



Hold high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought and carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end.

**1967:**

**Writings and speeches**

**Mao Zedong**

## Introduction

In 2013, a private collector of Mao Zedong's works and related memorabilia, published 52 volumes of the Collected Works of Mao Zedong.

Zhang Dijie, from Luoyang City in Henan province was born in December 1959, and joined the PLA in 1976, the year of Mao's death. He began collecting everything he could related to the writings of Chairman Mao, and his 52 volumes, each often comprising 500 or so pages, spans the first poem written by Mao in 1901 at the age of 8 years old, to the final message attributed to Mao before his death, the message on the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea.

According to Zhang Dijie, over 36 years of painstaking effort he had accumulated 102,000 copies and 15,000 editions of Mao's works from over 130 countries. The content of the published collection, by a Hong Kong publishing house, comprises 30% that is widely known, 50% that has only been released to a limited audience, and 20% published for the first time.

This is a translation of those parts of Volumes 49 and 50 that span the year 1967. The five volumes of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong published in various languages by the Foreign Language Press, Beijing, have made Chairman Mao's writings on protracted people's war, the New Democratic Revolution, literature and art, and a host of other topics prior to the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution available to the international communist movement.

I am not fluent in Chinese. I know enough to get by on a daily basis in China, but for the sake of getting the job done quickly, I use the online translators Google Translate and Deepl. As good as they are, they invariably contain errors or contain references that need to be explained for non-Chinese readers. I can at least recognise and correct the errors, and search the internet in Chinese to find the information that will help readers.

There are two types of footnotes in this collection of Mao's speeches and writings. Those enclosed in [ ] brackets at the end of each writing or speech by Mao are by Zhang Dijie, those at the bottom of a page are my own. There are not many of the latter. Those by Zhang Dijie are translated as they appear in his collection. Some are simply matters of fact ("XXX was at that time director of such and such an institution") while others reflect the revisionist reappraisal of events and people connected with the GPCR. Comrades will no doubt be able to use their own bullshit detectors in relation to the latter.

I have not been able to contact Comrade Zhang Dijie to thank him for his great effort in collecting and publishing the 52 volumes of Mao's Collected Works, so I use this opportunity to acknowledge his great contribution to our knowledge of Mao's thinking across the years, and particularly during the tumultuous year that saw the launching of the GPCR.

Nick G. (Contents pages at rear)

## **Directives on the Cultural Revolution of 1967**

(January 1, 1967)

1. The guiding ideology of this year's Cultural Revolution is the New Year's Day editorials in Red Flag and People's Daily, which call for comprehensive class struggle.
2. Four key areas must be addressed: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and the Northeast. The responsibility lies with the rebels. The majority must be united, and the rebel ranks must be more than doubled.
3. Shanghai holds great promise; many students, workers, and government officials have risen up. This is the current situation of the Cultural Revolution.
4. Red Guards must learn from the People's Liberation Army and maintain a simple and frugal lifestyle.

Wishing you success in socialism in the coming year!

## **Comments on Liu Shaoqi's Letter Regarding the Red Guards' Call for a Public Criticism at the Beijing Institute of Civil Engineering [1]**

(January 6, 1967)

Premier:

Please consider this matter. I think it is not appropriate to discuss it. Please do some work with the students. [2]

Mao Zedong,

January 6

[1] On January 5, 1967, Liu Shaoqi wrote to Mao Zedong: "The Jinggangshan Red Guard Headquarters of the Beijing Institute of Civil Engineering has sent a letter asking me to make a public self-criticism at the institute before 4:00 a.m. on January 7. Another letter has been sent from the institute's 'August 1st Regiment' Red Guards, also asking me to make a self-criticism there. Should I go there to make the self-criticism? Please give your instructions!" After reading the letter, Mao Zedong wrote this comment.

[2] On the early morning of January 7, 1967, Premier Zhou Enlai met with student representatives from the Beijing Institute of Civil Engineering and Architecture and stopped their efforts to force Liu Shaoqi to conduct a self-criticism at the institute.

## Instructions on the Tao Zhu Issue

(January 8, 1967)

I didn't resolve the Tao Zhu issue, and neither did you. The Red Guards rose up and resolved it.

Tao Zhu's problem is very serious. He was introduced to the Central Committee by Deng Xiaoping. He's quite dishonest, yet Deng Xiaoping said he was okay. Before the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Tao Zhu firmly adhered to the Liu-Deng line, and he continued to do so afterward. The shots of Liu and Deng at the Red Guards' reception, in newspapers, and on television were arranged by Tao Zhu. (Someone interjected: "Tao Zhu writes empty promises everywhere. Every time he meets with someone, he says, 'I want to see Chairman Mao in the capital. It was great. I think the Chairman will see you. If not this year, he will definitely see you next year.' Using this to manipulate the Chairman's forces, playing a double game, and benefiting oneself.) Several ministries under Tao Zhu's leadership collapsed. Those ministries didn't need to exist. Revolution doesn't necessarily require ministries. The Ministry of Education can't control it, and the Ministry of Culture can't control it. You can't control it, and we can't control it either. Once the Red Guards arrive, they will be able to control it. (Someone interjected: Tao Zhu was very evil. Xinhua News Agency released a photo for the 17th anniversary last year. It showed five people: Chairman Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping... Deng Xiaoping's body was Chen Yi's body. Chen Yi's head was cut off and replaced with Deng Xiaoping's.)

Promoting Mao Zedong Thought in the Central-South Bureau is a lie; it's not true. They're trying to establish their own authority and overthrow the Central Committee. I hope you can expose Tao Zhu at this meeting!

## Speech to the Central Cultural Revolution Group [1]

(January 9, 1967)

The leftists have seized power in Wenhui Daily. On the 4th, there was a rebellion. On the 6th, there was also a rebellion in Liberation Daily. This is a good direction. After Wenhui Daily seized power, I read all three issues of the newspaper and selected articles by the Red Guards. Some good articles can be selected for publication. Wenhui Daily's "Letter to the People of the City" on the 5th, [2] can be reprinted in the People's Daily and broadcast on the radio. Internal rebellion is good! A comprehensive report can be made in a few days. This is one class overthrowing another class; this is a great revolution. Many newspapers, in my opinion, would be better off being banned, but they still need to be published. The question is who should publish them. It's good for Wenhui Daily and Liberation Daily to rebel. Once these two newspapers are published, they will definitely have an impact on East China and all provinces and cities across the country.

To launch a revolution, one must first create public opinion. On June 1st, the People's Daily seized power. The central government dispatched a working group, which published the editorial "Sweep Away All Monsters and Demons." I disagree with starting a new organization, but to seize power, Tang Pingzhu replaced Wu Lengxi [3]. Initially, the masses didn't believe it because the People's Daily had deceived people in the past [4] and hadn't issued a statement. The seizure of power by two newspapers was a national issue, and we must support their rebellion.

Our newspaper wants to reprint the Red Guards' articles. They're excellent, while ours are dead. The Central Propaganda Department can dispense with them. Let those people live and eat wherever they want. There are many things the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Culture can't handle. I can't control you [5], but the Red Guards will take control as soon as they arrive.

The rise of revolutionary forces in Shanghai will bring hope to the entire country. It will inevitably influence East China, as well as provinces and cities across the country. "A Letter to the People of the City" is a rare good article. It addresses Shanghai, but the issue is national.

Some people in the revolution now demand this and that. We started the revolution in 1920, first with the Youth League and then with the Communist Party. How could we have the funds, the printing press, the bicycles? We were very familiar with the workers when we were working on the newspaper, chatting while we edited the manuscripts. We wanted to connect with all kinds of people, left, centre, and right. I have always disapproved of a unit being so clean. (Someone reported that Wu Lengxi was very comfortable and had gained

weight.) Wu Lengxi and his people were too comfortable. I do not advocate for their dismissal, but for them to remain in their posts and be supervised by the masses.

When we began our revolution, we were exposed to opportunism, not Marxism-Leninism. Even as young people, we had never read The Communist Manifesto. We must focus on revolution and promote production; revolution cannot be separated from production. Conservatives don't engage in production. This is a class struggle. Don't believe the saying, "When the Butcher Zhang dies, we won't eat hairy pig"<sup>1</sup>, thinking that we can't do without them. Don't buy into that!

[1] This is Mao Zedong's speech to the Central Cultural Revolution Group regarding the seizure of power at Wenhui Daily and Jiefang Daily. On January 4, 1967, the "Sparkling Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" of the Wenhui Daily published a "Notice to Readers" announcing its takeover of Wenhui Daily. On January 6, the "Revolutionary Rebel United Headquarters" of the Jiefang Daily published a "Notice to Readers" announcing its takeover of Jiefang Daily.

[2] This refers to the report "Grasp the Revolution, Promote Production, and Thoroughly Smash the New Counterattack of the Bourgeois Reactionary Line—A Warning to the People of Shanghai" published in Wenhui Daily on January 5, 1967, by 11 rebel organizations including the "Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters." On January 9, the People's Daily reprinted the report in full.

[3] Wu Lengxi served as editor-in-chief of the People's Daily from June 1957 to May 1966. After power was seized at the People's Daily, Tang Pingzhu took over.

[4] During the Great Leap Forward, the People's Daily published a series of exaggerated and erroneous articles, such as "The People are bolder, the Land is more productive." In "Remembering Chairman Mao," Wu Lengxi wrote: "By the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress in May 1958, the call for liberating the mind and daring to think and act was overwhelming. I, the head of the People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency, followed suit, but due to Chairman Mao's repeated warnings, I was initially cautious. By June, however, agricultural production 'satellites' began to be launched, followed by steel and coal 'satellites.' The Great Leap Forward reached its climax, and exaggeration became rampant. Initially, coverage of the people's communes was limited to typical examples, but later, with

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<sup>1</sup> "If Butcher Zhang dies, you won't eat hairy pig" is a Chinese folk saying, which refers to a butcher who monopolised his trade to the point that he convinced his customers that when he died there would be no pigs still with their bristles on (that is, unbutchered and still alive) to eat. Of course, when he died, other butchers appeared and the price of pork fell. Its extended meaning is that when there is a lack of key people or resources, things can still move forward, reflecting the substitution and continuity of the development of things.

the establishment of communes throughout Henan Province, a wave of communist propaganda swept through. While it cannot be said that the People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency bear primary responsibility for the exaggeration and communist tendencies of 1958, I still feel deeply guilty for the negative impact caused by the propaganda work I oversaw at these two organizations during that period."

[5] Refers to Chen Boda, who was the head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group at the time.

## **The Importance of the Cultural Revolution in Government Agencies**

(January 9, 1967)

The Cultural Revolution in our government agencies is extremely important. It wouldn't work if there were only student movements, workers' movements, and peasant movements without the active participation of government officials. Many important issues depend on government officials to expose them personally. Exposure is inevitable. Our government used to be composed of a small number of cadres sent from above and the vast majority of retained personnel. If workers and peasants hadn't risen up in revolution and seized control of the government, feudalism and revisionism would have easily emerged.

## **Comments on Two Telegrams, "Shanghai Revolutionary Rebels Launch a General Offensive Against the Bourgeois Reactionary Line," and Other Items**

(January 10, 1967)

Comrade Boda and fellow group members: (1) These two points [1] are excellent. (2) Within two or three days, please draft a congratulatory telegram [2] for the Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission to the revolutionary rebel groups in Shanghai, pointing out the correctness of their policies and actions and calling on the Party, government, military, and people throughout the country to learn from Shanghai's experience and act in unison. Once the message is drafted, hold a large meeting to approve and publish it.

Mao Zedong

January 10, 5:00 AM

PS. Don't post the document on anti-economism [3]. This one from Shanghai [4] is good. But I need to write an explanatory article [5].

[1] Refers to two Xinhua News Agency reports submitted by Jiang Qing, Deputy Head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on January 10, 1967: "Shanghai Revolutionary Rebels Launch a General Offensive Against the Bourgeois Reactionary Line—Reporters from Wenhui Daily and Jiefang Daily Comment on the Current Favorable Situation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Shanghai" and "Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters and Other Revolutionary Rebel Organizations Issue an Urgent Notice in Wenhui Daily and Jiefang Daily." These two reports were published in People's Daily and other newspapers on January 12, 1967.

[2] This congratulatory message was sent on January 11, 1967, and published in the People's Daily and other newspapers on January 12.

[3] This refers to the notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on opposing economism, submitted for review by Chen Boda and Jiang Qing on January 9, 1967. This notice was subsequently issued by the Secretariat of the General Office of the Central Committee on January 13, 1967, and dated January 11.

[4] This refers to the "Emergency Notice" issued by 32 rebel organizations, including the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters, in Wenhui Daily and Jiefang Daily on January 9, 1967.

[5] On January 12, 1967, the People's Daily published an editorial entitled "Oppose Economism and Smash the New Counterattack of the Bourgeois Reactionary Line."

## **Comments on "A Congratulatory Message to the Revolutionary Rebel Groups in Shanghai" and Five Other Documents**

(January 11, 1967)

1

Premier, Comrade Boda, and Comrade Jiang Qing:

I have read the two documents [1] and the other three [2] and they are very good. Please have Comrade Lin Biao preside over a Politburo meeting this afternoon or tomorrow, with the participation of the Cultural Revolution Group and certain other comrades. The five documents will be discussed and approved before being issued. If approved, please inform Comrade Lin Biao.

Mao Zedong

January 11, 2:00 AM

2

Agree to these three documents [3] and adopt them together at the Politburo meeting today or tomorrow.

Mao Zedong

January 11, 2:00 AM

[1] This refers to the draft congratulatory telegram from the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group to the various rebel groups in Shanghai, submitted by Zhou Enlai and others on January 11, 1967, and the draft editorial in People's Daily and Red Flag magazine, "Oppose Economism, Smash the New Counterattack of the Bourgeois Reactionary Line," both published in People's Daily on January 12, 1967.

[2] These documents refer to the draft notice of the CPC Central Committee on opposing economism, submitted by Chen Boda and Jiang Qing for review on January 9, 1967; the draft notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on stopping the corruption of mass organizations; and the draft notice of the CPC Central Committee on the issue of radio stations. All three documents are dated January 11 and issued by the Secretariat of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee on January 13.

[3] These are the other three items mentioned in the first part of this article.

## **Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Notice on Not Directing the Spearhead of Struggle at the Military and Three Other Documents [1]**

(January 12 and 13, 1967)

1

Agree.

2

Enlai Comrade [2]: Because this is an important document, it should be approved by the Political Bureau. Please make your own decision. [3]

Mao Zedong

January 12, 5:00 p.m.

3

I have asked the Premier to make his own decision [4].

Mao Zedong

January 13

[1] Refers to three documents drafted by the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission: 1. A Central Committee Notice Concerning the Prohibition of Directing the Spearhead of Struggle toward the Military. The notice states that the People's Liberation Army is the most important tool of the proletarian dictatorship, shouldering the great tasks of preparing for war and defending national defense, and safeguarding the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. No individual or organization may attack the People's Liberation Army's organs. Some local Party committees, under the guise of ensuring the security of Party and state secrets and the proper flow of intra-Party correspondence, have inserted materials related to the persecution of revolutionary masses during the Cultural Revolution into military organs, even inciting the masses, unaware of the truth, to direct the spearhead of struggle toward them. This is extremely wrong and absolutely prohibited by Party discipline and state law. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this notice on January 14, 1967. 2. Draft regulations of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on strengthening public security work during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. These regulations state: "Public security organs are one of the important tools of the proletarian dictatorship. They must adapt to the needs of the development of the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution and adopt appropriate methods to strengthen dictatorship over the enemy, safeguard the people's democratic rights, ensure the normal conduct of free speech, free airing of opinions, big-character posters, great debates, and great connections, and safeguard the proletarian revolutionary order." To this end, six specific provisions were made, including those regarding the legal punishment of active counter-revolutionaries. The CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued these regulations on January 13, 1967.

3. The Central Military Commission's draft notice, dated January 7, 1967, reaffirming that the military must never serve as air-raid shelters. The notice stated: "Since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, we have repeatedly emphasized that the military (including hospitals, sanatoriums, guesthouses, etc.) must not serve as air-raid shelters, harbouring a handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party, shielding those who persist in implementing the bourgeois reactionary line, and those who evade mass struggle. However, to this day, some units have failed to do so, and some have even participated in suppressing, attacking, and repressing the revolutionary masses." The notice stated: "Party committees at all levels must pay serious attention to this and take immediate and resolute measures to prevent such incidents from recurring."

[2] Enlai, that is, Zhou Enlai, was the Premier of the State Council at that time.

[3] The first and second comments in this article were written on the report submitted to Lin Biao by Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Jiang Qing, deputy head of the group, on January 12, 1967, for the review of these three documents.

[4] This comment was written on the report submitted by Chen Boda and Jiang Qing to Mao Zedong on January 12, 1967, regarding the three documents.

**Comments on the Red Flag Magazine Commentary Article, "Proletarian Revolutionaries Unite" [1]**

(January 14, 1967)

Comrade Boda:

Very well written.

Mao Zedong,

January 14

[1] This comment was written on a manuscript submitted for review by Chen Boda, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine, on January 14, 1967. When submitting the manuscript for review, Chen Boda wrote: "Comrades Wang Li and Guan Feng have written a commentary for Red Flag. Please read it!" Wang Li and Guan Feng were then members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee and deputy editors-in-chief of Red Flag magazine. The article "Proletarian Revolutionary Newspapers Unite," later published under the name of this magazine's commentator in the second issue of Red Flag on January 16, 1967, quoted Mao Zedong: "Seizing power from the handful of capitalist roaders in power within the Party is a revolution under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a revolution in which one class overthrows another, a revolution in which the proletariat eliminates the bourgeoisie."

**Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (Excerpt)**

(January 16, 1967)

Over the past decade or so, some of our cadres have degenerated.

Leftist masses rising up to seize power is a good thing. Rightist seizures are certainly not good. The left's power is growing rapidly. In early November last year, there were only a little over a thousand leftist workers in Shanghai; by early January this year, there were over a million. Add in the students, and they become the main force.

In the past, it was the army that won the battle; now it's the workers and peasants themselves who are winning the battle, with the army's support.

Let the masses elect new cadres! Let them take over factory directors and secretaries. We can take over the areas we take over.

Takeover is good; we only handle government affairs, not business operations. The original people will still handle the work, and we'll just supervise.

## **Comments on Bringing Representatives from Guizhou to Beijing for Study [1]**

(January 21, 1967)

Premier [2]: It would seem appropriate to bring Li Zaihan, the military district commander, some revolutionary cadres from the provincial committee, and a number of reliable leaders of the mass revolutionary rebel faction, a total of about a dozen people, to Beijing for study and policy, and then have them return to implement it. Please discuss this with the Cultural Revolution Group.

Mao Zedong,

January 21.

It would seem appropriate to do the same with each province and city, resolving the issue one by one.

[1] This comment was written on a telegram dated January 20, 1967, from Li Zaihan, Deputy Political Commissar of the Guizhou Provincial Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, to the General Political Department and the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The telegram addressed several issues concerning a certain rebel leader in Guizhou and his headquarters, and requested that dictatorship be exercised against them.

[2] Premier refers to Zhou Enlai.

**Comments on the report of the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture Party Committee requesting the Central Cultural Revolution Group to send a telegram to stop the conflict [1]**

(January 21, 1967)

Premier [2]: We should seize the power from the Yanbian counter-revolutionaries. Please make arrangements. Mao Yuanxin [3] has been working in Yanbian for a month. There has been a great improvement there. He is going to Harbin today. If he has not left yet, you can talk to him.

Mao Zedong

January 21

[1] This report, dated January 19, 1967, from the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, the Northeast Bureau, and the Jilin Provincial Committee, states that at 3:00 PM on the 18th, armed conflict broke out between the Yanbian "Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" and the Yanbian "Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel Army" over the takeover of the Yanbian Daily. Casualties have already resulted, and the scale of the conflict is likely to escalate. The Prefecture Committee has sent representatives to both sides three times to persuade them to send representatives to negotiate a solution, but to no avail. Now that they lack trust in the Prefecture Committee, the Committee is unable to carry out its work, and the situation has deteriorated significantly. The Central Cultural Revolution Committee is urgently requested to call or telegraph both sides to stop the conflict.

[2] The Premier refers to Zhou Enlai.

[3] Mao Yuanxin, Mao Zedong's nephew, was then the head of the Heilongjiang Province Red Rebel Revolutionary Committee.

## **Comments on the Nanjing Military Region Party Committee's Report Requesting Whether to Send Troops to Support the Rebels [1]**

(January 21, 1967)

Comrade Lin Biao: The troops should be sent to support the broad masses of leftists. Please consider.

Mao Zedong

January 21

PS. From now on, whenever genuine revolutionaries request military support or assistance, this should be done. The so-called non-intervention is false; we have already intervened. It seems that a new order should be issued on this matter [2], and the previous order is invalid. Please consider.

[1] On January 21, 1967, the Nanjing Military Region Party Committee of the Chinese People's Liberation Army reported to Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, and the Central Military Commission, stating, "We have just received a report from the Capital, Anhui Military Region; the Third Rebel Headquarters' Anhui Liaison Station, and other units have proposed to the Anhui Military Region to hold a rally of 150,000 to 200,000 people in Hefei from the 22nd to the 23rd." They also requested that the Anhui Military Region send 300 to 500 troops to guard the venue. They stated that sending troops would mean supporting the Cultural Revolution, while not doing so would mean not supporting it. They gave the Anhui Military Region a deadline of 2:00 PM on the 21st to respond. Please give your instructions promptly on whether to send troops."

[2] On January 23, 1967, the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the "Decision on the People's Liberation Army's Resolute Support for the Revolutionary Left."

## **Instructions on the Seizure of Power in the Broadcasting System**

(January 23, 1967)

The revolutionary comrades at the Central People's Broadcasting Station have seized power, which is very good. I have heard that internal divisions and internal quarrels are brewing again. Furthermore, the revolutionary faction at the Broadcasting Academy has seized power, but divisions are forming again. We should urge them to unite, prioritize the overall situation, and promote unity over small group dynamics. Regardless of whether they oppose us or not, or even if they oppose the wrong people, we should strive to unite with them. I do not support the idea of not cooperating with those who oppose us. Internal disagreements should be handled as contradictions among the people, and differences of opinion can be resolved through discussion.

## **Proletarian Revolutionaries Unite to Seize Power**

(January 23, 1967)

A new stage has begun in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The principal characteristic of this new stage is the great unity of the proletarian revolutionaries to seize power from the handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party and from those diehards who cling to the bourgeois reactionary line. This struggle to seize power is the proletariat's general counterattack against the 17 years of reckless attacks by the bourgeoisie and its agents within the Party. It is a nationwide class struggle, a great revolution in which one class overthrows another.

## **Reply to Zhang Chunqiao's Telephone Request for Instructions on Seizing Power**

(January 23, 1967)

If power falls into the hands of the rightists, it was already in their hands to begin with; seize it. If it is then seized by someone else, then it remains in the hands of the rightists. It's no big deal; power can be seized again.

**Comments on the Draft of "Decision on the People's Liberation Army's Resolute Support for the Revolutionary Left Masses" [1]**

(January 1967)

Send it as is.

[1] This comment was written on a draft decision submitted for examination on January 21, 1967, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group regarding the People's Liberation Army's resolute support for the revolutionary left. Based on Mao Zedong's directive that the People's Liberation Army should support the broad masses of the left, the draft decision made five directives: (1) All previous directives regarding the army's non-intervention in local Cultural Revolutions and other directives that violated this directive were invalidated. (2) Actively support the broad masses of the left in their struggle to seize power. Whenever genuine leftists requested the army's assistance, the army should send troops to actively support them. (3) Resolutely suppress counter-revolutionaries and counter-revolutionary organizations that oppose the revolutionary left; if they resort to force, the army should resolutely retaliate. (4) Reiterate the directive that the army must not serve as a bomb shelter for a small group of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party and diehards adhering to the bourgeois reactionary line. (5) Carry out in-depth education throughout the army on the struggle between the proletarian revolutionary line and the bourgeois reactionary line. On January 23, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued this decision.

## **We must practice thrift to make revolution**

(1967)

1

We must practice thrift to make revolution. [1]

2

We must practice thrift further to make revolution. [2]

[1] The People's Daily quoted this sentence in boldface in its editorial, "Economy for Revolution, Protection of State Property," published on January 26, 1967. The editorial stated: "Our great leader, Chairman Mao, recently instructed us: 'Practice thrift for to make revolution.'"

[2] The People's Daily quoted this sentence in boldface in its editorial, "Further Practice Thrift to Make Revolution," published on August 26, 1967. The editorial stated, "Our great leader, Chairman Mao, and the Party Central Committee have recently issued another call to the people of the nation: 'We must further practice thrift to make revolution.'"

## **Comments on the Study of the Scope of the Military Seizure of Power [1]**

(January 26, 1967)

Comrade Lin Biao:

This document reflects the masses' concerns about which organs can and cannot seize power; and the attitude of those who have seized power toward those who hold different opinions (they should strive for the majority and not exclude them). Please study it. [2]

Mao Zedong

January 26

[1] This comment was written in the fifth issue of the "Summary of the Situation of the Military Cultural Revolution Movement" compiled and published by the Cultural Revolution Group of the entire army on January 25, 1967.

[2] On February 16, 1967, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China issued the "Regulations on the Scope of the Seizure of Power in the Military." These regulations stated: (1) The scope of the seizure of power in the military is limited to academies and schools (excluding confidential schools, advanced technical schools, flight schools, and classes with overseas training missions), art and cultural groups, sports teams, hospitals (limited to the PLA General Hospital, military region and service general hospitals, and teaching hospitals), and military factories (excluding factories with advanced technical testing missions, factories affiliated with naval bases, and top-secret factories). The determination of which of these units should and should not be seized depends on the nature of the problems with the Party committee's leadership. (2) The seizure of power must be carried out by genuine proletarian revolutionaries within the unit; it is not permitted to join forces with revolutionary organizations outside the unit to participate in the seizure. (3) The security, communications, training, service, and transportation units of various academies, military factories, and other units cannot be seized, nor are they permitted to participate in the seizure of power. (4) Except for the scope of power seizure stipulated in Article 1, all other units, large or small, are prohibited from seizing power through bottom-up methods.

**Comments and Revisions on the Draft Military Commission's Eight-Point Order and the Central Committee's Draft Notice [I]**

(January and February 1967)

1

The seven points are very good and will be issued as is.

Mao Zedong,

January 26, 1967.

PS. One more point is added regarding the issue of disciplining the children of cadres. Regarding the issue of attacking leading bodies. In the past, if it was a counter-revolutionary who attacked, we would investigate; if it was a leftist, we would not investigate. In the future, attacks by rightists should be resisted, and attacks by leftists should be welcomed. This document will be issued after discussion and revision. Comrades who came to Beijing for the meeting, please wait a week before returning.

2

The eight points you've proposed are excellent and will be issued as is.

Mao Zedong

January 28<sup>th</sup>

3

Regarding attacks on military leadership bodies, we must treat them differently. In the past, if a counter-revolutionary attacked, they would be held accountable; if a leftist attacked, they would not be held accountable. From now on, attacks will be strictly prohibited.

4

Premier:

Agreed. Send it as is.

Mao Zedong

February 20

5

Send it as is.

[1] The draft order of the Central Military Commission, submitted for review by Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, on January 25, 1967, consisted of seven articles. On January 26, Mao Zedong wrote a comment during his review, which is now Part 1. On January 28, the draft order, revised to eight articles based on Mao's instructions, was sent to Mao again for review. Mao wrote another comment after reading it, which is now Part 2. Mao also revised Article 5, which was written based on Mao's January 26th instruction. The revised text is now Part 3. The draft order of the Central Military Commission, revised by Mao's two instructions, stated: 1. We must firmly support the genuine proletarian revolutionaries, win over and unite the majority, resolutely oppose the rightists, and resolutely take dictatorial measures against those counter-revolutionary organizations and elements with irrefutable evidence. 2. All commanders, fighters, political workers, service personnel, medical personnel, scientific research personnel, and confidential personnel must remain at their posts and must not leave their posts without permission. We must focus on revolution, promote war preparations, promote work, and promote production. 3. Within the military, units carrying out the Cultural Revolution should practice free expression, free airing of opinions, big-character posters, and extensive debates, making full use of the methods of presenting facts and reasoning. Strictly distinguish between the two types of contradictions. It is not permitted to handle contradictions among the people using methods similar to those used against the enemy. Arbitrary arrests without orders, arbitrary house searches and sealing of doors, and corporal punishment or disguised corporal punishment, such as wearing dunce caps, hanging black placards, parading through the streets, or being forced to kneel, are not permitted. We must earnestly promote cultural struggle and resolutely oppose armed struggle. 4. All university teachers and students, art groups, sports teams, and hospital and military factory workers who have gone out to organize should promptly return to their respective regions and units to engage in struggle-criticism-transformation and reclaim the power usurped by a small group of capitalist roaders in power. They should not remain in Beijing or elsewhere. 5. Attacks on military leadership organs must be handled separately. In the past, if a counter-revolutionary attacked, they were held accountable; if a leftist attacked, they were not. From now on, attacks are strictly prohibited. 6. Attacks and collusion with any military internal war system or confidentiality system are prohibited. All documents, archives, and technical materials not related to the Cultural Revolution must not be obtained or looted. Materials related to the Cultural Revolution are temporarily sealed pending further action. 7. Institutions at the army level and above should carry out the Cultural Revolution in phases and batches according to regulations. Army, division, regiment, battalion, company, and special units designated by the Military Commission must adhere to the policy of positive education to strengthen combat readiness, safeguard national defense, and defend the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 8. Cadres at all levels, especially senior cadres, must strictly discipline their children with Mao Zedong Thought, educating them to diligently study Chairman Mao's works, earnestly integrate themselves with the workers and peasants, learn from them, participate in labour training, transform their world outlook, and strive to

become proletarian revolutionaries. If the children of cadres violate laws and discipline, they should be educated by the masses; serious cases should be handed over to public security and judicial authorities. On February 3, Premier Zhou Enlai sent a draft of the CPC Central Committee's notice forwarding the Central Military Commission's eight directives to Mao Zedong for review. Mao wrote a comment, which is Part 4 of this article. In the list of agencies listed in this draft notice as "not allowed to be taken over by personnel from outside units," Mao added "banks at all levels." On February 22, Zhou Enlai sent a revised draft of the CPC Central Committee's notice to Mao Zedong for review. Mao wrote a comment, which is Part 5 of this article. The CPC Central Committee's notice was dated February 21, 1967. The notice stated that the Central Committee believed the Military Commission's eight directives were excellent. With the exception of Article 7, regarding the military's deployment for the Cultural Revolution, all other articles of the order were applicable to local governments. The notice also provided five specific clarifications and required all localities to post this notice, along with the Central Military Commission's orders, at all grassroots units.

## **Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Commission**

(January 27, 1967)

1. The military's attitude toward the Cultural Revolution: At the beginning of the movement, it was non-interventionist. However, in practice, it has intervened (for example, materials were sent to the military for safekeeping, and some cadres joined the army). Under the current circumstances, with the struggle between the two lines so acute, intervention is unavoidable. Intervention necessitates support for the left.
2. Most veteran cadres still don't understand the Cultural Revolution; most rely on their past contributions. Those who have made contributions in the past should temper themselves and reshape themselves in this movement. They must achieve new contributions and new achievements. They must firmly stand on the side of the left, not compromise, but firmly support the left. Then, under the control and supervision of the left, they should do their work well.
3. Regarding the seizure of power. The newspapers say that power should be taken from those in power who are taking the capitalist road and those who stubbornly adhere to the bourgeois reactionary line. Isn't that true? It seems we can't be too specific now. We should seize it first. We can't be metaphysical, otherwise we'll be restricted. What kind of power group will be in power after it's seized? We'll determine that later in the movement. After seizing power, we'll report it to the State Council for approval.
4. Veteran cadres from before the seizure of power and newly-elected cadres must work together to do their jobs well and safeguard state secrets.

## **Instructions on the Cultural Revolution in the Military**

(January 27, 1967)

1. I believe that the thirteen military regions should not launch the Cultural Revolution simultaneously; there should be a sequence of events.
2. The Cultural Revolution is raging in the local areas, and the struggle for power is still intense. Our military should support the local revolutionary left in their struggle for power. Therefore, the military and the local Cultural Revolution should be kept separate.
3. Currently, international forces, including the imperialists, revisionists, and the reactionaries, are exploiting our Cultural Revolution to continue their anti-China activities. For example, the Soviet Union is suppressing students, aircraft activity has increased along the Xinjiang border, and ground forces are being mobilized. All major military regions on the front lines, such as Jinan, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and Kunming, must be vigilant and prepared. Therefore, the Cultural Revolution should be postponed for a while. It must be carried out in the future, for the sake of the overall situation.

## Comments on Zhang Bosen's<sup>2</sup> report on the Hunan issue [1]

(January 27, 1967)

Premier, Wang Li: Hunan should also be dealt with in the same way as Guizhou. [2] Zhang Bosen was the only provincial party secretary who persisted in his work in the provincial party committee and did not flee at the beginning of the movement last year. It seems that we should consult with him and see if there are other better cadres or rebel leaders who can be brought in for consultation. Please make your own decision.

Mao Zedong

January 27

[1] Zhang Bosen, then serving as alternate secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and vice governor of Hunan Province, wrote a report on January 25, 1967, to Premier Zhou Enlai and Chen Boda, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. He stated, "As a Party member, I wish to report two points to the Central Committee: First, the situation in Hunan's Cultural Revolution movement is improving. The rebels have completely gained political dominance, while the conservatives are disintegrating. However, the work of the Provincial Committee is temporarily paralysed, and the work of the leading organs has essentially come to a standstill. How to rely on the rebels, unite the majority, and establish a new revolutionary order is an urgent issue. Second, many units are currently demanding the dismissal and expulsion of cadres who have committed errors. Since mid-January, demands for expulsion have been incessant. If this continues, the consequences will be unimaginable." In his telegram, Zhang Bosen also requested permission from the Central Committee to make a report in Beijing and asked for guidance on the above two issues.

[2] On January 21, 1967, Mao Zedong, in his comments to Zhou Enlai on handling the Guizhou issue, pointed out that a dozen representatives from various parties involved in

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<sup>2</sup> Zhang Bosen (1914 – 1995) joined the Communist Party of China in 1938. He was the chief of the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region Government. In 1958, he was appointed vice governor of Hunan Province. From May 1966 to August 1967, he served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and an alternate secretary of the Secretariat of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. On April 22, 1967, Zhang Bosen issued a statement supporting the rebels in seizing the "Hunan Daily". Later, Zhang Bosen served as deputy director of the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee. In 1974, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. He was suspended for review in 1977 after the revisionists seized power. In 1984, with the approval of the revisionist Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he was expelled from the party and removed from his position. He died in 1995.

Guizhou should be "brought to Beijing to study and determine the policy, and then they should be sent back to implement it."

## **Instructions on Foreign Friends' Participation in the Cultural Revolution**

(January 28, 1967)

Foreign friends who are truly revolutionary may participate in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution movement.

## **Comments on Tan Zhenlin's [1] Report on the Situation of Several Departments in the State Council's Agricultural Department**

(January 30, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai:

This document is worth reading. A small number of counter-revolutionaries, rightists, and degenerates have infiltrated the Party, government, military, people, academia, factories, rural areas, and commerce. Most of these people have come out on their own during this movement, which is a great thing. The revolutionary masses should carefully investigate and thoroughly criticize them, and then deal with them according to their severity. Please pay attention to this issue. Tan Zhenlin's opinion is correct. Please distribute this document to comrades who have a large number of copies to alert them.

Mao Zedong

January 30

[1] Tan Zhenlin was then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Director of the Office of Agriculture and Forestry.

[2] Lin Biao was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai is Zhou Enlai.

[3] This refers to the report Tan Zhenlin submitted to Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group on January 28, 1967. The report discussed Tan Zhenlin's views and expressed his attitude on the implementation of the Cultural Revolution in the Ministry of Land Reclamation, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Fisheries, and other units

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**Comments and Revisions on the Red Flag Editorial Draft, "On the Proletarian Revolutionary Faction's Struggle for Power" [1]**

(January 30, 1967)

1

Comrade Lin Biao: I have read this and think it is very good. I have made some revisions. Please take a look at it and return it to Comrade Chen Boda.

Mao Zedong

January 30

PS. If there are any revisions, please inform Boda.

2

We must use Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon to overcome such erroneous tendencies as localism, small-groupism, decentralization, non-organizational perspectives, extreme democratization, liberalism, subjectivism, and individualism within our own minds and within our own groups. All these ideas and actions that violate Chairman Mao's teachings and hinder the great unity of the proletarian revolutionaries are manifestations of the bourgeois worldview and a reflection of the current acute class struggle within the revolutionary ranks. These problems constitute contradictions among the people and must be resolved according to Chairman Mao's consistent policy of *learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient*, and the formula of unity—criticism—unity. We should prioritize self-improvement rather than attacking each other.

3

It is wrong to believe that anyone in power should be distrusted. To oppose everything, *reject everything, and overthrow everything* without distinguishing right from wrong is contrary to the class viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

4

Cadres who have made mistakes must be treated correctly and not be overthrown en masse. As long as they are not anti-Party or anti-socialist elements *and refuse to change despite repeated admonition*, they should be allowed to mend their ways and encouraged to atone for their sins [2]. *The traditional Party policy is to cure the sickness and save the patient. Only in this way can those who have made mistakes be sincerely convinced, and only in this way can the proletarian revolutionaries gain the wholehearted support of the majority, thus ensuring their invincibility. Otherwise, it is very dangerous.*

5

Cadres at all levels must withstand the test of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and make new contributions to it. *They must not rest on their laurels and look down on the new revolutionary young generals. They should not only see their own past achievements and fail to see the general direction of the revolution today. They should not only see the shortcomings and mistakes of the new revolutionary young generals and fail to see that their general direction is correct. This view is completely wrong and must be corrected.*

6

In the current stage of the decisive battle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and its handful of agents within the Party, landlords, rich peasants, bourgeois rightists, bad elements, counter-revolutionary revisionists, and U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek spies who persist in reactionary positions have all emerged. These monsters and demons spread rumours to mislead the public, deceive and win over those who are ignorant of the truth, establish counter-revolutionary organizations, and engage in frantic counter-revolutionary activities. For example, the so-called "Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Flag Army," the so-called "Restoration Army," the "Joint Action Committee," *and other organizations organized by revisionists, ostensibly "revolutionary" but actually conservative, are examples of such reactionary organizations.* The majority of the masses within these organizations are misled and should be educated. However, a handful of leaders within these reactionary organizations are deliberately attacking the proletarian revolutionary headquarters, seizing power from the proletarian revolutionaries, attacking revolutionary mass organizations, undermining the revolutionary masses, *bribing workers, halting production, disrupting transportation,* and destroying and looting state property. They exploit the situation and hope to achieve their own ends. Some of these reactionary organizations carry out counterrevolutionary activities under the direction of stubborn capitalist roaders in power. Such reactionary organizations are built on sand. Once exposed by the masses, they will immediately collapse, and the handful of leaders will be exposed.

7

Chairman Mao called on the People's Liberation Army to actively support and aid the genuine proletarian revolutionaries and resolutely oppose the Rightists [3]. The great People's Liberation Army, personally created by Chairman Mao, has enthusiastically responded to Chairman Mao's call. The People's Liberation Army is making new and great contributions to the cause of socialism during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. *This is the glorious mission of the People's Liberation Army.*

[1] This first section contains comments on a draft editorial submitted for review by Chen Boda, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine on January 29, 1967. Chen Boda wrote on the draft: "Comrades Wang Li and Guan

Feng have prepared an editorial for Red Flag magazine: 'On the Proletarian Revolutionary Faction's Struggle to Seize Power.' Please review it!" Wang Li and Guan Feng were then members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee and deputy editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine. Sections 2 through 7 of this section contain Mao Zedong's revisions to the draft editorial, with the text printed in italics containing his additions and revisions. This editorial was published in the third issue of Red Flag magazine, published on February 3, 1967, and was reprinted in advance by People's Daily on January 31, 1967.

[2] "As long as they are not anti-Party or anti-socialist elements and refuse to change despite repeated admonition, they should be allowed to mend their ways and encouraged to atone for their sins." This sentence was printed in boldface as Mao Zedong's words in the editorial "We Must Treat Cadres Correctly," published in the fourth issue of Red Flag magazine on March 1, 1967.

[3] This sentence was printed in bold when it was published in the editorial of Red Flag magazine.

**Comments on the publication of the "Notice of the Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionary Rebellion General Headquarters" and other documents**

(January 31, 1967)

Comrade Enlai [1]:

This notice [2] is very good. Do you think it can be published? The recently prepared document [3] can be published as the second article after they go back to discuss and revise it. Please consider it.

Mao Zedong

January 31

[1] Enlai, that is, Zhou Enlai.

[2] This refers to the "Notice of the Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters," published in the New Guizhou Daily on January 26, 1967. The notice announced that 40 rebel organizations, including the "Mao Zedong Thought Guizhou Red Workers' Combat Group," had assumed full leadership of the Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters on January 24, under the name of the "Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters." The People's Daily reprinted this notice on February 1, 1967.

[3] Refers to the "Ten-Point General Order of the Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters," later published in the People's Daily on February 5, 1967.

## Discussing the Seizure of Power with Zhou Enlai

(January 1967)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): How is the seizure of power?

Zhou Enlai (hereinafter referred to as Zhou): We have only been seizing power for a little over a day.

Mao: We must identify typical cases.

Zhou: The Municipal Bureau Committee held a meeting. There are several forms of seizing power. Cadres in power are: (1) Those who have been deeply influenced by gangsters and have become gangsters; (2) Those in power who have taken the capitalist road; (3) Those who stubbornly adhere to the bourgeois reactionary line; (4) Those who admit their mistakes but still have serious ones; and (5) Those who have individual, general mistakes (this type of person is the majority).

Mao: The first two types should be narrowed down, and the very few should be isolated and attacked. Taking over is itself revolutionary. Establishing a new one also takes different forms depending on the circumstances: (1) Complete reorganization (Shanghai: Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenxuan); (2) After taking over, different forms of handling those in power: reviewing and working while working, or retaining them under supervision (working according to instructions); (3) Suspending them while retaining them; (4) Removing them from their posts while retaining them; and (5) Removing them from their posts for investigation and prosecution.

Zhou: That's a good approach. Dismissing someone while fighting against them, while retaining them, strengthens the team. Putting too much pressure on one's shoulders (referring to the revolutionary rebels) is also passive. Retaining them allows them to fight while working. The leftist contingent at the Academy of Sciences has grown stronger, and they've done a great job promoting revolution and production. Letting those in power sweep the streets, then rest and sleep it off, is too easy for them; they're being given all the easy tasks. Don't get bogged down in the affairs; be mindful of this. Hold onto authority and supervise them. It's not surprising that several combat teams within a unit have differing views. It's better to discuss things than not.

Mao: Taking over is a major event, and it will trigger a series of changes. We need to clarify the purpose of the takeover, address the issues it addresses, and develop specific policies for handling problems encountered during the takeover (what happens to bureaus, departments, divisions, and staff members?). Power has been seized now, but it may be taken away again. The back-and-forth of some units is a training exercise. Consolidation is crucial, primarily relying on the strengthening of leftist forces. When the left's power is weak, the power seized will be limited, and any power seized will be quickly relinquished.

The left must strengthen. I support the seizure of power, and after seizing it, we must focus on revolution and promote production.

## **Discussing with Foreign Guests How to Read Big-Character Posters**

(January 1967)

Big-character posters should be viewed with a critical eye. Most are revolutionary, some are unrevolutionary, and some are bad. Some are factual, and some are not.

## **Instructions on Seizing Power**

(January 1967)

Mao: Seizing power is inevitable. Our government used to consist of a small number of cadres sent from above and the majority of retained personnel below. If workers and peasants had not risen up in revolution to seize the government, this would have easily given rise to feudalism and revisionism.

Xie Fuzhi [1]: Our older comrades don't understand this movement. They didn't understand it from the beginning, and they still don't understand it. They can't adapt.

Mao: They can't adapt, so they stand aside, but they still get food.

Xie Fuzhi: Yesterday I told the Chairman that the Joint Action Committee includes many children of high-ranking officials.

Mao: This is class struggle.

[1] Xie Fuzhi was then the Minister of Public Security and Vice Premier of the State Council.

**Comments on persuading the Red Guards to allow Wang Renzhong [1] to seek medical treatment (2)**

(February 2, 1967)

Lin and Zhou [3] I've read it and submitted it to the Cultural Revolution Group for discussion.

Mao Zedong

February 2

I think we should persuade the Red Guards to allow him to seek medical treatment. If the Red Guards need help, it will be available at any time, depending on Wang's condition.

[1] Wang Renzhong, formerly deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee, first secretary of the Central-South Bureau, and first secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee, was overthrown in January 1967 after being wrongly criticized.

[2] This comment was written on a letter from Wang Renzhong's wife, Xiao Huina, to Mao Zedong on January 29, 1967. The letter stated that Wang Renzhong was critically ill, currently being persecuted, his whereabouts unknown, and his future uncertain. He requested medical treatment. On February 3, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China telegraphed to the Hubei Provincial Committee and the Wuhan Military Region Party Committee: "Wang Renzhong's condition has recently worsened. To allow him to further examine his mistakes, the Central Standing Committee and the Central Cultural Revolution Group suggest that Wang be allowed to receive medical treatment for a period of time. The Red Guards should be available to assist him if needed, as long as his condition permits. The Wuhan Military Region Party Committee is requested to assist the Provincial Committee in handling this matter."

[3] Lin refers to Lin Biao, who was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.

## **Comments on Zhou Enlai's Letter to Chen Boda and Jiang Qing [1]**

(February 2, 1967)

This letter is not needed and is returned to Zhou.

[1] This is Mao Zedong's comment on Zhou Enlai's letter to Chen Boda and Jiang Qing. The main contents of the letter are as follows: 1. It is proposed that from now on, meetings be held at Diaoyutai starting at 10:00 PM every Monday, Tuesday, and Friday. The Cultural Revolution will be the primary focus. I will attend to discuss the current situation, policies, and draft documents. Other relevant comrades will be notified on short notice based on the nature of the issues. Tomorrow, I propose discussing documents for the opening of junior high and elementary schools, as well as industrial production issues (the documents are being printed and distributed). The next meeting will discuss agriculture. 2. It is proposed that meetings be held in the conference room every Tuesday and Saturday afternoon. The four Standing Committee members (Zhou, Chen, Kang, and Li) will be the primary focus, with Vice Premiers (Chen, Li, Tan, Nie, and Xie) and Jianying also participating. Comrade Jiang Qing, the Cultural Revolution leader, or a designated comrade, is kindly requested to attend to discuss various Party and government matters.

**The struggle must be civilized. Adhere to cultural struggle, not physical struggle. [1]**

(February 3, 1967)

The struggle must be civilized. We are the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must maintain a high profile and a high style. The slogans on the streets of Beijing are not very sophisticated. Everywhere there are slogans like "Down with" and "Smash the Dogheads." There aren't that many dogheads; they're just human heads. It's hard to understand how to engage the masses this way. They took photos of jet plane positions<sup>3</sup>, posted them in newspapers and posted them on the streets, and foreign journalists took them down. We must raise the level of our struggle now; it's too low.

In early August, it wasn't this fierce. The struggle to overthrow and discredit the people must be political, and we must educate our descendants. Otherwise, when they come to power, they'll do the same thing. That would be too simplistic. They think this is discrediting the people, and they also think that exposing other people's problems in their lives is also discrediting the people. I don't think that's appropriate. The main focus should be on political discrediting.

[1] This is a passage of instruction from Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai on the issue of struggle.

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<sup>3</sup> A number of people were subjected to mass criticism at rallies where they were forced to stand for long periods with their bodies bent at the waist, heads bowed, and each arm pulled backward by their interrogators so that they looked like a jet plane.

## Comments on a telegram from the Tibet Military Region Party Committee [1]

(February 7-8, 1967)

1

Comrades Lin Biao, Enlai, Ye, Nie, and Xu [2]:

Please study whether Zhang Guohua, Zhou Renshan, Wang Qimei [3], and others are good or bad people. Send me a telegram within a day or two to express your views. I sincerely hope you will do so!

Some issues have been handled too slowly. The Xinjiang issue should be resolved quickly.

Mao Zedong

February 7

PS. Some other major issues have been handled too quickly, without the Standing Committee having time for leisurely discussion. This seems inappropriate.

2

Already handled, filed.

Mao Zedong

February 8<sup>th</sup>

[1] On February 6, 1967, the CCP Tibet Military District Committee sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, stating that the "Lhasa Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" and its affiliated organizations considered Zhang Guohua a "counter-revolutionary revisionist" and that the Military District Party Committee was a "royalist" and "black den." Unaware of the truth, the masses were in great unrest, and some cadres and soldiers in the Military District headquarters and the troops stationed in Lhasa were also experiencing ideological confusion. If this situation continued, the consequences would be serious. Therefore, it was recommended that the Central Committee express its views on Zhang Guohua as soon as possible. On February 12, the Central Military Commission replied to the Tibet Military District. On February 24, the Central Cultural Revolution Group sent another telegram to the "Lhasa Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" and others, stating that the Central Military Commission's telegram represented Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee and that the Central Cultural Revolution Group fully supported the telegram's statement: Zhang Guohua stood with Chairman Mao's line. Although he had shortcomings and mistakes in his work, he was fundamentally a good comrade. I hope the

comrades of the Military Region Party Committee will do some work among the revolutionary masses.

[2] Lin Biao was then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. Enlai is Zhou Enlai. Ye refers to Ye Jianying, Nie refers to Nie Rongzhen, and Xu refers to Xu Xiangqian, all of whom were then Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China.

[3] Zhang Guohua, then First Secretary of the CPC Tibet Autonomous Region Committee and Commander of the Tibet Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Yong Renshan, then Secretary of the CPC Tibet Autonomous Region Secretariat and Vice Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region People's Government. Wang Qimei, then Secretary of the CPC Tibet Autonomous Region Secretariat.

## Conversation with Kabo and Balluku [1]

(February 8, 1967)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): When did Comrade Shehu [2] arrive in China?

Zhou Enlai: Last May.

Mao: Last May, I discussed this question with him: Will revisionism triumph or will Marxism-Leninism triumph? This is a question of the struggle between two lines. I also said that it is still unclear which side will triumph, and no conclusion can be drawn. There are two possibilities. The first possibility is that the bourgeoisie triumphs, revisionism triumphs, and overthrows us; the second possibility is that we overthrow revisionism and the bourgeoisie. Why do I prioritize the first possibility over our failure? I feel that this way of looking at the problem is more advantageous. It means not to underestimate the enemy.

For many years, the struggle within our Party remained hidden from the public. For example, in January 1962, we convened a meeting of seven thousand cadres, including county-level Party secretaries and above. At that time, I delivered a speech in which I argued that revisionism was going to overthrow us. If we didn't take action now and wage struggle, China would become a fascist dictatorship in a matter of years, perhaps a dozen years at best, or even decades at best. This speech was not published publicly, but was distributed internally. It will be reviewed later, and some of the content may need revision. However, the problem was already apparent at that time. In 1962, June 3, June 4, June 5, and June 6—five years. Why do we say that we haven't done much work well? I'm not being polite; I'm telling you the truth. In the past, we only targeted individual issues and individuals. For example, over the past seventeen years, we waged struggles against Gao Gang and Rao Shushi [3]. We punished their clique from the winter of 1953 to the spring of 1954. Then, in 1959, we punished the clique of Peng Dehuai, Huang Kecheng, and Zhang Wentian [4]. In the past, we waged struggles in the countryside, factories, and cultural circles, and carried out the Socialist Education Movement, but we couldn't solve the problem because we didn't find a form or method to openly and comprehensively mobilize the masses from the bottom up to expose our dark side.

This struggle had been in the works for some time. In November of the previous year, a critical article was published against the historian Wu Han [5]. Writing this article in Beijing wasn't feasible, and they couldn't organize a team to write it. So they had to go to Shanghai and find Yao Wen Yuan. They put together a team and wrote the article.

Kabo (hereinafter referred to as Ka): Was it written under the instructions of Comrade Mao Zedong?

Chairman Mao: I didn't even know it was written at the beginning. It was Jiang Qing and her group who did it. They gave it to me to read. They told me they were going to criticize it.

They couldn't organize it in Beijing, so they went to Shanghai to organize it, and I didn't even know about it. When the article was finished, they gave it to me, saying it was for your exclusive viewing, and not for people like Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng. If they wanted to see it, they would have to show it to people like Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, and Lu Dingyi, and Liu and Deng were against publishing it. After it was published, all provinces reprinted it, but Beijing didn't. I was in Shanghai at the time. Later, I suggested printing a pamphlet. All provinces agreed to distribute it, but the Beijing publishing house refused. Peng Zhen notified the publishing house not to reprint it. The Beijing Municipal Committee was like a city committee that couldn't get in, couldn't get in. Isn't it being reorganized now? Even the reorganized Municipal Committee wasn't good enough; it needs to be reorganized again. When the decision to reorganize the Beijing Municipal Committee was publicly announced [6], we added two garrison divisions. Now, Beijing has three army divisions and one mechanized division, for a total of four. That's why you can move around, and so can we. The two divisions we had before were good, but they were scattered terribly, defending everywhere.

There are also unreliable members of the current Red Guards, the royalists. They are inactive during the day but active at night. They wear glasses and masks, carry sticks and knives, and cause trouble everywhere. They have killed some good people, killed a few people, and injured hundreds. Most of them are children of high-ranking cadres, such as He Long, Lu Dingyi, and Luo Ruiqing. Therefore, our army is not without problems. For example, He Long was a member of the Politburo, and Luo Ruiqing was Secretary of the Secretariat and Chief of the General Staff. Luo Ruiqing's problems were dealt with in December of the previous year; the people in the Beijing Municipal Party Committee were dealt with in May of last year. The big-character poster movement was launched on June 1st of last year. The Red Guards were mobilized in August of last year. Didn't some of you meet with Nie Yuanzi [7] of Peking University? Who went to meet her?

Ka: Comrade Shitu Caili.

Mao: She wrote a big-character poster on May 25th of last year. I was in Hangzhou at the time, and I didn't see it until noon on June 1st. I immediately called Kang Sheng and Chen Boda and told them to broadcast it. Then the big-character posters were everywhere!

Baluku: The big-character posters sent a signal.

Mao: It wasn't written by me. It was written by Nie Yuanzi and seven others. The Red Guards were organized at the Tsinghua University Affiliated Middle School and the Peking University Affiliated Middle School. They showed me a document. On August 1st, I wrote a letter to the Red Guards at both schools, and then the movement took off. On August 18th, I met with hundreds of thousands of Red Guards. Then, from early to mid-August, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee was held. It was then that I wrote a 200-character big-character poster, accusing certain leaders, from the central government to the local

governments, of standing on a bourgeois standpoint, opposing students and the proletariat, and creating a White Terror. This exposed the problems of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Right now, the decisive battle between the two fronts is not yet complete. The outcome will likely be decided in February, March, and April. As for a complete resolution of the problem, it may take until February, March, or April of next year, or even longer. Don't believe that everyone in our party is a good person. Years ago, I said we would clear ourselves millions. Wasn't that just empty talk? What can you do? There's nothing. Only by mobilizing the masses can we do that. Without the masses, we have no solution. He won't listen [8]. Even the People's Daily won't listen to me. The People's Daily seized power twice: the first time on June 1st of last year, the second time this past January. I've publicly stated in the past that I don't read the People's Daily. I even told the People's Daily editor-in-chief, "I don't read your newspaper." I've said this several times, but he won't listen. My tactics don't work in China. You can't enter any university or college. Because it was controlled by people like Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Lu Dingyi's Propaganda Department, Zhou Yang's Culture Department, and the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of General Education, there was nothing we could do.

Many people have been exposed within our Party, and they can be roughly divided into several groups: The first group are those engaged in the democratic revolution. They are willing to cooperate during the democratic revolution phase, but their goal is the democratic revolution and the overthrow of capitalism. They support overthrowing imperialism and feudalism, and they also support overthrowing bureaucratic capitalism. However, they do not support actually overthrowing national capitalism. They support distributing land, but they do not support distributing it to the peasants and organizing cooperatives. This group is the so-called veteran cadres.

The second group of people joined the Party after liberation. Eighty percent joined after 1949. Some of them became cadres, serving as branch secretaries, Party committee secretaries, and even higher positions such as county, prefectural, and provincial Party committees, as well as members of the Central Committee.

The third group consisted of those Kuomintang members we took in. Some of them were former Communists who were captured by the Kuomintang and later defected, publishing anti-Communist advertisements in the newspapers. At the time, we didn't know they were anti-Communist, nor did we know what their so-called "performance procedures" meant. Now, upon investigation, we've discovered that they supported the Kuomintang and opposed the Communist Party.

The fourth group consists of the children of the bourgeoisie, landlords, and rich peasants. After liberation, they entered school, even universities, and gained some power. Not all of them are bad; many sided with us. However, some were counter-revolutionaries.

These are roughly the few groups. In short, they are not numerous in China, only a few percent. Their class base, such as landlords, rich peasants, capitalists, and the Kuomintang, is only a few percent—at most 5 percent. So, out of a population of 700 million, that's only 35 million people. They are also scattered across villages, cities, and neighbourhoods. If 35 million people were gathered together and armed, they would be a formidable army.

Ba: Even if they were united, they would still be an army without any ideas.

Mao: They are a perishing class. Their representatives, among over 30 million people, number at most a few hundred thousand, and they are scattered across cities, streets, villages, schools, and government offices. So, when the big-character posters, the mass movements, and the Red Guards appeared, they were terrified.

Also, some other things have been causing chaos. They've given me so many titles, like Great Teacher, Great Leader, Great Commander, and Great Helmsman. I'm not happy about that. But what can we do? They're doing it everywhere. Some people have suggested retaining the title of Teacher. I'm just an elementary school teacher, so an ordinary teacher would be fine. As for Professor, I can't really call myself that. I haven't been to university, have you all?

Ka: Not a single one.

Mao: Marx was a university student, Lenin was a university student, Stalin attended middle school, and I only attended middle school. I'm skeptical of a large number of university students, especially those studying the humanities and social sciences. If these people aren't educated and the Cultural Revolution isn't carried out, they're very dangerous. They'll become revisionists in the future. Those who study literature can't write novels or poetry; those who study philosophy can't write philosophical articles or explain social phenomena. And those who study politics and law are all bourgeois, and we haven't produced any good textbooks. And those who study economics are full of revisionists. However, there seems to be some hope now, and the struggle is intense.

The masses are mobilized, and any bad stuff can be discarded. We are optimistic about consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since my conversation with Comrade Shehu last year, I've become more optimistic.

Ka: The revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao has achieved tremendous victories.

Mao: We have achieved considerable victories, but not yet. We might be able to tell by this time next year. However, we cannot be certain. Perhaps our generation will be defeated. I am always prepared. If we are defeated, we will be defeated. There will always be people who rise up and continue the fight. China is a country that some people brag about being "peace-loving." That's not the case. We love struggle and are always ready to fight. I am one of them. Being combative makes it harder to become revisionist.

Ka: Without struggle, it is impossible. Otherwise, how can revolution be achieved?

Mao: That's right! It's not as easy for China to engage in revisionism as it was for the Soviet Union. China is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country that has suffered oppression for over a hundred years. Our country was conquered by the army, and the schools remain intact. Some Party and government leaders were appointed, like Cao Huoqiu and Chen Pixian [9]. (XX: They were elected later.) I don't believe in elections. China has over 2,000 counties. If one county elects two, that's over 4,000 people, and if one county elects four, that's over 10,000. How could there be such a large space for a meeting? How could so many people know each other? I was elected in Beijing, and many people never even saw me! How could they be elected if they hadn't even seen me? We're just famous. The Premier and I are both famous. We're not even as good as the Red Guards. Their leaders even spoke to them. But the Red Guards are also constantly splitting. Last summer, the left was a tiny minority. Those who stood on our side were oppressed and labeled "rightists," "counter-revolutionaries," and so on. In winter, things changed; the minority became the majority. Have you ever been to Tsinghua University?

Ka: Yes.

Mao: In the past, the Jinggangshan group was a minority and was attacked. Nie Yuanzi of Peking University was also a minority and was attacked. Now they are in the majority. They were oppressed in the past, but they were very revolutionary in the minority. But in the winter, they became the majority. Some of them split in December of last year and January of this year. Some were revolutionary in the summer, but became counter-revolutionary in the winter. Of course, we are working with Nie Yuanzi and Kuai Dafu [10] to persuade them. However, whether these people are truly reliable remains to be seen. However, when things get turbulent, there are always good people among them.

There's a kind of anarchist ideology circulating right now, with the slogan "doubt everything, overthrow everything." It's backfiring on itself. You doubt everything, but what about yourself? You overthrow everything, but what about yourself? The bourgeoisie needs to be overthrown, but what about the proletariat? His theory simply doesn't work. However, judging by the overall trend, those who have made mistakes always end up losing ground. Look, on the streets of Beijing, there are slogans calling for "Down with me," "Down with Comrade Lin Biao," and "Down with Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, and so on. There are even more slogans calling for the overthrow of Li Fuchun, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, and Xiao Hua. For example, Yang Chengwu was the acting Chief of the General Staff, which oversaw several departments. The head and deputy head of one of the operational departments wrote big-character posters calling for his overthrow. That was instigated by He Long. The overthrow of Xiao Hua was instigated by the Beijing Military Region Commander, Unit 121 [11]. Yesterday, they instigated the overthrow of Xiao Hua, and a day or two later, he was overthrown himself. This is China's second-largest military region! A commander, a political commissar, and even Zhang Nansheng, the deputy political commissar, have all fallen. However, there is one truth that

remains unwavering. It's a truth that will never fall. The vast majority of the people—workers, peasants, intellectuals, cadres, Party members, and League members—are good. We must firmly believe in this truth.

Ba: They are all living forces.

Mao: Although some of them made mistakes and had shortcomings, and I'm not going to cover up any flaws in Ye Jianying, Yang Chengwu, Shang Hua, or Wang Shusheng, they were basically good people.

Ba: Mistakes can be made at work, and they can be corrected.

Mao Zedong: They can be corrected! I made some mistakes, too. Do I just not make mistakes when others do? I did make some mistakes. I made mistakes in all aspects of politics and military affairs. As for the specific mistakes I made, I don't have time now. If you stay a few days, I can tell you. I don't hide my mistakes. Some people brag, saying I made no mistakes at all. I don't believe them, and I'm unhappy. You didn't believe me once, and don't you know what kind of person I am? You should have a little self-awareness.

If the sky and the earth turn black in China, don't be afraid. Believe this: it won't be completely dark. Qin Shi Huang's reign lasted only sixteen years before it fell. Two men led the uprising: Chen Sheng and Wu Guang [12]. They were both serfs at the time. The Red Guards who are posting big-character posters in China today were attacked last summer and labelled "counter-revolutionaries." We are all Spartacus, small-time people with no social standing, looked down upon. We were oppressed and organized into the Communist Party.

[1] This is a conversation between Mao Zedong and others on February 8, 1967, when he met with Hisni Kabo, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, a member of the Central Secretariat, and the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic, and Bekir Balluku, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic and Minister of Defense.

[2] Shehu was then the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania.

[3] During and around the 1953 National Conference on Finance and Economics and the National Conference on Organizational Work, Gao Gang, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, and Rao Shushi, then a member of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of the Organization Department, colluded to plot to split the Party and usurp supreme power in the Party and state. Their anti-Party conspiracy was exposed and criticized at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee in 1954. In 1955, the National Congress of the Communist Party of China passed a resolution expelling them from the Party.

[4] The enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Lushan from July 2 to August 1, 1959, and the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee held from August 2 to 16, adopted the "Resolution on the Mistakes of the Anti-Party Group Headed by Comrade Peng Dehuai".

[5] On November 10, 1965, Yao Wenyuan published "On the New Historical Drama 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office'" in the Shanghai Wenhui Daily, criticizing Wu Han's 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office'.

[6] On June 4, 1966, the People's Daily published the news that the "CPC Central Committee has decided to reorganize the Beijing Municipal Committee." The following is the news: Xinhua News Agency reported on the 3rd: The CPC Central Committee has decided to reorganize the Beijing Municipal Committee by appointing Comrade Li Xuefeng, First Secretary of the CPC North China Bureau, concurrently as First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee and transferring Comrade Wu De, First Secretary of the CPC Jilin Provincial Committee, as Second Secretary. Comrades Li Xuefeng and Wu De have already assumed their posts. The work of the Socialist Cultural Revolution in Beijing will be directly led by the new Municipal Committee.

[7] Nie Yuanzi, one of the leaders of the student movement at Peking University. Around 2:00 PM on May 25, 1966, seven members of the Peking University Philosophy Department—Nie Yuanzi, Song Yixiu, Xia Jianyao, Yang Keming, Zhao Zhengyi, Gao Yunpeng, and Li Raichen—posted a large-character poster titled "What on earth are Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun doing during the Cultural Revolution?" on the east wall of the main dining hall.

[8] Refers to Liu Shaoqi, who was the President of the country at the time and was in charge of frontline work before the Cultural Revolution.

[9] Before the Cultural Revolution, Cao Huoqiu was the mayor of Shanghai, and Chen Pixian was the party secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. Both were overthrown during the "January Storm." Cao Huoqiu was arrested in Shanghai in 1932 and released five years later after completing certain formalities. He was labelled a traitor during the Cultural Revolution. In 1930, Chen Pixian was captured by the enemy. Tu Yingda, who was also captured with him, was killed after interrogation. However, the bandit battalion commander adopted Chen Pixian as his son. During the Cultural Revolution, Chen Pixian was placed under incommunicado investigation.

[10] Kuai Dafu, leader of the "Jinggangshan Corps," a Red Guard organization at Tsinghua University.

[11] This refers to Yang Yong, then commander of the Beijing Military Region.

[12] Chen Sheng and Wu Guang led the first peasant uprising in Chinese history.

**Comments and Revisions to the Draft "Regulations on the Prohibition of Arbitrary Shooting by the Army in Support of the True Proletarian Revolutionaries in Their Struggle for Power" [I]**

(February 9, 1967)

1

There are some revisions. Regarding the question of supporting the broad masses of genuine leftists, many mistakes have occurred. Supporting not the left but the right has put us in a passive position. We should summarize our experience in this matter and formulate some directives. Please proceed expeditiously.

Mao Zedong

On the morning of February 9<sup>th</sup>

2

Comrade Lin Biao: Some changes have been made. Please consider them. This document should be discussed and approved at a joint meeting of the Party, Government, and Military chaired by the Premier before being issued.

Mao Zedong

February 15, 2019, 12:00 PM

3

**Regulations on the Prohibition of Arbitrary Shootings by the Army in Support of the *True* Proletarian Revolutionaries in Their Struggle for Power**

To all military regions and arms:

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has entered a new stage. The People's Liberation Army has encountered various complex situations in supporting the *genuine (not sham)* proletarian revolutionaries in their struggle to seize power, leading to armed clashes (such as in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia). Therefore, the following regulations are hereby enacted:

- (1) Shootings must not be opened against unarmed masses, regardless of their faction.
- (2) Party policies may be promoted against unarmed conservatives, rightists, *and counter-revolutionaries*, with the goal of splitting and disintegrating them through political offensives. If necessary, their leaders may be arrested, but shootings must not be opened.
- (3) Omit

(4) For active counter-revolutionaries who have committed murder, arson, poisoning, robbery, etc., *if they have been thoroughly investigated and proven to be correct*, such as those who resist arrest, resist stubbornly, or engage in armed riots, *if persuasion fails*, they may be shot and suppressed.

(5) *We must believe that even in counter-revolutionary organizations, the majority of the masses are still good and can be educated and won over, and the bad elements are only a few individual elements.*

(6) *We must respond calmly to the battle. Even if tens of thousands of people demonstrate against our troops, surround them, attack them, beat them, arrest them, or insult them, it does not matter. If we are not calm and are afraid, we will make a serious mistake.*

*The majority of the above regulations must be carefully publicized and explained to all officers and soldiers of the army. However, Article 3 (luring the enemy deep into our territory and encircling them by circuitous means) can only be issued during battle and must be kept secret beforehand [2].*

Central Military Commission

February 9, 1967

[1] Mao Zedong made two revisions to the draft regulations submitted by Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, for review on February 7, 1967. This first section is from the first draft; this second section is from the second draft; and this third section is the Central Military Commission's draft regulations after Mao's two revisions. The text printed in italics contains his additions and revisions.

[2] On February 11, 1967, Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, wrote to Lin Biao: "Regarding the regulations prohibiting the army from firing at will in supporting the genuine proletarian revolutionaries in their struggle to seize power, we have issued six points as five. The third point was only read once at the meeting (the draft was submitted). After the meeting, each military region requested that the third point be sent to their units for further reading so that they could understand it. We have printed it separately and sent it to them, stating that it will be withdrawn after reading (it has been withdrawn). Please report this to the Chairman."

[1]

(February 9, 1967)

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February 15, 2019, 12:00 PM

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**Comments on the broadcast of "The Basic Experience of the Red Rebels in the Struggle for Power in Heilongjiang Province" [I]**

(February 9, 1967)

Comrade Boda:

Please discuss with the comrades in the group whether this article can be published and broadcast publicly. If there are any revisions that need to be made, please consider them.

Mao Zedong

February 9

[I] This comment was written in the 390th issue of the Cultural Revolution Bulletin, published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group Office on February 7, 1967. This issue contained a document entitled "The Basic Experience of the Red Rebels in the Struggle to Seize Power in Heilongjiang Province." The document stated that the rebels' experience in the struggle to seize power in Heilongjiang Province was as follows: 1. Based on the specific local struggle conditions, they clearly embodied the Party's principles and policies, uniting the main leaders within the provincial party committee who implemented Chairman Mao's correct line and the main leaders in the military, forming a trinity to jointly seize power. 2. Before seizing leadership of the provincial party committee, they first placed the proletarian revolutionary mouthpieces, the newspapers and radio stations, and the public security bureau, organs of the dictatorship, in the hands of the left, preparing public opinion for the eventual seizure of provincial party committee power, resolutely suppressing counter-revolutionaries, and ensuring the smooth progress of the struggle to seize power. Third, firmly rely on the leftist forces within the units whose power has been seized, unite the middle forces, strike at the reactionary forces, seize power, and consolidate it. Fourth, the fundamental experience of the struggle to seize power boils down to one point: Mao Zedong Thought armed the leftist forces, and the leftist forces used Mao Zedong Thought to guide the struggle to seize power. This material was published in the People's Daily on February 10, 1967.

**Comments on the Central Military Commission's Draft and Supplementary Draft Regulations on the Cultural Revolution for Leading Organs at the Army and Above [1]**

(February 1967)

1

Follow the instructions. If there are any revisions made at last night's meeting, follow the revised draft.

2

Publish as is.

[1] This article was written on a draft of several regulations regarding the Cultural Revolution in leading bodies at the military level and above, which Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, sent to Lin Biao (then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission) for review on February 9, 1967. In his report, Ye Jianying wrote: "In accordance with the Chairman's instructions at the last Standing Committee meeting, I have drafted several regulations regarding the Cultural Revolution in leading bodies at the military level and above. This morning, I convened a meeting of 32 people to discuss and revise them. I hereby submit them for your review and approval." On February 10, Lin Biao forwarded the draft regulations to Mao Zedong for review. After discussion and revision, the Central Military Commission issued the seven-point order on February 11: 1. The Central Military Commission's order of January 28 is an important document. It must be widely publicized, the masses must be fully mobilized, and in-depth study and discussion must be carried out. The living thought must be earnestly grasped to ensure that everyone deeply understands the great significance of issuing this order and increases their awareness of its implementation. Second, the Cultural Revolution in military organizations and above (all headquarters, services, arms, major military regions, provincial military regions, military region air forces, and naval fleets) must resolutely carry out the "Four Major Movements" in phases and batches, in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions. Units already carrying out the "Four Major Movements" as determined by the Military Commission, except where necessary, must continue to fully mobilize the masses, firmly rely on genuine, not sham, proletarian revolutionaries, strive to unite the majority, thoroughly criticize the bourgeois reactionary line, and root out the handful of power holders taking the capitalist road. Units temporarily suspended from carrying out the "Four Major Movements" by the Military Commission must undergo positive education, and the timing of the commencement must be determined by the Military Commission. 3. All units below the corps level in the Army and Air Force, units below the base level in the Navy, flight schools in the Navy and Air Force, the Beijing Garrison Command, the Shanghai,

Tianjin, and Dalian Garrison Commands, and special units designated by the Military Commission shall not engage in the "Four Bigs" and must adhere to positive education. No individual or organization is permitted to collude with these units under any pretext. 4. The People's Liberation Army is the primary tool of the proletarian dictatorship and an armed group dedicated to carrying out revolutionary political tasks. Currently, class struggles at home and abroad are extremely acute and complex, and imperialism, revisionism, and reactionaries are intensifying their anti-China campaigns. Our army must heighten its vigilance, strengthen its combat readiness, and maintain a highly centralized, unified, and uninterrupted command. Therefore, military leadership at all levels (including the Department, Political Affairs, Logistics, and other leadership departments) will not tolerate any bottom-up seizure of power, and no individual or organization will be permitted to conduct such attacks. 5. In accordance with the principle of the Party's absolute leadership over the military, the Cultural Revolution in military-level and higher-level organizations must be led by the Party Committee. Individual Party committee members with serious problems may be removed, and Party committees unable to lead may be reorganized, but this must all be approved by higher authorities. Military leadership must maintain a strict and integrated command system and must not establish various Cultural Revolution combat organizations. Existing Cultural Revolution combat organizations must be reorganized as administrative units. These Cultural Revolution combat organizations have the right to criticize and make suggestions to the Party Committee, but they cannot replace or supervise the exercise of powers by the Party Committee and administrative leadership. 6. Leading cadres who uphold Mao Zedong Thought and the proletarian revolutionary line are a precious asset to the Party and the people. We must clearly distinguish between those in power who are proletarian and those who are bourgeois. It is completely wrong to believe that all those in power should be overthrown. Leading cadres at all levels must be courageous and go among the masses, listen humbly to their opinions, closely unite with them, join them in revolution, and make new contributions for the people. Cadres who have committed mistakes should be strictly distinguished between the two types of contradictions, based on the nature and severity of the problem, and treated accordingly. As long as they are not anti-Party or anti-socialist and refuse to change despite repeated admonition, they should be allowed to mend their ways and encouraged to atone for their mistakes. All leading cadres who have not been suspended or dismissed by order of superiors should remain at their posts, focus on the revolution, promote war preparations, promote work, and promote production, and diligently complete their work assignments. 7. During the movement, we must hold high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, actively study and apply Chairman Mao's works, and act in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions. We must oppose unhealthy tendencies such as anarchism, extreme democratization, small-groupism, individualism, and subjectivism, and strengthen the revolutionary, scientific, and organizationally disciplined nature of the movement. This second part was written on the draft of the "Supplementary Regulations on the Implementation of the Central Military Commission's 'Several Regulations on the Cultural Revolution in Leading Organs at the Army and Above,'" submitted by Lin Biao

for review on February 25, 1967. The supplementary regulations, issued by the Central Military Commission on February 27, stated that in order to maintain a strict and complete command system within the military leadership and further implement the Military Commission's instructions, it was decided that: All Cultural Revolution combat organizations that continue to carry out the "four major units" should be reorganized as grassroots administrative units. All joint Cultural Revolution combat organizations that transcend grassroots administrative units, such as the rebel headquarters and liaison stations of various headquarters, military branches, arms, and major units, should be abolished. All propaganda tools used by Cultural Revolution combat organizations, such as wired broadcasts, propaganda vehicles, and printing materials, should be handed over to the Cultural Revolution Office of the Party Committee of each unit.

## Instructions on the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai [1]

(February 12 and 18, 1967)

1

February to April is a critical period for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. During these three months, the Cultural Revolution will see progress. The overall direction of the work in Shanghai is very good. When you first went to the Anting Incident [2], there were only a few thousand workers in Shanghai. Now there are more than one million! This shows that the mobilization of the workers in Shanghai was relatively successful.

2

Weren't all the students there at the docks back then? Are they still there now?

(Zhang and Yao replied: "Yes.")

That's great. Before, the bond between students and workers wasn't truly united; now it is.

3

Our current revolution, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, is a revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, initiated by us ourselves. This is because a portion of the institutions of our proletarian dictatorship has been usurped. This portion no longer belongs to the proletariat, but to the bourgeoisie. Therefore, revolution is necessary.

4

The three-in-one approach must be implemented. Fujian's problems aren't serious, Guizhou's and Inner Mongolia's aren't serious either. A little chaos is fine. Currently, 53% of Shanxi Province are revolutionary masses, 27% are in the military, and 20% are government officials. Shanghai should learn from them. The January Revolution was victorious, but February, March, and April were even more crucial and important.

Those who "doubt everything" and "overthrow everything" will inevitably go the other way and be overthrown. They won't last long. We have a unit here that won't even hire a deputy section chief. People like that won't last long.

We should believe that more than 95% of the masses and more than 95% of the cadres will follow us. China has a considerable petty bourgeoisie, and middle peasants make up a significant number. In cities, the petty bourgeoisie, small artisans, and even small business owners are also quite numerous. As long as we lead well, they will follow us. We must trust the majority.

It's difficult for a university student, freshly graduated or even ungraduated, to lead a city. I don't think being a university president is a good option. Being a university president is

complex, especially for someone who's just graduated or hasn't yet graduated. Being a department head isn't a good option either. A department head needs to have some education, right? You haven't completed your studies yet. You've just graduated, so you don't have much. And you have no experience teaching or managing a department. To be a department head, we've already trained a group of teaching assistants and lecturers. We have to select some from the existing leadership team. We can't just throw all these veterans away. I'm afraid Zhou Gucheng [3] isn't up to the task! Zhou Gucheng isn't going to be able to teach anymore!

## 5

The Paris Commune was founded in 1871, and it's now ninety-six years old. If the Paris Commune had triumphed instead of failed, then, in my opinion, it would have become a bourgeois Commune, because the French bourgeoisie would not allow the French working class to hold power for so long. This is the Paris Commune. Another example is the form of Soviet power. When Soviet power emerged, Lenin was delighted, calling it a great creation of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, a new form of proletarian dictatorship. However, he didn't anticipate that this form could be used by the workers, peasants, and soldiers, the bourgeoisie, and even Khrushchev. Judging from the current Soviet system, it has transformed from Lenin's Soviets to Khrushchev's Soviets.

Britain is a monarchy, doesn't it have a king? The United States has a presidential system. Essentially, they're the same: both are bourgeois dictatorships. There are many other examples: South Vietnam's puppet regime was presidential, while neighboring Cambodia had Sihanouk as king. Which one was better? Probably Sihanouk. India has a presidential system, while neighboring Nepal is a kingdom. Which of these two is better? It seems the kingdom is better than India, judging by its current performance. Ancient China had the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors. The Zhou dynasty was called "King," the Qin dynasty was called "Emperor," the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was called "Heavenly King," and Tang Gaozong was called "Heavenly Emperor." You see, the names kept changing. We can't just look at the names; the problem isn't the name, but the reality; it's not the form, but the content. Presidentialism, kingship, monarchy, so-called bourgeois democracy, these are all forms. We're not looking at the name, but the reality; not the form, but the content. The title "president" in English is the same as "principal," the same word. It seems as if "principal" is much lower and "president" is much higher. In English, it's the same.

The names were changed too often. There's also Wang Mang, a historical figure known for his penchant for changing names. As soon as he became emperor, he changed all official titles, like the "Chief" (some people don't like the title "chief" today), and he changed the names of all the counties in the country, much like the Red Guards changing all the street names in Beijing. Even after the changes, he couldn't remember them and kept referring to the old names. Emperor Wang Mang had trouble issuing imperial edicts. He changed so many names that he couldn't even remember the names of the counties. So, he had to write

them down in his edicts. For example, Xianyang, a county in Shaanxi, was changed to Qijun. The edict would simply say "Qijun, meaning Xianyang." Having the old names written in the edicts made official correspondence extremely complicated.

The form of drama can be used in China and abroad; it can be used by both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The main experiences are the Paris Commune and the Soviets. It's also conceivable that the People's Republic of China could be used by both classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. If we were overthrown and the bourgeoisie came to power, they could keep the name and still call it the People's Republic of China, but it would not be a dictatorship of the proletariat, but a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Just like the Soviet Union, they kept the name unchanged and continued to call it the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Republic. The key issue here is which class holds power. Who holds power is the fundamental issue. So, isn't it better for us to err on the side of caution and not change the name?

Each province and city was called a "People's Commune." This posed the question of changing the political system, the state structure, and the name of the country. Should it be changed to "People's Commune of China"? Should the Chairman of the People's Republic of China be changed to the Director or President of the People's Commune of China? Once this question arose, the change would follow. Not only did this issue arise, but if changes were required, both large and small, it would raise the question of foreign recognition. Because the name change would invalidate foreign ambassadors, new ambassadors would be needed, and recognition would be renewed. I doubt the Soviet Union would recognize this; they wouldn't dare, because recognition would bring trouble to the Soviet Union. How could China have the issue of the People's Commune of China? The bourgeois state might recognize it. If they were all called communes, what would become of the Party? Where would the Party be placed? Because there were both Party members and non-Party members within the commune, and there were both Party members and non-Party members among the commune committee members, where would the Party committee be placed? There has to be a Party! There has to be a core! No matter what it's called, whether it's the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Labor Party, the Kuomintang, or the I-Kuan Tao [4], it has to have a Party. The I-Kuan Tao is also a Party. The commune has to have a Party. Can the commune replace the commune? I think we should not change the name! Don't call it a commune! Let's stick with the old system. We'll still have people's congresses and elected people's committees. Changing these names is just a formality; it doesn't address the underlying issues. Should the temporary authority we've established still be called a revolutionary committee? It's better to call it a Cultural Revolutionary Committee in universities, as that's stipulated in Article 16 [5].

The people of Shanghai really like the name "People's Commune"! They really like it. What should we do? Why don't you go back and discuss it and come up with a few options? The first option is to keep the name "People's Commune" and continue using it. This option has

both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that it will protect the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people of Shanghai. The disadvantage is that you are the only one in the country, so wouldn't that make you feel isolated? And now you can't publish it in the People's Daily. If you do, everyone will have to call it that. Otherwise, people will complain: "Why are only Shanghai allowed to call it that, and not us?" That's going to be difficult. The second option is to change it nationwide. Then, the aforementioned problems will arise: changing the political system, the name of the country, the flag, and whether or not to recognize it. The third option is for Shanghai to change it so that it aligns with the rest of the country. This can be done sooner or later, not necessarily immediately. If everyone says they don't want to change, then you can just use the name for a while! What do you think? Does it make sense?

[1] This is the minutes of the conversation between Mao Zedong and Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan.

[2] On November 9, 1966, the "Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters" (abbreviated as the "General Headquarters"), headed by Wang Hongwen, was established. The Shanghai Municipal Party Committee refused to recognize its legitimacy. On the 10th, Wang Hongwen led thousands of people to Beijing to file a complaint. They were ordered by the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee to stop at Anting Railway Station, whereupon they lay on the tracks to block the train. Zhang Chunqiao, representing the Central Committee in handling the "Anting Incident," considered the "General Headquarters" a revolutionary action and demanded that the Municipal Party Committee examine its mistakes.

[3] Zhou Gucheng, a Chinese historian and social activist, and former president of the Shanghai History Society, opposed studying history from the perspective of class struggle.

[4] In modern Chinese history, the Yiguandao (I-Kuan Tao) was the most tightly organized, widespread, most numerous, most meticulously reported, and most harmful reactionary secret society. It was banned in 1950.

[5] The Sixteen Articles refer to the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," adopted at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, referred to as the Sixteen Articles.

**Comments on Wang Mingkun's report on the establishment of the "Xi'an Area Revolutionary Rebel Committee" [1]**

(February 14, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai:

The rejection of the Jiaotong University faction and support for the ultra-leftist position deserves study. We should continue to investigate and do not rush to make public statements. The ultra-leftists are suspected of destroying factories, but Jiaotong University does not advocate the destruction of factories. Please consider the above. Also inform the Cultural Revolution Group.

Mao Zedong

February 14, 9:00 a.m.

[1] The eighth issue of "Important Events Report," published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group Office on February 12, 1967, contained a telephone report from Wang Mingkun, Deputy Commander of the Shaanxi Provincial Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Wang Mingkun stated: (1) The telegram we sent to Vice Chairman Lin and the Central Cultural Revolution Group last night contained flawed views. Our original viewpoint favoured Xi'an Jiaotong University, but now it seems that Jiaotong University has problems and we made a mistake. We are now correcting our erroneous view and siding with the Xi'an PLA Telecommunications Engineering College and Northwestern Polytechnical University, excluding Xi'an Jiaotong University. We have established the "Xi'an Regional Revolutionary Rebel Committee." A meeting will be held tonight to issue a statement from the "Xi'an Regional Revolutionary Rebel Committee." (2) The No. 28 Factory in the eastern suburbs of Xi'an was sabotaged by conservative elements there on the 10th. It is estimated that production will resume within six months. Tonight, another 10,000 to 20,000 people will gather, possibly to destroy the No. 803 Factory or storm the provincial military region headquarters. Rumours circulate that all factories in the eastern suburbs will be destroyed by the 20th. Please ask the Central Cultural Revolution Group to promptly give instructions on how to deal with the above two issues.

## **Comments on Sending Personnel to Investigate and Summarize the Military Training Experiences of Two Beijing Middle Schools [1]**

(February 14, 1967)

Comrade Lin Biao:

Please send personnel to investigate whether the military training experiences of these two schools are true. After verification, you can write a summary of about 1,000 words and circulate it nationwide for reference. Colleges and universities should also prepare a summary and circulate it nationwide. Please consider.

Mao Zedong,

February 14

[1] This comment was written next to the article "Military Training in Two Beijing Middle Schools," published in the Xinhua News Agency's special issue of "Cultural Revolution Trends" on February 13, 1967. The article stated that, in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, the troops stationed in Beijing had recently conducted a pilot program of intensive training for revolutionary teachers and students at Beijing No. 2 Middle School and No. 25 Middle School, achieving very good results. Military training at both schools was conducted in phases. The first phase, using Chairman Mao's "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" as the primary textbook, mobilized the masses to expose and criticize the bourgeois reactionary line, strictly distinguish between the two types of contradictions, and clearly distinguish between enemies and friends, in order to achieve the dual goals of "clarifying ideology and uniting comrades" and eliminate barriers between mass organizations. The second phase used Chairman Mao's article "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" as the primary textbook, guiding teachers and students to deeply criticize various non-proletarian ideas that hindered the great unity of the revolutionary factions, eradicate selfishness, and thoroughly destroy individualism, fragmentation, and factionalism, thereby achieving a great unity of revolutionary organizations and a great seizure of power.

### **Comments on Tan Zhenlin's<sup>4</sup> Letter to Lin Biao [1]**

(February 17, 1967)

I have read it.

Comrade Enlai read it and return it to Comrade Lin Biao.

[1] Lin Biao sent this letter to Mao Zedong and also wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, saying: "Chairman: Tan Zhenlin's recent thinking has become so muddled and degenerate that it is completely beyond our expectations." This was Mao Zedong's comment on Tan Zhenlin's letter.

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<sup>4</sup> Tan Zhenlin (1902 – 1983) joined the Communist Party in 1926 and became a senior general in the PLA. During the Great Leap Forward he was in charge of agricultural work and supported the “ultra-Left” communist wind of Liu Shaoqi. He had been elected to the Politburo in 1958. In February 1967, he was a leader of the “February Countercurrent”, but was allowed to resume work in 1975 because of his opposition to Lin Biao, and was re-elected to the Central Committee at the Tenth National Congress held that year. He supported Deng Xiaoping’s removal of Hua Guofeng.

## Conversation with Some Politburo Members

(February 18, 1967)

I heard that on the afternoon of February 16th, some people caused a disturbance in Huairan Hall, opposing the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Opposing the Central Cultural Revolution Group is opposing me and our Party! Over the past six months or so, the Central Cultural Revolution Group has done a tremendous amount of work. Comrades Boda, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and others have all done a tremendous amount of work. Have you seen it?

Tan Zhenlin, Xu Xiangqian, and Chen Yi attacked the Party and were full of nonsense.

The Central Cultural Revolution Group resolutely implemented the spirit of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee. Their achievements are paramount and important. If I were to give them a score, I'd give them 97. Whoever opposes the Central Cultural Revolution Group, I will resolutely oppose! You want to dictate the Cultural Revolution, but I tell you: it's absolutely impossible!

You all want to stir up trouble, so go ahead! It's simply because the Cultural Revolution has failed. I'll leave immediately, and Comrade Lin Biao will leave too. We'll return to Jinggangshan and start the revolution all over again. You say Jiang Qing and Chen Boda aren't up to the task, so reorganize the Cultural Revolution Group and make Tan Zhenlin the leader, Chen Yi and Xu Xiangqian deputy leaders, and Yu Qiuli and Bo Yibo members. If that doesn't work, bring back Wang Ming and Zhang Guogtao. If the force isn't enough, then invite the US and the Soviet Union in. Execute Jiang Qing and Chen Boda, exile Kang Sheng, and do whatever you want with the others. That's all that matters, right? You've achieved your goal, haven't you?

What kind of veteran revolutionary is Tan Zhenlin? I'm still here! You, Chen Yi, want to overturn the Yan'an Rectification Movement. Will the entire Party agree? Tan Zhenlin and Chen Yi are both veteran Party members. Why are they speaking from a bourgeois perspective? I propose: The Politburo should hold a meeting to discuss this matter. If one meeting doesn't work, hold two. If one month doesn't work, hold two. If the Politburo can't resolve it, mobilize all Party members to solve it!

## Comments on the Red Flag Editorial Draft, "We Must Treat Cadres Correctly" [1]

(February 18 and 22, 1967)

1

Returned to the Premier:

I agree with your opinion. We will discuss it before publishing it, and incorporate the idea of the "three-in-one" approach. [2] Furthermore, all important editorials should be published in this manner.

Mao Zedong

February 18, 8:00 p.m.

2

Publish as is.

[1] The Red Flag magazine editorial, "Cadres Must Be Treated Correctly," was submitted by Chen Boda, head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group, to Premier Zhou Enlai for review on February 17, 1967, and forwarded by Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on February 18. This article was included in the February 18th draft submitted by Zhou Enlai for review. Mao Zedong made some revisions during the interrogation. On page 8, regarding the use of cadres who have made mistakes, the editorial stated: "Some cadres can still be recruited to participate in the temporary power structure of the proletarian revolution and the joint seizure of power." Mao Zedong revised the phrase "some cadres" to "many cadres." At the end of the draft editorial, Mao Zedong deleted the following three slogans: "Long live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!" "Long live Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line!" "Long live Chairman Mao, the great teacher, great leader, great commander, great helmsman!" In addition, there were some textual revisions. This second part was written on the revised draft of the editorial submitted for review on February 22nd by Chen Boda and Guan Feng and Wang Li, deputy editors-in-chief of Red Flag magazine, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group. Chen Boda and others wrote on this draft: "A meeting chaired by the Premier raised some revisions. We have made another revision." This editorial was published in the fourth issue of Red Flag magazine, published on March 1, 1967, and was reprinted in advance by the People's Daily on February 23rd.

[2] On February 18, 1967, when Zhou Enlai forwarded the draft editorial to Mao Zedong, he wrote: "This editorial is very important and timely. I think it is well written. I propose that it be discussed at a meeting of the Party, government, military, and cultural circles before

publication." Zhou Enlai underlined three paragraphs in the second section of the editorial, "The Combination of Revolutionary Cadres with the Broad Masses of the Revolutionary Masses," and noted: "In this section, you can explain and clarify the three combinations at the local level and within government agencies." In the draft submitted for review on the 22nd, two paragraphs were added to this section. One paragraph read: "Experience has shown that in provinces and cities where power needs to be seized, temporary power organs combining the 'three combinations' must be established." This "three-in-one" temporary power structure is composed of leaders of revolutionary mass organizations that truly represent the broad masses, representatives of the local People's Liberation Army garrison, and revolutionary leading cadres. In industrial and mining enterprises where power needs to be seized, a "three-in-one" temporary power structure must also be established, composed of revolutionary cadres (leading cadres, general cadres, and technical personnel), worker representatives (veteran and young workers), and militia representatives. In Party and government organs where power needs to be seized, the principle of combining revolutionary leading cadres, revolutionary mid-level cadres, and the revolutionary masses must be implemented. Only in this way can a representative and authoritative leadership team be formed to lead the broad revolutionary masses and successfully accomplish the battle to seize power from the handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party. Another passage reads: "In establishing a "three-in-one" temporary power structure, the current focus must be on resolving the issue of correctly treating revolutionary cadres."

## Comments on the Beijing Garrison's Two Summary Reports on Military Training in Colleges and Middle Schools [1]

(February 19 and March 23, 1967)

1

Comrade Lin Biao:

(1) These two documents should be circulated nationwide immediately. (2) Universities, middle schools, and upper elementary schools will conduct military training once a year, for a period of twenty days. After classes begin, during the twenty days of military training, the training time should not exceed four hours per day. At the same time, the school curriculum will be reduced by four hours per day. (3) Party, government, military, and civilian organizations, with the exception of the elderly, will all middle-aged and young people undergo military training for twenty days each year. Please proceed as appropriate.

Mao Zedong

February 19<sup>th</sup>

After Premier [2] has read these two documents, send them to Comrade Lin Biao.

2

Don't publish any of them.

Experiences elsewhere have surpassed those in Beijing. Some of my comments are also inappropriate for the new situation, so they should not be published.

Mao Zedong

March 23

[1] Following Mao Zedong's February 14, 1967, instruction regarding a newspaper's investigation and summary of the military training experience at two Beijing middle schools, the Beijing Garrison of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) produced two summary reports on February 18 regarding the pilot program for short-term military and political training at five universities, including Peking University and Tsinghua University, and at Beijing No. 2 Middle School and No. 25 Middle School. Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, submitted these reports to Mao Zedong for review on February 19. The first report was written on the front page of the previous report submitted by Lin Biao for review. On March 4, Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Wang Li, a member of the group, wrote to Mao Zedong, stating: "Comrade Fu Chongbi,

Commander of the Beijing Garrison, advocates publishing the military and political training at universities and middle schools in the newspapers. They also advocate revising and publishing the two documents on military and political training in Beijing approved by the Chairman. Please make your decision, Chairman." The second report was written on the reports of Chen Boda and Wang Li. The two summary reports of the Beijing Garrison were neither circulated nationwide by the Central Committee nor published in newspapers.

[2] Premier refers to Zhou Enlai.

## **Comments on the Press Release on the Establishment of the Guizhou Provincial Revolutionary Committee [1]**

(February 20, 1967)

Comrades Boda and Wang Li [2]:

The name "Revolutionary Committee" is better. Please change it in all four documents.

Mao Zedong

February 20

It can be published over two days. The first three items will be published on the first day, and the last item on the second day [3].

[1] On February 17, 1967, Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, submitted four new drafts: "Guizhou Revolutionary Rebels Hold a Grand Celebration to Celebrate the Establishment of the Mao Zedong Thought Guizhou Provincial Revolutionary Committee, the Provisional Authority of Guizhou Province," "A Letter to the People of the Province from the Mao Zedong Thought Guizhou Provincial Revolutionary Committee," "A Telegram of Tribute to Chairman Mao at the Oath-taking Ceremony for the Establishment of the Mao Zedong Thought Guizhou Provincial Revolutionary Committee," and "The Experience of the Proletarian Revolutionary Rebels in Guizhou in Their Struggle to Seize Power." In his report for review, Chen Boda wrote: "Four pieces of materials from Guizhou Province, quite rich in content, and well-presented on the experience of the three-in-one combination. Please review them, Chairman. If you deem it suitable for publication, may the name be shortened to 'Guizhou Provincial Revolutionary Committee.' Please approve!" Mao Zedong's comments were written on the first draft Chen Boda submitted.

[2] Wang Li was a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at that time.

[3] On February 22, 1967, the People's Daily published the first three news articles submitted by Chen Boda for review. On February 23, the People's Daily published the fourth article. The phrase "Mao Zedong Thought Guizhou Provincial Revolutionary Committee" in all four articles was changed to "Guizhou Provincial Revolutionary Committee" upon publication.

**Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Letter to the Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants of the People's Communes and Cadres at All Levels in Rural Areas Nationwide [1]**

(February 20, 1967)

Comrade Lin Biao read it and return it to Wang Dongxing for implementation.

Mao Zedong

February 20, 11:00 a.m.

[1] This comment was written on a draft letter submitted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for review by Zhou Enlai and others on February 20, 1967. The letter pointed out that the poor and lower-middle peasants are the main force in the countryside promoting revolution and production. As spring ploughing begins, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee call on you to earnestly promote revolution and production, mobilize all forces, and immediately and actively work to ensure a successful spring ploughing season. Cadres at all levels in rural people's communes should be adept at consulting with the poor and lower-middle peasants and all working people to create a high tide in spring ploughing. The Party Central Committee believes that the vast majority of cadres at all levels in rural people's communes are good or relatively good. Comrades who have made mistakes should also strive to make amends during spring ploughing. If cadres do so, the poor and lower-middle peasants should forgive them and support their work. Criticism of them should adopt the attitude consistently instructed by Chairman Mao of "punishing the past and addressing the future, curing the illness and saving the patient." Landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists are absolutely prohibited from making reckless remarks or making unwarranted moves, disrupting production, undermining the unity of the working people, or inciting factional disputes. They must earnestly continue to undergo labour reform under the supervision of the poor and lower-middle peasants. Cadres removed from office during the "Four Cleanups" movement must actively participate in labour and reform themselves; they must not resort to retaliatory measures. I suggest that you consider immediately convening a meeting of cadres at the commune, production brigade, and production team levels to arrange spring ploughing production. I also suggest that you hold a meeting of all production team members to discuss spring ploughing production. I also suggest that the People's Liberation Army troops stationed in the area and military agencies at all levels strongly support and assist spring ploughing production. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this letter that same day, requesting that it be read and posted in the countryside.

## Comments on Understanding the Situation of Leading Cadres of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee

(February 24 and 28, 1967)

1

Premier:

Please tell the Guangzhou Military Region to investigate the political attitudes of Zhao Ziyang and Qu Mengjue, as well as the other provincial Party secretaries and standing committee members. Is it possible to have Zhao and Qu come to Beijing to talk with Chen Yu and Huang Yongsheng [3] and offer some guidance?

Mao Zedong

February 24

2

Premier:

Agree to do so.

Mao Zedong

February 8, 1:00 AM

[1] The first part of this article is Mao Zedong's comments after reading the February 23, 1967, report from the Guangzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and others on the new situation in the struggle for power in Guangzhou. On February 27, 1967, Premier Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao Zedong, saying that he had held a day-long discussion with comrades from Guangdong who had come to Beijing the previous day. The Guangdong comrades included Huang Yongsheng, Chen Yu, Zhao Ziyang, Chen De (then Political Commissar of the Guangdong Provincial Military Region), Qu Mengjue, and seven others. Tonight, at the Cultural Revolution meeting, we discussed the Guangdong issue and unanimously proposed: Guangdong should immediately implement martial law and prepare for the establishment of a revolutionary committee combining the three elements of power. Currently, Huang Yongsheng will be the chief and Chen De as the deputy. They will oversee the work of Guangdong Province and assist the provincial comrades in their self-criticism. It is expected that some comrades will gain the support of the masses. The situation in Yunnan is quite similar to that in Guangdong, and it is proposed that martial law also be implemented

initially to prepare the conditions for the three elements of power. After reading this, Mao Zedong wrote another comment, which is the second part of this article.

[2] Zhao Ziyang, then First Secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee and Third Political Commissar of the Guangzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Qu Mengjue, then Executive Secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee.

[3] Chen Yu was then the Third Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Governor of Guangdong Province. Huang Yongsheng was then Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

## **Comments on the public reports on the Guiyang Cotton Mill's integration into the administrative system [1]**

(February 27, 1967)

Comrades Boda and Wang Li [2]:

his seems to warrant public reporting. Also, there's an editorial in Wenhui Daily titled "Revolution Doesn't Distinguish Between Early and Late. [3] " It seems that, with slight revisions, it could be reprinted in the People's Daily. Other Beijing newspapers have already reprinted it. The People's Daily doesn't seem to have a strong political sense.

Mao Zedong

February 27

[1] This comment was written in the 1334th issue of "Kuaibao," published by the Cultural Revolution Group Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on February 25, 1967. The article, "Another New Form in the Great Unity: Guiyang Cotton Mill's Integration According to Administrative Systems Has Proven Results," stated that after seizing power, the Guiyang Cotton Mill had implemented integration based on administrative units, such as workshops, which had a significant impact on promoting both the Cultural Revolution and production. They called this integration "centralized great unity," and it was a new form of the great unity. On March 1, 1967, the People's Daily published this article, retitled "Using Mao Zedong Thought as the Soul of the Great Unity! Guiyang Cotton Mill's Integration According to Administrative Departments Has Significantly Strengthened Organizational Discipline, Emerging a New Look in the Revolution and Production." On the same day, the People's Daily also published an editorial entitled "A Good Form of the Great Unity of Proletarian Revolutionaries."

[2] Boda, also known as Chen Boda, was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Wang Li was then a member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[3] This refers to an editorial published in Wenhui Daily on February 18, 1967, originally titled "Rebellion Does Not Distinguish Between Early and Late" and reprinted in the People's Daily on February 20, 1967. The editorial states that revolutions may come sooner or later, and rebellions may occur at different times. Our attitude is: Regardless of the time of revolution, regardless of the time of rebellion, we warmly welcome genuine revolution and genuine rebellion. Rebellion today, welcome today; rebellion tomorrow, welcome tomorrow. All cadres willing to revolutionize should follow Chairman Mao's teaching of "seize the day"

and rebel immediately. Any argument that discriminates against or excludes cadres from rebellion is wrong and must be resolutely refuted.

**Comments on Zhang Riqing's article "Unwavering Support for the Proletarian Revolutionaries' Struggle to Seize Power" [1]**

(February 27, 1967)

Comrade Lin Biao:

You can publish it in the newspapers and broadcast it so that the army comrades will see it. There is no need to print it again. If you agree, please return it to the Cultural Revolution Group.

Mao Zedong

February 27, 10:00

[1] Zhang Riqing, then serving as the political commissar of the Shanxi Provincial Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, wrote to Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, during an interrogation on February 25, 1967, when Chen Boda, editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine, and his deputy editors-in-chief, Wang Li and Guan Feng, presented this article to Lin Biao, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. The article read, "This article was commissioned by Red Flag magazine and written by Comrade Zhang Riqing. We think it is excellent and intend to publish it soon. We would also like to recommend that the Military Commission distribute it to all comrades at the army-level cadre conference for reference." Lin Biao reviewed it and forwarded it to Mao Zedong, who inscribed his comments on the draft submitted by Chen Boda and others. Zhang Riqing's article was published in the People's Daily on February 28, 1967, and in the fourth issue of Red Flag magazine on March 1.

## **Instructions on the Formulation of Seizing Power**

(February 27, 1967)

I disagree with the slogan "Grand Union, Grand Seizure of Power." Does this mean that there isn't a single unit where the proletariat holds power? I suggest removing the "grand" from "grand seizure of power": "Grand Union, Grand Seizure of Power."

The spearhead of the struggle should be directed against those in power who are taking the capitalist road, not against those who stubbornly adhere to the bourgeois reactionary line.

"The world is our world; the country is our country; society is our society; if we don't speak out, who will? If we don't act, who will?..." This statement was made in response to the situation at the time and should not be repeated.

## **Comments on the Need to Pay Attention to the Phenomenon of Counter-Revolutionary Restoration [1]**

(February 28, 1967)

This phenomenon of counter-revolutionary restoration exists at all levels, from top to bottom, and deserves attention.

Mao Zedong

February 28

[1] This comment appeared in the 1332nd issue of "Express," published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group Office on February 25, 1967. This issue of "Express" contained a document titled "Who Did the Beijing Political and Legal Commune Support in Tianjin's Xiaozhan Commune?" The document stated: "On January 26, the Beijing Political and Legal Commune's Liaoyuan Long March Team supported the 'Liaoyuan Red Combat Team,' composed of cadres removed from office during the Four Cleanups Movement, in their attempt to seize the brigade seal in the Lazidi Brigade of Tianjin's Xiaozhan Commune. From then on, all sorts of monsters and demons emerged to launch a counterattack." On February 27, 1967, Chen Boda, head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group, submitted this issue of "Express" to Mao Zedong, writing: "This is an example of capitalist restoration. The revolutionary masses have asked reporters to report the situation to the Chairman. I am sending you the document now; please take a look."

## **Directive on the Question of Sectarianism**

(February 1967)

Anyone who engages in sectarianism or small grouping will ultimately fail.

**We must immerse ourselves in work and be good at thinking.**

(February 1967)

Among the prominent and influential figures of the May Fourth Movement, Hu Shih, on the right wing, later became a running dog of the American imperialists. Chen Duxiu, also a member of the May Fourth Movement, also became a counter-revolutionary. Li Dazhao, who wrote few articles at the time, devoted himself to his work and later became a revolutionary on the left. There was also Lu Xun, who emphasized social investigation and independent thinking and later became a great Marxist. We must learn lessons from history and not be fleeting figures. We must immerse ourselves in work, be good at thinking, and maintain close ties with the masses. Throughout China's revolutions, including those we have personally experienced, the truly promising were those who could think things through and not stand out. Those who are now making a fuss will surely become fleeting figures in history.

**Comments on a briefing on promoting Mao Zedong Thought in factories organized by the Shenyang Military Region.**

(March 3, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai:

This document [1] may be printed and distributed to all comrades at the army-level conference [2]. The army must not only coordinate with local governments in managing agriculture, but also industry. The Shenyang Military Region's approach of sending large numbers of personnel to factories to conduct propaganda and investigations is excellent. The 27th Army in Wuxi, the 54th Army in Chongqing, and the 23rd Army in Yichun and Weihe have also had good experiences. In short, the army cannot sit idly by and watch industrial production decline.

Mao Zedong

March 3

[1] This refers to a report submitted by the Shenyang Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to the Central Military Commission, the Cultural Revolution Group of the entire army, the State Council, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group on March 2, 1967. The report stated that in late February, the Shenyang Military Region leadership and various military agencies stationed in Shenyang mobilized 780 cadres to form Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams. These teams entered 122 large and medium-sized factories and some colleges and universities in Shenyang. Using wired broadcasts and oral explanations, they repeatedly publicized Chairman Mao's call to promote revolution and production, his Sixteen Articles, Ten Articles on Industry, and Eight-Point Directive, as well as other relevant notices and directives from the Central Committee and the Military Commission. Once the Party's policies were clearly explained, the abnormal phenomena in some factories, which had been caused by a few individuals causing unrest, were gradually corrected, production generally increased, and armed conflict was largely stopped.

[2] Refers to the meeting of military cadres at the army level and above held from February 26 to March 25, 1967.

## **Comments on the report on achieving school-wide unity at Tianjin Yan'an Middle School based on classroom teaching**

(March 7, 1967)

Lin Biao, Enlai, and fellow Cultural Revolution Group members:

This document seems suitable for nationwide circulation and reference. The military should implement military training for senior grades in universities, middle schools, and elementary schools in phases and batches, and participate in the work of reopening schools, reorganizing organizations, establishing leadership bodies combining the three elements and implementing struggle, criticism, and transformation. Pilot programs should be conducted first, experience gained, and then gradually expanded. Students should also be persuaded to adhere to Marx's teaching that only by liberating all of humanity can the proletariat ultimately liberate itself. Teachers and cadres who have made mistakes should not be excluded from military training. With the exception of the elderly and the sick, these individuals should be allowed to participate to facilitate their transformation. All of these problems, if addressed diligently, will not be difficult to resolve.

Mao Zedong

March 7

[1] Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai, refers to Zhou Enlai.

[2] This refers to a report submitted by Zheng Sansheng, Commander of the Tianjin Garrison Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and others on March 6, 1967, to the Beijing Military Region and the Cultural Revolution Group of the entire army regarding their experiences in achieving school-wide unity based on classroom teaching and rectifying, consolidating, and developing the Red Guards at Tianjin Yan'an Junior High School. The report stated that before the troops arrived at Tianjin Yan'an Junior High School, attendance was low, the organization was numerous and disorganized, and there were instances of armed conflict. After a month of military and political training, this situation was transformed. School-wide unity based on classroom teaching was achieved, a provisional revolutionary committee combining "three elements" was established, and the Red Guard organization was rectified, consolidated, and developed. After classes resumed on March 1, a new high tide of promoting revolution and promoting education was set off. On March 8, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded this report, along with Mao Zedong's comments, to the Party committees of all military regions and at all levels. On

March 8, 1968, the People's Daily published Mao Zedong's comments in full, titled "Chairman Mao's Instructions on the Great Strategic Deployment of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Because this comment was written on March 7, 1967, it is also referred to as the "March 7" Directive.

## **Comments on the Guizhou Provincial Military Region's Experience in Supporting Leftist Work**

(March 7, 1967)

Comrade Qi Benyu [1]: I have read this document [2] and it is good. However, some issues are not detailed enough. For example, the first issue does not have any examples, and it is unclear how it was resolved. Could you please write a more detailed report that can be published and send it to me? Please consider this.

Mao Zedong,

March 7

[1] Qi Benyu, then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

[2] This refers to the document "Experiences of the Guizhou Provincial Military Region on How to Effectively Support Leftists," published in the "Army Cultural Revolution Movement Situation Bulletin, Issue 17," compiled by the All-Army Cultural Revolution Group on March 2, 1967. The document states that the Guizhou Provincial Military Region Party Committee held a symposium from February 1 to 3, attended by key leaders of divisions and sub-districts, as well as cadres at the department level and above in the military region's headquarters. During the discussion on how to effectively support leftists, the following issues were examined: 1. We must firmly grasp the general direction of the struggle. The Central Committee has already pointed out that the proletarian revolutionaries must achieve a grand unity to seize power from the handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party. This is the general direction of the current struggle. In the past, due to a lack of understanding, we lost our way once we came into contact with reality. 2. Being able to identify leftists is a prerequisite for our support. The specific methods are: (1) Be adept at identifying leftists by analyzing the characteristics of each faction; (2) Pay attention to identifying leftists by looking at the connections between each faction and higher authorities; (3) Go among the masses and listen to opinions from all sides to avoid one-sidedness. 3. Overcome fear and firmly support the broad masses of the revolutionary left in seizing power.

## **Comments on the report on the experience of the troops stationed at Dukou in supporting the left**

(March 7, 1967)

Lin Biao, Enlai [1], and the Cultural Revolution Group:

This document [2] may be forwarded to the entire nation and the entire army for reference. Please make your own decisions.

Mao Zedong

March 7

[1] Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and was soon named Vice Chairman of the Central Committee. Enlai refers to Zhou Enlai.

[2] This refers to a report on the experience of the Sichuan Dukou Garrison's Joint Command in Supporting the Left, forwarded by the Party Committee of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Railway Corps on March 4, 1967, on the principle that "political and ideological support for the left is paramount." The report stated that after the support troops, primarily composed of the 5th Railway Division, arrived at Dukou, they based their support for the left on investigation and research, dedicating themselves to identifying genuine leftists in mass struggles. In supporting the left, they insisted on prioritizing their growth and development politically and ideologically. Specifically, they implemented the following approaches: 1. Helping them actively study and apply Chairman Mao's works in struggle; 2. Helping them cultivate active thinking and conduct solidarity education to form a unified and combat-ready collective; 3. Helping them maintain a clear mind and adhere to the general direction of the struggle. In its comments on this report, the Party Committee of the Railway Corps pointed out that the PLA's support for the revolutionary left must primarily be political, and this is the correct approach. On March 8, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded the experience of the Dukou garrison, along with the comments of the Railway Corps Party Committee, to the Party Committees of all military regions and all levels, stating: "The Dukou Garrison Support Left Joint Command has raised a very important issue of universal significance and created excellent experience." It is "worthy of study by the entire nation and the entire army, and all military region Party committees and Party committees at all levels should follow suit."

## Comments and Revisions on the Editorial Draft for the Red Flag Magazine, "On the Revolution's 'Three Combinations'" [1]

(March 7, 1967)

1

After reading it, Comrade Lin Biao [2] send to the Cultural Revolution Group. [I]

Mao Zedong,

March 7

2

From top to bottom, every unit seeking to seize power must have military or militia participation, forming a 'three-in-one' combination. This applies to factories, rural areas, finance and trade, culture and education (universities, middle schools, and elementary schools), Party and government organs, and mass organizations. Military representatives should be sent from the county level and above, and militia representatives from the commune level and below. This is extremely beneficial. If there are insufficient military representatives, they can be temporarily vacant and later appointed.

[1] This editorial was written by Wang Li and Guan Feng, members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and deputy editors-in-chief of Red Flag magazine. On March 2, 1967, Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group and editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine, submitted the editorial to Mao Zedong for review. He wrote: "The revolutionary three-in-one policy and the correct approach to the cadre issue have won broad support among the masses. At the same time, some are exploiting this issue to engage in restoration activities. In response to this situation, Comrades Wang Li and Guan Feng have drafted an editorial expounding on the Chairman's revolutionary three-in-one policy to draw attention." Part I contains Mao Zedong's comments on the draft for review; Part II contains Mao Zedong's additional comments to the editorial. The editorial was published in the fifth issue of Red Flag magazine, published on March 30, 1967, and was reprinted in advance by the People's Daily on March 10.

[2] Lin Biao was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

**The revolutionary "three-in-one" policy must be implemented. Establish a Revolutionary Committee**

(1967)

In those places and units where power needs to be seized, the revolutionary "three-in-one" policy must be implemented to establish a provisional authority that is revolutionary, representative, and imbued with proletarian authority. This authority should preferably be called a Revolutionary Committee. [1]

[1] The editorial "On the Revolution's 'Three Combinations,'" published in the fifth issue of Red Flag magazine on March 30, 1967, quoted this passage in boldface after "Chairman Mao pointed out." On March 10, the People's Daily reprinted the Red Flag editorial in advance and published Mao Zedong's remarks as quotations.

## **Comments on the Report on the Preparatory Work for the Seizure of Power in Beijing [1]**

(March 9, 1967)

Premier [2]:

The Workers' Congress has not yet been convened, and there is no news about the Middle School and Peasants' Congresses. It would be appropriate to convene the City Congress and elect the Revolutionary Committee in late March. Please consult Comrade Xie Fuzhi on this matter.

Mao Zedong

March 9

[1] This comment was written on a report submitted to Mao Zedong and others by Xie Fuzhi, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council, on March 5, 1967. The report stated that the Central Cultural Revolution Committee had instructed several of us to be responsible for preparing for the seizure of power in Beijing. After a month of deliberation and consultation, we plan to establish a temporary power body of over 90 members, the Beijing Provisional Revolutionary Committee, in the near future. If the Chairman and the Central Committee agree, we plan to hold a meeting this week to establish the Provisional Revolutionary Committee.

[2] Premier refers to Zhou Enlai.

## **Comments on the Procedure for Establishing Revolutionary Committees in Various Places**

(March 10, 1967)

All provinces and cities shall proceed in accordance with this document [1]. Where conditions are not yet ripe, we must wait until they are ripe before proceeding. Where anarchy exists, martial law shall be imposed first.

Mao Zedong

March 10

[1] This refers to Zhou Enlai's report to Mao Zedong on March 10, 1967. The report stated that last night, he received the Chairman's instructions that a meeting of representatives of workers, peasants, and middle school students or a mass meeting should be held before the establishment of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee. I have informed Xie Fuzhi and circulated this to the Standing Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group, and they all agree. This morning, in accordance with this policy, I telephoned Xie Xuegong in Tianjin (then First Secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China) and asked him to consider first holding a meeting of representatives of revolutionary factions from universities, middle schools, workers, peasants, and government agencies, and then convening a city-wide consultative conference of revolutionary organizations and a mass meeting. The procedure for establishing the Revolutionary Committee was announced.

## **Comments on the Postponement of the Establishment of the Tianjin Municipal Revolutionary Committee [1]**

(March 1967)

It is advisable to postpone its establishment until the end of March, in accordance with the Premier's opinion on the 10<sup>th</sup> [2].

[1] This comment was written on a report submitted by Premier Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and others on March 9, 1967. The report stated that most revolutionary student organizations in Tianjin were moving toward unification, with a meeting of the Red Delegates' Congress held on the 5th. Workers' revolutionary organizations had been organized systematically, with many now formed and totaling 170,000 members. The revolutionary organizations among middle school students were less well-organized. They planned to hold a consultative meeting this week to agree on the list of members of the Revolutionary Committee and its Standing Committee. A mass rally was scheduled for the 12th, at which the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee, the provisional organ of power in Tianjin, would be announced, along with a declaration.

[2] On March 10, 1967, Zhou Enlai called Xie Xuegong, First Secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, and asked him to consider first convening a meeting of representatives of revolutionary factions from universities, middle schools, workers, peasants, and government agencies, and then convening a city-wide consultative meeting of revolutionary organizations and a mass rally to announce the procedures for establishing a revolutionary committee.

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## **Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Letter to Workers and Cadres of Factories and Mines Nationwide [1]**

(March 1967)

Send it as is.

[1] This comment was written on a draft letter submitted by Zhou Enlai to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for review on March 16, 1967. The letter demanded that workers and cadres in factories, mines, and enterprises nationwide strengthen labour discipline, uphold democratic centralism, and establish a good order for socialist production and the Cultural Revolution. They should adhere to the eight-hour workday as stipulated by the Party Central Committee, and during their working hours outside of the eight-hour workday, they should continue to carry out the Cultural Revolution. They should not leave their production or work posts without permission during production hours, and should combat unhealthy practices such as unexplained absenteeism and perfunctory work. They should also follow the Party Central Committee's regulations and, during the Cultural Revolution, promote the revolutionary transformation of their own thinking, produce more quickly, efficiently, and economically, ensure product quality, and strive for high quality. They should combat unhealthy practices such as disregarding quality and wasting national resources. The letter pointed out that all factory and mine workers must study the experience of streamlining the workforce and administration during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. They must significantly reduce the number of people disconnected from production while also significantly improving work efficiency. They must pay attention to frugality in the service of revolution. Workers' organizations should generally not be disconnected from production. All factory and mine workers must, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, strengthen their sense of responsibility as masters of the country and diligently protect state property. Anyone who damages state property must be severely punished in accordance with national law. The Party Central Committee called on all revolutionary cadres working in factories and mines to take the lead in doing a good job in all aspects of their work and make their utmost efforts to fulfill and overfulfill the national production and construction plans. The Central Committee of the Party believes that the majority of cadres in all factories and mines are good or relatively good. Comrades who have made mistakes should rigorously engage in self-criticism. During the Cultural Revolution, they should diligently study Chairman Mao's works, strive to be good pupils of the masses, and reform themselves in their work, making amends for their mistakes. As long as these cadres do this, the workers should forgive them and support their work. Criticism of them should adopt the attitude of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient," as Chairman Mao has consistently instructed.

Landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists who have infiltrated factories and mines must be absolutely prohibited from making reckless remarks or making unlawful moves, disrupting production, undermining unity among workers, or creating and inciting factional disputes. Their treatment should be tailored to their political stance, work attitude, and the specific circumstances of the factory or mine. The Central Committee of the Party has decided that the People's Liberation Army will vigorously assist local governments and support industrial production. You should cooperate closely with the comrades of the People's Liberation Army. On March 18, 1967, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this letter, requesting that it be read and posted in all factories, mines, and capital construction units.

**Instructions on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's publication of the materials regarding the surrender and betrayal of Bo Yibo, Liu Lantao, Yang Xianzhen, and others**

(March 16, 1967)

A small number of counter-revolutionaries, rightists, and traitors have infiltrated the Party, government, military, civilians, factories, rural areas, and commerce. During this campaign, most of these individuals have emerged on their own initiative, which is a great thing. They should be identified and thoroughly criticized by the revolutionary masses, and then dealt with accordingly, depending on the severity of their crimes.

## **Comments on the document "Serious Chaos in the Transportation Situation at the Qiqihar Railway Bureau"**

(March 19, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai [1]:

Please read this document [2]. All railway bureaus experiencing disorder should be placed under military control to quickly restore normal order. All railway bureaus operating well should also send military representatives to learn from their good experiences and promote their application. Furthermore, automobiles, ships, and port loading and unloading must also be regulated. It's wrong to only manage industry and ignore transportation. Please study this matter and make your own decisions.

Mao Zedong

March 19<sup>th</sup>

[1] Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai, refers to Zhou Enlai.

[2] The document refers to "Serious Chaos in Transportation at the Qiqihar Railway Bureau." It states that the Qiqihar Railway Bureau is experiencing severe congestion along its routes, receiving numerous urgent requests for supplies daily from across the country. To meet these demands, the bureau must ship out over 5,100 railcars daily, but currently can only handle 1,700 to 1,800. Over 200 railcars of incoming supplies are also unable to be unloaded daily. Accidents at the bureau have increased significantly. By March 15th, 326 accidents had occurred, a 50% increase over the same period last year. This high number of accidents and the magnitude of the losses in such a short period of time are unprecedented in the bureau's history. The main causes of these problems are: lax discipline and a lack of compliance with orders; the proliferation of factions (over 200 organizations across the bureau), which not only increases the number of staff without work, but also leads to frequent arguments that disrupt work; some individuals emphasize breaking the mould, arbitrarily disregarding essential rules and regulations; and leading cadres, driven by fear, abandoning leadership. On March 18, the bureau's military representatives intervened in the Cultural Revolution and established a frontline production command centre, combining the "three-in-one" approach. They also planned to establish command centres in each branch bureau to replace the long-paralysed leadership structure. However, with only a little over 40 military representatives across the bureau, the situation remained challenging, and they urgently requested that the garrison send more cadres to strengthen leadership.

**Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Notice on Stopping the Nationwide Mass Link-ups [1]**

(March 19, 1967)

Send as is.

[1] This comment was written on a draft notice submitted by Zhou Enlai to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for review on March 19, 1967. The notice stated that all localities and units were currently concentrating their efforts on establishing a grand coalition of proletarian revolutionaries and establishing a temporary power structure based on the "three-in-one" approach. Furthermore, students and the masses who had been traveling abroad had just returned, and the tasks of struggle, criticism, and reform within their local units were heavy. Therefore, the Central Committee decided to continue halting the nationwide grand tour and cancel the original plan for this year's spring tour. The Central Committee requested that a proper explanation be given to the students and the masses. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this notice that same day.

## **Comments on Nie Rongzhen's Report on Military Takeover and Restructuring of National Defense Research Institutions [I]**

(March 20, 1967)

Return to the Premier to send out.

Mao Zedong

March 20

[I] On March 11, 1967, Nie Rongzhen, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Director of the Science and Technology Commission, and Director of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission, wrote a report to Mao Zedong and others, stating that, "According to our understanding, many research institutes within the defense industry and the Chinese Academy of Sciences responsible for national defense are experiencing leadership collapse, research work has stalled, and Third Front construction is plagued by numerous problems. This situation must be swiftly corrected." He recommended that these units be taken over by the military, with the National Defense Science and Technology Commission responsible for this work. Scientific research and production should be quickly resumed in the spirit of promoting revolution, war preparedness, work, and production. After the takeover, the issue of changing the current leadership system, which had been strongly demanded by the masses during the Cultural Revolution, would be addressed. He suggested that, while resuming production, the defense industry departments and the relevant defense research institutions within the Chinese Academy of Sciences should be comprehensively and appropriately adjusted and reorganized, taking into account the criticism and revision of the original text. The report also set out five principles for this adjustment and reorganization. On March 18, Premier Zhou Enlai wrote a report to Mao Zedong and others, stating that, in accordance with the Chairman's instructions and after consultation with relevant comrades, he had announced to the National Defense Industry Office and defense industry departments that he intended to implement military control. The proposed method was for each department to send a three-person military control representative team, utilizing existing organizational leadership. Simultaneously, he would encourage all revolutionary mass organizations to conduct open-door rectification and achieve a grand unity of the proletarian revolutionary faction. He would assist leading cadres at all levels who needed criticism to review and present themselves, and deal with them accordingly, ultimately achieving the "three-in-one" combination of revolution in all departments. Regarding the research institutes and institutes within the defense industry departments, as well as the research institutes under the Academy of Sciences that carried

out defense tasks, he agreed with Comrade Nie Rongzhen's opinion and submitted them to the National Defense Science and Technology Commission for military control. He also generally agreed with the principles of adjustment and reorganization he proposed, pending final approval. The State Council's departments of industry and commerce, finance and trade, agriculture, forestry, and health are following the Chairman's instructions and are lining up separately. They plan to impose martial law in even those departments where work is paralysed. The same measures will be adopted for the defense industry departments. After consultation, they will be submitted separately for approval. Mao Zedong's comments were written on Zhou Enlai's report.

## **Instructions on "Three Beliefs and Three Reliances" [1]**

(March 20, 1967)

This is a good report.

First, rely on the masses. This is crucial. We all come from the masses! The masses are workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and businessmen. The cadres under the General Office of the Central Committee are all from the masses! Work should primarily be done by the masses. Relying on a small number of leaders is neither feasible nor sufficient. Even then, we cannot be divorced from the masses; we must have a mass perspective.

Second, rely on the army. Our army is not only capable of fighting, but also of mass work, propaganda, and production. Many military cadres join the army at a young age and have little education. They gradually improve their education in the army, and their thinking is relatively simple. Unlike local governments, the army lacks land and financial power and can move at will. Provinces have territories, but the army does not. Furthermore, the army is well-organized and disciplined, and moves quickly. For example, the Shenyang army's experience supporting the left, workers, and farmers—after the central government approved it, the entire army was mobilized within 21 days. If it were passed around by local governments, action would be much slower.

Third, rely on cadres. The vast majority of cadres are good. Many things should be left to cadres, and policies should be implemented by them. Some provincial Party secretaries should be released quickly and asked to reflect on their actions. Some provincial Party secretaries made mistakes because they harmed the masses and mobilized some of the masses to protect them, which ultimately harmed them.

[1] This was Mao Zedong's directive after he listened to Lin Biao's speech at a meeting of cadres at the army level and above on March 20.

## Comments and Revisions on the Article "Patriotism or National Betrayal?"

(March 23, 1967)

1

Comrade Qi Benyu [2]:

I've read it and find it very well written. There are some minor revisions [3] I'd like to make, and I'm not sure if they're appropriate. Please discuss this with the comrades.

Mao Zedong

23 March

2

The Red Lanterns were also organizations of young women from many parts of northern China at the time. They organized themselves in a very disciplined manner, practiced martial arts, and opposed imperialism and its running dogs. A few more words might be added here [4].

3

Please check whether it is Qiao or Rao [5].

4

Did the Chinese people organize the Boxer Rebellion and flee to the imperialist countries of Europe, America, and Japan to rebel and commit "murder and arson"? Or did the imperialist countries invade China, oppress, and exploit the Chinese people, thereby inspiring the Chinese people to rise up against imperialism and its running dogs and corrupt officials in China? This is a matter of right and wrong that must be debated clearly.

[1] Sections 1 through 3 contain Mao Zedong's comments on the draft of this article, which was submitted for review. Section 4 contains a paragraph Mao added to the article. This article was later published in the fifth issue of Red Flag magazine, published on March 30, 1967, and was reprinted in major newspapers such as the People's Daily.

[2] Qi Benyu was then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and deputy editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine.

[3] Mao Zedong's revisions to Qi Benyu's article, in addition to the four revisions in this article, also included deleting the four modifiers before "Chairman Mao" on page two: "our great teacher, great leader, great commander, great helmsman." He also made some minor revisions to individual words.

[4] In one passage, Qi Benyu's draft of his article quoted a Boxer song: "Red lanterns illuminate the Boxers, like brothers and sisters, rejoicing in joy, united in purpose, to kill the foreign officials." Next to it, Mao Zedong wrote this comment. According to Mao Zedong's comments, Qi Benyu added a paragraph before and after the ballad: "During the Boxer Rebellion, young people were the most vibrant and active force. They made immortal contributions in this great revolutionary movement. The 'Red Lanterns,' which shocked China and the world, were organizations of young women from many parts of northern China at the time. They organized themselves with great discipline, practiced martial arts, and defended the motherland. They wore red clothes, red hats, carried red lanterns, and red guns. They fought on the front lines and eliminated traitors in the rear. They actively participated in the Boxer uprising, resolutely opposing imperialism and its running dogs, and demonstrated the revolutionary heroism of young Chinese women in their fight against imperialism and feudalism!" This ballad vividly reflects the unwavering resolve of the 'Red Lanterns' in their fight against imperialism. Stories of the 'Red Lanterns' heroic struggle have been widely circulated among the people. They say, 'The daughters of the Red Lanterns, once in battle, are ready to die. Amidst the hail of bullets, they fear nothing but falling behind.' "Since the Daoguang and Xianfeng eras, China has fought coastal defenses against barbarians both by land and sea, and has been completely routed." "Having these young men and women revitalize our tired spirits will not only chill the hearts of other nations, but also boost the morale of the Central Plains."

[5] In the draft of Qi Benyu's article, the following passage appears: "The film also slanders the Boxers as tools of the feudal rulers. It uses the voice of Minister Zhao Shurao to say: 'Please, Empress Dowager, issue an order to organize the Boxers into a righteous army, wipe out the foreigners, establish prestige throughout the world, and the fate of the Qing Dynasty depends on this one move.'" Mao Zedong drew a line under the character "Rao" in "Zhao Shurao" and wrote this comment. Zhao Shurao should be Zhao Shuqiao.

**Comments on the Draft Decision of the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission on the Implementation of Military Control over the Daqing Oilfield [1]**

(March 23, 1967)

Send it as it is.

[1] This comment was written on the draft decision submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on March 23, 1967. The main contents of the draft decision were: 1. Starting March 27, 1967, troops stationed in the Daqing area by the Shenyang Military Region will organize the Daqing Oilfield Military Control Committee and send military representatives to each production headquarters, key units, and important residential areas under the oilfield to implement military control. 2. The Oilfield Military Control Committee will be under the dual leadership of the Shenyang Military Region and the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. Its primary tasks are to take over the Party and government power in the oilfield, unify the leadership of the Cultural Revolution and production work; promote the grand unity of the proletarian revolutionaries in order to ultimately achieve the revolutionary "three-in-one" combination; suppress the sabotage activities of counter-revolutionary organizations and elements with proven evidence, safeguard the Cultural Revolution, and safeguard production and infrastructure in the oilfield. 3. The proletarian revolutionaries in the oilfield must achieve a grand unity based on Mao Zedong Thought. The vast majority of workers must remain steadfast in their production posts, observe labour discipline, and bravely shoulder the dual burdens of revolution and production. Workers currently participating in out-of-town activities must promptly return to their production posts. Fourth, we must quickly strengthen and reorganize production and operational leadership teams at all levels, actively restore the normal operation of production command systems at all levels, and ensure the smooth progress of production, construction, scientific research, and design work. Fifth, teachers and students from outside the oilfields, as well as workers from outside units, must immediately return to their respective schools or units to engage in revolution. Sixth, students working part-time at the Daqing Oilfield must return to their original production units or schools to resume classes and engage in revolution. We must adhere to Chairman Mao's "May 7th" directive and prioritize learning. Seventh, we must conscientiously implement Chairman Mao's cadre policy and treat cadres correctly. Model soldiers, red-flag bearers, and model workers who have made mistakes should be educated and united according to the principle of "unity, criticism, and unity." Eighth, the families of workers should work hard to ensure a good spring ploughing season and strive for a good harvest this year. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission issued this decision on the same day.

## **Comments on a Brief Report on the Cultural Revolution in Yibin [1]**

(March 27, 1967)

The Central Cultural Revolution Group:

This matter should be dealt with. Ten or so people from each side should come to Beijing for discussions. Gan Wei-han [2] of the Chengdu Military Region should also come. Please consult with the Premier [3] for his decision.

Mao Zedong,

March 27, 2:00 AM

[1] This refers to the "Cultural Revolution Bulletin," issue 435, published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group Office on March 26, 1967, entitled "Large Number of Revolutionaries in Yibin, Sichuan Imprisoned; Struggle Extremely Difficult." The bulletin excerpted a letter from Tian He of Yibin County, Sichuan Province, dated March 14, reflecting on the situation in Yibin during the Cultural Revolution.

[2] Gan Wei-han was then the political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[3] Premier refers to Zhou Enlai.

**Comments on the article "'Strike the Large, Protect the Small' is an Integral Part of the Bourgeois Reactionary Line" [1]**

(March 29, 1967)

Comrades Wang Li and Guan Feng:

This document is excellent and can be published publicly and broadcast. We should also investigate the situation in one or two schools and one or two government agencies.

Mao Zedong

March 29th

Please print and distribute it first for the comrades attending the meeting and for other comrades to review.

[1] This article was written under the guise of an investigator for the editorial department of Red Flag magazine. Its original title was "An Investigation into the Tsinghua University Working Group's Implementation of the Bourgeois Reactionary Line on Cadre Issues." The current title, revised by Mao Zedong during his review, was "An Investigation into the Tsinghua University Working Group's Implementation of the Bourgeois Reactionary Line on Cadre Issues in June and July 1966." On March 28, 1967, when Wang Li and Guan Feng submitted the article to Mao Zedong, they wrote: "'Strike the Large, Protect the Small' is an integral part of the bourgeois reactionary line. We have not investigated, exposed, or criticized this issue sufficiently in the past. It seems that we should fully expose and criticize this issue in the process of realizing the revolutionary 'three-in-one combination.' Some typical materials may be circulated to leading Party comrades." The article was later published in the fifth issue of Red Flag magazine, published on March 30, 1967, and was reprinted in major newspapers such as the People's Daily.

## Comments and Revisions on Lin Biao's Speech at a Conference of Military and Higher Cadres [1]

(March 30, 1967)

1

Comrade Lin Biao:

I have read it over and it is very good. Please submit it to the Cultural Revolution Group for consideration and then print it into a booklet and distribute it to the grassroots level of the Party, government, army, and people. I have made a few minor revisions.[2] Please decide whether it is appropriate.

Mao Zedong,

March 30, afternoon

2

A few words from Lenin should be quoted here. [3]

3

Animals are not isolated individuals, but are divided into classes, orders, genera, and species, so this sentence can be deleted. [4]

4

Our Chairman has particularly emphasized class struggle under socialist conditions. *This point has been overlooked by some good Marxist-Leninists, not to mention revisionist figures like Khrushchev.* [5]

5

Because, *at present*, China can be said to be the country that plays a decisive role in the world. For revolution, for world revolution, China *is now* a decisive factor. Whether it's a medium-sized country or a large country, if we compare them in this respect, none can be as influential as China. As long as China doesn't fall, as long as China doesn't change colour, there will be hope for the world. Most places have become revisionist [6] and have become dark, but we can still brighten them up again, transforming from black to red. *Moreover, revolutionary forces around the world have either already emerged or are in the process of rising. Those who want revolution are the majority, and they hope for our support.*

[1] The transcript of Lin Biao's speech, delivered on March 20, 1967, by Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, at a meeting of military

cadres at the army level and above, was submitted to Mao Zedong for review on March 30. Sections 1 through 3 contain Mao's comments on the speech submitted by Lin Biao for review; sections 4 and 5 contain Mao's revisions to the speech, with the text printed in italics containing his additions and revisions.

[2] In addition to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this article, Mao Zedong also made the following revisions: On page 16, he changed the phrase "many countries have achieved the seizure of power, but none have been able to hold on to it" to "most have been unable to hold on to it." On page 28, Lin Biao stated, "We must use Chairman Mao's thought to command the entire nation and guide all our work. This will last for eternity, guiding everything we do now. Moreover, it will be the eternal intellectual wealth of the people of the world and the entire Chinese people." Mao Zedong deleted the phrase "this will last for eternity" and removed the word "eternally" from the phrase "eternally an intellectual wealth" twice. In addition, several other individual text revisions and omissions were made.

[3] Page 2 of Lin Biao's speech notes that Lenin emphasized that after the proletariat seized power, "class struggle continued, but in a different form, becoming even more intense in some places." Following this sentence, Mao Zedong wrote this comment. In the copy of Lin Biao's speech distributed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on April 24, 1967, the following two passages were added: "Lenin, in 'Hail to the Workers of Hungary,' said: 'The abolition of classes requires a long, difficult, and stubborn class struggle. After the overthrow of bourgeois power, after the destruction of the bourgeois state, and after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, class struggle does not disappear (as the philistines of old socialism and old Social Democracy imagine), but only changes its form and becomes more brutal in many respects.'" "In 'Left-Wing' Communism: An Infantile Disorder,' Lenin emphasized: 'The dictatorship of the proletariat is the most fearless and ruthless battle waged by the new class against its more powerful enemy, the bourgeoisie. The resistance of the bourgeoisie becomes tenfold more fierce because it has been overthrown (even within a single country). Its strength lies not only in the power of international capital and the strength of its international connections, but also in the force of habit and the power of small-scale production. Because, unfortunately, there are still many small-scale producers in the world today, and small-scale producers constantly, daily, spontaneously, and on a large scale give rise to capitalism and the bourgeoisie.'"

[4] Page 4 of Lin Biao's speech manuscript states: "If man is an isolated individual, then he is no different from a dog, a cow, a horse, a bird flying in the sky, or a fish swimming in the water." Mao Zedong deleted this sentence and wrote this comment.

[5] In Lin Biao's speech, this sentence originally read: "Our Chairman has particularly emphasized class struggle under socialist conditions. In this respect, Stalin cannot compare, not to mention Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and other leaders of revisionist countries."

[6] In Lin Biao's speech, this sentence originally read: "Everywhere has become revisionist."

**Comments on the article "The Bourgeois Reactionary Line on the Cadre Question Must Be Criticized" [1]**

(March 30, 1967)

Wang Li [2]

Comrade: I have read it, publish it as is.

Mao Zedong

March 30, 9:00 p.m.

[1] This commentary article by Red Flag magazine was published in the fifth issue of Red Flag magazine on March 30, 1967, and was reprinted by major newspapers such as the People's Daily.

[2] Wang Li was a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and deputy editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine at the time.

## **The Basic Issue of the Two-Line Struggle [1]**

(March 1967)

The basic issue of the two-line struggle within our Party is whether China will take the capitalist road or the socialist road after the proletariat seizes power, that is, after the victory of the New Democratic Revolution. It is obvious that the bourgeoisie will take the capitalist road. Within our Communist Party, we will take the socialist road. However, some people believe that China is a very poor country with a low level of capitalist development and cannot develop socialism. Therefore, China must take the capitalist road for a period of time before taking the socialist road. The question of which road to take was a question that arose in the early days of liberation and still persists today. After more than 50 years this still remained a problem in the Soviet Union.

[1] This is an internal party directive drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

## **Don't Get Carried Away with Victory**

(March 1967)

The nationwide campaign to smash the Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang anti-Party clique and the bourgeois reactionary line of Liu and Deng is underway. We must address those within the Party who are taking the capitalist road and those who stubbornly adhere to the bourgeois reactionary line, who have yet to be exposed. Is there any reason to relax our vigilance? Don't get carried away with victory; we must guard against arrogance and impatience.

## **Instructions on Newspaper Work**

(March 1967)

Since the Cultural Revolution, there have been three shortcomings in newspapers: insufficient investigation, insufficient exposure, and insufficient criticism.

## **Instructions on Party Organizations**

(March 1967)

We must always be aware that the current situation is a temporary phenomenon. We cannot survive without a party. How can individual revolutionary rebel organizations replace the party? Nor can the revolutionary committees replace the party.

## Conversations on Criticizing "Self-cultivation" [1]

(March-April 1967)

1

Don't be fooled by the book "Self-cultivation" again. It is a deceptive book, divorced from the realities of class struggle, revolution, and political struggle. It remains silent on the fundamental issue of revolution, namely, the question of political power, and on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It propagates an idealist theory of self-cultivation, indirectly advocating bourgeois individualism and slavery, and opposing Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. "Self-cultivation" according to this book will only lead to more "cultivation," and the more you cultivate, the more revisionist you become.

2

This book is pure deception. The fundamental question of revolution is the question of power. This pamphlet ("Self-cultivation") avoids discussing these fundamental issues: whether power should be seized, whether it can be seized, and how it should be seized. It makes no mention of seizing power, nor of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It leaves out power, classes, class analysis, and class struggle. It is a completely bourgeois, idealistic, reactionary book that doesn't touch Chiang Kai-shek in the slightest. It is a poisonous weed of the bourgeoisie.

3

I've read Liu Shaoqi's "On the Cultivation of Communist Party Members" several times. It's anti-Marxist-Leninist. I think college students should study it more carefully and select a few passages to write critiques of. They should criticize Liu Shaoqi's "On the Cultivation of Communist Party Members" and Deng Xiaoping's speeches over the years.

4

I have never agreed with the "docile tool theory".

[1] Refers to Liu Shaoqi's "On the Self-Cultivation of Communist Party Members."

## **Instructions on the Notes and Other Issues of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong**

(March 1967)

1. Do not revise the notes now, and do not delete any of these names. This is all history. Without Sima Yan, Sima Shi, and Sima Zhao, how could there be a History of the Jin Dynasty?
2. The "Resolution on Certain Historical Issues" is poorly written and can be omitted.
3. The passage quoting Liu Shaoqi in "Rectifying the Party's Style of Work" is unnecessary and can be deleted.
4. The new edition of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong will retain the original date.
5. We will discuss Volumes 5 and 6 of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong a year from now. You don't have time now, and neither do I.
6. The passage quoting Liu Shaoqi on page 208 of the Quotations from Mao Zedong should also be deleted. The title on page 208 should be changed from "Ideological Cultivation" to "Correcting Mistaken Ideas."

**A paragraph added to the draft of the Central Committee's decision on the Anhui issue [1]**

(April 1, 1967)

Many students from out of town stormed Zhongnanhai, and some military academies stormed the Ministry of National Defense. The Central Military Commission did not reprimand them, much less ask them to confess their crimes, repent, or write self-criticisms. They simply explained their problems and advised them to return. However, local authorities took the storming of military institutions far too seriously.

[1] The draft of the Central Committee's decision on the Anhui issue, submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on March 30, 1967, consisted of five articles. Article 2 stated: "The masses must not be labelled 'counter-revolutionaries,' and arbitrary arrests are prohibited. Those labelled 'counter-revolutionaries' simply for charging into the military region, raising objections to it, or expressing dissent regarding the seizure of power in their region or unit should all be rehabilitated, those arrested should all be released, and arrest warrants should all be revoked." Mao Zedong added this paragraph to the end. On April 1, the Central Committee issued this decision.

## Comments and Revisions on the Central Military Commission's Ten-Point Order on Supporting the Left [1]

(April 4 and 6, 1967)

1

Comrade Lin Biao:

This document is excellent. There are only a few minor revisions [2] to the text. Please consider whether it is appropriate. I suggest that this draft be circulated to all comrades at the military region conference for comments. Once revised, it can be issued.

Mao Zedong

April 4

2

Comrade Lin Biao:

I have read it. Please send it to the Central Standing Committee for discussion and approval before it can be issued. [3]

Mao Zedong

April 6

3

No shooting is allowed against mass *organizations*, whether revolutionary, *controlled by reactionaries*, or whose situation is unclear; only political work may be carried out. [4]

4

There should be absolutely no mass "confession" campaigns. *Nor should the masses be forced to write self-criticisms. Self-criticisms written voluntarily by the masses should be returned to the individuals themselves. For those who have long remained unaware and persisted in erroneous viewpoints, we should not rush them into confessing their mistakes. Instead, we should give them time to educate themselves through struggle.* Corporal punishment and disguised forms of corporal punishment are prohibited. For example, wearing dunce caps, hanging black placards, parading people through the streets, or being forced to kneel, etc.

[1] Part I contains comments on the draft of the Central Military Commission's ten-point order submitted by Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the

Communist Party of China, for review on April 2, 1967. Part II contains comments on the revised draft of the order submitted by Lin Biao for review on April 5. Parts III and IV contain revisions to Articles 1 and 6 of Lin Biao's draft submitted on April 2. The text printed in Song typeface contains additions and revisions by Mao Zedong.

[2] Mao Zedong's revisions to the draft of the Central Military Commission's order, in addition to those in Articles 3 and 4 of this section, also included: changing the phrase "for reactionary organizations that have been confirmed" in Article 3 to "for mass organizations that have been confirmed to be controlled by reactionaries"; deleting the word "generally" from Article 4, "For the masses who have previously attacked military institutions, regardless of whether they are left, centre, or right, no one will be held accountable"; changing the phrase "Left, centre, or right cannot be distinguished based on whether or not they have attacked military institutions" in Article 4 to "Left, centre, or right cannot be distinguished based solely on whether or not they have attacked military institutions"; and deleting the words "represented by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping" from Article 7, "Education in the army on the two-line struggle between the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao and the bourgeois reactionary line represented by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping"; and other minor revisions.

[3] The Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China issued this order on April 6, 1967. After review and revision by Mao Zedong, the ten points of the order were as follows: (1) No shooting is allowed against mass organizations, whether revolutionary, controlled by reactionaries, or whose circumstances are unclear; only political work may be conducted. (2) No arbitrary arrests are permitted, let alone mass arrests. Counterrevolutionaries identified as such may be arrested, but this must be based on irrefutable evidence and approved procedures. (3) No mass organizations may be arbitrarily declared reactionary or banned. Even more so, no revolutionary organizations may be declared counterrevolutionary. Active assistance and education must be provided to mass organizations that have committed certain errors. For mass organizations identified as controlled by reactionaries, work must be carried out to split and win them over, isolating their worst leaders and winning over the misled masses. If a reactionary organization must be publicly declared and banned, this must be approved by the Central Committee. (4) No prosecution will be conducted against the masses, regardless of their left, center, or right background, who have previously attacked military institutions. Only particularly bad Rightist leaders who have been identified will be prosecuted, but the scope of the attack should be minimized. The distinction between left, center, and right cannot be based solely on whether or not they have attacked military institutions. (5) The attitude toward larger mass organizations should be determined through in-depth on-site investigation and research, conducted through class analysis; before taking major action, the Central Cultural Revolution Group and the All-Army Cultural Revolution Group should be consulted and reported. (6) Mass "confession" campaigns should be strictly prohibited. Nor should the masses be forced to write self-criticisms. Self-criticisms written voluntarily by the masses will be returned to

the individuals themselves. For those who have long remained unaware and persisted in erroneous viewpoints, we should not rush them into admitting their mistakes, but rather give them time to educate themselves through struggle. Corporal punishment and disguised corporal punishment are not permitted. For example, wearing a dunce cap, hanging a black sign, parading through the streets, being forced to kneel, etc. (7) Deepen education in the army on the two-line struggle between the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao and the bourgeois reactionary line. Studying Chairman Mao's works must be combined with the two-line struggle. Extensive collection of concrete materials exposing the reactionary line and the handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party should be carried out, and these materials should be printed and distributed to the company for education, so that the broad masses of officers and soldiers will understand their reactionary nature, conduct thorough criticism, and eliminate their harmful influence. (8) Detailed explanations of policy should be given to cadres assigned to local areas or in charge of supporting the Left. We must prevent counter-revolutionaries like Zhao Yongfu or those with extreme rightist ideas from taking charge of supporting the Left. (9) In supporting the Left, we must learn to engage in mass work, trust the masses, rely on the masses, consult with them on matters, and excel in using persuasion and education rather than crude, brutal, or commanding methods. (10) Any violations of the above provisions must be corrected immediately and the aftermath actively addressed. Going forward, we must resolutely adhere to the above provisions. Zhao Yongfu, mentioned in the order, was then Deputy Commander of the Qinghai Provincial Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and Deputy Head of the Xining Garrison's Joint Office Leading Group. In February 1967, while supporting the Left, the Joint Office Leading Group designated the Qinghai Province rebel organization, the "August 18th Red Guard Combat Team," as a reactionary organization and banned it. They established the principle of "the enemy shoots, I return fire." On February 23rd, they mobilized armed forces to seize the Qinghai Daily, where the August 18th group had seized power, leading to the serious incident of troop firing. Zhao Yongfu was the organizer and primary commander of the troops that seized the newspaper office. On August 13, 1978, the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission forwarded the General Political Department's "Conclusion and Opinions on the Handling of Comrade Zhao Yongfu's Mistakes," stating that "the problems that occurred within the Qinghai Provincial Military Region in February 1967 constituted internal contradictions among the people." They also stated that "the consequences of the 'February 23 Incident' were severe, but considering that Comrade Zhao Yongfu had been under investigation in isolation for ten years and had acknowledged his mistakes, we agree to remove him from his posts within and outside the Party, while retaining his current rank and assigning him the rank of full colonel."

[4] In the draft submitted by Lin Biao for review on April 2, 1967, this sentence originally read: "We are not allowed to shoot at the masses who have not shot at me, whether they

are revolutionary, reactionary, or whose situation is unclear. We can only carry out political work."

## Comments and Revisions on Jiang Qing's Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Commission. [1]

(April 1967)

1

Return to Jiang Qing.

Okay, go ahead with it. [2]

Mao Zedong

April 16

2

Read it, deleted some parts. [3]

3

*The Chairman said that this article [4] reflects the redistribution of property and power within the landlord class in the early days of feudalism replacing slavery. This redistribution is ongoing, as the saying, "The grace of a gentleman is cut off after five generations" implies. We do not represent the exploiting class, but the proletariat and the working people. However, if we do not pay attention to and strictly discipline our children, they too will degenerate and may even attempt a bourgeois restoration, and the property and power of the proletariat will be seized by the bourgeoisie.*

4

*Over the past few months, the entire army has gained many positive experiences. Comrades in Harbin reported that the troops there intervened from the left last summer. Some also intervened from the right and made some mistakes.*

[1] The transcript of Jiang Qing's speech at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission on April 12, 1967, delivered by Jiang Qing, Deputy Head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group and Advisor to the Group for the entire army, was submitted twice to Mao Zedong for review and revision. Part 1 of this section contains comments on the speech submitted by Jiang Qing on April 15, 1967; Part 2 contains comments on the revised draft of the speech submitted by Jiang Qing on April 17; Parts 3 and 4 contain revisions to the draft submitted by Jiang Qing on April 17. Text printed in italics contains additions and revisions by Mao Zedong.

[2] In her report to Mao Zedong on April 15, 1967, Jiang Qing submitted it for review: "This is a speech I gave at the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission. Comrade Lin Biao said it should be published. I've revised it several times, but it's missing citations and lacks succinctness, as I don't have a manuscript. I hope to receive your comments." Mao Zedong made some revisions to the draft for review. Primarily, on page 5, he supplemented Jiang Qing's historical story of "the foreign ministers who spoke to the Empress Dowager Zhao." On page 7, Jiang Qing, discussing the military's involvement in the local Cultural Revolution, said: "In the past, they said they wouldn't intervene. In fact, the Chairman had long ago declared this non-intervention false. In reality, they had already intervened." Before the phrase "the Chairman had long ago declared this false," Mao Zedong added, "In many units." On page 9, Jiang Qing discussed how, in the first 17 years prior to the Cultural Revolution, "in education, some intellectuals were cultivated who were completely divorced from the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and from production." Mao Zedong added the following nine words before the phrase "intellectuals divorced from production": "detached from proletarian politics and..." There were also some textual revisions and additions.

[3] In addition to paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article, Mao Zedong's revisions to Jiang Qing's April 17, 1967, draft included the following: On page 4, the sentence "At present, under the call of our great leader, Chairman Mao, comrades are making new contributions to the people" was changed to: "At present, under the call of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee, comrades are making new contributions to the people." On page 6, the nine words "study the Chairman's working methods" were deleted from the sentence "Learn the Chairman's working methods, then conduct investigations and research to find the true leftists." On page 7, when discussing the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou, the draft stated: "They have a good experience: organizations controlled by bad elements should not be easily declared reactionary. Instead, their leaders, those proven to be bad elements, should be arrested to disintegrate the organization." Mao Zedong changed the phrase "split and disintegrate that organization" to: "or allow the masses of that organization to choose new leaders themselves." On page 9, the draft, discussing the literary and artistic creation and education situation in the 17 years before the Cultural Revolution, states: "Basically, it was all foreign, ancient, or a distorted image of workers, peasants, and soldiers. As for education, it was completely their system, with Soviet revisionist influences added." Mao Zedong changed "basically" to "largely" and "completely" to "almost entirely." On the same page, Jiang Qing, referring to her resignation from various positions in the early years of the People's Republic of China, said: "I have resolved this problem ideologically." Mao Zedong changed it to: "I have resolved this problem ideologically, only in a certain sense." On page 10, Jiang Qing stated that before the Cultural Revolution, "what was presented on stage and screen was all bourgeois and feudal, or a distorted image of workers, peasants, and soldiers." Mao Zedong changed "all" to "largely." On page 13, Jiang Qing said, "I have many chronic illnesses, but my heart is fine. They gave me a heart attack the winter before last." Mao Zedong deleted these words. On page 14, Jiang Qing said, "Originally, the writing of

articles like the review of 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office' and the review of 'Three-Family Village' was led by the Chairman himself. It was written by Comrade Yao Wenyan." Mao Zedong deleted the phrase "led by the Chairman himself" and added the following ten words after "Comrade Yao Wenyan" in parentheses: "and the writing team he organized." Mao Zedong also made other textual revisions and additions to the speech.

[4] Refers to the article "Persuading the Queen Mother of Zhao to the Barbarians" in "Strategies of the Warring States".

## **Conversation During a Meeting with Xie Fuzhi**

(April 19, 1967)

I congratulate you and congratulate the success of this conference. Please extend my congratulations to all revolutionary rebels in Beijing.

The telegram of greeting is a grand declaration of unity for the proletarians of the world. There's no need for more declarations.

Young people should participate in your work to keep the older generation from alienating themselves from the masses and to train the young. Young people cannot be absent from work; this will alienate them. They should be half-officials, half-civilians. The situation in Beijing is still fluctuating. Anarchism is the punishment for opportunism. Don't be afraid of making mistakes. Reactionary viewpoints and reactionary mass organizations are extremely rare. Even reactionary organizations must be worked on, but they must still be fought.

## **Comments on the Report on the Arrest, Detention, and Custody and Investigation of Individuals in Huifang, Sichuan Province [1]**

(April 23, 1967)

Reprint and distribute to all comrades at the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission. Making mistakes is inevitable, but as long as they are earnestly corrected, everything will be fine. Sichuan arrested too many people and declared a large number of mass organizations reactionary. These were mistakes, but they corrected them quickly, as this document demonstrates. Now another trend has emerged: some people say that everything the army did there was wrong, leaving some military personnel involved in supporting the Left, military control, and military training feeling embarrassed and ashamed. When faced with such situations, we must remain calm, openly admit our mistakes to the masses in a realistic and truthful manner, and immediately correct them. Furthermore, we must provide positive education to both the army and the masses to put them back on the right track. I believe this trend will not be as severe as it was in February, because both the army and the masses have gained experience. The great People's Liberation Army will surely gain the support of the broad masses.

Mao Zedong

April 23

Lin and Zhou [2] will handle it after reading it.

[1] On April 20, 1967, Liang Xingchu, commander of the Chengdu Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, wrote a report to Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee, and others stating that, in accordance with the central government's directives, 27,865 individuals arrested, detained, or held for investigation had been released in Sichuan as of April 19, representing 85% of the total. On April 21, Zhou Enlai instructed that the report be "printed and distributed to Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin, and all comrades from the Central Committee who attended the Sichuan Conference." Mao Zedong wrote this comment while reviewing it.

[2] Lin refers to Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. He was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.

## **Comments on Bringing the Leaders of the Two Henan Factions to Beijing for Discussions and Resolving the Problems [1]**

(April 23, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai:

The Henan issue is being fiercely debated. Please consult with Comrades Chen Zaidao, Zhao Hanhua, and Liu Jianxun [2]. Is it appropriate to bring the leaders of the two factions together for a discussion? The Provincial Military Region should only protect Zhao Wenfu [3], while Liu Jianxun, Wen Minsheng, Ji Dengkui, Dai Suli, and Yang Weiping [4] should all be dismissed. This view is worth studying. Furthermore, the Hubei issue is also serious. Almost all the provincial party committee members are bad people. This should also be discussed quickly.

Mao Zedong

April 23

[1] This comment was written by Mao Zedong after he read the report of the Henan Provincial Military District Committee of the Communist Party of China on April 22, 1967, regarding the preparations of various rebel organizations in Henan to send more than 4,000 representatives to Beijing to report problems.

[2] Chen Zaidao, then Commander of the Wuhan Military District of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Zhong Hanhua, then Political Commissar of the Wuhan Military District of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Liu Jianxun, then First Political Commissar of the Henan Provincial Military District of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[3] Zhao Wenfu, then Secretary of the Henan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and Vice Governor of Henan Province.

[4] Wen Minsheng, then Acting First Secretary of the Henan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and Governor of Henan Province. Ji Dengkui and Dai Suli, then Alternate Secretaries of the Henan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. Yang Weiping, then Secretary of the Henan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China.

**Comments and Notes on the Material "Shaanxi Garrison Responsible Comrades Humbly Listen to the Masses' Opinions and Improve Their Work" [1]**

(April 23, 1967)

1

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai [2]:

I suggest that this document be distributed to all comrades at the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission [3]. The army is doing the right thing. I hope the entire army will adopt this approach.

Mao Zedong

April 23

2

Don't be afraid of criticism. Through this process of criticism, the entire army will correctly understand the world and transform it.

Mao Note

3.

A student leader at Jiaotong University, once labelled a counter-revolutionary and nearly forced to death, was later saved.

Mao Note

4

This is the most basic principle.

Mao Note

5

Carrying out heart-to-heart talks is a very good method.

Mao Note

[1] According to a document published in the "Kuai Bao" (Express Bulletin) No. 1940, published on April 21, 1967, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group, the leaders of the Shaanxi Provincial Military Region and the troops stationed in Shaanxi had, since mid-April, convened a series of discussions with representatives of the revolutionary faction from Northwestern Polytechnical University, the

PLA Telecommunications Engineering College in Xi'an, and the Cultural Revolution Committee of Xi'an Jiaotong University to hear their opinions and criticisms of the work of supporting the Left. During these discussions, the students criticized the troops for their lack of clarity in their previous support for the Left, insufficient investigation and research, and their failure to support genuine revolutionary rebels. They also criticized the troops for failing to link training content with the Cultural Revolution in Xi'an, leading to several waves of large-character posters posted during training, claiming that the troops "implemented a bourgeois reactionary line in schools," etc. (Mao Zedong included a note in brackets after this passage, which is the second part of this article). The troop leaders welcomed and thanked the students for their sincere, well-intentioned, and frank criticism and, taking advantage of the situation, transitioned the discussion to a discussion of how to firmly grasp the general direction of the struggle and prepare for a grand unity among the rebels. During the discussion, "Student Li Shiyong put forward eight suggestions on the military region's support for the Left" (after the five words "Student Li Shiyong," Mao Zedong included a note in brackets, which is the third part of this article). The seventh suggestion was "Trust the majority of cadres and the masses" (after this, Mao Zedong included a note in brackets, which is the fourth part of this article). The eighth suggestion was: "On the basis of doing a good job in ideological work in various colleges and universities, adopt the method of mutual communication and carry out extensive heart-to-heart talks to strengthen mutual understanding, enhance unity, and promote a grand alliance between the two major rebel factions." (After this, Mao Zedong included a note in brackets, which is the fifth part of this article). The military leaders believed that Li Shiyong's suggestions were correct and expressed their support. They decided to convene the leaders of four universities, including Northwestern Polytechnical University, for further consultation and discussion on how to firmly grasp the general direction of the struggle and promote a grand alliance between the rebel factions. This article is the comment on the printing and distribution of this material, which was written on the masthead of this issue of "Kuai Bao."

[2] Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai is Zhou Enlai.

[3] Refers to the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China being held in Beijing at that time.

## **Instructions on the Army's Support for the Left**

(April 1967)

The prestige of the army must be firmly upheld, without the slightest ambiguity. The publication of the editorial "Supporting the Army and Loving the People" is the focus of our current work. The army's first efforts to support the left, support workers, support farmers, conduct military training, and implement military control are large-scale combat missions. Mistakes are inevitable. The main danger at present is that someone will suppress the PLA.

Supporting the left and anchoring the movement, even if it leads to conservative tendencies, can be corrected. This is permitted. If we get two-thirds of these five tasks right and one-third wrong, that's good enough.

Some are influenced by the views of their wives and children. Some are county or prefectural Party secretaries whose children are conservative in their area, or whose wives are among the local authorities. This is something we should be particularly vigilant about.

## **Directive on the Cultural Revolution in Sichuan**

(April 1967)

The revelations of the Yibin issue marked the beginning of the class struggle in Sichuan, and the lifting of the lid on Li Jingquan. The difficulties of the Cultural Revolution in Sichuan were primarily due to Liu, Deng, and Li Jingquan, who labelled Liu Jieting a counter-revolutionary and expelled them from the Party. This reversal of events has only just begun. This material should be printed and distributed to every Party member. The lifting of the lid on the class struggle in Sichuan remains unresolved, as has the two-line struggle.

## **A Conversation with a Comrade**

(April 1967)

Mao Zedong: You say that the universities in Beijing have united and established the Red Army Congress. That's great! What about the three headquarters?

Answer: They no longer exist. They have all been abolished.

Mao Zedong: Ah, why should they be abolished? I don't believe it. Have they been abolished?

## **On the Issue of Military Control**

(April 1967)

Military control is too inadequate. The work teams sent by Liu and Deng oppressed the revolution and opposed the masses. Our military control supports the revolution.

## **On the Great Unity of the Revolutionaries**

(April 1967)

The current national struggle situation is excellent, with significant achievements and rich experience. The entire country is making progress. When the revolutionaries are in a dominant position, they can organize themselves according to systems, departments, and units. However, they must be wary of conservatives devouring the rebels. They should not resort to disbanding the revolutionary rebels to achieve a great unity.

## **Anarchism is a punishment for opportunism.**

(April 1967)

The combination of the previous eight points and the current ten points is correct. The left has risen, and so has the opposition. That's not a big deal; a little back-and-forth is beneficial. Anarchism is a punishment for opportunism; we must move toward the opposite. We must unleash all possible connections. (The current call for struggle, criticism, and reform is making some people restless.) We must make students sit still until summer.

## Instructions on the Cadre Question [1]

(April-May 1967)

We must not become alienated from the masses. This is one thing; another is that we must not become alienated from Marxism-Leninism.

During the three years of 1949, 1950, and 1951, our Party was supported and respected by the masses, even though we lived a simple and frugal life, eating millet and living in tents. We had just finished fighting, were still full of revolutionary enthusiasm, and had close ties with the masses.

After 1952, the situation began to change somewhat. We cadres began to feel left out among the masses. At that time, a salary system was implemented for cadres. The army lived in barracks, and government offices built high-rise buildings. We used to eat, wear, and live with the masses, but now we've become somewhat detached from them. Why is this happening? Because they didn't listen to me. Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Peng Dehuai adopted the Soviet system. I don't approve of the salary system. I also don't approve of adopting the Soviet system. This Cultural Revolution is about changing that.

We cadres have been tempered for a long time, and some still need to step forward. The current situation is: if no-one steps forward, we'll be beaten. We always need someone to take the lead. Can the Red Guards take the lead? They come to power today and are overthrown tomorrow because they're politically immature. We need to do a lot of work now to get those key cadres to step forward. Even if they're someone like Li Yuanhong [2], even if they step aside for two years, that's fine. The Red Guards are no match; they haven't been tempered. We can't trust them with such a major undertaking.

Some provincial party secretaries must be released quickly and allowed to reflect on their actions. Some provincial party secretaries made mistakes in the past because they feared the masses and mobilized some to "protect" them, ultimately harming themselves.

Cadres who have made mistakes must be treated correctly and not be overthrown en masse. As long as they are not anti-Party or anti-socialist elements and refuse to change, and refuse to change despite repeated admonitions, they should be allowed to repent and encouraged to atone for their sins. Learning from past mistakes to prevent future ones, curing the sickness to save the patient, is the Party's traditional policy. Only in this way can those who have made mistakes be sincerely convinced, and only in this way can the proletarian revolutionaries gain the wholehearted support of the majority, thus securing their own invincibility. Otherwise, it will be very dangerous.

We must cherish cadres and support the emergence of revolutionary leading cadres. It's not enough to ask young revolutionary leaders to take the lead now; there's a process of training

required. However, young leaders are lovable and are the successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause.

We must now promote the "three-in-one" approach, enabling young people to participate in leadership work in all areas. Don't look down on young people. We can accept them taking on roles in their twenties and thirties. How can we temper them if we don't bring up the new generation? The "three-in-one" approach involves the elderly, the middle-aged, and the young. That means those over twenty years old are sufficient.

We advocate for young people to take office. Some say young people lack experience, but they will acquire it once they take office. In the past, we also advocated cultivating successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause, but that was a formal approach. Now we must implement this in organizational terms.

The three-in-one approach involves combining the old, the middle-aged, and the young. We do not advocate overthrowing all veteran cadres, as veteran cadres are getting closer to seeing God day by day.

The most fundamental principle of state agency reform is maintaining ties with the masses. Institutional reforms should be tailored to connecting with the masses, not to bureaucratic structures.

In the past, influenced by the "Self-cultivation" movement, Party and League members became alienated from the masses, lacking independent opinions and becoming mere tools of docility. Local authorities discourage the premature restoration of Party and League organizations; they should wait six months or a year. The Cultural Revolution was a major review not only of cadres but also of Party and League members. The majority of results will undoubtedly be positive. For some cadres who have significant public dissatisfaction, their work can be rescheduled for two or three years, while some cadres can be reinstated immediately. Those who have made mistakes should be given the opportunity to correct their mistakes. Joint action must be freed; without rightists, there can be no leftists. I have always opposed the salary-based military rank system.

[1] This is part of Mao Zedong's speech at the meeting of the Central Standing Committee, the Central Cultural Revolution Group and the Political Bureau held from April 29 to May 1, 1967.

[2] Li Yuanhong, in 1911, when the Wuchang Uprising broke out, Li Yuanhong was forced by the revolutionaries to be elected as the governor of Hubei.

## Conversation with the Albanian Military Delegation [1]

(May 1, 1967)

At the 1962 Conference of 7,000 Cadres [2], I said, "The outcome of the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism is still undecided. It is very likely that revisionism will triumph and we will lose." We use the possibility of defeat as a reminder to everyone, which helps to heighten their vigilance against revisionism and to prevent and combat revisionism. In reality, the struggle between the two classes and the two lines within the Communist Party has always existed and cannot be denied by anyone. As materialists, we certainly should not deny it. After this conference, the struggle between the two lines and the two classes within our Party has manifested itself in the form of "Left" in reality and the opposition to "Left" in reality, the opposition to the existence of class struggle and the emphasis on its existence, the compromise and the emphasis on proletarian politics, and so on. This has been discussed in appropriate documents before.

Today, your country is sending a military delegation to understand my relationship with the Cultural Revolution.

I would like to first share my views on this issue. Our country's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution should be considered to have begun with Comrade Yao Wen Yuan's critique of "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office" in the winter of 1965. At that time, revisionism controlled certain departments and regions of our country. It was truly impenetrable. I suggested to Comrade Jiang Qing [3] that they organize an article criticizing "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office," but I was powerless to do so in this Red City [4]. I had no choice but to go to Shanghai to organize the effort. Finally, after the article was completed, I read it three times and thought it was basically acceptable. I asked Comrade Jiang Qing to take it back for publication. I suggested that some central leaders review it, but Comrade Jiang Qing said, "It's better to publish the article as is. I don't think there's any need to ask Comrade Enlai or Comrade Kang Sheng to review it."<sup>5</sup> After Yao Wen Yuan's article was published, it was reproduced in most newspapers nationwide, except in Beijing and Hunan. Later, I suggested publishing a pamphlet, but this was also met with resistance and didn't pan out.

Yao Wen Yuan's article was merely a signal for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. As soon as this signal came out, it was met with staunch opposition from Peng Zhen and others. The enemy is particularly sensitive; where there's a signal, there's action. Of course, we had to act, too. So, I presided over the drafting of the May 16th notice at the Central Committee Standing Committee. This notice clearly raised the issue of the Central Committee's line, as

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<sup>5</sup> The version of this talk printed in Selected Works of Chairman Mao Volume 9 (Foreign Language Press, Paris, 2021) contains an interjection at this point by Lin Biao. He says that we must implement Mao Zedong Thought even when we may not understand it. This was criticised later as a version of Liu Shaoqi's theory of docile tools. See Volume 9 p.331)

well as the question of two lines. At the time, most people disagreed with me, sometimes even me, saying my views were outdated. Many people still didn't understand, including Li Jingquan [5] and Liu Lantao [6]. Comrade Boda spoke with them, and they said, "I didn't understand it in Beijing, and I still don't understand it after I return." Ultimately, I could only let practice further examine myself.

After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, the focus was on criticizing the bourgeois reactionary line in October, November, and December 1966, which openly exposed contradictions within the Party. This criticism of this line ignited the revolutionary passion of many revolutionaries. Revolutionary intellectuals and young students played a vanguard role in this process, which conforms to the laws of revolutionary development. Incidentally, I would like to raise the question of how many core Party and League cadres, including workers and peasants, were misled during the process of criticizing the reactionary line. Let's examine how we view these misled comrades. I have always believed that the vast majority of workers, peasants, and soldiers are good, and the vast majority of Party and League members are good. They have been the main force in every period of proletarian revolution, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was no exception. The vast majority of workers, peasants, and soldiers were concrete labourers, so naturally they had little understanding of the situation at the top. Furthermore, the vast majority of Party and League cadres had an immense love for the Party and its cadres, while the capitalist roaders in power were waving the red flag to oppose it. Therefore, they were deceived and even unable to change their ways for a long time. This was due to historical factors. If they were deceived, they could change and it would be fine! As the movement deepened, they became the main force again.

The "January Storm" [7] was initiated by Shanghai workers, followed by the rise of workers, peasants, and soldiers across the country. It was only with the rise of the broad masses of workers and peasants that the bourgeois system was thoroughly overthrown, forcing the revolutionary intellectuals and young students to a subordinate position, wasn't it? The workers' rise up overthrow of counter-revolutionary economism, seized power from the capitalist roaders in power, and promoted the great revolutionary alliance and the "three-in-one" combination. This is the law of revolutionary development, true for both the democratic revolution and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The May Fourth Movement was initiated by intellectuals, fully demonstrating their foresight. But a truly thoroughgoing revolution, like the Northern Expedition and the Long March, must be accomplished by relying on the masters of the era as the main force—the workers, peasants, and soldiers. These workers, peasants, and soldiers are, in reality, just workers and peasants, since soldiers are merely workers and peasants in uniform. The criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line was initiated by the intellectuals and the broad masses of young students, but the January Storm seizure of power and the thoroughgoing revolution must be accomplished by relying on the masters of the era—the broad masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers—as the main force. Intellectuals have always been quick to change and perceive

problems, but they are limited by instinct and lack a radically revolutionary spirit, often resorting to speculation.

From a policy and strategic perspective, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution can be roughly divided into four stages: The period from the publication of Comrade Yao Wenyan's article to the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee can be considered the first stage, primarily the initiation phase. The period from the Eleventh Plenary Session to the "January Storm" can be considered the second stage. The third stage, encompassing Qi Benyu's "Patriotism or National Betrayal?" and "The Crux of 'Self-Cultivation' Is Betrayal of the Proletarian Dictatorship," [8] can be considered the fourth stage. Both the third and fourth stages were concerned with the seizure of power. The fourth stage was about ideologically seizing power from revisionism and the bourgeoisie. Therefore, this was the crucial stage in the decisive battle between the two classes, two paths, and two lines; it was the main theme, the main topic. After the "January Storm," the Central Committee repeatedly pressed for a grand unity, but to no avail. Later, it was discovered that this subjective desire was inconsistent with the objective laws of class struggle. This was because each class and political force was determined to assert itself. Bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologies have flooded forth without resistance, thus undermining the great unity. A great unity cannot be formed by forcing it; even if it is forged, it will eventually break apart. Therefore, the Central Committee's current attitude is to promote it, not to force it. The tactic of forcing things to grow will not work. The laws of class struggle are not subject to anyone's subjective consciousness. Numerous examples illustrate this point. The Beijing Municipal Workers' Congress, the Red Army Congress, and the Peasants' Congress—with the exception of the Peasants' Congress, where fighting is relatively rare—are all active. It seems the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee needs to be reorganized.

We originally intended to cultivate successors among the intellectuals, but now it seems far from ideal. In my view, the intellectuals, including young intellectuals still receiving education, both within and outside the Party, still have a fundamentally bourgeois outlook. This is because, over the past decade or so since liberation, the cultural and educational sectors have been dominated by revisionism, and bourgeois ideology has permeated their blood. Therefore, intellectuals who aspire to revolutionize must effectively transform their outlook during this critical period of the struggle between these two classes, two paths, and two lines. Otherwise, they will go against the grain of revolution. Let me ask everyone a question: What do you think the purpose of the Cultural Revolution was? (Someone answered: It was to struggle against the capitalist roaders in power within the Party.) Struggling against the capitalist roaders in power was the primary task, not the goal. The goal was to resolve the problem of worldview and eradicate the roots of revisionism.

The Central Committee has repeatedly emphasized the need for the masses to educate themselves and liberate themselves. Worldviews cannot be imposed. Ideological transformation must be driven by external factors working through internal ones, with

internal factors being the primary factor. Without a transformation of worldviews, how can the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution be considered a victory? Without a transformation of worldviews, this Cultural Revolution produced two thousand capitalist roaders in power, and the next one might produce four thousand more. The cost of this Cultural Revolution was enormous. Although resolving the struggle between the two classes and the two roads cannot be resolved with one, two, three, or four Cultural Revolutions, it must be consolidated for at least ten years after this one. It will only happen two or three times in a century, so we must focus on eradicating the roots of revisionism to strengthen our ability to prevent and combat revisionism at all times.

Here I ask you another question: What do you mean by "those in power who are taking the capitalist road"? The so-called "those in power who are taking the capitalist road" are those who have taken the capitalist road, right? That is, during the democratic revolution, these people actively participated in opposing the "Three Mountains," but after national liberation, when the bourgeoisie came into play, they were less supportive. They actively supported and participated in the campaign against the landlords and the distribution of land, but after national liberation, when collectivization was implemented in the countryside, they were less supportive. If they don't take the socialist road, and yet they're in power now, aren't they also those in power who are taking the capitalist road? Even if it's "veteran cadres facing new problems," it's still "veteran cadres facing new problems." But those with a proletarian worldview firmly follow the socialist road. Those with a bourgeois worldview are bound to take the capitalist road. This means the bourgeoisie wants to transform the world according to its bourgeois worldview, while the proletariat wants to transform the world according to its proletarian worldview. When some made errors in direction and line during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, they said it was "new problems faced by veteran cadres." But since errors have been made, it means that your bourgeois worldview, as a veteran cadre, has not yet been thoroughly transformed. Veteran cadres will face even more new problems in the future. To ensure their unwavering commitment to the socialist road, they must undergo a thorough proletarian revolutionization of their thinking. As revolutionary leftists, we must eliminate capitalism and promote proletarianism. Otherwise, if bourgeois ideology is not eliminated for a long time, it will inevitably lead to the opposite of things. Don't you believe it? I ask everyone: How do you concretely move from socialism to communism? Have you carefully considered this? This is a matter of great importance to our country and the world. Therefore, to avoid the error of taking the capitalist road and to truly care about national affairs, we must work hard to transform our worldview.

I said, "The revolutionary young people have a strong revolutionary spirit, which is great. But you can't take power now. If you do, you'll be driven out tomorrow." But a vice premier made this statement, which is quite wrong. The issue of nurturing the revolutionary young people is one of cultivation. We can't use this to dampen their spirit when they make certain mistakes. Some say elections are good and democratic. I think elections are just a polite

term, and I don't recognize true elections. I was elected as a people's representative by the Beijing district. How many people in Beijing truly understand me? I believe Zhou Enlai's appointment as Premier was a central government appointment. Some say China is deeply peace-loving. I don't think that's the case. I believe the Chinese people are still belligerent.

With regard to cadres, we must first establish a firm belief that over 95 percent of them are good or relatively good. This class perspective must not be lost. The current saying, "Making revolution is no crime, rebellion is justified," must not be used indiscriminately. Both "revolution" and "protection" are strongly class-based. We must protect revolutionary leading cadres, with unwavering confidence and justification, and liberate them from their mistakes. Even if they have taken the capitalist road and corrected their mistakes through long-term education, they should still be allowed to revolutionize. It's better to be left than right, to be left in form but right in reality. On the surface, this may appear more revolutionary than seeking truth from facts, but we will never advocate it. It belongs to the bourgeois category. There aren't many truly bad people. Among the masses, they constitute at most 5 percent. Within the Party and League, they constitute only 1 to 2 percent. Those in power who stubbornly pursue the capitalist road constitute only a small handful. However, we must make these small handful within the Party, those in power who follow the capitalist road, our primary target, because their influence and harmful effects are profound and far-reaching, and therefore they constitute the primary task of this Cultural Revolution. The bad elements among the masses constitute at most 5 percent, but they are scattered and powerless. If, at 5 percent, they represent 35 million people, they could form an army to organize against us, then this is indeed a matter worthy of our consideration. However, they are scattered and powerless, so they should not be the primary target of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. However, we must remain vigilant, especially during the crucial stages of the struggle, to prevent bad elements from exploiting loopholes. Therefore, the Great Unity must have two prerequisites: first, the destruction of private interests and the establishment of public interests, and second, the necessity of struggle. A Great Unity without struggle will not be effective.

The fourth phase of this Cultural Revolution is a crucial stage in the struggle between two classes, two paths, and two lines. Therefore, the time allocated for the Great Criticism is relatively long. The Central Cultural Revolution Group is still debating this matter. Some suggest the end of this year is the appropriate date, while others suggest May of next year. However, the timing must still be governed by the laws of class struggle.

[1] This is part of the conversation between Mao Zedong and the Albanian military delegation.

[2] From January 11 to February 7, 1962, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an enlarged central work conference in Beijing. Seven thousand leading officials

from Party committees at or above the county level attended the conference, earning it the nickname "Seven Thousand Cadres Conference." Mao Zedong presided over the meeting. Liu Shaoqi delivered a written report on behalf of the Central Committee. The report summarized the experiences and lessons learned from the twelve years since the founding of the People's Republic of China, particularly the Great Leap Forward. During the meeting, many attendees felt that the conference lacked sufficient attention to combating bureaucracy and promoting democracy within the Party, and requested an opportunity to speak. Mao Zedong and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee accepted their request. At the meeting on January 30, Mao Zedong delivered an important speech, emphasizing and systematically expounding on the implementation of democratic centralism and the promotion of democracy within and outside the Party. The conference thus became a democratic, critical, and self-criticism conference. Participants criticized provincial Party committees, central bureaus, and central government agencies. Leaders from various regions and departments engaged in self-criticism.

[3] Jiang Qing, before the Cultural Revolution, served as Director of the Film Department of the Central Propaganda Department and a member of the Film Steering Committee of the Ministry of Culture. In 1950, she led the investigation into Wu Xun and promoted criticism of the film "The Biography of Wu Xun." Starting in 1963, she promoted the reform of modern Peking Opera, resulting in the creation of the "Eight Model Operas." She also wrote "On the Peking Opera Revolution" (1964). After the Cultural Revolution began, she served as Deputy Head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[4] Red City refers to Beijing.

[5] Li Jingquan, then First Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and First Political Commissar of the Chengdu Military Region.

[6] Liu Lantao, then First Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and First Political Commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region, also served as Director of the Northwest Third Front Construction Committee.

[7] The January Storm, also known as the "January Revolution," erupted nationwide in January 1967, starting in Shanghai. On the 22nd, the People's Daily published an editorial declaring the January Storm "a great beginning for the nationwide all-out class struggle this year," calling for "seizing power from the bottom up from the handful of capitalist roaders in power within the Party and those diehards who cling to the bourgeois reactionary line."

[8] On May 8, 1967, the People's Daily and Red Flag magazine published an editorial entitled "The Crux of 'Self-Cultivation' Is Betrayal of the Proletarian Dictatorship," which had been discussed and approved by an enlarged meeting of the Central Political Bureau Standing Committee. In a notice dated May 11, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China stated: "We hope that all units will further and in-depth carry out a campaign of criticism against the largest handful of capitalist roaders in power within the Party."

## "May Day" Speech to Central Leaders

(May 1, 1967)

Today's meeting brings together the old, the middle-aged, and the young. (To Zhu De at this time) We are all in our seventies and eighties, the middle-aged are in their forties and fifties, and the young are in the square. Today's meeting is a great unity.

We must view cadres from a comprehensive historical perspective. With the exception of Liu, Deng, and Tao, all the others are here today. All provincial first secretaries must return; work still needs to be done. Jiang X, Jiang XX, and Tan XX are not "Three Antis" elements. Chen XX has degenerated in his thinking and work style and should be reformed effectively. Has Liao XX passed? He should be allowed to pass. Wang Zhen is not a Three Antis element, but he is a rough man. I suggest Comrade Tan XX visit him. Yu Qiuli told lies, and Gu Mu was arrested in 1936, so he is more difficult.

Some Red Guards at the Geology College had no idea about the history of the old marshals. Someone asked me to gauge the situation, and I said, "What if we overthrow all the old marshals? Can you do it?" Overthrow Tan XX. Isn't the meeting here today? Xu Xiangqian presided over the Cultural Revolution for the entire army. (Xu said, "I'm not in good health, so I'll take over.") You should do it!

There's a difference between Deng and Liu. Deng historically created his own kingdom, ignored me, and even fled the Central Secretariat at the last minute. Later, he was part of my faction in opposing Wang Ming's line.

Liu Shaoqi was arrested in 1925 but was later released on bail and lives in Beijing. Liu Shaoqi had one line, one theory, and one team. The six-member group was full of rumours, completely fabricated.

Most of the linkage is good, a few are bad, but what's the big deal? Chengdu just needs to let them admit their mistakes. Didn't they admit their mistakes? Didn't they correct them quickly?

(Shaking hands with Wang Zhen on the Tiananmen Gate Tower) Wang Huzi<sup>6</sup>, I haven't seen you in a long time. Someone wants to overthrow you, but can they? They can't, right? You should be lenient to those who overthrow you. Well, be lenient!

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<sup>6</sup> Wang Zhen (1908-1983) joined the Communist Youth League in 1924 and the Party in 1927. In 1929, he joined the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army with the rank of general. "Huzi" means "beard" and is presumably a nick-name.

## **May Day Conversation with the Director of the Revolutionary Committee**

(May 1, 1967)

Jiang Qing: This is Zhang X of the State Science and Technology Commission. They overthrew Han Guang and his gang. The movement there is no longer the same as before.

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): We should wish the comrades of the Science and Technology Commission a long life, and we should wish the people a long life!

Mao: Women comrades rebelled too! You overthrew the counter-revolutionary Han Guang, so you should seize power!

Mao: What do you do now?

Zhang X: I work in the Revolutionary Committee of the State Science and Technology Commission.

Mao: Director of the Revolutionary Committee, right?

Zhou Enlai: That's right!

Mao: She used to be a director, and she rebelled with the masses.

## Conversation at the May Day Gala in Zhongnanhai

(May 1, 1967)

(After Mao Zedong heard Jiang Qing describe the beatings at the Peking Opera Network)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): Are they still being beaten?

Actor: We are all united now.

Mao: No more beatings, good.

Mao: Are there still anti-erhuang and anti-xipi performances<sup>7</sup>?

Actor: Can anti-erhuang and anti-xipi performances be used in revolutionary modern drama?

Mao: I think so.

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<sup>7</sup> The erhuang or “two yellows”, is a traditional wind instrument mostly used to express melancholy, sadness or contemplation, and was often used in tragic themes. Xipi, one of the singing voices of Chinese opera, mainly expresses light-hearted, lively, and passionate emotions. Xipi and Erhuang complement each other and are collectively called Pihuang in Peking Opera, Han Opera, Cantonese Opera, and Hui Opera. Anti-Erhuang is basically the tone of the song that is sung by lowering the tune of the positive Erhuang by 4 degrees. The fall of the upper and lower registers of the anti-Xipi singing voice is exactly the opposite of the falling sound of the upper and lower registers of the Xipi, so it is called anti-Xipi.

## **Instructions on Cotton and Grain Work**

(May 1, 1967)

We must secure grain, cotton, and cloth. Procuring grain and oil is not only an economic task; it is first and foremost a political one. We must do this with utmost vigour. Every year, we must ensure the harvest, storage, and consumption (harvest, storage, and consumption) are rigorous and timely. Failure to pay attention to reserves, wasteful practices, and the consumption of everything are all mistakes and reflect the bourgeois reactionary line or bourgeois ideology in grain work.

## Instructions on the Great Criticism

(May 2, 1967)

Criticism articles should not be as long as the Nine Commentaries. Each should be one or two thousand words, never exceeding three thousand. Each article should have a central theme, a single concept, clearly stated. If it's too long, no one will read it or remember it.

I agree. Unity and obedience are conditional, not unconditional.

The "three-in-one" approach should apply to the elderly, the middle-aged, and the young. Don't look down on young people. People in their twenties and thirties can all do work. The "three-in-one" approach should apply to the elderly, the middle-aged, and the young. The elderly will all go to see God.

The situation is good this year, but we must still secure cloth and grain. Editorials should be produced more quickly. Critical articles should be short. Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang can be labelled counter-revolutionary revisionists; everyone else can be labelled revisionists. China's Khrushchev mentioned this in his article, and it should be mentioned in the title.

Major criticisms must be conducted with caution, with thorough investigation. Only with thorough investigation can criticism be powerful; otherwise, it will be a fleeting experience. When quoting Liu Shaoqi, we shouldn't just focus on the beginning and ignore the end. Criticism must be well-founded. The term "trust" cannot be refuted in general; the main focus should be on arguing for the claim that Liu Shaoqi is taking the capitalist road. Some old terms should be given new meaning.

The "docile tool theory" should be criticized, but proletarian discipline must also be maintained. Obedience and unity are conditional.

Writing articles requires careful consideration, accuracy, sharpness, and clarity.

**Comments and Revisions on the Article [1] "The key to 'Self-cultivation' [2] is betrayal of the dictatorship of the proletariat"**

(May 4, 6, and 7, 1967)

1

I have some opinions, which are included in this article. Please consider them.

Mao Zedong

May 4<sup>th</sup>

After revisions, this should be submitted to the small group [3] and the Standing Committee for discussion and approval.

PS. Please refer to the Cultural Revolution Group.

2

On page 7, I have added a few sentences [4]. Please review and determine if they are appropriate. After the draft is finalized, please print a formal proof and send it for review.

Mao Zedong

May 6<sup>th</sup>

3

Publish accordingly.

Mao Zedong May 7, 7:00 PM

4

This depiction of a communist society is nothing new; it has existed since ancient times. In China, there's the "Great Unity Chapter" in "Li Yun" [5], Tao Qian's "Peach Blossom Spring" [6], and Kang Youwei's "The Book of Great Unity" [7]. Abroad, there are numerous works by French and British utopian socialists, all of which are of this ilk.

5

According to the author, in a communist society, everything is beautiful, without a trace of darkness, without a single contradiction. Everything is perfect, and there are no opposites. Society ceases to develop. Not only does its quality never change, but even its quantity seems to remain unchanged. Social development ends there, remaining unchanged forever. Here, the author abandons a fundamental law of Marxism: everything, every human society, is driven to develop by the struggle of opposites, by contradictions. The author promotes metaphysics and abandons the great principles of dialectical and historical materialism.

[1] The article "The Key to 'Self-Cultivation' Is Betrayal of the Proletarian Dictatorship" was drafted by Wang Li and Guan Feng, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group and deputy editors-in-chief of Red Flag magazine. It was revised by Chen Boda, head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine, and published as an editorial article for Red Flag magazine and People's Daily in the sixth issue of Red Flag magazine and the May 8th edition of People's Daily on May 8, 1967. This article was submitted to Mao Zedong for review several times. Section 1 contains Mao's comments on the May 2nd draft; Section 2 contains his comments on the May 5th draft; Section 3 contains his comments on the May 7th draft; Sections 4 and 5 contain two paragraphs Mao added to the draft.

[2] This refers to the book "On the Cultivation of Communist Party Members." This is the first and second parts of a speech Liu Shaoqi delivered at the Yan'an Marxist-Leninist Academy in July 1939. It was originally published in issues 81-84 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Jiefang (Liberation), and was published as a separate volume by the Yan'an Xinhua Bookstore. In 1949, after Liu Shaoqi reviewed and revised it, the first revised edition was published by Jiefang Press (the predecessor of the People's Publishing House). In 1962, Liu Shaoqi reviewed it again, making some textual revisions and additions to the content. The original two parts were reorganized into nine sections, and the second revised edition was published by the People's Publishing House.

[3] Refers to the Cultural Revolution Small Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

[4] That is the fourth part of this article.

[5] Li Yun is a collection of Confucian thought and ritual works from the Warring States period to the early Western Han Dynasty, and the "Great Harmony" mentioned in it refers to an ideal society where "the world is for the public".

[6] Tao Qian, also known as Tao Yuanming, was a poet of the Eastern Jin Dynasty. His essay "Peach Blossom Spring" describes a "paradise" that is isolated from the world and free from troubles.

[7] Kang Youwei was a modern Chinese politician, thinker, and leader of the bourgeois reformists. His "The Book of Great Harmony" combined the "Great Harmony" theory in Li Yun with the "Three Worlds" theory of the Confucian Gongyang School, and put forward his own "Great Harmony" thought, believing that "in the era of Great Harmony, the world is for the public, there are no classes, and everyone is equal."

**Comments on Zhang Xiangshan's [1] Report on the Translation of a Quotation from "On Contradiction" [2]**

(May 4, 1967)

Comrades Kang [3], Wang, and Guan will decide how to deal with this matter.

Mao Zedong

May 4

[1] Zhang Xiangshan, then Secretary-General of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee.

[2] Zhang Xiangshan wrote a report to Wang Li and Guan Feng, members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee, on April 24, 1967, saying that Chairman Mao quoted a passage from Engels in his *On Contradiction*: "One of the main foundations of higher education is contradiction..." The passage was not quoted in full, so Chairman Mao used abridgement marks. When our original English translation was published in the UK, it was translated according to the Chairman's quotation. However, when the second translation was published in Beijing, the British side thought this was problematic, so the translator supplemented it. Therefore, if you read the Chinese and English versions side by side, you will find that the Chinese and English versions do not match. To avoid this problem, we suggest that the translation should be based on the Chairman's quotation without supplementing it. However, Adler, an expert from the Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, wrote a letter expressing his disagreement, believing that this treatment distorted Engels' original intention and said that Engels's original words referred to the particularity of contradictions, not the universality of contradictions. Adler's understanding may be correct. The problem is that the Chairman quoted this passage to illustrate the universality of contradictions. Therefore, even if the full quotation were used, it would still not solve the problem Adler raised. Please advise on how this should be handled. In the later English translation, Engels's words were translated in their entirety. If translated into Chinese accordingly, it should read: "We have already mentioned that one of the main foundations of higher mathematics is this contradiction: under certain conditions, a straight line and a curve should be the same thing. Higher mathematics also has another contradiction: lines that intersect before our eyes should be considered parallel if they are only five or six centimeters away from their point of intersection, and they would not intersect even if extended infinitely. However, higher mathematics exploits these and other even more acute contradictions to achieve results that are not only correct but also completely unattainable by elementary mathematics." (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 3, People's Publishing House, 1995 edition, page 463)

## **Comments on the Shandong Provincial Military Region's Report on Directing the Spearhead of Struggle toward the People's Liberation Army in the Shandong Region**

(May 7, 1967)

Lin Biao, Enlai [1], and Comrades of the Cultural Revolution Group:

Please read this [2]. It appears that the locations where the Shandong students and workers were involved (a minority, province-wide) may have had problems. How should this matter be resolved? Please work out a solution and let me know!

In Shandong and other provinces, the regular army made fewer mistakes. The 54th Army in Chongqing sent a telegram saying that regarding the question of whether the support for the major August 15th Incident [3] was a mistake, it was advisable to call on representatives from both sides to discuss the matter with Comrades Liang, Zhang, Gan, and Wei. [4]

PS. Mao Zedong

[1] Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai is Zhou Enlai.

[2] This refers to a telegram sent by the Shandong Provincial Military District of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to the Jinan Military District, the Central Cultural Revolution Group of the Communist Party of China, and the Cultural Revolution Group of the entire army on May 4, 1967. The telegram stated that the current struggle in Shandong Province was directed at the PLA, becoming increasingly obvious and spreading to all regions. The main manifestations were: 1. Posting and distributing large-character posters, slogans, and leaflets attacking the PLA everywhere. Almost all leading cadres of the provincial military district, military sub-district, and county and city armed forces who participated in the "three-in-one" campaign were publicly named and became the main targets of overthrow. 2. Attacking military institutions, besieging and kidnapping military personnel. 3. Insulting, beating, and struggling against PLA cadres and soldiers. The above situation is spreading to the grassroots level, making it impossible for many military sub-districts, county and city armed forces to carry out their work, and seriously affecting the progress of war preparations. Many temporary power organs of the "three-in-one" campaign in various places are already paralysed. If this situation continues to develop, industrial and agricultural production will be seriously affected.

[3] "August 15" was a mass rebel organization at Chongqing University at that time.

[4] Liang refers to Liang Xingchu, Zhang refers to Zhang Guohua, Gan refers to Gan Weihai, and Wei refers to Wei Jie, who were then the commander, first political commissar, fourth political commissar, and deputy commander of the Chengdu Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, respectively.

## **Comments on the Guangdong Provincial Military Control Commission's Report on the Training of Cadres Supporting the Left**

(May 7, 1967)

Comrade Lin Biao:

This document [1] may be forwarded for reference in all places. All armies should undergo a short period of training, preferably ten to fourteen days. It is best to adopt the policies and methods used in Guangzhou. Those who have already undergone training should undergo another training session after one or two months. All personnel in the three branches and two divisions of the entire army should undergo training once every one or two months to promote their achievements and correct their mistakes so that they can fight again. Please make your decision on the above.

Mao Zedong,

May 7

[1] This refers to a report submitted by the Guangdong Provincial Military Control Commission on May 5, 1967, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group and the Cultural Revolution Group of the entire army regarding the training of cadres supporting the Left. The report stated that we recently conducted intensive training for over 1,700 cadres assigned to the Guangzhou area to support the Left, support the workers, and conduct military control. The first session lasted 10 days, the second 8 days, and some cadres were retrained through the training. The main lessons learned from this training were: 1. Focusing on the struggle between the two lines, we prioritized addressing the issue of correctly treating the masses; 2. Mobilizing the masses, summarizing experiences and lessons, and educating ourselves; 3. Aiming at the active thinking of cadres, we organized the active study and application of Chairman Mao's works. The Central Military Commission forwarded this report and Mao Zedong's comments to Party committees at the regimental level and above.

**Comments on the publication of the material "How did the troops conducting military training at Beijing Normal University support the left?" [1]**

(May 7, 1967)

Comrades of the Cultural Revolution Small Group:

Please consider whether this document can be published publicly. If you plan to publish it, please consult with comrades from the Fifth Artillery Division, Tan Houlan, Li Qinglin [2], and others to verify its authenticity. If any inappropriate content is found, please revise it before publishing. Also, regarding the Sichuan document [3], which is of great importance, please inform me of the revision process. I await your notification.

Mao Zedong,

May 7

[1] This comment was written in the 470th issue of the Cultural Revolution Bulletin compiled by the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 5, 1967. This issue of the Bulletin published a document entitled "How did the troops conducting military training at Beijing Normal University support the left?" The document said that during the military training at Beijing Normal University, the 5th Artillery Division of the Beijing Military Region "stood firmly with the revolutionaries, carried out in-depth and detailed political and ideological work on conservative forces and centrists, disintegrated conservative organizations, improved the class consciousness of centrists, and strengthened and consolidated the left-wing ranks." On May 16, 1967, the People's Daily published this document and an editorial entitled "Military and Political Training is Good".

[2] Tan Houlan was the head of the "Jinggangshan Commune", a rebel organization in power at Beijing Normal University. Li Qinglin was the head of the "Jinggangshan Rebel Corps", another rebel organization at Beijing Normal University.

[3] Refers to the decision of the CPC Central Committee on May 7, 1967 regarding the handling of the Sichuan issue.

**We must trust and rely on the masses, the People's Liberation Army, and the majority of cadres.**

(1967)

We must trust and rely on the masses, the People's Liberation Army, and the majority of cadres. [1]

[1] The editorial "Warmly Respond to the Call to Support the Army and Love the People," published in the sixth issue of Red Flag magazine on May 8, 1967, quoted Mao Zedong's words in boldface. On April 28, the People's Daily reprinted the Red Flag editorial in advance and published Mao Zedong's words on the front page.

**Comments on the Central Cultural Revolution Group's Propaganda Opinions on  
Commemorating the 25th Anniversary of the Publication of the "Speech at the Yan'an  
Forum on Literature and Art" [1]**

(May 9, 1967)

To Comrade Chen Boda:

Let's discuss and decide at a meeting. If everyone agrees, I have no objection.

Mao Zedong

May 9th, 1:00 PM

[1] This comment was written on a draft opinion submitted for review on May 8, 1967 by Chen Boda, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The draft opinion suggested that the propaganda work in May should focus on the "Talks" and organize performances, publicity, and commemorative activities. The specific contents are as follows: (1) All newspapers should republish Chairman Mao's "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art," "A Letter to the Yan'an Peking Opera Theatre after Seeing 'Driven to Join the Liangshan Mountain Rebels'", and Chairman Mao's important instructions on literature and art since the criticism of "The Biography of Wu Xun" in 1951. (2) Publish editorials and articles commemorating the "Talks," organize several weighty commentary articles with emphasis, and organize symposiums with the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers. (3) Publish scripts of revolutionary model operas and other revolutionary literary and artistic creations. Organize revolutionary literary and artistic workers to write about their experiences in studying the "Talks" and vigorously publicize the great victory of Chairman Mao's literary and artistic line. (4) Publish the "Summary of the Forum on the Work in Literature and Art with which Comrade Lin Biao Entrusted Comrade Jiang Qing" and Jiang Qing's 1964 speech at the National Revolutionary Modern Peking Opera Performance and Appreciation Conference. (5) On May 23, a mass rally commemorating the "Speech" was held. (6) From May 10 to 31, celebrations were organized in major cities across the country, featuring performances of revolutionary model operas and revolutionary films, and extensive mass amateur theatrical performances. (7) A number of films about poisonous weeds were screened for criticism.

## Comments on a Letter Reflecting on Problems in the Jinan Area [1]

(May 10, 1967)

### 1

After being sent to the Premier for review, this document was passed to the Cultural Revolution Group for further review and then returned to Comrade Lin Biao for safekeeping. This document reflects the sentiments of many in the military during this period. Faced with such situations, we should remain calm, work hard, promote our achievements, and correct our mistakes. Problems can always be resolved.

Mao Zedong

May 10

### 2

This is the situation displayed by students and workers before Comrades Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan [2] arrived in Jinan. In fact, it wasn't that serious.

[1] This article is a commentary on a letter forwarded by Liu Bochong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, on April 30, 1967, signed by "All revolutionary masses in the Jinan Military Region and all support-left personnel in the Jinan garrison." This letter, dated April 29, 1967, stated that the current anti-PLA winds in Jinan have reached force 12. We are verbally abused daily, arrested, and detained at will. The families of cadres are also beaten and insulted, and the children of military region cadres are also subjected to daily beatings. The factories and enterprises we support have been vandalized one after another. The revolutionary masses are already experiencing an unprecedented white terror. We find it hard to believe that this is happening after the leftists seized power. The series of events since their seizure of power show that they are not following Chairman Mao's instructions, but rather following something called "Wang Xiaoyu Thought." Perhaps because our PLA failed to follow their lead, they harbor resentment and deceive the central government, stirring up this anti-PLA wind. We can't help but ask: Do they still want the People's Liberation Army? Do they still want the working class? Do they still want the poor and lower-middle peasants? Do they still want the vast majority of Party and League members? Who exactly is this dictatorship being exercised over? Who is exercising the dictatorship? When Liu Bochong asked Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, and others to forward this letter, he wrote: "Yesterday evening at 8:00 PM, a person claiming to be from the Political Department of the Armored Forces of the Jinan Military Region said that our troops were being attacked by Wang Xiaoyu's Red Guards. The situation was extremely tense. They urged

us to leave Jinan immediately and also asked me to pass on a letter to Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin." Mao Zedong emphasized this passage and wrote a comment, which is the second part of this article. Wang Xiaoyu, then Director of the Shandong Provincial Revolutionary Committee, was dismissed from his post in June 1970.

[2] Zhang Chunqiao was then deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee. Yao Wenyan was then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee.

## **Comments on a Letter Reporting Problems in Supporting the Left in the Jinan Military Region and the Shandong Provincial Military Region**

(May 11, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai [1]:

This letter [2] is well worth reading. It was written by comrades from the two Shandong Military Regions.

Mao Zedong

May 11

The same situation exists throughout the army, among many people, though certainly not the majority.

[1] Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. Enlai, also known as Zhou Enlai.

[2] This refers to the document entitled "Some Issues in the Support for the Left Work of the Jinan and Shandong Military Regions" published in the 178th issue of the "Cultural Revolution Letters and Visits Bulletin" compiled by the Letters and Visits Office of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 9, 1967. The document states that two cadres from the Political Department of the Jinan Military Region and the Shandong Provincial Military Region Command wrote letters reflecting that the Jinan Military Region and the Shandong Provincial Military Region "had many shortcomings and mistakes" in their support for the left: (1) They believed that the Jinan Military Region "adopted a two-faced approach" in "fighting against the countercurrent of capitalist counter-revolutionary restoration." On the one hand, they acknowledged that the revolutionary organizations surrounding the Provincial Drafting Committee were revolutionaries, while on the other hand, they acknowledged that some conservative organizations were also revolutionaries, supporting them openly or secretly and attacking the revolutionaries. (2) They said that some cadres in the Jinan Military Region had "wrongly commented" on Wang Xiaoyu, Director of the Shandong Provincial Revolutionary Committee. (3) They claim that the Jinan Military Region is actively preparing to "sue" and go to Beijing to file a complaint. (4) They believe that the Jinan Military Region and the Shandong Provincial Military Region have yet to expose the problems of Tan Qilong (then First Secretary of the Shandong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China). (5) They believe that the Jinan Military Region and the Shandong Provincial Military Region have gone from having little affection for the rebels in the past to open opposition.

## Comments on a Letter from Qin Houde [1], a Supporter of the Left in the Jinan Military Region

(May 13, 1967)

1

Printed Express [2], Cultural Revolution Office.

2

The problem this comrade raised [3] is quite common and deserves attention. The Jinan Air Force publicly declared their support for the Provincial Revolutionary Committee on May 5th, and the Jinan Military Region on May 6th. Both the Army and Air Force have reported to the Central Committee, and the problem has begun to be resolved. However, in many other provinces and cities, some have been resolved, while others have not.

Mao Zedong

May 13<sup>th</sup>

[1] Qin Houde, formerly a cadre at the Communications Station of the Jinan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, was dismissed from his post in September 1966 and subsequently assigned to civilian work. Trapped in the Cultural Revolution-intensified region, he was not accepted. In March 1967, he joined the Jinan Military Region Command's support for the Left.

[2] Refers to the "Express" compiled by the Office of the Cultural Revolution Small Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

[3] In a letter dated April 21, 1967, Qin Houde addressed to Chen Boda (then head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee), Kang Sheng (then advisor to the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee), and Jiang Qing (then deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee and advisor to the Cultural Revolution Group of the entire army), and forwarded to Mao Zedong and others, he wrote: On March 4, I participated in the military region's support for the Left. Based on my personal experience and understanding over a month, I feel that the support for the Left by the troops stationed in Jinan was entirely correct before February 10. However, since February 10, when they entered factories and schools, there have been numerous problems. These are primarily manifested in the following ways: First, they supported the conservatives, not the leftists, and their support for the conservatives crushed the revolutionaries. The People's Liberation Army, instead of supporting the leftists, has become a backer of the conservatives. Second, they engaged in a "merging two into one" policy, using conservative organizations as

the core to unite revolutionary mass organizations. Disagreement from these organizations was considered separatism and a disruption of the grand unity. Third, on the issue of "grasping revolution and promoting production," some units failed to prioritize revolution. Fourth, some propaganda teams adopted a crude and brutal attitude toward so-called counter-revolutionary organizations, creating a sense of fear. Fifth, there were differences of opinion between the Provincial Drafting Committee and the Jinan Military Region's Cultural Revolution Defense Command. Comrades in the army supporting the Left expressed dissatisfaction with Wang Xiaoyu, the chairman of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and were even more hostile to the speeches of other members of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee. Recently, the tensions had escalated to a tit-for-tat level. Sixth, comrades in the army were deeply antagonistic to revolutionary organizations such as the "Red Guard Shandong Command" and the "Shandong Revolutionary Workers' Rebellion General Command." This opposition had become public, with mass organizations supporting both sides constantly demonstrating and sometimes engaging in armed conflict. Seventh, the Jinan Military Region's Cultural Revolution Defense Command became a forum for conservatives to lodge complaints, while the Provincial Revolutionary Committee became a forum for revolutionaries to lodge complaints.

## **Comments on the Important Notice of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee [1]**

(May 1967)

Act upon this.

[1] This is Mao Zedong's comment on the "Important Notice of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee," submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on May 11, 1967. The main contents of this notice, adopted by the plenary session of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee, are: 1. All revolutionary masses must resolutely implement Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee's directives on "grasping revolution, promoting production, and promoting work," striving for a double harvest of revolution and production. 2. Resolutely implement Chairman Mao's directive on engaging in cultural struggle, not armed conflict. Beating, smashing, looting, raiding, and arresting are strictly prohibited. The minority of bad elements who incite armed conflict, and those who commit serious assaults and murder, should be punished by the laws of the proletarian state. The People's Liberation Army Beijing Garrison and military representatives have the authority to handle matters of armed conflict, and the relevant parties must obey and not refuse to comply. 3. Damage to state property, use of transportation for armed conflict, and mobilization of personnel from outside units for armed conflict are prohibited. Fourth, resolutely implement Chairman Mao's directive that "certain conditions of indiscipline or anarchy existing in many places must be resolutely overcome." No violations of labour discipline or unexcused absences from work are permitted. All phenomena that disrupt the revolutionary and production order must be resolutely combated. Fifth, the organs of the proletarian dictatorship should, in accordance with Chairman Mao's teachings, firmly support the proletarian revolutionaries and shoulder the sacred duty of maintaining and consolidating the revolutionary order of the proletarian dictatorship, protecting state property, and safeguarding the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Sixth, resolutely implement the April 20th notice issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group regarding the cessation of outbound activities. Beijing students and the public who have already gone out for outbound activities, except those with special permission from the Central Committee, should immediately return to Beijing. Students and the public who have come to Beijing for outbound activities should also immediately return to their hometowns. The Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee issued this notice on May 14th.

**Comments on the Report on Supporting the Left by the Guangdong Provincial Military Control Commission and the Hunan Provincial Military Region [1]**

(May 14, 1967)

1

To all major military commands, provincial military commands, sub-commands, people's armed forces departments, armies, divisions, and regiments directly under the command of the armed forces:

(1) We are sending you two reports from the Guangzhou Military Command and the Hunan Provincial Military Command. Please refer to them for implementation.

(2) Anyone who has made a mistake must resolutely correct it. If it is not corrected, it will only lead to further mistakes and, ultimately, to a need for correction, resulting in a significant loss of prestige. Correct it sooner rather than later, and your prestige will only increase.

(3) Do not waver or be indecisive. Do not take the false claims brought to you by your wife and children from the security forces at face value.

(4) Be able to withstand criticism from workers, peasants, students, soldiers, and cadres, analyse it, accept the good, and explain the bad. If the explanation is unsatisfactory, set it aside for now and address it later.

(5) Firmly believe that the vast majority of the people are good, and that the bad are only a tiny minority, no more than one, two, or three percent. If you think this way, everything makes sense.

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Central Military Commission Central Cultural Revolution Group

Central Military Commission Cultural Revolution Group

May 14, 1967

2

Enlai, Lin Biao [2], the Central Committee had a brief meeting and read and issued this.

3.

The time is too short. It should be ten to fourteen days.

Mao Zedong note

[1] This refers to the May 13, 1967, report of the Guangdong Provincial Military Control Commission to the CPC Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group on lessons learned from previous support for the Left and the next steps to be taken, and the May 12, 1967 report of the CPC Hunan Provincial Military District Committee to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, the entire army Cultural Revolution Group, and the Guangzhou Military District on implementing the instructions of the Guangzhou Military District commander. The Guangdong Provincial Military Control Commission's report stated that the Standing Committee had recently conducted an inspection of previous support for the Left and concluded that, while the troops had supported some genuine revolutionary leftists and achieved significant results, they also suffered from many serious shortcomings and errors, which were pointedly criticised by some young revolutionary leaders. They were slow to recognize and correct their mistakes, with some leading cadres lacking common sense, fearing gains and losses, and unwilling to take responsibility and correct their errors. To this end, the Standing Committee studied measures for future improvements. The Hunan Provincial Military District Party Committee's report stated that on the evening of May 11, Provincial Military District Commander Long Shujin called from Guangzhou, conveying the Guangzhou Military District chief's instructions on the Hunan issue, which sobered us up. We are determined to: 1. Unify our understanding from top to bottom, and promptly implement the Military District chief's instructions to all levels of leadership. Review our previous work in light of the Military Commission's ten directives. It has been decided to immediately train cadres supporting the Left at the grassroots level. Officials in government offices, military units, and soldiers will also be trained for five to seven days (followed by a critique in parentheses, which is the third point in this article) to conduct positive education on the two lines. 2. Correct mistakes and do a good job. 3. Firmly support the revolutionary Left. We must unify our understanding from top to bottom, believing that the vast majority of the masses are revolutionary and must trust and rely on them. 4. Strengthen leadership.

[2] Enlai is Zhou Enlai. Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

## Comments and Revisions on the Article "A Great Historical Document" [1]

(May 18, 1967)

1

Return to Comrade Wang Li, [2]. I have made some minor changes. Please ask the Small Group [3] to make their decision.

Mao Zedong

May 18, 2:30 a.m

2

In socialist society, especially after the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production is essentially complete, will classes and class struggle still exist? Will all class struggles in society still be concentrated on the struggle for power? Is revolution still necessary under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship? Who should be revolutionized? How should revolution be carried out? These are a series of major theoretical questions that Marx and Engels could not have addressed at the time. *Lenin saw that after the proletariat seized power, the defeated bourgeoisie would become even stronger than the proletariat, periodically attempting a restoration. At the same time, small producers would constantly foster new capitalism and the bourgeoisie, threatening the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, to counter and defeat these counterrevolutionary threats, the dictatorship of the proletariat must be strengthened over a long period of time. There was no other way.* However, Lenin's untimely death in fact prevented a practical resolution of these issues. *Stalin, a great Marxist-Leninist, effectively dealt with a large number of counter-revolutionary bourgeois representatives who had infiltrated the Party, such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Bukharin, and Rykov. His shortcoming was his theoretical failure to recognize the existence of classes and class struggle in society throughout the historical period of the proletarian dictatorship. Without a final resolution of the victory and defeat of the revolution, if things were not handled properly, there was a possibility of a bourgeois restoration. A year before his death, he had already recognized this, stating that contradictions existed in socialist society and, if not handled properly, could become antagonistic.* Comrade Mao Zedong, fully attentive to the experience of Soviet history, correctly addressed this series of issues in his series of great works and directives, in this great historical document, and in the great practice of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which he personally initiated and led.

3

The current Cultural Revolution is only the first; it will inevitably be repeated many times. Comrade Mao Zedong has often stated in recent years that the outcome of the revolution

will be determined over a very long historical period. If not handled properly, capitalist restoration will be imminent. All Party members and people of the country, do not assume that peace and tranquility can be achieved with one, two, three, or four Cultural Revolutions. Be extremely vigilant and never let down your guard.

[1] "A Great Historical Document" is an editorial written by Red Flag and People's Daily in response to the May 17, 1967, public release of the "Notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" (also known as the "May 16 Notice") of May 16, 1966. The article appeared in the People's Daily on May 18, 1967, and in the seventh issue of Red Flag, published on May 20, 1967. Part I consists of comments on the revised draft of the article submitted for review on May 17 by Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and editor-in-chief of Red Flag. Part II consists of revisions to a paragraph in the draft, including text added and revised by Mao Zedong, printed in italics. Part III consists of a paragraph added at the end of the draft.

[2] Wang Li was then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee and deputy editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine.

[3] Refers to the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

**Comments on the Summary of Huang Yongsheng's Speech at the Talk with the "Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions" Rebels [1]**

(May 23, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai [2], and to the Cultural Revolution Group:

Comrade Huang Yongsheng's speech is recommended to be distributed to all major military regions, provincial military regions, armies, and branches of the military for reference. I think this kind of small-scale heart-to-heart talk would be very good. The local highest chief came forward to talk with the young generals on an equal footing, without putting on airs, admitting his mistakes frankly without hesitation, and correcting them immediately. These are all very good. If you agree, please make your own decision.

Mao Zedong

May 23

[1] This comment was written on the 131st issue of the "Letter Express" published by the Office of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee on May 21, 1967. This issue of the express published part of the speech made by Huang Yongsheng, Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and Wen Yucheng, Deputy Commander, on May 10, during a discussion with eight representatives of the "Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions". In his speech, Huang Yongsheng reviewed "the shortcomings and mistakes in the previous period of support for the left, expressed his determination to thoroughly redress the revolutionary rebels who had been persecuted and to stand firmly on the side of the revolutionary rebels."

[2] Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai is Zhou Enlai.

**Comments on Jiang Qing's Inappropriate Participation in the Sino-Burmese Party Talks [1]**

(May 26, 1967)

It would be better for Jiang Qing not to participate.

Mao Zedong,

May 26

[1] This comment was written on a report submitted by Zhao Yimin, Deputy Minister of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee, to Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong on May 18, 1967, regarding the composition of the Chinese Communist Party's delegation to the Sino-Burmese inter-party talks. The report recommended the name of Jiang Qing, then Deputy Head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee.

## **Comments from the Central Military Commission on the 54th Army's Report on its Work with the Opposition [1]**

(May 27, 1967)

1

To all military regions, armies, and branches of the army: The 54th Army has done a good job in Chongqing and can serve as a reference for you. Where there is a serious conflict between two revolutionary mass organizations, the problem can always be resolved through careful ideological and political work. For conservative organizations, even reactionary organizations, which have a mass presence, careful ideological and political work must also be carried out.

Central Military Commission

May 27

2

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai [2], please read and distribute.

[1] A telegram from the 54th Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, sent to the Chengdu Military Region and reported to the CCP Central Cultural Revolution Group and the Cultural Revolution Group of the entire army on May 26, 1967, stated that in recent days, military leaders have made every effort to meet with leaders of workers' and student organizations, the "Red General" of the PLA Logistics Engineering College, and other organizations in Chongqing more than ten times, listening to their criticisms and opinions. Furthermore, through receiving these visitors, they have engaged with the general public of the opposition and organized military-civilian gatherings with some organizations. Through these efforts and activities, some misunderstandings have been resolved, tensions have been eased, and ideological rapprochement has been achieved. The opposition expressed support for the Central Committee's "Five Points" for handling the Chongqing issue, expressed willingness to accept the leadership of the preparatory group of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee, and, in principle, agreed to a coalition between the two factions. However, to truly achieve this coalition, a great deal of painstaking and meticulous political and ideological work is still required.

[2] Lin Biao was then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. Enlai is Zhou Enlai.

## **Comments on the involvement of some children of high-ranking officials in the house raids**

[1]

(May 28, 1967)

If not properly educated, they will become one of the root causes of future counter-revolutionary restoration. Fortunately, they do not constitute the majority of the children of cadres; most are relatively well behaved.

Mao Zedong

May 28

[1] This comment was written in the "Important Events Report" (2) compiled and published by the Cultural Revolution Group Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 26, 1967. This issue of the "Important Events Report" stated that according to the Yunnan Provincial Public Security Bureau, on the evening of the 22nd, 17 people claiming to be Red Guards raided the home of Yunnan Vice Governor Wang Shaoyan, confiscating watches, cameras, cash, and passbooks. They were arrested when they were trying to withdraw money. The participants were all middle school students, six of whom were from Beijing, and the remaining 11, except for two, were children of high-ranking officials.

## **Comments on the letter from Tang Wensheng and Wang Hairong [1]**

(May 29, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao, Enlai [2], and all comrades of the Cultural Revolution:

Please read this. The views of the extreme leftists are wrong. Comrades of the Cultural Revolution, please try to persuade them.

Mao Zedong,

May 29

[1] On May 27, 1967, Tang Wensheng, a translator for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Wang Hairong, a cadre in the General Affairs Group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' General Office, wrote to Mao Zedong: "Recently, there has been a trend of attacking Premier Zhou. This has also been reflected within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Station and its affiliated combat teams, where debate has become quite heated." "We believe that the Premier's mistakes and shortcomings can be raised in the form of small posters or letters to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, directly to the Premier himself, or directly submitted to you and Vice Chairman Lin. If there are different interpretations of the Premier's instructions or if there are disagreements with the Premier on certain issues, we can present the facts and use reason to engage in normal and thorough debate among the masses. However, this cannot be used as an excuse to attack or smear the Premier, labeling him as a capitalist roader or his backers." They also said: "We absolutely cannot agree with the statement that 'attacking the Premier is the general direction of the current movement.' Such a statement is wrong."

[2] Lin Biao was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai is Zhou Enlai.

## **Comments on the Implementation of Military Control in Gansu and the Establishment of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee [1]**

(May and July 1967)

1

Deal with it as is.

Mao Zedong

May 12

2

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai [2]:

Please read this document. The views expressed seem reasonable. Please consult with Comrades Zhang, Xi, and Zhan Danan [3]. Since Comrade Hu Jizong and others have come forward and share the views of the Military Region and actively support the Third Headquarters, is it possible to refrain from implementing military control and, instead, follow the Military Region's opinion and establish a Provincial Revolutionary Committee after a period of work? Please consider the above.

Mao Zedong

May 14, 2:00 AM

3

To Comrade Lin Biao:

I have read this document. It is very good. Act on it.

Mao Zedong

July 30

[1] The first part of this article is a commentary on the "Several Opinions on the Gansu Question" issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Military Commission, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and the All-Army Cultural Revolution Group on May 12, 1967. The opinion stated, "In view of the fact that the establishment of a temporary power structure combining the three elements of power in Gansu Province is not yet mature, the Central Committee has decided to impose military control on Gansu Province." The second part of this article is a commentary on the "Report of the Lanzhou Military Region Requesting Instructions on Supporting the 'Red Third

Command'." This telegram, sent at 12:00 on May 13, 1967, by the Lanzhou Military Region Party Committee of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, the All-Army Cultural Revolution Group, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, stated that the current situation of the Cultural Revolution in the Lanzhou area remained excellent, and that some leftist organizations had formed the "Gansu Red Rebel United Third Command" (abbreviated as the "Red Third Command"), a coalition of the proletarian revolutionary left in Gansu. Former Provincial Party Committee Acting First Secretary Hu Jizong and other leading cadres have expressed support for the "Red Third Headquarters," so the "Red Third Headquarters" has decided to merge with them. We believe that with the "Red Third Headquarters" as the core, further work should be conducted among other revolutionary mass organizations and the broader revolutionary masses, striving to unite all possible mass organizations, achieve a grand revolutionary unity, promote the "three-in-one" approach, and establish the Gansu Provincial Revolutionary Committee. After deliberation, the Military Region Party Committee believes that a clear statement of support for the "Red Third Headquarters" should be made. Please provide your instructions promptly. This third article is a commentary on the July 29th notice and minutes of the "Minutes of the Talks on the Gansu Question" forwarded by the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission. These minutes were produced following Mao Zedong's May 14th directive, summoning over 20 leaders from the Lanzhou Military Region and Gansu Provincial Military Region, including Xi Henghan and Zhan Danan, and Hu Jizong, to Beijing for a discussion on the Gansu question. The minutes pointed out that, given the establishment of the "Red Third Headquarters" and the emergence of comrades like Hu Jizong, the situation of the Cultural Revolution in Lanzhou was improving. It was agreed that Gansu Province could directly establish a preparatory group for the Revolutionary Committee without imposing military control.

[2] Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai is Zhou Enlai.

[3] Zhang refers to Zhang Dazhi, then commander of the Lanzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Xi refers to Xi Henghan, then political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Zhan Danan, then deputy commander of the Lanzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and commander of the Gansu Provincial Military Region.

**Comments on the Decision on the Implementation of Military Control over the Ministries (Commissions) of the State Council (Trial Draft) [1]**

(May 1967)

Act on it.

[1] This comment was written on the draft decision of the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, which Zhou Enlai submitted for review on May 28, 1967. In his report submitted for review, Zhou Enlai wrote: "After this year's struggle for power in the various ministries and commissions of the State Council, the revolutionary rebels in most units have split into two factions. The internecine struggles have severely impacted operations and production, necessitating the implementation of military control. This decision (trial draft) was adopted at the Standing Committee meeting yesterday (the 27th) and is now submitted for your approval." The decision (trial draft) stated: "In order to resolutely implement the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao, thoroughly carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, earnestly implement the policy of 'grasping the revolution and promoting production,' and ensure the dual victory of revolution and production, in accordance with Chairman Mao's important instructions that 'the army should not only coordinate with local governments in managing agriculture but also industry,' and that 'it is wrong to manage only industry without ignoring transportation,' it is hereby decided to impose military control on all ministries and commissions effective immediately, establishing a Military Control Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Military Control Commission) or a Military Control Group. Appoint XXX as director of the Military Control Commission or head of a small military control group, and XXX and XXX as deputy directors or deputy heads. "Under the leadership of the State Council and the Central Military Commission, the Military Control Commission will exercise unified leadership over all work within the ministries and commissions." "Two teams will be established under the Military Control Commission to 'grasp revolution and promote production.' They will prioritize revolution, take class struggle as the guiding principle, and use revolution to direct production. We will establish a new revolutionary order, usher in a new high tide in production, and strive to complete and overfulfill the national plan." Soon after, according to this decision (trial draft) approved by Mao Zedong, military control was gradually imposed on a number of ministries and commissions under the State Council.

**We must break away from the ideology of bourgeois right.**

(May 1967)

No matter how many factions there are, there are still two major ones. If they are not counter-revolutionary, we must work on them. Gradually, their views will become closer, not further apart.

Implementing a supply system and communist living is a Marxist-Leninist style, opposed to the bourgeois style. I think the rural style and guerrilla mentality are better. We won the 32-year war, so why can't we build communism? Why implement a wage system? This is a concession to the bourgeoisie, using the rural style and guerrilla mentality to belittle us. The result is the development of individualism, and the emphasis on persuasion rather than coercion has been forgotten. Shouldn't the military take the lead in restoring the supply system?

We must break away from the ideology of bourgeois right. For example, competition for status, rank, demanding overtime pay, higher wages for intellectual workers and lower wages for manual labour, etc., are all remnants of bourgeois ideology.

"Everyone gets what they are worth" is a legal requirement, and this is also bourgeois. Will there be class distinctions for car ownership in the future? Specialized cars are not necessary. The elderly and the infirm can be cared for, but for the rest, there should be no class distinctions. Our Party has fought continuously for over thirty years, practicing a supply system for a long time, expanding from hundreds of thousands to millions until liberation. In the early days, people generally lived an egalitarian life, worked hard, and fought bravely, relying not on material incentives but on the inspiration of the revolutionary spirit.

## **Instructions to the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee**

(May 1967)

The organization should not be oversized. The old bureaucratic apparatus must be dismantled. The old municipal committee inherited this bureaucratic apparatus, which is easily exploited by those in power taking the capitalist road. Therefore, the establishment of a revolutionary committee is essential. We must destroy the institutions of the old Beijing municipality that were exploited by those in power taking the capitalist road. This has been going on for several months, and we have gradually gained experience. We would like to summarize a few points.

## **Revolution Requires Class Sentiments**

(May 1967)

To carry out the Cultural Revolution successfully, we must unite with the workers and peasants, possess proletarian sentiments, and have ties with the workers, peasants, and soldiers.

## **Call to the Shanghai Revolutionaries**

(May 1967)

I hope you will become models in the struggle against the handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party. I hope you will become models in practicing the great revolutionary unity, models in opposing small groupism, anarchism, economism, and selfishness.

## **Call to the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee**

(May 1967)

1. Both sides have experience this time; this trend won't be very strong. We must adhere to the Eight Points, and the People's Liberation Army must adhere to the Ten Points.

2. Over the past decade or so since liberation, we have been deeply alienated from the masses. The Youth League, the Women's Federation, and the Communist Youth League Central Committee are all empty shells. Our demand is to remain in production, to be both part of the government and part of the common people. What solution is there? Be an official for one week a month and an ordinary person for three weeks. If we don't act like ordinary people, the leaders of the workers' movement may change if this continues. This is a major issue of direction. Comrades, please feel free to raise your concerns about whether this solution is a good one.

## **Directives on the International Situation**

(May 1967)

Some say the US and Soviet strategic focus is shifting. I disagree. They are focusing on the Far East, but the core remains in Europe. The strength of the seven divisions in Europe has not been reduced; only tens of thousands of veterans have been transferred to the Far East.

## Several Instructions on Handling Military-Civilian Relations

(May 1967)

There are now many divisional military regions and sub-districts. This isn't a big deal; don't be afraid. Some local newspapers have been shut down, and we've never advocated for so many newspapers. The hunger strike isn't a big deal; it's because we haven't done our job well enough. Why? Because we supported the Left incorrectly, didn't admit our mistakes straightforwardly, and hesitated to acknowledge our errors in direction and line. It doesn't matter if we made mistakes; just correct them.

Why was this Cultural Revolution launched? Because there were still bad people, some wanting to take the capitalist road, and some whose will was weakening. Hunger strikes were a way to deal with bureaucracy. We needed to get the work done, not let people starve to death. We had to find a solution. We could have given them hot water, with some glucose in it. Shootings were mostly carried out by the military, or even militias, not with military support, such as in Qinghai and Inner Mongolia. This Cultural Revolution was also a test for the military. Some places, such as Jiangxi, Hunan, and Henan, reported the situation as very serious. Was it really that serious? Northeast China used to be relatively peaceful, but now the Northeast Bureau and the military are each supporting one faction.

Beijing is also splitting into two factions, fighting each other. Chaos can lead to something big. Sichuan and Guizhou are the most chaotic, primarily due to He Long, Luo Ruiqing, and Li Jingquan. ... Sometimes, trying to smooth things over is necessary. Localities should resolve their own problems and report to the Central Committee for approval. The Central Committee has been talking too much about the Cultural Revolution lately. Don't talk about it everywhere; it won't work. Now everyone is denouncing the royalists, royalist dogs, the "Prisoner Three" faction, the "Four Four" faction, and even the "Non-Three, Non-Four" faction. The military is quite tense right now. Has the Joint Action been released? Why aren't the "XX" faction allowed to participate in the Red Delegates Congress? All university students who have been organizing in various places should return to campus to stir up revolution. All university students in Beijing should be withdrawn, including those in middle schools, factories, and rural areas. A cautious attitude should be adopted in the rural areas; some armed forces have problems. We must be resolute and firmly support the left. We must correct our mistakes; don't be hesitant; be decisive. We must conduct ideological work with the conservatives, adopting a policy of education, unity, and winning them over. We must turn our backs. If we don't correct this problem now and allow the conservatives to continue to develop, we will make mistakes. We must stand with the left and do a good job of working with the conservatives. Some armed groups are very stubborn. If this continues, we will make serious mistakes. We must pay attention to doing a good job of working with the armed groups.

**Veteran cadres should make new contributions during the Cultural Revolution.**

(1967)

Veteran cadres may have made contributions in the past, but they cannot rest on their laurels. They must thoroughly temper and transform themselves during the proletarian Cultural Revolution, making new contributions and establishing a new reputation. [1]

[1] The article "Let Children Experience Hardships and See the World" (author Ren Lixin) published in the People's Daily on June 1, 1967, quoted this sentence in boldface and wrote: "All revolutionary cadres must respond to Chairman Mao's great call."

## **Instructions on Summer Harvest**

(June 3, 1967)

Actively mobilize for summer harvest and planting. We are now entering the busy season of summer harvest and planting, and harvest has already begun in the south. This year's summer crops are growing well across the country. Leaders at all levels should attach special importance to this year's summer harvest and immediately begin harvesting and planting. All localities should organize students, government officials, workers, and the People's Liberation Army to vigorously support the people's communes with labour, animal power, and technical resources, ensuring that every grain is harvested. Strictly guard against sabotage by class enemies.

## **Instructions on External Propaganda**

(June 18, 1967)

Some foreigners have objections to the external propaganda efforts of our Beijing Weekly and Xinhua News Agency. Propaganda of Mao Zedong Thought, which developed Marxism, was not practiced in the past, but now, after the Cultural Revolution, it's being aggressively promoted. It's been overblown, and people can't accept it. Why do we need to say some things ourselves? We should be modest, especially when speaking to the outside world. We should be modest when we go out, but of course, we shouldn't lose our principles. In yesterday's hydrogen bomb announcement, I crossed out all the references to "great teacher, great leader, great commander-in-chief, great helmsman." I also crossed out the "10,000% joy and excitement" in the phrase "a mood of 10,000% joy and excitement". It's not 10%, not 100%, not 1,000%, but 10,000%. I don't want a single percent. I've crossed them all out.

## **Comments on a Letter Reporting on the Rebels' Extravagance and Ostentation in Several Xi'an Schools [1]**

(June 21, 1967)

Comrades of the Cultural Revolution Group: I suggest that this document be published publicly. Please discuss its appropriateness at the Standing Committee meeting. It would be helpful to include a commentary upon publication.

Mao Zedong

June 21

[1] This comment appeared in the 234th issue of "Letters and Telegraphs Express," published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group Office on June 19, 1967. This issue published a letter from Jing Xianfeng and four others on the Cultural Revolution Preparatory Committee of Shaanxi Normal University. The letter stated that recently, rebels at several schools in Xi'an celebrated the establishment of their revolutionary committees with a scale and extravagance that was truly astonishing. Instead of frugality in pursuit of revolution, they engaged in lavish extravagance. The Xi'an Military and Electronic University and the Northwestern Polytechnical University jointly held a celebration and established a draft committee, with 37,600 attendees, nearly four times the number of attendees at the founding meeting of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee. The event cost nearly 10,000 yuan to organize. The establishment of the Revolutionary Committee at the Metallurgical Institute was even more lavish and extravagant than the previous one. Some secondary vocational schools have also adopted the "Big Brother" mantle. This problem extends beyond just one school or region; it manifests as a widespread tendency that, if not corrected, is extremely dangerous. On June 29, 1967, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a notice on frugality in the revolution and preventing extravagance and waste, forwarding it to all military commands, revolutionary committees at all levels, military control commissions, and mass organizations. The notice stated that the Central Committee believed that the leaders of revolutionary committees and mass organizations at all levels must fully understand Chairman Mao's great call to "practice frugality in the revolution." This was not only an economic issue but also a crucial political one. Every comrade faced a new and severe test. They must understand that after assuming power, their status changed, and it was easy for bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas to grow and erupt, while the dust of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie in society also rushed in their faces. In this situation, they should be highly conscious and constantly use the weapons Chairman Mao gave us to transform their thinking and resolutely resist all exploiting class ideologies and practices.

## **On the Issue of Hunger Strike and Sit-in**

(June 29, 1967)

Under the socialist system and the conditions of proletarian dictatorship, hunger strike and sit-in can be used as a means of struggle. This is because there are small groups of enemies within the proletariat, and there is bureaucracy. They simply want you to agree to a few conditions. Therefore, hunger strike and sit-in are permitted, but not encouraged and generally disapproved of. During hunger strikes, sugar, salt, glucose, and other ingredients can be added to boiling water, and shifts are permitted.

## **We must guide petty-bourgeois ideology onto the track of proletarian revolution**

(1967)

We must be good at guiding the petty-bourgeois ideology within our ranks onto the track of proletarian revolution. This is a key issue for the victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[1] On June 25, 1967, the People's Daily reprinted the Wenhui Daily editorial of June 21, "Proletarian Revolutionary Nature and Petty-bourgeois Volatility," with an editorial note that quoted Mao Zedong's words in bold.

## Instructions on the Support Work of the 8341st Unit and Comments on the Support Work Report [1]

(June and November 1967)

### 1

1. After going down, we must do a good job of propaganda and carry out in-depth, meticulous, and arduous ideological and political work. There are many female workers in the factory, so we should send some female comrades down to facilitate the work.
2. After you go down, don't rush to express your stance. After investigation and research, if both factions are revolutionary mass organizations, you should gradually unite them. Even in mass organizations where the two factions are in serious conflict, the masses are willing to unite; it's only a few leaders who are unwilling.
3. Learn from the workers, don't be afraid of making mistakes, and correct them if you do. Show concern for the lives of the masses and organize medical teams to provide them with medical care.

### 2

I've read it. It's very good. Thank you, comrades!

Mao Zedong

November 15<sup>th</sup>

[1] Following Mao Zedong's instructions, the 8341st Unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army organized a support unit and, on June 26, 1967, entered the Beijing Knitting Factory, its two branches, and Beijing Chemical Factory No. 3. This article first presents the three instructions Mao Zedong gave the support unit before their departure. On November 11, 1967, the Revolutionary Committee of the Beijing Knitting Factory sent Mao Zedong a congratulatory letter, reporting that, with the assistance of the support unit, the factory had established a Revolutionary Committee. On November 13, the 8341st Unit also wrote to Mao Zedong, stating that after entering the Beijing Knitting Factory, we resolutely adhered to the Chairman's three instructions before our departure. We used Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon to educate, organize, and arm the masses. We vigorously promoted the Chairman's call for "no fundamental conflict of interests within the working class" and "fight self and repudiate revisionism." This facilitated the great unity of the two factions within the factory and the formation of a "three-in-one" leadership team. During the support work, we honestly acted like pupils of the workers, studying, working, and fighting alongside them. We shared our hearts and minds with them, gaining a profound understanding of their

situations and learning a great deal. Furthermore, we organized medical teams to provide medical care to nearly 2,000 workers and their families. The second part of this article is a commentary on the letter from the Beijing Knitting Factory Draft Committee and the report from Unit 8341. On November 17, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China printed and distributed the letter, report, and comments to all regions, enterprises, government agencies, and schools across the country, requesting their implementation based on specific circumstances.

**Instructions after viewing two big-character posters by the Xi'an Normal University rebels  
and a letter to the Central Cultural Revolution Committee**

(June 1967)

Some people now engage in "extravagant revolution," "adopting a rich young master's style," and "extravagance begins with power." If it's a contradiction among the people, be lenient in criticizing others and strict in criticizing yourself.

## **Instructions on the Movement of Central Departments**

(June 1967)

The national situation is slower than we anticipated, and the central departments are also slower. It's a quarter later than expected—not March, April, or May, but June or July. It's better to estimate it slower than faster, and it's better to estimate it more difficult than easy.

## **Correct Mistakes**

(June 1967)

If you make a mistake, you must admit it promptly and correct it. The faster and more thoroughly, the better. You must never be embarrassed or hesitant, and you must not persist in your mistakes, further deviating from your path.

## **Instructions on the Issue of Traitors**

(June 1967)

Traitors, except those with extremely serious crimes, will be given a path to rehabilitation, provided they refrain from continuing to oppose the Communist Party. If they are willing to return to the revolution, they may be accepted, but they will not be allowed to rejoin the Party.

## **Conversation with Zambian President Kaunda (Excerpt)**

(June 24, 1967)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): Welcome. Is this your first time in China?

Kaunda (hereinafter referred to as Ka): Three of us have been here before. My wife, I, and several others are here for the first time.

Mao: Zambia is in the tropics, and various animal husbandry and agriculture industries can be developed.

Kaunda: Yes. Zambia has great potential. In the past, it was under imperialist control, and many things were impossible to do. Now, cattle ranching is being developed in all regions.

Mao: Zambia covers over 700,000 square kilometers, roughly the size of several Zhejiang provinces in China.

Kaunda: Our main problem is transportation, so we need to develop the iron and soybean project through Tanzania.

Mao: We need to conduct an investigation, right? We must be determined and start working.

Mao: Tanzania hasn't decided yet who will help, right?

Zhou Enlai (hereinafter referred to as Zhou): Tanzania has decided that we will help with the investigation.

Kaunda: I mentioned the railway issue in passing. I've already discussed this issue in detail with Premier Zhou Enlai. We'll let you know after we return and discuss it with President Nicolas. The track widths of our railways differ from those of Tanzania: Zambia's are wider, and Tanzania's are narrower.

Mao: When all African countries gain independence and drive out imperialism, we can develop railways.

Zhou: Africa has been divided by imperialism.

Kaunda: That's right. Many African ethnic groups have been artificially divided.

Mao: This is imperialism's divide-and-rule system.

Kaunda: We can only repay your help by helping freedom fighters in other regions and enabling them to gain independence.

Mao: That's not a repayment. Countries that gained independence earlier have an obligation to help those that gained independence later.

Kaunda: Yes, I completely agree with what you said, Mr. Chairman. My words may be a little crude, but my point is that only in this way can we truly express our appreciation for your assistance.

Mao: You have only been independent for two and a half years, and you still face many difficulties. You have also helped countries that have not yet gained independence.

Kaunda: That's right.

Mao: We have been independent for eighteen years, so we should help them even more.

Kaunda: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mao: Without the liberation of the whole world, China cannot ultimately liberate itself, and neither can you.

.....

Mao: One day, imperialism will come to us. We have experience. Whether it's imperialism or domestic reactionaries, we can drive them out. When he (referring to Zambian Minister of Cooperation, Youth, and Social Development Banda) arrived in 1963, you weren't independent yet. If your country had been independent for eighteen years like ours, your national development and cultural education would have made great progress. By the time we reach that point, you still have fifteen years left. By then, your railway would have been open to traffic. It's only 1,700 kilometers long, and the investment is only 100 million pounds. It's nothing special.

Kaunda: I really hope to have the opportunity to speak more with Chairman Mao, but since he's very busy, we feel a little bad about it.

Mao: It doesn't matter. I'm very happy to talk to you.

## **Revision of the Speech of the Chinese Red Guards Delegation to Albania [1]**

(June 1967)

1. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao Zedong, (the Supreme Commander)...
2. Under the nourishment of Mao Zedong Thought, (the Invincible)...
3. Under the glorious Albanian Party of Labor headed by Enver Hoxha, {the Great Communist Fighter}...
4. Under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor and its {great} beloved leader Comrade Enver Hoxha, who leads the Albanian youth to victory...
5. Long live the great and invincible Marxism-Leninism, (Mao Zedong Thought)!

[1] The text in ( ) indicates the content deleted by Mao Zedong during the revision, and the text in { } indicates the content added by Mao Zedong.

## **Instructions for Yao Wenyan's Visit to Albania**

(June 1967)

Please be modest during this visit! This isn't just a delegation issue; it concerns the Chinese Red Guards.

## **On Susceptibility to Revisionism in Ideology**

(June 1967)

Counter-revolutionary revisionists have infiltrated the proletariat. Those most prone to revisionism are, first, those in the Central Committee, second, journalists, and third, those in liberal arts universities, all in the realm of ideology.

## **Instructions on the Burmese Question**

(July 1, 1967)

We are not afraid of severing diplomatic ties or a split on the Burmese question. In fact, severing diplomatic ties at this time is even better, as it will be more conducive to our free rein.

## Comments on the issue of stopping the construction of Mao Zedong statues, etc. [1]

(July 5 and 13, 1967)

1

Lin Biao, Enlai [2] and all comrades of the Cultural Revolution Group:

Such activities waste people's time and money, are useless and harmful. If not stopped, they will inevitably lead to a wave of exaggeration. Please discuss this at an expanded meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee and issue instructions to put a stop to it.

Mao Zedong

July 5, 1967

2

Please stop this as well.

3

Act on this.

[1] This first article is a commentary on the article "Messengers Across the Country Are Actively Building Giant Statues of Chairman Mao," published in the "Cultural Revolution Petitions Bulletin," issue 280, compiled and published by the Letters and Visits Office of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, on July 4, 1967. This second article is a commentary on a brief news item published in the same issue. This news item states: A mass organization at the Beijing Mining Institute had previously printed and sold unpublished speeches by Chairman Mao in Beijing, but was stopped by relevant authorities. However, they recently collected many unpublished speeches and sent personnel to Changsha to compile and print them. They hope the central government will stop this. This third article is a commentary on the draft directive of the CPC Central Committee on the construction of a statue of Chairman Mao, submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on July 13. The draft directive circulated Mao Zedong's comments of July 5 (see this first article) to all regions, stating that "the construction of a statue of Chairman Mao is a serious political issue" and that "it can only be planned uniformly by the central government and erected at the appropriate time and location." "The current hasty actions of some mass organizations will not only cause economic losses, but also political losses." "We hope you will follow Chairman Mao's instructions and put a stop to this." "The Central Committee reiterates: Chairman Mao's speeches, articles, documents, and poems that have not been publicly published may not be compiled, printed, published, or distributed without the approval of Chairman Mao and the

Central Committee. If such things occur, please put a stop to them." The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this directive that same day.

[2] Lin Biao was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai is Zhou Enlai.

## **Comments on sending troops to stop the armed conflict in Ganzhou [1]**

(July 6, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai [2]:

The Ganzhou issue is serious, involving more than ten counties in southern Jiangxi. If we send a division there, we can only handle Nanchang, Ji'an, Yichun, Fuzhou, etc., and it is far from enough to reach southern Jiangxi. Is it possible to send a division, or at least a regiment, from the Guangzhou Military Region to Ganzhou, and then return to Guangdong after the matter is resolved? Please consider this matter first and discuss it in person.

Mao Zedong

July 6

[1] This comment was written in "Excerpts from Mass Letters," No. 55, published by the General Office of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China on July 4, 1967. This excerpt contained a July 4 telephone report from the Jiangxi Complaints Group and the Jiangxi Ganzhou Complaints Group, which reported the severity of the armed conflict in Ganzhou, with heavy casualties, food and water shortages, and complete traffic congestion. They demanded that the central government immediately dispatch troops to stop the fighting.

[2] Lin Biao was then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. Enlai was Zhou Enlai

## Comments on Two Versions of Chairman Mao's "On Education" [1]

(July 6 and December 6, 1967)

1

To Comrade Chen Boda:

This document contains numerous errors and should be significantly edited out, at least one-third removed.

Mao Zedong

July 6

2

Comrade Chen Boda:

I haven't read this volume, 'On Education,' and it may contain some bad material. I would like you and the comrades from the Cultural Revolution Group to review it, along with the volume you edited. Delete all the bad parts, and keep only about half of the more accurate ones.

Mao Zedong

July 6

3

Comrade Chen Boda:

I have made some minor revisions. Please review it. If you find it acceptable, it can be printed and distributed.

Mao Zedong

December 6

[1] This first part is a critique of "Chairman Mao on Education," compiled and published by the Political Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in June 1967. This booklet is divided into nine sections: 1. Politics in Command; 2. Class Struggle; 3. The Purpose of Education; 4. Revolution in Teaching; 5. Teaching Content; 6. Teaching Methods; 7. Teacher-Student Relationship; 8. Education Should Be Oriented to and Rely on the Masses; 9. Schools Must Have a Strong Leadership Team. On June 27, Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and director of the Central Political Research Office, wrote in this pamphlet,

"The Political Research Office has compiled the pamphlet 'Chairman Mao on Education,' intending to distribute it to everyone as a positive teaching material and a guideline for the revolution in the teaching system. It invites discussion and, through investigation and research, a preliminary plan for teaching reform in universities, middle schools, and primary schools to be proposed for the Central Committee's consideration." This second part of the article was written in the pamphlet "Chairman Mao on Education," compiled and published by the Tianjin University "August 13" Red Guards in May 1967. This booklet consists of the following 15 sections: 1. Party Leadership; 2. Educational Policies; 3. Class Struggle on the Educational Front; 4. Education Must Be Revolutionary; 5. Politics as the Commander and Soul; 6. The Mass Line; 7. Focusing on Learning, While Learning Other Things as a Secondary Tool; 8. Teaching Methods; 9. The Transformation of Intellectuals; 10. Youth; 11. Mass Education and Frugal Management; 12. Integrating Theory with Practice; 13. On Knowledge; 14. Dispelling Superstition; 15. Critical Inheritance. Also included at the end is the material from "Comrades Chen Boda and Qi Benyu's Discussion with Representatives of Revolutionary Teachers and Students of Peking University on Educational Reform." Part Three of this section contains comments on "Chairman Mao on the Educational Revolution," a book compiled and published under the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group. Published by the People's Publishing House in December 1967, the book contains over 50 of Mao Zedong's statements on education from 1927 to 1967, arranged in chronological order. On December 7, 1967, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued a notice distributing the book to all provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional revolutionary committees (preparatory groups), military control commissions, military regions, and universities, colleges, and primary and secondary schools nationwide.

[2] Page 9 contains an excerpt from a speech Mao gave at the meeting of heads of delegations at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on May 18, 1958. In the excerpt, Mao stated, "In short, these materials are intended to prove this: Is it true that the humble are the most intelligent and the noble the most foolish? This is to deprive those high-ranking intellectuals of their capital, who are too proud to show off their wealth?" Mao Zedong added a note in parentheses after "These materials of mine": "At that time, a batch of materials on inventors from ancient and modern times, both Chinese and foreign, were printed." Page 11 of the second section contains an excerpt from Mao Zedong's speech at the Spring Festival Symposium on February 13, 1964. During his review, Mao changed the sentence "Confucius came from a declining slave-owning aristocracy, never attended university, and was a trumpeter" to: "Confucius came from a declining slave-owning aristocracy, never attended middle school or university, and initially worked as a funeral director, probably as a trumpeter." After the sentence "Later, he became a high-ranking official in the State of Lu and was no longer aware of the people's affairs," he added: "He later ran a private fund and opposed students

**We must focus our criticism on the biggest capitalist roaders in power within the Party.**

(July 7, 1967)

I personally feel that there is a tendency to abandon the struggle against the enemy, the struggle against the biggest capitalist roaders in power within the Party. During the last discussion here, I raised this issue and said that it should be addressed in a more focused way, targeting the biggest capitalist roaders in power within the Party. Currently, this contradiction is not focused but rather scattered. This makes it difficult to criticize and denounce the biggest capitalist roaders in power within the Party.

## **Speech after Listening to the Report of the Hydrogen Bomb Work Conference**

(July 7, 1967)

New weapons, missiles, and atomic bombs are being developed rapidly. We produced a hydrogen bomb in two years and eight months. Our development speed has surpassed that of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and France, and we now rank fourth in the world. We have made great progress in missiles and the atomic bomb, but this is the result of Khrushchev's "help." He withdrew the experts and forced us to go our own way. I want to give him a medal weighing a ton.

The situation is excellent now. The Rajas in India are opposing the Congress Party and engaging in armed struggle. The Indonesian Communist Party has liquidated its revisionism and is rising again. The Burmese guerrillas have grown significantly, and their armed struggle has a stronger foundation than that of Thailand, having been going on for decades. Previously, the parties were disunited (the Red Flag Party and the White Flag Party), but now they are united. Opposition to Ne Win is unanimous, and the armed activities now cover 60 percent of Burma. Burma's geographical conditions are better than South Vietnam's, with a larger swing zone. Thailand's geographical conditions are also excellent. If Burma and Thailand rise, we can completely draw the United States into Southeast Asia. Of course, we must also focus on striking early and hard on our own territory. It would be better if the Burmese government opposed us. We hope they would sever diplomatic ties with us, so that we can more openly support the Communist Party of Burma. This is the situation in Asia, and armed struggles in Africa and Latin America have also made significant progress. U.S. imperialism is becoming increasingly isolated, and people all over the world know that U.S. imperialism is the culprit of the war. The people of the world, including the American people, oppose it. Soviet revisionism was further exposed, especially in this Middle East incident, where the Soviet revisionists continued to adopt Khrushchev's tactics. He initially deployed over 2,000 military experts to the UAE. They initially adopted an adventurous approach, sending warships to persuade the UAE not to launch a preemptive attack. They also informed Johnson via the hotline (Khrushchev didn't have a hotline at the time), who quickly informed Israel, launching a surprise attack that destroyed 60 percent of the UAE's aircraft. The Soviet Union provided 3.3 billion yuan in aid to the UAE. Two billion yuan was lost, and the UAE ultimately surrendered and ceased fighting. This was another major exposure of national betrayal. Opposition to the Soviet Union was not limited to Arab countries; Asia and Latin America also saw it. The suicide of a Soviet man in his 70s was a sign of dissatisfaction. Shortly after the Middle East War, the Soviet Union convened three conferences of Eastern European countries. Romania refused to sign, nor did it sever

diplomatic ties with Israel. Later, Maurer<sup>8</sup> came to China, seeking comprehensive economic cooperation with us. We can cooperate in individual economic areas, but we won't engage in comprehensive cooperation. Imperialism and revisionism will only further isolate us. The Vietnam War will drag on. Currently, many places are anti-China. While it may appear that we are isolated, in reality, they are anti-China because they fear China's influence, the influence of Mao Zedong Thought, and the influence of the Cultural Revolution. They are anti-China to suppress the people at home and divert their dissatisfaction with their rule. This anti-China campaign is a joint effort by the US imperialists and the Soviet revisionists. It doesn't mean we are isolated, but rather that our influence worldwide has greatly increased. The more they oppose China, the more they promote people's revolution. The people of these countries will realize that China's path is the only path to liberation. China is not only the political centre of the world revolution, but also the military and technological centre of the world revolution. We must provide them with weapons, and now we can openly provide them with weapons, including inscribed Chinese weapons (except in some special regions). We must openly support them and become the arsenal of the world revolution, but we still have many technological advances.

We must also vigorously crack down on XX, XXX, XXXX. The Premier criticized the "four major aircraft lagging behind," and all four major aircraft must catch up significantly.

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<sup>8</sup> Jan Georgi Maurer (1902-2000) was a leader of the Romanian Communist Party, which he had joined in 1937. He served as secretary of the Anti-Fascist Law Association, and later became a leading member of the organization for the defence of fascist victims, actively carrying out the party's propaganda and agitation work. After the liberation of Romania, he participated in the Israeli army supported by the Romanian Communist Party. In 1958, he was elected to the Central Committee, and in 1960, to the Political Committee. He was Head of State at the time of his visit to China.

**Message of condolence from Mao Zedong and others on the death of Nguyen Chi Thanh [1]**

(July 8, 1967)

Comrade President Ho Chi Minh [2]:

We are deeply saddened to learn of the sudden death of Comrade Nguyen Chi Thanh due to illness. Comrade Nguyen Chi Thanh was a good comrade and comrade-in-arms of yours and ours, and a good comrade-in-arms of the revolutionary people and oppressed nations of the world. He made outstanding contributions to the revolutionary cause of Vietnam and to the unity, fighting friendship, and solidarity between China and Vietnam, the two parties, and the two armies. His death is a great loss to our common revolutionary cause. However, his brilliant example and influence will never fade and will continue to flourish. We sincerely wish you the best of both worlds and good health.

Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai

July 8, 1967

[1] Nguyen Chi Thanh, formerly a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, a member of the Central Secretariat, and a member of the National Defense Council of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, died of illness on July 6, 1967 at the age of 53.

[2] Ho Chi Minh, then Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

**Comments on the draft notice of the General Staff and the General Political Department on carrying out Lin Biao's [1] instructions to build a large-scale full-length statue of Mao Zedong [2]**

(July 12, 1967)

Return to Comrade Lin Biao.

This document will not be sent. The Central Committee has already issued instructions [3].

Mao Zedong

July 12

[1] Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China.

[2] This draft notice from the General Staff and General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, dated July 1, 1967, states that Vice Chairman Lin Biao instructed on June 28, "The construction of a large, full-length statue of Chairman Mao has become a conscious demand of the masses. Our troops should also do the same." It also states that "any representative large military organization with a large courtyard or square at its headquarters" can "do so." All headquarters, military services, and major military regions should immediately implement Vice Chairman Lin's instructions. On July 10, Lin Biao forwarded the draft notice to Mao Zedong for review, and Mao wrote this comment on it.

[3] Refers to the instructions issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on July 13, 1967 regarding the construction of a statue of Chairman Mao.

## **Comments on the Central Committee's Notice [1] on Prohibiting the Incitement of Peasants to Enter Cities for Armed Combat**

(July 13, 1967)

1

Act on it.

2

It is not appropriate to call him a bad person [2].

[1] The draft notice submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on July 13, 1967, was drafted by Qi Benyu, a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Its main contents were: 1. No person or organization may, under any pretext, incite peasants to enter the cities for armed struggle, much less mobilize peasants to manufacture weapons or distribute guns and ammunition for the purpose of such struggle. 2. No pretext may be used to incite peasants to set up checkpoints along railways, highways, or waterways, to block vehicles and ships, and to disrupt transportation. 3. Commune members who have entered the cities to participate in armed struggle or disrupt transportation must immediately return to the countryside to "grasp the revolution and promote production," and any weapons issued to them must be confiscated. 4. Any "preferential treatment" granted to communes who participated in armed struggle, such as work point subsidies, is invalid and prohibited. The instigators will be held responsible for any injuries, deaths, production losses, or missed workday subsidies caused by participating in armed struggle in the cities. 5. From the date of this notice, those who have committed the above-mentioned errors must immediately correct them and make amends for their mistakes. If they persist in not correcting their mistakes and repeatedly violate the above-mentioned provisions, they will be severely punished, and the ringleaders will be punished according to law. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this directive on the same day.

[2] The draft directive from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China begins with a paragraph stating that in recent times, in Jiangxi and other places, "a small handful of capitalist roaders in power, especially bad elements in the local armed forces of certain provinces, cities, prefectures, and counties, have instigated some peasants, unaware of the truth, to enter the cities and participate in armed struggle." When Mao Zedong reviewed the document, he changed the word "bad elements" to "a small number of comrades whose thoughts have not been properly reformed" and wrote this comment.

## **Instructions on Not "Going Too Fast"**

(July 13, 1967)

Going too fast will lead to a crash; we must warn others. Currently, the main focus is on achieving a grand alliance and the "three-in-one" approach. We must root out the bad guys and the evil spirits. Party organizations must be restored, and Party congresses and People's Congresses at all levels must be convened. I think this will take until around this time next year. Don't get tired, and don't try to escape.

## **Speech at a Meeting with Military Leaders**

(July 13, 1967)

Don't be afraid of riots. The bigger and longer they last, the better. No matter how much rioting there is, it will eventually lead to something. It can be cleared up. No matter how much rioting there is, don't be afraid. The more you riot, the more evil things will come. But don't open fire either. Opening fire at any time is not good.

A nationwide riot is impossible. Wherever there are tuberculosis or bacteria, an outbreak is bound to occur.

The riots in the streets of Nanjing are intense, and the more I see them, the happier I am. So many people in the "Third Faction" are opposing civil war and armed struggle. This is great!

(Zhang Chunqiao: Some say the "Third Faction" is taking the "Third Road.")

What kind of "Third Road" is there? They want a great unity and great criticism. You're trying to induce them!

## Central Committee's Reply to the Wuhan Military Region Party Committee Regarding the July 20 Incident in Wuhan

(July 25, 1967)

1

Lin, Zhou [1], the Cultural Revolution Group, and all comrades in the Central Committee:

The following is my draft reply. Please discuss and decide.

Mao Zedong

July 25th, 17:00

2

Wuhan Military Region Party Committee of the Communist Party of China:

We have received the full text of the attached Wuhan Troop Announcement [2], sent on July 24th at 8:10 PM. The Central Committee has discussed this matter and believes that (1) your current position and policy are correct. The announcement may be published. (2) Cadres who have committed serious errors, including Comrade Chen Zaidao [3], whom you and the broad masses of the revolutionary people want to overthrow, may still stand up and join the ranks of the revolution, provided they no longer persist in their errors, earnestly correct their mistakes, and are forgiven by the broad masses of the revolutionary people. (3) We must work with certain troops and members of the Million Heroes Army [4] who have different ideas to convert. (4) We must work with the leftists; do not take advantage of opportunities for revenge. (5) We must be vigilant against bad elements causing trouble and must not disrupt social order.

Central Committee

July 25<sup>th</sup>

[1] Lin refers to Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. He was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.

[2] This refers to a telegram sent by the Standing Committee of the Wuhan Military Region Party Committee of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on July 24, 1967, to Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and Zhou Enlai, and then to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Military Commission, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and the All-

Army Cultural Revolution Group, along with an attached announcement from the Wuhan Military Region. The announcement stated that on July 20, a "serious political incident" occurred in Wuhan, involving an attack on the residences of Xie Fuzhi (then alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Deputy Head of the All-Army Cultural Revolution Group) and Wang Li (then member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Red Flag magazine), representatives sent by Chairman Mao to Wuhan to handle issues related to the Cultural Revolution. This incident was "instigated by a very small number of individuals with ulterior motives within the army and the 'Million Heroes'," and Chen Zaidao and others were "the main culprits of the aforementioned incident." "Our military region leadership adopted the wrong direction and line in their support for the Left." This notice was publicly posted on July 26 and published in the People's Daily on July 29. On November 26, 1978, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded the "Request Report on Handling the July 20 Incident in Wuhan" from the Hubei Provincial Committee, the Provincial Drafting Committee, and the Wuhan Military Region Party Committee. The report stated: "After a long investigation, it has been proven that the July 20 Incident was a major event orchestrated and instigated by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four to oppose Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou, and the Party and army, inciting the masses to fight against each other in order to achieve their evil purpose of sabotaging the Cultural Revolution and usurping the Party and power. It was an integral part of their conspiracy." "After the incident, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four defied the instructions of Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou, portraying the July 20 Incident as 'a thoroughly counter-revolutionary incident.' They used all the propaganda tools under their control to create counter-revolutionary public opinion and launch a counter-revolutionary campaign against the vast majority of military and civilians in the Wuhan area. They falsely accused Wang Renzhong and Chen Zaidao of being 'the masterminds' of the July 20 Incident, labelled a large number of leading cadres as 'a handful of capitalist-roaders within the Party,' and smeared the 820th Unit as 'rebels.' The main leading comrades of the Wuhan Military Region were labelled 'rebels.'" The leaders of this mass organization were labelled "a small handful of bad leaders," and the families of many members of this organization were slandered as "relatives of the hundred bandits." Even the vast majority of cadres and the masses who sympathized with the 820th Unit and the "Million Heroes" were brutally persecuted. Some had their homes searched, some were subjected to struggle sessions, some were imprisoned for long periods, and still others were beaten or killed. "The Provincial Party Committee, the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and the Wuhan Military Region Party Committee have conducted numerous studies on the 'July 20 Incident' and unanimously concluded that it was a conspiracy orchestrated by Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four' to usurp the Party and seize power. It completely distorted the facts, reversed the distinction between friend and foe, and confused right and wrong. It should be publicly and completely rehabilitated. All false accusations levelled against the People's Liberation Army and the broad masses of cadres and the people due to the 'July 2 Incident' should be completely refuted; all

comrades who were persecuted should be rehabilitated and vindicated; and for those who were beaten or killed, remaining issues such as compensation should continue to be properly handled in accordance with Party policy.”

[3] Chen Zaidao was then the commander of the Wuhan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[4] "Million Heroes" was a mass organization in Wuhan at that time.

**Comments and revisions to the draft of "A letter to the revolutionary masses and the broad masses of commanders and fighters in Wuhan" [1]**

(July 25, 1967)

1

Comrade Lin Biao will decide. I added a short paragraph. [2]

Mao Zedong.

July 25, 10 p.m.

2

The Party Central Committee called on people who have made mistakes to wake up. As long as they can seriously correct their mistakes and gain the understanding of the revolutionary masses, such people are still good.

[1] This article was written on the letter forwarded by Lin Biao (who was elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee) on July 24, 1967; This article is a paragraph added by Mao Zedong in the letter. On July 27, the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued this letter.

[2] That is the second part of this article.

## **Guidance to military comrades**

(July 1967)

If you make a mistake, you should review it and correct it. Once you correct it, it will be fine. Just say three sentences.

First sentence: It was wrong; second sentence: Whatever the mistake is, it is the anchor. If the direction is wrong on this issue or that issue, admit that the direction is wrong on this issue; third sentences: Correct it. That's it. It's better to examine it openly than not in public, to examine it with a high profile than with a low profile, and to examine it early than late.

The military has done little mass work in recent years. If it is wrong, it will be fine if it is corrected. No punishment will be given, and no punishment will be imposed.

## **On the slogan of "surrounding the cities from the countryside"**

(July 1967)

It is reactionary to raise the slogan of "surrounding the cities from the countryside" now. In the past, under revolutionary conditions, it was right to raise this slogan. But the situation has changed now. There are proletarians living in the cities. Why do you use the countryside to surround the cities? Surrounding the cities means surrounding the proletariat and the revolutionary rebels.

## Instructions on Long Shujin<sup>9</sup> of the Hunan Military Region

(July 1967)

Is this person still useful? You should pay attention to the strategy of struggle. Why are you so low-level that you don't even study it? As far as I know, this person is very brave in battle, and I still respect people who are very brave in battle. Of course, he can be criticized for making mistakes, but since he expressed his willingness to change, he should be given a chance and you should not be too harsh. You cannot win sympathy from others by doing this.

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<sup>9</sup> Long Shujin (1910 – 2003) was a People's Liberation Army major general and a People's Republic of China politician. He was born in Hunan. He was Chairman of Xinjiang (1967–1972) and Secretary of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He enlisted in the Chinese Red Army in September 1930, joining Red Army XII; in December 1930, he joined the Communist Youth League of China. In February 1932, he joined the Chinese Communist Party. He was a Long March veteran.

## **Instructions on the Education Revolution**

(July 1967)

The situation in Shanghai is good. How can universities, middle schools and primary schools carry out teaching reform? Can Shanghai understand some of the situation, conduct some investigations and research, and create some typical materials?

(Struggle, Criticism and Reform in Universities) One possibility is a complete reversal, one possibility is a return to the old ways, and one possibility is reform.

Can we fight a hard battle in the next stage? Struggle and criticism are destruction, and reform is establishment. This education revolution must be a thorough reform, otherwise it will be reform, just like in the past, and it will not be able to continue in the end.

After the summer, we have to sit down.

The Great Cultural Revolution in middle schools must be regularized. Military training must be carried out. The anarchist trend of thought in middle schools is quite serious. Some units have done well in resuming classes and some have not. This is a question related to the revolution. For college students, it is a question of whether to train young people to be successors and whether to change their colours.

## **Instructions on the Wuhan Incident**

(July 1967)

Originally, there was no chance to solve the problems within the army. When the Wuhan incident occurred, there was a chance to solve it. The opportunity was given by them.

The whole country should learn from the Wuhan incident. The whole country supports the Wuhan region, and the struggle in the Wuhan region has promoted the work of the whole country. In the past year, earth-shaking changes have taken place. Of course, there is a bit of chaos. There is chaos here and there, but it doesn't matter. Like Wuhan, this is a good thing. Once the contradictions are exposed, they can be easily solved.

The rebellious behaviour of a small group of people in Wuhan can educate the People's Liberation Army, revolutionary rebels, and mass organizations across the country.

The losses of this Cultural Revolution are the smallest, and the achievements are the greatest.

Not a single one of the "Million Heroes" was arrested, and a few bad leaders were allowed to report themselves.

## **Directives Regarding the August 1st Army Day**

(July 1967)

August 1st cannot be changed. This is a very important day. We fired the first shot, marking the beginning of the struggle in Jinggangshan. This issue is a historical one, and historical issues cannot be reversed.

**Added to the People's Daily editorial of July 30, 1967**

(July 1967)

United as one, with one heart and one mind, any powerful enemy, any difficult situation, will surrender to us.

## **Instructions on Party Organizations**

(July 1967)

Party organizations should be composed of advanced elements of the proletariat and should be vigorous vanguard organizations that can lead the proletariat and the revolutionary masses to fight against class enemies.

## **Talks during inspection tours of North China, South Central China and East China [1]**

(July to September 1967)

Chairman Mao said that the situation developed very quickly in July, August and September. The situation of the great proletarian cultural revolution throughout the country was very good, not just a little good. The overall situation was better than ever before.

An important sign of the very good situation is that the masses have been fully mobilized. There has never been a mass movement as extensive and intensive as this one. Factories, rural areas, government agencies, schools, and troops across the country are discussing the great proletarian cultural revolution everywhere, and everyone is concerned about national affairs. In the past, when a family met, they talked a lot. Now it is not the case. When they get together, they debate the great proletarian cultural revolution. Fathers and sons, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, even teenagers and old ladies, have participated in the debate.

Chairman Mao said that some places seemed to be in chaos in the past period, but in fact, that was the chaos of the enemy and the training of the masses.

Chairman Mao said that in a few months, the overall situation will become better. Chairman Mao called on revolutionary mass organizations in various places to achieve a great revolutionary union. Chairman Mao said that there is no fundamental conflict of interests within the working class. There is no reason for the working class under the dictatorship of the proletariat to split into two irreconcilable factions. A factory was divided into two factions mainly because the capitalist roaders in power deceived the masses and instigated the masses to fight against each other in order to protect themselves. There are bad people infiltrating mass organizations, but this is a very small number. Some mass organizations are influenced by anarchism, which is also a reason. Some people become conservatives and make mistakes, which is a problem of understanding. Some people say it is a problem of stance, and stance can also be changed. If you stand on the wrong side, just stand over. The stance of a very small number of people is difficult to change, but most people can change. The revolutionary Red Guards and revolutionary student organizations must realize the great revolutionary union. As long as both factions are revolutionary mass organizations, the great revolutionary union must be realized under the principles of revolution. The two factions should talk less about each other's shortcomings and mistakes, let others talk about their shortcomings and mistakes themselves, and each should do more self-criticism, seek common ground and keep minor differences. This is conducive to the great revolutionary union.

When talking about who is the core of the great revolutionary alliance, Chairman Mao said that the question of "taking me as the core" must be resolved. The core is recognized by the

masses in the struggle and practice, not self-proclaimed. It is the stupidest to propose "taking me as the core". Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and Zhang Wentian wanted to be the core and wanted others to recognize them as the core, but they collapsed. They did not understand what peasants and workers are, what fighting is, and what fighting the local tyrants and dividing the land is.

Chairman Mao said that we should treat the deceived masses correctly. We should not suppress the deceived masses, but mainly do a good job in ideological and political work.

The problem of dictatorship over bad people. Help and catch a very small number of people. Chairman Mao said that neither the government nor the left should arrest people, but mobilize the revolutionary masses to handle the matter themselves. For example, this is what Beijing did. Dictatorship is the dictatorship of the masses, and relying on the government to arrest people is not a good idea. The government should only arrest a very small number of people based on the demands and assistance of the masses.

The bad leaders in an organization must be dealt with by the organization itself mobilizing the masses. Regarding the cadre issue. Chairman Mao said that the vast majority of cadres are good, and the bad ones are only a very small minority. The party's capitalist roaders must be dealt with, but most of them have done some good things in the past ten or even dozens of years! We must unite the majority of cadres. We must unite and educate the cadres who have made mistakes, including those who have made serious mistakes, as long as they are not stubborn and refuse to change. We should expand the scope of education and narrow the scope of attack, and use the formula of "unity-criticism and self-criticism-unity" to resolve our internal contradictions. When conducting criticism and struggle, we should use literary struggle, not armed struggle, and not armed struggle in disguise. Some comrades who have made mistakes cannot figure it out for a while, and we should give them time to think about it for a while. We should allow them to have repeated thoughts, and if they can figure it out for a while and then cannot figure it out again when they encounter some things, they can wait. We should allow cadres to make mistakes and allow cadres to correct their mistakes. We should not overthrow them as soon as they make mistakes. What's the big deal about making mistakes? Just correct them. We should liberate a group of cadres and let them stand out.

Chairman Mao said that the correct treatment of cadres is the key issue of implementing the three-in-one combination of revolution, consolidating the great revolutionary alliance, and doing a good job in the struggle, criticism, and transformation in the unit. Our party, through the Yan'an Rectification Movement, educated the vast number of cadres, united the whole party, and ensured the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation. We must carry forward this tradition.

Regarding the relationship between superiors and subordinates, Chairman Mao said, why do some cadres suffer criticism and struggle from the masses? One reason is that they implemented the bourgeois reactionary line, which made the masses angry. Another reason is that they became powerful officials with high salaries, and they thought they were great, so they put on airs, did not consult with the masses, treated people unequally, were undemocratic, liked to curse and scold people, and were seriously out of touch with the masses. In this way, the masses had opinions. They had no chance to talk about it in normal times, but it broke out during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Once it broke out, it was terrible, and they were very embarrassed. In the future, we must learn lessons, solve the problem of the relationship between superiors and subordinates well, and improve the relationship between cadres and the masses. In the future, cadres should go to the grassroots to take a look, consult with the masses when encountering problems, and be the primary school students of the masses. In a sense, the smartest and most talented are the fighters with the most practical experience.

We need to emphasize unity. If a cadre makes a mistake or has a problem, don't talk about it behind his back, talk to him individually or at a meeting.

We are now too serious and tense, but not united and lively enough.

Regarding the issue of educating cadres. Chairman Mao said that the cadre issue should start with education and expand the scope of education. Not only the military (the army), but also the civil (the party and government) should be educated and strengthened. The central government, major regions, provinces and cities should hold study classes and train in batches. Each province should hold a meeting of cadres at all levels above the county people's armed forces department, with 200 to 300 people in a province, 400 to 500 people at most, and about 1,000 people in large provinces. We should strive to complete this matter within half a year, otherwise, one year is also fine.

In the future, we will strive to hold it once a year, and each time should not be too long, generally about two months.

Chairman Mao taught us to educate the Red Guards and strengthen their study. We should tell the leaders of the revolutionary rebels and the young Red Guards that now is the time when they may make mistakes. We should use the lessons learned from our own mistakes to educate them. We should do ideological and political work for them, mainly by reasoning with them.

During his inspections of various places, Chairman Mao highly praised the contributions made by the broad masses of workers and peasants, the officers and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army, the young Red Guards, the revolutionary cadres and the revolutionary intellectuals in the proletarian cultural revolution over the past year. Chairman Mao called on them to fight selfishness, criticize revisionism, support the army and love the people,

grasp the revolution to promote production, work and war preparations, do a better job in all aspects of work, and carry the proletarian cultural revolution through to the end.

[1] From July to September 1967, Mao Zedong inspected North China, South Central China and East China, and investigated the Cultural Revolution in Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Shanghai and other provinces and cities. This article is a transcript of the main points of Mao Zedong's talks during his inspection of these regions. On October 7, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded this transcript to the Revolutionary Committees (Preparatory Groups) of provinces, cities and autonomous regions, the Military Control Commission, the major military regions and the provincial military regions.

## Comments on Zhang Jichun's letter regarding the use of models in art schools [1]

(August 4, 1967)

Painting is a science. When it comes to painting the human body, we should follow the path of Xu Beihong [2], and not Qi Baishi [3]. Circulated by the Central Cultural Revolution Group, stored in the General Office Secretariat.

Mao Zedong

August 4

[1] This comment was written on a letter from Zhang Jichun, former vice minister of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee and director of the State Council's Office of Culture and Education, to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee on July 27, 1967. In the letter, Zhang Jichun talked about the use of models for human body sketching in some art schools in recent years, and expressed his consistent views and his understanding of Mao Zedong's previous instructions. He said that if you want to draw the human body, you certainly can't do it without realism and models. But it seems that it is not necessary to hire models from the society, and other methods can be considered instead. The letter ended with: "I didn't say that 'the Chairman's approval cannot be implemented'. I advocated the use of models, but I just put forward some new ideas on the solution." During the "Cultural Revolution", Zhang Jichun was wrongly criticized and persecuted to death in 1968. In January 1979, the CPC Central Committee completely rehabilitated him.

[2] Xu Beihong, a famous painter, was good at oil painting, Chinese painting, and especially sketching. He was the president of the Central Academy of Fine Arts and the chairman of the All-China Artists Association.

[3] Qi Baishi, a famous painter, seal engraver, and calligrapher, was especially good at Chinese painting. He was the honorary president of the Beijing Chinese Painting Academy and the chairman of the China Artists Association.

**Regarding some names in the text of Selected Works of Mao Zedong Comments on not deleting or modifying them during translation [1]**

(August 4, 1967)

This is historical material, and there have been many changes since then. It is too much to modify, so it seems better not to modify it.

Mao Zedong August 4

Some annotations may be deleted, but the text remains unchanged.

[1] This comment was written on a report dated July 25, 1967 by Zhang Xiangshan, Secretary General of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee, to Wang Li and Guan Feng, members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The report said: "In January and February this year, comrades in the translation groups of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, based on the problems discovered during the Cultural Revolution, proposed to modify or delete some names that appeared in the text, title and notes of the Selected Works." After consulting the Chairman, "it was decided to translate the original text (the Central Committee agreed to delete two paragraphs of Liu Shaoqi and the Resolution on Historical Issues at that time)." Recently, we asked for instructions to delete the word "comrade" from "Comrade Wang Ming", and the responsible comrades of the Central Committee agreed. At the same time, with the deepening of the "Cultural Revolution", comrades in the translation groups once again proposed whether the names of Liu Shaoqi and twelve others should be deleted, or the word "comrade" after them should be deleted. Since this issue is extremely important and involves the modification of the text, please report the Central Committee's instructions.

## Comments and revisions to the Central Committee's draft decision on the Hunan issue [1]

(August 4 and 7, 1967)

1

Two points have been changed, but the rest is fine.

Mao Zedong

August 4

2

I have read it and agree with it.

Mao Zedong

August 7, 6:00 p.m.

3

In addition to the military region being responsible, the Central Cultural Revolution Group's "February 4th Instructions" on the Hunan Provincial Military Region's February 2nd report on the "Xiangjiang Fenglei" report was wrong. "Xiangjiang Fenglei" is a revolutionary organization<sup>10</sup> with a large number of people. During its great development, a very small number of bad people mixed in, causing the internal composition to be impure and some shortcomings and mistakes, but this organization should not be denied for this reason. The Central Committee is responsible for this issue. *Learn a lesson from this. Why was it so hasty to issue the "February 4th Instructions" based on one-sided statements without a thorough investigation? Therefore, the Central Committee should bear the main responsibility.*

[1] The draft of the CPC Central Committee's decision on the Hunan issue consists of four articles, mainly: 1. The Hunan Provincial Military Region Party Committee Standing Committee's "Report on Mistakes Made in Supporting the Left" contains a serious self-criticism of its previous support work. Its attitude is positive and its understanding is relatively profound. 2. The Central Committee has decided to reorganize the provincial military region and set up a preparatory group for the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary

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<sup>10</sup> 'Xiangjiang Fenglai' (Xiangjiang Wind and Thunder) was a revolutionary mass organisation of the Federation of Trade Unions in Hunan. The direction of the struggle of the "Xiangjiang Wind and Thunder" was aimed at the ruling faction in the party that had taken the capitalist road. After the February 4th directive, a large number of "Xiangjiang Fenglei" members were arrested, 5200 in all. One of its fiercest opponents was Long Shujin (see p.222 above). One of the supporters of Xiangjiang Wind and Thunder was Mao's nephew Mao Huachu (son of his martyred brother Mao Zemin), who spoke in support of the organisation on July 13, 1967 at the Hunan Theatre.

Committee to lead the Cultural Revolution and industrial and agricultural production in the province. 3. Under the leadership of the preparatory group of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, all revolutionary mass organizations should strengthen unity on the basis of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, carry out a great criticism of the revolution, grasp the revolution, promote production, and ensure the completion and over-fulfillment of this year's industrial and agricultural production tasks. 4. The "Agreement on Immediately and Resolutely Stopping Armed Conflict" signed by the Hunan Provincial Delegation to Beijing is very good and must be implemented conscientiously by all mass organizations. The draft of the Central Committee's decision was sent to Mao Zedong for review twice. The first and second parts of this article are comments on the two drafts respectively; the third part of this article is a revision of this draft decision, in which the words added and revised by Mao Zedong are printed in italics. On August 10, 1967, the CPC Central Committee issued this decision.

**Comments on the article "To Take the Socialist Road or the Capitalist Road?" [1]**

(August 11, 1967)

1

This article is well written. However, there are several places where it only condemns but does not cite evidence, which is not convincing enough. Please reconsider.

Mao Zedong

5:00 p.m. on the 11th

2

Return to Chen Boda and Jiang Qing for approval.

[1] Part 1 and 2 of this article were written on the article submitted for review by Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Jiang Qing, deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group, on August 11, 1967, in the Red Flag magazine and the People's Daily editorial department. This article was later published in the People's Daily on August 15 and the 13th issue of the Red Flag magazine published on August 17.

### **Several instructions on Chen Yi**

(August 11, 1967)

The evidence is not bad, and he is straightforward.

Chen Yi is a good comrade, and we should first criticise Chen Yi and second, protect him.

We should protect him, because he is the commander of the Third Field Army, and there is no one to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, so we need him to be the Minister.

How can we overthrow Chen Yi? Chen Yi has been with me for forty years and has made great contributions. Chen Yi has lost twenty pounds now, otherwise I would take him to meet foreign guests.

**Instructions and Revisions on "A Letter from the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group to Coal Industry Workers"**

(August 16, 1967)

1

I have read it. Implement it.

Mao Zedong

2

The Chairman added the phrase "the broad masses of workers" at the beginning of the letter. In the seventh paragraph, after the phrase "proletarian revolutionaries and revolutionary workers must prioritize the interests of the state," he added the words "the interests of the working class." In the eighth paragraph, the Chairman added the phrase "all workers who persevere, persist in production, and achieve results, regardless of which mass organization they belong to or whether they are not affiliated with one, should be praised and appropriately rewarded."

[1] Part One is Mao Zedong's comments on this letter; Part Two is the main revisions made by Mao Zedong.

**Comments on the Central Military Commission and the Central Cultural Revolution Committee's proposal to establish training courses for armed cadres in various provinces**  
[1]

(August 18, 1967)

Follow the instructions. After the first batch is piloted, the scope and methods for the second batch will be determined. By then, some changes may be necessary.

Mao Zedong,

August 18

[1] This comment was written on a draft document submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on August 17, 1967. The draft stated that, in accordance with Chairman Mao's directive regarding the effective implementation of training courses for cadres at all levels above the People's Armed Forces Department, we envision a training method primarily based on the Rectification Movement and the "Four Majors." This involves reading Chairman Mao's works, central documents, and other relevant materials; inviting central leaders to speak; inviting revolutionary leftists to share their struggle experiences; combining large, medium, and small meetings; linking practice with ideology; and engaging in criticism and self-criticism. The training process could be divided into four batches, tentatively scheduled for two months each, to align with the central government's approach to resolving provincial issues. The training would be directly led by Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, with assistance from Chen Boda, Head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Each provincial training course would have a small leadership team, selecting a group of rebels from the army and local Red Guards to participate. On August 19, the Central Military Commission and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued this document.

## Comments and revisions to the article "Comments on Two Books by Tao Zhu [1]" [2]

(August and September 1967)

1

Comrade Wenyan: I read it once, it is very good. The title may be changed to "Comment on Two Books by Tao Zhu", and the subtitle is not needed. In addition, some parts seem too brief and should be expanded. But the article is not short, and it may seem too long if it is expanded. You can discuss with your writing team comrades about what to do, and they may give some good suggestions.

Mao Zedong

August 20

2

Comrade Yao Wenyan:

I have read it, it is very good. I only changed a few words and added a paragraph. Please decide whether it is appropriate. It is recommended to publish it in Beijing and broadcast it the day before, so that it can be published in newspapers across the country on the same day as Beijing. It should also be sent to Beijing for dissection and discussed at the Central Cultural Revolution and Central Meeting for three or four days. If there are good opinions, they will be absorbed.

Mao Zedong

August 28th at 8:00 a.m.

It is also advisable to write a few articles criticizing Liu [3] in the next two or three months. Do you have time to take on this task? I will discuss this with you tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

3

Comrade Wenyan: I have read it and have followed it except for some minor revisions.

Mao Zedong

September 5

4

According to Comrade Chunqiao's opinion, it is better to delete this paragraph. [4]

5

Do not use boldface words; use words consistent with the context. [5]

6

This reactionary organization [6] dares not to appear in public and has been hiding underground in Beijing for several months. Most of their members and leaders are still unclear. They only send people out to post leaflets and write slogans in the dead of night. The masses are investigating and studying these people, and they will soon be able to figure them out.

[1] Tao Zhu, formerly a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat and Minister of the Central Propaganda Department, and Vice Premier of the State Council. In early 1967, he was overthrown due to vicious attacks and slanders by the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary groups. His two collections of works, "Ideals, Sentiments, and Spiritual Life" (published by China Youth Publishing House in 1962) and "Thoughts, Feelings, and Literary Talent" (published by Guangdong People's Publishing House in 1964), were also wrongly criticized for this. At the end of 1969, Tao Zhu was persecuted to death. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee held in December 1978 "reviewed and corrected the wrong conclusions made in the past about Comrades Peng Dehuai, Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo, and Yang Shangkun, and affirmed their contributions to the Party and the people."

[2] The original title of "Comment on Tao Zhu's Two Books" was "The Ugly Soul of Revisionists: Commenting on the Reactionary Nature of "Ideals, Sentiments, and Spiritual Life" and "Thoughts, Feelings, and Literary Talent". It was written by Yao Wenyuan, a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee, and his writing team in Shanghai. The first part of this article was written on Yao Wenyuan's draft submitted for review on August 17, 1967; the second part was written on Yao Wenyuan's draft submitted for review on August 26; the third part was written on Yao Wenyuan's draft submitted for review on September 3; the fourth and fifth parts of this article are two comments written in Yao Wenyuan's draft submitted for review on September 3; the sixth part of this article is a paragraph added to Yao Wenyuan's draft submitted for review on August 26. This article was published in the People's Daily and other newspapers on September 8, 1967.

[3] That is the sixth chapter of this article.

[4] Mao Zedong was in Shanghai at the time.

[5] Liu refers to Liu Shaoqi.

[6] The following paragraph was originally included in the draft submitted by Yao Wenyuan on September 3, 1967: "'Working people's intellectuals' is not valid. Intellectuals all belong to a certain class. According to Chairman Mao's analysis in "Speech at the National

Propaganda Work Conference of the Communist Party of China", we can only judge whether intellectuals belong to the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, the left, the middle or the right based on their class standpoint and world outlook. You can curse this scientific analysis as an 'oppressive spirit' or a 'deadly atmosphere', but the objective existence of the opposing classes cannot be obliterated by your counter-revolutionary jargon." On September 3, Zhang Chunqiao, deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, asked Yang Chengwu, acting chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the whole army (who accompanied Mao Zedong on an inspection in Shanghai at the time) to report to Mao Zedong: "In Yao Wen yuan's article criticizing Tao, there is a paragraph criticizing the term 'working people's intellectuals' (page 8), This question involves the debate between the Premier and Lu Dingyi. Please consider whether to not mention this question in this article. Mao Zedong deleted this paragraph from Yao Wen yuan's draft for review and wrote this comment.

[1]" [2]

(August and September 1967)

1

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Mao Zedong

August 20

2

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Mao Zedong

September 5

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**Comments on the "Call for Launching a Movement to Support the Army and Love the People" [1]**

(August 25, 1967)

Very good, publish it.

Mao Zedong

August 25

[1] This document, issued on August 25, 1967, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, stated that the Chinese People's Liberation Army is the great pillar of national defense and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. To advance the "Cultural Revolution," it was necessary for the People's Liberation Army to unite more closely with all proletarian revolutionaries, all Red Guards, and the revolutionary masses. It was necessary for the military and civilians throughout the country to launch a nationwide, fervent campaign to support the army and love the people. The document demanded that all parties formulate new "Support the Army and Love the People" conventions based on the specific conditions of the "Cultural Revolution" in their respective regions. These new conventions must embody Chairman Mao's guiding principles on supporting the army and loving the people.

## August 27 Directive

(August 27, 1967)

1. Xu Shiyou<sup>11</sup> must be helped to pass the test. He is a warrior. Since the Cultural Revolution, he has fallen behind and cannot keep up;
2. The Quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin must be published;
3. The Cultural Revolution will last for three years, one year to launch, one year to achieve victory, and one year to clean up;
4. Wei Dong, a Red Guard from Nankai University in Tianjin, wrote a good article (referring to "We must boldly use revolutionary cadres"), which raised a new question. The Red Guard tabloid is a good thing;
5. Don't mention the handful of capitalist-roaders in the party and the handful of capitalist-roaders in the army at the same time. Just mention the handful of capitalist-roaders in the party. If they bring down the People's Liberation Army, do we still need the government?
6. The mass organizations proposed that I should be the core, which is extremely stupid;
7. Rely on young people;
8. Rely on the masses and strengthen dictatorship. It is not necessarily good to run large-scale labour reform farms in Xinjiang. We need to study;

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<sup>11</sup> Xu Shiyou (1906 - 1985), Chinese People's Liberation Army Military general, founding general of the People's Republic of China, political figure of the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China, former deputy national leader. In March 1968 he was appointed director of the Jiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee, in April 1969 he was elected as a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and in December 1970 he was appointed first secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee. After the 9.13 Incident involving Lin Biao's death during his attempted defection to the Soviet Union, Xu Shiyou was summoned by Mao Zedong and was responsible for secretly arresting Wang Weiguo and others of Lin Biao's party in the central and southern regions. In the May 16 Movement that began in April 1970 (a counter-revolutionary "ultra-Leftist group that initiated attacks on Zhou Enlai), Xu Shiyou advocated "digging deeper" and taking the opportunity to crack down on dissidents, and 25 of the 45 members of the Standing Committee of the Jiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee under his presidency were branded as "May 16 elements". During the investigation, which lasted for more than three years, more than 250,000 people in the province were labelled as "May 16 elements", and more than 2,000 people died. In 1973, after Jiang Qing criticized Zhou Enlai for "losing power and humiliating the country, capitulationism", "kneeling to the Americans", and "can't wait to replace Chairman Mao", Xu Shiyou also participated in the criticism, jumping on a chair and reprimanding Zhou for "engaging in revisionism" and "wanting to be emperor". In addition, it was Xu Shiyou who reported the Kuomintang's forged "Wu Hao Departure from the Party" to Jiang Qing, and it was Xu Shiyou who put Zhou Enlai under great pressure (he also accused Tan Zhenlin and Yu Lijin of being traitors). In January 1974, he commanded the Battle of Xisha and fought against South Vietnam. In early 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese border war broke out, and Xu Shiyou, then commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, commanded the battle on the Eastern Front. In January 1980, he was appointed as a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission, and in September 1982, Xu Shiyou was elected deputy director of the Advisory Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

9. We must focus on learning, do a good job, and streamline the administration.

## **Instructions on the Grand Union**

(August 1967)

The biggest movement must have the biggest unity. Criticizing and denouncing China's Khrushchev is a major event that concerns the future of China's destiny and the future of the world's destiny. Therefore, we must unite as widely as possible. Every revolutionary organization and the leaders of revolutionary organizations must pay full attention to ideology and seek a big unity in the big criticism, otherwise it will be painful for the relatives and joy for the enemies. The phenomenon of revolutionaries attacking each other and Liu Shaoqi sitting on the mountain and watching the tigers fight can no longer be allowed to continue.

**Comments on the editorial in the 12th issue of Red Flag magazine in 1967 [1]**

(August 1967)

Return my Great Wall to me.

[1] The editorial, titled "Open Fire Fiercely at the People's Principal Enemy," was drafted by Lin Jie and approved for publication by Wang Li and Guan Feng. It erroneously raised the slogan "a handful within the army," thereby diverting the main direction of the struggle. Mao Zedong immediately issued a harsh criticism.

## **Instructions on the Tianjin and Hebei Issues**

(August 1967)

Tianjin and Hebei should be handled better because they are close to Beijing, and Tianjin, in particular, is more likely to influence Beijing.

## **The main target of revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat**

(August 1967)

The main target of revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat is the bourgeois headquarters hidden within the proletarian dictatorship. We are revolutionizing this part of the proletarian dictatorship. From the perspective of our party and our country as a whole, they are not in a dominant position, but they must be overthrown in order to consolidate and strengthen the proletarian dictatorship and prevent the restoration of capitalism.

## **Instructions on armed struggle**

(August 1967)

Don't be too nervous about armed struggle, don't take the situation too seriously, don't be impatient. Wherever there is armed struggle, there must be a backstage. Let them perform more. The more they perform, the more isolated they will be. Let the masses see more clearly. When the masses isolate them, it will be easier to deal with them. Chaos is temporary and can be transformed into something good. Fighting is a tributary, a temporary tributary. The general direction of the struggle must not be diverted.

## **Instructions on the issue of the army supporting the left**

(August 1967)

When the petty bourgeoisie is in power, the big bourgeoisie will come to power. The great benefit of the army supporting the left is that it educates the army itself, and they will understand this problem from the actual struggle. Supporting the left is not only supporting the revolutionary masses and left-wing organizations, but also seeing the existence of two-line struggles in all aspects of society, and at the same time seeing the existence of two-line struggles in the army, and seeing that class struggles are also reflected in the army. The army also exposes problems to society through supporting the left, thereby strengthening the army and improving the ideological level of our army. This is the materialist dialectics.

We cannot mess up our army. Problems within the People's Liberation Army can be negotiated one province at a time.

The faster the action, the better. Don't be too hasty in work, and do it thoroughly. [1]

[1] This is an instruction to the 6299th Unit to be dispatched to Wenzhou.

## **We must defeat the capitalist-roaders politically, ideologically, and theoretically**

(August 1967)

The current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is not about to end, but needs to be deepened. It should be carried out on a larger scale. We should focus on criticizing the largest handful of people in power who are taking the capitalist road within the Party. We should publicize the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, talk about the achievements and the direction, and overthrow the largest group of people in power who are taking the capitalist road, not only organizationally, but also politically, ideologically, and theoretically. This is a national and world event. If revisionism is not overthrown, they will restore the old order. This is a great historical task. We should look forward, as this task is far from being completed.

## **Instructions on public security work**

(August 1967)

The public security organs are a knife in the hands of the proletariat. If they are well controlled, they can strike the enemy and protect the people; if they are not well controlled, they can easily hurt themselves. If this knife is taken away by bad people, it will be even more dangerous. Therefore, public security work can only be led directly by the party committee, and cannot be led vertically by the business department.

**The spearhead of the struggle must be directed at the representatives of the bourgeoisie**

(August 1967)

In this great struggle, we must point the spearhead at the anti-Party and anti-socialist bourgeois representatives, at the capitalist roaders in the Party, and at the revisionists. Some of these people have sneaked into the Party and occupied leadership positions. They are evil-doers and harbouring people. These people are careerists, conspirators, and hypocrites of the exploiting class. They pretend to obey but secretly disobey, and are two-faced. They say nice things to people's faces but say bad things behind their backs. They often use Marxist-Leninist phrases as a cover and make a fuss behind the "but". Those who wave the red flag to oppose the red flag are much more sinister. This cannot but arouse our vigilance.

**Seven-character verse: Carry the revolution through to the end**

(Summer 1967)

There are so many bleak events in the past and present,

The past is vivid and cannot be forgotten,

I indulged the enemy at the Hongmen Banquet,

Why panic at the Wujiang River.

Xiuquan missed the opportunity,

Tianjing was finally reduced to ashes,

The heroes who were anxious to save the world, go to great calamities

Regardless of hundred wounds of the mortal world.

## **Telegram from Mao Zedong and others congratulating the 22nd anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam**

(September 1, 1967)

Hanoi

Comrade Ho Chi Minh, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

Comrade Truong Chinh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

Comrade Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

On the 22nd anniversary of the declaration of independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China, and the Government of the People's Republic of China, we extend our warmest congratulations to the Vietnamese people, the Workers' Party of Vietnam, and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Under the wise leadership of the Workers' Party of Vietnam headed by President Ho Chi Minh, the heroic Vietnamese people, in their war against the U.S. and for national salvation, annihilated vast swathes of the U.S. invaders and achieved one glorious victory after another. The Vietnamese people's heroic struggle has greatly shattered the prestige of U.S. imperialism, modern revisionism, and reactionaries of various countries, and has greatly boosted the morale of the revolutionary people of the world. The Chinese people warmly congratulate the fraternal Vietnamese people on their great victory.

US imperialism suffered a crushing defeat in Vietnam precisely because it was waging a war of naked aggression; it was facing the Vietnamese people's war for national liberation. The Vietnamese people, steadfast and courageous, unleashed the might of the people's war, inflicting devastating defeat on the US invaders and setting a shining example of a nation standing alone in resisting and defeating US imperialist aggression since World War II. The victory of the Vietnamese people proved to the world that US imperialism, a paper tiger with a strong exterior but a weak interior, could be completely defeated.

U.S. imperialism has been mired in the vast ocean of the Vietnamese people's war. However, it still has to make a final, desperate struggle. Currently, U.S. imperialism is intensifying its war of aggression against Vietnam and continuing to manipulate peace talks in a vain attempt to salvage its defeat. Soviet modern revisionism is also intensifying its collusion with U.S. imperialism, striving to sabotage the Vietnamese people's war against the U.S. and for national salvation. However, the heroic Vietnamese people cannot be intimidated or

deceived. As President Ho Chi Minh pointed out, the Vietnamese people "are united, fearless of hardship and sacrifice, and will resolutely fight to complete victory." We are confident that the Vietnamese people will crush all the enemy's schemes and plots, overcome all difficulties, and carry the war against the U.S. and for national salvation to the end. Final victory will surely belong to the Vietnamese people who dare to fight and dare to win.

The Chinese people have always considered the Vietnamese people's struggle their own and are determined to make the greatest national sacrifice in fully supporting the Vietnamese people in their war to resist the US and save Vietnam. Tempered by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the 700 million Chinese people have become even stronger and more capable of supporting the fraternal Vietnamese people. The Chinese people are determined to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese people and thoroughly defeat the US invaders.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

September 1, 1967

## **Comments on the Draft Order Prohibiting the Seizure of People's Liberation Army Weapons, Equipment, and Various Military Supplies [1]**

(September 5, 1967)

Premier: I have read it, act accordingly.

Mao Zedong

September 5

[1] This comment was written on a draft order submitted by Premier Zhou Enlai for review on September 4, 1967, by the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The order stated that, in order to resolutely implement the June 6th general order and the August 25th "Call on Launching a Support the Army and Love the People Movement" issued by the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, the following were reiterated: 1. No mass organization or individual, regardless of faction, may, under any pretext, seize the People's Liberation Army's weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, materials, or supplies. No one may seize weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, materials, or supplies from munitions depots, military warehouses, or defense enterprises. No one may intercept weapons, ammunition, equipment, materials, or supplies loaded on trains, buses, or ships. No outside personnel may be stationed at the People's Liberation Army's command structures. Second, no mass organization or individual is allowed to seize weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, materials, or supplies from military academies, cultural and sports units, or any other units involved in the "Four Majors" movement. Third, no military agency, unit, academy, or other unit is allowed to distribute weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, materials, or supplies to any mass organization or individual without the approval of the Central Committee. Fourth, all weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, materials, and supplies seized from the People's Liberation Army must be sealed and returned within a specified time limit. This order is effective from the date of its promulgation. Anyone violating this order will be punished for violating state law. This order was issued on September 5th by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

## **Comments on Qi Benyu's self-criticism letter [1]**

(September 7, 1967)

I have read it and I will return it to Comrade Qi Benyu.

It is good to make some mistakes, which can lead to deep reflection and correction of mistakes. Please inform Comrades Guan and Wang when it is convenient.

Mao Zedong

September 7

[1] Qi Benyu was a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee and deputy editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine. On September 4, 1967, he wrote to Mao Zedong saying that Guan Feng and Wang Li had made serious mistakes, which manifested in blind "left" actions. First, they misjudged the national situation and regarded the repeated phenomena in the struggle as the restoration of capitalism in the country, and failed to see the results and strength of the revolutionary masses. Second, they misjudged the Chinese People's Liberation Army and called for the arrest of "a handful of people in the army" everywhere in newspapers and radio stations. Third, they doubted everything and shook the leadership of Chairman Mao's headquarters at will. The ideological root of their mistakes was individualism, self-expansion, self-importance, and thinking that they were great and more revolutionary than anyone else, and could not tolerate different opinions. Qi Benyu also reviewed in the letter that he was not aware of some of their problems, and Wang Li's mistakes on the issue of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were related to me. I am willing to work hard to reform myself and always be a soldier loyal to Mao Zedong Thought. In January 1968, with the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Qi Benyu was isolated for investigation and dismissed from all positions within and outside the party. In November 1983, the Beijing Intermediate People's Court sentenced Qi Benyu to 18 years in prison and deprived him of political rights for 4 years for the crimes of counter-revolutionary propaganda and incitement, false accusation and framing, and gathering a crowd to smash, loot and rob.

## Comments and revisions to the transcript of Lin Biao's speech to Zeng Siyu and Liu Feng [1]

(September 13 and October 11, 1967)

1

I have read it and made some revisions. Please decide whether it is appropriate. This speech is well said and should be distributed.

Mao Zedong

September 13

2

Comrade Lin Biao:

This document has been suppressed for a long time. I read it for the second time today and made some minor revisions. Please consider it. Please forward it to Comrades Enlai, Boda, Kang Sheng [2], etc. Write a headline in the name of the Central Committee and distribute it. [3]

Mao Zedong

October 11

3

Revolutions in the past were also hastily launched. *The Northern Expedition, the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the establishment of various bases, the Agrarian Revolution, the fight against local tyrants, the fight against Chiang Kai-shek, and the fight against Japan* were all hastily launched.

[1] In his speech to the Chinese People's Liberation Army Wuhan Military Region Commander Zeng Siyu and Political Commissar Liu Feng on August 9, 1967, Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, said that the situation of the "Cultural Revolution" was very good and had achieved a great and glorious victory. We launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution based on two conditions: one was Mao Zedong Thought and the lofty prestige of Chairman Mao, and the other was the strength of the People's Liberation Army. With these two conditions, bad things could turn into good things. Some comrades in various regions have made mistakes, and those who can be saved must be saved. Those who have not collapsed now we do not want them to collapse. If they do not collapse, there are three ways: First, follow Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee closely. Second, keep a close eye on the situation below. Investigate and study the left, right and various mass organizations, and listen to opinions from both

sides. Third, now the left and right camps are clearly divided. You must not divide the left and right based on whether they rush into the military region, but based on whether they support the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and whether they support Chairman Mao. To carry out the Cultural Revolution well, we must rely on the People's Liberation Army created by Chairman Mao. To avoid making mistakes, we must consult the Chairman and the Central Committee more often. On the other hand, we must strengthen the ideological and political work of the troops, put politics in command, study Chairman Mao's works, use Mao Zedong Thought to lead everything, and develop and advance in the socialist direction guided by Chairman Mao, and not develop and retreat in the direction of capitalism. Mao Zedong made two comments (i.e., Part 1 and Part 2 of this article) and made revisions to this speech record of Lin Biao. The text he added is the part printed in italics in Part 3 of this article; the text he deleted, in addition to the names of several people criticized by name, also deleted the sentence "This is a great development of Marxism" after Lin Biao said "Chairman Mao said at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee that the main contradiction in the country is the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which has extremely great significance for the socialist revolution." In addition, there are some textual revisions.

[2] Enlai, that is, Zhou Enlai. Boda, that is, Chen Boda, was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Kang Sheng, was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and an advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[3] On October 19, 1967, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded Lin Biao's speech, pointing out that: "Comrade Lin Biao's speech on August 9, 1967 is very important. This speech, using the great weapon of Mao Zedong Thought, made a very insightful analysis of the current great proletarian cultural revolution movement and gave important instructions on the leadership of the cultural revolution in the future."

## Instructions on the Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang [1]

(September 16, 1967)

Nan Ping (hereinafter referred to as Nan): Chairman!

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): Nan Ping, are you Nan Ping? Is your ancestor Nan Wuyun? You are the descendant of Nan Wuyun, and you have experience in handling these matters.

Nan: I am following the Chairman's instructions.

Chen Liyun (hereinafter referred to as Chen): Chairman!

Mao: Chen Liyun, you should be under the leadership of Nan Ping as the centre. It would be bad if your Air Force 5th Army is stronger than Nan Ping. Isn't it?

Chen: Yes.

Mao: The Air Force 5th Army and the 20th Army should learn from each other; the 20th Army should learn from the Air Force 5th Army, and the 20th Army is the main body, and the Air Force 5th Army should obey.

Mao: Do you obey or not?

Chen: Obey.

Mao: Our army has always had two styles of work. One is the democratic style, with good relations between officers and soldiers, that is, learning from each other and conducting self-criticism, and maintaining good relations between superiors and subordinates. The other is scolding and cursing, putting on airs, treating people unequally, lacking democracy, and poor relations between superiors and subordinates. Soldiers are always scolding and cursing. It is great if a platoon leader or a company commander emerges from a village. It is even more amazing if a battalion commander emerges! It is amazing if a master teacher emerges from my village. Some of our marshals always scold and curse people. If you are really right, don't scold people. Now our cadres are too serious and tense, and lack unity and liveliness. I have repeatedly talked about the relationship between superiors and subordinates in Shanghai. There are two ways for a person to be punished: one is that he made a mistake and was punished; the other is that the bad people punished the good people, and the good people were punished. People who have never made mistakes have a big shortcoming. Nan Ping, have you ever been punished?

Nan: No.

Mao: This is a big shortcoming.

Mao: Have you ever been persecuted?

Chen: I was persecuted during the Three Antis Campaign.

Mao: Good! The Red Guards and factory workers are divided into two groups. One factory and one school are divided into two groups. I can't understand it. Both sides have backers. It's better to make a mistake. Nan Ping, why did you send the headquarters of the Independent First Division to Wenzhou?

Nan: The Wenzhou Military Sub-district is paralysed. Send them to take charge of the work in Wenzhou.

Mao: The more paralysed the better. The rotten ones are easier to deal with.

(After listening to Nan Ping's report on the situation in Wenzhou)

Mao: Why did the "Wenzhou Federation" counterattack Wenzhou City in three directions?

Nan: After the "Wenzhou Federation of Workers" took control of Wenzhou City, how did they treat the other group? They made a mistake in policy and treated the "Wenzhou Federation" with a retaliatory attitude.

Mao: Divisional commanders and political commissars should not be subjected to struggles at every level there. They can be transferred to military regions. Don't do this to Long Qian and Zhang Xiyou, using the jet-style method or making them kneel as punishment. They are very upset when they make mistakes, but you are fighting them at every level. This is not good! Don't do this. We didn't do this to Huang Botao, Wang Yaowu, and Du Zhangming! We shouldn't do this. The struggles against Chen Pixian and Cao Huoqiu in Shanghai were said to be more civilized, but they were accused of being dishonest when they defended themselves for a few words. They were just one or two people, while you are hundreds of people. In the long run, this is not good for the style we have cultivated. We have always been united in criticism and unity, and we have always been reasonable and allowed to defend ourselves. Now it has been messed up and destroyed.

Mao: You must be cautious about the opinions of both factions. There will be struggles in a family with red-violent views. Some children hold red-violent views, while others hold revolutionary views... If one family is divided into two, then the family will also be divided into two factions. Both factions must be listened to. In my family, two children are rebels and two are conservatives. Rebellion and conservatism are accidental. One of the eight orders in the past was to educate children and teach them not to listen. We don't have that much time to educate them.

(Mao Zedong asked Nan Ping and Chen Liyun to convey his regards to the commanders and deputy commanders of the 20th Army and the 5th Air Force when they reported to Mao Zedong that Commander Huang of the 5th Air Force was not performing well.)

Chairman Mao: Don't just look at one particular moment or one particular incident. He has fought in the war. If a comrade makes a mistake, you must help him if you can. You must be

cautious with the cadres of the provincial and prefectural committees. It is not good for the Red Guards to spread everywhere. Don't let some cadres off the hook, but don't make them too hard. Things like jet-style punishment, hanging black cards, kneeling as punishment, and house searches should be prohibited.

Mao: There are several cliques in Jiangxi, such as the Central Soviet Area, the Hunan Banner, the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Area, and so on. I was afraid that some comrades in the First and Third Armies would make mistakes, and I was angry that some comrades in the Fourth Front Army would make mistakes. As a result, Chen Zaidao emerged. As for Xu Xiangqian, I must protect him. The Red Guards want to overthrow him, but I will protect myself. This is the overall situation. There are contradictions, but unity must be achieved. Wang Ming was elected at the Seventh and Eighth Congresses to elect members of the Central Committee. Now we must restore that tradition. We should not beat people to death with one blow if they make mistakes. It is too easy to overthrow a person now. All the Red Guards need to do is to blast him. Even if he is stubborn to the end, it doesn't matter. Give him food. The main thing is to train him.

Mao: Zhang Wentian was the emperor for ten years. When he was the general secretary, he wanted to take charge of military affairs. I told him: Don't take charge. What happened? He went to the lower levels to incite. Later, he got together with Gao Gang and approved 62 traitors to surrender. When he was in Ruijin, they were divided internally. He and Wang Jiaxiang were excluded and did not stand on Xiang Ying's side, but the Zunyi Conference could not have been without him. The Red Guards wanted to take them out for struggle, but I disagreed. Now the Red Guards have messed up the unity, criticism, and unity, and destroyed this tradition. They proposed wearing dunce caps, hanging plaques, kneeling as punishment, and house searches. They quoted my "Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan", which was against landlords, local tyrants and evil tyrants! Well! Now he is a cadre! He has been a cadre for decades and has done some good things.

Mao: Chen Yi fought in the war but was not very prominent. He was more right-wing. How could Yao Dengshan be the Minister of Foreign Affairs? He caused a few disasters. There are bad people, black hands, and counter-revolutionaries in the diplomatic circle who say Ye Jianying and Xu Xiangqian are black hands, but I don't think that's necessarily true. The black hand is mainly Wang Li. There is a conspiracy group, and it focuses on attacking the Prime Minister. After the Prime Minister is defeated, they will attack others. Britain took advantage of this opportunity and sent a note to Chen Yi himself. Now they are attacking Peking University again, and Ju Dafu and Han Aijing are involved. Some students and worker leaders are unstable.

(During the conversation, when talking about Nan Wuyun)

Mao: Are you Nan Ping a descendant of Nan Wuyun?

(Mao Zedong leaned back, smoked a cigarette, and said a few words in a concluding tone)

Mao: Kong Ming captured Meng Huo seven times<sup>12</sup>, and we Communists can not only capture him seven times, but also eight times! I didn't agree with killing Zhang Huizan<sup>13</sup> in a counter-encirclement and suppression campaign, mainly because Peng Dehuai wanted to kill him. Zhang Huizan was not only a division commander but also a general commander.

Mao: It's not good for the army to stay in one place for a long time. He can't bear to leave his relatives and friends, brothers-in-law and aunts-in-law. The gold, silver and treasures are too heavy a burden. You can send them home! Or give them to the poor and lower-middle peasants! Don't love money like your life.

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<sup>12</sup> A story from the romance of the Three Kingdoms. Kong Ming was a respectful name for Zhuge Liang who led a campaign in southern China against rebels including Meng Huo. Meng Huo was captured and released seven times by Kong Ming, showing the futility of fighting against him, and eventually gave up his rebellion.

<sup>13</sup> Zhang Huizan (1884–1931), a native of Changsha, Hunan Province, was a general of the National Government of the Republic of China and the National Revolutionary Army. Zhang Huizan opposed Yuan Shikai, so he left his post on Beijing and absconded back to Hunan Province to participate in the National Defense War and organize the army against Yuan. During the Guangzhou Nationalist Government, due to the reorganization of the Hunan Army, his position was also changed to the commander of the 4th Division of the Second Army of the National Revolutionary Army, which later joined the Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army. After the victory of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Huizan was reappointed as the deputy commander of the 18th Division of the National Revolutionary Army. At the end of 1930, the 18th Division was involved in the first Jiangxi War to suppress the Communist Party in Jiangxi Province, but he was captured by the Red Army in the Battle of Longgang. Zhang Huizan and Mao Zedong were old friends from the same hometown and participated in the expulsion movement together in Hunan. It is said that Mao Zedong once said that he would not kill Zhang Huizan, but in the end he still asked He Changgong to escort Zhang Huizan to a public trial meeting, and then because the venue was out of control, the masses killed Zhang Huizan by beheading him. After being executed, Zhang's head was put into a bamboo cage and thrown down the Gan River. On February 2, the officers and soldiers of the National Army found the bamboo cage near Shengang Mountain in Ji'an and salvaged it. According to Chiang Kai-shek's order, he was buried in his hometown of Yuelu Mountain in Changsha. Its mausoleum was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution and was renovated by the Changsha Municipal Government in May 2008 and a monument was erected to commemorate it.

## Instructions on the Cultural Revolution in Hunan [I]

(September 18, 1967)

(When reporting on the Xiangtan issue, and talking about the fact that many workers in Xiangtan were deceived, the PLA was based on political offensives, and the Xiangtan rebels went back to act according to the policies after concentrated study in Changsha)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): Xiangtan's experience is very good.

Mao: Such a large number of industrial workers will not be royalists for life, and they must be treated correctly. As for their leaders, they should rely on the people below to rise up and rebel.

(When talking about the Changde and Anjiang issues, and reporting on the conservatives in these places inciting farmers to go to the city to create rebels)

Mao: It's good to fight, and get an education. It's not easy for many farmers to go to the city. Now it's 15 work points, and there are still 30 work points. Some draw lots to fight, some are 2 yuan a day, and some are 100 yuan for each battle. If you kill someone, you will be given 100 yuan, and if you don't kill someone, you will also be given 100 yuan.

(When talking about the struggle of masons and carpenters)

Mao: Masons and carpenters had some guild ideas and were afraid that people from the countryside would move to the city. At that time, each person had to pay six yuan to join the guild.

(When talking about the civil war, some people said that some organizations are large and think that they should be the centre because they have many people)

Mao: That is not necessarily true.

(When talking about seizing guns)

Mao: Seizing guns scared you very much. In name, they were seizing, but in fact, they were distributing them. The political cadre school distributed guns to the rebels.

(When talking about the PLA going to factories, the rebels treated the PLA very well, gave reports to the PLA, armed protection of the PLA, and the PLA soldiers explained the three major disciplines and eight points of attention to the rebels, and deepened their relationship with the rebels)

Mao: This is also an experience.

(When talking about extreme "left" thoughts)

Mao: There are a few slogans, it doesn't matter, if they are more, the masses will rise up to criticize, you don't have to arrest people.

(When talking about the reception station gathering some deceived masses for study)

Mao: It is not enough for them to study alone, the rebels should also study! Otherwise, it will be difficult to get along after returning.

(When talking about the issue of "Gao Si"<sup>14</sup>)

Mao: "Gao Si" also sent me a lot of telegrams, sent to Shanghai, and forwarded by Zhang Chunqiao.

Mao: Isn't there a person named Wan?

(When someone reported that the masses did not agree with Wan's arrival at the preparatory group for the revolution)

Mao: Wait for a while.

(When talking about the army not being able to carry guns)

Mao: The People's Liberation Army has "five nos".

(When someone asked whether the People's Liberation Army could carry guns during the parade)

Mao: The army can participate in the general meeting armed.

(When talking about the issue of military regions)

Mao: In the past, the military region sent out patrol teams on motorcycles, but they were stopped. They had no prestige. Now the military organizes patrol teams, which is good. The military is a big army.

(When talking about the military region carrying out the four majors, the military region guesthouse also carried out the four majors, and several internal organizations had different opinions, and the chef stopped cooking)

Mao: The chef is not easy to mess with.

(When talking about the train not being able to run)

Mao: The opposite of not being able to run is running. There is pressure from both the society and the internal.

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<sup>14</sup> The abbreviation of the Red Guard Headquarters of Changsha Colleges and Universities. it was supported by the Hunan Provincial Military Region and opposed to the Xiangjiang Wind and Thunder and the Changsha Revolutionary Rebel Workers' Joint Committee.

Mao: That year when I went to Xiangtan, there was a Wang Zhiguo in the prefectural committee. Where is he now?

Hua Guofeng: In Changsha, he was severely criticized.

Mao: Why was he criticized so severely? I know he is in poor health! He has high blood pressure.

(When the report was made to the military region that a mistake had been made, affecting the military sub-district, the county people's armed forces department, the provincial party committee, the provincial people's committee, the prefectural college, and the municipal organs, which were paralysed)

Mao: The central Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Reclamation are no longer effective, the Meteorological Bureau still plays a leading role, the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Culture are no longer effective, but the factories are still producing and the farmers are still farming!

Zhang Chunqiao (hereinafter referred to as Zhang): In the past, we tried to streamline the system, but it didn't work after several years. Now, this proves that we can streamline it greatly in the future.

(When talking about the public security, procuratorial and judicial organs)

Mao: In the past, it seemed that it would be terrible if there were no public security, procuratorial and judicial organs. When I heard that the public security, procuratorial and judicial organs had collapsed, I was very happy.

(When talking about the cadre issue)

Mao: To clean up the cadres, we need to carry out mass movements. It would be impossible to clean up so many military sub-districts and armed forces departments without the Cultural Revolution. In the past, these people were old revolutionaries with old qualifications, and no one could touch them. In the past, local party and government organs did not have guns, so they relied on military organs.

Mao: In the end, the majority of cadres are good. We should unite the majority, including those who have made mistakes and have made self-criticisms to the masses. Except for a very small number of bad people, the scope of the crackdown is too wide, which is not good.

(When talking about the training of cadres who have made mistakes)

Mao: The army and the party organs should be trained, not only those who have made mistakes, but also those who have not made mistakes. The Red Guards should also be recruited to participate and help them learn.

(When talking about the "Red Flag Army" issue in Hunan<sup>15</sup>)

Mao: Let's study it again and see what happens. Don't be so ignorant about the affairs of the world. Let's recover first and then talk about it.

Zhang: Comrade Lin Biao approved a document last year pointing out that the re-instated and retired soldiers should not set up organizations separately. They should be persuaded to form a big union now, combine with other organizations, or join other township organizations.

(When talking about the establishment of a temporary leadership group in Xiangtan)

Mao: The temporary leadership group will be set up in September and October.

Zhang: Jiangxi has also established a temporary leadership group, and the garrison has held a provincial meeting, and the situation is very good.

Mao: Meetings are also training.

(When talking about the issue of the great union and the issue of strengthening unity within the left)

Mao: Everyone should make self-criticism, talk less about others' shortcomings, and don't point the spearhead at the other side. In the past, we had an experience that in the past, the relationship between the army and the local governments was that the army proposed to support the government and love the people, and the local governments proposed to support the army and honour the families of soldiers. The army took the lead in self-criticism, and the relationship between the two sides was very good!

Zhang: There is such a passage in the Chairman's Quotations.

Mao: Both groups are workers, one is rebellious and the other is conservative. The conservatives are deceived by someone above them. You cannot suppress the deceived masses. The more you suppress them, the more they will resist. We were also suppressed by Chiang Kai-shek. After the Great Revolution, we were only a few tens of thousands of people. Chiang Kai-shek suppressed us, and we had hope. He suppressed us and produced 300,000 Red Army soldiers and 300,000 party members. Later, we made mistakes, and only then did we have the 25,000-mile Long March.

(When talking about taking guns)

Mao: Don't rush to grab guns, the militia will have tens of thousands of guns.

(When talking about the fortifications in Changsha)

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<sup>15</sup> The Hunan Red Flag Army was a revolutionary mass organisation established on December 6, 1966 in Changsha. It allied itself with the Xiangjiang Wind and Thunder mass organisation to oppose Long Shujin and the Gao Si group.

Mao: If you are worried, keep them for a period of time.

Yang Chengwu: Don't demolish the cement ones, it is also a preparation for war.

[1] On September 18, 1967, Mao Zedong met with Li Yuan, Hua Guofeng, and Zhang Bosen from the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Preparatory Group in Changsha, accompanied by Yang Chengwu, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Dongxing, and Yu Lijin. This was Mao Zedong's instruction on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Hunan Province when he listened to the report of the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Preparatory Group.

## Instructions during the inspection of Henan [1]

(September 22, 1967)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): You are Ji Dengkui, an old friend.

Liu Jianxun: He was imprisoned for four months and endured four months of struggle.

Mao: You say there is no benefit at all?

Ji Dengkui: It is very beneficial.

Mao: That was done by Wen Minsheng, Zhao Wenfu, He Yunhong and others.

Mao: (Asking Comrade Wang Xin) When did you come to Henan?

Mao: When I passed by Zhengzhou last time, I saw a big slogan saying "The overall situation has been determined, and February 7th will win."

Mao: The situation in Henan is very good.

(When reporting that some revolutionary cadres have stood up in various places)

Mao: This is a good thing done by He Yunhong! He Yunhong is so powerful!

(When reporting that armed cadres should go to Beijing for training)

Mao: Good people should also go to the training.

(When reporting the situation in Kaifeng, the fertilizer factory advocates fighting, and we advocate not fighting and strengthening the political offensive)

Mao: It is not good to not talk about the policy of prisoners. We need to work on the prisoners of August 2nd. I agree with your idea.

(When reporting that a few people did not talk much about the policy, shot at random, and sometimes killed people)

Mao: The masses all stood up to discuss and disagreed with them. The masses rose up to oppose, and it was over.

Mao: The slogan of arresting a small group of people in the army did not last long. Now it is not so popular. They do not support the army. Once they support the army, there is no target!

Wang Xin: The main thing is to criticize their wrong ideas theoretically.

Mao: Right!

[1] On September 22, 1967, Mao Zedong inspected the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in Henan and met with Liu Jianxun, Wang Xin, and Ji Dengkui, accompanied by Yang Chengwu and Zhang Chunqiao. This was Mao Zedong's instruction conveyed by Liu Jianxun on September 26, 1967.

## **Instructions during the inspection of Wuhan [1]**

(September 23, 1967)

The main task at present is to criticize, struggle and unite as soon as possible, and realize the three combinations as soon as possible.

I hope you will become a model in fighting against the largest handful of capitalist-roaders in the party, a model of unity, and a model of opposing small-groupism, anarchism, economism, and selfishness.

In the revolutions of the past, from my personal experience, it can be seen that the real hope is those who think about problems, not those who want to be in the limelight. Those who are making a lot of noise now must become figures who will be a flash in the pan in history.

[1] This was Mao Zedong's instruction on the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in Wuhan after he heard a report on the "Cultural Revolution" in the Wuhan Military Region during his inspection of Wuhan.

**Comments on the draft of the "Urgent Notice on the Immediate Return to Original Units of Students in Other Places and Petitioners in Beijing" [1]**

(September 23, 1967)

Do this.

September23

[1] This comment was written on an urgent draft notice submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on September 22, 1967, by the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The notice stated that students and petitioners in Beijing and other places should promptly return to their original locations and units to celebrate National Day, in accordance with the CPC Central Committee's repeated directives and Chairman Mao's great call to "grasp revolution and promote production." They should also conduct mass criticism and struggle-criticism-reform in their respective regions and units, and promote unity and the "three-in-one" approach within their units. All reception and liaison agencies in Beijing and other regions were to be abolished effective September 28. The CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued this notice on September 23.

## **Instructions on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Jiangxi [1]**

(September 27, 1967)

(When reporting on the situation of confiscated weapons, saying that as of September 16, more than 40,000 guns were confiscated in the province)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): Who distributed these guns? I see that both parties distributed them, who distributed more?

Answer: The conservative faction of the military sub-district people's armed forces department distributed them.

Mao: Oh.

(When reporting on the Fuzhou issue)

Mao: The Fuzhou issue is worth studying. Why are they so bold? They always hold meetings to study the situation. They think that the situation in Jiangxi, the country and the world is favourable to them, so they do this. I think they have misjudged the situation.

(When reporting that they organized a group of people to control nine counties)

Mao: From this point of view, they want to expand their power and attack Nanchang. What kind of problem is this?

Answer: According to the spirit of the central government's instructions, it is a military rebellion.

Mao: Are you sure?

A: It has been decided.

Mao: Has it been approved?

A: The Premier has approved it.

Mao: Oh, it is a rebellion, an attack. They say there is no civil war in China. I think this is a civil war, not a foreign war. It is an armed struggle, not a literary struggle. In Ganzhou, Ji'an, Yichun and other places, they also carry out agricultural management. One person is selected from each production team, and more than ten people are selected from each brigade. They use coercive methods to record work points and earn 60 cents a day. Now the countryside is surrounding the city. I don't think it will work.

(When reporting that the Chairman's thoughts and policies have taken deep root in the hearts of the people of Jiangxi and have played a decisive role in the situation in Jiangxi)

Mao: At the end of May, I wrote a few words to Comrade Lin Biao and the Premier, saying that why the Jiangxi Military Region is so opposed to the masses is worth studying. I did not draw a conclusion. I was referring to Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, and Henan.

(When reporting on Wang Jingyi's problem)

Mao: We should protect him. He played a role at a critical moment. I think we should start with education. There are always a minority of bad people, and there are always more good people in the People's Armed Forces Department. There are many people in the military sub-district who are deceived. Some people have made mistakes, and we should give them a chance to correct their mistakes.

Mao: Did the support-left troops come during the June 29 Incident?

Answer: Not yet.

Mao: Did they think the Central Committee would support them?

Answer: They took Nanchang first, and it would not work even if the whole country disagreed. They wanted to create a fait accompli and force the Central Committee to recognize it.

Mao: Oh. Wang Jingyi, the rebels scolded him, and the "Fireline War Report" was published. The "Fireline War Report" always said: Liu Peishan and Lin Zhongzhao are guilty, but Wu Ruishan is not mentioned. Why not mention Zhou Zitao?

Answer: Zhou Zitao was a deputy chief of staff.

(When reporting that "32·111" had basically collapsed)

Mao: I heard that some stragglers fled to Ningchang and Guangdu. What was the result?

A: They have already dispersed.

Mao: Oh, they have already dispersed.

(When reporting that the rebels have some revengeful feelings towards the deceived masses)

Mao: This is not good. You should pay attention. You rebels should be persuaded very well and not retaliate. You are on the side of the rebels, and I am afraid you will not listen to them completely. Killing people is always bad. It is not good for others to kill you, and it is not good for you to kill others. You need to persuade and educate. Retaliation, kneeling, wearing dunce caps, hanging signs, and the jet plane position, this is not good.

Mao: Do you have a steel plant here?

Answer: There is a Nanchang Steel Plant.

Mao: It was reported in the Fire Line Report that Nanchang Steel Plant was lost and Lushan was lost. Have they been recovered?

Answer: It has been recovered.

Mao: Is there a person named Wei in Lushan?

Answer: Wei XX. Former Party Secretary of Lushan Administration Bureau.

Mao: Which faction does this person belong to?

Answer: He belongs to the conservative faction.

(When reporting that the rebels in various places were suppressed and attacked in the previous period and were forced to flee to Nanchang, and the masses said that Nanchang was a liberated area)

Mao: Oh, such an incident has also occurred. I am afraid it is not just in Jiangxi.

(When reporting on the issue of Xia Shaolin)

Mao: We should also pay attention to the treatment of Xia Shaolin. He is bad, but he is different from Wang Jingyi.

(When reporting on the issue of Li Sheng)

Mao: Li Sheng, there is no need to report.

Mao: Are there still debates in factories and schools?

A: The conservatives have all collapsed, but there are still debates among the rebels.

Mao: Is there a train to Jiujiang?

A: Yes, and so are the roads and shipping.

Mao: Are there any in Jiangxi? The big counties still have them, but the small ones don't.

Mao: Some people say that the communes, districts, counties, and special districts have been paralysed. What does paralysis mean? There are always people there, either from one faction or another. The Jiujiang Military Sub-district seems to be better.

A: Most people are better.

Mao: There is also Zhong Fuchang!

A: His name has been changed to Zhong Guang.

Mao: He is a good man, an honest man.

Mao: How long have you been back?

A: A month.

Mao: There are still a dozen provinces in Beijing. We need to solve them one by one. The central government has not proposed any plan. Let them do it themselves and see what they can do. You guys also did it yourself. Are there any people from that faction working in the province now?

Answer: The liaison station has collapsed.

(When it was reported that Cheng Mingyuan had returned by himself, wrote a self-criticism, and was now arrested by the rebels)

Mao: Let Cheng Mingyuan go back. Don't make it too tense.

Mao: How about Huang Zhizhen, Zi Dongcun. Do they have hope?

(After reporting the situation of Huang and Zi)

Mao: If they can be protected, it would be good to win over a few more people.

Zhang Chunqiao (hereinafter referred to as Zhang): The provincial party committee originally put Huang Zhiqi in the front line.

Mao: I see that he has done a lot of work. He is holding the line there.

Mao: Did the provincial party committee set up an organization to protect itself in the past?

Answer: The workers' Red Guards were organized.

Mao: Is it a good thing or a bad thing that so many cadres have collapsed? Have you studied this issue? We should give them time to recognize and correct their mistakes, and criticize the idea of "overthrowing everything".

Zhang: There are still many people in Nanchang.

(When reporting that these people are fighting against right deviation and anti-restoration)

Mao: How can there be so many restorations? They have collapsed and cannot be restored. There is a saying that they collapsed. In fact, the world will not be in chaos, and the sky will not fall.

(When reporting that some good articles were written in Wenhui Daily, which had a great influence)

Zhang: People are still against our right deviation, saying that we have become right.

Mao: It is a question of educating the left, not a question of right deviation. For example, how many factions were there in the past? In Jiangxi, there were the Central Soviet Area, the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area, the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet Area, the Fujian-Jiangxi Soviet Area, the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area, the XXX, and northern Shaanxi. During the Anti-Japanese War, there were even more bases. We are united by one program. No matter which faction it is, we cannot just want one faction and not the others. How can we have

only factions? In the past, I only knew that Comrade Chen Changfeng and Comrade Yang Dezhi were soldiers in Jinggangshan. Later, I came here and got to know them after I arrived in northern Shaanxi. Comrade Yang Chengwu was the head of a regiment during the Long March. He said he had seen me there during the Long March. I forgot that I only met Comrade Yang Chengwu later. None of you knew him before. You who are division commanders may not know many people. You who are army commanders may not know many people. Some of them only know their surnames, not their given names. Soldiers only know so-and-so regiment commanders, so-and-so division commanders, and so-and-so army commanders, but they cannot name them. I tend to save more people. Those who can be saved should be saved. As long as we win over the majority, it's okay if a very small number of people remain stubborn. We will give them food.

(When reporting that the support-left troops were beaten by conservatives by four or five hundred people)

Mao: Were there any casualties?

Answer: When the troops entered Fuzhou, they were ambushed by Xia Shaolin and his men three times on the road. Our soldiers were all in the car, and they were all shot in the head and chest. Five people died and 56 were injured.

(When reporting Xia Shaolin's rebellion, he first took away the code and radio station. The Chairman exclaimed in surprise.)

Mao: In the past, the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee said that Jiangxi had no army and asked me to talk to the Central Committee and criticize a division.

Mao: (Asking Chen Changfeng) How many people are there in your division?

Chen: (Omitted)

Mao: It's a small division.

(When reporting the deeds of Li Wenzhong of the XX Division in supporting the left and loving the people)

Mao: I read the "Fireline Report", which has photos of the three of them. They are all very young. How many people are left in this platoon now?

Answer: There are still 17 people.

Mao: A group of cadres in Jiangxi have stood up. You are at the provincial level, and more people should stand up at the provincial level. And how many cadres can stand up at the municipal level?

(At this time, the Chairman also asked Huang Guang, Liu Ruisen, and Guo Guangzhou where they were from. Guo Guangzhou replied that they were from Jishui County)

Mao: Some people say that Wen Tianxiang is from Ji'an, but in fact, Wen Tianxiang is from Jishui!

Mao: I read the "Fireline Report" about Nanchang's emergency, the fall of Nangang and Lushan, the white terror, Yichun's military control, and the rural areas taking over the cities. The most tense period was in June, July, and August. When it was tense, I realized that the problem was revealed and the problem was easy to solve. If it wasn't tense, how could it be solved! Three thousand rebels in Ji'an escaped. How could they be eliminated? There must be some people left!

Answer: Some stayed and operated underground.

Mao: Now some people are trying to incite soldiers to oppose their officers, saying that you only get six yuan a month, while the rich earn more and ride in cars. Peasants are willing to join the People's Liberation Army. The People's Liberation Army is glorious. They get six yuan a month and their families are treated well. Peasants are willing to join the army. I don't think they can incite.

Mao: The Jiangxi Military Region should not make it too hard to carry out the Four Bigs. Once the soldiers come together, they will be very angry and unable to restrain themselves. When they fight, they will wear dunce caps, hang black cards, kneel down, and do jet-style fighting. People can't stand it, and it's not elegant! Wearing dunce caps is something I learned from my "Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan". You cannot punish without teaching. To punish is to kill. You cannot punish without teaching. We suffered this loss in the past. We did not ask the cadres of the military region and military sub-district to go to Beijing for education. You should train the armed cadres first.

Yang Chengwu: We have held a training class in Beijing, gathering cadres from several provinces for intensive training.

Mao: The central government should hold it, and mainly the provinces should hold it. Not only the army should hold it, but also the local party, government, culture and education should have training. In the past, when we held a cadre meeting, if no one from the commune came, everyone could come. How many counties are there in Jiangxi?

Answer: 82 counties.

Mao: We can divide them into three batches. Training is better than no training. The time is at most two months. It won't work if it's too long. In the past, the enlistment period in Huangpu was five months, and the training was four months. Comrade Lin Biao only lived in Huangpu for five months. In some military schools, the longer you study, the more confused you become.

(When reporting on the preparations for the provincial rebel political work meeting in October)

Chairman Mao: This is good. The rebels also need training. They cannot sit still and have become wild. There are many rebels. If the first phase is not enough, they can be trained in the second or third phase. There are many rebels. I think the training method is good. An independent battalion in Inner Mongolia has more than 800 people. They are supporting the protection of the Central Committee and oppose the decision of the Central Committee on the Inner Mongolia issue. When they arrived in Beijing, they were very angry and made a big fuss. They did not listen to the Premier and broke the furniture. The meeting could not continue. They put forward five demands to the Central Committee. After that, they went to Gaobeidian, a new city in Beijing, for training for 40 days and changed their minds. When they returned, they still supported the left and not the right. The independent battalion and the independent division changed their minds after training.

I don't have such a deadly view of the current rightists. There are bad people, but they are a minority. Most of them have problems with their understanding. Some people say that the problem of understanding is a problem of stance. Once the problem of stance is mentioned, it is a matter of principle, and they will never be able to turn over a new leaf in their lifetime. Can the problem of stance not be changed? For most people, stance can be changed, but for a very small number of bad people, it cannot be changed. In short, the scope of attack should be narrowed, and the scope of education should be expanded. Education should include left, middle and right. Leftists will become extremely "left" if they are not educated. Zhao Yongfu and Tan Zhenlin are arrested everywhere. How can there be so many Zhao Yongfu and Tan Zhenlin? What are they arrested in Jiangxi?

Answer: The Red Guards arrested Liu Peishan, Wu Ruishan, Lin Zhongzhao, and some people went to Fujian to arrest XXX. The Premier asked us to call back.

Mao: Your phone calls may not work, right?

Mao: We should protect them, not embarrass them, and make them correct their mistakes. You are right now, but it is not good to go too far.

Wang Dongxing: It's half past eleven now. We have been talking for an hour and a half.

Mao: That's it!

[1] These are some important instructions given by Mao Zedong and others when he met with Cheng Shiqing, Yang Dongliang, Huang Xian, Liu Ruisen, Guo Guangzhou, Chen Changfeng and other members of the preparatory group of the Jiangxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee. Accompanying the meeting were Yang Chengwu, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Dongxing and Yu Lijin.

**Comments on the editorial of two newspapers and one magazine, 'Long Live the Victory of the Cultural Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat' [1]**

(28th and 30th September 1967)

1

This can be used.

Mao Zedong

September 28

2

Several passages from Lenin should be quoted, and Marxism-Leninism should be mentioned repeatedly.

3

Comrade Chen Boda, please proceed accordingly.

The revisions are excellent [2]. On page three, I have made a few revisions [3]. Please consider them as appropriate.

Mao Zedong

12:00 p.m., 30 September

[1] This editorial was written by the editorial boards of the People's Daily, Hongqi Magazine, and the PLA Daily to celebrate the 18th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Sections 1 and 2 are comments on the editorial draft submitted for review by Chen Boda, head of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group, and member Yao Wen Yuan at dawn on 28 September 1967; Section 3 of this article consists of comments on the revised draft editorial submitted by Chen Boda for review at midnight on 30 September. This editorial was published in the 1 October issues of the People's Daily and the PLA Daily, and in the 15th issue of the Red Flag magazine published on 6 October.

[2] According to Mao Zedong's comments on September 28, 1967 (see Part 2 of this article), Chen Boda quoted the following two passages from Lenin in the revised editorial submitted for examination on September 30: "Revolution is a great festival for the oppressed and exploited. ... In such a period, the people can perform miracles that seem incredible from the narrow perspective of market-oriented gradualism." "The dictatorship of the proletariat is the most fearless and ruthless battle waged by the new class against the more powerful enemy, the bourgeoisie. ... For all these reasons, the dictatorship of the proletariat is

necessary, and it is impossible to defeat the bourgeoisie without a protracted, tenacious, and desperate battle, that is, without perseverance, strict discipline, perseverance, and unity of will." At the same time, the revised editorial also quoted the following passage from Marx and Engels' "Communist Manifesto": "The communist revolution is the most thorough break with traditional property relations; not surprisingly, In the course of its development, it will make the most thorough break with traditional ideas. " In addition, there are 4 places where "Marxism-Leninism" is added.

[3] In the revised draft of the editorial submitted by Chen Boda for examination on September 30, 1967, two passages were quoted from Mao Zedong's recent inspection tour of North China, South Central China and East China: "There is no fundamental conflict of interest within the working class. There is even less reason for the working class under the dictatorship of the proletariat to split into two irreconcilable factions." "The revolutionary Red Guards and the revolutionary student organizations must realize the great revolutionary union. The two factions are revolutionary mass organizations and must realize the great revolutionary union unconditionally." Mao Zedong made a wording revision to the second passage, which read: "The revolutionary Red Guards and the revolutionary student organizations must realize the great revolutionary union. As long as the two factions are revolutionary mass organizations, they must realize the great revolutionary union under the principles of revolution."

**Comments on Lin Biao's speech for the 18th anniversary celebration of National Day [1]**

(29 September 1967)

Comrade Lin Biao.

This piece is very good, with a grand tone, solid and not exaggerated. It is a summary of a year of struggle.

Mao Zedong

9 p.m. on the 29th of September

[1] Lin Biao (who was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and soon became Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee) drafted this speech, which was discussed and revised by Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and other members of the group. It was later published in the People's Daily on 2 October 1967

## **A Discussion on the 'May 16th' Group**

(September 1967)

In all of China's revolutions, including the ones I've experienced myself, the people who really have hope are those who think things through without trying to stand out. Those who make a lot of noise now will definitely become a passing phase in history. Revolutionary students should unite and overthrow the counter-revolutionary conspiracy group 'May 16'.

## **Instructions on Journalism**

(September 1967)

News organizations must establish a serious, scientific, and combative style of work, cultivating the combative style of proletarian revolutionaries.

## **Instructions on Celebrating National Day**

(September 1967)

This year's National Day should fully publicize the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. The parade is not just a parade; it is also a campaign of criticism. We will use art and literature to criticize the biggest capitalist roaders in power within the Party.

## Meeting with Prime Minister Numaza of the Republic of the Congo [1]

(3 October 1967)

Numa: I see that the great victory of the Chinese proletarian Cultural Revolution has greatly raised the political consciousness of the Chinese people.

Mao: Anarchism has also developed greatly.

Numa: Perhaps that is so, but we have not seen any evidence of it yet.

Mao: It is good to expose such trends so that people can learn from them.

Numa: Your cadres are very modest.

Mao: They have no choice but to be modest, otherwise the masses will fight against them.

Numa: There is a significant difference between your cadres and ours.

Mao: There is no significant difference. They all have higher positions, higher salaries, and ride in cars. Someone has to hold those higher positions; if no one does, what would happen? Higher salaries, better housing, and riding in cars are acceptable, but they must not act arrogantly and must treat workers and peasants as equals. They must not constantly scold or insult people. Some village party secretaries have low salaries, poor housing, no cars, and no real power, yet they still act like big shots. When the movement began, it scared them half to death.

Numa: Foreigners say China is very chaotic, but we haven't seen any of that.

Mao: Let it be chaotic for a while. You can go around and about. Once it becomes chaotic, it will no longer be chaotic. If it doesn't get chaotic enough, it won't work. It's about time now. We are preparing for another year of chaos.

Numa: What do you mean by 'the more chaotic, the better'?

Mao: Without chaos, there's no clear winner or loser. Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Zhejiang—except for Anhui—are all doing well. China has gained some experience. The coal mines in Hunan have resorted to violence. Production dropped from tens of thousands of tonnes to just a few tonnes, but now it's back up to 20,000 tonnes.

Numa: How did you resolve such contradictions so well?

Mao: The backers were exposed, and the masses had their fill of fighting. At this point, a few words from the Central Committee were enough. Don't listen to those who blow their own trumpets about how great China is. Africans are humble, so we hope you will come. Europe and Asia are no good.

Numa: We have also begun to oppose official arrogance.

Mao: I do not recommend that you also launch a Cultural Revolution. We have been building our army for forty years, our country for eighteen years, and have been fighting for twenty-two years, with a People's Liberation Army that has been fighting for decades, so we launched the Cultural Revolution.

Numa: We will not launch a Cultural Revolution, but we will study the theory and global significance of the Cultural Revolution.

Mao: This Cultural Revolution will reform certain state institutions, including the military. When Nkrumah [2] came last time, he did not anticipate that his own military would overthrow his regime. I think you should return home sooner rather than later.

Numa: There are still people at home, but I will try to return as soon as possible.

Mao: You should return home as soon as possible.

Numa: I will try to return as soon as possible.

[1] At the Berlin Conference of 1884, imperialist powers divided Africa, designating the region east of the Congo River as a Belgian colony, now known as Zaire, and the region west of the river as a French colony, now known as the Republic of the Congo, with its capital in Brazzaville. On 15 August 1960, the Congo gained full independence and adopted the name Republic of the Congo. China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo established diplomatic relations.

[2] Nkrumah, leader of Ghana's independence movement, declared independence for the Gold Coast on 6 March 1957, naming the country Ghana, and was elected Prime Minister. On 1 July 1960, the Republic of Ghana was proclaimed, and he was elected president. In February 1966, during his visit to China, a coup d'état occurred in Ghana, and the government he led was overthrown. He later went into exile and settled in Guinea.

## **Comments on Chen Boda and Jiang Qing's report on the selection and compilation of Liu Shaoqi's speeches [1]**

(9 October 1967)

Lin Biao and Enlai [2]: After reviewing this document, please return it to Comrade Chen Boda for processing. The Explanation does not mention Deng Xiaoping. Please determine whether this is appropriate. The question of which agency should be the publisher should be decided at a meeting. [3]

Mao Zedong

9 October

[1] On October 9, 1967, Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee, and Jiang Qing, deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group, wrote a report to Mao Zedong, saying: "In order to meet the needs of the current broad revolutionary masses to thoroughly criticize China's Khrushchev, we have selected and compiled the critical material, "Liu Shaoqi's Speeches." The report mentioned that regarding the publishing unit, "there are several options, please choose: (1) Central Cultural Revolution Working Group; (2) General Office of the Central Committee; (3) Red Flag Magazine; (4) People's Publishing House." The report was attached with the "Publishing Notes" for this book. When Mao Zedong reviewed it, he changed the sentence "he colluded with Deng Xiaoping, another biggest capitalist roader in the party" in the explanation to "colluded with some other capitalist roaders in power", deleted Deng Xiaoping's name listed with Liu Shaoqi, and wrote this comment.

[2] Lin Biao was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, and was soon appointed Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai refers to Zhou Enlai.

[3] Liu Shaoqi's Speeches was later published under the name of the People's Publishing House Reference Room, and Deng Xiaoping's name was not mentioned in the publishing statement.

## **Realizing a Great Revolutionary Unity According to the System [1]**

(1967)

All factories, schools, departments, and enterprises must, under revolutionary principles, realize a great revolutionary unity according to the system, industry, and class. This will facilitate the establishment of the revolutionary "three-in-one" system, facilitate the implementation of the "mass criticism" and "struggle-criticism-transformation" campaigns in all units, and facilitate the promotion of revolution, production, work, and war preparations.

[1] This quote from Mao Zedong was published in a notice issued on October 17, 1967, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group regarding the implementation of the Great Revolutionary Alliance based on the system. The notice also stated: "All revolutionary mass organizations should base themselves on Mao Zedong Thought and, after full consultation, follow Chairman Mao's instructions, based on their specific circumstances. All cross-sector organizations should, on a voluntary basis, make necessary adjustments based on their respective sectors." This quote from Mao Zedong was first publicly published in the People's Daily editorial, "Follow Chairman Mao's Instructions and Implement the Great Revolutionary Alliance Based on the System," published on October 19, 1967.

## Comments on the Qinghai Provincial Report on the Restoration of Party Organizational Life and Revisions to the Central Committee's Draft Reply

(October 24 and 27, 1967)

1

Comrades of the Central Cultural Revolution Group:

This matter should be discussed, and a response should be given. It should also be forwarded to all localities for implementation.

Mao Zedong

October 24<sup>th</sup>

2

It should be done this way.

3

The Qinghai Provincial Core Group of the Communist Party of China hereby notifies to all provincial, municipal, and autonomous region revolutionary committees (preparatory groups), military control committees, major military regions, and provincial military regions:

On October 19th, the Qinghai Provincial Core Group of the Communist Party of China sent a telegram requesting instructions on whether Party organizational life could be resumed, given that the positions of the Revolutionary Committees have already been established. The Central Committee believes that this should be done in all localities. *However, those who have been proven to be traitors, spies, or those who have behaved extremely badly during the Cultural Revolution and refuse to repent should no longer be allowed to participate in Party organizational life. Party organizations should be composed of advanced elements of the proletariat and should be vigorous vanguard organizations capable of leading the class and the masses in the fight against class enemies.*

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Central Cultural Revolution Group

October 27, 1967

4

Lin Biao, Enlai [2], and Comrades of the Central Cultural Revolution:

The telegram has been revised. Please hold another meeting. If you can agree, it can be sent out. Mao Zedong October 27

[1] This first part was written in a telegram from the Qinghai Provincial CCP Core Group to the Central Committee and the Central Cultural Revolution Group on October 19, 1967. The telegram stated: "Revolutionary committees have been established in grassroots units in our province, but Party organizations have not yet been restored. We frequently encounter issues that require Party organization attention. For example, some Party and League members who were previously disciplined by the Party are requesting a review and re-handling; many members of the rebel faction are requesting membership in the Party and League. To strengthen Party leadership, units that have already established Revolutionary Committees are being asked to resume Party organizational life." When Mao Zedong reviewed the telegram, he underlined the phrase "Can Party organizational life be restored?" and wrote a comment, which became the second part of this article. This third article is a revision of the October 27th reply from the CPC Central Committee and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, submitted by Chen Boda for review. The text, printed in italics, contains additions and revisions by Mao Zedong. The CPC Central Committee and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued this telegram that same day. This fourth article is based on a report submitted by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda (then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group), Kang Sheng (then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group), and Jiang Qing (then deputy head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group) to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao on October 27, 1967. The report, drafted by Chen Boda, stated: "The Chairman instructed the group to discuss the Qinghai Core Group's proposal to restore Party organizational life. The group did so on the 26th, but failed to fully understand the Chairman's instructions. Instead of drafting a circular directly and clearly in accordance with the Chairman's thinking, the group went off on a tangent, resorting to red tape. They made a phone call to Qinghai without first consulting the Chairman, completely acting on their own initiative. This mistake is entirely our responsibility. Similar mistakes have occurred several times. We respectfully request that the Chairman severely criticize or sanction us." "Attached is the original phone call. This call has been canceled in accordance with the Chairman's instructions." The call was made by Zhang Chunqiao, Deputy Head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, to Liu Xianquan, Head of the Qinghai Provincial Core Group of the Communist Party of China, at 3:00 AM on October 26th. Zhang Chunqiao stated, "The Central Committee believes that units that have already established Revolutionary Committees can continue to participate in Party organizational life as you requested. However, this is a major matter, involving many issues, such as how to 'restore' this? Should all existing Party members participate in organizational life? Should the Party organizations in the leading bodies be reorganized first, followed by lower-level organizations, or should both be done simultaneously? What is the relationship between the Party branch and the Revolutionary Committee? And, crucially,

how to recruit new members and infuse fresh blood, etc. Please discuss this matter and, based on your differing opinions, compile a brief summary and submit it to the Central Committee. You, or someone you send responsible, will come to Beijing to discuss this with us. We will then issue a formal reply after the Central Committee has made its decision."

[2] Lin Biao was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai is Zhou Enlai.

## **Comments on Nie Rongzhen's [1] Report on the Adjustment and Reorganization of the National Defense Scientific Research System**

(October 25, 1967)

Comrade Nie Rongzhen:

This document [2] has been suppressed for a long time. I have read it today and it is very good. It should be implemented.

Mao Zedong

October 25

[1] Nie Rongzhen was then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Director of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission.

[2] This refers to Nie Rongzhen's report to Mao Zedong and others on September 20, 1967, on a plan for adjusting and restructuring the national defense scientific research system. Based on the relevant directives of the Central Committee, the report proposed: 1. Comprehensive planning, overall arrangements, and rational adjustments and reorganizations, reorganizing the national defense scientific research units approved for takeover by the Central Committee into several research institutes. 2. Actively addressing the shortage of trial production and processing capacity within these units to shorten the development cycle. 3. Conscientiously carry out military control, carrying out takeover and adjustments in a step-by-step manner, taking over and establishing each unit as conditions mature, and striving to have them essentially all established by the first half of next year. On November 9, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded Nie Rongzhen's report and Mao Zedong's comments.

**Inscription for Li Zhifen [1]**

(October 29, 1967)

Study hard.

Never forget class struggle.

[1] Li Zhifen, then a staff member at the Great Hall of the People, had this inscription by Mao Zedong written on a copy of Quotations from Chairman Mao that she always carried with her.

### **The rebels must listen to Premier Zhou's words**

(October 1967)

If the rebels do not listen to Premier Zhou's words, what kind of rebels are they? Aiming the spearhead at Premier Zhou is the same as aiming it at me and Lin Biao.

## **Instructions on the Revolutionization of Party Organizations**

(October 1967)

Don't transfer personnel. Twenty or so people are enough. What do we need so many people for? If we have too few people, we can send more people down to the grassroots level, hold shorter meetings, solve problems at the grassroots level, and produce fewer tabloids.

**Comments on the Editorial Board Article "Advancing Along the Path Opened by the October Socialist Revolution" [1]**

(October and November 1967)

1

I haven't read the contents [2].

2

I have reviewed the contents and found it has been properly revised and is now available. [3]

Mao Zedong

November 3rd, 5:00 PM

[1] This article, published in the People's Daily, Red Flag, and the editorial offices of the Liberation Army Daily, was written to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution in the Soviet Union. It was published on November 6, 1967, in the People's Daily, the Liberation Army Daily, and in the sixteenth issue of Red Flag, published on November 23. The first part of this item was written on the envelope on which Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Yao Wenyuan, a member of the group, submitted the third draft for review on October 27; the second part of this item was written on the envelope on which Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan submitted the sixth draft for review on November 3.

[2] On October 27, 1967, Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan sent the third draft of the editorial to Mao Zedong for review. They wrote: "The editorial draft was sent before, with the size of the typeface. Now we are sending you a large-print copy for your review." Mao Zedong did not make any changes to this draft.

[3] On November 3, 1967, when Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan sent the sixth draft of the editorial to Mao Zedong for review, they wrote: "This editorial has been revised again. The six points on Chairman Mao's thought have been newly reorganized. Lenin's words have been fully quoted. The article has had a certain impact on Soviet revisionism. We very much hope that the Chairman will read it and make revisions." The "six points on Chairman Mao's thought" here refer to the six points summarized in the draft for review: "The Key Points of Comrade Mao Zedong's Theory on Continuing the Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat": "First, socialist society must be viewed with the Marxist-Leninist law of the unity of opposites. Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: 'The law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the universe.' 'Contradictions are universal.' 'This contradiction within things is the fundamental cause of their development.' In socialist society, 'there are

two types of social contradictions: contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and contradictions among the people.' 'Contradictions between ourselves and the enemy are antagonistic contradictions. Contradictions among the people, especially among the working people, are non-antagonistic.' Comrade Mao Zedong told us: "It is necessary to 'draw a clear line between contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and contradictions among the people,' and 'correctly handle contradictions among the people,' in order to consolidate and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and develop the socialist system." Second, *'Socialist society is a relatively long historical stage. Within this historical stage of socialism, classes, class contradictions, and class struggle still exist. There is a struggle between the socialist and capitalist roads, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration.'* After the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production is basically complete, 'class struggle has not ended. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between various political forces, and the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological field will continue to be long-lasting, tortuous, and sometimes even fierce.'" To prevent the restoration of capitalism and to prevent "peaceful evolution," the socialist revolution on both the political and ideological fronts must be carried through to the end. Third, class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat is, in essence, still a question of power: the bourgeoisie seeks to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat, while the proletariat vigorously consolidates it. *The proletariat must exercise comprehensive dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the superstructure, including in all cultural spheres. "Our relationship with them is absolutely not one of equality, but rather one of one class oppressing the other, a relationship of dictatorship or autocracy exercised by the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. It cannot be any other relationship, such as so-called equality, peaceful coexistence between the exploited and the exploiting classes, or a relationship based on benevolence, righteousness, and morality."* Fourth, *the struggle between the two classes and two paths in society will inevitably be reflected within the Party. The handful of people in power within the Party who are taking the capitalist road are the representatives of the bourgeoisie within the Party. They are a group of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once the time is ripe, they will seize power and transform the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.* To consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must pay full attention to exposing the "Khrushchev-like figures" who are "sleeping beside us." We must fully expose them, criticize them, and bring them down to earth, preventing them from making an uprising. We must firmly return the power they have usurped to the hands of the proletariat. Fifth, to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the most important thing is to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. *"The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution can only be the liberation of the masses themselves." "The masses must educate themselves in this great revolutionary movement." In other words, this Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution utilizes the methods of great democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat, mobilizing the masses from the bottom up while simultaneously implementing a great alliance of proletarian revolutionaries and the*

*revolutionary three-in-one combination of the revolutionary masses, the People's Liberation Army, and the revolutionary cadres. 6. The fundamental program of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the ideological sphere is to "fight self and repudiate revisionism." "The proletariat must transform the world in accordance with its own world outlook, and the bourgeoisie must also transform the world in accordance with its own world outlook." Therefore, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a revolution that touches people's souls and aims to resolve the issue of their world outlook.* Revisionism must be criticized politically, ideologically, and theoretically, and proletarian ideology must be used to defeat bourgeois egoism and all non-proletarian ideologies. Education, literature and art must be reformed, and all superstructures that are incompatible with the socialist economic base must be reformed, eradicating the roots of revisionism. The text printed in italics, indicates Mao Zedong's relevant statements, which have been "reorganized." The draft submitted for review also extensively quoted Lenin's arguments regarding the need to consolidate and strengthen the proletarian dictatorship, given the existence of acute and complex class struggle and the possibility of capitalist restoration under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Regarding the statement in the draft submitted for review that "Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism-Leninism of the highest level in our time, Marxism-Leninism that transforms people's souls," Mao Zedong deleted the phrase "is Marxism-Leninism that transforms people's souls" during his review, but made no other textual revisions.

## **The Proletarian Educational Revolution Must Rely on Proletarian Revolutionaries**

(1967)

To carry out the proletarian educational revolution, we must rely on the vast number of revolutionary students, revolutionary teachers, and revolutionary workers in our schools, and on the activists among them—the proletarian revolutionaries who are determined to carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end [1].

[1] On November 3, 1967, the People's Daily published articles titled "Several Plans for Educational Revolution," with an editorial note, including "Preliminary Concepts for Educational Reform at Tongji University," "Beijing Forestry College to Abolish Teaching and Research Departments and Organize Professional Companies to Lead Teaching and Educational Reform," and "Beijing Normal University's Teaching Reform Group's Concepts for Reforming Examinations, Promotion and Retention, and Enrolment." The editorial note quoted Mao Zedong's words in bold.

## **Talks on the Ninth National Congress and Party Rectification [1]**

(November 5, 1967)

Today, let's discuss the Ninth National Congress and the Party rectification.

The first batch of feedback on the Ninth National Congress has arrived. Could you please summarize it and share it with all localities so that we can continue to solicit their opinions?

We should also continue to collect opinions from all localities on the Party rectification issue.

Opinions from many localities have not yet been reflected because they are still in chaos.

After more than a year of fighting, many bad elements have emerged. Now we need to create a new Party. Of course, the bad elements cannot be completely eradicated; it is impossible to do so all at once.

The Party rectification cannot be completed completely before the Ninth National Congress. After the Ninth National Congress, we will continue to rectify and build the Party based on the new Party Program and Constitution.

In the past, membership in the Party required either obedience (being a tamed tool) or good production. Obedience depended on the specifics; being a tamed tool wasn't enough. A branch secretary's words were final, and nothing was discussed or consulted. No opinions were sought. When a branch made a decision, it was necessary to consult with party members. If one review wasn't enough, it would be repeated. Party members were encouraged to express their opinions, and if one review wasn't enough, it would be repeated. But in many places, this wasn't the case. It was a dead, stagnant situation.

In the past, it was extremely difficult for young people to join the Communist Youth League, even more so than joining the Party. The Party and League organizations were controlled by certain individuals. Veteran Party members controlled the Party branch, and veteran League members controlled the League branch. The branch secretary was like an emperor. This was the case with Shashiyu Brigade Party branch secretary [2]. He controlled all Party, government, and financial power within the brigade, engaged in corruption, and yet both of his children went to college. Is this only true in Shashiyu? I don't believe it.

Some Party members have become arrogant because of their power. They do not respect democracy, do not consult with their superiors, and do not seek others' opinions before encountering problems. They just talk all the time and like to lecture others. General Chen [3] likes to use his many years of experience, including his experience of opposing me, to lecture others.

Party members need to be full of vitality. Those who are lifeless and decadent should not join this party. How can a revolutionary party be lifeless? Some people, in their twenties and

thirties—not young at all—feel very decadent, staying in rest homes everywhere, treating minor ailments with serious treatment, even those without. During this Cultural Revolution, the masses surged forward, and their illnesses vanished. Jet flights<sup>16</sup> actually cured their ailments. Hospital visits are rare now; a huge change has taken place. I don't want to listen to doctors all the time. I haven't checked my blood pressure in years. A few days ago, I had a fever of 38.5 degrees. The doctor wanted to take a heart scan, but I refused. I took two pills and it was fine. Of course, some people truly have illnesses, like heart disease, and they need treatment.

I sent Doctor Li down to work as a labourer, and it was quite interesting. They went to the Beijing Knitting Factory. When they arrived, I gave them a few instructions: first, conduct research and study first, and be like the masses' pupils; second, don't express your views lightly; and third, encourage the workers to unite on the basis of revolutionary principles. Why would they just go to a place and start talking nonsense? There were two factions in that factory, fighting fiercely. Initially, both sides accused them of conspiracy, but they held their ground and continued their research and study. Later, I said a few words, saying that there was no fundamental conflict of interest within the working class, and I saved them; otherwise, they would have kicked them out.

Now the two factions have united. One faction at that factory has over 1,200 members, while the other has over 800. The 800-member faction complained that the 1,200-member faction was being too defensive. The two factions were vying for position, but the larger faction adopted a high-handed stance, which ultimately resolved the issue. Six members from one faction, seven from the other, and two from those without affiliation, a total of 15 people formed the preparatory group for the Revolutionary Committee. Some people also went to the chemical plant, which was a complex place with many intellectuals, and those who went were besieged. They put up a slogan, and those we sent made irresponsible comments and said the wrong thing, and we were arrested by the people.

The Cultural Revolution was a purge of the Party, the League, the government, and the military—everyone, including the Party, government, military, people, and students, was purged. Who knew Zhang Ben [4] had a problematic past? This Cultural Revolution created many problems. Of course, it couldn't be completely eradicated in one go, but it did create quite a few. I agree with Comrade Kang Sheng's opinion: one is a traitor and a spy, and the other is someone who displayed very bad behavior during the Cultural Revolution and refused to repent. They can no longer participate in Party organizational activities. That's quite lenient.

Our Party needs to absorb new blood. Active elements among workers, poor peasants, and Red Guards must be recruited into the Party. The old blood contains too much carbon dioxide, which needs to be eliminated. A person has arteries and veins, circulating blood

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<sup>16</sup> Referring to the “jet plane position” some people were forced into during mass criticism sessions.

through the heart, and breathing through the lungs, exhaling carbon dioxide and inhaling fresh oxygen. This is the process of expelling the old and inhaling the new. A Party also needs to expel the old and inhale the new. Without eliminating waste, it will lack vitality.

Regarding how to rectify the Party, please draft a few measures. This is also for consultation purposes. These can be distributed in November, and a directive will be issued in December.

Restore organizational life, not the old ways. Some Party members were not active in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and upon hearing about the resumption of organizational life, they became arrogant again. I think these people need to reflect on themselves. Why are they not active in the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the revolutionary movement of the broad masses of the people? What's their reason? Simply to be docile tools.

We don't want people like this; there are too many of them. But they need to reflect on themselves. Some people don't want to be Party members, so forget it.

The acceptance of new members must be subject to public discussion.

The Party Program needs to be revised. I'm reading the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They founded the party several times. We shouldn't write a long program like the Soviet Communist Party's. From political economy to the duality of commodities to surplus value, it's incredibly long and tedious. Our Party Program shouldn't be too long. If it's too long, few people will read it. If the Party Program is a book, what will the workers and peasants think? It's just nonsense, and once it's dispersed, it's gone. Our Party Program is the general program at the beginning of the Party Constitution.

Organizational discipline is still necessary, but we're talking about conscious discipline. Blind obedience and being a docile tool won't do.

Organizational discipline requires certain conditions. First, it must be conscious. Second, it must be connected to the masses. Third, it must be guided by a correct political line. Being a docile tool for Chen Duxiu or Qu Qiubai is not acceptable. When we opposed Chen Duxiu at the August 7th Conference, we didn't act as his docile tool.

Organizational discipline is conditional and relative. Unconditional discipline is unacceptable. Lenin outlined these three prerequisites in "Left-Wing Childishness." If you are revolutionary and your political line is correct, people will naturally obey you. After a victory, soldiers are happy and don't gossip about their leaders. After a defeat, gossip abounds. The People's Liberation Army has the best discipline. When they captured Jinzhou, they didn't touch any of the apples. This discipline is built on the foundation of serving the revolution. Of course, there are individual PLA soldiers who violate discipline; it's not an absolute rule.

The newspapers are all reporting positive things now. Reporting on internal affairs is so difficult, I don't believe it. I just don't believe everything is black.

Liu and Deng collaborated with each other. The resolutions of the Eighth Congress were passed without going through the presidium or asking for my opinion. As soon as they were passed, I opposed them. In 1963, they created the Ten Points [5], and just three months later, they held another meeting to come up with the Ten Points, [6], without asking for my opinion, and I didn't even attend. Deng Xiaoping wants to criticize it, and he asked the Military Commission to prepare an article. My opinion is that we should distinguish him from Liu Shaoqi and figure out how to separate Liu and Deng.

Two things:

Regarding the Ninth National Congress, we need to consolidate the first batch of materials and disseminate them.

Regarding Party rectification, we need to discuss what kind of Party we should rectify, how one should divide into two with the veteran Party members, how we should recruit new members, and how we should restore organizational life without returning to the old ways. We need to come up with some solutions.

We also need to discuss the issue of abolishing ranks.

[1] This is a conversation between Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[2] Zhang Guishun (1914-1999), Party Secretary of Shashiyu Brigade, was a native of Zunhua, Hebei. He joined the Communist Party of China in 1941 and served as Party Secretary of Shashiyu Village for nearly 20 years.

[3] General Chen refers to Chen Yi. On June 22, 1929, the Front Committee of the Red Fourth Army convened its Seventh Party Congress, chaired by Chen Yi, then acting Secretary of the Front Committee. The congress resolved the then-current debate over whether to abolish the Military Commission. Mao Zedong explicitly opposed abolishing the Military Commission. At the meeting, Chen Yi stripped Mao of his military command authority. Later, realizing his mistake through practical experience, Chen Yi reported his work to the Party Central Committee. In October of that year, he wrote three letters requesting Mao Zedong's return as Secretary of the Front Committee.

[4] Zhang Ben, formerly the director of the Revolutionary Committee of the Science and Technology Commission of the People's Republic of China. Qi Xianghong of the State Science and Technology Commission published an article titled "A Desperate Struggle with the Kuomintang Reactionaries: Thoroughly Settling the Heinous Crimes of the Traitor, Spy, and Current Counter-Revolutionary Zhang Ben" in the combined fourth and fifth issues of 1968 in the journal Scientific Research Criticism. The article enumerated Zhang Ben's counter-revolutionary crimes.

[5] The ten points refer to the first ten. On May 20, 1963, Mao Zedong presided over the drafting of the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Issues Concerning Current Rural Work (Draft)."

[6] On September 20, 1963, Liu Shaoqi presided over the drafting of the "Regulations on Certain Specific Policies in the Rural Socialist Education Movement (Draft)."

## **Reposting Chen Yonggui's Comments on the Rural Cultural Revolution Movement [1]**

(November 7, 1967)

Comrade Boda and fellow Cultural Revolution comrades:

This document seems suitable for forwarding to the countryside. Please proceed as appropriate.

Mao Zedong

November 7

[1] This comment appeared in Express No. 5290, published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group Office on November 5, 1967. This issue of Express contained a five-part speech by Chen Yonggui, Deputy Director of the Shanxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee, on the "Rural Cultural Revolution Movement." First, "The Rural Cultural Revolution Movement must target the largest handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party" and "their handful of black minions, who have extended themselves into the provinces, prefectures, and counties. They must be severely criticized and fought against, their pernicious influence utterly eradicated." Second, Chairman Mao's directives must be resolutely implemented, trusting and relying on the majority of cadres, ensuring they both lead the movement and organize production. The spearhead must absolutely not be directed against the vast majority of grassroots rural cadres or against one's own people. The Cultural Revolution is not about overthrowing everything. To overthrow everything would not defeat the enemy; instead, it would expand their power and undermine the Cultural Revolution in the countryside. Third, in places where revolutionary committees have been established, the Cultural Revolution in the countryside must be directly led by the county and commune levels. Revolutionary leading cadres must go deep into the brigades and production teams to conduct investigations and research, understand the situation, grasp the direction, and help resolve problems at the grassroots level. Fourth, we must rely on the poor and lower-middle peasants and organize a large Cultural Revolution army composed primarily of them to liberate and educate themselves. At the same time, we must resolutely suppress the sabotage activities of landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and bad elements. Fifth, we must hold extensive Mao Zedong Thought study classes, focusing on "fighting selfish and repudiating revisionism," to strengthen ideological education for brigade and production team cadres. On November 7, 1967, the CPC Central Committee and the Central Cultural Revolution Group forwarded Chen Yonggui's speech.

**Comments on the Brief Report on the Mao Zedong Thought Study Classes in the Prefectures, Prefectures, and Counties of Yunnan Province [1]**

(November 15, 1967)

Comrades of the Cultural Revolution Group and the meeting:

I suggest that this document be forwarded to all locations for reference. It is concise and to the point, and it addresses the essence of the problem. Please discuss and decide.

Mao Zedong

November 15<sup>th</sup>

[1] This comment was written on a report submitted by the Yunnan Provincial Military Control Commission to the Central Military Commission and the Central Cultural Revolution Group on November 11, 1967. The report stated that all prefectures, counties, and districts in the province were implementing the call for large-scale Mao Zedong Thought study sessions. Over the past month, local military Party committees, military control commissions at all levels, and support-the-left organizations have prioritized this work and strengthened leadership. According to incomplete statistics, by the end of October, 356 study sessions of various types had been held or were ongoing, with over 13,000 participants. The main achievements of these sessions include: 1. Petty-bourgeois factionalism, mountaintopism, and small groupism have been examined and overcome to varying degrees, promoting the great revolutionary unity. 2. A deeper understanding of the significance of liberating revolutionary cadres has been achieved, and the "selfish" nature of cadre issues has been examined and overcome to varying degrees. 3. We have further recognized the favorable situation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and established a firm resolve and confidence to carry it through to the end. Study sessions are being summarized in various locations. Initial insights from some sessions in southern Yunnan are as follows: 1. The guiding ideology must be clear. We must take "fighting selfish and repudiating revisionism" as our guiding principle, summarize the lessons learned from the previous period, and learn to use Mao Zedong Thought to answer and resolve the most pressing and important issues in the current movement. 2. We must always focus on Chairman Mao's "Five Old Articles"<sup>17</sup> and his latest directives. We must study them repeatedly and diligently, focusing on issues such as the great unity, cadre issues, and the "three combinations," continuously deepening our understanding and conducting comparative examinations. We must focus on the major issues and the general direction, and avoid getting bogged down in minor details. 3. We must grasp the key points. In light of actual conditions, we must thoroughly address one or

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<sup>17</sup> The articles were Serve the People, In Memory of Norman Bethune, The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountains, On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, and Combat Liberalism.

two key issues. 4. In implementing the mass line principle, we must consistently apply the formula of "unity-criticism and self-criticism-unity." We must engage in self-criticism, refrain from blaming others, and avoid imposing our own opinions on others. 5. We must strengthen leadership. We should study together with the students, foster and cultivate the advanced and emerging ideas among the masses, and summarize and promote them.

## **Forwarding the Jiangxi Provincial Revolutionary Preparatory Group's Notes on the Experience of Working Methods [1]**

(November 16, 1967)

1

Comrade Yao Wenyan [2]:

The four experiences gained from Jiangxi work seem worth sharing with other places for reference. Please consult with all comrades and make your own decisions.

Mao Zedong

November 16

2

This phenomenon exists in many places across the country.

[1] This article is a critique of the article "The Jiangxi Provincial Revolutionary Preparatory Group Should Pay Attention to Working Methods," published in Express No. 5414, compiled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group Office on November 30, 1967. The article states that the Jiangxi Provincial Revolutionary Preparatory Group, in implementing the Central Committee's decisions on handling the Jiangxi issue, adhered to Chairman Mao's teachings and paid attention to working methods. Its experience is as follows: 1. Focusing on the central task, it sought living role models and used the masses to educate the masses. At critical moments in the movement, it adopted the method of using role models to inspire the general public. 2. Going deep into the masses, listening to their opinions, and grasping their living thoughts. 3. Sending large numbers of Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams to carry out propaganda work in factories, mines, and rural areas, in conjunction with the central task, and promoting revolution and production. The Provincial Revolutionary Preparatory Group believed that a major reason for the failure of the situation to improve rapidly was that Chairman Mao's voice was not being heard. (After this sentence, Mao Zedong included a critique in brackets, which is the second part of this article.) 4. Persisting in studying Chairman Mao's works to promote their own revolutionization.

[2] Yao Wenyan was a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at that time.

## **A Speech to the Representatives of the Congress of Active Studiers of Chairman Mao's Works in the Navy**

(November 19, 1967)

This badge is great. With both the Navy and the Air Force, and so many people involved, I feel reassured.

[1] Refers to the badge presented to Mao Zedong by the Navy's Congress of Active Participants in Studying Chairman Mao's Works.

**Comments on the article "The Struggle of Two Roads in Rural China" [1] by the editorial board of two newspapers and one journal**

(November 20, 1967)

I have read it and it is acceptable. The cited materials must be verified for authenticity.

Mao Zedong

November 20

[1] This article, written by the editorial boards of People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily, was published in the sixteenth issue of each on November 23, 1967.

## **Comments on the "Red Riot" at Zhejiang University: The Principle of Unity Should Be Maintained [1]**

(November 22, 1967)

Comrades Lin Biao and Enlai, for your perusal.

The Red Rage in Zhejiang is different from the Million Heroes in Hubei [2]. This is an old rebel group that has made mistakes. Many people seem to agree with Comrade Yao Wen Yuan's opinion, adhering to the principles of assistance, criticism, and unity. Please discuss and decide what to do.

Mao Zedong

November 22

[1] This is a commentary on the article "Comrades Nan Ping and Chen Liyun Disagree on Uniting with the 'Red Storm' Faction," published in issue 5510 of the "Kuai Bao" published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group in November 1967. The article states that on November 16, during a discussion of the grand revolutionary unity at the Zhejiang Provincial Military Control Commission, Nan Ping, the political commissar of the 20th Army, and Chen Liyun, the political commissar of the 5th Air Force, disagreed on whether to unite with the "Red Storm" (a mass organization at Zhejiang University). Nan Ping believed that the policy of unity and education should be adopted towards revolutionary rebel organizations that had made mistakes. The Zhejiang University "Red Storm" and the "Medical University Corps" were old rebels who had made mistakes. Now that they were willing to return to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, they should be united with, and the tactics of division and disintegration should no longer be adopted. Chen Liyun believed that organizations like the Zhejiang University "Red Violence" and the "Medical University Corps" had made errors in their direction and line, and had not yet corrected them. To maintain the purity of the rebel faction, they could not unite with them and must resist. On November 21st, Yao Wen Yuan, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group, submitted this material to Mao Zedong, writing: "I think that of the two opinions, the Nanping faction's seems to be more consistent with the Chairman's line and policies; adopting a policy of total exclusion and refusal to unite with the 'Red Violence' faction would be disadvantageous."

[2] The "Million Heroes" was a mass organization in Wuhan. During the July 20 Incident in Wuhan in 1967, it was wrongly labelled a "counter-revolutionary organization." On November 26, 1978, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded the "Request for Instructions on the Handling of the July 20 Incident" from the Hubei Provincial

Committee, the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and the Wuhan Military Region Party Committee, rehabilitating the "Million Heroes" mass organization.

## **Do not impose external propaganda on others**

(1967 to 1970)

1

Comrade Kang Sheng [1]: This issue is worth noting. I believe An Zhai's opinion is correct.

What is your opinion? Please let me know. [2]

(27 November 1967)

2

Don't do that, it won't work. Different countries have different approaches. [3]

(7 March 1968)

3

These are imposed on people. Don't do that. [4]

(12 March 1968)

4

I have said this many times. Publicity (both external and internal) should be resolutely and gradually reformed. [5]

(17 March 1968)

5

Generally speaking, we should not interfere in the internal affairs of foreign parties (Marxist-Leninist). How they propagate their ideas is their business. We should pay attention to our own propaganda and not exaggerate or say things that are inappropriate, giving people the impression that we are imposing our ideas on them. [6]

(29 March 1968)

6

Don't use these empty words anymore. [7]

(6 April 1968)

7

Such words should not come from the mouths of Chinese people. This is the so-called 'I-centric' erroneous thinking. [8]

(16 May 1968)

8

First, be careful not to impose your will on others. Second, do not propagate that the people's movements in foreign countries are influenced by China, as such propaganda is easily exploited by reactionaries and is not conducive to the people's movements. [9]

(29 May 1968)

9

The name issue is not very important and can be postponed. The bourgeoisie has left behind many things, such as republics, engineers, and so on, which are too numerous to list. We cannot change them all. This matter should be postponed. [10]

(August 1968)

10

Delete some of the irrelevant chatter. Don't brag to foreigners. [11]

(September 1968)

11

Remove Article 11: Do not praise yourself with slogans issued in your own name. [12]

(September 1968)

12

Please note: Please refrain from such unrealistic self-praise in the future. [13]

(June 1969).

13

For all foreigners, we do not require them to acknowledge Chinese ideas, but only to acknowledge the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism combined with the specific practices of the revolution in their own countries. This is a fundamental principle. I have said this many times. As for their other unhealthy ideas besides Marxism-Leninism, they will come to realise this themselves, and we need not treat it as a serious issue when talking with foreign comrades. Just look at how our Party has gone through so many erroneous lines before gradually getting back on the right track, and even now there are still issues, namely, both internal and external great chauvinism, which must be overcome. [14]

(6 December 1970)

[1] Kang Sheng, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and advisor to the CPC Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group.

[2] This is Mao Zedong's comment on the Foreign Affairs Department of the CPC Central Committee's briefing for foreign guests, "An Zhai and others believe that Japan cannot follow the path of encircling the cities from the countryside."

[3] This is Mao Zedong's comment on the request report regarding the spraying of Chairman Mao's quotations on foreign aid aircraft.

[4] When reviewing a report on the handover of a foreign aid project, Mao Zedong deleted the following passage: "During the handover ceremony, we should vigorously promote the invincible Mao Zedong Thought and explain that the achievements of our foreign aid in constructing the project are the result of our faithful implementation of the great leader Chairman Mao's teachings on internationalism, and are a victory of the great Mao Zedong Thought." He then wrote this comment.

[5] This is Mao Zedong's comment on a report submitted by the General Secretary of the New Zealand Communist Party, Wilcox, criticising China's foreign propaganda work. In March 1967, during his visit, Wilcox pointed out that China's English-language foreign propaganda had good content, but the language and form used were incompatible with the people of English-speaking countries and were likely to cause resentment. In November of the same year, Wilcox again commissioned the Chairman of the Australian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), Hill, who was visiting China, to convey his opinions on China's foreign propaganda work, stating that 'Chinese comrades should pay close attention to preventing great-power chauvinism.'

[6] This is Mao Zedong's comment on the Myanmar Communist Party Central Committee's request to publish a statement in the People's Daily marking the 20th anniversary of the Myanmar Communist Party's armed struggle. The statement concerns the Myanmar Communist Party's evaluation of Mao Zedong Thought.

[7] When Mao Zedong reviewed the document drafted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Department of International Liaison and the General Staff Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army regarding the training of foreign personnel, he deleted the phrase "primarily to promote the great mentor of revolutionaries worldwide and the invincible Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought", and wrote this comment.

[8] When Mao Zedong was reviewing a report from the Military Administration Group of the National Defence Industry of the Chinese People's Liberation Army requesting that he meet with representatives attending a meeting of the Seventh Ministry of Machinery Industry, he drew two lines under the phrase "the centre of world revolution — Beijing" in the report and wrote this comment.

[9] This is Mao Zedong's comment on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' proposal to strengthen the promotion of Mao Zedong Thought and support the revolutionary struggles of the masses in Western Europe and North America.

[10] This is Mao Zedong's comment on a report by the Central Military Commission's Office on changing the name of military experts assisting other countries. The report said that 'military expert' is a term used in capitalist societies to refer to bourgeois 'military academic authorities,' which is not appropriate for the status of Chinese People's Liberation Army personnel assisting other countries.

[11] This is Mao Zedong's comment written while reviewing the editorial of the People's Daily titled 'The Direction of Victory for the Revolutionary People of the World' (first draft).

[12] When Mao Zedong reviewed the draft of the 'Slogans and Mottos for Celebrating the 19th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China' prepared by the Central Cultural Revolution Group of the Communist Party of China, he deleted the eleventh item, 'Pay tribute to the Central Cultural Revolution Group for its great achievements!' and wrote this comment.

[13] When Mao Zedong was reviewing the draft of the editorial "Long Live the Communist Party of China: Commemorating the 48th Anniversary of the Birth of the Communist Party of China" for the People's Daily, Red Flag Magazine, and Liberation Army Daily, he added the words "with initial achievements' before "prosperous" in the sentence "In the past 20 years, a series of great victories have been achieved in socialist revolution and socialist construction, turning a poor and backward old China into a prosperous and powerful socialist country", changed "powerful country" to "country", and wrote this comment.

[14] This is Mao Zedong's comment on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Department of International Liaison's "Request to Invite a Delegation from the Dutch Communist Unity Movement (Marxist-Leninist) to Visit China."

## **Telegram from Mao Zedong and others congratulating the 23rd anniversary of the liberation of Albania**

(November 28, 1967)

Tirana

Comrade Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania; Comrade Hanci Rehi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania; Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania:

On the great occasion of the 23rd anniversary of Albania's liberation, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Chinese people, we extend our warmest congratulations to the glorious Party of Labor of Albania, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, and the fraternal Albanian people.

Under the wise leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, the heroic Albanian people have consistently adhered to the proletarian revolutionary line. Through armed struggle, they defeated fascist imperialism, established people's power, and embarked on the path of socialism.

After liberation, the Albanian Party of Labor and the Albanian people, upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat and the principle of self-reliance, crushed the conspiracies, sabotage, and subversive activities of class enemies at home and abroad, and achieved brilliant achievements in the cause of socialist revolution and socialist construction.

In recent years, the Albanian Party of Labor and the Albanian government have adopted a series of major measures, carrying out a broad and in-depth revolutionization movement in all aspects of Party and state life. This has created new experience in strengthening and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing the restoration of capitalism. This revolutionization movement has not only far-reaching significance in ensuring Albania's victorious progress along the socialist road, but has also made an outstanding contribution to enriching the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism.

The Albanian Party of Labor, government, and people have consistently upheld the banner of opposing imperialism and adhered to a revolutionary foreign policy. They have resolutely opposed the policies of aggression and war of imperialism, led by the United States, firmly supported the Vietnamese people's war of resistance against the United States and for national salvation, and firmly supported the struggles of all oppressed peoples and nations for liberation. This clear-cut stand against imperialism and the spirit of proletarian internationalism have earned high praise from revolutionary peoples throughout the world.

The Albanian Party of Labor, government, and people have always stood at the forefront of the anti-revisionist struggle, resolutely waging a sharp and uncompromising struggle against modern revisionism centred on the leadership of the CPSU and the traitorous Tito [1] clique, demonstrating a high degree of Marxist-Leninist principle. Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people throughout the world will forever remember Albania's immortal historical contributions in this anti-revisionist struggle, which hinges on the fate of humanity.

Under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour, headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, the People's Republic of Albania has become a staunch socialist bastion in Europe.

Dear comrades, fellow fighters: In the common struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism, in the common cause of socialist revolution and socialist construction, the friendly and cooperative relations established between our two parties, two countries, and two peoples are those of true comrades and comrades-in-arms. These relations grow closer and deeper year by year. We would like to take this opportunity to express to you our conviction: no matter what happens in the world, no matter when, the Chinese people will always stand united with the fraternal Albanian people, fighting shoulder to shoulder and advancing together to fight to the end for the complete victory of the proletarian revolution throughout the world!

Long live the great revolutionary friendship between the Chinese and Algerian parties and peoples!

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

November 28, 1967

[1] Tito was then Chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and President of Yugoslavia.

## **Comments on the Draft of the Central Committee's Notice on Soliciting Opinions on Convening the Ninth National Congress [1]**

(November 1967)

1

A few sentences have been deleted. [2] Please read this with Comrade Lin Biao [3], and then return it to Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Jiang Qing [4].

2

Don't use these two sentences.

3

It's not good to delete it, but there's no need to rewrite it. [5]

Mao Zedong

November 25th, 2:00 PM

[1] This notice compiled the first wave of opinions received following the issuance of the Central Committee's "Notice on Soliciting Opinions on the Ninth National Congress." Its main contents included the fundamental tasks of the Ninth National Congress, building the Party with Mao Zedong Thought and revising the Party Program and Constitution, summarizing the experience of and conducting education on the struggle between lines, rectifying the Party's organization and reforming its leading bodies, the conditions and criteria for electing the Central Committee, and the timing, scale, selection of delegates, and methods of convening the Ninth National Congress. On November 21, 1967, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Jiang Qing submitted the draft notice to Mao Zedong for review. The notice stated: "In accordance with the Chairman's instructions earlier this month, Comrades Kang Sheng and Wen Yuan collected and reviewed opinions from various localities and units and drafted this notice. The notice was discussed and revised at the expanded group meeting on the evening of the 20th. We now submit a revised reprint for your review and approval." This notice was distributed on November 27.

[2] While reviewing the draft, Mao Zedong made two deletions and revisions: First, in the section on the most fundamental tasks of the Ninth National Congress, he deleted the phrase "highly uphold the absolute authority of the great leader Chairman Mao and the great Mao Zedong Thought, and highly uphold the absolute authority of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line," and wrote a comment, which is now part 2 of this article. Second, in this section, he also deleted the three words "and good student" from the sentence "The Ninth National Congress should vigorously publicize that Vice Chairman Lin

was Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms and good student." Furthermore, some minor wording was revised, primarily in the section on rectifying the Party organization and reforming the leadership, changing the sentence "Make the Party organization a contingent of advanced elements of the proletariat, a vigorous vanguard organization capable of leading the class and the masses in the fight against class enemies" to "Make the Party organization a contingent of advanced elements of the proletariat, a vigorous vanguard organization capable of leading the working class and the revolutionary masses in the fight against class enemies."

[3] Lin Biao was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

[4] Chen Boda, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Kang Sheng, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Jiang Qing, then deputy head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[5] This comment was written on a telephone transcript compiled by Lin Biao's office on November 25, 1967. The transcript states, "Comrade Lin Biao instructed by telephone that he advocated deleting the entire third paragraph on page 2, or rewording it to be more toned down. He believed the original text gave him too high a compliment." The full text of the third paragraph on page 2 of the CPC Central Committee's bulletin reads, "Many comrades suggested that the Ninth National Congress should vigorously publicize Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms and good student, and Chairman Mao's successor, and that this should be included in the Ninth National Congress's report and resolutions, thus further enhancing Vice Chairman Lin's lofty prestige." Lin Biao saw the draft that had been reviewed and revised by Mao Zedong, in which the three words "and good student" following "Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms" in this paragraph had been deleted by Mao.

## Comments and Revisions on the Central Committee's Draft Directive on the Cultural Revolution in Rural Areas This Winter and Next Spring [1]

(November 1967)

1

Implement this.

2

After more than a year of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the vast majority of poor and lower-middle peasants were further mobilized, achieving dual victories in both revolution and production. The current rural situation is excellent. *Only a small number of disaster-stricken areas and those controlled by capitalist-roaders, landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and bad elements are experiencing poor conditions.*

[1] This first section was written on a draft directive submitted for review by Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, advisor to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group, Chen Boda, group leader, and Jiang Qing, deputy group leader, on November 8, 1967. This second section is a revision of the first paragraph of the draft directive, with text added by Mao Zedong, printed in italics. On December 4, 1967, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this directive, with the title changed to "Directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Cultural Revolution in the Countryside This Winter and Next Spring."

**Military training sessions must include soldiers.**

(1967)

Military training sessions must include soldiers. [1]

[1] On December 12, 1967, the People's Daily published this sentence in bold in its column "Chairman Mao's Latest Instructions."

## Comments on the Absolute Authority of the Great Tree [1]

(December 17, 1967)

Lin, Zhou [2], and all comrades from the Central Committee and the Cultural Revolution:

(1) The term "absolute authority" is inappropriate. There has never been a single absolute authority. All authority is relative, and everything absolute exists only within relative things, just as absolute truth is the sum of countless relative truths, and absolute truth exists only within each relative truth.

(2) The term "cultivating a large tree" is also inappropriate. Authority or prestige can only be established naturally through the practice of struggle, not artificially. Prestige established in this way will inevitably collapse.

(3) The Party Central Committee long ago banned birthday celebrations, and this ban should be reiterated nationwide.

(4) The Hunan rally should be held on a different date.

(5) We do not want inscriptions.

(6) Regarding the name of the meeting, we can agree with Hunan's suggestion and use the first option.

I hope that all the above points will be discussed and approved at a single meeting.

Mao Zedong

December 17

[1] This comment was written on a report submitted by the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee Preparatory Group on December 13, 1967, to the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and to Zhou Enlai regarding the celebration of the inauguration of the Mao Zedong statue and the opening of the Shaoshan Railway. The report stated that after a year of hard work, the construction of Chairman Mao's statue in Shaoshan and the railway to Shaoshan were nearing completion, and the general public demanded a grand opening ceremony on December 26th of that year, Chairman Mao's 74th birthday. "In order to fully uphold the absolute authority of Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought, the Provincial Revolutionary Preparatory Group, after deliberation, agrees to hold a grand celebration on December 26th," specifically requesting the following three matters: 1. "Chairman Mao to write an inscription for 'Shaoshan Railway Station' (or 'Shaoshan Station')"; 2. "Vice Chairman Lin and Premier Zhou to write inscriptions for the inauguration of Chairman Mao's statue, and to send representatives

from the Central Committee, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and the Central Military Commission to Shaoshan to participate in the celebration." 2. Regarding the name of the ceremony, there are two opinions. (1) "The ceremony should be called the Chairman Mao Statue Dedication and Shaoshan Railway Opening Ceremony." (2) "The ceremony should be called the Celebration of the Great Leader Chairman Mao's 74th Birthday. The statue dedication and railway opening ceremony will be held at the ceremony." "We consider that, out of respect for the great leader Chairman Mao's instruction not to celebrate birthdays, we believe the first option is the best." 3. "On this day, a celebration rally of approximately 50,000 people will be held in Shaoshan. Simultaneous celebrations will be organized at railway stations in Changsha, Caizhou, and Xiangtan. In addition to organizing extensive publicity activities by the provincial newspaper and relevant propaganda departments, we hope that the New Film Studio will produce a news documentary." On December 21, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded Mao Zedong's comments and the report of the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Preparatory Group.

[2] Lin refers to Lin Biao, who was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.

**Comments on the draft of "Decision on the Implementation of Military Control over Xinhua News Agency" [1]**

(December 17, 1967)

Deleted several inappropriate adjectives in Article 3.

Mao Zedong,

December 17

[1] On December 16, 1967, Zhou Enlai and others submitted a draft decision by the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group for review. Article 3 of Part II stated: "Strive to establish a strong leadership core that is infinitely loyal to Chairman Mao, infinitely loyal to Mao Zedong Thought, and infinitely loyal to Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, and gradually build a news team that is deeply proletarian and deeply militant." While reviewing the draft, Mao Zedong deleted three instances of "infinitely" and two instances of "deeply" and wrote this comment. On December 18, the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued this decision.

## **Telegram Congratulating the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on its Seventh Anniversary**

(December 19, 1967)

Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho [1]:

On the seventh anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, on behalf of the people of China, I extend my warmest congratulations to the fighting people of South Vietnam.

You fought well! Under extremely difficult conditions, relying on your own strength, you have driven the world's most vicious U.S. imperialism into a corner and left it in a state of disarray. This is a great victory. The people of China salute you.

Your victory once again demonstrates that no matter how big or small a country is, as long as it fully mobilizes its people, firmly relies on them, and waged a people's war, any powerful enemy can be defeated. The Vietnamese people, under the wise leadership of their great leader, President Ho Chi Minh [2], in their war to resist the US and save their nation, set a shining example for the liberation struggles of oppressed peoples and nations throughout the world.

The American invaders' days in Vietnam are numbered. However, all reactionary forces, when on the verge of destruction, will inevitably launch a desperate struggle. They will inevitably resort to various military adventures and political deceptions to save themselves from destruction. The revolutionary people will inevitably encounter various difficulties before achieving final victory, but these difficulties are surmountable; no difficulty can stop the revolutionary people's advance. Perseverance is victory. I firmly believe that if the Vietnamese people persevere in a protracted war, they will surely drive the American invaders out of Vietnam.

We firmly support you. Our two countries are neighbors as close as lips and teeth. Our two peoples are brothers who share weal and woe. The fraternal people of South Vietnam and the entire Vietnamese people can be confident that your struggle is our struggle. The 700 million Chinese people are the staunch backing of the Vietnamese people, and the vast Chinese territory is their reliable rear base. In the face of the resolute fighting unity of our two peoples, any military adventures and political deceptions of U.S. imperialism are doomed to fail.

Victory will surely belong to the heroic Vietnamese people!

Mao Zedong

December 19, 1967

[1] Nguyen Huu Tho, then Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

[2] Ho Chi Minh, then Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

**Comments on the New Year's Day Editorial Draft of Two Newspapers and One Magazine,  
"Welcome the Complete Victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"**

(December 29, 1967)

Comrade Yao Wenyan [1]:

I have read it and think it is acceptable. I have removed a few exaggerated adjectives [2].  
Please consider it.

Mao Zedong

December 29, 4:00 a.m.

[1] Yao Wenyan, then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, submitted the 1968 New Year's Day editorial draft for People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily, titled "Welcome the Complete Victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," to Mao Zedong for review on December 28, 1967. He wrote: "The New Year's Day editorial has been discussed and approved at the meeting (twice). I am submitting it here. Please review and approve its appropriateness!" The editorial was published in the two newspapers and one magazine on January 1, 1968.

[2] In the draft editorial Yao Wenyan submitted for review, Mao Zedong deleted the phrase "long live the red sun in the hearts of the people of the world!" from the sentence "We sincerely wish our great mentor, Chairman Mao, the red sun in the hearts of the people of the world, a long life! Long live the red sun!" He also deleted the five words "highest level" from the sentence "The Chinese Communist Party is armed with the highest level of contemporary Marxism-Leninism—Mao Zedong Thought."

## 1967: Writings and Speeches

### Mao Zedong

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