



1966:

Writings and speeches

Mao Zedong

Introduction

In 2013, a private collector of Mao Zedong's works and related memorabilia, published 52 volumes of the Collected Works of Mao Zedong.

Zhang Dijie, from Luoyang City in Henan province was born in December 1959, and joined the PLA in 1976, the year of Mao's death. He began collecting everything he could related to the writings of Chairman Mao, and his 52 volumes, each often comprising 500 or so pages, spans the first poem written by Mao in 1901 at the age of 8 years old, to the final message attributed to Mao before his death, the message on the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea.

According to Zhang Dijie, over 36 years of painstaking effort he had accumulated 102,000 copies and 15,000 editions of Mao's works from over 130 countries. The content of the published collection, by a Hong Kong publishing house, comprises 30% that is widely known, 50% that has only been released to a limited audience, and 20% published for the first time.

I have chosen to translate those parts of Volumes 48 and 49 that span the year 1966. The five volumes of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong published in various languages by the Foreign Language Press, Beijing, have made Chairman Mao's writings on protracted people's war, the New Democratic Revolution, literature and art, and a host of other topics prior to the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution available to the international communist movement.

I am not fluent in Chinese. I know enough to get by on a daily basis in China, but for the sake of getting the job done quickly, I use the online translators Google Translate and Deepl. As good as they are, they invariably contain errors or contain references that need to be explained for non-Chinese readers. I can at least recognise and correct the errors, and search the internet in Chinese to find the information that will help readers.

There are two types of footnotes in this collection of Mao's speeches and writings. Those enclosed in [] brackets at the end of each writing or speech by Mao are by Zhang Dijie, those at the bottom of a page are my own. There are not many of the latter. Those by Zhang Dijie are translated as they appear in his collection. Some are simply matters of fact ("XXX was at that time director of such and such an institution") while others reflect the revisionist reappraisal of events and people connected with the GPCR. Comrades will no doubt be able to use their own bullshit detectors in relation to the latter.

I have not been able to contact Comrade Zhang Dijie to thank him for his great effort in collecting and publishing the 52 volumes of Mao's Collected Works, so I use this opportunity to acknowledge his great contribution to our knowledge of Mao's thinking across the years, and particularly during the tumultuous year that saw the launching of the GPCR.

Nick G. (Contents pages at rear)

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating the People's Republic of Albania on its 20th Anniversary

(January 10, 1966)

Tirana

Comrade Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania; Comrade Hanci Rehi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania; Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania:

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of Albania, on behalf of the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China, and the Government of the People's Republic of China, we extend our warmest congratulations to the Albanian people, the Party of Labor of Albania, and the Government of the People's Republic of Albania.

The founding of the People's Republic of Albania marks another event of great historical significance in the lives of the Albanian people, following the Liberation Day of Albania on November 29, 1944. Over the past twenty years, the hardworking and courageous Albanian people, under the wise leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, have achieved tremendous successes in the cause of socialist revolution and socialist construction. Albania has successfully completed its Third Five-Year Plan. Currently, upholding the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, hard work, and arduous struggle, the Albanian people are confidently working towards the realization of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, which begins this year. The Chinese people are heartfully happy for the great achievements of the brotherly Albanian people. We are deeply convinced that the Albanian people will achieve new and greater victories on the road to building socialism.

The Albanian Party of Labor, the government of the People's Republic of Albania, and the Albanian people have upheld the revolutionary banner of Marxism-Leninism and resolutely opposed Khrushchev's revisionism. They have also upheld the battle banner against imperialism, resolutely opposed the aggressive and warlike policies of U.S. imperialism, and actively supported the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and throughout the world, making significant contributions to safeguarding world peace and promoting human progress. The international influence and prestige of the Albanian Party of Labor and the People's Republic of Albania are growing.

In the cause of opposing imperialism, building socialism, and promoting the world people's revolution, and in the struggle against modern revisionism and in defense of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese and Algerian parties, the two countries, and the two peoples have always worked closely together and supported each other, forging a great friendship and a

fighting bond. Our friendship and unity, founded on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is eternal and unbreakable, and will radiate ever brighter light.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China

Zhu De, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

January 10, 1966

Letter to Zhang Shizhao [1]

(January 12, 1966)

Mr. Xingyan:

I have read your letter of December 16, 1965, and its attachments. I am deeply grateful! I have also received the "Three Kingdoms" volume [2], which I will use as a souvenir. I would like to express my gratitude to you at your convenience. Comrade Kang Sheng has read the great work "Essentials of Liu's Writings" and submitted it to me [3]. I have some comments on the wording and sentence structure. Please consider whether they are appropriate. Best wishes! Spring Festival [1]

Mao Zedong

January 12, 1966

PS. Attached are two sheets of paper and a letter [4] from Comrade Kang Sheng.

[1] Zhang Shizhao, also known by his courtesy name Xingyan, was a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and director of the Central Academy of Literature and History at the time.

[2] The Records of the Three Kingdoms is a chronicle of the Wei, Shu, and Wu kingdoms written by Chen Shou in the Western Jin Dynasty. It consists of three volumes: Wei, Shu, and Wu, totalling 600,000 volumes. The three volumes were originally independent, but were later combined into one.

[3] Essentials of Liu's Writings is a book written by Zhang Shizhao that specifically studies the collected works of Liu Zongyuan, a Tang Dynasty writer. On August 5, 1965, Mao Zedong forwarded the manuscript to Kang Sheng, Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, for reading. On December 5, Kang Sheng wrote to Mao Zedong, "After reading it, I feel that the Chairman's evaluation of this book in his letter of August 5 is very pertinent and completely correct." "Since some people already know that the Chairman has read the book, I have made a few comments and marked them on slips of paper. Please review them and see if any words or sentences need to be edited." "Essentials of Liu's Writings," after revisions by the author, was officially published by Zhonghua Book Company in 1971.

[4] Refers to Kang Sheng's letter to Mao Zedong on December 5, 1965.

Letter to Zhou Shizhao [1]

(January 29, 1966)

Brother Dongyuan:

I have received several letters and dozens of poems and lyrics that you have included. I have read them all and am very happy. I am very sorry that I did not reply sooner because I was busy, mainly because of laziness. It seems that your interest is still strong, while I have declined a lot. What should I do? I will reply with all my heart. Best wishes! Anji!

Mao Zedong

January 29, 1966

[1] Zhou Shizhao, also known by his courtesy name Beiyuan and Dongyuan, was a classmate of Mao Zedong at the Hunan Provincial First Normal School. He was then the Vice Governor of Hunan Province.

Comments on the Seven Materials [1] Concerning the Issue of "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office" [2]

(February 5, 1966)

Jiang Qing:

After reading these materials, temporarily keep them with you.

Mao Zedong

February 5

[1] These seven documents were submitted in January 1966 by Xu Liqun, Deputy Minister of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee, to Peng Zhen, a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat. On February 1, Peng Zhen forwarded them to Mao Zedong and others. Mao Zedong's comments are written on the table of contents of these seven documents. The seven documents are: 1. A discussion among the editors of six Beijing newspapers and magazines regarding the discussion and issues surrounding "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office"; 2. A report on Zhang Chunqiao's comments over the phone; 3. A report on the political formulations in four manuscripts by Guan Feng and others; 4. A report on a letter from Guo Moruo; 5. Several essays written by Guan Feng in 1962 and one essay written by Deng Tuo in 1962; 6. Materials on "Hai Rui's Memorial" and "Hai Rui Carrying the Yarn"; 7. Self-criticisms published in newspapers and magazines by actors who participated in the performance of "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office".

[2] "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office" is a new historical drama created by historian and deputy mayor of Beijing Wu Han. It was completed at the end of 1960 and started to be staged at the beginning of 1961. In early 1965, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chun were together in Shanghai Bridge secretly planned, written by Yao Wenyan to write an article "Commentary on the New Historical Drama "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office"" and will be compared The academic criticism of "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office" developed into a political critical movement in the field of literature and art, and this critical movement The movement became the prelude and direct fuse of the "Cultural Revolution". March 2, 1979, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China With approval, the Beijing Municipal Party Committee made a decision to rehabilitate Wu Han's unjust case.

Inscriptions for Jiao Yulu¹

(February 7, 1966)

When we die for the people; it is a worthy death.

¹ Jiao Yulu (August 16, 1922 – May 14, 1964) was from a peasant family in Shandong Province. At the age of 16, he joined the Red Gun Society, a local anti-Japanese militia, but was captured in 1942 and was beaten to the point where he could not walk. He was sent to Jinan and then to Japanese-occupied Manchuria where he was forced to work in a coal mine. He escaped and returned to his hometown. He could not work there, and took his wife and children to Jiangsu Province where he worked as a hired labourer. When the new Fourth Army liberated his hometown in 1945, he returned, joining the Communist Party in 1946. After 1948, he was assigned to carry out bandit suppression and land reform, and in 1954 he was assigned to work in a machinery factory in Henan. He took a leadership role in his county Party Committee, and resisted the “communist” wind of extravagance and boastfulness pushed by Liu Shaoqi during the Great Leap Forward to exaggerate crop harvests so as to extort grain from the peasants. He also promoted the planting of saline-alkali and wind-sand resistant paulownia and took steps to prevent water-logging and floods. He always lived simply and rejected gifts and presents. In 1964, he was diagnosed with an incurable illness and died soon after.

Comments on the Reprint of Mao Zedong's Speech at the 7,000-Person Conference [1]

(February 6 and 12, 1966)

1

Comrade Peng Zhen:

Please consult with the Standing Committee in Beijing and Comrades Kang Sheng, Ding Yi, and Boda to revise this document and consider whether to circulate it to county and regiment-level comrades as requested by the Central-South Bureau (distributing it only to the Central-South Bureau as a pilot program, not elsewhere). This issue appears to be a serious one. To truly implement democratic centralism, it requires serious education, pilot programs, and promotion, and long-term, repeated efforts. Otherwise, it will remain nothing more than empty talk among most comrades. Comrade Wang Renzhong's revisions are good [2].

Mao Zedong

February 6, 1966

2

Comrade Peng Zhen:

I have reviewed them all. We will proceed accordingly.

Mao Zedong

February 12, 2:40 am

[1] The Seven Thousand Cadres Conference refers to the enlarged working conference held by the CPC Central Committee in Beijing from January 11 to February 7, 1962. Attendees included over 7,000 leading cadres from the Central Committee, various central bureaus, provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committees, as well as local and county party committees, party committees of important factories, mines, and enterprises, and military units. At this conference, Mao Zedong delivered an important speech on democratic centralism and other issues. This speech was issued as top-secret document No. 147 of the Central Committee of the CPC [62]. On February 4, 1966, Wang Renzhong, second secretary of the Central South Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and first secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee, wrote to Mao Zedong: "I have read the Chairman's speech at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference. I believe it is of urgent importance to reprint it to the county party committee level and have it organized by the county party

committee to study it for leading cadres above the level of commune party committee secretaries. At present, China's socialist revolution and socialist construction have reached a new high tide. The correct implementation of democratic centralism is an important guarantee for guiding the healthy development of this high tide." This article was written in Wang Renzhong's letter. The second part of this article is a critique of the revised draft of Mao Zedong's speech at the 7,000-person meeting, submitted by Peng Zhen, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat, on February 11, 1966. In his report for review, Peng Zhen wrote: "We (with Comrade Renzhong participating) have discussed it twice and have put forward some minor revisions for your reference. Please approve them." This speech was distributed by the CPC Central Committee to county and regiment-level party committees on February 12, 1966, and published publicly in the People's Daily on July 1, 1978.

[2] In a letter to Mao Zedong dated February 4, 1966, Wang Renzhong offered six purely textual revisions to Mao's speech. Peng Zhen incorporated Wang Renzhong's suggestions into the revised draft of the speech, which he submitted for review on February 11.

Conversation on "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office"

(February 8, 1966)

The crux of Wu Han's "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office" is dismissal from office, which is related to the Lushan Conference and Peng Dehuai's Rightist opportunism. The struggle against bourgeois ideology is a long-term class struggle and cannot be resolved by hasty political conclusions. (Peng Zhen said that the leftists needed to be "rectified") Such issues will be discussed in three years' time.

Conversation with Mao Yuanxin [1]

(February 18, 1966)

When discussing the Military Engineering College's plan to first offer two or three years of work-study and then two years of part-time work combined with pre-division, Chairman Mao said:

Science and engineering must develop their own language. Try it out for three years within the six years; there's no need to rush into two years. Cutting-edge science requires three years of focused work. If three years isn't enough, we can supplement it later. Targeted work allows for concise but precise results, and it allows for the integration of the general and the specific. By reducing six years to three, we can ensure steady progress and a sound direction.

New things require years of work, constantly summarizing experience.

Science and engineering have their own particularities and their own language, requiring some reading. But they also share commonalities; simply studying isn't enough. The Whampoa Military Academy, where students studied for six months and served in the military for a year after graduation, produced many talented individuals. After it became the Army University (I don't remember how many years they studied there), they were defeated in countless battles and captured by us.

I don't understand science and engineering, but I do have some understanding of medicine. If you listen to an ophthalmologist, it sounds mysterious, but everyone should be viewed as a whole person.

Science develops from the basics to the advanced, from the simple to the complex, but lectures can't always follow this chronological order. History studies focus on modern history, but written records only cover a little over 3,000 years. How would we describe a history that stretches back 10,000 years?

Cutting-edge theories include those proven through practice, and some basic theories need to remove parts that have been proven useless and unreasonable through practice.

When teaching atomic physics, it's enough to just talk about the Sakata model; there's no need to start with the Danish school's Bohr theory. Even if you study like this for ten years, you won't graduate. Even Sakata uses dialectics, so why don't you?

Humans always understand things from the concrete to the abstract. I don't think it's right for medicine to talk about psychology, the nervous system, and other abstract things. They should start with anatomy. Mathematics was originally derived from physical models, but

now we shouldn't link mathematics to physical models; instead, we're further abstracting them.

[1] Mao Yuanxin, Mao Zedong's nephew, was a student and teacher at Harbin Military Engineering College.

Comments on the Hubei Provincial Party Committee's Proposal on Gradual Agricultural Mechanization

(February 19, 1966)

Comrade Ren Zhong [1]: I have read this document and find it very good. Please send it to Comrade Shaoqi, and ask him to decide whether it can be distributed to the provincial, municipal, and district party committees for consideration [2]. Regarding agricultural mechanization, each province, municipality, and district should formulate a five-, seven-, or ten-year plan based on self-reliance, starting with a small number of pilot projects and gradually expanding them. Within twenty-five years, agricultural mechanization should be essentially achieved. As for the period beyond twenty-five years, there's no end in sight, and the formulation will be different. It will probably be something like: "Build on the foundation of the past twenty-five years and make another twenty-five-year plan." For now, we should focus on the fifteen years starting this year. Ten years have already passed, and we haven't done a very good job in those ten years.

[1] Renzhong, also known as Wang Renzhong, was the First Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China at the time.

[2] This refers to the proposal issued by the Hubei Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China on February 5, 1966, regarding the gradual realization of agricultural mechanization. It stated that the realization of agricultural mechanization would lead to a revolutionary leap in agricultural production, resolving the contradiction of agriculture lagging behind industry. The rapid development of agriculture, in turn, would lay a solid foundation for socialist industrialization. It was crucial for consolidating the worker-peasant alliance, strengthening and developing the socialist front, and preparing for war, building, and maintaining defense. Therefore, it was not only an economic issue but also a political one. In our province, achieving agricultural mechanization must follow the path of the Jinxing Brigade in Xiaogan County, also known as the Dazhai path. This meant carrying out the "Four Cleanups" campaign while simultaneously pursuing self-reliance, diligence, thrift, and entrepreneurship, using locally produced agricultural machinery to achieve agricultural mechanization. We must carry forward the Dazhai spirit and correctly balance the relationship between accumulation and consumption. Under the principle of ensuring increased production and member incomes, we will gradually achieve mechanization through collective mechanization, supplemented by state assistance, using methods such as "using machinery to support machinery," instalment purchases, and state assistance and interest-free loans. The key to success lies in comprehensive planning and strengthened

leadership. This year, we must successfully conduct pilot projects in seventeen communes and formulate a comprehensive plan. This plan is not merely a set of targets; it is an action program for organizing a revolutionary leap forward. Starting this year, we will strive to achieve agricultural mechanization throughout the province within five, seven, or ten years (approximately twenty years from the first Five-Year Plan).

[3] On February 23, 1966, Liu Shaoqi wrote to Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, saying, "I agree that this document from the Hubei Provincial Committee be sent to the provincial, municipal, and district Party committees for study, along with the Chairman's comments. Furthermore, the Central Committee may add a comment." On April 10, 1966, the Central Committee forwarded the Hubei Provincial Committee's document, Mao Zedong's comments, and Liu Shaoqi's letter, adding a comment approved by Mao Zedong. The Central Committee's commentary noted: "Comrade Mao Zedong long ago pointed out the path for the development of my country's agriculture: to gradually achieve mechanization and electrification on the basis of collectivization. He recently proposed that each province, municipality, and autonomous region formulate a five-, seven-, or ten-year agricultural mechanization plan based on self-reliance, striving to achieve basic agricultural mechanization within fifteen years, starting this year. This is a crucial strategic task. This task is closely linked to his strategic thinking of preparing for war, preparing for famine, and serving the people. The first is preparing for war. The people and the army must first have food and clothing before they can fight. Otherwise, even guns and artillery are useless. The second is preparing for famine. In years of famine, localities lack reserves of grain, cotton, and oil, and relying on aid from other provinces is not a long-term solution. The difficulties are even greater in the event of war. Localized famines are often unavoidable in any province, and they are even more inevitable when several provinces are combined." Third, national accumulation should not be excessive. Consider the fact that some people still lack food and clothing; secondly, dispersed reserves should be provided for all people to prepare for war and famine; and thirdly, local funds should be accumulated for expanded reproduction. Therefore, agricultural mechanization must be closely linked to Comrade Mao Zedong's strategic thinking of preparing for war and famine for the benefit of the people. Only in this way can we mobilize the masses to strive for the relatively rapid yet steady implementation of agricultural mechanization. The Central Committee believes that Comrade Mao Zedong's directive is extremely timely and important. We must seize this work without delay. The Central Committee believes that the specific steps for implementing agricultural mechanization should be the direct responsibility of the Central Bureaus and the provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional Party committees, with the necessary initiative at the provincial level being particularly important. Following the Hubei on-site meeting, local Party committees should, based on their specific circumstances, draft preliminary five-, seven-, and ten-year agricultural mechanization plans. These plans should include measures such as phased implementation, prioritizing priorities, moving from specific areas to specific areas, from low-level initiatives to high-level initiatives, and

implementing both domestic and foreign approaches. These plans should also be integrated with the unified national plan. These draft plans will be deliberated upon and then submitted to the Central Working Conference to be held in August or September of this year for discussion.

To lure the enemy deep into our territory, we must prepare for both scenarios [1]

(February 21 and 22, 1966)

1

Lure the enemy deep into our territory. It worked in the past, especially against the Japanese. But it no longer works in Vietnam. The enemy won't easily advance directly, so we need to be prepared for both scenarios. What if they don't advance deeply? During the Korean War, luring the enemy deep into our territory worked in the first phase, but not in the second.

Lure the enemy deep into our territory, but I'm afraid it won't work. We can use small-scale tactics, for example, within a few dozen kilometers. The front lines will have to hold out for several months. I don't think the United States will follow the path of Japan and Hitler. The US wouldn't dare pursue the direct advance tactics of Japan and Hitler. They don't have many troops, and they're afraid we'll destroy them. So we need to have a backup plan. Completely preventing them from landing won't work either. Our coastline is so long, and if they can't land here, they can land somewhere else. The Germans set up defenses in Qingdao, and the Japanese landed at Longkou and captured Qingdao from behind.

We've been trying to lure the enemy deep into our territory for decades. The Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign suffered because we didn't lure the enemy deep into our territory. Now everyone believes it, because there's no other way. The Japanese advanced directly into our territory, seizing almost all the major transportation routes, except in the northwest and southwest. Lure the enemy deep into our territory may not work in the future. Regardless, we must hold out for several months on the front lines to prepare our rear areas.

2

There are two depths to luring the enemy deep into our territory. It's almost done, but it depends on the situation. This is the thinking before engaging the enemy. Once the battle begins, you'll know what the enemy will do, so you can plan this way now. In any case, we'll have to hold out on the front lines for several months or even six months, allowing the rear to prepare. We also have to consider the possibility of failure. It's impossible to not have a few loopholes. Even if your plans are meticulous, the enemy won't attack from your well-defended areas; they'll exploit your weaknesses. What should we do if they want to exploit your loopholes?

3

Using cities for attack is also an option. We could adopt the Stalingrad approach. We can't just empty the cities. Shanghai has a population of seven million, where would they move them? Some factories need to be relocated. Coastal cities need multiple layers of fortification. Once they breach one layer, there's another. We also need to pay attention to the defenses on the city's flanks. We could adopt this strategy at the beginning of the war, fight for a few months, and then see how things develop. The US can only conduct airborne operations at close range; it lacks the skills and resources to conduct long-range operations.

4

If one nation wants to destroy another, as long as its army and the majority of its people are present, the enemy will be powerless. To destroy a nation, one must first destroy its army, then conquer its people and seize its land.

[1] Parts 1 to 4 of this item are part of Mao Zedong's conversation with Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, and Yang Chengwu, Acting Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

Inscription for Luo Lihua (I)

(February 24, 1966)

We should pay attention to using the method of criticism and self-criticism to analyze ourselves and deal with contradictions among the people.

February 24, 1966

[I] Luo Lihua was a staff member of the Great Hall of the People at that time.

Comments on Wang Renzhong's Speech on the Issue of Putting Politics in Command [1]

(February and April 1966)

1

Comrade Shaoqi [2]:

Please take a look at this document. It is about putting politics first.

Mao Zedong

February 25

2

I agree.

[1] On January 24, 1966, Wang Renzhong, Second Secretary of the Central-South Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and First Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee, spoke at a meeting of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee Standing Committee, pointing out that many rural areas now prioritize work points over politics; many factories and commercial units prioritize bonuses, which are essentially material incentives. These systems, which are inconsistent with Mao Zedong Thought and production development, can be changed. Factories can add bonuses to wages, as long as they do not exceed the total wage fund. There are two principles: one is not to increase state expenditure, and the other is that workers' actual income does not decrease. From now on, we will only provide spiritual encouragement, not material incentives. The basic approach in rural areas is to implement a base point system, with base points assessed based on individual performance. We oppose pedantic philosophy and rely primarily on political leadership to mobilize the enthusiasm of the masses. This political leadership must be accompanied by a series of measures; otherwise, the problem cannot be solved. This first paragraph was written on the printed manuscript of Wang Renzhong's speech. On April 10th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded Wang Renzhong's speech with a comment, pointing out: "Comrade Renzhong's speech emphasizes the importance of politics in command, and his opinions are very good. This is a serious issue. Some of the current bonus systems, etc., are not in line with the spirit of politics in command. We mobilize the enthusiasm of the broad masses of the people not through material rewards other than wages or work points, but through Mao Zedong Thought, through the importance of politics in command, through the general line of building socialism more quickly, better, and more economically—in short,

through the continuous improvement of people's political awareness. However, fundamentally resolving this issue involves many aspects and problems, requiring systematic investigation and research, comprehensive consideration, and gradual resolution through the mass line. Relevant central ministries and provincial, municipal, and district party committees are requested to identify a few factories, shops, production teams, and other units with relatively mature conditions and conduct pilot projects this year. This will allow us to gain exemplary experience and gradually resolve this issue comprehensively." This second paragraph was written on the draft of the Central Committee's comment.

[2] Shaoqi is Liu Shaoqi

A Letter on Agricultural Mechanization

(March 12, 1966)

Comrade Shaoqi:

I have received your letter of March 11 [1]. The Small Planning Commission [2] has urged representatives to go to Hubei to jointly study with the Hubei Provincial Party Committee five-, seven-, and ten-year plans for agricultural mechanization and to visit the pilot projects for self-reliance in mechanization there. This is a very good idea. I suggest that each Central Bureau and each provincial, municipal, and district Party Committee also send representatives to Hubei for joint study. Seven to ten days will suffice. Upon return, each party should prepare a preliminary draft of the five-, seven-, and ten-year plan, and deliberate on it for several months. These plans can then be discussed at the work conference to be held in August of this year. Without prior preparation, it's unlikely that the discussion will go smoothly. This matter hinges primarily on self-reliance by provinces, municipalities, and districts. The central government can only provide assistance to regions facing shortages of raw materials, and it must also provide funds to local governments for purchases. This must be done only when the central government has reserves of raw materials ready for sale. There can't be a sudden rush to get everyone involved. Otherwise, the process will be delayed for several years. Therefore, for raw materials (steel), machine tools, and agricultural machinery managed by the state but manufactured locally, which significantly exceed national plans (for example, more than double the amount), a 30% to 50% portion of the excess will be retained for local purchase and use. Without this system, local initiative will be untenable. To promote agricultural mechanization and increase production in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline products, and fishery, we must secure a portion of machinery manufacturing rights for local governments. This portion of machinery manufacturing rights refers to the right to share in any significant excess, with minor excesses excluded. Centralizing everything and keeping everything tightly controlled is not a good approach. Furthermore, this matter should be linked to preparing for war, preparing for famine, and serving the people. Otherwise, even if the local governments have the conditions, they will not be enthusiastic about it. First, preparing for war. The people and the army must first have food and clothing before they can fight. Otherwise, even if they have guns and cannons, they will be useless. Second, preparing for famine. In a famine, local governments will lack reserves of grain, cotton, oil, and other supplies, and relying on aid from other provinces is not a long-term solution. War will only create even greater difficulties. Localized famines are often inevitable within any province, and even more so when several provinces are combined. Third, national accumulation should not be excessive.

Consider the fact that some people still lack food and clothing; secondly, consider the need for dispersed reserves for all people to prepare for war and famine; and thirdly, consider the need for local governments to accumulate funds for expanded reproduction. Therefore, agricultural mechanization must be linked to these aspects in order to mobilize the masses and strive for the relatively rapid and steady realization of this plan. The Soviet Union's agricultural policy has always been flawed, draining the pond to catch all the fish and alienating itself from the masses. This has led to the current predicament, primarily due to its long-term entrapment in the trap of simple reproduction. Even simple reproduction can't be maintained during a famine. We, too, have had several years of experience with the practice of draining the pond to maintain a warm climate (high procurement), and in many areas, the inability to maintain simple reproduction during famine. We should always learn from this lesson. Although the slogans of preparing for war, preparing for famine, and serving the people (which is the best way to simultaneously serve the country, as the old saying goes, "If the people are well-off, how can the ruler be short of food") have been put forward, whether they can be implemented in a sustained and sincere manner remains a question. Only in the future can we see whether this can be resolved. Isn't Soviet agriculture essentially mechanized? Why is it still in such a predicament? This is something worth pondering.

Please consider the feasibility of the above suggestions. Also, who should be sent to Hubei from the Small Planning Commission? Comrades Yu Qiuli and Lin Hujia [3] are suitable. If the Central Bureaus and provincial, municipal, and district Party committees are also asked to send representatives, it would be appropriate to have one secretary in charge of agriculture and one from the Planning Commission. In total, only about seventy people would go there to hold a seven- to ten-day on-site meeting. Please also consider whether this is feasible. [4]

Mao Zedong

March 12

[1] This refers to a letter Liu Shaoqi sent to Mao Zedong on March 11, 1966. The letter stated: "The document of the Hubei Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China on the concept of gradually implementing agricultural mechanization, along with the Chairman's comments, has been distributed to comrades in the Politburo and Secretariat, and to relevant ministries and commissions, including the State Planning Commission and the State Economic Commission, as well as to comrades in the North China Bureau for study. This issue was discussed at a Central Standing Committee meeting attended by the Vice Premiers in Beijing. Everyone agreed that the Small State Planning Commission should first assess the relevant circumstances and propose a plan, which would then be discussed by the Central Committee and submitted to the next Central Working Conference for further discussion, so that the efforts of localities would be more realistic." Comrade Zhou Enlai has

already asked the Small State Planning Commission to send personnel to Hubei to study their proposed plan with the Provincial Committee and to conduct a pilot test in Hubei.

[2] The Small Planning Commission was a working body established by Mao Zedong in early 1965 and directly led by Zhou Enlai. Its primary tasks were to study strategic economic and social development issues and formulate guidelines and tasks for the Third Five-Year Plan. Later, during the preparation of the Third Five-Year Plan, members of the Small Planning Commission actually presided over the work of the State Planning Commission.

[3] Yu Qiuli (1914-1999), a native of Ji'an, Jiangxi Province, served as First Deputy Director and Secretary-General of the State Planning Commission and head of the Small Planning Commission. Lin Hujia, born in 1916 in Changdao, Shandong Province, was a member of the Small Planning Commission.

[4] On April 10, 1966, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in a commentary forwarding a document from the Hubei Provincial Committee on the gradual implementation of agricultural mechanization, stated that in order to promote agricultural mechanization and exchange experiences, "The Central Committee and responsible comrades from the various central bureaus have agreed to hold an on-site meeting in Hubei in late April or early May of this year. In addition to representatives from the various central bureaus, each provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committee will be represented by a secretary in charge of agriculture and a member of the Planning Commission, with the possibility of an additional official in charge of agricultural machinery. Tibet will also be represented by one person. Prior to the meeting, the Central Committee will dispatch comrades from the Small Planning Commission to Hubei to conduct preliminary research and, together with the Hubei Provincial Committee, begin preparations for the on-site meeting. The specific date of the meeting will be announced later. The provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committees may also nominate one or two individuals to visit Hubei. At the same time, localities can summarize typical agricultural mechanization experiences and the production, supply, repair, and management of general agricultural machinery and implements in their respective units and bring them to the on-site meeting for exchange of experiences."

**Instructions to Medical Workers After Reading Articles Such as "Artificial Larynx,"
"Replantation of a Severed Hand," and "Hemostatic Powder"**

(March 12, 1966)

Medical personnel should strengthen their study of Marxism-Leninism and use it to guide their work. Since the military has proven that the weak can defeat the strong, and that those with little or no education can defeat graduates from Whampoa Military Academy and the Army University, why should the medical profession be an exception? Medical schools should also strengthen their Marxist-Leninist curriculum; many graduates simply don't understand Marxism-Leninism. Schistosome testing and treatment should be free. In the past, medical personnel simply didn't engage with the masses and didn't trust them. Wasn't the method for eradicating snails invented by the masses? Therefore, the poem I wrote says: "This tiny creature left even Hua To powerless!"² From now on, we must vigorously and systematically promote Marxism-Leninism in the medical community. All medical personnel must go down to the grassroots.

² This is a reference to the poem Mao wrote on July 1, 1958 called "Farewell to the God of Plague". The first part describes the havoc wreaked by schistosomiasis, carried by snails in paddy fields. The second part celebrates the eradication of the disease. Hua To was a famous physician of the Three Kingdoms Period (220-264AD). The campaign was the subject of British Doctor Joshua Horne's book "Away with All Pests".

Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee [1]

(March 20, 1966)

(1) On the Question of Not Attending the 23rd Congress of the CPSU

We will not attend the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. The Soviet Union held this congress under internal and external difficulties. We rely on self-reliance, not on others, and we will not drag our feet. If we want others not to waver, we must first not waver ourselves. If we do not attend, the left will become more assertive, and the centrists will move closer to us. Not attending the 23rd Congress is nothing more than an army at the gates. If we don't fight, we will just engage in a literary battle. We can write a letter to avoid attending. We have talked about traitors and scabs. It's good that the Soviet Union is anti-China. If they oppose us, we will have something to write about. Traitors and scabs will always oppose China. We must be clear-cut and not drag our feet. Castro [2] is nothing more than a wolf in power.

Someone asked: "Since we didn't attend this meeting, will we still send a congratulatory telegram to revisionist conferences in the future?"

Yes, we will, but we will send it to the Soviet people.

(2) Academic and Educational Issues

In the past, we were kept in the dark and unaware of many things. In reality, the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie were in control. Our policy toward the national bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals was distinct from that toward the comprador bourgeoisie, a change from the policies of the Soviet areas. This policy was effective and correct. We should distinguish between them; equating them is wrong. Currently, most universities, middle schools, and primary schools are monopolized by intellectuals from bourgeois, petty bourgeoisie, landlord, and rich peasant backgrounds. After liberation, we took over control of them, and that was the right thing to do. Now, we must carry out the revolution. We must protect a few individuals, such as Mr. Guo and Mr. Fan [3], but not the others. We must mobilize young people to challenge them, naming them by name. They will provoke struggle first. We will fight them in the newspapers.

Now, every medium-sized or larger city has a department for the study of literature, history, philosophy, law, and economics. There are many kinds of history, and every academic discipline has a history: history, general history, philosophy, literature, and natural sciences. There is no discipline without history. We have not yet touched upon the history of natural sciences. From now on, we should criticize them every five or ten years, reason them out,

and train successors. Otherwise, everything will be in their hands. Mr. Fan is an imperialist, very interested in the imperialist generals and ministers. He opposes young people studying history and opposes the methods used in 1958 to study history. When criticizing, don't fire blanks; study historical materials. This is a serious class struggle; otherwise, revisionism will emerge. It is this group of people who are producing revisionism, such as Wu Han and Jian Bozan [4], who both oppose Marxism-Leninism. They are both Communist Party members, but Communist Party members oppose the Communist Party. Currently, among the 28 provinces and cities in China, 15 have launched this struggle, and the remaining 13 have not.

Taking care of intellectuals has both advantages and disadvantages. They receive fixed interest and become professors or school principals. These people are actually members of the Kuomintang. And your Beijing publication, Frontline [5], is the front line of Wu Han and Jian Bozan. Liao Mosha [6] was a vocal supporter of "Li Hui Niang" and advocated the "ghosts are harmless" theory. Class struggle is unfolding across a wide range of sectors, including newspapers, periodicals, literature, film, and theatre. Class struggle is acute and widespread. All regions should pay attention and manage newspapers and the literary world.

Yin Da's article [7] has been published. It's well-written and should be reprinted in all newspapers. Yin Da is the director of the Institute of History and the younger brother of Zhao Yimin [8]. His article was written in 1964 and was suppressed for a year and a half before publication. Don't suppress young people's writings, whether good or bad. Don't deprive Wu Han and Jian Bozan of their right to eat; it doesn't matter. Don't be afraid of offending Luo Ergang, Jian Bozan, and others.

Technical secondary schools, vocational schools, and part-time students—all go to the countryside.

Literature departments should write poetry and novels, not literary history. How can you succeed without starting with writing? Writing is equivalent to learning composition, and learning composition is primarily about listening and writing. As for writing history, leave that for when you're working. Don't just read rote material without applying it. Our PLA army and division commanders won battles without knowing anything about the Song, Ming, and Yao and Shun dynasties. They did not read Sun Tzu's Art of War, and no one fights like him.

There are two ways: one is to engage in criticism, and the other is to work and study part-time, carrying out the Four Cleanups. Don't suppress young people; let them vent. Qi Benyu [10] criticized Luo Ergang [9]. Qi was a staff member of the Central Committee's Office of Letters and Calls, and Luo was a professor. Don't suppress both the good and the bad. We've even published the complete works of Khrushchev!

Lin Biao: We are engaged in material construction, while they are engaged in bourgeois spiritual construction.

Liberate the new forces, such as students, teaching assistants, lecturers, and some professors, and isolate the remaining old professors who refuse to change. It's fine if they change, but it doesn't matter if they don't. Yin Da was right. He said that the younger and less educated should overthrow the older and more knowledgeable.

Zhu De: Overthrow those authorities.

Chen Boda: Overthrow bourgeois authority, cultivate new forces, establish proletarian authority, and train successor

Who holds authority now? Yao Wenyan [11], Qi Benyu, and Yin Da. It's a matter of who will dissolve whom, and the issue hasn't been resolved yet.

Chen Boda: The successor should be formed naturally. Stalin installed Malenkov, but he wasn't a successor; he died before you even died.

We don't want these people to take over. We want people who are younger, less educated, have a firmer stance, are politically experienced, and are resolute.

(3) The Problem of the Industrial System:

There are some issues you can't understand. How can you possibly manage so much? In Nanjing, Jiang Weiqing and I discussed this: If a war breaks out, the central government will: first, not send troops; second, not send generals; third, have little food and can't send it; fourth, have no clothing; and fifth, have little guns and artillery. Each region and province will have to fend for itself. We need people to fight on their own, and each province will do it on its own. If the local governments can't manage the navy and air force, the central government will handle them all. If war breaks out, we still rely on the local governments; you can't rely on the central government. Local guerrilla forces still rely on weapons of struggle.

There are two ways to manage industry in East China. Jiangsu's method is the best: the province doesn't manage industry, but Nanjing and Suzhou have thrived. Suzhou and Suzhou have 100,000 workers and an output value of 800 million yuan. Jinan's approach is different: large ones are under the province, small ones under the city, and the lines are unclear.

Liu Shaoqi: How can we pilot a universal labor system? Universal participation in labor, including compulsory labor. Currently, there are too many people off-duty: 800,000 employees and 800,000 family members.

We must now conduct widespread propaganda, break with the old ways, and gradually implement it. Our country is made up of 28 "countries," some large and some small. Tibet and Qinghai, for example, are small countries with small populations.

Zhou Enlai: We must promote mechanization.

First, the Central Bureau, then the provincial, prefectural, and municipal governments, etc., will all return to air views and express opinions. For four, five, six, and seven months, provinces, prefectures, and municipalities must all air views and express opinions. This airing of views and expressing opinions must be linked to "preparing for war, preparing for famine, and serving the people." Otherwise, they won't dare to do so.

Zhou Enlai: I'm afraid they're being accused of decentralization.

Localities should focus on accumulation. Now everything is going to the national treasury. Shanghai has accumulated capital: first, funds, second, raw materials, and third, equipment. We can't centralize everything. We can't exhaust the resources. The Soviet Union suffered the consequences of exhausting the resources.

Peng Zhen: Shanghai used machinery to support the countryside, and it went from illegal to legal.

Illegal matters must be recognized as legal. Historically, illegal matters have always gone from illegal to legal. Sun Yat-sen was illegal at first, but later became legal; the Communist Party also went from illegal to legal. Yuan Shikai went from legal to illegal. Legality is reactionary, illegality is revolutionary. Today, the reactionaries are trying to stifle people's initiative and restrict their revolutionary efforts. It's better for the central government to be a "republic with a nominal monarch." [12]. The British Queen and the Japanese Emperor were both "republics with a nominal monarch. It's better for the central government to be a "republic with a nominal monarch," focusing solely on major policies. Even major policies are emanating from local voices, with the central government setting up a processing plant to produce them. Only when provinces, cities, prefectures, and counties release resources can the central government produce them. This is good. The central government only manages the details, not the actual ones, or even less so the actual ones. The central government has taken over too many factories. All those who have been taken over are being forced out of the central government and sent to the local governments, including their personnel.

Peng Zhen: Setting up a trust [13] and taking over Party work is actually an industrial party.

The Four Cleanups are all your responsibility, and the Central Committee will only be responsible for the Twenty-Three Articles [14].

.....

What military region political department? What experience do you have? The army still relies on local forces, and will only become a regular army later. I don't have much experience. The summaries of the past three months and six months were all based on reports from below. The arsenals were all built by the localities. The central government only produces spirit. For example, during the Liberation War, the central government had nothing—not a single person, not a single grain of food, not a single bullet. All it had was

your practical experience, your victories and defeats. It was all about transferring grain from the south to the north and coal from the north to the south [15]. This won't work.

Zhou Enlai: The defense industry must also be returned to the localities. It's about decentralization, not upward transfer. The central government should only be in charge of really important matters.

The aircraft factory still hasn't moved. If war breaks out and they need guns, they won't be able to deliver them. Every province needs a small steel mill. Even with tens of thousands of people, a province with 100,000 tons of steel isn't enough. A province needs dozens.

Yu Qiuli: "Two olds should lead three news: old factories lead new factories, old bases lead new bases, and old products lead new products."

Lin Biao: "Olds leading new—this is China's path."

This is like leading guerrillas during the War of Resistance. We must pursue socialism, not individualism.

Peng Zhen: There are 4,000 small steel mills, and the central government has taken them all.

Why are you dividing their property? It all belongs to them.

Peng Zhen: We'll figure out a plan next year.

What are we going to do next year? When you get back, hold a meeting and appoint anyone who needs someone else as deputy director.

Zhou Enlai: The current agricultural mechanization efforts are still riding on the coattails of the East Wind.

The Eighth Ministry of Machine Building is running a trust and has taken over quite a few factories.

Why not appoint Chen Zhengren [16] from the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building as factory director?

Some are really exploiting the peasants. In Jiangxi, taxes are collected on a single load of grain. I think the shoulder poles should be smashed. Let's hold a meeting with the civil and military officials and crack down on excessive taxes and levies.

Central planning must be integrated with local planning. The central government can't impose rigid control, and neither can the provinces.

Liu Shaoqi: Allocate some of the budget to the local governments.

You're threatening them with war. Once the atomic bomb explodes, individualism will cease to exist. If war breaks out, will the People's Daily still be published? We must prioritize

decentralization, not siphoning off resources while others take advantage. Right now, there's no one at the top to manage, and no one below has the authority to manage.

Tao Zhu: The central government has no authority either!

We now allow for independence. Fight against bureaucracy! Fight for independence like Qi Benyu and others did, fight against wrongdoing. As Minister of Propaganda, don't suppress it! Students want to rebel, and we must allow them to do so. The Cultural Revolution requires mass movements, allowing students to express their opinions freely. I support poaching their talents, including those of ministers. There was a chemistry professor whose lecture notes were so incomprehensible to students after months of reading them. When the university students asked him about them, he still didn't know. The students were just trying to poach him. Wu Han and Jian Bozan made their livings from history. The students had read Ming history, but Wu Han hadn't read it! Yu Pingbo [17] had no knowledge at all.

Lin Biao: You still have to study Chairman Mao's works.

Don't learn from Jian Bozan's stuff, and don't learn from me either. If you want to learn, you must break through. Don't be limited; don't just interpret and record; don't be bound. Lenin wasn't bound by Marx.

Lin Biao: Lenin also plagiarized. We should now promote the study of Chairman Mao's works, sowing the seeds of Mao Zedong Thought.

That's fine, but we shouldn't be superstitious or constrained. We should have new interpretations, new perspectives, and new innovations. We must teach students to overthrow them.

Lin Biao: These people only seek dictatorship.

A cultural and educational secretary in Jilin wrote an excellent article criticizing figurative thinking. Guangming Daily also criticized "Officialdom Unmasked" and "Strange Events Witnessed in the Past Twenty Years." Their critiques were excellent, clearly laying out the fundamental issues of right and wrong. "Officialdom Unmasked" is reformist. In short, so-called "condemning novels" are reactionary, anti-Sun Yat-sen, pro-monarchist, and promote landlord dictatorship. They seek to revise and improve them, but they are decadent.

The document on agricultural mechanization was sent to various provinces for discussion, but I won't discuss it here.

[1] This is Mao Zedong's speech at the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held in Hangzhou.

[2] Fidel Castro, the leader of Cuba, was born on August 13, 1926 in Biran, Oriental Province, Cuba. He graduated from the University of Havana in 1950 with a doctorate in law. On July

26, 1953, Castro led an armed uprising against the Batista dictatorship. After the uprising failed, he was arrested and delivered his world-famous defense speech in court, "History will declare me innocent." In 1955, he went into exile in the United States and Mexico. While in Mexico, he planned the "July 26 Movement." Castro returned to Cuba in 1956 and established an insurgent army and base in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. In January 1959, he led the insurgent army to overthrow the Batista dictatorship and establish a revolutionary government. He served as Prime Minister (later renamed Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Castro served as First Secretary of the United Party of Socialist Revolutionary Cuba from 1962. In 1965, after the party was renamed the Communist Party of Cuba, he became First Secretary of the Central Committee.

[3] Mr. Guo, also known as Guo Moruo, was then the President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and a leading authority in literature and history. Mr. Fan, also known as Fan Wenlan, was a renowned historian and then Vice President of the Chinese Historical Society. He was the editor-in-chief of the "A Brief History of China" and had long been involved in its revisions. Both were renowned scholars of Chinese studies.

[4] Wu Han, a Ming Dynasty history expert and then-Deputy Mayor of Beijing, wrote the newly adapted historical drama "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office." Jian Bozan, a historian and then-Vice President of Peking University, opposed Yao Wenyan's criticism of Wu Han's "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office."

[5] Frontline, a publication of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee. The "you" here refers to Peng Zhen, then the Party Secretary of Beijing.

[6] Liao Mosha, then head of the United Front Work Department of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, published an article titled "Ghosts Are Harmless" in the Beijing Evening News on August 31, 1961.

[7] Yin Da, whose original name was Liu Huoqu, was a renowned historian and archaeologist, then serving as director of the Institute of Archaeology. On March 2, 1966, the People's Daily reprinted his article, "The Historical Revolution Must Be Carried Through to the End," from the third issue of Red Flag in 1966. The author noted that the article was written in August 1964.

[8] Zhao Yimin, whose original name was Liu Wei, was a prominent figure in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated after the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961. In 1962, the Italian Communist Party held its congress. To align with the Soviet Union's efforts to suppress the Chinese Communist Party, only one representative was invited. Zhao Yimin was appointed to attend the congress as a representative of the Chinese Communist Party. At the congress, Zhao Yimin stood alone against the anti-China chorus incited by some, defending the dignity and honour of the Chinese Communist Party.

[9] Luo Ergang, a renowned historian and expert on Taiping Heavenly Kingdom history, published an article in the People's Daily on August 3, 1964, titled "Loyal Prince Li Xiucheng's Surrender Was Actually a Delaying Tactic," arguing that the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom's Loyal Prince Li Xiucheng's surrender to Zeng Guofan was a pretence.

[10] In December 1965, Qi Benyu published "Studying History for the Revolution" in the magazine Red Flag, criticizing Jian Bozan's "super-class" and "historicist" views. In 1963, Qi Benyu published "A Comment on Li Xiucheng's Autobiography: A Discussion with Luo Ergang, Liang Tielu, and Lu Jiye," in the fourth issue of Historical Research. Based on Li Xiucheng's autobiography, the article argued that Li Xiucheng "described himself as 'riding on a tiger's back, unable to dismount,'" and that "after becoming a marshal, Li Xiucheng did not maintain his frugal and simple lifestyle." "The Prince Zhong's Mansion was an unfinished project. Thousands of workers labored for over three years, yet construction was still ongoing when Suzhou fell." "Upon seeing the Prince Zhong's Mansion, Li Hongzhang could not help but exclaim, 'The jade-like buildings and the winding balustrades and bridal chambers truly resemble a fairy's lair.'" "In the same era, under the same historical conditions, two completely different characters existed. One preferred death to refute the enemy, sacrificing himself heroically; the other surrendered and betrayed his country, kneeling to the enemy and fawning on him." Concluding that Li Xiucheng had truly surrendered and "acknowledged the enemy as his father," the People's Daily reprinted an excerpt on July 24, 1964. After reading Qi's article, Mao Zedong specifically read a photocopy of "The Autobiography of Prince Zhong Li Xiucheng" and wrote the following comment: "The black and white words are ironclad evidence; his disloyalty in his later years is not worth emulating."

[11] Yao Wenyuan, then an editorial board member of Shanghai's Liberation Daily, published an article titled "A Comment on the New Historical Drama 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office'" in Shanghai's Wenhui Daily on November 10, 1965. The article argues that Wu Han, despite being an expert on Ming Dynasty history, distorted historical facts to create a perfect fake Hai Rui. The "return" and "reversal of wrongful convictions" depicted in the play are not historical facts. Historically, the "return" was intended to ease class contradictions and protect some small and medium-sized landlords and rich peasants, but the play portrays it as protecting poor peasants. Historically, Xu Ying, the son of retired Prime Minister Xu Jie, was only sentenced to military exile, and that was not Hai Rui's sentence. Yet, the play claims that Hai Rui "made up his mind to execute Xu Ying." As a Communist Party member, he failed to promote class struggle, instead advocating the feudal rhetoric of "honest officials saving the people." The poor peasants in the play are portrayed as begging "Master, let us make the decision," kowtowing to Hai Rui and shouting, "Master, make the decision for the people. The poor people of Jiangnan will have a better life from now on!" Clearly, Wu Han recast this character with his own bourgeois perspective.

[12] Mao Zedong believed that highly centralized central government was detrimental to the cause of socialism and proposed the concept of a "republic with a nominal monarch." This concept, thoroughly implemented during the Cultural Revolution, established a highly centralized central government within China's planned economy, creating a system in which local governments became the main actors in economic activities. This distinguished China's planned economy from the Soviet model.

[13] In the early 1960s, Liu Shaoqi, who was in charge of frontline work, suggested piloting trusts (monopoly enterprises). On February 26, 1964, the Ministry of Coal Industry proposed to the central government to establish the East China Coal Industry Company in Xuzhou as a pilot trust. On April 30, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China approved this proposal, officially establishing China's first pilot trust enterprise. In April 1964, the State Economic Commission, after extensive investigation and research, drafted a "Report on the Pilot Operation of Industrial and Transportation Trusts (Draft)," which was approved. In 1964 and 1965, a total of 16 national and regional trusts were piloted nationwide. However, these pilots encountered several problems, primarily in three areas: conflicts between national or cross-regional trusts and local governments; conflicts between unified management within trusts and the hierarchical management of their affiliated enterprises; and conflicts between trusts and the existing economic management system. Trusts were in conflict with Mao Zedong's advocacy of a "republic with a nominal monarch."

[14] From the end of 1964 to January 1965, the Central Political Bureau convened a national work conference, chaired by Mao Zedong, to discuss and formulate "Some Questions Currently Raised in the Rural Socialist Education Movement" (a 23-point document). This document defined the "Four Cleanups" as political, economic, organizational, and ideological cleanups. It emphasized that the nature of the movement was to resolve "the contradiction between socialism and capitalism" and proposed that the focus of the movement be on rectifying "those in power within the Party who are taking the capitalist road."

[15] The South-to-North Grain Transfer Program focused on strategically important northern provinces and regions like Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Liaoning, as well as the Beijing region. These regions, without exception, required grain transfers. The southern regions of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Guangxi, and the two lakes enjoyed favorable natural conditions and abundant grain production. The government has long implemented this policy, and imported grain primarily aids these regions. Despite this, farmers' food rations and incomes remain below the national average. The most serious problem facing the north is frequent disasters, particularly drought. Beginning in 1968, the State Council comprehensively deployed the drilling of mechanical wells in North China, establishing it as a major strategic measure to reverse the South-to-North Grain Transfer Program. In the following years, over 300,000 mechanical wells were drilled annually. This was a major agricultural infrastructure project on the North China Plain, and the state provided financial subsidies and equipment and materials, earning enthusiastic support from

farmers. During the Cultural Revolution, nearly two million wells were drilled across North China, and over 100 million mu of arable land was irrigated with groundwater. This significantly improved agricultural production conditions, which had suffered from droughts nine out of ten years. Coupled with the development of the fertilizer industry, grain production increased significantly, reversing China's long-standing practice of transferring grain from the south to the north. This shift in coal from the north to the south also saw China's coal resources concentrated in Shanxi, Shaanxi, and western Inner Mongolia, while major coal users were concentrated in East and South China, creating a north-south coal transfer pattern.

[16] Chen Zhengren was then the Minister of the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building (formerly the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery, renamed the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building in January 1965).

[17] Yu Pingbo, a renowned scholar of the *Dream of the Red Chamber*, is considered one of the founders of the "New Redology School" along with Hu Shi. He rose to prominence in the 1920s, before the Liberation Movement. In 1923, he published "A Defence of the *Dream of the Red Chamber*," in which he demonstrated that only the first eighty chapters of the original *Dream of the Red Chamber* were written by Cao Xueqin, with the last forty chapters being a sequel by Gao Que. However, his research on the *Dream of the Red Chamber* was based on bourgeois idealism. Mao Zedong not only enjoyed "*Dream of the Red Chamber*," but also studied it extensively, earning him the title of a Redologist. Mao used class analysis to evaluate "*Dream of the Red Chamber*," while Yu Pingbo approached it with a pragmatic philosophy. Mao believed that "*Dream of the Red Chamber*" depicted a detailed history and contained rich social historical data, while Yu Pingbo believed it was merely a reflection of a person's life experience and character. Mao considered "*Dream of the Red Chamber*" a classical realist novel, while Yu Pingbo believed its nature was similar to that of Chinese leisure literature. Mao considered "*Dream of the Red Chamber*" the best-written of classical Chinese novels, while Yu Pingbo believed its position in world literature was not high.

Amendments to a paragraph in the draft joint communiqué of the Chinese Communist Party and Japanese Communist Party delegations (1)

(March 1966)

As emphasized in the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement of the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, [2] *while opposing the principal danger, modern revisionism, we must also resolutely oppose and overcome dogmatism and sectarianism within our two parties. Most importantly, we must resolutely oppose the modern revisionist trends within our two parties. These trends are a reflection of the anti-communist, anti-revolutionary, and anti-people trends of the bourgeoisie at home and abroad within our parties. If we do not pay attention and take measures to overcome them, they will be extremely dangerous. When the modern revisionists, headed by the Soviet leadership, oppose us, they do not call us revisionists, but dogmatists and sectarians. This statement refers precisely to genuine Marxism and the genuine unity of international revolutionary parties and revolutionary peoples, and nothing else.*

[1] At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, a delegation of the Japanese Communist Party, headed by General Secretary Miyamoto Kenji, paid a friendly visit to the People's Republic of China from February to April 1966. During the visit, the two party delegations held talks and drafted a joint communiqué by the drafting groups of the two delegations. This article is Mao Zedong's revision of a paragraph in the draft communiqué submitted for review on March 27, 1966. The text printed in italics is the text added by Mao Zedong. Later, no agreement was reached on this draft communiqué.

[2] The 1957 Declaration refers to the "Declaration of the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries" adopted by the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Twelve Countries held in Moscow from November 14 to 16, 1957. The 1960 Declaration refers to the "Declaration of the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Various Countries" adopted by the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Eighty-one Countries held in Moscow in November 1960.

Comments and Revisions on the Minutes of the Symposium on Art and Literature in the Armed Forces Convened by Comrade Lin Biao and Entrusted to Comrade Jiang Qing [I]

(March and April 1966)

1

Jiang Qing:

I've read this document twice and feel it's acceptable. I've made some minor revisions. Please consider it. I suggest that this document be circulated in the name of the Military Commission to some responsible comrades in the Central Committee for their comments. Please point out any errors so that we can revise it. Of course, we must first seek the opinions of the comrades in the Military Commission.

Mao Zedong

March 17

2

Jiang Qing:

I have reviewed all of them and agree with them all. I have only added a few words or changed a few characters in a few places within the Minutes. Please make your decision. I am now returning the original to you.

Mao Zedong

March 24

3

I have read it and agree.

Comrade Peng Zhen is dismissed.

4

I have not seen this document [2], and I heard that I still need to study and revise it.

5

Remove a sentence. [3]

6

These four works of Chairman Mao will be enough for us proletarians *to use for a long time*. [4]

7

We must, *in accordance with the directives of the Party Central Committee*, resolutely carry out a great socialist revolution on the cultural front and completely eliminate this black line. *Therefore, this is an arduous, complex, and long-term struggle, requiring decades, even centuries, of effort.*

8

The lesson of the past decade or so is that we were late in taking action. Chairman Mao said he only addressed individual issues, not a comprehensive and systematic one. As long as we didn't address them, many positions would have been left to the black line. This is a serious lesson. After the Tenth Plenary Session of the Central Committee in 1962 decided to carry out class struggle nationwide, the struggle to promote the proletariat and eliminate the bourgeoisie in culture gradually unfolded.

9

This is more appropriate. [5]

10

The People's Liberation Army must *play an important role* in the Cultural Revolution. [6]

11

There were also good things in the 1930s, namely the militant left-wing literary and artistic movement led by Lu Xun. In the late 1930s, *some left-wing leaders, influenced by Wang Ming's rightist capitulationist line*, [7] deviated from the class perspective of Marxism-Leninism and put forward the slogan of "national defense literature." This slogan was a bourgeois one, while the proletarian slogan of "mass literature of the national revolutionary war" was coined by Lu Xun. *Some left-wing literary and artistic workers, especially Lu Xun, also put forward the slogan that literature should serve the workers and peasants and that workers and peasants should create literature themselves. However, they did not systematically address the fundamental issue of integrating literature and art with the workers, peasants, and soldiers. The vast majority remained bourgeois national democrats. Some failed to overcome the democratic revolution, and some failed to successfully overcome the socialist challenge.*

12

We should also study the works of the ancients and foreigners. Refusing to study them is a mistake, but we must study them critically, applying the past to the present and the foreign to China.

13

We must also analyse the relatively outstanding Soviet revolutionary literary and artistic works that emerged after the October Revolution. We must not *blindly* worship them, let alone imitate them. *Blind* imitation cannot become art. Literature and art can only come from life; only life is the sole source of literature and art. *The historical process of literature and art, both ancient and modern, both in China and abroad, proves this point.*

14

Literary and artistic creation related to the Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin campaigns, *as well as other major campaigns*, should be promptly initiated while the comrades who led and commanded these campaigns are still alive.

15

We must promote revolutionary, militant, mass literary and artistic criticism, break the monopoly of a few so-called "literary and artistic critics" (*i.e., those critics with erroneous orientations and who are weak and powerless*), and place the more powerful weapon of literary and artistic talent in the hands of the broad masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, *thus uniting specialized critics with mass critics.*

16

Don't be afraid of being called "sticks." We should analyse the criticisms we make about being simple and crude. Some of our criticisms are fundamentally correct, but the analysis is insufficient, the arguments are weak, and the persuasiveness is weak. We should improve on this. *Other criticisms are based on a lack of understanding, initially calling us simple and crude, then later dropping the topic.* But when the enemy calls our correct criticisms simple and crude, we must resolutely resist.

17

The principle of Party spirit is the most distinctive mark that distinguishes us from other classes. *It's important to understand that representatives of other classes also have their own Party spirit, and they are very tenacious.* Whether in creative thought, organizational line, or work style, we must uphold the proletarian principle of Party spirit.

18

The above content of the entire discussion record is for reference only by leaders.

[1] This summary, originally titled "Minutes of the Symposium on Art and Literature in the Army Convened by Comrade Jiang Qing," was revised during Mao Zedong's interrogation. Lin Biao was then Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Sections 1 and 2 are Mao Zedong's comments to Jiang Qing after reviewing the summary; Section 3 is a comment on the draft directive from Peng Zhen, a member of the CPC Central Committee's Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat, forwarding the summary, submitted for review on April 1, 1966; Sections 5 and 9 are two annotations to the summary; Sections 4, 8, 12, and 18 are additions to the summary; Sections 6, 7, 10, 11, and 13-17 are revisions to the summary, with the text printed in italics containing Mao Zedong's additions and revisions. Mao Zedong also made several other revisions to the minutes, primarily changing "under the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought" to "under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought," and "reading Chairman Mao's books all my life" to "reading Marxism-Leninism and Chairman Mao's books all my life." He also deleted phrases such as "hold high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, the highest peak of literary theory," and "the People's Liberation Army was created by the Chairman himself." On April 10, 1966, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded the minutes. On May 3, 1979, upon request from the General Political Department of the Central Military Commission, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China approved the revocation of the minutes and, based on facts, leniently rehabilitated individuals and literary works that had been wrongly punished as a result of the minutes.

[2] This refers to Chairman Mao's conversation with music workers (August 24, 1956), mentioned in the minutes. This conversation was edited and published in the People's Daily on September 9, 1979, under the title "Conversations with Music Workers." It was later included in the second volume of Selected Works of Mao Zedong, published by People's Publishing House in 1986.

[3] The minutes mentioned that Jiang Qing's "conversation with us, watching films and plays with us," and that "everyone agreed that this was equivalent to a short-term training course." During the interrogation, Mao Zedong deleted the phrase "everyone agreed that this was equivalent to a short-term training course" and wrote this annotation.

[4] The four works mentioned in the minutes refer to Mao Zedong's "On New Democracy," "Speech at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art," "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," and "Speech at the National Conference on Propaganda Work of the Communist Party of China." The phrase "enough for us proletarians to use for a long time" originally read "enough for us proletarians to use for hundreds of years."

[5] Refers to the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Beijing from September 24 to 27, 1962.

[6] The minutes mentioned that in the past three years, many "literary and artistic works praising our great Party and the wise leadership of our great leader Chairman Mao" had appeared. When Mao Zedong reviewed the minutes, he changed the quotation marks to read "literary and artistic works praising our great Party, its leaders, and the wise leadership of other comrades" and added this annotation.

[7] This sentence originally reads "The People's Liberation Army should take the lead in the Cultural Revolution."

[8] Wang Ming joined the Communist Party of China in 1925. From the Sixth Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee in January 1931, he served as a member of the CPC Central Committee and the Political Bureau. From then until the Zunyi Conference in January 1935, he was the primary representative of "Left" adventurist errors within the Party. In November 1931, he traveled to the Soviet Union as the CPC representative to the Communist International. Upon returning to China in November 1937, he attended the December meeting of the CPC Central Committee's Political Bureau and subsequently became Secretary of the CPC Central Committee's Yangtze River Bureau. During this period, he committed Rightist capitulationist errors. He trusted the Kuomintang more than the Communist Party, and was hesitant to mobilize the masses, develop the people's army, or expand the liberated areas in Japanese-occupied areas. He advocated "everything through the united front" and "everything subject to the united front," handing leadership of the War of Resistance Against Japan to the Kuomintang. Because the correct line represented by Mao Zedong already held sway throughout the Party, Wang Ming's errors only had a temporary impact in some areas. The enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held from September to November 1938, criticized Wang Ming's Rightist capitulationist errors and established the principle and policy of the entire Party independently leading the anti-Japanese armed struggle.

Criticism of the Central Propaganda Department and the Beijing Municipal Committee [1]

(March-April 1966)

Conversations from March 17 to 20, 1966

After liberation, we implemented a policy of "taking over" intellectuals, which had both advantages and disadvantages. Bourgeois intellectuals now hold real power in academia and education. The deeper the socialist revolution deepens, the more they resist, and the more their anti-Party and anti-socialist nature becomes apparent. Wu Han, Jian Bozan, and others were Communist Party members, but they were also anti-Communist, and in reality, they were Kuomintang members. Currently, many places still have a poor understanding of this issue, and academic criticism has yet to develop. All localities must pay attention to who controls schools, newspapers, periodicals, and publishing houses, and conduct a thorough critique of bourgeois academic authority. We must cultivate our own young academic authorities. We should not be afraid of young people breaking the law, and we should not withhold their manuscripts. The Central Propaganda Department should not become a rural work department. [2]

Frontline was also written by Wu Han, Liao Mosha, and Deng Tuo [3] and was anti-Party and anti-socialist.

Literature, history, philosophy, law, and economics require a Cultural Revolution and resolute criticism. How much Marxism is there in this?

2. Talks from March 28-30, 1966

The Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee made the decision [4] to carry out class struggle. Wu Han published so many articles, never asking for permission, never seeking approval. Why did Yao Wenyan's articles require permission? [5] Doesn't the Central Committee's decision count?

What are academic cliques? Those who shield anti-communist intellectuals are academic cliques. Those who shield "middle school cliques" like Wu Han and Jian Bozan are "university cliques." The Central Propaganda Department is the "Heavenly Palace." We must overthrow the "Heavenly Palace" and liberate the "little devils."

If Peng Zhen, the Beijing Municipal Committee, and the Central Propaganda Department continue to shield bad people, the Central Propaganda Department, the Beijing Municipal Committee, and the Five-Man Group must be disbanded [6].

I have always advocated that whenever central government organs engage in bad behaviour, I call on local governments to revolt and attack the central government. Everywhere should produce more "Sun Wukongs" to wreak havoc in Heaven.

In September [7] of last year, I asked some comrades, "What should we do if revisionism emerges in the Central Committee?" This is very likely and extremely dangerous. We must protect the left and cultivate a leftist contingent during the Cultural Revolution.

We are all old, and it's hard to say whether the next generation can withstand revisionist trends. The Cultural Revolution is a long and arduous task. I cannot complete it in my lifetime; I must carry it through to the end.

3. Speech of April 22, 1966

I don't believe the problems during the Cultural Revolution were solely related to Wu Han, with a whole series of "Three-Family Village" [8] incidents following. The Cultural Revolution was a revolution that touched people's souls, an ideological struggle that touched a wide range of areas. There were people within the government. For example, the Central Propaganda Department and the Central Ministry of Culture both had these issues. There were people within the government. There were people within the government, in every major region, province, and city.

In all departments of the Party Central Committee, including the major regions, provinces, and cities, is the government truly clean? I don't believe it.

Whether revisionism emerges in China or not, there are two possibilities: it doesn't happen, or it does, and it happens sooner or later. If it's handled well, it might not happen sooner. Even if it does happen sooner, it will go in the opposite direction.

IV. Speech of April 29, 1966

Not a single needle can penetrate Beijing, not even a drop of water can drip. Peng Zhen wants to reshape the Party according to his worldview. Things are developing in his opposite direction, and he has prepared the conditions for his own downfall. His mistakes must be thoroughly attacked. This was inevitable; they were exposed by chance and deepened step by step. Not everyone learns from historical lessons. This is the law of class struggle, and it cannot be changed by human will. Whenever anyone in the central government engages in mischief, I will call on the local governments to attack them, like Sun Wukong wreaking havoc in Heaven, and to target those who protect the Jade Emperor. Peng Zhen was a minor figure who had infiltrated the Party. He was nothing special; a single finger could have brought him down. "The west wind blows down leaves in Chang'an" [9] tells comrades not

to worry endlessly. Dust will accumulate until it is swept away, and class enemies will not be defeated until they are fought.

Phenomena are visible, but the essence is hidden, and the essence will also be revealed through phenomena.

Peng Zhen's essence remained hidden for thirty years. Revisionism is not limited to the cultural circles; it will also emerge in the Party, government, and military. Especially when revisionism emerges in the Party and military, the problem becomes serious.

[1] This is a conversation between Mao Zedong and some members of the Politburo in Hangzhou.

[2] On November 9, 1962, the CPC Central Committee issued the "Decision on the Dissolution of the Rural Work Department of the CPC Central Committee". The Rural Work Department of the CPC Central Committee was disbanded.

[3] Deng Tuo, who was the Secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee Secretariat and the Alternate Secretary of the CPC North China Bureau Secretariat, was in charge of ideological and cultural work and the editor-in-chief of the Beijing Municipal Committee theoretical journal "Frontline". He refused to reprint "Comment on the New Historical Drama "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office"" in Beijing.

[4] The Decision on Class Struggle refers to the communiqué issued by the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in Beijing from September 24 to 27, 1962: "The Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee pointed out that throughout the historical period of proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship, throughout the historical period of transition from capitalism to communism (a period that will take decades, if not longer), there will exist class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and a struggle between the two paths of socialism and capitalism. The overthrown reactionary ruling classes are unwilling to resign themselves to extinction and will always attempt a restoration. At the same time, the influence of the bourgeoisie and the habitual influence of the old society still exist in society, and there are spontaneous capitalist tendencies among some small producers. Therefore, among the people, there are still some who have not undergone socialist transformation. Their number is small, only a few percent of the population, but they will try to abandon the socialist path and take the capitalist path at the first opportunity. Under these circumstances, class struggle is inevitable. This is a historical law long ago articulated by Marxism-Leninism, and we must never forget it. This class struggle is complex, tortuous, constantly rising and falling, and sometimes even intense. This class struggle inevitably finds its way back into the Party. Foreign imperialist pressure and the influence of the bourgeoisie at home are the social roots of revisionist thinking within the Party. While waging a struggle against class enemies at home and abroad, we must remain vigilant and resolutely oppose all forms of opportunist ideological tendencies within the Party."

[5] On March 11, 1966, Xu Liqun, Executive Vice Minister of the Central Propaganda Department, acting on Peng Zhen's advice, called Yang Yongzhi, head of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee's Propaganda Department, to question why they hadn't informed the Central Propaganda Department before publishing Yao Wenyuan's article. Peng Zhen replied, "In the past, Shanghai published Yao Wenyuan's articles without even informing us. Where has the Party spirit of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee gone?"

[6] In July 1964, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China established a "Five-Man Group" to carry out Cultural Revolution work under the leadership of the Political Bureau and Secretariat. The group was led by Peng Zhen (First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC), and Lu Dingyi (Vice Premier of the State Council, Minister of the Central Propaganda Department, and Minister of Culture). Members included Kang Sheng (Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat), Zhou Yang (Deputy Minister of the Central Propaganda Department), and Wu Lengxi (President of Xinhua News Agency and President of the People's Daily). Initially, this "Five-Man Group" was not called the "Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group" but was always referred to simply as the "Five-Man Group." The term "Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group" only emerged on February 12, 1966, when the "Outline of the Report of the Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group on Current Academic Discussions" (later known as the "February Outline") was circulated throughout the Party.

[7] The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a working conference in Beijing from September 18 to October 12, 1965. During the conference, on October 10, Mao Zedong spoke with the first secretaries of the major regions, proposing war preparations. He urged all provinces to build up their "small third lines." He urged them not to be afraid of the enemy not coming, not to be afraid of mutinies, and not to be afraid of rebellions. He also said, "What will you do if revisionism emerges from the Central Committee?" It's very likely, and it would be the most dangerous. If revisionism emerges from the Central Committee, you will rebel. If the provinces have "small third lines," they will rebel. In the past, some people simply blindly believed in the International and the Central Committee. Now, you must be careful: no matter who says it—the Central Committee, the Central Bureau, or the Provincial Party Committee—if it's incorrect, you don't have to follow it.

[8] On September 20, 1961, the Beijing Municipal Party Committee's publication, Frontline, launched a column for essays titled "Notes from Three-Family Village." Wu Han, Deng Tuo, and Liao Mosha took turns writing for the column. Wu Han used the pen name "Wu," Deng Tuo used the pen name "Nan" (under the pen name "Ma Nancun"), and Liao Mosha used the pen name "Xing" (under the pen name "Fanxing"). They all signed their names as "Wu Nanxing." The "Three-Family Village" here referred to the anti-Party, anti-socialist revisionist group.

[9] The Tang Dynasty poet Jia Dao famously wrote in his poem "Remembering the Hermit Wu on the River," "The autumn wind blows upon the Wei River, and fallen leaves fill Chang'an." Mao Zedong, writing on January 9, 1963, in a poem titled "A River Full of Red: In

Response to Comrade Guo Moruo," included the line, "As the west wind blows, fallen leaves descend upon Chang'an, their wings rustling." This refers to the revisionists' desolate and bleak situation, and the impending clarion call for our offensive.

Comments on the article "Trial Implementation of Part-time Work (Farming) and Study in Beijing Art Schools" [I]

(April 14, 1966)

All schools and disciplines (primary schools, middle schools, universities, military academies, medical schools, art schools, and other schools such as Party schools, journalism schools, foreign language schools, diplomatic schools, etc., covering social sciences, natural sciences, and the general knowledge of both) should follow this approach. Step by step and with due preparation, all students should be discharged from the school system and sent to factories and rural areas, living, eating, and working alongside workers and peasants, learning about industry and agriculture, and studying. The ideal work-study ratio should be 50:50, and at most 4:6. Therefore, the amount of studying should be greatly reduced. Reading is necessary, but excessive reading is fatal. Teachers and students should be equal, putting aside their airs, and learning from each other. Experiences should be constantly reviewed and mistakes corrected. Many useless books should simply be shelved. Just as the reading of the Five Classics, the Twenty-Four Histories, the various philosophers, and the endless collections and anthologies of essays was abolished in the past, the revolution triumphed. For example, among the Communists and our military cadres, over 90 percent are illiterate or barely literate. Those who can read a little more, such as those who attended a few years of high school, the Whampoa Military Academy, the Yunnan Military Academy, or Soviet military academies, are a tiny minority, and there are practically no university graduates. Therefore, some say that the Communists are "unlearned but skilled," while they are "learned but unskilled." This statement is somewhat correct in form. But in essence, it is completely wrong. Communists have attended military and revolutionary universities for over twenty years (those twenty years of war and revolution), while university professors and students are only able to pore over books (a relatively easy task). They can't fight, they can't make revolution, they can't work, and they can't farm. Their knowledge is extremely poor, and when they talk about these things, they have no idea what they are talking about. Many of them do have one skill: anti-communism, anti-people, and anti-revolution, and they remain so to this day. They also have "techniques," methods of counter-revolution. That's why I often say that intellectuals are the least learned, compared to workers and peasants. They have no shame in themselves, and they spend their days going from book to book, from concept to concept. If this continues, they will be incapable of anything except counter-

revolution, bourgeois restoration, and cultivating revisionists. Some who participated in the first and second Four Cleanups Movements and learned from the workers and peasants returned feeling ashamed of their inferiority and invigorated by revolutionary drive. This is a good thing. A Tang Dynasty poem [2] goes like this: "The smoke from the bamboo hangings melts, the emperor's legacy is empty; the mountains and rivers are empty, the home of the first emperor. The ashes of the pit are still burning, yet Shandong is in turmoil; Liu and Xiang failed to read." Some comrades have said: "The less educated overthrow the more educated; the younger overthrow the older." This is a law of the past and present. The classics, history, philosophy, and anthologies have accumulated to the point of filling up volumes and becoming a vast sea. This has declared its own demise. Only one in a few hundred thousand people still cares about them; the rest are completely unaware of their existence. This is a great liberation, and we are extremely grateful. Therefore, all schools must be relocated to factories and rural areas, and part-time work and study must be implemented. Of course, this must be done in stages, in batches and phases, but it must happen. If not, such schools must be disbanded to prevent endless trouble.

Mao Zedong,

April 14th

[1] This comment appeared in "Document and Telegraph Abstracts," No. 168, published by the Confidential Office of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on April 12, 1966. The article "Trial Practice of Part-time Work (Farming) and Studying in Beijing's Art Schools" published in this issue described the China Conservatory of Music's transfer of first-year students and some faculty to the Beijing Branch of the China Automotive Industry Corporation to pilot factory-based education, and to Wenquan Commune in Beijing's Haidian District to pilot a part-time farming and studying program. Mao Zedong's comment was not published at the time.

[2] This is a seven-character quatrain titled "Burning and Burying Books," written by the late Tang poet Zhang He. The original poem reads: "The bamboo smoke scatters the imperial legacy, leaving nothing behind. Empty gates and rivers block the Emperor's home. The ashes are still warm, yet Shandong is in turmoil. Liu Bang and Xiang Yu, it turns out, didn't read."

Comments on a Passage in the Opening Address of the First Session of the CPPCC National Committee

(April 14, 1966)

This passage is accurately stated. Comrades, please discuss this issue frequently.

Notes from April 14, 1966

[1] This refers to the following passage from Mao Zedong's opening speech at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 21, 1949: "The imperialists and domestic reactionaries will never resign themselves to their defeat and will make a final struggle. Even after the whole country is pacified, they will continue to sabotage and disrupt China in various ways and will attempt to restore their rule every day and every hour. This is inevitable and beyond doubt. We must not relax our vigilance." In February 1966, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee compiled and printed some of Mao Zedong's instructions on confidential work and prepared to distribute them to participants in the National Confidential Work Conference for study. When Mao Zedong reviewed the document, he wrote this comment in brackets after this passage.

**Comments on the Brief Report on the In-depth Development of Academic Criticism
Arranged by the Party Committee of the Ministry of Higher Education**

(April 23, 1966)

This is a good document [1]. I will share it with all comrades. All university teachers and students, middle school teachers, and high school students in all regions should participate in the Cultural Revolution movement.

Mao Zedong,

April 23, 1966

[1] This refers to a briefing by the Education Office of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee on April 19, 1966, on the situation of the Ministry of Higher Education Party Committee holding a symposium to deploy the in-depth development of the academic criticism movement. The briefing said that the Ministry of Higher Education Party Committee held a meeting of party committee secretaries and propaganda ministers of ten universities in Beijing and Tianjin on April 17 to discuss and deploy the issue of in-depth development of the academic criticism movement. At the meeting, Peking University and other universities reported on the academic criticism situation in the previous period and pointed out that the main problem in the current criticism is that the leadership ideology lags behind reality, and there is more criticism from an academic point of view and less criticism from a political point of view. There is no conscious recognition that this is a class struggle on the political and ideological front. The meeting made the following arrangements for the in-depth development of this movement in the future: (1) The leaders of each institution must clearly understand that this is a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie on the front of literature and art education, and it is also a struggle to completely eliminate the monopoly of bourgeois experts on education on the education front and a struggle to seize the leadership of education. (2) All current work in universities should be integrated with current academic criticism, and through academic criticism, we should promote educational revolution and teaching reform. (3) We should mobilize the masses and organize teachers, students, and faculty to actively participate in this battle.

Comments and Revisions [1] on the Central Committee's Draft Notice on the Dissolution of the "Outline of the Report on Current Academic Discussions by the Five-member Cultural Revolution Group" [2]

(April 1966)

1

Jiang Qing:

I am sending you two copies of the letter [3] from Beijing. Please study it and see if there are any revisions. I have asked Comrades Kang Sheng and Boda to come to Shanghai today or tomorrow to discuss it with you. Then, Comrades Kang Sheng and Boda will come here to make a report on the night of the 16th and make the final decision.

Mao Zedong

April 14th, 8:30 a.m.

2

Comrades Enlai, Xiaoping [4], and Peng Zhen:

I have received and read your letter of April 12 and its attachments. I would like to ask Comrades Kang Sheng, Boda, and any other drafting group members who may be in Shanghai to go to Shanghai today (the 14th) or tomorrow to discuss the document with the Shanghai comrades. Then, I would like to ask Comrades Kang Sheng and Boda to come here on the night of the 16th or the morning of the 17th. You may come here on the 16th. You will decide whether the various Central Bureaux should send representatives.

Mao Zedong

April 14, 1966, 9:00 a.m.

3

There are some revisions; please consider them. To Comrades Enlai, Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng [5].

Mao Zedong

April 14, morning

4

Already read.

Return to Kang Sheng's office.

5

The Central Committee decided to revoke the "Outline of the Report of the Five-Person Cultural Revolution Group on Current Academic Discussions," approved on February 12, 1966. *It also disbanded the original "Five-Person Cultural Revolution Group" and its offices, and re-established the Cultural Revolution Group [7], which would be subordinate to the Politburo Standing Committee.*

6

This outline, using confusing, self-contradictory, and hypocritical phraseology, obscures the acute class struggle currently underway on the cultural and ideological front. It particularly obscures the fact that the purpose of this great struggle is the criticism of Wu Han [8] *and a large number of other anti-Party and anti-socialist bourgeois representatives (a group of whom can be found in the Central Committee and its various organs, as well as in every province, municipality, and autonomous region).* This outline fails to mention Chairman Mao's repeated emphasis that the crux of Wu Han's "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office" is the issue of dismissal from office, thereby obscuring the serious political nature of this struggle.

7

The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the struggle between the truth of Marxism and the fallacies of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes, is either the east wind prevailing over the west wind or the west wind prevailing over the east wind. There is no question of equality. *How can there be any equality on such fundamental issues as the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie, its dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, its dictatorship in the superstructure, including in all cultural spheres, and its continued elimination of bourgeois representatives who have infiltrated the Communist Party and are waving the red flag to oppose it? The old social democratic parties of the past few decades and the modern revisionists of the past decade have never allowed any equality between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. They fundamentally deny that human history, spanning thousands of years, is a history of class struggle, that the proletariat has waged class struggle against the bourgeoisie, and that the proletariat has revolutionized and exercised its dictatorship over the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they are loyal running dogs of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Together with them, they uphold the bourgeois ideology of oppression and exploitation of the proletariat and the capitalist social system, opposing the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the socialist social system. They are a group of anti-communist and anti-people counter-revolutionaries. Their struggle with us is a life-and-death struggle;*

there is no question of equality. Therefore, our struggle against them can only be a life-and-death struggle. Our relationship with them is absolutely not one of equality, but one of one class oppressing another—a relationship of dictatorship or despotism by the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. It cannot be any other kind of relationship, such as so-called equality, peaceful coexistence between the exploited and the exploiting classes, or a relationship of benevolence, righteousness, and morality.

8

Chairman Mao often said, "Without destruction, there is no construction." Destruction is criticism, it is revolution. Destruction requires reasoning, and reasoning is construction. With destruction at the forefront, construction is also inherent in it.

9

The main thrust of the Outline's opposition is directed at the proletarian left, clearly aiming to brand Marxist-Leninists as "scholars" and, in turn, support genuine bourgeois scholars, maintaining their precarious monopoly in academia. *In reality, it is those capitalist-roaders in power within the Party who support the bourgeois academic cliques, and those bourgeois representatives who infiltrate the Party to protect them, who are the real Party cliques. They do not read books, do not read newspapers, do not interact with the masses, possess no academic background, and rely solely on "arbitrary decisions and the use of power to coerce others" to usurp the Party's name.*

10

At a time when the proletariat had just begun a new and fierce struggle against bourgeois representatives on the ideological front, and when many sectors and places had not yet begun to participate in the struggle, *or when, even if the struggle had already begun, the vast majority of Party committees still lacked understanding, were not serious, and were ineffective in leading this great struggle*, the outline repeatedly emphasized the need for so-called "leadership," "caution," "prudence," and "approval from the relevant leading bodies" in the struggle. These were all attempts to impose numerous restrictions on the proletarian left, impose numerous rules and regulations, and shackle its hands and feet, thus creating numerous obstacles to the proletarian Cultural Revolution. In short, they were eager to put the brakes on the struggle and launch a counterattack. The authors of the outline were extremely resentful of the proletarian left's articles counterattacking the reactionary bourgeois "authorities," both those that had already been published and those that had not yet been published. *They have allowed all sorts of monsters and demons to run wild, filling our newspapers, broadcasts, periodicals, books, textbooks, lectures, literary works, films, plays, folk art, fine arts, music, dance, and so on for years, without ever advocating proletarian leadership or approving it. This contrast reveals the true position of the authors of the outline.*

Party committees at all levels must immediately cease implementing the "Outline of the Report of the Five-Person Cultural Revolution Group on Current Academic Discussions." The entire Party must follow Comrade Mao Zedong's instructions, hold high the banner of the proletarian Cultural Revolution, *thoroughly expose the bourgeois reactionary stance of those so-called "academic authorities" who oppose the Party and socialism, and thoroughly criticize the bourgeois reactionary ideologies in academia, education, journalism, literature, and publishing, seizing control of these cultural spheres. To achieve this, we must simultaneously criticize the bourgeois representatives who have infiltrated the Party, government, military, and cultural sectors. These individuals must be purged, and some must be transferred from their positions. In particular, these individuals must not be trusted to lead the Cultural Revolution, as many have, and continue to, engage in such work, a highly dangerous endeavour.*

The representatives of the bourgeoisie who have infiltrated the Party, the government, the army, and various cultural circles are counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once the time is ripe, they will seize power and transform the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of these individuals have already been identified, while others have not. Some, such as Khrushchev [9], are being trusted and groomed to be our successors. They are currently sleeping beside us. Party committees at all levels must pay full attention to this.

This notice, along with the erroneous document issued by the Central Committee on February 12 of this year, can be sent to county Party committees, cultural institution Party committees, and military regimental Party committees, inviting them to discuss which document is erroneous and which is correct, their own understanding of the situation, and their achievements and errors.

[1] This draft notice, later adopted by the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on May 16, 1966, became the "Notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," also known as the "May 16 Notice," and was published in the People's Daily on May 17, 1967.

[2] The Cultural Revolution Five-Person Group was established in July 1964 at Mao Zedong's suggestion. It consisted of Peng Zhen, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat; Lu Dingyi, then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat and Minister of the CPC Central Propaganda Department; Kang Sheng, then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat; Zhou Yang, Deputy Minister of the CPC Central Propaganda Department; and Wu Lengxi, President of Xinhua News Agency and Editor-in-Chief of the People's Daily. On February 3, 1966, the Cultural Revolution Five-Person Group

held an enlarged meeting to discuss issues arising from the academic criticism at the time. After the meeting, they compiled the "Outline of the Report of the Cultural Revolution Five-Person Group on Current Academic Discussions," also known as the "February Outline," and submitted it to Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee. On February 12, the CPC Central Committee approved and circulated this outline.

[3] This refers to the Central Committee's notice on revoking the "Outline of the Report of the Five-Person Cultural Revolution Group on Current Academic Discussions" (draft dated April 12, 1966), drafted by a drafting group headed by Chen Boda, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. It was submitted by Zhou Enlai and others from Beijing to Mao Zedong in Hangzhou on April 12, 1966.

[4] Enlai is Zhou Enlai, and Xiaoping is Deng Xiaoping, who was then the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee.

[5] This comment was written on a draft notice submitted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on April 12, 1966. Mao Zedong later made several revisions to this draft notice, as shown *italics* in sections 5 to 11 of this article.

[6] This was a comment on the revised draft of the notice submitted by Kang Sheng on April 18, 1966. In his report to Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng said: "The last sentence of Article 7 on page 4 of the 'Notice' has been revised in accordance with the Chairman's instructions. Please review it."

[7] On May 28, 1966, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China announced the list of members of the newly established Central Cultural Revolution Group. Chen Boda was appointed group leader, Kang Sheng was appointed advisor, Jiang Qing, Wang Renzhong, Liu Zhijian, and Zhang Chunqiao were appointed deputy group leaders, and group members included Xie Jiansheng, Yin Da, Wang Li, Guan Feng, Qi Benyu, Mu Xin, and Yao Wenyan.

[8] Wu Han, Vice Mayor of Beijing and Vice Chairman of the China Democratic League Central Committee, was wrongly criticized for writing the newly adapted historical drama "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office." He was persecuted to death in 1969. In March 1979, with the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Beijing Municipal Committee completely rehabilitated this unjust case.

[9] Khrushchev, former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was dismissed from his leadership positions in October 1964.

Revisions and Comments on Several Issues in Chairman Mao's Poems (Annotated Edition)

[1]

(April 1966)

1

In June 1930, the Central Red Army marched from Tingzhou (Changting) in Fujian Province into Jiangxi. In July, it advanced from Jiangxi into Hunan, preparing for a second attack on Changsha, *but ultimately failed*. Given the relative strength of the enemy at the time, *the enemy was well prepared*, and attacking Changsha would have been a mistake. *However, due to the chaotic fighting between Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Shimin in Henan Province, the southern provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi were largely free of strong enemy forces for six months, with the exception of Changsha and Nanchang. The Red Army seized this opportunity to capture large areas, expand its forces, and prepare the conditions for crushing the first enemy "encirclement and suppression" campaign.* Persuaded by Comrade Mao Zedong, the cadres of the Central Red Army finally changed their strategy and divided their forces to capture Chaling, Youxian, Dengling, Pingxiang, Ji'an, Xiajiang, and Xinyu, significantly strengthening the Red Army's strength and the peasants' struggle for the Agrarian Revolution. This poem captures the Red Army's heroic spirit during the advance. [2]

2

Okay.

3

Read,

Return to Qiaomu.

[1] On April 5, 1966, Hu Qiaomu, alternate secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong's secretary, wrote to Mao Zedong, saying, "There are two or three important issues in the annotated version of Chairman Mao's poems that require your guidance." (1) Based on the suggestions of several comrades from the General Political Department, I have added a caption to the poem "Dielianhua: From Tingzhou to Changsha." I refer to the "Resolution on Certain Historical Issues" and its annotations. I wonder if it is appropriate. Please approve it." This section contains Mao Zedong's revisions to this caption. The text printed in italics contains the text he added and revised. (2) The line "A bridge soars across the sky, transforming the north and south into a thoroughfare" in the poem "Shui

Tiao Ge Tou: Swimming" remains as "A bridge soars across the north and south, transforming the sky into a thoroughfare," according to Comrade Yuan Shuipai's opinion to the Chairman. (3) Regarding the phrase "Thousands of villages have been chopped off by weeds, and people have left their remains" in the poem "Seven-Character Verse: Farewell to the God of Plague," according to readers' letters and references to relevant texts, "Thousands of villages have been chopped off by weeds, and people have left their remains." I'm unsure whether the above two passages in the main text are correct. Please provide your instructions." Mao Zedong wrote a comment after these two passages, which is the second part of this passage. The third part of this passage was written on the envelope of Hu Qiaomu's letter to Mao Zedong.

[2] This note was revised in the Selected Poems of Mao Zedong, published by the People's Literature Publishing House in 1986. Further revisions were made to some of the text in the Selected Poems of Mao Zedong, published by the Central Literature Publishing House in 1996. The current text reads: "In June 1930, the First Corps of the Red Army (initially called the First Route Army) marched from Tingzhou (Changting) in Fujian Province into Jiangxi Province. In August, it advanced from Jiangxi towards Hunan, where it met up with the Third Corps of the Red Army led by Peng Dehuai northeast of Liuyang. They decided to form the First Front Army of the Red Army. In September, the First Front Army attacked Changsha but failed. The defending enemy was strong and well-prepared, so the Red Army did not pursue a direct offensive. That summer, due to the chaotic battles between Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan in Henan and other areas, for several months, Jiangxi and Hunan were free of any strong enemy forces, except for large and medium-sized cities like Changsha and Nanchang. Consequently, Mao Zedong persuaded the cadres of the First Front Army to change their adventurous strategy, as directed by the Party Central Committee and the then-preferential Li Lisan line, to seize the capitals of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi provinces. Instead, they divided their forces to capture Chaling, Youxian, Culing, Pingxiang, Ji'an, Xiajiang, and Xinyu (now Xinyu). They occupied a large area, expanded their forces, and prepared to crush the enemy's first offensive." "This poem describes the heroic spirit of the Red Army during its advance in June and July."

Comments on Lin Yishan's report on the construction of the Three Gorges Project on the Yangtze River [1]

(April 1966)

I have read it. A counter-report is needed.

[1] On March 9, 1966, Lin Yishan, Director of the Yangtze River Basin Planning Office, wrote a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong, stating that the Yangtze River planning and research on the Three Gorges Project, under the personal guidance of the Premier, were conducted in accordance with the Chairman's directives of "active preparation, full reliability" and "beneficial without disadvantages." The comprehensive utilization of the Three Gorges' water resources offers enormous benefits, but active development requires resolving the contradiction between construction scale and economic development levels. This is a key reason some oppose the near-term construction of the Three Gorges. In recent years, in accordance with the Chairman's directives, we have focused on studying three issues: structural protection, reservoir siltation, and phased construction. We have further recognized that phased construction is more consistent with the "beneficial without disadvantages" principle, greatly increasing the feasibility of near-term construction of the Three Gorges Project. The planning and design principles of the Three Gorges Water Conservancy Project are: comprehensive utilization, rationally arranging flood control, power generation, and navigation, fully utilizing water resources, eliminating harmful effects and promoting beneficial effects, and, in coordination with other flood control projects, gradually achieving the goal of fundamentally controlling the Yangtze River. The process for achieving various water conservancy goals can be implemented gradually, based on actual needs. Phased construction allows for smaller investments and shorter construction periods, enabling earlier returns, facilitating the rational use of state funds and facilitating project maintenance. After providing detailed analysis of issues such as siltation control and air defense at the Three Gorges Project, the report concluded that, given the current state of national economic development, the Three Gorges Project should be completed sooner rather than later, and recommended that the central government list the project as a construction project during the Third and Fourth Five-Year Plans. On April 10, Wang Renzhong, Second Secretary of the Central-South Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and First Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee, submitted Lin Yishan's report, along with two other related reports, to Mao Zedong for review. Mao's comments were inscribed on Wang Renzhong's submissions.

Directives to the Third Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Youth League

(April 1966)

This revolution relies on the youth. The Party Central Committee calls on you young people to dare to think, dare to speak, dare to act, dare to take risks, and dare to revolutionize. Wherever you young people criticize, the Party Central Committee will support you.

Will there be revisionism in China?

(April 1966)

The question of whether China will have revisionists in power is: one is yes, the other is no; one is early, the other is late. It is better to have revisionism early. If it is done well, it may not happen. It is difficult for China to have revisionism.

The Secretariat is also divided. Peng, Lu, Yang, Tan, Luo and others have served as secretaries of the Secretariat. It is constantly divided, which is in line with dialectics. Some people are scared to death. Not dividing is a subjective wish. If there is one in the Central Committee, there will be one in every province.

Conversation with Representatives of the Albanian Party and Government Delegation (Excerpt)

(May 5, 1966)

The development of things is not subject to human will. Marx and Engels did not foresee that the Social Democratic Party they founded would be usurped by their successors after their deaths and transformed into a bourgeois party. This was not subject to their will. Their party started out as revolutionary, but after their deaths it became counter-revolutionary. The Soviet Union was not subject to Lenin's will; he did not foresee the emergence of Khrushchev's revisionism [1].

Things are constantly moving in the opposite direction. It's not just quantitative change, it's qualitative change; if there's only quantitative change, without qualitative change, that's metaphysics. We're also prepared. Do you know when revisionism will take over Beijing? Those who support us now could easily become revisionists. This is the first possibility. The second possibility is partial division.

Given these circumstances, revisionism is likely to rise once we die.

It's already dusk for us, so we should take advantage of the last breath now to put an end to these bourgeois restorations.

In short, we must keep two possibilities in mind: the first possibility is a counter-revolutionary dictatorship, a counter-revolutionary restoration. If we prioritize this as the first possibility, we'll become somewhat anxious. Otherwise, we won't be anxious, and everything will be peaceful. If you're not anxious, and everything is peaceful, then that's all good? That's not the case. The bright side is now visible, but there's also a more important side, a dark side. They are working underground. Lenin said that the defeated exploiting classes will long remain stronger than the victorious proletariat. Lenin also said that the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie are growing capitalism every day and every hour. Who are the defeated classes? Imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism. The masses are the workers, peasants, and the urban petty bourgeoisie. And then there's China's national bourgeoisie and their intellectuals—we include them all. Then there were the children of the landlord class. In the past, the majority of our university students were children of the bourgeoisie and landlord class. Workers, poor peasants, and lower-middle peasants couldn't afford to go to school, not even elementary school. Even if they did, they couldn't get into middle school, let alone university. There were at least several million old intellectuals. The cultural education of the masses was in their hands, not ours. With so many elementary schools, we had no teachers, so we had to use those left behind by the Kuomintang. We also

had no middle school teachers, university professors, engineers, actors, or painters of our own, nor did we have anyone to run a publishing house or bookstore. Some of those old guard members had infiltrated the Party, lying dormant for a while, waiting for their chance to rise. Just like Khrushchev, who lay dormant, waiting for his chance to rise.

The second possibility is a peeling policy, removing layer by layer, leaving only the good and removing the bad. From 1921 to 1966, a period of forty-five years, we undertook a preliminary peeling, removing quite a few reactionaries: Chen Duxiu, Wu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Wang Ming, Zhang Guotao, Zhang Wentian, Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing, Peng Zhen, and dozens of other Central Committee members, including those who slept next to us and went unnoticed.

Don't be afraid of counter-revolutionaries. Sometimes I'm worried, too. To say I don't worry or have no concerns would be a lie. But after waking up, I'd gather a few comrades for a meeting, discuss things, and come up with a solution.

[1] Khrushchev (1894-1971), a former Soviet leader, praised Stalin as his "biological father" during his lifetime. After Stalin's death, he released a secret report that denounced Stalin as a "murderer," a "criminal," a "robber," a "gambler," an "Ivan the Terrible-style tyrant," the "greatest dictator in Russian history," a "bastard," and an "idiot." He completely disavowed Stalin and even had Stalin's remains removed from Lenin's palace.

Comments on the General Logistics Department's Report on Further Improving the Army's Agricultural and Sideline Production

(May 7 and 14, 1966)

1

Comrade Lin Biao [1]:

I have received the report from the General Logistics Department you sent on May 6th [2]. I think this plan is excellent. Would it be wise to send it to all military commands, asking them to convene army and division-level cadres for discussion, submit their opinions to the Military Commission, and then report to the Central Committee for approval before issuing appropriate instructions to the entire army? Please consider this. As long as a world war does not break out, the army should be a university. Even in the event of a Third World War, it is very likely to become such a university, capable of engaging in various tasks besides fighting. Didn't we do this in the various anti-Japanese base areas during the eight years of World War II? This university allows students to learn politics, military affairs, and cultural knowledge, while also engaging in agricultural and sideline production. They should also be able to establish small and medium-sized factories to produce a certain amount of their own products and products that can be exchanged with the state at an equal value. They should also be able to engage in mass work and participate in the Socialist Education Movement and the Four Cleanups Movement [3] in factories and rural areas. After the Four Cleanups are completed, there will always be mass work to do, ensuring that the army and the people are always one. They should also be constantly involved in the Cultural Revolution struggle to criticize the bourgeoisie. In this way, the military can combine military-academic, military-agricultural, military-industrial, and military-civilian tasks. However, this must be properly coordinated, with a primary and a secondary focus. A single unit can only handle one or two of the three tasks: agriculture, industry, and civilians, not all at once. In this way, the role played by millions of troops is enormous.

Similarly, workers should focus on industry, but also learn military, political, and cultural subjects. They should also practice self-discipline and participate in criticizing the bourgeoisie. Where conditions permit, they should also engage in agricultural and sideline production, such as in the Daqing Oilfield [4].

Peasants should focus on agriculture (including forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production, and cultural production), but should also learn military, political, and cultural subjects. When conditions permit, they should also collectively run small factories and criticize the bourgeoisie.

Students should also focus on education, but also learn other subjects. That is, they should not only study literature, but also learn about industry, agriculture, and the military, and criticize the bourgeoisie. The school system must be shortened, and education must be revolutionized. The phenomenon of bourgeois intellectuals dominating our schools cannot continue.

Those in business, the service sector, and Party and government agencies, wherever possible, should also do the same.

What has been said is not a new idea or innovation. Many people have been doing this for years, but it hasn't become widespread. As for the military, it has been doing this for several years, but now it needs further development.

Mao Zedong

May 7, 1966

2

Comrade Lin Biao:

If you agree, this document [5] can be printed and distributed to the Central Military Commission and the meeting [6]. Let them take it home and discuss it. If there are no objections, it can be implemented. When printing, please ask the Central Committee to add a note of approval [7]. Please consider it.

Mao Zedong

May 14

[1] Lin Biao was then Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Minister of National Defense.

[2] Refers to the report of the General Logistics Department of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China to the Central Military Commission on May 2, 1966, on further improving the agricultural and sideline production of the troops. The report said that judging from the situation in the past few years, the army's production is indeed a great thing, with great political and economic significance: (1) it restores the old tradition of our army; (2) it can open up a lot of farmland for the country; (3) it can provide a lot of food for the country; (4) the troops engaged in full production can still carry out certain political education and military training; (5) the production of frontier troops can be combined with the development of the frontier economy and the construction of national defense, which is of special significance. Our general idea is: if the army engages in more production during the war preparation period, it can provide the country with 400 million to 500 million

kilograms of grain within three to five years, which is equivalent to preparing military rations for wartime.

[3] This refers to the Socialist Education Movement, which was carried out in some rural areas and a few urban industrial and mining enterprises, schools, and other units from 1963 to 1966, focusing on clearing up politics, the economy, organizations, and ideology.

[4] During the Great Leap Forward, on September 26, 1959, a world-class, ultra-large sandstone oil field was discovered near the small town of Datong on the Songnen Plain. Coinciding with the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, Ouyang Qin, then Secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee, proposed changing the name of Datong to Daqing, presenting the Daqing Oilfield as a special gift to the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. In March 1960, development and construction of the Daqing Oilfield began. The discovery and development of the Daqing oilfield confirmed that continental strata could generate oil wells and form large oil fields, enriching and advancing petroleum geology theory, transforming the backwardness of China's petroleum industry, and profoundly impacting China's industrial development.

[5] This is the first part of this chapter. Because it was written on May 7, 1966, it later became commonly known as the "May 7 Directive."

[6] Refers to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Beijing from May 4 to 26, 1966.

[7] On May 15, 1966, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded Mao Zedong's comments and the report from the Military Commission's General Logistics Department, adding a commentary stating, "The Central Committee believes that Comrade Mao Zedong's letter to Comrade Lin Biao is a document of extremely important historical significance. It represents a groundbreaking new development in Marxism-Leninism. This thought not only has great historical significance in promoting China's socialist revolution and socialist construction, but also has great strategic significance in opposing possible attacks by imperialism, modern revisionism, and reactionaries in various countries, strengthening national defense, and implementing the idea of people's war."

Publishing Zhang Enci's comments on Peking University's "Four Cleanups" Movement [1]

(May 11, 1966)

After Comrade Shaoqi has read it, publish it for relevant comrades. [2]

Mao Zedong

May 11

[1] Refers to "My Opinions on the 'Four Cleanups' Movement at Peking University" written by Zhang Enci, a cadre of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (formerly a teacher of the Department of Philosophy at Peking University) on May 5, 1966. This document puts forward some sharp views on the leadership of the Peking University "Four Cleanups" Working Group, the Peking University Party Committee and the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China in the Peking University "Four Cleanups" Movement, as well as the implementation of Peking University's educational policy. When Mao Zedong instructed it to be printed and distributed, the title was changed to "Comrade Zhang Enci's Opinions on the Peking University 'Four Cleanups' Movement".

[2] Shaoqi, also known as Liu Shaoqi. On May 13, 1966, he instructed Wang Dongxing, Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee: "Please print and distribute this document immediately to all comrades at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau." The enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, convened to fully launch the "Cultural Revolution", was held in Beijing from May 4 to 26, 1966.

A Few Paragraphs Added to the CPC Central Committee's "May 16" Notice

(May 16, 1966)

The original "Cultural Revolution Five-Person Group" [1] and its administrative offices were abolished, and a new Cultural Revolution Group was established, subordinate to the Politburo Standing Committee.

The purpose of this major struggle was to criticize Wu Han and a large number of other anti-Party and anti-socialist bourgeois representatives (such bourgeois representatives existed in the Central Committee and its various organs, as well as in every province, city, and autonomous region).

Can there be any equality on such fundamental issues as the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie, its dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, its dictatorship in the superstructure, including in all cultural spheres, and the proletariat's continued elimination of bourgeois representatives who have infiltrated the Communist Party and wave the red flag to oppose it? For decades, the old social democratic parties, and for a decade or more, modern revisionism, have never allowed any equality between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. They fundamentally deny that thousands of years of human history are a history of class struggle, that the proletariat's class struggle against the bourgeoisie, and that the proletariat's revolution and dictatorship over the bourgeoisie are fundamentally denied. On the contrary, they are loyal lackeys of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Together with them, they uphold the bourgeois ideology of oppression and exploitation of the proletariat and the capitalist social system, and oppose the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the socialist social system. They are a group of anti-communist and anti-people counter-revolutionaries. Their struggle with us is a life-and-death struggle; there is no question of equality. Therefore, our struggle against them can only be a life-and-death struggle. Our relationship with them is absolutely not one of equality, but one of one class oppressing another, a relationship of dictatorship or despotism exercised by the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. It cannot be any other relationship, such as so-called equality, peaceful coexistence between the exploited and the exploiting classes, or a relationship of benevolence, righteousness, and morality.

Without destruction, there can be no construction. Destruction is criticism, it is revolution. Destruction requires reasoning, and reasoning is construction. With destruction at the forefront, construction is inherently part of it.

In fact, those capitalist-roaders in the Party who support the bourgeois academic cliques, and those bourgeois representatives who infiltrate the Party to protect them, are the big party cliques who are ignorant of books, newspapers, and the masses, possess no academic

knowledge, and rely solely on "arbitrary decisions and the use of power to oppress others" to usurp the Party's name.

.....or when, although the struggle has already begun, the vast majority of Party committees still lack understanding, are not serious, and are ineffective in leading this great struggle.....

They have allowed all sorts of monsters and demons to run wild, filling our newspapers, broadcasts, publications, books, textbooks, lectures, literary works, films, dramas, folk art, fine arts, music, dance, and so on for years. They have never advocated for proletarian leadership, nor have they ever sought approval. This contrast reveals the true position of the authors of the outline.

...Hold high the banner of the proletarian Cultural Revolution, thoroughly expose the bourgeois reactionary stance of those so-called "academic authorities" who are anti-Party and anti-socialist, thoroughly criticize the reactionary bourgeois ideologies in academia, education, journalism, literature, and publishing, and seize leadership in these cultural spheres. To achieve this, we must simultaneously criticize and purge the bourgeois representatives who have infiltrated the Party, the government, the military, and various cultural circles, and even transfer some of them from their posts. In particular, we must not trust these individuals to lead the Cultural Revolution, as many have done, and still do, and this is extremely dangerous.

The representatives of the bourgeoisie who have infiltrated the Party, the government, the army, and various cultural circles are a group of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once the time is ripe, they will seize power and transform the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of these individuals have already been identified, while others have not. Some, such as Khrushchev, are being trusted and groomed to be our successors. They are currently sleeping beside us. Party committees at all levels must pay full attention to this.

[1] Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group and Office: In July 1964, the CPC Central Committee established a "Five-Man Group" to carry out Cultural Revolution work under the leadership of the Political Bureau and Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. The group leader was Peng Zhen (First Secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee), the deputy group leader was Lu Dingyi (Vice Premier of the State Council, Minister of the Central Propaganda Department and Minister of Culture), and the members included Kang Sheng (Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat), Zhou Yang (Deputy Minister of the Central Propaganda Department), and Wu Lengxi (President of Xinhua News Agency and President of People's Daily). This "Five-Man Group" was not initially called the "Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group" and was always referred to as the "Five-Man Group". The term "Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group" only appeared when the "Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group's Report

Outline on Current Academic Discussions" (later known as the "February Outline") was circulated to the entire Party on February 12, 1966.

Comments and Annotations on Zhang Shizhao's Letter Regarding the Temporary Postponement of the Publication of "Liu Wen Zhi Yao" [1]

(May 17, 1966)

1

Liu, Zhou, and Deng reviewed it. Sent it to Comrade Kang Sheng [2] for discussion with Mr. Zhang. One option is to publish it as originally planned; the other option is to follow Mr. Zhang's suggestion and revise it after one, two, or three years, and then publish it. Either option is acceptable.

Mao Zedong,

May 17, 1966

2

It can't be that quick. [3]

3

This is an exaggeration. [4]

4

Those who deserve harsh criticism are those who, under the guise of communism, are selling anti-communist dog meat.

Not authors who are not anti-communist. Criticism may be present, but it's probably not the main point; it's not "harsh criticism." [5]

5

How could it be so? [6]

[1] "Liu Zongyuan's Essentials" is a book written by Zhang Shizhao, a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Director of the Central Academy of Literature and History. It specifically studies the collected works of the Tang Dynasty writer Liu Zongyuan. In 1965, Zhang Shizhao submitted the manuscript to Mao Zedong for review. On July 18 of the same year, Mao responded with comments, and on August 5, he sent the manuscript to Kang Sheng for review. On January 12, 1966, Mao returned the manuscript to Zhang Shizhao, along with Kang Sheng's comments and letter. On May 10, Zhang Shizhao

wrote to Mao Zedong, proposing to temporarily postpone the publication of "Liu Zongyuan's Essentials." The letter stated that after reading detailed reports of the Cultural Revolution in various newspapers for several days, "my thoughts have been unexpectedly shaken. After carefully reviewing my own writing, I feel that the "Liu Zongyuan's Essentials" recently submitted to Zhonghua Book Company for publication should be withdrawn for re-examination." The book "Liu Wen Zhi Yao" was later revised by the author and published by Zhonghua Book Company in 1971.

[2] Kang Sheng was then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee.

[3] This comment was written next to Zhang Shizhao's letter saying that the Cultural Revolution was a "quick battle and quick decision".

[4] Zhang Shizhao wrote in his letter, "My so-called key points are purely a recitation of Liu Zihou's views, which clearly whitewashes the literary zombies of feudal society." Mao Zedong drew a vertical line next to the second half of the sentence and wrote this comment.

[5] Zhang Shizhao wrote in his letter that "a work like Liu Wen Zhi Yao, in today's thriving new society, will inevitably prompt the progressive and energetic new writers of agriculture and industry to severely criticize and utterly destroy it." Mao Zedong drew a vertical line next to "severely criticize" and wrote this annotation.

[6] In his letter, Zhang Shizhao said that because of his book "Liu Wen Zhi Yao," he had "become a stumbling block to the masses' progress. In other words, not only had he become the target of this Cultural Revolution, but he had also unknowingly fallen into the black line of anti-Party and anti-people sentiment and must be punished." Mao Zedong drew a vertical line next to the phrase "fallen into the black line of anti-Party and anti-people sentiment and must be punished" and wrote this comment.

Comments on the Agreement to Send a Temporary Work Team to the People's Daily [1]

(May 30, 1966)

Agree to do so.

Mao Zedong

May 30, 23:00

[1] On May 30, 1966, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, wrote to Mao Zedong, stating that the prestige of the People's Daily had declined significantly over the past two months, negatively impacting the Party and the country. Since the newspaper's editorial board was unable to correct the current situation, many people requested that the Central Committee send a work team. We held a meeting today to discuss the possibility of organizing a temporary work team, under the direct leadership of Chen Boda, to manage the newspaper's daily layout and provide guidance for the foreign news reports of Xinhua News Agency and the radio station. The work team in Beijing was scheduled to begin work at the newspaper on May 31. The newspaper would conduct an internal rectification campaign, study documents, and continue writing big-character posters. A group of editors with a positive attitude and willingness to work actively should focus on maintaining the daily layout. After the newspaper's layout was improved, further internal issues could be addressed. A list of the temporary working group members in Beijing was attached to the letter. Mao Zedong wrote this comment after reading it.

Comments on the big-character poster "What on earth are Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun doing in the Cultural Revolution?" [1]

(June 1, 1966)

Comrades Kang Sheng and Boda [2]:

This article can be broadcast in full by Xinhua News Agency and published in newspapers and periodicals nationwide. This is extremely necessary. From now on, the crackdown on Peking University, this reactionary bastion, can begin. Please proceed as appropriate.

Mao Zedong

June 1

[1] This comment was written in the 13th issue of the Cultural Revolution Bulletin, published by the editorial office of Red Flag magazine and Guangming Daily on May 27, 1966. This issue of the Bulletin published a big-character poster written by Nie Yuanzi, Song Yixiu, Xia Jianlei, Yang Keming, Zhao Zhengyi, Gao Yunpeng, and Li Xingchen of the Department of Philosophy of Peking University on May 25, 1966, entitled "What on earth did Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun do in the Cultural Revolution?" The big-character poster was broadcast in full by Xinhua News Agency on June 1 and published by People's Daily and other newspapers on June 2. Song Shuo was then the deputy director of the University Department of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China. Lu Ping was then the president and party secretary of Peking University. Peng Peiyun was then a cadre of the University Department of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China and the deputy secretary of the Party Committee of Peking University. Shortly thereafter, they were all wrongly dismissed from their leadership positions.

[2] Kang Sheng was then an advisor to the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Boda, also known as Chen Boda, was then the head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Conversation with Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou (Excerpt)

(June 10, 1966)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): Since ancient times, inexperienced people have always defeated experienced armies; those without guns have defeated those with guns; a small number of people have defeated a large number of people. Isn't it the same with you? How many people were there during the August Revolution?

Ho Chi Minh (hereinafter referred to as Ho): There were over 5,000 party members, not many troops.

Mao: Your army was probably only a few hundred at first, but you'll have a handful later. Before 1927, weren't you helping us? Back then, we workers and peasants numbered tens of thousands, organized in trade unions and peasant associations. Peasants had peasant self-defense forces, and workers had pickets, but we weren't prepared for the enemy's killing. By the first half of 1927, in just four months, they were wiped out, similar to the situation in Indonesia today. Of 50,000 party members, fewer than 10,000 remained. Only two out of ten remained. Where did the other 40,000 go? Some were killed; some surrendered; and a large number quit, terrified and afraid to move, leaving the village. Only eight or nine thousand continued to work. I was forced to join the Liangshan movement. I had no previous preparation for war and was teaching elementary school. That was the year I was forced to join the Liangshan movement. I did this over and over again for ten years, losing some battles but mostly winning them. The army grew to 300,000, including guerrilla units that had been withdrawn from production. However, within a decade, we encountered three instances of "Left" opportunism. The first was Qu Qiubai; the second was Li Lisan and Xiang Zhongfa; and the third was Wang Ming. Consequently, the Fifth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign failed. During that time, we were expelled from the army. I was "expelled" from the Party once and three times. Actually, I was expelled from the Central Political Bureau. Rumours spread that I was expelled from the Party and became a democratic person. I was the secretary of Jinggangshan and the regional special committee secretary, and I was no longer allowed to join the Party branch. They tried every possible means to persecute me, but later they said I could become a division commander. That's how I was, a democratic personage for over six months. Later, after the truth was revealed and I wasn't expelled, I became a Party representative and a political commissar again. That was in 1928. They said my mistakes were, first, that I didn't burn enough houses; second, that I didn't kill enough people; and third, that I said, "Political power comes from the barrel of a gun." They distributed circulars everywhere, accusing me of being a "Left" opportunist,

saying, "Political power can come from the barrel of a gun." Later, several times, I was misunderstood by comrades within the Red Army and expelled from the army. I became an ordinary citizen, doing local work in Fujian. At that time, Comrade Lin Biao stood with me and supported me. He was in the team led by Zhu De, and his team supported me. But my own team, involved in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, removed me. Those with whom I had a long-standing relationship removed me, while those I barely knew supported me. Isn't that strange?

Ho: There are all kinds of strange things.

Mao: Do you have that kind of experience? You've had smooth sailing, having been a Party leader from the start.

Ho: You're right. I've had smooth sailing, never facing opposition.

Mao: You have Marx's blessing. You have more Marxism than I do.

Ho: I don't admit it.

Mao: Why don't people oppose you?

Ho: Our Party is small, our country is small, and our army is small. Other leaders in the Party and the army are younger than me, which is also a reason.

Mao: You have a lot of experience, but that has its drawbacks: you haven't experienced setbacks, and you lack experience.

Ho: That's right.

Mao: Everyone greets you with "Long Live"³. That's one thing I differ from you on.

Ho: Precisely because of that, you have a lot of experience.

Chairman Mao: They have tried to overthrow me many times. One time was in Jiangxi. We won the first, second, third, and fourth counter-"return suppression" campaigns, but they accused me of mistakes, saying I had consistently taken a Rightist opportunist line and lacked a single shred of Marxism-Leninism. A little bit is fine, but not a shred. They think they are 100% Marxist-Leninist. They say my fighting was also opportunistic. They say we should attack the big cities, but I won't. It's like you saying that not attacking the big cities now is also Rightist opportunism. If you attack, they'll have to retreat once they attack. Of your 800,000 enemy troops, only 200,000 are mobile. The other 600,000 must defend the roads, airports, seaports, and cities. It's precisely on this point that you will prevail.

Ho: I'm reporting that we have several battalions around Saigon.

³ The Chinese words are "wan sui" and were used repeatedly towards Mao during the Cultural Revolution.

Mao: But don't attack Saigon or the shipping ports. Don't occupy other provincial capitals for the time being. If you do, you'll recover, only to have to flee again.

Ho: We currently have a special forces unit that will attack the US embassy and airports in urban areas. We are not planning to attack major cities right now.

Chairman: That's good. It's good to go in and out occasionally, like when attacking a shipping port. Because you have your people acting as secret agents, the barbed wire, the earth pits, and so on, have to be sabotaged. Send a few hundred people in for a surprise attack; then fire artillery from outside. A few hours later, a few hundred more people emerge. This is good. We've done this many times before. By capturing some small towns, we can gather a lot of information, including enemy newspapers and maps. We can also expand our forces, expanding by thousands within a few days. For example, we attacked Ji'an in Jiangxi. We had 30,000 men, and the enemy had only a brigade of a few thousand men. We stayed there for ten days and expanded our forces by 10,000 to 20,000. Later, we attacked Zhangzhou in Fujian. I sent Lin Biao there. We annihilated an enemy division and obtained a large amount of weapons and ammunition, as well as a lot of rubber shoes from Tan Kah Kee, a wealthy Singaporean Chinese businessman who was in the rubber business. We also obtained a collection of Marxist-Leninist books. Why did the Kuomintang have Marxist-Leninist books? They had them in their library, too, for research purposes. Such works include Lenin's "State and Revolution" and "Two Strategies," as well as world economic geography, the history of social development, and Deborin's philosophy of history.

Chairman Mao: I'm very familiar with Deborin. Stalin criticized him as a Menshevik. He disagreed with Stalin and Lenin's claim that he had ushered in a new era in philosophy. Khrushchev awarded him a medal after he turned eighty, and he died only in the past year or two. Those who criticized Deborin in the past have now become revisionists, such as Midin, Yu Yu, and Rosenthal. Revisionism has also emerged in the Communist Party of China. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun are all your friends, as well as my friends. Didn't you ask if we knew about this before? We did. Peng Zhen made a series of mistakes, and I wanted to remove him several years ago. Beijing is an independent kingdom; no one can interfere. It's worse than Hanoi. I can't interfere, and Comrade Liu Shaoqi can't interfere, Comrade Zhou Enlai can't interfere, and Comrade Deng Xiaoping can't interfere. Regarding Luo Ruiqing, when Peng Dehuai was being purged in 1959, someone proposed that he be made Chief of the General Staff, but some of us disagreed. Later, the comrade who nominated him for the position was persecuted, and this lasted for six years. The person who nominated him was his superior, and now he's the one who's being persecuted. I advise you: not all of your people are loyal to you. The majority may be loyal, but a small minority may only pay lip service to you, wishing you a quick death. When they say "Long live," pay attention and analyze. The more they flatter you, the less reliable they are. This is a natural law. A party without division? That's not the case. Everything is divided into two. This wasn't invented by me; it was invented by Lenin. What's my invention? It's clearly stated by Lenin in

his Philosophical Notebooks. Lenin didn't talk about the three principles of dialectics. Marx and Engels copied Hegel's concepts of "unity of opposites," "mutual transformation of quality and quantity," and "negation of the negation," but Engels primarily copied them; Lenin did not. He said that the unity of opposites is the core of dialectics, but it needs to be explained and developed. According to this law, everything is divided into two, a unity of opposites. Everything always has two opposites. If your party only has complete unity and no opposites, it would be unrealistic. Parties all over the world are splitting. Marx and Engels did not anticipate that their successors, Bernstein and Kautsky, would become anti-Marxists. After their deaths, the parties they founded and led—the German Social Democratic Party, the French Socialist Party, and others—would become bourgeois forces. Failure to heed this principle will lead to harm. Although Lenin anticipated the emergence of oppositionists like Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Bukharin, his solution was to avoid execution. From 1917 to 1924, Lenin held power for less than eight years before his death. During this period, he primarily engaged in theoretical work. He did a little work with the trade unions, but not much. He did absolutely nothing with the peasants, and he didn't even develop a program for the peasant movement. During the October Revolution, the Narodnik program was temporarily adopted as the Bolshevik program. At a meeting of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, Lenin warned against excessive discussion of this program. The Narodniks were unable to implement their own program, and their call to "go to the people" was inappropriate. Later, the Narodniks became the spokesmen for the rich peasants. You previously said we made mistakes, that land reform shouldn't have gone too far to the left, and that too many people were killed. I think we killed too few. You published Humanities and Fine Products. You were afraid of mass demonstrations and asked us for tear gas. Humanities and Fine Products are nothing more than the Beijing Daily and Beijing Evening News. All is equal. As long as we understand, we are prepared, and the majority of the Party is prepared. We are not afraid. We are all over seventy years old, and one day we will be invited by Marx. Who will be his successor, Bernstein, Kautsky, or Khrushchev, is unknown. We must prepare; there is still time. In short, we must look at things from two perspectives and not just look at the current chants of "Long live the Communist Party."

Ho: Right now, four Chinese provinces are helping seven Vietnamese provinces, such as Guangdong helping our Quang Ninh Province.

Mao: Help with what?

Ho: They help with agricultural production, water conservancy, improving rice and cattle breeds, and also help build small power plants and factories, improve farm tools, and so on.

Mao: Is your steel mill up and running?

Ho: It has already begun production. Enemy planes have also begun bombing nearby.

Mao: How much steel is produced annually?

Ho: Very little. We don't have any rolling equipment yet.

Mao: Do you have coal or iron ore there? Where does the iron ore come from? Does it come from China?

Ho: Vietnam has coal and iron. China also sends some.

Mao: Without steel and the machinery industry, the country would lack a complete industrial system.

Ho: You may remember that it was after meeting you and, inspired by your efforts, that I built the steel plant.

Mao: I care most about the steel and machinery industries.

Ho: The equipment and experts at our Taiyuan Steel Plant are all Chinese.

Mao: We can start small and develop gradually. In a dozen years, we'll be able to accomplish this. Small rolling mills can be obtained from China, and new steelmaking technologies can be adopted. We've already begun developing oxygen steelmaking. Some new technologies can also be learned from them. Initially, don't rush things. We've suffered from overdoing things. We launched 1,700 capital construction projects a year. After a few years, they didn't work out, so we scaled back to just over 700. You see, we've reduced the number by 1,000. Some have already been completed. The remaining capital construction units are like lungs or diseased heads. Back then, people were greedy for size, quantity, and completeness. It's a pity you didn't visit Jinzhou. There were many small industries there. Without funds, cadres and workers each chipped in. Without money to build houses, they built straw huts. Now, many new products have been introduced. Some large factories are quite backward. For example, Anshan Iron and Steel, with 160,000 workers and an annual output of 5 to 6 million tons of steel, has its own backward aspects.

Mao: ...Chen Duxiu ruled from 1921 to 1927, a total of seven years; later he deserted and joined the Trotskyists. Cui Qiubai, a "leftist" figure, served in the second term for only three or four months. I was expelled from the Politburo, as I just mentioned. Someone spread rumors that I was expelled and became a democratic personage during this period. Li Lisan and Xiang Zhongfa, the third term, served for a few months and were very "leftist," wanting to attack the big cities. Wang Ming, the fourth term, reigned the longest, for four years. He never visited the base areas, but his people did. He sent people to all five base areas; he also had people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas. Peng Zhen implemented Wang Ming's line. Zhang Wentian, the fifth term. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, and Lu Dingyi were members of the Kuomintang.

Ho: Did they join the Kuomintang in the past?

Mao: During the period of the KMT-CCP cooperation during the First Great Revolution, that doesn't count. I also joined, but the Party asked us to. There's no definitive evidence against them; it's just a suspicion. They all worked in KMT-controlled areas for a period of time.

Ho: Were they bribed by the KMT?

Mao: Peng Zhen was arrested by the KMT, but we don't know how he got out. Why didn't we notice them infiltrating the Party for so long? We've noticed their mistakes. For example, Peng Zhen made mistakes while running the Party School in Yan'an. He also made mistakes while in Jin-Cha-Ji, but they're only now being exposed. We didn't know about them before. Nie Rongzhen knew about them; he was the commander and political commissar of Jin-Cha-Ji. Yang Chengwu was also from Jin-Cha-Ji. Peng Zhen had been in Jin-Cha-Ji for less than two years, implementing Wang Ming's line. This line differed from the one during the ten-year civil war. During the war, Wang Ming's line was "leftist," advocating attacking large cities. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Wang Ming's line was rightist and capitulationist. Later, Wang Ming fled, going to Moscow. We sent him there. He still writes articles under a false name, criticizing us. Also fleeing was Zhang Guotao, then a member of the Central Political Bureau and leader of the Red Fourth Front Army, who is now a spy in Hong Kong. The Director of the General Political Department in Jinggangshan, my successor as Political Commissar, and Minister of Logistics, all defected and joined the Kuomintang. You see, several dynasties were traitors. Chen Duxiu defected, and Qu Qiubai surrendered after being arrested. Xiang Zhongfa (actually a Li Lisan-affiliated leader) was arrested and led the enemy to capture others; after the enemy captured them, they killed him too—quite foolishly. Wang Ming also became a traitor after his arrest. He was arrested several times, and we don't know how he was released. In Northeast China, he was captured by the Japanese; in Shanghai, he was captured by Chiang Kai-shek! Then he was released. Rao Shushi was arrested while serving in the New Fourth Army, but how he was released is unclear. Peng Dehuai was the head of the Kuomintang. He fought against us, then later became opportunistic, and he consistently made mistakes related to his leadership. Luo Ruiqing collaborated with Peng Dehuai. Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing, Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun—they were all in the same group. Why did it take so long to expose them? We need to take a look at them. They were also colluding with foreign countries.

Ho: Wouldn't it be very dangerous for them to stay?

Mao: It is very dangerous. But unless the right opportunity arises and they expose themselves, we won't punish them. Take Peng Dehuai, for example. He made mistakes over and over again, and we simply criticized him, but he held a grudge. During the Korean War, he was commander, and after returning to China, he served as Minister of Defense for seven years. How many generals did he pull away? He pulled away fewer than ten generals and civilian officials. Throughout our Party's five successive dynasties, each leader was incompetent, and the revolution failed. There were two major failures: the failure of the Great Revolution under Chen Duxiu's leadership in 1927, and the Long March in 1934, when

an army of 300,000 was reduced to 25,000. Wasn't that also a failure? But the Party was not destroyed; the army still had 25,000 men, and after the eight-year War of Resistance Against Japan, it grew to one million. By this time, we had gained experience. Having gone through Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism, Wang Ming's "Left" opportunism, and three waves of "Left" opportunism by Qu Qiubai and Li Lisan, we had gained experience, enabling us to draw conclusions. Therefore, we must thank these people for educating us. First, we must thank the Kuomintang and imperialism. Second, we must thank the Right opportunists, "Left" opportunists, and traitors. Otherwise, Marxism alone would not have educated us.

Mao: Our recent struggle began last November, and it's been over seven months. Initially, Yao Wenyuan, a young man, launched the attack, discussing issues such as clean officials. Aren't you in favor of clean officials? You say there are clean palaces in the world, but I haven't seen one. There's no palace without corruption; it's just a matter of degree. There's no truly clean palace.

Ho: My father was a county magistrate, and he wasn't corrupt.

Mao: Not necessarily. You were young then, so you didn't know he was corrupt. Being a county magistrate was quite a feat.

Ho: He was dismissed after just a few months.

Mao: That was because he didn't have time to be corrupt. After a year or two as county magistrate, I don't think he was corrupt at all, but to a lesser extent.

Kang Sheng: No official is without corruption; officials and corruption are inseparable.

Mao: Now we are no longer dealing with the issue of honest and corrupt officials. We are carrying out the Cultural Revolution, targeting the educational, literary, academic, philosophical, historical, publishing, and journalistic communities. The literary and artistic world is divided into many sectors, including theatre, film, music, fine arts, and sculpture. The theatrical world is further divided into Peking opera and hundreds of local operas.

Mao: Today, I only slept for two hours because I have something on my mind. I want to see you, Uncle Hu. I asked what time you get up and found out you get up at five. Okay, I'll see you at seven. I slept eight hours the day before yesterday and eight hours yesterday. Two hours will be enough for today. In the summer, I sometimes go days without sleep. During the Lushan Conference, I didn't sleep. After giving a speech, I went swimming and came back to talk about persecuting Peng Dehuai. Now, the main thing is to read the big-character posters; the newspapers are also very lively. The big-character posters are very powerful, with a mass appeal and a vigorous atmosphere. You can go to Zhejiang University and take a look. Go at night, in disguise, and wear a mask. It's a good way to mobilize the masses to persecute reactionaries.

Ho: I also saw big-character posters in China in 1957.

Mao: It wasn't as deep-rooted or widespread as this time. This time, hundreds or even thousands of people, big and small, were targeted, especially in academia, education, journalism, publishing, the arts, universities, middle schools, and elementary schools. Because we had no resources at the time, we accepted all the Kuomintang teachers. We had very few teachers in universities, middle schools, and elementary schools, as well as newspaper publishers, opera singers, novelists, painters, and filmmakers, so we took in all the Kuomintang teachers. These people infiltrated our party. That way, you understand the logic of the Cultural Revolution.

Ho: China has it, and Vietnam has it too. What China is doing, Vietnam is also doing, although on a smaller scale. The situation in Vietnam is the same as in China.

Mao: It's probably the same. You also have teachers in elementary schools, middle schools, and universities, and they're all old intellectuals. People in the Party come from all corners of the country, and there's a mix of all kinds of people. Eighty percent of our Party members joined after 1949. They haven't experienced any storms or struggles, and among them there are both good and bad.

Ho: So there are contradictions.

Mao: Yes, there are contradictions. I have contradictions with many people.

Ho: Judging from the historical situation you've described, the issue is truly complex.

Mao: The struggle is complex, but the Party has not perished.

Ho: After listening to the talks of Chairman Mao, Chairman Liu, and other comrades, I've learned some lessons and am now more worried than before.

Mao: On the one hand, we should be worried, but on the other hand, we should be optimistic. The Party will not perish, the sky will not fall, the trees will continue to grow on the mountains, the fish will continue to swim in the water, and women will continue to give birth. If you don't believe it, just wait and see. Does Khrushchev's emergence mean that the sky will fall, the trees will stop growing on the mountains, the fish will stop swimming in the water, and women will stop giving birth? I don't believe it. The development of things constantly turns to their opposites. After the deaths of Marx and Engels, their successors became anti-Marxists. After Lenin's death, there was Stalin's generation. Stalin didn't anticipate that after his death, Khrushchev would oppose him, and with such brutality.

Comments on the temporary suspension of publication of Mao Zedong's speech at the 7,000-person meeting

(June 30, 1966)

Comrades Shaoqi and Xiaoping: [1]

I have received your call. After consideration, I think it is not appropriate to publish that speech now. [2] After the Cultural Revolution, there will be many new experiences that can be used to modify this speech. It will not be too late to discuss whether to publish it then. Comrade Wang Renzhong also disagrees with publishing it now. [3] In addition, please inform Comrades Boda, Kang Sheng, and Tao Zhu [4] that the draft of the twelve articles guiding the Cultural Revolution movement should be expanded to about twenty articles. [5] Because many of the twelve articles are confusing, some of them can be divided into two or three articles, so that each article only talks about one thing, which is clear and easy for readers to understand. It is more appropriate. I hope that within a week, you can discuss it several times in Beijing, and draft a second draft, and send me two copies. In addition, the East China Bureau reported to the Central Committee on the policies and deployments of the Cultural Revolution in East China on the 21st. It is worth referring to. [6]

Mao Zedong

June 30 at 2:00

[1] Shaoqi refers to Liu Shaoqi. Xiaoping, refers to Deng Xiaoping, who was then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

[2] This refers to Mao Zedong's speech on democratic centralism at the enlarged working meeting of the CPC Central Committee (also known as the 7,000-member conference) on 30 January 1962, where he spoke on the issue of democratic centralism. The speech was later published on 1 July 1978 in the People's Daily.

[3] Wang Renzhong, then a member of the CPC Central Committee, made a speech on democratic centralism. He was then deputy head of the Cultural Revolutionary Group of the CPC Central Committee and second secretary of the South Central Bureau, was the first secretary of the Hubei Provincial Committee,

[4] Boda, or Chen Boda, then head of the Cultural Revolutionary Group of the CPC Central Committee. Kang Sheng, then advisor to the Cultural Revolutionary Group of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Secretariat. Tao Zhu, then Executive Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee.

[5] The draft document of the CPC Central Committee guiding the Cultural Revolution was initially twelve articles, was once expanded to twenty-three articles, and finally settled on sixteen articles. On 8 August 1966, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a document entitled Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

(6) In the report submitted by the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to the Central Committee, Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group on June 21, 1966, it was stated that from June 3 to 6, the East China Bureau held a Secretariat meeting to convey and discuss the spirit of the enlarged meeting of the Central Political Bureau in May. Regarding the issue of further advancing the Cultural Revolution, everyone agreed that it was necessary to resolutely follow Chairman Mao's instructions. In the movement, we must further organize workers, peasants, soldiers and cadres to study Chairman Mao's works, learn in struggle, and apply in struggle, so as to push the mass movement of studying Chairman Mao's works to a new climax. The meeting studied the following policies and arrangements: 1. Boldly and freely mobilize the masses. 2. Firmly rely on the left, win over the middle, isolate and attack the right. Leftists with only individual shortcomings should be protected, and the goal of struggle should not be confused. We must pay attention to strictly distinguishing anti-party and anti-socialist elements from those who support the party and socialism but have also said some wrong words or written some bad works; we must pay attention to strictly distinguishing bourgeois "scholars" and "authorities" from those with general bourgeois academic thoughts. As for the rightists, we must focus on the key points, key units and key figures, especially the party's capitalist roaders. We must be careful and accurate in naming and publicly criticizing them in the newspapers. The dismissal of cadres and public criticism in the newspapers should be approved by the superiors according to the scope of cadre management. 3. Reorganize the revolutionary cultural team. 4. The "Four Cleanups" movement should focus on the Cultural Revolution. 5. Strengthen the party's leadership over the Cultural Revolution. The leadership of the party committees at all levels should adopt a combination of key points and general methods. Whether to send working groups to the movements of various units and when to send working groups should be considered according to the development needs of the situation. The report finally pointed out that at present, party committees at all levels must take class struggle as the key link, highlight the Cultural Revolution, and comprehensively arrange work in industry, agriculture, finance and trade, and the construction of the small third line.

Seven-Character Verse: Yearning

(June 1966)

Just when the capital of the gods [1] is in trouble,
I have come to the southern land [2] again.
The green pines roar against the heavens,
The fallen leaves drift along the clear water.
A gust of wind and snow startles the world,
The streets are filled with red and green flags of travellers.
Leaning on the railing, I quietly listen to the drizzling rain, [3]
The people of my homeland [4] are yearning.

[1] "Shendu" was the ancient name for the capital. Here it refers to the capital Beijing.

[2] "Nanguo" is a general term for southern China. The author was on a tour of southern China when he wrote this poem. From May 15 to June 15, 1966, he was in Hangzhou; on the 17th, he passed through Changsha and arrived at Dripping Cave in Shaoshan, where he stayed for 11 days; on the 28th, he left for Wuhan.

[3] "Leaning on the railing, I listen to the drizzling rain." This alludes to the line from Yue Fei's poem "Man Jiang Hong: My Hair Stands Raging with Fury": "Leaning on the pavilion, the pattering rain has ceased."

[4] The Chinese word for "homeland" used here has the same meaning as "motherland".

We must protect and support the left, and build and expand the ranks of the left.

(1966)

We must protect and support the left, and build and expand the ranks of the left. [1]

[1] On June 11, 1967, the People's Daily published an article titled "The February Outline is the Black Program of the Bourgeois Dictatorship" (signed by Ren Lixin), which quoted Mao Zedong's words in boldface. The article stated, "At the outset of launching this unprecedented Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao repeatedly pointed out the need to protect the left, support the left, and build and expand the ranks of the left."

Comments on the Draft Notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on How to Carry Out the Cultural Revolution Movement in Industrial and Transportation Enterprises and Infrastructure Units

(July 2, 1966)

Comrades Shaoqi and Xiaoping [1]:

I have received and reviewed your letter and notice sent to me on June 30 [2]. I agree with your opinion that this notice should be disseminated promptly.

Mao Zedong

July 2

[1] Shaoqi is Liu Shaoqi. Xiaoping is Deng Xiaoping, who was then the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee.

This refers to the June 30, 1966, letter from Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to Mao Zedong and the draft "Notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on How to Carry Out the Cultural Revolution Movement in Industrial and Transportation Enterprises and Capital Construction Units." The letter stated that the Cultural Revolution movement in education and culture was currently underway. If industrial and mining enterprises and capital construction units were all mobilized simultaneously, leadership would be overwhelmed and errors would be likely to occur. Recently, plans for industrial and transportation and capital construction have not been fulfilled well. Steel, steel products, and coal production have begun to decline, with a particularly severe decline in quality. Accidents have increased, and capital construction tasks have not been completed. After discussion, comrades in Beijing agreed that the focus of the Cultural Revolution movement should be on cultural and educational departments and Party and government organs. For grassroots units such as industry and transportation, capital construction, commerce, and hospitals, the original "Four Cleanups" plan and the "Twenty-Three Articles" (the CPC Central Committee document "Some Issues Currently Raised in the Rural Socialist Education Movement") should be followed in conjunction with the Cultural Revolution. The draft

notice submitted by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping for review pointed out that local Party committees needed to devote significant efforts to leading the ongoing revolutionary movement in culture and education, while also taking into account the specific nature of industrial and mining enterprises and capital construction units, which must ensure the completion of national tasks. The Central Committee believed that the Cultural Revolution in industrial and transportation enterprises and capital construction units (including design and construction units) should be combined with the "Four Cleanups" movement and carried out in phases and batches with leadership and planning, in accordance with the provisions of the "Twenty-Three Articles" and based on the original deployments of each locality. The notice demanded that local Party committees must prioritize the revolution while ensuring production, achieving dual victories in both revolution and production and construction. Units currently engaged in the Cultural Revolution and the "Four Cleanups" movement should focus their primary efforts on revolution, while also organizing a team dedicated to production and construction. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this notice on July 2, 1966.

Letter to Jiang Qing [1]

(July 8, 1966)

Jiang Qing:

I have received your letter of June 29th. It would be better for you to stay there for a while as Comrades Wei and Chen [2] suggested [3]. I have two foreign guests this month [4]. I will tell you about my schedule after the meetings. Since leaving Wulin [5] on June 15th, I have lived in a cave [6] in the west for more than ten days. I have not been very well informed. On the 28th, I came to the place where Ziyun Huanghe was [7]. It has been ten days since then. I read the materials every day and it is very interesting.

Great chaos will lead to great order. Seven or eight years later, it will happen again. The monsters and demons will emerge on their own. Their class nature dictates that they must emerge. My friend's speech, [8], is being urged by the Central Committee to be published, and I'm prepared to agree to its publication. He specifically addresses the issue of a coup d'état. His approach to this issue has never been seen before. His promotion of it always makes me feel uneasy. I've never believed that my few small books had such magical power. Now, after his promotion, the entire Party and the country are praising them. It's like Wang Po selling melons, boasting about her own achievements. I've been forced into this situation by them. It seems I can't disagree with them. This is the first time in my life that I've agreed against my will on a major issue. It's called being above human will. Ruan Ji, a Jin Dynasty scholar, opposed Liu Bang. He travelled from Luoyang to Chengxi and sighed, "In the absence of heroes, the world has made its own heroes." Lu Xun once said the same thing about his essays. Lu Xun and I share a common heart. I like his frankness. He said that dissecting oneself is often more rigorous than dissecting others. After stumbling a few times, I often do the same. But my comrades often don't believe me. I am confident, but also somewhat unsure.

When I was young, I once said, "I'm confident that I can live two hundred years and ride the waves for three thousand miles." I was quite cocky, but not entirely confident either. I always felt that when there's no tiger in the mountain, the monkey is king, and I've become that

kind of king. But it's not compromise. I have some tiger spirit, which is the main thing, and some monkey spirit, which is the secondary thing. I once quoted a few lines from a letter written by Li Gu of the Later Han Dynasty to Huang Qiong: "The first is easily defeated, and the one who cries is easily tainted. Those who are able to perform the "White Snow in Spring" are few in number. Under the influence of fame, a great reputation is difficult to justify." [9] These last two lines refer to me. I once read them at a Politburo Standing Committee meeting. It's important for people to know themselves. At the Hangzhou Conference in April of this year [10], I expressed my disagreement with my friends' proposals. But what good was it? He continued to speak in the same way at the Beijing Conference in May [11], and the press was even more ferocious, exaggerating it to the point of being a miracle worker. So, I had no choice but to go to the Liangshan Mountains. I suspect their real intention was to use Zhong Kui to fight the demons.

I became a member of the Communist Party's Zhong Kui in the 1960s. Things always tend to their opposite. The higher they are blown, the harder they fall. I'm prepared to be shattered. That's not a big deal; matter is indestructible; it just shatters. Of the more than one hundred parties in the world, the majority no longer believe in Marxism-Leninism. Marx and Lenin were also shattered by people, so how much more so are we? I urge you to pay attention to this issue as well. Don't let victory get you carried away. Always reflect on your weaknesses, shortcomings, and mistakes. I've spoken to you about this countless times. You remember, I spoke about it in Shanghai in April. What I've written above is a bit like jargon. Isn't that exactly what some anti-Party elements say? But they want to completely overthrow our Party and me personally. I'm only talking about the role I played, and I feel some of the terms are inappropriate. That's what distinguishes me from the gangsters.

This matter cannot be made public now. The entire left and the broad masses all say so. Revealing it would be a dampening of their enthusiasm and abetting the Rightists. The current task is to overthrow the Rightists throughout the Party and the country (it's impossible to completely overthrow them). Furthermore, in seven or eight years, there will be another campaign to sweep away all those monsters and demons, and there will be many more sweeps after that. Therefore, these black words of mine, which are almost cryptic, cannot be made public now. It's unclear when they will be made public [12], as the left and the broad masses do not welcome my speaking like this. Perhaps sometime after my death, when the Rightists are in power, they will make them public. They will exploit my words to try to perpetuate the black flag, but if they do, they will be doomed. Since the overthrow of the emperor in 1911, the reactionaries in power in China have never been able to hold power for long. The longest they managed was only twenty years (Chiang Kai-shek), and they fell as soon as the people rebelled. Chiang Kai-shek exploited Sun Yat-sen's trust in him and established the Whampoa Military Academy, recruiting a large number of reactionaries and thus establishing his own position. Once he turned against the Communist Party, he gained the support of almost the entire landlord and bourgeoisie. Since the Communist Party was inexperienced at the time, he was happy to temporarily gain power. But during these twenty

years, he never achieved unification. The wars between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the wars between the Kuomintang and various warlord factions, the Sino-Japanese War, and finally the four-year civil war left him stranded on a group of islands [13]. If an anti-communist right-wing coup were to occur in China, I'm certain they would suffer unrest and would likely be short-lived, because revolutionaries representing the interests of over 90 percent of the people would not tolerate it. The rightists might exploit my words to gain temporary power, but the leftists would undoubtedly leverage other words to organize and overthrow the rightists. This Cultural Revolution was a serious exercise in practice. Some areas (such as Beijing) were deeply entrenched and collapsed overnight. Some institutions (such as Peking University and Tsinghua University) were deeply entrenched and collapsed in an instant. Wherever the rightists were more arrogant, their defeat would be more disastrous, and the leftists would become more energized. This was a nationwide exercise, and the left, the right, and the wavering middle would all learn their own lessons. Conclusion: The future is bright, but the road is tortuous. These two old sayings still apply.

It's been a while since we last wrote, and when we do, it's been very long. Let's talk next time!

Mao Zedong

July 8, 1966

[1] Jiang Qing, then deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee.

[2] Wei refers to Wei Wenbo, then secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee's East China Bureau. Chen refers to Chen Zhuxian, then secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee's East China Bureau and first secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee.

[3] Refers to Shanghai.

[4] On July 12, 1966, Mao Zedong met with the Crown Prince of Nepal, Birendra Shah; On July 17, he met with representatives attending the Emergency Conference of Asian and African Writers and observers from some international organizations.

[5] Refers to the city of Hangzhou.

[6] Refers to the Dripping Cave in Shaoshan, Hunan, Mao Zedong's hometown.

[7] Refers to Wuhan City.

[8] Refers to the lengthy speech delivered by Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Beijing on May 18, 1966.

[9] The following lines appear in the "Book of the Later Han: Biographies of Zuo Zhou and Huang": "'The bright and clear sound is easily lost, and the wailing sound is easily defiled.' A song of springtime will inevitably find few sympathizers, and a great reputation is often not lived up to."

[10] Refers to the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee chaired by Mao Zedong in Hangzhou on April 16, 1966.

[11] Refers to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Beijing from May 4 to 26, 1966.

[12] In May 1972, this letter from Mao Zedong was published as the fifth document for the meeting to criticize Lin Biao and rectify the style of work. On October 1, 1972, September 2, 1973, and March 1, 1975, the People's Daily published portions of the letter.

[13] Refers to Taiwan Island, Penghu Islands and the surrounding islands of the People's Republic of China.

Comments on the letter from Tao Zhu and Zhang Pinghua regarding the organization and work of the Central Propaganda Department [1]

(July 10, 1966)

Comrade Tao Zhu: I agree with your opinion. Please let the Central Standing Committee make the final decision.

Mao Zedong

July 10

[1] Tao Zhu, Executive Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of the Central Propaganda Department, and Zhang Pinghua, Executive Vice Minister of the Central Propaganda Department, sent a letter to the Central Committee and Mao Zedong on July 5, 1966, which mainly contained the following contents: 1. Thoroughly reorganize the leadership of the department. 2. New working guidelines. The most fundamental task in the future is to concentrate on promoting Mao Zedong Thought. 3. How to carry out the current work. It is planned to organize criticism of key targets above the level of department heads in July and August, and continue to mobilize the masses, promote democracy, expose problems, and expand the team to carry out the Cultural Revolution in depth. At the same time, some resources will be allocated to the preparations for the National Congress of Active Participants in Studying Chairman Mao's Works in September and some daily work.

Conversation with Friends from Japan, Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina

(July 10, 1966)

Imperialism fears the awakening of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the awakening of the peoples of all countries in the world. We must unite and drive U.S. imperialism from Asia, Africa, and Latin America back to its home turf.

Comments on a Letter from Seven Students from the Beijing Language and Culture University

(July 12, 1966)

Boda and Kang Sheng [1] handle the matter at your discretion.

This letter [2] has been read. Please review it. The issues they discuss are indeed important and should be resolved within the movement. Please inform them that the letter has been received, seen, and taken note of.

Mao Zedong

July 12

[1] Boda, also known as Chen Boda, was then the head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee. Kang Sheng was then an advisor to the Cultural Revolution Group.

[2] This refers to a letter from seven Communist Youth League members and young students of the Beijing Language and Culture University to Mao Zedong on June 28, 1966. The letter said, "Our parents are all revolutionary cadres and Communist Party members. In the past, they had withstood the test of life in the stormy class struggle and on the battlefield under the rain of bullets. They are worthy of being heroes. Now they have become "officials" and "masters". They have political status and special treatment in life. Their revolutionary spirit is far less than before. If this continues, they will gradually lose their "freedom" to advance on the revolutionary path and will gradually degenerate into a special class and revisionists. Therefore, we believe that thorough reforms must be carried out in the following aspects: 1. Reduce wages and cancel various special treatments. 2. Revolutionary cadres should participate in labor regularly. 3. Anyone who violates the Party's discipline and the state law and does things that are not in the interests of the people should be punished. 4. Popularize

the part-time work-study and part-farming-study education system throughout the country as soon as possible." 5. During holidays, young students often organized themselves to work in factories and rural areas, or to serve in the army. This letter and Mao Zedong's comments were published as the third document of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Conversation during a Yangtze River Cruise [1]

(July 16, 1966)

1

The Yangtze River is wide and deep, making it a great place for swimming.

2

The Yangtze River is deep and fast-flowing, which can exercise the body and strengthen the will.

[1] On July 16, 1966, Mao Zedong cruised the Yangtze River for the fifth time in Wuhan. Parts 1 and 2 of this article are excerpts from his conversation during this cruise, published in the People's Daily on July 25, 1966, titled "Chairman Mao Cruises the Yangtze River."

The work teams must be disbanded. The Cultural Revolution must rely on revolutionary teachers and students. [1]

(July 21, 1966)

Two meetings were held: one was a central work meeting attended by regional secretaries, and the other was a meeting to draft documents for the Cultural Revolution. Some work related to the Cultural Revolution was discussed, primarily the need to withdraw the work teams and change the policy of sending them. A few days ago, I said the work teams were no longer effective. The former municipal Party Committee was rotten, the Central Propaganda Department was rotten, the Ministry of Culture was rotten, the Ministry of Higher Education was rotten, and so too was the People's Daily. Who should we rely on? Primarily the vast number of revolutionary teachers and students. The publication of the big-character poster on June 1st [2] was based on the realization that this was the only way. The Cultural Revolution must be carried out by them. Who else can we rely on? If you go, you won't understand the situation. You won't understand it in two months, six months, or even a year. Jian Bozan [3] has written so many books. Have any of you read them? Has Xiaoping read them?

Deng Xiaoping: No.

Oh, no. I know you don't either. So how can you defeat him? Only they understand the situation. Even if I go, it won't work. We can only rely on the revolutionary teachers and students.

Chen Boda: *Those currently running the movement have a few theories and policies. They set free mass mobilization and Party leadership in stark contrast, believing that emphasizing free mass mobilization means rejecting Party leadership.*

What nonsense! You don't understand the basics of Marxism-Leninism! Shaoqi and Xiaoping constantly talk about fearing chaos. You're just putting yourselves first. What's so great

about chaos? Now classes are suspended, but you're still providing food. If you eat, you'll get hot and cause trouble. What else can you do but cause trouble? To cause trouble is revolution. We can only rely on them. If we continue with the current approach, it'll be quiet for two months. When will it end?

Yesterday, you said you needed to change the policy of sending work teams. What effect do the work teams have now? They're obstructive. They're incapable of two things: first, they can't fight, and second, they can't reform. I can't do that either. Now it's all about revolution: first, fighting bad people, and second, reforming ideology. The Cultural Revolution criticized the bourgeois ideological establishment. How much of a fighter was Lu Ping [4]? How much of a fighter was Li Da [5]. The work groups were changed to liaison officers or consultants. You say consultants have great power, but they're still called liaison officers. For over a month, the work teams have only hindered the revolution and, in fact, aided the counter-revolution. Some work teams sat on the mountain and watched tigers fight tigers, watching students fight students. Xi'an Jiaotong University restricted people from making phone calls, sending telegrams, and traveling to Beijing. They should have written in the document that they can make phone calls, send telegrams, and send people to the central government. The Party Constitution has long been there! Jian Bozan published so many books, can you really fight him? The masses wrote couplets about him: "The temple is small, the gods are mighty; the pond is shallow, the turtles are numerous." Which of you can deal with him? I can't, and neither can the provinces. I don't understand what educational reform is. The only way is to rely on the masses and then centralize it. That's why the work teams must be withdrawn. If we continue as we are, we won't achieve anything!

Kang Sheng: *The work team openly conveyed the instructions of Shaoqi and Xiaoping, demanding absolute trust in the work team and claiming that anyone who opposed the work team was counter-revolutionary. Their campaign to eliminate interference was, in fact, inciting the masses to fight against one another.*

Many central government departments haven't done much good, while the Cultural Revolution Group, on the other hand, has done a lot of good and has a great reputation. It's said that when the Nanjing Xinhua Daily was surrounded by students, it was a major event, as if it had caused a huge disaster. I think it can be covered up. If the newspaper doesn't appear for three days, what's the big deal? If you don't make revolution, you'll be the target. Why aren't provincial and municipal Party committees, newspapers, or the State Council allowed to be covered up? Good people have come, but you won't see them. If you don't leave, I'll go. You've sent small cadres, but if you don't leave, I'll go. In short, you're afraid of the revolution, and you won't go down to the places where there's chaos. Li Xuefeng and Wu De [6] are here, right?

Li Xuefeng: *I'm here.*

Li Xuefeng, Wu De, you don't read the big-character posters, you're busy with practical matters every day, and you lack perceptual knowledge. How can you guide the movement? I think the three great debates at Nanjing University were good. All attendees should go to the places where the unrest is happening. Some people are talking for nothing. What's the big deal about speaking? Students, come up and say a few words when asked to speak: We are here to learn, to support your revolution, and we will come when called upon. We will come at your request and will come later.

Liu Shaoqi: *Chairman, there are no work teams now. What should we do if there are beatings and fights in schools?*

Are you calling them revolutionary teachers and students? You've been doing this for a month or two, but you still don't have any real understanding. You're just being deceitful. Regarding the beatings at the Broadcasting Institute and Beijing Normal University, some people were afraid of being beaten and asked the work team to protect them. What were they afraid of? No one died! Leftists are tempered by being beaten, and rightists only get a few hits. But this doesn't excuse not withdrawing the work team. Can your work team produce textbooks? No, it still depends on the people in your unit to make the changes. Most people understand this point, but you don't?

In short, the work teams cannot struggle, and they cannot reform. Not in half a year, not in a year. Only those within the unit can struggle and reform. Struggle is destruction, reform is construction. Textbooks are constantly being compiled. I think we can simplify them, removing the errors. It might be too late to add to them. If we need to add to them, we can add the Central Editorials and circulars.

Zhou Enlai: *We will listen to Chairman Mao on this matter. The work teams should be withdrawn immediately. The sooner the better. The faster and more proactive we can be. Furthermore, I propose that the textbooks include Chairman Mao's works.*

That's a direction, a guide, not a dogma. For example, regarding the handling of the assault at the Broadcasting Academy, which book contains this information? Which general would even consult a book during a war? At this stage, we need to shift the direction.

The Cultural Revolution Committee should include leftists, centrists, and rightists, including several rightists. For example, Bozan can be used by both rightists and leftists, serving as a walking dictionary, but it can't be centralized. Like Zhonghua Book Company, [6] they can organize a training class and serve as a walking dictionary (as long as it doesn't cause extreme public outrage). Both the representative conference and the revolutionary committee must have an opposing side; the Standing Committee can't play tricks.

Li Xuefeng: *Our municipal party committee has also established a revolutionary committee, with quite a few members.*

Apart from you, the Municipal Party Committee shouldn't have too many staff. If there are too many, they'll just be "revolutionary," making phone calls, and producing reports. I only have one person here, which is fine. Many ministers now have secretaries; get rid of them all. There weren't any before I arrived in Yan'an. The Municipal Party Committee can have a mail and mail department. Comrade Shaoqi, your wife doesn't need to be a secretary anymore; she can go down to the labour camp. Some of the ministries under the State Council can be reorganized into sections; these massive organizations have never been useful.

Deng Xiaoping: *Without the work teams, what if the black gangs return? What if the rightists cause unrest?*

Some are seeking restoration, but restoration doesn't matter. Are some of our ministers really that reliable? Who controls some ministries and newspapers? I think they're worse off than some schools! Have you ever thought about it? Students in schools don't attend classes, they're fed, and they cause chaos. And chaos is revolution. The work teams are hindering the revolution, as happened at Tsinghua and Peking University. Aren't we currently drafting a document on the Cultural Revolution? I think it should specify that only those who commit assault, murder, arson, or poisoning are considered counter-revolutionaries, and those who write big-character posters or reactionary slogans shouldn't be arrested. Someone wrote, "Support the Party Central Committee, Overthrow Mao Zedong,"—why would you arrest him? He still supports the Party Central Committee. He's a historical counter-revolutionary, and those who behave poorly are to be struggled against. Don't beat people up, just tell them to go! Putting up a few big-character posters and reactionary slogans is pointless.

In short, the work teams must be withdrawn; there's nothing to fear from unrest.

[1] This is Mao Zedong's speech at the joint meeting of the Politburo and the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[2] Around 2:00 PM on May 25, 1966, seven members of the Peking University Philosophy Department—Nie Yuanzi, Song Yixiu, Xia Jianwan, Yang Keming, Zhao Zhengyi, Gao Yunpeng, and Li Xingchen—posted a large-character poster titled "What on Earth Did Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Zheyun Do in the Cultural Revolution?" on the east wall of the main dining hall. On June 1, 1966, Mao Zedong instructed, "This article should be broadcast in full by Xinhua News Agency and published in newspapers and periodicals nationwide. It is absolutely necessary. From now on, the crackdown on Peking University, this reactionary bastion, can begin."

[3] Jian Bozan, a historian, was then the vice president of Peking University.

[4] Lu Ping, former president and party secretary of Peking University.

[5] Li Da, formerly the president of Wuhan University, attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China but later left the Party for various reasons. However, he persisted in studying Marxism. At the end of 1948, Li Da received a letter from Mao Zedong, which read, "Brother Qi is one of the founders of our company. Business is booming, and we hope you will come and join us soon." In 1949, he rejoined the Party, with Mao Zedong as his historical witness.

[6] Li Xuefeng was then the First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee. Wu De was then the Second Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee.

[7] Zhonghua Book Company is China's leading authority on the compilation, editing, proofreading, and publication of ancient Chinese books. It enjoys a high reputation both domestically and internationally, and has a profound influence.

Speech at a Meeting with Regional Party Secretaries and Members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group

(July 22, 1966)

Today, all the secretaries and members of the Cultural Revolution groups from all the districts have arrived. The meeting's task is to prepare good documents, primarily to change the practice of assigning work teams. School Cultural Revolution groups, composed of revolutionary teachers and students from the schools and those in between, will lead the Cultural Revolution. They are the only ones who understand school affairs; the work teams don't. Some work teams have caused trouble. The school Cultural Revolution is nothing more than struggle, criticism, and reform. The work teams have hindered the movement. Can we struggle and reform? Someone like Jian Bozan has written so many books, and you haven't read them yet. How can we struggle? How can we reform? When it comes to school affairs, "a small temple may have great gods, a shallow pond may have many turtles." Therefore, we must rely on the internal strength of the school; the work teams won't do. Not me, not you, not the provincial party committee. Whether we want struggle or reform, we must rely on our own schools and units, not on the work teams. Can the work teams become liaisons? They can become advisors. They have too much power, or they can be called observers. Some work teams hinder the revolution, while others don't. Work teams that hinder the revolution are bound to become counter-revolutionaries. Xi'an Jiaotong University won't let people make phone calls or send people to the central government. Why are they afraid of people coming to the central government? They'll surround the State Council. The document should state that they can make phone calls or send people. Is that enough to be afraid? That's why the Xi'an and Nanjing newspaper offices were surrounded for three days, terrified out of their wits. Are they that afraid? You people! If you don't

revolutionize, the revolution will come upon you. Some places forbid the siege of newspaper offices, the provincial party committee, or the State Council. Why are they so afraid? When they get to the State Council, they're greeted by unknown figures. It's hard to explain. Why is it like this? If you don't show up, I will. It all comes down to fear: fear of counter-revolutionaries, fear of the use of weapons. How can there be so many counter-revolutionaries? These past few days, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and Jiang Qing have all gone to schools to read big-character posters. How can we survive without perceptual knowledge? None of them went, busy with daily affairs, even when they stopped, to gain perceptual knowledge. Nanjing did a better job, not blocking students from coming to the Central Committee. (Kang Sheng interjected: Nanjing held three major debates. The first debate was about whether the New China Daily was revolutionary; the second debate was about whether the Jiangsu Provincial Committee was revolutionary; the debate concluded that the Jiangsu Provincial Committee was still revolutionary; the third debate was about whether Kuang Yaming [1] should wear a dunce cap and be paraded through the streets.) In schools, the majority are revolutionary, and the minority are not. The outcome of the debate will naturally become clear as to whether Kuang Yaming should be paraded through the streets wearing a dunce cap.

During the meeting, attendees should go to Beijing University and the Broadcasting Institute to read the big-character posters and visit the areas with the most problems. We need to work on documents today, so we won't go. When you read the big-character posters, just say you're here to learn and support your revolution. Go there to ignite the flames and support the revolutionary teachers and students, not to listen to the rhetoric of the counter-revolutionary Rightists. After two months, you still haven't gained any perceptual knowledge. You're full of bureaucracy. If you go, you'll be surrounded by students. Ask them to surround you, or even talk to a few of them, and they'll surround you. Over a hundred people were beaten at the Broadcasting Institute. This is the benefit of our time: Leftists are attacked by rightists, and this tempers the leftists. Sending a work team there for six months won't work, and even a year won't work. The people there are still capable. First, struggle; second, criticism; third, transformation. Struggle means destruction, transformation means establishing the new. Revising textbooks in just six months won't do. We must first simplify and eliminate any erroneous or repetitive content, cutting out a third to a half. Political textbooks, central directives, and newspaper editorials are the masses' guides and cannot be treated as dogma. Regarding the issue of beating people, that's not mentioned in the notice. That won't do. This is the direction, the guide. We must quickly determine the direction and make changes. We must rely on the revolutionary teachers and students and the leftists in the school. Even if rightists participate in the school's Cultural Revolution Committee, it doesn't matter. They are useful and can serve as negative examples. Rightists shouldn't be all brought together. The Beijing Municipal Committee doesn't need that many people. If there are too many, they'll have to make phone calls and issue orders. All secretaries should be fired. When I was in the Front Committee, I had a secretary named Xiang Bei. Later, during

the retreat, there were no secretaries. One person to receive and send documents will suffice.

(Kang Sheng interjected: "The Chairman discussed four things. First, the reorganization of the Beijing Municipal Committee, which was done. Second, the reorganization of the Central Propaganda Department, which was also done. Third, the abolition of the Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group, which was also done. Fourth, the reorganization of some departments into sections, which was not done.) Yes, ministers in charge of affairs can remain unchanged and can be called ministers, directors, bureau chiefs, or division chiefs. Those not in charge of affairs can be changed to metallurgy sections or coal sections." (Someone interrupted: "Peking University held four major debates, debating whether the June 18th Incident was a counter-revolutionary event. Some said it was, because there were hooligans involved, while others said it was not. Some said the work team made mistakes. More than 40 people from the attached middle school proposed removing the head of the working team, Zhang Chengxian, from his position.") Many working teams obstructed the movement, including Zhang Chengxian. Don't arrest people arbitrarily. What is a counter-revolutionary activity? It's nothing more than murder, arson, and poisoning. These people can be arrested, but those who write reactionary slogans will not be arrested for the time being. We can establish an opposing side and fight them first.

[1] Kuang Yaming (1906-1996), a native of Danyang, Jiangsu Province, was an educator. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as Party Secretary and President of the East China Institute of Political Science and Executive Vice Minister of the Propaganda Department of the East China Bureau of the Communist Party of China.

Regarding the June 18th Incident at Beijing University [1]

(July 1966)

The June 18th Incident was not a counter-revolutionary event, but a revolutionary event.

[1] On June 18, 1966, a large-scale violent uprising erupted across Beijing University. Over 60 faculty members and cadres were paraded through the streets, forced to wear dunce caps, kneel, and beaten. Later, the Beijing University Work Team put a stop to the uprising.

Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Decision on the Cultural Revolution [1]

(July and August 1966)

1

Comrade Boda:

I have read this document and find it very good. The working group will hold one or two meetings, and then the Politburo (with the participation of responsible comrades from the various Central Committee bureaus and the cities of Shanghai and Beijing) will hold a meeting for two or three days to discuss and approve it. It can then be published publicly in the name of the Central Committee. August 1st would be a good date. There are some minor revisions to the last two pages [2].

Mao Zedong

July 21st

2

Revised draft [3], July 26th. For discussion.

3

Comrade Boda:

The revisions are excellent and can be printed and distributed immediately [4].

Mao Zedong

August 3, 12:00 PM

4

Comrade Boda:

In the "Decision," it would be more appropriate to change "unknown foot soldiers" to "unknown young people." Please consider this.

Mao Zedong

August 7, 2:00 p.m

5

To Comrade Boda:

I agree with the revisions. I changed a few words on page 10. Please approve. [5]

Mao Zedong

August 7, 10:00 PM

[1] Mao Zedong made numerous comments and revisions to the draft of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's "Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" between July and August 1966. This first section contains his comments on the July 16 draft; this second section contains his comments on the July 26 draft submitted by Chen Boda, head of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group; this third section contains his comments on the evening of August 3 draft submitted by Chen Boda; and this fourth and fifth section contain his comments on the August 7 draft submitted by Chen Boda. The July 16 draft of the decision was titled "The Situation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and Certain Questions of the Party's Policies" and contained 23 points. After several revisions, it was retitled "Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and condensed to 16 points when it was issued on July 29 as a document of the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted this decision on August 8. On August 9, the People's Daily published the full text, titled "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (also known as the "Sixteen Articles"). Several passages from the decision were included in Chairman Mao's book, "Chairman Mao on the Educational Revolution," which was approved by Mao Zedong and published by the People's Publishing House in December 1967. These passages are: "The masses must educate themselves in this great revolutionary movement, discerning what is right and what is wrong, what practices are correct and what are incorrect." "Reforming the old education system and the old teaching principles and methods is an extremely important task of this great proletarian cultural revolution."

"During this great cultural revolution, the phenomenon of bourgeois intellectuals dominating our schools must be completely changed." "The school system must be shortened. The curriculum must be streamlined. Textbooks must be thoroughly reformed, starting with simplifying some content. Students should focus on their studies while also learning other things. That is, they should not only learn literature, but also learn about industry, agriculture, and the military, and they should always participate in the struggle to criticize the bourgeoisie in the cultural revolution." Furthermore, on the front page of the People's Daily on June 1, 1967, after "Chairman Mao pointed out," the following passage from the decision was published: "Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This question is the primary issue of the revolution and the primary issue of the Great Cultural Revolution."

[2] "The Situation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and Certain Party Policies" (draft), published on July 16, 1966, is a 19-page document. On page 18, Mao Zedong changed the sentence "The Cultural Revolution is to enable all work to be done better, more, faster, and more economically" to "The Cultural Revolution is to revolutionize people's thinking, thereby enabling all work to be done better, more, faster, and more economically." On page 19, he changed "Mao Zedong Thought is the supreme directive of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" to "Mao Zedong Thought is the action guide of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," and "Take Mao Zedong Thought as the supreme directive of the Cultural Revolution" to "Take Mao Zedong Thought as the action guide of the Cultural Revolution." He also changed the sentence "Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong, long live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" to "Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will achieve great victory."

[3] This refers to the revised draft of the decision submitted by Chen Boda on the morning of July 26, 1966. On page 7 of this revised draft, Mao Zedong added the words "and the backbone elements among the revolutionary masses" after the phrase "Party leadership" in the sentences "Party leadership in all units should be good at listening to the various opinions of the masses" and "Party leadership should work with the masses." In addition, there were individual wording changes elsewhere.

[4] These comments were made on the revised draft of the decision submitted by Chen Boda for review on August 3, 1966. In his report to Mao Zedong, Chen Boda said, "This morning, Comrades Kang Sheng, Tao Zhu, Wang Renzhong, Zhang Chunqiao, and others, considering the opinions expressed at the group meeting, and I have made some further revisions to this draft. Please review and approve it!"

[5] Page 10 of the revised draft of the decision submitted by Chen Boda for review on August 7, 1966, read: "For scientists, technicians, and general staff in general, as long as they are patriotic, actively working, not anti-Party or anti-socialist, and not colluding with foreign countries, the policy of unity, criticism, and solidarity should continue to be adopted during

this campaign. Scientists and scientific and technical personnel who have made contributions should be protected. Drawing such a broad line is necessary. It can help them continuously transform their world outlook and work style." When Mao Zedong reviewed it, he deleted the phrase "drawing such a broad line is necessary" and changed "for scientists, technicians, and general staff in general" to "for scientists, technicians, and general staff" and "can help them continuously transform" to "can help them gradually transform."

Comments on Avoiding the Use of Terms Such as "Peak" and "Highest Directive"

(July 25 and August 4, 1966)

1

Comrade Tao Zhu, after reading it, return it to Comrade Zhang Pinghua:

I have reviewed this document [1] and it is acceptable. On page 5, change "highest instruction" to "guiding direction." In the future, please be careful not to use language such as "highest and most active...", "peak", or "highest instruction".

Mao Zedong

July 25

2

This may be sent to the provincial, municipal, and district party committees for their attention and consideration [2].

Mao Zedong

August 4th

[1] This refers to a Xinhua News Agency report titled "The Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting to angrily criticize Zhou Yang, the chief leader of the black line in the literary and art circles, for his heinous crimes against the Party, socialism,

and Mao Zedong Thought." On page 5 of this report, Mao Zedong changed the phrase "supreme directive" in the sentence "He vehemently opposed the use of Mao Zedong Thought as the supreme directive for literary and artistic creation" to "guiding direction." This report was published in the People's Daily on July 29, 1966. Zhou Yang, formerly Deputy Minister of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, and Vice Chairman of the China Writers Association, was wrongly accused of being a representative of the so-called "black line in literature and art" during the Cultural Revolution. In 1979, the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee approved a decision by the Party Group of the Ministry of Culture, stating that there had been no such thing as a "black line in literature and art" or "representatives of the black line" like Zhou Yang in the 17 years after liberation. All those who had been persecuted and falsely accused of being members of the so-called "black line in literature and art" and other wrongful convictions would be completely rehabilitated.

[2] This comment was written in a report submitted by Tao Zhu to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong on July 29, 1966. The report stated that on the morning of July 28, the Central Propaganda Department convened the heads of various newspapers in the capital to convey the Chairman's instructions of July 25 and discuss them. They suggested the following steps: 1. This type of language should be eliminated from speeches and documents representing leading Party and government bodies, as well as from newspaper editorials, headlines, notes, and news leads. Where such language is used in mass contributions, it should be retained for a period. 2. When foreign friends praise Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought, their words should be reported as is, without inferences or "embellishments." Some phrases that do not conform to the spirit of the Chairman's instructions may still be reported, but they should not be used in headlines. 3. The "anti-Party gang" will inevitably exploit our change in wording to launch a counterattack against the Party and fundamentally oppose Mao Zedong Thought. We should expose their conspiracy. Please advise the Central Committee on whether the above suggestions are feasible. If you deem it feasible, please also consider and decide to what extent this information should be disseminated. On August 4, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent Tao Zhu's report to the provincial and military levels.

Letter to the Red Guards of Qinghua University Affiliated Middle School

(July 31 and August 1, 1966)

1

Comrades [1]:

Please consider whether this document [2] and its attachment [3] are correct. If there are any errors, please correct them.

Mao Zedong

July 31

2

Comrades of the Qinghua University Affiliated Middle School Red Guards:

I have received the two big-character posters you sent me on July 28th, as well as the letter you forwarded to me requesting a response. Your big-character posters of June 24th and July 4th express your indignation and denunciation of the landlord class, the bourgeoisie, imperialism, revisionism, and their lackeys who exploit and oppress workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, and revolutionary parties, and demonstrate that rebellion against the reactionaries is justified. I warmly support you. I also express my warm support for the big-character poster of the Beijing University Affiliated Middle School Red Flag Combat Group, which demonstrates the justification for rebellion against the reactionaries, and for the excellent revolutionary speech delivered on behalf of the Red Flag Combat Group by Comrade Peng Xiaomeng at the Beijing University faculty, students, and staff meeting on July

25th. I must say that my revolutionary comrades and I share the same attitude. Whether in Beijing, throughout the country, or within the Cultural Revolution, we warmly support all those who share your revolutionary attitude. Furthermore, while we support you, we also urge you to strive to unite with all those who can be united. For those who have made serious mistakes, after their errors have been pointed out, we should also provide them with opportunities for work, correction, and a new life. Marx said that the proletariat must liberate not only itself but all of humanity. If it fails to liberate all of humanity, the proletariat itself cannot ultimately be liberated. Comrades, please also pay attention to this principle.

Mao Zedong

August 1, 1966

[1] The group included Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Tao Zhu, Executive Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat, Chen Boda, Head of the CPC Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group, Kang Sheng, Advisor, Jiang Qing, Wang Renzhong, and Zhang Chunqiao, Deputy Group Leaders, Wang Li, Yao Wenyuan, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu, Li Xuefeng, First Secretary of the CPC North China Bureau and First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, and Wu De, Second Secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee.

[2] This is Part 2 of this item. This letter was not sent.

[3] These refer to the big-character posters "Long Live the Revolutionary Rebel Spirit" written by the Red Guards of Tsinghua University Affiliated Middle School on June 24, 1966, and "Further Discussion on Long Live the Revolutionary Rebel Spirit" written on July 4. On July 28, they submitted these posters to Jiang Qing for review and asked her to forward them to Mao Zedong for his approval. These posters were later published in the eleventh issue of Red Flag magazine, published on August 21, 1966, with the titles changed to "Long Live the Revolutionary Rebel Spirit of the Proletariat" and "Further Discussion on Long Live the Revolutionary Rebel Spirit of the Proletariat." The People's Daily reprinted them on August 24.

Anyone who suppresses the student movement will suffer a bad fate [!]

(July 1966)

Nie Yuanzi's big-character poster of May 25th was a manifesto of the Paris Commune in the mid-1960s, and its significance surpasses that of the Paris Commune itself. We can't write a big-character poster like that.

(Several Young Pioneers posted a big-character poster to their father, saying he had forgotten the past and, instead of teaching them Mao Zedong Thought, asked about their grades in school, offering prizes to those who performed well.)

(Mao Zedong asked Chen Boda to tell these children that the big-character poster was well-written!)

I tell everyone: the youth are the great army of the Cultural Revolution! We must fully utilize them.

After returning to Beijing, I felt very sad. It was so deserted. Some schools were even closed, and they even suppressed the student movement. Who suppressed the student movement? Only the Beiyang warlords! The Communist Party was afraid that the student movement was anti-Marxist. Some people constantly talked about following the mass line and serving the people, but in reality they were following the bourgeois line and serving the bourgeoisie. The Central Committee should have stood on the side of the students, but it sided with the suppression of the students. Who opposed the Cultural Revolution? The US imperialists, the Soviet revisionists, and the Japanese reactionaries.

Using the excuse of "differentiation between inside and outside" is a sign of fear of revolution. Big-character posters were posted and then covered up again [2]. This situation cannot be tolerated. This is a mistake in direction, and we must reverse it immediately. Smash all restrictions! We have faith in the masses (so, only those who are students of the masses can become their teachers). This Cultural Revolution is a truly earth-shaking event. Can we, do we dare, overcome the test of socialism? This test will ultimately eliminate classes and reduce the three major differences.

[1] This is a conversation between Mao Zedong and several leading members of the Central Committee.

[2] It refers to the incident at around 2:00 PM on May 25, 1966, when seven members of the Peking University Philosophy Department—Nie Yuanzi, Song Yixiu, Xia Jianwan, Yang Keming, Zhao Zhengyi, Gao Yunpeng, and Li Xingchen—posted a large-character poster titled "What on Earth Are Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Shuyun Doing During the Cultural Revolution?" on the east wall of the main dining hall.

Criticism of the Communist Youth League Central Committee

(July 1966)

Some people say the Central Committee is "three muddles": muddle-headed and confused. It clearly sides with the bourgeoisie, so what is muddle-headed about it? The Central Committee not only fails to support the student mass movement, but actually suppresses it. They should be dealt with severely.

On the Issue of Beating People

(August 1, 1966)

Party policy does not advocate beating people. However, beating people must be analyzed from a class perspective. Good people beating bad people, they deserve it; bad people beating good people brings honour to the good people; good people beating good people is a mistake. From now on, beating people is prohibited. We must present facts and reason. Amend the term "royalist" among students.

Do Not Suppress the Student Movement [1]

(August 4, 1966)

During the Qing Dynasty, then the Beiyang warlords, and later the Kuomintang, all suppressed student movements [2]. Now, even the Communist Party is suppressing student movements. What's the difference between this and Lu Ping and Jiang Nanxiang [3]?!

The central government has disobeyed its own orders. It ordered a six-month suspension of classes to focus on the Cultural Revolution, and then, when students rose up, it suppressed them again. It's not that no one has raised dissenting opinions, but that they simply won't listen; alternative opinions, however, are enthusiastically entertained. To put it mildly, this is a directional issue. It's actually a problem of direction, a problem of line. It's a line error, a violation of Marxism. This conference must resolve this issue, or it will be very dangerous.

They gave orders to coax students into revolution, and then suppressed them once they did. Their so-called mass line, their belief in the masses, their Marxism-Leninism, and so on are all shams. This has been going on for years, and whenever something like this happens, it explodes. They clearly side with the bourgeoisie and oppose the proletariat. They say opposing the new municipal committee is anti-Party, and if the new municipal committee suppresses the students, why can't we oppose it?!

I didn't go to the grassroots to observe them. The more they observe them, the more they side with the bourgeoisie and oppose the proletariat. They stipulated that no contact

between classes, departments, or schools was allowed. This was repression and terror, and this terror came from the central government. Some people have objections to the central government's criticism of the June 18th Incident [4], but it's hard to say.

The big-character poster by Nie Yuanzi and seven others at Peking University was the manifesto of the Paris Commune—the Peking Commune—in the 1960s. Posting big-character posters is a good thing, and it should be shared with people all over the world! However, the Xuefeng [5] Report stated, "The Party has its own discipline, and the state has its own laws. There should be a distinction between inside and outside. Big-character posters should not be posted outside the main gate for foreigners to see." Besides confidential areas like the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Public Security, which are off-limits to outsiders, what other areas are important? Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, mass petitions, demonstrations, and complaints are permitted. Moreover, freedom of speech, assembly, association, and publication are enshrined in the Constitution. Judging from this suppression of the student Cultural Revolution, I do not believe that the current Central Committee possesses true democracy or Marxism-Leninism. Instead, it sided with the bourgeoisie in opposing the proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The Communist Youth League Central Committee not only failed to support the youth student movement but also suppressed it. They should be dealt with severely.

[1] This is part of Mao Zedong's speech at the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

[2] During the 50 days from early June to late July 1966, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping presided over the work of the Central Committee and carried out the Cultural Revolution in the traditional way of official political movements. The methods included: sending work teams, categorizing the masses as "left, centre, and right", labelling those who dared to give opinions to the leadership as "rightists" and "counter-revolutionaries", and collecting black materials on them. Across the country, there were widespread phenomena of students confronting work teams and the suppression of students by work teams and party committees, such as the June 6th incident at Xi'an Jiaotong University, the June 7th incident at Qinghua University, the June 8th incident at Guangxi, the June 20th incident at Beijing Municipal People's Court, the June 20th incident at Beijing Normal University, and the "Minutes of Conversation" incident at the Forestry Institute. At Qinghua University alone, more than 800 students were labelled "counter-revolutionaries".

[3] Lu Ping, former president and party secretary of Beijing University. Jiang Nanxiang, former president and party secretary of Qinghua University. Both of them suppressed the Cultural Revolution movement at their respective universities.

[4] On June 18, 1966, from 9:00 to 11:00 a.m., while the Beijing University work team was in session, the masses left their work and engaged in a struggle session against over 40 university leaders and professors, some of whom were violent. The work team stopped them, "clearly pointing out that engaging in random fights without the work team's supervision is harmful to the revolutionary movement, and pointing out that such practices could and had already been exploited by bad elements." It also stipulated that "any struggle against someone must be approved by the work group" (see "Beijing University Cultural Revolution Bulletin (No. 9)"). On June 20, 1966, Liu Shaoqi, who was in charge of the Central Committee's work, added comments and forwarded it to various locations: "We are now sending you Beijing University Cultural Revolution Bulletin (No. 9). The Central Committee believes that the Beijing University work team's approach to handling the fights is correct and timely. If such incidents occur in any unit, you may refer to the Beijing University approach."

[5] Xuefeng, also known as Li Xuefeng, was the First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee at the time. After the big-character poster by Nie Yuanzi and seven others was posted, Li Xuefeng rushed to Beijing University that evening and subsequently convened a meeting, stating: "I am very dissatisfied with the appearance of a big-character poster deliberately leaking secrets at Beijing University. The Cultural Revolution cannot be carried out recklessly. It must be carried out in a systematic manner under the leadership of Party committees at all levels. Big-character posters must be approved before they can be posted. Do not post big-character posters on internal and external issues together. Big-character posters on internal Party issues involving Party and state secrets should not be posted outside. There must be a distinction between internal and external affairs." "The Party has its own discipline, and the state has its own laws. We are not carrying out the Cultural Revolution as a mob; we cannot do it in a chaotic manner. Beijing University must be well organized, the artillery fire must be fierce, and we must hit the vital points, but there must be organization. The Beijing University Party Committee must lead the movement well." He then submitted the draft of his speech to the Central Committee.

Bombard the Headquarters! My Big-Character Poster [1]

(August 5, 1966)

China's first Marxist-Leninist big character poster [2] and Commentator's article on it in *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) [3] are indeed superbly written! Comrades, please read them again. But in the last fifty days or so some leading comrades from the central down to the local levels have acted in a diametrically opposite way. Adopting the reactionary stand of the bourgeoisie, they have enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the great cultural revolution of the proletariat. They have stood facts on their head and juggled black and white, encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions differing from their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with themselves. They have puffed up the arrogance of the bourgeoisie and deflated the morale of the proletariat. How poisonous! Viewed in connection with the Right deviation in 1962 and the wrong tendency of 1964 which was 'Left' in form but Right in essence, shouldn't this make one wide awake? [4]

Mao Zedong

August 5, 1966

[1] The "headquarters" mentioned in Mao Zedong's big-character poster actually refers to the "bourgeois headquarters" with Liu Shaoqi as its "chief ringleader," which was erroneously characterized during the Cultural Revolution. The "exercise of bourgeois dictatorship" and "white terror" mentioned in the big-character poster for "over fifty days" refers to the dispatch of work teams to certain units in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, which were later erroneously accused of "the bourgeois reactionary line represented by Liu Shaoqi." During the Cultural Revolution, due to an unrealistic assessment of the situation within the Party and the country at the time, the Party assumed the existence of a counter-revolutionary revisionist line opposed to the Central Committee's line and a bourgeois headquarters. Liu Shaoqi was identified as the chief ringleader of the counter-revolutionary revisionist group within the Party and the largest capitalist roader in power in the country. Furthermore, the Party, deviating from the principles of democratic centralism and adopting erroneous policies and methods, launched a nationwide, open and erroneous campaign of criticism and struggle against Liu Shaoqi. Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and others, driven by their counter-revolutionary goal of usurping supreme leadership of the Party and state and subverting the dictatorship of the proletariat, exploited this mistake and, leveraging their stolen power, deliberately framed and persecuted Liu Shaoqi politically. They also falsely accused a large number of leading Party, government, and military officials of being "Liu Shaoqi's agents" and brought them down. Under the direct control and direction of Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, and others, they resorted to fabricating false information, quoting out of context, and forging confessions, piecing together fabricated and far-fetched materials and fabricating evidence. In September 1968, they submitted to the Central Committee a report titled "Report on the Investigation of the Crimes of the renegade, traitor and scab Liu Shaoqi." This report and its accompanying "Evidence of Crimes" were adopted by the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Party in October 1968, amidst the profoundly abnormal state of Party Central Committee work and inner-Party life. The communiqué of this plenary session also announced the Central Committee's resolution to "permanently expel Liu Shaoqi from the Party and remove him from all posts within and outside the Party." In October 1969, while seriously ill, Liu Shaoqi was forcibly escorted from Beijing to Kaifeng for "custody." He died unjustly on November 12 of the same year from persecution. Following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in February 1979, the Central Committee decided that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Organization Department of the Central Committee would conduct a review of Liu Shaoqi's case. On February 29, 1980, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted the "Resolution on Rehabilitating Comrade Liu Shaoqi." The resolution stated: "According to the review, there is no such thing as a "counter-revolutionary revisionist line" represented by Liu Shaoqi, no "counter-revolutionary revisionist group" with Liu Shaoqi as its "chief ringleader," and no "capitalist roader clique in power within the Party" with Liu Shaoqi as its leader." In the early days of the Cultural Revolution, sending work teams to certain units to guide the movement was a

practice our Party had employed for years to address grassroots issues. There was no "bourgeois reactionary line" formulated and promoted by Liu Shaoqi. The resolution concluded that the three major crimes of "renegade, traitor and scab"—as well as various other charges levied against Liu Shaoqi in the original investigation report—were entirely a deliberate frame-up by Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda." The resolution adopted by the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee based on this to "permanently expel Liu Shaoqi from the Party and remove him from all posts within and outside the Party" was erroneous. Past slanders, false accusations, fabricated materials, and all false statements against Liu Shaoqi must be completely refuted. Therefore, the Plenary Session decided to revoke the charges against Liu Shaoqi and the resolution regarding his punishment contained in the Communiqué of the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, and accordingly to revoke the original review report, thereby restoring Liu Shaoqi's reputation as a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary, and one of the key leaders of the Party and the state.

[2] This refers to a big-character poster titled "What on Earth Did Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun Do During the Cultural Revolution?" written by Nie Yuanzi, Song Yixiu, Xia Jianwan, Yang Keming, Zhao Zhengyi, Gao Yunpeng, and Li Xingchen of the Beijing University Department of Philosophy on May 25, 1966.

[3] Refers to the People's Daily editorial, "A Big-Character Poster Cheering for Beijing University," published on June 2, 1966.

[4] This article was originally written in a June 2, 1966, issue of the Beijing Daily. The Beijing Daily on that date reprinted a big-character poster by seven people, including Nie Yuanzi, from Beijing University, along with the People's Daily editorial. Mao Zedong later revised it twice and added the title "Bombard the Headquarters—My Big-Character Poster." "Bombard the Headquarters" was published as a conference document by the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China distributed it to county and regiment levels on August 17, 1966, and the People's Daily published it publicly on August 5, 1967.

Comments added to “Acclaiming Beijing University’s Big-Character Poster” [1]

(August 5, 1966)

Erroneous leadership that endangers the revolution should not be accepted unconditionally but resolutely resisted. During this Cultural Revolution, the vast majority of revolutionary teachers, students, and cadres have widely resisted erroneous leadership.

Note from August 5, 1966.

[1] "Acclaiming Beijing University’s Big-Character Poster " is a People's Daily commentary piece written in response to a big-character poster by seven Peking University students, including Nie Yuanzi. When the article was distributed at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong included this commentary in parentheses after the sentence, "For the proletarian revolutionaries, we abide by the discipline of the Chinese Communist Party and unconditionally accept the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao." The article and Mao Zedong's commentary were later distributed by the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to county and regiment levels.

Comments and Revisions on the Draft Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China [I]

(August 5, 9, and 11, 1966)

1

Comrade Kang Sheng:

Good revision. I will only delete one sentence on page 5.[2]

Mao Zedong

August 5

2

Comrade Kang Sheng:

Some revisions have been made.

Please consider them. I agree with everything else.

Mao Zedong

August 9th, afternoon

3

Comrade Kang Sheng:

You may print and distribute it accordingly.

Mao Zedong

August 11

4

The anti-people, counter-revolutionary activities carried out by U.S. imperialism and its running dogs in various countries are actually accelerating the revolutionary activities of the peoples of various countries. U.S. imperialism and its running dogs in various countries may appear powerful, but in reality they are very weak. In the long run, they are all paper tigers.

5

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee calls upon all workers, members of the people's communes, officers and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army, revolutionary cadres, revolutionary intellectuals, revolutionary teachers and students, and scientific and technical personnel throughout the country to raise higher the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, unite all those who can be united, *overcome the resistance arising from counter-revolutionary revisionism and "left" and right opportunism, overcome difficulties, overcome shortcomings, overcome mistakes, and overcome the dark side within the Party and in society*, carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the socialist revolution through to the end, and strive to achieve the Third Five-Year Plan and build our country into a powerful socialist country.

6

We must be a hundred times more vigilant to guard against sudden attacks by U.S. imperialism and its accomplices. If they dare to impose war on us, the seven hundred million Chinese people, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong *and the Communist Party of China*, will resolutely, thoroughly, completely, and utterly crush the aggressors.

[1] Part 1 was written on the draft of the Communiqué of the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, submitted for review by Kang Sheng, Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and Advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, on August 5, 1966. Part 2 was written on the draft submitted by Kang Sheng on August 9. Part 3 was written on the draft submitted by Kang Sheng on August 11. Part 4 is an addition to the draft submitted on August 9. Part 5 is a revision of a paragraph in the draft submitted on August 9. Part 6 is a revision of a paragraph in the draft submitted on August 5. The text in italics in these parts 5 and 6 contains additions and revisions by Mao Zedong. The Communiqué of

the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC was adopted by the plenary session on August 12 and published in the People's Daily on August 14.

[2] Mao Zedong deleted a sentence on page 5 of the draft communiqué submitted by Kang Sheng for review on August 5, 1966: "The plenary session warmly supports the statement issued by Comrade Liu Shaoqi on behalf of our country." The statement referred to here is the statement issued by Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China on July 22, 1966, on the Chinese people and the Chinese government's support for Vietnam in its fight against the United States.

[3] Mao Zedong's revisions to the draft communiqué submitted by Kang Sheng for review on August 9, 1966, included, in addition to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this article, the following: "The plenary session emphasized that Comrade Mao Zedong's series of instructions on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution are the guide to action for China's current cultural revolution and an epoch-making new development of Marxism-Leninism." He also changed the phrase "epoch-making new development" to "a development."

Comments on Li Da's Letter [1]

(August 10, 1966)

Comrade Tao Zhu, after reading, pass it on to Comrade Ren Zhong for his discretion.

Mao Zedong

August 10

[1] Li Da, formerly a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and president of Wuhan University, was wrongly labelled the "Three Family Village Black Ringleader" of Wuhan University, branded a "traitor" and a "landlord," and expelled from the Party. On July 19, 1966, he wrote to Mao Zedong, pleading for his release. Mao immediately wrote this comment upon reading the letter. On August 10, Tao Zhu, Executive Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat, received Mao's comment and immediately instructed, "Send it immediately to Comrade Ren Zhong." Ren Zhong, also known as Wang Renzhong, was then First Secretary of the CPC Hubei Provincial Committee. On August 24, Li Da was persecuted to death. In 1980, the CPC Central Secretariat approved the decision of the Hubei Provincial Committee, rehabilitating Li Da, restoring his reputation, and reinstating his Party membership.

Speech at a Meeting with the Capital's Residents at the Central Reception Station

(August 10, 1966)

You must care about national affairs and carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end! [1]

[1] According to a Xinhua News Agency report published in the People's Daily on August 12, 1966, Mao Zedong arrived at the mass reception centre at the CPC Central Committee headquarters at 7:15 p.m. on the 10th to meet with the capital's citizens who had come to celebrate the CPC Central Committee's decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. He addressed these words to them.

Speech at the Closing Session of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

(August 12, 1966)

Regarding the Ninth Congress, I'm afraid we need to make some preparations. Regarding the question of when the Ninth Congress will be convened, we need to make some preparations [1]. It's been many years since then; the Second Session of the Eighth Congress [2] will be ten years away next year. The next Congress will probably be held at an appropriate time next year. We need to make preparations now. I suggest entrusting the Central Political Bureau and its Standing Committee with the preparations. Is that a good idea?

Whether the decisions made at this plenary session [3] are correct or incorrect will depend on future practice. It seems the masses welcome our decisions. For example, one of the Central Committee's major decisions concerns the Cultural Revolution, which the vast majority of students and revolutionary teachers support. However, previous policies were resisted by these students and teachers, and we formulated this decision based on this resistance. However, whether this decision can be implemented depends on the leadership at all levels, both those present and those not. For example, regarding reliance on the masses and the mass line, there are two possibilities: one is reliance, the other is non-reliance; one is implementation of the mass line, the other is non-implementation. Never assume that just because a decision is written, all Party committees and all comrades will implement it. There will always be a small minority unwilling to implement it. This may be

better than in the past, because there weren't such public decisions before, and this time there is organizational guarantee. This time, some organizational changes, including adjustments to the Politburo members, alternate Politburo members, Secretariat secretaries, and Standing Committee members, have ensured the implementation of this Central Committee resolution and communiqué.

Comrades who make mistakes should always be given a way out and allowed to correct their errors. Don't assume that because someone has made a mistake, they shouldn't be allowed to correct it. Our policy is to learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, to cure the illness and save the patient, to observe first and then help, unity-criticism-unity. Our Party is not without factions outside the Party. I believe there are factions outside the Party, and there are also factions within the Party. This has always been the case, and it's a normal phenomenon. In the past, we criticized the Guomindang. The Guomindang claimed that there were no parties outside their Party and no factions within the Party. Some people then said, "No parties outside the Party, that's autocracy. No factions within the Party, that's rubbish." Our Communist Party is the same. You say there are no factions within the Party? There are, indeed. For example, when it comes to mass movements, there are two factions; it's just a matter of which faction holds the majority. If this plenary session hadn't been held, and things had continued for a few more months, I think things would have been much worse. Therefore, I think this meeting was a good one and will yield results.

[1] The Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was later held in Beijing from April 1 to 24, 1969.

[2] Refers to the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in Beijing from May 5 to 23, 1958.

[3] The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in Beijing from August 1 to 12, 1966, mainly discussed and approved the major decisions and measures of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on international and domestic issues since the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in September 1962, discussed and adopted the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", and adjusted the central leadership.

Comments on Chen Boda and Kang Sheng's [1] report [2] on Li Xuefeng's discontinuation of his concurrent post as Beijing Municipal Party Committee Secretary

(August 15, 1966)

Lin, Zhou, Tao, Liu, Deng [3], Comrade Xuefeng, please read. Lin, please preside over a meeting to discuss this. It seems that the Xuefeng Municipal Party Committee can remain in name only for the time being, with the actual work handed over to Wu De [4], who will provide support to the North China Bureau when needed. This seems to be a good idea. Please consider.

Mao Zedong

August 15, 22:00

[1] Chen Boda, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Kang Sheng, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[2] On August 15, 1966, Chen Boda and Kang Sheng wrote a report to Mao Zedong saying: "We ask the Chairman to consider whether Comrade Xuefeng can concentrate on managing the North China Bureau and no longer serve as the Secretary of the Beijing Municipal

Committee. Comrade Wu De can take over the position of Secretary of the Municipal Committee." Li Xuefeng was the First Secretary of the North China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee at that time.

[3] Lin refers to Lin Biao. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. Tao refers to Tao Zhu. Liu refers to Liu Shaoqi. Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping. The 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee adjusted the central leadership structure, and they all served as members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.

[4] Wu De was then the Second Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mayor of Beijing.

Letter to Liu Shaoqi

(August 15, 1966)

Comrade Shaoqi: On the words I suggested you rewrite in your letter to Xu Fanting [1], I have no deep impression. If you find them, please read them again and return them to me. I hope you will consider whether this is appropriate.

Mao Zedong

August 15

[1] Refers to a letter Liu Shaoqi wrote on June 28, 1943, to Xu Fanting, Director of the Northwest Shanxi Administrative Office and Deputy Commander of the Jinsui Military Region, on issues such as human nature, right and wrong, and good and evil. After reading the letter, Mao Zedong commented on some of the viewpoints and formulations. On December 17 of that year, he wrote to Liu Shaoqi, saying, "I read your article three times in one breath. I also gave you my frank comments." "I haven't studied it thoroughly, so I can't say that my comments are completely correct. Please read it and let me know." On August 15, 1966, Liu Shaoqi sent Mao Zedong his letter to Xu Fanting and Mao's comments.

Comments on Lin Biao's [1] Three Speeches

(August 16, 1966)

Comrade Lin Biao:

I have read all three [3] and agree with them all.

Mao Zedong

August 16, 7:00 p.m.

[1] Lin Biao was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

[2] Lin Biao's speeches at the Huairan Hall of Zhongnanhai on August 8, 1966, when he met with the Central Cultural Revolution Group, his speech at the closing meeting of the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee on August 12, and his speech at the Central Working Conference on August 13.

Title of the Beijing University Journal

(August 16, 1966)

New Beijing University⁴

⁴ Calligraphy written by Mao for the journal's masthead.

Conversation with Lin Biao at the Capital's Celebration of the Cultural Revolution [1]

(August 18, 1966)

This movement is large-scale and truly mobilized the masses, having great significance for revolutionizing the thinking of the entire people.

[1] On August 18, 1966, millions of people from Beijing and other parts of the country gathered in Tiananmen Square to celebrate the Cultural Revolution. This article is a conversation between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao while he was reviewing the celebratory parade from the Tiananmen Gate Tower. Lin Biao was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

Minutes of a Conversation with the Red Guards of Beijing University High School on the Tiananmen Gate Tower

(August 18, 1966)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): What is Lu Ping doing now?

XXX: Lu Ping is sweeping the floor at Beijing University.

Mao: Lu Ping can only sweep the floor, just like me. When I arrived at your school, I could only sweep the floor. I can't do anything else. I'm your orderly.

Mao: Zhang Chengxian is also a bad guy. He tore down your red flag. You should raise it. How many people have you recruited?

XXX: More.

Mao: That's on the right track.

(XXX asks the Chairman if he's in good health.)

Mao: I'm in good health. I went swimming in the Yangtze River, and a young comrade had liver pain, so I came up. Otherwise, I could have swum for three or four hours.

(XXX asks the Chairman what should be done next?)

Mao: You should practice "One Struggle, Two Criticisms, Three Reforms," and act according to the Sixteen Points.

(Mao asks XXX if she can swim.)

XXX: I just learned, and I'm not very good at it. I can only swim a dozen meters.

Mao: That's not swimming, that's strolling in the garden. (Mao makes a leisurely strolling gesture) If you can do that, you'll have moved from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. You're always afraid of criticism. Marxism was forged through pressure, weathering storms and flourishing.

Jiang Qing: We can't let her take the spotlight; we need her to be modest.

Mao: How can you say that? We need her to make revolution!

The Revolution Must Rely on Oneself

(1966)

The Revolution Must Rely on Oneself [1]

[1] This is a quote from Mao Zedong delivered by Zhou Enlai in his speech at a mass rally in Beijing celebrating the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution on August 18, 1966. Zhou Enlai's speech was published in the People's Daily on August 19, 1966.

Title for the magazine "Chinese Women"⁵

(August 20, 1966)

Chinese Women

Submitted to Comrade Li Chang.

Mao Zedong

August 20

⁵ This was for the masthead of the magazine, written in Mao's own calligraphy.

Comments on Bo Yibo's [1] Letter [2]

(August 21, 1966)

Distributed to the Standing Committee, the Cultural Revolution Group, and Comrade Bo Yibo.

Comrade Yibo, please first inform me of your request and your idea in writing, and then we can talk. This will shorten the conversation. You are a person who likes to talk at length, and I am a little afraid of listening to a long conversation of three or four hours.

Mao Zedong

On the night of August 21

[1] Bo Yibo, then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council, was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee reviewed and corrected the previous erroneous conclusions about him, affirmed his contributions to the Party and the people, and rehabilitated him.

[2] This comment was written in a letter from Bo Yibo to Mao Zedong on August 21, 1966. The letter said: "When the Chairman shook hands with me on August 18 at Tiananmen Square and warmly encouraged me to make a good revolution, I was deeply moved." "If the Chairman has time recently, I hope he will find me and talk to me. I would like to discuss two issues: (1) the current situation of the Cultural Revolution in the various ministries of industry and transportation; at the same time, I will examine the mistakes I made in the movement; and (2) my idea of reforming the industrial system."

Speech at the Central Working Conference

(August 23, 1966)

The main question is what policy should be adopted regarding the so-called chaos in various places? My opinion is, let the chaos last for a few months. We firmly believe that the majority are good, and the bad are the minority. It doesn't matter if there are no provincial committees; we still have prefectural and county committees! The People's Daily published an editorial urging workers, peasants, and soldiers not to interfere with the student movement. We should promote cultural struggle, not armed struggle.

I don't think the chaos in Beijing is serious. The students held a 100,000-person rally and arrested the murderers, and they were in a panic. Beijing is too civilized. [The text then abruptly shifts topics.] The hooligans are a minority, so don't interfere now. The League Central Committee is reorganizing. We originally wanted to hold a meeting, but now we're unsure. Let's wait a few months. Decisions were made hastily, and we suffered greatly. We rushed to send work teams, rushed to fight the rightists, rushed to hold a 100,000-person rally, rushed to issue a petition, and rushed to say that opposing the new municipal committee is opposing the Party Central Committee. Why can't we oppose it? I've published a big-character poster to bombard the headquarters. Some issues need to be decided

quickly, like the workers, peasants, and soldiers not interfering with the students' Cultural Revolution. Let them take to the streets, what's the big deal about writing big-character posters? Let outsiders take pictures, they're just showing how backward we are. What's the big deal about letting the imperialists speak ill of us?

Comments on Xie Fuzhi's Proposal on Streamlining the Ministry of Public Security [1]

(August 26, 1966)

Circulated to all comrades of the Politburo for study. I think this idea is a good one and should be discussed at the next meeting.

Mao Zedong,

August 26

[1] [I] On August 25, 1966, Xie Fuzhi, Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister of Public Security, wrote a report to Mao Zedong regarding the streamlining of the Ministry of Public Security. He said, "In accordance with the Chairman's directive in Hangzhou in April of that year that the Ministry of Public Security should be reduced by two-thirds, we mobilized cadres at the department level and above to hold a debate on the issue of streamlining in May. After several months of deliberation, and especially after the Cultural Revolution, the solution to the streamlining issue has become fully mature." The Ministry of Public Security currently has an administrative staff of over 1,400 people, a large organization. Based on the fundamental line of relying primarily on the Party and the masses for public security work

and the principle of "empty at the top and substantial at the bottom," we envision merging the current 12 bureaus into 6 and the 90 departments into over 30, reducing the administrative staff from over 1,400 to over 400. The current staff of over 7,000 in enterprises and institutions will be transferred to the relevant units. We also envision mobilizing the masses to speak freely and make a thorough revolution in the later stages of the Cultural Revolution, striving to reduce the administrative staff to 200 to 300 people."

Comments on Li Fuchun's Report on the Cultural Revolution in the Eight State Council Agencies [1]

(August 28, 1966)

Printed and distributed to all comrades of the Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Cultural Revolution Group. This matter should be discussed.

Mao Zedong,

August 28

[1] On August 21, 1966, Li Fuchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council, wrote a report to the Central Cultural Revolution Group and to Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and Zhou Enlai. He reported on the Cultural Revolution movement in eight State Council departments (excluding those in charge of foreign affairs, culture, education, and science) over the past two months and offered ten suggestions on how these departments should implement the "Sixteen Articles" and carry out the Cultural Revolution effectively. At an enlarged meeting of

the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on August 29, Mao Zedong commented on this, saying: "Not a single one. Why ten articles? Let's just let it go. We have sixteen articles, but they won't listen. Let them do whatever they want."

Comments on Guan Feng and Qi Benyu's Report on the Cultural Revolution in Beijing

(August 28, 1966)

This document [1] will be distributed to the Politburo, Secretariat, Central Cultural Revolution Group, Beijing Municipal Committee, and comrades Bo Yibo and Tao Baoxiao [2]. This matter should be discussed.

Mao Zedong,

August 28, morning

[1] Refers to a report submitted by Guan Feng and Qi Benyu, members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, to Jiang Qing, deputy group leader, on August 26, 1966. The report stated that the Red Guards in Beijing had grown significantly since the August 18th Million-Person Rally, with organizations generally established in universities and middle schools. The current mainstream of the movement was healthy, but there were also some shortcomings and side effects. For example, there were many cases of arresting and beating people, especially good people

and ordinary people; the scope of house searches had widened; and there was a bit more interference in the daily habits of the masses. Some leaders of the new Beijing Municipal Party Committee adopted a passive wait-and-see attitude towards the activities of the Red Guards and did not dare to actively lead the movement. Particularly noteworthy were: (1) some individuals used the Red Guards in certain schools to oppose the "Sixteen Articles" and undermine the Cultural Revolution; (2) the leadership of the Red Guards in some colleges and universities fell into the hands of the royalists, who implemented a work team line without a work team. The report put forward four suggestions: the new Beijing Municipal Party Committee should stand at the forefront of the movement to lead the movement and criticize the work team line. On August 27, Jiang Qing forwarded this report to Mao Zedong, and Mao Zedong's comments were written on this report.

[2] Bo Yibo, then alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council and Director of the State Economic Commission. Tao Lujia, then Deputy Director of the State Economic Commission.

Comments on Zhang Shizhao's letter reporting the house raids [1]

(August 30, 1966)

Sent to the Premier for his discretion [2]. He should be protected.

Mao Zedong

August 30

[1] On August 30, 1966, Zhang Shizhao, a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and director of the Central Research Institute of Literature, wrote to Mao Zedong, reporting the house raid on the night of August 29 and asking Mao for help, "to make some changes within the possible scope" and "the most important thing is to avoid repeated searches." Mao Zedong wrote this comment on the letter after reading it. According to the article "My Father Zhang Shizhao" written by Zhang Shizhao's daughter Zhang Hanzhi, Mao Zedong wrote a reply to Zhang Shizhao on September 1, saying: "I

received your letter and was deeply concerned about it. I have asked the Premier to make arrangements. I hope you don't worry!"

[2] After receiving the letter and comments forwarded by Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou Enlai immediately handled it and wrote on the envelope at 2:00 p.m. on August 30: "Done. Noted by Zhou." At the same time, he also personally wrote a list of leading cadres and famous democratic figures who should be protected, including Song Qingling, Guo Moruo, Zhang Shizhao, Cheng Qian, He Xiangning, Fu Zuoyi, Zhang Zhizhong, Cai Tingbei, Shao Lizi, Jiang Guangjing, Sha Qianli, Zhang Wuruo, Li Zongren, etc., as well as the Vice President of the State, the Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Vice Premier, Ministers and Vice Ministers of the State Council, leaders of various democratic parties, and leaders of the two high courts (referring to the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate).

Comments on Lin Biao's [1] speech at the meeting with teachers and students from all over the country [2]

(August 31, 1966)

Reply to Comrade Lin Biao: This revision [3] is very good.

Mao Zedong

August 31, 11:00 a.m.

[1] Lin Biao was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

[2] On the afternoon of August 31, 1966, Mao Zedong and other leaders of the CPC Central Committee met with 500,000 teachers, students and Red Guards from Beijing and all over

the country in Tiananmen Square. Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai delivered speeches respectively. This article is Mao Zedong's comments on the speech submitted by Lin Biao on August 31.

[3] It refers to the two sentences Lin Biao added to the speech submitted for review, namely, after the sentence "Revolutionary young generals, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee warmly praise your proletarian revolutionary spirit of daring to think, dare to speak, dare to act, dare to take risks, and dare to revolutionize. You have done a lot of good things and put forward a lot of good initiatives. We are very happy and we warmly support you", the sentence "Resolutely oppose suppressing you! Your revolutionary actions are very good!" was added.

Seven-character quatrain·Bombard the headquarters

(August 1966)

Where is the people's victory now?

The road is full of new nobles and everywhere decline meets the eye.

The nuclear bomb is placed on the top of Kunlun Mountain,

And only when the corruption is completely destroyed can we feel relieved.

We must use cultural struggle, not physical struggle [1]

(August 1966)

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a great revolution that touches people's souls. To achieve this great revolution, we must use cultural struggle, not physical struggle.

[1] These are two sentences from Mao Zedong quoted in the People's Daily editorial "Use cultural struggle, not physical struggle" on September 5, 1966. Earlier on August 29, Mao Zedong said at the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee: The Cultural Revolution has developed to the point of social struggle, criticism and reform. We need cultural struggle, not physical struggle.

Instructions on Yang Yintian's big-character poster

(August 1966)

Distribute to all comrades at the plenary session (referring to the 11th Central Committee Plenary Session). Use special fonts for the title of Yang Yintian's big-character poster and old size 5 for the full text.

Regarding the Work Teams

(August 1966)

Almost 90 percent of the work teams nationwide committed widespread errors in direction and line.

Instructions on the Beihang University "Red Flag Combat Team"'s persistence in struggle at the National Defense Science and Technology Commission

August 1966

Don't be afraid. Don't make the students sit on the ground, set up tents, and let them cause unrest for three months.

Comments on the draft notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on some specific issues in the Cultural Revolution [1]

(September 1, 1966)

Returned to the Premier. This document will not be sent.

Mao Zedong

September 1

[1] This comment was written on the draft notice submitted by Zhou Enlai for examination on August 30, 1966. The main contents of the draft notice are: 1. During the movement, the key and confidential departments and units of the party and the country must be resolutely protected. The draft notice divides these departments and units into 16 categories and lists

them one by one. 2. If counter-revolutionaries and bad elements are found to sabotage the above departments and units, they must be dealt with according to law. 3. Important files should be sealed. 4. This notice is sent to the county and regiment level, and is kept internally and not announced to the public.

Comments on Fu Lianzhang's Letter [1]

(September 3 and December 28, 1966)

1

I'm sending this to Comrade Tao Zhu for consideration [2]. This man is not in power and has committed no serious crime; he should be protected.

Mao Zedong

September 3

2

Dr. Fu: I've seen all the documents sent to me. Regarding the political arrangements, as with many others, we can't discuss them now. We'll discuss them later.

Mao Zedong

December 28th

PS: You should analyze your own life; don't just focus on your strengths and ignore your weaknesses.

Mao Zedong

[1] This first part is a commentary on a letter dated August 28, 1966, from Fu Lianzhang, a member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and Vice Minister of Health. In it, Fu Lianzhang reported to Mao Zedong that he had been labeled an "anti-Party, anti-socialist gangster" during the Cultural Revolution and requested protection. The second part is a commentary on a letter dated December 12, in which Fu Lianzhang stated that since the campaign against him, all his political privileges (including those of a member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) had been revoked, and he was prohibited from reading documents or listening to reports.

[2] Tao Zhu, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat, received Mao Zedong's instructions on September 3, 1966, and immediately instructed the head of the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Protect Fu according to the Chairman's instructions."

Comments on the two telegrams from the Central Committee to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and to the Northwest Bureau [I]

(September 4, 1966)

Send as is.

Mao Zedong

September 4

[1] This article is a comment on three documents submitted by Zhou Enlai for review on September 4, 1966. Two of the three documents were telegrams from the CPC Central Committee to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the Northwest Bureau, which

were issued as CPC Central Committee Document No. 451 and No. 452 of 1966. The two telegrams pointed out respectively: "Based on the ethnic policy, the Central Committee decided to adopt a protective policy towards Saifuding. Comrade Wang Enmao correctly implemented the Central Committee's decision and did not shield Saifuding. This matter can be officially announced to the masses. And explain to the students in Beijing that Xinjiang is a region where ethnic minorities are the majority, and the Cultural Revolution movement here must be to strengthen the unity of the Uyghur and Han nationalities and prevent the Soviet revisionists and ethnic minority activists from instigating and exploiting it." "In order to ensure border security and prevent Soviet revisionism from taking advantage of the situation, the Central Committee decided that the Cultural Revolution in border areas such as Ili, Tacheng, and Altai can use the "Four Bigs" to air opinions and expose problems in schools, institutions, enterprises, and other units. The district party committee is responsible for solving the problems by adjusting the leadership from top to bottom to meet the demands of the masses, and not to use the method of "dismissal" by the masses directly. In particular, it is necessary to dissuade students from other places from entering these areas to make connections. Students from other places who have already gone there should be persuaded and mobilized to leave. I hope you will strictly control this matter." Saifuding was then the Secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Chairman of the People's Committee of the Autonomous Region. Wang Enmao was then the Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Communist Party of China, the First Secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Committee, and the Commander and Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Comments on the Prohibition of Mobilizing Workers and Peasants to Intervene in the Student Movement [1]

(September 7, 1966)

Comrades Lin Biao, Enlai, Tao Zhu, Boda, Kang Sheng, Fuchun, Ren Zhong, and Jiang Qing [2]:

Please read this. The situation in Qingdao, Changsha, Xi'an, and other places is the same: they are all organizing workers and peasants to oppose the students. If this continues, the problem will not be solved. It seems appropriate for the Central Committee to issue a directive. [3]

Don't allow any localities to do this. Then write another editorial [4] advising workers and peasants not to interfere with the student movement. Beijing didn't mobilize workers and peasants to discipline students, except for the 600 peasants that Renmin University

transferred to the city for protection. Guo Yingqiu [5], no other examples. Based on Beijing's experience, tell localities to follow suit.

I think the opinions of Tan Qilong (6) and this deputy mayor are correct.

Please discuss this and determine the policy.

Mao Zedong

September 7th

[1] This criticism was written in a report submitted to the Central Cultural Revolution Group by Wang Xiaoyu, Deputy Head of the Qingdao Municipal Committee's Laoshan County "Four Cleanups" Working Group and Deputy Mayor of Qingdao, on September 4, 1966. The report stated that the Qingdao Municipal Committee's Laoshan County "Four Cleanups" Working Group Party Committee "did not call on workers, peasants, and soldiers to firmly support the students' revolutionary actions," but instead "instructed workers and peasants to educate the students, telling them that they were eating peasants' food and wearing workers' clothes and could not engage in mischief." "Instead of telling the students to learn to swim while swimming," they "persuaded and educated them not to enter the city." "This was in opposition to the Central Committee." The report concluded that the students' criticism was directed correctly, and that "organizing workers and peasants to support" the targets of criticism was "a mistake in direction."

[2] Lin Biao was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Enlai, also known as Zhou Enlai. Tao Zhu, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat, and Advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Boda, also known as Chen Boda, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Kang Sheng, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Fuchun, also known as Li Fuchun, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Secretariat. Renzhong, also known as Wang Renzhong, then Deputy Head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and First Secretary of the Central-South Bureau. Jiang Qing, then Deputy Head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[3] On September 11, 1966, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded Mao Zedong's comments and Wang Xiaoyu's report to all central bureaus, provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committees, and issued four specific

decisions prohibiting the mobilization of workers and peasants to interfere in the student movement.

[4] On September 11, 1966, the People's Daily published an editorial entitled "Workers, peasants and revolutionary students unite under the banner of Mao Zedong Thought."

[5] Guo Yingqiu, then secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China and president of Renmin University of China.

[6] Tan Qilong, then first secretary of the Shandong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Instructions on the "Report on the Situation in Changsha, Qingdao, Xi'an, and Other Places"

(September 7, 1966)

Comrades Lin Biao, Enlai, Kang Sheng, Boda, Jiang Qing, and others:

Please read this document. The situation in Qingdao, Xi'an, Changsha, and other places is the same: they are all organizing workers and peasants to oppose the students. This approach will not solve the problem. It would be appropriate for the Central Committee to issue a directive prohibiting all localities from doing so, and then write an editorial urging workers and peasants not to interfere with the student movement. Beijing did not mobilize workers and peasants to discipline students, except for the case of Renmin University

sending 600 peasants into the city to protect Guo Yingqiu. Based on Beijing's experience, we should advise localities to follow suit. I believe the opinions of Tan Qilong and this deputy mayor are correct.

Mao Zedong

September 7, 1967

Comments on a Big-Character Poster by Four American Experts

(September 8, 1966)

Comrades Lin Biao, Premier, Chen Yi, Tao Zhu, and Boda (I): I agree with this big-character poster (2). Foreign revolutionary experts and their children should be treated exactly like Chinese people. No difference is allowed. Please discuss this. All those who are willing should do the same. Please decide on the method.

Mao Zedong

September 8

[1] Lin Biao was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. The Premier refers to Zhou Enlai. Chen Yi, at the time, was a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Director of the Office of Foreign Affairs. Tao Zhu, at the time, was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat. Boda refers to Chen Boda.

[2] This refers to a large-character poster written by Yang Zao⁶ and four other American experts to the State Council's Foreign Experts Bureau on September 7, 1966, and copied by the Investigation Team of the Office of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The poster stated, "We firmly oppose special treatment in politics and life, and resolutely demand to become strong revolutionaries and resolute fighters against revisionism. To carry the struggle against U.S. imperialism to the end, we are determined to temper and test ourselves. Our descendants must become reliable revolutionary successors and must not be allowed to become revisionists. To this end, we demand: 1. Treat us as class brothers, not as bourgeois experts. 2. Allow and encourage us to participate in manual labour. 3. Help us with ideological transformation. 4. Allow and encourage us to closely integrate with workers and peasants. 5. Allow and encourage us to participate in the three major revolutionary movements. 6. Our children

⁶ Yang Zao was the name taken by US scientist Irwin (Sid) Engst (1918-2003) when he moved to China in 1946 as an animal husbandry expert of the United Nations General Relief Agency. In the same year, he went to the Communist base at Yan'an. After working on state farms with his wife, Joan Hinton, he went to Beijing in 1966 and was assigned to work as a translator for a Chinese film distribution company. In the summer, he co-wrote a big-character poster with Bertha Sneck (wife of William Hinton), Joan Hinton, and Ann Tomkins to oppose special treatment for foreigners. Then he joined the combat team of the rebels. In 1972, he went to work in Beijing Red Star Commune. In October 1979, he was appointed as a consultant to the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery of the People's Republic of China. After 1982, he was engaged in cattle breeding and improvement for 20 years at the Agricultural Machinery Experimental Station of Xiaowangzhuang Agricultural Mechanization Research Institute in Shahe Town, Beijing. In an interview with CNN in 1996, he and his wife said they "witnessed the collapse of their socialist dream" because Chinese people accepted Western-style capitalism. In a 2004 interview, Joan Hinton criticized China's economic transformation as "a betrayal of the socialist cause." The book *Silage Choppers & Snake Spirits: The Lives & Struggles of Two Americans in Modern China* tells their story. Their son, Fred Engst, remains critical of China's restoration of capitalism.

receive the same treatment and strict standards as Chinese children. 7. Living conditions are the same as those of staff members of the same rank. 8. Eliminate special treatment."

Regarding the "Revolutionary Transformation" of Overseas Agencies

(September 9, 1966)

Reply to Comrade Chen Y [1]: This critical document [2] is well written and deserves the attention of all overseas agencies. We should revolutionize it. Otherwise, it will be very dangerous. We can start with Vienna. Please decide.

Mao Zedong

September 9

[1] Chen Yi was then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Director of the Office of Foreign Affairs.

[2] This refers to a letter from an Austrian to the Compilation Bureau of the Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, published in the ninth issue of "Brief Report on Foreign Affairs During the Cultural Revolution," compiled by the Secretariat of the State Council's Foreign Affairs Office on September 8, 1966. The letter, while praising China's Cultural Revolution and the actions of the Red Guards, also criticized the excessively luxurious clothing and vehicles used by the Chinese embassy personnel in Vienna, requesting that "the relevant authorities be reported and that immediate measures be taken to correct the situation." Also submitted to Mao Zedong along with this issue of the bulletin was a document titled "A Letter from the Tanzanian Masses Sharply Criticizing the Bourgeois Ideology and Style in China's Foreign Affairs Activities," published on September 8 by the Cultural Revolution Preparatory Committee and Provisional Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League. The letter criticized the Chinese embassy in Tanzania for its ostentatious and extravagant diplomatic activities. Mao Zedong's comments were included in Bulletin No. 9.

Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Notice on the Methods for Hanging and Carrying Portraits and Slogans for National Day

(September 1966)

1

Comrade Tao Zhu [1]: Too many posters and slogans is a cumbersome philosophy. We need to greatly streamline them. A dozen or so of each will suffice, and the total should not exceed thirty. If there are more, no one will remember them, and they will not be considered a single thing. Please discuss further and print and submit them. [2]

Mao Zedong

September 10

2

Comrade Tao Zhu: It is much easier. I wonder if it has been sent to the Central Cultural Revolution Group for discussion? If not, please send it to them for discussion. [3]

Mao Zedong

September 12

3

Comrade Lin Biao [4] read it and return it to Comrade Tao Zhu.

Mao Zedong

Afternoon, September 14

PS Everything should be considered carefully; it is not appropriate to make hasty decisions.

For all major issues, we should seek the opinions of a wide range of comrades. Please note this to Tao, Zhou, and Renzhong [5]. Reducing the number of slogans from 100 to 23 is a good idea and a lesson for us.

Mao. [6]

4

Agreed [7].

5

Agreed [8].

[1] Tao Zhu was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat, Advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and Minister of the Central Propaganda Department.

[2] This comment was written on a draft of the Central Committee's notice, submitted by Tao Zhu for review on September 10, 1966, regarding the methods for hanging and carrying portraits, as well as posters and slogans for National Day 1966. In addition to proposing three regulations for hanging and carrying portraits on National Day, the draft also listed 60 posters and 40 slogans, for a total of 100. During his review, Mao Zedong made significant deletions to the slogans.

[3] This comment was written on the revised draft of the notice submitted by Tao Zhu for review on September 11, 1966. The revised posters and slogans together totalled 30.

[4] Lin Biao was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

[5] Tao refers to Tao Zhu. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. Ren Zhong is Wang Renzhong, then Deputy Head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee and First Secretary of the Central South Bureau.

[6] This comment was written on a revised draft of the notice submitted by Tao Zhu for review on September 14, 1966. In his report for review, Tao Zhu wrote: "Following instructions, I have sent this to the Cultural Revolution Group for discussion. I have revised it once more and am sending it to Chen for review again." The title of this revised draft was changed to "Notice on the Methods and Slogans for Hanging and Carrying Portraits for National Day 1966," and the slogans were condensed to 23.

[7] This comment was written on the revised draft of the notice submitted by Tao Zhu for examination at 2:00 a.m. on September 15, 1966. This draft for examination included additional revisions to some of the 23 slogans.

[8] This comment was written on a revised draft of the notice submitted by Tao Zhu for review on September 16, 1966. This draft included the slogans "Work with all your strength, strive for excellence, and build socialism quickly, efficiently, and economically" and "Consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat! Strengthen the worker-peasant alliance." The final draft consisted of 25 items. On September 17, the CCP Central Committee distributed this notice down to the county and regiment levels.

Letter to Lin Biao [1] and others regarding the meeting with teachers and students from all over the country in Beijing

(September 13, 1966)

Lin Biao, Premier, and Comrade Tao Zhu [3]:

I have been ill for three days and still have a slight fever. I am feeling better today. Can you hold a 700,000-person rally in Tiananmen Square at 10:00 a.m. or 5:00 p.m. tomorrow (the 14th) or the day after tomorrow (the 15th). If I can get up, I will go and meet the crowd. If I can't get up, please preside over it. I won't go. [4]

Mao Zedong

September 13, 19:00

[1] Lin Biao was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

[2] Premier refers to Zhou Enlai. Tao Zhu was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat, and Advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[3] According to a Xinhua News Agency report published in the People's Daily on September 16, 1966, Mao Zedong once again met with millions of teachers, students, and Red Guards from all over the country and the capital in Tiananmen Square on the afternoon of the 15th.

Comments on Liu Shaoqi's "Draft Outline of Self-Criticism at the Meeting of Leading Cadres of the Beijing Work Teams" [1]

(September 14, 1966)

Comrade Shaoqi: It is basically well-written and serious. The second half is especially good. I suggest that it be printed and distributed in draft form to the Political Bureau, Secretariat, Work Teams (Leading Cadres), Beijing Municipal Committee, and the Central Cultural Group [2] comrades should discuss and raise their opinions. You may gain something. Then, if necessary, make some revisions and submit a report. This may be more stable. Please consider it.

Mao Zedong

September 14

[1] After the outline of this review was revised, it was reviewed at the working conference of the CPC Central Committee held in October 1966.

[2] This refers to the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee.

Comments on Zhou Enlai's Speech at the Meeting with Teachers and Students from All Over the Country [1]

(September 15, 1966)

1

Agree.

2

It can be delivered by two persons.

Mao Zedong

10:30 a.m. on the 15th

[1] This first part is a commentary on a speech submitted by Tao Zhu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat, at 2:00 a.m. on September 15, 1966. When Zhou Enlai sent this speech to Tao Zhu on September 14, he said, "I still prefer that Comrade Lin Biao alone deliver the speech. I have already written to the Chairman for his approval." When Tao Zhu sent it to Mao Zedong for review, he wrote, "I think it would be better if both General Lin and the Premier delivered the speech tomorrow. Please approve it, Chairman." This second part is written in response to this incident. On the afternoon of September 15, Zhou Enlai delivered a speech at a reception meeting based on this speech. He emphasized the importance of improving industrial and agricultural production. "We must respond to Chairman Mao's call, grasping both revolution and production, and ensuring the dual victory of the Cultural Revolution and industrial and agricultural production!" "The vast majority of workers, commune members, scientific and technical personnel, and cadres in government and enterprise organizations should firmly adhere to their production posts, seize every opportunity to master the production process, and apply the tremendous enthusiasm unleashed during the Cultural Revolution to industrial and agricultural production and scientific experimentation!" "To facilitate the normal progress of industrial and agricultural production, Red Guards and revolutionary students from universities and colleges should not now conduct revolutionary liaisons in factories, enterprises, government agencies below the county level, or rural people's communes. The revolution there must be carried out in a planned and step-by-step manner according to the original 'Four Cleanups' deployment. Factories and rural areas cannot, like schools, close down production to carry out the revolution. Revolutionary students must respect and trust the workers and peasants, believing that they can fully rely on themselves to carry out the revolution." "The busy season of autumn harvest and planting has arrived. Red Guards and revolutionary teachers and students from universities and colleges should go to the countryside in an organized manner to participate in labour, assist with the autumn harvest, and learn from the revolutionary drive and hardworking qualities of the poor and lower-middle peasants."

On the Central Cultural Revolution Group

(September 1966)

Many central departments haven't done much good, but the Cultural Revolution Group has done a lot and has a great reputation. This group needs to be reformed.

On the question of the left-wing contingent Conversation with Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wen Yuan [1]

(October 1, 1966)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): How many leftists are there?

A: Shanghai is better, the left-wing contingent is larger.

Mao: How large?

A: 400,000, 500,000, 600,000 workers.

Mao: There won't be many leftists, probably 10%.

A: There may be more in the later period.

[1] This conversation took place during a break from watching the fireworks at Tiananmen Square on the evening of National Day in 1966. When Zhang Chunqiao relayed the details of this conversation at an enlarged meeting of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee on June 16, 1967, he added, "This refers to the transformation of one's worldview, not just general manifestations. It refers to a worldview that incorporates a greater degree of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Complete Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought are even more difficult."

Comments on the convening of the Central Working Conference as scheduled [1]

(October 7, 1966)

The meeting will continue as scheduled. However, three days is not enough; seven days is required.

Mao Zedong

October 7

[1] This comment was written on a report Zhou Enlai submitted to Mao Zedong at 11:00 AM on October 7, 1966. The report stated: "Yesterday, Comrade Lin Biao asked us to ask the Chairman if he is still considering the pros and cons of holding a national working conference now." "If the Chairman believes there is no need to change, proceed as notified. Please give your instructions on the best course of action." This Central Committee working conference was held in Beijing from October 9 to 28.

Instructions for Meeting with Troops in Beijing

(October 13, 1966)

The next meeting will be held in the form of a military parade. Regardless of the number of personnel, the PLA must take charge of them all. Through training, the PLA's glorious traditions, the "Three Eights" style, the "Three Disciplines" and the "Eight Points for Attention" will be spread throughout the country. Everyone must learn to sing the "Three Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention" song, including me.

Comments on Chen Boda's Speech at the Central Working Conference [1]

(October and November 1966)

1

Forwarded to Comrade Chen Boda: I have reviewed it and it is acceptable. Please send me the unfinished portion for review. There are a few minor revisions to the text in the sections I have reviewed. Please consider whether they are appropriate. Suggestion: After you have delivered your speech, print it out and distribute it to all the comrades present at the conference. Let them discuss it for a few days and offer their suggestions for revisions.

Mao Zedong

October 15, 8:30 p.m.

2

To Comrade Chen Boda: It is acceptable. Only a few words have been changed on the second page. I suggest that the full text be printed immediately so that it can be presented and distributed to the public at the same time.

Mao Zedong

On the night of October 15th

3

Send it to Comrade Chen Boda immediately.

I've reviewed the revised draft and it's excellent. Please consider where to add the phrase "grasp the revolution and promote production." [2] Print it in small volumes and distribute it in large quantities. Each branch and each Red Guard squad should have at least two copies.

Mao Zedong

October 24, 11:00 PM

4

To Comrade Chen Boda

The first step would be to distribute it to the county and regiment levels. Once the majority of cadres at the county and regiment levels and above have come to terms with it, we can then distribute it further down the chain. Please discuss and decide how best to proceed.

Mao Zedong

November 6

[1] On page two of the fourth section of the draft speech submitted by Chen Boda for review at midnight on October 15, 1966, it stated: "A fallacy of so-called 'self-made reds' is prevalent everywhere. Those who propagate this fallacy exploit the naive claims of children, 'A father is a hero, so his son is a hero,' to mislead a group of students. In reality, this is the reactionary theory of bloodline of the exploiting class." During his review, Mao Zedong changed the phrase "children" to "a section of young people."

[2] On October 25, 1966, Chen Boda, in accordance with Mao Zedong's instructions, added a paragraph to the end of the third section of the revised draft of his speech: "Our comrades in all regions and departments, the broad masses of workers and peasants, and the vast

majority of young people must all master the Party's decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, heed the Decision's instructions on 'grasping the revolution and promoting production,' and fulfill their utmost revolutionary obligations in their work."

Speech at the Central Political Bureau Report Meeting

(October 24, 1966)

What are you afraid of? Have you read Li Xuefeng's briefing [1]? His two children went out to make connections and came back to educate Li Xuefeng, saying: "Why is our old chief so afraid of the Red Guards? We didn't beat you." You just won't reflect on yourself! Wu Xiuquan [2] has four children, divided into four factions. Many classmates went to his house, sometimes a few or a dozen people. After more contact, there was nothing to be afraid of, and I found them very cute. You should educate others, and educators should be educated

first. You are not clear-minded, you dare not meet the Red Guards, you don't tell the truth to the students, and you act like officials and masters. First you dare not meet them, then you dare not talk to them. After decades of revolution, you are getting stupider and stupider. Shaoqi's letter to Jiang Weiqing [3] criticized Jiang Weiqing, saying that he was stupid, but he himself was smart?

Liu Lantao [4]: *The Red Guards are snatching files everywhere and investigating our historical issues. They're going too far.*

What are you going to do when you get back?

Liu Lantao: *I'll go back and see.*

You always speak so hesitantly.

(Mao Zedong asked Zhou Enlai about the meeting)

Zhou Enlai: *The meeting is almost over. We'll continue for half a day tomorrow. Specific issues will be resolved according to the general principles when we get back.*

(To Li Jingquan [5])

How's Liao Zhigao [6] doing in Sichuan now?

Li Jingquan: It wasn't that long ago at first, but things got better for a while after the plenary session. Historically, he was consistently correct.

What do you mean by consistently correct? After the masses rose up, you slipped away, frightened out of your wits, and went to live in the military area. Go back and pull yourself together and do a good job. But you absolutely cannot admit to being anti-Party and anti-socialist. Overthrow the Central Bureau, provincial, and municipal committees and let the students take over. Is that okay? They don't know anything about industry and agriculture, and only have a few books. Is that okay?

It's not okay to post big-character posters about Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping on the streets. People should be allowed to make mistakes, to make revolution, and to correct themselves! In my opinion, this meeting went much better. The last one was a case of trying to force things forward without gaining any insights; there was no experience. This meeting has two months' experience, for a total of less than five months' experience. The democratic revolution lasted twenty-eight years, and how many mistakes were made?! How many people died?! The socialist revolution lasted seventeen years, and the Cultural Revolution only five months. It takes at least five years to gain experience. One was the big-character poster, one was the Red Guards, and one was the great linking up to exchange revolutionary experiences [7]—no one anticipated this, not even me—led to chaos in the provinces and cities. The students also made some mistakes, but it was mainly us, the gentlemen, who made the mistakes. Let the Red Guards read "The True Story of Ah Q."

(Questioning Li Xiannian [8])

How did your meeting go today?

Li Xiannian: *The Finance and Economics College said they're holding a denunciation meeting tomorrow. I requested that I make a self-criticism, but they wouldn't let me speak.*

You should still go for self-criticism tomorrow, or they'll say you've slipped away.

Li Xiannian: *I'm going abroad tomorrow.*

You should tell them. In the past, it was "the mother teaching the son," but now it's "the son teaching the mother." I think you're a little lacking in spirit. They won't listen to your self-criticism, but you're doing it anyway. They're denouncing you, and you're admitting your mistakes. The central government started this chaos, so the responsibility lies with the central government, but the local governments also bear some responsibility.

My responsibility was to divide the troops into the first and second lines. Why was it divided into the first and second lines? [9] First, my health was poor, and second, it was the lesson of the Soviet Union. Malenkov [10] was immature and had no power before Stalin's death. He only toasted and flattered Stalin in every meeting. I wanted to establish their prestige before I died, but I didn't expect the opposite effect.

Tao Zhu: *Your supreme power fell into the hands of others.*

I deliberately let power slip into someone else's hands, but they weren't aware of it. Instead, they were acting like an independent kingdom. They didn't consult me on many matters, such as the Land Conference, the Tianjin Speech, the Shanxi Cooperatives, their denial of investigation and research, and their overwhelming praise of Wang Guangmei. They should have discussed and resolved things through the Central Committee, but he (Liu Shaoqi) insisted on going his own way. Deng Xiaoping never consulted me, from 1959 until now. He never consulted me on anything. I had no idea what the Secretariat and the State Planning Commission were doing. In 1962, four Vice Premiers—Li Fuchun, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian, and Bo Yibo [11]—all came to Nanjing to see me, and then to Tianjin. I immediately agreed to whatever they wanted to do. Later, the four of them left, but Deng Xiaoping refused to come. I was not satisfied with the Wuchang Conference [12]. The high targets left me helpless. The meeting in Beijing [13] was a mess. You held yours for six days, but I couldn't even hold mine for one. It doesn't matter that I can't complete the task. Don't treat me like a dead ancestor.

After the Zunyi Conference, the Central Committee became more centralized. After the Sixth Plenary Session of the 1938 Central Committee, Xiang Ying and Peng Dehuai established their own independent kingdoms, and those events (the Southern Anhui Incident, the Hundred Regiments Campaign) went unannounced. After the Seventh National Congress, the Central Committee was largely depleted. When Hu Zongnan attacked Yan'an, the Central Committee split into two factions. Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, and I were in northern Shaanxi,

while Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De were in North China. We were still relatively centralized. After entering the cities, we dispersed, each operating in our own way. The division into the first and second lines further dispersed us. After the 1953 Finance and Economics Conference, we issued a warning, urging everyone to keep in touch, both with the Central Committee and with the local governments. Liu and Deng operated openly, not in secret, unlike Peng Zhen. Previously, Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Wang Ming, Luo Zhanglong, and Li Lisan all operated openly, but that wasn't a big deal. Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, and Peng Dehuai all engaged in double-dealing. I didn't know Peng Dehuai was colluding with them. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun [14] were involved in secret activities, and those who engage in secret activities will not have a good end.

Those who made mistakes in the line must correct themselves. Chen Duxiu, Wang Ming, and Li Lisan did not. No matter what small group or faction, they must be shut down tightly. As long as they correct themselves and there is consensus and unity, everything will be fine.

Liu and Deng must be allowed to make revolution and change. You say I am a compromiser, and I am a compromiser. At the Seventh National Congress, Chen Qihan [15] said that those who followed Wang Ming's line should not be elected as members of the Central Committee. Wang Ming and several others were elected as members of the Central Committee. Now only Wang Ming is gone, but the others are still there! Luo Fu [16] is not good. I have a good impression of Wang Jiaxiang, and he supported the battle in Donggu. Luo Fu wanted to expel me at the Ningdu Conference, but Zhou, Zhu and others disagreed. He played a good role at the Zunyi Conference. At that time, we could not have done without them. Luo Fu was stubborn, Comrade Shaoqi opposed them, and Nie Rongzhen also opposed them. Liu Shaoqi cannot be written off.

If you make mistakes, just correct them! Correct them, and go back, cheer up, and boldly work. This meeting was my suggestion. It was so short, I don't know if it worked, but it might be better than the last one. I didn't expect the big-character posters, the Red Guards, and the mass linking up would cause such a big commotion. Some students come from less privileged backgrounds, but are we all from better ones? Don't recruit defectors. I have many rightist friends, like Zhou Gucheng and Zhang Zhizhong. How could I be so clean if I didn't approach a few rightists? Approaching them means investigating and studying them, understanding their dynamics. That day at Tiananmen Square, I deliberately brought Li Zongren [17] and I together. It's better for him not to be placed at all; it's better for him to have no position or power.

Do we need democratic parties? Is a single party sufficient? The school Party organization cannot be restored too soon. Many members were recruited after 1949. Jian Bozan, Wu Han, and Li Dazhao were all members. Are they all that good? Are all democratic parties so bad? I think democratic parties are better than Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang. We still need democratic parties, and we also need the CPPCC. We must make it clear to the Red Guards that China's democratic revolution was initiated by Sun Yat-sen. There was no Communist

Party at the time. It was Sun Yat-sen who led it, opposing Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and imperialism. This year marks the 100th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth. How should we commemorate it? We should discuss this with the Red Guards and hold a commemorative meeting. My division into the first and second lines is moving in the opposite direction.

Kang Sheng: *The political report of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China is about the extinction of class struggle.*

We've read the report; it was approved by the congress. They can't be held solely responsible.

The factories and rural areas should return in batches to influence the minds of the students at the provincial and municipal levels and hold the meeting well. In Shanghai, find a quiet place to hold the meeting, and let the students make their own noise. We held the meeting for seventeen days, and it was beneficial. As Comrade Lin Biao said, we must do a good job of political and ideological work with them. In 1936, Stalin said that class struggle was extinguished, and in 1939, he launched a purge. Isn't this class struggle? Go back and be energetic and do a good job. Who will overthrow you?

Deng Xiaoping, although deaf, always sat far away from me during meetings. Since 1959, he hasn't reported to me on his work for six years. He then arrested Peng Zhen for the Secretariat's work. Don't you think he's capable?

Nie Rongzhen: *This guy is very lazy.*

The view of the situation is small at the ends and large in the middle. Only Henan province is "daring" at the forefront, while the majority are "afraid." Those who are truly "opposition" are still a minority. Anti-Party and anti-socialist elements include Bo Yibo, He Changgong, Wang Feng, and Li Fanwu. The true fourth category cadres [18] number only 1, 2, or 3 percent.

Zhou Enlai: *Now it's far exceeded. Don't worry about it; we'll rehabilitate them in the future!*

Some who can't work locally can be transferred to other places. In Henan, one secretary is in charge of production, while the other five are in charge of reception. In the entire country, only Liu Jianxun [19] wrote a big-character poster on the 21st of December, supporting the minority. This is a good thing. How is Nie Yuanzi now?

Kang Sheng: *We still need to protect her.*

Li Xiannian: *All those who wrote the first big-character poster must be protected.*

Yes!

(Speaking of the Great Linkup)

Zhou Enlai: *It needs to be carried out with preparation.*

What preparation is needed? Where can we go without food? There were different views on the situation. After Wan Xiaotang died in Tianjin, a memorial service for 500,000 people was held. They thought this was a good situation, but in reality, it was a demonstration against the Party, using the dead to suppress the living. Li Fuchun took a year off. I don't even know who was in charge of the State Planning Commission. Fuchun was a disciplined person. He told the Secretariat some things, but the Secretariat didn't tell me. Deng Xiaoping kept his distance from me.

[1] Li Xuefeng, then First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee.

[2] Wu Xiuquan, then Deputy Minister of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee.

[3] Jiang Weiqing, then First Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee.

[4] Liu Lantao, then First Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and First Political Commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region, and Director of the Northwest Third Line Construction Committee.

[5] Li Jingquan was then the First Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the First Political Commissar of the Chengdu Military Region.

[6] Liao Zhigao was the first secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee at the time.

[7] A big-character poster refers to the poster "What Did Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun Really Do During the Cultural Revolution?" written by Nie Yuanzi and others. Red Guards refers to Mao Zedong's letter to the Red Guards of Tsinghua High School, in which he expressed "warm support" for the Red Guards, which immediately spread across the country. A great link-up refers to Chairman Mao Zedong's eight meetings with Red Guards in Tiananmen Square, meeting with over 13 million Red Guards from all over the country.

[8] Li Xiannian was then Vice Premier of the State Council and Deputy Head of the Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs.

[9] At the end of 1953, the Central Committee's Standing Committee was divided into the First and Second Lines, with Mao Zedong in the Second Line and the remaining members in the First Line. Liu Shaoqi chaired the Standing Committee. At the Eighth National Congress, the Central Committee established the Secretariat, with Deng Xiaoping appointed General Secretary. In 1959, Liu Shaoqi took over as President. After the division into the First and Second Lines, the day-to-day affairs of the Central Committee were handled by First Line leaders, primarily Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai.

[10] Malenkov, Stalin's designated successor, briefly served as the Soviet leader after Stalin's death, but was quickly overthrown by Khrushchev. Following Stalin's death in 1953, he served as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union and Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In February 1955, he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Electric Power. He was dismissed from his post in June 1957.

[11] Li Fuchun, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian and Bo Yibo were all vice premiers of the State Council at the time.

[12] The Wuchang Conference was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China held in Wuhan from November 21 to 27, 1958. Participants included some central leaders and the first secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committees. At the meeting, Mao Zedong harshly criticized frontline leaders for high targets, exaggeration, transitioning from poverty to communism⁷, and falsification, and demanded that targets be lowered, but faced significant resistance.

[13] From January 26 to February 2, 1959, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China convened a meeting of provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committee secretaries in Beijing. Liu Shaoqi presided over the meeting, but Mao Zedong was not present. The meeting resulted in the drafting of the "Explanation on Several Important Issues Concerning the 1959 National Economic Development Plan," the central thrust of which was the "strive to achieve and exceed the target of 20 million tons of steel production."

Speech at the Central Working Conference [1]

(October 25, 1966)

I would like to say a few words about two things.

Over the past seventeen years, I think some things have not been done well, such as in the area of cultural awareness.

In order to ensure national security, and given that Malenkov [2] could not be stopped after Stalin's death, problems arose, and revisionism emerged, we established a first and second

⁷ The policy of "transitioning from poverty" was an ultra-leftist mistake advocated by Liu Shaoqi and others during the Great Leap Forward. On July 14, 1958, Liu Shaoqi held an inspection of Shouzhong County, Shandong Province and put forward the slogan of "three years of hard fighting to transition to communism". This was an entirely unrealistic policy that claimed that there could be an immediate transition from poverty to communism. Mao Zedong stressed that the transition must have material conditions, spiritual conditions, and international conditions. It was useless to declare a transition without having the conditions. He said, according to Wu Lengxi's memoirs, that it was necessary to draw two lines: one is the difference between collective ownership and national ownership, and the other is the difference between socialism and communism. He warned against easily announcing the transition to national ownership, let alone communism.

line. Now it seems that it is not so good. I was in the second line, and other comrades were in the first line, and the result was that we were very scattered. Once we entered the city, we were no longer so concentrated. The establishment of the first and second lines gave rise to quite a number of independent kingdoms. Therefore, the Eleventh Plenary Session [3] of the Central Committee made changes to the issues of the first and second lines.

Before the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee, I was in the second line, not overseeing day-to-day work. I delegated many tasks to others, hoping to establish their prestige among the masses so that the country wouldn't be too shaken when I met Marx. That was my intention before, and everyone agreed with it. But the comrades in the first line didn't handle it well. Now, the first-line and second-line system has changed. But the Red Guards haven't been aware of it yet.

I also bear responsibility. Why do I say I bear responsibility? First, I proposed establishing a Secretariat, with members of the first and second lines within the Politburo Standing Committee. Second, I placed too much trust in others.

This raised alarm, back when the "Twenty-Three Articles" [4] were issued.

Many issues seemed unsolvable in Beijing. This was the problem existing within the Central Committee's front lines. Therefore, I issued a warning: What should we do if revisionism emerges in Beijing? This was stated in September and October of last year. I felt that my opinions could not be implemented or carried out in Beijing. Why wasn't the criticism of Wu Han [5] initiated in Beijing? Since no one in Beijing was committed to it, it was initiated in Shanghai. Comrade Yao Wenyan's article [6] was published in Shanghai.

The Beijing issue can be said to have been essentially resolved by now.

One more thing I want to talk about is the Cultural Revolution.

I caused trouble by distributing a big-character poster [7]. Also, I wrote a letter to the Red Guards at Tsinghua University Affiliated Middle School [8]. Also, I wrote a big-character poster myself [9].

The letter to the Red Guards at Tsinghua University Affiliated Middle School was not delivered, but they knew about it and spread it.

The Cultural Revolution lasted only a short time. June, July, August, September, and now October—less than five months. Therefore, comrades don't quite understand it.

It happened so quickly, and the momentum was so strong. I couldn't have anticipated the nationwide sensation that a single big-character poster (from Peking University) would cause once it was broadcast. Even before I'd sent this letter to the Red Guards, they were already mobilizing across the country. There were Red Guards from all sorts of factions, and there were three or four headquarters in Beijing. The Red Guards stormed in, and they absolutely ravaged you.

At the last meeting, I said that some people might not necessarily implement the meeting's decisions. Sure enough, many comrades still didn't understand. After two months, we've encountered some setbacks and gained some experience, so this meeting went much better.

This meeting had two phases. The first phase was a bit erratic, but the second phase was much smoother. Your own thinking has changed.

All in all, this movement has only been going on for five months. It might take two to five months, or even longer. By then, there will be new experiences to be gained and summed up.

Our bourgeois-democratic revolution took twenty-eight years to achieve victory. At the beginning, no one knew how to reform the law, myself included. From 1921 to 1949, 21, 31, 41, and 1949, that was twenty-eight years. We ourselves gradually summed up experience and found our path through practice. The democratic revolution lasted twenty-eight years, and the socialist revolution seventeen. This Cultural Revolution has only been going on for five months, so we cannot expect comrades to understand it just yet.

Since the criticism of Wu Han began last November, many comrades haven't read the articles, nor have they paid much attention. This includes the reform of Peking opera, the criticism of "The Biography of Wu Xun" [10], the criticism of Yu Pingbo's "A Study of the Dream of the Red Chamber" [11], the criticism of Hu Shi [12], and so on.

In the past, we didn't crack down on all of them. I say the responsibility lies with me. Who told you not to crack down on them systematically? Arresting individual cases is like treating the symptoms, not the root cause. It won't solve the problem.

In the first few months of this Cultural Revolution—last November and December, and this January, February, March, April, and May—despite numerous articles and the issuance of a "notice" on May 16th—it didn't attract much attention. I think it was the big-character posters and the Red Guards who were on the offensive. You couldn't ignore it. To use the words of the comrades, it's like "the revolution has come back to bite you." So, quickly, let's sum up our experience.

Why are we holding this work conference again, two months later? It's to summarize our experience and conduct political and ideological work. Comrade Lin Biao said that political and ideological work must be done. That's absolutely true. You'll have a tremendous amount of political and ideological work to do when you return. At least these four levels—the Central Committee, provincial, prefectural, and county—should hold meetings lasting more than ten days to truly clarify the issues. Don't try to make every cadre understand everything; that's impossible. There will always be some who aren't so clear and whose thinking isn't aligned.

Several comrades have told me, "I agree in principle, but when it comes to specific issues, I'm confused." I don't quite believe this. You understand the principle, but the specific issues

remain unresolved. What's the logic? Now I think there's probably some truth to it. Otherwise, why do they keep saying this? They agree in principle, but struggle to handle specific issues. Perhaps it's because their political and ideological work hasn't been done well. For example, after returning from the last meeting, it wasn't conducted well. In some places, it wasn't held at all, and in others, it wasn't thorough enough. The Red Guards stormed into chaos. If there were ten secretaries, seven or eight would have to meet with the Red Guards. If they were slow, they would rush in. The students were angry, unaware of it, and unprepared to answer any questions. They thought a superficial response, a welcome, would solve the problem. When people are full of anger and can't answer a few questions, they become passive. This passivity can be transformed into initiative.

I'm more confident about what will happen after this meeting. I won't repeat what I said at the last meeting, saying that this meeting is tantamount to not holding it. We'll just go back to the old rules, maintaining the status quo: opposing the Red Guards, opposing one faction, and using another faction for protection. I think this situation will change, and things are starting to improve. Of course, we can't expect too much. It's not certain that all cadres at the Central Bureau, provincial, prefectural, and county levels, not to mention the vast majority below the county level, will all come to terms so quickly. There will always be some who won't understand, and a small minority will still oppose it. However, we believe the majority will come to terms.

Let me talk about two things. One is history, addressing the issues of the front and second lines. The second is the issue of the Cultural Revolution.

I was the one who started the Cultural Revolution. It was a very short period, lasting only a few months. Compared to the 28 years of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the 17 years of the socialist revolution, this Cultural Revolution lasted less than half a year. It wasn't always smooth sailing, and there were conflicts. This is understandable and natural. Many comrades, previously focused on economic work, industry, agriculture, transportation, or other political and administrative tasks, had never envisioned launching this Cultural Revolution. Aren't students pushing hard now? Something unexpected has happened. It has happened. I think this push has its benefits. We need to reconsider things we haven't considered for years. It's just a matter of making a few mistakes. What's so big of a deal? Wrong lines, just correct them. Who wants to overthrow you? I don't want to overthrow you, and I don't think the Red Guards necessarily want to overthrow you. Two Red Guards said that after traveling across the country, they were surprised to find some veterans so frightened of the Red Guards. They asked, "What's so scary about the Red Guards?" One comrade had four Red Guards in his family: his children, divided into four factions, and their classmates. Many people came to his house, probably a dozen or twenty! He only managed to reach a small number of people. Others reached dozens, and still others reached one or two hundred. I think small contacts are very beneficial. Large contacts, reaching one and a

half million people, were accomplished in just an hour. This is also a form, a method. Each has its own role.

I've read almost every briefing from this meeting. I'm also worried that you won't pass. The time was too short, so it's forgivable. It wasn't intentional to make a line error. Some say it was made in a muddle. Comrades Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping [13] can't be blamed entirely. There were reasons for their mistakes.

In the past, the leadership at the front line of the Central Committee wasn't good. The time was too short, and we weren't mentally prepared for new problems, and our political and ideological work wasn't done well. Therefore, this time, we've been doing it for another seventeen days. I think things will get better in the future.

[1] On November 1, 1966, Mao Zedong made some textual revisions to the speech transcript submitted by Chen Boda, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and wrote in his instruction: "Return it to Comrade Chen Boda. Leave it as it is. I have changed a few words. Do not send it out for the time being."

[2] Malenkov, after the death of Stalin in 1953, served as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In February 1955, he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Electric Power. He was dismissed from office in June 1957.

[3] Refers to the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Beijing from August 1 to 12, 1966.

[4] From December 15 to 28, 1964, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a national work conference in Beijing to discuss the rural socialist education movement. On January 14, 1965, the CPC Central Committee released the minutes of this conference, titled "Some Current Issues Raised in the Rural Socialist Education Movement." The minutes consisted of 23 points, hence the abbreviation "Twenty-Three Points."

[5] Wu Han, Vice Mayor of Beijing and Vice Chairman of the China Democratic League Central Committee, was wrongly criticized for writing the historical drama "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office," among other works. He was persecuted to death in 1969. In March 1979, with the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Beijing Municipal Committee completely rehabilitated this unjust case.

[6] This refers to the article "A Comment on the New Historical Drama 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office,'" published in Wenhui Daily on November 10, 1965. This article was conspired by Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao in Shanghai and drafted by Yao Wenyan.

[7] This refers to a big-character poster titled "What on Earth Did Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun Do During the Cultural Revolution?" written by Nie Yuanzi, Song Yixiu, Xia Jianyao, Yang Keming, Zhao Zhengyi, Gao Yunpeng, and Li Xingchen of the Peking University Department of Philosophy on May 25, 1966.

[8] Refers to a letter from Mao Zedong to the Red Guards of Tsinghua University Affiliated Middle School on August 1, 1966.

[9] Refers to "Bombard the Headquarters - My Big-Character Poster" written by Mao Zedong on August 5, 1966.

[10] Mao Zedong made these remarks in his speech at the closing session of the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 12, 1966.

[11] Refers to the criticism movement against the film "The Biography of Wu Xun" launched on the ideological and cultural front in 1951.

[12] Refers to the campaign launched in 1954 on the ideological and cultural front to criticize the book "A Study of the Dream of the Red Chamber" by Yu Pingbo, a scholar of the Dream of the Red Chamber.

[13] Refers to the criticism movement against Hu Shi's thoughts launched on the ideological and cultural front in 1954.

[14] Refers to the "Notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," adopted on May 16, 1966, by the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, also known as the "May 16 Notice."

[15] Deng Xiaoping, formerly a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, was wrongly criticized for dispatching work teams to certain units during the early years of the Cultural Revolution, along with Liu Shaoqi. He was accused of formulating and promoting a "bourgeois reactionary line" and was subsequently wrongly criticized. He was later mistakenly labeled another "biggest capitalist-roader in power within the Party" and the second-in-command of "Liu Shaoqi's bourgeois headquarters," leading to criticism and persecution. In February 1980, the resolution of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC stated that dispatching work teams to certain units to guide the movement during the early years of the Cultural Revolution had been a long-standing Party practice for addressing grassroots issues. There was no "bourgeois reactionary line" formulated and promoted by Liu Shaoqi, no so-called "bourgeois headquarters" headed by Liu Shaoqi, and no group of people with Liu Shaoqi as the "biggest capitalist-roader in power within the Party."

Congratulatory Message to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour [1]

(October 25, 1966)

Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour

Dear Comrades:

The Communist Party of China and the Chinese people extend their warmest congratulations to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour.

We wish you a complete success!

The glorious Albanian Party of Labour, headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha [2], has firmly held high the revolutionary red banner of Marxism-Leninism amidst the heavy encirclement of imperialism and modern revisionism.

Heroic people's Albania has become a great beacon of socialism in Europe.

The Soviet revisionist leadership, the Yugoslav Tito clique [3], and all the various traitors and scab groups are but a cup of dirt compared to you, while you are towering mountains reaching the sky. They are slaves and minions who have fallen prey to imperialism, while you are fearless proletarian revolutionaries who dare to fight imperialism and its running dogs, and all the violent enemies of the world.

In the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and other countries where modern revisionist cliques are in power, the dictatorship of the proletariat has shifted, or is shifting, to capitalist restoration, transforming from a proletarian dictatorship to a bourgeois dictatorship. Heroic socialist Albania has withstood this countercurrent of counterrevolutionary revisionism. You have adhered to the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line, adopted a series of revolutionary measures, and consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat. You have independently built your country along the socialist path and achieved brilliant victories. You have provided valuable experience for the history of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"A true friend in need is a friend indeed." China and Albania, separated by thousands of mountains and rivers, are united in heart. We are your true friends and comrades. You, too, are our true friends and comrades. Neither you nor we are the kind of hypocritical friends, double-dealers. Our revolutionary and militant friendship has withstood the test of storms and winds.

The truth of Marxism-Leninism is on our side. The international proletariat is on our side. The oppressed nations and peoples are on our side. Over 90 percent of the world's people are on our side. We have friends everywhere. We are not afraid of isolation, nor will we ever be isolated. We are invincible. The handful of pathetic anti-China and anti-Albanian scoundrels are doomed to failure.

We are now in a new and great era of world revolution. The revolutionary storms in Asia, Africa, and Latin America will surely deal a decisive and devastating blow to the entire old world. The great victory of the Vietnamese people in their war against the United States and for national salvation is a powerful proof of this. The proletariat and working people of Europe, North America, and Oceania are experiencing a new awakening. U.S. imperialism and all other vermin have prepared their gravediggers; their burial will not be long.

Of course, our path forward will never be straight or smooth. Comrades, please believe that no matter what happens in the world, our two parties and peoples will unite, fight together, and triumph together.

The Chinese and Arab parties and peoples, the Marxist-Leninists of the world, unite! The revolutionary people of the world, unite! Overthrow imperialism, overthrow modern revisionism, and overthrow reactionaries in all countries. A new world without imperialism, capitalism, or exploitation must be established.

Mao Zedong,

Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

October 25, 1966

[1] This congratulatory message from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, signed by Mao Zedong, was read out by Kang Sheng, head of the Communist Party of China delegation, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and Secretary of the Central Secretariat, at the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor on November 2, 1966.

[2] Enver Hoxha, then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor.

[3] Tito, then Chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and President of Yugoslavia.

Instructions given to Comrade Nie Rongzhen during the missile launch

(October 27, 1966)

You often win battles, but this time you might lose. Be prepared for both scenarios.

**A conversation with comrades from various regions during the Central Working
Conference**

(October 1966)

Everyone has committed errors of the bourgeois reactionary line in their work. The primary responsibility lies with those who formulated this bourgeois reactionary line. Those who implemented it have different circumstances and should be treated differently.

Instructions on Organizing Political and Military Training for Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Other Places Coming to Beijing

(October 1966)

The military is responsible for organizing revolutionary teachers and students from other places into squads, platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions according to the PLA's organizational structure. After organization, they will undergo training, studying politics, the PLA, the speeches of Comrade Lin Biao and Premier Zhou Enlai, the Three Disciplines and the Eight Points for Attention, the PLA's "Three Eights" style of work, formations, basic drill movements, and footwork. Everyone must learn the song about the Three Disciplines and the Eight Points for Attention, so that the revolutionary teachers and students from other places can undergo inspection in an orderly manner.

Comments on Lin Biao's Speech at the Central Working Conference [1]

(November 4 and 7, 1966)

The words "thought" and "consciousness" should not be used together.

2

I agree with this revision [2]. Regarding some individual wording changes [3], please consider them.

Mao Zedong

November 4th, morning

3

It is beneficial to remove the eleventh character.

4

This was written by Comrade Chen Boda. I simply agreed with their writing.

5

I had no knowledge of the criticism of Feng Ding.[4]

6

Comrade Lin Biao: I agree with this revision. I have made some minor corrections [5] on pages 6 and 10. Please approve them.

Mao Zedong

November 7, 6:30 p.m.

[1] Mao Zedong made numerous comments and revisions to the speech delivered by Lin Biao (who was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee) at the Central Working Conference on October 25, 1966. Sections 1 and 2 of this article are comments on the revised draft submitted by Lin Biao for review on the night of November 3; sections 3 through 6 of this article are comments on the final draft submitted for review before printing. On November 9, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee distributed this draft to the county and regiment levels.

[2] The revised draft of Lin Biao's speech, submitted for review on the night of November 3, 1966, was edited by Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, based on Mao Zedong's comments. The main revisions were the addition of the following two paragraphs on page 12: "In a class society, everyone belongs to a certain class. They may belong to this class, a certain stratum within it, or a certain group; or they may belong to that class, a certain stratum within it, or a

certain group. There is no such thing as an abstract, independent individual. Thinking only of oneself is a purely bourgeois worldview. Bourgeois individualism is selfishness at the expense of others. They are willing to ruin millions of people in order to enrich themselves." Viewing the world from a self-serving, selfish perspective is viewing the world from a bourgeois perspective, not a proletarian one. "We need to cultivate people who work for the public good. Working for the public good can have different class characteristics. The public good we are talking about is the public good of the people, the public good of the proletariat, and the public good of socialism and communism." On the revised draft, Chen Boda reported to Lin Biao, "According to the Chairman's instructions, I have made important revisions to page twelve. Please review them and report back to the Chairman." When Lin Biao submitted the draft to Mao Zedong for review, he wrote, "Your instructions are excellent. I fully agree with them. I am submitting Comrade Boda's revised draft. Please review them again." Mao Zedong's remarks were directed at these two added paragraphs.

[3] In the revised draft of Lin Biao's speech, submitted for review on the night of November 3, 1966, the term "ideology" was used several times. Mao Zedong revised it during his review, changing some to "ideology," others to "ideological realm," and deleting the word "consciousness" in several places. He also wrote a commentary on this, which is now part 2 of this article. Other textual changes he made to this revised draft include: On page 11, he changed "Communism is selflessness" to "Communism is serving the public good"; on page 13, he changed "Chairman Mao created a new type of country" to "Chairman Mao led us in creating a new type of country"; on page 14, he changed the phrase "Chairman Mao is not only superior to us in practical experience, Marxist-Leninist theory, and personal talent, but also unmatched in the world" from "there is no one else like him" to "he is also influential"; and on page 15, he deleted the phrase "Chairman Mao's line has triumphed." In addition, there are some individual text modifications.

[4] Feng Ding was nominated by Mao Zedong in 1957 and transferred from Shanghai to Beijing University as deputy secretary of the Party Committee and professor of philosophy. He was wrongly criticized in 1964.

[5] Before the final draft of Lin Biao's speech was printed, it was sent to Mao Zedong for review again. This draft, in addition to being revised according to Mao Zedong's November 4, 1966, revisions, also included some textual changes. Mao Zedong agreed to this revision.

[6] Page 6 of Lin Biao's revised draft of his speech reads: "In March of this year, Chairman Mao revised the minutes of the symposium on literary and artistic work in the army, which we entrusted Comrade Jiang Qing to convene, and added that all class struggles are political struggles. He reiterated this classic Marxist-Leninist view, treating it as a matter of national importance and a political issue." When reviewing it, Mao deleted the words "which we entrusted Comrade Jiang Qing to convene" and wrote a comment, which is now part 4 of this section. He also added the words "agree" before the sentence "which stated that all class struggles are political struggles," and wrote a comment, which is now part 5 of this

section. On page 10, referring to "the criticism of Yang Xianzhen and Feng Ding in recent years," Mao deleted Feng Ding's name and wrote a comment, which is now part 6 of this section.

**A Conversation with Some Leaders Who Attended the Meeting with Teachers, Students,
and Red Guards from All Over the Country**

(November 10, 1966)

You must put politics in command, go among the masses, be with them, and make the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution even better. [1]

[1] On November 10 and 11, 1966, Mao Zedong met with over two million teachers, students, and Red Guards from all over the country in Beijing. These are the words he spoke to some leaders from the Central Committee and other departments who attended the meeting on November 10, from the Tiananmen Gate Tower.

Comments on the Draft Notice and Supplementary Draft Notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on the Issue of Making Connections [1]

(November 16 and December 2, 1966)

1

Returned to the Premier for implementation.

Mao Zedong

November 16, 24:00

2

Premier, please act upon it.

Mao Zedong

December 2

[1] This first part was written on a draft of the "Notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on the Issue of Revolutionary Connections between Revolutionary Teachers and Students," submitted by Zhou Enlai on November 16, 1966. The draft notice stated that the CPC Central Committee and the State Council "have decided that from November 21 of this year until the warm spring of next year, revolutionary teachers, students, and Red Guards from universities, colleges, military academies, and secondary schools across the country will cease traveling by train, ship, or bus to Beijing and other places for revolutionary connections. Revolutionary teachers and students currently waiting for transportation along land and water routes to travel can be persuaded to return to their original locations." "This year is the first year of our country's Third Five-Year Plan. In order to complete and overfulfill this year's national economic plan and better realize next year's national economic plan, it is necessary to concentrate all transportation resources this winter and next spring to accelerate the transportation of materials." The CPC Central Committee issued this notice on the same day. This second part was written on a draft of the "Supplementary Notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on the Issue of Revolutionary Connections between Revolutionary Teachers and Students," submitted by Zhou Enlai on December 1. The draft supplementary notice, building on the November 16th notice, included four specific additional provisions regarding the departure and return of teachers, students, and Red Guards from outside Beijing, those who were organizing outside Beijing, and those who were participating in other activities. When Mao Zedong reviewed the draft, he deleted the qualifier "our great teacher, great leader, great commander, great helmsman" before "Chairman Mao."

Conversation on Sending Military Cadres to Train School Teachers and Students [I]

(1966)

The method of sending military cadres to train revolutionary teachers and students is excellent. Training makes a huge difference compared to not training. By doing so, we can learn from the PLA politics, military affairs, the Four Firsts [2], the Three-Eight Style Movement [3], the Three Disciplines and the Eight Points for Attention [4], and strengthen organizational discipline. The experience of the troops stationed in Beijing in sending cadres to train revolutionary teachers and students is excellent and very effective, and should be promoted nationwide.

[1] The December 31, 1966, notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council regarding short-term military and political training for revolutionary teachers and students in universities and middle schools quoted this passage after "Chairman Mao, when he recently met with revolutionary teachers and students from all over the country who came to Beijing, repeatedly raised this issue with Comrade Lin Biao."

[2] The four firsts refer to the human factor first, political work first, ideological work first, and living thought first.

[3] The "Three Eights" style of work refers to the three phrases "firm and correct political direction, hard-working and plain work style, and flexible and maneuverable strategies and tactics" and the eight characters that make up the words "unity, tension, seriousness, and liveliness."

[4] The Three Major Disciplines refer to following orders in all actions, not taking a single needle or thread from the masses, and turning over all captured property to the public. The Eight Points for Attention refer to speaking politely, trading fairly, returning borrowed items, reporting damaged items, not hitting or cursing others, not damaging crops, not molesting women, and not mistreating prisoners.

Comments and Revisions on Jiang Qing's Speech at the Conference of Literary and Art Circles [1]

(November 1966)

1

I made some changes [2] for reference by group members.

2

Jiang Qing:

There are some revisions [3], which seem more appropriate.

Mao Zedong

November 28, 1:00 AM

3

In fact, over the years, with the shifting social, political, and economic landscapes, the struggle between the old and the new has also seen the emergence of new literature and art in literature and art, counteracting the old. Even Peking Opera, known as the most difficult to reform, has seen new works emerge. As we all know, over thirty years ago, Lu Xun was the great standard-bearer leading the Cultural Revolution. Over twenty years ago, Chairman Mao proposed the direction of literature and art serving the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and raised the issue of "weeding the old and bringing forth the new." This innovation requires new content, popular content, and national forms that appeal to the masses.

4

Only then did I fully realize that the form of sending work teams during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was wrong, and the content of their work was even more wrong! They weren't targeting the handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party or reactionary academic authorities, but rather the revolutionary students. Comrades, friends, where to direct the spearhead of the struggle is a matter of right and wrong, a matter of principle in Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought! It's said that our Chairman Mao warned against hastily sending work teams as early as June of this year, yet some comrades hastily sent them out without consulting Chairman Mao. *However, it must be pointed out that the problem lies not in the form of the work teams, but in their principles and policies. Some units didn't send work teams, relying instead on existing leadership, and they also made mistakes. Other work teams adopted correct principles and policies and didn't make mistakes. This explains where the problem lies.*

[1] Mao Zedong made numerous comments and revisions to this speech by Jiang Qing, Deputy Head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group. Part 1 contains his comments on the speech Jiang Qing submitted for review on November 24, 1966; Part 2 contains his comments on the speech Jiang Qing

submitted for review on November 27; Part 3 contains revisions to a paragraph in the draft submitted on the 24th; and Part 4 contains revisions to a paragraph in the draft submitted on the 27th. Text printed in italics in Parts 3 and 4 contains Mao Zedong's additions and revisions. On November 28, Jiang Qing delivered this speech at the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Conference in Literature and Art" held in Beijing.

[2] In addition to this third chapter, Mao Zedong also made some revisions to the draft Jiang Qing submitted for review on November 24, 1966. Pages 6 and 7 of this draft read:

"Comrades and friends of the First Peking Opera Troupe of Beijing, I have read all your letters to me. It's just that I was very busy with work and not in good health, so I wasn't able to visit your troupe in person. However, I have always been concerned about and valued the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in your troupe." During his review, Mao Zedong revised the last sentence to: "It's just that I was very busy with work and not in good health, so I wasn't able to visit your troupe. However, I do care about the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in your troupe." Page 7 reads: "The First Peking Opera Troupe of Beijing was the first unit to accept the glorious task of Peking Opera reform that I proposed. This is the result of the joint efforts of a group of revolutionary actors and other staff members in your troupe." During his review, Mao Zedong added the following 14 words after "jointly worked with me" to "process or reform on the basis of others' original ideas." In addition, Mao Zedong made some other textual revisions to the draft for review.

[3] In addition to this fourth chapter, Mao Zedong made several revisions to the draft Jiang Qing submitted for review on November 27, 1966. On page one, he changed "I have been exposed to literature and art in a relatively systematic way" to "I have been exposed to a part of literature and art in a relatively systematic way." On page three, he deleted the five words "loyal to Chairman Mao." On page seven, he changed "The First Peking Opera Troupe of Beijing was the first unit to accept the glorious task of Peking Opera reform proposed by me" to "The First Peking Opera Troupe of Beijing was the first unit in Beijing to accept the glorious task of Peking Opera reform." On page ten, he changed "Regarding the bourgeois reactionary line within our Party that opposes Chairman Mao" to "Regarding the bourgeois reactionary line within our Party that aims to oppose the proletarian revolutionary line of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao." Mao Zedong also made several other textual revisions.

Telegram Congratulating the 22nd Anniversary of the Liberation of Albania

(November 28, 1966)

Tirana

Comrade Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania:

On the 22nd anniversary of Albania's liberation, on behalf of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people, I extend my warmest congratulations to the Party of Labor of Albania and the Albanian people.

The Albanian people, under the correct leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, headed by you, have achieved brilliant victories in the struggle against class enemies at home and abroad, and in the great cause of socialist revolution and socialist construction. Albania has transformed from a poor and backward country into a socialist state with modern industry and collective agriculture. In recent years, the Albanian Party of Labor and the government have adopted a series of revolutionary measures to further consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and significantly advance the development of socialist construction. The political tasks set forth and the ambitious program formulated by the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor have opened up an even brighter future for socialist Albania. The Albanian people are confidently and courageously marching forward along the path charted by the Party of Labor.

The Albanian Party of Labor and people have consistently held high the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism, resolutely opposed the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war, and waged a tit-for-tat struggle against modern revisionism centered around the leadership clique of the CPSU. The Albanian Party of Labor and people firmly support the Vietnamese people's struggle to resist U.S. aggression and save their nation, and firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and throughout the world. Heroic Albania is a staunch bulwark against imperialism and modern revisionism.

The Chinese and Algerian parties and peoples have forged a profound revolutionary friendship in the cause of socialist revolution and construction, and in the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism. This friendship, founded on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is eternal and unbreakable. Let us jointly hold high the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism and, together with all Marxist-Leninists and all oppressed peoples and nations throughout the world, resolutely carry the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism, and the cause of proletarian revolution, through to the end.

May the great friendship between the Chinese and Algerian parties and peoples last forever!

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

November 28, 1966

We must support the masses' revolutionary connections.

(November 1966)

This is a very important matter and should be carried out on a large scale. It's not a big deal. We must support the masses' revolutionary connections. If we have to do it, do it on a large scale. We won't run out of places to stay.

Regarding the Central Committee's Draft Reply Regarding Liu Lantao's [1] Release from Prison and Zhang Wentian's Comments on the Evidence [2]

(November 1966, February 1967)

Do it.

Zhang Wentian's [3] letter to the Central Committee (1936) regarding the handling of the Northern Bureau leaders, requesting the Central Committee's approval for "simple procedures" to facilitate the early release of cadres imprisoned in Beijing prisons, and its attachments (printed and distributed to the Politburo, Secretariat, Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group).

Wang's [4] office.

[1] Liu Lantao was arrested in 1931 while engaged in underground Party work in Tianjin. In 1936, with the approval of the CPC Central Committee, he and 61 others, including Bo Yibo, were released from prison after completing simple formalities. During the Cultural Revolution, he was persecuted by the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques. He was rehabilitated in 1978.

[2] On November 24, 1966, Zhou Enlai wrote a report to Mao Zedong, stating, "I am sending you a telegram from the Northwest Bureau and a letter from Liu Lantao." "Because this collective surrender case implicates so many people, and the decision was made by Comrade Shaoqi on behalf of the Central Committee, and both the Seventh and Eighth National Congresses have examined it, the Central Committee must acknowledge its knowledge of the matter." "I have drafted a telegram on a separate sheet. If it is correct, please approve it." Zhou Enlai drafted a reply from the Central Committee to the Northwest Bureau, stating, "Please explain to the Nankai University Weidong Red Guards and the students from the Xi'an Bombardment Headquarters Combat Team that the Central Committee is aware of the issue of Comrade Liu Lantao's release from prison, as they revealed." The first part of this section appears in Zhou Enlai's report. The second part appears in Zhang Wentian's letter to Mao Zedong and others dated February 18, 1967. Zhang Wentian attached a supporting document to the letter. The document states, "Shortly after Liu Shaoqi first arrived at the Northern Bureau (in the spring of 1936), he wrote me a letter regarding how to resolve the issue of cadres working in the white areas." "He said there were a group of cadres in the Beijing prison who had performed well in the past. According to insider information, the prison administrators knew their days were numbered and were preparing to escape. They also wanted to deal with these prisoners quickly. Therefore, they could be released by simply following a simple procedure: not to oppose the Communist Party or make public statements. He proposed in his letter that this be done immediately." "He also enclosed a petition from the cadres, stating three conditions, and

asked me to sign it, so that the cadres in prison would believe that the Central Committee agreed to this approach. At the time, I had great faith in Liu Shaoqi's opinion and felt that it would be a great opportunity to solve the problem of a genuine shortage of working cadres without paying any price." "I replied to his letter, expressing my agreement with his opinion, signed the petition, and returned it." On December 16, 1978, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China approved the Organization Department's "Investigation Report on the 'Six-One Case'." The Central Organization Department's report stated: "The so-called traitor group of 61 people, including Bo Yibo, that was brought up during the Cultural Revolution did not exist and was a gross miscarriage of justice." It also stated: "Comrade Bo Yibo and others performed well in their struggle against the enemy in the re-education camp. The procedures they followed for release were "special measures taken by the organization under the specific historical conditions at the time."

[3] Zhang Wentian was responsible for the overall work according to the division of labour among the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee after the Zunyi Conference in January 1935.

[4] Wang refers to Wang Dongxing, who was then the director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Comments on the press release "Conference on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the Literature and Art Circles" [1]

(December 3, 1966)

Replied to the Premier: Revisions have been made. Please review.

Mao Zedong,

December 3

[1] This comment was written on a press release submitted for review by Premier Zhou Enlai on December 2, 1966. Zhou Enlai wrote in his report: "This report has been approved by the Cultural Revolution Group and with the consent of Comrade Lin Biao. It is now submitted to the Chairman for approval. On pages 7, 9, and 13, there are three places where individuals are criticized by name. Please comment on whether this is appropriate." During Mao Zedong's review, he deleted the names of leaders from the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Propaganda Department, Ministry of Culture, and other departments. This press release was published in the People's Daily on December 4, 1966.

Speech at the Discussion of the "Ten Articles on Industry and Mining"

(December 6, 1966)

First come facts, then concepts. Without facts, how can concepts be formed? Without reality, how can there be theory? Sometimes theory and practice go hand in hand, sometimes theory comes first, but reality always comes first. If workers don't first stir up revolution, where would a few regulations come from?

(December 15, 1966)

Returned to the Premier's Office.

Please have Comrade Lin Biao [2] preside over a meeting to approve it and issue it immediately.

Mao Zedong

December 15

[1] This comment was written on a report submitted by Premier Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao for review on December 13, 1966. Zhou Enlai wrote: "Regarding the procedures for this document, please consider whether to convene a meeting of the Standing Committee and a few comrades from the Cultural Revolution Group at the Chairman's office, or to continue with the previous method and have Comrade Lin Biao preside over a meeting of comrades from the Politburo, Secretariat, Cultural Revolution Group, and Beijing Municipal Committee. Please approve the decision." The opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China submitted by Zhou Enlai for review consisted of ten points: 1. Resolutely implement the directives of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee to "grasp revolution and promote production," vigorously promote the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, promote the revolutionization of people's thinking, and promote the development of agricultural production. 2. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in rural areas should be carried out in accordance with the Sixteen-Point Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as well as the first ten and twenty-three points of the Socialist Education Movement. The masses must be the masters of their own affairs, educate themselves, liberate themselves, and rise up for revolution. Generally, work teams will not be dispatched. Consider sending a small but elite group of observers. Third, the focus of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in rural areas is to rectify the handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party and the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and bad elements who have not been properly reformed. The "Four Cleanups" movement should be incorporated into the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, the issues of the "Four Cleanups" and its review should be addressed. The old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes should be thoroughly destroyed, and the new ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the proletariat should be established. The Cultural Revolution should also correct the bureaucratic and commandist style of work among cadres and implement a system of cadre participation in labour. Fourth, during the Cultural Revolution in rural areas, we must firmly rely on the poor and lower-middle peasants and unite with the middle peasants, gradually achieving unity with over 95% of the masses and over 95% of the cadres. Fifth, the

leading authority for the Cultural Revolution in rural areas is the Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants Cultural Revolution Committee, democratically elected by the Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants Congress. If incompetent, it can be re-elected or replaced at any time. After mass discussion, the production leadership team will be strengthened or re-elected to be responsible for production, distribution, procurement, and supply. Sixth, during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards will be established and developed, with young people from the poor and lower-middle peasants as their backbone. Red Guards may participate in the militia. Children of leading cadres at all levels in rural areas should generally not serve in leadership positions in the Red Guards. Children of landlords and rich peasants working or studying outside their hometowns should not return to their hometowns to organize. A policy of avoidance should be adopted, as was done during land reform. Seventh, the Cultural Revolution in rural areas should also adopt the policy of free speech, free airing of views, big-character posters, and great debates, practicing great democracy. Between teams and between communities, we can use the space and time of production to establish connections. We can also organize a group of revolutionary students to go to the countryside and connect with the poor and lower-middle peasants, living and working together, and participating in the rural Cultural Revolution. However, we should not take over and replace them. In the struggle, we should present facts and reason, insisting on cultural struggle rather than physical confrontation. We should prevent bad elements from inciting factional struggles. 8. Revolutionary masses who raise opinions to the leadership or post big-character posters during the Cultural Revolution must not be retaliated against or have their work points deducted. Revolutionary masses labeled "counter-revolutionaries," "saboteurs," etc. for raising opinions should be rehabilitated. Landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists are targets of dictatorship; they must not be allowed to rebel against the proletariat or against the poor and lower-middle peasants. 9. Secondary schools will be closed for revolutionary activities until next summer vacation. The Cultural Revolution in universities and middle schools for students who are part-time farmers and part-time students should be carried out in accordance with the principle of "grasping the revolution and promoting production" and appropriately arranged according to specific circumstances. The Cultural Revolution in rural primary schools should be carried out in conjunction with the local communes and production teams, under the unified leadership of the Cultural Revolution Committees of the respective communes and production teams. 10. During the Cultural Revolution, we must actively study and apply Chairman Mao's works, taking class struggle as the guiding principle and focusing on the word "application." Through the Cultural Revolution, the countryside was transformed into a university for studying Mao Zedong Thought. On December 15, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this document.

[2] Lin Biao was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and was soon named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

Regarding the Comments on Not Publicly Quoting "Bombard the Headquarters," etc. [1]

(December 25, 1966)

Comrade Guan Feng: Don't quote them at all.

Mao Zedong

December 25

[1] On December 24, 1966, Guan Feng, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural Revolution Group and deputy editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine, wrote to Jiang Qing, deputy group leader of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, stating, "Red Flag magazine's New Year's Day editorial quoted Chairman Mao's big-character poster, 'Bombard the Headquarters.' It also quoted Chairman Mao's comments on the People's Daily commentator's 'A Big-Character Poster Cheering for Peking University.'" "Please consider whether it is appropriate to quote these words of Chairman Mao and publish them publicly." Mao Zedong's comments were included in Guan Feng's letter. The first issue of Red Flag magazine in 1967 published the People's Daily and Red Flag magazine's New Year's Day editorial, "Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End," which did not quote Mao Zedong's big-character poster or comments.

Comments on Li Xuefeng's Main Points of Self-Criticism at the North China Bureau [1]

(December 26 and 28, 1966)

Comrade Boda [2]:

I wonder if any of the members of the Central Standing Committee and the Central Cultural Revolution Group have received this document [3]. Please discuss whether it is correct and whether it is worth distributing to various places for reference. Many comrades in various places have not yet made the determination to conduct honest and sincere self-criticism. It is extremely necessary to help them. What do you think?

Mao Zedong,

December 26

To Comrade Li Xuefeng:

This revision is good and may be sent out as is.

Mao Zedong

December 28

[1] The first part of this article is a comment on the main points of the self-criticism delivered by Li Xuefeng, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, First Secretary of the North China Bureau, and First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, at the North China Bureau on December 16, 1966. The second part of this article is a comment on the revised draft of the main points of the self-criticism submitted by Li Xuefeng for review on December 27.

[2] Boda, namely Chen Boda, was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

[3] This refers to the main points of Li Xuefeng's self-criticism, delivered to the North China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on December 16, 1966. It primarily examined the alleged errors in direction and line he made while leading the Cultural Revolution in Beijing over a period of approximately 50 days, from early June to mid-July. On December 29, the CPC Central Committee forwarded Li Xuefeng's main points.

Comments on the Report on the Heilongjiang Provincial Three-Level Cadre Conference

(December 26, 1966)

Comrade Chen Boda:

Please review this document [1] with the comrades in the group and see if it can be forwarded to the county and regiment levels for reference. I think it's better than Comrade Xuefeng's self-criticism [2]. The attachment [3] mentioned at the end of the document has not yet been received.

Mao Zedong

December 26

[1] This refers to a report submitted by the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau on December 23, 1966. The report stated that from November 14 to December 7, our province held meetings of cadres at the provincial, prefectural (municipal), and county levels to address three key issues: understanding the Cultural Revolution, understanding the two-line struggle, and how to correctly conduct oneself. The meetings were divided into four sections: studying documents to raise awareness; promoting democracy and airing views and debates; opening up new perspectives and unifying understandings; and summarizing the meeting and arranging work. Each section had its own key points, yet was interconnected and deepened step by step. Opening up new perspectives and saving cadres permeated the entire meeting. The entire meeting process was a process of conducting political and ideological work. On December 29, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded this report to the county and youth league party committees for reference.

[2] Refers to the main points of the self-criticism delivered by Li Xuefeng, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, First Secretary of the North China Bureau, and First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, at the North China Bureau on December 16, 1966.

[3] This refers to the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China's "Review of the Errors in the Provincial Committee's Line During the Cultural Revolution and Opinions on Future Movements."

Letter to Zhou Enlai

(December 27, 1966)

Comrade Enlai:

Recently, many revolutionary teachers, students, and the masses who have come to Beijing have written to me, asking whether labelling those in power who are taking the capitalist road, smearing their faces, and parading them through the streets with dunce caps, painted faces, and other symbols constitutes armed struggle. I believe that this practice should be considered a form of armed struggle. This practice is not good. It fails to achieve the goal of educating the people. I would like to emphasize here that in struggle, we must insist on using words, not violence, because violence can only affect people's bodies, not their souls. Only by insisting on using words, not violence, presenting facts, reasoning, and convincing people with reason, can we achieve effective struggle and truly achieve the goal of educating the people. We should analyse that the vast majority of armed struggles are instigated by a small number of bourgeois reactionaries with ulterior motives. They intend to undermine the Party's policies, sabotage the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and lower the Party's prestige. Anyone who physically assaults others should be punished according to law. Please convey this to the revolutionary teachers, students, and the masses who have come to Beijing.

Mao Zedong

December 27, 1966

Comments on Heilongjiang Province's Report on the Implementation of the Cultural Revolution in Urban Streets [1]

(December 28, 1966)

Comrade Boda:

- (1) We should reply and agree to follow their advice; (2) Please ask the Provincial Party Committee to write down some specific provisions and report to the Central Committee after doing some more work and gaining more experience. Please proceed with the above.

Mao Zedong

December 28

[1] This refers to a report submitted by the Cultural Revolution Office of the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Cultural Revolution Group on December 25, 1966, regarding several issues urgently requiring clarification regarding the implementation of the Cultural Revolution in urban and rural areas. The report stated that, with the full-scale deployment of the Cultural Revolution in urban and rural areas, the Cultural Revolution in most urban streets would also be vigorously launched, and many issues urgently needed clarification. These issues were primarily: 1. The focus of the street movement. We believe it should be to struggle against the handful of capitalist roaders in power within the Party (responsible cadres at the street office level and above), as well as unreformed landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists, and reactionary bourgeois elements. 2. We do not believe that the directors of street neighbourhood committees are considered to be in power. 3. In the street Cultural Revolution, we believe we should rely on the families of employees from worker, poor peasant, and lower-middle peasant families, as well as the revolutionary masses, and unite with other working people. 4. The street Cultural Revolution should be carried out in conjunction with the "Four Cleanups" campaign. Municipal and district committees may send personnel to inspect and understand the situation, but they will not interfere or lead. 5. The class situation within the neighbourhoods is quite complex, and some undesirable elements have joined and taken control of mass organizations. What policy should be adopted toward them?

Comments on Comrade Lin Biao's Instructions to the Zhejiang Provincial Military Region

(December 29, 1966)

This document should be distributed to all military organs at the battalion level and above.

Mao Zedong,

December 29, 1966

Praising the work of the PLA officers and soldiers who participated in receiving the Red Guards and revolutionary teachers and students

(December 1966)

You have done an excellent job during this Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Directives on the Participation of Demobilised and Retired Military Personnel in the Cultural Revolution

(December 1966)

(1) All demobilized and retired military personnel are prohibited from establishing Red Guards or other independent organizations; they may only participate in the Cultural Revolution organizations of their respective units. (2) They are prohibited from storming PLA headquarters and affiliated units, nor are they permitted to collude with troops or distribute leaflets. (3) All demobilised and retiring military personnel must uphold and carry forward the glorious traditions of the PLA, and assist the PLA in strengthening its combat readiness and safeguarding the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Four-Point Instructions at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Standing Committee

(December 1966)

1. Everyone must stand up, meet with the masses, accept their criticism, and engage in self-criticism, lest they bring disaster upon themselves.
2. Everyone must stand up and explain policies to the masses. Those wearing high hats or smearing their faces should take off their hats, wash their faces, and return to work immediately.
3. Unite the majority based on long-term interests. The "monsters and demons" are the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists. Even if some have made serious mistakes, they must be saved and helped to reform. Otherwise, how can we unite over 95 percent?
4. Convince cadres to understand that not everyone should be forced to pass muster, leaving them feeling humiliated. Stand up and don't let fear be the most important thing. If you dare, even the biggest problems can be solved. If you let fear be the most important thing, the price will continue to rise.

Learning Great Democracy in the Cultural Revolution

(December 1966)

Just as we learn to swim by swimming and to struggle by struggling, we must learn great democracy in this Cultural Revolution.

We must protect and support the left, and build and expand the ranks of the left.

(1966)

We must protect and support the left, and build and expand the ranks of the left [1].

[1] On June 11, 1967, the People's Daily published an article titled "The February Outline is the Black Program of the Bourgeois Dictatorship" (signed by Ren Lixin), which quoted Mao Zedong's words in boldface. The article stated, "At the outset of launching this unprecedented Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao repeatedly pointed out the need to protect the left, support the left, and build and expand the ranks of the left."

A Conversation with Lin Biao (Excerpt)

(1966)

Lin Biao (hereinafter referred to as Lin): The entire nation is now deeply studying Chairman Mao's works.

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): I do not want to simply copy and pass on what I have learned. We must break through, not blindly follow what I have learned. We must have new perspectives and new innovations.

Lin: We must use Mao Zedong Thought as the seed.

Mao: Good.

Lin: We cannot be satisfied with economic development; we must also engage in spiritual development.

Couplet⁸ presented to Ye Jianying⁹

(1966)

Zhuge Liang¹⁰ was cautious throughout his life;

Lü Duan¹¹ was not confused about major issues.

⁸ The couplet was written by Ming Dynasty scholar Li Zhi. Presenting it to Ye Jianying in his own calligraphy was Mao's message of encouragement to the beleaguered Ye Jianying whose administration of Guangzhou had been criticised at the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

⁹ Ye Jianying (1897–1986) was a Chinese Communist revolutionary leader and politician, one of the Ten Marshals of the People's Republic of China. In 1932 he joined the Jiangxi Soviet, serving as Chief of Staff of Zhang Guotao's Fourth Front Army. However, after Zhang's fighters met up with Mao Zedong's force during the Long March, the two leaders disagreed on the subsequent movement of the Chinese Red Army. Zhang insisted on turning southward to establish a new base in the regions inhabited by Tibetan and Qiang minorities. (This later proved to be a disaster, as Mao had anticipated, with Zhang losing over 75% of his men and retreating to the Communist base at Yan'an.) During the two leaders' disagreement, Ye – though he was Zhang's Chief of Staff – sided with Mao; and instead of supporting Zhang unconditionally as he had during the Guangzhou Uprising, Ye absconded to Mao's headquarters with Zhang's code books and maps. As a result, Zhang's communications with Comintern were cut, while Mao was able to establish a radio link, leading to Comintern's acceptance of Mao's leadership. Mao would never forget Ye's contribution, observing later that "Ye Jianying saved the (Chinese Communist) Party, the (Chinese) Red Army, and the (Chinese) Revolution". Ye Jianying was the top military leader in the 1976 coup that overthrew the Gang of Four and ended the Cultural Revolution, and was the key supporter of Deng Xiaoping in his power struggle with Hua Guofeng between 1978 and 1981, which ended in Hua fading into political obscurity. In his capacity as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Ye served as China's head of state from 1978 until 1983.

¹⁰ Zhuge Liang was a Chinese statesman, strategist and inventor who lived through the end of the Eastern Han dynasty (c. 184–220) and the early Three Kingdoms period (220–280). During the Three Kingdoms period he served as Imperial Chancellor (or Prime Minister) of the state of Shu Han (221–263) from its founding in 221 and later as regent from 223 until his death. Zhuge is recognised as the most accomplished strategist of his era, refusing to indulge local elites and adopting strict, but fair and clear laws. In remembrance of his governance, local people maintained shrines to him for ages.

¹¹ Lü Duan (935–1000), was a minister during the Northern Song Dynasty. After the death of Emperor Taizong, Lü Duan discovered a plot to depose the crown prince, which he thwarted, and ascended the throne with the crown prince. Earlier, when criticised for being confused, The Emperor Taizong had defended him, saying "Lü Duan is confused about small things, but not confused about big things." This became a Chinese idiom, meaning that people should grasp major events well and grasp them tightly, and not dwell on some unprincipled small issues, so as to hinder major events.

1966: Writings and Speeches

Mao Zedong

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