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# Chinese Law and Government

**WINTER 1968-69/VOL. I, NO. 4**

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IN CAMERA STATEMENTS OF MAO TSE-TUNG

Introduction

All of the selections in this issue of Chinese Law and Government are taken from a Chinese pamphlet entitled Mao chushih P'eng, Huang, Chang, Chou fan-tang chi-t'uan ti p'i-pan [Chairman Mao's Criticism of the P'eng-Huang-Chang-Chou (1) Antiparty Clique], an unauthorized publication containing statements of Mao· Tse-tung which he had never intended for public consumption. (2)

Official publications of Mao's writings consist essentially of only three collections: the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, four volumes), Quotations from Chairman Mao (Peking: FLP, 1966; revised editions, 1967 and 1968), (3) and Selected Readings from the Works of Chairman Mao (Peking: FLP, 1968). (4) In addition, the official media (e.g., People's Daily, Red Flag, and the releases of the New China News Agency) have contained statements by Mao which have not been published collectively.

Prior to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it was known that many of Mao's important statements were going unpublished. The information explosion which accompanied the Cultural Revolution has resulted in the revelation of a number of these statements. The reason for this is that the careful controls which had governed the circulation of such "internal documents" have been disregarded in the interest of mass political involvement. Various Red Guard publications carried previously unknown quotations of Mao, sometimes ranged in columns beside comparable quotations from the writings of
Liu Shao-ch'i in order to point up alleged divergences. Several pamphlets containing previously secret statements by Mao have appeared, and some of the material has already been published in English. (5)

But Chairman Mao's Criticism..., which we publish here virtually in its entirety, (6) is the most important collection of previously unknown essays by Mao which has yet come to light. Unfortunately, no date or place of publication is indicated, nor is there any indication of who edited and published it. None of the essays has ever been officially published in full or otherwise authenticated. Indeed, the title page bears the legend "INTERNAL DOCUMENT: TAKE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS." Furthermore, we have not seen any reference to this collection in other available "internal documents," although this is not unusual.

Thus, there naturally arises the question of the authenticity of the pamphlet. For a number of reasons, however, we believe that it is what it purports to be. In the first place, other materials (7) which have come to us through the same channels have been of such volume and diversity as to destroy most of the doubt as to their general authenticity. Furthermore, some of the texts herein have recently appeared in part or in whole in other Red Guard publications, often with somewhat clearer identification. (We have noted instances of such concordances in our annotations to some of the documents.) In one case, we have found a quotation from one of the statements in an official NCNA release. (See p. 85.) Such corroboration supports the authenticity of the documents.

We have deleted nothing from the original Chinese texts, although the editors of the Chinese pamphlet themselves made a number of deletions. These are indicated by dots or X's. X's are a device used to avoid mentioning statistics, an individual's name, etc. Parenthetical insertions are those of the editors of the Chinese pamphlet. Our insertions appear in square brackets, and are for the purpose of clarifying the text. In addition, we have supplied introductory comments for some of the articles, as well as a glossary at the end of the issue.
Special thanks are due to Mr. Richard Sorich, of Columbia University's East Asian Institute, without whose tireless help this issue would not have been possible.

J. D. S.

Footnotes

1) P'eng Te-huai, Huang K'o-ch'eng, Chang Wen-t'ien, and Chou Hsiao-chou. See Glossary.


3) The revised editions eliminated certain references to Liu Shao-ch'i and his works.

4) All of these English-language publications were antecedent to their Chinese-language counterparts.

5) E.g., Jerome Ch'en, ed., Mao (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), which drew upon Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan sui [Long Live the Thought of Mao Tse-tung] (April 1967); and The Case of P'eng Te-huai, 1959-1968 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), hereafter cited as The Case of P'eng..., which drew upon Ta tao ta yin-mo-chia, ta yeh-hsin-chia, ta chün-fa P'eng Te-huai [Down with the Big Conspirator, Big Ambitionist, Big Warlord P'eng Te-huai] ([Peking:] Chingkang Shan Corps at Tsinghua University, 1967), hereafter cited as Down with...P'eng....

6) We omit only the text of a "Letter of Opinion" which P'eng Te-huai wrote to Mao Tse-tung on July 14, 1959. A translation of the same letter appeared in CB No. 851, pp. 19-23. In it, P'eng criticized various aspects of the Great Leap Forward. After writing it, he was dismissed as Defense Minister.

7) Te-kong Tong has written an excellent survey of these materials and their history. See "Red Guard Newspapers," Columbia Forum (New York), Spring 1969, pp. 38-41.
Editors' Note*

In conjunction with the revolutionary great criticizing movement against the bourgeois headquarters headed by Liu Shao-ch'i and the antiparty clique of his faithful vanguard P'eng Te-huai, we have selected some of Chairman Mao's speeches and articles criticizing the P'eng [Te-huai], Huang [K'o-ch'eng], Chang, and Chou [Hsiao-chou] antiparty clique for study by our comrades. Because [errors may have been made in] the copying of the materials, corrections by our comrades are requested.

*This note appeared at the end of the Chinese pamphlet — Editor, Chinese Law and Government.
LETTER CRITICIZING P'ENG TE-HUAI'S "TALK ON DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION" (June 6, 1943)

According to a Red Guard attack on P'eng Te-huai, in April 1943 he released the text of a talk (possibly given earlier) entitled "Kuan-yü min-chu chiao-yü ti t'an-hua" ("Talk on Democratic Education"). The essay which appears below is Mao's critique of P'eng's talk. We are told that P'eng subsequently "rejected the criticism and used the Hsin-hua jih-pao [New China Daily, published in North China]...to delete and tamper with the section of editorials in the Chieh-fang jih-pao, organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which criticized his views and were not in accord with his way of thinking." (1) The text of Mao's criticism has never before been available.

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1) Down with the Big Conspirator..., op. cit., revision of translation in CB No. 851, p. 7, or in The Case of P'eng..., p. 193 (English) and p. 472 (Chinese). This Red Guard source quotes one sentence from Mao's criticism, and a comparison of this sentence with the text from the pamphlet we have used serves to support the authenticity of the latter.
We feel that the "Talk on Democratic Education," which you released about two months ago, is misleading. I wish to state my views as follows:

For example, the talk proceeds from the definitions of democracy, liberty, equality, and fraternity, rather than from the political needs of the current anti-Japanese struggle. Also, instead of stressing that democracy is for the purpose of resistance against Japan, it is stressed as antifeudal. Further, instead of saying that freedom of speech and publication is aimed at mobilizing the anti-Japanese enthusiasm of the people and at striving for, as well as safeguarding, their political and economic rights, it is interpreted as proceeding from the principle of ideological freedom. Also, instead of stating that the purpose of the freedom of assembly and association is to secure victory against Japan and to strive for people's political and economic rights, it is said that the aim is to augment mutual solidarity among mankind and to benefit cultural and scientific development. Also, instead of saying that the traitors and those who sabotage anti-Japanese solidarity should be deprived of freedom of residence, movement, correspondence, and all other political freedoms, you say generally that people should not be subjected to any kind of interference. In point of fact, at various bastions, there are too much, too many, and too unlimited democratic freedoms in regard to certain people, not too little, too few, or too limited. Consequently, the Central Committee, in November of last year [1942?], promulgated certain interpretations of a lenient policy, stressing the necessity for suppressing reactionary elements. You have failed to adopt this policy in your talk. Also, to advocate implementation of the right of referendum at the various bastions now is not only detrimental, but impracticable as well. Also, for example, you say that there should be no unequal provisions in law, thus making no distinction between revolution and counterrevolution. Moreover, it is now politically unsound to use the slogan of "do not do to others that which you do not wish done to yourself." The current task is to use war and other political means to defeat the enemy. The present social foundation is commodity econ-
Both of these call for doing to others what you do not wish done to yourself. Only after classes have been eliminated will it be possible to realize the principle of "do not do to others that which you do not wish done to yourself," as well as to eliminate war, political oppression, and economic exploitation. At present, among the various classes in China there prevails a kind of mutual help for the purpose of defeating the common enemy. Nevertheless, not only has exploitation not been abolished economically, but oppression has not been abolished politically (anticommunism, etc.). We must present demands for the restriction of exploitation and oppression, as well as emphasize solidarity against Japan. However, we should not raise such general and absolute slogans of mutual class aid (as: "Do not do to others that which you do not wish done to yourself"). Also, you say that the democratic movement in West Europe began from the time when workers reduced their working hours. This is not in keeping with fact.

The "Tang-nei sheng-huo" [Life Within the Party] mentioned by you before has already been received. I will let you know if I have any opinion after studying it.
SPEECH AT SUPREME STATE CONFERENCE
(January 28, 1958)

This meeting of the Supreme State Conference has never before been mentioned, nor have we ever heard of this talk by Mao. The speech is particularly interesting because it reveals the thinking which later produced the Great Leap Forward of 1958–1959. From published information on other Supreme State Conferences, we can determine that the January 1958 Conference was either the 13th or the 14th Supreme State Conference. See CB No. 458 for the 11th Conference of February–March 1957, SCMP No. 16332 (p. 1), for an unnumbered (12th or 13th?) Conference of October 1957, and SCMP No. 1852 (pp. 1–7) for the 15th Supreme State Conference of September 1958.

Today I may talk more generally.
I have observed this nation of ours for seven or eight years. I see great hope in our nation. Especially during the past year, it can be seen that the national spirit of our 600 million people has been more buoyant as compared to the past eight years. Through the great debate of extensive contending and extensive blooming, we have clarified our problems and understood our tasks. We will catch up with Britain in about fifteen years.
Promulgation of the forty articles of the [12-year] Agricultural Development Program has greatly encouraged the masses. We can now do and have confidence in many things that were impossible before. For example, the masses are very zealous in eliminating the four pests. Personally, I may not be able to catch any rats, but catch flies and mosquitoes I can.

Ordinarily it is flies and mosquitoes which assail us!...

There was someone in ancient times who wrote an essay advocating the elimination of rats. Now we want to get rid of the four pests, though in the past few millennia nobody, including Confucius, had the ambition to eliminate the four pests. Now the Hangchow municipal government has made plans to eliminate the four pests within a period of four years; some people suggested two years, three years, or five years. Thus, there is great hope for the development of our nation. There is no basis for pessimism. No, in criticizing pessimists, we should, of course, not fight, but must talk reason. There is truly hope — not a little hope, but great hope, with the accent on "great," as the Japanese would say: "great great have." (Laughter.)

Our nation has awakened, like we wake up in the morning; awakened, after having overthrown the feudal system of past millennia; awakened, after having changed the system of ownership. We are now engaged in rectification and have achieved victory in the antirightist campaign.

Our country is both poor and blank: the poor own nothing, and the blank is like a sheet of white paper. It is good to be poor, good for making revolution; when it is blank, one can do anything with it, such as writing compositions or drawing designs; a sheet of white paper is good to write compositions on.

We must have zeal so that the Western world will lag behind us. Aren't we prepared to rectify bourgeois ideology? No one knows how long it will take for the West to discard its bourgeois ideology. If [John Foster] Dulles should want to rectify his bourgeois style, he would have to ask us to be his teacher. (Laughter.)

Talking about it now, our country is so populous; it has such
vast territory and abundant resources, a history of more than 4,000 years, and culture...what a boast, though it is not even as good as Belgium. In short, we are a fine nation with a long history. Yet our steel production is so low; in the north, the [per mou?] output of grain is about 100 or more chin, and in the south — some 300 chin; so few people are literate. We are inferior when these things are compared, but we have zeal and must catch up with Britain within fifteen years.

In these fifteen years, we must emphasize the first five years; in these five years, we must emphasize the first three years; in these three years, we must emphasize the first year; in the first year, we must emphasize the first month.

Now the zeal has been bolstered. Our nation is one with ardor, and there is a fervent tide now. Our nation is like an atom...and after the fission of the atomic nucleus of our nation, thermal energy will be released which becomes so formidable that we will be able to do what was beyond our ability before. Thus, our nation has this zeal for endeavor. To catch up with Britain, we will have to produce 40 million tons of steel, our present output being some 5 million tons; 500 million tons of coal, our present output being some 100 million tons; we will have to develop 450 billion kwh of electric power generating capacity, our present capacity being 40 billion kwh, and therefore it must be increased tenfold. Hence it is necessary to develop hydroelectric power, not only thermoelectric power. It will take a decade to carry out the forty articles of the Agricultural Development Program. It may not take ten years; some say five years, others say three years, and it would seem that it may take eight years to complete the program.

In order to achieve this goal under these circumstances, there must be a zest for endeavor. In Shanghai I met a professor who discussed with me the People's Daily editorial entitled "Riding on the Wind to Break Through the Waves." He said: "To bolster the zeal for endeavor and strive energetically to reach the upper stream" means to proceed from Shanghai to Szechwan. It is more strenuous to go upstream than downstream. He spoke very aptly. I admired this person, who is a good person and has a sense of righteousness. Someone crit-
icized [the tendency] of "preferring what is big and meritorious, being impatient for merit and seeking immediate benefit, disdaining the past, and holding a blind faith in the future." What is preference for what is big and meritorious? Is this preference for what is big and meritorious on the part of revolutionists, or on the part of reactionaries? Is it based on subjectivism and formalism, or is it pragmatic? The ancients said: "Happiness like the East Sea and longevity like the South Mountain," and this would be preference for what is big and meritorious. What is bad about it? Nor are impatience for merit and pursuit for immediate benefit undesirable!

As for disdaining the past, it does not mean that there was nothing good in the past. There were good things in the past. Nevertheless, must we place so much emphasis on the past by devoting one's thought every day to [the ancient Emperors] Yu, T'ang, Wen and Wu, and to the Duke of Chou and Confucius? I do not subscribe to such a historical approach.... My view is that human history is progressive. One generation is not as good as another generation, and the predecessors were not as good as their posterity....

Blind faith in the future, our purpose is for the future.... It is correct for us to place our hope on the future, but we must not be blind about it....

There are two methods of leadership; one is a little better than the other. I am not referring here to Dulles' kind of leadership versus ours, nor to the rightist kind versus ours. There are two kinds of leadership, or work style, involved in achieving socialism. For instance, on the question of cooperativization, some advocated quick action, others — slower action. I consider the former better. Strike the iron when it is hot; better to get it done in one stroke than drag on. Between rectification and no rectification, I choose rectification. And in order to carry out rectification, it is better to effect extensive contending and extensive blooming....

I advocate the theory of uninterrupted revolution. You must not think that this is Trotsky's theory of uninterrupted revolution. In making revolution, it should be like striking the iron
when it is hot, one revolution to be followed by another, and the revolution must advance without interruption. As the Hunanese would say: "Straw sandals have no shape, but they look more and more like sandals as one knits on." Trotsky advocated that socialist revolution be undertaken even before the democratic revolution was accomplished. We are not like that. For example, the 1949 Liberation was followed immediately by land reform. After the conclusion of land reform, mutual aid teams were launched, then were followed by primary cooperatives, and later by higher cooperatives. In seven years, cooperativization has been accomplished and productive relations have changed. This was followed by the launching of rectification, and after that, by technological revolution. Like Poland and Yugoslavia, where democratic order has been established, after seven or eight years, rich peasants emerged. It may be possible not to establish a new democratic regime, though it would still be necessary to rally all the forces that could be rallied....

It is possible to catch up with Britain in fifteen years; we must bolster the zeal for endeavor and strive to reach upstream.

Zeal should be bolstered, not dampened. Where there are deviations and mistakes, they should be rectified by the method of extensive contending and extensive blooming, not by pouring cold water on them. Someone criticized preference for what is big and meritorious, but how can we prefer what is small and faulty? Can we stress the past and denigrate the future? It is necessary to like what is big and meritorious, and the man who said it is a good person. We must bolster morale.

The revolution has not yet been fully consummated. Our comrades are obligated to endeavor further.

This conference has been convened very successfully, and the speeches of some comrades are very good. (XX asked the Chairman especially to read the speeches of nine comrades. The Chairman has read the speeches of Comrades Chang Tsung-hsun and Liu Ya-lou.) Comrade Chang Tsung-hsun's speech is very good. I endorse it. This is what he has written under pressure from the Grade Four cadres conference of the Military Training Headquarters; it will be seen that one could write good stuff when there was compulsion. There is one point with which I disagree — that is, Chang Tsung-hsun said that he has erred because he did not study Mao Tse-tung's works carefully. This is not right; what he should say is that primarily it is because his level of Marxism-Leninism is not high. Comrade [Liu] Ya-lou's speech is also
good, which shows that army comrades do have [a high] level and can write. It would be best to organize some of the comrades at the army and division level to speak and write. This is because they do practical work, have contacts with the lower echelons, and what they write can achieve coordination between theory and practice. While the contents of conferences should be rich and many-splendored, it is also necessary to introduce advanced experience in work. In articles and speeches, don't criticize the Soviet Union. Dogmatism is a problem of our study; it is not whether the Soviet Union is advanced or not.

From the very beginning, the struggle between two lines of military construction has existed. There was some struggle at the Ku-t'ien Conference, but it did not convince those comrades who held erroneous views, and some comrades, even today, still insist upon upholding the erroneous line. Comrade Hsiao K'o not only had dogmatism, but was a warlordist with bourgeois ideology, dogmatism, and feudal ideology.

It is not practicable to execute orders in accordance with the Soviet army ordinances in wartime. We should rather develop our own ordinances. I don't know how much Marxism-Leninism there is in the Military Affairs Academy and in the General Department of Military Training. Marxism-Leninism was originally the compass for action, but they have been reciting it as dogma. If Marx and Lenin were still alive today, they would be criticized as being dogmatic. Now that dogmatists advocate copying the Soviet Union, let us ask whom the Soviet Union copied from. There is a section in the resolutions of the "Eighth Congress" concerning the problem of technological reform. Judging from today's condition of development, this proposal is none too proper in that it overly emphasized Soviet help. It is necessary to strive for Soviet aid, but what is of primary importance is self-help. If we should unduly stress reliance upon Soviet aid, let us ask on whom the Soviet-Union depended for its help then?

The great leap forward in industry and agriculture has broken superstition. We can catch up with Britain in x years, and with the United States of America in from x to x years. By next
year, our steel production may reach xx to xx 10,000 tons*; it is reported that, by 1962, xx 10,000 tons could be produced in the Northeast. This is the result of rectification. The Nanning Conference and Chengtu Conference have been instrumental in breaking superstitions and in liberating ideology, thereby shaping a great industrial big leap. Army training has been going on for more than eight years, but a combat ordinance has not yet been compiled. This time we must canvass some of the comrades who have rich working and combat experiences to produce our own book of combat ordinances. Some people mentioned that when the Soviet advisers saw that we would not copy theirs, they would make suggestions or show dismay. In that case, we might just as well ask these comrades why did they not copy the Chinese? If they should say no, then we could also say that since you won't copy us, why should we copy you?

Why is it that X X has not performed well after the revolutionary victory? Apart from the fact that he has not reviewed his earlier experience thoroughly and has failed to sufficiently accept the historic lesson, first, he has been superstitious about old things and old dogmas; second, he has blind faith in foreign dogmas and in the Soviet Union; and third, he is superstitious about himself. This man has been very active in his work and has also been highly responsible. The only thing is that his direction was wrong, and he is not sufficiently strong in politics. The purpose of this conference is mainly to destroy slavish ideology, to bury dogmatism, to undertake extensive contending and extensive blooming through the method of rectification, breaking superstitions, enhancing ideology, and absorbing experiences and lessons. The primary purpose is also to educate the entire party and army, as well as to solidify the entire party and army. Thus, one could name names when making criticisms at the conference, but I would suggest that when the resolution is written, it will be necessary only to dis-

*The Chinese language utilizes the denomination of "10,000" in the same way as the English language utilizes "thousands" — Editor, Chinese Law and Government.
tistinguish between right and wrong and to clarify the problems, and one need not write down the names of comrades who com-
mitted errors. In the resolution of the Ku-t'ien Conference, no names were mentioned.

X primarily has blind faith in foreigners, he has an inferi-
ority complex, he is unable to overcome his blind faith, and he does not regard himself as the master. Now even a cooperative has to sum up its own experiences; otherwise it will lag behind. There are five cooperatives in Hsin-chou, Hupei province, that have been run very well, while Ma-ch'eng's cooperatives are not so successful. Yet Hsin-chou failed to pay attention to sum-
marizing its own experiences. Ma-ch'eng sent its men to Hsin-
chou to study; the new knowledge combined with its own expe-
riences was summed up and promoted. The result is that Ma-
ch'eng has gone ahead in its work. In fighting battles in the past, did not the army first summarize the experiences of its fighting units, then train its units, and then go to fight again? In all kinds of work, it is incumbent on us to sum up the good experiences and then promote them.

The Soviet Union defeated the intervention of some fourteen imperialist countries. That was a long time ago. The Soviet Union has had the experience of World War II. We defeated Chiang Kai-shek, Japanese imperialism, U.S. imperialism; we have had rich experiences, more than those of the Soviet Union. It is not right to belittle one's own experiences as being worth-
less. (Lin Tsung [Lin Piao] rejoined: Our experiences are rich, but don't let us spend our gold as yellow dirt.) It is now neces-
sary to consider ourselves first when we study other people's advanced experiences. In the meantime, it is necessary to study the enemy's conditions and the conditions of friends. In the past we studied the conditions of the enemy, our friends, and our own conditions. Then we translated American and Japanese things. In the future, the United States must rely upon Japan if it should want to wage a Far Eastern war, and so it is incumbent on us to study Japanese conditions meticulously. The experience of the Soviet army must also be studied. Since (military) equip-
ment and technology are developing and changing almost daily,
in learning the Soviet army's technological experiences, we must also apply the developmental viewpoint. In the past the Russians were afraid of Napoleon because the latter had led his forces to Moscow even though he was finally defeated by the Russians. Thus, the Russians constantly propagandized that they were more formidable than Napoleon. At present, the things worked out by the Soviet military advisers (such as operational plans and thinking) are all of an offensive nature, based on victory; no provision is made for the defensive and for defeat. This is not in conformity with practical conditions. Some would say that it is empiricism to sum up the Resist-America Aid-Korea war. We should know that the Korean war is a great war in which we defeated U. S. imperialism and accumulated precious experiences that must be summed up. If they say that we are empiricists, then we could also say that when you brought back the things of the Soviet Union during World War II, this is also empiricism.

The error committed by Comrade Hsiao K'o was a very serious one. In the past we did not have such an opportunity to convene such a mammoth conference. We can now dig up the roots of dogmatism.

As to emulating the Soviet Union, privately speaking, it should be to "study critically"; but speaking publicly, in order not to create misunderstanding, we should "analytically and selectively study the Soviet Union's advanced experiences." What is most important is that the advanced experiences we have learned from the Soviet Union must be integrated with our own innovations. The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism must be integrated with the practices of China. We must not eat ready-made food, for if we do so we will be defeated in war. This point should be conveyed clearly to the Soviet comrades. As for studying the Soviet Union, we have done so in the past, we still study it now, and will do so in the future. Nonetheless, such study must be combined with our concrete conditions. We must tell them: if we learn from you, where do you learn from? Why can't we innovate? There have also been changes among Soviet experts, and these changes took place after the 20th Con-
gress of the CPSU and the Chuikov incident. (Ch'en Tsung [Ch'en Yi] rejoined: According to Soviet comrades who have returned home, when we came we brought our experiences with us; when we went home we took your experiences back.) This shows that the situation of the great leap forward has not only encouraged the people of China, but in the meantime it has also heartened the Soviet comrades. (Said Lin Tsung [Lin Piao]: Politically, our army has a system of its own, such as party leadership, political work, and fine traditions. Our party's level of Marxism-Leninism is a very high one, not to mention the Chairman's. The Chairman has said that the level of the editorials written by us is even higher than Pravda editorials. As regards the problem of superstructure and the problems of military science and tactics, we have a system of our own. Lenin died early and did not have time to deal with this problem. Stalin did not have a system. We don't have to learn from the Soviet Union. Concerning tactical problems, we may study one half, but not the other half. In their tactics, ideology and mass viewpoint are questionable. To study them halfway means that we study the use of naval and air forces and the cooperation of the various services. The half that we need not study includes such things as tactical ideas, because we have Chairman Mao's. We must study technology and sciences and modernized war organization. Nevertheless, we must also use our own mass line methodology to study them. Before we die, it is incumbent on us to organize a corps of cadres to develop our own system carefully and then pass it on.) This is very good.

Men like Li Shih-min, Ts'ao Ts'ao, etc., were all adept in war. China did have some things in the past. Comrade K'ai Feng once said: There is no Marxism in Sun-tzu pin-fa [Sun-tzu's Strategy]. I asked if he had read it, but he couldn't answer. This shows that he has made a conclusion dogmatically without even reading Sun-tzu pin-fa, and this is rather improper. (Lin Tsung rejoined: There is materialism and dialectics in Sun-tzu pin-fa, which is a collective compendium written by Sun Tzu, Sun Pin, Ts'ao Ts'ao, Tu Yu, etc.)

The elimination of blind faith was proposed at the Chengtu
Conference. It has developed rapidly during the past four months, and since the second conference of the Eighth Congress, the movement has been spread throughout the country. For instance, at Anshan, the original plan was to produce xx 10,000 tons of steel, but it has been modified so that by next year production may reach xx to xx 10,000 tons. They are also engaged in integrating large, medium, and small enterprises, as well as in combining native methods with foreign methods. According to Comrade X X X's letter from the Northeast, the Second Five-Year Plan of the Northeast may produce xx 10,000 tons of steel. With steel and with modernized industry, it would be easy to develop a modernized national defense industry. I subscribe to the idea of producing more light arms to arm the broad masses of militia. (Lin Tsung rejoined: Militia is very important.) In the past, others looked down on us mainly because we produced too little grain, steel, and machinery. Now let us do something for them to see.
The broad masses of cadres have done a tremendous amount of useful work in the people's commune movement. They manifested great activism as Communists. This is extremely valuable because without this activity on their part it would be impossible to make such great achievements. Naturally, there are not only great achievements in our work, but also some defects. In a new social movement for hundreds of millions of people like the people's commune, which lacked experiences and was unprecedented, the people and their leaders have gradually acquired experiences, deepened their understanding in regard to the substance of things, revealed the contradictions of things and resolved these contradictions, affirmed achievements in their work, and overcome their work defects. Whoever says that such a broad social movement can be free from any defect must be a wishful thinker, or a tidal wave watcher, or a bookkeeper, or simply an antagonist. The relation between our achievements and our defects is, as we have often said, that between nine fingers and the remaining one finger of both hands. Some people are skeptical about or negate the superiority of people's communes. This viewpoint is completely erroneous.
The commune has been established, whereby we now have the communal ownership system. As the resolution of the Peitaiho Conference [August 1958] and the resolution of the Sixth Plenary Conference of the Central Committee [November-December 1958 — the Wuchang Conference] said: This kind of commune, which is both great and public, has great superiority and is the best form for the transition of our rural villages from a socialist collective ownership system to a socialist all-people's ownership system, and it is also the best form for the transition from socialist society to communist society. This is beyond a doubt, and it has been completely affirmed. If one should still have doubts about such a basic problem, then he is entirely mistaken and must be a rightist-opportunist....

...It must be envisaged that, on the one hand, the tidal wave watchers and the bookkeepers are bound to ridicule us; on the other hand, those landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and undesirable elements would engage in sabotage. However, we must tell the cadres and masses that should these conditions arise, we would have nothing to fear. We should exercise forbearance, maintain our silence for a period of time, and endure the situation firmly, in order to let these people ex-
pose themselves fully. By then the broad masses are bound to distinguish quickly what is right from what is wrong and distinguish between the enemy and ourselves. They would rise up to smash the sarcasm of the backward elements as well as the assault of the antagonists....
This criticism of P'eng Te-huai's "Letter of Opinion" of July 14, 1959, was not included in the other documentation on P'eng's case, and is revealed here for the first time. The three asterisks after the first paragraph indicate that a large section was omitted in the Chinese pamphlet used in the present translation. P'eng's letter was included as an appendix to the present pamphlet, but it has not been included here because it has already been published in CB No. 851, pp. 19-23, in SCMP No. 4032, pp. 1-5, in The Case of P'eng Te-huai, op. cit., pp. 7-13 (English) and pp. 397-401 (Chinese), and in Chinese in Tsu-kuo (Hong Kong), No. 48 (March 1, 1968), pp. 42-44.

P'eng Te-huai's letter of opinion constitutes an antiparty outline of rightist opportunism.... It is by no means an accidental or individual error, but is planned, organized, prepared, and purposeful. Taking advantage of a difficult time in the party, which was under a double attack, both internally and externally,
he assailed the party and attempted to seize control of the party, and they wanted to form their own opportunist party.

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P'eng Te-huai's letter is in the nature of an outline; it is opposed to our general line. Don't you see that though superficially he seemed to support it, he has written very meticulously, stressing that the contradiction was the imbalance of proportion, alleging that massive steelmaking was extravagant and that petty-bourgeois fervor has spread to all places and all sectors, and saying that the people's communes should better be developed one year later, and that America's Dulles has also said that our proportions were not balanced. If the Chinese People's Liberation Army should follow P'eng Te-huai, I will go to fight guerrilla war.
You have spoken so much; permit me to talk some now, won't you? I have taken sleeping pills thrice. Can't sleep.

Let me talk about this kind of opinion. After seeing the minutes, speeches, and documents of our comrades, and after lis-
tending to the speeches of certain comrades, I feel there are two tendencies and wish to speak about them here. One is untouchable, there being the tendency that one would "jump if touched at all." Wu Ch'ih-hui [the late Kuomintang official] said that Sun Fo would jump whenever he was touched. Thus, some people feel there is pressure, that is, they are unwilling to hear others say bad things and want others to say only good words, not willing to listen to bad words. I advise these comrades to listen. There are three kinds of words; and the mouth has two functions. A man has only one mouth, which is used, first, to eat, and second, to discharge the obligation of speaking. With ears one must listen. He wants to talk, and what can you do about it? There are some comrades who just don't want to listen to bad words. Good or bad, they are all words and we must listen to them. There are three kinds of words: one is correct, the second is basically correct or not too correct, and the third is basically incorrect or incorrect. Both ends are opposites; correct and incorrect are also opposites.

Now we are under attack both from within and without the party. The rightists said: Why did Ch'in Shih Huang-ti collapse? Because he built the Great Wall. Now that we have constructed the T'ien-an-men, we would also collapse; that's what the rightists alleged. I have not yet finished reading a segment of opinions within the party. The reflection of what has been manifested in a concentrated form in the Kiangsi Party School can now be found all over, and the views of all rightists have been published. The Kiangsi Party School is an intraparty representative. Some of them are rightists, wavering elements. They could not see the situation clearly, but they could change after some work had been done on them. Some people have historically had problems. They have undergone criticisms, and they also felt that everything was in a mess, such as the materials of the Kwangtung Military Region. All this has been said outside of the conference. What we do now is to combine the conference from both inside and outside. It is a pity that Lushan is too small and we can't invite all of them to come over, such as the Kiangsi Party School, Lo Lung-chi, Ch'en Ming-shu, etc.
This is the responsibility of the Kiangsinese. The house is so small!

No matter what they say, it is muddled. This is also good; the more muddled they talked, the more one wanted to hear it. During the rectification we concocted the phrase of "stiffen the scalp to stand it." I have told some comrades that we must stand it, stand it by stiffening our scalp, but for how long? One month, three months, half a year, one year, three years, five years, eight or ten years? Some comrades would say "protracted war." I agreed with them, and such comrades were the majority.

Gentlemen of the audience, all of you have ears, and so please listen! It is nothing but muddled talk. Just because it is unpleasant, we want to listen. Welcome! If you would think in this way, it would not be so unpleasant to listen to. Why should we let others talk about it? The reason is that the Shen-chou [allusion to ancient China] will not sink, and heaven will not collapse. This is because we have done some good deeds and our loins are strong. The majority of our comrades have stiffened their loins, but why would they not do it? It was because for a period of time vegetables were scarce, there were not enough hairpins, no soap; there was an imbalance of proportions, the market was tense, everybody was tense, and the mental state became tense. I did not see any reason for tension. I was also tense; it would be untrue if I were to say there was no tension. You might be tense during the first half of the night, but upon taking sleeping pills after midnight, tension would disappear.

You say that we have deviated from the masses, but they still support us. I envision this as only temporary, maybe two or three months, about the time of the spring festival. I see that there is very good cooperation between the masses and ourselves.... In regard to this kind of extensive mass movement, one cannot pour cold water to dampen enthusiasm, but one should only use persuasion. Comrades, your hearts are good. It is in fact difficult to accomplish as a matter of fact; one can't be rash; there must be a step-by-step process. In eating meat,
one can only consume one piece at a time, but never hope to be
a fatso at one stroke. X X consumed one catty of meat daily,
but did not even become fat in ten years. That the commander-
in-chief [Chu Teh] and I are fat is not due to a single day.
These cadres have led several hundred millions of people,
among whom at least some 30 per cent are active elements,
30 per cent are passive elements, as well as landlords, rich
peasants, reactionaries, undesirable elements, bureaucrats,
middle peasants, and some poor peasants, and 40 per cent fol-
low the mainstream. How many people are there to make up
the 30 per cent? About 150 million people who must develop
communes, establish mess halls, and undertake mammoth co-
operation. They are extremely active and are willing to do it.
You say that this is petty-bourgeois fervor? This is no petty
bourgeoisie; they are poor peasants, lower middle peasants,
proletariat, and semiproletariat. Those who follow the main-
stream might also be disposed to form communes, and there
are some 30 per cent who were unwilling. In short, adding 30
to 40 per cent makes a total of 70 per cent, or 350 million peo-
ple, who, during a period of time, worked frantically. They
wanted to do it. For two months around the time of spring fes-
tival, they became dismayed and changed. When cadres went
to the countryside, they would no longer talk. They invited the
cadres to eat potato congee, and their faces were bland, with-
out any smiles. This was called blowing "communist wind."
There must also be some analysis. Who were those who had
some petty-bourgeois fervor? "Communist wind" consisted
mainly of the cadres at the hsien and commune levels, espe-
cially some commune cadres who squeezed production bri-
gades and teams. This was bad and the masses proved to be
unreceptive. It became necessary to rectify and persuade them
firmly. One month was spent for this, and by March or April
this wind was repressed. What should be withdrawn has been
withdrawn, and the accounts between communes and teams were
cleared. This one month or more of accounting education has
had its benefits, because in this short time it has enabled them
to understand that equalization was impracticable, since this
would cause them to "withdraw" or "transfer" their funds. We now hear that the majority have come over, but there were a few who still lacked "communism." Where can we find a school for short-term training classes? How can we enable the several hundred million population and the millions of cadres to receive education, to realize that the things must be returned and that they could not say that what is yours is mine and take them away at will. Even from ancient times there had never been such a rule, and even 10,000 years from now, it would not be possible to take what one wants. If there were ever such a case, it was that of the Green and Red gangs in which the Green band stole and the Red band robbed, exploiting other people's labor without compensation and sabotaging equal value exchange. The government of Sung Chiang [hero of the novel The Water Margin, translated by Pearl Buck as All Men Are Brothers] was called the Hall of Loyalty and Righteousness. He looted the rich to help the poor, and because the loot belonged to local despots and vicious gentry, he could do it with impunity. Such a rule seemed to be permissible. What Sung Chiang robbed was the "Sheng-chen-wang" — tantamount to our beating the local despots — and what he looted was some ill-gotten property, and "any ill-gotten property could be robbed without encumbrance." Such property was squeezed from peasants and should therefore be returned to them. For a long time we have not resorted to striking at local despots. When we do this, it is all right to divide the land and confiscate it. This is because this is also ill-gotten wealth. However, it is a mistake to blow "communist wind" by seizing the properties of production brigades and teams, and by taking away their fat pigs and big cabbages. Even when we were dealing with the assets of imperialist countries, we still resorted to these three measures: requisition, procurement, and squeezing them out. How could we then exploit the wealth of the laboring people? How did we succeed in suppressing this wind within one month or so? This proved that our party was great, wise, and correct. If you won't believe it, there were historical data to prove it. During March, April, as well as May, several million cadres and several hun-
dred millions of peasants were educated. They began to see
the situation more clearly. It was primarily the cadres who
did not understand before that this wealth was ill-gotten wealth.
They could not draw a boundary line; they did not study politi-
cal economy; they were ignorant of the law of value, equal
value exchange, and distribution according to labor. In a few
months they were convinced. There was probably no one who
had understood everything perfectly, but many did understand
about 70 or 80 per cent. They did not understand the textbooks,
and were told to read them because cadres at the commune
level must know something about political economy. It would
be all right if one were illiterate; if one could understand some-
thing, there would be no need to read books. One could be edu-
cated by facts. Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty had a prime
minister by the name of Ch'en Fa-chih who was illiterate. The
emperor asked him to compose a poem. Ch'en Fa-chih recited
the poem, but asked someone else to write it down, saying that
these scholars were not as good as he, who used his ears to
learn. Of course, this does not mean that I oppose the elimina-
tion of illiteracy. Old K'o [K'o Ch'ing-shih] said that all people
should be enrolled in colleges. I also support this view, though
the period of fifteen years must be prolonged. During the South-
ern and Northern dynasties there was a general by the name of
Ts'ao (Ts'ao Ching-tsung of the Southern Liang dynasty
[A. D. 502-557]) who wrote a poem when he was fighting a
war. It reads: "My children were sad when I went to war; there
was a fanfare as I returned, with horns and drums; let me ask
the passersby: Who among you is Huo Ch'ü-ping?" There was
also the Ode of Imperial Decree by Hu-lū-chin, of the Northern
dynasty, which reads: "The imperial decree is promulgated
for the river under Yin-shan [mountain]; the heaven is like a
canopy enveloping the fields all around; the sky is blue, and the
wilderness is hazy; when wind sweeps over grass, cattle and
lambs appear." This was also written by an illiterate. If an
illiterate could become a prime minister, why can our com-
mune cadres and peasants not hear political economy? It is
my view that one can attend college, and that when it comes to
economics, even the illiterate can also do it. After discussing it, he is bound to understand it. He can comprehend more easily than even the intellectuals. I have not read the textbooks myself. One should read some before one has the right to speak. It is necessary to squeeze out some time for the entire party and nation to launch a study movement.

Nobody knows how many inspections they have already conducted. Since the Chengchow Conference last year, inspections have been made repeatedly. They even carried out inspections when a 6th grade meeting affected a 5th grade meeting. People who came from Peking talked and talked, but they would not listen. We made a great many inspections, but you did not hear of them. Thus, I would advise these comrades to listen to other people, because they also have their own mouths as well as their own views. I notice that there are some problems which this conference cannot resolve. There are some who wouldn't give up their views. What they would like to do is to procrastinate — one year, two years, three years, or even five years. It won't do if you are not accustomed to listen to funny talks. What I say is that we must stiffen our scalps to stand it. All they can do is scold the three generations of our ancestors. When I was young and in the prime of my life, I would also be irritated whenever I heard some bad remarks. My attitude was that if others do not provoke me, I won't provoke them; if they provoke me, I will also provoke them; whoever provokes me first, I will provoke him later. I have not abandoned this principle even now, though I have learned to listen. Let us stiffen our scalps to stand it and listen to them for a couple of weeks, and then counterattack. I would advise our comrades to listen. Whether you agree or not is your own business. If you won't agree, and if I am wrong, I will engage in self-criticism.

Second, I advise another segment of comrades that they must not waver during this crucial moment. As I see it, some comrades are wavering. They also say that the great leap forward, the general line, and the people's commune are all correct, but one must look for the direction of their ideology when they speak and the direction in which they speak. This segment of
people belongs to the second category who are "basically correct, but only partly incorrect." They waver somewhat. There are some who would waver at the crucial moment and become irresolute during the great storms of history. There are four historical lines: the Li Li-san line, the Wang Ming line, the Kao-Jao [Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih] line, and now the general line. If one cannot stand firm, one dances the rice-sprout song dance (the Kuomintang says that we are the rice-sprout song dynasty). They are worried and want to do their best for the country, and that is good. What kind of class should we call it? Bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie? I won't talk about this now. I have spoken at the Nanning Conference, at the Chengtu Conference, and at the party congress about the waverings in 1956 and 1957; instead of giving out dunce caps, they were interpreted as a problem of ideological methodology. If one should talk about the mad fervor of the petty bourgeoisie, one could also say, on the contrary, that the antiadventurism of that time was caused by sad and dismal pessimism and by the low-key attitude of the bourgeoisie. We don't want to give out dunce caps because these comrades were different from the rightists; they were also engaged in socialism, though they lacked experience, and whenever there were straws in the wind they would waver and oppose adventurism. Those who opposed adventurism then have now stood firm. For instance, Comrade X X was very zealous, but after that lesson, we believe he would now be able to stand firm. It transpired that those who had criticized X X at that time no longer talk about adventures now, and even seemed to be opposed to them. For instance, they say: "Where there is loss, there is also gain," and by putting "gain" behind, it would seem that they have mulled it over carefully. For instance, in the case of giving out dunce caps, this is the waver ing character of the bourgeoisie or of the petty bourgeoisie. This is because the rightist factor has often been influenced by the bourgeoisie; under the pressure of imperialist bourgeoisie, one became a rightist.

When each production brigade made a single mistake, multiplied by some 700,000 production brigades, there would be
some 700,000 items in all. Would it be possible to publish them fully? Moreover, the length of articles may vary, and I see that it may take at least a year to publish them. What will be the result? Our nation will collapse, and if by that time the imperialists did not come, our own people would also rise up to overthrow us. If the newspaper you are publishing will print only bad news, and if you have no heart to work, then it won't take a year, but it will perish within a week's time. When 700,000 items are published, and they are all bad things, then it is no longer a proletariat. This would be a bourgeois nation and it would become the bourgeois Chang Po-chün's Political Planning Institute. Of course, there is no one at this conference who will suggest this. I am merely exaggerating. Suppose we do ten things, and nine of them are bad and are published in the newspapers. Then we are bound to perish, and should perish. In that event, I would go to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If the Liberation Army won't follow me, I will then find the Red Army. I think the Liberation Army will follow me.

I advise that some of the comrades pay attention to the problem of direction when they talk; the content of talk may be basically correct, but partly improper.

In order to ask others to be firm, one must be firm himself; in order to ask others not to waver, one must not waver himself. This is another lesson. As I see it, these comrades are not rightists, but middle-of-the-roaders. They are not leftists (leftists without quotation marks). I mention the word "direction" because some people have been frustrated and were worried. They could not stand firm; they wavered and went to stand in the middle. Whether they are left of the middle or right of the middle must still be analyzed. They have repeated the course of the comrades who erred during the latter half of 1956 and the first half of 1957. They are not rightists, though they have thrown themselves into the periphery of the rightists. They are still some 30 kilometers away from the rightists. This is because the rightists welcome such a view. It would indeed be a wonder if the rightists don't welcome the thesis held
by these comrades. Such a peripheral policy is quite danger-
ous, and just wait and see if you don't believe it. I may offend
some comrades when I say this publicly. If I don't say it now,
it may be detrimental to these comrades.

Among the themes I raise may be added the problem of sol-
olidarity, to which I will now devote a passage. Raise the banner
of solidarity, people's solidarity, national solidarity, party sol-
olidarity. I won't say whether this is useful or harmful to these
comrades. Even if it is harmful, I must still talk about it. Our
party is a Marxist political party. It is incumbent not only upon
those of the first side to listen to others, but also upon those
of the second side. People on both sides must listen to others.
Did I not say that I want to speak? The first thing is that I want
to speak; the second thing is that I want to listen to other peo-
ple's talk. I was not in a hurry to speak, and have endured it
by stiffening my scalp. Why can't I do it now? For twenty days
I have shown my forbearance, and now the conference will soon
be adjourned. We may just as well hold the conference until the
end of the month. [George C.] Marshall went up to Lushan eight
times; Chou En-lai went up to Lushan three times. Then why
can't we go up Lushan once? We have the right to do so.

Now about the problem of mess halls. A mess hall is a good
thing that cannot be unduly denounced. I am in favor of develop-
ing them successfully. It should be on the basis of voluntary
participation; the grain should be delivered to the member-
families, and any savings should be retained by the public. I
would be satisfied if one-third of the mess halls could be main-
tained throughout the country. As soon as I mentioned this, Wu
X X became very tense. Don't be afraid. There are still 90 per-
cent of the mess halls in Honan province that are under experi-
ment and must not be dissolved. What I have said here is from
a nationwide angle. Are there not four stages in dancing?
"Stand on one side, try and try, then dance-right on, until you
die." Is there such an adage? Being an unpolished man, I am
not too cultured. It would be all right if one-third of the peas-
ants, about 150 million, persevered. My second hope is that
there will be about one-half of the peasants, about 250 million
in all. We can do this if there are more provinces and cities like Honan, Szechwan, Hunan, Yunan, and Shanghai. Some of the disbanded mess halls should be restored. The mess hall is not our invention; it has been created by the masses. In Honan, mess halls were established in 1956 before communization. In 1958, mess halls were developed rapidly. According to X X X, mess halls can liberate the labor force. I think there is another advantage, that is, it can economize resources. Without the latter, it cannot last. Can this be done? I am sure it can. I would suggest that the comrades of Honan try to undertake mechanization. For instance, by using running water, there is no need to carry it. In this way, labor can be saved, and it is also possible to economize resources. I am a middle-of-the-roader, and such provinces as Honan, Szechwan and Hupei belong to the left. Nonetheless, there came the rightists. The Ch'ang-li investigation group of the Chinese Academy of Sciences alleged that the mess hall had no merit at all, thereby attacking one point, without mentioning the rest. They emulated the method of the "Ode of Teng-t'u-tzu's Lust for Beautiful Women." Teng-t'u-tzu took Sung Yu to task on three charges: handsome and fond of women, adept in speech, unwilling to go into the harem; therefore Sung Yu was very dangerous. Sung Yu retorted: My handsomeness was endowed by my parents, and my teachers taught me to speak with eloquence. As for my fondness for women, this is not true. No other place has such exquisite women as the State of Ch'u; among the beautiful women of the State of Ch'u, the best are to be found in my town. In my town the daughter of the family on my east is peerless, of the proper height that cannot be increased or decreased by even one-tenth of an inch.... Teng-t'u-tzu was then a tai-fu, which is equivalent to today's minister of a ministry, and it would be a large ministry, such as a minister of the metallurgical industry, a minister of the coal industry, or a minister of what you call agriculture. The investigation group of the Academy of Sciences attacked only one point, without mentioning the rest. This attack was undoubtedly centered on such things as pork, hairpins, etc. Nobody can be without shortcomings; even
Confucius had his mistakes. I have seen Lenin's own drafts that had been corrected pell-mell. If there were no errors, why should he correct them? We may set up more mess halls. Let us experiment with them for one or two years, and I figure that they can be completed. The people's communes won't collapse; not a single one has collapsed yet. We are prepared for the collapse of one-half of them, and after 70 per cent have collapsed, we would still have 30 per cent left. If they must collapse, let them collapse. They are bound to collapse if not managed properly. The Communist Party must manage well—manage communes, manage all enterprises well, including agriculture, industry, commerce, communications and transportation, and culture and education. It is basically impossible to anticipate some things. Hasn't it been said that the party does not control the party? Now planning organs do not concern themselves with planning, and for a time they did not deal with planning. Planning organs are not limited to the [State] Planning Commission; there are also the other ministries, as well as local governments. It might be possible for the local governments to excuse them when, for a time, they failed to concern themselves with the general balance. Though the Planning Commission and the Central ministries have been established for a decade, they suddenly (decided) at Peitaiho that they would no longer handle the planning. This was called planned directive, which was tantamount to doing away with planning. The so-called noncontrol of planning meant the dispensing of a general balance, thus basically failing to calculate how much coal, steel, and communications would be needed. Coal and iron could not walk by themselves, and had to be transported by rolling stock. I did not anticipate this point. I and X X, and the premier, did not at all get involved in it. It was possible that I did not know about it, and this is indeed to exonerate myself even if I don't want to do so. This is because I was not the director of the Planning Commission. Before August of last year, I devoted my main energy to revolution. Being basically not versed in construction, I knew nothing about industrial planning. I said at the West Tower [at Chung-nan-hai,
Peking: Don't write about the wise leadership; I did not even exercise any control, and so what wisdom is there? However, comrades, in 1958 and 1959 the main responsibility has fallen on me and you should take me to task. In the past the responsibility could be laid to others — En-lai and X X — but now you should blame me because I really have not dealt with a great pile of things. Would the person who invented the human statue for burial not be deprived of his posterity [a reference to Analects]? Shall I be deprived of my posterity (one son killed in battle and another son insane)? Was it K'o Ch'ing-shih or I who invented the massive smelting of iron and steel? I say it was I. I had a talk with K'o Ch'ing-shih and said it would bring about 6 million tons. Later when I talked with others, there was an X X X who also felt it could be done. In June I set the target at 10,700,000 tons. It was published in the communique at Peitaiho. X X suggested it and I thought it would be all right. This created a great disaster when 90 million people went ahead to smelt steel. The so-called inventor of the burial statue should be deprived of his children and grandchildren. Small native complexes [for iron smelting] were launched.... Many discussions were held, and they said it could be done, although it would be necessary to raise the quality, reduce cost, reduce the sulphur content, and produce really good iron. There would be some possibility if we would grasp it. The Communist Party has a method called grasping. Both the Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek have each had two hands, but the hands of the former belonged to Communists, and they took it up when they grasped. It is necessary to grasp iron and steel, as well as grain, cotton, oil, ramie, silk, tea, sugar, and vegetables, plus tobacco and miscellaneous items. There are 12 items in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, subsidiary industry, and fishery that must be grasped, and there must be a general balance. Conditions vary in different localities, and so there cannot be a model for each hsien. There is a place called Chiu-kung-shan in Hupei, where bamboo and wood grow in its many mountains. Because they wanted to develop grain, bamboo and wood were neglected. There are places where tea
and sugar cane do not grow. It is therefore necessary to make
adjustments in accordance with local conditions. Hasn't the
Soviet Union gone to procure pigs from areas inhabited by
Moslems? How absurd this was!

There is an article on industrial planning that is quite good.
As to the failure of the party to control party affairs, of plan-
ing organs to control planning and maintain a general balance,
what have they been doing? Basically he was not worried; the
premier worried, but he did not. When one does not worry and
does not have zest, nothing can be achieved. Someone has crit-
icized Comrade Li Fu-ch'un of the Planning Commission for
"lingering when the feet want to move forward and stammering
when the mouth wants to speak." Nonetheless, one must not be
too impetuous, like Li K'uei [a character in The Water Margin],
which also won't do. Lenin was full of enthusiasm and so he
was welcomed by the masses. When one stammers in talking,
it is usually because he has misgivings. During the first half-
month, there were misgivings, but now the situation has been
publicized. You have said what you wanted to say, and the min-
utes attest to that. If you have caught me in the wrong, you can
punish me. Don't be afraid of wearing tight shoes. I have said
at the Chengtu Conference that one should not be afraid of im-
prisonment; one should not even be afraid of execution or of
dismissal from the party. When a Communist and a senior
cadre had so many misgivings, it must have been because he
was apprehensive lest he speak improperly and be rectified.
This is what you call "self-preservation by those who are as-
tute"! As the adage says, disease comes into the mouth, but
troubles come from the mouth. If I should do something disas-
trous today, two kinds of people would be disappointed with me:
one kind would be those who are untouchable; the other kind,
people whose direction is problematical. If you don't agree,
you can refute it. I don't think it right to say that one cannot
refute the Chairman. The fact is that you have all refuted me,
though not by name perhaps. The views of the Kiangsi Party
School and the party schools of the middle level were all refu-
tations. They charged that the one who was the first to invent
burial statues should be deprived of posterity. It was I who suggested and made the resolve for the smelting of 10,700,000 tons of steel, and the result was that 90 million people went ahead with it, X X [may mean "squandered"] People's Currency [Jen-min pi], and "the gains could not compensate for the losses." Next was the people's commune. I did not claim the right of inventing people's communes, but I had the right to suggest. In Shantung, a reporter asked me: "Is the commune good?" I said, "Good," and he immediately published it in the newspaper. This might be due to some petty-bourgeois fervor. Hereafter, newspaper reporters should leave me alone.

I have committed two crimes, one of which involved calling for 10,700,000 tons of steel, or for massive steel smelting. If you supported it, you might just as well share some of it with me, but I was the first to make the burial statues and so cannot exonerate myself from the responsibility. As for the people's commune, the entire world has opposed it, including the Soviet Union. There is also the general line, for which, be it true or false, you also shared some responsibility. The general line has been implemented in industry and agriculture. As for the other big cannons, it is incumbent on the others to share some responsibility. Boss T'an [presumably T'an Chen-lin], you have had many big cannons, but they were not shot carefully and the communization was too fast. He began to talk when he was in Honan, and the records of Kiangsi and Chekiang spread rapidly. He did not speak carefully, and since he was not too sure, it would be better to be more careful. It is to his credit that he was full of zest and was willing to assume responsibility. This was better than those who seemed to be so sad and dismal. Nevertheless, in shooting cannons, one must be careful whenever vital problems are concerned. I have also shot three big cannons: the commune, steel smelting, and the general line. X X said that he was so rough that he could never be meticulous. I am like Chang Fei [a general of the Three Kingdoms] who, although crude, was careful at times. I said that the commune is a system of collective ownership. I said that the process of transition from a collective ownership system to a com-
munist all-people's ownership system may take more than two five-year plans, and that it may take a twenty-five-year plan!

In regard to speed, Marx also committed many errors. He hoped every day for the advent of European revolution, but it did not come. There were devious repetitions and reverses, and there was no revolution before the time of his death. It was only by the time of Lenin that it came finally. Wasn't this impetuosity? Wasn't this bourgeois fanaticism? (XX interrupted: Lenin also said that the trend of world revolution had arrived, but it did not come later.) Marx also opposed the Paris Commune at the beginning, while Zinoviev was against the October Revolution. Zinoviev was executed later, but was Marx also executed? When the Paris Commune was established, he supported it. He thought that it would fail, but seeing that this was the first dictatorship of the proletariat, it would be good even though it lasted only three months. It seems to be impossible to judge the result if economic accounting is applied. We also had our Canton Commune, but the great revolution was a debacle. Will our present work be such a failure as in 1927? Will it be like the 26,000-li long march, when most of the bastions were lost and the Soviet area was reduced to one-tenth of its original size? No, we cannot put it this way. Haven't we failed now? All comrades who have come to this conference have gained something; we have not failed completely. Isn't this a failure by and large? No, it is only a partial failure. We have paid a price, blown some "communist wind," and enabled the people of the entire nation to learn a lesson.

I have spoken twice on the problem of Stalin's socialist economics. It must now be studied more intensively. Otherwise, it won't be possible to develop and consolidate our enterprise.

As for the responsibility, XX and XXX have had some responsibility, and XXX of the Ministry of Agriculture has had some responsibility. I was the first to be responsible. Old K'o, did you have some responsibility for your invention? (Old K'o: I have.) Was it smaller than mine? What you have done is merely a question of ideology. What I did was the smelt-
ing of 10,700,000 tons of steel and the participation of 90 million people in it, and this was a great disaster for which I must be responsible myself. Comrades, you should analyze your own responsibility and you will feel much better after you have made a clean slate of it. [Literally: "and your stomach will feel much more comfortable if you move your bowels and break wind."]
Because of lack of consensus on the situation, it is impossible to have solidarity. In order to have intraparty solidarity, we must first clarify the problems and achieve ideological unity.

Some comrades lack comprehensive analysis in regard to the situation. We must help them understand what the gains are and what the losses are. (X X interrupted: Troubles developed last year because of the lack of experience. We have had to pay the price of learning in order to gain these experiences.)

Some people say that the general line is basically wrong. The so-called general line is nothing but [the achieving of] greater, faster, better, and more economical results, and this cannot be basically wrong.

After we have explained the reasons and laid out the problems, some 70 per cent of the people will be found supporting the general line.

It is necessary to admit drawbacks and errors. From the standpoint of a part or of a single problem, it could only be the comparison between ten fingers and nine fingers or seven fin-
gers, or between three fingers and two fingers. Yet from the standpoint of the whole, it could be only the problem of a single finger. From the standpoint of the general situation, it is the comparison between nine fingers and one finger.

I have always told the foreign comrades to come back to see us after a period of ten years and to see whether we have been right or wrong. This is because whether a line is correct or incorrect is a question of practice. It requires time, and it can only be borne out by practical results. We still do not have experience in construction, and it may take at least another ten years. In the conferences of this year, we have analyzed and resolved problems, insisted on the truth, and rectified our errors. There are comrades in the party who did not understand the situation, and so we must explain it to them. From the standpoint of certain specific facts, there were cases in which the gains did not compensate for the losses. However, generally speaking, we cannot say that the gains could not offset the losses. We must pay the price of learning if we wish to gain experiences.

Minutes of Speech on August 16

The comrades who committed right-opportunist errors did not present their views at the Chengchow Conference in November last year [1958]. Nor did they present their views on raising the targets at the Peitaiho Conference [August 1958]. They did not present their views at the Wuchang Conference of last December, or at the Peking Conference in January of this year, or at the Chengchow Conference in February this year. Nor did they present their views at the Shanghai Conference [Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee, CCP] at the end of March and April. But this time, at the Lushan Conference they presented their views.

Why did these comrades not make suggestions at that time, but are doing it now? Because they have had their own set of views which could not be submitted then. If they had had a set of
correct views that were better than ours, they would have pre-
sented them at Peitaiho! They did not present their views until
the Central Committee had either solved or largely solved the
problems. If they did not present them now, they would never
be able to do so. This is because they feel that if they would
not present them now, the situation might become even better
after a few months. It would be bad if the opportunity were to
pass away. Thus, they were anxious to initiate it.
COMMENTS ON A LETTER

(Chairman Mao's Comments on Li Chung-yun's Letter of Opinion) (July 26, 1959)

The letter I received is a document of a representative nature. Its writer has collected certain material from our economic work. These materials deal especially with shortcomings. It would seem that the writer was interested in materials on this aspect. Regarding those of another aspect, the aspect of achievements, it may be said he was not at all interested. He felt that since the last quarter of 1958, defects and errors formed the mainstream of party work; consequently, he concluded that the party has committed the errors of "left" adventurism and opportunism. The cause was traced to the failure to simultaneously oppose the perils of "left" adventurism in the 1957 rectification and antirightist struggle. The basic viewpoint of the writer Li Chung-yun (formerly Vice-Director of a bureau of the State Planning Commission, who was recently transferred to be the chief of the General Group of the Staff Office of the Northeast Regional [Economic] Cooperation Commission) was erroneous, and he has almost negated everything. He felt that the smelting of steel by tens of millions of people has caused great losses and that it was entirely useless; the people's commune was also a mistake; he was pessimistic toward capital construction. In the field of agriculture, he men-
tioned water conservation, considering the party's error of "left" adventurism and opportunism to be caused by the massive development of water conservation. He did not have any favorable comment on the massive development of water conservation, in the winter of the year before last and in last spring, by several hundred million peasants under the leadership of the party. He held the "thesis that the gains are outweighed by the losses," and in some places he advocated that "there were only losses and no gains at all." In his first paragraph, the writer put these conclusive views succinctly. The merit of this comrade is that he has told everything about his ideology. This is different from some of the other comrades who were basically disaffected, rather than disinterested with the main work of the party and the people. They underestimated the achievements, and overestimated the shortcomings. They were scared by current difficulties and, instead of encouraging the cadres, discouraged them. He had no confidence in the future and even lost their self-confidence. Nevertheless, instead of speaking out on their thinking and approaches, or instead of speaking some and keeping some to themselves, they would take the ambivalent attitude of "hesitating when their feet move forward, and stammering when their mouth is about to speak." Comrade Li Chung-yun was unlike these people. He did not conceal his views, but has written fervently to the Central [Committee] comrades, with the hope that the Central [Committee] would take steps to overcome the current difficulties. He thought that the difficulties were surmountable, although it may take a longer time. This approach is correct. The comments of the writer on the defects of planning work filled the greater portion of his letter. I consider them highly pertinent. During the past decade, there was not a single comrade who suggested and dared to expose analytically and systematically to the Central [Committee] the defects in our plan in order to seek adjustments. I have never seen such a man. I know there are such people, but they dared not appeal to the top echelon directly by bypassing the proper echelons. For this reason I suggest that this letter should be discussed in party organizations
of the central and local (provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional) levels, especially in the planning organs. Correct analyses should be made regarding the time, amount, benefits and detriments, gains and losses of their work during 1958 and 1959. This is to unify understanding, solidify the comrades, improve work, bolster the zeal for endeavor, and forge ahead bravely to strive for the new great victory in economic work as well as in other works (political work, military work, cultural, educational and public health work, leadership work of party organizations at all levels, industrial, youth and women's work, etc.). From the time of the first Chengchow Conference in November last year [1958] to the Lushan Conference now, the Party Central Committee has made stringent criticisms of the errors and shortcomings of various important activities under its own leadership, where the achievements have been sufficiently estimated (the achievements are primary, while the shortcomings and errors are secondary). This work of criticizing has been undertaken for nine months already. It must be realized that this kind of criticism is entirely necessary, and it has become effective either quickly or gradually. It must also be realized that this kind of solemn and earnest criticism would inevitably produce, and must have produced, some side-effects — that is, it has proved to be dampening to the morale of certain comrades. It is necessary to criticize the errors, as well as to prevent the dampening of morale. Morale must be bolstered, not dampened. If a person has no morale, he will amount to nothing. We must insist on what has been stated in the minutes of the second Chengchow Conference held in March this year — that in the exuberant spirit of protecting the cadres, it is necessary to guide those who have committed errors in their work so as to criticize and rectify their own errors and shortcomings. One need not be afraid of errors; what one should fear is unwillingness to criticize and rectify them, and the dampening of morale because of criticisms. It is necessary to rectify errors and bolster morale. We have undertaken criticisms and rectifications for nine months already. All unfinished work must be completed. None-
theless, both within and without the party, a new phenomenon has appeared: rightist sentiments, rightist ideology, and rightist activities have grown and become rampant, as manifested in a number of materials printed and distributed to the comrades at this conference. Though this situation has not yet reached the degree of the frantic attack on the party by the rightists in 1957, the indication and tendency have already become very salient and have already appeared on the horizon. This situation is of a bourgeois nature. Another situation is of the nature of ideology within the proletariat. They, like us, all want socialism, not capitalism. This is the basic similarity between us and these comrades. However, there is some divergence between their viewpoint and ours in that their sentiment is somewhat abnormal. They have overestimated the errors committed by the party and made improper conclusions. They have lacked confidence in overcoming prevailing difficulties. They have unconsciously put themselves in the awkward position between the leftists and the rightists, thus becoming typical middle-of-the-roaders. They believe in the "theory of proper balance between gains and losses," but they became irresolute and wavering at a crucial moment. Though we are not afraid of the frantic attack of the rightists, nevertheless, we are afraid of the wavering of these comrades because this is detrimental to the present solidarity of the people as well as to the party's effort to bolster the zeal for endeavor, to surmount difficulties, and to strive for victory. We believe that the attitude of these comrades could be changed. Our task is to rally around them and to strive for a change in their attitude.

In order to achieve this goal, it is important to make a necessary estimate of the internal activities of the party. The estimate should not be too high. We must not think that they are formidable and can rock the great boat of the party and the people in the storm. They do not have such strength. They form only a relative minority, while we are the overwhelming majority. We and the great majority of the people (workers, poor peasants, lower middle peasants, a segment of the upper middle peasants, and the revolutionary intellectuals) are united and
unanimous. The party's general line, and the directions, policies, and work method used to implement the general line, have received the welcome of the broad masses of party members, cadres, and people. However, we must not overly underestimate their strength. They have a considerable number of people. Before their erroneous views have been criticized and before their attitude has been rectified, they will not easily give up their own convictions. We must realize this point. Whenever there are some disputes in the party over big issues and divergent views are expressed, there are bound to be some who will waver temporarily and stay in the middle, and there will be others who stand to the right. This is a normal phenomenon that should occasion no surprise. In the final analysis, erroneous views and even erroneous lines are bound to be overcome. The majority of people, including those who are waver- ing or have followed the erroneous line, are bound to be solidified on a new basis. The 39-year history of our party has been such an experience: when one opposed the right, the "left" was bound to emerge; and when one opposed the "left," the right was bound to emerge. This is inevitable. At this point we should talk about this now. We must not talk about anything that is inimical to solidarity and to the party, as well as to individuals. The current dispute may prove that this is a dispute of far-reaching significance. Like various important disputes in our revolutionary period, in the new historic period — the period of socialist construction — it is impossible to have no dispute and to be tranquil without any ripples. The Lushan Conference might prove itself to be one of great significance. Solidarity — criticism — solidarity, to take lessons from the past and to be careful in the future, to heal sickness and save lives — this has been proven by history to be the effective method for resolving intraparty contradictions and contradictions among the people. It is incumbent on us to insist on this methodology.

At the plenary meeting of the conference on July 23, I expressed most of these views. I have written this as a supplement to what I left unsaid in that speech.
REMARKS CONCERNING THE PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION

OF THREE ARTICLES (July 29, 1959)

These three pieces [reference uncertain] are being printed and distributed to comrades. In the printing, please pay attention to place the one on Khrushchev (including a New York report of the Central News Agency) in front. The three articles are printed together; ask the comrades to study to see if the communes of the Soviet Union that had failed are the same thing as our people's communes, to see if our communes will collapse, and, if so, what are the factors that will bring about their collapse. If not, then why not? Whatever is not needed by history is bound to collapse; it is impossible to maintain it artificially. Whatever is in keeping with the demand of history will never collapse, and it will be futile to disband it artificially. This is the great truth of historical materialism. The comrades will please read the Preface to Marx's Critique of Political Economy. Recently, those who attacked the people's communes have brought out this scientific principle evolved by Marx as a magic power against us. Aren't you scared by this magic power?
LETTER TO WANG CHIA-HSIANG (August 1, 1959)

...Please look at this item, which may be interesting. I have written a few words purporting to refute Khrushchev. Later I will write some article proselytizing in favor of the superiority of the people's commune. The Khrushchevs oppose or are skeptical about these three things: one hundred flowers blooming, people's communes, and the great leap forward. I can see that they are in a passive position, while we have taken extreme initiative. What do you think? We must use these three things to challenge the entire world, including a large number of opponents and skeptics within the party.
LETTER TO CHANG WEN-T’IEN (August 2, 1959)

This is the first complete available text of the letter. The last three-quarters of it were published from a fragmentary Red Guard text in Tsu-kuo (Hong Kong), No. 50 (May 1, 1968), p. 36, and included in The Case of P’eng Te-huai, op. cit., pp. 315-316 (English) and p. 483 (Chinese).

What did you do to have yourself entrapped in that Military Club? This is really what the adage says: Things are aggregated into like categories, but men gravitate to their group. What purpose do you have in mind this time? You have so assiduously and extensively searched out these dark materials that really are treasures! Did you not go to get them from Ao-kwang, the Dragon King of the East Sea? Otherwise, how could there be so much! However, after they have been exhibited, it showed that they were all fake. Two days after you spoke, you became so panicky and perturbed that you found it hard to free yourself. Whom to blame? You deserved it. I think this was the relapse of your old sickness. You did not get rid of the original bacteria of malaria, and now your chills and fever have recurred. The ancients had a poem on malaria: "When one is cold, it is as chilly as sleeping on ice; when one
is hot, he feels as if he is sitting in a bamboo steamer; when it pains, it is as if the skull is cracking; when one trembles, even the teeth clatter. This is really like murdering, and how difficult it is to pass through the changes of winter and summer." Comrade, isn't this so? If it is, then it will be all right. You must undergo a serious illness. In Chao Ming wen-hsüan [Selected Writings of Chao Ming], the last part of Mei Ch'eng's essay entitled "Ch'i-fa" says: "This is also the excellent word and the best Tao of the world. Isn't the Prince interested in hearing it? Then the Prince rose up, holding onto the desk and said: It is like listening to the words of the sage and the debater; my sweat came and I suddenly felt well from my illness." Your ailment seems to resemble that of the Prince of the State of Ch'u. If you should be interested, you might also read Mei Ch'eng's "Ch'i-fa," which is really a wonderful essay. You have completely forgotten the excellent words and the best ways of Marxism, and so you joined the Military Club, which is really a combination of the civilian and the military, like two pieces of jade complementing each other. What can you do now? Now, let me think for you. There are two words for you: "Rectify painfully." Since you [profess to] respect me, have phoned me several times, and have wanted to come to my place for a talk, I am willing to talk to you. But I am busy these days. Please wait for some time. I am writing you this letter to express my sentiments.
CONCERNING MEI CH'ENG'S "CH'I-FA" (August 16, 1959)

This document was published in Tsu-kuo (Hong Kong), No. 50 (May 1, 1968), pp. 37-38. The source was not indicated, but it was stated that Mao had circulated it to the participants of the Lushan Plenum in August 1959. Mei Ch'eng was a Han dynasty poet who originated the 
ch'i-fa or seven-stanza style.

This essay has been printed and distributed before, and is worth reading. This is in the form of the "Sao" style of poetry that is creative and enlightening. The Sao style was replete with democratic flavor. Belonging to the romanticist school, it threw a kind of critical dagger against the degenerate rulers. Ch'ü Yuan was high in the hierarchy, followed by Sung Yu, Ching Ch'ai, Chia I, and Mei Ch'eng, who were also delightful. Don't you see that the atmosphere of "Ch'i-fa" is fraught with a critical air? "When the Prince of Ch'u was indisposed and was visited by a guest from the State of Wu," from the very outset, the decadence of the upper ruling class was roundly denounced. "Where one travels by sedan and carriage, it is the beginning of the weakening of one's legs. When one lives in a spacious house and splendid palace, it becomes the medium for feverish disease. Beautiful women of pearly teeth and crescent
brows are the axe that kills one's nature. Delicious meats and fatty foods corrode the intestines." These words will ring true even ten thousand years from now. Now our country is under the leadership of the Communist Party. It doesn't matter whether one is an intellectual, or a party, government, or army working staff member — he must perform some labor, such as walking, swimming, mountain-climbing, calisthenics, all of which are considered labor, like what Pavlov did, not to mention hsia-fang [downward placement] to participate in labor, which is even more solid. In short, we must boost the spirit of endeavor and oppose the rightist tendency. Mei Ch'eng criticized the Prince of Ch'u without mincing words: "Now, the Prince's complexion is sallow, his limbs are soft, his muscles are weak, his circulation is weak, and his hands and feet are lazy. He is served by the girls of Yüeh in the front, and by the maidens of Ch'i in the rear. He is indolent in his boudoirs. This is like taking poisons in the form of delicious food and playing with the claws of ferocious beasts. The cause of the illness is deep and long, and it has lingered persistently. What use is there even if [the famous doctors] Pien Ch'iao should treat him internally and Wu Hsien should treat him externally?" What Mei Ch'eng said is somewhat like our method of dealing with comrades who have committed errors. We would shout to them, warning that their ailment has become most serious and that they might die unless they were cured. Thereafter, the patient might, for a few days, weeks, or months, be unable to sleep, thus becoming confused and restive. In this way, there came hope. This is because when one if afflicted with the disease of either right or "left" opportunism, there must be some historical causes as well as sociological causes. That is why "the cause is deep and long, and it has lingered persistently." We call this method "stringent criticism." "The guest said: 'The ailment of the Prince cannot be cured by medicines or by acupuncture and cauterization, though it can be dispelled by apt words and wonderful ways. Is the Prince willing to hear them?'" Pointing out the apt words and wonderful ways is the main theme of the article. The first paragraph of this essay is a foreword,
and it is followed by seven paragraphs, in which are discussed some of the frivolous and newfangled things that make up the opposite side of the author. The essay is beautiful. A climax is reached in the paragraph describing the watching of tidal waves at Kwang-ling. The ninth paragraph is the concluding one, leading to apt words and wonderful ways. After that, the Prince became exultant: "His sweat came to the brim, and his ailment was suddenly cured." Thus, by using the method of persuasion rather than repression, and the method of presenting facts and talking reason, the effect is phenomenal. This method is like our method of "lenient disposition." The first and last paragraphs form the main themes and must be read. If one has no interest, the rest need not be perused. We should invite such fellows like Engels, Kautsky, Plekhanov, Stalin, Li Ta-chao, Lu Hsün, and Chüü Ch'iu-pai "to a discourse on the quintessence of the universe and to distinguish the merits of all things," to speak about the necessity of the great leap, the causes of communes, and the extreme importance of putting politics in command. Thus, Marx would "survey it" and Lenin "would calculate it meticulously in order to be sure of its utility." When I was young, I used to read this essay. Now, after a lapse of forty years, I recently remembered it, and when I turned over the book to read it, I thought I had found an old friend. Thus, I want to offer it to the comrades. What Mei Ch'eng represented was the stratum slightly below the landlord class, and so he had a line that aimed at striving for improving and bolstering the spirit of endeavor. Of course, this is in terms of the upper and lower strata of the feudal class, but not in terms of the two antagonistic classes of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in our socialist society. Our line of striving for improvement and bolstering the spirit of endeavor represents the will of the revolutionary proletariat and of several hundred million laboring peasants. The people Mei Ch'eng attacked were the decadent, pessimistic, and rightist upper crust ruling class. We have also this kind of people today. Mei Ch'eng was a native of Huai-yin in northern Kiangsu. At the time of Han Wen-ti, he was an official in the field of litera-
ture under the king of Wu named Liu Shun. He wrote this essay for the nobility of the State of Wu. Later on, the "Ch'i" [seven-paragraph] style was proliferated, but not a single one was good. In the Chao Ming Wen-hsüan there were collected "Ch'i-ch'i" [Seven Addresses] by Ts'ao Chih, and "Ch'i-ming" [Seven Commands] by Chang Hsieh, which were aimed at recruiting hermits. They harped in opposition to Ch'ü, Sung, Chia, and Mei, and so were wholly without interest.
1. The Problem of Revising the Targets

The Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee held at Wuhan [November-December 1958] decided the targets for the current year. At the Seventh Plenary Session held at Shanghai [March-April 1959] there were some who suggested that these targets be revised, although the majority disagreed. It would seem that the revisions will not be very thorough. There are still five months to go, and after the revisions they can be presented to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. High targets are like setting up a kind of Bodhisattva for one's own self to worship. Now we still have to break up those unrealistic targets, such as in steel, coal, grain, cotton, etc.

2. The Problem of Line

Some comrades have become skeptical. Is this right or not? They were unclear before they went to Lushan; after they went to Lushan, some demanded democracy and freedom, and said that they dared not talk because of pressure. At that time it was impossible to gauge what was the matter, and I did not
know what they meant by undemocratic. During the first half-month, it was a sort of angels' conference, entirely devoid of tension. When they said that there was no freedom, it meant that they wanted to attack and sabotage the general line; when they said that they wanted freedom, it meant that they wanted the freedom to sabotage the general line, and they wanted the freedom of speech to criticize the general line. They also demanded a tense situation in order to criticize what happened last year. They also criticized this year's work, and said that nothing was right last year. Since the first Chengchow Conference of November of last year, the blowing of communist wind has been rectified; also rectified were some of the "leftist" tendencies, such as equalization, transfer of assets, and withdrawal of funds. They have failed to see the work of the past nine months; they were disaffected and wanted to discuss it again, otherwise they would consider it as a suppression of democracy. They seemed to be still not satisfied with the enlarged conference of the Central Political Bureau. We are preparing to convene a party congress next spring, and should the situation demand it, it may also be convened in September or October of this year. Did they not demand great democracy, great contending, and great blooming, as well as the great debate in 1957? The Lushan Conference has been in session for a month already, but the newly arrived comrades still did not know what it was all about. First, small meetings were held for nine days, then the conference would be in session, and finally resolutions would be adopted.

The method of convocation is one which everybody has endorsed. This is to proceed from the wish for solidarity — the solidarity of the Central Committee Plenum which involves the fate of socialism in China. From our standpoint, we must have solidarity. There is now a kind of disruptive tendency. At the Eighth Congress last year, I said that the perils were none other but, first, world war and, second, splits in the party. There were then no salient signs yet, but they have appeared now. The method of solidarity is to proceed from the wish for solidarity, and then through criticism and self-criticism to
achieve the goal of solidarity on a new basis. This means that in regard to comrades who have committed errors, we must draw lessons from the past and be watchful for the future, and adopt the policy of healing illness and saving life, thus giving the erring comrades an outlet and allowing them to rectify their errors and to continue to make revolution. We must not emulate Chao T'ai-yeh, in the Biography of Ah Q, who refused to let Ah Q engage in revolution. As regards the comrades who committed errors, we must watch and help them. It is not right just to watch them without helping or working for them. We oppose errors because poisons are not eatable. We do not relish the smell of errors; the purpose of criticism and struggle is to enable them to come nearer to us, and to make deviations and errors as far removed from us as possible. We must analyze those comrades who commit errors. There are only two possibilities; one is remediable, while the other is unchangeable. The so-called watching is to see whether they can change or not. The so-called helping means helping them to change. There are some comrades who, for a time, have gone to the other side, but after criticism and persuasion, coupled with the change of objective circumstances, have changed and deserted those people. The [Li] Li-san line and the Wang Ming line have been rectified by the Tsun-i Conference. Thereafter, after a lapse of ten years and up to the time of the Seventh Congress, there have been four years of rectification. It often takes a person several processes to rectify his errors because there can be no instantaneous compulsory rectification. Marx said that a commodity must undergo hundreds and thousands of exchanges before its dual character could be recognized. In the beginning, Lo-fu would not admit his error of line; after a struggle at the Seventh Congress, Lo-fu admitted his erroneous line. In that struggle, Wang Ming did not change; nor did Lo-fu, who relapsed into his old ailment. He continued to have malaria, which would recur whenever an opportunity presented itself. The majority of comrades had changed for the better. In regard to errors of line, historical facts have borne out that they could be rectified, although there must be confidence. There
were individual cases that could not be changed. This shows that the policy of healing illness and saving life is effective. What is important is that we must help them sincerely; we must be sympathetic with people, but not with errors that are poisonous and that must be dealt with drastically and severely. Nevertheless, we should not use the methodology of Wu Sung, Lu Chih-shen, or Li K'uei [all characters in the novel *The Water Margin*], who were resolute and could join the Communist Party, but their setback was that they were not tacticians and did not know how to do political work. It is necessary to adopt the method of presenting facts and talking reason, and to conduct great debates, publish wall posters, "medium-sized posters," and brief news of the Lushan Conference.

After coming up to the mountain, I expressed these three sentences: "Achievements are great. Problems are considerable. And the future is bright." Later, many problems arose. There was the problem of the frantic attack of rightist opportunists on the party. There is no longer a blowing of communist wind; nor is there the tendency of equalization, transfer of assets, and withdrawal of funds; nor is there superficial bragging. What transpires now is not anti-"leftist," but it is anti-rightist. It is the problem of the frantic attack of rightist opportunism on the party, on the 600 million people, and on the resounding socialist movement. Now, the more concrete proposals we make, the better. After opposing a "leftist" tendency for several months, a rightist tendency is bound to emerge. Setbacks and errors do exist, but they have been rectified. They would continue to demand change; they have grasped these things to attack the general line and to lead the general line in an erroneous direction.
COMMENT ON THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED "THE STATUS OF TENS OF MESS HALLS OF TAO-CHU BRIGADE, TANLING COMMUNE, P'ING-CHIANG HSIEN, HUNAN, WHICH HAVE BEEN DISSOLVED AND THEN RESTORED"

(August 5, 1959)

This piece seems to be worthy of reading, and is therefore printed and distributed to the comrades. Tens of mess halls of a brigade were suddenly dissolved, and after a while they have been reactivated. The moral is that one must not capitulate in the face of difficulties. Things like people's communes and collective mess halls have deep economic roots. They should not nor can they be blown away by a gust of wind. Some mess halls might be blown away by the wind, but there are bound to be some people or a majority of people who will start them again. Perhaps after a few days, or a few months, or even a longer time, they will be blown back again. Sun Yat-sen said: "Where it is in keeping with the reasons of heaven, commensurate with the sentiments of man, adapted to the tide of the world, and geared to the needs of human emotions, and where it is done resolutely by men of foresight and vision, it will surely succeed." This appraisal is a correct one. Our great leap forward
and the people's communes belong to this category. There are difficulties, and errors are also unavoidable. Nevertheless, they can be overcome and rectified. The ideology of pessimism is one that corrodes the party and the people, and it runs counter to the will of the proletariat and the poor people. It is also contrary to Marxism-Leninism.
These two articles are to be printed and distributed to the comrades. The responsible comrades of the various provincial, municipal, and district party committees are hereby requested to distribute the article on the Wang Kuo-fan commune to all communal party committees under their jurisdiction, and also to ask the latter to study what experiences could be adopted. In my view, they can all be adopted. Item 1: develop communes with diligence and austerity; item 2: raise more pigs (with the exception of Moslems); item 3: increase the number of large animals; item 4: increase the number of large farm implements; item 5: measures for developing mess halls; item 6: honest and practical work; item 7: consult the masses and insist on the mass line. All of these are very good. I think it would be possible for each special district to find one or more successful communes like the Wang Kuo-fan commune. Please search carefully, and study them after you have found them. Also, write some articles for publication in order to propagate your experiences. "Who Are the People That Have More Complaints in Rural Villages Now?" is also worth reading. This is related to those people who have made more complaints at Lushan now.
COMMENT ON THE "REPORT" CONCERNING THE DIS- 
SOLUTION OF WU-WEI HSIEN MESS HALLS BY ORDER 
OF CHANG K'AI-FAN, SECRETARY OF THE SECRETARIAT 
OF ANHWEI PARTY COMMITTEE (August 10, 1959) 

This is to be printed and distributed to all comrades. There 
are right opportunists in the Central Committee, that is, those 
comrades of the Military Club; they are also found at the pro-
vincial level, such as Chang K'ai-fan, secretary of the secre-
tariat of the Anhwei provincial party committee. I suspect that 
these people are opportunists who have infiltrated into the 
party. During the period of transition from capitalism to so-
cialism, they took the bourgeois stand and were determined to 
sabotage the dictatorship of the proletariat, disrupt the Com-
munist Party, create factions within the party, spread their 
own influences, disintegrate the vanguards of the proletariat, 
and set up their own independent opportunist party. That the 
main components of this clique used to be important members 
of the Kao Kang conspiratorial antiparty clique is one of the 
salient evidences. These people were willing to participate 
(in the party) during the period of the bourgeois democratic 
revolution, and they were revolutionary at that time. Even 
then they often erred in regard to the methods of revolution.
Devoid of spiritual preparedness for socialist revolution, they became uneasy with the advent of the socialist revolution. They had joined the Kao Kang antiparty clique long ago. That clique resorted to conspiratorial tactics to attain its reactionary goal. The remnants of the Kao Kang clique are now making trouble, being anxious to launch their coup. Their speedy exposure has proved to be beneficial both to the party and to themselves. If they are willing to wash their brains, it would still be possible to win them over. This is because they have the dual character of being both reactionary and revolutionary. When they oppose the socialist program now, they are in fact opposing the great leap forward and the people's commune. Don't be deceived by their sophisticated words. For example, they would say the general line is basically correct, and the people's commune would be all right if it could be deferred a few years. We should rescue them; we should thoroughly expose them among the broad mass of cadres so that their market will be more and more circumscribed. It is necessary to implement the policy of healing illness and saving life by the method of presenting facts and talking reason. It is also necessary to give them an outlet for work and revolution. Although criticism should be stringent, the punishment should be lenient.
COMMENT ON THE REPORT OF LIAONING PROVINCE
ON IMPLEMENTING THE ANTIRIGHTIST DIRECTIVE OF
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (August 12, 1959)

This is to be printed and distributed to the various provinces and municipalities. What are the conditions in the various provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions? Has the arrangement been carried out to oppose the rightist tendency and bolster the zeal for endeavor, as has been done in Liaoning? What are the results? It would seem that rightist sentiments, ideology, and activities still exist and are growing in various places. There are varying degrees of differences in conditions. In some places there is a sentiment of frantic attack on the party among the rightist opportunists. It is therefore necessary to make analyses in accordance with the specific conditions and to beat this evil wind. This has been accomplished in Liaoning with speed and efficiency. They have seized the initiative, thereby forcing the rightist opportunists to be on the defensive. This experience is worthy of attention in all places.
A document is found lying on my table, and when I pick it up to have a look, there are several passages of my words as well as Lenin's. The title is "How a Marxist Should Correctly Deal with Revolutionary Mass Movement." I don't know which scholarly comrade did this. It would seem that he has found some machine guns and mortars to shoot a stream of bullets at rightist friends during the Lushan Conference. Have you, who are the splitters within the Communist Party and cannot be more rightist in your posture, heard the gunfire? Have the shots hit your vital parts? You are unwilling to listen to me. I have "come to Stalin's late years," am "despotic and dictatorial," and refused to give you "freedom" and "democracy." I was also "vain and fond of credit," "biased in view and faith." "Where someone at the top likes it, the lower echelons would like it even more." I would let "the errors reach the bottom before I would turn the curve, and once making the turn it would reach 180 degrees." I have "deceived" you and treated you "as big fish in baiting you." Moreover, I have come to "resemble Tito" in that nobody could talk to me and only your leader could be qualified to speak. This is really the darkest
time, and it would seem that only you can clear up the situa-
tion. These were your rapid-fire shots which almost razed
half of Lushan. How could you listen to my muddled talk? Yet,
it has been said that you are all first-rate Marxist-Leninists,
adept in summing up experiences by expatiating on shortcom-
ings and underestimating achievements. The general line must
be revised; the great leap forward has gained less and lost
more; the people's communes have been ruined. Both the great
leap forward and the communes are nothing but the manifesta-
tion of petty-bourgeois fanatism. If that is the case, then
please see how Marx and Lenin commented on the Paris Com-
mune, and how Lenin commented on the conditions of the Rus-
sian Revolution! Please see which is better: the Chinese Revo-
lution or the Paris Commune? Comparing the Chinese Revolu-
tion to the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907, which was better?
Also, when the conditions of socialist construction in China
from 1958 to 1959 are compared with those of Russia when
Lenin wrote these two articles in 1919 and 1921, which was
better? Have you seen how Lenin criticized the renegade
Plekhanov, those "capitalist tycoons and their lackeys," the
"moribund bourgeoisie and the pigs and dogs of the petty-
bourgeois democrats who subsisted on it?" If not, would you
read them?

"To rejoice in the difficulties and setbacks during the transi-
tion, to disseminate the sentiment of panic, and to advocate
turning the clock backward — all these are tools with which
the bourgeois intellectuals wage their class struggle. The pro-
letariat will never allow itself to be deceived." How is that,
our friends of the right wing!

Since the splitters and the friends who stand on the right all
like Marxism-Leninism, then I would suggest that these col-
lected documents be presented to the party for discussion. I
think they most probably won't oppose it.
Comrades:

I suggest that you read two books. One is The Small Dictionary of Philosophy [Che-hsüeh hsiao-tz'u-tien] (third edition), and the other is Textbook on Political Economy [Cheng-chih ching-chi-hsüeh chiao-k'o-shu] (third edition). Both books should be read through within two years. I refer here to the third edition of The Small Dictionary of Philosophy, because the first and second editions contain too many errors; the third is much better. In my view, there are still some shortcomings and errors in the third edition, but we can always analyze and distinguish them when we read it. Like the Textbook on Political Economy, it is basically a good book. With a view to criticizing empiricism theoretically, we must read philosophy. We have criticized dogmatism in the past from a theoretical point of view, but not empiricism. The principal danger now is revisionism. A portion of The Small Dictionary of Philosophy, entitled Empiricism or Marxism-Leninism, is printed here in order to stimulate the interest of the public in studying philosophy. Subsequently, the entire book may be read. As to reading the history of philosophy, it may be deferred to a later period. We must now engage in combat in order to defeat the antiparty and anti-Marxist-Leninist ideological tide from three aspects: ideologically, politically, and economically. Ideologically also means theoretically. I suggest that we proceed from philosophy and economics, and then branch into other disciplines.
THE ORIGIN OF MACHINE GUNS AND MORTARS, ETC.

(August 16, 1959)

Speaking yesterday morning about the article "How a Marxist Should Correctly Deal with Revolutionary Mass Movement," I said that "I don't know which scholarly comrade did this. It would seem that he has found some machine guns and mortars to shoot a stream of bullets at rightist friends during the Lushan Conference." This riddle I clarified last night. It was not done by a scholarly comrade at Lushan, but by Comrade X X X of Peking and his two aides, with great resolve and exuberance. The struggle that has arisen at Lushan is a class struggle. It is the continuation of the life-or-death struggle between the two great antagonists of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the process of the socialist revolution during the past decade. In China and in our party, it appears that such a struggle will continue for at least another twenty years, and possibly even for half a century. In short, classes must be completely eliminated before the struggle will cease. With the cessation of old social struggle, new social struggle will arise. In short, in accordance with materialist dialectics, contradiction and struggle are perpetual; otherwise, there would be no world. Bourgeois politicians say that communist philosophy is the philosophy of struggle. This is true. But the form of struggle varies with the times. In the present case, although the social and
economic systems have changed, the reactionary ideology left over from the old times remains in the minds of a large number of people. This is also the bourgeois ideology, as well as the upper-layer petty-bourgeois ideology, and cannot be changed all at once. It may take time to change, and a rather long period of time at that. This is the class struggle in society, and the intraparty struggle has merely reflected the class struggle in society. This is by no means surprising. Indeed, it would be inconceivable if there were not such struggle. In the past I have not spoken about it, and so many comrades still cannot comprehend it. Once problems cropped up, such as the Kao [Kang] and Jao [Shu-shih] problem of 1954 and the current problem of P'eng, Huang, Chang, and Chou, many people were surprised. This kind of surprise is understandable, because social contradictions are often concealed before they become salient. One's understanding of class struggle in the socialist epoch can only be deepened through his own struggle and practice. This is especially true in some of the intraparty struggles, such as the struggle against Kao and Jao, and against P'eng and Huang, which was complex and devious. Why is it that only yesterday they were men of great merit, but today they became arch culprits? Was there not a mistake somewhere? People are ignorant about their historical changes, about the complexities and deviousness of their history. Isn't this very natural then? We should explain this complex and devious characteristic to the comrades. Moreover, in handling such incidents, one cannot apply a simple method, or regard them as a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves. They must be handled as a contradiction among the people. It is necessary to adopt the policy of "solidarity — criticism — solidarity," "taking lessons from the past and being alert in the future in healing illness and saving life," "stringent criticism but lenient punishment," and "watching first and helping second." It is not only necessary to keep them in the party, but also to keep them in the provincial committees and in the Central Committee, while certain comrades should even be kept in the Central Political Bureau. Is there any danger in so doing? There can be, but it is avoidable
if the policy adopted by us is correct. With respect to their errors, there are two possibilities: first, they may change; second, they may be incorrigible. There are ample circumstances for their changing. First, they have a dual character: on the one hand — revolutionary; on the other — counterrevolutionary. Up to now, they are different from the renegades Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Lo Chang-lung, Chang Kuo-t'ao, and Kao Kang in that while the former constituted a contradiction among the people, the latter was a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves. A contradiction among the people may be transformed into a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves if the attitudes and methods adopted by both sides are improper. However, it may also never be changed into a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves, but will remain permanently as a contradiction among the people. It can be resolved thoroughly if we give it timely attention. The following prerequisites are important to implement supervision by the entire party and people. The political level of the majority of cadres at the Central and local levels has been enhanced tremendously as compared with the time of the Kao-Jao incident in 1953, and they are now much more experienced. Is not the successful struggle at the Lushan Conference a clear evidence of this advance? Moreover, our attitude and policy toward them must be in keeping with the attitude and policy of Marxism we have already espoused. There is also the possibility that they would be incorrigible in that they will continue to make trouble and seek their own destruction. This is by no means formidable. What harm can it do to our great party and great nation if a few more members were added to the ranks of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Lo Chang-lung, Chang Kuo-t'ao, and Kao Kang? However, we are confident that all comrades who have erred, with the exceptions of Ch'en, Lo, Chang, and Kao, who constituted an extremely small minority, will be corrige under specific circumstances, given the time. We must heighten our confidence in this point. The thirty-eight-year history of our party has provided us with ample proof that is known to all of us. To help the erring comrades correct their errors, we must continue to regard them as comrades and broth-
ers, give them enthusiastic help, and give them time to rectify their errors, as well as the outlet to engage in revolutionary work. It is necessary to have some leeway, to have warmth and a springtime, instead of keeping them always in the winter. I consider these words to be extremely important.
Your letter has been received. I have recently written two poems of seven-character lines, which, if you approve, may be published in Shih k'an [Poetry Journal].

Rightist opportunists have recently attacked frantically, denouncing the people's enterprises. Anti-Chinese and anticommunist elements the world over, as well as bourgeois and petty-bourgeois opportunists who infiltrated into the proletariat and the party, have connived to launch a frantic attack. They seem to be pushing down the K'un-lun mountain range. Comrades, wait! A handful of opportunists in China who hang out the signboard of "communism" are merely dragging up a few chicken feathers and onion peels to serve as their banner against the party's general line, great leap forward, and people's commune. This is really like "ants trying to shake a large tree, so ridiculous that they do not gauge their capability at all." The reactionaries throughout the world have also cursed and scolded us bitterly since last year. As I see it, this is very good. It would be really inconceivable if the great enterprises of 650 million people were not cursed by the imperialists and by their lackeys in various countries. The more severely they curse, the more jubilant I become. Let them scold for half a century! By that
time, let us see who has won and who has been routed. This poem of mine is also intended to reply to these eight-forgetful [rotten] eggs.

Note [by compilers of Chinese pamphlet]: The two seven-character line poems are "Shaoshan Revisited" and "Ascent of Lushan."
That Mao addressed the Military Affairs Committee on this occasion, or even that the Committee met at this time, has not hitherto been known.

Comrades:
This meeting has been very successful. I say that anyone who is malicious is bound to go to his opposite side. As regards the class of the world, the party of the world, class enterprises, as well as people's enterprises, anyone who is malicious is bound to go to his opposite side, which means that he won't attain his goal. One says, for example, that a certain goal must be achieved, but the result is that this is impossible to reach. He has thus proven himself to be wrong and become isolated among the masses. For example, there are several comrades who, according to my judgment, have never been Marxists, even up to now. What have they been? They have
been Marxist fellow travelers. There are plenty of materials to prove this thesis. For example, ample materials are being printed and distributed now; there are also the materials during the time of the anti-Japanese war and during the time of the Long March. During the anti-Japanese war, there were attempts at provocation and alienation, such as what they called "liberty, equality, and fraternity," the allegation that "the anti-Japanese front cannot be divided into the left, middle, and right," that "to divide it into the left, middle, and right is wrong," that "one must not do to others what one does not wish done to himself." In class relationships, they have advocated the principle that "when a prince commits a crime, he should receive the same punishment as the common citizen." Such a viewpoint in handling the relationship between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between the oppressor and the oppressed, cannot be described as a Marxist viewpoint; it cannot be described as such entirely. This is in contravention to Marxism; it deceives the people and is a bourgeois viewpoint. Later there came the antiparty viewpoints of Kao, Jao, P'eng, and Huang, such as the "theory of an army party," which disrupted normal relations in the party and held that there may be a domain here and another domain there. Such viewpoints and conduct are not the viewpoints and conduct of a Marxist. Here are exposed, on a mass scale, some of the disruptive activities that took place many years prior to the Lushan Conference and the program for the Lushan Conference. In addition, there was also the [Li] Li-san line, on which materials abound. They have all been written. What you exposed are the things I have just mentioned. Thus, it is necessary to prove my thesis that they have never been Marxists, but were merely our fellow travelers. They were only bourgeois and opportunist elements who infiltrated into our party. There are also ample data to prove this thesis. Now, however, I do not propose to prove these things, because to do so would require writing articles and involve the work of a great many comrades. I want to mention it only. Bourgeois revolutionists have entered the Communist Party, but their bourgeois world outlook and their stand
have not changed. This is entirely understandable. They could not but commit errors. It became impossible for this kind of fellow traveler not to commit errors at the crucial moment.

The Lushan Conference and this conference, as well as party organizations at all levels throughout the nation, are discussing the resolutions of the Eighth Plenary Conference of the Eighth Congress. They are taking advantage of this event to educate the broad masses so that they may be further enhanced and awakened. This has completely borne out the fact that the overwhelming majority — say, 95 per cent — do not support them. This also proves that our party has matured, as has been manifested by the response of the comrades to their attitude.

Bourgeois elements have wormed their way into the Communist Party. Among our party members, there are many with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois features. They should be analyzed and divided into two segments. The majority of them are good. They can espouse communism because they are willing to accept Marxism. The minority is about one, two, three, four, or five per cent. In recent weeks, conferences at the provincial level have exposed quite a number of senior cadres who were rightist opportunists. They made trouble and were anxious to have a troubled world. Wherever trouble arose, they would be elated. Their principle is: "When the world is tranquil and work proceeds smoothly, they feel uneasy. They would become jubilant at any signs of trouble in the wind." For instance, where there happened to be short supplies of pork, vegetables, soap, and hairpins for women, they would immediately take the opportunity to complain that "your things have not been done well!" They considered this to be your business, not theirs. They would remain reticent when the organization was convened to make resolutions. They kept their silence at the Peitaiho Conference, at the Chengchow Conference, and at the Wuchang Conference. Though they mumbled something at the Shanghai Conference, we failed to hear anything. But when something happened later on (they thought that things had developed), they would again complain about such things as vegetables, pork, grain in some areas, soap, and even umbrellas.
For example, when there was a shortage of umbrellas in Chekiang, they called it an imbalance, "petty-bourgeois fanaticism," etc. It is difficult for a small segment of people to espouse communism and to become Marxists truthfully. When I say difficult, it does not mean that it is impossible. As Comrade Liu Po-ch'eng has said, one must change one's bones and be reborn. There are some who have been warlords before. There are others who have never been warlords. For instance, what kind of warlord is Comrade X X X? He may have been a literary lord or an educational lord! Without being reborn and without changing his very bones, it would be impossible for him to enter the threshold of communism. There have been five erroneous lines: the [Li] Li-san line, the first Wang Ming line, the second Wang Ming line, the Kao-Jao line, and the current P'eng-Huang-Chang-Chou line. Some have been erroneous five times; others have erred less. For instance, Comrade X X X had not come in yet at the time of the Li-san line; even P'eng and Huang were dealt blows at the time of the Li-san line, which was by no means accidental. As regards the seriousness of these five lines, the last two times occurred when Kao and Jao, and then P'eng and Huang, conspired to disrupt the party, which constituted a violation of party discipline. They did not know that a Marxist political party must have discipline. Lenin said that the proletarian party must be disciplined; it must have iron discipline. What kind of discipline should be applied to these comrades? Should it be iron discipline, or steel discipline, or the discipline of gold, wood, water, fire and earth, or some bean-curd discipline? A discipline of water means no discipline at all. Where then is the iron discipline to speak of? In launching disruptive activities and in violating discipline, the end result is bound to sabotage the dictatorship of the proletariat and to establish another kind of dictatorship.

The banner of solidarity is extremely important. Let us unite as the slogan of Marx says: "Workers of the world, unite!" They won't do it. It would seem they wanted: the fewer people, the better. They wanted to launch their own clique and do their own things in contravention to the will of the broad
masses. At the Lushan Conference I mentioned the fact that they would not talk about the slogan of solidarity because once this slogan was mentioned, it would then be impossible for them to pursue their activities. This slogan was detrimental to them. That is why they dared not mention it. The so-called solidarity also includes those who commit errors. It is necessary to help them rectify their errors and rally with them anew. Why then should we not include those who have not committed errors? They wanted to wreck them; what they did was a wrecking policy, not a policy of solidarity. The banner they raised was one of destruction. They wanted to destroy those who disagreed with them. They considered this kind of people undesirable, but the so-called undesirable people are actually in the overwhelming majority, even more than 95 per cent.

In order to have solidarity, there must be discipline. This is for the purpose of building the entire nation into a great power within a few five-year plans. The current task is that the entire people and party should build China into a great power within a few five-year plans. To accomplish this, we must have iron discipline; without this, it would be impossible. It is therefore imperative to have solidarity. I may ask: How can this object be attained otherwise? Is it possible to build a strong socialist power within a few five-year planning periods? In the past, we had to make revolution; now we must construct. Isn't it possible? It would be impossible without discipline. Solidarity requires discipline. P'eng Te-huai wrote many documents when he was at T'ai-hang-shan. Comrades, please compare Sun Yat-sen's manifesto at the First National Congress of the Kuomintang with the views expressed by P'eng Te-huai during the anti-Japanese period at T'ai-hang-shan: one was a Kuomintang figure, the other was a Communist. The time was 1924 in the case of Sun Yat-sen, and 1938, 1939, and 1940 in P'eng Te-huai's case. The Communist was more backward than the Kuomintang member; the name of this Kuomintang figure was Sun Yat-sen and he was more progressive. Why did Sun Yat-sen publish that document under the influence of the Communist Party? Recently, I have found the first manifesto
of the Kuomintang Congress by Sun Yat-sen, in which there was the ideology of class analysis. How did he have the iron discipline of the Communist Party? How could he endorse the discipline of the proletariat? Without communist semantics and without a common stand and viewpoint, it would be impossible to establish discipline. So I say that P'eng Te-huai is not as good as Sun Yat-sen; Chang Wen-t'ien also is not as good as Sun Yat-sen. At that time Sun Yat-sen was a revolutionary, while these comrades were wayward and wanted to sabotage their own established organization. Their slogans were favorable to the enemy, but detrimental to class and people. There were more views of this kind, such as....

One should by no means betray one's own fatherland by conspiring with foreign countries. Our comrades have convened this conference and criticized this thing because they were all communist organizations and Marxists. For one clique to sabotage another clique is impermissible. We won't allow Chinese party members to sabotage the party organizations of foreign countries by encouraging one segment of the people to oppose another segment. Nor could we permit anyone to be lured by any foreign country behind the back of the Central Committee....
It is 10 o'clock now. The meeting is in session.

This plenary conference of the Central Committee has solved several important problems. One was the agricultural problem and the other was the problem of commerce, both of which are important. There were also the industrial problem and the problem of planning, which belonged to problems of a secondary nature. The third problem was one of solidarity within the party. Several comrades have spoken: the agricultural
problem was explained by Comrade Ch'en Po-ta; the commercial problem was explained by Comrade Li Hsien-nien; and the industrial and planning problems were explained by Comrade Li Fu-ch'un and Comrade X X X. In addition, there was the problem of the expansion of the membership of the Control Committee and the problem of the interchanges of cadres.

This conference did not begin today, but has been convened for more than two months already, about one month at Peitaiho and almost one month at Peking. During August and September, all practical problems have been discussed and clarified at various small groups (in which all those who are now attending have participated), which, in point of fact, were large groups. Now it won't take too much for the plenary sessions; probably some three to five days would suffice. If we can't wind it up by the 27th, it may be extended to the 28th, on which date the conference must be adjourned.

At Peitaiho [August 1958] I presented three problems: classes, the current situation, and contradictions. I raised the problem of classes because it has not been resolved yet. We need not mention domestic problems. In the international situation, we have the existence of imperialism, nationalism, and revisionism in bourgeois countries where the class problem is still unresolved. Thus, we have the antiimperialist task, as well as the task of supporting the movement of national liberation. This means that we must support the broad masses of people in the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including workers, peasants, the revolutionary national bourgeoisie, and revolutionary intellectuals. We must rally with so many people, but not include the reactionary national bourgeoisie, such as Nehru, or reactionary bourgeois intellectuals, such as the Japanese renegade Communist Shojiro Kasuga, who advocated the theory of structural reform, and seven or eight others.

In that event, are there classes and class struggle in the socialist countries? It can now be affirmed that classes do exist in socialist countries and that class struggle definitely exists there. Lenin said: After the victory of the revolution, the
defeated classes in one's own country, because of the existence of the bourgeoisie internationally, because of the existence of bourgeois remnants and the petty bourgeoisie that continue to breed bourgeoisie internally, are bound to remain for a long time to come and may even attempt restoration. The bourgeois revolution in Europe, in such countries as England and France, has undergone several repetitions. Following the overthrow of feudalism, there have been several restorations and relapses. This kind of relapse is also possible in socialist countries, such as Yugoslavia's deterioration into revisionism, thus changing it from a worker and peasant country into one dominated by reactionary nationalists. It is incumbent on our country to grasp, understand, and study this problem carefully. We must recognize the protracted existence of classes, recognize the struggle of class against class. We must also recognize the possibility of the restoration of reactionary classes. It is necessary to heighten our vigilance as well as to educate the youth, cadres, the masses, the middle and basic level cadres, and even the veteran cadres. Otherwise, a country like ours may head in the opposite direction. Even to head in the opposite direction may not be too important, because a negation of negation may come about, thereby leading in the opposite direction again later on. If the generation of our sons should espouse revisionism and head in the opposite direction, which, although called socialism, would actually be capitalism, then our grandsons will definitely stage an uprising to overthrow their parents because of mass disaffection. Hence, from this moment on, we must talk about it every year, every month, every day, at conferences, at party congresses, at plenary sessions, and at each and every meeting, so that we may have a sounder Marxist-Leninist line in regard to this problem.

The domestic situation has not been too auspicious in the last few years, but it has begun to improve now. In 1959 and 1960, certain things were mishandled mainly because of the lack of experience of a considerable number of people and their failure to understand the problems. This consisted largely in excessive procurement and requisition where there
was not enough grain, but we insisted that there was; and [it consisted] in blind command in agriculture and industry. There were also several other errors in massive undertakings. Rectification of errors began in the latter part of 1960 — even earlier than that, since it began at the first Chengchow Conference of October [sic] 1958. Attention has been given to correct the errors at the Wuchang Conference in November and December [1958], and then at the second Chengchow Conference in February and March [1959], and also at the Shanghai Conference in April 1959. There was a period of time during 1960 when this problem was given insufficient attention. This was because of the advent of revisionism which pressured us, and our attention was shifted to opposing Khrushchev. From the second half of 1958, he [Khrushchev] has attempted to block the China sea-coast, to launch a joint fleet in China to dominate the coastal area, and to blockade us. Khrushchev came to China because of this problem. Thereafter, Khrushchev supported Nehru in attacking us on the Sino-Indian border problem in September 1959, and a statement to this effect was issued by Tass [September 9, 1959]. Khrushchev came to China in October [1959] to attend the tenth anniversary of our National Day, and he attacked us when he was speaking at a dinner party. It was followed by the Bucharest Congress in [June] 1960, where they laid their siege against us, and then by the Conference of the Two Communist Parties [September 1960], the 26-nation drafting committee, the 81-nation Moscow Conference, and a Warsaw meeting, all of which concerned themselves with the dispute between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. During 1960, we fought with Khrushchev. You see, even between socialist nations and with Marxism-Leninism, such a problem as this has arisen. In fact, the roots were laid earlier; this episode occurred a long time ago. They did not allow China to make revolution. This was in 1945, when Stalin tried to prevent the Chinese revolution by saying that there should not be any civil war and that we must collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek. Otherwise, the Chinese nation would perish. At that time, we did not carry this into effect, and the revolution was victorious. After
the revolutionary victory, [they] again suspected that China would be like Yugoslavia and I would become a Tito. Later on, [I] went to Moscow to conclude the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance [February 14, 1950], which also involved a struggle. He [Stalin] did not want to sign it, but finally agreed after two months of negotiations [December 1949-February 1950]. When did Stalin begin to have confidence in us? It began in the winter of 1950, during the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign. He believed that we were not Yugoslavia and not Titoist. Nevertheless, we have now become "left adventurists," "nationalists," "dogmatists," and "sectarians," while Yugoslavia has become Marxist-Leninist. Now Yugoslavia is very popular, and it is said that she has become a "socialist" country. Thus, it is also very complicated within the socialist camp, though in fact this is also rather simple. The truth is this, namely, the problem of class struggle, the problem of struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the problem of struggle between Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism-Leninism, and the problem of struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism.

The situation is propitious, both internationally and domestically. At the beginning of the founding of the nation, I myself and Comrade X X, among others, used to take the view that the parties and trade unions of Asia and the parties of Africa might be undermined. Later on this view was proven incorrect, and it did not turn out as we thought. Since World War II, in Asia, Africa, or Latin America, determined struggles of national liberation have developed year after year. There have occurred the Cuban revolution, the independence of Algeria, the Asian sports meet in Indonesia, the demonstration of tens of thousands of people that wrecked the Indian consulate, the isolation of India, the handing over of West Irian by the Netherlands, the armed struggle in South Vietnam that was a very good armed struggle, the victory of Algeria's armed struggle, the victorious struggle of Laos, the Suez Canal incident, and the independence of Egypt. The United Arab Republic was a little to the right, but there was Iraq. Both of them were to the right of the
middle, but they were anti-imperialist. Even though Algeria
had a population of less than 10 million, France deployed some
800,000 troops and fought for seven or eight years. As a re-
sult, Algeria won. Thus, the international situation is excel-
 lent. Comrade Ch’en Yi has made a very good report on this.

The so-called contradiction is the contradiction between us
and imperialism, and the contradiction between imperialism
and the world is the primary one. The people of all nations
are opposed to the reactionary bourgeoisie and to reactionary
nationalism. There exist the contradiction between the people
of all nations and revisionism, the contradiction among impe-
rialist countries, the contradiction between nationalist coun-
tries and the imperialists, the internal contradiction of the im-
perialist countries, and the contradiction between socialism
and imperialism. It would seem to be better for China’s right
opportunism to change its name to Chinese revisionism. These
two months of conferences, from Peitaiho [August 1958] to
Peking [January 1959], were concerned with two different kinds
of problems: one — the work problem; the other — the problem
of class struggle, which was also the struggle between Marx-
ism and revisionism. The work [methods] problem is also the
problem of struggling with bourgeois ideology, as well as the
problem of struggle between Marxism–Leninism and revision-
ism. There are several documents on the work [methods] prob-
lem, some on industry, others on agriculture, commerce, etc.
Several comrades have spoken about them.

As to how the party should deal with the problem of revision-
ism and the problem of the bourgeoisie within itself, I think we
should adhere to our traditional policy. No matter what errors
a comrade may commit, we should follow the line of the recti-
fication movement of 1942–1945, that is, if he should change
himself earnestly, we should welcome him and rally with him.
We must aim at solidarity, learn lessons from the past and be
careful for the future, and adopt the process of unity — crit-
icism — unity. But it is necessary to clarify what is right and
what is wrong. We must not be equivocal about it. Why is it
that the Buddhist monk has to beat his drum of wooden fish
when he reads the sutra? As it is said in *A Trip West* [Hsi yu chi, translated by Arthur Waley as *Monkey*], the sutras that have been obtained [from India] were eaten up by some black fish, and each beat could get only one word out. This, then, was the origin. We cannot take the attitude of the black fish, but should think carefully. If the erring comrade recognizes his errors and returns to the Marxist stand, we will then align ourselves with you. I welcome several of the comrades here. Don't think that you cannot face people because you have erred. We permit the commission of errors. Since you have erred, we also allow you to rectify them. Don't try to proscribe errors or prevent the correction of errors. Some comrades have rectified successfully, which is good. The speech of Comrade X X X is a case in point. X X X has rectified his errors and so we trust him now! Watch first and help later, and we will do so resolutely.... I said last year that we must be analytical in dealing with others. A human being cannot be without error. The so-called sage — or to say that a sage is free from shortcomings — is a metaphysical viewpoint, not the dialectical materialist viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism. Anything can be analyzed. I wish to advise our comrades that if you have conspired with foreign countries or have engaged in antiparty cliques, if you will expose everything and speak out truthfully, we would welcome you, also give you work to do, and never take the attitude of apathy. Nor would we adopt the method of execution. We must not break the taboo against execution. There were many counterrevolutionaries whom we did not execute. P'an Han-nien was a counterrevolutionary, and so were Hu Feng and Jao Shu-shih, but we did not execute them. Wasn't the Hsüan-t'ung Emperor a counterrevolutionary? There were also such war criminals as Wang Yao-wu, K'ang Tse, Tu Yu-ming, Yang Kuang, etc., and we did not execute them. Many have rectified, and we have granted them amnesty. Among the rightists who have rectified themselves, their [rightist] cap as such has been removed from them! The recent vogue of rehabilitation is not correct. If one has really erred, he will be rehabilitated; we cannot rehabilitate someone who has not
erred. When the error is complete, he will be completely re-
habilitated; when the error is partial, he will be partly rehabil-
itated. There cannot be any uniform rehabilitation.

In regard to the problem of work [methods], it is incumbent on our comrades to pay attention to the truism that our work must not be affected by class struggle. The first Lushan Confer-
ence in 1959 was originally a work conference. Later, P'eng Te-huai came out to say: You have X [an obscenity omitted in original] my mother for 40 days, and so why could I not X your mother for 20 days even? This X jeopardized [the confer-
ence] and work was affected. Even 20 days was not enough, and so we abandoned our work. We cannot do it this time. In re-
porting [the conference], all localities and sectors should place work first. Work and class struggle should be undertaken side by side. One should not place the class struggle conspicuously. We have already formed two Review Commissions for special cases to clarify the problems. Our work must not be jeopar-
dized just because of class struggle, and we must not wait for the next conference or the one after that to clarify the prob-
lems. It is necessary to explain the problems and to convince others. Though class struggle is imperative, we need special persons to do this work. The Ministry of Public Security spe-
cializes in dealing with the class struggle. Its main task is to cope with enemy sabotage. There are people who engage in sab-
otage. When we resort to execution, it should be meted out only against those who sabotaged factories, bridges, who threw bombs at the Canton border, and who killed and engaged in ar-
son. The task of security work is to defend our undertakings, e.g., factories, enterprises, communes, production brigades, schools, the government, army units, the party, mass orga-
nizations, and also to defend cultural institutions, including news-
papers, [other] publications, and news agencies — i.e., the whole superstructure.

Isn't the writing of novels very popular now? To utilize nov-
els to engage in antiparty activities is a great invention. In or-
der to overthrow any political power, one must first create pub-
lic opinion and engage in ideological and philosophical work.
This applies to the revolutionary class as well as to the counter-revolutionary class.* Our ideology for revolution is the theories of Marx and Lenin, and the coordination of the universal truth of Marxism with the specific practice of the Chinese revolution. Where coordination is good, problems will be solved better. Where coordination is bad, there will be setbacks. In talking about socialist construction, it is also the coordination of universal truth with construction. Have we coordinated them well or not? We are still resolving this problem. This is also true in military construction. For instance, the military line of a few years ago differs from that of recent years. Comrade X X X has written a book that is rather sharp, never muddled where large phases are concerned. I have always criticized you as not being too sharp, but you are this time. Let me present you with these two maxims: "Chu-ko [Liang] has been meticulous all his life; but Lü Tuan is only clearheaded where big things are involved."

*The preceding four sentences are identical with a quotation released by NCNA on May 27, 1967, described as part of a speech by Mao to the Tenth Plenum — Editor, Chinese Law and Government.
This statement has never been alluded to before. There is no information concerning the occasion on which Mao delivered it, but it may have been at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and regional party secretaries, in June 1964. See Article Four in the "Twenty-Three Articles" of January 14, 1965, translated in Baum and Teiwes, Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 120-121.

We cannot follow the old path of technological development of other nations in the world by crawling behind them step by step. We must break the conventional rules and adopt as much as possible the most advanced technology, so that within a not too long historical period it will be possible to build China as a modern socialist great power. This is what we mean by our so-called great leap forward. Is it impossible to accomplish? Is this bragging? No, it can be done. Did we not defeat basically in our own country the seemingly formidable imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism? Have we not, on the basis of a poor and blank nation, attained an impressive level in such areas as
socialist revolution and socialist construction after fifteen years of endeavor? Have we not also exploded a nuclear bomb? In the past, Westerners dubbed us the "Sickman of East Asia." Haven't we discarded this moniker? Why is it that what the Western bourgeoisie has accomplished is beyond the capability of the Eastern proletariat? China's great revolutionist and our predecessor, Mr. Sun Yat-sen, said at the beginning of this century that there would come a great leap forward in China. This vision of his is bound to be realized within a few decades; this is a tendency that no reactionary forces can fore-stall.
I am not satisfied with the Wuchang Conference; the high targets made it impossible for me. I came to Peking to attend the conference. You have convened it for six days, but if I want to convene it for a day, it could not be done. It is not important if the tasks cannot be completed; don't look as if your parents have passed away. After the Tsun-i Conference, the Central Committee has become more centralized. After the Sixth Plenary Session of the [Sixth] Central Committee in [October-November] 1938, Hsiang Ying and P'eng Te-huai (the South Anhwei incident of the New Fourth Army and P'eng Te-huai's battle of 100 regiments) engaged in their independent kingdoms, and they did not inform us about these matters. After the Seventh Party Congress [at Yenan, April 23–June 11, 1945], there were only a few people in the Central Committee. Hu Tsung-nan launched an attack on Yenan. The Central Committee was divided into two routes: I and [Chou] En-lai and Jen P'i-shih were in North Shensi; and X X X and X X were in North China, and it was still rather centralized. But after entering the cities, we became scattered, each person attending to his own stall; it became even more decentralized after the division of the first line and second line.... In the past, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Wang Ming, Lo Chang-lung, and [Li] Li-san all engaged...
[in their own lines] overtly, which was all right. Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, and P'eng Te-huai resorted to double-faced tactics; P'eng Te-huai connived with them, but I did not know it. P'eng Chen, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Lu Ting-i, and Yang Shang-k'un resorted to clandestine tactics, and anything clandestine cannot have a good result.... Lo-fu was no good; I have some goodwill for Wang X X because it was he who supported the battle of Tung-ku. At the Ning-tu Conference, Lo-fu wanted to dismiss me, but Chou and others disagreed. The Tsun-i Conference also had good repercussions. At that time it would have been impossible without them. Lo-fu was stubborn....
"Ascent of Lushan"

Bucharest Congress
Third Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party in Bucharest, June 20-25, 1960. USSR and Chinese attacked each other with secret letters circulated among delegates.

CB — Current Background
A publication of the U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, consisting of translations from Mainland Chinese sources.

CC CCP
Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party

Chang Wen-t'ien
Chengchow Conference (First)
Meeting convened by Mao and attended by some higher and local party leaders, November 2-10, 1958. Concerned with communes. See CB Nos. 542, p. 1; 590, p. 21.

Chengchow Conference (Second)
Enlarged session of the CCP Politburo, February-March 1959; inter alia, made decisions on "tidying up" the communes. See CB No. 590, p. 21. Meeting never officially announced.

Chengtu Conference
A secret meeting of higher and local party leaders in March 1958. Preliminary steps taken toward the establishment of people's communes. See CB No. 590, p. 23.

Chou Hsiao-chou

Conference of Two Communist Parties
Secret conference of representatives of the CCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, September 1960.

Eighth Congress
The Eighth Congress of the CCP, held in September 1956, issued a document containing 16 proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962). The sixteenth point called for expanded division of labor and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies in

81-Party Moscow Conference
Conference of world Communist leaders held in Moscow, November 1960. Issued the famous Moscow Statement subscribed to by parties represented and signed on December 1, 1960. The Chinese often refer to this as the 81-Nation Conference.

General Training Department of PLA
A division of the PLA headed (from 1954 to 1957) by Liu Po-ch'eng (q.v.).

Huang K'o-ch'eng
Former Vice Minister of National Defense and PLA Chief of Staff. Purged with P'eng Te-huai in September 1959.

JMJP — Jen-min jih-pao
People's Daily (Peking). Official organ of the CC CCP.

Ku-t'ien Conference

Liu Po-ch'eng
Lushan Conference
Eighth Plenum of the CC CCP, held at Lushan, Kiangsi Province, August 2-16, 1959. See Communique of the Plenum in CB No. 589. A resolution on P'eng Te-huai, adopted by the Plenum on August 16, was only revealed in 1967. See Peking Review, August 18, 1967, pp. 8-10. More recently, documentation has appeared in CB No. 851.

Military Affairs Commission
The top-level party organ concerned with military affairs, generally considered to be an organ of the Politburo of the CC CCP.

Nanning Conference

Peitaiho Conference
Enlarged session of the CCP Politburo, held at Peitaiho, Hopei Province, August 17-30, 1958. Produced, inter alia, the first resolution on the establishment of the people's communes. See SCMP Nos. 1846, pp. 1-2; 1853, pp. 1-4; and 1857, pp. 1-10.

Peking Conference (January 1959)
Unknown, except for Mao Tse-tung's reference to the conference in "Minutes of Talks Before and After the Lushan Conference," above, pp. 44-46.
P'eng Te-huai
Former Politburo member, PLA Marshal, and Minister of Defense. Purged September 1959.

PLA
People's Liberation Army. The collective name for the various armed services of the People's Republic of China.

SCMP
Survey of the China Mainland Press. See note for CB.

Shanghai Conference

"Shao Shan Revisited"
A poem written by Mao on June 25, 1959, about his birthplace. Translation is in Chinese Literature (Peking), May 1966.

Supreme State Conference
Article 43 of the 1954 Constitution (PRC) states: "The Chairman of the People's Republic of China convenes a Supreme State Conference whenever necessary and acts as its chairman." Participants and function not further defined. In practice, such conferences have often been large gatherings (as many as 1,800 people) from government, party, and other elite circles. Some conferences have not been announced; others have been used as forums for launching programs, campaigns, etc.
Wuchang Conference
Sixth Plenum of the CC CCP, held in Wuchang, Hupeh Province, November 28-December 10, 1958. See CB No. 542 for documents. Distinguish: Wuchang Meeting (q. v.).

Wuchang Meeting
A meeting called by Mao Tse-tung between November 21-27, 1958, which was attended by central party leaders and by the first secretaries of party committees of provinces, cities, and autonomous regions. This meeting made preparations for the Wuchang Conference of November 28-December 10, 1958 (q. v.).
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