SELECTED WORKS
OF
DENG XIAOPING

Volume I
(1938-1965)
WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!
SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING

Volume I

(1938-1965)

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EDITOR'S NOTE ON THE SECOND EDITION

The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1938-1965) was published in 1989. With the approval of the author, the second edition is issued and the book is renamed the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume I).

The four articles included in the second edition are mainly the speeches by the author when he served as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. This book contains 43 articles and speeches.

In the second edition, a few changes have been made in wording and punctuation of the text, and a few notes have been added to the book.

Editorial Committee for Party Literature, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

July 1994
EDITORIAL NOTE

This book contains thirty-nine important articles and speeches by Comrade Deng Xiaoping, written or delivered between 1938 and 1965, most of which are published here for the first time.

Included are Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s main writings and speeches before the ‘cultural revolution’, reflecting his contributions in the fields of military and political affairs, economic development and Party building during the historical periods of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the War of Liberation, and the seventeen years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. As a component of Mao Zedong Thought, his views and theories will be of great significance to the study of the Party’s history; his creative views, in particular, will serve as valuable guidance for the ongoing socialist construction and reform in China.

In compiling this book, the editors have made a few changes in language and corrected errors of fact. Records of speeches have been edited. All writings in the book have been examined and approved by the author.

Editorial Committee on Party Literature, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

January 1989
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MOBILIZE NEW RECRUITS AND CONDUCT
POLITICAL WORK AMONG THEM

January 12, 1938

I

Currently we are suffering a temporary and partial setback in our defensive war against Japan, but this is not final defeat. The final outcome of the war will be determined by a protracted war of resistance.

In order to continue in the present war, we must take full advantage of the valuable experience we have gained from the past six months' fighting. We should not only study strategy and tactics, but also do our utmost in every possible way to build up and expand the national armed forces by mobilizing the people to join the army, replenishing the existing corps and organizing new armed units in order to support an arduous, long-drawn-out war.

There is no question that the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation are ready to fight to the death in the forefront against the Japanese aggressors and to win the liberation of their nation at the cost of their own flesh and blood. However, this does not mean that recruitment is completely without problems. First of all, we have not exploded the traditional myth that "a good man doesn't join the army". Second, not enough attention has been paid to education in the need to defend the country, and to fight Japan in particular, among the masses. This important work has remained utterly inadequate even since the war of resistance broke out. Third, some people have used coercion in recruitment — a mistake that has made it most difficult for us to enlist new recruits and

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has resulted in those forced to join the army lacking a strong will and the courage to fight, and one that could even cause antagonism between the people, on the one hand, and the government and army, on the other; this would only play into the hands of the Japanese aggressors and Chinese collaborators. Finally, the government's policy of giving preferential treatment to families of soldiers who are fighting against the Japanese aggressors in order to reduce their problems to a minimum has not been properly implemented, so that the soldiers are not able to fight without worries about their families and people are lacking the determination and courage to join the army.

If we soberly review our experience in recruiting soldiers over the past few months, we can see that, because of the aforesaid mistakes made in some areas, people may fail to realize that the future of the nation hangs in the balance and that they should rush to the front with the deepest hatred for the foreign foe, and they may, therefore, become increasingly reluctant to join the army. They may fail to realize the importance of the government's policy of building up and expanding its defence capability in order to achieve final victory in the war of resistance; moreover, among some people, dissatisfaction with the government may increase. People may fail to realize that the arduous struggle now being conducted by the officers and men at the front is closely related to the fate of the country and their families, they may fail to carry forward the fine tradition of unity between the army and the people during the days of the Great Revolution, and they may fail to warmly support the army and show gratitude in order to encourage it to win the war of resistance in the end; moreover, some people may become disgusted with the army and be loathed to join it. In addition, the Japanese aggressors, Chinese collaborators and Trotskyites may use these mistakes to incite people to revolt, as a way to threaten and harass the rear areas in the fight against the Japanese aggressors. These phenomena are serious enough to demand our close vigilance, even if they are to be found in only one or two villages and among a very small number of people.

It is true that our recent recruitment efforts have been quite successful and our troops at the front have generally been kept replenished. This does not, however, mean that we can continue those undesirable methods of recruitment, since they can help supplement the army only for a short period of time and they can never serve the needs of a protracted war of resistance. Only when the inappropriate methods are corrected will successful recruitment be ensured for the future.
II

Pointing out the inappropriateness of the recruitment methods and the bad results and effects they may lead to is not meant to be passive criticism, but is designed to encourage people to work out ways to correct them and adopt appropriate methods, so as to provide the front with a steady flow of replenishments and organize enough new troops.

It should be understood that people all over the country detest Japanese aggression. So long as we adopt the appropriate methods of recruitment and persuade and arouse the people, they will surely rid themselves of unhealthy attitudes and, with great determination and courage, go to the front, or encourage their husbands, sons or brothers to do so, to fight for the glorious cause of national liberation. This has been fully borne out by the notable success achieved in some areas.

These areas have gained the following valuable experience from which we can learn.

People there have carried out adequate propaganda and agitation activities. They have made use of various means of propaganda — operas, songs, "wall newspapers", mass meetings, brief lectures, private talks, and so forth — to explain to the masses about the current situation and the way for them to survive, and to expose the cruelty of the enemy. This widespread and thorough publicity promptly aroused the enthusiasm of the masses to fight the Japanese aggressors, and they volunteered to join the army. This method of recruitment has proved far more effective than coercion.

People there have united with anti-Japanese activists and persons respected by the masses (not careerists, who are out for power and money) in order to carry out recruitment with their help, which has yielded very good results.

People there have worked among families of anti-Japanese soldiers, inviting family members of servicemen of every army unit to meetings or even dinner parties, when possible, at which they explained various questions concerning resistance to Japan, showed them the respect they deserve, presented them with honour plaques, and asked for their opinions. When difficulties arose, people there asked the local governments and mass organizations for help. In this way everyone considered the families of anti-Japanese soldiers to be examples to follow and many commendable wives, parents and older brothers have come forward to send their husbands, sons and younger brothers to the army.

People there have urged local governments and mass organizations to co-ordinate efforts in publicizing the need to recruit new soldiers and in giving them encouragement and warmly sending them to the front.
Above all, the troops stationed there have set an example in maintaining discipline and, at the same time, establishing close contact with the people by holding evening gatherings for soldiers and civilians and inviting local people to dinner (usually one member representing a family is invited by a company). All this has made a deep impression on the people, dispelling their fear of the army, exploding the myth that “a good man doesn’t join the army”, and making it easier for the government and army to enlist recruits.

There, the soldiers themselves have been sent to enlist recruits. So long as they are friendly to the people and do not bother them, the results are often admirable.

People in some of the areas that are located in the enemy’s rear flanks or are often subject to enemy harassment have organized the masses to wage guerrilla warfare over wide areas. By expanding and strengthening their combat effectiveness, these guerrillas have gradually become regular forces, adding to our national defence capability. Some of them can possibly be mobilized to join the regular troops, on condition that guerrilla warfare is not impaired or weakened. This approach is extremely important today, when many parts of our territory have become enemy rear areas, since it not only serves to strengthen our national defence troops but also is of great strategic significance in a protracted war of resistance.

We fervently hope that all troops can be duly replenished and expanded. We also hope that, before implementing a conscription system throughout the country, both the government and the army will make use of this experience. Of course, our experience is still incomplete, but so long as we resolutely give up coercion in recruitment and stress propaganda, education, organization and persuasion when mobilizing the masses, we can enrich our experience and become more successful with each passing day.

III

As far as recruitment is concerned, we should try to fulfil the quotas and, at the same time, through political work, ensure that recruits are highly motivated and enthusiastic about going to the front. This is most important to the enhancement of the troops’ combat effectiveness. Completion of these tasks relies on co-operation between the recruitment organizations and the army.

Inappropriate methods make it extremely hard to consolidate the troops
and enhance their fighting capacity. Therefore, those armed units that are in urgent need of recruits should avoid using such inappropriate methods and do more effective political work. The latter cannot be ignored even if appropriate methods are used.

We should see that, since new soldiers are ordinary people before they join the army, they have a strong attachment to family life, are not used to army life and lack military skills. We should, therefore, take practical steps and work hard to help them settle down, so that they will soon become accustomed to army life and skilled in fighting.

We cannot agree with the idea that these aims can be attained only by officers’ strict control. Rigid discipline and rational control are indeed essential, but they have to be combined with political work. That is to say, our soldiers should not only have weapons in their hands but, more important, they should also be armed mentally. Totally repressive measures can produce only undependable, superficial effects; they cannot rouse the soldiers’ initiative or bring out their matchless fighting capabilities, much less unite the soldiers to carry on this arduous struggle under all kinds of adverse conditions.

Political work should, and can, greatly help the new recruits to settle down in the army and enhance their combat effectiveness.

We should co-operate with organizations in charge of recruitment in holding grand recognition and sending-off ceremonies for newly enlisted soldiers, and on their way to the front the local people should be organized to greet them and see them off. On their arrival at the front, the troops should also warmly welcome them.

As soon as the new recruits enter the army, we should understand the circumstances under which they were enlisted and their feelings and anticipate any problems that might arise. Then we should explain things to them, particularly the need to resist Japanese aggression, in order to heighten their political awareness.

In the army we should encourage veteran soldiers to be friendly to the new soldiers and to help them learn military skills and political affairs and not to bully them. At the same time, we should see to it that the new soldiers get their food, clothing and other supplies and that their difficulties and hardships are reduced to a minimum, so that they will be content to be in the army. These are the key factors for stabilizing the army.

We should exercise rational control and put more stress on education and persuasion, so that the new soldiers will conscientiously observe the rules of discipline and study hard.

We should encourage the new soldiers to write to their families, telling
about their pleasant life in the army and urging their family members to resist Japanese aggression and save the nation. We should also allow their family members to visit them in the army barracks, show solicitude for them and entertain them.

All this will not only help remedy the errors made during enlistment, but will also facilitate future recruitment. We hope those in charge of political work will do their best, and we also hope military officers will help them in this regard.

Improved enlistment procedures and political work in the army and advanced strategy and tactics will enable us to turn out a huge armed force for national defence, possessing great skill and the best fighting capabilities, which will finally defeat the Japanese imperialists.
THE PARTY AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

April 15, 1941

I. DEMOCRACY IS THE ESSENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT
ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF THE
THREE-THIRDS SYSTEM

Setting up an anti-Japanese democratic government based on the
three-thirds system is a genuine policy set forth by the Central Committee
of the Party; it has won the support of the masses and should be pursued
especially by all Party comrades. Being a dictatorship exercised jointly by
several revolutionary classes over Chinese collaborators, pro-Japanese ele-
ments and reactionaries, such a government not only conforms to the
principle of a united front in that it can unite the majority of people
in their struggle against the Japanese aggressors, Chinese collaborators,
pro-Japanese elements and reactionaries, but also ensures the leading role
played by members of the Communist Party and progressives in the
government. Therefore, it is not only the best form of government in
areas behind enemy lines during the present anti-Japanese war, but also
a form of government that should be adopted for the new democratic
republic in the future.

Specifically, what does the three-thirds system mean?

First, organizationally, in both the administrative organs and the
people’s representative bodies, the allocation of places should be one-third
or less for Party members, one-third for the progressives and one-third
for the middle sections of society. A small number of right-wingers may
be drawn into the people’s representative bodies. At the same time, since
the village is the basic unit of political power, the allocation of places in village organs of political power may be more than one-third for Party

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members, but we must therefore see to it that Party members are less than one-third in the village representative assembly and among the working personnel.

Second, when adopting policies, we should take the interests of each and every anti-Japanese class and stratum into consideration and apply the principle of winning over the majority and opposing the minority. We should also safeguard the freedoms, rights and legal status of all anti-Japanese political parties.

Third, since the political power we have established is a joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes, with the participation of the representatives of all anti-Japanese classes and parties, the struggle for democracy is bound to manifest itself among the different parties and classes cherishing different interests and maintaining different political positions. Far from being afraid of this kind of struggle, we should promote it, for it is beneficial, not harmful, to us.

Fourth, since it is a joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes, the question of who is to play the leading role in the organs of political power is bound to arise. Our Party must hold on to this position, that is, it should exercise the leadership role in the organs of political power. How are we to attain this role? It is guaranteed by the composition of personnel in the organs of political power, as is already embodied in the three-thirds system. However, we should do this mainly through the struggle for democracy. That is to say, we should chiefly rely on the political prestige our Party enjoys as a result of its correct views that are endorsed, supported and trusted by the masses. To be more specific, the Party's leading position stems from the appropriate number of its members in the government, and chiefly from the support of the masses. Through the struggle for democracy the masses will have a better understanding of our Party's views and will have greater faith in the Party through their own experience in the struggle. Therefore, only by waging a struggle for democracy can our Party truly play a leading role in the government.

From the above we can see that democracy constitutes the essence of the government established on the basis of the three-thirds system. Therefore, the Party should maintain a spirit of democracy in exercising leadership in the government. Otherwise, even if we have tried to make sure that Party members occupy no more than one-third of the places in the government, we shall not be regarded as having given wholehearted support to the three-thirds system.
II. OPPOSE THE CONCEPT OF "RULING THE COUNTRY BY THE PARTY"

If we say China is a semi-feudal country and a country that lacks democracy, it is reflected in our Party by the fact that, in general, Party members are not used to the practice of democracy and lack knowledge of and tempering in the struggle for democracy.

If we say that the Communist Parties in West European countries are tainted with some undesirable traditions of the social-democratic parties, the Chinese Communist Party is more or less tainted with the undesirable traditions of the Kuomintang. The concept of “ruling the country by the party”, held by some comrades, is a manifestation in our Party of an abominable tradition of the Kuomintang.

When the Party proposed the three-thirds system, some Party members in the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Area resisted it, showing their neglect of democracy and the bad effect of the idea of “ruling the country by the party”. Although there has been considerable change in this regard, education and struggle are still needed to discard this erroneous idea entirely.

In the past few years the idea of “ruling the country by the party” has become prevalent in some areas, and some leading comrades have held to this mistaken idea for a long time, bringing about the following disastrous consequences:

First, these comrades misunderstand the leading role played by the Party, believing that to play such a role, Party members should monopolize everything; they fail to see that to truly play such a role, the Party must have the support of the masses. A leading role built on power is unreliable. During the December 9th Student Movement in Beiping, Song Zheyuan suppressed the revolutionary students with his power — the army, prison, police, broadsword and water cannon. Can we say that superiority lay with Song Zheyuan? Of course not. In the past some comrades who often talked glibly about superiority believed that since Party members constituted the majority in the organs of political power and won the whole country, they could do whatever they liked. Consequently, they made so many ultra-Left mistakes that the middle sections of society became displeased with us, the progressives were worried about us, and the masses complained about the Party. Except for people like Ah Q, who would say that the Party has gained superiority?

Second, these comrades misunderstand Party leadership, believing that “Party leadership is above everything else”. They interfere in government work, change at will decrees promulgated by the government at a higher
level, and transfer cadres who work in organs of political power without going through administrative procedures. The authorities in some places have refused to carry out government decrees without Party notification, which led to confusion in the organs of political power. Some Party members have gone a step further, taking “Party leadership is above everything else” to mean “Party members are above everything else” and believing that Party members can do evil and that the ones who have violated the law can be forgiven. As a result, non-Party cadres regard the Party as “the supreme authority”. (This is indeed a bitter irony. Yet, unfortunately, some of our Party members pride themselves on it.) Some of them have become passive and dare not speak out and others are breaking away from us and even rising in opposition to us, while the progressives are deeply worried about us. This has given the masses the impression that the government is incompetent and that it is the Communist Party that has the final say in everything, that the Party levies grain and other taxes, formulates all the decrees for the government and is responsible for all the mistakes made by the government. Hence, the government is not respected by the masses and the Party has alienated itself from them. What stupidity! Under such circumstances the Party’s guidance organs at various levels have become increasingly insensitive, failing to study policies carefully, and busying themselves only with interfering in the day-to-day work of the government, thus relaxing political leadership. Party members become conceited simply because they are Party members. Those working in the government are arrogant and overbearing, always considering themselves to be in the right, looking down on non-Party people, and believing that they can break the law, violate government standards of discipline and undermine work order at will. A small number of Party members have even ganged up, becoming lax in their duties and degenerate and trying to protect each other. As a consequence, careerists have wormed their way into the Party in an attempt to destroy it in various fields of endeavour. Over the past few years we have suffered a great deal in this regard.

Third, these comrades always resort to simple methods to solve complicated problems. This is primarily because they lack faith in the correctness of their own positions and are afraid that people outside the Party would not agree with them. It seems to them that so long as Party members constitute the majority and agree with them by a show of hands, all problems can readily be solved. As a matter of fact, this is the easiest way to paralyse and corrupt the Party and alienate the masses. First of all, policies formulated on complicated problems behind closed doors will certainly lead to mistakes. Secondly, regarding non-Party cadres and the masses as puppets that can be
manipulated by anybody will separate the Party from the masses and arouse their opposition. Thirdly, in this way the Party and its members will become unaware of new things and gradually become corrupt. The advantage of democracy lies in the following: It can help us promptly learn the opinions of people of various classes in every field of work, so that we can study them carefully and handle them correctly. It makes it possible for us to verify with the masses whether the Party's policies are correct and whether these policies have been understood and supported. It can sharpen our sensitivity so that we can always maintain a high degree of vigilance. It can keep the Party under the supervision of the masses, so that Party members can avoid the danger of becoming degenerate and so that careerists and saboteurs can be uncovered and expelled from the Party, before it is too late. Finally, through the struggle for democracy, the Party members' fighting capacity can be increased, and the Party can draw closer to the masses and will become tempered as a Party of the masses.

In short, the concept of “ruling the country by the party”, a result of the pernicious influence of the Kuomintang, could most effectively lull the Party into complacency, debase and destroy it, and separate it from the masses. We oppose the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, which is characterized by one party running the country. We should especially prevent the pernicious influence of the Kuomintang from spreading to our Party.

III. THE PARTY EMPLOYS THE POLICY OF GUIDANCE AND SUPERVISION TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT

What is the correct principle for the Party to adhere to in leading the anti-Japanese democratic government? It is the policy of giving guidance to and exercising supervision over the government. In other words, the Party should assume the responsibility of guiding the government so that the Party's views can be acted on through the government; the Party should take the responsibility of supervising the government in order to ensure that the government truly accords with the principles of the anti-Japanese democratic united front. The Party exercises leadership by providing political principles, not by monopolizing everything, interfering in everything or placing Party power above everything else. This is diametrically opposite to the policy of “ruling the country by the party”.

Specifically, the Party should guide and supervise the government in the following ways:

First, it should carefully study policies, formulate correct ones and, through the leading Party members' groups in the administrative organs and people's representative bodies, turn its policies into the decrees and administrative policies of the government. The Party's guidance organs only have the right to issue orders to the leading Party members' groups and the Party members in the government and the right to offer suggestions to the government in the name of the Party when necessary; they have absolutely no right to give orders to the government.

Second, the Party's leadership and superiority in the anti-Japanese democratic government in north China is now basically guaranteed and the Party's policies can generally be embodied in government decrees. We should be aware of this. Therefore, Party headquarters at all levels should study the decrees and directives issued by higher-level government bodies, especially those in strategic areas (for example, the Joint Agency in our area), and in light of these decrees and directives, guide the work of the leading Party members' group in the government at that level. The responsibility of a Party organization is to work out specific measures and methods for enforcing the higher-level government decrees in its own district or county and constantly check on the execution of the decrees to ensure their actual enforcement. Therefore, every Party committee should make government work a regular subject for discussion. If it finds a higher-level government decree contains points which are inappropriate or inapplicable to its district or county, it should report the matter through the leading Party members' group to the government for discussion, after which the government should report it to the higher-level government for revision. For the same purpose, the Party committee should also report it promptly to Party headquarters at a higher level. However, it has no right whatsoever to instruct comrades working in government organs to refuse carrying out higher-level government decrees or to go their own way. In the past, some local government decrees were regarded as mere scraps of paper and couldn't be carried out unless the Party organization issued a relevant notification. Some leading Party comrades did not bother to study higher-level government decrees or directives and even ignored them entirely, guiding the work of the government at their level according to their own whim. This is irresponsible! They may as well be encouraging comrades working in organs of political power to break the law! They must stop doing this. Since higher-level government decrees embody Party policies, to study government decrees is to study specific Party policies; there is no need to wait for instructions from higher Party headquarters.
Without studying the decrees and directives issued by the anti-Japanese democratic government at a given level, one has no right to give guidance to the government at that level.

Third, the Party should do everything possible to institute the three-thirds system. It should guide the election of assemblies of representatives and administrative committees at all levels and the selection of administrative staff of governments at all levels so as to ensure the application of the three-thirds system. No desired results can be achieved in election or selection without leadership and planning. We should pay special attention to this point in selecting village and district cadres and see to it that the heads of villages and districts are Party members or progressives (or middle-of-the-roaders who are upright and abide by higher-level government decrees).

Fourth, since democracy constitutes the essence of the three-thirds system, the Party should urge and instruct leading Party members' groups and Party members working in government to have a full democratic spirit, high revolutionary enthusiasm, a friendly attitude, a positive and dedicated work style, and statesmanship. In their work they should stick to the Party's political stand, join with non-Party cadres and play an exemplary role, so as to spur non-Party cadres to work hard; they should guard against becoming arrogant just because they are Party members. In its work of guiding and supervising the government, the Party organization should start with leading Party members' groups and Party members.

Fifth, since the political power based on the three-thirds system is a joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes, comprising representatives from various anti-Japanese classes and parties, there are bound to be different political views and stands, evoking political debates. So long as we truly develop democracy, the struggle for democracy will certainly be conducted on a large scale. This is really a good thing, because during the struggle the opinions and demands of all classes will come out, and the true nature of some parties will be laid bare for the masses to see. We Communists do not fear the struggle for democracy, because our positions are correct. Only Right opportunists who do not believe in the correctness of the Party's positions, in addition to careerists, corrupt bureaucrats and embezzlers, fear this struggle and are afraid that the masses should know the Party's true features. Party organizations should, therefore, make a conscious effort to promote the struggle for democracy. First, they should help comrades abandon their arbitrary and undemocratic practices, so that non-Party cadres dare to speak out and do their work and entertain no misgivings about the Party. If they can achieve this, they will know how to undertake this struggle, and the prestige of the government and its work efficiency will be raised enormously.
Sixth, Party organizations should urge Party members and the masses to take a correct attitude towards the government, making it clear to them that the anti-Japanese democratic government of today is different from the government of the past under the dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, and that all the people should therefore support it heart and soul. The people should be persuaded to become accustomed to observing the decrees of the anti-Japanese democratic government. Comrades working in the government should observe discipline and the procedures of the government and combat confusion and oppose disrespect of authority at higher levels. Local Party organizations, mass organizations and army units have the responsibility to support and help raise the prestige of the government. They have absolutely no right to arrest or execute people or to interfere in the work of the government, and army units are not allowed to regard the government as an organ subordinate to them. It is true that some local governments do not accept Party leadership, enacting some erroneous decrees and doing things not in the people's interest and in violation of the principle of a united front. For instance, some district and village governments are like that. Such cases are likely to occur even after democratic election. However, we should support, not oppose, such anti-Japanese democratic governments, while opposing their erroneous decrees or bad administrative individuals. In handling such matters we should adopt proper methods. For instance, we can wage a struggle within the government or in the presence of the masses; we can partially reorganize the government in question or replace the bad individuals through election; we can also handle matters from above or from below — our general goal is to educate the masses, correct mistakes and ensure Party leadership. No undemocratic, improper methods are allowed in handling such matters. Even if a counter-revolutionary is involved here, he shouldn't be arrested and dealt with before waging a democratic struggle against him or going through legal formalities. To do otherwise will only harm, not benefit, us.

Seventh, the Party's guidance organs should regularly discuss policies and decrees, and check on the work of leading Party members' groups. Some comrades should be designated to take care of the work of leading Party members' groups and of Party branches in government organs. In providing guidance to leading Party members' groups, the Party organs should stress political principles rather than minor points, so as to allow the groups a certain flexibility in their work and to nurture their capabilities. Party organizations should pay attention to theoretical studies and the development of moral integrity and Party spirit among comrades working in the government. Whenever they find the comrades have made mistakes, they should
help them correct the mistakes without delay. However, on public occasions they should try to enhance the comrades’ prestige.

IV. THE TASKS OF LEADING PARTY MEMBERS’ GROUPS

To ensure Party leadership in the government and unify the actions of Party members working in the government, leading Party members’ groups should be formed in the people’s representative bodies and administrative organs at and above the county level. The group should be composed of no more than seven leading comrades, appointed by Party headquarters at the corresponding level. Guided and administered by the Party organization at the same level, the leading Party members’ group (A group at the higher level has no connection with one at the lower level.) should carry out the following tasks:

First, to accept Party instructions, orders and directives, try to win approval for Party policies and decisions by administrative organs or people’s representative bodies, turn Party positions into those of the government and then help the government carry them out.

Second, on political grounds, to unite with non-Party cadres who work with them, helping them fully understand Party policies so that they will willingly accept, support and implement them, giving full play to their enthusiasm for the work; through them to unite with every class, every anti-Japanese party and the majority of the people.

Third, to take every opportunity to expand the Party’s influence and expound the Party’s positions; to help the anti-Japanese democratic government give full scope to its role and enhance its prestige, so that the government and the people will be united and the struggle against the regime of the Japanese aggressors and their Chinese collaborators will be strengthened. At the same time, to seize every opportunity to combat all actions undermining the Communist Party and anti-Japanese democratic political power.

Fourth, to guide Party members working in the government, unifying their actions. To regularly report to Party headquarters at the same level on its work and inform the Party’s guidance organs as quickly as possible about its experience and problems in work, as well as the reaction of the masses and various sections of society to Party policies, so as to enable the Party to provide better guidance to the government.

To accomplish the tasks mentioned above, comrades of leading Party
members' groups should pay attention to the following in their work habits:

1. They should practise democracy. All important questions should be discussed at formal government meetings. Before solving general questions, they should seek the opinions of non-Party cadres to win their approval. For instance, county magistrates should not make decisions arbitrarily simply because they hold power in their hands. Instead, they should consult other people, let people of the various sections handle the things they should handle, and give a free hand to non-Party cadres to do various kinds of work, while providing them with the necessary guidance and checking on their work.

2. They should unite with people. All Party members should contact non-Party members, influence and help them politically, and work, study and discuss matters with them, overcoming the old tendency for Party members and non-Party people not to get along well. This is especially important where the middle sections of society, the gentry and social celebrities are concerned. In the past our comrades have failed to unite with progressives, let alone with these people. Our comrades should be modest, friendly and sincere, respecting them and listening attentively to their opinions. They should refrain from making a showy display of their abilities and considering themselves statesmen, but should learn to make political explanations appropriate to different people. Of course, friendly contacts are necessary, for this will make it easier for them to draw closer to others politically.

3. They should keep to the correct political stand. When faced with views and actions in violation of the principle of the united front or against the Party, they should not remain silent or agree with them. They should reason with the people concerned or even repudiate them, depending on the circumstances. Of course, in doing so, they should adopt the correct methods. In general, they should explain matters to people in a sincere manner, waging an effective struggle only against diehards and conspirators, and, moreover, this should be done along with non-Party cadres. If this is done only by Party members and non-Party people remain mere onlookers, it will show that they have done their job poorly. They should encourage non-Party people, including progressives and middle-of-the-roaders, to make proposals or motions along with them. In this way they can maintain close ties with non-Party people and bring their enthusiasm into full play. They should draw non-Party cadres into the study of policies and decrees. They may also ask them to help draft documents, but first it will be necessary to adequately discuss and determine the principles for drafting them. If they don’t and their draft is totally rejected, it may chill the enthusiasm of
non-Party cadres. By keeping to a political stand we don’t mean that they should be opinionated. They must adhere to political principles, not technical details. If such details do not do too much harm to the general direction (even if there are some defects in them), concessions are permitted. Moreover, they should be aware that they are not always thoughtful enough and that non-Party cadres often have many correct ideas. Therefore, they should listen attentively and remain open-minded when non-Party cadres present their views.

4. They should refrain from offering opinions in the name of the Party. Not every Party member is in a position to represent the Party. Only views on major events and questions can be raised in the name of the Party. Only representatives appointed formally by the Party have the right to speak on behalf of the Party, raise motions or get in touch with other parties. Party representatives should be extremely prudent in word and action. Each and every article to be published, speech to be delivered and motion to be raised must be examined and approved by the Party committee beforehand. Even if there is no time to do so, it should be discussed formally by the leading Party members’ group and afterwards reported to the Party committee for endorsement. As for an ordinary comrade, if he is openly a Party member, he can work in the capacity of a Party member; if he is an underground Party member, he can work as a progressive.

5. To ensure the Party’s united action, there must be strict discipline within the leading Party members’ group. First, it should hold itself totally responsible to the Party committee at the same level and place itself under the latter’s strict supervision. Second, there should be democratic discussion within the group, but once a decision has been made, all the members should act in unison and no one shall be allowed to go his own way. The leading Party members’ group bears the responsibility of giving guidance to other Party members in leading positions (for instance, the leading Party members’ group in an assembly of representatives should give guidance to all the Party members in the assembly) and should inform them of any resolutions formulated, which the latter must obey. To unify will and action, the leading Party members’ group can hold special meetings to communicate its decisions or those of the Party committee and organize discussions. It does not have to establish links with ordinary Party members. When problems emerge, it can ask the Party branches in government organs to solve them.

6. The leading Party members’ group has no right to go beyond the government or to issue orders and give instructions. None of its resolutions can take effect until approved by the government. The erroneous tendency
to turn the leading Party members' group into a second government must be combated.

7. All Party members working in the government, especially leading cadres, must set a good example in their work; this is one of the important prerequisites for ensuring Party leadership.

V. THE TASKS OF PARTY BRANCHES IN GOVERNMENT ORGANS

The tasks of Party branches in government organs are basically the same as those of ordinary Party branches; they do not have the same powers and responsibilities as leading Party members' groups. In the past, some Party branches in government organs turned into second leading Party members' groups or even second governments; this is wrong and must be corrected.

Unlike those in rural areas, Party branches in the government have their own special tasks, which require sound leadership from the Party branch committee.

What, then, are their special tasks?

First, they should systematically carry out united front work within their own organs and constantly disseminate Marxism-Leninism and the Party's positions among non-Party people. To accomplish this, they should organize reading classes, study associations, national salvation associations (also called national revolution associations or save-the-nation associations), forums or academic lectures for the personnel of their organs.

Second, Party members should set a good example in uniting with non-Party people, so that the latter will be more active and responsible in their work. As for those Party members who avoid contact with the masses, try to seek the limelight and outshine others, or are arrogant because of being Party members, Party branches should constantly educate and criticize them.

Third, Party members working in the government should be law-abiding and observe discipline. If any of them should violate the law or commit irregularities, he should not only be punished in accordance with the law, but also be dealt with by disciplinary measures within the Party.

Fourth, the Party branch has no right to interfere in administrative work. However, it should go to the masses to find out their problems, ideas and opinions, determine how well both Party members and non-Party people are doing in their work, and then report to the leading Party members' group.
and the Party committee. The Party branch has the right to check on the work done by individual Party members of the branch, but it has no right to check on the work done by any department.

Fifth, the Party branch is placed under a department designated by the Party committee, not by a leading Party members' group. But when a leading Party members' group has made a decision to be executed by all Party members of the branch, it should inform the branch of the decision and the branch should execute it. Meanwhile, both the Party branch and the leading Party members' group have the right to offer suggestions to each other. In order to make things go smoothly, the leading Party members' group should designate a comrade to serve as a liaison with the Party branch.

Sixth, the Party branch is an absolutely secret organization and no one is allowed to conduct any activities in its name.

Seventh, the Party branch should report regularly to Party headquarters at a higher level and accept its instructions.

VI. STRENGTHEN EDUCATION IN DEMOCRACY

With the development of the democratic movement, education in democracy has become more urgent than ever before. This education has been far from adequate both inside and outside the Party.

Actual political struggle gives Party members and the masses the best opportunity to temper themselves. We should stress education in democracy in schools, national revolution associations and training classes. Moreover, we should make a careful and detailed plan for each democratic movement, seeing to it that the movement fully meets the requirements of democracy, and truly mobilize the masses to take part in it and the entire Party to lead it. Only in this way can the movement achieve the desired results and the Party membership and the masses be educated.

Recently the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party made a proposal to the Joint Agency to establish the Provisional Assembly of Representatives of the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Border Area, which has been adopted. This represents a major democratic move. This year's village election and next year's county election and general election in the border areas are drawing near. Every aspect of our work involves democracy. In doing its work and launching movements, the Party should know how to mobilize the masses in a democratic manner and oppose all undemocratic practices. There can be no broad mass movement without
a democratic work style, and there can be no genuine Bolshevik Party without a broad mass movement.

In the struggle for democracy we should ensure Party leadership in the government and, more important, we should make the Party a party of the masses!
THE PRINCIPLES, TASKS AND ORIENTATION FOR CULTURAL WORK IN THE 129TH DIVISION

May 1941

I shall discuss three questions.
1. Cultural work as it serves the political mission.
All forces and groups subordinate their cultural work to their political mission.

In the political, military and economic fields in present-day China, three different forces exist: the anti-Japanese democrats; the Japanese aggressors, Chinese collaborators and pro-Japanese elements; and the anti-Communist diehards among the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. The struggle among the three forces is acutely manifested in the cultural field. Every force's cultural work is closely linked to its political mission; there is no such thing as culture which transcends politics.

1) The political aim of the Japanese imperialists, Chinese collaborators and pro-Japanese elements is to turn China into a Japanese imperialists' colony. In their cultural work they are pursuing a policy of enslavement, trying to extinguish our national consciousness, patriotism and integrity by enslaving us through education and other activities. They are destroying China's cultural institutions, burning Chinese books and records, killing or imprisoning patriotic men of letters, intellectuals, students and youths, establishing cultural institutions of Chinese collaborators, grooming men of letters among them, preaching Japanese culture, instilling the Chinese people with ideas of “Sino-Japanese goodwill”, “coexistence and co-prosperity” and “a new order in East Asia”, and training the Chinese to be a slavish people. They advocate outdated culture, ethics and social systems, encourage people to restore the ancient ways, and to be superstitious, blindly obedient, and backward, and establish feudal and superstitious organizations to aid in their

Excerpt from a speech made for the preliminary model propaganda team competition in the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. The speech was carried in issue No. 26 of the Anti-Japanese Front, published by the Political Department of the 129th Division on June 16, 1941.
sinister policies of enslaving the people and poisoning their minds. They are also creating and spreading rumours, inducing defeatist sentiments, pursuing a policy of mollification and denouncing our anti-Japanese laws and orders, in an attempt to destroy our anti-Japanese base areas.

The enemy employs a great variety of methods of cultural invasion, all characterized by a catering to the mentality of backward people and peasants, concealing their basic weaknesses in quality (i.e., political weaknesses) with quantity, taking great pains to repeat over and over again certain key slogans and taking advantage of the opportunity to carry out deceptive propaganda on certain specific problems. We should not take lightly this dangerous and sinister menace; the essential task facing us today is to launch fierce ideological warfare against the enemy.

2) Politically, the anti-Communist diehards among the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are not resolute and possess a dual character in the fight against Japan. Culturally, they advocate the old comprador feudal culture. They are subservient to foreign countries, compromising with them and surrendering to them, and practise feudalism at home. They advocate old ideas, social systems and ethics, respecting Confucianism, restoring ancient ways, preserving the “quintessence” of Chinese culture and saving the nation by means of the classics. They suppress the new cultural movement, trample on new cultural undertakings, close progressive bookstores, prohibit the sale of progressive books, newspapers and periodicals, stifle anti-Japanese opinions and repress or ban people’s anti-imperialist movements. They oppose communism, purge those who hold different views, hinder progress and favour retrogression. They establish feudal and superstitious organizations, shatter the morale of anti-Japanese armed forces, and undermine anti-Japanese governments and base areas. They also sing the praises of autocracy, oppose democracy and encourage people to “abide by state laws” in an attempt to trample upon them at will.

We are firmly opposed to this old comprador feudal culture, a culture that serves to help the Japanese imperialists implement their policy of enslavement and seriously endangers the future of the Chinese nation.

3) Politically, the anti-Japanese democrats stand for uniting to fight against the Japanese aggressors to the end, thoroughly emancipating the Chinese nation and establishing a new democratic republic. Culturally, they advocate a new-democratic culture — a culture for the liberation of the Chinese nation. What is the nature of new-democratic culture? As Comrade Luo Fu puts it:

“It is national in that its first priority is resistance to Japanese aggression. It opposes imperialism and the suppression of one nation by another; it
stands for national independence and liberation; it inspires national self-confidence and provides people with precise knowledge of the reality and characteristics of the nation;

“It is democratic in that it opposes feudalism, autocracy and the ideologies and social systems that are designed to suppress the freedom of the people, and it stands for democratic freedom, politics, activities and work style;

“It is scientific in that it opposes arbitrariness, superstition and ignorance, supports scientific truth, taking truth as the guide for practice, and urges people to genuinely master scientific truth, acquire a scientific ideology and learn to live and work in a scientific way;

“It is of the masses in that it opposes the culture of the small number of privileged aristocrats who oppress and exploit the majority of the people and fool and deceive them, landing them in perpetual darkness and misery; it represents the interests of the majority of the people; it advocates the possession of culture by the masses, the popularization of culture among the common people and the raising of their cultural standards.”

We are the ones who propagate and introduce the new-democratic culture. We resolutely oppose colonial culture and comprador feudal culture and are working to achieve the political goals of New Democracy.

2. The principles, tasks and orientation for cultural work in our division.

Cultural work is part of the political work in the army. What are the principles and tasks for our political work? According to the “Regulations Concerning Political Work (Draft)” promulgated by the General Political Department of the Eighth Route Army, “During the War of Resistance Against Japan the basic tasks of political work for the Eighteenth Group Army are to increase the army’s combat effectiveness, work for unity between officers and men and between armymen and civilians, unite with friendly forces and disintegrate the enemy, in order to achieve final victory in the war.” All this applies to our cultural work. Specifically, the principles and tasks for cultural work are as follows:

1) To intensify the struggle against the enemy in the cultural field and launch fierce ideological warfare against the enemy. We must constantly monitor and analyse what the enemy is doing, and promptly and unremittingly refute him in a political offensive.

2) To improve propaganda and education in national patriotism. Whether it is our army, friendly forces, people in base areas or in enemy-occupied areas, or puppet troops, we must instil national patriotism, self-confidence and self-respect in them, and be always ready to scathingly denounce the enemy’s policy of enslavement. It is even more important to
arouse people's national integrity, oppose vacillation and treason, heighten their courage to fight the enemy and foster their confidence in victory.

3) To publicize the policies and positions of the Communist Party, explain laws and decrees for resistance, practise democratic politics jointly with local Party organizations, government organs, mass organizations and local cultural institutions, and keep the people in enemy-occupied areas informed of all the benevolent policies and progressive measures in the base areas.

4) To promote science and disseminate truth, oppose ignorance, superstition and backwardness, and exert great efforts to propagate Marxism-Leninism. This is important both to the masses and to the army. It is particularly necessary for the army to acquire more general and scientific knowledge so as to enable the officers and men to master science and create a modern, regular army.

5) To become one with the people, as inseparable as flesh and blood. We must understand the people's problems and help solve them, help local authorities conduct cultural and educational work, and arouse the enthusiasm of officers and men for cultural and propaganda work so that they will become disseminators and organizers for New Democracy. Propaganda and education departments should co-operate with united front departments in united front work in the cultural field.

6) To do everything possible and use the best possible means to supply friendly armies with cultural nourishment, i.e., books, newspapers and other propaganda material. We should arrange mutual visits so as to learn from each other, harmonize our relations with them and make friends with them.

7) To improve our external propaganda work, introducing to the international community, overseas Chinese and people in the great rear area our actual military life through literary and artistic works, reportage, news releases, photographs and paintings.

Since the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, our cultural workers in the army have helped raise the political and educational level of our troops, laying a basic foundation for our cultural and artistic work. However, there is still something more to be desired in this work, which is inevitable. Discovering the shortcomings is the beginning of overcoming them. These shortcomings are:

1) "They have neither conducted adequate in-depth research nor deeply involved themselves with the masses," a sentence in the editorial of the north China edition of Xinhua Daily, published on May 3,15 that truly portrayed our shortcomings. Our cultural workers have not done enough in-depth research, not to mention making their work acceptable to people at the
grass-roots level. All this is manifested in the lack of cultural and propaganda work among the masses and the lax work, as well as dull cultural and recreational activities, of the national salvation associations at the level of company. Every cultural worker should pay attention to this. We should combine popularization of cultural work with in-depth research in this regard.

2) Our propaganda fails to promptly reflect and publicize certain urgent tasks and refute what the enemy alleges. Plays, for example, are generally about the past. As a result, our cultural and propaganda work does not accord with the current situation or serve as an effective weapon against the enemy. Some of our works may be a bit too roughly written since we want to be timely, but they serve the purpose as far as the propaganda effect is concerned.

3) Some of our works lack real content, vivid artistry and a sharp sense of politics. Some even contravene our political principles, playing an undesirable role. The forms of propaganda being used are not popular enough and, therefore, are not always familiar or loved by the masses. People in this field of work have failed to portray political content in diversified ways, and sometimes they are incompetent in depicting rapidly changing realities. Forms of propaganda should be improved in two directions. On the one hand, they should be more complex and elegant. On the other hand, they should be more simple and popular. It is also necessary to put new content into old forms, because the old forms are deep-rooted and loved by the masses and are, therefore, worth adopting. However, a critical and selective approach should be adopted in using them, depending on how well they can help portray reality.

4) We have neither given full scope to the creativity of cultural workers nor done enough to train potential cultural workers. As a result, the army has been short of cultural cadres, which has adversely affected the cultural and propaganda work among the troops.

5) External propaganda work is very weak, putting us in a grave situation in which we are fighting a war unknown to the outside world. We have failed to keep the outside world constantly informed of our military life via all available means. Although we have war correspondents, most of them have to serve as editors at the same time, with little time left to gather news. Our political organs have failed to give adequate guidance in this respect, which constitutes another reason for the weakness of our external propaganda work. From now on, war correspondents, and writers and artists teams and political organs of brigades should redouble their efforts to remedy defects in their external propaganda work, and all comrades in this division should
help improve the work.

The main cause for these shortcomings is: the political departments at various levels lack an adequate understanding of the importance and charac­ter of cultural work and have failed to give competent guidance. Some units have not paid enough attention to the working conditions of cultural workers or given full play to their talents. In addition, they have not tried to recruit as many intellectuals as possible. Cultural workers, on their part, have not kept in close touch with the masses and they lack experience in working both in the army and among the masses. As a result, they confine their work to a narrow perspective, beyond the reach of the masses.

How should cultural work be carried out in the army in future? Since I have not studied the question thoroughly, I shall offer only the following suggestions:

1) We should combat all tendencies to belittle cultural work and should try to make cultural work popular. We should constantly arouse the enthu­siasm of cultural workers and take full advantage of their initiative and creativity, so as to promote the cultural movement among the troops and the masses.

2) We should train a large number of young cultural workers and, at the same time, help the existing workers achieve progress. We should see to it that they become better qualified in literary and artistic work and pay more attention to the study of political affairs, provide them with all possible and necessary working conditions, encourage them to delve into reality at the grass-roots level and display their talents to the full — all for the purpose of enabling them to shoulder the responsibilities of organizing and guiding the cultural movement in the army.

3) Cultural workers should constantly cultivate themselves in the polit­ical, literary and artistic fields of endeavour and temper themselves in practical work so as to improve and enrich themselves. They should under­stand clearly that only by enhancing their political understanding can they increase their enthusiasm and creativity for cultural work, and only artistic works that have a profoundly political content and are vividly realistic are of high artistic value. Cultural workers should both improve their writing techniques and work among the people if they want to create works that portray real life in the army and base areas and meet actual needs. Self-improvement and spread of culture require a close link between politics and culture.

4) Cultural workers should be open-minded in learning and serious in discussing issues. They should present their works to the people for their comments. The objective world keeps developing from day to day. In order
to do a better job, one has to study; in order to learn something, one has to be open-minded. A person who is not open-minded will accomplish nothing. Discussion with others is a good way to pool collective wisdom. Study and discussion can serve to remove the defects in a work, perfecting it and making it produce better results. One can make progress only if one accepts opinions from others. In general, our current cultural workers have just learned the rudiments of their work. They will accomplish much if they learn with an open mind.

3. The work of propaganda teams.

Propaganda teams are the basic units engaged in cultural work in the army. It is absolutely necessary for them to try hard to improve their ability, acquire more knowledge, and help spread cultural activities. Members of the teams should become competent cadres in cultural and educational work, and the teams should become the vanguard of the new-democratic revolution.

Propaganda teams constitute the schools for training cadres, not only for cultural work, but also for political work. When transferring cadres of propaganda teams to other posts or promoting them, leading organs should take the work of the teams concerned into consideration, refraining from leaving the teams with no cadres at all. Team leaders, on their part, should be willing to let their cadres improve themselves at other posts. In short, everybody should take the overall interest into account.

In the future, propaganda teams should accomplish the following tasks under the leadership of propaganda and education departments of political organs:

1) Organize cultural and recreational activities in the army, help political departments check on political work among the troops, and help propaganda and education departments check on their work among the troops. In order to gear their work to the needs of the troops, they should become deeply involved with the soldiers, so as to understand them and also temper themselves in practical work.

2) Conduct ceaseless propaganda and agitation under all circumstances during wartime.

3) Urge and help the troops to conduct ceaseless propaganda and agitation among the masses.

4) Keep in close touch with local cultural workers and primary school teachers, in order to establish a broad cultural united front and help advance local cultural movement.

5) Study hard to raise their own political and educational level, increase their working ability and acquire more knowledge.
IN CELEBRATION OF THE FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY
OF COMRADE LIU BOCHENG

December 15, 1942

A deep love for his country, his people and his own Party is essential for a Communist Party member. Comrade Bocheng not only possesses this love, but has devoted all his energy to the country, the people and his own Party. During his 30-year revolutionary career he has ignored all matters concerning his own life and death, honour and disgrace, as well as his health, and has never taken a day free from work. He has been assigned many very arduous and dangerous revolutionary tasks and has managed to surmount all difficulties in accomplishing them. He has suffered wounds in at least nine places for the sake of the liberation of the country and the people. He is so dedicated to the country, the people's well-being and the Party's cause that he has simply neglected everything else. He has made indelible contributions during the entire course of the revolution.

I became acquainted with Comrade Bocheng in 1931, when we were working in the Central Soviet Area in Jiangxi Province. Later we both took part in the Long March. We became partners after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, and over the last five years we have been living and working together. We share the same feelings and co-operate closely with each other. Of course, there are times when we disagree, but neither of us stubbornly clings to his own opinion. We always work together according to the opinion that seems most correct, no matter whose it happens to be. We hear from time to time that when some comrade or another is having disputes out of spite against his superiors, subordinates or peers, he always believes he is right and the others wrong and is always trying to overwhelm others, posing as a hero or "king of the mountain". As a result, his mistake harms the Party and impairs its work. If the comrade was always acting in the interest of the country, the people and the Party, instead of seeking his own

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honour or promotion, how could he make such a mistake? Comrade Bocheng
constantly persuades and educates other comrades in this spirit.

Comrade Bocheng works conscientiously to fulfil the tasks assigned him. I shall mention only some examples from the last five years, since there is no need to repeat the earlier ones. He has persevered as ordered behind enemy lines in the anti-Japanese war. He has always acted in conformity with the Three People’s Principles, the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction and the Party’s policies, never going a step beyond. He has never been careless in carrying out orders and instructions from higher authorities; he has always read and considered them over and over again before carrying them out under his working circumstances. Moreover, he has regularly conducted checks on their thorough implementation. You could almost say “Dive deep to the bottom of the sea” is his daily advice to the comrades.

Comrade Bocheng loves our compatriots. Whenever he heard of the enemy’s crimes of raping, looting, burning and killing, he would fly into a rage; when he was informed that the enemy was press-ganging able-bodied men, he immediately wrote out a directive to protect them; when he learned that the enemy was looting the people’s grain, he immediately began considering methods for protecting it; when he was told that the enemy had set fire to houses, he promptly called for the digging of caves to solve the housing problem; when he learned that some comrades were indifferent to the interests of the masses, he reproached them by phone or telegram without delay. Not long ago he found that a road outside a village had been ruined by flooding and people had to walk across a wheat field. He immediately had it repaired, saving the wheat field. This sort of thing is a common occurrence. Not only has he led troops in thousands of bloody battles, large or small, to protect the country’s territory and the people’s lives and property, but in everyday life he has also exhibited a Party member’s true love for the country and the people.

Comrade Bocheng loves his comrades, always giving them systematic guidance and earnest instructions, and encouraging them to achieve progress. He spends a lot of time talking with other comrades. Even when he finds a character written incorrectly, he helps to correct it. Tens of thousands of cadres have benefited from his help.

Comrade Bocheng is a fine example of a tireless reader. He not only pays close attention to theoretical study, but also pays particular attention to combining theory with practice. He has often advised the comrades to learn from the rank and file and from the masses, as he himself has been doing.

Comrade Bocheng has so many admirable traits for us to emulate that
the ones I have mentioned are only like a branch or a leaf of the tree. His exemplary actions, moral qualities and great contributions cannot be fully covered in a short essay.

People may ask whether Comrade Bocheng has any shortcomings. I think he has only one, that is, he allows himself no time for recreation outside of reading and working. He has no bad habits like smoking or drinking, and he doesn’t even know how to play chess or ball games. In his leisure time he just takes walks or chats with people. He often criticizes himself for being too “grudging” with his time. Is this really his shortcoming — or is it just the cause for his comrades’ concern for his health?

On the occasion of Comrade Bocheng’s fiftieth birthday, I wish him good health and success in the cause for which we are working hard together.
A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS

January 26, 1943

OUR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY

Our struggle against the enemy in north China, which has become increasingly intense and grave over the past five years, can be roughly divided into three stages.

In the first stage the advancing enemy troops mounted frontal attacks, but they were short of armed strength in north China, lacked experience and underestimated the strength of our Party and our army, thus providing us with very good conditions for establishing anti-Japanese base areas in the course of the struggle. During that period we took full advantage of the enemy's weaknesses and opened up new opportunities. At a time when the troops of the Central Army were withdrawing from north China to the south, our Party and army put forward the basic slogan, "Persist in armed resistance in north China and the Eighth Route Army will fight together with the people of north China to the death", and adopted the fundamental policy of persisting in the struggle behind enemy lines. The struggle against the enemy at that stage centred around opening up new opportunities, establishing base areas and expanding such areas. This was conducted in our area in the following manner.

Militarily, first of all we deployed part of our troops along the northern section of the Datong-Puzhou Railway in 1937, burning planes at Yangmingbu,21 for instance, and then we had all our troops fighting battles

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The second and fourth sections of Part One of "A General Account of the Struggle Against the Enemy Over the Past Five Years and the Policy for the Struggle Against the Enemy in the Future", a report produced at a meeting of senior cadres of the Taihang Sub-bureau of the CPC Central Committee. It was carried in Combat, No. 15, (supplement) published by the Taihang Sub-bureau on March 15, 1943.
at Qigencun, Huangyadi and Guangyang\textsuperscript{22} along the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway\textsuperscript{23} — all were defensive operations fought on the enemy’s flanks and rear in co-ordination with friendly forces that were launching frontal attacks; it was only after the fall of Taiyuan that our division began to fight alone, as we did when smashing the enemy's six-point convergent attack\textsuperscript{24} along the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway. In 1938 we fought three battles against the enemy's “mopping-up” operations, the fiercest of which was fought in smashing the enemy's nine-point convergent attack\textsuperscript{25} in southeastern Shanxi, before enemy troops laid siege to Xuzhou. We set up an ambush with the bulk of our troops along the Handan-Changzhi highway,\textsuperscript{26} beating back enemy troops along the Licheng-Shexian sector, recovering the Changzhi area, and fighting all the way to the Daokou-Qinghua Railway.\textsuperscript{27} In this way we expanded our influence and established the Southeastern Shanxi Base Area. Towards the end of 1937 we sent detachments eastwards to southern Hebei on reconnaissance missions, and in the spring and summer of 1938 we formally entered southern Hebei to form the Southern Hebei Base Area. During the battles at Xuzhou and Wuhan,\textsuperscript{28} we organized assaults along the Beiping-Hankou Railway and the Tianjin-Pukou Railway. The dozen massive assaults we launched along the Beiping-Hankou Railway, in particular, rendered significant support to the Kuomintang troops making the frontal attacks.

Politically, through our policy of “persisting in armed resistance in north China”, we foiled the enemy’s policy of “using Chinese to subdue Chinese and sustaining the war by means of war”. We struck hard at the enemy’s lackeys, crushed the “associations for the preservation of order”\textsuperscript{29} in the vast areas of southeastern Shanxi and southern Hebei, and the feudal organizations utilized by the enemy, such as secret societies,\textsuperscript{30} self-defence corps and joint village associations,\textsuperscript{31} and established anti-Japanese governments in many areas. We also wiped out sixty to seventy thousand men of the Imperial Army’s assistant forces\textsuperscript{32} and feudalistic armed forces of bandits and secret societies that had become puppets of the Japanese aggressors, established anti-Japanese guerrilla forces everywhere, and increased the regular armed forces by several times. We conducted, both extensively and intensively, propaganda and education for resisting Japan and saving the nation, arousing the people’s enthusiasm for resistance to Japanese aggression and thwarting the enemy’s ploy of “calling back the displaced refugees and restoring public order”, designed to deceive the people. Incessant guerrilla operations on both sides of the railways crippled, to a considerable degree, the enemy’s scheme of protecting the railways.

Economically, we did not adopt any measures to speak of, nor did we
pay any attention to work in this area. Although the enemy had accomplished a great deal, he failed to attain the goal of "sustaining the war by means of war" because the vast rural areas were under our control.

Our military and political struggles served to confine the enemy troops within their strongholds and blockade lines. It was a period of major progress for our side.

In the second stage enemy troops returned to north China and carried out a plan of "maintaining public order and conducting mopping-up operations". Consequently the struggle in north China became severe. During that period our policy was to "consolidate north China and develop central China". This was implemented in our area in the following manner.

Militarily, we launched ten battles against the enemy's "mopping-up" operations. The year 1939 saw in the Taihang area the enemy's capture of the Handan-Changzhi highway and our recovery of it. In 1940 we took the initiative to destroy communication lines on a large scale, thereby thwarting the enemy's policy of building "prisoners' cages". The major struggles included: destroying the communication lines in southern Hebei throughout the year, the Baigui-Jincheng Campaign in May and, in particular, the Hundred-Regiment Campaign, fought from August 20 to the end of the year, all of which served to frustrate the enemy's scheme of attacking Chongqing, Kunming and Xi'an. The fierce fighting throughout 1940 considerably weakened both the enemy and ourselves, but the enemy suffered more casualties than we did (at a ratio of nine to seven).

Politically, the base areas were becoming increasingly consolidated. In 1939 our Party and army grew to a considerable extent, a large number of people were mobilized and an anti-Japanese regime began to take shape. The establishment of the Joint Administrative Agency of the Southern Hebei, Taihang and Taiyue Areas in the summer of 1940 was of major political significance in unifying efforts to strengthen base areas in our strategic zone, and especially so in our struggle against the enemy. For nearly half the time during that stage we were being attacked by the Japanese aggressors and Chinese collaborators simultaneously. On the one hand, the diehards made outrageous attempts to sabotage the anti-Japanese base areas and, on the other, the enemy tried to seize every opportunity to sow discord between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in close co-ordination with the diehards' attack on us. In 1939 southern Hebei, Taihang and Taiyue were in a very grave situation. It was not until the beginning of 1940 that the correct policy of our Party, the wise and direct leadership of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, the support of the people and military victories brought about a change in the situation,
consolidating the base areas, cementing domestic unity, and foiling the enemy's schemes and intrigues for sowing discord.

Economically, we were still paying little attention to work in this area in 1939. The people lived in destitution and the army experienced extreme difficulties in obtaining supplies. In enemy-occupied areas we did no work among the people except asking them for supplies. Consequently, little money and materials were requisitioned. This was a period of extreme poverty for us (worst in the Taihang area). Not until 1940, when we began to tend to economic matters and pay attention to production and conservation of the people's financial resources in the base areas, while combatting the concept of "regarding enemy-occupied areas as our colonies" (as a result of which our people refused to go and work in those areas), were the masses in the base areas able to recover from their dire straits. Moreover, in 1939 we issued Southern Hebei Bank notes and increased our economic strength, thus ensuring our military supplies. During that period, however, we accomplished very little in our economic struggle against the enemy.

As for the struggle against secret agents, we engaged in limited defensive work only, and so the enemy succeeded in sending secret agents to our areas.

In this stage more base areas were consolidated, but work in the enemy-occupied areas was neglected. Although we repeatedly called for rectifying this situation, little change was made. Our practice of asking people for supplies in enemy-occupied areas in 1939 left a very bad impression on the people there and seriously damaged our political prestige. Our absence from those areas in 1940 did nothing to reverse this setback; in fact, it provided the enemy with the opportunity to consolidate and expand the areas they occupied. Leftist errors in policies occurred in southern Hebei after the punitive war in 1940 and in southeastern Shanxi before and after the December Incidents of 1939. These errors impaired the building and consolidation of the base areas and, at the same time, helped the enemy expand his social foundation. The Licheng meeting in April 1940 put an end to the confusion and stressed the three major guiding principles for Party, army and government development, with the aim of consolidating the base areas. Producing notable results, the meeting was successful and right on the whole, though there were some one-sided shortcomings and errors evident over certain issues. For example, there was too little emphasis on the work among the masses in the base areas and work in the enemy-occupied areas, the significance of guerrilla warfare was underestimated, the role of the regular forces was overstressed and local armed forces were reorganized or amalgated into larger units — only to further facilitate the enemy's advance and bring on our retreat. Through our struggle under extremely difficult
circumstances, we consolidated the anti-Japanese base areas and began to build them up at this stage. The enemy, on his part, achieved considerable success, in part, because of our negligence of political work in his areas and certain mistakes in our policies.

In the third stage the enemy carried out the "tighten public security" campaign, while we intensified our efforts to struggle against him and build up our base areas. Both sides continued to step up their endeavours, bringing the struggle to a stage of unprecedented acuteness. This was manifested in our area in the following manner.

Militarily, we fought 19 major battles against the enemy's "mopping-up" operations, and 515 minor ones against such operations and harassment raids. In the space of two years we carried out as many as 7,976 military operations. At the start of 1941, we began to stress the building up of military areas, corrected the mistake of reorganizing and amalgamating local armed forces, and overcame the laissez-faire attitude towards them. We established basic units for county and district militia and gradually developed them, turning quite a number of regular troops into local armed forces. The buildup of people's armed forces, mainly the militia, has laid the foundation for guerrilla warfare waged by the masses. Having grown considerably in size and combat effectiveness over the past two years, these forces are playing an increasingly substantial role. The number of guerrilla groups has risen too. All this has greatly contributed to our strength in protecting the base areas. Although we began to pay more attention to conducting guerrilla operations in enemy-occupied areas in 1941, very little was achieved for a lack of understanding of the significance of this on the part of local people. However, in 1942 we formed armed working teams, shifted our attention to enemy-occupied areas and communication lines, started and intensified the struggle within the enemy's "crisscross network". Then, after the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee and the Military Sub-commission initiated the struggle against the enemy's "nibbling" operations, significant results were achieved. Although the base areas had been shrinking steadily, after May 1942 the situation began to turn around. The anti-Japanese government considerably expanded the area under its jurisdiction in the Taihang area. While the situation regarding the base areas in southern Hebei was deteriorating, we successfully maintained our guerrilla warfare on the plains. There were a good number of successes in Taiyue, and a breakthrough was made in Yuenan and the Zhongtiao Mountains. In certain areas, however, not enough attention was paid to carrying the struggle into enemy-occupied areas.

Politically, the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee released a
series of explicit policies towards the end of 1940 and established the Provisional Assembly of Representatives and the Government of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Area in 1941. Marked progress was made in every aspect of work to build anti-Japanese base areas. However, little attention was paid to mobilizing and organizing the masses in 1941, so that development of democracy and other work remained just "pie in the sky" without any real progress. When the Northern Bureau advocated a revolutionary dual policy for enemy-occupied areas, people in certain areas did not understand that this was a policy of offensive action and so they pulled back their forces, further facilitating the enemy's "nibbling" tactics. However, after this was put right, some success was achieved, especially in the work among the puppet troops in southern Hebei. The year 1941 saw almost no success in the struggles against the enemy's "nibbling" actions, against the enemy's use of secret agents or against his activities in the areas under his occupation; but much headway was made in various places in 1942, because we adopted a policy of "when the enemy advances, we advance", established a few covert guerrilla base areas within the enemy's crisscross network, and accumulated a wealth of experience in this regard in Taihang, Taiyue and southern Hebei.

Economically, in 1941 we already pointed out the need to intensify our economic struggle against the enemy. We did not meet with much success, because we were still groping our way in the dark. For example, the Hebei currency was worth far less than the currency issued by the puppet government, which resulted in soaring prices. However, there was a radical change in 1942. In the Taihang area we were not only fairly successful in building up base areas, but also gained some experience and began to win some major victories in the economic struggle in the enemy-occupied areas. However, our economic struggle in southern Hebei and Taiyue remained fruitless, while the enemy gained many successes. This deserves our attention. There will be a special report on this matter later, so I shall not dwell on it now.

In our struggle against secret agents, we were not vigilant enough in dealing with the multifarious, bizarre secret-agent activities conducted by the enemy against our base areas before 1941. We began to give some attention to this matter only after various astonishing incidents, such as the riot instigated among the followers of Li Gua Taoism in Licheng and the riot among the people in Chaiguan. Yet, in general, we lacked a deep understanding of the enemy's cruelty. We have seen some improvement since the development of the mass movement, but we must still appeal more strongly to our comrades to sharpen their vigilance.

As for culture and propaganda, we launched three political offensives
against the enemy in 1941 and conducted extensive political propaganda and agitation in the enemy-occupied areas, which played a considerable role in combatting the enemy’s “tightly public security” campaign and heightening people's morale in resisting the Japanese aggressors. In 1942 we launched three more political offensives, which were co-ordinated with guerrilla operations and, in some enemy-occupied areas, with the people’s struggle against press-ganging and rationing, the most successful being the one directed at the enemy’s fifth “tighten public security” campaign. This was because in political offensives previous to this we generally undertook very little propaganda work, but in the offensive against the enemy’s fifth campaign we focused our attack on the enemy’s plundering of grain, through a truly unified struggle in which many small armed units took powerful actions in conjunction with appropriate propaganda, agitation and struggle against Chinese collaborators, “associations for the preservation of order” and secret agents. It must be pointed out, however, that in political offensives over the past five years we have generally ignored organizational work in the enemy-occupied areas. Things are vastly different now following the outbreak of the Pacific War, our political offensives and improvement in our work in the enemy-occupied areas in 1942. Our political influence has been greatly extended and the people have come to realize that Japan is doomed to defeat, which forms the foundation for our organizational work in enemy-occupied areas. In the past we intolerably neglected such work in those areas and, therefore, we should make it our most urgent task in the days ahead.

To sum up, during the first three of the enemy’s five “tightly public security” campaigns we were far from vigilant; as a result the enemy attained substantial success. In the last two campaigns, in particular the fifth one, although the enemy was quite successful, he failed to achieve anything more than that, because we waged a fierce struggle and won an enormous victory.

The above is a brief account of our struggle against the enemy.

A BRIEF SUMMARY

What can we learn from our struggle with the enemy and the changes it has brought about over the past five years?

1. Both the enemy and we have capable leadership and political keenness. We know how to analyse our experience, study the enemy and work out countermeasures. The enemy also knows how to study us, learn from his experience and steadily improve his principles and policies. There-
fore, our struggle with the enemy is not just a contest of military strength, but one involving all our abilities. It is not just a battle of strength; even more important, it is a battle of wits. Now that the enemy and we are both fighting in a planned and organized way, the struggle will require more skill and become more intense. Our cadres at the lower levels seem far from being capable of waging such a complex struggle, so sincere efforts must be made to strengthen the lower levels and enhance these cadres' abilities to fight the enemy.

2. We should always keep in mind two features of the struggle against the enemy: the protracted nature of the war and our weak position in relation to the enemy. We should, therefore, work to weaken the enemy, preserve ourselves, covertly build up strength and prepare for a counteroffensive. In the past we had a poor understanding of this principle and often made the mistake of revealing our positions, which always resulted in great losses on our side — incurring either retaliation or sabotage by the enemy. We must see to it from now on that we do not reveal anything about our activities. We should learn how to discreetly amass strength from all quarters and cause the enemy to regard us as inferior. We should use every means to put the enemies off their guard. Only in this way can we build up our strength and strike the enemy where it hurts the most. The enemy also attaches great importance to secrecy. For example, a document from the enemy's 110th Division prescribes the tactic of "not shocking or disturbing the enemy before making a sudden leap". This shows that the enemy has actually been doing the same thing and has been quite successful (as in their preparations before each "mopping-up" campaign and "nibbling" operation). Therefore, we must act secretly on the one hand, and try to find out what the enemy is planning to do on the other.

3. The outcome of our struggle with the enemy is determined by the attitude of the people and, above all, by the attitude of the people in the enemy-occupied areas. Even if they oppose the enemy but remain neutral towards us, this will only benefit the enemy. Therefore, it is essential that we adopt correct policies in the base areas, but even more important, we should formulate a whole set of clear-cut policies for the enemy-occupied and guerrilla areas. Otherwise, we will make mistakes which the enemy is likely to use to his advantage. The enemy is, in fact, adept at taking advantage of our weak points to make up for his basic weaknesses inherent in the contradiction between China and Japan. Experience has shown that, for a while in the past, people in the enemy-occupied areas took a neutral or even unfriendly attitude towards us, because our policies were erroneous, which allowed the enemy to expand his strength tremendously. Experience has also
shown that if we do no work in the enemy-occupied areas, the base areas will shrink; if we fail to hold firmly to the guerrilla areas, not only will the base areas shrink, but we shall also lose advantageous positions from which to advance towards enemy-occupied areas. Moreover, experience has shown that we are bound to fail if we resort to oversimplified and rigid work methods in enemy-occupied and guerrilla areas and that we must consider the local circumstances, do everything to protect the people's interests, and put forward appropriate methods for the struggle against the enemy, if we want to win the support of the people and achieve victory. In particular, experience has shown that leaders who care about the people's problems and help them find ways to combat the enemy and protect their interests will enjoy popular support.

4. Whether in the base areas or in enemy-occupied or guerrilla areas the starting point for all our policies and work must be to magnify the contradiction between China and Japan, a principle which we must resolutely pursue — this will hit the enemy where it hurts the most. Great changes favourable to us are now taking place in the enemy-occupied areas. Basically this can be seen in the tremendous increase in people's enthusiasm for resistance to Japan and the increase in contradictions between the enemy and the puppet forces. We should get a good grip on this basic feature in developing our work, fully understand the essence of the contradiction between China and Japan, expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and unite all the anti-Japanese factions of various strata in the struggle against the enemy. Experience has shown that in enemy-occupied areas it is best not to magnify the class contradiction among the Chinese; the basic idea should be to unite all Chinese in the fight against the enemy. In this way we can further spread our work in enemy-occupied areas; if we do otherwise, we shall be unable to gain a foothold there. Experience has also shown that achieving unity of the Chinese against the enemy involves a struggle, too. The struggle should be directed mainly against those few individuals who fail to understand the just nature of the war of resistance and who try to disrupt unity, assist the enemy or pursue their own selfish interests, but it should be peaceful and political. Strong measures should be used only against the Chinese collaborators and secret agents who are totally committed to working for the enemy and are utterly detested by the people. In the base areas we should pay close attention to solidifying unity. For instance, the enforcement of the decrees on the reduction of rent and interest rates and reasonable distribution of the burdens in the base areas is absolutely necessary for fully arousing the masses, thereby laying a solid foundation for the united front and bringing this greater anti-Japanese force into play. However, we must still
make sure that we shall only mobilize the masses within the united front. Holding the base areas requires not only the mobilization of the masses in general, but also the unity of people from all strata. If we neglect either, our mistake will be to the enemy's advantage.

5. The building up of base areas (including the armed forces, political power, the masses and the Party) cannot be separated from the struggle against the enemy. Experience has shown that without base areas we cannot persist in the struggle against the enemy; without the struggle against the enemy, attempts to build base areas behind closed doors will imperil survival of the base areas. In the days ahead we should devote more thought to the base areas, work hard to further develop them and carry on a tenacious struggle to safeguard them. For the same purpose, we must organize powerful resistance in the enemy-occupied areas.

6. Our struggle with the enemy boils down to the formula that when the enemy advances, we advance, too. Now that the enemy is bent on advancing towards us, we must advance towards him, for only in this way can we disrupt or check the enemy's advance and consolidate our own positions. Consequently, guerrilla warfare will steadily increase in the base areas of north China, and the same will happen in the enemy-occupied areas. To gain the initiative in such an interlocking, complex struggle, we must become very familiar with the enemy, figure out his patterns of activity, and take advantage of all the opportunities the enemy may offer us. When the enemy conducts a "mopping-up" operation in an area, people in other areas should seize the interval to combat the enemy, while people in the area under enemy attack should co-ordinate their fight with operations on the exterior lines to gain the initiative. A "when the enemy advances, we advance" type of struggle can also be applied to the covert struggle. The enemy's secret-agent activities in our base areas and our efforts to covertly build up our strength in enemy-occupied areas, as well as in the puppet troops and organizations, will grow increasingly intense. In short, we must pay close attention to the matter of gaining the initiative in the struggle against the enemy.

7. The guiding principle behind our military operations is: guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions. Due to our lack of an adequate understanding of this principle in the past, we emphasized the building up of regular forces to the neglect of local and people's armed forces over a long period of time, making the mistake of reorganizing or amalgamating local armed forces or taking a laissez-faire attitude towards them. This seriously impeded our struggle against the enemy. In addition, we were not fully aware of the protracted
nature of the war and of the enemy's relative strength. In the days ahead (before we launch the counteroffensive) more guerrilla operations will be conducted in the base areas, and mobile warfare will be out of the question on the plains and will be kept to a minimum in mountainous areas. Therefore, we should develop extensive guerrilla operations with mass participation. Success was achieved in this respect in 1942, and we should provide more effective leadership to guerrilla operations in the future. We should cherish the armed forces and militarize Party cadres.

8. The enemy conducted “warfare in every field” against us and we waged a “unified” struggle against him. Past experience has shown that wherever “unified” leadership was exercised successfully, the effort against the enemy was powerful; internal friction and bickering only cause us to relax or lose control of the struggle against the enemy, resulting in great losses. We should carry out the decision of the Central Committee on unifying organization of the base areas behind enemy lines, exercising unified leadership, and ensuring leadership over work in the military, political, economic and cultural fields and in enemy-occupied areas, as well as close co-ordination of work in these fields. In order to intensify our struggle against the enemy, we must unify leadership and keep in step.

9. In the past our comrades generally had a clear understanding of the need to persist in armed resistance behind enemy lines and achieve victory, but not of the need to consolidate our positions in north China after the war, as can be seen from their neglect of the work in enemy-occupied areas over the past few years. From the very beginning of the war of resistance, however, the Kuomintang focused its efforts on infiltrating the puppet troops and organizations and hiding there for a long time to prepare themselves for the postwar days. They secured the lead start and made considerable headway, whereas we made serious strategic errors and must compensate for them through hard work. Our comrades were not sufficiently aware of the political significance of each and every move of our struggle behind enemy lines and its potential impact on the country as a whole. Due to this, they often failed to keep the overall situation in mind and sometimes were not careful enough in what they did and said or in making policy decisions, and they lacked a thorough understanding of the policies of the Central Committee. These are the chief manifestations of assertion of independence and impurity in Party spirit, as were criticized by the Central Committee. Obviously, it is our duty not only to achieve victory in the war of resistance, but also to build up the base areas, persist in the struggle against the enemy behind enemy lines, set a good example for the entire nation and strive for unity in national economic development after the war. Therefore, when formulating policies
and taking actions, we should not only take the base areas into account, but also their impact on the country. This point should be fostered among our cadres, especially among our leading cadres.

10. The Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong, the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai have always issued explicit guiding principles and directives on persevering in the struggle behind enemy lines. On the whole, we have carried them out and, therefore, have been successful over the past few years. However, when we do not adequately understand the directives issued by the Central Committee and our higher authorities, we are bound to make mistakes. For instance, our poor understanding of guerrilla warfare and our neglect of the work in enemy-occupied areas has impaired our work seriously and has caused considerable losses. This has taught us a lesson: Every cadre must, in his own work, carefully study the directives from the Central Committee and his higher authorities and try to apply them to his own working circumstances. This provides an important guarantee that we can overcome serious difficulties, achieve victory in the war of resistance and rebuild the country after the war.
ORGANIZATIONAL WORK AND APPLICATION OF POLICY IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED AREAS

January 26, 1943

Organizational work in enemy-occupied areas mainly consists of infiltrating the enemy, that is, establishing Party and mass organizations and conducting revolutionary work among the puppet troops and organizations. This is the correct application of the dual revolutionary policy.

Without organizational work it will be impossible for us to build up our strength in enemy-occupied areas and among the puppet troops and organizations, to start the fermentation process, so to speak, and to lay an organizational foundation. The Party has time and again stressed the importance of this work, but we have made far less effort in this regard than the Kuomintang or, strictly speaking, we have not truly begun working on it yet.

In the past, some of our departments did try to do something in this direction, but to no avail, with the exception of a few individual cases. We sent a number of cadres to infiltrate the puppet troops and organizations in enemy-occupied areas, but they never got anywhere because they did not have the necessary contacts with the right people there. Generally speaking, we do not know how to choose people from the vast enemy-occupied areas or from among the puppet troops and organizations to work for us, or to win over the intellectuals and progressives there so that they can infiltrate the enemy. We haven't done well at reforming double-dealers in the puppet troops and organizations into ones working for the revolution as our own cadres, because we did not realize that only such people have the necessary close ties in enemy-occupied areas and puppet troops and organizations and that only they can readily infiltrate the enemy. Actually, we had many chances to do this in the past, but we just let them slip by. Some people in

The main points from Part Three of "A General Account of the Struggle Against the Enemy Over the Past Five Years and the Policy for the Struggle Against the Enemy in the Future", a report delivered at a meeting of senior cadres of the Taihang Sub-bureau of the CPC Central Committee. The full text of this part was carried in Combat, No. 15, (supplement) published by the Taihang Sub-bureau on March 15, 1943.
the puppet troops and organizations have the potential to serve as revolu-
tionary double-dealers, and some have already become revolutionary double-
dealers. We might well ask what we have done, other than conducting some
propaganda work, making contacts and gathering some information from
among them, to help them progress towards becoming an organizational
force to infiltrate the enemy and take root there. It was more distressing when
some of our good contacts were destroyed by the enemy due to our confusion
in work and failure to maintain secrecy. Because of a subjective approach to
problems, a closed-door and narrow-minded work style, and satisfaction with
the status quo, our work in enemy-occupied areas has been confined to
propaganda and our organizational work has so far remained just a slogan.
In contrast, the Kuomintang, ever since the outbreak of the war against
Japan, has concentrated on building up its strength in enemy-occupied areas
to achieve superiority in the postwar period. It has been working hard to win
over puppet troops and organizations and sent people to work in enemy-
occupied areas and lie low for the necessary duration, establishing Kuomin-
tang organizations and a secret service. Relying on feudal forces, it has been
trying to keep under its control various feudal organizations and even secret
societies and bandits. The Kuomintang’s achievements in all this are not to
be belittled; we cannot afford to turn a blind eye to them!

We have no time to lose. To prepare for counter-offensive and postwar
endeavours, we must redouble our efforts in our organizational work in
enemy-occupied areas and be more meticulous.

Although we are at present still in an inferior position in enemy-
occupied areas, the changes over the past year are more advantageous than
ever to our organizational work, as shown in the following observation:
Never before have the contradictions between the people and the Japanese
invaders there been so sharp as they are today; they will continue to become
sharper and the people’s enthusiasm for fighting Japan will increase, which
will greatly help expand our social foundation for organizational work. The
prestige of our Party, our army and the anti-Japanese democratic government
has grown enormously, and after several years’ hard work, we have estab-
lished a number of contacts for conducting organizational work. Since most
of the people in the puppet troops and organizations are from north China,
they worry about their families and themselves, and have gradually come to
believe that north China cannot be separated from the Eighth Route Army
and the Communist Party. The prestige of the Kuomintang is decreasing (a
result of its policy of employing secret agents and its sabotage of anti-
Japanese efforts behind the enemy lines) and its organizational foundation
has been somewhat weakened.
However, we also face some difficulties: Through his clever secret-agent policy, the enemy will try to keep a tighter control over the puppet troops and organizations and the areas under his occupation; the Kuomintang secret agents' sabotage activities and their tactic of using others to eliminate their adversaries will certainly present an obstacle to our day-to-day work. For our part, we lack experience in doing organizational work in enemy-occupied areas; a narrow, closed-door, sectarian work style has impeded progress in our work; in particular, our cadres do not have a good grasp of policy and they lack experience in and knowledge of secret work.

We should take advantage of favourable conditions, overcome difficulties, especially self-imposed ones, and enrich our experience in work.

Now I should like to discuss some specific questions.

1. Infiltration.

Infiltrating the enemy is the primary concern in organizational work. If we fail to infiltrate the enemy, we can accomplish nothing.

There is a wide area which requires infiltration: the masses, enemy-occupied cities, puppet troops and organizations, secret societies, underground gangs, bandits and all other organizations — but most important of all is the puppet troops.

The tasks are: to lie low and conduct covert, resourceful and discreet propaganda and organizational work; to build up strength and to raise our political position, in addition to that of other revolutionaries and anti-Japanese people, so that when the time comes, they can support counter-offensives and meet the needs of the revolution. Therefore, we should learn how to apply the dual revolutionary policy and co-ordinate both the overt and covert work. Except for the most urgent and exceptionally important information, supplying information is of secondary importance; it should only be done secretly and only if it does not affect fulfilment of the basic tasks. In particular, we should not require those who have achieved infiltration to buy any sort of materials or make demands on them, in order to protect them from exposure.

There is a wide range of people we can choose for undertaking infiltration — from among people in revolutionary base areas, in enemy-occupied areas, especially intellectuals, progressive gentry and social celebrities and people from the puppet troops and organizations whom we have won over and transformed into revolutionary double-dealers, with people from the last two categories making up the majority. We should send many cadres into enemy-occupied areas, in particular, we should send the best ones to infiltrate and set up organizations there. This task may be accomplished if we can find enough of such persons in enemy-occupied areas and puppet troops and
organizations. We also need to send a number of cadres from the base areas, but they must be ones that have, among other things, contacts with people in the enemy-occupied areas, or they will not be of much use. At the same time, we should transfer some comrades who are experienced in working in such areas or who have other favourable qualifications to strengthen the departments in charge of work in those areas, letting them undertake training or liaison work.

Training for personnel who will infiltrate enemy-occupied areas is most important, but the training period should be short, the content simple, and the assigned task clear and uncomplicated. It should be conducted in the form of discussions; the trainees should be encouraged to raise questions, which should be answered explicitly. The teaching method characterized by stereotyped Party writing should be avoided by all means. In some cases we can only talk with them individually.

After our people are sent to enemy-occupied areas, we should keep in constant touch with them (which does not mean we can contact them anytime we like though) and give them any assistance they might need to overcome difficulties, including allocating funds for their activities and giving them guidance on working methods. At this moment we should see to it that they do not flinch from difficulties by bolstering up their resolve to infiltrate the enemy. After they have infiltrated the enemy, we should particularly strengthen political contacts with them, helping them solve any difficulties in their work and keeping them informed of the political situation so that they will not lose their bearings and become degenerate.

Infiltration requires a great deal of patient organizational work, for which we have little experience to draw upon. Therefore, we should try to identify and build on our experience in order to undertake this important work successfully.

2. Application of the Dual Revolutionary Policy.

First, the question of the dual revolutionary policy was raised by the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee in early 1941. In the past two years we have achieved a lot through applying this policy, though in the beginning some deviations occurred. Some people committed the error of retreating of their own accord, only to lose their own positions so that the enemy had more areas under his control. Others abolished the people's armed forces and discarded guerrilla warfare, which caused dissatisfaction among the people, increased defeatist sentiments and brought about confusion. They did these things because they did not understand that the dual revolutionary policy was, in essence, a policy of offensives on enemy-occupied areas, mistaking it for a policy of retreat. Therefore, we should, first of all, get it
straight in our minds that the dual revolutionary policy is an offensive one, a policy to be pursued only in enemy-occupied areas and enemy-dominated guerrilla zones.

In our fight with the enemy it may happen that enemy-occupied areas become guerrilla zones and even guerrilla base areas, whereas base areas may become guerrilla zones and even enemy-occupied areas. Such being the case, in giving guidance, we should pay attention not only to the need of offensive action when we are in a favourable position, but also to the need of retreat when we are in an unfavourable position. Both in offensive action and in retreat, we should act in accordance with plans and in a systematic and orderly manner. This is the only way we can hold and consolidate our position and avoid confusion.

Second, quite a few comrades in a number of places are not clear about the content of the dual revolutionary policy. They confuse revolutionary double-dealers with ordinary double-dealers. They are content to establish ordinary contacts or obtain a little information from double-dealers, even dropping their guard against the dual policy pursued by traitors — this is also incorrect. Therefore, we must make it clear that the dual revolutionary policy is an offensive policy designed to infiltrate the enemy (mainly the enemy-occupied areas and the puppet troops and organizations). This policy involves many aspects of work, such as the fostering of revolutionary double-dealers, the winning over of ordinary double-dealers and the utilization of all forces possible, with the chief aim being to foster and expand our group of revolutionary double-dealers so that we can rely on them to unite and organize all possible forces to struggle against the enemy, safeguard the people’s interests, build up our strength in enemy-occupied areas and within the enemy and puppet organizations, and wait for the opportunity to support our counter-attacks or win over the enemy.

Third, the dual revolutionary policy involves not only revolutionary resistance to Japan, which is of primary importance, but also the need to deal with the enemy, the purpose of which is to cover up our revolutionary resistance. Without the former it cannot be called a dual revolutionary policy and, conversely, if we ignore the latter, the policy won’t work. It is very important for us to distinguish between revolutionary double-dealers and ordinary double-dealers. The distinct feature of the latter lies in that they deal with the enemy as well as us, whereas that of the former lies in that they do all they can to build up their strength, safeguard the people’s interests and prepare for counter-offensives. Even though they may have to work with the enemy, it is for these same purposes. This is the criterion we should use to judge who is a revolutionary double-dealer and who is simply a double-dealer,
and to foster and expand our group of revolutionary double-dealers. Being ignorant of this difference, many comrades are content to make use of ordinary double-dealers and neglect to foster revolutionary ones. Therefore, we must have a clear picture of the difference between the dual nature of the dual revolutionary policy and revolutionary double-dealers, and that of ordinary double-dealers. The dual revolutionary policy calls primarily for an illegal struggle against the enemy and full use of legal forms of struggle and any legal status to shield and support the illegal struggle and of overt work to screen covert work. Failure to do so will make it impossible for us to execute the struggle against the enemy in enemy-occupied areas or cause us to act aimlessly and suffer defeat.

So much for the nature of the dual revolutionary policy. Now I should like to differentiate between two areas of the application of this policy: within the puppet troops or the upper levels of puppet organizations and within the enemy-occupied areas or villages in enemy-dominated guerrilla zones. The former represents the activities of revolutionary double-dealers and the latter takes the form of the activities of the masses.

Let's first discuss the application of the dual revolutionary policy within the puppet troops, the upper levels of the puppet regime, and semi-puppet feudal organizations and armed forces.

First, the basic point of departure is to get a clear picture of and fully exploit the contradictions between Japan and the puppet regime and contradictions within the puppet troops and organizations. Our people should try to expand the scope of the contradictions between Japan and the puppet regime and make use of each and every contradiction to further their work.

Second, they should make as many friends as possible so as to win the trust of their colleagues, subordinates and, in particular, their superiors, raise their position, and improve conditions for their activities. In making friends, however, they must bear in mind their status, so as not to arouse envy or suspicion.

Third, they should exploit their own position to conduct propaganda and organizational work secretly and resourcefully, but they should guard against impetuousity. The types of organizations should be varied and they should adopt neutral names or ones which will not attract the enemy's attention. It would be better to establish many small independent groups rather than large ones.

Fourth, they should try every means possible and take every opportunity to help their colleagues, subordinates and, in particular, their superiors become double-dealers and, better still, revolutionary ones.

Fifth, they should at all times secretly look after the interests of the
Chinese people, especially anti-Japanese revolutionaries.

Sixth, they should employ every possible means to eliminate sworn traitors and individuals who use others to kill their adversaries. With regard to secret agents who have not harmed us, they should take the attitude of "staying at a respectful distance". Experience in various places has shown that if we don't tackle this problem prudently, we shall suffer the consequences.

Seventh, they should supply no information unless it is very urgent or important.

Eighth, they must pay attention to secret work at all times and conceal their identities. Under unfavourable circumstances or when there is an opportunity to strengthen their position, it would even be permissible to reduce their revolutionary activities to a minimum. In short, they should do everything for the sake of long-term concealment, awaiting the right opportunity to arise.

Ninth, they should concentrate their efforts on the puppet troops, gradually shifting the emphasis from their work in other fields to work among the puppet troops.

Tenth, the activities of revolutionary double-dealers involve a bitter struggle which takes varied, complicated forms. These people must guard against Japan's secret agents and sabotage by Kuomintang secret agents. Therefore, they should carry out their activities boldly yet with great caution. If they work in a down-to-earth manner, do not boast or take reckless action or reveal their identities, they can certainly achieve the desired results.

Now let's talk about the application of the dual revolutionary policy in enemy-occupied areas or villages in guerrilla zones where the enemy is in a superior position. This policy can be applied only in villages that meet with the following requirements:

First, all the villagers are united against the enemy. In the villages united-front work to unite all social strata has been successful and, in particular, firm measures have been taken to eliminate sworn traitors. To unite all the villagers against the enemy is no easy job; it can be done only through struggle. The essential link lies in arousing the majority of the masses to struggle against the enemy, and only then can the problem be considered solved.

Second, the villages are supported by armed struggle, including both open armed struggle outside the villages and small-scale, concealed ones inside them. Without the former, it will be difficult to deceive the enemy; without the latter, no timely co-ordination will be forthcoming, which is essential to extensive guerrilla warfare with mass participation. The experience gained in
various places shows that guerrilla warfare has become an important component of the dual revolutionary policy. Control of the armed forces has a vital bearing on gaining the upper hand in a village, so we should do our utmost to keep the armed forces in our own hands or in the hands of other revolutionaries. These armed forces must be small, but well trained, and must operate absolutely underground. In general, they should operate at night so as to make the enemy believe they are Eighth Route Army guerrillas.

Third, outwardly, village organizations should take on the form of puppet organizations, but in essence they must resist Japan. As for political power, a united-front congress of villagers' representatives that is similar to a democratic government should be established, with all real power of the village held by the congress, not by the head of the village. We should realize that only this kind of political power can guarantee the villagers' united struggle against the enemy, avoid being used by the enemy, and take into consideration and safeguard the people's interests. It is inconceivable that a government ruled by the landlord class could execute a dual revolutionary policy, let alone safeguard the people's interests — at most it can be considered a double-dealing one, dealing with the enemy on the one hand and with us on the other (of course, the extent of this will differ between the two). As to mass organizations, with the exception of villages where there is sound groundwork and whose original organizational forms can be preserved, the rest should be made into pure and uniform associations for resisting Japan and saving the nation.

Fourth, united struggle by one village should develop into united struggle by several villages or even a whole area — only this can make it easier to deal with the enemy and deceive him. If only a few villages carry out the struggle, they can easily be overcome by the enemy.

When a village meets these requirements, it can be considered qualified to apply the dual revolutionary policy. It can not only wage the struggle against the enemy successfully, but also truly maintain a dominant position.

From the above we can see that the dual revolutionary policy includes revolutionary double-dealing, the winning over of double-dealers and making use of all those who can be utilized, but the expansion of revolutionary double-dealer groups should be our main objective. Of course, this does not mean we can slacken our work among ordinary double-dealers. In the past many of them have helped us a great deal in the anti-Japanese war; moreover, they are numerous and constitute the main elements for us to transform into revolutionary double-dealers.

From the above we can see that the dual revolutionary policy means co-ordinating legal and illegal struggles, legal and illegal methods and overt
and covert work, with emphasis on illegal struggles and covert work, which must be concealed through the legal struggle and overt work.

From the above we can see that the application of the dual revolutionary policy involves a serious struggle. The desired results can be achieved only through patient, painstaking and down-to-earth organizational work. Unplanned action, recklessness, impetuosity and carelessness will only lead to defeat.


In enemy-occupied areas (when our armed forces can frequently carry out operations there, they become guerrilla zones) illegal struggle should be the principal form of struggle. Armed struggle and guerrilla warfare are the highest form of illegal struggle.

The aggravation of the contradiction between the Chinese people and the Japanese invaders in enemy-occupied areas contributes to winning over double-dealers, fostering revolutionary double-dealers, and, even more so, to conducting guerrilla operations and setting up small, concealed anti-Japanese guerrilla base areas. From now on we should systematically wage guerrilla operations in enemy-occupied areas and set up small, concealed guerrilla base areas, with the aim of building up our strength, preparing for a counter-offensive and creating conditions for our postwar endeavours. These are important links in maintaining base areas in mountainous regions and sustaining guerrilla warfare in the plains, as well as an important way for us to hold out until victory.

Although conditions in enemy-occupied areas may be favourable for us to wage guerrilla operations there, setting up small guerrilla base areas there is an arduous task. However, to think it is easy reflects a false perspective. Experience in some places shows that before establishing concealed base areas, it is essential to create the necessary political conditions by steadily and surely launching political offensives. This is very true. First, we need to gain a full understanding of the specific local conditions, send small guerrilla units to attack enemy-occupied areas here and there, and then select cadres who have contacts in such areas and send them there or have them work with the guerrillas. We should prepare the masses and the community as a whole, broaden our influence through the exemplary observation of discipline and explicit policy, engage in propaganda and organizational activities, win over double-dealers, foster revolutionary double-dealers, utilize the contradictions between China and Japan to enhance the enthusiasm and courage of people in various strata in their struggle against the enemy, and try every possible means to establish concealed local armed forces. Only after we have done all
this can we get small guerrilla units to dispatch or establish small local units, and keep up guerrilla operations.

To sustain guerrilla warfare in enemy-occupied areas, guerrilla units (whether sent in by us or established there), operating in the name of the Eighth Route Army, should combine with small local armed forces; neither will be powerful enough without the other. Without armed forces in the name of the Eighth Route Army, it will be impossible to deceive or confuse the enemy; without armed forces composed of local masses, primary guerrilla units will cause themselves to become exposed and cannot last long.

The armed force, whether primary guerrilla units or armed forces composed of local masses, should operate covertly in enemy-occupied areas. It is better for the former to operate sometimes covertly and sometimes overtly, whereas the latter should operate only at night and in the name of the Eighth Route Army.

The main tasks of guerrilla units in enemy-occupied areas are to safeguard the people's interests, lighten the economic and forced-labour burdens imposed on the people (especially people in the guerrilla units' own districts or villages) by the enemy, protect able-bodied men from being press-ganged and grain from being looted, disrupt the enemy's ruling order, prevent the enemy and puppet troops from trampling on the masses, maintain the people's morale, frustrate the activities of enemy and puppet secret agents, and attack small enemy and puppet units when they are absolutely sure of not being exposed — all for the purpose of sustaining the struggle and building up their strength in such areas. Guerrilla operations in enemy-occupied areas should be combined with the application of the dual revolutionary policy, providing the main support for its application. In their operations, guerrilla units should keep in mind two things: They should consider the people's interests and endeavour to do whatever will safeguard them, and they should be very careful not to do anything that may cause the enemy to harm the people. They should also act in secret, not exposing themselves by ostentatiously parading their strength, so that the enemy can never find their whereabouts and will slacken his vigilance.

The preservation and maintenance of concealed guerrilla base areas in enemy-occupied areas not only calls for efforts to arouse the masses and keep up guerrilla warfare, but must also be supported by efforts to win over puppet troops and organizations and feudal armed forces (self-defence corps, secret societies, bandits, etc.) — this must be done in accordance with the principle of the Chinese people uniting as one man in the fight against the enemy. We should refrain from being too irritating with regard to the enemy, always keeping our eye on the long-term struggle. Attracting the enemy's
attention can be most disadvantageous to ourselves. In short, in enemy-occupied areas we should combine legal with illegal efforts, under no circumstances acting blindly to the neglect of the legal struggle or becoming careless due to victories.

In addition, we should prepare to wage guerrilla warfare, not only in the surrounding areas but also in nearby enemy-occupied famine-stricken areas — this is a strategically important step.

4. Doing Everything to Safeguard the Interests of the Chinese People.

Members of our guerrilla units and armed working teams in enemy-occupied areas should aim at safeguarding the interests of the Chinese people; this is a matter of preserving the might of the country and building up our strength and is the starting point of our revolutionary work in these areas. If we fail to co-ordinate our activities in these areas with the people’s interests, we shall be unable to establish concealed guerrilla base areas and foster revolutionary double-dealers; worse still, we shall lose our foothold. The essence of the dual revolutionary policy lies in safeguarding the people’s interests and, on this basis, expanding revolutionary anti-Japanese forces.

Safeguarding the people’s interests in enemy-occupied areas involves two aspects: uniting people of all strata to oppose the enemy and helping ease the burdens imposed on the people by the enemy; and taking the interests of the masses into account where the burdens imposed on them by the enemy and their daily lives are concerned. The latter should be confined to the common struggle against the enemy.

In enemy-occupied areas and in guerrilla zones where the enemy is in a superior position we cannot help people evade the burdens imposed by the enemy, but we can work to reduce them. These burdens are wide-ranging, including human and material resources plundered by the enemy, money and other things extorted by enemy and puppet personnel, enormous sums of village funds taken by them, and serious graft and waste. Therefore, we should help the people ease their burdens in various ways.

Lightening the burdens imposed by the enemy is a complicated affair, involving both a legal and illegal struggle and represents a definite application of the dual revolutionary policy. In the past we achieved notable results in co-ordinating armed struggle with the work of lightening these burdens. In one such example, people disguised as Eighth Route Army troops extricated labourers and able-bodied men who had been press-ganged, and retrieved money and materials that had been taken by the enemy and puppet troops. The most striking example was the struggle against the looting of grain waged in combatting the enemy’s fifth “campaign for tightening public security” which completely thwarted the enemy’s plan for storing grain.
struggles have provided the people with good pretexts to deceive the enemy and protect themselves, and at the very least they have helped stall for time and reduce the people's burdens. This comes under the category of the illegal struggle.

A legal struggle should also be employed. Although the possible scope for a legal struggle is quite limited under enemy rule, we should nevertheless make full use of it, as long as it can benefit the people in some way. Even if nothing is achieved in the struggle, the extent of the enemy's ferocity will be revealed and the people will gain some political experience and gradually switch to an illegal and armed struggle. Experience has shown that some results can be achieved if a legal struggle is conducted skilfully. Here, it should be pointed out that in the past we did very little to safeguard the interests of the people in enemy-occupied areas and that in some places we were content with just having people give us financial and material support, as they did the enemy. This is extremely harmful. In the struggle to protect able-bodied men from being press-ganged, in particular, we seemed to be incompetent and dull-witted. This merits our close attention in the future.

It is both possible and necessary to consider the interests of the masses in lightening their burdens and in their daily lives. Though absolutely impossible in areas completely under enemy rule (such areas are decreasing), in all other areas where we can wage guerrilla operations and especially where we have access in terms of political power (such areas are increasing), this issue should be raised and resolved. However, the extent of our efforts and methods to be used should differ from place to place, depending on the amount of work that has been done.

We should encourage Party members and cadres to learn how to identify problems in the daily lives of the local people and find opportunities to solve them. There are many ways to attend to the interests of the masses, such as upholding the principle of the reasonable distribution of burdens imposed by the enemy, taking advantage of people's enthusiasm for supporting the anti-Japanese government to explain government decrees to them and encourage them to carry out those decrees. Other methods include protecting the interests of the whole village by local guerrilla teams through demanding reduced rent and interest rates and not slackening any efforts in mediating in each and every problem concerning tenancy debt and employer-employee relationships, and even ordinary civil cases. For instance, when people in enemy-occupied areas bring a civil lawsuit to the anti-Japanese government, the government should be ready to accept the case and handle it impartially, mainly through mediation, while giving proper consideration to the interests of the masses. Impartially handling lawsuits itself benefits the masses. In rural
areas such problems are numerous, and here we can very well help iron out people's grievances in the light of actual circumstances. Of course, requests should not be excessive. If cases cannot be handled by district or by village, they can be dealt with by household. If rent cannot be reduced by 25 per cent and interest rates by 15 per cent, they can be reduced by an even lower percentage. We should try to do whatever will benefit the masses, making sure, at the same time, that our actions are also in keeping with the purpose of uniting to oppose the enemy.

In enemy-occupied areas or enemy-dominated guerrilla zones, we should pay attention to mobilizing the masses both when launching a struggle against the enemy and when handling relations between classes, making each demand one of the masses themselves and providing the necessary co-ordination and support. Apart from this, we should work hard at all times to organize the masses and establish underground Party organizations. Only in this way can the masses be tempered and their great power given full play. At the same time, we should pay special attention to explaining things to the masses, so that they will draw from their own experience the conclusion that our views are correct. Whoever alienates himself from the masses and disregards their attitude is bound to fail.

5. Application of the Policies of Leniency and Suppression.

The policies of leniency and suppression should be applied correctly. We should prevent the revival of reckless action and constantly combat the practice of indiscriminate killing and assassination, which only serves to create confusion in society; at the same time, we should guard against the tendency to allow traitors and saboteurs to run wild.

The ones to be suppressed are mainly diehard traitors, secret agents, saboteurs who have greatly impeded the war effort, incurring the implacable hatred of the masses, people who have used others to kill their adversaries, and sworn renegades. As regards followers under coercion and less important elements, we should try to win them over and give them a chance to turn over a new leaf. Our experience has always shown that it takes a strong determined attack against the sworn lackeys of the enemy to win over people who are wavering. Some local authorities have been hesitant over executing traitors and saboteurs who deserve the death penalty; this is incorrect. It should be made clear that what we oppose is indiscriminate killing and assassination.

With regard to puppet troops and organizations, we must oppose them politically, but in dealing with individuals, we should use force or persuasion as appropriate. The purpose of doing this is to break up these organizations and make them less reactionary, and to isolate the Japanese invaders for the
benefit of the revolutionary anti-Japanese work.

6. Co-ordination of and Connection Between the Legal and Illegal Struggle.

This is also a question of co-ordination of and connection between overt and covert work, a question that must be tackled in work in enemy-occupied areas and guerrilla zones and in infiltrating the puppet troops and organizations.

To handle this question we must understand what is meant by legal and illegal struggles and the forms they take. A legal struggle means a struggle which the enemy allows, and an illegal struggle means a struggle which the enemy does not allow; a legal form of struggle is one allowed by the enemy, and an illegal form is one that is not allowed by the enemy. A legal struggle and its legal forms are interrelated; without the legal forms there would be no legal struggle. As a matter of fact, the enemy does not allow us to wage any struggle. The reason we can conduct a struggle is that this kind of struggle takes on legal forms and is camouflaged by them, and therefore, the enemy permits it to a certain extent. An illegal struggle takes illegal forms and is sanctioned by the enemy. The various forms of legal struggle include presenting petitions, lodging complaints and carrying out activities through puppet organizations, all of which are now generally permitted by the enemy. There are also various forms of illegal struggle, such as holding demonstrations, refusing to pay government taxes in grain and cash, rejecting associations for the preservation of order, setting up revolutionary organizations, and even staging rebellions, instigating mutiny within enemy camps, and carrying out an armed struggle, which is the chief method. None of these forms is permitted by the enemy.

Is it possible to carry out a legal struggle under enemy rule? The facts say that it is possible, but to a limited extent. People in various localities have launched many such struggles. Do the masses have the courage to carry out such struggles? Facts have already given us an affirmative answer. Generally, in areas recently taken over by the enemy there is no legal struggle evident, due to the enemy's high-pressure tactics to subdue the people and because the people lack experience in coping with the enemy under his rule. After a while, however, they will find ways to deal with the enemy, becoming confident of and experienced in waging a struggle against the enemy and the puppet regime under given conditions.

Since the possibilities for continuing a legal struggle under enemy rule are limited and no significant results will be achieved, an illegal struggle must be our principal endeavour. However, we should not let slip any opportunity of launching a legal struggle, because it will involve less losses to the people
and facilitate the development of the illegal struggle. Legal and illegal struggles should, therefore, be closely co-ordinated, with the former camouflaging the latter and the latter assisting the former. We must make sure that the illegal struggle covers the legal one and does not expose it. From this people can see that we are not forfeiting either an illegal or legal struggle, but are trying to co-ordinate them and bring them together.

How are we to do this?

First, both legal and illegal struggles can be conducted separately. In the past, in enemy-occupied areas, for instance, there was usually no illegal struggle, but the people there were still able to wage legal struggles only. However, no significant results can be achieved if the two are not co-ordinated.

Second, the question of legal and illegal organizations is one of organizational forms which concerns the establishment, survival and development of illegal organizations through the best use of legal methods as a cover. The purpose of our dual revolutionary policy is none other than using legal forms to establish and expand illegal anti-Japanese revolutionary organizations and carry out an illegal struggle. Our purpose in infiltrating the puppet troops' organizations at higher levels is merely to use the enemy's organizational structures and the positions granted by the enemy to further revolutionary work and expand revolutionary organizations; in addition, getting a better understanding of the enemy's situation can help protect the revolutionary organizations. Therefore, it is most important to infiltrate the enemy organizations using all possible means. At the same time, revolutionaries who have infiltrated the enemy can and should seize every opportunity to undertake revolutionary work, making good use of our Party, army and anti-Japanese government's actions and statements. For example, when we have put forward our views regarding the enemy troops, they should disclose them in a skilful and covert way to the people they are trying to win over. When we have won a battle, they can spread defeatist sentiments among the puppet troops and organizations, and, pretending to be concerned about their interests, even offer the suggestion that they had "better gang up with the other side", to foster ordinary double-dealers and expand the number of revolutionary double-dealers.

Third, the aim of carrying out overt work is to begin covert work. Without using overt work as a cover, it would be very difficult for us to undertake covert work; overt work guarantees the success of covert work.

Fourth, open and secret armed forces complement and are co-ordinated with each other. The former can conceal the existence of the latter, and the latter can shield the sustained operations of the former.
From the above, it is clear that, like the legal and illegal struggle, overt and covert work are closely connected, and are co-ordinated with and complement each other. Therefore, when we organize a legal struggle, we should also consider its co-ordination with the illegal struggle, and vice versa. By connection and co-ordination we do not mean that they should be mixed up with each other or that a person should be engaged in both kinds of work, because this way he is bound to expose himself and fail. It must be emphasized that while we allow no abandoning of the legal struggle and overt work and advocate the best use of any slight opportunities available for carrying out the legal struggle and overt work, our aim is to further the illegal struggle and undertake covert work, in order to build up our revolutionary strength and weaken the enemy. Failure to recognize this point will lead to the error of legalism. While conducting the legal struggle, we should, on the one hand, try to lead the masses to victory and, on the other, fully expose the vicious face of the enemy. If victory is attained in the struggle, we should point out to the masses that this kind of victory is limited and that it is the result of a united struggle waged by the Chinese people, aided by the anti-Japanese army and government, lest the masses should cherish illusions about the enemy. If the legal struggle fails, it is essential to seize every opportunity to encourage the masses to continue the struggle against the enemy. Moreover, in the course of the legal struggle we should try to get a full understanding of the enemy and the contradictions among his ranks. In the past some comrades considered the enemy to be a monolithic bloc; this view is absolutely subjective and erroneous.

With the struggle behind enemy lines rising here and subsiding there, there must be constant adjustment in the balance between overt and covert work and the legal and illegal struggle. Although we ourselves want to expand the illegal struggle, we often cannot because the necessary objective conditions are lacking. Sometimes certain localities become our concealed base areas, thereby expanding the illegal struggle, and sometimes the possibility of an illegal struggle is greatly reduced as a result of the enemy’s destruction. In the face of such constant changes, we have to work surely and steadily at all times, trying not to expose ourselves nor to be too irritating to the enemy and preparing for vigorous covert work. In this way we can make an orderly retreat and avoid serious reverses under a perilous situation.

7. Making Political Offensive a Regular Practice.

This means that, except for a major event or issues of overall importance, political offensives shall be conducted, not in regions as a whole, but constantly in sub-regions, counties or even small areas, according to specific local demands. Only such political offensives can really get to the heart of
the matter, and only when they are combined with the demands of the current local struggles can they truly hit the enemy where it hurts and, furthermore, closely tie in with the interests of the people.

The wealth of experience accumulated in past political offensives should be used appropriately. However, we must point out that in the past we devoted most of our efforts to extensive propaganda work, while organizational work in enemy-occupied areas was not put on the agenda. The propaganda and agitation work conducted in enemy-occupied areas has laid the foundation for future organizational work, which is a significant achievement. In future political offensives we should not only intensify the work, but also put it on an organizational level and make it an important weapon in the organizational work in enemy-occupied areas.

To this end, in our political offensives we must make plans to unite with enlightened and progressive persons in enemy-occupied areas, especially intellectuals, to help them set up anti-Japanese organizations or to arrange for them to visit base areas secretly. We must establish underground Party organizations and recruit Party members prudently, and work hard to win over double-dealers and help them become revolutionary ones. We must assist the local people in their legal and illegal struggles, safeguard the people’s interests and, through the struggle, temper their courage to resist Japan. When conditions are ripe, we should also set up concealed guerrilla groups among the people or other forms of anti-Japanese armed forces and build small, concealed guerrilla base areas — this last objective being the most important goal for our future political offensives.

As the backbone of future political offensives against the enemy, armed working teams must be reinforced and include people who have close ties with the local people, so as to make political offensives a regular practice. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the military and political qualities of the guerrilla units (county and district primary guerrilla detachments) in border areas between the enemy-occupied areas and our base areas, so that they can launch political offensives. Meanwhile, to strengthen organizational work, Party activities, especially the activities of the anti-Japanese democratic government, must be increased in enemy-occupied areas in the course of unified political offensives against the enemy.

8. Establishing Party Organizations in Enemy-Occupied Areas.

I shall only mention this task here; I am not going to discuss how to establish such organizations. Many of our comrades are quite experienced in this respect. In the past few years, however, we have completely ignored this basic task, a state of affairs which cannot continue.

The task of the underground Party organizations in enemy-occupied
areas is to gather strength secretly by every means available and to bide their
time. They should try to organize well-selected cadres to work underground
as extensively as possible. Party members should try to infiltrate all enemy
and puppet organizations, as well as local feudal organizations, to carry out
their own activities and overcome past tendencies to work in the dark without
the assistance of others and keep themselves aloof from others (actually a
manifestation of “wait-and-see” mentality).
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS AND
THE MASS MOVEMENT

February 20, 1943

1. The Laws Governing the Establishment of Base Areas.

In the course of discussion some comrades raised a question about the laws governing the establishment of base areas. Comrade Peng Dehuai has answered this question in his pamphlet.\textsuperscript{55} For establishing a revolutionary base area, besides considering the proper geographical conditions, the enemy's situation and timing, there must also be the necessary revolutionary armed forces, political power, and mass and Party organizations. Comrade Peng Dehuai said, "Whether a revolutionary base area is consolidated and sound depends on whether these four types of organizations there are consolidated and sound." None of these four revolutionary forces can be dispensed with if a revolutionary base area is to be established. The four forces are co-ordinated; if one of them is not strong enough, the rest will be affected. Poor co-ordination will also harm the base area.

Some people may ask: In establishing a base area which of the four should be present first, armed forces or Party organizations and mass movements? This represents a mechanical way of thinking. In practice, in some places Party organizations and mass movements appeared first, inciting the peasants to rise in rebellion, form their own armed forces and political power and build base areas, and then use their armed forces and political power to expand the base areas and build new ones. In other places revolutionary armed forces appeared first, opening up opportunities for establishing Party organizations, political power and mass organizations before building the base areas. Both cases go to show that no revolutionary base areas can be established in the absence of these four revolutionary forces.

Others may ask: Which of these four revolutionary forces is the most...
important, the key link? In my opinion, this, too, represents a mechanical way of thinking. Since none of the four is dispensable, they are equally important. If we must arrange them in order of importance, then the armed forces should come first, as determined by the characteristics of the Chinese revolution and war. However, it must be understood that without the Party, political power and the masses, an armed struggle cannot be sustained and will ultimately fail. This has been demonstrated by past armed struggles in some places that failed because of a purely military viewpoint. Likewise, if we have only mass movements or strong political power but have no sufficient, powerful armed forces, or if we follow an erroneous military line, the base areas will suffer defeat and the work of the Party and government and among the masses will collapse, as was demonstrated by the Red Army’s withdrawal from the Central Soviet Area after failing to break the Kuomintang’s fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign. If our political power is not strong enough and little is achieved in building financial and economic systems, eliminating traitors and administering justice, then it will be impossible for us to maintain order in the base areas, meet the needs of our troops and people, and consolidate and hold the base areas, as was borne out by the situation in the Taihang area in 1939. Finally, if we have no strong Party leadership and Party organizations and no unified Party leadership, and if the Party does not exercise leadership over the armed forces, political power and mass organizations, or if the Party makes mistakes in leadership, then the establishment, consolidation and maintenance of base areas will be adversely affected. Instances of this are numerous. So, it can be seen that the question of which of the four forces is the most important, the key link, is irrelevant. Does this mean that at all times and under all circumstances we should pay equal attention to these forces? No, we should not. The Party should determine where to focus its attention in the light of the prevailing situation at a given time and place. If the work of the political power is weak, we shall intensify our efforts there, and if work among the masses constitutes a weak link, we shall concentrate our efforts there. Of course, this should be co-ordinated with work in other areas. For instance, our work at the initial stage in north China had certain different characteristics compared with what we had done previous to this. We concentrated first on making a breakthrough with the help of the gigantic forces of the Eighth Route Army, then on establishing political power, establishing and expanding Party and mass organizations from the top down, building financial and economic systems and securing public order. Our tremendous achievements show that we understood the laws in this regard. At the consolidation stage we concentrated on executing the land policy to arouse the masses, while trying to build a
sound democratic political system. In this regard, however, there was still something to be desired in our effort to carry out the directives of the Central Committee and its Northern Bureau, and in 1940 and 1941 we didn't pay enough attention to work among the masses. These are historical lessons for us.

Still others may ask: How should the armed forces, political power, mass organizations and the Party be linked so that they are co-ordinated? First comes the question of Party leadership, which is the central factor for everything else. In places where there are no Party organizations it is the duty of the revolutionaries to establish Party organizations and expand them. It is the duty of Party organizations in base areas to ensure a strong link and co-ordination between the four forces, decide on the central task according to specific circumstances and make sure that the central task is co-ordinated with work in other areas. It is the duty of the armed forces to defend the base areas and revolutionary political power, safeguard the people's interests, establish Party organizations and subordinate themselves to the Party's political leadership, set up revolutionary governments and obey their revolutionary decrees, take part in work among the masses to arouse them and, at the same time, seek their help and accept their supervision. It is the duty of the government to follow the Party's leadership by adhering to its political line and policies, support mass movements, take into consideration the interests of the main sections of the masses, consolidate the united front, and take good care of the army and guarantee its supplies and replenishment. It is the duty of the mass organizations independently to arouse, organize and educate the masses under the Party's political leadership, help the masses to enhance their awareness of the need for a political and armed struggle, so that they become a self-conscious class for themselves, form a united front with landlords and the bourgeoisie and try to consolidate it, persuade the masses to carry out the government's revolutionary decrees, and call on them to support and join the revolutionary army and organize themselves into a militia. This is what co-ordination and link among these four forces mean. To say that once we have armed forces or the support of the masses we have everything is correct only under certain circumstances; without these circumstances, this observation is faulty.

Here I should like to stress that the consolidation of the anti-Japanese democratic base areas behind enemy lines depends on the consolidation of the united front; this is also a decisive condition, which calls for our attention.

The above are the laws governing the establishment of base areas.

Some people may still ask: Have we applied these laws in establishing
base areas? Yes, we have, in general. This explains why we have achieved so much in establishing and maintaining base areas in the past few years. If the opposite were true, then we couldn’t explain why we have persevered in the struggle and why the base areas are becoming increasingly consolidated. Have we experienced any shortcomings or mistakes? The answer is yes. There was a period when some deviations occurred in our policy with regard to the armed struggle and for a fairly long time we neglected work among the masses and did not pay enough attention to linking together and co-ordinating the various forces. If it had not been for these deviations, we could have done our work better and the base areas could have become even more consolidated. Some people say our base areas are not yet consolidated, but of course, this is not true.

The Central Committee and its Northern Bureau have always had a clear policy regarding the establishment of base areas. The very reason for the deviations and mistakes lies in that we didn't examine their directives carefully enough or execute them satisfactorily. These are historical lessons for us.

In the relentless struggle in the days to come we must correctly apply the laws governing the establishment of base areas, further consolidate these areas and do our utmost to defend them. Without base areas, we shall have nothing to fall back on in continuing the anti-Japanese war, instituting democracy and launching counter-offensives in the future. We don’t want to forget the hard times when we had practically no base areas.


Mass movements have their own laws and the Party must guide the movements with these laws firmly in mind. In the past we did not satisfactorily implement the directives issued by the Central Committee and its Northern Bureau in this regard, so we haven’t achieved as much as we should.

What laws should we keep in mind in guiding mass movements in the base areas? First, organize and arm the masses while arousing them. Second, as soon as they have been aroused, make plans for and regularize the activities of mass organizations. Third, in arousing and organizing the masses, pay attention to their political education. When the masses have been sufficiently incited and organized, we should shift the focus of our work to educating them in order to promote their activities in the struggle for democracy and armed struggle, so that they will become a class for themselves, join the united front, take part in mass guerrilla warfare, and consolidate the political and economic rights they have won. Fourth, keep the economic and political struggle of the masses within the scope of the united front. Without a proper understanding of the foregoing laws regarding mass movements and the need
to guide the movements gradually from a lower to a higher level, the movements will fall apart and the masses will not become a class for themselves or safeguard the benefits they have gained.

Some people say we lost ground and it demonstrated our weakness when we failed to fix a specific period of time for arousing the masses. This is quite correct. Others say, however, that failure to do so showed that we have not mastered the laws for establishing base areas and launching mass movements. I cannot agree with this view, I am afraid. To set aside time is a question of method, not of laws. It is inconceivable that a period of time for arousing the masses can be set aside for just any place at any time. For example, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party set the goal of consolidating north China, with the focus on intensifying work among the masses, but certainly did not require fixing a period of time to arouse the masses. To give another example, satisfactory work was done among the masses in central China, but as of 1941 no decision was made as to fixing a period of time for arousing the masses. This does not mean that the Central Committee and its Central China Bureau did not fully understand the laws of mass movements. Moreover, knowledge is a process of development. Only now, as we look at the past, do we see that the best way would have been to fix a period of time for arousing the masses in 1940 and 1941 and that not doing so represented a serious shortcoming. It is especially important to point out that this was not our main mistake in guiding the mass movements; instead, it was that, at the consolidation stage, we failed to focus on applying the land policies of reducing rent and interest rates and raising the payments to hired hands when arousing the masses.

Still others say we let go many opportunities for fully arousing the masses, and this is true. However, it cannot be said we did nothing at all in this respect. We not only extensively and thoroughly urged the masses to take part in the war of resistance during its initial stage and launched vigorous mass movements against friction created by anti-Communist diehards, but now we are waging mass movements in southern Hebei for total unity of the Chinese people. The political significance of these developments should in no way be underestimated. We also incited the masses to struggle for rent and interest rate reductions. We should especially make an adequate evaluation of our work done in the second half of last year, when we did well in some places but not as well in others. For instance, results were better in the Taihang area than in the Taiyue area and southern Hebei.

The purpose of learning from the past is to improve future work, not to do mechanically what was possible in the past. As to how we should do things today, this depends on the present specific conditions. It is now
possible in the Taihang and Taiyue areas to fix a period of time for arousing the masses, but not in the vast guerrilla base areas in southern Hebei, which have been reduced to guerrilla zones or occupied by the enemy. There the task is to closely co-ordinate the struggle against the enemy with due consideration given to the interests of the main sections of the masses, focusing on fighting the enemy when arousing the masses, rather than on reducing rent and interest rates or demanding a pay rise for hired hands. Even in the Taihang and Taiyue areas we should bear in mind the ruthlessness and complexity of the struggle behind enemy lines and there we cannot rigidly fix a period of time for fighting feudal landlords or for trying to win them over. The correct way is to do both at the same time, keeping the time spent on fighting them to a minimum. This is determined by the new circumstances.

Arousing, organizing and educating the masses is a difficult task and takes time, not to be accomplished in a short period. However, it is wrong to think that “if we can’t get it done this year, we can always do it the next year or the year after.” In the Taiyue and Taihang areas we should solve the problem of uneven development and arouse the masses and get them organized, for the most part, during this year. In southern Hebei we should do this without hesitation in the course of struggling against the enemy, not in the course of implementing the land policy. There the land question is undoubtedly a question of secondary importance. In the Taihang and Taiyue areas the land question should also be placed within the scope of the united front. Therefore, standing by itself, the slogan for weakening the feudal forces introduced in southern Hebei needs reconsideration.

What are the criteria by which to judge whether the masses in the guerrilla base areas in southern Hebei have been aroused? I think they should be: 1) Not only advanced, but also backward, people are taking an active part in the struggle against the enemy. 2) In the struggle most of the masses have joined either open or underground people's armed forces and control them. 3) They voluntarily participate in the activities of the organs of political power in the villages, where the three-thirds system has been truly instituted. 4) The majority of the masses has benefited from the struggle against the enemy and helped consolidate the united front with the landlords and the bourgeoisie in a common struggle against the enemy. 5) The masses have their own organizations or they hold dominant positions in united-front organizations. 6) They have faith in the Party and the Eighth Route Army, recognizing that they cannot liberate themselves unless they follow our Party and army.

It seems to some people that these requirements have been met in
southern Hebei, but this optimistic evaluation of the situation is groundless. In fact, the work done there still falls far short of the requirements, which cannot be fully met without correct political leadership and painstaking and effective organizational and educational work.

3. Arousing the Masses and Consolidating the United Front.

This is a question of how to confine mass struggle to the united front or, to be more specific, a question of how to arouse the masses and, at the same time, cement unity among people of all strata. Here I should like to discuss a few points that should be understood correctly.

1) We should combine the struggle against feudal landlords with the effort to win them over. That is to say, while struggling against them, we should try to draw them nearer to us; and vice versa. We should make sure that we struggle against them to an appropriate extent and that we try to draw them nearer to us at the right moment. Of course, in some counties and districts it is necessary to fix a period of time for each, but the duration of the struggle should not be too long. Even during the course of the struggle, in most cases, we should try to reason things out to win over enlightened landlords, so that they can persuade other landlords to reduce rent and interest rates. Even if landlords are not sincere in reducing the rates, they should be encouraged, because they can be useful to us, too. The struggle shall be waged only against a few obdurate landlords after they have been isolated. When trying to win over feudal landlords, we should guard against their counter-attacks. Special efforts should be made to persuade the masses to take the initiative to unite with the landlords.

2) We should weaken the feudal forces, not destroy them. Our policy is to improve the living standards of the masses and, at the same time, allow landlords to maintain a certain economic position. In some places we went too far in implementing decrees to reduce rent rates and settle old accounts; this should be rectified. Government decrees are only general principles, which should be carried out properly, in accordance with the policy mentioned above. The practice of settling very old accounts with landlords should be ended.

3) We should weaken the feudal forces, not only economically, but also politically and ideologically. Overthrowing the rule of the landlord class and practising democracy based on the "three-thirds system" means no more than weakening the political position of the feudal classes, not depriving them of such a position. Landlords who resist Japan and are not opposed to democracy have the right to participate in the democratic government based on the "three-thirds system", so we should not only safeguard the masses' rights of person, property, land ownership and participation in the political
power but also the landlords'. In mass movements no practices such as humiliating landlords by beating and spitting on them should be encouraged. Party leaders, in particular, should prevent such practices, because they can cost us the sympathy of society as a whole and present an obstacle to our efforts to unite with the landlords against Japan and to involve backward elements in the struggle. Weakening the political position of the feudal classes is a serious struggle. Experience has shown that it is not hard for landlords, especially big landlords, to accept demands for reduced rent and interest rates. What they value most is their political position as a ruling class, so whenever this is challenged, they will put up stubborn resistance. Therefore, it is impossible to weaken the political position of the feudal classes without the voluntary participation of the masses in political struggles.

4) In our efforts to unite with the landlords against Japan, it is far from enough just to consider the methods to be used; most important is to guarantee that the landlords can make a living and enjoy a certain economic status and that their legitimate right of property is safeguarded. Unless we do this, it will be of no help even if we adopt a very friendly attitude towards them and elect them as representatives or members of consultative councils. This merits our attention when solving specific problems.

5) Are "Left" deviations on the part of the masses something to be feared? They are nothing to be feared as long as our Party can identify them in good time and correct them. However, if we let them spread to the point of splitting the united front, we would have something to fear. We Communists should not only understand the world, but transform it as well, and we should be both the pupils of the masses and their teachers. The Party does not want to let things drift along by themselves in the mass movements, but wants to put its policies into effect through the movements. This explains the guiding role of the Party.

6) Our policy relating to rich peasants is to weaken their feudal aspects and, at the same time, encourage their capitalist aspects. How can this be achieved? Mainly by executing the relevant policies and decrees. At the same time, in carrying out the struggle, we should not put rich peasants on a par with landlords. A large number of rich peasants were made targets of past struggles, which is an irregular phenomenon. Recently, excessive actions have been taken against them in various places; this should be stopped.

7) The mass movement should be intensified, but kept on an appropriate scale. For instance, it is important to consider how one area or one mass organization should support the struggle waged in another area or by another mass organization, and how meetings of the masses and of their cadres and conferences of representatives — all of a specified size — should be held,
etc. Our purpose is to spread the experience and lessons of mass struggles for the benefit of less advanced areas and smooth development of the mass movement, raise the class consciousness and self-confidence of the masses and train new leaders from among them.

4. Relationship Between the Party and Mass Organizations.

Organizationally a mass organization is independent; politically it must place itself under Party leadership. The Party, on its part, should strengthen political leadership over the mass organization, but not act in its place. The work of a mass organization should be discussed and performed by the organization itself. The Party exercises political leadership over mass organizations through leading Party members' groups, not by issuing orders directly to them. In the past there was some misunderstanding in various places as to the functions of mass organizations, which usually resulted in two errors: the first, undertaking work that should have been the responsibility of the mass organizations; and the second, slackening political leadership over them. Both should be corrected. While affirming the organizational independence of mass organizations, we should guard against any tendency on the part of a mass organization to break away from the Party's political leadership or of a leading Party members' group to assert its independence.

In future we should see to it that mass movements are directly led by mass organizations, especially peasant associations. Party and military cadres sent to engage in mass movements should carry out activities as members of mass organizations or recommended by them. Only in this way can we help foster the masses' sense of organization, enhance the prestige of mass organizations and train more leaders from among the masses.

At the same time, the Party should provide more effective guidance to mass movements by sending good cadres, who maintain close ties with the masses, to lead mass organizations, paying special attention to raising the competence of mass organizations at the grass-roots level. Since it is impossible to give equal attention to all mass organizations, for the present, the Party should particularly strengthen its leadership over the work of peasant associations, first of all improving their organization and activities.

There is no need to change the form of national salvation federations at or above the district level, but each village should have its own national salvation organization. The number of members of federations at higher levels should be reduced to a minimum, with the surplus ones sent to strengthen federations at lower levels.

Mass organizations should gradually become financially self-supporting, but the government will provide them with adequate subsidies. From now on, the mass organizations should be responsible for their own budget
expenditures; it is not necessary for the government to examine and verify them.

The Party should do its utmost to train junior and senior leaders of the masses. We should be aware that the leaders of the masses are our most valuable assets, without whom we cannot sustain the arduous struggles.


The government should support mass movements, not watch them from the sidelines or ignore them in a bureaucratic manner. Since mass movements should be movements launched by the masses of their own accord, the government should not monopolize or interfere in them.

Since the anti-Japanese democratic government behind enemy lines is the political power of the united front under the political leadership of our Party, its administrative programme and decrees accord with the Party's policies, giving consideration to the interests of workers and peasants, on the one hand, and those of the landlords and capitalists, on the other, and therefore benefit the majority of the masses. When we are reducing rent and interest rates and reasonably distributing burdens through the mass movements for the benefit of the majority of the masses, we are executing government decrees. After promulgating decrees, the government must ensure their implementation, so it would be wrong to turn the mass movements against the government. In guiding mass movements and supporting them, both the Party and mass organizations and the government are trying to ensure the execution of government decrees, seeing to it that the movements are conducted within the limits of government decrees or, in other words, within the united front. In this sense the positions of the mass organizations and of the government are identical, except that differences may occur in attitude and method.

What is the correct attitude of the government towards mass movements?

1) With regard to rural areas where the decrees for reducing rent and interest rates and reasonably distributing burdens have not yet been implemented, the government should send people there to explain the decrees and urge the masses to follow them, making it definitely clear that it will accept no refusal.

2) When the masses are mobilized in the struggle for reduced rent and interest rates, government personnel should show respect for the mass movements and the class consciousness of the masses, or their awareness and initiative, refraining from interfering in and monopolizing the struggle and from bringing it to an end prematurely by resorting to the power of the government or to administrative means. Through the government's interfer-
ing in and monopolizing of the struggle, the masses may reap some benefits the easy way, but it will prevent them from demonstrating their own initiative, thus from recognizing their own great strength and, moreover, from becoming aware of the need for a political struggle. Therefore, these methods are harmful.

3) In the course of a mass struggle it is the job of government personnel to give thorough explanations of government decrees, which actually is a way of supporting the mass movement.

4) When a dispute arises between the masses and the landlords, the government should solve the dispute impartially in accordance with its decrees, which actually is a way of supporting the majority of the masses, too.

5) When excessive actions are taken in mass movements, government personnel should, first of all, ask the Party and mass organizations to persuade the masses to correct the mistakes or solve the problem through consultation and co-ordinated efforts, being sure to avoid adopting simple administrative methods. Where such excessive actions have exerted enormous impact, however, especially if they have played into the hands of reactionaries and caused public chaos, the government should stop them, explaining the situation fully to the masses afterwards.

6) In mass movements government personnel should work among landlords and the gentry, mainly to explain government decrees to them and urge them to observe those decrees. We cannot criticize or attack mass organizations or their cadres in front of the landlords, lest we inflate their arrogance. If the mass organizations or their cadres have done something unreasonable, we can offer explanations to the landlords and, at the same time, point out the landlords' unreasonable actions.

7) Government personnel should always show respect for leaders of the masses and help them gain prestige among the masses. At the same time, Party and mass organizations should, through the mass movements, help enhance the prestige of the anti-Japanese democratic government among the masses. It is extremely harmful to taint the good name of the government among the masses.

It is essential for the army to participate in mass movements. In the past, mass movement departments in the army were removed, because the achievements of local authorities were overestimated and army cadres were so rigid in some of their working methods that some local authorities asked the army to keep out of their work in order to avoid disruption. It now seems this decision was inappropriate. In future the army should send cadres to join in local work as members of mass organizations (chiefly peasant associations)
or through recommendation by mass organizations. Moreover, the troops should take part in the mass struggle, assisting the mass movements and, more important, receiving education in practical movements. Of course, they do not have to carry their machine guns and cannons along with them. Army cadres sent to rural areas must work under the leadership of the local Party organizations and in conformity with the plans of the mass organizations there.

6. Work at the Village Level.

The village constitutes the basic unit for all our work, so we must exercise sound leadership over it. In his pamphlet, Comrade Peng Dehuai has set out some general principles for work at the village level. Work at this level is very complex; Party organizations at all levels are expected to continue to study and solve the problems regarding village work.

In our effort to simplify administration we have merged smaller villages into larger ones. Though this move has made our work more difficult, it has avoided subjecting the people to many more burdens, so we need not make any changes here. We should now be working out methods of leadership to suit conditions in the larger villages.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE TAIHANG AREA

July 2, 1943

The war of resistance behind enemy lines is an extremely complex and arduous struggle. After six successful years we have laid the foundation for the continued struggle and final victory. For the Eighth Route Army, though poorly equipped and without a single copper or bullet of assistance in four years, to have overcome so many difficulties and to have done battle with such a formidable enemy at close range is nothing short of a miracle. What is the secret behind this miracle? As everybody knows, we have Mao Zedong's principles guiding our strategy and tactics. It is by following these principles that through innumerable battles we have established, defended and consolidated each and every anti-Japanese base area and pinned down half of the Japanese invading troops in China, lightening the burden of frontal military operations in the great rear area. As everyone knows, we have been carrying on serious political, cultural and anti-secret-agent struggles with the enemy, greatly inspiring the enthusiasm of the people in the base areas and enemy-occupied areas for resistance and increasing their sense of national pride and self-confidence. In addition, everyone knows that our struggle on the economic front in the enemy's rear area, under extremely difficult conditions, has been highly successful. It is this successful struggle that has enabled us to persevere in the war of resistance in the enemy's rear area for six years and will enable us to do so in the future.

The struggle on the economic front in the enemy's rear area is by no means less intense than the struggle on the military front. The enemy's economic attack, closely connected to his military, political and secret-agent attacks, is extremely cruel. In the areas under his occupation the enemy has been rapaciously plundering manpower and material resources. The people's financial burden is double or treble their total income. When they run out of grain and money, they have to hand over their furniture to pay for the burden. The plunder of manpower is even more horrifying. A great many

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able-bodied men have been press-ganged and the amount of corvee can hardly be calculated. An enemy commander announced, “The length of blockade trenches in north China is six times that of the Great Wall, or one-fourth of the circumference of the earth.” All this has been built up with the blood and sweat of the people in enemy-occupied areas. As a result there have been consecutive crop failures there over the past few years and a serious famine this year. Taking advantage of this famine, the enemy has incited the people to seize grain from the base areas in an attempt to create deep animosity between Chinese in the anti-Japanese base areas and those in areas under his occupation. With regard to the anti-Japanese base areas, the enemy has been pursuing a policy of blockade and plunder, i.e., blocking the supply of the materials we need, taking the materials he needs (like grain), incessantly “nibbling” the border areas and flagrantly plundering and trampling on the base areas in each “mopping-up” operation — killing and press-ganging people, burning houses, destroying farm tools, seizing draught animals, burning grain and ruining growing crops. The enemy has perpetuated all kinds of atrocities to “destroy the life blood of the war of resistance”. The people are deeply distressed by the devastation caused by the enemy. Unless effective measures are taken, it would be inconceivable to persevere in the war behind enemy lines once people’s vitality is exhausted and provisions for the soldiers and people cannot be guaranteed. In the Taihang area, we are guarding against such an eventuality and we are paying particular attention to the economic front.

The economic front behind enemy lines consists of two inseparable factors — the economic struggle with the enemy and economic development in the base areas. Without the former, the latter would be out of the question; without the latter, the former would be even more doubtful. It is with these two factors in mind that we have drawn up all our specific economic policies. During the initial stage of the war of resistance, the Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong advocated “self-sufficiency and self-reliance” as a guide for our economic development, and we have been following this guide in our development work over the past six years. After meeting with countless complications and difficulties, we have found a way that has made it possible for us to meet the needs of the war effort, protect the people’s interests, cripple the enemy’s plundering scheme and prepare for counter-offensives and postwar reconstruction.

What have we accomplished and what has our experience taught us, then?

First of all, we have come to the conclusion that expanded production provides the foundation for developing our economy and also for breaking
the enemy's blockade and building a self-sufficient economy, with agriculture and the handicraft industry as the main production activities. Experience tells us that if you have grain, you have everything. Times of war bring widespread grain shortages. Since we are operating in rural areas, agricultural production is of necessity a major task. The greatest shortage faced by the enemy in the cities is in the supply of grain. With enough grain supplies in our hands, we can feed our soldiers and people. In addition, with grain and other farm by-products, we can carry on the struggle against the enemy and exchange them for everything else we need. At the same time, only agricultural production can provide the handicraft industry with raw materials, laying the foundation for its development. Development of this industry, in turn, can propel agricultural production and allow us to boycott the enemy's dumping of goods, bringing about a self-sufficient economy.

Developing production must not remain just an idea. It requires correct policies and meticulous organization. Our policies concerning the reduction of rent and interest rates and the payment of rent and interest have opened up a broad avenue for the development of production. In areas where rent and interest rates have been reduced, the working people have displayed greater enthusiasm for the war of resistance and for expanding production. In addition to reducing rent and interest rates, the government has made the payment of them mandatory. These policies have served to stabilize the relations among people of all strata and strengthen unity, calling on everyone to give his best in production work, save money and store grain, and advance from mere self-sufficiency to having ample supplies of food and clothing. To this end, the government has promulgated important decrees providing, among other things, "No taxes shall be levied on grain stores and bank savings," "No taxes shall be levied on one half of a hired labourer's income," "No taxes shall be levied on flocks of sheep," and "Taxes shall be imposed on the basis of the grain yield of an average year since the outbreak of the war of resistance, the surplus amount belonging to the producers." Moreover, labour heroes and those who participate in the "Wu Manyou Campaign" will be rewarded. These policies are all designed to promote development of the economy while restricting feudal exploitation. This is the path that Dr. Sun Yat-sen pointed out to us. Our policies relating to industry and commerce have greatly facilitated the growth of agriculture and the handicraft industry. The taxes levied by the government on industry being minimal, the handicraft industry, especially the household textile industry, has grown considerably in recent years. The building of bigger industries is practically impossible under conditions of guerrilla warfare.

The anti-Japanese democratic government and mass organizations have
done their best to organize and lead production. Our army has also played an active part on this front, rendering much encouragement and assistance to the people. Agricultural production is both year-round and highly seasonal; strictly speaking, there is no slack season. It involves ploughing, selecting seeds, sowing, thinning seedlings, weeding, summer harvesting, autumn harvesting and the timely collecting and applying of manure (preparations for manure to be used the next year begin in June) — we have done a great deal of work during the spring and autumn ploughing, and the summer and autumn harvests. We arouse the people's enthusiasm for production work, criticize idleness, organize and redistribute the labour force, improve seed strains, supply the necessary draught animals and farm tools, mobilize children to collect manure, call upon women to participate in production work, mediate between landlords and tenants and between employers and employees, mobilize the people to plant trees, build irrigation ditches, dig wells, make waterwheels, and so on. These are all very concrete jobs. In addition, the government has been granting low-interest and interest-free loans every year, ranging from several million to ten million yuan. Everything it advocates and does is for the benefit of the people. Due to our attention to organizing and leading production, many of the people's difficulties have now been overcome. The slogan "Increase production, improve life and prepare for counter-offensives" can be heard all over the Taihang Mountains. We have been victorious on the production front year after year. Besides producing what is needed to cover part of the military expenses, during busy farming seasons men in army uniform toil alongside civilians across hill and dale. It is precisely during such seasons that the enemy conducts devastating "nibbling" and "mopping-up" operations against the base areas. Therefore, the army not only has to help the people with production, but also, with the militia, has to protect the people doing the ploughing and harvesting. This is why our soldiers are at one with the people and why our army is called the people's own army.

The growth of the handicraft industry still has a way to go, but results so far have greatly reduced the inflow of goods from enemy-occupied areas. No kerosene, cigarettes, soap and luxuries are imported here. We make our own cigarettes and other items, and have enough and to spare. For example, we export a part of our products, such as cloth, towels, other cotton textiles and paper. We are short of salt and matches, which are not so difficult to procure, but we are making steel for flint as a substitute for matches.

Last winter and this spring, one-fifth of the land in the Taihang area was afflicted by drought and a large number of victims fled into the area from enemy-occupied areas. This was the hardest time for us within the past
few years. We organized a great deal of relief work and a spring ploughing campaign, and now we have, by and large, made it through the difficulties. So long as there is adequate rainfall, the people will soon recover from the effects of these difficulties. Aside from social relief, expanding production is our principal relief measure. The government has granted a large sum in loans to the victims, including loans for textile production. In Wu'an County alone, for example, loans have been used to organize more than 20,000 women in textile production. Their daily income can support one and a half to two persons, which has impressively elevated the social status of women. Loans have also been granted for water conservation projects. This year they amount to between 40,000 and 50,000 yuan. The workers are all drought victims. Every day each worker earns 1.5 kg of millet in wages and he can save some of this for his family. We once obtained grain from grain-producing areas in enemy-occupied areas and sold it to the victims at a low price (equivalent to one half or two-thirds of the market price). The grain was transported entirely by the victims, who could in this way earn some income to support their families. Co-operatives have also sprung up everywhere. In enemy-occupied areas drought victims have been left homeless and a great many have died; in anti-Japanese democratic base areas drought victims have suffered a little, but thanks to the government's planned and organized relief efforts, they maintain full vitality to both fight the enemy and combat nature. Our soldiers and cadres of the government and mass organizations have become the main production force in areas badly stricken by natural disasters. Prefectural commissioners, county magistrates, commanders and political commissars lead the cadres and soldiers in helping the victims with their farm work, giving them tremendous encouragement. Now the work of sowing and thinning out seedlings has ended, and with timely rainfall, there will be no consecutive natural disaster. A great many victims from enemy-occupied areas have received assistance from the government and people in overcoming their difficulties and have obtained, among other things, housing, grain, farm tools and seeds. Lush crops have sprung up on their reclaimed wasteland.

Not everything has turned out satisfactorily in our efforts to organize and guide production. Subjectivism and carelessness have greatly impeded progress. The early days of the war of resistance witnessed excessive assignments of corvée duties and wasting of manpower, but these were soon corrected. The government decided that only leading bodies at and above the prefectural commissioner's office or the military sub-region level have the power to assign corvée duties. During busy farming seasons, no corvée duties were to be assigned, and soldiers had to carry grain and charcoal themselves.
This move was a substantial improvement. Later we found some formalistic and bureaucratic ways of doing things, such as too many mass meetings and cadres' meetings and an excess of sentry duties and drills of the people's armed forces, all of which hindered the peasant's farm work. Therefore, specific number and length of time were fixed for meetings and drills, and routine sentry duties were cancelled. Our cadres know too little about production matters and often make decisions according to their wishful thinking. For instance, it wasn't until spring ploughing time that they called upon children to collect manure and paid attention to the selection of seeds and other such work. Isn't that absurd! In another example, their leadership over development of the handicraft industry has remained empty calls in many cases, and they have made no efforts to settle the masses' practical problems. The co-operative movement is not satisfactory either. All these problems have to be solved in the days ahead.

Secondly, I should like to discuss the policy relating to the financial burden. In general, we have been adhering to a principle whereby those who have more money contribute more, and those who have less contribute less. This means to earn enough for expenditure and to keep expenditure within the limits of income, take into account both the people's capability of shouldering the burden and the needs of the war effort. Even more important, the burden shall be shared in such a way as to encourage the development of production. The decree that "no taxes shall be levied on grain stores and bank savings" and other decrees mentioned above are all designed to lighten the people's burden. We have consistently encouraged the practice of thrift, combated waste and severely punished embezzlement (the death penalty is inflicted upon anyone who has embezzled 500 yuan or more). In addition, we have conducted two successive campaigns for "better troops and simpler administration", with the result that agricultural tax paid in grain in 1943 is 16 to 17 per cent less than in 1942. The mammoth size of village levies has historically been one of the major symptoms of maladministration. We began long ago to make the county the unit for unified collection and spending of funds, and stipulated that the village had no right to impose levies, thus eliminating this symptom. The unified progressive taxation, adopted by the Provisional Assembly of Representatives of the Border Area, will come into force in the Taihang area this year. This truly serves to benefit the interests of the people of all social strata and have more people pay taxes, entirely conforming to the Central Committee's policy of having 80 per cent of the population pay taxes. This taxation system will help improve the financial foundation and will certainly enhance the enthusiasm of the people of the various social strata for developing production.
Thirdly, our policy of taxation and trade is based on the principle of "external control and internal flexibility". It is our goal to strike a balance between the flow of goods in and out of our area. In order to facilitate the struggle with the enemy, we have placed the departments of taxation and trade under the unified leadership of the Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau, protecting the economy of the base areas by means of a strict taxation system. This will make it easier for us to win in the struggle. We have banned all kinds of luxuries and restricted the inflow of nonessentials. At the same time, we have organized the outflow of nonessentials and surplus goods from the base areas, such as medicinal herbs and straw hats, in exchange for goods from the outside. For this purpose we have organized people to participate in anti-contraband activities, offering large rewards to them and severely punishing smugglers. It is most important to involve the tradesmen in the economic struggle against the enemy. Therefore, in managing trade with the enemy-occupied areas, the government did not try to exercise complete control over it. In particular, it gave a free hand to internal trade, instead of monopolizing it. With regard to tradesmen's speculative activities, it made use of publicly run shops and co-operatives to restrain them. These methods have served to considerably increase our capacity to fight the enemy, boost tax revenues, bring about a flourishing market and meet the people's needs. Prices in the Taihang and Taiyue areas have been lower than in other areas for a long time. Grain redistribution and trade in cotton cloth have helped us greatly this year to recover from the famine. Of course, our comrades made some mistakes in this regard. For example, they discontinued trade with other areas for a while, at first they lacked adequate understanding of the role played by tradesmen, and they exercised rigid control over the co-operatives. All this impeded economic development in the base areas. In addition, in trade with other areas, they arranged for an excessive outflow of goods, failing to see the importance of restricting the outflow of goods and materials for the benefit of our struggle against the enemy, so we suffered a lot as a result. The industrial and commercial administration departments were preoccupied with trade speculation, paying little attention to the co-operative undertakings in production and the step-by-step development of materials for sale outside the base areas (for instance, mobilizing the people to collect medicinal herbs, purchasing hog bristles, etc.). We have corrected or are now correcting these glaring shortcomings.

Our monetary policy is also an important weapon in developing production and fighting the enemy. The principle behind our policy is to eradicate the currency issued by the puppet regime and protect the legal currency."
The enemy has issued a huge amount of currency and has come into possession of a lot of legal currency in a bid to plunder large quantities of goods and materials from the people. Under such dangerous circumstances, we have issued the Southern Hebei Bank notes as the local currency in our strategic zone. This has crippled the enemy's scheme of making use of the legal currency, restrained the market for the puppet currency, reinforced our position in the economic struggle with the enemy, and has fully guaranteed economic development in the base areas. In order to fortify faith in our own currency, we have restricted its issue and granted big loans to individual people and production undertakings, thus gaining the people's warm support and strengthening the people's faith in the currency. Our incessant political offensives directed against enemy-occupied areas and our timely utilization of goods and materials have severely damaged the puppet currency. However, we cannot underestimate the puppet currency or overestimate its instability, lest we start taking risks and making inappropriate moves.

Lastly, we have adopted the principle of lightening the burden imposed by the enemy on the people and protecting the people's interests as the point of departure for all our policies relating to enemy-occupied areas and guerrilla areas. When the enemy plunders grain, we encourage the people to upset the enemy's plan through an armed struggle and by any other means; when the enemy press-gangs men, we help the men to escape or join in the people's efforts to re-disperse the men who have been gathered by the enemy. During the past few years such struggles have never ceased for a single day. Without these intense struggles at close quarters our compatriots in enemy-occupied areas would have been subjected to untold misery.

The above was a brief account of economic development in the Taihang area. What have we learned from this experience? First, everything that goes on in the enemy's rear area is inseparable from the intense struggle against the enemy; all our achievements in economic development have been paid for in blood. Second, without the correct policies, there can be no economic development to speak of; these policies must be shaped in the light of the well-being of the people and the needs of the war of resistance. Third, any attempt at economic development will be fruitless without the voluntary and active participation of the people. Fourth, economic development can be guaranteed only when we assign a large number of capable cadres to the economic front and help them gain experience.

The struggle in the days ahead will be even more ruthless and will still take a fairly long time before it results in our victory in the war. Comrade Mao Zedong has told us that fighting, production and education are the three major responsibilities for us behind enemy lines. We do everything for
victory in the war; production directly guarantees victory and education serves both the war and production. Closely combining these three will give us invincible strength. Therefore, we should do everything in our power to strengthen leadership in economic development in the days to come.
Comrades,

The rectification movement\(^{63}\) launched by the Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong last year has yielded substantial results across the country, especially in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Unprecedented in the Party's history, the movement is not only of great significance to the building of the Chinese Communist Party, but also constitutes a very important contribution to the building of communist parties in the world.

As we all know, the aim of rectification is to overcome non-proletarian, non-Marxist-Leninist ideology, still extant among our comrades, with proletarian, Marxist-Leninist ideology, so that our entire Party membership can have unified thinking and will, rallying more closely around the Central Committee headed by Mao Zedong and bringing the Chinese revolutionary cause to fruition. Naturally, our rectification movement should start with each individual comrade. The Party is composed of many individuals; when one individual rectifies his way of thinking he can improve the work for which he is responsible, thus helping to strengthen the Party as a whole, and when all our comrades discard their unhealthy practices, the strength of our Party will multiply miraculously! The rectification movement is of vital and lasting importance for building our Party, so every comrade should become involved.

Do all the comrades truly understand the significance of the movement, however? I am afraid that so far our comrades, including both rank-and-file

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Delivered at the beginning of the eighth term of the Party School of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the speech was carried in *Rectification Weekly* No. 2, published on December 4, 1943 by the study committee of the departments directly under the Northern Bureau and the General Headquarters of the Eighteenth Group Army.
comrades and leading comrades, still lack a deep understanding of it. Otherwise, there is no way to explain why the movement has not been started over the past year and a half. Therefore, at a time when the present term of the Party School begins and all the departments and army units in the Taihang area are about to start the movement, I think it is necessary to stress the significance of the movement once again.

Why did the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong call for rectification last year? I think rectification is a policy measure formulated by Comrade Mao Zedong after he analysed the historical experience and lessons of the Party over the past 21 years, especially after he studied present conditions prevailing in the Party — a policy measure for further Bolshe­vizing the Party to make it better armed and unified ideologically, in order to successfully lead the Chinese revolution to victory.

Our Party now has a history of more than 22 years, in which it has gone through three great revolutionary wars. It has always stood in the forefront, fighting heroically for the liberation of our nation and people and consistently guiding the Chinese revolution forward. However, we have met with a number of setbacks and failures, each of which was caused by people who dominated the Party leadership with their erroneous style of study, style in conducting the Party's internal and external relations and style of writing. Take the First Great Revolution, for example. It was a vigorous revolution launched after our Party had gathered some strength, but it was strangled under the leadership of Chen Duxiu's opportunism, which was prevalent for a short time towards the end of this revolution. Again, under the leadership of Comrade Li Lisan's adventurism, the strength that had been built up after overcoming Chen Duxiu's opportunism was greatly weakened. The "Left" opportunism that emerged during the late Soviet period dominated the Party even longer and caused much more damage, with the bulk of the Red Army in the Soviet areas and the Party organizations in the White areas destroyed at the hands of leaders who dominated the Party with these three erroneous styles. These experiences have taught us that when the Party exercises correct leadership, its work and the revolutionary movements will develop, but when the three erroneous styles predominate in Party leadership, the groundwork laid through protracted, painstaking struggle will be undermined and the revolution will suffer setbacks and defeats. The longer subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing dominate the Party leadership, the more serious the damage they will do to the Party and to the revolution. This is the first lesson.

There is another lesson we have learned. Since the Zunyi Meeting of January 1935, the Party, under the leadership of the Central Committee
headed by Comrade Mao Zedong, has eradicated "Left" and Right opportunism within the Party, swept away subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing, and placed the Party's cause entirely under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism suited to Chinese conditions, that is, Mao Zedong Thought. Over the past nine years, not only has the Party made no mistakes, but it has moved ahead triumphantly. This is obvious to all. Indeed, all the comrades, recalling the past bitter lessons under the leadership of opportunists, can see that they have been doing well over these years under the leadership of a Central Committee that has been guided by Mao Zedong Thought; at the same time, they have become more aware of the pernicious influence exerted on them by the three erroneous styles. Anyone who has studied the Party's history will fully realize the importance of the rectification movement.

Now that we have such an excellent Central Committee and a wise leader like Comrade Mao Zedong, both so vital to our Party, can we say that all our problems have thus been solved? No. To the correct leadership of the Central Committee must be added Party organizations and cadres at the various levels that faithfully carry out the Central Committee's instructions. Otherwise, if the Party organizations and cadres are thoroughly tainted with subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing, it would be impossible for them to follow the correct leadership of the Central Committee. Unfortunately, these bad styles and non-proletarian ideologies still remain serious among them and have severely impaired our work. Comrade Mao Zedong's call for rectification is, of course, not a shot in the dark; it is precisely directed against our weaknesses. If all of us carefully review our work over the past few years and examine our ideology, we shall understand this point. In Taihang and Taiyue areas and southern Hebei, for instance, we have achieved much in our work during this period under the leadership of the Central Committee. However, it is distressing that some of our comrades, especially some leading comrades, still follow erroneous ways in doing things and so have seriously impaired the work. For example, in the period of the Party's great expansion, people were forced to join the Party, which, to this day, still hampers our efforts to consolidate the Party and increase its fighting capacity. Sectarianism among our comrades has driven large numbers of intellectuals in rural areas to the Kuomintang. Comrades working in the government based on the "three-thirds system" still do not know how to unite with non-Party people or to broaden and consolidate the united front. There were prolonged "Left" financial and economic policies and vacillation (now to the "Left", now to the Right; mostly to the "Left") in executing the policy of eliminating traitors. In addition, there were a
formalistic style of leadership in production, an oversimplified, rigid approach to work, and so on. Many failings can be found everywhere at any time. These unhealthy practices have done us much harm; some still remain to do so, and others will cause us to suffer in the future. Anyone who has examined his own work will surely realize the need for the rectification movement.

As for ourselves, we must definitely admit that the ideology and work style of both rank-and-file Party members and many leading cadres still have something to be desired to varying degrees. We are not exaggerating if we say that a great many comrades still harbour non-proletarian ideas. Our comrades used to overestimate themselves and Party organizations lacked a profound understanding of their cadres. Our experience in the rectification movement has shown that knowing oneself is no easy matter, for people are prone to exaggerate their strong points and forgive their weaknesses, even taking their weaknesses for strong points. Therefore, it is only through the rectification movement conducted among groups of people that we can discover our weaknesses and know and remould ourselves anew through our own individual efforts and with the help of others. Reports of the rectification movement from various places show that although some comrades have fought for the revolution for many years, it was only through their recent deep self-examination and the help of others that they came to realize that they had not yet become true proletarian fighters and had not finally established a revolutionary outlook on life, or had joined the Party only organizationally, but not entirely ideologically, with one foot in and the other foot outside the Party organization. Can such comrades withstand revolutionary storms? Naturally, it would be difficult for them if they do not remould themselves. Unfortunately, there are quite a few such comrades, among whom there are even many members of prefectural Party committees who still have serious ideological weaknesses. Frankly, it is not a question of whether or not one has weaknesses, but how many and how serious they are. When Comrade Mao Zedong says that subjectivism and other erroneous practices are not predominant in the Party, he is speaking of the Party as a whole. So we should not forgive ourselves, believing that we have only a vestige of such practices and that it does not merit serious attention and vigilance. As a matter of fact, many comrades exhibit not just a vestige of subjectivism and sectarianism, but are ideologically dominated by them. These bad practices are manifested to varying degrees in different areas, some of them serious in one area, but less serious in another. They are holding sway in some districts, causing these districts to meet defeat (for instance, the Huxi area in Shandong Province). In short, weaknesses can be found,
more or less, in all districts and among all comrades. We should carefully examine ourselves if we want to know, remould and better ourselves.

Comrade Peng Dehuai said that anyone who does not take part in the rectification movement will not understand its importance. Indeed, our experience from the previous term of the Party School has proved this. Many comrades arrived at a deep understanding of the rectification movement as it gradually developed in depth. It is not until they knew themselves and learned how to remould themselves that they realized the great power of the movement.

So far I have discussed the importance of the rectification movement.

Since the rectification movement is so important, why have we failed to practise it over the past year and a half? In my opinion, it is chiefly because the leading cadres have not gained an adequate understanding of the movement and, therefore, have not paid sufficient attention to it or devised practical ways of implementing it. Were there objective difficulties? Of course there were — for instance, wartime conditions, a heavy workload, and so on — however, these were definitely not the main reasons. If we had a full understanding of the importance of the rectification movement, we would try to overcome the difficulties by all possible means.

As this term of the Party School begins, the rectification movement is commencing throughout the Taihang area. We must overcome our past failings, continue conscientiously and fulfill the tasks set in the movement. In order to achieve this goal, instead of giving it up halfway as we did before, we must, above all, make sure we have good leadership. Leading cadres must keep tabs on the movement. They should plunge themselves into it, making a breakthrough at some point, and gaining experience with which to guide other departments. At the same time, specific methods will be adopted. For example, only a small number of cadres will take care of the day-to-day work in each department or government office, making it possible for the rest to concentrate on the movement. This method is better and more practicable than the one we used in the past, when we spent half a day on the movement and the other half on work; now all comrades can devote their attention to the movement. So long as we do not do a halfway job, we are sure to achieve our goal.

Leading cadres are paying closer attention to the rectification movement, but it is more important for each comrade to adopt a correct attitude towards the movement. Therefore, in the light of our experience from the previous term of the Party School, I should like to make the following suggestions to the comrades who are taking part in the present rectification movement.

First, each of you should resolve to correct your way of thinking. You
should first and foremost examine yourself to see whether or not you have weaknesses in your thinking and what they are before you become determined to remould yourself. In the past some comrades came to the Party School for the purpose of listening to reports, but they were wrong there. One should understand that rectification requires one's own painstaking effort. Only when one has unbounded revolutionary enthusiasm and a sense of responsibility to the Party can one be open-minded and possess the mettle to reveal one's weaknesses and rectify one's way of thinking. Anyone who does not have the resolve to do so or, being reluctant to make public his mistakes, intends to correct them only in private can absolutely not succeed in rectifying his thinking. Some comrades who attended the previous term of the Party School did just that, coming to grief themselves and harming the Party.

Second, each of you should have the courage to help others in the movement. This is the correct attitude for us to adopt towards the Party and other comrades. We should have a spirit of both self-criticism and criticism of others and oppose the vulgar liberalistic attitude of the petty bourgeoisie. The rectification movement conducted during the previous term of the Party School shows that some comrades in southern Hebei had many weaknesses, but because they criticized themselves and each other frankly, they achieved a great deal. In contrast, because they lacked this spirit, some comrades in the Taihang area did not achieve such good results. Of course, criticism is aimed at helping comrades or, in other words, curing the sickness to save the patient, so we should be particularly open-minded in accepting criticism from others as a piece of advice for self-examination. Even if other people only give their impressions of us, that is still of value.

Third, rectification should be linked to the checking of your work. This means integrating theory with practice. Checking on your work here does not mean a special summary of your work; that can only be done when rectification is over. The purpose of conducting the present rectification in connection with the check on work is to make it easier for you to straighten out your thinking. At the outset of rectification in the previous term of the school, some comrades made a point of generally checking on their work, thus evading the cutting edge of the rectification movement. You should also watch out for this practice.

Fourth, during rectification you may feel weighed down with a heavy load mentally. When a comrade places truth in conflict with his personal interests, lacks the courage to be frank and lay bear his weaknesses and is overwhelmed by misgivings, especially when being helped and criticized by others, he is bound to feel depressed. In that case you should go a long way
to explain things to him, making it clear that rectification is not directed at individuals but at the mistakes and that it is nothing to feel ashamed of, but rather something commendable, to yield when faced with the truth. You should encourage him to speak his mind so that other people can help him. As for those who have lost their bearings and are not of one mind with the Party, you should also earnestly persuade them to confess their errors to the Party, telling them that the Party will surely forgive them. Our experience in the previous rectification movement proved that when a comrade had struggled with himself mentally, received other people’s help and made a clean breast of everything, he became cheerful at once, taking a more active part in the movement and trying harder to help other people. You should warmly encourage and welcome such comrades.

Fifth, it is essential to advocate the attitude of “saying all you know and saying it without reserve” to one’s comrades and superiors, and to oneself. If you have something to say about the Northern Bureau, the sub-bureaus or the Party committees at the district level, you should say it frankly. Although in our work we are divided into higher and lower positions, you do not need to worry about this difference. People holding higher posts should be frank and outspoken with those holding lower ones, and vice versa; they should also help each other. All group leaders and heads of study committees should be chosen from among rectification activists regardless of their regular positions.

Comrades,

These are the suggestions I should like to offer for your reference on the occasion of the new term of the Party School. For comrades to leave their posts and devote themselves fully to the rectification movement represents an opportunity that is hard to come by. You may feel pressed for time, but so long as you are determined to remould yourselves and improve your work, you will see enormous results. A few months from now you will have a fresh understanding of yourselves and a new attitude towards your work, and I am convinced that the Party’s cause will be advanced markedly.
BUILD STABLE BASE AREAS IN THE DABIE MOUNTAINS

August 27, 1947

1) Our army has crossed the Huaihe River and thrust into the Dabie Mountains, utterly thwarting the enemy’s plan of pursuit. The task ahead is to wholeheartedly and unwaveringly build stable base areas in the Dabie Mountains and, in co-ordination with the friendly corps, gain full control over the Central Plains.

2) Accomplishing this historic task requires a painstaking process; it will take us more than six months to expand the base areas. Unless we annihilate large numbers of enemy troops and fully arouse the masses, it would be impossible for us to gain a firm foothold. Therefore, we should not become conceited or impetuous but should conscientiously fulfil every single task with one mind.

3) We should explain to the whole army why we are certain of victory. First, we have the co-operation of the Chen-Xie Army,73 operating in the vast area of the Funiu Mountains and western and southern Henan, and of the Shandong army,74 operating north and south of the Longhai Railway. Second, we are confronted with only 23 enemy brigades, whose troops are dispersed and whose morale is low; at the same time, the enemy is in a more passive position strategically after failing in its recent pursuit operation. Third, the people in the Dabie Mountain area have a long revolutionary tradition and are experienced in guerrilla warfare. There are also a good many local cadres. We are sure of victory especially due to the wise leadership of the Central Committee and Chairman Mao, and the strong determination and confidence of the officers and men throughout the army. We have difficulties, but we can overcome them.

Directive issued to subordinate army units in the name of the Central Plains Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and submitted to the Military Commission of the Central Committee in the names of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping on August 30. After Comrade Mao Zedong read it and wrote some instructions on it, it was issued to Comrade Peng Dehuai, the Northeast Bureau and the East China Bureau.
4) We should explain to the people in the whole area that we, the people's own army of Hubei, Henan and Anhui that has been victorious in north China and has expanded its ranks, are back home now. We should explain to them why the Kuomintang troops are bound to fail and why our army is certain to win and that we shall never leave again. Our vow is to live or die together with the people of Hubei, Henan and Anhui provinces, to liberate the Central Plains and to emancipate the people of these provinces.

5) Militarily, in the first month we shall not seek to fight large-scale battles, but to occupy cities and towns, eliminate bandits and diehards, and win some small battles (for instance, annihilating one or two enemy regiments at a time). Meanwhile, we should particularly urge our officers and men to familiarize themselves with the terrain, become used to things here and learn how to fight mountain warfare, so as to prepare themselves for large-scale battles of annihilation. However, we must be aware that unless we wipe out more than ten enemy brigades within six months, we shall not be able to convince the masses that we are here to stay to support their courage to rise up and fight, and as a result we shall encounter even more difficulties. Therefore, the entire army must always maintain a high morale and be ready to fight.

6) Fully arousing the masses to wage guerrilla warfare and fight shoulder to shoulder with us is a decisive factor in the fulfilment of our strategic tasks. Our troops' strict adherence to the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention and to the rules of conduct are preconditions for creating a favourable impression with the masses, so that they will never hesitate to get in contact with us. Army units at all levels must make special efforts to see to it that these regulations are observed without fail.
THE SITUATION FOLLOWING OUR TRIUMPHANT ADVANCE TO THE CENTRAL PLAINS AND OUR FUTURE POLICIES AND STRATEGY

April 25, 1948

On this visit to the Henan-Shaanxi-Hubei Border Area I find the situation very good, the result not only of efforts made by all the Party, government and army comrades here, but also of the countrywide counter-offensives launched in July last year. I have been asked to talk about the current situation and I think the existence of the embryonic Henan-Shaanxi-Hubei Border Area confirms, on the whole, what I have just said about the situation. Over the past nine months there has been a new development in the war situation nationwide; our army has switched to counter-offensive in every area. We have advanced five hundred kilometers from the Yellow River to the Yangtze River. We cannot underestimate the significance of this advance, for China is only a few thousand kilometers from north to south. Another such advance will bring us to the border of Guangdong and Fujian provinces, with less than five hundred kilometers left and the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary regime imminent. The present advance is indicative of the tremendous change that has taken place in the strategic situation, and as noted by Chairman Mao in his report “The Present Situation and Our Tasks”, our counter-offensive has turned the war around. We have thwarted Chiang Kai-shek’s counter-revolutionary plan, forcing him to go from the offensive to the defensive and from exterior to interior lines; at the same time, we have moved from the defensive to the offensive and from interior to exterior lines, thus changing the strategic situation.

Since our field armies moved to exterior lines, they have suffered hardships, with troops in the Dabie Mountains, in particular, encountering many difficulties. Conditions are somewhat better for troops operating in the Henan-Shaanxi-Hubei Border Area, but they still feel that things are not so easy as

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before when they were fighting on interior lines in the Taiyue area. In view of
this situation, people may ask, "Didn't we change to a counter-offensive
position a bit too early? Wouldn't it have been better if we had done this a bit
later?" Facts have shown that the counter-offensive was launched at just the
right moment and that it would have been a mistake if we had delayed it. This
is because Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary strategy is to continue with
the war in the liberated areas, an experience he gained from his protracted war
against the people. Comrades who took part in the civil war during the ten-year
Soviet period can understand this point. During those years, whether we were
fighting in the Central Soviet Area, the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area or
the Western Hunan-Hubei Soviet Area, we found ourselves encircled by the
enemy on all sides. The enemy's policy was to keep the fighting centred around
or in the Soviet areas, trying to exhaust the manpower, material supplies and
financial resources in our Soviet areas and make it impossible for us to fight on
even if we were victorious in some military operations. During the campaign
against the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression", if we had moved
from interior to exterior lines, dragging the enemy out of the Soviet areas in
accordance with the principle formulated by Chairman Mao, the outcome
would have been better — the Soviet areas would have been preserved and the
Red Army would not have been forced to begin the Long March. Unfortunately,
the "Left" opportunists didn't do it that way and fell into Chiang
Kai-shek's trap. This time Chiang Kai-shek wanted to resort to the same trick
of restricting the fight to the liberated areas in an attempt to exhaust our
manpower, material supplies and financial resources and make it impossible for
us to carry on the fight and move out of the liberated areas, so that he could
keep his rear area, with a population of 300 million, out of the war and obtain
supplies from the area for his military operations. Although Chiang Kai-shek
is shrewd in his calculations, we have our Chairman Mao, who is even wiser and
saw through them as early as when he began to formulate the concept of the
principle for the war of self-defence. He pointed out to us that we should start
by fighting on interior lines and then carry the war to exterior lines, that is, to
the Kuomintang areas after we had weakened the enemy considerably. By doing
so, we could ruin Chiang Kai-shek's vicious counter-revolutionary strategy.
Since, in the initial stage of the war, we were not equipped well enough and still
lacked experience in military operations, it was more convenient for us to wipe
out the enemy, organize and expand our forces and accumulate experience by
fighting on interior lines. Therefore, it was the only choice to fight on interior
lines first; in fact, we have already had some victories. In the first year of the
war of self-defence, from July 1946 to June 1947, we annihilated a total of 1.12
million enemy troops on all the battle fronts in the country. We organized the
dispersed guerrilla units into field armies and accumulated a wealth of experience in military operations. This is the right moment for us to carry the war to exterior lines; otherwise, we shall suffer setbacks. After fighting on interior lines in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Area for one year, for example, the number of chickens, swine and draught animals raised by the local peasants dropped sharply, as also did the number of trees in the villages. We may well ask whether we can afford to restrict the fighting to the liberated areas. If we were bent on fighting on interior lines for the sake of convenience, we would fall into the enemy’s deadly trap.

It has been nine months since we moved out of the liberated areas and we have achieved a great deal. Some comrades are prone to neglect this. Take our columns there for instance. They won many battles in the first year, wiping out nine and a half enemy brigades over 23 days during July last year. However, when they reached the Dabie Mountains, they annihilated only four enemy brigades in all, so that some people suspected that the situation was taking a turn for the worse. If they take a good look, they will see the true picture. First, strategically, we have gone from the defensive to the offensive, advancing 500 kilometers and occupying an area with a population of 45 million; within this area we are able, as a result of our struggle, to control a region with a population of 20 million and wage guerrilla warfare in the region containing the remaining 25 million. In this area the enemy cannot enlist soldiers or collect grain. In other words, the enemy has lost control of one-sixth of its 300 million-strong population. Second, let us look at the number of enemy troops wiped out. According to the latest battle reports, nearly 2.1 million enemy troops were wiped out on battlefields throughout the country from July 1946 through February 1948 and at least 100,000 enemy troops were annihilated in March this year. In other words, the number of enemy troops wiped out over the past nine months since we started the counter-offensive equals the number annihilated in the first year of the war of self-defence. Although we have suffered hardships, we have achieved even greater victories and dealt even heavier blows to the enemy. As for the three field armies operating in the Central Plains, the columns in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Border Area and the Dabie Mountains area have been weakened to some extent, their forces down by about 15 per cent. However, our forces in Jianghan and Tongbai military regions have been expanded by 100 per cent and 50 per cent respectively; in the Henan-Shaanxi-Hubei Military Region they have been expanded by 100 per cent, and in the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu Military Region they have increased as well. Therefore, when viewed as a whole, our forces are now more powerful than before.

Comrades, you must be puzzled about the situation in the Dabie Mountains. We occupied over 20 counties and then lost them all, and the main force
of the field army moved from the Dabie Mountains to the Huaibei area. Can we say we were victorious? I think we can. As you all know, the Central Plains is very important strategically, leading right up to the enemy's gateway, with the Dabie Mountains close by. After we changed to the counter-offensive strategy, the Central Plains took the place of Shandong and northern Shaanxi as the enemy's chief target. Here the enemy has assembled the largest number of troops. The situation in the Central Plains depends on two mountain ranges — the Dabie Mountains and the Funiu Mountains. However, the enemy's greatest concern is for the Dabie Mountains, which are more important than the Funiu Mountains. Control over the Dabie Mountains is decisive for the general situation in the Central Plains. Strategically, the Dabie Mountains make an excellent base from which to advance. Being close to the Yangtze River and leading directly to Nanjing and Shanghai in the east and Hankou in the southwest, they provide an important springboard for us to cross the Yangtze River, constituting a constant threat to the enemy. Therefore, both the enemy and ourselves will fight for the Dabie Mountains, a matter involving a bitter struggle. We have already established two military areas in the Dabie Mountains, with a population of 12 million, completed extensive deployment for guerrilla operations, dispersed remaining troops to every corner of the Dabie Mountains and built up armed political power at county and district levels. We have gained a firm foothold here and the enemy will by no means be able to drive us out. Facts have shown that we can gain a firm foothold even through guerrilla warfare. So, we are now in a position gradually to use our field armies in mobile fighting in a vast area, something which was impossible for us earlier. The struggle in the Dabie Mountains has moved a step forward to where the local people and our troops are able to maintain the struggle. So far, more than half of Chiang Kai-shek's troops operating on the southern lines have been pinned down in the Central Plains, making it possible for our army units to win more battles in other parts of the country. Although of all the army units in the country, we have, in the Central Plains, suffered the greatest hardships and losses, strategically we have gained the initiative and achieved an overall victory. Therefore, when commenting on the war situation, the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao first spoke about the Central Plains and highly praised the achievements scored here.

Some of our Party members are lacking in the Marxist-Leninist way of thinking. Once they see a wisp of cloud over their heads, they come to the conclusion that the whole world is overcast. They make judgements by instinct, predicting the outcome of the revolution by whether or not there are clouds overhead, so that when faced with difficulties, they lose sight of the bright future and prospects for victory and cannot but become dishear-
tened. Our forces are growing and we have more than a few victories to our credit. However, we must admit that fighting on exterior lines is not so easy and convenient as on interior lines. No revolution can be staged with ease, and in future the struggle will become more and more arduous until final victory. Without doubt everyone hopes for a quick victory in the revolution, but he is not so sure when asked whether he dares to win the victory. Not all those who hope for victory dare to win it; victory requires painstaking efforts. Many of our troops from the north fear to cross the Yangtze River, because they are not accustomed to life in the south. However, to achieve victory they have to cross the Yangtze. Since the enemy still rules an area inhabited by several hundred million people, we have to cross the Yangtze and carry the war to the heartland of the enemy if we want to achieve nationwide victory. Anyone who is afraid to cross the Yangtze is a coward and anyone who yields to difficulties is not a staunch revolutionary. He is a true hero who is ready to overcome difficulties, bear hardships and fight courageously and resolutely to cross the Yangtze River. This applies to local comrades as well. It is a matter involving the political line to follow and determination to carry on the revolution. All comrades working in the Central Plains are shouldering arduous tasks. People throughout the country place their hopes on us, so we should try to work even harder.

The comrades surely want to know how long it will be before we can attain victory. Comrade Ren Bishi stated in his report that if we don't make mistakes, we shall certainly win in three to five years. Everyone was both surprised and delighted at this statement; delighted because victory is sure to come, and surprised, because it will still take three to five years, which is an unbearably long period of time. In fact, three to five years is not a long time; besides, during this period we have to do our utmost before we can win. Since there are 450 million people in China and only 2 billion people in the world, our victory will mean the victory of one-fourth of the world's population. It has only been some 20 years, not yet even 30 years, since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, yet under the leadership of such a Party we shall soon achieve victory for 450 million people in the Chinese revolution — this will truly be a great and joyful event.

The precondition for winning victory in three to five years is not making mistakes. What are the mistakes we should try to avoid? As laid out by the Central Committee, we should avoid the ones that concern the following five questions; we shall suffer defeat if we make a mistake of principle in any of them.

1. The war. As mentioned above, under the careful leadership of the Central Committee and Chairman Mao, we have successfully fought a
defensive war over the past 21 months, our military forces have been expanding and, being qualitatively already superior to the Kuomintang troops, they will one day be equal in size to them. The most important thing for us now is not to become conceited; the victorious troops, in particular, should be the most cautious and conscientious. Having experienced setbacks, the enemy has become wiser. We should not lose sight due to success; instead, we should constantly review our experience in order to enhance our combat effectiveness. So long as we continue to wipe out eight brigades, totalling 100,000 enemy troops, each month, and hit the target set for the first year of the war of self-defence — 97 brigades or 1.12 million enemy troops — the enemy is bound to be defeated. From now on, we need to be more mobile and flexible, carefully choosing battle opportunities. Our victory depends on our “feet”. Whenever we find an opportunity to fight, we should have the courage and lose no time in launching a surprise attack on the enemy. We must dare to remain mobile — to keep moving either to escape from the enemy or to cover much ground to make an attack.

2. Land reform. Before the National Land Conference, some comrades in the Party neglected land reform and some were even strongly against it, which was extremely dangerous. What does revolution mean? Revolution means fighting against imperialism and feudalism. Feudalism is the backbone of imperialism. If we do not oppose feudalism and carry out land reform, we shall be unable to support a protracted war and the revolution will not succeed. Even if we capture Nanjing, we cannot say we have succeeded, because the foundation for feudal rule will remain if we do not conduct land reform. Therefore, opposing feudalism is a fundamental task of the Chinese revolution. Since the National Land Conference, the serious tendency relating to land reform has, by and large, been overcome throughout the country. Land reform does not mean simply shouting a few slogans in support; it involves many matters of policy that call for a real solution. In newly liberated areas, for example, there are a few areas where the reform has seen some progress, but, in general, it has not been conducted satisfactorily.

3. Party consolidation. Imperfection in organization and way of thinking exists to a serious degree in the Party, as a result of which the Party will lose its fighting capacity and become unable to accomplish revolutionary tasks. In order to overcome this phenomenon we must consolidate the Party; otherwise, the Party will become decadent. Most of the comrades who have resisted land reform, embezzled the fruits of victory, or been weighed down with “mountain-stronghold” mentality have remedied their mistakes through Party consolidation. Party consolidation must be conducted properly. It should be aimed at educating comrades, achieving internal unity and solving
ideological problems. Chairman Mao has said that we should and can help anyone who has failed to meet the minimum qualifications for Party membership to overcome their mistakes. We need correct methods for Party consolidation, just as we need correct policies in land reform. All comrades in the Party, without exception, should subject themselves to Party consolidation. As we all know, each of us has shortcomings and makes mistakes to varying degrees. Therefore, everyone should take part in the movement and examine himself conscientiously. Those who are not conscientious should be helped by others. Those who are really incorrigible should be expelled from the Party. This is the inviolability of Party consolidation. The Chinese revolutionary ranks are very large, the tasks are numerous, and Party members are charged with heavy responsibilities. Whether the Party leadership is good or not and how well the Central Committee's line and policies are carried out depend on whether Party members measure up to the qualifications for membership. Chairman Mao gives us correct instructions, but if we practise liberalism and always contravene them, we shall fail all the same. If, through Party consolidation, we can unify our will, carry out the Central Committee's line and policies and increase our fighting capacity, we shall succeed in the cause of the people's liberation.

4. The policy concerning industry and commerce. In the later Soviet period\(^80\) the enemy imposed a strict blockade on the Soviet areas, with the result that five grams of salt sold for one yuan. We, on our part, made policy mistakes which crippled industry and commerce and erected a barrier against ourselves. When we advance to the Central Plains, policies were contravened in all areas without exception, and we paid for those mistakes. Many comrades attributed the crippling of industry and commerce to the war, saying that industrialists and businessmen had stopped their operations because the enemy had looted them, and few comrades admitted they themselves had anything to do with it. If we fail to discover the true cause, there will be no way of correcting the mistakes, and we shall meet with numerous difficulties. We may have money, but no goods to buy, or we may have goods (such as timber in the Dabie Mountains), but no way to export them. If the oil mill is closed down, there will be no cooking oil available. The pan factory in the Dabie Mountains and the coalpits and the shops connected to the factory can support 30,000 people. If the factory closes down, the 30,000 people will immediately be out of work. If the small street market in Lushan shuts down, at least 10,000 people will lose their means of livelihood and will soon be begging for food from you. In our area 30,000 people live on growing tobacco. If the cigarette factory closes down and no products are turned out for sale in other areas, the 30,000 people will soon
have no food and clothing. Whom have we overthrown, the capitalists or the common people? I don’t think we have overthrown the capitalists; instead, we have stripped the common people of their means of livelihood. Bureaucrat-capital refers to that one clique — the four big families — and doesn’t mean bureaucrat plus capital. Otherwise, if a county magistrate opened a shop, we would have to confiscate it. If we fail to make industry and commerce a success, we cannot develop the economy in the liberated areas and the people’s existence will be jeopardized. In that case, even if the Kuomintang didn’t drive us away, we would have to leave and the revolution would fail. Hence the importance of the policy concerning industry and commerce. Private industry and commerce are an integral part of the new-democratic economy and we should help develop them.

5. Execution. If we have people executed indiscriminately, we are sure to be defeated. After reaching the Dabie Mountains, life became hard for our troops and discipline was very lax. At the time people asked us two questions: Can’t you handle your troops any better? Are you going to eliminate counter-revolutionaries again? In the past it was Zhang Guotao who had people killed indiscriminately. Recently, in Yuexi County, an official who came from a landlord’s family killed many people in a small town, causing the breakdown of work in several neighbouring villages. Eight or nine of the ten victims, labelled lackeys, were poor people. Execution will solve no problems. When, at a meeting, the participants were asked to vote on who should be executed, some of them raised their hands while hanging their heads, only to regret it on their way back home. This demonstrates that if we kill people wrongly, we are bound to become divorced from the masses.

Generally speaking, before the National Land Conference, the Right tendency was serious. Now it is the “Left” tendency that predominates in the country as a whole, although a Right tendency is to be found in some areas, too. The Right tendency is manifested in that some comrades are not taking an active part in land reform. They take the Central Committee’s emphasis on policies and tactics as grounds for their inaction, saying that the reform can wait because they have to study the tactics first. Other comrades show no concern for Party consolidation, emphasizing their special circumstances and asking why their faction cannot be made an exception. Party consolidation is a serious matter, and nobody is to be exempted from it on account of being a member of a so-called faction or someone’s former intimate or personal friend; these things are feudalistic. Persuasion and education are policies for Party consolidation. We must take a serious attitude towards any comrades who have made mistakes and conduct criticism and self-criticism. In the course of Party consolidation we should put right all
erroneous ideas and other mistakes: impurities in ideology and class composition, graft and corruption, bad work style, lax discipline, war-weariness, fear of hardship and of crossing the Yangtze River, etc. It seems that a growing number of people are harbouring a fear of the United States. Some say they know it is not much use for the United States to supply Chiang Kai-shek with hundreds of millions of dollars and arms, but now they fear the United States may dispatch troops to China and use its atom bombs. Many comrades have no faith in Chairman Mao's thesis that U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger, believing that the U.S. troops must be very formidable and that we are bound to be defeated. A revolutionary should not think that way. In particular, being Communist Party members whose revolutionary programme or task is to fight against imperialism and feudalism, why should we fear imperialism? It is not so easy for the United States to send troops to China, and even if it did send troops here, I should like to ask: Would you continue to participate in the revolution? Would you still adhere to the anti-imperialist programme? Are you still qualified for membership of the proletarian vanguard? Communist Party members of lofty character should answer: Fight imperialists to the very end! We should have such courage. The last thing Communist Party members should exhibit is the servility Lu Xun used to condemn. We should despise U.S. imperialism, look down on servility, such as fear of foreigners, and boost our own morale. For the United States to send troops would be an international issue and its rhetoric about doing so is only meant to scare people. We should foster a firm belief that we can defeat U.S. troops. We must have the courage to win; all Right sentiments should be repudiated.

The "Left" tendency is manifested in the course of differentiating classes in land reform, where rich peasants are treated the same way as landlords, the interests of middle peasants are infringed upon and middle peasants are rejected; in the new liberated areas impetuosity has occurred in our work, resulting in the broadening of the scope of attack and the adoption of a "Left" policy with regard to industry and commerce. This "Left" tendency is nothing new to us; we adopted a "Left" policy relating to industry and commerce during the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan. We failed to carefully study and carry out the relevant directives issued by the Central Committee and the resolution adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, with the result that we shot ourselves in the foot. If we do not overcome this "Left" tendency now, we cannot succeed in land reform or economic development in the base areas.

All these questions involve policy and tactics. We should diligently study the "Essential Points in Land Reform in the New Liberated Areas", drafted
by Chairman Mao, and the report delivered by Comrade Ren Bishi, for these two documents can help solve most of the problems arising in land reform in the new liberated areas. The tactical principle put forward by Chairman Mao is: make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one. This principle is simple and easy to understand. Who are the many? The poor peasants and farm labourers who make up 70 per cent of China's population, plus the middle peasants who account for 20 per cent, who together constitute the mainstay. In doing anything, we should always think in terms of that 90 per cent of our population and see if we represent their interests and have their support. In the preceding period of land reform, usually no consideration was given to the middle peasants who make up 20 per cent of the population; in fact, among the poor peasants and farm labourers who account for 70 per cent of the population, it was only the poor peasant leagues that controlled everything. The so-called line of solely relying on poor peasants and farm labourers is erroneous. The correct line should be to rely on poor peasants and farm labourers and firmly unite with middle peasants, so as to abolish the feudal system. What is meant by making use of contradictions and crushing our enemies one by one? This applies to the landlords and rich peasants, who account for 10 per cent of the population, and means concentrating on striking at some of them and causing the others to take a neutral stand during a certain period of time. As pointed out in the “Essential Points in Land Reform in the New Liberated Areas”, we should strike at the landlords and cause the rich peasants to take a neutral stand. Treatment must be different for big, middle and small landlords, and the total scope of attack should generally not exceed eight per cent of the number of households of 10 per cent of the population. All this is designed to remove obstacles in the mass movement. If we do not differentiate among big, middle and small landlords, even striking at rich and middle peasants, it will be as though we are erecting barriers against ourselves in a battle. We have adopted these tactics in order to eliminate obstacles so that we can make great strides forward. They are not meant for the benefit of landlords, but to facilitate our effort to unite with the masses and lead them to success in land reform. Most of our comrades lack such tactical thinking and even reject it, so their scope of attack is too wide, which creates many obstacles. Such a situation occurred in the Dabie Mountains. There small landlords and rich peasants were driven to revolt and took up spears to fight us, and the masses were harmed, too. Recently, after we rectified the situation, the bandits and diehards laid down their arms. The poor peasants said it would have been better if we had done this earlier. Comrades working in the Dabie Mountains can readily under-
stand this tactical concept, having been paid back for their mistakes promptly and fiercely. Will the comrades working in the Henan-Shaanxi-Hubei Border Area be able to thoroughly understand this tactical concept, too? Yes, they should, although they have not suffered. In short, we should not antagonize too many people. We should try to get as many landlords as possible to take a neutral stand and pacify as many as we can. Whoever does not oppose us today is of benefit to us. If you take this to mean our yielding to the landlords and abandoning of land reform, you are mistaken. We are determined to carry out land reform, and this tactical concept will enable us to speed it up; otherwise, it will be a matter of more haste and less speed.

We should also adopt a correct policy for industry and commerce. We have learned some lessons in this regard. Often you may think you are winning over the many, but in reality you are losing them. When capitalists do business, they naturally want to make money by exploiting others. If a firm goes bankrupt or we confiscate it, it will have a much more adverse effect on the lives of the people than the exploitation of the capitalist does. So in doing things we should first consider by whose side we stand and how we can better serve the masses. Prohibiting capitalist exploitation sounds like a revolutionary idea, but if we make some calculations, we shall find that it is not a revolutionary idea, but an idea that will lead our revolution to failure. Operating in the Central Plains, the hundreds of thousands of our men there need food and clothing. If we neglect industry and commerce, we shall not be able to move forward at all. We have to organize our own economy to meet the needs of war. Our principle is plain living and hard work. It would be absolutely unrealistic if we asked for the same amount of rations as in north China. We should set an appropriate limit to them in the light of actual conditions in the new liberated areas. We need to have a well-defined policy and suitable methods for handling our finances. The excessive issue of paper money is no solution. Unified guidelines, policies and plans, plus help from north China, will solve the problem. If we do not learn how to make use of private industry and commerce in every field of our endeavours in the new areas, it will be impossible for us to solve the problem of supplies. Unlike north China, where we have many publicly run cooperatives with financial resources amassed over nearly ten years and a wealth of experience accumulated over more than six years, the new areas lack such a base as well as other favourable conditions. Therefore, we should take advantage of existing private industrial and commercial enterprises and organize our economy step by step. This merits our attention regarding the mass movement; we cannot allow the confiscation or closing down of industrial and commercial enterprises, including those owned by landlords.
and rich peasants. If the masses have divided up these enterprises, we must help them resume operation as quickly as possible. At the same time, we should form a united front with the businessmen, urging them to accept the paper money we issue. We should grant loans to businessmen and allow them to buy shares. The economy cannot be organized overnight. We should constantly check tax rates and our policy concerning industry and commerce, focusing our attention on war supplies and the people's means of livelihood. While opposing profiteering and monopoly, we should still allow businessmen to make some money. Without specific policies, practical problems cannot be solved.

We often say that policy and tactics are the lifeblood of the Party. Without policy and tactics, the Party's line would be lifeless. A correct line must be ensured through correct policy and tactics. All comrades in the Party should study the Party's policies and tactics carefully. This is the only way for us to become all powerful and invincible.
CARRY OUT THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE’S DIRECTIVE ON THE WORK OF LAND REFORM AND OF PARTY CONSOLIDATION

June 6, 1948

I

We were guilty of being too impetuous in the new liberated areas, alienating ourselves from the masses, isolating ourselves, and creating many difficulties in our struggle against the enemy and in our effort to establish base areas. In view of this, comrades working in the Central Plains should review all our policies and tactical measures in accordance with the directive on the work of land reform and of Party consolidation in 1948, issued by the Central Committee on May 25. The Central Plains has a total population of 45 million, with about 20 million in areas basically under our control, 10 million in guerrilla zones and about 15 million in areas soon to be liberated by our army. For the 30 million in the areas under our control and the guerrilla zones, land has been redistributed among four million at most; only movable property has been redistributed among the rest. Therefore, in the great majority of the areas, including those areas under our control where land has not really been redistributed and all the guerrilla zones and the areas unreached by our army, we should follow the Central Committee’s directive to “make full use of the experience acquired during the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and put into effect the social policy of reducing rent and interest and of properly adjusting supplies of seed and food grains”. We should also apply “the financial policy of the reasonable

This directive was drafted for the Central Plains Bureau of the Central Committee. After it was submitted to the Central Committee, Comrade Mao Zedong, on behalf of the Central Committee, sent a telegram in reply on June 28, in which he expressed full agreement and added two paragraphs to it. The Central Committee communicated the document to all its bureaus, sub-bureaus and front committees. Comrade Deng Xiaoping was then first secretary of the Central Plains Bureau of the Party Central Committee.
distribution of burdens, so as to unite with all social forces or persuade them to take a neutral stand, and help the People's Liberation Army to wipe out all the Kuomintang armed forces and strike blows at the local tyrants, who are politically the most reactionary. Neither land nor movable property should be distributed in these areas, because they are newly liberated and border on enemy territory, and distribution there would not be of advantage to uniting with all social forces or persuading them to take a neutral stand for the accomplishment of the basic task of wiping out the Kuomintang reactionary forces”. Even in those areas where land has been redistributed, because of the many problems, we should, in accordance with this guideline and in light of the actual conditions, make a special study of the problems, work out solutions and make the necessary readjustments.

II

In carrying out the Central Committee’s guideline, the major obstacle we may encounter is resistance by some cadres, so it is imperative that our cadres recognize the correctness of the Central Committee’s directive by drawing severe lessons from the mistakes of their past “Left” impetuosity. The important lessons for us are:

1. Our guidelines and plans were not formulated on the basis of reality in the new liberated areas, but out of our wishful thinking. When we arrived in the new liberated areas, we did not investigate and study the situation, but simply planned to complete land reform in six months, without regard to whether or not the enemy’s situation permitted it and whether or not the masses and cadres were prepared for it. We overlooked the arduousness of mass work, taking the action of a few reckless persons for that of the overwhelming majority of the masses, and the momentary popular enthusiasm upon the arrival of our army for the awakening of most peasants and their demands for the redistribution of land. Therefore, we did not try to lead the masses in attaining victory step by step and group after group, but just decided recklessly to undertake land reform. Results have shown that this approach was not only impracticable, but harmful. For instance, in the Dabie Mountains, land had been redistributed in areas with a total of several hundred thousand people, shortly before the Kuomintang troops collaborated with the forces of the landlords and rich peasants to launch counter-attacks, concentrating their forces on these areas or other areas where land reform had proceeded well. Since these areas were like isolated islands standing out
and vulnerable to the enemy's attacks, they were the first to suffer terrible and total destruction, with areas where work had been done most satisfactorily suffering the greatest losses. In most cases land was not truly redistributed. In some cases its redistribution was controlled by landlords and rich peasants. In others, the masses who had obtained land returned it secretly to the landlords and rich peasants and then rented it from them when the enemy's activities presented a serious menace and the landlords and rich peasants made threats against them. In still others, a handful of reckless persons (many of them riffraff or persons who had connections with landlords) seized the fruits of land reform, leaving the great majority of poor peasants and farm labourers with very little or poor land, if any at all. In still other cases, the peasants were only brave enough to take the land of small, weak landlords and rich peasants and of middle peasants, avoiding the land of powerful landlords and rich peasants. These things happened nearly everywhere, mostly because cadres from other areas had land redistributed by administrative orders or redistributed it on behalf of the local people before the people were really aroused and organized and before the majority of peasants really wanted land redistribution. Experience has proved that when we do not have an entire area under our control militarily, when the armed forces of the Kuomintang and the landlords and rich peasants have not yet been eliminated, when the great majority of peasants are not demanding land redistribution and have not been organized, and when honest local cadres at the district and village levels have not emerged in large numbers and cadres sent in from other areas are not yet familiar with the local conditions and have not forged ties with the masses, an attempt to carry out land reform promptly is not only subjectivist, but adventurist.

2. Generally speaking, our leading bodies and cadres did not have the right idea about policies and tactics. After Chairman Mao and the Central Committee issued a series of directives in this regard, things are better and good results have been achieved in some areas. However, most leading organs and cadres still lack a profound understanding of the directives and some are even against them. Because we were overoptimistic about the situation concerning the war in the Central Plains after we embarked on the counter-offensive and because we underestimated the strength of landlords and rich peasants in the new liberated areas, believing we could solve every problem with guns plus land reform, we made severe "Left" errors in matters of policy and tactics on an extensive scale. Actually, in the new liberated areas there was a broad united-front force against Chiang Kai-shek. Among landlords and rich peasants, especially among intellectuals, there were enlightened gentry and left-wingers. For instance, there were forces opposed to the
warlords of the Kuomintang Guangxi clique in Anhui, there were forces opposed to Tang Enbo, the Kuomintang general, in Henan, and when our army entered these areas, middle and small landlords stayed. However, suffering from a "Left" infantile disorder, we were bent on overthrowing everything and solving all the problems at one stroke, forgetting all about Chairman Mao's tactical principle — "make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one" — and the valuable experience acquired during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Due to this, we have embarked on land reform prematurely and made mistakes in pursuing the policy concerning the distribution of burdens for raising grain and funds (namely, the policy of expropriating local tyrants) and the policy concerning industry and commerce (eliminating the capitalist sector of the landlord and rich peasant economy), and made the mistakes of beating people and making arrests and conducting executions indiscriminately, with the immediate result of driving to the Kuomintang side a number of social forces that took up arms against us; otherwise they might have joined us or been convinced not to oppose us. Consequently, we broadened the scope of attack, making many enemies and isolating ourselves instead of the enemy.

3. We implemented a policy of arousing the masses to distribute movable property wherever we go. In reality, most of the property went to a few reckless individuals, while the great majority of the people received very little or nothing at all. Although this served temporarily to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, it did not help solve much of their problem; what is more, landlords and rich peasants also made use of the distribution of property to stir up a lot of disputes among the masses. In particular, because social wealth was distributed prematurely and squandered profusely, our army soon encountered difficulties with military supplies (especially grain), and before long the whole burden of military supplies fell on the peasants, arousing their discontent. The middle peasants were victimized by all the mistakes we made in differentiating classes, distributing movable property, executing people, etc.; we encroached upon their interests very seriously in imposing grain levies on them, and we even harmed the interests of poor peasants. In addition, we adopted the measure of exchanging grain for money to buy non-staple foods, which had a negative effect, too. Over the past few months we have wasted an incalculable amount of grain in distributing movable property and exchanging grain for non-staple foods. Unless we correct these two mistakes, we could offend the masses and destroy the base areas.

4. The army units and local governments in the area, without exception, acted against the policy concerning industry and commerce formulated by
the Central Committee. They confiscated the property of landlords and rich peasants in the industrial and commercial sectors, arbitrarily confiscated factories and shops that should not have been confiscated, under the guise of confiscating bureaucrat-capital and the property of reactionaries; they seriously damaged the manufacturing of the means of production; and they inordinately imposed taxes, which overburdened the people. Unstable social order and anarchy gravely undermined the economy, which then came to a stand still. Depression in the market and the closure of industrial and commercial enterprises were prevalent. As a result of the rash disruption of the original economic structure, large numbers of the people, who had been relying on industrial and commercial enterprises, sideline production and the market for a living, lost their means of livelihood. This is a serious social problem concerning the people's livelihood and a most thorny problem for us to tackle in the days to come.

5. Experience has shown that excessive executions cannot curb counter-revolutionary activities, but can only bring about greater unity among the enemies and their fiercer resistance and cause social disorder, anxiety and discontent among the masses, which will facilitate counter-revolutionary activities. Striking at local Chiang Kai-shek forces militarily to the neglect of disintegrating them politically has usually led to failure. Experience has proved that we should focus on disintegrating the enemy politically, while using the support of military attacks. Militarily, we should first and foremost concentrate our forces on striking at the most reactionary of the enemy’s forces and cause the less reactionary forces to maintain a neutral stand. Wherever this tactic was applied, victory was achieved.

6. It often happened that comrades who arrived in a new area suffered from the lack of a rear area to support the fighting, so they were eager to establish one where wounded soldiers and leading bodies could be placed. This led to impetuosity. In the initial stage of the anti-Japanese war we pursued a broad united-front policy and before long we had a stable rear area. This experience has proved that even in areas where the enemy's forces present a particularly serious threat, we can make arrangements to take care of wounded soldiers and build munitions factories, with the sympathy and support of the overwhelming majority of the people (including anti-Japanese landlords and rich peasants). However, after our army advanced down south, we followed a “Left” policy, broadening the scope of our attack and making many enemies, with the result that our rear area was frequently raided. Where enemy’s forces presented a particularly serious threat and an ultra-Left policy was pursued, it was the most difficult to build a rear area.

7. Although our political power always enjoys prestige among the people
in the new liberated areas and constitutes a tremendous organizing force, we often neglected its special role or failed to bring it into play. Experience has shown that the people demand order and fear chaos; they want government to be established and want to live in peace. Yet, we insisted that everything be done directly through the people, collecting grain and taxes and raising funds without going through the government, and having people executed without going through judicial procedure in court. All this created misgivings and fear among the people. True, smashing the old regime was absolutely necessary and was demanded by the overwhelming majority of the people. However, when we were ready to establish our new regime, we became impatient, not realizing that we could have, for the time being, used the old regime and provided it with guidance to maintain order and obtain military supplies. Therefore, the result was turbulent disorder. Beyond all doubt, the old regime will not work with us sincerely. So it is essential to establish a new regime to take its place as soon as possible. However, if the old regime can help maintain order, prevent chaos and provide some of our military supplies, it will be of enormous benefit to us and the people during the transition period before the new regime has been established.

8. Experience has always proved that conducting ample propaganda on all the correct policies of the Party, exposing the enemy's tricks and crimes, and, above all, establishing and occupying ideological positions among the masses are extremely important for us to defeat the enemy and mobilize the people in the new liberated areas. Yet, we have generally neglected propaganda work. For instance, in the Dabie Mountains, instead of strengthening the organization and leadership of propaganda teams, theatrical troupes and cultural work, we sent the cadres working in these fields to undertake land reform work, and so their role was weakened or eliminated. As for the content of the propaganda, we generally stressed land reform to the neglect of the Party's correct policies in all other fields of endeavour. "Left" slogans and rhetoric overshadowed or diminished the power of the Party's correct slogans and views.

9. In both town and country we seriously damaged nearly all the public buildings, factories, workshops, schools, cultural undertakings, churches and temples, as well as houses, furniture and trees owned by landlords and rich peasants. It was our troops, in particular, who did the most serious damage, arousing strong repugnance among the masses. People said, "The Communist Party can handle its military affairs well, but not its political affairs!" Up to now, only a few of our leading comrades have truly realized that this kind of agricultural socialism is destructive, reactionary and evil and that it is causing incalculable losses to the interests of the people and the Party's
political influence.

10. Many of our cadres who came from other areas exhibited a very bad work style, lacked adequate understanding of the role played by local cadres, and failed to devote their attention to finding large numbers of honest activists or to turning them into cadres at district and village levels through training. Instead, they promoted a bunch of hooligans and scoundrels as cadres. This was an important reason for our becoming alienated from the masses.

11. An important root cause for our mistakes was that before we entered an area, we did not do enough mobilization work or make enough preparations. In general, we knew little about the complicated situation in new areas and did not analyse it after we entered. We acted blindly, employing prior experience (while ignoring the most important experience acquired during the anti-Japanese war) and out-dated work style (while forsaking many useful ways of doing things). This kind of destructive empiricism caused us to suffer a great deal.

12. Due to our fighting without a rear area and creating difficulties for ourselves with our “Left” errors, a Right tendency was nurtured among some of our cadres, especially in areas where the struggle was fierce. Some of them, not recognizing the brilliant victories we achieved after the counter-offensive, lost their bearings; some, lacking a firm will to fight, were content to drift along; some took an indifferent, passive or perfunctory attitude towards policies and their work; some even doubted the complete correctness of our advance to the Central Plains or regarded it as premature; some slackened their vigilance over the enemy’s so-called total warfare and espionage; some showed no concern for the interests of the masses, squandering manpower and material resources at will; some adopted a negligent, tolerant attitude towards many serious problems that emerged in the newly organized army units and towards the discontent among the masses over our incorporating local Chiang Kai-shek forces and bandits into our army; and some leading organs adopted a liberal attitude towards the neglect of discipline and anarchy that existed to a serious extent in the Party. All this has done us much harm and must definitely be overcome if we want to achieve unity of thinking and organization in the Party, avoid losses in work and fight for victory in a more effective way.

The aim of making self-criticisms for the mistakes mentioned above is to sober us up so that we shall not repeat them later. We must understand how to educate cadres, persuade the masses and work out appropriate methods to quickly remedy the “Left” errors.
It must be stressed that the mistakes and shortcomings mentioned above cannot in any way obscure the great victories and achievements in the Central Plains area, which came after our massive offensive. We now control an area with a population of 20 million and have a guerrilla zone containing 10 million people. We have wiped out large numbers of the Kuomintang's regular and local troops. “And that is not all. Since we marched to the Central Plains, we have drawn large numbers of enemy troops here, thus utterly upsetting the enemy's counter-revolutionary plan to carry the war into the liberated areas and completely destroy these areas and pushing the war into areas under Kuomintang rule. In this way, we have not only preserved the existing liberated areas, but also enabled friendly army units along various routes to annihilate large numbers of enemy troops and recover large tracts of lost territory in Shandong, northern Jiangsu, northern Henan, southern Shanxi, northwest and northeast China and in other places. As a result, we have helped bring about offensives on all fronts. We have not suffered hardship for nothing.” Although a few of our army units have decreased in number, our army as a whole has greatly increased. We now have much valuable experience which we can apply to work in the new liberated areas in other parts of the country. Strategically, we have gained the initiative and we shall achieve superiority if we continue to wipe out enemy troops, and the day is not far off for the liberation of the entire Central Plains area. This will be a brilliant victory, made possible by all the comrades through their hard struggle under the correct guidance of the strategic principles formulated by Chairman Mao and the Central Committee. This is precisely the principal aspect of our work in relation to our mistakes and shortcomings. Besides, the mistakes and deviations, and the chaotic phenomena caused by them, can all be rectified and remedied. In fact, over the past few months we have, by and large, corrected or are in the process of correcting our mistakes in many important matters and have attained some good results, which offers substantial proof of this. “All Party comrades in the Central Plains must come to an adequate appreciation of our achievements. If, after the mistakes and shortcomings in our work are pointed out, we forget our achievements — the principal aspect of our work, forget the groundwork we have laid for forging ahead, as if we had made mistakes in everything, and forfeit our confidence in victory, that would be completely wrong and represent a Right opportunist view.”
In order to avoid repeating past mistakes, unite with all social forces to fight effectively against U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek and liberate all the people in the Central Plains at an early date, we should immediately end redistribution of land, expropriation of local tyrants, distribution of their movable property and indiscriminate confiscation of items in the area as a whole. All sabotage activities and beating, arresting and executing people contrary to the law should also be strictly prohibited. We should carry on and readjust our work in all fields in accordance with the following guiding policies and practical measures:

1. In areas under our control where land has not been distributed, we should immediately put an end to propaganda concerning land distribution and begin propaganda regarding the reduction of rent and interest rates and the reasonable distribution of burdens. We should set about conducting investigations and studies, create good examples and become more experienced, so that the Party committees in these areas can formulate unified, succinct decrees and measures for the reduction of rent and interest rates and the reasonable distribution of burdens, and, in accordance with these decrees and measures, train cadres, educate the masses and conduct a broad mass movement for reduced rent and interest rates from late autumn to next spring. In areas where land has been distributed, we should make a distinction between true and false distribution, between distribution carried out in a vast area and that in isolated places, and between areas where many problems have arisen and ones with fewer problems, so as to work out solutions accordingly. As a basic principle, in cases of true distribution, we should generally determine land ownership and property rights and make no further alterations; and in cases of false distribution, we should persuade the masses to enter into tenancy relationship at reduced rent and interest rates. For distribution carried out over a vast area, if conditions permit and the masses demand it, we should lead them in completing land distribution and, at the same time, correctly differentiate the classes and remedy our shortcomings. As for the isolated places, if conditions permit and the majority of peasants agree, we should make no alterations in existing land ownership and property rights and persuade the masses to begin the movement for reduced rent and interest rates. As for the problems that have arisen, we should consult with the masses to work out solutions based on the merits of each case. In solving problems, we should not act according to the
views of a tiny number of cadres and activists, but according to those of the majority of the peasants (including middle peasants), and we can get the landlords and rich peasants who have not left the place to take part in the discussions and let them air their views.

2. In the guerrilla zones, under the principle of uniting with all social forces and concentrating on attacking the enemy, we should resolutely fight against press-ganging people, plundering and rule by special agents and the bao-jia system, safeguard the interests of the masses and of people from all social strata, and appropriately carry out the policy of reducing rent and interest rates in the light of the actual conditions and according to the wishes of the masses. That is to say, the rates can be reduced with the consent of landlords and rich peasants, or reduced by a lesser amount than in areas under our control, or reduced first by landlords and rich peasants who volunteer to do so. As for the policy concerning burdens, we should really take the interests of the ordinary masses into account. When distributing the total burden, we should refrain from imposing heavier burdens in the guerrilla zones than in areas under our control, and appropriately lighten burdens on people in areas where they are loaded with burdens imposed both by the Kuomintang and us. We must overcome and strictly check the tendency to take things from the guerrilla zones. In the guerrilla zones we should employ relatively covert forms of struggle and organization and strive for unity among various social strata to fight against the Kuomintang troops and local Chiang Kai-shek forces, concentrating our attack on the small number of reactionary special agents, while keeping a low profile, lest the people should suffer persecution from the enemy, which otherwise could be avoided. In areas where the enemy exercises powerful control, we should use armed working teams in the struggle and adopt a dual revolutionary policy against the "total warfare" now being waged by the Kuomintang on an extensive scale.

3. When we enter an area for the first time, we should pursue the united front policy on a broader scale to unite with all social forces to fight against U.S. imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek and the most reactionary elements there, so as to wipe out the enemy and gain a firm foothold. We should never execute tactical measures with undue haste. First and foremost, we must not make mistakes; we should carry out political, economic and social reforms gradually, according to the degree of consolidation of the area, and the political consciousness and organization of the masses. Therefore, politically we should make the best use of contradictions among the enemies, winning over or uniting with those who
are not hostile to us, persuading the vacillating ones not to oppose us, and isolating and striking at the most reactionary ones. We must by all means avoid overthrowing all of them, lest we should help the enemy become more united and land ourselves in an isolated position. So far as social policies are concerned, we are not to expropriate local tyrants, distribute their movable property or confiscate their economic assets, with the exception of the few most counter-revolutionary elements already sentenced to death, whose personal property shall, for political purposes, be confiscated and distributed among the masses. Before reducing rent and interest rates, we should take such measures as explaining the policy to the masses, helping them to become organized and promulgating the government’s official decrees. This should not be started hastily without adequate preparations. In readjusting the supplies of seed and various grain, we should not do this by using our grain reserves to relieve the poor or by compelling landlords and rich peasants to take out grain for the same purpose. Instead we should encourage mutual aid, such as extending interest-free loans or loans at low interest rates, have the government extend grain loans for production or as temporary relief for the poor by taking out a portion of the grain that was confiscated or levied. Military supplies are the greatest difficulty in the new liberated areas. Aside from the necessary preparations made before our troops enter an area, they can requisition or borrow grain and impose monetary levies after their entry, which should be as rational as possible; that is, they should pursue a financial policy of reasonably distributing burdens. At the beginning they should make use of the old regime’s organs to raise military supplies (but, at the same time, the policy of reasonable distribution of burdens should be made known to the public), so they can avoid doing it themselves; otherwise, there will be chaos. Tax collection in cities and towns should be continued and be carried out by existing taxation organizations for the time being, which are to be transformed systematically; though the existing tax system can be applied temporarily, unreasonable, exorbitant taxes and levies should gradually be abolished. In the cities that are under our effective control or are to be under our occupation for a relatively long time to come, a reasonable taxation policy should be instituted. Only in the fairly wealthy cities, where we can stay for just a few days, is it permissible to raise donations on an interim basis in one collection through the chamber of commerce and under the guidance of the leading bodies at and above the level of district and army column Party committees. Moreover, a meeting of representative businessmen should be called to win their approval and the contribution must
not be too large; no compulsion should be used. It is particularly important that our troops should set an example in adhering to all the Party's correct policies in the new area, conscientiously observing the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,\textsuperscript{75} and strictly executing the policy of protecting cities, industrial and commercial enterprises, schools, hospitals and all public buildings and property. Damaging or wasting anything is forbidden. Meanwhile, it is necessary to resolutely refute the reactionary, destructive theory of agricultural socialism.

4. The Party should exercise its leadership and have its policies implemented by giving full play to the role of governments and mass organizations. In areas under our control, we should send large numbers of competent cadres to work in the various government departments, giving first priority to the financial and economic departments (including finance, grain, industry, commerce, banking and taxation), so as to ensure military supplies and the people's livelihood and avoid waste and disorder, and taking the initiative in work. At the same time, we should establish people's courts to handle and try cases, maintain public order and prevent indiscriminate beatings, arrests and executions. In nature, our political power remains a people's democratic political power of the masses opposed to imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism under the leadership of the proletariat, so it would be a mistake to discard the "three-thirds system"\textsuperscript{3} formulated by the Central Committee. Therefore, governments at the district and village levels should totally be in the hands of the peasants (including middle peasants). However, the ones at and above the county level can for now, in the light of the actual conditions, consider engaging as consultants, advisers, etc. a number of progressive people from industrial and commercial circles and members of local enlightened gentry who are comparatively honest, just and well-respected, are in favour of our basic programmes and policies, such as fighting against U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, promoting democracy, reducing rent and interest rates, and reasonable distribution of burdens, and are willing to remain in the area. However, when engaging consultants and advisers, it is necessary to seek qualified candidates, subject to examination and approval by a district Party committee; no incompetent persons should be engaged just to make up the required number, and attention should be paid to assigning the right person to the right job; otherwise we shall divorce ourselves from the masses. In guerrilla zones, guerrilla political power at county and district levels can be established under the unified organization of armed working teams, and in the villages the old organs
of political power can be preserved, to be gradually transformed and brought to an appropriate democratic level. Where we have to deal with the enemy, we can establish revolutionary organs of political power with a dual character. In areas we have just entered, besides flexibly applying the principles mentioned above, we should make good use of the old governments in the early days to maintain public order and obtain military supplies.

5. In areas under our control, we should establish peasant associations (middle peasants included) on an extensive scale. Poor peasant leagues should be expanded into peasant associations, and no new leagues are to be organized; if there is both a poor peasant league and a peasant association, the two should be merged into one peasant association. Peasant associations are the principal mass organizations in rural areas; it is necessary to encourage large numbers of peasants to join them of their own free will, so as to increase their membership and prevent a handful of people from monopolizing and controlling them and turning them into narrow, sectarian organizations. In general, peasant association leadership should be composed of two-thirds poor peasants and farm labourers and one-third middle peasants. We should prevent hooligans and scoundrels from usurping leadership and see that honest, faithful working peasants hold power. Besides peasant associations, we should gradually establish youth, cultural, women's and children's organizations in the rural areas to unite and educate the masses. In cities we should, first and foremost, establish trade unions and organizations for uniting educated youth. In guerrilla zones and new liberated areas, we should set up small, but competent, secret or semi-secret mass organizations and intelligence agencies, and their names need not be uniform nor the organizations unified. Once progress has been made, we can set up other kinds of organizations, such as those for workers, peasants, youth and women, and, once the groundwork has been laid, small, competent Party branches should be set up.

6. In order to expand production and promote economic prosperity to ensure the people's livelihood and to support the war, we should urge the people to accelerate production, miss no farming seasons and leave no land uncultivated, and we should prevent landlords and rich peasants from slowing down farm work and disrupting production. We should also resolutely carry out the policy of protecting the cities and industrial and commercial enterprises, and rectify the widespread erroneous tendency to attach little importance to the cities and abandon leadership over urban work. Factories, workshops, shops and sideline production in urban and
rural areas have suffered serious damage in the past, so the Party and
government should make great efforts to organize all kinds of specialized
departments (engaging the services of industrialists, merchants, technicians
and workers) to work out ways of restoring production rapidly. As for
wrongly confiscated means of production belonging to private industrial
and commercial enterprises, if they are still in the possession of the army
or government organs, they should unconditionally be returned, lock, stock
and barrel; if they have been distributed to the masses, we should persuade
the masses to return them, or the government should barter with the
masses for their return. Means of production that were confiscated, as
they should, must not lie idle, but be used by the government or leased
to individuals or a group of people for restoring and helping to increase
production. At the same time, in order to restore and expand industry
and commerce as quickly as possible, government banks should extend
loans to industrial and commercial enterprises according to the prevailing
circumstances, giving first priority to those closely related to the people’s
livelihood and military supplies.

7. When applying the principles and policies mentioned above, we
must fully propagate and explain them to the masses, and not be afraid
to criticize ourselves in front of them. We should appropriately make it
clear to them that the “Left” practices of the past, especially indiscrimi-
nately beating and executing people, damaging industry and commerce,
encroaching upon the interests of middle peasants, casting out landlords
and rich peasants and letting hooligans and scoundrels hold power, ran
counter to the principles and policies formulated by the CPC Central
Committee and Chairman Mao, did harm to the people and, therefore,
must be put right. We should explain to them that land reform is a
policy our Party will continue to carry out, because only through land
reform can peasants win relatively complete liberation, and that the reason
we have temporarily stopped to reduce rent and interest rates is that
conditions for land reform are not yet ripe and the reduction of these
is beneficial to the people at present. We should also explain to them
that only when the peasant masses are organized, honest peasants hold
power and the overwhelming majority of peasants truly demand land
distribution, can land be distributed fairly and with no problems. When
dealing with specific problems, we must resolutely defend the ground the
masses have already gained and repulse any retaliation by landlords and
rich peasants. We should make it clear that we shall only appropriately
compensate middle peasants for property that has been confiscated. We
should try to return the industrial and commercial enterprises to landlords
and rich peasants to whom they belonged. Other property belonging to landlords or rich peasants should not be returned; however, where land has been distributed, we must ensure that every landlord or rich peasant gets an equal share of land, housing and farm tools. We should encourage as many landlords and rich peasants as possible to return to their homes, but we must adopt a serious stand and attitude, letting them know that the government and the people are lenient towards them. When they return, they must register with government authorities and declare that they will abide by all the laws and decrees promulgated by the government and will not engage in any sabotage or espionage for the Kuomintang. At the same time, we should advise the masses to increase their vigilance against counter-attacks and sabotage by landlords, rich peasants and special agents.

8. As for local Chiang Kai-shek forces and bandits, we shall pursue the policy of punishing the chief criminals without fail, allowing accomplices under duress to go unpunished and rewarding those who perform meritorious deeds. We shall focus on disintegrating these enemies politically, while attacking them militarily, for the purpose of eliminating all of them. We should mobilize people from all quarters to persuade Kuomintang officers and men to go home, and the government will be lenient to all of them; they will not be subject to insult of execution, except that they should register with the competent authorities. As to captives taken on the battlefield, we shall apply the same policy as that towards those taken from the regular Kuomintang troops; killing them is absolutely forbidden; we should instead use them to help disintegrate and win over the other enemies. As to the main criminals who must be executed, they should be shot after the court has passed the sentence of death on them; beating criminals to death and other unlawful methods are forbidden, because we shall lose people's sympathy if we employ these methods.

9. Now that local armed forces in the various places have expanded considerably, we should plan to reorganize and consolidate them, with emphasis on strengthening the ranks of cadres, intensifying class education, establishing Party organizations, carefully screening out bad elements and secret agents, and enforcing strict military discipline and discipline regarding the masses. At the same time, the local armed forces should expand continually once they have been consolidated. Due to the many problems in the existing people's armed forces, we should also take effective measures to reorganize and consolidate them, with the support of peasant associations, and prevent secret agents, landlords and rich
peasants from controlling them. In villages where there are reliable peasant associations, the people’s armed forces should be placed under their leadership; the peasant associations should gradually control all the villagers’ weapons.

10. Strengthening propaganda and education is a task that demands immediate attention both in the army and in all areas. Propaganda teams and theatre troupes should be restored and strengthened in the army. Party committees and political organs at all levels should provide more effective leadership over propaganda and education, so as to be sure they are fully in keeping with the Party’s principles and policies. They should put a stop to such erroneous practices as writing slogans and conducting propaganda at will.

11. Training local cadres is not only a key link in maintaining ties with the masses and doing a thorough job, but is also the responsibility of cadres from outside areas. All local authorities should select large numbers of honest activists and poor intellectuals (including those from middle peasant families) in the struggle and promote them to cadres at district and village levels after they have received training. The Party should often check this work to see how well it is being done. We should also enlist large numbers of young intellectuals who were from landlord and rich peasant families and send them to study in north China, remould them in local military and political schools, or send them to work in other districts or villages after training.

12. The army is an important force in local work in the new liberated areas. Comrade Liu Shaoqi has said that if the army does not follow the Party’s policies, it means there is no way to ensure the Party’s policies in the most important part of the Party. Therefore, Party organizations and cadres in the army should be on the alert, be aware of their heavy responsibilities, assiduously study policies, use manpower and material resources sparingly, and make sure they are models in carrying out all the Party’s correct policies.

V

The Central Committee has instructed the entire Party to resolutely overcome certain manifestations of lax discipline and anarchy in many places and to abolish empiricism and bureaucratism in the leading bodies. These phenomena are most serious in the Central Plains. Since we launched the
counter-offensive, the leading bodies in the various areas have to operate separately in a relatively tense situation, each having to work on its own. Consequently, indiscipline and anarchy have grown and there is a lack of a serious and responsible attitude towards the Party's policies and tactics almost everywhere. Slackness, tardiness, inefficiency, lax leadership and liberatistic attitudes towards various kinds of erroneous tendencies have all reached an appalling extent. Therefore, it is necessary for Party organizations and cadres at the various levels to discuss the Central Committee's directives carefully, adopt the correct methods of leadership and work methods and rectify the erroneous ones. Although we have made a preliminary breakthrough in the Central Plains, we are still confronted with many difficulties in our effort to completely defeat the enemy and ensure supplies for our several hundred thousand troops. Thus, it is imperative that all comrades in the Central Plains conscientiously carry out the correct policies, tactics and leadership methods formulated by the Central Committee, promptly rectify errors and increase working efficiency; only in this way can we overcome one difficulty after another and liberate the whole of the Central Plains area.
SOME SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING OUR ENTRY INTO NEW AREAS IN THE FUTURE

August 24, 1948

In view of the things we have learned from work in the new areas over the past year, I now propose some suggestions concerning our entry into new areas in the future.

First, the preparation before action. This should include ideological, organizational, policy, military, and economic preparation. Lack of preparation caused us to suffer a lot when we marched south. Mentally, it is a tremendous strain for peasants to be far away from home and for northerners to be in the south. When they reach new areas (in the south), they must definitely confront many problems. For example, they have to eat rice, negotiate mountain paths and narrow trails, get bitten by mosquitoes and other insects, acclimatize themselves, learn to understand local dialects, and fight battles in mountainous terrain. All this tends to affect the morale of the cadres and soldiers. Therefore, everything should be made clear to them before they set out, explaining to them repeatedly that their attitude towards these problems comes down to the question of whether or not they are truly revolutionary. Clarifying this ideological question can serve to strengthen their morale and confidence. Due to the 10th Column's thorough mobilization activities, its troops have remained firm and in high spirits ever since they began marching to the south. Organizationally, there must be an adequate number of cadres to go along with the troops, cadres who have been informed of the tasks they have to accomplish, the policies they should pursue and the work style they should adopt. Militarily, there must be formations and equipment suited to mountain warfare and soldiers who have received tactical training for such warfare. As for economic considerations,
the troops' supplies must be guaranteed if we want to prevent policies from being violated and discipline becoming lax after they enter a new area. Major policies to be executed in a new area should be thoroughly explained to and understood by cadres, in particular.

Second, expansion. After entering a new area, the troops' first and foremost responsibilities are to win battles and occupy territory. These two at once are interdependent and contradict each other. To occupy territory requires a part of the troops or even a part of the main force, reducing the strength of the field armies. However, without territory, there would be no rear areas and the army could not expand itself. Consequently, it would not be able to mobilize the masses, procure military supplies, get the enemy troops dispersed and win battles. Therefore, it is most important to deploy an appropriate number of men to occupy territory. We in the Central Plains did not hesitate to weaken our main formation by deploying a large number of our troops to organize armed units in military regions and sub-regions and in counties, which has proved to be a success. Before deploying troops for expansion, every possible preparation must be made. Lack of preparation forced the army in the Dabie Mountains to spend nearly two months completing expansion. Learning from the army's experience in the Dabie Mountains, the armies in the Jianghan and Tongbai areas organized beforehand troops, as well as military sub-regions, prefectural Party committees and commissioner's offices and Party, government and military organs at the county level. As a result, it took them only about 10 to 15 days to complete expansion. Before entering a new area in future, it would be best to separate the functions of field armies and those of military regions. The military region should be a unit composed of Party, government and military organs (including armed forces) at military region and sub-region and county levels, and they should form themselves into temporary detachments when marching into a new area — which is bound to bring about quick results. In addition to the troops which come from field armies, whenever possible it would be best if some could come from local armed forces and militia in old areas, so as not to excessively weaken the strength of field armies.

Third, military operations. When launching an operation, the army should take into consideration the enemy's situation at the time and place and make an adequate estimate of the difficulties that may occur in the area. In the first few days after the army has moved into the area, it should especially follow the principle of not fighting any battle it is not sure of winning. The main force of our army should refrain from rushing into a battle, because once it has suffered a setback, it would easily fall into a passive position — at best, greatly reduced in number; at worst, forced to withdraw.
It is best for the army to operate flexibly over a wide area, seeking to wipe out a weakened enemy. Thus, victory would strengthen the confidence of the troops and both officers and men would have time to gradually familiarize themselves with the terrain and operational conditions, and become more sure of success. After our troops have become familiar with the enemy’s situation and the terrain, the military regions and local Party and government organs have begun to function and wounded soldiers have been accommodated, it is then safer to launch larger-scale battles of annihilation. However, this does not mean the army should refrain from fighting large-scale battles of annihilation it is sure of winning during the initial stage, let alone that the army should avoid any battle, which would naturally be wrong because it would destroy morale in the army. Especially when times are hard, the troops should be encouraged to fight with determination to deflate the enemy’s arrogance — this is the only way to strengthen their morale. That was our experience with the troops in the Dabie Mountains last September. Another important question concerning military operations is the dispersal and concentration of troops. Our field armies and military regions have different functions — the field armies are concentrated in order to fight large-scale battles, while the troops from military regions are dispersed in order to occupy territory, annihilating local reactionary armed bands and fighting small-scale battles — this is the way we will solve this major question. When the enemy is besieged by our main force, he will give up all the cities and strongholds of secondary importance to avoid being wiped out, and then begin to concentrate his forces and attack us from all sides when he outnumbers us; if he is sure of defeating us, he will pursue us, allowing us no time to rest. Therefore, our field armies should also know when to disperse their troops and concentrate them (sometimes in the mountains they have to disperse their troops in order to eat), disperse in order to lure the enemy into spreading out his forces and weaken him, then regroup again in order to wipe out a part of the enemy forces at an opportune moment. The most important reason behind dispersing our troops is to regroup them again and wipe out the enemy. Therefore, dispersing presupposes conditions favourable for regrouping. We could often use our main force to watch the enemy, with another part of our forces seeking favourable opportunities to launch surprise attacks against the enemy. The battle at Xiangfan is a case in point. Sometimes the military regions also disperse and regroup their troops. In order to expand ourselves, most of our military regions disperse almost all their troops to cover local activities. The Third Sub-region of the Tongbai Military Region dispersed a small number of troops from its two regiments to protect local work, while pooling the rest to wipe out reaction-
ary armed bands. As a result, it gained the most victories, kept its troops and local people in the highest spirits and expanded most rapidly. This method — concentrating forces to cut down enemy military strength in the initial stage — is a fairly good one. It is also necessary for our troops to prepare and allocate equipment, light cannons, in particular, before they move into new areas (mountainous areas).

Fourth, supply. This is the first, the biggest, and the most important question of policy we come in contact with in the new areas. Neither during the civil war periods nor in the anti-Japanese war period did we have the experience of providing for our troops in areas where we had laid no groundwork at all. In the Central Plains we used to parcel out the movable property expropriated of local tyrants and sell grain for money with which to buy non-staple foods for our troops, only to incur enormous waste and create utter confusion, which proved that this was impracticable. Since we shall stop expropriating local tyrants in the future, we shall need money to buy many things. For instance, we shall have to buy strips of cloth for making straw sandals and buy paper for handling official business. The expenses will certainly be immense. If we do not use appropriate methods to obtain these funds, we are bound to plunge ourselves into chaos. The methods which we need to adopt are as follows:

1) Carry some silver dollars and give each of our men two dollars every month for half a year to cover the cost of non-staple foods, tobacco and straw sandals.

2) Issue paper money for troops to use and exchange. One drawback is that the money’s value cannot be kept stable and small merchants will be hurt; one advantage is that it can meet our urgent needs and prevent chaos in hard times. The methods for issuing the money should be studied carefully, and the paper money should not be crudely printed.

3) Continue urban taxation, as long as our troops are stationed in a given city, using the existing rates and regulations, and collect an appropriate amount of funds from chambers of commerce.

4) Levy money in townships and villages.

5) Borrow grain from households, possibly through the bao-jia system before a reasonable distribution of burdens can be implemented. As the bao and jia will surely not work wholeheartedly for us, within the army we should have a relatively stable unit in charge of procuring grain. As soon as conditions are ripe, a system of delivering public grain should be put into effect.

6) Turn in all grain and money captured from the enemy, which may help solve some of our problems.
7) Therefore, army administrative organs, which may be called field administrative committees, must be well-formed, shouldering full responsibility for requisitioning and borrowing grain, collecting taxes and raising funds, taking over cities, controlling and handling captured goods, conducting any confiscations necessary, handling currency conversion and other business, as well as administering the supply departments of the army. The field administrative committees are to have sub-committees in army columns and offices in brigades and regiments. It is necessary to prepare large numbers of cadres for this undertaking. After a breakthrough is made in new areas, these cadres will serve as the backbone in financial and economic development there.

Fifth, social policy. The principles embodied in the Central Committee’s directive of May 25 and the methods formulated in the Central Plains Bureau’s directive of June 6 for implementing those principles and the policies executed in Kaifeng are all practicable. So long as we do not make “Left” mistakes and proceed gradually, we can avoid major errors, rally the majority of the people around us in fighting U.S. imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek, and minimize the difficulties of our army. New areas must go through a military stage before entering a period of consolidation. (This is a very general plan.) During the military stage we should adopt tactics to liberate the masses politically by relieving their sufferings; as for the enemies, we should deal them political blows by confiscating their property, purely for political reasons, with the most reactionary ones being the main targets in the struggle. In particular, attention should be given to making full use of political power and strengthening propaganda work. Organs of political power marching with the army take the form of the field administrative committees or the local people’s governments. It is better for these organs, instead of the army, to handle public affairs. When we arrived in the Dabie Mountains, the first thing the people there wanted was “political stability”, because they most feared chaos and anarchy, demanding order instead. “Not to bungle things” is in itself a major policy for uniting with the majority of the people. If we make extensive use of the media, such as propaganda teams, theatrical troupes, propaganda by officers and men, government notices, meetings, forums, lectures and art exhibitions, to explain our views and policies and explode the enemy’s rumours and lies, we can dominate the ideological positions, set people’s minds at ease and create a different atmosphere in the new areas. We can find more recruits, including educated youth, for the army. We can also begin to establish small secret mass organizations, admit a few individuals into the Party in secret or organize underground Party groups. All this was what we did in the early days of the
anti-Japanese war, and we benefited much from it, but then we suffered a
great deal, because we didn’t do those things when we were in the Dabie
Mountains. As soon as a breakthrough has been made militarily, we should
generally enter the period of consolidation, shifting the focus of our work
over to the reasonable distribution of burdens, gradual reduction of rent and
interest rates, with preparations made beforehand, and the establishment of
a taxation system, peasants’ associations, Party organizations and training
classes on an extensive scale.

Sixth, armed forces. We must do our best to organize local armed forces
in all new areas. They provide reliable sources for expanding and replenishing
our army and an important force for consolidating occupied areas. Although
we adopted a “Left” policy in the Central Plains, we still succeeded in
establishing or expanding local armed forces, totalling about 120,000 men.
Otherwise, the number would have been larger. When forming such forces,
we should not hesitate to transfer cadres and troops from the army to serve
as the backbone. It is not advisable to organize militia before the masses have
been mobilized. However, when our troops arrive in a new area, there will
certainly be many unemployed poor people suffering from cold and hunger
who will want to join the army, but they should be recruited in small
numbers. We have become out of practice in this work with many years of
neglect.

Seventh, the cadres. New areas are in great need of cadres. In the Central
Plains there are altogether about 30,000 cadres, out of which 11,000 come
from north China, 6,000 from east China, and more than 10,000 from the
army. Most of them, however, are cadres at the village level and are not
competent enough. If cadres appointed to new areas were all at and above
the district level, the number could be much smaller. In the meantime, we
always have the feeling our work is being seriously impaired by the lack of
cadres, particularly financial and economic cadres. Judging by the number of
cadres employed in the Central Plains, the region south of the Yangtze River,
with a population of 100 million when liberated, will need 30,000 to 40,000
qualified cadres, which the Central Committee is requested to provide.
Meanwhile, a large number of cadres and students have returned to their
hometowns from areas controlled by Chiang Kai-shek, waiting for our army’s
arrival, and they will form another major source of cadres.

The above are matters concerning our army’s entry into new areas for
your information.
OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE
Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign

March 31, 1949

1. Chiang Kai-shek's forces, assembled between Shanghai and Anqing, consist of 24 corps, or 72 divisions, totalling about 440,000 men. Among them 18 corps, or 49 divisions, are defending the Yangtze River; six corps, or 23 divisions, are controlling the areas along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi sector, including Hangzhou, Jinhua, Quzhou and Huizhou; four or five corps are for emergency use.

2. In order to wipe out all or most of these forces, occupy southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui and the whole of Zhejiang Province, seize Nanjing, Shanghai and Hangzhou, so as to completely destroy the political and economic centre of the reactionary Kuomintang government, we have decided that our Second and Third Field Armies begin to cross the Yangtze River and launch the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign at 18:00 hours on April 15.97

3. When our troops have succeeded in crossing the river, the enemy may attempt the following moves:

1) Draw back his troops to the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou triangle and the Nanjing and Wuhu areas to control his strategic points of Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Wuhu, Zhenjiang and Wuxi; take advantage of the long distance between our two armies, one in the west and the other in the east, to concentrate his forces to fight a decisive battle when our troops in the east have rushed to the east section of the Nanjing-Shanghai Railway, and withdraw his forces operating west of Wuhu to an area along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway, so as to guarantee his retreat.

2) Retreat and set up defences in Wuxi, Nanjing, Wuhu and in areas further down south; swiftly transport his troops by means of the Zhejiang-

Drafted for the General Front Committee, this outline plan was submitted to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee on April 1, 1949 and was approved by the commission on April 3.
OUTLINE PLAN FOR NANJING-SHANGHAI-HANGZHOU CAMPAIGN

Jiangxi Railway in order to control areas along the railway; defend the two strategic points of Nanjing and Wuhu and, at the same time, cut off connections between our armies in the west and the east and, depending on the circumstances, wage a decisive battle against us in the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou triangle, or withdraw to areas along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway to fight a decisive battle there, or beat a strategic retreat along the railway.

3) Abandon the areas of Wujin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing and Wuhu and withdraw all his forces south along the Yangtze River to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway and to the coastal areas along Wuxi, Shanghai and Hangzhou, so as to put up stubborn resistance or to make an orderly retreat, taking advantage of the railway and ports.

4) Desperately defend Nanjing, Shanghai and Hangzhou if circumstances do not favour a retreat.

5) Once our troops succeed in crossing the Yangtze, the course of the war will turn in our favour no matter what tactics the enemy employs, and he will probably be thrown into utter confusion.

4. Our army's battle plan is as follows:

1) Cross the Yangtze during the first stage of the campaign and, depending on the requirements of the next stage, deploy troops for the coming campaign; during the second stage, divide and encircle the enemy and bring a section of the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway under our absolute control in order to cut off the enemy's retreat and, during the third stage, wipe out the encircled enemy forces one by one to bring the campaign to a close.

2) In preparing for the campaign, we must keep in mind the first two moves the enemy may attempt, as described under 3, so that when our troops in the east encounter fierce fighting after having crossed the Yangtze, the troops in the west can give timely and effective support.

3) No matter which move the enemy makes and no matter what else happens, the main force of the Seventh and Ninth Armies of the Third Field Army in the west, except for those troops required to co-operate with the Second Field Army in wiping out the enemy they confront, should march eastward quickly to join forces with the Eighth and Tenth Armies of the Third Field Army in the east that should march westward at the same time. If this is done, not only will the main force of the armies in the east be assured of victory instead of being isolated, but we shall also be able to disrupt the enemy's operational system and divide and encircle enemy troops. Hence, this move is truly the key to the success of the whole campaign.

4) If the enemy adopts the first move, the main force, or even the entire force, of the four armies of the Third Field Army should be concentrated on
the Nanjing-Shanghai Railway for a decisive battle, and an army of the Second Field Army should advance to Quzhou and areas to its north and west to cut off the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway, while its main force should move eastward along the Yangtze River to capture Wuhu and prepare for the capture of Nanjing. If the enemy employs the second move, our troops should do the same as above, except that the main force of the Second Field Army should advance to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway.

5) If the enemy employs the third move, part of the Second Field Army should garrison Nanjing while the main force should wipe out the enemy troops along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway, and the entire force of the Third Field Army should then annihilate the enemy in the areas of Shanghai, Hangzhou and Wuxi.

6) If the enemy uses the fourth move, the Second Field Army should capture Nanjing, and the Third Field Army should seize Shanghai and Hangzhou. It would be better to take Shanghai after Nanjing and Hangzhou.

7) If the enemy troops are thrown into utter confusion, we shall act in light of the circumstances.

5. Deployment for the first stage of the campaign — crossing the Yangtze River:

1) Comrades Su Yu⁹⁸ and Zhang Zhen⁹⁹ will be in command of the headquarters of the Third Field Army and directly lead the main force of the Eighth and Tenth Armies of the Third Field Army, which comprises six corps and three independent brigades, in crossing the Yangtze River from the section between Zhanghuang Port and Longshao Port and from the Kou'an-Sanjiangying-Jingkou section respectively, and when the campaign begins, the 34th and 35th corps of the Eighth Army will make a feint to draw enemy fire and tie down the enemy troops operating in Pukou and Puzhen. After crossing the river, some troops from the two corps will remain there to wipe out enemy troops they confront along the river, while the main force should march rapidly towards the Nanjing-Shanghai Railway and seize a section of it. They should establish a firm foothold before redeploying themselves, strengthening their positions and consolidating their rear communications lines to extend their victory by attacking the enemy systematically and with a rear area to fall back on. If conditions permit, troops should be dispatched to march westward and cut off the Nanjing-Hangzhou Highway. If attacked, they should try to wipe out the enemy group by group through field operations. If outnumbered, they should continue strengthening their positions until the Seventh and Ninth Armies arrive and join them to wipe out the enemy.

2) Comrade Tan Zhenlin¹⁰⁰ will lead the Seventh and Ninth Armies of
the Third Field Army across the Yangtze River from the section between Yuxikou and Yaogou and the section from Yaogou up to, but not including, Zongyang Town. After crossing the river, sufficient troops should remain to wipe out the enemy troops they confront along the river and keep watch on the enemy in Wuhu, while the main force should march swiftly eastward to join forces with the Eighth and Tenth Armies, cut off the Nanjing-Hangzhou Highway so as to cut up the enemy troops in the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou area and, with the Eighth and Tenth Armies, wipe out those troops piecemeal.

The two routes mentioned above (involving four armies) are to be under the command of Su Yu and Zhang Zhen. The specific battle plan for these two routes and the route along which the Seventh and Ninth Armies are to march eastward is to be worked out by the commanders of the Third Field Army.

3) The Second Field Army is to cross the Yangtze from the section starting at Zongyang Town and extending to Wangjiang. Besides wiping out any enemy troops it might confront, one army is to press onward as swiftly as possible to Quzhou and areas to its north and west and bring a section of the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway and the highways south and north of Tunxi under complete control, in order to cut off the enemy’s retreat. The main force of the Second Field Army should march quickly eastward to take over the tasks unfulfilled by the troops left behind by the Third Field Army, wipe out the enemy troops in the Wuhu area, and prepare to attack and seize Nanjing. The specific operational plan for the units of the Second Field Army is to be worked out by its commanders.

4) After crossing the Yangtze, all army units should send men to assist neighbouring units in crossing the river, maintaining close communication with these units, exchanging information and co-operating closely with them, and actively support them in fighting.

6. The General Front Committee will use transceivers belonging to the East China Bureau to keep in contact with the two field armies and the four armies of the Third Field Army. All telegrams concerning the campaign sent by the armies of the Third Field Army to Su Yu and Zhang Zhen should be sent simultaneously to the General Front Committee.

7. Matters relating to tactics, techniques, communications and logistics of the campaign are to be decided by the two field armies themselves.

8. This is an outline plan for the campaign. The General Front Committee will, whenever necessary, issue separate orders with regard to the arrangements to be carried out and the measures to be taken as the campaign develops.
BREAK THE BLOCKADE IMPOSED BY THE IMPERIALISTS

July 19, 1949

All the imperialists' tricks, including the blockade, are designed to force us to submit. Similarly, our struggle is aimed at forcing the imperialists to submit. We will never give in, and the experience of the past month or so demonstrates that it will not be easy to force the imperialists to submit, either. Actually, the struggle between the two sides during this period was of an exploratory nature until Britain and the United States brought the blockade into play. Although the blockade has caused us more than a few problems, it also has a beneficial side. Even without the blockade, we still have many unsolvable problems. However, the blockade will do enormous harm to us if it lasts too long. In order to break it, Chairman Mao stressed the need for a swift military occupation of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Xikang, Qinghai and Ningxia provinces, and an early occupation of the offshore islands and Taiwan. At the same time, the sooner we carry out our foreign policy of leaning to one side,103 the more favourable it will be for us (Chairman Mao says we are leaning to one side on our own accord now to avoid being manoeuvered into leaning to one side in the future). As regards our domestic policy, we must stress the need for conscientiously relying on our own efforts; we should not just call for it but should earnestly set about doing it (Chairman Mao says it is even more important for us to adopt this policy from the perspective of the long-term building of a new democracy). He says that these two policies are sound and in line with the intentions of the Central Committee. By doing so, that is, by occupying the whole of China, leaning to one side and relying on ourselves, we can not only lay a solid foundation for ourselves, but also compel the imperialists to yield to us.

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Excerpt from a letter to the comrades of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee relaying Comrade Mao Zedong's oral instructions.
FROM THE CROSSING OF THE YANGTZE TO THE CAPTURE OF SHANGHAI

August 4, 1949

Having just come to Beiping from Shanghai, I should like to report to you on how the Second and Third Field Armies of our People's Liberation Army crossed the Yangtze River and captured Shanghai and what they have done there since.

The campaign to cross the river was launched on the night of April 20. Due to the fact that the reactionary Nanjing government had rejected the people's eight peace terms, part of the People's Liberation Army, namely, the Second Field Army, under the command of Comrade Liu Bocheng, and the Third Field Army, under the command of Comrade Chen Yi, were ordered to fight across the river. All our troops successfully crossed the Yangtze along the long battle line of more than 500 kilometres. Before launching the battle, we gave the reactionary Nanjing Kuomintang government one last chance to reconsider. When they rejected the people's generous terms for peace, we had to teach them another lesson by dealing them one more blow. It could be said that we met with little resistance during the battle to cross the river. Along the battle line, extending 500 kilometres from Hukou to Shanghai, 450,000 Kuomintang troops were deployed there (700,000 if those stationed along the Yichang-Hukou sector are included), which failed to prevent the People's Liberation Army from crossing the river. We did not encounter fierce resistance anywhere. We made a wide, frontal crossing from scores of places, meeting with no substantial resistance in most places. Should anyone ask, "How long did it take to cross the river?" we have a definite reply: a quarter of an hour for the fastest advance boats. Beginning on the night of April 20, nearly all the 300,000 men crossed the river in a twenty-four hour period, plunging the enemy troops into chaos. With just one thought on their minds — breaking out of the encirclement

First part of a report delivered to delegates of the Preparatory Committee of the New Political Consultative Conference.
they fled southward helter-skelter. The People's Liberation Army immediately took up pursuit, launching a wide frontal attack, until it took Nanjing in the process, on April 23. By early May our troops had completed their pursuit, which lasted two weeks. They had advanced 750 kilometres from where they crossed the Yangtze, to northern Fujian and northeastern Jiangxi. The reason our officers and men could accomplish this striking feat — travelling such a long distance in such a short time despite skirmishes and rain — lay in their bravery in the face of personal danger. Previously, their bravery had been manifested on the battlefield; this time it was manifested mainly through their feet. This kind of pursuit made it impossible for the enemy to reorganize his troops. After our first echelon was 250 or 300 kilometres ahead, the second and third echelons still had to wipe out enemy troops left behind. In early May our troops completed their pursuit, occupying Hangzhou, Wenzhou, Fenghua (Chiang Kai-shek's hometown) and Ningbo, and advancing all the way down to northern Fujian and northeastern Jiangxi. After that, they prepared to attack Shanghai, where there were 200,000 enemy troops under the personal command of Chiang Kai-shek. After a week-long battle, we captured Shanghai on May 27. The entire operation was named the “Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign” by the Central Committee. From the crossing of the Yangtze to the capture of Shanghai, it took one month and seven days, during which we wiped out more than 400,000 enemy troops. Of the 25,000 casualties among our troops, 17,000 were wounded or killed when trying to take Shanghai, and the rest during bombing by enemy planes while crossing the Yangtze. One of our armies captured 60,000 enemy troops at the cost of 1,100 of its own men, a small loss in comparison with that of the enemy.

Why were we able to cross the Yangtze and swiftly complete the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign using only half the time we expected? In addition to the correct leadership of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission and Chairman Mao Zedong, the reasons are as follows:

First, we made adequate military preparations and our officers and men were brave. Before we crossed the river, the Chiang Kai-shek clique mistook the leniency we extended them for weakness on the part of the people, and believed that the river, a natural barrier, could not be breached, staking their lot on it. The People's Liberation Army soldiers, however, were confident of victory, basing their confidence not only on their political faith but also on the practical preparations they had made. For example, we needed boats to cross the river, but the boats had all been towed to the south bank of the river by the Kuomintang. Our boats were berthed on the lakes and rivers
north of the Yangtze (each boat could carry eight to twelve persons; larger ones, fifty, and the largest, one hundred), but the mouths of these rivers were blockaded by the enemy, making it impossible for us to paddle our boats into the Yangtze. Some so-called strategists thought this difficulty insurmountable, yet we overcame it. When we began to cross the river, the enemy wondered where our boats could have come from. Actually, we took our boats to the river overland instead of by water, digging ditches through which we pulled our boats to the river. Sometimes we had to dig ditches many kilometres long, the longest being 30 kilometres. We put in 21 million man-days digging ditches and pulling down dams. It took several hundred thousand officers and men, including divisional and regimental commanders, plus the same number of labourers, six weeks to complete that enormous project. We had about ten thousand boats on hand, enabling our one million soldiers to cross the river. In addition, most of our troops were northerners, who are unaccustomed to water. It was just because of this that Cao Cao was defeated. In order for our troops to avoid becoming seasick and to be prepared for all circumstances, we performed manoeuvres north of Chaohu Lake day and night. After becoming accustomed to the boats, we began to think about being shot at on the river. Many soldiers got the idea of making life preservers out of straw, because the rubber ones would deflate if shot. In fact, we did not use them when crossing the river, so this preparation was "wasted". Finally, we practised on inland rivers, in the belief that the Yangtze River was no more turbulent than the Yellow River. In short, our confidence was built on practical military preparations, not to speak of our political faith. From practical experience we learned that the Yangtze River was not too difficult to cross.

Second, we had the support of the masses and the co-operation of underground Party members and guerrilla fighters. We had worked only in some of the guerrilla areas, yet all the people supported us, digging half the ditches, for example. While preparing to cross the river, with our main force assembled in the area between Wuhu and Anqing, we needed 75,000 tons of grain, of which 80 per cent came from the people along the river. They gave us every bit of grain they could spare, saying it did not matter if they suffered from hunger so long as they could help us cross the river. To help us solve the problem of firewood, people even pulled down their houses without hesitation and gave us the wood. The people also undertook other arduous tasks for the campaign, including repairing roads, transporting grain and serving as boatmen. Half the boatmen came from among the people; the other half were soldiers specially trained for the purpose. Underground Party members and guerrilla fighters south of the Yangtze also helped us in the
battle. For example, one of our army units crossed the river and hid for ten days without the enemy knowing.

Third, we were faced with a weak enemy. We overestimated the enemy in the beginning. The resistance he offered was feeble, as could be seen when we pursued him after crossing the river. Thus we were able to complete swiftly the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign.

Without doubt, the battle to cross the river was crowned with great victory, marking the downfall of the enemy's largest and best organized force south of the Yangtze River. After the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign in northeast China, the Huai-Hai Campaign in east China and the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign in north China, the Kuomintang reactionaries stationed the largest and best-organized of their remaining forces along the battle line south of the Yangtze. In the battle to cross the river we wiped out over 400,000 of their troops, which means the Kuomintang can no longer put up any effective resistance. Politically, our victory spells the end of the reactionary Nanjing government. It also means that the People's Liberation Army will not come up against any fiercer military resistance in the future and that it will not be long before the PLA wipes out the remaining enemy troops and liberates the whole of China.

After occupying the cities militarily, we began, one by one, to take total control of them. From the day we started to cross the river to the day I left Shanghai, a period of about 3 months, the takeover was, by and large, complete and, generally speaking, things went fairly well.

First, this was because the Central Committee had formulated a series of explicit policies for the personnel in charge of the takeover of cities to follow. In addition, the experience we gained in liberating Changchun, Shenyang, Beiping, Tianjin, Jinan, Weifang, Shijiazhuang, Zhengzhou, Kaifeng and Xuzhou greatly facilitated our efforts to liberate areas south of the Yangtze, with the result that we avoided many detours.

Second, it was because people from all walks of life supported us. After crossing the river, we noticed that people were extremely displeased with the reactionary Kuomintang rule and warmly applauded the policies of the Communist Party. Workers and students, in particular, expressed tremendous enthusiasm for the revolution. If it had not been for their great fervour and enthusiasm, we would have encountered even more difficulties. Besides the workers and students, people from industrial, commercial, cultural and scientific circles also co-operated with us. For example, people from these circles in Nanjing volunteered to help us take over Shanghai and joined our army.

Third, because it was dictated by the general trend of events —
everybody had noticed that there was no hope of propping up the reactionary Kuomintang rule again and even those who had cherished illusions about the Kuomintang began to reconsider their positions. Everybody had come to realize that the people’s victory was a foregone conclusion. Although Chiang Kai-shek can still boast of Taiwan and the 200 million people under his control, the Kuomintang’s 400,000 troops are gone and its military structure has been thrown into confusion. This is the general situation. Many people were compelled to reconsider their positions, as was demonstrated by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the employees in Kuomintang institutions remained there. As a result, their offices, colleges and scientific institutions were in fairly good repair, and many of them had done a great deal to protect these institutions even before we crossed the river, making the takeover much easier. This happened practically in every city. Under this general situation, in which the people support us and oppose them, the imperialists and reactionaries have to yield to the mighty strength of the people. There is no alternative for Leighton Stuart either; he dares not treat the people’s government as he did the Kuomintang, nor does he dare treat the people of our liberated areas as he did the people under Kuomintang rule. He may have something evil secretly planned, but he has to conceal his malicious feelings.

Fourth, because we worked hard. As I mentioned earlier, we prepared ourselves both politically and organizationally for the takeover to be executed after crossing the river. We transferred over 20,000 cadres from east China, who had received some education in policy. On entering a new area, they followed the policy known as the “four contradictions involving eight sides”, as formulated by Chairman Mao, and contacted and held many meetings with people from all walks of life. Although their work may leave something to be desired (this was especially true under the complex circumstances in Shanghai), they have made every effort to co-operate with people from all sections of society in conformity with this policy. In Shanghai, Comrade Chen Yi attended one or even two meetings every day to explain our position and policies, calling on the people to co-operate with us. Their attitude and activities have won us even more support from all quarters, contributing to the success of the takeover.
TACTICS FOR WORKING IN THE NEW AREA
OF GUIZHOU

November 12, 1949

In general, the preliminary ideas expressed in your telegram of November 6 concerning work in Guizhou are practicable. However, you should pay attention to the following points:

1. Your tactic of uniting with the many, attacking the few, antagonizing as few people as possible and guarding against "Left" tendencies is quite correct, but it is not advisable to impose the general principle of concentrating our attack on "the central group", because Guizhou has over the years been under the group’s rule and such a principle can result in attacks on too many people. Actually, the overwhelming majority of the members of this central group are vacillating. We should, therefore, adopt tactics to allow them to turn over a new leaf and make a living, so as to split up the reactionary camp, isolate the most reactionary elements and weaken resistance to the revolution. By so doing, we shall soon be able to establish revolutionary order and mobilize the masses. Therefore, you should repeatedly explain to cadres at the various levels that the first thing they should do after arriving in a new area is to unite with all those who can be united with, eliminate antagonism towards us among all those who can be so persuaded and separate anyone who can be separated from the enemy camp. These tactics should also apply to the central group. It should be made clear to the public that all those willing to repent will be given a chance to make a fresh start. Our initial main targets of attack are those who continue to oppose us, because they refuse to mend their ways and go on with their reactionary evil acts. When you reach Guiyang, you should also choose a number of left-wingers, middle-of-the-roaders, and even a few right-wingers, who do not actively oppose us and are willing to be associated with us, to

Telegram drafted for the Front Committee of the Second Field Army and sent to Comrades Yang Yong, Su Zhenhua and Xu Yunbei of the Fifth Army. It was submitted to the CPC Central Committee, which, deeming that it merited attention, communicated it to all its bureaus on November 19.
participate in our work. When taking over the city, you can put them in research or advisory groups. You can also appoint representative figures from the middle and upper strata, who have been doing better than others, as members of the takeover committees in various departments. That is to say, you should enlist their co-operation in handling practical matters from the very beginning, consulting them when issues arise, heeding their opinions and adopting any good suggestions they offer, and actively and patiently work among them, explaining to them the Party's policies and the Common Programme, and helping them remould themselves and make progress. If you do this, you are sure to make a good impression on the public, quickly enter into contact with people from all sections of society in Guizhou, and find it easier to solve any difficult problems or, at least, encounter less resistance. After arriving in Guiyang, you should also find out the attitude of representative figures from local groups (such as Wang Jialie), the central group (those who are comparatively friendly to us), the industrial, commercial and educational circles, and the minority nationalities, and make preparations to draw some of them into the provincial government. At least one-third to one half of posts, such as member of the provincial government and director or deputy director of all the departments under the government's general office, should be given to people who are not Party members. All prefectures and counties should follow suit. We hope that within a month you can give us a preliminary list of the names of those who are to hold provincial government posts for examination, after which we shall submit the list to the Central Government for approval. The chief hindrance to the implementation of this policy is the "closed-doorism" of our cadres. Therefore, to ensure its implementation, we must repeatedly explain its importance to Party cadres. The Central Committee and Chairman Mao have issued explicit and detailed instructions on the question of the united front, of which Comrade Song Renqiong has been asked to inform you.

2. Recently, when we discussed the work in Chongqing and other areas in eastern Sichuan with leading comrades in eastern Sichuan, we all agreed that the sooner conferences of representatives from all circles in cities and counties are convened, the better. This is because when we enter a city, we are immediately confronted with many difficult problems, such as those of currency, prices and wages. In the countryside we first meet the formidable problem of borrowing grain and also those of currency, the maintenance of public order, and so on. These problems are best solved by promptly convening conferences composed of representatives from all circles, rather than trying to solve them within the Party or through forums. We hope that you will consider this question and offer us your opinions.
3. Where the local armed bands of different shades are concerned, you should deal with them separately and cautiously, weighing the pros and cons of each group. The aim is to reorganize and control them all, which can be done only if you use systematic tactics and methods. When dealing with a specific local armed band, you should consider the others at the same time. You should have the overall situation in mind, refraining from seeking small gains at great cost. Your ideas on this question are right in principle, but you should avoid taking rash steps and measures when trying to put them into effect, particularly when you are dealing with armed bands of minority nationalities.

4. The Central Committee has made it clear that personnel taken over from the Kuomintang institutions, including military officers and men, government employees and factory workers and staff, should all be accepted; not one of them should be dismissed. This policy will bring with it many advantages. Since Comrade Song Renqiong will explain it to you, I shall not discuss it in detail. Your decision to give former employees short-term living expenses is a good one. After you arrive in Guiyang, you should discuss with them the amount of pay they should receive, instead of just deciding it within the Party. This is very important. However, it is inappropriate for you to decide that “on the whole, the living expenses for workers should be no less than those of former employees, and the living expenses of government employees and teachers should be more than those of former employees, but less than those of workers.” It is not proper for you to arbitrarily decide that workers should receive more material benefits than former employees. Particularly under the present circumstances, you should not try to increase such benefits of workers, because it is impossible at this time and besides, it would be dangerous. The problem of wages is extremely complex and should be dealt with cautiously. We shall share with you the recent experience of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee in Changsha. We hope you will study this carefully. We plan to pay the workers and other employees in Chongqing according to the former wage rates, which are divided into three grades, as living expenses for a short period of time. The amount to be paid at each grade cannot be fixed until our arrival. You can also consider adopting this method, but should report the amount of money you are going to pay at each grade to the Bureau of the Central Committee for approval.

5. The problems being extremely complex in new areas, you should identify them and examine them from every angle, frequently ask for our instructions, and report your work to us so that we can help you. You should also require your subordinates to follow strictly the practice of seeking instructions from and reporting their work to their superiors.
REPORT DELIVERED AT A CONFERENCE ON
THE PRESS IN SOUTHWEST CHINA

May 16, 1950

The pen is a major tool for exercising leadership, so leading comrades should learn to write. Holding meetings is essential to leadership, but it is always a small number of people who can attend meetings; even when you make an important report, the audience will number no more than a few hundred. Private conversation is also a way to exercise leadership, but it is confined only to individuals. The pen provides the tool for exercising the most extensive leadership. Through writing people can spread their views far and wide and refine and systematize their thoughts. That is why Chairman Mao told us that writing is a major way to exercise leadership. Anyone who cannot write should learn to write and those whose writing is poor should gradually improve it.

Writing takes on many forms. It is important for the Party and government to write resolutions, directives, plans and telegrams, but the directives and telegrams can be communicated only to a limited range of cadres. None of our policies, however, can take effect unless they are made known to the masses, not just to the cadres. The most extensive uses of writing are in publishing articles in the newspapers, issuing pamphlets and broadcasting them over the radio. Moreover, if the work of the press and broadcasting is closely integrated with practical and central tasks, it will be more effective on a broader scale than other means and will play a greater role in the carrying out of the leaders' intentions.

What if some local leaders say that “the pen is too heavy” and they do not know how to write? We should drive home to them the importance of the pen and the press, so as to help them understand that he who does not know how to wield the pen cannot make a competent leader. Writing is not so difficult; the most important thing is that what you write should be sound in content. Leading comrades are already in the right position — they are well informed, and they view things in a correct and relatively comprehensive
manner. The technical aspect of writing is of secondary importance. So long as they try hard and receive help from others, they can gradually increase their ability to write. If they are reluctant to write articles, journalists should go and encourage them to do it. When a leading comrade refuses to write, he always has a good reason to offer, “I cannot write” or “I have no time to write.” Then you should go to him and suggest, “You do the speaking; I will do the writing.” Or, you can ask someone who has a close contact with the leader and can write to do the writing. The best way, however, is for leading comrades themselves to write; journalists can then volunteer to help, and they should make plans for people to contribute articles to their newspapers. In this way we can progressively make it possible for leading organs and leading comrades to wield and exercise leadership over the newspapers. A well-run newspaper meets three requirements: it deals with practical matters, maintains close ties with the masses and makes criticism of others and itself. The fulfilment of these requirements depends on our leadership; otherwise, the newspaper will turn into a “recorder” and its news will carry no weight. Therefore, running a newspaper successfully presupposes leadership.

Local newspapers should be made a success, too. The Xinhua Daily has been making progress lately. Newspapers should carry the general news released by the central news agency, but local papers do not necessarily have to use all the material released by the head office of the Xinhua News Agency. Instead, they should select, rewrite, condense or improve it, as appropriate. They should also consider whether readers have enough time to read so much news and whether they can understand the views contained in their newspapers. Compared to the leading newspapers, some local newspapers are more practical and suited to the needs of the people, their style is livelier and their language is easier to understand. Of course, leading newspapers must be published in the places where they are needed, such as in big cities, but this is not necessary in every locality.

Newspapers should cover the practical matters of life and the central task at a given time and place. Dispatches from the head office of Xinhua News Agency should get primary consideration, and they may be easily edited. Leading comrades and those working on the newspapers should concentrate on local news and give wide coverage to the local people’s work and life. Local newspaper offices should keep in constant touch with leaders so as to keep their guidelines in conformity with the current local tasks. Not long ago Xinhua Daily carried a special commentary on the suppression of bandits. Its main theme was a criticism. Was it correct? Yes. Was it appropriate at that time? No. To judge correctness, we should take into account time, place,
circumstances, and other factors. When our troops had achieved some success in suppressing bandits through their arduous and bitter struggle, it was an inappropriate time to be critical. A month earlier it would have been appropriate. This shows that our comrades lacked adequate understanding of the actual suppression of bandits. Today the newspapers are more influential than in the past, so the result would be unthinkable if they publish something incorrect. Over the past few years only a few cadres were reading newspapers, but this has changed. People trust the newspapers and try to follow what they say. After a newspaper criticizes mistakes in one place, the same mistakes will quietly be corrected in many others. That is the function of the newspapers. Many people look to the newspapers to find out the attitude of the Communist Party and the policies of the People’s Government. They seek from the newspapers solutions to their own problems. Precisely because cadres and the masses all value our newspapers, we must exercise discretion.

What are the central tasks of Southwest China today? For the area as a whole, the central tasks are: one, to suppress bandits; two, to fulfil the quotas for public grain, taxes and bonds; three, to exercise leadership in production (mainly agricultural production); and four, to regulate industry and commerce and give relief to the unemployed. To accomplish these tasks, both people’s and peasant conferences should be convened. The next step is to reduce land rent this winter and next spring, also a task which applies to the whole area.

What has been accomplished so far towards fulfilling these tasks? Regarding the suppression of bandits, Sichuan Province has a wealth of valuable experience that should be reported in the newspapers, provided we do not give away our tactics. The newspapers should publicize our policy of combining this suppression with leniency towards the bandits, that is, the main criminals shall be punished without fail, those who are accomplices under duress shall not be punished, and those who render meritorious service shall be rewarded. What do we mean when we say that those who are accomplices under duress shall not be punished? It means they should be exempted from punishment, but some accomplices have been released without interrogation, and this is a mistake. They should at least be educated and confess their crimes before they are released on bail. Generally speaking, the suppression of bandits in Sichuan has been successful. Things are different in Guizhou and Yunnan provinces. The newspapers must grasp the special characteristics of each area. This is in the nature of the guiding function of newspapers.

Collecting public grain always starts off with a fanfare and ends up in failure. Wanxian County has found a fairly appropriate solution to this
problem. We should praise their methods and introduce them to other areas. This is the way we exercise leadership. The newspapers should guide the collection of public grain by means of commentaries, editorials and a series of news reports.

The guidance of production on the whole is not bad. Chairman Mao stressed that production in new areas should be kept at the same level as before and should not drop, while in the old liberated areas it should increase.\textsuperscript{119} This is no easy job. At present, the peasants are more enthusiastic about production, but they should not be encouraged to reclaim wasteland, because they will have to fell trees for the purpose, and the major problem in Sichuan now is the scarcity of wooded areas. It was reported that in some localities some rich tenant-peasants had redistributed their land to poor peasants, and allegedly, voluntarily. This should not be commended in editorials or publicized through news reports. Discretion is one of the main policies for dealing with matters of production. Therefore, we should be careful when dealing with matters about which we are uncertain — examining them first or writing something in their favour, while, at the same time, pointing out what dangers may be involved, so that people can consider them from a different angle. This is also a way to exercise leadership.

The regulation of industry and commerce chiefly involves the cities. Our policy is to regulate the relations between the workers and their employers to benefit both of them; otherwise it will harm the entire national economy. We should support private industry and commerce beneficial to the national economy and the people’s livelihood, encouraging private enterprises’ enthusiasm for production. Capitalists, on their part, should improve management and reduce costs. Recently the newspapers reported on some privately run cotton mills that have managed to solve their difficulties. This is the correct thing to do, since holding up exemplary private enterprises is a way to exercise leadership over private enterprises. We should give assistance to progressive and promising private enterprises and encourage those that have no future to manufacture other products. The regulation of industry and commerce involves three aspects: the capitalists, the work force and the state, and it must facilitate the development of the productive forces. The Communist Party works for the development of the productive forces; to do otherwise would run counter to Marxist theory. In Shanghai a bale of cotton yarn sells for five million yuan,\textsuperscript{120} and here it costs nine million. Who will buy it at such a high price? We cannot allow the erection of tariff barriers in the Three Gorges area, which would lead to the setting up of a feudal separatist regime there again. It is said that some industrialists and businessmen don’t like our policies and yet, at the same time, they are truly trying
to remould themselves. That is fine; they will see that our policies are beneficial to them in due course. Since we are in the midst of great reform, some destruction is unavoidable. Enterprises that are managed in a very irrational manner will go bankrupt and so will those engaged in speculation and profiteering. There is no future for the manufacture of joss sticks, candles and paper money burned as offerings to the dead and other articles of superstition. The production of some articles, such as cosmetics, should be reduced for the present, but may be increased ten years from now. We should properly guide the development of industry and commerce. Stable prices are beneficial to them; recently loans have been made on this basis. We should provide guidance to and specify the use of loans. For instance, the two billion yuan plus lent to the Minsheng Company was specified for buying coal and repairing ships, thus helping solve some production problems in the coal and machine-building industries. Supervision is necessary to make sure that loans are all used appropriately, otherwise anarchy would arise. Some enterprises have turned out products in excess of demand, finding no market for them, so they should stop to manufacture other products under guidance.

Unemployment is mainly a problem in the big cities. It is said there are 50,000 unemployed people in Chongqing (out of a total of 250,000 workers), 10,000 in Guiyang (out of 30,000) and 20,000 in Chengdu. Proper arrangements should be made for these unemployed workers and they should receive relief from the government.

Solving these problems chiefly depends on the convening of conferences of people from all circles, which provide the best and principal means of maintaining links with the masses. It is necessary to conduct rectification among cadres, with emphasis on combatting bureaucratism and authoritarianism. This includes both “busy work bureaucratism” and “push comes to shove authoritarianism”.

The Central Committee will soon promulgate a land law and people of all social strata should be encouraged to study it, because it involves everybody. Careful study will prepare people for this year’s reduction of land rent rates and next year’s agrarian reform. The newspapers should organize study and discussion of the law to enable people inside and outside the Party to understand it. “With many eyes watching and many fingers pointing” and with everybody studying and coming to understand the law, cadres will not dare to act irresponsibly. This is a good thing for the leadership as a whole.

All the tasks mentioned above require leadership exercised by way of the newspapers. We should concentrate on the outstanding issues, sometimes devoting a whole page to one issue or spending a month to explain the tasks
and help bring about their fulfilment by publishing a series of commentaries and editorials. That way people will take note of them. The effect of newspapers depends on quantity as well as quality of the articles they carry. By quality we mean accuracy, to which must be added greater quantity. When everyone follows this principle, our newspapers will carry weight.

Lately, *Xinhua Daily* has improved when it comes to criticizing others and itself. In the past it reported only the good news and not the bad. Now it also reports bad news, which is good for counteracting conceit and apathy. A newspaper's power lies mainly in its criticism of others and in self-criticism. Some newspapers have been praised by the Central Committee chiefly because they were successful in this respect and in making a clear distinction between what is right and what is wrong and between what should be done and what should not. When criticizing a mistake, the newspapers should make use of typical cases throughout, while pointing out the positive orientation, sometimes purposely contrasting the good with the bad. Only in this way can criticism or self-criticism be effective, showing that it is intended for the purpose of improving work, rather than just for the sake of criticism. What is meant by “liveliness”? This has nothing to do with the length of an article, but means that the account is written in a lively style and with a conclusion. Some newspapers only expose the problems and fail to follow up on their solution. Of course, a lot of descriptive details are unnecessary. Since we have seriously fallen short in criticism and self-criticism, we should make a greater effort in this area. Leaders of Party committees and governments should fully support reporters in writing critical articles. Nowadays, few people dare to say what they think, so we should encourage people to speak. When necessary, we should also point out and refute false criticism.

The leaders view the publishing of newspapers as concerning everyone, and the journalists feel the same way. When the newspapers are really involved with practical matters and the masses, and are well run, they will be the greatest help to leaders. It often happens that the newspapers are better informed than the Party and government. They can feel the pulse of our society. They can discover the most outstanding issues of the day simply by making a comprehensive study of readers’ letters.

None of the tasks can be accomplished by just one newspaper. Different newspapers are concerned with different aspects of life. Therefore, it requires a joint effort for the voice of the Party and government to be communicated to people of all strata.
OVERCOME THE CURRENT UNHEALTHY TENDENCIES IN THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS OF SOUTHWEST CHINA

June 6, 1950

Today I shall speak about rectification,\textsuperscript{124} a matter concerning the entire Party. At the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in May, it was decided to conduct a rectification movement this year, the third rectification movement in the history of our Party.

As you all know, during the War of Resistance Against Japan our Party conducted a very long rectification movement,\textsuperscript{63} chiefly to overcome subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing, with the aim of rallying the entire Party membership under Mao Zedong Thought and around the Central Committee headed by Mao Zedong, so we could lead the masses in defeating the Japanese aggressors. That movement laid sufficient groundwork for the Party's Seventh National Congress.\textsuperscript{125} At the congress it was decided that Mao Zedong Thought be the Party's guiding ideology, as a result of which our Party became unprecedentedly united politically, ideologically and organizationally. On this basis the Party led the entire nation in defeating the Japanese aggressors and then Chiang Kai-shek, who was supported by U.S. imperialists, before achieving nationwide victory. Without that rectification movement, today's victory would have been impossible.

During the War of Liberation we conducted the second rectification movement, that is, the "three check-ups and three improvements".\textsuperscript{126} This movement was necessary because the war had become extremely intense and we were at the point of winning, so we needed to forge still closer ties with the masses. However, undesirable phenomena in the Party — impurities in membership composition and work style, and apathy, low morale and serious estrangement from the masses, as had been found among some comrades — had to be overcome before we could continue. Through the three check-ups and three improvements, the confused thinking within the Party was clari-

Speech delivered at the second Party conference of representatives of Chongqing.
fied, the Party became united and its ties with the masses were strengthened; in other words, we achieved successful results.

Of course, these two rectification movements had some shortcomings, but we should not let these shortcomings conceal the fact that they were successful in the main. They have been of great service to the Party.

Chairman Mao and the Central Committee have called on us to undergo a third rectification movement, which comes now at a time when we are faced with increasingly more work and responsibilities. We have to work in the new liberated areas with a combined population of 300 million, where our cadres are sparsely spread out and many problems have arisen. We cannot continue unless these problems are solved; hence the need for a rectification movement. During this movement, we should make use of the strong points and avoid the shortcomings of the two previous movements.

This rectification movement means primarily to check on ideology and work style, to see what attitude our comrades have towards the Party's revolutionary cause and whether or not they have carried out the Party's policies in various movements, maintained ties with the masses, performed their work well and acted in conformity with Mao Zedong Thought. The purpose is to overcome confusion and achieve unity in matters of ideology and policy, so we can continue with our work on the foundation we have already built.

What are the major erroneous tendencies in our Party at present? The Central Committee has pointed out that they are mainly bureaucracy and, in particular, authoritarianism. The second problem is more serious in the southwest than in other areas. It must be stressed that, since we entered the southwest, we have been engaged in difficult tasks and the overwhelming majority of our comrades, both in rural and urban areas, have been working very diligently. However, we cannot use how “diligently” one works as the sole criterion for checking on the work of our Party or Party members. The word “diligently” implies a willingness to accomplish one’s task satisfactorily, the very least we should expect of a Communist Party member, but more important than that is the end result. There are two ways of working diligently: one is to perform the work well and accomplish one's tasks by carrying out the policies and maintaining close ties with the masses; the other is to appear busy while actually just ordering people about, thus going against the policies, becoming separated from the masses, not completing any tasks, and damaging the Party's reputation. We should distinguish between these two ways of working diligently, promoting the correct way and opposing the incorrect way. Some of the Party comrades who are guilty of bureaucracy also work very diligently, hence the new expression, "busy work bureaucrat-
ism". Since the Zunyi Meeting, the correctness of our Party’s line and guiding policies has been ensured under the leadership of Chairman Mao. However, the correctness of the Party’s line is not tantamount to the correct solution of all problems; the solution still depends on Party cadres at various levels and Party members correctly following this line. Even though the line, guiding principles and policies formulated by the Central Committee are correct, if Party members do not carry them out properly, what good can they do? Therefore, even though the overwhelming majority of the comrades are working diligently, that doesn’t mean that everything is fine and that we are successful in all our fields of endeavour; we still have to examine in what way they are working diligently.

Grain collection in eastern Sichuan, for instance, is a case in point. In some counties the work proceeded well, but not in other counties, even though all the comrades worked diligently there. After checking on the work there, it was found that in most cases those who did a good job, as opposed to those who didn’t, managed to avoid deviating far from the policies and their work was performed more fairly and reasonably. As for their work methods, they knew how to hold conferences of people from all circles, as well as peasant conferences, rely on the peasant masses, unite with the intellectuals and enlightened gentry in the rural areas, and get the heads of the bao and jia to work under the supervision of the peasant masses. In other words, these cadres have less problem with bureaucratism and authoritarianism. This shows that only by working diligently, to which we must add the correct methods, can we accomplish our tasks. Here both policy and work style are involved and, generally, it is a matter of maintaining ties with the masses.

The same is true of the factories and other enterprises in Chongqing. Where people carry out the policies correctly and have a good work style, there they accomplish their tasks satisfactorily. In the Nantong Coal Mine, for instance, there are not many cadres, but they perform their work well, because they base their work on reality and maintain close ties with the masses. Before the higher authorities decided to abolish the labour contractor system, they had already found the system irrational and reformed it. At the port of Chongqing the number of cadres is also small and the work is complicated and difficult, but they are still fairly successful, because they follow the mass line. They first try to get a clear understanding of the problems and then solve them one by one. The munitions factory provides another example. Because production was still suspended, the workers received only living expenses, which did not amount to much, and all of them were dissatisfied. There are two ways to cope with such a problem: simply
issue an order and put up a notice, or hold a conference of representatives to reason with the workers. The cadres adopted the latter option: workers elected representatives to attend a conference which lasted a few days and at which Commander Liu Bocheng\textsuperscript{16} delivered a speech. The result was that all the representatives, including those who planned to wage a struggle against the Department of Industry, unanimously voted in favour of not raising their wages. Which method is actually better then, practising bureaucratism and authoritarianism or relying on the masses and reasoning with them? The facts speak for themselves.

Only a small number of our cadres have come to the southwest and they are shouldering strenuous and pressing tasks. How can they perform their work well under such circumstances? The only correct way is to follow the mass line. However, we have often found that some comrades, when confronted with difficulties, instead of examining whether they themselves have made any mistakes in carrying out policies or whether there is anything wrong with their ideology and work style, complained that the tasks assigned to them were too heavy, that there were not enough cadres and that the masses lacked political awareness. Without a doubt, the experience gained in work at the port of Chongqing and in the Nantong Coal Mine stands as a severe criticism of this erroneous argument.

Some comrades, as soon as they encounter difficulties, blame the new cadres. This is not right. The 30,000 cadres from the army and the old liberated areas who have come to the new liberated areas to undertake local work are the new cadres' teachers. New cadres learn whatever they are taught by the old and, moreover, it is hard for them to change. Whether or not work in the southwest will have a sound foundation depends on the correctness of the work style of these 30,000 people. If this foundation is unstable because of their bad work style, there will be no end to their troubles. Therefore, the current rectification movement is absolutely necessary, and these 30,000 people will be the main targets for rectification, and the chief purpose is to overcome the serious problem of bureaucratism and, in particular, authoritarianism.

The correct work style we advocate is the one put forward by Chairman Mao — integrating theory with practice, maintaining ties with the masses and making self-criticism. Bureaucratism and authoritarianism run counter to Chairman Mao's teachings. Those tainted with such a work style cannot integrate theory with practice, maintain ties with the masses, practise self-criticism or accomplish their tasks, which will only impair the Party's work and prestige.

There are two other erroneous tendencies: “closed-doorism” in the
united front and a growing degenerate and decadent way of thinking. These two tendencies should also be overcome in the course of the rectification movement.

The question of the united front is one of the three fundamental questions in the Chinese revolution. In “Introducing The Communist”, Chairman Mao pointed out that the united front, armed struggle and Party building are the three fundamental questions in the Chinese revolution. If we make mistakes in any of these questions, we shall suffer defeat in the revolution. That is to say, if we fight battles successfully and the Party is also quite united, but we fail in united front work, the revolution will still fail. The reason for our victory in the Chinese revolution was that we successfully handled the three questions. However, can we discard the united front having won the revolutionary war? No, we cannot. We needed the united front in the past and now we shall not only need it, but must also consolidate it in the days to come. If we discard it, we shall still suffer defeat in the revolution. At the recent conference convened by the Central Committee, Chairman Mao once again stressed this matter. There are still not many comrades in our Party who truly understand the importance of the united front. Although some comrades do not oppose the idea of the united front, they are not so sure about it when it comes to concrete problems. For instance, some Party comrades refuse to be reconciled to the assignment of certain posts to non-Party people. In industry and commerce, some comrades maintain that we should force the national bourgeoisie into bankruptcy, and some doing rural work refuse to co-operate with the enlightened gentry and intellectuals. All these tendencies have severely hindered the fulfilment of the Party’s tasks.

The united front is a concrete application of Marxist-Leninist strategic and tactical principles. In essence, it means uniting with the overwhelming majority so as to isolate the enemy. We should even placate those whom we can for the time being but who may still oppose us in the future, thus winning over those who can be won over and narrowing the enemy’s circle, so that we can then overthrow the principal enemy. Some comrades often manifest a sectarian bias in their work, turning the Party into a small circle or faction and forfeiting the Party’s leading role. When some comrades consider problems, they don’t proceed from overall interests, but from their own interests, fearing they might be overshadowed by others; therefore, they do not like the united front. Some comrades take on airs as veterans, they refuse to delegate functions and powers to others and insist that others obey them just on account of the fact that other people are not Communist Party members. Some comrades think that, since victory has been achieved in the war, they can do without the help of other people. All these ideas and
practices are completely erroneous. The question of the united front being a vital question of principle, if we do not clarify it among Party members, we shall suffer great losses in our work. The reason is simple. In the southwest, in addition to the army, there are about 150,000 to 200,000 cadres doing local work, of whom only 30,000 are Party members, a few are Youth League members and 80 per cent or so are non-Party or non-League people. The question of co-operation between Party cadres and non-Party ones is one of co-operation between 20 per cent of the cadres and the other 80 per cent. Let me ask: Can we perform our work well if we do not unite with 80 per cent of the cadres? Is the danger of a “small circle” mentality still not obvious? We may run into problems when we co-operate with non-Party people, since they may also have erroneous thinking and understanding. We should help them patiently. The Central Committee maintains that where Party members and non-Party people fail to co-operate well with each other, the Party members should be the first to be held responsible for it, whether they have good reason or not. Otherwise, the united front cannot be consolidated, and we shall isolate ourselves, find it hard to perform our work well and increase resistance to the revolution — all to the detriment of the people's cause. A Communist Party member should adhere to the Party's line and policies of his own accord, serve the people wholeheartedly and perform his work well. He should always be ready to endure disadvantages and troubles and, if he has not performed his work well, he should be ready to accept criticism and, furthermore, should behave this way all his life.

It is quite right for us to maintain Party leadership in the united front, but how should Communist Party members exercise Party leadership in their own work? First, they should firmly carry out the Common Programme proposed by our Party and adopted at the People's Political Consultative Conference, as well as every decree and proclamation issued by the People's Government. Second, they should know how to unite with non-Party people, in order to put the Common Programme into effect and carry out the decrees. If a Party member does not thoroughly understand the Common Programme and the government's decrees and if he does not know how to use these as weapons to unite with and educate the people in the fight against the enemy, then he cannot exercise any leadership at all and may even do something against the Common Programme and our policies, violating the law and rules of discipline. This would land him in a completely indefensible and passive position. Unfortunately, this is exactly what is happening today: some Communist Party members do not study and apply the Common Programme. Non-Party people have become thoroughly familiar with the Common Programme, so they can quote copiously from it and present valid
arguments when discussing work and policies. In contrast, some of our Party members often stare at them tongue-tied during such discussions; others went so far as to simply refuse to listen to reason. I should like to ask these comrades, “Is this exercising leadership?” Third, besides becoming a model in carrying out the Common Programme and observing law and discipline, a Party member should have a correct work style — fearing no trouble, acting modestly and living plainly, and seeking truth from facts — and serve the people wholeheartedly without considering personal gain or loss. Some comrades believe that since we have conquered the country, everyone should obey us. This view is completely erroneous. In fact, the masses will not obey you, I am afraid. A leader is not self-appointed. His leadership has to be accepted and approved by the masses. If a leader has an abominable work style, the masses will not obey him and, if he always makes mistakes, the masses will not accept him as their leader. Someone may say he has been involved in revolutionary work for a long time and is very talented, but if the masses do not follow him, he will accomplish nothing.

Within our Party there are two kinds of people: one kind use their Party membership and seniority in the revolution to intimidate other people, insisting that people outside the Party obey them. They speak rudely to others and put on airs, regarding this as “exercising leadership”. In fact, this only disgusts people, alienates the masses, and they put themselves in a corner. The other kind, though not possessing a great deal of talent, knows how to be open-minded in co-operating with non-Party people, consulting them about any matters that may arise, making joint decisions, and working diligently and conscientiously. As a result, they handle affairs fairly well and win other people’s respect. Therefore, a correct idea can only become realized with the help of a good working method. If we adhere to the Common Programme, adopt an honest, sincere attitude and speak convincingly, other people will readily accept our criticisms of them. Only by doing this can we be regarded as good leaders. Commander-in-Chief Zhu De said that when we are comparing ourselves with non-Party people, we are taking the Party as a whole; when making comparisons between individuals, not every Party member is necessarily better than everyone outside the Party. Do not look down on non-Party people, for they can master the lessons of our experience very quickly. If we do not progress, we shall be surpassed by many young people before long. The only way to avoid this is to continue to advance, respect other people and study with an open mind. What makes veteran comrades valuable is that they have rendered meritorious service and are experienced. Even more important is that they are neither complacent nor arrogant, they can get close to the masses and forge ahead tirelessly. If a Party
member becomes arrogant or complacent, refuses to move ahead and alienates himself from the masses, then he will lose the noble qualities associated with Party membership, all his previous efforts will be for nothing, and he would become a person without an ideal who hinders others from making progress and our cause from advancing.

The various levels of government are now making personnel appointments and many non-Party people will become ministers and section chiefs. If some Party comrades are appointed as deputies, they must accept other people's leadership. This does not contradict the principle of Party leadership; so long as Party members correctly implement policies, they will embody Party leadership. Even if a Party member is in a leadership position and a non-Party person is his deputy, he should consult with his deputy when issues arise, making sure that non-Party people truly exercise their functions and powers.

We should sincerely help former work personnel and stop calling them "former personnel". We should respect them and remain on friendly terms with them. In this way we can help them progress and remould themselves.

I should like to speak about the tendency towards degeneration and corruption. This tendency is growing and has caused many troubles in the economic sphere, in particular. In both urban and rural areas embezzlement and corruption have become very serious. Another problem concerns cadres' marriages — divorce and remarriage have become prevalent everywhere. People always base their arguments on the marriage law, saying the marriage law stipulates freedom of marriage and they, therefore, disregard political conditions, their children's wellbeing and questions of morality. Some cadres have made a very bad impression on the public and their work has been impaired. Others even resort to indecent behaviour, threats and deception to get their way. If this phenomenon is not rectified, it will not only adversely affect our work and impair the Party's prestige, but will also bring some comrades to ruin.

The above are the unhealthy work styles and tendencies we want to overcome in this rectification movement. The root cause for the emergence of these tendencies is that these comrades think that since victory has been achieved in the revolution, they can go to sleep, become conceited, live in comfort and ease and relax their efforts. This kind of thinking is extremely dangerous. It is true that we have achieved a basic victory in the revolutionary war, but we still have many enemies. Banditry is still rampant, the feudal forces remain intact, and we still have a long way to go to fulfil the quotas for public grain and taxes. Our tasks being so strenuous and difficulties so numerous, is there anything of which we can be proud? For a considerable
length of time following the victory in the revolution in the Soviet Union, conditions were extremely bad. For the present, we have to practise the supply system of distribution. A Party member should place his work above everything else, giving no thought to comfort and ease. We must see clearly that our living standard cannot be separated from the living standards of society in general.

These tendencies also indicate that the activities of our Party organizations leave much to be desired and that we have not made sufficient criticisms of others and ourselves, especially among the leading comrades. Recently we received anonymous letters from several comrades, exposing a number of problems. These comrades are good people, but the fact that they wrote anonymous letters also indicates that the inner-Party life in some army units and local organizations is neither democratic nor sound, so that healthy trends are not yet gaining ground among Party members.

Can these tendencies be overcome? At every stage of the revolution there have always been some dregs sinking down, but the overwhelming majority of our comrades are of fine character. Most of the people with an unhealthy work style can change their thinking, correct their mistakes and continue to progress. In this rectification movement we should avoid the shortcomings of the past, emphasize enlightenment and guidance, and make criticisms and self-criticisms in earnest through checking on the work done over the past six months. In accordance with the guiding principles of “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones” and “curing the sickness to save the patient”, we should concentrate on helping comrades who have made mistakes to solve their ideological problems. We should only take disciplinary measures against the few people who are of extremely bad character — ones who are guilty of serious embezzlement or corruption, or who have tried to undermine or opposed the Party’s policies. I hope that every comrade will actively participate in the rectification movement, so as to prepare for the rent reduction work to take place this winter and continue to next spring, and for the agrarian reform movement to take place next winter and continue to the spring of the year after next.

Following rectification we shall reveal our Party membership to the public. This Bureau of the Central Committee will issue a directive to make public all our Party membership in urban and rural areas, in factories and in government departments. There are considerable advantages to making Party membership public, as the experience in the old liberated areas in this regard shows. Some comrades are afraid of having Party members, who have not shown themselves to be good ones, become known to the public. The ugly daughter-in-law will have to see her parents-in-law in the end, so letting the
masses supervise and criticize us is all for our own good.

It is of vital importance for Party branches to maintain their activities regularly; otherwise they will lack fighting capacity. We should establish and strengthen commissions for discipline inspection in the Party and control commissions in the government, which are important weapons for combating bureaucratism and authoritarianism and for supervising Party members in observing rules of discipline and the law.

It is essential to do a good job in our studies, conscientiously establish a system for study and give it effective leadership. The municipal Party committee and Party committees directly under it should study this matter. The reason many mistakes were made in the past is that some comrades attached no importance to study and they got so bogged down in routine matters that they seldom had time to absorb new ideas. Study can help us look to the future and clarify confused thinking. Besides the rectification movement, the above measures we have adopted are aimed at overcoming our shortcomings, enhancing the Party’s fighting capacity, and enabling us to better accomplish the arduous tasks the Party has assigned to us.
THE QUESTION OF MINORITY NATIONALITIES
IN THE SOUTHWEST

July 21, 1950

On the question of minority nationalities, I am still a pupil. You comrades have done more research on this question than I have and you are specialized in this field of work. Today I shall speak mainly on the issue of minority nationalities in connection with the situation in the southwest.

The question of minority nationalities is very important in the southwest. In China most of the minority nationalities live in the northwest and southwest. Perhaps a greater number of them live here in the southwest than in the northwest, and the situation here is also quite complicated. The southwestern boundary line is several thousand kilometres long, extending from Tibet to Yunnan and Guangxi, along which the overwhelming majority of inhabitants are minority nationalities. So, if the issue of minority nationalities is not handled well, the matter of national defence cannot be handled well. Therefore, in view of the importance of the southwest to national defence alone, we should give high priority to our work among the minority nationalities.

At present we are not certain about the exact number of minority nationalities in the southwest. According to the latest reports from Yunnan, there are more than 70 names of nationalities in that province. It is said that the Miao nationality in Guizhou has over one hundred branches. In fact, some of them do not belong to the Miao nationality. For instance, the Dong people used to be believed to belong to the Miao nationality, when in fact, the two have different languages and histories and they themselves hate to be lumped together. From this we can see that we do not know the first thing about the subject of minority nationalities, let alone a good working knowledge. Of course, after two or three years of work we may gain a clearer understanding of each individual nationality and we may be able to clarify

Speech delivered at a rally welcoming the delegation sent by the Central Government to visit minority nationalities in southwest China.
questions that have long remained a mystery.

Historically, China's minority nationalities have been estranged to a high degree from the Han nationality. As a result of our work done in the past and particularly over the past six months, this state of affairs has been changing gradually, but we still cannot say that we have cleared up this estrangement. Only after a long time through examining the facts will we be able to put an end to the historical estrangement between the minority nationalities and the Han nationality caused by Han chauvinism. We will have to make efforts for a long period of time before we can eliminate this estrangement. We should convince the various minority nationality people that, politically, all nationalities within China's boundaries are truly equal, that their living standards can be improved and that their cultural level can be raised. By culture we mean mainly culture of each nationality. Unless we succeed in these three aspects of work, it will be impossible to iron out this historical estrangement or rift. The People's Republic of China is a multi-national country and only by ending this national estrangement and enlisting the concerted efforts of the various nationalities can we form a truly great, happy family of the Chinese nation. The conditions are present for eliminating this estrangement. The policy of Han chauvinism adopted by the reactionary regimes of the past deepened the national estrangement, but the nationality policy stipulated in the Common Programme, adopted at the Political Consultative Conference, will certainly end this estrangement and bring about a great unity of the various nationalities.

I should like to make a few remarks on the Tibetan nationality in Xikang. In the past the Tibetan and Han nationalities were very estranged. However, after our army entered the southwest, and especially after we proclaimed the policy concerning the liberation of Tibet and put forth the ten terms, great changes have taken place. How did they fare in the past? In the old days the reactionary regimes in Xikang caused the local Tibetans to suffer a great deal. After we entered Xikang, the first thing we did was announce the nationality policy stipulated in the Common Programme. At the same time our troops' fine conduct found expression in some concrete matters; for instance, through observing the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, respecting the Tibetan people's customs, habits and religious beliefs, quartering in no lamaseries, etc., they won the trust of our Tibetan compatriots. The Tibetan people said that our troops were so good that even in a heavy rain they would neither enter nor live in their houses unless invited. This is the result of carrying out correct policies. Didn't rulers of the past proclaim good policies? The problem is they never put their policies into effect. For us, once we have formulated policies, we
mean to have them carried out. As regards the ten terms we put forth, some representative figures in Tibet find them a bit too magnanimous. That is how we mean them to be. We are not deceiving anybody. Therefore, these policies have made a powerful impression on them that should not be underestimated, because they are in accord with their requirements and the requirements for the unity of all nationalities.

In minority nationality areas in the southwest our Party did some work in the past that produced good results. During the Long March, the Red Army scattered the seeds of revolution in all the areas it passed through, including Yunnan and Guizhou. Even in Xikang some revolutionary influence was felt. When the Red Army troops marched northward, they did some things in violation of the rules of discipline for the sake of their survival. They were starving and had no choice. Now we should express our gratitude to the people, explaining to them that in those days they had to shoulder the burden of the nationwide revolution and that they had done everything in their power to preserve the Red Army. At the same time, we should apologize to them for anything we did wrong. When we went to Tibet, some Tibetans told us quite frankly that they were displeased when we ate all their grain. Now they understand this and are delighted with their own liberation.

With our past work plus our current work we are quite capable of solving the several-thousand-year-old problem of estrangement from the minority nationalities and uniting all our nationalities. Marxism-Leninism can help solve the problem of nationalities throughout the world. In China, Mao Zedong Thought — the integration of the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution — can also help solve this problem. So long as we truly act in accordance with the Common Programme and so long as we sincerely assist the minority nationalities in political, economic and cultural fields, we can solve the problem satisfactorily. If we throw off Han chauvinism, the minority nationalities will forsake their narrow nationalism in return. We should not ask the minority nationalities to abolish their nationalism before we honestly abolish Han chauvinism. Once these two isms are abolished, unity will result.

Since our entry into the southwest, we have arrived at a general understanding: the question of minority nationalities in the southwest is complicated and it must be solved properly. This involves work in various fields, yet we know very little about things here, so we must adopt a careful attitude and from the outset work to harmonize relations with the nationalities. We should try hard to dispel the misgivings of the various minority nationalities concerning the People’s Liberation Army and eliminate the estrangement between different nationalities. In handling the affairs relating
to minority nationalities, we should not act blindly and go there rashly to carry out reform, raise proposals and propagate the nationality policy. In practical work we should strictly observe rules of discipline and not encroach upon their interests in the slightest. In collecting public grain we should also take their practical difficulties into account, ensuring above all that the amount never exceeds the burden imposed on them in the past, instead keeping it below this level. We have decided that because of the past deep estrangement between the minority nationalities and the Han nationality and the complicated nature of the situation, no force from the outside shall be used to wage or create a so-called class struggle within the minority nationalities or attempt to carry out reform of any sort. All reforms within the minority nationalities should be carried out through internal forces. Reform is necessary, however, for without it the minority nationalities cannot eliminate poverty, which will make it impossible for them to do away with backwardness, but reform must not be carried out until conditions within the minority nationalities are ripe for it.

At present, our central task concerning the nationalities is to work for unity and end estrangement. Where no trouble crops up and estrangement begins to disappear and unity begins to grow, there the work can be considered well done and good results achieved. If we become impetuous, trying to get quick results in procuring grain and organizing the masses, as we have been doing in the Han nationality areas, troubles are bound to crop up. In the past, people in other areas experienced troubles. An important cause was their impetuousity. Many of our comrades have learned that they must not be impetuous and that it does not matter if they proceed a bit slowly. Slowness does not give rise to errors; impetuosity does. In handling other matters we should be neither impetuous nor proceed slowly, but in handling this matter, we should not be afraid of going slowly. Of course, we still need to work; we cannot go to sleep for fear of becoming impetuous. We should work on a sound basis and advance after acquiring a clear understanding of the situation. As the basis for unity becomes stronger, our work will move forward. Some of our comrades have good intentions, but unfortunately they are impetuous in their work. Therefore, leaders should always guard against impetuosity. At present an important principle for working in minority nationality areas is to brook no trouble or failure. Even if ninety-nine out of a hundred cadres do well and only one cadre makes a mistake, he can still spoil our efforts. With this in mind, we should only dispatch a few selected cadres to minority nationality areas. They should thoroughly understand the nationality policy and ardently wish to make a success in their activities among the minority nationalities. No one can be
permitted to make mistakes. This is a must. The reason no trouble has come up so far in the southwest with regard to the question of minority nationalities is that we have been working on a sound basis, which is in itself an accomplishment.

Have we done enough work so far, then? A number of new problems have now cropped up, requiring us to do more work to avoid trouble. For instance, the Common Programme stipulates that regional national autonomy be introduced in areas where different minority nationalities live together. When the Common Programme was proclaimed, the minority nationalities rejoiced and asked us when and how autonomy was to be introduced. They want it to be materialized. If we fail to do so in six months or even in twelve months, they will lose faith in our policies. We must solve this politically significant problem. Our Party encountered such a problem before. For instance, we have had such an experience in Inner Mongolia and in the northern part of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. However, we have no experience in the vast new liberated areas, and it is a new problem for many of our cadres. We must now set about solving this problem, because the demands from the minority nationalities are pressing. In Xikang some representative figures are even thinking of using the name “Bod government” when regional national autonomy is implemented. We have not yet reached an agreement on this matter, but we are determined to adopt a name they like better. In Xikang the names of many places have been given by Han people. Even though we are used to these names, that does not mean the people there are. This is only a problem of names, other problems are more complicated. For instance, eastern Xikang used to be divided into counties, some of which have been in existence for ten to twenty years. When regional national autonomy is introduced, should we keep these counties? From a long-term point of view, it would be good to retain the counties; moreover, we are accustomed to them. But will the local people agree? Our principle is: if they do not agree, the original division should be abolished and a new division made. Furthermore, how do we solve the problems among the minority nationalities when adopting regional national autonomy? In the past some minority nationalities entangled themselves in bitter feud, with one nationality attacking another, followed by retaliating attacks. This was instigated primarily by the reactionary ruling class, which pursued Han chauvinism; it was used by chauvinists from large nationalities to dominate small and weak nationalities. However, the minority nationalities themselves also had many problems involving their gain and loss. We should study these problems soberly and persuade them to unite and stop fighting each other. Should we dispatch cadres to help exercise regional
national autonomy? Sending them there is a must, but we should send only a few selected ones who can truly help them. We should consult with the local people to determine in what capacity these cadres should be dispatched. This will be a difficult assignment for our comrades, so we should see that those who are sent have first straightened out their thinking, and we should only dispatch comrades who are willing to work there. All these problems have to do with our policies relating to the exercise of regional national autonomy.

To introduce regional national autonomy in the southwest, we should begin in eastern Xikang, for conditions there are ripe for this. First, compatriots of the Tibetan nationality are concentrated there; second, we had some experience in this regard; third, after our troops arrived there, they established good relations with the compatriots of the Tibetan nationality; and fourth, there is a progressive organization called the Dongzang Democratic Youth League, with more than one hundred members. With these conditions present, we can start work there at once. This is a major project. If it is made a success, it may lend a direct impetus to Tibet. In other places we should work to create the necessary conditions for introducing regional national autonomy and we cannot just pay lip service to it. In some localities a democratic coalition government of the local nationalities may be established first. For instance, regional national autonomy should be exercised in the Daliang and Xiaoliang mountain areas where people of the Yi nationality live together, but conditions there are not yet ripe, so for the time being it is more suitable to establish a democratic coalition government of the local nationality in these areas. This will be good to them. The same can be applied in Yunnan and Guizhou provinces. Under a coalition government we can also introduce national autonomy in a small area by establishing a township where people of one minority nationality live together, for instance. The minority nationalities have the political right to be masters of their own affairs.

For the benefit of economic development, we have to get started right now. In Xikang, for instance, a number of problems have cropped up in this field. We first face the problem of grain supplies. At present we have only 3,000 to 4,000 people working there and we have borrowed 350 tons of grain. Some progressive people from the upper strata have given us much help. They are not only lending grain to us but have also set a fair price. However, this cannot go on for a long time, because the masses of the minority nationalities cannot bear such a heavy burden. We are also confronted with other economic problems in the areas of the market, trade, banking and so on. If these problems are not solved, the political foundation
will be shaken. Regional national autonomy will be only nominal if we fail to manage economic affairs well. The minority nationalities want to benefit from regional autonomy, so if the economic problems are not solved, trouble will ensue. Chairman Mao has laid down two principles concerning Tibet: first, introducing regional national autonomy; and second, after entering Tibet, not depending on local people for grain supplies. If we follow these two principles, we can solve the Tibetan issue and become united with the Tibetan people to consolidate national defence. These principles are applicable to all minority nationality areas. Politics is based on the economy. Can we do without a solid economic base? No, we cannot if we just give the minority nationalities a nominal regional national autonomy while consuming all their grain. We have established this principle to be applied in the minority nationality areas, that is, policies enforced in Han nationality areas in different fields of endeavour, including economic policies, cannot be applied mechanically to minority nationality areas. We must distinguish among those that can be applied, those that must first be revised, and those that cannot be applied. We should formulate a different set of policies for minority nationality areas if we want to serve the minority nationalities wholeheartedly. For instance, if we can help solve the problem of salt for the minority nationality people in Guizhou, most of whom live in the mountains, we are sure to win their support. Also, Xikang has no highways at present, so we should make proper arrangements for the following: facilitating the minority nationalities’ economic exchange with the interior, determining the kind of goods that should be brought in, the way of moving their products out and the prices of the products, and making sure that they have some profits to gain. When doing business with them, we shall follow the principle of exchange at equal value, occasionally, however, letting them profit at our expense. In our effort to help the minority nationalities develop their economies, a very important link is trade, and our economic work there should be based on trade. We should assist the minority nationalities in organizing their own business activities, which we cannot monopolize. In doing business, we should see to it that they are not subjected to exploitation by middlemen at any stage. In this way their economies will be enlivened and their living standards will improve. Right now the key is first to enable them to profit from business activities and then help them develop their agriculture, industry, animal husbandry, commerce and so on.

In the realm of culture, too, we have much work to do. We should try to help raise the cultural level of the minority nationalities as quickly as possible. We should promote educational undertakings in minority nationality areas, encouraging people to set up schools there. For now we should hold
some training courses, focusing on explaining the nationality policy. The main obstacle to operating schools is the lack of teachers, not of funds or anything else. To remedy the shortage of talented people in the southwest, we have to establish a nationalities institute without delay in order to enrol some young people for advanced studies. Related to culture and education is the question of public health. Work in this field is also very important in minority nationality areas, where medicine is badly needed. At present, cultural work should centre primarily on public health work, which has a significant role to play.

We should embark on all these political, economic and cultural undertakings right away. In doing so we should adhere to one principle, namely, to consult with the minority nationality people. If they agree, we go ahead; if they agree with only a part, we do only a part; if they agree with the major portion, we do the major portion; if they agree with everything, we do everything. We definitely need their consent; we need the consent of most of them, particularly of people from the upper strata; if the upper strata do not consent to our plan, we should give it up, for only their consent counts. Why? Because, owing to historical, political and economic peculiarities, the upper strata hold the chief sway in minority nationality areas. Progressive forces are weak there and exert little influence. In future, however, when the progressive forces expand, they will exert a very great influence, although they do not have a decisive bearing at present. For now we should do everything through the upper strata. We should do more to persuade them, consult them frequently and unite with them, guiding and helping them to progress step by step. If we fail in our work among the upper strata, all our efforts will come to nothing. Some of our comrades are wont to take radical measures, thinking they can do better without the help of people from the upper strata. As a matter of fact, they will not be able to do a better job but a worse job; they will not be able to do things more rapidly but more slowly, for they will meet with obstinate resistance. If our work among the upper strata is done well, so that they keep making progress and fully co-operating with us, then with their help we can do our work more smoothly. Some comrades are worried that if they do it this way, they might lose their class stand, not understanding that class stand is manifested differently there. What is the correct class stand? It is at present not launching class struggle, instead achieving unity among the nationalities. That is the correct class stand. Of course, we are not depending completely on the upper strata; we are seeking their help in order gradually to promote our work in all fields.

By the way, some special problems should be solved in the light of actual conditions. For example, we decided not to carry out rent reduction...
agrarian reform\textsuperscript{122} in minority nationality areas, but the Miao people in Guizhou have demanded rent reduction and agrarian reform and their need is more urgent than that of the Han people. Why? We find it quite natural since there are only a few landlords among the Miao nationality in Guizhou. Most of the Miao people till land owned by Han people; moreover, it is located on mountain slopes. Their demand is reasonable. If we do not allow rent reduction and agrarian reform, it will be a manifestation of Han chauvinism and it will mean we have not taken into account their immediate interests. On the other hand, it is not likely that the few landlords from the upper strata of the Miao nationality will consent to their demand. Therefore, we have made a specific stipulation that rent reduction and agrarian reform can be conducted where the land tilled by Miao people belongs to Han landlords, but not where the land belongs to Miao landlords, and in this case the matter should be settled by the Miao people themselves step by step through consultation. That is to say, rent reduction and agrarian reform are not to be totally ruled out in minority nationality areas; in some areas we should still implement them, but on one condition: the demand must come from the great majority and not just from a few people, and the matter is not decided by people from the outside, but by the native people themselves. Also, we should consider ways and means for instituting regional national autonomy and establishing a coalition government in minority nationality areas. We could hold different types of conferences of representatives, since this has yielded substantial results in the interior. Through conferences of representatives we could solicit opinions and discuss and study problems, so as to avoid making decisions subjectively. Sometimes we may proceed from good intentions but reach incorrect decisions. Even if the decisions are correct, we may still meet opposition if we do not have the consent of the people concerned. Conversely, we will have their support even if some decisions are imperfect, because we have won their consent.

Lastly, I should like to discuss the question of our attitude towards work. Our working method should be as I have just mentioned, that is, to consult with the people concerning all matters and to solve problems through conferences of representatives. Our attitude towards work is to seek truth from facts and to be honest. Recently we came to realize that we should also be honest in respecting the customs and habits of the minority nationalities. We should take the initiative to explain clearly to them that because our customs and habits are different from theirs, we are likely to create misunderstandings and violate taboos, offending them without our realizing it. We do want to learn about some of their customs and habits, but we cannot do it overnight, because this is not something to be imposed on people, and so
we have to ask them to forgive us for any faux-pas. This is also being honest. In this way we can easily win their sympathy. In all our political, economic and cultural work we should adopt this attitude.

The delegation sent by the Central Government to visit the southwest will surely be of enormous help to us. You have studied and learned much more about the minority nationalities than we have. Especially when you go down there and come into contact with concrete matters, you will discover many problems. We sincerely hope that you comrades will examine all kinds of problems and make suggestions. Even a one-sided view is better than none. At present, we are in urgent need of suggestions. I hope you comrades will not hesitate to let local comrades know whatever strikes you. It is quite likely that some comrades at the lower levels are subjective, so you may be rebuffed, or local comrades may pay no attention to the problems you point out or hold differing views on these problems, and it is more likely that their views are wrong. When this happens, take no offence. You can write to us or to comrades working in the provincial governments. The matter can be solved reasonably in the end. If some of your opinions happen to be incorrect, we shall also let you know. In this way, with your help, I am sure we can solve the most complicated and most important issue in the southwest — establishing unity among nationalities, or at least laying a very good foundation for this goal.
OUTLINE FOR THE REPORT AT THE MEETING ON URBAN WORK CONVENED BY THE SOUTHWEST BUREAU OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE

December 21, 1950

The objective of the current meeting on urban work convened by the Southwest Bureau is to call on our leading bodies to pay more attention to strengthening leadership over urban work for the future and solving such major problems as factory management, work in trade unions and Party building among the ranks of the working class, which are the crucial and weakest aspects of urban work. Comrades Duan Junyi, Cai Shufan, Zhang Linzhi and Yu Jiangzhen have made reports respectively on those problems. I fully agree with them.

I should like to talk about the general problems in urban work.

I. THE SITUATION IN URBAN WORK

Over the past year we have scored success in our work in southwest China. According to the laws of development in the new liberated areas, as we take over cities, with regard to the method of work we should concentrate our focal point of work on rural areas. This is absolutely correct. This does not violate the principle of “The period of ‘from the city to the village’ and of the city leading the village has now begun” adopted at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party. Next year, after initiating the movement for the reduction of land rents and the return of security money to the leaseholder we shall carry out reform in the distribution of land. Therefore, our leading bodies at all levels should continue to provide guidance mainly to work in rural areas and at the same time, they must pay more attention to strengthening their leadership over urban work.
Since our leading bodies have been focusing their efforts on rural areas, over the past year we have not had so marked success in urban work as we have had in rural work, but we do have some results.

The early takeover of cities has proceeded smoothly and satisfactorily. We have accomplished considerable results and gained some experience in establishing revolutionary order, fulfilling taxation tasks, stabilizing currency and commodity prices, restoring or maintaining industrial production, providing relief to unemployed workers and intellectuals, remoulding personnel left over from the old regime, conducting study campaigns for current affairs, restoring or maintaining school education, organizing workers and students, convening representative conferences of the people from all circles and developing the united front. It is true that our comrades who work in the cities have been working hard.

However, we only have gained fragmentary and unsystematic experience in solving many major problems arising from urban management and construction. From the bureau of the Central Committee, we have not systematically studied the experience in urban work and spread and improved it. In particular, we have had very little experience in the two most important aspects of our endeavour, that is, factory management and school education. This state of affairs must be changed.

The cities and big towns in southwest China have a population of nearly 10 million. After the rural areas have undergone reduction of land rents, return of security money to leaseholders and agrarian reform, there is a greater need for the cities to lead them. If we do not strengthen urban work, “to link closely urban and rural work, workers and peasants, industry and agriculture” and if urban work progresses more slowly than rural work, we may risk divorcing urban areas from rural areas and make gross mistakes.

II. WHAT IS URBAN WORK? ON WHOM SHOULD WE RELY?

At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao said, “On whom shall we rely in our struggles in the cities? Some muddle-headed comrades think we should rely not on the working class but on the masses of the poor. Some comrades who are even more muddle-headed think we should rely on the bourgeoisie. As for the direction of industrial development, some muddle-headed comrades maintain that we should chiefly help the development of private enterprise and not state enterprise, whereas others hold the opposite view that it suffices to pay
attention to state enterprise and that private enterprise is of little importance. We must criticize these muddled views. We must wholeheartedly rely on the working class, unite with the rest of the labouring masses, win over the intellectuals and win over to our side as many as possible of the national bourgeois elements and their representatives who can cooperate with us — or neutralize them — so that we can wage a determined struggle against the imperialists, the Kuomintang and the bureaucrat-capitalist class and defeat these enemies step by step. Meanwhile we shall set about our task of construction and learn, step by step, how to administer cities and restore and develop their production."

"Our comrades must do their utmost to learn the techniques of production and the methods of managing production as well as other closely related work such as commerce and banking."

According to this directive, the tasks for comrades doing urban work are to learn, step by step, how to administer and build cities, restore and develop production undertakings in cities, do their utmost to learn the techniques of production and the methods of managing production as well as other closely related work as commerce and banking. At present, the weakest but most crucial link in the chain of our urban work is precisely the management of production. We must work hard in this regard. If we do not do well in production, particularly factory management, it will be impossible to turn consumer-cities into producer-cities, the agricultural country into an industrial country and New Democracy into socialism.

The urban work breaks down roughly into five aspects:

1. To organize and educate the working class, restore and develop production and learn how to manage modern industries such as factories, mines, transportation and municipal engineering.

2. To organize and educate young students, unite with people from cultural and educational circles, do a good job in school education and mobilize intellectuals to participate in the fight against imperialists and the remnant Kuomintang forces. The cities are the centres of culture and education, and petty bourgeois intellectuals are an important force in urban revolutionary struggles.

3. To do a good job in trade, banking and finance on the economic front. We should strengthen market management, accomplish taxation tasks, stabilize currency and commodity prices and facilitate the flow of goods between the urban and rural areas.

4. To strengthen public security, intensify the struggle against imperialists and the remnant Kuomintang bandits and secret agents and consolidate revolutionary order. Meanwhile, we should strengthen the ideological struggle to eliminate the influence exerted by the imperialists and remnant
Kuomintang forces and support the anti-feudal struggle in the rural areas.

5. To strengthen the united front work among people from all circles. We should do more work among the bourgeoisie, the main object of our united front in the cities. We should organize, unite with and educate the city dwellers through representative conferences, enabling them to participate in urban management and construction.

All those aspects of work should be done according to Chairman Mao's directive: “Other work in the cities, for example, in Party organization, in organs of political power, in trade unions and other people's organizations, in culture and education, in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, in news agencies, newspapers and broadcasting stations — all this work revolves around and serves the central task.”

On whom should we rely to do all this work well? Chairman Mao has instructed us to wholeheartedly rely on the working class. How to do so?

First, ideologically we must have a full understanding of the role of the working class. If we do not rely on workers, we cannot do well in industrial production and our country cannot develop into socialism. Therefore, we should oppose the bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideas among Party members and cadres that neglect the importance of the working class and the wrong views of those people who argue that workers make no contributions to the revolution, the workers' life is too good, workers are backward and workers are hard to rule.

Second, we must organize the overwhelming majority of workers into trade unions and rely on trade unions to educate them, arouse their class consciousness and give play to their initiative for production. If we neglect the work in trade unions, relying on the working class will be out of the question.

Third, we should show the warmest care for the working class in various aspects, such as political and cultural matters, their livelihood and their material benefits. We should not neglect “minor matters” beneficial to workers. We should oppose some comrades' wrong view of making use of workers. In times of stress, they rely on workers. But when things go smoothly, they do not rely on them. When they need workers, they rely on them. When they don't need workers, they refuse to rely on them. They rely on workers only orally but not ideologically. They set high requirements for workers, but give little to them. Worse still, in certain places workers are being maltreated. Therefore, some workers complain that “under the rule of the Kuomintang we were oxen and horses, and now we are horses and oxen.” These mistakes must be resolutely corrected.

Fourth, relying on the working class must become the Party's guiding
concept to be carried out in all departments. This cannot be taken as a matter of trade unions and factories alone. Our Youth League organizations, women’s federations, cooperatives and cultural organizations must ensure an important place for work among workers.

III. FACTORY MANAGEMENT

In his report, Comrade Duan Junyi has dwelt on the management of state-owned factories and mines.

Long ago we put forward the slogan of “relying on workers and uniting with staff to do well in production”. This is the key to effective factory management. So far, many of our military representatives, work teams and even trade union cadres have not understood this slogan. They do not arouse the enthusiasm of workers and staff. They even do not trust workers and staff. Some comrades like to “have the final say” on matters of technology and management they do not understand. Although the maladies of bureaucracy and commandism have been slightly rectified after the rectification campaign, they remain the major problem among our cadres. If we do not continue to combat bureaucracy and commandism, it will be impossible for us to rely on workers and unite with staff to do well in production.

Experience has proved that if we do not rely on the workers, it is impossible for us to unite with the staff. The latter do not come close to us and wholeheartedly display their initiative until the workers’ enthusiasm has been aroused and the workers have gained some success in production.

The Central Committee has instructed us that to successfully manage factories and mines, we must exercise democratic management and conduct enterprise operation. Democratic management must be specifically reflected in “relying on workers and uniting with staff, especially in the three forms of organization — trade unions, factory management committees and workers’ representative conferences. Otherwise, there will be no democracy or democratic contents to speak of. At present, many factory management committees are nominal. Trade unions either fail to perform their function or are called by workers as “the shadows of military representatives”. Workers’ representative conferences are usually held only in times of stress and at irregular intervals. At these conferences, such problems as production tasks and the welfare of workers and staff are seldom discussed. Even if such a conference is held, it is the usual practice for a military representative or others to simply lecture them. This state of affairs must be changed.
Enterprise operation can be conducted only on the basis of democratic management. It is right for the Department of Industry to decide to start from the two things — rationalization proposals and collective contracts. These steps will arouse the wisdom and initiative of the masses and make cost accounting possible. If a factory cannot calculate its production cost, normal production and enterprise operation will be out of the question.

It is necessary to organize labour emulations, but they can only be organized in factories where such conditions as production plans, raw materials and markets permit and the masses have been mobilized to some extent. In southwest China, most of these conditions are lacking. Therefore, emulations should not be held extensively for the time being.

To successfully manage existing factories and mines, we must also do the three things:

First, we should try our best to choose some capable cadres from government departments and dispatch them to factories and mines. Second, our leaders should pay attention to selecting some factories or mines to make typical experiments and accumulate experience so as to guide the work of other factories and mines. Since there are only 192 major public-owned or private factories and mines in southwest China, we shall certainly gain some success by using this method. Third, since prefectural and county Party committees are preoccupied with struggles in the countryside and are not capable of doing other things, they cannot be entrusted to manage major factories and mines. Instead, the Party committees of provinces, administrative regions and cities should directly manage these factories and mines. Therefore, Party committees of provinces, administrative regions and cities should each establish a department of industry or designate a leading comrade to take charge of industry. Meanwhile, Party committees and trade union offices should be set up in factories and mines (for example, in Qjjiang-Jiangjin area) and three cadres will be enough to handle affairs. If people are put in charge of industry, things will go well.

Besides successfully managing state enterprises, each province, administrative region and city must give more effective guidance to local industry. Owing to the limitation of national financial resources at the moment, we cannot build many large factories. But we can expand small industrial enterprises. We should take a positive attitude in this regard. In the light of local conditions (such as raw materials and markets), local authorities may set up some small industrial enterprises as much as possible by appropriating funds, pooling private capital, or organizing government departments to conduct production and successively manage them. As for those existing small factories with neither raw materials nor markets, we should change their
line of production or consider having them close down.

Some of our factories maintain their status quo. They must try to find a way out and make proper use of their productive forces.

As for private enterprises, our police of the past was correct. In the days to come, we should further promote their reform through consultation between workers and employers and by relying on workers and uniting with staff to do well in production.

IV. TRADE UNION WORK

Comrade Cai Shufan has talked about this in his report.

It is estimated that the workers in southwest China, including handycraftsmen, total 1.6 million. About 300,000 of them have become members of trade unions, only accounting for 19 to 20 per cent of the total. Trade unions are well organized in various industrial enterprises, and 65 to 70 per cent of their workers have joined trade unions. But only a few trade unions perform their function well and really maintain ties with the masses of workers.

Serious tendencies of closed-doorism and formalism can be found in trade unions. The root cause of closed-doorism is a lack of trust in workers. Formalism manifests itself in the fact that trade unions practise no democracy in their activities, fail to gear their activities to production and attach no importance to workers' welfare. That is why they do not enjoy the workers' trust. Of course, there are a very small number of trade unions that function well.

At present, the trade unions' tasks are as follows:

First, they must further admit workers. First of all, they should focus on recruiting new members in factories, mines, transport departments, municipal engineering departments and shops.

Second, they must resolutely admit the worker activists from the locality and their own factories into their leading organs at all levels to cement their ties with the masses of workers so that they are no longer divorced from the masses. In addition, the leading organs of certain trade unions should reduce the excessively large percentage of staff.

Third, they should practise democracy in their activities and rectify their bureaucratic style of work. Once trade unions are preliminarily consolidated, they should convene representative conferences or membership meetings to elect their leading organs. Trade unions must fully heed the workers' opinions
and suggestions and handle them conscientiously and properly.

Fourth, they must strengthen cultural and educational work among workers. From a long-term point of view, workers should receive education mainly in cultural and technical knowledge. For the time being, they should still focus on political education and at the same time, they should receive cultural and technical education.

Fifth, they must attach importance to workers' labour protection and welfare. In the days to come, they should still avoid setting excessive requirements, but what is more important, they should straighten out some comrades' wrong ideas of neglecting workers' welfare and of giving them benefits as a form of charity (without discussion in trade unions and among workers).

V. PARTY BUILDING IN THE CITIES

At present, a common tendency in various localities is to neglect Party building in the cities and pay no attention to expanding Party organizations on the pretext of prudently expanding them.

We recruit new Party members mainly from workers in the cities. But quite a few comrades within our Party look down upon workers (because they are born in peasant or petty bourgeois families). Some time ago, more than a hundred workers in Chongqing applied to join the Party. After two to three months of examination, only six of them were admitted into the Party. Later, some more workers were recruited directly by the Department of Organization of the Municipal Party Committee.

The plan put forward by Comrade Yu Jiangzhen in his report is appropriate. It is both necessary and possible to admit into the Party seven per cent or about 20,000 from among 300,000 workers in major factories and mines within the next six months. We should recruit a few new Party members from schools, government organizations and other departments aside from factories and mines, but set stricter requirements on them.

An open Party building policy must be carried out all over southwest China without exception. Secret Party organizations should immediately begin conducting activities openly. Party building should be carried out first slowly and then quickly and new Party members admitted prudently one by one. We must oppose both the tendency of closed-doorism and the tendency of pressing people into the Party. We must consolidate Party organizations from the very beginning and conduct strict Party activities.
We must attach importance to expanding Youth League organizations and rectify the tendency of closed-doorism as well.

VI. ON THE BOURGEOISIE

The Characteristics of the Chinese Bourgeoisie

Our attitude towards the bourgeoisie is to unite with them while struggling against them. The aim of struggle is to achieve unity. At the present stage we must "win over to our side as many as possible of the national bourgeois elements and their representatives who can cooperate with us — or neutralize them — so that we can wage a determined struggle against the imperialists, the Kuomintang and the bureaucrat-capitalist class and defeat these enemies step by step". It is a wrong and dangerous idea to kick away the bourgeoisie either politically or economically. Shortly after south-west China was liberated, "Left" deviation like this did exist. But after we began to readjust industry and commerce in May, there emerged the right deviation of having no daring to wage the necessary struggles against the bourgeoisie.

We have relations with the bourgeoisie mainly in tax collection, labour and capital, and the public and the private interests. Meanwhile, reduction of land rents, returning of security money to leaseholders and land distribution in the countryside also involve them. Generally speaking, the bourgeoisie care only about capital in the labour-capital relations, give no consideration to both public and private interests and complain that taxes are too heavy. But we must conscientiously carry out the policies of taking into consideration both labour and capital and both the public and the private interests and of collecting neither more nor less than the right amount of taxes.

Between April and May, private enterprises were really in dire straits. Therefore, we firmly carried out the policy of industrial and commercial adjustment. If we had not done that, a great many factories would have closed down. This would be extremely harmful to the working class, the national economy and the peoples' livelihood. Therefore, this policy (the policy defined by the Central Committee) is correct. It is incorrect to maintain that the policy is wrong.

We should continue to implement this policy in future. As for taxation, we should follow the policy of collecting neither more nor less than the right amount of taxes. We should take the initiative to readjust irrational taxes, but must collect rational taxes without hesitation and combat tax evasion so
as to ensure the fulfillment of taxation tasks. We must pursue the policy of taking into consideration both public and private interests and urge the capitalists to further reform their decadent setups in placing state orders with private enterprises for processing materials and market pricing. Meanwhile, in southwest China we should appropriately expand the state-owned industry and commerce so as to enable the state-owned sector of the economy to play a greater leading role. As for the labour-capital relations, it was necessary for us in the past to persuade the workers to lower their wages to an appropriate extent so as to tide over the difficulties. After July, the situation of industrial and commercial enterprises began to improve. Therefore, we should not lower the workers’ living standards, but should achieve a balance of revenue and expenditure in factories by reforming the decadent setups of private enterprises and by trying to develop production. In factories and mines where capitalists are not making profits, we should still persuade workers not to demand too much. But in factories and mines where capitalists are making profits, we should restore some wages or welfare appropriately.

While carrying out correct policies in all fields of endeavour, we must do more work of persuasion and education among the bourgeoisie. Experience has proved that more work produces more results. We should correct the erroneous tendency of being unwilling to contact the bourgeoisie and their representatives. We should also improve work in federations of industry and commerce.

We should prudently consider returning security money by the industrialists and businessmen. Generally speaking, we can adopt the principle of returning security money in instalments within six months.

VII. STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SECURITY WORK

At present, public order is stable. But the enemy has not been completely eliminated. They often employ new ploys and take us by surprise, inflicting great damage on us. For instance, a pack of dynamite exploded at a warehouse in Nan'an [a district in Chongqing], causing a great loss of our assets. Therefore, we can never slacken our vigilance.

As for urban public security work, we should focus on protecting economic departments, in particular, major factories and mines, workshops and warehouses. The armed personnel guarding the important departments must be reliable.

We are too lenient in suppressing counter-revolutionaries in urban
areas. For a long time we did not dare to arrest the counter-revolutionaries in factories and schools and often released those who were caught without punishing them. This greatly dampened the masses' enthusiasm in the struggle against secret agents. Shortly after Chongqing was liberated, the workers dared to inform against secret agents, but later they did not do so because they found that we did not punish those secret agents. Recently their enthusiasm has risen again because we arrested more than 100 counter-revolutionaries at one stroke. This shows that we shall be divorced from the masses if we do not suppress counter-revolutionaries.

We should intensify the ideological struggle against American imperialists and the education against secret agents. We should promptly make known to the public the crimes of secret agents and expose their rumours so that the masses can heighten their vigilance. This is the basis for our fight against secret agents.

VIII. OTHER ASPECTS OF WORK

Urban work involves many aspects and I cannot talk about all of them. We must strengthen school education. Our propaganda department should study and discuss it at the meeting that will soon be held. Although the problem cannot be solved in a short time, we must start to tackle it.

We should do a good job in implementing the system of the representative conferences of people from all circles. Practice over the past year shows that the system is the best way to maintain ties with the masses, solve problems and consolidate the united front. Local authorities should review experience, hold those conferences with better results and make them play an even greater role.

IX. UNIFIED LEADERSHIP

Since urban problems are complicated and need to be solved promptly and more often than not one problem involves many departments, urban work should be done under the unified leadership of municipal Party committees. Some of our departments are placed under dual or triple leadership. They should solve general problems, except some special ones, under the leadership of municipal Party committees. Otherwise, a problem usually cannot be solved for a very long time, because it involves many things
to attend to and no organ and persons are put in charge of tackling it. This malady of bureaucracy emerges just because there is no unified leadership and no persons specially assigned to solve problems. Therefore, in the days to come when a problem involves several departments, we must call personnel from those departments to meet together to decide on the principles and measures through consultation and carry them out with concerted efforts. For major problems, we must form a special group or committee and designate persons mainly responsible for solving them. Facts indicate that it is a good method.

The method of leadership — concentrating our efforts on setting typical examples, accumulating experience and spreading it — is effective in all aspects of urban work. Many of our comrades often forget this method of leadership and take a roundabout course in their new work. This should draw their attention.

X. THE PROBLEM OF CADRES

We should not hope that the higher authorities will send us cadres and that cadres will be transferred from other regions. We should be determined to promote cadres from among the rank and file. After one year of work, many activists have emerged, so it is possible to select a number of cadres from among them. Only in this way can we further our ties with the masses and lay a firm foundation for our work. We should pay special attention to selecting cadres from among workers. If we do well in the work of trade unions, it will be a little easier to find new sources of cadres.

XI. THE REPORT SYSTEM

To study urban work and strengthen the leadership over it, we have stipulated that in 1951, the Party committees of cities directly under the provincial (regional) governments and of key enterprises, shall write bi-monthly comprehensive reports on their work and at the same time submit their copies to the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
THE ENTIRE PARTY SHOULD ATTACH MORE IMPORTANCE TO UNITED FRONT WORK

March 26, 1951

The Central Committee of the Party and Chairman Mao have pointed out time and again and made it very clear that united front work should be improved. Our victory in the revolution is inseparable from the united front work we did. Without the united front we could not have fought battles so successfully; even though we may be victorious, we still cannot do our work well without it. However, not all our cadres realize its importance. That is why the Central Committee and Chairman Mao have once again brought up this matter and the Central Committee has issued a special directive on it. In accordance with this directive, we are holding this conference on united front work. The requirements in the Central Committee’s directive are quite specific, so there is no need for me to dwell on them. Today I shall mainly discuss problems concerning erroneous ideas.

We say that united front work must be improved. Why must it be improved? First of all, we should get a clear understanding of the importance and principle of the united front. Our Party adheres to the axiom that in order to do our work well, we must first understand its importance. As in fighting, first of all, we need to know why we are fighting as well as with whom we should ally ourselves and whom we should attack. So far only a small number of comrades have attached importance to united front work, and the majority do not yet have a true understanding of its importance and underlying principles. It is true that many of our cadres in the southwest have achieved good results in united front work. However, many other comrades are not doing the work conscientiously, only doing it when pushed. After February or March of last year bandits became a serious problem all over the place and prices were affected. Our troops and local cadres went everywhere asking enlightened gentry and public figures of industrial and public figures of industrial and...
commercial and other circles for their support in the suppression of bandits and collection of public grain. This is also a form of doing united front work. After the bandits had been eliminated and the grain collected, they stopped doing it or did only a little. Why should we ally ourselves with as many people as possible to suppress bandits and collect grain? The fact reflected here is: In times of difficulty, we need them to work together with us, which means that we cannot do without them. The reason we were victorious in the revolution is that we won over all the friends we could and isolated the enemy.

Some comrades in our army units hold that our victory came solely through the barrel of our gun. This is not the complete picture. Over the years, the Central Committee and Chairman Mao have always attached great importance to united front work, performing it meticulously. On the one hand, our victory was achieved through the barrel of our gun, but on the other hand, it cannot be separated from our united front work. When we arrived in northern Shaanxi after the Long March, there were only six thousand men in the First Front Army of the Red Army; and only a little over ten thousand men in all, including the troops of the 25th and 26th Corps of the Red Army in northern Shaanxi. Furthermore, we were surrounded by more than 100,000 enemy troops, so conditions were extremely bad. Thanks to the fact that the Party had sent out some of its finest cadres to do united front work, as well as work in other fields, new prospects for resisting Japan and saving the nation opened up after the December 12th Incident in 1936. After our troops arrived in north and central China during the War of Resistance Against Japan, everyone felt the need of united front work, because we realized that we could not gain a firm foothold without friends. In those days we even did united front work among puppet troops in a blockhouse at the risk of our lives. During the War of Liberation we paid special attention to matters of policy and other work relating to united front, resulting in our winning over all democratic parties. Chiang Kai-shek also tried to win them over, but it was we who succeeded. Because we had won the support of people from all strata of society and of all the democratic parties, we had justice on our side and were able to maintain a high morale — this is why we won the war in the end. When the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea began, some people, including some democrats and public figures from the industrial, commercial and intellectual circles, had misgivings. Later, as we strengthened our propaganda work, people from all walks of life began to favour and support our efforts in the war; the democratic parties issued a joint declaration and the bourgeoisie came out as well to demonstrate in support of the war. All this served to
boost our morale and deflate the enemy's arrogance. Some of our comrades
did not appreciate the significance of the joint declaration, thinking it just
a formality, but people from all strata of society set great store by it. This
declaration demonstrated that the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid
Korea had the unanimous support of the entire nation. Can we carry on the
war in the absence of a united front and internal unity? Facts have shown
that the united front is one of the three decisive factors\textsuperscript{151} for our victory in
the revolution. Without united front work we can accomplish nothing.

There are some within our Party who still think along the lines that so
long as we have the workers and peasants on our side, we can do everything.
This view is not entirely correct; to be more specific, it is only fifty per cent
correct. Workers and peasants indeed form the main body of the masses on
whom we should rely. However, working only with them cannot solve all
our problems. For instance, can we deal with relations between the state and
private sectors of the economy if we do not work with the private sector or
deal with relations between employees and employers if we do not work with
the capitalists? In reducing rent\textsuperscript{50} and returning security money\textsuperscript{141} we mobil­
ized some democrats and members of enlightened gentry to go to the
countryside (for example, to northern and western Sichuan), and with their
help deadlocks were easily broken and the task was easily accomplished. By
contrast, in other places where this was not done, the movement progressed
rather slowly and there were some glaring problems. Without democrats and
members of democratic parties writing articles about what is happening in
the countryside after their return to the cities, city dwellers are sure to think
the countryside is "a mess" and that it is "absolutely lawless". This can
isolate us from the people. Some of our comrades lack an adequate under­
standing of the role played by democratic parties and democrats and they do
not know that the democratic parties are representative of people from
different strata of society who like to listen to what they say, have faith in
them and find those parties' declarations more to their liking than ours.
These comrades are not looking at problems in the light of the complicated
conditions created by the existence of different social strata; therefore, they
often neglect the united front. This idea of relying solely on workers and
peasants and paying no attention to uniting with the petty bourgeoisie,
national bourgeoisie and other patriots is an important root of closed­
doorism.

Some comrades believe that united front work will last for only two years
and that we can end it as soon as agrarian reform\textsuperscript{122} is completed. Chairman
Mao said that experts should be trained for united front work, whereas some
of our comrades have said that united front work will end in two years and
that it has no future. In fact, united front work is a component of our Party's general line and policy and is to be carried through to the end. We say this not just to set people's minds at rest, because it is true. The principal task for united front work is to strengthen education among democrats and democratic parties through the united front and to ally ourselves with them to step into socialist society together. After the realization of socialism the bourgeoisie will no longer exist, but there will still be people belonging to different strata in society, most of whom will be our friends, plus a handful of hostile elements bent on undermining socialism. So long as there are friends and enemies, we should ally ourselves with our friends in order to isolate and attack the enemy; hence we need united front work. It follows that this work must continue even in the days after socialism is materialized.

Other comrades think that the united front's only function is to split the enemy. This view is also incorrect. To be sure, united front work has its tactics, but more important is its strategy — uniting a broad range of people, including the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and people from other strata. We must unite with everyone we can and reduce opposition to our cause wherever possible in order to isolate the enemy. The reason some comrades think democrats and democratic parties are not important is that they mistakenly believe united front work is only meant to split up the enemy camp, without understanding that this work has two aspects. One aspect is allying ourselves with the working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie and any other friends we can ally ourselves with — this is the principal aspect of the work. The other aspect of this work involves splitting the enemy so that some members of the enemy camp will come over to the side of the people. Because these comrades fail to see both aspects of united front work, they do not pay attention to uniting with democrats and democratic parties and people from all social strata. They are not being far-sighted.

Still other comrades, though they may approve of united front work, think it is the responsibility of united front work departments and it has nothing to do with them. Therefore, they seldom bother themselves to contribute to the success of the work. For instance, when we were suppressing counter-revolutionaries in Chongqing, some democrats became panic-stricken because our Party comrades did not explain the need to them amply beforehand, which relegated us to a passive position. It is true that few people today regard united front work as lavishly entertaining people, but some people still think it troublesome and are not doing meticulous work among non-Party people.

The above shows that we should really do what the Central Committee
has required us to do, that is, we should further publicize the importance of united front work so that the number of Party comrades concerned about this work will increase from the present minority to a majority. Improving united front work is one of our Party's long-term tasks, involving all fields of endeavour, and is not merely the responsibility of united front work departments. All departments should do united front work. Take the industrial departments, for example. Not all engineers and staff are Party members. In government departments there are cadres who are not Party members, and the same is true of a large number of cultural workers, teachers, doctors and technicians. We should, therefore, do a good job of uniting with and educating these people, so that we can all follow the same road to socialism. United front work should be done by all departments in the Party. We cannot make a success of the work unless we drive this point home to every cadre and every Party member.
AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTHWEST CHINA AND OUR EXPERIENCE

May 9, 1951

The struggle in southwest China was most acute in March and April. The return of security money and the punishment of law-breaking landlords in rural areas as well as the three great movements — embarking on the first phase of agrarian reform, suppressing counter-revolutionaries and resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea — reached a climax. In the second half of March, the Southwest Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting on united front work and, in the second half of April, held the second meeting on urban work. I shall not dwell on those two meetings, since we have submitted separate summary reports on them.

Last July we began preparing for the “Huai-Hai Campaign” in southwest China, namely, the movement to eliminate bandits, oppose local despots, reduce rent rates and make landlords return tenants’ security money. The movement was in full swing by last November and successfully ended in mid-April this year in 208 counties and the suburbs of seven cities, involving a population of over 66.6 million, or 83 per cent of the total of southwest China. Except for a small part of Yunnan with a population of two million, the movement has not been or should not be conducted in the rest of the province, 20 counties in Guizhou, and areas inhabited by minority nationalities in western Sichuan and Xikang. The movement is large in scale and the struggle is exceptionally fierce. It is estimated that we can bring in 3,850 million tons of rice from the reduction of rent rates, return of security money and punishment of law-breaking landlords, of which we have already collected about 3,250 million tons (actually a little more). The most outstanding successes are in eastern Sichuan, where it is estimated that we can receive 1,250 million tons of rice and we already have 1,100 million, and in western

Excerpt from a comprehensive report to the CPC Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong. In the report, which was transmitted to various localities on May 16, Comrade Mao Zedong remarked, “Comrade Xiaoping’s report is very good” and he added some comments of his own to the report.
Sichuan, where we expect the total to be 750,000 tons of rice of which 600,000 tons is already in our hands. More than 20 million people in the area, or 28 per cent of the whole population of southwest China, have joined peasant associations. There are more than 2.24 million, or three per cent of the area's population, in the people's armed forces. More important is the fact that large numbers of peasant activists have come forward. In the later stage of the movement in particular, we made clear our policy of mobilizing the poor peasants and farm labourers, and satisfactorily met their economic needs by returning them the security money reimbursed by landlords and by expropriating law-breaking landlords. As the movement deepened, the poor peasants and farm labourers were mobilized, which provided the basis for systematically transforming the composition of the leadership of peasant associations and organs of political power in the rural areas. Only with this accomplishment were we able to distribute land on a sound foundation. Looking at the situation as a whole, we can say the peasants have really been emancipated and a new atmosphere is prevailing in the countryside. Democrats who have been to the rural areas regard all this as a historic miracle and believe that cities lag behind the countryside.

While the "Huai-Hai Campaign" was going on, we conducted the first phase of land distribution between February and April of this year in 18 counties, 12 districts, 158 townships and the suburbs of Chongqing, Wannian and Nanchong, involving a total population of 13.51 million. While carrying out agrarian reform in all those localities, we re-examined our work in connection with expropriating local despots, obtaining the return of security money, punishing law-breaking landlords, arousing poor peasants and farm labourers, further transforming the composition of the leadership of peasant associations and suppressing counter-revolutionaries. (Mao Zedong's comment: Well done and congratulations! In places where this work has not gone as far, people there should follow this example.) Many more cases of landlords stubbornly resisting the reform, committing arson, poisoning food and water, murdering activists and inciting riots have occurred than in the past, so the struggle was unusually severe. This has smashed the illusion that agrarian reform can be carried out peacefully following the campaign to eliminate banditry, expropriate local despots, reduce rent rates and obtain the return of security money.

Experience has shown that agrarian reform cannot be thorough unless the poor peasants and farm labourers are fully mobilized. We have decided that in the struggle to obtain the return of security money and especially in punishing law-breaking landlords, one aim is to further weaken the feudal forces, and the other is to make sure the poor peasants and farm labourers
receive appropriate economic benefit so as to mobilize them and transform the composition of the leadership of peasant associations. This decision is correct and has been followed in all localities. As a result, in many localities poor peasants and farm labourers received about 50 kg. of rice apiece and in others the amount they received per person was equal to the amount middle peasants reaped from production. In most villages poor peasants and farm labourers secured the leading posts in peasant associations, so in areas where agrarian reform has been completed, solid groundwork has been laid and the reform has been carried out thoroughly in most of them. Comrades in areas where the reform is still to be carried out should draw on this experience and adhere to the explicit policy of re-examining work in connection with reducing rent rates, obtaining the return of security money, punishing law-breaking landlords, properly meeting the needs of poor peasants and farm labourers and transforming the composition of the leadership of peasant associations and of government in rural areas.

Experience has also shown that if we had not suppressed counter-revolutionaries, the feudal forces would not have bowed to us, the poor peasants and farm labourers would not have dared to rise up, and the return of security money and agrarian reform could not have been completed so smoothly. (Mao's comment: All this is correct and should be heeded by people in all other localities.) We have submitted reports to the Central Committee on the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, and Comrade Zhou Xing152 will go to Beijing to report on the latest developments in this regard. Overall, we have done a good job and achieved a great deal. But during the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries and punish law-breaking landlords, control tended to weaken in some localities. The nearer the movement is to completion, the more vigorous it becomes and the more hotheaded comrades working at grass-roots level are — at this point, leading organs should exercise strict control. This is the lesson Party committees at the provincial or regional level and we should bear in mind. In the later stages of the two movements, anarchy and indiscipline began to gain ground when people concerned did not ask higher authorities for instructions or submitting reports afterwards and violated rules and regulations. (Mao’s comment: Comrades working in the provinces in south-central and east China are expected to pay close attention to this lesson and see to it that the system of asking for instructions from above and submitting reports afterwards is applied rigorously and that no practices of this undesirable type shall be tolerated.) We have already notified all localities to check this tendency.

With regard to other matters: (1) The movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea reached the rural areas in April. More than 33 million
people were involved in the signature drive in support of the movement and more than 21.9 million people took part in May Day demonstrations to show their support. The campaign is still in progress. (2) Things went smoothly and with very little difficulty in the first phase of army expansion — 50,000 men were enlisted in eastern Sichuan and 40,000 in northern Sichuan. (3) Since May all cadres have been engaged in the rectification movement to review experience gained in work during the previous period, including the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, prepare for the second phase of agrarian reform and make plans for future suppression of counter-revolutionaries. As usual, we have conducted the movement by acknowledging achievements, carrying forward strong points and remedies shortcomings, while trying to overcome the tendency towards anarchy and indiscipline. (Mao's comment: Please consider following the example of southwest China by carrying out the movement in June and July and again in winter, instead of only once in winter.) (4) We are paying close attention to the leadership over spring ploughing. Comrades in all localities report that the masses have been truly mobilized, but the thinking of the leaders often lag behind the political awareness of the masses. Many comrades consider the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea an added burden that hinders their work, but in reality, when the masses are involved in the movement they add sound and colour and give a great impetus to it. Accomplishing the task of expanding the army so smoothly was more than we ever expected. (Mao's comment: Two other things have exceeded the expectations of many comrades. One, some leaders are afraid to suppress counter-revolutionaries on a grand scale and to invite non-Party people to participate in the judicial committee trying counter-revolutionaries, though events have shown that wherever people have abandoned the practice of working behind closed doors, they have scored greater achievements. This is a case of underestimating the people's enthusiasm, including that of non-Party people. Two, some leaders are afraid to invite large numbers of democrats, industrialists and businessmen, professors and secondary school teachers to go in groups to see the progress of agrarian reform and the execution of counter-revolutionaries. Even when they do so, they allow them to see only the good things and are afraid to let them see the bad things. This shows that closed-doorism still exists to a serious extent among our leaders. However, it turned out that those who had gone to see for themselves have returned full of praise and have also made progress ideologically. Comrades of the East China Bureau did things differently, allowing people to see both the good and the bad, which yielded very good results. This is another example of underestimating the enthusiasm of the large numbers of
people outside the Party.) What worries us most is the spring ploughing, because we have had too much rain this spring and many seedlings have rotted. In addition, crops sown in late autumn last year are not growing as well as the previous year's, and a number of places in every province have been seriously damaged by natural disasters. We are worried that these problems have not received sufficient attention in all localities and that the central task of producing a good harvest has been neglected, which would bring about serious consequences. We are trying to give better guidance in this regard. (Mao's comment: This problem worries me, too, and I hope you will give more effective guidance and work for a good harvest.)
I shall now discuss the six principles for future financial work.

First, the budget should be made by central departments. Why? Because our budgets of the past few years, particularly the one of 1953, contained risky provisions. The greatest risk lies in that the Ministry of Finance makes policy decisions for all departments, which shows ignorance of the fact that policies are embodied in figures and that to decide on figures is to make policies. Having central departments prepare the budget is a matter of policy. The amounts allocated indicate the importance and urgency of projects, as well as which projects should be undertaken and which should not, and therefore this is a political question. When the Ministry of Finance makes decisions for the departments, some people say it “has the money but no policy for spending it”. It does have a “policy”, but it is not the correct one. In the past the Ministry of Finance exercised too much control over departments, only to elicit complaints for the following two reasons. One, as it drew up the budget behind closed doors, it was criticized right and left whether it allocated funds to the departments or not. Two, as the budget was not worked out by central departments, the ministry was not in a position to exercise effective control while trying to have a finger in every pie, thus becoming the main target of attack. If the budget is prepared by central departments, it will be easy to control and decide on it. Therefore, all projects must be covered by budgets that are worked out by central departments. However, this does not mean the Ministry of Finance will have nothing to do with budgeting; it still has the right to intervene and offer suggestions. When offering suggestions, the ministry takes the overall situation into account, making sure that the state can afford the expenditures allocated and that they conform to the growth rate of the national economy. A budget cannot be decided on by a department itself; the department has to consult

Excerpt from a report delivered at a national conference of directors of financial departments and bureaus. At the time Comrade Deng Xiaoping was Vice-Premier of the Government Administration Council and Minister of Finance.
with other departments concerned. Departments at all levels are in favour of
the principle of having the central departments preparing the budgets. There
are no central departments to be responsible for the preparation of some of
the budgets. Once there are, things will be easier.

Second, departments should shoulder the responsibility for their own
finances. Will they have to do so forever? Not necessarily, although some of
them may for a long time to come. At any rate they will have to do that in
1954 and many of them in 1955, too. The chief purpose is to control the
budget. We made this decision because after the budget for 1953 was adopted
on February 12, the general reserve fund was used up by the end of March,
and in August, revenues and expenditures were well out of balance, resulting
in a deficit to the tune of more than 21,000 billion yuan. In order to
control the budget we have decided from now on to hold departments
responsible for their own revenue and expenditure. Departments are divided
into two levels: central and local. At the central level is the Financial and
Economic Commission, which is in charge of overall affairs. Its No. 4 Office
is responsible for the finances of the departments of agriculture, forestry and
land reclamation, and water conservancy; the No. 3 Office for the finances
of the department of transportation; the No. 2 Office for the finances of
the departments of finance, banking and trade; and the No. 1 Office for the
finances of the department of industry. The total amount of the budgeted
investment will be examined and approved by the Financial and Economic
Commission and the Planning Commission. Investments in individual un-
dertakings and projects will be decided by the departments concerned in the
light of importance and urgency. At the local level are the greater adminis-
trative areas that will be charged with the responsibility of regulating their
finances. At present, financial affairs are supposed to be administered at three
different levels, but in fact they are managed only at two, that is, the central
and the greater administrative area levels, because it is difficult to do it at
provincial level now. In future such affairs will be administered at this level,
too. Some people want to know if they should be responsible for their
revenues as well as for their expenditures. Of course they should. According
to the directive on the budget for 1954, total revenues are not to fall below
previous levels and efforts should be made to exceed them; total expenditures
are not to increase and efforts should be made to save them. From this we
can see that the departments are also responsible for their own revenues. Only
in this way can we maintain a stable budget that we can actually meet. There
are many advantages to holding departments responsible for their finances.
One result is that the budget has remained stable by and large over the past
two months since the directive on the budget for 1954 was issued on
November 10, 1953. This is something we have never seen before.

Third, departments can retain their own reserve funds and keep any surplus for their own use instead of turning it over to the state. This principle is the most controversial: some of our comrades and Soviet experts do not agree with it. Actually, without this principle people would not be enthusiastic about anything, and it would be impossible to have budgets prepared by competent departments at central and local levels or to hold departments responsible for their finances. With this principle people will have the courage to introduce the two practices just mentioned and local authorities will have something to fall back on in case of emergency. This time we have decide to set aside three to four per cent of the budgeted figure as working fund for 1954 and three to five per cent as reserve fund. We have now laid all our cards on the table for everybody to see and to help manage the financial affairs of the state. Let's stop working out the budget behind closed doors and see that the general budget is not exceeded. Surpluses (excluding that from capital construction) are not to be turned over to the state.

Fourth, we shall reduce administrative personnel and strictly control the size of staffs. It could be dangerous if we do not do this. The reasons are obvious.

Fifth, the general reserve funds cannot be used without the approval of the central authorities. This will make us think twice before asking for approval to use the funds. The power of approval should be in the hands of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, not the Ministry of Finance. In the past, a considerable portion of the state's general reserve funds has been spent on trivial things, as was the case in 1953. Now with this principle we can check such a practice. The benefit of this principle lies in that it lets people know it is difficult to obtain access to the general reserve funds. The funds are reserved for important purposes, not insignificant ones.

Sixth, we shall strengthen financial supervision. This principle was emphasized by Chairman Mao at a meeting of the Central Committee and will serve as the key link in our future financial work. There has been enormous waste in our finances. Chairman Mao said, “If we could save 10 per cent on some projects, it would mean an immense amount.” Ten per cent of the state budget is equal to over 20,000 billion yuan. Therefore, we must strengthen financial supervision.

Why have the six principles been formulated? To put it briefly, it is because of the following:

First, an important political aim is to put the country's finances on a long-term stable, reliable foundation. Today our state finances are not stable enough to stand any severe test. We must be aware of this situation and try
hard to end it. All of us should discuss this problem and find ways to solve it. Our finances were not stable in the past. In 1950, when the country had just been liberated, the finances were not stable because of unstable banking; in 1951, when we had to fight in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, it was impossible for us to maintain stable finances; in 1952 the situation was relatively good; and in 1953, since the general reserve funds were used up too soon, we had to “extort” more than 40,000 billion yuan from departments at both local and central levels. Everything will be fine if no major problems crop up; otherwise we will be at the end of out rope. The policy of building up a country should be designed to build up the strength to resist foreign aggression and deal with emergences. If we “extort” all the local reserve funds, we would have no money for situation such as the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, serious famine, the building of a huge emergency project or the introduction of new technology. In that case, we would have to levy more taxes and reduce subsidies for everybody, which would give rise to complaints everywhere. Another method would be to cut back necessary expenditures, reducing investment in national industrialization and socialist transformation. That would produce even more drastic effects, shaking the foundations of our society. Building a solid base for our financial reserves hinges on economic development. In order to develop the economy and ensure the stability of prices, industrial and commercial enterprises must have a fixed amount of working fund and banks must have enough reserve funds, of which they have had not enough or nothing at all in the past. Moreover, departments at all levels in greater administrative areas have already spent all their reserve funds, leaving themselves with no working fund to carry on. It will take us several years to build up a stable foundation for the state’s finances. To this end, we must build up reserve strength and lay foundations in all fields of endeavor. How we should do this remains a question to be studied, but it should be done gradually on a year-to-year basis in the light of economic development until the base is large enough. For example, we must first figure out how much money commercial enterprises and banks need to sustain their normal operations and then appropriate a certain amount of money for them every year until they are on a solid foundation and we can stop worrying about them. Only after providing them with adequate funds can we check up on their work on strong grounds. But for now, they may attribute their failure to our not having supplied them with enough money. We should also gradually help replenish the reserve funds of central and local enterprises. If we can accomplish this task in a few years, we shall be in a position to deal with any emergency and can avoid falling into dire straits. So, we must accomplish this. It not only calls for the
efforts of the Ministry of Finance but also those of everybody else. Allowing departments to retain reserve funds does not mean allowing them to be extravagant, but helping them to build up their foundations. For the first step, it is hoped that the Ministry of Finance will be able to accumulate 10,000 billion yuan over and above the reserve funds. If the funds from the greater administrative areas, the provinces and the municipalities are included, it is hoped the amount will reach 20,000 billion at least, which will be enough for us to cope with any emergencies. This is my own opinion, not a final conclusion, since it has not yet been discussed by the Central Committee. This way when unforeseen problems arise, the central authorities will be able to collect money from the local authorities, who will be ready to turn over their money out of patriotism.

Second, unless it has reserve funds, the state will not be able to concentrate financial resources on socialist industrialization and socialist transformation. The Party’s general line for the transition period is to build a great socialist country, which must be guaranteed through maintaining proper finances. Without stable finances, building such a country would be out of the question. Only when budgets are worked out by central departments and departments are charged with the responsibility for their finances shall we be able to accumulate surplus reserve funds to spend on important projects, not on trivial ones, keep the state’s general reserve funds from being wasted and place industrial development on a firm foundation.

Third, in order to put the country’s finances on a stable basis and ensure socialist industrial development, we must curtail all expenditures possible and check waste. However, we cannot do this without these six principles, which are needed to rouse the departments to play a positive role in managing their own finances. As things are very complicated today, we shall get nowhere if we just depend on a few regulations, decrees and measures; we must also act in the light of local conditions. Things will be easier to handle if all of us take an interest in managing our own finances. It is also necessary for local authorities to take an interest in practising economy, without which waste would ensue.

Since the six principles have so many advantages, we can say they are correct for today, at least. Of course, things may change in future, but we must act according to these principles today.
THE OVERALL SITUATION SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN LOCAL FINANCIAL WORK

January 25, 1954

This conference has been a success and achieved the desired results. This is because all participants have taken the overall situation into consideration and proceeded from the facts. Neither of these two approaches is dispensable. It is precisely because the Ministry of Finance did not follow these approaches in the past that problems have cropped up in its work, bringing numerous complaints from all departments.

At the beginning of this conference I discussed the need to check up on the work of the Ministry of Finance, elaborating on its shortcomings and the correct way it should do its work. Today I should like to focus on how the local authorities should conduct their financial work. Chairman Mao once pointed out that our Party always attached importance to strategy, involving all the soldiers and cooks with matters of strategy, and that as long as the strategic situation was made clear to everybody, things would be easy to handle. What Chairman Mao said is quite right. Take, for example, the collection of public grain. If we make clear to everyone the strategic importance and the overall situation, we shall be able to accomplish the task. In the past, however, when we ran into problems we seldom proceeded from the overall situation or explained to everyone the strategic questions clearly. This is why there have been shortcomings in the work of the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, I shall now try to explain the hows and whys clearly to everyone.

All our work involves relationships between the whole and the part, between the central and local authorities and between the principle of centralized and unified guidance and the principle of consideration of local conditions. We must have a clear understanding of both major and minor

Excerpt from a concluding speech made at a national conference of directors of financial departments and bureaus.
principles. Neither the whole nor the parts are dispensable, for without the parts, the whole, which is composed of the parts, would not exist. Which, then, should play the leading role — the whole or the part, the central or the local authorities, the principle of centralized and unified guidance or the principle of consideration of local conditions? If we let the part, the local authorities and consideration of local conditions play the leading role, we shall make mistakes of principle. The central authorities, the whole and the principle of centralized and unified guidance must play such a role. Therefore, comrades working at the central departments should give constant consideration to the parts, the local authorities and local conditions, and find out what difficulties the local authorities may have in their work. The Minister of Finance and the ministry's division directors, bureau directors and section chiefs should always pay attention to the parts, enthusiastically helping local authorities solve all the difficult problems they can or explaining why when they cannot do it. The local authorities, for their part, should have in mind the whole, the central authorities and the principle of centralized and unified guidance, subordinating themselves to the central authorities. Since the local authorities are under the leadership of the central authorities, the parts belong to the whole and the principle of consideration of local conditions can be applied only under centralized and unified guidance, when contradictions arise between the opposites, the local authorities must be subordinate to the central authorities, the part to the whole, and the principle of consideration of local conditions to that of centralized and unified guidance. Otherwise, localism, departmentalism and "mountain-stronghold" mentality will result. In fact, departmentalism existed to varying degrees, and localism and "mountain-stronghold" mentality (which, of course, has historically been a problem) have also been a problem, because local authorities lacked sufficient understanding of the need of centralized and unified guidance and of consideration of the overall situation. Some of the central departments, on their part, failed to take the interests of the parts and the local authorities into consideration in the past, as a result various local authorities raised many justified complaints about the central departments prior to the National Conference on Financial and Economic Work held in the summer of 1953. But attention must also be paid to preventing the part from not giving consideration to the interests of the whole and the central authorities, although this does not present a problem now. We must have a clear and correct understanding of the relationship between the two all the same.

What is the overall point of view we should take in financial work? The financial department is a comprehensive department that fully reflects state
policy and like all other departments, it must serve the needs of the general line. In other words, it must ensure the implementation of the Party’s general line or fulfilment of its general task for the transition period. Figuratively speaking, the main body of the general line is China's industrialization and its wings are two transformations, namely, socialist transformation of agriculture and the handicraft industry on the one hand and socialist transformation of private capitalist industry and commerce on the other. The financial department should guarantee we have the funds for the country’s industrialization and socialist transformation. How should it guarantee this? First, by increasing revenues; and second, by cutting back expenditures. All possible revenues must be collected and expenditures cut back wherever possible. In order to curb expenditures, Chairman Mao says that in the final year of the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-57 — Tr.) the total expenditure of state organs (including administrative and military expenses) should not exceed 30 per cent of the state’s total budgeted expenditures and that cultural and educational expenses should also be cut appropriately, so as to concentrate our funds on industrialization and socialist transformation. Therefore, we should try to concentrate our financial resources on industrialization and socialist transformation if we want our country to become a great socialist state after a period of two or three five-year plans. When restricting expenditures, we should reason with people by explaining this principle to them, allocating money to them if we can or refusing if they can get along without this allocation. Although China is vast in territory and rich in natural resources, its productive forces are fairly backward and its financial resources limited. Therefore, our financial workers should know how to practise economy and spend money where it is needed most. If we think in terms of the general line, we shall easily see where the interests of the whole lie and understand the significance of centralized and unified guidance and the need to subordinate the local authorities to the central authorities and interests of the part to interests of the whole. In this way we shall be keen on practising economy, instead of trying to start too many undertakings at once. Therefore, the financial department should pay attention to the important things and take a strategic point of view.
CONCEIT AND COMPLACENCY ARE THE ARCHENEMY OF UNITY

February 6, 1954

I fully agree with Comrade Liu Shaoqi’s report, which appropriately appraised the work done by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee since the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. I also fully agree with the “Resolution on Strengthening Party Unity”, drafted at the suggestion of Comrade Mao Zedong and submitted to the session for discussion, and with the clear and elaborate explanations of the draft resolution made by Comrade Liu Shaoqi.

I think that adopting such a resolution for the entire Party is absolutely necessary and comes at just the right moment when the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong have explicitly defined the Party’s general line or general task for the transition period. This is because, throughout the transition period, the revolution will involve struggles that are more acute and profound, extensive and complicated than those in the new-democratic revolution. In addition, imperialists abroad and classes at home that have been overthrown or will soon be eliminated will use every possible means to carry out sabotage activities. Under such a situation, the Party must become more united and acquire greater fighting capacity to ensure the implementation of the general line or the fulfilment of the general task for the transition period. More important, this is also because after victory in the new-

Speech delivered at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Beijing from February 6 to 10, 1954. Comrade Liu Shaoqi, on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong, gave a report to the session. Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping and other comrades delivered speeches. The participants fully agreed with the report given by Comrade Liu Shaoqi, affirmed the achievements made in various fields since the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, exposed and criticized the activities of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, who plotted to split the Party and usurp the supreme power of the Party and the state, and unanimously adopted the "Resolution on Strengthening Party Unity", drawn up at the suggestion of Comrade Mao Zedong, which served to safeguard and cement the Party unity.
democratic revolution we have been immensely successful in all fields of endeavour and conceit and complacency began to show themselves in our Party, especially among our Party’s high-ranking cadres. If we do not become aware of this problem in time, it will certainly cause us to relax our vigilance against the enemy, undermine the unity of our Party and rob us of our fighting spirit, rendering us unable to withstand any attack from the enemy and bringing defeat to our great cause.

As Comrade Liu Shaoqi has said in his report, this draft resolution is not a shot in the dark but is based on concrete facts and directed at specific targets. Can we say that the concrete facts and specific targets have to do with only a few individuals? No, we cannot. As I see it, this resolution focuses on an important problem which the Party needs to address at this stage, a tendency we need to guard against and overcome. Do not think you and I need not examine ourselves or be on guard because it is meant for only a few people and has nothing to do with us.

This draft is comprehensive in that it analyses the situation both inside and outside the Party and offers effective ways to overcome conceit and complacency. Now I am going to add my views on one of the problems raised in the draft resolution, namely, the problem of conceit and complacency I mentioned above.

I believe that conceit is growing in the Party, primarily among a large number of high-ranking cadres. If they do not try to overcome this, it could get seriously out of hand. The draft resolution puts it this way, “After victory in the revolution, a number of Party cadres have developed extremely dangerous conceit and complacency. They have let the achievements in their work go to their heads, forgetting about the modest attitude and the spirit of self-criticism that all Communists should possess, exaggerating their personal roles and stressing their personal prestige. They consider themselves number one in the world, being ready to accept flattery and praise but not criticism and supervision. They suppress criticism and retaliate against those who criticize them and even go so far as to intentionally or unintentionally regard the areas and departments under their leadership as their personal property and independent kingdom.” The resolution also tells us clearly that conceit can definitely harm Party unity and the cause of revolution. Conceit exerts a corruptive influence on Party members, leading to the development of individualism and causing Party members who once had the noble quality of serving the people enthusiastically and wholeheartedly to degenerate into the most despicable of individualists.

Generally speaking, all of us should understand that a conceited person is prone to exaggerate his role and contribution to the revolution. Everyone,
no matter what his responsibility, is serving as no more than a cog in the wheel of the revolutionary cause. Nobody should regard any achievements as his own, instead he should regard them as the result of the efforts made by many comrades — from the Central Committee and his superiors to the vast numbers of cadres and the people, as well as his colleagues and the comrades of neighbouring departments. We can absolutely not give ourselves credit for achievements scored owing to correct leadership at higher levels and the efforts of other comrades and people in other fields of endeavour. Conceited people always think of themselves as terrific, and they often complain that the Party and other people do not value them highly enough and are not warm-hearted to them. Instead they feel that those who flatter them and do favours for them are kind and warm-hearted to them. But this kind of thing has a corruptive influence. Conceited people tend to get their priorities wrong when it comes to the work or locality under their leadership. For instance, they may mishandle the relationship between the central and the local authorities. If they work in a central department, they may tend to ignore the conditions in the localities, paying no heed to opinions offered by local comrades and even trying to intimidate those comrades in the name of the central department. If they work in a locality, they may be prone to give scant consideration to the interests of the whole or to central departments. When a problem crops up, they always believe that their locality is in the right and may even feel uncomfortable with the restraints placed on them by the higher authorities, hating people from higher levels examining their work or criticizing them. As a matter of fact, people like us can hardly avoid mistakes and shortcomings no matter what kind of work we do. Therefore, it is unrealistic for anyone to have an unreasonably high opinion of himself, or be unwilling to be examined or criticized, or feel uncomfortable when being examined and criticized. It also goes against the Party's principles. A conceited person sees only his own achievements and practically shuts his eyes to those of other people, departments and localities. When he is praised a bit more often than others are, he gets carried away. In handling relations with other departments and localities, he sees only the difficulties of his own department, ignoring the difficulties of others, seldom takes the interests of others into consideration and is never willing to get anything less than others. He only sees his own strong points, not the strong points of other comrades, and sees only others' weak points, few or none of his own. He engages in endless arguments with others on issues that are not matters of principle but of a purely technical nature, categorically refusing to compromise or be patient with others.

Conceit, especially the conceit of high-ranking cadres, will unavoidably
harm Party unity and work. Since achieving victory in the revolution, we
have seen some phenomena which I believe are very damaging. For instance,
on the one hand, people seldom stress the Party principles formulated by
Comrade Mao Zedong that have proved effective over the years and enabled
our Party to attain victory. These principles are: taking a serious attitude
towards mistakes and shortcomings and making criticism and self-criticism;
proceeding from the desire for unity and achieving unity through criticism
and struggle; helping others and “curing the sickness to save the patient”;
and giving consideration to other people, departments, localities and the
minority. On the other hand, violations of these principles are increasing.

We are often hearing about people who praise other people or themselves
to the skies, who are unwilling to be examined or criticized and who always
consider themselves in the right, turning a deaf ear to others’ opinions. They
seldom make criticism or self-criticism, show no respect for collective
leadership, do not try to co-operate with others, do not work to “cure the
sickness to save the patient” in dealing with those comrades who have made
mistakes, and give little consideration to the interests of other localities or
departments. Even worse, instead of preserving the prestige of the Central
Committee, some comrades have exceeded the limits permitted by the Party
organization in their criticism of leading comrades on the Central Commit­
tee. Comrade Mao Zedong encourages criticism of any leading comrade (he
often says he is no ex ception.) However, such criticism should be conducted
on appropriate occasions and according to Party principles, or be made to
the person’s face. Criticism made in this way is justified and indispensable.
The chief leading comrades on the Central Committee have time and again
said they welcome criticism, but this criticism cannot exceed the limits
permitted by the Party organization.

It often happened that some comrades expressed erroneous opinions
about the chief leading comrades on the Central Committee in disregard of
prescribed procedures and the Party’s organizational principles. Since the
National Financial and Economic Conference there have been many remarks
made about Comrade Shaoqi, some of which are totally inappropriate. I
think Comrade Shaoqi’s self-criticism at this session was factual and appro­
priate, yet I have been hearing reports which bear little resemblance to
criticism. Some criticisms are not true to fact or are exaggerated; others are
little more than rumours and completely groundless. For instance, what
Comrade Shaoqi said today in his self-criticism about the question of the
bourgeoisie is different from what some are saying. I have not read the
original text of Comrade Shaoqi’s speeches delivered in Tianjin in the early
days of 1949, but from what I have heard, I can tell those speeches were
based on the principles of the Central Committee at the time and greatly helped our comrades to avoid mistakes when crossing the Yangtze River and advancing down south to liberate all of China. There may have been a few defects in wording in these speeches, but on the whole the speeches exerted favourable effect. What was the situation when he made those speeches? At that time the overall situation in China was unsettled, since half of the country had not yet been liberated. When we entered the cities the worst mistakes we were trying to avoid were “Left” mistakes, which, in fact, had already been made. Under these circumstances, it was absolutely correct for the Central Committee to adopt drastic measures to overcome and check “Left” tendencies. After crossing the Yangtze, we took over cities, keeping in mind the principles of the Central Committee, preferring to lean Right rather than “Left”. In this way we lost a few months’ time at worst; otherwise, we would have suffered heavy losses and it would have been very difficult for us to correct “Left” mistakes. Therefore, I think the speeches delivered by Comrade Shaoqi served a good purpose, though I have heard rumours which imply the opposite. Let us take another example: the question of Party members who have become rich peasants. This is merely a question of when we should issue a directive; yet again I hear rumours implying otherwise. Still another example is the question of the working class and semi-working class leading the revolution. The term is not proper, of course, but this is not a question concerning the nature of the Party, though the rumours I heard were quite to the contrary. Some of the rumours I mentioned have gone beyond the limits of criticism and self-criticism and violated organizational principles of the Party, and others are completely groundless or wildly exaggerated. These phenomena deserve our close attention. Can we separate the prestige of the Central Committee from that of the chief leading comrades on the Committee? Or, can we say that protecting the prestige of the Central Committee has nothing to do with protecting that of chief leading comrades on the Committee — for example, Comrade Shaoqi? Being not keen enough politically, we have failed to effectively counter or end criticism of the chief leading comrades on the Central Committee, criticism which was not in keeping with the Party’s organizational principles. Can we say that our failure to combat such criticism has nothing to do with our conceit and low ideological level? Is this not serious enough for us to heighten our vigilance? I believe it is and we should take it as a warning.

So far I have only discussed conceit in general terms. If we become conceited, we shall stop making progress and working diligently, and we are bound to make serious mistakes. If we do not try to get rid of it in time but
let it grow, we shall be unable to withstand any attack by hostile classes and
ideologies. It should also be noted that conceit may have another result, as
Comrade Shaoqi has pointed out in his report. When Party members' conceit
and individualism are not resolutely reined in by the Party, these members
will eventually begin to argue over their position in the Party, fight for power
and personal gain, trade flattery and favours, form small cliques and even go
to the extent of treacherously helping the enemy undermine and split the
Party. Should this not call for our redoubled vigilance?

I think the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee
and the resolution it produced are of great importance to comrades who have
made grave mistakes, because they have given these comrades an opportunity
to correct their mistakes, which is the most direct way to help them. In
addition, I think that the resolution will provide the most effective guarantee
for the implementation of the Party's general line or the fulfilment of its
general task for the transition period, and will be most useful to all Party
members, especially our high-ranking cadres. It is a disinfectant, arousing our
class consciousness, heightening our vigilance, consolidating our Party and
increasing its fighting capacity. All of us, first of all our high-ranking cadres,
should examine ourselves ideologically to see if we have any of those
tendencies mentioned in the draft resolution. In my own case, for example,
although I experienced some frustrations in the past, these last twenty years
have been smooth sailing. Precisely because of this, however, I need to
maintain a sharp vigilance against those tendencies. We should soberly assess
our contributions to the Party and people. Have we ever accomplished
anything without the help of others? Is it possible to believe that we are
perfect in every way, without any shortcomings or mistakes? Again, in my
own case, I have many shortcomings and make mistakes every now and then.
Since I was transferred to work with the central authorities not many years
ago, I have been involved in decentralism and, besides this, I am not always
right in dealing with people or with certain matters. In the past, when I
worked in north China, the Central Plains and the southwest, I also had
shortcomings and made mistakes. It is inconceivable that people such as
ourselves, whose Marxist-Leninist level is not so high, do not have any
mistakes or shortcomings in work. We should inspect ourselves using this
resolution as a mirror. Now that the Party has set forth the general line or
general task for the transition period, it is vital for all of us high-ranking
cadres in the Party to inspect ourselves in the mirror and wash our faces.
Comrade Mao Zedong once asked: Why were we able to achieve nationwide
victory in a very short period of time after the Seventh National Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party?125 It was mainly thanks to the rectification
movement conducted before the Congress, which made our Party highly unified ideologically, politically and organizationally, thus forming a stronger unity and establishing centralized and unified leadership of the Central Committee. This then inspired all Party members and cadres to march to the front full of confidence and in high spirits. This was one of the fundamental reasons why we attained nationwide victory. No doubt the resolution on strengthening Party unity adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session will play a role similar to that of the rectification movement. It will lead to greater Party unity, enable us to correct many erroneous tendencies and boost our confidence and morale in fulfilling the historic task of this phase of socialist revolution.
RUN OUR SCHOOLS WELL AND TRAIN CADRES

July 9, 1954

Now that we are engaged in construction programme, cadres have become a decisive factor. The situation with regard to our cadres is: on the one hand, we do not have enough of them and, on the other, we are not making the best use of those we have. So, we should take full advantage of the cadres we have and at the same time train large numbers of personnel for the various fields of our construction programme. Leaders in many departments of the Government Administration Council are paying close attention to production and capital construction, which is the right thing to do, but they are not paying enough attention to the training of cadres, as can be seen from the little attention they have paid to the schools they run. They barely seem to realize that running schools well and training cadres are the fundamental of our construction programme. At present, some departments have staffs of several hundred thousand and dozens of schools, but instead of trying to run these schools well, they always pin their hopes on people transferred from other departments. They should mainly depend on cadres trained in their own schools. Our secondary technical schools generally are a failure, except a few that are truly well run. We must find a way to solve this problem. Administrative personnel in some departments feel they are highly valued if they are asked to take charge of production and feel they are being demoted if asked to run schools. This is an unhealthy tendency which represents the chief obstacle to successful management of schools and must be overcome.

School discipline must be enforced strictly. Discipline in schools in the Soviet Union is very rigorous. If our students there do not study hard, they are sent back. We should learn from the Soviet schools and set such strict demands on our students. Bad students should be expelled from school, a weapon that schools must wield and that they simply cannot do without. If

Excerpt from a speech delivered during a discussion of educational work at the 221st Government Affairs Meeting of the Government Administration Council.
a few of the bad students are expelled, the rest may learn a lesson and mend their ways. Some bad students may become good after they have been expelled. We have had similar cases in our Party. Some comrades let themselves be weighed down by their past contributions and thought no one could do anything about their mistakes. Only after they were expelled from the Party did they become good comrades; some even rejoined the Party later. Of course, this weapon should not be overused. In fact, so long as schools are allowed such a weapon, the majority of students will be careful and few will need to be expelled. The question of school discipline has remained unsettled, remaining at the talking stage for many years. Now it is time we set to and strictly enforce discipline. I suggest that the Ministry of Higher Education and the Culture and Education Commission study the question of discipline in Beijing's schools. They should select some typical cases, deal with a few of them and then publish an editorial in the newspapers criticizing their behaviour so that both schools and students can learn to do better.

As for the material benefits of teachers, at present it would be very difficult to raise the salary of each and every one of them, but we should raise the salaries of truly capable professors, associate professors, senior engineers, senior doctors and senior specialists in other fields of endeavour. Such people cannot be numerous, perhaps numbering only about ten thousand in the country as a whole. In the past few years wages were raised a great deal on a nationwide basis, but there was a tendency towards egalitarianism in this action. For instance, wages of construction workers, earth-moving labourers and other ordinary workers were raised by a great margin, some by 100 to 200 per cent, while wages of capable professionals were raised very little. In future wage differentials should be widened, so that genuinely capable people who have contributed greatly to the country receive much higher pay than others. By the way, must the salary of a university president be higher than that of a wise professor? I do not think so. I remember that Chairman Mao once asked why no one in the country received a salary higher than his own. We have asked people in charge of different trades and professions to make out name lists, so that we can raise salaries accordingly. This has remained on our lips for a long time and has never been carried out. It seems that some Party members are still clinging to the idea of egalitarianism, presenting an obstacle everywhere, so that leaders hating to invite trouble leave the matter unresolved. Here I should like to suggest that the Culture and Education Commission make a list of people under its own administration, selecting one or two hundred truly capable scientists who are not necessarily renowned but who have made outstanding contributions. It
can also select one or two hundred university professors. At the same time it should lay down some rules and regulations for the selection, so that those who object may become convinced about the selection. Teachers in primary and secondary schools who work very hard and have made significant contributions should also have higher pay. We should not practise egalitarianism. I should like to ask our revered Comrade Guo to order a list of two hundred or so persons be drawn up, to solve these people's problems first. Premier Zhou talked about the matter at previous meetings, but nothing was done. This time we have to insist on having it finished within a time limit, the way people hand in their examination papers; otherwise the persons concerned cannot be considered keen on the job.
Comrades,

More than eleven years have passed since the Seventh National Congress of our Party was held in April 1945. During this period tremendous changes have taken place in both our country and our Party. In a little over three years our Party, led by the Central Committee with Comrade Mao Zedong at the head and rallying the people of the country, defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s army of several million men, overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, and established the People’s Republic of China. Following the nationwide victory in the revolution, the Party and the People’s Government, again in no more than three years, completed the rehabilitation of our national economy and carried out a series of democratic reforms. From 1953 on, the Party and the People’s Government have been engaged in the construction programme mapped out in the First Five-Year Plan and have achieved decisive victories in socialist transformation. This succession of magnificent victories furnishes indisputable proof of the correctness of the political line laid down by the Party’s Seventh National Congress and of the political leadership of the Party Central Committee since the Seventh Congress. It is also indisputable proof of the correctness of the organizational line laid down by the Seventh Congress and of the organizational leadership of the Central Committee in the same period. Comrade Liu Shaoqi has already made a detailed report on the various aspects of the work done by the Party during this period and the tasks that now confront it. The Central Committee has entrusted me to make the following report concerning the revisions to our Party Constitution necessitated by the changes that have taken place in the Party.
The draft of the Party Constitution now before the Congress for consideration has been discussed by Party organizations in all localities and has undergone much revision. The present draft does not differ on any fundamental principle from the Constitution adopted at the Seventh Congress, but it contains many specific changes, including some involving principles.

At the time of the Seventh Congress our people’s revolution had not yet achieved victory in most parts of the country. Most of our cities and communications lines were then still under the occupation of the Japanese aggressors, and the greater part of the rear areas was still under the control of the Chiang Kai-shek government. The liberated areas under the leadership of the Party were still separated from one another by the enemy. At that time there were 1.21 million Party members, with the vast majority operating in villages of the liberated areas. Party members in Kuomintang-controlled and Japanese-occupied areas were all working underground.

Now the situation in our country has changed entirely. Under the leadership of our Party the people’s revolution attained nationwide victory in 1949, bringing about unprecedented national unity. Now, except in a few outlying areas, we have not only completed the task set for the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution, but also, in the main, carried out the task for the stage of socialist revolution. Besides, in the past seven years, we have achieved tremendous results in all spheres of our socialist development. All this has brought about a fundamental change in the class relationships in our country. The working class has become the leading class of the state; the peasantry has changed from individual farming to co-operative farming; and the bourgeoisie as a class is on its way to extinction.

Our Party has also undergone great changes. The Communist Party of China is now the party in power, playing the leading role in all the work of the state. Party organizations have spread to every city and town, to every county and district, to every major enterprise, and to the various nationalities. Party membership is now nine times what it was at the time of the Seventh Congress and nearly three times what it was in 1949 at the time of our nationwide victory. Furthermore, the majority of our Party members are now working in government offices, economic and cultural establishments and people’s organizations at all levels. All these changes make it imperative for us to pay extremely close attention to improving the Party’s organizational and educational work among our membership.

As the party in power, our Party has been facing a new test and, in
general, has stood the test over the past seven years. Our country has made notable progress in every sphere, and the overwhelming majority of our Party members are working hard and doing well in their respective posts. However, the experience of these seven years has also shown us that, with the Party in power, our comrades are liable to become tainted with bureaucratism. For both Party organizations and individual members, the danger of becoming divorced from reality and from the masses has increased rather than decreased. As a consequence, errors of subjectivism, that is, errors of dogmatism and empiricism, have been made, which have increased rather than decreased in our Party over the last few years.

Being the party in power can also easily breed conceit and self-complacency among the membership. Some Party members become puffed up over the smallest success in their work, looking down on others — particularly the masses and non-Party people, as though the mere fact of being a Party member puts one head and shoulders above non-Party people. Others, fond of showing off their positions as leaders, stand over the masses and order them about and are reluctant to consult them when matters arise. This, in fact, represents a tendency towards narrow sectarianism, an extremely dangerous tendency which could lead to absolute isolation from the masses.

In view of this situation, the Party must constantly be on the alert to combat subjectivism, bureaucratism and sectarianism and must keep up our guard against the danger of becoming divorced from reality and the masses. Therefore, apart from strengthening the ideological education of its members, the Party has an even more important task, namely, to strengthen the Party’s leadership in every way and to make appropriate provisions in both the state and the Party systems for strict supervision over Party organizations and members.

We need internal supervision, and we also need supervision of Party organizations and members by the masses and non-Party people. The key to supervision, whether internal or external, lies in promoting the democratic spirit in the Party and the state and developing our Party’s traditional work style of “integrating theory with practice, forging close ties with the masses and practising self-criticism”, as expounded by Comrade Mao Zedong in his political report at the Seventh Congress.

It is clear that the great changes in our country and our Party mentioned above have placed more rather than less strict demands on our Party. It is also clear that more, not less, is now expected of our Party members. It is on the basis of these changed conditions and demands that appropriate revisions have been made of the existing Party Constitution, revisions contained in the draft Constitution now placed before the Congress.
Furthermore, since the Seventh Congress our Party has accumulated a
great wealth of fresh experience in maintaining close ties with the people, in
organizing them, in uniting with democratic forces outside the Party, in
guiding state affairs and economic work, and in expanding and consolidating
the Party and leading all Party organizations and membership so that they
may become closely united and do their work well. This store of new
experience is also reflected in the draft Constitution, as appropriate.

That is all I have to say regarding the basis on which the Party
Constitution has been revised.

II

Comparing the General Programme of the draft Constitution with that
of the existing Constitution, we can see many changes, especially in the
political sphere. This is understandable. The General Programme in our Party
Constitution embodies the Party's basic political and organizational pro-
gramme. Now that fundamental changes have taken place in our country's
political situation, fundamental changes have to be made in our current
political programme accordingly. As for the political section of the General
Programme, I hardly think any more explanation is needed, for you have all
heard Comrade Liu Shaoqi's report. What needs to be elaborated first of all
in relation to the General Programme of the draft Constitution is the
question of the Party's mass line.

The question of the mass line is not a new one in the work of our Party.
The Party Constitution adopted by the Seventh Congress, and particularly
its General Programme, is permeated with the spirit of the mass line. At the
same Congress, illuminating explanations of the mass line were given by
Comrade Mao Zedong in his political report when he spoke about the Party's
work style, and also by Comrade Liu Shaoqi when he dealt with the General
Programme in his report on the revision of the Party Constitution. There are
several reasons why the mass line must again be explained with great
emphasis: First, the mass line is of fundamental importance in the Party's
organizational work and in the Party Constitution and therefore needs
constant reiteration in Party education. It is true that this question was
explained at the Seventh Congress, but since the vast majority of our present
members have joined the Party after the last Congress and in practice many
comrades have failed to consistently adhere to the mass line, it is evident that
education on the mass line within the Party can by no means be considered
The mass line in Party work is of profound theoretical and practical significance. Marxism has always maintained that history, in the final analysis, is made by the people. Only by relying on the strength of its own masses and that of all labouring people will the working class be able to fulfil its historic mission — that of emancipating itself and, at the same time, all labouring people. The greater the awareness, enthusiasm and creativity of the masses become, the more the cause of the working class will flourish. Consequently, a political party of the working class, unlike the political parties of the bourgeoisie, never regards the masses as its tool, but consciously regards itself as their tool for carrying out their given historic mission in a
given historical period. The Communist Party is the collective body of the advanced elements among the working class and the labouring people, and there can be no doubt as to its great role in leading the masses. But the Party is able to play its part as vanguard and lead the masses forward precisely and solely because it wholeheartedly serves the masses, represents their will and interests, and works hard to help them organize themselves to fight for their own interests and for the fulfilment of their own will. To affirm this concept of the Party is to affirm that the Party has no right whatsoever to place itself above the masses, that is, it has no right to act towards the masses as if it were dispensing favours, to take everything into its own hands and impose its will “by decree”, or to lord it over the people.

Unless we understand from a correct ideological approach that our Party policy must of necessity be “from the masses, to the masses”, we shall not be able to really solve the problem of the Party’s relations with the masses. In practice we see that although many people do have the desire to serve the masses, they end up in failure, doing great harm to the masses. This is because they regard themselves as advanced elements or as leaders who know a great deal more than the masses. Therefore, they neither learn from the masses nor consult them when matters arise, with the result that their ideas more often than not prove impracticable. Far from learning from their mistakes and failures, they blame them on the backwardness of the masses or other temporary factors, abuse the Party’s prestige, and wilfully and arbitrarily persist in their own ways, thereby aggravating their mistakes and failures.

The history of our Party furnishes us with cases of such subjectivists who have caused incalculable losses to the Party, to the Chinese revolution and to the Chinese people. The subjectivists do not understand that only those who really know how to be pupils of the masses can ever become their teachers, and that only by continuing to be pupils can they continue to be teachers. Only by carefully analysing the experience of the masses and pooling their wisdom can a party and its members point out the correct path and lead the masses forward. We do not tail behind the masses, and we know quite well that opinions coming from the masses cannot all be correct and mature. What we mean by analysing the experience of the masses and pooling their wisdom is by no means a simple process of accumulation; it requires classification, analysis, critical judgement and synthesis. Yet without investigation and study of the experience and opinions of the masses, no leader, however talented, can provide correct leadership. Mistakes may still occur even after classification, analysis, critical judgement and synthesis, but by constantly consulting the masses and analysing their practices, the Party will be able to avoid mistakes or to discover them once they are made, and
correct them in time to prevent their becoming serious.

The mass line in Party work, therefore, demands that the Party leadership conduct themselves with modesty and prudence. Conceit, arbitrariness, rashness, pretending to be clever, not consulting the masses, forcing one's opinions on others, and clinging to errors to keep up one's prestige — all this is utterly incompatible with the Party's mass line.

Let us look back at the path our Party has traversed since the Seventh Congress. In the War of Liberation, the agrarian reform, the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce, and the development of industry, agriculture and other economic and cultural undertakings — in all these fields our Party has achieved great victories. Yet which of them could have been successful without following the mass line? For example, how were the officers and men of the People's Liberation Army able to beat the Kuomintang army, which was superior in both numbers and equipment? Is it not chiefly because they upheld the principle of serving the people, established exemplary relations with the people through sacrificing their own interests, created inside the armed forces a comradeship that brought the initiative of junior officers and the rank and file into full play, relied on the masses, analysed the experience of each battle, and from battle to battle made continuous progress, both strategic and tactical? Soldiers carrying water for local inhabitants, officers putting blankets over sleeping soldiers, the calling of "collective wisdom meetings" in the trenches, caring for the health and self-respect of the captives and not searching their pockets — all appear to be trivial matters, but they had a good deal to do with many a great victory.

Again, how is it that millions upon millions of peasants, oppressed by the landlord class for thousands of years, have become masters of their own fate and are determined to build up their own new life? Is it not because during the agrarian reform, the work teams sent out by our Party really worked among the poor peasants, discovered activities among them, aroused their class consciousness, mobilized the peasants themselves to overthrow the rule of the landlords and parcel out their land, instead of turning the landlords' land over to the peasants simply by issuing government orders, thus causing the peasants to recognize their own strength and form their own leading core? Why have the peasants joined the agricultural producers' co-operatives so readily of their own will? Is it not because our Party, proceeding from the masses' own experience, gave extensive assistance to the peasants in organizing seasonal mutual-aid teams, then year-round mutual-aid teams, then elementary co-operatives, and finally advanced co-operatives, so that the peasants came through practice with a firm belief in the superiority
of co-operative transformation?

Let me give another example. How could our country achieve so much with a minimum of mistakes in the movement for suppressing counter-revolutionaries? Is it not because we adopted the correct policy of coordinating the work of the government departments concerned with mobilization of the masses? Is it not because we fully mobilized the masses that, under the sharp and watchful eyes of hundreds of millions of people, large numbers of counter-revolutionaries, unable to find hiding places, were forced to hang their heads, admit their guilt, and embrace the opportunity to reform themselves and turn over a new leaf?

Here is yet another example. In less than three years after nationwide liberation, we got rid of the appallingly corrupt social conduct of the old days and fostered new social conduct with fine moral character. How could such results have been obtained without the conscientious and voluntary participation of the masses, without their learning from each other, offering advice to each other and helping each other?

There are more examples. We have emerged victorious in the movement to completely wipe out the evil of opium smoking, in our large-scale patriotic public health movement and in production, construction and other fields of endeavour. Which of these would have been possible if the movement or the task in question had not actually reflected the demands of the masses and been translated into conscientious and voluntary action by them?

When we speak of the great victories of our Party resulting from following the mass line, we do not mean that all our work in this regard had been excellent. On the contrary, our purpose is to remind the entire Party membership that if correct application of the mass line has brought success, any departure from it will certainly damage our work and the people's interests. As I have mentioned earlier, the present position of our Party as the party in power throughout the country has greatly increased the danger of our becoming divorced from the masses, and the damage this could do to the masses is also greater than before. Therefore, it is of special significance at present to diligently propagate and carry out the mass line throughout the Party.

Tendencies towards bureaucratism of different shades are growing among many functionaries in Party organizations and state organs. Not a few leading bodies and leading cadres hold themselves aloof and refrain from coming into close contact with the masses; they pay little attention to investigation and study, and are unaware of how things really stand in their work. When they consider their work and make decisions, they very often start not with the objective conditions and what the masses are actually doing, but with
inaccurate information or, subjectivity, with their own imagination and wishes. Therefore, although they issue numerous resolutions and instructions, some are not altogether correct and some are even entirely wrong. When they carry out the instructions of higher organizations and the Central Committee, they often fail to consult their subordinates and the masses about the ways and means to be adopted and fail to take into consideration the actual conditions at a given time and place; instead, they just carry out the instructions mechanically and blindly. They often feel satisfied with superficial achievements and ignore the actual results of their work. They see only the bright side of their work, not the seamy side, or else they pursue quantity only and ignore quality. They have no definite ideas about their work, so they constantly vacillate between “Left” and Right thinking, sometimes falling victim to Right conservatism, their ideas lagging behind reality, sometimes rushing ahead impetuously and placing undue emphasis on quantity and speed, in an attempt to go beyond what is actually possible.

Not a few leading comrades in different departments spend most of their time dealing with official papers and telegrams and attending too many unnecessary meetings, so that they very seldom go to the grass-roots organizations and mingle with the masses in order to find out their needs and study their experience, and thus they inevitably fall into a groove of routine and red tape. Not a few leading comrades like to turn their own departments into huge apparatuses. These unwieldy and overlapping organizations, like artificial barriers erected between themselves and the masses, make it impossible for the opinions and needs of the masses to be accurately and promptly brought to their notice and for their own decisions and instructions to be correctly and quickly carried out. Quite a number of leading comrades, when problems calling for immediate solution arise in their work, instead of tackling these problems themselves, pass them on to people on a lower rung of the department ladder, who in turn pass them on to others on a still lower rung, until finally the solution of the problems is again reported from rung to rung in reverse order. In this way, the problems are either mishandled or left unsolved until too late, only to cause losses to work. Even more serious is the fact that some leading comrades are unwilling to come into contact with the masses and are unconcerned about the people’s welfare; instead of trying to solve the problems for which the masses want an immediate solution, they remain aloof and indifferent.

Among some cadres bureaucratism assumes the form of conceit and complacency. These comrades exaggerate the role of the individual and emphasize personal prestige. They lend a willing ear to flattery and praise, but cannot bear criticism or supervision; some persons of bad character even
go so far to stifle criticism and resort to reprisals against their critics. Yet another kind of people in our Party reverse the relations between the Party and the people. Instead of serving the people, they abuse their authority over the people and commit all manner of evil deeds in contravention of the law and rules of discipline. This is a most wicked, anti-popular work style, a hangover in our own ranks of the working style characteristic of the ruling classes of the old days. Although such cadres are few in number, the harm they do is very great.

Another fairy widespread form of bureaucratism is authoritarianism. Quite a number of Party organizations and cadres do not consult the masses before they make decisions and issue instructions. Moreover, in the process of carrying out these decisions and instructions they do not try to explain these decisions and instructions to the masses so as to convince them, but simply resort to issuing orders to get things done. Comrades who make such mistakes may wish to do a good job, but actually they do their work very badly. Mistakes of authoritarianism are more glaring among the grass-roots Party organizations and their cadres, but mistakes of this kind in the lower organizations are often inseparable from the subjectivist and bureaucratic methods of leadership employed by the leading bodies above them.

The presence of the mistakes mentioned above shows that the mass line is still far from being thoroughly carried out in our Party. We must constantly combat such manifestations of bureaucratism and isolation from the masses. We must realize also that bureaucratism, being a vestige of the age-long rule of exploiters in the history of mankind, has a deep and far-reaching influence on socio-political life. Therefore, carrying out the mass line and overcoming bureaucratism invariably involve a long-term struggle.

This task is brought out in both the General Programme and all relevant articles of the draft Party Constitution. Of course, these provisions alone cannot solve the problem; we must adopt a series of practical measures. What measures must we take?

First, we must concentrate on expounding the mass line throughout the Party's educational network, in educational literature for Party members, and in all Party newspapers and periodicals.

Second, we must systematically improve the working methods of leading bodies at all levels so that leaders will have ample time to mingle with the masses, study their condition, their experience and their opinions by investigating typical situations. This should replace the present practice of spending most of their time in offices, handling papers and documents and holding meetings within the leading bodies. The number of staff and of organizational levels of leading bodies should be reduced. The leading bodies
should send as many of their surplus working personnel as possible to lower bodies and let the remaining personnel handle practical work themselves, so as to guard against the danger of bureaucratism.

Third, we must see to it that democracy is fully developed in the Party and government so that the lower Party and government organizations have ample guarantee that they can promptly and fearlessly criticize all mistakes and shortcomings in the work of higher bodies, and that all kinds of Party or government meetings, especially Party congresses and people's congresses at all levels, can serve as forums for the full expression of the opinions of the masses as well as for criticism and debate.

Fourth, we must strengthen supervision by the Party and state, in order to quickly discover and correct all kinds of bureaucratic practices, and mete out due and prompt punishment to people who have contravened the law and rules of discipline or seriously damaged the interests of the masses.

Fifth, Party organizations in all localities and departments must check up on the working style of all Party members at regular intervals through criticism by the masses and through self-criticism, drawing on the experience gained in Party rectification movements of the past and laying stress on the implementation of the mass line.

In carrying out the mass line and combating bureaucratism, it is of vital importance to work in close co-operation with non-Party people, getting as many of them as possible to participate. At present, however, a good many Party comrades, including some in fairly high leading positions, are either reluctant or unaccustomed to co-operating with non-Party people. This, in fact, is a very harmful sectarian tendency, which must be overcome before the Party's united front policy can be carried out thoroughly.

It must be made clear to such comrades that our Party's co-operation with the democratic parties and with democrats without party affiliation is a long-term policy which was fixed long ago. Even since the anti-Japanese war our Party has been pursuing a policy of co-operation with democrats outside the Party. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China our co-operation with the democratic parties and democrats having no party affiliation has gone a step further. Experience of the last ten years or so has shown that this kind of co-operation benefits, not harms, our Party's cause. Many of the democrats who co-operated with us were at first political representatives of the bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie, but in the course of co-operation they have gradually, to varying degrees, shifted their views towards socialism and will continue to do so in this direction. Of course, there are struggles in the process of co-operation, which is inevitable. But the point is that these democrats can provide a kind of supervision over our Party
that Party members alone cannot easily provide; they can discover mistakes and shortcomings in our work that may escape our own notice, and give us valuable help in our work. This help is bound to increase, now that socialist transformation has achieved a decisive victory and their views are coming closer than ever to ours. Therefore, it is our task to continue to broaden our co-operation with non-Party people and to enable them to play an even greater role in our struggle against bureaucratism and in all fields of state affairs.

That is all I have to say about the significance of the mass line and the need for the Party to continue to follow it in its work.

III

Democratic centralism is our Party's Leninist organizational principle and its fundamental organizational principle; it is also the mass line in Party work applied to the activities of the Party. The General Programme and Chapter Two of the draft Constitution specify more detailed provisions concerning democratic centralism in the Party. These provisions are the result of many years' experience gained in the organizational activities of our Party.

The Party depends on all its members and organizations to maintain contact with the people. Generally speaking, collecting opinions and experience from the masses, propagating the Party's views until they become the views of the masses, and organizing the masses to put these views into effect—all this must be done through the efforts of Party members and Party organizations at lower levels. Therefore, with regard to the question of democratic centralism in the Party, of special significance is the correct regulation of relations between the Party organization and its members, between higher and lower Party organizations, and between central and local Party organizations.

Historically, deviations have occurred in relations between higher and lower Party organizations. During the period when "Left" opportunism was dominant in the Party, this deviation took the form of excessive centralization. In those days lower organizations had practically no right to voice opinions to higher organizations. The leaders at higher levels not only showed no interest in the conditions and opinions of the lower organizations, but even attacked those who offered rational opinions, based on actual conditions, that differed from theirs. This kind of mistake was generally overcome after the Central Committee ended the domination of "Left"
opportunism in January 1935.

Since 1935 relations between higher and lower and central and local Party organizations have been normal on the whole. Before dealing with important questions of a national character, the Central Committee has always done its best to consult comrades working in the various localities and departments and listen to their opinions; in general, free and frequent discussion takes place when differences of opinion occur. As we all know, many important directives of the Central Committee are first sent in draft form to local organizations, which are asked to suggest revisions after they have discussed them and put them tentatively into practice; the directives are issued in official form only after being revised in the light of the opinions received — a process that takes several months, and sometimes even more than a year, to complete. The Central Committee also permits local organizations to make adaptations in the light of local conditions if they really find it impossible to carry out the directives as they are. Not only during the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation but also during the first few years after the founding of the People's Republic, the Central Committee gave local organizations extensive powers to deal with problems independently, and facts have proved that it was perfectly correct to do so. Generally speaking, relations between higher and lower organizations in all localities and departments have been governed by the same principle; the local and lower organizations respect the leadership of the Central Committee and the higher organizations; consequently our policies have in the main been carried out throughout the Party.

However, during this period another kind of deviation developed within the Party, namely, decentralism. Some Party cadres tended to turn their particular department into a little world of their own. They enjoyed acting according to their own ideas on political questions, disliked the Party's guidance and supervision, and did not respect the decisions of higher organizations and the Central Committee. They did not even ask for prior instructions from higher organizations and the Central Committee on important questions that required a uniform decision by the Central Committee, nor did they submit any report to them afterwards. In this way they acted contrary to Party policy and rules of Party discipline and impaired the unity of the Party. The Central Committee has waged a stern and continuous struggle against this deviation. The Decision on Strengthening the Party Spirit (1941), the Decision on Unifying Leadership in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas (1942), the Directives on Setting Up a System of Reports and on Heightening the Sense of Organization and Discipline (1948), and the Decision on Strengthening the Party Committee System (1948), all issued
by the Central Committee, were mainly designed to overcome this tendency towards decentralism. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, held in February 1954, dealt a smashing blow to decentralism ideologically, politically and organizationally. Since then this deviation has never survived except in certain isolated cases.

At present the main shortcoming in the relations between higher and lower Party organizations as a whole is still that not enough attention is being paid to bringing into play the initiative and creativity of lower organizations. Undue emphasis on centralization manifests itself not only in the economic, cultural and other administrative work of the state, but also in Party work. Too many rigid regulations are laid down by the higher organizations, many of them formulated without careful study of the conditions and experience of the lower organizations, with the result that the lower organizations find it difficult to implement them. Many higher organizations are not yet used to working among the rank and file, listening to the opinions of the lower organizations and the masses, and solving work problems through consultation with the lower organizations. They are still prone to issue orders from their offices or to try to run the lower organizations themselves. Moreover, some leaders at higher levels like to put on airs and make a great show of their authority. They are wont to lecture and criticize people, and are unwilling to seek advice or listen to criticism from their subordinates or make any self-criticism in their presence. Such cases, though not prevalent, are by no means isolated. If we do not pay attention to this state of affairs and bring about a change, there can be no real democratic centralism in places where such a situation exists.

In the light of the various kinds of experience mentioned above, the draft Constitution makes the following additional provisions with regard to the relationship between higher and lower organizations under democratic centralism:

First, with regard to the basic conditions of democratic centralism, the following provisions have been added: "All leading bodies of the Party must pay constant heed to the views of their lower organizations and the rank-and-file Party members, study their experiences and give prompt help in solving their problems." "Lower Party organizations must present periodical reports on their work to the Party organizations above them and ask in good time for instructions on questions which need decision by higher Party organizations."

Second, concerning the functions and powers of the central and local organizations and of the higher and lower Party organizations, the following article has been added: "The functions and powers of the central Party
organizations and those of the local Party organizations shall be appropriately divided. All questions of a national character or questions that require a uniform decision for the whole country shall be handled by the central Party organizations so as to contribute to the centralism and unity of the Party. All questions of a local character or questions that need to be decided locally shall be handled by the local Party organizations so as to find solutions appropriate to the local conditions. The functions and powers of higher local Party organizations and those of lower local Party organizations shall be appropriately divided according to the same principle."

Third, with regard to discussions on questions of policy and the implementation of decisions, the following article has been added: "Before decisions on Party policy are made by leading bodies of the Party, lower Party organizations and members of the Party committees may hold free and practical discussions inside the Party organizations and at Party meetings and submit their proposals to the leading bodies of the Party. However, once a decision is taken by the leading bodies of the Party, it must be accepted. Should a lower Party organization find that a decision made by a higher Party organization does not suit the actual conditions in its locality or in its particular department, it should request the higher Party organization concerned to modify the decision. If the higher Party organization still upholds its decision, then the lower Party organization must carry it out unconditionally."

Another fundamental question with regard to democratic centralism in the Party is that of collective leadership in Party organizations at all levels. Leninism demands of the Party that all decisions on important questions be made by an appropriate collective body, not by any individual. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has thrown a powerful light on the profound significance of adhering to the principle of collective leadership and combating personality cult, which has produced a tremendous effect not only on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union but also on the Communist Parties of all other countries throughout the world. It is obvious that it runs counter to the Party-building principles of the political parties dedicated to the cause of communism for individuals to make decisions on important questions and is bound to lead to errors. Only through collective leadership, in close touch with the masses, can we conform to the Party's principle of democratic centralism and reduce the possibility of errors to the minimum.

It has become a long-established tradition in our Party for a collective body of the Party and not any individual to make decisions on important questions. Although violations of the principle of collective leadership
been frequent in our Party, once discovered, they have been criticized and rectified by the Central Committee. In particular, the decision made by the Central Committee in September 1948 on strengthening the Party committee system greatly helped to strengthen collective leadership in the Party. I think it is still useful to refer to it here for the benefit of the whole Party. The decision reads:

“The Party committee system is an important Party institution for ensuring collective leadership and preventing any individual from monopolizing the conduct of affairs. It has recently been found that in some (of course not all) leading bodies it is the habitual practice for one individual to monopolize the conduct of affairs and decide important problems. Solutions to important problems are decided not by Party committee meetings but by one individual, and membership in the Party committee has become nominal. Differences of opinion among committee members cannot be resolved and are left unresolved for a long time. Members of the Party committee maintain only formal, not real, unity among themselves. This situation must be changed. From now on, a sound system of Party committee meetings must be instituted in all leading bodies, from the bureaus of the Central Committee to the prefectural Party committees; from the Party committees of the fronts to the Party committees of brigades and military areas (sub-commissions of the Revolutionary Military Commission or leading groups); and the leading Party members' groups in government bodies, people's organizations, the news agency and the newspaper offices. All important problems (of course, not the unimportant, trivial problems, or problems whose solutions have already been decided after discussion at meetings and need only be carried out) must be submitted to the committee for discussion, and the committee members present should express their views fully and reach definite decisions which should then be carried out by the members concerned. The same procedure should be followed by Party committees below the prefectural and brigade levels. In the higher leading bodies there should also be meetings of the leading cadres in the departments (for example, the propaganda department and the organization department), commissions (for example, the labour, women's and youth commissions), schools (for example, Party schools) and offices (for example, the research offices). Of course, we must see to it that the meetings are not too long or too frequent and they must not get bogged down in discussion of petty matters lest the work be hindered. On important problems which are complicated and on which opinions differ, there must, in addition, be personal consultations before the meeting to enable the members to think things over, lest decisions by the meeting become a mere formality or no decision can be reached. Party committee
meetings must be divided into two categories, standing committee meetings and plenary sessions, and the two should not be confused. Furthermore, we must take care that neither collective leadership nor personal responsibility is overemphasized to the neglect of the other. In the army, the person in command has the right to make emergency decisions during battle and when circumstances require."

This decision was implemented throughout the Party and is still valid to this day.

Of course, the system of collective leadership existed long before this decision was made. The significance of the decision is that it analysed the Party's successful experience in conscientiously practising collective leadership, urged organizations that exercised nominal collective leadership to rectify their mistake, and extended the application of collective leadership.

As was pointed out in the decision, the system of collective leadership of the Party committee or, to be more exact, the system of division of responsibility among the commanders under the collective leadership of the Party committee, had long been practised in the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The PLA's long years of wartime experience proved the system to be beneficial to army work and by no means a hindrance to the direction of military operations. In the light of the experience of the last few years, the Central Committee has decided to carry out the system of collective leadership of the Party committee in all enterprises as well, i.e., the system of the factory director or manager assuming responsibility under the collective leadership of the Party committee.

However, there are still many defects in the application of the system of collective leadership in our Party. In a small number of Party organizations some leading comrades are still prone to exercise exclusive personal control. They seldom call the necessary regular meetings, or when they do call meetings of Party organizations, they reduce such meetings to mere formalities. They neither give the participants a chance to prepare themselves beforehand for the questions to be decided on, nor create an atmosphere conducive to free discussion, so decisions are virtually imposed on the members. This practice of personal arbitrary action under the guise of collective leadership must be resolutely opposed. All questions submitted to the meeting must be discussed and differences of opinion permitted. If in the course of discussion a serious difference of opinion arises, the discussion should be suitably prolonged and conducted between individuals so as to reach real agreement among the great majority, provided this does not affect an urgent matter that needs to be settled immediately. Moreover, nothing should be put to a vote in a hurry, nor should any conclusion be drawn
arbitrarily. Similarly, before an election takes place in a Party organization, the necessary exchanges of views and discussion should be carried out among the electors regarding the proposed list of candidates. Only thus can democratic activities within the Party truly be ensured.

Another defect pointed out by the Central Committee in its decision of September 1948 is still found in many organizations: Too many meetings are held and the meetings go on for too long. This not only takes up time that full-time Party workers ought to be spending in getting into close contact with the masses and exercising practical leadership, thus encouraging bureaucracy and red tape, but also affects the work and leisure time of many Party members and non-Party people. This defect is due to lack of planning and preparation and to poor leadership at meetings. It is also due to people misusing meetings by raising a great many questions that do not need to be discussed there. This defect should also resolutely be overcome.

One of the basic requirements of democratic centralism in the Party is that Party congresses at the various levels be held at regular intervals and play their part to the full. More than eleven years has elapsed between the Seventh and Eighth Party Congresses. This interval was, of course, much too long. As for local Party congresses and conferences at the various levels, a few localities and units have kept strictly to the provisions of the Party Constitution, but the majority have held congresses and conferences less often than required. This is a serious defect in the democratic activities of our Party.

However, inner-Party democracy has not been seriously affected by the long and irregular intervals between Party congresses and conferences, because in the years since the Seventh Congress a great number of cadres' conferences have been held by both central and local Party organizations. These conferences, at which the Party's policies and all kinds of problems arising in work were discussed in a fully democratic spirit, have to a considerable extent played the role of Party conferences and even Party congresses. For example, since 1949 the Central Committee has called quite a number of conferences that were national in scope: the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, held from March 5 to 13, 1949; the Third (Enlarged) Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, from June 6 to 9, 1950; the National Conference on Financial and Economic Work, from June 13 to August 13, 1953; the National Conference on Grain, from October 10 to 13, 1953; the Fourth (Enlarged) Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, from February 6 to 10, 1954; the National Party Conference, from March 21 to 31, 1955; the Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees, from July 31 to August 1, 1955; the Sixth (Enlarged) Plenary Session of the
Seventh Central Committee, from October 4 to 11, 1955; the Conference on the Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce, from November 16 to 24, 1955; the Conference on the Question of Intellectuals, from January 14 to 20, 1956; and the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau with the participation of secretaries of provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees, from April 25 to 28, 1956. In general, attendance at these conferences numbered over a hundred or a few hundred to over a thousand. To all intents and purposes these conferences played the role of national conferences, solving important problems in Party policy and work through free and practical discussion. Nevertheless, the holding of these conferences cannot legally replace the holding of Party congresses or make up for the defect of not holding regular Party congresses.

To completely remedy this defect and raise democratic activities in the Party to a higher plane, the Central Committee has decided to introduce a fundamental reform in the draft Party Constitution. The national Party congress and the congresses at provincial and county levels are to have a fixed term respectively, somewhat similar to that of the people's congresses at the various levels. It is laid down in the draft Party Constitution that the national Party congress is to be elected for a term of five years, congresses at provincial level for three years; and congresses at county level for two years. Congresses at all three levels are to be called into session once a year; therefore, the original system of Party conferences at the various levels will no longer be necessary. A system of Party congresses with fixed terms will greatly reduce the burden of electing deputies, and the congresses may be convened at any time during the term of office. Since the congresses will be in session once a year, the occasion need not be an elaborate affair. The greatest merit of a system of fixed terms for the congresses is that it will make the congresses the Party's highest policy-making and supervisory organs operating with an effectiveness which is hardly possible under the present system whereby congresses are held once in a number of years, with deputies elected afresh each time. Under the new system the Party's most important decisions can all be brought before the congresses for discussion. The Central Committee and the provincial and county committees must submit annual reports to their respective congresses, listen to their criticisms and answer their questions. Since the deputies are elected for a fixed term and are responsible to the bodies that elected them, they will be in a better position to regularly gather the views and experience of lower organizations, rank-and-file Party members and the masses. Thus they will attend the sessions as true representatives, and when the congresses are not in session, they can also supervise, in whatever way is appropriate, the work of Party organs. For these
reasons we feel sure that this reform will greatly help develop inner-Party democracy.

It must be emphasized that the Party is a militant organization. Without centralized, unified command it would be impossible to win any battles. The measures taken for the development of inner-Party democracy are not meant to weaken necessary centralization in the Party, but to supply it with a powerful and vigorous base. This is perfectly clear to every one of us. Our purpose in proposing to improve the system of congresses at all levels is to make it easier for the Party committees at all levels to solicit the opinions of the masses and to work more correctly and effectively. Our purpose in proposing to improve the working relationship between central and local and higher and lower bodies is to enable the central and higher bodies to exercise their leadership in closer conformity with actual conditions, to concentrate their attention on work that needs to be centralized and to improve their inspection and guidance of the work of the local organizations and the lower bodies. We do not advocate strengthening collective leadership in order to reduce the role of the individual. On the contrary, the individual can play his role correctly only through the collective, while collective leadership must be combined with individual responsibility. Without division of labour and individual responsibility we would not be able to perform any complicated tasks and would find ourselves in the woeful predicament of no one being responsible for any particular job. Whatever the organization, we need not only division of labour and individual responsibility, but also somebody assuming overall responsibility. Are we all not well aware that even a small group cannot function without a leader?

Here I should like to say a few words about the role of leaders in the Party. While recognizing that history is made by the people, Marxism never denies the historical role of outstanding individuals; Marxism simply points out that the individual role is, in the final analysis, dependent upon given social conditions. Likewise, Marxism never denies the role of leaders in political parties. In Lenin's famous words, the leaders are those who are "the most authoritative, influential and experienced". Undoubtedly, their authority, their influence and their experience are valuable assets to the Party, the working class and the people. We Chinese Communists can fully appreciate this from our own experience. Of course, such leaders emerge naturally out of mass struggle, and cannot be self-appointed. Unlike the leaders of the exploiting classes in the past, the leaders of the working-class party stand not above the masses, but in their midst, not above the Party, but within it. Precisely because of this, they must set an example in maintaining close contact with the masses, obeying Party organizations and
observing rules of Party discipline. Love for the leader is essentially an expression of love for the interests of the Party, the working class and the people, and not the deification of an individual. An important achievement of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union lies in the fact that it showed us what serious consequences can follow from deification of an individual. Our Party has always held that no political parties or individuals are free from flaws and mistakes in their activities, and this has now been written into the General Programme of the draft Party Constitution. For the same reason, our Party abhors the deification of an individual. At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, held in March 1949 — that is, on the eve of the nationwide victory in the people's revolution — the Central Committee, at the suggestion of Comrade Mao Zedong, decided to prohibit birthday celebrations for Party leaders and the use of Party leaders' names to designate places, streets and enterprises. This has helped check the glorification and exaltation of individuals. The Central Committee has always been against sending the leaders messages of greetings or telegrams reporting successes. Likewise, it has been against exaggerating the role of leaders through works of art and literature. Of course, the cult of the individual is a social phenomenon with a long history, and it inevitably finds certain reflections in our Party and public life. It is our task to continue to observe faithfully the Central Committee's principle of opposition to the elevation and glorification of the individual and to achieve a real consolidation of the ties between the leaders and the masses so that the Party's democratic principle and its mass line will be carried out in every field of endeavour.

IV

Part of the General Programme of the draft Constitution dwells on Party solidarity and unity. Solidarity and unity are most important questions in Party building. As is pointed out in the General Programme, "Solidarity and unity are the very life of the Party, the source of its strength. It is the sacred duty of every Party member to pay constant attention to the safeguarding of the solidarity of the Party and the consolidation of its unity."

Why was the people's revolution, led by our Party, successful? First of all, of course, it was because our Party's policy was correct and represented the interests of the people. But a correct policy alone could not have enabled us to defeat a powerful enemy and emerge victorious. Our Party also kept in
close touch with the people and, moreover, rallied them into a united force. But if our Party itself had not been united, how could it have rallied the people?

Again, after victory in the people's revolution in our country, on what did we depend to overcome tremendous difficulties and obstacles, rapidly achieve national unity, quickly rehabilitate and develop our national economy, embark on the socialist transformation of our national economy and complete it for the most part? Beyond all doubt, we could not have led the people and accomplished these complicated tasks in such a short time without Party unity.

Our Party has now assumed the leading role in all state affairs and public activities. It is obvious that our Party in its present condition is exercising a more direct and extensive influence on national life than ever before. It is for the benefit of not only the Party but also the people that we cement Party solidarity and preserve its unity.

The Party is the highest form of class organization. It is particularly important to point this out today when our Party has assumed the leading role in state affairs. Of course, this does not mean that the Party should be directly in command of the work of state organs or discuss questions of a purely administrative nature at Party meetings, thus overstepping the necessary line of demarcation between Party work and the work of state organs. It means, first, that Party members in state organs, particularly the leading Party members' groups formed by those in leading positions in such organs, should follow the unified leadership of the Party. Second, the Party must regularly discuss and decide on questions relating to guiding principles, policies and important organizational matters in state affairs, and the leading Party members' groups in the state organs must see to it that these decisions are put into effect with the harmonious co-operation of non-Party people. Third, the Party must conscientiously and systematically study the work and problems of the state organs so as to be able to make correct, practical and specific proposals concerning state affairs or revise these proposals promptly in the light of actual practice, and it must also exercise constant supervision over the work of state organs. Some comrades working in state organs do not respect the leadership of the Party, saying that their work is of a special nature, and attempt to turn their own departments into "independent kingdoms". This is a dangerous tendency that must be overcome. At the same time, some Party organizations unjustifiably interfere with the administrative work of state organs, while still others, without investigation and study, are content to offer vague, generalized leadership or leadership based on personal impressions. This is another tendency that must be overcome.
The points I have mentioned about the relationship between the Party and the state organs in their work also apply in general to the relationship between the Party and the various people's organizations. But since democracy in these organizations is much broader than in state organs, the Party should take this special feature into consideration when exercising leadership over the leading Party members' groups in these organizations.

In order to strengthen solidarity and unity within its own ranks and correctly play its role as leader and nucleus, the Party has waged an uncompromising struggle against all sorts of erroneous deviations in this regard. The Party's long-term existence in widely scattered rural areas, the strong influence that feudal, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas and work styles still have in our society, and the deepening of class struggle for a certain period of time during the socialist revolution are all inevitably reflected in Party activities. Therefore, Party solidarity and unity are inseparable from inner-Party struggle of varying degrees.

As we all know, the most serious inner-Party struggle during the interval between the Seventh and Eighth Congresses was the fight against the anti-Party alliance of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi. A detailed report on this struggle was given and was followed by discussion at the National Party Conference held in March 1955.

The essence of this anti-Party alliance was its attempt to seize supreme Party and state power through conspiracy on an extensive scale and in utter disregard of principle. This alliance intended to maintain exclusive control over certain areas and departments and use them as its "capital" to oppose the Central Committee and usurp its authority; for this purpose it attempted to arouse resentment against the Central Committee in various areas and among the People's Liberation Army. These conspiratorial activities were completely counter to the interests of the Party and the people and could only benefit the enemies of the Chinese people. That was why the National Party Conference held in March 1955 unanimously endorsed the measures taken in this connection by the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, held in February 1954, and by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee following the session.

Since the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee and the National Party Conference, the Party's solidarity and unity have been strengthened immensely, and the political awareness of all Party members and the fighting capacity of the Party organizations have increased greatly. The enemies of the Party and the people gained nothing from this struggle.

The Central Committee decided to expel Gao Gang and Rao Shushi from the Party, because their conduct gravely imperilled the interests of the
Party and the people and they showed no signs of repentance for their activities or desire to mend their ways in spite of repeated warnings given by the Party over a long period of time before and after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. At the National Conference on Financial and Economic Work in the summer of 1953 and again at the National Conference on Organizational Work in September and October of the same year, the Central Committee stressed the need for all Party members to strengthen Party solidarity and oppose any actions that might undermine it, but the conspirators, bent on splitting the Party and seizing power, turned a deaf ear to these warnings.

The resolution adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee states, "As for those who take a stand against the Party, stubbornly refuse to correct their errors, or even carry on sectarian, splitting or other malignant activities within the Party", the Party "must wage relentless struggle against them and subject them to severe disciplinary measures or even expel them from the Party if necessary. Only by so doing can Party unity be maintained and the interests of the revolution and the people be defended."

However, this is only one side of the Party's policy towards Party members who have made mistakes. The same resolution points out, "Every comrade may have shortcomings or make mistakes, and every comrade needs other people's help; the purpose of Party unity is precisely to develop this kind of comradely mutual help. In dealing with the shortcomings or errors of Party members, the policy adopted should vary according to different circumstances." It adds, "To comrades whose shortcomings or errors are comparatively unimportant or those who, though their shortcomings or errors are serious or comparatively serious, can still be helped through criticism and education to place the interests of the Party above their own and are willing to mend their ways and actually do so, the principle of curing the sickness to save the patient should be applied. Serious criticism must be made and the necessary struggle waged against their shortcomings or errors in the light of the circumstances, but such criticism or struggle should start from unity and aim to reach unity through this criticism or struggle. The comrades concerned should not be deprived of the chance to do better. Still less should their occasional, partial, temporary, or relatively unimportant shortcomings or errors be deliberately exaggerated into systematic, serious ones; this is not starting from unity, and unity cannot be attained in this way. Therefore, it is not in the interest of the Party."

The principles mentioned above for dealing with the mistakes of Party members, as set forth in the resolution of the Fourth Plenary Session of the
Seventh Central Committee, have now been written into the General Programme of the draft Constitution.

As we all know, since 1935 the Central Committee, in dealing with Party members who have made mistakes, has always acted upon the principle of treating each case on its own merits. Practice has shown that it is correct to adhere to this principle, that the unity of the Party benefits from it and that the Party's cause prospers because of it. The Central Committee believes that under ordinary circumstances the aim of correcting the mistakes of Party members is to draw lessons, improve their work and educate all Party members; in other words, to “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones” and “cure the sickness to save the patient”. The aim is not to take such members to task so severely as to make it impossible for them to continue to work in the Party. Therefore, in dealing with such members, the emphasis should be on dispassionately analyzing the root and essence of their errors, raising their ideological consciousness and drawing the correct lesson for other comrades or the entire Party, but not on the disciplinary action taken by the Party organization; solutions to the problem must not be sought through “putting labels” on such members or simply resorting to punishment. Unduly severe or widespread punishment is especially to be avoided, for it would create tension and cause fear in the Party, and this is detrimental to the Party's strength. When our Party was dominated by “Left” opportunists, inner-Party struggle was pushed to the extreme. A policy of excessively harsh struggle and wanton punishment (the so-called “ruthless struggle” and “merciless blows”) was carried on within the Party. As a result, Party unity, inner-Party democracy and the initiative of rank-and-file Party members all suffered severe damage and the advance of the Party's cause was seriously hindered. Such wrong treatment of comrades' shortcomings and mistakes is no longer a dominant feature of Party life, but it still exists in some organizations, and we must pay attention to rectifying it.

On the other hand, there is another tendency in the Party which also deserves attention: that of being over tolerant and overindulgent towards comrades who have made mistakes, not giving them the punishment they deserve or waging any ideological struggle against them. This is a tendency towards liberalism, which must also be resolutely opposed.

In order to maintain Party solidarity and unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and help comrades overcome their shortcomings and correct their mistakes in time, it is necessary to greatly intensify criticism and self-criticism within the Party. Encouraging and supporting criticism from below and prohibiting the suppression of criticism are of decisive importance for the development of criticism in the Party. On many occasions in the past
few years the Central Committee has organized Party-wide campaigns of criticism and self-criticism in the form of "rectification movement", which have yielded remarkably good results. When calling lower-rank comrades to meetings or in talking to them, leading comrades of the Central Committee have of their own accord asked them to criticize the Central Committee's work, listened patiently to their criticisms, and promptly taken necessary and practical measures to correct the shortcomings and mistakes pointed out, with the result that inner-Party criticism from below has been greatly encouraged. The Central Committee has carried out a sharp struggle against the suppression of criticism and applied disciplinary measures to some leading personnel who arbitrarily stifled criticism from below. However, it must be admitted that even now quite a few leading comrades in Party organizations and quite a few Party members who hold leading positions in state organs and people's organizations still do not encourage and support criticism from below. Some even despicably resort to attacks and reprisals against their critics. This is also a grave sign that the germs of bureaucratism are attacking our Party. Every true Communist must fight to root out this evil.

V

Now I should like to make some explanations of the provisions for Party membership in the draft Constitution. As compared with the Constitution adopted at the Seventh Congress, a number of important changes have been made in the draft Party Constitution. This is because conditions of the Party and its membership are now quite different from what they were at the time of the Seventh Congress. These revisions make higher demands on the members and at the same time extend their rights.

The most significant change for the Party is that it is now in the position of leadership throughout the country. The Party's programme for a democratic revolution has been carried out in nearly all parts of the country, and its programme for a socialist revolution has in the main been successfully carried out. The Party's present task is to complete the socialist revolution and bring about, in not too long a period, the country's socialist industrialization, turning China into a powerful socialist industrial country. Organizationally, the Party has changed greatly both in numerical strength and in the social status of its members. According to figures provided by the Organization Department of the Central Committee, at the end of June 1956 the Party had a total membership of 10,734,384, which is 1.74 per cent of the total population. Of these,
1,502,814, or 14 per cent of the total membership, are workers; 7,417,459, or 69.1 per cent, are peasants; 1,255,923, or 11.7 per cent, are intellectuals; 558,188, or 5.2 per cent, are of other social status. Women constitute about 10 per cent of the total membership.

The triumph of the Party's cause, the increasing weight of its responsibility for the people, and the rise of its prestige among the masses all demand that our Party set higher standards for its members. Moreover, in the past a person's decision to join our Party generally meant that he was determined to fight, at the risk of personal freedom and even his very life, for the interests of the masses and the supreme ideal of human society. Nowadays, however, it is easy to find people who have joined the Party for the sake of fame and position and who do not safeguard the interests of the masses, but harm them. To be sure, such people are very few in our Party, but we cannot overlook their existence. Working hard to raise the standards of Party membership is one of the Party's important political tasks at the present time.

For this purpose, the draft Constitution contains new provisions regarding qualifications for Party membership.

In the first place, the draft demands that Party members be people who work and do not exploit the labour of others. In our era only that which is the result of labour can bring honour, and to exploit the labour of others instead of working oneself is an infinite disgrace in the eyes of the people. With the development of socialist transformation, living off the fruits of other people's labour is dying out in our country. However, in present-day Chinese society there are still exploiters, overt and covert practices of exploitation, and ideas of the exploiting class. We must not allow such people, practices, or ideas to find their way into the ranks of the Party, and we must see to it that every Party member draws a clear line between labour and exploitation.

As compared with the relevant articles of the existing Constitution, the draft contains many new provisions concerning the duties of Party members.

In the draft Party Constitution it is listed as a duty of Party members to "safeguard the Party's solidarity and consolidate its unity". The reason for such a provision is obvious. Solidarity and unity are the very life of the Party, and it is unthinkable that the Party should have any need for members who do not care for its life.

It is provided in the draft that Party members must energetically fulfil the tasks assigned them by the Party, because this is the concrete guarantee for the carrying out of Party policies and decisions.

The draft Party Constitution requires that every Party member, without exception and regardless of his position or prior service rendered, strictly
observe the Party Constitution and state laws and behave in accordance with communist ethics. The Central Committee considers it of special importance today to stipulate very clearly that no Party member, regardless of his position or prior service rendered, is allowed any privilege to act against the Party Constitution, state laws, or communist ethics. Some Party members who have rendered meritorious service and hold leading positions think it is their "prerogative" to act as they please. Some Party organizations have even given tacit consent to this view. In actual fact, anyone who entertains or supports this view is helping the enemy corrode our Party. People who conduct themselves like "overlords" tend to think they are indispensable to the Party, but the truth is quite to the contrary. Our Party, far from having any use for such persons, does not permit the presence in its ranks of any "overlords" who behave differently from ordinary members in fulfilling the duties of a Party member. Respect is due to good record and position only if the person possessing them does not become conceited or consider them something entitling him to "privileges" but, instead, becomes more modest, prudent and conscious of his responsibility to set a good example. If he does not do this, his conceit and insolence will be his downfall. The Party will never tolerate such people at the risk of isolating itself from the masses.

The draft Party Constitution stipulates that it is the duty of every Party member to practise criticism and self-criticism, expose shortcomings and mistakes in work and try hard to overcome and correct them, and that it is his duty to report such shortcomings and mistakes to the leading Party bodies, up to and including the Central Committee. Without doubt this provision in the draft will help stimulate the political enthusiasm of all Party members, promote inner-Party criticism and facilitate the exposure and elimination of shortcomings and mistakes in Party work.

The draft Party Constitution provides that Party members be truthful and honest with the Party and not conceal or distort the truth. This is a principle of great significance in Party activities. To proceed from reality and seek truth from facts is our fundamental stand as materialists. Any distortion or concealment of the truth from the Party can only harm the Party, and in the end will only harm the very person who distorts the facts or conceals them from the Party.

The draft Constitution also requires Party members to be constantly on the alert against the intrigues of the enemy and to guard Party and state secrets.

All these new provisions concerning the duties of Party members indicate that the Party is making more exacting demands on its members than in the past.
Extensive and thorough education in the duties of Party members needs to be conducted among the membership and among activists who want to join the Party. When a Party member fails to fulfil his duties, the Party organization should promptly criticize and educate him. Many Party members, especially new members, have failed in their duties because they do not really know what their duties are or because they have read, but did not understand the real meaning of, the relevant articles in the Party Constitution. Therefore, when a Party member fails in his duties for the first time, timely criticism and education are often sufficient to help him avoid making similar or bigger mistakes in future. In cases of this kind it is wrong to rashly take disciplinary measures.

Education by itself, however, will not ensure strict observation of the duties by all Party members. The draft Party Constitution provides that any serious infraction of these duties, undermining of Party unity, breaking of state laws, violation of Party decisions, damaging of Party interests, or deception towards the Party constitutes a violation of the rules of Party discipline, and disciplinary action shall be taken against the Party member concerned.

Every applicant for Party membership must undergo the admission procedure individually. The draft Constitution stipulates that an applicant be recommended by two full Party members; after being accepted at a general membership meeting of a Party branch and approved by the next higher Party committee, he is then admitted as a probationary member. The probationary period is one year, following which he may become a full Party member.

In the draft the term “probationary period” has been adopted in place of the long-employed “candidature”, and the term “probationary member” in place of “candidate member”, since “probationary” is more accurate in this case. This change, which we have accepted, was suggested by a non-Party person.

During discussion of the draft many comrades asked, “If it is our purpose to raise the standards of Party membership, why have we discarded the original provisions about different admission procedures for applicants of different social status? Might this not affect the purity of the Party?”

The distinction hitherto made in admitting new members has been removed because former classifications of social status have lost or are losing their original meaning. Both before the Seventh Congress and for a considerable period afterwards it was essential to have different admission procedures for applicants of different social status; this served a very good purpose then. In recent years, however, the situation has basically changed. The
difference between workers and office employees is now only a matter of division of labour within the same class. Coolies and farm labourers have disappeared. Poor and middle peasants have all become members of agricultural producers' co-operatives, and before long the distinction between them will become merely a matter of historical interest. With the introduction of the conscription system, revolutionary soldiers no longer constitute an independent social stratum. The vast majority of intellectuals have now come over politically to the side of the working class, and a rapid change is taking place in their family background. The conditions under which the urban poor and professional people existed as independent social strata have virtually been eliminated. Every year large numbers of peasants and students become workers, large numbers of workers, peasants and their sons and daughters join the ranks of intellectuals and office workers, large numbers of peasants, students, workers and office workers join the army and become revolutionary soldiers, while large numbers of revolutionary soldiers return to civilian life as peasants, students, workers or office workers. What is the point, then, of classifying these social strata into two different categories? Even if we were to try to devise a classification, how could we make it clear and unambiguous?

It has already been stated that only those who work and do not exploit the labour of others and are qualified to be Party members can be admitted to the Party. Therefore, the question of different admission procedures for applicants of different social status has ceased to exist.

Practice has shown that the chief measures needed for keeping the Party ranks pure are to maintain strict supervision over the work of recruiting new members; to see that the general membership meeting of the Party branch and the Party committee at the next higher level carefully check applicants for admission and probationary members at the end of their probationary period; to subject probationary members to careful observation and educate them during their probationary period; to give timely education to Party members who are not fully up to standard; and to expel any bad elements who have wormed themselves into the Party. Purity does not depend on the number of Party members required for recommending different types of applicants, the length of Party standing of such members or the length of the probationary period.

Present Party membership is nine times what it was at the time of the Seventh Congress. How were these new members admitted into the Party? Are they really qualified for Party membership? Judging from the results of Party rectification movements over past years, the overwhelming majority of members were admitted according to the procedures specified in the Party Constitution and are qualified for Party membership. On the whole, the
Party organizations have grown up in the course of mass revolutionary struggles, admitting activists among the masses who have stood the test of struggle — this provides the chief guarantee for the quality of the Party membership. But mistakes were made on many occasions in admitting new members. During the War of Liberation new members were recruited in the rural districts of some liberated areas by means of so-called “campaigns to join the Party” or through a process of so-called “self-recommendation, public discussion, and approval by the Party organization”. In the two years just before and after nationwide liberation, Party membership grew with undue speed; in certain areas it grew practically without guidance or plan, while Party organizations in some areas even went about recruiting new members in large numbers and setting up Party branches before the masses were aroused. The result was that certain Party organizations were at one time highly impure. At the same time, the mistake of “closed-doorism” was also made in admitting new members. At one time the Party failed to attach importance to recruiting new members from among industrial workers; at another time it neglected to recruit new members from among revolutionary intellectuals; in certain rural areas the Party organizations neglected to recruit activists among youth and women.

Anyway, it is a clear fact that 90 per cent of the present 10,730,000 members have joined our Party since the Seventh Congress. Experience has shown time and again that many members, although they have joined the Party organizationally, have not or not fully joined ideologically. It is therefore the task of Party organizations at all levels to conscientiously educate the vast numbers of new members more effectively, taking practical measures to organize and guide their study of Marxism-Leninism, Comrade Mao Zedong’s writings and the history and policy of our Party and to strengthen their education in proletarian internationalism, so as to raise the level of their political awareness and enable them to become truly qualified ideologically as Party members.

The ranks of the Party have expanded rapidly, but among certain sections of the people, in certain enterprises, government offices and educational institutions, in certain villages and among certain nationalities, Party members are still very few in number. At the same time, more and more activists are coming to the fore and asking to join our fighting ranks. Therefore, apart from working to improve the quality of the membership, the Party should, in the time to come, continue in a planned way to admit those who apply for membership and are fully qualified for it. It should also do more work among women and pay special attention to recruiting the more advanced among them.
While trying to raise the standards of its members, the Party should pay attention to the protection and extension of members' democratic rights. The draft Constitution contains some new, important provisions concerning members' rights.

The draft Party Constitution states that Party members enjoy the right of giving full play to their creative ability in work. This has the significance of a principle. It will greatly stimulate vast numbers of Party members to endeavour to the fullest extent possible within the rules of Party discipline, to bring together the wisdom of the masses, to think independently and to solve problems in a practical and creative way. It will also effect a change in the work style of leading personnel who are stuck in a groove and disregard the creative ability of rank-and-file Party members; this, too, will help promote inner-Party democracy.

The draft gives the Party member the right to ask to attend in person the meeting at which a Party organization is to decide to take disciplinary action against him or make an appraisal of his character and work. This means that the Party organization will have the opportunity to listen to the member's own statement so that decisions made on the basis of incorrect or one-sided reports can be avoided. This procedure has generally been adopted in the Party, but certain Party organizations have not yet put it into effect. Without any reason whatsoever, these organizations have often failed to inform members of their intention to take disciplinary measures against them until the decision has already been made. Of course, there are special cases in which it is impossible for the Party member concerned to attend in person the meeting at which such a decision is to be made by a Party organization. Such cases, however, should be regarded as an exception. And even in such cases, the member concerned still has the right to ask to attend the meeting in person beforehand and the right to appeal afterwards if he disagrees with the decision made by the Party organization.

The draft Party Constitution gives Party members the right to reserve their opinions or submit them to a leading body of the Party, in case they disagree with any Party decision, which, in the meantime, they must carry out unconditionally. Everyone knows that the Party is an organization based on ideological unity and that the ideological unity of the membership is the foundation of Party solidarity and unity, but this does not mean that a Party member may not hold different opinions about Party decisions. This would be impossible. The unity that the Party demands is an ideological unity on all questions concerning the Party's basic principles, and unity of action on all practical issues. Concerning day-to-day work, it is permissible, even unavoidable, for Party members to hold differing views to some extent. In
order to solve various practical problems, the Party membership must act according to the principle that the individual is subordinate to the organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level is subordinate to the higher level, and all constituent Party organizations in the country are subordinate to the Central Committee. In this connection, it is entirely correct and necessary for the Party to demand that members who hold different views unconditionally carry out Party decisions in their actions. Yet these members still have the right to reserve their own opinions and, moreover, the right to submit them to the Party organizations to which they belong and to higher bodies, and the Party organizations, on their part, should not compel them to give up their opinions by force of discipline. Far from harming the Party, these provisions can have a good effect. If the Party’s decisions are correct and the Party members holding different opinions are willing to bow before the truth, they will eventually be glad to acknowledge the Party’s correctness and admit their own mistakes. If, however, truth eventually turns out to be on the side of the minority, then protection of the right of the minority will help the Party ascertain the truth more easily.

Compared to corresponding articles in the existing Constitution, the draft Party Constitution expands on the provisions regarding the right of members to participate in free and substantial discussion at Party meetings or in the Party press on theoretical and practical questions relating to Party policy, to criticize any Party organization or any functionary at Party meetings, and to address any statement, appeal or complaint to any Party organization, up to and including the Central Committee.

The draft stipulates in particular that infringement of the rights of Party members constitutes a violation of the rules of Party discipline, and disciplinary action shall be taken against it. This is an effective guarantee of the rights of Party members.

With regard to commendatory and disciplinary measures within the Party, the draft Constitution contains the following important changes: First, the former provisions regarding commendation have been taken out; second, the provisions concerning disciplinary measures applicable to Party organizations have also been taken out; and third, the provisions concerning disciplinary measures applicable to Party members have been simplified.

Real life has shown that it is not appropriate to regard “admonition” as a disciplinary measure and that it is inconvenient to divide warnings into private and public warnings. It is entirely feasible to replace provisions regarding disciplinary measures against an entire Party organization with those regarding disciplinary measures against individual members.
Some comrades ask, "Why have the provisions for commendation been left out?" This, again, is what we have learned from the reality of everyday life. Although provisions regarding commendation were made in the Party Constitution adopted by the Seventh Congress, our experience over the past eleven years has proved them to be unnecessary. Certainly this does not mean that the Party has taken no notice of the excellent work done by many of its finest members. It has publicized their achievements and experience and promoted them to important posts according to their personal qualities and abilities. All this represents the commendation the Party has given to these members. But there is a more important reason for removing the provisions about commendation. Fundamentally speaking, we Communists do not work in order to be commended. We work in the interest of the people. When we Communist Party members have worked diligently and properly, consequently winning the confidence of the people, we are receiving the highest reward possible.

Here I feel it necessary to speak about the question of Party cadres. If we make strict demands on every rank-and-file Party member, we need, indeed, to make still stricter demands on Party cadres. Since the backbone members in the Party organizations at all levels enjoy greater confidence from the Party and the people, then obviously they have a greater responsibility to the Party and the people than the rank-and-file members. According to rough statistics, there are altogether over 300,000 Party cadres serving as county Party committee members and above. The quality of their work has a vital bearing on the Party's cause. These cadres, more than other Party members, should learn never to become separated from the masses, become complacent, or fear difficulties; they should always readily accept criticism from below, ceaselessly improve their work, and patiently educate those working under their leadership through their personal example.

It would be superfluous to note that since the Seventh Congress, especially since 1949, the number of Party cadres has increased enormously. Nevertheless, there is a universal feeling that there are still not enough. This shows there are still serious defects in the process of selecting and promoting cadres. Chief among these is that even today many comrades only use "seniority" as the criterion for selection. Older Party members with a rich store of experience are undoubtedly a valuable asset to the Party. But we should be making a very serious mistake if we set store by this asset to the exclusion of everything else, because our revolutionary cause is developing all the time and the number of cadres required is constantly increasing, while the number of old Party members is inevitably on the decrease. Given this fact, if we do not resolutely employ and put our trust in carefully selected
new cadres, it would only bring harm to the cause of the Party and the people.

In order to keep up with the rapid development of this cause, one of the Party’s important tasks is to train and promote large numbers of new cadres and help them familiarize themselves with their work and build a comradely relationship with the older cadres, a relationship of unity and solidarity and of learning from one another. The Party must pay particular attention to training cadres to master production techniques and various branches of professional knowledge, because cadres with such qualifications are the basic force for the building of socialism. In all localities our Party must train native cadres who are familiar with local conditions and have close ties with the people. In minority nationality areas the Party must do its utmost to train cadres belonging to the nationalities there. It should firmly resolve to train and promote women cadres, helping and encouraging them to continuously advance, since women form one of the greatest reservoirs of Party cadres.

In the Party’s administration of cadres an important improvement in the last few years has been the division of administration according to rank and department, which co-ordinates administration with political and professional inspection and supervision. The Party should try to further improve its administration work in this direction, so that cadres at all posts and in all departments will be under the careful supervision of the Party and receive concrete help from it and they will keep improving themselves. This is also an essential prerequisite for a steady rise in the quality of all Party members.

VI

With regard to the organizational structure of the Party, the draft Party Constitution, besides giving the Party congresses from county level upwards a fixed term of office and abolishing the Party conferences which were provided for at all levels under the existing Constitution, contains a number of other new provisions. These provisions concern the central organizations, local organizations, primary organizations, control organs, and the Party’s relationship with the Communist Youth League. In connection with these provisions, only a few brief explanations are needed.

In the section dealing with the central organizations, the draft provides that the Central Committee, which elects the Political Bureau, shall also elect a Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, which shall take over the role formerly filled by the Secretariat, a role that has proved both necessary and
expedient by the long experience of our Party. The Central Committee will also elect the Secretariat, which in future will attend to the day-to-day work of the Central Committee under the direction of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. The pressure of Party and government work has proved too much for the existing central organs. Hence the Central Committee finds it essential to set up an additional central organ. It further finds it necessary to have a number of vice-chairmen and a general secretary; the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Central Committee will concurrently be the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Political Bureau.

In the section dealing with local Party organizations, the draft spells out the system to be followed for Party organizations of the province, autonomous region, municipality directly under the central authority, autonomous chou, county, autonomous county and municipality. In view of the increasingly complicated work of the leading bodies of local Party organizations, the draft provides that a standing committee and a secretariat be set up under the Party committee of each of these organizations. In order to reduce the number of organizational levels, the draft provides that regional committees may be established to serve as the representative bodies of provincial or autonomous region committees and that district committees may be established to serve as the representative bodies of the Party committees for municipalities directly under the central authority, other municipalities, counties or autonomous counties. Actually, in certain provinces some of the regional committees and district committees in rural areas have already been abolished.

The membership in the primary Party organizations ranges from a minimum of three to a total of almost ten thousand, making it necessary to allow the greatest flexibility in their organizational structure. The draft divides primary Party organizations into three categories: one, primary organizations each with a hundred or more Party members, which may set up primary Party committees, each with a number of general branches or branches under them; two, primary organizations each with fifty or more members, which may set up general branch committees, each with a number of branches under them; and three, primary organizations each with fewer than fifty members, which may set up branch committees. In addition, the draft contains certain other provisions conducive to flexibility. In the course of implementation, the three forms mentioned above may not be found entirely suitable for some situations, and in such circumstances the competent Party committees can regard these as special cases and deal with them as they see fit.

With regard to the tasks of the primary organizations, fairly compre-
hensive provisions are made to suit current conditions. The draft stipulates that primary Party organizations in enterprises, villages, schools and army units should guide and supervise the work of the administrative bodies and mass organizations in their respective units. It points out that primary Party organizations in public institutions and organizations should keep watch over the ideology of all Party members in the said institutions and organizations and that they should report without delay any shortcomings in the work to the administrative chiefs of the given units and to higher Party organizations. Up to now, however, many primary Party organizations have failed to carry out these tasks.

Inasmuch as primary organizations form the basic links between the Party and the masses, an important political task of the Party's leading bodies is to constantly check and help improve their work. In both urban and rural areas, however, there are many leading bodies that busy themselves assigning one task after another to primary organizations but seldom check up on how these organizations are doing their work or give Party members of these organizations any concrete explanations or help. All Party committees directly responsible for leading primary organizations should, in accordance with the Constitution, carry out extensive education among these organizations and at the same time draw the necessary conclusions as to how to improve their leadership over them.

To set up and strengthen the control organs of the Party at different levels is a matter of great importance for the struggle against unhealthy tendencies within the Party. Although it was only after the National Party Conference in March 1955 that the Central Control Commission and local control commissions at different levels were established on the basis of the former discipline inspection commissions, the work of these control commissions has already proved effective. The draft defines the tasks of the control organs and the relationship between higher and lower control commissions. The control commissions should not confine themselves to dealing with individual cases as they arise, but should work actively to find out how the Party Constitution, Party discipline, communist ethics and state laws and decrees are being observed by Party members. To this end, the Party committees at different levels must ensure that the control commissions are adequately staffed and must give them constant and vigorous support.

Ever since its establishment the Communist Youth League has shown that it is the Party's reliable reserve force as well as its capable assistant. When the League organization was restored in 1949, it was known as the China New-Democratic Youth League. Since then its membership has grown to 20,000,000, and the League's enthusiastic activities can be seen on all fronts.
In view of the progress of socialist transformation in our country and the spread of communist education among the youth of China, the Central Committee of the Youth League has decided to suggest to the League's forthcoming national congress that it be renamed the Communist Youth League of China. The Party Central Committee believes this is a correct decision. The draft Party Constitution sets forth the relationship between the Party and the Youth League, requiring Party organizations at all levels to pay close attention to the League's ideological and organizational work, to guide the League in imbuing all its members with communist spirit and educating them in Marxist-Leninist theory, to see that close contact is maintained between the League and the masses of young people, and to pay constant attention to selecting members for the League's leading core. The youth represent our future; it is they who will carry on all our undertakings. We therefore believe that Party organizations at all levels will spare no effort in carrying out these tasks.

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In the foregoing I have made some necessary remarks about the draft Party Constitution proposed by the Central Committee. The Central Committee believes that it suits our Party's present conditions and tasks.

The Central Committee also believes that the draft Party Constitution, after being discussed and adopted by the Eighth National Party Congress, will become a powerful instrument through which we shall be able to further raise the quality of the Party, broaden the scope of inner-Party democracy, bring into full play the political initiative of the Party membership, improve the Party's organizational work, and strengthen its solidarity and unity as well as increase its fighting capacity.

As I have said above, the draft Party Constitution does not differ in fundamental principle from the Constitution adopted by the Seventh Congress, and furthermore, it must be said that the fundamental spirit of the draft Constitution is just the logical development of the various principles laid down by the Seventh Congress to govern the Party's work. After thorough discussion the Seventh Congress made the correct decisions on such issues as the Party's mass line, democratic centralism, Party solidarity and unity, and the need to raise the standards of Party membership and protect members' rights. Thanks to these decisions our Party has become more dynamic and thriving in both its organizational work and political struggles since the Seventh Congress. The Party's organizational work ensured the fulfilment of its political tasks. In the eleven years between the Seventh and
Eighth Congresses our Party’s organizational strength has grown rapidly, its ties with the masses have been greatly extended and strengthened, inner-Party activities have become increasingly energetic, the Party’s ranks have become more closely united than ever before and, consequently, the Party’s cause has scored greater achievements than ever before.

We have made some mistakes and encountered danger in our work, and there are still shortcomings and difficulties to be overcome, but none has been, or ever will be, cause for alarm in our Party. On the contrary, our Party maintains boundless confidence in itself and the courage to correct mistakes, overcome danger, remove shortcomings, surmount difficulties and work for greater victories.

Our Party owes its victories, first and foremost, to the people’s trust and support as well as to the perseverance of the entire Party membership. We shall cherish with everlasting gratitude the memory of the martyrs who laid down their lives for the Party’s cause.

Our Party also owes its victories to the leading cadres of Party organizations at all levels, particularly to the leader of our Party, Comrade Mao Zedong.

Now our Party is confronted with new and formidable tasks. We must accomplish the great task of socialist transformation, fulfil the First Five-Year Plan for the development of our national economy ahead of schedule and then surpass it, and actively prepare to carry out the Second Five-Year Plan, in order to bring about a great advance in the development of industry, agriculture, communications, transport and commerce, promote scientific and cultural work, and raise the living standards of the people to a new level. We must liberate Taiwan. We must actively contribute to the preserving of world peace. To be ready for such great tasks, we must do our utmost to further consolidate our Party and cement the ties between our Party and the people.

The Communist Party of China, which is built and developed on Marxist-Leninist principles and which has ceaselessly improved its organization and work through practice and strengthened its ties with the masses, will certainly be able to accomplish, in solidarity and unity, the glorious tasks the people have entrusted to it.
INTEGRATE MARXISM-LENINISM WITH THE CONCRETE CONDITIONS OF CHINA

November 17, 1956

Some of our friends have raised the following questions: What do the Chinese Communist Party members mean to do? Who decides which of the classic international principles of communism are applicable to China?

My friends, if you want to obtain a detailed answer to the first question, you could consult the Party Constitution adopted at the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, or, to be specific, the General Programme and the chapter on Party membership in the Constitution. The "Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China" can also help to clarify it. If what the Party members mean to do or their tasks are put in a nutshell, there are just two: serve the people wholeheartedly and put the interests of the people first in doing everything. The aim of every Party member is the realization of socialism and communism. Following Marxist-Leninist principles, China first had to accomplish a bourgeois democratic revolution. Following this step, China now is building socialism and then, in future, advance from socialism to communism. In this way the Chinese people will be guided to a society utterly free from exploitation and oppression, in which to build a happy life under communism. These are what the Chinese Communist Party members mean to do or their tasks. Of course, not all or even most of the 11 million members of the Chinese Communist Party measure up to such a high standard. The Party's task is to gradually enhance the political awareness of its members, so that they can be Communists worthy of the name in both thought and deed. The Chinese Communist Party takes this as its regular task. A great many members of the Chinese Communist Party have a peasant family background since a large number of people who joined the Party shortly after it was founded were peasants. They joined because they wanted to fight imperialism and feudalism and obtain land. It could be said that in the beginning they

Answers to questions raised by an international youth delegation.

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wanted democratic revolution, not socialism. Take agricultural co-operation, for example. It was through education and actual practice that they gradually came to demand it. Now most of the peasants have explicitly chosen to follow the socialist road and called for the co-operative transformation of agriculture. Therefore, we cannot expect Party members to come up to the required standard overnight. A Communist Party member is, first, an ordinary person and, second, a more advanced ordinary person. However, there are also Party members who are lagging behind the ordinary people.

Who decides which of the classic international principles of communism are applicable to China? The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held 11 years ago, laid down the following principle: we shall integrate the universal truth of Marxism and Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution as a guide for our country's revolution and development. This principle, formulated by our Party and Comrade Mao Zedong on the basis of the experience of failure and success in revolution, was affirmed at the Seventh and Eighth Party Congresses. Naturally this is just a principle and many specific problems may still crop up when it is put into practice. A country has to confront many types of problems. Whether it be during times of revolution or economic development, integrating Marxism-Leninism with the specific conditions of the time is a question that requires a constant search for solution. This question should be discussed and solved at Party congresses. When the congress is not in session, it is up to the Party Central Committee to deliberate and decide on it. Once a decision has been made, we need Party members to carry out the decision in practice, so first of all, tens of hundreds or even hundreds of thousands of backbone members will need to have a good grasp of the principle before it can be implemented.

The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism must be integrated with the concrete practice of a country — a formulation which is itself a universal truth. It embraces two aspects — universal truth and the integration of that truth with a country's concrete conditions. We have consistently held that neither aspect can be ignored. It is the view of our Chinese Communist Party that the universal truth includes abolishing feudalism and capitalism and realizing socialism, to be followed by communism. Can we do without taking the socialist road? No, we cannot. If we deviate from this universal truth and give up our efforts to establish socialism, the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party would have no need to exist. How then can China abolish feudalism and capitalism and realize socialism and communism at an earlier date? We have to study the characteristics of our own country. Otherwise, if we mechanically copy the experience of other countries, this
universal truth will not be realized in China. You, my friends, must have learned about China's socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce in the various places you visited. This is a case of integrating the universal truth with the concrete conditions of China. The universal truth calls for abolishing capitalism and exploitation, and realizing socialism. If we depart from it, socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce would be out of the question, and we shall find ourselves on the capitalist, not the socialist, road. This is one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is that the road we are taking today, namely, transforming capitalist industry and commerce, is the one which Lenin had in mind but was unable to take. We have chosen the peaceful transformation of capitalist industry and commerce. Experience has shown that in so doing our production has not been impaired but, rather, expanded and we have not only eliminated capitalism but educated the bourgeoisie as well. It has proved to be a good method. If the universal truth had not been integrated with the concrete conditions of China or had been poorly integrated, we would have suffered great losses. The same is true in the socialist transformation of agriculture and in all other fields of our endeavour as well.

On the question of integrating the universal truth with concrete practice, our Party suffered a great deal in the past. That is why we have been concentrating on combatting subjectivism, which has two aspects: dogmatism and empiricism. Dogmatists only know Marxist-Leninist phrases and do not apply them in the light of concrete conditions. This practice led to defeats and setbacks in our revolution. Empiricists only lay stress on concrete practice or the experience of a given time or place of a country, ignoring Marxist-Leninist principles. We oppose both.

I should like to make one more point for our friends. In our experience we have found that it is no easy job to integrate the universal truth with concrete conditions. The Chinese Communist Party also makes mistakes every now and then. Nevertheless, we closely examine the causes of these mistakes and try to correct them without delay. As Chairman Mao said, just as a man should wash his face regularly and a house should often be cleaned, a political party should constantly correct its mistakes. I myself often make mistakes; everybody does. Chairman Mao often says that he, too, makes mistakes from time to time, but we all know he makes fewer mistakes than we do. Everyone makes mistakes; the person who does not make any is nonexistent.
OUR CHIEF TASK AHEAD IS BUILDING UP THE COUNTRY

April 8, 1957

We were engaged in revolution during the earlier period. As of last year, when we basically completed the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce, we fulfilled our revolutionary tasks by and large. What are our future tasks? Besides just a few tasks left over from the revolution, the chief task for the future is building up the country. The task set forth at the Eighth National Congress of our Party was to bring into play all positive factors and all possible forces in striving to make our country a great industrial socialist country. This will be our task for a very long time to come. No one knows how long it will take us to accomplish the task. Building up China will be, if not more difficult, at least as difficult as making revolution, with which we became very familiar. As far as development is concerned, our entire Party is still learning, with a great deal we still do not know. No one would say we were not capable of making revolution, now that we have succeeded in it. But we are not sure how well we will do at building up the country.

It cannot be denied that our achievements of the past few years in all fields, including national reconstruction, were great. Our country has indeed undergone rapid development and taken on a new look. I visited Xi'an towards the end of 1952, but the city of that time bore no comparison to the city of today, where many modern industrial enterprises have been established, as is true of other big cities. Last year we accomplished many things, but some were overdone or done impetuously. As a result, we have somewhat lost the initiative today and perhaps we shall not regain it in the near future. In general, however, last year's achievements were remarkable. Last year socialist transformation was basically completed, capital construction underwent rapid development and, thanks to the success of co-operative transformation, agriculture easily made it through the famine caused by

Excerpt from a report delivered at a meeting of cadres in Xi'an.
serious crop failures. In short, we have achieved a lot over the past few years, and it would be wrong not to recognize this.

However, under no circumstances should we exaggerate our achievements or regard our accomplishments as superb. This simple way of thinking has been reflected in our propaganda work, and every endeavour in the country is described as successful as could be, as if we had no difficulties whatsoever now and there were nothing for us to do except enjoying a happy life. Some cadres think that having devoted themselves to the revolution for so many years and now that the country has been built up, it is time to satisfy their own needs. As a matter of fact, we still have many difficulties and we are confronted with problems which are more complex than those of the past. We should recognize that despite the great achievements — industrial and agricultural production has grown rapidly, a preliminary foundation has been laid for industrial development and many enterprises have been established — our country is still poor and backward. It will take a long time and strenuous efforts to turn such a poor and backward country as China into an advanced, industrial, socialist country. That is to say, we must learn to build up the country through thrift and hard work, because we are too poor to do otherwise. Given this poverty, our country will never prosper if we do not learn how to build up the country through thrift and hard work. Our Party and the Chinese people have proved highly capable in class struggle in the past. This explains why we succeeded in the revolution. On the whole, our Party and cadres have learned the science of class struggle, but they know little or nothing about the science of transforming nature. Of course, we do have some talented people, but they are too few in number to meet our needs. China's scientific and technological level is still very low. The work of development in the past few years had demonstrated our lack of knowledge and proved that we have not learned how to build up the country through thrift and hard work. Chairman Mao said it took us more than twenty years to learn how to make revolution, during which time major mistakes were made. These years refer to the period from 1921, when the Party was founded, to 1945, when the Party's Seventh National Congress was held. Of course, as far as the Central Committee is concerned, it solved the question of how to make revolution at the Zunyi Meeting. In the 24 years from 1921 to the convening of the Party's Seventh National Congress, our Party made Right opportunistic mistakes once and "Left" opportunistic mistakes three times. The "Left" opportunistic mistakes made the third time practically ruined our entire revolutionary force — 90 per cent of the revolutionary base areas collapsed, which was disastrous and cost us dearly. Chairman Mao wondered if we could carry out economic development
within a period shorter than twenty-odd years and avoid making major mistakes and suffering serious setbacks. He implies that if we do not proceed cautiously, we may make major mistakes and suffer serious setbacks in development as well. For a socialist country to make major mistakes and suffer serious setbacks in development is not without precedent. Therefore, it is unrealistic for us to believe that we shall not suffer this fate; we shall if we do not study hard and review our experience.

Is it possible for us to build up our country in a relatively short period of time without making major mistakes or suffering serious setbacks? I should say yes, it is, because we have conditions favourable to development, with fewer impediments than the Soviet Union had after the October Revolution. First, the international situation is in our favour. Second, we have the experience of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries to go by. The fact that we have been able to go fast in our development over the past few years is partly due to Soviet experience and assistance. Of course, that is not to say that all of the Soviet Union’s assistance has been efficient in all respects. Generally speaking, if it were not for their help, we would not have been so successful. We should continue to learn from the Soviet Union and know what to learn. To learn from the successes of the Soviet Union does us much good, as does drawing lessons from the mistakes it has made. We should make good use of the experience and lessons of the Soviet Union, so as to avoid losses. Of course, we should also learn from all the advanced experience of all the other countries in the world, including the United States. But we must first learn from the Soviet Union, because only the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries are assisting us, whereas the United States has imposed an embargo on us.

We ourselves have also gained some experience in managing our own development over the slightly more than seven years since we embarked on it. In some areas, such as the northeast, we began even earlier. Our experience of the past few years is also of great importance and should not be downplayed. We have blazed our own trail, and if we truly learn from our experience, it will be of even greater benefit to us. In the development of these years we have been quite successful, but we have made more than a few mistakes as well. We should learn from both our successes and our mistakes, and learn to profit from our own experience as well as that of other countries.

The international and domestic situation is in our favour. What we must do now is to take advantage of the situation, accomplish more with less money, constantly analyse our experience, add to our achievements, overcome our shortcomings and avoid major mistakes. The key to our success lies in the Party leadership. In the past our success in revolution hinged on Party
leadership, the same is true of our success in economic development today. In other words, successful development depends on whether the Party is good at learning (if it is, it will avoid major mistakes and get more done on less money), and whether the Party relies on the masses and constantly works to root out subjectivism, bureaucratism, sectarianism and, in particular, dogmatism from its ranks. During the revolutionary years, subjectivism, bureaucratism and sectarianism estranged us from reality and the masses, and in the course of economic development they can do the same, making it impossible for us to build up the country through thrift and hard work, and to bring into play all positive factors in our effort to make development a success.

We have made great stride in development over the past few years. The work of all political parties and all the people across the land has been fruitful, as has been the work done by us Communists. This is the principal aspect of our work that we must recognize first, for if we ignore this, we may become frustrated. At the same time, however, we should recognize that serious shortcomings have arisen in the course of development. Tendencies towards subjectivism, which ignores reality, and, in particular, towards dogmatism occurring over the past two years call for close attention. For example, some of our comrades tend to go in for new and large projects. Such formalistic mentality, divorced from reality, has cost us much. Do we need new and large projects? Certainly. Projects such as the Anshan Iron and Steel Complex and some of the large enterprises in Xi'an constitute the backbone of our economic development. Without these new projects and the development of such key enterprises it would be impossible for us to solve the problems connected with more advanced technologies. In future, more new and large enterprises will be established. However, not every enterprise has to be new and large, nor should we assume that being new or large is necessarily a good thing. As far as form is concerned, it is indeed necessary. We should pay close attention to form whenever possible, but we should not allow this to degenerate into formalism, wasting state funds for the sake of form or stressing the importance of form at the expense of our work.

At present, our enterprises, especially the large ones financed by the central authorities, have wasted too much money. If we managed things correctly, it should have been entirely possible to save a great deal by spending less money to set up new enterprises of the same size equipped with the same level of technology. Some of our enterprises are very large, covering a vast area, with a huge area in front of the factory and an office building besides the factory itself. Can they not do without these extras? Can they not direct production under simpler conditions? A lot of money has been spent improperly. Some central enterprises have taken the lead by giving a
massive appearance, erecting impressive name signs and behaving like pampered princes, exerting a bad influence on some local industries. For example, when a coal mine was operated by the provincial authorities, the costs were low, but after it was handed over to the Central Coal Administration, the costs went up considerably. When the mine is run by the local authorities, its accounts are well kept, but once it is brought under the control of the central authorities, nobody calculates the costs of production on the grounds that it does not matter much if the mine is running at a loss, since the state can compensate for the loss. Such things do not happen in the Soviet Union or in the United States, France or other capitalist countries. Even the Kuomintang did not dare to behave this way. Although it had many corrupt officials, the Kuomintang managed enterprises better than we do. Many of the national capitalists in China have made their fortunes through hard work, and they are doing better at running enterprises than we do. When I came here last time, I heard that there were 13 joint state-private factories whose workshops and workers' living quarters were old and whose directors lived in humble houses. I suggested that the Xi'an Municipal Party Committee organize a visit to those factories for comrades of the state-run enterprises. I also suggested that comrades of the Provincial Party Committee visit Shanghai, where some enterprises with economical and practical facilities really owe their success to their hard work. Such a visit may help you change your way of thinking, because these enterprises have a wealth of valuable experience for you to emulate. People managing large enterprises, those managing the central ones in particular, should take care not to be rash and go in for new, large projects and stateliness in disregard of China's reality. They should do things simply and economically, practising economy and working hard with perseverance. In my opinion, economy can be truly practised only under socialism. In Lanzhou I visited a factory where everything was very simple, including its equipment and the director's office, yet the factory turned out quite good products. Of course, I am not suggesting that all enterprises follow this example, except that this spirit is worth emulating.

There are also many problems in city planning. Planning is a necessity; it would be improper for us not to do it. The problem is how. In planning, too, we must adopt a correct guiding concept, because improper planning may lead to enormous waste. It is said that the urban plan for Xi'an has already accounted for all the space in the city. In fact, there is still plenty of empty space and nobody knows when it will be filled. I have noticed that the workshops of some cotton mills and factories of the Second Ministry of Machine-Building Industry are located quite far from each other. As the mills and factories cover large areas, a lot of money has to be spent for their
Where the “bone” projects and the “flesh” projects are concerned, we have been building new, large “flesh” projects, too. It is true that in the past we did not pay enough attention to the “flesh” projects when making city plans, failing to set up enough service trades, such as stores and barbershops, as we should have. This question must be solved now; it would be inappropriate not to solve it, for this is a question related to the system. However, it must be emphatically pointed out that although a large amount of money was allocated for such projects, the money was inappropriately used. From now on, we should build more projects with less money. As far as the central authorities are concerned, they have failed to pay enough attention to “flesh” projects; the local authorities, for their part, should pay more attention to using their money appropriately, I am afraid. On this visit I have gone to many places and noticed that in some of them a lot of money was spent on nothing. To be frank, Lanzhou made a better impression on me than Xi’an. I saw a lot of simple facilities in Lanzhou. For example, theatres there also serve as cinemas with quite comfortable seats. It took only one hundred thousand yuan, and sometimes even less, to build such a theatre. As a matter of fact, building one less large, elegant theatre will make it possible for us to build many smaller, simpler ones that are laid out more proportionately in the city. As ours is a large country, we do need some marvelous facilities to demonstrate the new look of the country. I am not totally against this, but such facilities should not be too great in number. I feel that we already have too many of them, and we should definitely stop setting up any more. As long as we bear this in mind and build more simpler facilities, we shall be able to solve the question of “flesh” projects and spend our money on the badly needed projects, such as sewers. In Xi’an there are more than a few cinemas and theatres, but none is in the industrial district, so that those who want to see plays have difficulty finding a theatre, and where theatres are located, there are few patrons. The layout of theatres is obviously irrational. There are many simple shops in the Chenghuangmiao area of Xi’an; why not have more “Chenghuangmiaos” in the industrial district? Are people not complaining that transportation represents a large problem? If our urban facilities are laid out properly, that is, if we are to set up more simple stores and barbershops in densely populated areas, the traffic problem will be solved. Where there are people, there is a need for schools. Building fewer large schools will make it possible for us to build more smaller ones. In short, these are all questions concerning the guiding concept of city planning and the guiding concept for handling the relationship between the “bone” projects and the “flesh” projects.
The guiding concept for our economic development should consist of the following:

First, to face up to the actual conditions of the country. We should never divorce ourselves from China's actual conditions. What is dogmatism? It is divorce from reality. Experience is a good thing, but it can turn into a bad thing if we learn the wrong lessons from it. A lot of the experience of the Soviet Union is good, but it would be disastrous if we emulate it in a dogmatic way. We must not forget for a moment the fact that ours is a poor country beset with difficulties. It is precisely because we are poor that we emphasize the need to increase production and practise economy. We must face up to the actual conditions of the country and take economy, practicality and attractiveness into account in the course of development. Premier Zhou Enlai talked about this question as early as in 1953. Some comrades stress the need of attractiveness, which is good, of course; everybody likes attractive things. However, it should not be over emphasized at the expense of economy and practicality, or without regard to what is actually possible. It is all right if something is not very attractive. We can take care of that in future, when we are rich enough, but for now we should concentrate on economy and practicality.

Second, to face the needs of the masses. We tend to neglect the needs of the masses when considering things. There are different views prevalent today. People are pursuing a variety of "-izations", including communization, to the neglect of the needs of the masses. Instead of trying to solve easy problems, they spend money where they should not. They do not pay enough attention to solving the problems of concern to the masses that can be solved with a small amount of money or even without spending any money. We should consider the needs of the masses in the course of development, finding out what their problems are and helping them solve these problems. We should do the same when we build schools, set up cultural and recreational centres, and solve problems in the relationship between the "bone" projects and the "flesh" projects.

It should be noted that in the past our Party was successful in leading economic development, but it has slackened its efforts over recent years, spending money in disregard of the country's actual conditions and the masses' needs. In addition, our propagandists are always saying that our country is very beautiful and wealthy. Some students and young workers are creating disturbances because they think the state had done too little to satisfy their needs and has been unfair to them. Some cadres share their sentiments. After working in the city, they are unwilling to go down to the countryside. Our country is poor, but people are trying to make it appear very rich.
Therefore, I suggest that simple facilities be set up purposefully in the neighbourhood of high buildings here in Xi'an, which may help educate the young. In short, in economic development we must not divorce ourselves from reality and the actual living standards of the masses. Looking back on our past, I should say that first, our achievements have been great and we should do even better tomorrow; and second, mistakes are unavoidable. This is not meant as negative criticism, so do not feel disheartened. Those mistakes cannot be blamed on any one individual; the central authorities should be the first to blame. We have spent money to gain experience, experience that is rather dear. We shall have to do it in future, but we should try to buy much more experience with much less money.
THE COMMUNIST PARTY MUST ACCEPT SUPERVISION

April 8, 1957

The Party and Party members should be subject to supervision, a point which was emphasized at the Party's Eighth National Congress. Recently Chairman Mao stressed in particular that a set of rules and regulations should be formulated for the convenience of supervision. He said that we should allow others to challenge us with opposing views, because this is better than acting alone. Our Party is the ruling party and enjoys high prestige. A good many of our cadres hold leading posts. In China who is in a vulnerable position to make big mistakes? None other than the Chinese Communist Party. When it makes such mistakes, the effects are most widespread, so the Party should be particularly careful. The Party's leadership position is stipulated in the Constitution. If the Party wants to exercise good leadership, it should constantly overcome subjectivism, bureaucratism and sectarianism, accept supervision and expand democracy within the Party and the state. If we do not accept supervision or work to expand democracy within the Party and the state, we shall surely cut ourselves off from the masses and make big mistakes. If we handle affairs behind closed doors, rest content with our long years of experience and refuse to listen with an open mind to opinions from the masses and non-Party people, we are most likely to become uninformed and consider problems in a one-sided way, thus inevitably making mistakes. That is why Chairman Mao has been repeatedly stressing this matter ever since our victory in the revolution. This shows his keen foresight.

The supervision I have just mentioned comes from three sources. First, supervision by Party organizations. As far as Party members are concerned, supervision by Party organizations is the most direct supervision. Stricter demands should be made on Party and Youth League activities; that is, the Party and Youth League organizations should exercise stricter supervision over their members respectively. Second, supervision by the masses. The

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Excerpt from a report delivered at a meeting of cadres in Xi'an.
masses' supervision over the Party and Party members should be expanded. Third, supervision by the democratic parties and democrats without party affiliation. It is also necessary to expand their supervision over the Communist Party and its members. With supervision from these sources, we shall become more prudent and better informed, and we can prevent ossified thinking and avoid being one-sided in our approach to problems. It is not good for Party members to be either too cautious or too bold. It is always better for them to stand in awe of the Party, the masses and the democratic parties; it is better to be ever prudent.

With regard to the masses, democracy should be expanded in all respects. We should see that the People's Congress and the Political Consultative Conference hold their sessions successfully. It is of great benefit to hold fruitful sessions of the people's congresses and political consultative conferences at all levels. The recent session of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was a success; the participants spoke out freely and put forward many useful suggestions. Democracy should also be expanded in the management of factories, mines and other enterprises. This was emphasized in the directive issued recently by the Central Committee on dealing with workers' and students' strikes. Workers' congresses should be instituted and their role strengthened — this requires expanded supervision by the masses in factories, mines and other enterprises. The resolution of the Party's Eighth National Congress touched only one aspect of the question, that is, the system of the factory director assuming full responsibility under the leadership of the Party committee. The recent directive on handling workers' and students' strikes stressed the other aspect — the system of supervision by the masses under the leadership of the Party committee. Now we have two systems: one, from the top, the system of the factory director assuming full responsibility under Party committee leadership, and the other, from the bottom, the system of supervision by the masses under Party committee leadership. Supervision by the masses is all for the good of leading comrades in factories, mines and other enterprises, making them act more prudently. Supervision by the masses can help arouse their initiative and encourage them to contribute many good suggestions. I have heard, however, that administrative leaders in quite a number of factories, mines and other enterprises are still not convinced why they should be supervised by the masses. They always seem to feel that, without supervision, they can issue orders at will and can act arbitrarily without hindrance. The fact that a considerable number of leading comrades remain unconvinced shows how essential and vital this supervision is. In rural areas we should also expand democracy, running co-operatives democratically. The tendency of
rural cadres towards authoritarianism stems from the undemocratic working style of leaders at higher levels. With rigid planning, compulsion is almost unavoidable. In Shanxi Province the peasants are complaining, saying, “You try to have a finger in every pie.” When we were in southern Shanxi, we found that the local authorities had decided that cotton plants be topped on the fifth day of the eighth lunar month, except those not up to the specified height. Cadres measured the plants in the cotton fields with rulers. Those who followed the instructions gathered only 300 kg of cotton per hectare, whereas those who did not follow the instructions gathered 375 kg. How can this be called a progressive measure? This is misuse of the Party’s prestige. The peasants had no alternative but to follow the Party’s call. If this sort of thing happens only occasionally, the masses can put up with us, but they will not if it goes on and on like that. Democracy should also be increased in schools. Trade unions of teachers and administrative staff as well as student unions should have roles to play so that the opinions of the teachers, administrative staff and students can all be heard. School leaders should try to solicit their opinions. Promoting democracy will not hamper unified leadership. Does our army not lay particular stress on centralism? We also practised democracy in fighting in the past. Did that hamper our unified command and leadership? Only by maintaining a strong unity between higher and lower levels can things be done easily. In fact, the masses are quite tolerant of difficulties and mistakes as long as they are involved in activities. Conversely, if we simply issue orders, they will be unhappy even if we handle matters correctly. Therefore, it is very important to broaden democracy in all endeavours and increase supervision by the masses.

The policy of “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” between the Communist Party and the democratic parties and that of “letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend” have already been explained by Chairman Mao, and I have nothing to add. I just want to say that quite a few people within our Party are not convinced about these policies and do not understand their advantages. These policies are extremely important to our country and highly advantageous to our Party and to the development of Marxism-Leninism. If we do not “let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend”, our thinking will become rigid and our Marxist theory will decline. Only by doing so, by enabling people to express their different views and argue, can we further develop Marxism and dialectical materialism. In this regard, Stalin made some mistakes, because the policy he formulated was too rigid and oversimplified. As a result, Marxism declined for a period of time in the Soviet Union. The policy of “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” has
the same advantages. It is better to have supervision than not and it is better to let everybody contribute ideas than to let only a few people do so. The Communist Party approaches problems from one angle, while the democratic parties approach problems and can contribute their ideas from a different angle. This will serve to bring up more problems and have them solved more comprehensively; it will facilitate decision making; the principles and policies thus formulated will be more appropriate; and even troubles that crop up can be remedied more easily. Therefore, we should all try to see the merit of these policies.

Is it not true that disturbances are now breaking out in some places? Is it not true that some people are advocating “greater democracy”? Some-how, some young people believe greater democracy can solve the problem. We are not in favour of having greater democracy. It can be prevented, provided there is “lesser democracy”. Without lesser democracy there would have to be greater democracy, because the masses need to find outlets for their anger. Our idea is to provide places for the masses to vent their anger, places for them to speak their mind and places to make appeals. The suggestions of the masses fall into the following categories: Some are reasonable and should be accepted and put into practice; it would be wrong to ignore them, which would be bureaucratic. Others may be basically reasonable, in which case the reasonable part should be put into effect and explanations offered concerning the part that cannot be put into effect. Still others may be totally unreasonable, in which case we should explain to the masses why. In brief, the masses should have plenty of opportunity to air their views, offer suggestions and give vent to their anger — at people’s congresses, political consultative conferences, workers’ congresses, students’ congresses, and so forth. Greater democracy can be avoided if there is lesser democracy. Nobody would demand greater democracy and no workers or students would go on strike once the masses have vented their anger and every effort has been made to solve their problems. We do not advocate greater democracy, for it is not a good thing. Hungary tried it, and it will take several years for it to recover. It is the people who have suffered. The same thing happened in Poland, and it will also take quite a long time for that country to recover. So, let us hope no greater democracy will be practised here. It is not worthy of emulation. However, since there will always be people guilty of gross bureaucratism, occasional disturbances are unavoidable. This still is no cause for alarm; in such situations we should just stay calm and try to face the masses, rely on them and explain things to them painstakingly. Then, disturbances will subside.

If we do what I have just said, our Party will be able to continue
exercising leadership and will not be overthrown, because we are among the masses, not being sectarian in relation to them and non-Party people, not being bureaucratic towards the masses, or being subjectivistic in handling matters. If our Party was able to exercise good leadership in the past, it will be able to do so in the future as well. Whether the Communist Party possesses the qualifications to exercise leadership depends on the Party itself. Whether other people recognize our qualification is another story, but even if they do not, it is no cause for alarm. We would be qualified even if they don't think so, just as we would not be qualified even if they think we are. In the final analysis, this depends on ourselves. Does the Communist Party have the ability to lead the schools at the present time? And what about science? I am afraid that at present it is not capable yet. In Chairman Mao's words, it is able, and at the same time unable, to exercise such leadership. As to the Party's political leadership, which is laid down in the Constitution, it seems that it does not present a problem; but not all Party members are capable of that. If the Communist Party practises sectarianism, subjectivism and bureaucratism in leading others, it will be unable to exercise leadership no matter how much it says it can. Without correct methods and thinking, it cannot lead or rally the people around itself. Of course, the Party knows little about any one specific branch of science. Therefore, it should ally itself with others to do such work. In short, whether the Party is qualified for leadership depends on its thinking and work style.

So long as the Party and its members maintain close ties with the masses, accept their supervision, learn things with a modest attitude, do their work continually and conduct ideological and political work among the masses, our Party will undoubtedly be able to lead national economic development to success, just as it did the revolution in the past. It will also learn how to carry out development and manage the economy in a fairly short time in order to turn China from a backward agricultural country into an advanced industrial country.
CONGRATULATORY SPEECH DELIVERED
AT THE THIRD NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF THE NEW-DEMOCRATIC
YOUTH LEAGUE OF CHINA

May 15, 1957

Dear Deputies and Comrades,

Eight years have passed between the founding of the New-Democratic Youth League of China in 1949 and the convocation of the current Third National Congress. During these years the Youth League, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, has taken an active part in China's democratic revolution, socialist revolution and great socialist construction. Through its own work the Youth League has proved itself to be a standard bearer of the fine sons and daughters of the motherland and a capable assistant to the Party on all fronts. With the basic completion of socialist transformation, our motherland has now entered a new historic period, and the youth movement will also enter this period. As a symbol of this historic change, the New-Democratic Youth League of China will be renamed the Communist Youth League of China at the present Congress. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, I should like to extend the warmest congratulations to you.

Changing the name to the Communist Youth League for our advanced contingent of the youth not only brings radiant glory to the entire membership of the Youth League but also places an even more arduous task on the shoulders of the Chinese youth. This task is, under the leadership of the Party, to imbue the younger generation with the spirit of communism and unite all the young people to work enthusiastically for socialism in order to turn China into a great industrial socialist country in the shortest possible time and prepare the ground for the realization of communism in the future. Comrades, this will be our task for a long time to come, and it is not a bit easier or lighter than our revolutionary tasks were in the past. We should not fail to recognize that our country has been economically backward, vast
numbers of people still live in poverty, we are besieged by imperialist powers and we have numerous other difficulties. Unless we unite the people throughout the country and fully arouse their initiative, unless we work industriously and practise thrift, we cannot succeed in socialist construction. Faced with this arduous task, our Communist Youth League members must be utterly loyal to the motherland and the people, and stand together with the Party at the forefront of this great struggle, keeping close ties with all the people, including the youth, and persevering in a long-term, arduous struggle at their various posts.

Comrades, we cannot create a happy life under socialism without working very hard. We should participate in labour and, in particular, we should take an active part in the manual labour of industrial and agricultural production, because manual labour is the basis for the existence and development of society and is the glorious obligation of the overwhelming majority of people. The despising of manual labour, a vestige of the ideology of the exploiting classes, is an obstacle to the progress of our new society. To prove themselves worthy of the name of advanced Communist fighters, our Youth League members must combat views that belittle labour in general and manual labour in particular. Moreover, with their own exemplary deeds they should urge vast numbers of young people to join them at the forefront of manual labour. They should become a shock brigade on the labour front of socialist construction, one worthy of the people’s trust.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party hereby pays tribute to all youths on the industrial and agricultural production front. They are in the daring vanguard in building socialism in our country and creating a happy life for the people. We hope that they will exert great efforts to increase production and practise economy and splendidly accomplish their task. We hope that the youth and students throughout the country will study diligently, preparing to participate in productive labour, primarily in manual labour, for national development. Young people engaged in mental work should also undergo a period of manual labour, which is essential to their all-round development, morally, intellectually and physically. Youth League cadres should not separate themselves from production activities unless it is necessary for them to do so; those who cannot take part in such activities should try to find time to do some manual labour. This is of great benefit in maintaining contact with the masses and tempering oneself.

In order to better fulfil socialist construction under the Party’s leadership, all members of the Chinese Communist Youth League should continually study hard. They should integrate their efforts to build up the country with their diligent study of Marxism-Leninism, enhancement of their under-
standing of communism, and elimination of the influence of bourgeo"ideology and all other erroneous ideas. They should work hard to master various skills and incessantly raise their educational, scientific and technological levels. Youth League members should inspire other young people to respect the older generation and learn all kinds of useful skills from them.

As close assistants to the Chinese Communist Party, members of the Communist Youth League should also learn how to rally the broadest possible masses of youth around them and march forward with them. They should not only know how to unite with advanced youth, but with all patriotic youth, including those not yet in favour of the communist way of looking at the world. Then they can all pull together to work for the cause of socialism in our country. The Communist Youth League should set right any sectarian tendencies in its own ranks that tend to separate it from the masses, and try its best to form a close association with all the patriotic youth of China and become their centre of strength. To attain this goal, it is definitely necessary to encourage modesty and combat conceit and complacency; every Youth League member must try to help others by all possible means, without worrying about his own loss. To be the first to bear hardship and the last to enjoy comfort is our credo.

Comrades, the task confronting you is extremely difficult, but the Chinese Communist Party firmly believes that the Youth League members and the rest of the youth of China will undoubtedly be able to surmount all the obstacles in their path to fulfil their glorious task with flying colours. This is because the youth of China have not only the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the support of the democratic parties and patriots without party affiliation, but also their own glorious revolutionary tradition. The youth of China performed their duties very well in the long years of revolutionary struggle of the past and in construction of recent years. They are not afraid of making sacrifices, they meet difficulty and hardship head-on, they love labour and are well-behaved. Our Communist Youth League members not only need to continue this glorious tradition but also develop it further under new historic circumstances. It should be noted that though the people who have grown up under favourable conditions following victory in the revolution are full of vigour and vitality, this generation also has its weaknesses. Many of them tend to regard things as very easy, try to shirk difficulty and are reluctant to bear hardship or do hard work. They sometimes make excessive and rash demands for better material benefits. The blame for this situation, however, lies not with the youth themselves, but with the Party and the League that have not explained things clearly enough to them. If we can improve ideological education of young people in future,
explaining to them clearly the actual conditions of the country and the only way to a bright future, encouraging healthy trends such as enthusiasm for hard work and combatting unhealthy trends such as selfishness, and make every effort to correct the errors of bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism in our work, we shall certainly be able to help the vast numbers of young people to conscientiously overcome their weaknesses so that they will courageously and happily take up their militant tasks.

Comrades, Comrade Mao Zedong once said, “We are now engaged in a great and most glorious cause, never undertaken by our forefathers.” The exemplary action and creative spirit of Youth League members will play an important role in this extremely great and glorious cause. If our youth want a brilliant page to be written for them in the annals of successes for socialist construction, they must be honest and diligent, guard against conceit and rashness, practise economy and industriousness, and unite all forces possible to create a happily life through hard work. We should draw on the advanced experience of the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies and on the strong points of people in countries all over the world. We should join with the people of the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, and with all the other peace-loving people of the world.

Work hard to build up our motherland!

Assiduously study Marxism-Leninism, study science, and acquire more general knowledge!

Long live the great unity of all the youth of China!

Long live the great unity of peace-loving youth all over the world!
At this meeting we should concentrate on discussing the question of primary and secondary schools. On the whole, efforts to make education universal and eliminate illiteracy are proceeding well, the work-study programme is being carried out vigorously and vocational secondary schools are developing rapidly. These are all good things which have only come about in the past few years. We should now review our experience, make appropriate adjustment and solve the problems which have arisen.

Making education universal and raising educational standards are the main issues needing to be addressed in the field of education. Our policy in this regard is that education should be made universal and educational standards raised and that we should not overemphasize one to the neglect of the other. If we only make education universal without raising educational standards, our science and culture cannot progress rapidly. If we only raise the standards of education without making it universal, the needs of the country in various spheres cannot be met. Socialist construction requires well-educated workers and all workers need to be educated. When education has been made universal and when the cultural and scientific level of the masses has been raised, there will be more inventions and innovations. We should adhere to the principle of “walking on two legs” at all times, raising the standards of education on the basis of making education universal, and making education universal under the guidance of the raising of standards.

Making education universal seems easy, but raising educational standards is difficult. Under no circumstances should we neglect the quality of instruction at vocational secondary schools. A few graduates from such schools should be able to go to colleges. It is impossible for vocational secondary schools to raise their standards of education if they still offer such

Speech at a meeting on education held by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC.
a small range of courses. Schools of all types which have already been built should not lower the quality of their instruction. Improving the quality of instruction is related to the number of students. Schools should make fullest use of instructional facilities to enroll more students, but the quality of instruction should not be lowered as a result. Schools which can both enroll more students and ensure the quality of instruction are the successful ones.

In carrying out the work-study programme, we should pay attention to the same things. The wording concerning work-study programme in the Sixty Articles on Working Methods is a careful one. According to the Articles, the work-study programme should not be implemented in all schools and only vocational secondary and technical schools are required to be self-supporting or partly self-supporting with their students participating in the work-study programme. The other schools are not required to do so. Only the students in these schools are required to take part in manual labour. Vocational secondary schools should definitely be carrying out work-study programmes. More vocational secondary schools should be set up in cities and quite a number of such schools can be partly or wholly self-supporting. Other schools should provide students with the opportunity to do manual labour. Manual labour is also a kind of training, a political and ideological course.

In considering this question, one must keep the three things in mind. First, it is essential for students to take part in labour. Second, the amount of labor should be appropriate. Third, the students are capable of doing labour. Secondary schools may, according to their current conditions, build small farms or small workshops where students can take turns working or have their students go to the countryside to work as their contribution to society. Taking part in labour should be included in the curriculum, with half a day set aside for labour every week. The main objective is to help students cultivate good work habits and strengthen their collective spirit. In addition, students can earn a little income through labour. With the money they earn, they can also help poor students. But we should not turn such a kind of labour into a profession, nor should we consider earning money as the sole purpose of labour. If we encourage the students to make money, they will be prone to compete in their own interests. It is impossible for secondary school students in the cities to carry out the work-study programme, because they are too young and they don't have many social connections that can help them find suitable work to do. Schools which are in a position to be partly or wholly self-supporting may undertake this programme provided that it doesn't interfere with the students' study. In a word, schools should ensure that the quality of their instruction is improved. Otherwise, they cannot be considered as successful ones.
The Chengdu Meeting decided not to reduce the total amount of educational funds and the portion allocated to each province. All provinces should try to accomplish more with their portion of the funds, but the quality of instruction is guaranteed. Equipment necessary for teaching should not be reduced. We should not exercise too strict control over the use of educational funds. One principle we should adhere to in economizing on educational funds is that the quality of instruction should not be affected as a result. If the quality of instruction is lowered, the consequences will be obvious in a few years when universities and colleges find it difficult to enroll enough students.

Close attention should be paid to the quality of teachers. The quality of teachers in institutions of higher learning and secondary schools should not be lowered. In recent years, a good many schools have been set up, which is a good thing. At the moment, there is no need to worry too much about whether the teachers in these schools are qualified or not. Adjustments and improvements can be made gradually. Of course, the establishment of so many vocational secondary schools raises the question as to how we should run the institutions of higher learning in the future. Some countries have suffered from the poor quality of primary and secondary schools. At any rate, we must ensure that we have quite a number of students who study the basic courses well. Otherwise, we shall suffer a lot in the future.

In publicizing the importance of the need to make education universal and raise educational standards, as Chairman Mao put it, we should be warm-hearted and cool-headed. The main thing we should do now is not to set targets but to take measures. So long as those measures are practicable, we shall not be labeled opportunists. The provincial government of Henan Province has planned to make primary school education universal in the province in one year and I think it is better to say in two years. It doesn't matter if this plan cannot be fulfilled in two years. It is nothing to be ashamed of and should not be considered as being opportunistic. We do not require all provinces to follow the example of Henan Province. So long as we are warm-hearted and take effective measures, it will be all right if we fulfil the plan a couple of years late.

The Ministry of Education should have the local authorities take charge of a fairly large part of primary and secondary schools. Each province is to decide how many schools it can administer in the light of its actual conditions. The Ministry of Education does not need to interfere in the matter. But it is responsible for teaching materials. It is inconceivable that our country has not a set of unified teaching materials for secondary schools. The Ministry of Education itself does not necessarily compile teaching
materials for primary and secondary schools; it can pool the efforts of various localities to do so. The Ministry of Education should work out ideas and plans with regard to the teaching materials and educational system. It should also grasp typical examples, review advanced experience and disseminate it. By so doing we can promote the development of education in our country.
CORRECTLY DISSEMINATE MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT

March 25, 1960

I have discussed the dissemination of Mao Zedong Thought in Shandong and Tianjin and later discussed the subject with other comrades of the central leading bodies. Yesterday I mentioned this matter to Chairman Mao and he agreed with the following views. First, the major problem at present is that Mao Zedong Thought has been vulgarized. Every success is being attributed to Mao Zedong Thought. For instance, when a shop does a greater volume of business, people say it is a development of Mao Zedong Thought, and Mao Zedong Thought is even said to be applicable to table tennis. Second, people say little about Marxism-Leninism. This tendency can be found to varying degrees in more than a few newspapers. Why do we need to raise this question? Because Mao Zedong Thought, if we understand it correctly, involves two aspects: one, upholding and safeguarding Marxism-Leninism, and the other, developing Marxism-Leninism. Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism are one and the same thing. Mao Zedong Thought not only adheres to the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, but also adds much new content to the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, we should not separate Mao Zedong Thought from Marxism-Leninism as if the two were different things. In disseminating Mao Zedong Thought, we must follow the directive of the Central Committee, attaching equal importance to “studying Marxism-Leninism” and “studying the works of Comrade Mao Zedong”. Of course, we may mention Mao Zedong Thought alone, but we should never forget the fundamental teaching, Marxism-Leninism.

Recently some comrades suggested that Mao Zedong Thought serve as the guide for the study of political economics. It is true that Comrade Mao Zedong has developed the theory on political economics. However, the theories of Marx and Engels or Capital should always be used as the guide

Excerpt from a speech given at the Tianjin Meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
for studying capitalism at its initial and developing stages, and Lenin's *Imperialism, the Final Stage of Capitalism* for studying imperialism. In the study of socialism, Lenin and Stalin as well as Comrade Mao Zedong have made important contributions to its development. Therefore, Mao Zedong Thought cannot be regarded as the sole guide for studying political economics. What if someone should ask you which works of Mao Zedong's would best serve as a guide for studying imperialism? It would be hard to give a definite reply. Of course, Comrade Mao Zedong has contributed to the exposition of imperialism, adding such ideas as the thesis that imperialism is a paper tiger. However, *Capital* and *Imperialism, the Final Stage of Capitalism* have already dealt with the basic theories concerning capitalism and imperialism. How to regard Mao Zedong Thought is a serious matter of principle. We should see to it that Mao Zedong Thought is not vulgarized, which would bring harm to ourselves and to the international communist movement.

The Central Committee has issued a directive concerning the dissemination of Mao Zedong Thought. It will issue another one when more material has been gathered. The banner of Mao Zedong Thought should be held aloft. However, if we lay stress on Mao Zedong Thought to the neglect of Marxism-Leninism, it may seem as if we are building it up, but we are actually diminishing its importance.

The question of collective leadership should also be discussed at appropriate meetings. Our Party practises collective leadership, and Comrade Mao Zedong is representative of this collective leadership and leader of our Party. His position and role are different from those of ordinary members of the collective leadership. However, we should never separate him from the Central Committee; we should regard him as a member of the Party's collective leadership and appraise his role in the Party in a realistic manner. Comrade Mao Zedong himself values collective leadership. He said yesterday that the wording used for the dissemination of Mao Zedong Thought should accord with reality lest it become untenable. We should disseminate Mao Zedong Thought in this spirit.
ENCOURAGE THOROUGH AND
METICULOUS WORK

October 23, 1961

Your present conference has been very successful. Comrade Hu Yaobang\textsuperscript{182} made a good summary of the work done by the Youth League over the past few years, and I agree with it. At a meeting of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee, I said that, on the whole, we had kept to the correct line in the past few years. We have achieved a great deal but also made many mistakes. We should draw lessons from our mistakes and take these lessons seriously. You are not being held responsible for the mistakes made in those years. Comrade Yaobang said that you should be held partly responsible for the tendency towards effecting a premature leap towards Communism.\textsuperscript{183} As the Youth League organizations at all levels have been working hard under the leadership of the Party committees at various levels over the years, as have all the Party organizations, it is not for you to bear the major responsibility for the mistakes and shortcomings. However, it will be to your benefit to look into them. Anyway, the Youth League should keep in mind the lessons drawn by the Party.

At this conference, you have had more discussions on how the Youth League should do its work, and some questions in this connection have been clarified. Now I should like to raise a question concerning the leadership of the Youth League. As has been done in the past few years and confirmed at this conference, the work of the Youth League organizations comprises no more than two aspects. One, under the leadership of the Party committees at the corresponding levels, to take an active part in various kinds of work of the Party and the state; two, do their own specific work. The Youth League should have its own system of leadership. This point was not made very clear in the past, and it is best to make it clear at this time. For instance, in carrying out a directive given by the Central Committee of the Youth

\textsuperscript{182} Talk given to the comrades attending a working conference of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League.
League, Youth League committees at various levels should consult with Party committees at the corresponding levels so that the latter can make unified arrangements as to when and how to implement this directive in light of local conditions. In this way the League's system of leadership can be combined with the Party's unified leadership.

The Youth League's system of leadership should not function entirely the same way as it did before. For instance, did the Youth League not independently issue calls to conduct nationwide movements? Yes, perhaps it did. Some calls issued in the past were necessary and we do not want to deprive the Youth League of the right to issue its own calls to the youth throughout the country. The question is when and how and on what matters to issue calls, and we should also examine which calls are correct and which are not. These questions should be considered not only by the League but also by the Party. For example, the Party once issued a call nationwide to experiment with high-yield farm plots, which was answered by organizations of the Youth League and of the Women's Federation, but the results were not satisfactory. We are all aware of this experience. Of course, you are not entirely to blame because you acted in response to the call of the Party. We have seen many such cases in recent years. In another example, the Youth League called on young people to plant trees, which was not a bad idea. The problem was that it was done only by Youth League members and, moreover, the Youth League organization did not provide effective leadership over this job. Consequently, the survival rate of saplings was very low, which should teach us a lesson. When newspapers for youth issue calls through editorials, these should not be general calls; they should also specifically tell young people the correct approach to carrying them out. In this way the calls may achieve good results. There are many things for which the Youth League can call on the youth to work hard. For instance, it should attend to the study of youth. Speaking of studying, compulsion used in the past should be abandoned, since it did not yield good results. In short, it should analyse what it has done in this area, and should not ignore the specific demands and problems of young people. So, it follows that the League has many things to do and should have its own sphere of responsibility. When it comes to work which should be done nationwide, the Central Committee of the Youth League should consult with the Party Central Committee. As to tasks to be fulfilled in a specific province, the provincial League committee should consult with the provincial Party committee. The purpose of this is to obtain their approval and support. If you can win their approval and support, you will be more successful in your work than if you do not. This is nothing new to you, I am sure.
What work should the Youth League do, then? Should it do more or less work? It should do more, of course. Should it play a greater or lesser role? It should play a greater role, without doubt. Should it do ideological work among more people or less people? It should do it among more people. Let's put it this way: If League members play an exemplary role in all fields of endeavour where a large number of older and younger people work together, we can consider that they have done more work, played a greater role and done ideological work among more people. In this way, you will exert an influence first of all on the young people and then on the older people.

Naturally this kind of work is not performed in an atmosphere bustling with activity. Such an atmosphere deserves careful analysis. Some people present here today have probably worked in the Taihang Mountains or in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan area. In the Hebei-Shandong-Henan area work was done in a much more exciting atmosphere than in the Taihang Mountains, where work was performed meticulously. Maybe, it would have been better if there had been a bit excitement in the Taihang Mountains. In the final analysis, however, the meticulous and thorough work there achieved great results and few soldiers deserted. Of course, it would be wrong to completely deny the need of a vigorous and dynamic atmosphere. However, we cannot be successful in our work if we only seek such an atmosphere to the neglect of thorough and meticulous work. The success of our cause invariably calls for elaborate care, without which we can accomplish nothing. Did the success of our cause come from the efforts of only a few inventive minds? We can say these people did make greater contributions to it than others and sometimes one person can play as great a role as many other people combined. In the final analysis, however, the completion of a task calls for the cumulative efforts of everyone; this is fundamental.

According to the interpretation given consistently by our Party and Chairman Mao, following the mass line means following the principle “from the masses, to the masses”, concentrating the ideas of the masses and seeing to it that the correct ones are translated into action by the masses. This means correctly reflecting the opinions of the masses before exercising correct leadership over them. Since the Party’s correct line and policies come from the ideas of the masses, reflect the demands of the masses, accord with their actual situation and are therefore realistic, they can be accepted by the masses and can mobilize them, and the Party can, in turn, guide the masses in their actions. This is what following the mass line means. It involves the use of various forms, including a bustling atmosphere. We are not going to do away with such an atmosphere. For instance, we are soon going to begin a movement against backdoor dealings in the commercial sphere. The number
of petty thieves and young hoodlums has been increasing lately, and this
problem cannot be solved without carrying out a movement. Instead of being
lenient, we should be strict in handling cases of backdoor dealings. We should
say that our social conduct was excellent before 1959, for which foreigners
praised us and we ourselves were proud. In the past two years, however,
things have changed. This shows that as soon as we slacken our efforts, evil
trends will crop up. So we cannot deny the need of a proper atmosphere for
a certain length of time in which we can crack down an evil trend and
perform a task successfully. Such an atmosphere is needed to solve nationwide
problems and problems in an area or city as well. But in following the mass
line, we should not rest content with this one method; the main thing is to
do constant and thorough work, explaining things to people. We should do
this work bit by bit before scoring magnificent achievements. Therefore, we
must be a little more thorough in our work. From the history and traditions
of our Party we can see that the Party has made use of this method in its
work, but in essence it has been concentrating on doing a thorough job in
the light of actual conditions. Why have we been so successful in our past
work in the countryside? It was precisely because we did thoroughgoing work
there. We were even able to accomplish some things without issuing a call
through the newspapers. We were successful in the movement to ban
opium-smoking and opium trade, in agrarian reform\textsuperscript{122} and in suppression of
counter-revolutionaries,\textsuperscript{146} all without making use of the newspapers. We did
all this by making the movements known to every household and individual.
This method of spreading the news by word of mouth brought about an
atmosphere and called for most meticulous work. So what we actually did
was meticulous and thorough work. We should do meticulous work in all
fields of endeavour — in ideological work among the people, in all trades
and professions, in agricultural and industrial production, and in the running
of schools. We should do our work mostly among the masses — living,
pursuing various activities, chatting and playing chess with them while doing
ideological work among them. We cannot put on airs as Party and League
members. This will be difficult, making it harder than ever to do our work
meticulously. Of course, the easiest way would be to hold meetings, issue
general calls and create excitement by beating drums and gongs, but how
much can we achieve in this way?

We should focus on day-to-day work. Is the shock role of youth still
needed, then? Youth still do have this role to play. Can we ask them to play
such a role? Yes, I think so. But we needn’t ask them to do it too often.
When faced with a new, urgent and difficult task, a factory may wish to
organize a youth shock team to help accomplish it. In such cases, I would be
in favour of it. We have never objected to such a practice; in fact, we believe it is an effective way for young people to do their part. In agricultural production I think it is a good thing, not a bad thing, to organize a youth shock team to tackle a difficult problem. The question is how properly to make use of such teams. In other words, they should be used only when it is truly necessary, not in just any kind of work.

Many things need to be done in society, and so there are many things for the Youth League to do. In recent years we have been getting the feeling that bourgeois ideology and the dregs of society invariably try to worm their way to the surface. It seems we are not sure of ourselves when we speak nowadays because we have failed to provide the people with good food, clothing and shelter. Besides, in the past we boasted and exaggerated a bit too much and made “Left” errors in some movements. This is a problem with both the Party and the Youth League. Now that we have become alive to all this, we should have confidence in ourselves and improve our work. Are there not some young people involved in the growing number of hoodlums and backdoor dealings in the shops that I mentioned earlier? Public places such as the Beijing Railway Station have fallen in disorder. There are also some young people and even juveniles involved in this. These unhealthy practices demand our close attention. When we speak of rectifying things, this must also be included, as well as our style of work and thinking. This problem should be investigated and studied carefully everywhere. Conducting investigation and study is also part of following the mass line. Bad social conduct concerns the masses, a great number of them being dissatisfied with it and some of them having a part in it. In short, we should inculcate the young people with the spirit of communism. For this purpose, we should do more work and make more investigations. Social conduct was very good in the first ten years after liberation, when we had true mass supervision and extensive mass movements and did thoroughgoing ideological work. Children had good manners, concerned themselves with collective undertakings and public order, and criticized anything which was incorrect. We should try to restore this healthy atmosphere. At present very few people are interested in doing this work, but gradually more and more people will rise to the occasion. We should guide people along the path of progress. We should make a point of fostering lofty, communist ideals. We are poor but we should maintain lofty ideals; the more difficulties we encounter, the higher our aspirations should be. It is essential to widely disseminate these ideas among young people.

The Party and the Youth League are now confronted with much work, and it is more difficult than ever for us to do it well. This is true at least at
the present stage. It is easier for us to perform our tasks under a fresh atmosphere in which everybody is happy and in high spirits, but now that things are not going so well, it is difficult to do our work. Under these circumstances we should especially do much more work and do it even more thoroughly.
PROMOTE LARGE NUMBERS OF YOUNG TECHNICIANS

November 23, 1961

In the last few years we have not given much thought to our technicians, failing to make proper use of them. As a result, a great many technical personnel who have just entered the ranks cannot fully utilize their abilities. Many college graduates remain technicians on probation after they have worked for several years. Why can we not boldly promote them to engineers? How have returned students been employed? We must promote them no matter how scant our funds are. If they are not assigned to posts commensurate to their abilities, they will not be able to do much. By promoting these young people to higher positions with more responsibilities, thereby broadening their horizons, we can make better use of their talents and abilities. We should highly value our young people in their twenties and thirties. Many scientists in the world have come into prominence around the age of thirty. If we do not begin to address the problem of training and promoting young people now, by the time they reach our age it will be too late.

How many engineers and technicians have we trained over this period of more than ten years since liberation? How many people have graduated from our universities and colleges? How many people in design institutes and enterprises should have been promoted? All ministries should investigate the situation in their subordinate units and then promote a large number of young people to engineer status. Enterprises and departments under the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry could add several thousand engineers to their staff, as could the Ministry of Railways, including those promoted from among outstanding workers. Research institutes can also have engineers. This work should be undertaken over this winter and next spring.

This time we should promote as many people to the status of engineer as are qualified, not a few individuals. As I see it, we can have several tens

Talk delivered at a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee after hearing a report on the seven-year plan of the metallurgical industry.
of thousands of people to be promoted nationwide, but they must be carefully selected and appraised. Professional and technical competence will be the main criterion for promotion, but politically they must not be opposed to the Communist Party and must be loyal to the motherland. No Party members will be promoted if they are not qualified professionally and technically. When necessary, exceptions can be made where a person can become an engineer without having to proceed from technician on probation to technician first. The newly promoted engineers should receive material benefits in line with the standards set for engineers, which means no more than a salary increase of a few dozens of yuan per person.

Our chief problem today is the inefficient use of professional and technical forces. In most factories technicians are sitting idle because of poor organization of work. In some departments they are assigned to do administrative work that has nothing to do with their own field, and still others are even transferred to do manual labour or odds and ends for long periods of time. In future, when assigning work to college graduates, we should pay close attention to giving them work appropriate to their area of learning.

Leading bodies at the various levels and of all trades, major factories, ministries and commissions might consider the establishment of assessment committees. They should, without fail, exercise control over such matters as the number and background information of registered professional and technical personnel in their own units. They should assess the performance of college graduates every two years. In other words, they should see to it that no able people are overlooked. Personnel departments alone cannot do the job; they must rely on experts to examine and evaluate professional and technical levels. They should regularly provide opportunities for professional and technical people to pursue advanced studies and self-study, which will require setting up a system to implement. It seems we cannot go on without instituting the use of academic degrees, for which we can first work out a plan.
IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACCOMPLISH OUR DAY-TO-DAY WORK

December 27, 1961

With regard to our mass work, our Party has stressed the need to follow the mass line at some of its meetings. Following the mass line has been a very good tradition of our Party's for a long time. Our work among the masses has always been thorough. Both when we were in the rural areas and after we won nationwide victory, we did all aspects of work well. I am not boasting in saying that some foreign political parties really believe in our mass line. In the past, we accomplished a great deal. Sometimes we got things done without publicizing them in newspapers. This did not mean that we failed to conduct extensive and thoroughgoing publicity. For example, we made known to every household our effort to improve public security and the general mood of society. We did this by relying on the leadership of the Party and the day-to-day work of the mass organizations.

Over the past few years, we have neglected our painstaking day-to-day work. This is the fault of the leadership of the Party. The Party does not have its own work, nor do the Youth League, the trade unions and the women’s federations. The March 8th teams, youth teams and children’ teams have all come to do ordinary work, ignoring the matters on which our people in all professions and trades should keep a tight grip. The Central Committee of the Party will soon convene an unprecedented meeting on the work of the Party to be attended by about 7,000 people. The Party’s work has been weakened to a great extent. This can be seen from the Party’s leadership over the work among women. Did we follow the mass line over the past few years? Yes, we did, but at least we also launched many mass movements against the will of the masses and in violation of the mass line. We are not evading these problems. It is also a good thing that we committed some follies. They have

Excerpt from a speech to all the comrades attending the conference of the chairwomen of the women’s federations of provinces, municipalities directly under the Central Government and autonomous regions.
made us more aware that the traditions and experience of the Party are valuable and that we should restore them and conduct our thoroughgoing and painstaking work bit by bit. All good things, such as the style of work and practices we used to have, should be restored. We should not retain the things which have been bragged about over the past few years but the good experience, work style and practices we have accumulated for a long time. The principle of readjustment, consolidation, filling out and raising standards has been formulated mainly to tackle economic problems, but is also applicable to mass work. It will be appropriate if we do not cover up what we have done and proposed inappropriately and realistically review our experience.

What is the day-to-day work among women? It is the special work that women's federations should be particularly responsible for. For example, the work of encouraging women to be industrious and thrifty in managing their households. We should stress the need both to build up the country through thrift and hard work and to be industrious and thrifty in managing a household. It is not right just to stress one of the two. Only when the country becomes powerful and prosperous can families become rich. We must first build up the country through thrift and hard work, and then we should manage our households well. We are now carrying out a ten-year plan, and we should keep this slogan for ten years. This is due to the material foundation of our country. It is the special work of women's federations. Of course, men should also be industrious and thrifty in managing their households. But the publicity work should be mainly the responsibility of women's federations. You should conduct publicity among the men. It is a long-term task to advocate building up the country through thrift and hard work and being industrious and thrifty in managing our households.184

Promoting family harmony is also what we should always do. We should properly handle relations between husband and wife, between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, between sisters-in-law and between parents and children. This has been women's day-to-day work for a long time. These problems are women's special problems and special work of women's federations. The education of children is also the responsibility of the father, but in general the mother assumes the major responsibility. Marital problems are often reported by women, and, generally speaking, women are the plaintiffs. As they are concerned with these problems, aren't these problems their special problems? Women's hygiene, the prevention and cure of diseases, midwifery and breast-feeding, etc., are women's special problems. It has been our tradition that no matter what work (including work among women) we do, we should do it thoroughly within the limits of our official duty, put forward
specific measures in full accordance with the demands of the masses and help the masses to solve problems.

By stressing the importance of day-to-day work, we do not mean to reject shock movements without exception. For example, the movement against the three evils,\textsuperscript{185} the movement against the five evils,\textsuperscript{186} the suppression of the counter-revolutionaries\textsuperscript{146} and the agrarian reform\textsuperscript{122} are shock movements. For another example, now it is our shock work to check floods. It is all right for us to make a concentrated effort sometimes to do some work among women quickly, but the day-to-day work is the foundation. Mass movements are only a form of the mass line and should not last all the year round. We cannot launch the same movement here and there. One should not copy the experience of someone else indiscriminately, but should instead be realistic. If we carry out movements all the year round, we tend to exaggerate and practise formalism, which is, in fact, against the will of the masses and divorced from the masses. In the final analysis, therefore, we should routinize the day-to-day work. A great deal of day-to-day work we do constitutes the most reliable foundation for shock movements. We can accomplish nothing without doing mass work for a long time. We won victory in the three-year-long War of Liberation because we pooled all the forces by doing mass work for a long time. For example, when our army was preparing to cross the Yellow River, the masses gave us their door planks. As the door planks in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Area were not enough, the people in southern Hebei contributed theirs. Meanwhile, people did not have much to eat, but they gave their grain to the People's Liberation Army. That would not have been possible if we had not done work among the masses for a long time. The Kuomintang could hardly do what we did. The Communist Party has always maintained ties with the masses, doing things for their good, and the fundamental interests of the Party and the masses coincide. The War of Liberation was the people's war, and only by relying on the people could we receive their support and win the war.

At present, the stress of Party and mass work should be put on routinizing the day-to-day work. At this meeting, the establishment of grass-roots organizations has been proposed. This is a good proposal, and there should be more specific proposals. Our work must be done by grass-roots organizations. We should also hold meetings of women and working conferences. We should do this at regular intervals, review our experience and discuss some problems every year. The system of day-to-day work should be restored, and without such a system, work cannot be done. What is our day-to-day work? If you do not make it clear, the Party committees will not be able to put it on the agenda. They may call on you
when they deem it necessary, for example, asking you to explain to the people why food is rationed. But they may not know what special problems to be handled. Therefore, the women’s federations should tell the Party committees what the special problems are. In a word, we should routinize our day-to-day work, including consolidating our organizations. To establish and improve grass-roots organizations, we should have cadres at the grass-roots level. I am in favour of your proposal that most communes should have full-time women cadres. The female leaders of communes with a small population can serve as women cadres concurrently and they should do a good job as women cadres. It is necessary to have women cadres in charge of women’s affairs. If you can routinize the day-to-day work in three years, it will be your greatest achievement. We should do this work conscientiously. Only by carrying out the grass-roots and day-to-day work can we hopefully implement all of our slogans and principles. Otherwise the calls we make and the directives we issue to lower levels will disappear for ever like a stone dropped into the sea. Now people in all trades and professions are routinizing their day-to-day work. Of course, they are acting under the leadership of the Party committees. They will accomplish nothing without the support of the Party committees. As you are in charge of women’s affairs, you should solve all problems that must be solved. As long as you often raise problems, air your views, put forward measures and get things done, how can the Party committees not support you?

Have you discussed the situation at the conference? In doing work among women, women must take charge of their own affairs, discuss major matters and widen their field of vision. Not only the cadres in charge of women’s affairs but also ordinary women should be concerned about political affairs. Day-to-day work involves political and ideological work. To build up the country through thrift and hard work is something of great importance, which involves ideology. It is no good to pay attention only to the family to the neglect of the country. Women cadres should have the world in view, as should women in the rural areas. At all meetings we should discuss the situation. After listening to reports, we should air our views about them. This should become a regular practice. By so doing we are discussing ideological guidelines. But we are actually doing something concrete, too, because ideological understanding will manifest itself in reality and in people’s enthusiasm for work. We must discuss major matters and should not narrow our vision. We should bear this in mind when training women cadres. In future, we should make a rule that women’s federations at or above the county level should discuss major matters at their conferences.
Comrades,

This meeting is of great significance. In his report, Comrade Liu Shaoqi reviewed our experience of the past twelve years, particularly the past four years, and put forward guiding principles for our future work and targets for the next ten years. Comrade Mao Zedong's speech, especially with regard to democratic centralism, is of far-reaching significance to our Party in reinforcing leadership and to different departments in fulfilling their tasks in the future. I fully agree with Comrade Liu Shaoqi's report and Comrade Mao Zedong's speech.

Now I should like to discuss some problems concerning the Party.

One of the three major sections of Comrade Liu Shaoqi's report deals with problems concerning the Party. I should like to add some opinions of my own.

Ours is a party that has won victory in the revolution and is leading the state power. This Party, as we have consistently maintained, is glorious, great and correct and is a Marxist-Leninist Party worthy of the name. In the international arena our Party is determined to hold aloft the banners of anti-imperialism, revolution and proletarian internationalism. At the same time, it has always held aloft the banner of world peace. In the final analysis, whether or not our Party can fulfil its obligations in the world will depend primarily on whether or not we can make our domestic work a success. Success in national reconstruction and work in the various fields at home, in turn, hinges on leadership by our Party.

Can our Party bear these unshirkable international obligations? Can it provide effective leadership for work in all spheres in China? I am sure the overwhelming majority of the comrades in our Party will answer in the affirmative.
In my view, our Party has five strong points or advantages.

First, a sound guiding ideology, represented by Mao Zedong Thought. This is an ideology that integrates the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of China's revolution and development. Its correctness has been borne out by history. It was the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought, not that of any other ideology, that led the Chinese revolution to victory. In the years following that victory, it has also been thanks to the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought that we have been able to achieve such noticeable successes in socialist construction and to continue on our triumphant advance.

Second, a good Party Central Committee with Comrade Mao Zedong as its leader. This has been proved by our experience over the past twenty-seven years since the Zunyi Meeting held in January 1935. Some comrades might argue: Did the Party Central Committee not have shortcomings and errors, too? Did Comrade Liu Shaoqi not admit in his report that the Central Committee should bear the primary responsibility for some shortcomings and errors in our work in recent years? Now, how do you reconcile this with your conclusion above? We maintain that no party central committee can be free from shortcomings and errors. The question is whether we can squarely face these problems and take a down-to-earth attitude towards them. This conference has provided proof of my statement that our Central Committee is a good one. During the conference, the Central Committee, acting on Marxist-Leninist principles, has carefully reviewed our experience and made criticism and self-criticism, adding to our achievements and correcting our mistakes. According to Lenin's standard, this is an indicator of a party's seriousness. Our Party measures up to this standard. Comrade Liu Shaoqi focused his report on problems, especially on a host of shortcomings and mistakes made in our work over the past few years, after which he made some criticism and self-criticism and analysed our experience. This was not easy to do. It is precisely because we are not afraid to seriously face up to problems and to take a realistic attitude towards them, saying it like it is, that we can conclude our Party conforms to Lenin's standard and our Central Committee is a good one.

Third, a large contingent of good backbone members, including a large number of activists who have just come to the fore. Although about 70 to 80 per cent of its members joined the Party after national liberation, they have all gone through the test of practical struggle, so the overwhelming majority of them are good.

In particular, it should be pointed out that most of our cadres are good, and we have capable backbone cadres. Most of the chief ones at and above
the level of county Party committee or regimental rank in the army have
gone through long years of revolutionary struggle. Most of the cadres at
prefectural Party committee level joined the Party in the early days of the
War of Resistance Against Japan, while secretaries of county Party commit­
tees mostly did so near the middle of the anti-Japanese war. Of course, there
are some who joined later. As they have all weathered the storms, they are
highly valuable. Our cadres have acquired twelve years of experience in
socialist revolution and construction, including both positive and negative
experience. The positive experience is very important, as is the negative.
Comrade Liu Shaoqi commented in his report that we have increased our
“immunity” as a result of the negative experience. Having tempered them­
selves in revolutionary struggles and acquired twelve years' experience in
economic development, our cadres have become excellent mainstay of our
Party.

Fourth, fine traditions and work style. Comrade Mao Zedong generalizes
the work style as integrating theory with practice, maintaining close ties with
the masses and making self-criticism (including, of course, criticism), or in
Comrade Mao Zedong's brief words, a “seeking-truth-from-facts” work style.

Our Party also has a tradition of holding high ideals and aspirations and
of not fearing “ghosts”. Certainly, we must acknowledge that this tradition
originated with Marx. Our Party has always been adhering to this tradition.
We should not relinquish it and become fearful of “ghosts” just because we
have criticized our unrealistic notions and deeds in recent years; we should
not be ready to see a snake in every rope just because we have discovered
shortcomings and mistakes in our work. There are “ghosts” of various
descriptions, one of which may be the “ghost” that causes us to lose
confidence. The entire Party should guard against this one. We should
continue to pursue high ideals and aspirations and do our work well. We have
confidence in our ability to rectify our shortcomings and mistakes by
ourselves and do a good job.

Another of our traditions is a sound set of principles governing Party
activities. This has been especially true since the Zunyi Meeting. Under the
leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, our Party has established a whole set of
principles, including democratic centralism; the unity-criticism-unity meth­
od; blaming not the speaker but being warned by his words, learning from
past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient;
being strict in criticism but lenient in meting out punishment, and not
engaging in excessive struggle and merciless attack; and working hard and
living plainly, and being modest and prudent. All of these have been
consistently advocated by Comrade Mao Zedong and represent our Party's
rules and regulations. We should say that, except for the periods when we made mistakes, as was mentioned earlier, we have diligently followed these principles over the years. Comrade Mao Zedong and many other leading comrades on the Central Committee have insisted upon the importance of modesty and prudence. At the Party's Eighth National Congress Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized this point in his speech.

Our Party certainly has more fine traditions, but here I have only given you a few examples.

Because of these fine traditions our Party has remained a united, unified and combat-worthy Party.

Fifth, the good people who have the utmost faith in our Party. Maintaining close ties with the masses is one of our Party's fine traditions. The people of our country have a high level of political consciousness. There is a story which Comrade Mao Zedong has told more than once. It took place when the Red Army was crossing the grasslands. The cook, upon rising in the morning, never asked whether or not there was rice for cooking for the day. Instead, he asked whether the army was heading south or north. This was the most important strategic question at that time. This illustrates that all soldiers in our army were concerned about matters of strategy.

Our people understand the significance of taking the general situation into account. They have high ideals and never lose confidence. As you all know, during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation, the people gave practically everything they had to support the army. During these years, whenever we truly relied on the people and clearly explained the "whys and wherefores" to them, workers, peasants, intellectuals and patriotic democrats all gave first priority to the interests of the entire nation, believing it was right to follow the Party.

We must point out, however, that in recent years the masses have been dissatisfied with some of our comrades, who abused the people's trust in the Party and misused the Party's prestige. Even when we were making these mistakes, they still believed they were not really seeing the Communist Party at work. When we corrected the mistakes, they said the real Communist Party was back. Our people are very good people. Not to rely on them and pursue the mass line is utterly unjustifiable.

The foregoing is a general assessment of our Party. I should like to repeat that our Party has five strong points — a sound guiding ideology, a good Party Central Committee, a large contingent of good backbone members, fine traditions, and a nation of good people who trust the Party. Since such a Party has already succeeded in leading the people to victory in revolution,
it will definitely be able to lead them to victory in socialist construction. Since it has done its work well at home, it is certain to be able to fulfil its obligations in the international communist movement.

It should be pointed out that in the past few years our Party has exhibited serious shortcomings in its leadership and other work. One particularly serious aspect is the impairment of its fine traditions, which is very evident in some regions and not so evident in others. Looking at the Party as a whole, these traditions have been weakened considerably. In order to arouse the vigilance of the entire Party, we feel overestimating this malady is justified. In recent years many comrades have been busying themselves with their day-to-day work, neglecting Party problems and Party building. Hence, it is vital to emphasize this point.

Why have our Party's fine traditions been impaired? There are various reasons, but in my view, the primary one is that more than a few of our comrades have not studied Mao Zedong Thought hard enough or acquired adequate understanding of it. Since we have paid little attention to investigation and study in recent years, we have, more often than not, come up with unrealistic tasks and brought out many slogans which do not conform to actual circumstances. The practice of assigning excessively heavy tasks, demanding their speedy fulfilment and launching inordinately ambitious development projects has impaired many of our fine traditions, which in turn has aggravated the shortcomings and mistakes in our work.

Another reason is the errors made in recent years in inner-Party struggles against both "Left" and Right deviations, a problem which was also brought up during discussions at this conference. Errors did occur during recent movements, hurting a great many Party and non-Party cadres. Of course, we should struggle against degenerate elements and punish them, but here I am referring to the cadres who should not have been harmed. These errors have weakened many fine traditions of our Party. For instance, seeking truth from facts and speaking the truth have been our Party's traditions but, because of failure to practise democratic centralism and because of excessive struggle in the movements and so forth, unhealthy practices have become more and more common in our Party over the years. Such practices include submitting false reports of situations, lying, and being afraid to speak the truth. Deliberate deception is undesirable, but fear of speaking the truth is not good either, even though people involved may advance a variety of reasons and it is not the same as deception.

In recent years not all of our comrades have been doing enough to uphold the Party's fine traditions. Particularly, their negligence or impairment of the traditions of seeking truth from facts, pursuing the mass line
and practising democratic centralism has done enormous harm to our work. The situation warrants serious attention from the entire Party.

At this time we must restore, strengthen and continue to develop the fine traditions of the Party. What we should do today is not to formulate rules and regulations, for they have been there for a long time. As I mentioned earlier, ever since the Zunyi Meeting our Party has established a whole set of principles for Party activities, a complete set of fine traditions, and a good work style. Now we must work to restore and develop them in real earnest. This should not be terribly difficult to do. The overwhelming majority of comrades here are familiar with these fine principles and traditions. We should turn back to them now and make a self-examination, in order to restore and carry them forward. It is of particular importance for you comrades present here to do so. As almost all of you are either “squad leaders” or “deputy squad leaders” of different localities and departments throughout the country, whatever you do will exert a significant influence on the work of the entire Party.

Adhering to the Party’s fine traditions and work style is most important because of the fact that our Party is a party in power. As to the characteristics of such a party, I have already explained them clearly in my report at the Party’s Eighth National Congress. It was an event worth celebrating when our Party came into power. However, it is not easy to serve as such a party. The Party, its members and its leading cadres have to shoulder heavier responsibilities. What responsibilities do we have? In the past we were only concerned with revolution, whereas after victory when our Party came to power, we have to concern ourselves with the arduous tasks of leading the country onto the socialist road and undertaking its development.

We are in the process of building socialism. You comrades must not think the course of building socialism will be problem free. As Comrade Liu Shaoqi stated in his report and Comrade Mao Zedong said in his speech, if we slip and stumble, especially if we fail to practise democratic centralism satisfactorily, the Party, the state, socialism, the cadres and everyone may degenerate.

Now that we are in power, it is even more vital for us to act prudently. First of all, we want power, the proletariat wants power, so we must see to it that it is not seized by the bourgeoisie. Marxist-Leninists want power and they see to it that it is not seized by opportunists. Second, we should be more prudent now that we are in power. Do not believe that with power in our hands we can easily handle everything or do whatever we like. We shall come to grief if we think that way.
Now that we have entered the cities and come to power, should we act as bureaucrats or work as servants of the people? This issue has been expounded upon by Comrade Mao Zedong more than once. We could adopt one of two possible approaches — to work as bureaucrats or servants of the people. If we are to work as servants of the people, we must act as ordinary workers, treat others as equals and serve the people heart and soul. Now that we have entered the cities and come to power, we are in a position to become officeholders, and it would be all too easy for us to take on bureaucratic airs. In fact, this has already happened to many of our comrades. We must always keep in mind the fact that our Party is in power. Only by so doing can we pay more attention to upholding the Party’s fine traditions, avoid being tainted with bureaucratic airs, and keep from becoming divorced from the masses and reality. Only thus can China adhere to the socialist system and advance along the road to communism, and can our Party uphold Marxist-Leninist principles.

Besides conducting investigation and study, seeking truth from facts, staying in touch with the masses and correcting mistakes promptly, maintaining the Party’s fine traditions calls for efforts to improve Party activities. This is one of the most important aspects involved in maintaining these traditions. I should like to discuss four questions regarding this aspect: first, practising democratic centralism; second, establishing a system for dealing with day-to-day work; third, training and selection of cadres; and fourth, study.

The first question is concerned with democratic centralism, which Comrade Mao Zedong explained clearly in his speech. He raised it to the high plane of principle that involves our choice between socialism and capitalism, and between proletarian and bourgeois dictatorship. Here we are face to face with the stark fact: without democracy, there can be no centralism, and centralism cannot be truly or correctly realized unless it is based on democracy. Without proletarian democracy and centralism, socialism will be out of the question and capitalism will make a comeback. In terms of leadership methods, we shall have nothing with which to go among the masses unless we first concentrate their ideas. In other words, if centralism is not based on democracy, we cannot put into practice the method “from the masses, to the masses”. If we do not practise democratic centralism, we shall alienate ourselves from the masses and rank-and-file Party members. In addition, superiors will become estranged from their subordinates, and even among co-workers, a minority or an individual will split off from the majority and make arbitrary decisions.

At present our Party activities leave much to be desired. Of course, there
are a variety of reasons for this. Excessively high targets and absurd deadlines over the past few years have encouraged the spread of both decentralism and authoritarianism, thus greatly weakening the Party's democratic centralism. In dealing with many matters, we seem to be exercising more centralization than before, when in fact decentralization has become a serious problem. In many other matters we seem to be practising more democracy than before, when in fact authoritarian practices, arbitrary decisions made and peremptory actions taken by a few people or an individual are all too common. Therefore, it is essential and timely at this conference to stress the need to reinforce democratic centralism, expand democracy, strengthen centralism and unity, and oppose decentralism.

The past few years have seen a serious extent of decentralism arising in our work. Comrades, you might want to carefully consider the five unifications we have achieved by putting together correct ideas: unified thinking, policy, planning, command and action. When did we best practise centralism — during the past revolutionary war years, the early years after national victory, or the last few years? It should be pointed out that over the past few years we have given the appearance of exercising more centralism than in earlier times, but as far as the five "unifications" are concerned, we are not doing as well as before. In other words, decentralism is on the rise.

Along with the rise of decentralism we have seen the spread of authoritarianism and weakening of democracy in the Party. Without democracy there can be no centralism and thus no way to unify thinking and action. In emphasizing centralism and unity and opposing decentralism, we should lay more stress on the need to adhere to the principle of democratic centralism. Let no one misunderstand this emphasis, believing that centralism and unity can be stressed at the expense of the democratic aspect of democratic centralism. On the contrary, in order to intensify centralism and unity and oppose decentralism, more emphasis should be placed on the democratic aspect. This will place centralism on a solid foundation, ensuring genuine centralism and unity. Comrade Mao Zedong has made this quite clear in his speech at this conference.

In future we must work out realistic plans that allow for some flexibility, being certain not to set too heavy or inflexible tasks any more. During the discussions many comrades expressed their worry that the Central Committee might set tasks which were too heavy. We can promise you here and now that the Central Committee will work hard not to come out with such tasks. Setting targets which were too high was the main shortcoming of the Central Committee over the past few years. When planned targets conform to reality and allow for some flexibility, such problems will not arise. In future, we
should have unified plans that leave the local authorities the leeway to make adjustments in line with specific local conditions. In particular, future plans should be improved in such a way as to make it possible for the local authorities to adapt measures to the conditions in their area and bring their initiative into full play.

While stressing the need of centralism and unity in formulating specific policies and solving problems, we should make greater efforts to apply the concept of “from the masses, to the masses”, as advocated by Comrade Mao Zedong. After gathering opinions from grass-roots units through investigation and study, we should formulate realistic policies and plans, which can then be carried out among the masses and tested in actual practice. Solving specific problems should be done in the same way.

In short, we must follow Comrade Mao Zedong’s proposal, creating a political situation in the Party and the country in which we have both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness. This situation has to be created first within the Party. (Liu Shaoqi’s comment: What do we mean by aiming high? First of all, we mean doing our utmost to create such a political situation. In such an atmosphere we can achieve greater and better results in production and economic development.) This kind of political situation should also be created in the nation as a whole, which would be impossible unless it is first created in the Party. Our Party must bring about such a lively political situation and practise full democracy.

Our Party is a unified, united, combat-effective Party. Without democracy it would not have centralism and unity; without centralism and unity it would not be combat-effective. Therefore, we should always maintain centralism and unity. A party which does so is genuinely combat-effective. However, it is on the basis of democracy, the exercise of full democracy, that we can become a unified, disciplined and combat-effective party.

The last few years have seen the emergence of some undesirable phenomena in this area. At this time we will once again call your attention to these problems. If we have made mistakes, let’s redress them; if we have been failing to uphold some of our fine traditions, let’s now restore them and further develop them. These traditions are, after all, not unfamiliar to us. During the discussions many comrades said they missed the inner-Party activities of former days. This proves that the good situation of those days is still alive in our memories, so let’s restore it now.

We must resolve to restore and further develop our Party’s fine traditions. We must establish a correct relationship between the Party and its members in accordance with those traditions and the provisions of the Party
Constitution. All Party members, in line with organizational principles, have the right within the Party to offer criticisms and opinions about the Party, its work, any problems and leaders as well as the right to reserve their own opinions. According to the Party Constitution, when an issue comes up for decision, Party members may freely voice their views at Party meetings or in the Party's newspapers and journals. There are just two prohibitions. First, no Party member is allowed not to carry out the Party's resolutions. If they disagree, they may present their own opinions; if they consider something in the resolutions incorrect, they may suggest amendments. In any case, as is stipulated in the Party Constitution, they must carry out the Party's resolutions, though they are entitled to reserve their own opinions. Should they not implement them, they would be violating the rules of Party discipline. Second, factional activities are banned. (Mao Zedong's comments: Underground factional activities are forbidden. Suppose a person wants to air an opposing opinion in public. Is this permissible?) Yes, the Party Constitution permits this. When an issue is pending, everyone may express his or her opinions in public; after the decision is made, everyone must firmly carry it out. In the course of implementation, however, people may still offer suggestions. Theoretical and academic issues are a different matter, for free discussion on them may be held at any time. In recent years many things have been done in violation of the principle of inner-Party democracy, and this should be rectified.

Both Comrade Mao Zedong in his speech and Comrade Liu Shaoqi in his report talked about the "three don'ts" — don't pick on others for their faults, don't label people, and don't use a big stick, but some comrades worry about changes which may occur after a few years from now. Their apprehensions are understandable, for they reflect the reality of recent years. Even so, their apprehensions are groundless. They should have faith in our Party's traditions. Of course, some comrades will want to wait and see, which is all right. Have we not already said it was all right for one to reserve one's opinions? Yet some comrades still feel they can only write anonymous letters. They may be considered "semi-courageous". Recently we received some anonymous letters among which were a number that contained very good opinions. Why did the writers wish to remain anonymous? Why can Party members not earnestly declare their opinions in public, turning their semi-courageous acts into completely courageous ones? We should all take the lead in this regard. By so doing we can help bring about a change in the atmosphere, restore our Party's fine traditions and carry them forward. If we continue to be hampered by various apprehensions, hesitating to speak out, there will be no way to bring back these old traditions. In particular, the
“squad leaders” and “deputy squad leaders” present here today should take the lead in restoring the old traditions. The Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong have been standing for these traditions stipulated in the relevant rules and regulations of our Party. Only in the last few years have they been impaired, so we can and should revive them speedily, and we also can and should rectify the irregular practices speedily. But, we must make one point very clear: to do this, full democracy must be exercised within the Party.

Success in truly reviving and carrying on our Party’s old traditions hinges on the attitude taken by the leading comrades of our Party at all levels. They should attentively listen to opposing or differing views and they should be receptive to honest remarks from sincere people. This is also our tradition, consistently supported for many years by Comrades Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi as well as the Central Committee. During discussions at this conference many comrades recalled earlier years when they dared express whatever views they had and found it easier to have heart-to-heart talks with one another. Let us have it again. But, it is essential that our Party’s chief leading comrades at all levels give their attention to this question. These leaders, particularly the “squad leaders” and “deputy squad leaders”, should be subordinate to and ally themselves with the majority while respecting the minority. Comrade Mao Zedong expounded upon this point on numerous occasions, and he brought it up once again at this conference. If leaders hope to handle matters smoothly, they must win approval from the majority and must absolutely not insist on having the final say on all matters. They should respect opinions of the minority, for their opinions are not necessarily wrong. Even when they are wrong, they are likely to be shared by many others. Only by listening to these opinions can we set them right and help our comrades correct their mistakes.

In addition, leaders should be fairly broad-minded and tolerant. They should be able to lend an ear to opposing opinions, treat others as equals, act modestly and prudently, etc.

What constitutes the basis for the prestige of our Party’s leading comrades at the various levels, especially the chief leaders? Correct ideas, work and words, a democratic work style, and a habit of making criticism and self-criticism. It is impossible for leaders to do everything one hundred per cent correctly, without any shortcomings or mistakes. What matters most is whether they are ready to criticize their shortcomings and mistakes, allow others to do so, accept criticism and act accordingly. If a leader can thoroughly criticize himself for the mistakes he has made and lend an attentive ear to criticism from others, he will gain the initiative and everyone
Supervision should be exercised over our Party's leaders at all levels (including all the members of the Party committees). This supervision comes from various quarters — their superiors and subordinates, the masses, and the Party groups they belong. In this regard I have an idea to offer for you to see if it is appropriate. I believe the most important supervision should come from the Party committee, the secretariat, or the standing committee of the Party committee. This is a small group. Some of our leading comrades are put in a group with cooks and odd-jobmen, in which not much supervision can be exercised. Of course, in accordance with the Party Constitution, every Party member should take part in the regular activities of the Party branch. I think it would be best if the leaders participate in the regular activities of a Party committee, secretariat, or standing committee. Members of a Party committee should take some time for heart-to-heart talks, truly creating an atmosphere favourable for conducting criticism and self-criticism. Supervision will probably be better served when comrades working together at the same level have heart-to-heart talks. (Liu’s comment: We could suggest that Party committees at various levels call a meeting once a month at which to conduct criticism and self-criticism.) Holding such a meeting every three months would be good enough, but not necessarily every month. (Liu’s comment: Once a quarter, or four times a year, would be fine. How do you like this idea? The Party committees, including those at the provincial, prefectural and county levels, should all do so.) (Mao’s comment: At the meeting they can check on their work, analyse their experience and exchange views.) In this way they may conduct heart-to-heart talks, engage in mutual criticism and voice their opinions. We should attach importance to mutual supervision among Party committee members. Leading members of the same Party committee see each other much more often than their superiors and subordinates, which makes it convenient for them to discuss matters, reach unanimity and make decisions — this is most important.

Party committee members should pay attention to collective leadership and the division of responsibility. Here, the “squad leaders” play a very important role. For a time the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong strongly advocated forming a nucleus in the Party. After it was established on the whole, they particularly stressed the need of competent “squad leaders”. In other words, a Party committee has to establish a nucleus, lest it be lax in its work and fail to do a good job. At this conference most “squad leaders” probably felt they were being “put on the spot”. This does not mean that we do not think highly of them; in fact, we do think highly of them.
We are only saying that "squad leaders" should perform their duty well. Any leading body that does not have an appropriate "squad leader" needs to train one, or should have the higher authorities help them select a competent one. Once that body has a "squad leader", everyone should help him perform his duty well. Being a "squad leader" is a hard job, for he is often confronted by difficult issues. You should not think he has an easy job. I know a great number of "squad leaders" complain of hardships. They have a host of matters to deal with, and nobody can boast of being able to handle everything perfectly. It seems that we should excuse them when they fail to handle some matters satisfactorily. The "squad leaders" themselves, being aware of the difficulty, should follow what Comrade Mao Zedong said at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee about learning to play the piano.\textsuperscript{191} It is not easy to learn to play. Unfortunately, we have to learn it all our lives. We should remind ourselves to try to master it every day, never saying we actually have mastered it. (Mao's comment: After learning to play, we may yet have to learn something new.) It often happens that when we come across a new situation or problem, or deal with new people or go to new regions, we find we are not sure how to "play", so we can see that mastering this skill would indeed be difficult. Every day we should learn more about "playing the piano" and "being an orchestra conductor". "Squad leaders" must bravely shoulder their responsibilities. There are certain problems that must be personally handled by them, not be left to any one else.

Perhaps we can divide matters roughly into two types: day-to-day matters, and important matters concerning policy. Day-to-day matters should be handled or approved by different Party committee members according to their division of responsibilities; approval by the first secretary is a must. If every matter had to be discussed at meetings of the Party committee or secretariat, there would be no end to such meetings. The first, second or some other secretary, taking responsibility on the basis of the division of labour, must give his approval when it is required and when he sees fit. When it comes to a major issue, however, it must be submitted to the Party committee, standing committee or secretariat, according to the circumstances, so that the appropriate body may discuss, reach a consensus and make a decision. (Mao's comment: When disagreement occurs, the minority should yield to the majority.)

In short, democratic centralism is the fundamental system of our Party and state; it is a tradition with us as well. Upholding and perfecting this traditional system is of vital significance, bearing on the destiny of our Party and state. Anything contravening this system must be redressed.
I should like to say again that Comrade Mao Zedong’s emphasis of this problem at this conference is of tremendous significance. Because we have not done well at practising democratic centralism in recent years, the leading bodies and grass-roots units have lost touch with each other. This is a serious phenomenon which has become all too common. The problem was raised in Comrade Liu Shaoqi’s report and Comrade Mao Zedong’s speech at this conference. At least we have taken the first step here to communicate with one another, which is commendable. Of course, in the process many comrades found it difficult to get any sleep; some even stayed awake for over two nights on end. Not sleeping then represents a good phenomenon — showing that they were turning things over in their minds. Our aim at this conference is to have all the participants take the lead in communicating with each other, so that we can revive and continue the practice of democratic centralism. As I said earlier, by offering criticism and opinions to the Central Committee and to the provincial Party committees, you can give vent to your dissatisfaction, and it is also a way of communicating with one another and reviving and maintaining democratic centralism.

Let me make one point clear, that is, the Central Committee should be held responsible for many of the mistakes which were made by provincial, prefectural or county Party committees and for which they were criticized at group meetings. Comrade Liu Shaoqi made this clear in his report. The Central Committee is accountable for its actions; it should bear the major responsibility where it should. Of course, the provincial, prefectural and county Party committees are also accountable for their actions. They should be responsible for their mistakes and mind their own accountability. Still, the Central Committee should be held accountable for quite a few mistakes, such as the chain reaction (Mao Zedong’s comment: several big movements.) that followed the setting of excessive targets, and the problems arising from several “large-scale campaigns”192 and movements. Certainly, this does not mean that the provincial, prefectural and county Party committees did not make any mistakes in these campaigns and movements.

What should be done after this conference? The Central Committee has already discussed this question and concluded that the provinces, prefectures and counties across the country should not call meetings for people to “let off steam”. Should such meetings be held in a few localities? This would be possible. (Mao’s comment: In a few localities and departments.) A few counties, prefectures, provinces, departments or work units may need to do it. This matter should be decided on by authorities at a higher level, and such meetings should not be called everywhere. (Mao’s comment: It should be done in a positive manner.) In most places we should take a positive
approach and explain what democratic centralism means. Of course, it may be necessary to hold self-criticism meetings for leading comrades who have done a poor job over the years. These comrades should follow the spirit of Comrade Mao Zedong's words — if once is not enough, examine the mistakes a few more times until nobody wants to listen any more. They should take the initiative, which is also a positive approach. In short, we must not issue a general call for meetings to “let off steam”. However, Party committees, standing committees, secretariats at the provincial level as well as prefectural, county and other departmental Party committees should hold such meetings for members to have heart-to-heart talks with one another and make self-criticism. (Mao's comment: If they have something they want to get off their chests, let them.) Let them get it all off their chests. (Mao's comment: Do not blame anyone for saying something erroneous. If the speaker is right, you should accept it. On the other hand, it would not be right to reproach someone for erroneous remarks.) When people express their dissatisfaction, it is impossible for them to get everything right, but this is not important. We should not expect others to agree with us when our dissatisfaction is unjustified any more than we should expect others' dissatisfaction to be totally justifiable. In addition, leading comrades at various levels can have heart-to-heart talks with a few individuals who hold differing views, either about the leaders themselves or about some work-related issues. In this way the leading comrades of Party committees can examine their day-to-day work and their methods of leadership. Let us restore our old practices, our old traditions, through such positive steps as these.

That is all I have to say for now on democratic centralism.

The second question is concerned with day-to-day work. As Comrade Liu Shaoqi mentioned in his report, achievements in our work are accumulated bit by bit and with great care. Mass movement is one way of carrying out the mass line. The success of such a movement depends on the success of our day-to-day work. It is through meticulous work that we achieved great success in the large-scale movements of banning opium-smoking and the opium trade and of agrarian reform, without publicizing them in the newspapers. We have launched many large-scale movements in recent years, using them almost exclusively in pursuing the mass line. It is not good to have movements so frequently. The result of this has been that much of the regular work of departments and work units has been interrupted by the continual campaigning and hindered by the method of “dividing up responsibilities among individuals or small groups”. This working method, which is related to that used especially for running movements, is inadvisable. We should learn some valuable lessons from our experience over these years.
The neighbourhood committees in our cities used to do an excellent job. They did well in uniting with good people, reforming bad ones, establishing sound social conduct and fulfilling various tasks. Women's federations, Youth League organizations, trade unions and Party committees all did meticulous work in the past, but they have all slackened their efforts in recent years. This is just an example of what has been occurring in all fields of endeavour, so there is no point in giving further explanations.

In short, a system for dealing with day-to-day work must be set up. The Party and mass organizations, army units, enterprises and government departments should all have a system to handle regular organizational, publicity and educational work. Meticulous day-to-day work will help probe more deeply into problems and facilitate investigation and study.

Party committees should help Party branches and groups to improve their daily work. At present branch activities are far from adequate. I am not going to elaborate on its importance, but it does deserve our serious attention. The organization departments of Party committees at all levels should take due note of this problem. Party members must participate in branch and group activities, in order to check on the work, make criticism and self-criticism, and study. This is a stipulation in the Party Constitution and should therefore be done conscientiously.

The third question is concerned with training and selection of cadres, especially the leading core at the various levels. This is an important issue which should also be included in the regular work of Party committees at all levels. We should establish a system for handling matters concerning cadres. Over the past few years we have suffered enormously from the instability of cadres. We should be alert to the serious phenomenon of frequent changes in status of significant numbers of cadres. We should pay constant attention to the performance of our cadres, judging their merits and demerits by their long-term work, not their performance in some movement or over a short period of time.

Until recently, our Party has always been prudent in handling matters concerning individual cadres. As a result, we had a united Party that was acting in unison and whose leading members kept in touch with the rank and file. Unfortunately, this kind of close communication has not been maintained in recent years, especially during the large-scale movements when a considerable number of cadres were subjected to unjust treatment and their cases were handled imprudently. We should review the cases of cadres who were criticized and punished during recent years in line with the principles set forth by the Central Committee in its Directive Concerning the Discussion and Trial Implementation of the Revised Draft Regulations on the Work
in the Rural People’s Communes (Sixty Articles). In handling these cases, there are three possible circumstances to consider. One is that the criticism or punishment was correct and therefore does not need to be redressed. Two is that it was partially incorrect, in which case only that part should be corrected. This would involve a partial rehabilitation, since only the part of the punishment considered extreme should be rescinded. The third possibility is that it was totally wrong which calls for complete rehabilitation. In short, we should seek truth from facts and deal with each case on its merits. No movement should be launched to re-examine the cases and rehabilitate cadres; the work should be done by specially designated organs and persons, such as the supervisory commissions. Should they have more cases than they can handle, they may recruit more staff. Party committees should appoint suitable leading comrades to take charge of the work. Currently we are very busy with heavy work loads, in addition to being confronted with economic difficulties, so we cannot afford to devote all our efforts to the re-examination of cases and rehabilitation of cadres. Besides, this is meticulous and time-consuming work, so we should specially assign people to do it. The best way would be for those who originally mishandled a case to redress that case, which would help to draw us closer together.

The fourth question concerns the study of Marxist-Leninist theory and Comrade Mao Zedong’s works. It is not necessary to expound on the reason for this one. Our experience of these past few years has made us recognize our insufficient understanding of the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, which resulted in a spate of mistakes. When we become absorbed in day-to-day work to the neglect of study, we can easily get bogged down in the mediocrity of routine and become low-minded. This is a dangerous situation which could lead to political degeneration. We need to create an atmosphere which will encourage study, one conducive to theoretical study. (Mao Zedong’s comment: If we busy ourselves with everyday routine and pay no attention to the study of theory, we shall definitely lose our bearings.) Encouraging study in practice is also a part of our Party’s work style and one of our Party’s fine traditions.

I have raised four questions here concerning our inner-Party activities. Though I have only brought up these four, there are, naturally, many others.

Today we are confronting numerous difficulties and our tasks are formidable. Although the targets we have set are modest, it will still be hard to achieve them. As Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out, it is particularly important this year that we put matters in order concerning industry, agriculture, commerce, education, the army, the government and the Party. Facing such enormous and heavy tasks, leadership by the Party and its
committees at all levels is extremely important.

At this conference we have stressed the need of strengthening Party leadership, democratic centralism, and centralization and unification. The most important aspect of centralization and unification is unifying our thinking. This is essential if we are to have unity in our actions. The entire Party needs to unify its understanding of the report given by Comrade Liu Shaoqi and the important speech made by Comrade Mao Zedong. Accomplishing this will then enable us to obtain unity in our work and actions.

In summary, now that we have established our guiding principles, we should work with one heart, adopt a forward-looking attitude, and continue to review our experience in all the localities, departments and work units. We must do everything possible to overcome the difficulties and carry out the policies and tasks of the Party and state. Once a decision is made, we must implement it in unison. This is one of the rules of our discipline and a tradition of our Party.

Almost all the comrades of our generation, especially the comrades present here, are principal leaders at various levels, shouldering immense responsibilities. Our generation must uphold the Party's fine traditions, set a good example, do our work well as servants of the people, and fulfil our obligations to China's socialist cause and to the emancipation of the people all over the world.

Comrade Liu Shaoqi has challenged us to aim high and let us do as he says.

We should aim high in upholding the Party's fine traditions and work style!

We should aim high in strengthening and correctly exercising democratic centralism!

We should aim high in learning how to be a competent "squad leader", an orchestra conductor, and an "accomplished pianist"!

Our generation should aim high in setting a splendid example for the next generation!

This concludes my talk.
MEASURES FOR OVERCOMING OUR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES

May 11, 1962

I do not have any differing opinions on the report of the Central Financial and Economic Group or Premier Zhou's speech on the problems which have been discussed over the past few days. It seems to me that the decisions we have made at the current meeting are all that we can do for now. Although we lack a full understanding of all the problems in our work, some of which call for further study, it is highly necessary for us to make decisions on the problems we have already recognized. At this time I should like to make a few remarks on this subject.

First, from the problems related to the various fields of endeavour that have been laid out on the table, we can see there is much to be done, but I believe it boils down to two central tasks: one, to cut back the urban population by 20 million, and two, to help improve the work of production teams in the rural areas. These two matters are most pressing. Maybe we can afford to take more time with some other matters, but with regard to these two tasks, the more we delay taking them up, the more we stand to lose. For instance, if we do not start reducing the urban population right now, we shall not be able to cut back the amount of money to be put into circulation and the amount of grain to be supplied and, among other things, our effort to readjust production will be impeded. If we delay improving the work of production teams, agricultural production will be affected. We shall not be able to turn the situation around until we have enough grain, cotton and other products, for which we have to rely on the production teams to provide. The production teams are also involved in the reduction of the urban population; we have to rely on them to help make arrangements for people who are to move from the cities to the countryside. It follows that if

Speech delivered at a working conference of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
the work of the production teams is not improved, agricultural production will suffer, and our effort to cut back the urban population will run into snags. For now we are formulating guiding principles before proceeding to carry them out systematically in our work.

Second, I should like to draw your attention to the document on the work of re-examination of cases and rehabilitation of cadres issued by the Central Committee recently. The work is most important for arousing the initiative of cadres, especially of those at and below the county level in rural areas, as well as of the masses. The work primarily involves cadres, but in reality it will exert an influence on a large number of people because every cadre is linked to the masses. The army is the first to start the job and become stable. Some local authorities have also been successful in this. Comrade Tan Zhenlin has noticed that cadres in Shandong are more enthusiastic about production and the people there are in higher spirits than those in Henan. After a careful study of the situation many reasons have been found for this. One reason is that only a small number of people had been unjustifiably criticized or punished at the final stage and, what is more, they were all re-examined and rehabilitated at one stroke, so that the authorities gained the initiative in their work. The same method has been used in Sichuan. Everyone is now in favour of this method of accomplishing re-examination and rehabilitation at one time in localities below the county level, starting with the rural areas. In other words, the political labels imposed on those who were criticized or punished unjustifiably or more or less unjustifiably should be removed once and for all. Because the cadres below the county level were all grass-roots cadres, they were not in a position to make serious mistakes or occasion serious Right deviation or “Left” deviation. Besides, they maintained direct links with the masses, and when their friends, relatives and others heard of their being criticized or punished, they could not but feel quite restless. It does us no good when people are restless. Are we not going to help improve the work of the production teams? The re-examination and rehabilitation are essential to arousing the initiative of the cadres at the grass-roots level and the masses and must not be taken lightly. Leading cadres at higher levels should go out to the localities to share in the responsibilities in order to speed up the process. We are now asking all the bureaus of the Central Committee to urge the Party committees of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions to continue this work if they have begun or to begin immediately if they have not yet started. The results of the re-examination and rehabilitation must be made known directly to the masses. Actually, by so doing we
are admitting we made a mistake, acknowledging that we have done something wrong.

Third, we must establish and strengthen the leading cores of the Party committees at the various levels, especially those of the Party committees at and below the county level and of enterprises. In order to do a good job in agriculture the Party committees at and below the county level must first of all establish and strengthen their leading cores. Of course, Party committees at and above the prefectural level should do the same. From today’s vantage point, it seems we are a bit too late in handling certain problems. The obstacles we may encounter stem mainly from the county authorities, and the problems with them are whether or not they aim high enough, display sufficient enthusiasm for work, assess the situation correctly, and show great determination and ample confidence. The present danger lies in our lack of confidence, reluctance to find ways of surmounting difficulties and failure to make quick decisions. One can hardly avoid being slow to see a problem when one does not recognize it as a problem. But, if one does not take prompt action once a problem has been identified, things will eventually become worse. It seems that most of the ideological problems exist at the county level. Naturally, the enterprises and institutions at the grass-roots level have their own problems, too.

At the enlarged working conference of the Central Committee, the issue of strengthening the leading cores of Party committees at all levels was set forth, which it seems that we have not been watching closely enough. In 1953 in order to meet the needs of the country’s industrial development, we took a number of cadres from local Party committees and assigned them to work in enterprises. That weakened the leadership of local Party committees to a considerable extent. It is thanks to the efforts made by those cadres that the enterprises have expanded over the years. Now veteran, backbone cadres can be found only in a few local Party committees, while such cadres serving as “squad leaders” or “deputy squad leaders” in the rest of local Party committees have been promoted to the posts since 1957. These cadres made rather serious mistakes in 1958 when the “five practices” prevailed. Our cadres did useful work most of the time, and during the past few years they did not really intend to make a mess of things. They are still good cadres, and we should trust them as usual, though we should see both their strong points and their weak points.

The principal measure for establishing the leading cores of Party committees at the various levels is to train those with a good style of
MEASURES FOR OVERCOMING DIFFICULTIES

work selected from among the cadres already on Party committees. By a good style of work we mean mainly integrating theory with practice, maintaining close ties with the masses and being tainted with less subjectivism than other people. There has been a great deal of subjectivism in recent years. How can we follow the mass line by just issuing many orders? How can we integrate theory with practice if we do not try to suit measures to local conditions? There is another way of resolving the issue of leading cores. We are presently reducing the staff of many enterprises, and many of the cadres in the staff of these enterprises originally came from the countryside and are of longer standing than the present cadres on local Party committees. It is entirely feasible for the Central Committee and the Party committees of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions to take advantage of this opportunity by transferring a number of their cadres to lower levels to strengthen the local Party committees, including county and commune Party committees. Each county or commune Party committee should have at least two or three persons serving as “squad leader” and “deputy squad leaders”. Those who are transferred there would not necessarily become the first secretaries; they might serve just as secretaries or members of Party committees. Through this measure, we should be able to make agriculture a success and strengthen the leading cores of counties, communes, production brigades and production teams. A question of fundamental importance to the Party or the government is selection of the right people. Take the production brigade, for instance. Can you send people there to serve as cadres who do not engage in production? It might be all right, though, to send a few people to work for a limited period of time there, trying to strengthen the leading core and explore the situation. Basically, the proper way is to make use of local people, people who are native of a place or belong to the production brigade; practising democracy is fundamental. For the Party committees at the commune and county levels, however, there is the need of strengthening the leading cores. We should bring about a change in the county and commune Party committees by sending some new people there even if they already have leading cores of their own. Long-time colleagues become very familiar with each other, which has both advantages and disadvantages. As they work together every day, they are used to each other’s ways, so that they become slow in perceiving problems. With dulled senses, they remain indifferent to problems that should be brought up and mistakes that should be criticized. A shake-up of personnel will help to change their style of work and create a new atmosphere. The Organization Department of the Central Com-
mittee should begin working on this matter, and the organization departments of Party committees of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions should do the same. Since a province has a limited number of counties, over a hundred at most, comrades on the provincial Party committee most probably know the leading cadres of every county well. With a general picture of the composition of each county Party committee in mind, they should make a change of the committee by adding a few new people to it. This will be conducive to the training of cadres and to work in general.
RESTORE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

July 7, 1962

Since we adopted some economic measures recently, I must say the overall situation has improved a little. This is not to say that our production has expanded in any way, only that our readjustment effort has begun to yield results. The shortage of food, clothing and other daily necessities cannot be covered overnight, but as long as we continue our efforts in line with the readjustment policy, we will be able to overcome the difficulties and bring about an early turn for the better.

We must set about restoring agricultural production if we want to overcome difficulties and bring about a fundamental turn for the better in the financial and economic situation. If we fail in agriculture, there will be no hope of success in industry, and the shortage of food, clothing and other daily necessities cannot be filled up. Restoring agricultural production calls for a series of policies, two of which are primary. One is to arouse the peasants' enthusiasm for increased agricultural production, so that they will produce more grain and restore the growth of cash crops. The other is to have industry support agriculture.

In 1957 the grain yield amounted to 195 million tons, and 145 million tons last year. I cannot say for sure whether it will reach 150 million tons this year, since the weather has not been favourable. Some places suffered from floods and others from drought. All things considered, the grain yield this year will not be lower than last year's, but even if it reaches 150 million tons, it will still be 45 million tons short of the 1957 level. We must try to find ways to restore grain production within a certain period of time and, on the basis of increased grain output, restore the production of cash crops.

It seems to me that the problem of agriculture must be solved mainly through changes in the relations of production. This means arousing the peasants' initiative. At present there are still a few rural people's communes...
across the country that maintain commune ownership. Since the people there are unwilling to break them up, let them remain as they are. Other communes have production brigades as their accounting units, whereas even more communes have production teams as the accounting units. In some places where production teams form the accounting units, new situations have appeared, such as fixing farm output quotas for each household, holding households fully responsible for the farmland they work, and implementing the principle of "five unifications". It looks as though more than 20 per cent of the production teams have, in various forms, fixed output quotas for each household, so this is no trivial matter. The Party Central Committee will study answers to this question at the meeting to be held this coming August. We now have the policy of "letting a hundred schools of thought contend". A question of this importance should be open for discussion in line with that policy to let everybody offer suggestions so that answers can be found in the end.

As to what kind of relations of production is the best mode, I'm afraid we shall have to leave the matter to the discretion of local authorities, allowing them to adopt whatever mode of production that can facilitate quickest recovery and growth of agricultural production. The masses should also be allowed to adopt whatever mode they see fit, legalizing illegal practices as necessary. These are all tentative ideas, not final decisions, so they will not necessarily come to pass in future. When talking about fighting battles, Comrade Liu Bocheng often quotes a Sichuan proverb — "It does not matter if it is a yellow cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice." The reason we defeated Chiang Kai-shek is that we did not always fight in the conventional way. Our sole aim is to win by taking advantage of given conditions. If we want to restore agricultural production, we must also take advantage of actual conditions. That is to say, we should not stick to a fixed mode of relations of production but adopt whatever mode that can help mobilize the masses' initiative. At present, it looks as though neither industry nor agriculture can advance without first taking one step back. Can you not see this? Is agriculture not now taking a step backwards? Are communes not taking a step backwards? The accounting unit has regressed from the commune through the production brigade to the production team, because only by stepping back can they go forward. At present, it is necessary to fully arouse the masses' initiative and tap their potential. The first step is to revive the production of grain, to be followed by cash crops. At the same time, we should gradually restore supplies of farm implements and draught animals. All this represents readjustment in the relations of production, and for us it is a test. Of course, our entire Party should hold a common view
and be of one mind. For example, in order to keep the production team as the basic accounting unit, we shall have to convince the masses and strengthen the ranks of cadres. This is one possibility. Another possibility would be to legalize the practice of fixing farm output quotas for each household. These are all just ideas; as for what measures should actually be adopted, the entire Party, including the Central Committee, is now considering the matter. We must soberly deliberate these questions now. We failed to give them enough consideration in the past, rashly placing the entire country under a unified plan. In some cases, instead of giving full consideration to the different conditions and particular circumstances of different areas, we jumped to conclusions and made everyone do the same thing. As I have mentioned on other occasions, we have had too many movements, launching a movement for each and every undertaking, and all of them were nationwide in scope. It seems that they have not worked out successfully. In some cases we had no choice but to launch a movement, as, for example, the agrarian reform movement. However, even that movement was carried out with different methods at different stages.

Everything I have discussed above has to do with the policies to be adopted in the rural areas, all of which are designed to help peasants harvest more grain, plant more trees and raise more farm cattle. The peasants will be fairly happy, when they can retain more grain for their own use and turn over more to the state. Generally speaking, we must consolidate the collective economy of the country, that is, consolidate the socialist system. This is our fundamental orientation. Of course, we must also solve specific problems arising in our work and leadership. In the rural areas we have to readjust the relations of production at the grass-roots level and recognize the need of diversified modes of production. In my own opinion, it may be better to have diversified modes.

To restore agricultural production we must also solve problems concerning the relationship between urban and rural areas. More city dwellers mean more grain to be collected from the peasants, which will make it difficult for us to restore agricultural production. For example, ten million more city dwellers would require an additional 2 million tons of grain; 20 million more would mean 4 million tons; 30 million more, 6 million tons. It appears that each person could have only some 15 kg a month when 6 million tons of grain is shared by 30 million people. Actually, this is an immense amount, since there are only three hundred or so counties across the country which are comparatively rich in grain.

Two factors put pressure on the peasants for grain supplies, one of which is the urban population. So, we must try to reduce the population in the
cities. Last year it was reduced by more than 10 million people, and if it can be reduced by another 20 million or more this year and next, we shall have an urban population the same size as that of 1957. The cadres in production brigades and teams under the communes constitute the other factor squeezing the peasants for more grain. There is a considerably large number of such cadres. If we tackle the problem from the structural angle, cutting back a large number of these cadres, the strain on the peasants will be eased accordingly. If the peasants had more grain on hand, they would have enough feed to raise pigs, and the amount of draught animals would gradually increase since they would not be dying in such great numbers. Of course, this also involves the relations of production. For example, how would draught animals be raised — mainly privately or collectively?

By tackling the problem from the structural angle, I mean altering the present relationships among the commune, production brigade and production team. But how? The Party Central Committee has discussed this question many times, and comrades from provincial Party committees still hold differing views. Most of them are in favour of actually abolishing the brigade. Except for exercising leadership, formulating plans, checking on work and issuing general calls, neither the commune nor the brigade is in charge of money or grain, nor would they administer trade when supply and marketing co-operatives are set up in future. At present hundreds of people are fed with public grain in each commune, so this is a formidable problem. In fact, given the size of its working personnel, the scope and nature of its work, and its tasks, a commune is a large township as it used to be and should be now, and the commune committee can serve as the township people's committee. We think only one cadre will be enough for the brigade, who should take part in production and will not be paid by the peasants, instead receiving a subsidy from the state. This is one approach. Another is to fix the amount of subsidy for the village to pay the cadre as was done before. In future, a couple of brigades could merge into a village with a village head, a Party branch secretary and a clerk. The clerk would receive a subsidy from the state for his work points. This will not only serve considerably to reduce the amount of grain taken from the peasants, but also improve the relations between the Party and the masses, which is the greatest advantage.

In short, we should solve the problem of the relationship between urban and rural areas by reducing the urban population, which is a major policy, and by readjusting the structures of the commune, the production brigade and production team, which constitutes another major policy. We should help peasants gradually improve their living standards. This will in turn
arouse their enthusiasm for production and bring about hope for the recovery and development of agriculture.

Another policy to help effect a recovery in agriculture is to have industry render more support to agriculture. First, industrial production in the service of agriculture cannot be reduced and must be increased, and we need to solve the problems in industrial production. Take farm machinery, for example. Although we have exerted great efforts in this regard for many years, we have not found satisfactory ways of manufacturing farm machinery and tools suited to different local conditions. In another example, although the state has spent a lot of money on water conservation projects in recent years, irrigation has yielded little result. Now we have to rebuild the existing water conservation facilities and dig wells in some places. In addition, in the production of fertilizers, we should find out what kind of chemical fertilizer is suited to which place. In short, industries in support of agriculture cannot be cut back and must be run well. Second, industrial production should be geared to people's needs for food, clothing and daily necessities so as to reduce the burden on agriculture. We can gradually solve the clothing problem, for example, with the help of industry. In 1957 we decided to import the technical data and equipment for manufacturing vinylon, but that decision was held up somehow. If vinylon factories were set up, they would help alleviate the strain on the supply of cotton and could exchange vinylon for peasants' cotton. This exchange might then spur on agricultural production. If we can help meet the need for clothing in this way, we can help meet the needs for food and other daily necessities in the same way.

To restore agricultural production, we must also solve the problem of market and commodity prices. Markets must be managed properly. The Central Committee has decided to have supply and marketing co-operatives set up everywhere in the country. If run well, these co-operatives can not only facilitate trade but also help organize and promote production, increase market supplies, and enable peasants to earn more income.

In short, we shall have no hope of success unless we make every effort to arouse the initiative of the masses, including both peasants and city dwellers. It appears that we can find a way to rehabilitate the national economy in a comparatively short time. We should work hard to bring about a fundamental turn for the better in our financial and economic situation within five years, that is, during the Third Five-Year Plan period, or sooner.
QUESTIONS CONCERNING CADRES OF THE PARTY IN POWER

November 29, 1962

The Party must exercise control over itself, over its members and its cadres. For a party in power, the heart of this matter concerns the cadres, because many of its members are working as cadres of varying ranks.

There are many issues concerning our work among the cadres, and we have not found good solutions to all of them. We already have a large number of cadres, with perhaps up to ten million or so more than we need, if cadres of production brigades and teams are included. Even if the surplus was only three to five million, it would also pose a formidable problem. What is more, the number of cadres keeps increasing. At least 200,000 people graduate from universities and colleges and secondary vocational schools annually. Tens of thousands of armymen are demobilized to serve as civilian cadres every year, and during the past two years this number has increased to more than one hundred thousand a year. Local comrades must help make arrangements for demobilized army officers. Otherwise, the army will be composed of only officers and no soldiers or only a few men under each officer, and the army will have no combat effectiveness. There is an age limit for officers, because older officers would have difficulty climbing mountains while in action. It is particularly inappropriate for a man over forty to be a regimental commander, for he would find it beyond his ability to conduct reconnaissance and explore terrain on the frontline and scale snow-covered mountains, whereas a younger person would be more able. Not long ago we purposely transferred a number of army cadres to strengthen the commercial departments. Since this was a decision of the Central Committee, no local authorities may refuse to accept these cadres on the grounds that it may be difficult to find places for them. Besides, new...

Excerpt from a talk to comrades attending a conference on organizational work and a national conference on supervisory work.
cadres should constantly be promoted. All things considered, we shall add at least 300,000 cadres every year, or three million in ten years.

For many years we have guaranteed the positions of all cadres, promoting them but never demoting them. Now it seems that this has created a considerable side effect. We have not yet found a satisfactory solution to this thorny problem. The only way out is to have the cadres prepared to accept posts at levels lower than the ones they are holding. This is a formidable task. First of all, we should straighten out their thinking. I should say it is not entirely a question of material benefits — this can be solved by retaining their original salary scales and ranks, but a question of their willingness to accept posts at lower levels. Too many people hold deputy posts. In a military command there are so many deputy commanders that they need two tables for meals, and this is the case with deputy provincial governors, deputy commission directors, and deputy secretaries of a provincial Party committee. Both central and local authorities have been trying in vain to solve this problem for many years. It calls for a lot of work. We have to persuade our cadres, and create an atmosphere in which cadres are willing to accept lower posts. Their material benefits and political treatment should remain unchanged. We should also persuade some comrades to take honorary posts, such as members of the political consultative conference or vice-chairmen in the conference of a county or a province. Others can be sent to replace cadres at lower levels, who can return to production with their material benefits unchanged. Still others, who can no longer work at all, might just as well leave their positions for recuperation or take honorary posts. The fact that cadres are only prepared to be promoted and not demoted has become a hindrance to our work. This problem cannot be solved at one stroke, but we must keep working towards a solution.

At a recent meeting held by the Secretariat of the Central Committee to hear reports on organizational work, I suggested that cadres be demoted on a trial basis, beginning with cadres at the grass-roots level. For example, after serving two terms in office, the secretary of a brigade Party branch may return to production, and the head of a production brigade may become an ordinary commune member again. Cadres should not always be promoted to higher positions. They may be demoted and should always be ready for either a higher or a lower post, and be ready to lead others and be led. When being led, they can help the leader in the way an ex-secretary of a brigade Party branch helps a new secretary and an ex-head of a production brigade assists the new one. The ex-secretary or ex-head may be elected secretary or head again after leaving office for a couple of years. Enterprises and schools can do the same. In this way, cadres can be tempered. The Central Committee
has not discussed this problem yet; I am the first to express an opinion about it. It is not good for a cadre to work at the grass-roots level in the countryside for a long time. After a person has served as secretary of a production brigade Party branch for one or two decades, he forms his own clique, and what he says is taken almost as “imperial edicts”. This hinders the promotion of democracy and the exercise of democratic centralism. If the secretary of a production brigade Party branch is demoted to the position of an ordinary Party member or the head of a production brigade to that of an ordinary commune member, they may be able to make a clear evaluation of the work they did and the work style they displayed while in office. This will help promote democracy. I hope when you go back, you will discuss this method with leading comrades of the bureaus of the Central Committee and the Party committees of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions to see if it can be tried out in a few places. Personally, I think this may be a good way to approach the problem, and it will certainly not do us any harm. However, this cannot be applied to technical cadres in enterprises; it is not advisable to transfer engineers or competent workshop directors to serve as workers. This method can be tried first among some administrative Party cadres. For example, factory directors can be demoted to serve as workshop directors for a couple of years. Why should they always lead others instead of being led? In short, we should start with cadres at the grass-roots level, making it a rule that cadres be ready to take a higher or a lower post, so that everybody will become accustomed to the practice. In this respect, we are not doing so well as the capitalist societies, where people may be moved to higher or lower posts. I do not know what the Soviet Union is doing about it. Anyway, this is a formidable problem for us to tackle.

More effort should be made to control and supervise cadres. Recently Comrade Liu Shaoqi criticized the long-term lack of appraisal of cadres’ performance. Organization departments should take up this work. Supervision of cadres involves only a few aspects, such as, first of all, requiring Party cadres to take part in the regular activities of the Party organization. At an enlarged working conference of the Central Committee held last January it was noted that it was difficult to supervise many high-ranking cadres who only took part in the regular activities in Party branches. This has been the case for years. During those years we suggested that senior cadres take part in such activities in a Party committee or a leading Party members’ group once every quarter or half a year to discuss their work, and engage in criticism and self-criticism to see whether they have made an effort to correctly and firmly implement the Party’s guiding principles and policies. This is not merely a matter of individual self-cultivation; it is also a type of supervision
and a part of the regular activities of the Party organization. This is quite suitable for those high-ranking cadres. There is no question about this suggestion; the point now is to put it into practice. All ordinary Party members and cadres should take part in Party branch or group activities at regular intervals to receive supervision from the Party. The exercise of democratic centralism is also a form of supervision. In addition, supervision is also exercised by Party members and non-Party people, by the Party's supervisory system and the organization department's appraisal system. This supervision is mainly over the cadres, including principal, leading cadres at corresponding levels. It would be of tremendous benefit if we could set up and improve day-to-day control and supervision of cadres and restore the system for appraising cadres. It is easier to solve problems as soon as they come up among cadres than to launch a movement for this purpose.

Another question concerning cadres is the exchange of cadres. The Central Committee has also made a decision in this respect, and now we should execute it. By exchange of cadres I mean the transfer of cadres both at higher and lower levels. The Organization Department of the Central Committee is to submit to the Central Committee for approval its suggestions on cadres of the Central Committee for exchange. The organization departments of provincial Party committees are also to submit to their respective committees for approval its suggestions on cadres under the charge of the provincial Party committees for exchange. As many cadres as necessary will be involved — the ratio or number is not to be proposed by departments at lower levels. According to Comrade Liu Shaoqi, a number of departments will transfer around five per cent of their cadres, while others none. The Central Committee has proposed that the first group of cadres to be transferred shall not exceed five per cent of the existing cadres at any one level. The intent of setting this figure is to exercise prudence and not involve too many people at once. The cadres are not all necessarily being transferred because they made mistakes; the transfers themselves will do the cadres some good no matter what the case may be. When people who know each other well work together too long, they become accustomed to hearing each other speak, slow to react to things and careless in analysing problems. It will be better for them to hear new things and work in a fresh environment. If cadres are transferred to work in different places, they will have more chances to deal with different situations and will therefore become more knowledgeable. Still another reason for transferring some cadres is that they do not cooperate well with others but prefer to go their own way, though they may be qualified and have made no mistakes. Such cadres can be found in enterprises, schools and Party committees. Why not transfer them to another
place? Holding the same post, they may get along well with others in a different unit. Some cadres do not get along well with others any place; after being transferred a number of times, they may come to realize that they have a problem. Therefore, in order to better temper cadres, facilitate our work and create favourable working conditions for all units and Party committees at all levels, we are beginning the practice of transferring cadres for exchange.

Cadres should redouble their efforts to study. The army has taken the lead in urging its cadres to learn. I think the regulation issued by the Central Military Commission is correct. Local cadres should also read books and create a studious atmosphere. They have a lot to learn. I shall not go into detail as to what they should study, but on the whole, they should study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, which will give them plenty to study.

Recently, both the Propaganda Department and the Organization Department of the Central Committee have been considering the question of Party schools and the training of cadres in rotation. At the conference on propaganda it was proposed that Party schools be separated from this training, which I think is the correct thing to do. Party schools provide regular training over a fairly long period of time. In addition, they are charged with training theoretical cadres, so their students are required to read books in a systematic programme. To train cadres in rotation, however, requires a fairly short period. Perhaps we could divide a Party school into two departments, one department being devoted to providing regular education and the other to training cadres in rotation, each with its own teaching staff. The Central Party School has also proposed restoring the division into two departments. Although the Central Committee has not yet given formal consideration to that proposal, I would go along with it. Local Party committees can also look into this question. It is evident that we shall suffer if we do not run Party schools on a regular basis. We did not seriously look at this question for a time, running the school on an off-and-on basis. Some places have completed their first round of training of cadres, while others have not. Those where training is still in progress should go on with it, and those that have finished it may consider a second round. The second round may not necessarily take one and a half months or teach the same things as the first one. The documents of the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, for example, could serve as the teaching material for the second round. Cadres may be released from their work for ten to fifteen days or even just a week to discuss the documents. They may also read books or discuss a certain issue during the period of training. Both central and local authorities may consider these matters.
Do we need to adhere to the principle of the “three don’ts” in the training of cadres in rotation? The “three don’ts” refer to don’t pick on others for their faults, don’t label people and don’t use a big stick. The Secretariat of the Central Committee has discussed this question and decided that we need the “three don’ts”. It is necessary to continue to implement the principle of the “three don’ts” put forward in the Decision of the Central Committee on Training of Cadres In Rotation. In the past there were shortcomings in following this principle in that only those who had been criticized previously were allowed to give vent to their dissatisfaction, whereas those who had criticized others dared not and could not air their views whether their opinions were correct or partly correct. Or, they were only allowed to air their views concerning a certain area of work. Since we have decided to follow the principle, it should apply to everybody. In short, we should do as Chairman Mao says: “Say all you know and say it without reserve” and “Blame not the speaker but be warned by his words.” This is the kind of atmosphere we want to create. The principle of the “three don’ts”, put forward in the light of the need during a given period of time, gives expression only to “blame not the speaker”. Chairman Mao’s words are a complete formulation. They are included in the decision mentioned earlier. The decision contains many other “don’ts”, such as “Don’t take notes in group discussions.” We encourage people to say all they know and say it without reserve, to speak the truth and to correct erroneous views. Chairman Mao and Comrade Liu Shaoqi say that we are not afraid of overt opposition in our Party, except people who play tricks on us and resort to underhanded schemes. We will always have opposition, but we need not fear them so long as they are operating in the open. The normal way is for everyone to say all he knows and say it without reserve. When we discover that we are only partially implementing this principle, we should correct it without much ado. In short, we should exercise democratic centralism as emphasized by Chairman Mao at the enlarged working conference held by the Central Committee last January.
BE REALISTIC AND LOOK TO THE FUTURE

August 20, 1963

With regard to industrial development, my main concern is how to be realistic and look to the future. We should have a sober estimate of our industrial foundation, neither overestimating nor underestimating it. So long as we know the existing industrial foundation, proceed from the reality and review the experience gained in our country while drawing on foreign experience, we can achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in industrial development as is required by the general line.203

We should be clear about our industrial foundation and the agricultural foundation as well. Here comes a population problem. Last year there was a net increase of more than 13 million people. This year there may be another net increase of 20 million. By 1970 we shall have a population of 800 million. A big population on the one hand is favourable for us, but on the other hand it is unfavourable for us, because we have to supply such a huge population with food, clothing and other daily necessities. It will be many years before we can solve this problem. Besides, we should be clear about the number of technical personnel. We made rapid progress in the training of such personnel during the past 13 years. However, the shortage of technical personnel is still an acute problem in all departments. Many things remain to be done in this respect. For example, we should appropriately reform the educational system and increase the number of teachers, etc. The low standards of management constitute another problem.

We should distinguish between the industrial level and the technological level. Our technological level is not high and the categories of technologies are incomplete. Many technological problems concerning some important military products remain to be solved. They are hard nuts to crack. Without foreign data and materials, it would not be so easy for us to solve those problems in a short time. Our industrial level is not high either. For example,

Main points of a speech on industrial development at the meeting held by the Industrial Decision Drafting Committee.
we have only approximately 600,000 machine tools and lack precision, large and special machine tools. We have only more than 34,000 kilometres of railways. Nearly one-third of the rails need to be replaced, and many bridges need to be repaired.

Long ago Chairman Mao defined the path for the country's industrial development. In his *On the Ten Major Relationships* and *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, he pointed out that we should develop industry and agriculture, and light and heavy industries simultaneously. This is a summarization of the experience gained in other countries. With a formidable agricultural foundation industry developed rapidly in the United States long ago. Japan was able to develop its industry rapidly after World War II simply because it first solved the problem of agriculture. Our weak link lies mainly in agriculture. With an annual increase of ten or twenty million people, we have to supply them with food, clothing and other daily necessities. This is a real burden.

There are many problems with industry and particularly with basic industry. We lag far behind in mining and steel rolling, the two sectors of iron and steel industry. The nonferrous metals industry and machinery industry are also very weak. Our output of petroleum is only several million tons. Coal is used as the main fuel, and if we want to increase its output, we have to make huge investment. This will take a long time. Many countries have been able to develop industries and sophisticated industries rapidly just because they have powerful basic industries. It seems that we can hardly find any country in the world which has developed sophisticated industry rapidly with a weak basic industry.

In a word, when formulating principles and plans for industrial development, we should give consideration to the foundations of our agriculture, industry and science and technology as well as our management standards. From a long-term point of view, we can achieve faster and better economical results if we put agriculture first and then light industry and heavy industry. I think that, for some time, we should focus on taking agriculture as the foundation and trying to appropriately solve the problem of our inadequate supply of food, clothing and other daily necessities (of course on a low level). In industry, we should concentrate on developing basic industry, which is still weak.

What is our objective to be accomplished? We want our country to be among the advanced countries in the world through our forty years of hard work. That is, we want it to become one of the few major industrial powers in the world, but not to surpass all the other countries. We are not sure whether we shall be able to surpass all the other countries, because our
economic foundation is different from that of other countries and they are also advancing. Of course, it may not necessarily take forty years for China to become one of the major powers in the world.

I think we had better set a short-term objective first, that is, to preliminarily or basically establish an independent nationwide industrial system after five to seven years of hard work. We should try to achieve this objective by 1970 through careful and rational planning. If we fail in our effort, we may spend one or two more years attaining this goal. The basic or preliminary establishment of such an industrial system will lay a foundation for faster development of industry, agriculture and national defence.

During this period, we should first solve the problem of the supply of food, clothing and other daily necessities. In agriculture, we should solve the problems of fertilizer, pesticides and water conservancy in particular, including the drainage of flooded fields. We should try every means to develop light industry so as to accumulate more capital. An important thing we should do is to develop cash crops. In the next few years, we should produce more cash crops, even if we have to continue to import grain. Second, we should develop basic industry and build new railways. Third, we should develop sophisticated technology in national defence. We should still pay attention to producing conventional weapons. All these are the main tasks to be fulfilled. To this end, we may as well put forth several plans or methods for discussion. The general programme is to accomplish the four modernizations.

In establishing new enterprises in future, we should give priority to small and medium-sized ones and only establish large enterprises which are absolutely necessary. If we concentrate on small and medium-sized enterprises, our management standards will also improve rapidly.

I should like comrades from each major region of the country to consider whether or not we should change the managerial system of enterprises, establish trusts and put the big industrial cities directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Government. We should try to find out the problems.

In the document we should explain the proportion of accumulation to consumption, that is, the proportion of investment. We must settle this issue.

It is necessary to say something about the cadres policy. To sum up, our cadres should be both politically sound and professionally competent. Those who are in charge of industry must have professional knowledge. I am pleased to learn that there are really a number of directors of departments or bureaus and some vice ministers who are capable and vocationally proficient. There are also a number of such cadres in the provinces and municipalities. We
should send them to enterprises (small or medium-sized, but not necessarily large enterprises) to serve as directors for a couple of years and then appoint them ministers or vice ministers. By so doing we can have a number of key leading cadres who are capable and both politically sound and professionally competent and our management standards will be greatly raised. We should adopt this policy organizationally, because it has an important bearing on our future.
BUILD A MATURE AND COMBAT-EFFECTIVE PARTY

June and December, 1965

I

I should like to tell you a little about the experience gained by our Party and Comrade Mao Zedong in handling inner-Party issues in the ten years between the Zunyi Meeting, held in 1935, and the Party’s Seventh National Congress, held in 1945.

During the nearly four years between the Fourth Plenary Session of our Party’s Sixth Central Committee convened in January 1931 and the end of 1934, we fell into the trap of “Left” errors in the political line for the third time, ending with a great loss of our revolutionary strength — practically all our forces in areas under Chiang Kai-shek’s rule and ninety percent in the Red Army’s Soviet areas. When the exponents of the “Left” line held sway, they not only totally rejected Comrade Mao Zedong’s correct line but removed him from leading posts in the Party and army until the Long March. In the early stage of the Long March, mistakes were made owing to the absence of his command. The Red Army’s First Front Army dwindled from 80,000 to 30,000. When we got to Zunyi, the line represented by Wang Ming and Bo Gu could no longer be maintained and we had to ask ourselves what should be done. An enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, i.e., the Zunyi Meeting, was convened, marking the beginning of Comrade Mao Zedong’s leadership. At the meeting he adopted the correct policy of pointing out only errors in the military line and not bringing up those in the political line. Comrade Mao Zedong did not become general secretary at that time. Of course, Bo Gu was no longer eligible for the post of general secretary, but it was nevertheless taken by Luo Fu, once an exponent of Wang Ming’s line. Why did we do this? We did it because we wanted to unite with comrades who had made mistakes,

Excerpts from two talks with an Asian Communist leader, which took place on June 14 and December 27, 1965, respectively.
especially when we were then in hard times. Thanks to Comrade Mao Zedong's policy of correctly handling problems within the Party, we became more united, went through our roughest time and completed the Long March. After the Long March Comrade Mao Zedong had still not been placed in the position of general secretary, though, of course, since the Zunyi Meeting he had actually been the leading core of our Party. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party clarified the past struggle between the two lines by reviewing our experience and rectifying incorrect work styles. However, the final conclusion was not drawn until the Party's Seventh National Congress held in 1945. At that Congress Comrade Mao Zedong was formally elected Chairman of the Central Committee (a change in form did away with the title of General Secretary). This shows that Comrade Mao Zedong adopted the approach of unifying with comrades who made mistakes. At that time he formed the concept of "starting from the desire for unity and, through criticism or struggle, arriving at a new unity on a new basis". It took a decade for those comrades to truly become aware of their mistakes. With their enthusiasm aroused, the Party became more united. It was on this basis that we won in the War of Resistance and ushered in nationwide liberation. Thus, there are two ways to deal with inner-Party problems. One is to deal with them promptly and hastily; the other is by exercising patience over a fairly long time. Of course, this does not mean that we have to spend ten years every time to solve any kind of problem. The main thing is to see what results this method will produce. By results we mean that the comrades who made mistakes come to recognize them through education and that all Party members benefit by it, becoming clearer about the distinction between what is right and what is wrong in the Party and between the correct and the erroneous line. Is it reliable to solve problems in a simple way on an organizational basis? It is best to solve them ideologically. Of course, our experience is not necessarily applicable to the struggle in your party, though it may be regarded as a method for reference, for every party is likely to encounter such problems.

We have always explained to fraternal parties that the strategies, tactics, programmes and requirements applicable to the specific circumstances in a country can be drawn up only by the party in that country. In this way, a party acquires experience, benefiting by its correct decisions and suffering from its mistakes, which it can draw on itself. It does not matter if mistakes are made. Provided that we faithfully apply the method of criticism and self-criticism and constantly review our experience, we can make steady progress. Our Party can do no more than relate our experience to fraternal parties. It is entirely up to these parties to determine what experience is
relevant and what is irrelevant to their situations. However, we do believe in a fairly important principle, generalized by Comrade Mao Zedong, that is, in order to formulate correct strategies and tactics and achieve victory in revolution, a party must integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the revolutionary practice and actual conditions in its own country.

Our experience consists of formulating and carrying out correct strategies and tactics in the light of our country's specific conditions and, in particular, on the basis of profound understanding of the conditions of classes and the class struggle. Shortly after its founding, our Party clearly recognized that Chinese society was a semi-colonial and semi-feudal one. With this nature of our society in mind, our Party determined the stages, targets and motive forces of the revolution, and decided that opposing imperialism and feudalism was our revolutionary task in the first stage. But, can we say that by presenting this task we have truly understood the meaning of the struggle against imperialism and feudalism? No! We cannot say this, because it is no easy job to formulate and implement correct strategies and tactics for such a struggle. Over a fairly long period of time in this revolutionary stage our Party was unable to settle or straighten out such questions as how to fight against imperialism and feudalism, what forces we should rely on, what forces we should unite with, and what forces we should attack.

For example, our Party has always been aware of the need to mobilize the peasants, for they constitute the overwhelming majority of China's population. During the period from the founding of our Party to the Great Revolution (1925-27) the peasant movement grew considerably. But did this growth prove that our Party had come to know the peasants? No, it didn't. Comrade Mao Zedong said it took him six to seven years, beginning in 1925, before he began to truly understand the peasants. Only afterwards was he able to propose correct programmes and policies relating to the peasants and the worker-peasant alliance and, in the light of China's actual conditions, to formulate the correct strategic principle of encircling the cities from the countryside. During the Agrarian Revolution we based our correct class policy on the conditions of classes in rural areas. The slogan "land to the peasants" alone was not enough; there still remained the major problem of how to distribute land. Comrade Mao Zedong advocated distributing an equal share of land to everyone in the rural areas, including the landlords. The "Left" opportunists who dominated our Party at the time opposed his proposal, asserting that it was not a correct class line. They advocated distributing poor land to rich peasants and no land to landlords, calling Comrade Mao Zedong an opportunist. In their view, the rich peasants were members of the exploiting class and the bourgeoisie in rural areas, so why
should they receive the same share of land as the poor peasants? Since the landlords had oppressed the peasants for so many years, why should they now receive an equal share of land? All this sounded so revolutionary! In fact, they knew nothing about the countryside. With no land or with only poor land how could the landlords and rich peasants feed themselves? The landlords and rich peasants had to eat, but what could they do if they had no land? In actuality, this policy only forced all landlords and rich peasants to join forces with Chiang Kai-shek and stand against the peasants, which was of no benefit to the poor and middle peasants, the worker-peasant regime or production. By distributing land to landlords and rich peasants, they could gradually be transformed from exploiters to labourers and, in the meantime, we could use their manpower. This is just one example; there are a host of similar problems. Without making a full investigation in the countryside and a careful study of class conditions there, it would have been impossible for us to truly understand the demand of all the peasants, including the poor peasants, and what policies would meet their interests. Some “Left” slogans sound very revolutionary but do not serve the interests of the peasants. That is why I said the slogan “land to the peasants” alone could not settle all problems.

The attitude to be adopted towards the national bourgeoisie is another highly important question in the stage of national democratic revolution. Failure to handle it properly could lead to the error of either “Left” or Right opportunism. As a vacillating class, the national bourgeoisie has a thousand and one links with imperialism and feudalism. On this question our Party made both “Left” and Right opportunistic mistakes. The former lingered longer than the latter and inflicted greater damage on us. In the early stage of the Great Revolution our Party handled the question appropriately by working together with the bourgeois revolutionaries represented by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and initiating Kuomintang-Communist co-operation to advance the revolution, and we also co-operated with Chiang Kai-shek. It would have been a mistake if, in the course of this co-operation, we had only maintained relations with the bourgeoisie. When we entered into alliance with the bourgeoisie to lead the democratic revolution, one question of supreme importance was to develop the progressive forces, the forces of workers and peasants, under this alliance. In the later stage of the Great Revolution our Party was misled by Chen Duxiu's Right opportunistic error, when we were afraid of engaging in a political struggle with the bourgeoisie, afraid of irritating it, and not daring to arouse the masses into action. Consequently, the Great Revolution ended in defeat as soon as Chiang Kai-shek betrayed it. Then the “Left” opportunistic mistakes occurred in our Party three
times\textsuperscript{173} which were characterized by the practice of overthrowing everything. At that time we were chiefly attacking the bourgeoisie, its intellectuals and the parties of the petty bourgeoisie, which resulted in our self-isolation. Many people in the cities, including the intellectuals and youth, were alienated from us for a long time. It was hard to launch workers' movements; strikes were held aimlessly and, moreover, the demands were so outrageous that the movements ended in failure. Our strength in the cities kept dwindling until at last it was nearly gone. Correct policies were adopted, however, in the rural areas which were under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong. In those days the Red Army protected industry and commerce. Some industrial and commercial capitalists were practising feudalistic exploitation, which was all eradicated. We did not do anything with regard to their shops or factories and we did not confiscate anything from them; instead we provided protection for their property. Benefiting a great deal from policies such as these, we were able to break the economic blockade imposed by the Kuomintang against our base areas. Later, when the leaders of the "Left" opportunist line came to the Central Soviet Area,\textsuperscript{17} they opposed Comrade Mao Zedong's correct policies and attacked national industry and commerce. As a result, under Chiang Kai-shek's blockade, even salt was unavailable in the base areas. Even when Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism was prevalent, "Left" mistakes were made in urban work. For example, the government in Wuhan at that time was led by left-wingers of the Kuomintang who were co-operating with our Party in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek. There we organized strikes and set economic demands which were more than the bourgeoisie could bear. Consequently, the market slumped, to the detriment of the economic base of the revolutionary regime. In dealing with the national bourgeoisie, our Party has made both "Left" and Right mistakes. It is essential to adopt correct policies. Without doubt, the national bourgeoisie tends to vacillate, but we should, nevertheless, make use of its positive side, uniting with it as well as struggling against it. We cannot lay down rigid rules as to the circumstances under which mainly to unite with it and circumstances under which mainly to struggle against it. This is a question that requires flexibility and solution based on concrete analysis of the national bourgeoisie in one's own country.

In giving these two examples, I have been trying to illustrate that in order to formulate correct programmes and policies, it is necessary to obtain a thorough understanding of the actual conditions in one's own country. This is no easy job, especially when it comes to trying to understand the peasants.

Now I should like to talk about our Party's experience during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Tactics serve strategies. The years prior to the
anti-Japanese war are called the period of the Agrarian Revolution. At that time we pursued a policy of confiscating land from the landlord class. After Japan stepped up its aggression against China, the national problem became the principal concern, and Japanese imperialism became our main target of attack. Under these circumstances, we had to ally ourselves with all our indirect allies in the world, which included contacts with the United States, for example. The comprador-capitalist class, previously our main target of attack, became one whom we both unite with and struggle against. Its representative was Chiang Kai-shek, with whom we co-operated to resist Japan, adopting a policy of both unity and struggle in the course of co-operation. The landlord class, our other main target of attack, also became a class that we both unite with and struggle against. In other words, our policy of confiscating land from the landlord class was replaced by a policy of reducing rent and interest rates in order to appropriately satisfy the peasants' demands. If we had continued our battles with the Kuomintang, instead of making the Japanese imperialists our main target of attack, the war of resistance would have been out of the question. Likewise, if we had taken both the Japanese imperialists and the Kuomintang as our main targets, the war could not have been waged. If we had continued our attack mainly on the landlord class, following a policy of confiscating land instead of a policy of reducing rent and interest rates, the landlords would have been driven to the side of the Japanese aggressors. Therefore, we must be clear about the main target of attack; otherwise, we would isolate ourselves. During the anti-Japanese war, Chiang Kai-shek was not our main target of attack. However, on the question of both unity and struggle, Right opportunism emerged in our Party in the form of Wang Ming's Right capitulationist mistakes.

II

It's not easy for a party to grow gradually into a mature party maintaining ties with the masses. Judged from the history of our Party, the Seventh National Congress in 1945 marked the maturation of our Party as a whole. Beginning with the Party's founding in 1921, it took us 24 years to achieve this goal. Of course we are referring to the maturity of the Party as a whole. As far as the central leadership is concerned, we can say it reached maturity at the Zunyi Meeting in January 1935, which established the central leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong as the core. This took us thirteen and
a half years.

After the Zunyi Meeting, struggle continued in the Party. In the early days of the anti-Japanese war, our Party was plagued by Wang Ming's line for a second time as he switched from "Left" to Right opportunism. Party cadres, including some of the principal cadres, lacked a clear understanding of the history of the Party, the struggle between the two lines and such questions as how to build a sound Party that maintains ties with the masses, and with what ideology and work style to arm the Party.

In October 1935 the Red Army's First Front Army triumphantly completed the Long March and the Central Committee reached northern Shaanxi — not yet Yan'an, but a place north of Yan'an. After the Red Army's three front armies joined forces, Comrade Mao Zedong found that the Red Army had only 30,000 survivors, including some two to three thousand leading cadres. Studying the history of the Party and analysing our experience and lessons to educate Party members became a vital question. At that time Comrade Mao Zedong concentrated on achieving unified thinking in the Party. Before long the War of Resistance Against Japan broke out. While exercising leadership in this war and ensuring that the Party pursue a correct line of resistance, he reviewed the Party's experience and lessons and wrote a series of essays covering philosophy, political and military affairs, and so forth. Based on these works, a rectification movement was launched. You could say this began in 1939 and 1940. Over a period of about five years, particularly in the course of the rectification movement throughout the Party, which started in 1942, we thoroughly exposed and criticized "Left" and Right opportunism and unified the thinking of the Party at long last. Those who had made mistakes in the past admitted them. It was on such a basis that our Party worked out the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party". This resolution dealt with errors in political line, especially the errors of Wang Ming's "Left" opportunist line. However, Wang Ming has all along clung to his errors. He now lives in Moscow and still attacks us in the articles he writes.

It was at the Seventh National Congress that our entire Party was united by Mao Zedong Thought. It had been 17 years between our Party's Sixth National Congress in 1928 and its Seventh National Congress in 1945. Discussing questions in a positive manner, this was a congress of unity. Shortly after its close, Japan surrendered. But then the entire Party had been armed with Mao Zedong Thought. Confronted with the civil war launched by Chiang Kai-shek with the support of the United States, this great Party, armed with Mao Zedong Thought, was up to the situation.

By maturity of the Party as a whole we mean, first of all, that it had
reached maturity ideologically. Our Party has Mao Zedong Thought that integrates Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. The broad ranks of cadres and Party members have a good grasp of this thought. Politically, although erroneous lines have emerged occasionally in the Party since the Zunyi Meeting, Comrade Mao Zedong has always redressed them with his correct line. This is why the Party’s principles and policies have been correct ever since that meeting. Having won the support of the masses, the principles and policies that embody the correct line have been translated into action by the masses. After the War of Resistance Against Japan, the number of Party members jumped from 30,000 to over 1.2 million, the army from 30,000 to one million and the population in the liberated areas to over a hundred million. This would never have been possible if the Party’s line, principles and policies had not been correct.

Organizationally, we have become a sound Marxist-Leninist Party with a correct work style. At the Party’s Seventh National Congress a correct work style was summarized by Comrade Mao Zedong as having three parts: first, the Party must be a party that integrates theory with practice; second, it must maintain close ties with the masses; and third, it must be based on self-criticism. Without the spirit of criticism and self-criticism it would not be able to review its experience and rectify mistakes in good time, nor would it be able to educate cadres, Party members and the masses by distinguishing between correct and erroneous or positive and negative experience. Comrade Mao Zedong often tells us that there is no party, person or leader that never makes mistakes. The key lies in reviewing experience in a timely manner and checking on the work in the spirit of criticism and self-criticism. In this way minor mistakes will be kept from developing into major ones or into errors in the nature of a political line. Party members and cadres can learn from correct experience, and errors will be turned into fertilizer and bad things into good ones.

Comrade Mao Zedong set forth a series of policies and principles concerning Party organization. Our Party’s organizational principles combine a high degree of democracy with a high degree of centralism, developing the principles of democratic centralism advanced by Lenin. A party cannot do without centralism. It will have no fighting capacity unless its central committee and party committees at various levels exercise centralized leadership. If not based on a high degree of democracy, the centralism will be a sham. By encouraging democracy, criticism and self-criticism, the Party will be able to truly unify the will of all its members, so that they can act with one heart and one mind. Comrade Mao Zedong has also encouraged the army to practise democracy. Our People’s Liberation Army practises democracy in
the three major fields, namely, political, economic and military fields. At a company meeting, soldiers can criticize the company commander, but will this democracy not hinder his unified command? No, it will not. If he rectifies his mistakes as soon as he discovers them, he will exercise better command and his soldiers will have greater fighting capacity. It is true not only at the level of a company, but also at the level of a large war zone: a commander will be subject to criticism if he makes mistakes. For instance, a corps or regiment commander will criticize the commander who has lost a battle in a certain war zone. What other choice does he have? If we fail, we must admit our mistakes and there is no other alternative. This way we will be better-equipped to fight the next battle. With the practice of inner-Party democracy and criticism and self-criticism, people will not tend to make irresponsible remarks behind other’s backs, but instead lay the problems out on the table. Comrade Mao Zedong proposed “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient”. He said we should allow people who have made mistakes to correct them. For example, Wang Ming was again elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh and the Eighth National Congress of our Party. At the Ninth National Congress we will once more consider his re-election in order to give him a chance to correct his mistakes. In short, we should patiently help comrades who have made mistakes through the method known as observance and help. By observance we mean simply observing whether or not they can rectify their mistakes. Regardless of whether or not they are able to do so, we should offer them plenty of help, keeping in mind “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient”.

As we see it, the whole series of concepts concerning Party building defined by Comrade Mao Zedong has immensely expanded on Lenin’s principles on Party building. The fine work style of the Party should be carried on by our successors. We attach particular importance to spreading Mao Zedong Thought in order that it will take root among the masses. As for what kind of party we should build, this is a question not only for our generation, but also for the next generation and the generation after that. The party is the key element in a country’s revolution. Only a good party can steer revolution towards victory, after which a good party is still essential to the building of socialism if it is to succeed.

The foregoing has all been to give you an introduction to our Party’s history. In brief, a party must be able to unite all its cadres and members through the necessary struggle. A united party will then be strong enough to unite with the masses. Such a party can play a tremendous role even if it does not have many members. A party with a small number of members and
combat effectiveness is much better than a party with a large number of members but no combat effectiveness. A party with combat effectiveness will grow.
NOTES

1. The Great Revolution, which lasted from 1925 to 1927, was a revolutionary movement of the Chinese people against imperialism and feudalism. PP. 14, 95

2. A reference to Chinese Trotskyites. After the failure of the revolution in 1927 a small number of capitulationists, represented by Chen Duxiu, adopted the Trotskyite stand. They held that the Chinese bourgeoisie had achieved victory over imperialism and feudal forces, that the bourgeois-democratic revolution had gone to completion, that the Chinese proletariat would have to wait until the future to carry out a socialist revolution, and that for the time being the proletariat would have to call off all revolutionary movements, instead conducting legal movements calling for the convocation of a "national assembly". Hence, they were also known as Trotskyite Chen Duxiu liquidationists. After being expelled from the Party in November 1929, Chen Duxiu and others, with the help of Trotsky, ganged up with other Trotskyites and in May 1931 formed a Chinese Trotskyite clique known as the Left opposition of the Communist Party of China (In 1935, it was renamed the Chinese Communist League). Chen Duxiu was made its secretary. Soon afterwards the leaders of the league were arrested by the Kuomintang and the clique disintegrated, but some Trotskyites and small Trotskyite groups continued their activities. During the War of Resistance Against Japan the Trotskyites also averred in their propaganda that they stood for resistance to Japanese aggression, but attacked the policy of an anti-Japanese national united front advocated by the Chinese Communist Party. Owing to the mistaken idea prevalent in the Communist International that the Trotskyites were connected with the espionage organizations of the imperialist countries and that the Chinese Trotskyites were connected with the Japanese imperialist espionage organizations, Trotskyites and Chinese collaborators were considered to be the same. P. 14

3. The three-thirds system was a policy concerning the united-front government adopted by the Chinese Communist Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan. According to this policy, the anti-Japanese democratic government should be roughly composed of one-third Communists, one-third Left progressives, and one-third middle-of-the-roaders and other elements. PP. 19, 78, 96, 126

4. On December 9, 1935, several thousand students in Beijing [now Beijing] held a patriotic demonstration under Communist leadership, raising such slogans as "Stop the civil war and unite to resist foreign aggression!" and "Down with Japanese imperialism!" They were suppressed by the Kuomintang government. The following day students in all schools in Beijing declared a general strike. On December 16 over ten thousand students and city residents held a second demonstration. The movement received a warm response from people throughout the country and gave a new impetus to the Chinese people's fight against Japanese aggression and for national salvation. Historically, it is known as the December 9th Movement. P. 21

5. Song Zheyuan (1885-1940), a native of Leling, Shandong Province, was commander of the 29th Army of the Kuomintang army and governor of Hebei Province. P. 21

6. The leading Party members' group was a leading body set up in government and mass organizations by the Chinese Communist Party. PP. 24, 81

7. The Joint Agency refers to the Joint Administrative Agency for the Southern Hebei, Taihang and Taiyue Areas, established on August 1, 1940. It was the supreme organ of political power in the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Border Area and assumed the responsibility of
legislation for the base areas in the border area. It was dissolved when the government of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Area was established in August 1941. PP. 24, 45

8 National salvation associations conducted political, military and cultural activities among the anti-Japanese army and people in Shanxi, Hebei, Henan and other places at the beginning of the anti-Japanese war. The name for the individual associations varied in different areas and departments. In Shanxi it was usually called the National Revolution Association and in other places it was called the National Salvation Association. PP. 30, 37

9 On March 18, 1941, the Joint Administrative Agency for the Southern Hebei, Taihang and Taiyue Areas decided to accept the suggestion offered by the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It invited representatives from Party, government, army and civilian circles to join together in a preparatory committee for organizing the Provisional Assembly of Representatives of the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Border Area to conduct an election for representatives to the Assembly within the area under its jurisdiction. On July 7 of the same year, the Provisional Assembly of Representatives of the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Border Area was inaugurated in Liaoxi County (now Zuoquan County), Shanxi Province. Representatives from the four regions of southern Hebei, Taihang, Taiyue and Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area attended the inauguration. On July 9 the Assembly was renamed the Provisional Assembly of Representatives of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Area, serving as the border area’s supreme organ of political power. PP. 31, 48, 90

10 Bolshevik is the English transliteration of the Russian, which means the majority. In 1903, when the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party drew up its Party programme and constitution, the Marxists, led by Lenin, waged an intense struggle against Martov and other opportunists. It was Lenin’s supporters who won the majority of the vote in the election of the central leading organ, and so they were called Bolsheviks. Henceforth, Marxists have been called Bolsheviks, and Marxism-Leninism, Bolshevism. PP. 32, 95

11 "A new order in East Asia", a scheme for invading and enslaving China, was proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe on November 3, 1938, in the "Statement of the Imperial Government". It prescribed that Japan, Manchukuo (the puppet state the Japanese imperialists created after their occupation of China's northeast in 1931) and the Kuomintang government join in opposition to communism, thereby placing China under Japan’s political, economic and cultural control. P. 33

12 Luo Fu (1900-76), alias Zhang Wentian, a native of Zhangjiazhai, Nanhu (now part of Chuansha County, Shanghai), Jiangsu Province, was elected member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. After the Zunyi Meeting held in January 1935, according to the division of work among members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, he assumed general responsibility in place of Bo Gu. After 1938, he served as member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and director of the Central Propaganda Department. PP. 34, 332


14 A reference to the “Regulations Concerning the Political Work of the Eighteenth Group Army (the Eighth Route Army) of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army (Draft)”, formulated by the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army. It was a revised draft of the “Provisional Regulations Concerning the Political Work of the Eighteenth Group Army of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army (Draft)”, promulgated in 1938. The full text was carried in issues 4 and 5, Vol. II, of the Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army, published in 1940. It was officially promulgated in 1942. P. 35
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15 The north China edition of Xinhua Daily, launched on January 1, 1939, was an organ of the Northern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. It was replaced by the Taihang edition of Xinhua Daily on October 1, 1943. P. 36

16 Liu Bocheng (1892-1986) was a native of Kaixian, Sichuan Province. In his early years he joined the students army, formed in response to the Revolution of 1911, and fought in the wars for protecting the Republic and upholding the Provisional Constitution. In 1926 he joined the Chinese Communist Party. As chief of the general staff corps under the CPC Frontline Committee, he was one of the leaders of the August the First Nanchang Uprising, in 1927. Towards the end of the year, he went to study in the Soviet Union. After his return to China, in 1930, he served as member of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, president and political commissar of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Academy, and chief of the general staff of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. In 1934 he took part in the Long March, serving as chief of the general staff of the Red Army and commander of the Central Column. After the Red Army's First and Fourth Front Armies joined forces, he waged a resolute struggle with Zhu De and others against Zhang Guotao's attempts to split the Party. Following the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, he became commander of the Eighth Route Army's 129th Division. Together with its political commissar, Deng Xiaoping, he set up the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan and other anti-Japanese base areas. During the War of Liberation he served as commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Heilongjiang-Henan Field Army, the Central Plains Field Army and the Second Field Army. In June 1947 he and Deng Xiaoping led the army in pressing onward to the Dabie Mountains area, raising the curtain on the PLA's nationwide strategic counter-offensive against Kuomintang troops. Later he helped lead the Huai-Hai and Crossing-the-Yangtze campaigns. After the founding of the People's Republic, he became second secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, chairman of the Southwest Military and Administrative Council, president and political commissar of the PLA's Military Academy, vice-chairman of the CPC Central Committee's Military Commission and of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, member of the Seventh through to the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, and of the Political Bureau from the Eighth to the Eleventh CPC Central Committee. PP. 40, 143, 160, 318

17 The Central Soviet Area was a base area under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. It was located in southern Jiangxi Province and western Fujian Province, with Ruijin, the seat of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, as its centre. In its heyday it had 21 counties under its jurisdiction, with a population of about 2.5 million. PP. 40, 74, 104, 336

18 In October 1934 the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the Central Red Army, after joining forces with the Red Army's Fourth Front Army in June 1935 and restoring the name of First Front Army), along with two columns composed of personnel of the Central Committee, its Military Commission and army units directly under the Commission, set out on a major strategic shift from Ruijin and other places in southern Jiangxi. They traversed the eleven provinces of Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan, Xikang (now divided under the jurisdiction of Sichuan Province and the Tibet Autonomous Region), Gansu and Shaanxi, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless marshlands and grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating hundreds of thousands of repeated enemy encirclements, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions. The Red Army covered more than 20,000 li (about 12,500 kilometres) on this march, to arrive triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shaanxi in October 1935. PP. 40, 104, 169, 190, 338

19 The Three People's Principles were the principles and programme put forward by Sun Yat-sen during China's bourgeois-democratic revolution on the questions of nationalism,
democracy and the people's livelihood. These three varied a little at different times, but here they refer to the new Three People's Principles, established after Sun Yat-sen, at the suggestion of the Communists, restated the principles at the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in January 1924. They included the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, in addition to a programme of opposing imperialism and feudalism.

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20 The Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction was adopted at the provisional national congress of the Chinese Kuomintang, held in Wuhan, Hubei Province, from March 29 to April 1, 1938. Its contents covered military, political, economic and foreign policies for the war of resistance, and certain concessions made to the people, such as organizing people's political organs and granting freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association. However, because of Chiang Kai-shek's policy of passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party, some of these concessions were never realized.

P. 41

21 A reference to a surprise attack by the Eighth Route Army on the Japanese aggressors' airport in Yangmingbu, Daixian County, Shanxi Province. On the night of October 19, 1937, the 3rd Battalion of the 769th Regiment of the Eighth Route Army's 129th Division, supported by the 1st and 2nd battalions and the local people, secretly crossed the Hutuo River, slipped into the Japanese airport in Yangmingbu, and mounted a sudden attack. Within an hour of fierce fighting they set 24 enemy aeroplanes on fire and wiped out more than 100 Japanese troops.

P. 43

22 A reference to a series of military operations conducted by the 386th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army's 129th Division involving the ambush of Japanese troops in the area of Qigencun, Huangyadi and Guangyang, south of Nangziguan, from late October to early November, 1937. In late October 1937 two Japanese divisions advanced westwards along the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway, attempting to join Japanese troops along the Datong-Puzhou Railway for an attack on Taiyuan. A unit of the 386th Brigade laid an ambush at Qigencun on October 26 and 28, and attacked the baggage convoy of the Japanese 20th Division, wiping out more than 400 enemy troops. They then ambushed a regiment of the Japanese 109th Division at Huangyadi, on November 2, wiping out more than 300 enemy troops. The 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army annihilated nearly 1,000 Japanese troops in an ambush in the Guangyang area. After that the 386th Brigade, supported by the 769th Regiment, laid an ambush in an area east of Guangyang on November 7, putting more than 250 enemy troops out of action.

P. 44

23 The Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan Railway was formerly known as the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway. It was originally planned to run from Liulinpu in Zhengding, Hebei Province, to Taiyuan in Shanxi Province. After construction began, however, it was changed into a line running between Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, and Taiyuan.

P. 44

24 On December 22, 1937, the Japanese aggressors assembled more than 5,000 infantrymen and cavalrymen to protect their rear area and communication lines. They set out from Taigu, Yuci, Shouyang, Yangquan, Pingding and Xiyang in Shanxi Province for a six-point convergent attack on men of the Eighth Route Army active in the area southeast of Shouyang. The 772nd Regiment of the Eighth Route Army's 129th Division fought the enemy on interior lines while the 769th Regiment attacked on exterior lines, eventually forcing the Japanese troops to withdraw on December 26, with more than 700 casualties. This brought about favourable conditions for the establishment of the base areas in the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Border Area.

P. 44

25 In order to remove the threat to their rear area, the Japanese aggressors assembled over 30,000 men in early April 1938 for a convergent attack on the Eighth Route Army troops and other anti-Japanese armed forces in southeastern Shanxi. The enemy troops set out from nine routes, including Yuci, Taigu and Hongtong on the Datong-Puzhou Railway, Xingtai on
the Beiping-Hankou Railway, Pingding on the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway, Shexian and Changzhi on the Handan-Changzhi Highway, and Tunliu on the Linfen-Tunliu Highway. The General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army decided to concentrate its main force on fighting against Japanese troops on one route and use smaller forces to check Japanese troops on the other routes. After more than ten days of fighting, Japanese troops infiltrated the base areas in southeastern Shanxi from three routes, but those from all the other routes were held back. On April 16 the main force of the Eighth Route Army's 129th Division seized the opportunity to shift to the interior lines and wiped out more than 2,200 Japanese troops in the area of Changle Village to the east of Wuxiang. On hearing the news, the Japanese troops on all the other routes withdrew. By April 27 the Eighth Route Army had completely shattered the Japanese convergent attack, annihilating a total of more than 4,000 enemy troops and recovering 18 county seats, thus consolidating and expanding the anti-Japanese base areas in southeastern Shanxi. P. 44

In early March 1938 the 108th Division of the Japanese invading forces advanced westwards along the Handan-Changzhi highway in an attempt to join the 20th Division, that was moving southwards down the Datong-Puzhou Railway, to wipe out Kuomintang troops that had retreated to southern Shanxi. Acting on orders from the Revolutionary Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army marched to the area southeast of Xiangyuan, waiting for an opportunity to destroy the Handan-Changzhi highway and attack enemy troops. On March 16 part of the 129th Division attacked Licheng, an important military depot of the enemy, to attract enemy reinforcements from Lucheng. They then ambushed the enemy reinforcements in the Shentouling area between Licheng and Lucheng, wiping out more than 1,500 Japanese troops. On March 31 they ambushed a Japanese baggage convoy at Xiangtangpu, southwest of Shexian County, annihilating more than 400 Japanese troops, destroying 180 enemy trucks and capturing a huge amount of military supplies. The two victorious ambushes on the Handan-Changzhi highway struck the Japanese troops hard and held them back, assisting the Kuomintang troops in western and southern Shanxi Province. P. 44

The decisive battle at Xuzhou was fought between Chinese troops and Japanese invading forces over a large territory centring around Xuzhou. Beginning in December 1937, Japanese troops in north and central China began advancing towards the periphery of Xuzhou from the south and north, along the Tianjin-Pukou Railway and the Tai'erzhuang-Weixian highway. In early April 1938, in the wake of their victorious battle at Tai'erzhuang, Chinese troops continued to send reinforcements to southern Shandong and assembled about 600,000 troops in the vicinity of Xuzhou. The Japanese troops, after their setback at Tai'erzhuang, began to muster more than 200,000 troops from the south and north in early April to outflank Xuzhou. Under the Japanese convergent attack, the Chinese troops broke through the encirclement and moved towards the Henan-Anhui Border Area by various routes. Xuzhou was occupied by Japanese troops on May 19. The decisive battle at Wuhan was fought between Chinese troops and Japanese invading forces in a vast area centring around Wuhan. After the battle of Xuzhou, the Japanese army assembled its forces from the southern and northern theatres before launching a convergent attack on Wuhan in mid-June 1938. In August the Japanese forces, 350,000 strong, closed in on Wuhan along the banks of the Yangtze River from the east, north and southeast. The Chinese troops, 1.1 million strong, stubbornly resisted the Japanese troops at a number of strategic positions around Wuhan, but failed to repel the Japanese troops' advance. As a result, Wuhan was encircled by Japanese troops. On October 25 the Chinese troops withdrew from all fronts and two days later Wuhan fell into enemy hands. P. 44
"Associations for the preservation of order" were provisional local puppet governments established by Chinese collaborators under the instigation of the Japanese aggressors in the areas they occupied during the anti-Japanese war. P. 44

Secret societies in old China included such clandestine organizations among the people as the Triad Society, the Society of Brothers, the Big Sword Society, the Rational Life Society and the Hongmen. Their membership consisted mainly of impoverished peasants, unemployed handicraftsmen and the *lumpen* proletarians. They were often drawn together by religion or superstition, and some groups armed themselves. Although some of the secret societies fought against the oppression of the bureaucrats and landlords, these feudalistic and backward organizations were easily utilized by the reactionary ruling classes and even by the Japanese aggressors and puppet forces. PP. 44, 64

The self-defence corps and joint village associations were armed forces established by Japanese aggressors in villages and towns to maintain "public security" in their areas during the anti-Japanese war. In some areas they were known as "civil corps". PP. 44, 64

During the anti-Japanese war the Japanese aggressors who had occupied north China reorganized in their areas stragglers and disbanded soldiers of the Kuomintang army, who had surrendered to Japan, and armed bandits for the purpose of "using Chinese to subdue Chinese". Known as the Imperial Army's assistant forces, their task was to assist Japanese troops in garrisoning communication lines and strongholds and support their attacks on the anti-Japanese base areas led by the Chinese Communist Party. P. 44

The brutal plan of "maintaining public order and conducting mopping-up operations" was carried out by the Japanese invading forces from the beginning of 1939 to March 1940 to strengthen their occupation of north China. The plan included the launching of military attacks to destroy the anti-Japanese base areas, establishment of puppet organizations, building up of pro-Japanese armed groups, practice of "self-defence" and "self-government" to bring the masses under their control, and a policy of mollification to deceive the people. P. 45

See "On the New Stage", a political report by Mao Zedong at the enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee in 1938. P. 45

This was a cruel policy adopted by the Japanese imperialists to eliminate the Communist-led people's armed forces operating behind enemy lines and destroy the anti-Japanese base areas. With railways as pillars, highways as chains and blockhouses as locks, supplemented by blockade walls and trenches, the policy was designed to construct a framework for tightening their encirclement of the army and people of the anti-Japanese base areas. P. 45

The Baigui-Jincheng Campaign was fought in early May 1940 by the troops of the Eighth Route Army's 129th Division, with the support of the people in the base areas, to destroy the Baigui-Jincheng Railway, of which the Japanese aggressors had been trying to complete construction hastily. They destroyed more than 50 kilometres of the railway, demolished more than 50 bridges of various size and annihilated over 350 enemy troops, thwarting the enemy's plan to complete building of the railway and break up the base areas. P. 45

This was a large-scale campaign conducted by the Eighth Route Army behind enemy lines in north China during the anti-Japanese war. From August 20 to December 5, 1940, more than 100 regiments totalling 400,000 men were deployed. Supported by the masses and the militia, they launched an attack on the main communication lines in the enemy's rear in north China, and co-operated with the armed forces and people of various base areas in their operations against the enemy's "mopping-up" drives. The campaign lasted three and a half months, in which over 1,800 battles were fought, more than 2,900 enemy strongholds captured, and over 46,000 Japanese and puppet troops annihilated. P. 45

Southern Hebei Bank notes (called Hebei Currency for short) were legal tender issued
by the Southern Hebei Bank of the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Border Area. They first appeared in southern Hebei and the Taihang area in October 1939. Later they were circulated all over north China, greatly ensuring and promoting expanded production and trade, and economic development in north China. After the People's Bank of China was founded in December 1948, it began issuing the renminbi as the national currency and the issuance and circulation of Hebei Currency came to an end. 

PP. 46, 92

39 A reference to a counterattack in self-defence conducted by the Eighth Route Army to check the military attack of the Kuomintang diehards during the first anti-Communist onslaught launched by Chiang Kai-shek. Between the winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940, the Eighth Route Army smashed the attacks on the anti-Japanese base areas in southern Hebei and Taihang launched by Kuomintang diehards Shi Yousan, Lu Zhonglin and Zhu Huaiying. 

P. 46

40 On December 3, 1939, Yan Xishan, a warlord in Shanxi, gathered four corps, one division and one brigade for a convergent attack on the 2nd Column of the Shanxi Youth Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps, stationed in western Shanxi, and the Western Shanxi Independent Detachment of the Eighth Route Army. They murdered dozens of cadres of the anti-Japanese democratic governments and the League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation in Shanxi and sick and wounded men of the Eighth Route Army in Xixian and five other counties. Between December 8 and 26 Sun Chu led Yan Xishan's troops, in alliance with troops from Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army, to mount attacks on the 1st and 3rd columns of the Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps active in southeastern Shanxi, destroying the anti-Japanese democratic governments and mass organizations in Qinshui, Yangcheng and five other counties, massacring more than 500 Communists and other people, arresting more than 1,000 people, and inciting some reactionary officers of the 3rd Column of the Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps to rebel. These anti-Communist incidents were generally known as the December Incidents.

P. 46

41 A reference to the meeting of senior cadres convened in Licheng, Shanxi Province, by the Northern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in April 1940. 

P. 46

42 The “tighten public security” campaign was a measure adopted by the Japanese aggressors to conduct “warfare in every field”, i.e., political, military, economic and cultural, on the basis of “maintaining public order and conducting mopping-up operations”. Between the spring of 1941 and the winter of 1942 Japanese aggressors staged five campaigns for “tightening public security” in north China, intensifying their “mopping-up” operations in the anti-Japanese base areas, establishing puppet troops in the guerrilla zones, tightening control of these zones, instituting the bao-jia system in their areas, making house-to-house inspections and expanding the puppet troops, in an attempt to suppress the anti-Japanese forces. 

PP. 47, 65

43 During the anti-Japanese war the Japanese aggressors, in order to consolidate the areas they had occupied and demolish and reduce the anti-Japanese base areas, built large numbers of strongholds, blockhouses, highways, trenches and walls to divide the anti-Japanese base areas into small patches, cutting off their communication links and imposing a rigid blockade on them. This web of highways, trenches, walls and so forth was known as the “crisscross network”. 

P. 47

44 The Military Sub-committee refers to the North China Sub-committee of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee. 

P. 47

45 On April 29, 1942, the 12th Army of the Japanese invading forces gathered together part of the 1st, 7th and 8th Independent Composite Brigades and some of the puppet troops, totalling more than 12,000 men, and launched a massive “mopping-up” operation against the Southern Hebei Anti-Japanese Base Area. The base area was partitioned into many small zones, most reduced to guerrilla zones or occupied by the enemy. 

PP. 47, 78
46 See Note 7 above.  

47 On October 8, 1941, hundreds of believers in Li Guia Taoism, a feudalistic and superstitious organization in Licheng, Shanxi Province, were manipulated by Chinese collaborators and secret agents into staging an armed rebellion. They attempted to occupy the county seat, overthrow the anti-Japanese government, organize a puppet regime and throw in their lot with the Japanese aggressors. The Licheng County Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Licheng county government promptly led anti-Japanese troops and the people in suppressing the rebellion.  

48 In the spring of 1942 Japanese aggressors along the Beijing-Hankou Railway engineered a “mopping-up” operation against the Western Hebei Anti-Japanese Base Area to disrupt spring ploughing there. To co-operate with this operation, a small number of Chinese collaborators and secret agents, who had sneaked into the base area, plotted to meet at Chaiguan in Shahe County on April 11 and coerce the deceived people into staging an armed rebellion. The local anti-Japanese government cracked the case in time and executed the principal culprits on the spot, thus shattering the enemy’s plot to destroy the anti-Japanese base area.  

49 The Pacific War refers to the conflict in the Pacific region between the anti-fascist allied nations and Japan during the Second World War. On the morning of December 7, 1941, without declaring war, Japan employed a huge naval and air force in a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour, the main Pacific base of the U.S. navy and air force, inflicting disastrous losses on the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The following day the United States and Britain declared war on Japan, while Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. Japanese troops occupied many countries and regions in Southeast Asia and some islands in the Pacific Ocean. Later, under the heavy blows dealt by the armed forces of the anti-fascist nations in the Pacific region, Japan suffered one defeat after another. In August 1945 it surrendered unconditionally, and thereupon the war was ended.  

50 Following the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, the anti-Japanese democratic regime in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Area promulgated decrees on the reduction of rent and interest rates and a reasonable distribution of burdens, with a view to improving the lives of the people in the base area, mobilizing the people to support the war effort and overcoming financial difficulties. The gist of the decrees on the reduction of rent and interest rates was: Generally land rents under all forms of tenancy should be reduced by 25 per cent and interest should be reduced to 15 per cent or less. The important points in the decrees on the reasonable distribution of burdens were: The extent of taxation should be in proportion to assets and income; except for a few extremely poor people, who are exempt from taxation, everyone must pay taxes according to the rates; taxes should not exceed 30 to 35 per cent of an individual's annual income. The policy of reducing rent and interest rates was carried out in the new liberated areas during the War of Liberation and in the early days of the People's Republic of China. The policy of reasonable distribution of burdens was also implemented in some places during the War of Liberation.  

51 “Warfare in every field” was a strategic policy applied by the Japanese aggressors during the stage of strategic stalemate in the anti-Japanese war. The policy combined political, military, economic and cultural means to exercise control over occupied areas and attack the anti-Japanese base areas.  

52 This refers to the “Decision on Unifying Party Leadership in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas and Readjusting Relationship Among Various Organizations”, issued by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on September 1, 1942. According to the decision, centralized Party leadership should be exercised in all the base areas, the Party committees at various levels should serve as the supreme organs of leadership in their areas and exercise unified leadership over Party, government, army and civilian work in these areas, and Party,
government and military committees in various areas should be disbanded. The decision stressed the need for strict implementation of the system of democratic centralism and the principle of the lower level being subordinate to the higher level, and the entire membership being subordinate to the Central Committee. It also stressed the need to correct and guard against the tendency of Party committees to monopolize the work of government and mass organizations. The decision was of great significance in unifying the actions of various organizations in the anti-Japanese base areas, in strengthening the struggle against the enemy, and in building up base areas.

P. 53

53 “Stereotyped Party writing” characterizes the writings of certain people in revolutionary ranks who piled up revolutionary phrases and terms instead of analysing the facts when they wrote articles, delivered speeches or did other propaganda work. Their writings and speeches were nothing but verbiage.

PP. 58, 95

54 The plan was carried out by Japanese invaders in north China during China’s war of resistance under the banner of storing grain for the masses. They forced the peasants in their areas and guerrilla zones to put their grain in storehouses near Japanese strongholds, in order to satisfy their own needs and prevent grain from being transported to anti-Japanese base areas. P. 65

55 A reference to the report made by Peng Dehuai on December 18, 1942, at a meeting of cadres at and above the battalion level from the armed forces in the Taihang area and at and above the county level from the local Party organizations. The report, entitled “How to Hold On To and Consolidate the Anti-Japanese Democratic Base Areas”, was carried in Party Life, published by the Northern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on January 15, 1943.

P. 73

56 In September 1933 Chiang Kai-shek assembled some 500,000 troops and launched the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign against the Central Revolutionary Base Area by the new strategy of using blockhouses. At the time the Communist Party leadership, influenced by Wang Ming’s “Left” adventurism, erroneously practised positional warfare instead of guerrilla and mobile warfare. They were adventurist when on the offensive, then made the mistake of being conservative when on the defensive. As a result, the Red Army lost many battles, became unable to take effective action and failed to break the “encirclement and suppression” campaign after a year of bitter fighting. In October 1934 the main force of the Central Red Army was forced to withdraw from the Central Revolutionary Base Area and began the Long March.

PP. 74, 104

57 The Sixth Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Yan’an from September 29 to November 6, 1938. At the session Mao Zedong delivered a political report entitled “On the New Stage”, and a concluding speech calling on the entire Party membership conscientiously to shoulder the great and historic responsibility of leading the War of Resistance Against Japan. All the participants supported the policy of an anti-Japanese national united front, criticized the mistakes of Right capitulationism on the question of a united front and decided on the policy that the Party should independently lead the anti-Japanese armed struggle. It was decided that the Party should mainly work in war zones and the enemy’s rear areas and that great efforts should be made to consolidate north China and develop central China. It was stressed that all the Party membership, from top to bottom, should conscientiously study the theory of Marxism-Leninism, learn to apply Marxism-Leninism and the experience of other countries to the specific circumstances of China and oppose dogmatism.

P. 77

58 After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, in order to develop wartime production, arouse the enthusiasm of the masses for production, safeguard the interests of workers, benefit both labour and capital and consolidate the anti-Japanese national united front, the anti-Japanese democratic government in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Area promulgated a decree increasing wages for hired hands. One stipulation read: The wage
of a hired hand should be fixed in the light of local living conditions; it should be enough
for himself and for the minimum living expenses of an additional one or one and a half
persons. When he is asked to work longer hours, his pay should be increased accordingly, and
when he works on holidays, he should get additional pay in accordance with the relevant
regulations.

50 Wu Manyou, a native of Hengshan, Shaanxi Province, fled from famine in 1928 and
arrived in Yan'an to do farm work. In 1942 he distinguished himself in the great production
campaign by working hard to reclaim wasteland and grow crops, becoming a labour hero in
the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. On January 11, 1943, the Liberation Daily
newspaper in Yan'an published an editorial calling on the peasants in the region to launch a
"Wu Manyou Campaign" in order to learn from him and devote every effort to reclaiming
wasteland and developing production.

52 A reference to the "Provisional Rules of Unified Progressive Taxation in the Shanxi-
Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Area", promulgated on April 25, 1943. The unified progres-
sive taxation was a system of taxation introduced by the anti-Japanese democratic government
during the anti-Japanese war. Under this system, several taxes simultaneously levied on assets
and income in rural areas were combined into one. An increase in minimum taxable assets
and income was accompanied by an increase in the tax rate.

51 On November 4, 1935, in order to take control of the banking business nationwide,
the Kuomintang government implemented the paper currency policy, which banned the
circulation of silver dollars. It decided that the paper notes issued by the Central Bank, the
Bank of China, the Bank of Communications and, later, the Farmers' Bank of China should
be the legal unified currency throughout the country, which was called legal currency for
short. During the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation, galloping
inflation in the Kuomintang areas caused a sharp devaluation of the legal currency, which was
replaced by gold yuan notes as of August 19, 1948.

53 Quoted from Mao Zedong's telegram to Peng Dehuai of January 25, 1943, the original
reads: "The central responsibilities for the base areas behind enemy lines are fighting,
-economic development and education."

54 The rectification movement was a Party-wide Marxist-Leninist ideological education
movement launched by the Chinese Communist Party in 1942. The main tasks were: Fight
subjectivism to rectify the style of study, fight sectarianism to rectify the style in Party
relations, and fight Party stereotypes to rectify the style of writing. Through this movement,
the whole Party became more conscious of the basic orientation, i.e., integrating the universal
truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.

55 The three great revolutionary wars were the First Revolutionary Civil War (1925-27),
the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-37) and the War of Resistance Against Japan
(1937-45).

56 Chen Duxiu's opportunism refers to the error of Right capitulationism in the first half
of 1927, represented by Chen Duxiu, who forfeited leadership of the peasant masses, urban
petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie, and, worst of all, the armed forces. He advocated
all alliance and no struggle, adopting a policy of compromise and capitulation towards the
activities plotted by the Right wingers of the Kuomintang against the Communist Party and
the people, to the extent that when Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, representatives of
the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, betrayed the revolution and sprang a surprise
attack on the people, the Chinese Communist Party and the people were unable to organize
effective resistance, bringing about the failure of the First Revolutionary Civil War. On
August 7, 1927, the CPC Central Committee convened an emergency meeting in Hankou,
at which it analysed the experience and lessons drawn from the failure, and ended the rule
of Chen Duxiu's Right capitulationism in the Central Committee.
NOTES 353

66 Li Lisan (1899-1967), a native of Liling County, Hunan Province, was one of the early leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. On June 11, 1930, under his leadership, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee adopted a resolution entitled "The New Revolutionary High Tide and Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces", which advocated preparing for immediate armed insurrections throughout the country. He drew up an adventurist plan to organize such insurrections in the key cities and to amass all the forces of the Red Army to attack these cities. He subsequently combined the leading organs of the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions at all levels into action committees for insurrection. These "Left" adventurist mistakes became known as the "Li Lisan line". In September of the same year, the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee began to correct these "Left" mistakes. Li Lisan admitted his mistakes at the session and stepped down from his leading position on the Central Committee. When he proved that he had corrected his mistakes through a long period of revolutionary practice, he was re-elected a member of the Central Committee at the Party's Seventh and Eighth National Congresses. P. 95

67 A reference to the error of the "Left" adventurism represented by the dogmatist Wang Ming from January 1931 to January 1935. With the support of the Communist International and its representative, Pavel Mif, Wang Ming and his followers gained the leading position in the Central Committee at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee, held in January 1931. Politically, they blurred the demarcation line between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution and put the struggle against the bourgeoisie on a par with the struggle against imperialism and feudalism; they ignored the marked change in China's class relations after the September 18th Incident of 1931 (Japan's invasion of northeast China) and regarded the intermediate forces as "the most dangerous enemy". They also continued to push the "theory of making the cities the centre of the Chinese revolution" and held that the Red Army should seize the key cities in order to achieve victory first in one or more provinces, which would then lead to nationwide victory. Militarily, they first practised adventurism and, later, lapsed into conservatism and fleeing away. Organizationally, they practised sectarianism and followed a policy of "ruthless struggle and merciless blows" towards those who disagreed with their erroneous views. The "Left" adventurism of Wang Ming dominated the Party for four years and brought heavy losses to it and the whole revolutionary cause. In January 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting in Zunyi, Guizhou Province, which established the correct leadership of the new Central Committee represented by Mao Zedong, thus ending the domination of Wang Ming's "Left" adventurist line in the central leading organs of the CPC. PP. 95, 332

68 The Zunyi Meeting was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held at Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in January 1935, during the Long March. It focused on discussing and rectifying the errors in military affairs, organizationally ended the domination of Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism in the CPC Central Committee, established the correct leadership of the new Central Committee represented by Mao Zedong, thus saving the Red Army and the Party from destruction at a most critical juncture. PP. 96, 159, 260, 295, 332

69 A reference to the period from November 1937, around the time of the fall of Taiyuan, to October 1938, around the fall of Wuhan, when the Japanese aggressors launched a frontal attack against north China as Kuomintang troops retreated southwards. In order to persevere in the war of resistance in areas behind enemy lines in north China, the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army under its leadership penetrated the enemy's rear area, waged guerrilla warfare independently there, recruited Party members in great numbers, established and consolidated Party organizations, vigorously expanded anti-Japanese armed forces, set up anti-Japanese governments and built anti-Japanese base areas. P. 96

70 The Huxia area, also known as the Jiangsu-Shandong-Henan Border Area, was situated west of Weishan Lake where Jiangsu, Shandong and Henan provinces meet. From August to
November 1939, a campaign to eliminate the Trotskyites was erroneously conducted there; many Party, government and army cadres were falsely accused of being Trotskyites, arrested and placed under investigation, and some were wrongly killed. Party organizations in the area were paralysed for a while, bringing extremely serious losses to the revolutionary cause. The campaign represented a major case of injustice which was dealt with on many occasions between 1940 and 1945 by the Central Committee and its Shandong Sub-bureau and was redressed completely with the approval of the Central Committee in December 1983. P. 97

Peng Dehuai (1898-1974), a native of Xiangtan, Hunan Province, was deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighteenth Group Army. From August 1942 to September 1943, he was acting secretary of the Northern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. P. 98

Study committees were established during the rectification movement. A general committee was formed under the CPC Central Committee, and regional committees were set up in organizations directly under the departments of the Party, government and army, and there were similar committees at lower levels. Their task was to help lead the studying during the rectification movement. Here it refers to the study committee of the Party School of the Northern Bureau. P. 100

Chen refers to Chen Geng (1903-61), a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan Province. At the time he was commander of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. Xie refers to Xie Fuzhi (1909-72), a native of Huang’an (now Hong’an), Hubei Province. He was political commissar of the Fourth Column. The Chen-Xie Army was formed on orders from the Central Military Commission when it was advancing towards the Central Plains. It had the Fourth Column, the Ninth Column, the 38th Corps and the 22nd Brigade of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army under its command. P. 101

The Shandong army refers to the main force of the East China Field Army, under the command of Chen Yi and Su Yu, fighting in Shandong Province against the Kuomintang troops. The army was ordered to march to Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu provinces, engaging in military operations on exterior lines together with the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, and with the army of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, commanded by Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, in order to carry the war to the Kuomintang areas. These troops fought in a series of major campaigns in areas centring on Henan Province and enclosed by the Yangtze, Huaihe, Yellow and Hanshui rivers. P. 101

The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were the rules of discipline laid down by Mao Zedong and others for the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. Their contents varied slightly at different times and in different army units. In October 1947, the General Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army issued a standard version as follows:

The Three Main Rules of Discipline: 1) Obey orders in all your actions; 2) Don’t take a single needle or length of thread from the masses; 3) Turn in everything captured. The Eight Points for Attention: 1) Speak politely; 2) Pay a fair price for what you buy; 3) Return everything you borrow; 4) Pay for anything you damage; 5) Don’t hit or swear at people; 6) Don’t damage crops; 7) Don’t take liberties with women; 8) Don’t ill-treat captives.

P. 102, 126, 168

A reference to the six columns led by Commander Liu Bocheng and Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, the eight columns led by Commander and Political Commissar Chen Yi and Deputy Commander Su Yu of the East China Field Army, and the group army led by Commander Chen Geng and Political Commissar Xie Fuzhi of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. Beginning in June 1947, these three main forces advanced into the Dabie Mountains and then the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu and Henan-Shanxi-Hubei border areas, effecting a strategic deployment and constituting a favourable triangular military posture on the Central
NOTES 355

Plains battlefield. P. 103

77 The civil war during the ten-year Soviet period, generally known as the Second Revolutionary Civil War or the Agrarian Revolutionary War, refers to the revolutionary war waged from 1927 to 1937, in which the Chinese Communist Party led the Chinese people in an armed struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries in order to launch an agrarian revolution and build and safeguard the workers' and peasants' Soviet democratic political power. P. 104

78 Ren Bishi (1904-50), a native of Tangjiaqiao (now part of Miluo City), Xiangyin County, Hunan Province, was then member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The report referred to here was a speech he delivered at the enlarged meeting of the Front Committee of the Northwest Field Army, held on January 12, 1948. The speech, entitled “Some Problems in Land Reform”, has been included in the Selected Works of Ren Bishi. P. 107

79 The National Land Conference was convened by the Working Committee of the CPC Central Committee in Xibaipo Village, Jianping County (made part of Pingshan County in 1958), Hebei Province, from July 17 to September 13, 1947. It summed up the experience in land reform since the issuing of the "May 4th Directive" in 1946, opposed the Right tendency in land reform, and adopted a policy of confiscating land belonging to landlords and distributing it equally among the peasants. It drafted and adopted the "Outline Land Law of China" and decided to consolidate Party organizations in conjunction with land reform. The promulgation of the "Outline Land Law of China" promoted land reform movements to eliminate the system of feudal exploitation in various liberated areas. However, the conference did not pay sufficient attention to the "Left" tendency that had already manifested itself in the previous stage of land reform, and overestimated the lack of thoroughness in land reform and impurities in ideology and organization within the Party in some areas, thus leading to a further development of "Left" errors. P. 108

80 The later Soviet period refers to the period from the end of 1931 to the end of 1934, namely, from the victorious conclusion of the third campaign against the enemy’s "encirclement and suppression" to the Zunyi Meeting. During this period the "Left" adventurist line, represented by Wang Ming, predominated in the Soviet areas. P. 109

81 Zhang Guotao (1897-1979) was a native of Pingxiang, Jiangxi Province. From 1931 to 1932, when he was secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Sub-bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of its military commission, he wrongly conducted a large-scale movement to eliminate "counter-revolutionaries", in which many revolutionary cadres and other people were executed. P. 110


83 In his report, "On the New Stage", delivered at the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC, held in October 1938, Mao Zedong proposed a policy of "protecting the free operation of privately run industrial and commercial enterprises". The session adopted a resolution approving Mao Zedong's report. P. 111

84 "Essential Points in Land Reform in the New Liberated Areas" was an inner-Party directive drafted by Mao Zedong for the CPC Central Committee. It was included in the fourth volume of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong. P. 111


86 This directive is included in the fourth volume of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong. PP. 115, 136

87 The Guangxi clique refers to local warlords in Guangxi headed by Li Zongren and Bai
Chongxi. After 1938, Li Zongren, Liao Lei and Li Pinxian, generals of the Guangxi clique, served successively as the Kuomintang governor of Anhui Province.

88 Tang Enbo (1900-54), a native of Wuyi, Zhejiang Province, served as deputy commander of the First War Zone and commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang troops in the Henan-Shandong-Jiangsu-Anhui border area, with his troops garrisoned in Henan Province during the War of Resistance Against Japan.

89 The quoted passage was added by Mao Zedong when he read over this document.

90 The quoted passage was added by Mao Zedong when he read over this document.

91 "Total warfare" was a strategy applied by the Kuomintang from the end of 1947 to early 1948 that combined military means with political and economic measures to retrieve its defeat. Militarily, it redelimited pacification zones and defended them separately. Politically, it intensified its efforts to "train the masses in rotation and expand local armed forces". Economically, it imposed blockade on the liberated areas. It was not long after this strategy was adopted in the battlefields, it was smashed by the strategic offensive launched by the PLA.

92 A reference to the Xiangfan Campaign. Between mid-June and early July 1948, with the support of the Central Plains Field Army, the main force of the East China Field Army launched the Eastern Henan Campaign. Xiangyang, Fancheng and other places along the middle section of the Hanshui River valley were inadequately defended, because Kuomintang troops had been transferred to eastern Henan as reinforcements. On July 2, with the support of the troops of the Jianghan Military Region, the Sixth Column of the Central Plains Field Army and the main forces of the Tongbai and southern Shaanxi military regions started the Xiangfan Campaign, rushing to attack the enemy from a long distance. After 14 days of fierce fighting, they wiped out more than 20,000 enemy troops, captured Kang Ze, commander of the Kuomintang troops' 15th Pacification Zone, and liberated Guanghua, Laohekou, Gucheng, Nanzhang, Yicheng, Xiangyang and Fancheng.


94 Between June 17 and 22, 1948, with the support of the Central Plains Field Army, the main force of the East China Field Army attacked and captured Kaifeng, capital of Henan Province, which had been guarded by Kuomintang troops. In order to retain battleground initiative, the People’s Liberation Army withdrew from Kaifeng on June 26. During its occupation of Kaifeng, the PLA followed to the letter the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention. To protect the lives and property of the people and maintain public order in the city, it gave lenient treatment to all officers and men of the Kuomintang army, who had laid down their arms, and asked Kuomintang government’s officials at provincial, municipal and county levels and its economic and cultural staff to perform their duties as usual and with an easy mind and to protect the assets and documents of their departments. The PLA did not capture or arrest anyone unless he had resisted with arms, and gave preferential treatment to those who had performed meritorious service. In addition, it protected schools, churches, hospitals, and all private factories, shops and houses. All these policy measures were affirmed by the CPC Central Committee in a circular.

95 Cf. Note 50 above.

96 The Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign is also known as the Cross-the-River Campaign. On April 20, 1949, the Second and Third Field Armies of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, acting on orders from the Central Military Commission, started the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign by crossing the Yangtze River from the Hukou (in
Jiangxi Province) - Jiangyin (in Jiangsu Province) sector. Meanwhile, the advance army of the Fourth Field Army marched to the Wuhan front in support of the Second and Third Field Armies. The campaign was concluded on June 2. More than 430,000 of the two Kuomintang group armies, under the command of Tang Enbo and Bai Chongxi respectively, were wiped out, and southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui, a vast area of Zhejiang, part of Jiangxi, Fujian and Hubei, as well as the key cities of Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou and Wuhan, were liberated, proclaiming the end of the 22-year reactionary rule of the Kuomintang government and laying the groundwork for the PLA's triumphant march into Fujian and south and southwest China. See "From the Crossing of the Yangtze River to the Capture of Shanghai" in this book for more detailed information about the campaign, pp. 138-42 below. P. 138

97 On April 3, 1949, the CPC Central Military Commission approved the "Outline Plan for the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign". At that time a delegation from the Chinese Communist Party and one from the Nanjing Kuomintang government had already entered into talks. Although all preparations for crossing the Yangtze River had been made, the Chinese People's Liberation Army time and again postponed the operation in the hope that an agreement favourable to the people would be reached through the talks. On April 20 the Nanjing Kuomintang government refused to sign the "Agreement on Internal Peace (final amended version)", drafted by the delegates of both sides, and that night the PLA launched the Cross-the-River Campaign as planned. P. 138

98 Su Yu (1907-84), a native of Huitong, Hunan Province, was then deputy commander of the PLA Third Field Army. P. 140

99 Zhang Zhen (1914- ), a native of Pingjiang, Hunan Province, was then chief of staff of the PLA Third Field Army. P. 140

100 Tan Zhenlin (1902-83), a native of Youxian, Hunan Province, was then first deputy political commissar of the PLA Third Field Army in 1949. He was elected member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee at the First Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee held in 1956 and member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee held in 1958. He was appointed Vice-Premier of the State Council in 1959. PP. 140, 313

101 As to what the three armies of the Second Field Army should do in the first stage of the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign, the General Front Committee proposed on April 17, 1949, that the Fourth Army of the Second Field Army march east into the Wuhu area, take over the tasks unfulfilled by the troops left behind by the Ninth Army of the Third Field Army, wipe out the enemy troops there and prepare to join the attack on Nanjing, and that the main force of the Third and Fifth Armies of the Second Field Army march to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway. This proposal was approved by the Central Military Commission. In the course of the campaign, however, all the main force of the three armies of the Second Field Army marched to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway and areas to its south, because of the changes on the enemy's side. P. 141

102 The General Front Committee, representing the CPC Central Committee on the Huai-Hai Campaign front, was formed in November 1948. Composed of Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, with Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping as members of its standing committee and Deng Xiaoping as secretary, it assumed unified leadership of the military operations of the East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army, and exercised overall command over affairs on the Huai-Hai front. After the conclusion of the Huai-Hai Campaign, it was instructed by the Central Military Commission, in February 1949, to continue exercising command over military affairs and operations in the Central Plains and East China areas, and lead the Second and Third Field Armies and the advance army of the Fourth Field Army in the campaign to cross the Yangtze. P. 141

103 On June 30, 1949, in the light of historical experience and the current situation, Mao Zedong explained in his article, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", the foreign
On January 1, 1949, the Nanjing Kuomintang government, defeated in the civil war which it had launched, proposed to the Chinese Communist Party that peace talks be held. On January 14 the Chinese Communist Party issued a statement agreeing to this proposal and set eight terms as the basis for peace negotiations between the two sides. These terms were: 1. Punish the war criminals. 2. Abolish the bogus constitution. 3. Abolish the bogus "constituted authority". 4. Reorganize all reactionary troops on democratic principles. 5. Confiscate bureaucrat-capital. 6. Reform the land system. 7. Abrogate treasonable treaties. 8. Convene a political consultative conference without the participation of reactionary elements, and form a democratic coalition government to take over all the powers of the reactionary Nanjing Kuomintang government and of its subordinate governments at all levels. In April of the same year, the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party and the delegation of the Nanjing Kuomintang government held peace negotiations and formulated the "Agreement on Internal Peace (final amended version)", based on the eight terms. The agreement, consisting of twenty-four articles in eight sections, was rejected by the Nanjing Kuomintang government on April 20.

Chen Yi (1901-72), a native of Lezhi, Sichuan Province, was then commander and political commissar of the PLA Third Field Army.

The Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign was a decisive campaign against Kuomintang troops fought by the PLA Northeast Field Army in western Liaoning Province and in the Shenyang-Changchun area between September 12 and November 2, 1948. During this campaign 470,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out and the whole of the northeast was liberated. This victory plus victories on other battlefields during the same period brought about a fundamental change in the military situation of the country, so that the PLA, which for a long time had been superior in quality, now became superior in number as well.

The Huai-Hai Campaign was a decisive campaign fought between November 6, 1948 and January 10, 1949 by the PLA East China and Central Plains Field Armies and part of the local armed forces from the East China and Central Plains Military Areas and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Sub-area of the North China Military Area against Kuomintang troops over a large territory, centring on Xuzhou and extending as far as Haizhou in the east, Shangqiu in the west, Lincang (now Xuecheng) in the north and the Huaihe River in the south. During the campaign a total of 550,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out, and a vast area north of the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River was liberated. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek lost all his crack forces, while Nanjing, the centre of reactionary Kuomintang rule, as well as Shanghai and Wuhan, fell under direct threat from the People's Liberation Army.

The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign was a decisive campaign fought between November 29, 1948 and January 31, 1949, by the PLA Northeast Field Army, two armies of the North China Field Army and part of local armed forces against Kuomintang troops over an area extending from Zhangjiakou in the west to Tanggu and Tangshan in the east, including Beiping and Tianjin. The People's Liberation Army wiped out the defending Kuomintang forces in Xinchuan, Zhangjiakou and Tianjin. Owing to efforts to win them over and as a result of negotiations, the defending enemy forces in Beiping, commanded by Fu Zuoyi, commander-in-chief of the enemy's North China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, accepted reorganization by the PLA, and Beiping was liberated peacefully. During the campaign more than 520,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out or reorganized, and North China was liberated in the main.

John Leighton Stuart (1876-1962), an American, was born in Hangzhou, China. He was appointed U.S. ambassador to the Chinese Kuomintang government in July 1946. In April 1949, when Nanjing was liberated, he remained there to observe developments and left China in August of the same year.
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110 The policy of the “four contradictions involving eight sides” was the economic policy of “giving consideration to both public and private interests, benefiting both labour and capital, encouraging mutual co-operation between urban and rural areas and promoting trade between China and other countries”, put forth by Mao Zedong. It is so called because it involves eight sides whose interests are poised in four conflicting relationships.

111 A reference to the forces planted and fostered by Chiang Kai-shek in Guizhou Province.

112 The Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (the Common Programme for short), adopted at its First Plenary Session on September 29, 1949, was a programme for China’s reconstruction. It was drawn up jointly, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, by representatives of all the democratic parties, mass organizations and people from all China’s nationalities and from all walks of life. It laid down the common goals which the entire Chinese people would strive to attain within a fixed period and constituted the political foundation for unity in action. It served as a provisional constitution before China promulgated “The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” in 1954.

113 Wang Jialie (1893-1966), a native of Tongzi, Guizhou Province, was the Kuomintang governor of Guizhou Province and a principal representative of the local forces in Guizhou. He was transferred out of Guizhou in 1935, when troops under Chiang Kai-shek’s direct command entered the province. In July 1949 he was offered the post of deputy director of the Kuomintang government’s Guizhou Pacification Headquarters, but he did not take up the position. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, he became a member of the Southwest Military and Administrative Commission and vice-chairman of the Guizhou Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

114 Song Renqiong (1909–), a native of Liuyang, Hunan Province, was then political commissar of the Fourth Army of the PLA Second Field Army.

115 The local conference of representatives from all circles was a form of popular participation in government affairs in early post-liberation days. The representatives were chosen, invited, decided upon through consultation or elected. Prior to the convening of the local people’s congress at different levels, the conference first served as a consultative organ for the local people’s government to propagate its policies to the masses and maintain links with them, and later it exercised the functions and powers of the local people’s congress at the various levels. When the conference is not in session, its consultative committee assisted the people’s government in implementing the conference’s resolutions and took charge of preparations for the convening of the next conference.

116 A reference to the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. On July 16, 1949, the Central Committee decided that Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng, He Long and others form the bureau, which was officially set up on November 23, with Deng Xiaoping serving as first secretary, Liu Bocheng as second and He Long as third secretary.

117 A reference to the official newspaper of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Its publication began in Chongqing on December 10, 1949, and ended on August 31, 1954.

118 The People’s Victory Parity Bonds in Kind (their par value was calculated on the basis of the prices of daily necessities) was floated by the Central People’s Government in January 1950 for the purpose of achieving complete victory in the War of Liberation, restoring the economy quickly, and stabilizing people’s lives.

119 This call was issued by Mao Zedong during the War of Liberation. The original reads “Let the army advance, production increase and the sense of discipline grow stronger and the revolution will be ever-victorious.”

120 Referring to the old currency circulating at that time. On March 1, 1955, the People’s
Bank of China issued the new currency to replace it. One new yuan is equal to 10,000 old yuan.  

121 Referring to the “Agrarian Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China”, promulgated by the Central People’s Government on June 30, 1950. P. 155

122 The agrarian reform was conducted by the peasants under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in the early days of the People’s Republic, in order to abolish the feudal system of land ownership and bring about peasant land ownership. In June 1950 the Central People’s Government promulgated the “Agrarian Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China”. Beginning that winter, the agrarian reform movement was unfolded in the new liberated areas. By the winter of 1952, the reform was basically complete throughout the country, with the exception of Taiwan Province and some minority nationality areas. About 300 million landless or land-deficient peasants (including those in the old liberated areas) received some 700 million mu (one mu is 0.0667 hectares) of land and other means of production. PP. 155, 175, 177, 191, 194, 285, 292

123 See the “Great Learning” in the Book of Rites by Confucius: Watchful eyes and pointing fingers guarantee strict discipline. P. 155

124 A reference to the rectification movement, conducted within the Chinese Communist Party in 1950. On May 1 of that year, the Party Central Committee issued the “Directive on Conducting a Rectification Movement Throughout the Party and Army”, pointing out that, following the nationwide victory, there was a great increase in Party members, many of whom were weak in ideology, whereas many veteran Party members had become arrogant and prone to authoritarianism. A small number of them had even become corrupt and degenerate and violated the law and rules of discipline. The entire Party membership were required to carry out a rectification movement in close conjunction with various other tasks, by adopting the following methods: studying selected documents, summing up work results, analysing the situation and conducting criticisms and self-criticisms, in order to rectify the Party membership’s work style, in general, and that of the leading cadres, in particular. P. 157

125 The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Yan’an from April 23 to June 11, 1945. At the congress Mao Zedong delivered a political report entitled “On Coalition Government”, Zhu De delivered a military report entitled “The Battlefront of the Liberated Areas”, Liu Shaoqi presented a “Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution”, and Zhou Enlai made an important speech entitled “On the United Front”. The congress decided that the Party’s line would be “boldly to mobilize the masses and expand the people’s forces so that, under the leadership of our Party, they will defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate all the people of China and build a new-democratic China”. The congress also adopted a new Party Constitution and elected a new Central Committee. The new Party Constitution defined Mao Zedong Thought — the integration of the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution — as the guide for all the work of the Chinese Communist Party. The congress was one of unity and victory, which laid the foundation for nationwide victory in the new-democratic revolution. PP. 157, 212, 217, 257, 260, 333

126 The “three check-ups and three improvements” movement for Party consolidation and ideological education in the army was carried out by the Chinese Communist Party in conjunction with the agrarian reform during the War of Liberation. In the localities, the “three check-ups” meant checking on class origin, ideology and work style; in the army units, the check-ups were on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight. The “three improvements” meant organizational consolidation, ideological education and rectification of work style. P. 157

127 The labour contractor system, or labour monopoly system, was a system of exploitation by middlemen, characteristic of feudal monopoly in employer-employee relations in old China. Most feudal labour contractors were chiefs of secret societies, local ruffians or
hooligans. In collaboration with local authorities, they controlled certain trades, monopolized the hiring of labour, and cruelly exploited and enslaved the labourers. Kuomintang secret agents also controlled and used labour contractors in their service. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the labour contractor system was gradually abolished through the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries and other democratic reform movements.

P. 159

128 The supply system was a distribution system applied during the revolutionary war years and in the early days of the People's Republic, whereby the primary means of subsistence were distributed on a roughly equal basis to work personnel of Party and government organizations and mass organizations, and to officers and men in army units. After 1950 the supply system was for the most part changed to a system of payment partly in kind and partly in cash — by converting some basic supply items, such as clothing and meals, into money. By 1955 both the supply system and the system of payment partly in kind and partly in cash had been changed to the wage system.

P. 165

129 The minority nationalities in Yunnan are generally divided into several branches, each branch having its own name. The number given here includes different branches of the same nationality. At present 25 minority nationalities have been confirmed in Yunnan Province by the state, following identification and classification.

P. 167

130 Xikang was originally a province. After the Qamdo Region, which was under its jurisdiction, was liberated in October 1950, a people's liberation committee, under the Southwest Military and Administrative Commission, was established. In March 1955 the People's Liberation Committee of the Qamdo Region was placed under the Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region. In October of the same year the Xikang provincial administration was officially abolished and the territory under its jurisdiction incorporated into Sichuan Province.

PP. 168, 194

131 In May 1950, in accordance with the CPC Central Committee's directive and in the light of the actual conditions in Tibet, the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee put forth ten policies for the peaceful resolution of the Tibet issue. After these policies were approved by the Central Committee, they served as terms for negotiation with the Tibetan local government, and they were announced in the proclamation of the Southwest Military and Administrative Commission of the People's Republic of China and the Southwest Military Command. The main contents were: The Tibetan people shall unite in order to drive British and U.S. imperialist aggressive forces out of Tibet; regional national autonomy shall be exercised in Tibet; the present political systems in Tibet shall be maintained as they are and remain intact, with the position and powers of the Living Buddha, the Dalai Lama, remaining intact and officials at various levels continuing to hold office; a policy of freedom of religious belief shall be carried out, lamaseries shall be protected and the religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected; the present military system in Tibet shall remain intact and the Tibet troops shall become part of the national defence forces of the People's Republic of China; the Tibetan people's spoken and written language and school education shall be developed; agriculture, animal husbandry, industry and commerce in Tibet shall be developed in order to improve the people's living standards; matters of reform in Tibet shall be settled by the Tibetan people and Tibetan leaders through consultation and in strict conformity with the will of the Tibetan people; so far as former pro-British, pro-American and pro-Kuomintang officials are concerned, provided that they sever relations with British and American imperialists and the Kuomintang and commit no acts of sabotage or resistance, they shall continue to hold office without being censured for their past misdeeds; and the People's Liberation Army shall enter Tibet in order to consolidate national defence.

P. 168

132 A reference to the experience gained in establishing the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on May 1, 1947, in accordance with the Chinese Communist Party's policy of equality
among nationalities and of regional national autonomy. P. 171

133 In April 1942 the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government established a Hui nationality autonomous area consisting of the fourth and fifth districts of Dingbian County and two natural villages of Chengguan Town. In September of the same year it established a Hui nationality autonomous area in Sancha Town, Quzi County. The text here refers to the experience gained in these localities. P. 171

134 Bod means the Tibetan nationality in the Tibetan language, so the Bod government means the Tibetan government. When the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army passed through Xikang, the local Tibetan people established a "Bod government". P. 171

135 In 1906 (the thirty-second year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty), when Zhao Erfeng became the minister of frontier affairs in Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, he abolished the tusi system of appointing minority nationality hereditary chieftains and set up counties to facilitate administration of these two provinces. After the Revolution of 1911 some chieftains in eastern Xikang regained their power and the system of counties was retained in name only. In 1939 Xikang Province was officially established and divided into counties. P. 171

136 The Dongzang Democratic Youth League was a progressive youth organization led by the Working Committee of the Xikang-Tibet Border Area of the Chinese Communist Party (an underground Party organization in Batang). It was established in November 1949 and did a lot of useful work helping the People's Liberation Army to liberate this area. In April 1950 members of the League became members of the Chinese New-Democratic Youth League. P. 172

137 After the founding of the People's Republic of China, in order to guarantee equal rights to minority nationalities in local organs of political power, democratic coalition governments of the local nationalities were established in some areas inhabited by several minority nationalities in accordance with the fundamental spirit of the nationality policy contained in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. On December 29, 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai signed and issued the "Directive of the State Council on Modifying Democratic Coalition Governments of Local Nationalities", changing the counties and townships under the jurisdiction of such governments into autonomous counties and townships of nationalities or ordinary counties and townships and changing the prefectures and districts into autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties or prefectural commissioners' offices and district offices. P. 172

138 The delegation sent by the Central Government here refers to the one sent to visit minority nationality areas in the southwest from July 1950 through March 1951. P. 176

139 Duan Junyi, born in 1910, a native of Fanxian County (now part of Henan Province), Shandong Province, was then director of the Department of Industry under the Southwest Military and Administrative Commission. Cai Shufan (1905-58), a native of Han yang, Hubei Province, was then director of the Department of Labour under the Southwest Military and Administrative Commission and director of the Southwest Office of All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Zhang Linzhi (1908-67), a native of Nangong, Hebei Province, was then secretary of Chongqing Municipal Party Committee and deputy director of the Southwest Office of All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Yu Jiangzhen (1912-67), a native of Xichong, Sichuan Province, was then deputy director of the Department of Organization of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. P. 177

140 This session was held by the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Xibaipo Village, Jianping County (which became part of Pingshan County in 1958), Hebei Province, from March 5 through 13, 1949. Mao Zedong delivered a report at the session. The session discussed such topics as total defeat of the Kuomintang regime to achieve nationwide victory, the shift in emphasis in Party work from the countryside to the city and
the necessity of making production and construction the central tasks. It analysed the situation in different sectors of China's economy and what policies the Party ought to adopt. It determined the general tasks and main course for transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a new-democratic into a socialist society after nationwide victory was achieved.

141 In old China, people who rented land, houses or other property had to pay security money in advance for their tenancy. According to the usual practice, this security money should be returned to the leaseholder at the termination of the tenancy. However, relying on their power and position, more often than not landlords refused to return the money under one pretext or another. In the early days of the People's Republic of China when the reduction of interest rates and agrarian reform were being carried out, more and more peasants demanded that landlords reimburse the money. The Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government decided that landlords return all security money received in the past, but in practice, some peasants received total reimbursement, others received it in instalments, in some cases it was delayed or reduced and in others no reimbursement was made at all, depending on actual conditions.


143 Ibid., p. 364.

144 Ibid., p. 365.

145 Ibid., p. 365.

146 The movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries was launched throughout China from 1950 through 1953. In the early years of the People's Republic, there were still many counter-revolutionaries, such as bandits, local tyrants, secret agents, hard-core members of reactionary parties and other organizations and chieftains of reactionary secret societies, who engaged in all kinds of sabotage against the people's revolutionary and construction programme. In order to rapidly establish and consolidate revolutionary order, the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries was launched nationwide in accordance with the "Directive on Suppressing Counter-revolutionary Activities", issued by the CPC Central Committee, and the "Regulations of the People's Republic of China Regarding Punishment of Counter-revolutionaries", promulgated by the Central People's Government. The movement dealt a severe blow to the remaining counter-revolutionary forces and consolidated the people's democratic dictatorship.

147 In February 1951 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued an inner-Party "Directive on Further Improving United Front Work", in which it analysed the unprecedentedly extensive and intensive development of the people's democratic united front and called on the entire Party membership to take advantage of all favourable factors to further expand the people's democratic united front. At the same time it outlined the main task for united front work in 1951 and criticized some Party cadres because they were not enthusiastic enough about united front work.

148 The December 12th Incident of 1936 is also known as the Xi'an Incident. It occurred during a critical period when the Japanese imperialists were stepping up their aggression to colonize China. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang Northeastern Army, headed by General Zhang Xueliang, and its 17th Route Army, headed by General Yang Hucheng, influenced and encouraged by the Chinese Communist Party's Anti-Japanese National United Front policy and the people's anti-Japanese movement, demanded that Chiang Kai-shek stop the civil war and unite against Japan. Chiang not only refused to comply but hurried to Xi'an to actively prepare for "suppressing the Communists". On December 12, 1936, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng took joint action and detained Chiang Kai-shek in Lintong, near Xi'an. This
became known as the Xi'an Incident. After this incident the pro-Japanese faction in the Kuomintang, headed by He Yingqin, intended to exploit this opportunity to launch a large-scale civil war, get rid of Chiang Kai-shek and put themselves in his place. The Chinese Communist Party insisted that the incident be settled peacefully. Thanks to the arduous efforts of representatives of the CPC, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu (Qin Bangxiang) and Ye Jianying, and the efforts of Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, the Xi'an Incident was resolved peacefully, thus facilitating the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. P. 190

Immediately after the outbreak of a civil war in Korea on June 25, 1950, the U.S. imperialists sent troops to invade Korea and at the same time dispatched troops to invade China's territory of Taiwan. On September 15, under the banner of the United Nations Forces, their troops landed at Inchon on the west coast of Korea, then crossed the 38th Parallel, the provisional line of demarcation between north and south Korea, and pushed northward en masse, bombing and strafing the frontier cities and villages of northeast China, posing a serious threat to China's security. To support the Korean people in their war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and to defend the newly-born China, the Chinese people, in response to Chairman Mao Zedong's call to resist U.S. aggression, aid Korea and safeguard the homeland, organized the Chinese People's Volunteers with Peng Dehuai as commander and political commissar. The Volunteers arrived at the Korean battlefield and fought shoulder to shoulder with the Korean People's Army against the U.S. aggressors. On November 4, China's democratic parties issued a joint declaration expressing firm support for the Volunteers' just action. The people of China gave all-out support to the war effort in Korea by increasing production and practising economy, signing up for the Volunteers and donating arms. Under the heavy blows of the Chinese and Korean people's armies, the U.S. imperialists suffered one defeat after another and finally had to sign the Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea waged by the Chinese people was crowned with victory. P. 190, 194, 202

A reference to the declaration on resisting U.S. aggression, aiding Korea and safeguarding the homeland issued on November 4, 1950 jointly by the Chinese Communist Party, the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, the China Democratic League, the China Democratic National Construction Association, democrats without party affiliation in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the China Association for Promoting Democracy, the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, the China Zhi Gong Party, the Jiu San Society, the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League and the Chinese New-Democratic Youth League. They condemned the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression against Korea and exposed their plot to invade China, called on peace-loving people all over the world to take positive action to oppose the U.S. imperialists' violent aggression, and reiterated their position that the Korean question must be resolved peacefully and that imperialist aggressors must pull out of Korea. They solemnly declared that all the democratic parties in China pledged to give all-out support to the people throughout the country in their effort to accomplish the sacred task of resisting U.S. aggression, aiding Korea and safeguarding the homeland on a voluntary basis. P. 190

The three factors, generally known as the three magic weapons, were the three basic questions handled correctly by the Chinese Communist Party in leading the new-democratic revolution, namely, the united front, armed struggle and Party building. P. 191

Zhou Xing (1905-75), a native of Yongfeng, Jiangxi Province, was then chief procurator of the Southwest Sub-procuratorate of the Supreme People's Procuratorate and director of the Public Security Department under the Southwest Military and Administrative Commission. P. 196

The Finance and Economy Commission under the Government Administration Council was charged with directing the work of the ministries of finance, trade, heavy industry, fuel industry, textiles industry, food industry, light industry, railways, post and
telecommunications, transportation, agriculture, forestry, land reclamation, water conservancy and labour, as well as the People's Bank and the General Customs Administration. P. 200

154 At that time, the country was divided into six greater administrative areas, namely, North China, the Northeast, the Northwest, East China, the Central-south China, and the Southwest, with a bureau in each representing the CPC Central Committee. After October 1949, when the Central People's Government was formed, each area excepting North China had its own administrative organ. That of the Northeast was called the people's government, while in the other four it was known as the military and administrative commission. In November 1952 the Central People's Government decided that these be all renamed administrative councils, each serving as an agency of the Central People's Government instead of a local government. A council was also established in North China. At an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, held in April 1954, it was decided that the Party and government organs of the greater administrative areas be abolished. P. 200

155 With the “Outline for Study and Propagation of the Party's General Line for the Transition Period” approved by the CPC Central Committee and distributed in December 1953, the line was made known to the entire Party membership. It stated, "The time between the founding of the People's Republic of China and the basic completion of socialist transformation is a period of transition. The Party's general line or task for the transition period is gradually to accomplish the country's socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce over a fairly long period of time. This general line is the beacon illuminating all our work, and wherever we deviate from it, we shall make Right or 'Left' mistakes." PP. 203, 206, 207

156 The Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held from June 6 through 9, 1950, in Beijing. P. 207

157 The “Draft Resolution on Strengthening Party Unity” was drawn up at the suggestion of Mao Zedong and adopted on February 10, 1954, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee. The resolution comprehensively analysed the situation inside the Party, pointing out that a number of cadres, even some senior cadres, did not fully understand the importance of Party unity and had become very dangerously conceited, and exaggerated their role in the Party. The resolution stressed the importance of strengthening Party unity and pointed out that unity of the Party, the working class, other working people and people throughout the country provided the basic guarantee for victory in the revolution. The resolution held that unity of the entire Party hinged on unity of the Central Committee, unity of the leading comrades at and above the level of provincial or municipal Party committee, and unity of the high-ranking comrades of the armed forces. To strengthen Party unity, the resolution included six regulations for the Party's senior cadres to follow. The resolution stressed the need to fully develop democracy and carry out extensive criticism and self-criticism in order to strengthen Party unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. P. 207

158 During his inspection tour of Tianjin from April 10 to May 7, 1949, Liu Shaoqi delivered speeches on several occasions, expounding on the Party's policy relating to the "four contradictions involving eight aspects" and stressing the need to correctly handle relations between the state and private sectors of the economy, labour and capital, foreign and domestic trade, and town and country. He emphasized organizing the working class and changing working methods in rural areas in order to speed up efforts to rehabilitate and develop the national economy. In these speeches, he criticized some "Left" tendencies with regard to the national bourgeoisie, and pointed out the importance of the existence and development of private capitalism under the specific conditions of China at the time. P. 210

159 From 1948 on, Party organizations in north and northeast China successively raised the question of how to deal with Party members who had become rich peasants. Liu Shaoqi believed that it was too early to raise this question, maintaining that resolution of this question should be postponed in favour of restoring and developing agricultural production as quickly
as possible. P. 211

160 In its documents the Chinese Communist Party has always stated clearly that the working class is the leading class in China’s new-democratic revolution and socialist revolution. The formulation that semi-working class was also a leading class only appeared in a few documents issued around the time of the founding of the People’s Republic. Mao Zedong used this formulation when revising the “Regulations of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning Differentiation of Classes in Agrarian Reform and Their Treatment” in February 1948, stating, “The proletariat and the semi-proletariat (poor peasants) are the leading classes in the people’s democratic revolution and in the new-democratic state power, the proletariat being the main leading class.” When discussing requirements for Party membership in his report delivered at the First National Conference of the Chinese Communist Party on Organizational Work held on March 28, 1951, Liu Shaoqi said, “The urban working class and the rural semi-working class, through the Communist Party and under its leadership, staged the revolution, overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and completing agrarian reform.” When the report was officially issued on May 5 of that year, the section on requirements for Party membership was deleted and so was the foregoing quotation. However, in the “Resolution on Consolidating Primary Party Organizations”, drafted in accordance with the report mentioned above, the formulation that “the Chinese revolution was led by the urban working class and the rural semi-working class” was retained. In “Explanation by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Leading Role of the Working Class and the Semi-working Class”, issued in July 1951, that sentence was changed into “the Chinese revolution was led by the urban and rural working class and semi-working class”. Later on, Yin Yigang and Luo Yunlu, who worked in the Party school attached to Hebei Provincial Party Committee, wrote a letter to the Central Committee and Mao Zedong expressing their disagreement with the formulation that the semi-working class was also a leading class. After consulting with Liu Shaoqi and An Ziwen, Mao Zedong agreed to change this formulation. In December 1951, the Central Committee officially issued the “Directive on Revising the Formulation of the Leading Classes in the Chinese Revolution”, pointing out, “Whether speaking of the past or the future, we should say only that the Chinese revolution was led by the working class (through its vanguard the Chinese Communist Party) and that the semi-working class should no longer be included as a leading class.” P. 211

161 A reference to the Culture and Education Commission of the Government Administration Council. P. 215

162 Guo Moruo (1892-1978), a native of Leshan, Sichuan Province, was then Vice-Premier of the Government Administration Council, Minister of the Culture and Education Commission and President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. P. 216


165 The agricultural producers’ co-operatives were collective economic organizations formed at that time by working peasants on their own initiative under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. According to the level of collectivization, they were divided into elementary and advanced agricultural producers’ co-operatives. In the elementary co-operatives, the members held shares representing their portion of the pooled land and exercised unified management, profits were then distributed in proportion to the members’ shares and manpower. The members also received reasonable dividends on shares representing their draught animals, farm implements and other means of production which they pooled. In the advanced co-operatives, the members were not compensated for the use of land, which belonged to the collective; their draught animals, farm implements and other means of
production were appraised and paid for before being turned over to the co-operative, and distribution was then made strictly according to one's work. P. 223

166 A reference to the countrywide movement to eliminate hidden counter-revolutionaries conducted from July 1955 to the end of 1957. P. 224

167 The Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held from February 6 to 10, 1954, in Beijing. At the session Liu Shaoqi delivered the "Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee" and Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping also spoke. The session affirmed the achievements scored in all fields of endeavour since the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, approved the Party's general line for the transition period put forth by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, approved the decision on holding the National Party Conference, and discussed the outline of the First Five-Year Plan and other relevant questions. At the session participants exposed and criticized the plot of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi to split the Party and usurp supreme Party leadership and state power. They also adopted the "Resolution on Strengthening the Party's Unity", drafted at the suggestion of Mao Zedong, which served to preserve and strengthen Party solidarity and unity. P. 230


169 When the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party discussed the reform of Party and state leadership in August 1980, Deng Xiaoping proposed to institute the system of the factory director or manager assuming full responsibility under the collective leadership of the Party committee, step by step in a planned way. On October 20, 1984, the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee of the CPC adopted the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Reforming the Economic Structure", which stipulated that enterprises adopt the system whereby the factory director or manager assumes full responsibility. Party organizations in enterprises should support factory directors in exercising their authority to manage production and operation, guarantee and supervise the implementation of the principles and policies of the Party and the state, strengthen the Party's ideological and organizational work in enterprises, improve their leadership over trade unions and Communist Youth League organizations and do effective ideological and political work among workers and staff. It also called for strengthening the system of congresses of workers and staff and various forms of democratic management as well as giving full play to the functions and powers of trade union organizations and workers' and staffs representatives in examining the major policy decisions of enterprises, supervising the administrative leadership and protecting the legitimate rights and interests of workers and staff. P. 233


171 Gao Gang was formerly a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, vice-chairman of the Central People's Government, secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee, chairman of the Northeast Administrative Council, and chairman of the State Planning Commission. Rao Shushi was formerly a member of the Central Committee, a member of the Central People's Government, first secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee, chairman of the East China Administrative Council, and head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee. In 1953 these two men plotted to split the Party and usurp supreme Party leadership and state power. In February 1954, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee they were exposed and criticized. In March 1955, the National Conference of the Chinese Communist Party, summing up the experience of this major struggle, adopted a resolution to expel them from the Party. P. 239

172 The Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Beijing
from September 15 to 27, 1956. It analysed the situation following the basic completion of the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production, and laid down the task of the all-round building of socialism. Mao Zedong made an opening address, Liu Shaoqi delivered a political report, Zhou Enlai gave the "Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy", Deng Xiaoping gave the "Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China", and other important speeches were made by Zhu De, Chen Yun and Dong Biwu. The congress adopted the "Resolution on the Political Report", the "Constitution of the Communist Party of China" and the "Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62) for the Development of the National Economy", and elected the new Central Committee. The Eighth National Congress of the Party defined a correct line which pointed out the direction for the development of the socialist cause and for the building of the Party. PP. 256, 259, 267, 297, 340

173 The Right opportunistic mistakes refer to the Right capitulationist mistakes represented by Chen Duxiu in 1927. The three times of "Left" opportunistic mistakes refer to the error of "Left" putchism represented by Qu Qiubai during the period from November 1927 to April 1928, the error of "Left" adventurism represented by Li Lisan from June to September 1930, and the error of "Left" adventurism represented by Wang Ming during the period between January 1931 and the Zunyi Meeting held in January 1935. PP. 260, 336

174 A figurative way of describing the classification of capital construction projects made by planning departments when working out the allocation of investment. "Bone" projects refer to industrial and transport projects and "flesh" projects refer to support facilities such as a network of facilities for scientific research, culture, education, public health, service network, housing, and other urban public utilities needed by workers and other employees in production and their daily lives. P. 264


176 Ibid, p. 783. P. 269

177 "Greater democracy" and "lesser democracy" were satirical terms quoted and explained by Mao Zedong in his speech delivered at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in November 1956. He criticized the erroneous views of some people who advocated greater democracy. They said lesser democracy was not enough and wanted to practise Western bourgeois democracy in China. In his speech Mao also used "greater democracy" to refer to large-scale mass struggle or disturbance. The "greater democracy" used here refers to large-scale unrest and disturbance. The "lesser democracy" refers to the conscientious implementation of the democratic system stipulated in China's Constitution which respects and guarantees the people's right to freely air their views and other democratic rights. P. 270

178 A reference to the political events that took place in Hungary in October and November 1956. P. 270

179 A reference to the events which occurred in Poznan, Poland, in June 1956. P. 270


181 On January 12, 1960, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a directive in reply to a question submitted by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League as to the wording for the movement to study Mao Zedong's works. The Central Committee pointed out in the reply that it would be appropriate to say "Study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's works" in this movement for young people. It went on to state that the study of Marxism-Leninism and the study of Mao Zedong Thought should not be mentioned separately, lest it give the impression that Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought were two different things. The directive noted that Mao Zedong Thought itself was Marxism-Leninism and, moreover, a major development of Marxism-Leninism.

182 Hu Yaobang (1915-89), a native of Liuyang, Hunan Province, was then first secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League.

183 A reference to the mistakes made during the "Great Leap Forward" and the movement to establish people’s communes in 1958. These mistakes consisted chiefly of the following: denying differences between individual production teams, bringing rich and poor teams to the same level and carrying out equal distribution within a commune; accumulating too much for common funds and expending too much voluntary labour; and trampling on the principle of exchange at equal value and requisitioning some property of production teams and commune members without compensation.

184 In August 1957 when the secretariat of the CPC Central Committee discussed the work report to be delivered at the Third National Women's Congress, Deng Xiaoping suggested that practising diligence and thrift in managing the household as well as building the country and working hard for socialist construction be the long-term policy for women's work. His suggestion was unanimously endorsed by the Secretariat and approved by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

185 The movement against the "three evils" (corruption, waste and bureaucracy) was carried out from the end of 1951 to October 1952 in government departments, army units and state enterprises.

186 The movement against the "five evils" (bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing of economic information) was launched nationwide in 1952 in capitalist industrial and commercial enterprises.

187 A reference to Liu Shaoqi's written report submitted to this enlarged working conference on behalf of the CPC Central Committee. It was included in the Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, Vol. II.

188 A Reference to the speech Mao Zedong delivered at the enlarged working conference of the Central Committee on January 30, 1962. It was published on July 1, 1978. The Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong, published in 1986, contained the first, second, fourth and sixth points of his speech.

189 During the Long March in June 1935, the Red Army's First Front Army joined forces with the Fourth Front Army in Maogong (now Xiaojin), Sichuan Province. At the time the CPC Central Committee had decided on the strategy of marching northward to establish the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base area. Zhang Guotao, who was then working in the Fourth Front Army, denied the possibility of establishing a base area in the north and stood for heading south and retreating to the border area of Sichuan and Xikang. He tried hard to obstruct the implementation of the policy of marching northward. The two conflicting policies of marching south and marching north had a vital bearing on the entire revolution and on the destiny of the Red Army, so its commanders and fighters became gravely concerned over them.

190 See "The Situation in the Summer of 1957" (July 1957).


192 In August 1958, during the "Great Leap Forward" movement, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged meeting at which it was decided that the steel output in 1958 should be double that of the previous year. Immediately after the meeting, the mass movement to produce more iron and steel was launched on a national scale. Meanwhile, large-scale, national campaigns were begun in transport, post and telecommunications, education, culture, public health and other fields of endeavour. This series of
"large-scale campaigns", spurred by the mass movement to make more iron and steel, pushed the "Great Leap Forward" to a high tide, only to bring about a severe imbalance in the principal sectors of the national economy and inflict gross losses to the socialist economy.

193 The directive was issued on June 15, 1961.

194 A reference to the "Report on the Discussion of the Readjustment Plan for 1962", submitted to the CPC Central Committee on April 30, 1962. In the report the Group analysed the basic situation of the national economy at the time, truthfully demonstrated the severe difficulties in the economy and put forward three important policy decisions: 1) To readjust the national economy on a large scale. 2) To work for a quick turn but expect a slow fundamental change for the better in the financial and economic situation. 3) To resolutely curtail industrial production and construction, continue to reduce workers and other employees as well as the urban population, and devote every effort to boosting agricultural production. It also proposed concrete measures for carrying out these decisions. The report was discussed at the working conference of the Central Committee held in May 1962, and on May 26 it was promulgated by the Central Committee throughout the Party for implementation.

195 A reference to the "Circular of the CPC Central Committee on Speeding Up the Work of Re-examining Party Members and Cadres" issued on April 27, 1962. It was pointed out in the circular, "All Party members and cadres, who were criticized or punished unjustifiably or more or less unjustifiably in the movements to bring down the 'white banner', to combat Right deviation, to rectify the work style of cadres, to consolidate the communes, and to accomplish the tasks that should have been accomplished during the democratic revolution, should be re-examined and rehabilitated quickly and conscientiously by using simplified methods." The re-examination and rehabilitation served to arouse the initiative of vast numbers of Party members and cadres, and unite the entire Party membership and the people throughout the country in restoring and increasing industrial and agricultural production and overcoming temporary difficulties.

196 The conference referred to here was convened in Beijing from January 11 to February 7, 1962. It was attended by more than seven thousand persons — leading members of the Central Committee and its bureaus; leading members of Party committees of the various provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, prefectures and counties; leading members of Party committees of major factories, mines and other enterprises; and leading cadres from army units. It was also known as the Conference of Seven Thousand Participants. At the conference Liu Shaoqi, on behalf of the Central Committee, delivered a report in which he made a preliminary review of the experience and the lessons learned since the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958, analysed the major shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the previous years, and pointed out that the major task facing the entire Party was readjustment. Mao Zedong delivered an important speech at the conference, in which he particularly expounded on the system of democratic centralism, calling for full exercise of democracy both inside and outside the Party and for analysis of the experience, both positive and negative, in order to deepen people's understanding of the laws governing socialist development. He also made a self-criticism, bearing responsibility for the shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the previous years.

197 A reference to premature communization, exaggeration and boastfulness, authoritarianism, cadres seeking privileges, and giving arbitrary orders for production, which prevailed during the "Great Leap Forward" and people's commune movement.

198 The "five unifications" constituted a way of managing agricultural production practised in some rural areas of China in the early years of the 1960s. The main factors were unified deployment of the collectively owned means of production, labour force and farm cattle; unified production planning; unified use of fertilizers; unified harvesting; and unified
distribution of crops. On this basis, major farm work was done collectively, while individuals were responsible for other farm work.

199 During the working conference held in Beidaihe by the CPC Central Committee from late July to late August 1962, Mao Zedong erroneously criticized the production responsibility system under which farm output quotas were fixed for each household and which was adopted in some rural areas at the time and suited the development of the productive forces. P. 318

200 The Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Beijing from September 24 to 27, 1962. At the session it was pointed out that the entire Party was confronted with the following urgent task: to continue to do a good job in readjusting, consolidating, filling out and raising the standards of the national economy by implementing the general principle of taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor in developing the national economy. The "Decision on Further Consolidating the Collective Economy of the People’s Commune and Developing Agricultural Production”, "Regulations on Work in the Rural People’s Communes (Revised Draft)”, “Resolution on Questions Concerning Commercial Work” and other documents were adopted at the session. Mao Zedong spoke on the questions of classes, the overall situation, the contradictions in China at the time, and unity within the Party. He spoke in absolute terms about class struggle that still exists within certain scope in socialist society and broadened its scope, expanding on the view he advanced after the anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie remained the principal contradiction in Chinese society. He went a step further and asserted that the bourgeoisie would exist and try to stage a comeback throughout the historical stage of socialism. At the same time, he also pointed out that class struggle should not be stressed at the expense of economic readjustment. At this session the so-called black wind (referring to views demanding full recognition of the serious and difficult situation of that time), the tendency to return to individual farming (referring to the practice of fixing output quotas for each household) and the “evil wind of reversing correct verdicts” (referring to the demand for re-examining and rehabilitating Party members and cadres who had been unjustifiably criticized or punished during the movements after 1958 and to the petition presented by Peng Dehuai to the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong) were all wrongly criticized. P. 326

201 The “Decision on Training of Cadres in Rotation” was issued by the CPC Central Committee on September 15, 1961. According to this decision, “It is most important to launch a new, Party-wide drive for study.” Therefore, the Central Committee decided that all Party cadres holding leading posts at various levels and in various fields should attend, group by group, a short-term training course. The purpose was to help Party cadres better understand and grasp the objective laws governing socialist construction, overcome one-sidedness in their thinking and mistakes in their practical work, conscientiously master a Marxist-Leninist style of work and correct the mistakes of being divorced from both reality and the masses, running counter to Party policies and violating rules of discipline. P. 327


203 A reference to the general line of “going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism” which was proposed by Mao Zedong and adopted at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1958. P. 328

204 During the period of the First Five-Year Plan and in the early period of the Second Five-Year Plan, heavy industry ranked first, followed by light industry and agriculture, in China’s national economic plan. In the early days of the Lushan Meeting held in 1959, Mao Zedong pointed out that, “In the past, heavy industry ranked first, then light industry and agriculture. Now we should reverse the order and put agriculture first and then light industry and heavy industry”. “Heavy industry”, he added, “should serve light industry and agricul-
According to a decision of the CPC Central Committee the six bureaus of the Central Committee, namely, the Northeast, the North China, the Northwest, the Central-south, the Southwest and the East China Bureaus were established in 1960.

Trusts are advanced forms of capitalist monopolies. They combine many enterprises producing the same kind of commodities and those closely related to the marketing of those commodities. In socialist countries, trusts are forms of socialist enterprises. From 1963 to 1964, industrial and transport departments under the Central Government successively established on a trial basis twelve trusts of tobacco, salt, medicine, rubber, aluminium, motor vehicles, textile machinery, geological machinery and instruments, etc.

The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Shanghai on January 7, 1931. Supported by the Communist International and its representative, Mif Pavel, Wang Ming and others took over the leading positions in the Central Committee at this session, thus starting a four-year-long “Left” adventurist rule in the Party.

Chen Shaoyu (1904-74), alias Wang Ming, was a native of Jinjiazhai (now part of Jinzhai County), Lu’an, Anhui Province. He joined the CPC in 1925 and served as member of the Central Committee and its Political Bureau since the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, held in January 1931. From this session to the Zunyi Meeting, held in January 1935, he was the principal exponent of the “Left” adventurist error in the Party. In November 1931 he went to the Soviet Union as the representative of the CPC to the Comintern. He returned to China in November 1937 and attended the meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in December of the same year. After the meeting he served as secretary of the Changjiang Bureau of the Central Committee. When holding this post, he made Right capitulationist mistakes. For a long time he rejected the Party’s criticism and help. He lived in the Soviet Union from 1956 until his death in 1974.

Bo Gu (1907-46), otherwise known as Qin Bangxian, was a native of Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. From September 1931 to January 1935 he served as the principal leader in the provisional central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. During this period he devoted all his efforts to pursuing Wang Ming’s “Left” adventurist line. After the Zunyi Meeting he was dismissed from the top leadership of the Party and Red Army. In the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan he worked in the Changjiang Bureau and the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. After 1941 he founded and then headed the Liberation Daily and the New China News Agency. At the Seventh National Congress of the CPC in 1945 he made a self-criticism of his previous errors and was again elected to the Central Committee. In April 1946 he died in a plane crash.

In December 1937 Wang Ming, who had just returned from the Soviet Union, delivered a report entitled “Continuing the Nationwide War of Resistance and Striving for Victory” at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. In the report he put forth many Right capitulationist views. Afterwards, when he served as secretary of the Changjiang Bureau of the Central Committee, he issued some declarations, resolutions and articles which contained erroneous ideas. His faith in the Kuomintang exceeding his faith in the Communist Party, he dared not fully arouse the masses to struggle or expand the people’s army and the liberated areas in the Japanese-occupied areas. He stood for “everything through the united front”, handing over to the Kuomintang leadership in the War of Resistance Against Japan. As the correct line represented by Mao Zedong was already dominant in the Party at that time, Wang Ming’s errors affected only some areas for a while. The Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, held from September to November 1938, criticized his Right capitulationist errors and established principles and policies for the
Party to exercise independent leadership over the armed struggle against Japan. P. 337

211 The Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Moscow from June 18 to July 11, 1928. Qu Qiubai made a report entitled "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party". Zhou Enlai delivered reports on organizational and military affairs. Liu Bocheng delivered a supplementary military report. Resolutions on political, military and organizational affairs were adopted. The congress affirmed that Chinese society was semi-colonial and semi-feudal and that the Chinese revolution in progress was a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It pointed out that the prevailing political situation represented a trough between two revolutionary high tides, that the revolution was developing unevenly, and that the Party's general task at the time was not to carry out offensives or organize uprisings, but to win over the masses. While criticizing Right opportunism, the congress pointed particularly to putschism, military adventurism and authoritarianism, which resulted from being divorced from the masses, as the most dangerous tendencies inside the Party. The main thrust of the congress was correct, but there were also shortcomings and mistakes. It failed to correctly evaluate the dual character of the intermediate classes and the internal contradictions among the reactionary forces, and to put forward appropriate policies on these questions. It also lacked a proper understanding of the need for an orderly tactical retreat by the Party after the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, of the importance of rural base areas, and of the protracted nature of the democratic revolution. P. 338

212 Ah Q is the leading character in The True Story of Ah Q, the famous novel by the great Chinese writer Lu Xun. Ah Q typifies all those who compensate themselves for their failures and setbacks in real life by regarding them as moral or spiritual victories. P. 21

213 A reference to the system under which neighbours were requested to keep watch on each other's activities and report them to local authorities. PP. 124, 135, 159

214 Cao Cao (A.D. 155-220) was a prominent politician, strategist and poet during the Three Kingdoms period. P. 145
邓小平文选
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