalin on China*, p. 41, Bombay, 1951.)
10. Referring to Carson Chang and his group. After the May 4 Movement, Chang openly opposed science in the name of “metaphysics” and so-called

- “spiritual culture”, and thus came to be known as a “metaphysics-monger”. In December 1938, on the order of Chiang Kai-shek, he published an “Open Letter to Mr. Mao Tse-tung”, in which he frantically conducted propaganda along the lines laid down by the Japanese invaders and Chiang Kai-shek for the abolition of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region.
11. Quoted from the declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the establishment of its co-operation with the Kuomintang, issued in September 1937.
 12. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, *Lectures on the Principle of People's Welfare*, 1924, Lecture II.
 13. Referring to the book *Vitalism*, an exposition of Kuomintang fascism, a hotch-potch written by a number of reactionary hacks hired by the notorious Ch'en Li-fu and published under his name. Ch'en Li-fu is one of the chiefs of Chiang Kai-shek's secret service.
 14. A high-sounding slogan once put forward hypocritically by Yen Hsi-shan, warlord and representative of the big landlords and big compradors in Shansi province.
 15. Originally the title of an article written by Wang Ching-wei after his betrayal of the revolution in 1927.
 16. Stalin said in his speech, “The National Question in Yugoslavia”, delivered in the Yugoslav Commission of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on March 30, 1925:

“... the peasantry represents the main army of the national movement; ... without the peasant army, there is not nor can there be a powerful national movement. This is what is meant by saying that the national question is *virtually* a peasant question.”

 (Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, London, 1947.)
 17. Originally a jibe by some dogmatists in the Party at Comrade Mao Tse-tung's emphasis on rural revolutionary bases. Here Comrade Mao makes use of the expression to explain the importance of such revolutionary bases.
 18. “The modern school system” refers to the educational system modelled on that of capitalist countries in Europe and America. “The imperial competitive examination system” refers to the old examination system in feudal China. Late in the nineteenth century, *i.e.* towards the end of the Manchu dynasty, enlightened Chinese intellectuals urged the abolition of the old system and the establishment of modern schools.
 19. This marked a new stage in the patriotic movement launched on May 4, 1919. On June 3 students in Peking held public meetings and made speeches in defiance of persecution and repression by the army and police. Then, following the lead of the students, the workers and businessmen in Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, Hangchow, Wuhan, Kiuikiang and in the provinces of Shantung and Anhwei went on strike. In this manner the May 4 Movement developed into a broad mass movement with the participation of the proletariat, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie.
 20. A renegade Communist who became a hack writer for Chiang Kai-shek and joined the Kuomintang secret service.
 21. Referring to those represented by Hu Shih.
 22. A view advanced by a number of the Chinese bourgeois scholars completely enslaved by antiquated individualist bourgeois Western culture. They recommended so-called “wholesale Westernisation”, which means imitating the capitalist countries of Europe and America in everything.
 23. V. I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*

OVERCOME THE DANGER OF CAPITULATION —STRIVE TO MEND THE SITUATION

1. Referring to the “Programme for Adjusting the New Relations Between China and Japan”, a treasonable secret agreement signed between Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese invaders at the end of 1939. Its main provisions were:
 - (1) The cession of North-east China to Japan and the designation of the “Mongolian Territory” (referring to what was at that time Suiyuan, Chahar and northern Shansi), North China, the lower valley of the Yangtze river and the islands in South China as “zones for close Sino-Japanese collaboration”, with their permanent occupation by Japanese troops.
 - (2) The supervision of the puppet régime, from its central government to the local governments, by Japanese advisers and officials.
 - (3) The training of puppet troops and police by Japanese military instructors as well as the supply of their armaments by Japan.
 - (4) Control by the Japanese of the puppet government's fiscal and economic policies, its industrial and agricultural undertakings and its means of communication; and Japan's free exploitation of all of China's natural resources.
 - (5) The prohibition of all anti-Japanese activities.

UNITE ALL THE ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND COMBAT THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS

1. See Note 1 to *The Reactionaries Must Be Punished*.
2. On November 11, 1939, more than 1,800 Kuomintang secret agents and soldiers made an assault on the rear office of the New Fourth Army in the town of Chukow, Chuehshan county, Honan. Over two hundred people were murdered in cold blood, including the New Fourth Army's cadres and soldiers wounded in the Anti-Japanese War and members of their families.
3. The old army refers to the troops under Yen Hsi-shan, the Kuomintang warlord in Shansi. The new army, known as the Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps, was the people's anti-Japanese armed forces of Shansi which grew up under the influence and leadership of the Communist Party early in the Anti-Japanese War. In December 1939 Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan, in an attempt to annihilate the new army, amassed six armies in western Shansi to attack it, but met with a smashing defeat. Meanwhile Yen's troops in south-eastern Shansi wrecked the anti-Japanese democratic county governments and mass organisations in the Yangcheng-Chincheng area and murdered a great number of Communists and progressives.
4. Chang Yin-wu, commander of the Kuomintang “Peace Preservation Corps” in Hopeh, began in 1939 his ceaseless attacks on the Eighth Route Army on Chiang Kai-shek's orders. In June of that year he sprang a sudden attack on the rear office of the Eighth Route Army in Shen county, Hopeh, and killed in cold blood more than four hundred of its cadres and soldiers.
5. In April 1939 Shen Hung-lieh, the Kuomintang governor of Shantung, directed the Kuomintang troops under Ch'in Ch'i-yung to attack at Poshan the Third Guerrilla Detachment of the Shantung Column of the Eighth Route

- Army, killing in cold blood four hundred of the detachment's cadres of regimental and lower ranks.
6. In September 1939 Ch'eng Ju-huai, a Kuomintang reactionary in eastern Hupeh, concentrated his bandit troops to attack the rear office of the New Fourth Army, killing in cold blood between five and six hundred Communists.
 7. The Kuomintang secret agents thus described their work in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region, because they tried to form a network there by using the cities and towns in the region as their bases and establishing connections between them.
 8. From the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940, the Kuomintang troops seized the county towns of Chunhwa, Sunyi, Chengning, Ning and Chenyuan in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region.
 9. Imitating the German and Italian fascists, the Kuomintang reactionaries established during the Anti-Japanese War many concentration camps which extended from Lanchow and Sian in the North-west to Kanchow and Shangjao in the South-east. Large numbers of Communists, patriots and progressive youth were interned in them.
 10. After the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, the Kuomintang stepped up its anti-Communist activities. After Chiang Kai-shek secretly distributed in February 1939 reactionary documents like the "Measures to Deal with the Communist Problem" and the "Measures for Guarding Against Communist Activities in the Japanese-Occupied Areas", he steadily intensified political repression of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang-controlled areas and military attacks on it in Central and North China. Such repression and attacks culminated in the first anti-Communist upsurge of December 1939-March 1940. The attacks made by the reactionary Kuomintang troops on the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and on the Communist-led anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps in western Shansi mentioned in the text were the two major military attacks during that anti-Communist upsurge. In February and March 1940, Chiang Kai-shek further directed the reactionary Chu Huai-ping to rally the bandit troops under P'ang Ping-hsun, Chang Yin-wu and Hou Ju-yung and attack in three columns the Eighth Route Army in the Taihang mountain region. The Eighth Route Army completely smashed the attack and wiped out three Kuomintang divisions. Thus ended the first anti-Communist upsurge.
 11. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army engaged even more Japanese troops later on. By 1943 they were fighting 64 per cent of Japan's invading troops and 95 per cent of the puppet troops. Cf. the section "Two Battle Fronts" in *On Coalition Government*, Vol IV of the *Selected Works*.
 12. Referring to those in the Kuomintang who made anti-communism their full-time job. See also Note 7 to *Oppose Capitulationist Activities*.
 13. The average allowance for the personnel in the anti-Japanese army and anti-Japanese organs of government under Communist leadership.

TEN DEMANDS TO THE KUOMINTANG

1. See Note 20 to *On New Democracy*.
2. Szuma Chao was a prime minister of the Wei dynasty (220-64) who was preparing the way for his son's usurpation of the throne. When the emperor offered to make him a Duke, he declined the honour in order to conceal his

- far greater ambitions. Thereupon the emperor remarked, "Szuma Chao's intention is obvious to every man in the street."
3. Officials notorious for their cruelty who served the Empress Wu Tse-t'ien (towards the end of the seventh century A.D.) of the T'ang dynasty. Employing numerous spies, they arrested at will the people they disliked on false charges and put them to death by all sorts of torture.
 4. Eunuchs under the Emperors Wutsung (sixteenth century) and Hsit-sung (seventeenth century) of the Ming dynasty respectively. At the head of large secret services, called the East Hall, the West Hall and the Imperial Guards, they exercised great power and kept close watch on the people. All those who dared to oppose them were persecuted and murdered.
 5. Referring specifically to the case of Chiang Ting-wen, the reactionary Kuomintang army commander in Sian.

AN INTRODUCTORY REMARK TO THE CHINESE WORKER

1. A monthly publication founded in February 1940 in Yen-an. It was published under the auspices of the Trade Union Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

WE MUST EMPHASISE SOLIDARITY AND PROGRESS

1. See Note 3 to *Unite All the Anti-Japanese Forces and Combat the Anti-Communist Die-Hards*.
2. The full name of the "League of Self-Sacrifice" was the "League of Self-Sacrifice in Shansi Province for National Salvation", a local anti-Japanese organisation of the masses. In close co-operation with the Communist Party, it played a significant role in the Anti-Japanese War in Shansi. In December 1939 Yen Hsi-shan, the Kuomintang warlord-governor of Shansi, began openly to persecute the League in the western part of the province, and many Communists, cadres of the league and progressives among the masses were ruthlessly murdered.
3. In 1939 the Kuomintang drew a cordon along the Sienyang-Yulin highway and the Kansu-Haichow railway by setting up a number of "hostels" of its Youth Corps of the Three People's Principles. Secret agents posted at these "hostels" or stations, with the co-operation of the Kuomintang troops, arrested the progressive youth and intellectuals entering or leaving the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and sent them to concentration camps, where they were cruelly murdered or forced to become Kuomintang spies.

NEW-DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM

1. Wu Yu-chang, then chairman of the Association of All Sections of People in Yen-an for Urging the Advancement of Constitutionalism.
2. Referring to the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

3. In 1923 Ts'ao K'un, warlord of the Northern clique, bribed 590 members of parliament with five thousand silver dollars each and got himself elected President. Then he promulgated a constitution drafted by these members, which came to be known as the "Ts'ao K'un's constitution" or "the constitution of bribed electors".
4. Originally commander of the Twenty-first Mixed Brigade of the Manchu army, he was compelled to side with the revolution during the Wuchang uprising in 1911 and became the revolutionary army's military governor for Hupeh province. Subsequently he served as Vice-President and then President in the régime of the warlords of the Northern clique.
5. A subordinate of Yuan Shih-k'ai, he became the leader of the Chihli group (the Hopeh group) among the warlords of the Northern clique upon Yuan's death. In 1917 he ousted Li Yuan-hung and took over the Presidency of the Peking régime.
6. A politician affiliated with the warlords of the Northern clique. He was elected President in 1918 by the parliament controlled by Tuan Ch'i-jui, leader of the Anhwei group of warlords of the Northern clique.
7. A merely consultative body which the Kuomintang government was compelled to set up after the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War. Its members were all "invited" by the Kuomintang government. Nominally including the representatives of all anti-Japanese parties and groups, it was actually dominated by the Kuomintang majority. It had no power to control the policies or activities of the Kuomintang government. As Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang became more and more reactionary, the number of the Kuomintang and other reactionaries in the Council increased while the number of the democrats decreased and their freedom of speech was severely curtailed, and the Council became more and more clearly a tool of the Kuomintang reactionaries. After the Southern Anhwei Incident of 1941, Communist members of the Council boycotted its meetings several times to protest against the reactionary policies of the Kuomintang.
8. In September 1939, on the proposal of the Communist Party and the democrats of other parties and groups, the Fourth Session of the People's Political Council passed a resolution demanding that the Kuomintang régime convoke the National Assembly and bring about a constitutional government. In November 1939 the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang announced that the National Assembly would be convoked on November 12, 1940. Though the Kuomintang gave this much publicity, the Council's resolution was never implemented.
9. Yuan Shih-k'ai proclaimed himself Emperor on December 12, 1915, but was forced to give up the title on March 22, 1916.

FREELY EXPAND THE ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES; RESIST THE ATTACKS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS

1. A general appellation for the several anti-Japanese guerrilla units in South China led by the Chinese Communist Party.
2. Reactionary Kuomintang generals stationed respectively in Kiangsu, Chekiang, southern Anhwei and Kiangsi.

3. Detachments of the New Fourth Army. They were then engaged in building up an anti-Japanese area in the Hwai river valley on the Kiangsu-Anhwei border.
4. Sections of the New Fourth Army led by Comrades Yeh Fei and Chang Yun-yi. They were then carrying on the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and building up an anti-Japanese base area north of the Yangtze river in central Kiangsu and eastern Anhwei.
5. During March and April 1940, Li P'in-hsien, the Kuomintang provincial governor of Anhwei, and Li Tsung-jen, the Kuomintang commander-in-chief of the Fifth War Zone (both warlords of the Kwangsi clique), launched a large-scale offensive on the New Fourth Army in the Anhwei-Hupeh border area. Strong protests against their criminal acts of undermining the Anti-Japanese War were lodged by Comrade Chang Yun-yi, commander of New Fourth Army units north of the Yangtze river, and Comrade Li Hsien-nien, commander of the Army's Hupeh-Honan Storming Troops. Comrades Chang and Li also resisted the offensive.
6. Referring to Ch'en Tu-hsiu's mistakes of Right opportunism.
7. Referring to the Kuomintang's die-hard clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek.
8. In January 1940 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party dispatched these forces from North China to reinforce the New Fourth Army in its anti-Japanese struggle north of the Hwai river in eastern Anhwei and northern Kiangsu.
9. See Note 4 to *Interview with Three Correspondents, etc.*, this volume.
10. Chiang Kai-shek's clique called its own armed forces the "Central army" and those belonging to other cliques "troops of miscellaneous brands". Chiang's clique discriminated against the latter and did not treat them on an equal footing with the "Central army".
11. Referring to the cliques and individuals within the Kuomintang who were in certain periods only mildly anti-Communist or remained neutral in Chiang's anti-Communist campaign.
12. Though the Kuomintang's "Central army" consisted of Chiang's personal troops, some of its officers and units were only mildly anti-Communist or remained neutral in the anti-Communist campaigns during the Anti-Japanese War.
13. The organ which, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, directed the work in South-east China (including the provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh and Hunan) in the period 1938-41.

ON POLICY

1. See Section IV of the appendix, *Resolution on Some Historical Problems*, Vol. V of the *Selected Works*.
2. A big bureaucrat in the government of the warlords of the Northern clique and subsequently a collaborator with the Japanese. He was brought into the Kuomintang government by Chiang Kai-shek after the North China Incident of 1935. As a puppet of the Japanese invaders he was appointed chairman of the bogus Administrative Committee of North China in 1938.
3. One of the weathercocks among the Kuomintang warlords. He was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's Tenth Army Group after the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War. Allying himself with the Japanese army in

southern Hopeh, he did nothing but attack the Eighth Route Army, destroy the anti-Japanese democratic political power and massacre the Communists and progressives.

ORDER AND STATEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN ANHWEI INCIDENT

1. Concluded in Berlin on September 27, 1940.
2. These are the two widely condemned telegrams which, to start the second anti-Communist upsurge, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched in the winter of 1940 over the signatures of Ho Ying-ch'ing and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, Chief and Deputy-Chief of Staff of the Military Council of the Kuomintang government. The telegram of October 19 contained an outrageous calumny against the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army which were keeping up resistance in the enemy's rear and the categorical order that units of these anti-Japanese troops operating south of the Yellow river should be shifted to the north of the river within a time-limit. Taking into account the situation as a whole, Comrades Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai, Yeh T'ing and Hsiang Ying, in a telegraphic reply to Ho Ying-ch'ing and Pai Ch'ung-hsi on November 9, while exposing all the slanders, consented to shift northward the troops in southern Anhwei. Ho's and Pai's telegram of December 8, which was a reply to the telegram of November 9, represented a further attempt to mobilise "public opinion" against the Communists.
3. Referring to the cordon of blockade which the Kuomintang reactionaries drew round the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region after 1939. They pressed the local people into service and built five lines of blockade, each consisting of blockhouses, stone walls and trenches. The cordon started from Ningsia in the west, ran along the Ching river in the south and terminated at the Yellow river in the east. On the eve of the Southern Anhwei Incident the Kuomintang troops surrounding the border region were increased to more than 200,000.
4. From the *Analects* of Confucius. Chi Sun was a minister of the State of Lu. Chuanyu was a small state in the Era of Spring and Autumn (722-484 B.C.). When Chi Sun was about to attack Chuanyu, Confucius made this remark, meaning that not the enemy state, but internal dissension was Chi Sun's trouble.

THE SITUATION AFTER THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST UPSURGE

1. Cf. *A Comment on the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee and the Second Session of the Third People's Political Council*, Vol. IV of the *Selected Works*.
2. Referring to the counter-revolutionary order for the disbandment of the New Fourth Army, issued by Chiang Kai-shek in the name of the Military Council of the National Government on January 17, 1941. For details, see *Order and Statement on the Southern Anhwei Incident*, this volume.

3. On March 6, 1941, Chiang Kai-shek delivered an anti-Communist speech at a meeting of the People's Political Council. Harping upon his old theme that "the direction of all military and political affairs" must be "unified", he declared that the anti-Japanese democratic political power in the enemy's rear should be abolished and that the people's armed forces led by the Chinese Communist Party must be "concentrated in specified areas" according to his "orders and plans". On the same day, the People's Political Council dominated by the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang passed a resolution which defended Chiang Kai-shek's criminal acts against the Communists and the people and attacked violently the Communist members of the People's Political Council for their refusal to attend the Council's session in protest against the Southern Anhwei Incident.
4. See Note 2 to *Order and Statement on the Southern Anhwei Incident*, this volume.
5. The first "twelve demands", proposed by the Communist members of the People's Political Council at its session of February 15, 1941, were similar to those given in the *Order and Statement on the Southern Anhwei Incident*. The second "twelve demands" were proposed to Chiang Kai-shek as a series of emergency measures on March, 2, 1941, by the Communist members of the People's Political Council, who indicated that they would attend the Council's sessions only on the condition that these measures were carried out. The demands were:
 - (1) Immediately stop the nation-wide attacks on Communist armed forces.
 - (2) Immediately stop the nation-wide political persecution of the Chinese Communist Party and of all other democratic parties and groups, recognise their legal status, release all Communists arrested in Sian, Chungking, Kweiyang and other places.
 - (3) Lift the ban on the bookshops which were closed down in various places, and rescind the order for impounding anti-Japanese books and newspapers in post offices.
 - (4) Immediately desist from any repression of the *New China Daily*.
 - (5) Recognise the legal status of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region.
 - (6) Recognise the anti-Japanese democratic political power in the enemy's rear.
 - (7) Maintain the *status quo* of the garrison areas in Central China, North China and the North-west.
 - (8) The armed forces led by the Chinese Communist Party are to be increased to six armies; in other words, in addition to the Eighteenth Group Army, a new group army led by the Chinese Communist Party is to be formed.
 - (9) Release all the Communist cadres arrested during the Southern Anhwei Incident and allocate a fund to relieve the families of the victims.
 - (10) Release all officers and men taken prisoner during the Southern Anhwei Incident and return to them all their rifles.
 - (11) Form a joint committee of all the parties, with one delegate from each, and appoint the representatives of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communist Party as its chairman and vice-chairman respectively; and
 - (12) Include Communist representatives in the presidium of the People's Political Council.
6. Referring to the article *On Policy*, this volume.

A REVIEW OF THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST UPSURGE

1. Concluded on April 13, 1941, this treaty ensured peace on the eastern frontier of the Soviet Union, smashed the plot of Germany, Italy and Japan for a joint attack on the Soviet Union and thus marked a major victory of the Soviet Union's foreign policy for peace.
2. A counter-revolutionary *coup d'état* staged by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai on April 12, 1927, during which a large number of Communists and revolutionary workers, peasants and intellectuals were massacred. See Note 6 to *Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
3. See Note 17 to *The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
4. Referring to the first anti-Communist upsurge launched by Chiang Kai-shek during the winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940. See Note 10 to *Unite All the Anti-Japanese Forces and Combat the Anti-Communist Die-Hards*, this volume.
5. See Note 2 to *The Situation After the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Upsurge*, this volume.
6. A remark made by Chu Hsi, a Chinese philosopher of the Sung dynasty, in his notes to Chapter 13 of *The Doctrine of the Mean*.
7. See Introductory Note to *Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces; Resist the Attacks of the Anti-Communist Die-Hards*, this volume.
8. Referring to the telegram sent by Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai, Commander and Deputy-Commander of the Eighteenth Group Army (the Eighth Route Army), and Yeh T'ing and Hsiang Ying, Commander and Deputy-Commander of the New Fourth Army, in reply to the October 19 telegram of Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. Exposing the Kuomintang reactionaries' anti-Communist scheme and their plot for capitulation, the telegram refuted the absurd proposal of Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi that the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army should shift from the southern bank to the northern bank of the Yellow river. However, for the sake of maintaining unity against Japan, the telegram, in a spirit of conciliation and compromise, agreed to the shift, while demanding the solution of a number of important standing issues between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. It won the sympathy of the middle-of-the-roaders and landed Chiang Kai-shek in isolation.
9. This means that the Chinese industrial proletariat leading the revolution, like the reactionary big landlords and big bourgeoisie, forms only a minority of China's population. See *Speech Before the Assembly of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region*, Vol. IV of the *Selected Works*.